THE ONE GOD
A COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST PART OF
ST. THOMAS’ THEOLOGICAL SUMMA

BY THE

REV. REGINALD GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O.P.

TRANSLATED BY

DOM. BEDE ROSE, O.S.B., S.T.D.

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To

The Holy Mother of God
The Author
Most humbly dedicates this work

as a
Token of Gratitude and
Filial obedience

TRANSLATOR S PREFACE
Theology is the queen of sciences. Many, who are not Catholics,

would seriously dispute this statement, and a considerable number
perhaps would emphatically deny it. Cardinal Newman, in his Idea
of a University, declared and proved that no institution of learning
can rightly call itself a university unless it teaches theology. St.
Thomas Aquinas in the very first question of his admirable Summa
theologica states and proves that theology is nobler than the other
sciences. But his appeal is to men who have the faith, who believe
there is a God who will reward those that seek Him, as St. Paul as­
sures us in equivalent words.
There is a crying need at the present day for the civilized nations
to give up materialism and return to belief in God and acceptance
of His revelation with all that this implies. The words of G. K.
Chesterton uttered twenty years ago read now almost like a proph­
ecy. He said: “The age-long struggle of the Church against heresy,
in the technical sense of the word, is over. But another great strug­
gle is approaching. I may not live to see it. Hell's next attack will be
on that doctrine on which all religion and all morality are based,
the existence of a personal, infinite, and eternal God. That effort
will be accompanied by a mighty effort to sweep away the standards
of Christian purity.” What we are experiencing at the present time
confirms what Chesterton said.
One of the chief purposes of dogmatic theology is to defend the
doctrine of God’s existence and His revelation against all adver­
saries. For all Christians some knowledge of dogmatic theology will
prove most beneficial. A knowledge of theology is also of great im­
portance for the spiritual life, especially for a deepening of the in­
terior life of communion with God. There is at the present time,
even among devout Christians, too much extroversion and too little
introversion. The connection between theology and the interior life
is shown by Father Garrigou-Lagrange in the Introduction to his
commentary on The One God. He points out that there is often too
great a separation between study and prayer. He has in mind those
who believe in the supernatural, and what he says about study ap­
plies not only to theology, but to all branches of knowledge. He
sounds a note of warning about sentimentalism in piety, which con­
sists in a certain affected love that is not accompanied by a true and
deep love for God and souls. Certainly the emotional element in our
v

vi

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

nature has its place in the spiritual life, but it must not be allowed
to be the standard of judgment in spiritual things. St. Theresa con­
versed with good theologians, as she says in her Autobiography, so
as not to stray from the path of truth. She is referring to theologians
who sanctified their study of theology by prayer. What Father
Garrigou-Lagrange says in his Introduction on the relation between
study and prayer is well worth reading. St. Thomas Aquinas real­
ized the importance of prayer in its relation to study. Whenever an
intricate problem presented itself either in theology or in philoso­
phy, he did not spend more time in study, but more time in prayer.
It should not be necessary to stress the importance of the study
of theology for the clergy. Yet it is to be feared that too often among
priests books on dogmatic theology are relegated to the back shelves
of oblivion. After their ordination this branch ol knowledge tends
to become more and more a forgotten science. Undoubtedly a knowl­
edge of dogmatic theology is of great help in preaching, and the rea­
son why some find it difficult to preach is very often that they have
forgotten their dogmatic theology. There is also the danger that
many seminarians may approach the study of dogmatic theology in a
perfunctory manner, viewing it merely as a study required in the
seminary course, but as being of no practical value. Moral theology
and canon law are considered of more importance. These sacred
branches are necessary, but they should never be allowed to usurp
the place of dogmatic theology. It must also be said that the study of
dogmatic theology, and especially a perusal of this manual, will be
of great benefit to the more educated among the laity. How beauti­
fully St. Thomas discusses the mysteries of our faith in his com­
pendious Summa theologica. All the fundamental principles of moral
theology and canon law are to be found in this work of St. Thomas.
There have been many Latin commentaries on the Summa theologica
of St. Thomas, but it is the opinion of the writer of this preface that
there has never been any English translation of any part of any of
die Latin commentaries on the Summa theologica of St. Thomas.
Without a commentary it is often difficult to grasp all that St. Thomas
wishes to convey to the student, since at times he expresses his mind
on certain points with a brevity that contains richness of thought.
It is to be hoped that this English translation of Garrigou-Lagrange’s
Latin commentary on the first twenty-six questions of the Summa
theologica of St. Thomas will appeal to many of the clergy, students
of theology, and the more educated among the laity.
In conclusion I wish to express my deep sense of gratitude to the
Rev. Newton Thompson, S.T.D., for his very careful preparation of
my manuscript for the printer, and also for his many valuable sug­
gestions.

CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

Introduction.................................................................................. i

I.

Sacred Doctrine................................................................ 39

II.

The Existence of God.................................................... 93

III.

God’s Nature and Attributes........................................156

IV.

The Perfection of God................................................... 205

V.
VI.

VII.

On Goodness

in

General............................................ 214

The Goodness of God.................................................. 229

The Infinity

of

God.................................................. 236

VIII.

The Existence of God in Things................................ 253

IX.

The Immutability of God............................................ 268

X.
XI.

XII.

The Eternity
The Unity

of

of

God.................................................. 276

God........................................................ 293

The Knowability of God............................................ 306

God......................................................... 382

XIII.

The Names

XIV.

God’s Knowledge............................................................... 416

XV.

Of Ideas.......................................................................... 476

XVI.

Of Truth.......................................................................... 48°

XVII.

XVIII.
XIX.

of

Of Falsity

The Life
The Will

of

of

.................................................................... 483
God.............................................................. 485
God..............................................................487

XX.

God’s Love.......................................................................... 595

XXL

The Justice and Mercy of God...................................... 606

vii

CONTENTS
XXII.

The Providence

of

God..................................................625

XXIII.

Predestination.............................................................. θ53

XXIV.

The Book

XXV.

XXVI.

of

The Power

Life..................................................... 718

of

God..................................................... 720

Of the Divine Beatitude............................................ 725

Index..........................................................................................

INTRODUCTION
The Importance and Significance of the Theological Summa
of St. Thomas

Since this volume is an explanation of the first part of the Theo­

logical Summa of St. Thomas, it is expedient by way of intro­
duction, first to show the importance or value and the significance
of this work from two points of view, historical and theoretical.
Our reference to the history of theology concerns only those matters
about which one is not allowed to plead ignorance.
i) In the history of theology generally three periods are distin­
guished. First we have the patristic period, which extends from the
first century to the eighth, and this is chiefly apologetic, polemic,
and positive. Then we have the period of the Middle Ages, from the
eighth century to the fifteenth, and this is the scholastic period.
Finally there is the modern period, from the sixteenth century to
the present time, and this period is chiefly positive and critical.
In each successive age the progress of theology is clearly seen,
since, whatever period we take, a certain function of theology comes
particularly into prominence, according to the necessities of the
times. In this evolution we have the manifestation of something
that is truly providential.
Thus in the patristic period, theology is primarily apologetic
(second century) for the conversion of the world from paganism to
Christianity. It afterward becomes chiefly polemic in tone, being
directed particularly against the heresies cropping up within the
fold of the Church, and these heresies, such as Arianism, Nestorian­
ism and Monophysitism, are concerned with the more important
dogmas, such as the Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption. Theol­
ogy must then defend the principles of faith from the very sources
of revelation, namely, from Holy Scripture and tradition. Thus
theology gradually assumes the form which is called positive, that
is, it gathers together the various points of revealed doctrine as con­
tained in Holy Scripture and divine tradition. But a systematic
theology, combining all that is of faith and what is connected with
it, so as to form one body of teaching, did not yet exist in the
patristic period, except in certain works of St. Augustine 1 and St.
John Damascene.2
i Cf. De Trinitate, PL, XLII.
s Cf. De fide orthodoxa, PG, XCV.

2

THE ONE GOD

But in the second period, the Middle Ages, we find systematic or
Scholastic theology definitely established, which didactically and
speculatively expounds and defends what is of faith, and which de­
duces from it theological conclusions. Thus there is gradually
formed a body of teaching which, though subordinate to what is
strictly of faith, includes the science of theology, as it is commonly
accepted in the Church, and which transcends, by reason of its uni­
versality and certainty, the various theological systems more or less
in opposition to one another. In this age the theological Summae
were written, which are so called because each is a complete treatise
on all subjects pertaining to theology, and according as these vari­
ous subjects are considered under the light of the higher principles
of faith and reason.
In the third or modern period, theology again becomes chiefly
both polemic and positive against the Protestants, and apologetic
against the rationalists. We may call this third period critical or
reflexive, and in this period, too, we see clearly the progress made
in theology, since critical reflection normally follows direct knowl­
edge. As St. Thomas says: "human reasoning, by way of seeking
and finding, advances from certain things simply understood,
namely, the first principles; and again, by way of judgment returns
by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines
what it has found.” 3 Thus in this third period, we find developing
a more critical knowledge and defense, against Protestants and
rationalists, of the very foundations of the faith or sources of reve­
lation, namely, Holy Scripture and divine tradition, and as a result
of this we have the fundamental treatises on revelation, the Church,
the de locis (theological sources), this last being a scientific method
of sacred theology.
In this we readily see the progress made in theology which, like
a tree, grows and is perpetually renewed as a result of the more
diligent efforts made in acquiring a knowledge of the sources, these
being, as it were, the roots from which it proceeds.
2) We should note in the history of theology three brilliant
epochs, each following immediately the close of an ecumenical
council. Thus, after the First Council of Nicaea (325) against
Arianism, in the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth
century the greater Fathers of the Church flourished. In the East,
in the Greek Church, we have St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Gregory
of Nazianzus, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, and St.
Cyril of Alexandria. In the West we have St. Hilary, St. Ambrose,
St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and St. Leo the Great.
Similarily, in the second epoch, after the Fourth Lateran Council,
» Summa theol·, la, q.79, a.8.

INTRODUCTION

3

held in the year 1215 against the Albigenses and Waldensians, the
thirteenth century saw the rise of the great theologians St. Albert
the Great, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas.
Finally, the third brilliant epoch in the history of theology is
at the time of the Council of Trent (1545-63). Even before this
time there had been some celebrated theologians, such as Cajetan
and Sylvester of Ferrara, and during the period of the council and
afterward we have Soto, Bannez, Tolet, Medina, the Salmanticenses,
John of St. Thomas, and Suarez in speculative theology. But all
these theologians are commentators of the Summa of St. Thomas,
even Suarez, although he pursues his own eclectic method. During
the same period Cano, St. Robert Bellarmine, Natalis Alexander,
and Bossuet are prominent in the art of controversy; and in exegesis
we have Maldonatus, Cornelius a Lapide, and others.
In like manner, after the Vatican Council (1869-70) there is a
revival of theology in the works of Joseph Kleutgen, S.J., Scheeben,
Schwane, Hefele; and in the revival of Thomism we have Sanseverino, Cornoldi, S.J., Zigliara, O.P., and others. In several of his
encyclicals, especially in the Aeterni Patris (1879), Leo XIII highly
recommends the doctrine of St. Thomas.
From the fact that these three golden ages of sacred theology
follow in the wake of ecumenical councils, it is seen how the Holy
Spirit directs, by the living voice of the authoritative teaching of
the Church, the progressive knowledge of dogmatic truths with
regard to those matters that are of faith, and the progress of theol­
ogy in questions subordinate to faith. For God, by His special provi­
dence, watches over His science, that is, theology, which in the
strict sense is the science of God proceeding from divine revela­
tion. On the other hand, in these three generally accepted periods
preparations were somehow made for the ecumenical councils then
held by reason of the inquiries of the theologians during these
times of preparation. Thus human labor is the disposing cause, and
God assisting the Church teaching is the principal cause, of the
progressive understanding of dogma in matters of faith, and also in
consequence of this of the progress itself made in theology.
3) It is to be observed that in each of these three periods there
is a time of preparation, a time of splendor, and a stationary time
when compendiums and compilations make their appearance.
Finally, there is the period of more or less pronounced decline, as
in the seventh, the fourteenth, and the eighteenth centuries.
In the time ol splendor, the wonderful harmony in the various
functions of theology is p trticularly in evidence, a harmony which
the human mind cannot attain suddenly. Generali} speaking, dur­
ing the time of preparation there are two tendencies to some extent

4

THE ONE GOD

opposed to each other, because of a certain excess in each càsé.
Some, for instance, exaggerate the necessity of speculation, as the
Alexandrian school does; others devote themselves exclusively to the
positive study of Holy Scripture, as the school of Antioch does.
Likewise, in the Middle Ages, in the twelfth century, Abélard,
assigning too much to the role of reason, falls into many errors,
while, on the other hand, several of the school of St. Victor stress
too much the mystic element and do not rely sufficiently upon
reason.
Contrary to this, in the golden age, especially in the thirteenth
century, the doctors succeed in effecting a marvelous reconciliation
between the various functions of theology, which is then perfected
in its positive, speculative, and even affective aspects. For we then
see all the great theologians writing commentaries on Holy Scrip­
ture; they have a profound knowledge of the teaching of the Fathers,
and they are conspicuous for their wisdom or exalted perception
of the mysteries that are most productive of fruit in the Christian
life.
This we see is the case in the thirteenth century, in which we
detect notable differences as to genius, inclination, and method
among the greater theologians.
Thus St. Bonaventure in his works is generally faithful to the
teaching of St. Augustine. His preference is for Platonic instead
of Aristotelian philosophy, giving precedence to the will over the
intellect, and he devotes himself more to mystic contemplation than
to speculative theology. At the same time St. Albert the Great, who is
profoundly versed in philosophical subjects, purges Aristotelian
philosophy of the errors injected into it by the Arabian commenta­
tors and accommodates it to the uses of theology as an instrument
that is more precise and exact than Platonic philosophy.
Finally, St. Thomas completed what St. Albert had begun. He
showed the value of the foundations of Aristotelian philosophy with
regard to first ideas and first principles of reason, as also in deter­
mining the constitutive principles of both natural things and hu­
man nature. Thus he determines more accurately what is the proper
object of our intellect and hence what absolutely transcends our
natural knowledge, and even the natural knowledge of any created
intellect. Better, therefore, than any of his predecessors, St. Thomas
distinguished between natural reason and supernatural faith,
though he showed how they are interrelated. With wonderful
logical order he expounded the various parts of theology according
as it treats of God as He is in Himself, how all things proceed from
Him, and how He is the final end of all things. Thus he collected

INTRODUCTION

5

all the theological material so as to form one body of doctrine, and
this he did by a display of qualities rarely united in one individual,
namely, with great simplicity as well as profundity of thought, and
also with great rigor of logic as well as with a deep sense of the
inaccessibility of the mystery. Therefore his doctrine was praised in
the highest terms by the Supreme Pontiffs. Leo XIII wrote as
follows: "Among the scholastic doctors, the chief and master of all,
towers Thomas Aquinas, who, as Cajetan observes,4 because ‘he
most venerated the ancient doctors of the Church, in a certain way
seems to have inherited the intellect of all.’ The doctrines of those
illustrious men, like the scattered members of a body, Thomas
collected together and cemented, distributed in wonderful order,
and so increased with important additions that he is rightly and
deservedly esteemed the special bulwark and glory of the Catholic
faith. . . .
"Moreover, the Angelic Doctor pushed his philosophic con­
clusions into the reasons and principles of the things which are
most comprehensive and contain in their bosom, so to say, the seeds
of almost infinite truths, to be unfolded in good time by later
masters and with a goodly yield. And as he also used this philo­
sophic method in the refutation of error, he won the title to dis­
tinction for himself: that single-handed he victoriously combated
the errors of former times, and supplied invincible arms to rout
those which might in after times spring up.
"Again, clearly distinguishing, as is fitting, reason from faith,
while happily associating the one with the other, he both preserved
the rights and had regard for the dignity of each; so much so, in­
deed, that reason, borne on the wings of Thomas to its human
height can scarcely rise higher, while faith could scarcely expect
more or stronger aids from reason than those which she has already
obtained through Thomas.” 6
In the same encyclical various testimonies of the Sovereign
Pontiffs are quoted, and we would draw especial attention to the
crowning point of these, which is the judgment by Innocent VI,
who writes: “His teaching above that of others, the canons alone
excepted, possesses such an elegance of phraseology, a manner of
statement, and a soundness in its propositions, that those who hold
to it are never found swerving from the path of truth, and he who
dares to assail it will always be suspected of error.” 6 After the
thirteenth century scholastic theology gradually begins to decline,
« Cf. Cajetan, Com. in Summam S. Thomae, Ha Hae, q.148, a.4 in fine. (Tr.j
s Aeterni Patris, Aug. 4. 1879.
• Sermon on Sç. Thomas.

6

THE ONE GOD

just as following the age of the greater Fathers, after the fourth and
fifth centuries, we have that of the minor Fathers, from the sixth
to the eighth centuries.
Even after the beginning of the fourteenth century, John Duns
Scotus in many of his metaphysical questions receded from the
logical method of St. Thomas and established a new school of
thought. Duns Scotus disagrees with St. Thomas on two points.
1) He admits a new distinction, namely, an actual-formal distinc­
tion on the part of the object, which he considers a possible dis­
tinction between the real and the logical, whereas the Thomists say
that distinction either precedes the consideration of the mind, and
is real, or else it does not, and then it is logical. There is no possible
intermediary. Scotus substitutes this formal distinction sometimes
for the real distinction which St. Thomas holds, for instance, be­
tween created essence and existence, between the soul and its
faculties, and between the faculties themselves, and thus he paves
the way for nominalism. But sometimes Scotus tends toward ex­
treme realism, substituting- the formal distinction for the logical
distinction which St. Thomas admits, for instance, between the
divine attributes, and between the various metaphysical grades in
the created being, for instance, between animality, vitality, sub­
stance, and being. Hence being is conceived as univocal, for the
distinction between being and the substance of both God and
creatures is formal, before any consideration of the mind. This new
teaching in metaphysics does not, according to the Thomists, escape
the danger of pantheism; for if the created substance and the divine
substance are outside of being, since they are formally distinguished
from it as objective realities, then they are non-entities, because out­
side of being is not-being; and so there would be but one thing.7
Moreover, by such formalism, Scholasticism ends in subtleties and
a war of words.
2) Voluntarism is another innovation introduced by Scotus. Thus
he maintains that the distinction between the orders of nature and
grace depends upon God’s free will, as if grace were not supernaturally essential, but only actually so. This same voluntarism
makes Scotus affirm that God could have established another nat­
ural moral law regulating the duties among human beings, and
so He could revoke such precepts as "thou shalt not kill, thou
shalt not steal.” Thus Scotus paves the way for the contingency
and positivism of the nominalists of the fourteenth century.8
About the same time Roger Bacon, a prodigy of erudition,
r Cf. Vacant, Etudes comparées sur la philosophie de saint Thomas et sur celle
de Duns Scot, 1891, p. 25.
* Ihid.. pp. 14—16. 19 f.

INTRODUCTION

7

though not free from rash opinions, here and there in his writings
speaks with contempt of Aristotle’s philosophy, and of St. Albert
and St. Thomas, whom he calls children.
Thomas Sutton, O.P., said to be English by birth (I1310), was
one among others who in his commentaries on the four books of
the Sentences wrote in defense of St. Thomas against Scotus. But
Peter Aureolus, O.M., Anthony Andrea, O.M., Richard of Middle­
town, O.M., took up the defense of Scotus’ doctrine, and Gerard
of Bonn, O.D.C., strove to reconcile the opinions of each school.
Throughout the fourteenth century and in the early fifteenth
century, scholastic theology gradually resolved itself into a war of
words, railleries, and useless subtleties. The chief reason for this
decline was the revival of nominalism, which maintains that uni­
versals are mere concepts of the mind or common names. Hence
not even an imperfect knowledge of the nature of things can be
acquired, whether of corporeal things or of the soul and its facul­
ties, or the foundation of the natural law, or the essence of grace
and the essential distinction between it and our nature.
Thus the advocates of nominalism deny the principle that the
faculties, habits, and acts are specified by the formal object. Where­
fore nominalists, especially William Ockham, despising the sound
and lofty doctrine of their predecessors, prepared the downfall of
solid scholastic theology, and prepared for the errors of Luther,
whose teachers in the schools of Wittenberg were nominalists.
In the fifteenth century a revival in scholastic theology began
with John Capreolus, O.P. (11444), who is called the prince of
Thomists, with Juan de Torquemada, O.P. (+1468), who wrote
the Summa de Ecclesia, with Cajetan, O.P. (I1534), the distin­
guished defender of Thomistic doctrine, who was practically the
first in the schools to explain the Theological Summa of St. Thomas
instead of the Sentences. In this same period we have Conrad Kollin, O.P. (11536), who wrote a series of commentaries on the
Summa contra Gentes. These last mentioned theologians prepared
the way for the theology of modern times, which began with the
sixteenth century. Its first task was to refute the errors of this time,
namely, Protestantism, Baianism, and Jansenism. These attenuated
forms of Lutheranism deny the essential distinction between the
order of nature and that of grace, and give a distorted notion of
predestination and the divine motion.
Most prominent among the controversialists who labored to re­
fute these errors are St. Robert Bellarmine, S.J. (I1621), Cano
(I1560), and Bossuet (11704). Among scholastic theologians, in the
Dominican order we have Victoria (+1546), Soto (11560), Bannez
(I1604), John of St. Thomas (I1644), and Gonet (ti68i); among

8

THE ONE GOD

the Carmelites we have the theologians of Salamanca, who wrote
the best commentaries on the works of St. Thomas. In the Society
of Jesus we have Toletus (11596), Suarez (tiôiy), Molina (ti6oo),
and Lugo (ti66o), who proposed a different interpretation of the
Angelic Doctor’s teaching. Suarez, the eclectic, sought to steer a
middle course between St. Thomas and Scotus, and receded less
than Molina did from the Thomistic doctrine on predestination
and grace.
Eminent in positive theology during this time are Batavius,
Thomassin, Combefis, and others.
In the eighteenth century there was a gradual decline in theology
from its former splendor. Yet we still have such Thomists as Charles
René Billuart and Cardinal Louis Gotti, who defended the teach­
ing of the Angelic Doctor with clarity and soundness of argument;
St. Alphonsus Liguori, who wrote particularly on moral subjects,
has received the title of Doctor of the Church.
Finally, after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars,
when peace was again restored, the study of both positive and
speculative theology gradually began to flourish, and later on a
special incentive was offered for the advancement of theology by
the Vatican Council in its condemnation of Positivism and agnosti­
cism. The fruits of this were seen in Modernism, condemned by
Pius X. This Sovereign Pontiff, like Leo XIII, again highly recom­
mended the study of St. Thomas’ works and wrote: “But we warn
teachers to bear in mind that a slight departure from the teaching
of Aquinas, especially in metaphysics, is very detrimental. As Aqui­
nas himself says, ‘a slight error in the beginning is a great error
in the end.’ ”B
Finally, the Code of Canon Law, promulgated by the authority
of Benedict XV in 1918, says: "Mental philosophy and theology
must be taught according to the method, teaching and principles
of the Angelic Doctor, to which the professors should religiously
adhere.” 10 This is stated again in the new law for the doctorate
promulgated by Pius XL11
All these testimonies, whether of the Sovereign Pontiffs or of the
theologians who always have recourse to the Theological Summa
of St. Thomas, most clearly proclaim its value and significance. All
know of the works that have been written in recent times concern­
ing the Theological Summa.12
» Encycl. Pascendi and Sacrorum antistitum.
10 Can. 1366, no. 2.
11 Encycl. Deus scientiarum Dominus.
12 Consult the commentaries of Father Buonpensiere, O.P., Father del Prado,
O.P., Father Billot, S.J., Father Mattiussi, S.J., and pthçrs. Many articles have

INTRODUCTION

9

THE METHOD OF ST. THOMAS
ESPECIALLY THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLES
OF THE THEOLOGICAL SUMMA

Many seem to think that before Descartes wrote his Discourse
on Method, traditional philosophy was not yet fully and unmis­
takably cognizant of the rules governing sound reasoning for the
construction and teaching of knowledge. Many others, on the con­
trary, think that Descartes, who despised history and his predeces­
sors, could easily have found out from these latter the true rules
of method. Some logicians are even of the opinion that a discourse
on method could have been written, more scientific than Descartes’,
one in accordance with the teachings of Aristotle and St. Thomas.
I should like in this article to explain briefly the main features of
St. Thomas’ method. Let us see first, by way of a statement of the
question, what several of our contemporaries have to say about it.
Then we shall examine how the Angelic Doctor found the solid
foundation of this method in Aristotle’s writings and how he made
use of analysis in inductive inquiry, and also of synthesis in dem­
onstration. Finally, we shall see how he closely connected analysis
and synthesis in the light of divine contemplation.
ON THE VARIOUS JUDGMENTS ABOUT THIS METHOD

Nowadays there are some who say that the method of St. Thomas
is too scholastic and artificial, that it is not sufficiently historical
and real. It is, so they say, too much an a priori method, almost
always a process of deduction and analysis, or else in the analysis
itself there is too much abstraction. It even seems at times to con­
found logical abstractions with the objectivity of things. Some,
though not realizing that they are nominalists, nowadays assert
that “St. Thomas speaks sometimes of matter and form, of essence
and existence, as if these were distinct realities.” 13 To be sure, for
the Angelic Doctor, even before any consideration of the mind,
matter is not form, created essence is not existence; and therefore,
appeared in periodicals, especially in the Revue Thomiste, Bulletin Thomiste,
Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, Angelicum, Gregorianurn.
There are also many monographs on some particidar part of the Summa, and
several articles in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique and in other contem­
porary encyclopedias.
l’Edgar de Bruyne in his Saint Thomas d'Aquin, 1928, p. 99, writes: "If we
wanted to remain true to the tradition of the schools we should be led to believe
that from the beginning Thomism committed the mistake of confusing the logical
and the real. ... St. Thomas speaks of essence as if it were a reality. . . . He
reasons about the matter and form of corporeal things as if they were distinct
realities that are in opposition.”

10

THE ONE GOD

before any consideration of the mind, matter is distinct from form,
and essence from existence. Yet form and essence are not, for St.
Thomas, that which is, but that by which something is; nor does
it follow that they are merely logical entities and not realities.14
But in these days many no longer know how to distinguish between
metaphysical abstraction of direct consideration and logical ab­
straction of reflex consideration.16 Therefore they think only that
which is is real, namely, the concrete singular. Hence, for them, the
abstract object not only is not concrete, but it is not real. Thus the
essence of man, of virtue, of society, and such things, would not be
anything real, and the whole of metaphysics, not excepting the
principle of contradiction, would be reduced to logic, logical ab­
stractions, logical being, or, as they say, to extreme intellectualism
that is without reality and lifeless. They would not dare to say
explicitly that the abstract principle of contradiction (that some­
thing cannot at the same time be and not be) is not a law of real
being but only a logical law governing the operations of the mind,
as the laws of the syllogism are. To such an extreme admission,
however, is one brought by this silly and at the present day com­
mon enough objection.
Moreover, several say that the method of St. Thomas often pro­
ceeds, not according to the natural way in which the mind operates,
but in the conventional way of the schools of the thirteenth cen­
tury, namely, by first proposing objections, at least three, which
might be proposed afterward with better results; for, placed at the
beginning, they are a source of obscurity rather than of light to
the mind. Furthermore, it is indeed surprising, some say, that St.
Thomas begins by setting forth the errors, introducing them with
the formula Videtur quod non, and only after this comes the true
doctrine, which is proved in very few words by an appeal to au­
thority, more at length, however, in a theoretical manner; and
finally the objections are solved.
Therefore some nowadays, in philosophy and also in speculative
theology, depart from this method which, so they say, is too scholas14 Summa theol., la, q.13, a. 1 ad sum; q.54, a. 1.
is According to the teaching of St. Thomas (I Sent., d.2, a.3, c; De potentia,
q.7, a.9). the direct consideration of metaphysics, which is called first intention,
is concerned with the object as conceived by the mind, with the real nature itself
of individualized things; as, for instance, the essence of man; whereas the reflex
consideration of logic, which is called second intention, is concerned with the
object only according to the subjective mode of its existence in the mind; thus,
for instance, logic considers the formal universality of any predicate or subject,
or the laws of the syllogism. Likewise the distinction is said to be real when it
precedes the consideration of the mind, and logical when it follows this con­
sideration. In fact, however, before the consideration of the mind, matter is not
form; it can even be separated from this latter so as to receive another form.

INTRODUCTION

11

tic. Already in the time of Pius IX, as is evident from the thirteenth
proposition of the Syllabus, several said: “The method and prin­
ciples by which the old scholastic doctors cultivated theology are
not at all suitable to the demands of our times and to the progress
of the sciences.” 16 Some, not considering the profound difference
between St. Thomas’ method of procedure and the merely a priori
or synthetic method adopted by Spinoza, seem to admit that St.
Thomas’ method and even St. Bonaventure’s, from the abuse of
philosophical deduction, lead to rationalism and pantheism, as
clearly seen from the propositions to which the Sacred Congrega­
tion of the Index ordered Augustine Bonnetty to give his assent
(1855) in writing.1’
Now some depart from St. Thomas' method, preferring the his­
torical not only for the useful and necessary investigation in the
history of philosophy and theology, but also for a more or less
direct knowledge of even philosophical or theological truth. This
mode of procedure was indeed already in vogue among the follow­
ers of idealistic evolutionism, especially with Hegel, and later on
we come across it, though in a modified form, in many works of
modern authors. Whatever these modifications may be, this method,
so it seems, tends by its very nature to confuse philosophy with the
history of philosophy, and thus is established a certain philosophy
of the history of doctrines, one that is more or less according to the
tenets of evolutionism.
According to this view, which is not infrequent today, among all
the systems appearing in the course of time in accordance with the
evolution of ideas, no system is absolutely true, but each is rela­
tively true, that is, in opposition to another preceding doctrine,
or else to some other brief evolutionary period of the past. They
say that, for instance, Thomism was relatively true in the thirteenth
century in opposition to the doctrine of certain Augustinians,
which it surpassed; but it, too, is not absolutely but relatively false
with respect to the subsequent system which, either as an antithe­
sis or as a superior synthesis, is of a higher order in the evolu­
tion of ideas. Thus Scotism, coming at a later date, would be truer
than St. Thomas’ doctrine, and this by the momentum of its prog­
ress in the history of philosophy and theology. Then why should
not this be so for the nominalism of William Ockham? In like
manner, the eclecticism of Suarez, which often seeks to steer a
middle course between the system of St. Thomas and that of Scotus,
would be a still more perfect synthesis and the beginning of a new
process and progress among the modern intellectuals.
le Denz., no. 1713.
ir Ibid., no. 1652.

THE ONE GOD

12

If it were so, nothing would be absolutely true, not even the
principle of contradiction, at least as a law of being and higher
reason, as Hegel admits. All the more so, none of the accepted def­
initions would be absolutely true, and hence from none of them
could the true properties of things be deduced. There would be
only relative truth, in its reference to the present state of knowl­
edge, and this rather as regards the already superseded past than
the unknown future. Even for knowing the relative truth of any
doctrine, it would be necessary to have full knowledge of the pre­
ceding periods of evolution, which were the prerequisites for the
manifestation of its ultimate development. By way of illustration,
we may say that for a knowledge of what ought to be our philo­
sophical conception according to the intellectual exigencies of the
twentieth century, we would have to go through Kantianism and
Hegelianism, and then vitally reconsider Thomism so as to render
it truly presentable to modern minds. Yet this new cogitation, as
regards the mental attitude of the twentieth century, would not be
absolutely but only relatively true, just as the cogitation of St.
Thomas was relatively true in the thirteenth century.
This conception of truth, however, does not seem to differ from
that of the Modernists, who said: “Truth is no more immutable
than man himself is, in that it is developed with, in, and by him.” 18
But this proposition, if we wish to consider the question more
seriously, presupposes immanence or absolute evolutionism. Ac­
cording to this theory, as Pius IX said in the first proposition of
the Syllabus: “In effect God is produced in man and in the world,
and all things are God and have the very substance of God, and
God is one and the same thing with the world, and, therefore,
spirit with matter, necessity with liberty, good with evil, justice
with injustice.” 19 Indeed the charge is made against St. Thomas
that his method—as if it did not differ from Spinoza’s—leads to
pantheism; and now the new historical method, which is evolu­
tional in its tone of thought, leads to the form opposed to it, which
is pantheism. Spinoza, indeed, identified all things with the im­
mobile God, while the evolutionists reduce God to universal evolu­
tion. According to the evolutionists, God is really in a process of
becoming both in man and in the world, and He never will be in
the true sense, as Renan said. Thus nothing would be absolutely
true and nothing absolutely false. There would be only relative
truth and relative falsehood. Only relativity would be absolute.
The above-mentioned confusion between history and philosophy
corresponds to the desires neither of the true historian nor of tire
i« Ibid., no. 2058.
Ibid., no. 1701.

INTRODUCTION

’3

true philosopher. But the true historian seeks to acquire a knowledge
of history from the facts, before the uncertain philosophy of his­
tory is established. The desire of the true philosopher is, indeed,
to acquire an accurate knowledge of philosophy, but he does not
consider the temporal sequence of doctrines, as if these were the
criterion or sign of their relative truth, and as if this sequence of
doctrines were always and necessarily an evolution in the ascendant
order, but never a regression and senile decline. From the fact that
Scotus came after St. Thomas, it does not follow that his doctrine
is truer, and that later on there is greater perfection in the eclec­
ticism of Suarez.
We must use the historical method in the history of doctrines,
and this is indeed of great help in understanding the state and
difficulty of the question, so as to give us, as it were, a panorama
of the solutions of any great problem. But in philosophy we must
employ the analytic and synthetic method proportionate to it. In
theology, however, we rely first upon proofs taken from the au­
thority of Holy Scripture or divine tradition, or even the writings
of the holy Fathers, and in the second place on arguments drawn
from reason, while, of course, not neglecting the history of prob­
lems and their solutions.
ON THE ARISTOTELIAN FOUNDATION OF ST. THOMAS’ METHOD

If we consider, however, the works of St. Thomas, we shall see
that the common Doctor of the Church did not despise history, as
was the case with Descartes, but, so far as possible in his time, he
made use of the history of doctrines, appropriating whatever truth
he found in the writings of the ancient philosophers, especially
Aristotle, as well as in the works of the Fathers and other Doctors
of the Church. Often, too, with very keen mental perception, St.
Thomas has recourse to the history of errors in formulating his
objections, since Providence permits errors so that the truth may
become more apparent, and permits evils so that greater good may
result therefrom.
If we consider the general structure of St. Thomas’ articles, we
detect in it a scientific application of method, which the Angelic
Doctor had previously discussed at length in his commentary on
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. This work of Aristotle treats of the
search for real definition by the division of the genus and the in­
ductive and comparative inquiry into the specific difference; it also
discusses a priori and a posteriori demonstrations, and especially
the middle term in demonstration.
Some modern writers say that the structure of the Theological

14

THE ONE GOD

Summa is artificial, as in the case of eclectic syncretism in which
heterogeneous elements are mechanically and, as it were, acciden­
tally joined together. However, not only all the commentators of
the Angelic Doctor, but many contemporary historians (e.g., Father
Grabmann 2°) point out that the Theological Summa from begin­
ning to end constitutes one organic whole. The orderly arrange­
ment of the three parts, containing thirty-eight treatises (about
three thousand articles, almost ten thousand objections), is effected
with superb constructive skill. Furthermore, the divisions are not
accidental, but have their foundation in the very nature of things.
Notwithstanding so great a complexity of questions, the whole
doctrinal edifice, as it is well called, is simple in its magnitude,
like the Egyptian pyramids or the Gothic cathedrals, not even one
column of which can be changed without destroying the perfect
harmony of the edifice. But what is the foundation of this method
of doctrinal construction?
For a closer inspection of this architecture, attention must be
drawn to the general way the articles are composed in accordance
with the technique of scholastic exposition, to which St. Thomas
adheres, as he didactically proceeds in the Summa theologica and
the Quaestiones disputatae. But he dispensed himself from this in
the Opuscula and the Summa contra Gentes, where he often juxta­
poses arguments at the reader’s choice, not explicitly distinguish­
ing between direct and indirect arguments, or between those
derived from proper and those from common principles.
This art or technique, which to some seems too conventional,
truly corresponds to the normal progress of the intellect in the
philosophical or theological investigation of truth. Why, in the
Summa theologica, do we always find at the beginning of each
article three objections, which are introduced by the formula,
Videtur quod non? Why does an article in the Quaestiones disputatae
often begin with ten objections against one part of the contradic­
tion and ten or twelve against the other?
To some it seems that these objections should follow the demon­
stration of the truth. On the contrary, according to Aristotle’s
method and that of almost all the doctors, in the beginning there
must be a statement of the question and of what is essentially the
point at issue in the difficulty to be solved. It is about this that the
methodical doubt is chiefly concerned, and the Stagirite spoke of
it long before Descartes, and with shrewder judgment, too, not by
doubting the validity of the first principles of reason, but by solv­
ing the objections of the skeptics.21
20 Saint Thomas d'Aquin, p. 41.
21 Metaphysics, Bk. IV.

INTRODUCTION

>5

The necessity of this methodical doubt is well shown by St.
Thomas. Aristotle said: “With a view to the science which we are
investigating, we must first approach the subjects about which it
behooves us first to raise doubts. . . . The difficulty to be solved
must first be examined.” 22 Concerning this the Angelic Doctor
says: “Just as he who wishes to free himself from a chain that
binds him, must first inspect the chain and the way it binds him, so
he who wishes to solve a doubt must first examine all the difficulties
and their causes. . . . Those who wish to search for truth, not
taking doubt first into consideration, are like those who do not
know where they are going . . . hence they cannot go by a direct
route, unless perhaps they do so by chance . . . nor can they know
when they find the truth sought, and when they do not. . . . Just
as in judgments no one can give a decision unless he hears the
reasons for and against, so he who has to examine philosophical
questions is necessarily in a better position to judge if he has in­
formed himself of practically all the reasons for the doubts raised
by the adversaries. On account of these reasons it was Aristotle’s
custom in almost all his works to prepare for the search or deter­
mination of the truth by recounting the doubts raised against it.” 23
In this the philosopher’s critical spirit manifests itself, nor is it a
matter of little importance for one to be well aware of the nature
of the difficulty to be solved. Such must be the method of proced­
ure, at least for die great and fundamental questions; otherwise
the true difficulty of the problem sometimes remains almost un­
known even to the very end of the thesis, or else it receives but a
passing comment in the last objection.
But the state and difficulty of the question to be solved are made
manifest by the opposite solutions that have already been given
by the predecessors, or by the opposing arguments for and against
the thesis. This was Aristotle’s method of procedure, and St. Thomas
followed him, especially in his Quaestiones disputatae, in which first
he sets forth the opposition, so to say, between thesis and antith­
esis, the mind being fully aware of the nature of the difficulty to
be solved before it proceeds to the development of the superior
synthesis. And this is part of the truth contained in the Hegelian
method, which Hegel did not retain in its purity of form. Thus the
hearers do not let the merits of their case consist in the solution
of accidental difficulties, nor do they ask useless questions, which
distract the mind from the main point at issue; but at once they
go to the very root of the difficulty. Thus the theses must be elabo­
rated in harmony with the teaching of St. Thomas and that is why
22 Ibid., Bk. HI, chap. I, lect. i.
23 Com. on Metaphysics, Bk. Ill, chap. 1, lect. 1.

ι6

THE ONE GOD

they are enunciated in the form of a question by means of the
particle "Whether,” and not in the form of a positive statement;
for the complete solution is to be found only at the end, and
often many propositions are required so as fully to express the
meaning.
In the Summa theologica, because St. Thomas proceeds with
more brevity of diction than in the Quaestiones disputatae, there are
only three principal objections; sometimes they are most striking,
gems, and, in opposition to these, there is the counterargument,
which generally is taken from authority. St. Thomas does not de­
velop these arguments from authority, but gives only one in each
case, sometimes expressed in very few words, because he presup­
poses what was already said by him in his commentaries on Holy
Scripture, especially on the Epistles and Gospels, and also in his
Catena aurea. Evidently, in our days, these arguments from au­
thority, especially on dogmatic subjects, must be developed, so
that whatever is declared by the Church as the proximate rule of
faith may be clearly and explicitly known and what is the founda­
tion for this both in Scripture and in tradition.
The body of the article is variously constructed in accordance
with the different questions to be solved. But, as the Angelic Doc­
tor explains elsewhere,21 there are four scientific questions: (t)
whether a thing is, for instance, whether God is; (2) what He is;
(3) whether He is such by nature, for instance, whether He is free;
(4) for what purpose He is such, for instance, for what purpose or
why He is free? These four questions are evidently different in
nature, notwithstanding the identity of the classical formula in the
Summa theologica: "Whether this is . .
The question whether a thing is presupposes what it means in
name or the nominal definition, that is, what the name of the
thing means according to conventional use. This leads up to the
question about what the thing is, just as the third question, whether
a thing is of such a nature, leads up to the fourth: for what pur­
pose it is of such a nature. In all these questions, as Aristotle
said,25 the middle term in the demonstration must be the subject
of special consideration.
When the argumentative part of the article answers the question,
whether a thing is, for instance, whether God is, then, as the
Angelic Doctor says: “it is necessary to accept as the middle term
the meaning of the word,” 20 for instance, this name "God.” That
is, the name "God” means the first uncaused cause; and the first
24 See his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Bk. II, chap. 1, lect. 1.
25 Ibid.
26 Summa theol., la, q.2, a.2 ad 2un>.

INTRODUCTION

17

uncaused cause exists, for everything that comes into being has a
cause, and there is no process to infinity in directly subordinated
causes. Therefore God exists.
It must especially be taken into consideration how St. Thomas
answers the question about the quiddity and purpose of things.
ON THE INDUCTIVE SEARCH FOR DEFINITIONS

But when it is asked what a thing is, for instance, what is the
human soul, what is charity or faith, it is a question of seeking for
a real definition in accordance with laws laid down by Aristotle
in one of his works,27 in which it is shown that the meaning of a
definition cannot be demonstrated, unless there are two definitions
of the same thing, one of which, obtained by means of final or
efficient causality, contains the reason for which of the other,
namely, of the essential definition. Thus the circle and its circum­
ference is defined as a figure, every point of which circumference is
equally distant from the center, because it is formed by the revolu­
tion of a straight line around one of its extremities. But, with the
exception of these cases, the definition cannot be demonstrated
either a posteriori, as the existence of a cause can be demonstrated
from its effects, or a priori, as a property is deduced from the es­
sence; for the definition of a thing is the very means by which its
properties are demonstrated, nor is there any process to infinity in
this. But if the real definition cannot be demonstrated, it is to be
sought for by beginning with the nominal or conventional defini­
tion, which determines only what is the subject of discussion. The
transition from the nominal to the real and essential definition is
effected, as shown in the same work just quoted,28 by the gradual
process of the division of the genera from the highest to the lowest,
and by the inductive ascent to the specific difference from a com­
parison of similar and dissimilar things.29 This method of finding
definitions that truly expresses the reality and essence of things, is
most admirably retained by St. Thomas. While several modern
authors right at the beginning propose definitions that are some21 Posterior Analytics, Bk. II, chap. 8, lect. 7, 8.
2s Ibid., chap. 12, lect. 13-16.
2s In this way Aristotle attained to the definition of motion, inasmuch as it
has reference to being and to the division of being into potency and act. Thus
motion becomes intelligible since it is reduced to being, which is the object of
the intellect; whereas, contrary to this, Descartes later on (Principes, II, 25) defined
motion in reference to rest or cessation of motion, and from this no philosophical
and intelligible idea of motion is obtained. By the same method Aristotle defined
the soul, the faculties, wisdom, knowledge, prudence, art, the various virtues, and
other things.

18

THE ONE GOD

times very complex, as if they had received them by revelation,
often not saying how they obtained them, St. Thomas at the be­
ginning of each treatise inquires throughout several articles into
the definition of the thing in question, for instance, the defini­
tion of charity, as being a friendship between God and man, and
also a special and most sublime virtue. He also inquires into the
definition of the four kinds of justice: equalizing, legal, distribu­
tive, and commutative, into the definition of prudence, and so on.
In these articles there is no inquiry into the middle term of the
demonstration, since the quest of the definition is not demonstration;
but in this inductive inquiry the holy Doctor often adduces the
most appropriate of observations, as Father Simon Deploige ob­
served,30 for instance, in the case of social matters. Thus the transi­
tion is made gradually from natural reason or common sense of
mankind to philosophic reason.
This search for the definition is evidently of great importance,
for all the demonstrations of the properties of anything have their
foundation in its definition. In like manner, the direct division of
any whole rests upon its definition; even universal principles are
derived from rightly constituted and interconnected primary no­
tions, and these principles, in the metaphysical order, are in every
case true. Thus St. Thomas with profound penetration of thought
decisively distinguishes between the antecedent and consequent
wills from the very definition of the will, the object of which is
good, this latter being formally not in the mind but in the things
themselves. Fie says: “The will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifica­
tions (here and now). Hence we will a thing simply, inasmuch as
we will it when all particular circumstances are considered, and
this is what is meant by willing consequently.”81 On the other
hand, as stated in this same article, we will some good anteced­
ently, as long as we will it when all particular circumstances are
not considered, but according as it is absolutely good in itself; and
this is to will it in a qualified manner and not simply. From these
definitions thus established, St. Thomas deduces in the same article
so cf. The Conflict between Ethics and Sociology (1938), pp. 273 ff. In matters
of faith the development of dogma consists in this transition, from a confused to
a distinct notion, for instance, from the most confused notion of the human soul
to this notion: that the human soul is by itself and essentially the form of the
body. This proposition does not enunciate a property but the definition of the
soul, which was known before in a confused manner. But if from the definition
of man it is demonstrated that he is free, then this enunciates a property of his
intellectual nature, and this is a new truth distinct from the definition of man.
But often the search for the true definition entails more labor than the deduction
of its properties from the same definition.
»1 Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.6 ad lum.

INTRODUCTION

*9

this most universal principle: "Thus it is clear that whatever God
simply wills, takes place; although what He wills antecedently may
not take place.” But this double proposition virtually contains the
whole teaching of St. Thomas about efficacious grace. If, indeed,
the above-stated definitions of the consequent and antecedent wills
have metaphysical validity, the same must be said of the principle
that has its foundation in them. Then not even the least good act
and most easy of performance right at the moment happens as de­
pendent solely upon God’s antecedent will, or without a decree of
His consequent will, the causality of which is infallible, although
it most admirably preserves intact human liberty, for, as just stated:
“Whatever God simply wills, takes place; although what He wills
antecedently may not take place.” If any good act, even most easy
to perform right at the moment, were to happen without such a
decree of the consequent will, then the principle enunciated by St.
Thomas would no longer he metaphysically true, and this would
mean the complete ruination of his doctrine concerning God’s
foreknowledge and consequent will. If this principle were of no
metaphysical validity, it would amount to nothing more than say­
ing that salutary acts in the majority of cases do not take place
unless they have been consequently willed by God, or, in other
words, the universal Ordainer did not ordain all good thiiïgs but
only very many. This doctrine would be of no value either philo­
sophically or theologically. But the principles that have been for­
mulated in this order are not metaphysically and universally, or
in every case, true unless they have their foundation in the due or
correct definition of the subject. In this we clearly see the impor­
tance of searching for real definitions.
ON THE MIDDLE TERM IN DEMONSTRATION

From the articles, however, in which a methodical inquiry is in­
stituted into the real definition of anything, we must distinguish
and otherwise explain those in which St. Thomas solves the ques­
tion, whether a thing is of such a nature, and often he solves as
one question the composite: For what purpose is it of such a na­
ture? Examples of such are: when he asks whether the human soul
is incorruptible (that is, whether and for what purpose it is in­
corruptible); whether man is free, whether faith is most certain,
whether it belongs to God alone to create, whether and for what
purpose Christ’s passion was the cause of our salvation by way of
merit, and other similar questions. In these cases the solution of
i he question for what purpose, refers to a true and indeed a priori
demonstration, nor does it mean one derived from common but

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THE ONE GOD

from proper principles. Hence in these last-mentioned articles that
are strictly demonstrative, whether they are deduced from reason
alone or from faith and reason, a special inquiry must be made into
the middle term of the demonstration, which is, as it were, the
golden key of the article.
The title of the article gives the two terms of the conclusion,
namely, the minor and the major; the middle term must be as­
signed by which the other two can be united in a scientific con­
clusion, and this term assigns "why a thing is and cannot be
otherwise than it is.” It is the very Aristotelian definition of scien­
tific knowledge.52
Sometimes, however, in the composition of the body of these
articles, St. Thomas begins with the major and through the minor
descends to the conclusion, so that the argument is easily presented
in scholastic form as to make it clear what is the middle term in the
demonstration. Thus, in the question, "Whether the human soul is
incorruptible,” 32
33 the argument may be condensed into the follow­
ing syllogism: Every simple and subsistent form is absolutely in­
corruptible. But the human soul is a simple and subsistent form.
Therefore the human soul is incorruptible. Likewise, in the ques­
tion, “Whether it belongs to God alone to create,” 34 the argument
may be reduced to this syllogism: The most universal effects must
be reduced to the most universal and first cause, and that is God.
Now being itself, which is absolutely produced in creation, is the
most universal of effects. Therefore to produce being absolutely,
not as this or that being, or to create, belongs to God alone.
Often, too, St. Thomas begins with the minor, the subject of
which is already given in the title and will appear again as the
subject of the conclusion. Thus by the minor he ascends from the
subject of the title to the middle term in the demonstration. After­
ward he enunciates the major, its subject being the same middle
term, its predicate being the major term of the title, which in the
conclusion must be joined to the minor term. Thus often the
process of proof in the article is by the ascent from the minor to
the middle term in the demonstration, and by the descent from
the major to the conclusion. We have an example of this in the
question: "Whether any created good constitutes man’s happi­
ness.” 35 St. Thomas replies by enunciating first the minor: Happi­
ness is the perfect good, completely lulling the rational appetite
which is specified by universal good; now the perfect good, which
32 Post. Anal., Bk. I, chap. 2.
33 Summa theol., la, q.75, a. 6.
«♦ Ibid., q.45, a. 5.
«ο Ibid., la Ilae, q.2, a. 8.

INTRODUCTION

21

completely lulls the rational appetite that is specified by universal
good, cannot be anything created or limited; therefore man’s hap­
piness cannot consist in any created good.
If we wish to present the argument in syllogistic form, the major
must be enunciated first. In the generality of cases, by retaining
the very propositions of St. Thomas, the argument can be reduced
to scholastic form. It is better, however, to keep to the Doctor’s
own terms than to change them so as to follow an excessive logi­
cal formalism. Finally, the major or minor must be defended against
the attacks made upon it by the opponents of St. Thomas.
In the explanation of the body of the article the middle term of
the demonstration must be the subject of diligent inquiry, or, if
there are several subordinate middle terms, evidently we must con­
centrate our attention upon the principal one. The reason is that,
as St. Thomas often remarks, “the conclusions are known materi­
ally; but the middle terms in the demonstration are the formal
cause of our knowledge, and by these the conclusions are known.” 38
Thus it is known formally for what purpose a thing is of such a
nature, for instance, why man is free. It is because he has knowl­
edge of universal good that his attitude toward some particular
good is one of dominating indifference. Or again, why man is a
social being; this is because of the requirements of his specific act,
which are to know those things which he needs to know. Because
of his very limited intelligence he needs the assistance of others.
Thus there is only one formal or proximate middle term, which
is the definition of the thing as to its essence, from which the first
property is to be deduced, and from this fust property the one
subordinate to this, and so on in ascending order. Nevertheless,
anything that has already been demonstrated directly and from
the properties of the thing by means of the formal cause, can still
be demonstrated in other ways, for instance, by means of its proper
final cause, or even from its common principles, or indirectly
either by what signifies it or by the method of reduction to ab­
surdity. Thus St. Thomas in the books of the Contra Gentes makes
use of these direct or indirect arguments so as to reach the same
conclusion and places them together, not giving the reason why
they are six or ten in number. But in the Summa theologica and
the Quaestiones disputatae there is usually only one direct argument,
which is of the formal kind and is deduced from the properties of
a thing, introducing the proximately formal middle term, or if the
holy Doctor gives two or three arguments he assigns the scientific
reason why and how there are two or three methods of argumenta­
tion.
»· Ibid., Ha Ilae, q. I, a. i, c.

22

THE ONE GOD

Therefore the middle term in the demonstration must be clearly
presented, which in the syllogism of the first figure is the subject
of the major and the predicate of the minor and we know that the
modes of the other figures can be reduced to the modes of the
first figure.
Therefore this middle term thus clearly stated presents itself as
the keystone of the article, inserted in the syllogism as a precious
jewel set in a ring. Thus we make use of logic, not indeed for its
own sake, but that by it we may acquire a direct knowledge of the
middle term or principle in which the truth of the conclusion
must be considered, or at least of the main conclusion, if there are
several conclusions in the article, as sometimes happens. Having
accomplished this task to commit to memory what is of first im­
portance in the article, it is enough to bear in mind the middle
term. When the question is again posited, the major and minor
terms are included in it; hence in replying to the question it suf­
fices to enunciate the middle term in the demonstration, so that
again we may have the demonstration of the conclusion. In illustra­
tion of this let us take the question: “Whether the human soul is
incorruptible?” It suffices to reply to this: “Every simple and sub­
sistent form . . . Therefore the human soul is incorruptible.”
If the middle term in the demonstration of the article is thus
carefully taken into consideration, this makes us see more clearly,
without the aid of a syllogism, the solution of the objections which
were presented in the beginning of the article. As a matter of fact,
St. Thomas casts upon the solution of the objections the search­
light of the middle term in the demonstration, and by means of
this light the distinction to be made is easily discovered and under­
stood. After this, whatever doubts and corollaries there may be,
these can be profitably presented. This method was often adopted
by the Salmanticenses.
The stand taken by St. Thomas, if properly understood, is seen
to be the just mean and summit between and above the two ex­
tremes: on the one hand, of empiric nominalism—which retains a
certain objectivity of experience, though denying the necessity and
universality of knowledge—and on the other, of the idealism of the
conceptualists or subjectivists, which retains a certain necessity and
universality of knowledge, although without any ontological va­
lidity, that is, without any true objectivity.
Thus St. Thomas’ method of procedure in the construction of
his articles is far more in accordance with the natural progress of
the mind in its search for truth than is the method adopted by
several Scholastics of a later date, who in the beginning multiply
the preliminary remarks about those things that have already been

INTRODUCTION

23
explained by them and that do not need any further explanation.
Often also they materially juxtapose these various preliminary re­
marks, not showing the essential relation between them, and then
they propose the argument in the briefest manner, so that the
middle term in the demonstration is not sufficiently clear, and some­
times several arguments in succession are proposed in which the
direct formal argument deduced from the properties of a thing is
not sufficiently distinguished from the others, or from those derived
from the common principles, or from the indirect arguments. This
later method is rather mechanical, whereas the method of St.
Thomas is organic, according to the natural process of the mind in
operation.
Lastly, the importance of the middle term in the demonstration
is clearly perceived from the rules to be observed in scholastic dis­
putations. The objector, in accordance with these rules, by clever
argumentation, so as to overthrow the conclusion, must attack by
three successive objections in scholastic form the middle term in the
demonstration, which is, so to speak, the chief point of attack to
be defended in the article, and, as it were, the citadel of the de­
fender. But the defender of this citadel must train upon the ob­
jector the light of the middle term in the form of a brilliant
distinction that is not accidentally but directly and truly to the
point. Thus after a well-ordered scholastic demonstration, which is
of reasonable difficulty, the truth of the article, having been sifted
and freed of all its difficulties, becomes increasingly clear, and is
certainly confirmed by this austere criticism which is, as it were,
the acid that attacks all metals, gold alone excepted.
ON THE PERFECT UNION OF ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS
IN THE ANGELIC DOCTOR’S METHOD

In this way St. Thomas perfectly observed the rules of method in
general, namely, by always beginning from the more known, by
proceeding gradually and not jumping to the conclusion. He never
reaches the more remote conclusions before the immediate con­
clusions are known with certainty. Thus the connection between
them is clearly perceived, and all the conclusions make up a truly
organic body of doctrine.
In like manner he perfectly applied the rules of the analytic
method in the order of finding, especially so, in the direct and not
accidental division of the complex subject to be considered, until
he reaches the transcendental notions and first principles. Thus,
after carefully considering the parts, he arrives at a correct judg­
ment of the whole. He likewise most adroitly made use of the

THE ONE GOD

24

analytic method in the inductive and comparative inquiry into the
specific difference of a thing so as to discover the distinct real defi­
nitions contained in a confused manner in the nominal ones.
With an equal degree of perfection he employed the synthetic
method in his doctrine, both in the questions to be proposed and
in the manner of solving them. For in proposing the questions he
always begins from the more universal and gradually descends to
the less universal, from the essence to the properties, from causes
to effects. Likewise, in solving the questions he always starts from
principles either revealed or directly known, or derived from ex­
perience and from the definition of the thing in question; nor does
he depart from the certain principles because of the obscurity of
the mystery to which these principles lead, as in the case of the
questions on grace and free will. Hence we may say that the ele­
ment of truth contained in the rules of method as formulated by
Descartes, was already perfectly known by the Angelic Doctor.
Thus the Theological Summa is a splendid example of this
synthetic method in the orderly arrangement of theological knowl­
edge. It first treats of God’s existence and His nature, then of His
attributes, in the third place of the three Persons, fourthly of God’s
actions ad extra, and so on for the rest. In this orderly arrange­
ment anyone can see that St. Thomas far surpasses the Master of
the Sentences, who treats but incidentally of moral theology, dis­
cussing faith, hope, and charity on the occasion of the following
question: “Whether Christ had faith, hope, and charity," 37 and
treating of sin in general when the question of original sin pre­
sents itself.38
Finally, and this must especially be noticed, the Angelic Doctor
succeeded exceedingly well in combining analysis and synthesis,
according as ascendant analysis, which terminates in principles and
causes, is the principle of descendant analysis. For analysis, having
finished with natural philosophy, in ontology ascends to consider
the notions of analogous being, act and potency, as also the uni­
versal principles of reason and being, which illumine the whole
synthesis of general metaphysics. After this the mind ascends to
consider the pure Act, the Supreme Being, which is required in the
final analysis, the true notion of which is, as it were, the sun of all
synthesis in the universality of its scope, which is knowledge of all
beings inasmuch as they are beings.39
Cf. Ill Sent., d.23.
ss Cf. Il Sent., d.35 f.
so See St. Thomas, Com. on Post. Anal., Bk. II, lect. 20; Bk. I, lect. 22 f.; Com.
on Metaphysics, Bk. I, lect. 1 f.; Bk. IX, lect. 5: also Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.9,
a.2; Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps. 3, 9; Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 112, a.5.
st

INTRODUCTION

25

By no means do we find in the system of St. Thomas this abuse
of the a priori method which, as clearly seen in the works of
Spinoza, excludes by means of mathematics the consideration of
efficient and final causes, and hence leads to rationalism and pan­
theism, as if all things could be deduced from God’s nature in a
geometrical way.·10 By way of investigation and analysis St. Thomas
ascends by the light of the first principles of reason from sensible
things and the most certain facts of experience to the supreme and
most universal cause who, since He is infinitely perfect and in no
way stands in need of creatures, created all things with absolute
freedom.41 Then by the way of synthesis, the holy Doctor judges of
all things by means of a lofty principle. As he himself says: "By
way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we judge of
temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we dispose
of temporal things.” 42 In accordance with this union of analysis and
synthesis, presented by the Angelic Doctor, as Father del Prado
shows,43 the supreme truth of Christian philosophy, in which the
analytic method, or method of finding in the ascending order,
terminates, and which is the principle of the synthetic method of
judgment, is this: God is the self-subsisting Being, 1 am who am.
In other words only in God are essence and existence identical.44
This is the golden key of the whole doctrinal edifice, which is con­
structed by the Angelic Doctor with such penetration of thought
and fixity of principles that, as Leo XIII testified,45 no one sur­
passed him in this. Avoiding both nominalism, which denies the
objectivity of metaphysics, reducing it to logic, and the extreme
realism of Plato, which on no just grounds considers the universal
to exist formally apart from the thing, St. Thomas admirably dis­
tinguished between logic and metaphysics, between logical and real
being.43 He clearly shows that, before our mind considers the
question, the essence of any finite being is not its existence, and
that hence only in God are essence and existence identical.42 This is
the culminating point of the five proofs for God’s existence, the
terminus in the ascending order by the method of finding, and it
is the principle of judgment from the highest cause by the syn­
thetic method.
<0 Cf. Leo Michel, O.P., "Le système de Spinoza au point de vue de la logique
formelle” in the Revue Thomiste, January, 1898.
<1 Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.3.
42 Ibid., q.79, a.9.
«3 De veritate fundamentali philosophiae Christianae (Fribourg, 1911).
«Summa theol., Ia, q.3, a.4.
45 Cf. Encyclical Aeterni Patris.
«e Summa theol., Ia, q.85, a.2 ad 2um.
42 Ibid., q.3, a.4.

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THE ONE GOD

For many years the more we have studied this Theological
Summa, the more we have seen the beauty of its structure. The ex­
positions and demonstrations are simple and clear, especially if
they are compared with the commentaries on the Sentences of Peter
Lombard, and superfluous questions are avoided in accordance with
the Angelic Doctor’s plan as stated in the Prologue. Likewise,
repetitions are eliminated, as much as possible, because subjects
are always treated in a general way before they receive special con­
sideration, and St. Thomas does not refer his reader to what is to
be said later on. In this simplicity and clarity, the Angelic Doctor
evidently far surpasses not only his predecessors, but even Scotus
and Suarez.
The perfection of this edifice is in great part due to the consum­
mate skill with which he effects the divisions between the treatises
or the questions or the articles or the arguments. These divisions,
of course, are not extrinsic but intrinsic, arranged in accordance
with the formal point of view of the whole to be divided, and
effected by means of members that are truly opposites to each
other, so that the divisions are adequate, with subordinate sub­
divisions; yet all is done with discretion and not by descending to
the least details. Thus by a gradual process the light of the princi­
ples reaches to the ultimate conclusions that are, nevertheless, still
universal—for speculative knowledge does not descend to the particu
lar—and thus it is essentially distinct from experience and
prudence.
THE DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS PROCEEDS FROM THE FULLNESS OF HIS
CONTEMPLATION

In addition to all these considerations, we must finally say that
the Angelic Doctor never cherished method for its own sake, but
for the purpose of finding out the truth and transmitting it to
posterity, especially divine truth to which he especially directed
his attention. On the contrary, just as many hunters find greater
delight in the sport of hunting than in the game they take, so some
evidently have in mind the mode of demonstrating the truth rather
than the actual discovery of the truth itself, even when they are
investigating things most sublime, such as the infinite value of
Christ’s merits or the divine processions. This is a deformation of
the theologian’s profession, when he is not sufficiently contempla­
tive. He then digresses too much and is too much given to argu­
mentation.
Nevertheless, in the hours of study we must give careful con­
sideration to the proper method, which, as we acquire the habit,

INTRODUCTION

27

we unconsciously make use of little by little, as is the case with a
musician who is practicing to play on the guitar or the harp. Thus
the greater facility gradually acquired in the use of the proper
method disposes a person for a correct knowledge of the differei.t
parts of philosophy and theology, and by this very fact for the con­
templation of truth from which proceeds the living doctrine that
illuminates the mind and inflames the heart. The Angelic Doctor
says that doctrine and preaching must “proceed from the fullness of
contemplation.”·* 8 It was so when he taught. Just as only those
musicians make good use of their method who, under the influence
of a certain inspiration, fully penetrate the soul of a symphony, so
St. Thomas employed his scientific method, inspired as it were from
above, illuminated by the light of vivid faith and the gifts of the
Holy Ghost; and this light absolutely transcends all systems and
all knowledge acquired by human efforts. Thus only by this super­
natural light does theology attain its end, and then we find verified
in it the words of the Vatican Council: “Reason, indeed, en­
lightened by faith, when it seeks earnestly, piously, and calmly,
attains by a gift from God some, and that a very fruitful, under­
standing of mysteries. . . . But reason never becomes capable of
apprehending mysteries as it does those truths which constitute its
proper object. For in this mortal life we are pilgrims, not yet with
God: we walk by faith and not by sight.” 40
Therefore St. Thomas, before he dictated or wrote or preached,
used to recite this prayer: “Ineffable Creator, who out of the
treasures of Thy wisdom hast appointed three hierarchies of angels
and set them in admirable order high above the heavens and hast
disposed the diverse portions of the universe in such marvelous
arrays, Thou who art called the true source of light and superemi­
nent principle of wisdom, be pleased to cast a beam of Thy radiance
upon the darkness of my mind and dispel from me the double
darkness of sin and ignorance in which I have been born.
“Thou who makest eloquent the tongues of little children,50
fashion my words and pour upon my lips the grace of Thy bene­
diction. Grant me penetration to understand, capacity to retain,
method and facility in study, subtlety in interpretation, and
abundant grace of expression.
"Order the beginning, direct the progress, and perfect the achieve­
ment of my work, Thou who art true God and man and livest and
reignest forever and ever. Amen.”
This prayer was heard; for in the holy Doctor’s works on the
**lbid., Ha Ilae, q. 188, a. 6.
<» Denz., 1796; II Cor. 5: 7.
so Wis. 10: 21.

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THE ONE GOD

logical method is to be seen the light of the gifts of the Holy Ghost
as also the gratuitously given grace of the “word of wisdom,” 51 as
Pope Pius XI says.52 Therefore, in a certain responsory in the office
for the feast of St. Thomas, we read: “There is brevity of style, a
pleasing eloquence, sublimity, clarity, and well-founded opinion.”
There is sublimity, because the knowledge is derived from the
highest of causes; there is clarity, because by the light of the highest
principles he penetrates to the very source of the question; there
is well-founded opinion, because “he assigns the cause why the thing
is and cannot be otherwise than it is,” according to the Aristote­
lian definition of knowledge.53 This pleasing eloquence coupled
with a brevity of style is the result of a vivid and supernatural
contemplation, by which the holy Doctor was conversant not only
with the literal but also with the spiritual interpretation of Holy
Scripture. He knew, to be sure, that, especially for the discussion
of divine subjects, prayer and contemplation were no less necessary
than laborious efforts in the pursuit of knowledge; and when diffi­
culties arose, he did not pray less so as to give himself more time
for study, but in preference to this he spent more time in prayer.
This truth is of great importance for renewing the spirit of study in
theology, so that it may be something vital and productive of its
due effects. Concerning the holy Doctor's contemplation, Pope Pius
XI wrote as follows: “The more readily to obtain these illumi­
nations from above, he would often abstain from food, spend whole
nights in prayerful vigil, and, surrendering to a holy impulse,
would repeatedly lean his head against the tabernacle and would
constantly turn his eyes with sorrow and love toward the image of
Jesus crucified. To his friend St. Bonaventure he confided that what­
ever he knew he had for the most part learned from the book of
the crucifix.” 54 Christ indeed had said: “The words that I have
spoken to you are spirit and life.” 55 Of course, books give us the
letter, but study without prayer and the interior life does not attain
to the spiritual meaning.
Whoever considers the light of divine contemplation from which
this great synthesis of St. Thomas proceeds cannot say that this
doctrine is extreme intellectualism, devoid of reality and lifeless.
By an intellectual process, as befitting a science, and not accord­
ing to tire tenets of “sentimentalism, ” St. Thomas treats of God,
si i Cor. 12:8.
S2 Cf. Encyclical Studiorum ducem.
ss Post. Anal. Bk. I, chap. 2.
Encyclical Studiorum ducem.
s» John 6: 64.

INTRODUCTION

29

our natural and supernatural states. But he never separates our
intellectual life from the influence exerted upon it by the will or
even by the sensitive faculties; for he shows to our complete satis­
faction the mutual relations between the faculties. He says, indeed:
"If therefore the intellect and the will be considered with regard to
i hemselves, then the intellect is the higher power. . . . For the
object of the intellect is simpler, and more absolute than the object
of the will.” 56 Being is prior to and more universal than good; thus
I he intellect is simpler and higher than the will which it directs.
Yet the holy Doctor adds: “But relatively and by comparison with
something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the
intellect . . . thus the love of God (at least in this life) is better
than the knowledge of God.” 57 The reason is that the intellect
draws to itself the thing understood even though this is superior to
it, whereas the will is drawn to the thing. Thus charity is the most
excellent of all the virtues.58 St. Thomas also says: “Some are
hearers that they may know, and these build upon intellect (only,
and not upon charity); and this is building upon sand.” 59
This doctrine is not, indeed, extreme intellectualism. Concerning
all these things St. Thomas speaks not oratorically but scientifically,
as befitting his scope, which is the search not for the beauty that
attracts as in poetic art, but for the truth, without which there can­
not be any true goodness or beauty.
St. Thomas excludes the particular from knowledge in the strict
sense, since nothing is knowable except by way of abstraction from
individualized matter. He certainly affirms that "the knowledge of
singulars does not pertain to the perfection of the intellective soul
in speculative knowledge”; but he adds immediately that “it per­
tains to the perfection of the same in practical knowledge,”80
namely, of prudence and the gift of counsel. It pertains also to
either external or internal experience, which the Angelic Doctor
certainly did not despise. He even asserts that the just person can
have by the gift of wisdcm “a quasi-experimental knowledge” 81 of
the presence of God in the soul and of the mysteries of salvation,
according to the following text of St. Paul: “For the Spirit Himself
giveth testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God.” 82 He
’•«Summa theol., la, q.82, a.3.
s’ Ibid.
««Ibid., Ila Ilae, q.23, a.6.
<a> Com. in Matt., 7: 26.
00 Summa theol., Illa, q. 11, a.i ad 311m.
81 Cf. I Sent, d.14, q.2, a.2 ad 311m; Summa theol., la, q.43, a.3; Ila IlaC, q.45,
a. 2.
02 Rom. 8: 16.

3O

THE ONE GOD

gives this testimony "through the effect of filial love which God pro­
duces in us.”03
The holy Doctor possessed this mystic experience in the highest
degree, and it certainly influenced the construction of his theo­
logical synthesis, but, as it were, from on high, by conforming and
elucidating his faith. But knowledge in the strict sense, whether
philosophical or theological, which is acquired by study, is essen­
tially distinct from any individual experience whatever, even the
most sublime, and is concerned only with universals either in pred­
ication or being or causation.®4
But the universal in predication is fundamentally in individual
things, and expresses what is necessary and negatively eternal in
them, namely, what is true not only here and now, but always. It
is το τί ήν tîvai: the being what is was intended to be.®5 Therefore
the holy Doctor says: “So far as universals taken as logical entities
are concerned, so far as they are the cause of knowledge and demon­
stration, they are more truly beings than particulars are, because
the former are incorruptible, whereas the latter are not. But as
regards natural subsistence, particulars are more truly beings, be­
cause they are called first and principal substances.” ®® Thus reality
is preserved absolutely intact.
Hence in scientific knowledge, and rightly so, St. Thomas reduces
all things to universal principles that are fundamental, necessary,
and perpetual laws not only of the mind but of being, and of being
whether natural or supernatural.
Thus his method is of great help in remedying the defects of
modem philosophy, in which the distinction between the internal
os Cf. St. Thomas, Com. on Rom. 8: 16.
e* Summa theol., la, q.i, a.2 ad 2um; Ila Ilae, q.45, a.2.
oo Cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1041, a.27. On the etymology of Aristotle’s descrip­
tion of essence, Dr. Coffey remarks (Ontology, p. 75, no. 1), “that the expression
τό τί fir tirai is not easy to explain. He presumes that the phrase ri tirai sup­
poses a dative understood, such as: τό άνθρώπω tirai (“the being proper to man”).
To the question τί ίστι το άνθρωπω tirai ("What is the being proper to man?’’),
the answer is: that which gives the definition of man, that which explains what
he is: τί ?p’. Is the imperfect τί ην an archaic form for the present, τί ίση; or is
it a deliberate suggestion of the profound doctrine that the essence is ideal, or
possible, that it is anterior to its actual, physical realization? Commentators are
not agreed. Cf. Matthias Kappes, Aristoteles Lexicon, p. 25; Mercier, Ontologie,
p. 30." Father Clarke, S.J. (Logic, p. 5, no. 2) remarks: “Quidditas is the some­
what barbarous but very expressive equivalent of the Aristotelian phrase τό τί f/r
cirai. The essence or quiddity of a thing consists in its corresponding to the pat­
tern after which it was fashioned. Hence τί ηι> means, what is its nature? What
was it intended to be by the Creator? And therefore τό τί f/r tirai means the
being what it was intended to be by its Creator." Father Garrigou-Lagrange
seems to incline to this latter view. (Tr.)
ee Com. on Post. Anal., Bk. I, lect. 37.

INTRODUCTION

3*
senses and the intellect, between nature and grace, gradually dis­
appeared. With the elimination of ontological validity from the
first principles of reason there is nothing firm and stable left in
the speculative order and a fortiori in the practical order.”
The Theological Summa of St. Thomas, constructed as it is ac­
cording to the above-mentioned method, since it avoids the opposite
extremes of rationalism and fideism, is a work that is both truly
scientific and always elucidated by the light of supernatural revela­
tion. It is, therefore, truly a classical and perennial work, not indeed
of extreme intellectualism, but of “sacred theology” that has been
raised to the status of a true science notwithstanding the obscurity
of faith. It constitutes a really organic body of doctrine, and is truly
a single science, though subordinated to God's knowledge and to
that which the blessed have of Him, and bears, as it were, the stamp
(in us) of the divine science,68 considering all things under the
formality of God as author of grace and as the ultimate end.
THE RELATION BETWEEN THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY AND THE INTERIOR
LIFE

There is often too great a separation between study and the interior
life; we do not find sufficiently observed, that beautiful gra­
dation spoken of by St. Benedict which consists in: reading, cog­
itation, study, meditation, prayer and contemplation.60 St. Thomas,
who received his first education from the Benedictines, retained this
wonderful gradation when speaking of the contemplative life.70
Several defects result from separating study too much from prayer.
Thus the hardship and difficulty that not infrequently accompany
study are no longer considered a salutary penance, nor are they
sufficiently directed to God. Thus weariness and disgust sometimes
result from study, without any spiritual profit.
St. Thomas speaks about these two deviations71 when discussing
i he virtue of studiousness or application to study, which must be
commanded by charity as a check to inordinate curiosity and sloth,
so as to study those things which one ought to study, how, when,
and where one ought, especially with regard to the spiritual end in
view, this being for the acquisition of a better knowledge of God and
for the salvation of souls.
er A dear and long exposition of this has been given in the books entitled:
I.e sens commun, la philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques; God, His
existence and His nature. Consult also P. F. Richard, O.P., Introduction à l’étude
et à l'enseignement de la scolastique (2d ed.), Part III, chap. 4.
es Summa theol., la, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2um.
«0 Rule of St. Benedict, chap. 48.
roSumma theol., Ila Ilae, q.180, a.3.
n Ibid., q.166.

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THE ONE GOD

To avoid the above-mentioned defects that are opposed to each
other, it is good to recall how our intellectual study can be sancti­
fied, by considering first what benefit the interior life receives from
a study that is properly directed, and then, on the other hand, what
the study of theology can hope to receive in an increasing degree
from the interior life. It is in the union of these two functions of
our nature that we find the best verification of the principle:
“Causes mutually interact, but in a different order.” There is a
mutual causality and priority among them, which is truly wonderful.
THE INDEBTEDNESS OF THE INTERIOR LIFE TO STUDY

By the study of theology the interior life is especially preserved
from the two serious defects of subjectivism in piety and of
particularism.
Subjectivism, as it applies to piety, is often now called “sentimen­
talism.” It consists in a certain affected love which lacks a true and
deep love for God and souls. This defect arises from the fact that
the natural inclination of our sensitive nature prevails in prayer
according to each one’s disposition. An emotion of our sensitive
nature prevails, and this emotion sometimes expresses itself in
certain outbursts of praise which are quite without solid foundation
in reality. In our days several skeptical psychologists, such as Berg­
son in France, think that even Catholic mysticism is the result of
some prevailing and noble emotion that arises from the subcon­
scious self, and that afterward finds expression in the ideas and
judgments of the mystics. But a doubt always remains whether these
judgments are true that result from the impulse of the subconscious
self and the affections.
Contrary to this, our interior life must be founded on divine
truth. It already has this from infused faith that rests upon the
authority of God revealing. But study that is properly directed is
of great help in fully realizing what the truths of the faith are
strictly in themselves, independently of our subjective dispositions.
Study is of special help, indeed, in forming a true concept of God’s
perfections, of His goodness, love, mercy, justice, as also of the
infused virtues of humility, religion, and charity, and this without
any admixture of emotion that has not its foundation in truth.
Therefore St. Theresa says72 that she received much help by con­
versing with good theologians, so that she might not deviate from
the path of truth in difficult straits.
When our study is rightly ordered, it frees the interior life not
12 Autobiography, chap. 13.

INTRODUCTION

33

only from subjectivism but also from particularism resulting from
i he excessive influence of certain ideas prevalent at some period
of time or in some region, ideas which after thirty years will appear
antiquated. Some years ago ideas of this or that particular philos­
ophy prevailed, which now no longer find favorable acceptance. It
is so in every generation. There is a succession of opinions and
events that arouse one’s admiration; they pass with the fashion of
i he world, while the words of God remain, by which the just man
must live.
Thus, in truth, study that is well ordered preserves intact the
objectivity which the interior life should have above all the devia­
tions of our sensitive nature, and it also preserves the universality
of the same which is founded upon what the Church teaches every­
where and at all times. Thus it becomes increasingly clear that the
higher, the deeper, and the more vital truths are none other than
the elementary truths of Christianity, provided they are thoroughly
examined and become the subject of daily meditation and con­
templation. Such are the truths enunciated in the Lord’s Prayer
and in the following words from the first page of the catechism:
"What must we do to gain the happiness of heaven? To gain the
happiness of heaven we must know, love, and serve God in this
world.” Equally so it becomes increasingly clear that the funda­
mental truth of Christianity is: “God so loved the world as to give
His only begotten Son.” 73
It is a matter of great importance that these truths profoundly
influence our lives, without our deviating into the subjectivism,
sentimentalism, and particularism prevalent at some period of
lime or in some region. In this, however, our interior life is in many
ways benefited by good study; and the choicest fruit of penance is to
be found in the arduousness of study. It is a fruit much more precious
than the natural pleasure to be found in study that may consist
in intellectual labor- not sufficiently sanctified or directed to God. In
diligent study that is commanded by charity, we find pre-eminently
verified the common saying: If the roots of knowledge are bitter,
its fruits are the sweetest and best. We are not considering here the
knowledge that inflates, but that which, under the influence of
charity and the virtue of studiousness, is truly upbuilding.
The interior life, which study saves from a number of deviations,
therefore remains objective in its tendency and is truly founded on
what has been universally and at all times the traditional doctrine.
On the other hand the interior life influences the study of theology.
73 John 3: 16.

34

THE ONE GOD
WHAT THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY OWES TO THE INTERIOR LIFE

Often this study remains lifeless, whether viewed in its positive,
or in its speculative and abstract aspect. Sometimes it lacks the
noble inspiration and influence of the theological virtues and of
the gifts of understanding and wisdom. Hence theological wisdom
is sometimes not that ‘‘savory knowledge” which St. Thomas speaks
of in the first question of the Theological Summa.
At times our mind is occupied too much with dogmatic formulas,
in the analysis of their concepts, in the conclusions deduced from
them, and it does not by means of these formulas penetrate the mys­
tery of faith sufficiently to taste its spiritual sweetness and live
thereby.
Here it is fitting to state that a number of saints, who were in­
capable of such serious studies as we engage in, penetrated these
mysteries of faith more deeply. Thus St. Francis of Assisi, St. Cath­
arine of Siena, St. Benedict Joseph Labre, and many others, who
certainly did not attempt to analyze in an abstract and speculative
manner the dogmatic concepts of the Incarnation, the Redemption,
and the Eucharist, and did not deduce theological conclusions that
are known to us. Yet from the fountainhead of these mysteries with
a holy realism they drew abundant life for themselves.
Through the formulas they reached by a vital act, in the obscurity
of faith, the divine reality itself. As St. Thomas says: “The act of
the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing,” 74
in a revealed truth.
Even without the great grace of contemplation, a number of very
good Christians, by humility and self-denial, penetrate in their own
way the depths of these mysteries. And if this fact is verified in
these good Christians among the faithful, with far more reason
it must be verified in the religious or priest who has truly under­
stood the dignity of his vocation. Daily the priest must celebrate the
Holy Sacrifice with a firmer faith, a more vivid hope, and a more
ardent charity, so that his Eucharistic Communion may be almost
every day substantially more fervent, and not only preserve but also
keep on increasing in him the virtue of charity.
St. Thomas well says: “The more a physical motion approaches
its terminus, the more it is intensified. It is just the opposite with a
violent motion (the throwing of a stone). But grace inclines in a
way similar to that of nature. Therefore (as the physical motion
of a falling stone is always accelerated), so for those who are in a
state of grace, the nearer they approach the end, the more they
74 Summa theol., Ha Ilae, q. i, a.2 ad 2um.

INTRODUCTION

35

must increase in grace”;76 because the nearer they approach God,
i he more they are enticed or drawn by Him, just as the stone is
drawn toward the center of the earth.
If our interior life were to receive such increase of grace every
day, it would have a most favorable influence upon our study, and
each day this would become more vigorous. Thus study and the
life of prayer are causes that interact in beautiful harmony.
THE FRUIT OF THIS MUTUAL INFLUENCE

When the priest’s interior life is one of great and solid piety, his
theology is always more vigorous. After this theologian has made
the descent from faith for the purpose of acquiring theological
knowledge by the discussion of particular questions, he desires to
return to the source, namely, to ascend from the theological knowl­
edge thus acquired by the discussion of particular questions to the
lofty peak of faith. The theologian is like a man who is born on
the top of a mountain, for instance, Monte Cassino, and who after­
ward descends into the valley to acquire an accurate knowledge of
individual things. Finally this man wishes to return to his lofty
abode, that he may contemplate the whole valley from on high and
in a single glance.
There are some men who prefer the plains, but others are more
attracted by the mountains: “Wonderful is the Lord on high.” 78
So the good theologian must daily breathe the mountain air and
derive from the Apostle's Creed an abundance of spiritual nourish­
ment for himself, and also, at the end of the Mass, from the Pro­
logue of St. John’s Gospel, which is, as it were, the synthesis of all
Christian revelation. Daily, in like manner, he must live his life on
a higher plane, directed by the Lord’s Prayer, the beatitudes, and
the Sermon on the Mount in its entirety, which is a synthesis of all
Christian ethics in its wondrous elevation.
When the priest has, as he should have, the spirit of prayer, then
his interior life urges him to search more in dogmatic theology and
in moral theology for that which savors preferably of vitality and
fecundity. For then, under the influence of the gifts of under­
standing and wisdom, faith becomes more penetrating and savory.
Then the most beautiful quasi-obscurity in Christian doctrine
becomes apparent, or the harmonious blends of light and shade
which, like chiaroscuro in a painting, hold the intellect spellbound
and are the subject of contemplation for the saints. As an example
of this, gradually all the great questions of grace are reduced to
78 Com. in epist. ad Ilebr., io: 25.
76 Ps. 92: 4.

gB

THE ONE GOD

these two principles: on the one hand, ‘‘God does not command
what is impossible, but by commanding, both admonishes thee to
do what thou art able, and to pray for what thou art not able to
do,” as St. Augustine says, who is quoted by the Council of Trent
against the Protestants.77 On the other hand, against the Pelagians
and Semipelagians we have: "For who distinguished! thee? Or what
hast thou that thou hast not received?”78 As St. Thomas says:
"Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing
would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for
one than for another.” 70
These two principles taken separately are clear and most certain;
but their intimate reconciliation is very obscure, the obscurity re­
sulting from too great a light. To perceive this intimate reconcilia­
tion, we would have to see how infinite justice, mercy, and liberty
are reconciled in the eminent Deity.
Likewise there is another example; for in proportion as the in­
terior life develops within us, so much the more do we realize the
sublimity of the treatise on the Incarnation accomplished for the
purpose of our redemption; and we are especially impressed with
die motive of the Incarnation of the Son of God, "who for us men
and for our salvation came down from heaven and became man.”
In the same way, under the influence of a life of prayer, the trea­
tise on the Incarnation is presented to us in a more striking light,
and among the various opinions concerning the Sacrifice of the Mass
we more and more realize that the teaching of the Council of Trent
surpasses them all, when it states: "The victim is one and the same,
the same now offering by the ministry of priests, who then offered
Himself on the Cross, the manner of offering being different.” 80
Increasingly Christ appears as the high priest, “always living to
make intercession for us,” 81 especially in the Mass, which is there­
fore of infinite value. Thus we gradually discover in the councils
those most precious adamantine rocks, and likewise in the Theo­
logical Summa the dominant chapters or the more sublime articles
are by degrees made known to us, which are, as it were, the higher
peaks by which the whole mountain range is clearly outlined.
If we were to apply ourselves to the study of theology in a true
spirit of faith, prayer, and penance, we would find verified in
us these words of St. Thomas: “Doctrine and preaching proceed
n Denz., no. 804.
I Cor. 4:7.
n> Summa theol., la, q.20, a.3.
88 Denz., no. 940.
81 Heb. 7: 25.

INTRODUCTION

37

from the fullness of contemplation,” 82 somewhat in the manner
of the preaching of the apostles after the day of Pentecost.
Theology, understood in this sense, is of great importance in
the ministry of souls. It thoroughly imbues a priest with the spirit
of sound judgment according to the mind of Christ and the Church,
so that souls are exhorted to strive after perfection in accordance
with true principles, by showing one, for instance, that according
to the supreme precept, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with
thy whole heart,” all Christians must strive after the perfection of
charity, each one, however, according to the manner of his state
in life.
And we cannot reach this fullness of perfection in the Christian
life unless our lives are profoundly influenced by the mystery of
the Incarnation in its redemptive aspect and by the Eucharist, and
unless, by faith, enlightened by the gifts of wisdom and understand­
ing, we penetrate these mysteries and taste their sweetness. For this,
indeed, the study of theology is of great help provided it be prop­
erly directed, not for the satisfaction we get from it, but for the
purpose of knowing God better and for the salvation of souls.
Thus these beautiful words of the Vatican Council become in­
creasingly possible of verification in us: “Reason, enlightened by
faith, when it seeks earnestly, piously, and calmly, attains by a gift
of God some, and that a very fruitful, understanding of mysteries;
and this both from the analogy of those things which it naturally
knows, and from the relations which the mysteries bear to one
another and to the last end of man.” 83
The study of sacred theology, which sometimes is hard and ardu­
ous, though fruitful, thus disposes our minds for the light of con­
templation and of life, which is, as it were, an introduction and a
beginning of eternal life in us.
82 Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q. 188, a.6.
sa Denz., no. J796.

PROLOGUE TO THE THEOLOGICAL SUMMA
In this prologue St. Thomas expresses his intention, namely, to

treat of whatever belongs to the Christian religion, in such a way as
may tend to the instruction of beginners, because the Catholic
doctor must be a teacher to all, even to little ones.
But from the explanation of this purpose it is evident that this
work is suitable for beginners, not because it treats solely of the
first principles of Christian doctrine, but because all questions are
proposed in it according to the order of the subject matter, and
not as the occasion of the argument may offer, by which it fre­
quently happens that there are useless questions and repetitions as
in many works of preceding authors. Since Holy Scripture includes
the order of charity or of the subjection of all affections to God’s
love, a logical order must also be pursued in the body of Christian
doctrine.
Hence this Summa of St. Thomas was not meant to be merely an
elementary work; for, as Cajetan remarks, all theological problems
are here appropriately and dearly treated. Already in this prologue
St. Thomas shows himself the great classicist of sacred theology
because of his superior simplicity, which is, as it were, a develop­
ment of common sense and the Christian sense. There is a vast
difference between this simplicity and the complicated exposition
of Scotus.
As we shall see at the beginning of the second question, the
order observed in this work is didactic and strictly theological. St.
Thomas adopts a far better method than that of the Master of the
Sentences or of Alexander of Hales in the arrangement of the
questions, and this not only as to generalities but also as to particu­
lars. In the Summa of the Angelic Doctor all questions are con­
sidered as they refer to God, who is the proper object of theology,
rather than as they refer to man and his liberty. This point of view
may be called therefore theocentric but not anthropocentric, as the
psychological tendency is of modern times.

38

CHAPTER I
Question i

The Nature

and

Extent of Sacred Doctrine

This question contains ten articles. It treats (1) of the necessity

of sacred doctrine, asking whether it is necessary; (2) of the nature
of this sacred doctrine in three articles: whether it is a science;
whether it is one science; whether it is speculative or practical; (3)
of its excellence compared with the other sciences, in articles five
and six; (4) of its subject or proper object; (5) of its method:
whether it is a matter of argument, the intrinsic and extrinsic
sources being discussed in a general way in this article; there is
also an article on the use of metaphor, and the last article concerns
the use which theology makes of Holy Scripture.
As to the arrangement of these articles, the objection might be
raised that St. Thomas ought to have treated of the subject or object
of sacred doctrine before he discussed its nature and excellence, be­
cause the nature of a science depends upon its object. In answer
to this it must be said that from the very beginning of this question
he supposes the nominal definition of sacred doctrine, in which the
object of this latter is expressed at least in a confused manner. After
this, gradually and methodically, he makes the transition from the
nominal to the real and scientific definition, which is completed in
the seventh article, in which he speaks explicitly of the proper
subject of this science.
Concerning the nominal definition, or the meaning of the words
"sacred doctrine,” there is a dispute as to what the holy Doctor
implies by them. Does he mean faith? or theology? Or does he mean
sacred doctrine in general according as it abstracts from faith and
theology? Cajetan and several others hold this last view; but John
of St. Thomas, Sylvius, and others contend that by these words
St. Thomas means theology in the strict sense. This seems to be the
true answer, although, of course, the first article is concerned more
with sacred doctrine in general. But immediately from the second
article it is strictly a discussion of sacred science as distinguished
from faith. Gradually St. Thomas passes from the confused to the
distinct notion of this science.
89

40

THE ONE GOD
FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER BESIDES PHILOSOPHY ANY FURTHER DOCTRINE IS REQUIRED 1

State of the question. Necessity is of many kinds. It is: (a) ab­
solute; (b) hypothetical, which is either physical or moral.
It is a question of hypothetical necessity for the attainment of
the end; but it is certainly not a question of absolute necessity that
is presupposed by the very nature of the thing independently of
the end to be attained, as when we say it is necessary for man to be
a rational animal.
We must note that a thing is said to be necessary for the end
in two ways. First, as indispensable for the attainment of the end
(ad esse simpliciter), and this is called physical necessity, as in the
case of food for the preservation of human life. Secondly, a thing is
said to be necessary for the convenient attainment of the end (ad
bene esse), as in the case of a horse for a long journey; for otherwise
there would be great difficulty in attaining the end, though it
would not be a physical impossibility.
The difficulties placed at the beginning of the article by way of
a statement of the question, are those which later on were pro­
posed in another form by the positivists and the rationalists. These
are: (i) that man must not seek to know those things that are
above reason; so say the positive agnostics; (2) now a certain part of
philosophy treats of God; so say several rationalists, who seek to
reduce theology to philosophy, and they propose a merely natural
interpretation of the mysteries of faith, as Spinoza and afterward
Hegel did.
In the body of the article there are two conclusions which may
be briefly expressed as follows: (1) the divine revelation of super­
natural truths is hypothetically necessary, but it is so indispensably
(simpliciter) or physically; (2) the revelation of certain natural
truths that pertain to religion was hypothetically necessary, con­
veniently so (ad bene esse) or morally speaking.
First conclusion. This is proved in the body of the article accord­
ing to St. Thomas’ usual way by beginning with the minor, which is
as follows: It is necessary that the end first be made known to men
who are to direct their actions to the end. But according to revela­
tion men are ordained to a supernatural end. Therefore it is neces­
sary that the supernatural end first be made known to men by
divine revelation.
It is evidently a question of hypothetical, but of indispensable
1 See also Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps. 4, 6.

SACRED DOCTRINE

4'

(simpliciter) or of physical necessity, because nothing is willed
unless it is foreknown. The middle term of the demonstration is:
the foreknowledge of the end.
In this argument the major is founded upon reason; the minor is
revealed, for the Scripture says: “The eye hath not seen, O God,
besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait
for Thee." 2 In like manner we read: “But to us God hath revealed
them by His Spirit. For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the
deep things of God.” 3 Hence the Vatican Council says that divine
revelation is necessary “because God of His infinite goodness has
ordained man to a supernatural end, to be a sharer of divine bless­
ings which utterly exceed the intelligence of the human mind.” 4
This council likewise declared that the mysteries of faith transcend
also the natural powers of the created intellect, which includes even
the angelic.5*
The second conclusion concerns the moral necessity for the
revelation of certain truths of the natural order that pertain to
religion, such as the existence of God the Author of nature, His
universal providence that extends even to the least detail, creation
from nothing, the personal immortality of the human soul.
St. Thomas gives the reason for this, namely, that otherwise few
there are who would come to know these truths, and this only after
a long time, and with a mixture of many errors. This reason is
developed by St. Thomas in another of his works,® and solemn
utterance was given to it in the Vatican Council in the following
words: “It is to be ascribed to this divine revelation, that such
truths among things divine as of themselves are not beyond human
reason can, even in the present condition of mankind, be known
by everyone with facility, with firm assurance, and with no mixture
of error.” 7
We have the confirmation of this in the history of philosophy,
since the Greeks, who were particularly apt at speculation, having
spent a long time in this pursuit, did not succeed in acquiring a
clear idea of creation from nothing, and they had more or less
doubts about the universal scope of Providence and the personal
immortality of the soul. In this we clearly see how first of all revela­
tion, even from the very opening words of Genesis in which it
2 Is. 64: 4.
• I Cor. s: 10.
• Denz., no. 1786; see also canons of the same council, ibid., nos. 1807 f.
c Ibid., no. 1796.
• Cf. Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 4.
» Denz., no. 1786.

.

42

THE ONE GOD

speaks of creation, emphatically confirms from on high the certain
findings of philosophy, as evidently is the case in Christian philoso­
phy. This latter surpasses the philosophy of the more profound
Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, especially in two respects,
namely, as regards the unwavering certainty concerning the most
free creation of all things from nothing and the personal immor­
tality of the soul. Thus philosophical speculation directed by faith
reaches much loftier heights among the great Christian philosophers.
We have another confirmation of this from the history of modern
philosophy, especially from the history of agnosticism, whether of
the positivist or idealist type. A third confirmation is found in the
history of religions, and of their fluctuating opinions about the
great problems concerning God and the soul.
It is not as yet scientific theology but sacred doctrine according
as it abstracts from faith and theology that is the subject matter of
the body of the first article. There is also a reference to faith inas­
much as faith and not theology is necessary for salvation. Theology
as a science is not indeed necessary for any of the faithful, but for
the Church collectively, at least according to the ordinary law, since
the teaching Church must also make use of human means in the
discharge of her office, having recourse to reason in defending what
is of faith against the objections of the adversaries.
In the reply to the second objection we find the first mention
of theology as distinct from faith. This reply states that there is no
reason why theology, guided by the higher light of divine revela­
tion, may not teach those truths which philosophy already teaches
us by means of the natural light of reason.
The reason for this is that sciences are differentiated according
to the various means through which knowledge is obtained. For it
is not the material but the formal object that differentiates the
sciences, according as the knowledge is obtained from a different
source. Thus the astronomer and the geologist prove that the earth
is round in different ways, the former by mathematics, the latter
by physics. Thus the distinction between the sciences is the result
of the different degrees of abstraction.
Scotus, as Cajetan remarks, attacks this first article since he has
a different conception of the distinction between human nature
and grace. For Scotus, our soul is by its very nature positively or­
dained for the beatific vision,8 the desire for which would be nat­
ural and innate, although the soul cannot attain to it without
God’s help, to which it is not entitled, and which depends upon
s According to the theory of Scotus, if the soul saw itself directly, it would
behold in itself this positive ordination to the immediate vision of God. Cf.
Scotus in Quaestio Ia Prologi Primi Sententiarum.

SACRED DOCTRINE

43
God’s most free sanction.9 This theory of Scotus is in harmony with
his teaching on being which, he says, applies univocally to God
and creatures, and thus the infinite distance between the divine
and human natures is not sufficiently safeguarded, as we shall see
in question thirteen.
The Vatican Council speaks according to the terminology of St.
Thomas when it says: “The Catholic Church, with one consent, has
also ever held, and does hold, that there is a twofold order of
knowledge, distinct both in principle and in object: in principle,
because our knowledge in the one is by natural reason and in the
other by divine faith; in object, because, besides those things to
which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief
mysteries hidden in God which, unless divinely revealed, cannot
be known. . . . For the divine mysteries by their own nature [it
does not say according to God’s free decree] so far transcend the
created intelligence that, even when delivered by revelation and re­
ceived by faith, they remain covered with a veil of faith itself, and
shrouded in a certain degree of darkness.” 10
SECOND ARTICLE

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A SCIENCE

State of the question. From this title we see that it is now not
merely a question of sacred doctrine in general according as it
abstracts from faith and theology, but it is a question of theology
as a science.
The difficulty is that every science proceeds from principles di­
rectly known and evident, whereas sacred theology proceeds from
principles of faith, which are obscure and not admitted by all.
Moreover, science is not concerned with individual facts but with
universal principles, whereas sacred doctrine treats of particulars,
namely, of Christ, the apostles, the patriarchs, and the prophets.
The reply of St. Thomas is this: sacred doctrine, that is, sacred
theology, is a science, but it is a science that is subordinated to a
higher science possessed by God, and in a lesser degree by the
blessed. It is proved to be a science in the counterargument from
the authority of St. Augustine who says: “to this science alone be­
longs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected,
9 Concerning this difficulty, see question twelve. In this question it will be
necessary to show that the innate desire for the beatific vision would have to be
efficacious, otherwise God as the Author of nature would have given a natural
inclination to an end to which as Author of nature He could not bring the
creature, and thus there would be no proportion between agent and end.
10 Denz., nos. 1795 f.

44

THE ONE GOD

and strengthened.” 11 In this descriptive definition obtained from
the effects, the divers functions of theology are already to some ex­
tent distinguished, for, as theology is somewhat apologetic, by
means of it saving faith is begotten; afterward, by the theological
explanation of sacred doctrine, faith is nourished and is defended
against those denying it, and it is strengthened since the various
points of faith are so arranged as to constitute one body of doc­
trine, and, like the setting of precious stones in a diadem, its value
becomes increasingly apparent by this orderly arrangement.
Nevertheless tire difficulty remains if we contend that theology
is a science not only in the broad sense but in the strict sense; for
science properly so called is certain knowledge of truth that is de­
duced by demonstration from true and certain principles. More­
over, the certitude of sciences has its foundation in the evidence
of the principles, and, contrary to this, the principles of sacred
theology are not evident.
To solve this difficulty, St. Thomas establishes the second part
of the conclusion: that theology is a science subordinated to the
higher science of God and the blessed. It is proved as follows:
A subordinate science proceeds from principles known by the
light of a higher science, as the science of perspective (optics) pro­
ceeds from principles established by geometry. Now sacred theology
proceeds from principles transmitted by God through revelation.
Therefore sacred theology is a science subordinated to the science
of God and the blessed. We say ‘‘of the blessed,” because they see
God's essence, although in a finite way, a point which we will dis­
cuss in question twelve.
Thus in the reply to the first objection the difficulty presented
at the beginning is solved. For the principles of any science are
either in themselves self-evident—and thus a science is not sub­
ordinated—or else they are reducible to the conclusions of a higher
science. Hence, too, the conclusions of a subordinated science are
reduced to self-evident principles, but through the intermediary of
a subordinating science.
First corollary. The principles of a subordinated science can be
known in two ways: either by faith and without evidence of reason,
or by a higher science already acquired, and then there is evidence
of reason.
Thus the optician, if he is not a geometer, believes the principles
transmitted by geometry, and then his optics is truly a subordi­
nated science, but as yet imperfect. If afterward this optician be­
comes a geometer, then his optics will be not only a truly sub­
ordinated science, but a perfect one. Likewise, the musician believes
ii De Trinitate, PL, XLII, 1037.

SACRED DOCTRINE

45

the principles he receives from arithmetic, if he does not know
arithmetic; but he can acquire this knowledge.
In the same manner, the theologian who is still a wayfarer, be­
lieves the principles transmitted by God revealing and proposed
by the Church; and thus his theology is truly a subordinated science,
but as yet imperfect. But when this theologian afterward attains
to the beatific vision or comes into possession of it, then he not
only believes but sees the principles transmitted to him by God
through the beatific vision, or in the Word, and he still can, out­
side the Word, make use of his discursive theology, which then is
truly not only a subordinated science, but a perfect one. Thus with
the attainment of the beatific vision faith is made void, but not
theology. St. Thomas’ conclusion concerns sacred theology as it is
in itself, and this can be in the theologian either as wayfarer, or
as one of the blessed or possessors of God.
Second corollary. The theologian will have the same theological
habit in heaven as he now has on earth; just as the optician does
not lose his science of optics when he becomes a geometer. So
Christ when on earth had acquired knowledge as well as the beatific
vision.
Third corrollary. Therefore what is substantially a true science
is sometimes imperfect under certain conditions. Thus in the theo­
logian as wayfarer, theology is substantially a true science (and is
neither opinion nor faith), because its conclusions are reducible to
evident principles. But if, in fact, the reduction does not result in
actual evidence, this is not owing directly to the defect of this
science, but is, as it were, accidentally so, because of the defect in
the person knowing, as in the case of the optician who would not
know geometry. Hence the theology of the wayfarer is a true
science, but it is imperfect as to its status.
In other words, a science that is imperfect, not in itself but be­
cause it is in the initial stage of its development, can still be called
a science, because as such its conclusions are reducible to prin­
ciples. The optician who is not a geometer has good grounds for
thinking that his optics is a science and not merely an opinion.
It must be observed that this distinction between the essence of
a science and its state, is of almost similar application in many
other problems, and there is a most certain foundation for this.
In fact, one as yet merely a boy or even an infant is, as regards his
nature, a true human being, but he is in an imperfect state. In
like manner, the acquired moral virtues in a sinner can be true vir­
tues, but they are in an imperfect state as regards their disposition.
Thus the acquired virtue of true temperance differs from the
temperance of the miser which has not as yet reached the perfect

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THE ONE GOD

state of a virtue that is practically stabilized, but is still in the im­
perfect state of a fickle disposition.
Likewise the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas does not differ
specifically, as regards its formal object, from Aristotle’s philosophy;
but the difference consists in this, that in Aristotle the habit was
imperfect, whereas in St. Thomas it was perfect. Thus Aristotle did
not succeed in acquiring a clear idea of creation from nothing,
nor of providence that extends even to the least detail, nor was he
fully convinced of the personal immortality of the soul. His phi­
losophy never penetrated to such depths as this. In our days some
would wish to relegate Christian philosophy to Christian apolo­
getics, which is sacred theology functioning by an appeal to rea­
son. To be sure, the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas did not
differ specifically from the philosophy of Aristotle except in its cir­
cumstances, because it was fortified from on high by divine revela­
tion as its guiding star; because of this positive fortification and
the perfection resulting therefrom, it is called Christian.
SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS

Durandus, Scotus, and Aureolus raised objections against the
conclusion of St. Thomas. These objections are examined by Ca­
jetan.
First objection. According to Aureolus, since the theologian does
not have evidence of the truth of the conclusions, theology is the
science of consequences or of logical inferences, but not of the
conclusions themselves, or of actual facts. In other words, it would
be but a good application of logic to matters of faith.
We reply with Cajetan that from this it follows that theology is
a science in an imperfect state, but not that it is not a science. The
theologian is not only a logician applying logic to matters of faith,
but he must also be a metaphysician, and in addition to this a
theologian in the strict sense of the term, treating not only of logi­
cal being, or merely of being purely as such, but of the mystery
of God’s life.
Second objection. A subordinating science states the reason why
the principles of a subordinated science are true. But it does not
give the reason why the principles of faith are true.
Reply. Wayfarers do not see the reason for this; however there
is such a reason. Thus there is a certain reason on account of which
God is triune, for He is triune by reason of Himself. Likewise there
is a certain reason for the free decree of the redemptive Incarna­
tion.

SACRED DOCTRINE

47
Third objection. The object of a subordinated science is distinct
from that of a subordinating science, as optics with reference to
geometry. But theology and the beatific vision have the same
object. Cajetan 12 replies to this objection by the following distinc­
tion: that theology has the same object as it is an entity, this I con­
cede; as it is an object, this I deny; for the object of the beatific
vision is God clearly seen, whereas the object of theology is God
as revealed, abstracting both from clarity and obscurity. But if,
moreover, a subordinating science has a limited object, such as
geometry, then the object of the subordinated science, such as
optics, is also distinct as an entity.
This distinction between the object as an entity and the object
as an object, is of great importance. Thus God, although He is
most simple as an entity, is the object of several specifically distinct
habits, namely, of the light of glory, of infused faith, of the gifts
of understanding and wisdom, of sacred discursive theology
(whether in the blessed or in wayfarers), and of natural theology.
And these various habits remain specifically distinct by reason of
their object, not as it is an entity, but as it is an object. Likewise
man is the material object of various sciences, namely, of biology,
psychology, metaphysics, and even theology.
In the reply to the second objection of this article, St. Thomas
remarks why sacred theology can treat of individual facts, although
science treats of universals. In truth, it treats of these things, namely,
of the deeds performed by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, not as con­
stituting the principal object but as they are examples, and to
establish the authority of those through whom the divine revela­
tion came down to us. But when it treats of Christ, it considers in
Him what the redemptive Incarnation is, just as physics or astron­
omy treats of the sun, considering its influence in the solar system.
First doubt. For true theology is it enough for one to have a
knowledge of supernatural things, not through infused faith but
through faith acquired by human efforts, such as the formal heretic
has? In other words, is infused faith necessary for theology, so that
the loss of infused faith through heresy would mean the loss of
theology?
Vasquez replies that acquired faith suffices for theology: (t)
because theology survives in the heretical theologian; (2) because
theology is a naturally acquired habit and therefore does not neces­
sarily depend upon any infused habit. It suffices that the principles
of faith be believed by whatever kind of faith.
John of St. Thomas, on the contrary, justly replies that the op12 Com. in Summam S. Thomae, la, q. 1, a.2, no. 13.

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THE ONE GOD

posite opinion must by all means be held; and he says that it is
the one commonly held among theologians, especially the Thomists.
This we deduce from the text of St. Thomas who, when comparing
the certitude of theological science with other sciences, says:
“whereas this derives its certitude from the light of the divine
knowledge, which cannot be misled”;18 and he shows that it is
divine revelation which gives to theology its formal aspect.14
Now the acquired faith of the formal heretic is uncertain, be­
cause he believes by an act of his own judgment and will those
truths which he approves of, and rejects others that have been re­
vealed, thus rejecting the formal motive of infused faith, which is
the authority of God revealing as regards all revealed truths. Those
which he retains are believed on grounds of human reason. Hence
the faith of the formal heretic is some kind of opinion from which
certainty of conclusions cannot be deduced.15
Hence many ideas concerning matters of faith survive indeed
materially in the theologian who becomes a formal heretic, but
there is no longer the formal connection between these ideas, and
in the conclusions deduced the word “is” implies an affirmation
that is merely an opinion and not a certainty. Hence nothing is
left but the corpse, as it were, of theological science in such a
person. For science is a habit or simple quality together with sub­
ordination of ideas. But this simple quality is specified by the for­
mal object, which in this case is God as made known to us by virtual
revelation. Hence, when divine revelation is rejected by formal
heresy, this simple quality or theological habit no longer remains,
but in its place we have only ideas that are precariously connected
under the dominance of a fickle opinion which is the result of the
heretic’s own judgment and volitional act. Thus the human body,
when the soul has departed, is no longer truly a human body; for,
lacking what formally connects the various parts, it is but a corpse
in the process of corruption or disintegration. The habit of sacred
theology implies the presence of a theological bent of mind, and
this the heretic, such as Luther or Calvin, no longer possesses.
In reply to Vasquez, it must be said that theology, since it is ac­
quired and not infused, is formally natural, though radically it is
supernatural, in that it has its root in infused faith, as we shall
state later on. Nor can anyone be said to have acquired a sub­
ordinated science who is not certain of having acquired a sub­
ordinating science; nor can such a science be acquired by one who
accepts from a subordinating science what he approves of and nothSumma theol., la, q. 1, a.5.
*1· Ibid., a. 4.
1« Ibid., Ila Itae, q.5, a.3.

SACRED DOCTRINE

49

ing else, as in the case of the optician who would accept from
geometry only those things which he approved of; for he would
be accepting these things not on scientific but aesthetic grounds.
Second doubt. With what theological conclusions is this article
concerned? It is chiefly concerned with conclusions strictly so called,
with those that are inferred by a discursive process which is not
only explanatory but also objectively illative, and that establish a
new truth which is deduced and distinct from the two truths enun­
ciated in the premises. In other words, it is a new truth that is
not formally but virtually revealed.
It must be noted that there can thus be several distinct truths
of the same thing, even of the same divine reality; because, al­
though God is most simple as an entity, yet He can be the object of
different habits and even more so of different judgments or truths
in the same science. Thus three distinct truths are enunciated in
the following syllogisms: Every intellectual being is free. But God
is intellectual. Therefore God is free.18 Being is consequent upon
person. But in Christ there is only one person. Therefore in Christ
there is one being.17
These are examples of objectively illative reasoning by which
we acquire a new truth. For to say that “God is intellectual,” and
“God is free,” is to enunciate two distinct truths, two true judg­
ments (truth is formally in the mind), although these are enunciated
of the same divine reality. If this were not so, we should have to
say with the nominalists that the divine names, such as mercy and
justice, are synonymous.18 Father Marin Sola does not stress this
point sufficiently in his new theory on the evolution of dogma,10
about which more will be said later on.
On the other hand, the theological conclusion improperly so
called, which is obtained by an explicative process of reasoning is
not a new truth but one that has already been revealed and is now
more explicitly proposed. Thus the infallibility of the Supreme
Pontiff speaking ex cathedra is the same truth as that revealed by
Christ when He said: “Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will
10 Ibid., la, q. 19, a.i, 10.
Ibid., Illa, q. 17, a.2.
io Ibid., la, q. 13, a.4.
10 In L'Evolution homogène du dogme catholique (French tr., Ill, 333), we
lead: "Two propositions that have the same subject differ or are identical in
meaning according to their predicates. If therefore the predicates are really iden­
tical, the meaning of the propositions will be also." Although justice and mercy
are really identical in God, and not really distinct, the meaning of these two
truths is not the same: God is just, God is merciful. This point is of primary
importance; if it is denied, we are led involuntarily to the admission of nominalinn.
it

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THE ONE GOD

build My Church and the gates of hell shall not prevail against
it.” 20 In the explicative process of reasoning there may be some
inference resulting therefrom which is merely of subjective im­
port, or as far as we are concerned, but in itself it means no addi­
tion to knowledge. In this way there is no acquisition of a new
truth, but the truth that was formally and implicitly revealed is
expressed in another form and more explicitly.
On the contrary, in the objectively illative process a new truth
is acquired, which is not formally but virtually revealed, and which
is deduced from what has been revealed, as in the proposition:
there is one being in Christ. In this we see the specific distinction
between theology and faith, which latter is not a discursive science.
Third doubt. When is the discursive reasoning proper or truly
illative? It is generally admitted that such is the case when the con­
clusion is contained in the premises, as the property is contained
in the essence, or the effect in its cause. We have an example of
this in the following syllogism: every man is free; but Christ is
truly a man; therefore Christ has human liberty (which is distinct
from His divine liberty). But this truth thus deduced is otherwise
revealed in that it has been revealed that Christ freely obeyed and
merited for us. Another example is the following: every man can
acquire knowledge by experience and observation; but Christ was
truly a man; therefore Christ had acquired knowledge (and not
only infused knowledge and the beatific vision). A third example
would be: it was fitting that Christ, like His apostles, should have
the gift of tongues; but this gift presupposes infused knowledge;
therefore Christ had infused knowledge.
On the contrary, we have the case of discursive reasoning im­
properly so called, if the conclusion is contained in the whole, or
the singular in the universal, or the implicit in the explicit. The
following is an example: all men have sinned in Adam; but Abra­
ham was a man; therefore he sinned in Adam. Likewise in the fol­
lowing syllogism: Christ died for all men; but Abraham was a
man; therefore Christ died for him. In the same way it is shown
that Christ died for the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom He redeemed,
but by preservative redemption.
Fourth doubt. What theological conclusions are definable by the
Church as dogmas of faith, such that their contradictory proposi­
tions would not only be erroneous but heretical? All know the
difference between these two terms: erroneous and heretical. A
proposition is said to be erroneous when it is against a theologically
certain conclusion, and heretical when it is against the faith.
20 Matt. 16: 18.

SACRED DOCTRINE

51
In answer to this we say:
1) All theologians are agreed that the theological conclusion im­
properly so called is definable as a dogma. The reason is that it
is not a question here of a new truth that has been deduced, but
of a truth that has already been formally but confusedly or im­
plicitly revealed, such as the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff
when our Lord said: “Thou art Peter. . .
Then the discursive
reasoning is only explicative, or at most subjectively but not ob­
jectively illative. In this case the discursive method explains only
the subject or predicate of the proposition that is expressly re­
vealed. Thus it has been revealed that Christ is truly God and
truly man. But for true humanity a rational soul is an essential
requisite. Therefore Christ had a rational soul. This conclusion
was defined against Apollinaris.21
For this same reason particular propositions included in an ex­
pressly revealed universal proposition are definable as dogmas of
faith. Thus we conclude that Abraham contracted original sin, for
the universal proposition that has been expressly revealed, “in
whom (Adam) all have sinned,” 22 covers all particular cases. This
assertion is generally admitted by theologians.
2) A conclusion deduced even by a truly illative process of rea­
soning from two principles that are of faith, is also definable as
a dogma of faith.23 The reason is that, although the conclusion is
reached by the illative process, yet specifically as such it is of faith.
It is implicitly revealed, indeed, in the two revealed premises; for
a new idea is not introduced, and the connection between predicate
and subject can be affirmed by reason of the formal revelation. It
is, as it were, the logical explanation of the two propositions taken
together that are of faith.
3) A theological conclusion that is deduced by an objectively
illative process of reasoning from one premise that is of faith, and
another founded on reason, is not of faith in itself, nor can it be
for us defined as a dogma of faith. The reason is that this conclu­
sion is a new truth that is not simply revealed, but is simply deduced
from revelation and is only virtually revealed.24
We have an example of this in the following syllogism: being is
consequent upon person, so that there is only one substantial exist­
ai Cf. John of St. Thomas, in lam, q.i, disp. 2, a.4, no. 16.
22 Rom. 5: 12.
23 Cf. Salmanticenses, De fide, disp. I, dub. IV, no. 127.
24 So say the Salmanticenses (ibid., no. 124), who quote for this same opinion
such famous Thomists as Cajetan, Capreolus, Bannez, John of St. Thomas, against
Vega, Vasquez, Suarez, and Lugo. Cf. Dictionnaire de théol. cath., art. "Explicite
et implicite”; also art. "Dogme."

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THE ONE GOD

ence for each person; but m Christ there is only one person; there­
fore in Christ there is only one being, namely, the one and only
substantial existence for the two natures.25
In this discursive method, the major is founded on reason, and
the minor is of faith. Hence in the conclusion the connection be­
tween the predicate and the subject cannot be affirmed solely on
account of the authority of God revealing, but partly because of
the revelation contained in the minor, and partly on account of
the light of natural reason, by which we are impelled to give our
assent to the major premise. Therefore this conclusion belongs
directly to theology and not to faith.
In other words, this conclusion is not simply revealed (not even
implicitly), but it is simply deduced from revealed principles and
is only virtually revealed. Hence if the Church were to propose it
as a dogma of faith, the contradictory of which would be heresy,
the Church would be uttering what is false, because it would pro­
pose as simply revealed and to be believed on the authority of
God revealing, what is not simply revealed but merely deduced
from what is revealed. But the Church can condemn infallibly as
erroneous the denial of such a deduced conclusion.
Another example: infused knowledge is necessary so that the
human intellect may not remain imperfect but may know, for in­
stance, various languages not known by one's natural powers; but
it was not to be thought of that Christ’s human intellect even in this
life should be imperfect; therefore Christ even in this life had in­
fused knowledge.26 This conclusion is not of faith, nor is it definable
as a dogma of faith.
In these truly illative processes of reasoning a new truth is in­
ferred in that from the premise known by the natural power of
reason (especially if this premise is the major), a new truth is in­
troduced, and we have not merely an explanation of the subject
or predicate of the revealed proposition. Such conclusions (if not
otherwise equivalently revealed in Sacred Scripture or tradition)
are not defined by the Church. But the Church sometimes condemns,
and even infallibly, as erroneous, opinions that deny theologically
certain conclusions.
For a more complete explanation of the conclusion just stated,
we must add that, according to the Vatican Council, "all those
things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which
are contained in the word of God written or handed down, and
which the Church, either by a solemn judgment or by her ordinary
and universal teaching, proposes for our belief as having been
2® Cf. Summa theol., Illa, q.17, a.2.
2® Ibid., Illa, q.9, a.3.

SACRED DOCTRINE

53

divinely revealed.”27 This is the definition of dogma. But that
which is only connected with what is revealed, cannot be said to be
simply and strictly revealed, but is distinguished from what is re­
vealed as being deduced from it.
Moreover, if the Church defined as a dogma such a conclusion, it
would not only be infallibly guarding and explaining the deposit
of the faith, but it would be perfecting the teaching that is of
faith, and would be establishing new dogmas; for by this definition
it would be declaring of faith what before was not of faith, either
in itself or for us.
Finally, if the above-mentioned theological conclusions were de­
finable as dogmas of faith, then all theologically certain conclusions,
even those most remote, would be equally definable as dogmas, and
all conclusions condemned as erroneous could be condemned as
heretical in the strict sense of the term. Thus a great part of the
Theological Summa and, especially so, practically the whole treatise
on God and His attributes, rigorously deduced from revealed prin­
ciples, could become dogmas of faith.
We must therefore carefully distinguish between a theological
conclusion that is only virtually connected with what is revealed,
and a truth that is formally and implicitly revealed. Yet in individ­
ual cases it is not always easy to make this distinction. For what
seems to the majority virtually connected with that which is re­
vealed, to one of prodigious and keener intellect appears to be
formally and implicitly revealed. There are Thomists who see in
the words of St. Paul, “It is God who worketh in you, both to will
and to accomplish, according to His good will,” 28 a formally im­
plicit revelation that grace is efficacious of itself and not because
God foresees our consent. They come to the same conclusion from
the following words of our Lord: "My sheep . . . shall not perish
forever, and no man shall pluck them out of My hand . . . and
no one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” 29 In ac­
cordance with these texts, for many Thomists, an explicative proc­
ess of reasoning, and one that is objectively illative, suffices to show
that grace is of itself efficacious, because it concerns not a new
truth that is deduced, but the same truth more explicitly formu­
lated.30
22 Denz., no. 1792.
28 Phil. 2: 13.
28 John 10:27-29.
80 As for the contrary opinion, namely, that the Church can define as a dogma
of faith, theological conclusions in the strict sense of the term, those which are
deduced by an objectively illative process of reasoning, cf. Vega, In Trident.,
Bk. IX, chap. 39: Suarez, De fide, disp. HI, sect. 11; De Lugo, De fide, disp. I,
nos. 268-77.

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THE ONE GOD

Objection. Father Marin Sola disagrees, saying that at least if it
concerns God, a conclusion obtained by a truly illative process of
reasoning from one premise that is founded on reason and another
that is of faith, is revealed, because it concerns the same most
simple divine reality.31
We reply to this objection by appealing to the classical distinc­
tion given by Cajetan.32 That the premises of faith and the abovementioned theological conclusion concern the same divine reality,
as an entity, this I concede; as an object, this I deny. For the same
divine reality specifies various specifically distinct habits, as it is
variously presented to them as object, namely, as clearly seen, or
as obscurely believed, or as the object of the gift of wisdom, or as
the object of sacred theology, or as the object of natural theology.
With greater reason it can be the object of several propositions in
the same science, or of several judgments, which are different truths
(truth is formally in the mind) of the same divine reality.
For it is evident that, if for the same divine reality there is only
one truth for the divine intellect, which by one intuitive act knows
the divine essence, for the created intellect, however, and especially
for the human intellect, there are several true judgments and truths
concerning the same divine reality, as, for example, God is intel­
lectual, God is free, God is just, God is merciful. But it is now a
question not of the divine intellect, but of the human intellect
with reference to which a distinction must be made between truth
that is revealed and truth that is deduced from what is revealed.
ai Cf. L’Evolution homogène du dogme catholique, II, 332 f., where we read
as follows: "Under pain of falling into nominalism or the subjective conceptual­
ism of Ockham or Aureolus, we must admit that the validity of a proposition does
not depend precisely upon the words but upon their objective meaning, the
words being but the material element, whereas their signification constitutes the
formal element. Two propositions about God, the predicates of which are identical,
are really identical in meaning. Two propositions with the same subject (God),
differ or are identical in meaning only by reason of their predicates. If therefore
the predicates are really identical, the meaning will be, too, and likewise their
doctrine.
Father Marin Sola does not take sufficiently into consideration the fact that
in these two propositions, "God is intellectual, God is free,” and likewise in these
two, "God is merciful, God is just," the predicates are not really distinct, for there
is only a virtual distinction between the divine attributes. Nevertheless these four
propositions are not the same in meaning, nor do they enunciate the same truth,
unless we admit the opinion of the nominalists, that the divine names are
synonymous terms, such as Tullius and Cicero. This opinion is refuted by St.
Thomas (cf. Summa, la, q>3, a.4: "Whether names applied to God are synony­
mous"). From such an admission it would follow that wherever we find "mercy”
written, "justice” could be substituted for it, and we could rightly say that God
punishes by reason of His mere)'. Thus, though his intention is to avoid nomi­
nalism, the renowed objector falls into it.
•2 Cf. Com. in lam, q. 1, a. 3, no. 8.

SACRED DOCTRINE

55

Moreover, by this method, in seeking to avoid nominalism, the
mind would revert to the same, according to the theory that claims
divine names to be synonymous terms, a theory which is refuted by
St. Thomas.83 Thus divine mercy and justice would be synonymous
and it could therefore be said that God punishes by means of His
mercy.
Finally, if the above-mentioned opinion were true, then all con­
clusions in the treatise on God, even those most remote, provided
they are metaphysically certain, could be defined as dogmas under
pain not only of error, but of heresy in the strict sense. Thus merely
one revealed truth concerning God, namely, that He is the self­
subsisting Being, would suffice to render all conclusions deduced
from it such that they could be said to be strictly revealed, and to
be believed on the authority of God revealing.
This seems to be an inadmissible exaggeration of the powers
assigned to theology, or what is called theologism, and consequently
it impairs the superiority of faith to theology.
Instance. For anything to be defined as a dogma of faith, it suf­
fices that it is contained actually and implicitly in what is revealed;
but any divine attribute whatever is contained actually and im­
plicitly in the divine nature, since this is the self-subsisting Being
(“I am who am”);34 therefore any divine attribute deduced from
revelation is a dogma of faith.85
Reply. I distinguish the major: provided it is the same truth,
this I concede; even if it is a new truth that is deduced, this I deny.
And this Father Marin Sola concedes.38 I contradistinguish the
minor: that every divine attribute is actually and implicitly con­
tained in the divine nature, and that each is the same truth for the
human intellect, this I deny; that each is a new and deduced truth,
this I concede.
Explanation. One divine attribute is actually and implicitly con­
tained in another and in the divine nature, considered reduplicatively as a divine reality, this I concede; considered as an object,
so that each is the same truth, again I distinguish: that it is so for
the divine intellect, I concede; for the human intellect, this I deny.
Otherwise, as we said, all divine names, for instance, justice and
mercy, would be synonymous terms, and it could be said that God
punishes by means of His mercy. Moreover, the revelation of merely
one proposition about God would be sufficient, namely, that He is
the self-subsisting Being, so that from this all the deduced attribsi Summa theol., la, q. 13, a.4.
S4 Ex. 3: 14.
ss So says Father Marin Sola, op. cit., II, 342.
so Ibid., p. 333.

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THE ONE GOD

utes and all the metaphysically certain propositions in the treatise
on God could be defined as of faith.
For a dogmatic definition it is necessary that the definition should
be the expression of a truth that is the same with what has already
been formally and explicitly revealed, and that is not explicitly
proposed for our belief. Now even being in general contains actu­
ally and implicitly all the modes of being, for these are not outside
of being; and yet, concerning these modes, namely, substance, quan­
tity, and quality, new truths are enumerated.
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS ONE SCIENCE

State of the question. The question is whether it is one science
reduced to its ultimate species, or whether it is divided into several
sciences, just as there are several mathematical sciences, namely,
geometry, arithmetic, and several philosophical sciences, as logic,
natural philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics.
The difficulty is, as stated in the beginning of the article, that
sacred theology treats not only of God, but also of created beings,
namely, of angels, of man, or irrational creatures, as also of the
morality of human acts. But these various subjects pertain to dif­
ferent philosophical sciences, namely, metaphysics and ethics. Hence
it seems that dogmatic theology, which treats especially of God, is
a science distinct from moral theology, which is concerned with
the morality of human acts. Thus there seem to be several theologi­
cal sciences, as, among the Scholastics, Vasquez thought subse­
quent to the time of such nominalists as Durandus and Gabriel
Biel.
The answer of St. Thomas is that sacred doctrine is one science.
This indeed is what its name, "sacred theology,” implies, for it is
singular and not plural in form.
The conclusion is proved as follows: The unity of a faculty or
habit is gauged by the unity of the formal aspect of its object; but
sacred theology considers all things according as they are knowa­
ble by revelation; therefore sacred theology is one science reduced
to its ultimate species.
The major is philosophically certain. Thus sight is specified by
the colored object perceived by the light of the sensitive faculty,
logic by being that is a creation of the mind, natural philosophy
by mobile being perceived by the light of reason according to the
first degree of abstraction, mathematics by quantitative being ac­
cording to the second degree of abstraction, metaphysics by being
as such perceived by the light of reason according to the third de­

SACRED DOCTRINE

57

gree of abstraction, namely, as removed from all that is material,
and ethics is specified by human acts.
The minor. But sacred theology considers everything as it is
knowable by revelation. It thus includes all that is formally re­
vealed and believed as of faith, and likewise all that is virtually
revealed, which means all that can be deduced from revealed prin­
ciples. These virtually revealed truths can be said to be, as stated
in the body of this article, potentially revealed. They are known
by the light not of formal but of virtual revelation. What is for­
mally revealed is the formal motive of faith. But virtual revelation
is the light or formal motive why we assent to theological conclu­
sions.
Therefore everything that is considered in theology, namely, God,
creatures, morality of human acts, come under the one formal
aspect of the object, according as they are considered as included
within the scope of virtual revelation, which is the objectum for­
male quo of sacred theology.37
1) This conclusion receives its confirmation from the reply to the
first objection, which is as follows: "Sacred doctrine does not treat
of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily; and of crea­
tures only so far as they are referable to God as their beginning
or end. Hence the unity of this science is not impaired.”
This reply is concerned with the objectum formale quod3* of
s’ By the objectum formale quo, or the formal aspect under which or by means
of which of any science, is meant in scholastic language, the light inherent in the
first principles of such a science by which one is able to reach the conclusions
pertaining strictly to such a science. It means the objective evidence of the con­
clusions borrowed from the first principles of such a science. In other words it is
the objective evidence by which the conclusions of such a science are made known
dearly to all. (Tr.)
sa A few words of explanation may again be of help to those not well versed
in scholastic terminology. There is a distinction between the material and the
formal object as such (objectum formale quod) of any science. By the material
object are meant the realities or entities which constitute the subject matter of
a science. The particular point of view from which the subject is discussed con­
stitutes the formal object of that science. An example will help to make this
dearer. Thus the extension or extended quantity of cosmic bodies constitutes the
material object of geometry. The measure of this continuous extension constitutes
its formal object (objectum formale quod)·, for it is the measure of the dimensions
of these bodies which is particularly enunciated and considered in the theorems
of geometry. Finally, the axiomatic principles of geometry are the source of light
by which the theorems are made evident. These are called by the Scholastics the
objectum formale quo or the ratio formalis sub qua of geometry. For these prin­
ciples constitute formally or actually the object by which, or formally the reason
by which, the theorems and conclusions of geometry are made evident. Yet it
must be carefully noted that the objectum formale quo is what truly and ade­
quately specifies a sdence, and not its objectum formale quod, for this latter may
sometimes be the same in different sciences. Thus the measure of extended bodies

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THE ONE GOD

sacred theology. This will be more explicitly determined in the
seventh article in which the question will be taken up of the proper
and formal subject of this science. But even from its nominal defini­
tion theology is evidently concerned principally with God and only
secondarily with those things that proceed from God, namely, crea­
tures, and the movement of the rational creature toward God. Thus
the unity of the science is not impaired. And how this unity of
sacred theology depends upon both formal objects, namely, quo
and quod, will be more clearly seen from the explanation of the
seventh article. For theology treats of God under the aspect of
Deity, in so far as this comes within the scope of virtual revelation.
Thus it is distinct from metaphysics, which treats of being as such,
and of God as included in the notion of being, in so far as He is
known by the light of natural reason.
It is, however, the common teaching in philosophy that the
sciences derive their species and unity from the unity of both for­
mal objects quo and quod. Thus the difference between physics,
mathematics, and metaphysics consists in this, that physics treats
of mobile being according to the first degree of abstraction; mathe­
matics, of being according to the second degree of abstraction;
metaphysics, of being as such according to the third degree of ab­
straction. Thus any science is specified by its object, not as this
latter is an entity, but as it is formally an object, such being the
means or precise reason why it can be known.
2) This conclusion is furthermore confirmed by the reply to the
second objection, in which it is shown that although there are
different philosophical sciences, yet theological science is specifically
one. The reason is that the higher science considers its object in
its more universal aspect, just as the common sense, which is the
lowest of the internal senses and in which the five objects of the
external senses are united, attains the visible, the audible, the
tangible, and other objects according to the more common notion
of the sensible.
So these things discussed by philosophical sciences, namely, by
natural philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics, sacred theology can con­
sider under one aspect, inasmuch as they are capable of being di­
vinely revealed, or are virtually revealed, and according as all these
are directed to God, as being the principle whom they manifest and
the end to whom they tend.
We shall see in the sixth and seventh articles that God in His
intimate life can be known only by divine revelation, and this ap(pbjectum formale quod) is what is formally considered both by geometry and
hydrostatics, but the method of approach in each (objectum formale quo) is
different. (Tr.)

SACRED DOCTRINE

59

plies equally to those things that participate in God’s intimate life,
such as grace, the infused virtues, and the gifts. So we shall see
that the formal object quod and the formal object quo in theology
are interchangeable, as in the other sciences. The Deity and the
divine light are interchangeable, just as being as such and the light
of reason in the third degree of abstraction are, just as mathemati­
cal quantity and the light of reason in the second degree of ab­
straction are, just as the colored object and sense perception are.
First corollary. Positive theology and speculative theology are
not two sciences, but they are, so to speak, the inductive and deduc­
tive parts of the same science. For positive theology brings together
the revealed truths by the inductive method from Holy Scripture
and tradition. After this, speculative theology takes up the analysis
of the concepts of these truths, defending them against opponents
by arguments drawn from the analogy of things known by the
natural power of reason, and it deduces conclusions that are vir­
tually contained in them.
Second corollary. Positive theology, since it is truly a part of
theology, reaches its conclusions under the guidance of the light
of revelation, and thus it is distinct from history; but it makes use
of history, just as speculative theology makes use of metaphysics.
Third corollary. Specialization is a more difficult process in the­
ology than the other sciences, and this because of its unity. The
relationship between moral theology and grace, the infused virtues,
the gifts, merit and demerit cannot be fully perceived without a
profound knowledge of what dogmatic theology teaches about God’s
love for us, the divine motion, redemption and its application to
us. Hence specialization in theology sometimes leads to a too ma­
terial and superficial knowledge, which no longer penetrates to
the very vitals of this corporate doctrine.
Sometimes specialists in this or that branch of theology have
an insufficient knowledge of theology in general, and therefore of
those things that are fundamental in theology, so that the branch
in which they specialize, for instance, ascetic or mystic theology, is
not properly understood by them. Doctors, too, must not be ig­
norant of the general principles of medical science, otherwise their
knowledge of that in which they particularly specialize is deficient.
It is evident from St. Thomas’ reply to the second objection that
sacred theology, even when discussing man and the morality of his
acts, examines in them what is strictly divine, what can be known
only by the light of virtual revelation, and what is related to God
as such, that is, to His intimate life. In this we see the sublimity of
theology, since it considers what is divine in all things by means
of the divine light, namely, the various participations of God’s in­

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THE ONE GOD

timate life—grace, the virtues, the gifts, their acts, the modalities
of these acts, these being meritorious and their opposites demer­
itorious, in that contraries are governed by the same law.
Just as in the preaching about Christ no distinction is drawn be­
tween the dogmatic and the moral parts, but the kingdom of God
is spoken of, or God’s life as it is in itself and as it is participated
in by us, so sacred theology does not consist of two specifically dis­
tinct sciences, dogma and moral, but is only one scientific habit,
which treats of God as knowable by revelation and of those things
that refer to God. Therefore St. Thomas says at the end of the
reply to the second objection: "So that in this way sacred doctrine
bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science which is one and
simple yet extends to everything.” Hence dogmatic theology and
moral theology are but branches of the same science, and this ap­
plies more so to soteriology, mariology, asceticism, and mysticism.
Fourth corollary. In the human sciences, metaphysics bears a cer­
tain relation to theology since it treats of being as such, that is, it
treats of supreme generalities and higher principles. Thus it is one
and yet it discusses all things from a higher point of view, accord­
ing as they are reduced to being and to the first principles of being.
Sacred theology considers all things from a higher plane accord­
ing as these are directed to God, and in this it is guided by the
divine light. Hence the unity of this science is perfect, and it thus
disposes one for the contemplation enjoyed by the blessed, which
is a still more simplified process.
FOURTH ARTICLE

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A PRACTICAL SCIENCE

State of the question. It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical
science, because its purpose is the regulation of action, namely,
direction in the Christian life; and it explains both the Old Law
and the New Law, which direct human acts. It is to be noted that
according to Scotus, who wrote very extensively on this subject,
theology is a practical science because its proper end is action,
especially the love of God and one’s neighbor, since the whole law
and the prophets depend upon these two precepts. Scotus inclines
to this view because he thinks that the will is a higher faculty than
the intellect, and that all knowledge, even the beatific vision, is
ordained to love, as disposing one for a perfection of a higher order.
It must also be noted that we already detect this practical tend­
ency in the writings of the Master of the Sentences, who divided
his work, as to the acts of the will, into enjoyment and use, in the
following manner:

SACRED DOCTRINE

61

1) The things to be enjoyed are the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Ghost.
2) The things to be made use of for the attainment of eternal
happiness are the world and created things.
3) The things to be enjoyed and made use of are the humanity
of Christ, the angels, and the saints.
St. Bonaventure said38 that sacred theology is an affective science,
since it is intermediary between speculative theology and practical
theology, because contemplation and the performance of good con­
stitute the end in view. St. Albert the Great expresses a similar
view at the beginning of his Summa. In his opinion sacred theology
is an affective study since it is directed to God’s love. The nomi­
nalists along with Durandus admit that theology consists of two
sciences, one of which is speculative and the other practical.
St. Thomas’ reply is that sacred doctrine, being one, is both
eminently speculative and practical, but it is speculative rather
than practical.
1) It is proved in the counterargument from the nominal defi­
nition of theology, because it is chiefly concerned with God, who
does not come within the scope of things operable, but who is the
Being to whom our intentions and actions must be directed.
2) The first part of the conclusion is proved from the intrinsic
end of this science in the body of the article as follows: A science
which considers things speculative and practical from the same
formal point of view, is eminently speculative and practical; but
sacred theology considers all things speculative and practical as vir­
tually revealed and directed to God, the first truth and last end;
therefore sacred theology is eminently speculative and practical.
The term eminently is taken in the sense of formal eminence
and not merely of virtual eminence. This means that, just as the
absolutely simple perfections are contained in God formally and
eminently (which is more than virtually), just as the human soul
is formally and eminently sensitive and vegetative, so also, as we
shall state farther on, infused faith is eminently speculative and
practical, since it is concerned with mysteries to be believed, the
precepts, and the counsels.40 In various passages St. Thomas says
30 In Proem. I Sent., q.3.
43 This distinction between formal and virtual eminence is of great imporlance. First of all, it must be observed that when we say a being contains some
perfection eminently, this means that the being in question contains the per­
fection in a nobler way than it is contained in any being of a lower order. Thus
sensation in man is nobler or more refined than in the irrational animals. But
when a perfection is contained in a being formally and eminently, this means
that the perfection denoted by the concept is contained actually in such a being,
though in a nobler manner. Thus human wisdom is contained formally and

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THE ONE GOD

that the same applies to the gifts of understanding and wisdom.41
3) The second part of the conclusion is proved in the body of the
article as follows: Sacred theology is more speculative than prac­
tical, because, as its name implies, it is more concerned with God
than with human acts. God, however, is the object of speculation
and contemplation, but He does not come within the scope of
things operable, as in the case of ethics that is concerned with
things capable of being done, and of the arts that are concerned
with things capable of being made. Thus St. Thomas distinguishes
better than St. Bonaventure does between theology, which is ac­
quired by human effort, and infused contemplation. This latter
is truly an affective and quasi-experimental knowledge that pro­
ceeds from the gift of wisdom.42
But although theology, which is acquired by human effort, and
the gift of wisdom are specifically distinct, yet they are most fittingly
united, and this point is clearly exemplified in the great doctors
of the Church, as in St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure,
St. Albert, and others. In fact, the Church never declares any serv­
ant of God a doctor of the Church unless he has first been not
only beatified but also canonized. This means that he must first
have been of eminent sanctity, and hence that the gift of wisdom
and acquired knowledge are each possessed in a high degree.
Concerning the doctrine of this article, it is important to note
here that Scotus denies the possibility of one and the same science
being both eminently speculative and practical. To this Cajetan 43
replies that the practical and the speculative are not essential dif­
ferences of a science, as it is a science, but as it is finite. The divi­
sions we find in things of the lower order, for instance, in the
philosophical sciences, are found united in those of the higher
order, as in the case of faith and the gifts of understanding and
wisdom. Gonet, too, ably defends the doctrine of this article by
considering the loftiness of both formal objects quod and quo of
sacred theology. For the formal object quod of theology is not only
something speculative, such as being inasmuch as being, nor is it
something merely operable, such as human actions about which
eminently in the natural wisdom of the angels. When a being possesses the active
power that renders it capable of producing a perfection found in other beings,
then this perfection is said to be contained in such a being virtually and eminently.
Thus local motion is contained virtually and eminently in the human soul, be­
cause through the will it commands the motion of hands or feet. (Tr.)
«1 Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.4, a.2; q.8, a.3; q.9, a.3; q.45, a.3.
43 Ibid., q.45, a. 1, 2.
43 Com. in lam, q. 1, a.4, no. 3.

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63

ethics is concerned, but its object is God considered under the as­
pect of the Deity, who is the first speculative truth and the last end
to be attained and the first rule of our life
Likewise, the formal object quo or light of sacred theology is
virtual revelation, but it is virtual revelation that has its founda­
tion in both speculative and practical knowledge. Thus formal
revelation is the formal motive of faith, which is both speculative
or contemplative, and practical according as it is concerned with
the belief of mysteries or the fulfillment of precepts. The formal
objects quod and quo, however, are correlatives, in that the latter is
the searchlight enabling one to know the former.
Objection. If theology were both speculative and practical, then
many of its acts would be both speculative and practical, because
of the formal aspect of this science. But this is false; for there are
in theology merely speculative conclusions, such as the four rela­
tions in the divine Persons, and there are conclusions that are
merely practical, such as a particular act to be avoided.
We reply to this by denying the major. Although it is true to
say that the rational soul is eminently and formally both vegetative
and sensitive, yet it does not follow that its every act must be both
vegetative and sensitive. So also each and every act of any science
does not extend to everything included in this science. It is not
necessary that each and every act totally and adequately share in
i he formal aspect of a science. Although this latter is formally in­
divisible, nevertheless it is virtually multiple.
Hence some theologians, such as St. Thomas, excel in dogmatic
theology, whereas others, such as St. Alphonsus Liguori, are con­
spicuous for their knowledge of moral theology. In like manner,
although the gift of wisdom is formally and eminently both specu­
lative and practical, some saints, such as St. John of the Cross, are
prominent in contemplation; others, however, such as St. Vincent
de Paul, distinguish themselves by the wisdom of their direction
in works of mercy. In the two saints just mentioned we see the
gift of wisdom operating in a high degree; but in the former it
manifests itself more in contemplation, whereas in the latter it
concentrates rather on those things that pertain to the active life.
In the former it is like a searchlight, but in the latter it is like a
glow in the heavens that illuminates all things from on high.
From this article as also from the preceding we see that the unity
of sacred theology is of a higher order, since it is, as it were, a
participation in the science of God and the blessed, a subordinate
science, as it were, to this latter science or rather to this higher
vision.

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THE ONE GOD
FIFTH ARTICLE
WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS NOBLER THAN THE
OTHER SCIENCES

State of the question. Our contention so far is that sacred the­
ology is a true science, and indeed one as such eminently specula­
tive and practical. It is one and the same aspect in these three
conclusions, namely, that sacred theology proceeds from principles
that have been revealed by the higher science of God, a science
that is not only most certain but also absolutely one and eminently
speculative and practical. Our discussion now centers upon the
nobility or excellence of sacred theology with reference to the
other sciences, namely, as to the certitude and sublimity of the ob­
ject.
The difficulty about sacred theology is that it proceeds from
principles that are not evident and that are doubted by some. Thus
it seems to be inferior to the mathematical sciences. Moreover,
theology draws upon the philosophical sciences. Therefore it seems
to be inferior to them. St. Thomas accepted several principles from
Aristotle.
St. Thomas replies to this, however, as follows: sacred theology
transcends all other sciences both speculative and practical. He
proves this:
1) By the argument from tradition, in which philosophy and the
other human sciences are said to be handmaids of sacred doctrine.
He also quotes the following text of Sacred Scripture in support of
his doctrine: “Wisdom hath built herself a house . . . and hath
sent her maids to invite to the tower, and to the walls of the
city.”14 The Supreme Pontiffs have often drawn attention to the
dignity of sacred theology.46
2) In the argumentative part of the article this twofold aspect
of the conclusion is taken up in turn and proved theologically.
Among the speculative sciences it is because of the certitude and
dignity of the subject matter that one is nobler than the other.
Now sacred theology excels the other speculative sciences in both
respects. Therefore it is nobler than the others.
The major is evident; for dignity is thus considered from both
the objective and the subjective points of view. The minor is no
less certain; for sacred theology derives its certitude not from the
light of reason but from the light of the divine knowledge, from
principles believed by divine faith. But faith in itself is more cer« Prov. g: 1-3.
«Cf. Syllabus of Pius IX, props. 8, g, 11, 12, against semirationalism. Also
especially Leo XIII in his encyclical Aeterni Patris.

SACRED DOCTRINE

65

tain than all the sciences on account o£ the authority of God re­
vealing.46 The object of theology has reference to those things which
by reason of their loftiness transcend both human reason and the
angelic intellect.
Likewise, sacred theology is nobler than ethics and all the prac­
tical sciences, because it ordains and directs to a higher end, namely,
to the ultimate supernatural end, which is eternal life. Since this
latter is essentially supernatural, it surpasses the future life about
which the nobler minded among the ancient philosophers spoke.
The argumentative part of the article presents no difficulty about
what is meant. The formal aspect is clearly set forth, and is the
same as in the preceding articles, namely, that sacred theology pro­
ceeds under the guidance of the divine light, and treats of the
loftiest object that is both the supreme truth and the ultimate end.
There remains but the difficulty presented in the first objection,
namely, that sacred theology, since it argues from principles that
are not evident to reason, seems to be less certain than metaphysics,
mathematics, and physics.
In the reply to the first objection it is stated that sacred theology
is more certain than the other sciences in itself, but not to us. It
is more certain in itself on account of its formal motive being
higher, for this is virtual divine revelation. It is, however, less cer­
tain to us on account of the weakness of our intelligence, “which
confronted by the light of those things more intelligible in them­
selves is as dazzled as the owl is by the light of the sun.” 47 Yet, as
Aristotle says, “the slightest knowledge that may be obtained of
the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowl­
edge obtained of lesser things.” 48 Why is this? It is for the reason
that, since knowledge is specified by its object, its worth is esti­
mated more from the object known than from the way in which
it is known. Thus the argument of the fittingness about the pos­
sibility of the Trinity is of a higher order than the rigorous demon­
stration of any property of the triangle.
Concerning the distinction made in this reply to the first objec­
tion between what is more certain in itself and not to us, and be­
tween what is more certain to us and not in itself, we must recall
what Aristotle says on several occasions in his Metaphysics, namely,
that those things which are more intelligible in themselves, as God,
the pure Act, His immutable eternity, are less intelligible to us
because they are most remote from the senses; for our human knowl­
edge originates from the senses. On the contrary, motion and time,
«0Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.4, a.8.
Cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Bk. II, chap. 1.
«» Cf. De animalibus, Bk. I, chap. 5.

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THE ONE GOD

which are to us more intelligible than immobile eternity, are less
intelligible in themselves. Eternity is most lucid in itself, for it is
the measure of the subsistent Intelligence or of the pure Act, who
is pure intellection.
First doubt. Does the greater degree of objective certainty though
not of subjective certainty enjoyed by sacred theology over the
other sciences apply to this same theology as possessed by us as
wayfarers? We answer in the affirmative to this with the Thomists.48
Proof. It is repugnant for a formal cause to inform a subject and
not give it its formal effect. Thus infused faith by the very fact
that it is received in our intellect, notwithstanding the obscurity
of the mysteries, imparts to our intellect a firmness or a greater
certainty than that enjoyed by any natural science. St. Augustine
says: "It would be easier for me to doubt that I am living than to
doubt what I have heard (from God) to be true.” 50 What indeed
Christ says, "Heaven and earth shall pass away; but My word shall
not pass away,” 51 is therefore most firmly to be held as true. Hence
St. Paul says: "But though we, or an angel from heaven preach a
gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him
be anathema.” 62 Hence, according to the teaching of St. Thomas,53
infused faith, not only as it is in itself, and as if it were in the
air, external to us, but as it is in us, is more certain than the first
principles of reason, because its formal motive, namely, the authority
of God revealing, surpasses in validity the evidence of reason, or the
power of the light of reason. But sacred theology, since its motive
is virtual revelation, though it is inferior to faith, shares in this
certitude of faith which we truly possess.
Nevertheless faith and theology are less certain to us because an
obscure object but partially dispels the doubt arising in our mind,
but imperfectly corresponds to the connatural mode of knowing
by our intellect.54 St. Thomas says: “Certitude can be looked at in
two ways. First, on the part of its cause (in itself); and thus a thing
which has a more certain cause, is itself more certain. In this way
faith is more certain than those three virtues (i.e., all natural
knowledge); because it is founded on the divine truth, whereas the
aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. Secondly, certi­
tude may be considered on the part of the subject (for us), and thus
the more a man’s intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it
is. In this way faith is less certain” than the evidence of natural
Cf. Gonet, Clypeus theol. thomist., I, commentary on this article.
so Confessions, Bk. VII, chap. io.
si Mark 13: 31.
52 Gal. 1: 8.
53 Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.4, a.8.
5* Consult the commentaries of Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, and Gonet.

SACRED DOCTRINE

67

knowledge, because our intellect does not so connaturally and fully
attain an obscure as an evident object. Obscure objects do not give
us that pleasure and fruition which evident ones do. But St.
Thomas goes on to say: "Each thing is judged simply with regard to
its cause, but relatively with respect to a disposition on the part of
the subject; hence faith is more certain simply, while the others are
more certain relatively, i.e., for us.” 55 But theology, since the source
from which it argues is infused faith, shares in the certitude of
faith.
So “we have this treasure (of faith) in earthen vessels,” 56 but
we have it. It is in us. This means that faith and also theology are
more certain in themselves and in us than any natural knowledge
whatever, although they are not so to us. Hence, if doubts suddenly
arise on account of the obscurity of the object, these are merely
subjective, resulting from the weakness of our intellect, but not
from the formal motive of the habits of either faith or theology.
In this matter we must therefore take care to distinguish between
the two expressions in us and to us. We have an example of this
in the principle of finality. That every agent acts for an end is more
certain in itself and in us than the objective existence of colors.
Yet this existence of colors is to us (at least for many, for the
majority of mankind) more certain than the principle of finality.
All see colors by the sense of sight, but all do not perceive intellec­
tually the absolute necessity and universality of the principle of
finality. So, in like manner, faith in the Trinity is more certain in
itself and in us than the existence of colors, but it is less certain
10 us. The reason is that the Trinity is the object most removed
from the senses, from which our knowledge originates.
On the contrary, some cling most tenaciously to improbable opin­
ions, for example, to political opinions. The formal heretic persists
obstinately in his error, which is not in itself anything certain but
is something stubbornly inhering in this badly disposed subject.
Some do not firmly assent to truths that in themselves are most
certain, and others cling most tenaciously either to the poorest of
opinions, or to errors. Thus it is quite clear that there is a dis­
tinction between what is certain in itself and what is certain for us.
Therefore sacred theology is nobler than all the other sciences.
It is so objectively because of the dignity of the object, and sub­
jectively because of the greater certitude accruing to it from the
divine light.
Second doubt. How is it that sacred theology is nobler than the
sciences from which it accepts anything? It accepts a number of
os Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.4, a.8.
5« Π Cor. 4: 7.

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THE ONE GOD

principles from metaphysics and therefore seems to be inferior to it;
as optics, accepting something from geometry, is inferior to this lat­
ter, as being a subalternate science.
In the reply to the second objection it is stated that sacred
theology does not accept its principles from other sciences, for
these principles are revealed by God; but it accepts from them a
certain means for the better manifestation of revealed truths, and
thus it makes use of these sciences as being inferior to it and
ancillary. It makes use of them, indeed, not because of any defect
on its part but on that of our intellect, which is more easily led
by means of natural things to acquire a certain understanding of
supernatural truths.
This reply is profound and contains several points worthy of
note. If sacred theology were to accept its principles from meta­
physics, it would be subordinated to this latter, as optics is to geom­
etry. But it accepts them only as the means for the greater mani­
festation of the revealed truths.
Thus sacred theology makes use of the natural sciences in accord­
ance with the proper meaning of the word “use.” In the strict sense
of the term, only the superior makes use of the inferior, that is, or­
dains the action of the inferior in co-operating with the superior’s
action, which is ordained to a higher end. Thus the writer uses his
pen, the painter his brush, the general of the army his soldiers,
the finer arts the inferior, as the art of navigation avails itself of
the constructive art of shipbuilding. In like manner sacred theology,
as the superior science, makes use of metaphysics as the inferior
and the handmaid. Thus metaphysics, for instance, the metaphysics
of Aristotle, serves a much higher end. The Aristotelian notion of
predicamental relation, for instance, is for us instrumental in ac­
quiring a certain knowledge of the Trinity. Aristotle could not fore­
see so great an honor and glory for his metaphysics that it would
serve the uses of the higher science of God. Thus metaphysics is
not despised but is honored, just as that citizen is honored who is
at the king’s immediate disposal; for it is better to obey a king than
to rule over a household, and this because of the high end in view
for the attainment of which this collaboration is given.
Hence, as John of St. Thomas correctly observes, when sacred
theology makes use of natural premises, a metaphysical truth, for
example, it makes use of this as a means. But a means, such as a
pen or brush, acts in virtue of the power transmitted to it by an­
other, and is at the same time applied to its act and elevated by
the motion of the principal agent, so as to produce an effect that
transcends its own power. Thus by means of the motion imparted
to the pen by the writer, it not only deposits the ink on the paper,

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but it writes something intelligible; and the brush not only puts the
colors on the canvas, but arranges them most beautifully and artisti­
cally. In like manner, according to the navigator’s instructions, the
shipwright constructs a vessel that is seaworthy. So also sacred
theology uses the natural premise taken, for instance, from meta­
physics. It first approves of the premise for this purpose under the
guidance of the divine light of revelation, at least negatively, accord­
ing as this natural premise is not in opposition to what has been re­
vealed. Then it makes use of this premise not only by a motion that
applies the same to act but also by a motion that is instrumental
in the attainment of its higher end. This end is a certain understand­
ing of the supernatural mysteries either in themselves (if it is a case
of an explicative process of reasoning), or as regards their conse­
quences, corollaries (if it is a case of an illative process of reason­
ing). Therefore the theological conclusion thus obtained, although
it has less certainty than a proposition of the faith, has more
certainty than a natural premise as such, because it is deduced from
this premise which has been elevated and clarified by a higher
light. Thus also in this case, the instrument produces an effect that
transcends its own power and it operates by way of disposing for
the effect of the principal agent.
It must be noted that great doctors, such as St. Augustine, pro­
duced even with a most imperfect instrument, for instance, with
Neoplatonic philosophy, a wonderful theological work. It was in
this way that St. Augustine wrote his books on the Trinity. Thus
great painters sometimes paint a beautiful picture with a most im­
perfect brush. And besides, in these great doctors, faith, illuminated
by the gifts of understanding and wisdom, makes up for the
deficiency of the instrument, or of philosophy.67
The philosophy, however, to which St. Thomas had recourse was
more exact because Aristotle enunciated with great precision the
philosophical notions and metaphysical principles, as Euclid did
the elements of geometry. Thus St. Thomas excels in both kinds of
wisdom, namely, acquired wisdom which is the result of the perfect
functioning of reason, and infused wisdom which proceeds accord­
ing to a connaturalness of judgment with things divine under the
inspiration of the Holy Ghost.68
In other words, a natural premise is in some way elevated so as
to manifest the supernatural order, and it receives a somewhat
greater certitude than it would have in its own right; for it is
judged by faith and theology, corrected (if it needs to be) and ap­
proved by them. Thus St. Thomas in his treatise on the Trinity
o’ Cf. J. Maritain, Les degrés du savoir, Part II, chap. 7.
Summa tfieol., Ha Ilae, q.45, a.if.

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'THE ONE GOD

approves of and in some measure corrects the Aristotelian distinc­
tion between principle and cause, by showing that in the divine
Persons the Father is the principle of the Son but not the cause.
We have some evidence of this from experience. We are conscious
of assenting with greater certainty to natural truths discovered by
us, when we see that they have the approval of the leading doctors,
especially when we see that they have divine confirmation and
approval.
Even a natural premise which in itself would be only probable
would not become certain by reason of its connection with a prin­
ciple that is of faith, nor would it lead to a theologically certain
conclusion; it would only be probable. But if it is certain in itself,
it becomes more certain in proportion as it is clarified by a higher
light. Thus the philosopher who already has metaphysical certainty
of God's existence before he receives infused faith, is after its recep­
tion more certain of this truth, since infused faith confirms from on
high this metaphysical certitude. These statements are true even
for the strictly illative process of reasoning, and more so for the
explicative process.
From what has been said it is evident that sacred theology is a
science subordinated not to metaphysics but solely to the science pos­
sessed by God, and by the blessed; for, as regards its own intrinsic
principles, it depends solely upon divine revelation. But theology
from its exalted position makes use of natural principles as strangers
to it, and it makes use of them not because of any deficiency in
itself, but because of the deficiency of our intellect, which is in­
capable of knowing the truths that are implicitly and virtually
contained in the revealed principles solely by the light of faith.
Now the angelic intellect, since it is not discursive, does not thus
stand in need of this additional natural knowledge so that it may
have a certain understanding of supernatural mysteries. For the
angel immediately sees the conclusion contained in the principles,
the properties in the essence, and thus it immediately knows all
the properties of man from the very concept of the human nature.
Hence the angel, without any discursive process, immediately under­
stands in this revealed truth, “The Word was made flesh,”50 what
we deduce only by a slow process of reasoning.
It follows from this that the certitude of a strictly theological
conclusion is less than the certitude of infused faith, but it is
greater than the certitude of the natural sciences, even of meta­
physics. The certitude of the theological conclusion improperly so
called, of the conclusion that is obtained by the explicative process
of reasoning, is less than the certitude of faith; but it acquires the
ssjohn i: 14.

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certitude of faith, if by the special assistance of the Holy Spirit it
is defined by the Church. Then it must be firmly accepted not be­
cause it has been proved by an explicative process of reasoning,
but because "it hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost.” ®°
Objection. The conclusion in a syllogism follows from the weaker
premise. But the theological conclusion often results from a premise
that is only naturally certain. Therefore then the conclusion is only
naturally certain, for it follows from the weaker premise.
We reply with Gonet by distinguishing the major. If the premises
equally influence the conclusion, then I concede the major; if one is
the instrument of the other under the guidance of a higher light,
then I deny it. I contradistinguish the minor: that the theological
conclusion often results from a natural premise which is the instru­
ment of another premise that is of faith, under the guidance of a
higher light, this I concede; that this natural premise equally influ­
ences the conclusion, this I deny. And I deny the consequent and
the consequence. Nevertheless, we may still say that the aforesaid
logical axiom is in some manner verified since the theological con­
clusion is not so certain as the premise that is of faith. For to a theo­
logical conclusion strictly so called we cannot firmly assent solely on
the authority of God revealing, but we assent to it partly on the evi­
dence of reason; although faith makes use of reason in the deduction
of this new truth that is only virtually contained in revelation. Such
is the case if the natural premise is the major rather than the
minor.
Third doubt. Is theology an essentially supernatural habit? It is
the common teaching of the Thomists that sacred theology is essen­
tially or intrinsically a natural habit; infused faith, this being how­
ever, its extrinsic root, is essentially supernatural. Contenson dis­
agreed with them on this point.
The reason is that theology is a habit acquired by human effort,
that is, by natural acts of understanding which are acquired and
not infused.®1 Moreover, the formal object quod of theology, which
is God, specifies it only in that it underlies the formal object quo.
And this formal object quo, or light, is not formal but virtual reve­
lation, which means that it is the light of reason deducing from
revelation the conclusions virtually contained in this latter. The
object of theology is God not formally revealed but virtually re­
vealed. Nevertheless the extrinsic root of theology is infused faith,
and this is essentially supernatural as regards both formal objects
quod and quo; so that, as we said, with the removal of faith by
formal heresy, we no longer have theology but merely its corpse,
«0 Acts 15:28.
« See a. 6 ad gum.

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THE ONE GOD

because there is wanting that formal connection between the ideas
effected by the principles of faith.
Hence there are some theologians, like St. Bernard, who excel in
faith, this being of a higher order and intense, and these are holier.
Others, like Abélard, excel in dialectic, or in reason or the instru­
ment of faith. There are some saints who have no knowledge of
theology but they have great faith, which means that their lives
are spent in a most profound contemplation of the mysteries of
Christ; the faith of these is most intense and deep. On the other
hand, there are many theologians whose faith is not so intense and
profound, but they have a more extensive knowledge of what has
been defined by the Church and of very many theological con­
clusions. The intensive increase of faith, however, is of more im­
portance than its extensive increase.
SIXTH ARTICLE
WHETHER SACRED THEOLOGY IS THE SAME AS WISDOM

State of the question. We have seen that sacred theology is a
science subordinated to the science possessed by God, that it is emi­
nently speculative and practical. The question is whether it is worthy
of the name of wisdom, as is the case with metaphysics or first philoso­
phy among the sciences of the natural order.
The difficulty is that: (i) sacred theology borrows its principles
from a higher science, and therefore is subordinate to this science,
whereas “it is for the wise man to direct,” 82 and not to be directed;
(2) sacred theology does not prove or defend from on high the
principles of the other sciences, as metaphysics, which treats of
being, does by defending the principles invoked by the other
sciences; (3) sacred theology does not seem to be supernatural wis­
dom, because this latter is infused, and is not acquired by human
effort.
The reply, however, to this is that sacred theology is wisdom above
all other human wisdom. Sacred doctrine is often called wisdom in
Holy Scripture.03 St. Paul, comparing God’s wisdom with the wis­
dom of this world, says: “Howbeit we speak wisdom among the
perfect: yet not the wisdom of this world, neither of the princes
of this world that come to naught. But we speak the wisdom of God
in a mystery', a wisdom which is hidden. . . . For the Spirit search­
ed all things, yea, the deep things of God.” 04 St. Paul speaks in
«2 Aristotle, Metaph., Bk. I.
00 Cf. Deut. 6: 6, quoted by St. Thomas in this article; and especially Wis.,
chaps. 5-7.
64 I Cor. 2: 6 (.. 10.

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this text, indeed, of revealed sacred doctrine, of faith illuminated
by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. But sacred theology, which is ac­
quired by human effort, proceeds from this faith, and thus it
participates in the perfection of wisdom.
In the body of the article St. Thomas has recourse to the philo­
sophical notion of wisdom as determined by Aristotle,05 who shows
that metaphysics is not only a science, but wisdom, or the highest of
sciences, because it is the knowledge of things acquired not only
through their causes, but through the highest of causes. St. Thomas
retains this notion of wisdom in the present article and in other
parts of the Summa."
The doctrine of the article is briefly expressed as follows: Wis­
dom is the knowledge of things through their highest cause. But
sacred theology essentially treats of God, the highest cause, also so
far as He is known to Himself alone and to others by revelation.
Therefore sacred theology is first of all wisdom, and more so than
metaphysics.
The major is the very definition of wisdom established by Aris­
totle.07 In this article St. Thomas briefly shows the validity of this
real definition, beginning with the nominal. For, according to the
nominal definition, wisdom is something of eminence in the cog­
nitive order; thus we have the common saying that it is for the
wise man to direct and judge. But a scientific judgment about a
thing is obtained through its causes, inquiring what the thing is in
itself, what are its efficient and final causes. The highest judgment
is therefore obtained through the highest of causes. Thus wisdom
surpasses the sciences, since science pure and simple is knowledge
through proximate causes, but wisdom is knowledge through the
highest of causes. Thus metaphysics treats of being as such through
its highest causes, and it therefore does not reach perfection unless
it acquires a definite idea of creation or of the production of the
totality of finite being from nothing, and of the end of creation,
which is the manifestation of God’s goodness. Aristotle did not ac­
quire this definite idea that can be known by the natural power of
reason, and which, moreover, is equivalently expressed in the first
words of the Bible: “In the beginning God created heaven and
earth.” 08
The nominal definition of sacred theology and the preceding
remarks establish the evidence of the minor. For theology is the
knowledge of God derived from revelation. Hence “it essentially
es Metaph., Bk. I, chaps. 1 f.
eecf. Summa theol., la, q. 14, a. 1 ad ïum; la Hae, q.57, a.2 ad mm.
Metaph., Bk. I, chaps. 1 f.
os Gen. 1: 1.

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THE ONE GOD

treats of God viewed as the highest cause,” 69 and not only as He
is the cause of the being as such of created things, but as He is the
cause of grace and glory, that is, as He is the Author of salvation. The
reason is that it treats of God not only so far as He can be known
naturally from creatures, but also so far as He is known to Himself
alone and made known to others through revelation.
In other words, sacred theology not only treats of God as He
is the first Being, the self-subsisting Being, and the cause of beings
as such, but it treats of God in His intimate life or under the aspect
of the Deity. This is what St. Paul said: ‘‘But to us God hath re­
vealed them by His Spirit. For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea,
the deep things of God,” 70 or God’s intimate life. That is, the
object expressed in this utterance is God under the aspect of the
Deity, because the Deity contains formally and eminently all
absolutely simple perfections such as being, unity, truth, good­
ness . . . , in which creatures are naturally capable of participa­
tion; whereas the Deity is not capable of participation except by
grace, which makes us ‘‘partakers of the divine nature.” 71 Thus
the Deity in a certain manner transcends being and the one, since
it contains all these perfections formally and eminently in its higher
eminence. It contains them more so than whiteness contains the
seven colors of the rainbow, which are included in it not formally
and eminently but only virtually and eminently.72
Hence sacred theology is especially wisdom because it treats
essentially of God, the highest cause, in His intimate life. Never­
theless theology, especially that of the wayfarer, does not attain to
a quiddative knowledge of God as He is in Himself; it does not see
the Deity, but reaches this in the midst of faith, especially when it
discusses the mystery of the Trinity. Thus sacred theology can from
on high judge of all created things and of human life, namely,
through the highest cause of being and of grace, and through the
ultimate end not only natural but also supernatural.
In the reply to the first objection it is stated that sacred
theology derives its principles not from any human knowledge but
from the divine science, and thus it remains wisdom. Its principles
are especially the fourteen articles of faith from which also the other
articles of faith can be deduced.
First doubt. How does sacred theology judge of other sciences?
In his reply to the second objection St. Thomas says that:
i) ‘‘Theology is not concerned with proving the principles of
oo Summa theol., la, q.i, a.6.
το I Cor. a: io.
τι II Pet. i: 4.
T1 Cf. infra, q. 13, a.3, 5.

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75

other sciences,” because its proper sphere of action extends to what
has been supernaturally revealed, and the principles of the natural
sciences are either directly known or are proved in a subalternating
science, as geometry proves the principles of optics. In like manner
metaphysics defends the first principles of reason.
2) Sacred theology judges, however, of the other sciences, and this
in two ways. It judges negatively, because "whatever is found in
other sciences contrary to any truth of this science must be con­
demned as false.” Thus many hypotheses that have not been scientif­
ically proved, from the very fact that they are contrary to divine
revelation are repudiated by theology. But it positively approves of
a certain proposition of metaphysics or of natural philosophy or of
ethics, according as it is otherwise revealed, or at least is in con­
formity with revelation. Thus it approves of propositions about the
immortality of the soul or the foundation of moral obligation or
the distinction between virtuous, pleasant, and useful good.
Corollary. Thus the legitimate and relative autonomy of the
natural sciences is preserved intact according as they proceed from
their own naturally known principles and make use of their own
method, as the Vatican Council states.” But they cannot affirm as
a scientific certainty what is contrary to revealed truth, because
truth does not contradict itself.74 Hence the rationalist assertion of
the absolute autonomy of reason was condemned by the Vatican
Council in the following words: “If anyone shall say that human
reason is so independent that faith cannot be enjoined upon it by
God, let him be anathema.” 75
Thus there are several declarations of the Church about the bene­
fits of revelation. By means of it reason is freed from error, en­
lightened and confirmed in truth.” It upholds the certainty and
purity of natural knowledge;77 it is the infallible guide of phi­
losophy,78*and its indispensable norm; 78 not only the philosopher
but even philosophy is subject to its teaching authority.80 In the
Syllabus of Pius IX the following proposition is condemned
against moderate rationalism: “As the philosopher is one thing,
and philosophy another, so it is the right and duty of the philoso­
pher to subject himself to the authority which he shall have proved
to be true; but philosophy neither can nor ought to submit to any
78 Cf. Denz., no. 1799.
u Ibid., nos. 1797 F., 1878 F.
75 Ibid., no. 1810: see also no. 1789.
’· Ibid., nos. 1799, 1807.
77 Ibid., no. 1786.
™Ibid., nos. 1656, 1681.
7» Ibid., no. 1714.
<0 Ibid., nos. 1656, 1674 F., 1682 F., 1710, 1714, 2073, 2085 F.

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THE ONE GOD

such authority.” 81 This is practically the same assertion as that con­
demned as heretical by the Vatican Council, which reads: “Human
reason is so independent that faith cannot be enjoined upon it by
God.”82 This latter assertion is tantamount to saying that the
formal motive of a philosophical admission does not come within
the scope of the formal motive of infused faith, namely, the author­
ity of God revealing, and thus in the final analysis the certitude of
infused faith would rest not only materially and extrinsically but
even formally and intrinsically upon the natural evidence of the
signs of revelation. Thus human reason would remain the supreme
judge of truth and falsehood. This was the semi-rationalist error of
Gunther, Hermes, and the Modernists.
Second doubt. How does theological wisdom differ from the gift
of wisdom? St. Thomas answers this question in his reply to the
third objection of this article, and more explicitly when he dis­
cusses the gift of wisdom.83 Theological wisdom, which is acquired
by human effort guided by the light of divine revelation, judges
according to the perfect use of reason, namely, by analyzing the
concepts of the principles of faith or of the enunciation of the mys­
teries, and by deducing the conclusions contained in these prin­
ciples. Contrary to this, the infused gift of wisdom, under the special
inspiration of the Holy Ghost, transcending the discursive method,
judges of divine things by way of an inclination or connaturalness
for them, and it has its foundation in charity. This connaturalness
arising from charity, is a loving sympathy, and by means of this
quality the revealed mysteries manifest themselves not only as true,
as revealed by God, but as most good since they admirably corre­
spond to our higher aspirations.
So also in the natural order, there are two ways of judging, for
instance, in questions of morality. It is accomplished either by way
of scientific knowledge, as he judges who is well versed in moral
science even though he is not virtuous; or it is accomplished by way
of an inclination, as he who is virtuous, who is chaste, for instance,
even though he has no knowledge of moral science, judges well of
those things that pertain to chastity, because these are in conformity
with his virtuous inclination. According to each one’s inclination
or affection, so does he see the fitness of the end, said Aristotle.
Wherefore the prudent judgment is said to be practically true by
reason of its conformity with a right appetite, that is, with an up­
right intention, even though it is speculatively false because of an
si Ibid., no. 1710.
82 Ibid., no. 1810.
83 Cf. Summa theol.. Ha Ilae, q.45, a.2.

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involuntary error.84 Thus prudence presupposes all the moral
virtues and without it they cannot be virtues. In like manner, knowl­
edge that is the fruit of the gift of wisdom, presupposes charity,
whereas acquired theology remains in a theologian who is in a state
of mortal sin.
The reply to the third objection of this article must be carefully
read and compared with what St. Thomas has to say later on about
this subject.85 Some who read these passages superficially, see in the
knowledge resulting from the gift of wisdom but a loving connat­
uralness for divine things (and this is already present in the act
of living faith that is informed by charity, even without the special
inspiration of the Holy Ghost). What others perceive is this special
inspiration, but they do not sufficiently advert to the fact that
the Holy Spirit by means of this special inspiration makes use of the
aforesaid loving connaturalness to manifest how excellent are the
mysteries of faith, in that they admirably satisfy our nobler aspira­
tions: “O taste and see that the Lord is sweet.” 88 If this special
inspiration of the Holy Ghost is not considered, one fails to under­
stand why Hierotheus is said “to be patient of divine things.”
Great theologians excel in both kinds of wisdom. Thus knowledge
that is not discursive and that is the result of the gift of wisdom,
illustrates and confirms from on high the discursive knowledge of
acquired theology. This is clearly seen in the writings of St. Augus­
tine and not infrequently this reinforcement from on high in some
way makes up for the imperfection that is of philosophical for­
mation.
Another corollary. Apologetics is not a science specifically dis­
tinct from sacred theology, but it is theology functioning according
to the principles of reason, and pertains to it, inasmuch as theology
is wisdom and inasmuch as it defends the principles of faith and
adheres to the same against those denying them. This has been more
fully explained in another of our works.87 It will be made clearer
in the eighth article, in which it is said that theology defends its
principles against those who deny them, and it does not leave this
defense to another science, because it is wisdom or the highest of
i he acquired sciences. But in this rational or apologetic function
of theology, it makes use of history and philosophy.
Ibid., la Ilae, q.57, a.5 ad 311m.
e» Ibid., Ila llae, q.45, a.2.
80 Ps. 33: 9.
er Cf. De revelatione, I, chaps. 2 f.

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78

SEVENTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS SCIENCE

State of the question. At first sight is seems that this article comes
rather late in the discussion, because a science is specified by its
proper object or subject, and from this its definition is derived, its
properties are deduced, and its relations are established to the other
sciences either inferior or superior.
Nevertheless, if the difficulties propounded at the beginning of
this article are carefully considered, we see that it is in the right
place here as being a recapitulation of the preceding articles and
the goal of the hunt or search for the real scientific definition of
sacred theology. The nominal definition of sacred theology, that
it is the science of God derived from revelation, sufficed for the
preceding articles.
It is now formally and explicitly determined why the subject of
sacred theology is not, as some said, either Christ the mediator, or
the sacraments, or the public worship due to God, or supernatural
being in general, but God Himself in His intimate life.
The difficulty, however, is that every science knows what its
subject is by means of the definition of the same, and from this it
deduces the properties. Thus mathematics knows what is quantity,
either continuous or discrete, namely, magnitude and number. Like­
wise natural philosophy knows what is mobile being, and meta­
physics what is being as such. Contrary to this, sacred theology does
not know properly or quiddatively what God is. As Damascene says:
“It is impossible to say what God is.” 88 To say what the Deity is
we should have to see it; the beatific vision, however, is not given
to one in this life. Moreover, sacred theology treats not only of
God, but also of creatures and of human acts.
The reply, however, is that God is the subject of sacred theology.
r) This is already evident from the nominal definition of the­
ology, since the term implies a discussion about God.
2) The direct proof is as follows: The object of a faculty or the
subject of a science is that under the aspect of which all things
are referred to the faculty or the science; but all things are con­
sidered in sacred theology with reference to God under the aspect
of God; therefore God under the aspect of God is the subject of this
science.
The major distinguishes to some extent between object and sub­
ject. The object is that which is presented to the faculty, and is
that which the faculty directly and immediately attains, and hence
bb De

fide orthod., Bk. HI, chap. 4.

SACRED DOCTRINE

79

that under the aspect of which it attains all other things. Thus the
object of sight is the colored object seen by sense perception; the
object of the intellect is being, but the proper object of the human
intellect is intelligible being of sensible things. With reference to
science, which demonstrates conclusions about some subject (prop­
erties of man, for instance, about man), its object is the demon­
strated conclusion or conclusions, but its subject is that which is the
subject of the conclusions, or that about which the properties are
demonstrated. Object and subject are commonly accepted for the
same thing. But, strictly speaking, the subject of metaphysics is being
as such, because metaphysics demonstrates the properties of being.
The subject of natural philosophy is mobile being, and the subject
of psychology is the soul. Hence, if metaphysics treats of God in
natural theology, it does not discuss Him as the proper subject but
as He is the cause of the being as such of various things.
Likewise the subject of medicine is the human body viewed under
the aspect of health; and medicine considers all other things as
remedies—salts, for instance, medicinal herbs, and such like—and
so far as these have reference to the health of the human body. So
also psychology considers the various manifestations of the life of
the soul, languages, for instance, so far as these refer to the soul. It
does not treat of these as the linguist does. Hence, although the
object of a faculty may be something common to many sciences, the
subject of a science may be something that is restricted.
The minor is: In sacred theology all things are considered with
reference to God under the aspect of God. By logical induction this
is evident; for it treats either of God Himself, or of those things
i hat refer to Him as the beginning and end of all things Thus
sacred theology in the treatises on God as one, as triune, as creator,
as Word made flesh, treats of God as the proper subject, not as
metaphysics does, which treats of God as He is the cause of the be­
ing as such of various things. Moreover, sacred theology treats of
God under the aspect of God or of the Deity, and not only as He
is the first Being, which metaphysics does. This means that it treats
of God in His intimate life, and it is concerned with the "deep
things of God.” 89 Therefore all the conclusions of sacred theology
are derived from a certainty of knowledge of the Deity transmitted
through revelation and directed to a greater knowledge of this
Deity, just as all the conclusions of metaphysics presuppose the
notion of being and are directed to a more profound knowledge of
being, and just as all the conclusions of psychology tend to a greater
knowledge of the soul.90
β» I Cor. 2: io.
oo See Cajetan’s commentary on this article, no. i.

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THE ONE GOD

As long as sacred theology treats of creatures it considers them
as they refer to God under the aspect of the Deity, just as medicine
considers mineral remedies or medicinal herbs so far as they refer
to man’s health. This means that sacred theology treats of creatures,
in that they are vestiges or images of God, and in that the nobler
creatures have been admitted to participate in God’s intimate life
by grace, and are ordained to see God and love Him above all
things.01 Thus God under the aspect of God is the proper subject of
theology; or He is the formal object quod of theology made known
by the light of virtual revelation. St. Thomas had said in the pre­
ceding article that it is ‘‘God so far as He is known to Himself alone
and revealed to others.”
This is confirmed by the following argument: A science and its
principles have the same subject, since the whole science is virtually
contained in its principles: but God under the aspect of the Deity
is the subject of the principles of this science, which are the articles
of faith; therefore God is the subject of this science.
St. Thomas enumerates the articles of faith.02 Four of them con­
cern the one and triune God; three refer to Him as He is the cause
of creatures, as also of grace and glory; the rest are about the Word
made flesh. All the other truths of faith are referred to these articles
of faith. As theology is a science deriving its principles from faith,
its object is the same as that of faith, though this object is perceived
not by the light of formal but of virtual revelation.
We have as yet to consider the difficulty posited at the beginning
of this article, which is to the effect that in this life we cannot know
what God is or know His essence. The Deity as such or the divine
essence is known through the beatific vision. How can it be said,
therefore, that sacred theology is the science that treats of God
under the aspect of the Deity?
St. Thomas replies to the first objection by saying that, “although
we cannot know what constitutes the essence of God, nevertheless
in this science we make use of His effects either of nature or of grace,
in place of a definition.” Thus we say that sacred theology treats
of God as the Author of grace, and this means a formal partici­
pation in the Deity. We also know the infinite fecundity within the
Deity, in that it is manifested to us through the revealed mystery of
the Trinity. Thus we have analogical knowledge of the divine
Paternity, the divine Filiation, and the divine Spiration.
As Cajetan remarks,03 God can be considered: (i) under the
»1 See reply to the second objection of this article.
»2 Summa lheol., Ila Hae, q.i, a.8.
»3 See his commentary on this article, no. i.

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common concepts of being and act; (2) under the relative concept
of supreme cause; (3) under the mixed concept (namely, one that is
both common and either relative or negative) of pure act, first be­
ing; (4) transcending all these modes, however, God can be con­
sidered according to His proper quiddity or essence, "which by way
of circumlocution we call the Deity.” 84
We have only the name but not the proper concept of the Deity
as such. In this life by this name we understand an eminence that
contains formally all absolutely simple perfections, such as being,
unity, truth. ... As regards the Deity we are somehow like one
who, having seen the seven colors of the rainbow and knowing of
whiteness only by name, would understand that by this name is
meant the origin of colors. The difference, however, is this, that
whiteness contains colors only virtually, whereas the Deity contains
absolutely simple perfections formally and eminently.
At the end of the reply to the first objection, St. Thomas remarks
that in some philosophical sciences the effect is taken in place of
a definition of the cause. Such is the case in a descriptive definition,
for it is only descriptively and, as it were, empirically that we define
the species of minerals, plants, and animals, man being the excep­
tion. We do not know the essence of the rose, the lion, the eagle.
1’his means that we do not know their distinct specific difference,
so as to deduce their properties. The reason is that the substantial
forms of these plants and animals are immersed in matter. Man
alone among animals is properly defined by means of the specific
difference, and from this his properties are deduced, because his
form, the rational soul, is not immersed in matter, and the power to
reason is a mode of intelligence the object of which is intelligible
being. Thus by the light of intelligible being man becomes intelli­
gible to himself; he defines his own nature better than that of a lion
or eagle, the forms of which do not transcend the material; and just
as the specific difference of the lion and eagle is inferior to our
intellectual knowledge, so the Deity, which is, as it were, the βρε­
ι ific difference of God, is superior to our natural intellectual knowl­
edge. It remains to be said, however, that the Deity is known in the
mist of faith as the root of the divine processions manifesting its
fecundity, and as the cause of grace and glory, these being properly
the formal participations in the Deity as such, since by these gifts
"we are made partakers of the divine nature." 8S
In this sense, therefore, we say that the subject of sacred theology
is God under the aspect of the Deity, according as He comes within
M Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 3.
II Pet. 1: 4.

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the scope of virtual revelation. But if we distinguish between its
object and subject, then the conclusions about God or those things
that are directed to Him constitute its object.
First corollary. Even when sacred theology treats of creatures, of
the morality of human acts, God is always its subject, that is, God
the Creator or God the ultimate end. On the other hand, the subject
of ethics is human action. Thus ethics is specifically distinct from
moral theology, just as acquired prudence, described by Aristotle
as "the right ordering of things to be done,” differs from infused
prudence spoken of in the Gospels.86
Second corollary. Among the various theological systems, that one
approaches closer to the perfection of a theological science which
has as its germinating idea and, as it were, as its golden key, the
exalted notion of God the Author of grace and salvation, rather
than the notion of the created will. The reason is that in theology
the idea of God is, as it were, the sun illuminating all things, just as
in metaphysics this role belongs to the idea of being as such.
Third corollary. From the fact that God is the proper object of
theology, this science begins by treating of God as He is in Himself,
then of the procession of creatures from God, and finally of the or­
daining of created things to God as to their end. Such is the method
employed in the Theological Summa.07 It is the synthetic method of
descent from God and a return to Him.
Contrary to this, metaphysics is the science of being as such, of
being as previously known by us in sensible things, and it begins to
treat of the knowableness of extramental being,88 of being as
divided into substance and accident, potency and act, and it dis­
cusses God only at the end of the treatise.88 Moreover, metaphysics,
as a general rule, comes after natural philosophy, since the being
of sensible things is what is first known by our intellect. The
method in philosophy is analytico-synthetic; it ascends to God, and
afterward judges of creatures from its lofty standpoint of reference
to the first cause.
This difference must be carefully noted. St. Thomas says: “In the
doctrine of philosophy . . . the discussion is first about creatures
and finally about God; in the doctrine of faith, which discusses
creatures only as they refer to God, God is its first consideration,
and then creatures; thus it is more perfect, as being more like
God’s knowledge.” 160 Wherefore the philosophical treatise on the
oo Summa theol., la Hae, q.63, a.4.
»’ See also Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps. 3, 9; Bk. II, chaps. 4, 46.
se Metaph., Bk. IV.
«»Zbid., Bk. XII.
100 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 4.

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soul begins by discussing the vegetative and sensitive faculties of
the soul and ends by discussing the intellective faculties, the spirit­
uality and immortality of which it finally proves; whereas from the
very start the treatise on man,101 considering the soul as coming
from God, treats almost immediately of its incorruptibility and its
difference from the angelic nature.
EIGHTH ARTICLE
WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A MATTER OF ARGUMENT

State of the question. The meaning of the title is: Have those
things which sacred doctrine teaches the force of conviction? The
difficulty is that what is transmitted to us in theology is believed
rather than proved. In fact, it seems that proof would lessen the
merit of faith. The reply, however, is that sacred theology is a
matter of argument, and this for three reasons:
1) That it may prove, not its principles, but the conclusions to
be deduced from them.
2) That it may defend its principles from the revealed truths ad­
mitted by the opponent.
3) That it may defend its principles by solving the objections of
opponents, if they concede nothing at all of divine revelation.
As regards the proof of conclusions, sacred theology is in this
respect like all the sciences. As for the defense of its principles, in
I his it does not differ from metaphysics which, since it is wisdom,
defends its own principles against those denying them, solving their
objections at any rate, and proving them to be false or at least not
convincing.
Thus Aristotle 102 defends the real validity of the first principle
of reason, that is, of the principle of contradiction, and also the
validity of reason itself. In this process metaphysics, to be sure,
makes use of logic, but it does not leave the defense of its prin­
ciples to logic, for these are concerned not only with logical being
but also with real being. It is the privilege of wisdom as such to
defend its principles by the analysis of their concepts and the solu­
tion of objections, before it proceeds to the deduction of conclu­
sions. So also sacred theology, inasmuch as it is wisdom, before
deducing conclusions analyzes the principles of faith, and defends
these principles against those who deny them and, by positive and
speculative arguments drawn from revelation, solves the objections.
In doing so, sacred theology makes use of history and philosophy.
*oi Summa theol., la, q.75.
*02 Metaph., Bk. IV.

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As St. Thomas says: “It refutes those things that are said against
the faith by showing that they are false or of no consequence,” 103
that is, not convincing. Cajetan admirably says: “There is a dif­
ference between the solution of an objection and the proof of a
thesis. For a proof is drawn from the evidence of argument ... ;
a solution, however, does not require evidence, but simply that the
intellect be not compelled. ... A solution is also obtained from
what does not seem to be false, though it may not be known to be
true.” 104
We have an example of this in the case of the Trinity. If it is
objected that one and the same nature does not belong numerically
to several persons, the theologian replies: that this can be said of
a finite nature, I concede; of an infinite nature, that I deny. It is
not that the theologian positively knows that the infinite nature
pertains to several persons; this he believes and consequently main­
tains that there is no means of proving the impossibility of this in
an infinite nature. Thus the possibility of essentially supernatural
mysteries is neither proved nor disproved. But we are reasonably
persuaded of the same; it is defended against those denying and it
is firmly believed. St. Thomas says: “Therefore what is of faith can
be proved by authority alone to those who accept the authority;
while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches
is not impossible.” 105 John of St. Thomas says: "It is not evident
to reason that a proposition contradictory to the faith is in itself
false, but simply that the arguments by which it is proved are not
cogent.” 108
Essentially supernatural mysteries are, of course, likewise super­
natural as to their knowableness, for being and truth are one and
the same. Therefore not only the existence of mysteries but even
their intrinsic possibility is neither proved nor disproved, but we
are reasonably persuaded of the same (by an argument of congru­
ence), and it is firmly believed. If, indeed, it were positively proved,
for instance, that the Trinity is really possible, then the fact of its
existence would be proved because, in necessary things, what is
really possible demands of necessity the existence of the same. And
if it were positively proved that the beatific vision or eternal life is
really possible, this mystery would transcend our naturally acquired
knowledge, not because of its essentially supernatural nature but
103 Com. in Boetium de Trinitate, q.2, a.3.
104 Com. in a.8, nos. 4 f.
103 Summa theol., la, q.32, a. 1; also Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 8. Such is the
common teaching of the theologians. Thus Billuart (De Deo trino, diss, prooem,
a.4) says: ‘The possibility of the Trinity is not proved by a positive and evident
argument, but by a negative and probable proof.”
ioe Com. in lam, q. 1, a. 12, nos. 5 f.

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because of its contingency, in that it is a contingent future of the
natural order which depends upon God’s most free good pleasure,
just as the last day of this material world does.
From the privilege sacred theology enjoys as wisdom, it follows,
as we already remarked, that apologetics is not a specifically dis­
tinct science from sacred theology, but is the same science function­
ing rationally for the defense of the credibility of the mysteries
of faith. Just as the critical part of metaphysics defends the real
validity of the first principles of reason and of intellectual evidence,
and in this it makes use of logic, so sacred theology defends the
credibility of the mysteries of faith, and in this it makes use of
history and philosophy, presenting from its lofty standpoint, under
the direction of faith, arguments drawn from reason as to the
demonstrative force, for instance, of miracles and other signs, so
i hat unbelievers may know from these signs that revelation is a
fact and may so present unto God “a reasonable service.” 107
What is the mode of argumentation that is pre-eminently proper
to sacred theology?
In the reply to the second objection it is stated that the argu­
mentation is from divine authority, for sacred theology proceeds
under the guidance of the light of revelation or of the authority
of God revealing.
In this reply to the second objection we have the germ, as it
were, of the treatise on the theological sources. Melchior Cano, O.P.,
was the first in this field. The theological sources are divided as
follows:
Sacred Scripture
Divine tradition
i of ordinary magisterium and
Authority of the
Catholic Church I of ecumenical councils

Apodictic

Authority of the
Roman Pontiff
s
o

Probable

y

Γ Authority of holy Fathers

I, Authority of scholastic theologians

Apodictic 4

‘The natural power of reason
and history as we can rely
on its certainty

.Probable 4 The authority of philosophers
tot Rom.

iî: i.

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THE ONE GOD

Cajetan points out108 that sacred theology makes use of natural
or metaphysical reasons, as extrinsic or probable arguments, if
these reasons are absolutely considered; it makes use of them as
proper and sometimes necessary arguments, if these are considered
as ministering to theology, that is, as helping in the deduction
of the theological conclusion. But if we use these reasons as per­
suasive arguments in favor of the possibility of mysteries, then they
furnish us with only a probable argument or with one of fitness
that may be, however, most profound and always to be examined,
but that is not apodictic.
Melchior Cano 100 in treating of history as an extrinsic theologi­
cal source, holds that, if all the approved and weighty historians
concur in admitting the same historical fact, then we have an ar­
gument of certainty on their authority.
Hence sacred theology first of all appeals to the argument from
authority, and then has recourse to reason for the explanation,
defense, right ordering of the authorities, and for the deduction of
the conclusions from them.
The method of procedure in sacred theology is explained in the
treatise on the theological sources, especially as regards the posi­
tive part. It lays down rules for discerning the literal sense of Sacred
Scripture, for the discernment of divine tradition, as also for the
correct interpretation of the definitions of the solemn utterances
of the Church and for the validity of the other decisions. It also
decides the doctrinal authority of the Fathers and theologians. It is
likewise concerned with the appeal to reason and history.
But as to the speculative part of theology, the fundamentals of
the analogical method are explained by St. Thomas when he dis­
cusses the divine names;110 for our knowledge of God and of the
supernatural gifts is but analogical, derived by means of a com­
parison with things in nature.
NINTH ARTICLE
WHETHER HOLY SCRIPTURE SHOULD USE METAPHORS

State of the question. The reason for this inquiry is that the
theologian must carefully distinguish in Sacred Scripture between
the literal sense according to the proper signification of the words,
and the metaphorical sense, according to some similitude, as when
it is said that “our God is a consuming fire.” 111 Hence the question
los Com. in lam, q. i, a. 8, no. 8.
109 De locis theologicis, XI, 4.
no Summa theol., la, q. 13.
in Heb. 12: 29.

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is. Why does Sacred Scripture sometimes have recourse to meta­
phorical language?
The difficulty is: (1) that metaphor fittingly pertains to poetry,
not to the proposition of some truth; and thus it is not allowed in
the sciences;112 (2) that by metaphors the truth is obscured; (3)
that metaphors taken from corporeal creatures cannot at all rep­
resent the purely spiritual life of God.
The answer, however, is: It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward
divine and spiritual truths metaphorically by means of compari­
sons with material things. This is proved in two ways: (1) because
it is natural for man to attain to intellectual truths through sensi­
ble objects, and God provides for everything according to the ca­
pacity of its nature; (2) because many are unable of themselves to
grasp intellectual things, and Sacred Scripture is proposed to all.
Hence Christ our Lord spoke to the multitude in parables.
Does Sacred Scripture make use of metaphors in the way poetry
does? In the reply to the first objection it is stated that poetry
makes use of metaphors on account of the pleasure derived from
representation, but Sacred Scripture on account of its usefulness.
Farther on,113 St. Thomas states in substance that poetry makes
use of metaphors because of the lack of appeal on the part of the
object extolled, but theology because of the preponderance of the
divine reality, which cannot be expressed except by way of analogy.
God, however, is analogically made known to us in two ways,
either by proper analogy, as when it is said that God is just; or
by metaphorical analogy, as when it is said that God is angry.114
In the reply to the second objection it is pointed out that “those
things which are taught metaphorically in one part of Scripture,
in other parts are taught more openly.” Moreover, “the hiding of
truth in figures is useful as a defense against the ridicule of the
impious.”
Commenting on the reply to the third objection, regarding meta­
phors taken from corporeal things, as when it is said that God is a
consuming fire, we say that these are more fitting, in this sense
that they do not permit us to rest the merits of our case in the
similitudes, because God is not a material fire and because this is
said only by way of similitude. On the other hand, when we speak
of the divine perfections in the strict sense, it may be that some
judge of these perfections as being formally and actually distinct
in God as they are in our mind. This would be to detract from
God’s absolute simplicity and loftiness of life.
112 Cf. Post Anal., Bk. II, chap. 12, no. 26.
112 Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 101, a. 2.
114 Ibid., la, q. 13, a. 3.

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THE ONE GOD
TENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER IN HOLY SCRIPTURE A WORD MAY HAVE
SEVERAL SENSES

State of the question. The special purpose of this article is to
distinguish between the literal sense and the spiritual sense in Holy
Scripture. The difficulty in admitting several senses is: (i) that
many different senses in one text produce confusion; (2) that au­
thors are not fully in agreement about the names to be given to
these various senses.
The reply is, however, that in Holy Scripture a word can be
used both in the literal or historical sense and in the spiritual sense,
which latter is either allegorical or moral or analogical, in accord­
ance with the traditional terminology.
A profound reason is given for this first distinction, namely, that
‘‘the Author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify
His meaning not by words only (as man also can do), but also by
things themselves.” But what is signified by the words belongs to
the literal sense, whereas the signification by which things signified
by words have themselves also a signification belongs to the spirit­
ual sense. Thus Job is the figure of Christ suffering, the paschal
lamb is the figure of the Lamb who taketh away the sins of the
world. Therefore these two senses are fittingly distinguished.
But the spiritual sense (1) is called allegorical so far as the things
of the Old Law signify in figure the things of the New Law; (2) it
is called moral according as the things done in Christ are types of
what we ought to do; (3) it is called anagogical, as the New Law is
itself a figure of future glory, as Dionysius says.115
So far there is no special difficulty, but St. Thomas furthermore
says in the last paragraph of the body of the article: “Since the
literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author
of Holy Writ is God, who by one act comprehends all things by His
intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says,116 if, even accord­
ing to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several
senses.” This statement has been and still is a subject of contro­
versy, namely, whether a word can have several senses. St. Thomas
seems to affirm this in the passage quoted above,117 and his leading
commentators are generally of the same opinion. Many modern
exegetes, however, such as Patrizzi and Comely, take the opposite
view. This question of the many different literal senses in Holy
ns Cf. Coel. Hier., Bk. I, chap. 5.
rw Confess., Bk. XII, chap. 31.
111 See also II Sent., d.12, q. 1, a.2 ad 7um; De potentia, q.4, a.i.

SACRED DOCTRINE

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Scripture is explained at length by Father P. V. Zapletal, O.P.118
When it is said, for instance, "God created heaven and earth,” 119
the word "heaven” would mean, so says St. Augustine,120 both the
material heaven and the angels. Or again, when it is said: "Give
us this day our daily bread,” this would mean both the ordinary
bread and the supersubstantial bread, explicitly so named in the
Gospel.121 Let us see first the replies to the objections that are ad­
vanced in argument by those who deny the many different literal
senses in Holy Scripture.
In the reply to the first objection it is stated that: “The multi­
plicity of these senses does not produce equivocation . . . seeing
that these senses (namely, these about which the objection is con­
cerned, the literal sense, and the threefold division of the spiritual
sense) are not multiplied because one word signifies several things,
but because the things signified by the words can be themselves
types of other things.”
Some say that in this passage St. Thomas seems to deny the
multiplicity of the literal sense. Many Thomists reply that such is
not the case, because St. Thomas would then contradict himself.
He is now speaking, they say, only of the quadruple sense about
which the objection was concerned, the literal sense, namely, and
the threefold spiritual sense.
In the same reply to the first objection it is furthermore remarked
that: “In Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are
founded on one (the literal) from which alone can any argument
be drawn . . . and nothing necessary to faith is contained under
the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scrip­
ture in its literal sense."
In the reply to the second objection, St. Augustine’s terminology
is explained, who called the spiritual sense, for instance, allegorical.
In the reply to tire third objection it is stated that the literal
sense is either proper or parabolical, that is, metaphorical. Thus
when God’s arm is mentioned, the literal sense is to be taken meta­
phorically as expressing God’s power.
There is still a doubt whether there are not several literal senses
in some texts of Holy Scripture.122 St. Augustine answers in the
affirmative. Summing up the question, he writes: “When it is said
‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth,’ it is revealed
that God did not create from eternity and at one and the same time
ns cf. Hermeneulica biblica, pp. 26-36.
ue Gen. 1: 1.
120 Confess., Bk. XII, chaps. 26-32.
121 Matt. 6: 11.
122 Cf. P. V. Zapletal, O.P., loc. cit.

THE ONE GOD
90
both the material heaven and the angels, both visible ana invisible
things; for this truth is afterward held as certainly revealed.” 123
St. Augustine remarks that if we perceive this twofold sense, why
is it that Moses, guided by the light of inspiration, did not perceive
it? St. Gregory the Great says the same.121
St. Thomas, says Father Zapletal, frequently speaks of the literal
sense in a favorable manner, as he so does at the end of the argu­
mentative part of this article. Likewise in another of his works he
writes: “It is not incredible that Moses and other authors were
granted by God knowledge of various truths capable of perception
by man, and that the one statement of words denotes these truths,
so that any one of them may be the meaning intended by the
author.” 125
Thus it is not incredible that Moses, inspired to write: "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth,” understood not only the
material and visible heaven, but also the invisible angels, as Augus­
tine says.128 In like manner, our Lord Jesus, saying that thus we
must pray: “Father . . . give us this day our daily bread,” 127 could
have had in mind both the ordinary bread and supersubstantial
bread. The opponents say that this second sense is not literal but
spiritual. But it is evidently not so, for the actual words of the
first Evangelist are: “Give us this day our supersubstantial
bread.” 128 Perhaps Jesus said to the multitude "daily bread,” and
to the apostles “supersubstantial bread.”
St. Thomas, who is conservative in his statement, writes: "it is not
incredible. . . 128 He would have more to say if it were a ques­
tion only of the spiritual sense, because this latter is quite evident.
Hence he is speaking of the twofold literal sense. The majority of
the commentators of St. Thomas, as Father Zapletal points out, ad­
mitted the multiplicity of the literal sense. Among these are Ca­
jetan, Cano,130 Bannez, Sylvius, John of St. Thomas, and Billuart.131
Against this multiplicity of senses are quoted, among the earlier
12a St. Augustine, loc. cit.
ni Cf. in Ezech. 3: 13.
125 De potentia, q.4, a. 1.
12« St. Augustine, loc. cit.
nr Luke 11: 2-3.
lie Matt. 6: 11.
12s De potentia, q.4, a. 1.
io De locis theol., Bk. II, chap. 11 ad yum, arg. ad 3am rationem.
i’i Many of them, such as Bannez, quote as example the following verse: "In
the beginning God created heaven and earth.” They say that the words "in the
beginning" mean: (1) in the beginning of time, so that the world is not eternal;
(2) it was created before all things, which means that the angels were not created
before the material world. Billuart discusses this point in his treatise De regulis
fidei, diss. la, a. 8.

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theologians, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and St. Albert
the Great who said: “Theology gives one meaning to a word.” 132
Of the same opinion are most of the modern exegetes, who bring
forward the objection that, if there were several literal senses, the
result would be confusion and equivocation. This is their chief
reason.
In reply to this we say that if the names used were equivocal, as
in the case of dog used to denote the terrestrial animal and
the heavenly constellation, then I concede the assertion; but if the
names are analogous, then I deny it. Thus heaven denotes both the
starry firmament and the angels, and bread is understood in the
ordinary sense of the term and it also means the Holy Eucharist.
But if it is a case of two subordinated analogates, or of two that
are co-ordinated under a higher, and if no false sense arises from
this, then there is no equivocation.133
It is still a disputed question. The following argument may be
advanced in favor of those who admit a twofold literal sense. If
men can utter words that have a twofold literal sense and that are
most intelligible to an intelligent hearer, much more so can God
do this, who is the author of Holy Scripture. But intelligent men
frequently utter words that have a twofold literal sense and that
can easily be understood. Thus at a certain banquet a prelate who
was a moderate Thomist said to another prelate who was of the
rigid type: “Do you want a little water in your wine?” The rigid
Thomist perceived quite well the twofold literal sense in the words,
the first being a reference to the mixing of water with the wine,
the other to the moderation of Thomism. His answer therefore
was: “I admit only one drop of water in the wine of the Mass.”
There was likewise in these words a twofold literal sense: (1) the
obvious sense; (2) the metaphorical literal sense, the one however
primarily meant, namely, that there must be no mitigation in the
soundest of doctrine. Thus it is said that W. Goethe sometimes as­
signed a twofold literal sense to his verses, so that at least the more
intelligent readers might perceive this second sense. This frequently
is the case when persons of great culture converse.
132 Summa theol., I, tr. 1, q.5, memb. 2 ad gum.
>33 John of St. Thomas (in lam, disp. 12, a. 12) says: “Nor does it follow that
there is equivocation or confusion from such plurality of senses, and this for two
reasons: (1) because there is often a certain similarity or order among these senses,
for where there is order, there is no equivocation: (2) because a multiplicity of
senses results in equivocation when it is the occasion of deception, or when there
is a possibility of falsity in the other sense. But when each sense is true, as must
be the case by the very fact that it is said of God in the literal sense, then there
is no occasion either for equivocation or deception. It is due, however, to the
element of mystery and the excellence of the speaker that he can in one utterance
include and denote several senses."

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But if men can so express themselves, why could not God, and
even Moses, have attached a twofold sense to the words: “In the
beginning God created heaven" (namely, the material heaven and
the angels). And why could not these words, “Give us this day our
daily bread,” have a twofold literal sense, the one referring to
ordinary bread and the other to supersubstantial bread?
But the opponents would say that in these examples one of the
senses is literal (as in the case of ordinary bread and the material
heaven), whereas the other sense is spiritual, since bread in the
usual sense of die term is the symbol of the other kind, and since
the material heaven is the quasi abode of the angels. Hence it is
not quite clear that there are two literal senses; but neither is the
contention of the opponents an established fact. It is therefore a
probable opinion, if the question concerns the presence of a two­
fold literal sense in certain texts, and a more than probable opin­
ion if it is a question of the possibility of these two senses.
As for the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and
earth,” it is not quite clear that there are two literal senses. How­
ever, the Fourth Lateran Council discovers two truths in this text,
namely, that God did not create the world from eternity, and that
“He created out of nothing, from the beginning of time, both the
spiritual and corporeal creature, to wit, the angelic and the mun­
dane,” 184 which means that the angels were not created before
corporeal creatures. Hence this council seems to understand, as St.
Augustine did, that the words, “In the beginning God created
heaven,” mean that He created at one and the same time, the
heavenly bodies and the angels.
We must conclude that the possibility of a word having two
literal senses appears to be a certainty, but that there are actually
two senses is but a probability. Therefore St. Thomas says: “It is
not incredible that Moses and other authors were granted by God
knowledge of various truths capable of perception by man, and
that one statement of words denotes these truths, so that any one
of them may be the meaning intended by the author.” 135
Thus we bring to an end the question on sacred doctrine, a ques­
tion in which the holy Doctor determined the nature and dignity
of sacred theology, effecting this by an examination of its object
and of the light from which it proceeds. He also determined its
method of argumentation and the various senses of Holy Scripture.
Denz., no. 428.
135 De potentia, loc. cit.

CHAPTER II
Question 2

Prologue
The prologue to this question is concerned with the orderly ar­

rangement of the whole Theological Summa. The definition of
sacred theology, however, is the foundation for this division; for it
is the knowledge of God as such, as acquired by the light of revela­
tion. Hence it follows that theology must treat: (1) of God in Him­
self,1 and as He is the principle of creatures, especially of rational
creatures; (2) of the rational creature’s advance toward God as its
end; (3) of Christ, who as man, is our way to God. Thus there are
three parts to the Theological Summa.
It must be noted that the order is not philosophical but strictly
theological. St. Thomas says: "For in the teaching of philosophy,
which considers creatures in themselves and leads us from them to
the knowledge of God, the first consideration is about creatures,
and the last about God; whereas in the teaching of faith, which
considers creatures only in their relation to God, the consideration
about God takes the first place, and that about creatures the last.
And thus it is more perfect as being more like God’s knowledge;
for He beholds other things by knowing Himself.” 2
This theological order is known as the synthetic order. It begins
by considering the higher and more universal things in causation,
and it descends to the lower and less universal; and this is in ac­
cordance with the very order of nature and causality.
Moreover, in this order, those things that are necessary receive
first consideration, which, in the first and second parts of the
Summa, are God and created natures, especially human nature.
These are considered before the great contingent fact of the In­
carnation of the divine Word for the redemption of the human
race in accordance with the following statement in the Apostle’s
Creed: “Who for us men and for our salvation came down from
heaven.”
iThe prologue says: “God, as He is in Himself," that is, as He is the principle
and end of creatures. This expression, however, does not mean "just as He is,”
because it is only in the beatific vision that God is known "just as He is.”
2 Cf. Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 4, § 3.
93

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THE ONE GOD

Finally, this order is of the nature of a complete revolution, in
that its starting-point is God, the beginning of all things; and in
the treatise on the last things it returns to this same starting-point,
which is God, the ultimate end of all things. Thus it embraces
everything, and for this reason the work is truly a Summa in which
the dogmatic and moral parts of sacred theology are united under
one formal aspect.
It is not exactly the same order that is observed in the Summa
Contra Gentes, because in that work St. Thomas proceeds by the
apologetic method. Yet it is not a philosophical summa that be­
gins with a consideration of creatures, for it begins with a con­
sideration of God Himself. In the first three books, however, God
and creatures are considered according to what can be known of
these by reason alone, whereas in the fourth book strictly super­
natural mysteries are discussed, such as the Trinity and the Incarna­
tion.
Although St. Thomas proceeds by the synthetic method in these
two theological works, nevertheless, in beginning the treatise by
considering the question of the demonstration of God’s existence,
he brings together arguments which had been given by Aristotle.3
Thus he makes use of them, as was said, “not because of the defect
or insufficiency of sacred theology, but because of the defect of our
intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through
natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences), to that
which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science.” *
It is, indeed, under the guidance of a higher light that this as­
sembly of philosophical arguments concerning God’s existence is
effected, and by this means certitude rests on more solid grounds.
There is a threefold division in the first part of the Summa.
Here are considered: (i) whatever pertains to the divine essence,
or de Deo uno; (2) whatever pertains to the distinction of Persons,
or de Deo trino; (3) whatever pertains to the procession of creatures
from God, or de Deo creante et devante.
The treatise on the one God is likewise divided into three parts.
First, whether God exists (q. 2). Secondly, the manner of His exist­
ence, or rather, what is not the manner of His existence. This is
discussed from the third question to the end of the thirteenth, in
which the metaphysical attributes of God are considered, many of
them expressed in the negative form, such as the simplicity, the
perfection, the infinity, the immutability, and the unity of God.
These pertain to God as He is in Himself, and are considered from
the third question to the end of the eleventh. Then in the twelfth
» Physics, Bk. VIII; Metaph., Bk. XII.
* Summa theol., la, q.l, a.5 ad sum.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

95

and thirteenth questions God is discussed in His relation to us,
how He is known and named by us. The analogical method is em­
ployed here, namely, the method of speculative theology. Thirdly,
whatever concerns God’s operation is discussed from the fourteenth
question to the end of the twenty-sixth. In these questions the
knowledge, life, will, love, justice, mercy, providence, predestina­
tion, power, and beatitude of God are considered.
From this division it is already apparent that the theological
treatise on the one God is concerned with several truths that can­
not be known by reason alone. Such are the beatific vision (q. 12),
God’s providence even as it concerns those creatures that are of the
supernatural order, or predestination (q. 23). These must be the
subject of special consideration, because there are other attributes
that have already been discussed by philosophy in their metaphysi­
cal aspect.
It must be pointed out that this order proposed by St. Thomas is
a great improvement upon the order established by Peter Lombard
in the Books of the Sentences. This theologian, as we remarked,
divides the subject matter not as it refers to God (the sub­
ject of sacred theology), but as it refers to the human will, the two
acts of which are enjoyment and use. Thus his treatise is concerned
first of all with those things in which we must find our delight,
with those things that bring us happiness, namely, with the Father,
the Son, and the Holy Ghost, or, with the triune God. Then he dis­
cusses the knowledge, power, and will of God. He afterward comes
to a consideration of those things which we must make use of,
namely, creatures; in other words, angels, man, and grace. Original
sin and actual sin are here discussed. Afterward he takes up the
consideration of those things that must be the object both of our
enjoyment and of our use, namely, Christ as man, and the virtues.
Finally he discusses the sacraments and our last end.
In this division a discussion of the moral part of theology is not
directly intended, but only as the occasion requires, as in the third
book of the Sentences, although the division of the entire treatise
gives one the impression that it is concerned more with moral
questions, namely, with those things that can be the object of our en­
joyment and use.
Several modern authors, such as Scheeben, after the treatises on
the one and triune God, and on creation, begin at once with the
treatise on Christ before discussing grace and the infused virtues.
Thus grace is presented more in its Christian aspect; but, on the
other hand, grace must be considered as it existed even in the state
of innocence and in the angels, who were not redeemed by Christ.

THE ONE GOD

9θ

The Existence of God

There are three articles to this question: (i) whether the existence

of God is self-evident; (2) whether it can be demonstrated that God
exists; (3) whether God exists. Thus three possible standpoints are
considered. (1) There is the standpoint of those who, like St. An­
selm, say that God’s existence is self-evident; (2) then there are
those who, like the agnostics, hold that God’s existence is neither
self-evident, nor possible of demonstration; (3) and we have the
stand taken by St. Thomas, who shows that God’s existence can
be and is demonstrated by a consideration of existing effects.
John of St. Thomas asks why St. Thomas treats in theology of
God’s existence. He replies that the reasons given by sacred theology
in proof of the existence of God as the Author of nature, are not its
own but are taken from metaphysics. These reasons, however, are
corrected and perfected by theology guided by the light of revela­
tion, which says those men are inexcusable 5 who, from the orderly
arrangement of all things in the world, did not know that there is
a supreme Ordainer. This constitutes the preamble to the faith. It
is also of faith that God exists as the Author of grace and salvation;
and this is not proved but supposed by sacred theology, and is
afterward explained and defended by it.
This question begins by taking for granted what is meant by the
name God or the nominal definition, namely, that by this name
men generally understand the intelligent and supreme Cause of the
universe, which He has designed. Hence the question is, whether
this highest and most perfect cause truly exists as really and es­
sentially distinct from the world. Thus any demonstration of God’s
existence begins by some nominal definition of God, and the exist­
ence is proved of the first Mover, the first Cause, the first necessary
Being, and the supreme Ordainer.
FIRST ARTICLE
whether the existence of god is self-evident

State of the question. That proposition is self-evident which, as
soon as the terms are known, and without the medium of demon­
stration, is known as true and necessary. Such are the first princi­
ples of reason, which are immediately evident and which therefore
cannot be demonstrated except indirectly or by a reduction to
absurdity. Is the proposition, God is, self-evident; is it evident from
the terms alone?
4 Rom. 1: 20.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

97
In the state of the question St. Thomas first gives the reasons for
affirming this, (i) Damascene says: “The knowledge of God is nat­
urally implanted in all,” ® and therefore the proposition seems as
self-evident as the first principles of reason are. (2) St. Anselm’s ar­
gument 7 is proposed by the following syllogism: Nothing greater
can be thought of than what is signified by the word “God”; but
what exists actually and mentally is greater than what exists only
mentally; therefore, as soon as the word “God” is understood, it
evidently follows that God exists not only mentally but also ac­
tually. This argument was later on revived by Descartes, Leibnitz,
and the ontologists. It was admitted even by Spinoza, but accord­
ing to the pantheistic type of ontologism. (3) It is evident that truth
exists, says St. Thomas (for if it is said that truth does not exist,
then it is true that truth does not exist); but God is truth; therefore
God exists.
It must be noted that St. Anselm’s argument, as de Wulf8 re­
lates, was admitted by William of Auxerre, Richard Fitzacre, and
Alexander of Hales. St. Albert the Great seems to be of the opinion
that this argument appeals to philosophers. It is rejected, however,
by St. Thomas, Robert Middleton, Scotus, and many Scholastics.
Among modern intellectuals it is rejected by Kant who, moreover,
in accordance with his subjectivism, maintains that St. Anselm’s de­
ceptive argument, which he calls the ontological argument, is im­
plied in all the classic proofs of God’s existence. In this difficult
question that must be carefully considered, as we shall at once see,
there are three systems of thought that are in opposition to one
another, namely, the exaggerated realism of St. Anselm and the
ontologists, the subjective conceptualism of Kant, and the moder­
ate realism of St. Thomas, this latter being, so to speak, the just
mean and summit between the other two.
The reply. That God exists, is not self-evident, at least to us.
1) The indirect proof is given in the counterargument as follows:
no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident (e.g.,
of the principle of contradiction, or of causality); but "the fool
said in his heart, there is no God”;8 therefore, that God exists, is
not self-evident.
To this the followers of St. Anselm reply: This proposition, “God
is,” is self-evident only to the philosophers, as this other, that “in­
corporeal substances are not in space.” It is not self-evident, how­
ever, to those whose intelligence is obscured by reason of inordinate
‘De fide orthod., Bk. I, chap. 1.
7 Proslogium, chap. 3.
s History of Medieval Philosophy (4th ed.), p. 335.
8 Ps. 52: 1.

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THE ONE GOD

passions, and who, therefore, do not consider what is signified by
this name God. Truly this indirect argument does not seem to be
apodictic. On the contrary, what is said in the body of the article
constitutes a cogent argument for St. Thomas.
2) The direct proof is then given. The entire argumentation has
its foundation in the distinction between “what is self-evident in
itself and to us,” and “what is self-evident in itself, but not to us,”
and is reduced to this conclusion: A proposition is self-evident in
itself, but not to us, when the predicate is included in the essence
of the subject, the essence of either subject or predicate being un­
known to us. Now in this proposition, “God is,” the predicate is
included indeed in the essence of the subject (for God is His own
existence), but we do not know the essence of God. Therefore this
proposition is self-evident in itself, but not to us, not even to
philosophers; it needs to be demonstrated by things that are more
known to us, though less known in their nature, namely, by ef­
fects.10 The major is evident; but the difficulty is in the minor, as
regards the words, “we do not know God’s essence.” For a better
understanding of this difficulty the objections of St. Anselm’s fol­
lowers must be presented as they increase in urgency.
The followers of St. Anselm object that we have not the quid­
dative knowledge of God which the blessed enjoy in heaven, which
means that we do not know the Deity as it is in itself; but we do
know what is meant by the name God, namely, that if God exists,
then He is the first Cause and the most perfect Being; and this
suffices.
St. Thomas would reply to this, as he points out in the reply to
the second objection of the following article, by saying: The names
given to God are derived from His effects (as first Cause, most per­
fect Being), and this point will be more clearly explained later on
in the first article of the thirteenth question in which the analogy
between names taken from creatures as applied to God is discussed.
“Consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His
effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word
God.” 11 In other words, the nominal definition of God does not
include actual existence, and from this definition all that can be
concluded is that God is self-existent and independent of any other
being, if He exists. It follows then that God’s existence must be
10 As Cajetan observes, although a proposition that is self-evident in itself ex­
cludes an a priori middle term of demonstration, it can admit with reference to
us an a posteriori middle term; that is, a middle term by which we acquire a
greater knowledge of the subject. Scotus objects, saying that a proposition selfevident in itself and not to us, is not a proposition. In reply to this we say that
St. Thomas has in mind the fundamental aspect of the proposition.
u Summa theol·, la, q.2 ad turn.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

99

demonstrated a posteriori, that is, from those effects already known
to us. This is just what is said in the reply to the second objection
of this article.
The followers of St. Anselm again object that, even apart from
the effects, we at once know God’s essence, namely, that He is the
primal Truth and the supreme Good. And it is at once evident
that truth exists, especially primal Truth; and it is likewise evident
that good exists, especially the supreme Good.
In the reply to the third objection of this article, we read: “The
existence of truth in general is self-evident; but the existence of a
primal Truth is not self-evident to us.” This is proved indeed a
posteriori in the third article by the fourth way as follows: “Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the
like. But ‘more’ and ‘less’ are predicated of different things, according
as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maxi­
mum . . . and consequently something which is uttermost being."
Likewise in the reply to the first objection of this article, we
read: “Man naturally desires happiness (or to be happy), and what
is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him.” Thus
he has a confused knowledge of the supreme good. “This, how­
ever, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know
that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter
is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for
many there are who imagine that man’s perfect good, which is
happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in
something else.”
From these replies to the first and third objections, we see that
St. Anselm’s argument would be valid and fundamentally true if
absolute realism were true, that is, if the formal universal had ob­
jective existence, as Plato, the Platonists, the ontologists, and
Spinoza thought, though the latter applied this theory only to the
notion of substance. Even long ago Parmenides formulated the
principle of contradiction in accordance with the theory of ab­
solute realism, when he said: "Being exists, non-being does not
exist.” The principle of contradiction would be then not only an
abstract principle (abstracting from actual existence), but also a
judgment pertaining to the order of existence. Contrary to this,
Aristotle formulated this principle in the abstract by saying: “Be­
ing is no. non-being”; something cannot at the same time be and
not be.
But if absolute realism were true, that is, if the universal ex­
isted not only fundamentally, but formally apart from the thing,
then being in general would be identical with the divine being, as
Parmenides maintained, later on Spinoza, and also the ontologists,

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THE ONE GOD

though with some modifications. That such is the conclusion of
their teaching is clear from their condemned propositions. These
are: “An immediate and at least habitual knowledge of God is es­
sential for the intellect, so that without this there is no possibility
of its acquiring any knowledge since this is intellectual light itself.
That being which is in all things and without which nothing is
perceived by the intellect, is the divine being. There is no real
distinction between universals considered apart from things and
God. All other ideas are but modifications of the idea by which
God as being is simply understood.” 12
Hence, whereas St. Thomas says: “What first comes to our mind
is intelligible being” of sensible things, these extreme realists say
that what first comes to our mind is the divine being. In other
words, the ontological First or the first Being is what is first known
by our mind. But in this case being in general is identified with
the divine being, as Parmenides maintained among the ancient
philosophers and Spinoza among the moderns. Evidently, if this
extreme realism were true, St. Anselm’s argument would be valid
and undoubtedly a fundamental truth even in the order of inven­
tion (like the principle of contradiction). But this absolute realism
leads to pantheism and is without any foundation; for what is
first known is intelligible being of sensible things, and this will be
more clearly seen later on.13 Sometimes we have a superficial refu­
tation of St. Anselm’s argument. Its true refutation does not leave
out of consideration the problem of universals.
Several followers of St. Anselm object that, even independently
of absolute realism, God’s essence is sufficiently made known to us
by the name God, so that we can at once affirm that God is not
a stone, or a man, but that He is “the greatest being that is pos­
sible of conception.” It is especially this that the philosophers
understand the name implies. But the greatest being possible of
conception must exist not only mentally but also actually; other­
wise it would be possible to conceive a greater being, namely, one
that would exist both mentally and actually. Thus God’s existence
is demonstrated, but by an a priori proof derived from the notion
of God.
About the end of the reply to the second objection of this article
the minor of the preceding syllogism is denied, for we read: “Nor
can it be argued that this being actually exists, unless it be admitted
(by the adversary) that there actually exists something than which
nothing greater can be thought.” In other words, the atheist or the
i2 Denz., nos. 1659 f.
is Summa theol., la, q.88, a.3: "Whether God is the first object known by the
human mind."

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

1O1

agnostic will say: Most certainly God is self-existent and is inde­
pendent of any other being, if Fie truly and actually exists; but
it must be proved that He actually exists. This is not proved from
merely the abstraction of God, a notion that does not include actual
existence. In other words, if extreme realism is untrue, in this argu­
ment given by St. Anselm there is an unwarranted transition from
the ideal order of essences to the real order of actual or de facto
existence. Against the proof of the minor it must be said that
neither God existing is greater than God viewed as possible as
regards His essence, to which the nominal definition refers; but in
addition to this He has actual existence, and this cannot be proved
merely from the abstract notion of God.
To state the case more briefly, in the ideal order of essences con­
ceived by us there cannot be anything greater than the most per­
fect being;14 but in the order of real and de facto existence, a fly
that really exists is greater as regards actual existence than a creata­
ble angel, and even than the most perfect being that is conceived
as merely possible of existing. From this we more clearly see what
St. Thomas meant when in the body of the article he said: “We
do not know the essence of God.”
Similarly, St. Thomas had said in the prologue to this second
question: “We must consider whether God exists and the manner
of His existence, or, rather, what is not the manner of His exist­
ence”; this means that He is not finite, not mobile, not corporeal,
and so forth. To know positively what God is would be to have a
proper and positive knowledge of the Deity, and not a knowledge
that is analogical and as it refers to creatures. In this case, the
proposition, “God is,” would be self-evident, as St. Bonaventure
says, who, on this point, does not seem to differ from St. Thomas.
If we had an intuitive and quiddative knowledge of the Deity,
then we would see actual existence in the same, because God is
His existence.10 But we know God’s essence only in an abstract and
analogical way, and essential existence is of course included in this
abstract notion, but not actual existence. In other words, it is in1« Cajetan says in his commentary on this article: “The reason for this sur­
passing excellence is the nobility of the thing signified in itself,” and there is no
contradiction implied when we say, “Existence is not," but only when we say,
"What exists is not." The whole of Cajetan’s commentary on this article should
be read.
15 In God, as He is in Himself, there is no distinction between essence and
existence, not even between the ideal order and that of actual existence. I am who
am, or Who is, each is a judgment that pertains both to the essential and to the
existential order. Identity of the two orders (the ideal and the real), which Hegel
posited as the foundation of his system, is found only in God. See Summa theol.,
la, q. 12, a.2 (end).

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THE ONE GOD

deed a priori evident that, if God exists, He is self-existent and
independent of any other (this being a hypothetical proposition
that concerns essential existence); but it is not a priori evident
solely from the abstract notion of God, that He truly and de facto
exists.
This already virtually excludes the opinion of those who posit
either some impressed or expressed species in the beatific vision.
From this species we would have only an abstractive and analogical
knowledge of God, and we would not know God just as He is. As
St. Thomas says: “The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by
any created similitude representing the divine essence as it really
is,” because the essence of God is the self-subsisting Being. We
cannot know of God what He is, unless we directly see the Deity,
without the intermediary of any created species or representation.
We shall then at once see not only that God is self-existent if He
exists, but that He is actually self-existent, existing as such exter­
nally to the soul.1’
In other words, as with our abstract notions, so our abstract and
analogical notion of the most perfect Being does not include actual
existence, but abstracts from it. It differs, however, from our no­
tions of contingent beings, such as of an angel or a stone, in that
it includes essential existence. Thus we already have evidence of
the truth of the hypothetical proposition that, if God exists, then
He is self-existent.
THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND THE OPINIONS
OF MODERN PHILOSOPHERS

Several modern philosophers sought to confirm St. Anselm’s ar­
gument by a consideration of the objective validity of our intellect.
Descartes says: Whatever is contained in the clear and distinct idea
of anything, the same is true; but real existence is contained in the
clear and distinct idea of God; therefore God exists.17
We reply to this by distinguishing the major. In the ideal order
of essences known by abstraction, whatever is contained in the
clear idea of God is true, this I concede; in the order of real and
actual existence, this I deny. We contradistinguish the minor in
like manner; for our idea of God is, like our other ideas, an ab­
stract one and, moreover, is analogical, derived from creatures.
Leibnitz says: For the argument of Descartes to be valid, this
1» St. Thomas says (De veritate, q. 10, a. 12, the end): "But in heaven, where we
shall see God’s essence, His essence will be far more self-evident to us than the
following truth is now self-evident to us: that affirmation and negation of a thing
are not both true.”
i’ Meditations et réponses aux objections.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

103

must prove that it is really possible for God to exist objectively, or
outside the mind. His argument is as follows: If God is really
possible, He exists, because His essence implies existence; but
it is a priori manifest that God is really possible, for neither con­
tradiction nor negation is implied in the idea of God; therefore
God exists.18 Father Roselli, O.P., incautiously admitted this argu­
ment.
We reply to this by neither affirming nor denying the major, because
in absolutely necessary things, existence that is necessary and not
contingent follows from real possibility. Thus if the Trinity were
proved a priori to be really possible, then its existence would fol­
low from this. We distinguish the minor. That it is a priori mani­
fest that God is really possible, and that this is negatively apparent,
I concede; positively so, this I deny. This means that we do not
see the existence of the most perfect Being to be an impossibility;
but neither can this be positively proved a priori. Why so? It is
because, as St. Thomas says, in the body of the article, we do not
know God’s essence; we have not a positive and proper knowledge,
but only an analogical knowledge of the Deity. In a relative and
negative sense we know that God is the supreme Being, the prin­
ciple of other beings. In other words, because we do not know
God’s essence, we cannot know a priori whether He is capable of
existing. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile certain absolute per­
fections that are clearly properties of the most perfect Being, such
as God’s absolute immutability and His liberty. It is also difficult
to reconcile the free act which, as an act, could be non-existent in
God, with His absolute immutability and necessity. Likewise, the
intimate reconciliation between the omnipotent God’s mercy and
justice, as also between His goodness and permission of evil, these
are hidden from us. They do not indeed impair the forcefulness
of the a posteriori demonstration of God’s existence, but they do
not allow of an a priori demonstration.
But Leibnitz objects that there is nothing of negation implied
in the idea of God. Therefore it evidently excludes contradiction,
for this latter is the result of some negation.
In reply to this we say that concealed contradiction can be the
result only of the association of two ideas for which there is no
foundation. Thus there is no negation involved in the idea of the
swiftest motion; yet it implies contradiction because it is always
possible to think of a swifter motion, just as the sides of a polygon
inscribed in a circle are always divisible. So also there is no nega­
tion involved in the greatest possible creature, but it implies a
contradiction because "God can make something else better than
18 Monadologie, §45; Meditation sur les idées, p. 516.

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THE ONE GOD

each thing made by Him.” 18 Likewise, there is perhaps no founda­
tion for the union of the two concepts of being and infinite.
Hence we cannot positively affirm a priori the possibility of God's
existence. For a positive knowledge of the analogical validity of
our ideas of being, goodness, and the like, as these relate to God,
this postulates God as the cause of finite beings from which our
notions of being, goodness, and the like, are abstracted; for be­
tween the cause and its effects there is a certain similarity, at least
that of analogy.20
Being is that the act of which is to exist (whether it be selfexistent or dependent upon another for existence), and it is only
from the similitude of the inferior analogate previously known to
us that we can know the supreme analogate of being; but this
similitude has its foundation in causality,21 and from the existence
of the effect we conclude the actual existence of the cause.
In more recent times Father Lepidi22 sought to revive the onto­
logical argument by having recourse to the principle of the ob­
jective validity of our intellect. His argument is as follows: The
intellect clearly makes known to us that being is either logical or
real; there is no intermediary. But the objective idea of the most
perfect and infinite Being clearly represented in our mind is not a
logical being. Therefore it is a real being. Yet it is not, as is selfevident, being that is possible of realization, existing potentially
in its cause. Therefore it is actually existing real being.
We reply to this by conceding the major. Concerning the minor,
we say, please prove it. Probable reasons, to be sure, are advanced,
just as persuasive reasons are given to show the possibility of the
Trinity; but they have no demonstrative value. It is not positively
proved a priori that God is really possible or that the Trinity is
really possible. This possibility is neither efficaciously proved a
priori, nor is it efficaciously disproved by unbelievers.
But Father Lepidi persists in his objection by proving the minor
as follows: Logical being is that which in no way exists in itself,
nor can it so exist, but exists only in the mind. Because logical be­
ings are not in the true sense entities, they are absolute non-entities,
squared circles or negations, as a not-man, or privations, such as
blindness. But, on the contrary, the most perfect Being is conceived
as having plenitude of being. Therefore the idea of the most per­
fect Being is not the idea of a logical being, but of a real being, and
it is not only possible of existence, but it also actually exists.
i» Summa lheol., la, q.25, a.6.
20 Ibid., q.4, a.3; q.88, a.3.
21 Ibid., q.4, a.3: q.13, a.5.
22 Revue de phil., December, 190g; Ontologia, pp. 90 f.

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105

In reply we say that this proves only that we do not see the im­
possibility of the most perfect Being existing; in fact, we are per­
suaded of the same (just as we are persuaded of the possibility of
infinite internal fecundity), but we have no positive proof of the
same. The atheist can say: Perhaps there are no legitimate grounds
for uniting in one concept the notions of being and infinity. An
infinite man implies a contradiction; infinite being does not seem,
indeed, to imply a contradiction; but yet we do not know a priori
whether the notion is correct that has reference to something ex­
tramental. It may be like the notion of a supreme and infinite
possible being, which at first, sight does not seem to imply a con­
tradiction, and yet it does if “God can make something else better
than each thing made by Him.” 23
Finally, Father Lepidi objects that the aforesaid argument pre­
supposes the five a posteriori proofs given by St. Thomas; but these
are required only for acquiring the true notion of the most perfect
Being, and from this correct notion, due to the objective validity of
our intellect, the existence of this most perfect Being is proved.
Thus the five proofs would serve as the ladder of ascent to the roof
of the edifice, and after we have reached the roof, the ladder is no
longer necessary.
We reply to this with the following distinction: If this notion of
the most perfect Being were univocal or at least of itself im­
mediately referred to God, as our notion of being of sensible things
has immediate reference to the being of sensible things, then I
agree. But this notion is analogical and for this reason does not
bring us to a knowledge of God, the first analogate, except by the
way of causality, by beginning from the previously known inferior
analogate, which is finite being. By reason of the principle of causal­
ity, when imperfections have been removed from the absolutely
simple perfections in which finite beings participate, these are at­
tributed to God, the first Cause. Hence the five classical proofs of
God’s existence, as we shall see farther on, are not only guides but
are truly a posteriori demonstrations. They would be merely guides
if our intellect had a confused intuition of God, as the oncologists
contend, in accordance with the realistic tendency of Plato.24
Yet there is an element of truth in what Father Lepidi and others
of like mind say, for it will be more clearly seen later on that the
23 Summa theol., la, q.25, a.6.
24 Father Lepidi admitted a certain naturally innate idea of God, inasmuch as
the soul, since it is according to God’s image, received, at the moment of its
creation, a certain irradiation from God, or a confused notion of the Creator.
But this is not proved, nor can it be proved. Moreover, according to the principles
of Thomism, all our ideas are the result of abstraction from sensible things (cf.
Summa, la, q.84, a. 3, 6).

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THE ONE GOD

five classical proofs are in some way co-ordinated since they all
have their remote foundation in the notion of being and in the
principle of contradiction or of identity (of being with itself, in
that it is opposed to not-being), and their proximate foundation is
in the principle of causality.
Thus we construct the following apodictic but a posteriori argu­
ment: Because of the objective validity of our reason, the principle
of contradiction or of identity is the fundamental law not only of
reason but of extramental being. But, if such is the case, the funda­
mental or supreme reality must be one of absolute identity, which
means that it is not composite but is most simple and immutable,
so that it is its being and its act, which means that it is the self­
subsisting Being. Therefore the most simple and immutable self­
subsisting Being exists above all composite and mutable beings.
This proof is apodictic but a posteriori. It is, as it were, a combi­
nation of the five classical proofs, clearly setting forth the oppo­
sition that prevails between the principle of identity and the
changeableness of the world (first three proofs), and its composition
(fourth and fifth proofs). Thus, by reason of this opposition, it
would make it at once evident, at least for the philosophers, from
the very fact that the world is composite and changeable, that it is
contingent, which means that it is not self-existent. From this, too,
the immediate conclusion is that the self-existing Being must be to
existence, as A is to A, that it must be identical with it, so that He is
the self-subsisting Being.
In other words, at the beginning of our discovery by the way of
finding, it is first of all apparent, by reason of the real validity of the
principle of contradiction or of identity, that being is being, nonbeing is non-being, or being is not non-being. And at the end of our
discovery by the way of finding, due to the same principle of iden­
tity, it is evident that the supreme reality is absolutely identical with
itself, without composition and change, that it is the self-subsisting
Being: “I am who am.” In this, indeed, we have the refutation of
pantheism, since the most simple and unchangeable self-subsisting
Being is really and essentially distinct from every composite and
changeable being.25 But this distinction is clearly seen only after a
profound penetration of the five a posteriori proofs.
God’s existence is known not a priori solely from the notion of be­
ing, as the followers of St. Anselm declare; but a posteriori from
the notion of being and its first principles by means of the light re­
flected in the mirror of sensible things.
Confirmation of this proof. The existence of God who transcends
the world cannot be denied without denying the real or ontological
25 Ibid., q.3, a.8, “Whether God enters into the composition of other things."

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107

validity of the principle of contradiction or of identity. We already
have precise evidence of this in the ancient teaching of Heraclitus,
and more so in Hegelianism, which declares that the principle of con­
tradiction is only a grammatical law and at the same time a law of
the lower reasoning faculty, but not the supreme law of the higher
or intuitive reason and of reality. Instead of the most simple and
immutable God we then have universal pantheistic evolution; for
the denial of the existence of the immutable and self-subsisting Being
means that the creative evolution of itself or universal becoming is
the only fundamental reality, in which being and not-being are
identified, since what is becoming does not as yet exist and still in
some way does exist. But if this becoming is its own reason for such
becoming and needs no extrinsic cause, then we have the denial of
the principles of efficient and final causality and hence of the real
validity of the principle of contradiction or of identity. For if evo­
lution is creative of itself, that is, if this becoming is its own reason
for such becoming, then it is without an efficient cause, and so in
evolution of this kind the greater proceeds from the less. It is like­
wise without a final cause, because this evolution lacks a directing
agent; it has no material cause and is like a flux without a fluid, be­
cause this evolution is not in any subject that is distinct from it and
that would necessitate being moved by another; it is without formal
cause, for “in effect, God is produced in man and in the world,
and God is one and the same thing with the world, and therefore,
spirit with matter, necessity with liberty, good with evil, justice
with injustice.”26 In all this we have the very negation of the real
validity of the principle of contradiction, which would be merely
a grammatical law of speech, and a law of logic governing the
discursive process of the lower reason, but it would not be a law of
the higher intellect directly perceiving the universality of this flux.
Hence if Hegelianism were non-existent, the theologians could
devise it as a means of proving by the method of absurdity God’s
existence and His distinction from the world. Thus we pass from
the criticism of St. Anselm’s argument, which in our opinion is
insufficient, to the a posteriori proofs of God’s existence.
THE DECLARATIONS OF THE CHURCH ABOUT ONTOLOGISM

A decree of the Holy Office (September 18, 1861) condemned
seven propositions of the ontologists, stating that the propositions
cannot be safely held.27 In this decree it is not the ontological or a
priori argument, or its possibility that is rejected; but the doctrine
20 See Syllabus of Pius IX, Oenz., no. 1701.
27 Denz., nos. 1659-65.

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THE ONE GOD

is condemned which states that ‘‘the immediate knowledge of God,
at least habitual, is essential for the human intellect, so that with­
out it the intellect can have no knowledge of anything; since it. is
intellectual light itself.” The following two propositions are also
condemned: “That being which is in all things and without which
there is not anything we do understand, is the divine being. Uni­
versals objectively considered are not really distinct from God.”
Ontologism confuses being in general with the divine being, and
thus would end in the pantheistic ontologism of Spinoza.
Equally condemned is the ontologism of A. Rosmini, who de­
clared that “being, which is the object of man’s direct perception,
must of necessity be something of the necessary and eternal be­
ing.” 28 We say that the intelligible being of sensible things is the
proper object of our intellect, and the ontologists apply this to the
divine being about whom we have a confused knowledge.
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD EXISTS

State of the question. Posited that God’s existence is not selfevident to us, the question is whether it can be demonstrated. The
difficulty is threefold: i) that God’s existence is the first article of
the Creed, “I believe in God,” and it is not the articles of the faith
but only the preambles to the articles that are demonstrated; (2)
that the medium of demonstration is the essence of a thing, and we
do not know God’s essence; (3) and that God’s existence cannot
be demonstrated from effects, for there is no proportion between
the finite effect and the infinite God.
This last difficulty is variously proposed by modern agnostics,
whether they are positivist empiricists such as Stuart Mill and
Spencer, or idealists such as the Kantians. According to the posi­
tivists, we have indeed knowledge only of phenomena, and of their
laws or constant relations. According to Kant, the theoretical reason
cannot prove God’s existence, because the principle of causality is
only a subjective law of our mind; at least it is not clearly seen to
be a law of real being, for the notion of causality seems to be a
subjective category of our understanding, useful indeed for the sub­
jective and for us necessary classification of phenomena, but with­
out any ontological validity, and a fortiori without any transcendent
validity for acquiring a knowledge of the transcendent Cause.
According to Kant only the practical reason proves God’s exist­
ence with a certainty that is objectively insufficient but subjectively
sufficient, namely, from the postulates of moral action. Kant indeed
28 ibid., no. 1895.

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109

says: It is a synthetic a priori or subjectively necessary principle that
the just person is deserving of happiness. But the just do not enjoy
permanent happiness in this life. Therefore God the rewarder must
exist, who is the only one who in the other life can effect a per­
manent union between virtue and happiness. This is not theo­
retically demonstrated, but it is reasonably believed by moral faith.
Likewise the traditionalists or fideists, condemned in the year
1855,29 held that reason left to itself (without the aid of primitive
revelation handed down by traditions among the nations) cannot
demonstrate God's existence. Already in the Middle Ages Nicholas
of Ultricuria 80 upheld fideism, denying the real validity of reason,
especially the real validity of the principle of causality.
The reply is that God’s existence can be demonstrated by effects
known to us.
1) The authority of Scripture is proof of this, for we read: "The
invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made.” 81 But this
would not be the case if, by the things that are made, God’s ex­
istence could not be demonstrated. All Scholastics, except such radi­
cal nominalists as Nicholas of Ultricuria, so understood this and
similar texts of Holy Scripture.82 The above-mentioned text from
the Epistle to the Romans is quoted by the Vatican Council in
defining against traditionalists, fideists, Kantians, and positivists
that "the same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God,
the beginning and end of all things, may be known for certain by
the natural light of human reason by means of created things;
for the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are
clearly seen, being understood from the things that are made.” 88
The same is defined in the corresponding canon.84
Moreover, there is a better explanation of this text against the
agnostics of our times in the antimodernist oath that expresses the
faith of the Church in the following words: “I (name) firmly hold
as true and accept everything which the infallible teaching author­
ity of the Church has defined, maintained, and declared, especially
those points of doctrine which are directly contrary to the errors
of the present time. And first of all I profess (profiteor) that God,
the beginning and end of all tilings, can be known for certain and
proved by the natural light of reason, that is to say, through the
visible works of His creation, just as the cause is made known to us
2» Ibid., nos. 1649-52.
so Ibid., no. 553 f.
si Rom. 1: 20.
82 Wis., 13: 1-5.
ss Denz., no. 1785.
Ibid., no. 1806.

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THE ONE GOD

by its effects.” 86 The word "profiteor” in the Latin of this oath
expresses a profession of faith, and this is especially evident from
what is stated a little farther on, for we read: "Thirdly, I firmly
believe that the Church was instituted by the true and historic
Christ.” We have elsewhere fully examined each word of the above
quoted dogmatic definition of the Vatican Council, which is ex­
plained by this oath.8®
In the definition as explained by the oath we have the condem­
nation of the fideism of the traditionalists whose theses had already
been proscribed.87 Kantianism is likewise condemned.88 Moreover, the
Church declares that God’s existence can be proved not only from
the postulates of practical reason, but from the visible effects. Nor
is the proof founded in the primacy of the immanent method of
sufficient weight, because the proof does not give us objectively
sufficient certitude. This has already been shown at length in an­
other work.39
Hence the Church in some measure gives her approbation to the
validity of the a posteriori traditional proof of God’s existence, but
she neither approves nor condemns St. Anselm’s argument and
Descartes’ theory of innate ideas.
Moreover, the above-quoted definition as given by the Council is
concerned with “the existence of the true God, the beginning and
end of all things.” 40 It is not, however, formally defined that reason
can demonstrate creation out of nothing, but that it can demon­
strate the existence of God, the first Cause, and that the divine
attributes of infinity, eternity, supreme wisdom, providence, and
sanctity are included in this notion. To avoid the charge of heresy,
therefore, it would not suffice to say with several agnostics that
reason can demonstrate the existence of some first eternal cause,
which however is perhaps an immanent principle in the world,
ss Ibid., no. 2145.
ss See God, His existence, I, 8-39.
»’ Denz., nos. 1622, 1650.
ss Cf. Acta Concilii, Collectio Lacencis, VII, 130, which explains the word
"certo." The council is speaking of objectively sufficient certainty and not solely
of subjectively sufficient certainty, as Kant said it was.
80 Cf. God, His Existence, I, 40-60. Maurice Blondel in his “L'Action,” pp. 437 f.,
writes: “The knowledge which before option was purely subjective and propul­
sive, after the choice becomes privative and constitutive of being (according as
the free choice is good or bad). . . . The second kind of knowledge ... is no
longer merely a subjective state of mind; for instead of positing the problem in
the practical order ... it directs the attention to what is an accomplished fact
(in the free choice), to that which is. Thus it truly is an objective (but practical)
knowledge, even though it is obliged to admit a deficiency in action." But quite
recently Blondel made a retractation of this last chapter of his first work, and
he is now more in agreement with the traditional teaching.
<0 Denz., no. 1785.

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111

neither transcendent nor personal, that is to say, intelligent and
free. This would not be proving the existence of the true God.
It is not defined whether reason alone can deduce explicitly the
proper attributes of the true God, especially infinity. However,
Bautain had to acknowledge his acceptance of the following propo­
sition: "Human reasoning can with certainty prove the existence
of God and the infinity of His perfections. Faith, being a super­
natural gift, presupposes revelation, and hence cannot be consistently
invoked to prove the existence of God against an atheist.” 41 Hence,
if the denial of the demonstrability of God’s infinity is not heretical,
it is at least erroneous.
Finally, the aforesaid definition is concerned not with the fact
but with the possibility of proving God’s existence. It is defined to
be physically possible even in the state of fallen nature.42 Moral
possibility, however, or a possibility that presents no great difficulty,
is proximate to the faith, this being the common teaching of the
theologians; otherwise the Scripture would not have said: “But all
men are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of God: and who
by these good things that are seen could not understand Him that
is, neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was
the workman.” 43 At least from the order to be seen in the world
there is no difficulty in concluding as to the probability of a su­
preme Ordainer, and then man is bound to make further inquiries.
If he does not do so, his ignorance is not entirely involuntary or
invincible. Therefore theologians commonly reject the possibility of
invincible ignorance about the existence of God as the author of
the natural moral law. The first principle of this law, namely, “good
must be done, evil must be avoided,” 44 is known without difficulty;
and there can be no law without a lawgiver, nor can there be any
passive designing without active designing, or without a supreme
Designer.
Hence the following proposition was condemned as temerarious
and erroneous, namely, the proposition about a philosophical sin
that would be against right reason and yet not an offense against
God, because it would be committed “by a man who either has no
knowledge of God, or does not advert to Him.” 45
Revelation is morally necessary, however, as the Vatican Council
says: “that such truths among things divine as of themselves are not
beyond human reason can, even in the present condition of man­
41 Ibid., no. 1622.
42 Cf. Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, I, 28, 289, 673.
43 Wis. 13: 1.
** Summa theol., la Ilae, q.94, a.2.
44 Denz., no. 1290.

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THE ONE GOD

kind, be known by everyone with facility, with firm assurance, and
with no admixture of error.” 48 These are the principal arguments
drawn from authority.
2) The conclusion is proved by reason. In the body of the article
St. Thomas: (1) distinguishes between two kinds of demonstration,
one being a priori, the other a posteriori; (2) he shows that the
demonstration a posteriori, or from the effect, is valid; and (3) he
shows how this applies to the demonstration of God’s existence.
1) Demonstration is of two kinds. The a priori demonstration is
through the cause, and it assigns the reason for which of the thing
demonstrated. Each of the four causes can give us this kind of dem­
onstration. Thus the spirituality of the soul is assigned as the
reason for its incorruptibility (formal cause); likewise, man is
mortal from the fact that he is composed of contraries (material
cause); also that we are free is proved from the fact that we are en­
dowed with reason and have knowledge not only of particular but
also of universal good (directive formal cause). In like manner, the
necessity of the means is demonstrated a priori from the end; thus
grace is necessary for the supernatural vision of God. The same is
true of the efficient cause. Given the cause in the act of causing, as
in the case of the sun illuminating, then the effect follows. Thus
this kind of demonstration can be effected by means of the four
causes.
Demonstration through the effect, however, is called a posteriori,
because the effect is something posterior to the cause; but sometimes
it is previously known to us. This demonstration shows that the
cause is, quod vel quia est, for in the Latin terminoloy of the Scho­
lastics, quia est means the same as quod est. Thus it is called
demonstratio quia in opposition to demonstratio propter quid. It
is therefore a demonstration by means of those things that are
previously known to us. The order of invention is then ascendant,
whereas the order of things is descendent.
It must at once be noted from the reply to the second objection
that, “in demonstrating God’s existence from His effects, we must
take for the middle term the meaning of the word ’God.’ ” This
means that we must begin with the nominal definition of God, since
by the name “God” is understood the supreme Cause, the most
perfect Being, the supreme Ordainer, and the question is whether
the supreme Cause exists.
2) The reason for the validity of the demonstration from the
effect and the kind of demonstration required. It is valid in virtue
of the principle of causality, for, as St. Thomas says in the body of
<e Ibid., no. 1786. For an explanation of this, consult author’s commentary on
q. 1, a.1.

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113

the article, "since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect
exists, the cause must pre-exist.”
But this principle of causality must be properly understood. The
Positivists understand it as referring only to the phenomenal order,
since every phenomenon presupposes an antecedent phenomenon.
Thus if we have expansion of iron, this presupposes the phe­
nomenon of a greater degree of heat, because heat expands iron. If
such were the case, this principle would hold good only in the order
of phenomena, and as an experimental law but not as an absolutely
necessary law. But a miracle would be out of the question, because
a miraculous phenomenon does not suppose an antecedent phe­
nomenon, but proceeds from God’s exceptional intervention as first
Cause, operating beyond the ordinary course of nature. Nor does it
suffice, as the Kantians say, that the principle of causality should be
a subjectively necessary law of our mind for the necessary subjec­
tive classification of phenomena. To prove the existence of the
transcendent Cause, this principle must have, moreover, ontological
validity as regards extramental being; in fact it must have tran­
scendent validity.
As a matter of fact, this principle is commonly formulated not
only in the phenomenal but also in the ontological order, and not
only does it state that “every phenomenon supposes an antecedent
phenomenon,” but it also says: "Everything that comes into being
has a cause”; or rather, to express it more universally, every contin­
gent being is efficiently caused by another. Even if de facto this
contingent being eternally existed, it would still need a productive
and conservative cause, because a contingent being is not its own
reason for existence.
Nor need we be surprised that this principle is thus formulated
with reference to extramental being and not only to phenomena,
because the proper object of our intellect, as distinct from the ob­
ject of either the external or internal senses, is not only color,
sound, extension, hardness, and such like, but it is the intelligible
being of sensible things. Whereas the object of sight is colored being
considered as colored, the object of the intellect is colored being
considered as being; and at once our intellect perceives the truth
of the first principle of contradiction or of identity, that “being is
being, not-being is not being,” or “no being is not-being.” This
pertains to the ontological order, which is above the order of
phenomena.
Moreover, one cannot deny the principle of causality without
denying the principle of contradiction. This is evident from an
analysis of the terms, for this principle of causality is immediately
evident without any middle term of demonstration; but it can,

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THE ONE GOD

moreover, be demonstrated indirectly by the method of reduction
to absurdity, as all Scholastics admit.
In fact, uncaused contingent being is repugnant to reason. In
other words, nothing is what results from nothing, without a cause
nothing comes into being. Parmenides already expressed the same
in the negative form (for it was the negative formula of the prin­
ciple of causality, in which the efficient cause was not as yet suffi­
ciently distinguished from the material cause). Why is an uncaused
contingent being repugnant to reason? It is because a contingent
being is that which can either exist or not exist (this being its
definition). Therefore it is not self-existent, and must be dependent
upon another for this; otherwise, if it were neither self-existent nor
dependent upon another for existence, it would have no reason for
existing, and so would be the same as nothing. “Nothing is what
results from nothing.” To say that from nothing, or that from no
cause either efficient or material, something comes into being, is a
contradiction.
It is not, indeed, so clearly and directly contradictory, as if one
were to say, “the contingent is not contingent”; but to say, “some­
thing that is contingent is not caused,” is to deny a property of the
same that directly enters into its definition, and indirectly this means
to nullify its definition.47 Such would be the case if Lucifer were to
say: "Therefore I came forth from nothing, not having been
caused.” To say, “Something contingent exists that is not caused,”
is to affirm a positive relation of agreement between two terms
which are in no way related to each other. Most certainly nothing
comes into being without a cause.
Hence the ontological validity of the notion of being and of the
principle of contradiction or of identity being admitted, this means
that the ontological and not only the phenomenal validity of the
notion of cause and of the principle of efficient causality must be
admitted. The experimental law that heat expands iron pertains to
the order of phenomena, and is hypothetically necessary, which
means that if heat exerts its influence, the expansion of iron is the
result; but this does not exclude the possibility of this expansion
being produced by a higher cause beyond the ordinary course of
nature. On the contrary, the principle of efficient causality is a law
of the ontological order and is of absolute necessity; we cannot
conceive of even a miraculous exception, for nothing comes into
being without a cause. This formula extends to every cause what­
ever, whether the proximate and lowest, or the supreme cause.
It must be noted that for our demonstration it is not absolutely
47 For a more complete explanation of this, consult, God, His Existence, I,
181-91.

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115

necessary to prove that the notion of cause is not innate to us, but
that it is abstracted from sensible things. Even if it were innate to
us, it could and would have not only phenomenal but also tran­
scendent and ontological validity; for it manifests to us something
deeper than phenomena, namely, the dependence of contingent
being upon another being, for that which is not self-existent is de­
pendent upon another for its existence.48
St. Thomas says: "From every effect the existence of its proper
cause can be demonstrated.” Why does he say “the proper cause”?
It is because, if it is not a case of the proper cause, then the demon­
stration is invalid. Thus the following inference is valueless: this
man exists, therefore his father exists, and yet the father is the cause
of the son. Very often the father dies before the son. Likewise, very
often the antecedent phenomenon disappears when the subsequent
phenomenon makes its appearance, as in the case of the local mo­
tion of rubbing the hands together by which heat is produced.
Hence the agnostics would merely say that “from every effect it can
be demonstrated, not that its cause does exist, but that it did exist.”
Thus heat is produced by local motion, and this latter presupposes
heat, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, rain comes from the
clouds, the clouds from the evaporation of the water, the evapora­
tion is caused by the heat of the sun, and so on indefinitely, so that
there was never a first rain, or a first evaporation. The case is the
same in the series of generations of plants, animals, and men. There
was never a first oak or a first lion or a first man. In fact, even
Aristotle admitted that the world and generations are eternal, yet
according to a certain mysterious dependence on the pure Act.
St. Thomas would reply that we are concerned with the proper
cause, whereas the proposed difficulty does not refer to the proper
cause.40 What is the proper cause? It is the cause on which the effect
absolutely first of all, or necessarily and immediately, depends, as
Aristotle said, just as the property depends on the specific difference,
for instance, the faculty of reasoning on the ability to reason. The
proper effect is like a property manifested ad extra in its relation
to the proper cause about which we are concerned in this article.
St. Thomas presupposes from the works of Aristotle 50 the philo­
sophical and profound notion of the required proper or absolutely
first cause. Of the four modes of per se predication, the fourth per­
tains to causality, as the killer kills, light illuminates, the sculptor is
In Adam, since he was created an adult in the state of innocence, with his
ideas, the idea of cause was per accidens infused, or innate; in us it is acquired
by abstraction as the notion of being is. Cf. Summa, la, q.84, a.6.
«» This is explained more fully in God, His Existence, pp. 71-81.
»0 Post. Anal., Bk. I, lect. 10; Metaph., Bk. V, chap. 2, lect. 3.

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the cause of the statue.51 St. Thomas also examines more closely
this notion of cause in his discussion of creation.52 The most uni­
versal effect (that is, being inasmuch as this term applies to all ex­
isting things) must be reduced to its most universal cause, as the
proper effect of this cause. St. Thomas again refers to this causality
when treating of the conservation of all things by God.58 These
articles constitute the most sublime comment on the doctrine of the
present article, and this because they treat of the same relation of
causality, but they do so by starting from above, from God already
known, and not by ascending to Him as we do here by the way
of finding out.
For a more profound understanding of the proper or proximately
direct cause, that is, of the one that is necessarily and immediately
required, we must recall the five evident propositions taken from
the Metaphysics of Aristotle. In this we see the methodical transi­
tion from the natural reason or the common sense to the philo­
sophical reason, in accordance with Aristotle’s accustomed way, who
thus gave metaphysics its elements as Euclid did to geometry.
i) The proper cause must be the direct or necessarily required
cause,54 and not the accidental cause. We have an example of a direct
cause in the following: a man generates a man, or the man generat­
ing is the direct cause of the generation of the man. An accidental
cause would be: Socrates generates a man; because for a man to be
generated it is not necessary that the one generating be Socrates or
Plato. A fortiori, it is accidental that the musician generates a man,
because it is accidental for the one generating to be a musician.
In like manner and with far greater reason, the grandfather is the
accidental cause of the generation of the grandson, for he is not
directly concerned in it, and often he is already dead. His son
generates inasmuch as he is a man, and not inasmuch as he is the
son of another man, as St. Thomas says.55 Hence a series of past
causes, as grandfather, great-grandfather, and so on, is a series of
accidental causes and in Aristotle’s opinion was infinite in the past,
that is, there was no first generator; but, according to St. Thomas,
this is not repugnant to reason, as we shall state farther on.58 We
si The first mode of per se predication is the definition of the thing; the second
is the property that is necessarily connected with the essence of the thing; the
third is the first substance, which exists in itself; the fourth is the necessarily
required cause.
S2 Cf. Summa, la, q.45, a.5.
«s Ibid., q. 104, a. 1.
os It is said to be necessarily required, rather than necessary, because it can
be a free cause. Thus we speak of God.
w Summa theol., la, q.46, a. 2 ad yum.
so Ibid.

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maintain it to be of revelation, however, that the world had a be­
ginning, and Adam the first man was able to generate because, as
we have said, man generates inasmuch as he is of adult age, and not
inasmuch as he is the son of another man.
2) The proper cause must be not only direct, but proximately or
immediately required for its proper effect, as the specific difference
is the cause of the property that is derived from it. Thus to say
that an animal generates a man, is to assign the direct cause, but
not the proximately direct cause, not the proper cause. We must
say that a man generates a man.
3) Hence a most particular or singular cause is the proper cause
of a most particular effect. Thus Socrates is the proper cause of the
generation, not of a man, but of this man, his son. St. Thomas
says: “Of two things in the same species (as a father and son), one
cannot directly cause the other’s form as such, since it would then
be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the
form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much
as it is in matter, in other words, it may be the cause that this
matter receives this form.” 57 Thus Socrates is said to be the proper
cause of the generation not of a man but of this man.
4) The most universal cause is the proper cause of the most uni­
versal effect. As St. Thomas says: “For the more universal effects
must be reduced to the more universal and prior causes. Now
among all effects, the most universal is being itself. Hence it must
be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, and that
is God.” 67
68 Thus only God can create or "produce being absolutely,
not as this being (for instance, this wood), or such being (for in­
stance, wood rather than stone).”88 In like manner, "this move­
ment is produced by this mover,” 00 for example, the movement of
the carriage by the horse; but if motion taken in the absolute sense
is not its own reason for existence and needs a cause, we must re­
duce motion taken in the absolute sense and hence all motions to
a higher universal cause, namely, to the first mover, who will be the
proper or proximately direct cause, not of this particular motion,
but of motion itself taken in the absolute sense (as it is a universal
effect); and hence this first mover, the cause of all motions, will be
immobile, at least as regards local motion. In fact, if immobility is
a requisite for the mover not only of bodies but also of spirits,
whatever kind of motion this may be, then our soul is mobile, not
67 Ibid., q. 104, a. 1.
6SIbid., q.45, a.5.
o® Ibid.
80 Likewise my will is the proper cause not of the free choice, but of my free
choice as being mine.

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by way of local motion, but because of the discursive and delibera­
tive process of its reasoning faculty.
5) Finally, we must distinguish between the proper cause of
the beginning of the effect and the proper cause of the being of the
effect.61 Thus the builder is the proper cause of the building of the
house, and when the actual construction of the house ceases, then
its construction in the passive sense also ceases; but the builder is
not the proximately direct cause of the being of the house, for its
being does not depend on the being of the builder; in fact, when
the builder dies the house continues in its being. Likewise, Socrates
is the cause of his son as to his becoming, or as to his passive gen­
eration, but not as to his being; for the son’s being is independent
of the father’s being; in fact, whereas the father dies, the son con­
tinues to exist.
On the other hand, the illumination by the sun is the cause of
the air being illuminated, and when the sun ceases to illuminate,
then the air is no longer illuminated. In like manner, the object
seen is the objective cause of the seeing, so that the seeing ceases
with the removal of the object. Likewise the evidence of the prin­
ciples is the cause of the evidence of the conclusion, not only as
to its becoming, but also as to its being. Also the attraction of the
good that is desired is the cause of the desire not only as to its
becoming, but also as to its being and continuance in being.
These five subordinate propositions not only give us a more pro­
found insight into the meaning of the proper or proximately direct
cause as understood by Aristotle and St. Thomas, but they also ex­
plain the following words of this article: “From every effect the
existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated,” and not only
that it did exist.
This is the same as saying with Aristotle,62 that the positing of
the cause (as it is the cause) means the positing of the effect, and,
on the other hand, the removal of the cause means the removal of
the effect. Thus the positing of a potential cause means the posit­
ing of a potential effect; for instance, the builder can build, and
the house can be built. The positing of the cause in the act of
causing the becoming of the effect means the positing of this be­
coming (the one who builds, is building); the positing of the cause
in the act of producing the being of its effect means the production
of this being. Thus, as long as the sun illuminates the atmosphere
by its presence, this latter remains illuminated.
It is now easy to explain the end of the argumentative part of
this article, which is but the application of the preceding to the
•1 Summa theol., la, q.104, a. 1.
»2 Metaph., Bk. V, chap. 2, lect. 3 (end).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

"9
proof of God's existence. This means that, if there are in the world
effects proper to God, the supreme Cause, then God's existence can be
demonstrated a posteriori from them, and, indeed, by an absolutely
necessary metaphysical demonstration, if these effects pertain to
being, inasmuch as it is the being of created things. But these ef­
fects proper to God are investigated in the following article.
Already from the aforesaid it is clear that these effects must be
universal, since the most universal effects are the proper effects of
the most universal cause, as being by participation is the proper
effect of Him who is essential being. Thus our conclusion will be
that this motion is caused by this previous motion; but if motion
taken absolutely in its generic sense is not its own reason for exist­
ence, then we must seek for the proper cause of motion in the
generic sense, and of all motions.
So we shall conclude: (i) that the proper cause of all motions
is the first and immobile Mover (first way); but that it does not
follow immediately from this that the first Mover is infinite and
intelligent; (2) likewise that the proper cause of all caused cau­
sality is the first uncaused Cause (second way); (3) that the proper
cause of all contingent being is the necessary Being (third way), and
this necessary Being will manifest Himself to us as the cause not
only of the becoming but also of the being of contingent beings;
(4) that the proper cause of those things that admit of greater and
less in being, in truth, and in goodness, is the greatest in being, in
truth, and in goodness (fourth way); (5) finally that the su­
preme and intelligent Ordainer of all things is the proper cause of
the ordaining of all things. This means that the supreme Ordainer
is the absolutely first cause of the ordaining and preserving of all
things in the world, just as the sculptor is the proximately direct
cause of the formation of the statue as to its becoming (but not as
to the being of the statue, for this continues in existence after the
sculptor’s death).
First doubt. The question is whether the aforesaid demonstration
from effects ought to have its foundation in a series of accidentally
connected causes, or in a series of actually existing and essentially
connected causes.63
This difficulty arises from another general principle that together
with the principle of causality is included in all proofs of God’s
existence. The principle is that we cannot proceed to infinity in a
series of subordinated causes. Therefore we must come to a first
uncaused cause. What sort of subordination are we concerned with
here?
Some, having failed to grasp the meaning of St. Thomas in the
·» This has been more fully explained in God, His Existence, I, 77-84.

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THE ONE GOD

following article, think that he considers an infinite series of ac­
cidentally subordinated causes to be a contradiction in terms, so
that this necessarily implies that creation was not eternal, which
means that there must have been a first man, a first lion, and no
series of eternal generations of men, animals, and plants. But after­
ward, these same persons find St. Thomas, in the article in which
he asks whether it is of faith that the world began, writing as fol­
lows: “But it is not impossible to proceed to accidental infinity as
regards efficient causes,” 61 in a series, for instance, of past genera­
tions. This shows that they misunderstood the proofs of God’s
existence.
We find the solution to the doubt precisely in the complete reply
of St. Thomas from which the above-mentioned quotation is taken.
He writes: “In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to ab­
solute infinity; for example, there cannot be an infinite number
of causes that are absolutely required for a certain effect; for in­
stance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and
so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to accidental
infinity as regards efficient causes; as for instance, if all the causes
thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause,
their multiplication being accidental; as an artificer acts by means
of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be
taken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts
after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this
particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for
he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all
men generating hold one grade in efficient causes, namely, the
grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a
man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be
impossible if the generation of this man depended on this man,
and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to in­
finity.” 65
Hence the ancients said that “man and the sun generate man,”
which means man acting in conjunction with the general agents
actually existing; for, if there were a cessation of solar heat on the
earth, this would mean the end of the generations of animal and
plant life. But the influence of the sun directly depends on the
actual influence of a higher cause, and we cannot proceed to in­
finity in a series of directly subordinated efficient causes; as Aris­
totle said: ανάγκη στηναι, or we must come to a first in this series.
Otherwise all movers would be moved and no reason could be as** Summa theol., la, q.46, a. 2 ad 711m.
es Ibid.

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121

signed for the being or cause of motion itself. We must therefore
come to a first cause that is its own principle of action.08
In accordance with the modern physics of our times, we may ex­
press the series of directly subordinated efficient causes as follows:
the ship supports the sailor, the sea enables the ship to float, the
earth holds the sea in check, the sun keeps the earth fixed in its
course, and some unknown center of attraction holds the sun in
its place. But we cannot proceed to infinity in this series; other­
wise all movers would be moved, and so we could not assign any
cause for motion itself, which needs a cause, since it is not its
own principle of motion. Hence we must come to the supreme
Mover that is not of the past but is actually existing, who is His
own action and His own being, because operation follows being,
and the mode of operation the mode of being.
Similarly there may be many wheels in a clock, but we must
come to that part of the mechanism whose elasticity, whether you
call it tension or weight, is the cause of the local motion of the
wheels and of the index hand of the hours. Thus local motion
originates from some force, from some dynamic influence that must
be explained by some higher cause.
In the opinion of St. Thomas, that creation was not eternal but
took place in time, so that there was a first day, a first revolution
of the sun, is dependent on God’s most free will and is known only
by revelation.87
So also Aristotle,88 although he admits the eternity of motion,
proves the existence of a supreme and immobile mover who does
not need to be premoved so as to act. In fact, he says that the
greatest motion must be infinitely powerful to move in an infinity
of time (that is to say, eternally).89 In like manner, from the fact
that act is prior to potency, Aristotle seeks to prove the perpetuity
of eternal generation. Hence he concludes that the first Mover is
permanently unmoved.70 Indeed he shows that there is no process
to infinity in any genus of directly subordinate causes.71
88 O£ course the Augustinians generally rejected, as St. Bonaventure did, the
possibility of eternal creation, whereas, contrary to this, the Averroists held with
Aristotle that the world actually is eternal, being somehow dependent, however,
in the order of causality, on the pure Act. St. Thomas holds in all his writings
that eternal creation is not repugnant to reason, and that temporal creation is an
article of faith, which cannot be demonstrated.
or Summa theol., la, q.46, a.a; Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 38; De potentia,
q.3, a. 14. Quodl., XII, q.6, a.i; Opusc., vj, De aeternitate mundi.
88 Physics, Bk. VIII (lect. 9, 21, 23 of St. Thomas’ commentary).
88 Ibid., lect. 21.
to Metaph., Bk. XII, chap. 6 (lect. 6).
n Ibid., Bk. II.

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1) In the genus of material cause we must admit the presence of
first matter, namely, some first material subject; otherwise there
would be no second matter or what is disposed to receive this or
that form. In such a case there would be no earth, air, water, fire,
or bodies composed of elements. To deny first matter would be to
do away with the material cause, which is a necessary requisite as
constituting the subject of alteration.
2) In the genus of formal cause there must be a substantial form
underlying the accidental forms, and also in the category of sub­
stance, as in the categories of quantity, quality ... we must come
to the supreme genus, for without this there would be no directly
subordinate genera, and so there would be nothing definable and
nothing intelligible. Thus the supreme genus of substance is di­
vided into corporeal and incorporeal substances; the corporeal are
divided into non-living and living; the living into non-sensitive
and sensitive; the sensitive into irrational and rational. Likewise
there is no proceeding indefinitely in a series of demonstrations,
but we must come to those first indemonstrable and to us selfevident principles.72 It is always a case of ανάγκη στήναι (necessity of
a first).
Similarly, in the genus of efficient cause there is no proceeding
indefinitely in a series of directly connected causes, although there
may be such a series of accidentally connected past causes. Thus,
as Aristotle says, man is moved to take off his clothes when it is
warm, but this happens because of the sun, but now the sun is
moved by a superior force, and we cannot proceed to infinity in
this series of directly connected causes; otherwise there would be
no cause for movement as such or in the absolute sense (and not
merely as it is this particular motion). But motion needs a cause,
because it is not its own principle of motion; it is not as A is to A
in its reference to being, that is to say, it is not identical with its
being.
Lastly, in the genus of final cause there is no process to infinity
in a series of directly subordinated ends, otherwise there would be
no final causality. As St. Thomas says: “Absolutely speaking, it is
not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends from any
point of view. For in all things whatever there is an essential
order of one to another, so that if the first is removed, those that
are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also. . . .
In ends, that which is first in the order of intention, is the prin­
ciple as it were, moving the appetite. Consequently, if you remove
this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite (that is,
attract it). . . . But since accidental causes are indeterminate . . .
72 Poit. Anal., Bk. I, lect. 35.

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123

it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends and of things
ordained to the end." 78
There is direct subordination when it is said that we walk so as
to keep in health, and that we seek health for the sake of happiness.
But if we were to say that happiness is sought for some other rea­
son and so on indefinitely, then this would do away with all finality
and hence with every desire and action. The ultimate end, con­
sidered at least under the aspect of happiness in general, is prior
in intention. Thus all men wish to be happy, although many do not
know what truly constitutes happiness.
Hence in the four kinds of causes there can be no process to in­
finity in a series of directly connected causes, otherwise this would
do away with every kind of cause. Thus we see that this principle
of the impossibility of proceeding indefinitely in such a series of
causes is, as it were, the corollary of the principle of causality; in
fact, it is the corollary to the commonly accepted principle of cau­
sality according as this latter is proportionately or analogically
verified in the four kinds of causes.
Corollary. But if the process were to infinity in a series of ac­
cidentally connected past causes, as regards generations of men,
animals, and plants, then the first Cause would have only a
priority of dignity and causality in its relation to the world. This
will be more clearly explained farther on when we show that there
is no necessity for a first man, a first lion, a first day, or a first
revolution of the sun.74 So it would have been if God had most
freely willed an eternal creation; yet in this case He would have
priority of causality as regards the created world, just as the foot
would have with reference to its imprint or trace left in the sand,
if the foot were eternally implanted in the sand. Hence in the
proofs for God’s existence, we must not proceed according to a series
of past causes, but we must get away from this series and rise
above it to an actually existing higher cause. For it is evident that
any contingent being, such as Abel the son of Adam, does not neces­
sarily require another contingent being as cause, but they both
postulate the necessary Being as higher cause.
Second doubt. What is to be our method of procedure as regards
agnosticism, in showing the ontological and transcendental validity
of the ideas and principles from which the proofs for God’s exist­
ence are deduced?
This question has been fully discussed by us elsewhere,70 and
only the outstanding principles will be discussed here. Agnosticism
73 Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 1, a.4.
t* Ibid., la, q.46, a. 2, c. ad 6um et 711m.
7“ See God, His Existence, I, 111-242.

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in general rejects the demonstrability of God’s existence because it
denies the ontological and transcendental validity of first ideas and
principles of reason, especially the principle of causality. For their
formula of the principle of causality is not: every contingent being
has an efficient cause; but they say: every phenomenon presupposes
an antecedent phenomenon, and so on indefinitely. Hence, by vir­
tue of this principle thus formulated in the order of phenomena, it
is impossible to tianscend this same order.
These agnostics are either of the empirical or idealist type. The
empiricists, such as the Positivists, reduce the principle of causality
to an experimental law which is repeatedly confirmed and cor­
roborated by heredity; but in their opinion we do not know
whether the law applies beyond the scope of our experience. Per­
haps, beyond the limits of our experience, there is a phenomenon
without one preceding it, or perhaps something comes into being
that is not caused. But this is contrary to common sense or natural
reason, for something to come into being that is not caused.
The idealist agnostics, however, such as Kant, seek somehow' to
explain this intimate persuasion of the common sense and of the
absolute necessity and universality of the principle of causality. But
they say that this necessity is subjective, and is the result of the
subjective application of the category of our mind, namely, of the
category of causality as regards phenomena. Thus they say that it
is for us unintelligible for something to come into being that is
not caused; but perhaps this is not absolutely impossible outside
our mind.
But we cannot in the course of this theological treatise engage
in a lengthy and philosophical discussion of this question, which
we have done in another of our works as above mentioned. It suf­
fices to point out the fundamentals, the ignorance of which does
not excuse one.
The ontological validity of first ideas and of the first principles
of reason is shown inasmuch as these ideas and correlative prin­
ciples do not express sensible phenomena but being that is in itself
intelligible and accidentally sensible, and also the first modes of
being. Hence they are said to have not merely phenomenal validity,
as the ideas of color, heat, or sound have, for these express phe­
nomena; but their validity is ontological since by means of them
we acquire a knowledge of being that underlies the phenomena.
Of such a nature are the ideas of being, substance, and also of
causality. For causality is not anything directly sensible (either the
proper sensible, as color or sound; or the common sensible that
affects several senses, such as extension or figure); but it is the accidemally sensible and directly intelligible which, as St. Thomas

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says, "is apprehended by the intellect immediately that the object
of sense perception is presented to it; just as, when I see someone
speaking or moving, I apprehend by the intellect (without any
illative process of reasoning) that there is life; hence I can say that
I see him living,” 76 although life is not directly sensible as color is.
Just as only the intellect, reading what is within, can directly ap­
prehend being, and substance or substantial being, so only this
faculty is able directly to apprehend efficient causality and finality.
For efficient causality is the production or realization of actual
being, and this realization is apprehended only by the faculty whose
object is real being. It is not apprehended by sight which is speci­
fied by the colored object, or by hearing which is specified by sound.
But, whereas sight apprehends the colored being as colored, the
intellect apprehends colored being as being and, if this being under­
goes a change, the intellect apprehends its passive and active reali­
zation. Likewise, whereas the sense of touch is aware of the extension
and hardness of bodies, the intellect knows that the passive pressure
produced upon us by the resistance of bodies is a reality.
Hence St. Thomas says: “Understanding implies an intimate
knowledge, for intelligere (to understand) is the same as intus
legere (to read inwardly). This is clear to anyone who considers
the difference between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowl­
edge is concerned with external sensible qualities (or phenomena),
whereas intellective knowledge penetrates into the very essence of
a thing (at least the intellect has a confused knowledge, which means
that it penetrates to the intelligible being of sensible things). The
object of the intellect is what a thing is, as stated in De anima
(Bk. Ill, chap. 6). . . . Thus, under the accidents lies hidden the
nature of the substantial reality (and only the intellect knows the
difference between the natures of a stone, a plant, and an animal);
under words lies hidden their meaning . . . and effects lie hidden
in their causes, and vice versa.”77 In like manner, St. Thomas
shows that although the irrational animal knows by sense percep­
tion the thing toward which it tends as its prey, yet it does not see
in it the idea of an end as such, or the reason for the existence of
the means. These cannot be apprehended except by the faculty
whose object is intelligible being and the reasons for the existence
of things.78
Nor can it be said that the idea of causality is merely a subjec­
tive category of the mind, the sole purpose of which is to express
something mental or logical being; for this idea, just as that of
τβ Com. on De anima, Bk. II, chap. 6, lect. 13.
” Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.8, a. 1.
IB ibid., la Ilae, q.i, a.2.

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extramental being, is a representation that is essentially related to
the thing represented. As St. Thomas says: “That which is prima­
rily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness.”
Just previous to this he had said: “But since the intellect reflects
upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of
intelligence, and the species by which it understands.” 79 Similarly
he writes: “Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness
of the stone, except by a reflection of the intellect on itself; other­
wise the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligi­
ble species.” 80 That the sciences are concerned with things is a
truth held by all men as in accordance with natural reason. Thus
these sciences are distinct from logic, which is concerned with men­
tal being. Otherwise we should have to identify direct with reflex
understanding; yet the two are distinct, because the latter pre­
supposes the former.
Confirmation. The ontological validity of the first ideas of reason
and of the correlated principles is admitted by all as naturally
evident, even by the agnostics when they are not actually defending
their own opinion, which is a denial of this validity. Thus all men
are convinced that even in some world of which we know nothing
it is absolutely impossible that anything should come into being
without a cause. Therefore, in opposition to empiricism, we say
that this principle transcends experience. Even the idealist agnos­
tics hold that they are really the authors of their books; hence they
admit that causality expresses a reality, and not only what is merely
subjective. Otherwise we should have to say that the murderer was
not really the cause of death, and that he docs not deserve really
to be punished; but we must say that he was the cause of death
only in the manner in which we conceive of it. In like manner,
we should have to say that Kant was not really the author of the
Critique of Pure Reason, but is said to be the author of this work
as we conceive of it. According to this opinion there would be no
real relation of dependence of the creature on God, but only a
logical relation, just as we conceive it to be in God with reference
to creatures.
Hence to deny the ontological validity of the first ideas of our
intellect is to deny that the object of the intellect is intelligible
being.81 In other words, this means that intelligible being is reduced
7» Ibid., la, q.85, a.2: cf. ad mm, ad 2utn et ad gum.
so Ibid., q.76, a.2 ad <|um; consult also Com. on De anima, Bk. Ill, lect. 8.
8i It is self-evident that the object of the intellect is intelligible being. This
truth is established from the operations of the mind by an inductive process
of reasoning; for every conception or idea presupposes the idea of being (and is
concerned with the modes of being). The formal element in every judgment con­
sists in the final analysis in the verb "is.” (“Peter runs" is equivalent to “Peter

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

127

either to the order of sensible phenomena that are the objects of
the external or internal senses, or else to that of mental being which
is the object of logic, and thus there would no longer be any dis­
tinction between logic and the other sciences. Hence this question
in its final analysis is one that concerns the problem of universals.
Empirical agnostics, like all sensualists, are nominalists. For such as
these the idea is but a certain composite and confused image of the
imagination accompanied by a common name. The idealist agnos­
tics are subjectivist conceptualists, and for these every idea is but
an expression of mental being. Contrary to this, traditional realism
holds that the proper object of our intellect is the intelligible being
of sensible things which “the intellect apprehends immediately that
the object of sense perception is presented to it,” previous to any
illative process of reasoning.82
But the transcendent validity of the first principles of reason and
of their correlated principles consists in this, that by them we ac­
quire certainty of knowledge as regards the first transcendent cause,
or, in other words, of the Cause that is really and essentially dis­
tinct from the world. Taken in this sense, the transcendent validity
of these ideas is clearly seen from the fact that these ideas express
perfections which, in what is formally denoted by them, imply no
imperfection. Hence the analogical but proper attribution of these
ideas in an eminent degree to the supreme Being implies no con­
tradiction, and they are actually attributed to Him, if the world
demands a supreme cause having these perfections.
Such are the ideas of being, unity, truth, goodness, causality . . .
for these are already analogically predicated of various finite be­
ings; analogically, to be sure, but properly and not merely meta­
phorically. Thus being is first of all predicated of substance and
then of accidents, of a stone, for instance, and then of its size, quali­
ties, and other notes. In like manner, goodness is already predicated
analogically but properly of a good stone, a good fruit, a good horse,
of a virtuous and generous man. Moreover, these ideas are not only
predicated analogically of finite beings, but they imply no imper­
fection in what they formally denote, although the way in which
they are predicated of creatures does imply perfection. Thus wis­
dom, as found in human beings and even in angels, is imperfect;
but wisdom as such is not, for it means the knowledge of all things
by the highest of causes. Hence there is no repugnance in the idea
that these perfections, which in themselves imply no imperfection,
is running"). Every process of reasoning gives either the reason for the existence
of the thing demonstrated (in a priori demonstrations), or for affirming the
existence of the thing (in a posteriori demonstrations).
22 Cf. St. Thomas, Com. on De anima, Bk. II, chap. 6, lect. 13.

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THE ONE GOD

should be attributed analogically and in a most eminent degree
to the most perfect Being. And they must actually be attributed to
Him if the world requires these perfections.
Thus the idea of cause, unlike the idea of being, is not absolute,
but is relative to the thing caused. It therefore admits the possi­
bility of our raising the mind to God and of actually attributing
to Him the aforesaid perfections. But before doing so we see no
repugnance in this kind of attribution, since these ideas, analogical
as they are in the created order, imply no imperfection.
We must therefore stress especially the transcendent validity of
the idea of cause, inasmuch as it is already analogically but properly
predicated in the created order and implies no imperfection in
what it formally denotes. For it is quite clear that the word “cause”
is predicated analogically but properly of the four kinds of causes.
The intrinsic causes (the material and the formal) of course denote
imperfection, especially matter which is able to be actuated and
perfected, and also the form, which is a component part, something
that is participated and limited by the matter in which it is re­
ceived. But extrinsic causes (efficient and final) imply no imperfec­
tion, and are de facto predicated analogically but properly in the
created order. Thus the efficient cause is de facto predicated of the
principal cause, which operates in virtue of its own power, as in
the case of a writer, and the same applies to the instrumental
cause, which acts in virtue of another power, as a pen is moved
by the hand of a writer. Hence it is not repugnant to the idea of
efficient causality that it should be attributed analogically but
properly to the most perfect Being. And it must de facto be
attributed to Him, if the world requires the presence of a most per­
fect Cause. But the proper or uncreated mode of the divine cau­
sality will not be for us positively knowable in this life but only
negatively (saying that it is the uncaused cause, not premoved),
and relatively (as when we call it the supreme, most eminent, ab­
solutely transcendent cause).
St. Thomas does not here take up professedly this question of
analogy, but explains it at length later on.83 Why is this? It is be­
cause he proceeds as a theologian, by the synthetic method, starting
from the divine Being and His knowableness by us, and not by the
analytical method of investigation, as the philosophers would, in­
quiring step by step into the foundations for the demonstrability
of God’s existence.
However, St. Thomas points out what is necessary for this in his
reply to the second and third objections of this article. This dif88 Summa theol., la, q. 13.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

’29

ficulty is presented in the second objection as follows: The middle
term of demonstration is the essence, or what is called the defini­
tion; but we cannot know what constitutes God’s essence; there­
fore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
The reply may be expressed in scholastic form by saying: I dis­
tinguish the major. That the middle term of demonstration is the
essence in a priori demonstrations, this I concede; thus the im­
mortality of the soul is demonstrated from its spirituality. But in a
posteriori demonstrations, I subdistinguish: that the middle term
is the real definition of the cause, this I deny; that it is the nominal
definition, this I concede. Therefore it can be demonstrated a
posteriori that God exists, taking as a prerequisite for this the
nominal definition of God, which states that He is the supreme and
most perfect Cause; of course this definition derives its force from
its reference to God’s effects, and it suffices, although God’s nature
or His intimate life is hidden from us.
The third objection may be expressed equivalently by the fol­
lowing syllogism: A cause can be demonstrated only by an effect
that is proportionate to it; but God’s effects are finite, and hence
they are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite; therefore
God’s existence cannot be demonstrated a posteriori from His ef­
fects.
The reply of St. Thomas is that from the effects we cannot have
a perfect knowledge of the first Cause, but its existence is proved.
There is also the possibility of a distinction as regards the word
“proportionate” in its application; for God’s effects are propor­
tionate to Him, the proportion not being of perfection but of
causality, and this suffices for an a posteriori demonstration. For
there is a proportion of causality between the proper cause and its
proper effect, although this latter is less perfect. Thus, just as we
say that light illuminates, fire heats, so we say that the first Mover
moves all things, the supreme Ordainer has ordained all things in
the world, the most real Being “realizes” or produces and preserves
all things in being. This proposition pertains to the fourth mode of
direct predication between the effect and its proper, necessarily
and immediately required, cause.
This a posteriori knowledge of God from finite effects will in­
deed be very imperfect, namely, analogical; but the knowledge ac­
quired will apply properly and not merely metaphorically to God,
as will be stated farther on.84 For, whereas God is said metaphori­
cally to be angry, inasmuch as anger is a passion and not an ab­
solute perfection, it is without any use of metaphor that justice,
a* Ibid., a. 3.

13°

THE ONE GOD

and a fortiori the supreme Cause, the most perfect Being, and other
such terms are predicated of God.
Final doubt. In the first objection of this article a difficulty of a
different kind is presented, which may be expressed by the follow­
ing syllogism: The articles of faith are not demonstrated; but that
God exists is an article of faith, for we say, “1 believe in one God”;
therefore that God exists is not demonstrated.
In the reply to this first objection it is remarked that God’s
existence, so far as it is known by natural reason, is not an article
of faith, but is a preamble to the faith. In other words, the major
is conceded, and the minor is denied. But St. Thomas adds: “There
is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting,
as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being
scientifically known and demonstrated.”
Two objections are raised against this reply. The first is as fol­
lows: No one can accept revelation as the motive for believing in
the existence of God as the author of nature; for the act of faith
presupposes the evidence of credibility, and this has its foundation
in the principle that God’s veracity is infallible and that He has
confirmed this revelation by divine signs.
Reply. That the existence of God as the author of nature can­
not begin to be known by revelation, in a rudimentary and con­
fused manner, let this pass without comment; that we cannot have
a more explicit and more certain knowledge of the same by revela­
tion, this I deny. All men have, practically by natural instinct, a
confused knowledge of God’s existence as the Ordainer of the
world and the Lawgiver; for when human beings come to the full
use of reason, they have knowledge at least of the first precept of
the natural law, which is that “we must do good and avoid evil”;
the natural law, however, like the order prevailing in the world,
presupposes clearly enough a supreme Ordainer. This truth not
only is known as the result of a scientific or philosophic process of
reasoning, but it also arises as it were spontaneously from the ra­
tional faculty, as when we say: “The heavens show forth the glory
of God.” 85
But, if afterward men doubt God's existence, influenced by their
unrestrained passions and the objections of materialists and skep­
tics, this truth can be manifestly made known to them by revela­
tion and confirmed by some divine sign; for, as the Vatican Council
declares: “the miracle is a clear indication of God’s omnipotence
and liberty.” 88 Thus certain materialists, who believed in the ab­
solute determinism of the laws of nature, when confronted by what
ss Ps. 18: i.
8« Denz., no. 1790.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

131

was manifestly a miracle, acknowledged God’s existence and liberty,
and accepted the Christian revelation.
They had already given their assent to the hypothetical truth
that, if there is a God, He cannot lie. This suffices in conjunction
with some clearly enough divine sign for the evidence of credibility
that is a prerequisite to the act of faith elicited on the authority of
God revealing.
For this reason we said in the reply, let the major pass without
comment, rather than conceding it; for God’s existence as the Au­
thor of nature can be made known to one, if not by revelation it­
self, at least by some manifest and divine sign that confirms the
revelation. This sign suffices in conjunction with the hypothetical
truth that, if there is a God, then He cannot but say what is true.
It was by this method that certain Positivists were converted. Cer­
tainly God can, if He so wills, clearly manifest Himself to unbe­
lievers.
Second objection. The Vatican Council seems to infer that all
the faithful, even philosophers and theologians, must believe in
God’s existence from a supernatural motive. Therefore this truth is
"an indemonstrable article of faith” and not merely a demonstra­
ble preamble to the faith. For the Vatican Council says: “The Holy
. . . Church believes that there is one God. . .
87 and the prin­
cipal attributes of the true God are enumerated. Farther on we
read: "All those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic
faith which are contained in the word of God, written or handed
down, and which the Church . . . proposes for belief as having
been divinely revealed.” 88 But St. Paul says: “He that cometh to
God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek
Him.” 88
It is the common teaching of the theologians that at least these
two primary truths can be the subject matter of belief, and that
they always were necessary as means for attaining salvation.91’ There­
fore all, even Christian philosophers, must believe God’s existence
and say, by reason of belief and not of knowledge, “I believe in one
God.”
We are confronted by two difficulties (1) the article of faith in it­
self, as it is distinct from the preamble to the faith, cannot be
demonstrated; (2) for us, at least according to the teaching of St.
Thomas,91 one and the same thing cannot be both known (or
S’ Ibid., no. 1782.
ss Ibid., no. 1792.
8» Heb. 11:6.
so Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.2, a.5.
»1 Ibid., q.i, a.4 f.

13«

THE ONE GOD

evident) and believed (or obscure) by the same person. We do not
believe what we already see, for the evident object is already suf­
ficient of itself to move the intellect. I do not believe, but 1 see
the presence of the pen which I hold in my hand.
Certain theologians, as Mazzella and Didiot, thought it impossi­
ble, after the declaration of the Vatican Council, for the Thomists
to continue to defend the thesis that, one and the same thing
cannot be the object of science and of belief for the same person.
On the contrary A. Vacant,02 although he himself does not admit
the Thomist thesis, shows that it was not condemned by the Vati­
can Council, and, in fact, that it is more easily reconciled with the
declarations of the Council.
What is the more common opinion among the Thomists? They
say that all the faithful, even philosophers, who know the demon­
stration of God’s existence as the Author of nature, must believe
God’s existence as the Author of grace or salvation. This is what
St. Paul has in mind in the following text: “He that cometh to God
must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek
Him.”03 The reference is certainly to a supernatural rewarder,
otherwise the believer would not have a supernatural end in view,
since he would not have even a confused knowledge of this. There
is also reference in this text, as in the parallel texts of the Council,
to God's existence as the Author of salvation and grace. This truth
is an indemonstrable article of the faith, and is something more
than a preamble to the faith. God, the Author of salvation, is called
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the Old Testament, and
the heavenly Father in the New Testament.
On the other hand, God’s existence as the Author of nature is
a demonstrable preamble to the faith, as St. Thomas stated in his
reply to the first objection. Thus it remains true that the same
thing, taken in the same sense, is not for the same person both
known (or evident) and believed (or obscure). God as the Author
of nature is not called either the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,
or the heavenly Father, but the first Mover and Ordainer of the
world, pure Act.
Moreover, according to the teaching of the Thomists, when the
Christian philosopher is not actually considering the demonstra­
tion of God’s existence as the Author of nature, it is possible for
him to believe the same, and he actually does, as included in the
belief of God’s existence as the Author of grace. Finally, infused
faith confirms from on high the certitude resulting from a philo»2 Cf. Eludes sur le Concile du Vatican, I, 16g; II, 132, 200 f.
«s Heb. 11:6.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

133
sophical demonstration, since it is the same faculty and is con­
cerned with the same object, considered not in its formal but in
its material aspect.94
This view, which is the one more commonly held among the
Thomists, is more in harmony with the Vatican Council, which
says: “The Church believes that there is one God . . .” (then His
attributes are enumerated).96 Certainly the whole of this previous
declaration pertains directly to the faith, if the reference is to God
as the Author of salvation and His supernatural providence. But
from this it does not follow that God’s existence as the Author of
nature must be strictly believed by Christian philosophers. Like­
wise, when the Council says: “All those things are to be believed
by faith which are contained in the word of God, written or
handed down . . . , and which the Church proposes for belief,” 99
this does not militate against the general principle that some of the
faithful are ignorant of certain dogmas that are necessary for sal­
vation, and that Christian philosophers may hold it to be true that
God exists as the Author of nature, and this solely for the reason
that they have proved the same, and while they are actually con­
sidering this proof.
The foregoing suffices to establish the demonstrability of God’s
existence.
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD EXISTS

State of the question. From the difficulties presented by St.
Thomas at the beginning of this article, it seems that he had in
mind the principal objections raised by both the pessimists and the
pantheists against the true God.
The first difficulty, which has often been formulated, is taken
from the fact that physical and moral evil are in the world. It seems
from this that the world has not been produced by a perfect cause,
by one of infinite goodness whose works exclude all that is evil.97
Thus among modern philosophers, Stuart Mill admitted that God
is finite, because He cannot prevent all evils. This same point of
view accounts for the pessimistic doctrine of Schopenhauer and
Hartmann. The second difficulty is as follows: What can be ac04 Sumina theol., Ila Ilae, q. 1, a.4 ad gum.
05 Denz., no. 1782.
ooz&id., no. 1792.
01 This objection is developed in the treatise on Providence; cf. Summa theol.,
la, q.22, a.2; De malo, la, q.49, a.2.

•34

THE ONE GOD

counted for by a few principles is not produced by many; but
natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is nature;
and voluntary things can be reduced to one principle, which is
human reason or will; therefore it is not necessary to admit the
existence of a first transcendent cause that is distinct from the
world.98 This difficulty is later on developed in its pantheistic
aspect.99
From what is said in the present article, some have made the un­
warrantable assertion that St. Thomas did not consider the pan­
theistic hypothesis and therefore did not refute it, and that his five
ways of proving God’s existence are of no validity in disproving
the pantheism of Spinoza, who admitted in some sense the exist­
ence of a first Mover, a first Cause, a first necessary Being, a su­
preme Being, even to some extent a first Ordainer, but a being who
is not really and essentially distinct from the world. If such were
the case, the Angelic Doctor would have been ignorant of this
question as it was discussed even in his time.
In answer to this we say that the pantheism of several ancient
as well as of certain medieval philosophers was not unknown to
St. Thomas. In fact, he has this error in mind in the second ob­
jection of this article, and he alludes to it more explicitly farther
on 100 He certainly knew from the works of Aristotle about the two
principal forms of monism, or the pantheism of antiquity, that is,
the static monism of Parmenides, and the absolute evolutionism
of Heraclitus. In the former case, the material things of the world
are absorbed in the one and only immobile Being, and it is a sort
of acosmism. In the latter case, and in contradistinction to the
former, God is absorbed in the evolution itself of the world; God
becomes in the world, and this pantheism is a sort of atheism.
Pantheism must of necessity always fluctuate between atheism and
acosmism.101 Spinoza is of the school of Parmenides in the applica­
tion of his absolute realism to the notion of substantial being.
Hegel’s evolutionism, on the contrary, is developed more in con­
formity with the views of Heraclitus.
St. Thomas was acquainted, moreover, with the pantheism of
certain medieval philosophers. In a certain article he does indeed
refute the materialistic pantheism of David of Dinant as well as
This is the principle of economy.
oo Summa theol., la, q.3, a.8: "Whether God enters into the composition of
other things”; also la, q.19, a.3: “Whether whatever God wills, He wills neces­
sarily.”
100 ibid., la, q.3, a.8; q.19, a.3.
tot The identification, to be sure, of God with the world means ultimately one
of two things: either the absorption of God in the world, or the absorption of
the world in God.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

135

the pantheistic theory that God is the formal cause of all things.102
He even refuted the pantheistic emanationism of the Neoplatonists
who, to some extent, adopted the views of the Averroists.102 The
latter taught that God operates externally by reason of the neces­
sity of His nature or of His wisdom, and that there is only one
intellect for all human beings.104
As a matter of fact, St. Thomas radically refuted pantheism by
showing that there can be no accident in God, 105 that the world
postulates God as its extrinsic, most simple, and absolutely im­
mutable cause, whereas the world is essentially composite and
mobile,100 that nothing is predicated univocally of God and crea­
tures,107 and that creation is a most free act.108 But all these state­
ments have at least their philosophical foundation in the five proofs
which we shall now set forth in detail, since they refer to the ef­
ficient Cause, which is extrinsic to the world, and which is ab­
solutely simple and immutable, and therefore really and essentially
distinct from the world that is changeable and composite.
Certainly the Angelic Doctor had all these points in mind when
he wrote the five proofs, which we shall now carefully consider.
We must preface our examination of each of the five proofs in de­
tail by a more general statement regarding their universality and
order. Are the five proofs included confusedly in this most general
of demonstrations?
THE UNIVERSALITY AND ORDER OF THESE PROOFS

The five proofs given by St. Thomas are most universal in scope,
being deduced from the highest metaphysical principles. The start­
ing point, which is also the minor, and which is previously enun­
ciated in each of these proofs, is the fact as established in any
created being whatever, namely, the fact of corporeal or spiritual
motion, of causality, of contingency, of composition and imperfec­
tion, and of ordination in the passive sense. But the principle or
the major in each of these a posteriori demonstrations is the prin­
ciple of causality with its corollary: that there is no process to in­
finity in directly subordinated causes. The first proof is concerned
102 Summa theol., la, q.3, a.8; also Contra Gentes, Bk. 1, chaps. 17, 27, 28.
10s Summa theol., la, q.90, a. 1; Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 85.
rot Summa theol., la, q.19, a.3; q.76, a.2; opusc. de unitate intellectus; Contra
Gentes, Bk. 1, chaps. 26, 27, 32, 50, 65, 81, 82, 88; Bk. II, chaps. 23-27; 3‘—37· 73<
76, 78, 85, 87.
10s Summa theol., la, q.3, a.6.
100 Ibid., a. 1-8.
IOT Ibid; q. 13, a.5 f.
10s ibid., q.19, a. 3.

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THE ONE GOD

with the supreme and efficient cause of motion, the second with
conditioned causality, the third with contingency, the fourth with
composite and imperfect being, and the fifth with the orderly ar­
rangement of things in the world. The fourth and fifth proofs
treat also, and especially so, of the supreme and exemplary direc­
tive cause. The terminating point of these five proofs is the exist­
ence of the self-subsisting Being, who is absolutely simple and un­
changeable, and hence really and essentially distinct from the world
that is composite and changeable. The ultimate objective, indeed,
of no matter which of these proofs we take, is the establishing of
some divine attribute, and this latter can be predicated only of the
essentially self-subsisting Being.108 The five proofs reach this sum­
mit, as constituting the supreme truth in the order of finding, from
which afterward the divine attributes are deduced. This highest
truth, which is also revealed (‘‘I am who am”), is, so to speak,
the golden key to the entire treatise on the one God. It is the
culminating point in the way of finding and the beginning in the
way of judgment, and in this transcendent truth are contained
the supreme reasons of things.109
110
This must be carefully noted, because several theologians, such
as Suarez,111 not understanding these five proofs, so changed them
as to deprive them of all demonstrative validity.
All these proofs are deduced from the laws of finite or created
being, considered as such, inasmuch as any finite being whatever,
ranging from stone to angel, in accordance with these five general
aspects, is dependent on the first Cause. There is not one of these
proofs that is deduced from objects of the sensible or physical order,
although examples are given from objects of sense perception, since
these are more known to us. This means that the starting point of
these five proofs can also be facts pertaining to the intellective life,
according as these are in our soul and also in the angels, that is,
from intellectual and volitional movements, from their causality,
from the contingency of mind, its composition and imperfection,
and from the fact that either our mind or the angelic is ordained
to something else as its universal truth and its universal good.112
109 ibid., q.3, a.4: "Whether the essence and existence are the same in God.”
no Ibid., q.79, a.9.
111 Suarez (Disp. Met., XXIX, sec. 1, no. 7), in rejecting the necessity of the
divine premotion for our will to act, does not admit the universality of the prin­
ciple that whatever is set in motion, is set in motion by another. Also in not
admitting a real distinction between created essence and existence, he likewise
failed to understand the other proofs of St. Thomas, especially the third and
fourth. It is the opinion of the Thomists that Suarez deprives these proofs of
their demonstrative value.
>12See the answer to the second objection of this article: also la. q.79, a.4.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

i37

The universality of these proofs may be expressed as follows:
mobile ....................................... and is dependent on die first im-' bo
mobile Mover
'2
caused in causing.................... and is dependent on the first un­
caused Cause
contingent................................ and is dependent on the first nec­
essary Being
composite and imperfect........ and is dependent on the most per­
fect and most simple Being
"Z
ordained to something............ and is dependent on the supreme v
Ordainer
J "
THE ORDER IN WHICH THESE FIVE PROOFS ARE PRESENTED

These proofs start from the more evident signs of contingency
and proceed to discuss those of deeper significance, namely, from
the very beginning of motion, which obviously is contingent, and
they proceed to discuss the composition and imperfection even of
beings that existed before our time, for instance the stars and the
whole world of physical entities, or else they proceed to discuss the
composition of any finite being whatever, even if it had no beginning.
The ordaining of any finite being whatever to some end is also
considered, for instance, even of any finite intelligence whatever,
whose object is truth.
As regards the terminus of these five proofs, they manifest: (i)
the necessity of a first cause, as first mover, first uncaused cause,
first necessary being; (2) the perfection of the first cause, as most
perfect, most simple, and the ordainer of all things to an end.
Hence these five proofs start from the more elementary principles,
from those already known to us, and they proceed gradually to a
consideration of those that are of deeper significance and of greater
perfection. This will be more clearly seen in the exposition of the
proofs. The orderly arrangement of these proofs excels by far that
presented by the theologians who preceded St. Thomas.
We shall see farther on that the other traditional proofs are
easily reduced to these five, particularly the proof based on the con­
tingency of mind, which refers back to the third way; and to the
fourth way are referred the proof based on the eternal verities
leading up to the maximum in truth, and the proof based on the
natural desire for the sovereign good leading up to the maximum
in good. Also the proof based on moral obligation that leads to
the admission of a supreme Ordainer and Lawgiver refers back to
the fifth wav.

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THE ONE GOD
IS THERE A MOST GENERAL PROOF THAT INCLUDES
CONFUSEDLY THESE FIVE PROOFS?

There is indeed a general proof which is readily understood by
the natural reason or the common sense, and which includes con­
fusedly the other proofs. It has its foundation in the principle that
is derived from the principle of causality, namely, that the greater
or more perfect does not come from the less perfect, but the imper­
fect comes from the more perfect. This principle, especially as ex­
pressed in its primary negative form, is self-evident, even for the
common sense, and it concludes confusedly the principles of the
five typical proofs. For the principles of the first three proofs show
clearly the necessity of a first mover, a first uncaused cause, a first
necessary being, and the principles of the other two proofs clearly
denote the perfection of the first cause, since the imperfect is
evidence of the most perfect Being, and the orderly arrangement
of things of a supreme intelligence.
Hence this general demonstration, although in itself somewhat
vague, is very strong, for it contains virtually the probative force
of the five typical proofs. The natural knowledge of God’s existence
finds expression in it, and the spontaneous certitude resulting from
it, which is prior to strictly philosophical certitude is confirmed by
this latter. It holds its own against objections, even though it may
not give a direct answer to particular difficulties.
This most general proof may be presented in the following form:
The greater does not proceed from the less, the more perfect from
the less perfect, but contrariwise; but men, who contingently exist,
have being, life, intelligence, morality, and sometimes holiness;
therefore there must be a first Cause which possesses, by reason of
itself and eternally, these perfections of existence, life, intelligence,
and holiness. Otherwise the greater would come from the less, as
the proponents of absolute evolutionism are obliged to admit, and
it is by recourse to this method of absurdity that God’s existence
is proved, who is absolutely perfect and distinct from the world.
The principle of this general demonstration refers back to the
negative formula of the principle of causality, long ago expressed by
Parmenides, who said: “Nothing is made from nothing,” which
means that without a cause nothing comes into being. But if the
greater or more perfect were to come from the less perfect, then this
greater degree of being would be without a cause. Hence it is the
common saying that after creation we have not more of being but
more beings. This means that we have not more of being by way of
intensity, or more of perfection, because whatever of perfection

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there is in the world pre-existed in God in a more eminent way.
The minor of this proof is a fact admitted by all. The principal
perfections in the world are existence, life, and intelligence; and
these are found in human beings. But evidently human beings are
contingent, because they are born and die.
Hence the conclusion is, that there is an eternally existing being,
life, and intelligence; more than this, there is an externally self­
existing Being, Life, and Intelligence. Otherwise, if there were only
eternally existing contingent beings, since these have not in them­
selves the reason for their existence, they would have no reason for
existing. Any contingent being does not necessarily require another
contingent being as its cause, but they both of necessity require the
necessary Being.
This demonstration is therefore most forceful, even though it still
fails to give a definite answer to the particular difficulties that
we shall afterward have to examine. This explains why the certitude
either of natural reason or of the common sense persists, even
though it may be incapable of giving a definite answer to all the
objections. In this sense the saying is true, that a thousand diffi­
culties do not make one doubt, provided they do not destroy the
middle term in the demonstration of the declared conclusion, or
its principle, but are, as it were, from some extrinsic source.
We have elsewhere examined these five proofs,113 which St.
Thomas has expounded in various works of his.114 We shall now,
however, briefly consider them as they are given in the Theological
Summa, and as they are further elucidated in the subsequent articles
of the same work.
Each of these proofs starts from some established fact (of motion,
of conditional causality, of the presence of contingent beings, their
imperfection, of order in the world), and it ascends to God by the
principle of causality and its corollary, namely, that there is no
regress to infinity in a series of directly subordinated causes.
THE FIRST PROOF: FROM MOTION

The fact: "It is certain and evident to our senses, that in the
world some things are in motion.” It is a question of motion or
change taken in its widest sense, first, indeed, of physical change
(whether substantial, local, qualitative, or quantitative), which
ns See God, His Existence and His Nature, I, 242-372.
11« Cf. Corn, in Physicam Aristoteles, Bk. VIII, lect. 9 f.; in Metaph., Bk. XII,
lect. 5 f.; Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps. 13, 15, 16, 44; Bk. II, chap. 15; Bk. Ill,
chap. 64; De verit., q.5, a.2; De pot., q.3, a.5; Compend. theol., chap. 3.

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latter is by way of augmentation. We are also concerned, as is evi­
dent from this article,116 with the spiritual motion of our intellect
and our will.
The principle: "Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by
another.” This principle is necessary and most universal. For mo­
tion is the transition from potentiality to actuality, or from indé­
termination to determination. “But nothing can be reduced from
potentiality to actuality except by something that is in actu­
ality ... ; now it is not possible that the same thing should be at
once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect.” In the same
being, to be sure, one part of it can move the other, as in the case
of living beings. But if the part that moves, is itself moved, by a
motion of the higher order, then this requires an external and
higher mover.110
Moreover, there can be no regress to infinity in a series of essen­
tially subordinated movers. We are not concerned with past movers,
as in the series of generations either of animals or of men; for these
movers are accidentally and not essentially subordinated, and their
influence as such has ceased. “Hence it is not impossible,” says St.
Thomas, “for man to be generated by man to infinity.” 117 But it is
contrary to reason for the absolutely sufficient reason or first cause
ms Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3 ad 2um; cf. la, q.79, a.4; q.82, a.4 ad 311m;
q.105, a.2-5; la Ilae, q.9, a.4.
no Cf. ibid., la, 9.105, a-5this article the relation between cause and effect
is considered in the inverse order. Many agnostics object to this principle, that
whatever is in motion, is set in motion by another. They say that it has its
foundation in a spatial image; mover and moved are conceived as being spatially
distinct; but the mover may be a certain immanent force, as in the case of living
beings.
Our reply is that this principle has not its foundation in a spatial image, but
in the very idea of motion, whether this is local, or quantitative, or even of the
spiritual order, as pertaining to the intellect and will that transcend space. Like­
wise the distinction between potentiality and actuality is not spatial, but onto­
logical and necessary, in order that motion, even that which is spiritual, may be
made intelligible with reference to being, which is the first intelligible. From
nothing, of course, nothing is made, and being does not come from what is
(already determined) actual being; a statue does not come from what is already
a statue. Therefore something comes from undetermined or potential being, for
example, the statue is made from the wood.
Nor can it be admitted that becoming itself is simply as such prior to being,
for that which becomes is less perfect than that which is, and the greater or more
perfect is not produced from the less.
Nor does the argument of the first way advance the supposition against panthe­
ism, that there are several substances distinct from one another; even though
there were only one substance that is in motion, we should still have to say that,
whatever is in motion, is set in motion by another, or by a part of itself; and if
this part is itself moved, then this requires a mover that is not spatially, but
qualitatively and by its nature, of a higher order.
W Summa theol., la, q.46, a.2 ad yum.

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141

of motion to be explained by this past and even infinite series of
movers, which also themselves are moved. If this series is eternal, it
is an eternally insufficient explanation of motion, and is not its own
reason for this.
We are concerned, therefore, with a series of actually and essen­
tially subordinated movers. St. Thomas says farther on: “It would
be impossible to proceed to infinity, if the generation of this man
depended on that man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun,
and so on to infinity.” 118 Thus we say that the moon is attracted
by the earth, the earth by the sun, and the sun by another center of
attraction. But in this ascending series there can be no process to
infinity. For if all the essentially subordinated movers receive that
impulse which they transmit, so that there is not a prime mover
which imparts movement without receiving it, then motion is out
of the question. So a clock, even if you increase the number of
wheels, will never run without a spring, or without the ductility
or elasticity of some metal, or without some weight that acts as its
driving power.
Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, which is set
in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God as
He is nominally defined. The first mover is immobile, not with the
immobility of inertia or of passive potency, which implies imper­
fection and is inferior to motion, but with the immobility of actu­
ality, who does not need to be premoved so as to act. In other
words, we must come to a first mover, who acts by himself, who is
his own action,119 and consequently his own being, for operation
follows being, and the mode of operation the mode of being.120 The
prime and most universal mover of bodies and of spirits must, there­
fore, be pure Act, without any admixture of potentiality, both with
regard to action and with regard to being; and hence, as will be
clearly seen farther on,121 He must be the self-subsisting Being.122
ns Ibid.
no Ibid., q.3, a.6; q.9, a. 1; q.25, a. 1 ad gum; q.54, a. 1.
120Ibid., q.25, a.2.
121 Ibid., q.3, a.4.
122 Objection. According to the principle of conservation of energy, the quanti­
tative totality of (actual and potential) energy remains constant throughout its
various transformations. But, by reason of the influx from the first mover who is
distinct from the world, there would be a change, that is, an increase, in this
quantitative totality. Therefore, this influx is not admitted.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that the quantitative totality of energy remains
constant equivalently so, this 1 concede; that it is absolutely identical, this I deny.
The minor is distinguished in the same way. In other words, the quantitative
totality of energy remains constant inasmuch as a certain motion (for example,
the local motion of my hands) ceases, and an equivalent motion is produced (for
example, the equivalent heat in my hands); but the prior form of energy is only

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THE ONE GOD

And so it is evident that this prime mover absolutely transcends the
changeable world.*
123 We shall see farther on 124 that the first Cause
is free, and that when it wills, a new effect is the result of its eternal
action, and that this has been eternally decreed by it.
Thus absolute evolutionism is refuted, according to which be­
coming or creative evolution, which underlies the phenomena, is
the principle of all things. This is impossible, since becoming
is not its own reason for this; for it includes a new element that is
not the effect of its action, otherwise the greater would come from
the less, being from nothing. This absurdity must be acknowledged
by all who believe in a progressive evolution, in the course of which
the more perfect is always produced by the less perfect.123
the secondary cause of the other form, and produces it under the invisible influx
of the prime mover.
Moreover, from the very fact that there is transformation of energy, evidently
it is not absolutely the same. Only in the cause that is its own action and its own
being, and hence is not transformed, is there absolute identity. Likewise the
quantitative totality of human energy remains about the same in the world, yet
human beings undergo a change. In fact, it is the general rule that "the generation
of one thing means the corruption of another.” Finally, the principle of con­
servation of energy would not exclude the invisible influence either of our free
will or of the first Cause, unless it were proved that the world is a closed system,
constantly the same and removed from the invisible influence of a higher Cause.
But this cannot be proved. Experience furnishes us only with an approximate
proof that the productive energy and the produced energy are equivalent. Hence
this principle no more conflicts with the conclusion of this first proof than docs
the old established principle that "the generation of one thing means the cor­
ruption of another."
123 Summa theol., la, q.j, a.8.
12« Ibid., q.19. a.3; q.25, a.2 ad 311m.
120 Suarez (Disp. Met., 29, sect. 1, no. 7) objects to this first proof, giving as his
reason that, although a mere potentiality cannot pass from this to actuality unless
it is premoved, yet, in his opinion, virtuality or virtual act can reduce itself to
actuality without being premoved. But our will is not mere passive but active
potentiality, and is virtual act. Therefore it does not need to be premoved so as
to act. Hence the principle of the first proof is not so universal and necessary as
stated.
Reply. This objection is examined by John of St. Thomas (in lam, q.2, disp. 3,
a.2, no. 6). It is easy enough to solve the objection. St. Thomas, too, admits with
Aristotle an intermediary between even active potency and its act or action. As
examples of this we have artistic, scientific, or virtuous habits, which constitute
the first actuality of potency. Therefore the question is whether this first actuality
can reduce itself to second actuality without being premoved by a higher cause.
St. Thomas denies this, because the first actuality is in potency as to its second
actuality, as to something new and more perfect; for when the second actuality
makes its appearance there is some becoming, something new that is coming into
being. This becoming presupposes an active potency which was not its own activ­
ity, not its own action, in fact a potency which immediately before was not in
action, but was only capable of action. Therefore this first actuality, which can

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

»43

THE SECOND PROOF: FROM THE NATURE OF
EFFICIENT CAUSE

The fact, which is the starting point of this proof, is expressed
as follows: “In the world of sense we find that there is an order of
efficient causes,” for instance, of those things that are necessary not
only for the production but also for the conservation of vegetative
and sensitive life on the face of the earth. And from conditional
causality the mind soars to the unconditioned first Cause, that is
necessary not only for the production but also for the conservation
of things in being.128 Hence this proof is of somewhat deeper sig­
nificance than the proof from motion, but the method of procedure
is about the same. It is made clear from what St. Thomas says in
the two subsequent articles,127 about God’s preservation of things
in being. This same relation of dependence is considered in these
articles, though the consideration is of the transcendent order, not
by way of finding but of judgment, the descent being from God to
creatures.
The minor of our proof, previously enunciated in the first way,
is: We find that there are in the world essentially subordinated
causes. For instance, there are all the cosmic causes, which are neces­
sary not only for the production but also for the conservation of
animal and plant life. Thus we have the chemical activity of the
air, the atmospheric pressure according to its determinate degree,
solar heat. . . . But causes of this kind presuppose a first uncon­
ditioned cause. For, on the one hand, it is impossible for “anything
to be the efficient cause of itself, for in this case it would be prior
to itself.” On the other hand, in actually and essentially subordi­
nated causes, it is impossible to go on to infinity, as was already
shown in the first way. Therefore, apart from and transcending the
series of mundane and efficient causes, there is a first cause that is
not caused, or an unconditioned cause that is absolutely inde­
pendent of the others. But the unconditioned cause must be its
own action, and even its own being, because operation follows be­
ing, and the mode of operation the mode of being. In fact, this
cause is the self-subsisting Being, a point that will be more clearly
be called the virtual act (or the virtuality spoken of by Leibnitz), cannot bring
itself into action without being premoved by an agent of a higher order.
From this objection it is evident that Suarez, in rejecting the divine premotion
as regards the act of our will, fails to perceive the probative force of St. Thomas’
first proof. If now the will does not need to be premoved for it to act, then the
greater proceeds from the less, the more perfect from the less perfect.
Summa theol., la, q. 104, a. 1 f.
127 Ibid.

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THE ONE GOD

established farther on.128 Hence this cause merits the name God,
since it corresponds to the nominal definition of God. Thus an
absolutely unconditioned Cause is required, who transcends the
physical energy of heat or of electricity or of magnetism, and of
whom the liturgy says:
"God, powerful sustainer of all things,
Thou who dost remain permanently unmoved.”129
THE THIRD PROOF: FROM THE CONTINGENCY OF
THINGS IN THE WORLD

This third proof, like the others, starts from a fact of experience,
which serves as the minor in the demonstration, and is as follows:
We find in nature certain things that manifestly are contingent,
which means that it is possible for them to be and not to be. Daily
indeed we see plants and animals being generated and perishing,
or ceasing to exist. It is indeed a fact attested to by science, that
there was a time when there were no plants, animals, or men on
this earth, when the heavenly bodies did not exist as they now do,
but only in a nebulous state. This fact of the contingency of cor­
ruptible things is illustrated by the following principle.
Contingent beings, however, since they have not in themselves
the reason of their existence, of necessity presuppose the necessary
self-existent Being. Otherwise nothing would have existed. If at
any time the necessary Being had not existed, then nothing would
exist. Therefore there must be something the existence of which
is necessary.
Moreover, if something is only hypothetically or physically and
not absolutely and metaphysically necessary (as cosmic matter is
necessary for all changes), "it has its necessity caused by another.”
But it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which
have their necessity caused by another. Therefore there is required,
as the cause of all other things, the existence of a being that is not
hypothetically but absolutely necessary.130
The difficulty is that perhaps this necessary being is in the world
as its immanent principle, and so is not God. We say in reply that
this necessary being is not: (a) an aggregation of contingent beings,
even though it were infinite in time and space, because to increase
the number of contingent beings still leaves the series contingent,
and no more constitutes a necessary being than a numberless series
of idiots results in an intelligent man; (b) it is not the law govern­
ing contingent beings, since the existence of this law depends on
128 Ibid., q.g, a.4.
120 See Roman Breviary, hymn assigned for None.
iso Summa theol., la. q.44, a. 1.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

145

the existence of contingent beings; (c) it is not the common sub­
stance of all the phenomena, for this substance would be the sub­
ject of motion (first proof), and susceptible to perfection. Thus at
any moment it would be deprived of some contingent perfection,
which it could not give itself, because its being and perfection can
never be more than it previously had. The necessary being can in­
deed give, but not receive; it can determine, but not be deter­
mined; it must have, however, of and by itself, and eternally, what­
ever it can have.131
From this very fact that the necessary Being is self-existent, it
follows that His essence is not only something capable of existing,
of receiving and limiting existence, but that this necessary Being
is the self-subsisting Being. This point will be made clearer in the
next question.132
THE FOURTH PROOF: FROM THE GRADES OF
PERFECTION IN BEINGS

The perfection of the First Cause is what is particularly made
manifest in this proof, which is as follows: Among beings there are
some more and some less good, true, noble. This means that be­
ing and its transcendental and analogous properties (unity, truth,
goodness, beauty) are susceptible of greater and less, which we do
not find to be the case with specific and generic perfections. Thus
goodness is predicated of the stone, the fruit, the horse, the pro­
fessor, the saint, on various grounds and in varying degrees. In
like manner the unity of the soul excels that of the body; there
is a greater degree of truth in principles than in conclusions, and
in necessary propositions than in those that are contingent. So also
life is found in varying degrees according as it is vegetative, sensi­
tive, intellective, moral; and the highest degree of the moral life
is sanctity. This fact of the inequality of perfection in beings is
illustrated by the following principle.
More and less are predicated of different things according as they
resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum
and which is the cause of the others. To understand this principle,
its terms must be explained.
1) It is a case of different things. But a multiplicity of things
different in themselves does not explain the unity of similarity that
is found in these things. To express this more briefly: multitude
does not give the reason for the unity in which it participates. Eleisi Ibid., q.j, a.6, where it is stated that in God, the necessary Being, there
cannot be any accident.
132 Ibid., a.4.

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THE ONE GOD

ments that are different in themselves, do not of themselves coalesce
to form some sort of unity. As St. Thomas says: “Multitude itself
would not be contained under being, unless it were in some way
contained under one.” 133 Thus those things that are many nu­
merically, are one specifically; and those that are many specifically
are one generically; and there are many processes of reasoning that
are one in principle. Our first conception is of being, then of nonbeing, of division of being, of indivision or of unity of being, and
finally of multitude, which last is logically and ontologically pos­
terior to unity.13'*
2) We are concerned with the absolute perfections of being, truth,
goodness predicated of different things in varying degrees, which
means that they are predicated of finite beings in an imperfect
manner. But the imperfect is a composite of perfection and of a
limited capacity for perfection. Thus goodness is found in varying
degrees in the stone, the fruit, the horse, the good professor, the
saint; and in all of these it is found in a finite manner, although
this goodness in itself is not limited, for what is formally denoted
by the concept implies no imperfection.
But the composite of perfection and of a limited capacity for
the same needs a cause, for, as St. Thomas says, “things in them­
selves different (perfection and limited capacity for this) cannot
unite unless something causes them to unite.” 135 The reason is that
the union of several things presupposes unity. Multitude does not
explain the reason for the unity that is imperfectly contained in
it. Union that is effected according to either composition or simili­
tude presupposes a unity of a higher order. It is a question of the
exemplary cause and also of the efficient cause, because the ex­
emplary cause without the efficient does not actually produce any­
thing. “Consequently there is something that is truest, something
best, something noblest, and something that is uttermost being; for
those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being.” So
says St. Thomas in this article. But why does he add: “Now the
maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus”? He does
so to show that the greatest in truth, in goodness, and in being is
the true equivalent of the nominal definition of God, or of the
supreme Being, and of the cause of all beings. Therefore he con­
cludes by saying: "And this we call God.” If this greatest in being
were not the cause of all beings, it would not correspond to the
nominal definition of God.
Some were of the opinion that, previous to the introduction of
iss ibid., q.n, a. 1 ad 211m.
134 Consult St. Thomas’ Com. on Metaph., Bk. IV, lect. 3.
iss Summa theol., la, q.3, a.7.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

»47
this causal element, this proof does not proceed by the way of
causality. But there is no other way of proving God’s existence, as
was previously stated,130 and we must not only come by this proof
to the ideal conception of the supreme Good, conceived by us as
the exemplar in this order, but also to the supreme Good as truly
existing outside the mind, and as truly and actually the cause of
other beings.
This interpretation is confirmed by what St. Thomas says in an­
other of his works: "If one of some kind is found as a common
note in several objects, this must be because some one cause has
brought it about in them; for it cannot be that the common note
of itself belongs to each thing, since each thing is by its very nature
distinct from others, and a diversity of causes produces a diversity
of effects. . . .
"(Moreover), if anything is found to be participated in various
degrees by several objects, it must be that, starting with the one in
which it is found in the highest degree, it is attributed to all the
others in which it is found more imperfectly. For those things that
are predicated according to more and less, this they have by reason
of their greater or less approximation to one of some kind; for if
any one of these were to possess this perfection in its own right,
then there is no reason why it should be found in a higher degree
in one than in the other.”137 St. Thomas also says: “What belongs
to a being by its very nature, and not by reason of any cause, can­
not be either partially or completely taken away.” 138
This argument differs entirely from St. Anselm’s, for it does not
start from the idea of perfect being, but from the real grades of
perfection as found in the world. Therefore, by means of the proof
based upon exemplary and efficient causality, the most perfect Be­
ing is established, since actually existing imperfect beings originate
from the real fount of perfection.
We find the same argument in the Theological Summa, but the
order is reversed. The descent is from God, since the same relation
of dependence can be considered by starting from the lowest or
from the highest in the grades of being. The passage from the
above-mentioned work reads as follows: “Whatever is found in
anything by participation must be caused in it by that to which it
belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been
shown above (q. 3, a. 4) that God is the essentially self-subsisting
Being; and it was also shown (q. 11, a. 3,4) that subsisting being
must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one,
13« [bid., q. 2, a. 2.
1st De pot., q.3, a.5.
iss Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 15.

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THE ONE GOD

since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. . . . Therefore it
must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse partici­
pation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one
first Being, who possesses being most perfectly. Hence Plato said
that unity must come before multitude.” 138
Thus this fourth way proves the necessity of a maximum in being,
unity, truth, and goodness; in fact, it proves the necessity of the
most pure Being that is not a reality considered as distinct from
the limited capacity in which it would be received. Thus the
maximum in being must be to being as A is to A. It must be the
self-subsisting Being.140 And so it is quite clear that this supreme
Being by reason of His absolute identity, which excludes composi­
tion, imperfection, and changeableness, completely transcends the
world, which is essentially composite and imperfect.141
St. Thomas applies this proof to the intellect, truth, goodness,
and the natural law.
1) The application to our intellect. “What is such by participa­
tion and what is mobile and imperfect, always requires the pre­
existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect.
Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participa­
tion in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly
intellectual but only in part. Moreover, it reaches to the under­
standing of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning
and movement. Again, it has an imperfect understanding. . . .
Therefore there must be some higher intellect by which the soul
is helped to understand.” 142 And this higher intellect must be the
self-subsisting Being.143
2) Application to eternal truths. We perceive by the intellect
truths that are at least negatively eternal, absolutely necessary and
universal, such as the principle of contradiction. But the absolute
necessity of these, which is the rule of every finite intellect and of
every possible and actual contingent being, calls for an actually
existing and necessary foundation. Therefore this necessary and
eternal foundation exists, and it is the necessary and the eternal
intellect.
St. Thomas says practically the same in the following passage;
“From the fact that the truths understood are eternal as regards
what is understood, it cannot be concluded that the soul is im­
mortal, but that the truths understood have their foundation in
189 Summa theol., la, q.44, a.i.
no/feid., q.3, a. 4.
1« Ibid., a. 8.
na/feid., q.79, a.4.
i«’Ztid., q. 14, a. 4.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

149
something eternal. They have their foundation, indeed, in the first
Truth as in the universal Cause that contains all truth.” 144 This
means that, in accordance with the fourth proof, they have their
foundation in the maximum truth.
Obviously the absolute necessity of the principle of contradiction,
which is the law governing every real being, whether possible or
actual, has not its foundation in either contingent being or in the
different natures of contingent beings; multitude does not explain
the reason for unity. There is required a supreme truth. Likewise
the first principle of ethics, good is to be done and evil to be
avoided,145 has its proximate foundation in the nature of virtuous
good to which our will is ordained, and its ultimate foundation is
in the supreme Good and in the maximum Truth.
Thus the natural law in the rational creature is ‘‘the participa­
tion of the eternal law.” 148 This is confirmed by the fifth proof,
since the passive ordination of our will to do what is virtuously
good presupposes the active ordination of the supreme Ordainer or
Lawmaker.
3) Application to the natural desire in us for universal good.
More and less are predicated of different goods, according as these
approximate in varying degrees to the highest goods. It follows
psychologically from this that, in conceiving universal good, we
naturally desire a non-finite good (in virtue of the principle of
finality: every agent acts for an end). And this desire, being natural,
cannot be to no purpose. We are not concerned here with the con­
ditional and inefficacious desire for the beatific vision, but with the
natural desire for natural happiness, which no finite good, but only
the supreme Good naturally known and loved can satisfy. Hence
St. Thomas says: ‘‘That good which is the last end, is the perfect
good fulfilling the desire. Now man’s appetite, otherwise the will, is
for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a
participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore
none of them can be man’s last end.” 147 And farther on he says:
“Hence it is evident than nothing can lull man’s will except the
universal good. This is to be found not in any creature, but in
God alone, because every creature has good by participation.” 148
This may be expressed more briefly as follows: If there is a nat­
ural appetite for universal good in the things of nature, since good
is not in the mind but in things, then it must be the universal or
1« Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 84.
ws Summa theol., la Ilae, q.94, a.2.
ne Ibid., q.91, a.2.
rtr Ibid., q.2, a. 7.
1«Ibid., q.2, a.8.

THE ONE GOD

150

most perfect good. Otherwise the existence of this appetite or nat­
ural desire would be a psychological contradiction. In such a case
the tendency of this natural desire would be and would not be for
infinite good.
This is an apodictic argument at least for philosophers, and it
must be most clear to the angels. It is an application of the fourth
proof in conjunction with the principle of finality: that every agent
acts for an end, and that a natural desire cannot be purposeless.
The fifth proof confions this argument, since the passive ordina­
tion of our will to non-finite good presupposes the supreme Or­
dainer.
THE FIFTH PROOF: FROM THE ORDER OR
THE GOVERNANCE IN THE WORLD

We see that things lacking intelligence act for an end. Not only is
this an established fact, but it is the minor of this demonstration.
Indeed we notice that there is a wonderful order and finality pre­
vailing in the strikingly regular courses of the heavenly bodies. The
centripetal and centrifugal forces are so regulated that the heavenly
bodies move in their orbits with enormous speed and in perfect
harmony. More striking are the unity and variety that we behold
in the organic structures of plants, animals, and man. Finality, or
the relation to an end, is clearly seen in the evolution of the primi­
tive embryonic cell, which in its simplicity virtually contains all
that belongs to the determinate organism of this particular species
rather than of a certain other, of a lion, for instance, rather than
of a dog. This evolution manifestly tends to a determined end.
Hence Claude Bernard spoke of “tire directive idea” of this evolu­
tion. There is something truly wonderful in this. In like manner
the organs of animals are adapted to this particular function rather
than to a certain other, such as the eye with its multiplicity of
visual conditions and its cells is adapted to this most simple opera­
tion of seeing, and the ear to that of hearing. Similarly the instinct
and activities of animals are directed to certain determined ends.
Thus the activities of the bee are for the building of its hive and
the making of honey.
What particularly manifests this finality, as St. Thomas notes, is
the fact that natural agents of the irrational order “always or nearly
always act in the same way, so as to obtain the best result.” 148 If
God had created but one eye for the evident purpose of seeing,
this would already be something wonderful. This best result, which
is the terminus of action, is strictly entitled to the name of end;
it»/bid., la, q.a, a.3.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

151

for the end is the good in view of which an agent acts. In fact, be­
fore God’s existence is proved, the principle of finality, “every agent
acts for an end,” is an evident truth. As St. Thomas says: “An agent
does not move except out of intention for an end (unless it do so at
least unconsciously). For if the agent were not determined to some
particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another.
Therefore, in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must of
necessity be determined to some certain one, which has the nature
of an end.” 150
It will not do to have recourse to chance, for chance is an acci­
dental cause, and hence is not the cause of what happens always
and according to nature. Otherwise the accidental would no longer
be accidental but essential; instead of being something which accrues
to the essence, it would be its foundation, and in that case the essential
would be subordinate to the accidental, and this would be unintel­
ligible and absurd. The wonderful order existing in the universe
would be the result of no order, the greater would proceed from the
less. Neither will it do to appeal solely to the efficient cause, and to re­
ject the final cause. For in that case we could not give any reason
for the action of an agent: why, for instance, a certain organ has
a certain determinate tendency; nor could we say why an agent
acts instead of not acting. There would be no raison d’être for the
action. The active potency or the inclination of the agent tends
essentially toward something, just as the imperfect tends toward
the perfect. “Potency refers to act.” For instance, the faculty of
sight is for seeing. Therefore, we cannot doubt the existence of
finality in the world, the order of which is the suitable arrange­
ment of means in view of an end.151 Now the existence of order or
finality in the world is illustrated by the following principle which
is the major of this demonstration.
Irrational beings cannot tend toward an end, unless they are
directed by some supreme Intelligence. In fact, to be directed pre­
supposes a directing cause, which is an act that pertains to the in­
tellect and not to the imagination. “It is for the wise man to
direct.” Why? Because an intelligent being alone perceives the
raison d’être of the means. “Irrational beings,” says St. Thomas,
“tend toward an end by natural inclination; they are, as it were,
moved by another and not by themselves, since they have no
knowledge of the end as such.” 102 Animals have a sensitive knowl­
edge of the thing which constitutes their end, but they do not per­
iso/fet'd., la Ilae, q. 1, a.2; also la, q.44, a.4; Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 2.
isi See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, chaps. 8 f., and the Commentary of St. Thomas,
lect. 7-14.
m Summa theol., la Ilae, q.i, a.2.

THE ONE GOD
152
ceive the formal end as such in this thing. If, therefore, there were
no intelligent designer directing the world, the order and intel­
ligibility in things would be the effect of an unintelligible cause,
and our own intelligences would originate from a blind and un­
intelligible cause, and again we should have to say that the greater
comes from the less, which is absurd. This was understood to be
so by Anaxagoras, and he was very much praised by Aristotle for
having made this assertion.153 There is, therefore, a supreme intel­
ligent Being, who directs all things in nature to their respective
ends.
Kant objects that this argument proves only the existence of
some finite intelligence. We reply to this by saying that it is not
enough for the first Ruler to have, like ourselves, an intellectual
faculty directed to intelligible being, for this would at once de­
mand the presence of a designing intelligence of a higher order.
The supreme Designer cannot be designed for any other purpose.
Therefore He must be the self-subsisting Intellection and self-sub­
sisting Being, and this will be more clearly seen in subsequent
articles.151
This proof, like the preceding proofs, is most universal in scope.
It takes in anything whatever that denotes design, and from this it
rises up to the supreme Designer. Thus it starts with equal force
either from the fact that the eye is for seeing, and the ear for hear­
ing, or that the intellect is for the understanding of truth, or the
will for the willing of good.
Viewed under this aspect, there are two proofs for God’s exist­
ence that are referred back to this fifth way. One is the natural
tendency of our will to do what is good and avoid what is evil;
the other is the natural desire of the will for happiness, or for un­
limited good, which is found only in God, who is the essential
Good.
Evidently this twofold ordination of the will presupposes a su­
preme Ordainer, just as the ordination of sight to seeing does. This
proof must be most convincing for the angels; by the very fact that
they see that their will is directed to universal good, at once with­
out any discursive process they see that passive ordination presup­
poses the active ordination of a supreme Ordainer. “There is no
ordination without an ordainer.” 155
This fifth proof, since it starts from the consideration of the
order prevailing in the world, the harmony, for instance, in the
movements of the heavenly bodies, is readily understood at least
103 Metaph., Bk. I, chap. 3.
lot Summa theol., la, 9.3, a.4: q.14, a. 1, 4.
«s Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 38.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

•53
in a confused way by the natural reason. Hence it is said: “All
men are vain in whom there is not the knowledge of God, and
who by these good things that are seen could not understand Him
that is. Neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who
was the workman.” 166 Hence the Psalmist says: “The heavens show
forth the glory of God.” 157
THE ONE END TO WHICH THESE FIVE PROOFS CONVERGE

We have already pointed out at the end of each of these five
proofs that the result of each is to move us to admit the existence
of a divine attribute which can be predicated only of the self-sub­
sisting Being, as will be explicitly proved by St. Thomas.168 The
article referred to serves the double purpose of pointing out to us
what is the terminus in the ascending order in the process of rea­
soning or the terminus by way of finding in proving God’s exist­
ence, which rises from sensible things until it reaches the supreme
cause, and it is also the principle in the descending or synthetic
process, by which reason deduces the divine attributes, and judges
of all things by the highest cause.169
In fact, the prime mover must be his own action, and, therefore,
his own existence, and the same must be said of the first uncaused
cause, of the necessary being, of the most perfect being, and of the
ruler of the universe. Thus the supreme truth of Christian phi­
losophy, or the fundamental truth by way of judgment, is that "in
God alone essence and existence are identical.” God is “He who
is.” 160 This is the golden key to the whole treatise on the one God,
and its dominating principle.
These are, therefore, the principal metaphysical proofs to which
all others are reduced. If we study them carefully, we see, contrary
to the assertions of modern agnostics, that the existence of God,
who transcends the world, cannot be denied without denying the
principle of causality, namely, that "every being which is con­
tingent, changeable, composite, imperfect, and relative, is caused,”
and so requires a first and unchangeable being, one that is abso­
lutely simple and perfect. Now, the principle of causality cannot be
denied or doubted without denying or doubting the principle of
contradiction, for “a contingent and uncaused being” would exist
neither of itself nor by reason of another, and consequently could
158 Wis. 13: 1.
is? ps. 18: 1. On the natural knowledge of God’s existence, cf. Contra Gentes,
Bk. Ill, chap. 38.
ιββ Summa theol., la, q.3, a.4.
Ibid., q.79, a. 9.
188 Ex. 3: 14.

»54

THE ONE GOD

not be distinguished from nothingness, since it would have no rea­
son for existing. This would mean the subversion of the principle
of contradiction, that “being is not non-being,” and of the prin­
ciple of identity, that “being is being, non-being is non-being.”
If, on the contrary, the principle of contradiction or identity is
the supreme law of reality and of our reason, then the supreme
reality must indeed be the identity of essence and existence, or self­
subsisting Being. Thus the five ways of proving God’s existence
unite in the wonderful opposition prevailing between the principle
of identity and the changeableness and composition of the world.
From this opposition it is at once evident that the world is con­
tingent and depends on the immutable and pre-eminently simple
Being whose name is “I am who am.” 161
It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to choose between the ex­
istence of God, who transcends the world, and the denial of the
real validity of the principle of contradiction. Absolute evolution­
ism denies this validity, maintaining that motion or becoming is
its own reason for such,182 and hence that the more perfect comes
from the less perfect, and that contradictories are identified in a
universal process of becoming. Thus we see in absolute evolution­
ism an incontestable proof, by reductio ad absurdum of the true
and transcendental God, since this existence cannot be denied with­
out denying the real validity of the first principle of reason, and
without positing a fundamental absurdity as the principle of all
things. For if God is truly the absolutely necessary being, then the
denial of His existence means the positing of a fundamental ab­
surdity as the principle of all things.
We see the radical absurdity of this system in the first of the
propositions condemned in the Syllabus of Pius IX, which reads as
follows: “There is no supreme Being, who is all-wise, ruler of the
universe and distinct from it; God is identical with the nature of
things, and is, therefore, subject to changes; God really becomes or
begins to be in man and in the world, and all things are God and
have the same substance with Him; thus God and the world, spirit
and matter, necessity and liberty, truth and falsehood, goodness and
evil, justice and injustice, are all identified in the one same and
only reality.” 183 If absolute evolutionism were true, then nothing
would be stable, and therefore we should have to say that there is
nothing but relative truth. In such a state of knowledge the antithiei Ibid.
iea For this reason Heraclitus is said to have denied the real validity of the
principle of contradiction, reducing it to a grammatical law. See Aristotle’s,
Metaphysics, Bk. IV, chaps. 3-8.
tea Denz., no. 1701.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

155

esis would always be truer than the thesis and then there would
be a synthesis of a higher order, and so on indefinitely. Contradic­
tories would be identified in the very process of becoming, which
would be its own reason for such.
To avoid this absurdity we must affirm the existence of God,
who, as the Vatican Council says, “being one, sole, absolutely
simple 164 and immutable185 spiritual substance, is to be declared as
really and essentially distinct from the world (which is composite
and subject to change), of supreme beatitude in and from Himself,
and ineffably exalted above all things which exist or can be con­
ceived beside Himself.” 108
St. Thomas gives us in merely a few words his solution to the
objection raised against God’s existence because of the prevalence
of evil in the world,187 because he intends to examine this problem
more at length farther on in this treatise.188 But we now merely call
to mind the solution of the problem of evil given by St. Augustine,
who says: “Since God is supremely good, He would not at all per­
mit any evil in His works if He did not have power and goodness
enough to draw good out of evil.” 189 Thus in the physical order
He permits the death of some animal for the preservation of an­
other, of a lion, for instance; and in the moral order He permits
persecution for this greater good, namely, the constancy of the
martyrs. Similarly, St. Thomas says: “God allows evils to happen
in order to bring a greater good therefrom. Hence it is written
(Rom. 5:20): ‘Where sin abounded, grace did more abound.’ Hence,
too, in the blessing of the paschal candle we say: Ό happy fault
that merited such and so great a Redeemer.’ ” 179
Reply to the second objection. Nature is not the first cause of
those things that are done in a natural way, because, “since nature
works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent,
whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as
to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily,” as all mobile
and defectible beings must be traced back to some first immobile
and essentially necessary being.
This suffices for the proofs of God’s existence, which we have
expounded more philosophically in another work.171
194 See the fourth and fifth proofs as above explained.
100 See the first, second, and third proofs of St. Thomas.
100 Denz., no. 1782.
ιβτ Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3 ad turn.
los/hid., q.22, a.2 ad 211m; q.48, a.2 ad 3um.
16» Enchiridion, chap. XI.
no Summa theol., Illa, q.i, a.3 ad 3um.
in See God, His Existence and His Nature.

CHAPTER III
Question 3

Introduction
On God’s Nature and His Attributes in General

Before we come to consider God’s various attributes, we must dis­

cuss His nature as conceived by us, and His attributes in general.
This especially applies here, because from the very end to which
the five proofs converge, which is the self-subsisting Being, there
arises the question whether what formally constitutes God’s na­
ture, according to our conception of it, is self-subsisting Being,
from which perfection all the other attributes are afterward de­
duced.
WHAT FORMALLY CONSTITUTES GOD’S NATURE ACCORDING
TO OUR CONCEPTION OF IT

State of the question. We are not concerned here with God’s na­
ture as it is in itself and as it is seen by the blessed; for what
formally constitutes the divine nature as it is in itself, is that most
proper and most eminent formal concept of the Deity, which con­
tains actually and explicitly (and not merely implicitly) all God’s
attributes, which are truly identified in the absolute simplicity of
the Deity, and which are seen in it by the blessed without any de­
ductive process.
It is our analogical and very imperfect knowledge of God’s na­
ture that concerns us here, and the question is whether among all
the divine perfections there is one that is, as it were, the source of
the others, just as in the human nature rationality is the source
of the various properties in man. Then the divine nature, when
so viewed, according to our imperfect mode of knowing it, is vir­
tually distinct from the divine attributes. This means that it con­
tains them actually and implicitly, but not explicitly; for these at­
tributes are afterward explicitly derived from it.
Billuart and certain other Thomists make another addition to
the state of the question, but, unless I am mistaken, on insufficient
grounds. Billuart is of the opinion that it is not a question of the
divine nature as expressed by the most common and transcendental'
concept of uncreated being, which applies to all the divine at156

GOD’S NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES

157

tributes, just as the concept of created being applies to all the dif­
ferences found in creatures.
There seems to be no foundation for this distinction between
what is common and special in God, for God is not in any genus,
not even according to our mode of conceiving Him. We can in­
deed distinguish in any creature the transcendentals that are com­
mon to all the genera and the species. But this distinction is of no
value in God, since God is not in any genus, and transcendentals,
such as being, unity . . . , are verified in God in a most special
manner, that is, by reason of Himself. Hence it is not repugnant
on a priori considerations for what constitutes the divine nature
to be the self-subsisting Being, this constituting the terminus of the
five proofs in the ascending order and the principle for the deriva­
tion of the attributes.
THE VARIOUS OPINIONS AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES THE
DIVINE NATURE

1) The nominalists reply that God is an accumulation of perfec­
tions, and there is no need of our inquiring into the logical priority
of one perfection over the others. It would be a useless question.
In fact, the nominalists said that the distinction between the divine
attributes was a purely mental one (rationis ratiocinantis), a verbal
distinction, such as we have between Tullius and Cicero, and from
this it would follow that the divine names are synonymous.1 This
opinion of the nominalists leads to agnosticism, for it could just as
well be said that God punishes by His mercy and forgives by His
justice. This would mean the end of all knowledge about God,
and for this reason the nominalists were formerly expelled from
the University of Paris.
2) On the other hand, Scotus admitted an actual and formal dis­
tinction between the divine attributes, a distinction that is actual
from the nature of the thing, and which is prior to the considera­
tion of our mind, and which gives us the answer to the question
as to what constitutes the divine nature, by saying that it is radical
infinity, demanding as such the various divine attributes.
In reply to this, the Thomists say that radical infinity, or the
exigency of all perfections, does not constitute the divine nature,
but is presupposed by it and has its foundation therein. It is indeed
the very essence of God that demands all the perfections which
are derived from it. Moreover, God's infinity is deduced from the
fact that He is the self-subsisting Being.2 Besides, infinity is a mode
1 Summa theol., la, q. 13, a.4.
2Ibid., q.7, a.I.

158

THE ONE GOD

of each of the divine attributes. Finally, the Thomists say that the
actual and formal distinction of Scotus, by the very fact that it is
prior to our consideration of it, is already a real distinction, how­
ever slight this may be, and hence it is excluded from God by rea­
son of His absolute simplicity in whom, as the Council of Florence
says, “all things are one and the same where there is no opposition
of relation,” 3 and this opposition is to be found only between the
divine Persons.
3) Several Thomists of the seventeenth century and later, such as
John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticences, and Billuart, hold that
subsistent intellection is what constitutes the divine nature. Their
principal argument is as follows: The supreme degree of being is
that which must constitute the divine nature; but the various
grades of being are existence, life, and intellection; therefore sub­
sistent intellection is what constitutes the divine nature.
Hence in their opinion “self-subsisting Being” is in God to be
taken as something transcendental and not specific. But, as we have
pointed out in the state of the question, there seems to be no
foundation for this distinction in God between what is common
and what is specific; because God is not in any genus, not even
according to our mode of conceiving Him.
4) Many other theologians, several of them being Thomists, hold
that self-subsisting Being is what constitutes the divine nature.
Among the Thomists holding this opinion we have Capreolus,
Bannez, Ledesma, Contenson, Gotti, and more recently del Prado
and Father Billot. We find this view expressed in the twenty-third
proposition of the Thomistic theses approved by the Sacred Con­
gregation of Studies (1914): “The divine essence, in that it is identi­
cal with the actuality of the divine being in act, or in that it is
the self-subsisting Being, is proposed to us as constituted, as it
were, in its metaphysical aspect, and by this same furnishes us
with the reason of His infinite perfection.” 1 But Suarez says that
it is better to posit the fact itself of aseity as the principle from
which the divine attributes are derived.
Others reply to this, and justly so, that the reason for this fact
is that only in God are essence and existence identical, or that
God alone is the self-subsisting Being. But Suarez expresses a dif­
ferent view, because he does not admit a real distinction between
created essence and existence.
As we shall at once see, it seems that our preference must be for
s Denz., no. 703.
4 Cf. Guido Mattuissi, S.J., Le XXIV tesi della filosofia di S. Tomasso d’Aquino *
approvate dalla S. Congregazione degli sludi. Roma, 1917, pp. 260-76.

GOD’S NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES

159

this opinion, on the supposition, however, that God is not a body
but pure spirit. But it is especially because God is He who is 5 that
He transcends all spirits. Before we prove this fourth opinion, men­
tion must be made of two other views proposed by those outside
the Catholic schools of theology.
Fifth opinion. There are those who maintain that essential good­
ness is what formally constitutes the divine nature. Thus Plato was
of the opinion that the supreme reality is the idea of Good tran­
scending essence and intelligence.® In like manner Plotinus con­
sidered that the supreme reality is the One Good transcending
intelligence. We still find some traces of this theory in the writings
of several Augustinians although they do not explicitly examine
this question. Thus Peter Lombard divided the subject matter of
his Book of the Sentences with reference to enjoyable and useful
good, namely, to those things that can be enjoyed, especially God,
usables or creatures, inasmuch as they are means for the attainment
of the supreme Good.
To this opinion the Thomists reply in the words of St. Thomas,7
that, as being is absolutely prior to the good, God, prior to being
conceived as the supreme Good, is conceived as the supreme Being
existing of Himself; in fact, God is the supreme Good only because
He is the plenitude of being. In other words, the idea of being is
more absolute, simple, and universal than the idea of good, and
good can be conceived only as being that has reached its final stage
of perfection, and that is capable of appealing to the appetitive
faculty and perfecting it. Hence God is the supreme Good inas­
much as He is the plenitude of being.
But it must be conceded 8 that in a certain sense, that is, not in
order of being but of causality, good is prior to being, since the
end is first among causes, attracting the agent, and the agent educes
the form from the matter for the production of the causated being.
Hence, for us, God is first of all considered as the supreme Good,
our ultimate end; but in Himself, God is first of all the self-sub­
sisting Being, and would be so even if He had not created anything,
and were not the end of any creature.
Sixth opinion. It is that of certain modern philosophers, such as
Secrétan and J. Lequier, who believed in voluntarism and absolute
libertism. These maintained that divine liberty is what formally
constitutes the divine nature, for God is His own reason for what
» Ex. 3: 14.
• The Republic, Bk. VII.
7 Summa theol., la, q.5, a.a.
8 Ibid.

ι6ο

THE ONE GOD

He is. But there is nothing, they say, that is more its own reason
for what it is than liberty, which determines itself as it wills. Hence
God would be absolute liberty, and most freely would have deter­
mined all things, even those that pertain to His intimate life.
Wherefore, according to Secrétan,9 the definition of God is not
“Who is" or “I am who am,” but “I am that which I most freely
will to be.”
The writings of Descartes revealed a tendency to accept this
theory. In his opinion, eternal truths, even the truth of the prin­
ciple of contradiction, depend upon God's free will. Ockham had
said something similar to this in maintaining that God could have
commanded us to commit murder and even to lead an irreligious
life; to which Leibnitz replied that “God would then no more be,
according to His nature, the supreme Good than the supreme evil
of the Manichaeans.” 10 St. Thomas likewise said: “To say that jus­
tice depends simply upon the will of God, is to say that the divine
will does not act according to wisdom; and this is blasphemy.” 11
This libertarian theory cannot be admitted, because freedom of
choice presupposes deliberation on the part of the intellect, other­
wise it would be the same as chance. But chance is an accidental
cause, and so cannot be the first cause; for the accidental presup­
poses the essential. If anyone digging a grave, did not intrinsically
as such dig, the treasure would not accidentally be found. Hence
it is most manifest that the first liberty presupposes the supreme
Being and the first Intellect.
Besides these six opinions, it is difficult to conceive or think of
any other ways of solving this problem. Priority is given either to
Being or to the Good or to the Infinite or to Intellection or to
liberty. Whether we consider in God what is subjective or what is
objective, no other answers than these can be found.
We have already stated why the last two opinions cannot be ad­
mitted, nor the opinion of the nominalists nor that of the Scotists.
Therefore we have but two opinions left to consider, namely,
whether self-subsisting Being is what formally constitutes the di­
vine nature, or whether it is self-subsisting intellection.
Solution. From the teaching of St. Thomas we see that the for­
mal constituent of the divine nature is self-subsisting Being, which
is the view held by several Thomists above mentioned, although
not all are of this opinion.
We are at least persuaded of this for three reasons: (i) because
of the order observed by St. Thomas in this treatise on God; (2)
9 La philosophie de la liberté, I, Bk. XV, pp. 361-70.
10 Theodicée, II, §§ 176 f.
11 De veritate, q.23, a.6.

GOD'S NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES

t6i

from his teaching on this point;12 (3) from the solution of the
difficulties proposed against this opinion.
1) The order observed in the treatise is evidence of this. In fact,
according to this order, by means of the five proofs, we advance in
knowledge to the establishing of this supreme truth: “God is the
self-subsisting Being,’’13 and the divine attribqtes are afterward
derived from this supreme truth.
Thus from the beginning of the third question to the end of the
fourth article the mind continually advances in knowledge, for the
first article establishes that God is not a body; the second, that God
is not composed of matter and form; the third, that God is not a
composite, consisting of His nature and the principle of individua­
tion. From this we conclude that God is a pure spirit. But a pure
spirit can be a created being; hence to distinguish God from even
the noblest of creatures, it is established in the fourth article that
God is the self-subsisting Being, since He is the first efficient cause,
pure act, and essential being.
This is the culminating point in the ascendant order or by the .
way of finding, and the principle in the descendent process or by
the way of judgment, of wisdom, which judges of all things by the
highest of causes. Thus from the fact that God is the self-subsisting
Being is deduced the real distinction between God and the world,14
and from this the divine attributes are afterward deduced, such as
goodness (plenitude of being),15 infinity (being not received in any­
thing is infinite),13 immutability, eternity, and other attributes.
Likewise the divine intellection is deduced from the immateriality
of the divine being, and omniscience from the fact that God is the
self-subsisting Being. Hence it is only in the fourteenth question
that the divine intellection is discussed. In fact, the opening words
of the prologue to this question are: “Having considered what be­
longs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God’s opera­
tion.” Being is prior to truth and intellection, for intellection is
predicated only of the subject and as this latter is related to in­
telligible being as the object.
Such is the order observed in this treatise on God. From this we
see that the formal constituent of the divine nature is stated be­
fore the fourteenth question, in the fourth article of the third ques­
tion, where it is shown that only in God are essence and existence
identical. As Father del Prado 17 with good reason shows, this prop
12 Summa theol., la, q. 13, a. 11.
is ibid., q.3, a.4.
1« Ibid., a.8.
1» Ibid., q.5.
ie Ibid., q.7.
17 De veritate fundamentali philosophiae Christianae.

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osition constitutes the fundamental of Christian philosophy, fun­
damental indeed not by way of finding but by way of judgment,
since wisdom judges of all things by the highest cause, or by reason.
2) This opinion is equivalently what St. Thomas said: “This
name, He who is, is most properly applied to God for three rea­
sons. First, because of its signification . . . , since the existence of
God is His essence itself. . . . Secondly, on account of its univer­
sality ... to designate by this the infinite sea of substance. . . .
Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence,
and this above all applies to God, whose existence knows not past
or future.” 18
Thus, when Moses asked God His name, "God said to Moses:
I am who am. He said: Thus shalt thou say to the children of
Israel: He who is hath sent me to you.” 18 The Hebrew word
"Yahweh” (from which the word Jehovah is derived, which is
written with the vowel signs of Adonai) is the equivalent of "He
who is.” It is known as the Tetragrammaton, a word of four letters,
and is God’s proper name in the strictest sense.
3) This opinion receives its confirmation from the solution of
the principal difficulty proposed by other Thomists who hold a
different opinion. This difficulty is enunciated as follows: The
highest degree of being is what constitutes the divine essence. But
this highest degree is intellection: for, in the ascendant order of
the grades of being we have; existence, life, intellection. Therefore
intellection is what constitutes the divine nature.
St. Thomas replies to this by distinguishing between participated
being—which can be without life and intelligence—and self-sub­
sisting being, which is the fullness itself of being, including all
other perfections actually and implicitly. In the passage referred
to, St. Thomas says: “Although therefore existence does not include
life and wisdom, because that which participates in existence need
not participate in every mode of existence, nevertheless God’s
existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the
perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is subsisting being
itself.” 20 Similarly, from the work just quoted, we read: "Being
taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life
and all that follows it.” 21
is Summa theol., la, q. 13, a. 11.
10 Ex. 3: 14.
20 Summa theol., la, q.4, a.2 ad 311m.
Ibid., la Hae, q.2, a.5 ad 2um; see also I Sent., d.8, q.t, a.i, 8; De potentia,
q.7, a.2 ad gum; cf. Gotti, O.P., De Deo, tr. II, dub. 3, §3; Contenson, O.P.,
De Deo, diss. II, c. 2, spec. 2.

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163

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN GENERAL

The theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries usu­
ally discussed this question at the beginning of their treatise on
God. St. Thomas discusses it in a special manner in the thirteenth
question, in connection with the divine names, and rightly so, be­
cause the divine being is first considered by him, and then our pos­
sibility of knowing it.
Nevertheless the different views about these attributes as pre­
sented by nominalism, the formalism of Scotus, and the moderate
realism of St. Thomas, oblige us to insert this introduction, which
serves as material for reflection upon this treatise, and which was
ideally present to the mind of St. Thomas as he was assigning in
orderly arrangement the various parts of this treatise.
In this question of the divine attributes, all theologians distin­
guish between absolutely simple perfections, which imply no im­
perfection (such as intellection) and relative or mixed perfections,
which denote imperfection even in their formal signification (such
as reasoning). But certain theologians do not sufficiently distinguish
the divine attributes or the absolutely simple perfections from
God’s free action and the divine persons; for, although the latter
do not imply any imperfection, yet they are not absolutely simple
perfections in the strict sense.
HOW THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTE IS DEFINED

To avoid the above-mentioned confusion we must define the ex­
pression “divine attribute,” as the Thomists usually do, by saying
that it is an absolutely simple perfection which exists necessarily
and formally in God, and which is deduced from what we conceive
as constituting the divine essence.22
Explanation of this definition.
1) We are concerned with what is an attribute in the strict sense
of the term, for sometimes the term refers in an improper sense to
all that is predicated even not necessarily of God (as the divine free
act) or else relatively (as the relations of paternity, filiation, passive
spiration, by which the divine persons are constituted).
2) It is called an absolute perfection, not to the exclusion of per­
fections that are named with reference to creatures, such as provi­
dence, mercy, justice, omnipotence, but to the exclusion of the
divine relation, to which the term “attribute” does not apply since
22 Cf. Damascene’s De /ide orthodoxa, Bk. I, chap. 12; Summa theol., la, q.3, a.3
ad mm; q. 13, a.4 ad sum. 311m.

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THE ONE GOD

the relations are not common to the three Persons; for the attribute
is a property of the nature and is common to the three Persons.
3) It is called an absolutely simple perfection so as to exclude rel­
ative or mixed perfections, which essentially imply imperfection,
such as rationality. But what in the strict sense is an absolutely
simple perfection? It is that perfection which in its formal concept
implies no imperfection, and which it is better for one to have
than not. Many add these last words to the definition, and rightly
so, because the divine free act and the divine relations, although
they imply no imperfection, yet are not absolutely simple perfec­
tions, at least in the strict sense. For it is not better for God to
have the creative act than not, and there would have been no
imperfection in God if He had not created, no matter what Leibnitz
said about this; nor does it add to God’s perfection that He most
freely wills to create the universe. In like manner the Father, to
whom the opposite relation of filiation does not apply, would be
lacking in some absolutely simple perfection if the relation of filia­
tion were an absolutely simple perfection, as if it were superadded
to the infinite perfection of the divine nature, which is common to
the three Persons. Hence neither the divine relations nor the divine
free act are absolutely simple perfections, at least in the strict sense.
But the contrary of this is true as regards liberty and omnipotence,
for God would be free and omnipotent, even if He had not created
anything.
4) It is said to be necessarily existing in God, which means that
it is like a property of the divine nature, so that God’s free acts
such as creation, are excluded by these words.
5) It is said to be formally existing in God so that also mixed
perfections may be excluded; for these are only virtually in God,
since He can produce them in creatures. Thus life is formally at­
tributed to God, but not animal or rational.
6) It is said, “as derived from the essence,” so as to exclude the
prior concept of the divine nature. Thus the divine attribute is
accurately defined.
HOW THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES ARE CLASSIFIED

The theologians are not altogether in agreement concerning this
classification. Some stress too much the attributes as they relate to
us in the classification; others prefer to discuss the attributes as
they relate to God as He is in Himself.
Suarez and several other theologians, discussing the attributes
more as they relate to us, classify them into positive attributes, such
as goodness, wisdom, justice, and negative attributes, such as in­

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165

corporeity, infinity, immutability, inefïability. They also point out
that very many negative attributes, such as infinity and immuta­
bility, are incommunicable, or cannot be participated in.
A difficulty presents itself in this classification, inasmuch as cer­
tain attributes expressed in a negative form, such as infinity, are
in themselves positive, just as incorporeity in itself denotes spiritu­
ality,23 and immutability in itself expresses stability in the highest
degree, the positive form of which is eternity. Hence this Suarezian
division stresses too much the quoad nos element in the attributes.
St. Thomas, however, in considering the attributes as they relate
to God as He is in Himself, seems to have devised a better classifica­
tion, by distinguishing between those that pertain to the divine sub­
stance and those that refer to the divine operation.2·* In the first
class of attributes we have simplicity, perfection, goodness, infinity,
immensity, immutability, eternity, unity, invisibility, and ineffability. In the second class, however, we have knowledge, will, and
love, and subordinate to these are justice, mercy, and providence,
as virtues residing either in the will or in the intellect. Finally, as
regards virtually transient operations, we have the creative, conser­
vative, and directive powers.23 This division is primary and funda­
mental, because it stresses more God as Fie is in Himself, and not
so much as we are related to Him. The classification proposed by
Suarez is more of the nature of a subdivision, and St. Thomas re­
fers to it as such.2®
HOW THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES ARE DISTINCT FROM
ONE ANOTHER AND FROM THE DIVINE ESSENCE

There are three leading opinions, and they are the result of the
different ways of solving the twofold problem about universals and
the analogy of the divine names.27 Let us first consider the extreme
views that are fundamentally in opposition.
1) The nominalists admitted only a mental distinction between
the divine attributes, like the verbal one between Tullius and
Cicero, or between Cicero the subject of some proposition and
Cicero the predicate of another proposition.
23 On the contrary, for the angels who have a positive and intuitive knowledge
of spiritual things, corporeity is the negation of spirituality.
Summa theol., la, prologue to q.3 and especially to q.14.
25 Ibid., q.25.
23 Ibid., q. 13, a.2. In this same article St. Thomas notes another subdivision,
since certain divine names are predicated absolutely (as perfection, simplicity),
whereas others are predicated relatively as referring to creatures (such as prov­
idence, mercy, justice, omnipotence).
27 This has been more fully examined by us in God, His Existence, II, 203-46.

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THE ONE GOD

They give two reasons for this opinion: (i) The universal is not
even fundamentally present in things; only individuals exist, and
in these there is no true, essential, and unchangeable similarity
according to the species, the genera, and the transcendentals; (2)
hence not even analogically can anything be predicated of God
and creatures at least in the proper sense, but only metaphorically
or symbolically.28 Hence to say, “God is just,” would no more
properly belong to Him, than to say “God is angry.” To say that
“God is just” would not mean that He is so substantially but only
causally, inasmuch as He is the cause of justice in creatures just as
He is the cause of life in animals.28
Criticism. From this opinion it follows that the divine names are
synonymous and that, contrary to reason, Scripture, and tradition,
it can be said therefore that God punishes by means of His mercy
and pardons by means of His justice; for, as the nominalists say,
there is only a verbal distinction between these two attributes as
between Tullius and Cicero, and wherever we find the name Tul­
lius written the name Cicero can be written for it. Thus this opin­
ion leads to pure agnosticism, which would result in God being
absolutely unknowable, the treatise on God an absolute impos­
sibility, and all the definitions of the Church about the divine
attributes would be identical in meaning. As St. Thomas remarks:
“If the words 'God is good’ signified no more than ‘God is the
cause of good things,’ it might in like manner be said that God is
a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies.” 80 In the next two
articles of this question he observes that not all the names applied
to God are metaphorical in meaning, for some are applied properly
although analogically (as in the case of “God is just”), and not all
the divine names are synonymous.81 The nominalist view destroys
the analogy of being, and leads to equivocality of being.82
2) Scotus admits, however, that the divine essence is distinct from
the attributes and the Persons, and he posits an actual and formal
distinction pertaining to the nature of the thing, between the divine
28 Concerning the philosophical errors of the nominalists, see Denzinger, nos.
553-7°. The following philosophical errors of Nicholas of Autrecourt are con­
demned: (1) “That we can have no certainty from the natural appearances of
things," which is practically a denial of the ontological validity of primary ideas;
(3) “There is absolutely no difference in meaning between the propositions: God
is, God is not.” This is a denial of the transcendent validity of the notion of being
in acquiring a knowledge of God, and so being is equivocal or is used in absolutely
different senses, if its affirmation and negation are no different in meaning; (32)
“God and the creature are not anything.”
29 Summa theol., la, q.13, a.2.
so Ibid., q. 13, a.2.
st Ibid., a. 3 f.
Ibid., q.13, a.5, for a refutation of this view.

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167

attributes, which is previous to our consideration of them, as al­
ready stated. Only in this way, according to Scotus, it can be af­
firmed that God punishes by His justice and not by His mercy.
This necessitates that these two attributes be formally and actually
distinct in God, previous to our consideration of them, about tire
same way as, in our soul, the intellect and the will are formally
and actually distinct.33
This theory has its foundation in the extreme realism advocated
by Scotus, who contends that already in created beings there is an
actual and formal distinction between the metaphysical degrees of
anything whatever, as, for instance, in Peter, between humanity,
vitality, substantiality, and entity. From this it follows that being
is predicated univocally of God and creatures, as Scotus explicitly
maintains. Nor is it to be wondered at that being is univocal, if,
previous to the mind’s consideration, it is formally and actually
distinct from substantiality, vitality, that is, from the modes of
being.
Criticism, (a) This actual and formal distinction, devised by
Scotus, if it is truly more than virtual, that is, as we remarked, if
it truly exists in the thing before the mind’s consideration, is al­
ready a real distinction, however slight it may be,34 and then it is
opposed to God’s absolute simplicity; for, as the Council of Florence
says: “In God all things are one and the same where there is no
relation of opposition.” 35 In other words, in this way Scotus ends
in extreme realism and in a certain anthropomorphism, since he
posits in God a distinction that exists only in the mind. This theory
is the absolute reverse of nominalism and agnosticism. Thus Scotus
does not sufficiently recede from the exaggerated realism of Gilbert
de la Porrée, which was condemned in the Council of Reims as
contrary to God’s absolute simplicity.3®
b) The metaphysical degrees are not actually distinct in a thing
before the mind’s consideration, as, for instance, in Peter, animality,
vitality, rationality, and substantiality; for these are reduced to the
same concept of humanity, of which animality is the genus, and
rationality is the specific differentia. Thus they correspond to the
same reality that is in itself one but virtually multiplex. 37
c) Moreover, if being is formally and actually distinct from its
33 Consult Scotus in I Sent, d.3, q.i, 3; d.8, q.3; d.5, q.t.
3« There is no intermediate distinction between the real and the virtual or
that distinction which has its foundation in the thing, because there is no inter­
mediate step between what precedes the mind’s consideration and what does not.
3s Denz., no. 703.
’3 Ibid., no. 391.
37 Cf. Goudin, Metaphysica, disp. I, q.3: "De distinctione quo gradus metaphysici distinguuntur.”

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THE ONE GOD

modes, then these modes would be outside being, and therefore non­
entities. There is danger of pantheism in this, for if being were
univocal, there would be but one being, because the univocal is not
differentiated except by differences extrinsic to it, and what is not
being is a nonentity. Truly the modes of being are included in the
concept of being, and are contained in it actually and implicitly.
Therefore being is not univocal (like a genus, the differentiae of
which are extrinsic to it), but analogical. Being expresses something
that is not absolutely but proportionately the same in self-existing
Being, in created substantial being, and in accidental being. Finally,
this doctrine of Scotus does not seem to be in conformity with the
teaching of the Fourth Lateran Council, in which we read: “So
great similarity cannot be detected between the Creator and the
creature that we do not have to take note of a greater dissimilarity
between them.” 38 This is practically a definition of analogy, since
the analogical aspect in God and creatures is not absolutely but
proportionately the same, as with wisdom which in God is the cause
of things and in us is measured by things.80 Hence, while the nomi­
nalists tend toward equivocation of being, Scotus maintains the
univocation of being. The two opinions are fundamentally in
opposition.10
3) The common opinion of the theologians mediates, so to speak,
between nominalism and exaggerated realism, and towers above
them. This opinion, the source of which is the moderate realism of
St. Thomas, is commonly formulated by the Thomists and a great
number of theologians as follows: There is a minor virtual dis­
tinction between the divine attributes and God’s essence, between
the divine attributes, and likewise between the divine persons and
the essence.
St. Thomas uses simpler terminology, saying that God’s essence
is distinct from the attributes and the divine Persons “not really
but logically.” 41 He is speaking of the logical distinction that is
founded on reality, which subsequently is commonly called virtual;
and this calls for an explanation.
a) The virtual distinction is a distinction founded on reality,
which means, contrary to Scotus’ theory, that it is non-existent
previous to the mind’s consideration, and it does not destroy God’s
absolute simplicity. Against the nominalists and agnostics, however,
ss Denz., no. 432.
so Cf. infra, q. 13, a.5.
40 Nevertheless, when Scotus substitutes his formal distinction for St. Thomas'
real distinction, for instance, between the faculties of the soul, he paves the way
for nominalism.
41 Summa theol., la, q.28. a.2.

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169

it is said to be “founded on reality,” since the different absolute
perfections found in creatures are equivalently expressed in the
eminence of the Deity.42 St. Thomas says expressly: “To the various
and multiplied conceptions of our intellect there corresponds one
altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, im­
perfectly understood.” 43 The eminence of the Deity is most simple,
but it is virtually multiple, and all absolutely simple perfections are
contained in it formally and eminently. This must now be briefly
explained, and more fully in the thirteenth question.
Formally: This means substantially and properly; not merely
metaphorically, but analogically and properly.44
Eminently: How the perfections are contained is mysterious; but
the divine attributes are so identified in the most eminent and
formal concept of the Deity as not to be destroyed by it. They are
contained formally in it, and yet they are not formally distinct. In
fact, they are found in their purest state, without any imperfection,
only in the Deity.
More briefly, absolute perfections are in God more so than the
seven colors are in the white light; for these seven colors are only
virtually present in whiteness, whereas the divine perfections are ’<■'
formally distinct from one another. For, whereas whiteness is not
blue, one and true are predicated of the Deity.45
b) The distinction between the divine attributes is called a minor
virtual distinction. For the major virtual distinction is that which
is of the nature of excluding and excluded, as in Peter the genus of
animality is distinct from rationality, which is the differentia ex­
trinsic to it, and there is a real foundation for conceiving it as in
potentiality for this latter, as being susceptible of further perfection
by something extraneous to it. But there is no real foundation
for conceiving anything in God as in potentiality for some further
perfection by the addition of something extraneous to Flim. What­
ever is conceived in God, must be conceived in Him as purest act.
Hence there is a minor virtual distinction between the divine
attributes, and between these and the divine essence. This means that
the distinction is not of the nature of excluding and excluded, but
of implicit and explicit. In other words, God’s nature as we conceive
it (the self-subsisting Being) contains the attributes more so than
virtually, more so than the genus contains the differences extrinsic
to it, for they are contained actually and implicitly in it; but dis« Ibid., q. 13, a.4, 5; I Sent., d.2, q. 1, a.3.
«3 Summa theol., la, q. 13, a.4.
44 Ibid., a. 1-5.
«’See Cajetan’s Commentary in lam, q.13, a.5, no. 7.

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THE ONE GOD

cursive reasoning is necessary for their explicit deduction from the
divine nature. But the Deity, as it is itself, contains them actually
and explicitly. Thus the blessed no longer need to have recourse to
discursive reasoning so as clearly to see God’s attributes in the
Deity. Hence all the attributes mutually include one another, or
each contains the others actually and implicitly.
Moreover, this minor virtual distinction properly applies only
to those attributes that are differentiated specifically and that per­
tain to different orders, as, for instance, between intellection and
volition, justice and mercy; but there is no such distinction between
attributes which, as found in creatures, differ only as potency and
act do, such as between essence and existence, intellect and in­
tellection. There is only an extrinsically virtual distinction between
these, which means that the foundation for this distinction is not
in the divine reality but in creatures. Otherwise it would have to
be said that our conception of God includes the presence of some­
thing potential in Him for which there is a foundation in the
divine reality. St. Thomas, as we have remarked, makes use of sim­
pler terminology, and says that the distinction between the at­
tributes and the Persons and the divine essence is “not real but
logical.” 40 Moderate realism and the doctrine of analogy are the
two fundamental reasons for this traditional opinion.
1) According to moderate realism, the universe exists funda­
mentally in things, and there is a foundation for this in them. Thus
in Peter there is a virtual distinction between rationality, animal­
ity, and entity. In like manner, there is a virtual distinction be­
tween God’s attributes.
2) Being is analogous, and is not a genus, for the differences of
being would be outside being, and what is outside being is a non­
entity. Nor is being equivocal, for this would mean the abolition
of all true resemblance between beings. God would be absolutely
unknowable, and it could be said of Him, as Nicholas of Autrecourt
contended, “God is” and “God is not.” 47 In fact, if being were
equivocal, the principle of contradiction would be false.48
Therefore the divine attributes apply to God analogically, and
are present in Him formally and eminently; but between the
attributes and between each of them and the divine essence there
is only a virtual distinction. Expressed more briefly: the attributes
are formally in God, but they are not formally distinct.
48 Summa theol., la, q.28, a.2.
Denz., no. 555.
48 Summa theol., la, q.13, a.5.

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171

The Simplicity of God

Prologue
Concerning God we must consider what He is and how He is, or
rather how He is not, for in this life we cannot know His essence,
since this would be to see the Deity? Hence we inquire how God is
not, by removing from Him what does not apply to Him, such as
composition and motion. Thus we must treat of God’s simplicity,
perfection, infinity, immutability, and unity. But we shall after­
ward see how God is known and named by us.
This question of God’s simplicity starts out by excluding from
Him what is known as physical composition, or of really distinct
parts. In the first four articles it is established: (1) that God is not
a body; (2) that He is not composed of matter and form; (3) nor of
nature and suppositum; (4) nor of essence and existence. Then what
is known as metaphysical composition, which consists of genus and
differentia, is excluded in the fifth article.
Finally, it is shown that there is no accident in God (a. 6), that
God is altogether simple (a. 7), and that He does not enter into the.
composition of other things, either as form or matter, since He is
the extrinsic cause, which means that He is the efficient and final
cause of all things (a. 8). In these last three articles we have the
refutation of pantheism, and they are the result of the conclusions
of what was established in the fourth article, namely, that only God
is the self-subsisting Being. This fourth article contains the domi­
nating principle of this question, that is, it is the terminus in the
ascending order by way of investigation, and the beginning in the
descending order by way of judgment, since wisdom judges of all
things by the highest of reasons.
first article

WHETHER GOD IS A BODY

State of the question. A body is defined as a substance that is
extended according to three dimensions. But Holy Scripture speaks
1 Wayfarers, as regards the Deity, since they have not the adequate concept of
this, but know it only in name, are like men who would have seen the seven
colors and never have seen whiteness; this latter they would know only in name,
and they would understand that by this name is implied the origin of colors.
Thus for wayfarers the Deity is the root of all divine perfections that are nat­
urally participable and knowable. The Deity is participable only by grace, and
the participation is physical, formal, and analogous.

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THE ONE GOD

metaphorically of God’s arm, right hand . . . , as pointed out in the
beginning of this article, and we must carefully distinguish between
the metaphorical and literal senses in Holy Scripture. Tertullian
did not sufficiently observe this distinction. But among philosophers
Spinoza, as a pantheist, maintains that extension is an attribute of
God, and he admits that it is infinite.
The reply, which is de fide, is as follows: God is a spirit and
therefore is not a body. Jesus said to the Samaritan woman: “God
is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and
truth.” 2 Similarly St. Paul says: “The invisible things of Him from
the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the
tilings that are made.” 3 Preaching to the Athenians, he said: “We
must not suppose the divinity to be like unto gold or silver or stone,
the graving of art and device of man.” 4*The Vatican Council says:
“The Holy Catholic Church believes that there is one true and
living God . . . absolutely simple and immutable spiritual sub­
stance.” 6
Three proofs from reason are given, that God is not a body. The
first proof discusses the body as a physical entity; in the second
proof the quantitative aspect is considered; in the third proof the
metaphysical element is stressed.
First proof. No body is in motion unless it is put in motion; but
God is the first unmoved Mover (first way); therefore God is not a
body. Against the major there is the difficulty of attraction, since
the magnet attracts other bodies to itself, although it is not itself
set in motion. In reply to this we say that, although the magnet has
this property of attraction, its action is not its own, its power to
act is not its action; for this it would have to be its own being,
because operation follows being, and the mode of operation the
mode of being. Therefore the magnet is moved invisibly by the first
Mover, at least as a qualitative motion. Moreover, as Cajetan ob­
serves, the magnet can also be moved locally, and every moving
body is moved at least as in potentiality for this, since it is by nature
apt to be moved, and this suffices to distinguish it from the ab­
solutely immobile first mover (this immobility not being that of
inertia but of perfection), which is the terminus of the first way in
proving God’s existence. Hence the major can be construed as mean­
ing: every body is mobile. But God is the first immobile Mover.
Therefore He is not a body.
Second proof. It considers rather the quantitative aspect in bodies,
2 John 4: 24.
» Rom. 1: 20.
4 Acts 17: 29.
» Denz., no. 1782.

GOD’S NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES

'73

inasmuch as the parts are continuous. Every body is in potentiality,
at least because the continuous is divisible to infinity. But God is
pure act and there is absolutely no potentiality in Him. Therefore
God is not a body.®
The minor is proved as follows: actuality is, absolutely speaking,
prior to potentiality, for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced
into actuality only by some being in actuality; but God is the first
Being, as established in the fourth way of proving God’s existence;
therefore God is pure Act.7 Every potentiality presupposes actuality,
for every being that is in potentiality expresses a relation to ac­
tuality and cannot be reduced into actuality except by a being that
is in act. Therefore the supreme Being is in no way in potentiality.
Third proof. It considers the metaphysical aspect in bodies. The
noblest of all beings cannot be a body; but God is the noblest of
all beings, as established in the fourth way of proving God’s exist­
ence; therefore God is not a body.
The major is proved by showing that corporeity is something in­
ferior. For a body is either living or non-living, and a living body
is nobler than a non-living body; thus the ant is, absolutely speak­
ing, nobler than a heavenly body. Moreover, the principle of life
in a living body is nobler than the body as such. To put it more
briefly, life is something nobler than corporeity, otherwise every
body would be a living body. Vegetative life and sensitive life come
from the specific form in the living body; this form, however, is not
a body, but vivifies the body.8 From this third argument, as also
from the other two, it is proved, indeed, that God is not a body;
but this does not as yet prove that God is not the form of a body,
so that Fie might be the soul of the world. This is proved, however,
in the following articles, especially in the eighth article.
In the reply to the objections, St. Thomas explains the metaphors
of Holy Scripture, when it speaks of the height or the depth of God
and of His knowledge.
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM

State of the question. According to St. Thomas, everything com­
posed of matter and form is a body, as he affirms in the counter® The major is explained by St. Thomas in his commentary on Aristotle’s
Physics, Bk. VI, chaps, i f., where he discusses especially the question of the
continuous.
7 This had already been clearly proved by Aristotle in his Metaphysics, Bk. XII,
chap. 7.
s Summa theol., la, q.75, a. 1.

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argument. But in Avicebron’s opinion there is a composite of
matter and form that is not a body, because this philosopher said
that even spiritual substances are composed of spiritual matter and
form. Perhaps he said this so as to explain their individuation, and
thus there could be several angels of the same species. Contrary to
this, St. Thomas is of the opinion that the only composition in
created spiritual substances is that of essence and existence, and of
substance and accident. Each of them is a subsistent and immaterial
form, and hence there cannot be two angels of the same species.
The conclusion of the article states the impossibility of matter
existing in God. The proofs for this are given by considering: (i)
matter in itself; (2) matter in its relation to its participated form;
(3) matter in its relation to the action of the first agent.
First proof. Matter is in potentiality. But God is pure act, as
stated in the preceding article, because He is the first being, the
maximum in being (fourth way). Therefore God is immaterial.
This article is expressed according to Aristotle’s terminology.
Second proof. Here Plato’s terminology concerning participation
is more in evidence. Everything composed of matter and form is a
participated good, or a participated form in matter; but God, in­
asmuch as He is the greatest good, is the essential good (fourth
way); therefore God is not composed of matter and form.
Third proof. It starts from the principle that God is primarily
and essentially an agent. Since the agent acts by its form, the
manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an
agent. But God, since He is the first agent (second way), is pri­
marily and essentially a form, but not composed of matter and
form.
The major is evident from the fact that the agent acts by its
form, that is, the form is the reason of its acting; for to act is to
determine, to actuate, and it is only by reason of its own determi­
nation that any being can determine. Thus fire heats and water
cools. Hence it is said that the agent acts inasmuch as it is in act,
and it is in act by means of its form, primarily by its substantial
form from which the natural qualities originate.
Minor. God, being the first agent, is primarily and essentially
an agent, which means that He is not moved by some higher power,
but is of Himself essentially and immediately operative, just as the
triangle of itself and immediately (or essentially and primarily) has
three angles equal to two right angles. But this is a necessary prop­
erty of the triangle, whereas God, as we shall see farther on,0 is free
in His external operations.
There arises a difficulty from this third argument. It seems that
» Ibid., q.19, a.3.

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we can conclude only that God has essentially and primarily a form
that is the reason of His action, but not that He is essentially and
primarily a form. There is considerable difference between the verb
"to be” and the verb “to have.” Thus fire essentially and primarily
generates heat, because it has essentially and primarily heat, but it
is not heat.
In reply to this we say with Cajetan: It can truly be concluded
that God is primarily and essentially a form, because He is pri­
marily and essentially an agent, and not dependent upon any other
being. For if God were an agent who, by reason of His form, con­
stituted a part of a composite, He would not be primarily and
essentially an agent; for action in this sense could be attributed to
all that participate in such a form. Thus fire is not, strictly speak­
ing, essentially and primarily generative of heat, because it is not
heat, but participates in heat. If fire were unreceived heat, then,
just as in the case of unreceived or subsistent heat, it would be
unique of its kind. Hence St. Thomas’ argument holds good. From
the fact that God is primarily and essentially an agent, it follows
that He is primarily and essentially a form not received in matter.
This is also evident, as was said, from the fact that God is pure act
and essential good. Thus God is pure spirit.
In the replies to the objections St. Thomas explains the meta­
phorical use of terms in Floly Scripture, when discussing the
questions of a soul and of anger in God. It is said in the reply to
tiie third objection: “The form which cannot be received in matter,
is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject.”
Hence God is an unreceived and unreceptive form. We shall see
in the fourth article that God is also the unreceived and unreceptive
being, and in the sixth article that He is the unreceived being be­
cause Fie cannot be the recipient of accidents. Thus what is meant
by participation and unparticipated being is made increasingly
clear, and we already find this vaguely presented to us in the
writings of Plato.
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD IS THE SAME AS HIS ESSENCE OR NATURE

State of the question. It is asked whether there is composition of
suppositum and nature in God. In the order of created things the
suppositum is the complete subsisting being, of which the nature is
the essential part. Thus the suppositum is really distinct from the
nature, as the whole is from its principal part. Thus man is not his
humanity (as stated in the second objection), but has humanity.
The question is therefore, whether God is His Deity or has Deity.

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THE ONE GOD

Thus it becomes increasingly evident that there is a difference be­
tween the verb "to be’’ and the verb "to have.” By this name “God”
in the concrete sense, St. Thomas understands that which is, namely,
suppositum or the Godhead as it connotes the individual, whether
this word is previously taken to mean that He consists of three
Persons or is one of the three Persons. This point is at present
undetermined.
Reply. God is the same as His essence or nature. In other words,
God is His Godhead and not only has the Godhead.
1) There is evidence of this on the authority of Holy Scripture,
and it is a revealed truth, since Jesus said: "I am the way, and the
truth, and the life.” 10 He did not say: “I have truth and life,” or
merely: "I am true or truthful and living,” but “I am the truth and
the life.” So that underlying the logical difference between subject
and predicate, the verb “is” expresses real identity between them.
Just as life, however, refers to the living being, so the Godhead refers
to God. Hence God is His Godhead whereas, on the contrary, man is
not His humanity, because the whole is not its part, but has its part,
a point that will be more clearly explained in the body of the
article.
In like manner, "God is charity,” 11 and not only has charity.
Contrary to this, the just, whether angels or men, have charity and
are not charity. It must be observed that the Council of Reims
defined against Gilbert de la Porrée, who denied that abstract terms
can be predicated of God in the concrete: “We believe and confess
that the simple nature of the Divinity is God, nor can it be denied
in any Catholic sense that the Divinity is God and God is the
Divinity.” 12
2) Proof from reason. In corporeal things nature differs from
suppositum, just as the essential part differs from the whole, for
besides the essential part there are the individualizing principles,
for example, these bones and this flesh. But God is not corporeal,
or composed of matter and form, but is a pure subsistent form (pre­
ceding article). And thus in God nature does not differ from sup­
positum. In other words, the suppositum is the subsistent form
itself of the Godhead.
This proof rests upon the principle that, if affirmation is the
cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation. But the affir­
mation that nature is a part of the suppositum, is the foundation
for the aforesaid distinction. Therefore to deny that nature is a
10 John 14: 6.
“ I John 4: 8.
W Denz., no. 389.

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part of the suppositum, is to deny the aforesaid distinction. This
argument is of validity provided it is properly understood.13
A difficulty, however, presents itself, since it seems to follow
from this that, since the archangel Michael is a pure subsistent
form apart from matter, he is his Michaelness. But this is false, for
Michaelness is only an essential part of Michael, who in addition
to this has existence and accidents.
In reply to this we say that, from the very fact that God is a pure
form without matter, St. Thomas excludes from Him in this article
individuating principles that are distinct from the common nature.
In the angel, too, there are no individuating principles distinct
from the nature.
But in the present article St. Thomas is not yet explicitly con­
sidering the fact that in God there is no composition of either
essence and existence, or of substance and accident. This he will do
in the fourth and sixth articles, in which it will be more clearly seen
that God is His Godhead, because the Godhead in God is not solely
an essential part, whereas, on the other hand, Michaelness is but an
essential part in Michael, who is also a contingent being with the
accidents of intellect and will. Hence Cajetan says in reference to
this article: "Although this process of argumentation taken by itself
can be criticized, yet when taken in conjunction with the doctrine
of the subsequent articles it was found to be irreproachable, be­
cause the subsequent articles of this question exclude all compo­
sition.” 14 Hence, to bring out more clearly the force of this argu­
ment, it may be expressed by the following syllogism: Where nature
is not a part of the suppositum they do not differ; but in God
nature is not a part of the suppositum; therefore in God nature and
suppositum do not differ. The major is explicitly enunciated by
St. Thomas in several places.16
Proof of minor. Since God is pure form, there are no individu­
ating principles in addition to His nature. In fact, His existence is
13 Summa theol., Illa, q.2, a.2: q.4, a. 2.
14 Com. in Summam theol., Illa, q.4, a.2.
is Thus St. Thomas says in his Quodl. II, a.4, “Whether suppositum and nature
are identical in the angel”: § 4, "To whatever being anything can accrue that
does not belong to the concept of its nature, in that being suppositum and nature
differ. ... It is only in God that His essence excludes the presence of anything
accidental, because His existence is His essence. Therefore suppositum and nature
are absolutely the same in God. In the case of an angel, however, these are not
absolutely the same, because there accrues to an angel something that does not
belong to the species as such, for an angel’s essence or nature does not include
existence, and there are certain other accidental notes in an angel (contingent
thoughts and volitions), and these do not belong to the nature but to the sup­
positum."

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THE ONE GOD

identical with His nature, nor is there such distinction as that be­
tween accidents and nature. Thus God and the Godhead are abso­
lutely identical whereas, on the contrary, Peter is not his humanity,
nor also, strictly speaking, is Michael his Michaelness.
But if God is His Godhead, then why the use of the concrete
noun God and the abstract noun Godhead? The reply to the first
objection solves this difficulty by saying: “We can speak of simple
things only as though they were like the composite things from
which we derive our knowledge.” But the composite is the sub­
sistent concrete thing, and its nature is spoken of in the abstract,
as its essential part.
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE ARE THE SAME IN GOD

State of the question. This article, as we already pointed out, is
the terminus in the ascending order by way of finding, of the five
proofs for God’s existence, and it is also the principle in the de­
scending order by way of judgment, by which wisdom judges of all
things by the highest of reasons and causes. We shall at once see
that what St. Thomas says in this article is already a refutation of
pantheism, since he gives us the reason why God is really and
essentially distinct from every finite being.
But it must be well understood what is meant by existence, so as
to distinguish the divine existence from existence as applied to vari­
ous other things. The first objection of this article refers to this
difficulty. The second objection, however, is as follows: We can
know whether God exists, but we can cannot know what He is (at
least know Him quiddatively). Therefore His essence is not exist­
ence.16
Reply. God and God alone is His existence, or in God alone are
essence and existence identical.
There is at least a veiled reference to this in the Scripture, for
we read: "God said to Moses: I am who am. . . . Thus shalt thou
say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you.” 17
This constitutes God’s proper name. Creatures, however, have
existence, and cannot be so named. Therefore from this it is inti­
mated that God not only has existence but is existence, that He is
His own existence.
Also truth and being are convertible terms. But Christ said: “I
am the truth,” and not merely: “I have truth.” Therefore this sup1» Concerning this article, cf. Norbert del Prado, O.P., De veritate fundamentali
philosophiae Christianae, p. 89; also pp. 20, 60.
17 Ex. 3: 14.

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poses that He is essential being. But being derives its name from
existence, because being is that which exists or can exist, whose act
is existence. Similarly, St. Hilary, who is quoted in the counter­
argument, says: “In Gpd existence is not an accidental quality, but
subsisting truth.” 18 This does not mean that existence is properly
an accident of created substance, but that it is predicated contin­
gently of the creature, though not so of God.
St. Thomas replies in the body of the article by advancing three
proofs from reason for his conclusion. In the first he proves that
God is the first efficient cause (first and second ways); in the second,
that He is pure act (third and fourth ways); in the third, that He is
the first being. Thus we can truly say that in this article we have
the one end expressed to which the five proofs for God’s existence
by the ascending process of reasoning converge.
First proof. Essence and existence are the same in the first un­
caused cause. But God is the first uncaused cause (second way).
Therefore essence and existence are the same in God. The minor
presents no difficulty, and it is the terminus of the second proof for
God’s existence.
The major is proved as follows: Whatever a thing has besides its
essence must be caused either by the essential principles or by some
exterior agent; but in the first uncaused cause, existence is not
caused either by any other cause or by the essential principles of
the thing, because “no thing is its own cause,” since operation
follows being; therefore existence is not something besides essence
in the first uncaused cause, but is identical with it.
It cannot be said that God is cause of Himself, because to cause
is to operate, and operation follows being. But it can be said that
God’s essence is the reason of His existence, inasmuch as He exists
of Himself, is of Himself the reason for His existence. Thus this
proposition, God exists, as stated above,19 is self-evident in itself,
but not to us.
Corollary. Father N. del Prado rightly infers against Suarez that
in all other efficient causes existence differs from essence. He says:
"It belongs therefore to the nature of the first efficient cause that
its essence and existence is one and the same, since the first efficient
cause must of necessity have its existence uncaused; and it is of the
essence of uncaused existence in a being that this is identical with
its nature, which exists without being caused. Therefore ... it
must be inferred that in all other efficient causes existence differs
from essence. Otherwise there would be no secondary efficient
causes, and before we could establish God’s existence by means of
is De Trinitate, Bk. VII, chap. 1.
is Summa theol., la, q.a, a. 1.

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THE ONE GOD

efficient cause we should also have to find out what properly be­
longs to an uncaused cause, namely, identity of essence and
existence.” 20
Thus this first argument serves a double purpose: (i) It points out
the terminus of the first, second, and third proofs for God’s exist­
ence, namely, of first unmoved Mover, of first uncaused Cause, and
of the first necessary Being who is His own existence, or of the
self-subsisting Being. (2) It assigns the ultimate reason for the dis­
tinction between caused or created being and the uncreated Being,
as also between contingent being and the necessary Being. Contin­
gent being is a potentiality to be or not to be, because it is not its
own existence, but, if it exists, has existence. There is a vast differ­
ence between the verbs "to be” and "to have.” Hence it is said that
“the powers tremble” with reverential fear in seeing the self­
subsisting Being, because the angels are not their own existence,
but only have existence, and they could be annihilated by God’s
absolute power.
Second proof. It has its foundation in the principle that God is
pure act, and is as follows: Existence is compared to essence, which
is a distinct reality from it, as actuality to potentiality; but God is
pure act, in whom there is no potentiality; therefore God’s essence
is not potentiality for existence, but is identical with existence. The
major is the very definition of esse or existence. It is that which
makes every form or nature actual. Thus humanity is not spoken
of as actual except so far as it is spoken of as existing.
The minor was proved in the first article of this question. The
reason given was that, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to
potentiality, since a being is said to be in potentiality with refer­
ence to its actuality, and is not reduced into actuality except by
some being in actuality. But God is the first Being (fourth way).
Therefore nothing of potentiality is in Him, but He is pure act.
This is also evident from the fact that God is the first Mover, the
first Cause, the first necessary Being. God must be His action, and
hence His own existence, because operation follows existence, and
the mode of operation the mode of existence. This argument points
out the one end to which these three proofs for God’s existence
converge.
Corollary. Therefore in everything that is caused by God, essence
is potentiality with reference to existence, and hence is really dis­
tinct from it, just as matter is from form. Before the consideration
of our mind, matter is not form, but is potency that is made actual
by its form, and hence is really distinct from it. In like manner,
the essence of a caused thing is not its existence, previous to the
20 Del Prado, op. cit., p. 320.

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181

mind’s consideration o£ this. In other words, it is not identical with
its existence, but is distinct from it previous to the mind’s con­
sideration. Therefore this distinction, however slight it may appear,
is real. The angel, knowing its own essence directly, sees this to be
distinct from its existence. From this it is already apparent that
there can be only one essence that is existence itself, for multi­
plication presupposes participation. Thus participated existence is
manifold, as the existence of a stone, of a plant, of an animal, of
a man.
Third proof. It is derived from the principle that God is the first
Being (fourth way). That which is essential being is its own exist­
ence; but God is essential being, since He is the first being; there­
fore God is His own existence.
The minor presents no difficulty, for it is the terminus of the
fourth way in proving God’s existence. The major is declared as
follows: “That which has existence, but is not existence, is a being
by participation,” just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire,
as a coal fire, is on fire by participation. Therefore, “that a thing
be essential being, it must be its own existence.”
We have in this argument a transcendent confirmation of the
principle of efficient causality. This principle, which is invoked in
proving God’s existence, is thus formulated: Some other being is the
efficient cause of every contingent being. It is commonly held among
the Scholastics that an uncaused contingent being is a contradiction
in terms, that is, it is something not only unintelligible (which
Kant admits), but is also an absurdity and an absolute impossibility,
as for instance, that Lucifer originates from nothing, without any
efficient cause.
However, an "uncaused contingent being” is not so clearly repug­
nant to reason as a “caused non-contingent being”; to say that it is
uncaused is not a direct denial of the definition of contingent being,
but of its property. “The uncaused contingent being” would be
neither self-existent nor dependent on another for existence, and the
proposition, “the uncaused contingent being exists,” would be the
affirmation of the positive agreement between two terms that in no
way agree. Hence what exists, but is not self-existent, depends on
another for its existence.
But now it is said that the contingent being has existence and
is not its existence. Therefore it is participated being, and hence it
depends on the essential Being. The idea of participated being,
however, is not completely intelligible apart from the correlative
idea of essential Being. Therefore it is better to use this term after
and not before the proofs for God’s existence. Plato, indeed, prac­
tically started out with this notion of being but, on account of his

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THE ONE GOD

extreme realism, he thought he had a certain intuition of the
supreme Good, or of God.
St. Thomas, in accordance with moderate realism, makes use of
this notion of participated being preferably after the proofs of
God’s existence. Then the principle of causality receives its con­
firmation as from a transcendent source, since participated being
is shown to be dependent on essential being, or being composed of
potency and act on pure act.
Corollary. Father del Prado 21 concludes from this argument that
the division of real being into essential being and participated
being has its root in the distinction between the self-subsisting Being
and that which is composed of essence and existence.
In this distinction we have the foundation for the refutation of
pantheism. For if God is the self-subsisting Being, then nothing can
be added to His being,22 because He is ultimate actuality. Hence
there can be no accident in God,23 because the self-subsisting Being
is not capable of further determination, but is the maximum in
determination, although not limited, for limitation is on the part
of matter that receives the form, or of essence that receives exist­
ence. From this we have the refutation of absolute evolutionism,
according to which God is becoming in the world, and of Spinoza
according to whom God is the recipient of finite modes that are,
as it were, His accidents. Neoplatonic emanatism is likewise vir­
tually refuted. This theory states that the soul is not made, not
created out of nothing, but is “of God's substance,” generated, as
it were, from God. St. Thomas says in contradiction to this: “The
soul is not its own existence, but is a being by participation. There­
fore it is not a pure act like God.” 24 Hence it is not the same as
God's nature, and therefore is not generated from Him, is not of
His substance, because generation is the origin of a living being
from a living principle in the likeness of nature.25 Thus man gener­
ates man, and as stated in revelation, God the Father gener­
ates the Son in the likeness of His nature, communicating to Him
even the whole of His indivisible nature, which cannot be multi­
plied.
Thus we readily see from this that pantheism, by confusing God
with the creature, must end either in the absorption of the world in
God, as in the acosmism of Parmenides, or else in the absorption of
21 op. cit., p. 329.
22 Summa theol., la, q.3, a. 4 ad turn.
23 Ibid., a.6.
2« Ibid., q.90, a. i ad 211m.
20 Ibid., q.27, a. 2.

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God in the world, as in the absolute evolutionism of Heraclitus and
of several modern philosophers.
There are other corollaries to which Father del Prado alludes,28
such as that the real distinction between created essence and exist­
ence is the foundation of the division of real created being accord­
ing to the various grades of perfection, for the formal concept of
existence does not denote either imperfection or limitations, and
it is not susceptible to divers limitations in the stone, the plant,
the animal, and man, unless it is received in some subject, namely,
in some essence which is capable of existing, or in which there is a
real capacity for existence, just as in matter there is a real capacity
for its form, which is received in it and thus limited by it. Hence
the various grades of being or of perfection are the result of the
diversity of participation in being. Thus the fourth way of proving
God’s existence is illustrated from a transcendent source, namely,
from the grades of being.
Finally, in accordance with this doctrine of a real distinction be­
tween created essence and existence, which Suarez rashly rejected,
St. Thomas admits one existence for the composite of matter and
form, although the essence is composite, that is, the parts of the
essence (matter and form) have not partial existences. Thus the
unity of the natural composite is much better safeguarded. There
is one existence even in the human composite; and the soul, which
is essentially subsistent and immortal, will again communicate its
existence to the reassumed body on the resurrection day. Moreover,
as St. Thomas teaches, there is one existence for the two natures in
Christ, which is the divine existence.27 All these things presuppose
that created essence is really distinct from its existence. And this
is the corollary of the conclusion of this article, namely, that only
in God are essence and existence identical.
Hence this truth is rightly termed by Father del Prado 28 the fun­
damental truth of Christian philosophy, fundamental indeed, not
by way of investigation (which starts from facts attested by ex­
perience and the first principles of reason), but by way of judgment,
by which wisdom judges of all things from the highest reason and
cause.
Father del Prado expressly says: “This is the primary funda­
mental truth of Christian philosophy, not by way of investigation
by which the mind ascends from creatures to God . . . but by way
of judgment, since we decide about those things and resolve the
ze Loc. cit.
2T Summa theol., Illa, q.17, a.a.
2» Loc. cit.

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truth of our knowledge into its ultimate causes, and we seek for
the ultimate reason why there must be only one unrelated absolute
immutable being that is endowed with every perfection, and why
all other beings except this one have received and must receive
both what they have and desire to have, because of their absolute
dependence on the first Being from whom, through whom, and in
whom are all things.” 29
Thus it is apparent why the proper name of God is “Who is” or
“I am who am,” and why God said to St. Catherine of Siena: “I am
who am; thou art who art not,” because, as St. Augustine says,
creatures in comparison to God are as if they did not exist. For
after creation, although there are more beings, there is not more
of being or more of perfection.
Hence with good reason Father del Prado says: “All those things
that are set forth by St. Thomas in his first consideration of the
one God are contained fundamentally, virtually, and as to their
beginnings, in the third article of the second question, and the sub­
sequent questions are but explanations of those five ways by which
God’s existence can be proved. And the golden key of entrance in
the explanation of these proofs is presented by St. Thomas in the
fourth article of the third question, where he gives many reasons
why it is impossible for God’s existence to differ from His essence.
In this we have the secret for finding out not what constitutes but
rather what does not constitute the nature of the one who is the
mover, the causer, the necessary in being, the maximum in being
and in intelligence. In this we have the scientific foundation of the
whole treatise on the one God. This constitutes the cornerstone
of all subsequent statements, namely, the identity of essence and
existence in God,” 30 and in God alone.
CONFIRMATION OF THE THESIS FROM THE
SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS

Reply to the first objection. The divine being is being to which
nothing can be added, because being is the ultimate actuality of
essence, and therefore divine being is neither received nor receiva­
ble, but is irreceptive, and is not in potentiality to further actuality;
wherefore, as stated in the sixth article, there can be no superaddi­
tion of any accident in God. In fact, it is only in an improper sense
that addition can be attributed to God in His external operations
by way of causality and creation. For after creation, although there
are more beings, there is not more of being, of perfection, because
29 Ibid., p. 372.
•0 Ibid., p. 469.

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185

God already possesses unlimited being and perfection. Contrary to
this, universal being is that to which something can be added, as
in the determination of the genus and the species, or in the modi­
fications of being, and these are contained actually and implicitly
in being.
Reply to the second objection. From the fact that we know a
posteriori that God is, we do not, however, know that God’s exist­
ence is His essence; but from the effects we know that this proposi­
tion is true, when we say: “God is.” In creatures, “to be” concerns
in itself only the question of the existence, not of the quiddity, of
a being. In God, “to be” concerns also, and even in the strict sense,
the question of His quiddity, for God alone is the self-subsisting
Being, and what this self-subsisting Being is in Himself, this we
shall see only in heaven, because, as stated farther on, in this life
we know God only by means of His effects, from the concepts de­
rived from creatures, and “every effect which is not an adequate
result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of
the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short.” 31
This existence in creatures is a contingent, but in God an essential,
predicate, which is not really distinct from God's essence that is
unknown to us. Hence in this life we know God’s essence not as
it is in itself, but as it is the foundation for the truth of the proposi­
tion known from effects, namely, “God is.”
Doubt. Has St. Thomas clearly deduced the corollary of this
article, namely, that in every creature its essence differs from its
existence? He explains this at length in another of his works (Con­
tra Gentes), where he says: “Now being, as being, cannot be
diverse, but it can be differentiated by something besides being:
thus the being of a stone is other than the being of a man. Hence
that which is subsistent being can be one only. Now it was shown
above (Bk. I, chaps. 22, 42) that God is His own subsistent being:
therefore nothing besides Him can be its own being. Therefore in
every substance, besides Him, the substance itself must be distinct
from its being.” 32 Likewise in every creature, what is (or the sup­
positum) and existence are different.
Father del Prado33 proposes this fundamental argument in the
deduction of the above corollary as follows: Act is multiplied and
limited by the really distinct potency in which it is received; but
in creatures existence is multiplied and limited by the essences of
different creatures; therefore in creatures essence is potency, or
ai Summa theol., la, q. 13, a.5.
82 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 52; see also Summa theol., la, q.7, a.i; q.54, a.2;
De ente et essentia, chap. 5.
83 Op. cit., p. 26.

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real capacity, which is really distinct from existence, just as matter
is real capacity for the form, and really distinct from the form. In
other words, previous to the mind’s consideration, essence and
existence are not identical in creatures, just as matter is not form.
The major is explained by stating that the division of being into
potency and act is absolutely necessary for the understanding of
change and multiplicity, as Aristotle shows34 in solving the argu­
ments of Parmenides against change and multiplicity in beings, by
appealing to the real distinction between potency and act. Being
does not come from what is already being, just as a statue does
not come from a statue, for it is already such. Nothing comes from
nothing. But being comes from potential being, just as the statue
can be sculptured from the wood, and just as the plant is developed
from the seed.
In like manner, the act of existence cannot be multiplied or
limited by itself, because in its formal concept it implies no limita­
tion. Therefore it can be limited and multiplied only by the real
capacity in which it is received, that is, by the essence which is
capable of existing, for instance, by the essence of either stone,
plant, animal, or man. Thus the form is limited and multiplied
by the matter, which is the principle of individuation; thus in­
tellection is limited and multiplied according to the various intel­
lectual capacities of human beings, and so forth.
Thus by means of the distinction between potency and act we
have not only the reconciliation of the principle of identity or of
contradiction, a principle to which Parmenides always appealed,
but also change and multiplicity, which Heraclitus defended. In
other words, it is only in this way that the first principle of reason
is reconciled with the most certain facts of experience. But because
there is a certain lack of identity in change and multiplicity, in
virtue of the principles of identity and causality our mind of neces­
sity soars to the first Cause who is absolutely identical with Him­
self, who is to being as A is to A, and in whom there can be
neither change nor composition, but who is absolutely simple. This
point will be made still clearer in the subsequent articles.
FIFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD IS CONTAINED IN A GENUS

State of the question. By genus, in the strict sense, is meant the
logical genus. Thus, according to Aristotle, there are ten genera or
categories, namely, substance, quantity, quality . . . and under the
»< Physics, Bk. I.

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187

supreme genus come the less universal genera ranging down to the
proximate genus, and this latter is expressed together with the
specific difference in a definition, for instance, by the words rational
animal, by which man is defined.
The principal difficulty is that God seems to come at least under
the genus of substance, because substance is a being that subsists
of itself, and we speak of the divine substance. But, on the other
hand, it is generally admitted that God transcends the genera and
species. But it may be asked whether God is at least reducible to
the genus of substance, as habitual grace is to the genus of quality,
or as the point is to the genus of quantity, as the terminus of the
line.
Conclusion. God is not in any genus either directly or as reduci­
ble to it.
It is proved in many ways that God does not come directly under
any genus, and this first of all in the counterargument from general
notions. For genus is prior in the mind to what it contains. But
nothing is prior to God either really (because He is the first Being),
or mentally, because He is the self-subsisting Being, and all formal
concepts, such as those of substance, quality, presuppose being
whose act is to exist. Yet for us there is something prior to God,
namely, being in general.
In the body of the article three proofs are given why God is not
directly in any genus. The first is founded on the notion of genus,
the second on the notion of being, and the third on the identity of
essence and existence in God.
1) On the notion of genus. Genus takes the place of potency,
whereas specific difference takes the place of act. But God is pure
act. Therefore God is not in a genus.
The minor has been proved. The major needs explanation.
Genus is not indeed matter; but it is to the specific difference as
matter is to form. For just as the matter is determined by the form,
so the genus is determined by the specific difference. Thus, for in­
stance, the genus animality is determined by rationability; for
animality is derived from the material body endowed with sensi­
tive life, and rationability is derived from the rational soul. Hence
no being is in a genus unless there is really something potential in
it, something susceptible of further determination. The genus is
in potentiality for the differences by which it is determined.
2) On the notion of being. Being cannot be a genus, but tran­
scends the genera. But if God were in a genus, then being would
be His genus. Therefore God is not a genus.
The major is proved by Aristotle.35 For the genus is diversified
35 Met., Bk. HI, chap. 3.

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THE ONE GOD

by the differences that are extrinsic to it, for instance, animality by
rationality. But being cannot be diversified by differences that are
extrinsic to it, for what is not being is nothing. Whereas rationality
is not animality, substantiality still is being, and the same is true
of vitality and other notes. Whereas tire genus contains only vir­
tually the differences extrinsic to it and is not contained in them,
being contains actually and implicitly the modes of being and is
contained in them. Therefore being is transcendent, or transcends
the genera or the categories of being, and hence is analogous. It
signifies in the different categories something that is proportion­
ately alike, namely, that whose act is to exist. But the existence of
substance is existence not in another, whereas the existence of
accidence is inexistence or existence in another. Hence being is
not a genus.
The minor. If God were in a genus, being would be His genus,
because God is essential being, since He is His existence. Manifestly,
if God were in a genus, His genus would have to be most universal
and unlimited being.
3) On the identity of essence and existence in God. Essence and
existence differ in all things that are in a genus. But essence does
not differ from existence in God. Therefore God is not in a genus.
Cajetan given us the following explanation of the major: “When
St. Thomas says that 'all in a genus differ in existence,’ ‘esse’ is
taken both for specific existence (specific difference) and for actual
existence; and from the verification of one is inferred the verifica­
tion of the other’’; for those things that differ in species differ also
in existence, because specific (and individual) existences are the
proper recipients of the act of existence. Hence from the fact that
God is His existence, He is above all the genera. This proves that
God is not at least directly in a genus.
Corollary. God cannot be defined by genus and differentia.
In the last part of the body of the article it is proved that God
is not in any genus as reducible to it. For “a principle reducible
to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as a point is the
principle only of continuous quantity; and unity, of discontinuous
quantity. But God is the principle of all being” and of all the
genera of being. Likewise habitual grace, which is reduced to the
genus of a quality, is not in the other genera. The solution of the ob­
jections confirms this.
Reply to the first objection. God is not in the genus of substance,
because the word “substance” does not signify the self-subsisting
Being, but an essence that has the property of existing in itself
and not in another. Now existence is predicated contingently of
every substance, for the substance of a stone, plant, animal, man,

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189

or angel exists contingently. Spinoza refuses to give this considera­
tion, defining substance as being that exists of itself, in this sense,
that existence is not a contingent but an essential predicate of sub­
stance. It follows from this that there can be only one substance.
Reply to second objection. If God is said to be the measure of
things, He is not the homogeneous measure, as unity is the principle
of number, but He is the heterogeneous measure since everything
has being only according as it resembles God, who is the maximum
in being (fourth way).
Thus it is evident that God is not in a genus, and this is com­
monly admitted, even by Scotus, although he holds that being is
univocal. We shall comment on this farther on.36
SIXTH ARTICLE
WHETHER IN GOD THERE ARE ANY ACCIDENTS

State of the question. Composition of substance and accident is
excluded from the exposition of God’s simplicity. We are here
concerned with accident as a predicament, the existence of which
is to exist in another, whether this accident is necessary as a prop­
erty as, for instance, the intellective faculty in our soul, whether
this accident is contingent, as this man who happens to know
geometry. The difficulty here is because wisdom and virtue, which
are accidents in us, are attributed to God.
Conclusion. There cannot be any accident in God.
For this conclusion three proofs are given, based on the fact
that God is (1) pure act, (2) the self-subsisting Being, (3) the first
Being.
1) A subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actu­
ality by which it is perfected; but God is pure act;37 therefore there
cannot be any accident in God.
The major is evident; for the subject is determined and perfected
by a positive accident, for instance, the soul by faculties and habits.
But God is pure act and therefore is not in potentiality for any
further actuality. He is not determinable but is supremely deter­
mined.
2) Being that is absolute and unreceived cannot have anything
superadded to it; but God is the absolute and unreceived being;
therefore God cannot have any accident superadded to Him.
Cajetan explains the major by pointing out that what is not re­
ceived cannot have anything else superadded to it without res« Summa theol., la, 9.13, a.5.
s’ Ibid., q.2, a.3.

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THE ONE GOD

ceiving. But absolute being cannot recede or be determined,
because it is the ultimate actuality of a thing. Therefore unreceived
being cannot have anything superadded to it, and so is at the same
time incapable of receiving anything.
Contrary to this, therefore, it must be said that if, as we see in
creatures, being has an accident superadded to it, for instance,
operation, then this is not unreceived being, but is received in the
essence, which is potency in relation to being; and this essence or
substance is capable of further determination by the faculties and
operations. Hence created essence can be determined in two ways,
namely, by the act of existence and by the faculties and operations.
On the other hand, God is the self-subsisting Being and is there­
fore incapable of further determination.
3) What is essential is prior to what is accidental, and accident
is what comes after; but God is the absolute primal being, and in
Him there cannot be anything that comes after, whether this be
caused or derived; therefore nothing accidental can be in God.
In the reply to the first objection it is stated that virtue and wis­
dom, which are accidents in us, are not so in God, because they
are predicated only analogically of Him.38 Indeed, as we shall see,
God is not in potentiality, either as to the act of understanding, or
as to that of loving, but is self-subsisting intelligence and essential
love. We already have some evidence of this inasmuch as God is
pure act.39
Corollary. This article gives us a complete refutation of panthe­
ism, for pantheism, willingly or unwillingly, must posit accidents
in God. Thus Spinoza posited in God not only necessary attributes
(which are, according to his theory, thought and infinite extension),
but he also posited finite modes of thought and extension, these
being successively produced in the world from eternity. But Spinoza
never succeeded in deducing these finite modes from the divine
substance, and he did not refute the doctrine of St. Thomas in the
present article, in which it is shown that there can be no accident
in God, since God is incapable of further determination. Likewise
it follows from this that God cannot be “creative evolution,’’ which
is always capable of further determination and perfection. Creative
evolution cannot be to being, as A is to A. Only the true God is
the self-subsisting Being, and for this very reason He absolutely
transcends the composite and changeable world.
Difficulty. We shall have the completion of this doctrine in a sub­
sequent article,40 in which it will be shown that God’s free act of
se Ibid., q. 13, a.5.
Ibid., q.2, a.3.
<° Ibid., q. 19, a.3.

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191

creation, although it would be possible for Him not to act, is not
an accident. Free will in God is not as in us a faculty that must be
perfected by act, but it is self-subsisting will, by which the divine
good is necessarily loved, and creatable good not necessarily so. In
other words, God’s liberty is the dominating indifference, not of a
faculty in need of perfection, but of pure act itself. Thus it is said
of Him:

“God, powerful sustainer of all things,
Thou who dost remain permanently unmoved,
Determining the course of time,
By the successions of the light of day.”
SEVENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER COD IS ALTOGETHER SIMPLE

State of the question. This article is a recapitulation and syn­
thesis, as it were, of the preceding articles.
The difficulty is that creatures are but images of God, and among
created things the composite are better than the simple, as chemi­
cal compounds are better than simple elements, plants than stones,
and animals than plants. The higher organisms are more complex.
The same is to be said of sciences that have acquired their final
development.
The reply is, however, that God is absolutely simple. It is of
faith, and is thus enunciated by the Vatican Council: “God, as be­
ing one, sole, absolutely simple and immutable spiritual substance,
is to be declared as really and essentially distinct from the world
(which is composite and changeable).” 41
In the body of the article many proofs from reason are given
for this conclusion. They have their foundation in the doctrine of
the preceding articles, which is here recapitulated, and in the
truths that God is the first Being, the first Cause, pure Act, and
the self-subsisting Being.
1) From the very start, composition of many kinds is excluded,
such as that of quantitative parts, of matter and form, of supposi­
tum and nature, of essence and existence, of genus and differentia,
of substance and accident. This means the exclusion of all composi­
tion, both physical and metaphysical.
2) Every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is
dependent on them; but God is the first Being;42 therefore He is
absolutely simple.
«1 Denz., no. 1782.
«Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3.

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THE ONE GOD

To understand the major we must note that every composite is
posterior to its component parts, at least by a posteriority of nature
if not of time, for the composite results from the parts, and is de­
pendent on them. Thus man results from matter and form, from
body and soul. But God is the first Being according to priority not
only of duration, but of nature and dignity, so that there is nothing
in God that is caused or dependent, or that is resulting. Therefore
He is absolutely simple.
3) Every composite has a cause; but God is the first uncaused
cause; therefore in God there is no composition.
The major is explained by St. Thomas as follows: “Things in
themselves different do not unite unless something causes them to
unite”; or the uncaused union of different things is impossible. This
principle is implicitly contained, as we have said, in the fourth
way of proving God’s existence, which starts in the ascending order
from a consideration of diverse and imperfect composites to es­
tablish the existence of the maximum and uncaused in being. Ex­
pressed more briefly: things in themselves different, do not in them­
selves unite.
In another of his works, St. Thomas thus explains this principle:
“A diversity of causes produces a diversity of effects.” 43 In like
manner he writes: “Whatever a thing may fittingly have, if it does
not originate from its nature, accrues to it from an extrinsic cause;
for what has no cause is first and immediate.” 44 This means that
what has no cause is to existence as A is to A; it not only has exist­
ence, but is identical with its existence, in virtue of the principle
of identity: being is being, not-being is not-being. This principle
is absolutely verified, without any lack of identity, only in the one
who can say: “I am who am.” 45 More briefly: the uncaused being
has not existence, but is its existence.
4) In every composite there must be potentiality and actuality;
but God is pure act; therefore God is in no way composite.
The major is evident, whether the reference is to essential and
natural unity, or to accidental unity. If it is a question of essential
unity, as in the human composite, then one part, matter, is in
potentiality as regards the other. If it is a question of accidental
unity, as in the proposition, the man is a musician, then the sub­
ject is to its accident as potentiality is to actuality.
5) In every composite there is something which is not it itself,
or which is not predicated of it first. Thus the parts are distin­
guished from the whole. But since God is pure form, in fact the
<» De pot., q.3, a.5 (2a ratio).
« Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 15, § 2.
*· Ex. 3: 14.

GOD’S NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES

’93

self-subsisting Being, there is not anything that is not predicated
of Him first, for this latter would be less perfect than the self­
subsisting Being, and therefore cannot be in God.
In other words, whereas no part of man is man, whatever is in
God is God. Likewise, whereas the parts of the air, although they
are air, are not the whole air, whatever is in God is the whole of
God and not a part of Him. This has its foundation in the principle
that is inserted in the body of the article about the end of the
fifth proof, and which is very briefly expressed as follows: “In the
form itself (that is not received), there is nothing besides itself.
Hence since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can
be in no way composite.” Thus the fourth way of proving God's
existence is illustrated from on high, by the very fact that we have
reached the terminus of this proof. Thus when we are on the sum­
mit of a mountain we have a better knowledge of the way that
leads to it.
Reply to the first objection. It declares that there is a real dis­
tinction between created essence and existence: “It is of the es­
sence of a thing caused, to be in some sort composite, because at
least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown here­
after.” ·* β
Reply to the second objection. "With us composite things are
better than simple things, because the perfection of created good­
ness cannot be found in one thing, but in many things.” However,
there is a certain likeness in creatures to God’s higher simplicity,
inasmuch as the soul is of a higher and simpler order than the
body, the angel than the soul, and although a perfect science is
more complex than one in its rudimentary stage, yet its tendency
is toward a simplicity of a higher order, for it sees all things in a
few principles. Thus we must distinguish between the lowest sim­
plicity of pure potency, of matter, for instance, and the highest
simplicity of the most pure Act. Thus this makes more complete
the refutation of pantheism, namely, that God, being absolutely
simple, is really and essentially distinct from the composite world.
A certain difficulty still presents itself, for according to revelation
there are three distinct Persons in God. Does this mean then that
God is composed of three Persons? St. Thomas considers this dif­
ficulty in one of his works, and says: “A plurality of Persons posits
no composition in God. For we may consider the Persons from two
points of view. First in their relation to their essence with which
they are identified; and thus it is evident that there is no com­
position remaining. Secondly we may consider them in their mutual
relations, and thus they are related to one another as distinct, and
Summa theol., la, q.4, a.3 ad 3um.

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THE ONE GOD

not as united. For this reason neither from this point of view can
there be composition: for all composition is union.” 47 Elsewhere
he remarks: “All the divine relations are not greater than only one;
because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each
Person”;48 otherwise any one of the Persons would not be God.
Therefore God is absolutely simple, and it will be stated farther
on that the three Persons have, in fact are, one existence, one in­
tellect, one essential will.
EIGHTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD ENTERS INTO THE COMPOSITION
OF OTHER THINGS

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to complete
the refutation of pantheism, or to prove that God absolutely tran­
scends the world and all finite beings.
In the title, as Cajetan observes, “enter into the composition of
other things” is said of form and matter that constitute a com­
posite, and of substance and accident. Hence the meaning is
whether God can be joined to another in the entitative order, as
the informing act or as potency, as if He were either the matter
or soul of the world, or the common substance of the whole uni­
verse. This must be carefully considered, so as to distinguish the
composition in question here from the hypostatic union, which
according to revelation is possible and de facto exists. In the hypo­
static union, the Word is united, indeed, in the entitative order
with the humanity of Christ, but not as the informing form, but
as the Person terminating the humanity and communicating to it
His existence. And thus the Word does not enter into composi­
tion with Christ, because the Word is not related to Christ as a
part, for the part is always less perfect than the whole.
To explain the doctrine of St. Thomas against pantheism, let
us see: (i) what forms of pantheism were known to St. Thomas,
which he wished to refute; (2) how he refuted them; (3) how, in ac­
cordance with the principles formulated by St. Thomas, modern
pantheism can be refuted; (4) how the doctrine of St. Thomas on
the divine causality preserves that portion of truth, which panthe­
ism distorts.
1. THE FORMS OF PANTHEISM KNOWN TO ST. THOMAS

This question is not of minor importance, for many and also
modern philosophers tend toward pantheism. Moreover, several
<7 De pot., q.7, a. 1 ad loum.
<8 Summa theol., la, q.42, a.4 ad gum.

GOD'S NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES

‘95
modernists said that St. Thomas in his treatise on the one God did
not professedly consider, and therefore did not refute, pantheism.
So says Hébert.·
*
9
On the other hand, others said that Thomism exaggerates the
divine universal causality, and that it tends toward occasionalism
and pantheism, as if God alone existed and acted in every agent.
Thus do those sometimes speak who reject physical premotion.
Hence it must be carefully considered whether St. Thomas wished
to refute various forms of pantheism. The present article already
makes this point clear, for the body of the article distinguishes
three forms of pantheism. The first form is of those who said that
God is the soul of the world or at least of the highest heaven. It
is the pantheism of the Stoics, who to some extent revived the
evolutionism of Heraclitus, who taught that the principle of all
things is the artificer, fire, which is endowed, as it were, with in­
telligence. St. Thomas mentions in this article the error spoken of
by St. Augustine.50
This type of pantheism was to some extent retained by Spinoza,
who said that God is the only substance, whose two principal at­
tributes are thought and infinite extension, in which finite modes
are distinguished, which from all eternity are successively produced
in time.
The second type of pantheism to which St. Thomas alludes is
of those who said: “God is the formal principle of all things,”
even of the lower order. So said Amalric of Chartres or of Bena,
who died in 1209, and whose disciple was David of Dinant.
The third type is materialistic pantheism or rather the atheism
of David of Dinant, who, as St. Thomas says, “most absurdly taught
that God is prime matter.” He says "most absurdly,” because this
teaching is quite opposed to wisdom, which judges of all things
by the highest cause. David of Dinant judges of all things, even of
the highest, by the lowest cause, and his is simply foolishness, which
is contrary to wisdom. Thus St. Thomas, after the question on the
gift of wisdom, professedly treats of folly.51 For what is there more
absurd than to say that the minds of St. John the Baptist and of
St. Augustine, and their holiness, come from matter or are the re­
sult of material and blind necessity? This means that the greater
comes from the less, the more perfect and the nobler from the
least and the ignoble. It means a return to the doctrine of the first
Ionian philosophers, to Thales, Anaximenes . . . who said that the
«0 Cf. "La dernière idole" (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, July, 1902).
so Cf. De Civitate Dei, Bk. VII, chap. 6, in which the doctrine of Varro is dis­
cussed.
si Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.46.

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THE ONE GOD

principle of all things is a material element, either water, air, or
fire.
It must be observed that the Fourth Lateran Council condemned
the pantheism of Amalric in the following words: “We reject and
condemn the most perverse teaching of the impious Amalric, whose
mind was so blinded by the father of lies, that his doctrine is to be
considered not so much heretical as insane.” 52 In like manner, tire
Council of Sens condemned the following error of Abélard: “The
Holy Spirit is the world-soul.” 53
What has just been said suffices to show, contrary to what cer­
tain modernists declared, that the error of pantheism was not
unknown to St. Thomas. In fact, St. Thomas has elsewhere 54 ex­
plained more fully these types of pantheism, beginning with that
of Parmenides. Moreover, St. Thomas refuted, as Aristotle did,05
two ancient types of pantheism. These are: (1) the static monism
of Parmenides, who reduces all things to one being, in fact, to the
sole and motionless being, and this by denying change and multi­
tude; 53 (2) the absolute evolutionism of Heraclitus, who denied
the real validity of the principle of contradiction or of identity,
because according to his view everything becomes, nothing is, and
being and non-being are identified in the very becoming, which is
its own reason for such. The first type is a sort of acosmism, the
second is rather atheism.
St. Thomas, following Aristotle, solves the arguments of Par­
menides by distinguishing between potency and act; and from this
distinction the four kinds of causes are derived.57 Thus becoming
and multitude are explained, but as dependent on the sole su­
preme Cause, who is motionless and most simple. Against Heracli­
tus, however, St. Thomas defends the real validity of the principle
of contradiction.58 Thus St. Thomas not only knew the various
Denz., no. 433.
os/ti'd., no. 370.
w Com. in II Sent., d.17, q.i, a.2.
oo Com. in Met., Bk. I, chap. 9; in Phys., Bk. I, chap. 8.
ίβ Parmenides said: It is only from being or from non-being that something
could come. But being does not come from being, because it is already being;
just as a statue does not come from a statue, because it is already a statue.
To this Aristotle replies: Being does not come from actual being, this I con­
cede: but being does come from potential being, just as the plant comes from
the seed, and the animal from the semen.
In like manner, Parmenides denied multiplicity in being, because being cannot
be diversified by itself, but only by another, and what is not being is nothing.
To this Aristotle replies that being is not univocal but analogous, and is predicated
in various ways of different beings. Also act is multiplied by the potency in which
it is received, just as the form of a lion or man is by matter.
or See Physics, Bk. I; Met., Bks. IX, XII.
os See Met., Bk. !V (almost in toto), but especially chaps. 3-5.

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types of ancient and medieval pantheism, but he examined and
refuted the sources of these errors.
Finally, throughout his life St. Thomas refuted Averroism, which
is another type of pantheism, for the Averroists say that there is a
single intellect for all men.59
Afer having explained the article we shall consider the principal
types of modern pantheism condemned by the Vatican Council. It
suffices at present to say, as noted in the schemata of the Vatican
Council,80 that for the modern pantheists either God becomes the
world, or the world becomes God.
According to Spinoza and Schelling, God, actually existing from
all eternity and prior to the world, becomes the world; thus in
some way we have a revival of the teachings of Parmenides and
the Neoplatonists, which is descendent evolution or emanation.
On the contrary, in absolute evolutionism, according to the
ascendant process of evolution, the world becomes God. Accord­
ing to the modern pantheists, however, absolute evolutionism ap­
peared under two forms. It was conceived either from the material­
ist (Haeckel), or the idealist point of view (Hegel). It is a quasi
revival of the Heraclitean evolutionism.
There is always a return to the two ancient types of pantheism,
those of Parmenides and Heraclitus. The former is a quasi absorp­
tion of the world in God, the latter is rather the absorption of
God in the world. Thus it is clearly enough established from the
history of pantheism that it cannot be defined unless it includes
the tendency to deny either God or the world. From this we al­
ready see clearly the contradiction in identifying God with the
world.
2. WHERE AND HOW ST. THOMAS REFUTED THE ABOVEMENTIONED TYPES OF PANTHEISM

a) St. Thomas explains, indeed, in his commentaries on Aristotle’s
works 81 how this philosopher refuted Heraclitus and Parmenides
by the division of being into potency and act, and also by the
principle of causality: nothing is reduced from potency to act ex­
cept by a being that is in act, and in the final analysis by the pure
Act, who by reason of His immutability and absolute simplicity is
See the opusculum of St. Thomas, De unitate Dei, against the Averroists;
also Summa theol., la, q.76, a. t: "Whether there is one intellect for all men”;
also Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 23: "That God does not act by a necessity of
His nature or by a necessity of knowledge”; also chaps. 26-29.
80 Cf. Vacant, Etudes sue le Concile du Vatican, I, 200, 211 f., 230-44, 571, 581.
01 Cf. Com. in Phys., Bk. I, chap. 8, lect. 14; in Met., Bk. I, chap. 9; Bk. IV,
chap. 3 (end); Bks. XI, XII, De actu puro.

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really and essentially distinct from the changeable and composite
world. But Aristotle said nothing about the divine liberty in the
production of things, and so he left unanswered the question
whether God, who is distinct from the world, is the cause of it
by a necessity of nature or of knowledge. These questions are solved
by St. Thomas himself in his own works.
b) In the body of the article St. Thomas shows that God cannot
enter into the composition of other things either as the formal
principle or as the matter of the world. Three proofs are given for
this in the present article, from the truth that God is (1) the first
efficient Cause, (2) the first and essential Agent, (3) the first and
unparticipated Being.
1) The agent and the form are not numerically identical, and the
agent and matter are not so specifically; for the matter is potential,
whereas the agent is actual; but God is the first efficient Cause;
therefore He cannot be either the form or the matter of any com­
posite.
This is a simple application of the distinction between potency
and act, from which the four kinds of causes are derived. Of these,
the efficient and final are the extrinsic causes, whereas the form and
matter are the intrinsic causes. Thus it is evident that the efficient
cause is not numerically identical with either the form or the matter,
for nothing produces itself.
A difficulty arises concerning the proof. Perhaps God is the form
of another composite, that is, of the one generating but not gen­
erated. To this Cajetan replies: "To be a composite implies being
an effect (because every composite is made, as evident from the
preceding article)”; but every effect depends on the first efficient
cause; therefore the first efficient cause is neither the form nor the
matter of any composite, because it would be the form or matter
of its effect, which is impossible, since the agent is not numerically
identical either with the form or matter of its effect, as was said.
2) No part of the composite is primarily and essentially the agent;
but God is primarily and essentially the agent; therefore God is
not a part of any composite.
The major is illustrated by the following example: "For the
hand does not act, but the man by his hand.” St. Thomas does not
mean by this, as Cajetan observes, that the composite is primarily
and essentially an agent. On the contrary, he said02 that God is
primarily and essentially an agent, therefore He is primarily and
essentially a form, that is, a form separated from matter; in fact,
He is the Being that is not received in another.
3) The major is evident, for matter is potency, and thus is pos­
es Summa theol., la, q.3, a.2.

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199

terior to act and less perfect. But the form which is part of a com­
pound is a participated form; and as that which participates is
posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which is
participated. Therefore no part of a compound can be absolutely
primal among beings.
These three proofs can be compendiously expressed as follows:
God is not the matter of the world, because matter which is potency
or capacity susceptible to further determination, can be determined
only by another, namely, by an agent, and in the final analysis by
the first agent, who is His activity and His being. (First, second,
and third proofs of God’s existence.)
Moreover, God is not the form of the world, because thus He
would be something participated and less perfect than the com­
posite of which He would be a part. In fact, everything composite
requires a cause.63 Therefore God must be superior to everything
composite, as being the absolutely simple and unchangeable cause,
not capable of further determination.
N.B. In the hypostatic union, the Word is not a part, either as
matter or as informing act, but as terminating act, just as in some
way, in the order of being as in that of intelligence, the divine es­
sence clearly seen terminates the intellect of the blessed. This is a
mystery, and the existence or even the possibility of this can be
neither proved nor disproved by reason. Apparent contradiction is
excluded, since the terminating perfection is not participated as
an informing form. Thus the statue of Moses seen by me, termi­
nates my vision, but it is not something participated in me, as is
the case with the representative similitude which is received in the
visual faculty. Thus the confusion of the divine and human na­
tures is avoided in the hypostatic union. They remain unconfused,
and the one is not to the other as matter is to form.
Even if God were to unite Himself hypostatically to all created
natures, this would not result in pantheism, for there could not
be a fusion of the assumed natures with the divine nature. We know
from revelation that God is hypostatically united only with Christ's
humanity, and if He were united with the humanity of other hu­
man beings, these would be impeccable as Christ is, which is
manifestly not so.
We shall find the completion of the refutation of pantheism in
two subsequent articles,61 in which St. Thomas shows that God did
not produce the world either by a necessity of His nature, or by
a necessity of science, but with absolute freedom: (1) because God’s
goodness, which He necessarily loves with utmost joy, is infinite
es Ibid., a. 7.
·« Ibid., q. ig, a.3 f.

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200

and can exist without other things, “inasmuch as no perfection can
accrue to Him from them”; (2) because God acts not only freely but
immediately by His intellect and will in things external to Him­
self, not by nature as man does in freely generating. For every
natural agent by the very fact that it acts for an end must be
directed by the supreme and intelligent agent (fifth way). There­
fore already from the fifth way of proving God’s existence it is to
some extent clear that God acts by His intellect and will.65
Finally, emanatism is refuted when St. Thomas denies that the
soul is of God’s substance,66 for God would be material if things
were not produced from nothing, but from God’s substance as their
pre-existing subject. Thus God’s substance would not be His exist­
ence, for He would be capable of further determination. In like
manner, he shows that there cannot be one intellect for all men,67
nor even one active intellect for all;68 for the human soul, which
is intellectual, is the form of the body and is multiplied with the
body. The same man understands that he understands, and that
he wills freely.
Summing up, we must therefore say that these refutations of
pantheism proceed from the five proofs for God’s existence, and
they can be reduced to this one statement of the Vatican Council:
“God is really and essentially distinct from the (mutable and com­
posite) world," 69 for He is required as the absolutely immutable
Cause (first, second, and third proofs), and is absolutely simple and
perfect (fourth and fifth proofs).
3.

HOW MODERN PANTHEISM CAN BE REFUTED BY INVOKING
THE PRINCIPLES FORMULATED BY ST. THOMAS

The Vatican Council refers to the various types of modern pan­
theism. “If anyone shall say that the substance and essence of God
and of all things is one and the same; let him be anathema.” 70
Here we have pantheism in general. Then the Council condemns
emanatism in the following terms: “If anyone shall say that finite
things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual, have
emanated from the divine substance; let him be anathema.”71
65 Consult also on this point Contra Gentes, Bk. Π, chaps. 23, 26-29, in which
St. Thomas says against the Averroists that God does not act by a necessity of
His nature or of His intellect.
Summa theol., la, q.90, a. 1.
87 Ibid., q.76, a.2.
88 Ibid., q.79, a. 5.
«oDenz., no. 1782.
70 Ibid., no. 1803.
7> Ibid., no. 1804. S ··

GOD’S NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES

201

Here we have descendent emanatism in which God exists with all
His perfections prior to the world, and He then becomes the world,
since the world emanates from Him. Thus God would be capable
of further determination, and thus He would not be the pure Act,
at least He would have accidents. After this the pantheism of
Schelling is condemned, in which God still becomes the world: “If
anyone shall say that the divine essence by the manifestation and
evolution of itself becomes all things; let him be anathema.” 72
Finally pantheism of universal being is condemned, and it is
especially this type that was proposed by Hegel. It is evolution of
the ascendant order; hence in this type it is rather the world that
becomes God: “If any one shall say that God is universal or indefi­
nite being, which by determining itself constitutes the universality
of things, distinct according to genera, species, and individuals;
let him be anathema.” 73
The various types of pantheism are refuted by one and the same
principle already formulated by St. Thomas.74 It is thus expressed
by the Vatican Council: “God, as being one, sole, absolutely simple,
and immutable spiritual substance, is to be declared as really and
essentially distinct from the world . . . and ineffably exalted above
all things.” 78
The reference is to a real distinction. God and creatures are not
one being but many beings, although after creation there is not
more being, namely, more perfection. The reference is not only to
a real but to an essential distinction, since the divine nature in­
finitely transcends other natures.
The Vatican Council78 confirms the condemnation of pantheism
by its definition of the absolutely free creation of all things, both
corporeal and spiritual, from nothing and not from God’s sub­
stance. Pantheism is absolute determinism, which is a denial of
both divine and human liberty, and hence of the distinction be­
tween moral good and moral evil, of merit and demerit. It ex­
cludes the moral life from man, just as it excludes true personality
from him.
But previous to this, the Syllabus of Pius IX had clearly set forth
the contradiction in pantheism, condemning the following formula
propounded by it: God is one and the same thing with the world,
and, therefore, spirit with matter, necessity with liberty, good with
T2 ibid., § 2.
Ibid., § 3. On this point see Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, I, 212 f.,
581.
s* Summa theol., la, q.3, a.7, 8.
75 Denz., no. 1782.
7« Ibid., no. 1805.

THE ONE GOD

202

evil, justice with injustice.” 77 It would follow from this, of course,
that all things in the world, even the gravest errors and crimes,
would be, with the destruction of contingency and liberty, neces
sary moments of universal evolution, in which nothing could be
absolutely and simply true; but there would be something that is
relatively true and good in the present state of knowledge and of
ethics, which would be followed by an opposite state or antithesis,
which again would be succeeded by a superior synthesis, and so on
in succession. There would be nothing stable, not even the prin­
ciple of contradiction or of identity, because the fundamental
reality would be this universal becoming, which would be its own
reason for such. Contrary to this, it must be said that the greater
does not come from the less, and what is already in existence is
greater than what is becoming. Hence there is an eternally self­
existing Being, who is the self-subsisting Being, who said of Him­
self: “I am who am.” 78
It must be noted that certain theses of the ontologists savor some­
what of pantheism, and for this reason they were condemned. Such
are the following propositions: “That being, which is in all things
and without which nothing is understood by us, is the divine be­
ing. Universals considered in the concrete are not really distinct
from God.” 78 In this way universal being is confused with the
divine being, and universal truth with the divine truth. . . . The
same is to be said of certain propositions propounded by Antonio
Rosmini.80
All these declarations are a confirmation for us that the funda­
mental truth of Christian philosophy is, that God alone is the self­
subsisting Being, that essence and existence are identical only in
God. The first truth by way of investigation is the principle of
identity: being is being, not-being is not-being. The supreme truth
by way of investigation and the first by way of judgment is: God
alone is His existence, so that He is really and essentially distinct
from any other being whatever.

4·

DOES ST. THOMAS IN HIS DISCUSSION OF THE DIVINE
CAUSALITY PRESERVE INTACT THE TRUTH THAT IS
DISTORTED BY PANTHEISM?

In every error there is a distortion of some part of the truth. Yet
it is there not as “the soul of truth,” but rather as the servant of
rr Ibid.., no. 1701.
i» Ex. 3: 14.
’•Denz., nos. i66of.
»olbid., nos. 1894-99.

GOD’S NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES

203

error, because it serves to seduce or deceive the intellect. Thus in
pantheism it is, as it were, the grain of truth that is distorted. This
is most apparent in the natural order. (1) There is nothing that is
not, as to the whole of its being, caused by God.81 (2) There is
nothing that is not preserved by God, for the being of things is the
proper effect of God. Just as the becoming ceases when the cause
of any becoming ceases to act, so when the cause of the being of
things ceases to act, the being of things would cease to exist, just
as the light in the air disappears when the sun ceases to give us
its light, or just as there is no longer evidence in the conclusions
when there is a cessation of evidence in the principles, or just as
the means to the end lose their attraction for us when the end
ceases to attract us.82 (3) There is not any being in existence to
which God is not intimately present, contacting it by His power
and keeping it in existence.83 Thus God is intimately present in all
things, and is even more intimately present to our soul than it is
to itself, for He moves it to acts that are more intimate and pro­
found to which it could not move itself. (4) God operates in every
agent, not to dispense the creature from acting, as the occasionalists
think, but to apply it to action.84 (5) God moves every intellect,85
and immediately moves the created will,83 but He does no violence
to it, for He moves it interiorly in accordance with its inclination
for universal good, and He moves it to a particular good which
can be the object of its deliberate choice; or He permits sin, and
then He is the cause only of the physical entity of the act of sin,
but not of the sin itself as it is a defect, for which only a deficient
cause is needed.
Thus there is nothing real and good external to God that is not
related to Him as causally dependent on Him. Even the free de­
termination of our will, inasmuch as it is something real and good,
cannot be external to God so as not to be in a relation of de­
pendence on Him. Thus the fruit of the tree comes all from the
tree as from its secondary cause, and all from God as its first cause;
so also my choice, inasmuch as it is real and good, is all from God
as first cause and all from myself as secondary cause. Thus God
is present in all things by a virtual contact, keeping them in being,
and He operates in every agent applying it to its act.
It is this truth which pantheism distorts. This truth is strikingly
affirmed by St. Thomas, although he absolutely rejects pantheism,
ei Summa theol., la, q.45, a.5.
82 Ibid., q. 104, a. 1, 2.
88 Ibid., q.8, a. 1.
8« Ibid., q. 105, a.5.
ss Ibid., a.3.
88 Ibid., a.4.

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THE ONE GOD

since God is neither the material cause nor the formal cause of the
world, nor its necessary and efficient cause, but its absolutely tran­
scendent and free efficient cause.
Then after our elevation to the order of grace, the intimacy of
our union with God is increased, since habitual grace is a formal
and physical, although analogical, participation in the Deity, or in
God’s intimate life, so that we are like to Him not only in being,
life, and intelligence, but in the very Deity. Thus a soul in the
state of grace is the temple in which the most Holy Trinity dwells,
dwelling indeed in the blessed as clearly seen by them, but dwelling
in us as obscurely known.
Finally, the union of the divine and human natures in Christ
is the greatest that can be. The union is substantial and personal,
so that there is only one person and one existence. However, there
is not the least trace of pantheism in this, for there is an infinite
distinction between the two natures and without any confusion of
the natures. All these truths are strikingly affirmed by St. Thomas.
Moreover, in none of the teachings of Catholic theologians is
the truth more clearly expressed than in Thomism, namely, that
God is distinct from the world, and yet He is most intimately pres­
ent to it by His efficacious influx. The doctrine of analogy as set
forth by St. Thomas87 brings out far more clearly, indeed, the dis­
tinction between God and the world than does univocation of be­
ing, which is admitted by Scotus, and which is retained to some
extent by Suarez.88 On the other hand, St. Thomas stresses the in­
timacy of divine motion in us more than Scotus does, and he stresses
especially its efficacy more than Suarez and Molina do.88
Thus we terminate the question of God’s simplicity. The prin­
ciples enunciated here about being can easily be applied to cogni­
tion and volition, by treating of the most eminent simplicity of
God's wisdom and love.90 But this will be discussed in subsequent
questions.91
Ibid., q. 13, a.5.
ss Disp. Met., Disp. Π, sect. 2, no. 34.
so Some have said that Thomism is pantheism in disguise. This could be said
with greater truth about univocation of being, and the denial of a real distinction
between created essence and existence. "A slight error in the beginning is great
in the end.”
so We have explained this in another work; see Providence, pp. 79-90.
»1 Summa theol., la, q. 14, 19 f.
st

CHAPTER IV
Question 4
The Perfection

of

God

This question contains three articles: (1) whether God is perfect;

(2) whether the perfections of all things are in God; (3) whether
creatures can be said to be like God. The third article contains the
fundamentals of the teaching of analogy between God and crea­
tures, and under this aspect it concerns the present question,
namely, whether God is so perfect that no creature can be like Him.
first article

whether god is perfect

State of the question. The title, as Cajetan observes, does not
mean: whether God has some perfection; for the various perfec­
tions are discussed subsequently. Nor does it mean: whether God
possesses all perfections, since this point is discussed in the second
article. The question is whether God is pre-eminently that which
He is, for instance, pre-eminently the efficient cause.
Reply. God is most perfect. The conclusion is of faith, for Jesus
says: “Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is
perfect.” 1 The same is affirmed in very many texts of Holy Scrip­
ture. The Vatican Council affirms it in these words: “The holy
Church believes that there is one God . . . infinite in all perfec­
tion . . . who, to manifest His perfection by the blessings which
He bestows on creatures, with absolute freedom created them.” 2
Proof from reason. In the body of the article it is proved that
God is most perfect for the reason that God is the first active prin­
ciple, whereas, on the contrary, the ancient philosophers of Ionia
thought that the first principle of all things is something material
(water, air, or fire) and hence most imperfect, nay even absolute
evolutionism, in which by an ascendant process of evolution the
greater is produced from the less.
The argument of St. Thomas is reduced to this syllogism: The
first active principle must needs be most actual and hence most
1 Matt. 5: 48.
2 Denz., no. 178a.

205

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THE ONE GOD

perfect; but God is the first active principle (second way); there­
fore God is most actual. The major is proved from the fact that
the agent, as such, is in actuality; for if any agent needs to be
premoved so as to act, inasmuch as it is moved it is mobile as re­
gards a higher agent; but as an agent it is already in actuality, as
in the case of water which heats, not inasmuch as it becomes hot,
but inasmuch as it is already hot. From this we see that the su­
preme agent is most actual and motionless, and hence most per­
fect. For, as stated at the end of the body of this article: “We call
that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.”
It must be observed that, according to the opinion of several
historians of philosophy, Aristotle 8 held that God is only the final
but not the efficient cause of the world, because, in explaining how
the first mover is immobile, he gives the example of the end, which,
although it is immobile, attracts other things to itself. But it does
not follow from this that Aristotle denied that God is the efficient
cause of the world, as if the immobile agent could not move others.
On the contrary, he said on several occasions that an agent, inas­
much as it is an agent, is in actuality; for nothing is reduced from
potentiality to actuality except by a being that is in actuality. Thus
the agent, as an agent, already is in actuality and so is perfect.
Hence the supreme agent is most in actuality and most perfect.
In the reply to the third objection it is remarked that the exist­
ence of anything is not only more perfect than matter, but also
more perfect than form, for it is its ultimate actuality. But God is
unreceived or subsisting existence; therefore He is most perfect.
St. Thomas, like an eagle that makes the same circular flight several
times high up in the air, always returns to the same supreme truth.
He makes it the object not only of direct contemplation (by ascend­
ing from one fact to be explained) and of oblique (in spiral form),
but also of circular.4
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER THE PERFECTIONS OF ALL THINGS ARE IN GOD

State of the question. It concerns all perfections, whether these
include no imperfection or admit an admixture of imperfection.
The difficulty is (i) that God is absolutely simple whereas the per­
fections of things are manifold; (2) that, in fact, there are several
perfections of things which are in opposition to one another, for
example, opposite differentiae in the same genus, and they cannot
be at the same time in the same subject; (3) that God’s essence is
8 Metaph., Bk. XII, chap. 6.
* Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q. 180, a.6.

THE PERFECTION OF GOD

207

His existence, but life and intelligence are more perfect than exist­
ence.
The conclusion, however, is: all created perfections are in God.
This truth is affirmed in equivalent terms in many texts of Holy
Scripture, and they are not difficult to find. Such are: “All things
were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing that was
made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men.” 5 “For
of Him and by Him and in Him are all things.”8
Two proofs from reason are given for the conclusion: (1) because
God is the first effective cause of things; (2) because He is the self­
subsisting Being.
1) Whatever perfection exists in an effect must pre-exist in the
agent, and in a more eminent way in the supreme agent. But God
is the supreme agent, the effective cause of all things. Therefore
the perfections of all things pre-exist in God in a more eminent
way.
Molina ought to have taken note of the major of this argument;
for whatever perfection there is even in the free determination of
our choice pre-exists in the supreme agent, and this free determina­
tion of ours cannot exist externally to God unless it is in a rela­
tion of dependent causality to Him.
If anyone objects that the plant reaches the perfection of its
growth from an imperfect shoot, and that the animal is developed
from the seed, we must reply that the seed is but the instrumental
cause of the agent. It is not indeed the seed of the ox that gen­
erates the ox, but the fully developed ox by means of the seed
generates an ox; in like manner the fully grown plant by means of
the shoot generates a plant like itself in species; for it is only the
fully developed that generate. Otherwise the greater would be
produced from the less, and this more of being would have no rea­
son for its existence. Therefore it is a common saying among theo­
logians that after creation there are more beings but not more of
being or perfection, because whatever perfection is in the effect
pre-existed in a more eminent way in the first eternal cause. Thus
the validity of the notion of efficient cause in its relation to the
First Cause becomes increasingly clear.
2) The conclusion is proved also from the principle that God is
the self-subsisting Being. The perfections of all created things are
included in the perfection of being, for a thing is perfect in that
it has being, for instance, in that there is in it either solely cor­
poreity, or life, whether this is vegetative, sensitive, or intellectual;
for being is the actuality of all these things; in fact, the existence
6 John 1: 3 f.
8 Rom. 11: 36; see also Ex. 33: 19; Ps. 93: 9.

2o8

THE ONE GOD

of intellection is its actuality. But since God is the self-subsisting
Existence, He has in Himself the whole perfection of being. There­
fore God contains in Himself the perfection of all things.
If He did not have the whole perfection of being, then He would
have only participated being, and would not be essentially the self­
subsisting Being. Thus “if heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the
virtue of heat would be wanting to it”; self-subsisting heat would
have the whole perfection of heat.
Reply to first objection. All these perfections, because they are
in God in a more eminent way, are in Him without detriment to
His simplicity. Thus white light contains eminently whatever per­
fection there is in the seven colors of the rainbow; yet it contains
them only virtually and eminently (in that it can produce them),
whereas the Deity contains formally and eminently absolutely sim­
ple perfections, a point that will be more clearly brought out in
subsequent articles.7 Whereas white light is neither azure blue nor
red, the Deity is formally and eminently real, one, true, good ... ;
and, moreover, it contains mixed perfections, such as rationality,
virtually and eminently. Now, indeed, visual sensation contains in
a unified form a great variety of sensible objects, and scientific
synthesis contains many experiences, for what is divided in things
of the lower order is found united in those of the higher order.
Similarly our soul, although simple, is vegetative, sensitive, and
intellective.8
Reply to third objection. Although participated being, as in a
stone, is without life and intelligence, the self-subsisting Being, in
that He is plenitude itself of being, contains life and intelligence.
And therefore this can be what constitutes the divine nature accord­
ing to our imperfect mode of conceiving it. “Nothing of the perfec­
tion of being can be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself.”
THIRD ARTICLE

WHETHER ANY CREATURE CAN BE LIKE GOD

State of the question. The meaning of the title is, as Cajetan re­
marks, whether God’s perfection is so great that no creature can be
like Him. It concerns likeness to Him as He is the first Being and
the first Cause, and not as He is the triune God; nor is it concerned
with this special likeness that is called image, for this is discussed
elsewhere.9 We are concerned here with the general likeness that is
i Summa theol., la, q. 13, a.2-5.
e The rational soul is not only virtually, but also formally and eminently
vegetative and sensitive, because it not only can produce the principle of the
vegetative and sensitive lives, but is in us the radical principle of these lives.
“Summa theol., la, q.93.

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found in every created being. This article contains the fundamentals
of the doctrine about the analogy between God and the creature as
explained in a subsequent article.10
The difficulties that present themselves are the following: (1) that
God and the creature are not contained even in a genus, therefore
they are absolutely different; (2) that they do not communicate in
any form, which is the foundation for similitude; (3) that, if the
creature were said to be like God, then it could be said that God is
like the creature, which seems to be inappropriate and contrary to
Scripture.11
The conclusion, however, is: all created beings, so far as they
are beings, are like God; moreover, in many this likeness is in life
and intelligence. Not infrequently Holy Scripture speaks of this
likeness, even of the likeness according to image, as when it says:
“Let us make man to our image and likeness.” 12
About this question we should note what the Fourth Lateran
Council says: “The similarity which we note between the Creator
and the creature cannot be so great as to prevent us from detecting
a greater dissimilarity.” 18 Moreover, this statement is made about
the similarity of grace, and in this sense the Scripture says: “Be you
therefore perfect (by grace) as also your heavenly Father is perfect
(by nature).” 14 In this text of the Fourth Lateran Council we have
a quasi definition of analogy between God and creatures, and this
text is more in conformity with the Thomist definition of analogy
than it is with the Suarezian. According to St. Thomas and the
Thomists: things that are analogous are those having a common
name, but the idea signified by the name is simply different in each
of them, and relatively or proportionately the same; thus being is
predicated of essential being, of substantial being that is produced
by another, and of accident. On the contrary, according to the prin­
ciple of Suarez: “things that are analogous are those having a
common name, but the idea signified by the name is simply the
same in each of them, and relatively different.10 To this the
Thomists reply by asking why the Fourth Lateran Council there10 Ibid., q. 13, a.5.
11 Is. 40: 18.
>2 Gen. 1: 26.
13 Denz., no. 432.
n Malt. 5: 48.
10 Suarez indeed says (Disp. Metaph. 2, §2, no. 34): "Now I merely assert that
everything which has been said concerning the unity of the concept of being,
appears to be clearer and more certain than that being is analogous. Therefore,
in order to defend analogy, it is not right to deny the unity of the concept; but
if one of the two is to be denied, it is analogy, which is uncertain, that is to be
denied rather than unity of concept, which seems to be demonstrated by sound
arguments.

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fore had said: “The similarity which we note between the Creator
and the creature cannot be so great as to prevent us from detecting
a greater dissimilarity.” Moreover, animality, which is predicated
univocally of the lion and the worm, is simply the same and rela­
tively different in them; analogical similarity, however, is less than
univocal similarity.
Lastly, the Vatican Council says: “Reason enlightened by faith
when it seeks earnestly, piously, and calmly, attains by a gift of God
to some . . . understanding of mysteries; partly from the analogy
of those things which it naturally knows, partly from the relations
which the mysteries bear to one another. . . 16 Therefore the
analogy that prevails between God and the creature is a certainty;
in fact, its certainty is that of faith.
The conclusion is proved from reason in the body of the article
by one argument which is founded on causality. But first of all, by
way of introduction, St. Thomas distinguishes between three kinds
of likeness.
Likeness is of three kinds: (i) of form which is of the same for­
mality and of the same mode, as two things equally white, or two
grown-up men; (2) of form which is of the same formality but not of
the same mode, as something less white is like something more
white, or as the boy is like the man; (3) of form but not according
to the same formality, as between the effect and the non-univocal
agent, or as prevails in things of a higher nature, as in the sub­
ordination of causes.17 Thus, inasmuch as the intellective life
arouses the action of the sensitive life, as when the intellect by a
rational process arranges in an orderly manner the phantasms and
words for the expression of some syllogism, then the verbal expres­
sion, which previously exists in the imagination, is indeed ration­
able, but by participation, being dependent on the reason as
directing it. Thus the rationability of the verbal expression and the
rationability of the conception or judgment are alike according to
form but not according to the same formality; there is indeed un­
likeness on the part of the one directing and of that which is
directed. Thus rationability is primarily in prudence and second­
arily by participation in the virtues of fortitude and temperance by
which the sensitive appetite is directed by reason. In like manner
and with greater reason, order is not according to the same formality
in the supreme Ordainer of the universe and in the natural agents
which are directed by Him to a certain end (fifth way).
ie Denz., no. 1796.
it According to the physics of ancient times, heat in the sun differs in formality
from that in other bodies. This is no longer admitted; but there are other
examples.

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Thus likeness is o£ three kinds: (i) univocal and according to the
same mode; (2) univocal and not according to the same mode, as
between the boy and the man; (3) non-univocal, which is not either
according to species or according to genus, but is analogical.
With these preliminary observations, the conclusion is proved by
one argument as follows: every agent reproduces itself, either
specifically or generically or at least analogically; but God, who is
not contained in a genus, is the efficient cause of creatures; therefore
creatures are analogically like God.
For some the major, like the experimental laws, is evident only by
induction, in so far as a man generates a man, an ox generates an
ox, and a plant one like itself in species. Yet, in truth, this major is
more than an experimental law; it is a principle that is directly
known from the analysis of the terms; for to act is to determine or
reduce from potentiality to actuality, from indetermination to de­
termination; for actuality is the principle of determination. But a
thing can determine only according to its own determination; hence
the common saying: every agent acts inasmuch as it is in actuality,
and it is in actuality by means of its form. Thus a man generates a
man, and a body that is hot makes another hot. Flence St. Thomas
says in this article: “Since every agent reproduces itself so far as it
is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its form,
the effect must resemble the form of the agent.” This principle is
self-evident from an analysis of the terms.
But this principle is applied in various ways in accordance with
the previous remarks, namely: (1) If the agent is contained in the
same species with the effect, there is likeness according to the same
formality of the species; (2) if the agent is not contained in the
same species, but in the same genus, then there is only generic like­
ness. The old example of the sun is here given. Nowadays we can
say: There are various effects of heat, since it expands metals, pro­
duces the fusion of solids and the evaporation of liquids. In like
manner, there are various effects of electricity and magnetism, and
these effects are not specifically but generically like the cause. Thus
electricity produces local motion, atmospheric changes, chemical
combinations ... ; (3) lastly, if the agent is not contained in any
genus, “its effects will still more distantly reproduce the form of
the agent,” that is, not specifically or generically, but analogi­
cally.
The minor, however, was proved in a previous article,18 in which
it was shown that God, who is not in any genus, is the efficient cause
of all creatures. Therefore creatures are analogically like God, at
least inasmuch as they are beings. Many creatures, too, are like God
is Summa theol., la, q.3, a.5.

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in life (as plants), in intellect (as our soul), and the just are like
God according to His intimate life or His Deity.
Being indeed is that which exists or can exist; in other words,
it is that whose act is to exist. But it is not predicated according
to absolutely the same formality of the self-subsisting Being, of the
caused substantial being, and of its accidents. Of these three it is
predicated proportionately or according to a similarity of propor­
tions. Thus God is to His existence as the created substantial being
is proportionately to its existence. Thus the likeness is true and
not merely metaphorical (as when it is said that God is angry), but
it is according to the proper meaning of the name “being.”
However, as the Fourth Lateran Council said: “A greater dissimi­
larity is to be noted” in that God is the self-subsisting Being,
whereas created substance is not its own existence, but has existence
in itself, and accident has existence in another. When we shall see
God face to face, then it will be clearly seen that creatures are as if
they do not exist in comparison with God, as St. Augustine often
says.
This means that the analogous perfection cannot be perfectly
abstracted from the analogates10 because it expresses a likeness of
proportions, and this cannot be conceived by the mind without
having actual and explicit concepts of the members of the propor­
tionality. Being is that which exists either of itself, or in itself,
though dependent on another, or in another that is dependent on
some other.
Contrary to this, the genus (for instance, animality) can be per­
fectly abstracted from the species, because it is diversified by
differentiae that are extrinsic to it. Thus animal signifies what is
simply one and the same; the living body signifies the sensitive life,
whereas being signifies what is proportionately one. The analogical
concept can be represented by 8, and the universal concept by o.20
There is a certain intrinsic variety in the analogical concept; for
every mode of being is still being, whereas the differentia of ani­
mality, for example, rationality, is not animality.
Objection. Being abstracts perfectly from the modes of being in
that it is defined as that which exists independently of its modes
(id quod est independenter ab his modalitatibus). In like manner,
“knowledge” is the union of the one knowing with the thing known
19 Cf. Cajetan, De analogia nominum, chap. 5.
20 These signs are merely arbitrary. (See, God, His Existence, II, 205.) What the
author seeks to show is that being, as predicated of various things, is propor­
tionately the same, whereas the univocal concept is the same in those things of
which it is predicated. Hence being is analogical in concept, whereas animal is
univocal. Rationality is extrinsic to the notion of animal, but not to the notion
of being. (Tr.)

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213
or of subject and object without any reference to sensation and in­
tellection. The same applies to “love” and "cause" in reference to
first cause and second cause: for the efficient cause is that from which
another being comes into existence.
Reply. This seems to be so if the words of the definition are con­
sidered only materially, but it is not so if they are taken in their
formal sense; for these very words of the definition of being are
analogous; namely, id is predicated analogically, as also are qtiod
and est. The same must be said of other definitions, such as those
of cause, knowledge, love. Cause is predicated analogically of
the four causes, as it is also of the first efficient Cause and of the
secondary cause. In like manner, although our cognitive faculties
are univocal as faculties in the genus of quality, as they are cog­
nitive, they are analogous. Thus knowledge can be attributed ana­
logically to God, and the same applies to love.
It is already quite clear from St. Thomas’ own words that being
and existence are not predicated of God and creatures purely "ac­
cording to the same formality,” but proportionately, as stated at
the end of the body of the article. And what is said here of exist­
ence applies to all absolutely simple perfections, and this will have
to be discussed in a subsequent article (q. 13, a. 5). Thus it applies to
the intellect that is specified by intelligible being, and to the will that
is specified by good.
Reply to second objection. God is related to creatures as the prin­
ciple of all genera.
Reply to third objection. Likeness of creatures to God is therefore
"solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being,
whereas other things are beings by participation.”
Reply to fourth objection. Although the creature is like God,
God is not like the creature, because there is no real relation of
God to creatures, but only of creatures to God; for God does not
depend on creatures, nor is He in the same order. Thus the image
is said to be like Caesar, but Caesar is not said to be like his image:
“When two extremes are not of one order, in one of the extremes
the relation is a reality, and in the other it is an idea.” 21 Thus
knowledge refers to the knowable, but the knowable thing, as a
thing, is outside the order of intelligibility, and does not refer to
knowledge.22 Thus all creatures are ordered to God, but God is not
ordered to creatures.23
21 Ibid., a. 7.
22 Conversely, there is a real and mutual relation if the two extremes are of
the same order, as between father and son, as also between two brothers who are
sons of the same father; this is especially so if one extreme is dependent on the
other, as the son on the father.
23 Summa theol., la, q. 13, a.7.

CHAPTER V
Question 5

Of Goodness in General

The attribute of goodness follows perfection, for, as will be said

immediately, everything is good in so far as it is perfect. Therefore
St. Thomas treats of God's goodness before treating of His truth
and unity, although unity and truth are predicated before goodness
of being and the divine nature. St. Thomas inserts here the question
of the divine goodness as being a part of the divine perfection.
And he treats first of goodness in general.
The question is concerned with transcendental good, which is a
property of being, and is being viewed as perfect and appetible. It
is called transcendental, because it transcends all the categories of
being, and is common to all of them, such as good substance, good
quantity, good quality. . . . However, in this question, goodness
is also divided into the pleasant, the useful, and the virtuous, and
from this division we get the idea of moral goodness, which is dis­
cussed by St. Thomas in the moral part of his theology,1 where he
shows that moral goodness is virtuous goodness in so far as it is
governed by the rules of moral actions and especially by the eternal
law. Moral goodness is conformity of the object and the action with
the rules of moral actions. But we are at present concerned with
transcendental good.
There are three points of investigation in this fifth question: (1)
The relation of goodness to being (a. 1-3); (2) of goodness in itself,
considered under the aspect of end and order in goodness (a. 2-5);
(3) the way goodness is divided (a. 6). The explanation of these
articles must be brief, for they pertain rather to metaphysics.
FIRST ARTICLE
WHETHER GOODNESS DIFFERS REALLY FROM BEING

Conclusion. Goodness and being are really the same, and differ
only in idea. The first part is proved as follows: That which is in­
cluded in the idea of being is not really distinct from being; but
goodness is included in the idea of being, for it is being considered
1 Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 18.
214

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215

as perfect and desirable; therefore goodness is not really distinct
from being.
The major is certain. Just as humanity, which contains in its
connotation animality as genus, is not really distinct from ani­
mality, so that which in its connotation contains the idea of being
is not really distinct from being. On the contrary, created essence,
which in its connotation does not contain the idea of existence, is
really distinct from it. Where we have two concepts irreducible to
each other and to a third concept, there we have irreducibility of
realities, in virtue of the objective validity of our intellect. But if
two concepts are reduced to one concept, as animality and ration­
ability are reduced to humanity, then there is no real distinction
between them. Animality is included in the idea of humanity,
although the latter includes something else, namely, rationality.
The minor. The idea of being is included in the idea of goodness.
For goodness is that which is desirable; but it is desirable in so
far as it is at least somehow perfect and perfective; therefore the
idea of being is included in the idea of goodness, although it ex­
plicitly denotes something else.
Thus a fruit is good in so far as it is desirable. But for this
it is necessary that the fruit be ripe, that in its species it be perfect
and perfective, as a food that is preservative of life. And it would
not be so unless it were actual being. Thus we speak proportion­
ately of a good stone for the construction of a building, of a good
horse for drawing a carriage, of a good sculptor or of a good painter.
Hence it is clear that good is predicated of things by analogy of
proportion, and is not really distinct from being.
The second part of the conclusion, namely, that goodness and
being differ in idea, is easily proved; for “goodness presents the
aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.” In other
words, being contains the notion of goodness actually and implic­
itly, but not actually and explicitly. Something explicitly is de­
clared in the notion of goodness, which is only implicitly declared
in the notion of being. Thus there is no addition of any extrinsic
difference to being, but of an explicitly signified mode of being.
It must be remembered with Cajetan, however, that desirableness
does not constitute the idea of goodness, but presupposes it, as a
property its essence. However, if the desirable is viewed not formally
but fundamentally, then goodness is intrinsically desirable in so far
as it is the foundation for desirableness. Hence many Thomists
say: The formal notion of goodness consists in perfection as being
the foundation for desirableness. And this foundation is not really
distinct from the desirableness, because it is a relation, not indeed
real but logical as regards the appetite. On the contrary, there is a

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THE ONE GOD

real relation of the appetite to the appetible on which it depends.
Thus there is a real relation of knowledge to the thing knowable,
but not of this latter to knowledge.
Hence for goodness to be fundamentally desirable, it must be
perfect and perfective and therefore actual being. As John of St.
Thomas says against Durandus and Vasquez: If goodness were to
consist formally in desirableness, it would not be anything real, but
a logical relation.
The reply to the first objection confirms this: Although goodness
and being are not really distinct, for what is simply being (which
a thing has through substantial being) is not simply goodness
(which a thing has through some superadded perfection). Thus a
barren tree is simply a being in so far as it has substantial being,
but it is not something simply good in its species, because it is
barren. The same applies to an unripe or overripe fruit, as also to a
young or old carriage horse.
Hence what is simply being is good relatively, for example, a
young horse not yet fully grown is, however, truly a horse and
not a mule. Thus it has relative goodness of its species, although it
has not as yet attained its due perfection. The same may be said of
wine that has not much body to it, which, however, is truly wine
and not vinegar.
Conversely, that by reason of which something is good simply, is
being relatively, since it is an accidental perfection superadded to
substance, as ripeness in fruit.
It must be observed that according to Scotus 2 the properties of
being, such as goodness, are distinct from being by a distinction
that is formal and actual on the part of the thing. In reply to this
we say that such distinction posits an impossible intermediary be­
tween the real distinction and the logical distinction that has its
foundation in the object; for a distinction exists either before or
not before the mind’s consideration; if before, it is real; if not, it
is logical. In the present case, however, there can be no real dis­
tinction, because then goodness would be outside being; it would
not be being, and thus would be nothing. Being is included in all
its modes, which are still being.
Consequently there is only a virtual distinction between being
and goodness; in fact, a virtual minor distinction, since being in­
cludes goodness actually and implicitly, but not explicitly. In other
words, the mode of goodness is not an extrinsic difference with
reference to being, as rationability is with reference to animality.
2 I Sent., d.3, q.3.

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217

SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER GOODNESS IS PRIOR IN IDEA TO BEING

State of the question. The Platonists taught that goodness is
prior to being. For Plato the supreme reality is the separate Idea of
Good? Likewise, Plotinus held that the supreme hypostasis is the
One-Good, the super-intelligence? According to this tendency some,
such as Scotus, said that the will, which is specified by good, is
simply superior to the intellect, which is specified by being.
St. Thomas, by way of a difficulty he puts to himself in the be­
ginning of the article, refers to the opinion of the Platonists in the
words of Dionysius who, among other names, assigned the first place
to good rather than to being. Likewise, in the counterargument the
Neoplatonist Proclus is quoted, the author of the book De causis.
Plato and Plotinus placed good above being and essence, because
every essence is intelligible, and the intelligible is the correlative
of intellect, and is distinct from it. Hence above the duality of in­
tellect and intelligible, there must be a higher and ineffable, a most
perfect unity, from which all things proceed, namely, the OneGood? But the divine causality is explained by the Platonists in­
dependently of the divine liberty, in that good is essentially
diffusive of itself. We already find this principle admitted by Plato,
who does not sufficiently distinguish between final causality and
efficient causality. It is also admitted by Plotinus, who held that
the supreme Good is essentially, or by a necessity of nature, diffu­
sive of itself, and not because of a most free creative act.
Contrary to this, St. Thomas, following Aristotle, correctly dis­
tinguishes between the final cause and the efficient cause, and he
maintains that good is diffusive of itself as the end which attracts
the agent to act? St. Thomas adds that in accordance with the
dogma of creation the supreme agent is absolutely free since He
already contains within Himself infinite goodness, and is not in
3 See Plato’s Republic, Bk. VII, 517, D; "In the world of knowledge the idea
of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and when seen is also
inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and good, and the
immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual world."
4 Cf. Enneades, Bk. Ill, ii, 12; V, i, 6; ii: 1; VI, viii, 9, 11.
5 The Neoplatonists speak of the One-Good, which transcends being, some­
what as subsequently Catholic theologians say that the Deity in some way tran­
scends all absolutely simple perfections, which are contained in it eminently. But
for the theologians, the Deity contains formally being, the one, the good; whereas,
contrary to this, the One of the Platonists virtually contained the inferior notes,
which necessarily proceeded from it.
tSumma theol., la, q.5, a.4; la Ilae, q.t, a.4 ad 1; Illa, q.i, a. 1; Contra Gentes,
Bk. IV, chap. 11.

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THE ONE GOD

need of created goods, which cannot increase His perfection and
happiness.7 The conclusion of St. Thomas is: In idea being is prior
to goodness.
This had been already proved by him,8 in that the idea of being
is included, as presupposed, in the idea of goodness, which is perfect
and desirable being. In this article, however, the same argument is
proposed as follows: That is prior in idea which is first conceived
by the intellect; but the first thing conceived by the intellect is
being; therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.
The major is not concerned with the order of time and investiga­
tion, according to which we first have a knowledge of sensible
things; it concerns, however, the order of nature and of formal
concepts or notions. But the notion of being is the first of all no­
tions. Why is this? It is because everything is intelligible inasmuch
as it is actual. Thus the proper object of the intellect, as such, and
not as it is human, is intelligible being,9 just as color is the first
thing visible, and sound the first thing audible. Hence every formal
concept or notion, for it to be intelligible, presupposes the concept
or notion of being.10
As Bannez remarks, St. Thomas is speaking of goodness in general.
From this it follows that, both in God and in created beings, being
is prior in idea to goodness. Being is included implicitly in good­
ness, and it implicitly includes goodness, as its transcendent mode.
St. Thomas deduces from this the following corollary: “If there­
fore the intellect and will are considered with regard to themselves,
then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we com­
pare their respective objects. For the object of the intellect (namely,
intelligible being) is simpler and more absolute than the object of
the will (which is goodness). Now the simpler and the more abstract
(and more universal) a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself
(at least as an object). . . . Thus the intellect is absolutely higher
and nobler than the will.” 11 Therefore it directs the will, knowing
the very concept of good in the good willed.
t Summa theol., la, q. ig, a.3.
s I Sent., d.8, q. 1, a. 3.
» The proper object of the human intellect as such is the nature of sensible
things, or intelligible being of sensible things in the mirror of sensible things.
1» Thus the notion of being is not in generation and time prior to that of
goodness, but it is prior simply, in the order of nature, just as essence is prior to
its properties. The reason for this priority is the principle already admitted by
Plato and Plotinus, that "the simpler and the more abstract a thing is, the
nobler and higher it is in itself” (Summa theol., la, q.82, a.3).
Thus the idea of being, while it is included in the idea of goodness, is some­
how already limited and contracted, because it can be found also in the ideas of
truth and unity.
11 Summa (heol·, la, q.82, a.3.

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219

Second conclusion. We discover this in the reply to the first objec­
tion, which states that goodness is relatively prior to being, that is,
as a cause, as the end is prior to the form. This is goodness con­
sidered not in itself, but with respect to something else.
To the Platonists and Neoplatonists, and particularly to Diony­
sius, St. Thomas makes the concession that, “among the names
signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being.” The
reason is that, in the order of causality, goodness conveys the idea
of end; but the end is the first in the order of causes, since it at­
tracts the agent to act, and by the agent the matter is prepared to
receive the form. Thus in this order of causality God is called the
supreme Good, or the good God.
Yet, absolutely speaking, it is still true to say that in idea being
is prior to goodness. By simpliciter is meant, if the essence of the
thing in question is discussed; but by secundum quid is meant, if
something secondary in this thing is considered. Thus a wise man
is simpliciter better than unwise Hercules; but as regards physical
strength, Hercules is better secundum quid. Simpliciter loquendo
means about the same as “absolutely speaking” or “in its primary
aspect,” whereas secundum quid means “in some secondary aspect.”
Thus being, "relatively” considered with respect to the four
causes, and not in itself, corresponds to the formal cause; for being
is predicated of a thing in so far as it is in actuality by reason of its
form, as in stone, wood, animal, or man. But the form, in the order
of causes, is posterior to the end and the agent, because it is pro­
duced by the agent operating in view of the end. Thus it must be
conceded to the Platonists that the supreme Good is prior to created
being, which is produced in manifestation of divine goodness. Like­
wise the supreme Good is prior to finite intelligence, the object of
which is finite good, in which God is known as in a mirror.
It may be asked whether St. Thomas gives us a correct statement
of Plato’s doctrine. It must be said that Plato, in calling God (or
the supreme reality) the supreme Good, considered God with refer­
ence to inferior realities, which He produces by a diffusion of Him­
self, to be the sun from which emanate light and heat. Hence Plato
said: Since God is good, He produced the world. Yet Plato and
Plotinus seem to hold also that good is absolutely prior to being.12
is Plato and Plotinus seem to admit that the One is indivisible, whereas being
is divided; and they identify the One with the Good. Thus they solve the argu­
ments of Parmenides by positing "the One-Good" above being, and explaining
causality, which Parmenides denied, in that good is essentially diffusive of itself.
On the contrary, St. Thomas and Aristotle solve the arguments of Parmenides
against multiplicity in being and motion by distinguishing between potentiality
and actuality. They also hold that unity, by the very fact that it is convertible
with being, is divided, like being, into potentiality and actuality.

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THE ONE GOD

If such is the case, then St. Thomas on this point separates from
them. Hence we conclude that in idea being is prior to goodness
absolutely, but posterior to it relatively, namely, in causation.
Corollary to the second conclusion. The will is relatively prior to
the intellect (namely, in moving to the exercise of the act). Thus
the intellect in the exercise of its act, or attention to its object, is
moved by the will. Thus at the end of deliberation it is the will
that causes the final judgment to be final. Likewise, as stated by St.
Thomas,13 in this life “the love of God is better than the knowledge
of God,” because, whereas the intellect draws God to itself, to its
imperfect conception of Him, the will is drawn to God, since good­
ness is in things and not in the mind. So also, though seeing is abso­
lutely nobler than hearing, yet the hearing of a beautiful symphony
is nobler than the seeing of something mediocre.
It must be observed that St. Thomas, at the end of the reply to
the first objection, gives us a good explanation why the Platonists
held that goodness applies to more things than being does. The
reason is that in their opinion being does not apply to matter,
which they thought to be a privation and non-being. Yet they said:
Matter manifests its appetency for good.
On the contrary, St. Thomas and Aristotle, distinguishing matter
from privation or non-being, declare it to be, indeed, a real potency
or a real capacity for receiving a form, and thus matter is being in
potentiality, for example, it is in potentiality to receive the form
of either air, wood, or animal. Hence being is just as extensive in
application as goodness; in fact, it is more universal than goodness,
for not every being is perfect and appetible.14
The following objection may be raised against the first conclu­
sion: Goodness is absolutely more perfect than being because it in­
cludes being and its perfection.
Reply. It is true to say this of the suppositum or subject, about
which good is predicated; but it is not true to say this of the formal
concept of goodness. This means that the suppositum, which is
said to be absolutely good, such as wine of the best vintage, is
more perfect than the suppositum which is only being, such as wine
not of the best vintage. But the formal concept of goodness is by
nature posterior to the formal concept of being, which is simpler,
more abstract and more universal, and thus more perfect as an
object.
But I insist. Although animality is simpler than humanity, yet it
is more imperfect.
is Summa theol., la, q.82, a.3.
ulbid., q.5, a.2 ad 2um et 3um.

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Reply. It is simpler logically, since it is the genus of humanity;
but it is not so really, because it is derived from matter, which has
not the unity, simplicity, and perfection of a form, especially of
man’s form, which is the intellectual soul.
This article, however, is concerned with being and goodness, not
only in their logical aspect, but as they are realities. It must be
conceded that only the concrete suppositum which is good, is a more
perfect suppositum than if it were not good. But St. Thomas is not
speaking in this article of the good as suppositum, but of the idea
of goodness, which is viewed, however, ontologically and not merely
logically. Being, which is prior to goodness, derives its name from
existence, namely, from its ultimate actuality. This must be our
reply to the Neoplatonists and also to Scotus.
Thus the intellect truly is absolutely nobler than the will, be­
cause it is specified by being (that is, the faculty is specified by the
object, and not by the suppositum), so that the will is specified by
this object that is good, viewed as such, but it is not specified by the
good as suppositum.
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER EVERY BEING IS GOOD

State of the question. It seems that not every being is good, for
good adds perfection and desirableness to being. Matter, however,
is being, but it has not the aspect of desirableness. Likewise Aris­
totle says: "In mathematics goodness does not exist." 1S
The conclusion, however, is: Every being, as being, is good.
This doctrine is of faith against the Manichaeans, who said that
some beings are good, and some are evil, in accordance with their
error of a twofold principle. The Scripture says: "And God saw all
the things that He had made, and they were very good.” 18
The conclusion is proved from reason as follows:
Perfect presents the aspect of what is desirable and good;17 but
every being, inasmuch as it is being, is actual and in some way per­
fect; therefore every being, inasmuch as it is being, is good.
This means to say, as remarked above,18 that every being is such
simply and good relatively, in that it has at least its essence and
existence, even though it is not good simply. Thus every wine, proI» Metaph., Bk. HI, ii, 4.
18 Gen., 1: 31.
17 See supra, a. 1.
sb Ibid., ad mm.

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THE ONE GOD

vided it still is wine and not vinegar, can be said to be good, or not
corrupt, although it is not the best of wine.
Reply to first objection. Good does not contract being to any of
the predicamental modes, that is, it does not limit being to any
category, such as substance, quantity ... ; however, goodness is a
transcendental mode of being that is not so universal as being it­
self. For being applies also to unity and truth.
Reply to second objection. Evil is the privation of any good that
is due to any subject.
Reply to third objection. Prime matter is being in potentiality
and good in potentiality. Moreover, it implies goodness for the
composite to have its matter, which cannot exist without it.
Reply to fourth objection. “In mathematics goodness does not
exist,” because it abstracts from motion and end. Wherefore
Spinoza, who sought to proceed geometrically in metaphysics, ex­
cluded the efficient and final causes from the subject matter of
metaphysics. He wanted to deduce everything from God, just as the
properties of a triangle are deduced from its nature.
Thus the foregoing consideration sufficiently explains goodness
with reference to being, which does not differ really but logically
from being, and which is absolutely posterior to being. Every being
is good at least relatively, although it frequently is lacking in that
perfection by which it could be said to be good absolutely. In the
two following articles goodness is considered, not in its relation to
being, but as it is in itself.
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOODNESS HAS THE ASPECT OF A FINAL CAUSE

State of the question. The difficulty is that Dionysius often says
that goodness is self-diffusive.19 But to be diffusive implies the aspect
of an efficient cause. Also St. Augustine says: “We exist, because
God is good.” 20
The conclusion, however, is: Goodness has the aspect of a final
cause.
1) It is proved on the authority of Aristotle, for he thus defines
the end and the good as “that for the sake of which something is
done.” 21
2) It is proved by reason as follows: The desirable has the aspect
of an end; but goodness is desirable; therefore goodness has the as­
pect of an end, at least as regards the act of the one desiring; and
19 De nom. div., chap. 4.
20 De doctr. christ., chap. 31.
22 Physics, Bk. II.

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223

it can be desirable either because it is pleasant (as a fruit), or be­
cause it is useful (as a bitter medicine), or because it is virtuous.22
There is furthermore another conclusion in the body of the ar­
ticle, which may be enunciated as follows: Goodness is the first in
causation and the last in being, because the end is the first in causa­
tion, in the order of intention, since it attracts the agent to act; and
the end is the last in being, or in the order of execution. Thus the
generator tends to reproduce its form, for instance, fire tends to
reproduce the form of fire, the ox the form of an ox, and the form
of the thing generated terminates the passive generation, and after­
ward what is generated is made perfect. Thus when the animal
acquires its complete development, then it is perfectly like the one
generating.
Reply to first objection. Goodness and beauty differ logically, for
goodness relates to the appetite, whereas beauty relates to the cog­
nitive faculty; for things are said to be beautiful that please the
eye.23 Thus beauty is the splendor of form in material things, as in
the rose or the lily; but if it is a case of intellectual beauty, then it
is the splendor of truth or the irradiation of some principle in the
many conclusions deduced from it. In like manner the splendor
manifesting itself in a life of heroic moral acts constitutes moral
beauty; transcending all, we have the sublime, when there is the
greatest of diversity in the closest of unity, as in Holy Communion:
O wonderful thing, he that is poor, and a servant, and lowly, eateth
the Lord.
Beauty seems to be a transcendental property of being, for every­
thing produced by the divine artist is beautiful; but every being is
produced by the divine artist as the author of nature; therefore
every being is beautiful, at least according to its nature or essence,
for it conveys to us some idea of God. But integral beauty, as seen
in God, in Christ, in the Blessed Virgin Mary, is splendor of being
according to unity, truth, and goodness, that is, splendor and har­
mony of all the properties of being.
Reply to second objection. There is a brief solution of the diffi­
culty arising from the Platonist conception, that goodness is selfdiffusive: and this pertains to the efficient cause. St. Thomas replies:
“Goodness is described as self-diffusive, as being the end,” namely,
in that it attracts the agent to act, and the appetite to desire. But
as remarked farther on,24 by way of a logical sequence, goodness is
an active diffusion inasmuch as the agent operates effectively be­
22 Summa theol., la, q.5, a.6.
23 Ibid., q.39, a.8, where it is stated that three conditions are required for the
pleasing effect of beauty, namely, integrity, due proportion, and clarity.
2« Ibid., la, q.19, a.ï.

THE ONE GOD

S24

cause of the end intended, and this either by a necessity of nature,
as the ox generates an ox, or else freely, as when man communicates
his knowledge to others or exhorts them to good.
Hence St. Thomas says: “It belongs to the essence of goodness
to communicate itself to others. Hence it belongs to the essence of
the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to
tire creature, and this is brought about chiefly by . . . (the incar­
nation of the Word).” 26 Thus self-diffusion primarily belongs to
the end as attracting, and afterward to the agent. But God is not
necessitated, however, in His external operations, but is absolutely
free, for He is in no need of finite goods,20 and He operates to mani­
fest His goodness, as will be stated farther on.
Therefore, when the Neoplatonists said: “Goodness is essentially
self-diffusive,” they did not sufficiently distinguish between the
agent and the end, and so they unwarrantably asserted that God
operates externally by a necessity of His nature, as the sun diffuses
heat and light in the air. The consequence of this was pantheistic
emanatism, which is contrary to the dogma of an absolutely free
creation.
Reply to third objection. The saying of St. Augustine, "We exist,
because God is good,” refers to the final cause. This means that we
exist because God willed to manifest His goodness in loving and
creating us; thus we receive a certain participation of the divine
goodness. Therefore goodness has the aspects of an end.
FIFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOODNESS CONSISTS IN MODE, SPECIES, AND
ORDER

State of the question. It is concerned with causated good, as
Cajetan says, and this is manifest from the counterargument, which
quotes the following definition of goodness given by St. Augustine,
as consisting “in everything which God has made.”
The reply in the affirmative is thus presented: “For a thing to
be perfect and good it must have a form together with all that pre­
cedes and follows upon that form,” for everything is what it is by
its form. But the form is itself signified by the species, that which
is prerequired for it by the mode, and that which follows
upon it by the order. Thus the form of a fruit constitutes it
in a certain species; but this presupposes the mode of commensuration of the material and efficient principles, for instance, of the
25 /bid., IHa, q. 1, a. 1.
*e Ibid., la, q. 19, a.3.

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225

earth and the sun, so that the fruit may attain its ripeness. Finally,
in the fruit there is order toward an end, for instance, the pres­
ervation of life in man. Likewise these three conditions are re­
quired so that one may be a good painter, a good sculptor, or a
good musician. The mode is required for the acquisition of the art,
and its order for the end. Thus goodness demands the congruent
concurrence of the four causes, because the end is last in the order
of execution. Thus the reason is assigned for this descriptive defini­
tion given by St. Augustine.
SIXTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOODNESS IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO THE VIRTUOUS, THE
USEFUL, AND THE PLEASANT

State of the question. This question is concerned with transcen­
dental goodness, but in the formal and not in the material sense of
the term. Good in the material sense, subjectively considered, is
divided into the ten categories. Thus we speak of a good substance,
a good quantity, a good quality. . . . Goodness in the formal sense,
however, is divided according to the idea of goodness, namely as it
is something perfect and desirable. But this division is the founda­
tion for the notion of moral goodness, which is virtuous goodness
that is in conformity with the rules of moral action, that is, with
the eternal law and right reason.27
Certain difficulties are raised against this division. (1) It seems
better to divide transcendental goodness by the ten categories in
which it is found. (2) This division is not made by members that
are opposites to one another, for some thing, for instance, a virtue,
is both objectively good and pleasant. (3) There is the aspect of end
in goodness, but there is no such aspect in the useful.
The conclusion, however, is affirmative.
1) It is proved on the authority of St. Ambrose,28 who gives the
aforesaid division, which he found in Cicero’s works. It was already
given by Aristotle.20 Thus Aristotle distinguishes between three
kinds of friendship, in so far as it is the foundation for goodness
that is either useful, or pleasant, or virtuous. This last kind is
friendship among the virtuous. This classical division is found in
the writings of St. Augustine and Dionysius. The Master of the
Sentences divided the subject matter of theology, according as some
parts are useful, but as other parts are virtuous and capable of
being enjoyed by us.
2T [bid., la Hae, q. 18.
28 De officiis, Bk. I, chap. 9.
so Ethics, Bk. I, chap. 5.

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THE ONE GOD

This classical division, however, is not retained by the Epicu­
reans who, like all materialists and sensualists, belittle virtuous good,
and consider that goodness consists only in what is useful and pleas­
ant. Thus they recommend a virtuous life only as a means of avoid­
ing the inconveniences of vices that are in opposition to one an­
other, and not because the object of virtue demands our love.
2) The genuineness of this classical division is proved from rea­
son, for it applies, as St. Thomas says, not only to human goodness,
but to goodness as such. A good division has its foundation in the
formal aspect of the whole that is to be divided, and so it is with this
division. For goodness, inasmuch as it is desirable, terminates the
movement of the appetite. But this terminus is either the means
(and thus it is called the useful), or it is the ultimate end, as the
thing desired for its own sake (and thus it is called the virtuous),
or else it is the ultimate end in the form of rest in the thing (and
thus it is called the pleasant). This division properly has its founda­
tion in the formal aspect of the whole that is to be divided, and it
is effected by parts that are opposites to one another. Thus the
division is not accidental, but essential and adequate.
We must particularly insist on the definition of virtuous good.
It is that good which is desired for its own sake, as stated in the
body of this article, and the reply to the second objection says
that "the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in them­
selves,” that is, regardless of any pleasure or usefulness resulting
from it, as in the case of telling the truth even though death or
martyrdom may be the result of this. As St. Thomas says else­
where,30 honest means the same as worthy of honor, and is indeed
the object of virtue, and the source of spiritual elegance and beauty.
It is also called rational or moral goodness, in so far as it is in
conformity with right reason, as the object of the upright will.
Reply to first objection. This division is derived formally in ac­
cordance with the formal aspect of goodness, and not materially
according as the subject serves as the foundation for this.
Reply to second objection. “This division is not by opposite
things but by opposite aspects.” Therefore the same thing, such as
a virtue, can be both virtuous and pleasant, and even useful as re­
gards the ultimate end.
However, those things are properly called pleasant that are only
pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Likewise
those things are properly called useful that are only useful, as
money and bitter medicine. St. Thomas shows elsewhere 81 that the
virtuous is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite; that
«0 Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.145, a.i, 2; la Ilae, q.39, a.a.
Ibid., Ha Ilae, q. 145, a.3.

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227

the pleasant is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite,
and that nothing repugnant to virtuous good is absolutely and
truly useful, but relatively so.
Reply to third objection. Goodness is not divided into these three
as something univocal, but as something analogical; and it is
predicated chiefly of the virtuous, secondly of the pleasant, and
lastly of the useful.
First corollary. In this division we have the principle for the
refutation of hedonism and utilitarianism, namely, of the false
ethics that has its foundation in the pleasant and the useful, but
not in the virtuous good. But the sensualists cannot truly preserve
in their system the idea of virtuous good, which is good as such,
regardless of the pleasure and usefulness resulting from it, as in the
case of suffering martyrdom for the love of divine truth.
Second corollary. The first principle of ethics is: “We must do
good and avoid evil.” The reference here is to virtuous good toward
which our rational nature is inclined by its Author.32 Hence when
a person comes fully to the use of reason, such person must love
efficaciously the virtuous good for its own sake, and this more than
himself. But this implies that confusedly or implicitly, though
efficaciously, God, the author of nature and the supreme good, is
loved more than oneself. But since this efficacious love, in the state
of fallen nature, is impossible without a healing grace, which is also
elevating,33 St. Thomas, speaking of the age of reason, concludes:
“If he (the child) then directs himself to the due end, he will by
means of grace receive the remission of original sin,” 34 namely,
by baptism of desire. This remark alone suffices now, so as to show
clearly how virtuous good transcends the pleasant and useful.
Doubt. It may be asked whether the brute beast tends at least
materially toward the virtuous good that is proportionate to its
natural inclination, although it has no knowledge of the end or
of the virtuous as such.
We reply in the affirmative with St. Thomas, who says: “Every­
thing (whatsoever creature) naturally loves God more than itself
. . . since each part (in the universe of created things) naturally
loves the whole more than itself. And each individual naturally
loves the good of the species more than its own individual good.” 35
Thus the malice of onanism is clearly seen, for it is against the
good of the species and of its preservation. In like manner St.
Thomas in commenting on these words of Christ, “How often
32 Ibid.,
33 Ibid.,
3< Ibid.,
’3 Ibid.,

la Ilae, 9.94, a. 2.
q.109, a.3.
q.89, a. 6.
la, q.6o, a.5 ad nun; see also la, q.6, a. 1 ad sum; Ila Ilae, q.26, a.3.

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THE ONE GOD

would I have gathered thy children together as the hen gathers her
young under her wings, but thou wouldst not!” has this to say:
“The hen, feeling concerned about her young, defends them, and
gathers them under her wings. So also Christ takes pity on us, and
truly bore our infirmities.” 36 From this we clearly see how sublime
is virtuous good, which is already materially present in the nobler
actions of animals, so that Christ speaking of generosity could ap­
peal to this example of the lower order, an example that is known
to all.
And so with this we bring to a close the question of goodness
in general.
This question gives us the nominal definition of goodness (that
which all things desire), its real definition (perfect and desirable
being), its relation to being and to causality, and also its division
into the virtuous, the pleasant, and the useful.
In Matt., 23: 37.

CHAPTER VI
Question 6

The Goodness

of

God

In this question there are four points of inquiry. It treats first of

God as He is in Himself, and then in His relation to creatures.
The first two articles consider the question of God’s goodness:
whether God is good, and whether He is the supreme good. After
this there is a discussion of the mode in which goodness belongs to
God, namely, whether He alone is essential goodness. Lastly, the
question is discussed, whether all things are good by the divine
goodness, at least in so far as all things proceed from the divine
goodness and tend toward it.
Therefore it treats of ontological goodness, by which God is good
and desirable in Himself, and according to which He is the end
of all things and the supreme agent communicating to creatures all
good things they receive.
But this ontological goodness is the foundation of benevolence
or of the love of benevolence, and it is also the foundation of jus­
tice and mercy, these being discussed by St. Thomas after his ques­
tion about the divine will, since justice and mercy are, so to speak,
virtues of the divine will.1 We must draw special attention to this,
for many already expect that tire discussion of God’s goodness
means a discussion of His love of benevolence.
In this question it will be seen that St. Thomas proceeds by the
way of affirmation and excellence, since goodness is a positive at­
tribute. The middle term of the demonstration in these articles
is the first efficient Cause (second proof of God’s existence). For
the first efficient Cause is the source of all good, and hence it is
thus a posteriori evident that this Cause is the essential Good.
FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD IS GOOD

State of the question. Among philosophers, Plato had said that
the supreme reality is the subsistent good. Aristotle, too, says that
God is pure Act and, as the end or the supreme good, attracts or
i Summa theol., la, q. 19-21.
449

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THE ONE GOD

draws all things to Himself. Several historians maintain that God,
according to Aristotle, is only the end of all things, but not the
efficient cause. Certainly Aristotle did not get so far as to admit
the idea of a free creation from nothing; but he did not deny that
God is in some way the efficient cause of the change in things, and
of things themselves. In this question St. Thomas shows that God
would not manifest Himself to us as the supreme good and the
ultimate end of all things, unless He were the supreme efficient
cause. But with this admission, there must be an application of
the following principles, namely, that every agent acts with an
end in view, and the order of agents must correspond to the order
of ends, and the supreme agent to the ultimate end.
The reply of the article is this: Since God is the first effective
cause of all things, evidently the aspect of good and of desirable­
ness belong to Him.
1) This truth is revealed in countless passages of Holy Scripture,
and is, so to speak, more than of the faith; for if God’s goodness
is denied there would be nothing left of Christian faith; this denial
would be, in a certain sense, something more than heresy, for the
heretic denies something and retains something; but with the denial
of God’s goodness there would be nothing left of the Christian
mysteries.
From the Holy Scripture the following text is quoted: “The
Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh
Him.” 2 In like manner Christ says: “Why askest thou Me concern­
ing good? One is good, God.” 3
Manichaeism is condemned, which denies that the supreme Good
is the sole principle and source of all goodness.4 Against this heresy
the Council of Florence defined that “God is the creator of all
things visible and invisible, who when He willed, of His goodness
created all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal; the good, in­
deed, because they were made by the supreme Good; but they are
changeable, because they were made from nothing; and it (the
Church) asserts that no nature is evil, because every nature as
such, is good.” 5 In like manner, the Vatican Council says: “God
of His goodness ... to manifest His perfection which He bestows
on creatures . . . created them out of nothing.3
2) The reply is proved from reason as follows: The effective cause
is desirable and good as regards its effects (thus the father is so as
2 Lam. 3: 25.
x
» Matt. 19: 17.
« Denz., nos. 234 f., 367, 707, 710.
» Ibid., no. 706.
« Ibid., no. 1783.

THE GOODNESS OF GOD

231

regards his children); but God is the first effective cause of all
things (2nd, 3d, 4th, and 5th proofs of God’s existence); therefore
God is good as regards all creatures.
The major is proved as follows: The proper perfection of the
effect is its likeness to the agent, for every agent makes its like;
but everything seeks its own perfection; therefore everything seeks
to be like its efficient cause. But if the likeness of the efficient cause
is desirable, then a fortiori the effective cause itself is desirable.
Some object that this argument is very involved for the affirma­
tion of this most simple truth: God is good.
We reply by saying that this rather involved argument is ex­
pressed more simply by the Christian mind when it is said that
God, inasmuch as He is the source of all good things, is in the
highest degree good.7
But this argument brings out more clearly this great law of
progressive development in all created things, namely, that the per­
fection of anything whatever is for it to be like its cause. Thus the
perfection of the boy is that he becomes a man, just as his father
is who begot him. In like manner the perfection of the disciple
is for him to become like his master. Hence it is natural for the
son to love his father, just as it is natural for the father to love
his son; but the father’s love is stronger because it is the love of
one who is the cause.8
Hence because God is the first effective cause of all things, evi­
dently He is good. Thus men and especially apostolic men, must
manifest His goodness, by laboring effectively as true causes for
the salvation of souls. They must have the goodness of a true in­
termediate cause which is intimately united with the supreme
Cause of salvation. Thus the apostles are the salt of the earth and
the light of the world, provided they receive the power to live an
interior life not from inferiors but from God, who is the source
of life. If the apostolic man is thus the true intermediate cause of
salvation, he will certainly be desirable and desired, and all will
say, as was said of the saints, whose effective influence was an
evident manifestation of their goodness, how good he is. This ap­
plies far more so to God Himself. This is the profound meaning
of this article, which at first sight seems very abstract and meta­
physical, and yet there is in it some reference to the intimate life
of a spiritual and apostolic man. In fact, the doctrine of this article
is above sentimentalism, and is truly Christian realism.
This will be made much clearer to us in a subsequent article in
which it is stated that “the love of God infuses and creates good1 Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3: fourth proof of God’s existence.
8 See reply to second objection in this article.

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THE ONE GOD

ness in things,” e for His love does not presuppose lovableness in
creatures, but posits or creates, preserves and increases, this in them.
Thus goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds
by way of love as personal love.
Reply to first objection. Mode, species, and order, which give us
the descriptive definition of goodness, are in God as in the One who
is the cause of order.
Reply to second objection. That which all creatures either know­
ingly or unknowingly love is a certain participated similitude of
the divine goodness; thus when the hen gathers her chickens under
her wings, she is loving the good or conservation of her species.10
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD IS THE SUPREME GOOD

State of the question. It is still a question whether there is such
goodness in God. Certainly it is of faith that God is supremely, in
fact, infinitely, good.
The same middle term is employed in proving this from reason
as in proving the conclusion of the preceding article. It is as
follows: In the univocal cause the likeness of an effect is found uni­
formly, but in the higher and non-univocal, cause it is found emi­
nently; but goodness belongs to God as the supreme effective cause
of all things, which is non-univocal, yet transcending every genus;
therefore goodness belongs to God in a most excellent way. For
“all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause.”
However, the objections of this article are of minor importance,
but they are formulated, such as they are, in accordance with the
scholastic method of the thirteenth century.
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER TO BE ESSENTIALLY GOOD BELONGS
TO GOD ALONE

State of the question. Essential goodness is set in opposition to
participated goodness. This article is the explanation of our Lord’s
words when He said: “None is good but God alone.” 11
The reply is in the affirmative; and its proof is the synthesis of
what St. Thomas already wrote in another of his works,12 and is
» Summa theol., la, q.20, a.2.
io See Plato’s Phedrus (on beauty) and his Symposium (banquet on love, toward
the end).
H Luke 18: 19.
VDe veritate, q.21, a.5.

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233

reduced to this syllogism: A thing is good in so far as it is perfect,
(1) according to its being, (2) as to its operative principles, (3)
according as it attains its end; but this threefold perfection belongs
to God essentially, because He alone is His own existence, His own
action, and His own end; therefore essential goodness belongs
properly to God, and all else is goodness by participation.
The difficulty is that St. Thomas, in virtue of the minor, con­
cludes rather that only God is essentially good, whereas he intended
to conclude that only God is the Good essentially, not by par­
ticipation, that is, He does not participate in goodness. These two
conclusions are not however universally the same; for Socrates is
by reason of his essence a man, and yet he is not man per es­
sentiam, but by participation. For it is only the “separate man,” of
which Plato speaks, who would be man per essentiam or the arche­
type of man.
In reply to this it must be said that in God, though nowhere else,
these two modes of predication coincide, or, as Cajetan says, coin­
cide "because of their matter.” This means that not only does it
follow from the argument of St. Thomas that God is essentially
good, but also that He is the Good per essentiam; for God not only
has goodness, but He is the very plenitude of being, or He is the
supreme perfection, hence supremely desirable, or, in other words,
He is bonum per essentiam.
On the contrary, although Socrates is by reason of his essence a
man, yet he is not his humanity; for humanity is an essential part
in him, and Socrates has this; but he is not his humanity.13
Reply to first and third objections. Anything whatever is one or
undivided by reason of its essence, but it is not absolutely good by
reason of its essence, but because of a superadded perfection.
Reply to second objection. “The essence of a created thing is not
its existence,” 14 and this is true before the mind considers it. Thus,
in the teaching of St. Thomas, created essence and existence, which
are not included in one and the same concept, are really distinct.
We can find any number of similar expressions in his works.
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE GOOD BY THE DIVINE GOODNESS

State of the question. This article was written to refute Plato’s
error, who held that the species of things are separate entities
from individual things; in like manner, he held that the goodness
of things is a separate entity from them, so that things are called
is Summa theol., la, q.3, a.3; Illa, q.a, a. a.
14 Ibid., la, q.3, a.4.

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THE ONE GOD

good by extrinsic denomination and by a certain participation, the
nature of which is a secret of Platonism.
This teaching is the result of absolute realism, which maintains
that the universal exists not only fundamentally but formally,
apart from the thing in which it is found, or that it exists extramentally. Thus universal being is confused with the divine being,
universal good with the divine good. In other words, the universal
in predication is confused with the universal in being and causa­
tion. The pupils of Gilbert de la Porrée revived this extreme
realism in the Middle Ages.
St. Thomas already examined this question in another of his
works.” He now briefly recalls to mind Plato’s opinion and con­
cludes: Everything is called good from its own goodness formally
and intrinsically as such, and it is called good from the divine
goodness as from the effective and exemplary principle of all good­
ness.
The proof of the first part of this conclusion, which is against
absolute realism, is that the species of things are not separated
from them, any more than entity, unity, and goodness of things
are separated from them. Everything is called formally good by
intrinsic denomination, or by reason of its own goodness, which
in an individual thing is its individual goodness. Thus the uni­
versal does not exist formally outside the mind, but fundamentally
inasmuch as in individual things the similarity is either specific,
generic, or analogical.
The proof of the second part of the conclusion is clearly deduced
from the fourth proof of God’s existence, since more and less are
predicated of different things according as they resemble in their
different ways something which is the maximum; for multitude
does not explain the idea of unity of similarity to be found in them,
and everything that is a compound (of receptive capacity and re­
ceived perfection) needs a cause.
Hence Plato unwarrantably posited a separate or essential man,
because man cannot exist apart from matter, and bones and flesh
cannot exist unless they are the bones and flesh of this particular
person. But he had a good reason for contending that there is a
separate and essential Good. Yet he did not sufficiently distinguish
this from universal good; and so we must say that in Platonism
there is a pantheistic trend, which is more accentuated in the neces­
sary emanatism of the Neoplatonists, which is radically in opposi­
tion to the dogmatic teaching of an absolutely free creation.
St. Thomas does not explicitly refute Manichaeism in this
is De veritate, q.21, a.4.

THE GOODNESS OF GOD

235

sixth question, because he does this later on when discussing the
problem of evil.1® But this heresy is virtually refuted, since the
supreme principle of all things, as stated, is the essential Good.
is Summa theol., la, <1-47-49.

CHAPTER Vil
Question 7
The Infinity

of

God

After a consideration of the divine perfection, the question of

God’s infinity is discussed, because infinity is a mode of perfection
of the divine nature and of every divine attribute. This question
considers infinity in the divine nature, and is not concerned with
the mode of this infinity in this or that particular divine attribute,
such as wisdom or power.
First we consider God’s infinity, then we discuss whether any­
thing except God can be essentially infinite, or at least infinite in
magnitude or multitude.
FIRST ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD IS INFINITE

State of the question. It concerns infinity of perfection or infinite
perfection. The difficulty is: (1) that infinity is attributed also to
matter, since there is in matter an infinite capacity for receiving
all kinds of forms; (2) that it is attributed likewise to quantity,
which can always be increased, as a series of days can; (3) that the
coexistence of the finite and the infinite seems an impossibility,
for, if the infinite in magnitude exists, no place is left for the
finite.
The reply is in the affirmative, however, and it is of faith that
God is infinite, or infinitely perfect.
1) Several texts in Holy Scripture assert this. Thus we read:
“Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised; and of His greatness
there is no end.” 1 The Vatican Council declared: “God is incom­
prehensible and infinite in all perfection.” 2
2) The reply is proved from reason by the following fundamental
argument, which St. Thomas considers a simple corollary of the
assertion that God is the self-subsisting Being.3
Whereas matter is called infinite by an infinity of imperfection,
1 Ps., 144: 3; also Bar. 3: 25.
2 Denz., no. 1782.
• Summa theol., la, q.3, a. 4.
236

THE INFINITY OF GOD

237

the unreceived form is infinite by an infinity of perfection, at least
relatively so. Thus if whiteness were not received in anything, it
would have the total perfection of whiteness without any limit.
But being is the most formal of all things, as it is the actuality of
forms themselves. Therefore being that is not received in anything
—and this being is God—is infinite by an infinity of perfection,
and not merely relatively as included in some genus as would be
the case with whiteness that is not received in anything, but is so
absolutely, transcending every genus.
The major is explained in the beginning of tire body of this
article. The ancient philosophers of the Ionian school, such as
Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Heraclitus, attributed infini­
tude to the first principle because it is the source of an infinity of
things. But they erred about the nature of the first principle, con­
sidering it to be something material, such as water, air, or fire.
Hence they erred about its infinity, which they thought was some­
thing material and quantitative as consisting in an infinitely ex­
tended body. But infinity of matter is infinity of imperfection or
something privative in that matter, which is pure potentiality and
lacking in all determination, since it is made finite by the form, is
perfected or determined by it.
On the contrary, the form is limited by the matter in which it
is received, and the form considered in itself, or as not received
in anything, has an infinity of perfection, since it is unlimited and
is infinitely capable of being participated in, as in the case of
whiteness. Hence if whiteness were not received in anything, it
would have the total perfection of whiteness without any limit and
would be infinitely perfect in a restricted sense, that is, in the
genus of whiteness, though not of heat. Hence the common asser­
tion: Matter is determined by the form, and the form is limited by
the matter in which it is received. Thus determination is perfec­
tion or action; whereas limitation is imperfection.4 It is a question
of the form as such, which is thus infinitely perfect in a relative
sense, if it is not received in anything. But such a form (for in­
stance, that of an ox) is perfected together with matter, without
which it cannot exist.
The minor, however, is evident, namely, that being is the most
formal of all things, since it is the actuality of the forms them­
selves.5 Therefore being that is not received in anything, which
is God, is infinite with an infinity of perfection, and absolutely so.
4 Not understanding this distinction between determination and limitation,
Spinoza said: "Every determination is a negation." In truth, God is in the highest
degree determined or perfect, but He is unlimited.
» Summa theol., la, q.4, a.i.

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THE ONE GOD

Thus St. Thomas makes the transition from the relative infinity—
for instance, of whiteness, that cannot be limited by matter; or of
Michaelness, that is not indeed limited by matter—to the absolute
infinity of the self-subsisting and unreceived Being, who is not
limited by an essence which is distinct from Himself and in which
He would be received.
Reply to the first and second objections. The infinity which is
attributed to quantity has reference to matter and therefore does
not apply to God.
Reply to third objection. Pure Act or being that is not received
in any other is really and essentially distinct from every finite be­
ing; for every finite being is a compound of limiting essence and of
limited or participated existence. Thus is solved the difficulty of
the coexistence of the finite and the infinite. The existence of the
infinite does not prevent the existence of the finite, which is dis­
tinct from it. Even if it were to prevent the existence of the finite,
this would be because the infinite could not produce anything ex­
ternal to itself; and thus this being would not be infinite, because
the power of causing, or infinite power, would be denied this be­
ing. The infinite being can indeed not create, because He was
most free in creating; but He must of necessity have the power to
create.®
Objection of Suarez. Suarez, who came after Scotus, says that the
aforesaid argument presented by St. Thomas presupposes some­
thing not admitted by all theologians, namely, the real distinction
between created essence and existence. In fact, Suarez denies this
distinction and says: ‘‘Being is not finite, because it is received in
some other; and it is not infinite, because it is not received in any
other.” 7
In reply to this, we say with John of St. Thomas8 that, even apart
from the direct consideration of the real distinction between es­
sence and existence, the reason given by St. Thomas is still cogent.
Indeed, before we consider that the existence of the creature is re­
ceived subjectively in the created essence and is really distinct
from it, we see that it is received objectively and by participation,
since it is produced contingently by God and contingently belongs
to the subject, which does not have to exist. On the contrary, self­
subsisting Being is not received in any other objectively and by
participation, because it is not produced, and is not a contingent
but a necessary predicate of the subject.
But from this it follows that God alone is His own existence,
«Ibid., q.45, a.5.
T De attributis Dei, Bk. Ill, chap. 1.
« In lam, q.7, a. 1.

THE INFINITY OF GOD

239

and that contrary to this the creature,9 before any consideration on
our part, is not its existence, but has existence, just as matter is
not form, but receives it. Thus it remains true, as St. Thomas says,
that there is a real distinction between created essence and exist­
ence, and this for three reasons: (1) because actuality (which of it­
self is unlimited), is de facto limited only by the real capacity in
which it is received; (2) because created essence and existence can­
not be reduced to the same concept (as animality and rationality are
reduced to the concept of humanity); (3) because existence is a
contingent predicate for every creature, and is not included in the
adequate concept of its essence.
But how does Suarez prove God's infinity? He proves that God
is infinite because no being can be thought of greater than God;
whereas it is possible to think of something greater than any finite
being whatever.10
As John of St. Thomas remarks,11 even St. Thomas proposed this
argument;12 but it does not bring out clearly what is the very
foundation and reason for God’s essential infinity, since it does not
take as its starting point the very lack of terms limiting His exist­
ence.
On the contrary, when it is said that God is the self-subsisting
and unreceived Being, the reason is given for His infinite perfec­
tion, just as, if whiteness were of itself subsistent and unreceived,
it would have all the perfection of whiteness without limitation.
The self-subsisting and unreceived Being has, without limitation,
all the plenitude of being.
St. Thomas shows farther on 13 that there cannot be two angels
of the same species, because the angel’s nature is a subsistent form,
which is not received in matter and is not capable of being par­
ticipated in by matter. Thus, by the very fact that Michaelness
is not received in any other, it is relatively infinite; the Deity, how­
ever, is absolutely infinite. Briefly stated: God is supremely deter­
mined or perfect, and therefore unlimited. The reference is to
intensive infinite perfection.
But from the infinity of God's being is derived the infinite per­
fection of His operation, namely, of His intellection, love, and
power: for operation follows being, and the mode of operation fol­
lows the mode of being.1·*
* Summa theol., la, q.3, a.4.
>0 De attributis Dei, loc. cit.
In lam, q.7, a.i, no. 19.
12 Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 43, §§ 7 f.
is Summa theol., la, q.50, a.4.
nibid., q.25, a. 2.

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THE ONE GOD
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER ANYTHING BUT GOD CAN BE ESSENTIALLY INFINITE

State of the question. This article is written for the purpose of
distinguishing more clearly between absolute infinity and relative
infinity. It begins by proposing three difficulties. (1) Why cannot
God produce anything infinite, since His power is infinite? (2) The
human intellect, for the very reason that it has knowledge of the
universal, has infinite power in knowing all the singulars con­
tained in the universal. (3) Prime matter itself is said to be in­
finite.
Conclusion. Things other than God can be relatively infinite,
but not absolutely infinite.
This conclusion is of faith. Only God is infinitely perfect, "in­
effably exalted above all things besides Himself which exist or are
conceivable” 16 as the Vatican Council says.
The reason is that absolute infinity is the infinity of the being
that is not received in any other, and there can be only one such
infinity, just as, if whiteness were not received in any other, there
would be but one whiteness.
However, immaterial forms, such as Michaelness, are relatively
infinite with an infinity of perfection. Thus Michael has all the
perfection that belongs to his species.18 Infinity that is said to be
secundum quid is also relative, or as referring to some genus of
infinity, whereas infinity that is said to be so simpliciter, is absolute
infinity. But matter is relatively infinite, with an infinity of imper­
fection, since it has a real capacity for receiving all natural forms.17
It must be noted that the end of the argumentative part of this
article again affirms clearly the real distinction between created
essence and existence in the following words: "Because a created
subsisting form (as Michaelness) has being, yet is not its own be­
ing, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a deter­
minate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.”
Likewise, in the reply to the first objection we read: “It is against
the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; be­
cause subsisting being is not a created being.” Thus God, although
He is omnipotent, cannot make something that is absolutely in­
finite, because this is really an impossibility.
Reply to second objection. Our intellect, since it transcends mat­
ter, naturally tends to extend itself in a way to know an infinity
us Denz., nos. 1782, 1804.
ie Summa theol., la, q.50, a.4.
1’ Ibid., ad gum.

THE INFINITY OF GOD

241

of things; yet it knows them in a finite way. Thus farther on 18 it
will be stated that our intellect elevated by the light of glory can
directly see God’s essence, but in a finite way, not comprehensively
as it is seen by God Himself.
THIRD ARTICLE

WHETHER AN ACTUALLY INFINITE MAGNITUDE CAN EXIST

State of the question. It is asked, for instance, whether it is pos­
sible for air to be infinite in extent, and yet for it to be finite ac­
cording to the essence of air. The purpose of this article and the
following one is to distinguish between actual or categorematic
infinity, and potential or syncategorematic infinity, which is the
finite that is always perfectible, or which is always capable of hav­
ing something added to it, as in the case of magnitude or a series
of numbers. This distinction was already made by Aristotle,19 who
showed that everything which is continuous is, indeed, infinitely
divisible, but is never infinitely divided; for it consists, indeed, of
parts that can always be divided and of terminating points. In like
manner, the sides of a polygon inscribed in a circle can always be
subdivided, and yet the polygon will never be equal to the cir­
cumference. It must be observed that Spinoza, not sufficiently
distinguishing between infinity of perfection and infinity of imper­
fection—a distinction which St. Thomas had made in the first
article of this question—said that actually infinite extension is one
of God’s attributes.
The conclusion of St. Thomas is: "No natural body, in fact, no
mathematical body can be actually infinite.”
A physical body is an existing subject of three dimensions; in it
are matter, form, and sensible qualities. A mathematical body is
merely quantity according to three dimensions. This distinction
was not sufficiently upheld by Descartes.
The first part of the conclusion, concerning natural bodies, is
proved in two ways; metaphysically and physically.
The metaphysical proof may be thus enunciated: Determinate
accidents, and hence determinate quantity, follow upon a deter­
minate form. But every natural body, for instance, air or water, has
a determinate specific form; so also has every created being. There­
fore every natural body has a determinate quantity.
The major has its foundation in the principle that accidents in­
here in substance, and, as it were, flow from it or are derived or
emanate from it. Therefore an infinite accident is not derived from
is Ibid., q. is, a.7.
1» Physics, Bk. Ill, chaps. 1 f.

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THE ONE GOD

a finite substantial form; otherwise this finite form would be in­
finite in power.
It may be objected, however, that infinite air or infinite water
would not constitute one individual body, but would be an ag­
gregation of molecules of either water or air. In reply we say that
then this would be another question, which is solved in the subse­
quent article about infinite multitude.
The physical proof is thus formulated:
Every natural body has some natural movement, either direct
or circular. Thus the direct tendency of a stone is downward, but
the movement of the planets is circular (or elliptical). But an in­
finite body could not be so moved; not indeed by a direct move­
ment, because it would already occupy every place; nor could it be
so moved by a circular movement because the lines, the farther they
are drawn from the center of such a body as this toward the cir­
cumference (which would be in no place), would be infinitely dis­
tant from one another, and thus one of these lines could never
reach the place occupied by another; but such a condition is re­
quired for the circular movement of any body revolving in the
same place by a rotatory motion. There would be neither periphery
nor circular motion in this periphery. Thus Paschal speaks of some
sphere whose center would be everywhere and its circumference
nowhere.
This physical argument presupposes the doctrine of natural mo­
tion as opposed to violent motion and as terminating at some nat­
ural place, as in the motion of a stone downward to the center of
the earth. But after Galileo’s experiments dealing with the fall­
ing of any body in a vacuum, this doctrine of the natural motion of
bodies cannot now be admitted, at least without some modifica­
tions. However, modern physics has retained something of this
teaching in the law of the diminution of energy. In accordance
with this law, the heat required for the production of local mo­
tion cannot be fully restored by the conversion of this local motion
into heat, and thus the whole world tends by a natural motion
toward a certain state of equilibrium.
The proposed argument seems a sound one, if it is conceded that
every natural body has a natural motion, at least in the same place.
But some may say that this infinite body cannot be moved all at
once as a compact mass, but perhaps the parts of this body can be
moved.
In reply to this we say that then we are concerned with another
question, namely, that of the actually infinite multitude of distinct
parts, which is discussed in the following article.
But can one imagine an actually existing mathematical body that

THE INFINITY OF GOD

243

would be infinite in magnitude? St. Thomas replies in the nega­
tive at the end of the argumentative part of this article. His reason
is that this body could not be actual without some form or figure.
But every figure is finite. Therefore it is impossible to imagine an
actually existing body that would be infinite in magnitude.
Nevertheless St. Thomas himself, commenting on this last proof,
says: "It is not conclusive but only probable, because whoever
would assert the existence of an infinite body would not concede
that it is of the essence of a body to be bounded by a surface, unless
perhaps potentially, although this view is probable and much
argued.” 20 Furthermore it must be said that a mathematical body
cannot naturally exist without a subject that is a composite of
matter and form, and thus the previous arguments remain in force.
Reply to first objection. In geometry by the expression “infinite”
is meant an actually finite line that can always be extended.
Reply to second objection. Infinite is not against the nature of
magnitude in general, but it is against the nature of any of its
species, because any species whatever of magnitude has a finite
figure. “Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the
genus.” This last proposition confirms the probable argument about
a mathematical body, given at the end of the argumentative part
of this article.
Reply to third objection. “The infinite is not in the addition of
magnitude, but only in division.” The first part of this statement is
true of a natural body, because it increases until it reaches a deter­
minate size that is proportionate to its specific form. Moreover,
even if a body were capable of infinite increase, it would never
be actually or categorematically infinite, but only potentially or
syncategorematically.
Reply to fourth objection. It is conceded that infinite is not
against the nature of time and movement, because time and move­
ment differ from magnitude inasmuch as they are not in actuality
as to the whole of their being, but only successively. Hence there
seems to be no repugnance in the idea that the movement of the
heavenly bodies and time should be from eternity, as Aristotle
thought, and then there would be neither a first revolution of the
sun nor a first day.
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER AN INFINITE MULTITUDE CAN EXIST

State of the question. This question, is a very difficult one, this
being the decision of St. Thomas, as will at once be seen, especially
20 Com. on Physics, Bk. Ill, chap. 5, lect. 8, no. 4.

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THE ONE GOD

from what he wrote on this subject in another of his works in
which he stated: “Whoever would assert that any multitude is in­
finite, would not mean that it is a number, or that it belongs to
the species of number. For number adds to multitude the idea of
measurement. Number is, indeed, multitude measured by one.’’21
Hence it is certain that an infinite number is a contradiction in
terms, because every number bears a fixed relation to unity, and
is the result of addition beginning from one, which is the principle
of number. But the question is, whether an actually infinite and
innumerable multitude, such as of grains of sand, is an impossi­
bility. We have already discussed this question elsewhere.22
It is difficult for the peripatetic philosopher to give a negative
reply to this question, because for him, as also for St. Thomas, there
does not seem to be any repugnance in the idea that the world may
have been created from eternity.23 In this case there would have
been no commencement of motion, for instance, of the sun; there
would have been no first revolution of the sun, no first day, and
there would be no difference between creation and preservation
of things in existence. We find it difficult to imagine this, yet there
does not seem to be any repugnance in it according to St. Thomas.
It would be like a footprint made in the sand from eternity by an
eternal foot, which would have a priority not of time but of cau­
sality as regards its imprint.
But if it were so, already the series of days antecedently would
be actually infinite, just as the series of acts of immortal souls sub­
sequently will be infinite. It is indeed true that past days, since they
no longer exist, do not constitute an actually infinite multitude of
actually existing parts. But in this hypothesis, there is nothing re­
pugnant in the idea of God creating from eternity on any day what­
ever a grain of sand or an angel, and forever conserving these
effects in being. In this case there would already be antecedently an
actual infinite multitude of grains of sand, or of angels, although
there could always be made an addition to these subsequently.
But these difficulties were not unknown to St. Thomas; in fact,
he hints at them in the beginning of this article by remarking:
(i) Number can be multiplied to infinity; nor is it impossible for
a potentiality to be made actual; (2) the species of figures are in­
finite; thus the sides of a polygon can be multiplied to infinity;
(3) if we suppose a multitude of things to exist, for instance, grains
of sand, there can still be infinitely many others added to these.
21 Ibid., lect. 8.
22 God, His Existence and His Nature, I, 77-80.
23 Summa theol., la, q.46, a.2 ad 7um.

THE INFINITY OF GOD

245

This third difficulty finds its confirmation in the consideration of
the non-repugnance of the world having been created freely from
eternity, without a first day; for as was said, if on any day what­
ever, God had eternally created one grain of sand, and had after­
ward conserved all these grains in being, then the multitude of
these grains would be actually infinite antecedently, and the multi­
tude of these grains would be innumerable in a regressive series
starting from the last created and going back to the earlier crea­
tions, because in this hypothesis there would not have been a first
grain created, just as there would not have been a first day. But
the days and years would have been from eternity, just as forever
without end the intellectual and volitional acts of immortal souls
are multiplied.
We shall see that it can be denied that St. Thomas took a defi­
nite stand in this difficult problem. Nevertheless the Thomists and
many other Scholastics commonly deny the possibility of an actu­
ally infinite multitude of actually coexisting things. Many of them,
however, grant that a multitude of past days could be actually in­
finite antecedently and innumerable, just as a multitude of in­
tellectual acts of an immortal soul will be infinite subsequently,
but these acts do not all exist at the same time.
Contrary to this among those who maintain the possibility of an
actually infinite multitude of even coexisting things, must be
named Scotus, and the nominalists Gregory of Arimini, Ockham,
Gabriel Biel, as also Vasquez. The Jesuits of Coimbra University
considered it to be a probable opinion that there is no repugnance
in the idea of an actual infinite. Cardinal Toletus was of the same
opinion.24 Of modern philosophers, Descartes and Leibnitz admit
the actual infinite. Likewise Spinoza admits in a pantheistic sense
the infinity of all things, in existence, magnitude, and multitude.
In more recent times this point has been the subject of great con­
troversy, for instance, in France. Charles Renouvier keenly de­
fended finiteness, and Milhaud defended the opposite thesis.26
We must first of all exclude arguments that have no probative
force, before we consider the more cogent reasons advanced by St.
Thomas.
It is quite astonishing that several authors did not even see the
difficulty of the problem and said: Every multitude is divisible into
two parts. But any part of it is finite. Therefore the whole multi­
tude is finite. Those who assume that multitude is actually infinite
antecedently, would reply: Certainly multitude can be divided into
2« In lam, q.7, a.4.
25 Essai sur les conditions de la certitude logique, 177 f.

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THE ONE GOD

two parts, one of them being finite both antecedently and subse­
quently, and the other being infinite antecedently. Others wish to
prove the impossibility of an actually infinite multitude, because
something could be added to and subtracted from it whereas noth­
ing can be added to or subtracted from the infinite. It is easy to re­
ply to this objection by saying that an actually infinite multitude
requires merely that it have antecedently no beginning, and then
something can be added to or subtracted from it subsequently, just
as this could be done to the succession of days, if it were from
eternity.
Finally, some unwarrantably assert that of two actually infinite
multitudes, one cannot be greater than the other. But it would be
so if the series of days were from eternity, because the series of
hours would still be much greater.
We reply by distinguishing the antecedent: of two actually in­
finite multitudes one cannot be greater than the other, in their
infinite aspect, this I concede; in their finite aspect, this I deny.
Thus the series of hours would be greater in their finite aspect,
so that there could be a series of days greater in their finite aspect
by the addition of new days.
St. Thomas begins the argumentative part of this article by refer­
ring to the opinion of Avicenna and Algazel and then refuting it.
He denies the possibility of an actually infinite multitude of co­
existing things, and admits the possibility of a potentially infinite
multitude.
The opinion of Avicenna and Algazel is this: An actually in­
finite multitude of things not essentially but accidentally subordi­
nated, is possible. Examples of this are, if the generation of man
actually depended on the man generating, and on the sun and on
other agents actually exerting their influence in an infinite series;
or if we take the case of a hammer moved by the hand, and by the
will, and so on in an infinite series. In such cases there would be
no supreme efficient cause, and hence no secondary causes which
in their causation are dependent solely on the supreme cause.28
But according to Avicenna and Algazel, it is not repugnant to
reason that there should be an infinite series of accidentally sub­
ordinated causes. This would be the case if the artificer were to
make something with an infinite multitude of hammers, inasmuch
as one after the other may be broken. This is accidental multitude,
for it happens by accident, inasmuch as one hammer or mallet is
broken and another is used.
It must be observed that St. Thomas admits this saying: "It is
not impossible to proceed to accidental infinity as regards efficient
& Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3.

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247

causes ... as an artificer acts by means of many hammers acci­
dentally, because one after the other may be broken.” 27
But St. Thomas denies that any particular consequence follows
from this general assertion: namely, that now there would be an
actually infinite multitude of coexisting things, for instance, of
broken hammers or of immortal souls, granted that the series of
generations is eternal. St. Thomas seems to see no repugnance in
an actually infinite multitude of past things or of past days, which
are no longer in existence, of generations of animals, for instance,
which are now not in existence; but he denies this for the genera­
tion of men, because there would now be an actually infinite
multitude (antecedently) of immortal souls.28 He excludes the par­
ticular reason given by Avicenna, with the following remark: “One
might say that the world was eternal, or at least some creature, as
an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in
general, whether any creature can exist from eternity.” 29 In like
manner, in the reply to the first objection he says: “A day is re­
duced to act successively, and not all at once,” so also a series of
days.
The conclusion of St. Thomas is this: An actually infinite multi­
tude of coexisting things, even accidentally connected, is an im­
possibility.
Reasonable proofs are given which, however, according to the
judgment of St. Thomas, do not appear to be incontestable.30
The counterargument is taken from the Scripture: “Thou hast
ordained all things in measure, and number, and weight.” 31 But
this is said of those things that have been made, so that it leaves
undecided the question of those things that can come into exist­
ence. The body of the article has two arguments; the first is de­
rived from the determinate species of multitude, the other from
the fixed intention of the Creator. The first argument is reduced to
the following syllogism: Every kind of multitude must belong to
some species of multitude. But no species of multitude is infinite;
for the species of multitude are to be reckoned according to the
species of numbers and any number whatever is finite, being mul­
titude measured by one. Therefore no kind of multitude is infinite.
Doubt. Is this an incontestable argument? In answer we should
note what St. Thomas wrote, following the statement of this proof
as given by Aristotle. St. Thomas says: “It must be observed that
27 Ibid., q.46, a.2 ad 711m.
28 Ibid., ad 8um.
29 Ibid.
80 Com. on Physics, Bk. Ill, chap. 5, lect. 8; also De aeternitate mundi, and
Quodl. 12, q.2, a work which he wrote near the end of his life.
si Wis. 11: 21.

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THE ONE GOD

these arguments are probable, expressing the commonly accepted
view; they are not, however, rigorously conclusive: because ... if
anyone were to assert that any multitude is infinite, this would not
mean that it is a number or that it belongs to the species of num­
ber: for by number a multitude becomes measurable, as is stated
in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, and therefore number is
said to be a species of discrete quantity; but this is not the case
with multitude which is of the nature of a transcendental.”32 Thus
it is that things of the same species are numbered, and the multi­
tude of angels, who are not of the same species, is not a number.
However, it must be observed that St. Thomas wrote his commen­
tary on the Physics in 1264, and the first part of the Theological
Summa in 1265. In fact, in 1264 he wrote in another work: “It has
not yet been proved that God cannot bring it about that there be
actually infinite beings,” 33 for instance, the creation from eternity
on any day whatever (without there being a first day) a grain of
sand, and the conservation in being of all these grains. Then this
multitude would be antecedently infinite and innumerable.
Likewise St. Thomas wrote later on (1274) as follows: “To make
something actually infinite, or to bring it about that infinites
should exist actually and simultaneously, is not contrary to the
absolute power of God, because it implies no contradiction; but if
we consider the way God acts, it is not possible. For God acts
through the intellect, and through the word, which assigns to all
things their forms, and hence it must be that all things are formally
made (that is, determined) by Him.” 34
This last consideration belongs to the discussion of the second
argument. But on first inspection it does not appear to be incontesta­
ble. An adversary could say that a multitude of things accidentally
connected (as grains of sand) is not necessarily in any determinate
species, and in this it differs, for instance, from a plant or ani­
mal. Every plant must be in a certain genus and species, and the
same is to be said of every animal, because its parts unite to
form one natural and determinate whole. But it is not so evident
that such is the case with a multitude of accidentally connected
things; for it would have to be proved that an innumerable and
actually infinite multitude of things antecedently and simultane­
ously existing is an impossibility. It is indeed evident that an in­
finite number is a contradiction in terms; but it is not so clear that
such is the case with an actually infinite multitude, because, as
St. Thomas says, “by number a multitude becomes measurable; for
82 Com. on Physics, Bk. ΙΠ, chap. 5, lect. 8.
83 De aeternitate mundi (the end).
«< Quodl., loc. cit.

THE INFINITY OF GOD

249

number is multitude measured by one.” 85 Moreover, there is an
infinite multitude of possible things.
St. Thomas says that “God can make something else better than
each individual thing.” 88 Why then could not God from eternity
(that is, without any first day) have created every day an angel and
always more perfect angels, and preserve them in being? Then the
multitude of these would not be a certain number or measurable
by number, but would be infinite antecedently. Hence the first
argument does not appear to be incontestable; to consider it as
absolutely certain would seem to be exaggerated realism. Moderate
realism can indeed prove that every body, for instance, a mineral
or a living being, which is essentially one as a natural whole, is in
some species under some genus; but it does not conclusively prove
anything like this of a multitude of simultaneously existing things
that are accidentally connected.
The second argument is derived from the clear intention of the
Creator, and is reduced to the following syllogism: Everything
created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Cre­
ator; but multitude in nature is created; therefore it is finite.
St. Thomas seems to propose this as a certain argument, for he
wrote: "If we consider the way God acts, it is not possible. For
God acts through the intellect and through the word, which assigns
to all things their forms.” 87
What force has this argument? The work just quoted gives us
the answer in these words: “To make something actually infinite
is not contrary to the absolute power of God, because it implies
no contradiction. But if we consider the way (assigning the forms)
God acts, it is not possible.” 88
This is the same as saying that it is not intrinsically impossible
according to God’s merely absolute power, but that it is so if we
consider God’s power of ordaining all things in accordance with
His divine wisdom, whether this power is ordinary or extraordinary.
Thus it is shown farther on38 that God could by His absolute
power annihilate all creatures, immortal souls, the Blessed Virgin
Mary, and the humanity of Christ, but this is not possible in ac­
cordance with God’s power in ordaining all things (whether it is
ordinary or extraordinary), for there can be no purpose or end in
view in such annihilation, “since the power of God is conspicuously
shown in His preserving all things in existence." 40 But it is not
»» Com. on Physics, loc. cit.
"Summa theol., la, 9.25, a.6 ad lum.
s’ Quodl., loc. cit.
ss Ibid.
s» Summa theol., la, q. 104, a.gf.
«° Ibid., a.4 ad lum.

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THE ONE GOD

so clear that this argument applies as to the impossibility of an
actually infinite multitude.
Is this argument as thus set forth incontestable? It is not quite
certain that St. Thomas himself considered it an incontestable
argument, for farther on he proposes the following objection:
“Everything that works by intellect works from some starting
point; but God acts by intellect; therefore His work has a starting
point. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always
exist.”41 He replies to this objection as follows: “This is the
argument of Anaxagoras (Physics, Bk. Ill, chap. 4, no. 5, lect. 6
of St. Thomas). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, ex­
cept as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what
should be done, which is like motion. Such is the human intellect,
but not the divine intellect.” 42
Moreover, this argument would have more force if it referred to
any created thing whatever taken by itself, the parts of which unite
to form one natural whole; for instance, if it referred to every plant
or animal. But it has less force if it refers to a multitude of acci­
dentally connected things; for if, every day from eternity, God had
created the souls of men, any one of these would be determinate,
and yet the multitude of these souls would be infinite antecedently.
Nor it is easy to prove that God cannot so bring them into being
and preserve them in being.
Finally, it must be observed that no serious consequence arises
if we say with St. Thomas43 that these arguments are not incon­
testable; for no truth of great importance has its foundation in
them. On the contrary, a very serious consequence would arise if
the proofs of God’s existence depended on this conclusion. We have
already seen 44 that the proofs of God’s existence have not their
foundation in the principle that it is impossible to proceed to
infinity in a series of accidentally subordinated past causes, but in
the principle that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in a series
of essentially subordinated and actually existing causes. And this
last process is impossible, not because an actually infinite multitude
is impossible, but because secondary causes do not act unless they
are premoved to act by the supreme Cause. If therefore the supreme
Cause does not exist, or does not move others to act, then there are
no secondary causes actually in motion and no effects. Therefore
no serious consequence arises, if the aforesaid arguments of this
article are not incontestable.
« Ibid., q.46, a.2, obj. 3.
42 Ibid., ad 311m.
43 Com. on Physics, Bk. Ill, lect. 8.
44Summa theol., la, q.2, a.2.

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251

From the very fact that the arguments are not considered by
St. Thomas to be incontestable,45*this brings out more clearly the
demonstrative validity required by him in a truly apodictic argu­
ment, in such arguments, for instance, as the proofs of God’s exist­
ence.
Cajetan in his commentary is moderate in his statements. He
writes: “It is sufficiently in agreement with the art of logic, so that
it can be enunciated as a universal proposition, that every species
of multitude is according to some species of number.” 48 But when
it is a question of an apodictic argument, he says more than "it is
sufficiently in agreement with the art of logic.”
At the end of the argumentative part of this article, St. Thomas
says without any hesitation: “A potentially infinite multitude is
possible,” whether this be the continuous divisible to infinity, or
the multitude to which something can always be added. From the
replies to the objections evidently St. Thomas understands an
actually infinite multitude as consisting of things simultaneously
existing, so that it does not seem to be contrary to reason for a series
of past days to be infinite antecedently.47
RECAPITULATION

Thus the question of the divine infinity comes to an end. There
is infinity of perfection, so that God is both in the highest degree
determined, as pure Act, and unlimited, since He is the unreceived
and self-subsistent Being, possessing in Himself all plenitude or
perfection of being, just as whiteness that is not received in any
other would have all the perfection of whiteness. Only God, who
is not a body, is infinitely perfect. Hence also, if besides God there
existed an infinite body or an actually infinite multitude either of
angels or of bodies, none of these would be confused with God. It
was therefore a great mistake for Spinoza to say that an actually
infinite multitude is one of God’s attributes. This would mean that
God is a body, just as man is. But this has already been refuted.48
It would follow, of course, from this that God is a composite of
spirit and body; but every composite demands a cause, and in the
final analysis a most simple cause, which is to being as A is to A,
the self-subsisting Being without limitation of essence. “Things in
themselves different (as spirit and body) cannot unite unless some­
45 Ibid. See also De veritate, q.2, a. 10, in which St. Thomas leaves the question
undecided. He speaks more forcibly in Quodl., loc. cit.
48 See a.4, no. 6.
Summa theol., la, q.46, a.2.
48 Ibid., q.3, a. 1.

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THE ONE GOD

thing causes them to unite,” says St. Thomas,49 in treating of God’s
absolute simplicity, which would be destroyed in saying with Spi­
noza that infinite and divisible quantity is one of God’s attributes.
Thus not everything that is in God would be God, but a part of
God.
All these things are contrary to reason if it is properly understood
that God is the self-subsisting Being, who is (without any limitation
of essence) not received in any other, incapable of this, and to whom
there can be no superaddition of any accident, as are the finite
modes of Spinoza, which would be successively produced from
eternity.
From all that has been said we are assured that the supreme
truth of the treatise on the one God is this: in God alone are essence
and existence identical.50 It follows from this, as we have said, that
God is absolutely simple and unchangeable and hence He is really
and essentially distinct from the composite and changeable world.
The infinity of God’s intelligence, of His love, justice, mercy, power,
follows from the infinity of the divine nature, because infinity is a
mode of any of the divine attributes.
** Ibid., Λ.η.
50 Ibid., a.4.

CHAPTER VIII
Question 8

The Existence

of

God in Things

In this chapter we consider how God is immanent to the world,

although at the same time transcending it. We shall also clearly
distinguish between this immanence and pantheism, inasmuch as
immanence belongs to God not as the formal or material cause of
the world, but as its efficient or extrinsic cause, which is intimately
connected, however, with the effect that immediately proceeds
from it.
This question is placed right after that of God’s infinity, because
God’s immensity and omnipresence are discussed in it, and these
are in some way related to God’s infinity.
First of all, we must note that immensity and omnipresence have
not absolutely the same meaning. Immensity, or impossibility of
being circumscribed by real space, is commonly defined as the
aptitude or capacity to exist in all things and places. But omni­
presence is the actual presence of God in all places. Hence immen­
sity is an attribute that is an indispensable accompaniment of the
divine nature. Even if God had not created, He would have been
immense; on the contrary, omnipresence is a relative attribute since
it refers to actually existing creatures.
There are four points of inquiry in this question, (i) Whether
God is in all things. The question considers His actual presence,
but the mode of His presence is likewise touched upon in this
article. (2) Whether God is everywhere, or in all things in so far
as these are in place. (3) How God is everywhere: whether by
essence, power, and presence. (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs
to God alone. The first article is of great importance, and from this
article it is evident that there is a considerable difference between
the doctrine of St. Thomas and that proposed later on by Scotus,
as we shall at once see.
FIRST ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD IS IN ALL THINGS

State of the question. Several difficulties are proposed: (1) that,
since God is above all, He is not in all things; (2) that God rather
«53

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THE ONE GOD

contains things than is contained by things; (3) that God is the
most powerful of agents and therefore He can, like the sun, act at
a distance, and all the more so inasmuch as He is the more power­
ful agent; (4) that God does not seem to be in the demons, and
therefore He is not in all things that exist.
It must be observed that because of these and similar difficulties
several persons denied that God is in all things. Thus the Manichaeans said that only spiritual things are subject to the divine power,
but that corporeal things are subject to the power of the contrary
principle. Some denied God’s existence in things by His general
presence, inasmuch as they said that divine providence does not
extend to the lower grades of being. Moreover, certain Jews con­
fined God to the temple of Jerusalem.1 Lastly, the Socinians and
certain Calvinists said that God is everywhere by His power and
action, making His presence felt as the sun does on things here
below, but that He is substantially present only in heaven.
Reply. God is in all things, and intimately so.
1) In evidence of this we may quote the following texts from
Holy Scripture: ‘‘Whither shall I go from Thy spirit? Or whither
shall I flee from Thy face? If I ascend into heaven, Thou art there;
if I descend into hell, Thou art present.” 2 “Do not I fill heaven and
earth, saith the Lord?” * "He is not far from every one of us, for
in Him we live and move and are.” 4 “In Him are all things.” 5
"One God and Father of all, who is above all and through all, and
in us all.” ® Moreover, Isaias says: “Lord, Thou hast wrought all
our works for us.” 7
But we must seek for the reason why God, who is pure spirit,
and ineffably exalted above all things, is in all things, even those
that are corporeal. St. Thomas gives us the reason for this in the
body of this article, when he says: “God is in all things, neither
as part of their essence (matter or form) nor as an accident, but as
an agent is present to that upon which it works.” It is proved as
follows:
Every agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately,
by virtual contact if not by quantitative contact, which does not
belong to an incorporeal agent; but God is the proper and imme­
diate cause of the production and conservation of all things in
being; therefore God is in all things as agent, not by quantitative
1 Cf. St. Jerome, Com. on Isaias, chap. 66.
2 Ps. 138: 7 f.
» Jer. 23: 24.
* Acts 17: 27.
» Rom. 11: 36.
8 Eph. 4: 6.
7 Is. 26: 12.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS

255

contact, since God is incorporeal, but by His virtual contact, which
is really not distinct from His essence.
Then St. Thomas proves that God, as agent, is innermost in all
things, because He conserves in them that which is more inherent,
namely, “being which is formal in respect of everything found in a
thing,” Just as, in anything whatever, form is more inherent than
matter, because it contains and determines the matter (for instance,
in us the soul remains just the same, whereas the body undergoes
a change), so being is more inherent in anything whatever than
the form, because it is related to the form as its ultimate actuality.
All that is contained in anything is actuated by being, either by
substantial being or by accidental being.
In this article St. Thomas declares but does not prove, that God
is the conservative and immediate cause of being in all things. This
he proves farther on, saying: “As the becoming of a thing cannot
continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the
becoming of the effect (as when the building of the house ceases,
the house ceases to be built), so neither can the being of a thing
continue after that action of the agent has ceased which is the
cause of the effect not only in becoming but also in being.” 8
Thus when color ceases to affect the sense of sight, sense percep­
tion of color ceases; likewise, when the end, such as health, ceases
to attract, then the desire ceases for the means, such as medicine,
to attain the end; also when the principles of a demonstration
cease to have any force, then there is no more evidence in the
conclusion. When the sun ceases to illumine, there is no longer
light in the air. If therefore God is the proper cause of created
being, which is distinct from the becoming of things, then the
being of things cannot continue in existence without God’s pre­
servative action.
In the body of the article, however, it is proved in a few words
that “created being is the proper effect of God, just as to ignite is
the proper effect of fire.” The reason is that God is essentially being.
Thus He is the cause of participated being. For the proper effect
is that which necessarily and immediately depends on its proper
cause.9 The proper effect is like a property manifested ad extra,
for it is related to its proper cause, as a property is related to its
essence; but it is external to its cause. Thus the killer kills (for
there can be no one killed without a killer); so also the builder
builds, the painter paints, the singer sings. Thus God brings things
into existence and preserves them in being. Indeed, as St. Thomas
e Summa theol., la, q. 104, a.i.
a St. Thomas, Com. on Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, lect. 10: "the fourth mode of
direct predication.”

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THE ONE GOD

says more explicitly, “the more universal effects must be reduced
to the more universal and prior causes. But among all effects the
most universal is being itself. Hence it must be the proper effect
of the first and most universal cause, and that is God.” 10
Thus my free choice, as it is my own personal choice, is the
proper effect of my will; but as it is a being, it is the proper effect
of God. Thus God is in all things by a virtual act, preserving them
in being.
However, there is still a difficulty in this demonstration. We have
yet to show that God immediately preserves things in being, and
not through the intermediary of some other being.
It is only in one of his subsequent articles that St. Thomas ex­
plicitly proves this for us, when he shows that there can be no
instrumental cause in God’s creative act: “Now the proper effect
of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that
is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and
instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from any pre­
supposed (subject), which can be disposed by the action of the
instrumental agent.” 11 There would be no effect produced by the
instrument, and, moreover, the instrumental action would be an
accident in God, and it would have to terminate in something that
is acted upon, that is, in a pre-existing subject, and there is nothing
such in creation.
In like manner, St. Thomas shows farther on that God preserves
the being of things directly, and indirectly the less universal effects,
for he says: "An effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it
depends. Now just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only
produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the
power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving
another.” 12 Thus the sun is the conservator of light in the air
inasmuch as it is light, but not inasmuch as it is being, because the
sun is just as much a created being as light is. Hence just as God
does not create by means of an instrument, neither does He pre­
serve things in being, inasmuch as they are being, by means of an
instrument, but does so immediately, as stated in this article.
Thus the major of this article is explained; namely, "Every agent
must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately, and be in
virtual contact with it.” But if the agent is corporeal, there are two
ways in which it comes immediately in contact with its effect,
namely, by its quantitative matter and by its power. But if the agent
is incorporeal, it does not come immediately in contact with its effect
iOSumma theol., la, q.45, a.5.
11 Ibid.
to ibid., q. 104, a. 2 ad 2um.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS

257

by quantitative matter, but by its power.13 In this case there is
immediate contact both o£ power and suppositum.
There is immediate contact of power because the divine power
does not produce its effect through some intermediary power; for
it does not operate by the power of a higher agent, but immediately
of itself.
There is also immediate contact of suppositum, that is, there is
no intermediate suppositum between God preserving and the being
of the thing preserved; for there is no instrumental cause in the
creative act and in the immediate preservation of things in being.
Nor is the divine power something distinct from God, for it is the
very essence of God, since God is His own action and His own
being. Thus St. Thomas proves that God is in all things by His
preservative action.
This conclusion is confirmed by the solution of the objections.
Reply to first objection. God, who transcends all things, not
locally but by the excellence of His nature, is in all things, not as
a part of their essence but as the agent who is the cause of being
in all things.
Reply to second objection. God, being pure spirit, is in things as
containing things, in a way, as the soul contains the body. How­
ever, God contains things, not as a form determining matter, but
as a cause conserving the effect.
Reply to third objection. No agent acts upon any distant thing
except through some medium. Thus the sun illumines and imparts
heat to bodies on this earth through the medium of the air and
ether, for the power of the agent can be only in a subject; but
if it is not in the subject to which it properly belongs, then it is
in an intermediate subject, as in an instrument.14 But, as stated,
God cannot make use of an instrument in creating and preserving
things in being, inasmuch as they are being. Therefore He pre­
serves them immediately. As St. Thomas in this article says: “But
it belongs to the great power of God that He acts immediately in
all things,”15 because He alone is the proper Cause of being as
such in things.
Hence to the objection, “The more powerful an agent is, the
more extended is its action,” we must reply with the following dis­
tinction: that it is so when there is some medium, this I concede;
is Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 68.
14 In fact, creative action cannot be an accident, because as an accident it
would be received and would terminate in a subject. But there is no presupposed
subject in creation. Hence creative action is not really distinct from God's essence.
See la, q.45, a.3 ad turn. Conservative action, however, is continued creative
action.
1» Cf. ad junx.

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THE ONE GOD

when there is no medium, then I deny it. Thus while the sun pre­
serves light as such, God preserves the same as being; just as He
preserves the sun as being. Moreover, matter, the human soul, and
angels can be produced only by God's creative act, and their preser­
vation in being depends on God alone.1®
Reply to fourth objection. God is in the demons, not as preserv­
ing the deformity of sin in them, which is not from Him, but as
preserving them in their nature.
In order to bring out more clearly the meaning and validity of
St. Thomas’ doctrine, these objections may be presented in syl­
logistic form. Thus the syllogism serves as a means of direct per­
ception.
1) What is above all things is not in all tilings; but God is above
all things; therefore God is not in all things.
Reply. I distinguish the major; what is above all things because
of the dignity of its nature is not in all things as an essential part,
this I concede; that it is not in all things as their cause, this I
deny. I concede the minor, and distinguish the conclusion in the
same way as the major.
2) But neither is God in all things as cause. Therefore the dif­
ficulty remains. The proof: The supreme cause produces inferior
things only through the mediation of secondary causes; but God
is not the sole, but the supreme cause; therefore God is not in all
things as cause, at least not in inferior things.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that the supreme cause does not
produce particular being, luminous being, for instance, this I con­
cede; that it does not produce absolute being, or being as such,
this I deny. I concede the minor, and distinguish the conclusion in
the same way as the major.
3) But neither God as cause of being as such is in all things.
Proof: The more powerful an agent is, the more it can act at a dis­
tance; but God is the most powerful of agents; therefore God can
produce the being of things at a distance.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that the agent can act at a disieAs Goudin says, and rightly so (Metaph., disp. II, q.3, a.2), God not only
premoves secondary causes, but, by a simultaneous concurrence that is properly
explained, He produces the being of their effects.
Whereas the divine motion ceases when the causality of the created agent
ceases, the divine concurrence preserves the effect produced as long as the effect
continues in being. Thus absolute being in all things is the immediate result of
the divine concurrence. Therefore God, by producing and preserving the being,
for instance, of the ox generated, after the generating action of the ox has ceased,
comes in immediate contact with this effect not only by His power, but also by
His suppositum.
However, creation does not enter into the operations of nature, for the ox
generated is not produced from nothing, but from a presupposed subject.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS

259

tance without an intermediary, this I deny; through an intermedi­
ary, again I distinguish; that it can so act by producing such or
such being, this I concede, by producing being as such, this I deny.
4) It seems that God can create and maintain things in being by
means of an instrumental cause, that is, by not acting immediately.
For God, indeed, creates every day the souls of children, while the
parents give to the matter the final disposition requisite for the
human form.
Reply. The parents are not, strictly speaking, the instruments
in the creation of the soul, because the spiritual soul is not educed
from the potentiality of matter. But the matter is duly disposed
so that it can be informed by the soul, which is created from noth­
ing. On the contrary, there is an instrument (namely a sacrament)
in the production of grace, which is educed from the obediential
potentiality of the soul, on which it depends as its accident.
5) Nevertheless the action of the creature can extend to being
as such, at least instrumentally. For my freedom indeed is the
proper cause of my choice, as it is my choice, and it is the instru­
mental cause of the same choice as it is being. Then being as such
is not immediately produced by God.
Reply. This is not a case of creation from nothing, but under
the divine motion our will elicits its act. Nevertheless the being as
such of my choice depends of itself and immediately as such on
God as its proper effect, and God produces it immediately not only
by the direct contact of His power but also of His suppositum. In
a broad sense we can speak of the will as an instrument with ref­
erence to the being as such of our choice. Nevertheless God, who
maintains immediately our soul in being, is intimately present in
it and in its operations.17
6) How is it, then, that creation does not apply to operations
of the natural order, if God is the proper cause, for instance, of
the being as such of the ox that is generated?
Reply. Although the being as such of the generated ox depends
of itself and immediately as such on God as His proper effect, yet
it is not produced by way of creation, namely, from no presup­
posed subject. Hence in this case the total entity of the ox is not
produced, because the matter, which is immediately preserved in
being by God, was already in existence.18
OBJECTIONS OF SCOTUS AND THE SCOTISTS

Scotus and the Scotists attacked this doctrine of St. Thomas.1’
See Cajetan, Com. on Summa, la, q.45, a.5, nos. 5-11.
is Ibid., no. 10.
i’ In I Sent., d.37, q. unica.
it

26ο

THE ONE GOD

They deny that God’s virtually transitive operation is precisely the
reason for His existence in things, just as material quantity is
precisely the reason why a body occupies a place. Scotus attacks the
major of St. Thomas, namely, “an agent must be joined to that
wherein it acts immediately.” He holds this proposition to be true
only as regards corporeal and limited agents, which must be in
quantitative contact with the subject to which they are joined, be­
fore they can act upon it.
Reply. This major of St. Thomas is true of every agent as such,
and does not apply merely to a corporeal agent, which first oc­
cupies a place before it acts. Although indeed the agent may be a
pure spirit and likewise the effect be merely spiritual, as the angel
maintained in being by God, the agent must be joined to its ef­
fect at least by a virtual contact, and this for two reasons, (i) Be­
cause the perfecter and the perfectible that is immediately actuated
by the perfecter must be joined together; for the effect seeks im­
mediate contact with the active power from which it dynamically
(though not always spatially) proceeds. There is no other way pos­
sible of conceiving this. (2) If it were not so, then there is no reason
why this causative power would produce that particular effect
rather than a certain other. The divine power is not something dis­
tinct from God, but is the very Deity, a formally immanent action,
which is said to be virtually transitive in that it produces an effect
external to itself.
1) Objection. It may be said that this is something merely philo­
sophical, which has not at all been revealed, not even virtually.
Reply. There is at least a veiled reference to this proposition in
the following familiar words of St. Paul: “He is not far from every
one of us. For in Him we live and move and are.” 20 Here the
Apostle clearly shows from God’s operation in us that He is present
in us, even in those who do not know Him. The reference is to
God’s general presence or to His immensity, and not to His special
presence in the souls of the just, in whom He dwells as knowable
by them by a quasi-experimental knowledge, and by whom He is
loved.21 Moreover, St. Augustine says: “Since we are something
other titan God Himself, it is not because of something else that
we are in Him, but because this latter is the result of His opera­
tion.” 22
2) Objection. The Scotists say that it is not repugnant for God
to operate in things by a power that goes forth from Him, and to
20 Acts 17: 27.
21 Summa theol., la, q.43, a.3.
22 De Gen. ad lit., chap. 12, no. 23.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS

261

make use of creatures as instruments. Therefore the difficulty re­
mains.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. It is not repugnant for God
to operate by a power that goes forth from Him and is created, so
as to produce such or such being, for instance, luminous being,
this I concede; to produce being as such or absolutely, this I deny.
There can be no instrument, indeed, in the act of creation, no
presupposed subject being required for this.
3) Objection. Just as operation follows being, so operation in a
place follows the presence of a being in a place, and not vice versa.
Therefore a being must be there where it operates.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. I concede that operation in
a place follows the presence of a being in a place, as regards a
corporeal agent, which essentially occupies a place by reason of its
quantity; I deny that this applies to a spiritual agent. For the
spiritual agent occupies a place only in so far as it operates in a
place; and yet in the order of being, not of location, its operation
follows upon its being.
4) Objection. However, God’s operation does not appear to be
the reason for His presence where He operates. For, what is not
distant is present. But, if by an impossibility, God did not act in
any thing, He would not, however, be distant from it, because God
is not absolutely assigned to a place. Therefore He would be pres­
ent.
Reply. I distinguish the major. What is not locally distant is
present, always positively present, this I deny; always negatively
present, or not distant, this I concede. That God would be nega­
tively present, which means not locally distant, this I concede; that
He would be positively present, this I deny.
5) Objection. But a necessary attribute of God cannot be depend­
ent on His free action. But ubiquity is one of God’s necessary at­
tributes. Therefore it cannot be dependent on His free action.
Reply. I distinguish the minor. That this is true of ubiquity in
the broad sense of the term, or of immensity, this I concede; of
ubiquity in the strict sense, this I deny. For immensity is only the
aptness to exist in all things and places. But ubiquity is the actual
existence in all things.
Final objection. Just as God by His eternity is immediately co­
existent in all time, so by His immensity He is immediately present
in every place.
Reply. The difference between the two is that eternity is the
actual and simultaneously whole duration of the immutable God,
whereas immensity is not the actual existence in things, but only

2Û2

THE ONE GOD

the aptness to exist in them. The reason is that God is by His very
nature absolutely and actually immutable and His life is simul­
taneously whole and interminable without any successive dura­
tion, and He would be so if there were no created beings. On the
contrary, it is not in accordance with God’s nature to occupy a
place, because He is a pure spirit. And before creation He was
nowhere, transcending the spatial order.23
This last reply shows that the teaching of St. Thomas on this
subject follows as a logical conclusion from the principle that God
is incorporeal, a pure spirit. Those, on the contrary, who seek to
explain God’s presence in all things apart from His divine action
in them, willingly or unwillingly posit a certain virtual extension
in God prior to His action, and thus they do not sufficiently dis­
tinguish between immensity and ubiquity. Thus Suarez, who fol­
lows Scotus to some extent in this thesis as in several others, main­
tains that God actually exists in imaginary spaces, beyond the limits
of the universe.
To this the Thomists reply that God is virtually present in imag­
inary spaces, in that He can create some body in them; but He is
not actually and positively present in them, for these imaginary
spaces are not actual realities, but only possible receptacles of
bodies. This question, however, belongs rather to the following
article.
SECOND ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD IS EVERYWHERE

State of the question. The subject of inquiry in this article is
whether God is not only in all things, but also in all places, inas­
much as they are places. The liquid is formally in the dish inasmuch
as it is a place, whereas the picture is in the painted dish, inasmuch
as it is a thing, and not formally inasmuch as it is a place. Can it
be said that God is in a place, and in all places?
It seems this cannot be said of God, because incorporeal things
are not in a place. Moreover, if God could be in a place, then He
could not be everywhere, because He is indivisible and unextended,
and because, if He were in a place, He would be there totally, and
therefore He would not be everywhere.
Reply. God is in all places not absolutely but relatively, inas­
much as they are formally places. The reason is that God is in a
place, not as a body is by filling the place to the exclusion of an2’ St. Augustine says in his commentary on psalm 122: “Where was God before
He made heaven and earth? He was in Himself, with Himself." Without Him
nothing was; therefore He was not in another.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS

263

other body, but because He gives being to all things placed, and
also to the real place itself, or to the surface of the encompassing
body. Hence God does not exclude other things from being there,
but He causes things placed to be there.
Reply to first objection. Incorporeal things are in place by virtual
contact.
Reply to second objection. God is indivisible, though not like a
point which is the term of the continuous, for He is outside the
whole genus of the continuous. Thus, unlike the point, He can be
everywhere, and for this it suffices that He maintain all bodies in
being by His divine power.
Reply to third objection. God, inasmuch as He preserves things
in being, is whole in all and in each of them, somewhat as the soul
is whole in the entire body and whole (by a totality of essence) in
each and every part of it. Even whiteness is whole, by a totality of
essence in each and every part of the wall, but it is not whole by
a totality of extension.
Descartes, who is referred to, and rightly so, as an extreme spirit­
ualist, since he denies that the soul is the form of the body, did not
properly understand the indivisibility of the soul; he viewed it in
a sort of material way as if it were a point, saying that the soul can
contact the body only in one point, namely, the pineal gland.
Likewise Leibnitz calls the monads metaphysical points. They failed
to see that the substantial form is indivisible, not as a point is, but
inasmuch as it is outside the whole genus of the continuous, as St.
Thomas says in this article; 24 and so it can be whole in each and
every part of the body. With far greater reason it must be said that
God, not as form, but as agent, maintains things in being.
THIRD ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD IS EVERYWHERE BY ESSENCE, PRESENCE,
AND POWER

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to explain
the classical statement of St. Gregory quoted in the counter­
argument, that “God by a common mode is in all things by His
presence, power, and substance; still He is said to be present more
familiarly in some by grace." 25
In the body of the article St. Thomas distinguishes between
God’s general presence by way of agent in all things and His
special presence in the just inasmuch as He is present in them as
24 Cf. ad 2um.
24 Com. on Cant. Cantic., 5: 17.

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THE ONE GOD

the object of quasi-experimental knowledge in the knower,28 and
as the beloved is in the lover, and especially so in the blessed, being
in them as clearly seen.22
This article mentions the three ways by which God, after the
manner of an agent, is in all things: (1) by His power, inasmuch
as all things are subject to His power, as the King of the universe;
(2) by His presence, inasmuch as all things are bare and open to
His eyes, since all things, even the smallest, are the immediate ob­
ject of divine providence;28 (3) by His essence, inasmuch as God’s
essence, which is not really distinct from His omnipotence and
preservative action, is present to all things as the cause of their
being.29
The error of the Manichaeans was in denying God’s universal
presence by His power, maintaining that corporeal things were not
subject to His power. Others, such as Plato and Aristotle, denied
that individual things are the immediate concern of God’s provi­
dence. If Aristotle admitted a certain general providence, as the
Averroists did later on, he did not acknowledge its extension to
each particular thing.
Also, since he never had a clear idea of creation, he could not
conceive of God’s existence in all things. We see that great ad­
vance has been made on this point from the time of Aristotle to
that of St. Thomas. This has been accomplished by the light of
revelation, which is truly like a guiding star for the Christian phi­
losopher, and it is, moreover, the proper light of theology, whose
objectum formale quo is virtual revelation.30
In the body of the article St. Thomas notes that there were cer­
tain philosophers who, although they said all things are subject to
God’s providence, still maintained that all things are not immedi­
ately created by God, but that He immediately created the first
creatures, and these created the others. So thought certain Neoplatonists. If such were the case, God would not be present by His
essence in inferior things, because He would not have immedi­
ately created them and would not immediately preserve them in
being.
On the other hand, according to revelation it is certain that
“God, with absolute freedom of counsel, created out of nothing,
from the beginning of time, both the spiritual and the corporeal
creature, namely, the angelic and the mundane; and afterward the
2« So it is with faith that is illumined by the gift of wisdom. Thus God is, as
it were, experimentally knowable, and sometimes He is actually known.
27 Summa theol., la, q.43, a.3, 5 f.
2» Ibid., q.22, a.3.
2» See q.8. a.i.
8« See p. 57. no. 37.

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265

human creature, as partaking, in a sense, of both, consisting of
spirit and of body." 31
Certainly it is only by creation from nothing that the angels,
the soul, and matter can be produced, for these are not educed
from any presupposed subject; it is equally certain that they can
be immediately maintained in being only by God. In this there is
a vast difference between our Catholic faith and the teaching of
Aristotle, which says nothing either about God’s liberty, or about
His absolute freedom in creating all things. Aristotle wrote very
well the elements of metaphysics, as Euclid did those of geometry,
but he never soared to the sublime in metaphysics, except in a very
imperfect way, when he spoke of the pure Act as “the self-con­
templative thought” or the self-subsistent intellection.32
In reply to the fourth objection we should note the following:
“No other perfection except grace, added to substance, renders God
present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore only
grace constitutes a special mode of God’s existence in things. There
is, however, another special mode of God’s existence in man by the
(hypostatic) union.”
This is explained in a subsequent article.33 There we see that
the philosophical knowledge of God, which can be acquired with­
out grace, does not suffice for His special presence; for God is
known only in an abstract way, as something distant, not as some­
thing really present. On the contrary, by habitual grace and living
faith enlightened by the gift of wisdom, a quasi-experimental
knowledge of God can be acquired and sometimes He is known as
the principle of our interior life, prompting us to intimate acts of
filial love, as St. Paul assures us in the following passage: “The
Spirit Himself giveth testimony to our spirit that we are the sons
of God.” 34 St. Thomas, explaining this text in his commentary on
this epistle, says that the Spirit gives testimony by means of the
filial love which He arouses in us, as when the disciples going to
Emmaus said: “Was not our heart burning within us whilst He
spoke in the way?” 33
From this it cannot be argued against what was said in the first
article of this question, that there is another way by which God can
be present in all things than by His preservative action; for this
special presence presupposes the general presence, that is, God
gives being to the just; in fact, He causes and effectively preserves
si Denz., nos. 428, 1784.
32 Metaph., Bk. XII.
33 Summa theol., la, q.43, a.3.
s« Rom. 8: 16.
3s Luke 24: 32.

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THE ONE GOD

charity in them. Thus He preserves the humanity of Christ, which
is hypostatically united to the Word.
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER TO BE EVERYWHERE BELONGS TO GOD ALONE

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to determine
more accurately the mode of the divine omnipresence, and to dis­
tinguish it from the mode of omnipresence of universal being,
prime matter, the universe, and the human soul that sees even re­
mote stars. As Augustine says: “The soul feels where it sees, and
lives where it feels, and is where it lives.” 88
Reply. To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, belongs
properly to God alone.
1) Proof from authority. St. Ambrose says: “Who dares to call
the Holy Ghost a creature, who in all things and everywhere and
always is, which assuredly belongs to the Divinity alone.” 3T
2) Proof from reason. That is everywhere absolutely and prima­
rily, which is everywhere not accidentally but necessarily, and im­
mediately in its whole self, and not according to its parts in
different places. But God alone, after creation, is necessarily and im­
mediately in His whole self in all things and places, for He main­
tains all things in being. Therefore, to be everywhere belongs
primarily and absolutely to God alone.
In opposition to what is stated in the major and in explanation
of it, it may be said that a grain of sand would be accidentally
everywhere, on the supposition that no other body existed. But
God, after creation, is necessarily everywhere, no matter what may
be the number of things and places, even though the number of
places should be infinite.38
Moreover, contrary to this, the whole world is everywhere, not
primarily or immediately, namely in its whole self, but according
to its different parts.38
Reply to first objection. Abstract being and prime matter are
indeed everywhere, but not according to the same mode of exist­
ence. This view is moderate realism. Contrary to this, extreme
realism confuses abstract being with the divine being, inasmuch as
it maintains that the universal (in predication) exists formally and
not only fundamentally in the objective world, that is, extramentally. If it were so, pantheism would be true, and abstract being
se Epist. ja ad Volusianum.
De Spiritu Sancto, Bk. I, chap. 7.
»e Cf. ad 511m.
·· Cf. ad ]um.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS

267

would be everywhere according to the same mode of existence. God
would not only preserve immediately the being of all things, but
He would be the very being of all things.
Prime matter is everywhere, but not according to the same mode
of existence, for it receives its existence from the form, and under
the different quantitative dimensions of the universe the form is
not the same, and consequently neither is the matter the same ac­
cording to existence. However, prime matter is negatively one, in­
asmuch as there are not two prime matters.
Reply to sixth objection. How are we to understand St. Augus­
tine when he says: “Where the soul sees and feels, there it lives and
is”? He must be understood as meaning that the soul, seeing the
heavens, reaches the heavens as object; but subjectively it lives only
in itself, because to live is an immanent act. Hence it does not fol­
low that the soul is everywhere. Seeing is an immanent act, but
the thing seen is not immanent, whatever the idealists may say. In
fact, there can be no true seeing (as distinct from hallucination)
without a tiling seen, or a true sensation without an object of sense
perception, or a true sensation of resistance without a resistant
object. “Bodily vision (as distinct from imaginary apparition) is
that whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it
and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such vision only a body
can be seen.” 40 Hence the soul, although it is not everywhere, can
see even remote bodies; it is, of course, in the very act of seeing,
in transcendental relation to these bodies.
With this we conclude the question of God’s existence in things,
a question in which immensity must be carefully distinguished from
omnipresence, namely, aptitude to exist in all things from actual
existence in them. Before creation, God was immense, but He was
not everywhere, because there were not things and places in which
God was; but He was with Himself, in Himself, for as the Gospel
says, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,
and the Word was God.” 41
<0 Ibid., la, q.51, a.2.
*1 John 1: 1.

1

CHAPTER IX
Question 9
The Immutability of God

From the truth that God is the self-subsisting Being, we have thus

far deduced that He is absolutely simple, perfect and good, infinite
and immense, and everywhere present inasmuch as He maintains
all things in being. From the very fact that God is the self-subsist­
ing Being, it likewise follows that He is absolutely immutable, with
an immutability not of inertia but of supreme perfection, which
belongs to God alone.
We shall see that, although this immutability is expressed in
negative terms (inasmuch as our knowledge is first of mutable
things), yet in itself it is something absolutely positive; and it can
be expressed by the word “stability,” whereas the mutability of
things in the world is their instability.
Evolutionist philosophy does its utmost to eliminate the tvord
“stability,” for it maintains that all immutability is imperfect, be­
ing like the immobility of an inert, lifeless thing. On the contrary,
supreme life is absolutely immutable or supremely stable. The ref­
utation of pantheism is completed in this question, inasmuch as
the self-subsisting Being, since He is absolutely identical with
Himself and stable, is really and essentially distinct from the
changeable world and from the soul that is always capable of
further perfection in knowledge and love. There are now two points
of inquiry: (1) Is God altogether immutable? (2) Does it belong to
God alone to be altogether immutable?
FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD IS ALTOGETHER IMMUTABLE

State of the question. The difficulty here is that St. Augustine says:
"The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time nor by place.” 1
In like manner wisdom is said to be more mobile than all active
things.2 We also read in the Scripture: “Draw nigh to God, and
1 De Gen. ad lit., Bk. VIII, chap. 20.
» Wis. 7: 24.
268

THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD

269

He will draw nigh to you.” 8 In all these utterances we must dis­
tinguish between the metaphorical and the literal sense. The analy­
sis o£ concepts contained in revelation is of great importance in
speculative theology, and this is prior to the deduction of the
theological conclusion. This point is brought out clearly in the
present article, in which the reply is not a theological conclusion
but an explanatory proposition of the faith.
Reply. God is altogether immutable. This must be stated most
emphatically against absolute and pantheistic evolutionism.
This truth is expressed in Holy Scripture by the following texts:
"I am the Lord and I change not.” 4 “God is not a man, that He
should lie; nor as the son of man, that He should be changed.” 5
“The heavens shall perish, but Thou remainest; and all of them
shall grow old like a garment. And as a vesture Thou shalt change
them, and they shall be changed, but Thou art always the self­
same, and Thy years shall not fail.” 8 “For she is the brightness of
eternal light. . . . And being but one, she can do all things; and
remaining in herself the same, she reneweth all things, and through
nations conveyeth herself into holy souls.” 7 “Every best gift and
every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of
lights, with whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.” ’
“And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the like­
ness of the image of a corruptible man.” 8
The councils on several occasions also affirmed God’s immuta­
bility. Thus the Council of Nicaea anathematizes those who say
that the Son of God is “changeable.”10 The Fourth Lateran Coun­
cil says: “We firmly believe and absolutely confess that the one and
only God is eternal, immense, and unchangeable.” 11 In like man­
ner, the Vatican Council declares: “God, as being one, sole, ab­
solutely simple and immutable spiritual substance, is to be declared
as really, and essentially distinct from the world.” 12
Three proofs are given from reason that God is absolutely im­
mutable: (1) inasmuch as He is pure Act; (2) inasmuch as Fie is
absolutely simple; (3) inasmuch as He is not perfectible.
1) Everything that is changeable must be in potentiality, as res James 4: 8.
4 Mai. 3: 6.
6 Num. 23: 19.
« Ps. 101: 27.
7 Wis. 7: 26 f.
8 James 1: 17.
8 Rom. 1: 23. See also Eccles. 42: 16; Prov. 19: 21.
1° Denz., no. 54.
11 Ibid., no. 428.
uibid., no. 1782.

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THE ONE GOD

ceiving determination; but God is pure Act without the admixture
of any potentiality, because He is the first Being (fourth proof),
and act is absolutely prior to potentiality; therefore God is ab­
solutely immutable.13
It is, indeed, quite clear that potentiality is spoken of with refer­
ence to its act, and, in the order of dignity and nature, it pre­
supposes this act. If, then, there were potentiality in God, He
would not be really the first Being, and there could be imperfec­
tion in Him; a certain part in Him would not be God. He would
thus be no longer the self-subsisting Being. But if He were not the
self-subsisting Being, then existence would be predicated contin­
gently of Him. Thus God would be participated being; He would
be like the highest angel in whom there is an admixture of po­
tentiality, namely, essence subordinate to existence, and an opera­
tive faculty that is subordinate to operation. There is here a re­
capitulation of what was said on tliis subject, but without repetition,
which is somewhat like circular contemplation.14
God’s immutability is proved from His absolute simplicity. In­
deed, everything that is mutable is in some way composite; for it
partly remains as it was, and partly passes away, or at least can
do so. This means that it is variable. In other words, every muta­
tion presupposes a subject that is susceptible to variation. Thus in
everything that is moved, there is some kind of composition to be
found; but there cannot be any composition in God.
God’s immutability is proved from the fact that He is not sus­
ceptible to further perfection. For indeed everything that is moved
acquires something. But God, since He is the very plenitude of
being, cannot acquire anything; nor can He lose anything, for He
is the necessary Being, the self-subsisting Being.
This must be said in refutation of absolute evolutionism, whether
of the idealist type as proposed by Hegel or of the empirical type
as proposed by Henry Bergson. Hence universal being, which ac­
cording to Hegel’s opinion is the principle of all things, cannot be the
true God; for, if it were, it would be the self-subsisting Being, abso­
lutely immutable or stable, incapable of any evolution. Absolute evo­
lutionism must say that the principle of all things is “the creative
evolution of itself.” It then admits that something becomes universal
which is its own reason for this. Such an admission means the denial of
the real or ontological validity of the principle of identity or of con­
tradiction (being and non-being are identified in this becoming,
which is its own reason for such); it likewise means the denial of
*i Aristotle affirmed this in his Metaphysics, Bk. XII, chaps. 7, 9.
1« Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.100, a. 6.

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the real validity of the principle of efficient causality and of finality;
for the evolution of anything to something more perfect would
always tend to this without any efficient cause and without being
directed to any end. Thus the greater would always be produced
from the less, the more perfect from the less perfect; for there is
more in what exists than in what is becoming and does not as yet
exist; there is more in the adult and developed man than in the
embryo and the child.
Corollary. Hence the immobility of inertia, which is inferior to
motion and our activity, must not be confused with the immobility
of perfection, which is the supreme stability of Him who is self­
subsisting Being, Intelligence, and Love. These two immutabilities
are distinct, just as the infinity of matter, which is always capable
of further determination and perfection, is distinct from the in­
finity of perfection, as was stated above.16 Thus equally so, supreme
and permanent contemplation is distinct from the ever changeable
aberrations of error, as also the supreme love of the supreme good
is distinct from the human emotions.16
Reply to first objection. Augustine says that ‘‘God moves Him­
self neither by time nor by place,” meaning that God’s mode of
operation, namely, by understanding, willing, and loving, tran­
scends time. The expression is metaphorical, and it owes its origin
to the fact that there is no intellection in us without movement or
transition from ignorance to knowledge. Hence what must be care­
fully considered in analogy, is the analogical concept, which is at­
tributed formally and analogically to God (such as life, intellection,
love), and the imperfect and created mode (movement), which is
not attributed properly but only metaphorically to God.
Reply to second objection. Wisdom 17 is called mobile by way
of similitude, or metaphorically, not formally but causally, according
as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things. This means
that it is mobile, not in itself, but according as it produces all mu­
tations of things. We find this stated in the canonical hour of none
as follows:
God, powerful sustainer of all things,
Thou who dost remain permanently unmoved,
Determining the course of time
By the successions of the light of day.
io Summa theol., la, q.7, a. 1.
i«See what St. Thomas says farther on (la, q.18, a.3), in the article entitled:
"Whether life is attributed to God," which discusses God's absolutely immobile
and most perfectly stable life, a life that is without variation and succession, and
that is measured by eternity, as stated in q. to, a. 2.
n Wis. 7: 24.

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THE ONE GOD

Thus also metaphorically and causally God is said to be angry,
inasmuch as, like an angry man, He punishes sinners.
Reply to third objection. In like manner, it is in a metaphorical
sense that God is said to approach to us inasmuch as we receive
the influx of His goodness.
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER TO BE IMMUTABLE BELONGS TO GOD ALONE

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to distinguish
between God’s absolute immutability and that of the angel and
the human soul, their substances being incorruptible. It is also the
purpose of this article to distinguish between God’s absolute im­
mutability and that of the blessed, who are in possession of eternal
life.
Conclusion. God alone is altogether immutable.
Thus St. Augustine says: “God alone is immutable; and what­
ever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable.” 18
It is proved from reason by distinguishing between incorrupti­
ble and corruptible creatures.
1) All created things, even the incorruptible, are, as regards sub­
stantial being, mutable by an extrinsic power that is in God. For
God, indeed, by a most free act of His power brought creatures
into existence, and He freely preserves them in the same. He can,
therefore, by His absolute power, annihilate all things, although
He would never do so by His well-ordered power (whether ordinary
or extraordinary).18
2) All created and corruptible things are mutable, as regards their
substantial being by an intrinsic power that is in them; for these
are composed of matter that can lose its present form and receive
another.30
3) All creatures, as regards their accidental being, are mutable
by an intrinsic power. Even in the angels there is mutability as
regards their choice of either good or evil. All were created good
and in grace, and some freely merited their eternal happiness,
whereas others sinned. In fact, the blessed are capable of receiving
is De natura boni, chap. 1.
™ Summa theol., la, q.104, a.jf.
20 St. Thomas, along with the ancient physicists, thought that the heavenly
bodies are incorruptible, since there were no signs of corruptibility to be seen
in them. This was explained inasmuch as the form of ether (quintessence) per­
fectly completed the capacity of matter.
But nowadays spectral analysis has shown that the same chemical combinations
are to be found in the stars and in terrestrial bodies. Heavenly bodies are there­
fore corruptible.

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273

new accidental illuminations and of acquiring accidental glory.
Finally, there is mutability in the angels by way of virtual contact,
inasmuch as they can act in this place or that, and do not always
act in the same place.
On the contrary, God is absolutely immutable as regards sub­
stantial being, which is absolutely necessary and not contingent,
nor is there any accident in God. Moreover He always preserves
in being all existing things by His virtual contact. Hence it is
only in those things external to God that there can be mutability,
as when the blessed begin to see Him. God’s free act is a difficulty
which must be later examined.21
It must be noted that God can annihilate all created things by
His absolute power, but not by His well-ordered power (whether
ordinary or extraordinary), for no end can be assigned as reason
why God should annihilate the angels, the blessed, and Christ’s
humanity. Yet it remains true to say that all created things can be
annihilated by an extrinsic power.
On this point Cajetan remarks that the potentiality of created
things does not refer primarily to non-existence, because potentiality
refers essentially to actuality, and not to its opposite. Real po­
tentiality by its very nature is directed to actuality, although it
cannot directly reduce itself to actuality; hence a thing is said to
be in potentiality to exist in a particular way and not to exist in a
certain other, just as active potency of itself means that a thing if
capable of acting and not acting. In other words, potentiality is
really ordained for actuality, and is not really but logically or­
dained for its opposite.
Hence in created things there can be no real potency for non­
existence except in a secondary sense, inasmuch as in anything
there is a potency to exist in another way that is incompatible
with the existence that it actually has. Thus in composites of mat­
ter and form there is a real potency to exist in another way, inas­
much as the matter can receive another form, which can give it
a different existence. Hence for anything to have a real potency
and not merely a logical potency for non-existence, it must have
matter that is capable of receiving another form.
Therefore in the essence of the angel and of the soul there is a
21 Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.3. We must say that God's free act is not an
accident, for it is not the actuation of divine liberty that was prior to this simple
potency. There is only one act of love in God, by which He necessarily loves His
own goodness, and not necessarily creatable and created goodness. Thus the
possibility of a free act in God does not posit mutability in Him. Moreover, this
act is eternal and irrevocable.
On this point consult what St. Thomas says about the incorruptibility of the
angels (la, q.50, a.5), and of the soul (fa, q.75, a.6).

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THE ONE GOD

real potency for existence, and only a logical potency for non­
existence; corresponding to this there is the real power of God,
who can annihilate all things created and freely maintained in
being by Him. For just as the power of creating presupposes only
a logical potency or a possibility on the part of the thing creatable,
so the power to annihilate presupposes only the possibility of an­
nihilation. In incorruptible things there is therefore no real potency
for non-existence.
Corollary. Therefore the instability in any being arises solely
from the possibility of its desiring some other reality which it does
not have, for nothingness is not desired by anyone. Hence insta­
bility comes from the imperfection of that which is possessed, in­
asmuch as this does not fully satisfy the capacity for desiring.
Therefore the more we approach to God, the more stability takes
the place of instability. This is the immutability of perfect sanctity
that exists in heaven.22 The saints in heaven adhere immutably to
God, so that sin is no longer possible.23 This immutability is of
a higher order and is by participation.
On the other hand, there is an inferior kind of immutability
that proceeds not from the illimitation of being, but from the
limitation of its capacity or desire, which is found in those, as St.
Paul so vividly expresses it, who are already filled and have no
higher aspirations. For he says: “You are now full, you are now
become rich.” 24 This is an inferior kind of immutability, a sort ol
inert egotism, fanaticism, or sectarianism, since such persons do not
sufficiently aspire to the higher truth and goodness.
Intermediate between this inferior kind of immutability of those
who are now filled and the higher immutability of the blessed, is
the praiseworthy mutability of the holy wayfarer who is, like
Daniel, "a man of desires” 25 and who always aspires to something
higher. This praiseworthy mutability, which tends toward the
higher immutability, differs entirely from the instability of the
dilettante, who regards no truth as immutable, who does not tend
toward God, but who is always of a fickle disposition.
Reply to second objection. The good angels have a participated
immutability of the will for good.
And so this terminates the question of God’s immutability com­
pared with that of any created being whatever. This question per­
fects the teaching proposed by St. Augustine since it brings out
Ibid., Ha Ilae, q.8i, a.8.
23 Ibid., la Ilae, q.5, a.4.
24 1 Cor. 4: 8.
25 Dan. 9: 23.

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275

clearly the distinction between mutability that is the result of
intrinsic power, and mutability that is the result of extrinsic power.
In this we have a wonderful application of the Aristotelian distinc­
tion between real potentiality and actuality.

CHAPTER X
Question io

The Eternity

of

God

We now come to consider eternity, because, as will at once be
seen, eternity follows from immutability, since it is the duration
of the absolutely immobile being. There are two things which St.
Thomas considers in this question: (i) eternity as such is consid­
ered in the first three questions, namely: what is eternity, whether
God is eternal, whether to be eternal belongs to God alone; (2) in
the remaining articles eternity is compared with created durations,
that is, with reference to our continuous time, to the discrete time
of the angels which is measured by their successive thoughts, and
to aeviternity, or the duration of the angelic substance and the
separated soul, which as substances are immutable, though they
had a beginning.
In these last three articles the comparison is made from on high,
namely, from eternity as it has already been defined. In the first
three articles, however, there is already a similar comparison made,
but it starts as it were from below, and by way of investigation
finally formulates the definition of eternity.
FIRST ARTICLE
whether this is a good definition of eternity:

"the

SIMULTANEOUSLY-WHOLE AND PERFECT POSSESSION
OF INTERMINABLE LIFE”

State of the question. The definition of Boethius is the subject
of inquiry.1 It must be observed that this definition is implied in
what Holy Scripture says about God’s immobility, as we shall state
in the second article. Among the philosophers, Plato likewise says
that time is the mobile image of immobile eternity.2 Aristotle says
equivalently, “God is the everlasting and noblest living being. In
God there is both life and duration that is continual and eter­
nal.” 8 In like manner, farther on,4 he shows that God is subsistent
1 De Consolatione, Bk. Ill, pros. 2.
2 Timaeus,
d.
s Metaph., Bk. XII, chap. 7 (end).
4 Ibid., chap. 9.

»76

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277

intellection who continually understands Himself, transcending suc­
cession of time. Moreover, Aristotle defined time as "movement that
is estimated according to its before and after.” 5 Thus the motion
of the sun is measured in time, inasmuch as one revolution is called
a day, and this day consists of distinctly different hours according
to a before and after. Thus we have already at least a confused
notion and a nominal definition of eternity.
Plotinus 6 explains eternity in the same way, speaking not only
of the immobility of eternity but also of its indivisibility, whereas
time is divided into years, days, and hours. Hence Plotinus says
that, if one were to say that eternity is life interminable and
totally present to itself, none of it pertaining to the past or to
the future, such a one is not far from its true definition.
St. Augustine says the same,7 speaking of the indivisible and
ever constant now of eternity, whereas time is fleeting. Thus gradu­
ally the transition is effected from the nominal and confused defi­
nition to the real and distinct definition. Then Boethius ^524)
gave us the same concept of eternity in the aforesaid classical defi­
nition, saying that it is "the simultaneously-whole and perfect
possession of interminable life.”
St. Thomas shows here that this definition is a good one, since
it is in accordance with the laws governing the search for a defi­
nition, inasmuch as by these laws there is a methodical transition
from a confused to a distinct notion.8 But St. Thomas first of all
sets forth the difficulties, the two principal ones being these: (1)
a whole is what has parts. But this does not apply to eternity,
which is simple; (2) further, if a thing is said to be whole, perfect
is a superfluous addition; nor does it seem that possession im­
plies duration.
Yet the reply is that this definition is a good one, since it
properly expresses eternity as the interminable duration, which
is without succession, and so it is spoken of as “being simultane­
ously whole.”
This is not, strictly speaking, demonstrated in the body of the
article, for, as it is pointed out elsewhere,8 it is not the definition
of a thing but its property that is, strictly speaking, demonstrated.
The definition is sought by a certain investigation, says Aristotle,10
by a division of its genus or quasi-genus (in the present instance,
the notion of duration) and then comparing the thing to be de» Physics, Bk. IV, chap. 11, lect. 20.
o Enneades, Hia, Bk. VII, chap. 4.
7 De vera religione, chap. 2, no. 97.
8 Post. Anal., Bk. II.
» Ibid.
so Ibid.

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THE ONE GOD

fined with things similar and dissimilar (in the present instance,
by comparing the confused notion of eternity, according to its
nominal definition, with time). Yet in the body of the article there
is a sort of demonstration, inasmuch as eternity is deduced from
God’s absolute immobility. This will be made clearer in the second
article.
The argument of the article by the way of investigation may
be summed up as follows: We must come to the knowledge of
eternity by means of time. But time is but the numbering of move­
ment by before and after. Contrary to this, in the duration of that
which is without movement, there is absolute uniformity, with­
out any before and after. Moreover, what is absolutely immutable
is interminable, without beginning and end, whereas those things
that are measured by time have a beginning and an end. Thus,
therefore, eternity has two characteristics: (1) uniformity without
succession, and so it is truly spoken of as "being simultaneously
whole”; (2) interminableness, so that it can be truly said to be
"the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable
life.”
It must be observed that the first characteristic is the principal
one, and so also if the movement of the heavenly bodies and time
were eternal, as Aristotle thought, that is without beginning and
end, time would still be distinct from eternity; for in time there
is always a succession of centuries and years, although there would
never have been a first or last day. Hence the principal difference
between eternity and time is that the former is without before and
after or that it is “being simultaneously whole.”
Contrary to this, our life is not simultaneously whole, for it
consists of the distinct periods of infancy, youth, adult age, prime
of life, and old age. Our life is also divided into periods of labor,
prayer, sleep, and the like, so that there is a great variety and
instability in this succession. Hence the now of time is the current
now between the past and the future, so that past and future do
not actually exist but exist only in the mind, whereas the now of
eternity is a standing now, which is absolutely permanent and
immobile, and we find this already equivalently expressed, al­
though less distinctly, in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and
Plotinus.
Thus the definition of Boethius is a good one, since it complies
with the rules to be observed in the search for a definition.11 The
transition is effected methodically from a confused to a distinct
notion, and this by a correct division of duration, and by a com11 Ibid.

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279

parison of one’s already confused notion of eternity with that of
time.
This hunt or search presupposes the true definition of time as
given by Aristotle, who says that it is movement estimated by its
before and after, for example, the movement of the sun is esti­
mated by its successive revolutions and portions of one revolution.
It seems that this definition12 is a good explanation of what is
obscurely implied in the popular or common notion of time and
its parts, namely, century, year, day, hour. This is the realistic no­
tion of time. On the contrary, Kant proposed an idealist notion
of time, which in his opinion is an a priori subjective form of our
sensibility, in which things appear to us as a succession of phe­
nomena.
But Kant unjustifiably denied the reality of time, giving as his
reason the false antinomies that would result from this. In his opin­
ion, it is equally demonstrated that the world had and did not
have a beginning in time. But, as St. Thomas points out: “By
faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved,
that the world did not always exist.” 13 God, who created with
absolute freedom, could have eternally created, so that there never
would have been a first day; just as the imprint of a foot in the
sand would be eternal, if the foot were eternal. And even if the
movement of the sun and time had been eternal creations, as we
remarked, there would still be a complete distinction between time
and eternity, only this latter being simultaneously whole.
The proof given in the argumentative part of the article may be
presented in the following syllogistic form: What is absolutely im­
mutable is simultancously-whole and interminable; but eternity is
attributed to a thing that is absolutely immutable, just as time is
attributed to things that are mobile; therefore eternity must be
simultaneously-whole and interminable duration.
The solution of the difficulties confirms this conclusion.
Reply to first objection. Eternity is conceived by us as being
negatively interminable, because our knowledge is first of things
that come to an end.
Reply to second objection. "Interminable life” is predicated of
eternity rather than “interminable being,” because what is truly
eternal is not only being, but also life, in fact, self-subsistent life.
But life extends to operation, and not to being. Hence it is clear
that both God’s being and His operation are measured by eternity,
12See St. Thomas’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Bk. IV, chap, it, lect. so.
u Summa theol., la, q.46, a.2.

THE ONE GOD

28ο

whereas the angel’s immutable essence and operations are not
measured the same way.14
Reply to third objection. Eternity is called whole, not because
it has parts, but inasmuch as it is wanting in nothing. In this we
see the imperfection of our knowledge.
Reply to fourth objection. Sacred Scripture speaks metaphori­
cally of the "days of eternity.” 16
Reply to fifth objection. The word perfect is not a superfluous
addition, for simultaneously whole excludes past and future, and
perfect excludes the passing now, which is imperfect.
Reply to sixth objection. Lastly eternity is said to be perfect
possession rather than duration, to designate the indeficiency of
eternity; for what is possessed, is held firmly and quietly. On the
contrary, a boy does not yet possess the maturity of old age, nor
does the old man possess the complete vitality of youth. So also
in the interior life, the beginner does not yet possess the perfec­
tion of the unitive life.
Therefore the above definition of eternity is a very fine one,
especially as regards the words “being simultaneously whole.” This
last expression must be the object not only of speculation, but
also of acquired contemplation resulting from sacred theology, and
of infused contemplation which is the result of living faith that is
illumined by the gifts of intellect and wisdom.
As a complement to this investigation into the true notion of
eternity, it must be observed that great geniuses have a certain
experimental knowledge of a life which by remote comparison can be
called “simultaneously whole.” For the most sublime manifestations
of art (for instance, of music) are a certain remote participation of
this kind of perfection. Thus it is said of Mozart that he heard all
together a whole melody that he was composing, in that he was hear­
ing it or previously heard it in the thought that gave it birth; whereas
others heard it only successively. Thus great mathematicians by one
intellectual act perceive the many elements of a very complex prob­
lem. In like manner great philosophers and theologians toward the
end of their life have a sort of simultaneously whole knowledge of
their science, inasmuch as they see it from on high as an irradiation
of its principles. So also the contemplative experiences the joy of
infused contemplation, and it remains with him during the day as
a sort of latent reserve force, possessing this throughout the day as
it were from on high; for when the time of prayer comes to an end,
there is not a complete cessation of prayer, for it continues as it
14 Ibid., q. 10, a. 5.
1G Mich. 5: 2.

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281

were during the time of study or even of recreation. Thus the inferi­
ority inherent in multiplicity gradually resolves itself into the
superiority of unity, and this finds its realization in the unitive life
of the saints. Hence St. Augustine 16 exhorts us to a loving union
with God and His eternity, peacefully awaiting the events of time,
which are, as it were, beneath us, beneath the summit of the soul that
is united with God.
But if Mozart heard all at once the various parts of a melody
which he was composing, so we can conclude that God possesses His
life all at once and sees simultaneously from on high the entire se­
quence of centuries. Thus eternity is like the apex of a cone, the base
of which represents time. All the successive points of this base corre­
spond to the one point of the apex.
But many difficulties, especially about the problem of evil, result
from the fact that we do not see from on high the succession of time,
but only successively. Thus we do not know that it is for the greater
good of the world and of the Church that God permits this or that
very great evil actually to happen. But if this succession of time
were seen from on high by one glance, then evil would appear as a
certain particularization that is a condition of the higher good, as
in a picture we have the harmonious blending of light and shade,
especially so in the “light transcending obscurity.” In the above
examples, as in that of the musical composition which is quoted by
H. Bergson, there is a certain experimental knowledge of a life that
bears a certain analogical resemblance to eternity. Thus the investi­
gation is completed in a less abstract and more concrete way.
Solution of certain difficulties. As Cajetan remarks, Aureolus raised
several objections against this article of St. Thomas. In the first place,
he says that uniformity, because it does not differ from immutability,
is not the chief characteristic of eternity.
In reply we must say with Cajetan that uniformity differs from
immutability as a property differs from its essence. Immutability is
the denial of the possibility of change. Uniformity adds to immuta­
bility the idea of unity of form, and this can be attributed also to
motion; for we speak of uniform motion, the velocity of which is
always the same, and thus it differs from variation in motion. In fact,
we speak of a uniformly accelerated motion, such as the fall of a
stone, or of the uniformly retarded motion of a stone thrown in the
air. And just as there is uniformity in motion or succession, so also
there is the same in immobility or permanence. Immutability is
opposed to motion, whereas, on the other hand, uniformity is not,
for there can be uniformity in motion. Consequently it is false to
ie Com. on Ps. 91.

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THE ONE GOD

say that there is no distinction between uniformity and immutability.
Hence eternity is correctly and more briefly defined as the uniformity
of an absolutely immutable thing.
But again Aureolus objects, saying that time is not the variation
of motion, and therefore uniformity is not the uniformity of the
immobile.
We reply to this by distinguishing the antecedent. That time is not
solely the variation of motion, this I concede; that it is not variation
of motion according to before and after, this I deny. Therefore the
uniformity of the immobile, in which there is no before and after,
suffices for the constitution of eternity. This point will be made
clearer in the following article.
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD IS ETERNAL

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to show in what
particular sense God is eternal and is His eternity, and also to explain
how eternity can be called the measure of God, although He is not
measured; whereas even the sun’s motion is measured, inasmuch as
its revolutions are numbered.
Reply. God is not only eternal, but He is His eternity.
1) It is of faith that God is eternal and is so essentially. This truth
is clearly stated in many texts of Holy Scripture. Thus we read:
“Abraham . . . called upon the name of the Lord God eternal.” 17
“For He is the living and eternal God.” 18 God is often called eter­
nal.19
The Athanasian Creed says: “The Father is eternal, the Son is
eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal.” The Fourth Council of the
Lateran declares: “We firmly believe that there is only one true God,
who is eternal.” 20
According to Vacant,21 it is of faith that God has neither beginning
nor end. That there is no succession in God is a certain truth and is
proximate to the faith. Vacant22 thinks, however, that this does not
as yet appear to be a dogma of the faith.
2) In the body of the article God’s eternity is deduced from His
immutability, and may be expressed by the following syllogism:
Eternity follows immutability, as time follows movement; but God
11 Gen. 21: 33.
is Dan. 6: 26.
is Ps. 101: 12-26: John 8: 58; 12: 34.
2»Denz., no. 428; also no. 1782 (Vatican Council).
21 Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, I, 183 f.
22 Ibid., p. 188.

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283

is supremely immutable; therefore it supremely belongs to Him to
be eternal. It is also stated that God is His own eternity. For God
and God alone is His own existence and essence; consequently God is
His own duration.
This is the same as saying that everything survives inasmuch as it
retains its existence; but God alone is His existence. Therefore He
alone is His own uniform duration. Thus St. Thomas holds that
eternity is God’s duration. Wherefore the notion of duration is far
more universal than that of time. Duration is predicated analogically
of eternity, of our continuous time, of the discrete time of the angels,
and of aevum or aeviternity, as will be stated farther on.
In the reply to the first objection the words of Boethius are ex­
plained, namely: “The now that flows away makes time, the now that
stands still makes eternity.” This latter now is said to make eternity
according to our apprehension. This means that the apprehension
of eternity is caused in us inasmuch as we apprehend the now stand­
ing still. Eternity has complete existence ext ramen tally, whereas, on
the other hand, time has complete existence only in the mind, inas­
much as past and future exist only in the mind.
What is real in time is the now that flows away, and it is said to
flow away like movement, which is the act of a being in potentiality
inasmuch as it is such, the act of a further perfectible and to be
perfected being, the successive transition from potentiality to perfect
actuality. Contrary to this, the now of eternity is spoken of as stand­
ing still, and corresponding to it are all the successive moments of
time, just as all the points in the base of a cone correspond to its
apex. Thus there is but one instant in the immobility of eternity.
In this reply to the first objection there is an explanation of St.
Augustine’s words: “God is the author of eternity,” which are to be
understood of participated eternity consisting in the eternal life
of the saints. Their beatific vision begins but will not end, and there
is no succession or variation in this vision at least as regards the
primary object, which is God's essence clearly seen. Thus, strictly
speaking, their life is not only said to be a future life with reference
to ours, but it is eternal life, because it is measured by participated
eternity.
It must be observed that just as a beginning is not repugnant to
the idea of participated eternity, so also the end is not absolutely
repugnant to this idea, provided there is no succession in this partici­
pated eternity. Therefore if St. Paul had on this earth the beatific
vision as a transient act, this vision could have been measured by
participated eternity, transcending our continuous time and the
discrete time of the angels in which their successive thoughts are
measured.

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THE ONE GOD

Reply to second objection. When the Scripture says that "the
Lord shall reign forever and ever,” 28 this means always. Others
change the phrase to “forever and always,” thus making it in a way
redundant. St. Thomas points out that eternity transcends time, and
this would be the case even if time were unlimited as regards the
future.
Reply to third objection. It is pointed out that eternity is said to
be the measure of God "according to the apprehension of our mind
alone.” In several other passages St. Thomas says that eternity is the
measure of divine life. This must be understood of intrinsic measure­
ment, inasmuch as God is His eternity. Thus God is not measured.
Contrary to this the motion of the heavenly bodies is measured by a
recurrent succession of revolutions or of days, and all the more so is
the motion of other bodies, which is measured extrinsically according
to solar time. There was formerly a dispute of minor importance on
this subject, as can be readily seen by consulting Billuart.
Reply to fourth objection. "Eternity includes all times” or "com­
prises all time,” which means that it virtually contains all inferior
durations, just as the apex of a cone virtually contains all the points
of its base, or the center of a circle all the radii and points of its
circumference.
Doubt. How are created things said to be present in eternity?
The Thomists hold, as will be stated farther on, that creatures are
physically present in eternity, coming under God's direct vision.
John of St. Thomas says: “Eternity does not immediately measure
created things on the supposition that they have already undergone
a passive change and been passively produced, but it measures them
precisely for the reason that they are contained in the divine action,
which contacts and regards created things as its terminus.24 Indeed,
not only God’s intellection and volition are eternal, but even His
external action is eternal, and yet it has its effect in time. “From the
eternal (free) action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such
an effect as God willed, namely, that which has being after not
being.” 25
Thus created things are really present in eternity, and are not
merely either possible or future. They are contained in the divine
essence not as merely having the power or will to produce them, but
as actually producing them. Thus God’s knowledge of these things
is intuitive, although they may not as yet have been passively pro­
duced. It is evident that this presence of things in eternity or in God’s
2s Ex. 15:18.
34 Com. in lam, disp. IX, a.3. Billuart (De Deo, diss. VI, a.3), Gonet, and many
other Thomists say the same.
w Summa theol., la, q.46, a.i ad 10 um.

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eternal action presupposes God’s free decree, for the action spoken
about here is a free one. Thus St. Paul’s conversion was eternally
present to God’s intution only because He eternally willed it; other­
wise this conversion would not be a contingent but a necessary act.
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER TO BE ETERNAL BELONGS TO GOD ALONE

There are two conclusions in this article: (1) Eternity truly and
properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on ab­
solute immutability, which is in God alone; (2) creatures share in
God’s eternity, just as they do in His immutability. Thus it is said
by participation that "the earth standeth forever.” 20 Thus, because
of the length of their duration, the mountains are said to be eternal
and their peaks to be covered with perpetual snow. Incorruptible
spiritual substances share more fully and in a nobler manner in the
nature of eternity. This is especially so of the blessed, who are said to
have eternal life, inasmuch as the beatific vision, whose primary object
is always the same, is measured by participated eternity. It is, indeed,
an absolutely immutable operation.
Several Thomists remark that, just as the different motions of the
earth are measured by solar time, or according to the measure of the
sun’s motion, so also the beatific vision is measured according to God’s
eternity, inasmuch as, by reason of the object or of God who is
clearly seen, there is a participated eternity in this vision.27
Reply to second objection. The punishment in hell is eternal inas­
much as it never ends. However, “in hell true eternity does not exist,
but rather time” in accordance with a certain change in sensible
pain.
Reply to third objection. The principles of demonstration are
called eternal truths but in a negative sense, in that they abstract
from time and place and are absolutely necessary. Moreover, they
are positively eternal inasmuch as they are positively in the intellect
of God, who alone is positively eternal.
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER ETERNITY DIFFERS FROM TIME

State of the question. It is not, strictly speaking, a question here
as to whether there is a difference, but it is asked what is the reason
for this difference. Thus eternity and time are compared from on
high, whereas in the first article the ascent of the mind was made by
28 Eccles. 1: 4.
27 Consult the commentaries of Banner and John of St. Thomas.

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the way of investigation, from time to the definition of eternity. Now
by the way of sapiential judgment, time is judged from the highest of
causes, or from eternity as already defined. There are three difficulties:
(i) It seems that eternity does not differ from time, because they occur
together. Hence it seems that time is a part of eternity, just as an hour,
which occurs along with a day, is a part of a day. In other words, the
finite cannot coexist with the infinite, unless it is a part of the in­
finite, as several pantheists say. (2) According to Aristotle,28 the now
of time remains the same in the whole of time. Therefore it does not
differ from the now of eternity. (3) Eternity, which comprises all
time, seems to be the measure of all things inasmuch as they proceed
from God, and so it does not differ from time.
Yet the reply is that time and eternity are not the same, because
eternity is simultaneously whole, whereas time has a before and an
after.
In the body of the article, St. Thomas shows that, even if time
had neither beginning nor end, it would differ from eternity, inas­
much as it would consist of a succession of years and centuries, namely,
of a before and an after; whereas only eternity is simultaneously
whole. He even says that the difference, which is founded on the
fact that time has a beginning and will have no end, is an accidental
one, which means that it could as well not be so. Therefore the reason
for the difference lies essentially in the fact that eternity is the
measure of permanent being, whereas time is the measure of move­
ment. The solution of the difficulties confirms this.
Reply to first objection. Eternity and time can coexist and yet
time is not a part of eternity, because they are not of the same genus,
but only analogically agree in point of duration. So the finite being
and the infinite being can coexist, and yet the finite is not a part
of the infinite, because they are not of the same genus; but they are
alike in this, that being is predicated analogically of each. Infinite
being is self-existing being, whereas finite being is participated being,
and is not its own being. There is never any variation from this in
the refutation of pantheism.
Reply to second objection. What sort of identity is there between
the now of time and the whole of time as this differs from the identity
between the now of eternity and eternity? The now of time is the
same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, just as move­
ment is measured by time; but it differs in aspect, for what is movable
is first here and then there. On the contrary, the permanent now of
eternity is absolutely the same as regards both its subject and its
aspect.
St. Thomas says with profundity of thought in this article: “The
w Physics, Bk. IV, chap. 11.

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flow of the now as alternating in aspect, is time,” just as the pro­
gressive passive actualization of the movable is movement. When he
says that the now differs in aspect in the whole course of time, he
does not mean that alternation is merely according to aspect and is
not anything real. He is speaking, as he does in one of his commen­
taries,29 in which he says that terminative transitive action and
passion are the same as movement, but differ in aspect, inasmuch as
action is movement as coming from an agent, and passion is move­
ment as found in the movable. This means to say that they are the
same as regards their subject, but that they differ according to their
constitutive aspects, and so, according to the Thomists, there is a
modal distinction between terminative action and passion. In like
manner, St. Thomas says: "Man and white are the same in subject,
and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of
whiteness is another.” s0 He does not mean that whiteness, which is
an accident, is not really distinct from the substance of man; but it
can be said that this man is white, so that in this proposition as in
every affirmative proposition, "the predicate and the subject signify
the same thing in reality.” 81
There is a most manifest difference, at least in the abstract sense,
between the passing now of time and the permanent now of eternity.
The passing now of time comes within our experience, but the per­
manent now of eternity does not. Hence eternity is less intelligible
to us than time, but it is more intelligible in itself. For in itself the
now of time is scarcely intelligible, because it is almost nothing, is
among the inferior limitations of being, is always changing, and
when it is said that the present moment is, it already is not. On the
contrary, the now of eternity is always permanent, always is; in fact,
it is the self-subsisting Being, inasmuch as God is His eternity.
Reply to third objection. The being of corruptible things, because
it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time. However,
as we remarked above, since created things are not passively produced
in themselves, but are present in God as the terminus of His eternal
action, they are measured by eternity. Thus eternity is the measure
of all measures and includes all times.
FIFTH ARTICLE
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AEVITERNITY AND TIME

State of the question. The purpose of this question is to inquire
into the proper meaning of aevum (age). This word, which is still
29 Ibid., Bk. Ill, lect. 5.
>0 Summa theol., la, q.13, a. 12.
»1 Ibid.

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THE ONE GOD

one in common use, as when we speak of the Middle Ages (medium
aevum), means, among Latin authors, either a certain age of the
human race or that of some man—thus the first age corresponds to
the period of youth, whereas full age corresponds to maturity—or
perpetual duration (Varro). Aeviternal means also perpetual.
The Scholastics say that aeviternity is “the measure of spiritual
substances.” Previous to this, St. Augustine 32 had said that we must
admit a certain intermediate duration between eternity and time.
This intermediate duration is difficult to conceive. It is, indeed, not
so intelligible in itself as eternity, and not so intelligible to us as
time, because it does not come within our experience. The principal
difficulty that confronts us in distinguishing between aeviternity and
time is that, if aeviternity is not eternity, then it is not simultaneously
whole. Therefore it has a before and an after, and hence it does not
seem to differ from time.
Yet the reply is that aeviternity differs from time and from eternity,
as the mean between them.
The proper reason for this difference is not given by some, whose
conception of eternity is more material than formal. They said that
eternity has neither beginning nor end; that aeviternity has a be­
ginning but no end (inasmuch as the angels were not created from
eternity); that a time has both beginning and end. But this difference
is accidental, because even if aeviternal things had always been,
aeviternity would be distinct from eternity.
Others said that aeviternity differs from eternity, in that it has a
before and an after; and that it differs from time, because it has
neither youth nor age. But this involves a contradiction; for if aevi­
ternity has a before and an after, it also has youth and age. It would
have youth when the after part appears, and age in the receding of
the first part. In like manner, if the aeviternal thing were not subject
to youth and age, this would be because it is immutable, and hence
it would have neither before nor after.
But the true difference consists in this, that aeviternity is the mean
between eternity and time, because it is unchangeable, though it
has changeableness annexed to it. It is proved as follows: In so far
as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from
eternity. But mutation, whose measure is time, recedes more from
eternity, than does immutation, to which, however, mutation is
annexed, whose measure is aeviternity. Therefore aeviternity is the
mean between eternity and time
St. Thomas explains this in his reply to the first objection, in which
he says: “Spiritual creatures, as regards successive affections and in­
telligences, are measured by time (not by continuous time, however,
Book of 8} questions, q.72.

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such as solar time, but by discrete time). . . . But as regards their
nature, they are measured by aeviternity, and as regards the vision of
glory, they have a share of eternity.”
Thus aeviternity is the measure of an immutable thing, which
in its operations, however, is connected with change. Hence aevi­
ternity has not in itself either before or after, as stated in the second
opinion; but before and after are compatible with it.33
Scotus objects to this, remarking that at least several angelic opera­
tions are not successive but permanent. Hence they are measured, he
says, not by discrete time but by aeviternity.
Bannez replies by saying that there are three kinds of angelic
operations. (1) There are those angelic operations that are connatural
to the angel and unceasing. These are measured by aeviternity, as
St. Thomas himself says.34 Thus the angel’s natural knowledge of
himself, of God as the Author of nature; and his natural love of him­
self and of God are of this first kind. (2) Then there are those imma­
nent angelic operations that are not permanent but successive. These
are measured by angelic discrete time. This time refers to the number
of angelic thoughts, as St. Thomas states farther on as follows: “If the
time of the angel’s motion is not continuous, but a kind of succession
of nows, it will have no proportion to the time which measures the
motion of corporeal things, which is continuous, since it is not of the
same nature.” 33 Thus one angelic thought constitutes one angelic
moment, and it can last for several years of our continuous solar time.
Thus with those saints who are still wayfarers, when they are in
ecstasy, there is a sort of immobile and loving contemplation that
takes place in the summit of their soul, and sometimes this lasts for
several hours of our continuous time. (3) There is finally, the vir­
tually transitive operation of the angel by which he locally moves
bodies. It is measured terminatively by our continuous time, in that
the movement of this body is measured by solar time and it lasts, for
instance, half an hour.
Doubt. How can aeviternity be simultaneously whole, although
before and after are compatible with it, as St. Thomas says in his
reply to the second objection?
The difficulty is that if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it con­
tains time eminently, just as eternity does. Such being the case, the
angels would have a natural knowledge of future contingent things,
and they would not have to wait for their realization.
St. Thomas replies to this by saying that aeviternity is simul­
taneously whole inasmuch as the angel’s substantial being is imss Cf. ad 2um.
»« Quodl., q.5, a.7.
»8 Summa theol., la, q.53, a.3 ad mm.

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THE ONE GOD

mutable, and is not the subject of succession.38 However, aeviternity
does not contain time eminently as eternity does, because angelic
being does not contain eminently the being of mutable things, as the
first cause in its action contains all things that are. Moreover, as it
has been remarked, the angelic knowledge of particular things is not
measured by aeviternity but by discrete time. Thus angels cannot
have a natural but only a conjectural knowledge of future contingent
things. Hence aeviternity coexists with our continuous time some­
what as an immovable stone placed in a river, coexists with the
various parts of the flowing water. But eternity is like a mountain
peak from which the whole river is seen by one glance. And so this
proves that aeviternity is the mean between eternity and time.
SIXTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE AEVITERNITY

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to compare the
unity of aeviternity of all aeviternal things, namely, of angels and of
disembodied spirits, with the unity of time of all sensible movements.
The reply of St. Thomas is that, according to the truer opinion,
there is one aeviternity for all subordinate aeviternal things, just
as there is one time for all subordinate sensible movements in the
universe. For it is evident that to form an idea of the unity of dura­
tion of spiritual beings, we must first consider the unity of duration
of sensible things. But the unity of duration of sensible things or
the unity of continuous time depends on the fact that the movement
of the first movable (we are speaking of the sun in our solar system)
is supposed to be uniform. Thus solar time is the intrinsic measure
of solar movement and the extrinsic measure of other subordinate
movements. Thus time is one and continuous. By analogy, therefore,
there is one aeviternity, inasmuch as there is subordination among
the angels, and thus the being of all subordinate aeviternal beings
is measured extrinsically, as it were, according to the intrinsic
measure of the first aeviternal being, or of the highest angel. This
opinion presupposes that the angels are not equal, but are subor­
dinated, or that they proceed from God in a certain degree and
order.37
It must be observed that unity of continuous time presupposes,
but does not apodictically prove as many think, that the apparent
movement of the sun is uniform, or that the real movement of the
earth around the sun is uniform, that is, always of the same velocity.
s® Quod I., q.io, a.4; also reply to third objection of this article.
*7 Summa theol., la, q.47, a. 2.

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But this, as many think, is not apodictically true, for there would
have to be first a fixed unity of time which is reckoned according to a
presupposed uniformity of movement. Nevertheless the hypothesis
of the uniformity of the sun’s apparent movement is confirmed by
the harmony that prevails between the various ways we have of meas­
uring time, for instance, in the clocks we use.38 Moreover, this hy­
pothesis, which was already explicitly formulated by Aristotle,39 is
more in conformity with the simplicity of the laws of nature than is
the hypothesis of some non-uniform but accelerated or retarded
movement, or of one that is sometimes accelerated and sometimes re­
tarded with compensation, whose velocity is not always the same.
Therefore the truer opinion is that there is one time and one aevi­
ternity.
Yet the fourth objection in this article states that things not de­
pendent on one other, do not seem to have one measure of duration.
But aeviternal things do not depend on one another, for one angel
is not the cause of another angel. Consequently there is not only one
aeviternity.
St. Thomas replies by saying: “For things to be measured by one,
it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that
it be simpler than the rest.” Thus arithmetical unity is the principle
of number, and the letter is the principle of unity for the syllable.
Recapitulation. And so we bring to an end this beautiful question
of eternity, which is compared with other durations. From the fore­
going we clearly see that the principle characteristic of eternity is not
to be without beginning and end, but to be simultaneously whole,
without succession and variation, according to a most perfect uni­
formity. Hence there is but one and permanent now of eternity. On
the contrary, the now of continuous time alternates between the
past and the future. Aeviternity is the mean between time and eter­
nity, and so it is “simultaneously whole, but before and after are com­
patible with it,”40 according to a succession of thoughts in the angels.
Finally, in the discrete time by which these successive thoughts of
the angels are measured, there are several standing, successive nows;
so that one angelic thought or contemplation is present in the same
moment of time, and a subsequent thought in another, without any
continuous time intervening; whereas in our time two moments are
always separated from the one time that is infinitely divisible. Thus
also, while the angels move bodies locally, as stated farther on, “the
time of an angel’s motion can be non-continuous; so an angel can
38 Cf. Lechalas, Espace et temps, p. 84.
39 Physics, Bk. VIII, chap. 14; Metaph., Bk. X, chap. 1.
40 Summa theol., la, q. 10, a.5 ad aum.

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THE ONE GOD

be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next in­
stant without any time intervening. ” 41
Wherefore “the standing now” of eternity is like the apex of a
cone, the base of which would represent the successive parts of time.
But between the apex and the base is aeviternity to which change is
annexed, and discrete time consisting of several successive standing
nows. Thus a more profound knowledge is acquired of the definition
of eternity as formulated by Boethius, who says it is “the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life.” 42 The unitive life of the saints, already here below, approaches this eternity,
and especially so does the beatific vision of which participated eter­
nity is the measure.
« Ibid., q.53, a.3 ad 311m.
42 De consolatione, Bk. HI, pros. 2.

CHAPTER XI
Question 11

The Unity of God

Why does St. Thomas now treat of God’s unity? It seems that he
should have discussed it before God’s goodness, because unity is the
first property of being considered in itself, and it precedes truth and
goodness. Moreover, it seems that St. Thomas had already dis­
cussed God’s unity in the third question in connection with God’s
simplicity, because unity is the undividedness of being, and it was
already shown in that question that God is the absolutely undivided
and indivisible being, because He is not composed of matter and
form, of essence and existence, of substance and accident, or of other
parts.
In reply to this it must be said that in this eleventh question, as
appears particularly from the third article, in which St. Thomas
inquires whether there are one or several gods, he is concerned es­
pecially with God’s unicity; but God’s unicity has its foundation in
the absolute indivisibility of the divine nature,1 that is, in the unity
and absolute simplicity of the divine nature. Therefore, in order
properly to discuss God’s unicity, St. Thomas speaks also of His in­
divisibility or of unity in the strict sense.
St. Thomas first treated of the divine nature, having considered it
quasi-metaphysically as it is in itself.2 He now inquires whether this
divine nature can be in several gods, just as one would ask whether
Michaelness can be in several angels, as humanity is found in several
numerically distinct human beings. It is therefore more a discussion
of God's unicity, as is evident from the third article of this question;
but the two preceding articles treat of unity in general, in that it is
along with simplicity the foundation of unicity.
Thus there are four articles, (i) Whether one adds anything to
being. (2) Whether one and many are opposed to each other (this
article confirming, as it were from on high, the fourth proof for God’s
existence). (3) Whether there is only one God. (4) Whether God is
supremely one.
1 Summa theol., la, q. 11, a.3 (first proof).
2 Cajetan’s commentary may be consulted concerning this difficulty about the
arrangement of the subject matter of this part of the Summa.
«93

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THE ONE GOD

To some this seems a repetition of the preceding; yet it is not,
properly speaking, a repetition, but rather a case of circular con­
templation,3 which always returns to the same supreme truth (God
is the self-subsisting Being), to behold the new rays emanating from
it.
FIRST ARTICLE
WHETHER ONE ADDS ANYTHING TO BEING

State of the question. The discussion is not about numerical unity,
which is the principle of number and which belongs to the category
of quantity, but it concerns transcendental unity, which is a property
of being and which is found in every category of being, inasmuch as
we speak of the unity of substance, of the unity and simplicity of
quality, of the unity of action, and similarly of the other predica­
ments. This distinction is implied in the first objection of this article.
It must be noted that in ancient times Parmenides and Heraclitus
seriously disputed this point. Parmenides affirmed the unity and
unicity of being, even denying the multiplicity of beings. He pro­
ceeded along the lines of absolute realism, conceiving the universal
as existing formally in the concrete, and thus he confused universal
being with the divine being and said: Being cannot be diversified by
itself (because being is being and nothing else); nor can it be diversi­
fied by something other than itself (because what would be other than
being would be non-being, and non-being is nothing). Hence he
concluded: “Being is being, non-being is non-being, and it is impos­
sible to think of anything else.” In other words, multiplicity of be­
ings is absolutely impossible. This argument was revived by Spinoza
to prove the unicity of being.4
St. Thomas, following the lead of Aristotle, examined this argu­
ment of Parmenides, and says of it: “In this Parmenides and his dis­
ciples were deceived, since they always referred to being as if it had
one meaning and one nature, as is the case with any genus (which
is diversified by extrinsic differences). But this is impossible. For be­
ing is not a genus, but is predicated (analogically) of various things
and in many different senses.” 6 For the modes of being are not ex­
trinsic to being, but being is included in them. Thus quantity still
is being.
But on the other hand, of ancient philosophers it was Heraclitus
who denied the unity or indivisibility and identity of being; for he
said that experience tells us that everything is becoming, and noth8 Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q. 180, a.6.
* Ethica, def. Ill, axioma 7, prop. 7.
» Com. on Metaph., Bk. I, chap. 5, lect. 9.

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ing is, and so to some extent Heraclitus identified being and nonbeing with becoming, which thus would be its own reason for such,
as the absolute realists maintain. Thus, contrary to Parmenides, he
ends in denying the real validity of the principle of contradiction or
of identity, namely, “being is being, non-being is non-being,” or
"being is not non-being.”
Thereupon Plato sought to solve the problem of unity and mul­
tiplicity by admitting the intelligible order of ideas, the highest of
which is the Idea of Good, which is one, indivisible, and immutable,
and also admitting the sensible order in which all things undergo
a change. This was a sort of juxtaposition of the doctrines of Par­
menides and Heraclitus.®
Finally, Aristotle with greater penetration investigated the prob­
lem of unity and multiplicity, showing that unity is a transcendental
property of being, and is found in every category of being.7 In like
manner, what makes Aristotle famous is his affirmation of the in­
divisibility and unicity of God, of the pure Act. But he did not ex­
plain how multiplicity of beings proceeds from the one God. For
his reasoning did not lead him to admit the idea of a most free
creation. The Neoplatonists, however, sought to explain by neces­
sary emanation how plurality of beings proceeds from the OneGood, inasmuch as good is essentially self-diffusive. But in doing
so they denied the revealed doctrine of an absolutely free creation,
and contradicted themselves, because God in operating from a ne­
cessity of His nature could not produce anything finite or limited.®
Now St. Thomas proceeds, however, in accordance with Aristotle’s
doctrine, very much improving upon it.
Conclusion. One does not add any reality to being, but is only
a negation of division.
This conclusion is proved from the analysis alone of the terms,
for "one means undivided being.” This is evident from inductive
reasoning, by considering the various categories of being: unity of
substance is undivided substance, unity of quantity is undivided
quantity, and the same applies to unity of quality, action, passion,
relation, place, time, position. Nevertheless, one or undivided being
is capable of being divided. Thus substance, which is composed of
matter and form, man, who is a composite of soul and body, like­
wise the continuous (magnitude, movement, time), each is un­
divided, but indefinitely divisible.
Hence from the analysis of the terms it is clear that unity is
o Dialogues, Parmenides (on unity), Sophista (on being).
7 St. Thomas' Com. on Metaph., Bk. V, chap. 6, lect. 7 f.; also Bk. X for a fuller
discussion.
» Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.4.

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THE ONE GOD

nothing but undivided being, as Aristotle had already shown.®
Hence unity does not add any reality to being, but is only a nega­
tion of division.
From this we get the following corollary: one is convertible with
being. Indeed what is convertible with another is that which is
predicated absolutely first of it, or necessarily and immediately,
whether as specific difference, or as an inseparable property. But
every being is one, because it is either simple or composite. But
what is simple is perfectly one, because it is undivided and indivisi­
ble. But what is composite has not being while its parts are divided.
Hence every being is one.
That everything guards its unity as it guards its entity, is a sign
in confirmation of this truth. Thus in every living being, whether
rational or irrational, in every nation whose country is in danger
of being attacked, we find this instinct for self-preservation. Thus
the Church guards her unity of faith, government, and worship,
just as she guards her being.
From this it is clear that one does not add any reality to being,
but is only a negation of division. Thus there is only a distinction
of the mind between them. And contrary to the teaching of Par­
menides, just as being is predicated not univocally but analogically
of the different categories of being and of different beings, so also
is one. Thus unity can be merely either analogical, or generic, or
specific, or numerical. The solution of the objections confirms this
doctrine.
Reply to first objection. Transcendental unity, which is found in
all the categories of being, differs from unity that is the principle
of number, this belonging solely to the category of quantity. Py­
thagoras, and Plato to some extent, as also Bannez among modern
philosophers, erred in not distinguishing between these unities.
Yet there is clearly a distinction between them. Thus we say of a
doctrine lacking in coherence that it is one among many others,
but that it lacks unity.
Does unity that is the principle of number add any reality to
being? It does not add anything really distinct from being, because
what is not being is nothingness; but it adds a special and limited
mode of being, which is actually and implicitly contained in being,
so that quantity still is being and not other than being.
It is in this sense that St. Thomas says at the end of his reply to
the first objection: “The one which is convertible with being does
not add a reality to being; but the one which is the principle of
number does add a reality to being, which belongs to the genus
of quantity.” In other words, although quantity is not an extrinsic
■ Metaph., Bk. V, chap. 6; also Bk. X.

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differentia to being, as rationality is an extrinsic differentia to the
genus of animality, yet quantity connotes a special nature which the
notion of being does not connote, and which does not apply to
every being. On the contrary, one which is convertible with being
does not connote any other nature than being, but the transcen­
dental mode of this nature.
Reply to second objection. In this reply several arguments are
presented that serve to elucidate the fourth way of proving God’s
existence.
1) What is one or undivided absolutely may be divided acci­
dentally. Thus what is one in essence and subject may have many
accidents. Likewise the continuous is one absolutely or is actually
undivided, but it can be divided indefinitely into still smaller parts.
Thus it is one absolutely and many accidentally.
2) On the other hand, those things that are absolutely divided
and many, are one accidentally. Thus those things that are many
in number are one in species or in principle. Thus many men are
absolutely many.
3) Therefore, since being is one absolutely, "being is divided by
one absolutely and by many accidentally.” This means that one
and many do not refer on equal terms to being; they are not co­
ordinated but subordinated. “For multitude itself would not be
contained under being, unless it were in some way contained under
one.” Thus Dionysius says that “there is no kind of multitude that
is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in
their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject;
and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are
many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in proces­
sions, are one in principle.” 10 Similarly, what are many in genera,
are one in analogous being.
4) The elucidation of the fourth way 11 follows from this, namely,
that multitude, which is subordinate to one, cannot be the rea­
son for the unity found by participation in it, the unity of simi­
larity, for instance, either specific, generic, or analogical. Therefore,
as St. Thomas says, “if one of some kind is found as a common
note in several objects, this must be because some one cause has
brought it about in them; for it cannot be that the common
note of itself belongs to each thing, since each thing is by its very
nature distinct from the other, and a diversity of causes produces a
diversity of effects. Since, therefore, being is found as a common
note in all things, which, in all that they are, differ from one an­
other, it must of necessity be that being is attributed to them not
10 De nom. div., last chapter.
n Summa theol., la, q.z, a.3.

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THE ONE GOD

of themselves but from some one cause. And this seems to have
been Plato’s idea, whose wish was that, prior to any multitude,
there should be some unity, not only in numbers, but also in the
natures of things.”12 For this reason, too, it was stated in a previous
article that “every composite has a cause, for things in themselves
different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite.” 13
Thus the unity of being is preserved, which was the wish of Par­
menides; yet it is neither univocal unity nor unicity of being that
is preserved, but analogous unity of beings, which are dependent
on the supreme Being.
Reply to third objection. “It is not nugatory to say being is one,
because one adds an idea to being.” Likewise it is not nugatory
or tautological to say every being is one and the same with its
phenomena; for this is the principle of identity so determined that
it can be called the principle of substance. Nor is it nugatory to
say being is being, non-being is non-being, because by such state­
ments it is affirmed that being is not non-being. Likewise if we say:
Flesh is flesh, spirit is spirit; good is good, evil is evil. As our
Lord says: "Let your speech be yea, yea: no, no.” 14 This means
that being is necessarily by its nature opposed to non-being, as good
is to evil, as spirit to flesh. By this the identity of being is affirmed
against the contentions of absolute evolutionism.
Therefore one is undivided being. Hence one and being differ
only in idea, and because our first concept is of being, one is
related to being as a property to the essence from which it is de­
rived, as, for instance, incorruptibility is related to a spiritual sub­
stance.
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER ONE AND MANY ARE OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER

State of the question. This article completes the idea of unity,
inasmuch as it is compared with its opposite. The principal dif­
ficulty is enunciated in the fourth objection of this article, namely,
that a vicious circle must be avoided in definitions, and there
seems to be a vicious circle here; for if one is undivided being, it
is opposed to the previously accepted notion of the divided, or to
multitude. Thus multitude would come before and not after one,
which is contrary to what was stated in the previous article,15 and
this would nullify the fourth way of proving God's existence.
12 De potentia, q.3, a.5. See also Summa theol., la, q.44, a. 1.
is Summa theol., la, q.3, a.7.
1« Matt. 5: 37.
15 Cf. ad turn.

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299

Reply. One is opposed to many, but in various ways, inasmuch
as one is considered the principle of number, or as it is converti­
ble with being. For the one which is the principle of number, is
opposed to multitude which is number, as the measure is to the
thing measured; for number is multitude measured by one, as
Aristotle says.10 But the one which is convertible with being, is
opposed to multitude by way of privation, as the undivided is to
the thing divided. Thus we speak of a united kingdom as being
against a kingdom that is divided.
The first kind of opposition referred to here is of the relative
order, as between father and son; the other is privative. Aristotle
mentions two other kinds of opposition;17 namely, contradictory
(as between a thing and its negation, between being and non-being,
one and not one), and contrary (as between two opposite habits,
for instance, between virtue and vice). Among these four kinds of
opposition, the kind that is verified between transcendental unity
and multitude is privative opposition.
Objection. But how is the principal difficulty to be answered? It
is contended that if one is opposed to multitude, then it would
follow that one comes after multitude, and is defined by it, as
privation is by the want of form or perfection, as blindness is de­
fined by privation of sight. But if unity is defined by privation of
multitude, there is a vicious circle in definitions, for one is posited
in the definition of multitude. Thus some define humility by its
opposite, which is pride, as if it were a privation of pride; also
pride is defined by humility, as if it were a privation of humility.
St. Thomas, in his reply to the fourth objection, concedes that
"division is prior to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according
to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by
compound things; and hence we define a point to be what has no
part, or the beginning of a line.” Hence unity is defined by us as
the privation of division, but not of multitude. Thus we conclude
that one is prior to multitude, and is conceived as prior to multi­
tude. In fact, as stated in this reply: what first comes to the mind
is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we
apprehend division; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the
notion of multitude. Hence we conclude that one is prior to multi­
tude, although according to our way of apprehension it comes after
division; for “we do not understand divided things to convey the
idea of multitude except by the fact that we attribute unity to
every part.” Hence there is no circle in definitions. Moreover, as
Cajetan observes, division is negation, which is logical being. Hence
« Metaph., Bk. X, chap. 1.
η Ibid., Bk. V, chap, io (lect. 12 of St. Thomas’ commentary).

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THE ONE GOD

division is absolutely prior to unity in the intelligible order, but
not in the natural order.
In the reply to the first objection, it is pointed out that multi­
tude is the privation of unity and has its foundation in unity, be­
cause privation neither takes away entirely the existence or being
of a thing, nor unity which is converted with being. For privation
is the want of some perfection in a subject. Thus privation of be­
ing and of unity has its foundation in being and in unity. But
this does not happen in the privation of special forms. Thus the
privation of whiteness is not founded on whiteness, nor is the
privation of sight on sight, but on the subject apt for sight.
It remains true, however, that opposition between one and many,
inasmuch as, although many is one relatively and has its founda­
tion in one, yet it is not one absolutely. What is many absolutely
is one relatively, namely, according to either specific, generic, or
analogical similarity. Also what is one absolutely, as man, is many
relatively, by reason of its parts and accidents.
Reply to second objection. The other difficulty is solved, namely,
that multitude is constituted by one, and therefore it is not opposed
to multitude. In the reply it is stated that unities constitute mul­
titude in so far as they have being, but not in so far as they are op­
posed to multitude. Thus the parts of a house make up the house
by the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are “not
houses,” namely “not the whole.” Every distinct part has a unity
that is distinct from the unity of the whole.
The particular conclusions to be drawn from these first two
articles are that unity is a property of being, inasmuch as one is
undivided being, and that multitude by way of privation is op­
posed to this transcendental unity, but presupposes it, and this for
two reasons: (i) because multitude is a plurality of unities; (2) be­
cause multitude results from the division of a being that is one
either by unity of genus or of species or of quantity or of subject.
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD IS ONE

State of the question. The discussion is not about the absence
of division in God, for we have already seen, when treating of
God’s simplicity,18 that He is absolutely indivisible since there is
no kind of composition in Him, either physical, metaphysical, or
logical. But the discussion concerns God’s unicity. A being, how18 Summa theol., la, q.3.

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301

ever, is said to be unique, when there cannot be or at least are
not other beings of the same species or genus. Therefore God is
unique, if there cannot be many Gods. But, as we shall at once
see, unicity has its foundation in unity, and God’s unicity in the
absolute indivisibility of the Deity.
It must be noted that all polytheists denied God’s unity, and
likewise many heretics who admitted two principles, one of good
and the other of evil, such as the Gnostics, the Marcionites, the
Valentinians of the second century. Along with these we must in­
clude the Manichaeans of the third century, and finally the Albi­
gensians of the thirteenth century. In the sixteenth century, too,
the Tritheists, not having a proper conception of the real distinc­
tion between the three divine Persons, spoke as if there were three
Gods.
Finally, the pantheists implicitly deny God’s unity, inasmuch
as they admit a necessity of emanation of the divine nature in its
external communication, just as the sun’s rays of necessity proceed
from it. St. Thomas gives three reasons for idolatry or polytheism:
(1) an excessive love for certain men, who were the objects of
veneration; (2) ignorance of the true God; (3) demoniacal inspira­
tion.
Reply. There is of necessity but one God.
1. This conclusion is of faith, as clearly seen from very many
texts of Holy Scripture; e.g., ‘‘Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God
is one Lord.” 18 There is scarcely a page of the Old or New Testa­
ment in which there is not a reference to monotheism. Likewise
the first words of the Nicene Creed are: “I believe in one God.”
The Fourth Lateran Council says: ‘‘We firmly believe that there
is only one true God . . . the one principle of all things.” 20 This
same truth is equivalently expressed in the Vatican Council.21
2. Three proofs from reason are given of God’s unicity. It is
proved: (1) from God’s simplicity; (2) from His infinity; (3) from
the unity and order in the world. It is proved from God’s sim­
plicity as follows: It is impossible to communicate to many that
by which any singular thing is this particular thing, for instance,
that by which Socrates is this particular man as distinct from
others. But because Socrates is not humanity, there can be many
men. Since God, however, is His Deity, for the same reason He is
both God and this God. Therefore it is impossible that there
should be many Gods.
1» Deut. 6: 4.
20 Denz., no. 428.
21 Ibid., nos. 1782, 1801.

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THE ONE GOD

This reasoning is clear, and is made clearer by contrasting it
with its opposite, when it is said: "If Socrates were a man by what
makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many
Socrates, so there could not be many men.” Hence, because in
the same way God is God and this God, there cannot be many
Gods.
For the understanding of the major, it must be noted that this
whereby any singular thing is this particular thing cannot be com­
municated to many, whether we are speaking of individuality re­
sulting from matter which is the foundation of quantity, or whether
we are speaking of subsistence or of personality. Indeed, matter
which is the foundation of quantity cannot be communicated to
inferior things, that is, it cannot be participated by another sub­
ject, since matter is the ultimate subject and pure potency, capable
of receiving but not of being received. But if we consider sub­
sistence or personality, then that by which this particular thing
cannot be communicated is that by which the nature is made in­
communicable to another suppositum or person. Therefore in these
two acceptations of the term "singularity” we have the verification
of the major.
The minor, however, has its foundation in the truth that God
is His own Godhead,22 which means that there is no distinction
between either the Godhead and this Godhead (because Godhead
is not a form received in matter), or between this Godhead and
this God (because God is absolutely simple, and He does not con­
stitute a whole of which the Godhead would be only an essential
part).
On the other hand, although there is not any distinction be­
tween Michaelness and this Michaelness, Michael is not his Michaelness, because Michael represents the whole, of which Michaelness
is the essential part, and besides this there is in Michael contingent
existence and accidents.
Moreover, in contradistinction to the Godhead, the angelic na­
ture taken generically can be communicated to many, inasmuch
as there can be many subordinated angelic species according to the
perfections of their intellectual power. But this plurality does not
apply to the Godhead, for this is not only separated from matter,
but transcends every species and genus.28 From this first proof it
is clear that God’s unicity is deduced from His unity, and from
His simplicity or indivisibility.
The second proof is derived from God’s infinity.
There cannot be two or many infinitely perfect beings. But God
22 Summa theol., la, q.3, a. 3.
«· Ibid., q.3, a.5.

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303

is the infinitely perfect being as stated above.24 Consequently, there
cannot be many Gods.
Proof of major. If there were two infinitely perfect beings, there
would have to be a difference between them, and this difference
would have to be a perfection and not an imperfection. Hence a
certain “perfection would be wanting to one of them.” This means
that each of them would have to be the self-subsisting Being, and
then there would be no way of distinguishing between them, either
on our part or in themselves. In other words, there is only one
unreceived subsisting Being, just as there would necessarily be but
one whiteness, if this were not received in anything. On the other
hand, there is a real distinction between God and creatures, inas­
much as these are not their existence, and this, being an imperfec­
tion, cannot be in the infinitely perfect Being.
From this proof given by St. Thomas many Thomists deduce
that the subsistent relations in the divine Persons, according as
they denote regard to another (esse ad), are not absolutely simple
perfections, for since filiation is not in the Father, He would be
without some absolutely simple perfection and thus would not be
God. For an absolutely simple perfection not only implies no im­
perfection, but it is better for one to have than not to have this.
Hence the divine relations, according as they denote regard to an­
other (esse ad), do not add a new perfection to the infinite perfec­
tion of the divine nature. The same is to be said of God’s free act,
for instance, the creative free act.
The third proof is derived from the unity of the universe, and
thus the fifth way of proving God’s existence is perfected from on
high.25
Things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, un­
less they are ordered thereto by one, because one is essentially the
cause of one. But there is ordination, either of subordination or of
coordination, between all existing things in the universe. There­
fore all these things are ordered by the one, which must be most
perfect, so that all things may be ordered by it. And this one is
God.
The major is evident from what we said about unity and multi­
tude; for multitude does not convey the idea of unity that is
found in it.26 There must be an intelligent Ordainer, for He must
perceive the reasons for the existence of things, and the means in
the end. Moreover, He must be the self-subsisting Intellection,
otherwise His intelligence would be ordered to intellection and
2« Ibid., q.4, a.3.
2’ Ibid., q.2, a.3.
2° See above, q.2, a.3, fifth way.

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THE ONE GOD

truth by a higher Ordainer. But there must be only one self-sub­
sisting Intellection, just as there is only one self-subsisting Being.27
Reply to second objection. God is said to be one or undivided
by a privation of division. But this privation is only according to
our mode of apprehension, because with us the concept of the
composite is prior to that of the simple. Hence we define a point
to be “what has no part.” 28
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD IS SUPREMELY ONE

State of the question. We are concerned here with unity that is
the foundation for unicity. This follows as a corollary from what
was said about God’s simplicity.28 The difficulty that could be
raised from the mystery of the most Holy Trinity is solved when
we come to discuss this mystery. For the present, as regards the
Trinity, only St. Bernard’s words are quoted: “Among all things
called one, the unity of the divine Trinity holds the first place”;30
that is, the unity is so sublime and intimate that it persists in the
very Trinity of Persons. From this most exalted point of view
God’s unity is revealed. On the contrary, if this unity is not con­
sidered with reference to the Trinity, it constitutes the preamble
to the faith, and is proved by reason alone, as we have seen. In fact,
in this article it is proved by reason alone that God is supremely
one.
The proof. What is supremely being and supremely undivided
is supremely one; but God is supremely being (because He is the
self-subsisting Being) and supremely undivided (because He is
absolutely simple);31 therefore God is supremely one. This means
that He is infinitely farther removed from composition than even
the highest angel, who is composed of essence and existence. In
fact, God alone is essential unity; for creatures have not unity as
an entity except by participation.
In the treatise on the Trinity, however, it is shown that the real
distinction between the Persons does not take away from God His
supreme unity, for this distinction has its foundation in the op­
position of relation. This means that there is a real distinction be­
tween the Persons and not between these and the divine nature.32
2T Ibid., q. 14, a.4.
28 Ibid., q.n, a. 2 ad 411m.
20 Ibid., q.3.
so De consideratione, chap. 5.
8i Summa theol., la, q.3, a.7.
»2 Ibid., q.39, a. 1.

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305

Thus in the equilateral triangle the three equal angles are really
distinct from one another and not really distinct from the super­
ficies of the triangle, which is one and the same in these three
angles. The closer is the unity effected by the real distinction, the
nobler is this unity. This constitutes the very mystery of the Trinity.
Cajetan most correctly draws attention to this point so as to
show that, although the divine nature is no way either really or
formally distinct from paternity, yet this nature is communicable
and is really communicated, whereas paternity is incommunicable.
In like manner, although the first angle of a triangle is not really
distinct from its superficies, and is not communicated to the other
two angles, yet its superficies is really communicated. On this point
Cajetan says: “As in the real order, so also in the formal order,
or of formal aspects in themselves, and not as we speak of them,
there is in God but one formal aspect, which is neither purely
absolute nor purely relative, neither purely communicable nor
purely incommunicable. But this aspect most eminently and for­
mally contains whatever there is of absolute perfection and
whatever the relativity in the Trinity demands. . . . But we are de­
ceived when we proceed from the absolute and relative attributes
in our approach to God, in that we imagine that the distinction
between the absolute and the relative is, as it were, prior to the
divine reality; and consequently we believe that this must be put
under the other member. And yet there is totality of opposition,
for the divine reality is prior to being and to all its differences;
for it transcends being and one.” 83
This means that the divine reality, as it is in itself, contains
formally and eminently all the most purely simple or absolute
perfections, and also the divine relations, so that these real and
subsistent relations are neither really nor formally (as realities) dis­
tinct from the nature. There is only a rationis ratiocinatae or vir­
tual distinction between them and the divine nature.34 Thus we
see the sublimity of God s unity from revelation more clearly than
from the most searching investigation of reason.
Com. in lam, q.39, a.t, no. 7.
3« By the rationis ratiocinatae distinction is meant a distinction tor which there
is a foundation in the object distinguished. Thus there is a distinction rationis
ratiocinatae between the spirituality and simplicity of the soul.
Rationis ratiocinatae means that the mind has reasoned out this distinction
because of the object that is distinguished. (Tr.)

CHAPTER XII
Question 12

The Know ability

of

God

After speaking of "how God is not,” St. Thomas now treats the
question, “How God is known by us,” as he had already announced.1
The importance of this question. It is of the greatest importance.
Just as the second question, concerning God’s existence, is of funda­
mental importance as regards those truths that belong to natural
theology, so this twelfth question is of fundamental importance as
regards those truths that are of the supernatural order. For this
question concerns the possibility of the rational creature being
elevated to the order of grace and glory, namely, to the super­
natural end of the beatific vision. It is, strictly speaking, a discus­
sion of the essentially supernatural nature of this vision, which far
surpasses the supernatural nature of miracle. For a miracle is super­
natural only as regards the manner of its production. Thus by the
resurrection the natural life, both vegetative and sensitive, is supernaturally restored to one who is dead; whereas, contrary to this, as
we shall at once see, the immediate vision of the divine essence is
intrinsically and essentially supernatural, for it is essentially super­
natural life. Several theologians of more recent times, wishing to
prove conclusively from reason alone the possibility of the beatific
vision, because of the natural desire for this, forgot to take into
account this distinction between the essentially supernatural na­
ture of eternal life and the supernatural nature of miracle, the
existence and possibility of which latter can be known in a natural
way. We shall see that reason alone cannot prove apodictically
either the existence or the possibility of the beatific vision; for the
knowability of what is essentially supernatural is itself supernat­
ural, inasmuch as truth and being are convertible. We shall see,
however, that the possibility of the beatific vision cannot be dis­
proved, that it is defended against those who deny it, that reason
alone persuades us of this by means of a most profound argument
of its fittingness, and that it is firmly held by faith. This is the
common opinion of the theologians, and it is only by inadvertence
that this can be denied.
iSee prologue to q.3.

306

THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

S»?

Therefore in this question we already have the concept of the
essentially supernatural life developed for us in its fundamental
aspects, and completed in the treatises on happiness 2 and on grace,
inasmuch as grace is the seed of glory.3
St. Thomas in his treatise on happiness says: "Neither man nor
any (angelic) creature can attain final happiness by his natural
powers,” because "the vision of the divine essence (is of that)
which infinitely surpasses all created substance,” * which means that
it surpasses the natural powers and exigencies of such. It is like­
wise shown farther on that “without grace man cannot merit ever­
lasting life” because "everlasting life is an end exceeding the pro­
portion of human nature,” 0 and even of the angelic nature.®
The fundamental principles of all these truths are contained in
this question, which is divided into three parts as follows: (1) God’s
knowability by direct vision is discussed in the first eleven articles;
(2) God’s knowability by the abstractive method of reasoning from
natural effects is discussed in the twelfth article; (3) God’s knowa­
bility by faith is the subject of the thirteenth article.
The first part of this question, which is the principal part, has
four divisions: (1) the possibility of the beatific vision, or of our
being elevated to the supernatural order of grace and glory (a. 1);
(2) the intuitiveness of this vision; whether God is seen through
some similitude or idea (a. 2); (3) the faculty and the light of glory
by which the created intellect can see God (a. 3, 4, 5); (4) the re­
maining articles are concerned with the various modifying circum­
stances of this vision, inasmuch as there is difference of degree in
this among the blessed, since it is not a comprehensive penetration
of the divine essence, and inasmuch as these circumstances modify
the state of blessedness.
FIRST ARTICLE
WHETHER ANY CREATED INTELLECT CAN SEE THE
ESSENCE OF GOD

State of the question. It is a discussion not only of the human
intellect, but of every created intellect, even that of the highest
angel, and even of higher angels that could be created. The word
can in the title is taken in the unrestricted sense, as referring either
to the natural power of the created intellect or to the elevation of
2 Summa theol., la Ilae, q.5, a.5.
s Ibid., q. 109, a. 5; q. 110, a. 5; q. 112, a. 1, 5.
‘ Ibid., q.5, a.5.
• Ibid., q. 109, a.5.
• Ibid., la, q.62, a. 2.

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THE ONE GOD

this power by God. The question is whether the vision of God is
possible (or non-repugnant) for the created intellect. But the
existence of this vision is of faith, and it is purely a gift. Lastly, to
see God’s essence means to know God’s essence, not partially but
completely, although it is stated in the seventh article that this
knowledge is not comprehensive. This is what the Scholastics say is
not the abstractive but the quiddative knowledge of God.
The intellect has no difficulty in understanding this terminology.
The abstractive knowledge of God is incomplete and imperfect;
for by it we acquire a knowledge of God by predicating, indeed,
attributes that are essential but only analogically common to Him
and to creatures. Thus God is known as the first Cause, the first
Being, the self-subsisting Being, the infinite Being. ... On the
contrary, the quiddative knowledge of God is complete and per­
fect, because by it we know God according to all His essential pred­
icates, down to and including the ultimate difference, that is, to
His Deity or intimate life. But the Deity as such contains formally,
enimently, and explicitly all absolute perfections, which are in­
timately reconciled in His eminent Deity; in fact they are identified
therein (without any real distinction between them), although with­
out destroying one another. The Deity as such, however, is named
by us wayfarers, but it is not known by its proper concept, because
it is not naturally capable of being participated in by created na­
tures from which by the abstractive method we get our ideas; these
natures participate, indeed, in being, unity, truth, goodness, in­
telligence, and love, but not in the Deity, which can be participated
in only by grace, which is strictly a participation of the divine na­
ture, or of God’s intimate life.
Hence there is a great difference between knowing God abstrac­
tively, or, as it were, externally, in some created image, and know­
ing Him quiddatively, in His intimate life. Thus there is a great
difference between knowing some man, for instance, the supreme
pontiff, only according to his external characteristics and know­
ing him in his intimate life. This terminology, however, has its
immediate foundation in Holy Scripture. Thus St. Paul says: “Eye
hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart
of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.
But to us God hath revealed them, by His Spirit. For the Spirit
searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God [that is, the in­
timate life of God, or the Deity as such]. For what man knoweth the
things of a man [intimately] but the spirit of a man that is in him?
So the things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit
of God.” 7
71 Cor. a; g-u.

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309

St. Thomas has spoken in several other places of the distinction
between the abstractive and intuitive or quiddative knowledge of
God.8 This question has been discussed at length by us in another
work,9 and therefore we shall mention here only the principal
points.
Let us see: (1) what is defined to be of faith about the beatific
vision; (2) the errors of those who deny either the possibility of the
beatific vision, or its supernatural character; (3) what Sacred Scrip­
ture and tradition have to say about it; (4) how St. Thomas defends
the possibility of this vision in this article and in other places;
(5) the terminology of later theologians on this point; (6) the vari­
ous opinions; (7) the common opinion among the Thomists.
WHAT IS DEFINED TO BE OF FAITH
ABOUT THE BEATIFIC VISION

We have the following definitions and declarations of the
Church: 10 “Those who, having been baptized, die without any
actual sin on their souls, go immediately to heaven, the state of
grace being required for entrance therein;11 heaven or beatitude
is not a substantial transformation into God,12 but man is raised to
supernatural happiness,13 and this cannot be found out by reason
alone.” 14 It is also declared that this supernatural happiness cannot
« Cf. Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 3; Bk. Ill, chaps. 49, 50.
8 Cf. De revelatione, I, 337-403.
10 Cf. Denz. (theological index, no. XIV, a), nos. 464, 530, 693, 3048.
11 Ibid., nos. 800, 80g, 842, 1011.
12 Ibid., no. 510.
is Ibid., no. 1808.
st Ibid., no. 1669. This declaration is directed against the semirationalism of
Froschammer, who is condemned for having held the following: “Man’s super­
natural end and all that pertains to this . . . come within the scope of human
reason and philosophy, and reason can by its own natural strength and principles
acquire the knowledge of these truths, provided they be proposed to it as its
object" (Denz. 1669).
This declaration also states: "Therefore, according to this same author’s opinion,
it can and must most certainly be concluded that reason is able of itself, not now as
accepted on the principle of divine authority, but by its own natural powers and
principles, acquire knowledge or certainty not only of the most abstruse mysteries
of God’s wisdom and goodness but also of the free decrees of His will, although
it is admitted that these have been revealed. No one with rudimentary or slight
knowledge of Christian doctrine can fail to see and fully realize how false and
erroneous is this teaching of the author.”
Those who seek to establish from reason alone not only persuasive but also
apodictic arguments in proof of the possibility of the beatific vision do not suffi­
ciently take into consideration what Pius IX wrote on this subject against the
semirationalism of James Froschammer. The whole Letter of Pius IX, Gravissimas
inter, must be read, or at least those parts of it quoted in Denzinger’s Enchiridion,

31O

THE ONE GOD

be had in this life,16 but in the future,18 and that it consists in see­
ing God immediately and intuitively face to face, and in the en­
joyment of this vision.17
A special quotation must be given from the Constitution Bene­
dictus Deus of Benedict XII, which states: “By apostolic authority
we define that, according to God’s common ordination, the souls of
all the saints . . . immediately after death and the aforesaid purga­
tion of those who are in need of this even before their souls are
again united to their bodies and the general judgment ... see
the divine essence by direct intuition and face to face, in such
wise that nothing created intervenes as an object of vision, but
the divine essence presents itself to their immediate gaze, unveiled,
clearly and openly, and that in this vision they enjoy the divine es­
sence. . . . Also in this vision and enjoyment of the divine essence,
they do not make acts of either faith or hope in the same . . . and
this vision and fruition will continue . . . forever.” 18
In this constitution emphasis must be placed on the words "noth­
ing created intervening as an object of vision.” This does not mean,
however, the condemnation of the opinion of those who maintain
that there is a created impressed or expressed species in the beatific
vision; for these do not say that such species intervenes as the ob­
ject of vision, but only as that by which or in which the divine es­
sence is seen, just as the angel sees his essence in some expressed
intelligible species. In like manner the Council of Florence says:
“The souls of the saints in heaven know by clear intuition the one
and triune God as He is in Himself, yet one more perfectly than
another according to the diversity of their merits.” 18
CONDEMNED ERRORS

As for the condemned errors on this subject, some recede from
the true doctrine by denying the possibility of the beatific vision;
others go to excess by saying that no absolutely gratuitous gift is
required to make this vision possible.
Those who denied the possibility of the intuitive vision of God
appealed to the arguments quoted by St. Thomas at the beginning
of this article, namely, that there is no existing proportion between
the created intellect and God, for there is an infinite distance be­
nos. 1669-73. These refutations received their final formulation in the Vatican
Council; see Denz., nos. 1795, 1796, 1816.
is Ibid., nos. 474 f.
ie Ibid., no. 287.
it ibid., nos. 530, 693, 1928 f., 3030.
is Ibid., no. 530.
i»Ibid., no. 693.

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311

tween them. In fact, the Deity in a certain way transcends being,
but the object of the intellect is being. Moreover, God can be seen
only in a finite manner, and then His essence is not immediately
seen.20 St. Gregory speaks of this error.21 Amalric, who lived dur­
ing the pontificate of Innocent III, erred likewise on this point.
But particularly the fourteenth century Palamites denied the pos­
sibility of the beatific vision, maintaining that the divine nature,
as it is in itself, cannot be even supernaturally seen by the created
intellect. Therefore the Palamites admitted that a certain uncreated
light emanates from God, which can be seen by the bodily eye,
such, they say, as the apostles saw on Mount Thabor, and it is
this light which constitutes the enjoyment and happiness of the
saints in heaven. The Greeks in four pseudo-synods accepted and
confirmed this doctrine.22
Among modern philosophers, Rosmini seems to have denied the
possibility of the absolutely immediate vision of God even with
the help of the light of glory. The following propositions of Ros­
mini were condemned: “God is the object of the beatific vision in­
asmuch as He is the author of ad extra works.” “Since God cannot,
even by the light of glory, entirely communicate Himself to finite
beings, He could reveal and communicate His essence to the pos­
sessors only in that way which befits finite intelligences, namely, by
manifesting Himself to them, inasmuch as He enters into relation
with them as their creator, foreseer, redeemer, and sanctifier.” 23
These propositions seem to deny the immediate vision of God’s
essence, even with the help of the light of glory.
In contradistinction to these, the fourth century heretics, Eunomius, Aëtius and the Anomoeans, attributed to the merely natural
powers of the intellect not only the intuitive but also the com­
prehensive vision of God. They were most strenuously attacked
by Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Am­
brose, Epiphanius, and others
St. Thomas in the first objection of this article quotes a text
from St. Chrysostom which suggests a difficulty, for he says: "Not
only the prophets have not seen God, but neither have angels or
20 There is a tendency in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus to deny the possibility
of the beatific vision, because it maintains that the supreme hypostasis, the OneGood, transcends Intelligibility and Intelligence, which is the second hypostasis.
Hence the One-Good cannot be seen, but is known only by a certain mystical and
obscure contact. Moreover, this pantheistic doctrine, according to which all things
proceed from God by a necessary emanation, denies the possibility of our free
elevation to the order of grace.
21 Morals, Bk. 18, chap. 28.
22 Cf. Diet theol., art. "Palamas.”
23 Denz., nos. 1928, 1930.

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THE ONE GOD

archangels.” 24 A similar text is quoted from the works of Diony­
sius.25 St. Thomas replies: “Both of these authorities speak of the
vision of comprehension,” not of the merely intuitive vision. And
he proves this by quoting what Chrysostom says farther on in this
text about Dionysius; “He says this of the most certain vision of the
Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension
as the Father has of the Son.” Indeed the words of Chrysostom
here are directed against the Anomoeans, who said that they see
God as God sees Himself.28
In the fourteenth century, the Beguines and Beghards likewise
erred on this point, and were condemned in the ecumenical Coun­
cil of Vienne. They asserted “that any intellectual nature what­
ever is naturally blessed in itself, and that the soul does not need
the light of glory, elevating it to see God and to enjoy seeing Him
in this blissful state.” 27 This means that the beatific vision is not
only possible, but natural.
Later on Baius denied the gratuity of our elevation to the order
of grace and glory, admitting a natural and efficacious desire in us
for the beatific vision, as a gift due to our nature or as not being
one to which we have no claim, and which is not gratuitous. He
said: “The elevation and exaltation of human nature to a partici­
pation in the divine nature was due to it because of its original
state of integrity; hence it must be declared natural and not super­
natural.” 28 He likewise asserted that “the opinion of those is ab­
surd, who say that in the beginning man was raised above his nat­
ural state by a certain supernatural and gratuitous gift, so that he
might worship God by the supernatural virtues of faith, hope,
and charity.” 28
He also said: “That distinction between the two kinds of love,
namely, the natural by which God is loved as the author of nature,
and the gratuitous by which God is loved as the beatifier, is vain
and false, its purpose being to ridicule Scripture and the very many
testimonies of ancient writers." 30 All these condemnations are of
the greatest importance, for they are a condemnation of the natural
and efficacious desire for the beatific vision. This desire is called
efficacious, not that the beatific vision would exceed the exigencies,
but only tire powers, of our nature; for the beatific vision, like the
elevation and exaltation of human nature to a participation in the
2> Hom. XIV in Joan, i: 18.
25 Div. nom., I.
28 Consult the commentary of Francis Silvius on this article.
27 Denz., no. 475.
28 Ibid., no. 1021.
& Ibid., no. 1023.
to Ibid., no. 1034. See also nos. 1012, 1013, 1014.

THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

3!3

divine nature, would be due to this nature and not gratuitous. This
means the denial of the gratuity of grace itself.
It must be noticed that subsequently the ontologists expressed a
preference for this error, as is evident from their condemned propo­
sitions, such as the following ones: “The immediate and at least
habitual knowledge of God, is so essential to the human intellect
that without it nothing can be known; it is indeed the very light
of the intellect.’’ “That being, which is in all things and without
which nothing is perceived by the intellect, is the divine being.” 81
If the beatific vision were such as just stated, then there would be
no essential distinction between the formal object of this vision
and that of natural knowledge; but the formal object of each
would be the same, known confusedly at first and afterward dis­
tinctly, just as we say that the formal object of natural reason is
specifically the same in the rustic and the great metaphysician,
though known in a different way by each, since it is known vaguely
by the former and clearly by the latter. This would do away with
the essential distinction between the two orders of nature and
grace.
Semirationalists, such as Frohschammer, said about the same.82
Their doctrine was more explicitly condemned in the Vatican Coun­
cil, which most clearly affirmed “that there is a twofold order of
knowledge, distinct both in principle and in object.” 88
Finally Pius X, in his Encyclical Pascendi, says against several
modern apologists who stressed excessively our natural aspirations
and came near teaching the error of Baius: “We cannot refrain
from once more and very strongly deploring the fact that there are
Catholics who, while repudiating immanence as a doctrine, never­
theless employ it as a system of apologetics; they do so, we may
say, with such a lack of discretion that they seem to admit in
human nature not only a capacity and fittingness for the super­
natural order, both of which Catholic apologists, with due reserva­
tions, have always demonstrated, but they assert that it truly and
vigorously demands the same. As we may more truly say, however,
this need of the Catholic religion is attacked by the modernists,
who seek to be looked upon as more moderate in their views. For
those whom we may call integralists want it to be taken for a
demonstrated fact that there is this latent supernatural germ in
the unbeliever, which was transmitted to mankind from the con­
sciousness of Christ.” 84
si Ibid.,
32 Ibid.,
33 Ibid.,
·« Ibid.,

nos. 1659 f.
nos. 1669, 1671, 1673.
nos. 1795, 1816.
no. 2103.

3*4

THE ONE GOD

The second part of this encyclical rejects the opinion of those
who wish to find in our nature (which for them is in a process of
becoming) the germ of the Christian life, which thus would not
be strictly supernatural. The first part rejects the natural desire that
postulates the beatific vision, or proves effective of the same. This
would be to revive the error of Baius, who said: “The exaltation
of human nature to a participation in the divine nature, was due
to it because of its original state of integrity; hence it must be
declared natural and not supernatural.” 35
What we have said suffices concerning mutually conflicting er­
rors, that is, those that are such either by defect or by excess. But
from this we already have the beatific vision correctly explained,
especially if these mutually conflicting errors are taken exactly into
consideration. Similarly, in the question on grace, the doctrine that
is of faith is already to a great extent explained by a careful con­
sideration of the Pelagian and Semipelagian errors, and of Predestinationism, Protestantism, and Jansenism.
THE TESTIMONY OF SACRED SCRIPTURE
AND TRADITION CONCERNING THE
BEATIFIC VISION

The aforesaid definitions of the Church are more explicit proposi­
tions of the truth that is already contained in the deposit of revela­
tion, namely, in Sacred Scripture and Tradition.
The principal texts of Sacred Scripture, as Tradition has inter­
preted them, must here be quoted.30
In St. Matthew’s Gospel we read: “Blessed are the clean of heart,
for they shall see God.” 37 This text is explained by the following
one: “See that you despise not one of these little ones; for I say
to you, that their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father
who is in heaven.”38 These words refer of course to the angels; but
from this text and several other texts of the Gospel it is clear that
our heavenly happiness, as regards the object seen, does not differ
from that of the angels.
Moreover, St. John says: “In that day you shall know that I am in
My Father, and you in Me and I in you.”30 “That they all may be
ss Ibid., no. 1021.
se On this point consult Petavius, Dogmata theologica, Vol. I, Bk. VII, chaps. 5,
6, p. 593; Rouet de Journel, S.J., Enchiridion Patristicum (theological index,
nos. 105, 607).
st Matt. 5: 8.
ss Ibid., 18: 10.
3» John 14: 20.

THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

3'5

one, as Thou, Father, in Me and I in Thee; that they also may
be one in us. . . . Father, I will that where I am, they also whom
Thou hast given Me may be with Me; that they may see My glory
which Thou hast given Me, because Thou hast loved Me before
the creation of the world.”40 The words "I will that where I am”
are explained elsewhere by the Evangelist in these words: “We
testify what we have seen. . . . And no man hath ascended into
heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man who
is in heaven.41
Similarly, in his first epistle St. John says: “Beloved, we are now
the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We
know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because
we shall see Him as He is.” 42 However, if God’s essence is not
known by an intuitive vision, but by means of a created image,
then this cannot be called "seeing Him as He is”; for a created
image is something altogether imperfect with reference to God con­
sidered just as He is in Himself. This will be more fully explained
in the following text.
Lastly St. Paul says: “We see now through a glass in a dark man­
ner, but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall
know even as I am known.” 43
This means that we know God at present through a mirror,
namely, the mirror of created things, even if it is a question of the
knowledge acquired by faith which is a gift of God; for the mys­
teries of faith are expressed according to concepts, for instance, of
nature and person, and these are obtained from created things.
Likewise it is said that "we see in a dark manner” because of the
obscurity in the mysteries of faith, which is not an immediate and
clear knowledge of these just as they are in themselves, but a
knowledge that rests solely on God’s testimony confirmed by divine
signs. “But then face to face,” which means that God will be
directly seen. And this is confirmed by the last words of the text,
“as I am known.” But God’s knowledge of us is absolutely perfect,
for the Scripture says: “All things are naked and open to His eyes.” 44
There is, however, some difficulty about the expression “face to
face,” for the Scripture says: “And the Lord spoke to Moses face
to face as a man is wont to speak to his friend.” 45 It also says:
to ibid., 17: 21-24. $ee a'so commentaries of St. Augustine and St. Thomas on
St. John’s Gospel.
«1 Ibid., 3: 11, 13.
«2 I John 3: 2.
I Cor. 13: 12. See commentary of St. Thomas.
44 Heb. 4: 13.
«s Ex. 33: 11.

3i6

THE ONE GOD

“And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses,
whom the Lord knew face to face.” 40 In fact, we also read that
after Jacob had seen the angels and heard God’s message, he said:
“I have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved.” 4T
This text does not refer, however, to the immediate vision of God’s
essence, because, as stated in this text, Jacob fought with the angel
who appeared in a sensible form, and he received only God’s bless­
ing and had his name changed.
The reply to this difficulty is that the expression “face to face”
in these passages from the Old Testament is materially the same
as the text quoted from St. Paul’s epistle,48 but the words of this
text are to be taken in a more sublime sense, as is evident from
the context: "Then I shall know even as I am known.”
St. Thomas explains these texts of the Old Testament farther
on in this question. He says: “So when Jacob says, ‘I have seen
God face to face,’ this does not mean the divine essence, but some
figure representing God . . . , or that Jacob spoke thus to desig­
nate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary
state.” 49
It is no wonder, however, that this expression “face to face” is
not used exactly in the same sense in the Old Testament and in
the text just quoted from St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians;
for the expression is analogical and metaphorical. Therefore God’s
appearance in some sensible form first suggests itself to us in this
utterance; but it is afterward understood in a nobler sense of God’s
immediate manifestation without any intervening sensible image.
Finally it must be said that not all the Fathers declared that this
text of St. Paul refers strictly to the beatific vision. Nevertheless this
is commonly admitted, because the text concerns our knowledge as
it will be in heaven, which transcends faith and all the charismata.50
In the Old Testament there is veiled reference to the beatific
vision, as in the following text: "I shall be satisfied when Thy
glory shall appear.” 51
As early as the second century we find the Fathers speaking of
the beatific vision. Among them is St. Irenaeus, who says: “(God)
grants this to those who love Him, namely, to see Him, which the
prophets also prophesied. . . . For man does not see God by his
own powers. But when He pleases He is seen by men, by whom He
40 Deut. 34:10.
‘i Gen. 32: 30.
I Cor. 13: 12.
49 Of. a. 11 ad mm.
50 Cf. Estius, In omnes canonicas apostolorum epistolas, Vol. 1, in ep. ad Cor.,
13: 12.
•1 Ps. 16: 15.

THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

3*7

wills, and when He wills, and as He wills.” 52 Likewise, too, St.
Cyprian says: "What will be the glory and how great the joy, to be
admitted to see God, to be honored with the companionship of
Christ the Lord Thy God, and experience the joy of salvation and
light eternal!”03 Petavius 5,1 quotes the principal texts from the
Fathers, and explains several passages in the works of St. Chry­
sostom and St. Basil, who seem at first sight to deny the immediate
vision of God, whereas from the context it is clear that these
Fathers are speaking against the Anomoeans, who said that the
merely natural power of the intellect is sufficient not only for the in­
tuitive but also for the comprehensive vision of God, as St. Thomas
remarks.05 Long before the scholastic period, even the Stoics knew
that comprehension means complete perception; for Zeno distin­
guished between simple sensation and comprehensive perception,
comparing the former to the unclenched hand, and the latter to
the clenched hand, which grasps what it holds. Thus St. John
Chrysostom defines the comprehensive vision as the adequate
knowledge which the Father has of the Person of His Son.53
THE BEATIFIC VISION AND THE VIEWS
OF NON-CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS

As for the ancient philosophers, it must be noted that Plato
spoke of the future life especially in his Phaedo, and in a mythical
manner about the contemplation of the supreme Good. But in an­
other of his works57 he says that the Idea of the Good is the
source of all truth and intelligence, so that it appears to transcend
intelligible essence and intellection.
For Plotinus58 the supreme hypostasis, namely, the One-Good,
transcends intelligence (the second hypostasis, which consists of a
certain duality of subject and object), and therefore the supreme
Good cannot be seen, but is known by a certain obscure and mystic
contact.59
Among modern philosophers, Spinoza30 had a pantheistic con­
ception of the vision of God. He held that there is but one sub­
stance, which is endowed with two attributes, namely, thought and
w Adv. haer., Bk. IV, 20, 5. Cf. Rouet de Journel, op. cit., no. 236.
Ep. 56, ad Thibaril. Cf. Rouet de Journel, ibid., no. 579.
μ Dogmata theologica, Bk. VII, chaps. 5, 6; Vol. I, p. 567.
s® Summa theol., a.t ad turn.
se Hom. XIV. Consult also St. Augustine, De civil. Dei, XXII, 29, 30; Retracta­
tiones, Bk. I, chap. 13; De Trinitate, Bk. IX, chap. 11; Bk. XV, chap. 9.
v Republic, Bk. VII, 517, D.
M Ennead, Bk. VII, nos. 34-36.
s» Ibid., Bk. IX, no. 12; also Bk. IV, no. 6.
eo Ethica, II, § 47; V, § 36.

3'8

THE ONE GOD

extension; and just as our bodies are finite modes of infinite ex­
tension, so our intellect is a finite mode of divine thought. Among
men, however, those are immortal who attain to the idea of God,
which is an eternal and not a transitory mode of God. Thus there
is a certain impersonal immortality, and beatitude consists in a
certain knowledge of God from which proceeds the intellectual love
of God. He says: “The intellectual love of the mind for God is the
very love of God by which He loves Himself, or the intellectual
love of the mind for God is a part of the infinite love by which
God loves Himself.” 61
All this results from the pantheistic definition of substance, in
which abstract being is confused with the divine being, from which
Spinoza seeks to deduce all things geometrically, according to the
principles of absolute determinism. Thus the denial of God’s lib­
erty results in the denial of the possibility of supernatural revela­
tion and of miracles. In fact, this means the absolute denial of
everything supernatural even in God, because the divine naure is
identified with our nature. Human nature cannot be elevated to
the supernatural order, since there is now no real and essential
distinction between it and the divine nature.62
But it is quite clear that Spinoza was wrong, as stated above,63
in confusing abstract being with the divine being, by conceiving
infinite extension as one of God’s attributes. He never did succeed
in deducing from God the finite modes of extension and thought,
for he considered the successive series of these as eternal.
Against this mental attitude toward God, it has already been
established that He is the self-subsisting, absolutely simple and im­
mutable Being, and thus He is really and essentially distinct from
the changeable and composite world. There can be no finite modes
in God, which could be considered as His accidents, because the
self-subsisting Being is not capable of further determination. He is
pure Act without any admixture of potency.
HOW DOES ST. THOMAS DEFEND THE POSSIBILITY
OF THE BEATIFIC VISION IN THIS ARTICLE
AND IN PARALLEL PASSAGES?

This article consists of three parts: (i) the reason for doubting
this vision; (2) the opinion of those heretics who deny this truth;
(3) refutation of opinion because it is opposed to the faith and
ei ibid., V, § 36.
ea The same, too, must be said of pantheistic Brahmanism from which Buddhism
is derived.
es Summa theol., la, q.3, a.i, 4.

THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

319

because the denial of the possibility of the beatific vision is against
reason.
In the first part it is proved that God is in Himself supremely
knowable; because everything is knowable according as it is actual.
But God is pure Act. Thus Aristotle said that the pure Act is both
supreme intelligence and the supreme intelligible. But this in some
measure is directed against Plotinus, who held that the first hy­
postasis, the One-Good, transcends intelligence (second hypostasis)
and essence. Nevertheless Plotinus admitted a superintellection in
the first hypostasis.
Furthermore St. Thomas remarks: “But what is supremely know­
able in itself may not be knowable to a particular intellect on ac­
count of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect;
as, for example, the sun which is supremely visible cannot be seen
by the bat on account of the excess of light.” 04 Aristotle had al­
luded to this.65 Hence there is reason for doubting this vision,
since the created intellect, not as an intellect, but as it is created
and weak or deficient, is like the owl in this respect.
The second part of this article reports the opinion of those who
“held that no created intellect can see the essence of God.” Thus
several Neoplatonists, followers of Plotinus, said that finite intel­
lects, even in a state of supreme ecstasy, cannot see God, or the first
hypostasis, but are only in mystic and obscure contact with Him.
Similarly, in the pontificate of Innocent III, as we remarked, the
Amalricians denied the possibility of the immediate vision of God’s
essence.
The third part of this article proves the falsity of denying the
possibility of the beatific vision, both because that denial is "op­
posed to the faith” and because it is “against reason.”
It is said to be "opposed to the faith,” at least as an erroneous
doctrine. In fact, St. Thomas says: “This point of view cannot be
upheld, since it is heretical." 66 Several definitions of the Church
have made this increasingly clear, especially the definition of
Benedict XI.67
St. Thomas shows that the opinion is opposed to faith, since it
is of faith that our ultimate happiness is to be found in God. But,
as Aristotle declares,68 man’s ultimate happiness consists in his
highest operation, which is intellection. And any being whatever
is perfect in so far as it attains to its principle, as even the Neopla­
tonists said.
ei Ibid., q. 12, a. 1.
85 Metaph., Bk. II, chap. 1.
eo De veritate, q.8, a. 1.
e? Denz., no. 530.
•s Ethics, Bk. X, chap. 9.

J2O

THE ONE GOD

There is still a difficulty concerning the natural premise which
is here posited, for it must be proved that ultimate happiness does
not consist in the abstract knowledge of God, but in the intuitive
and absolutely direct knowledge of Him. It may be said, as John
of St. Thomas observes, that a thing is perfect by the fact that it
is united to its principle according to its capacity.
In reply to this we say that this immediateness is sufficiently
established by the Scripture passages quoted above and from the
definitions of the Church, and especially, since the time of St.
Thomas, from the definition of Benedict XI.
Finally it is shown that the denial of the possibility of the
beatific vision is against reason. This means that reason cannot
demonstrate the impossibility of this vision, or the possibility of
this vision cannot be proved false; moreover, it is reasonably de­
fended against those who deny it.
A natural desire cannot be to no purpose. But every man nat­
urally desires to know the cause when he sees the effect. Therefore
it is against reason to say that no created intellect can see God.
Much has been written by the commentators of St. Thomas about
this argument.®9 We must first see how St. Thomas enunciates this
argument in other parts of his works. Thus in one passage he says:
“The object of the intellect is what a thing is, that is, the essence
of a thing, according to De anima, Bk. III. Wherefore the intellect
attains perfection in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. . . .
Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a
cause, there naturally remains in man the desire to know about that
cause, what it is. . . . Consequently, for perfect happiness the intel­
lect needs to reach the very essence of the first Cause.” 70 Elsewhere he
says: “This natural and imperfect knowledge the angels have of
God does not set their natural desire to rest, but rather urges it
on to see the divine substance.” 71
From these and other places the argument is thus better con­
strued as follows: A natural desire cannot be void or tend to some­
thing that is impossible.72 But there is in man a natural desire to
know not only whether there is a cause, but also what it is in itself.
Therefore to know the essence of the first cause, as it is in itself,
does not seem impossible to man, that is, there does not seem to be
oe This has been more fully explained in another work. Cf. De revelatione, 1,
376-4°3·
ro Summa theol., la Ilae, q.g, a.8.
η Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 50.
77 It is the possibility of the beatific vision rather than the fact of this vision
that is defended by St. Thomas in this article. For our elevation to the super­
natural order, as our Catholic faith teaches, depends on God's free will; in fact,
it is absolutely gratuitous since it is essentially supernatural.

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any ineptitude in man for this possibility of being elevated; and
therefore the denial of this possibility is “against reason.”
A doubt arises concerning the meaning and force of this argu­
ment. Several have objected that it proves too much or not
enough.
It proves, of course, too much, if it is a question of a natural and
efficacious desire, or of an exigency for the beatific vision; for, in
such a case, this vision would be due to our nature and not gratui­
tous, as Baius and later on Jansenius said, who appealed to St.
Thomas’ argument in defense of their opinion. Such an interpre­
tation of this argument would evidently prove too much; for it
would prove also the beatific vision itself and would lead to a con­
fusion between the two orders of nature and grace.
It does not prove enough, however, if it is a question of a con­
ditional and inefficacious natural desire, or of a velleity; for this
velleity can be frustrated and be ineffective. In fact, perhaps it tends
toward an impossibility, just as if anyone, thinking that the in­
tuitive vision of God must be also comprehensive, were to desire
conditionally and inefficaciously not only the intuitive but also the
comprehensive vision of God, which latter is incommunicable. But
to desire conditionally is to desire on condition that the thing de­
sired be possible, as if, for instance, one were to desire to have wings
on condition that such be possible.
Moreover, there is another difficulty, inasmuch as a perfect, ab­
stractive knowledge of the essence of the first Cause is all that is
recjuired for the explanation of things in nature, because God is
the cause of things not by reason of His essence, acting from a
necessity of His nature, but by a most free intervention of His
intellect and will. Therefore, to explain things in nature, it suffices
for us to know that the first Cause is endowed with intellect and
will. Contrary to this, for a perfect explanation of sanctifying grace,
which is participation in the divine nature, we would have to see
God’s essence.
The Thomists, especially those after the time of Baius, generally
reply to this difficulty by observing that St. Thomas is certainly not
speaking of an unconditional and efficacious natural desire or one
of exigence. Therefore he has in mind a conditional and ineffi­
cacious desire, by reason of which we defend not the existence but
the probability of the beatific vision, and are intimately persuaded
of the same, although it is not conclusively proved. We have evi­
dence of this from the following observations.
1) St. Thomas certainly is not speaking of a natural efficacious
desire but of an inefficacious one. For, in his opinion, there is no
natural efficacious and necessitating desire except with reference to

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good that is proportionate to and due to our nature. He says:
"Everlasting life is a good exceeding the proportion of created
nature; since it exceeds its knowledge and desire, according to
I Cor. 2: 9: Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered
into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that
love Him.” 73 Likewise, on the necessity of grace for the angels, he
says: “To see God in His essence is beyond the nature of every
created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the
motion of the will directed toward such beatitude unless it is
moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the
help of grace.” 74 Similarly when defining predestination, he says:
“The end toward which created things are directed by God is two­
fold. One is that which exceeds all proportion and faculty of
created nature; and this end is life eternal, which consists in seeing
God, and this is above the nature of every creature, as shown above
(q. 12, a. 4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created
nature, to which end created being can attain according to the
power of its nature.” 75 Elsewhere, too, he says: “Man’s ultimate end
is twofold; one kind, the happiness to which philosophers refer, is
proportionate to human nature; the other is a good that exceeds
the proportion of human nature.” 70
It is therefore certain that St. Thomas has not in mind in this
article an unconditional and efficacious, or exigitive natural desire;
for he most certainly holds that grace and glory are gratuitous gifts,
which are in no way due either to our nature or to the angelic
nature.
2) But if the natural desire here in question is not unconditional
and efficacious, it must be conditional and inefficacious. This means
that to see God’s essence would be supreme happiness, if God were
freely to raise me so as to make this immediate vision possible.
rs Summa theol., la Hae, q.114, a.2.
Ibid., la, q.62, a.2. In the reply to the first objection of this article, St.
Thomas says: “The angel naturally loves God, so far as God is the author of his
natural being. But we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows
beatitude by the vision of His essence.” It is this distinction which Francis Silvius
(Ferrariensis) stresses, and rightly so, in his commentary on the Third Book of
the Contra Gentes, the fifty-first chapter. And so we find very many Thomists
saying that there is in man not an innate, but a naturally elicited, conditional,
and inefficacious desire to see God’s essence as He is the author of nature (but not
the triune God, as He is the author of grace; for in this most sublime aspect,
God is not known in a natural way). So say John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Salmanticenses, Gotti, Billuart, and others.
rs Ibid., la, q.23, a. 1.
ref>e verit., q.27, a.2. For this same doctrine, consult the treatises on grace:
la Ilae, q. 109, a.5, 6; q. 112, a.3; q.114, a.5; on the necessity of the theological
virtues, la Ilae, q.62, a. 1 ad mm et ad 3um; on the necessity of the gifts of the
Holy Ghost, la Ilae, q.68, a. 2.

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One may raise the objection that the words “conditional” and
“inefficacious,” in use among the Thomists, especially after the time
of Baius, do not occur in the works of St. Thomas. We reply that
it is certain from the passages quoted from the works of St. Thomas
that this natural desire is not efficacious, and is therefore ineffica­
cious. But the inefficacious desire supposes a condition which, as a
matter of fact, may not be realized.
A general explanation is given of this in the passage in which St.
Thomas distinguishes between God’s will to save all mankind,
which is conditional and efficacious, and His efficacious will to save
the elect. In this passage St. Thomas shows that "a thing, taken in
its primary sense, may be good,” 77 and desired (such as the salva­
tion of all men), which, however, taking all things into considera­
tion, is not absolutely or efficaciously but only conditionally willed.
St. Thomas then goes on to say: “Nor do we will simply, what we
will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for
the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will
a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circum­
stances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing con­
sequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the
hanging of a murderer but in a qualified manner he would will
him to live, namely, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will
may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will.” 78
Similarly, as regards ourselves, to see God’s essence, on first con­
sideration, is a good and one that is desired; but, taking all things
into consideration, this vision does not appear to be naturally
possible; it is made possible, however, only by a gratuitous elevation
of our nature. Hence this desired good is not willed absolutely and
efficaciously, but conditionally. Thus wings for flying would be good
for us, if this were granted to us; and the same is to be said of even
some better gift. To continue to live is a desirable good, but on
condition that this privilege be granted by God as a preternatural
gift.
Hence in this article St. Thomas, speaking of the natural desire
of seeing God’s essence, has in mind a desire that is not efficacious,
but inefficacious; and it is inefficacious because it is conditional,
since it presupposes our free elevation to this order. Otherwise this
elevation to grace would be due to our nature, which is a heresy
that destroys the very notion of grace, and there is not the slightest
doubt that St. Thomas most certainly held this doctrine, even be­
fore the Church condemned the heresy of Baius.
11 Ibid., la, q. 19, a.6 ad lum.
1» Ibid.

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On the accepted terminology
concerning the division of
the appetite or of love

The division as commonly accepted among theologians may be
clearly presented by the following schema: 78
79
supernatural

of charity
of hope

Love -

natural

(■innate
(.elicited

necessary

efficacious
free J conditional and
inefficacious

Love is called natural when it proceeds from a natural principle,
and not from grace. On the contrary, it is called supernatural when
it proceeds from a supernatural principle, namely, from grace, or
from charity, or hope, or even from actual grace that disposes one
for habitual grace. Even “the pious impulse to believe,” 80 required
for unformed faith, is supernatural. The following proposition of
Baius is condemned: “That distinction between the two kinds
of love, namely, the natural by which God is loved as the author of
nature, and the gratuitous by which God is loved as the beatifier, is
vain and lying, and is devised in ridicule of Sacred Scripture and
the very many testimonies of the ancients.” 81 This distinction is
frequently formulated by St. Thomas, as when he says: “The angel
does naturally love God, so far as God is the author of his natural
being. But here we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God
bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.” 82
Natural love is of two kinds, innate and elicited. The innate
desire is, so to speak, a very tendency or natural inclination for
good, before the good is apprehended. Thus the plant instinctively
and of necessity seeks the light of the sun.83 Similarly we speak of
the sensitive appetite (concupiscible and irascible) and of the ra­
tional appetite, which are faculties of our soul. But all creatures,
78 See Cajetan’s Com. on la, q.19, a.i; also John of St. Thomas on la, q.12, a.i.
Also commentaries of Salmanticenses and Gonet on q. 12, a.i. Against Baius and
the Jansenists, consult Billuart, De gratia, diss. Ill, a.4.
80 Denz., no. 178.
st Ibid., no. 1034.
82Summa theol., la, q.62, a.2 ad lum. Cf. Gardeil, O.P., Dictionaire de théolo­
gie catholique, art. "Appétit."
es ibid., la, q. 19, a. 1.

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each in its way, thus naturally love God, the author and preserver
of nature.84 Thus in the physical order it is natural for the part to
love the whole more than itself, and so the hand is naturally ex­
posed to ward off a blow on the body, and especially on the head;
otherwise this would mean the perversion of a natural inclination.85*
The elicited love is that by which the knower, after apprehending
the good, starts out in pursuit of it. And just as cognition, which
directs this movement, is an act elicited by the cognitive faculty,
so this is an act elicited by the appetitive faculty.
The elicited act is of two kinds. It is either necessary, or free and
elective. The act is necessary when its object is universally good,
so that all men necessarily (at least as regards the specification of
the act) love happiness as such, or necessarily will to be happy, even
when they do not as yet know in what true happiness consists in
the concrete.80 The free or elective love is concerned with an object
that is not universally good, or that is proposed as an object of
indifferent judgment.87
Lastly, love is said to be efficacious, or else it is conditional and
inefficacious. The efficacious presupposes a judgment on the good­
ness and natural attainableness of the object desired. The con­
ditional and inefficacious love presupposes a judgment on the
goodness and natural unattainableness of the object desired.88 Thus
man would will not to die, and this would be good for him if such
a preternatural gift were granted to him, as was granted to man in
the state of innocence. This last mentioned appetite is a velleity.
This good is most desirable, but it is naturally unattainable. 1
would wish it if God freely gave me the means for attaining it.
What a happiness this would be! Lastly, this velleity is either
explicit or implicit, according as the object desired and the pre­
supposed condition are either clearly or confusedly known.
THE VARIOUS OPINIONS OF THE THEOLOGIANS

In the eighteenth century, the Augustinians Noris and Berti80
were of the opinion that there is a natural and innate desire in us
for the intuitive vision of God. In a way this desire is efficacious,
though not as Baius meant. For the intuitive vision of God con­
84 Ibid., q.6o. a.5.
es Ibid., Ila Ilae, q.26, a.i.
se Ibid., la Ilae, q.10, a.i, 2.
«7 Ibid., a. 2.
»8 Cf. Billuart, De gratia, diss. II, a. 2, Solv. objectiones; also diss. Ill, a.4.
80 Berti opera, Bk. V, diss. II, chap. 1, nos. 1, 8.

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stitutes our natural end in the appetitive order, but it is our super­
natural end as regards its attainment and the means for attaining it.
Criticism. This opinion scarcely differs from Baianism, since it
does not uphold the absolute distinction prevailing between the
natural and the supernatural orders. By way of retaining some
semblance of a distinction, it denies the principle of finality. For
God as the Author of nature would have given us an innate ap­
petite (a sort of ponderousness of nature) for the end, toward which
as the Author of nature He could not direct us. Thus there would
be no relation between the efficient and final causes. This would
mean the violation of the corollary to the principle of finality, that
every agent acts for a proportionate end.
The view of Scotus90 is that we have a desire for the intuitive
vision of God, which is both innate and natural, though ineffica­
cious. The reason is that this most sublime happiness is the fitting
and final end of all human beings, and therefore the innate appetite
has its foundation therein. But it is not efficaciously desired, since
not all have a knowledge of this happiness.
Criticism. The only conclusion we can draw from the reason
given by Scotus is that we have a natural and innate appetite for
happiness as such, but not for the beatific vision; for this vision is
not so in agreement with our nature as to be proportionate to it.91
Moreover, the general view taken by the Thomists92 is that the
desire of seeing God’s essence cannot be innate, and if it were innate
then it would have to be efficacious. For the innate appetite, as
distinct from the elicited, implies in the object desired a natural
relation and positive fittingness, which have their foundation in
the very nature of the one desiring, even before there is any knowl­
edge of this desired good. Now there is not in our nature any natural
relation and positive fittingness for an object that is essentially
supernatural, but only an obediential potency or possibility of be­
ing elevated to this order. Therefore our nature is not endowed
with an innate and natural appetite, which would be a sort of pon­
derousness of nature for the immediate vision of God. In fact, if
there were this appetite, it would be, for this very reason, efficacious;
for, inasmuch as the desire is the result of a conditional judgment,
it is inefficacious. Thus I would wish this naturally attainable good
if God were freely to elevate me to this order. The innate appetite,
however, is not the result of knowledge, but springs from nature
itself and corresponds to the forces or at least the exigencies of
oo Cf. in Prol. Sent., q.i; in IV Sent., d.49, q. 10.
01 De veritate, q.22, a.7; q. 14, a.2.
02 See John of St. Thomas, Com. in lam, q.12, disp. XII, a.g, no. 8.

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nature; hence it is not concerned with that to which nature is not
entitled, but with that to which it is entitled.
Furthermore, it must be said that if Scotus’ opinion were true,
then God as the Author of nature would have given it an innate
appetite, a ponderousness of nature, for an end to which He could
not bring it as the Author of nature, as already stated against the
Augustinians Berti and Noris. Thus there would be no relation be­
tween the efficient and final causes, as demanded by the principle of
finality, which states that every agent acts for a proportionate end.
Lastly, this innate appetite which Scotus speaks of, would be both
essentially natural as being a property of nature, and essentially
supernatural inasmuch as its object of specification would be for­
mally supernatural. Nor can it be said to be specified by an entitatively supernatural object, but by one that is naturally and, as
it were, materially known; for this appetite, being innate, inde­
pendently of any knowledge whatever would tend toward God as
He is in Himself. Thus there would be a natural tendency in our
nature toward something essentially supernatural, which is a con­
tradiction in terms and which would end in the denial of the
distinction between the two orders, as it would also mean the univocity of being, which, according to the doctrine of Scotus, is
included in this opinion.
It must be observed that the Thomists consider this final criticism
a valid argument in refutation of the theory of an active obediential
potentiality admitted by Suarez in his search of a via media be­
tween the view of Scotus and that of St. Thomas. This active
obediential potentiality, as the Thomists generally admit,93 would
be both essentially natural, since it is a property of the nature, and
essentially supernatural, since it is specified by an essentially super­
natural object. Suarez admitted only a natural desire that is elicited
and inefficacious, however, as regards the beatific vision, and in this
he differed from Scotus.
In opposition to the view of Suarez, according to the view held
by St. Thomas and the Thomists, the obediential potentiality is
passive, and, as its name implies, refers directly to an agent of a
higher order whom it obeys and from whom it receives this super­
natural elevation and relation or positive fitness for this essentially
supernatural object.94 Hence for the Thomists the obediential
potentiality is nothing else, as John of St. Thomas shows,95 but a
os Cf. ibid., q. 12, disp. XIV, a 2, no. 11; also Billuart, De Deo, diss. IV, a. 5, § 3.
o« Summa theol., Illa, q. it, a. 1; q. 1, a. 3 ad 311m; Quaest. Disp., de virtutibus
in communi, a. to ad sum et 311m; Compendium theologiae, chap. 104.
os Com. in lam, q. 12, disp. XIV, a.2.

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THE ONE GOD

potentiality that denotes a possibility of being elevated to the order
of grace and glory.
Cajetan’s opinion. It differs radically from that held by Scotus.
He says: “In convincing proof of what we have said, understand
that the rational creature can be considered in two ways, either
absolutely or as ordained to happiness. If the rational creature is
considered absolutely, then the natural desire is for that which is
within the scope of the natural faculty; and thus I concede that
there is no natural desire of seeing God absolutely as He is in
Himself. But if the rational creature is considered in the second
sense, then it naturally desires to see God, because, as such, it has
knowledge of certain effects, namely, those of grace and glory, God
being the cause of these, considered as He is absolutely in Himself
and not as universal agent. But when the effects are known, then it
is natural for any intellect whatever to desire to know the cause of
these.” 98 And Cajetan adds that St. Thomas is here speaking as a
theologian; hence it is a question of the natural desire of the
creature ordained by God to eternal life.97
Criticism. Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis) and several other
Thomists have attacked this opinion of Cajetan in their commen­
taries. After quoting Cajetan’s opinion, Ferrariensis says: "But this
does not seem to be the view of St. Thomas. . . . For the reason
given by St. Thomas (la, q. 12, a. 1, and Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill,
chap. 50) is not restricted to the knowledge of the effects of grace
and glory, but is also concerned with knowledge of whatsoever
effects and with knowledge of every cause. . . . (Moreover) it would
then follow that only those who know the supernatural effects of
grace and glory would have such a desire; but this conclusion is
false, for, as St. Thomas says (Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chaps. 51, 57),
every intellectual being has this desire.” 98 Therefore it is not a
question of a natural desire for eternal life. So writes Ferrariensis,
and very many Thomists are of the same opinion, such as Bannez,
John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart, Gotti,
and others.99
It must furthermore be remarked that the desire which Cajetan
speaks of, cannot be called natural, absolutely as such, but is natural
only in a relative sense, or is connatural; and once the effects of
grace are known, 't is truly a supernatural and efficacious desire
that proceeds either from infused hope or from charity. On the
00 Cf. ibid., q. 12, a. 1.
07 Consult also Cajetan’s Opusc., HI, tr. 7.
os Com. in Contra Genies, Bk. Ill, chap. 51.
88 Consult their commentaries on the Summa theol., la, q.12, a.t; also their
treatises De gratia: Whether the state of pure nature was possible.

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contrary, St. Thomas is referring to an absolutely natural desire
that originates from a knowledge of natural effects, as is evident
especially from a passage in which he discusses this desire arising
in the angels from their natural knowledge of God as mirrored in
their essence.100
In fact, we even find that this natural desire, which originates
from a knowledge of natural effects, is truly and wonderfully de­
scribed by Plato. For he teaches that, in accordance with the ascend­
ant dialectic of love, we must first love beautiful bodies, sounds,
colors, and then, in a loftier flight, proceed to love the beauty of
the soul. But since the intrinsic worth of the soul consists in glorious
actions which have their foundation in the best of precepts and
maxims, we must love sublime teachings which are the rule of
human actions. But the excellence of these teachings is derived from
the extraordinary perfection of the supreme science, whose object is
the self-subsisting Beauty and Goodness. Then he goes on to say:
"This beauty, O Socrates, in the first place is eternal, neither com­
ing into being nor perishing, never increasing or decreasing. . . .
It is the absolute and eternal beauty, in which all other beauties
participate, without inducing in it by their birth or destruction
the least diminution or increase. But what a felicitous sight shall
we not deem it to be, if one were to gaze upon the genuine, perfect,
pure and simple beauty . . . beholding that divine unvarying
beauty ... ? Do you not think that (a man who attains to this
contemplation of God) acquires no longer the semblance of virtues
but real virtues . . . , since by this he will be the friend of God and
by all means will be immortal?’’101
Hence Plato rises from the consideration of natural effects to the
knowledge of the existence of the supremely Good and Beautiful.
Expressing this as a velleity, he says: “What an immense happiness
this would be for man if he could directly see this supreme Good!”
Of course traditional religious beliefs contributed to this view of
Plato, as did also his exaggerated realism; but even excluding
these, it is possible to attain this end by tire way of ascendant
dialectic.102
Lastly, we must say that even Cajetan seems in some measure to
concede what Ferrariensis asserts, for, after repeating the reply
quoted above from his commentary,103 he says: “Yet in a special
sense ... it can be said that the human intellect, knowing of
100 Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chaps. 50, 51.
101 Banquet, chap. 29, p. 211.
102 FOr this desire of Plato and the Platonists, consult St. Augustine's De
civitate Dei, Bk. VIII, chap. 8.
103 Com. in lam Ilae, q.3, a.8.

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THE ONE GOD

God’s existence and of His general attributes, naturally desires to
know what He is, inasmuch as He is included in the category of
causes, and not absolutely as He is, except as a certain consequence
of this previous knowledge. And this is true, because we are natu­
rally inclined, on seeing the effect, to desire to know the cause what­
ever this may be. Hence take note, thou beginner, that to know
God’s essence is the same as to see it. This point is made clear, of
course, in the proof of the last article of this question.” 104
THE MORE COMMON OPINION
AMONG THE THOMISTS

This question was very much disputed in the schools during the
time of Baius and Jansenius; then the Thomists, so as to avoid all
equivocation, by more explicit definitions restricted the application
of the terms used. But previous to this, Ferrariensis and Bannez
had helped to solve the problem by introducing the finest of dis­
tinctions.
Ferrariensis said: “We naturally desire to see God in so far as He
is the first Cause, but not as He is the object of supernatural happi­
ness. For it can be known by the natural power of the intellect that
God is the cause of other things, but it cannot be known in this way
that He is the object of supernatural happiness.”105 Thus the
object of the aforesaid desire is clearly determined, but a certain
difficulty remained about this desire subjectively considered.
However, Bannez offers the following explanation: “Man can
have a natural appetite, that is, elicited by one’s natural powers,
which is a certain conditional and inefficacious desire of seeing
God. . . . For, if . . . St. Thomas were referring to the ponderous­
ness of nature (or to an innate desire), then man would be inclined
thereto even without having seen the effect. ... I have said con­
ditional, because by his natural powers man cannot be certain that
such a good is possible. Thus man can desire and wish never to die,
if this be possible. And although such a condition is not explicitly
conceived by the mind, yet it is implicitly contained in the object,
which is represented as good, and not as possible.” 106
Later on, many Thomists admit that man’s natural desire to see
God’s essence as He is the Author of nature, is not innate but
elicited, conditional and inefficacious.10’ Furthermore, the Thomists
Cf. q. 12, a. i.
wo/n Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 51.
100 Com. in lam, q. 12, a.i.
101 So say John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Salmanticenses, Gotti, Billuart, and
others.

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generally remark that this desire is also free, inasmuch as it is not a
necessary act as regards the specification of the object.108
And so this desire is explained both objectively and subjectively.
Objectively, a desire of seeing God’s essence as He is the Author of
nature, but not as He is the triune God and the Author of grace;
for this cannot be known in a natural way. Subjectively considered,
this desire is said to be elicited, conditional and inefficacious.
It follows from this desire, as so conceived, that there is a natural
knowledge of God’s natural effects and of His naturally knowable
divine attributes. This natural knowledge, indeed, of God’s attributes
is imperfect, since the intimate reconciliations of several of these
attributes is mysterious, for instance, the reconciliation of supreme
immutability with supreme liberty, likewise of infinite and omnipo­
tent goodness, with the permission of evil, or even of infinite mercy
with infinite justice. Hence St. Thomas says: "Therefore this knowl­
edge (so imperfect) does not set the natural desire to rest, but
rather urges it on to see the divine substance,” 100 which means that
the divine essence as constituting the foundation for the naturally
knowable attributes, or God’s essence as He is the Author of nature,
may clearly be known by the intellect. However, the essence is the
same both in God as the Author of nature and in God as the
Author of grace.110 Thus, therefore, the object of this natural de­
sire is not formally supernatural, but only materially so, for it is by
the natural light of reason that this object is known to be desirable
or, as the Salmanticenses say, “the thing desired is materially super­
natural, but not the reason for desiring it. . . ; for it is desired
under the aspect of a certain maximum good.” 111
Thus there is an immense abyss between this natural desire and
infused hope or charity. This distinction, which Baius eliminated,112
was long before expressed by St. Thomas when he wrote: “Charity
loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For
nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning
and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He is
108 Cf Salmanticenses, De Deo, tr. II, disp. I, dub. IV, no. 3. It is somewhat
in disagreement with Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis), Suarez, Vasquez, and Valentia
that the above statement is made.
Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 50.
no As a matter of fact and tightly so, there can be no immediate vision of God
as He is the Author of nature without seeing Him as He is the Author of grace;
for the Deity is the immediate object of this vision, which actually and implicitly
contains both the naturally knowable attributes, and the divine subsistent rela­
tions by which the three divine Persons are constituted.
in De Deo, tr. II, disp. I, dub. V, nos. 75, 77. Likewise John of St. Thomas,
De gratia, disp. XX, a. 1, Solv. obj., no. 5.
h2 Denz., no. 1034.

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the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual
fellowship with God.” 118
Doubt. Can the possibility of this beatific vision be strictly
demonstrated by the natural light of reason? In these latter days
some have contended that from Cajetan’s time many of the great
commentators of St. Thomas, including Bannez, John of St.
Thomas, and the Salmanticenses, did not correctly interpret St.
Thomas’ doctrine about the natural desire to see God’s essence, be­
cause they did not properly distinguish between the order of possi­
bility and the order of existence or, as we say, between the meta­
physical order of intention and the physical order of execution.114 But
having posited this distinction, we should have to say that from this
natural desire, inasmuch as it arises from a knowledge of the natural
effects of the first Cause, the possibility of the beatific vision can be
strictly demonstrated by reason alone, and hence that there is an obe­
diential capacity in our nature of being elevated to the order of
grace. Yet this elevation and even the beatific vision must still be
regarded as essentially supernatural, inasmuch as, in the order of
existence, or in the physical order of execution, they are dependent
on God’s free and gratuitous good pleasure. And thus, as already
stated, it is only in this latter order that this desire is conditional
and inefficacious, although in the metaphysical order it is effica­
cious in demonstrating apodictically the possibility of the beatific
vision.116
But is it true that from Cajetan’s time many commentators of St.
Thomas did not correctly interpret his teaching about the natural
desire, and that they erred in not admitting the metaphysical
demonstrability by reason alone of the possibility of the beatific
vision?
We have discussed this question at sufficient length in a recent
book,11® but it seems fitting at this point to explain briefly the fun­
damental reason for the traditional stand taken by the theologians.
This reason may be regarded as the pith or germinal idea of an
earlier work,117 though many of our readers are not sufficiently
aware of this fact.
113 Summa theol., la Ilae, q.109, a.3 ad mm. See also Ila Ilae, q.26, a.3; De
veritate, q. 14, a.2; in I Cor., c.13, lect. 4.
m Cf. P. Mag. A. Fernandez, in the periodical Divus Thomas, nos. 1, 5, 6.
11® This last acceptation of the word "efficacious” does not seem to preserve
the natural meaning of the words, because the desire is said to be efficacious as
regards the attainment of the desired object and not as regards the demonstration
of the possibility of this object.
ne Le Sens du mystère et le clair-obscur intellectuel, pp. 176-205.
11’ De revelatione (4th ed.).

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The present problem resolves itself into this more general
question, namely, whether the intrinsic possibility of essentially
supernatural mysteries can be strictly demonstrated by reason alone.
1) The question is about their intrinsic possibility or their non­
repugnance objectively considered. Thus we may ask whether the
Trinity of divine Persons is really possible, extramentally, or really
and in itself non-repugnant, and not merely so for us. What is for
us non-repugnant, is something whose non-repugnance is urged and
defended against those denying it, although it is not positively and
apodictically demonstrated.
2) We are concerned here with essentially supernatural mysteries,
those that are intrinsically supernatural and entitatively so as re­
gards their substance or essence. Such are the Trinity, the Incar­
nation, grace and glory. We are not concerned with those that are
supernatural only in the mode of their production, such as the
resurrection of the dead in whom natural life is supernaturally
restored.
3) The reference here is to a metaphysical or apodictic demon­
stration, and not merely to a very probable argument. The reference
is also to a demonstration that is obtained solely by reasoning, or
from the natural light alone of reason, which means that it is not
dependent on revealed premises either explicitly or even implicitly
presupposed. I say, even "implicitly” presupposed.
Moreover, it must be observed that very probable arguments,
those proposed by the great doctors of the Church concerning divine
truths, may be most profound or most sublime, without being
apodictic. And the intellect, either human or angelic, can always
continue to see more clearly the force of these arguments, which,
however, may not be convincing. These great arguments of con­
gruence compared with those that give us evidence and absolute
certainty, are like polygons inscribed in a circle. The number of
sides may be increased indefinitely, yet they will never be equal to
and be identified with the circumference of the circle.
Such are the most profound arguments of congruence which,
taken from the traditional teaching of the doctors of the Church,
are advanced in defense of the possibility of the Trinity, the Incar­
nation, and other mysteries. In heaven we shall see how much truth
there is in these arguments of congruence, which even the highest
of the angels by his natural powers could always penetrate more
deeply, and yet never acquire conviction of evidence in this state.
I. To the question as thus stated we reply according to the tradi­
tional teaching of the theologians as follows:
What is supernatural not only as to the mode of its production

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THE ONE GOD

but also as to its essence, or entitatively, is likewise supernatural
as to its knowableness, because truth and being are convertible.
This major is a fundamental principle throughout theology, and its
denial means the denial of truth and of the supernatural. But the
intrinsic possibility of the aforesaid mysteries is the intrinsic possi­
bility of the essentially supernatural. Therefore this possibility is
supernatural as to its knowableness, and hence it cannot be apodictically demonstrated by the natural powers alone of any created
intellect, either human or angelic, or even any creatable intel­
lect.
The major is evident, for it concerns the essentially supernatural,
that which is “far removed from our knowledge” not only in its
contingent aspect, like future contingent things of the natural order
which depend on God’s most free good pleasure (for instance, the
hour when this material world will come to an end), or even future
miracles (such as the resurrection of the dead), but also in its aspect
of intrinsic supernaturalness. There is no doubt that truth and
being are convertible. As St. Thomas says: “The true that is in
things is convertible with being as to substance (anything is know­
able inasmuch as it has being); while the true that is in the intellect
is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the mani­
fested.” 118 There must be, or course, a proportion between the
manifestation and the manifested. Hence what is essentially super­
natural can be known formally as such only in a supernatural way
(clearly by the beatific vision, obscurely by infused faith, and as
virtually revealed by sacred theology).11’
In other words, what is essentially supernatural cannot be known
in a natural way, because there is no necessary and evident con­
nection between it and things of the natural order. If it were so re­
lated, then it would become a philosophical truth, as is the case
with natural truths about God as the Author of nature. The super­
natural mysteries about God properly belong to the order of
naturally unknowable truths, for there is no necessary and evident
connection between them and things of the natural order. We must
include among these not only the Trinity and the Incarnation, but
also the mystery of God’s eternal life, which is essentially super­
natural, since it is a formal participation of His intimate life.
It is indeed true that supernatural mysteries can be known
materially by a natural and certain knowledge derived from the
signs of divine revelation. In this way the mysteries are known by
an acquired faith, which is the way the devil knows them.120 But
ne Summa theol., la, q.16, a. 3 ad lum.
110 See a.4 of this question; also Ila Hae, q.6, a.i.
no ibid., Ila Ilae, q.5, a.a.

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335

apart from revelation and its signs, the mysteries are materially
known only as probable, for there is no necessary and evident con­
nection between them and natural things that are naturally know­
able.121
Neither can it be strictly demonstrated that anything essentially
supernatural (such as the beatific vision) is really possible, abstract­
ing from its supernatural formality. In a word, such an object is
not necessarily and evidently connected with things of the natural
order.122
The minor is equally certain, for intrinsic possibility is evidently
of the same order as the thing itself that is said to be possible. It
is its non-repugnance to existence, not only considered as such by
us, but as it is really so in itself.
Therefore the conclusion is that this intrinsic possibility or real
non-repugnance, cannot be naturally known, and that it cannot
be apodictically proved solely by the natural light of the human
intellect or even of the angelic intellect. But, after this truth has
been revealed, we are persuaded of this intrinsic possibility, or real
non-repugnance, by congruent and even most profound arguments,
which can always penetrate more deeply into the mystery; yet the
arguments are not such as to become convincing.
Thus Billuart expresses the common opinion among theologians
when he says: “That a positive and evident proof can be given that
no contradiction is implied in this mystery (of the Trinity), this I
deny; that a negative and probable argument can be given, this I
concede. This suffices, indeed, so that this mystery cannot be de­
clared impossible, yet not so as to be known as evidently possi­
ble.” 123 In like manner St. Thomas had said: “We can make use
of philosophy in sacred doctrine ... by defending the faith
against those who attack it, either by showing that their statements
are false or that they are not convincing.” 124 For theology shows
that the objections proposed against the possibility of the Trinity,
the Incarnation, life eternal, and other mysteries, are not convincing.
Thus this possibility is neither disproved nor positively and apodic­
tically proved, but we are reasonably persuaded of the same. This
It can indeed be demonstrated by reason alone that there is an order of
supernatural truths in God; but then these truths are known only negatively, as
naturally unknowable truths. But to prove that the beatific vision is possible (a
positive predication), it would have to be positively known and demonstrated
that the Deity or the intimate life of God can be directly seen by the created
intellect. The subject of this proposition, however, is not positively known by
reason alone.
122 See synopsis at the end of this doubt.
123 Cursus theol., De Trinitate, diss, prooem., a. 4.
12« In Boetium, De Trinitate, q.z, a.3.

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THE ONE GOD

possibility is defended against those who deny it, and it is firmly
held by faith.
II. This fundamental reason is without difficulty elucidated by
examples, if we may be permitted further comment on this disputed
point.
1) If the intrinsic possibility of the Trinity were demonstrated by
reason alone, then its existence would be apodictically demon­
strated, for the Trinity is not a contingent but a necessary truth,
and in necessary things from their real possibility the existence of
the same is legitimately inferred. This would mean the revival of
the error of the semirationalists and of Rosmini, who said: “Pro­
vided the mystery of the Trinity has been revealed, its existence
can be demonstrated by merely speculative arguments, though they
are negative and indirect, so that by such arguments this truth is
classed among the philosophical subjects and, like the rest of them,
becomes a scientific proposition. If it were denied, the theosophical
doctrine of pure reason would remain not only incomplete, but
also abounding in every respect with absurdities, which would
mean its utter extinction.’’125
2) If the real and intrinsic possibility of the Incarnation were
demonstrated apodictically by reason alone, then it would be only
because of its contingency that the Incarnation would transcend
our natural knowledge, as being a future contingent of the natural
order that is dependent on God’s most free good pleasure, such as
is the hour when this material world will come to an end, or even
when it came into existence. The Incarnation would no longer be
an essentially supernatural mystery; at most it would be a miracle
supernatural as to its mode of production, as the resurrection from
the dead is, the possibility of which can indeed be strictly demon­
strated, inasmuch as God is evidently the Author and Lord of na­
ture, and hence of natural life, which He can miraculously restore.
But the Incarnation is concerned not only with the miraculous
restitution of natural life, but also with the essentially supernatural
life of the Word and the hypostatic union of the same with the
human nature.
3) Likewise, if the real possibility of the mystery of eternal life
or of the light of glory and of the beatific vision were apodictically
demonstrated solely by the light of reason, then the beatific vision
and the light of glory required for this would no longer be sub­
stantially supernatural, for that which is substantially or essen­
tially supernatural is by this very fact supernaturally knowable
inasmuch as truth and being are convertible. These principles are
126 Denz., no. 1915.

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337

absolutely necessary and absolutely fundamental, and they are not
even examined by several of the more modern theologians, who
seek to depart from the traditional stand.
If the real possibility of the beatific vision were apodictically
proved by the sole light of reason, then this vision and the light
of glory would transcend our natural knowledge solely by reason
of their contingency, inasmuch as they depend on God’s most free
good pleasure, like contingent futures of the natural order (such
as the last day of the material world); and at most they would be
reduced to what is supernatural as to its mode of production, like
the resurrection from the dead or the glorification of the body.
Even if, leaving the light of glory out of consideration, the real
and intrinsic possibility of the beatific vision were apodictically
demonstrated by reason alone, then it would follow necessarily from
this that we could deduce the real and intrinsic possibility of the
supernatural gifts required for this vision, namely, of those gifts
now called by us habitual grace and the light of glory. But the
intrinsic possibility of habitual grace cannot be proved by reason
alone; for then grace would no longer be essentially supernatural,
but only as to the mode of its production, as when the natural life
is supernaturally restored to the corpse by the resurrection. That a
participation in God’s intimate life is possible or that it is com­
municable by way of participation, cannot be proved by reason
alone. The possibility of grace is beyond the scope of demonstra­
tion.
Therefore the arguments deduced from reason alone concerning
the intrinsic possibility of the beatific vision are indeed very prob­
able, and as such most profound. They can always be more deeply
penetrated by the intellect, whether human or angelic, yet they are
not convincing, and compared with those arguments that give us
evidence and certainty of conviction, they are like the polygon in­
scribed in a circle, since the number of its sides can always be in­
creased. In fact, if these arguments of congruence were proposed as
apodictic, then they would lose their force, since they do not come
within the scope of demonstrability, but transcend it. What we are
here discussing is indemonstrable because of tire excess and not
because of the deficiency of its light.
Hence the great commentators of St. Thomas, those who came
after Cajetan (such as Bannez, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses), did not have a false conception of St. Thomas’ argument,
which is founded on the natural desire to see God’s essence. It is
still true to say that the possibility of the mystery of eternal life is
neither disproved nor apodictically proved, but we are reasonably

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THE ONE GOD

persuaded of the same. It is defended against those who deny it,
and it is firmly held by faith.126
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THIS REPLY

1) In God, that is said to be essentially supernatural which can­
not be known through creatures, because there is no evident and
necessary connection between creatures and this object. In God this
is “that which is known to Himself and revealed to others.”127
God is not here considered under the aspect of being, but in what
intimately and most properly belongs to the notion of the Deity.
And St. Thomas shows that the Trinity pertains to this order be­
cause “the creative power of God is common to the whole
Trinity.” 128
2) In those things extrinsic to God, the essentially supernatural
is defined as that which is a formal participation of the Deity or
of God’s intimate life (such as grace, the infused virtues, the gifts,
the light of glory), and there is no evident and necessary connec­
tion between creatures and this object. Hence this object cannot
be formally known by the natural power of the intellect, but only
materially and this in various ways, as is evident from the follow­
ing synopsis.
i26 Some object that from the natural desire of seeing God, the possibility of
the beatific vision is at least indirectly and extrinsically but apodictically proved;
for this desire is in transcendental relation to the beatific vision.
Reply. This desire would be in transcendental relation to the beatific vision,
if it were a desire resulting either from infused hope or from charity. In created
things only the essentially supernatural is transcendentally related to God's in­
timate life. It is the very definition of the created substantially supernatural. If
any natural entity were to be actually in such positive relation to God's int'mate
life, then grace would not be absolutely necessary, but only required fo» the
easier performance of supernatural acts, as the Pelagians said.
Indeed, this natural desire of seeing God does not terminate formally but only
materially in what is objectively supernatural, as was stated above. Otherwise
it would be both essentially natural (as originating from nature) and essentially
supernatural (as specified by a supernatural object).
That this would mean that the possibility of the beatific vision would be
apodictically demonstrated, if the desire were efficacious, let this pass without
comment; but the desire (unless the doctrine of Baius be admitted) is conditional
and inefficacious. It presupposes two conditions that have not yet been proved,
namely, if the elevation be possible and if God will to grant it to us. Therefore
this desire, since it presupposes the uncertainty of the possibility of this vision,
does not enable us to give an apodictic proof of the same, but it serves as the
basis for a probable argument of greater cogency, to be sure, though it has not
the force of a demonstration. Reason alone can penetrate the essentially super­
natural only by means of probable arguments, for it is beyond the scope of
demonstration.
i2T Summa theol., la, q.i, a.6; also Vatican Council, Denz., no. t8r6.
iMIbid., la, q.32, a.i.

THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

formally as
supernatural

perfectly
as to its
quiddity

339

"comprehensively by God alone
not comprehensively by the
.blessed

"by infused faith and the gifts

imperfectly ) by sacred theology under the
.guidance of virtual revelation
'from the signs of revelation, and it is thus
known by the devil with the certainty of
acquired faith

The essentially
supernatural is
known
materially
in a less
formal
aspect

negatively, and thus is proved
the existence of naturally un­
knowable truths in God
not from
revelation

positively, and thus we are per­
suaded of the possibility of the
beatific vision from the natu­
ral desire to see God, the
Author of nature

What has been said suffices for the solution of this problem.129
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD IS SEEN BY THE
CREATED INTELLECT THROUGH AN IMAGE

State of the question. That the beatific vision is enjoyed by the
blessed is now known to be a revealed fact, and we have defended
the possibility of this truth. In this question an inquiry must be
made into those things that of necessity concur or do not concur
in this vision, on the part both of the object seen and of the seer.
In other words, on the part of the object seen, is it necessary or at
least possible to have a species or similitude of God’s essence, and
then on the part of the seer, must there be an infused light that
fortifies the created intellect?
As regards the similitude on the part of the object seen, St.
Thomas, in stating the question at issue, recalls the following text
from St. Augustine: "When we know God, some likeness of God
is made in us.”130 And he also says that the intellect, like the
sensitive faculty, in the act of knowing is informed with the like120 This has been fully explained by us elsewhere. Cf. Revue Thomiste, MarchApril, 1936, "La possibilité de la grace est-elle rigoureusement démonstrable?"
pp. 194-218. See also Revue Thomiste, 1933, pp. 669-88, and Angelicum, April,
>93θ> PP· 241-48.
iso De Trinitate, Bk. IX, chap. 11.

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THE ONE GOD

ness of the thing co be known. Thus Aristotle says that in sensible
things the object of sense perception is potentially intelligible, then,
through the light brought to bear upon it by the active intellect, it
becomes actually intelligible in the impressed intelligible species,
and finally it is actually understood in the expressed species, or
in the word, which is the medium in which the nature of the thing
understood is understood, such as the nature of a stone or of a
plant.
Therefore the question is whether in the beatific vision there is
an infused intelligible species in the intellect, and also an ex­
pressed species or a mental word.
This was not a question of minor importance for St. Thomas.
We read in his life that, when his confrater Aegidius Romanus,
after dying, appeared to him by God’s permission, St. Thomas
asked him the following question: “Do you see God directly?’’ He
received this answer: "As we have heard, so do we see in the city
of the Lord of hosts.” 181 St. Thomas looked upon this answer as
confirming what he considered to be the true interpretation of
scriptural texts on this subject, and there is reference to this in
the counterargument of this article.
It reads as follows: “On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin.,
Bk. XV, chap. 9) that when the Apostle says, ‘We see now through
a glass, in a dark manner,’ by the terms ‘glass’ and ‘in a dark man­
ner’ certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommo­
dated to the vision of God. But to see the essence of God,” as St.
Thomas adds, "is not an enigmatic or speculative vision, but is, on
the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is
not seen through a similitude.”
St. Thomas’ conclusion is: God’s essence cannot be seen by any
created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really
is.
All the disciples of St. Thomas unhesitatingly accept this conclu­
sion, saying that there can be no question either of an impressed
or expressed species in the clear vision of God. Or else they say
that, according to the imperfect way we conceive it and speak of
it, the divine essence takes the place of both the impressed and the
expressed species. This terminology is interpreted in a benign sense
by the Thomists, but it is faulty; for the impressed and expressed
species take, so to speak, the place of the object, as representing it.
And therefore to say that the divine essence takes the place of the
species, is to say that it acts as substitute for the same. However,
this terminology is permissible according to our imperfect mode
i»r Ps. 47: 8. The above words are but a slight variation of this text in the
Book of Psalms.

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341

of conceiving it, just as we say that God enters into logical relations
with creatures.
But St. Thomas’ conclusion is not admitted by all theologians.
Several, such as Aureolus, Suarez, Vasquez and Valentia, are of the
opinion that there is nothing derogatory in admitting the presence
of an impressed species in the beatific vision, although such is not
actually the case. In fact, Suarez affirms the impossibility of the
beatific vision without the utterance of the mental word or the ex­
pressed species. A comparison of these opinions with that held by
St. Thomas most clearly shows what an exalted notion the Angelic
Doctor had of this mystery.
Although St. Thomas’ opinion is not de fide, it appears to be
more in harmony with the definition given by Benedict XII, who
declared: “The blessed . . . see the divine essence by direct in­
tuition and face to face, in such wise that nothing created inter­
venes as an object of vision, but the divine essence presents itself
to their immediate gaze, unveiled, clearly, and openly.” 132
This definition does not exclude a created species, because a
created species does not function as an object of vision, but is the
medium by which or in which the thing seen is reflected. Never­
theless, the concluding words of this definition emphasize the im­
mediateness of this vision.
The question is freely disputed, and it can be solved only in a
speculative way. First of all, it must be said that intuitive vision
in general does not exclude either an impressed or an expressed
species. Thus the sense perception of color is obtained through the
impressed species (although St. Thomas differs from Suarez in that
he does not admit such through the expressed species). But St.
Thomas maintains that the intuitive vision which the angel has
of his own essence is obtained through the expressed species or
the mental word. This is clearly enough affirmed by him in the follow­
ing passage: "(The angel) knows itself by itself. Yet the life of angels
does not reach the highest degree of perfection because, though the
intelligible species is altogether within them, it is not their very
substance, because in them to understand and to be are not the
same thing.” 133 This means to say that the angel’s essence is indeed
of itself intelligible, not merely potentially (like the essence of a
stone), but actually, and so it is understood without an impressed
species. However, it is not actually understood, because the angel’s
essence is not its act of understanding, and hence not itself under­
stood. On the contrary, God’s essence is His existence, and Himself
understood, and is of Himself actually understood. Hence, to know
is2 Denz., no. 530.
iss Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 11, § 1.

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THE ONE GOD

Himself, as will be stated farther on,134 God is not in need, like
the angel, of the accidental mental word. But from revelation it is
known for certain that God the Father, not as denoting indigence,
but by reason of His infinite fecundity, generates the Word that is
not accidental, but substantial.
This substantial Word is not only "God understood” but “true
God” of true God, "because the natural being of God is not dis­
tinct from His act of understanding (and its being understood).
Hence it is said (John i: i): The Word was God. . . . (Thus) this
shows that the divine Word is not merely an intelligible species,
as our word is, but that it is, indeed, a real and subsistent being.
On the contrary, man’s word (concept of himself) cannot be called
a man simply, but only with a qualification; namely, a man under­
stood. Hence this statement is false: The word is a man; whereas this
is true: The Word was God,” 135 as St. Thomas very well explains in
this passage.
Thus the state of the question clearly is this: by divine revela­
tion we know indeed that the beatific vision terminates in the sub­
stantial Word, who is “the brightness of His glory and the figure
of His substance.” 133 But the question is whether there is or can
be an accidental word in this vision.
It must be observed that the accidental word is not excluded
from the intuitive vision, inasmuch as it is intuitive; for the angel’s
knowledge of himself is not abstractive but intuitive, and yet it is
acquired by means of the accidental word, which is immediately
received from the presence of the thing known. Neither is the im­
pressed species excluded from intuitive vision, inasmuch as it is
intuitive; for I intuitively see the flower, through the impressed
species; but intuitive knowledge postulates that the species is im­
mediately received from the presence of the thing known.
On the contrary, in the case of abstractive knowledge the species
is not immediately received from the thing known, but from some­
thing resulting from it. Thus we have abstractive knowledge of
God as reflected in creatures, and also of the essences of sensible
things from the likeness of sensible qualities. Thus we have descrip­
tive knowledge of the essence of the lion, the rose, or the lily, but
we do not directly see the specific difference of the lion through the
species that would be immediately received in the intellect from
the very essence of the lion. The state of the question being thus
precisely determined, let us see what St. Thomas says in the argu­
mentative part of the article.
m Summa theol., la, q. 14, a.4.
135 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 11, § 4.
iso Heb. 1:3. Thus the general saying among theologians that the blessed see
all things in the Word.

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343

It consists of three parts: (i) it determines what is required both
for sensible and for intellectual vision; (2) it establishes that a
similitude is required on the part of the visual faculty for the
vision of God, namely, a reinforcing light; (3) it is proved that
God's essence cannot be seen by any created similitude on the part
of the object seen.
1) Two things are required for sensible and for intellectual vision,
namely, power of sight and union of the thing seen with the sight.
Thus the similitude of the stone is in the eye, whereby the vision
is made actual. But, as will be stated farther on,137 the angel sees
himself through his essence, without an impressed species.
2) To see God there must be some similitude of God on the
part of the visual faculty. Now indeed, the intellective power is
a certain intelligible light that is derived from God, the first intel­
lect; but in addition to this, an infused light is required that re­
inforces the intellect, and this is called the light of glory, as will
be more clearly explained in the fifth article. Mention of this is
made here to explain St. John’s statement quoted in the first dif­
ficulty: "We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to
Him, because we shall see Him as He is.” 138 As it is said in the reply
to this first objection, “that authority speaks of the similitude which
is caused by participation of the light of glory.” The light of glory
is analogically called a light inasmuch as it serves to show the
reinforced light given to the intellect.
3) On the part of the object seen, God’s essence cannot be seen
by any created similitude. Three proofs are given for this principal
conclusion: (1) in that God is of a higher order of immateriality;
(2) in that God both entitatively and intellectually is His own
existence; (3) in that the Deity is uncircumscribed.
First reason. It is reduced to this: The difference between the
created and the uncreated is greater than that between the divers
orders of created things. But the reality of a higher order, for ex­
ample, the angelic nature, is not seen as it is in itself by a similitude
of a lower order, for example, by a sensible species, nor even by
an intelligible species abstracted from sensible things. Therefore
much less can God’s essence be seen by any created species what­
ever.139
It must be observed that in the minor there is no mention of an
inferior species, but of a species of an inferior order; for the lower
137 Summa theol., la, q. 56, a. 1.
iss I John 3: 2.
iso This is unhesitatingly affirmed by St. Thomas, whereas, on the contrary,
several theologians of later times, as we shall see, say that the created species is
possible in the beatific vision, though it is superfluous. In fact, the wish of Suarez
is that there actually be such a species. St. Thomas clearly excludes it.

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THE ONE GOD

angel is able to see the higher angel by an inferior species of the
same order. Yet in this case his knowledge of the higher is incom­
plete.
The second reason is that God’s essence is His own very exist­
ence.140 But no created form can be its own existence. Therefore
no created form can be the similitude representing God’s essence,
as it is in itself. As will at once be stated in the solution of the
objections, the major is to be understood as meaning that God
alone is His existence both entitatively and intellectually. In other
words, God alone is pure act in every respect; hence He alone is
His intellection. On the contrary, the representative created species,
however perfect it may be, cannot be its own subsistent intellection,
because it is intelligible by participation.141
The third reason is that the Deity is uncircumscribed, containing
supereminently in itself whatever can be signified or understood
by the created intellect, namely, all absolutely simple perfections.
But every created form (or idea) is determined according to some
aspect of wisdom or of power or of being itself. Therefore God
cannot be seen as He really is by any created species.
This third reason shows pre-eminently that the Deity in a cer­
tain way transcends being, unity, truth . . . , in that it contains
formally and eminently all absolutely simple perfections, which are
naturally participable. But the Deity as such, or God’s intimate life,
is not naturally participable, nor is it naturally knowable; for it
is participated in only by grace, which is properly defined as tire
participation of the divine nature according to the following text:
“He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these
you may be made partakers of the divine nature.” 142
In the reply to the third objection it is said that “the divine
essence is existence itself . . . and is united to the created intellect
(not only as the object actually intelligible, but as) actually under­
stood, making (our) intellect in act by and of itself.” This is prac­
tically what the Thomists mean when they state that the divine
essence takes the place of the impressed and expressed species. But,
as we have observed, this statement is to be accepted in accordance
with our imperfect mode of understanding and speech; for the
species substitutes for the object, and the Deity, strictly speaking,
does not function as its substitute. It is, however, truer to say that
the vicarious similitude of the object is neither necessary nor even
possible when the object is present not only as actually intelligible,
no Summa theol., la, q.3, a.4.
m Ibid., la, q.3, a.4 ad 311m.
Hz II Pet. 1:4.

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but as actually understood. Thus God is clearly seen, inasmuch as
He Himself alone is His intellection and Himself as understood.
SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

Aureolus objected to the aforesaid reasons, and said that all are
at fault since they do not distinguish between the species as an en­
tity and the species as a representation. But, although the species
as an entity is but a finite accident, why as a representation could
it not intentionally manifest God’s essence as it really is? In fact,
the species of the stone, although it is an accident, represents the
substance of the stone; likewise the species of the angel represents
the substance of the angel.
In reply to this we say with Cajetan that it is a question of the
species formally as such, namely, according to its intentional or
representative existence, but not materially, according to its entitative existence. It is for this reason that St. Thomas calls it a
similitude. Therefore it is correctly affirmed in the first reason that
a thing of the higher order (for example, the angelic nature) can­
not be seen as it really is by a species or similitude of a lower order
(for example, by an idea abstracted from sensible things). Hence the
infused created species, which is not of the same degree of im­
materiality or of actuality in intelligible being as the Deity itself,
cannot be represented as it really is by such species.
The affirmation in the second reason is likewise correct, when it
is stated that the divine essence is its existence, not only in the
entitative order but also in the intelligible order, for it is only
God who is His intellection and Himself as understood. But no
created similitude, however perfect it may be, is its own intellec­
tion; but every similitude is intelligible by limited participation.
Only God is His own subsistent intellection, an eternally existing,
so to speak, intellectual flash. Therefore no infused created simili­
tude can be God either entitatively or intelligibly. By the beatific
vision, however, the intellect of the blessed in a certain way, namely,
intentionally, becomes God, as Cajetan says, and it cannot become
so by any created species.
This means to say that there is no distinction between the real
and the ideal order in the Deity. Only in God are these two orders
identical, since He alone is pure act both entitatively and intel­
lectually. But the purpose of Hegel’s idealism was to identify these
two orders, inasmuch as he said that “everything intelligible is
real,” which is panlogism. In truth, this identification is to be
found only in God, not in possible things that are known only as

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THE ONE GOD

possible in God without actually existing as realities, and not in
existing creatures, which truly are actually existing realities, though
they are not their own intellection, nor themselves understood.
Thus the essence of a stone or of wood is only potentially intel­
ligible in itself, and the essence of the angel is indeed actually
intelligible in itself, yet it is not of itself actually understood; it
alone is its substantial intellection and itself understood.
Wherefore St. Thomas rejects St. Anselm’s argument, saying:
“God is His own existence. Now because we do not know the es­
sence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us, but needs to
be demonstrated by things that are more known to us though less
known in their nature, namely, by effects.”1·13 On the contrary,
the blessed, in knowing God’s essence, see that God necessarily and
actively exists. We see a priori only this, namely, that, if God
exists, He is self-existent; but the blessed see that God necessarily
exists, and that the denial of His actual existence would be the
denial of the Deity itself. Hence the proposition “God is,” is selfevident to them since the transition from ideal being to real being
is unwarranted.
Therefore the aforesaid Thomistic refutation of St. Anselm’s
argument is worthless if we admit the presence of a created species
in the beatific vision. For St. Thomas holds that if one were to
admit the presence of this created species, God would, indeed, be
known as in fact actually existing, just as the archangel Michael
clearly seen would be known as actually existing, but by this species
it would not be known that God necessarily and actually exists. St.
Thomas holds that, for this proposition to be self-evident to us,
our intellect must have immediate knowledge of the Deity without
the intervention of a created species. In other words, all that the
created species would represent to us would be either that God is
self-existent if He exists, or that God in fact exists, but not that
God is actually self-existent.
As Cajetan remarks,144 the expressed species is excluded for the
same reason. For just as the impressed species acts as the means by
which, namely, as the principle determining the intellect to elicit
the act of understanding some particular object, so the expressed
species or the mental word is that in which we understand the
nature of the thing understood. Because of the reasons just given,
no created species can thus represent the self-subsisting Intellection
as it really is; for every created species is intelligible by participa­
tion, and the difference between it and the self-subsistent intellec­
tion is far greater than that between the sun and its ray; and just
143Summa theol., la, q.2, a.i.
1« Com. in lam, q.2, a.i, no. 13.

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347

as he who would see only the sun’s ray would not see the sun it­
self, so he who would see only that which is expressed in the
highest infused species, would not in the strict sense see God.
Corollary. Wherefore it is commonly held that the extraordinary
intellectual visions of the most Holy Trinity still pertain to the
order of faith; for they do not give intrinsic evidence of the mystery
of the Trinity, and it is not sufficiently clear that God would cease
to be such if He were not the triune God. On the contrary, this
would be made manifest if one were to receive the beatific vision
by way of a transient act, which St. Augustine and St. Thomas be­
lieved that St. Paul received when rapt in ecstasy.
All that is expressed by these above-mentioned intellectual visions
of the most Holy Trinity is the idea of the fittingness of this mys­
tery, inasmuch as, for instance, good is essentially diffusive of
itself; and the higher the nature, the more intimate and more
complete is this self-diffusiveness, so that the Father communicates
to the Son and to the Holy Spirit the whole of His nature without
any division or multiplication of the same.
Suarez proposes another objection. It is his opinion that, just as
there can be a similitude on the part of the seer, namely, the light
of glory, reinforcing the intellect, so also there can be a similitude
on the part of the object seen, consisting in the expressed word.
We reply with John of St. Thomas that the light reinforcing the
intellect of the seer is a similitude by way of a tendency, and that
which tends is not actually that toward which it tends; whereas,
contrary to this, the objective species must actually have the form
of the thing represented; in fact, it must be in its representative
existence, the object itself. Therefore, to represent the object as
this really is, it must be of the same order of immateriality and of
the same actuality in the intelligible order. For this reason, as
already stated, the species abstracted from sensible things cannot
manifest the angel as he really is, nor can the created species rep­
resent the Deity as it really is. Thus the negative conclusion is es­
tablished, namely, that there can be neither an impressed nor an
expressed species in the beatific vision, because the created species,
however perfect it may be, cannot represent God or the self-sub­
sisting Intellection as He really is.
First doubt. Does the divine essence take the place of the im­
pressed and expressed species in the divine essence?
The Thomists reply in the affirmative, although this is but an
imperfect way of expressing it, and is not strictly applicable. For,
if we take care to note that the species substitutes for the object,
then the Deity cannot properly be said to take the place of this
substitute. But the theologians speak in this way according to the

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THE ONE GOD

imperfect manner of our intellectual perception, just as we speak
of God’s relation to creatures, which is not a real but a logical
relation.
This commonly held opinion among the Thomists is equivalently
expressed in many passages of St. Thomas’ works. Thus, in this
question he says: “When any created intellect sees the essence of
God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the
intellect.” 145 Similarly he says: “The divine essence must be united
to the created intellect as an intelligible species,” 140 so, then, in­
stead of the impressed species. In this article, however, he says:
“The divine essence is united to the created intellect, as the ob­
ject actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of
itself.” 147 This means instead of the expressed species. The reasons
for this assertion are those given in the body of the article to show
that God cannot be seen as He really is by a created species.
Moreover, it must be noted that several doctors, who see no
repugnance in admitting a created species for the beatific vision,
yet maintain that de facto it is not present, because it is super­
fluous. And it is thus proved to be superfluous for both the im­
pressed and the expressed species.
1) The impressed species is required either when the object is
absent, or when it is not directly present to the intellect or is not
sufficiently intelligible because of its immateriality. But the object
of the beatific vision, namely, God, essentially exists, is already in­
timately present to any created intellect whatever, as preserving it
in being, and is the maximum in intelligibility, because it is the
maximum in immateriality. Therefore at least the impressed species
is superfluous. It suffices that the created intellect be elevated and
strengthened by the light of glory to see God’s essence, which is
already intimately present to it as preserving it in being. Just as
the bat cannot see the sun, so in our present state we cannot see
God because of His dazzling brilliance. We have a confirmation
of this in the angel, who intuitively sees his own essence without
an impressed species, for the reason that his essence exists, is in
him, and is of itself actually intelligible.
2) The expressed species is required so that the object may be
actually understood and be present in the intellect in its representa­
tive form. But the divine essence is most pure act in the intel­
ligible order, i.e., it is not only actually intelligible, but actually
understood, and, as St. Thomas says, “is united to the created in­
tellect, as the object actually understood making the intellect in
1« Cf. a.5.
i«e Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 53.
Cf. ad 311m.

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349

act by and of itself.” 148 It is also intimately present in it. There­
fore the expressed species is at least superfluous. Thus there will
be an immediate and complete transforming union; and so it is
apparent that the inchoate union of which the mystics speak, ac­
companied by the ardent desire for the beatific vision, is the nor­
mal way that leads to eternal life.
But Suarez objects that there must be a created species, because
there must be a terminus assigned to the vision produced by it.
In reply to this the Thomists say that the concept of an immanent
act does not include that it should produce its effect, although this
may often be the case. But the beatific vision is an immanent act.
Therefore it is not of the essence of the beatific vision that it
should produce its effect. This reply has its foundation in the dis­
tinction between immanent and transitive actions. The transitive
action, indeed, which properly belongs to the category of action,
of which passion is the counterpart, is for the perfection of the
patient, and thus it necessarily produces the terminus as its effect.
Contrary to this, the immanent action is for the perfection of the
agent in which it remains, and it formally belongs to the category
of quality, not of action.
Therefore, when we contemplate the nature of anything already
expressed in the word, this is purely intellection and is no longer
a case of the utterance or production of the word. Similarly, in the
Trinity the three Persons understand by one and the same essential
intellection; only the Father utters, or generates the Word. Hence
the created accidental word is at least superfluous in the beatific
vision. The beatific vision terminates in the uncreated substantial
Word, and thus the blessed are said to see all things in the Word.
Not only is the created accidental word superfluous, but, as we
have stated, it is also repugnant. For, if there can be no impressed
species of such perfection and immateriality as to represent God as
He really is, then a fortiori there can be no created expressed
species, since this must be more perfect than the impressed species,
for in the expressed species the object must be present not only
as actually intelligible, but as actually understood.
Second doubt. How can the divine essence, without denoting
imperfection, take the place of the impressed and expressed species?
The difficulty is that this seems to imply imperfection, and for
two reasons, (i) For the created intellect must oe informed by the
impressed species so as to enable it to elicit the determinate act
of seeing such object. But the divine essence cannot be the inform­
ing form, since thus the divine essence would form a compound
with the other, as being a part; and the part is less perfect than the
ws cf. ibid.

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THE ONE GOD

whole. (2) Because if the divine essence were to contribute to this
act of seeing as the impressed species, then it would be subordinated
to the created intellective faculty, from which this very act derives
its being and vitality. Moreover, if the divine essence were to take
the place of the impressed species, it would be of the nature of a
first act, which is less perfect than the second act.
In reply to this first difficulty we say with Cajetan and John of
St. Thomas that the species, taken not in its material sense as an
inhering accident, but formally as a species, or as a similitude of
the object, does not inform the intellect by inhering in it, does
not inform the intellective faculty by constituting with it some
third entity in the physical order; but this species informs the
faculty objectively, so that the faculty becomes intentionally the
object itself in first actuality. For as Aristotle says: “The soul is in
a sense all things,” 149 which means that the knower is in a sense
the thing known, or what is other than itself. Hence Averroes was
right in furthermore remarking that “a greater unity is effected be­
tween the knower and the known than between matter and form”;
for matter is not form, but receives this as its own, and constitutes
with it a third entity, namely, a composite, which is more perfect
than its essential parts. On the other hand, the knower is inten­
tionally the thing known, or is the form of the thing known, for
it does not receive this form as its own but as the form of the
other, as will be stated farther on.150 Therefore the divine essence
can function as the impressed species. To do so it does not have to
inform the created intellect entitatively, constituting with it a
third entity or a composite. All that is needed is for it to draw
the created intellect into a participation of its intelligible being,
and thus its function is not to inform but to terminate, somewhat
as in the substantial order the incarnate Word terminates the
human nature of Christ, which it does not inform. For just as in
the incarnation the Word does not constitute with the human na­
ture a third entity or a more perfect compound; that is, just as
the Word is not a part of any composite and hence something less
perfect, so the clear vision of God’s essence does not constitute a
third entity or compound with the created intellect, but only ter­
minates it and by so doing gives it the greatest of perfection with­
out being itself perfected. Just as the human nature in Christ is
drawn into a close union with the divine being, so in the beatific
vision the created intellect is attracted to the divine object.
We detect another remote analogy to this union inasmuch as
number is terminated by the last unit, or inasmuch as two lines
ns De anima, Bk. Ill, chap. 8.
iso Summa theol., la, q.14, a.i.

THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

35t

mutually terminate in the apex of the triangle. Cajetan remarks:
“We must preserve intact the principle that God is by nature prior
to the intellect when it sees God, and yet it is not that the intellect
knows God intentionally and afterward sees Him.”151 What he
means is this: The intellect must of necessity be God intentionally
but not indeed entitatively, just as the knower is the thing known
in first actuality, before it is known in second actuality. Such is
the common opinion among the Thomists. This is the complete
transforming union.152
Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis), as Billuart observes,153 does not
admit that the intellect is God intentionally in the order of intel­
ligible being; his contention is that the union of the object with
the intellect results in a third entity distinct from each. But this
opinion of Francis Silvester seems to be not so profound a view,
and to be less in agreement with the teaching of Aristotle and St.
Thomas. Moreover, it does not appear to be a sufficient answer to
the objection.
Cajetan seems to give a more profound explanation of the in­
timate union of the created intellect with God clearly seen in the
intelligible order, without any pantheistic confusion resulting there­
from, since he appeals to the infinite distinction between the two
in the entitative order. In fact, this infinite distinction persists be­
tween the two natures that are most intimately united in the one
Person of Christ.
Nevertheless, as we stated in the commentary on the first article,
as reason cannot prove conclusively the possibility of the Incarna­
tion, so it cannot prove the possibility of the beatific vision. This
means that it cannot be conclusively proved by reason that no im­
perfection is implied for the divine essence to perfect the created
intellect by actually terminating it. We are indeed most profoundly
persuaded of this, but it cannot be conclusively proved. For the
supernatural mysteries are neither proved nor disproved, but they
are defended; and there are solid grounds persuading us of their
fitness, and either their existence or their possibility is firmly held
by faith, which is essentially supernatural. What is essentially super­
natural is supernaturally knowable, because truth and being are
convertible. This point was not so clearly presented in the first
article of this question.
isi Com. in lam, q.12, a.2, no. 15.
i52Thus we have absolute confirmation of the thesis that the spiritual mar­
riage or the inchoated transforming union is in this life the culmination of the
normal way leading to eternal life, and that it likewise includes an ardent desire
of seeing God's essence. Evidently this ardent desire is a prerequisite for this
vision, either here on earth or in purgatory.
153 Art. VII, Solv. obj.

THE ONE GOD

S52

As to this second difficulty, however, it must be said that the
impressed species concurs with the faculty in the eliciting of the
act, but it is not subordinated to the faculty, because it is not re­
lated to the faculty as an inferior instrument to the principal cause,
but the purpose of this species is to give greater perfection to the
faculty and determine it to elicit its act; hence it is truer to say
that the species subordinates the faculty to itself. Thus the divine
essence can take the place of the impressed species.
Finally, in this process the divine essence is not of the nature
of a first actuality, which is less perfect than the second actuality,
for it concurs as the principle by means of which the vision is ef­
fected, to the exclusion of all imperfections, as Cajetan observes. It
constitutes, indeed, the created intellect in first actuality, but it is
not itself of the nature of a first actuality. In other words, the pure
act supplies the formality of the impressed species, but not its po­
tentiality, because it supplies to the exclusion of all imperfections.
Hence it is not subordinated either to the created intellect or to
the created intellection.
Contrary to this, the divine essence can in no way take the place
of the light of glory, because this latter functions on the part of
the intellective faculty, informing it and constituting with it a
third entity, or a composite that is more perfect than its parts. Un­
justifiable, therefore, was the assertion of some, such as Master
Francis of Good Hope and John of Ripa, who said that the blessed
see God by His uncreated vision that is communicated to them.
This cannot be, because the beatific vision is a vital act, and every
vital act comes essentially from an intrinsic principle of the living
being.
Thus we have sufficiently explained why there can be no created
species in the beatific vision, and why the divine essence takes the
place of both the impressed and the expressed species.

THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD CAN BE SEEN
WITH BODILY EYES

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to explain cer­
tain metaphorical expressions of Holy Scripture, such as: “In my flesh
I shall see . . . God.” 154 It was formerly said by some Catholics
that God can be seen not by the bodily eye, but by the spiritualized
10« Job 19: 26.

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353

eye in its glorified state. So said Master Francis of Good Hope.
Valentia considered this a probable opinion.
St. Thomas replies to this as follows: "It is impossible for God
to be seen by the sense of sight or by any other faculty of the sensi­
tive power." This opinion thus formulated by St. Thomas is the
common one.
Although this conclusion is not explicitly defined to be of faith,
yet it is a most certain truth; for its contradictory irrtplies an error
that is repugnant to the faith since it means that God is corporeal.
There is foundation for this in several passages of Holy Scripture.
Thus we read that “God inhabiteth light inaccessible, whom no man
hath seen nor can see.” 165 Thus God is declared to be “invisible.” 150
Also we have: “No man hath seen God at any time.” 157
The argument from reason is as follows: The act of any sensitive
faculty, since it is the act of a corporeal organ, cannot go beyond
corporeal things; but God is incorporeal; therefore He cannot be
seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.
Hence when Holy Scripture says that God is seen, this means that
He is seen by the eye of the mind, but not of the body.158
Reply to second objection. If it is stated that we see the life of
another living person, this is because life is accidentally sensible,
and the object of sense perception is apprehended by the intellect
immediately on its being presented. Hence St. Thomas says at the
end of this reply: “But that the divine presence is known by the
intellect immediately on the sight of corporeal things and through
them, happens from two causes, namely, from the perspicacity of
the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused
into the body after its renovation.”
Reply to third objection. “The essence of God is not seen in a
vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form
representing God according to some mode of similitude.”
In fact, it is impossible for the sensitive faculty to be elevated to
see God, for it is impossible for any faculty to be referred to what
is beyond the scope or extent of its adequate object. But God,
since He is a pure spirit, is not included within the scope and ex­
tent of the adequate object of the sensitive faculty, for this object
is something corporeal and sensible, such as color, sound, smell.
To deny this is to confound the sensitive faculty with the intel­
lective. If the created intellect can be elevated to see God, this is
I Tim. 6: 16.
i«e Ibid., 1: 17.
157 John 1: 18.
i68 Cf. ad mm.

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THE ONE GOD

because God, although He transcends its proportionate object
(which for our intellect is the essence of material things), does not
transcend its adequate object, which is being according to all that
is implied by the term. The Deity is eminently and formally being,
and being in all its purity exists only in the Deity, and cannot be
seen without the Deity itself being seen.
From this it is clear that there is a vast difference between in­
tellect and sense. And thus it is evident that the more material a
faculty is the more restricted is its range, because it is limited by
matter. It is only the intellect, at least as such if not as human,
which by reason of its absolute immateriality can be directed to
intelligible being of any kind. We are at least persuaded of this,
and it cannot be disproved.
Objection. Natural water in baptism, spiritually elevated as it is,
produces grace. Therefore the sense of sight can in like manner be
raised to see God.
Reply. There is no comparison. For water is merely the efficient
instrument, which acts through the power transmitted to it by the
principal agent, who is God. On the contrary, sight is the vital
and principal cause of seeing, and the faculty elicits the act of see­
ing by its own power. Hence its act cannot go beyond the scope
of its adequate object.
Nor can the bodily eye see God by a spiritual vision that is im­
parted to it, because seeing, since it is a vital act, must of necessity
come from an intrinsic principle. But spiritual sight is intellection,
and this cannot proceed from the eye as from an intrinsic principle.
Hence this intellectual sight would be a sort of extrinsic addition,
and the eye itself would not see by it; for the corporeal eye can
no more understand than can a stone or a piece of wood.
Final objection. There is a greater difference between the angel
and God than between the corporeal eye and the angel. But the
angel can see God supernaturally. Therefore the corporeal eye can
see the pure spirit supernaturally.
Reply. I distinguish the major. That there is a greater difference
entitatively between the angel and God than between the corporeal
eye and the angel, this I concede; that the difference is greater ob­
jectively, this I deny; or, in the order of being, I concede the major;
in the cognitive order, I deny the major; for, since God is true
and intelligible being, He is included in the adequate object of
both the angelic and the human intellects. But the angel, being
immaterial, cannot be included in the object of sense percep­
tion.169
169 Cf. ad mm et ad 311m.

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355

FOURTH ARTICLE

WHETHER ANY CREATED INTELLECT BY ITS NATURAL POWERS
CAN SEE THE DIVINE ESSENCE

State of the question. In the title “by its natural powers” denotes
the sufficient cause. But nature is the radical and essential principle
of operation. Therefore the question concerns the possibility of the
created intellect’s seeing God by its real and natural power, with­
out being supernaturally elevated for this end. It is supposed from
the first article that the created intellect can be raised to see the
divine essence.
The principal difficulty is declared in the beginning of the article
in the third objection, which is as follows: corporeal sense cannot
be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, because such
understanding is above its nature. Therefore, if to see the essence
of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that
no created intellect can be elevated for this vision.
The answer is: It is impossible for any created intellect to see
the essence of God, unless the intellect is supernaturally elevated
for the vision.
i) This conclusion is de fide, and is defined as such in the Coun­
cil of Vienne, in which the following proposition of the Beghards
was condemned: “The soul does not need the light of glory elevat­
ing it to see God and enjoy Him in this blessed state.” 180 This
was, indeed, already implicitly defined against the Pelagians and
Semipelagians, against whom the Church on several occasions as­
serted than man cannot by his natural powers merit eternal life,
which is supernatural.161
The same was declared against Baius.162 Likewise the Vatican
Council declared: “If anyone shall say that man cannot be raised
by divine power to a higher than natural knowledge and perfec­
tion, but can and should, by a continuous progress, attain at length
of himself to the possession of all that is true and good; let him
be anathema.” 103 The Council also says: “There is a twofold order
of knowledge, distinct both in principle and in object ... ; in
object because, besides those things to which natural reason can
attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries hidden in God,
which, unless divinely revealed, cannot be known. . . . For the
io» Denz., no. 475.
iei Ibid., nos. 176-200.
ιβζ Ibid., no. 1021.
les Ibid., no. 1808.

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THE ONE GOD

divine mysteries by their own nature so far transcend the created
intelligence that, even when delivered by revelation and received
by faith, they remain covered with a veil of faith itself, and
shrouded in a certain degree of darkness, so long as we are pilgrims
in this mortal life, not yet with God.”181
From this definition it is clear that the supernatural mysteries
transcend the created intellect, not only because of God’s free de­
cree, but by their very nature; that is, they are essentially super­
natural, and not only de facto supernatural. But the contrary would
be the case if God could give the light of glory to the created in­
tellect as a natural property.
The following condemned proposition of Rosmini must also be
noted: “God is the object of the beatific vision inasmuch as He
is the author of ad extra works.” 185 The ontologists likewise were
condemned, because they did not sufficiently maintain the distinc­
tion between the two orders, for they said: “The immediate and
at least habitual knowledge of God is so essential to the human
intellect, that without it nothing can be known.” 188
This truth of the faith is equivalently expressed, although not
so clearly, in several texts of Holy Scripture. Thus we read: “No
one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth anyone know the
Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal
Him.” 187 But if the created intellect by its natural powers could
see God’s essence, it could also see His paternity and filiation, which
are not really distinct from it. St. Paul also says: "Eye hath not seen,
nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what
things God hath prepared for them that love Him.” 188 In like man­
ner he says: “The grace of God, life everlasting.” 188 But eternal life
is the vision itself of God in accordance with the following text:
"This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true
God." 170 The Greek and Latin Fathers, commenting on the afore­
said texts of Holy Scripture, on several occasions affirmed the im­
possibility of any creature's seeing God by its natural powers.171
2) Proof from reason. A careful reading of the argumentative
part of this article of St. Thomas enables us to distinguish with
Cajetan five consequences. But his argument can be expressed more
104 Ibid., nos. 1795 f.
165 Ibid., no. 1928.
166 Ibid., no. 1659.
167 Matt. 11: 27.
168 I Cor. 2: 9.
169 Rom. 6: 23.
170 John 17: 3.
171 Cf. Rouet de Journel, Enchiridion patristicum, no. 105; also nos. 236, 451 f.,
*747 *93» 986, 1075» 1106, 1123, 1126, 1161, 2150.

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357

simply by the following syllogism: Since the norm for knowledge
is that it be according as the thing known is in the knower, accord­
ing to the mode of immateriality of the nature of the knower, then
the object whose mode of immateriality exceeds the mode of im­
materiality of the nature of the created intellect cannot be nat­
urally known as it really is by this intellect; but God is such an
object; therefore God cannot be naturally known as He really is
by the created intellect, but only as it is elevated by grace.
The major has its foundation in the principle that knowledge
is according as the thing known is present immaterially in the
knower, according to the nature of the knower. But the more im­
material a cognitive faculty is the more universal is its knowledge.172
This is evident by inductive reasoning in the cases of sensation and
intellection. Whereas plants, because of their materiality, do not
know, color is known by the sense of sight inasmuch as the simili­
tude of color is in some way immaterially present in the sense of
sight;178 for, as Aristotle says, the sense is cognitive because it is
capable of receiving species separated from matter.174 But the in­
tellect is all the more cognitive, because it is more separated from
matter. Thus it knows not only sensible qualities, but the nature
of sensible things. Hence the object, whose mode of immateriality
exceeds the immaterial mode of the nature of the knower, cannot
be known as this really is by it. Thus it is natural for our intellect,
united as it is with the body, to see intelligible things only in the
mirror of sensible things.
The minor is proved, because God is not only absolutely im­
material, but is His own existence, that is, He is pure act both in
the existential and in the intellectual orders, is the self-subsisting
Being. This will be more clearly explained in a subsequent
article.175 On the other hand, our intellect, although immaterial,
is directly united to the body, because it is the lowest type of in­
tellect, whose proportionate object is the least in the intelligible
order, namely, the intelligible being of sensible things, and for
this knowledge it has need of the senses. Thus, as will be more
clearly stated farther on,17® it is because of its debility that our in­
tellect needs the aid of the senses.
But it is the merely immaterial essence of the angel, which is not
his existence, that constitutes the proportionate object of the angelic
172 Cf. Summa theol., la, q.14, a. 1.
173 However, the soul of the irrational anima) and its sensitive faculties, al­
though they are not its body, intrinsically depend on the body, and the visual
faculty depends on its organ of sight.
774 Cf. De anima, Bk. Il, chap. 12; Bk. Ill, chaps. 4, 8.
773 Summa theol., la, q.14, a. 1.
170 Ibid., q.76, a.5.

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358

intellect. Therefore the mode of immateriality of the created and
creatable intellect is a mode of essence that is not its own existence
or its own intellection. Only God is in the highest degree of im­
materiality, and He thus absolutely transcends the mode of im­
materiality of any created intellect whatever. Hence God cannot be
naturally known by the intellect as He really is.
The doctrine of this article may be expressed as follows: the
object of the intellect is being, and the intellect is predicated
analogically of the created intellect and of the uncreated intellect,
just as being is so predicated of created being and of the uncreated
being. Thus we may write:

Intellect -

divine;
angelic;
human;

its proper object:
its proper object:
its proper object:

divine essence
angelic essence
essence of ma­
terial drings

being

This means that the proper object of our intellect is the essence
of material things. Thus it knows spiritual things in the mirror
of sensible things. However, its correspondingly adequate object,
not as it is strictly a human intellect, but as it is an intellect, is
being in the widest sense of the term. This point will become in­
creasingly evident from the explanation of the reply to the third
objection.
Objection. Absolute immateriality does not admit of different
degrees; but every intellect, even the human intellect, is as such
absolutely immaterial; therefore there is no foundation for the
above assertion.
Reply. That the exclusion of matter does not admit of different
degrees, this I concede; that there are not different degrees of im­
materiality with reference to pure act, this I deny. Thus all the
degrees of certitude exclude the fear of error, and yet there is cer­
tainly a distinction between these degrees as regards the firmness of
assent, according as they are immediately referred back to first
principles, that is, according as they are either without or with the
intermediary of the senses and the testimony of men. Thus there
is a distinction between metaphysical, physical, and moral certi­
tudes.
Reply to first objection. The angel has a natural knowledge of
God as mirrored in his essence; but he has not immediate knowl­
edge of God as He really is.
Reply to second objection. Thus the angel, although he is a pure
spirit, is most defective compared with God, because he is not
his own existence.

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359

THE ADEQUATE OBJECT OF OUR INTELLECT

The reply to the third objection solves the principal difficulty
already presented in the beginning of the article, for it states: "The
sense of sight, as being altogether material (being intrinsically de­
pendent on the organism), cannot be raised up to immateriality.
But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated
above matter (since it is not intrinsically dependent on a corporeal
organism), can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level
by grace.” This means that it can be elevated to know any intel­
ligible being whatever, even the highest. At least this cannot be
disproved. In fact, there is proof of the possibility of this elevation,
and this proof confirms what was said in the first article concern­
ing the natural and inefficacious desire of seeing the essence of
God.
St. Thomas says in this same reply: “The proof is, that the
created intellect, although it naturally knows the concrete in any
nature, still is able to separate that existence by its intellect, since
it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is an­
other. . . . (This proves) that it can by grace be raised up to know
separate subsisting substance (as this really is).”
In other words, our intellect not only knows the nature of sensi­
ble things, and spiritual things in the mirror of sensible things, but
it knows being itself as such. Therefore we can distinguish between
its proper object, which is the essence of material things, and its
adequate and extensive object, which is being in the widest sense
of the term.
But God clearly seen comes under being in the widest sense of
the term, because being in the most pure state of pure act is found
only in the Deity, and cannot be seen in this most pure state, with­
out the Deity itself being seen, in which it is found formally and
eminently.
But it must be observed that sometimes the formulation of this
adequate object of the human intellect is inexact; this object ap­
plies to it, not strictly as it is a human intellect, but as it is an
intellect. This adequate object is not only being as such, which is
the object of metaphysics; for metaphysics is still a human science,
which knows its object in the mirror of sensible things. If the ade­
quate object of our intellect were nothing else, then the possibility
of metaphysics would be all that could be proved from this against
positivism and Kantianism.
Indeed, the adequate object of our intellect is being in the widest
sense of the term (a commonly accepted expression); so that noth­

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THE ONE GOD

ing transcends it, which means that it includes the triune God as
He really is, or as He is clearly seen. We cannot, of course, prove
conclusively by reason alone that this is the adequate object of our
intellect; but it cannot be disproved. In fact, we are persuaded that
it is not repugnant for our intellect to be informed by any intel­
ligible being, however perfect it may be, inasmuch as our intellect
is absolutely immaterial, or is intrinsically independent of the
organ of sight.1” As St. Thomas says: ‘‘The soul is naturally capa­
ble of grace since, from its having been made to the likeness of
God, it is fit to receive God by grace.” 178 But the soul is made to
God’s image, inasmuch as it is made like to Him not only in exist­
ence and life, but also in intelligence. This means that it is ab­
solutely immaterial or intrinsically independent of the body.179 On
the other hand, although the soul of the irrational animal has that
measure of immateriality required for sensitive knowledge,180 yet
it is intrinsically dependent on the body and perishes with it; for
it is then reduced to the potentiality of the matter in which it was
first potentially. But the rational soul was not in the potentiality
of matter, for it is created by God, and is intrinsically independent of
the body in becoming, in being, and in operation. And the proof
of this is that its intellect can be informed by any intelligible being
whatever, even the most perfect.181
This means that the passive capacity of our intellect is greater
than its active power; neither of itself is it limited to some order
of intelligible beings; whereas, on the contrary, its active power ex­
tends only to what is knowable from sensible things. Indeed, every
creature can receive from God more than it can effect; hence it is
not surprising that there should be in our nature a passive capacity,
and that there is nothing of repugnance for this nature to be
raised to the knowledge of the most perfect intelligible being that
transcends the mirror of creatures. This capacity for being elevated
is called an obediential capacity.182
Hence it is only in a spiritual way, as transcending everything
material, that the intelligible object, however perfect it may be,
177 This has been more fully explained by us elsewhere. Cf. De revelatione, I,
380-84.
1rs Summa theol., la Ilae, q.113, a. 10.
170 Ibid., la, q.3, a.2.
iso Ibid., q. 14, a. 1.
isi See John of St. Thomas, Com. in lam, q. 12, disp. XII, a.2, nos. 9, 10, 12;
also disp. XIV, a.2, nos. 11, 21; a.6, no. 6. Consult also his Cursus phil., de anima,
q.X, a.3.
182 And as its name "obediential” indicates, its immediate reference is not to
the essentially supernatural object to be known, but to the supreme agent whom
it obeys, and from whom it gratuitously receives the positive direction both as to
the eliciting of the supernatural act and as to the object of inis act.

THE KNOWAB1I ΓΓΥ OF COD

361

informs the intellective faculty. Consequently this does hot appear
to be beyond the elevatable or obediential capacity of our nature.
Thus we are persuaded of the existence of this obediential or
elevatable capacity for the beatific vision. However, as the Thomists
generally admit,183 this argument is not conclusive, but only very
probable and indeed most profound in this order. Neither can the
possibility of the light of glory be proved solely by the powers of
reasoning, because it is the possibility of what is essentially super­
natural, and hence of what is supernaturally knowable, inasmuch
as being and truth are convertible.
Therefore St. Thomas presents this argument only as a “sign,”
and he often distinguishes between the demonstrative argument
and the sign.184 The possibility of essentially supernatural mysteries
is neither proved nor disproved, but is defended, urged upon us,
and held firmly by faith.180
Doubt. Is it possible for God by His absolute power to create an
intellect that by its own natural powers can see God as He really
is? Further, can a supernatural substance be created, such that the
light of glory would be connatural to it, as a property of its nature?
The theologians, especially the Thomists, generally answer in
the negative to each. As Gonet says, these two negative conclusions
are now commonly held "against Durandus, Molina, Ripalda,
Arriaga . . . whose opinion Vasquez calls absurd, Nazarius looks
upon as temerarious, and Bannez as extraordinary ignorance.” 188
Scotus and the Nominalists prior to Molina had defended a
similar opinion, denying the absolute necessity of the light of glory
so as to see God.187
Cajetan says that the condemnation of the Beghards in the Coun­
cil of Vienne makes this view of Scotus no longer tenable. He
writes: “Note well that this opinion of Scotus and his followers can
no longer be maintained; for the encyclical of Pope Clement V,
Ad nostrum, de haereticis, condemns as positively erroneous the
assertion of those who say that the soul does not need the light of
glory elevating it to see God. In this you perceive that the Church,
accepting the teaching of St. Thomas, definitely decided not only as
to the need of the light of glory, but as to the cause of this, since
the soul needs to be elevated for such vision, as stated in the en183 Cf. Salmanticenses, Com. in lam, q. 12, disp. I, dub. HI, §§ 2 and 3, nos. 44-47.
* Summa theol., Illa, q.55, a.5; la, q.32, a. 1 ad 2um.
s»
18S Consult St. Thomas’ commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, q.2, a.3,
in which it is shown that theology solves the objections against the mysteries,
either as being evidently false, or as not necessary, or as not convincing.
188 Clypeus thomisticus, tr. II, De possibilitate visionis Dei, disp. I, a.t, §3.
isr Cf. in III Sent., d. 14, q.t; ZF Sent., d.49, q.11; also 1 Sent., d.3, q.3, nos.
24-25·

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THE ONE GOD

cyclical.” 188 Gonet likewise contradicts Scotus on this point.188
According to the teaching of Scotus100 and the Nominalists, the
distinction between the natural order and the supernatural order of
sanctifying grace is not one of necessity, as resulting from the very
transcendence of God’s essence over every created intellect; but the
distinction is one of contingency, the result of God’s free decree
appointing angels and men in this state of wayfarers, such that they
have not the immediate vision of His essence. This distinction of
Scotus, however, is in harmony with his doctrine as formulated in
two of his theses; for he says that being is predicated univocally of
God and creatures, wherefore there is no essential and necessary
distinction between the natural and supernatural orders. He states
also that, since God’s will is higher than His intellect, the distinction
between the two orders is the result of God’s free decree. This con­
clusion is also in accordance with the principles of Nominalism,181
for the Nominalists maintain that the common name “humanity’’
designates a collection of men and not a necessary and immutable
nature.
But it is difficult to see how this merely contingent distinction
can be reconciled with the teaching of the Vatican Council, which
says: “The Catholic Church with one consent has also ever held
and does hold that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct
both in principle and in object: in principle, because our knowl­
edge in the one is by natural reason, and in the other by divine
faith; in object because, besides those things to which natural
reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries hidden
in God, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot be known. . . .
For the divine mysteries by their own nature [there is no mention
of any free divine decree] so far transcend the created intelligence
that, even when delivered by revelation and received by faith, they
remain covered with the veil of faith itself ... so long as we are
pilgrims in this mortal life, not yet with God." 182 Hence this su­
ies See his commentary on this article, no. g.
is8 Clypeus thomisticus, De gratia, disp. II, a.3: Whether habitual grace is
an essentially supernatural form. In this article he says: “The opinion of Scotus
is commonly rejected, because he does not distinguish between the intrinsically
supernatural, or as to its entity, and the extrinsically supernatural, or as to the
mode (of its production). It is also against the common opinion of the theologians,
who admit the existence of essentially supernatural beings; it is even against faith,
which also emphasizes the same.” Thus grace and the infused virtues are essen­
tially supernatural, whereas it is the natural life that is supernaturally restored
to a dead person.
100 In I Sent., d.3, q.3, nos. 24, 25.
iei Cf. Zigliara, Summa phil., Ontologia, Bk. II, chap. 1, a. 4: Dotes essentiarum
contra nominales.
i»2 Denz., nos. 1795-96.

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363

periority has its foundation not in the divine liberty, but in the
very transcendence of the divine nature. Thus, A. Vacant183 and
Scheeben 184 have not interpreted the above text from the Vatican
Council in favor of Scotus’ opinion.
OBJECTIONS OF SCOTUS 185

First objection. From the fact that the thing known is in the
knower according to the mode of the knower, it follows solely that
the knower cannot know naturally an object of a higher order except
in an inferior manner. But it does not follow that the knower is abso­
lutely incapable of knowing this object in a natural way. There­
fore a natural, confused, and finite knowledge of the Deity or of
God’s intimate life is perhaps possible.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that the knower can naturally
know an object of a higher order only in an inferior manner, that
is, as it is related to the formal object of the lower order, namely,
in some inferior image, this I concede; that it can naturally and
immediately know this object according to the formal concept of
the higher order, at least confusedly, this I deny. And I deny the
consequent. We naturally know God in the mirror of creatures,
according to the analogically common notions of being, good­
ness . . . , but not immediately according to the proper and inti­
mate notion of the Deity. Otherwise our knowledge would be
simultaneously according to two opposite modes of immateriality,
namely, according to the human and the divine modes. This su­
perior mode can be participated in only by the infusion of super­
natural light, which is a certain participation of the divine nature.
Indeed, to know God confusedly is to know God under the common
notion of being, and not under the most proper and most eminent
notion of the Deity. It was not in a formal but in a material sense
that Scotus understood the proposition of St. Thomas, that “the
thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the
knower,” that is, according to the mode of immateriality of the na­
ture of this knower. This principle, however, has its foundation
in the principle that the intelligent being differs from the nonintelligent being, since by reason of its immateriality it can be­
come something other than itself.188
Second objection. There is no need of proportion between the
i®3 Cf. Etudes sur la philosophie de saint Thomas et sur celle de Duns Scot
(1891), p. 14.
394 Cf. Dogmatik, De Deo, no. 278 f.
195 Cf. In IVam Sent., d.49, q. 11; also In lam. Sent., d.3, q.3, and Cajetan’s
replies In lam, q.12, a.4.
i" Cf. Summa theol., la, q. 14, a. 1.

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THE ONE GOD

intellect and its proper object. St. Thomas maintains, to be sure,
that for our intellect this object is of a lower order, as being the
essence of things material. But if there is no need of proportion,
then the proper object also of our intellect can be of a higher order.
Reply. There is no comparison, for our intellect by its natural
power can elevate an inferior material object to its own mode of
intelligibility; but it cannot in a natural way, or according to its
mode of operation, be elevated to the higher mode of operation
of the divine intellect.
Third objection. Then it follows that the angel of a lower order
could not by its own power know the angel of a higher order, which
is false.
Reply. Two angels are of the same order of immateriality; where­
fore the lower by its own power knows tire higher, but not so clearly
as the higher knows itself.
FIFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS ANY CREATED LIGHT IN ORDER
TO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD

State of the question. So far we know that the created intellect
can be raised to see God’s essence (a. 1) and that it cannot by its
natural powers attain to this (a. 4). It is now a question of the
necessity of the supernatural light of glory, which was already
affirmed somewhat incidentally in the second article. The nature of
this light must be determined. How does this necessity manifest
itself and what is its proper effect?
What is of faith concerning this? The necessity of the light of
glory is affirmed in the Council of Vienne, as is evident from the
condemnation of the following proposition: “The soul does not
need the light of glory elevating it to see God and enjoy Him in
this blessed state.” 187 Hence the Council affirms the light of glory
in the blessed not only as being an actual fact, but also as necessary
so that the soul may be raised to see God, and for this very reason
it declares that this light is supernatural; otherwise the soul would
not be raised to a higher order by this light. Yet even so, the
Council does not determine the degree of this necessity. It is at
least a necessity in accordance with God’s ordinary power, although
it may still be a disputed point whether this light is absolutely
necessary, so that even by God’s absolute and extraordinary power
the created intellect could not see God unless it were elevated by
means of this light. The Council, likewise, did not define that the
1er Denz., no. 475. This error is expressly refuted by Clement V in the fifteenth
ecumenical Council of Vienne.

THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

365

light of glory is a quality, an infused habit; but we must say of
it what was afterward declared by tire Council of Trent198 concern­
ing habitual grace, namely, that it is something created, infused
and inherent in the soul. St. Thomas says more, inasmuch as he
declares more explicitly that the light of glory is an infused quality
and an infused habit.
Billuart puts the following question to his readers: “You will
ask whether it is of faith that sanctifying grace is, in the strictly
philosophical sense, an infused quality and an infused habit? Not
in the strict sense, we reply; yet that it is so must be held as certain
doctrine.” 199 The same must be said of consummated and inamissible sanctifying grace, which is in the essence of the soul, and which
is the source of the light of glory for the intellect of the blessed,
just as it is of the infused light of faith for the intellect of way­
farers. Thus theology, in the common acceptation of the term,
explains still more precisely what is defined by the Church.
It must be observed that the Council of Vienne, in thus deter­
mining the necessity of the light of glory for the soul to be raised to
this higher order, presents more clearly the doctrine already formu­
lated against the Pelagians and Semipelagians in the Second Council
of Orange 200 concerning the necessity of grace, which is the seed
of glory.
THE VARIOUS OPINIONS OF THEOLOGIANS BEFORE AND
AFTER THE COUNCIL OF VIENNE

Notice must be taken of two opinions proposed before the time
of the Council, and conflicting with its decisions.
1) Opinion of Scotus. He understood the light of glory to be the
beatific vision in its second actuality, inasmuch as it is communi­
cated to us by God. This opinion is contrary to the teaching of the
Council, which declares “that the soul needs the light of glory
elevating it to see God.” Therefore the light of glory, since it is
necessary for the beatific vision, differs from this latter. Hence
Cajetan 201 says that, since tire time of the Council, this opinion
of Scotus is no longer tenable, which is also what Gonet says.202
John of St. Thomas says of Scotus’ opinion: “Its affirmation cannot
but be a very dangerous assertion.” 203
2) The opinion of Durandus. He, too, before the time of the
ifSDenz., nos. 799, 821.
100 cf. De gratia, diss. IV, a.3.
200 Denz., nos. 176-200.
201 Com. on this article, no. 9 f.
202 cf. De gratia, disp. II, a. 3.
203 See his commentary on this article.

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THE ONE GOD

Council, understood the light of glory to be the divine essence
itself, inasmuch as it immediately manifests itself to the intellect
and changes it in the order of intellection. This opinion, says John
of St. Thomas, is not in accord with the spirit of the Council; for
those condemned as heretics did not deny the necessity of the divine
essence manifesting itself as the object of vision, but they denied
the necessity of a light elevating the intellect so that it can be
united with the object.
3) Vasquez, who lived after the time of the Council, thinks the
light of glory, as a habit perfecting the intellect, to be superfluous.
Similarly, Molina and Suarez are of the opinion that, by God’s ab­
solute power, all that is required is an actual help, but no infused
habit elevating the soul. There is nothing surprising about this in
the teaching of Suarez, for he admitted an actual obediential power,
by which our nature would be positively and actively directed to
the performance of supernatural acts, although it would need the
divine assistance to pass into act. This active obediential power is
somewhat like the innate natural appetite for the beatific vision
admitted by Scotus, Suarez, and Molina, who conceive God elevat­
ing and our intellect more as two co-ordinated causes (like two
men pulling a boat) than as two causes subordinated one to the
other.204
4) The Thomists reject this actual obediential power, for they
say it would be both essentially natural, as being a property of the
nature, and essentially supernatural, as specified by a supernatural
object. Therefore they say along with St. Thomas that the obedien­
tial power is passive, and that its immediate reference is not to the
eliciting of a supernatural act, nor to the object of this act, but
to the agent of a higher order, that is, to God the author of grace,
whom it obeys, and from whom it receives the grace which has as
its purpose the attainment of glory. However, the obediential
power, which in itself is formally passive, also inheres in the active
faculty, namely, in the will; but then it is only materially active
because the will is its subject of inhesion.
This Thomist opinion agrees exactly with what St. Thomas
teaches in his various works in which he discusses the obediential
power, especially that which is required as a prerequisite for the
beatific vision. There is also a vast difference between this latter
and the obediential power required in bodies in which miracles
are to be performed, or in the water that is instrumental in the
soi Thus Suarez holds that the beatific vision is a naturally vital act. This means
that the essentially supernatural act of the beatific vision would consist of two
parts, namely, the naturally vital act and the supernatural superadded mode,
just as at times a thin coating of gold is superimposed on a common metal, and
then we have a gilt object but not one of solid gold.

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production of grace. But for St. Thomas every obediential power,
since it refers to God as agent and elevator, is a passive power. The
two following quotations suffice: “In the human soul, as in every
creature, there is a double passive power: one in comparison with
a natural agent; the other in comparison with the first agent, which
can reduce any creature to a higher act than a natural agent can
reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential power of a
creature.” 205Also: “In every creature there is a certain obediential
power, inasmuch as every creature obeys God so as to receive in
itself whatever God may have willed.” 208 But God’s will and om­
nipotence are limited only by what is repugnant to existence; hence
all that is required for the obediential power in a being, is that
it be not repugnant for such being to be raised to a higher order.
Thus there is an obediential power in our nature even for the
hypostatic union, to which our nature is not positively ordained.
Similarly there is an obediential power both in the disembodied
spirits and in the angels of heaven for a greater degree of the light
of glory, because the highest degree of this glory is inconceivable.
The light of glory could always be intensively increased, and yet
it would never attain to the comprehensive vision of God, for this
can apply to God alone.207 Therefore St. Thomas says that there is
no limit to the obediential power, for it corresponds to divine om­
nipotence, which is always able to produce still greater effects.208
HOW ST. THOMAS PROVES THE NECESSITY OF THE LIGHT OF GLORY

In the body of the article he shows that the light of glory is
necessary: (1) as a disposition preparing the intellect for union
with the divine essence; (2) as a power strengthening the intellect
to elicit this act of vision.
Proof of first requisite: Everything which is raised up to what
exceeds its nature, needs to be supernaturally disposed for this;
but the created intellect that sees God is so raised, and the divine
essence takes the place of its intelligible species; 200 therefore the
intellect needs to be disposed so as to see the divine essence.
Proof of second requisite: A power must be proportionate to the
act that is to be elicited by it, so that it can elicit this act; but the
natural power of the created intellect is intrinsically incapable, or
20s Summa theol., Illa, q.11, a.i; see also Illa, q.i, a.3 ad 311m; Com. theol.,
c. 104; De potentia, q.6, a. 1 ad i8um.
2oe Quacst. disp., de virt. in communi, a. 10 ad 131101.
207 See a. 7.
20s Summa theol., Illa, q.7» a. 12 ad 21101; q.10, a.4 ad 3um; De veritate,
q.20, a.4 ad 211m et sum.
209 See a. 2.

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THE ONE GOD

is not in proportion so as to elicit the supernatural act of seeing
God; therefore the intellect needs the reinforcement of a super­
natural light.
The following objection is raised against the first argument: if
the major were true, then a disposition would be necessary for the
reception of this infused disposition, and so on indefinitely.
In reply to this we say with Cajetan and John of St. Thomas,
that the reception of a form or perfection necessitates some dispo­
sition, of course, in the subject; but the disposition itself necessi­
tates no previous disposition. In other words, there is no such thing
as a disposition for a disposition; otherwise there would never be a
disposition in any order. Hence the major of St. Thomas must be
understood in the sense that there must be a first actuality or proxi­
mate potentiality in everything which is raised up to that which
exceeds its nature and by which it is disposed for this. Such is mani­
festly the case in material things, and it is verified in every order.
Thus the necessary prerequisite for wood to begin to burn is that
it acquire a certain degree of heat. Similarly, for the reception of a
substantial form (e.g., the sensitive soul, as also the intellective
soul), there must be a disposition for this as a necessary prerequisite.
In like manner, in the attainment of knowledge, the student
needs to be disposed so as to be able to listen to and profit by the
special lectures on metaphysics. It must be noted that the lack of
this requisite disposition for a form results in a monstrosity both in
the natural order and in the intellectual order. So it would be if,
through lack of this previous disposition, one were to understand
Thomism in the Calvinist sense.
Not only is the disposition required for the action of an agent,
but also for the proper reception of some exalted perfection, such as
the proper appreciation of one of Beethoven’s symphonies, or the
understanding of a difficult passage. So also the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost are required so as to dispose one to receive His in­
spirations.210 Hence it is not surprising that a special infused dis­
position is required for receiving the divine essence as an intelligible
form or impressed species.
For our intellectual faculty, which of itself is incapable either
of making use of this essence as intelligible form so as to see God,
or of receiving it without being elevated, must be proportioned to
it. And this functioning of the light of glory by way of a dispo­
sition is closely connected with the second and principal function
with which the second argument is concerned.
The probative force of the second argument is evident if we
consider that the operative power, which of itself and intrinsically
210 Summa theol., la Ilae, q.68, a.a.

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is incapable of any act, needs to be intrinsically elevated, strength­
ened, and perfected by the reception of some habit that is either
acquired or infused. It is this general principle that is invoked in
showing the necessity of habits, and it is quite clear that there is
no reference here to an acquired habit, because the object is of the
supernatural order. Therefore an infused virtue is meant, which
is commonly called the light of glory, since here we have a case of
analogy of proportionality; for this light is to the created intellect
as regards the beatific vision just as material light is to the eye as
regards its object of vision.
Hence, as is more clearly seen in the answer to the first objection,
the light of glory in the blessed is a permanent quality or a super­
natural infused habit inhering in the intellect, elevating and per­
fecting it so as to see God. But this habit is always in second
actuality, because the vision itself is permanent, and resides in the
intellect as charity does in the will, and this light does away with
the infused habit of faith. The principal function of this light is
to elevate the faculty to elicit the act of vision, and its secondary
function is to dispose the faculty to receive the divine essence as the
intelligible form. Yet it is not of faith that the light of glory is a
habit.
SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

The first series of objections denies the necessity of the light of
glory.
First objection. What is of itself lucid needs no other light in
order to be seen; but God is of Himself lucid, because He is light
itself; therefore no other light is needed in order to see Him.
Reply. What is of itself lucid needs no other light on its own
part in order to be seen, this I concede; on the part of the visual
faculty, this I deny. I contradistinguish the minor in the same
way.211
Second objection. A created light is not required even on the part
of the visual faculty, for God takes the place of the impressed
species; but the impressed species functions on the part of the visual
faculty; therefore, in like manner, God can take the place of the
light of glory.
Reply. I concede the major, but distinguish the minor. That the
species functions as a perfection actuating the faculty by way of
terminating it, this I concede; as informing form, this I deny. For
it takes the place of the object. On the other hand, the light that
strengthens the faculty belongs properly to the operative faculty,
211 Cf. ad turn.

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THE ONE GOD

as informing form, and God cannot take the place of the informing
form, which is essentially something participated and thus im­
perfect.
Third objection. But the divine concurrence suffices on the part
of the subject so as to render the intellect capable of seeing God;
therefore the intellect does not need to be strengthened by any
created light so as to see God.
Reply. If the beatific vision transcended the faculty merely in­
tensively in the natural order, then I concede the consequence. But
this vision is essentially supernatural. Hence this faculty, which of
itself is intrinsically incapable for such act, must be supernaturally
elevated so as to be made intrinsically capable in first actuality for
this vision.
SECOND SERIES OF OBJECTIONS, TO SHOW THAT THE LIGHT OF
GLORY IS SOMETHING REPUGNANT

First objection. If God is seen by means of a light, then He is
seen through a medium; but the beatific vision is absolutely direct;
therefore the light of glory is incompatible with this vision
Reply. I distinguish the major. If God is seen by means of a light,
then He is seen through an objective medium quo or in quo, this
I deny; that He is seen through a subjective medium sub quo, or
one that strengthens tire faculty, this I concede. The minor I con­
cede, and I distinguish the conclusion in the same way.212
Second objection. Even this subjective medium that strengthens
the faculty is something repugnant. For what is finite cannot dis­
pose one to see the infinite. But the light of glory is finite, since it
is created. Therefore it cannot dispose one to see God, who is in­
finite.
Reply. I distinguish the major. What is finite in the entitative
and natural order, this I concede; what is finite in the entitative
and supernatural order cannot dispose one to see the infinite, this
I subdistinguish: it cannot dispose one for an infinite or compre­
hensive knowledge of God, this I concede; that it cannot dispose
one for a finite knowledge of God, this I deny.213
Third objection. The light of glory is incompatible even with a
finite knowledge of God, for the power that perfects a vital faculty
must itself be vital; but the light of glory is not vital, because it
does not proceed from an intrinsic principle; therefore this light is
repugnant to the faculty.
Reply. I distinguish the major. The power that perfects a vital
212 Cf. ad sum.
2is cf. Contra Genies, Bk. Ill, chap. 54.

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faculty must itself be vital, as being that by which the act is a
vitally elicited act, this I concede; as being that which is vitally
produced by the created intellect, this I deny. Although the light
of glory is not vital as being what is produced by the intellective
faculty, yet it is vital as being that by which the elicited act of
vision is vital.
First doubt. How does the light of glory concur with the intellect
in the beatific vision?
Reply. Each concurs actively, as two total and subordinated
causes, but each under a different aspect. For the created intellect
and the light of glory are not two partial and coordinated causes,
such that the vitality of the beatific vision would be a natural
vitality, as Suarez would have it in accordance with his conception
of an active obediential power which, as we stated, almost dispenses
with the necessity of an elevation or of an elevating grace.214
The created intellect and the light of glory are indeed two total
and subordinated causes, such that the intellect is the total and
radical principle, and the infused habit of the light of glory is the
total and proximate principle by which the act of vision is elicited.
Hence the vitality of the beatific vision is essentially supernatural,
because it proceeds not from a purely natural faculty, but from an
elevated faculty. Thus eternal life is truly a new life, the two
aspects of life and vision being equally applicable in this sense; for
it is essentially supernatural as being specified by an essentially
supernatural object.215 Thus the beatific vision differs entirely from
the miraculous restoration of sight to a blind person, because this
sight is essentially natural and is only supernaturally restored. In
other words, it is only supernatural as regards the mode of its
production.
It must be observed also that the created intellect is not the in­
strumental cause of intellectual vision, as baptismal water is of
grace; but the beatific vision is its vital and connatural act, although
it does not elicit this act independently of the infused habit. This
habit, however, functions by way of a second nature of the higher
order. So also the will of the blessed is not the instrumental cause
of the act of charity elicited by it, but is its connatural act.
Second doubt. Can there be the creation of an intellect to which
the light of glory would be connatural?
St. Thomas denies this in his reply to the third objection: “The
light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has
214 See John of St. Thomas, Com. in lam, q.12, a.s, no. 10 f.
215 An essentially supernatural and simple act cannot be partly natural and
partly supernatural.

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THE ONE GOD

a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational
creature is made deiform, as is said in this article.”
Scotus held the opposite view.21® But from Scotus’ opinion it
follows that consummated grace, as a matter of fact, would be grace
not essentially, but only contingently. This is contrary to the prin­
ciple that powers, habits, and acts are specified by their formal
object.217 But the formal and proper object of the divine intellect
evidently transcends the proper and natural object of any creatable
intellect whatever; otherwise this intellect would be of the same
nature as God, would be God created.
Third doubt. Why is a created and supernatural substance a con­
tradiction in terms?
It is because the intellect of this substance would be of the same
nature as the divine intellect, for it would be specified by the same
formal object, and hence would be the divine nature created, which
is a contradiction in terms, just as pantheism is.
Moreover, this substance would be supernatural; but it is intrin­
sically repugnant for a supernatural substance to be created. In­
deed, nothing created can be essentially supernatural without its
being essentially related to the Deity as such, to God’s intimate life,
and thus specified by it; for it is only God’s essence that transcends
every created nature. But no created substance can be essentially re­
lated to the Deity and specified by it, since substance is being in
itself and for itself. This means that the reason for its specification
is to be found in itself, and it cannot be defined because of its being
referred to something else. On the contrary, an accident, such as a
power or a habit, can be essentially related to something else. Thus
grace, which is the seed of glory, is specified by God’s essence, of
which it is a participation, and by means of it we are ordained to
see God in His essence.218
SIXTH ARTICLE
WHETHER, OF THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD, ONE SEES
MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER

The answer is in the affirmative, and it is of faith against Jovinian,
as also against Luther, who said that all men are equally blessed,
21e I Sent., d.3, q.3, nos. 24, 25.
21T This principle, however, pervades the whole of psychology and theology as
the searchlight in all that concerns the acquired virtues, the infused virtues, and
the vices. Thus St. Thomas says: "The species of every habit depends on the
formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot re­
main” (Ila Ilae, q.5, a.3).
21s Cf. Gonet, Clypeus thomisticus, De gratia, disp. II, a.3; Billuart, De Deo,
diss. IV, a.5, § 4.

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in that they are justified not by their own justice, but by the justice
of Christ which is imputed to them.
The Council of Florence defines it to be of faith in the following
words: "The souls of the saints . . . clearly intuit the one and
triune God, one seeing Him more perfectly than another, according
to the diversity of their merits.” 219 Likewise the Council of Trent
condemns those who say that "men justified by good works do not
merit an increase of glory.” 220
This doctrine of the faith is equivalently expressed in the follow­
ing passages of Holy Scripture: “Star differeth from star in glory”;221
and this is said of the blessed. Similarly we have: “In My Father’s
house there are many mansions”; 222 and these words must be under­
stood as referring to the kingdom of heaven, because in this same
chapter our Lord says: “I go to prepare a place for you . . . that
where I am, you also may be.” 223
The Fathers, especially St. Augustine, frequently alluded to the
doctrine of the various degrees of happiness in heaven that corre­
spond to the varying degrees of merit among the blessed.224 But
Holy Scripture also discloses the reason for this inequality, which
has its foundation in the merits acquired in this life. Such texts
are: "Your reward is very great in heaven”; 225 “Who will render to
every man according to his works.” 223 But there is inequality of merit
among wayfarers.
Theology, which explains more clearly the reason for this in­
equality, teaches that the more the intellect participates in the
light of glory, the more perfectly it sees God. But the greater the
charity, the greater is the participation in the light of glory; for
desire actuated by charity in a certain degree makes the one de­
siring apt to receive the object desired.
First doubt. Does the inequality of vision result solely from the
inequality of participation in the light of glory, or is it also be­
cause of the inequality of the natural power of the intellect?
Reply. The general answer to this, against the Scotists, Molina,
and even partly against Cajetan, is that it is solely because of the
inequality of participation in the light of glory. As St. Thomas says:
"it [the inequality] will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of
zi® Denz., no. 693.
220 Ibid., no. 842.
2211 Cor. 15: 41.
222 John 14: 2.
223 Ibid., 14: 2, 3.
224 Cf. Rouet de Journel, Enchir. patristicum, nos. 696, 710, 1383, 1502, 1831,
1931, 2308.
220 Matt. 5: 12.
22e Rom. 2: 6.

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the intellect, not indeed the natural faculty, but the glorified
faculty.” 227 Why is this? It is because, as stated in the body of the
article, ‘‘the faculty of seeing God does not belong to the created
intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory.” There­
fore the faculty of seeing God more perfectly does not belong to
the created intellect according as it is by nature more perfect.
Hence the penetrative vision of the divine essence is not greater in
the angelic intellect than in the human intellect, if each receives an
equal degree of the light of glory. The incongruity resulting from
its denial confirms this view. For otherwise, granted equality of
merit, one would see God more perfectly than the other, namely,
the one whose intellect is endowed with greater penetration of
vision; but this would be contrary to the notion of reward. There
is another incongruity in that any degree of glory would not be
according to the corresponding degree of grace, but would be ac­
cording to one’s natural powers, and thus man by his natural
powers would claim something as his own in the spiritual order,
which is contrary to what St. Paul says: “For who distinguished!
thee?” 228
The opinion of the Scotists and Molina arises from the fact that
they consider the intellect and the light of glory not so much as two
total and subordinated causes, but rather as two partial and co­
ordinated causes.
Second doubt. Do some of the blessed enjoy an equal degree of
glory?
Reply. This we affirm, especially for baptized children who die
before coming to the use of reason.
SEVENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD COMPREHEND HIM

It is of faith that the blessed do not comprehend God, inasmuch
as the Lateran Council declares that “God is incomprehensible. ” 220
It is commonly admitted among theologians that this incompre- 1
hensibility is to be understood as referring not only to the natural
but also to the supernatural faculties; for there is a difference be­
tween invisibility and incomprehensibility. The blessed are called
comprehensors, inasmuch as their immediate vision of God is con­
strued as comprehension in the broad sense of the term.230
The theological proof given by St. Thomas is clear. To compre22T Cf. ad gum.
228 I Cor. 4: 7.
229 Denz., no. 428.
230 cf. ad turn.

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hend God is to know Him both intensively and extensively so far
as He is knowable, that is, infinitely; but no created intellect, either
by its own power or by means of the light of glory, can know God
infinitely; therefore no created intellect can comprehend God.
The major has its foundation in the principle that the source of
knowledge and of knowableness is immateriality. But God alone is
absolutely immaterial as being most pure act both in the entitative
and in the intellectual orders. Hence no created intellect can see
God with the same clarity, distinction, and penetration, as God
sees Himself, that is, intensively; nor even extensively, for the more
profound one’s knowledge of God is, the more profound one’s
knowledge is of what comes within the scope of omnipotence or
divine causality.231
Objection. It is stated that the blessed see the indivisible God as a
whole. Therefore it does not seem possible for their vision to remain
imperfect.
Reply. In reply to the second objection it is pointed out that the
blessed see the whole of God but not as He is infinitely knowable.
Thus he who knows any demonstrable proposition by a probable
reason, knows every part of the proposition, namely, the subject,
the predicate, and the verb “is”; yet he does not know it as perfectly
as it is capable of being known. So also in sense perception, when
several persons see a mountain more or less perfectly, clearly, and
distinctly, it is seen in all its details according as one has a keener
vision than the other.
Similarily, it is pointed out in the reply to the third objection
that the blessed see God as a whole, but not wholly, in the sense
that the mode of the one knowing does not adequately correspond
to the mode of the object known. This means that the blessed see
God only in a finite way.
First doubt. Do the blessed see all the formal and necessary con­
stituents of God, namely, the essence, the attributes, and the
Persons.
Reply. That they do is commonly affirmed against the nominal­
ists.232 In fact, the common teaching against Scotus is that it is
repugnant for the divine essence to be seen by the blessed apart
from the attributes and the Persons, because there is no real dis­
tinction between the divine essence, the attributes, and the Persons,
231 Cf. Summa theol., la, q. 14, a.i.
232 Contrary to tl;e nominalists, it must be said that omnipotence, which as
its name implies denotes a reference to undefined creatures, can be known quidditatively provided the formal and primary object of its action be known, which
is the idea of created being. It is not necessary that the material and secondary
objects be known, which are all possible creatures. Thus the quiddative knowl­
edge of matter does not necessitate tire knowledge of all material things.

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THE ONE GOD

not even an actual formal distinction on the part of the object, as
posited by Scotus; for there is no intermediary distinction. Either
the distinction between objects is real and exists before the mind’s
consideration, or it is logical, and does not exist before the mind’s
consideration. Thus the divine reality, as it is in itself, actually and
explicitly contains not only the divine essence, but also the at­
tributes and the Persons. But if it is a question of the divine essence
as conceived by us wayfarers, then the attributes and the Persons
are contained actually and implicitly in it.
Second doubt. Do the blessed in seeing God see His free decrees?
Reply. They see them inasmuch as these are existing realities in
God, but they do not see them inasmuch as these terminate defectibly in creatures, unless God wills to manifest this to them. Thus
they do not know the day of judgment or the number of the elect.
The reason is that future free things are contained in God’s essence
only by reason of His free decree, which is made known either by
some effect or by God’s special revelation. Having sufficiently dis­
cussed the primary object of the beatific vision, we now pass on to
consider its secondary object.
EIGHTH ARTICLE
WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD SEE ALL IN GOD

In the title the word “all” signifies everything outside God and
everything that can exist.
Reply. It is denied that the blessed see all that God does or can
do, for then they would have a comprehensive knowledge of God,
which means that they would know all that God does or can do;
for the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be
seen, and all possible effects if it is seen comprehensively.
Doubt. What, therefore, do the blessed see in God?
It is generally admitted that the blessed see of past, present, and
future things whatever pertains particularly and principally to
them.233 The proof is that the beatific vision must perfectly satisfy
every lawful desire of the blessed. But the blessed lawfully desire
to know what specially pertains to them. Therefore the blessed
see all that specially pertains to them.
It is not easy to determine in detail what specially pertains to
them. However, the theologians generally agree in saying that the
blessed can be considered from three points of view: (i) inasmuch
as they are elevated to the supernatural order; (2) inasmuch as they
233 Summa theol., Illa, q. to, a.2.

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are a part o£ the universe in the natural order; (3) inasmuch as
each is an individual person, either public, as the Pope, the king, or
the founder of a religious order, or in a private capacity, as the father
of a family.
But the blessed as raised to the supernatural order see the mys­
teries believed in this life, such as those of the incarnation, re­
demption, predestination, and grace. It is not necessary, however,
that these be seen in all their circumstances of time and place, as
is evident concerning the day of judgment, which not even the
angels know. Nor is it necessary for them to see the fulfillment of
these mysteries in all individual cases. The blessed as part of the
universe see the genera and species, as St. Thomas teaches in this
article.284
The blessed, inasmuch as each is an individual person, see all
or at least the principal things that pertain to their state. Thus St.
Peter and more likely the Pope, too, see all that pertains to the
universal Church; so also does the king see all that pertains to his
kingdom, and the father to his family. They likewise see all the
prayers of the faithful who implore their intercession. Hence the
knowledge of the Blessed Virgin Mary far surpasses that of any of
the saints, especially as regards the prayers and thoughts of human
beings; yet not, so it seems, all the thoughts of human beings. This
privilege belongs to Christ, as judge of the human race, and thus
He must know the acts of all those to be judged.235
Similarly, the blessed see God’s free decrees in their fulfillment,
those that specially pertain to them according to God’s good
pleasure.
NINTH ARTICLE

WHETHER WHAT IS SEEN IN GOD, BY THOSE WHO SEE THE
DIVINE ESSENCE, IS SEEN THROUGH ANY SIMILITUDE

Reply. The answer is that the blessed see without the inter­
mediary of a created species what they see in the divine essence or
in the Word. In this case the divine essence is for them the medium
previously known, in which creatures are known as in their efficient
and exemplary cause. This vision of creatures in the Word is the
beatific vision itself, which is one of simple intuition.238
This vision of creatures in the Word, which is called morning
knowledge inasmuch as it is the vision of creatures as in their
23< Cf. ad 411m.
225 Summa theol., Illa, q. 10, a. 2.
200 ibid., la, q.58, a.7.

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THE ONE GOD

dawning, is a certain participation of the knowledge which God has
of creatures in Himself. They are known not merely in a confused
manner, but distinctly as possible participations of the divine per­
fections. Thus he who would have an intuitive knowledge of the
intellective soul, would know the sensitive and vegetative souls.
Hence the knowledge of things in the Word is without any created
species.
But the blessed can also know creatures outside the Word, and
this by created species.237 This knowledge outside the Word is called
evening knowledge, as though it were twilight knowledge, because
it is of an inferior kind; for, as St. Augustine says: "The knowledge
of created things contemplated by themselves is, so to speak, more
colorless than when they are seen in the wisdom of God, as in the
art by which they were made.” 238
From this it is evident that the vision of things in the Word is
more or less perfect according to the degree of the beatific vision
and hence of merits. On the contrary, in the vision of things out­
side the Word there is not this same correspondence to the degree
of the beatific vision and merits. Thus it may happen that the
knowledge of a Pope or a king, who enjoys a lower degree of the
beatific vision, may be greater as regards those things that specially
pertain to him, which the blessed of a higher order do not have,
since they are unknown to the latter.
John of St. Thomas remarks that theologians who, out of love
for God, take up the study of theology, see the object of theology
more eminently in the Word, whereas those who take up the study
of theology more from a natural desire of acquiring knowledge, see
the theological conclusions outside the Word.
Objection. If the blessed see various created things in the Word,
why can they not see God’s free decrees even as to their fulfillment?
Reply. The reason is that God, just as He freely brings creatures
into being, so He freely makes use of His essence as the intelligible
species in representing these rather than the former. Hence the
blessed see the free acts of the future that specially pertain to them,
only if God expressly wills to make these known to them, and this
manifestation is a certain revelation; but it is one that is effected
in the Word, although it may also take place outside the Word.
The question may be asked whether the name “Word” imports
relation to creatures. It certainly does, though not indeed essentially
so, but only if there is a divine decree.
23’ Ibid., ad 211m.
233 De civit. Dei, Bk. XI, chap. 7.

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TENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD SEE ALL THEY
SEE IN IT AT THE SAME TIME

The article is concerned with the knowledge of things in the
Word. In the title “at the same time” means that things are not
seen successively.
Simultaneity of vision is affirmed, because this vision of things
formally in the Word, is a unique intuition that is effected by
means of but one and absolutely invariable species both as a repre­
sentation and as an entity. Hence all things at one and the same
time are included in this vision.
Therefore the beatific vision is measured by participated eternity,
and not by time, not even by the discrete time of the angels in
which their successive thoughts are measured.230 But participated
eternity has indeed a beginning, but after its inception it is simul­
taneously whole, and it is not a fleeting but a permanent now.
However, just as the beatific vision begins, so it could by God’s
absolute power come to an end; but as long as it endures, it is
measured by participated eternity, by a single indivisible instant.
This was so if St. Paul received it as a transient vision during his
life here on earth.240 Hence what the blessed see in the Word, they
see at one and the same time and not successively. On the con­
trary, what they see outside the Word by their own different species,
are not seen at one and die same time, but successively, and this
for the opposite reason.
Corollary. Probably the blessed know outside the Word the
prayers directed to them, because if diey saw formally in the Word
at one and the same time all the petitions of all those praying to
them, they would already know the day of the last judgment.
ELEVENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER ANYONE IN THIS LIFE CAN SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD

The answer is that no one in this life can see the essence of God.
The Council of Vienne condemned the following proposition of the
Beghards: “It is possible for man to acquire in this life the same de­
gree of final happiness as he will have in heaven.”241 In like
manner, the Scripture says: “Man shall not see Me and live.” 242
239 Summa theol., la, q. io, a.5 ad turn.
2-ioztid., Ha Ilae, q.175, a.3.
241 Denz., no. 474.
242 Ex. 33: 20.

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THE ONE GOD

“No man hath seen God at any time.” 248 “While we are in the
body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith and not by
sight.” 244
St. Thomas assigns as the reason for this that the soul, united as
it is with the body and the senses, knows God in a natural way only
as it is related to sensible things; that is, with reference to its
proper object.
The same also applies to the soul in its supernatural belief, be­
cause it is by means of concepts naturally abstracted from sensible
things that revelation is made possible, for example, concepts of
nature, person. The proper object of the lowest in the scale of
intellectual beings is the lowest in the degree of intelligibility.
However, as pointed out in the reply to the second objection,
God could, by way of an exception, have given the beatific vision as
something transitory to St. Paul, who was rapt in ecstasy so that he
might be the teacher of the Gentiles. This is the opinion of St.
Augustine, and of St. Thomas when he discusses the subject of
rapture.245
TWELFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD CAN BE KNOWN IN THIS LIFE BY NATURAL REASON

The answer is that we cannot see God by our natural power of
reason, because our natural knowledge begins from sense, and sen­
sible effects do not adequately express the power of the First Cause.
However, we can by these effects know that God exists, and that He
has perfections the lack of which would make it impossible for Him
to be the First Cause.
Thus there are three ways of knowing God, namely, by causality,
negation, and eminence.
THIRTEENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER BY GRACE A HIGHER KNOWLEDGE OF GOD CAN BE
OBTAINED THAN BY NATURAL REASON

The answer is in the affirmative, and the superiority of this know­
ledge of God is considered from two points of view: (i) subjectively,
inasmuch as our intellect is strengthened by the infusion of gratu­
itous light (light of faith, or also of prophecy); (2) objectively, in­
asmuch as it implies the presentation of an object that is not
«’John 1: 18.
* II Cor. 5: 6-7.
«
*** Summa theol., Ha Ilae, q. 175, a.3.

THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

381

naturally knowable; and this is effected either by the infusion of
images or ideas, or by the divine arrangement of the acquired ideas
to express a supernatural truth.
In the reply to the first objection it is remarked that “by the
revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God what He is,”
still we know Him more fully than by the power of natural reason,
and thus we believe that there are three Persons in God. Hence,
although the faithful do not know the Deity as it really is, yet they
have an obscure knowledge of the same by means of God’s reve­
lation.
And so this terminates the question about the beatific vision both
in itself as regards its proper object and its secondary object (created
things seen in the Word), and also in its relation to other kinds of
knowledge, which is knowledge outside the Word, these being
faith, prophecy, and the natural knowledge of God. What St.
Thomas made clear and particularly stressed is that the beatific
vision is essentially supernatural. He is of the opinion that it ab­
solutely demands the elevation of the intellect by the light of glory,
such that this essentially supernatural light cannot be a natural
property of any created or creatable intellect.
In like manner, St. Thomas shows convincingly that this vision
is absolutely immediate, inasmuch as God’s essence is united to
our intellect as impressed and expressed species. For no created
species, which is intelligible by participation, can represent God
Himself as He really is, who is the self-existing Being and self­
subsisting Intellection, in fact, His Deity, which in a certain sense
transcends being and intellection, inasmuch as it contains these
formally and eminently, which must at once be shown.

CHAPTER XIII
Question 13

The Names of God
prologue

“After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine
knowledge we now proceed to the consideration of the divine
names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge
of it.” 1 For words are signs of ideas, and ideas express the nature
of things, as explained by Aristotle.2 Thus every science has its
terminology, although we must not say with the nominalists, es­
pecially with Condillac: “The sciences are well-constructed lan­
guages.” Science makes use of good terminology in expressing its
ideas; but, since it consists especially in the well-ordered arrange­
ment of ideas as expressive of the very nature of things, it transcends
this terminology. In fact, science is a simple quality, a habit that is
specified by its formal object, subordinating the ideas with refer­
ence to this formal object.
The importance of this question. This question is of great im­
portance, as it treats of the analogy existing between God and
creatures, and in this life God is known and named only analogi­
cally by us. We shall give here but a brief explanation of this
analogy, not only because it has been already discussed in our
refutation of agnosticism in the question concerning the demon­
strability of God's existence,3 in which we treated of analogy by
way of investigation in the ascendant order, but also because we
have written extensively on this subject in two other works.4
By all means the conclusions and reasons given by St. Thomas
must be here presented, so that it may be clearly and distinctly
seen how his theory avoids the two extremes, namely, of agnosticism
and of a certain anthropomorphism. Agnosticism gets no farther
than a certain symbolism in which there is no criterion so as to
distinguish between what is predicated literally of God and what
1 Summa theol., la, q. 13, prologue.
a Perihermenias, Bk. I, chap. 1.
a Summa theol., la, q.2, a. 2.
4 Cf. God, His Existence and His Nature, 1, 206-41; II, 187-267, 397 f. See also
De revelatione, I, 276-318.
382

THE NAMES OF GOD

383

is predicated metaphorically of Him; e.g., in determining why it
can properly be said of God that He is just, but not that He is
angry. Thus in the end we should have to say that God is absolutely
unknowable and ineffable in a depreciatory sense.
On the other hand, there is a type of anthropomorphism which
considers God, not indeed as a great man as the ancient anthropomorphists did, but which considers Him in too human a way,
predicating the divine names univocally or quasi-univocally, as if
they had absolutely the same meaning when predicated of God
and of creatures, as when wisdom is predicated of God and of a
wise man.
We shall see that St. Thomas maintains that divine names are
not predicated either equivocally (this would be the symbolism of
the agnostics) or univocally (this would be the tendency of an­
thropomorphism), but analogically; yet they are not predicated
merely analogically in the metaphorical sense, as when God is said
to be angry, but they are predicated analogically in the literal
sense, as when it is said that God is just, and when absolutely
simple perfections implying no imperfection in their formal sig­
nification are attributed to Him. Hence, as we shall state farther
on, these analogical names that are predicated of God and crea­
tures, do not in their concept signify what is absolutely the same,
but what is proportionately so. Thus wisdom is the knowledge of
things by their highest causes; but God’s wisdom is the cause of
things, whereas our wisdom is caused by things.
Having shown the importance of this question by the foregoing
principles, we must point out that it is divided into three parts.
The first part, which treats of the divine names in a general way
and which includes the first seven articles, contains the following
queries: whether God can be named by us, whether any names
applied to God are predicated of Him substantially (or only caus­
ally); literally (or only metaphorically); whether any names ap­
plied to God are synonymous (so that it can be said that God
punishes by His mercy, as He is said to punish by His justice);
whether names are applied to God and creatures univocally, or
equivocally, or else analogically; but if analogically, whether they
are applied first to God or to creatures; finally, in the seventh article,
whether some names are applied to God temporally, as Creator and
Lord, and others eternally. The second part of the question, which
includes four articles, is concerned with the meaning of this name
“God” in the first three articles, and in the fourth with the mean­
ing of this name, "Who is," whether it is the supremely appropri­
ate name of God. The third part is a sort of recapitulation and
application of die preceding doctrine to the conclusion established

S84

THE ONE GOD

in the last query, namely, whether affirmative propositions can be
formed about God.5
FIRST ARTICLE
WHETHER A NAME CAN BE GIVEN TO GOD

State of the question. Three difficulties present themselves: (i)
because it is commonly held that God is ineffable; (2) because
every name is either concrete (wise), or abstract (wisdom). But a
concrete name does not belong to God, since He is simple; nor
does an abstract name belong to God, because He is subsisting Be­
ing; (3) there are special difficulties for the names taken to signify
substance with quality, because God is without quality; for demon­
strative pronouns, because God is not pointed out; for verbs that
have a temporal signification, since God transcends time.
Yet the answer is that God can be named by us from creatures,
yet not so that the name signifying Him expresses the divine es­
sence in itself or quidditatively.
1) It is proved from Sacred Scripture, in which God is referred
to under various names, such as Lord, Omnipotent, Who is. On
the other hand, it is likewise said in Sacred Scripture that God is
ineffable. The Fourth Lateran Council also declares this in the
following words: “We firmly believe . . . that there is only one
true, eternal, immense, immutable, incomprehensible, omnipotent,
and ineffable God, the Father and Son and Holy Ghost.” 5 So also
Dionysius calls God anonymous or ineffable; yet he says that God
has several names.'
2) Proof from reason. We can give a name to anything inasmuch
as we can understand it. But in this life we know God from crea­
tures, as being their principle, and also by way of excellence and
remotion; in this life, however, we cannot see the essence of God.
Therefore God can be named from creatures, yet not so that the
name expresses the divine essence in itself.
The major has its foundation in the following principle formu» Consult the commentary of St. Thomas on the work of the Pseudo-Dionysius,
entitled, De divinis nominibus. There is evidence of considerable progress in the
doctrine as presented in this commentary compared with that given in this article
of the theological summa. As to what the predecessors of St. Thomas held on this
subject, consult also Alexander of Hales, Summa, la, q.48-70, and St. Albert the
Great, Summa theol., Ia, tr. HI, q.13, membr. 1; q.14, membr. 1; q.15, membr. 1;
and q.50-59. As for the commentators of St. Thomas, consult Cajetan, John of
St. Thomas, Xantes Mariales, and Gonet.
» Dcnz., no. 428.
t De div. nom., chap. 1.

THE NAMES OF GOD

385

lated by Aristotle, which clarifies this entire question: “Words are
signs of ideas (of concepts and judgments), and ideas are the simili­
tudes of things.”8 Thus words relate to the meaning of things
signified through the medium of the intellectual concept. This
formula, transcending nominalism and subjective conceptualism, is
realistic. For the nominalists maintain that ideas do not express
the nature of things; for instance, the idea of humanity would
not express the human nature, but rather an actually existing col­
lection of men. Thus the purpose of ideas would be, not for ac­
quiring a knowledge of the nature of things, but rather for action;
this is pragmatism. Thus, according to the nominalists, the prin­
ciple of contradiction is a grammatical law for avoiding contradic­
tion in discourse, and is at most a law of discursive thought, but
is not a fundamental law of extramental being. Thus they end in
doctrinal nihilism.®
The minor is evident from what was said in previous articles.10
God is known from creatures as their principle. But we cannot
have a proper concept of the Deity, such as would define it, for
we have not a quidditative knowledge of the Deity. On the con­
trary, our concept of man, which defines man, is a proper con­
cept. As St. Thomas says: “Such names (those signifying the divine
substance) do not signify what God is, as though defining His sub­
stance.” 11
This is what St. Thomas thinks that St. John Damascene means,
whom he quotes in this objection. Hence, as will be more clearly
seen farther on, by the name "Deity” we understand that eminence
which contains formally and eminently all absolutely simple per­
fections and the divine relations; but with reference to the Deity
we are in this life like men who would know the seven colors of
the rainbow without ever having seen whiteness. They would under­
stand that the name “whiteness” implies the eminent fount of all
colors; but the difference between whiteness and the Deity is, that
whiteness contains colors only virtually, whereas the Deity contains
all absolutely simple perfections formally and eminently. As Cajetan remarks: "The Deity is conceived through the medium of
another concept (of being, of wisdom), yet it is not a representative
but an abstractive concept of the Deity; and this is a sufficient reas Perihermenias, Bk. I, chap. 1.
» On this subject of the real validity of the principle of contradiction, as founded
on the first notion of being and on the principle of its primary opposition to nonbeing, consult Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bk. IV.
to Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3; q.4, a.3; q.12, a.4.
11 De potentia, q.7, a.5 ad turn.

386

THE ONE GOD

son for distinguishing between the Deity thus known and what is
directly known by us.” 12
Hence the names attributed to God do not accurately express
Him as He is, inasmuch as we have but an inadequate knowledge
of Him from creatures, whether by way of causality (as when we
say that He is the first Mover, the first efficient Cause, the first Ordainer), or by way of excellence (by means of such common con­
cepts as supreme Being, supreme Truth, supreme Goodness), or by
way of remotion (by means of such negative concepts as immaterial,
immobile), or by a combination of common and relative concepts,
as when we say that He is the First Being.18
The solution of the objections confirms this conclusion.
Reply to first objection. God is ineffable inasmuch as “His es­
sence is above all that we understand about God and signify in
word.” For we do not know it quidditatively. We cannot say what
formally constitutes the Deity in itself, just as a person who never
saw whiteness cannot say what whiteness is. On the other hand,
we know what man is, namely, a rational animal; although his
specific difference is known by us abstractively and not intuitively,
as the angels know it.
Reply to second objection. With reference to creatures, abstract
names, such as wisdom, signify a simple form, whereas concrete
names, such as wise, signify a composite subsisting being in which
such form is found. And as God is both simple and subsisting, we
attribute abstract names to Him to signify His simplicity, and con­
crete names to signify His subsistence. In addition to this we say
that God is His Godhead;14 for God not only exists, but is Flis
existence, His goodness, and similarly for His other attributes.
Reply to third objection. “Verbs and participles signifying time
are applied to God because His eternity includes all time.” Thus
it is said of God that He is, was, will be, no distinction being made
between present, past, and future. But the way we speak of God
shows that we have an imperfect conception of Him, and this is
because in this life we know Him only from creatures.
Corollary. The perfect name of God, that is, the adequate name,
cannot be a name uttered by the voice, or formed in the imagina­
tion, or the word of a created mind but is the uncreated Word, in
whom the Father adequately declares His essence.10
iz Com. in lam, q.i, a.7; q.86, a. 1, no. 7.
13 Cf. ibid., q. 1, a.7.
1« Ibid., q.3, a.3.
Summa theol., la, q.34.

THE NAMES OF GOD

387

SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER ANY NAME CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD
SUBSTANTIALLY

State of the question. God can be named; but how?
The title says “any name.” Yet the inquiry is not about every
name, for there are relative names that do not properly express
the substance of God, but His relation to creatures, as Creator, or
even Father as regards the only begotten Son. Hence the question
is whether any name is applied to God substantially to signify His
substance (although not quidditatively), or whether all God’s names
refer to creatures. Is this name "essential Being,” for instance, ap­
plied to God substantially?
The difficulty is that we know God only from creatures. But,
on the other hand, it is sufficiently clear that there is a certain
distinction between absolute names, such as “essential Being,” and
relative names, such as “supreme Cause.” Moreover, St. Augustine,
who is quoted in the counterargument, says: “The being of God is
the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say
of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified.” 10
Conclusion. Negative names and names referring to creatures do
not signify tire substance of God; but, of course, absolute and af­
firmative names do, although they do not fully represent Him.
Examples of negative names are “incorporeal,” “immense”; of
relative names, “Lord,” “efficient,” “end”; of absolute and affirma­
tive names, “being,” “living,” “wise.” The first part of the conclu­
sion is evident, for negative names signify the elimination of some
imperfection, and relative names signify God’s relation to creatures,
or rather the relation of creatures to Him. Hence the second part
must be proved, which concerns absolute and affirmative names.
That his argument may be convincing, (1) St. Thomas presents
two opinions, (2) he proves his point by refuting these opinions,
(3) he proves the same directly.
1) Two opinions are presented. The first was proposed by Maimonides (Rabbi Moses). He was born in Cordova in 1135, and his
purpose was to give the true conception of anthropomorphism by
distinguishing in Sacred Scripture between what is predicated meta­
phorically of God and what is predicated properly of Him. He be­
lieves that, to preserve God’s simplicity, we must say that affirmative
names, too, have been brought into use to express the elimination
of something from God, rather than to express anything that exists
uDe Trin., Bk. VI, chap. 4.

388

THE ONE GOD

positively in Him. Hence to say “God is living” would mean “God
is not non-living.”
Others said that absolute and affirmative names also are not
predicated substantially, but causally. Hence to say “God is good”
would mean that “God is the cause of goodness in things.” 17
2) The conclusion is proved indirectly by refuting both opinions
at the same time. (1) If these opinions were true, it could be said
that God is a body, because this could have but one of two mean­
ings, either that God is the cause of bodies, or else that He is not
primary matter without any actuality.18 (2) Hence not only meta­
phorical names, but all names applied to God, would be predicated
of Him in a secondary sense, and primarily of creatures. Thus, be­
ing and goodness would apply primarily to creatures, and this not
only as regards the name that is imposed (by the way of investiga­
tion), but also as regards what is signified by the name.19 Then God
could not be called the essential Being, the first Being; and crea­
tures could not be called being by participation. Christ said: “No
one is good, but God only.” 20
3) Names express what is conceived by the mind of those utter­
ing them. But the above opinions are contrary to what is meant
by those speaking of God. For when they say that God is good,
they do not mean to say that God is the cause of goodness, but
that God is good in Himself. It is especially to this that Christ re­
ferred.21
Moreover, it must be noted that St. Thomas says against Maimonides: “It would also follow from this that we could not say of
God that He was wise or good before creatures were. . . . More­
over, a negation is always understood on the basis of an affirma­
tion, for every negative proposition is proved by an affirmative.
Hence, if the human intellect could not positively know anything
about God, it could not deny anything about Him.” 22
4) The conclusion is proved directly. Absolute and affirmative
names are predicated of God substantially, but imperfectly. For
names express God so far as our intellect knows Him from crea­
tures. But creatures are made like to God, the likeness being
ir Concerning these opinions, consult St. Thomas’ De potentia, q.7, a.5.
is The reference is here to the Aristotelian and scholastic theory of matter and
form. Primary matter is the substratum, or that which underlies every existing
material thing. It is never found apart from its actualizing form. It is, in relation
to its form, a pure potentiality; yet it is something real, and not merely a logical
entity. [Tr.]
is Cf. ad 211m and a. 6.
20 Mark 10: 18.
21 Cf. ibid.
UDe potentia, q.7, a.5.

THE NAMES OF GOD

389

imperfect, which is neither specific nor generic, but which is analo­
gous. Therefore absolute and affirmative names are predicated of
God substantially but imperfectly.23
The major is proved from the preceding article. The minor is
evident from what was said in the third article of the fourth ques­
tion, in which it was proved that creatures are like God inasmuch
as every agent reproduces itself either specifically or generically or
at least analogically.
Likewise, in the second article of the fourth question it was said:
“Whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the ef­
fective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent,
or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent (non­
univocal). . . . Since therefore God is the first effective cause of
things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a
more eminent way,” to the exclusion of imperfections.
But as St. Thomas points out in this article and in the following
one, as also in another of his works,24 we must carefully distin­
guish between absolutely simple and mixed perfections, in that
the former imply no imperfection in their formal concepts. Such
are being, truth, goodness, wisdom, and love, although the created
mode of these perfections is imperfect. On the contrary, mixed per­
fections, such as rationability and discursive knowledge, denote
imperfection in their formal concepts.
Hence, as St. Thomas says in this article, when we say God is
good, the meaning is not that God is the cause of goodness, or that
God is not evil; but the meaning is that whatever good we attribute
to creatures pre-exists in God, and in a higher way. And also, “be­
cause He is good in Himself, He causes goodness in things.” The
solution of the objections confirms this.28
What Dionysius meant when he said 28 that such expressions as
not-good, or super-good, not-wise . . . must be attributed to God,
is explained elsewhere by St. Thomas.27 His opinion is that these
names are affirmed of God according to the thing signified, or ac­
cording to what is meant by the name; but they may be denied
because of the mode of their signification. For, according to the
mode of their signification, abstract names, such as wisdom, signify
a form apart from its subject, and concrete names, such as wise,
signify a composite, consisting of a subject that has such a form.
But God is pure self-subsisting form. To say that God is super23 This adverb "imperfectly” will be more fully explained in the third and
fifth articles of this question.
24 Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 30.
26 Cf. ad turn, ad turn, ad sum.
26 De div. nom., chaps. 1, 5.
27 De potentia, q.7, a.5 ad turn.

39°

THE ONE GOD

good is to say that the Deity or God’s intimate life, contains all
absolutely simple perfections in an eminent way, which was proved
in the preceding article. In the next article it is proved that God
contains these perfections not only eminently, but also formally
and eminently, that is, more than virtually. But this is already
suggested in the present article, in which it is said that absolute
and affirmative names are predicated of God “not only causally but
substantially, although imperfectly.”
And so the danger of agnosticism is already avoided, which main­
tains that God is absolutely unknowable, inasmuch as He transcends
the genera and the species.
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER ANY NAME CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD
IN ITS LITERAL SENSE

State of the question. It is not “commonly” but “metaphorically”
that is here contrasted with “literally.” Thus we speak frequently
of the literal meaning of words, meaning what is not metaphorical.
In the interpretation of Sacred Scripture the distinction between
the literal and the metaphorical senses must be very carefully noted.
Thus it is often said that God is just, and sometimes He is said
to be angry. He is said to be angry metaphorically, since anger is,
strictly speaking, a passion, which has no place in the pure Spirit.
But the question is whether the word “just” is to be applied to
God in its literal sense, or is not to be so applied, because He is
super-just. This difficulty arises from what Dionysius is quoted as
saying in the second objection, who maintained that these names,
"good," “wise,” “just,” are more truly withheld from God than
predicated of Him.
The conclusion of St. Thomas is that, as regards the signified
perfection, several names are predicated properly of God and more
properly and primarily than they are of creatures. But as regards
their mode of signification, they do not properly apply to God.
First the terms are explained; for instance, as regards the per­
fection signified by the name, “wisdom” signifies knowledge by
the highest of causes. But as regards the mode of its signification,
wisdom is an accident, that is, a quality of the mind either ac­
quired or infused, or a habit of the created mind. Thus wisdom is
in a certain genus and in a certain species of quality; hence under
this aspect it cannot be properly attributed to God, who is not in
any genus.
The terms being thus explained, the reason for the conclusion,

THE NAMES OF GOD

391

which is stated more clearly in the reply to the first objection, is
that the perfection signified by these names implies no imperfec­
tion, as in the case of wisdom; whereas the mode of their significa­
tion is imperfect and applies to creatures. On the contrary, other
names which, in their formal signification, imply imperfection,
such as “angry,” are predicated of God only metaphorically.
The reply to the first objection finds fuller expression in another
of St. Thomas’ works.28 According to what he states there, it may
be said that God is not wise, but super-wise, if the imperfect mode
is considered, inasmuch as wisdom is found in man as an acquired
or infused habit.
It must be noted that the expression “properly as regards what
is formally signified and not properly as regards the mode of
signification” is somewhat the equivalent of "formally” and "emi­
nently,” that is, formally as regards the perfection signified, emi­
nently and virtually as regards the mode of signification. However,
this term “formally” must be understood as referring to predica­
tion not in the univocal sense but in the analogical, as will be
stated in the fifth article.29
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER NAMES APPLIED TO GOD ARE SYNONYMOUS

State of the question. Synonymous names are those that have
absolutely the same meaning, so that to say that God is wise, good,
merciful, just, would be the same in meaning. If this were so, then,
as it is said that God punishes by His justice, it could likewise be
said that He punishes by His mercy, for justice and mercy would
have the same meaning. This would result in agnosticism, and any
distinction between justice and mercy would be no longer tenable.
Yet evidently they are distinct from the way Sacred Scripture uses
these terms.
But the difficulty here is to show why such names are not synony­
mous. This question is the same as the problem about the distinc­
tion between God’s attributes. As previously remarked by us, the
nominalists admitted only a logical distinction between them,
such as between Peter the subject and Peter the predicate in a
proposition, as when we say: Peter is Peter; or they admitted a
nominal distinction, such as that between Tullius and Cicero.
Scotus Eriugena said about the same. Similarly, these two proposi­
tions of Master Eckhart were condemned: “Any distinction in God
se ibid.
28 See Cajetan’s Commentary on Summa, q. 13, a.5, no. 7.

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THE ONE GOD

is both impossible and inconceivable. Any kind o£ distinction does
not apply to God.” 80
On the contrary, Gilbert de la Porrée said: “The divinity is not
God, but the form by which He is,” 81 because abstract names do
not signify the subsisting subject. There is a certain anthropomor­
phism in this, since the imperfect mode of creatures is thus trans­
ferred to God.
Duns Scotus posited his actual-formal distinction between the
divine attributes, considered as objects. There appears to be no
possibility of a medium between the distinction that is not the re­
sult and that which is the result of the mind’s consideration. But
if this distinction of Scotus is more than a virtual distinction, as
previously stated, then it is incompatible with God’s absolute
simplicity.
Very many theologians admit a minor virtual distinction be­
tween God’s essence and His attributes, inasmuch as His essence,
which is conceived by us actually and implicitly, but not explicitly,
signifies the attributes that are derived from it.82
The exclusion of synonymous names is still the difficulty that
confronts us; for, as stated in the objections, all divine names
mean the same thing, namely, God’s substance, which is most
simple. If it is said that they signify the same thing, but differ in
idea, there seems to be no purpose in different ideas that do not
correspond to different things. Moreover, God is supremely one,
not only in reality, but also in idea, which means that there is
one proper and most eminent concept which expresses Him, this
being the concept of the Deity.
Nevertheless the conclusion is that names attributed to God, al­
though they signify the same reality, are not synonymous.
1) This conclusion is proved indirectly in the counterargument,
for if these names are synonymous then their multiplication would
be redundant or absolutely superfluous; because it would be af­
firming the same thing when we say that God is just and that God
is merciful. In fact, if these names were synonymous, it could be
said that God punishes by His mercy, and forgives by His justice.
This would be agnosticism.
2) Direct proof. Names that signify the same thing but have
different meanings are not synonymous. But such are the divine
names: supreme being, wisdom, goodness, justice, mercy. . . . There­
fore divine names are not synonymous.
The major has its foundation in the principle that names signify
so Denz., nos. 523 f.
si Ibid., no. 389.
»2See introduction to third question: the divine attributes.

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393

the thing only through the medium of the intellectual conception.33
The minor, however, is proved in the body of the article as fol­
lows: “But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, forms
conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to
creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply,
whereas in creatures they are received, divided, and multiplied.”
This means that being, wisdom, goodness, belong indeed properly
to God, as was stated in the third article, but they are identified in
tire eminence of the Deity; and they are so identified in the Deity
as not to be destructive of one another, but are there in a most
pure state. Thus the divine being is the self-subsisting Being, who
is identical with His self-subsisting intellection; also the divine
existence is identical with the self-subsisting will of God. But there
is only a virtual distinction between God’s subsistent intellection
and His subsistent will. Thus what inferior beings have separately,
superior beings have unitedly.31
So, analogically, the rational soul is eminently and formally both
sensitive and vegetative. This means that there are not three sub­
ordinated souls in man, but only one, which is at one and the
same time the principle of the intellective, sensitive, and vegeta­
tive lives. These three names are not synonymous, although they
denote the same soul, because they denote it under different aspects.
Nor need we have recourse to the actual-formal distinction on the
part of the object, because this distinction is either previous to or
the result of the mind’s consideration. In the latter case the dis­
tinction is virtual; in the former case, the distinction is already
real, which is repugnant to God’s absolute simplicity.
Reply to second objection. “The many aspects of these names
are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one
simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect
manner." This means that the eminence of the Deity, which is
most simple, is virtually multiple, since it is variously imitable.
Similarly, in the natural order the same cause is virtually multiple,
inasmuch as it produces different effects in different subjects. Thus
fire expands iron, melts wax, burns flesh. ... It is also evident a
priori, as was shown above,33 that multitude does not explain the
reason for unity, and that it must proceed from the supremely One,
who must hence be virtually multiple. In like manner, great artists,
33 Cf. ad mm.
31 See Cajetan's commentary on a.5, no. 7. He shows most clearly that intellec­
tion and volition can be identified only in one formal concept of a higher order,
namely, in the concept of the Deity; otherwise they would be destructive of each
other, since volition would be completely changed into intellection, or vice versa.
Thus the Deity is eminently and formally intellection and love.
“Summa theol., la, q.a, a. 3 (fourth way).

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THE ONE GOD

such as Leonardo da Vinci, in their portraits of persons seek to
depict what is, so to speak, the predominant trait, which, though
simple in itself, is virtually multiple. So also the fundamental
principle of any doctrine is simple in itself and virtually multiple,
such as the Aristotelian distinction between actuality and po­
tentiality. In the reply to the difficulty proposed in the third ob­
jection, it is stated that God is supremely one, not only in reality
but also in idea. In other words, there is not only one reality in
God, but also only one most proper and most eminent concept of
Him, namely, the concept of the Deity, which, according to revela­
tion, is expressed in His only Word.
St. Thomas also says in his reply: “The perfect unity of God
requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist
in Him simply and unitedly.” This must be given careful con­
sideration, since it is the foundation for the distinction between the
most imperfect unity (for instance, of primary matter) and the
supreme unity. This inferior kind of unity is potential, and is
found in primary matter, which is quasi-negatively the same in
all bodies; for this inferior kind of unity is found even in inferior
elementary bodies and in the primitive cell from which the em­
bryo originates, before the multiplicity or diversity of the parts of
the organism appear in it. Contrary to this, the higher kind of
unity is not potential but actual, and is then virtually multiple;
such is the unity of the rational soul on which the divers parts of
our exceedingly complex organism depend. But transcending all is
the divine unity, which is the maximum in actuality, and of such
virtual multiplicity that it contains an infinite multitude of pos­
sible things. At the end of this reply to the third objection the
reason is given why “our intellect apprehends God in a manifold
manner,” because it apprehends Him “as things represent Him,
which is in a manifold manner.”
First Corollary. There is only one truth for the divine intellect
concerning God, the one and only Word being the adequate ex­
pression of this truth. This truth not only expresses equality but
also identity between the divine intellect and the divine reality.
Second Corollary. As for the created intellect, especially the
human, there are many truths about God, and there are many
names applied to Him that are not synonymous, which means that
they do not have the same meaning. The reason for this is that
truth exists formally in the mind and not in the thing; for it de­
notes conformity between the judgment formed by the mind and
the thing judged conformable to it. Hence for us there are certain
revealed truths about God, others that are deduced from revealed
truths, and also others that are naturally knowable.

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Third Corollary. To say that these two truths, "God is intelli­
gent” and “God is free,” have the same meaning and that there­
fore, if the first is revealed, by this very fact the second is revealed,
is to say that divine names are synonymous. Then it could be said
that God punishes by His mercy, and forgives by His justice.38
Fourth Corollary. The lower the degree of intellectuality of the
created intellect, the more it apprehends God by a multiplicity of
concepts.
FIFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER WHAT IS SAID OF GOD AND OF CREATURES
IS UNIVOCALLY PREDICATED OF THEM

State of the question. We know that many names applied to
God, who is most simple, are predicated of Him substantially and
in the literal sense, yet not so as to be synonymous. The question
is whether they are predicated univocally or analogically. Now it
is certain from what has been said that they are not predicated
equivocally, because they are attributed to God in the literal sense.
St. Thomas adopts Aristotle’s terminology,37 and this must be ex­
plained, as St. Thomas himself explains at the end of the argu­
mentative part of this article.
A univocal term is one that is predicated of things simply in
the same sense. Thus “man” is predicated univocally of various
men, as “animal” is predicated of the horse, the wolf, and the
lion. For by these names is meant either the species that is simply
the same in individuals of the species, or else the genus which is
likewise simply the same. Thus the name "animal” signifies a living
body endowed with sensitive life, and this genus is diversified by
differentiae that are extrinsic to it. Thus the univocal concept adse Father Marin Sola does not pay sufficient attention to this, for in his Evolution
homogène du dogme catholique (Fr. tr., II, 333), he says: "Two propositions that
have the same subject (God) differ or are identical in meaning according to their
predicates. If, therefore, the predicates are really identical, the meaning of the
propositions will be also." If the predicates are really identical in reality and
idea, then the propositions will have the same meaning, this I concede; if the
predicates are identical in reality and not in idea, then I deny this. It is quite
clear that in God, inasmuch as He is a reality, there is no real distinction between
intelligence and liberty. But divine intelligence and divine liberty are not the
same in meaning, are not synonymous; they do, indeed, concern the same thing, as
it is a reality, but not as it is an object, as Cajetan says in his commentary on
la, q. 1, a. 3, no. 8. Otherwise, in wishing nothing else but to consider the point,
under the pretext of avoiding nominalism, this nominalist thesis would be ad­
mitted by us, namely, that divine names are synonymous.
s’ See Categories, chap. 1, no. 2; Post. Anal., Bk. II, chaps. 13, 14; Metaph.,
Bk. IV, chap. 1; Bk. X, chap. 1; Bk. XII, chap. 4; Ethics, Bk. 1, chap. 6.

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THE ONE GOD

mits of complete logical separation from the different subjects to
which it is attributed.
An equivocal term is one that is predicated of things in an en­
tirely different sense. Thus “lion” is predicated equivocally of the
quadruped and of one of the signs of the zodiac. Similarly “dog”
is predicated of the animal and of a certain constellation.
An analogous term is one that is predicated of different things
neither in simply the same sense nor in an entirely different sense,
but according to a certain proportion or proportionality.88 An ex­
ample of analogy of proportion or of attribution is the following:
health is predicated primarily of the animal; and then propor­
tionately, as referring to the healthy animal, the urine is said to be
healthy (as a sign of health), the air, the food (as being the causes
of health), medicine. . . . There is a proportion among these
analogates, and extrinsic denomination suffices for this, as health is
intrinsically in the healthy animal, and only extrinsically in the
air, the urine. . . . Hence this analogy is also called analogy of
attribution, because extrinsic attribution suffices for such analogy.
An example of analogy of proportionality is the following: what
the head is to the organic body, such is the general to his army,
and the king to his kingdom. But this analogy of proportionality
can be either metaphorical or proper. The king is metaphorically
said to be the head of his kingdom. On the contrary, being is
predicated in the proper sense of substance and of accident; for
substance has existence in itself, and accident in another. Similarly,
cognition is predicated properly and proportionately of sensation
and intellection, because sensation is to the sensible what intellec­
tion is to the intelligible. Similarly love is predicated properly of
sensitive love and of rational love. Nor does this demand a deter­
se Certain eclectics, refusing to decide which is the true general metaphysics,
whether it be the Thomistic, the Scotist, or the Suarezian metaphysics, say:
"Those things are analogous which have the same name, but what is signified
by the name is partly the same, and partly different.” This was, indeed, at one
time the view of St. Thomas; but it is merely a nominal and as yet confused
definition of analogy. For Scotus and Suarez, the analogical concept is simply the
same and relatively different; on the other hand, for the Thomists such a concept
is simply different and relatively (or proportionately) the same. (See the appendix
to the seventh article of this question, in which these doctrines are compared.)
St. Thomas knows quite well that the definition of analogy must declare in what
the analogical concept (or perfection) simply consists: whether it has absolutely
the same or has absolutely a different meaning in the things it represents. And
he says at the end of the argumentative part of the article: “For in analogies the
idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as
in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various
proportions to some one thing.” The same applies to analogy of attribution, and
it is proportionately the same idea that is signified by the term in the analogy
of proportionality. See also fa, q.4, a.a, 3; De veritate, q.2, a.11.

THE NAMES OF GOD

397

minate proportion among these analogates; in fact, there is an im­
mense or immeasurable difference among them, since intellection
pertains to the higher order, so that the internal senses would al­
ways be susceptible to further perfection in their order, and yet
they would never attain to the dignity of the lowest grade of in­
tellection.30
This division of analogy may be expressed by the following
schema:
(as medicine and air with reference to the animal’s health).
(thus quality and quantity are spoken of as being dependent on
substance; yet intrinsically they are beings).
(thus the lion is said to be the king of animals; God is said to
be angry).

distance
determined:

created substance
its existence
in created beings

distance
J
. undetermined

proportionate accident
its existence

(intellection and sensa­
tion are analogically
and properly cognitions).

between God and f
God
_
Creature
.the creature
His existence - its existence 40

With these principles posited about the terminology, the chief
difficulty about our knowledge of God is in the statement made
immediately before the argumentative part of this article, namely,
“God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from
each other.” If, therefore, no corporeal being seems to be a suf­
ficiently expressive image for our knowledge of the created pure
spirit, far more so no creature whatever can be this for our knowl­
edge of God.
Yet the reply is that names are predicated of God and creatures,
neither univocally, nor equivocally, but analogically or proportion­
ately. There are three parts to this reply.
First part. Not univocally: because the names are not predicated
as having absolutely the same meaning. The reason for this is that
“the effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the
efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full
s» Read what St. Thomas says about this at the end of the argumentative part
of this article. Although he does not clearly distinguish between analogy of pro­
portion and analogy of proportionality in this article, yet he speaks about this
latter in the body of this article, and in the replies to the first and second objec­
tions, in which he refers to the likeness of the creature to God. See also la, q.4,
a.2, 3; q.13, a.2, 3; De veritate, q.2, a.11.
«ο For a fuller explanation of these matters consult what we wrote in De
revelatione, I, 301-18.

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THE ONE GOD

degree, but in a measure that falls short.” Thus wisdom in man is
an accident that is distinct from his essence, his existence, his in­
tellectual faculty, whereas in God wisdom is the same as the divine
essence.
This terminology of St. Thomas must be carefully noted, for he
says: “Hence it is evident that this term ‘wise’ is not applied in
the same way to God and to man.” St. Thomas says the same in
several other passages.41 Cajetan most faithfully preserves St.
Thomas’ teaching, with which Scotus disagrees.
2) These names are not predicated equivocally. This has been
already refuted in the second and third articles of this question,
in which it is shown that several names are predicated of God
substantially and in the literal sense. In this article equivocation is
disproved by reason of its inappropriateness, since “nothing could
be known about God” which is contrary to Sacred Scripture testify­
ing that “The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being under­
stood by the things that are made.” 42 Moreover, it is quite clear that
the words “being,” “wise,” do not signify in God and creatures
totally different ideas or perfections, as when “dog” is predicated of
animal and the constellation. For “being” signifies, both in God
and in creatures, that which is, although God is self-existent and
creatures are not. Similarly "wisdom” signifies, both in God and
in man, knowledge by the highest of causes, although not applied
in the same way to each.
3) These names are predicated analogically. The reason for this,
which has already been given 48 and which is repeated in the body
of this article and in the reply to the first objection, is that every
agent reproduces itself, inasmuch as it determines according to its
own determination, and therefore it produces something that is
either specifically or generically or at least analogically like itself.
Thus there is proportion or order, and proportionality between
God and creatures. But St. Thomas speaks more of the analogy
of proportion in this article. In other passages, however, he speaks
explicitly of the analogy of proportionality.44
<i Cf. la, q.4, a.2: "Whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in
the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent, as when
man reproduces man, or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal or non­
univocal agent." Also in la, q.4, a.3, he says: “In a third way, some things are
said to be alike which communicate in the same form (or perfection), but not
according to the same formality, as we see in non-univocal agents." Likewise at
the end of the argumentative part of the present article, he says: “For in analogies
the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse
as in equivocals."
<2 Rom. 1: 20.
<3 cf. la, q.4, a.2, 3.
« Cf. De veritate, q.2, a. 11.

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399

1) There is proportion, or preferably order of the creature toward
God as to its principle and cause, so that the being of creatures de­
pends on the divine Being. This is stated in the article.
2) There is proportionality, since there is a likeness between the
being of creatures and the divine Being, between created wisdom
and uncreated wisdom.
God
__ creature
His being
its being

God
__ the wise person
to all things
to all things
that must be known that must be known

This similitude is according to a formality that is neither ab­
solutely the same nor totally different, but proportionally the same.
The creature, like God, is intrinsically being, namely, that which
exists, but it is not its existence. Man, like God, is intelligent, but
he is not his intellection; created wisdom is knowledge of things
by the highest of causes, but it is not the cause of things. In all
these examples there is similarity of two proportions, namely, as
being is predicated of the creature in relation to its existence, so
being is predicated of God in relation to His existence; but God
alone is His existence. And as the Lateran Council says: “Between
God and the creature so great a similarity cannot be detected, as
not to detect a greater dissimilarity between them.” 45
Therefore the analogous notion cannot be perfectly prescribed
from its analogates, because it expresses what is proportionally
alike in each (for example, being is that which exists); and that
which is proportionally alike cannot be conceived without the very
members of the proportionality being included confusedly in the
concept.46 Contrary to this, the univocal notion, such as humanity,
animality, can be perfectly prescinded or abstracted from its various
subjects. The univocal notion can be represented by the symbol
o; the analogical notion, however, by the symbol 8.
The analogy of attribution can express the relation of one thing
to another (as of the air to the health of the animal), or of several
things to one object (as of the salubrious air and the healthful
remedy to the health of the animal). And since extrinsic denomina­
tion suffices for this analogy of attribution in the secondary analo­
gates (for the air is not intrinsically healthy), this analogy does not
as yet clearly make known in what the analogates are intrinsically
alike, when they are truly so alike. Hence, although this analogy is
<5 Denz., no. 432.
46 Being is that which exists either of itself (God), or by reason of another
(creature), or in itself (substance), or in another (accident). Thus there is truly
an analogical concept in the analogy of proper proportionality, whereas there is
a univocal concept (as of health) in the analogy of attribution, which is applied
to others by extrinsic denomination.

THE ONE GOD

400

perhaps prior in the way of investigation, yet if we wish to know
in what the analogates, which have something intrinsically in
common, are intrinsically alike among themselves, we must have
recourse to the more profound analogy of proportionality. Thus
from the relation of sense perception to the sensible object, we
know analogically the relation of the intellect to the intelligible
object, although it is of a higher order; also from the relation of
the sensitive appetite to sensible good, we know analogically the
higher relation of the will to rational or spiritual good. Likewise
from the relation of created being to its existence, we know ana­
logically of the conformity between the uncreated Being and His
existence, who is, however, the self-subsisting Being. Similarly from
the relation of human wisdom to things known by it we know
analogically what divine wisdom is, although this latter is the cause
of things, whereas our wisdom is caused by things.
It is of this proportionality that St. Thomas frequently speaks,
as in the following passage: “Sometimes the attention is directed
to conformity between two terms not proportionate to each other,
but which are proportional, as between 6 and 4, for 6 is to 3, as 4
is to 2. . . . Thus seeing is predicated (analogically) of both cor­
poreal and intellectual vision because, as sense perception is in the
eye, so intellectual perception is in the mind.”47 This is the
similarity that prevails between the created being and the un­
created Being, and they are both intrinsically beings (that which
exists, that whose act is existence), but it is a different mode of
existence in each. God alone is His existence, whereas the creature
has existence, and has it dependent upon another. St. Thomas
speaks of this analogical likeness (and indeed intrinsic) in the reply
to the first objection of this article: “The universal agent (God),
while it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal,
otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to
be called an analogical agent." 48 In the reply to the second objec­
tion, he says: “The creature’s likeness to God is imperfect, for it
does not represent one and the same generic thing.” 48
SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS
1) Objection of the agnostics. There is no proportion between
the finite and the infinite. But the aforesaid analogy would suppose
this proportion.
Reply. That there is no quantitative or proper proportion, this

47 De veritate, q.2, a. 11.
<e See also la, q.4, a.2, 3.
48 Cf. q.4, a.3.

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401

I concede; that there is no proportion in the sense of proportion­
ality, this I deny. Thus a likeness that is dependent on the divine
causality is sufficiently established.00
Instance. The difference between God and the creature is greater
than that between the creature and nothingness. Hence the Scrip­
ture says: “My substance is as nothing before Thee.” 51 But there
is no analogy between the created being and nothingness. There­
fore there is no analogy between God and the creature.
Reply. I distinguish the major. That the difference is greater as
regards the mode of being, this I concede; greater according to
the idea of being, this I deny.
Instance. The divine perfections, such as intellection and voli­
tion, cannot be identified without being destructive of one an­
other. But, according to the aforesaid doctrine, they are identified
in God. Therefore they are destructive of one another.
Reply. I distinguish the major. That they cannot be immediately
identified so that intellection is the same as volition, or vice versa,
this I concede; that they cannot be identified in the formal and
more eminent notion of the Deity without being destructive of
one another, this I deny.02 Superior beings unite in themselves the
various perfections of inferior beings. So eminent is the formal
notion of the Deity that it is equivalent to intelligence, will, and
other perfections, which are contained therein formally and emi­
nently. The Deity truly furnishes the foundation for these different
concepts.
And the aforesaid perfections cannot indeed be thus identified
according to their created mode, but according to the uncreated
mode. In fact, essence and existence, as well as operative power
and operation, demand according to their proper exigencies that
they be identified, since they are contained in the Deity without
any potentiality. But intellection and volition are identified not
under the aspect of being, but under the aspect of Deity. Therefore
the intimate reconciliation of God’s attributes remains a mystery
for us, since we have not the proper concept of the Deity.
Objections of Scotus and the Scotists. Although they admit anal­
ogy of being, yet they seek to retain univocity of being between
God and creatures. For Scotus, the formal notion of being is not
only proportionately but also absolutely one in God and creatures.
First objection. The concept of being prescinds completely from
God and creatures, since anyone can be certain, for instance, that
charity is an entity and yet can doubt whether charity is either
00 Cf. De veritate, q.2, a. 1, 11; q.22, a.7 ad gum.
»1 Ps. 38: 6.
62 See Cajetan, Com. in lam, q. 13, a.5, no. 7.

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THE ONE GOD

God or something created. Therefore the concept is absolutely
one.
Reply. Concerning this doubt, it suffices to say that the analogous
concept does not clearly express the analogates, though it actually
implies them, and not merely virtually, as the genus includes the
various species. For being, indeed, is that which exists either of
itself or by reason of another, and the various modes of being are
still being, whereas rationality is not animality.
Instance. If God and creatures were actually implied in the con­
cept of being, then God would be predicated of anything whatever
about which being is predicated. But the consequent is absurd.
Therefore the antecedent is also.
Reply. 1 distinguish the antecedent: If the concept of being actu­
ally and conjointly implies God and creatures, then I concede the
antecedent; if the concept implies them separately, then I deny
the antecedent. For being is that which exists, either of itself or
by reason of another; or it is predicated separately but not con­
jointly of God and creatures.53
SIXTH ARTICLE

WHETHER NAMES PREDICATED OF GOD ARE PREDICATED
PRIMARILY OF CREATURES

State of the question. It seems that they are predicated primarily
of creatures, for our first knowledge is of creatures. “We name God
from creatures.” 54
St. Thomas replies to this with the following distinctions:
1) All names that are applied metaphorically to God are applied
primarily to creatures, for they mean only similitudes to creatures.
Thus God is metaphorically said to be angry, and anger is pri­
marily predicated of the movement of the sensitive irascible ap­
petite.
2) Names that are not applied to God metaphorically but properly,
are applied to Him primarily as regards what the names signify,
and primarily to creatures as regards the imposition of the names.
The reason for the first part of this conclusion is that they are ap­
plied to God not as the cause only, but also substantially.55 The
reason for the second part is that, in the way of investigation, our
first knowledge is of creatures.
os Consuli Cajetan’s commentary on this article, and his treatise De analogia
nominum, chaps. 5, to. See also the appendix to the seventh article of this question,
in which the doctrine of St. Thomas is compared with that of Scotus and Suarez.
Dionysius, De nom. div., chap. 1.
«s Cf. q. 13, a.2.

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403

And so this explains why Christ said: "None is good but one, that
is God,” 58 and why St. Paul wrote: "I bow my knees to the Father
of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom all paternity in heaven and
earth is named.” 67 This article, in thus explaining these revealed
words, is of great importance in the refutation of agnosticism, just
as the third article is, in which it is stated that these names are
applied to God in the literal sense, and not metaphorically or sym­
bolically.
SEVENTH ARTICLE
WHETHER NAMES WHICH IMPLY RELATION TO CREATURES
ARE APPLIED TO GOD TEMPORALLY

The question is whether such names as Creator, Lord, Savior,
can be applied to God eternally. It seems to be so, because the
creative action is the same as God’s essence, so that it is eternal,
although its effect takes place only in time. Moreover, if these
names were applied to God temporally, it could be said that God
became the Savior, and this would denote a certain change in God.
At least it would posit a new relation in God toward creatures,
and not only a logical but a real relation, because God is really the
Creator and the Savior.
The reply is: The names which import relation to creatures are
applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.
The reason for this is clearly given at the end of the argumenta­
tive part of this article. It is that these names are predicated not
indeed because of any change in God, but because of some change
in the creature; so that these names denote a real relation of de­
pendence of the creature upon God, and only a logical relation
of God toward the creature.
This is possible because “the two extremes are not of the same
order.” Thus there is a real relation of the visual faculty to the
thing visible; but there is not a real relation of the visible object
considered according to its physical entity to the visual faculty,
for this physical order is distinct from the cognitive order. Like­
wise there is a real relation of knowledge to the thing knowable;
but the thing knowable considered in itself is not in real relation
to knowledge, because the thing in itself is of another order,
namely, of the physical. Hence the thing is said to be known only
by extrinsic denomination, according to a logical relation. But God
completely transcends the order of created beings, and all created
beings are ordered to Him, and not conversely.
ee Mark 10: 18.
er Eph. 3: 14.

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404

Thus these names (Creator, Savior, Lord) are applied to God
temporally, not because of a change in God, but because of a change
in creatures.
Reply to first objection. “ ‘Creator
*
and ‘Savior’ are applied
temporally in their relation to creatures, but not as they signify the
divine essence,” since the creative action is the same as the divine
essence.
This completes the first part of this question, which is a discus­
sion of the divine names in general. The solution of the following
doubt is appended to this part by way of recapitulation.
THE DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS COMPARED WITH
THE TEACHINGS OF SCOTUS AND SUAREZ

THE EMINENCE OF THE DEITY

What is meant by the statement that the divine perfections are
contained ‘‘formally and eminently” in God?
It is generally admitted that absolutely simple perfections are
contained ‘‘formally and eminently” in God. What this means, ac­
cording to the teaching of St. Thomas, must now be the subject
of inquiry.
All theologians are aware of the necessity of defending this doc­
trine so as to avoid the nominalism of modern agnostics, who to
some extent revive the opinion of Maimonides (Rabbi Moses), who
said that the divine attributes are contained virtually and emi­
nently in God, as mixed perfections are, rather than formally and
eminently.
But theologians are not all agreed as to the meaning of this last
expression, and so its exact signification is now sought. First of all
we must recall very briefly what is commonly admitted on this
subject, as recorded by St. Thomas in the various articles of this
thirteenth question, and in the same order as presented by him.
I. What does the adverb “formally” signify in the above expres­
sion?
i) These absolutely simple perfections are said to be formally
in God inasmuch as they are in Him substantially and in the literal
sense.58 Substantially, indeed, and not merely causally, as if "God
is good” meant, as Maimonides contends, merely that “God is the
cause of good things.” 59 In the literal sense, too, and not merely
metaphorically. Thus, in the literal sense, God is said to be just,
and metaphorically He is said to be angry.80
08 Cf. a. i, a, 3.
80 Cf. a. 2.
80 Cf. a.3.

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405

The reason for this twofold assertion is that absolutely simple
perfections, such as goodness, wisdom, love, imply no imperfection
in their formal signification, since they differ from the finite mode
of these perfections in creatures. And it is clear that the First Cause
must possess eminently all created perfections that imply no im­
perfection.01 There is not the least doubt about this part of the
question.
2) The names that express the above-mentioned perfections are
not synonymous. This is said in refutation of the nominalists who
asserted that there is only a logical and verbal distinction between
the divine attributes, such as between Tullius and Cicero. If this
were so, then, just as it is purely optional for one to write Cicero
instead of Tullius, so it would be purely optional for one to write
divine justice instead of mercy, and thus it could be said that God
punishes by His mercy, and forgives by His justice.02 This second
assertion is likewise most certain, and is commonly admitted by
Thomists, Scotists, and Suarezians.
3) The aforesaid perfections are predicated of God neither un­
ivocally nor equivocally, but analogically. Hence in the expression
“formally and eminently” the meaning is: formally and eminently,
not univocally. For St. Thomas says: “Every effect which is not an
adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the
similitude of the agent not in its full degree (which means, accord­
ing to the context, not univocally), but in a measure that falls short,
so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the
agent simply, and in the same manner. . . . All perfections exist­
ing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly
and simply.” 03
These texts are of great importance. St. Thomas defines analogy
for us in these texts, though not in the way Suarez does.04 For those
who accept the principles of Suarez, analogues are such as have a
ei Ibid., la, q.4, a. 2, 3.
«2 Cf. a. 4.
ea cf. a.5; also la, q.4, a.2, 3.
04 Consult Suarez (Disp. metaph., disp. 2, sect. 2, no. 34), who, in discussing the
unity of the concept of being, says: "Now I merely assert that everything which
has been said concerning the unity of the concept of being, appears to be clearer
and more certain than that being is analogous. Therefore, in order to defend
analogy, it is not right to deny the unity of the concept; but if one of the two
must be denied, it k analogy, which is uncertain, that is to be denied rather than
unity of concept, which seems to be demonstrated by sound arguments. See also
Disp. metaph., disp. 28, sect. 3, nos. 9, 11; disp. 32, sect. 2. See also Delmas, S.J.,
Metaphysica, p. 61; Frick, S.J., Ontologia, no. 23. For those who take the opposite
view, consult A. Martin: “Suarez métaphysicien et théologien" (Science catholique,
July, September, 1898); Norbert del Prado, O.P., De veritate fundamentali, pp.
196 f.: "Suarez recedens a D. Thoma per viam Scoti graditur."

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THE ONE GOD

common name, but the meaning signified by the name is relatively
speaking different and absolutely speaking the same. But the
Thomists maintain that St. Thomas defined analogues as having a
common name, but the meaning signified by the name is absolutely
speaking different in the analogates, and relatively speaking the
same in them, that is, they are alike according to some proportion,
or proportionally the same.65
This Thomistic formula expresses adequately the teaching of St.
Thomas in the text just quoted, in which he speaks ex professo on
this subject, and says: “Every effect which is not an adequate result
of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the
agent not in its full degree (that is, not univocally, as is evident
from the preceding paragraph in the context), but in a measure
that falls short.” 66 A little farther on in this same article, he says:
“This term ‘wise’ is not applied in the same way to God and to
man.” The term is predicated, indeed, in proportionally the same
sense, inasmuch as wisdom in general is knowledge by the highest
of causes; but God's wisdom is the cause of things, whereas created
wisdom is caused or measured by things.67
The way St. Thomas expresses himself here is completely in agree­
ment with what is commonly admitted in logic, which establishes
a distinction betwen analogues and univocals. Thus it is said that
the generic and univocal name “animality” expresses absolutely the
same notion or “a living body endowed with sensitive life,” in both
the higher and the lower forms of animal life, as in the lion and
the worm.66 But the meaning signified by the name “knowledge”
is absolutely speaking different and only proportionally the same
in sensation and intellection, since sensation is related to the sen­
sible as intellection is to the intelligible. Likewise the meaning sig­
nified by the name “love” is only proportionally the same in
sensitive love and in spiritual love. Therefore, while the univocal
perfection can be perfectly abstracted from the inferior grades of
being, as in predicating “animal” of the lion and the worm, by not
e5 Consult Cajetan, De analogia nominum, chap. 6: also Com. in lam, q. 13,
a.5, no. 15; John of St. Thomas, Cursus phil., Logica, q. 13; Goudin, Philosophia,
Logica major, la, dist. II, q.i, a.2; J. M. Ramirez, “De analogia secundum doc­
trinam Aristotelico-thomisticam” (La Ciencia Tomista, July, 1921, January, 1922).
ee Cf. a.5.
•r Cf. q.13, a.5 (end of argumentative part of the article); also la, q.4, a.2, 3,
in which St. Thomas says the same.
es Thus in the genus animality we already find verified what Suarez considers
to be the definition of analogy; for in this case the meaning signified by the name
is, absolutely speaking, the same (a living body endowed with sensitive life) and,
relatively speaking, different, inasmuch as animality applied to the higher forms
of life implies the presence of all the internal and external senses, but it is not
so of animality as applied to the lower forms of life.

THE NAMES OF GOD

407

considering the differentiae that are extrinsic to the genus, the
analogous perfection cannot be perfectly abstracted from its analogates,09 because the similarity of the proportions is not conceived
without conceiving confusedly or actually and implicitly the mem­
bers of the proportionality. Hence it is difficult to define knowledge
in general, so that it can be applied in the strict sense to sensation,
to created intellection, and to the divine intellection. In like man­
ner it is difficult to define being, such that it applies equally to God.
to created substance, and to accident.
But from this, that the analogous concept is only proportionally
the same, it follows, as St. Thomas notes,70 that there can be an
infinite difference between two analogates. Now there is, indeed, a
vast difference between sensitive knowledge and intellective knowl­
edge; yet the term “knowledge” is applied to both analogically and
properly, and not merely metaphorically.
Moreover, the terminology of St. Thomas, according to which
the idea of an analogical perfection is not absolutely but only pro­
portionally the same in God and in creatures, is completely in
agreement with that of the Fourth Lateran Council, which says:
“Between the Creator and the creature not so great a similarity can
be detected, as not to detect a greater dissimilarity." 71 Therefore,
when we say that perfections implying no imperfection are in God
formally, the word “formally” must be understood not univocally
but analogically; in the literal sense, however, and not meta­
phorically; just as in the created order knowledge is predicated of
sensation and intellection analogically, but properly.72 Having ex­
plained what is meant by “formally,” we must now declare what
is implied by “eminently.”
II. What is meant by the adverb “eminently” in the abovementioned expression?
1) From what has been said, it follows that the most eminent
mode in which the divine attributes are contained in God is in
itself mysterious, and is expressed only negatively and relatively, as
when God’s wisdom is spoken of as not finite, as supreme, highest.
Hence St. Thomas says: “This term ‘wise’ applied to man in
some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified (as
distinct from the essence of man, his existence, power . . . ); where­
as this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the
es See Cajetan, De analogia nominum, chap. 5.
to De veritate, q.2, a. 11.
” Denz., no. 432.
72 Cf. John of St. Thomas, Logica, q. 13, a.5. M. T. L. Penido, La rôle de
l'analogie en théologie dogmatique, pp. 53-60, 136-45. There are not two un­
knowns in proportion. Objections of Father Descoqs; Is proportionality fictitious?
Is it primary?

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THE ONE GOD

thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the significa­
tion of the name.” 73 In this we already have the explanation of the
adverb “eminently” in the expression "formally and eminently.”
But this requires further explanation.
2) From what has been said it follows likewise, against Scotus,
that there is no actual-formal distinction between the aforesaid
divine perfections arising from the nature of these. For this dis­
tinction, according to Scotus, is more than virtual, inasmuch as it
is prior to the mind’s consideration. But a distinction that is prior
to the mind’s consideration is already real, however slight it may
be. A real distinction, however, between the divine attributes is in­
compatible with God's absolute simplicity. Therefore the Council
of Florence says: “In God all things are one and the same where
there is no relation of opposition.” 74
Therefore a virtual and indeed minor distinction is the only kind
that can be admitted between the divine attributes. It is a dis­
tinction by way of implicit and explicit connotations, inasmuch as
one attribute actually implies the others.
Yet it must be maintained, against the nominalists, that the di­
vine names are not synonymous, that there is not only a distinction
of names, for instance, between mercy and justice, as between Tul­
lius and Cicero.
3) Then tire difficult question is posited of the identification of
the divine perfections in God, in such a manner that they are not
destructive of one another, but remain in God formally, or sub­
stantially and properly, and are not synonymous. The question here
concerns the difficulty of combining the two adverbs “formally”
and “eminently.” At first sight it seems that, as regards their signi­
fication, the latter is destructive of the former. It is indeed not
difficult to see how the seven colors of the rainbow are contained
in white light; but it contains them only virtually and not formally,
for white light is formally neither blue nor red, whereas the Deity
is formally good, intelligent, merciful. ... It is particularly this
difficulty that Scotus proposed, and he defended his actual-formal
distinction between the divine attributes arising from the nature
of these, because he deemed their formal identification an impossi­
bility. As Scotus sees it, for the divine attributes to exist formally in
God, they must be in Him as distinct formalities and more than
virtually.
Is this identity an impossibility? Cajetan replies that there are
two ways of understanding this: "(1) If we suppose that the proper
formal concepts of wisdom and justice constitute one formal conr« Cf. a.5.
« Denz., no. 703.

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409

cept, such that this one concept is not another concept, but is only
the proper concept of wisdom and justice. And this sort of identity
is absolutely impossible, involving two contradictories. ... (2) If
we suppose that the concepts of wisdom and justice are eminently
included and formally identified in one formal concept of a higher
order. And this identity is not only possible, but is actually so with
all perfections in God. For it must not be thought that the formal
concept that belongs properly to wisdom is found in God; but, as
stated in the article, the concept of wisdom in God is not the proper
concept of wisdom, but is the proper concept of a higher order,
namely, of the Deity, and it is a concept that is formally and emi­
nently common to justice, goodness, power, and other attributes.
For, just as in rational creatures the reality which is wisdom and
the reality which is justice are elevated so as to constitute one reality
of the higher order, which is the Deity, thereby constituting one
reality in God, so the formal concepts of wisdom and justice are
elevated so as to constitute one formal concept of a higher order,
the proper concept, namely, of the Deity. They constitute numeri­
cally one formal concept, containing eminently what is implied in
each concept: not only virtually, as the concept of light includes
the concept of heat, but formally, as the concept of light includes
the concept of calorific energy.78 Whence St. Thomas, with that
most keen penetration of his divine-like intellect, inferred from this
that wisdom is not predicated of God and creatures in the same
sense.” 76 This means, as Cajetan says farther on: “There is not ab­
solute unity of concept,” 77 but a proportionate unity, as Cajetan
had said in another treatise.78
This, then, is the meaning given by the Thomists to the ex­
pression “formally and eminently.” By “formally” is meant that the
perfections are in God substantially and not causally, literally and
not metaphorically; nevertheless they are predicated analogically.
The term “eninently” excludes an actual-formal distinction between
God's attributes, and expresses their identification or rather identity
in the most eminent formal concept of the Deity, whose proper
mode is in itself unknown to us, and is known only negatively and
relatively in this life.
This is practically what St. Thomas says, as in the following
passages: “These perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply,
whereas in creatures they are received, divided, and multiplied. . . .
78 Nowadays we would say: As white light contains the seven colors not formally
but virtually, having the power to produce these colors.
re Com. in lam, q. 13, a.5, no. 7.
77 Ibid., no. 15.
7« De analogia nominum, chap. 6.

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THE ONE GOD

So also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect
there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to
these conceptions, imperfectly understood.” 78 Also: “The many as­
pects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds
to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold
and imperfect manner.” 80 Hence the divine attributes are so iden­
tified in the most eminently formal concept of the Deity as not to
be destructive of one another. They are contained formally in the
Deity, yet not as distinct formalities. In fact, the divine perfections
are so identified without being destructive of one another in the
eminence of the Deity, that they exist there in their most pure state
without any admixture of imperfection. Thus God alone is essential
Being, essential Goodness, and similarly for the other attributes.
4) It is easier to explain this identification for those perfections
which are of the same order, and between which there is only an
extrinsic virtual distinction, namely, one that has its foundation
only in creatures. Thus intelligence, intellection, the divine truth
always understood, are most evidently identified, inasmuch as God
is the self-subsisting Being, who is identical with the maximum
Truth that is of itself and always actually understood.
It is more difficult to explain the identification of those per­
fections that do not belong to the same order, such as intellection
and love, mercy and justice. Nevertheless, from what has been said
it is clear that they are identified in the eminence of the Deity,
which is eminently and formally intellection and love, mercy and
justice.
5) This same explanation holds good for saying that there is no
actual-formal but only a virtual distinction between the divine na­
ture and the subsistent relations which constitute the divine Persons,
as, for instance, between the divine nature that is communicable ad
intra and incommunicable paternity.
Hence Cajetan says: “In itself, not according to our manner of
speaking, in God there is but one formal concept, which is not
purely absolute or purely relative or purely communicable or purely
incommunicable. But it is a concept which in a most eminent and
formal way contains whatever there is of absolute perfection, and
whatever is demanded by the Trinity in a relative sense. . . . For the
divine reality is prior to being and all its differences. It is above being
and above the one. . . 81 For the same reason, therefore, the
divine reality transcends the absolute and the relative, which are
contained in it formally and eminently.
™ Summa theol., la, q.13, a.4.
*0 Ibid., ad 2um. See also a.5, c.
»1 Com. in lam, q.39, a. 1, no. 7.

THE NAMES OF GOD

4n

This doctrine of the eminence of the Deity elucidates especially
three questions which are of the greatest importance in dogmatic
theology.
1) What stands out clearly from this doctrine is that reason alone
can demonstrate the existence in God of a truth and life that are
of the supernatural order, inasmuch as the Deity or God's intimate
life transcends the proper object and powers of any created or
creatable being. As St. Thomas says: “It is most evident that some
divine intelligibles absolutely transcend the native power of human
reason.” 82
2) It is likewise evident from this doctrine of the eminence of the
Deity that sanctifying grace must be called a participation of the
divine nature, since it is a physical, formal, and analogical partici­
pation of the Deity as this is in itself; and so this participation
radically ordains us to see the Deity as it really is. Thus the question
of whether grace is a participation of the divine infinity is clearly
seen to be of less importance. Certainly there is no subjective par­
ticipation of the divine infinity, for by this it would be limited.
But grace ordains us to see the Deity, of which it is a true partici­
pation. Now, stones are like God according to being, plants accord­
ing to life, human and angelic intellects according to intellection,
but by grace alone we are like God according to the Deity.
3) Finally, in this doctrine of the eminence of the Deity we have
a sublime explanation of why we cannot perceive in this life how
God’s universal will to save is intimately reconciled with the mys­
tery of predestination. This would be to perceive how infinite
mercy, justice, and supreme liberty are intimately reconciled in the
eminence of the Deity, and why God mercifully elected this par­
ticular person rather than a certain other.
This theological contemplation of the eminence of the Deity,
provided it is united with an ever-increasing charity, normally dis­
poses one for infused contemplation, which, under the special in­
spiration of the Holy Ghost, proceeds from vivid faith illumined
by the gifts of understanding and wisdom, and which, in a mystic
darkness and in a more exalted way, attains to the Deity or to
“that” light inaccessible whom, as St. Paul says, "no man hath seen
nor can see,” 88 except in Heaven.84
82 Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 3, §3. See also la, q. 12, a.4. This has been
proved extensively by us in De revelatione, I, 337-70, where it is proved that there
is a truth and life of the supernatural order in God, or of an order of super­
natural mysteries.
83 I Tim. 6: 16.
8i On this point consult the discussion in Acta Pont. Academiae romanae
sancti Thomae Aq., in which several objections are answered.

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THE ONE GOD
EIGHTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THE NAME “GOD” IS A NAME OF THE NATURE

State of the question. Certain divine names in particular are now
considered. The question is whether “God” (@eos) is a name of the
nature or of operation.
Reply. God is a name of operation as regards the imposition of
this name, by the way of investigation; but it is a name of the
nature as regards what is meant by this name.
The reason is that we have not immediate knowledge of the
essences of things, and especially of God’s essence; but we know
them only by their operations. Thus the name “stone” designates
the nature of the stone, but many hold that this name is derived
from its act, since it hurts the foot.85 But the divine operation from
which this name “God” is imposed, seems to be that by which God
knows and ordains all things, at least according to the etymology
given by Dionysius.88 Hence the name “Deity” expresses properly
the divine nature.
At the end of the reply to the second objection there is again a
reference to the three ways by which God is known, namely, by
causality, by eminence, and by negation.
NINTH ARTICLE
WHETHER THE NAME

“god" IS COMMUNICABLE

Reply. This name “God” is incommunicable in reality (in the
literal sense), but communicable in opinion and metaphorically.
The reason for the first part is that the divine nature or the Deity
is in itself incommunicable to creatures. There can be only one
God.8T Nevertheless from revelation we know that God the Father
communicates the Deity to the Son and the Holy Ghost. Hence
nothing outside God can properly be called God.
The reason for the second part is that men, adopting the erro­
neous opinion of polytheists, spoke of several gods. Moreover this
name is predicated metaphorically of the just because of the grace
or participation of the divine nature which they have. Thus the
Scripture says: “I have said, you are gods.” 88
Hence while being, life, and intellection are naturally partici-

85 The reference is to the Latin name; for lapis implies laedil pedem (“it hurts
the foot”). [Tr.]
eo De div. nom., chap. 12.
87 Summa theol., la, q. 11, a.3.
88 Ps. 8i: 6.

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413

pable in stones, plants, and rational creatures, the Deity is not
naturally but only supernaturally participable by grace, which is a
formal participation of the Deity, or of the radical principle of the
operations by which God sees and loves Himself.
TENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THIS NAME "GOD” IS PREDICATED UNIVOCALLY OF
THE TRUE GOD, OF IDOLS, AND OF THE JUST

Reply. This name is predicated of God alone, in fact uniquely
so. Of idols it is predicated analogically in accordance with the
false opinion of the polytheists; of the just it is predicated ana­
logically by a certain participated likeness.
ELEVENTH ARTICLE
WHETHER THIS NAME “HE WHO IS” IS THE MOST PROPER NAME OF GOD

Reply. It is in the affirmative, and for three reasons: (1) because
God alone is His existence, so that His existence is His essence; (2)
because this name, “He who is,” determines no mode of being, and
therefore it denominates the infinite ocean of substance, and thus
it comprehends all other names confusedly. "Therefore the less
determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute
they are, the more properly they are applied to God”;89 (3) because
this name, “He who is,” signifies present existence, and so it ex­
presses God’s eternity, which transcends past and future.
Reply to first objection. Nevertheless, “as regards the object in­
tended by the name, this name ‘God’ is more proper, as it is imposed
to signify the divine nature,” namely, the Deity which eminently
and formally contains being, life, and intellection. St. Thomas dis­
tinguishes between the Tetragrammaton and the name “He who
is”; but nowadays all identify these two names.90
Reply to second objection. Supreme Good is God’s principle
name, as regards causality, inasmuch as He is the end of all things,
and the end is the first of causes. But ’’What is” is His principal
name absolutely.91
so See argumentative part of this article.
90 Undoubtedly the Scholastics knew that the Hebrew name “Yahweh” is the
Tetragrammaton or word of four letters; but they were ignorant of its true
pronunciation. This pronunciation of hybrid form is of recent origin, not being
heard before the sixteenth century. This ignorance probably explains why several
Scholastics erred in distinguishing, though on insufficient grounds, between the
Tetragrammaton and the divine name, “He who is.” Cf. Prat, Diet, de la Bible
(III, 1225), art. "Jehovah.”
it Summa theol., la, q.5, a.2 ad turn.

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THE ONE GOD
TWELFTH ARTICLE
WHETHER AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITIONS CAN BE FORMED
ABOUT GOD

State of the question. This article may be looked upon as a re­
capitulation of the preceding articles, its purpose being the laying
down of rules for the forming of affirmative judgments. That diffi­
culties arise is owing to the fact that Dionysius says, in what is
called his negative theology: “Negations about God are true, but
affirmations are vague.” 82 For God is ineffable, and we have no
proper concept of the Deity, which for us pilgrims is like “a great
darkness” or “an obscure night.” Moreover, God is a simple form,
in no way composite, whereas there is composition in affirmative
judgments.
Reply. Nevertheless, true affirmative propositions can be formed
about God. The first proof of this is the fact that there are several
propositions about God that are of faith.
Another proof of this may be expressed by the following syl­
logism: In every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the
subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different
things in idea. Thus in the proposition “Peter is white” (“Peter”
and “white” are the same in subject). But God, considered in Him­
self, is altogether one and simple; yet our intellect knows Him
according to different conceptions. Therefore two affirmative propo­
sitions can be formed about God.
Reply to first objection. “Dionysius says that the affirmations
about God are vague inasmuch as no name can be applied to God
according to its mode of signification.”83 Thus abstract names
signify the form only, and concrete names signify the composite
subject in which there is such a form, whereas God is pure subsisting
form.94
Reply to third objection. “Any intellect which understands that
the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not hold in
the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition
about God, does not affirm that He is composite.” But there is
imperfection in its manner of understanding.
And so this terminates the question about divine names, in which
St. Thomas most correctly determines the just and transcendent
mean between the two opposite errors, namely, of agnosticism and
a certain anthropomorphism. Agnosticism is avoided, as it is af02 Coel. Hier., chap. 2.
os Cf. a. 3.
Cf. ad 2um.

THE NAMES OF GOD

415

firmed that absolutely simple perfections are substantially and
properly in God, and are primarily in Him rather than in crea­
tures. Anthropomorphism is avoided, as it is affirmed that these per­
fections are not predicated univocally of God and creatures, but
analogically, according to a likeness of proportions. Just as there is
an existence that belongs properly to the creature, so there is an
existence that belongs properly to God, and He is His own exist­
ence. Just as there is a wisdom that belongs properly to man, so
there is a wisdom that belongs properly to God, and He alone is
His own intellection, as will be more clearly explained farther on.
This method of analogy is applied to all questions about the one
and triune God, which is most accurately determined in this
thirteenth question. Analogy is necessary both for the natural
knowledge of God and for the supernatural knowledge of revealed
mysteries. Thus with the former there is evidence resulting from
demonstration, with the latter there is obscurity of faith. For God,
in the manifestation of the mysteries of His intimate life, made use
of such analogical notions as those of nature, person, paternity,
filiation, and these are in us as naturally acquired. Hence, as regards
God the author of nature, the legitimate analogies can be known
by reason alone; but it is not so if it is a question of God the author
of grace, in His intimate life.

CHAPTER XIV
Question 14

God’s Knowledge

“Having considered what belongs to the divine substance,” says
St. Thomas, “we have now to treat of God’s operation.” Those com­
mentators who maintain that self-subsisting Being is what formally
constitutes the divine nature, according to our imperfect mode of
conceiving it, say that the divine intellection, according to St.
Thomas, belongs to His operations. But those who hold that subsist­
ent intellection is what formally constitutes the divine nature,
declare that St. Thomas does not say that he has so far treated of
the divine nature, but of those things that belong to God’s sub­
stance; nor does he say now that he is considering only the divine
operations, but those things that belong to God’s operations. But
nature belongs to them as their principle. Nevertheless this pas­
sage of St. Thomas favors rather the first opinion, and it seems that
St. Thomas did not wait for this fourteenth question in order to
treat of what formally constitutes the divine nature.1
First are considered merely immanent actions, such as intellection
and volition, and then virtually transitive operations, in which
God’s power is discussed.
In the fourteenth question, which concerns God's knowledge,
four principal points are considered: (1) Is there intellection in God,
and what is its nature? (2) the primary object of God’s knowledge
(a. 2, 3, 4); (3) the secondary object (a. 5-13); (4) the way the divine
knowledge operates; whether it is enunciative, variable, speculative,
practical (a. 14,16).
first article

WHETHER THERE IS KNOWLEDGE IN GOD

State of the question. In the title, “knowledge” is taken in its
broad sense as referring to certain and evident intellectual cogni­
tion. The article is not concerned with knowledge strictly so called,
as distinct from wisdom; and so it is cognition acquired by proxi­
mate causes, and not by the highest of causes. In fact, in the reply
1 Cf. supra, q.3.

416

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

417

to the second objection, it is stated that the divine intellection is
eminently, without distinction of habits, intelligence, science,
wisdom, prudence, and art.
The difficulties enunciated at the beginning of the article apply,
however, to knowledge in the strict sense, inasmuch as it is a habit
distinct from act, being concerned with conclusions and with uni­
versal abstract cognition. All these pertain to the created and im­
perfect mode of our knowledge.
Reply. God occupies the highest place in knowledge, because He
is in the highest degree of immateriality.
1) This conclusion is a revealed truth, for there are many texts
in Holy Scripture in which it is clearly stated that God is intelli­
gent. It is a dogma of faith; in fact, the Vatican Council states that
"God is infinite in intelligence.” 2
It is also demonstrated by the following syllogism: The imma­
teriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive, and the mode
of knowledge is according to the mode of immateriality. Therefore
God occupies the highest place in knowledge, for He is in the highest
degree of immateriality.
The minor has already been proved.3 God is not a body, not com­
posed of matter and form, but is pure subsisting form; in fact, He
is the self-subsisting Being,4 and besides is infinite.6 He transcends
all limitations of essence, and a fortiori of matter.
The first part of the major is as follows: The difference between
the intelligent being and the non-intelligent being is that the in­
telligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some
other, which is therefore because of the amplitude of its nature;
but the contraction of the form comes from the matter,8 which
limits the amplitude of the form; therefore the immateriality of a
thing is the reason why it is cognitive.
This argument gives the proof for the second part of the major.
The mode of knowledge is according to the mode of immateriality;
thus the intellect is more cognitive than sense. Therefore, since God
is in the highest degree of immateriality, He occupies the highest
place in knowledge.
The whole of this doctrine has its foundation in the principle
that the intelligent being differs from the non-intelligent being,
inasmuch as the former can in a sense become something other than
itself. Thus Aristotle says: “The soul is in a sense all things.” 7
2 Denz., no. 1782.
s Summa theol., q.3, a.2.
4 Ibid., a.4.
‘Ibid., q.7, a. 1.
e Ibid.
» De anima, Bk. Ill, chap. 8.

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THE ONE GOD

Whereas the plant, which at first was cold, under the influence
of the sun’s rays undergoes a change, becoming warm, the intelli­
gent being, on seeing the sun, does not undergo a change, becoming
warm, but in a sense becomes something else. This demands for
such a being the possibility of its having in itself not only its own
form but also the form of the other thing, namely, the representa­
tive species of the thing to be known.
But if the contraction or limitation of the form comes from the
matter which receives the form, and which individualizes it, the
immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive. Hence
plants, because of their materiality, are not cognitive, whereas God
is in the highest degree cognitive, because He is in the highest
degree immaterial.
Both the materialists and the subjectivist idealists fail to per­
ceive this profound reason why anything is cognitive. Materialism
denies this immateriality of the principle of cognition, maintaining
that it is only an epiphenomenon of not much importance, which
transcends the physico-chemical phenomena.
On the other hand, subjectivist idealism does not admit that the
knower truly knows something other than himself, but that he knows
only his subjective modifications.
In these two extreme systems, which are fundamentally in opposi­
tion to each other, there is no conception of what is meant by this
intentional change necessary for our knowledge, and transcending
the physical or organic change already existing in the non-cognitive
plant.
Whereas in physical or material reception there is appropriation
of the form, which thus becomes the proper form of the subject, as
when a plant is first cold and then becomes warm; on the other
hand, in immaterial or intentional reception there is no appro­
priation of the form received, this remaining the form of the other
thing. Hence Averroes was right in saying: “The knower and the
known are more one than matter and form”; for matter does not
become the form which it receives, whereas the knower, in a sense,
namely, intentionally or representatively, becomes the object
known, or becomes something other than itself.8
St. Thomas says: “Change is of two kinds, one natural, the other
spiritual. Natural change takes place by the form of the changer
being received, according to its natural existence, into the thing
changed, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual
change takes place by the form of the changer being received, ac­
cording to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing changed.
. . . Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual change is re• Consult the commentaries of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas on this article.

GODS KNOWLEDGE

4i9

quired, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the
sensile organ.” 9 Previous to this, he had written: ‘‘But feeling is
evidently accompanied with some change in the body. . . , and
thus every operation of the sensitive soul is an operation of the
composite. . . . Understanding alone is performed without a cor­
poreal organ.” 10 Now indeed, the sensitive faculty is in some way
elevated above material conditions, although it depends intrinsically
on the organism. The intelligent being, of course, first becomes in­
tentionally other than itself in first actuality by the impressed
species of the thing known, and then in second actuality it becomes
other than itself while actually knowing the extramental reality. It
does not go out of itself in a literal sense, as a man goes out of his
house, for knowing is an immanent act; but it becomes intentionally
other than itself, inasmuch as the intentional species and the cog­
nition are essentially related to the object of cognition.
From all that has been said, it is clearly enough established that
knowledge has its foundation in the immateriality of the knower,
and that the “mode of knowledge is according to the mode of im­
materiality.” Since, therefore, God is in the highest degree of im­
materiality (inasmuch as He is not only a pure spirit but pure Act,
the self-subsisting Being), it follows that He is in the highest degree
knowing.
Cognition and intellection in their formal signification imply no
imperfection, and thus they can be predicated of God analogically
and properly, and not merely metaphorically.
Reply to first objection. Knowledge is said to be a habit that is
not so perfect as act with regard to the created mode of its being,
but not with regard to what is meant by the name. Moreover, there
is not even a virtual distinction in God between wisdom and
knowledge.
Reply to second objection. Likewise in man, knowledge, as re­
gards its created mode, implies the imperfect process of formally
discursive reasoning, and the transition from the unknown to the
known. But there can be a most perfect knowledge, with only vir­
tually discursive reasoning, and thus it differs neither from intelli­
gence nor from wisdom.11
Reply to third objection. Universal knowledge does not exist in
» Summa theol., la, q.78, a.3.
10 Ibid., q.75, a.3: cf. De veritate, q.2, a.i.
11 Yet it is knowledge in the strict sense which God has, namely, knowledge of
things through their causes; because virtual discursive reasoning suffices for
knowledge, as is the case with the angels, who know things not successively but
by one intuitive act. God, as will be stated farther on, does not proceed from the
known to the unknown, does not know the effects from their causes, but imme­
diately in their causes.

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THE ONE GOD

God as abstracted from singular things; but by this knowledge God
also knows at once singular things, a point that will be made clear
in a subsequent article.12
SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

First objection. The following objection is raised against the
fundamental proof in the argumentative part of this article: There
are many immaterial things that are not cognitive, such as the will
and its habits. Therefore the reason given by St. Thomas is of no
value.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. That there are many im­
material supposita that are not cognitive, this I deny; that there
are many operative principles, such as the will and its habits, I
subdistinguish; that they are not cognitive as elective acts, this I con­
cede; that they are not of the cognitive order, acting in concert
with the intellect, this I deny.
Second objection. The air and the mirror receive the intentional
species without undergoing any change, and yet they are not cogni­
tive. Therefore the reason given is of no value.
Reply. That these species are received in the air and the mirror,
as in their subject of inhesion, in which these species materially
inhere, this I concede; that the air and the mirror receive them
formally as intentional or representative species, this I deny. As
a matter of fact, what the air and the mirror receive is rather the
power by which the impressed species is produced in the senses,
or in the visual faculty, and in this alone, as in its proper habitat,
it is formed.18
Third objection. All angels are equally immaterial, and yet they
are not equally cognitive. Therefore the mode of cognition is not
according to the mode of immateriality.
Reply. That all angels are equally immaterial in the negative
sense, which means that they are without matter, this I concede;
that they are so in actual fact, this I deny, for they do not equally
participate in the intellectual life.
Fourth objection. It is not repugnant for God to create an im­
material substance that is not cognitive. Therefore cognition is not
dependent on immateriality.
12 Cf. a.ii.
is It must be noted that St. Thomas says the souls of irrational animals and
their senses are in some way (or in a certain sense) spiritual, since they are already
in some way elevated above material conditions. Thus the soul of the irrational
animal is not a body, and is a higher form than that of the plant; nevertheless
the souls and senses of such animals are intrinsically dependent on their organ­
isms. and so they are simply of the material order.

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

421

Reply. That there is no repugnance in the creation of an im­
material substance that is not proximately cognitive, this I con­
cede; that is not radically cognitive, this either I deny, or I say,
please prove it. An immaterial substance that in some extraor­
dinary case would be deprived of its intellective faculty, would
still be radically cognitive. Thus it remains true that the degree of
cognition of a being corresponds to the degree of its immateriality,
or of its elevation above material conditions. Hence God, who is
in the highest degree immaterial, is in the highest degree cognitive.
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF

State of the question. The next three articles are concerned with
the primary object of the divine intellection. This second article
begins by presenting the difficulty that arises from the imperfect
way in which we know our own soul; for it is a reflexive knowledge
which presupposes a direct knowledge. Thus there is a multiplicity
of acts which cannot be attributed to God. Moreover, it is by means
of a certain assimilation of the knower with the thing known that
we have intellection, and this is accompanied by a certain duality
of subject and object, which cannot be in God, who is most simple.
Therefore Plotinus said that the supreme hypostasis, which is the
One-Good, transcends the second hypostasis, which is Intelligence,
in which there is duality of subject and object. This objection was
revived by many modern pantheists, who denied the possibility of
a personal or intelligent and free God, for intellection presupposes
duality of subject and object, and this cannot be attributed to the
most simple Absolute.
Reply. God understands Himself through Himself.
1) It is of faith that God understands Himself, and there are very
many texts in Sacred Scripture confirming this, such as the follow­
ing: "The things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit
of God.” 14
2) It is proved from reason that God knows Himself; and also
from reason is proved the manner in which He knows Himself,
which is immediately through Himself, without any duality or real
distinction between the divine intellect and His essence understood
by Him. This is demonstrated as follows:
The intelligible is not understood unless it is in the intellect
understanding (at least by some representation), and there is no
distinction between these two, except that eaçh is in potentiality,
*41 Cor. ?: π.

422

THE ONE GOD

namely, except that the intellect understanding does not of itself
actually understand, and that the intelligible is not of itself the
intellect in act.
But God, who is actually understanding and whose essence is
intelligible, is without any potentiality. Therefore God understands
Himself through Himself, so that “His intellect and (the primary
object) understood are altogether the same,” that is, without the
duality which Plotinus speaks of as being necessary for intellection.
The major is proved because intellection is an immanent act, its
object being actually understood only in the intellect. Thus in the
case of our intellect, when we understand the nature of a stone,
this nature, which is in the stone itself, is only potentially intel­
ligible, and is actually understood only in the intellect. And there
is no distinction between our intellect and this intelligible object,
except that each is in potentiality; for, prior to our act of under­
standing, it was possible for the intellect to understand, and for
the stone to be understood. But when the object is actually under­
stood, the intellect and the object understood are more one than
matter and form, because, as it was stated, matter does not become
form; whereas the intellect in the act of understanding in a certain
sense becomes the object understood.
The minor is evident, because God is neither a body nor a com­
posite of matter and form,15 and because He is intellect in act and
pure Act without any potentiality.
Hence His intellect is of itself and eternally always in act, and
His essence is not potentially intelligible (as the essence of a stone),
nor is it only actually intelligible (as the angel’s essence), but it is,
of itself and eternally, actually understood. Hence there is no dis­
tinction between it and His intellection. This means that so long
as all potentiality or imperfection is eliminated from the cognitive
intellect and the intelligible object, they are identical. Aristotle
had already said this.18
On the contrary, in the case of the angel understanding himself,
there is not absolute identity between his essence that is under­
stood and his intellective faculty; for the angel’s essence is only
actually intelligible and is not actually understood, and his intel­
lectual faculty is not his intellection. The completion of this doc­
trine is in the fourth article of this question, in which the identity
between God’s intellect and His essence is considered not only ob­
jectively but subjectively, as the subject of intellection.
Reply to second objection. Intellection is not, properly speaking,
movement, for it is an act of the agent, whereas movement, properly
1® Cf. supra, q.j, a.i, 2.
i· Metaph., Bk. XII, chap. 9.

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

423

speaking, is in the thing moveable by the agent. "Likewise, that
the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, or is assimilated
to it, belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality.
. . . But the divine intellect, which is in no way in potentiality, is
not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto,
but it is its own perfection and its own intelligible object.” This
is the best answer to the objection of the Neoplatonists and of
others who said that any intellection whatever implies a duality of
subject and object, and hence this cannot be formally or properly
in God, who is most simple.
Reply to third objection. "God is pure act in the order of exist­
ence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He
understands Himself through Himself, which means without any
impressed or expressed accidental superadded species. On the other
hand, the angel is in need of an accidental mental word to under­
stand himself, because his essence is not actually understood, but
only actually intelligible."1T
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD COMPREHENDS HIMSELF

State of the question. Does God know Himself as much as He is
knowable, or, in other words, is it an adequate and most complete
knowledge which He has of Himself, knowing whatever is in
Himself and in His productive power, which means knowing all
possible things?
Reply. The conclusion in the affirmative is revealed (1) by the
following statement from Holy Scripture, and in similar passages:
“The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.” 18
(2) It is proved from reason as follows: A thing is, strictly speak­
ing, comprehended when it is known to the extent that it is
knowable, or when it is known adequately and completely. But
the cognitive power of God is as great as His actuality is knowable;
for His intellect is in no way in potentiality, being pure Act in
the intellective order, just as He is pure Act in the entitative order.
And both are identical, as was stated in the preceding article.
Hence, whereas man remains a sort of mystery unto himself, in­
asmuch as "the heart (of man) is unsearchable” 19 (this being the
reason why St. Paul says: “Neither do I judge my own self, but
He that judgeth me is the Lord” 20), God knows Himself most per17 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 11.
i» I Cor. 2: 10.
19 Jer. 17: 9.
2» I Cor. 4: 3, 4.

424

THE ONE GOD

fectly, being no mystery unto Himself; and He likewise knows
His power, which means that He knows all possible things, the
multitude of which is infinite.
It must be noted that this conclusion is most evident for us, al­
though there are several other truths about the divine intellect
that remain for us most obscure, such as God’s infallible knowl­
edge and permission of sin, the sinner being charged with the of­
fense. But in this treatise on the one God there is frequently to
be found a wondrous “light-transcending darkness,” in which what
is for us most clear is accompanied by an obscurity, which is not
because of any absurdity or incoherence of drought in the revealed
truth, but because the light is far too bright for our intellectual
vision. It is most evident that God most perfectly knows or com­
prehends Himself, and it is the commonly accepted opinon among
Christians that to deny this would be truly foolishness.
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER THE ACT OF GOD’S INTELLECT
IS HIS SUBSTANCE

State of the question. We have seen 21 that God’s intellect is ab­
solutely identical with His essence as the object known. Now the
question is whether the act of God’s intellect is identical with His
substance as the subject of this intellection.
The difficulties proposed at the beginning of this article are of
less importance.
Reply. The conclusion is in the affirmative. It is proved in two
ways, indirectly and directly.
1) Indirectly. The act of understanding is the perfection and act
of the one understanding. But if God’s act of undertanding were
other than His substance, then His substance would be related to
His act of understanding as potentiality is to act, which is impos­
sible, since God is pure Act. Therefore God’s act of understanding
is identical with His substance. This indirect argument is apodictic.
2) Directly and ostensively.22 To understand follows on the in­
telligible species and perfects it, just as existence follows on the
form. But God’s essence is His existence 23 and His intelligible
21 Cf. a. 2.
22 By "ostensively” is meant a demonstration in which the conclusion is vir­
tually contained in the premises. When some general principle contains the
proposition to be proved, the demonstration is said to be direct and ostensive.
[Tr.]
23 Cf. q-3, a.4.

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

425

species.24 Therefore God’s act of understanding is His essence or
substance and His existence. In other words, as stated in the reply
to the second objection, God is His subsistent act of understanding,
like an intellectual and eternally existing flash of itself.
The major of this proof has its foundation in the proportionality
prevailing between the existential and intellectual orders. But God
in virtue of His essence is not capable of further perfection, and
thus He must be pure Act, unreceived and unreceptive both in the
existential and intelligential orders. This means that, just as God’s
essence does not differ from His existence, so His intelligible es­
sence does not differ from His act of understanding.
At the end of the argumentative part of this article, St. Thomas,
by combining this conclusion with that of the second article, sums
up and says: “Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God
the intellect understanding (subject) and the object understood and
the intelligible species and His act of understanding are entirely
one and the same. Hence, when God is said to be understanding,
no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.” Thus it was
an unwarrantable assertion on the part of Plotinus, for him to
say that every intellection supposed a duality of subject and object
which cannot be predicated of the first hypostasis, who is most
simple. Hence the famous contrary statement of Aristotle, that
“God is absolute self-thought,” 26 or God is self-subsisting intellec­
tion.
Reply to third objection. “The act of divine understanding which
subsists in itself and belongs to its very self and is not another’s
is absolute self-thought.” The reference is to the primary object of
the divine intellect; but the secondary object is not excluded.
First doubt. Is there a virtual distinction between God’s essence.
His intelligence, and His intellection?
Many Thomists with good reason reply that there is no intrinsi­
cally virtual distinction between these three, because, if this distinc­
tion were admitted, then God’s essence and His intelligence would
be conceived as in potentiality to His intellection, the divine reality
constituting the foundation for this distinction. But this cannot be
conceived of God, who is most pure Act; for nothing in Him can
be conceived as potential or as capable of further determination or
perfection. Therefore in God there is no intrinsically virtual dis­
tinction between these three.
If, therefore, there is a virtual distinction between these three,
it is merely extrinsic, which means that the foundation for this dis24 Cf. q. 14, a.2.
25 Metaph., Bk. XII, chap. 9.

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THE ONE GOD

tinction is not in the divine reality but in creatures, inasmuch as
subsistent intellection is equivalent, in an eminent way, to the
radical and proximate principles of intellection and to intellection
itself.
Hence there is an intrinsically virtual distinction in God only be­
tween those perfections which, as found in created things, are dis­
tinct according to their objective concepts, and which belong to
different orders, such as intellect and will. But intellect and actual
intellection belong to the same order, and are concerned with the
same formal object.28
However, there is a virtual distinction in God between His
knowledge or wisdom and His providence. In fact, it can be said
that the formal object of the divine intelligence is the divine es­
sence, as absolutely knowable in itself. The formal object of the
divine knowledge is the divine essence as the cause of this; of
prudence or providence it is the divine essence as the reason of
things to be done; of divine art it is the divine essence as the reason
of things to be made.
Second doubt. What is the formal and primary object of the
divine knowledge?
Reply. The primary object is God or the Godhead, as containing
actually and implicitly God’s essence, His attributes and relations.
The reason is that the formal and primary object of divine knowl­
edge is that which primarily and of itself is attained by it. Now this
object is neither created being, nor being as such, abstracting from
created being and uncreated being, but is God Himself. But God
as He really is, not as conceived by us, contains actually and im­
plicitly what we call the divine essence, the attributes deduced
from it, and the relations. There is only a minor virtual distinction
between these, as already stated.2’ “In God all things are one and
the same, where there is not a relation of opposition," 28 says the
Council of Florence.
Durandus rashly maintained that the formal and primary object
of the divine knowledge is being as such, as abstracted from created
being and uncreated being, because, so he said, it is more universal
than uncreated being. Rosmini said about the same. This opinion
must be absolutely rejected, for nothing is or can be conceived
prior to God. It is only according to our manner of speaking that
abstract being is more universal than God, since we conceive being
as having universality of content according to ontological reality.28
See John of St. Thomas, commentary on this article.
27 Cf. q.3.
28 Denz., no. 709.
20 Cf. Cajetan, Com. in lam, q.39, a.t, no. 7.

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

427

God knows being as such, not abstractively and imperfectly (for
in this way He would know only actually and implicitly the various
modes of being), but He knows it, so to speak, in the concrete, in­
asmuch as it exists in the divine being, namely, in the primary ob­
ject of His knowledge, and inasmuch as it is in creatures, as in the
secondary object of His knowledge. We must now treat of this
secondary object of divine knowledge.
FIFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER COD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF

State of the question. The secondary object of the divine knowl­
edge is discussed in this and the following eight articles. This ob­
ject is considered first in general from the fifth to the eighth
articles inclusive. The inquiry is about the existence, nature, and
medium of this divine knowledge of creatures. Is it a proper knowl­
edge of things as they are distinct from one another? Is it discur­
sive? Is it the cause of things, and how is it the cause of things?
These articles, in which the question is discussed in a general
way, are of great importance for the understanding of the follow­
ing articles which treat in a special manner of such things as God’s
knowledge of contingent futures and of evil. The last articles of
this question, as also what is said in explanation of God’s will,
especially whether God’s will is the cause of things,30 are closely
connected with the eighth article, namely, whether God’s knowl­
edge is the cause of things.
In this fifth article there are two points of inquiry: whether God
knows things other than Himself, and how, or through what
medium He knows them.
That God has such knowledge is a dogma of our faith, or rather
a dogma of Providence which is expressed in almost every page
of Holy Scripture. But through what medium God knows things
other than Himself, is a disputed question among theologians.
At the beginning of this article St. Thomas proposes three dif­
ficulties: (1) How can God know things that are outside Himself?
Augustine says that "God does not behold anything out of Him­
self.” 31 (2) If God were to know other things than Himself, He
would be perfected by something other than Himself, as the in­
tellect is by its object. (3) The intellectual act is so much the
nobler, as the .object understood is nobler. Therefore only the
divine essence can be the object of the divine intellect.
It must be noted that Aristotle gave these difficulties at least
so Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.4.
ai Book of 8] Questions, q.46.

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THE ONE GOD

some consideration, and was unable to solve them. In discussing
the intellection of the first intellect, he says: “Clearly, then, it
thinks that which is most divine and estimable, and does not
change; for the change would be for the worse. . . . Clearly, then,
there must be something else which is more excellent than Mind,
namely, the object of thought; for both thought and the act of
thinking will belong even to the thinker of the worst thoughts;
wherefore this must be avoided. For it is indeed better not to see
some things, than to see them. This is not so if thinking is the
supreme good. Therefore Mind thinks itself, if it is that which is
best. And its thinking is a thinking of thinking.” 82
Several historians, such as Zeller and Ravaisson, said that in this
text Aristotle denies knowledge of the world to God, inasmuch as
it is more becoming for one not to see some things, as being of an
inferior order. Contrary to this, St. Thomas observes that Aristotle
appeals to this general axiom merely to show that the nobility of
intellection depends on the nobility of its object, and therefore
that the proper object of the divine intellect must be God Him­
self and not things of this world. As St. Thomas says: “Since, there­
fore, some act of understanding is to be avoided on account of the
unworthiness of the intelligible species, it follows that the nobility
of this act, which is to understand, depends on the nobility of the
intelligible species. Therefore the thing understood is more excel­
lent than the act of understanding it. . . . (Hence) it is that the
(supreme Intellect) must understand Himself. . . . Evidently there
is no perfecting of God's intellect by any other thing besides Him­
self that is understood by Him. Nevertheless it does not follow
from this that all things other than Himself are unknown to Him;
for by understanding Himself He understands all other things
(inasmuch as God is the cause of things).” 83
This text from Aristotle’s Metaphysics is indeed obscure. But it
must be noted against Zeller and Ravaisson that the Stagirite has
spoken more clearly in another chapter,84 in which he praised
Anaxagoras for having said that there must be a supreme intelli­
gence who has ordained all things in the world. Aristotle said in
this chapter that Anaxagoras thus showed himself to be the wise
one among the foolish. He said likewise in another passage: "But
the world refuses to be governed badly. The rule of many is not
good; let one be the ruler.” 85
He also argued against Empedocles, that “God would be most
Metaph., Bk. XII, chap. 9.
as Com. in Metaph., Bk. XII, lect. 11.
»4 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. 3.
•5 Metaph., Bk. XII, chap. 10 (end).

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ignorant if He did not know discord.” 36 Finally, Averroes, accept­
ing the teaching of Aristotle, admitted a general providence, by
which God has a general knowledge of things in the world which
He directs, if not as to each detail, at least in a general way.
It must be admitted, however, that Aristotle was always in doubt
on this point, because he never succeeded in acquiring a clear con­
cept of creation, especially of eternal creation. Therefore he was at
a loss to explain how God can have any knowledge of this world
without a certain passivity or dependence on things, which cannot
be attributed to Him who is pure Act. But St. Thomas gives us
an excellent solution of this difficulty.
Two truths are affirmed in this article: (1) God necessarily knows
things other than Himself; (2) God knows things other than Him­
self, not immediately in themselves, but in Himself.
The first proposition is of faith, and is included in the dogmas
of creation and providence. The words of St. Paul are quoted in
proof of this: “All things are naked and open to His eyes.” 37
It is also proved by reason from what was said in the preceding
articles: Anything is not perfectly known unless its power is per­
fectly known and unless it is known to what its power extends.
But God knows Himself perfectly (otherwise His existence would
not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding),
and the divine power, which is the first efficient cause of all things,
extends to things other than Himself. Therefore God necessarily
knows things other than Himself.
In affirming that the divine knowledge of things is according to
the knowledge of the divine power, St. Thomas already implicitly
assigns the medium of this knowledge.
This proof is confirmed from the fact that the divine power con­
tains things other than Himself, after the manner of an intelligible
species. For a thing is in another according to the mode of the
other in which it is. But in God, as first efficient cause, His exist­
ence is His act of understanding. Therefore whatever effects pre-exist
in God as in the First Cause, are in Him His act of understanding
and His intelligible species.
As Cajetan observes, this proposition, "God’s existence is His act
of understanding,” is to be taken rather in its formal sense than as
expressing merely identity. There is identity (by reason of the
reality or subject of the proposition) between God’s act of under­
standing and His act of willing, because there is no distinction be­
tween them. But something more is affirmed when it is said that
30 Ibid., Bk. ΙΠ, chap. 4 (Com. of St. Thomas, lect. 12); see also la, q. 14, a. 11;
also De caelo. Bk. I- chap. 4, and Bk. II, chap. 9.
« Heb. 4: 13.

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“God’s existence is His act of understanding,” for in God, as the
First Cause, His existence is, strictly speaking, His act of under­
standing, inasmuch as His act of understanding is the foundation
for His active power of intellectual cause as such. This is the case
with the artificer, and it applies analogically to God, as will be
stated more clearly in the eighth article.
In the second part of this article it is shown that God knows
things other than Himself, not immediately in themselves, but in
Himself. It concerns the medium of this knowledge, and is proved
as follows: For a thing to be seen in itself, means that it is seen
by its proper and adequate species (as through the medium by
which it is seen); whereas a thing is seen in another when it is seen
through the image of that which contains it, which is what is seen
first, as the image of the mirror is what is first seen, and then what
is reflected in it. But God knows things other than Himself inas­
much as His essence contains the similitude of other things, and He
does not know them through the proper species of each thing.
Therefore God knows things other than Himself, not in themselves,
but in Himself.
This means that God knows things other than Himself in Him­
self first known as what is known. On the contrary, we know ex­
ternal things not in ourselves, but in themselves; for our senses
know sensible qualities through the proper species impressed upon
them by these qualities, and our intellect knows the nature of
external things through their proper intelligible species, which
are abstracted from the things. Hence it is commonly said that,
whereas our knowledge is measured by things, God's knowledge
is the measure of things. But although God knows things other
than Himself, His knowledge of things is intuitive, because it ex­
tends both to the existence of the thing and the mode of its own
existence.38
SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

The solution of the objections of this article confirms this opin­
ion.
Reply to first objection. When St. Augustine says that “God sees
nothing outside Himself,” this must be understood as meaning that
God does not see what is outside Himself except in Himself.
Reply to second objection. "Hence it does not follow that there
is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine es­
sence.” Thus is solved the difficulty which baffled Aristotle, be­
cause for him creation was an unknown concept. If God is the
«« Cf. a. 6.

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

431

Creator, then He is able to know the things of this world in Him­
self, in His causality, without His being in any way dependent on
the things themselves.
Reply to third objection. “Hence it does not follow that the
divine intellectual act is specified by anything else than the divine
essence itself, because the intellectual act is not specified by what
is understood in another, but by the principal object understood
in which other things are understood.”
This opinion held by St. Thomas concerning the medium in
which God knows things other than Himself is not admitted by
all theologians, and especially by the Molinists; for if God cannot
know things other than Himself except in Himself as the cause,
this means the end of the scientia media by which, as Molina will
have it, God knows conditionally free acts of the future (futurables)
independently of His decree, or of His causality.
Therefore many Molinists, particularly Vasquez, hold that God
knows things other than Himself immediately in themselves, or at
least both ways, namely, either immediately in Himself as the
cause (thus He knows created things), or immediately in themselves
(thus He would know futurables independently of the divine de­
cree).
But the Thomists refute this opinion, arguing from the princi­
ples laid down in this article. For to have immediate knowledge
of external things is to know them by their proper species. But
there is only one species in God, which is His essence, and the
divine essence is not immediately representative of created things
as the medium by which He sees them, but is that which is seen
by God, and that in which God’s effects are known. But whatever
is external to God, must be in a relation of dependent causality to
Him, who is the cause of all beings and their real modes of being.
Nor can it be said that God has immediate knowledge of things
other than Himself without a species, for then His knowledge
would not be determined more to one particular thing than to a
certain other. The final result of this would be that the divine
intellect is determined and perfected by something extrinsic. Thus
God would not be pure Act, and the first determining Being, but
would be determined by another, and this would make Him de­
pendent on another. This is the grave defect in the theory of the
scientia media, as will be stated in a subsequent article.
Nor can the divine essence be considered as the immediately
representative medium by which He knows created things; for
immediate representation is effected by the proper and adequate
species. But the divine essence infinitely transcends every created
being. Nor can it be said evidently that God, by reason of His

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essence, knows, as it were on equal terms, both Himself and crea­
tures. There must be not co-ordination but subordination of either
a possible or an actual effect in relation to its cause. Thus God
knows all things other than Himself in His essence as the cause.39
Objection. Some say that God knows created truths in as many
ways as they are knowable. But truths are also knowable immedi­
ately in themselves, and they are thus known by angels and by us.
Therefore God knows them immediately in themselves.
Reply. That God knows created truths in as many ways as they
are knowable on the part of the thing known, this I concede; on
the part of the knower, I subdistinguish: in every way that does
not imply imperfection, this I concede; otherwise I deny it.
Objection. Still some insist that to know a thing in itself is a
more perfect way than to know it in another. Therefore this way
must be attributed to God.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: if the thing to be known
is not so clearly expressed in another as it is in itself, then I con­
cede the antecedent; if it is more clearly expressed in another than
it is in itself, then I deny the antecedent. Things are contained,
however, more perfectly in God, as in the most eminent intellec­
tual cause, than in themselves. Just as the production of a work of
art pre-exists in more perfect form in the mind of a great painter
or sculptor than on the canvas or in the marble, and as he cannot
produce in matter whatever is vividly conceived by him, then far
more so are things contained in God in a more eminent way than
in themselves. By knowing them in Himself, God knows them as
in their dawning, by what St. Augustine calls morning vision,
which is measured by the unique instant of motionless eternity.
On the contrary, whereas we know things in themselves, we know
them as in their twilight, by what is called evening knowledge, in
the obscurity of sensible and material things. Therefore it is the
common opinion among theologians in discussing the knowledge
of the blessed, that it is a more perfect way for one to know
created things in the Word than outside the Word.40
Final difficulty. God is not the adequate cause of our vital acts,
especially of our free ones. Therefore God cannot know them in
His causality.
Reply. Although God is not the proximate cause of our acts, yet
ss But if certain Molinists say that God knows futurables in His essence, they
do not mean by this that He knows them in His essence as the cause, for they
maintain that futurables are not dependent on the divine decrees, as will be
stated in a subsequent article.
<o Summa theol., la, q.58, a. 7.

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whatever entity and perfection they have come from God and are
contained eminently in Him.
SIXTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN
HIMSELF BY PROPER KNOWLEDGE

State of the question. This article is concerned with proper
knowledge, not on the part of the knower as acquired by various
acts, but on the part of the thing known. In other words, does God
by a single act know things in the world as they are distinct from
one another and according to their proper natures, or has He
merely a general knowledge of them? The difficulty is that other
things are in God as in their common and universal cause, and,
moreover, the proper ratio of the divine essence cannot be the
proper ratio of many and diverse things.
Reply. The conclusion is in the affirmative and is of faith.
i ) It is revealed in several passages of Holy Scripture, as when it
speaks of God’s knowledge of things as “reaching unto the division
of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a
discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart. Neither is there
any creature invisible in His sight; but all things are naked and
open to His eyes.”41 The concluding words of this passage are
quoted by the Vatican Council, and it adds “even those which are
yet to be by the free action of creatures.” 42
It must be noted that this article is especially directed against
those who, like Averroes and Algazel, maintained that God has a
general knowledge of things in the world, as regards the general
laws of nature, but that He does not know them in particular.43
2) Indirect proof. To know creatures in a general way would be
to have an imperfect or confused knowledge of them. Therefore
both God’s understanding and His being would be imperfect, which
is an impossibility. For it is evident that such knowledge is im­
perfect on the part of the thing known, because it would not be
perfectly known.
3) Direct proof. It specifies the mode of this proper knowledge.
St. Thomas does this gradually, first by giving the examples brought
forward by others in explanation of this mode, as, for instance, if
the center knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from
« Heb. 4: 12.
«2 Denz., no. 1784.
Malebranche wanted even more or less to restrict divine providence to general
laws, so as to explain the presence of evil in the world and of free will in man.

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the center; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors. But
these examples are not sufficiently convincing, says St. Thomas, be­
cause multitude and diversity are not caused by that one principle
as regards that which is the reason for the distinction but only as
regards that in which they communicate. Hence, if the center knew
itself, it would know only that to which the lines converge. It must
be shown that whatever perfection exists in any creature, even what
belongs properly to it as such, pre-exists either eminently and
formally or eminently and virtually in the cause of the total being
of things.
St. Thomas gives a more convincing example as evidence of this,
namely, the perfect act, which is posterior in the order of genera­
tion, and which contains all imperfect acts, which are prior to it in
the order of generation. Thus animal and living are included in
man, and the sensitive and vegetative souls are included in the
intellective soul, because whatever perfection there is in the im­
perfect act, is found eminently in the perfect act. Thus he who
knows a man knows an animal by proper knowledge.
This gradual preparation leads up to the following direct proof:
The divine essence contains in itself whatever there is of reality in
all creatures even to what ultimately differentiates them, of which
His essence is the total cause, inasmuch as there is nothing in the
creature that is not caused by God, not even matter, which is the
principle of individuation in sensible things. But God has compre­
hensive knowledge of His essence, which is the self-subsisting Being.
Therefore God by knowing Himself, knows all things by proper
knowledge. In other words: “God knows all the ways in which His
own perfection can be shared by others.”
In addition to this it is said: “Neither could He know the very
nature of being perfectly, unless He knew all modes of being.”
Averroes, denying this, failed to perceive that the self-subsisting
Being contains all modes of being. He judged of being, the modes
of which are also being, as of any genus, the differentiae of which
are extrinsic to it. Thus rationality is an extrinsic differentia of
animality. Hence, whoever perfectly knows an animal does not by
reason of this know a rational being by proper knowledge. But
whoever knows a rational being knows an animal.
Corollary. Only God, who has comprehensive knowledge of self­
subsisting Being, has perfect knowledge of the very nature of being,
either as an act or as an entity. Thus He alone knows all possible
modes of being, or the infinite number of possibles. We know by
abstraction those things that are actually and explicitly in being,
but not all those that are actually and implicitly in being, that is,

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we do not know all modes of being. We know these successively
by experience and by discursive knowledge.
The solution of the difficulties confirms this conclusion.
Reply to first objection. Although God knows things in this
world, not immediately in themselves, but in Himself as they are
in Himself, nevertheless He knows them in their own nature as
they are in themselves. Thus by one cognitive act, which is self­
subsisting intellection, He knows them distinctly, and ‘‘all the more
perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.”
Reply to second objection. “The created essence is compared to
the essence of God, as the imperfect act to the perfect act. There­
fore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowl­
edge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.”
Reply to third objection. “The divine essence (by reason of its
eminence) can be taken as the proper ratio of each thing according
to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in and
imitate it.” Thus, dependent on God, stones participate in being,
plants in life, animals in cognition, men and angels in intellective
life, and the just in divine life strictly as such. It is only this last
participation that is called a “participation of the divine nature,”
all others being imitations of the divine essence according to be­
ing, life, and intellection.
This eminence of the divine essence is for us mysterious or in­
visible, but in it is verified the principle, that “superior beings
unite in themselves the various perfections of inferior beings.”
Thus one visual act of sense perception includes within its range
all visible things of a vast region, which are seen in one glance.
Likewise one thing perfectly known includes within itself all in­
telligible objects pertaining to it. Transcending all beings, God
has comprehensive knowledge of the self-subsisting Being, that is,
of Himself, and He has perfect knowledge of all possible and
actual modes of being.
SEVENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS DISCURSIVE

The reply is in the negative, and it follows as a corollary from
the preceding. Discursion is of two kinds; either it is according
to succession only, inasmuch as in point of time the things under­
stood follow one another, as the night the day; or else it is accord­
ing to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowl­
edge of conclusions.
But neither kind of discursion belongs to God, because He sees

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436

all things together, seeing them all in one thing, which is Himself.
Moreover, since God does not proceed from the known to the un­
known, He knows effects not from their cause, but immediately in
their cause, as we do when the terminus of discursive reasoning
is reached.
EIGHTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS

State of the question. The question asked in this article really
includes two questions: (i) Whether God’s knowledge is at least
the directive cause in the production of things, these being truly
produced by God, so that God, the Creator and Ordainer, operates
most wisely, and not in a blind or ignorant way; (2) whether God’s
knowledge is the effective cause of things, so that it in no way is
caused by or is dependent on things (not even on our future free
acts). But, if the first question is solved in the affirmative, then so
is the second, on the supposition that there can be nothing real
or future (either absolute or conditional) that is not dependent on
God.
The answer to this first question, however, is in the affirmative
and is of faith; for it is expressed in very many texts of Holy Scrip­
ture, such as in the following: “Thou hast made all things in
wisdom”;44 “who made the heavens in understanding.” 45 More­
over, this is already evident to reason from the proof of God’s
existence because of the order prevailing in the world; for the
supreme Ordainer of things acts not in a blind way but most wisely,
since He operates by His intellect in all things effected by Him.
But as for the second question, namely, whether God’s knowledge
is the effective cause of tilings, so that it is in no way caused by
things, St. Thomas in the first objection and in the counter-argu­
ment, notes a certain difference of opinion on this point between
Origen and St. Augustine. For Origen, who is quoted in the first
objection, when commenting on the words, "Whom He called, them
He also justified,” 46 says: "A thing will happen not because God
knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account
known by God before it exists.” 47 Taken literally, these words
seem to mean that God’s knowledge is in some way dependent on
future things.
Contrary to this, St. Augustine says: “Not because they are, does
« Ps. 103:24.
« Ibid., 135: 5.
<e Rom. 8: 30.
*r Com. on Rom. 8: 30.

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

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God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He
knows them therefore they are.’’48 This means that things are de­
pendent on God's knowledge, and not God’s knowledge on things.
St. Thomas quotes St. Augustine, following him as his authority.
In his reply to the first objection, he charitably interprets Origen’s
words in a good sense. If these words were taken literally, it would
follow that God knew things to be created because they were to
come into being, and not that they were to come into being because
God knew and freely willed them. But, as a matter of fact, in this
passage Origen is referring especially to sin, which God is not the
cause of, and Origen means that the divine foreknowledge does not
do away with human liberty. Moreover, as St. Thomas says, “if
things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but
not that the futurity of things is the cause of God’s knowing
them. ” 48
For a better understanding of the importance of this question,
we should note that the difficulty arising from the conflicting state­
ments of Origen and St. Augustine, persisted among theologians as
regards the divine foreknowledge. This is especially the case with
Molina who, in his theory of the scientia media, maintains that
God foresees conditionally free actions of the future or futurables
before there is any determining divine decree concerning them.
Thus the divine knowledge of futurables in its relation to these
would not be determining, but rather determined by them and
dependent on them. For Molina says: “It was not in God’s power
to know by this scientia (media) anything else than He actually
knew. . . . (But) if the created free will were to do the opposite,
as it truly can, He would have known even this by the same knowl­
edge, but not that He actually knows it.” 88 Thus Molina speaks
rather the language of Origen than that of St. Augustine.
Therefore, as for the question asked in this article, Molina holds
that God’s knowledge is indeed the directive cause of things which
are produced by Him; but he maintains that God’s knowledge is
not the effective cause of the determination of our free will, the
act of which, in his opinion, is first foreseen by God as a condi­
tionally free action of the future; e.g., if Peter were situated in
certain circumstances he would choose this particular thing, and
then, with the positing of the conditions, it is foreseen as a future
act; i.e., Peter, actually situated in certain circumstances, will
choose this particular thing. But St. Thomas settles both questions
by one answer.
48 De Trin., Bk. XV, chap. 13.
48 Cf. ad mm.
50 Concordia, q.14, a. 13, disp. 52 (Paris ed., 1876, p. 318).

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THE ONE GOD

His answer is: The knowledge of God, in so far as His will is
joined to it, is the cause of things, and is not caused by them.
1) There is foundation for this doctrine in Holy Scripture, as
shown from the following texts: “The Lord by wisdom hath
founded the earth, hath established the heavens by prudence”;61
"and God said: Be light made. And light was made”;52 “by the
word of the Lord the heavens were established”;83 “Who is a more
artful worker than she (Wisdom) of those things that are?” 84 “All
things were made by Him (the Word)”;88 “upholding all things by
the word of His power.” 80 But these complex terms, “The Lord by
wisdom hath founded, hath established, is an artful worker,” con­
vey the idea that God’s knowledge is the cause of things.
2) Among the Church Fathers, who stated this truth more clearly,
prominent is St. Augustine, a quotation from one of his works be­
ing given in the counterargument of this article.87 He also says in
another of his writings: “This world could not be known to us
unless it existed, but it could not have existed unless it had been
known to God.” 88 St. Gregory the Great asserts: “For even what­
soever things are, in His eternity are not therefore seen because
they are, but therefore they are because they are seen.” 88
3) The conclusion is proved by the following theological argu­
ment: The knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowl­
edge of the artificer is to the things made by his art. But the
knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his
art so far as his will is joined to it. Therefore the knowledge of God
is the cause of all things, in so far as His will is joined to it.
The major enunciates an analogy drawn from the Holy Scrip­
ture in which God's wisdom is called the “artificer” of all things.
Moreover, this is also evident to reason from the proof of God’s
existence as supreme Ordainer by reason of the order prevailing
in the world. Hence, as stated in the body of the article, “It is
manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being
is His act of understanding,” a truth previously established.00 This
is also clearly seen from the fact that to act by the intellect is a
si Prov. 3: 19.
52 Gen. 1: 3.
83 Ps. 33: 6.
55 Wis. 8: 6.
55 John 1: 3.
5β Heb. 1: 3.
5’ De Trin., Bk. XV, chap. 13.
55 De civit. Dei, Bk. xl, chap. 10.
55 Morals, Bk. XV. chap. 23.
eo Summa theol., la, q. 14, a.4.

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

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more perfect and more universal mode of action than to act by
nature.®1
Now in man, for instance, the intellective life is above the vege­
tative which operates from a necessity of its nature. Finally, to act
by the intellect is to determine the form and end of its action,
whereas, on the other hand, to act by nature is to be determined
by the Author of nature. This answers the objections of the pan­
theists.®2 Therefore it can truly be said that knowledge is predicated
analogically of God and the artificer.
The minor of this proof states, however, that the knowledge of
the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art, in so far
as his will is joined to it. For it is evident that the artificer acts
by his intellect, and therefore by his practical knowledge or by his
art, which is the perfection or form of his intellect. But besides this
it is of necessity that there be conjunction of will and intellect;
for just as the natural form, for instance, of a plant, is for action
by reason of its natural appetite or inclination, so also the intel­
ligible form, by reason of its rational appetite or will, is for the
same end. “For since the intelligible form,” says St. Thomas, “has
a relation to opposite things, inasmuch as the same knowledge
relates to opposites (thus ethics is concerned with the performance
of good and tire avoidance of evil), it would not produce a deter­
minate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the ap­
petite.” ®3 For the intelligible form or the idea has a relation to
opposite things, namely, to being and to non-being. Thus the
artificer can produce or not produce the work of art that is con­
ceived by him, and God can produce or not produce the world, and
of possible things these particular ones in preference to others. But
God’s knowledge joined to His will constitutes the divine deter­
mining decree, and is not only the directive but also the effective
cause of things, just as command presupposes freedom of choice.
St. Thomas states this more clearly in various passages of his
works. Thus he says: “Knowledge never produces its effect except
through the intervention of the will, the concept of which implies
a certain influx into things willed.” ®4 “Hence it does not necessarily
follow that things come into being whenever there is knowledge,
but only when the production of these is determined by the will.” ®6
"The (divine) idea is determined as regards those things that are,
ei Ibid., la, q. 19, a.4; Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 23.
»2 Ibid., la, q.19, a.4.
«s Com. on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bk. IX, chap. 5, lect. 4.
e< De veritate, q.2, a. 14.
eo Ibid., ad turn.

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THE ONE GOD

or were, or will be produced, by a decree of the divine will; but it
is not so determined as regards those things that neither are, nor
were, nor will be.” 88 "God does not, therefore, act by a necessity
of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite
perfection according to the determination of His will and intel­
lect.” 87 “The form, as it is in the intellect only, is not determined
to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will.” 88
This determination just mentioned is nothing else but the de­
termining divine decree, for which, just as for a human decree,
there is required: (i) a judgment of the intellect directing the free
choice of the will; (2) the choice itself by the will. Then there is
the command of the intellect directing one to make use of the
means willed. The gradual development of this doctrine is to be
found in St. Thomas' treatise on human acts.89 It is there shown
that there are two orders, one of intention and the other of execu­
tion. In the order of intention, the intellect apprehends the end
and proposes it to the will; the will intends the end, and in virtue
of this intention the intellect inquires into the means more suitable
for the attainment of the end, and the intellect judges of them or
distinguishes between them (this being a practical judgment); then
the will freely chooses these means, and this terminates the order
of intention, by a descendent process from the end intended down
to the first and least of the means chosen. After this begins the
order of execution through a command of the intellect, which
means that the intellect commands the use of the means willed,
beginning with the lowest and ascending to the higher until the
end is attained, which is first in intention and last in execution. In
virtue of this command the will applies the faculties to the per­
formance of their acts, and this application is called the active use,
which is followed by the passive use of these faculties, and after
this comes the attainment of the end.70
This is analogically verified in God. The divine intellect ap­
prehends the divine goodness manifested to it as its end, and the
divine will intends this end. In virtue of this intention the intel­
lect, so to speak, inquires into the means, proposing these to the
divine will, which wills them, and this terminates the order of
intention. In this process the divine knowledge is directive but
not effective. But, posited the efficacious choice of the means, in
virtue of this the intellect commands the employment of the means,
00 Ibid., q.j, a.6.
97 Summa theol., la, q.19, a.4.
«8 Ibid., ad 411m.
«» Ibid., la Mac, q.ia, 13, 14, 17.
to Ibid., q. 17, a.i.

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and thus the divine knowledge is not only the directive but is also
the effective cause of things in second actuality. In this setting, the
divine knowledge, presupposing as it does election, was usually
called “knowledge of approbation” or even "of vision,” because by
producing the effect it sees, and by seeing it produces the effect,
which means that it extends to things either as actually present or
as belonging entirely to the future, not precisely as it is knowledge
of vision, but as the will is joined to it.
Hence the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is concerned
with possible things before God’s free choice of them, is only the
directive cause of things, whereas the knowledge of approbation,
which follows the efficacious choice, is the effective cause of things.
This commanded act is efficacious, inasmuch as it presupposes a
determining choice, and this latter is often called the purpose or
efficacious decree of the divine will.
Thus we understand why St. Thomas said: “Determined effects
proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the deter­
mination of His will and intellect.” 71 By “the determination of
the will” is meant here the election which follows the directive
judgment and which precedes the command moving one to make
use of the means.
Conclusion. Therefore God’s knowledge is the effective cause of
things, as being a command that presupposes the efficacious act of
election on the part of the divine will. And it is concerned with
all things without exception, for there can be no reality that is
not causatively dependent on God’s knowledge and will, not even
the free determination of our choices.
SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

Reply to first objection. It solves the difficulty presented by the
text quoted from Origen, who spoke inappropriately and in too
human a way about God’s knowledge. Truly, his purpose is to
prove that God’s knowledge is not harmful to human liberty, and
he is especially concerned with sin, which God is not the cause of,
because He only permits it. Moreover, it is still true to say in an
illative sense, but not in a causal sense, that if anything will come
into existence, this is known by God before it exists.
Reply to second objection. Although God’s knowledge is eternal,
it does not follow that creatures are eternal, because it was not
in God’s knowledge that things should be eternal, but only that
they should come into being in a time that is determined by God’s
will.
n Ibid., la, q.19, a.4.

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Reply to third objection. The knowable is prior to created
knowledge, but not to the uncreated knowledge. Whereas our
knowledge is measured or caused by things, God’s knowledge is
the measure and cause of things.
Objection. Created liberty cannot exist with that knowledge
which, in virtue of an absolute and antecedent decree, is the cause
of future action. But such is God's knowledge, in accordance with
the preceding thesis. Therefore God’s knowledge is not the cause
of future actions.
Reply. According to what St. Thomas says in a subsequent ques­
tion,72 I distinguish the antecedent as follows: If the decree of the
divine will concerns only the substance of the future action, I con­
cede it; if it concerns also the free mode of this action, then I deny
it. Replying to one of his objections in this subsequent question,
St. Thomas says: ‘‘From the very fact that nothing resists the divine
will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to
happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently accord­
ing to His will." 73
Another objection. Then God could not know sin, because He
is not the cause of sin. Therefore the difficulty remains.
Reply. In the tenth article of this question St. Thomas solves this
difficulty by pointing out that God knows possible evil things by
their opposite good things; also actual and future sins, inasmuch as
He wills to permit them for a greater good.74
Doubt. How does St. Thomas distinguish between the knowledge
of simple intelligence and that of vision?
Reply. St. Thomas explains this in different works of his.75 In
his opinion, the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowl­
edge of vision are not two kinds of knowledge, but are one and the
same in God; their difference arises only from the diversity of their
objects. In other words, the knowledge of simple intelligence has
not die will joined to it, and is concerned with possible things, thus
being a necessary knowledge. The knowledge of vision has the will
joined to it, and is concerned with really existing things, either
present, past, or future. The knowledge of vision is said to have the
will joined to it inasmuch as it is accompanied by either a positive
or permissive decree of the divine will. As will be stated farther on,
the knowledge of conditionally free actions of the future or of
futurables refers back to the knowledge of vision inasmuch as it preT2 Ibid., a.8.
’s Ibid., ad 2um.
74 Ibid., a.9 ad gum, in which this divine permission is discussed.
75 Cf. la, q. 14, a. 16; De ventate, q.g, a.8 ad 8ura; Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps.
60, 6g.

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supposes a conditional decree of the divine will, without which
these conditionally free actions of the future would be undeter­
mined. Such as these are: What would Peter do if situated in certain
circumstances? Or what would Paul have done, if he had been in
Peter’s place, in the circumstances of our Lord’s Passion? Con­
fronted by the two possibilities of faithfulness or unfaithfulness,
which would he have chosen? If we say that God is able to know
this infallibly before His decree, then such knowledge is not the
cause of things but is caused by conditionally free actions of the
future or is dependent on them; nevertheless, inasmuch as they are
contingent, they are still undetermined. From this we already see
how very important the present article is as regards the foreknowl­
edge of future things.
In this article we have a legitimate application of the analogical
method, to the exclusion of all anthropomorphism, because what is
said of the artificer’s knowledge, inasmuch as it is the cause of
things made by his art, does not in its formal concept imply any
imperfection. Thus knowledge is predicated analogically of God in
the literal sense and not merely metaphorically, those imperfections
being removed, of course, which are found in the created mode of
the artificer’s knowledge.
NINTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS THAT ARE NOT

State of the question. By "things that are not” is meant things
that do not actually exist but that exist only potentially so, either
in God or in a creature.
The answer is affirmative. (1) It is of faith, for the Scripture says:
“Before I formed thee in the bowels of thy mother, 1 knew thee.” 78
There are very many parallel texts in Holy Scripture concerning
God’s knowledge of things that are not, but which are either possi­
ble or which did exist or which will exist.
2) Proof from reason. Things that are not absolutely, namely,
that are not actually, are in the power either of God or of creatures.
But God knows those things that are either in His power or in the
power of a creature, otherwise He would not have comprehensive
knowledge of Himself. Therefore God knows things that are not
absolutely.
There are two more conclusions:
1) By the knowledge of vision, God knows past or future things,
because God’s glance is measured by eternity, which is without
7«Jer. 1:5.

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succession and which comprehends all time, just as the apex of a
pyramid corresponds to all the points of its base.
2) By the knowledge of simple intelligence God knows merely
possible things, those which never were nor are nor will be. God
knows these in His essence as it is infinitely imitable.77
St. Thomas in this article is not speaking of conditionally free
actions of the future, for he treats of this elsewhere when discussing
prophecy of denunciation.78 He is now speaking of merely possible
things, which must not be confused with futurable; for the futurable means this: of two possible things (for instance, of remaining
faithful or of being unfaithful), which would one choose if situated
in certain cicumstances? Thus the futurable adds a new determina­
tion to the possible.
The purely possible is merely what is capable of existence, what
is not repugnant to existence. Inasmuch as it is something really
possible, it is called a real possible, which is a different entity from
what is purely a figment of the mind or mental being, which is not
capable of real but only of logical existence, like the universality
of any predicate. It also differs from real and actual being, or
actually existing being.
TENTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD KNOWS EVIL THINGS

State of the question. The most serious difficulty is that God
knows things other than Himself inasmuch as they are in Himself
as in their cause. But God is not the cause of evil. Therefore it
seems that God does not know evil things.
Nevertheless the contrary is affirmed frequently in Holy Scripture,
as in the following text: “Thou hast set our iniquities before Thy
eyes.”78 It is of faith that God knows physical and moral evils and,
if God did not know sins and the grievousness of these, He could
not justly punish them.
The body of the article contains two conclusions: (1) God knows
evil things; (2) God knows evil things by their opposite good things.
Proof of first conclusion. There are some good things that can be
corrupted by the presence of evil; but all good things and what
can be accidental to them are perfectly known by God; therefore
evil things are known by God.
The major is evident both as regards natural good, such as health,
the loss of which may be due to various causes, and as regards moral
’7 De veritate, q.2, a.8.
is Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q. 171, a. 6, ad sum; q. 174, a. 1; la, q.19, a.7 ad 2um.
Ps. 89: 8.

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good, such as virtue, which can likewise be corrupted so as to beget
vice. The minor is evident, it having been established that God has
comprehensive knowledge of those things that are in Himself as in
their cause.
Proof of second conclusion. A thing is knowable in the degree in
which it is. But the essence of evil consists in the privation of good.
Therefore God knows evil things by their opposite good things,
just as darkness is known by light. Thus God knows injustice by
justice, and from the fact that He has knowledge of all justice, He
knows the gravity of injustice. But because we have not intuitive
knowledge of all justice, our valuation of it is obtained from in­
justice and from the grief caused by grievous injustice. These two
conclusions are concerned more with the nature of evils than with
their existence.
Doubt. With regard to the existence of evils and with regard to
the elucidation of the second objection, the following question is
asked: How does God foresee evils, especially sins?
The answer is: God knows them in His permissive decree. St.
Thomas speaks of this permissive decree in the preceding article,
saying: “The knowledge of God joined to His will is the cause of
things. Hence it is not necessary that whatever God knows, is, or
was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills
to be, or permits to be.” 80 St. Thomas’ answer is the same in the
following replies to objections proposed by him: "God does not will
evil to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a
good.” 81 "One who provides universally, allows some little defect
to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered.” 82 “Rep­
robation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and
to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” 83
“Permission is of many kinds. There is permission: (1) of licit con­
cession; (2) of dispensation ... ; (3) of tolerance, as when a lesser
evil is permitted for a greater good. Such was the permission given
by Moses, when he allowed a bill of divorce ... ; (4) of favorable
concession, as when something is permitted, though its opposite
is better; as when the apostles permitted second marriages (I Cor.,
chap. 7) ... ; (5) of forbearance, as when God permits evils to
happen, that through them He may effect some good.” 84
Before the permissive decree God knows sins as possible, but not
as future. Moreover, God wills to concur in the act of sin, so that
s° Cf. ad jtim.
si Ibid., la, q.19, a.g ad gum.
82 Ibid., q.22, a. 2 ad 211m.
S3 ibid., q.23, a.3; see also la Ilae, q.yg, a.4.
«< Com. in Malt., 5: 31.

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THE ONE GOD

whatever actuality there is in it depends on the First Cause.85
86 Nor
does it follow from this that God is the cause of sin, namely, of
the deordination in sin. Since God is indefectible, He cannot be
either the direct or the indirect cause (as it were through negligence)
of this deordination, which is a defect.88 Thus evil is explained on
three grounds: (i) on the part of the formal cause (as being the
privation of a good that is due); (2) on the part of the material
and defective cause (the defectible creature); (3) on the part of
God permitting it, who in no way is the cause of sin, His permission
being the indispensable condition for sin, which He ordains for a
greater good as the end in view.87
Clarity and obscurity are combined in this solution. What is most
clear is this, that, just as God cannot produce what is not included
in the notion of being, so He can in no way be either the direct or
the indirect cause of the deordination in sin, which is excluded from
the adequate object of divine omnipotence. Nothing is more exclu­
sive in itself than the object of any faculty. Thus the intellect knows
good only under the aspect of the true; for although there is no
real distinction between the true and the good, yet the intellect
does not attain to the good under the concept of good, this being
the province of the will, but it attains to this under the proper
concept of the true. Thus God wills, and causes sin only as it is
an entity, but not as it is a sinful act. This is an absolute certainty.
Yet there is obscurity as to the intimate mode in which God, by
permitting sin, concurs in its entity and in no way concurs in its
malice. This intimate mode is hidden from us; and no wonder, for
the mode is strictly divine, and is only analogically known by us
in an inferior mirror.88
ELEVENTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD KNOWS SINGULAR THINGS

The answer is in the affirmative and is of faith, being a part of
the dogmatic truth known as Providence which, according to Holy
Scripture, extends even to the least of singular things, as is evident
from the following passage: “Are not two sparrows sold for a
farthing? And not one of them shall fall on the ground without your
Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. ’89 St.
85 Summa theol., la Ilae, q.79, a.2.
88 Ibid., a. 1.
Ibid., Illa, q.i, a.3 ad 311m.
M Ibid., la, q. 19, a.6, 8, 9; q.22, a.2, 3, 4; q.23, a.3, 5.
88 Matt, to: 30.

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Thomas quotes a text from the Old Testament: "All the ways of a
man are open to His eyes.” 99
In the body of the article it is shown: (1) that God knows singular
things; (2) how He knows them.
The truth of the first statement is established by the following
argument: All perfections found in creatures, which in their formal
signification imply no imperfection, pre-exist formally and emi­
nently in God; but knowledge of singulars is of this nature; there­
fore such perfections pre-exist in God formally and eminently.
The major was proved in a previous article.91 The minor is evi­
dent. For, although sense perception of singular things implies im­
perfection, such is not the case with intellectual knowledge of
singular things, if this intellectual knowledge does not have to be
in conjunction with sensitive knowledge.
St. Thomas appeals to the authority of Aristotle, who, in refuting
Empedocles, says: “God wotdd be most ignorant if He did not
know discord.” 92 Yet it is not quite clear that Aristotle has in mind
not only discord in general, but also particular cases of it.
In the second statement the question is asked: How does God
know singular things? The answer is, that it will not do to say
that God knows singular things in that He knows all their universal
causes; for the singular thing, in its singularity, is dependent on
individual matter, and thus the singular would not be realized as
such. Nor will it do to say that God applies universal causes to
particular effects, for this application presupposes but does not
constitute the singular as known. It must be said that God, as shown
above,93 knows things other than Himself by His essence as their
cause. But the divine causality extends to singular things inasmuch
as it produces not only the form of things, but also the matter by
which things are individualized. Therefore God knows singular
things by His essence as their cause.
The minor is evident, for matter, although it is pure potentiality,
still is being, and is distinct from both actuality and nothingness.
Therefore it is not independently of God, the first Being, that this
matter is caused and preserved here and now in such individual.
“Matter, in so far as it has being in this or that way, retains a certain
likeness to the divine Being.” 94
Hence, whereas we know spiritual things in the mirror of sensible
things, God knows material things in the most exalted mirror of
00 Prov. 16: 2.
0» Cf. q.4, a.2.
ο2 De anima, Bk. I, chap, 5; Metaph., Bk. Ill, chap. 4.
os Summa theol., la, q.14, a.8.
o« Ibid., a. 11 ad 311m.

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His essence, which is the cause of all things even as regards their
singularity. For us the spiritual is something immaterial: for the
pure spirit and especially for God, the material is something non­
spiritual, not having the amplitude of spirituality, something
limited or confined here and now by matter, the ultimate subject,
which is almost nothing. Thus in a spiritual way God knows from
on high, for instance, a symphony which we perceive by the sense of
hearing.
TWELFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD CAN KNOW INFINITE THINGS

State of the question. It seems that the infinite, such as an un­
ending series of days, is something unknown and unknowable, be­
cause a thing is knowable inasmuch as it is in act, or determined.
Also the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, for it has
no end. Such, for instance, is the successive and endless series of
intellectual and volitional acts. For that alone is traversable which
has a beginning and an end.95
The answer is, however, in the affirmative, and it is of faith, a
point that will be more clearly established in the next article, which
affirms that God knows future contingent things, even the intel­
lectual and volitional acts of immortal souls, for there will be an
unending series of such acts. It is first proved that God knows in­
finite things both by the knowledge of simple intelligence and by
that of vision. Then the reason is given for the possibility of this
knowledge.
1) As regards the knowledge of simple intelligence. Those things
that are possible to God and to creatures are infinite. But God
knows not only actual things, but all those that are possible to
Him and to creatures. Therefore He knows infinite things, namely,
an actually infinite and innumerable multitude of possible things.
For, as St. Thomas says, “number adds to multitude the idea of
measure; for number is multitude measured by one.” 96
2) As regards the knowledge of vision. The thoughts and affec­
tions of immortal souls will be multiplied to infinity. But God
knows all these actually and simultaneously, and not successively, as
we know them. Therefore also by His knowledge of vision He
knows infinite things. The multitude of these thoughts is succes­
sively infinite, and absolutely innumerable.
3) The reason is given for the possibility of this knowledge of
infinite things. Knowledge is measured by the mode of the form,
05 See St. Thomas' Com. on Aristotle's Physics, Bk. VI, lect. g.
** Ibid., Bk. Ill, lect. 8. Cf. supra, q.7, a.4.

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which is the principle of knowledge. But the divine essence, where­
by God knows, extends as cause to infinite things, even as these
are distinct from one another.07
The major is evident by an inductive process. Sense perception
is co-extensive with the sensible species, and includes all sensible
things represented by this latter. Our intellect, however, is co­
extensive with the abstracted intelligible species, and includes an
infinity of particulars as these communicate in the specific nature
so understood, but not as they are distinct from one another.
But the minor is proved from the sixth and the eleventh articles
of this question, in which it is stated that whatever perfection
exists in creatures, even their individuating notes, pre-exist in God
as in their most eminent cause, which most perfectly knows its
power and causality.
The solution of the objections confirms this conclusion.
Reply to first objection. To know the infinite successively, part
after part, is an impossibility even for God, because there would
never be an end of this addition. But God knows the infinite or
infinite things, not successively, that is, not part after part; for He
knows all things simultaneously, inasmuch as they are contained
in His power and eternal causality, which, as being simultaneously
whole, includes all time. Thus it is not repugnant for infinite things
to be contained in a most perfect and pre-existing Infinite, namely,
in the power, intellect and eternity of God; for they exist unitedly
in God, and are not as parts outside parts, as measured properly by
time, but they are measured by the unique instant of motionless
eternity.
Reply to second objection. "The infinite cannot be traversed by
the infinite,” because transition imports a certain succession of parts
(and is not the terminus of the infinite multitude of parts). But
the infinite can be adequately comprehended by the Infinite, in the
higher reason of the divine essence, whose power is infinite.
Reply to third objection. Thus God’s knowledge is not the quan­
titative measure of things, but is their measure inasmuch as things
imitate God’s knowledge, as the things made by art agree with the
art.
THIRTEENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD’S KNOWLEDGE IS OF FUTURE THINGS

State of the question. The divine omniscience must indeed extend
to all things, but it seems to eliminate contingency from things,
because God’s knowledge, which is the cause of things, is not a
07 Cf. a.6, u.

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THE ONE GOD

contingent cause but a necessary one, from which, therefore, a
necessary effect proceeds. Moreover, everything known by God must
necessarily be, whereas no contingent thing must necessarily be.
Hence, that the Stoics might defend God’s foreknowledge of
future things, they denied free will; so also did the Hussites. On the
contrary, since Cicero08 could not reconcile God’s foreknowledge of
future things with our freedom, in order to defend the latter he
denied the former. The same also applies to Marcion, and in later
times the Socinians maintained that God has only a conjectural
knowledge of future free acts.
It is of faith, however, that God has infallible knowledge of all
absolute futures, both contingent and free, without detriment to
their freedom.00
This is evident from several texts in Holy Scripture, such as the
following: “He who hath made the hearts of every one of them,
who understandeth all their works”;100 “Thou hast understood my
thoughts afar off . . . and Thou hast foreseen all my ways”;101
se De divinatione, Bk. II.
oo It must be noted that the future is correctly defined as that which is deter­
mined in its causes to exist in course of time. Such is the common teaching of
the Thomists.
It is not a question here of a cause having precisely the power to produce such
effect, because this denotes merely what is possible; nor is it a question of a cause
as actually producing such effect, because this denotes an existing thing. There­
fore the definition concerns an absolute future.
Evidently the future must be constituted as such by that which eliminates it
from the mass of possible things and distinguishes it from both possible and exist­
ing things. But there is only one way by which this is effected, and that is by the
determination of that cause; and from all eternity the only cause was the First
Cause.
Hence St. Thomas says: "That which now is, was future, before it was; because
it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that
thing’s coming to be was not future. But the First Cause is alone eternal. Hence
it does not follow that it was always true that what now is, would be, except in
so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a
cause" (la, q.16, a. 7 ad 311m).
The future is either necessary or contingent. The necessary is that which of
its nature seeks to exist some time, nor can this be prevented by natural causes;
such a future is the rising of the sun tomorrow. The contingent, properly so
called, is that which of its nature is indifferent as to whether it exists or does not
exist; such are those things that depend on free will. The contingent in the broad
sense of the term, of its nature seeks to exist, but it can be prevented by natural
causes; such a contingent is a long life because of robust health. The future con­
tingent, properly so called, is either absolute or conditional. The absolute is
independent of any condition; the conditional is dependent on a condition, and
is called a futurable, because it mediates between the absolute future and the
possible.
100 Ps. 32: 15.
101 Ibid., 138: 3.

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45’
"For I know that transgressing thou wilt transgress, and I have
called thee a transgressor from the womb.” 102 It is likewise said
of Jesus: "For Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that
did not believe, and who he was that would betray Him.” 103 These
texts refer to future and, in fact, free contingent acts. Nor is the
reference here solely to conjectural knowledge, for such knowledge
is not expressed by the words “understands,” “I know,” "knew from
the beginning.” Moreover, a conjecture is fallible and is something
repugnant to the most perfect Being, to the first Truth, and to
supreme Intelligence. Finally, there is no reason why God should
know one rather than another of many future things, as will be
clearly seen from the proofs that follow.
Several councils have affirmed that the decrees of divine provi­
dence are infallible, and that they are accompanied by the most
certain foreknowledge of future things. As the Council of Valencia
says: “We unhesitatingly maintain that God absolutely foreknew
that the good will be so by His grace, and that by this same grace
they will receive the reward of eternal life; He foreknew that the
wicked will be so through their own malice.”104 The Vatican
Council says: “All things are naked and open to His eyes, even those
which are yet to be by the free action of creatures.” 105
Theological proof. This truth of the faith is proved from other
truths which are likewise revealed, and which can be known by the
natural powers of reason. Thus St. Thomas proves in the body of
the article: (i) that God certainly knows future contingent things;
and he declares (2) how God knows them, by assigning the proper
reason for this knowledge both on the part of the thing known and
on the part of the knower.
1) Arguing from common principles it is proved that God cer­
tainly knows future contingent things; for God knows all things,
not only those that actually are, but even those that are possible
to Him or to creatures. But of these some are for us future con­
tingent things. Therefore God knows them, which means that He
certainly knows them. This is the reason that is deduced from
common principles.
2) How does God know them? The proper reason is assigned for
this both on the part of the thing known and on the part of the
knower.
The contingent cannot be infallibly known unless it is known
as actual and present. It is not enough for it to be known in its
102 Is. 48: 8.
103 John 6: 65.
104 Denz., no. 321.
10s Ibid., no. 1784: Heb. 4: 13.

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proximate cause, for this is not determined to one thing. But God
knows all contingents as they actually are and are present to Him.
Therefore God knows them infallibly, and yet they do not cease
to be contingent; just as when I most certainly see Socrates sitting,
the contingency of this sitting is not thereby destroyed.
The minor is proved, and at the same time this knowledge is ex­
plained on the part of the knower.
Eternity, being simultaneously whole, comprises all time, so that
futures are present in it; but the divine knowledge is measured by
eternity; therefore the divine knowledge extends to future things, as
actually present in this higher type of duration.
In other words, in the very now of eternity “God’s glance is
carried over all tilings as they are in their presentiality." 100 In the
reply to the third objection it is said: “Things reduced to act in
time, are known by us successively in time, but by God they are
known in eternity, which is above time ... ; just as he who goes
along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas
he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all traveling
by the way.”
Thus the unique and permanent instant of eternity corresponds
to all the passing instants of time, just as the peak of a pyramid
corresponds to all the points of its base. This was explained in
a previous question,107 in which it was declared that eternity is
“simultaneously whole,” but that time is not. In this same question
it was said: “The flow of the now as alternating in aspect, is time.
But eternity remains the same to both subject and aspect.” 108 Eter­
nity is the proper measure of the permanent Being, of His intellec­
tion and of His love, just as time is the proper measure of movement,
suggesting succession and alteration, which cannot apply to God.
There are four points to be considered concerning this article
of St. Thomas: (i) the interpretation proposed by the Molinists;
(2) how future things are present in eternity, according to the
teaching of the Thomists; (3) the objections proposed against the
Thomist solution; (4) what is to be thought of the theory devised
by Molina and known as the scientia media.
I. MOLINIST INTERPRETATION

It is generally admitted among the Molinists that St. Thomas, in
those passages where he speaks professedly of the divine knowl­
edge,109 does not mention the divine decree spoken of subsequently
ιοβ Summa theol., q.14, a. 13, c.
10T Ibid., q. 10, a. 2, 4.
10s ibid., a.4 ad sum.
toolbid., q. 14, a. 13: I Sent., d.38, q.i, a.5.

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by the Thomists, but he has recourse to the presence of future things
in eternity, which comprises all time. Hence, according to St.
Thomas, the medium of the divine knowledge of future tilings is
not, as the Thomists would have it, the divine decree predetermin­
ing these future things. They say that the holy Doctor’s opinion is,
that the foreknowledge of future free acts does not presuppose an
absolute decree of the divine will concerning this future determina­
tion of our free will. Therefore his teaching can be reconciled with
the theory of the scientia media, by which God, before His decree,
certainly knows from all eternity conditionally free actions of the
future (for instance, what Peter’s choice would be if he were
situated in certain circumstances), and then God decreed to place
this man in these circumstances, in which He foresaw what his
choice would be.
Examination of this interpretation. The Thomists generally reply
that this interpretation lacks foundation and contradicts many texts
of St. Thomas; in fact, it is contrary to the very principles laid down
in the preceding articles of this question.
For in the fifth article St. Thomas said: "Since therefore the
divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is
the first effective cause of all things, God must necessarily (by the
perfect knowledge He has of His power) know things other than
Himself. . . . He sees other things not in themselves, but in Him­
self,” as in their cause.
Moreover, in the eighth article he wrote: "The knowledge of
God is the cause of things ... in so far as His will is joined to
it.” This is the decree of the divine will concerning which is the
following clearer statement. “Determined effects proceed from His
own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will
and intellect.” 110 In fact, the determination of the will is mentioned
in this text before that of the intellect, for, as stated in the eighth
article of this question: "Since the intelligible form has a relation
to opposite things, inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to
opposites, it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were
determined to one thing by the appetite, as the philosopher says
(Metaph., Bk. IX, chap. 5).” St. Thomas says similarly in another
passage: “God’s idea as regards the things that are, or will be, or
were to be produced, is determined by the purpose of the divine
will.” 111
There is no retractation, however, of the universal principles laid
down by St. Thomas in this question; but he is giving the particular
application of this doctrine to future things that are contingent, by
no Ibid., la, q.19, a. 4.
in De veritate, q.3, a.6.

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showing how these, although they are contingent, can certainly be
known as present. It is not here a question of reconciling the de­
termination of God’s most efficacious will with the contingency of
the thing willed by Him. This will be discussed in its proper place
when St. Thomas inquires whether God’s will imposes necessity on
the things willed, in which we shall see that he says: “Since, then,
the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things
are done which God wills to be done, but also that they are done
in the way that He wills,”112 namely, either contingently or
necessarily.
This point belongs properly to God’s will, and there was no need
of discussing it here along with God’s knowledge. It is precisely
this alone that St. Thomas proves in the present question, namely,
that the knowledge of the future contingent thing, inasmuch as it
is certain knowledge, does not take away contingency from the
thing, if the contingent thing is known as present, just as when I
certainly see Socrates who happens to be sitting.
There remains, however, this question: how is it that this future
contingent thing, such as the creation of the world in the passive
sense, or the conversion of St. Paul, is present in eternity rather than
its opposite, namely, that the world was not created, or that St.
Paul was not converted? Most certainly, if this future contingent
thing were eternally present to God independently of the determi­
nation of the divine will, it would be something necessary and not
contingent. Therefore from the principles already mentioned in
this question (concerning God’s knowledge, which is the cause of
things, inasmuch as the will is joined to it), it is evident that the
presence in eternity of this contingent future rather than its oppo­
site presupposes the determination of the divine will, which will
be more clearly explained in a subsequent question.113
Therefore in the second argument of this article, St. Thomas does
not speak so explicitly of the medium of this foreknowledge as of
the condition required for it to be intuitive. This condition is that
the divine knowledge refers to the future thing, not as it is future,
but as it is already present to this knowledge. Abstracted knowledge
can refer to those things that are not present, but intuitive knowl­
edge, and this alone is most perfect knowledge, refers to things that
are present.114
112Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.8.
ns Ibid., a.4, 8.
11« St. Thomas already spoke of the medium of God’s knowledge of creatures
in the fifth article, in which he said: “God knows things other than Himself in
Himself," as in their cause. In the eighth article he said: “The knowledge of
God is the cause of things, in so far as the will is joined to it,” which means in so

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Hence in this article St. Thomas most certainly presupposes that
there is and will be nothing outside God, no matter what its grade
of being may be, that is not related by way of causality to God, or
is not dependent on Him. In fact, in the beginning of the argu­
mentative part of this article he says: "Since God knows all things,
not only things actual but also things possible to Him and the
creature, and since some of these are future contingent to us, it
follows that God knows future contingent things.” This is the proof
that is derived from common principles.115
There are many other passages from St. Thomas’ works that con­
firm this interpretation, such as the following: "God knows our
mind’s thoughts and our secret wills in their virtual causes, since
He is the universal principle of being. . . . God so knows other
things in knowing His essence, as effects are known through their
cause being known. Therefore by knowing His essence God knows
all things to which His causality extends. Now this extends to the
works of the intellect and of the will. ... So by knowing His act
of intelligence and will, He knows every thought and will.” 115
He also says: "But since the act of free will is traced to God as a
cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the
exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence.”117
“Just as the will can decide otherwise, far more so can God do
this.” 118
But if St. Thomas says in this article, “a contingent thing as it is
in its cause ... is not subject to any certain knowledge,” he is
speaking of the created cause considered as such, which as regards
its effect is contingent and future. He has not in mind the divine
cause, for which nothing is future, all things being present to it.
far as the determination of the divine will is joined to it. On this point see
q.19, a.4, 8.
115 In fact, in this article St. Thomas alludes to the divine decree when toward
the end of the argumentative part he says: "Hence, all things that are in time
are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things
present within Him, as some say"; but the practical types of things are ideas
determined by the decree of the will.
He said the same in 1 Sent., d.38, q. 1, a.5: "God, from all eternity, saw not only
His relation to that thing which by His power was to come into existence, but
He also directly saw the very existence of this thing." This means that He not
only sees future things in the decree of His will, but as they are present to Him.
Nor would these things be present to Him rather than their opposites, except
by a decree of His will.
ns Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 68.
nr Summa theol., la, q.22, a.2 ad 4um; see also la, q. 103, a.8; q. 105, a.4; la
Ilae, q. 10, a.4 ad 311m.
i»8De veritate, q.22, a.8; cf. ibid., a.9.

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II. HOW FUTURE THINGS ARE PRESENT IN ETERNITY
THE THOMIST VIEW

According to the Thomists and many other theologians, including
Fonseca, Tiphanius, and others, future things are eternally present
in God not only objectively and intentionally, but physically and
really. They give two proofs for this, one indirect and the other
direct.
Indirect proof. If futures were not so present, then they would
be for God absolute futures, for simple representation does not
exclude the notion of futurity. Thus what is foretold in prophecy
precedes its realization. If God had only objective knowledge of
future things, He would thus begin again to see things as actually
existing. Thus God would be perfected in His knowledge, and only
then would it become intuitive.
Direct proof. Eternity is duration which, as such, is infinite, in­
divisible and simultaneously whole. But this duration contains
eminently, in the same permanent now, all successive durations,
past, present, and future, and it so contains them as not to cause
a variation in it when something new occurs in the inferior kinds
of duration. Thus St. Thomas says: “Newness of effect does not dem­
onstrate newness of action in God, since His action is His
essence.” 118
Objection. Some say that this merely proves that eternity is with­
out intrinsic but not extrinsic succession, just as the tree on the
bank of a river undergoes no change, though the constant flow of
the stream results in only a part of this water being present to the
tree, and not all the water is simultaneoutly present to the tree.
Therefore future things are not physically and really present in
eternity.
Reply. I deny the antecedent. A better illustration of eternity
would be to compare it with a tree planted equidistant from the
source and mouth of the river, and of such vast size as to extend to
all parts of the river. Similarly, it might be more fittingly compared
with the apex of a pyramid, which at one and the same time with­
out succession is coexistent with all points of its base. Hence there
is no increase in God’s knowledge when things appear in course of
time.
But they again object that it is unintelligible for something to
exist in eternity which does not have individual existence. But
futures do not now have individual existence. Therefore they do
not exist in eternity.
us Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 35.

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

457

Reply. I distinguish the major: it is unintelligible for some­
thing to exist in eternity which does not have individual existence
according to its proper duration, this I deny; that it does not have
individual existence in duration of a higher order, this I concede.
I explain with John of St. Thomas120 as follows: Eternity does not
measure created things immediately in themselves and by supposing
them already in themselves passively produced; but it measures
them properly, as they are contained in the divine action, by which
created things are attained and viewed as the terminus of this
action. For not only God’s intellection and volition are eternal, but
also His creative and motive action is eternal, although it has its
effect in time. This action is formally immanent and virtually transi­
tive. Thus the creative action in the creation of this particular soul,
from eternity regards this individual soul, and yet it is produced
only in time.
Futures indeed do not actually have individual existence, either
in time or from eternity as passively produced effects, but they exist
from eternity as terms implying actual eternal action. And under
this aspect, the created thing, although it is not as yet passively
produced, is however not only possible, or not only future, but it is
really present in eternity, for the divine essence contains it not only
as having the power or will to produce it but as actually producing
it. Thus the created thing is the object of direct knowledge, although
it does not yet exist in its own duration.
Doubt. Is this presentiality the medium of the divine knowledge
of future contingent things?
Reply. Presentiality is not the medium of this knowledge, but a
mode affecting the object known and a condition for this knowledge
to be intuitive. The medium of this divine knowledge, however, is
the determination of the divine will as actually causing from eter­
nity. For St. Thomas, to see future things as present in eternity is
to see them in the divine will as actually causing them. This is most
evident from what St. Thomas has already said in this question,
namely, that God does not see created things immediately in them­
selves, but in Himself as their cause.121 Farther on he declares that
God is the cause of things by His will.122
III.

THOMIST SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CONCLUSION
OF THIS ARTICLE

First objection. It is at the beginning of this article, and is as
follows: From a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect; but the
120 Disp., IX, a.3.
121 Summa theol., la, q.14, a.5, 8.
122 Ibid., q. 19, a.4.

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knowledge of God is the necessary cause of things known by Him;
therefore things known by Him are necessary.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that a necessary effect proceeds
from a proximate necessary cause, this I concede; that from the
supreme cause such an effect proceeds, this I subdistinguish: with
a proximate necessary cause, this I concede; with a proximate con­
tingent cause, this I deny. Thus, owing to the necessary influence
of the sun’s rays, the germination of the plant is contingent by
reason of the proximate contingent cause.
It must be noted that God’s knowledge cannot be called a neces­
sary cause, except in an improper sense: (i) in that it is a necessary
prerequisite; (2) in that it is infallibly efficacious; but as such it is
a free cause, and as St. Thomas says, “God wills some things to be
done necessarily, some contingently.”128 Hence, as will be explained
farther on,124 the divine causality transcends the necessity and con­
tingency that proceed from it.
Second objection. Every conditional proposition of which the
antecedent is necessary, must have a necessary consequent; but in
this conditional proposition, “If God knew that this thing will be,
it will be," the antecedent is necessary, in that it is eternal and
immutable; therefore the consequent is also necessary.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if the antecedent is absolutely
necessary in fact, then I concede it; if it is necessary as something
contingently seen, which cannot at the same time not be seen, then
I deny it. Thus, if I see Socrates sitting, he must be sitting, but it is
contingent, nevertheless, that he sits.
Third objection. Everything known by God must necessarily be;
but no future contingent thing must necessarily be; therefore no
future contingent thing is known by God.
Reply. That everything known by God must necessarily be, by
reason of a conditional necessity or one of consequence, this I con­
cede; by reason of an absolute necessity or one of consequent in
itself, this I deny. Thus, if I see Socrates sitting, he must of necessity
be sitting; but it is contingent, as stated above, that he is sitting.
In other words, this proposition, “Everything known by God
must necessarily be,” if it concerns the thing is divided, and is false;
for the meaning is: Everything which God knows is necessary. But
the same proposition is true, if understood of the saying and in the
composite sense, for then the meaning is: That which is known by
God is necessary.125
Similarly, we say that what is foreseen by God must of necessity
123 ibid., a. 8.
12« Ibid.
12« Cf. ad jum.

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happen; but it happens contingently. For the mode of the necessity
affects not the thing and the mode of the thing in itself, but the
statement declaring that some foreseen contingent event will in­
fallibly come to pass, such as the conversion of St. Paul.
Expressed more briefly, as stated in the body of the article and
in the replies to the second and third objections, the necessity does
not affect the thing as it is in itself, but as it is subject to the divine
knowledge, as in the case of Socrates who is seen to be sitting.
By this reply contradiction is avoided, but we have still to give
the reason why the infallible efficacy of the determination on the
part of the divine will does not destroy the freedom of the human
will. The divine will does not destroy this freedom, because it ac­
tualizes the same and extends even to the free mode of our choice.
For God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contin­
gently; and this infallibly happens as God wills.126
Another objection. Effects cannot be known with certainty in
their universal and remote cause, because the power of the universal
cause can be modified and even prevented by a particular cause,
just as the sun’s rays can be because of a defective disposition in the
plant, which prevents the ripening of the fruit. But the divine cause
is the universal and remote cause. Therefore effects cannot be
known with certainty in it.
Reply. I distinguish the major; in the universal cause, which is
not die supreme cause, this I concede; in the supreme universal
cause, on which every other cause depends, this I deny. For nothing
prevents the First Cause from producing its effect, unless this is
permitted by it. But God does not permit such deficiency in those
things which He efficaciously wills, namely, in future contingent
things efficaciously willed by Him; and it is of these that we are
speaking.127
Final objection. If the decree of the divine will is of itself in­
fallibly efficacious, then our acts are necessary, and therefore not
free.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: if the decree extends only
to the substance of the act, this I concede; if it extends also to the
free mode of this act, this I deny. For God moves creatures in the
way that is befitting to their natures. What is more absurd than to
say that God wills efficaciously that this particular sinner be con­
verted freely, as Bossuet says,128 and then to conclude that he cannot
be converted freely? 128
12° Cf. la, q. ig, a.8.
12’ Cf. infra, q.ig, a.6 ad lum.
Cf. Traité du libre arbitre, chap. 8.
H» Summa theol., la, q.19, a.8.

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IV. THE "SCIENTIA MEDIA”

What must be said of the theory proposed by Molina, and known
as the scientia media?
Molina says: “We must distinguish between three kinds of knowl­
edge in God, unless we want to expose ourselves to the danger of
laboring under a hallucination in reconciling the freedom of our
will and the contingency of things with the divine knowledge. One
kind is merely natural, and hence it could on no account be other
than it is in God, (for it is concerned with necessary and possible
things). . . . The second kind is merely free, by which God, after a
free act of His will, regardless of any hypothetical condition, knew
absolutely . . . what things would come into existence. The third
kind, finally, is the scientia media, by which God, from a most
profound and inscrutable comprehension of every free will in His
essence, has intuited what each, according to its innate liberty,
would do if placed in this or that condition, or even in infinite­
conditions of things, although it could, if it wished, do exactly the
opposite.” 180
Hence Molina maintains that God's merely natural knowledge
is concerned with necessary and possible things; His free knowledge
with absolute contingent futures; and the scientia media with con­
ditional futures, which are called futurables, inasmuch as they
mediate between the merely possible and the absolute future.
Immediately after the preceding extract, Molina adds: "Perhaps
someone will ask whether this kind of scientia media is to be called
free or natural. In reply to this it must first of all be said that on
no account must this knowledge be called free, both because it
precedes every free act of the divine will, and because it was not
in God’s power to know by this knowledge anything else than He
actually knew. . . . (But) if the created free will were to do the
opposite of what it did, as it truly can do, God would have known
this very act by the same knowledge, but not that He actually
knows it.” 181 Here we have a point of greatest difficulty.
The text of Molina is of great importance. Therefrom it seems to
follow that there is a dependence or passivity in God as regards
futurables, for instance, this one: If Peter the apostle were placed
in the circumstances of the Passion, he would deny the Lord, so
that in this order of things God could not have preserved Him
from sin. For Molina says: “It was not in God’s power to know
by this knowledge anything else than He actually knew. . . . (But)
if the created free will were to do the opposite of what it did, as it
iso Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 52, pp. 317 f.
«1 Ibid.

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truly can do, God would have known this very act by the same
knowledge, but not that He actually knows it.” 182
This consequence appears to be absolutely necessary: for if God
is not the first determining Cause as regards free conditionate
futures, He is determined by them, and there is no other alterna­
tive. If all things are not dependent on God, then God Himself is
dependent on another. Here is the main difficulty of the question.
The Thomists maintain, indeed, that God infallibly knows free
conditionate futures, referred to in prophecies of commination,
such as the destruction of Ninive, if the Ninivites are not con­
verted.183 But they add: God infallibly knows these contingent
futurables in a decree that is objectively conditional and subjec­
tively absolute. Such are, for instance, the destruction of Ninive
or tire conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians, if Christ had
preached to them.
This decree is required, so the Thomists say against the Molinists,
because, even posited the condition, these conditionally free acts
of the future (futuribilia), as being contingent and free acts, are
undetermined. To make the gratuitous assertion that they are de­
termined in themselves, is to end in determinism of circumstances
and to posit passivity and dependence in God as regards these acts.
For God either is the first determining Cause or is determined by
another, or dependent on another at least in the foreknowledge of
conditionally free acts of the future.
Therefore the theory of the scientia media essentially consists
in this, namely, that God, before the actual decree that is objec­
tively conditional, infallibly knows free conditioned futures, namely,
what the created free will would do if placed in certain circum­
stances. Afterward God decreed to put the will de facto in these
or other particular circumstances; and thus dependent on the
scientia media He knows absolute contingent futures. Thus God
foresees before any decree of His that Peter, if placed in certain
circumstances, would make good use of the sufficient grace to be
offered him, and then God wills to place Peter in such circum­
stances.134
132 Ibid.
iss Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.171, a.6 ad 211m: q.174, a.i; la, q.19, a.7 ad 211m.
134 Some want to prove the existence of the scientia media by the following
argument: The divine knowledge gets its name, too, from the object. But between
the merely possible and the absolute future there is an object of intermediate
knowledge, namely, the conditionally free act of the future (futuribile). There­
fore, in like manner, between the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is con­
cerned with possible things, and the knowledge of vision, which is concerned with
future things, there is the scientia media, which is concerned with conditionally
free acts of the future. In reply to this we say that this is conceded also by the
Thomists, provided the scientia "media" presupposes some objectively conditional

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THE ONE GOD

Molina wants to explain the scientia media by the divine super­
comprehension of the created free will. Suarez preserves intact the
scientia inedia in his congruism, but he explains it by the divine
knowledge of the formal or objective truth of futurables, as if
contingent futurables were in themselves determined before what­
soever divine decree; as if, before any decree, of two contradictory
propositions in a contingent matter of the future, such as, Peter
placed in these particular circumstances would or would not deny
the Lord, one were determinately true and the other false.135
CRITICISM OF THE THEORY OF THE SCIENTIA MEDIA

This theory is not in agreement with the doctrinal principles of
St. Paul, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas.
1) St. Paul says: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou
that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost
thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?” 136 Christ, too, had
said: “Without Me you can do nothing.” 137 According to St. Paul’s
words just quoted, the singling out of one from another must
finally be sought not in the human will, but in God who singles
out one from another by His grace. But the scientia media sup­
poses that one by his own will singles himself out from another,
divine decree, and then it differs from the scientia media admitted by Molina.
It must be noted with Father Diekamp (Theologiae dogmaticae manuale
('933)· h 2O4): "This doctrine is very often proposed in such a manner as if
Molina had set forth this knowledge as occupying a middle ground between the
knowledge of vision and that of simple intelligence, and in this sense it is attacked
by the Thomists. But the case is not exactly so. Conditioned futures can indeed
in some way be conceived as occupying a middle ground between merely possible
and really existing things. For this reason we may divide the divine knowledge
into three parts, inasmuch as it is knowledge of existing things, of conditioned
futures and of merely possible things. But this knowledge of conditioned fu­
tures cannot be identified with the Molinist scientia media. For it is precisely
this that Molina asks, namely, whether God, before any free decree of His will,
knows conditioned futures, and whether this knowledge necessitates a special
mode of cognition in God, namely, a knowledge that mediates between His
necessary knowledge and His free knowledge. This the Molinists affirm, though
the Thomists deny it.
Consult Father N. del Prado, De gratia et libero arbitrio, III, 117 f. Consult
also among Jesuit authors. Father M. de la Tailie's article entitled, "Sur les
diverses classifications de la science divine” (Recherches de la science religieuse,
1923, pp. 7 f., 528 f.). But Father de la Taille separates from the Thomists inas­
much as, instead of a predetermining decree, he admits one that is concomitant,
which the Thomists say is not sufficient for the foundation of infallible certainty
required for the divine knowledge of futurables, as will be stated farther on.
Cf. Suarez, De scientia futurorum contingentium, chap. 7.
ise I Cor. 4: 7.
137 John 15: 5.

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for instance, Peter from Judas. Therefore the scientia media does
not seek for this singling out in God.
Proof of the minor. Let us suppose that Peter and Judas situated
in equal circumstances receive equal prevenient grace; then God
sees Peter consenting to accept that grace, and hence singling him­
self out from Judas who does not consent, not on account of the
grace, for an equal grace is indifferently offered to each. Therefore
it is because the will decides to accept the grace. Thus do all
Thomists argue against Molina, and they thus affirm as revealed
the principle that can be called "the principle of predilection,”
namely, that no one would be better than another unless he were
loved more and helped more by God. This principle is frequently
enunciated by St. Paul, as in the following text: “For the Lord
saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy. And
I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy. So then it is not of
him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth
mercy.” 138
But this principle cannot be reconciled with the scientia media.
For what two persons equally have is not a reason for singling out
one from another. But in the same circumstance the grace is sup­
posed equal in Peter consenting and in Judas not consenting.
Therefore this grace does not single out one from another, but
in the final analysis Peter singles himself out by that which of
himself he adds to it, namely, by his consent to and use of the
grace. Moreover, St. Paul says: “For it is God who worketh in you
both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 188
2) St. Augustine often quotes the aforesaid text of St. Paul
against the Semipelagians: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what
hast thou that thou hast not received?” 140 He says: “It is grace that
singles out the good from the bad, not a grace that is common to
both good and bad.” 141 “And so this grace that is secretly given
by the divine liberality to human hearts, is spurned by no one
hard of heart, because it is primarily given to overcome this hard­
ness of heart.” 142 "Of two infants equally bound by original sin,
why the one is taken and the other left; and of two wicked men
already mature in years, why one should be so called that he fol­
lows Him that calleth, while the other is not called at all, or is
not called in such a manner; these are unsearchable judgments of
God.” 143
is» Rom. 9: 15; cf. infra, la, q.20, a.3, 4.
138 Phil. 2: 13; consult Com. of St. Thomas on this text.
1«® I Cor. 4: 7.
1« De praedest. sanctorum, chap. 5.
142 ibid., chap. 8.
its De dono perseverantiae, chap. 9.

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THE ONE GOD

Contrary to this, according to the theory o£ the scientia media,
it would have to be said that o£ two wicked men situated in equal
circumstances, and receiving an equal prevenient grace, God sees
one consenting to that grace and then singling himself out from
the other.
The considerable opposition between the doctrine of St. Augus­
tine and that of Molina is therefore evident in their definition of
predestination. St. Augustine thus defines it: “The predestination
of the saints is nothing else than the foreknowledge and prepara­
tion of the gifts whereby they who are delivered are most certainly
delivered.” 144*"By predestination God foreknew those things which
He was going to do.” 146
On the contrary, Molina says: “To the foreknowledge which in­
cludes predestination on the part of the intellect, there is the con­
dition attached of the use of free will without which there would
have been no foreknowledge in God.” 140 He also says: “Of two
called and helped by an equal grace, one is converted and the
other not.” 147 Hence no wonder that Molina acknowledges his de­
parture from the teaching of St. Augustine, as is evident from many
passages in the work just quoted.148149
3) The principles of St. Thomas equally exclude the scientia
media.
a) St. Thomas admits only the knowledge of simple intelligence,
which is concerned with possible things, and the knowledge of
vision which, granted a decree, intuits future things. The knowl­
edge of conditioned futures belongs by a reductive process to this
latter.
b) In reconciling the freedom of the will with the divine de­
crees, St. Thomas never has recourse to the scientia media, which
explores the field of human liberty concerning the consent or dis­
sent of the will before there is a divine decree, but with St. Augus­
tine he asserts: “Since the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it
follows not only that things are done which God wills to be done,
but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God
wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently (and
freely).” 140
c) For St. Thomas, before there is an actual decree on God’s part,
there is nothing that will be, as is evident from the following pas­
144 Ibid., chap. 14.

us De praedest. sanctorum, chap. 10.
146 Concordia, p. 516; see also pp. 426, 505, 513, 514.
141 Ibid., pp. 51, 565.
148 ibid., q.23, a.4, 5, disp. 1, membr. ult., pp. 546-48.
149 Summa theol., la, q.19, a.8.

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465

sage: “That which now is was about to be before it actually was;
because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause
were removed, that thing’s coming to be was not future. But the
first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was
always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its
future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such
a cause.’’150 Also this text: “Contingent futures are not knowable
in themselves, because their truth is not determined.” 151 It is not
determined before God's decree, and if it were determined before,
God would be determined by these contingent futures in His fore­
knowledge.
d) According to the teaching of St. Thomas, "God sees things
other than Himself, not in themselves but in Himself”152 as in
their cause. But in the theory of the scientia media God is not the
cause of the determination of conditionally free acts of the future.
Therefore, according to the principles of St. Thomas, God cannot
know this determination. Moreover, the Angelic Doctor admits the
principles which we now give.
4) Finally, the scientia media conflicts with many principles com­
monly accepted by the theologians.
a) Before the divine decree, there is no object for the scientia
media, because the conditionally free act of the future is not deter­
mined either in itself or in another, as was stated.
b) The medium of the scientia media does not precede the divine
decree, because there is no cause in which this conditioned future
is determined; for it is not determined in the divine cause or in
human liberty or in the circumstances; and if it is said that God
knows infallibly this conditioned future by exploring the circum­
stances, then this theory would end in determinism of circum­
stances. Thus the scientia media, which is devised to save created
liberty, would destroy it.
c) God’s knowledge cannot be determined by anything which is
extrinsic to Him, and which would not be caused by Him. But
such is the scientia media, which depends on the determination
of the free conditioned future; for this determination does not
come from God but from the human liberty, granted that it is
placed in such particular circumstances; so that “it was not in
God’s power to know any other thing .... but if the created
free will were to do the opposite, He would have known this other
ihing,” as Molina says in the passage just quoted.153 Thus God
Ibid., la, q. 16, a.7 ad 311m.
L‘ilbid., Ila Ilae, q.171, a.3.
m Ibid., la, q.14, a.5.
«s Concordia, p. 318.

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THE ONE GOD

would be dependent on another, would be passive in His knowl­
edge, and would be no longer pure Act. The dilemma is unsolvable: Either God is the first determining Being, or else He is
determined by another; there is no other alternative. In other
words, the scientia media involves an imperfection, which cannot
exist in God. Hence there is a certain tinge of anthropomorphism
in this theory.
All the aforesaid arguments bring us to this conclusion: there is
no determination without a determining cause, and the supreme
determining cause is God, otherwise He would be determined by
another. But this is nothing else than the principle of causality.
d) With the positing of the scientia media, God is no longer the
first and universal Mover, the First Cause, for any movement of
the created free will to determine itself is not from God. Thus the
demonstration of God’s existence by the first way (from motion)
loses very much in forcefulness.
e) Thus this theory takes away from God His supreme dominion
over created free wills. In such circumstances, God could not con­
vert the will, if it wills the opposite. For Molina says: “It was not
in God’s power to know any other thing, but He would have
known this other thing if the created will were to do the opposite
of what it did.”151 But this is contrary to what Holy Scripture
says, as in the following texts. "As the divisions of waters, so the
heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will
He shall turn it.” 185 “As the potter’s clay is in his hand, to fashion
and order it . . . , so man is in the hand of Him that made
Him.” 156 “For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to
accomplish, according to His good will.” 107 The theory of the scientia
media limits the divine omnipotence. For if God, by means of the
scientia media, foresees that our will under certain conditions will
refuse to be moved to perform some good act, then He is already
incapable of moving our will so that in these conditions it freely
consent to be moved to perform this good act.168
f) God would no more be the author of good than of bad acts,
at least as regards their intrinsic and free determination, because
neither good nor bad acts would come from Him, at least as re­
gards the performance of these acts. He would be the cause of the
good determination only by proposing the desirable object. And
this even men can do.
uu Ibid., p. 318.
iss Prov. 21:1.
ise Eccli. 33: 13, 14.
i” Phil. 2: 13.
i68 So does Father Diekamp very wisely remark in his Theol. dogm., I, 224.

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

467

g) The scientia media puts less emphasis on the need for prayer.
For the Molinist, who would wish to have his theory remain unim­
paired in prayer, could not ask God for the efficacious grace that
makes him will, that takes away from him the stony heart, that
compels the rebellious will to turn to God, as the Church prays. He
cannot pray with the profundity of meaning as in the prayer of
the Mass: “Make me adhere to Thy commandments and never
permit me to be separated from Thee.” 159 But according to the
Molinist’s theory, he asks God merely to place him in those circum­
stances in which He foresaw that he would consent to the grace
offered.
h) This theory seems to savor somewhat of Semipelagianism,
which holds that the beginning of salvation is from ourselves, and
not from God’s grace.160 Molinism admits a prevenient interior
grace, indeed, but maintains that it moves the will only objectively
and not infallibly; in fact, according to Molina, “of two that are
called and equally aided by grace, it can happen that one of them
is converted, and the other not.” 161 Thus the true beginning of
salvation appears to be only in the one who is converted, which ap­
pears to be a free determination that is from God only in so far
as He objectively urges this one to the free determination, just as
He urges the other who is not converted.
Finally, the scientia media has been frequently condemned be­
cause of the novelty of this theory. In fact, Molina acknowledges
that he is the discoverer of this theory.162 Nevertheless the Semi­
pelagians made use of this knowledge according as it served their
purpose, saying that God foresees the good use of free will and for
this reason gives the grace. He also foresees the good works that
would have been performed by the baptized infants if they had
not died.
The Molinists object, indeed, that Christ said: “Woe to thee,
Corozain! Woe to thee, Bethsaida! For if in Tyre and Sidon had
been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they
had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes.” 163 But, as
they say, this reproof would have been unjust if understood in
the Thomist sense; for, according to the opinion of the Thomists,
the Jews could have justly replied to this by saying: Lord, if Thou
hadst efficaciously decreed our penance on the supposition of
Christ’s preaching, just as Thou didst decree the penance of the
iss Prayer before priest’s communion.
ιβο Denz., no. 178.
iei Cf. Concordia, pp. 51, 565, and the index under the word “Auxilium."
162 Ibid., pp. 546-48.
les Matt. 11: it.

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THE ONE GOD

Tyrians on the same condition of Christ’s preaching and miracles,
we would have repented, just as they did.
To this the Thomists reply: (i) This was the very way St. Paul
argued in the objection which he put to himself; for, after having
said: "So, then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that run­
neth, but of God that showeth mercy, (who) hath mercy on whom
He will, and whom He will, He hardeneth,” 104 he at once follows
this up with the counterobjection: “Thou wilt say therefore to me:
Why does He then find fault? For who resisteth His will?” 164
*166 The
apostle does not solve the objection, however, by having recourse to
God’s foreseeing our consent, whether this is for what is good or
for what is bad; but he says: “O man, who art thou that repliest
against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why
hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay,
of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto
dishonor?” 1ββ The apostle does not settle the dispute by saying that
all have sufficient grace, the efficacy of which depends on their con­
sent foreseen by God. He replies that God is not bound to give the
efficacious grace, for it is something freely given, as the name grace
indicates.
A direct answer is given to this objection by saying that it was
the Jews’ fault that they were hardened, whereas the Tyrians were
not; because they made it more difficult for themselves to receive
the efficacious grace, which was offered in the sufficient grace. The
Tyrians would not have resisted Christ’s preaching and miracles,
and thus they would not have been deprived of the efficacious
grace. The Jews showed themselves more unworthy than the Tyrians,
because of their greater blindness of intellect and ingratitude.
Instance. Man of his own free will can at least not resist suf­
ficient grace, just as he can resist it. Therefore the difficulty re­
mains.
Reply. I deny the antecedent, for there is a great difference be­
tween resisting and not resisting. To resist sufficient grace is an
evil, and is solely of our own doing; not to resist it is a good which
is not solely of our own doing, but which comes also from the
source of all good, God’s efficacious will, who eternally willed this
act of non-resistance to be performed right at this moment in time.
As St. Thomas says: “Whatever God simply wills takes place; al­
though what He wills antecedently, may not take place.” 167
164 Rom. 9:
Ibid., 9:
ιββ ibid., 9:
1e7 Summa
article.

16, 18.
19.
20 f.
theol., la, q. 19, a. 6 ad turn. See also our commentary on this

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

469

Final objection. God infallibly knows future sins, and yet He is
not the cause of them. Therefore it is false to say that God’s in­
fallible knowledge has its foundation in the divine causality or in
the decrees of the divine will.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. God infallibly knows future
sins in His permissive decree as to what there is of deordination
or privation in sin; and He knows them in His positive decree, as
to the physical entity of sin, with which He concurs. And I deny
the consequent. Without a permissive decree, God would know
these sins as possible, but not as future.
This reply has its foundation in this most certain principle,
namely, that just as no good, however insignificant it may be, hap­
pens to belong de facto to this man rather than to a certain other,
unless God eternally and efficaciously willed that it should thus
happen, so no sin happens to be in this man rather than in a
certain other, unless God permitted it. The sinner, to be sure, in the
very moment of sinning, can avoid committing the sin, and God
eternally willed that it be really possible for the sinner to avoid
committing the sin, and this is known as God’s antecedent will. But
God did not efficaciously will that this sinner right at this moment
should de facto avoid committing sin; and if God had efficaciously
willed it, this sinner de facto not only really could avoid sin, but
would avoid it. As St. Thomas says: “Whatever God simply wills,
takes place; although what He wills antecedently, may not take
place.” 108 This is the ultimate reason for the distinction between
sufficient grace and grace that is of itself efficacious. There is, in­
deed, a mystery in this, but we now disclose the element of clarity
in this light-transcending obscurity. It cannot strictly be said, how­
ever, that Molina directly denies these commonly admitted princi­
ples just given; but by introducing the scientia media, which posits
a passivity in God, he impairs their validity.
ON THE VARIOUS WAYS OF EXPLAINING THE SCIENTIA MEDIA

The Molinists say that the divine decree is not necessary for
God’s infallible knowledge of conditioned futures, for He certainly
knows them (1) either in His ideas before the decree, or (2) by
His supercomprehensive knowledge of the causes, or (3) in the
formal or objective truth of contingent conditioned futures.
In reply to this we say: (1) God cannot, before a divine decree,
infallibly know conditioned futures in His ideas, because, accord­
ing to the divine ideas, the thing may either exist or not exist;
ιββ ibid.

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THE ONE GOD

there may be either consent or no consent, and they do not include
the determination of our free will.188
2) Nor is the supercomprehensive knowledge of causes a sufficient
explanation of God’s infallible knowledge of conditioned futures,
because free causes are indifferent, and the examination of the
circumstances does not suffice, unless we admit determinism of cir­
cumstances.
3) Nor does it suffice with Suarez to have recourse to the formal
or objective truth of contingent conditioned futures, saying that
before the divine decree, of two contradictory propositions con­
cerning the future, one will be true and the other false, and that
this is known by God from all eternity.
In reply to this we say with Aristotle,170 that of two contradictory
propositions concerning the future in contingent matter, one will
be true and the other false, but that neither is determinately true
(before the divine decree);171 otherwise the result of this would be
the logical fatalism of the Stoics.
RECAPITULATION

From the foregoing it is clearly enough established that Molinism
is not a scientifically elaborated system, one that proceeds from
certain and universal principles. But it starts out by presenting
some particular objection for solution. Then it proposes the solu­
tion of the same, and ends willingly or unwillingly in the denial
of the principle of causality (the transition of the created free will
from potentiality to actuality would in this case be without cause)
and of higher principles which concern God. Such principles are
tire following: God is pure Act without any potentiality, passivity,
or even dependence in His knowledge; God is the first Cause and
most universal Mover of both corporeal and spiritual beings to
their acts of understanding and their voluntary choices.
Therefore the theory of the scientia media seems to imply not
only a mystery, but a contradiction. Although it is devised for the
preservation of free will, it seems to end in the destruction of the
same through determinism of circumstances.
On the contrary, Thomism is a scientifically elaborated doctrine,
which starts from certain and universal principles, and reaches its
conclusions by a legitimate process. Therefore, if in these conclu­
sions there is obscurity, this is owing to God’s incomprehensibility
leaDc veritate, q.3, a.6; also la, q. 14, a.8.
170 Perihermenias, Bk. I, chap. 9, lect. 14 of St. Thomas' commentary.
in Truth follows being, and the being of the free future, or even of the free
conditioned future, is undetermined.

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

471

and His intimate action on our free will, but it is not owing to
contradiction.
Molinism says that it places the mystery in God’s knowledge,
namely, in the scientia media. Thomism finds that it consists in
the efficacy of the divine will, which is able infallibly to move our
will to choose freely, inasmuch as the divine will extends even to
the free mode of our choice, actualizing but not destroying our
free will.172
HOW CONDITIONALLY FREE ACTS OF THE FUTURE ARE KNOWN
BY GOD, ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
THOMIST DOCTRINE

The prophecies of commination are concerned with free condi­
tioned futures which, as stated, occupy a middle ground between
the purely possible and the absolute future. Such are, when the
destruction of Ninive is announced, if the Ninivites are not con­
verted, and when Christ our Lord said that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have been converted, if the Gospel had been preached
to them, and they had seen the miracles performed.
According to the principles of Thomism, how does God know
infallibly from all eternity these free conditioned futures? The
Thomists commonly reply that these are known in God’s decree,
which is objectively conditional and subjectively absolute; and
without this decree, the aforesaid conditionally free acts of the
future would remain, as stated, undetermined and therefore unknow­
able even to God Himself.
1) St. Thomas proves this inasmuch as he acknowledges in God
an antecedent will to save all mankind,178 and he says that this
will is sincere and is one of good pleasure.174 But, according to St.
Thomas, this antecedent will is subjectively absolute and objec­
tively conditional. For the holy Doctor says: “The antecedent will
can be called a conditioned will, and yet the imperfection is not
on the part of the divine will, but of the thing willed, which is
not accepted with all the required circumstances for its right
ordering to salvation.” 175 This means that God would save all man­
kind, if this did not conflict with the manifestation of His attri­
butes, one of these being His justice.178
2) Proof from reason. Without this divine decree contingent and
secondary causes are undetermined as to whether or not they proi’2 Summa theol., la, q.19, a.8.
i’s Ibid., a.6 ad 111m.
veritate, q.23, a.3.
ns Com. in I Sent., d.46, q.i, a. 1 ad 311m.
rte Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad 311m.

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THE ONE GOD

duce the effect. Hence without this decree conditioned futures
would still belong to the order of possible things. But there is
clearly a difference between the conditionally free act of the future
and the purely possible. Thus it is evident that there are two pos­
sibilities for Peter as regards the situation in which he finds him­
self during our Lord’s Passion: he can either deny our Lord or not
deny Him. But the conditioned future has this determination at­
tached to it, namely, which of these two possible things Peter
would choose if he were placed in these circumstances. Therefore
without the aforesaid conditioned decree the free conditioned fu­
ture would not be knowable, even to God Himself. "Contingent
futures are not knowable in themselves, because their truth is not
determined.” 177
WHAT MUST BE SAID OF THE OTHER OPINIONS CONCERNING
THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF CONDITIONED FUTURES

1) Certain Scotists, as also some later theologians, said that God
knows free futures in a concomitant and non-determining decree.
But if this decree is only concomitant, then it will not be the cause
of future things, for the cause, at least in the order of nature, pre­
cedes its effect. Hence this concomitant decree cannot be the me­
dium for knowing the future. Thus all the disadvantages of the
scientia media reappear.
2) Others teach that God knows future things in a decree, either
absolute or conditional, multiplying the number of graces until
the creature consents. This opinion resembles the congruism of
Suarez, inasmuch as the multiplication of graces is equivalent to a
congruent grace, but not to one that is of itself efficacious.
Nor can such a decree be the foundation for certainty of fore­
knowledge. There is no certainty in this multiplication of graces as
to which of them will conquer the will, and when it will do so.
God’s foreknowledge is insufficiently explained by saying that He
makes a shrewd guess; absolute certainty is required. Therefore
these opinions, whether those defending them wish it or not, end
finally in the theory of the scientia media. There is no other alter­
native between the scientia media and the doctrine of the divine
predetermining decree. Either God infallibly knows contingent
futures, even conditioned futures, in His determining decree, which
extends even to the free mode of our choices, or else He does not
know them in this decree, that is, before this decree, which is
precisely the theory of the scientia media.
Ibid., Ila Ilae, q. 171, a.3.

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

473

It must be noted finally that what has been said against the
Molinists applies also to the Jansenists as regards the state of in­
nocence; for these admit the scientia media and extrinsically effica­
cious grace in this state. If, after original sin, they admit the
presence of intrinsically efficacious grace, they do so not because of
the dependence of the created will on God, but because of its
weakness, by reason of the consequences of original sin.17*
FOURTEENTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD KNOWS ENUNCIABLE THINGS

The answer is in the affirmative, because God knows whatever
is in our power to perform. Yet He knows these enunciable things,
not after the manner of enunciable things, by way of composition
and division, but by simple intelligence. For all things are represented
in the divine essence unitedly and undividedly, not like our in­
telligible species which represent one thing in such a way as not to
represent another. So, in like manner, God knows material things
immaterially.
FIFTEENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD’S KNOWLEDGE IS INVARIABLE

The answer is in the affirmative, because God’s knowledge is
self-subsistent intelligence, which is altogether invariable, just as
the self-subsis tent Being is.
Therefore God’s knowledge is measured by eternity, and it ab­
solutely transcends time, embracing all time. It is in this sense
that we must understand the following text: With God “there is
no change nor shadow of alteration.” 178
Reply to first objection. “Created things are in God in an in­
variable manner, while they exist variably in themselves.”
Reply to third objection. There is, indeed, variation in enuncia­
ble things known by God (e.g., Christ will be born, Christ was
born). But God does not know enunciable things as we do, after the
manner of enunciable things, by way of composition and division,
but by simple intelligence, as was stated.
i’« For the solution of the objections raised against Thomism by those who
say that it does not preserve intact human liberty and the divine sanctity, and
also that the helps are insufficient, consult q.19, a.8, in which St. Thomas shows
that the divine will is most efficacious, and that it does not impose necessity on
all things, nor does it interfere with but actuates human liberty.
it» Jas. 1: 17.

474

THE ONE GOD
SIXTEENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD HAS A SPECULATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS

In answer to this it is stated that knowledge is said to be specu­
lative in three ways: (i) on the part o£ the thing known, which is
not operable by the knower; (2) as regards the manner of knowing,
if the operable thing be considered also by defining it, resolving it
into its universal principles, for instance, stating what a harp is;
(3) as regards the end, if there be a consideration also of the opera­
ble thing only as it concerns knowledge, not action.180
But God has only speculative knowledge of Himself, because He
is not operable. He has speculative knowledge of other things as
regards the mode, since He knows not only how things are made,
but what they are; He has practical knowledge of those things that
can be made but never will be, and this as regards both the object
and the mode, but not as regards the end on the part of the
knower; He has simply and actually practical knowledge of those
things that come to be in some period of time. But it must be
noted that God’s knowledge is eminently speculative and practical,
being in itself undivided, and the only distinction in it is on the
part of the things known.
Scotus held that God’s knowledge of Himself is simply practical,
because it is naturally prior to divine love by which He loves Him­
self. In reply to this it must be said that it does not suffice for
practical knowledge that love of the object known follow it; the
form of the work or the object of operation must be determined
by it, so that it can be called the rule of operation.
Thus we terminate this question of God’s knowledge, in which
it has been our special purpose to show that God, by reason of His
absolute immateriality, is in the highest degree cognitive; in fact,
that He is the self-subsistent Intellection; that He knows things
other than Himself, in Himself and not immediately in themselves;
that He knows possible things, indeed, inasmuch as they have their
foundation in the divine essence, as it is imitable ad extra, and He
knows existing things in the decree of His will, without which His
iso It must be remarked with Cajetan that practical and speculative are here
taken in the sense not only as they are conditions of knowledge in themselves,
but also as they are on the part of the knower. Therefore it is said that the house­
building art in one who does not intend to build a house is speculative as regards
the end. This must be further explained by saying, as it concerns the end on the
part of the knower, not of the knowledge, because knowledge that is practical
as regards the thing known and the manner of knowing it, is also as such practical
as regards the end, although it does not essentially extend even to the actual
execution of the thing known; and thus it differs from prudence. Cf. la Ilae,
q.57, a. 4.

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

475

knowledge would not be the cause of things;181 that He knows
contingent futures not only in His decree, but inasmuch as they
are already eternally present to Him, this being the intrinsic termi­
nus of the eternal creative or motive action, the effects of which
are passively produced in time. In this way the perfection of God’s
knowledge, which is intuitive and absolutely invariable, is preserved
intact. Its measure is eternity, which includes all time within its
ambit.
isi See a. 8.

CHAPTER XV
Question 15
Of Ideas
This question determines what must be retained of the exemplarism

of Plato, as St. Augustine understood it, in that the exemplary
ideas of things are not outside God as Aristotle interpreted it,1 but
are in Him.2
St. Thomas shows in this question that Augustinian exemplarism
cannot be admitted on God’s part without rejecting the principles of
Aristotelianism.
FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS

The answer is: “As then the world was not made by chance, but
by God acting by His intellect, there must exist in the divine mind
a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this
the notion of an idea consists.” 2
Reply to first objection. “God does not understand things accord­
ing to an idea existing outside Himself.” In fact, the idea, for in­
stance, of man or dog cannot exist outside God and individuals of
these species, for their nature implies a common matter (bones and
flesh), and these cannot exist apart from individualized matter
(these bones, this flesh). But matter in common can be abstracted,
or it can be conceived apart from individualized matter, but it
cannot exist apart from such matter.1
1 Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, Bk. XII, maintained that God has knowledge
only of Himself. His reason for this was that the knowledge of other things was
derogatory to God’s perfection. The divine intellect, in knowing such things,
would have to be determined by them, so said Aristotle, in that it would receive
some sort of intelligible impression from them; and this would imply poten­
tiality in God, whereas He is pure actuality. The falsity of this statement has
already been proved by St. Thomas in the previous question concerning God's
knowledge. His knowledge is the cause of things, His essence is the prototype of all
things, and He is not dependent on things for His knowledge. [Tr.]
a Even at the present day it is a disputed point among authors of the History
of Philosophy whether Plato held that exemplary ideas are outside God, or in
Him.
* End of argumentative part of this article.
* Summa theol., la, q.84, a.4, 5.

476

OF IDEAS

477

Reply to second objection. The divine essence, as being rep­
resentative of creatable and created things, is of the nature of an
idea or exemplar. Similarly, in accordance with the reply to the
third objection, it must be said that the divine idea is identical
with God’s essence, as known, and as it is capable of participation
and imitation in various ways ad extra.
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER THERE ARE MANY IDEAS IN GOD

There are many ideas in God, inasmuch as there can be no idea
of the whole world unless there are proper ideas of those things
which constitute the world. But this plurality of ideas is not re­
pugnant to God’s simplicity, because the divine ideas are identical
with God’s essence as known and capable of imitation in various
ways ad extra.
“Now it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind
that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to
its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality
of images,” or determined by these in understanding them, as St.
Thomas says in this article.
It must be remarked that God, by understanding His essence,
inasmuch as it is the principle of variously possible creatural imi­
tation, and as it is the terminus of this relation of imitability,
which declares a real relation of the creature to it, is in no real
relation to creatures.
St. Thomas likewise says in another of his works: “And there­
fore the divine essence, which implies a knowledge of the various
degrees in which things are related to it, is the idea of each par­
ticular thing. Hence, since there is a diversity in the degrees of
relationship of things to it, there must be a plurality of ideas owing
to the various degrees in which creatures are related to it.” 6 He
also says: "God understands the relation of things to His essence,
and so these relations are in God as understood by Him." ·
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS OF ALL THINGS THAT GOD KNOWS

The difficulty is whether God has ideas of evil, primary matter,
and not only of created natures, but also of singulars and accidents.
These questions were already raised by Plato in the elaboration
* De veritate, q.3, a.2.
• Ibid., ad 8um.

478

THE ONE GOD

of his exemplarism, a system which was perfected by St. Augustine.
The answer is that the idea, as an exemplar, refers to every­
thing made by God in any period of time, and the idea as the
principle of knowledge refers to all possible things. Hence, as stated
in the reply to the first objection, “there is no idea of evil in God,
neither in so far as an idea is an exemplar (because God is not the
cause of evil) nor as a type (because evil is known by God not
through its own type, but through the type of good).”
The reply to the third objection posits another corollary: “Since
we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form,
matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the
composite; for matter in itself can neither exist nor be known.
Reply to fourth objection. Accidents that are properties of some
created nature do not have a special idea that is distinct from the
idea of this nature. But accidents which supervene to the subject
have their special idea. And providence extends to individuals, as
will be shown later.’
Hence, as the Thomists say, God has actually practical ideas of
those things which He does or will do, because they are determined
for realization by a decree of His will.8 But God has virtually prac­
tical ideas of possible things, because they are not meant for
realization by a decree of His will. St. Thomas stated this clearly
in the following passage: “The (divine) idea is determined by a
decree of the divine will as regards those things that either are or
will be or were produced; but it is not so determined as regards
those things that neither are nor were nor will be produced; and
so the ideas of things of this kind (possible things) are to some ex­
tent undetermined.”9
The causality of the divine idea is an exemplary causality, or
one of extrinsic form, just as the idea of a house is in the mind
of the architect. Therefore the divine ideas are the exemplars of
things, but they are produced only “according to the determina­
tion of the divine will and intellect.” 10
In this we see what St. Thomas retains of Platonism. Exemplary
ideas are not outside God but in God, and the divine ideas are
the supreme causes of things, but in so far as the determination
of the divine liberty is joined to them, which is not what Plato
said. But as regards our intellectual knowledge, the divine ideas
are not immediately known by our intellect, as the ontologists said,
’ De veritate, q.22, a. 3.
e Summa theol., la, q.19, a.4.
s De veritate, q.3, a.6.
10 Summa theol., la, q.19, a.4: see also q.14, a.8, in which there is already a
veiled reference to this exemplarism.

OF IDEAS

479

nor can they be immediately seen without our seeing God’s essence;
but they are known mediately in the mirror of sensible things, as
being the supreme norms and eternal types of things.
On this point St. Thomas says: “One thing is said to be known
in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known; as one
may see in a mirror the images of things reflected in it. Thus the
soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal
types; but it is in this way that the blessed know all things in the
eternal types, for they see God and all things in Him.
“Secondly, one thing is said to be known in another as in a prin­
ciple of knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what
we see by the sun. And thus we must say that the human soul
knows all things in the eternal types, since by participation of these
types we know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is
in us is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated
light, in which are contained the eternal types.” 11
Thus the divine ideas are the eternal exemplary forms of beings
and created intellection. This means that the created being and
created intellection have the same ultimate foundation. In other
words, if there is harmony between being and intellect, between
the laws of the mind and the laws of being, it is because created
intellect and created being proceed from the same supreme cause.
This constitutes the ultimate metaphysical foundation for the
ontological validity of our knowledge which by way of investigation
begins with facts of experience and first principles of reason and
being, and ascends to God. As St. Thomas says: “By way of investi­
gation we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of
things eternal. ... By way of judgment, from eternal things al­
ready known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws
of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.” 12
Thus the holy Doctor retains what must be retained of Plato’s
exemplarism as St. Augustine conceived it; yet he does not depart
from the moderate realism of Aristotle, and he avoids all the ex­
cesses of idealism.
Ibid., la, q.84, a.5.
12 Ibid., q.79, a.9.
h

CHAPTER XVI
Question

i6

Of Truth
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE

St. Thomas first treats of truth in general and then of divine truth.

Concerning truth in general he considers it in its threefold rela­
tionship: (i) to the intellect by which it is known or manifested;
(2) to being on which it is founded; (3) to good which follows as
a property of being. These questions are treated at length in meta­
physics, so that we shall not devote much time to them.
'In the first article it is shown that truth resides formally and
primarily in the intellect and secondarily in things as they relate
to the intellect. But things are measured by the divine intellect
and by the divine ideas, and they measure our intellect, which is
said to be true in so far as it is in conformity with them. Thus
"a stone is called true which possesses the nature proper to a
stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect.” 1
In the second article it is shown that the conformity or identity
between our intellect and the thing can indeed already be present
in the intellectual act of simple apprehension by way of a repre­
sentation that expresses conformity with the thing. But a conformity
as known and compared with the thing, is found only in the act
of judgment, or in the intellect composing and dividing, because
it is there that the conformity or non-conformity of the predicate
with the subject is first clearly seen, inasmuch as it is true to say
that a thing is what it is, and is not what it is not; and that it is
false to say that a thing is what it is not, and is not what it is.
The third article determines the relation of truth to being. Truth
as found in things is convertible with being, entitatively or accord­
ing to substance, by adding relation to the intellect, such as true
gold. But truth as found in the intellect is not convertible with
being entitatively, but manifestatively, as the manifestator is with
the thing manifested, or regulatively, as the regulator is with the
thing regulated. Thus the intellect is true when judging of a thing
or regulating what must be regulated.
1 Cf. a. 1, c.
480

OF TRUTH

481

The fourth article concerns the relation of truth to goodness. It
is stated that, although the true and the good are the same enti­
tatively, yet in their formal aspects the true is prior to the good,
because the true has its foundation in the being of the thing, ac­
cording to its very essence; but the good has its foundation in
the thing according as it is perfect and desirable. Similarly, the
true refers to knowledge, which is prior to the appetite, to which
good refers; for nothing is willed that is not foreknown.
The second part of the question is about divine truth, namely,
how it exists in God; and from divine truth it is shown that truth
is one, eternal, and immutable.
The fifth article shows that God is not only true, but is Truth
itself, because His being is not only conformed to His intellect,
but is the very subsistent act of His intellect. Moreover, God is the
supreme truth, because His act of understanding is the cause of
every other being and intellect. Thus God is the first truth in the
ontological, logical, and moral orders, in that it is impossible for
God to lie.
The sixth article explains that truth which is absolutely one, is
found only in the divine intellect, which is the measure of all
things; but in creatures there are as many ontological truths as
there are entities, and as many formal truths as there are things
known to be true.
The seventh article shows that the positively eternal truth is
found only in the divine intellect, which alone is eternal; but nega­
tively some things are said to be of eternal truth, because they ab­
stract from circumstances of place and time. Such are the principles
of contradiction, causality . . . , and all necessary propositions. But
the formal or cognitive truth of these statements is eternal only in
the divine intellect, in that God alone knows from eternity these
necessary truths.
Therefore we must not overlook what St. Thomas says in another
of his works: “From the fact that truths known by the intellect are
eternal with regard to what is thus known, one cannot conclude
that the soul is eternal, but that the truths known have their
foundation in something eternal. They have their foundation in
that first Truth which, as the universal cause, contains within itself
all truth.” 2
This is the proof of God’s existence founded on the eternal
verities, and i' is referred back to the fourth proof of St. Thomas,’
in that it ascends from different degrees of truth until it reaches
the maximum truth. For it is evident that an absolutely necessary
2 Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 84.
» Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3.

482

THE ONE GOD

principle, such as the principle of contradiction, by which all actual
and possible beings and all our intelligences are necessarily regu­
lated, must have its foundation in some necessary and supreme
Being and in some supreme and eternal Intellect. For this abso­
lutely necessary principle, such as the principle of contradiction,
cannot have its foundation in some contingent existence, or in a
multiplicity of such contingent existences, for all these come under
the law of this principle; but this necessary and negatively eternal
truth postulates as its ultimate foundation one that is necessarily
and positively eternal.
Finally, the eighth article shows that the truth of the divine in­
tellect is immutable, whereas our intellect changes from truth to
falsity; and this happens in two ways: (1) when one gets a wrong
opinion about something which in itself has not changed; or (2)
when the thing is changed, but not the opinion.4
« St. Thomas says in the body of this article: "The truth of our intellect is
mutable, not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our in­
tellect changes from truth to falsity." Thus necessary truths, especially first
principles, do not change. It is likewise always true that a thing was such as it
once was. But our intellect, even in its judgment of immutable truths, sometimes
undergoes a change, and this is because of its debility, that is, because of its want
of consideration or forgetfulness.
At the end of the argumentative part of the article he says: "The truth, however,
of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be
true, and this is altogether immutable.” This statement affirms both the immu­
tability of the divine intellect and the immutable nature of things, which corre­
spond to the divine ideas. Thus, too, for us truths which strictly pertain to the
very natures of things, such as "man is a rational animal," are immutable and
negatively eternal, inasmuch as they abstract from circumstances of place and time.

CHAPTER XVII
Question 17
Of Falsity

As opposed to truth, St. Thomas treats of falsity in its relation to
things, to sense, to intellect, and to truth itself.
The first article shows that natural things, in so far as they are
compared with the divine intellect, are not false, because in so far
they exist, inasmuch as they are from God, and are from His idea
to which they conform. Yet it is possible for moral actions even to
withdraw themselves from God’s rule, and therefore sins are called
lies. But in relation to the created intellect things can be called
false, either because they are signified by what is false, or because
of their resemblance to the truth, as brass is false gold.
In the second article it is decided that falsity, formally as such,
is not formally in the senses as in one knowing falsity, because the
senses do not compare one thing with another. Nevertheless there
is an occasion of falsity or of false judgment from the senses appre­
hending the thing as being like what it truly is. As remarked in
this article concerning proper sensibles (such as color, sound), the
senses have no false knowledge, except accidentally, because of a
defect in the organ; but of the common sensibles (such as exten­
sion, distance) and of the accidental sensibles (such as substance,
life) the senses, even rightly disposed, can have a false knowledge,
because of the abnormal way in which the object is proposed to
the faculty; for the senses are not directly and immediately re­
ferred to these. Thus a stick half submerged in the water appears
to be broken.
The third article concludes that the intellect cannot be false
in the simple apprehension of a thing, but in composition and
division, or in judgment, inasmuch as it attributes to a thing what
does not belong to it. Thus there can accidentally be falsity in the
first act of the intellect, which is apprehension, in so far as com­
position of the intellect is mixed up in it, for instance, if in a
definition parts are united which are mutually exclusive, such as
“a reasonable four-footed animal.”
Finally, in the fourth article, St. Thomas teaches that truth and
falsity, which are found in the intellect, are opposed as contraries
483

484

the one god

and not merely as privations, because each Consists in some act, or
acceptance on the part of the intellect, which is truth, indeed, ac­
cording to an adequate apprehension or conformity, and falsity ac­
cording to an inadequate apprehension.
Thus the questions about truth and falsity are concluded as they
concern God, which is the way they must be concluded in theology.

CHAPTER XVIII
Question 18
The Life

of

God

Since to understand belongs to living beings, after consideration of

the divine intellect comes the question of the divine life.
The first article concludes that the difference between living and
lifeless things is, that living things move themselves to their ac­
tions. We already see that such is the case with plants, which
nourish or renew, and reproduce themselves; whereas, on the other
hand, lifeless things are merely moved by another, such as stones,
which do not move themselves, but are moved and drawn by an­
other.
The second article shows that life is not an accidental but a
substantial predicate in living things, although it manifests itself
to us by vital operations, and these are accidents. Thus the sub­
stance of a plant, an animal, a man, is life in first actuality, al­
though it is only in their operations that they have life in second
actuality.
The third article concludes that life in the highest degree and
essentially so is in God, because He is subsistent Intellection, so
that He is not determined or moved by another; for in so far as a
thing is lower in the scale of beings, or is less endowed with life,
just so is it in need of being moved or determined by another, so
that it move itself. Thus there is no created living being that is so
completely endowed with life as to be absolutely the principle of
its own action, and not need to be moved by another. Even the
higher creatures, those of the intellectual order, need to be moved
efficiently by God, the supreme agent, and to be drawn to Him as
their ultimate end.
God alone is essentially Life, just as He is Wisdom itself, and
subsistent Intellection. Hence Christ affirmed His divinity when
He said: “I am the way, the truth, and the life.”1 Creatures of tire
higher order have life, but they are not life itself.
In this article St. Thomas has depicted for us the beautiful
gradation in being, from the plant life to essential life, showing
that the nobler the life, the more it is immanent and immobile.
i John 14: 6.
485

486

THE ONE GOD

Plants live by nutrition, increase, and reproduction; but the form
by which they act and the end for which they act are determined
for them by nature. Animals move themselves, moreover, to their
objects apprehended through the senses. Man, however, prescribes
for himself the end for which he acts, and yet he must be moved
by a higher efficient Cause and be drawn to Him as his ultimate
end. Only God, who is subsistent Intellection, is essential life that
is absolutely immanent and immobile. But this immobility of su­
preme life is fundamentally the very opposite of the immobility
of inertia or death. This latter means the absence of operation or
privation of movement, whereas the operation of God’s intellect
and will is most perfect, and is always in act. His life is always in
second actuality, and is not a transitive action, but an immanent
and most perfect action.2
The fourth article shows that all things that proceed from God
have their life in Him, according to the ideal being they have in
His act of understanding, in His divine idea. Thus all things live
in God, as Holy Scripture says in the following text: “Without
Him was made nothing that was made. In Him was life." ’
2 Cf. ad lum.
8 John i: 3, 4.

CHAPTER XIX
Question 19
The Will

of

God

After considering the things that belong to the divine knowl­

edge, we must consider what belongs to the divine will. We shall
proceed in the following order: (1) About God’s will itself (q. 19).
(2) About what strictly belongs to His will, namely, divine love,
which is the act of His divine will (q. 20), and justice and mercy,
which may be regarded as virtues residing in the divine will, by way
of analogy with the moral virtues that reside in our will (q.2i).
(3) About what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will, namely,
Providence as regards all things (q. 22), and predestination in re­
spect of man as regards his salvation (q. 23).
Already from this division as set forth in the prologue, it is
evident that Providence is named by way of analogy with our
prudence, which presupposes a rightly ordered appetite, or a rightly
ordered will.
Thus the discussion is about the divine moral acts, by way of
analogy with the virtues of the rational soul, namely, of the will
and intellect; for it is evident that the virtues of the sensitive soul,
such as temperance, cannot be analogically and properly in God,
who is a pure spirit. In other words, the inferior virtues cannot be
in God, nor even the theological virtues, which in us refer to God
as our superior. Nevertheless, God’s love for Himself and for us,
which is discussed in the twentieth question, corresponds analogi­
cally to our love of God and of our neighbor.
The nineteenth question, which concerns God’s will, is divided
into twelve articles, and these again are subdivided into three prin­
cipal parts. The first part includes the questions as to the existence
(a. 1) and nature of the divine will (a. 2). The second part is con­
cerned with the ways in which God’s will operates as regards His
acts and objects, in that creatures are freely willed by Him (a. 3),
in that His will is the cause of things (a. 4), in that His volition is
uncaused (a. 5), that it is most efficacious and immutable, and does
not impose necessity on things willed (a. 6-8), and finally that His
will is impeccable, or that He cannot will sin (a. 9). The third
part, which includes the last two articles, concerns the manifesta487

488

THE ONE GOD

tion of God’s will: whether the will of expression is to be distin­
guished in God, and whether there are five expressions of will
assigned to the divine will.1
In this arrangement, what constitutes the very kernel of this
question is more clearly seen, for the division is not immediately
made by means of twelve members in opposition to one another,
but by means of two, which must afterward be subdivided. And,
in fact, the first two parts are reduced to one, namely, God’s will in
itself, which must be considered before its manifestation is dis­
cussed.
But the subdivisions show that St. Thomas considered everything
that pertains to this question, both as to God Himself and our­
selves, according to the various modes of God’s liberty, and as to
His efficacious causality and impeccability, which directly pertain
more to His will than to His intellect.
The fourth article of this question, whether God’s will is the
cause of things, must be carefully considered in its connection with
the question of God’s knowledge,2 in which it is stated that God's
knowledge is the cause of things in so far as His will is joined to
it. The eighth article of this question: whether the will of God im­
poses necessity on things willed, which throws light on the fore­
knowledge of contingent futures, must also be most diligently
examined.
FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER THERE IS WILL IN GOD

State of the question. The word “will” has two meanings, for it
means either the act of willing, as when one says: it is my will that
you do this; or else it refers to the faculty of willing. But in this
article it matters not in which sense the word is used, for the other
meaning is implied, especially in God, who is pure Act.
The difficulty is: (i) that the object of the will is the end; but we
cannot assign any end to God; (2) that the will is an appetitive
faculty which is for something not possessed; but this denotes im­
perfection, which is not in God; (3) that the will moves, and is
moved in that it is moved by the intellect; but God is the first cause
of movement, and He Himself is unmoved. It may be further re­
marked that Aristotle, who discussed God’s intellect at sufficient
length,3 did not at least explicitly refer to God’s will and liberty;
1 It must be presumed that the author assigns the tenth artide to the second
part, including it in the third article of St. Thomas. [Tr.]
2 See q. 14, a.8.
» Metaph., Bk. XII, chap. 1.

THE WILL OF GOD

489

perhaps he thought they could not be reconciled with the supremely
determined although unlimited pure Act; for God is not capable of
further determination by His divine free act, as though something
might be wanting to Him. Hence the difficulty.
The answer is in the affirmative. There must be will in God,
since there is intellect in Him.
1) This answer is not a theological conclusion, but is of faith,
although the existence of God’s will can be proved from His in­
tellect. That this conclusion is of faith is evident from very many
texts of Holy Scripture, such as the following: “Whatsoever the
Lord pleased, He hath done.” 4 “For who resisteth His will?” 8 The
Fathers understood these and similar texts not in a metaphysical
sense, as when it is said that God is angry, but in a proper although
analogical sense. The reason for this interpretation is that, whereas
anger includes imperfection, what is formally signified by will im­
plies no imperfection.
Finally, it is the common teaching of the councils. The following
quotation from the Vatican Council suffices for our purpose: “The
Holy . . . Church believes that there is one God . . . infinite in
intelligence, in will, and in all perfection.” 8
It must be noted that in this truth of the faith, namely, that will
belongs properly to God, more is affirmed than in the following
assertion from Plato: “Why did God produce the world? Because
He was good and not avaricious, but free from envy.” 7 Similarly,
toward the end of his treatise entitled The Banquet, he speaks not
only of the supreme Good, but of His love for those things that
proceed from Him.
But Plato’s idea of God’s goodness is not so much a goodness of
benevolence, as a metaphysical goodness that is essentially diffusive
of itself and fecund. Similarly Plotinus’ supreme hypostasis is the
One-Good, diffusive of itself, but actually diffusive of itself by a
necessity of its nature, by way of emanation, and not by a free act
of will creating all things other than itself from nothing.
So, therefore, in these conceptions of the Greek mind, the world
appears as a necessary irradiation from God, just as the rays of
the sun proceed from the sun; and so the world is a manifestation
of His goodness and physical perfection. This paves the way for
pantheism.
On the contrary, God’s will, and indeed His free will, the prin­
ciple of a most free creation, are revealed to us far more clearly in
4 Ps. 13.4: 6.
8 Rom. 9: 19.
"Denz., no. 1782.
7 Timaeus, no. 29.

490

THE ONE GOD

the Old and New Testaments. Consequently God is conceived not
only as the supreme Good, expressed in the neuter form, το αγαθόν
(the good), but as He who is supremely good, full of benevolence,
ό αγαθός (He who is good); He is conceived, indeed, as the supreme
Person. This is already evident from the first chapter of Genesis,
for we read: “Be light made. And light was made.” 8*So this thought
is constantly recurring: "He hath done all things, whatoever He
would.” 8 This becomes increasingly evident in the New Testament,
especially when Jesus says: “For God so loved the world as to give
His only begotten Son.” 10 Similarly, “He that loveth not, knoweth
not God; for God is charity. By this hath the charity of God ap­
peared toward us, because He hath first loved us and sent His Son to
be a propitiation for our sins. My dearest, if God hath so loved us,
we also ought to love one another.” 11 And again: “But God commendeth His charity toward us, because when as yet we were sinners,
Christ died for us.” 12
This mode of speech differs very much from that employed by
Plato, Aristotle, or Plotinus. For these Greeks, the world appears
to proceed from God according to a certain necessity of His nature,
as the rays emanate from the sun. In this way God's metaphysical
goodness, which is diffusive of itself, is made manifest rather than
His benevolence, which is analogically conceived as the benevolence
of a living person who has companionship with us.
There is a considerable difference on this point between the
Christian teaching and that of modern philosophers. If some of
them exaggerated the divine liberty and said, as Descartes did, that
the truth of the principle of contradiction and the primary dis­
tinction between good and evil depend on God’s free will, never­
theless very many did not sufficiently recognize God’s free will.
Spinoza and the pantheists of his school absolutely denied it, for
pantheism is absolute determinism. Others, such as Leibnitz and
Malebranche, exceedingly restricted God’s free will, saying that
God would be neither wise nor good if He had not created, and if
He had not created the best of possible worlds.13 This paves the
way for pantheism, for if such be the case, then the world is already,
as it were, a necessary irradiation from God, not indeed by a meta­
physical or physical necessity, but by a moral necessity.
On the contrary, God’s will is affirmed most emphatically in
8 Gen. i: 3.
8 Ps. 113: 3.
10 John 3: 16.
111 John 4: 8-11.
12 Rom. 5: 8.
is Œuvres de Leibnitz (Erdmann ed.), II, 563, a.

THE WILL OF GOD

4gi

revelation, and His absolute liberty is particularly described when­
ever it refers to God’s good pleasure, as in the following texts:
‘‘Remember us, O Lord, in the favor of Thy people.” 14 And again:
“I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because
Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast re­
vealed them to little ones. Yea, Father; for so hath it seemed good
in Thy sight.” 16
There is evidently nothing like this to be found in the writings of
Aristotle. Similarly, in the writings of Greek philosophers there is no­
where any reference to the purpose of the divine will, so often spoken
of by St. Paul, as in the following text: "He hath predestinated us . . .
according to the purpose of His will.” 16 And in another of his epistles
we read: “that the purpose of God, according to election, might
Stand” (’να ή κατ’ εκλογήν πρόθεσή τοΰ Θεού μενί))·1’ The purpose of the
divine will is the same as the decree of the divine will. It still per­
tains to the order of intention, which precedes the order of ex­
ecution, just as our purpose must afterward be put into execution.
Thus in the very first article on God’s will, by the light of divine
revelation His will is affirmed in the strict and full sense of the
term, so that there is nothing like this to be found in the writings
of Aristotle, or even in those of Plato and Plotinus; and far more
so does this apply to the writings of Spinoza and the modern
pantheists.
2) In the body of the article, St. Thomas proves a priori that
there is will in God, and moreover that His will is His existence
and His act of willing. Under this aspect these truths seem to be
theological conclusions, but they are already revealed; for among
the revealed truths, some are dependent on others, as the immortal­
ity of the soul depends on its spirituality.
But the existence of will in God is proved a priori, in that the
will properly has its root in the intellect, and is reduced to the
following syllogism: Will follows upon intellect; but there is in­
tellect in God; therefore there is will in God.
The major is proved in virtue of the similarity of proportion
that prevails between the natural form and the intelligible form,
since we know spiritual things in the mirror of sensible things.
For just as a natural thing, for instance, a plant, is in actuality by
its specific form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its in­
telligible form, which represents the object. But everything tends
toward its natural form when it has not this form, and is at rest
M Ps. 105: 4.
15 Matt. 11: 25 f.
ie Eph. 1: 5.
i’ Rom. 9: 11.

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THE ONE GOD

therein when it has it; thus matter tends toward its form, or, when
the form is acquired, it rests therein and retains it. Similarly every
natural thing tends to possess and retain its integral parts, as the
plant, for instance, seeks to have and retain its normal size. For all
these things the natural appetite suffices, which is the thing itself
tending by its very nature toward its natural perfection. It is often
called a natural inclination, as in the case of the stone, that tends
toward the center of the earth.
Hence proportionately so, as stated in this article, “intellectual
natures have a like aptitude to good as apprehended through its in­
telligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not
possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will.
Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every
sensible being there is animal appetite,” which is called sensitive.
And thus there must be will in God, since there is intellect in
Him.
Cajetan and John of St. Thomas draw attention to the difficulty
that is, nevertheless, inherent in this proof. There is, indeed, a
similarity of proportion between the natural thing, for instance,
the plant, and the intellect; but from this it does not seem that,
besides intellect, some appetite should be admitted as a distinct
power and a distinct act. A natural appetite in the intellect appears
to be sufficient, just as in the stone there is a natural appetite or
inclination for the center of the earth, Thus Spinoza refuses to
admit that intellect and will in us are two distinct faculties.
In fact, there is another difficulty, in that there appear to be
four terms in the proof given by St. Thomas, because in the major
he speaks of the intelligible form that is in the intellect, and in the
conclusion, of the good apprehended outside the intellect. This
second difficulty is of less importance, for the good referred to is
that which is apprehended by means of the intelligible form.
In reply to the first difficulty, however, we say with Cajetan and
John of St. Thomas that the natural appetite of the intellect does
not suffice for this inclination, but that another faculty is also re­
quired, which is called the will or the rational appetite. This is
evident for three reasons: (i) because the natural appetite, even
in the intellect, follows its natural form, and not the apprehended
form, or that of the thing known; (2) because the natural appetite
is consequently determined to one thing, as the inclination of the
stone is for the center of gravity, of a plant for a determined
height, and of the intellect for knowledge in general. On the con
trary, the appetite that follows the form of the thing known is not
determined to one thing, but extends to various things, and is an
act elicited by the will (or even by the sensitive appetite), just as

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cognition resulting therefrom is an act elicited by the cognitive
faculty, either intellective or sensitive; (3) finally, the natural ap­
petite of the intellect is concerned only with truth to be known,
which is the good of the cognitive faculty; whereas, on the con­
trary, the rational appetite is concerned with the good of the subject
in toto, or of man in toto, just as actually the animal or sensitive
appetite is concerned with the good of the brute in toto. Hence man
is not said to be simply good, unless he be a man of good will,
which means that he wills the true good of the entire man.
There is this remarkable difference, which many intellectuals
are not sufficiently aware of, since with them there is a sort of atrophy
of the will along with a certain hypertrophy of the intellect, and
they often do not advert to the fact that Christian contemplation
must have its foundation not only in the love of knowledge, but
also in the love of God Himself, as St. Thomas says.18
And therefore, just as in the brute animal the appetite that is
called animal or sensitive is a special faculty distinct from the
cognitive faculty of the sensible order; so also the rational appetite
in man, the act of which follows intellectual cognition, is a special
faculty that is called will and that is concerned not only with know­
ing, which is the good of the cognitive faculty, but also with the
apprehended good of the entire man.18 Thus it is established that
the will follows upon intellect. But, since there is intellect in God,
there is also will in Him.
Confirmation. In fact, as St. Thomas frequently says, the dis­
tinction between these two faculties is evident from the fact that
“knowledge comes about in so far as the object known is without the
knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to what is out­
side it.” 20
In other words, truth is formally in the intellect, being con­
formity of judgment with the thing judged; whereas good is outside
the mind, being in the things themselves. They are two operations
that take place in an inverted order, as experience proves; for by
knowledge we mentally absorb things, whereas by volition and love
we are attracted by the object loved. And, as experience proves,
we will not only the knowledge of the true, but also the possession
of the good. Thus we love not only the knowledge of God but God
Himself. As the Scripture says: “Where thy treasure is, there is thy
heart also.” 21 There is a great difference, for instance, between lovie Summa theol., Ha Ilae, q.180, a.i.
io Ibid., la, q.8o, a. 1: Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul: also
la. q.59, a.2: Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect.
10 Ibid., la, q.59, a.2.
oi Matt. 6: 21.

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THE ONE GOD

ing to know humility, so as to speak about it, and loving humility
itself.
The proof given by St. Thomas has not four terms: when he says
“the intellect is actually intelligible by its intelligible form,” he
subinfers “which is apprehended as good.” Thus it is legitimately
concluded that “the intellectual nature as regards the apprehended
good” tends toward it or rests therein by means of the will. Thus
the above-mentioned proportionality is preserved with natural
things. Thus the ascent is made by the mind from the lowest degree
of natural inclination, such as that of the stone for its center of
gravity, until the supreme will is reached, in which there is no
longer to be found inclination or desire, but rest in the good that
is eternally possessed. In this mental ascent the natural inclination
of sensible things is first considered, because spiritual things are
known only in the mirror of sensible things, and this leads us to
know the supreme act of the will that delights in the divine good.
In the second part of the body of this article it is shown that
God’s will is His existence and His act of willing, because there
is no difference as to the mode in which will and intellect are in
God. But it was shown that God's intellect is His existence and His
act of understanding, without any admixture of potentiality. There­
fore, so is His will.
Corollary. God’s will is self-subsisting volition without any in­
trinsic virtual distinction; otherwise there would be a foundation
in the divine reality for conceiving the will of God as in potentiality
with regard to its act. Hence there is only an extrinsic virtual dis­
tinction between them, one that has its foundation not in the
divine reality but in creatures, since the self-subsisting volition is
the equivalent of our faculty of willing and our willing. On the
contrary, there is an intrinsic virtual distinction between God’s
intellect and His will, for which there is a foundation in the divine
reality, because they belong to different orders. Similarly there is
a virtual distinction between subsistent intellection and subsistent
volition; yet it does not follow from this that there is a foundation
in God for conceiving anything as in potentiality with respect to
another thing.
In other words, this same corollary may be expressed as follows:
God’s will is not of the nature of a potentiality as regards His
volition, which means that this notion of potentiality is not found
in the divine will formally and eminently, but only virtually and
eminently, as mixed perfections are, such as rationability or dis­
cursive knowledge. For this pertains to the created mode of the
will, and this created mode implies imperfection, which is not in­
cluded in what is formally signified by the name “will.” This formal

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signification is found in God not only virtually and eminently, but
also formally and eminently, or properly. The solution of the ob­
jections confirms this.
Reply to first objection. The difficulty was that the object of will
is the end. But God is not directed to any end. Therefore there is
not will in Him. The reply is: “Although nothing apart from God
is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things,”
and thus, as will be stated farther on, God wills things apart from
Himself for the manifestation of His goodness.
Hence, for the solution of this difficulty, it must be said: there
is no assignment of an end to the act of God’s will, let this pass
without comment; of things willed by God, this I deny. It is said
that this non-assignment should pass without comment, because
the divine goodness, which is willed by God, is not truly and
formally the end of the divine volition, because the end is distinct
from what is directed to the end, as being its extrinsic cause; yet
it may be said that the divine goodness to be loved and made mani­
fest is the reason for the divine volition, just as it is said that the
divine immutability is the reason for eternity, and divine imma­
teriality for subsistent intellection. In this sense the divine good­
ness can be said to be virtually, although not formally, the final
cause of the divine will. This is a better way of distinguishing be­
tween what is formally signified by the name "will” and the created
mode of our will.
Reply to second objection. Our will not only seeks the good that
it does not possess, but loves the good which it possesses, and finds
its delight therein. In this respect will is said to be in God. God’s
will is primarily directed to the divine good, which it actually
possesses. This brings out still more clearly the distinction between
the formal signification of the word "will” and its created mode.
Reply to third objection. The relationship between the will and
its object is one of moveable to mover, if it is a question of the
created will, which is distinct from its objects; but it is not so with
the divine will, which is identical with its object. Thus there is
will in God, and this in the strict sense of the term, or formally
and eminently, to the exclusion of all imperfections that pertain
to its created mode. In its formal signification, will excludes im­
perfection.
Instance. Even in its formal signification will includes imper­
fection, since it denotes dependence on the divine intellect, from
which it is virtually distinct. Therefore the difficulty remains.
In reply to this we say, first of all, that if such were true, then
even indirectly the intellect would include imperfection, since it
depends on truth and on the divine Being. We may reply directly

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the one god

to this objection by distinguishing the antecedent: if the will pro­
ceeded from the intellect as from its cause, then I concede the ante­
cedent; if it proceeded as from a previously known principle, then
I deny the antecedent. Thus in the Trinity there is no imperfection
in the Son, because He proceeds from the Father, not as cause, but
from Him only as the principle, just as the line proceeds from
the point as principle.22 Whatever imperfection there may be in this
is due to our imperfect mode of conception, since we distinguish
between the divine intellection and the divine volition, by a dis­
tinction known as rationis ratiocinatae, for which there is a founda­
tion in the divine reality. But this distinction, as such, exists only
in our mind, and so it is called a logical distinction (rationis).
In actual fact, the divine intellection and the divine volition are
identified (although not destructive of each other) in the eminence
of the Deity in which they are formally and eminently.23 Thus in
God, conceived as being, the divine attributes that must be deduced
from Him are contained only actually and implicitly; whereas in
God conceived as the Deity, namely, as He is in Himself, they are
contained actually and implicitly, without the necessity of any de­
duction.
Finally, we must not overlook the importance of this assertion,
namely, that will is properly or formally in God. We see the im­
portance of this if we consider the superiority of our will as regards
our sensitive appetite. For our will, inasmuch as it is specified by
universal good and not by sensible good, is of almost infinite pro­
fundity on the part of the object willed, in the sense that God
alone clearly seen can invincibly draw it; other goods do not of
necessity draw it, and the will loves these freely.24 But if it is ac­
tually true to say that our will is of almost infinite profundity on
the part of the thing willed, what must be said of God’s will, which
is specified not by universal good, but by the divine good, which
is not really distinct from it but is absolutely identical with it? For
it is infinite complacency in this good, divine rest therein; so that
what is found by participation in the prayer of quiet is essentially
in the divine will, to the exclusion of all imperfections.
22 If it is said that the divine will depends on the divine intellect, such depend­
ence is according to our imperfect mode of conceiving this, arising from the
virtual distinction between God’s will and His intellect. This distinction is also
called rationis ratiocinatae, because it is one formed by the mind, reasoned out
by the reason, for which there is a foundation in the object. [Tr.]
But if it is a question of the divine reality itself, then all theologians exclude
all causality and dependence from the divine persons, admitting only an order
of origin between them. See la, q.27, a. 1, 2, and Billuart's commentary on the
same.
23See Cajetan's Com. in lam, q.39, a.i, no. 7.
2« Tattler speaks frequently about this fundus of our will.

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From this it is already clear that the formal object of the divine
will is the divine goodness, which of itself is not only lovable, but
is actually and eternally loved; just as the divine truth is of itself not
only actually understandable, but is actually and eternally under­
stood.
SECOND ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD WILLS THINGS APART FROM HIMSELF

State of the question. Right now we consider the secondary object
of the will. St. Thomas begins by stating most correctly the diffi­
culties of this problem. Perhaps these are the difficulties that caused
Aristotle not to affirm that God wills the world, and especially that
He wills it freely. In fact, these difficulties were revived by Spinoza 25
in establishing his thesis that God does not act for an end, and that
the world proceeds from the divine substance by a necessity of
nature.
The principal difficulties are in the second, third, and fourth
objections. In the second it is said that the willed moves the wilier,
as the appetible the appetite, which means that it entices, draws
the appetite to itself. But God cannot be moved or enticed by an­
other. Therefore He does not will any other thing than Himself. In
the third objection it is stated that His own goodness suffices God
and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not properly
will anything apart from Himself. If this is affirmed, it is only by
way of metaphor, as when God is said to be angry. The fourth ob­
jection presents the difficulty that, if God wills Himself and things
apart from Himself, then there are two acts of the will in God,
because the acts of the will are multiplied in proportion to the
number of their objects, and this is contrary to God’s simplicity.
These difficulties are presented to purify the concept of will from
all imperfections in its relation to creatures. Thus the foundation is
laid for the solution of the objections that concern the free act of
God’s will,28 and of God’s love for creatures.27
The answer given by St. Thomas consists of two parts: (i) God
wills not only Himself, but also other things apart from Himself
(and this indeed by taking will in the literal sense, not meta­
phorically); (2) God wills Himself as the end, and other things as
ordained to that end.
1) Both are very often affirmed in Holy Scripture, and they are
of faith. St. Thomas quotes the following text: “This is the will of
25 Ethics, Bk. I, chap. 33.
See a.3.
2T See q.20.

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THE ONE GOD

God, your sanctification.” 28 For the second part, the following text
is usually quoted: “The Lord hath made all things for Himself”;29
and also: “He hath done all things, whatsoever He would.” 30*The
Vatican Council expresses this second part in equivalent words, by
defining as follows: “If anyone shall deny that the world was made
for the glory of God, let him be anathema.” 81 Just previous to this,
the canon defines that creation is a free act.
2) The first conclusion is proved from reason as follows: There
is a similarity of proportion between the natural inclination and
the rational inclination, which is the will; but natural things, in
so far as they are perfect, are naturally inclined to communicate
their good to others; therefore much more so does it pertain to the
divine will, in so far as it is most perfect, to communicate by like­
ness its own good to others. Thus God wills Himself and things
apart from Himself.
The major is not so clearly stated in this article as in the pre­
ceding. It necessarily prepares the ground for us, because we know
spiritual things only in the mirror of sensible things, and we judge
of the spiritual inclination because of a certain resemblance it bears
toward the natural inclination of sensible things. This is the normal
mode of procedure in the ascent of the mind to higher things.
The minor is proved by reason of the effects produced, or from
experience, as Aristotle remarked. "We see that every agent, in so far
as it is perfect and in act, produces its like.” From this it is evident
that there is a natural inclination in every perfect thing to impart
its good to others. Thus the fully grown plant produces its like, and
so does every grown-up animal.
From this general observation, the mind proceeds by the in­
ductive process to enunciate this general principle: “It pertains to
the nature of the will to communicate to others, as far as possible,
the good possessed.”
The Neoplatonists, especially Plotinus32 and Dionysius, often
enunciated this principle: “Good is essentially diffusive of itself.”
The way they showed the truth of this was by an inductive and
gradual process of reasoning in the ascendant order, observing that
the sun gives out life and heat, the fully grown plant produces its
like, just as the fully grown or developed animal does; also the
natural tendency of a man who is master of his art or who excels
in knowledge or wisdom is to communicate this knowledge to
28 I Thess. 4: 3.
28 Prov. 16: 4.
«° Ps. 113: 3.
si Denz. no. 1805.
W Enneade, Bk. V, chaps. 1, 6, 7.

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others. Similarly the source of all gifts is perfect love, which ex­
plains the loving generosity of parents toward their children. Hence
from all this it is evident that good is diffusive of itself; in fact, the
nobler the nature, the more intimately and completely it is diffusive
of itself. This doctrine of mental ascent is in substance retained by
St. Thomas in the present article, and in another of his works,33 to
illustrate God’s interior fecundity in the generation of the eternal
divine Word, and so as to enunciate elsewhere 34 the fittingness of
the Incarnation. But if this principle is true, then its application
to God’s will is manifest inasmuch as His will is most perfect.
As St. Thomas remarks,35 good is described as self-diffusive pri­
marily and immediately in the genus of final cause as regards the
agent, and then mediately in the genus of efficient cause, inasmuch
as the inclination of the perfect agent is to communicate actively
to others the good possessed by it.
From this, however, Plotinus concludes not only that the supreme
Good is diffusive of itself, but that it actually diffuses itself, accord­
ing to a necessity of its nature, just as the sun emits its rays. Thus
the world would seem to be a necessary irradiation of the divine
goodness or of the divine perfection. Something like this is said by
Leibnitz, who, according to his theory of absolute optimism, affirms,
not the physical, but the moral, necessity of creation, and of the
creation of the best among possible worlds. Otherwise, he says, God
would not be infinitely wise and good.3®
St. Thomas affirms in this article that “it appertains to the divine
will to communicate by likeness its own good to others, as much as
is possible.” By these words he affirms the fittingness, but in no way
the moral necessity, of this communication.
There are three difficulties regarding this first part of the argu­
mentative part of this article.
First difficulty. If good is essentially diffusive of itself, then it
seems that God, being the supreme Good, is essentially diffusive of
Himself ad extra; hence creation is not a free act. But, it is of faith
that creation is a free act, as will be stated in the next article.
Reply. When it is said that good is essentially diffusive of itself,
we must distinguish between the capacity of communicating and
the act of communicating. Certainly the capacity of communicating
good to others is a necessary perfection in God. Moreover, the act
of communicating good to others or of perfecting involves no im­
33 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV. chap. 11.
34Summa theol., Illa, q.i, a.i.
as Ibid., la. a.a.4 ad sum; la Ilae, q.i, a.4 ad turn.
3β Œuvres de Leibnitz (Erdmann ed.), Theodicée, §§7-10, pp. 506, 563; see
also La Monadologie, §53, p. 171, Boutroux ed.; also Introd. pp. 77-116.

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THE ONE GOD

perfection, and can be applied to God. But this suffices. Good en­
tices the agent, inclines it to act; but the agent can act either
according to a necessity of its nature, or freely. In the following
article it is shown that God wills things apart from Himself most
freely, because “the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist with­
out other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from
them.”
Second difficulty. Is the act of communicating good to others a
special perfection?
The answer is, that it is not, because God is neither better nor
greater in having created the universe. This conclusion, funda­
mentally the opposite of what Leibnitz taught, will be better ex­
plained in the following article. Leibnitz said that, if God had not
created or if He had not created the best of possible worlds, then
He would be neither infinitely wise nor infinitely good. On the
contrary, according to St. Thomas’ teaching which was admirably
expressed by Bossuet against Leibnitz, God is not better in having
created the universe, and He would have been none the less good
if He had not created it. This point will be more clearly explained
in the next article. The statement just made serves its present pur­
pose, which is to indicate that the present article is concerned with
the fittingness of creation, so much so that it would be equally
fitting if God had not willed to create, as will be stated in the
following article.
On this point the Thomists generally do not adopt the language
of Cajetan, who, in his commentary on this article, writes: “It is
a perfection for the divine will, that it tend in the manner that
pertains to it, to communicate its good to others; but . . . this per­
fection is voluntary . . . and absolutely free. But there is no unfittingness in conceding that God’s willing of things apart from
Himself is a voluntary and absolutely free perfection . . . for this
means that its opposite is no imperfection.” 3T
The Thomists, however, commonly repudiate such language as
this, for they say that God cannot be conceived as acquiring some
new and free perfection superadded, as it were, to the infinite and
necessary perfection of pure Act, and virtually distinct from it. In
such a case there would be a foundation in the divine reality for
conceiving the divine will as in potentiality with regard to this new
and free perfection that is superadded; in this there is a certain
danger of pantheism, since in this way the validity of the following
principle is impaired: “The divine being is being that can have
nothing added to it.” 33 Hence there can be no accident in God.
»? Cf. no. 7.
sb Summa theol., la, q.3, a.4, 6.

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5oi

Therefore the Thomists say what Cajetan, after more mature re­
flection, wrote: “To communicate oneself to others implies perfec­
tion not in the one communicating, but in the recipients of this
communication. . . . And it is of the nature of good to communi­
cate itself to others, not for the betterment of the one communi­
cating, but for the sake of others to be made good by it.” 38
Godoy40 correctly observes that the way Cajetan first expressed
himself must be understood as referring to a free perfection, which
God may not possess, not inasmuch as it is a perfection, but in the
sense that the object willed is contingent. But to express this ex­
actly, the Thomists say that the free act in God does not add a new
perfection in Him, but presupposes the infinite perfection of pure
Act, and is defectible only because of the object willed.41
The terminology commonly accepted in the schools expresses in
somewhat different language what Cajetan meant. It is formulated,
of course, as a modal proposition that refers to the saying rather
than as a modal proposition that refers to the thing. It does not say
that the act of creating is a free and befitting perfection in God,
for then the word “befitting” would terminate in an apparently
superadded perfection. But it says that it is befitting that God
created the universe, although it would have been just as befitting
if He had not created. Similarly it is befitting that God raised us
to the supernatural order, and that He sent His Son into the world
to save us, although it would have been just as befitting if He had
not raised us to the supernatural order, or if He had not willed the
Incarnation. These are, indeed, absolutely free acts.
In the example just given, it is evident that a modal proposition
referring to the thing is not equivalent to a modal proposition re­
ferring to the saying, as St. Thomas observed.42 For it is false to
say that everything known by God is necessary. But it is true to
say that everything known by God must needs be (by a necessity of
consequence but not of consequent). Similarly it is true to say that
it is necessary (by a necessity of consequence) for the predestined to
wish the good of salvation and be saved. But it is false to say that the
predestined necessarily wills the good of salvation and is saved.
Hence the argument of St. Thomas holds good, namely: “It ap­
pertains to God’s will that He communicate His good to others as
much as possible.”
Third difficulty. It arises from the concluding words (“as much
as possible”) of the sentence just quoted. This seems to suggest that
M Com. in IIlam, q.i, a.i, no. 6.
«ο Com. in lam, q.19. cl.48, §§4, 5, no. 85.
«1 Summa theol., la, q.19, a.3.
42 Ibid·, la, q. 14, a. 13 ad 3U111.

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THE ONE GOD

if God creates the world, He ought to create the best of possible
worlds, as Leibnitz asserts.
Reply. St. Thomas holds, as we shall find him stating in the next
article, that the volition by which God most freely wills things
apart from Himself, cannot be known by us a priori but only after
the act, or by revelation. But now, after the creative act, it is shown
to be fitting for God to create, although it would have been equally
fitting if He had not created, as will be stated in the next article.
Hence these words, “as much as possible,” indicate only this afore­
said fittingness. Moreover, as will be stated farther on, the supreme
limit in the possible or creatable is impossible of conception, be­
cause "the (infinite) God can make something else better than each
thing made by Him.” 43 Thus He can create better angels and of a
higher order, because, between any created being and the infinite
perfection of God, the distance is infinite.
Second conclusion. It states that God wills Himself as the end
and other things as ordained to that end. This follows as a corol­
lary from the first conclusion, because God cannot, except by not
observing the order of subordination, will Himself and things apart
from Himself. He cannot will equally, as it were, two things that
are co-ordinated; for all co-ordination presupposes subordination.
Order is the arrangement of things according to priority and pos­
teriority with reference to some principle. Hence it is verified first
in subordination and then in co-ordination. Thus two soldiers are
not so much co-ordinated as subordinated to the same general of an
army.
A difficulty arises concerning this second conclusion. If God wills
all things for Himself, this seems to impair the ordinary conception
we have of His goodness or liberality, and of the generosity of His
love for us. In fact, God’s love for us is not a love of concupiscence
but of benevolence. But by the love of benevolence we love others
not for our sake but for their sake. Therefore, that God’s love for
us should be truly a love of benevolence, He must love us for our
sake and not for His sake. Kant, Hermes, Gunther, and more re­
cently Laberthonnière, proposed this objection.44
Reply. Against Hermes and Gunther it was defined by the Vati­
can Council in one of its canons: “If anyone shall deny that the
world was made for the glory of God, let Him be anathema.” 45
This same point is explained by the Council in the chapter to which
this canon is attached, for it says: “This one, only, true God, of
His own goodness and almighty power, not for tire increase of His
43 Ibid., la, q.25, a.6.
44 Cf. Revue Thomiste, 1935, pp. 568-605.
48 Denz., no. 1805.

THE WILL OF GOD

503

own happiness,
*®
nor to acquire but to manifest His perfection by
the blessings which He bestows on creatures, with absolute freedom
of counsel, created out of nothing, from the beginning of time, both
the spiritual and the corporal creature, namely, the angelic and the
mundane; and afterward the human creature, as partaking, in a
sense, of both, consisting of spirit and of body.” 47
The Vatican Council explained the following text from Scripture:
"The Lord hath made all things for Himself,” 48 as meaning "for
the manifestation of His goodness.” If a man’s actions are performed
to show how good he is, not directing them to God, then this is
vainglory; but if either man’s acts or God’s acts are performed to
manifest the divine or supreme goodness, there is no vainglory but
true glory in this; for this manifestation results in God’s being
clearly known and praised, which is true glory and due recognition
of His supreme excellence.
It does not follow, therefore, that God loves us, not with love
of benevolence, but of concupiscence. For the love of benevolence
is that love by which the lover wills good to the one loved, and not
only to himself. But God wills good to us, and not only to Himself.
In fact, God wills to give Himself to us, and gave us His Son; but
we are subjected to God as the supreme good. Therefore God loves
us with the love of benevolence, but He subjects us to Himself. In
other words, God loves us as that for which He wills good, but not
as the end of creation.
Unless this were so, there would be an inversion of the established
order, which would be a perversion, as when a miser prefers money
to his own dignity as a rational being, and through love of money
loses his soul. In fact, if God were to love the creature as the end of
creation, He would no longer love the supreme good above all
things. Thus God would repudiate Himself, which would be a
mortal sin in God, the height of absurdity.
Hence this would result in a false definition of the love of benev­
olence, and it could not be attributed to God if it were said to be
the love by which another is loved for his own sake and not for the
sake of the lover. The love of benevolence must be defined as
the love by which we wish good to another, so that the other is the
one to whom we wish the good, and not necessarily the ultimate
end of our love.49 But when we love God with the love of benevo48 This would imply love of concupiscence.
47 Denz., no. 1783. See also Vacant, Etudes théologiques sur le Concile du Vatican,
I, 268, against Hermes and Gunther.
48 Prov. 16: 4.
48 If it is sometimes said that it is of the nature of friendship that the friend
be loved for his own sake, the meaning is that the friend is loved as the end for

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THE ONE GOD

lence and of charity, we wish God His good, namely, His glory, and
we love Him, moreover, as the ultimate end. Thus the Scripture
says: "Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to Thy name give glory.” 50
Thus teachers truly delight in expounding sublime truths to
their students, even to only one student, and more indeed from
love of God and of truth than from love of the student to whom
the truth is communicated.
Moreover, from the stand taken by Kant, Hermes, and Gunther,
it would follow rather that the creature, instead of being happy,
would be unhappy. For if the rational creature were the end of
creation, the ultimate end of man would not be the supreme Good,
who is to be loved above all things, but it would be the limited good
that is contained in the dignity of the human nature. Thus the
natural aspirations of man for the infinite good would be frus­
trated even in the natural order.
Finally, it is false to say that it amounts to "egoism” in God, if
Fie made all things for Himself. Egoism is that inordinate love of
self by which a man prefers himself to a higher good, such as family,
country, and the like. But God cannot prefer Himself to a higher
good, because He is identical with the supreme Good. God, in lov­
ing Himself above all things, prefers, as one must, the supreme
Good to all things.51
Hence this doctrine, no matter what Kant, Hermes, Gunther, and
Laberthonnière may have said, by no means impairs God’s liberal­
ity and His love of benevolence or of charity for us; but it most
clearly ilustrates that the divine goodness is capable of being loved
in the highest degree, which is the only object that can be loved
by God as the end. Created goodness or the creature is the one
to whom God by the love of benevolence wills good as a manifesta­
tion of His goodness.
In fact, because the love of creatures, as will be stated in the
next article, is most free, it being not at all necessary for God’s
happiness, for this very reason it is absolutely gratuitous and there­
fore most liberal, being the very opposite of egoism, since it manifests
God’s generosity or His magnanimity. Biiluart, in his commentary
which, or the one to whom, we wish the benefits. It does not mean that the
good qualities we perceive in the friend are the reason why we love him; in fact,
the friendship is more generous when there is nothing lovable in the one that is
loved.
so Ps. 113: 1.
61 In this we see how egregiously those erred who spoke of God’s "transcendental
egoism." Egoism is not an absolutely simple perfection, but is a defect, since it is
an inordinate love of self. It does not, therefore, exist in God, nor does the addi­
tion of "transcendental” suffice to make this defect an absolute perfection.

THE WILL ΟΓ GOD

505

on this article remarks: “The more generous and the more perfect is
the friendship, so much the more is another loved and showered
with benefits, who is most destitute of anything that is lovable,
God’s love being solely a gratuitous act of His will. Thus it is
solely by reason of His goodness that God loves creatures, and com­
municates His good gifts to them, not for His sake, but that it may
well be for them a means of seeing Him as their supreme Good and
ultimate end.” Many texts in Scripture are to this effect, such as:
"Give glory to the Lord, for He is good, for His mercy endureth
forever.” 52 “He hath filled the hungry with good things.” 53 In the
parable of the talents, in rewarding the good deeds performed, the
Lord says: “Well done, good and faithful servant. . . . Enter thou
into the joy of thy lord.” 34 Here we have the perfect love of friend­
ship, since God gives us His own happiness.
The conclusion of this article is confirmed by the solution of the
objections.
First objection. It is of minor importance. It states that the di­
vine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself.
Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
Reply. That the divine will is God’s existence objectively and
not conceptually, this I concede; objectively and conceptually, this
I deny. It is of the nature of volition that it relate to something.
Second objection. The thing willed moves the will, entices the
will. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will
is moved, enticed by another, which is impossible.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that the thing willed moves
the will for its own sake, this I concede; for the sake of something
else, this I deny. Thus in the case of a person who takes a bitter
medicine for the sake of health, it is health alone that moves the
will. But God wills things apart from Himself only for the mani­
festation of His goodness, which is the reason for His loving crea­
tures, and the reason for all God’s works ad extra. Nor can it be
said, strictly speaking, that the divine goodness moves, entices, the
divine will, but it is the reason for His loving creatures.
Third objection. What is willed suffices the wilier, and he seeks
nothing beyond it; but His own infinite goodness suffices God, there­
fore God does not will anything apart from Himself.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that he seeks nothing beyond it,
unless such is a reason for its being made manifest, this I concede;
that he wills absolutely nothing beyond it, this I deny. Thus God
Ps. 105:1; 106:1.
Luke 1: 53.
μ Matt. 25: 23.

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THE ONE GOD

wills nothing besides Himself, except by reason of His goodness,
but He wills things apart from Himself for the manifestation of
His goodness.
Fourth objection. Acts of the will are multiplied in proportion
to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and
things apart from Himself, it will follow that the act of His will
is manifold.
Reply. “As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in
the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as will­
ing the many only through the one, that is, through its own great­
ness.
First doubt. Is the divine goodness alone the formal object, the
motive and what terminates the divine will, so that creatures are
only its material object?
It follows from the reply to the second objection of this article
that the answer is in the affirmative. For the formal object of a
faculty, its motive and what terminates it, is that which and by
reason of which it is directly moved to act, and which directly and
by reason of which it attains its object. But God wills all things for
the manifestation of His goodness. Consequently the moving and
hence the termination of the faculty find their complete explanation
in the divine goodness, because the principle that attracts and the
terminus of volition coincide; but it is called principle with refer­
ence to the intention, and terminus with reference to enjoyment
of the good intended and possessed. Moreover, the will is specified
by its formal object. But the divine will can be specified only by
the divine goodness, for otherwise it would be dependent on some
other goodness.
Second doubt. Is the divine goodness alone the adequate object
of the divine will?
The Thomists reply in the affirmative, because the divine good­
ness in the order of good is coextensive with the divine will as
faculty, for each is infinite. Hence the distinction that is made as
regards the created intellect between the proper and the adequate
objects, does not apply to God. The adequate object of the created
intellect is being in all that pertains to being, whereas the adequate
object of the divine intellect is the Deity, which, in a certain sense,
transcends being and good, as it contains these formally and
eminently.
Objection. Nevertheless God is moved on account of our merits
to reward us, and on account of our miseries to come to our assist­
ance, for the misery of others is the reason why one is merciful.05
Thus God willed the Incarnation for our redemption. Therefore
w Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.30, a.2.

THE WILL OF GOD

507

the creature in some way moves the divine will as the motivated
object.
Reply. The antecedent is denied: for God is moved toward these
things solely by reason of His goodness considered under various
aspects. For God is not moved toward these things as we are moved,
on account of some particular good quality reflected in these objects.
But the divine goodness, being the reason for doing good, specifies
the divine liberality; being the reason for giving everyone his due,
it specifies divine justice, which rewards or punishes according to
one’s deserts. Similarly divine goodness, being the reason for coming
to the assistance of those in misery, moves and specifies divine
mercy, because the divine virtues cannot be specified by created
good. If, therefore, St. Thomas says that “the misery of others is the
reason why one is merciful,” 58 he is then speaking of created mercy;
and, moreover, he says this as regards the material cause, for the
perfecting of it, and not as regards the final cause, or the end for the
sake of which the act is performed. Thus God is said to have willed
the incarnation of His Son for our sake, inasmuch as the re­
demption of the human race was the subject for the sake of which
or the end for which the Incarnation was of benefit.57 Thus it re­
mains true to say that the ultimate end of the Incarnation is the
manifestation of divine goodness.
Instance. Yet God wills one creature for another, and all things
for the sake of the elect. Therefore, at least the higher creatures are
the motivated object of the divine will.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent in this sense, that “God wills
this to be as means to that; but He does not will this on account of
that.” 58 In other words, the conjunction propter ("on account of”)
affects the object, for God wills one creature to be on account of
another; but the conjunction does not affect the divine volition,
which is one only and uncreated, and is not dependent on creatures.
Thus God wills all things for the sake of the elect; but the elect are
not the cause of this divine volition ("volition” in the subjective
sense). On the contrary, our will has at least two acts, namely, in­
tention and choice, and on account of the end intended we will the
means by a subsequent act of choice, which is the effect of the first
act of intention. Therefore it remains true to say that God wills no
created good by reason of itself, but by reason of the divine good­
ness to which all created things are ordained.
Corollary. When it is said that all God’s operations ad extra have
been for His external glory, this must not be construed as meaning
oe Ibid.
67 ibid., Illa, q.i, a.3, c. et ad 3111η.
58 See q-19. a.5.

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THE ONE GOD

that they have been for the created and distinguished knowledge of
Him with praise, because this created knowledge and praise are or­
dained to God; but it must be construed as meaning that all His works
are for the manifestation of His uncreated goodness. This most ad­
mirably confirms the answer of St. Thomas, that God wills both
Himself and other things, but Himself as the end, and other things
as ordained to that end.
From what has been said it is also evident that the ultimate end
of all God’s works ad extra, even the incarnation of the Word, is
the manifestation of divine goodness, although there may be a sub­
ordinated end, since the Incarnation is for our salvation, as being
beneficial to us.
Another corollary. Hence, just as only the divine good can com­
pletely satisfy the will of the blessed, far more so is this the case
with the divine will. We say a fortiori, because the divine will is
specified by the divine good, whereas the created will is specified
by universal good. If we were to say that the created will is specified
by the divine good, it would already have the same specified object
as infused charity, and then it could not be elevated to the higher
order of grace.
THIRD ARTICLE

WHETHER WHATEVER GOD WILLS, HE WILLS NECESSARILY

State of the question. The question in this article is whether God
freely wills things apart from Himself, or whether He wills them from
a certain necessity either of nature or of knowledge, namely, be­
cause of a physical or moral necessity. According to the pantheists,
such as Spinoza, God necessarily produces things apart from Him­
self, this necessity being metaphysical, or at least physical; and so
nothing would be possible besides that which exists. Thus Spinoza
could not have been born in any other city than the one in which
he was born, as Leibnitz replied to him. Yet Leibnitz himself said
that God wills things apart from Himself by a moral necessity, be­
cause it would be unbecoming, contrary to wisdom and goodness,
for God not to will things apart from Himself, and not to will better
things. This same doctrine is found in the writings of Malebranche,
and later on in those of Gunther and Rosmini. If such were the case,
then it would have been morally necessary for Leibnitz to be born
only in that city and at that time in which he was born. Thus in
the opinion of Leibnitz, all things that happen would be necessary,
at least morally so.59
•8 Theodicée, first part, §§ 7-10.

THE WILL OF GOD

509

St. Thomas in the state of the question makes known the diffi­
culty of this problem. He begins by positing six objections.80
Two of these present special difficulty. There is first the difficulty
as regards the exercise of the free act, which appears to be some­
thing contingent in God, because there is a possibility of its absence.
This difficulty is touched upon in the fourth objection by the follow­
ing remark: “The divine will would be contingent upon one or the
other of two things, and so imperfect”; in fact, there would be a
free volition that could as well not be. The fifth objection inquires
into the cause of this contingent determination in God. This diffi­
culty is thoroughly examined by the Thomists.
The other difficulty is concerned with the specification and the
motive of the free act in willing the object, since nothing is willed
unless it is foreknown as suitable and better. Thus it is better to
create; it would be unbefitting not to create, and not to create
better creatures. Hence it seems that God ought to will things apart
from Himself, if not from necessity of His nature, at least because
either His knowledge or wisdom or goodness dictates this.
In other words, if there is not a metaphysical and physical neces­
sity, at least there is a moral necessity for this, otherwise there will
be imperfection in God. Leibnitz, Gunther, and Rosmini make this
objection the subject of special discussion. St. Thomas knew of this
objection, and he touched upon it to some extent.81
Aristotle never affirmed God’s liberty, because he found himself
unable to reconcile it with His immutability. It seems that he ad­
mitted not only that the world was from eternity, but that it was a
necessary production. This was the view of the Neoplatonists, as
expressed in their doctrine of emanation.
In the Middle Ages it was Abelard who denied God’s liberty,
saying that “God can do only what He does.” 82 Aureolus taught
that liberty was attributed to God only metaphorically, for other­
wise His free act would be contingent. In later times, Wyclif, Bucer,
and Calvin seem to have denied true liberty in God. This question
has been discussed at length by us elsewhere.83
The answer is that God wills things apart from Himself, not
necessarily, but most freely.
1) It is of faith and is often declared in Holy Scripture, as in the
eo De veritate, q.23, a.4: De potentia, q.3, a. 15; Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps. 76,
81, 82; Bk. II, chaps. 23, 24, 26, 27 (against the Averroists).
«i See the second and sixth objections of this article: also q.25, a.6: Whether
God can do better than what He does; and Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chaps. 26, 27,
against Averroist determinism.
os Denz., no. 374.
es See God, His Existence and His Nature, II, 95-108; 268-354.

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THE ONE GOD

following texts: "And God said: Be light made. And light was
made.”84 "The God of revenge hath acted freely.”85 “And the
Lord said to Moses ... I will have mercy on whom I will; and I
will be merciful to whom it shall please Me."88 “Therefore He hath
mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.” 87 “Who
worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.”88 There are
many other passages that refer to God’s will of good pleasure and
to the gratuity of His love for the elect. The divine election is, in
the strict sense, a free act.89 In the parable of the laborers in the
vineyard, the Lord says: "I will also give to this last even as to thee.
Or, is it not lawful for me to do what I will?” 70
In fact, even in the Old Testament we find God’s liberty fre­
quently affirmed, as in the following texts: “As the potter’s clay is
in his hands . . . so,man is in the hand of Him that made him, and
He will render to him according to His judgment.” 71 “For if it shall
please the Lord, He will fill him with the spirit of understanding." 72
The Vatican Council, in attacking the moral necessity of creation
as taught by Gunther and Leibnitz, defined as follows: “If anyone
shall say that God created not by His will, free from all necessity,
but by a necessity equal to the necessity whereby He loves Himself;
let him be anathema.” 73 In the corresponding chapter it states that
God “with absolute freedom of counsel” 74 created.
Likewise the following proposition of Anthony Rosmini was con­
demned: “The love by which God loves Himself even in creatures,
and which is the motive that determines Him to create, constitutes
a moral necessity which in the most perfect being always brings
forth the effect; for it is only in the many imperfect beings that
necessity of this kind leaves liberty intact on either side.” 75 If such
were the case, then liberty would be a mixed perfection, just as dis­
cursive knowledge is. On the contrary, liberty is an absolutely
simple perfection, and so it must of necessity be in God. Neverthe­
less, as we shall see, this free act, such as that of creating, is not an
·« Gen. i: 3.
65 Ps. 93: 1.
88 Ex. 33: 17, 19.
β’ Rom. 9: 18.
·
es Eph. 1: 11.
e» Rom. 9: 11; 11: 5, 28.
70 Matt. 20: 14 f.
71 Ecclus. 33: 13 f.
72 Ibid., 39: 8. See also Jer. 18: 3.
73 Denz., no. 1805.
74 Ibid., no. 1783. See Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, I, 269, 270.
76 Denz., no. 1908.

THE WILL OF GOD

51 1

absolutely simple perfection in God, as least in the strict sense,
because it is not better for God to have this act than not to have it.
2) It is proved by reason that God necessarily wills His own good­
ness, and things apart from Himself freely.
The first part presents no difficulty: ‘‘For the divine will has a
necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper
object.” Moreover, there is not and cannot be any idea of evil re­
sulting from the divine goodness, but in it we see clearly all that
pertains to good. And then God is of necessity actually willing and
not merely potentially so. Therefore God necessarily wills His good­
ness, and the necessity is one of specification and of exercise.
St. Thomas proves the second part of this proposition from the
fact that God is in no way dependent on creatures for the possession
of His infinite goodness. This point is made clear by the following
argument.
In willing the end we do not necessarily will those things that are
conducive to the end, unless they are necessary for the attainment
of the end. But God wills things apart from Himself as ordained
to His goodness (for its manifestation), which, since it is perfect,
can dispense with creatures, and no perfection accrues to Him from
them. Therefore God does not necessarily will things apart from
Himself. But supposing that He wills these, He is unable not
to will them, because His will cannot change.
There is another way of expressing the minor, by saying that after
creation there are more beings, but not more being, or more per­
fection or goodness, because prior to this there necessarily and from
eternity pre-existed infinite goodness that is necessarily and ac­
tually loved and possessed by God.
This proof is apodictic and most clear. This is the element of
clarity in this light-transcending obscurity. The obscurity will be in
what formally constitutes God’s free act.
THE SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS CONFIRMS THIS PROOF

Reply to first objection. Everything that is eternal is necessary
either absolutely or hypothetically. Hence from the fact that God
wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that it is
absolutely necessary for Him to will things apart from Himself.
This is only hypothetically necessary, on the supposition that He
wills these.
Reply to second objection. The divine goodness, which God nec­
essarily wills, can exist without other things. Hence God most freely
wills things apart from Himself, and with absolute generosity.

5'2

THE ONE GOD

Reply to third objection. It is not natural to God to will things
apart from Himself; yet it is not unnatural but voluntary and free,
in fact most free.
Reply to fourth objection. Every contingent being is imperfect.
But the divine will is contingent to one or the other of two things.
Therefore it would be imperfect. This difficult objection is solved
by conceding the major and denying the minor. That the divine
will would be in itself indifferent to one or the other of two things,
this I deny; in that it is not necessarily related to something
willed, this I concede. The conclusion is distinguished in the same
way, so that the imperfection is only in the contingent thing willed,
but not in the divine will. This is well explained by St. Thomas
in his reply. He says: "Sometimes a necessary cause has a non­
necessary relation to an effect, owing to a deficiency in the effect
and not in the cause. Even so, the sun’s power has a non-necessary
relation to some contingent effects on this earth, owing to a defect
not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily
from the cause.” Thus certain fruits never become ripe.
Reply to fifth objection. Nothing determinate results from that
which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, unless it is
determined by an extrinsic cause; but God cannot be determined
by an extrinsic cause; therefore God is not indifferent to one or
the other of two things. This objection is answered by distinguish­
ing the major. What is indifferent potentially or passively, this I
concede; that the indifference is actual and active, this I deny.
I concede the minor, and distinguish the conclusion as follows:
That God is not indifferent potentially or passively so, this I con­
cede; that the indifference is actual and active, this I deny. St.
Thomas says the equivalent of this in his reply: “A naturally con­
tingent cause, such as human liberty, must be determined to act
by some external power (thus it is attracted by the object and
moved by God to choose this object freely); but the divine will,
which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to
which it has no necessary relation.”
For the explanation of this distinction, it must be observed that
there is a dominating potential or passive indifference in our free
will before it chooses anything. But once it is determined by reason
of its choice, although it remains free, it retains a dominating in­
difference, not indeed one that is potential or passive, but one that
is actual and active, inasmuch as man, in freely choosing some
particular good, not universal good, is not invincibly attracted by
it, but actually wills it at the same time retaining the real power of
not willing, in fact, of actually not willing it. In God, however, who is
pure Act, there is no potential and passive indifference, but only a

THE WILL OF GOD

513

dominating actual and active indifference of His self-subsisting act
of willing, or of His self-subsisting love, which is in no necessary
relation to creatures.
These last two objections of St. Thomas, as we shall at once see,
are of great help in explaining the nature of God’s free act and its
indifference.
Reply to sixth objection. Whatever God knows, He knows neces­
sarily, because His knowledge is His essence. Therefore it likewise
follows that whatever God wills, He wills necessarily. This objec­
tion may be answered by distinguishing the antecedent: I concede
this statement of His knowledge of simple intelligence; I deny it
of His knowledge of vision, and I deny the consequent and conse­
quence, because in this case the will is now joined to God’s knowl­
edge of vision.78 Moreover, God’s knowledge of things is as these
are eternally present to His knowledge, whereas the will is related
to things as they are in themselves (inasmuch as good, unlike
truth, is not in the mind but in the things). Things in themselves,
however, are contingent.
There are especially two objections among others that are pro­
posed. As already stated, good is essentially diffusive of itself. But
God is the supreme good. Therefore God is essentially (or neces­
sarily) diffusive of Himself.
We reply to this by distinguishing the major: good is essentially
diffusive of itself, that it may communicate itself, and first in the
genus of final cause, this I concede; that de facto it necessarily com­
municate itself, this I subdistinguish: if it is a question of com­
municable natural good, such as the light given by the sun, this I
concede; if it is a question of communicable good by a free act of
the will, this I deny. Hence God essentially diffuses or communicates
Himself; but it is only by a free act of His will that He actually
communicates a participation of His goodness, because for the
complete possession of this goodness He is in no need of creatures.
Finally, the following objection must be noted. God is absolutely
immutable, or, in other words, He cannot be otherwise than He is.
But God would be mutable if He could will or not will to create,
or, in other words, He would be otherwise than He is if He were
not the Creator. Therefore the difficulty remains.
From what has already been said, we answer this by distinguish­
ing the major and denying the minor. For God is absolutely im­
mutable, although it was in His power not to choose that which
He freely chose from eternity. For this free choice is not even in
the least degree a superadded accident in God, and it posits no
Summa theol., la, q.14, a.8.

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THE ONE GOD

new perfection in Him. Hence the change and variation is solely
on the part of the things willed, as stated in the reply to the fourth
objection. This gives rise to some doubts, however, which must
be examined.
First doubt. What formally constitutes God’s free act?
The difficulty is that God either could or could not have been
without His free act, for instance, the creative act. If He could,
then how is He immutable? He is at least from eternity, otherwise
than He could have been. If He could not, then how is He free?11
This is what is obscure in this light-transcending darkness,
whereas what is most clear in it is that God most freely created,
as He in no way is in need of creatures for the most complete posses­
sion of His infinite goodness. For the solution of this difficulty two
contradictory and improbable opinions are proposed.
The first of these opinions states that God’s free act is consti­
tuted by some intrinsic and defectible reality in Him, which is
superadded, so to speak, to His pure Act.
Reply. If this reality were identical with God, then He would
be intrinsically defectible. If, on the other hand, this reality were
really distinct from God’s substance, then it would be an accident
in God, and then He would be neither absolutely simple, nor pure
Act, since He would be in potentiality for this new determination,
which, indeed, He would have from all eternity, but which it was
possible for Him not to have. Thus the self-subsisting Being would
no longer be the “being to whom nothing can be added.” 78 He
would not be both the unreceived and unreceptive Being. This
opinion would prepare the way for pantheism, which posits cer­
tain accidents in God, such as are the finite modes admitted by
Spinoza, the series of which would be infinite both regressively and
successively.
The second opinion, which is proposed by Aureolus, states that
God’s free act consists in some extrinsic denomination that is ap­
propriated from creatures. Thus Aureolus says that the free act is
not formally and properly in God, but only metaphorically, as
anger is, which is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Reply. God is from all eternity free, before anything was created
by Him. In fact, the free creative act exists eternally in God as a
formally immanent and virtually transitive vital act, although its
effect ad extra is passively produced only in time. Therefore God’s
free act cannot be constituted by something purely extrinsic to
Him and created, but it must be something intrinsic to Him.
7’ See John o£ St. Thomas, Salmanticenses, Gonet, and Billuart in their com­
mentaries on this article.
le Summa theol., la, q.3. a.4 ad turn et ad 6um.

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5’5

Likewise we must reject the opinion which differs but little from
that of Aureolus. This opinion states that a logical relation to
creatures is what constitutes God’s free act. For logical being cannot
be the cause of real being. But God’s free act is the cause of the
real being of all creatures. Moreover, God’s free act exists before
there can be any logical relation in Him, which has existence only
in the created intellect. Therefore God’s free act must be something
real and intrinsic to Him. But there is still the difficulty as to how
this act is defectible in God, or may as well not be.
The more common opinion among the Thomists mediates be­
tween the above-mentioned contradictory opinions and is superior
to them. It is, as it were, a higher synthesis, combining what is best
in each of the other opinions, for it states that the entity of God’s
free act is indeed intrinsic to Him, but only its defectibility is ex­
trinsic to Him.
To be more explicit, this means that God’s free act is nothing
else but the necessary act by which He loves His goodness, in so
far as this connotes a non-necessary relation to creatures, and so it
is only extrinsically defectible by reason of the defectibility in the
thing willed. There is foundation for this opinion in many texts
from the writings of St. Thomas. Thus in the preceding article he
says: “The divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only
through the one, that is, through its own goodness.” 79
In this article he says: “That God does not necessarily will some
of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing
willed.” 80 More explicitly he writes: “God’s will by one and the
same act wills Himself and other things. Now His relation to Him­
self is necessary and natural; whereas His relation to other things
is by way of a kind of fittingness, not indeed necessary and natural,
or violent and unnatural, but free.” 81
Thus, from the teaching as set forth in this present article, this
opinion is proved by the following syllogism: Divine liberty does
not, like human liberty, consist in the indifference of a potency
with regard to several acts, but it consists in the indifference of one
most simple act with regard to different objects. But this act, simple
in itself, is virtually multiple, and is necessary and free under dif­
ferent aspects; for it is necessary in so far as it terminates the
divine goodness, and free in so far as it connotes a non-necessary
relation to creatures. Therefore this act, permanently unmoved in
itself, is in God something vital and intrinsic by reason of its enτ» Ct. ad 411m.
Cf. ad 4um; see also ad 511m.
« Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 82. See also Bk. I, chap. 76, no. 1.

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THE ONE GOD

tity, and is only extrinsically defectible because of the defectibility
in the thing willed, namely, the creature; for the aforesaid termina­
tion would be lacking in the case of a creature that does not or
will not exist. This likewise explains why the free act is called
volition in so far as it terminates in the being of the creature, and
is called nolition in so far as it terminates in the non-being of the
creature.
Thus the absolute actuality as well as the simplicity and emi­
nence of the divine act gives us the solution of the question. St.
Thomas illustrates this by a comparison in another of his works:
“For every power tends by one operation or act to its object and
the formal aspect of that object: even as by one sight we see light
and the color made visible by light.82
In fact, by one and the same act of seeing, we see light together
with many colors and objects seen by means of color; yet some of
these colors are absent, though the act of seeing remains the same.
Far more so does God by one and the same act see His goodness
and the manifestation of this in different things, though His rela­
tion to these is not a necessary one. Thus it is said of Him:
God, powerful sustainer of all things,
Thou who dost remain permanently unmoved,
Determining the course of time
By successions of day and night.
Thus the entity of the divine free act is intrinsic to God, whereas
its defectibility is extrinsic to Him.
Objection. The relation of the necessary act to creatures is only
a logical relation. Therefore it seems that God’s free act consists
only in this logical relation.
Reply. I concede the antecedent, and deny the consequent. There
is, indeed, a logical relation as a result of this act; but God’s free
act is something real, vital, intrinsic to Him, which is God’s love
that connotes a non-necessary relation to creatures, this being the
foundation for the logical relation, and this free act is virtually
distinct from the necessary love of His goodness.
Another objection. The very termination of the immanent and
eternal free act must be intrinsic to God, and hence intrinsically
defectible. So the difficulty remains.
Reply. I concede the antecedent, and deny the consequence. That
this termination of God’s immanent and eternal act is intrinsic to
Him as regards the entity of this immanent act, this I concede; as
regards its defectibility, this I deny. It is only extrinsically defecti»2 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. 76.

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·

517

ble, by reason of the defectibility in the thing willed.83 Hence, as
stated above, the entity of the free act is, indeed, intrinsic to God,
and only its defectibility is extrinsic.8·*
Hence in answer to the principal objection posited at the be­
ginning of this article, the following must be said: that God’s free
act could as well not be, this I distinguish: that it could not be
as regards creatures, this I concede; in itself, as it is the unique act
of God’s love, this I deny. To put it in other words, God, who is
permanently unmoved, had it in His power not to create, and to
bring other creatures into being, for the divine liberty is the domi­
nating indifference not of a potency but of a pure act of subsistent
love. Thus the peak, of a pyramid, which in itself is fixed, is the
terminus of new linet converging toward it. So also he who, re­
maining in some place, and having within his view a certain ter­
ritory, sees all the objects that change their locality in this territory,
though he remains in the same place. This is indeed a feeble com­
parison, but it shows that even in sense perception the higher be­
ings unite within themselves those things that are found dividedly
in lower beings. It is the application of general principles. Thus the
absolute simplicity and immutability of the pure Act is safeguarded.
Hence this whole question consists in a proper understanding of
dominating indifference, an indifference that is not potential and
passive, but actual and active, and which formally and eminently,
or properly, and not merely metaphorically, applies to God.
Second doubt. Can God, without undergoing any change, begin
to will what He did not will, and not will what He willed?
The answer is in the negative,85 for once the relation is estab­
lished toward things willed, it cannot be changed, unless we pre­
suppose a change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of
the wilier. But neither of these changes can take place in God.
Suarez advances the objection that from the mere idea of liberty,
without anyone undergoing any change either in disposition or in
knowledge, he could begin to will what before he did not will.
Reply. There cannot be another free choice without another
practical judgment that immediately regulates the choice. But there
is no change of judgment in God, for His judgment of all things
is from all eternity immutable. There is something similar to this
in the angel, because of the perfection of his intellect, as “the
angel’s free will is flexible to either opposite before the choice but
ea Cf. ad 411m of this article; also what St. Thomas says in the De veritate,
q.23, a.4, c. and ad 4um.
8< Consult Gonet, Goudin, and Billuart in their commentaries on this article,
es See a. 7 of this question.

5i8

.

THE ONE GOD

not after.” 86 Thus all the blessed in heaven are unchangeable in
their love of God.
Third doubt. Can there be a suspension of any act on the part
of God’s free will concerning a created object?
The Thomists generally deny this against Gonet. They hold that
God cannot remain, as it were, in suspense and undecided as to
whether He will create or not create. Concerning this there must
be either a volition or a nolition, because this suspension of any
free act would seem in a way to detract from the divine perfection.
For God is of necessity free, and His liberty is not a potential but
an actual dominating indifference. Therefore it seems that God
ought to have one or the other of these acts: to will to create, or to
refuse to create. The refusal to will differs from non-willing.
Fourth doubt. Is God’s free creative act an absolutely simple per­
fection?
Reply. It is not an absolutely simple perfection, at least in the
strict sense; for this is defined as a perfection which implies no im­
perfection, and which it is better for one to have than not to have.
But it is not better for God to have the creative act than not to
have it. Therefore this free creative act is not an absolutely simple
perfection.
Yet it remains true to say that liberty in God is an absolutely
simple perfection, in the strict sense, for it is better for God to
have it than not to have it; in fact, God is of necessity free, al­
though it is not necessary for Him to have this particular act rather
than a certain other.87
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS

State of the question. So far we know that God freely wills things
apart from Himself, or acts freely ad extra. We now inquire
whether He acts by His will. On first consideration, this seems to
be a useless question after what has been said in the preceding
question; for if God freely wills creatures, then He causes them by
His will. Yet it is really another question that is now asked, and
ee Summa theol., la, q.64, a.2.
87 Some raised the following objection against divine liberty: The divine good­
ness is of necessity perfectly willed by God; but it cannot be perfectly willed by
God, without His willing the manifestation of this goodness by creation; there­
fore creation is not a free act.
We reply to this by distinguishing the major: that the divine goodness is of
necessity perfectly willed by God, intensively as a perfection, this I concede;
extensively as such, this 1 deny; for God's goodness is complete in itself apart
from His diffusion of this ad extra.

THE WILL OF GOD

5'9

one that requires special examination. For man does, indeed, freely
generate, yet he does not do so by his will, but because he is of a
certain nature. Hence, if he generates, he can generate only one
like himself in species. Therefore it is now a question not only
whether God freely willed to create, but whether God is the cause
of things by His will, or by His nature.
This is clearly made known to us from the difficulties presented
at the beginning of this article. They state that it seems God is
not the cause of things by His will, but by His nature: (i) because,
as Dionysius says, “the divine good by its very essence pours the
rays of its goodness upon everything that exists”;88 (2) because God
is the first agent, therefore He acts by His essence, just as He is es­
sentially being; (3) because God is essentially good, and Augustine
says: "Because God is good, we exist”; (4) because God is the cause
of things by His knowledge, He is therefore not so by His will.
Yet the answer is that God’s will is the cause of tilings, or that
God acts by His will, and not by a necessity of His nature.
In this article we get a much clearer conception of what was
meant when it was said in a previous question that “God’s knowl­
edge is the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it.” 88
We are now concerned with this conjoined will, and the deter­
mination of this divine will. There is special reference to this latter
in the second proof of the argumentative part of this article, which
is afterward frequently called the decree of the divine will. At the
same time, this article completes the refutation of pantheism, for
the pantheists, like the Averroists of the Middle Ages, hold that God
is the cause of things by a necessity of His nature. The beginning
of this refutation of pantheism is in God’s transcendence as the
extrinsic cause of the world, and this point is made clear in the
proof of God’s existence,80 and from the fact that God is most
simple, there being no accidents in Him,81 and absolutely immuta­
ble,02 whereas the world is composite and continually subject to
change.
The truth of this answer is established in various texts of Holy
Scripture. We quote the following: “And how could anything en­
dure, if Thou wouldst not?” 83 "And God said: Be light made. And
light was made,” 84 which means that God is the cause of things by
es De div. nom., Bk. IV, chap. 1.
so Summa theol., la, q. 14, a.8.
00 Ibid., q.2, a.3.
01 Ibid., q.3, a.6, 7, 8.
02 Ibid., q.9, a. I.
·» Wis. 11: 26.
Gen. 1: 3.

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THE ONE GOD

a command of His intellect and will. And again: “Who worketh all
things according to the counsel of His will.” 90
Three proofs are given in the body of the article: (i) from the
very order of active causes; (2) from the disposition of a natural
agent; (3) from the relation of effects to their causes. These proofs
given in the article are clear, especially after the explanation of
the proof for God’s existence as supreme Ordainer from the order
prevailing in the universe.
First proof. The first agent must act by intellect and will. But
God is the first agent. Therefore He must act by intellect and will.
The major is proved as follows: since both intellect and nature
act for an end, the natural agent must have the end and the
means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; thus the end
and definite movement are predetermined for the arrow by the
archer.
The ultimate reason for this is that the things which lack intel­
ligence do not know the nature of an end as such, even though, as
animals, they have a sensitive knowledge of the thing which con­
stitutes their end, as in the case of the swallow collecting the wisps
of straw for building its nest. They have no knowledge of the end
as such, or of the raison d’être of the means, because they lack the
faculty whose object is intelligible being and the raison d’être of
things. Hence, as stated in the fifth proof for God’s existence:
“Those things that are without (intellectual) knowledge do not
move toward an end, unless they are directed by some being that
is endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot
to its mark by the archer.” 98 Hence the supreme agent must act
not by nature, but by intellect and will.
Second proof. A natural agent always produces the same effect,
unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is ac­
cording to the nature of the agent. But God in His being and na­
ture is infinite or unlimited. Therefore, if God were to act, not by
His intellect and will, but by His nature, then He would produce
an infinite effect in being, which is impossible.9’
It must be observed that the major of this syllogism is an in­
ductive principle, already invoked by Aristotle, namely, that the
same natural cause in the same circumstances always produces the
same effect; for in this article it is stated that “the nature of the
act of the natural agent is according to the nature of the agent;
and hence, as long as it has that nature, its act will be in accord­
es Eph. 1: 11.
e® Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3.
·’ Ibid., q.7, a.2.

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52>

ance with that nature.” 88 If, therefore, it is certain that heat once
or on several occasions expanded iron, then there is no need of
having recourse to the method of induction by exhausting the
number of particular cases; but we can affirm that if heat is truly
the natural cause of the expansion of metals, it will always be so
in the same circumstances, so long as heat remains the same in
nature. And so, no matter what historians in our times may say,
Aristotle and St. Thomas well knew on what the inductive prin­
ciple of the laws of nature rests, namely, that the natural agent is
determined to one thing.
At the end of this second proof St. Thomas speaks explicitly of
the determination of the divine will, which is afterward frequently
called the decree of the divine will. He says: “(God) does not,
therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects pro­
ceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determina­
tion of His will and intellect.” Why did he put the will before tire
intellect? The reason is found in what was previously stated by
him: "Since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things
(for the thing to be or not to be), inasmuch as the same knowledge
relates to opposites, it would not produce a determinate effect un­
less it were determined to one thing by the appetite.” 88 Thus both
in ourselves and in God, the will in choosing brings it about that
the last practical judgment is the final one (so that there is an end
of deliberation), and after the will has made its choice (which ter­
minates the order of intention, and which is frequently called the
purpose of the will), then the intellect is urged to command the
act (which begins the order of execution).188
Finally, it must be remarked concerning this second proof that
the determination of the divine will is required not only in electing
that things come into being or not, but also for the non-necessary
determination of these things, such as that the movement of the
heavenly bodies should be, as at present, from east to west, instead
of contrariwise. This point is made much clearer in a subsequent
question,101 in which it is stated that “(God) produced things into
being in order that His goodness might be communicated to crea­
tures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could
not be adequately represented by one creature alone.”102 Thus
oe Otherwise a change in the effect, without a change in the cause or circum­
stances, would be without a reason for its existence.
oo Summa theol., la, q. 14, a.8.
100 On this point consult the reply to the fourth objection of this article.
101 Summa theol., la, q-47, a.i, 2.
102 Cf. ibid., a. 1.

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THE ONE GOD

God's intellect and liberty are the explanation for the many and
different creatures that proceed from the supreme Agent, who in
Himself is most simple. Contrary to this, the Neoplatonists, in
denying the absolute freedom of the creative act, advanced the
theory of emanation, namely, the One-Good, as if indeed, in ac­
cordance with this theory, the first hypostasis, namely, the OneGood, generated by a necessity of his nature a second hypostasis
inferior to himself, then a third and so on in succession. But then
it is not explained why the second hypostasis is inferior to the
first; for if the first acts from a necessity of his nature, as man
generates, he ought to produce an effect like to himself in nature
and therefore infinite, which is impossible, as stated in this second
proof.103
Third proof. Effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in
so far as they pre-exist in the agent. But God's being is His own
intellect. Therefore effects pre-exist in God after the mode of in­
tellect, and therefore they proceed from Him after the same mode.
Consequently these effects proceed from Him after tire mode of
will.104
Reply to first objection. When Dionysius says that God com­
municates a participation of His goodness just as the sun illumines
all things, he does not mean to exclude election from God abso­
lutely, but he means that, just as the sun illumines all things, so
God communicates a certain participation of His goodness to all
things.
Reply to third objection. God’s goodness is the reason for His
willing all things, and in this sense Augustine said: “Because God
is good, we exist.”
From this it is evident that God not only created most freely, but
by His will, and so He differs from man, who does indeed freely
generate; but he does so, however, by his nature, inasmuch as he
is of a certain nature, and hence he can generate only a being like
himself in species. In fact, as Cajetan remarks, in commenting on
this article: “A vigorous male generates a male, and the irascible
ios Grecian philosophers, who never succeeded in acquiring the concept of a
free creation from nothing, were incapable of explaining how a multiplicity of
things proceeds from one supreme principle. Plato wrote much in his dialogues,
especially in the Parmenides and the Sophist, to solve this problem. He failed
finally to show the relation between the different exemplary ideas and the idea
of the supreme Good. In explaining the multiplicity of individuals, he admitted
the eternal existence of matter which does not proceed from ideas, for they bear
no resemblance to them. He also added that matter is not-being, which in a
certain way exists.
See Cajetan’s commentary, and St. Thomas’ reply to the second objection;
also Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 23; De potentia, q.i, a.5; q.3, a. 15.

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523

one that is irascible, as Aristotle says in his Ethics, Bk. VII, chap.
6.” 105
FIFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER ANY CAUSE CAN BE ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL

State of the question. It seems that some cause is to be assigned
to God’s will. The reasons for this are the following: (1) otherwise
He would act irrationally; (2) otherwise there would be but one
answer to any question whatever, namely, God willed it so, and
thus it would be useless to seek the causes of things, which would
mean the abolition of science, since it is knowledge by causes; (3)
finally, we would have to say that all things depend simply on the
will of God, there being no reason prior to this. Thus we could
not even discover reasons of fittingness for any of the divine opera­
tions, such as creation, incarnation. Thus, in the fourteenth cen­
tury, Ockham said, too, that the distinction between moral good
and moral evil, or the first principle of the practical reason, namely,
that good must be done and evil must be avoided, depends simply
on the will of God, that is, on the divine positive law, so that this
would be to do away with the natural law. Descartes says, too, that
the truth of the principle of contradiction depends on God’s free
will. Contrary to this, St. Thomas wrote: “To say that justice de­
pends simply on the will, is to say that the divine will does not
proceed according to the regulations of wisdom; and this is blas­
phemous.” 106 Leibnitz said likewise against Ockham and Descartes:
"It is dishonoring God to hold that He established the distinction
between good and evil by a purely arbitrary decree. . . . Why,
then, would it not be the Manichaean principle of evil as the or­
thodox principle of good?” 107 This would result in the mind finally
accepting the theories of absolute contingency and libertism, which
are the very opposite of absolute determinism, such as that taught
by Spinoza. Thus the statement of the question is evidently con­
cerned with grave enough problems.
The answer is: There is no efficient cause of the divine will, or
God does not will this on account of that (which is first intended),
but He wisely wills this to be as means to that.
The first part is proved on the authority of St. Augustine in the
counterargument, and then the following proof is given: The will
follows from the intellect; but the divine intellect by one intuitive
ios Com. in lam, q. 19, a.4, no. 8.
100 De veritate, q.23, a.6.
lOï Theodicée, II, §§ 176. 177.

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THE ONE GOD

act knows both principles and conclusions; therefore the divine will
by one act wills its own goodness in itself and as it is the reason
for loving creatures. Hence in God intention or the willing of the
end is not, as in us, the cause of another act, namely, the choosing
of the means. And so it is said that He does not will this on account
of that; for God, the end is not the motive of His willing on the
part of His act of willing, but only on the part of the thing
willed.
The second part is proved as follows: The wise person wills the
means to be for the end, the lower for the higher; but God wills
most wisely whatever He wills; therefore God wills the means to
be for the end, and the lower for the higher. This is stated in the
body of the article and in the reply to the first objection. These
two parts of the answer are summed up briefly in the following
accepted formula: God does not will this on account of that, but
He wills this to be as means to that. Hence, when we speak of the
motive of either the creation or the incarnation, this does not mean
the motive on the part of the wilier, but on the part of the thing
willed. Thus there is an end to difficulties.
Reply to second objection. It is not, therefore, useless to seek for
causes secondary to the divine will. In fact, there are absolutely
necessary laws in things, such as metaphysical principles, or the
laws of being, for instance, the principle of contradiction, the truth
of which does not depend on the divine liberty, notwithstanding
what Descartes said. Similarly, mathematical laws, which abstract
from both efficient and final causes, are absolutely necessary, for it
is impossible that the three angles of a triangle be not equal to
two right angles. Moreover, there are hypothetically necessary nat­
ural laws in things. Thus, if there is fire, then its action is to burn
and not to cool, although God may miraculously prevent its ac­
tion. In fact, there are certain laws of nature that are absolutely
contingent and especially dependent on the divine liberty, such as
that the motion of the heavenly bodies is from east to west, rather
than in the reverse order. Finally, there are certain laws in things
dependent solely on the will of God. As St. Thomas says: “In the
things of nature, since primary matter is altogether uniform, a
reason can be assigned why one part of it was fashioned by God
from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form
of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of
nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this par­
ticular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple
will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that
this stone is in this part of the wall, and that in another; although

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the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and
some in that place.” 108
First corollary. Two errors must be avoided: (1) absolute con­
tingency, which denies the absolute necessity of metaphysical and
mathematical principles, and the hypothetical necessity of the laws
of nature; (2) absolute determinism, which denies all contingency,
as in Spinozism, or in a certain kind of mechanical materialism,
in which, for instance, the law of conservation of energy is declared
to be absolutely necessary, so that the influence exerted by our
liberty on our organism and God’s miraculous intervention are ex­
cluded; for, as they say, there would thus be an increase in the
quantity of energy in the universe, which remains the same. It does,
indeed, remain the same in this sense, that when one form of
energy is produced, such as heat, this is equivalent to an antecedent
form, namely, of local motion necessary for the generation of heat.
But the law of conservation of energy, without a begging of the
principle, cannot be enunciated as a law that is by all means or
absolutely necessary, in this sense, that the whole universe would
be a closed system that would be removed from all external in­
fluence, even the invisible influence of God the Creator, who con­
serves and keeps it in motion. For how could experimental knowl­
edge exclude this invisible influence, which is beyond the scope
of experience? On the contrary, the transformation of energy de­
mands not only a secondary cause, such as local motion for the
generation of heat, but it also demands the First Cause; for only
the First Cause is its own action and being, and without it the
other causes produce no effect. Hence both absolute contingency
and absolute determinism must be avoided.
Second corollary. It is hinted at in the reply to the third objec­
tion: the first effects willed by God depend on His divine will,
namely, that creatures exist rather than that they do not exist de­
pends solely on the most free will of God. Thus, for example, we
may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect
by their work; or we may say that God willed the incarnation of
Ilis Son for our redemption, as the end for which or the subject to
whom the Incarnation is of benefit.
Third objection. Hence it would be false to say with the abso­
lute nominalists, that we must not seek for reasons of fittingness
lor the creation or the Incarnation. But we must say that creation
is so expedient for the manifestation of divine goodness that it
would be inexpedient if God had not created, so that creation is a
most free act. The same observations apply equally to the decree
10s Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad 3um.

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THE ONE GOD

of the Incarnation. We mtist not seek for reasons of fittingness in
those things that depend only on the simple will of God or solely
and merely on His will of good pleasure, for example, “why this
part of matter is under the form of fire, another under the form
of earth.” 100
SIXTH ARTICLE
WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS ALWAYS FULFILLED

State of the question. It seems that the will of God is not always
fulfilled, (i) For the Apostle says that God “will have all men to be
saved,” 110 and it does not happen so. We have also the following
texts: “How often would I have gathered thy children together
. . . and thou wouldest not.”111 “I called, and you refused.”112
“You always resist the Holy Ghost.” 113 (2) It seems that, just as
God knows all truth, He wills all good, and yet many good things
do not become realities. (3) The effects of the First Cause may be
hindered by a defect of a secondary cause. On the other hand,
there are many texts in Holy Scripture that state the opposite, such
as: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.” 114
The answer is: It is of faith that there is a certain will in God
which is always fulfilled. This will of God is called the simple or
consequent will, or the will that is absolute and efficacious.
1) Revelation proves this clearly, for we read: “The Lord of
hosts hath decreed, and who can disannul it?” 115 “My counsel shall
stand, and all My will shall be done.” 118 “There is none that can
resist Thy will." 117 “He will do all that pleaseth Him.”118 “For
who resisteth His will?” 119 “I give them (My sheep) life everlasting,
and they shall not perish forever, and no man shall pluck them out
of My hand. Ί hat which My Father hath given Me is greater than all;
and no one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” 120
The Church has particularly defined that God’s will concerning
the bringing of the elect to glory is always fulfilled.121 In fact, con­
io» Cf. ibid.
110 I Tim. 2: 4.
111 Matt. 23: 37.
112 Prov. 1: 24.
11s Acts 7: 51.
u< Ps. 134: 6.
11s Is. 14: 27.
ue Ibid., 46: 10.
in Esth. 13: 9.
us Eccles. 8: 3.
11» Rom. 9: 19.
120 John 10:28 t.
121 Denz., nos. 300, 316, 321.

THE WILL OF GOD

527

cerning the two divine wills, one of which is not always fulfilled,
but the other infallibly so, the Council of Quierzy declares as fol­
lows: “Almighty God wills without exception all men to be saved,
though not all are saved. That some are saved, however, is the
gift of Him who saves; if some perish, it is the fault of them that
perish.” 122 This formula is taken from the writings of St. Prosper.123
The Fathers, in explaining the above-quoted texts from Holy
Scripture, often affirmed the infallibility of God’s consequent will,
as St. Augustine did in the following words: "Nor is there any other
reason why God is truly called omnipotent except that He can do
whatever He wills to do; nor is the effect of God’s omnipotent will
prevented by the will of any creature.” 124
The argumentative part of the article gives the following theo­
logical proof for the conclusion: It is not possible for anything to
fall outside the order of the most universal cause, under which all
particular causes are included; but God’s will (which is the will in
the absolute sense) is the most universal cause, under which all
particular causes are included; therefore it is not possible for any­
thing to fall outside the order of this cause, and it is contradictory
for this cause not to produce its effect.
The major is illustrated by a comparison between efficient and
formal causes; for the agent acts in so far as it is in act, by means
of its form. But in forms, although a thing may fall short of a
particular form, such as humanity or life, it cannot fall short of
the most universal form, which is being; for it is not possible for
anything not to be being. Similarly, in efficient causes, something
can fall outside the order of a particular cause, for instance, the
sun; but it cannot fall outside the order of the most universal
cause, under which all other causes are included.
The minor is evident from the fact that God’s will is the cause
of all things, as already shown.125 It presupposes a certain distinclion which is explicitly made in the reply to the first objection,
namely, the distinction between the antecedent or conditional and
the consequent or absolute wills in God. It is only this latter which
is called will in the absolute sense, and which is always fulfilled, a
point that will be at once more clearly seen in the explanation
that follows.
Immediately at the end of the argumentative part of the article
122 Ibid., no. 318.
123 Responsio ad secundam objectionem Vincentianam.
121 Enchiridion, chap. 96. On the omnipotence of the divine will, consult Rouet
tie Journel’s Enchiridion patristicum, nos. 111, 171, 194, 266, 323, 325, 402, 542,
628, 815, 1366, 1711.
120 Cf. a.4.

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THE ONE GOD

the following corollary is deduced: "That which seems to depart
from the divine will in one order, returns to it in another order;
as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from tire divine will as
much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will when
by its justice he is punished.” The reason for this is that God’s
will is the most universal of causes, and He permits evil only for
the sake of a greater good which is efficaciously intended by Him,
and which will infallibly be realized. This is also what is said in
the reply to the third objection of this article. Similarly, in the
reply to the second objection it is remarked that God does not
will all possible good.
THE ANTECEDENT WILL OF GOD

Nevertheless there is still a difficulty about the universal will to
save. The first objection in this article refers to this will, and it
is formulated by the Apostle as follows: “God will have all men to be
saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” 126 But this
does not happen.
St. Thomas’ reply to this first objection must now be examined,
and this universal will to save will be more fully discussed in our
appendix to this article. We shall there see that the consequent
will and even the antecedent will refer to the will of good pleasure,
which properly belongs to God.
Now there are several things of great importance to be remarked
concerning this reply to the first objection. It must first of all be
read.
i) It mentions St. Augustine’s explanation of St. Paul’s words,
“God wishes all men to be saved.” St. Augustine interprets these
words as applying to God’s efficacious will which is always fulfilled,
and therefore he says: “God wills all men to be saved that are
saved; or God wills some men of every class and condition to be
saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small.” 127
It must be observed that as regards adults who actually are not
saved, St. Augustine said, as mentioned in the Council of Trent:
"God commands not impossibilities, but, by commanding, both
admonishes you to do what you are able, and to pray for what you
are not able (to do).” 128 These words declare that there is a certain
will attributed to God, by which He wills that His divine precepts
be right at the moment really possible of fulfillment for all adults,
ΐ2β I Tim. a: 4.
121 De praed. sand., chap. 8; Enchiridion, chap. 103.
128 De natura et gratia, chap. 43, no. 50.

THE WILL OF GOD

529

and according as these know that they are bound by such obliga­
tions. Thus according to God's will it is really possible for these
to be saved, which is denied by Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius.129
2) St. Thomas in his reply to this first objection refers to the
opinion of St. John Damascene, who held that the words of St.
Paul, “God will have all men to be saved,” apply to God’s antecedent
will, but not to His consequent or efficacious will. This means that
God of His goodness wills all men to be saved by His antecedent
will which does not take into consideration, of course, the fore­
seeing of sin. But God, having foreseen the final impenitence of
many, wills by His consequent will to inflict upon them the punish­
ment due to their sins.130
But this solution of St. John Damascene considers the problem
only under its moral aspects, so as to reconcile God’s infinite good­
ness with His damnation of many. More briefly, according to St.
John Damascene, God, of Himself and prior to any consideration,
wills the salvation of all; but many sin and remain in sin, and
therefore, as a consequence of this, God damns them, and so de
jacto they are not saved. This is the commonly accepted answer
among Christians.
But there is still the difficulty about how the will of the omnip­
otent God is not fulfilled concerning those who are not saved. Is
it not in God’s power to preserve them from falling into tire sin
of final impenitence? But if He has the power, does He permit this
sin for a greater good, and what greater good is this? Moreover, are
those who are actually saved, loved more and helped more by Him?
Thus does St. Thomas posit the problem as it was formerly posited
by St. Augustine, not only in its moral aspect as it was considered
by St. John Damascene, but in its higher metaphysical and theo­
logical aspects, considering it under the light of this higher prin­
ciple in the present article, namely, that the will of the omnipotent
is always fulfilled. Thus the question is approached from a higher
plane.
3) St. Thomas solves the question by three syllogisms which have
their foundations in the following principles.
A. Everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. But a
thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may
be good, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken
into account, it may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man
should live is good; but if a man is a murderer, that he live is an
evil. Thus a just judge antecedently wills all men to live, but con12s Denz., no. 1092.
iso De fide orthodoxa, Bk. II, chap. 29.

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THE ONE GOD

sequently (on second consideration) he wills the man to be hanged.
Therefore, in like manner God antecedently wills all men to be
saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice
exacts.
In the first syllogism St. Thomas retains the doctrine of St. John
Damascene on the antecedent will, and thus he gives a better ex­
planation of St. Paul’s text than St. Augustine gave in the passages
just quoted. But there is still the difficulty that is not sufficiently
considered by St. John Damascene, though properly so by St. Augus­
tine, i.e., whether the omnipotent God is incapable of saving all
men or of preserving them from falling into sin? St. Thomas solves
this difficulty by means of two arguments which he deduces from
the first.
B. What we will antecedently we do not will simply but in a
qualified manner, because the will is directed to things as they
are in themselves (for good is not in the mind, as truth is, but in
things), and in themselves they exist under particular qualifica­
tions, that is, they are willed as they are at the moment of willing.
Thus the just judge wills only in a qualified manner that the
murderer should live, namely, inasmuch as he is a man. Hence it
is not surprising that this antecedent will is not fulfilled, God’s
omnipotence, however, remaining intact, as will be more clearly
seen now in the final argument to be presented.
We will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular
circumstances are considered, and this is what is meant by willing
consequently. Thus a just judge wills simply the hanging of a
murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, in­
asmuch as he is a man.131 Therefore “whatever God simply wills
takes place, although what He wills antecedently does not take
place.” Thus the conclusion of this article is preserved intact,
namely, that God’s will, which is the will in the absolute sense, is
always fulfilled. The principle of St. Augustine concerning the will
of the omnipotent God and the opinion of St. John Damascene are
likewise safeguarded by the previous arguments. The opinion of
St. John Damascene is now presented in a clearer light, and this
not only as regards its moral aspect, but also as regards its meta­
physical and theological aspects.
First corollary. It follows from this that the antecedent will is not
only that will which precedes the foreseeing of sin, but it is also
the divine will that is never fulfilled, as in the case of those fruits
that never get ripe, of those sufficient graces that make it possible
isi Cf. Summa theol., la Hae, q.6, a.6, concerning the merchant who, during
a storm, wills simply to throw his cargo into the sea, although he would wish
to keep it.

THE WILL OF GOD

531

to keep God’s commandments, but which remain ineffective be­
cause of the resistance of the created free will.
Second corollary. Similarly not only is the consequent will the
divine will of punishing after having foreseen one’s demerits, or of
rewarding after having foreseen one’s merits, but it also refers to
every act of the divine will which is directed toward good con­
sidered as it actually is with its accompanying circumstances, for
instance, the fruits that actually get ripe, and the effective com­
pliance with God’s commands.
Third corollary. Thus the principle of the distinction between
sufficient grace and that grace which is of itself efficacious is as­
cribed to a higher source, as will be more clearly explained in a
subsequent article.132
We shall also see farther on, after explaining the eleventh and
twelfth articles of this question, that the antecedent will is also the
will of good pleasure, which is truly found in God, and which is
not merely the will of expression, not merely an external sign of
the divine will.133
The whole of this most celebrated reply to the first objection can
be summed up in the following syllogism: Everything, in so far
as it is good, is willed by God, and good exists only as it actually
is; but the antecedent will is directed toward good considered in
the absolute sense and not as it actually will be, whereas the con­
sequent will is directed toward good as it actually will be; there­
fore “whatever God simply or consequently wills takes place,
although what He wills only antecedently may not take place.” Thus
we come to the final conclusion as established by St. Thomas, by
writing in the major of this argument what is expressed in each of
the majors of the three preceding arguments.
If these arguments, however, are given careful consideration,
then this reply of St. Thomas to the first objection is seen in all
its beauty of structure. All its concepts are expressed with absolute
precision and simplicity of language, and are in perfect harmony,
so that God’s omnipotence, as affirmed by St. Augustine, is recon­
ciled with His universal will to save, as affirmed by St. John Damas­
cene. There remains indeed for our consideration the mystery about
how infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty are intimately
reconciled in the eminence of the Deity or of God’s intimate
life.18*
132 Cf. a.8.
133 See the appendix to this article: The teaching of St. Thomas on the uni­

versal will to save.
134 On this point consult farther on our commentary on predestination, q.23,
a.5, c. et ad sum.

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THE ONE GOD

All this doctrine may be summed up in this most certain prin­
ciple formulated in the Council of Thuzey (860), which put an end
to the discussions on predestination arising from the works of
Gottschalk: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done in heaven
and on earth (Ps. 134: 6). For nothing is done in heaven and on
earth except what He Himself is pleased to do, or justly permits to
be done.” 135 It follows from this: (1) that no good thing positively
and actually happens to be found in this man rather than in a
certain other, unless God from all eternity efficaciously willed that
it should so come to pass; (2) that no evil thing positively and
actually happens to be found in this man rather than in a certain
other, unless God from all eternity permitted it. The sinner, indeed,
in the very act of sinning, can avoid committing the sin, and from
all eternity God willed that it be really possible for the sinner to
avoid committing the sin (which is God’s antecedent will); but
God did not efficaciously will that this sinner right at this moment
positively should avoid committing the sin, and if God had effica­
ciously willed this, then this sinner not only positively could avoid
committing the sin, but truly would have avoided committing it.
These are most certain and commonly accepted principles which
have their foundation in revelation, and from them is derived the
distinction between sufficient grace, which gives the power to do
what is right, and grace that is of itself efficacious, which causes
us freely to do what is right.
TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS ON THE UNIVERSAL WILL TO SAVE

This question is bound up with another, namely, whether Christ
died for all men, and this evidently concerns the mystery of pre­
destination. In fact, every error about God’s will to save brings us
back to an error about the mystery of predestination, and vice
versa.
Thus the Scmipelagians held that the beginning of salvation and
final perseverance come from us, and not from God.138 Hence they
said that God wills equally the salvation of all men, and went so
far as to deny the gratuity of predestination on the part of the
elect. On the other hand, the predestinarians and subsequently
the first Protestants and the Jansenists so vitiated the notions of the
gratuitous predestination of the elect and of human liberty, as to
13» PL, CXXVI, 123. See also Denz., no. 816.
ΐ3β Cf. Denz., nos. 178, 183, for condemnation of Semipelagianism by the Second
Council of Orange.

THE WILL OF GOD

533
deny God’s universal will to save and the existence of grace that
is truly sufficient for those not predestined. They likewise said that
Christ did not die for all men.137
We must therefore investigate: (i) what is defined of faith and
what is theologically certain on these points; (2) what is the dis­
puted point among theologians, especially between Thomists and
Molinists, as regards God’s universal will to save; (3) what is tire
validity of the Thomist view as compared with the teachings of St.
Augustine, St. Prosper, and St. John Damascene. (5) Then there
will be a solution of the objections.

I. WHAT IS OF FAITH

1) It is of faith that God sincerely wills the salvation not only of
the predestined, but of all the faithful. This is evidently so for two
reasons. (1) The fifth proposition of Jansenius, asserting that “it is
a Semipelagian heresy to say that Christ died for all men without
exception,” 138 was condemned as heretical, if this means that Christ
died only for the salvation of the predestined. (2) Moreover, the
Apostles’ Creed is binding upon all the faithful, and it says of
Christ: “Who for us men, and for our salvation came down from
heaven.”
2) It is certain and proximate to the faith that God sincerely
wills the salvation of even all adult infidels, in so far as He makes
it really possible for them here and now to observe His precepts
whenever these are binding upon them. To say otherwise would
mean that God commands what is impossible.139
3) It is the common opinion of theologians that God sincerely
wills even the salvation of all infants who die before they can be
baptized. But it is more difficult to explain how it is really possible
for these to be saved. The faith of the Church on these points has
its foundation in revelation as variously expressed in Scripture and
tradition. Thus we read: “We hope in the living God, who is the
Savior of all men, especially of the faithful.” 140 Even concerning in­
fidels, St. Paul says: “I desire first of all that prayers be made for
all men. . . . This is good and acceptable in the sight of God our
Savior, who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowl>37 Cf. Ibid., nos. 804-6, 814-16, 826 f., 1092-96.
iss Ibid., no. 1096.
130 Ibid., no. 804.
no I Tim. 4: 10.

534

THE ONE GOD

edge of the truth.”141 This text refers to all human beings. St.
Augustine, too, understood these texts in this manner.142
IN WHAT SENSE CHRIST DIED FOR ALL

The Church has declared that Christ died for all,148 not only for
the predestined144 or only for the believers,145 although not all re­
ceive the benefit of salvation.148
How do the majority of Thomists explain this truth? They un­
derstand it in the sense that ‘‘Christ so died for all men that He
truly and sincerely willed to offer His death to the Father for the
eternal salvation of the whole human race, antecedently indeed and
sufficiently salutary for the reprobates, consequently and effica­
ciously so for the predestined.” 14T
St. Paul says: "If one died for all, then all were dead; and Christ
died for all.” 148 Similarly he says: "Therefore as by the offense of one,
unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all
men to justification of life.” 149 According to this parallelism it must
be said that each and all died because of Adam’s sin; therefore Christ
died for all. Thus St. Augustine declares in one of his works: "Just as
infants died through Adam’s sin, so also Christ died for them,” 150
even for those not baptized.
But the contrary teaching of Jansenius frustrates one of the prin­
cipal articles of faith. Hope, which is founded primarily on Christ’s
death offered for us, becomes languid, and charity, which finds its
source of energy in the remembrance of Christ’s love as the Savior
of mankind, becomes cold.
II. THE DIFFERENT OPINIONS OF MODERN THEOLOGIANS
CONCERNING GOD’S ANTECEDENT WILL FOR THE

SALVATION OF ALL MEN

This question is discussed at length by the Thomist, Gonzalez de
Albeda,151 who wrote after Molina and Bannez. His special purpose
Hi Ibid., 2: 1 f.
1« Cf. De catechizandis rudibus, PL, XL, 345.
ms Denz., nos. 319, 795, 1096, 3026.
M«Zbid., nos. 1096, 1380 f.
ns Ibid., no. 1294.
Μβ/Md., Index, VIII, h.
147 Cf. Billuart, De Deo, diss. VII, a.7, § 11,
1« II Cor. 5: 14 f.
mo Rom. 5: 18.
mo Contra Julianum, Bk. VI, chap. 4.
151 Com. in lam, q. 19, a.6.

THE WILL OF GOD

535

is to show that sufficient grace, which depends on the antecedent
will of God, is, in its order, truly sufficient. There is much that is
helpful in his writings, although not all that he wrote is to be ap­
proved, and was not approved by the other Thomists. It must first
of all be noted that there are two general and mutually conflicting
opinions. These are the Thomist and Molinist opinions.
For the Thomists, who follow the teaching of St. Thomas,152 the
antecedent will of God is always of itself inefficacious, because it is
concerned with what is considered absolutely as such to be good, but
not with what is considered here and now to be good. But it is only
good in this latter sense that comes into being.
On this point all Thomists agree, but they differ in this, that
formerly some held the antecedent will to be more probably the
will of expression, which is not found properly and formally in God,
but only metaphorically, because it is more an external expression
of God’s will. Such was the opinion of Cajetan, Bannez, Zumel, as
also of several of the old theologians.153
Other Thomists who wrote after the time of Bannez (such as Lemos,
Alvarez, Gonzalez, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gonet,
Billuart) hold that the antecedent will is the will of good pleasure,
which is properly and formally in God.
The Molinists, however, have a different conception of the ante­
cedent will. They are of the opinion that this will is not of itself
alone always inefficacious;154 for they define it as that will which
precedes the foreseeing of our consent that is known by means of the
scientia media. And they define the consequent will as the will which
follows this foreseen consent, and is thus the will by which God
punishes or rewards. Molinists are agreed on this point, although
there are certain minor differences among them, as will be stated
farther on.
These opinions must be examined, and they may be expressed by
the following schema:

utSumma theol., la, q.ig, a.6 ad lum.
>m Alexander of Hales (la, q.36, membr. 2), St. Bonaventure (I, d.46, a.i, q.i),
and Scotus (II, d.46, a. 1) are also quoted as in favor of this opinion. These
ancient authors said that the will of good pleasure is always fulfilled; but in
other parts of his works, St. Bonaventure said that the antecedent will is the will
of good pleasure, which was what St. Thomas said.
154 Even in Molinism the antecedent will of God is not properly "of itself
alone” sometimes efficacious, but by reason of our foreseen consent. Nevertheless
it can be said that the will is "of itself alone sometimes efficacious,” understood
in the sense that it is not found along with God's consequent will. In this Molinism
differs from Thomism. See Molina's Concordia (Paris ed., 1876), pp. 384-94.

THE ONE GOD

53θ

is always
ineffica­
cious

Ante­
cedent
will of
itself
alone

is not
always
ineffica. cious

' and is more probably the will of expression: the view
of Cajetan and Bannez.

It is the will of good pleasure: the view of St. Thomas
. and of die Thomists generally.
die absolute gratuity of predestination to salvation is
preserved intact: the opinion of St. Robert Bellarmine
and of Suarez.
so that predestination to salvation is after our foreseen
merits, at least the conditionally free and meritorious
acts of the future: the opinion of Molina, Valentia,
and Vasquez.

1) Cajetan and Bannez think it more probable that the antecedent
will as regards the salvation of all men is only the will of expression,
but not the will of good pleasure. They understand this distinction
as explained by St. Thomas,156 namely, that the will of good pleasure
is the very act of the divine will, and thus it is formally in God;
whereas the will of expression is only metaphorically and causally
attributed to God, for it is, strictly speaking, something external
which, as we understand it, is a sign that God wills something. Thus
a divine command externally given to men, even the most wicked, is
called the divine will, inasmuch as it is a sign that God wills us to
do what is commanded. Thus God wills (by His will of expression),
so they say, that all men, even criminals, be saved. Moreover, God
does not command what is impossible, and so He wills at least that
the fulfillment of His precepts be here and now really possible for
all adults who have knowledge of these commands.156
Cajetan and Bannez also say that the will of expression, which is
a command, sometimes is identical with the will of good pleasure,
and sometimes not. Thus when God commanded Abraham to kill
his son, this did not coincide with His will of good pleasure, since
indeed He afterward commanded the contrary.16’
2) The opinion of other Thomists, such as Lemos, Alvarez, Gon­
zales, includes a criticism of tire preceding. They reply that the ante­
cedent will is not only the will of expression, but is also the will of
good pleasure, as expressly stated by St. Thomas, for he says: “Will
in the strict sense of the term is found in God, and so will is, strictly
speaking, predicated of God, which is the will of good pleasure, and
this is subdivided into consequent and antecedent wills.” 168 This is
iss Summa theol., la, q.19, a.n; De veritate, q.23, a.3.
Cf. De veritate, q.23, a.3 ad 2um.
nr Summa theol., la, q.19. a. 11 ad 2um.
les De veritate, q.23, a.3; see also I Sent., d.46, a.2: Com. in Ep. I ad Tim. 2: 4.

THE WILL OF GOD

537

also quite clear from the examples given by St. Thomas in his reply
to the first objection of the present article, in which he points out
that a judge truly and in the strict sense wills that a man, inasmuch
as he is a man, should live, although he condemns the murderer to
death. Moreover, this opinion is proved both from Holy Scripture,
and by a theological argument.
A. Scriptural proof. The words of Holy Scripture are to be taken
in their literal sense, provided nothing derogatory to God or con­
trary to faith or morals results therefrom. But Holy Scripture in
various texts asserts that God wills the salvation of all men coming
into the world since Adam’s fall, and if this is understood, indeed, as
referring to His conditioned but proper and formal will of good
pleasure, and not to His will metaphorically so called, nor merely to
His will of expression, then there is nothing either derogatory to
God or contrary to faith that follows therefrom. Hence the words
of Holy Scripture asserting that God wills the salvation of all men
are to be taken in their literal sense. By all means the following texts
must be so interpreted: “Who will have all men to be saved, and to
come to the knowledge of the truth . . . (for) Christ gave Himself
a ransom for all."168 “The Lord . . . not willing that any should
perish, but that all should return to penance.” 180 “Jerusalem, how
often would I have gathered together thy children, . . . and thou
wouldest not.” 181 St. John Chrysostom understood these texts as re­
ferring to God’s will which He truly possesses, for he says: “In a won­
derful way God yearns for and vehemently desires our salvation.” 182
The Greek Fathers all speak in like manner, as Jansenius concedes.
Even St. Augustine seems to admit this will of good pleasure, for he
writes: “It is most sincerely to be believed and professed that God wills
men to be saved, since indeed the Apostle, who was of this opinion,
earnestly commanded what is faithfully observed in all the Churches,
that supplications be made to God for all men.” 188
B. The generally accepted opinion among Thomists is proved by
the following argument: The will of good pleasure derives its name
from the interior inclination and ordination of God, and not solely
from what is a sign of this will. But God interiorly wills the salva­
tion of all men and provides them with sufficient means for this al­
though, considering the circumstances, and because of the higher
ends involved by reason of the manifestation of His justice and His
other attributes, the defectibility of the human will presupposed, He
<59 I Tim. 2: 4-6.
ιβο II Pet. 3: g.
Matt. 23: 37.
182 Hom. la in Ep. ad Eph.
ies De spiritu et littera, chap. 33.

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THE ONE GOD

willed to permit that a considerable number fail to attain this end,
'Therefore His universal salvific or antecedent will is His will of good
pleasure.
The minor of this argument is proved as follows: as the choice of
efficacious means for salvation presupposes the efficacious interior
intention to save, so also the choice of sufficient means for salvation
presupposes the inefficacious interior intention to save. So say the
majority of the Thomists.
This argument is confirmed by a consideration of God’s salvific
will. For indeed an object that is in itself good and that is not only
possible, but that is a conditioned future, terminates the internal
decree of the divine will which is subjectively absolute but objec­
tively conditioned. But the salvation of all men who are still way­
farers is something that is in itself good and that is a conditioned
future or a futurable, and not something that is merely possible.
Therefore the salvation of all men who are still wayfarers is a con­
ditioned future that terminates the internal decree of the divine
will which is subjectively absolute but objectively conditioned.
The major is explained by pointing out that, if this good object
were merely possible, it would not terminate the internal decree of
the divine will; if it were a contingent absolute future, it would ter­
minate God’s efficacious decree; but as a conditioned future it ter­
minates the internal conditioned decree of the divine will, namely,
a decree similar to that presupposed in the prophecy of commination.184
Therefore the conclusion we come to is, that the antecedent will
is not only the will of expression, but is also the will of good pleasure,
although it is objectively conditioned, as will be more clearly seen
from the solution of the objections.
3) The opinion of Molina and the Molinists. Molina and Valentia
think that St. John Damascene and St. Thomas held different opin­
ions on this subject, and they seek to depart from the teaching of St.
Thomas and return to that of St. John Damascene. But among the
Molinists, Vasquez maintains that St. Thomas interpreted aright the
viewpoint of St. John Damascene, though he himself departs from
the teaching of St. Thomas.
What is Molina’s teaching about the antecedent will? This is
clearly made known to us from his writings.185 He is of the opinion
that the antecedent will as regards the salvation of all men is a con­
ditioned will in this sense: “provided we, too, will.” Hence some­
times God’s antecedent will is fulfilled, that is, when man wills to
make God’s help efficacious in its second actuality; and sometimes
184 Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.7 ad aum; Ha Ilae, q. 171, a.6 ad 2Utn; q. 174, a.i.
10s Concordia, p. 386.

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this antecedent will of God is only a velleity, that is, when man does
not will to make God’s help efficacious in its second actuality. Hence
for Molina the antecedent will is the will that is prior to the fore­
seeing of our consent.
Nevertheless, that Molina may escape the taint of Semipclagianism,
which declares that God wills equally the salvation of all men, so
that predestination is made to consist in the foreknowledge of the
merits, he holds that God, by reason of His most free will of good
pleasure, decreed to place this man, for instance, Peter, in those cir­
cumstances in which He had foreseen his good consent; whereas
Judas is placed in other circumstances in which his infidelity to grace
was foreseen. Thus Molina vitiates the above definition of the ante­
cedent will. But, according to this definition, Molina must define
the consequent will in the opposite sense, as being the will which
follows the foreseeing of our consent, like the will of rewarding and
punishing, of which St. John Damascene speaks.
It must be noted that Molina’s conception of the antecedent will
is such that the predestination of the elect to salvation is considered
the result of foreseen merits, at least of conditioned merits, which is
the teaching of Valentia and Vasquez. In fact, Valentia maintains
that all good acts which are dependent on free will are willed by
God’s antecedent will and not by His consequent will. On the con­
trary, St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez, although they retain from
Molinism the theory of the scientia media and its corresponding con­
ception of the antecedent will, nevertheless maintain with the
Thomists, Augustinians, and Scotists, the absolute gratuity of pre­
destination to salvation. Hence their conception of the antecedent
and consequent wills is more in agreement with the opinion of St.
Thomas. Thus, according to these theologians, sufficient graces are
the result of God’s antecedent will; and congruous graces, are the
result of God’s freely predestinating consequent will and are infal­
libly efficacious, not indeed of themselves, but because of the fore­
seeing of our consent by means of the scientia media.18*
CRITICISM OF MOLINA’S OPINION

i) This opinion rests on the theory of the scientia media. But the
scientia media, which is concerned with the conditionally free acts
of the future before God’s conditioned decree, is a knowledge with­
out an object, because before God’s decree the conditionally free act
see Cf. Bellarmine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, Bk. II, chaps. 9-15; Bk. IV,
chap. 15. Suarez, De auxiliis, Bk. HI, chaps. 16 f.; De causa praedestinationis,
Bk. II, chap. 23; De scientia futurorum contingentium, chap. 7.

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THE ONE GOD

of the future is undetermined, since it is a contingent and free act.1’7
But if it is said that God, because of His super-comprehensive knowl­
edge of our will and of the circumstances, foresees our consent if we
should be placed in such and such circumstances, then this theory,
which was devised to safeguard our liberty, leads to determinism of
circumstances, and moreover, since God would not be determining,
then He would be passively determined in His foreknowledge. There
is no solution of the dilemma: God is either determining or deter­
mined, there is no other alternative. The same is also to be said of
the modified theory of the scientia media proposed by Suarez.168
2) The Molinist definition of the antecedent will results in a defi­
nition of the consequent will as the will which follows the foresee­
ing of our consent. But this definition applies to a certain kind of
consequent will, namely, to that of rewarding or punishing, but not
to every kind of consequent will. For indeed the consequent will of
calling one efficaciously to faith and grace does not presuppose but
precedes our consent, since it is the cause of this. Similarly the pre­
destination of the elect to glory or salvation denotes the consequent
will, and yet it does not presuppose the foreseeing of merits, as will
be stated farther on,169 because the merits of the elect are the effects
of their predestination. St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez admit this.
Even in Molinism, the will to place Peter in circumstances in which
his good consent is foreseen, rather than to place him in certain other
circumstances, is the consequent will, and yet it does not presuppose,
like the will of rewarding or punishing, the foreseeing of Peter’s con­
sent as a future act, but only as a conditionally future act.
Hence we come back to St. Thomas’ opinion,170 that the ante­
cedent will is directed toward good, considered absolutely as such,
and not as it is under particular qualifications. Thus of itself alone
it is not efficacious, because only what is good under particular quali­
fications comes into being. On the other hand, the consequent will
io? Summa theol., Ila Ilae, 9.171, a.3: "Future contingent things, whose truth
is not determined, are not in themselves knowable."
ros Consult what was said about the scientia media in our commentary on
q.14. a.13.
ie9 Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5.
no Ibid., la, q. 19, a.6 ad mm. The phrase “ante praevisa merita" which, trans­
lated literally, means "before foreseen merits," may be misleading for many
readers. It does not mean that God first predestined and afterward foresaw our
future merits; this would lie an imperfection in God, which is impossible. By
one and the same act God decrees and foresees. Nor does it mean that God pre­
destined certain persons to glory by a purely arbitrary act of His will, and that
they would get to heaven without having merited this. It does mean, however,
that the foreseen future merits of the elect were not the motive for God’s pre­
destination of certain persons to glory. [Tr.]

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541

is directed to good considered as such here and now, that is, when
all the particular circumstances are considered. This is what is
known as will simply as such, and it is always efficacious, because good
is in things themselves, and these exist only under particular qualifi­
cations.
These definitions, which consider the will and good in their meta­
physical aspects, can be applied universally. The first definition ap­
plies to every antecedent will, and the second to every consequent
will, which means that it applies not only to the will of rewarding or
punishing, but also to the efficacious will of calling one to the faith
and predestinating one to salvation before foreseen merits.
III. THE VALIDITY OF THE THOMIST OPINION AND HOW IT
COMPARES WITH THE TEACHINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE,
ST. PROSPER, AND THE VIEWPOINT OF ST. JOHN DAMASCENE

The Thomist opinion is in harmony with the teaching of St.
Augustine, whose interpreter was St. Prosper, and that of St. John
Damascene. It reconciles these teachings from the exalted notion it
has of the “simple will” of the omnipotent God, which is always ful­
filled, as shown in this sixth article. A careful examination of the
principal texts of St. Augustine, St. Prosper, and St. John Damascene
establish this point with sufficient clarity.
It must be noted first of all that St. John Chrysostom distinguishes
two wills in God.171 One is the will to save all men, even sinners; the
other is the will to punish consequent to the foreseeing of the sin.
Yet he maintains that the elect are more loved and helped by God,
in accordance with the scriptural text: “What hast thou that thou
hast not received?” 172 In his commentary on this epistle he says:
“Therefore thou hast what thou hast received, neither this only nor
that, but whatever thou hast; for these are not thy merits, but God's
gifts.” 173
But as St. Augustine frequently remarked, the Fathers who wrote
before the time of the Pelagian heresy spoke only incidentally of
predestination. It is a mystery that is intimately connected with
God’s universal will to save.171
in Com. in Eph., hom. I, 2.
172 I Cor. 4: 7.
ns Hom. 12. See also St. Gregory Nazianzus, Com. in Rom., hom. XIV, 7;
hom. XIX, 7. Cf. also Tixeront’s History 0/ Dogmas, II, 145 f.
in On this subject consult St. Robert Bellarmine's De gratia et libero arbitrio,
Bk. II, chap. 14: also Tixeront, op. cit., Il, 497-500, for St. Augustine’s teaching
on God’s universal will to save. This point had already been discussed by Petau
in his De incarnatione, Bk. XIII, chaps. 3 f.

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THE ONE GOD

1) St. Augustine, as we already said, frequently understood St.
Paul's text, “Who will have all men to be saved,” 175 as referring to
God’s efficacious will; so he at once interpreted it as meaning: "God
wills all men to be saved that are saved, and He wills some men of
every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and
Gentiles, great and small.” 176 What St. Thomas says of God’s con­
sequent will, which is always fulfilled, is absolutely in agreement
with these texts of St. Augustine.
2) St. Augustine spoke in another of his works in equivalent terms
of God’s antecedent will, which is not always fulfilled. Thus he
wrote: “God commands not impossibilities, but, by commanding,
both admonishes thee to do what thou art able and to pray for what
thou art not able (to do).” 177 From this text, which is quoted by the
Council of Trent,178 it is evident that, according to St. Augustine,
God wills to make the fulfillment of His precepts really possible for
adults, here and now, in so far as these are not only known by adults,
but also as they are of obligation for them; otherwise God would be
commanding impossibilities, and then sin would be unavoidable, in
which case He would be punishing them unjustly, especially with
eternal punishments. The Thomist doctrine of the antecedent will,
by which God gives sufficient graces which make it really possible for
us here and now to fulfill God’s precepts, is absolutely in agreement
with this and similar texts of St. Augustine.
3) Afterward, in various places, St. Augustine spoke more explicitly
of the universal will to save, as referring to God’s antecedent will,
although he does not use these words. It is more a question of what
is implied than of words used. Thus he writes: “God wills all men
to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth; yet not in
such a way that He deprives them of free will, for the good or bad
use of which they will be most justly judged.” 179 As is evident from
the context, St. Augustine means this proffered statement of his to
be taken as a probable way of explaining the words of the Apostle:
“God will have all men to be saved.”180
In like manner St. Augustine says: "God, in His mercy, sent His
only begotten Son, wishing to free men from this death that consists
in eternal punishments, provided they are not their own enemies,
and do not resist the mercy of their Creator.” 181
I Tim. 2: 4.
sro De praed. sand., chap. 8, and the Enchiridion, chap. 103, one of his earlier
works.
i” De natura et gratia, chap. 43, no. 50.
ire Denz., no. 804.
ir® De spiritu et littera, chap. 33, no. 58.
i80 I Tim. 2: 4.
1er De catechizandis rudibus, chap. 26. See also ibid., no. 52.
its

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543

Moreover, St. Augustine clearly affirms that Christ died for all,
which presupposes in God the will to save all. For the holy Doctor
says: “One, says the Apostle (II Cor. 5: 15), died for all, therefore
all died: showing by this that He could have died only for those who
died. For by this he proved that all died, because one died for all.
. . . See, as a consequence of this, that he wanted us to understand
that all died, if he died for all.’’182
Finally, in one of his uncompleted works, St. Augustine likewise
says: “One died for all, therefore all died. This conclusion of the
Apostle remains unchallenged, and by reason of this, because He
also died for infants, assuredly, too, infants died.” 183 The holy Doc­
tor says this against the Pelagians, who refuse to admit the existence
of original sin; but from this it is evident that, in St. Augustine’s
opinion, Christ died for all without exception, even for infants who
die without being baptized, and who de facto are not saved. This
shows clearly that there is a will in God to save all, which of itself,
since it is not found in connection with His efficacious will, is not
actually fulfilled. Therefore these texts of St. Augustine are fully in
agreement with the Thomist opinion concerning the antecedent will.
On this point, what was the teaching of St. Prosper, who was a
disciple of St. Augustine? 184 St. Prosper was prompted to write by
reason of the error of Cassian, who in his Collations showed a pref­
erence for Semipelagianism.185 Cassian, indeed, and many of the
monks of Marseilles had rejected the absolute gratuity of predestina­
tion taught by St. Augustine. St. Prosper and St. Hilary wrote to St.
Augustine about this (429), so that he wanted to refute them.188 These
monks of Marseilles said that “God’s grace accompanies but does
not precede human merits,” 187 and that "God wills indifferently all
... to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” 188 Thus
the predestination of the elect was reduced to the simple foreknowl­
edge of their merits, as in Semipelagianism, and hence the elect were
not the objects of God’s predilection, nor were they more helped by
Him.180
St. Augustin replied to these epistles of St. Prosper and St. Hilary
by writing two treatises 180 against the Semipelagians, in which, to
i»2 Contra Julianum, Bk. VI, chaps. 4, 8.
iss Contra Julianum, op. imp., Bk. Il, chap. 163: cf. ibid., chaps. 63, 174, 175.
i84 Consult Tixeront, History of Dogmas, III, 272-82.
iss Cf, Collationes, XII, nos. 7, 17, 18; XVII, no. 25.
iss Among the letters of St. Augustine, letter 225 is the epistle of St. Prosper,
and letter 226 is the epistle of St. Hilary.
18' Cf. epist. 225, no. 5.
188 Ibid., nos. 3, 4, 6.
iso Ibid.
100 Cf. De praedest. sanet.; de dono persever.

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THE ONE GOD

make it clear that predestination is gratuitous, he stresses certain
texts from St. Paul’s epistles.181
After the death of St. Augustine, St. Prosper, who was a layman
out a most faithful disciple of St. Augustine, defended his master’s
doctrine about the beginning of faith and the intrinsic efficacy of
divine grace by which we perform good acts; hence he denied that
God wills “indifferently” that all men be saved.182
Nevertheless, St. Prosper wrote: “It must be most sincerely believed
and professed that God wills all men to be saved.” 183 But he adds
that this will is efficacious only for the predestined, whose number is
determined. Thus he is clearer than St. Augustine in teaching that
damnation is after foreseen demerits; yet he retains the absolute
gratuity of predestination, which is thus before foreseen merits.
Shortly after St. Prosper’s death, between the years 434 and 460,
some unknown person wrote a work 184 in which he set forth the
teaching of St. Augustine, yet not in all its rigor. The author of this
work seeks to reconcile God’s universal salvific will, which he ad­
mits, with the fact that many are lost. Therefore he distinguishes
between a general grace, which is offered to all, and a special grace
which, by God's special mercy, is granted to many and which is the
efficacious cause of their salvation.
In the fifth century, however, the priest Lucidus seems to have
denied God’s universal salvific will. Faustus of Riez replied in the
Semipelagian sense.185 Finally the African, St. Fulgentius, strictly de­
fended St. Augustine’s doctrine on the gratuity of predestination,
though it does not seem that he stresses enough God’s universal will
to save.188 Yet St. Fulgentius refused to deny this proposition of St.
Augustine: “God commands not impossibilities, but, by command­
ing, both admonishes thee to do what thou art able, and earnestly
to ask for what thou art not able (to do).” 187
Finally, in the eighth century, St. John Damascene distinguished
between God’s antecedent and benevolent will, by which He wills
the salvation of all men, and Fl is consequent will, by which He wills
to punish sinners either for a time or for eternity.188
Nevertheless he says: “Without God’s help we can neither will nor
101 Cf. Rom., chaps. 8 £.; Eph., 1: 4-12; I Cor. 4: 7: “For who distinguisheth thee?
Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?”
102 Cf. Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum gallorum calumnianlium, 4, 5.
103 Responsiones ad capitula objectionum vincentianarum, chap. 2.
ιοί PL, LI, 647.
10s Cf. Tixeront, op. cit., Ill, 284 f.
iso Cf. ibid., 287 f.
i®’ De natura et gratia, chap. 43, no. 50; Denz., no. 804.
108 De fide orthodoxa, PG, XCIV, 968 f.

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545

do what is good, but we are free either to persevere in doing good or
refrain from so doing.” 100 From this text it is clear that those who
persevere in doing good (the elect) are more helped by God than
the others whom He permits to fall into sin. For God is the cause of
the meritorious act, but not of sin. St. John Damascene clearly states
this, although he makes no profound statement about the necessity
and efficacy of actual grace in the life of the predestined.200
As I said above, St. John Damascene considered this question in
its moral aspect as it refers to God’s goodness and man’s culpability,
rather than in its theological and metaphysical aspects as it refers
to God’s omnipotent will, which is always fulfilled when it is a case
of His absolute will and not of His qualified or conditioned will.
On the contrary, it was particularly this second aspect of God’s
will that was considered by St. Augustine. And St. Thomas recon­
ciles both aspects, by explaining the antecedent will, which St. John
Damascene speaks of, as referring to good considered absolutely as
such, and not as it is here and now; whereas the consequent will, he
observes, is directed to good considered as it is here and now. But
since good, which is in the things themselves, comes into being here
and now only, it follows that the antecedent will of itself alone,
when not joined to th®consequent will, remains inefficacious. Hence
the division of God’s will into these two wills is the ultimate founda­
tion for the distinction between sufficient grace, and grace that is of
itself efficacious. The former is the result of God’s antecedent will,
which makes it really possible for us here and now to do what He
commands; the latter is the result of His consequent will, which
moves us so that we actually do what He commands. But from the
fact that man resists sufficient grace, by reason of his defectibility, he
deserves to be deprived of efficacious grace.
Thus the teaching of St. Thomas preserves intact both St. Augus­
tine’s opinion and St. John Damascene’s, thus safeguarding the
omnipotence of God, whose absolute will is always fulfilled, and the
goodness of God, who does not command impossibilities and who
makes it really possible for all to do what He commands.201 What100 Ibid., col. 97a, 973.
200 On this point consult also his Com. in I Cor. 4: 7: “What hast thou that
thou hast not received?"; and in II Cor. 3: 4 f., in which he affirms that every good
act, and hence our merits, are the result of God's grace. Cf. Tixeront, op. cit.,
Ill, 478.
Some, too, in recent times have sought to interpret St. John Damascene’s doc­
trine in a Molinist sense. But several of his texts can be understood in the opposite
sense. In truth, it must be said that St. John Damascene had not as yet so ex­
plicitly considered this question.
201 Consult St. Thomas’ Com. in I Sent., d.46, a. 1; d.47, a.i; De veritate,
q.23, a.2; in I Tim. 2: 1-6, which agrees with what he said in the reply to the
first objection of this sixth article.

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THE ONE GOD

ever the adversaries may say, Thomism acknowledges that this ques­
tion of the salvific will is a mystery, not only as it affects our liberty,
but also on God’s part. And in this we clearly see both the exalted
nature and insufficiency of sacred theology, which disposes one for
the knowledge of infused contemplation, in which there is peace of
mind and rest; for this contemplation is the effect of grace, which is
a formal participation of the Deity, in which justice, mercy and su­
preme liberty are identified.
IV. SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

First objection. One fails to see why the antecedent will is condi­
tioned, unless it is said that God wills all men to be saved, if they
themselves will to be saved. But this is precisely Molina’s opinion.
Therefore, unless Molina’s opinion is accepted, one fails to see why
the antecedent will be conditioned.
Reply. This opinion, as we have said, presupposes the theory of
the scientia media, for which there is no foundation and by which
God, in His foreknowledge of conditionally free acts of the future,
would be in a passive state. This theory was not fully approved even
by Molina himself, who, to avoid Semipelagianism and preserve
intact the dogma of predestination, admittea that God of His own
most free will of good pleasure places the elect in circumstances in
which He foresaw their good consent. And it is the gratuity of pre­
destination that is more affirmed both by St. Robert Bellarmine and
by Suarez.
Hence it is for Molina himself to answer this question, namely,
why God did not will to place all men in those circumstances in
which He foresaw their good consent.
But he must answer this question as St. Thomas did, by quoting St.
Paul’s text: “What if God, willing to show His wrath (i.e., the
splendor of His justice), and to make His power known, endured
(i.e., permitted) with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for de­
struction, that He might show the riches of His glory upon the ves­
sels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory (where is the in­
justice?)” 202
Hence it follows that the antecedent will is conditioned in this
sense, that God would will the salvation of all men if He did not will
to permit in many the sin of final impenitence to serve the higher
ends of either manifesting the splendor of His justice, or His in­
alienable rights to be loved above all things. Thus He willed to
manifest His goodness, sparing by His mercy and punishing by His
justice.
so2 Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad 311m; Rom. 9: 22.

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This condition is retained even by Molina, otherwise he would be
absolutely denying the mystery of predestination. It is, indeed, an
inscrutable mystery, and its reconciliation with the universal salvific
will is nothing but the intimate reconciliation of infinite mercy, jus­
tice, and supreme liberty in the Deity, which is hidden from us, and
which can be seen only in the beatific vision. But a strictly syllogistic
objection, and one that is incapable of solution, cannot be raised
against the possibility of God’s permitting the sin of final impeni­
tence.
But I insist: Nevertheless, what was said by several of the postNicene Fathers, namely, those who wrote before the rise of Pelagianism, and after the rise of this heresy what St. John Damascene said,
practically meant that God wills the salvation of all men if they
themselves will to be saved. Therefore the condition on which God’s
antecedent will depends, finds its explanation in none of the higher
motives, but merely in man’s will.
The Thomists reply to this by distinguishing the antecedent: God
wills the salvation of all men, if they themselves will to be saved,
waiting for them so to will, this I deny; if such volition is the result
of God’s operation in them, this I concede, according to what St.
Paul says: “For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to
accomplish, according to His good will.” 208 I distinguish the con­
sequent in like manner. It was not the intention of the post-Nicene
Fathers or St. John Damascene to deny this text of St. Paul or the
following: “For who distinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that
thou hast not received?” 204
To say otherwise would not be to uphold the definition of the
Council of Orange, which says against the Semipelagians: “If anyone
maintains that God waits for us to will that we be cleansed from sin,
but does not confess that even this act of willing to be cleansed from
sin is the result of the inspiration and operation of the Holy Spirit
in us, such a person resists the Holy Spirit . . . and the Apostle
preaching for our spiritual benefit that: It is God who worketh in
you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 205
St. Augustine wrote in like manner.206 To say otherwise, as we already
remarked, would be to deny the mystery itself of predestination.
Wherefore, as we pointed out, even Molina somewhat restricted his
definition of the antecedent will. On the other hand, all Catholics
admit that God wills all men to be saved, if they themselves will to
be saved, that is, presupposing their co-operation prompted by grace.
Phil. 2: 13.
204 I Cor. 4: 7.
20s Denz., no. 177; Phil. 2: 13.
2oe Cf. ad Bonifacium, Bk. I, chap. 19.
203

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THE ONE GOD

St. Augustine himself says: “He who created you without your help,
will not save you without your help.’’20T Nor did anyone ever think
of saying that God wills to save those who refuse and do not wish to
be saved.
Second objection. What is conditioned is imperfect. But the ante­
cedent will is conditioned, because, as stated above, it presupposes a
greater good, namely, the manifestation of God’s attributes. There­
fore it implies an imperfection, and hence cannot be properly and
formally in God, but only metaphorically and virtually, as being the
will of expression and not of good pleasure. This objection expresses
the very opposite of the preceding.
Reply. I distinguish the major. The conditioned is imperfect, on
the part of that which is conditioned, this I concede; otherwise I
deny it. 1 contradistinguish the minor: that the antecedent will is
conditioned on the part of the thing willed, which is not accepted
with all its accompanying circumstances because of a higher good,
this I concede; that it is conditioned, as if God were incapable of
saving all men, this I deny. So say St. Thomas 208 and the majority
of the Thomists when discussing God’s subjectively absolute and
objectively conditioned decrees.209 This means that God wills all
men to be saved, if this does not conflict with the manifestation of
His divine attributes, the ordering of all things by His providence,
and the contingency and defectibility of human beings.
But I insist: The efficacious will as such is a perfection; hence the
inefficacious will as such is an imperfection. Therefore this cannot be
properly and formally in God.
Reply. I distinguish the consequent: that the inefficacious will,
which is the result of the nullification of its power by an extrinsic
impediment, is an imperfection, this I concede. Such is the will of
the merchant who desires to save his merchandise at the moment of
shipwreck. That the inefficacious will, which is the result of the
wilier’s positively ordaining things to higher ends, is an imperfection,
this 1 deny.
It is the antecedent will, as conceived by Molinists, that posits im­
perfection in God; for they say God wills all men to be saved, pro­
vided they themselves will to be saved. In this case the antecedent
will would be conditioned, the condition depending on the consent
Confessions, II, 7.
20s St. Thomas says (I Sent., d.46, q.i, a.i ad sum): “The antecedent will may
be called conditioned; yet its imperfection is not on the part of the divine will,
but of the thing willed, which is not willed with all the circumstances that are
required for being rightly ordered to salvation." St. Thomas says about the same
in his reply to the first objection of this artide.
209 For a critical estimate of the scientia media, consult their commentaries,
for instance, Billuart, De Deo, diss. VI, a.6, § to.

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or dissent of human beings, and not solely because of a higher good
intended by Providence, this being the manifestation of God’s at­
tributes.
This solution is confirmed by the fact that Holy Scripture records
many instances of conditioned futures. Thus God promised Abraham
to spare Sodom, if ten just men were found in it. Similarly it was
revealed that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have been converted
if Christ had come to them. But these conditioned futures are infal­
libly knowable by God only in His subjectively absolute and objec­
tively conditioned decrees, and this we say against those who favor
the theory of the scientia media. Hence a subjectively absolute and
objectively conditioned decree must likewise be admitted with re­
gard to the conditioned salvation of all men.
Third objection. But the subjectively absolute and the objectively
conditioned decree implies a contradiction, for by it God wills and
does not will the same object. Thus God wills the conversion of the
Tyrians, and, on the other hand, He does not will it, because He
does not will that the gospel be preached to them. Therefore the
same holds good of His decree.
Reply. It is false to say that by this decree God wills and does not
will the same formal object, but only the same material object, and
this in different ways; that is, God wills inefficaciously the salvation
of all men, absolutely considered, and He does not will efficaciously
the salvation of all, having taken into consideration all the circum­
stances and the higher ends in view. Similarly He wills inefficaciously
the conversion of the Tyrians, provided the gospel should be
preached to them, and He does not will it efficaciously because, on
account of higher ends in view, He does not will the gospel to be
preached to them. There is no contradiction in this.
Thus the merchant during a shipwreck truly, though ineffica­
ciously, wills to save his merchandise, and he efficaciously wills to cast
it into the sea. It would be a contradiction if God willed antecedently
the salvation of those already damned, to whom He no longer gives
graces sufficient for salvation.
Fourth objection. If this decree of the antecedent will does not
involve a contradiction, it is at least useless and illusory, it being as
if a wealthy person were to say to a poor person: I will give you a
hundred pennies if you fly.
Reply. This decree is not useless, because, although it fails to at­
tain its ultimate effect, yet it serves many other useful purposes. (1)
It establishes the foundation for the foreknowledge of conditionally
free acts of the future. (2) By this decree God provides for all way­
farers sufficient means whereby they may be saved, whereas, on the
other hand, for the salvation of those who are already damned, His

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THE ONE GOD

attitude at most can be merely one of passive complacency. (3) It
serves as the foundation for God's promise to save us on certain con­
ditions; for He could not sincerely and conditionally promise any­
thing, unless He willed by such decree.
Moreover, this decree of the antecedent will is not illusory, be­
cause the condition is possible, not impossible, such as the example
given above by the objector: “I will give you wealth, if you succeed
in flying.” For God does not command impossibilities. But in this
there is the mystery of God’s permission of the sin of final impeni­
tence for higher ends, and it is not in our power to judge of these.
Finally, we can turn back the objection on our opponent by say­
ing: What we consider contradictory is the conditioned decree as
conceived by the Molinists, namely, “I will concur in your action
if you have first freely determined yourself to act.” This, in our
opinion, implies a contradiction, because the divine concurrence is
no less necessary for man’s self-determination than light is for seeing,
or existence for acting. Hence to say: “I will concur in your action,
if you have first freely determined yourself to act,” is tantamount to
saying: “I will give you light, if you see this object,” or "I will give
you existence, if you do this.” No wonder Molinism leads to such
conclusions, for, if Thomism is true, then Molinism is absurd, or
vice versa. For the principles of these two systems are contradictory,
that is, before God’s determining decree, either He can or cannot
know conditionally free acts of the future with infallible certainty.
But I insist: Nevertheless this antecedent will is de facto merely
inoperative and sterile, for by its own power nothing is accomplished,
but only when it is joined to the consequent will, for it is only this
will that is directed toward good considered with its accompanying
circumstances.
Reply. It is, indeed, true that the antecedent will by its own power
never accomplishes anything, because it is directed toward good ab­
solutely considered, and good comes into being only with its accom­
panying circumstances.
But it does not follow that the antecedent will is merely idle and
sterile, for by it God gives sufficient graces, which make the fulfill­
ment of His precepts here and now really possible for adults, al­
though it is not here and now effective.
Moreover, all Thomists are agreed that every grace which is called
proximately sufficient as regards some perfect act, for example, that
of contrition, is infallibly and of itself efficacious, in virtue of some
absolute decree, as regards an imperfect act, for example, that of
attrition. But because man, by reason of his own defectibility, re­
sists the sufficient grace, in which the efficacious help was offered to
him, God justly denies tire efficacious grace that was previously of­

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55i

fered to him. This denial on God’s part is of the nature of a penalty,
and thus it presupposes at least a first offense. Hence there is a dis­
tinction between it and the divine permission of this offense, which,
as is evident, precedes the offense. In fact, God often moves us way­
farers to pray as in the prayer of the Mass before Communion: ‘‘Per­
mit me not, O Lord, to be separated from Thee.”
Hence God’s antecedent will concerning the salvation of all way­
farers is not inoperative and sterile. This is more clearly seen by
comparing it with God’s will concerning the salvation of the damned.
For God ceases to operate as regards their salvation, because they
are incapable of being saved, as they have reached the end of their
course and are confirmed in evil. Hence, as we said, God’s attitude
toward the salvation of the damned can be only one of merely pas­
sive complacency. But it is not so as regards the salvation of the way­
farer, no matter how great a sinner such a person may be, because
as long as a person is in this world there is possibility of conversion
and salvation.
But you insist: St. Thomas says: “The antecedent will may be
called a willingness rather than an absolute will.” 210
Reply. What is denied by this statement is that the antecedent will
is an absolute will, but not that it is a will; for it is called “a velleity”
compared with the consequent will, which is the simple or absolute
will.
Final objection. The antecedent will in God does not denote what
He sincerely and positively wills. For indeed, he who has the power
to do what he is said to will, and does not do so, does not positively
and sincerely will it; such would be the case with a merchant who
could save his merchandise and would not do so. But it is in God’s
efficacious power to save all men, and He does not do so. Therefore
He does not positively and sincerely will all to be saved.
Reply. I distinguish the major: he who has the efficacious power
to do what he is said to will, and does not do so, does not positively
and sincerely will it by the consequent will, this I concede; by the
antecedent will, this I deny. For it may happen that something, ab­
solutely considered, is good, and not merely a possible but a condi­
tioned future, namely, unless this conflict with higher ends. Such a
good terminates God’s conditioned decree of His positive and sincere
will, which is distinct, for example, from His quasi-negative will of
permitting sin. Hence the object of God’s universal salvific will is in
itself good, but as it stands in the way of a greater good, it is not
good, and consequently is not willed. Hence, just as the merchant
sincerely wills to save his merchandise, which, however, he throws
overboard because there is danger of shipwreck, so also God sincerely
sio Summa theol., la, q.19, a.6 ad lum.

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552

wills to save all men, though He does not save all, considering the
higher ends in view.
But you insist: I deny the parity in the above illustration, for
God, unlike the merchant, can efficaciously save all human beings.
Reply. It is not a case of absolute parity, but of analogy. It is in­
deed in God’s efficacious power to save all, if we consider His omni­
potence; but it is not so, if we consider the present ordering of His
providence, by which He wills to manifest His infinite justice, as also
His infinite mercy, governing and moving defectible creatures in ac­
cordance with their natures. Thus He does not efficaciously will all
the fruits of the earth to become ripe. Hence, if all these and other
conditions are considered, whether they are occult or manifest, it is
not good, if in each case the particular circumstances are considered,
that all should be saved. For it pertains to the universal Provider to
permit various evils to happen so that the higher ends in view may
not be frustrated.
Finally, you insist, arguing that if such were the case, then there
would be no more hope for anyone, and the value of prayer would
be very much impaired. Such is the case with the congruism of the
Sorbonne, especially as Tournely presents it, by which salutary acts
easy to perform, such as prayer, do not require a grace that is of
itself and infallibly efficacious, this being required only for acts that
are difficult to perform.
Reply. Even a salutary act easy of performance is the positing of
an act that is actually as such a good. Therefore it presupposes the
divine consequent will that is of itself efficacious, and grace that is
of itself infallibly efficacious. Otherwise the previously enunciated
principles are no longer exclusively and metaphysically certain.
But it does not follow that hope is either destroyed or diminished,
because the formal motive of this theological virtue is not to be at­
tributed to our endeavor, but to God’s help; for the formal motive
of this virtue postulates the uncreated, and so God Himself. But in
Molinism and congruism the formal motive of theological hope
would be partly created, because our endeavor would enter into it;
for a part of man’s hope would be by reason of his endeavor, and to
some extent he would be singling himself out, contrary to what St.
Paul says: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that
thou hast not received?” 211 For the result would be that of two
persons equally loved and helped by God, one would be better than
another, at least because of the salutary act easy to perform. But this
is impossible, as we shall see farther on, for St. Thomas says: “Since
God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be
I Cor. 4: 7.

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better than another if God did not will greater good for one than
for another.” 212
Nor are the value and necessity of prayer impaired by this doc­
trine. In fact, they become more convincing, for, according to the
teaching of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas, we have to pray even
for the grace that is of itself efficacious for the performance of salu­
tary acts, whether these are difficult or even easy to perform. On the
other hand, if either Molinism or the congruism of the Sorbonne
were true, then human beings would not, in their temptations, have
to pray to obtain the grace that is of itself efficacious for the per­
formance of salutary acts, at least those easy to perform; all they
would have to do would be to strive to give the salutary consent which
God expects of them.
This brings us back, therefore, to our original conclusion, namely,
if we wish to consider this mystery, not only in its moral aspect, as it
concerns the exhortation of men in the order of execution or fulfill­
ment of God’s commands, but also as it concerns God’s attributes,
His omnipotent will, and the order of intention proposed by His
providence, that is, in its metaphysical and strictly theological as­
pects, then the doctrine of St. Thomas remains intact. It is in
agreement with the teachings of St. Paul and St. Augustine, and it re­
solves itself into this dogma, which is thus expressed by St. Augustine:
“God commands not impossibilities, but, by commanding, both ad­
monishes thee to do what thou art able and to pray for what thou
art not able (to do).” 213 If one did not resist the sufficient grace to
pray, then the efficacious grace to pray, and subsequently other
graces, would be given. Hence St. Prosper’s formula of God’s salvific
will, quoted by the Council of Quierzy (853), which is in agreement
with St. Augustine’s teaching, is the best way of expressing this
dogma. It reads as follows: “The omnipotent God wills absolutely
all men to be saved, although not all are saved. That some are saved
is the gift of Him who saves. That some perish is the fault of those
who perish.” 214 These are two most certain aspects of this mystery.
We have considered this second aspect, namely, “the fault of those
who perish”; the other aspect: “the gift of Him who saves,” will be
discussed in the treatise on predestination.215
But the intimate reconciliation of these two aspects is for us mys­
terious, for it is the intimate reconciliation of infinite mercy, justice,
and supreme liberty in the eminence of the Deity or of God’s intimate
212 Summa theol., la, q.20, a.3.
21s De natura et gratia, chap. 43, no. 50; Denz., no. 804.
21« Denz., no. 318.
218Summa theol., la, q.23, a.2-5.

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life; and it is only by the beatific vision that this can be clearly known,
and as it actually is.
Doubt. Does God provide sufficient means for all to be saved?
The answer is that He does. He not only prepares for all, without
distinction, those general helps that are sufficient for salvation, but
He also offers, in fact, He bestows upon each and every adult, means
that are sufficient for salvation.
First part. That God prepares for all, without distinction, those
general helps that are sufficient, is admitted by all Catholics against
Jansenius. This conclusion is deduced from God’s universal will to
save and the fact that Christ died for all. For God cannot will the
end without willing the means that are sufficient for attaining the
end. Otherwise God would command what is impossible.
The universal salvific will not only refers, as Arnauld contends,
to the human nature considered in the abstract, or as it exists in the
mind; but it also refers to the human nature objectively as such,
which means all human beings without exception, inasmuch as they
are all individuals of the same nature which God has destined for
salvation, even after Adam’s sin. Nor can it be said that sufficient
grace is merely sufficient in the abstract, as Arnauld contends, but
it makes the fulfillment of God’s precepts really possible here and
now in the concrete, although it is not the cause of the actual fulfill­
ment of the precepts. Thus a man who is sleeping, although he does
not actually see, yet he has at the very time the power to see, for
he is not blind; and to say that sufficient grace does not give the
power to perform a good act is to say that one who is asleep, is blind.
Second part. The answer to this, namely, “that God offers, even
bestows upon each and every human being, sufficient helps for sal­
vation,” is not admitted by all Thomists. It is denied especially by
Gonet, not indeed for the just, but for all hardened and blinded
sinners. But several of tire best Thomists teach this, such as the
Salman licenses, Billuart, Bancel, and Goudin, who quote Ferrariensis
as being on their side.
It does not, indeed, follow from this that an equal degree of
sufficient grace is given to all. This second part of the reply, however,
is to be understood in the sense that God gives to each and every
one (at least to those who have the use of reason),216 where and when
the fulfillment of a precept is of urgent necessity, helps that are
proximately or at least remotely sufficient for salvation, according to
each one’s condition. Hence if they do not keep some of God’s com­
mandments, this is not because God denies them the sufficient help,
*16 This is said because of the special difficulty concerning infants who die
without baptism, which will be examined farther on.

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but because men either reject the proffered sufficient grace, or else
resist the sufficient grace already given.
According to this conclusion, he who does not resist the remotely
sufficient grace, will receive the proximately sufficient grace. Thus the
proximately sufficient help to begin to pray is remotely sufficient
with regard to the more perfect salutary act. There is the mystery,
inasmuch as to resist sufficient grace is an evil that comes solely from
ourselves, whereas not to resist it is a good that comes from the
source of all good.217
Holy Scripture furnishes us with the foundation for this conclusion
in the many texts by which it affirms God’s mercy toward all way­
farers. Thus we read: “I called, and you refused. I stretched out My
hand, and there was none that regarded.”218 "Thou hast mercy upon
all, because Thou canst do all things." 218 “Jerusalem . . . how often
would I have gathered together thy children as the hen doth gather
her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldest not?” 220 “What is
there that I ought to do more to My vineyard, that I have not done
to it?” 221 “I stand at the gate and knock. If any man shall hear My
voice and open to Me the door, I will come in to him.” 222 “The
Lord is compassionate and merciful, long suffering and plenteous in
mercy.” 228
The theological reason is that otherwise God would command what
is impossible. Thus sin would be unavoidable, and to punish it would
be an act more of cruelty than of justice. For God would command
what is impossible if He denied man the sufficient and necessary help
to keep His commandments. Hence the Council of Trent quotes
against the Protestants the following words of St. Augustine: "God
commands not impossibilities, but by commanding, both admonishes
thee to do what thou art able and to pray for what thou art not able
(to do).” 224
21 r In fact, that one at the very moment does not resist a sufficient grace is a
good efficaciously willed by God’s consequent will, which alone, as we said, is
directed toward good that is at the very moment to be performed.
The sufficient grace, inasmuch as it is sufficient, or as it refers to the possibility
of complying with God's commands, depends on His antecedent will; but, inas­
much as it is a gift and a good bestowed at the very moment, it depends on His
consequent will, and it truly produces in us the good thought and often the
pious desire that inclines the will in its choice of the means for salvation.
ate Prov. 1: 24.
21» Wis. 11:24.
220 Matt. 23: 37.
221 is. 5: 4. In this text we read: "what I ought to do,” not “what I could do”;
for God can, moreover, give the efficacious grace.
222 Apoc. 3: 20.
223 ps. 102: 8.
224 Denz., no. 804; De natura et gratia, chap. 43.

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THE ONE GOD

These principles must be applied to infidels and hardened sinners,
when the occasion arises that the fulfillment of a precept is of urgent
necessity. If these do not resist the remotely sufficient grace, they
will receive the proximately sufficient grace and subsequent graces,
in virtue of the commonly accepted principle that “to the man who
does what he can (with the help of actual grace), God does not re­
fuse the (habitual) grace.” 225* Expressed more briefly: salvation is
possible for any wayfarer; for this, however, sufficient grace is re­
quired. As Pius IX declared: “It is known to us and to you that those
who labor under invincible ignorance concerning our most holy
religion and who, diligently observing the natural law and its pre­
cepts that are engraved in the hearts of all by God, and being ready to
obey Him, lead an honest and upright life, can, through the operative
power of divine light and grace, attain eternal life.” 220
According to several theologians it is sufficient for such persons
to believe that God (the author of salvation) exists and is the re­
warder of the good, and that they love Him above all things. Several
Thomists, the Salmanticenses included, hold that, although strictly
speaking an explicit belief in the mystery of the Incarnation is
necessary, since it is the necessary means by which salvation is ob­
tained, yet it may be that it is not necessary for the one to whom the
mystery was not preached, or to whom it was not sufficiently pro­
posed.227
A special difficulty presents itself about infants who die without
being baptized. On this point it must be said that, the condition of
these infants being taken into consideration, God has sufficiently
provided for them by instituting the sacrament of baptism, inasmuch
as it was instituted for all and can be conferred on all, although
various natural and free causes sometimes intervene to prevent its
actual administration. Not infrequently, indeed, infants fail to re­
ceive the grace of baptism through the fault of their parents who
neglect to pray and make use of the means for salvation. The princi­
ple in the solution of this difficulty is that God, on His part, provides
for the salvation of all according to each one’s capacity; but infants
are not capable of being saved by any salutary acts but only by
baptism, the actual administration of which, since it depends on both
natural and free causes, can be prevented by these causes. Nor does
225 Sumina theol., la, q.49, a.2 ad gum; la Ilae, q.109, a.6: q.112, a.3; De
veritate, q.14, a. 11.
22« Denz., no. 1677.
227 Cf. Salmanticenses, Com. in Ham Ilae, q.2, a.7. Suarez was more or less of
this opinion. Just recently Capéran defended this opinion in his theological essay
entitled: Le problème du salut des infidèles.

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it pertain to God’s general providence that He interrupt the course
of secondary causes.228
Finally, infants who die without being baptized are not punished
for actual sins, but only for original sin. Therefore they do not
suffer interiorly the pain of sense, nor do they suffer as adults do, at
being deprived of the beatific vision.229 They enjoy a certain natural
happiness which, even in the natural order, is not absolute but rela­
tive happiness; for their will, which is directly turned away from their
ultimate supernatural end, is indirectly turned away from their ulti­
mate natural end; for every sin that is directly against the super­
natural law is indirectly against the natural law, which demands
obedience to God in whatever He commands.280 Hence the limbo
of the children clearly shows that the supernatural life is gratuitous,
and also that in the present economy of salvation the absence of the
state of grace makes perfect natural happiness simply impossible.
Man’s present condition is not the state of pure nature, but he is
ordained to the life of grace, and if he does not attain to it, it cannot
be said that he is absolutely happy even in the natural order. This
does not denote a lack of harmony in the disposition of Providence,
but, on the contrary, it is consistent with the principles, posited that
the whole human race is ordained to the supernatural life. Thus the
doctrine of God’s universal salvific will remains intact, which is not
His consequent will or that which of itself is efficacious, but it is
His antecedent will by which He gives sufficient graces to all accord­
ing to each one’s capacity. What always remains a mystery in this
doctrine is the intimate reconciliation of the salvific will with the
gratuitous predestination of the elect, that is, the mystery of the in­
timate reconciliation of infinite mercy, justice and, supreme liberty
in the Deity.
SEVENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS CHANGEABLE

State of the question. What is asked in this article is whether God
can begin to will what He did not will, and not will what He willed,
228 Consult St. Thomas’ Com. in IV Sent., d.6, q.i, a.i, so). 1, ad 1.
22s See Supplement to St. Thomas' Summa theologica, q.69, a.6 ad sum, in
which there is the following quotation from St. Augustine's Enchiridion, chap.
93: “The punishment of children who die only with original sin is most lenient."
Sec also ibid., q.71, a.7; De tnalo, q.5, a.3.
230Summa theol., la Ilae, q.82, a. 1 ad mm; q.85, a.i; q.109, a.3. John of
St. Thomas, De gratia, disp. XIX, a.4; Salmanticenses, De gratia, disp, II, dub. 3,
nos. 102, 116. Billuart, De gratia, diss. II, a.3.

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so that from not willing He becomes willing, and vice versa. As a
general rule, indeed, God’s will is said to be unchangeable, but the
Lord Himself says: “It repenteth Me that I have made man.” 231
Moreover, God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He
ordered the law to be observed, and afterward forbade it. Finally,
God is free; therefore He does not have to will continually and ir­
revocably what He first willed. In fact, just as it was possible for God
not to will what He willed, without undergoing any intrinsic change,
why could He not, without undergoing any intrinsic change, begin
to will what He did not will?
Yet the answer is that God’s will is entirely unchangeable, just as
His substance and His knowledge are.
t) Holy Scripture shows that the conclusion is of faith, for we
read: "God is not as the son of man, that He should be changed.” 232
“I am the Lord and I change not.” 233 Likewise, the Vatican Council
declares that God “is one absolutely simple and immutable spiritual
substance.” 234 It is the constant teaching of tradition that the de­
terminations of God’s will are unchangeable, that His decrees, which
are measured by eternity, in which there is no before and after, are
unchangeable, as the following text asserts: "There are many
thoughts in the heart of man; but the will of the Lord shall stand
firm.” 235
Theological proof. There would be a change in God’s will if He
began to will what before He had not willed; but this is impossible;
therefore a change in God’s will is impossible.
Proof of minor. A change in God’s will would presuppose either a
change in His substance (and thus something would begin to be good
for Him, which before was not), or else in His knowledge (as He
would know for the first time that a thing is good for Him, which He
did not know before). But it has already been shown 236 that God’s
substance and His knowledge are unchangeable, inasmuch as He is
pure Act, and not in potentiality for further actuality both in the
entitative and intellectual orders, and therefore not in the volitional
order.
Corollary. God, by His same permanently unchangeable will, wills
a change in some things; for it is one thing to change the will, and
another thing to will a change in things. Thus change occurs only in
time, but not in eternity, which admits of no variation; for it is “the
231 Gen. 6: 7. See also Jer. 18: 17.
232 Num. 23: 19.
233 Mai. 3: 6.
234 Denz., no. 1782.
235 Prov. 19: 21.

233 Summa theol., la, q.g, a. 1; 9.14, a. 15.

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simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life.” 237
Reply to first objection. The Lord spoke metaphorically when He
said: “It repenteth Me that I have made man,” 238 thereby making
known that it was His will to punish men; for from all eternity God
foresaw their sins, and He decreed that they must be punished for
them.
Reply to second objection. The same must be said of prophecies
of commination concerning conditioned futures that are not realized,
because the condition is not fulfilled.238 Thus we read in the Old
Testament: “Yet forty days, and Ninive shall be destroyed”;240 but
because the Ninivites repented, the Lord changed His sentence of
condemnation, but not His counsel or the eternal decree of His will.
Reply to fourth objection. “Although God’s willing a thing is not
by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of
the unchangeableness of the divine will.” According to the teaching
of St. Thomas, there is something similar to this by way of partici­
pation in the angels, because of the vigor of their intellect, for he
says: “The angel’s free will is flexible to either opposite before the
choice, but not after.” 241 With us wayfarers, the free will is flexible to
either opposite even after the choice, because we can always re­
consider the thing, about which we already made the choice, under
new aspects. Thus, because of the imperfection of our knowledge,
which is acquired gradually, we can make a different choice. Con­
trary to this, God’s will is entirely unchangeable.

EIGHTH ARTICLE
WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IMPOSES NECESSITY ON THINGS WILLED

State of the question. The question asked in this most famous
article is how to reconcile the efficacy of the determination of the
divine will with the freedom of our actions. This problem belongs
properly to this question of God’s will, rather than to the question
of God's knowledge, which states merely “that contingent things
are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the
divine sight in their presentiality (as God’s knowledge is measured
by eternity, which comprises all time); yet they are future contingent
things in relation to their own causes.” 242 This left unsolved the
w Ibid., la, q.to, a.i.
238 Gen. 6: 7.
w Summa theol., Ha Hae, q. 171, a.6 ad 211m; q.174, a. 1.
240 Jonas 3: 4.
2«i Summa theol., la, q.64, a.2.
242 Ibid., q. 14, a. 13.

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question why this contingent future, for example, the conversion of
St. Paul, is eternally present to the divine sight rather than Paul’s
resistance. It is certain and of faith that Paul’s conversion would not
have taken place in time, or have been eternally present to the divine
sight, if God had not willed it; for if this conversion had been in this
way present independently of God’s free will, then it would have
been of itself necessary, and not something contingent. Therefore it
is now a question whether God’s efficacious will, which is always
fulfilled, imposes necessity on all things, even on our choices. This
same question is discussed by St. Thomas when he treats of God’s
providence.243 Hence this article is concerned strictly with the
question of the transcendent efficacy of the determinations or decrees
of the divine will with reference to our free acts. In other words, is
this predetermination necessitating or non-necessitating?
The article begins by presenting three difficulties, and these con­
stitute the state of the question. They are: (1) It seems that the will
of God imposes necessity on all things, because St. Augustine says
(Enchir., chap. 103): “It must necessarily be, if God wills (any­
thing).” (2) “God’s will cannot be hindered. Therefore the will of
God imposes necessity on the things willed.” This objection is after­
ward revived by the Molinists against the Thomists. (3) Lastly, “this
true conditional statement is necessary: If God wills a tiring, it comes
to pass.” Now it is quite clear that the first and third difficulties are
easily solved by means of the distinction between absolute necessity
(or of consequent) and conditional necessity (or of consequence), as
when I see Socrates sitting, he must be sitting, the necessity being one
of consequence; but that he sits is contingent.244 The second objection
presents the principal difficulty, namely, that God’s will cannot be
hindered; and this is solved in the body of the article.
The answer is that God’s will does not impose necessity on all
things, but that some things happen contingently, because God wills
that they should happen contingently. To say otherwise would be to
do away with free will, merits, laws, counsels, rewards, guilt, and
punishment, all of which must be acknowledged as pertaining to
the faith, as stated in the counterargument.
This conclusion was subsequently expressed in equivalent terms
by tire Council of Trent in the following canon: "If anyone says that
man’s free will moved and aroused by God, by consenting to God’s
call and action, in no way co-operates toward disposing and pre­
paring itself to obtain the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse
its consent if it wishes, but that, as something inanimate, it does
243 Ibid., q.22, a.4; la Ilae, q.10, a.4, the title of which is: Whether the human
will is moved of necessity by God. Also De veritate, q.23, a.5.
2« Ibid., la, q.i4, a. 13 ad 3um.

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nothing whatever and is merely passive; let him be anathema.” 248
The following Jansenist proposition was condemned: "For merit­
ing and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from in­
ternal compulsion is not required; it is sufficient to be free from
external restraint.”248 It was not defined, however, whether the
divine decree concerning our future salutary acts is intrinsically
efficacious, or extrinsically so, namely, because of our foreseen con­
sent (by means of the scientia media), as the Molinists and congruists
contend.
But all Thomists, as also Scotists and Augustinians, hold that the
decrees of the divine will concerning our future salutary acts are
intrinsically or of themselves infallibly efficacious, that is, because
God wills, and not because man wills. They assert that such is the
teaching of St. Thomas in this article and wherever he discusses this
subject. In fact, they hold that this doctrine is connected with the
principles of the faith, and is proximately definable.245
*247248
*Let us see
what Holy Scripture, the councils, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas
himself have to say on this subject.
According to Holy Scripture, even God’s efficacious will does not
impose necessity on all things. We find it frequently mentioned in
the Old Testament that God's will is efficacious, and that we are
free to choose. Thus we read: “As the divisions of waters, so the heart
of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will, He
shall turn it”; 248 and yet the king freely wills what he decides upon
doing. Similarly, Queen Esther prays as follows: “O Lord, King of
gods and of all power, . . . turn his heart to the hatred of our
enemy”; 240 and farther on we read: "And God changed the king’s
spirit into mildness” (toward the Jews).250 Again we have: “As the
potter’s clay is in his hand . . . , so man is in the hand of Him that
made him.” 261 “The Lord of hosts hath decreed, and who can
disannul it? And His hand is stretched out, and who shall turn it
away?” 252 Yet our freedom remains intact, as is clearly stated in the
following text: “And I will give you a new heart and put a new
Denz., no. 814.
24e Ibid., no. 1094.
242 To know this truth with certainty there is no need of an objectively illative
process of reasoning, but an explanatory discursive process suffices. It is sufficient,
for example, that the following revealed words be explained: “It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will” (Phil. 2: 13).
See supra, pp. 49 f.
248 Prov. 21:1.
24S Esther 14: 13.
280 Ibid., 15: 11.
281 Ecclus. 33: 13.
282 Is. 14- g-j'
245

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THE ONE GOD

spirit within you, . . . and I will cause you to walk in My command­
ments and to keep My judgments and do them.” 253 Likewise in the
New Testament we have: "It is God who worketh in you, both to
will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 254 “No one can
snatch them (My sheep) out of the hand of My Father.” 255*Especially
to the point is the following text: “I will have mercy on whom I will
have mercy; and I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy. So
then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God
that showeth mercy.”253
The Second Council of Orange likewise declares against the
Semipelagians "God does many good things in man, which man does
not accomplish; but there is no good work done by man which God
does not assist him to do.” 267 The same council declares: “No man
can claim as his own anything except lying and sin. If a man hath
anything of truth and righteousness, it is from that foundation which
it behoves us to thirst after in this desert that being, so to speak, re­
freshed with some of its drops we may not faint by the way.” 258*This
means that every salutary work is performed by means of at least
actual grace, and that every ethically good act is performed by God’s
natural concurrence, which is due to the human nature, but not to
this individual here and now rather than to another whom God
permits to fall into sin.
Teaching of the Fathers. Those who wrote before the rise of
Pelagianism and against Manichaeism and its denial of free will,
sometimes did not speak quite so correctly on this point, as St.
Augustine often remarks. Yet they always said with St. Paul: “For
who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not re­
ceived? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou
hadst not received it?” 230 Hence St. Cyprian says: “We must not
boast of anything, since there is nothing that is ours.” 280 St. Basil
likewise says: "Nothing is left to you, O man, of which you may boast;
for in all things we live by the grace and gift of God.” 281 But if the
free determination of the salutary choice were in man’s power and
253 Ezech. 36: 26 f.; also ibid., 11: 19.
254 Phil. 2: 13.
256 John 10: 29. See also Matt. 24: 24: John 7: 30: 13: 1; 15: 5; 17: 1; Acts 2: 23;
10:41; 13:48; 17:26; 22: 14; Rom. 8:28; 9: 11-18, 23, 37; 11: 1-7; I Cor. 4:7;
Eph. 1: 5-7, 12.
258 Rom. g: 15.
267 Denz., no. 193.
258 Ibid., no. 195.
2591 Cor. 4: 7.
280 Ad Quirin., Bk. HI, chap. 4.
281 Hom. XXII, De humilitate.

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563

not from God, then he would have something that would single him
out from another equally loved and helped by God, and what is
better in the created order would not come from God.282
It is particularly St. Augustine who, against the Pelagians and
Semipelagians, explains the infallible efficacy of the divine will and
grace, not because of our foreseen consent, but by reason of God’s
omnipotence. Commenting on the words of St. Paul, ‘‘It is God who
worketh in you both to will and to accomplish,” 283 he says: “Cer­
tainly we will, when we will; but He causes us to will what is
good. . . . Certainly it is we who act when we act; but He causes us
to act by enabling the will to act efficaciously. . . . When He says: I
will cause you to act, what else does He say but: I will take away the
stony heart out of your flesh and will give you a heart of flesh?” 284
Similarly he says: "God has power over the heart, moving it from
within ... ; and the wills of men are more in His power than in
their own; who else causes it that chastisement is wholesome and that
the heart being contrite there should be amendment of life?” 285*
Similarly he says: “Secretly this grace is bestowed by the divine lib­
erality upon human hearts, and it is spurned by no one that is hard of
heart; for this very purpose it is bestowed, that the hardness of heart
may first be taken away.” 288 It is sufficiently clear that the text of
St. Paul just quoted concerns grace that is of itself efficacious, because
God wills it to be, and not because we will it to be so by reason of
our consent.287
282 Rouet de Journel (Enchiridion patristicum, index theologicus, no. 335),
after having correctly said that "grace does not destroy free will,” and having
quoted the testimony of many of the Fathers on this point, then adds: "Hence
also with an equal grace, one can consent, the other can dissent,” which seems
to be meant in the Molinist sense, namely, that one actually consents, the other
actually dissents. But there are two quotations from the writings of St. Irenaeus
(no. 247) and of St. Augustine (no. 1753), and these in no way prove that he is in
favor of Molina's opinion. In fact, St. Augustine a little farther on in this passage
just cited (De civitate Dei, Bk. XII, chap. 9), says: "If both the good and bad
(angels) were created equally good, then, whereas the latter fell by their evil
will, the former were more abundantly assisted, and reached that state of com­
plete happiness which made them absolutely certain of never losing it." This
is the simple application of the principle: "For who distinguisheth thee? Or what
hast thou that thou hast not received?" (I Cor. 4: 7.) The angels who turned to
God and received their reward, the others having fallen from grace, in this
respect were better, and this same was the result of God’s grace, as having been
more helped, the freedom of the will, however, remaining intact.
282 Phil. 2: 13.
281 De gratia et libero arbitrio, chap. 16; Ezech. 36: 26.
285 De correptione et gratia, chap. 14.
zoo De praedest. sanct., chap. 8.
282 See also, De libero arbitrio, Bk. Ill, chap. 3, no. 8.

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THE ONE GOD

In this article St. Thomas first of all mentions the opinion of some
who maintain that the divine will imposes necessity on all things,
because what God produces by necessary causes is necessary, but what
He produces by contingent causes is contingent. Thus the distinction
between contingent and necessary things would be the result only
of secondary causes. This seems to be the opinion of the Averroists,
that contingency would be the result only of secondary causes.
It is rejected by St. Thomas for two reasons, (i) The effect of a
universal cause, such as the sun, is contingent on account of the
secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is
hindered because of a defect in the secondary cause, as the sun’s
power is hindered by a defect in the plant, so that the fruit does not
become ripe. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God’s
will from producing its effect; for God can remove this defect, other­
wise He would not be omnipotent. (2) If the distinction between the
necessary and the contingent is to be referred only to secondary causes,
this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is
inadmissible. For everything external to God must of necessity be in
a relation of causality or dependence with respect to God’s will. Thus,
as our immediate declaration will have to be, not even the free de­
termination of our salutary choices can be made independently of
God’s will, who “worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.” 268
Then St. Thomas shows what is the ultimate reason for the dis­
tinction between the contingent and the necessary, and he proves his
conclusion, namely, “God does not impose necessity on all things,”
by appealing to the absolute efficacy of the divine will.
He builds up his argument as follows: When a cause is efficacious
to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done,
but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus the one
generated is generated even in accidental points. Since then the divine
will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done
which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way
that He wills. But God wills some things to be done necessarily, some
contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of
the universe.
Therefore to some effects God has attached necessary causes, which
cannot fail, from which effects necessarily proceed (just as day and
night follow in regular succession); but to other effects He has
attached defectible and contingent causes from which arise con­
tingent effects (such as the ripening of fruits and the acts of our freé
will). Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent
that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God
208 Phil. 2:13.

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565

has prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they
should happen contingently.2®9
This whole argument has its foundation in the following principle:
“When a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows from the cause,
not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done
or of being.”
There is first of all inductive evidence of this principle; for, be­
cause of the debility in the generative power, it happens that a child
is born unlike its father in accidental points, which pertain to its
mode of being. On the contrary, if the father is very vigorous, the
child is born like him even in accidental points, for example, in the
general expression of the face, as we observe in different families
whose facial expression conforms persistently through several genera­
tions to a certain type. Similarly many soldiers die in war; but there
is a heroic way of dying, and not many die heroically.
In like manner great generals not only lead their soldiers on to
victory, but they lead them in that characteristic and genial way by
which the latter obey willingly. This special manner is quasi­
characteristic of this general. Likewise great writers, great poets, have
their special manner of expressing themselves, also great musicians,
but far more so God, whose will is perfectly efficacious.
The aforesaid principle is not only inductively evident, but its
truth is clearly seen from the very analysis of the concepts of its con­
stituent parts. For when a cause is efficacious to act, its influence
extends not only to the thing done, but also to the manner in which
it is done; because the whole effect depends on and is determined
by its cause.
Lastly, this principle is not only found out by reason, but is also
equivalently expressed in revelation, which speaks of the absolute
efficacy of the divine will, as in the above quoted texts that follow the
sea There is a considerable difference between this opinion which St. Thomas
gives and the one he rejects at the beginning of his argument. For according to
this discarded opinion, which seems to be that of the Averroists, God’s providence
would not at least be concerned particularly with the freedom of human acts,
but He would be the prime mover, moving all things in the same way, without
any free decree. Thus all things would happen of necessity, with the exception of
some contingent things, their contingency being the result of defectible causes.
This would explain why all the fruits of the earth do not become ripe.
On the contrary, according to St. Thomas’ opinion, God in His providence
first willed for the order of the universe that there be some necessary things, such
as the movements of the heavenly bodies, and some contingent and even free
things, such as free human acts. Therefore He prepared for necessary effects
necessary causes or those that of their nature are determined to one thing; and
for free effects He prepared causes that are not of themselves determined to one
thing.

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THE ONE GOD

state of the question in this article. Thus we have: "As the divisions
of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whither­
soever He will He shall turn it,” 270 and yet the king freely wills what
God moves him to do. Similarly, “As the potter’s clay is in his
hand . . . , so man is in the hand of Him that made him.” 271 “It is
God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according
to His good will.” 272
Are the Thomists justified in concluding from this article their
doctrine of the intrinsic and infallible efficacy of God’s decrees and of
grace with respect to our free salutary acts?
The answer is in the affirmative. For St. Thomas already said as
much, when he declared: "God’s knowledge is the cause of
things ... in so far as His will is joined to it.” 273 And again: “The
will of God is the cause of things. . . . Determined effects proceed
from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of
His will and intellect.” 274 This determination of God’s will is often
called His purpose.275 We now take up the question of the absolute
efficacy or decree of the divine will.273
But if it is admitted that God’s decrees and His grace are only
extrinsically efficacious, that is, because of our foreseen consent
through the scientia media, then God’s will is no longer perfectly
efficacious, nor does it extend even to the contingent and free mode
of our salutary choices. In fact, the free determination of these choices
is then, as regards the performance of these acts, solely from us, not
being referred to God as dependent on His will, which is impossible,
since this is contrary to the universal causality of the supreme Cause.
For nothing can exist that is external to God unless it is in a relation
of causality toward Him or of dependence on Him; to say otherwise
means the nullification of the proofs for God’s existence, these having
their foundation in this necessary dependence. Finally, in this way
the mind would revert to the opinion refuted by St. Thomas in the
beginning of the body of this article, namely, that the distinction
Prov. si: i.
271 Ecclus. 33: 13.
272 Phil. 2: 13.
278 Summa theol., la, q.14, a.8.
27< Ibid., q. 19, a.4.
276 Rom. 9: 11; 4: 5; 8: 28; Eph. 1:5, 11; II Tim. 1: 9; see also Commentary of
St. Thomas on these texts.
270 Scotus uses the expression "decree of the divine will,” and so do the Scotists;
but it by no means follows that the Thomist doctrine on the divine decrees
originated from Scotism and not from St. Thomas himself, who uses an equivalent
expression, speaking of “the determination of the divine will,” and of the preordainings of providence and piedestination, which presuppose election on the
part of the divine will. See la. q.22, a.i, 3; q.23, a.i, 4, 5, 6.
sto

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between the contingent and the necessary would arise from secondary
causes, and would not be included in God’s intention.
Moreover, St. Thomas spoke the same way in his other works and
in other parts of his Theological Summa, as in the following passage:
“We must remember that, properly speaking, necessary and con­
tingent are consequent upon being as such. Hence the mode both of
necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who
provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes
that provide only for some particular order of things.” 277
And again he says: “The divine will must be understood as exist­
ing outside the order of beings, as a certain cause that penetrates the
whole of being and its differences; but the possible and the necessary
are differences of being, and therefore necessity and contingency in
things originate from the divine will.” 278*On the contrary, the evil
of sin is not included in the adequate object of divine omnipo­
tence; 270 and even if, though this is an impossibility, God were to will
to be the cause of the evil of sin, He could not be so, just as the eye
cannot see sounds. Similarly, in another passage he says: “God moves
all things in accordance with their conditions, so that from necessary
causes, through the divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but
from contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, therefore,
the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but
having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it that
He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement
remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which
it is moved naturally.” 280 He says the same in the following reply:
“If God moves the will to anything, it is incompossible with this
supposition that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossi­
ble simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by
God necessarily,” 281 but it freely chooses and acts under the influence
of the divine motion. Similarly, in one of his replies, he says: “God
moves the will immutably on account of the efficacy of the moving
power which cannot fail; but on account of the nature of the will
that is moved, which is indifferently disposed to various things, the
will is not necessitated but remains free.” 282
In these various passages St. Thomas says: “God moves all things
in accordance with their conditions,” that is, God adapts His move277 Summa theol., q.22, a.4 ad gum.
27» Com. in Periherm., Bk. I, lect. 14; St. Thomas also speaks in like manner
in his Com. on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Bk. VI, lect. 3.
27»Summa theol., la Ilae, q.79, a.i.
Ibid., q.10, a.4.
2si Ibid., ad gum. See also la Ilae, q.112, a.3; Ila Ilae, q.24, a. 11.
282 De malo, q.6, a.i ad 3um; also Quodlibet, q.12, a.3.

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ment to creatures according as He moves either natural agents or
our free wills. Thus secondary causes do not actively modify God’s
motion, but only objectively and materially, inasmuch as God oper­
ates in our will according to its natural inclination which He gave
it and preserves in it. He is more intimate to it than it is to itself.
Hence, according to St. Thomas, God moves our will not only by
proposing to it the object that attracts it, but also by applying it
to make the choice. “It belongs to God to move the will, but es­
pecially by an interior inclination of the will.” 283
First confirmation. God is with greater reason the cause of our
free consent than angel and man are. But the angel guardian and
man concur in our free consent by moral suasions. Therefore these
moral suasions do not suffice on God’s part.
Moreover, if an angel, or a human being very much loved by us,
causes us to will what he wills, by proposing to us the object which
attracts us, far more so can God do this by an interior movement of
our will, moving it according to its natural inclination which He
preserves intact in us, as the cause that is intimately present to all
its effects.
Second confirmation. To say otherwise would be to deny that God
is the truly efficient cause of our free consent. It is not enough to have
recourse to moral suasion. For moral suasion does not belong to the
order of efficient causalty, but of final and objective causality. More­
over, even Pelagius admitted that God moves us by moral suasion to
good; yet St. Augustine rejects these movements as insufficient.284
Nor does it suffice to have recourse to simultaneous concurrence
as advocated by Molina, which is offered indifferently, as to whether
we consent or dissent; for such indifference of this simultaneous con­
currence does not determine the will to consent rather than to dis­
sent. The simultaneous concurrence and the human will are like
two co-ordinated causes, like two horses pulling a boat; and one of
these causes does not influence the other to act, but both of them
influence only the effect. Hence what is better in the created order,
namely, the free determination of our salutary choice, would not be
from God, and, contrary to what St. Paul says,285 man would be
singling himself out, because of two men equally helped by God and
situated in the same circumstances, one would become better than
another, which is contrary to what St. Thomas says.288
Third confirmation. If God does not determine, then He is deter­
mined, that is, He assumes a passive role in this foreseeing by means
2S3 Summa theol., la, q.105, a.4.
281 De gratia Christi, chaps. 7, 10, 11.
ass I Cor. 4: 7.
286 Summa theol., la, q.20, a. 3, 4.

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of the scientia media, which is antecedent to the decree of the divine
will. For, according to this theory, God, by concurring indifferently
and by moral suasion, must wait for and ascertain our consent, or
inquire by examining our will as to what it would choose if placed
in such and such circumstances. The result of this would be pas­
sivity or dependence in God’s knowledge; but there can be no pas­
sivity in Him who is pure Act. He is in the highest degree in actuality,
and is nowise in potentiality.
Molina says: “It was not in God’s power to know by this (middle)
knowledge anything else than He actually knew. Then again it
must not be called natural even in this sense, as if it were so innate
in God that He could not know the contrary of what He knows by
it. For if the created free will were to do the opposite of what it did,
as it truly can do, God would have known this very act by the same
knowledge, by which He really knows it, but not that He actually
knows it.” 287 Therefore passivity or dependence is thus posited in
God’s knowledge with regard to our free conditional future choices,
which actually will be, if God decreed to place our will in these cir­
cumstances. The independence of God’s knowledge is thus destroyed,
and the conception of the divine knowledge becomes tinged with
anthropomorphism.
Lastly, it is not possible in this way for God to know infallibly our
conditionally free acts of the future, and then our future choices,
because the determination of these choices cannot be seen by the
supercomprehension of the human will, which in itself is undeter­
mined, otherwise the will would not be free; nor is it possible for
God to have this knowledge by foreseeing the circumstances, other­
wise we would have to admit determinism of circumstances, and
this would mean the end of freedom. This we have more fully ex­
plained in another work.288
Therefore the doctrine of St. Thomas is vindicated, which was
subsequemly expressed so brilliantly by Bossuet in the following
passages: “To reconcile the decree and the omnipotent action of God
with our free will, we have no need to give it a concurrence which
is ready for all things indifferently, and which becomes what we
please; still less do we have to make it wait for what our will is in­
clined to do, for it to formulate afterward with no risk its decrees
about our resolutions. For without this poor circumspection which
gives us a confused notion of the First Cause, it suffices for us to bear
287 Concordia, q.14. a. 13, p. 318.
288 See Predestination (Eng. tr.), pp. 81 f., 300-309, 371-76. Consult also (ibid.)
principle of predilection: “One thing would not be better than another if God
did not will greater good for one than for another," pp. 16, 38, 75-80, 129, 149,
173-75· >95 G 329. 344. 349·

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in mind that the divine will, whose infinite power reaches everything,
not only the essence, but also the modes of being, is of itself accounta­
ble for the complete effect, in which it puts everything which we
conceive in it, ordaining that it will be accompanied by all the prop­
erties that are befitting it. . . .
“God wills from eternity, all the acts that will be performed by the
free will of human beings, all the good and reality there is in them.
What is more absurd than to say, that it is not because God wills,
that a thing exists? Must we not say, on the contrary, that a thing
exists, because God wills it? And just as it happens that we are free
in virtue of the decree that wills us to be free, so it happens that we
act freely in this or that act, in virtue of the decree which includes
all this in detail?” 288
SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS IN THIS ARTICLE

Reply to first objection. When St. Augustine says, “Man must in­
evitably be saved, if God has willed it,” 200 the reference is to con­
ditional necessity or to that of consequence, but not to absolute
necessity or to that of consequent. Thus, when it is said, “I see Peter
running,” Peter must at that very moment inevitably be running,
by a necessity of consequence but his running is a contingent and
free act, for he has the power not to run. Similarly, in the reply to
the third objection it is said: “Things effected by the divine will
have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either abso­
lute or conditional."
Reply to second objection. It answers the principal difficulty re­
vived by Molinists, namely, that every cause that cannot be hindered,
produces its effect necessarily. But the will of God cannot be hindered,
according to the following statement: “Who resisteth His will?” 281 It
is not a question here of the antecedent will of God, on which suf­
ficient grace depends, which a man often resists; but it refers to the
consequent will of God, from which efficacious grace proceeds, which
a man does not resist, but to which he consents. St. Thomas replies
to this objection: “From the very fact that nothing resists the divine
will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to
happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according
to His will.” Hence St. Thomas does not have recourse to the fore­
seeing of our consent by God, as Molina did afterward in his theory
of the scientia media; but again he affirms the absolute efficacy of
289
290

Traité du libre arbitre, chap, 8.
Enchir., chap. 103.
Rom. 9: 19.

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the divine will, this absolute efficacy extending even to the free mode
of our choices. Therefore we reply to the objection by distinguish­
ing the major: every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its
effect necessarily, if it is incapable of producing the contingent and
free mode in its effect, this I concede; otherwise, I deny it.202 Hence
the absolute efficacy of the divine will not only does not interfere
with the freedom of our choice, but causes this, as declared by St.
Thomas in the following passage: “Just as by moving natural causes
He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary
causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary; but
rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in
each thing according to its own nature.” 203 The free mode of our
choices is a mode of being, and it is thus included in the adequate
object of divine omnipotence, since it is only the evil of sin that is
excluded from it.
Doubt. To what is contingency ultimately to be ascribed? To the
freedom of the divine will, or to its absolute efficacy?
The Thomists answer with Cajetan: “It is of importance to know
that, after the divinelike Thomas had written these things, there
arose a new opinion about the ultimate foundation of contingency,
advanced by Scotus.284 For he believes that the condition of the
divine will truly constitutes the ultimate foundation of contingency,
and on this point he is in agreement with us; but we say that the
absolute efficacy of the divine will is that condition; but he says that
it is its contingency. Concerning this theory of his, by contingency
in the divine will he means its liberty: so that he imagines that be­
cause God wills and causes freely, for this reason there is contingency
in the universe.” 292
295 To this Cajetan replies: “If the contingency
*294
arises from the manner of God’s willing, then it is not chosen, but is
the consequence of the manner of choosing. Therefore, according to
this proposed theory, the effect is not produced by God as the agent.
And thus there is contingency in the universe over and above what
is intended by God, inasmuch as it is the consequence of His manner
of willing, but not of His willing.” 288
Moreover, God also wills freely that some things happen neces­
sarily in the world, such as that the sun gives out light and heat.
Therefore contingency is not the result of the free mode of the divine
will, but is due to the fact that God efficaciously wills some things
292 Summa theol., la, q.19, a.8 ad gum.
m Ibid., q.8g, a. 1 ad gum.
294 Com. in I Sent., d.2, q.i; d.8, q.5; d.gg, q.i.
295 Com. in lam, q.19, a. 8, no. 11.
29β ibid., nos. ig f.

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to happen contingently in the universe and some necessarily. And
God can produce these divers modes of being, because He is the
author of being.
SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS OF OPPONENTS

The opponents, that is, the Molinists and the congruists, who ad­
mit the scientia media and deny the intrinsic efficacy of God’s decrees
and grace, object to this doctrine, basing their objections (1) on
scriptural grounds, (2) on the impairment of free will, (3) on the in­
sufficiency of the help, (4) on the contention that by such teaching
God would become the cause of sin. These objections are examined
at length by such Thomists as the Salmanticenses, John of St. Thomas,
Gonet, and Billuart. We give only the principal objections. The re­
plies taken together are like an ancient and exquisitely harmonious
canticle. They are, so to speak, the leitmotif of ancient theology.
They can be explained frequently, just as a symphony of Beethoven
is heard many times. Our purpose is to show the intimate harmony
that prevails in the whole Thomist system.
Objections from Holy Scripture. These are taken from texts that
speak of man’s resistance with reference to God’s grace. Thus we
read: “What is there,” said the Lord, "that I ought to do more to
My vineyard, that I have not done to it? Was it that I looked that
it should bring forth grapes, and it hath brought forth wild
grapes?” 207 “I called, and you refused. I stretched out My hand, and
there was none that regarded.” 288 “You always resist the Holy
Ghost.” 288
Reply. These texts do not concern the consequent will of God by
which He grants the efficacious grace; but they refer to His antecedent
will by which He gives the sufficient grace, by reason of which the
fulfillment of His precepts is made really possible, though not as
yet effective. In fact, these texts refer to His will of expression, which
is made known to us by His commands, which men do not always
obey.
Therefore the first text just quoted does not say: “What is there
that I could do more to My vineyard,” but “What is there that I
ought to do more to My vineyard, that I have not done to it?” This
means that God gave the Jews many sufficient graces, which had made
it possible for them to be converted; but He did not give them the
efficacious graces, which God had indeed been able to give them, but
was not bound to give them, because the order observed in His
stn is. 5: 4.
208 Prov. 1:24.
288 Acts 7:51.

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providence did not demand this. If God were bound to give His
efficacious grace always and to all persons, sin would never happen,
which, however, He can permit for a greater good. Hence in the
aforesaid text the Jews are reproved, because of their own accord they
refused to obey God’s commands and make use of the sufficient grace,
and thus they deserved to be deprived of the efficacious grace.
The other texts are explained in like manner, namely; “I called,
and you refused”; “You always resist the Holy Ghost.” Man often
de facto resists sufficient grace by not obeying God’s precepts; but
he does not de facto resist efficacious grace, although he can resist it
in sensu diviso, that is, inasmuch as he has the power to do the op­
posite; just as Peter cannot at the same time sit and stand, but
when he stands, he has really the power to sit down. Likewise a man
asleep has really the power to see, and, although he does not actu­
ally see, yet he has really the power to see, for he is not blind.
Hence these texts of Holy Scripture nowise render less convincing
others which refer to God’s consequent and efficacious grace. Thus
we read: “As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in
the hand of the Lord. Whithersoever He will He shall turn it.” 300
“As the potter’s clay is in his hand ... so man is in the hand of
Him that made him.” 301
But I insist. Nevertheless we read: "Woe to thee, Corozain! Woe
to thee, Bethsaida! For if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the
miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done
penance in sackcloth and ashes.” 302
The Thomists in general reply to this by appealing to the same
principles. They say this text means that the inhabitants of Corozain
and Bethsaida showed themselves more unworthy than those of
Tyre, because of their greater blindness of intellect, hardness of
heart, and ingratitude. For man of his own accord resists God’s grace,
but there is a greater degree of resistance in some, for they resist even
the greatest sufficient graces, as was the case with the preaching of
Christ which was confirmed by miracles. The Jews of Corozain and
Bethsaida placed a greater obstacle to the efficacious grace offered
in the sufficient grace, just as the fruit is contained in the flower.
Thus they were deprived of the efficacious grace.
Still I insist. According to the teaching of the Thomists, the Jews
needed an efficacious grace so that they might not resist the sufficient
grace and thus place an obstacle to the reception of the efficacious
grace. Therefore, if Thomism is true, it was possible for these Jews
to reply that they resisted the sufficient grace because they simply
soc Prov. gi: i.
soi Ecclus. 33: 13 f.
’os Matt. 11: 21.

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THE ONE GOD

did not have the efficacious grace required for not resisting the suf­
ficient grace.
Reply. The cause of this resistance is not the lack of efficacious
grace, but man’s own defectibility. Resistance to sufficient grace is
indeed an evil, or a deficiency, which comes from a defectible cause.
An evil will, which is the first deficient principle, suffices for this.
Hence it is false to say that our will resists the sufficient grace be­
cause it lacks the efficacious grace. But it must be said that our will
lacks the efficacious grace because it resists the sufficient grace. The
deficiency of a secondary cause is due to the fact that this cause is
defectible. St. Thomas makes this clear by the following statement:
“The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but the first
cause of the bestowal of grace is on God’s part, according to Osee
12:9: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.” 303
To state the case more briefly: resistance to sufficient grace is an
evil, and is therefore due solely to a defectible and defective cause.
On the other hand, the non-resistance to sufficient grace is a good,
and is therefore not to be attributed solely to the secondary cause,
but also and primarily to the First Cause, the source of all good.
Hence the Jews of Corozain and Bethsaida, after Christ’s preaching
confirmed by miracles, had no reasonable excuse for their resistance,
and they were deservedly deprived of the efficacious grace, which the
Tyrians, by God’s mercy, would have received in similar circum­
stances, because they would not have resisted with such hardness of
heart and ingratitude.
It is because Thomism teaches that this divine bestowal of grace,
which is of itself efficacious, is the cause of the salutary act, that this
final objection seeks to infer that therefore the non-bestowal of the
efficacious grace is the cause of the sin of omission and of the re­
sistance.
But this does not follow; for, when two causes concur, one of which
is indefectible and the other defectible, the deficiency comes from
the defectible cause and not from the divine indefectible cause. Simi­
larly, everything being in proportion, in that the clear explanation
given by the teacher, arousing the attention of the pupil, is the cause
of the pupil’s knowledge, it does not follow that the cause of the
pupil’s error is because tire teacher failed to give a clear explanation.
This error can come from the defectibility in the pupil, from insuf­
ficient attention on his part.
More briefly: deficiency comes not from the indefectible cause but
from the defectible cause. Thus we read: "Destruction is thy own, O
Israel; thy help is only in Me.” 304 Similarly the Council of Quierzy
»0» Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 112, a. 3 ad aum.
’«« Osee 13: g.

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says: "That some are saved, is the gift of Him who saves; if some
perish, it is the fault of them that perish.” 305 This text is taken from
the writings of St. Prosper, being his reply to the second Vincentian
objection.
Therefore it remains true to say that the Jews of Corozain and
Bethsaida were deservedly rebuked, compared with those of Tyre,
because they placed a greater obstacle to the efficacious grace that
was offered in the sufficient grace. The Tyrians would not have
placed so great an obstacle to grace, and God in His mercy would
have given them the efficacious grace of conversion.
This answer is clearly established from what our Lord says: “With­
out Me you can do nothing" 306 for salvation; also from what St.
Paul says: "For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that
thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory
as if thou hadst not received it?” 307 These words imply that every good
thing comes from God, that is, to be able to keep His command­
ments, not to resist them, and actually to keep them. All these good
things come from God, and if anyone not only can keep, but actu­
ally does keep, God’s commandments, this is a new good that cer­
tainly comes from God, the source of all good. But if a man could by
his own power make God's grace efficacious, then this would single
him out from another equally loved and helped by God, and thus
the words of St. Paul would be untrue: "For who distinguisheth thee?
Or what hast thou, that thou hast not received?”
EFFICACIOUS GRACE IN ITS RELATION TO HUMAN LIBERTY

SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

The principal objection from this point of view is already solved
by St. Thomas in this article, for he says: “From the very fact that
nothing resists the divine will (consequent or efficacious), it follows
that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but
that they happen either contingently (i.e., also freely) or necessarily
according to His will.” 303 In other words: the determination effected
by God’s consequent will, which is perfectly efficacious, does not
interfere with the freedom of our will, because it extends even to
the free mode of our choice, producing this in us and with us. For
this mode is a modification of being and action, and hence is in­
cluded in the adequate object of the power of Him who is the Au­
sos Denz., no. 318.
sos John 15: 5.
sot I Cor. 4: 7.
•os Cf. ad sum.

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THE ONE GOD

thor of the being of all things and actions. Thus God by His primary
contact does not interfere with, does not destroy, the freedom of our
will, but actuates it.
The opponents bring forward another objection. They declare
that the Council of Trent says: “If anyone says that man’s free will,
moved and aroused by God . . . cannot refuse its consent if it wishes
... let him be anathema.” 300 But this refers to grace that is in
some manner efficacious, with which man de facto co-operates, and
to which he assents. Therefore, under the influence of this grace,
man cannot refuse his consent, if he would, and hence this grace is
efficacious, not of itself, but because our consent was foreseen by
God. So say Lessius, Molina, Vasquez.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that the free will of man, moved
and aroused by God, can refuse its consent, this I concede; that it
can refuse its consent in sensu composito, that is, unite actual resist­
ance with efficacious grace, this I deny; for this grace would no
longer be efficacious. Similarly, Socrates cannot stand and sit at the
same time, but, while he sits, he can stand, that is, he has the power
to stand at the same time that he actually sits. Thus a man asleep,
although he does not actually see, yet he can see, for the fact that
he is asleep does not mean that he is blind. That the minor, indeed,
refers to efficacious grace, this I concede. The conclusion is distin­
guished in the same manner as the major: that a man under the in­
fluence of efficacious grace can refuse his consent if he so wills, in
sensu diviso, this I concede; in sensu composito, this I deny. That
is, under the influence of efficacious grace, a man can refuse his con­
sent, if he so wills; but, under the influence of this grace a man never
de facto so wills. Thus St. Thomas says: “If God moves the will to
anything it is incompossible with this supposition that the will be
not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply,” 310 because the
will really has the power to do the opposite.
In fact, many Fathers of the Council of Trent, who were either
Augustinians or Thomists, understood the aforesaid canon as re­
ferring to grace that is of itself intrinsically efficacious, which they
admitted; and against the Protestants they held that grace of itself
efficacious does not take away the freedom of the will. But if such
is the interpretation of this text of the Council of Trent, then it is
more against the Molinists who, along with the Protestants, admit
that grace of itself efficacious takes away the freedom of the will.
The earlier Protestants said, just as the Jansenists did in later
times, that grace of itself efficacious takes away the freedom of the
will. But after original sin, for the performance of a salutary good
»oo Denz., no. 814.
»10 Summa theol., la Ilae, q.10, a.4 ad 311m.

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act, grace of itself efficacious is required. Therefore, after original
sin, free will is an empty title.
The Molinists reply to this by conceding the major and denying
the minor. The ancient theologians, especially the Thomists, replied
by denying the major and conceding the minor.
Hence from this text of the Council of Trent, in the formulation
of which many Thomists and Augustinians collaborated, nothing
can be concluded against Thomism.311
Moreover, from the complete text of this quoted canon it is clear
that the doctrine condemned differs entirely from that of St. Thomas;
for it says: "If anyone says that man’s free will moved and aroused
by God, by assenting to God’s call and action, in no way co-operates
toward disposing and preparing itself to obtain the grace of justifica­
tion; that it cannot refuse its consent if it wishes, but that, as some­
thing inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive; let
him be anathema.” 312
Yet I insist. But even Calvin admitted this distinction between the
sensus divisus and the sensus compositus; yet he was condemned.
Therefore this distinction does not suffice.
Reply. Calvin admitted this distinction, but not in the Thomist
sense. The Thomists say that under the influence of grace that is of
itself efficacious we can refuse our consent in sensu diviso, because
our will really has the power to do the opposite. On the contrary,
according to Calvin, under the influence of this efficacious grace, man
has not the power to do the opposite; but when no longer influenced
by efficacious grace, then the power to do the opposite reasserts it­
self, that is, as a consequence of original sin free will is extinguished,
is an empty title.313 He admitted only a certain contingency for the
will, as in the case of the fruits of the earth, all of which do not ripen
because of some impediment. Thus he reduced human liberty to
spontaneity or to freedom from external restraint. The same was
said by Jansenius, whose third proposition reads: “For meriting and
demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from internal com­
pulsion is not required; it is sufficient to be free from external con­
straint.” 314
Second objection. A supposed condition that precedes and infal­
libly causes our choice, necessitates the will and takes away its free­
dom; but such is the Thomist opinion about predetermining decrees;
therefore these decrees necessitate our choice.
Reply. 1 distinguish the major. That a supposed condition pre»11 Cf. Reginald, O.P., De mente Concilii Tridentini, on this canon.
S12 Denz., no. 814.
bis Ibid., nos. 793, 815.
en Ibid., no. 1094.

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THE ONE GOD

ceding and infallibly causing our choice necessitates the will as re­
gards the substance of the choice, this I concede; that it also does
so as regards the free mode of this choice, this I deny. I contradis­
tinguish the minor, and deny the consequent and consequence.815
But I insist. For our choice to be a free act, what it depends on
and what it is infallibly connected with must be within our power;
but the divine predetermining decree, on which our act depends and
with which it is infallibly connected, is not within our power; there­
fore our choice is not a free act.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if the principle pertains to the
order of secondary causes, as our ultimate practical judgment that
regulates our choice, then I concede it must be in our power; if this
principle pertains to the order of first cause, I subdistinguish: that
this principle must be in our power in the originative sense, as it
pertains to the order of first cause, this I deny; in the terminative
sense, or as regards the execution of the act, this I concede; and so
it is, because, while our will freely elicits the act of choice, it retains
the power to choose the opposite.
Hence a distinction must be made before we can admit the Molinist
definition of free will, namely, "that it is a faculty which, granted all
the prerequisites for the will to act, can either act or not act.” We
must distinguish as follows: granted all the prerequisites for the
will to act when the time comes for the performing of the act, the
will is free to act or not to act even in sensu composito; but if we
presuppose only all the natural prerequisites, such as are the divine
efficacious motion and the ultimate practical judgment, the will is
indeed still free not to act in sensu diviso, inasmuch as it retains the
power to do the opposite, but not so in sensu composito; for the nonpositing of the act cannot coexist with efficacious grace.815 Thus,
when Socrates is standing, he can sit down; but he cannot at the
same time stand and sit down. The above-mentioned Molinist defi­
nition of free will implies a begging of the question, for it presup­
poses before it is proved, that the divine decrees and grace are not
of themselves efficacious.
Moreover, this definition is contrary to the principle that “facul­
ties, habits, and acts are specified by their formal object"; and to
define these it suffices for us to declare their essential relation to
this object. Thus free will is defined as the dominating indifference
of the will (either divine, angelic, or human) with respect to an object
that is not good in every respect, which can be judged as good under
one aspect and as not good under another. Thus St. Thomas says:
“If the will is offered an object which is good universally and from
sis Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.8 ad 2um.
MIbid., la Ilae, q.10, a.4 ad gum.

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every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills any­
thing at all; since it cannot will the opposite. (Thus it cannot but
will God who is clearly seen.) If, on the other hand, the will is
offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will
not tend to this of necessity.”817 This is the true definition of free
will as obtained from its specified object, and without any begging
of the question.
Moreover, this indifference of judgment remaining intact with
respect to an object that is not in every respect good, God, by in­
teriorly moving our will as regards the performance of the act, can­
not necessitate it, because He cannot change the nature of this act
that is thus specified by this object thus proposed to it; but the divine
action really causes the free mode of our choice by actuating this
dominating indifference, which before this was potential. In the
very act of choosing there is an actual dominating indifference of
the will with respect to particular good that is actually chosen and
does not infallibly attract the will. On the other hand, the will of
the blessed is infallibly attracted by God clearly seen, so that there
is no longer indifference of judgment in this respect.
WHETHER SUFFICIENT GRACE IS AN INSUFFICIENT HELP
SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

First objection. That help is insufficient which, for us to act, re­
quires another which is not in our power. But in addition to the help
that is called sufficient, according to the Thomist opinion there is re­
quired another help that is of itself efficacious, which is not in our
power. Therefore the first help is truly insufficient for the actual
observance of God’s commandments. Thus we must go back to the
theory of the scientia media. This objection can be answered either
indirectly or directly.
i) Indirectly. This objection is in substance the same as that which
St. Paul put to himself.818 Just previous to this, St. Paul, speaking of
the divine election, had said: “It is not of him that willeth nor of
him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. . . . Therefore
He hath mercy on whom He will; and whom He will, He hard­
ened!.” 818 He at once remarks: "Thou wilt say therefore to me: Why
doth He then find fault? For who resisteth His will?” 820 But to this
objection St. Paul replies: "O man, who art thou that repliest against
si’ Ibid.,
»18 Rom.
sis Ibid.,
»30 Ibid.,

a.2.
9: 19.
9: 16, 18.
9: 19.

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THE ONE GOD

God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast
thou made me thus? . . . What if God, willing to show His wrath
(avenging justice) and to make His power known, endured with
much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might
show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He
hath prepared unto glory (is there in this any injustice in God?)” 821
But St. Paul, in thus replying to the objection, does not have recourse
to God’s foreseeing our consent; for then man would single himself
out, which is contrary to what he says in the following words: “For
who distinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not re­
ceived?” 822
Therefore St. Paul’s reply comes to this: on the one hand, God
does not command impossibilities; on the other hand, no one would
be better than another, unless loved and helped more by God; "for
what hast thou that diou hast not received?” 828 These two princi­
ples taken separately are most certain; but how are they intimately
reconciled? This cannot be known by us in this life. This would be
to see how infinite mercy, justice, and absolute liberty are intimately
reconciled in the Deity, or in the intimate life of God. But it is only
in heaven that the Deity can be seen as it really is. Therefore St.
Paul says farther on: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and
of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments
and how unsearchable His ways!” 824 It is in this way that the ele­
ment of the mysterious must be safeguarded in this reply, so that
the mystery be kept on its high plane, and that a human theory for
which there is no foundation in the divine reality be not substituted
for it. This would savor of anthropomorphism.
2) A direct reply in scholastic form must be given to this objection,
so as to avoid an evident contradiction. That the help which requires
another help is not absolutely sufficient and in every respect, let this
pass without comment; that it is not sufficient in its own order, this
I deny; for it confers a real power, in fact, the proximate power to
act so that nothing is wanting on the part of the faculty or first ac­
tuality. Thus the visual faculty is sufficient for seeing, and the man
who is asleep really has this faculty, although he does not actually
see. Therefore, to say that sufficient grace as conceived by the Thom­
ists is not truly sufficient and does not really give one the proximate
power to act, is to say that a man when asleep is blind. Aristotle 825
321 Ibid., 9: 20-23. This is the answer to his previous objection: “Is there in­
justice in God?” (Ibid., 9: 14.)
3221 Cor. 4: 7.
323 Ibid.
»2« Rom. 11: 33.
325 Metaph., Bk. IX, chap. 3.

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581

had already said this against the Megarics, namely, that a thing can
be really in potency without functioning. Thus the art of building
in the builder who is asleep and is not actually building, remains in
him as an acquired art.
Moreover, to the first part of the distinction I said only transeat
(“let it pass without comment”), and not "I concede.” Why this? It
is because the efficacious grace is offered in the sufficient grace, as the
fruit is offered in the flower; but because man, through his own de­
fectibility, resists the sufficient grace, he is deservedly deprived of
the efficacious grace, by which he not only could have kept God’s
commandments, but actually would have done so. Thus the sin
of resistance falls upon the sufficient grace, as the hail falls upon the
trees in blossom which gave promise of the fruit, and so the fruit
did not materialize.
Lastly, all Thomists admit that every actual efficacious grace for
the performance of the imperfect salutary act, such as the act of
attrition, is sufficient for the perfect act, such as the act of contrition.
Yet, when the sin of resistance intervenes, the efficacious grace of
contrition is not given, which was truly offered in the preceding
grace, as the fruit is contained in the blossom, as the act is contained
in the potency.326
To resist grace is an evil, which is to be attributed solely to our
deficiencies; not to resist is a good which comes from God, the source
of all good. And there is again in this a mystery, but not a contradic­
tion.
But I insist. If affirmation is the cause of affirmation, then negation
is the cause of negation. Thus the sun illuminating is the cause of
day, and its absence is the cause of night. But the bestowal of grace
that is of itself efficacious is the cause of the salutary act. Therefore
the non-bestowal of grace that is of itself efficacious is the cause of
the omission of this act, or of our resistance to grace.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if it is a case of one cause, which
is, indeed, posited and then taken away, such as the rising of the
sun, then I concede the major; if it is a case of two causes, one of
which is supreme and indefectible, and which would not be bound
to prevent the defect of the other, whereas the other is defectible,
then I deny it; for then the defect is to be attributed solely to the
defectible cause, and not to the indefectible cause. Thus the Scrip­
ture says: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in
Me.” 827 Such is the teaching of St. Thomas.328
32« Cf. Alvarez, De auxiliis, Bk. Ill, disp. 80; Gonet, Clypeus, De voluntate Dei,
disp. 4, no. 147; N. del Prado, De gratia et libero arbitrio, III, 423.
sa? Osee 11:9.
»28 Com. in I Sent., d.40, q.4, a.2 ad 311m.

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THE ONE GOD

It must be observed that according to certain Thomists, such as
Gonzalez, Bancel, Massoulié, and, among later Thomists, Guillermin,320 the actual sufficient grace is virtually efficacious, in this sense,
that it not only would give the power, but even would give one
the impulse to act, although not infallibly, because it would not
remove all the obstacles. Therefore, even according to these authors
(who, like other Thomists, reject the scientia media), even the salutary
act easy to perform is not posited and persisted in de facto here and
now, unless God from all eternity willed this by His consequent and
infallibly efficacious will, and unless God grants at the moment the
grace that is of itself efficacious to overcome the obstacles to the
performance of this salutary act here and now to be posited or per­
sisted in.
All Thomists maintain that to resist grace is an evil that comes
solely from a defectible cause, but not from God; whereas, on the con­
trary, here and now not to resist sufficient grace is a good here and
now posited, which presupposes, therefore, a decree that is of itself
and infallibly efficacious of God’s consequent will, as explained by St.
Thomas in the following statement: “Whatever God simply wills
takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take
place.” 329
330 But the distinction between God’s antecedent and conse­
quent wills is the ultimate foundation for the distinction between
sufficient and efficacious graces.331

WHETHER THE INTRINSIC EFFICACY OF THE DIVINE DECREES
AND GRACE BEARS ANY RESEMBLANCE TO CALVINISM
SOLUTION OF OBJECTIONS

Objection. It was defined in the Council of Trent that God in no
way is the cause of sin: “If anyone says that it is not in man’s power
to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh
as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly
and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His
own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anath­
ema." 332 But, according to the Thomists, God is the cause of the
329 See Revue Thomiste, 1903, pp. 23 f. We have examined this opinion in
Predestination (Eng. tr.), pp. 345 £.
330 Summa theol., la, q.19, a.6 ad mm.
331 Cf. Billuart, De Deo uno, diss. VI, a.6, de scientia media, §g. This
question has been treated more fully in Predestination (Eng. tr.), pp. 328, 33335· 345_5<: also Revue Thomiste, May-June, 1937: "Le fondement suprême de la
distinction des deux graces suffisante et efficace.”
332 Denz., no. 816.

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act of sin by physical premotion, which presupposes a divine pre­
determining decree that concurs in the physical entity of sin. There­
fore it seems that God is the cause of sin itself, as He is according to
the tenets of Calvinism.
Reply. God is truly the author of the physical entity of sin; yet He
is neither directly nor indirectly the cause of the deordination that
there is in sin, as St. Thomas shows.333 For God to be the direct cause
of sin, this means that He influences His or another’s will to commit
sin. But God draws all things to Himself, as to their end, and He
cannot turn His will away from Himself. Therefore God is not tire
cause of sin.
He cannot be the indirect cause of sin, because to be the indirect
cause of sin means not to prevent it. But God’s wisdom and prudence
do not require that He should prevent sins, which He permits. He
can permit them, however, for a greater good, for the greater mani­
festation of His mercy and justice. Thus there would be no patience
of the martyrs without the persecution of tyrants, as St. Thomas
points out.334 Hence St. Augustine gives the solution of the problem
of evil, when he says: “Since God is absolutely good, He by no means
would permit evil in His works, unless He were good enough and
powerful enough to bring good out of evil.” 335
Moreover, the evident conclusion we must come to from this is
that even if, by an impossibility, God willed to be the cause of sin,
He could not be, for the evil of sin is excluded from the adequate
object of divine and indefectible omnipotence, just as sound is ex­
cluded from the object of sight.336
Yet it is insisted that he who premoves efficaciously and determinately to the act of sin, is the cause of sin itself. But, according to
Thomism, God premoves efficaciously and determinately to the act
of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin itself.
Reply. I distinguish the major: he who premoves, not prescinding
from the malice of sin, this I concede; otherwise, I deny the major.
I contradistinguish the minor. Similarly the motive power causes
whatever motion there is in lameness, though prescinding from the
defect of lameness.
Again it is insisted that God cannot prescind from the malice of
sin, for He moves the will to the act precisely as coming from the will;
but in the act of sin, as it comes from the will, malice is not excluded;
therefore God moves the will to the malice of sin.
Reply. I distinguish the major. God moves one to the act of sin, as
333 Summa theol., la Ilae, q.79, a. 1.
334 /bid., la, q.22, a. 2 ad 2um.
335 Enchiridion, chap. 11.
333 Predestination, pp. 208-12, 324-35.

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THE ONE GOD

it proceeds effectively from the will, this I concede; as it proceeds
defectively, this I deny.
Still it is insisted that if two things are inseparably connected, the
cause of the one is the cause of the other; but the act of sin and its
malice are inseparably connected; therefore God is the cause of the
malice in sin.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if the connected effect is included
in the adequate object of this cause, let it pass without comment;
otherwise, I deny the major. But malice is not included in the ade­
quate object of divine omnipotence; for there is nothing that is more
precisive than the causality of a faculty that is specified by its object,
even though something else is intimately connected with it. Thus
it is only the color of the apple that is seen by the visual faculty,
and not the smell; and just as smell is not included in the object of
sight, so the evil of sin is not included in the adequate object of in­
defectible omnipotence.
Finally, it is insisted that the cause of anything is the cause of that
which is essentially combined with it; but certain physical acts are
essentially and morally evil, such as the hatred of God; therefore God
in moving one to these acts, cannot prescind from their malice.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that the cause of anything in the
physical order is the cause of that which is essentially combined with
it in the same order, this I concede; when what is essentially com­
bined with it is in the moral order, then I deny the major.
Hence God causes whatever there is of a positive nature in sin,
as it is an effectible entity, but not as it is a defectible entity, because
the evil of sin is not included in the adequate object of indefectible
omnipotence. Even if, by an impossibility, God willed to cause it, He
could not do so. This constitutes what is most clear in this
chiaroscuro.
On the contrary, the objective motion to the act of sin, by reason
of the object proposed to the will, does not prescind from its malice.
Thus he who advises or commands the sinful act, is guilty of sin.
But God does not move the will to the object of sin, but only to the
performance of the act, and He does not determine it to the material
element in sin, before it has in some manner determined itself to
what formally constitutes sin, through the will deliberately refusing
to consider at the very moment the fulfillment of the obligation
imposed upon it. This deliberate refusal on the part of the will to
consider the obligation imposed upon it is the beginning of sin,
which coexists with sufficient grace, or the proximate power for the
required consideration. And prior to this deliberate refusal of con­
sideration, all that is required on God’s part is the permission of sin,
which is not the cause of sin, but its indispensable condition.

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Moreover, we must carefully distinguish between the divine per­
mission that is prior to the first offense, and which therefore is not a
punishment, and the refusal of divine efficacious grace, which is
already a punishment, and which therefore presupposes at least a
first offense. To confuse these two, between which the Thomists take
care to distinguish, as being that which is prior to the first offense,
and that which follows it, would result, indeed, in Calvinism.337
Moreover, there is a vast difference between Calvinism and
Thomism, inasmuch as Calvinism maintains the extinction of free
will after original sin, it being an empty title. Thus there is an end
of all merit, of all merit in obedience. The mystery of predestination
is contaminated at its source by reason of the denial of God’s uni­
versal will to save, which means the overthrow of the whole Christian
religion. There is, besides, a more complete solution of this question
in the following article.
Finally, it must be noted that this assertion maintained by the
Thomists namely, “the divine decrees and grace are of themselves
efficacious with reference to salutary acts,” is connected with the
principles of faith and proximately definable. In this almost all
the schools, with the exception of the Molinist, agree with the
Thomists.838
This assertion must not, therefore, be confused with the two
following statements: “grace of itself efficacious must be explained
by physical predetermination”; "predetermination must be applied
to natural acts and to the material element in sin.” These last two
assertions may be looked upon as philosophical and logical de­
ductions from the previous affirmation about grace that is of itself
efficacious.
But the opponents strive to confuse these two questions, so that
from the first assertion concerning the intrinsic efficacy of grace they
may conclude that God becomes the cause of sin. Let them but remain
faithful to the teaching of St. Thomas as set forth in this eighth
article, and to his higher principles.339
387 Ibid., pp. 208-12.
338 Cf. Billuart, De Deo uno, diss. VIII, a.5 (the end).
333 it must be noted that there is no possible medium between these two
propositions: God infallibly knows free conditioned futures either before He
issues a decree about these (as stated in the theory of the scientia media), or else
after He has issued a decree (as all those admit who reject the scientia media).
But of late several theologians have sought to find a medium between these two
contradictory propositions, confusing the conditioned future with the purely
possible, as an anonymous author did in a recent brochure entitled: Essai sur
la determination exemplaire des futurs libres (Paris, Mignard, 1937)· But there
is no excuse for this confusing of the issue: all indeed know that if Peter were
placed in certain circumstances, either he would or would not betray his Master;

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THE ONE GOD
NINTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD WILLS EVILS

State of the question. The difficulty consists in this: on the one
hand, God, who is infinitely good, cannot will evil; on the other hand,
He wills everything that appertains to the perfection and beauty of
the universe. But the evil, for example, of persecution, without which
there would not be the patience of the martyrs, pertains to the per­
fection of the universe. Moreover, if God in no way willed evils,
these would not happen, because nothing happens unless God wills
it. That is, as stated in the third objection of this article, “God does
not will that evil should not exist.” Therefore it seems that God
wills evils.
It must be noted that evil is of three kinds.340 For there is (i) the
evil of nature, which is the privation of good, even in irrational
things; then there is (2) in voluntary things the evil of sin, which is
the privation of moral rectitude; and there is (3) the evil of punish­
ment, which is the privation of some good on account of sin.
There are two parts to the reply. The first part refers to the evil of
sin, and the second to the evils of nature and of penalty.
1) God does not at all will or cause the evil of sin, even acci­
dentally, but only permits it. He cannot in any sense be called the
author of sin.
This conclusion is of faith according to Holy Scripture, which
says: “Thou art not a God that wiliest iniquity. . . . Thou hatest
all the workers of iniquity. Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.” 341
It was defined in the Council of Trent against Luther and Calvin:
“If anyone says that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil,
but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are
good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Himself, in such wise
that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the
vocation of Paul; let him be anathema.” 342
The reason for this first part of the answer is explained at length
by St. Thomas elsewhere,343 by showing that God can be neither the
direct cause of sin (by inclining the will to sin), nor the indirect cause
(by not giving the required help, or giving it insufficiently), and
that Fie can permit sin on account of a greater good. Thus the evil
these are two possible events; but the conditioned future implies also a new
determination, that is, which of these two possibilities Peter would choose.
sio Cf. Summa theol., la, q.48, a.5.
841 Ps. 5: 5; cf. Rom. 3: 5; 9: 14; James, 1: 13; I John 1:5; 3: 9.
342 Denz., no. 816.
843 Sumina theol., la Ilae, q.79, a.i.

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587

of sin is a defect coming from a defective cause, not from God.
But in this article St. Thomas gives the general reason, which is:
Since the aspect of good is the aspect of desirability, and since evil is
opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be
sought directly and essentially, though it can be sought indirectly
and accidentally, inasmuch as it accompanies a good that is more
desirable than the good of which it is a privation. Thus a lion kills
a stag for the purpose of obtaining food.
But God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness.
Hence God in no way, either essentially or accidentally, wills the
evil of sin, which is the privation of the order toward divine good.
But, as stated,344 He only permits it.
Therefore, as we said previously,345 God knows future sins in His
permissive decree. It can now be said more explicitly that God knows
future sins in a twofold decree, namely, permissive and effective;
for there is a positive element in sin, that is, the act of effect, which
can be produced only with the concurrence of the First Cause; and
there is the privative element, and this comes, however, solely from
a defectible and deficient cause.
The other part of the answer, that which refers to the evils of
nature and of punishment, is worded as follows: God wills the evils
of nature and of punishment, not indeed essentially but accidentally,
by reason of the good that is connected with them.
What has been said makes this clear. (1) It is, indeed, impossible
than an evil, as such, should be sought essentially and directly, for
the aspect of good is the aspect of desirability. (2) God wills acciden­
tally the evils of nature and of punishment, because He wills more the
good to which this twofold evil is annexed, than the good of which
the evil is the privation. Thus, by willing the preservation of the
natural order, He wills accidentally or indirectly, as a quasi­
consequence, the corruption of certain natural things. So, by willing
of itself the life of the lion. He wills accidentally the death of the
stag; so also in the moral order, by willing of itself justice, He wills
punishment indirectly and accidentally.
Reply to first objection. This reply is against Hugo of St. Victor,343
who taught that God willed that evils should be done, because it is
a good thing, inasmuch as evils are directed to some good end. St.
Thomas replies: “This, however, is not correct, since evil is not of
itself ordered to good, but accidentally ... ; as it was beside the
intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine
forth from all their persecutions.” That which of itself is ordered to
Cf. ad jum.
345 Cf. in lam, q.14, a. 10.
843 De sacramentis, Bk. IV, chap. ij.

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THE ONE GOD

good is not the evil itself which God permits, but God’s holy per­
mission. The reply to the second objection is to the same effect.
Reply to third objection. "God neither wills evil to be done, nor
wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this
(willing to permit it) is a good.”
Thus we must distinguish, as stated at the end of our commentary
to the preceding article, between the permission of sin (especially the
first sin), which is not a punishment, and the divine refusal of effica­
cious grace, which is already a punishment, and which presupposes,
therefore, at least a first sin.84’
TENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD HAS FREE WILL

It has already been made clear to us in the third article that God
does not necessarily will things other than Himself; for His goodness
is infinite, and He is in complete possession of it apart from other
things. But this article shows that free will is to be attributed to
God, because what it formally signifies implies no imperfection.
There are two conclusions, (i) There is free will in God, because
there is election in Him, inasmuch as He does not necessarily will
things apart from Himself. This is of faith. (2) God is absolutely free,
although it is not possible for Him to sin, this belonging to the im­
perfection of creatures. As St. Thomas says: "Since the evil of sin
consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God
wills all things, it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil
of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as
He wills a thing to be, or not to be.” 848 This means that God enjoys
absolute liberty, sin being for Him an impossibility, just as supreme
wisdom excludes the possibility of error. This applies, though in a
modified manner, to the most holy soul of Christ, which is both free
and absolutely impeccable, for its liberty is the most pure image of
the divine liberty, which is both absolute and impeccable.
ELEVENTH ARTICLE
WHETHER THE WILL OF EXPRESSION IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED IN GOD

State of the question. The purpose of St. Thomas in this article
is to explain the commonly accepted distinction between God’s will
34T Cf. Summa theol., la Ilae, q.79, a.gf. See also end of commentary to q. 19,
a.8: solution of the objections because of the supposed resemblance between
Thomism and Calvinism.
Cf. ad turn.

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589

of good pleasure, and His will of expression. The former has already
been discussed in this question.340
That God’s commands, which are not always observed, are called
God’s will, seems to be the foundation for this distinction. Thus we
read: “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” 330 Then the
will of God is not the same in meaning as His consequent and
efficacious will of good pleasure, which is always fulfilled, and this
latter is not absolutely the same as His antecedent will of good
pleasure, which is of itself never efficacious.351 In what sense, there­
fore, is God’s command called His will?
To understand this distinction, St. Thomas makes the following
observations in this article: “What is usually with us an expression
of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God, just as when
anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes this precept
obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the
will of God, as in the words: Thy will be done on earth, as it is in
heaven.” 352
St. Thomas concludes: “Therefore in God there are distinguished
will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor.
‘Will’ in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure (which
is, as above stated, either consequent or antecedent); ‘will’ meta­
phorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself
of will is called will.”
It must be observed that sometimes God’s command does not co­
incide with His will of good pleasure, as is evidently the case when
God commanded Abraham to kill his son Isaac, since indeed He
afterward commanded the contrary. But this command was a sign
that God wished the patriarch to will the slaying of his son and make
the necessary preparations.
TWELFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER FIVE EXPRESSIONS OF WILL ARE RIGHTLY
ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL

State of the question. There are five expressions of will that are
generally assigned in various passages of Holy Scripture to the divine
will. These are: precept, counsel, prohibition, permission, and
operation.
The reason St. Thomas gives for this enumeration is that in these
five ways we are accustomed to signify that we will something. For
sis See supra, pp. 534 f.
eso Matt. 6: 10.
soi See q. 19, a.6 ad turn.
352 Matt. 6: 10.

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THE ONE GOD

when we do anything it is a clear sign that we will it. When we
command or advise something to another, it is a sign that we will
it to be done (or not done, if it is something we forbid). Finally, when
we permit someone over whom we have authority to do something,
it is a sign that we do not will to prevent it. Hence St. Augustine says:
‘‘Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by
permitting it, or by actually doing it.” 353
Doubt. How is the will of expression related to the will of good
pleasure?
St. Thomas replies 354*by showing that there is sometimes, but not
always, agreement between these two wills. He says more explicitly
in another of his works: “It is necessary for us to know that there
are three ways in which the will of expression is related to the will
of good pleasure. For there is a will of expression which never coin­
cides with the will of good pleasure, such as when God permits the
perpetration of evil, since He never wills this; 353 but there is a will of
expression that always coincides with the will of good pleasure, as in
the case of operation; and sometimes, indeed, they coincide, and
sometimes not, as in the case of command, prohibition, and coun­
sel.353 Thus when God commanded Abraham to kill his son Isaac,
this did not coincide with His will of good pleasure, for He afterward
commanded the contrary. Thus when a command is not fulfilled as
it ought to be, it does not coincide with God’s efficacious or con­
sequent will of good pleasure, but with His antecedent will.
Objection. If the will of expression does not always coincide with
the will of good pleasure, then it is incorrect to call it the will of
expression; for a sign that is not in conformity with the thing sig­
nified is a false sign.
St. Thomas replies: "Although God does not will everything He
commands or permits, yet He wills something concerning this; for
He wills all to be under obligation to do what He commands, and
that it be in our power to do what He permits, command and per­
mission being an expression of this divine will.” 357
Finally it must be noted what is often said by spiritual authors,
such as Bossuet: “Christian indifference being out of the question
where the expressed will 358 of God is concerned, we must restrict it,
as St. Francis de Sales does, to certain events controlled by His will
of good pleasure, whose sovereign commands determine the daily
353 Enchiridion, chap. 95.
ssi Cf. ad 211m.
35« God wills only to permit the evil of sin.
ass De veritate, q.23, a.3 ad 6um.
as? Ibid., ad 2um. See also la, q.19, a. 11 ad 211m.
sos what is said here is against Quietism.

THE WILL OF GOD

59i

occurrences in the course of life.” 359 Dom Vital Lehodey says: “The
good pleasure of God is the domain of abandonment; His expressed
will, of obedience.” 300 We have explained at length elsewhere 301 in
what sense it is true to say that the divine will of expression made
known by various commands is the domain of obedience, whereas the
will of good pleasure not as yet made known is the domain of holy
indifference and abandonment into God’s hands. But we must now
treat of God’s love for Himself and for us, or of the act of His will of
good pleasure.
APPENDIX
ON god’s personality in opposition to pantheism

The pantheists and monists either completely or partly identify
the world with its principle, and therefore they deny the distinction
between God and the world, and His real personality. For they teach
that a personal God does not exist, since the notion of person implies
limitation. For these, person or the ego presupposes another certain
independent being, as a non-ego in opposition to the ego. Thus the
notion of person implies limitation.
This error is refuted from the principles already established. We
must bear in mind that a person is an intelligent and free subject.
But the teaching authority of the Church enunciates in the Vatican
Council what is the foundation for this refutation, by attributing to
God what formally constitutes person, namely, subsistence, intelli­
gence, free will, and also a real and essential distinction from the
world; and the reason assigned for this is that, whereas the world is
essentially composite and mobile, it requires God as the supreme,
absolutely simple, and unchangeable cause.
The Vatican Council says; “The Holy Catholic . . . Church be­
lieves and confesses that there is one true and living God, Creator and
Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incompre­
hensible, infinite in intelligence, in will and in all perfection, who,
as being one, sole, absolutely simple and immutable spiritual subEtats d’oraison, Bk. VIII, chap. 9.
8e»Ho/y Abandonment, p. 123. St. Francis de Sales explains this more fully
in his Love of God, Bk. VIII, chap. 5: “Of the conformity of our will with that
will of God which is made known to us by His commandments and his counsels";
also chap. 14: "A short method for knowing God’s will”; similarly, Bk. IX.
chaps. 1-5: “Of the union of our will with that divine will which is called the
will of good pleasure, especially in afflictions, and of holy indifference."
3e> Providence (Eng. tr.), pp. 215-67, in which this doctrine is explained that,
"in obeying as best we can God's will as made known to us, we must abandon
ourselves for the rest with full confidence to His will of good pleasure.” See
ibid., p. 218.

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THE ONE GOD

stance, is to be declared as really and essentially distinct from the
world (which is composite and changeable), of supreme beatitude in
and of Himself, and ineffably exalted above all things besides Him­
self which exist or are conceivable.” 362
From what has been said in previous questions, it is evident that
this doctrine has its foundation in Holy Scripture; moreover, the
reason is given for the distinction between the absolutely simple and
unchangeable God and the composite and changeable world, and the
reason why the term “person” is predicated of God, since He is the
intelligent, free, and subsistent Being who is independent of any
other being.
Although revelation declares that there are three Persons in God,
yet God, speaking of His nature and creative power, which are
common to the Trinity,303 says to Moses: “I am who am. . . . Thus
shalt thou say to the children of Israel: The Lord God of your fathers,
the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob hath
sent me to you. This is My name forever.” 334 And again we read: “I
am the Lord and I change not.” 365 “I am, I am the Lord; and there
is no savior besides Me. I have declared and have saved.” 333 God is
always referred to in Holy Scripture as endowed with knowledge,
volition, action, spiritually creating and exercising dominion over
all things, and He often expresses that He is the personal Being, by
using the pronoun “I” in speaking of Himself. Moreover, in ac­
cordance with revelation, God must be invoked as Father,337 which is
a personal name.338 Therefore, whatever belongs to the notion of
person (subsistence, intelligence, liberty) is found formally and emi­
nently in God, without any imperfection.
Objection. But the subsisting ego is named in opposition to the
non-ego, which is likewise independent. If, therefore, God were a
person, this would presuppose something else independent of Him­
self, and thus He would not be the principle of all things.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: the subsisting ego, inasmuch
as this is a created and limited person, is named in opposition to tire
non-ego that is likewise independent and existing, this I concede;
that this pertains to what is formally signified by the name “person,”
sea Denz., no. 1782.
ses Summa theol., la, 9.32, a.i.
884 Ex. 3: 14.
808 Mai. 3: 6.
seels. 43: 11. See also Jer. 7: 11; 32: 27.
sei Matt. 6: 9.
ses St. Thomas remarks (la, q.33, a. 3): "This name Father in the divine persons
is predicated first personally, and afterward essentially (as common to the whole
Trinity) with reference to creatures, especially rational creatures that by grace
become the adopted sons of God.”

THE WILL OF GOD

593

inasmuch as it is distinct from its created mode, this I deny. And I
deny the consequent and consequence.
For indeed, as stated, what is formally signified by “person” im­
plies only subsistent, intelligent, and free being, which can be called
ego. Thus in God, ego is what is formally signified by person, and
with reference to God, non-ego signifies possible things, and after
creation those things which, inferior to God, either are, will be, or
were created by Him.
Thus the name “person” is not predicated univocally of God and
created rational beings, but analogically, and this not only meta­
phorically but properly, so that what is formally signified by “person”
is in God formally and eminently as absolutely independent sub­
sistence, intellection, and free will.
Another objection. Every person must be endowed with self­
consciousness. But all self-consciousness necessarily implies limita­
tion, inasmuch as consciousness distinguishes the ego from the
non-ego. Therefore God is not a person.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that a person must have the created
mode of consciousness, this I deny; that a person can be without
such mode, this I concede. I distinguish the minor: that the created
mode of consciousness denotes limitation, this I concede; that what
is formally signified by consciousness denotes limitation, this I deny.
Evidently a created person as such is self-conscious, inasmuch as it
is this that makes such a person distinct from God and other created
persons. But nothing prevents God from being most perfectly con­
scious of Himself, inasmuch as He is the self-subsisting Being, and
by this He is distinct from possible beings and, after creation, from
created beings.
THE SANCTITY OF GOD

From what has been said about God’s will, it is evident that God
enjoys the highest degree of sanctity, because He is infinitely perfect
both in intellect and in will, and, as we shall see in the following
question, God infinitely and immutably loves His most perfect good­
ness for its own sake and as the measure of any moral good. Hence
God’s will, which is impeccable,309 is most holy; in fact, it is essential
sanctity.
Holy Scripture repeatedly asserts this, as in the following texts:
“The Lord is just in all His ways, and holy in all His works.” 370
“Who is like to Thee, glorious in holiness?”871 “Holy, Holy,
868 Cf. q.19, a.9.
878 Ps. 144:17.
877 Ex. 15: 11,

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THE ONE GOD

Holy,” 372 the seraphim proclaim Him to be. God is often called
‘The Holy One of Israel.” This sanctity is the exemplar of our
sanctity: “Be you therefore perfect as also your heavenly Father
is perfect.” 378
This sanctity of God, inasmuch as it is communicative, is called
benignity. This is declared many times in Holy Scripture: “When
Thou openest Thy hand, they shall all be filled with good.” 371 "O
how good and sweet is Thy spirit, O Lord, in all things.” 876 “Every
best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from
the Father of lights.” 378 Moreover, God in calling Himself Father,
expresses His readiness to be beneficent. In fact, “God so loved the
world as to give His only begotten Son.” 377 As St. Thomas says:
“It pertains to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own
good to others as much as is possible.” 378 Moreover, this benignity
of God is especially evident in His love and mercy toward creatures,
which we must now discuss.
Finally, from what has been said it is clear that there is infinite
beauty in God, in fact, essential beauty not only of the ontological
but also of the intellectual and moral orders.
For as St. Thomas says: “Beautiful things are those which please
when seen; hence beauty consists in due proportion,” 378 which
means that this requires unity in diversity or harmony, and splendor
of this unity as well as of truth and goodness.
But God most perfectly and essentially possesses the infinite pleni­
tude of being, intelligence, and goodness, of all perfections in the
highest unity of His Deity, so that it is said of His wisdom: “For she
is more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of the stars:
being compared with the light, she is found before it.” 880 “She is
the brightness of eternal light.” 381
Hence God by reason of His beauty is to Himself the fount of in­
finite delight and beatitude,382 and the vision of God produces in in­
tellectual creatures ineffable complacency and supreme joy. Thus
God is the first beauty, and the exemplar of all ontological, intellec­
tual, and moral beauty.
a” is. 6:3.
Sts Matt. 5: 48.
374 Ps. 103: 28.
sto Wis. 12: 1.
Sts James 1: 17.
s’T John 3: 16.
Sts Summa theol., q.19, a.2.
sto ibid., la, q.5, a.4 ad turn.
sso Wis. 7: 29.
ssi Ibid., 7: 26.
sssSee infra, q.26.

CHAPTER XX

Question 20
God’s Love

This question treats of God’s love as being the principal act of His
will: (1) its existence (a. 1); (2) its object (a. 2); (3) the mode of this
love (a. 4, 5): Whether God loves all things equally, or whether He
loves the better things more.
FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER LOVE EXISTS IN GOD

State of the question. The point of inquiry in this article is whether
love is formally and not merely virtually in God. It seems that love
is not formally in God, for love is a passion, and there are no pas­
sions in God. Moreover, love is of the same order as anger and sor­
row, and these are not in God. Lastly, love is a uniting force, the
connecting link between lovers. Hence this does not seem to exist
in God, who is most simple.
Yet the answer is: We must assert that in God there is love in the
strict sense, not merely metaphorically.
1) This conclusion is of faith and is expressed many times in Holy
Scripture. Thus we read: “God is charity.” 1
2) It is also proved by reason as follows: Love is the first act of
the will; but will is formally in God; therefore love is formally in
Him.
The major is evident from the fact that the will is specified by
lovable good, and its love of good is prior to its avoidance of evil,
and its love of good simply as such is prior to its sadness or its joy
by reason of the absence or presence of good. To love means nothing
else but to will good. Love is nothing else but the inclination to
good, or, if one is already in possession of good, as God is, then it
is complacency in the same. But this perfection includes no imper­
fection. Therefore love not only exists in God, but exists in Him
formally and eminently.2 It is not a question here of love as a pas11 John 4: 16.
2 Cf. ad aum.

595

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THE ONE GOD

sion, or as an act of the sensitive appetite, but as it is an act of the
intellectual appetite.3
Corollary. Joy is likewise formally in God, because it is satisfac­
tion in the good possessed. The reason is that there is no imperfec­
tion in the formal concept of joy, as there is none in the concept
of love. On the contrary, anger and sadness imply imperfection, and
can exist in God only virtually or metaphorically. Sadness is affliction
of mind because of present evil, and this sadness at having been of­
fended gives rise to anger, which is the appetite for revenge. Hence
when Holy Scripture says that God repents or is angry, this repent­
ance and anger must be understood in a metaphorical sense. Thus
anger signifies justice that inflicts the deserved punishment.
First doubt. Of what kind is the love by which God loves Himself?
The answer. From what has been said it is clear that God infinitely
and necessarily loves Himself.4 But this most eminent love is not, in
the strict sense either the love of concupiscence or of friendship, but
is something higher.8 For the love of concupiscence is that by which
we will something as being good especially for ourselves; and the
love of friendship is that by which we love another, wishing good
for the other as we wish it for ourselves. But God is absolutely identi­
fied with His love for Himself. Hence this love transcends both the
love of concupiscence and the love of friendship.
Objection. There is between the divine persons, for example, be­
tween the Father and the Son, a mutual and amicable love that is
accompanied by a supreme communication of good things. There­
fore the love of friendship exists formally in the divine persons.
Reply. I deny the antecedent; for this mutual love between the
divine persons is not formally such on the part of the act itself of
love, but only on the part of the Persons loving, who by one sole
act love Themselves. Hence it is not simply friendship, but some­
thing more than this, that is, it is not unifying love, but unity of
love and identity of good things.
Second doubt. Can zeal be properly attributed to God? It can,
because zeal is intense love that vigorously repels all that is contrary
to it; and there can be no imperfection in it, such as that of envy or
suspicion. Thus God is said to be zealous.3
Third doubt. Is hatred properly attributed to God?
Reply. The evil of enmity by which we will evil as such to another
is only metaphorically in God; for God does not will evil as such to
the sinner, but as it is a just punishment. Now, to be sure, the just
s Cf. ad lum.
* Summa theol., la, q.19, a. 2, 3.
» See John of St. Thomas' commentary on this article.
e Ex. 34: 14.

GOD’S LOVE

597

judge condemning the murderer to death, does not do this because of
hatred for him, but from love of justice. Far more so, does God do
this, of whom it is said: “Neither hath He pleasure in the destruc­
tion of the living,” 7 but loves justice. Thus the devil is strictly so,
the enemy of God; but God is not, strictly so, the enemy of the
devil.
But as for the hatred of abomination by which the just person de­
tests sin as an evil, it is disputed whether this is attributed properly
or only metaphorically to God. Suarez, Vasquez, and several modern
theologians affirm that it applies properly to God, because Holy
Scripture says that God hates iniquity, and that sin is displeasing to
Him. Hence they say that He formally detests it as simply evil, al­
though He permits it, and afterward punishes it.
On the contrary, St. Thomas says: “Hence (because God cannot
will evil) it appears that hatred of a thing cannot be ascribed (prop­
erly) to God. Just as love is related to good, so is hatred to evil; for we
will good to those we love, but evil to those we hate. Therefore if
God’s will cannot be inclined to evil, as wras said above,8 it is im­
possible for Him to hate anything.” 8 Hence several Thomists, such
as John of St. Thomas and Gonet, hold that hatred of iniquity is
only metaphorically or virtually in God, as a consequence of His
love of justice. They say that no act of the divine will refers strictly
to what is evil, either as to be pursued or as to be avoided, and that
it is directly in conflict with it. No act of God can be formally avoid­
ance of evil; for avoidance of evil belongs properly only to the
created will, since it is imperfect, and it may find itself opposed by
evil, and be prevented from attaining its good. But God’s will is
most perfect; no evil can oppose it and prevent it from attaining its
good. Therefore hatred of iniquity is not formally but virtually in
God, inasmuch as it is virtually contained in His love of justice, and
inasmuch as sin is directly opposed to His created virtue, that is,
to charity or justice. Similarly, reasoning is virtually contained in
the divine intellect. This seems at least to be the more probable
opinion.
Fourth doubt. Do hope and desire properly belong to God?
The answer is in the negative. The reason is that hope refers to
future good, which is something arduous or difficult of attainment,
and this cannot be said of God. But desire refers to absent good,
which is neither formally nor eminently possessed by the one who
desires it. But God possesses all things eminently.
r Wis. i: 14.
s Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 95.
» Ibid., chap. 96. See also the commentary of Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis) on
this chapter.

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THE ONE GOD
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD LOVES ALL THINGS

State of the question. It seems that God does not properly, but
only metaphorically, love things apart from Himself, for Dionysius
says: "Love places the lover outside himself,” 10 and this, so it seems,
would be an imperfection for God. Moreover, God’s love is eternal
and He alone is eternal; hence it seems that God loves only Himself
and not things apart from Himself.
Aristotle seems to admit this, even Plato, as also the Neoplatonists,
and among modern philosophers Spinoza, who maintains that the
world proceeds of necessity from God, but is not loved by Him.
But the answer is: God loves all existing things, and indeed in
the strict sense of the term.
1) This conclusion is of faith, for the Scripture says: “Thou lovest
all things that are, and hatest none of those things which Thou hast
made." 11 And in the New Testament we read: “God so loved the
world as to give His only begotten Son.” 12 Nor is there any rea­
son, as will immediately be stated, for restricting these words to a
metaphorical sense.
2) The proof from reason is as follows: To love anything is to
will good to that thing; but God wills good to all things that are,
were, or will be, that is, He wills at least their existence, which de­
pends on His divine will; therefore God properly loves all existing
things.
Moreover, “the love of God infuses and creates goodness (in
things),”13 whereas, on the contrary, our will is not the cause of the
goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, and thus it
calls forth our love, whereby we will the preservation and increase
of goodness in another.
Therefore God’s love with reference to creatures is in no way
passive, but active; in fact, it creates, conserves, and vivifies this love
in them. It does not presuppose lovableness in the object, but posits
this in it. Thus grace that makes one pleasing to God is the effect
of His love elevating us to a participation of His intimate life.14 Thus
the treatise on grace is connected with the treatise on God.
There is no imperfection in what is formally denoted by this
concept. However, God’s love of creatures is not said to be an ab10 De div. nom., Bk. IV, chap. i.
11 Wis. n: 25.
ii John 3: 16.
ii See end of argumentative part of this article.
1« Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 1 to, a. 1.

GOD’S LOVE

599

solutely simple perfection in the strict sense, because this love is a
free act, as stated above,15 and therefore it is not better for God to
have this love than not to have it.
Reply to first objection. The expression, “love places the lover
outside himself,” is improperly used to signify that the lover wills
good to the beloved; and in this latter, there is no imperfection.
Reply to second objection. As God knows future things eternally.
He loved them eternally. In fact, the creative action is eternal, al­
though its effect takes place in time. It is a formally immanent ac­
tion, and is only virtually transitive inasmuch as it produces an
external effect. Thus the effect is new, but not the action.
Reply to third objection. God loves rational creatures with the
love of friendship, inasmuch as He wills them good, especially the
good of eternal life. God, strictly speaking, does not love irrational
creatures with the love of friendship (because they are incapable of
returning this love and sharing in His life), but with the love of
quasi-concupiscence, inasmuch as He orders them to rational crea­
tures, and thus indirectly to Himself.
Reply to fourth objection. God loves sinners in so far as they be­
long to a certain kind of nature, and He preserves them in existence;
but He does not love them in so far as they are sinners, or as they
are deficient in good.
First doubt. Does God love possible things? He does not indeed
in the sense that He wills to give them existence, and this consti­
tutes the distinction between possible and future things. But God
loves His essence as it is infinitely capable of being participated in
ad extra; and as the number of possible things is infinite, so He loves
His omnipotence.
Second doubt. Does God love futuribilia, conditioned futures that
will not come into existence?
Reply. He loves these conditionally. We discussed this point when
treating of18 God’s antecedent will, which is conditional.
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD LOVES ALL THINGS EQUALLY

State of the question. The difficulty presents itself because we read
in Holy Scripture that “He hath equally care of all."17 Moreover,
God’s love, inasmuch as it is the unique uncreated act, does notio
*
io Ibid.., la, q.19, a.3.
Ibid., a. 6 ad lum.
I7 Wis. 6: 8.

6oo

THE ONE GOD

admit of degree. Lastly, God is not said to know some things more
than others. Therefore He does not love some things more than
others.
On the other hand, St. Augustine says: “God loves all things which
He has ihade, and among them rational creatures more, and of these
especially those who are members of His only begotten Son; and,
much more than all, His only-begotten Son Himself.” 18
The answer is that God loves all things equally on the part of
the very act of the will, because by one and the same act He loves all
things. But He does not love all things equally on the part of the
good willed, but He loves the better things more.
The first part requires no special proof, for there are not several
acts in God differing in intensity. Hence the saying, "God has equally
care of all,” 18 because He administers all things with a like wisdom
and goodness.20
The second part of the proof presents no difficulty. On the part of
the good willed, we are said to love that one more than another,
for whom we will a greater good, although we do not will with
greater intensity. But God wills a greater good for some creatures
than for others; for some He wills only existence, for others life, for
others intelligence, for others the life of grace, for others the life
of glory, and for Christ the hypostatic union. Therefore God does
not love all things equally on the part of the good willed.
Corollary. This is expressed at the end of the argumentative part
of this article as follows: "Since God’s love is the cause of goodness
in things (a. 2), no one thing would be better than another, if God
did not will greater good for one than for another.” This can be
called the “principle of predilection,” and it is most universal. It
holds good for whatever being is better than another: for the plant
with reference to the stone, for the animal with reference to the
plant, for man with reference to the animal, for the just person with
reference to the wicked one, for the elect with reference to others.
The doctrine of gratuitous predestination is virtually contained
in this principle. There is a better explanation of this doctrine in
the following article, in which we see that it is both a naturally
knowable and a revealed truth.
is Tract, in Joan., 110.
is Cf. ad mm.
20 On the contrary it is proper for us to love God more intensively than crea­
tures. For the observance of the precept, indeed, it suffices that we love God
appraisively above all things: but the saints in heaven also love God intensively
above all things, which is what we must strive to do.

GOD’S LOVE

601

FOURTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD ALWAYS LOVES THE BETTER THINGS MORE

State of the question. The difficulty arises from the following con­
siderations. (i) Although Christ is better than the whole human race,
yet "God delivered Him up for us all.” 21 Therefore it seems that He
loves the human race more than He loves Christ. (2) An angel is
better than a man, and yet God showed that He loved men more by
sending them His Son. (3) Peter was better than John, since he loved
Christ more, as our Lord’s question shows: "Simon, son of John,
lovest thou Me more than these?” 22 Yet Jesus loved John more, who
was called tire disciple whom Jesus loved. (4) The innocent man is
better than the repentant, and yet it is said: “There shall be joy in
heaven upon one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninetynine just who need not penance.” 23 (5) The just man who is fore­
known (not predestined) is better than the predestined sinner, and yet
God loves the predestined sinner more.
Nevertheless the answer is: “The reason why some things are bet­
ter than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it
follows that He loves the better things more.
1) This truth is expressed clearly in revelation, as stated in various
texts of Holy Scripture. Thus we read: “How could anything endure
(in good), if Thou wouldst not? 24 And our Lord said: “Without Me
you can do nothing,” 25 in the order of salvation. “For He saith to
Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will
show mercy to whom I will show mercy. So then it is not of him
that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth
mercy.” 20 Thus of the two thieves who died on Calvary, one of them
by God’s special mercy was saved. This is the principle of predilec­
tion, namely, that no one would be better than another unless loved
more by God. This principle virtually contains, as we said, the whole
doctrine of predestination, according to which some attain to eternal
life and are called the elect, because they were loved and helped more
by God.22
2) For this answer the proof from reason is more than a theological
conclusion since it is a truth revealed in Holy Scripture. It is as
22 Rom. 8: 32.
22 John 21: 15.
23 Luke 15: 7.
21 Wis. 11: 26.
25 John 15:5.
23 Rom. 9: 15; Ex. 33: 19.
22 Summa theol., la, q.23, a.4, 5.

6O2

THE ONE GOD

follows: God's will is the cause of goodness in things;28 but God’s
love for anything is greater in so far as He wills a greater good foi
it; therefore the reason why some things are better than others, is
that God wills a greater good for them.
This conclusion follows as a corollary from the principle of cau­
sality, and may be fully expressed as follows: Every contingent being
requires a cause, and in the final analysis the first cause, which is
God. Thus God is the cause of the entity and goodness of things.
Hence no being would be better than another unless God willed a
greater good for this being than for another, as it was already stated
in the preceding article.
It must be observed that this principle, as thus expressed, concerns
God’s consequent will, on which depends any good whatever that
here and now happens, whereas what really can happen depends on
His antecedent will, such as that His commandments can really be
observed, even when they are not actually observed.29
Moreover, this principle is most universal and admits of no ex­
ception, that is, it applies to all created beings, and especially to
men and angels, in this sense that no one would be better than an­
other (by an act easy or difficult to perform, natural or supernatural,
first or final), unless he were loved more by God.
This principle is declared by St. Augustine when he says of the good
and bad angels: “If both the good and bad (angels) were created
equally good, then, whereas the latter fell by their evil will, the
former were more abundantly assisted, and reached that state of
complete happiness which made them absolutely certain of never
losing it.” 80 This means that, as men are predestined, so the good
angels were previously loved, chosen, and predestined.
The solution of the objections confirms this conclusion.
Reply to first objection. “God loves Christ more than He loves
the entire created universe because He willed for Him the greater
good in giving Him a name that is above all names, in so far a', He
was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when
God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race;
rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror,” since he be­
came the conqueror of sin, the devil, and death. Farther on we find
St. Thomas saying: “Had sin not existed, the incarnation would not
have been”;81 but he adds: “There is no reason, however, why hu­
man nature should not have been raised to something greater after
sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good
28 Ibid., q. ig, a. 4.
!« Cf. ibid., a.6 ad lum.
so De civitate Dei, Bk. XII, chap. 9.
•i Summa theol., Illa, q. 1, a.3.

GOD’S LOVE

603

therefrom. Hence it is written (Rom. 5: 20): ‘‘Where sin abounded,
grace did more abound.” Hence, too, in the blessing of the paschal
candle, we say: "O happy fault that merited such and so great a
Redeemer.” This means that, had sin not existed, the incarnation
would not have been; but, on the other hand, God permitted Adam’s
sin and original sin only for a greater good, and after the Fall this
greater good is known to be the redemptive incarnation, which is
the source of all our graces. Hence the doctrine of this article is
confirmed, namely, that no one thing would be better than another
unless it were loved more by God, and Christ was and is loved by
God more than the entire created universe.
Reply to second objection. “God loves the human nature assumed
by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all
the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of
union with the Godhead. . . . God therefore did not assume human
nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but be­
cause the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house
may give to a sick servant some more costly delicacy, which he does
not give to his own son in sound health.”
But the fallen angels were incapable of redemption because, as
stated farther on, ‘‘the angel’s free will is flexible to either opposite
before the choice but not after,” 32 so that their choice is a participa­
tion in the immutability of the divine choice.
Reply to third objection. As to whether Christ loved Peter more
than John, St. Thomas remarks at the end of his reply, that “it may
seem presumptuous to pass judgment” on which of the two, either
Peter or John, Christ loved more with the love of charity. It is also
presumptuous to say which of the two God loved more, absolutely
speaking, and ordained to a greater degree of eternal glory. For, as
the Scripture says: “The Lord is the weigher of spirits,” 33 and there
is no other. Moreover, there is no certain statement about this in
revelation.
Reply to fourth objection: “Whether innocent or penitent, those
are the better and the better loved who have more grace. Other things
being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved.
God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent,
because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and
fervent.” From this something of great importance follows concern­
ing predestination. It is that, if one of two sinners rises from sin,
this is solely because of God’s special mercy, who converts one rather
than another. But if anyone keeps baptismal innocence until death,
Ibid., la, q.64, a. 2.
»8 Prov. 16: 2.

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THE ONE GOD

this is a sign of God’s greater grace, who thus preserved such a per­
son in the performance of good works.
Reply to fifth objection. The non-predestined just person is better
than the predestined sinner, although according to some other time
he is worse.
Corollary. The validity and importance of the principle of pre­
dilection.
Hence the principle enunciated in the preceding article remains
intact, namely, that, other things being equal, no one thing would
be better than another unless it were loved more by God, or unless
God willed it a greater good. Hence God loves the better things more.
The whole doctrine of gratuitous predestination, which is explained
farther on,34 is virtually contained in this most exalted and most
universal principle.
Moreover, this most exalted principle precludes from either pri­
ority or posteriority, which are expressed in the formulas: “before
the foreseeing of merits” and “after the foreseeing of merits,” and
in some measure it transcends the distinction between the orders of
intention and execution. But, as we have already clearly seen, it con­
tains virtually, as it were from on high, what is called predestination
before the "foreseeing of merits.” In a manner more sublime it ab­
stracts from the less important principles on which perhaps too much
stress is laid at times, whereas it does not present clearly enough this
principle of predilection.
This exalted principle presupposes with reference to our salutary
acts, whether easy or difficult to perform, that God’s consequent will
is of itself efficacious, and that consequently grace is of itself effica­
cious, and not because our consent was foreseen by God.
Therefore Molina indirectly denies this principle of predilection
when he says that grace is not of itself efficacious, by asserting that
“of two that are called and equally aided by grace, it can happen
that one of them is converted and the other not. In fact, it is possible
for one who has received a less grace to rise again, when another who
has received a greater grace does not rise again, and remains obdu­
rate.” 36
This principle is likewise indirectly denied for salutary acts easy
to perform, by the congruism of the Sorbonne. Thus Tournely held
that grace of itself efficacious is required only for salutary acts dif­
ficult to perform, but not for easy ones, as if greater and less differ­
entiated the species. Then if this principle admitted of exceptions,
it would no longer be metaphysically certain.
Summa theol., la, q.23, a. 1-5.
Concordia, pp. 51, 565 (Paris ed.). Consult also the index of this work under
the word "Auxilium.”
m

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605

It is likewise indirectly denied by the Augustinians, such as Berthi
and Noris, who in the time of Jansenism wrote and admitted that
grace of itself efficacious is required only as a consequence of original
sin, because of the moral weakness of human nature, but not because
of man’s dependence on God. Hence they indirectly denied the prin­
ciple of predilection for the state of innocence and for the angels, as
if Molinism truly applied to the angels. But a metaphysical principle
that admits of exceptions is no longer metaphysical, and is, more­
over, of no value. On the contrary, the sublimity and absolute uni­
versality of this exalted principle so beautifully illustrates all
questions concerning grace and predestination, either for men in any
state of life, or for the angels.

CHAPTER XXI
Question 21

The Justice

and

Mercy of God

After considering the divine love, we must treat of God’s justice

and mercy. For they are virtues that reside in the will, the principal
act of which is love. Then providence will be discussed, which is a
virtue of the practical intellect, inasmuch as it analogically corre­
sponds to our prudence and especially to that part which provides
for future things.1
There are no other virtues in God, because the rest imply imper­
fection. For it is evident that faith, which is obscure, cannot be in
God; nor can there be hope, which concerns future good that is
difficult of attainment. But charity corresponds to the uncreated act
of love, which was discussed in the previous question. Nor can there
be any moral virtues in God by which Fie is referred to another
either as His superior or equal, such as religion and piety; nor are
there in Him those virtues that regulate the passions, such as tem­
perance and fortitude, which in us reside in the sensitive appetite
as directed by reason, although fortitude bears a certain resemblance
to omnipotence, which is discussed in a subsequent question.2
But this twenty-first question decides: (1) whether there is justice
in God and of what kind; (2) whether justice is identical with truth
of which Holy Scripture speaks, associating it with mercy: (3)
whether mercy is in God, and how it can be analogically and prop­
erly attributed to Him without denoting imperfection; (4) whether
mercy and justice are to be found in every work of God.
first article

WHETHER THERE IS JUSTICE IN GOD

State of the question. The principal difficulty is that the act of
justice is to pay what is due, or what is peculiarly one’s own. There­
fore justice is not attributed properly to God, not even analogically,
but only metaphorically.
1 Cf. Summa theol., la, q.21, a.i ad lum.
2 Cf. q.25.
606

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD

607

Yet the answer is: Justice belongs properly to God, and there are
very many texts in Holy Scripture that show this to be of faith. Thus
we read: “The Lord is just and hath loved justice.” 3
In these texts God’s justice is clearly seen as His constant will of
giving to all what is due to them, in accordance with their nature
and condition, and in view of their merits as ordained and promised
by God.
It must be noted that Luther implicitly denied God’s justice, as­
serting that the just person, even though he was a murderer and
unchaste, can never be punished by the supreme Judge. Likewise, in
our times, those impious persons who deny punishments in the
future life, also contradict God’s justice.
There is only the difficulty as to what kind of justice is properly
attributed to God. Now justice, as explained in the treatise on this
virtue, is divided into general and particular, which is again sub­
divided into commutative and distributive.
General justice, however, is of two kinds. There is legal justice,
that refers to the common good in accordance with law, and equity
or epikeia, which regards the spirit of the law more than its letter,
which, if it were applied in certain cases, would be more severe, ac­
cording to the saying: "extreme law, extreme injustice.” But since
this twofold general justice is, as St. Thomas says,·1 by way of a master­
craft in the king who commands, and administratively in his sub­
jects, it is evident that this exists formally in God, who is the King
of kings and the Lord of lords. Thus God takes care of all things,
providing for the common good of all things in the universe, as be­
fitting the manifestation of divine goodness.
Therefore this leaves only the difficulty concerning distributive
and commutative justice to be considered. St. Thomas examines this
difficulty in the body of this article.5
Reply. Commutative justice does not belong properly and for­
mally to God, because the obligation of commutative justice arises
from this, that another gave us something belonging to himself over
which we had no dominion. But man and angel can give God noth­
ing that is not already His and under His dominion. Even our free
action is under God’s dominion, just as all created beings are. Hence
St. Paul says: “Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall
be made him?” ® Therefore commutative justice does not exist prop­
erly and formally in God.
s Ps. 10: 8. See also Deut. 10: 17; 32: 4; Prov. 8: 18; Jer. 23: 6; Dan. 9: 14;
Zach. 9: 9; Acts 10: 34; Eph. 6: 9; Col. 3: 25; II Tim. 4: 8: I Pet. 1: 17; I John 1: 9:
Apoc. 16: 5.
« Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.58, a. 6.
» See also Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 93.
« Rom. 11: 35.

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THE ONE GOD

Objection. One who is under obligation by reason of a pact or
promise to reward another, if a certain work is performed, is bound
by commutative justice. But God put Himself under such an obliga­
tion, for He says of Himself: “Call the laborers and pay them their
hire.” 7 In fact, St. Thomas says: “This form of the divine judgment
is in accordance with the conditions of commutative justice, in so
far as rewards are apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.” 8
Reply. I distinguish the major: That one who is thus under obli­
gation by reason of a pact or promise to reward another, is bound by
commutative justice, if what is given is not already belonging to the
other by right, this I concede; otherwise, I deny the major. I con­
tradistinguish the minor in like manner. Hence, on God’s part, the
obligation is one of fidelity, but not of commutative justice. But if
it is said that the kingdom of heaven is obtained by good works,
then this is said metaphorically.
As for the difficulty arising from the text quoted by St. Thomas,
it must be said that God in rewarding adheres to the mode of com­
mutative justice, because He gives so much for so much; but this
divine act is not properly and formally an act of commutative jus­
tice, for the reason already given. Similarly vindictive justice, in so
far as it exists in God, pertains to commutative justice only as re­
gards the mode of retribution; but as regards the debt incurred, it
seems to belong more to legal or distributive justice.9
Distributive justice, however, is found formally in God. It is that
justice whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank de­
serves. But this is perfection that excludes all imperfection, and it
most fittingly applies to God as the supreme lord and ruler of the
universe. Therefore distributive justice is found formally in God.
Experience clearly shows that God distributes to all creatures what
is necessary so that they can attain their end, although all do not
actually do so.
Objection. Distributive justice implies the payment of what is
due. But God is debtor to nobody. Therefore distributive justice
does not properly and formally belong to God.
In accordance with the reply to the third objection of this article,
we may say: I distinguish the major: I concede that distributive
justice implies the payment of what is due, sometimes as dependent
on the proper ordering of the one who distributes, as in the distribu­
tion of one’s own as reward; I deny that the payment of what is due
is always independent of this ordering. I contradistinguish the minor:
that God is debtor to nobody, independently of His ordering, this I
7 Matt, ao: 8.
» Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.6i. a.4 ad mm.
« See below after the second article, corollaries concerning vindictive justice.

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD

609

concede; as dependent on it, this I deny. Hence it is said that God
is a debtor to Himself to give to all creatures what is necessary so
that they can attain their end. Wherefore it is stated in the reply to
the third objection: "It is due to God that there should be fulfilled
in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests
His goodness. In this respect God’s justice regards what befits Him
inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself." Simi­
larly, St. Thomas says: "Since our action has the character of merit
only on the supposition of the divine ordination, it does not follow
that God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it
is right that His will should be carried out.” 10
But I insist. In distributive justice he who disposes of anything
abdicates his right over the thing disposed of and transfers it to an­
other. But God cannot abdicate His right over created things. There­
fore distributive justice does not belong formally to God.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that sometimes he who disposes
of something abdicates his right over the thing disposed of, this I
concede; that he does so always, this I deny. Thus the sovereign
preserves intact distributive justice by bestowing goods in common
use by way of emphyteusis, though retaining direct dominion over
them. Thus God, though retaining His supreme dominion over all
created things, grants us dominion inferior and subordinate to
His.11
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER THE JUSTICE OF GOD IS TRUTH

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to explain
these words: “Mercy and truth have met each other; justice and peace
have kissed,” 12 in which, according to the context and tradition,
truth stands for justice.
The difficulty is, however, that truth resides in the intellect,
whereas justice is in the will. If there is a virtue that is called truth
or rather veracity, it is a virtue that is annexed to justice, but is not,
however, justice itself.
But the answer is: God’s justice is fittingly called truth. The reason
is that, since the divine intellect is the rule and measure of things,
the truth of these things consists in their conformity with the divine
intellect. Similarly, our works are called just according as they are
in conformity with the divine law. But God’s justice establishes
things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is
10 Summa theol., la ()ae, q.i 14, a.i ad gum.
11 Consult John of St. Thomas on this article.
12 Ps. 84: 11.

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THE ONE GOD

the law of His justice. Therefore God’s justice is fittingly called truth.
Reply to first objection. Justice, as to tire law that governs, resides
in the intellect; but God’s knowledge is the cause of things in so far
as His will is joined to it, and command is an act in which the in­
tellect and will concur.
Reply to second objection. The truth of justice is thus distinct
from God’s veracity, but they are interrelated.
COROLLARIES
THE PRINCIPAL ACTS OF DIVINE JUSTICE

There are three acts: (i) to give everyone his due in accordance
with his nature and condition; (2) to inflict the punishment that is
due to sins; (3) to assign the reward that is due to one’s merits. This
second aspect of justice is called vindictive, and the third remunera­
tive.
1) Divine justice is the just distribution of natural goods and super­
natural helps, without which it is impossible for any creature to at­
tain its end. St. Thomas says on this point: “As then the proper order
displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice
of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen
both in things of nature and in things of the will, shows forth the
justice of God.’’13
This is affirmed by Christ our Lord in His Sermon on the Mount:
“Do not be solicitous for your life, what you shall eat; nor for your
body, what you shall put on. Is not the life more than the meat,
and the body more than the raiment? Behold the birds of the air,
for they neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns; and your heav­
enly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much more value than they?
. . . For your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things.
Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all
these things shall be added unto you.” 14 If there is a just distribution
of material goods, far more so must there be a just distribution of
spiritual goods: “Is not the life more than the meat?"
Nevertheless, without injustice on God’s part, there is great in­
equality of both natural and supernatural conditions. The inequality
of natural conditions in the human race already existed in the state
of original justice, for, as St. Thomas says: “Man is naturally a social
being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social
life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless
under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many,
is Summa theol., la, q.21, a. 1, c. See also ad jum.
14 Matt. 6: 25 f. Consult St. Thomas’ Commentary on St. Matthew.

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD

611

as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. . . . The
natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man.” 1B
Similarly, there are hierarchies among the angels, for some dominate
others. In fact, inequality among creatures, which is necessary so as
to make them specifically different, is required for the fitting mani­
festation of divine goodness, and this cannot be sufficiently made
manifest by one creature or by several that are absolutely equal.
Thus no one collects a thousand copies of Virgil of the same edition
and binding for his library. St. Thomas shows farther on 10 that the
universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were
found in things. Similarly, the plant would not be perfect if all its
parts consisted of flowers, nor would the human body be perfect if
all its parts were equal in dignity to the eye. Thus God has estab­
lished inequality among creatures, and also inequality of conditions
in the human race.
But after original sin, as also by reason of the concupiscence of
the flesh, the eyes, and the pride of life, this inequality of natural
conditions has been very much increased and accentuated, so that
some are extremely wealthy and others are in dire need and distress.
Hence Christ said: "But woe to you that are rich, for you have your
consolation; woe to you that are filled, for you shall hunger; woe
to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep.” 17 These
words are a condemnation of the inordinate love of riches. The Gos­
pel also records what our Lord said about the wicked rich man and
the good beggar Lazarus.18
Wherefore, among the signs of His Messianic office, Jesus declares
that "the poor have the gospel preached to them”;10 and in the
beginning of His Sermon on the Mount, in proclaiming the evangeli­
cal beatitudes, He shows that inequality of natural conditions is not
infrequently compensated by inequality of graces inasmuch as “God
resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble.” 20 Thus He says:
"Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land. Blessed are
they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. Blessed are the merci­
ful, for they shall obtain mercy. . . . Blessed are they that suffer per­
secution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.” 21
In this we see clearly that the highest degree of distributive justice
is joined indeed to mercy, and this justice is also expressed in the
is Summa theol., la, q.96, a.4.
it Ibid., q.47, a. 2.
ir Luke 6: 24 f.
is Ibid.., 16: 25.
*s Matt. 11: 5.
20 Jas. 4: 6.
21 Matt. 5: 3 f.

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THE ONE GOD

Magnificat in these words: “He hath put down the mighty from their
seat and hath exalted the humble. He hath filled the hungry with
good things, and the rich He hath sent empty away.’’2223
This distributive justice as regards the distribution of graces is
clearly seen in this, that, as St. Augustine says, "God commands not
impossibilities, but, by commanding both admonishes thee to do
what thou art able, and to ask for what thou art not able (to do).” 28
Thus the common saying: To one who does what he can (with the
help of actual grace) God does not refuse to give (habitual) grace.
Thus God gives sufficient grace to all adults, by which the fulfillment
of an actually pressing obligation is made really possible. The effica­
cious grace is offered to us in the sufficient grace, just as the fruit is
contained in the flower; but if man resists this sufficient grace, he
deserves to be deprived of the efficacious grace by which de facto he
could have effectively observed God’s commandments.
Hence God’s distributive justice is preserved intact even as regards
infidels, as Pius IX declared in the following statement: “It is known
to us and to you that those who labor under invincible ignorance
concerning our most holy religion and who, diligently observing the
natural law and its precepts that are engraved in the hearts of all
by God, and being ready to obey Him, lead an honest and upright
life, can, through the operative power of divine light and grace, at­
tain eternal life, since God, who clearly intuits, scrutinizes, and
knows the minds, impulses, thoughts, and habits of all, because of
His supreme goodness and clemency, by no means will allow any­
one to be punished eternally who was not guilty of any willful of­
fense.” 24 Similarly, St. Thomas had said: “If anyone, brought up as
a savage, were guided by the light of natural reason in seeking good
and avoiding evil, it must be held as most certain that God would
make known to such a person either by an interior revelation what
must be believed, or else He would direct someone to preach the
faith to such a person, just as He sent Peter to Cornelius.” 25
All these things pertain to distributive justice whereby God dis­
tributes to all creatures what is necessary so that they can attain
their end. Thus God sees to it that the adult is not without the
necessary help to escape damnation and, if such a person is lost, it is
his own fault.
Not all indeed received five talents, for some received only one; but
if they did not resist this divine grace, they would receive many
22 Luke i: 52.
23 PL, XLIV, 271; cf. Denz., no. 804.
2< Denz., no. 1677. See also no. 1648.
25 De veritate, q. 14, a. 11 ad ium; cf. Acts, chap. 10.

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613

others. Not infrequently, as we said, it is by inequality of graces that
there is compensation on God's part for this inequality of natural
conditions, especially so in the case of poverty. Hence in these cases
not only does distributive justice remain unimpaired, but it is often
wonderfully made manifest.
2) Another act of distributive justice is to inflict the punishment
that is due to sin. Thus the Gospel records the following words as
being addressed to the wicked rich man after his death: “Son, re­
member that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime, and like­
wise Lazarus evil things; but now he is comforted; and thou art
tormented.” 26 As St. Thomas clearly explains: “Whatever rises up
against an order to which it belongs, is put down by that order or
by the principle thereof. . . . (But) whoever sins, . . . acts against
reason, and against human divine law. Wherefore he incurs a three­
fold punishment; one, inflicted by himself, namely, remorse of con­
science; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God,27
as the just judge who, without any passion, inflicts the punishment
through love of His justice and infinite goodness that must be loved
above all things. Thus vindictive justice belongs properly or for­
mally to God.28
In this there is most just retribution, which is according to the
proportion between the punishment and the sin. Thus venial sin is
punished by temporal punishment, and mortal sin that is not for­
given in this life, but that has become irreparable through the sin
of final impenitence, is justly punished by eternal punishment, for
as St. Thomas says: “Sin incurs a debt of punishment through dis­
turbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains.
Therefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains, the debt
of punishment must remain also. . . . Consequently, if a sin de­
stroys the principle of the order whereby man’s will is subject to God,
there will be a deordination such as to be considered in itself
irreparable, although it is possible to repair this by the power of
God. Now the principle of this order is the last end to which man
2« Luke 16: 25.
22Summa theol., la Hae, q.87, a.i.
28 It is quite clear that eternal punishments, of which there is evidence in Holy
Scripture (Matt. 25: 41, 46), because of their eternity can be only vindictive: for
they are not inflicted either to correct the damned or to deter them from evil,
although the punishments are medicinal for others.
From what has been said it is also apparent that vindictive justice follows as
a result of God’s sanctity. For the moral order, which is the image of God’s
sanctity that is freely willed by Him, cannot be maintained unless there can be
a recourse to punishments for sins, and punishments that are vindictive and not
merely corrective of a will confirmed in malice and refusing any correction.

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THE ONE GOD

adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from
God, so as to destroy charity, considered in itself, they incur a debt
of eternal punishment.” 29
If therefore these sins are not forgiven before death, final im­
penitence, supervening upon this irreparable perversion of the order,
is made permanent, and it is then de facto punished by eternal pun­
ishment. Proportionate contrition and satisfaction are required in
strictest justice for a deliberate sin, and when these are wanting
punishment is inflicted so that the order may be preserved.90
It is a manifestation of mercy, however, that sinners who have
many times fallen into mortal sin, frequently and repeatedly turn
again to God; but they must fear lest, falling again into mortal sin,
it may never be forgiven, because they did not know the time of
God’s visitation.91 This concerns the question of the inscrutable
mystery of predestination. Nevertheless we must always hope in
God’s mercy.
3) Finally, there is another act of divine justice, which consists in
the admirable assignment of rewards, and these in just proportion.
Thus we read: “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the
kingdom of heaven. Blessed are the meek, blessed are they that mourn,
2« Summa theol., la Hae, 9-87, a.3.
so As St. Thomas says (ibid., ad 311m): "God does not delight in punishments
for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which re­
quires them.” He wills the manifestation of His justice by proclaiming the in­
alienable right of His infinite goodness to be loved above all things. The act of
supreme legal justice consists in this, that it must compensate for the imper­
fections of human justice which does not always punish as it ought or assign
the fitting reward; for great crimes committed here below sometimes go un­
punished, and heroic virtues, since they remain hidden, are unrewarded. But on
Judgment Day all these things will be revealed, and then the splendor of divine
justice will be made manifest.
It is not derogatory to God’s goodness and mercy to impose eternal punish­
ment upon one for mortal sin that is not forgiven or for final impenitence. In
inflicting this punishment God freely and rightly wills to manifest His most holy
love for justice, and consequently His hatred of iniquity, having set aside the
manifestation of His mercy. In fact, those are unworthy of this mercy who depart
this life in a state of final impenitence, not asking for forgiveness. Nevertheless,
as stated farther on (q.21. a.4 ad turn), "even in the damnation of the reprobates
mercy is seen, since God punishes them short of their deserts."
Hermes, although he did not deny eternal punishments, asserted that vindictive
justice is derogatory to the ultimate end of God’s operation ad extra, because he
considered that this end was the happiness of creatures rather than the mani­
festation of God’s goodness and perfections. It must be observed, however, that
God is most free in the exercise of His vindictive justice, so that He can pardon
the repentant sinner, without inflicting any punishment. For it is the privilege
of the supreme legislator and supreme judge that he can grant pardon outright
for an offense. (Cf. infra, q.21, a.3 ad aum).
»1 Cf. Luke 19: 44.

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD

615

blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, blessed are the
merciful, blessed are the clean of heart, blessed are the peacemakers,
blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs
is the kingdom of heaven.’’82 But there must be purity of inten­
tion and a certain proportion between merit and reward. Therefore
our Lord says: “Take heed that you do not your justice before
men, to be seen by them; otherwise you shall not have a reward
of your Father who is in heaven.” 88 In these words our Lord ad­
monishes us to strive for the simplicity of a pure intention. Hence
He says of the hypocrites who give alms so as to be honored by men,
that “they have received their reward,” 84 namely, human praise. On
the contrary, “that thy alms may be in secret; and thy Father who
seeth in secret, will repay thee.” 85
God’s mercy and justice both intervene here in accordance with
the following text from St. Paul: “I have fought a good fight, I have
finished my course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid
up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will
render to me in that day; and not only to me, but to them also that
love His coming.” 80 And the degree of the light of glory will corre­
spond to the degree of charity in each of the blessed.
THIRD ARTICLE
WHETHER MERCY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO GOD

State of the question. The difficulty is that mercy seems to be a kind
of sorrow. But there is no sorrow in God. Moreover, it seems that
mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what apper­
tains to His justice; for He cannot deny Himself. Hence it seems that
mercy is only metaphorically in God, just as anger is.
Yet the answer is: Mercy belongs properly or formally to God.
1) It is of faith, as attested by many texts in Holy Scripture and
by the common interpretation of the Church, although there is no
special and solemn definition on this point that is already most
certain.
The following are some of the texts from Holy Scripture: “The
Lord is compassionate and merciful, longsuffering and plenteous in
mercy.” 87 “The mercies of the Lord I will sing forever.” 85 “Show
32 Matt. 5: 3 f. See also Luke 6: 23.
33 Ibid., 6: 1.
si Ibid., 6: 2.
33 Ibid., 6: 4.
3β π Tim. 4: 8.
Ps. 102: 8; see also Ps. 110: 4; 144: 8.
»« Ibid., 88: 1.

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THE ONE GOD

forth Thy wonderful mercies; Thou who savest them that trust in
Thee.” 39 “From the morning watch even until night, let Israel hope
in the Lord. Because with the Lord there is mercy, and with Him
plentiful redemption.” 40 In the psalms and the prophetical books
often the same three ideas are found inseparable, namely, man in his
misery invoking God’s mercy that the glory of God may be made
manifest. Thus we read: “Help us, O God, our Savior; and for the
glory of Thy name, O Lord, deliver us and forgive us our sins for
Thy name’s sake.” 41 "We have sinned . . . and trespassed in all
things ... ; but deal with us according to Thy meekness and ac­
cording to the multitude of Thy mercies. And deliver us according to
Thy wonderful works, and give glory to Thy name, O Lord.” 42 Thus
the prophets see that God’s mercy in its effect is the highest mani­
festation of His goodness and omnipotence. In fact, they say: “The
earth, O Lord, is full of Thy mercy.” 43 The ideal of this revelation
is reached in the following text of the New Testament: “For God
so loved the world as to give His only begotten Son, that whosoever
believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting.” 44
Thus mercy was the motive of the incarnation.45 St. Paul often speaks
of the riches of God’s mercy and grace, as in the following text: “God,
who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charily wherewith He loved
us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together
in Christ.” 46 God’s mercy toward the children of Israel is described
at length in the Old Testament,42 and the mercy of Christ, the good
Shepherd, is taught in all the parables, as in the parable of the
prodigal son, and throughout the Gospel.
But it must be shown by a theological argument that what is
formally meant by mercy implies no imperfection, and, as St. Thomas
says, “is especially to be attributed to God.” This is clearly shown in
die argumentative part of the article.
The holy doctor distinguishes in human mercy toward those who
are in misery between being affected with sorrow at the misery of
another and dispelling the misery of this other. But this sorrow, by
reason of the subject of this sorrow, constitutes the material part
of mercy; whereas, on the other hand, by reason of the object of this
ss Ibid., 16: 7.
«0 Ibid., 129: 6 f.
«1 Ibid., 78: 9.
42 Dan. 3: 29.
« Ps. 118: 64.
44 John 3: 16.
Summa theol., Illa, q. 1, a.3.
46 Eph. 2: 4 f.
42 Wis. chaps. 11, is.

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sorrow, the inclination of the will to alleviate the misery of another
constitutes the formal element in sorrow.
But, although sorrow over the misery of another does not belong
to God, to dispel the misery of another implies no imperfection, and
belongs especially to God. For defects are not removed except by the
perfection of some kind of goodness. But the primary source of good­
ness is God, who is essential goodness. Therefore mercy, according
to its formal signification, belongs properly and not merely meta­
phorically to God.
Mercy in this sense is a most beautiful example of the analogy of
proper proportionality. There is a relation of proportion between
God’s merciful attitude toward sinners imploring His pardon and
that of man toward those who are in misery, all imperfections being
removed, such as sorrow or a feeling of compassion.
In like manner, St. Thomas says in discussing the virtue of mercy:
“A virtue may take precedence of other virtues in two ways: first,
in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In itself, mercy
takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be
bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their wants,
which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is ac­
counted as being proper to God, and therein His omnipotence and
goodness are declared to be chiefly manifested.
On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the
greatest virtue, unless that subject is greater than all others, surpassed
by none and excelling all, since for him that has anyone above him
it is better to be united to that which is above than to supply the
defect of that which is beneath.” 48 Hence in us the most sublime
of all virtues is charity, which unites us with God, but "of all the
virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest.” 49
St. Thomas most correctly distinguishes between the virtue of
mercy and the emotion of commiseration, which is a praiseworthy
inclination of the sensitive appetite, and is not a virtue.50 So also
there is a distinction between the virtue of chastity and a sense of
shame; but chastity implies imperfection, whereas the virtue of mercy
does not. In fact, as St. Thomas remarks,51 if the weak and timid
are especially inclined to feeling compassion for others, on account
of the possibility of suffering, in like manner the virtue of mercy
pertains especially to the perfect, who so excel in goodness and
fortitude that they can dispel the misery of others. Thus mercy beSumma theol., Ila Ilae, q.30, a.4.
Ibid.
so Ibid.
51 Ibid., a.i.

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THE ONE GOD

longs especially to God. “God takes pity on us through love alone,
inasmuch as He loves us as belonging to Him.” 52 Consequently, there
is neither anthropomorphism nor sentimentality in this, but purely
revealed truth that has been theologically explained. The motive o£
divine mercy is not properly the misery of the creature (this being
the matter about which it is concerned), but it is God’s goodness to
be made manifest in the alleviation of a person’s misery.
First doubt. What is the difference between God’s mercy, goodness,
justice, and liberality?
Reply. As stated in the body of the article, "to bestow perfections
appertains not only to God’s goodness, but also to His justice,
liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicat­
ing of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness.
But, in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the
bestowal of them belongs to justice. In so far as God does not bestow
them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs
to liberality. In so far as perfection given to things by God expels
defects, it belongs to mercy.” What is here said explains the doctrine
of the following article.
Second doubt. How is it that mercy which forgives sin that has been
committed, is not a relaxation of vindictive justice that must inflict
the punishment for sin?
The reply to the second objection answers this as follows: “God
acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing
something more than justice. Thus a man who pays another person
two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred,
does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The
case is the same with one who pardons an offense committed against
him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the
Apostle calls remission a forgiving. “Forgiving one another even as
God hath forgiven you in Christ.” 63 Hence it is clear that mercy does
not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fullness thereof. And thus it is
said: “Mercy exalteth itself above judgment.” 01
I insist. But the human judge is in justice bound to inflict the
penalty for the crime, and he cannot show mercy by remitting it.
Therefore neither can God do so, if justice belongs formally and
properly to Him.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: 55 The subordinate judge can­
not, of course, without violating justice, let the offense go un­
punished; but the supreme legislator can do so, and this right is a
02/bid., ad mm.
“ Eph. 4: 32.
Jas. 2: 13.
,6Cf. Summa theol., la, q.25, a.3 ad 311m.

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD

619

privilege that belongs either to the king of a country, or to the
president of a republic, that he can pardon criminals imploring his
mercy. Thus the goodness of either the king or the president is
strikingly made manifest, and the common good is preserved intact
as well as the king’s honor. St. Thomas explains this very well: “Even
this justice (which exacts reparation for sin) depends on the divine
will, requiring satisfaction for sin from the human race. But if He
had willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction, He would
not have acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice,
cannot pardon the offense without imposing a penalty, for he must
punish the offense committed against another, for instance, against
another man, or against the state, or any prince in higher authority.
But God has no one higher than Himself, for He is the sovereign and
common good of the whole universe. Consequently, if He forgives
sin, which has the formality of fault in that it is committed against
Himself, He wrongs no one; just as anyone else, overlooking a per­
sonal trespass, without demanding satisfaction, acts mercifully and
not unjustly. And so David exclaimed tvhen he sought mercy: “To
Thee only have I sinned” (Ps. 50: 6), as if to say: “Thou canst pardon
me without injustice.” 58 This means that the exercise of God’s justice
and mercy depends on His free will. Therefore St. Augustine says:
“Why He draws this (sinner) and not another, seek not to judge, if
thou dost not wish to err.” 57 On this point St. Thomas says: “The
reason for the predestination of some, and the reprobation of others,
must be sought for in the goodness of God.” 58 This remains for us a
mystery, namely, how infinite justice, mercy, and supreme liberty are
intimately reconciled in the eminence of the Deity. Now in this
article it is shown that God’s mercy in sparing sinners is not a relaxa­
tion of His vindictive justice, but transcends it, for, as the Apostle
says, “mercy exalteth itself above judgment.” 50 But how some divine
perfection can in a certain way excel another, will be discussed in the
following article and in the corollaries on divine mercy.
FOURTH ARTICLE

WHETHER IN EVERY WORK OF GOD THERE ARE MERCY AND JUSTICE

State of the question. The purpose of this article is to explain the
scriptural text: "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.” 80
ee ibid., la Ilae, 9.46, a.2 ad gum.
s’ Hom. 36 in Joan.
68 Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad gum.
«9 Jas. 2: ig.
eo Ps. 24: 10.

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THE ONE GOD

This difficulty arises chiefly for the following reasons: (i) Some
works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the un­
godly; and others are attributed to justice, as the damnation of the
wicked. (2) Many just persons are afflicted in this world, and this
does not appear to be just. (3) The works of justice and mercy pre­
suppose creation, which does not manifest these divine perfections.
Yet the answer is: “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and
truth.” 61 It must be observed that this assertion is verified, if mercy
is taken in the broad sense as meaning the removal of any kind of
defect, but not if it refers to mercy only in the strict sense of the
term, as stated in the body of this article and in the reply to the
fourth objection.
The reason is that the work of divine justice always presupposes
the work of mercy, and has its foundation in this latter. For nothing
is due to creatures (for instance, either help or reward or punishment)
except on account of something pre-existing in them. In the final
analysis, it must be because of something that depends solely on the
goodness of the divine will that has gratuitously created and ordained
us to a supernatural end. Thus we see that mercy (at least in the
broad sense) is the primary source of all God’s works.
First corollary. It is stated in the body of the article that "the power
of this primary source of all God’s works remains in all that follows
therefrom, and operates indeed with greater force, just as the in­
fluence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes.”
Thus all God’s works have their foundation in His love for creatures,
and it is manifested first by mercy, either in the broad or in the strict
sense of the term, rather than by justice, which may be considered
the branch in this tree of God’s love; whereas mercy is, as it were, the
principal part of the tree, its trunk, so to speak, which comes directly
from the root. Nor is it to be wondered at that a certain order prevails
between the infinite perfections of God; for, as the divine will is
logically preceded by the divine intellect, so also mercy and justice
presuppose God’s goodness and love. But mercy is the first manifesta­
tion of love, whereas justice is, so to speak, its second manifestation.
In mercy it is God’s goodness as self-diffusive that is manifested,
whereas it is especially in vindictive justice that the inalienable right
of supreme goodness to be loved above all things is made manifest.
Thus mercy is the primary source of God's works. St. Thomas says:
“It is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare, than to
punish.” 62
Second corollary. In the argumentative part of this article occurs
ei Ibid.
βΐ Summa theol., Ha Ilae, q.21, a.2.

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD

621

the following statement: “For this reason God out of the abundance
of His goodness bestows upon creatures what is due to them more
bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would
suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine good­
ness confers; because between creatures and God’s goodness there can
be no proportion.” Thus the psalmist says: "The earth is full of the
mercy of the Lord.” 83 God gives generally to all creatures more than
is strictly necessary for the attainment of their end; for He gives
in the majority of cases what is befitting for their well-being, in the
material, moral, and spiritual orders. Thus in all God’s works mercy
is the result of His superabundant good; but justice results from His
operation, since He gives what is proportionately due to each.
Reply to first objection. In the damnation of the reprobate it is
justice, indeed, that is more in evidence; nevertheless mercy is made
manifest in it, as somewhat alleviating the punishment, because the
reprobates are punished short of what is deserved.84
Reply to third objection. Prior to the works of mercy and justice
taken in their strict sense, the ideas of these perfections are in some
manner preserved in creation, inasmuch as beings are, as it were,
mercifully changed from non-existence to existence, and justice is
seen in the production of these beings in a manner that accords with
the divine goodness and wisdom, particularly in sparing and having
mercy.85 Therefore the psalmist says: “Help us, O God, our Savior,
and for the glory of Thy name, O Lord, deliver us; and forgive us
our sins for Thy name’s sake.” 88 Thus in this prayer, the sinner in
his profound misery invokes God’s most sublime attribute of mercy,
not only that his misery may be alleviated, but also that God may be
glorified, and that His goodness and omnipotence may be made
manifest. Likewise, the Scripture says: “We have sinned and com­
mitted iniquity . . . but deal with us according to the multitude of
Thy mercies, O Lord.” 87 Anyone who prays in this manner with
humility, piety, and perseverance, is always heard.88 The abyss of
misery invokes the abyss of mercy, and God’s goodness and omnipo­
tence are made manifest.
2) In so far as God in His mercy bestows upon creatures more than
is strictly necessary, punishes short of what is deserved, and rewards
8» Ps. 32:5.
*e Summa theol., la Ilae, q.gg; see also Tabula aurea, under the word "mercy,”
no. 26.
es cf. ibid., la, q.25, a.3 ad 311m.
ee Ps, 78: g.
er Dan. 3: 2g, 42 f.
es Cf. Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.83, a.15 ad turn; also a.16.

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THE ONE GOD

beyond what is deserved, in these three acts His mercy in a certain
manner transcends His justice.09
A. God in the majority of cases bestows upon creatures more than
is strictly necessary. Thus He could have created us merely in the
natural order; yet de facto He raised us to the supernatural order.
After Adam’s sin, God could have left us in the state of fallen nature,
or He could have afforded us some relief by simply forgiving the sin
on certain conditions, this being announced to us through some
prophet. As a matter of fact, “God so loved the world as to give
His only begotten Son.” 70 “Mercy and truth have met each other.” 71
“Mercy exalteth itself above judgment.” 72 Christ manifested His love
for us even by dying on the Cross. Moreover, of His superabundant
mercy He gave us baptismal grace or the grace of regeneration, and
actual graces to persevere, and also the Holy Eucharist and other sacra­
ments. In all this it is quite clear that God in His mercy bestows upon
creatures more than is strictly required by rigorous justice.
B. In like manner, as stated in this article, God punishes short of
what is deserved. For He often reinstates sinners who throughout
their lives have repeatedly fallen into sin. He raises up souls to make
reparation for them, and as St. Thomas observes: “It is a remarkable
sign of God’s mercy when He punishes sinners in this life, in accord­
ance with the saying of St. Augustine: Burn, cut here, provided Thou
spare in eternity.” 73 Even the damned, as stated in this article, are
punished short of what they deserve.74
C. God also rewards beyond what justice demands, and of His full­
ness we have received graces beyond our merits. Certainly the first
grace of justification, which is the principle of merit, is not the object
of merit; and this also applies to the grace of final perseverance,
which means to die in the state of grace.75 The same is to be said of
sacramental graces. Especially so is the nourishing grace which we
receive in Holy Communion which is not the object of merit, for it
is given without being merited by us; and, according to God’s dispen­
sation, every Communion, by increasing charity in us, if there is no
venial sin of negligence on our part, ought to dispose us for a more
substantially fervent Communion the following day.
God’s mercy is especially made manifest toward the laborers in
the Lord’s vineyard who came to work at the last hour, shortly before
os Consult the Tabula aurea of St. Thomas’ works, under the word "mercy,’’
no. 26.
78 John 3: 16.
n Ps. 84: 11.
rajas. 2: 13.
78 Com. in Ep. ad Hebraeos, chap. 3, lect. 2 (at the end).
7« Cf. ad turn.
78 Cf. la Ilae, q. 114, a.9.

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD

623

their death,78 and toward those in whom are found verified these
words of Scripture: “Whosoever shall give to drink to one of these
little ones a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple, amen
I say to you, he shall not lose his reward.” 77
But the splendor of mercy will be made manifest in behalf of those
to whom the Lord will say: "Come, ye blessed of My Father, pos­
sess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of
the world; for I was hungry, and you gave Me to eat; I was thirsty,
and you gave Me to drink. ... As long as you did it to one of these,
My least brethren, you did it to Me.” 78
This infinite mercy of God is the foundation of our hope, and is
a most remarkable example for us of mercy and compassion toward
our neighbor, being in agreement with the Gospel, which says:
“Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.” 79 “This is
My commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.” 80
Finally, how are infinite mercy and justice intimately reconciled?
There is inexorable justice as regards the damned, who, besides, do
not ask for forgiveness. It is only by directly seeing the eminent Deity
in which all the divine perfections are so united as not to be in the
least destructive of one another, that we shall know how justice and
mercy are reconciled. Hence Pius IX says: “When, freed from the
trammels of this corporeal life, we see God as He is, we shall certainly
understand how close and beautiful is the interrelation between
divine mercy and justice.” 81 Then, as stated farther on, we shall
clearly understand the teaching of the Church when it says that
"the gifts of heavenly grace are by no means wanting to those who
sincerely will and ask to be directed anew by this light.” 82 Thus,
although the elect are by God’s mercy more loved and helped than
others,83 yet for all it is true to say that God does not command im­
possibilities, but by commanding both admonishes us to do what we
are able, and to ask for what we are not able to do.84 Thus in the
obscurity of faith, especially in infused contemplation, the reconcilia7· Matt. 20:1-16.
77 Ibid., 10: 42.
78 Ibid., 25: 34, 40.
Ό Ibid., 5: 7.
eo John 15: 12.
81 Denz., no. 1647.
ttlbid., no. 1648. See also no. 1677.
es This follows from what St. Paul says (I Cor. 4: 7): "For who distinguisheth
thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” Cf. la, q.23, a.4, 5.
If it is because of a special act of God's mercy that one of two sinners is con­
verted, far more so is this the reason why the just person is continually preserved
from falling into sin, especially so if it is the case of one who was baptized in
infancy.
8i Cf. Denz., no. 804.

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THE ONE GOD

tion of infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty in the eminence
of the Deity is in a certain manner attained. Yet as long as we are in
this life we always make use of limited analogical concepts, and
these represent God’s spiritual attributes after the manner of a
mosaic, the little colored stones of which cannot express its charm of
appeal. Our concepts of mercy, justice, and liberty are too much dis­
connected, and not enough united that we may know what properly
constitutes the Deity.

CHAPTER XXII

Question 22
The Providence

of

God

Having considered all that relates to the will, we must proceed to

those things which have relation to both intellect and will. Of this
kind, however, is providence, and predestination is its more exalted
part. There is resemblance, by way of analogy, between providence
and our virtue of prudence, to which providence belongs with ref­
erence to the future as fully explained elsewhere by St. Thomas when
he says: “Providence (as the name signifies) implies a certain relation
of one who is distant from things that occur in time and that must
be directed to their ends.” 1 For providence is an orderly direction in
the mind, the direction to their ends of those things that are to be
done.
The doctrine of St. Thomas on providence has been explained at
length by us in other works.2 Therefore we now make some brief
observations only about the principal points. St. Thomas’ division
of this question is in four articles. (1) Whether providence can suit­
ably be attributed to God, in which the questions as to the existence
and nature of providence are solved. (2) Whether everything is sub­
ject to the providence of God, or what the scope of providence is.
(3) Whether God has immediate providence over everything, the
answer to which will be in the affirmative, and thus there is a differ­
ence between providence and divine government. (4) Whether provi­
dence imposes any necessity on things foreseen. The solution of this
doubt will be the corollary to the doctrine as already set forth on
this point?
State of the question. The difficulty arises from the following facts:
(1) “Providence” denotes a certain part of our prudence in which
there is always imperfection, that is, doubt and uncertainty; (2)
providence is concerned with existing things that are not eternal.
Therefore it does not appear to be anything eternal. There are other
difficulties arising especially from the existence of physical and moral
‘Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.49, a.6.
2 Cf. Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, art. “Providence,” and also Provi­
dence (Eng. tr.. Herder Book Co.).
s Cf. Summa theol., la, q.19, a.8.
625

6a6

THE ONE GOD

evil in the world. These difficulties are pointed out by St. Thomas at
the beginning of the second article, lor he says: “We see many evils
existing. Either, then, God cannot prevent these, and thus is not
omnipotent, or else He does not have care for everything.” This ob­
jection belongs properly to the question of the scope of providence,
and is explained more fully in another work.4
It is affirmed in this article that providence is to be attributed to
God, and very many passages from Holy Scripture and the declara­
tions of the Church show that this doctrine is of faith.
In the Old Testament, Judith prays as follows: “All Thy ways are
prepared, and in Thy providence Thou hast placed Thy judg­
ments. . . . The prayer of the humble and the meek have always
pleased Thee. O God of the heavens, Creator of the waters, and Lord
of the whole creation, hear me a poor wretch making supplication to
Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy.” 6 The Book of Wisdom says:
“God made the little and the great, and He hath equally care of
all.”8 “Wisdom reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all
things sweetly.” 7 “Thou has ordered all things in number, measure,
and weight.” 8 “There is no other God but Thou, who hast care of
all.” 8 Of those crossing the sea in ships, it says: “Thy providence, O
Father, governeth it; for Thou hast made a way even in the sea, and
a most sure path even among the waves, showing that Thou art able
to save out of all things." 10
The prayer of petition presupposes faith in divine providence,
which extends to the least of our free acts. Hence Mardochai prays
in the following manner: “O Lord, Lord almighty King, for all things
are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will, if Thou
determine to save Israel.” 11 It is in this way, too, that Queen Esther
prays and is heard.12 Never did even the nobler minded among the
Greek philosophers reach such a degree of certainty about divine
providence, which extends even to the least details. Again, in
Ecclesiasticus we read: “As the potter’s clay is in his hand, ... so
man is in the hand of Him who made him; and He will render to him
according to His judgment.” 13 And Isaias says: “The Lord of hosts
« Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chaps. 64, 71-79, 89-97.
8 Jdth. 9: 5-17.
e Wis. 6: 8.
r Ibid., 8: 1.
8 Ibid., 11: si.
» Ibid., 12: 13.
10 Ibid., 14: 1-5.
11 Esther 13: 9.
12 Ibid., 14: 12-19.
is Ecclus. 33: 13.

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

627

hath decreed, and who can disannul it? And His hand is stretched
out, and who shall turn it away?” 14
The psalms declare the wonders of God's providence toward the
Israelites, freeing them from captivity. Thus we read: "When Israel
went out of Egypt.” 18 "Direct me in Thy truth, and teach me; for
Thou art God my Savior.”18 “The Lord ruleth me: and I shall want
nothing. He hath set me in a place of pasture. ... He hath led me
on the paths of justice, for His name’s sake. For though I should walk
in the midst of the shadow of death, I will fear no evils, for Thou art
with me.”17 “But I have put my trust in Thee, O Lord. I said: Thou
art my God. My lots are in Thy hands. Deliver me out of the hands
of my enemies, and from them that persecute me. Make Thy face to
shine upon Thy servant: save me in Thy mercy.” 18
There is a certain aspect of God's providence that is most manifest
from the order prevailing in the world. Thus the psalmist says: “The
heavens show forth the glory of God: and the firmament declareth
the works of His hands.” 18 But on the other hand, as shown in the
Book of Job, there are certain and indeed most sublime ways of
Providence that are unsearchable, such as the dispositions of Provi­
dence toward Joseph, the son of Jacob, when God permits him to be
sold by his brothers. Then the purpose of these ways is made clear,
when Joseph says to his brothers: “Not by your counsel was 1 sent
hither, but by the will of God: who hath made me . . . governor in
all the land of Egypt.” 20 The inaccessible height of Providence is
also apparent in the following text: “Thy justice is as the mountains
of God: Thy judgments are a great deep.” 21 But this greater ob­
scurity is owing to the fact that He is far too luminous for our in­
tellect; for God’s providence in itself is light inaccessible, and under
the guidance of this light all things co-operate unto good. Hence the
Scripture says: “Thou art great, O Lord, forever, and Thy kingdom
is unto all ages. For Thou scourgest and Thou savest: Thou leadest
down to hell, and bringest up again, and there is none that can escape
Thy hand. ... He hath chastised us for our iniquities: and He will
save us for His own mercy.” 22 The whole history of the Israelites is
ordained by God’s providence to prepare them for the coming of
14 Isa. 14: 27.
1s Ps. 113.
10 Ibid.., 24: 5.
17 Ibid., 22: i.
i»Ibid„ 30: 15-17.
ιθ Ibid., 18: 2.
20 Gen. 45: 8.
21 Ps. 35: 7.
22Tob. 13: 1.

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THE ONE GOD

the promised Savior. The history of Susanna is for this same end.28
God’s providence together with His goodness and omnipotence is
frequently mentioned in the New Testament. Thus our Lord says:
“Behold the birds of the air: for they neither sow nor do they reap nor
gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not
you of much more value than they?” 24 It is an a fortiori argument, the
implication being that if God's care extends to the smallest things, far
more so is He concerned with the life of the soul. Hence our Lord con­
cludes: “For your Father knoweth that you have need of all these
things. Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice,
and all these things shall be added unto you.”25 And again: “The
very hairs of your head are all numbered.” 28 The parables of the
laborers in the vineyard 27 and of the talents28 contain this same
doctrine. “If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to
your children, how much more will your Father from heaven give the
good Spirit to them that ask Him!” 20 St. Peter says: “Be you humbled,
therefore, under the mighty hand of God, that Fie may exalt you in
the time of visitation; casting all your care upon Him, for Fie hath
care of you.” 30
All these texts declare that providence is evident by reason of the
order prevailing in the world and the life of the just. On the other
hand, there remains the profound mystery expressed by St. Paul in
the following words: "How incomprehensible are His judgments and
how unsearchable His ways!” 81 This mystery applies especially to
the tribulations the just endure, and the iniquity perpetrated by evil
persons, both of which are permitted by God for a greater good and
which in this life often remain hidden.
Some of the Fathers 82 wrote especially about providence. Thus St.
John Chrysostom wrote a number of treatises concerning the provi­
dential purpose and advantage of suffering in the lives of the just.38
23 Cf. Dan. 13: 42.
2* Matt. 6: 26.
26 Ibid., 6: 33.
20 Ibid., 10: 30.
22 Ibid., 20: I.
2s Ibid., 25: 14.
29 Luke 11: 13. Consult also Luke 15:4 (parable of lost sheep), and John 10: 1
(parable of good shepherd).
»0 I Pet. 5: 6.
81 Rom. 11: 33.
32 Cf. Rouet de Journel, Enchiridion patristicum, nos. 202, 422, 1014, 1134, »37733 Cf. Ad Stagir., in which he remarks that we alone are the cause of our
spiritual wounds, and one of his treatises concerns those who are scandalized on
account of adversities. Consult also St. Leo’s Ep. ad Thuribium, and St. Gregory
Nazianzen’s Oratio 16.

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

629

St. Augustine tvrote a book explaining the action of divine provi­
dence in its dealings with human beings.34 There are two cities in the
world, which at present are intermixed, but which at the end will
be separated. There is the city of evil in which love of self finally
leads to hatred of God, and there is the city of God, in which the love
of God finally leads to contempt of self.35
From the definitions and declarations of the Church it is evident
that God certainly foreknew from eternity, and immutably pre­
ordained, all future things;35 yet it does not therefore follow that this
makes it absolutely necessary, for all things that come into being.37
God governs by His providence both visible and invisible things,58
truly acting upon the world and man.38 He does not will evil things
just as He wills good things,40 only permitting sin.41 He does not
have to obey the devil,42 neither does He communicate His omnipo­
tence to us, nor is He subject to us,43 and He ordains all things for
the manifestation of His goodness.44 Hence the course of man’s life is
not under the controlling influence of the stars,45 nor is man ruled
by fate.40
Among these definitions, the following declaration of the Vatican
Council deserves special mention: “God protects and governs by His
providence all things which He has made, reaching from end to end
mightily, and ordering all things sweetly. For all things are naked
and open to His eyes, even those which are yet to be by the free action
of creatures.” 47
In the body of the article St. Thomas proves the existence of provi­
dence, which is a revealed doctrine. This he does by means of a
theological argument, and at the same time he defines providence.
He presupposes its quasi-nominal definition, according to which
providence is a part of prudence, which orders different things to
3< De civitate Dei.
»5 Cf. ibid., Bk. VII, chap. 29. This chapter must be read since it treats espe­
cially of Providence. Consult also Diet, de théol. cath., art. "Providence" (section
concerning St. Augustine).
8« Denz., nos. 300, 316, 321 f., 1784.
37 Ibid., nos. 321, 607, 3026.
ss Ibid., nos. 421, 1784.
s» Ibid., no. 1702.
<0 Ibid., no. 514.
<1 Ibid., no. 816.
42 Ibid., no. 586.
<s Ibid., nos. 1217 f.
** Ibid., no. 1783.
45 Ibid., nos. 35, 239.
*e Ibid., no. 607.
47 Denz., no. 1784; cf. Wis. 8: 1; Heb. 4: 13.

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THE ONE GOD

the attainment o£ their end. Thus the common saying is that it
belongs to the governor of the state to provide for its grain supplies,
and to the father of the family for necessities of life.48 This common
notion of providence can be attributed to God only analogically; but
now the question is whether it is to be attributed to Him analogically
and in the strict sense, or only analogically and metaphorically.
The answer is that providence is predicated analogically and
properly of God, and it is proved as follows.
In every effect produced by an intellectual agent, the type or idea
of this effect pre-exists in such agent. But God is the cause of all
created good by His intellect and hence of the order of things to
their end, particularly their ultimate end. Therefore the type of the
order of things to their end, which is called providence, in accordance
with its nominal definition, pre-exists in God. Thus providence is
suitably attributed to God analogically and properly, as it implies
no imperfection.
The major of this argument is self-evident and, moreover, is
equivalently revealed. But the minor is revealed, and is also proved
by philosophy. Thus this argument, by reason of its twofold aspect,
belongs to either theology or philosophy.49 Therefore providence is
suitably attributed analogically and properly to God, just as intelli­
gence, will, and the free act of creating are. To deny God’s providence
would be to deny that He is intelligent, or that He is God.
This proof is quasi a priori, since it presupposes that God is the
cause by His intellect; quasi a priori, I say, because providence is not
immediately deduced from God’s nature, but presupposes that God
most freely willed to create.
A philosophical a posteriori proof can also be given of providence,
reasoning from the order prevailing in the world. This proof cor­
responds exactly to the fifth way by which St. Thomas proves God's
existence, especially as the supreme Designer.50 This proof is reduced
to the following syllogism: things which lack intelligence do not
tend toward their end unless they are directed to it by some intelli­
gent being, as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer; but we
see that things which lack intelligence act for an end, and this is
evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way,
so as to obtain the best result; therefore some intelligent being exists
by whom all natural things are directed to their end, and this being
we call God.
It must be remarked that St. Thomas in this fifth proof, just as in
«8 Cf. Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.49. a.6.
48 cf. supra, q.14, a.8: Whether God’s knowledge is the cause of things: also
q.19, a.8: Whether God’s will is the cause of things.
59 Cf. ibid., la, q.2, a.3.

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631

our argument, insists that the order of things toward their end per­
tains to the good of the universe, of which God is the author. As we
stated above,51 Aristotle splendidly formulated and explained the
minor of this fifth proof, namely, that natural agents operate for an
end, but he did not grasp the concept of creation, especially of a most
free creation from nothing for the manifestation of the orderly di­
rection of divine goodness. Hence he did not acquire the right idea of
divine providence.
In the Middle Ages the Averroists, who deny a free action, reduced
providence to some general preordination that extends only to the
general laws of the world, but not to particulars.52
COFIRMATION OF THIS CONCLUSION BY THE SOLUTION OF
THE DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED IN THIS ARTICLE

Reply to first objection. Although to take counsel about doubtful
matters does not belong to God, nevertheless to give a command as
to the ordering of things toward an end does belong properly to God,
because it implies no imperfection.
Reply to second objection. Providence is, properly speaking, the
reason of order (or the ordering) of things to their end, whereas di­
vine government is the execution of this order. Thus providence is
eternal, whereas divine government is predicated of God in time,
since it implies a relation to already existing things.53
Reply to third objection. Providence, as the word denotes, as being
an ordering of things, is in the divine intellect, but it presupposes
the willing of the end. “Nobody gives a precept about things done
for an end, unless he wills that end, as St. Thomas remarks in this
reply. Thus human prudence presupposes the moral virtues, which
direct the appetite aright concerning the end. In this reply it is al­
ready evident that for St. Thomas, God, like every wise person, first
wills the end before He wills the means for the end. This does not
mean, indeed, that there are two acts of the will in God, for as stated
above, "He wills this to be as means to that, but He does not will
this on account of that.” 54
The solution of the objection arising from the existence of evil
in the world is given in the following article of this question.55
First doubt. In what act of the intellect does providence, strictly
speaking, or at least principally, consist? What acts of the will does
it presuppose?
si Com. on q.2, a.3.
52 Cf. Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chaps. 75 f.
os Cf. Summa theol., la, q.13, a.7, c. et ad 311m; q. 103, a.i; q. 110, a.i.
5< Ibid., la, q. 19, a. 5.
65 Cf. ad eum.

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THE ONE GOD

The replies to the first and second objections of this article make
it clear that providence consists, at least principally, in the act of
the intellect that is called commanding or giving orders, as prudence
does in us. It presupposes two acts of the will, namely, the intention
of the end and the choice of means for the end.56
There are virtually several acts that concur in divine providence,
just as there are really several acts that concur in human providence.
(1) God's will, directed by His wisdom, intends as the end in view
the manifestation of His goodness ad extra; (2) the divine intellect
judges concerning the most fitting means for the attainment of the
end. On this point, the Salmanticenses correctly state 57 that among
all possible dispositions of things, this one is known as possible by
God’s knowledge of simple intelligence, namely, the disposition in
which there is subordination of nature, grace, and glory along with
permission of original sin to the hypostatic union (for this consti­
tutes some possible world); (3) this will accepts or chooses the means
for the manifestation of divine goodness; (4) in virtue of this effica­
cious intention and choice, the intellect eternally commands that
these means be made use of in time. Providence consists formally in
this efficacious command, for, as St. Thomas says in this article, “it
orders and gives a command as to the ordering of things toward an
end,” and “nobody gives a precept about things done for an end,
unless he wills that end.” 68 This statement demands the attention
of those who say that Scotus was the first among theologians who, on
the subject of predestination, said that he who wills in an orderly
manner, wills the end before willing the means to the end.
Objection. Once there is a choice of something by the divine will,
then there is no difficulty in its execution, for nobody resists God’s
will. Therefore command is superfluous, and hence providence finds
its ultimate explanation not in command but in choice.
Reply. I deny the consequent: for we do not posit command in
God because of some difficulty to be overcome, but because the means
as eligible and the means as possible of execution are objects differ­
ent in concept. The means actually chosen never would be made
use of, unless the command were present to direct the execution of
the means. Hence there are two virtually distinct acts in God. In fact,
whereas deliberation in the descendent order starts from the inten­
tion of the ultimate end to choice of the least of means, command,
in the reverse order, by directing the execution of the means, rises
from the choice of the least of means to the attainment of the ulti08 Cf. ibid., Ila Ilae, q.47, a.8; la Ilae, q.17, a.i: Whether command is an act
of the reason.
87 Com. in 111am, q. 1, a.3.
88 Summa theol., la, q.22, a. 1 ad turn et 3um.

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633

mate end; for the end is first in intention and last in execution.
Divine government, however, is the execution in time of the order­
ing of things under the direction of the aforesaid command which
is eternal. Thus St. Thomas said that the reason of order in things
is eternal, whereas the execution of this order is temporal.59
Second doubt. Whether God’s practical knowledge, which is the
cause of things,90 is distinct from His providence.
Reply. St. Thomas shows that God’s providence is distinct
from His practical knowledge, because knowledge concerns the end
and the means, but providence concerns the means in so far as they
are ordered to the end.91 Providence is also distinct from the eternal
law, just as the conclusion is distinct from its principle; for it is by
the eternal law that God’s providence orders and governs all things.
Similarly prudence in us presupposes practical or moral knowledge
and the law.
Third doubt. What does providence presuppose on the part of
God s will?
Reply. As we already said, it presupposes the willing of the end
and the choice of the means. It follows from this that providence
presupposes God’s love for creatures and two virtues of uncreated
love, namely, mercy and justice. Wherefore St. Thomas said in his
reply to the third objection of this article that, just as “prudence
presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive
faculty is directed toward good,” so it is distinct from art.
Hence the provident God is not only the supreme artificer, or the
architect of the universe, but He is also the most holy ordainer of all
things and minds to their ultimate end, which is the most holy and
most liberal manifestation of His goodness. Thus providence is more
than divine art, since it presupposes mercy and justice, just as a
man cannot be prudent unless he is just and benevolent toward
other men. But providence, since it presupposes justice and mercy,
directs the execution of the works of mercy and justice, just as
prudence, since it presupposes the moral virtues, directs the acts of
these virtues.92
Fourth doubt. Does providence presuppose the antecedent and
consequent wills of God?
Reply. It presupposes both wills; for the antecedent will, as stated
above," concerns what is good in itself, on first consideration inde­
pendently of actual circumstances. But since good is not in the mind
»9 Cf. ibid., ad 2um.
80 Cf. ibid., la, q.14, a.8.
91 Cf. De veritate, q.5, a. I, c. et ad 211m.
92Cf. Summa theol., la. q.103, a.2, 3: Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 97.
«s Ibid., Ia, q. ig, a.6 ad turn.

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THE ONE GOD

but in things, and things exist only as they actually are, this ante­
cedent will rests on the condition that it is because of some greater
good that the defect in the thing is permitted. On the contrary, the
consequent will is concerned with good when all its particular cir­
cumstances are considered, and therefore only this will is efficacious.
Thus by the antecedent will the merchant in a storm at sea would
will to save all his merchandise, but to save his life he de facto and
simply wills to cast it into the sea.
Likewise, God wills antecedently that all the fruits of the earth
become ripe, unless some greater good prevents this. In like manner,
He wills that all animals find what is necessary for their sustenance,
and far more so He wills all men to be saved. But God does not
will consequently and efficaciously that all the fruits of the earth be­
come ripe, that all animals actually have what is necessary for their
sustenance, that all human beings de facto be saved; but, for a
greater good not always known to us, He permits that what is defectible may at times be defective.
Thus we have the answer to the doubt, as to whether providence
presupposes both antecedent and consequent wills in God. For it
presupposes the efficacious intention of the end of all things in the
universe, which is the manifestation of divine goodness by way of
liberality, mercy, and justice, and moreover the choice of the most
fitting means to this end, namely, the disposition of things in ac­
cordance with the orders of nature, grace with permission of original
sin, and the hypostatic union. But all this implies God’s antecedent
will to save all men, inasmuch as “God commands not impossibilities
but, by commanding both admonishes you to do what you are able,
and to ask for what you are not able (to do),” 84 as St. Augustine
says.05 It also implies God’s consequent will of effectively leading
some, although not all, to their ultimate end. And so we find St.
Thomas saying farther on that predestination is a part of provi­
dence.66
Similarly, as regards the infallibility of divine providence, it fol­
lows from what has been said that providence is absolutely infalli­
ble even as to the attainment of the end, inasmuch as it presupposes
God’s consequent or efficacious will; and it is infallible only as re­
gards the ordering of the means to the end and not as regards the
attainment of the end, inasmuch as it presupposes only His ante­
cedent will.67 The Thomists are generally agreed that this constiei Denz., no. 804.
De natura et gratia, PL, XLIV, 271.
«e Summa theol., la, q.23, a. 1.
87 This point will be made dearer in the next artide.

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tutes the difference between providence and predestination, which
is the teaching of St. Thomas.88 For it is evident that the efficacy of
providence, in the act of command, depends, in the attaining of the
end, on the efficacy of the willing or intending of the end.
Fifth doubt. How does natural providence differ from supernat­
ural providence?
Reply. There is only one providence in God; nevertheless it can
be considered under different aspects on the part of its objects. (1)
There is providence in its most universal or complete aspect, which
consists in the ordering of all beings to the end for which the uni­
verse was created, which is the manifestation of God’s goodness. (2)
Providence may be considered in its relation to particular ends, and
thus it is called either natural or supernatural, the supernatural be­
ing either ordinary or extraordinary. Thus providence is called nat­
ural in so far as it is concerned with natural things, which are ordered
by providence in its most universal aspect to supernatural things
and to Christ.
But such particular ends are not always efficaciously willed, and
thus, although all human beings are by God’s providence destined
for eternal life, yet not all are saved. On the contrary, the most uni­
versal end in the creation of the universe is efficaciously intended
by God.
From this it does not follow that we must admit a certain antecedent
and inefficacious providence. There is but one providence, which
presupposes, for many things, a consequent will, and for other things,
an antecedent will. This applies proportionately so to human pru­
dence. Thus there is but one prudence in the merchant who, when a
storm is threatening, efficaciously commands the casting of his mer­
chandise into the sea for the saving of his life, although at the same
time he may will antecedently or conditionally to save his merchan­
dise; in fact, this merchant prudently does all in his power to save it,
but afterward he casts it into the sea. Hence it is not surprising that
divine providence likewise for many things presupposes a consequent
or efficacious will, and for other things an antecedent or conditional
and inefficacious will.
Sixth doubt. How does providence differ from fate?
Reply. As St. Thomas says in explanation of this: “The order given
by divine providence to things is called fate by Boethius (De consol.,
Bk. IV, prosa. 6). Hence as the idea is to the species of the thing, so
is providence to fate,” 89 in which fate is taken in a good sense, and
es Cf. De veritate, q.6, a.i.
es Ibid., q.5, a.i ad lum. By the species rei, St. Thomas is here referring to
the intelligible species that is representative of the object known. By the idea,

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THE ONE GOD

not as implying fatalism or absolute determinism, which is a denial
of both divine liberty and human liberty.
St. Thomas also remarks70 that several ancient philosophers were
of the opinion that fate is a disposition of the stars under which each
one is begotten or born, inasmuch as this disposition of the stars has
an influence also on our human actions in things that take place
by luck or by chance. To this St. Thomas replies: "It is manifest that
a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle,”71
which is determined to one thing. Hence it does not cause those
things that are altogether accidental, such as those things that hap­
pen by luck or by chance. Previous to this he had said that "human
actions (as being spiritual and free acts) are not subject to the action
of heavenly bodies, unless accidentally and indirectly,” as proved
above,72 that is, according to the influence they have upon the or­
ganism. But the indifference of judgment remaining intact, or the
free judgment of reason, this influence of the stars on our choice,
just as the attraction for us of sensible things, is not necessitating.
Otherwise fate would have to be taken in the sense of absolute physi­
cal determinism.
But, as St. Thomas says, fate can be taken in a good sense, and
then it signifies "the very disposition or order of second causes," 73*
to the production of some effects foreseen and ordered by God. Thus
we speak nowadays of the physical determinism of the laws of na­
ture, in accordance with a series of connected causes, and besides
these laws there is the possibility of miracles, and of various things
happening by accident, such as those that happen by luck or chance.71
"Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the
divine will or power, is subject to fate.” 75 Thus we are free in our
choices.
So then, in establishing the existence of divine providence, its
analogical notion is sufficiently determined by saying that it is “the
type of the order of things toward their end, or the type existing in
the divine mind of things ordered toward an end. It is already ap­
parent in what the infallibility of providence consists, and this will
be more clearly shown in the next article.
he has in mind the mental type or exemplar according to which things are made
or produced. [Tr.]
io Summa theol., la, q. 116, a. 1.
n Ibid.
iz Ibid., q.115, a.4.
10 Ibid., q. 116, a.s ad turn.
1* Ibid., a. 1 ad sum; q. 105, a. 7.
Ibid., a.4 ad sum.

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SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER EVERYTHING IS SUBJECT TO THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD
State of the question. This article is concerned with the scope of
providence, whether it extends to all things, even to the least detail
and to the moral law. Whether it extends immediately to all things
is the point of inquiry in the following article.
St. Thomas also discusses this subject of providence in other
works,76 directing his arguments especially against the Averroists,
who were of the opinion that providence does not extend to par­
ticulars, but only to general laws.
This article begins by setting forth the state of the question and
the many problems it presents. It seems that everything is not sub­
ject to divine providence: (1) because many things happen either by
hazard or chance; but what happens by chance is not foreseen; (2)
because there are many evils in the world, and it seems to follow
from this that the omnipotent God does not have care for every­
thing. One meets with this objection throughout the Book of Job
and in the ninth chapter of Ecclesiastes. This difficulty made many
say that God wills things only in a general way, and that His provi­
dence does not extend to details. So said the Deists and to some ex­
tent Malebranche. (3) Moreover, many things happen of necessity,
and therefore they do not need to be directed by providence. (4) On
the other hand, many things happen freely, and, as the Scripture says:
“God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of
his own counsel.” 77 Thus Cicero, for the safeguarding of human
liberty, denied the infallibility of God’s foreknowledge and provi­
dence. Among modern philosophers, the Socinians and J. Lequier
were of this opinion. (5) Finally, the Deists said that material in­
dividual things in their smallest details do not come within die
scope of providence. All other objections can be reduced to these.78
Some ancient philosophers admitted three subordinated providences,
the highest of which was divine, and did not extend to things in their
least detail.
Yet the answer is in the affirmative and is of faith, namely, that all
things, even those of least value, are subject to divine providence,
so that nothing happens by chance on God’s part.
1) That this conclusion is of faith is evident from many texts of

76 Cf. Ibid., q. 103, a.5; De veritate, q.5, a.3-7; Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chaps. 1,
64. 75· 89, 90, 98.
77 Ecdus. 15: 14.
78 Read the beginning of the argumentative part of this article, in which the
errors of the ancient philosophers about providence are recounted. See also De
veritate, q.5, a.3-10; Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chaps. 64-75;.89, 90, 94, 95, 149, 164.

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THE ONE GOD

Holy Scripture and several definitions of the Church quoted in the
preceding article. It suffices for present purposes to recall the follow­
ing words of the Vatican Council: “God protects and governs by His
providence all things which He has made, reaching from end to end
mightily, and ordering all things sweetly" (Wis., 8: i). "For all
things are naked and open to His eyes (Heb. 4: 13), even those which
are yet to be by the action of creatures.” 79 In like manner, Pope
Adrian I says: “God, in His eternal unchangeableness prepared works
of mercy and justice. . . . He therefore prepared merits in the justi­
fication of human beings . . . and rewards; for the wicked, how­
ever. He did not prepare that their wills and deeds be wicked, but
He prepared for them just and eternal punishments.” 80
This doctrine concerning the scope of divine providence, which
includes even all particular things, is expressed in many texts of Holy
Scripture that have already been quoted in the preceding article.
Thus Christ teaches that the birds of the air, the lilies of the field,
the grass of the field, and the hairs of our head are all subject to
divine providence, so that not one of them will fall without our
Father’s leave.81 Similarly, concerning our free acts, the Scripture
says: “As the potter’s clay is in his hand . . . so man is in the hand
of Him that made him.” 82 And again: "For it is God who worketh
in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 83
It is foolish for the Christian to say that even some most insignificant
act escapes God’s providence, and that it happens independently of
His will or permission.
Likewise, what we think happens merely by chance is subject to
divine providence, for Holy Scripture says: “Lots are cast into the
lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord.” 84 Also when Joseph,
Jacob’s son, was sold by his brothers, then cast into prison, and
finally was raised to a high position, these things seem to have hap­
pened very much by chance; yet they are said to have been accord­
ing to God’s plan. If the merchants who bought Joseph had passed
by one hour earlier or later, then this would have changed the entire
course of events. But this happened according to the infallible de­
sign of Providence, for as Joseph said to his brothers: “Not by your
counsel was I sent hither, but by the will of God,” 86 and so it is of
several other events recorded in Scripture.88
so Denz., no. 1784.
β» Ibid., no. 300. See also nos. 316, 321 f.
8i Matt. 6: 26-31: 10: 19, 28; Luke 12: 22 f.
es Ecclus. 33: 13.
es Phil. 2: 13.
81 Prov. 16: 33.
8» Gen. 45: 8.
8β Cf. ibid., chaps. 4, 5.

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The Church Fathers always understood these texts of Holy Scrip­
ture as applying to God’s universal providence that extends even to
the least detail. Thus true Christians, especially the saints, see provi­
dence and the finger of God even in the many insignificant things
that happen.
The answer is proved by a theological proof, although it is apart
from this revealed. The reasoning of this proof is theological if at
least one premise is considered as revealed, and it is philosophical
if both premises are considered as evident from the natural light
of reason.
Since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects toward
that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. But
the causality of God, who is the first agent, extends to all things,
down to particulars and the least details. Therefore it necessarily
follows that, inasmuch as all things participate in existence, in so
far they are subject to the divine ordination or to providence.
The major is, in the philosophical order, the corollary of the prin­
ciple of finality, or of the relation of agent to end, for “every agent
acts for an end”; every action tends toward an end that is either
known or is not known but attained, as the arrow is shot to its mark.
This corollary of the principle of formality is indirectly confirmed
in this article by the following statement: “Whence it happens that
in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference
toward the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than
and outside the intention of the agent.” But no created agent can
act without being moved to act by God.87
The minor. God’s causality extends to all things, even particulars
and the least details; and since God produces and conserves matter
for the multiplication of individuals of every species, it follows that
God by His providence just as by His knowledge knows things not
only in general but also in particular.88 As St. Thomas said in this
last article just quoted: “God’s knowledge extends as far as His
causality extends. Hence, as the active power of God extends not
only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter
(q. 44, a. 2), the knowledge of God must extend to particular things,
which are individualized by matter.” 89 With far more reason it in­
cludes within its scope particular spiritual things.
This proof is most universal, and it includes God’s providence
concerning our choices, which positively wills those that are good,
and permits those that are evil, as will be more clearly explained.90
er Cf. Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3; q.19, a.4, 8.
es Cf. ibid., la, q. 14, a.6, 11.
so Ibid., a. 11.
»0 Cf. ibid., q.22, a.2 ad 411m,· a.4.

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Nevertheless there is no reference in this proof to what we find
Molina afterward calling the scientia media by which God would
foresee certain conditionally free acts of the future, whose positively
free determination would be independent of Him. But there can be
nothing external to God that is not in a relation of causality to God
or dependence on Him, except the evil of sin, which is the privation
of a good that one ought to have, and which is only permitted by
God.
Almost the same proof is given of the universality of providence
that extends to particulars even in their least details, for the divine
government.91 Thus, on the part of the agent, for the same reason
God is the ruler and cause of things. But God is the cause of the
total entity of all beings. Therefore there can be nothing which is
not subject to His government. This universality of providence can
also be proved from the nature of the end of government. The end of
the divine government is the manifestation of divine goodness. But
all things have as their end the manifestation of divine goodness.
Therefore nothing escapes from the divine government, not even
sin, which includes the incurring of punishment. But punishment
is a manifestation of God’s justice.92

THE SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES CONFIRMS THIS PROOF

PROVIDENCE AND CHANCE

The first difficulty was: Things that happen by chance do not
seem to be subject to providence.
The reply to this first difficulty was: Things are said to happen by
chance with reference to secondary causes. Thus the finding of a
treasure in digging a grave is said to happen by chance to the one
who digs, that is, it is beyond what was intended and foreseen. But
this was not beyond what God foresaw and provided for. So also the
meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance cir­
cumstance, was foreseen nevertheless by their master who purposely
sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the one did
not know about the other. Thus God sent the Ismaélite merchants
on a certain day and hour to that place where they bought Joseph,
sold to them by his brothers. The reason given here is the same as in
the argumentative part of the article, and it is thus enunciated:
“Since, then, all particular causes are included under the universal
cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the
»1 Ibid., q. 103, a.5.
02 Cf. De veritale, q.5, a.3.

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range of that universal cause.” This statement applies with equal
truth to the free determination, which is the effect of our free will;
for it is impossible that this determination should escape the order
of the most universal cause, or that it should not be produced by
God inasmuch as it is an entity and a good.
Moreover, as St. Thomas remarks farther on: "The very fact that
an element of chance is found in those things (that are generated and
corrupted) proves that they are subject to government of some kind.
For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they
would tend to nothing definite (not to anything), especially those
which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen un­
intentionally, which constitutes the idea of chance.” 03 Expressed more
briefly: if there were no natural laws and tendencies, then nothing
would happen by chance outside the scope of these natural tend­
encies.
PROVIDENCE AND EVIL
The second difficulty was that the existence of both physical and
moral evil seems to show that God does not have a care for all things
in particular.
St. Thomas replies to this objection as Plato,04 Chrysippus the
Stoic, and St. Augustine did,05 by considering the good of the uni­
verse.
The solution of the problem of evil is given in this reply by quot­
ing these words of St. Augustine: “God would in no wise permit
evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good
as to produce good even from evil.”00 Thus, unless the lion killed
animals, it could not live; and there would be no heroic constancy
in the martyrs unless they were persecuted.07
St. Thomas says in various parts of his works that good and evil
are subject to divine providence as foreknown and ordained; but it
is the good that is intended, and not the evil. In fact, moral evil
cannot even indirectly and accidentally be willed by God.08 It is
only permitted, and by God’s permission it is made to serve a greater
good. It is in this sense that St. Thomas says evil is foreknown and
ordained by God, yet not intended. “Whatever pertains to the right
order of providence comes under providence not only as ordered to

93 Summa theol., la, q.103, a.5 ad lum.
De legibus, 903.
e» De civitate Dei, Bk. XI, chap. 22.
μ Enchir., chap. 11.
87 On the advantage of sufferings for Christians and of Christ suffering patiently
for us, cf. Illa, q.46-49; also on patience consult Ila Ilae, q. 136.
88 Cf. Summa theol., la llae, q.79, a.i.

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THE ONE GOD

the other, but as that to which the other is ordered; but that which
departs from the right order, comes under providence, inasmuch as
it is ordered to the other but not as the other is ordered to it.” 99
Thus evil is permitted for a greater good, and so it is declared that
all things are “for the sake of the elect.” 100
In like manner, St. Thomas says: “It is lawful to make use of an
evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead
anyone to do evil.” 101
Thus evil and errors are permitted by providence only that good­
ness and truth may be more clearly made manifest; just as in a paint­
ing the purpose of the darker colors is to bring out the lighter colors
in bolder relief, and just as the malice of several actors in a tragedy
is for the purpose of showing more clearly the heroism of the famous
actors.102
There is no contradiction in the chiaroscuro effect of this mystery,
but in it these certain principles are preserved intact: moral evil
cannot even indirectly be willed by God; God commands not impos­
sibilities, but by commanding admonishes you to do what you are
able, and to ask for what you are not able (to do), as said by St.
Augustine, whom the Council of Trent quotes.103 But, on the other
hand, no one would be better than another, unless he were loved
more by God.104 But the intimate reconciliation of these principles
can be seen only in the immediate vision of the Deity, in whose emi­
nence infinite justice, mercy, and supreme liberty are reconciled.105
OTHER SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES

The third objection was: Many things happen in the world from
necessity, and these do not need the direction of providence. It is the
objection of Democritus.
Reply. That these do not need the direction of man, this I con­
cede; that they do not need the direction of the Author of nature,
this I deny. Thus God made the eye for seeing, the ear for hearing,
the feet for walking, wings for flying. This ordering, to be sure, inas­
much as it is natural, is necessary and is determined to one effect;
but it is so determined by the Author of nature, for all ordering to
an end is from the supreme Ordainer, inasmuch as every agent acts
oo De veritate, q.5, a.4. See also I Sent., d.39, q.2, a.2 (about the end).
100 Matt. 24: 22.
101 Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.98, a.4 ad 4um.
102Cf. De veritate, q.5, a.4 ad 411111, sum, loum, num.
toe Denz., no. 804.
ιοί Cf. Summa theol., la, q.20, a.3, 4.
105See q.22, a.3; q-23, a.5.

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for an end, tends to some end, and the order or subordination of
agents corresponds to the order of ends.106
The fourth objection was: ‘‘God left man in the hand of his own
counsel.” 107 Therefore man, inasmuch as he is free, is not subject
to divine providence, as Cicero thought.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: God left man to himself, inas­
much as He gave him the operating force that is not determined to
only the one effect, this I concede; inasmuch as the very act of free
will is not traced to God as to a cause, this 1 deny. And I deny the
consequent.
St. Thomas furthermore remarks: ‘‘God extends His providence
over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked,
inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede
their final salvation. ‘‘For to them that love God, all things work
together unto good” (Rom. 8: 28).108 In this sense it is said that “all
things are for the sake of the elect.” 109
Fifth Objection. It has its foundation in this query of St. Paul:
"Doth God take care for oxen?” 110 This was the objection raised
by Maimonides (Rabbi Moses).
Reply. God does not show His care in the same way for oxen as
for men; but His providence extends even to oxen. As St. Thomas
remarks farther on: “Irrational creatures are only acted upon (by
God) and do not act. So, when the Apostle says that it is not for the
oxen that God has care, he does not wholly withdraw them from the
divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational
creatures are governed.” 111
Thus the answer of the article is established, namely, that God's
providence is most universal, reaching down to the least of individual
corruptible things, which is contrary to what Maimonides thought.
Thus divine providence disposes all things most wisely, firmly, and
suavely, subordinating the lower to the higher. Hence divine provi­
dence wills in some manner for their own sake those things that are
honorable in themselves or deserving of honor, and likewise those
things that are permanent either as individual beings (such as the
angels), or specifically so (such as sensible singular things, which serve
as means for something higher).112
100 See supra, la, q.2, a.3: fifth way of proving God’s existence.
107 Ecclus. 15: 14.
toe Summa theol., la, q.22, a. 2 ad 411m.
loo Cf. Matt. 13: 20, 22; 24: 22; Rom. 8: 33: II Tim. 2: 10. See article 4 of this
question, and la, q. 103, a.5 ad 211m, 311m.
no I Cor. g: 9.
111 Summa theol., la, q. 103, a.5 ad 211m.
112 Cf. Contra Genies, Bk. Ill, chaps. 111-13; De veritate, q.5, a.3. See also
Tabula aurea, under the word “Providentia,” nos. 22, 28, 32, 33, 40.

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THE ONE GOD
THIRD ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD HAS IMMEDIATE PROVIDENCE OVER EVERYTHING

State o£ the question. It seems that God has not immediate provi­
dence over all things. For: (i) it belongs to the dignity of a king to
have ministers by whom he provides for his subjects. Therefore this
likewise belongs to the dignity of God; (2) because it appertains to
every cause to direct its effect to good; (3) because St. Augustine says:
“It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for
example, vile things.” 113 Aristotle says the same, in fact he seems to
declare this of God Himself.114
Yet the answer is in the affirmative, and it is of faith.
1) According to revelation, from previously quoted texts,115 it is
evident that divine providence, like divine knowledge, is not igno­
rant of anything, but orders all things down to the least detail, and
even immediately. St. Thomas quotes in this article a text from the
Old Testament.118 Many other texts can be quoted, especially those
which make it clear that God knows the prayers addressed to Him
by the faithful, and hearkens to them. Our Lord also says: "Are not
five sparrows sold for two farthings? And not one of them is forgot­
ten before God. Yea, the very hairs of your head are all numbered.” 117
This means that they are numbered directly by God Himself.
The definition of the Vatican Council must be understood in the
same sense: “God protects and governs by His providence all things
which He has made, reaching from end to end mightily and order­
ing all things sweetly. (Wis. 8: 1). For all things are naked and open
to His eyes (Heb. 4: 13), even those which are yet to be by the free
action of creatures.” 118 This means that divine providence of itself
without any intermediary, reaches to all things and orders them from
end to end, even what we do of our own free will, inasmuch as He
wills efficaciously our actually accomplished good deeds, and wills to
reward them. He also permits evil deeds, either ordaining a just
punishment for them or else mercifully pardoning them.
2) The theological proof in the argumentative part of the article
results in two conclusions, the first of which belongs to providence
and the second to divine government, or to the execution of the
providential order.
us Enchir., chap. 17.
m See Metaph., Bk. XII, chap. 9.
us See a. 1, 2.
us Job 34: 13.
111 Luke 12:6.
ueDenz., no. 1784.

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645

The first conclusion is: As regards the type of the order of things
foreordained toward an end, God has immediate providence over
everything.
The reason is that He has in His intellect the type of everything,
even the smallest, and He has assigned to all causes certain effects,
from inanimate things, such as the gravitation required for the cohe­
sion of the universe, even to the lives of the saints. Thus according
to God’s plan the grain of wheat is for the production of wheat, just
as grace, which is the seed of glory, is for this very glory. Likewise
God has ordained from all eternity that our prayers of petition are
for the purpose of obtaining those things that are either necessary or
useful for our salvation and sanctification. This constitutes the dog­
matic foundation for the efficacy of prayer, which is very well ex­
plained by St. Thomas in the following passage: "For we pray, not
that we may change the divine disposition, but that we may impe­
trate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers; in
other words, that by asking, men may deserve to receive what Al­
mighty God from eternity has disposed to give, as St. Gregory says”
{Dial., Bk. I, chap. 8).lie
But if God’s knowledge did not immediately extend to all things,
then it would remain only general and confused, and therefore im­
perfect, just as is the knowledge of a king, who is incapable of super­
vising all the particular things of his kingdom. Hence for a king the
complete centering of all things in himself would be a practical
error, but it would not be so for God.120
Second conclusion. As regards the execution of the order, God
governs tilings inferior by superior things, or through these as in­
termediary.
It is not because of any defect in His power that He does so, but,
on the contrary, because of His abundant goodness, so that He may
impart the dignity of causality even to creatures.121
So also Christ in His mystical body imparts to the Blessed Virgin
Mary the dignity of causality, so that, for example, she may be the
coredemptress. He also imparts to the saints that in Him and with
Him and for Him they may save souls, by carrying their cross, preach­
ing, and being merciful to others.
Thus the error of Plato or of several of the Platonists is excluded,
who admitted three subordinated providences.122 According to a
number of Platonists, the providence of the supreme God is con­
nu Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.83, a.2.
120 Cf. ibid., la, q. 14, a. 11, 13; q. 103, a.6.
121 Cf. ibid., la, q. 103, a.6.
122 Cf. ibid., la, q. 103, a. 6 ad 1 um; q. 110, a. 1; Contra Gentes, Bk. IXI, chap. 76;
Z Sent., d.39, q.2, a. 2, 2a.

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THE ONE GOD

cerned with spiritual things and the whole world in a general way;
the providence of the inferior gods is concerned with individual
things that can be generated, and the “demons” in a certain manner
direct human affairs, as the demon of Socrates does.
The error of the Averroists is likewise excluded, who admitted
only a general providence that extends merely to the species and
necessary individual things, to the sun and moon, for instance, but
not to individual corruptible things.
THIS ANSWER CONFIRMED BY THE SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS

Reply to first objection. “It pertains to a king’s dignity to have
ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not
the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a de­
ficiency in himself. For every operative science (both prudence and
providence) is the more perfect, the more it considers the particular
things with which its action is concerned.”
Reply to second objection. "God’s immediate provision over every­
thing does not exclude the action of secondary causes, which are the
executors of His order.” Thus God provides immediately for all
things, and as regards the execution of the plan of providence, He
governs the lower creation through the higher, as St. Thomas says
farther on: “Therefore God so governs things that He makes some
of them to be causes of others in government as a master who not
only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of
teaching others.” 123
Reply to third objection. “It is better for us not to know low and
vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of
what is better and higher .... and because the thought of evil
sometimes perverts the will toward evil. This does not hold with
God, who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose
will cannot turn in the direction of evil.”
First doubt. Does it follow from this conception of divine govern­
ment through intermediaries that God does not operate immediately
in all things?
It does not, for God immediately produces those effects that be­
long properly to Him, by the immediate contact both of His being
and His power. Thus God alone creates things and immediately
preserves them in being, even inferior things.124 So also God alone
enters into the soul and moves interiorly our intellect and will. But
through the mediation of creatures He produces the effects that be­
long properly to these creatures. Thus He objectively illumines men
^3 Ibid., la, q. 103, a.6.
124 Cf. ibid., q.45, a.5; q.104, a.2; q.105, a.3-5.

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

647

by means of angels and human teachers, although it is only He who
can move interiorly the intellect and will to the performance of
their acts.125*Hence, stated more briefly: Only God can produce and
preserve in everything, being absolutely as such or being inasmuch
as it is being; but any creature can produce and preserve in another
creature of a lower order, a modification of being, for instance, that
it be hot or luminous, or this particular kind of being.
Second doubt. Is divine providence always infallible, not only as
to the ordering of the means to the end, but also as to the attainment
of the end?
Reply. From what has been said,120 providence is not always in­
fallible. For the efficacy of providence, which consists in the act of
command concerning the means for the attainment of the end, de­
pends on the efficacy of the willing or intending of the end. Hence
providence is absolutely infallible even as regards the attainment of
the end, in so far as it presupposes God’s consequent or efficacious
will, which is concerned with good here and now to be produced,
for as previously stated: “Whatever God simply wills takes place;
although what Fie wills (only) antecedently may not take place.” 127
On the contrary, God’s providence is infallible only as regards the
ordering of the means to the end, and not as regards the attainment
of the end; in so far as it presupposes only His antecedent will. This
means that God’s providence is infallible in so far as it prepares the
means necessary for the salvation of all adults, making the fulfill­
ment of His commands really possible for them, even when they do
not actually comply with these commands.
So then in the most general ordering of all things to the end for
which God created the universe, this being His glory and the mani­
festation of His goodness, providence is absolutely infallible even as
regards the attainment of the end, which is efficaciously or conse­
quently willed by God.
But as regards certain particular ends, providence is infallible con­
cerning the ordering of the means, but not concerning the attain­
ment of these particular ends, because such ends are not efficaciously
willed by God. Thus, although all men are ordered by God’s provi­
dence to eternal salvation, yet not all are saved, because God does
not efficaciously will the salvation of all. Yet all the particular ways
of providence, whether they result in the attainment of the end or
not, concur in the attainment of the most universal end, for they are
125 Cf. ibid., q.104. a.2; q. 105. a.3-5.
■ 2« See a.i, third doubt: What does providence presuppose on the part of the
divine will? See also fourth doubt: Whether God's providence presupposes His
consequent and antecedent wills.
!2T Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.6 ad turn.

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THE ONE GOD

subordinated to it. Thus he who by the act of final impenitence de­
parts from the way of salvation, concurs in God’s glory through the
manifestation of His justice.128
By means of these principles the various texts of St. Thomas about
the infallibility of providence are thereby reconciled. Thus he says:
“The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain so far
as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether
from necessity or from contingency.” 120 And again: “Divine provi­
dence does not fail to produce its effect, nor in the way foreseen." 130
These statements make it certain that God’s providence presupposes
His consequent or efficacious will.131
St. Thomas says in another of his works: “In all ordering of things
to their end there are two points to be considered; namely, the order
(to the end) and the result or consequence of this order; for not all
things that are ordered to their end attain their end. Therefore provi­
dence (inasmuch as it depends on God’s antecedent will) regards only
the order to the end. Hence by God’s providence all men are ordered
to eternal happiness; but predestination regards also the result or
consequence of this order, so that it therefore refers only to those
who attain to the glory of heaven.”182 Predestination presupposes
God’s consequent will as regards the salvation of tire elect, and it
orders and commands the means that are efficacious for salvation.
From what has just been said it is evident that no good ever actu­
ally takes place in the world unless God efficaciously willed from all
eternity that it should take place, and unless He efficaciously ar­
ranged that it should take place, whether this good is natural or
supernatural, whether this good is an act easy or difficult of per­
formance. For as stated above, "whatever God simply wills takes
place, although what He wills (only) antecedently may not take
place.” 133 But the absolute or consequent divine will is concerned
with good that will take place when all particular circumstances are
considered, and it is only in this way that anything takes place.13'*
Likewise no one actually commits a sin, unless God permitted it from
all eternity.
Third doubt. Is the infallibility of divine providence only an in­
fallibility of foreknowledge, as some in more recent times have con­
tended, or is it also an infallibility of causality?
iss Cf. ibid., q.22, a.2 ad 411m.
129 Ibid., a.4 ad 211m.
180 Ibid., ad jum.
181 Cf. ibid., q.103, a.7, 8; also Contra Gentes, Bk. HI, chap. 94.
182 De veritate, q.6, a. 1; see also I Sent., d.40, q.i, a.2.
iss Summa theol., la, q.19, a.6 ad lum.
i»‘ Cf. ibid.

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

649

Reply. As regards sin, considered purely as such, of which God
cannot be the cause either directly or indirectly, providence is only
an infallibility of foreknowledge, on the supposition, however, of
God’s permissive decree, to which is added His positive decree con­
cerning the physical entity of sin. But with reference to all that is
real and good, the infallibility of providence is also an infallibility
of causality; for God is the cause of all being and goodness of what­
ever kind. As St. Thomas says: "Since all particular causes are in­
cluded under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect
should take place outside the range of that universal cause.” 135
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER PROVIDENCE IMPOSES ANY NECESSITY ON
THINGS FORESEEN

State of the question. It seems to be so: (1) because the effect fol­
lows of necessity from eternal providence, for divine providence can­
not be frustrated. (2) God is both provident and almighty. There­
fore He imposes the stability of necessity to things provided. Never­
theless the answer is that divine providence imposes necessity upon
some things, not upon all.
1) This conclusion is of faith, it being declared in very many texts
of Holy Scripture, which affirms that our free choices, our prayers
and merits, are subject to divine providence. Therefore the Vatican
Council declares: "God protects and governs by His providence all
things which He has made . . . even those which are yet to be by
the free action of creatures.” 138
The following theological argument is also given in proof of this
conclusion.
It pertains to providence to produce every grade of being for the
perfection of the universe. But, that every grade of being be pro­
duced, there must be both necessary and contingent effects, in fact,
free effects. Therefore divine providence has prepared for some effects
necessary causes or those that are determined to one particular thing;
but for certain other effects providence has prepared contingent
causes, so that they may happen contingently, and for some effects
free causes or the power of choosing, with indifference of judgment
and choice. This argument is but a summary of the complete proof
on this point given in a previous article.137
The major is evident because the perfection of the universe de13··' Ibid., la, q.22, a.2 ad lum. Consult also la, q.19, a.6; Contra Gentes, Bk.
HI, chap. 94.
136 Denz., no. 1784.
Cf. Summa theol., la, q.19, a.8.

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THE ONE GOD

mands a subordination of beings. For the universe would not be
perfect if there were only one grade of goodness in things, a point
that is more clearly explained farther on.138
The minor is likewise evident inasmuch as the species of things
are necessary; and individuals which preserve the continuity of the
species (for instance, of plants and animals) are contingent. There
must also be necessary effects, that is, those that proceed from a
proximate cause that is determined to one particular thing, and
contingent effects, in fact, free effects, which proceed from a proxi­
mate cause that is not determined to one particular thing. There is a
special fitness in this so that in created things there may be a certain
reflection of the divine liberty. Therefore the conclusion is estab­
lished, and it is also revealed, as already stated.
THIS CONCLUSION CONFIRMED BY THE SOLUTION OF
THE DIFFICULTIES

Reply to first objection. "The effect of divine providence is not
only that things should happen somehow, but that they should hap­
pen either by necessity or by contingency.” Hence, as St. Thomas
says: “God foresaw that it (for example, the conversion of St. Paul)
would happen contingently.138 It follows then infallibly that it will
be, contingently and not of necessity.”
Reply to second objection. "Thus all things foreseen happen as
they have been foreseen by God, whether from necessity or from
contingency.” For, as stated above, "since the divine will is perfectly
efficacious, it follows not only that things are done which God wills
to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills.” 140
Thus the divine will extends even to the free mode of our choices;
by actualizing our liberty, He does not interfere with it. As Bossuet
remarks, nothing is more absurd than to say that our choice cannot
be free because God efficaciously wills it to be free.141
Reply to third objection. “The unchangeableness of providence
does not fail to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen.” St.
Thomas also says in another work: “It belongs to God’s providence
sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail and sometimes to pre­
serve them from failing.” 142
We should note what Cajetan says on this point. He writes: "I
suspect that just as to be foreseen posits neither contingency nor
issef. ibid., q.47, a.i.
13» Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 94, no. 11.
no Summa theol., la, q.19, a.8.
i«i Traité du libre arbitre, chap. 8.
i‘2 Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 94, no. 14.

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651

necessity in the event that is foreseen . . . , so God, by reason of
His excellence, that is far beyond our power of conception, thus
provides for things and events, that to be foreseen by Him is the
consequence of something more exalted than anything either avoid­
able or unavoidable.” 148
But Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis) censures Cajetan, not referring
to him by name, however, and he shows that the way St. Thomas
speaks is better, who says: “God foresaw that it (a particular effect)
would happen contingently. It follows then infallibly that it (a par­
ticular effect) will be, contingently and not of necessity.” 143
144 It fol­
lows infallibly as foreseen, and contingently as proceeding from a
proximate cause that is not determined to one particular thing.
Thus both the certitude of providence and the true contingency of
tilings are preserved intact. Such is the general teaching of the
Thomists.
But Cajetan expressed himself more clearly on this point in an­
other of his commentaries.145 He had also very well said concerning
contingent futures: "The divine ideas . . . represent the existences
of things and their contingent characteristics, it being presupposed
that the divine will is freely determined as regards the other term
of the contradiction.” 146 But the divine will is perfectly efficacious,
as stated above,14148
’ and it extends to the free mode of our choices.
First corollary. The unchangeableness of divine providence does
not thereby render our prayers useless, but is the very reason why we
should pray, because God from all eternity willed and disposed
things for our prayers. As St. Thomas says: “For we pray, not that
we may change the divine disposition, but that we may impetrate
that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers.” 148
Second corollary. The great mystery connected with God’s provi­
dence is not so much its reconciliation with human liberty as its per­
mission of sin, especially the sin of final impenitence, which pertains
to the mystery of predestination and reprobation.
In fact, the reconciliation of the infallible efficacy of the decrees of
providence with the liberty of our choices, although this is in itself
profoundly obscure, yet it clearly enough follows from God’s nature
and the omnipotence of His will. If God is God, He certainly can
move created liberties interiorly, firmly, and suavely, and especially
so to the performance of salutary and holy acts. Moreover, it is suf­
143 Com. in lam, q. 22, a.4, no. 8.
144 Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chap. 94, no. 11.
14® Com. in Ep. ad Rom. 9: 23.
1«“ Com. in lam, q. 14, a. 13, no. 17.
141 Cf. Summa theol., la, q.19. a.8.
148 ibid., Ila Ilae, q.83, a.2; see Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chaps. 95, 96.

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THE ONE GOD

ficiently clear that the divine actualization of our liberty cannot
destroy or interfere with this liberty.
But God’s permission of sin is a great mystery, especially the sin
of final impenitence. It is the mystery of the intimate reconciliation
of infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty in the eminence of
the Deity. Of two sinners (for instance, the two thieves dying on Mt.
Calvary) one is efficaciously called, the other is not. As St. Thomas
says, quoting St. Augustine, "To whomsoever help is given by God, it
is mercifully given; and from whom it is withheld, it is justly with­
held, in punishment of a previous sin.” 148 There is in this a most
profound mystery, which we must now discuss in the following ques­
tion.
ns Ibid., Ila Ilae, q.2, a.5 ad mm.

CHAPTER XXIII

Question 23
Predestination
There are three parts to this question: (1) The nature of predestina­

tion; (2) its cause; (3) the certainty of it.
The first part, which concerns the nature of predestination, con­
sists of three articles. What its name implies and its reality (a. 1); its
real definition and whether it posits anything in the predestined (a 2);
what its opposite is, which is reprobation (a. 3).
The second part concerns the cause of predestination. On God’s
part, whether the predestined are chosen by Him (a. 4); on our part,
whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination
(a· 5)·
The third part concerns the certainty of predestination: Whether
it is a certainty (a. 6); whether the number of the predestined is cer­
tain (a. 7); whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of
the saints (a. 8).
We have discussed this question at length in a special work, to
which we refer the reader.1 In the beginning of this work we treated
of the significance and reality of predestination according to Holy
Scripture, and of the teaching of the Church on this subject. The
principal difficulties of this problem and the method of procedure,
as also the classification of the theological systems, were then con­
sidered. In this same work the teaching of St. Thomas was compared
with that of St. Augustine and with the theories of several modern
theologians, especially of Molina and the congruists.
This question is connected with the preceding question. The
gratuity of predestination is a disputed point among theologians, in
so far as they admit or do not admit the intrinsic efficacy of the divine
will as regards the merits of the predestined. For St. Thomas,2 the
Thomists, the Scotists, and the Augustinians, these decrees are of
themselves efficacious, so that the merits of the predestined are the
effects of predestination and therefore cannot be the cause of pre­
destination, as will be stated in the fifth article. For the Molinists
and the congruists, the divine decrees as regards the merits of the
1 Predestination (Eng. tr., Herder Book Co.).
2 Cf. Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.4, 6, 7, 8; q.14, a.8; q.20, a.3, 4.
653

654

THE ONE GOD

predestined are not of themselves efficacious; but their efficacy de­
pends on our consent foreseen by means of the scientia media, and
therefore Molina says: "To the foreknowledge, which is included in
predestination on the part of the intellect, there is attached the
condition of the use of free will without which there would have
been no preordaining by God.” 3 Something similar is to be found
in the congruism of St. Robert Bellarmine and of Suarez, in so far
as they retain the theory of the scientia media; nevertheless they
agree with St. Augustine and St. Thomas in defending the absolute
gratuity of predestination to glory.
As we shall see, what clarifies this entire question is the principle
of predilection as formulated by St. Thomas in a previous article, in
which he says: “Since God’s love is the cause (efficacious of itself) of
goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if
God did not will a greater good for one than for the other.” 4 And
again: “The reason why some things are better than others, is that
God wills for them a greater good.” 3 This means that no one would
be better than another unless loved and helped more by God. This
principle presupposes that God’s will or His love is the cause that
is of itself efficacious of the goodness of our salutary choices and of
our merits in accordance with the following text: “For who dis­
tinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 6 It
follows from this, as will at once be seen, that as merits are the effects
of God’s predilection and predestination, they cannot be its cause,
as will be stated in the fifth article of this question. This teaching on
the divine causality constitutes what there is of clarity, and the per­
mission of the sin of final impenitence constitutes what there is of
obscurity in this chiaroscuro.
In other words, St. Thomas preserves the principle of predilection
absolutely intact in this question, whereas Molina says: “Of two that
are called and equally aided by grace, it can happen that one of
them is converted and the other not. It is possible for one who has
received a less grace to rise again, when another who has received a
greater grace does not rise again, and remains obdurate." 7 Never­
theless, so as not to deny the mystery of predestination and at least
defend the extrinsic validity of the principle of predilection, Molina
says that it depends entirely on God’s good pleasure that Peter was
placed in those circumstances in which God, by the scientia media,
had foreseen his good consent, and that Judas was placed in different
» Concordia, q.23, a.4, 5, disp. I, membr. 11, p. 516.
« Summa theol., la, q.20, a.3.
s Ibid., a.4.
« I Cor. 4: 7.
τ Concordia, pp. 51,565. See also index to this work, under the word “Auxilium.”

PREDESTINATION

655

circumstances in which God, by this same knowledge, had foreseen
his sin.8 Thus the solution of this entire question on predestination
is to be sought in the preceding questions on God’s knowledge and
will. The Thomists reject the scientia media completely, for it posits
a passivity in God with reference to our conditionally meritorious
free acts of the future. They always appeal to this most exalted prin­
ciple, namely, that no good is actually done by this particular man
rather than by another unless God efficaciously willed it, and no one
actually commits sin without God’s permission.0
If these principles are borne in mind, it will be easier to under­
stand what must now be said on this subject.
Let us see what is the general condition of this question from the
standpoint of Holy Scripture, what are the principal conflicting er­
rors and the classification of the Catholic theological systems. The
explanation of the articles of St. Thomas will thus be much simpli­
fied. Many appeal to him as their authority, yet their appeal does
not always rest on solid grounds.
TESTIMONY OF HOLY SCRIPTURE

There is already indeed in the Old Testament frequent reference
to the gratuitous election by which God chose the people of Israel
from among all nations. Thus Seth was elected by God, and not Cain;
then Noe was chosen, and Sem in preference to his two brothers;
Abraham and Isaac, too, in preference to Ismael, and then Jacob
was preferred to Esau. Similarly, in the New Testament we read that
God freely calls the Gentiles to salvation, whereas He permits the
crime committed by Israel.10
Thus it is often said in the Old Testament that God’s free election
does not conflict with justice. There is no evidence that this divine
election presupposes the divine foreknowledge of man’s merits.
Hence St. Paul says of Jacob and Esau: ‘‘When the children were not
yet born, nor had done any good or evil (that the purpose of God
might stand), not of works but of Him that calleth, it was said to
her (Rebecca): the elder shall serve the younger; as it is written:
Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated,” 11 that is, but I loved
Esau less. Thus the mystery of salvation was announced “as a type” 12
in the Old Testament.
Does the Gospel declare the mystery of predestination? It cer* Ibid., p. 513.
» Summa theol., la, q. 19, a. 6 ad lum.
10 Rom. 11: 11-25.
11 Ibid., 9: 11.
12 cf. I Cor. 10: 6, 11.

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THE ONE GOD

tainly does, inasmuch as it speaks of the elect and the divine election.
The Gospel announces indeed to all the mystery of redemption and
the possibility of salvation, as in the following text: “Going there­
fore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father
and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all
things whatsoever I have commanded you.’’13 St. Paul likewise says:
“God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of
the truth. For there is one God, and one Mediator of God and
men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself a redemption for
all.” 14
Most certainly God does not command what is impossible, but
makes the fulfillment of His precepts really possible at the very mo­
ment that they are of obligation, and in so far as they are known by
men.
Nevertheless there are men and angels who, through their own
fault, have strayed from the path of salvation or havé perished, even
men who knew Christ the Savior and followed Him, such as “the son
of perdition.” 16
Others, who in the Gospel are called the elect, are saved. If they
are adults, they not only can keep God’s commandments, but they
actually do, and they persevere until the end. Of these Christ says:
"My sheep hear My voice, and I know them and they follow Me.
And I give them life everlasting; and they shall not perish forever, and
no man shall pluck them out of My hand. That which My Father hath
given Me is greater than all; and no one can snatch them out of
the hand of My Father. I and the Father are one.” 18 Similarly He
says farther on: “Those whom Thou gavest Me have I kept; and
none of them is lost but the son of perdition, that the Scripture may
be fulfilled.” 17 There is reference in these texts not only to God’s
foreknowledge, but especially to His most efficacious omnipotence.18
It is likewise declared that “many are called, but few are chosen.” 19
Also in the prophecy concerning the fall of Jerusalem and the end
of the world, we read: “Unless those days had been shortened, no
flesh should be saved. But for the sake of the elect those days shall
be shortened.” 20
13 Matt. 28: 19.
141 Tim. 2: 4.
1· John 17: 13.
Ibid., 10: 27 f.
17 Ibid., 17: 12.
is Consult St. Augustine’s Com. in Joannem, 10: 27, tr. 48. Also St. Thomas'
Com. in Joannem (ibid.).
is Matt. 22: 14.
2<> Ibid., 24: 22.

PREDESTINATION

θ57

Therefore the Gospel treats of the mystery of the divine election,
which is the same as the mystery of predestination. In fact, as St.
Robert Bellarmine shows, there are three certain propositions which
we conclude from the Gospel.21
1) God has chosen several among all classes of men. In the parable
of the laborers in the vineyard and in the other of those that were
invited to the marriage feast, we read: “Many are called, but few
are chosen.” 22 And again, there is the following text: “God shall
send His angels with a trumpet and a great voice, and they shall
gather together His elect from the four winds, from the farthest
parts of the heavens to the utmost bounds of them.” 23
2) God efficaciously chose those to be saved that they may infalli­
bly attain to eternal life. Thus we read: “There shall arise false
Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders,
insomuch as to deceive, if possible, even the elect,” 24 that is, if this
were possible. And again: “This is the will of the Father who sent
Me: that of all that He hath given Me I should lose nothing, but
should raise it up again in the last day.” 25 “My sheep . . . shall not
perish forever, and no man shall pluck them out of My hand.” 26 This
text seems to point to the intrinsic efficacy of the divine election and
grace, and that this efficacy does not depend on our foreseen consent.
For this text does not speak of God's knowledge, but of His omnipo­
tent will that preserves the elect and leads them to salvation.
3) God’s choice of the elect was gratuitous, for we can in no way
conclude from the Gospel that God chose them on account of their
foreseen merits. Thus in the text: "Fear not, little flock, for it
hath pleased your Father to give you a kingdom,” 27 the verb “hath
pleased” expresses God’s good pleasure and mercy. The text does
not say: "Fear not, because your merits were foreseen.” Likewise,
we read: "I have called you friends. . . . You have not chosen Me,
21 De gratia et libero arbitrio, Bk. II, chaps. 9 f.
22 Matt. 20: 16; 22: 14.
28 Ibid., 24: 31. See also Luke 12: 32.
24 Ibid., 24: 24. John Maldonatus in his commentary on this text remarks:
"When he says, ‘if possible,’ he indicates that it is not possible. But it is not pos­
sible, posited the fact of divine predestination, as the theologians admit in dis­
cussing this text. From this passage they conclude the stability and, as they call
it, the certainty of predestination. Christ is not speaking of any kind of straying
away, but of the kind that is called final separation. For the elect can often be
led astray, but they cannot die in that state." Consult also Matt. 24:40: “Then
two shall be in the field: one shall be taken, and one shall be left. Two women
shall be grinding at the mill: one shall be taken, and one shall be left.”
25 John 6: 39.
2« Ibid., 10: 28. Consult St. Thomas’ commentary on this text.
2’ Luke 12: 32.

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THE ONE GOD

but I have chosen you, and have appointed you that you should
go and should bring forth fruit, and your fruit should remain.” 28
These words are uttered, indeed, directly to the apostles, but they
concern indirectly all those who must labor in the Lord’s vineyard
and all God’s friends. St. Thomas says: “Many attribute to them­
selves the cause of divine friendship, in that they attribute the prin­
ciple of good works to themselves and not to God. And the Lord
excluding this, says: ‘You have not chosen Me’ (namely, that I should
be your friend); ‘but I have chosen you’ (that 1 should make you My
friends), and He is not speaking here only of the grace of the apostolate." 29 St. Thomas explains the whole of this passage as referring
to the gratuity of predestination, and he concludes: “It is the good
already present in the thing that influences our choice, but the divine
election is the cause of greater good in one thing than in another.
. . . This shows clearly God’s mercy to some, whom He prepares for
grace without their having previously merited it.” 30
The gratuity of the divine election is likewise intimated in the
following words of our Lord: “I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of
heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things (the mysteries of
the kingdom of heaven) from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed
them to little ones. Yea, Father, for so hath it seemed good in Thy
sight.”31 This means, as we read in one of the epistles: “God resisteth
the proud, and giveth grace to the humble,” 82 and even makes them
humble; for humility is God’s gift. Hence St. Thomas explains this
text from St. Matthew by referring it to predestination, saying: “Why
God is merciful to this one rather than to a certain other, is to be
attributed solely to Flis will . . . His will of good pleasure.” 33 There­
fore, Jesus says: “Yea, Father, for so hath it seemed good in Thy
sight.” 34
The deep humility of the saints has its foundation in this, that
when great saints see a criminal condemned to death, they say to
themselves: “If this man had received all the graces which I received,
perhaps he would not have been so unfaithful; and if God had per­
mitted me to commit the sins which He permitted him to commit,
this man would be in my place and I would be in his.” Thus Chris­
tian humility has its foundation in the mystery of creation from
nothing and in the mystery of grace or divine election.
Hence already in the synoptic Gospels and in the Gospel of St.
zsjohn 15: 16.
20 Com. in Joannem, 15: 16.
so Ibid.
31 Matt. 11: 25.
»2 Jas. 4: 6.
33 Com. in Matt. 11: 25.
31 Matt, it: 25.

PREDESTINATION

659

John the mystery of the divine election is declared, as well as its
efficacy and gratuity. It must be noted that, just as in the principle
of predilection enunciated by St. Thomas,35 so the gratuity of elec­
tion follows from its efficacy, which extends even to the merits of the
elect, for our Lord says: “Without Me you can do nothing.” 38
What is stated more clearly about this mystery in the epistles of
St. Paul? It is called predestination, a name that properly applies to
it. The efficacy and gratuity of this predestination are more clearly
presented.
Now, in truth, St. Paul frequently declares the principle of predi­
lection, which virtually contains the doctrine of predestination. He
says: “For who distinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that thou
hast not received? And if thou hast received it, why dost thou glory as
if thou hadst not received it?” 3T This is a quasi-commentary on our
Lord’s words: “Without Me you can do nothing” 38 as regards salva­
tion. That is, no one thing would be better than another if God did
not will greater good for one than for another. St. Paul also says:
“It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, ac­
cording to Flis good will.” 39 The efficacy and gratuity of predestina­
tion, which is asserted in the following texts, already follows from this
principle of predestination.
Such texts are: "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus
Christ, who hath blessed us with spiritual blessings in heavenly
places, in Christ: as he chose us in Him before the foundation of the
world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity.
Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through
Jesus Christ unto Himself: according to the purpose of His will:
unto the praise of the glory of His grace, in which He hath graced us
in His beloved Son.” 40 St. Thomas, like his predecessor, St. Augustine,
commenting on this passage in his commentary' on this epistle, says:
“He chose us, not because we were saints, for we were not; but He
chose us that we might become saints by leading a virtuous life and
one free from vices. . . . But when the Apostle says that God pre­
destinated us unto adoption, these words may be referred to the im­
perfect likeness of adoptive sonship realized here on earth by sancti­
fying grace; yet it is better to say they refer to the perfect likeness to
God that will be realized in our heavenly home, and it is of this adop­
tion that St. Paul says: ‘We ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting
85 Summa theol., la. q.20, a.3.
38 John 15:5.
87 I Cor. 4: 7.
88 John 15: 5.
88 Phil. 2: 13.
48 Eph. 1: 3-7.

66ο

THE ONE GOD

for the adoption of the sons’ (Rom. 8: 23). But there are two causes as­
signed . . . for the divine predestination. One is the simple will of
God, denoted by the words, ‘according to the purpose of His will.’
. . . The other cause is final, which is, that we may praise and know
God’s goodness, and this is denoted by the words, ‘unto the praise
of the glory of His grace.’ ” 41 This interpretation of St. Thomas is
confirmed by the fact that adoptive sonship in this life is willed by
God on account of the perfect adoption realized in heaven. This
interpretation also brings out clearly both the gratuity and the ef­
ficacy of predestination.
And again St. Paul says: “We know that to them that love God, all
things work together unto good, to such as, according to His pur­
pose, are called to be saints. For whom He foreknew (προίγνω) he also
predestinated (προώρισΐν) to be made conformable to the image of
His Son; that Fie might be the firstborn amongst many brethren.
And whom He predestinated, them He also called. And whom He
called, them He also justified. And whom He justified, them He also
glorified.” 42
With St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and St. Robert Bellarmine,43 we
must remark that in this last text the words, “whom He foreknew
He also predestinated,” tire meaning is: “Those whom God has
foreknown, looking favorably upon them, He has also predestined.
These words do not refer to the divine foreknowledge of our
meritorious acts, for such interpretation would imply that there is
some good not produced by God Himself. Nowhere in St. Paul’s
epistles would we find any foundation for this interpretation; and
it would contradict the texts just quoted and the ones we are about
to quote. The meaning is: Those whom He has foreknown, looking
favorably upon them (and among these are children who will die
immediately after being baptized, before they performed any meri­
torious act). This is the frequent acceptation in Holy Scripture of
the verb (προγιγνώσκω) “I foreknow.” Thus we read: “God hath not
« Com. in Eph., 1: 3—7; see also ibid., 1: 11, 12. Consult Estius, Com. in Ep. ad
Eph., 1: 11, 12. Concerning the words, "having been predestined in the purpose
of Him who works all things according to the counsel of His will," Estius says:
"And so the Apostle is of the opinion that our salvation and the whole process
of our sanctification is the result of God’s efficacious operation in us, just as He
operates in all things by a causality that in the strict sense of the term is called
physical, which is rashly denied by some who in other respects are learned. It
follows, moreover, from this that we are predestined not on account of our merits,
but simply because it was God's will. St. Thomas, too, clearly adverts to this fact
in his commentary on this passage.” See also Father J. M. Vosté, O.P., Com. in
Ep. ad Eph., pp. 99-121.
42 Rom. 8: 28-30.
<s De gratia et libero arbitrio, Bk. II, chaps, g f.

PREDESTINATION

661

cast away His people, which He foreknew.” 44 The Gospel speaks of
the Lord as saying to the wicked: “I never knew you: depart from Me,
you that work iniquity." 45*And St. Paul says: “But now, after that
you have known God, or rather are known by God.” 48 "If any man
love God, the same is known by Him.” 47 “Then I shall know even as
I am known.” 48 “The Lord knoweth who are His.” 49 “The Lord
knoweth the way of the just, and the way of the wicked shall perish.” 50*
This exegesis of St. Thomas and St. Robert Bellarmine is upheld at
the present day by Lagrange, Allo, Zahn, Jülicher, and others.
In the previously quoted passage,61 the gratuity of predestination is
clearly seen since it depends on God’s gratuitous purpose, which is
there referred to.52*St. Paul also says in another epistle: “In whom
we also are called by lot, being predestinated according to the pur­
pose of Him who worketh all things according to the counsel of His
will, that we may be unto the praise of His glory.” 83
Likewise, in this previously quoted passage, the efficacy of pre­
destination is made clear in its effects, which are vocation, justifica­
tion, glorification.
Finally, St. Paul sets forth God’s supreme independence or liberty
in the distribution of His graces.54*For God had chosen Israel, which
is now rejected because of its unbelief; and God announces salva­
tion to the Gentiles, but the future conversion of the Jews is also
foretold. The principle of predilection is proclaimed, which is ap­
plied to nations and individuals in the following words: “What then
shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. For He saith
to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will
show mercy to whom I will show mercy. So then it is not of him
that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth
mercy.” 65
Father Lagrange, O.P.58 shows that these words are indeed pri­
marily said of the Gentile nations, but the principles enunciated
therein are also applied, according to St. Paul, in a secondary sense
44 Rom. 11:2.
« Matt. 7: 23.
«« Gal. 4: 9.
4T I Cor. 8: 3.
4» Ibid., 13: 12.
4» II Tim. 2: 19.
so Ps. 1: 6. Cf. Estius in Ep. ad Rom., 8: 29.
si Rom. 8: 28-30.
S2 Cf. ibid., v.28.
os Eph. 1: 11. See also II Tim. 1: g; Tit. 3:5.
s4 Rom. chaps. 9-12.
so Ibid., 9: 14 f.
so Epitre aux Romains, chap. 9, p. 244.

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THE ONE GOD

to individuals; in fact, strictly speaking, only persons are predestined.
The meaning of these words is that God freely chooses, without of­
fending against justice. Therefore there is no injustice on His part.
For God does not command what is impossible and deprives nobody
of his due, when He freely grants a greater grace to some as we shall
find St. Thomas stating farther on.57
St. Paul concludes: “Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and
of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments
and how unsearchable His ways! For who hath known the mind of
the Lord, or who hath been His counselor? Or who hath first given to
Him, and recompense shall be made him? For of Him and by Him
and in Him are all things. To Him be glory forever, amen.” 58
We shall explain several of these texts again in our commentary
on the articles of St. Thomas. At present, however, we must show,
with St. Robert Bellarmine,59 that the three propositions which we
have formulated from the Gospel, which concern the divine elec­
tion, are more clearly deduced from what St. Paul says in his epistles
concerning predestination which follows the divine election. They
are:
1) God has chosen and predestined some among all classes of men.80
2) God efficaciously chose and predestined those to be saved that
they may infallibly attain to eternal life. "Those whom He predesti­
nated, them He has also called . . . and justified . . . and glori­
fied.” 81
3) God has freely chosen and predestined the elect. “Those whom
He foreknew (looking favorably upon them) He also predesti­
nated.” 82 “Who shall accuse against the elect of God?” 83 “There is
a remnant saved according to the election of grace.” 84 “In Him, in
whom we also are called by lot, being predestinated according to
the purpose of Him who worketh all things according to the coun­
sel of His will, that we may be unto the praise of His glory.” 88
The gratuity of election is also inferred when St. Paul says that
“God is able to make him stand,” 60 which means, as the Council of
Trent explains, “that he stand perseveringly (and that He is able)
to restore him who falleth.” 87 This implies that it is by a special
v Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad gum (the end).
«8 Rom. 11: 33 f.
88 De gratia et libero arbitrio, Bk. II, chaps. 9-15.
e» Cf. Rom. 8:30-33: Eph. 1:4.
ei Ibid., 8: 30.
82 Ibid., 8: 29.
os Ibid., 8: 33.
e« Ibid., 11:5.
es Eph. t: 11.
ee Rom. 14: 4.
«1 Denz., no. 806.

PREDESTINATION

663

act of God’s mercy that he who falls is restored or converted, and it
is just as much God’s predilection that is made manifest, if one is
always preserved from sin and never loses baptismal innocence.
From all these texts of Holy Scripture, St. Augustine deduced the
following definition quoted by all theologians: “Predestination is the
foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits by which most cer­
tainly are liberated whoever are liberated.” 08 and St. Augustine says
more explicitly: “By predestination God knew what He Himself will
do.” 08 It is not the foreknowledge of our merits that is assigned as
the cause of predestination in this definition, but the merits of the
elect are clearly seen to be the effects of this predestination, which
is therefore gratuitous. Thus St. Augustine frequently says that God,
in rewarding our meritorious acts, crowns His own gifts.70
THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH AGAINST MUTUALLY
CONFLICTING HERESIES

The teaching of the Church on this subject was formulated in the
condemnations of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism. It is subse­
quently declared against the absolutely contradictory errors of predestinarianism as also against those of Protestantism and Jansenism.
The teaching of the Church is thus like the mountain peak of
truth that towers above and between these conflicting errors.
THE DECLARATION OF THE CHURCH AGAINST PELAGIANISM
AND SEMIPELAGIANISM

The Pelagians said: “Without grace we can keep the command­
ments . . . and grace is not necessary except for making it easier to
keep them.” This proposition was condemned in the fifth canon of
the Council of Carthage (418).71 The Semipelagians said that man
does not need grace for the beginning of faith and good will, spoken
of as the “beginning of salvation,” and that he can persevere until
death without a special grace. This statement was condemned by the
Second Council of Orange.72 The Semipelagians held that God wills
equally the salvation of all, although certain special graces are
granted to some, such as the apostles. Consequently the Semipela­
gians identified predestination with God’s foreknowledge of the be­
ginning of salvation and of merits by which man perseveres until
es De dono persever., chap. 14.
β» De praed. sanct., chap. 10.
TOCf. Denz., nos. 810, 842: see also no. 141.
η Ibid., no. 105.
’2 Ibid., nos. 178, 183.

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THE ONE GOD

the end in doing good without any special help. Negative reproba­
tion was identical with the foreknowledge of demerits. Thus pre­
destination and negative reprobation followed human election,
whether good or bad. Hence this eliminated the element of mystery
in predestination spoken of by St. Paul. Hence God was no longer
the author but merely the spectator of that which singles out the
elect from the rest of mankind. Hence in Pelagianism and Semipelagianism the elect are not loved and helped more by God.
Concerning children who die before the age of reason, the Semi­
pelagians said that God predestines or reprobates them, foreseeing
the good or bad acts they would have performed if they had lived
longer. Thus already the Semipelagians admitted, previous to any
divine decree, a foreknowledge of the conditionally free acts of the
future or of the futurables, which in later times was called by Molina
the scientia media. The opponents of Pelagianism replied that such
interpretation would mean that children are marked for reproba­
tion on account of sins they did not commit, which is unjust.
Toward the end of his life St. Augustine wrote especially two
treatises73 against Semipelagianism, in which he shows from the
testimony of Holy Scripture particularly three things: (i) that, with­
out a special and gratuitous grace, man cannot have the beginning
of salvation, and that he cannot persevere until the end without a
special and gratuitous grace: (2) that God does not will equally the
salvation of all, but that He wills more the salvation of children who
die immediately after being baptized. He likewise wills more the sal­
vation of believers than of those who de facto do not receive the faith,
and He wills more the salvation of those who persevere until the end;
(3) that the elect, as their name indicates, are loved more and helped
more, and that their merits are not the cause but the effect of the
divine election. Even in one of his earlier works,74 St. Augustine had
already said, speaking of the angels who were of the elect, that they
were “helped more” than the others.
The Council of Orange (52g), in condemning Semipelagianism,
took many of its formulas from the writings of St. Augustine and of
his disciple St. Prosper. All historians agree that it disapproved of
the Semipelagian denials of the gratuitousness of grace and of its
necessity for the beginning of salvation and for final perseverance.75
Hence, on account of the declarations of the Council of Orange,
all Catholic theologians admit three propositions, although they do
not all interpret them in the same sense. They are: (1) predestination
to grace is not because of God’s foreseeing our naturally good works.
73 De praed. sand.; De done persever.
is De civitate Dei, Bk. XII, chap. 9.
75 Penz., nos. 176, 177, 179, 183. See also no. 806.

PREDESTINATION

665

nor is the beginning of salutary acts due to natural causes; (2) pre­
destination to glory is not because of God’s foreseeing we would
continue in the performance of supernaturally meritorious acts apart
from tire special gift of final perseverance; (3) complete predestina­
tion, in so far as it comprises the whole series of graces from the
first up to glorification, is gratuitous or independent of foreseen
merits.
Nevertheless not all Catholic theologians interpret these three
propositions in the same sense. There is particularly a difference be­
tween the Molinists who deny the intrinsic efficacy of grace, and
others who admit it. The latter find this efficacy obviously stated in
the declarations of the Council of Orange.
Thus, in the first proposition, for the actual grace that is required
for the beginning of salvation, the Molinists understand this grace
to be extrinsically efficacious, because our consent was foreseen by
God. Hence they differ on this point from the Thomists, the Augustinians, and the Scotists.76 This does not safeguard so well the
gratuity of grace as asserted by the Council of Orange.77
Similarly, contrary to the above-mentioned theologians, the Mo­
linists understood the second proposition as meaning that the actual
grace of final perseverance is extrinsically efficacious, inasmuch as
God foresaw our consent by means of the scienlia media. St. Augus­
tine said of the grace of final perseverance: “It is a grace that is
spurned by no one whose heart is hardened, and it is therefore given
that the hardness of heart may first be eliminated.” 78 Contrary to
this, Molina says: "It may happen that two persons receive in an
equal degree the interior grace of vocation; one of them of his own
free will is converted and the other remains an infidel. It may even
happen that one who receives a far greater prevenient grace when
called, of his own free will is not converted, and another, who re­
ceives a far less grace, is converted.” 79
It is not so easy to reconcile this statement with what the Council
of Trent says: “of this great and special gift of perseverance . . .
which cannot be derived from any other than from Him who is able
to establish him who standeth 80 that he stand perseveringly, and to
restore him who falleth.”81 Likewise, from what the Council of
Trent teaches, it is commonly admitted that we cannot merit de
condigno the grace of final perseverance, for the continuance of the
78 Consult Molina’s Concordia, pp. 43, 564.
77 Denz., nos. 176-78, 199, 200.
78 De praed. sand., chap. 8.
78 Concordia, pp. 51, 230, 231, 548.
so Rom. 14: 4.
87 Denz., no. 806; see also no. 826.

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THE ONE GOD

state of grace up to the moment of death is the principle of merit,
and therefore cannot be merited.” 82 Hence, if the Molinists wish to
admit predestination to glory after foreseen merits, then they must
say that predestination to glory is independent of our foreseen super­
natural merits which, without the special gift of final perseverance,
would continue until the end. This is expressed in the third proposi­
tion, which we are now going to explain.
The third proposition is: ‘‘Complete predestination, in so far as
it comprises the whole series of graces from the first up to glorifica­
tion, is gratuitous or independent of foreseen merits.” The Molinists
differ from St. Thomas in the interpretation of this proposition.
Molina admits it, but he adds: “To the foreknowledge, which is
included in predestination on the part of the intellect, there is at­
tached the condition of the use of free will without which there
would have been no preordaining by God.” 83
Contrary to this, Augustinians and Thomists understand complete
predestination as it is explained by St. Thomas: “It is impossible
that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have
any cause as coming from us; because whatever is in man disposing
him toward salvation, is all included under the effect of predestina­
tion; even the preparation for grace.” 81 Thus even the free deter­
mination disposing one toward salvation is entirely included in the
effect of predestination. “There is no distinction,” says St. Thomas,
“between what flows from free will and what is of predestination;
as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause
and from a first cause.” 88 They are two total causes that are not
co-ordinated, but subordinated. But the effect of predestination
cannot be its cause.
The import of these three propositions seems to be that they ex­
press the very teaching of St. Augustine and are obvious inferences
from the canons of the Council of Orange.
This is especially made clear from the following canons of tliis
same council. Canon 9 reads: “As often as we do good it is God who
works in us and with us enabling us to act.” 86 Thus efficacious grace
82 The Council of Trent says: "The just man can truly merit eternal life, and
the attainment of eternal life itself (if he dies in the state of grace).” (Denz.,
no. 842). See no. 80g. This means that a man can merit the attainment of eternal
life, if he retain his merits, however, until the end, and they are retained by the
gift of final perseverance.
The Council of Trent, likewise says: “God’s goodness toward all men is so great
that He will have the things which are His own gifts (see no. 141) to be their
merits (canon 32)."
es Concordia, p. 516.
Summa theol., la, 9.23, a.5.
8» Ibid.
se Denz., no. 182.

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667

not only makes it possible for us to do what is good, but by it we
actually do what is good. It effectively works in us, as St. Paul says:
“It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.” 87
Also canon 12 says: “God so loves us, as we shall be by the gift of
His grace, not as we are by our own merit.” 88 It follows from this
that “God so much the more loves us, as we shall be better by the
gift of His grace.” 88 This means that no one would be better than
another if he were not loved more by God. In the quotation of this
last canon,80 there is reference to the "Indiculus” on the grace of
God, which expresses the same doctrine.81
Hence ancient theologians, namely, Augustinians and Thomists,
noted that this Second Council of Orange expresses in equivalent
terms this principle of predilection, which is already enunciated by
St. Paul in the following words: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or
what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 82 It was this great truth
which the Pelagians and Semipelagians denied in maintaining that
God wills equally the salvation of all. Thus those who are saved would
not be more loved and helped by God, who would be rather the on­
looker than the author of what singles out the just from the im­
pious.
We must now consider the declarations of the Church against the
errors of those who deny God’s universal will to save.
Predestinarianism (ninth century) denied God’s universal will to
save, and taught predestination to evil. Several said that these errors
are to be found in the writings of Gottschalk. This was the occasion
of much controversy. On this point must be quoted especially the
declarations of the councils of Quierzy (853), Valence (855), Toul
(859), and Thuzey (860). It was in this last council that the bishops
of France came to an agreement on this difficult matter.83
There are particularly two declarations which we get from these
provincial councils. They are: (1) God wills in a certain way to save
all men; (2) there is no predestination to evil, but God decreed from
all eternity to inflict the penalty of damnation for the sin of final
impenitence, a sin which He foresaw and in no way caused, but
permitted.
The meaning and scope of these declarations are clearly seen es­
pecially from the third canon of the Council of Quierzy, which says:
87 Phil. 2:13.
88 Denz., no. 185.
88 St. Prosper's fifty-sixth sentence.
88 Denz., no. 185.
87 Ibid., nos. 131, 133-35, «37. 141; see also nos. 189, 193.
82 1 Cor. 4: 7.
83 Cf. Denz., nos. 316 f.

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THE ONE GOD

“Almighty God wills, without exception, all men to be saved,04
though not all are saved. That some are saved, however, is the gift
of Him who saves; if some perish it is the fault of them that perish.” 05
This canon is taken from the writings of St. Prosper, who was a dis­
ciple of St. Augustine. This canon makes it clear to us that God
does not will equally the salvation of all, as the Pelagians thought;
for that some are saved, is the gratuitous gift of Him who saves.
Moreover, predestination to evil is excluded. Therefore the two ex­
treme aspects of this mystery are declared in plain language, but we
fail to perceive the mode of their intimate reconciliation. The fourth
canon of the Council of Quierzy affirms that Christ died for all
men.
The Council of Valence insists more strongly on the gratuity of
predestination to eternal life. This council declared "that God ab­
solutely foreknew that the good will be so by His grace, and that the
wicked will be so through their own fault. Nor do the wicked there­
fore perish, because they could not be good, but because they refused
to be good. ... In the election of those to be saved, God's mercy
precedes their merits; but in the damnation of those who will perish,
their demerits precede God's judgment. The malice of the wicked
was foreknown but not predestined by God, since He is not the
cause of this.” 06
Finally the Council of Thuzey (86o) very plainly formulates the
higher principles that elucidate this question. The first declaration
is: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done in heaven and on
earth.07 For nothing is done in heaven or on earth except what He
Himself is pleased to do or justly permits to be done.” 08 The bishops
who accepted the teaching of St. Augustine demanded nothing more,
and so they all agreed. This meant that no good deed is actually
performed by this man rather than by a certain other, unless God
Himself graciously wills and effects it; and no bad deed is actually
performed by this man rather than by a certain other unless God
justly permits it. Countless consequences are included in this abso­
lutely general principle. The Thomists see in it the principle of
predilection, that no one would be better than another, unless such
person were loved more by God.
In the synodal letter approved by the Council of Thuzey all the
other declarations proceed from this first one. The fifth declaration
*ο Cf. I Tim. 2: 4.
»5 Ibid., no. 318.
so Ibid., nos. 321, 322.
07 Ps. 134: 6.
es PL, CXXV1, 123.

PREDESTINATION

669

reads: "Hence it is because of God’s grace that the world is saved;
and it is because man has free will that the world will be judged.”
Thus the two extreme aspects of this mystery are declared: God’s
universal will to save and the gratuity of predestination.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this teaching of the
Church was confirmed by the decisions of the Council of Trent
against the errors of Protestantism and by the condemnation of
Jansenism. The Council of Trent says: “But, though He died for
all09 yet not all receive the benefit of His death, but those only to
whom the merit of His passion is communicated.” 100 And again: “If
anyone says that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but
that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are
good, not permissively only, but also proprie and per se, so that the
treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of
Paul, let him be anathema.” 101 Also the following: “If anyone says
that the grace of justification is attained only by those who are pre­
destined to life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed,
but do not receive grace, as being by the divine power predestined
unto evil, let him be anathema.” 102
It is likewise affirmed against the Jansenists that Christ did not
die only for the predestined, or only for the faithful, but for all
men;103 that there is a grace which is truly sufficient, and which
makes it possible for adults to observe God’s precepts according as
these can be known by them.
The Church, quoting the words of St. Augustine, affirms against
the reformers: “God commands not impossibilities, but, by com­
manding, both admonishes thee to do what thou art able, and to
pray for what thou art not able (to do).” 104
The Church, however, though asserting that God by a sufficient
grace makes the fulfillment of His precepts possible for all, neverthe­
less affirms the efficacy of grace that actually is productive of good
works. Thus the Council of Trent declares that “God, unless men
are themselves wanting to His grace, as He has begun the good work,
so will He perfect it, working in them the will and the perform­
ance.” 105
From all these declarations of the Church against conflicting
heresies, we get, by way of summary, the following four propositions.
»0 II Cor. 5: 15.
100 Denz., no. 795. See also no. 797.
101 [bid., no. 816.
102 [bid., no. 827; cf. no. 200.
los [bid., nos. 1096, 13801., 1294.
ιοί [bid., no. 804; sec also nos. 806, 807, 816, 827, 1647, 1677.
los [bid., no. 806; Phil. 2: 13.

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THE ONE GOD
A. AGAINST PELAGIANISM AND SEMIPELAGIANISM

1) The cause of predestination to grace is not the foreknowledge of
naturally good works performed, nor is it on account of any pre­
liminary acts of the natural order that are supposed to prepare for
salvation.
2) Predestination to glory is not on account of foreseen supernat­
ural merits that would continue to be effective apart from the special
gift of perseverance.
More briefly: “That some are saved, is the gift of Him who
saves." 106
B. AGAINST PREDESTINARIANISM, CALVINISM, AND JANSENISM

1) God (in a certain way) wills to save all men.
2) There is no predestination to evil, but God has decreed from
all eternity to inflict eternal punishment for the sin of final impeni­
tence which He foresaw, He being by no means the cause of it, but
merely permitting it.
More briefly: “That some perish, is the fault of those who per­
ish.” 107
Hence the two truths that must by all means be held as of faith
on this subject are these two propositions declared by the Council
of Quierzy: “That some are saved, is the gift of Him who saves. That
some perish, however, is the fault of those who perish.” Pelagianism
denied the first statement, predestinarianism the second. Between
these two precipices of error the revealed truth towers like a moun­
tain whose peak cannot be seen. It will be seen only in heaven, for
it is the intimate reconciliation of infinite mercy, justice, and supreme
liberty in the eminent Deity. Long ago Holy Scripture expressed the
two extreme aspects of the mystery, which must be reconciled in
these words of the prophet: “ Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy
help is only in Me.” 108
These two truths are most certain and the assent of the Christian
mind has always been given to them; but their intimate reconcilia­
tion can be clearly seen only in the beatific vision.
THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

The revealed doctrine of predestination and of the will to save
mankind is, as we have remarked, like a mountain peak towering
10» Ibid., no. 318. The Council of Quierzy is quoting from the writings of
St. Prosper.
10’ Ibid., no. 318. Again the Council of Quierzy is quoting from St. Prosper.
108 Osee 13:9.

PREDESTINATION

671

above and between the two precipices of Pelagianism on the one
hand, and predestinarianism on the other.
This representation makes it easy to see how the theological systems
are at variance with one another. There are two contrary systems,
each situated about half way up on opposite sides of the mountain.
On one side above Semipelagianism is Molinism, and a little farther
up the congru ism of Suarez. On the other side we have the more
rigid interpretations of Augustinianism and Thomism, which modify,
so it seems, God’s universal will to save, saying that negative reproba­
tion, which is previous to foreseen demerits, consists not only in the
permission of sins that are not forgiven, but in the positive exclu­
sion from heavenly glory as from a favor to which one is not en­
titled.108
Midway between the two sides, however, we find the eclecticism
of the congruists of the Sorbonne, who with the Molinists admitted
the extrinsic efficacy of grace for salutary acts easy of accomplishment,
and who with the Thomists and the Augustinians admitted the in­
trinsic efficacy of grace for difficult salutary acts. This view, which
seems to be practically applicable, has in its speculative aspect all the
difficulties of Molinism or of the scientia media for acts easy of per­
formance, and almost all the difficulties of Thomism for difficult
salutary acts. Hence it does not set the mind at rest.
Higher up is the mountain peak, which is, indeed, inaccessible for
pilgrims here on earth, this being the Deity just as it is, in whose
eminence infinite mercy, justice, and supreme liberty are intimately
reconciled. But before we reach this peak, it is possible for us in this
life to formulate most certain principles, in which we clearly see the
equilibrium or harmony of the revealed doctrine, and which enable
us to determine in this life the exact location of this inaccessible
peak. These principles are: (1) God does not command impossibili­
ties, but makes it possible for all to be saved. (2) One person would
not be better than another, unless such person were loved more by
God. “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” 109
110 But these two
principles stem from one more sublime, namely, “God’s love is the
source of all good,” that is, of grace by which we can keep God’s
commandments, and of grace by which we actually do keep them.
But these two higher principles are the ones that were so famously
formulated by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, both of whom ad­
mitted their universal validity.
Thus we can now come to the methodical classification of the
Catholic systems:
109 See next page, § 1.
no I Cor. 4: 7.

Pelagianism
Negation of gratuitous
predestination

Predestinarianism
Negation of universal will
to save

The systems have been classified in three ways. The first classifica­
tion, which is the one more commonly proposed, considers not so
much the principles as the conclusions of tire theologians. The sec­
ond, proposed by Father Billot, S.J., is from the Molinist point of
view and considers rather the principles. The third, proposed by
Father del Prado, O.P., is from the Thomist point of view and like­
wise considers not so much the conclusions as the principles.
i) According to the commonly proposed classification there are
two principal tendencies. Some say the predestination of adults to
glory is the result of foreseen merits; these are sponsors of the purely
Molinist view, such as Vasquez and Lessius. Others say that the pre­
destination of adults to glory is previous to foreseen merits, and that
negative reprobation or non-election is previous to foreseen de­
merits. Such is the view of the Thomists, the Augustinians, the
Scotists, and, even among congruists, it is the view of St. Robert
Bellarmine and Suarez.

PREDESTINATION

673

Nevertheless there is considerable difference of opinion between
the theologians of this second category, of those, namely, who admit
the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory. Almost all of the
old school, namely, the Thomists, the Augustinians, and the Scotists,
hold that this gratuitous predestination has its foundation in the
divine predetermining decrees. St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez,
however, deny these decrees and retain the Molinist theory of the
scientia media so as to explain the distribution of “congruent” grace
and God’s certain knowledge of the consent given by the elect to
this grace.
2) The second classification, which is the one proposed by Father
Billot,111 has its foundation not so much in the conclusions as in
the principles. For some, he says, the foundation of foreknowledge,
which implies predestination, is in the divine predetermining de­
crees; for others, however, it is in tire scientia media. Among these
latter, there are some who, like Vasquez and Lessius, admit the pre­
destination of certain adults to glory after foreseen future merits,
and the non-election of certain ones after foreseen future demerits.
But there are others who, like Suarez, hold that the predestination
of adults to glory is even before conditionally future foreseen merits,
and that negative reprobation or non-election is even before condi­
tionally future foreseen demerits. Finally, others will have it that
predestination of adults to glory is after foreseen merits as condi­
tionally future, but not as future. Father Billot admitted this last
opinion, which he thinks is the one Molina taught. Thus, for Father
Billot, what is absolutely gratuitous is the divine choice of circum­
stances in which God places a certain person, after having foreseen
by the scientia media that in these circumstances the consent would
be freely given. But as for negative reprobation or non-election,
Father Billot’s view does not differ much from that of Vasquez,
which latter is very difficult to maintain.
Lastly, there is a third classification proposed by Father N. del
Prado, O.P.112 He also takes into consideration not so much the
conclusions as the principles of the theologians, according as they
admit as the foundation for their doctrine predetermining decrees,
or the scientia media. But he insists that only the theologians admit­
ting the divine predetermining decrees are faithful followers of St.
Thomas, who wrote: “Whatsoever is in man disposing him toward
salvation is all included under the effect of predestination, even the
preparation for grace.” 113 This includes, therefore, even the free
determination of the salutary act in so far as it is in this one rather
m De Deo uno, p. 290 (last ed.).
112 De gratia et libero arbitrio. III, 188.
rn Summa theol., la, q.23, a. 5.

674

THE ONE GOD

than the other, for example, in the good thief ort Mt. Calvary rather
than in the other. The absolute gratuity of predestination to glory
is thus clearly seen; for, since the merits of the elect are the effects
of predestination, they cannot be its cause. This is truly what was
meant by St. Thomas, who previously in the article just quoted had
written: “Now there is no distinction between what flows from free
will, and what is of predestination; as there is no distinction between
what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause.” For they
are two total subordinated causes, so that the entire effect is from
God as the first cause, and the effect is entirely from our will as
the secondary cause moved by God. They are not two partial co­
ordinated causes, as when men are pulling a boat.114
It must also be remarked that only the theologians who admit the
intrinsic efficacy of tire divine decrees and of grace recognize the
absolute and universal validity of tire principle of predilection for­
mulated by St. Thomas in these words: “Since God’s love is the cause
of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another,
if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 115 Simi­
larly St. Thomas says: “He who makes a greater effort does so be­
cause of a greater grace; but to do so he needs to be moved by a
higher cause." 116 This principle of predilection presupposes that
the divine decrees concerning our future salutary acts are intrinsically
and infallibly efficacious. If, on the other hand, this intrinsic efficacy
of grace is denied, the case might arise in which, of two persons who
are loved and helped to the same extent by God and who are placed
in the same circumstances, one would correspond with the grace re­
ceived and the other would not. Thus without having been loved
and helped more by God, one would prove to be better than the
other by doing something either easy or difficult to perform, whether
this is the first or final act. This is indeed what, in opposition to St.
Thomas, Molina maintains. He reduced the principle of predilec­
tion to the divine choice of favorable circumstances in which God
places those whom He foresaw will consent to make good use of the
grace in such circumstances.
Conclusion. Hence a comparison of the different systems about
predestination brings us back to the question of the value of die
principle of predilection, namely, that one thing would not be better
than another, unless it were loved more by God. Is this principle of
absolute and universal validity, as the early theologians thought,
especially the Thomists, or has it merely a relative value and one
in Cf. ibid., la Ilae, q. ns, a.4.
H» Ibid., la, q.20, a.3.
no Com. in Matt., 25: 15.

PREDESTINATION

675

that is restricted to favorable circumstances, as the Molinists and
the congruists think, who admit the scientia media?
As we shall see when we come to explain the doctrine of St. Thomas
in the articles of this twenty-third question, this principle of pre­
dilection, in the philosophical order, is the corollary of the principle
of causality applied to God’s love which is the cause of all good.
Hence St. Thomas says: "Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in
things, one thing would not be better than another, if God did not
will greater good for one than for another." 117
In the supernatural order, however, this principle of predilection
has been revealed by St. Paul in these words: "For who distinguished!
thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 111 He finds
this principle expressed in the Old Testament writing: "For He
saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I
will show mercy to whom I will show mercy.” "·
This principle of predilection, as we stated above, was admitted
by St. Augustine even for the angels. He says, concerning the good
and the bad angels: “If both were created equally good, then, while
some fell by their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted,
and reached that high degree of blessedness from which they became
certain that they would never fall.” 120 It is evident, of course, that
the following text applies even to the angels: “For who distinguisheth
thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 121 St. Augus­
tine also says, speaking of predestination: "Why He draweth one and
not another, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.” 122 We
must now explain the articles of St. Thomas.
As we said, this twenty-third question consists of three parts. The
first part contains the first three articles: (1) What is meant by the
ii? Summa theol., la, q.20, a.3.
11« I Cor. 4: 7.
11» Rom. 9: 15.
120 De civitate Dei, Bk. XII, chap. 9.
in I Cor. 4: 7.
122 On St. John, hom. 26. Consult Rouët de Journel’s Enchiridion patristicum,
Index theologicus, p. 850, nos. 127-40. See also ibid., what is meant by the "pre­
destination of the saints,” doctrine of St. Augustine: There are some whom God
“has predestined to eternal life. He being most merciful in the bestowal of His
graces” (nos. 1882, 1951, 1985, 1988, 2002). Predestination to the faith and to
justification is absolutely gratuitous. Predestination is "the hidden work of God."
Those who are damned, are damned through their own fault. The teaching of
other Fathers: Predestination is "God’s secret plan" (St. Fulgentius), nos. 2246,
2254. 2255. 2286. Rouët de Journel quotes these words of St. Ambrose: "God
predestined to reward those whose merits He foreknew" (no. 1272). De fide ad
Gratianum, PL, XVI, 665. But these words refer to glory inasmuch as it is the
reward in the order of execution; and inasmuch as it is the reward, it is evi-

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THE ONE GOD

name predestination and whether persons are predestined. (2) The
real definition completes this inquiry: Does it place anything in the
predestined? (3) What is meant by its opposite, reprobation? The
second part concerns the cause of predestination (a. 4, 5); the third
pjpt treats of the certainty of predestination (a. 6, 7, 8).

FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER MEN ARE PREDESTINED BY GOD

State of the question. The difficulty is (1) that St. John Damascene
says: “God foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it
all.” *123 (2) Other creatures are directed to their end by Providence
and are not said to be predestined. Then why would men be pre­
destined?
The answer is: It is fitting that God should predestine men; and
predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.
1) The conclusion is proved on the authority of St. Paul, who says:
“Whom He predestinated, them He also called.” 124
The word “predestined” (προώρων, from the verb προορίζω) sig­
nifies to predefine, to decree.125*The word praedestinavit, which St.
Thomas quotes from the Latin Vulgate, is a good translation of the
Greek verb, though it denotes something that is sent on in advance.
There is another foundation for this idea in the Old Testament, for
we read: “He hath made me as a chosen arrow. In His quiver He
hath hidden me.” 123 Likewise in the New Testament: “As many as
were ordained to life everlasting, believed.” 127
Moreover, the Fathers and Councils make use of this word "pre­
destination.” Thus the Council of Quierzy (853) says: “God, who is
good and just, chose from the same mass of perdition (descendants
of Adam), according to His foreknowledge, those whom He has pre­
destined by grace for life,128 and He has predestined eternal life for
them. But the rest, whom by His just judgment He left in the mass
of perdition, He foreknew will perish, though He did not predestine
dently given to adults in the order of execution only on account of merits.
Hence, as pointed out farther on, the Thomists generally agree in saying that
“God (in the order of intention) freely wills to give glory to the elect, but He
does not will to give it freely (in the order of execution).”
123 De fide orthod., Bk. II, chap. 30.
12« Rom. 8: 30.
125 See Eph. 1:11.
!2β Isa. 49: 2. See also Ps. 126: 4.
12T Acts. 13: 48.
12s Rom. 8: 29; Eph. 1: 11.

PREDESTINATION

677

that they should perish. But because He is just He predestined eter­
nal punishment lor them.” 129
This dogma of predestination is affirmed also by the Council of
Trent, which says: “No one, moreover, so long as he is in this mortal
life, ought so far to presume as regards the secret mystery of divine
predestination as to determine for certain that he is assuredly in the
number of the predestinate.” 130 It likewise says, speaking of the
gratuity of the gift of final perseverance: “Which gift indeed cannot
be derived from any other but Him who is able to establish him who
standeth, that he stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falleth.”131
The proof from reason is as follows: “Just as there is a type in the
divine mind of the ordering (disposition and direction) of all things
to their end, which is called providence, so there must be a type of
the ordering of those who are to be transmitted to their end, which
is supernatural happiness. But the type of the transmission of the
rational creature is called predestination, for to destine is to send.
Therefore it is fitting that God should predestine men, and predesti­
nation is, as regards its objects, a certain part of providence.
This argument means the end of all difficulties. In the reply to
the first objection it is remarked that where Damascene says that
God “does not predetermine what is in us,” he means that “He does
not predetermine by an imposition of necessity.” This is evident
from the context in which Damascene says: “God does not will
malice, nor does He compel virtue.” Hence predestination is not ex­
cluded by Him.
Reply to second objection. Irrational creatures cannot properly
be said to be predestined, because they are not capable of attaining
to eternal life.
Reply to third objection. Predestination applies to angels, just as
it does to men. Thus St. Augustine says: “Who made the good will
in the angels, if not He who created them with their good will, that
is, with their chaste love, by which they adhered to Him, at the same
time establishing them in their nature and endowing them with
grace?” 132 A little farther on St. Augustine says that the good angels
"were more abundantly assisted and attained to their eternal hap­
piness, whereas the others fell by reason of their evil will.” 133
From this article we get the definition of predestination, which is:
"the type of the ordering of some persons toward eternal salvation,
120 Denz., no. 316.
iso Ibid., no. 805.
isi Ibid., no. 806.
132 De civilate Det, Bk. XII, chap. 9.
iss Ibid.

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THE ONE GOD

existing in the divine mind.” 184 This means that it is the ordering,
preconceived in the divine mind, of some to salvation. On this point
St. Thomas is completely in agreement with St. Augustine, who de­
fined predestination as “the foreknowledge and the preparation of
those gifts whereby they who are delivered are most certainly de­
livered.” 138
In this definition St. Augustine by "foreknowledge” does not have
in mind merely speculative knowledge, or the scientia media by
which God before any decree foresaw what we of ourselves will do;
but he is referring to that practical and effective knowledge by which
God foresees what He Himself will do. It is therefore dependent on
His executive decree. Wherefore it is said that predestination is “the
foreknowledge and preparation of the gifts, whereby they who are
delivered, are most certainly delivered.” St. Augustine had also said:
“By predestination God knew what He will do.” 138
St. Thomas likewise says: "Although knowledge as such does not
concern things to be done, nevertheless practical knowledge does,
and it is to this knowledge that predestination refers.” 137 This means
that predestination refers to God’s knowledge, “which has the will
joined to it, and is the cause of things.” 138
Thus St. Thomas139 explains St. Paul’s words: "Whom He fore­
knew, He also predestinated,”140 as meaning that He foreknew
by the practical knowledge that regulates the choice, and the
choice of the will precedes predestination as will be stated farther
on;141 for predestination, as St. Thomas declares,142 is an act of the
intellect, which means that it is an efficacious command concerning
the means, concerning the execution of the means already chosen.
To predestine, indeed, means the ordering of the means that are
efficacious for the salvation of the elect. But ordering is an act of
the intellect, and the ordering of the efficacious means for the at­
tainment of anything is a command that directs the execution of a
preconceived and chosen thing. Also providence, of which predesti­
nation is an objective part, is an act of prudence, or a command
that presupposes choice.
134 Yet it is in a.2 of this question that St. Thomas gives us this definition of
predestination. [Tr.]
iss De dono persever., chap. 14.
iso De praed. sand., chap. 10.
lor De veritate, q.6, a.t ad 7um.
ne Summa theol., la, q. 14, a.8.
»30 De veritate, q.6, a.i.
io® Rom. 8: 29.
i‘i Summa theol., fa, q.23, a.4.
142 De veritate, q.6, a.i.

PREDESTINATION

679

First doubt. In tvhat sense is predestination an objective part of
providence?
Reply. It is not to be understood as constituting a subjective part
of providence. This means that it is not subordinated to providence
as the species is subordinated to its genus. Some said that there are
four kinds of providence: (1) providence that concerns the order of
nature; (2) general providence that concerns the salvation of all
human beings; (3) special providence that concerns the salvation of
the predestined, or predestination; (4) providence that concerns the
order of the hypostatic union. The distinction between them would
be virtual.
St. Thomas says at the end of the argumentative part of this article:
“Predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.” This
means that predestination constitutes some part of the material ob­
ject of providence. Thus it is that one and the same divine provi­
dence concerns the three orders of nature, grace, and the hypostatic
union, there being no virtual distinction between these kinds of
providence, and it is only because of the different objects that this
divine providence receives different names. In this respect it resem­
bles the divine knowledge, which in itself is only of one kind, yet
because of its different material objects it is called the knowledge of
simple intelligence, of vision, and of approbation.
The reason why divine providence is one and undivided is because
its object is one, namely, the universe, which consists of three sub­
ordinated orders, and there is one end to which all these orders are
ordained, which is God’s glory. The Salmanticenses clearly show, in
discussing the motive of the incarnation, that God by one and the
same decree willed to manifest His goodness by means of the universe
in which the subordination between the three orders is as follows:
first comes the order of nature, which is subordinated to that of
grace with permission of original sin, both of which are subordinated
to the hypostatic union.
Second doubt. Does predestination add anything to providence in
general?
Reply. It adds the efficacy of the means and the infallible attain­
ment of the end.143 In other words, as Alvarez explains,144 by divine
providence the end directly intended by God’s consequent will is
always attained, namely, the good of the universe; but for the at­
tainment of this end certain evils are permitted, and thus certain
things are indirectly intended; these are willed by God's antecedent
143 Cf. De veritate, q.6, a.i, and what we said in treating of providence (q.22.
a.i).
i«4 De auxiliis, p. 242.

THE ONE GOD

68ο

will, such as that all the fruits do not become ripe, that all human
beings are not saved. Contrary to this, since predestination depends
solely on God’s consequent will, it always obtains its effect, in this
sense that the predestined are always saved. Nevertheless, that the
predestined in the course of their lives here on earth are permitted
to fall into sin is more probably the effect of predestination, so as
to make the elect more humble, as will be stated farther on.
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER PREDESTINATION PLACES ANYTHING IN
THE PREDESTINED

This article completes the definition of predestination, a point
that is particularly evident from the fourth objection, which states
that if predestination places anything in the predestined, such as
grace, then it is something temporal, and is not eternal and un­
created.
The reply of St. Thomas is: Predestination is not anything in the
predestined, but only in the person who predestines. But the execu­
tion of predestination is in a passive way in the predestined.
The first part is proved from the fact that predestination, as it was
stated, is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the
things provided for, but is a type of the ordering of those things that
exist in the divine mind.
The second part is proved from the fact that, just as the execution
of providence, which is the divine government, is actively in God,
as an action that is formally immanent and virtually transitive, but
is passively in the things governed; so the execution of predestination
is passively in the predestined.
First doubt. But what is this execution of predestination, or what
are its effects?
St. Thomas replies at the end of the argumentative part of this
article that these effects are the calling and magnification, for St.
Paul says: “And whom He predestinated, them He also called; and
whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified,
them He also glorified.” 145
Several Thomists, comparing what St. Thomas says in this article
with other passages in his various works, define the effect of pre­
destination by saying that it is whatever God does by reason of His
efficacious intention of saving some in preference to others. Hence
four conditions are required for anything to be the effect of predesti­
nation: (i) that the thing is caused by God; (2) that it is the result
1« Rom. 8: 30.

PREDESTINATION

681

of God’s efficacious intention to save; (3) that it leads one certainly to
eternal life, for, since it is the result of God’s efficacious intention, it
cannot be frustrated; (4) that it is the result of Christ’s merits, in­
asmuch as we are concerned here with the predestination of men in
the state of fallen nature.
These four conditions are verified primarily in the proper effects
of predestination, which result from it by an elective process. Such
are the efficacious call, justification not interrupted by sin and con­
tinuing up to the moment of death, and finally glorification. But be­
sides these proper effects there are others that are not a matter of
choice, but are imperative only by reason of predestination. Such
are the good disposition of the predestined and their natural endow­
ments, which depend by way of choice on the general direction of
providence in the natural order. Thus in our human life we dis­
tinguish between acts elicited by charity and those commanded by
this virtue, which are, of course, elicited by a virtue that is subordi­
nated to charity.
Having posited these conditions, Thomists are generally enough
agreed, from a consideration of the various texts of St. Thomas, in
arranging the effects of predestination according to the following
schema:

w

k-<
8.
ε

' Glorification.
Good use of grace in the life of the elect (a. 5). This is against
Molina’s theory.
Uninterrupted justification ending in final perseverance. Also
interrupted justification inasmuch as the remembrance of this
results in a life of penance by the predestined, and inasmuch
as lost merits are restored.
Especially the efficacious call in the predestined; also the ineffi­
cacious call, inasmuch as its remembrance by the predestined
. leads them to give thanks to God.

Poverty, diseases, misfortunes, death in such circumstances as
assure one of being saved.
Naturally moral good acts, or the good use of natural qualities,
such as moral rectitude, meekness.
Good disposition of the predestined, natural endowments, such
as being born of good parents.

It is also more probable that the permission of sin in the pre­
destined, inasmuch as it is the means of greater sanctification for
them, is the effect of predestination. This last statement must be
understood in the right sense. Indeed it is not sin but the permission
of sin that is the effect of predestination, inasmuch as this permission
is meant to be the occasion of leading the elect to greater humility

68ί>

THE ONE GOD

and more fervent charity, as is seen in the life of St. Mary Magdalen, or
in St. Peter’s life after his repentance for having denied the Lord.
This doctrine has its foundation in these words of St. Paul: “To
them that love God (until death), all things work together unto
good";14’ and St. Augustine adds: "all things, even sins,” inasmuch
as they serve as the occasion to make one more humble.147
Second doubt. How are the natural gifts of the elect the effect of
predestination, and how are they conducive to their salvation?
It is easy to see that natural gifts are conducive to salvation, since
the natural inclination to fortitude is the foundation for stability
in the life of the Christian. But it is more difficult to say how these
natural gifts of the elect are the effect of predestination, because the
order of nature is presupposed by the order of grace, to which pre­
destination belongs. Hence there is not absolute agreement among
Thomists in the explanation of this point, for they arrange in dif­
ferent orders the ordaining of the divine decrees concerning nature,
grace, and the hypostatic union.
Some say: (i) God, intending to manifest His goodness, willed the
order of nature; (2) He ordained intellectual creatures to a super­
natural end; (3) having foreseen Adam's sin and original sin, He
decreed the reparation of the human race through Christ the Re­
deemer; (4) in Christ, God chose some in a more special manner and
effectively, leaving the rest alone. According to this order, it is dif­
ficult to conceive how the very being of the predestined, native
endowments, and other natural qualities, are the effect of predestina­
tion, and are thus conducive to salvation. For, according to this view,
all these natural qualities, which will be realized in course of time,
are supposed as already present in the previous signs. These Thomists
seem to multiply excessively the number of virtually distinct divine
decrees, nor do they answer the question why God permitted Adam’s
sin and original sin. This order was followed by John of St. Thomas
and Billuart in discussing the motive of the incarnation.
Other Thomists, however, such as the Salmanticenses, Godoi, and
Gonet, differ, and with good reason, from John of St. Thomas and
Billuart. In discussing the motive of the incarnation, they say that
God permits sin only for a greater good. We cannot, of course, say
a priori for what greater good He permitted Adam’s sin; but after
the incarnation this good is clearly seen, as St. Thomas remarks,
who says: “God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater
good therefrom. Hence it is written (Rom. 5: 20): ‘Where sin
abounded, grace did more abound.’ Hence, too, in the blessing
of the paschal candle we say: Ό happy fault, that merited such
1«· Ibid., 8: 28.
Sec St. Thomas’ Com. in Ep. ad Rom., 8: 28.

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683

and so great a redeemer.' ’’148 Thus God permitted Adam’s sin
on account of the redemptive incarnation that was first willed in
the genus of final cause, but not in the genus of material cause that
is to be perfected, just as He wills the matter as capable of being
actuated by its form, and the form as actuating the matter. Thus
God permitted Adam’s sin and the abounding of the offense in order
that grace might abound yet more. Nor is there any need for a
multiplicity of decrees, but by one and the same decree God willed
that the natural order should be subordinated to the supernatural
order (with permission of Adam’s sin), and that the supernatural
order should be subordinated to the hypostatic union.140 In this way
it is more readily shown how the natural gifts of the elect serve to
promote the salvation of the predestined. Thus the natural intelli­
gence with which St. Augustine and St. Thomas were endowed,
helped them in their theological studies. Likewise, in the elect the
inclination to prudence is subordinated to infused prudence, just
as the natural inclination to fortitude is subordinated to the Chris­
tian virtue of fortitude in the martyrs.
Not only do the natural gifts and temperament of the elect pro­
mote their salvation, but also their misfortunes and sicknesses do,
inasmuch as "to them who love God all things work together unto
good,” 150 since there could be no heroic patience without suffering.
THIRD ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD REPROBATES ANY MAN

Since opposites have their foundation in the same principle, repro­
bation must be defined by its opposite, which is predestination.
Reply. It is of faith that there is such a thing as reprobation, which
does not mean, however, predestination to evil. The Council of
Quierzy says against Gottschalk: “God, who is good and just, chose
from the same mass of perdition, according to His foreknowledge,
those whom He has predestined for life,151 and He has predestined
ne Summa theol. Illa, q.i, a.3 ad gum.
i4»This means that God, by His knowledge of simple intelligence, contemplated
first of all several possible worlds, and among these was the world of sinners with
the redemptive incarnation. In this possible world, the natural order is subordi­
nated to the supernatural order with permission of original sin, and the super­
natural order is subordinated to the redemptive incarnation.
Thereupon, just by one decree. God willed this possible world together with
all its parts. Thus the architect does not first intend the foundation of the house
and then the roof; but he first intends to construct a suitable dwelling and the
whole house together with all its parts.
iso Rom. 8: 28.
1st Ibid., 8: 29; Eph. 1: 11.

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THE ONE GOD

eternal life for them. But the rest, whom by His just judgment He
left in the mass of perdition, He foreknew will perish, though He
did not predestine that they should perish. But because He is just,
He predestined eternal punishment for them.” 152
Holy Scripture speaks of the reprobates, of the son of perdition.153
St. Paul says: ‘‘I chastise my body . . . lest ... I myself should be­
come a castaway.” 134 Christ Himself reveals to us the sentence of
judgment: “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire.” 155
Theological proof. The following answer is given to those who
inquire about the definition and fitness of reprobation: It is the
part of providence which permits the failure of some through their
own fault to attain glory; and because it was their own fault, the
penalty of damnation is inflicted on them. Thus reprobation is the
opposite of predestination. It is a question of sin which de facto is
not forgiven, especially the sin of final impenitence.
That it is fitting for God to reprobate some is proved as follows:
It belongs to God’s providence, as universal provider, to permit for
the general good of the universe the failure among defectible things
that are subjected to tliis providence. But intellectual creatures, who
are destined for glory, are of their nature defectible. Therefore it
belongs to God’s providence to permit that some through their own
fault fail to attain their end, and to inflict the penalty of damnation
for their sin. The motive, however, of this divine permission will be
discussed farther on 150 along with the motive of predestination.
First doubt. Does reprobation imply only foreknowledge?
Reply. It does not, but as St. Thomas says: “It includes the will to
permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of
damnation on account of that sin.” This negative reprobation is the
will to permit sin which de facto will not be forgiven; and, as we
shall see,157 this negative reprobation is previous to foreseen demerits
that are not to be forgiven, which are not infallibly foreseen as
future without this divine permission.
Positive reprobation, however, is the will to inflict the penalty of
damnation for sin, and this is the result of foreseen demerits; for
every just punishment presupposes a sin, on account of which the
punishment is inflicted.
Second doubt. What must be said of the opinion of certain Thom­
ists who maintain that negative reprobation, which is prior to the
102 Denz., no. 316.
103 John 17: 12.
104 I Cor. 9: 27.
100 Matt. 25: 41.
100 See q.23, a. 5 ad sum.
107 See a.5.

PREDESTINATION

685

foreseeing of demerits, consists in the positive exclusion from glory,
as a gift to which they are not entitled? Such was the opinion of Al­
varez, the Salmanticenses, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, and Contenson.
Reply. It is more difficult to reconcile this opinion with God’s
universal will to save, and there seems to be no foundation for this
theory in the present article of St. Thomas, or in any other passage
of his works. All that St. Thomas says in this article and elsewhere
is: “Reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into
sin,” especially into the sin of final impenitence and other sins that
dispose one for it. He does not speak of the positive exclusion from
glory as from a gift to which one is not entitled.
St. Thomas says, indeed, in the reply to the first objection of this
article: “To some God does not wish this good which is eternal life,”
which means that He wills eternal life to them only antecedently
and not consequently or efficaciously. But to exclude them from
glory as from a gift to which they are not entitled would be not
only not to will, but to be unwilling; it would be an act of positive
exclusion from glory. This seems, however, too harsh a view, and
by this very fact, these men, before their demerits were foreseen,
would be excluded not only from their ultimate supernatural end,
but also from their ultimate natural end.
Similarly, in the reply to the second objection it is stated that
"reprobation is the cause of abandonment by God,” that is, after sin
and on account of sin.
In the reply to the third objection it is explained that the reprobate
can be saved, although de facto he will not be saved. This point is
better explained, however, if we bear in mind that before foreseen
demerits such a person is not excluded from glory as from a gift to
which one is not entitled.
Therefore this opinion of certain Thomists seems scarcely recon­
cilable with God’s universal will to save. For God, to the utmost ex­
tent, sincerely wills by His antecedent will that all be saved, so that
it is their own fault if they are damned. But He would not will all
to be saved if, before having foreseen any sin on the part of the
reprobate, He had decreed positively to exclude such a person from
eternal salvation as from a gift to which one is not entitled.
Confirmation of proof. God wills whatever there is of good in
anything. But that a person, who is ordained to an ultimate end that
is both natural and supernatural, before the foreseeing of sin, be
excluded from this end as from a gift to which one is not entitled,
is not in itself anything good. Therefore God, before the foreseeing
of sin, does not exclude a person from the ultimate natural and
supernatural end as from a gift to which one is not entitled.

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THE ONE GOD

Hence negative reprobation is simply God’s will to permit one
through one’s own fault to fail to reach the ultimate end. Therefore
Thomist theologians generally distinguish between the permission
of sin and the denial of efficacious grace; for this latter is an evil that
implies a penalty and it therefore presupposes sin; whereas, on the
contrary, the permission of sin precedes the sin, and is not a penalty,
but something that is not good; for privation is more than a simple
denial. There is a great difference, indeed, between not giving some­
thing that is gratuitous and refusing to give it.
Objection. Since God proceeds according to order, He first in­
tends the end before the means. But in the case of reprobation, ex­
clusion from glory is the end, and the permission of sin is the means.
Therefore God first intends exclusion from glory, and then the per­
mission of sin.
Reply. I concede the major, and deny the minor; for the exclusion
from glory as from a gift to which one is not entitled is the end in
the case of reprobation; for in the order of execution, the end is that
which is attained. But God in the order of execution excludes no
one from glory as from a gift to which one is not entitled, but only as a
punishment for sin.
Moreover, we must not look for absolute parallelism between rep­
robation and predestination, because divine providence is not re­
lated to good and evil in the same way. It directly intends good
things, because these are in themselves appetible; but it does not
indirectly intend, but only permits, evil things, because these are
not in themselves appetible; and having permitted them, it orders
them to some good, and it permits them only because of some good.
Hence, because God first intends the general good of the universe,
which demands the manifestations of His justice, He at once and
directly wills simply to permit sin, and then He ordains the punish­
ment of the sin which has been permitted and foreseen, which is a
good thing; for it is just that sin should be punished, and in this we
see the splendor of God’s justice.
Third doubt. What is meant by God’s permission of sin?
Reply. God’s permission of sin means that the will, which by its
nature is defectible, is not maintained by Him at that particular
time in the performance of good; for if this will were maintained
by Him in the performance of good at that particular time, sin would
be prevented and would not be permitted.158
But that the will is not maintained in the performance of good
requires careful consideration. There is a mystery in this, and we
must avoid contradiction. Three principles must be noted.
i) That the will, which by its nature is defectible, is not maini” Cf. Summa theol., la Ilae, q.79, a. 1; q. 109, a.a ad aura.

PREDESTINATION

687

tained by God in the performance of good is not yet an evil, because
it is not the privation of a good to which one is entitled.
God is not bound always to maintain in the performance of good
the will which by its nature is defectible; whereas, on the contrary,
He is bound always to maintain it in existence along with the im­
mortal soul.
Similarly, on the part of the creature, the will, which by its na­
ture is defectible, is not bound always to be maintained in the per­
formance of good, but only in being. If it were entitled to the
former, then it would be impeccable.
Hence it is not an evil that the will, which by its nature is defecti­
ble, is not maintained by God in the performance of good. Never­
theless we do not say that it is a good. Thus the lack of greater
perfection in a less fervent act of charity is not a good; neither is it
an evil, because it is not the privation of a good that is due to one.
Thus there is a great difference between the lack of greater perfec­
tion, and the smallest venial sin, which already is purely a moral
evil.
2) Also the first sin that is committed is a moral evil, or the priva­
tion of that rectitude required of anyone. But sin follows inevitably
the divine permission of sin which, as was stated, implies that one
is not maintained by God in the performance of good. Thus the
divine permission of sin is good because of the end in view; whereas
that one is not maintained by God in the performance of good is
neither a good nor an evil. But sin which infallibly follows there­
from, as a necessary consequence not of causality but of inference, is
simply a moral evil or a sin.
The denial of God’s efficacious grace is not indeed a moral evil,
but it is a just punishment which presupposes the guilt of sin. To
be without grace is a privation of good, and is not a moral evil but
a punishment. Thus this denial of grace differs from the non-maintenance by God of anyone in the performance of good, which pre­
cedes even the first sin, and which is neither a moral evil nor a
punishment.
Calvin confuses the first principle with the third, namely, God’s
permission of sin with His denial of grace, whereas St. Thomas
plainly distinguishes between them.158 Similarly, in the reply to the
second objection of this article he says: ‘‘Guilt proceeds from the
free will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In
this way the word of the prophet is true, ‘‘Destruction is thy own, O
Israel.” Thus there is a difference between God’s permission of sin,
which precedes it and which is only its indispensable condition (not
i®9 Cf. I Sent., d.40, q.4, a.2.

688

THE ONE GOD

being at all its cause, either direct or indirect),180 and being aban­
doned by Him, which is the result of sin.181
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER THE PREDESTINED ARE ELECTED BY GOD

State of the question. In this title the word "elected” as Cajetan
observes, is taken strictly in the sense as expressing an act of the will
by which, when the choice is offered to one, a person prefers or pre­
elects one thing to another.
The principal difficulty is that to which reference is made in the
third objection, which is: Election implies some discrimination. But
God wills all men to be saved (I Tim. 2: 4). Therefore predestination,
which preordains men toward eternal salvation, is without election.
The reply is in the affirmative, however, and is as follows: all the
predestinate are objects of election and love, so that love precedes
election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination.
1) It is proved on the authority of Holy Scripture, for St. Paul says:
"He chose us in Him (Christ) before the foundation of the world,
that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity. Who
hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus
Christ unto Himself: according to the purpose of His will.” 182 As
St. Thomas explains: "He chose us, not because we were saints, for
we were not; but He chose us that we might become saints and be
without blemish.” 188 This is what St. Augustine had already said.184
St. Paul clearly indicates election in the following passage: "For
when the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil
(that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand), not
of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said to her: The elder shall
serve the younger.” 188 And again: "Even so then at this present time
also, there is a remnant saved according to the election of grace.
And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more
grace.” 188
This election that precedes predestination is expressed by St. Paul
in the following words: “Whom He foreknew, He also predesti­
nated,” 187 that is, whom He has foreknown looking favorably upon
isoCf. Summa theol., la Ilae, q.79, a.i, 2. See also infra: the motive of negative
reprobation.
iei See also la, q.23, a. 3 ad gum.
162 Eph. 1: 4 f.
res Com. in Ep. ad Eph., 1: 4.
* De praed. sanct., chap. 18, no. 36.
1·
165 Rom. 9: tif.
i®e Ibid., 11:5.
i«r Ibid., 8: 29.

PREDESTINATION

689

them or with predilection. There are several similar passages in Holy
Scripture concerning the elect.168
Theological proof. The conclusion is proved by means of two
syllogisms. (Some have said recently that Scotus was the first who
said: "God first wills the end before willing the means for the end.” 100
It is at once evident that this doctrine is to be found in the works
of St. Thomas, and it belongs to the very notions of both providence
and prudence.)
Nothing is directed toward an end unless the will for that end
already exists. But predestination is a part of providence which, like
prudence, is the ordering of some things toward an end. Therefore
the predestination of some to eternal salvation, presupposes that
God wills their salvation; and to this latter belong both election and
love.
In the second syllogism it is shown that in God, though not in
ourselves, love precedes election. It is proved as follows: God’s will,
by which He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good pos­
sessed by some in preference to others. But God by His love wills for
some the good of eternal salvation, and by His election wills this
good for them in preference to others. Therefore God’s love precedes
election in the order of reason, just as election precedes pre­
destination.
The case is the reverse with our will which, in loving anyone, does
not cause good in the person loved, but is incited to love because of
the good pre-existing in the person. Hence we choose someone whom
we love, and thus in us election precedes love.
This means, as stated above: “God’s love infuses and creates good­
ness in things.” 170 Therefore God loves before He elects. Also: “God’s
will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some
things are better than others is that God wills a greater good for them.
Hence it follows that He loves the better things more.” 171 And again:
“Those are the better and the better loved who have more grace.” 172
This is the principle of predilection that has already been ex­
plained.173
This principle is denied by Molina, who says: “Given an equal
grace or even a less grace, it can happen that one of two persons
iss cf. Matt. 24: 22; 1 Tim. 5: 21; II Tim. 2: 10. See also Denz., no. 316 (Council
of Quierzy).
lea The Divine Foreknowledge According to Duns Scotus and His First Fol­
lowers by Dr. Schwamm, Innsbruck, 1934.
no Summa theol., la, q.20, a. 2.
sri Ibid., la, q.20, a.4.
> '·>
112 Ibid., ad 4um.
4·..4 q «.hiil47*
its Cf. ibid., q.20, a.3.
.8tg .on ..snsO·’!

THE ONE GOD

6go

called is converted, and the other not.” 174 Hence it is not surprising
that Molina wrote: "Election did not precede predestination. . . .
Others affirmed the opposite. . . . And this seems to be the opinion
of St. Thomas (la, q. 23, a. 4). . . . But I never found it ac­
ceptable.” 175
In Molina’s opinion, predestination to glory is because of at least
conditionally future foreseen merits. Thus, as he himself acknowl­
edges, he departs essentially from the teaching of St. Thomas.
Nevertheless, even Molina has to admit that God freely chose to
place Peter in those particular circumstances in which He foresaw
that he would give his good consent, and He chose to place Judas in
other circumstances.
Hence, not even does Molina believe that God wills equally the
salvation of all men. If he affirmed this, then he would be denying
the very mystery of predestination, for the Council of Quierzy says:
"That some are saved, is the gift of Him who saves; that some perish,
is the fault of those who perish.” 178
St. Thomas points out in his reply to the third objection of this
article that God’s universal will to save is His antecedent will, which
means that it is His conditioned, but not His consequent, will. This
means that God wills all men to be saved, unless higher ends prevent
this.
FIFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF MERITS IS THE CAUSE OF
PREDESTINATION

State of the question. On this subject we must recall the principal
systems according to the names given them by modern theologians.
They have, indeed, already been stated in the prologue to this
question.
Independently of the scientia media: St.
Not because Augustine
of foreseen . Dependent on the scientia media for the
distribution of congruent grace: congruPredesmerits
ism of St. Bellarmine and of Suarez
tination to glory
Because of
At least conditionally future: Molina,
foreseen
- Billot
merits
Absolutely future: Vasquez
ir< Concordia, pp. 51, 565.
1rs /bid., p. 42g.
1»· Denz., no. jt8.

PREDESTINATION

691

St. Thomas in his state of the question of this article shows that
he is aware of the arguments of his adversaries. He says: (1) it seems
that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination, for the
Apostle says: "Whom He foreknew He also predestinated”; 177 (2) be­
cause otherwise there would be no reason for predestination or it
would be unreasonable; (3) because it is unjust to give unequal
things to equals.
Yet St. Thomas replies in the counterargument by saying that
foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.
It is his principal conclusion, Suarez, and St. Bellannine agreeing
with him on this point.
St. Thomas means that foreknowledge of merits is not the cause
of predestination to glory, which was already defined by him as "the
type of the direction of a rational creature to the end of eternal
life.” 178 Moreover, predestination only to grace, which is common
both to the elect and the reprobates, is not predestination in the
strict sense of the word.
St. Thomas in a few words proves this conclusion on the authority
of Holy Scripture in the present article, and more at length in his
other works.170
St. Paul says: "Not by the works of justice, which we have done,
but according to His mercy, He saved us.” 180 Similarly we read: “I
will have mercy on whom I will; and I will be merciful to whom it
shall please Me.” 181 “He saved me, because He was well pleased with
me.” 182 “I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, be­
cause Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast
revealed them to little ones. Yea, Father, for so hath it seemed good
in Thy sight.” 188 That some receive greater helps than others, as
stated in these texts, is to be attributed to God’s predilection and good
pleasure. There are also other texts from St. Paul, which we already
quoted in proof of election. These are: "He chose us in Him before
the foundation of the world that we should be holv.” 184 "So then
it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that
showeth mercy.” 188 "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense
shall be made him? For of Him and by Him and in Him are all
177 Rom. 8: 29.
1’8 See q.23, a.i.
17» Cf. Com. in Ep. ad Rom. et ad Eph. See also the prologue to this question:
Testimony of Holy Scripture.
iso Tit. 3: 5.
rei Ex. 33: 19.
182 PS. 17: 20.
les Matt. 11:25.
18< Eph. 1: 4.
188 Rom. 9: 16.

692

THE ONE GOD

things.” 188 “For who distinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that
thou hast not received?” 186
187 This is tantamount to saying that our
merits are the effect of God’s predilection, and therefore they cannot
be its cause. “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the
knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments and
how unsearchable His ways!” 188
Moreover, that St. Augustine understood these texts in this
sense,189 is recognized by St. Bellarmine and Suarez, even by Molina,
for he departs from the opinion of St. Augustine when he says: “And
this opinion of St. Augustine alarmingly disturbed the minds of many
of the faithful, as also of the learned, and it was even the occasion
that their salvation was placed in jeopardy. . . . But the divinelike
Thomas, and subsequently many of the Scholastics, followed St.
Augustine’s opinion.” 190 Farther on, when Molina is again explain­
ing his opinion, which is the theory of the scientia media, he says:
“If these principles had always been given and explained, perhaps
neither the Pelagian heresy would have sprung up ... , nor would
so many of the faithful have been disturbed in their mind, and
joined the ranks of the Pelagians, because of Augustine’s opinion.” 191
As if God finally revealed to Molina alone what to Augustine, the
holy Fathers, and the most learned of theologians for countless cen­
turies He has not at all made known.192
In the prologue to this question we have already seen that this
argument derives its greatest force from the texts of Holy Scripture
and the writings of St. Augustine.198
The principle of predilection as already formulated by St. Thomas
elucidates this whole question: “Since God’s love is the cause of
goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if
God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 194 The
equivalent of this principle is declared by St. Paul when he says:
"For who distinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not
received?” 195
In the argumentative part of the article, St. Thomas first reminds
186 Ibid., 11: 35.
187 I Cor. 4: 7.
iss Rom. 11: 33. See St. Thomas’ Com. in Ep. ad Rom., lect. 2 (the end).
iso See prologue to this question.
iso Concordia, pp. 546 f.
isi Ibid., p. 548.
iss On this point consult Salmanticenses, De gratia efficaci, disp. VII, dub. 1
et 3.
iso On this point consult also St. Albert the Great. Summa theol., la, q.63,
m.3, a.i.
19« Summa theol., la, q.20, a.3.
iss I Cor. 4: 7.

PREDESTINATION

θ93

us of the condemned heresies, which he arranges and passes judgment
on in accordance with the principle of predilection as above enun­
ciated.19® He begins by remarking:
i) “Nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of
divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator”; for
this is the uncreated act by which God does not will this on account
of that, but wills this to be as means to that. This implies that by
one uncreated act He wills all things, and His willing the end is not
the cause of His willing the means, but He wills the ordering of the
means to the end.197
But the question is: “Whether, as regards the effect, predestination
has any cause; or, what comes to the same thing, whether God pre­
ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone
on account of merits.”
On this point there were three errors:
3

This was the opinion of Ori­
gen, who thought that souls
were created in the beginning.

But this contradicts St. Paul,
who says: "For when the chil­
dren were not yet born nor had
done any good or evil . . . not
of works but of Him that calleth,
it was said to her: ‘The elder
shall serve the younger.’ ” 198

So said the
Pelagians and
Semipelagi­
ans.

But this contradicts St. Paul,
who says: “Not that we are suffi­
cient to think anything of our­
selves as of ourselves." 199

After justification, that is, God
predestined some to grace, be­
cause He foreknew that they
will make good use of it.

St. Thomas replies: "There is no
distinction between what flows
from free will and what is of
predestination; as there is no
distinction between what flows
from a secondary cause and from
a first cause.

5

0
<u
3 J

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c
o
cS

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o
t/>
►—C<

Before justi­
fication, that
is, because of
the begin­
ning of salva­
tion made by
one.

It must be observed that the refutation of this third error holds
good against Molina, even against all who admit the scientia media,
which supposes that there is a distinction between what flows from
ιββ Summa theol., la, q.2O, a. 3, 4.
19’ Cf. ibid.., la, q. 19, a.5.
res Rom. 9: 11 f.
199
Π Cor. 3: 5.

694

THE ONE GOD

free will and what is of predestination (that is, from either indeter­
minate grace or even a congruent grace).
The first and second causes, indeed, are two causes that are not
co-ordinated but subordinated, such that the second cause acts only
inasmuch as it is moved by the first cause. This doctrine of St. Thomas
holds good, too, against all who admit a simultaneous concurrence,
or even an indifferent physical premotion, as Pignataro, S.J.,200 and
others admit. For even these latter theologians maintain that there
is a distinction between what flows from the first cause, namely, the
being of the act, and what flows from the free second cause, namely,
the determination of the free will foreseen by the scientia media.
Willingly or unwillingly, they have to admit a certain passivity or
dependence on God’s knowledge, in Him who is pure Act; for of
two men equally tempted and helped, according to their opinion,
one could be converted and the other not. Thus man would single
himself out, and this differentiation would come from the man and
not from God, who in His foreknowledge would be a passive on­
looker.201
In the second part of the body of this article St. Thomas posits two
conclusions, and two more in the reply to the third objection.
First conclusion: “There is no reason why one effect of predestina­
tion should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent ef­
fect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the
previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious
cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. For the end
is first in intention and last in execution. Thus causes mutually in­
teract from different points of view, as God made the matter for the
form, and the form as actuating the matter. Thus glory is the final
cause of merits, and merits dispose one for the attainment of glory.
Thus “God preordained to give glory on account of merit” (for
in the order of execution, contrary to what the Protestants say, God
does not give glory gratis, but according to merit); and "He pre­
ordained to give grace (efficacious, as a result of His consequent will)
to merit glory.”
Thus God predestines to glory before He predestines to grace, for
the wise man first intends the end before the means to the end, be­
cause, as stated in the preceding article, “nothing is directed toward
an end unless the will for that end already exists.” Scotus, St. Robert
Bellarmine, and Suarez agree with St. Thomas and the Thomists
on this point.
200 De Deo Creatore, p. 519. See also what we said about this opinion in
Predestination, pp. 248 f., 267, 358 f.
201 See the last and weakest reply of Father d'Ales in his book entitled, Prov­
idence et libre arbitre (last chapter).

PREDESTINATION

695

In this first conclusion St. Thomas does not mean that God pre­
ordained to give extrinsically efficacious grace to anyone to merit
glory. This is excluded by what he has already said about God’s con­
sequent will,202 and concerning predestination in this article, he says:
“There is no distinction between what flows from free will, and
what is of predestination.” The proof of the following conclusion
likewise excludes this intention of giving extrinsically efficacious
grace for the meriting of glory.
Second conclusion. “It is impossible that the whole of the effect
of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from
us.”
This proposition is admitted by Molina, though in a restricted
sense, inasmuch as it implies that the whole of the effect of predesti­
nation includes the first grace, which cannot be merited by us. But
St. Thomas attaches a much deeper meaning to this proposition, as
is evident from the reason he gives.
The reason is: “Whatever is in man disposing him toward salva­
tion is all included under the effect of predestination, even the prepa­
ration for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by
divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5: 21): Convert
us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.”
This means that even the free determination of our salutary act
disposing us to justification and afterward the meritorious acts of
the elect, are all included under the effect of predestination. There­
fore no cause or reason can be given for predestination, and hence
it is not because of foreseen merits. This is against what Molina says,
even against congruism, which states that the congruous grace is not
of itself efficacious. Thus in this system of congruism the free deter­
mination of the merits of the elect is not properly the effect of pre­
destination.
The reason given by St. Thomas is therefore the corollary to the
principle of predilection, which states that, "since God’s love is the
cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than an­
other if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 208
“What hast thou that thou hast not received?”201 Hence, more
briefly: The merits of the elect are the effect of predestination, and
hence they cannot be its cause.205
Summa theol., la. q.19, a.6 ad lum.
203 Ibid., la, q.20, a.3.
204 I Cor. 4: 7.
20s St. Augustine said: “When God crowns our merits, He crowns His own
gifts.” Thus in the Indiculus on the Grace of God, it is said: "So great is God’s
goodness to men, that what are His gifts He wills that they shall be our merits;
and for those things which He has bestowed upon us. He will reward us with

696

THE ONE GOD

Therefore St. Thomas adds at the end of the argumentative part
of this article: “Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its
effect, the goodness of God for its reason; toward which the whole
effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it
proceeds, as from its first moving principle.” This manifests God’s
goodness,206 and is explained in the reply to the third objection.
In the reply to the third objection there are two conclusions.
The third conclusion is: “God willed to manifest His goodness in
men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His
mercy, in sparing them; and in respect to others whom He repro­
bates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason
why God elects some and rejects others.” Hence this mystery is both
most charming and terrible.
St. Paul proves this by saying: “God, willing to show His wrath
(that is, His vindictive justice) . . . , endured (that is, permitted)
with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He
might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He
hath prepared unto glory.” 207
This finds its explanation in the fact that God made all things in
order to manifest His goodness, and indeed in many ways, because
created things cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus God al­
lows some evils lest many good things may not happen. But God’s
goodness, inasmuch as it is self-diffusive, is the foundation for His
mercy; and inasmuch as He has an indisputable right to be loved
above all things, this constitutes the foundation for His justice. Thus
this mystery is a fitting manifestation not only of God’s mercy,
but also of the splendor of His justice, and both express His good­
ness.208
The fourth conclusion is: “But why He chooses some for glory and
reprobates others, has no reason except the divine will.”
Two proofs are given for this statement: (1) There is the authority
of St. Augustine, who says: “Why He draws one, and another He
draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.” 208 (2)
From the analogy prevailing between natural things and those made
by art: thus, too, it depends on the simple will of God that this par­
ticular part of matter is under the form of earth, and that other
part under the nobler form of fire. Similarly, from the simple will
of the artificer it depends that this stone is in the lower part of the
eternal life" (Denz., no. 141). See also no. 810, and Summa theol., la Ilae, q.110,
a. 1 (the end).
zoo See a.5 ad mm et 211m.
2or Rom. g: 22. See also II Tim. 2: 20.
208 Cf. De civitate Dei, Bk. XII, chap. 12.
200 Hom. 26 in loan.

PREDESTINATION

607

wall, and that other stone (which is absolutely the same in size and
material) is in the upper part of the wall.
The analogy holds good, for the different goodness that is found
in men is not theirs in their own right; because, since God’s love is
the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than
another if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 210
“What hast thou that thou hast not received?” 211
The objection was: It is unjust that unequal things be given to
equals.
The reply to this objection is: “In things which are given gratui­
tously a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he
deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice.
This is what the master of the house said: ‘Take what is thine and go
thy way. ... Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?’ ” 212 But in
the elect, efficacious grace is the effect of predestination, not theirs by
right, but gratuitously given to them. Yet sufficient grace is given
to all adults, which makes it possible for them to keep God’s com­
mandments. But the one who resists sufficient grace deserves to be
deprived of efficacious grace.
The doctrine of this article was distorted by Calvin, but in itself
it is a most beautiful and perfect expression of the traditional teach­
ing on predestination.
This conclusion is confirmed by the teaching of Trent on the gra­
tuitousness of the gift of final perseverance, which is freely given to
the good thief on Calvary rather than to the other, and to Peter in
preference to Judas. The Council of Trent says: "As regards the gift
of perseverance, of which it is written: ‘He that shall persevere unto
the end, he shall be saved,’213 it cannot be derived from any other but
Him who is able to make him stand214 that he stand perseveringly,
and to restore him who falls.” 215
Hence the common teaching is that the just person cannot merit
the gift of final perseverance; for this gift is no more than the con­
tinuance of the state of grace up to the moment of death, and the
state of grace is the principle of merit, and this latter cannot be
merited.218 If, therefore, some will have it that predestination is be­
cause of foreseen merits, they must at least add that these merits do
not continue up to the moment of death without the gratuitous gift
of final perseverance, which is granted only to the elect.
2io Summa theol., la, q.20, a.3.
2111 Cor. 4: 7.
212 Cf. q.23, a.5 ad 311m; also Matt. 20: 15.
213 Matt. 10: 22.
214 Rom. 14: 4.
215 Denz., no. 806.
218 Cf. Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 114, a.9.

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THE ONE GOD

Thus St. Thomas in teaching the absolute gratuity of predestina­
tion retains the doctrine of Holy Scripture, especially of St. Paul,
who says: “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” 217 This
also is the conclusion reached by St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez,
who taught the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, although
they retained the theory of the scientia media in order to explain
the distribution of congruous grace and to explain that the effect of
this grace may be infallibly known by God.
Therefore all this teaching of St. Thomas on predestination is
virtually contained in the principle of predilection: "Since God’s
love is the cause of goodness in things, no one would be better than
another, unless such person were loved more and helped more by
God." 218
This principle applies even to the angels. Hence St. Augustine says
of them: “If both were created equally good, then, while some fell by
their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted, and reached
that high degree of blessedness from which they became certain they
would never fall.” 218
Finally, there is the statement of the Council of Quierzy, which is
taken from the writings of St. Prosper. It reads as follows: “Almighty
God wills, without exception, all men to be saved, though not all
are saved. That some are saved, however, is the gift of Him who
saves; if some perish, it is the fault of them that perish.” 220
This doctrine eliminates systems founded on motives that are too
human, and there is left the revealed mystery of predestination as
the object of contemplation.
THE MOTIVE FOR NEGATIVE REPROBATION

First doubt. What is the motive for negative reprobation taken
absolutely, not as yet considering it as it is the reprobation of this
particular person rather than of a certain other?
In the explanation of the third article we said that negative rep­
robation, according to St. Thomas’ opinion, consists in “the will to
permit a person to fall into sin,” whereas positive reprobation is "the
will to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that
sin.” 221
2ir I Cor. 4: 7.
218 Cf. Summa theol., la, q.20, a.3.
219 De civitate Dei, Bk. ΧΠ, chap. 9.
220 Denz., no. 318.
221 Cf. Summa theol., la, q.23, a.3. Against predestinarianism, as also against
Wyclif, John Hus, Jerome of Prague, Luther, and Calvin, all Catholics hold that
God, the just judge, punishes only the one who is guilty. In fact, the Lord says:
"I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way
and live" (Ezech. 33: 11). See also Council o£ Orange, Denz., no. 200.

PREDESTINATION

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Now the doctrine concerning the motive for negative reprobation
must be carefully formulated, so that the disadvantages mentioned
above (a. 3) may be avoided. These disadvantages follow from the
opinion of those who maintain that this reprobation is the positive
exclusion from glory as from a gift to which one is not entitled, and
it is difficult to reconcile this view with God’s universal will to
save.
First of all, it is evident that the motive for negative reprobation
or for the permission of the sin of final impenitence and of sins that
lead to this impenitence cannot be the foreseeing itself of this sin;
for God could not foresee the sin of final impenitence, for instance,
the impenitence of Judas, as something not only possible but future,
if He did not permit it. Likewise, the sins that precede this final sin
could not de facto dispose one for that sin if God did not permit it;
for God can come to the aid of hardened sinners, and He frequently
does. The question is why God permitted sins not to be forgiven in
others, either original sin or personal sins.
There is a great difference, indeed, between the permission of a
sin, such as Peter’s sin, so that one may become more humble, at
the same time intending that one’s salvation be assured, and, on the
other hand, the permission of a sin that will not be forgiven, such as
the sin of Judas, not intending that one’s salvation be assured.
From what has been said, however, it is evident that God permits
some to fall into sin before having foreseen their demerits. By the
very fact that some in preference to others are predestined to glory
before the foreseeing of their merits, it necessarily follows that those
are permitted to fall into sin who are not included in the number
of the elect.222
More briefly: since negative reprobation is the will to permit some
to fall into sin and fail to attain the glory of heaven, and since the
permission of sin in the reprobates precedes this sin, this sin cannot
be its motive.
We must always return to those higher principles, by which in the
ninth century the controversy on predestination between the Augus­
tinian bishops of Gaul and others was terminated. The Council of
Thurzey (860) formulated these principles in the following words:
"Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done in heaven and on earth
222 Contrary to this, there are Molinists such as Less i us (De div. perf., Bk. 14,
chap. 2. no. 15). Franzelin (De Deo uno, th. 55), Pesch (De Deo uno, prop. 61-62),
and others, who maintain, according to the principles of Molinism as they under­
stand them, that there is no negative reprobation before foreseen demerits. On
this point they differ from all Thomists, and even from Suarez, Bellarmine, and
Ruiz.

THE ONE GOD

γόο

(Ps. 134). For nothing is done in heaven or on earth except what He
Himself is pleased to do (such as the conversion of Peter and of the
good thief), or justly permits to be done (such as the sin of Judas and
of the bad thief).” 223
Therefore, what is the motive for the permission of the sin of final
impenitence, and of sins which de facto are not forgiven and which
lead to the sin of final impenitence?
The general answer to this question is that God wills a thing only
in so far as it is good. Hence it is only on account of some good to be
obtained that He wills to permit some, through their own fault, to
fail to attain the glory of heaven. Therefore St. Augustine says: “God
by no means would permit any evil in His works unless He were
powerful enough and good enough to bring good out of evil.” 224
More briefly: God permits evil only for a greater good.
But for what greater good does God permit the final impenitence
of many men and angels? St. Thomas answers this in his reply to the
third objection of this article: "God willed to manifest His goodness
in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His
mercy, in sparing them; and in respect of others, whom He repro­
bates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason
why God elects some and rejects others.” We find this already de­
clared somewhat differently by St. Paul, who says: “God, willing to
show His wrath (that is, His vindictive justice) and to make His
power known, endured (that is, permitted) with much patience ves­
sels of wrath fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of
His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto
glory.” 225
Therefore the reason for negative reprobation, taken absolutely, is
the manifestation of God’s goodness by means of His justice. God’s
goodness, inasmuch as it is self-diffusive, constitutes the foundation
for His mercy, and inasmuch as He has an indisputable right to be
loved above all things, this constitutes the foundation for His justice.
This holds good as regards the end.
But it must furthermore be said that, as regards the creature or
as regards the material cause, the natural defectibility of the crea­
ture or its disposition to fail, is the indispensable condition for nega­
tive reprobation. For if the creature, either human or angelic, were
not by its nature defectible, God, who is the source of all goodness,
could not permit it to fail. But, if anything is by nature defectible,
the consequence is that it may sometimes fail.
Yet this defectibility is not, strictly speaking, the motive for repropl, CXXVI, 123.
22< Enchir., Bk. II, chap. 24.
22' Rom. 9: 22 f.
223

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bation, for God does not permit the defect on account of the defecti­
bility of the nature, as being the motive for reprobation, but He
permits the defect on account of some good to be derived therefrom.
Therefore the natural defectibility is rather the indispensable condi­
tion, or the aptitude and disposition on the part of the matter.
In this whole question there is no proposition more obscure than
that God permits the final impenitence of some (for instance, of the
bad thief rather than of the other) as a punishment for previous sins
which de facto will not be forgiven and for a greater good, which
includes the manifestation of infinite justice. Indeed this proposi­
tion is most obscure. But that our firm assent to this proposition
should be made easier for us, we may consider the fact that its con­
tradictory cannot be upheld, or that the aforesaid proposition can­
not be proved false. In this proposition we see clearly the application
of the most exalted principle of predilection, which is a corollary to
the principles of causality and finality, which state that all good
comes from the supreme good and is ordered to it. The principle of
predilection was revealed to Moses: "I will have mercy on whom I
will; and I will be merciful to whom it shall please Me.” 228 St. Paul
says: "For who distinguisheth thee? What hast thou that thou hast
not received?” 227 No one would be better than another without being
loved more beforehand by God. And among the nobler good things
on account of which God can permit sin, are to be included either
the splendor of His justice or the manifestation of His infinite good­
ness, which has an indisputable right to be loved above all things.
Thus God wills to permit sin for a greater good. For this reason
He wills to permit that what is defectible may sometimes fail. This
permission is the indispensable condition for sin, but it is neither its
direct nor its indirect cause, because the universal Provider, who
directly sees the higher ends, is not bound to prevent these sins, not
even the sin of final impenitence.
The defectible creature, which by its nature is apt to fall into sin,
cannot justly complain of not having received these more abundant
graces, by which it would have been preserved from falling into sin.
As St. Paul says: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God?
Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou
made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same
lump, to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?
What if God, wishing to show His wrath (that is, the splendor of His
justice and His mercy) ... ?” 228 This symbolism was already em­
ployed in the Old Testament. Thus we read: “As the potter’s clay is
22e Ex. 33: 19.
222 I Cor. 4: 7.
22s Rom. 9: 20 f.

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THE ONE GOD

in his hand ... so man is in the hand of Him that made him; and
He will render to him according to His judgment.” 229
Jeremias also said: "Behold as clay is in the hand of the potter,
so are you in My hand, O house of Israel.” 230 And again Isaias said:
“I, the Lord, that do all these things. . . . Drop down dew, ye
heavens, from above. . . . Woe to him that gainsayeth his maker.
. . . Shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it: What art thou
making, and thy work is without hands? Woe to him that saith to
his father: Why begettest thou? And to the woman: Why dost thou
bring forth?” 231
On the one hand, that is, in respect of those not chosen, the splen­
dor of God’s justice is particularly made manifest, yet not without
manifestation of His mercy. On the other hand, that is, in respect of
those chosen, God’s mercy is particularly made manifest, yet not
without manifestation of His justice. As St. Thomas says: "Certain
works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because
in some justice appears more forcibly, and in others mercy. Even in
the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does
not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates in punishing short of
what is deserved. In the justification of the ungodly justice is seen,
when God remits sin on account of love though He Himself has
mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: ‘Many sins
are forgiven her because she hath loved much’ ” (Luke 7: 47).232
Moreover, as stated by St. Thomas in this same article just quoted:
"Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this
world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they
are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this
Gregory says: (Moral., XXVI): “The evils that press on us in this
world force us to go to God.” 233
Corollary. Hence there is great inequality either of natural or of
supernatural conditions. But sometimes the inequality of graces
compensates for the inequality of natural conditions. As our Lord
says: “Blessed are the poor in spirit. . . . Blessed are the meek. . . .
Blessed are they that mourn. . . . Blessed are they that hunger and
thirst after justice.” 234 This means that many are the tribulations of
the just and that those of the just who are loved more by God, such
as Christ and the Blessed Virgin Mary, must suffer for the others as
victims offered up in complete sacrifice. It was so with all tire martyrs
and great servants of God, who always suffered much. Thus there
229 Eccli. 33: 13.
229 Jer. 18: 6.
231 Is. 45: 9 f.
232 Summa theol., la, q.21, a.4 ad lum.
233 Ibid., ad 311m.
234 Matt. 5: 3 f,

PREDESTINATION

7°3

is effected a most wonderful compensation, which to some extent is
pointed out by Christ in the parable of the wicked rich man and
the good beggar, in which we read that Abraham said to the wicked
rich man who was condemned to hell: "Son, remember that thou didst
receive good things in thy lifetime, and likewise Lazarus evil things;
but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented.” 235
We find this compensation most beautifully described in a passage
of the Old Testament which expressed the dogma of predestination
in these words: “The souls of the just are in the hand of God, and
the torment of death shall not touch them. In the sight of the un­
wise they seemed to die and their departure was taken for misery.
And their going away from us, for utter destruction; but they are in
peace. And though in the sight of men they suffered torments, their
hope is full of immortality. Afflicted in few things, in many they
shall be well rewarded; because God hath tried them, and found
them worthy of Himself. As gold in the furnace He hath proved
them, and as a victim of a holocaust He hath received them (especially
so the martyrs). . . . The just shall shine, and shall run to and fro
like sparks among the reeds. They shall judge nations and rule over
people, and their Lord shall reign forever . . . for grace and peace
is to His elect.” 233 Thus the dogma of predestination is already
clearly expressed in the Old Testament.
This great mystery of divine predestination is of itself more an
object of contemplation than of theological discussion. For it is the
nature of theological investigation to enable one to acquire a cer­
tain more sublime understanding of the mysteries of faith. As the
Vatican Council declares: “Reason, indeed, enlightened by faith,
when it seeks earnestly, piously, and calmly, attains by a gift from
God some, and that a very fruitful, understanding of mysteries
... ; but reason never becomes capable of apprehending mysteries
as it does those truths which constitute its proper object. For the
divine mysteries by their own nature so far transcend the created in­
telligence . . . that they remain shrouded in a certain degree of
darkness, so long as we are in this mortal life exiled from the Lord;
for we walk by faith, and not by sight.” 237
This statement is particularly true concerning predestination,
which is the sublimer part of providence.
Second doubt. What is the motive for negative reprobation taken
in the selective sense, namely, as it is the reprobation of this particu­
lar person rather than that other?
The answer of St. Thomas is that negative reprobation, taken in
2’5 Luke 16: 25.
2se Wis. 3: 1 f.
2’7 Denz., no. 1796; cf. II Cor. 5: 6.

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THE ONE GOD

the selective sense, has no reason except the divine will. He says:
“Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no
reason except the divine will.” 238 He gives two proofs for this: (1)
The authority of St. Augustine, who says: “Why He draws one, and
another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to
err." 238 (2) From the analogy prevailing between natural things and
those made by art. He remarks: “Why this particular part of matter
is under this particular form, and that under another, depends on
the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it de­
pends that this stone is in this part of the wall, and that (equal in
size) in another; although the plan requires that some stones should
be in this place, and some in that place.” 240
In this argument founded on the analogy prevailing between nat­
ural things and those made by art, there is an unexpressed but im­
plied major, namely: in those who are alike as regards defectibility,
no reason can be assigned why one rather than another is permitted
to fall into some defect that is not willed by the one foreseeing it.
Then the minor is subsumed. But all creatures that are destined for
a supernatural end are alike as regards defectibility, and it is only
by God’s help that they do not fall into some defect; for the very
fact of not falling into some defect is a good that comes from the
source of all good. Therefore it depends solely on God’s will that
these particular persons rather than certain others are permitted to
fall into some defect. This truth is expressed by the Council of Trent
which, in discussing the gift of perseverance, says: “which cannot
be derived from any other but Him who is able to make the one
stand who stands (Rom. 14: 5), so that such a one stand perseveringly,
and to restore the one who falls. . . . Let him who thinks he stands
take heed lest he fall (I Cor. 10: 12) and work out his salvation with
fear and trembling (Phil. 2: 12).” 241
The foundation of Christian humility consists in this, namely, the
twofold mystery of creation from nothing and the gratuitousness of
grace. This humility does not degenerate into pusillanimity and
despair, because God does not command impossibilities, and He
gives His grace to those who humbly pray for it.
The following principal objections are raised against this doc­
trine of the motive for reprobation, considered either in a general
way or in particular cases. We must show that on this point there is
no severity on God’s part.
First objection. Without anyone being reprobated, God’s justice
238 See q.23, a.5 ad 311m.
239 Hom. 26 in Joan.
no Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad 311m.
Denz., no. 806.

PREDESTINATION

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would be made manifest in the elect, both by rewarding them, and
by punishing them for a time on account of sins they committed.
Reply. Such a procedure would be but an imperfect manifestation
of God’s infinite justice. For the rewarding of the just is more an il­
lustration of God’s mercy than of His justice, and, moreover, it is
not at all a manifestation of His vindictive justice. This latter is to
some extent made manifest in temporal punishments, but these do
not make us realize what it ought to be by reason of the infinite
malice of sin, which does all it can to rob God of His dignity of being
the final end of creatures. Likewise, God’s mercy would be very
feebly manifested if He were to reward the elect with the beatific
vision only for a time.
Moreover it has been revealed that some are reprobated on ac­
count of their sins, which God permitted; and the only possible rea­
son for this permission is the greater good that is intended.
But I insist. The will to manifest vindictive justice before having
foreseen the sin, is to will the punishment before the sin. But this is
an injustice which leads to the predestinarianism of Gottschalk and
Calvin. Therefore this view must be rejected.
Reply. I deny the major, which confuses God’s infinite justice with
His finite chastisement. For God does not will the permission of sin
because of His love and intention to impose finite chastisement, for
that would be repugnant to justice. But because He wills the permis­
sion of sin for the manifestation of His infinite justice, or the in­
alienable right of sovereign goodness to be loved above all things,
He first wills the permission of sin, and then wills to inflict the
punishment for the sin in manifestation of His justice. The punish­
ment is but a means of manifesting infinite justice, and it is a means
that is not an intermediate end with reference to the permission of
sin. Punishment cannot be, indeed, an intermediate end, for to
punish is a good only on the previous supposition of sin. Hence God
most certainly does not will the permission of sin because of His
love to punish, for this would be cruelty; but He wills it from love
of His infinite justice, or from love of His goodness which has a
right to be loved above all things. But it is easy to depart from the
orthodox teaching on this point, and a slight error in the beginning
will be great in the end.
Thus God could cause the great persecutors of the Church to be
converted at the last moment of their lives, but He can permit, too,
their final impenitence from love of His infinite justice that must
forever be made manifest; but He cannot permit this impenitence
from love of punishment.
Again I insist. To will the permission of sin for the manifestation
of justice, is to will the permission of sin so that it be punished. But

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THE ONE GOD

this is a hard saying and savors of inclemency. Therefore to will the
permission of sin for the manifestation of justice savors of inclemency.
Reply. I deny the major, for it would mean to will the punishment
before the sin, which would not be the manifestation of justice, but
its contrary. Punishment is not the immediate end, but only the
means for the manifestation of justice; for punishment is good only
when it presupposes sin, whereas, on the contrary, the manifestation
of God’s infinite goodness and justice is good even before the fore­
seeing of the sin; the knowledge of the possibility of sin is sufficient.
It is essentially good that God’s inalienable right to be loved above
all things as the sovereign good be made manifest; and eternal
punishment proclaims this truth, as Dante says in his Inferno:

Through me you pass into the city of woe:
Through me you pass into eternal pain:
Through me among the people lost for aye.
Justice the founder of my fabric moved:
To rear me was the task of power divine,
Supremest wisdom, and primeval love.242

Second objection. But then we would have to admit the rigorous
opinion of certain Thomists, namely, the positive exclusion of rep­
robates from glory as from a gift to which they are not entitled, be­
fore the foreseeing of their sins. For at the same moment in which
God chose those who are predestined for glory, He excluded all the
others from it. Therefore the more rigorous opinion that was previ­
ously rejected follows from this reasoning.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. That at the same moment in
which God chose those who are predestined to glory, He positively
excluded all the rest from it, this I deny; that He permitted them to
be excluded, this I concede. Similarly I distinguish the consequent:
that the permission of the reprobates to be excluded from glory pre­
cedes their foreseen demerits, which will not be forgiven, this I con­
cede; that they are positively excluded from glory, this I deny.
God, in predestining some, does not intend to do the opposite of
this, saying: "I will the rejection of the others from glory,” but He
says: “I will to permit that the others, through their own fault, fail
to attain the glory of heaven.” This act means, indeed, the exclu­
sion of some from being efficaciously chosen for the glory of heaven,
but it does not mean their positive exclusion from this glory. Never­
theless the reprobates are always destined for glory, so that this glory
would be attained by them unless they themselves prevented it.
Hence God does not repel them from the glory of heaven, but He
Inferno, Canto III, verses 1-6.

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permits that they fail to attain the glory of heaven, and this through
their own fault. As Billuart rightly observes,2,3 it is one thing to be
excluded positively from glory before sin, and it is another matter
to be excluded from being efficaciously chosen for the glory of heaven.
The first proposition we deny, but we concede that those not among
the elect are excluded, before the foreseeing of their sin, from being
efficaciously chosen for the glory of heaven; nor is this efficacious
election to glory due to them in virtue of God’s antecedent will to
save all men, otherwise all would be saved, and God’s universal will
to save would not only be His antecedent will, but also His conse­
quent will, and it would be infallibly fulfilled.
In truth, those not among the elect, before their sin was foreseen,
are excluded from being efficaciously chosen for the glory of heaven,
as from a gift to which they are not entitled; and this is accom­
plished by leaving them to their weakness. This is also in some meas­
ure accepted by Molina when he says that God of His own gratuitous
love decreed to place the elect in circumstances in which He had
foreseen their salvation as a conditioned future, and He decreed to
place others in circumstances in which He had foreseen their final
impenitence.
Again I insist. But from this permissive exclusion the same effect
infallibly follows as in the case of positive exclusion from glory.
Therefore it is useless to deny this positive exclusion.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. That the same effect follows
on the part of the reprobates, this I concede; on God’s part, this I
deny. For it seems to follow from positive exclusion that God is the
cause that some would not be saved, since He would refuse to save
them. On the other hand, the only effect that follows from permissive
exclusion is that those not among the elect, through their own fault,
fail to persevere; and God merely permits this.
There is a considerable difference between these two exclusions.
Just as God is not the cause of sin, which contradicts what Calvin
asserted; so also He is not the cause of perdition, or of exclusion
from the glory of heaven. But He is the cause of our salvation. Hence
the Council of Quierzy says: “That some are saved, is the gift of
Him who saves; but that some perish, is the fault of those who
perish." 244
Still I insist. Yet the Council of Trent declared: “God forsakes
not those who have been once justified by His grace, unless He is
first forsaken by them.” 245 But the will to permit that some through
their own fault fail to attain the glory of heaven is to forsake them
2« Cursiis theol., Vol. I, De motivo reprobationis, § 2, Solv. objectiones.
2-x Denz., no. 318.
Ibid., no. 804.

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THE ONE GOD

before they separate themselves from Him. Therefore God cannot
permit the failure of some to attain the glory of heaven.
Reply. Several theologians interpret these words of the Council
of Trent as meaning:
1) That God takes sanctifying grace away from any of tire just only
on account of a previous mortal sin. And this is most certain.
2) Granted that this being forsaken by God is to be understood
as meaning the withdrawal of actual grace, still I distinguish the
major: that God is not, strictly speaking, the first to forsake the just
by taking away from them His common helps and ordinary protec­
tion which He extends toward them, this I concede; for this with­
drawal of common helps is a punishment, which presupposes sin.
But God permits sin before it is committed; and so it is only in an
improper sense that He forsakes one. It is true, indeed, as Billuart
says,248 that God by leaving a man to his defectibility, does not keep
him from falling into sin by means of a special and efficacious help.
But this special and efficacious help, although it is in some way due
to human nature in general, yet it is not due to this individual rather
than to a certain other.
It is most evident that God's permission of sin must precede the
commission of the sin that is permitted, not indeed as the cause but
as the indispensable condition. For if God did not permit this sin,
it certainly would not happen to be committed, and nothing happens
unless it is either willed or permitted by God. Hence this permission
of sin by God does not mean, strictly speaking, that He forsakes any­
one, concerning which the Council of Trent says: “God forsakes not
those who have been once justified by His grace, unless He is first
forsaken by them.” 247 If it were said that God forsakes anyone by
the very fact that He permits him to fall into sin, then this would be
the same as saying that God cannot permit the first sin before it
happens to be committed.
The Council of Trent maintains,248 indeed, that every sin presup­
poses the divine permission, for it declares that God’s part is per­
missive with reference to sin, for example, to the betrayal of Judas.
We also pray in the Mass: "Permit me not to be separated from
Thee.” 240
Final objection. Even the Thomists admit that no one is deprived
of efficacious help except through his own fault. Therefore it is false
to say that God in an improper sense forsakes a person by the with­
drawal of His efficacious help.
24e Cursus theol., Vol. I, De motivo reprobationis, § 3.
24T Denz., no. 804.
Cf. Denz., no. 816.
24s Prayer before the priest’s communion.

PREDESTINATION

7°9

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that the refusal of efficacious
grace is a punishment, which presupposes at least a first sin, this I
concede; but the simple permission of sin by God is not, strictly
speaking, the refusal of efficacious grace, and this permission evi­
dently precedes the sin.
God in conferring the sufficient grace wills antecedently to confer
the efficacious grace, unless a man deliberately and wickedly resists
the sufficient grace. God could, indeed, by giving more abundant
help, prevent this resistance and this wicked act of the will; but as
universal Provider He is not bound to prevent this, and with higher
ends in view He wills by His consequent will to leave a man to his
defectibility. Thus it is true that a man is deprived through His
own fault of efficacious grace which God, in the bestowal of sufficient
grace, willed by His antecedent will to give him.
Third doubt. Is original sin a sufficient motive for positive repro­
bation?
We answer this question as several Thomists do. We distinguish
and say that it is a sufficient motive in those who have not been
freed from original sin, especially in infants who die without being
baptized. These children, inasmuch as they have no other sin, are
thus deprived of the beatific vision, without having to suffer, how­
ever, the punishment of the senses. But I deny that it is a sufficient
reason in those who have been freed from original sin. In these, the
effects of original sin (such as concupiscence and a weakening of the
will in the performance of good) are conditions that contribute to
■.heir greater defectibility, and this latter shows itself in actual sins,
and ultimately in the sin of final impenitence, for which they are
positively reprobated.
But if it is a question of negative reprobation, since original sin
is the same in all, both in the predestined and the reprobates, this
sin cannot be in the reprobates the reason why God permits the
sins that will not be forgiven. Therefore St. Thomas does not speak
of original sin in this article, but says: “Why He chooses some for
glory, and reprobates others, has no reason except the divine will." 250
So say the Salmanticenses, Alvarez, and John of St. Thomas.
The effects of reprobation. By the effect of reprobation is meant
whatever God does with the efficacious intention of manifesting His
justice by means of those whom He reprobates.
Hence the proper effects of reprobation are: (i) the permission of
a sin that will not be forgiven; (2) the refusal of grace; (3) blinding
of the intellect; (4) hardening of the heart; and finally (5) condemna­
tion to eternal punishment.
2B« Cf. ad gum.

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THE ONE GOD

Sin itself is not the effect of reprobation, for God is in no way the
cause of sin, not even indirectly, when He permits it.251
The signs of reprobation, however, are too great an attachment
to the transitory things of this world, the sin of lust persisted in even
to old age, a rebellious attitude toward the teachings of the Church,
aversion for the reception of the sacraments, and great pride.
According to the Salmanticenses,252 reprobation is the effect re­
sulting from the predestination of the elect, because it shows more
clearly God’s greater mercy toward the elect. Hence St. Paul says:
“God . . . endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for
destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels
of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory.” 253 Thus all things
are for the sake of the elect, who realize the splendor of God’s justice
in the very restoration of this order of justice and in the triumph of
God’s goodness over evil.264 Angels do not grieve either for sins or
251 Cf. Summa theol., la Ilae, q.79, a. 1, 2. St. Thomas says (ibid., a.t): "Neither
can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the
assistance whereby they may avoid sin, and if He gave them this assistance they
would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and
justice, since He Himself is wisdom and justice: so that if someone sin it is not
imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is
not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless
he cease to steer while able and bound to steer." But God is not bound always
to preserve from defect that which is naturally defectible. If anything is by its
nature defectible, however, the consequence is that sometimes it is defective.
And this is permitted by God for a greater good.
St. Thomas says (ibid., a.3), in explaining the blinding of the intellect and the
hardening of the heart, which are a punishment of previous sins: "God, of His
own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle.” And
again he says (ibid., a.4): “Blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damna­
tion of those who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of
reprobation. But, through God’s mercy, temporary blindness is directed medic­
inally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is
not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, but only to the predestined, to whom
all things work together unto good (Rom. 8: 28)."
252 Cursus theol., De praedestinatione, 'r. V, disp. V, dub. unicum, no. 25. See
also ibid., disp. VIII, dub. 2, § 2. Concerning reprobation, their conclusion
is: “We must say of reprobation, as regards the first permission of the first sin
that leads efficaciously to the damnation of the reprobate, that the cause of this per­
mission is not any demeritorious act of this same reprobate." The reason is that,
as regards the permission of this first sin, there can be no question of a previous
sin that is the cause of this permission. We are not concerned here with sins that
will be forgiven, as happens in the case of many of the elect. We are concerned
here with the permission of the first sin that will not be forgiven; whereas, con­
trary to this, God permits the elect to commit sins that afterward will be for­
given. This is, strictly speaking, an inscrutable mystery, and it is verified both in
the angels and in human beings.
253 Rom. 9: 22 f. It is what St. Thomas says in his Com. in Ep. ad Rom., 9: 24.
26« Cf. Summa theol., la, q. 113, a. 7.

PREDESTINATION

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for penalties inflicted upon men, although sin is displeasing to them
as it is to God. They will the fulfillment of the ordering of divine
justice in this matter.
Thus too, as the same theologians of Salamanca say,255 we see more
clearly with what liberality God chose the predestined for glory
without any obligation on His part, and thus the riches of His mercy
toward them are made more manifest. Likewise we see more clearly
from reprobation the defectibility of the created free will and at
the same time the powers conferred on us by grace. Thus all things
are directed “unto the praise of the glory of His grace.” 258 St. Augus­
tine frequently said about the same, though more concisely, when he
declared that the wicked are in this world either that they be con­
verted or that they afflict the good.257
255 De praedestinatione, disp. VIII, dub. 2, § 2.
258 Eph. 1:6.
257 Cf. Bossuet, Defense de la tradition, Bk. XI, chap. 5. In this work (chap. 4),
he says: "There is this difference between God and man, that man is not innocent
if he allows himself to commit the sin which he can prevent, and that God, who
is able to prevent the sin without this costing Him anything but the will to
prevent it, and who allows man to repeat the sins even to the exceeding number
seen by us nowadays, is nevertheless just and holy: although He is allowed to
do, says St. Augustine (Op. imp., Ill, chaps. 23, 24, 27), that which, if done by
man, would be unjust. Why is this, says this same Father (ibid., chap. 27), unless
it is because there is a great difference between the rules of God’s justice and
those of man's justice? God, he goes on to say, must act as God; and man, as
man. God acts as God, when He acts as first cause, omnipotent and universal,
which subordinates to the common good what particular causes will and do
either of good or of evil; but man, whose weakness cannot make the good triumph
in him, must prevent all the evil that he can prevent.
"Such is then the profound reason why God is not bound to prevent the evil
of sin. It is because He can draw a greater good from it, even an infinite good.
Thus in the crime committed by the Jews in the sacrifice of God’s Son, whose
merit and perfection are infinite ... it suffices for us to know, as St. Augustine
again says (ibid., chap. 24), that the more exalted is His justice, the more im­
penetrable are the rules which it makes use of.”
Bossuet (ibid., chap. 5), in the height of contemplation, says: "Men wish indeed
to understand the purpose in the permissions of sins that turn out to their
advantage; for example, of the sin committed by the Jews, the purpose of which
was to give men a Savior; of the sin committed by Peter, the purpose of which
was to make him more humble; of all sins, whatsoever they may be. whose pur­
pose is to make grace more conspicuous. But when they are told that God permits
their sins to show the splendor of His justice, since this permission tends to make
them suffer, their self-love turns them against His justice. We must stress just
as much this fifth truth, namely, that God permits sin, because if He did not
permit it, then there would be no avenging justice, and God's severity would
not be known, which is equally adorable and holy as His mercy is. . . . This is
what God said to Pharaoh, speaking through Moses (Ex. 9: 13), at the same
time announcing to him the punishment for his sins, and we know how forcibly
this utterance was repeated by the Apostle (Rom. 9: 17). In this text indeed.

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THE ONE GOD

Molina 258 admits that the manifestation of justice is one of the
ends for which God permits sin.
PREDESTINATION AS A MYSTERY OF MERCY

The whole of this doctrine on gratuitous predestination may be
summed up finally by what we may call an a posteriori observation.
It is one that has already been made by us, and it is this: if, of two
sinners who are equally obdurate, one is converted rather than a
certain other, this is the effect of God’s special mercy toward such
person. A fortiori, it is the effect of God's special mercy, if any just
person perseveres in doing good for many years, and especially if any­
one is preserved in the state of grace from the time when he was
baptized as a child until death. Thus the mystery of gratuitous pre­
destination is a posteriori made manifest, so to speak, to those who
are Christian in sentiment, just as God’s universal will to save is
also manifested to such as these in many ways. The intimate recon­
ciliation of these truths is hidden in the obscurity of faith, but the
light of life, which is the object of contemplation, is found in this
obscurity.
The author of the Imitation of Christ in his treatise on the spiritual
life said about predestination: “I am He who made all the saints, I
gave them grace, I brought them glory. I know what every one hath
deserved; I led them with the blessings of My sweetness.259 I fore­
knew My beloved ones before the beginning of the world. I chose
them out of the world; 280 they chose not Me first. I called them by
grace, I drew them by mercy, I led them safely through sundry temp­
tations. I poured into them glorious consolations, I gave them per­
severance, I crowned their patience.
"I acknowledge both the first and the last; I embrace all with love
inestimable. I am to be praised in all My saints; I am to be blessed
above all things, and to be honored in all whom I have thus glori­
ously exalted and predestined without any merit of their own.” 281
St. Paul says to us: "Therefore He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He
will He hardeneth."
In this same work (chap. 6), Bossuet quotes again this saying of St. Augustine,
which serves as a principle for every school of theology: "God hardens the heart
of anyone, not indeed by bestowing malice, but by not bestowing mercy. (Ep.
194).” In this same chapter Bossuet points out that it is a calumny to say: There­
fore, according to St. Augustine, God is the cause of sin; for times without num­
ber he plainly said the contrary.
ass Concordia, p. 480.
259 Ps. 20: 4.
200 John 15: 19.
281 Imitation of Christ, Bk. Ill, chap. 58.

PREDESTINATION

713

Farther on, this same author says: "They glory not in their own
merits, inasmuch as they ascribe no goodness to themselves but at­
tribute all to Me who of Mine infinite love have given them all
things.” 282
Hence this same author says: "When a certain person who was in
anxiety of mind, often wavering between fear and hope, said within
himself, Ό, if I knew that I would yet persevere,’ he presently heard
within him an answer from God, which said: ‘If thou didst know it,
what wouldst thou do? Do now what thou wouldst do then, and
thou shalt be secure.’ And being immediately comforted and strength­
ened, he committed himself wholly to the will of God, and his anxious
wavering ceased.” 263
SIXTH ARTICLE

WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS CERTAIN

State of the question. It seems that predestination is not certain:
(1) because the crown, which is the effect of predestination, can both
be acquired and be lost; (2) because it is possible that one predes­
tined, such as Peter, may sin and then be killed; (3) because God,
who most freely predestined this particular man, has it in His power
not to predestine him.
Yet the answer is that the effect of predestination is certainly at­
tained. It will at once be seen from the argument that St. Thomas has
in mind not only certainty of foreknowledge but also of causality.
This latter is denied, however, by Molina.
The certainty of predestination is clearly established from texts in
Holy Scripture. Thus we read: “No one can snatch them (My sheep)
out of the hand of My Father.” 201 This text points to the certainty
not only of foreknowledge but also of causality on the part of divine
omnipotence, which preserves and leads the elect to salvation. Our
Lord says: "There shall arise false Christs . . . insomuch as to de­
ceive, if possible, even the elect.” 285 If possible means: unless they
had been specially preserved from falling into sin by God.
The certainty of God's foreknowledge and causality is likewise
pointed out in St. Augustine’s definition of predestination, who says
that it is “the foreknowledge and preparation of those gifts whereby
whoever are liberated are most certainly liberated.” 288
282 Ibid., no. 8.
ses Ibid., Bk. I, chap. 25, no. 2.
284 John 10:29.
265 Matt. 24: 24.
268 De dono persever., chap. 14.

714

THE ONE GOD

Theological proof. Predestination is a part of providence, which
includes God’s absolute and consequent will concerning the elect.
But this absolute and consequent will of God is always or infallibly
fulfilled. Thus predestination differs from simple providence, which
is not fulfilled in the case of those who are included only in God’s
consequent will. God wills antecedently the salvation of all, but He
permits the perdition of many, and wills consequently or absolutely
the salvation of the elect.
Yet this consequent will does not interfere with created liberty,
because God efficaciously wills also that the elect freely merit eternal
life. The divine causality extends even to the free mode of our
choices; it actualizes our liberty, and in doing so most certainly does
not destroy it, a point which has already been explained.267
St. Thomas excludes Molina’s opinion, when he writes: “It cannot
be said that certainty of foreknowledge is the only thing superadded
to providence by predestination. This is tantamount to saying that
God ordains the one predestined to salvation as He does anyone else,
but that in the case of the one predestined He knows that he will not
fail to be saved. In such a case, to be sure . . . , predestination would
not be because of the choice of the one predestining, which is con­
trary to the authority of Holy Scripture and the sayings of the saints.
Hence in addition to the certainty of foreknowledge, there is
infallible certainty (of causality) in this order of predestination.” 268
Nevertheless this certainty is not injurious to created liberty be­
cause, since God’s will is most efficacious, it follows not only that
the elections of the predestined take place, but that they take place
freely, as God wills.
THE SIGNS OF PREDESTINATION

The following signs of predestination, which give one conjectural
or at most moral certainty about it, have been taken by the theo­
logians from various passages in the writings of St. Augustine, St.
Gregory, St. Anselm, St. Bernard, and St. Thomas. These are: (i) A
good life until the end; (2) the testimony of a conscience that is free
from serious sins, and especially if one is prepared rather to die than
offend God grievously; (3) patience in adversities endured for the
love of God; (4) readiness to hear the word of God; (5) compassion
for the poor; (6) love of one’s enemies; (7) humility; (8) a special
devotion to the Blessed Virgin, of whom the Church chants: “He
2βι See commentary on la, q. 19, a.8.
see De veritate, q.6, a.3.

PREDESTINATION

7*5

that shall find me shall find life, and shall have salvation from the
Lord.” 209
Hence the author of The Imitation says: “If thou didst know it
(that thou art predestined), what wouldst thou do? Do now what thou
wouldst do then, and thou shalt be secure.” 270
These signs are such as to give one particularly a feeling of security
under the special inspiration of the Holy Spirit, concerning whom
St. Paul says: “The Spirit Himself giveth testimony to our spirit that
we are sons of God,” 271 through the filial affection we have toward
Him, which He inspires in us, as St. Thomas points out in his
commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. Nevertheless, as the
Council of Trent says: “Except by special revelation, it cannot be
known whom God has chosen unto Himself.” 272 And again: “If any­
one saith that he will for certain, with absolute and infallible
certainty, have that great gift of perseverance unto the end, unless
he shall have learned this by special revelation; let him be
anathema.” 273
Thus the fact itself of being saved at the end of one’s life still re­
mains an uncertainty; yet “hope tends to its end with certainty, as
though sharing in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive
faculty.” 271 Thus the certitude of hope is not certainty of salvation,
but a tendency to salvation, which is more and more deepened in one
as one approaches the end of life.
SEVENTH ARTICLE

WHETHER THE NUMBER OF THE PREDESTINED
IS CERTAIN

The answer is that the number of the predestined is certain, and
this not only formally but also materially; for God knows how many
will be saved, and who will be saved. Thus our Lord says: “I know
whom I have chosen”; 276 and St. Paul remarks: “The Lord knoweth
who are His.” 276
The Church says that God alone knows the number of the elect
aes Prov. 8:35; cf. Summa theol., la Ilae, q.112, a.5: Contra Gentes, Bk. IV,
chaps. 21, 22, concerning the signs of the state of grace.
210 Imitation, Bk. I, chap. 25, no. 2.
271 Rom. 8: 16.
272 Denz., no. 805.
2’3 Ibid., no. 826.
27-1 Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q. 18, a.4.
2’6 John 13: 18.
27β II Tim. 2: 19.

716

THE ONE GOD

who are destined for the happiness of heaven.277 When this number
is completed, the end of the world will come and the generations of
men will cease.
Is there a great number of the elect? Absolutely speaking and not
comparing them with the number of the reprobates, we can state
that the number is very great, for the Apocalypse says: “I heard
the number of them that were signed, a hundred forty-four thou­
sand. . . . After this I saw a great multitude which no man could
number.” 278
But if we compare the number of the elect with the number of
reprobates, then St. Augustine and St. Thomas think that there are
not so many elect as reprobates, for our Lord says: “How narrow is the
gate and strait is the way that leadeth to life! And few there are that
find it.” 270 And again: “Many are called, but few are chosen.” 280 We
are concerned here with “the good that exceeds the common state of
nature.” 281 But if we include among the saved both angels and men,
then St. Thomas is of the opinion that the number of the elect is
probably greater than the number of reprobates.282 Several theo­
logians think it more probable that, among Christians who are
Catholics, the number of the predestined is greater than the number
of reprobates. It seems possible for us to reach this conclusion from
the intention of Christ in instituting His Church and from the
efficacy of His Passion and the sacraments.

EIGHTH ARTICLE
WHETHER PREDESTINATION CAN BE FURTHERED
BY THE PRAYERS OF THE SAINTS

The answer is that no one is predestined by the prayers of the saints.
Predestination, as St. Thomas declares,283 depends solely on God’s
good pleasure. But the prayers of the saints can obtain certain effects
of predestination; just as the good works of the elect are the meri­
torious cause of their glory in heaven. Thus “whatever helps that
person toward salvation, falls under the order of predestination,
2’7 Secret of Mass for the dead.
278 Apoc. 7: 4.
2’2 Matt. 7: 14.
2soyfcid., 20: 16; 22: 14. This text is disputed. Many exegetes say it refers to
the call of the Jews to accept our Lord as the Messiah. [Tr.]
281 Cf. q.23, a.7 ad gum, ad 4um.
282 Cf. 1 Sent., d.39, q.2, a.2.
288 cf. q.23, a.5 ad sum.

PREDESTINATION

717

whether it is one’s own prayers, or those of others.” 284 Thus the saints
by praying for others, are God’s assistants.285
284 Ibid., a. 8. c.
285 To present the mystery of predestination in more concrete form, we may
quote the following extract from Father J. P. Caussade’s beautiful work, entitled:
Absolute Surrender to Divine Providence (Bk. Ill, chap, lï): "God assures to
faithful souls a glorious victory over the powers of earth and hell”:
"If the divine action is veiled here below by an exterior of weakness, it is that
the merit of faithful souls may be increased; but its triumph is no less sure. The
history of the world is simply the history of the struggle maintained from the
beginning by the powers of the world and hell with souls humbly submissive to
the divine action. In the conflict all the advantage seems to be on the side of the
proud; yet humility is always victorious.
"This world is represented to us under the form of a statue of gold, brass, iron,
and clay. This mystery of iniquity, which was shown in a dream to Nabuchodonosor. is but the confused assemblage of all the acts, interior and exterior, of the chil­
dren of darkness. These are again represented by the beast coming up out of the
abyss from the beginning of all ages, to make war upon the interior and spiritual
man; and this war still continues. The monsters succeed one another; the abyss
swallows them and vomits them forth again. . . . The combat begun in heaven
between Lucifer and St. Michael still wages. . . . Lucifer is the chieftain of those
who refuse obedience to the Almighty; this mystery of iniquity is but the inversion
of the order established by God. . . . All these impious persons who have declared
war against God . . . have been seemingly great and powerful princes, famous in
the world and adored by men. They are but the beasts which rise from the abyss
. . . and God has always resisted them with men truly powerful and great, who
give the deathblow to these monsters; and even as hell vomits forth new monsters,
heaven raises up new heroes to battle with them. . . . Were the powers of earth
and hell arrayed against one single soul, that soul would have nothing to fear
in abandoning itself to God's order. That apparent might and irresistible power
of iniquity, that head of gold, that body of silver, brass, and iron, is but a phan­
tom of glittering dust. A pebble overthrows it and makes it the sport of the
winds. . . .
"All these monsters are sent only to exercise the courage of the children of
God; and when the latter’s virtue has been sufficiently tried, God gives them the
pleasure of killing the monster, and He summons new warriors to the battle­
field. . . .
"Thus all opposition to God’s order serves but to render it more adorable. All
servers of iniquity are the slaves of justice, and from the ruins of Babylon the
divine action builds the heavenly Jerusalem."

CHAPTER XXIV

Question 24

The Book

of

Life

FIRST ARTICLE

In Holy Scripture “the book of life” is a metaphorical expression for

"the knowledge of God by which He firmly remembers that He has
predestined some to eternal life.”
SECOND AND THIRD ARTICLES

Primarily those are said to be written in the book of life who are
predestined to glory; but, in a secondary sense, the expression applies
to those who are justified, and then fall from grace, dying in that
state.
This completes the question of predestination, which is clarified
by these two principles: (1) God does not command impossibilities;1
hence it is really possible for all adults to keep God’s commandments,
as these are known by them. (2) But, on the other hand, “since God’s
love is the cause of goodness in things, no one would be better than
another, without being loved more by God.” 2 St. Paul says: “Who
distinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 8
But in heaven the blessed see how God’s infinite justice, mercy, and
the supreme liberty of His good pleasure are intimately reconciled
in the eminence of the Deity. As our Lord says: “Yea, Father, for so
hath it seemed good in Thy sight.” 4
Dante, in his Paradiso,
*
speaks of predestination. There, in poetic
language, he declares that the mystery of predestination is beyond
the ken even of the saints in heaven.
1 Denz., no. 804.
2 Cf. la, q.20, a.3.
» I Cor. 4: 7.
4 Matt. 11: 26.
» Canto 20, 130 f.: canto 21, 80 f.; Cary’s translation:
“O how far removed,
Predestination! is thy root from such
As see not the first Cause entire.”
718

THE BOOK. OF LIFE

719

"But not the soul
That is in heaven most lustrous, nor the seraph,
That hath his eyes most fixed on God. shall solve
What thou hast asked: for in the abyss it lies
Of the everlasting statute sunk so low,
That no created ken may fathom it.”

This means that not even the blessed, without a special revelation, know wit4i
certainty who of those still on this earth are among the elect; nor can they know
the ultimate reason for predestination, which is hidden in the Deity and in God’s
most free good pleasure. See la, q. 12, a.8, and what we said on this subject in
the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, art. “Predestination” (end): "The cul­
minating point of this mystery and its spiritual fruits.”

CHAPTER XXV
Question 25

The Power of God
FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER THERE IS POWER IN GOD

What has already been said permits us to dismiss this question with
a few brief comments.
Passive power cannot be attributed to God, who is pure act; active
power, however, can rightly be attributed to Him. For it is manifest
that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active
principle of something.
It must be observed that the idea of active power is retained in
God, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect ad extra; not, how­
ever, as it is a principle of action, for God’s action is His essence,
which is His esse and His agere.
Reply to second objection. Hence "God’s action is not distinct
from His power," and God's action ad extra is formally immanent
and virtually transitive, inasmuch as it produces the effect ad extra.
Reply to fourth objection. Active power in God is the divine
command itself, inasmuch as this latter is the principle of His works
ad extra.
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER THE POWER OF GOD IS INFINITE

It is of faith that God’s power is infinite. The Second Council of
Constantinople says: “If anyone says or thinks, either that God’s
power is finite, or that He has done all the things that He was able to
have in mind, let him be anathema.” 1
Proof. The more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts,
the greater is its power to act, for instance, in giving heat. But God’s
essence, by which He acts, is infinite,2 or His power is infinitely
perfect.8
1 Denz., no. 210.
2Cf. Summa theol., la, q.7, a.i.
»Cf. ibid., q.25, a.2 ad mm.

720

THE POWER OF GOD

721

Reply to second objection. “Even if it were to produce no effect,
the power of God would not be ineffectual; because a thing is in­
effectual which is ordained to an end to which it does not attain.
But the power of God is not ordered toward its effect as toward an
end; rather it is the end of the effect produced by it.”
St. Thomas in this reply observes that “the power of a univocal
agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man
is not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non­
univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of
its effect,” just as the power of the sun is not wholly manifested, for
instance, in the ripening of the fruits of the earth. But God evidently
is not a univocal agent. “Hence His effect is always less than His
power.” Nevertheless His infinite power is manifested in the mode of
producing things, inasmuch as He produces something out of
nothing, or from no presupposed subject.
Analogically we say that men of great genius are superior to the
works they produce; but it is, nevertheless, in the way they produce
these works that their superiority is seen. On the contrary, men of
ordinary ability are, so to speak, univocal agents, and the whole of
their power is manifested in the effect produced. They could not do
more.
THIRD ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD IS OMNIPOTENT

It is of faith that God is omnipotent4 as His power is infinite. God
is said to be omnipotent, inasmuch as He can do whatever is ab­
solutely possible, that is, whatever is not repugnant to existence,
whatever is capable of existing, or whatever can be conceived as real
being.
Proof. “The divine existence, upon which the nature of power
in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
being; but it possesses within itself the perfection of all being. There­
fore whatever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered
among the absolute possible beings, in respect of which God is called
omnipotent.”
Reply to third objection. “God’s omnipotence is particularly
shown in sparing and having mercy . . . , and in that He freely for­
gives sinners, thus leading them on to the participation of an infinite
good.”
Reply to fourth objection. "The wisdom of the world is deemed
foolish because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be im­
possible to God."
< Denz- "O. 1783.

722

THE ONE GOD

FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD CAN MAKE THE PASI NOT TO HAVE BEEN

The answer is that God cannot make the past not to have been,
because what implies contradiction does not come within the scope
of God’s omnipotence. But, that the past should not have been implies
a contradiction. Thus God cannot remove from the sinner the fact
ol his having sinned, and of having lost charity. God removes sin,
indeed, by justification, but He cannot remove from the sinner the
fact of his having sinned.
FIFTH ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD CAN DO WHAT HE DOES NOT

The Council of Sens condemned the following proposition of
Abelard: “It is possible for God to do only those things which He has
done, and not to do only those things which he has not done; and to
do things only in the manner and at the time in which He does them,
and not otherwise.” 5
St. Thomas recalls two erroneous opinions: (i) That God acts from
natural necessity in such a way as the sun illumines. So said the
Neoplatonists and subsequently Spinoza. (2) That God acts indeed by
His will, but by His will determined by reason of the necessity of
His knowledge. Thus, among modern philosophers, Leibnitz says
that God by reason of a moral necessity was bound to create the best
among possible worlds, otherwise He would not have been either
infinitely wise or infinitely good. Rosmini said practically the same.9
These errors deny the dogma of divine liberty, which is expressed
by the Vatican Council in these words: "God, of His own goodness
and almighty power, not for the increase of His own happiness, nor
to acquire but to manifest His perfection by the blessings which He
bestows upon creatures, with absolute freedom of counsel, created
out of nothing from the beginning of time, both the spiritual and
corporeal creature, to wit, the angelic and the mundane; and after­
wards the human creature . . . , consisting of both spirit and
body.” 7
St. Thomas explained the divine freedom in a previous article,8
and he now recalls the principal argument as set forth by him in that
article, saying: “The whole idea of order which a wise man puts into
s Ibid., no. 374.
«Ibid., no. 1908.
’ Ibid., no. 1783. Cf. ibid., no. 428 (Fourth Lateran Council).
s Summa theol., la, 9.19, a.3.

THE POWER OF GOD

723

things made by him is taken from their end. . . . But the divine
goodness (that must be manifested) is an end exceeding beyond all
proportions things created. Therefore the divine wisdom is not so
restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could
happen.”
Thus the apparent movement of the sun could be in the reverse
direction; likewise there could be other species of plants and of
animals, God could create angels of a higher order, and many other
things similar to these.
Reply to first objection. Whatever is not in itself a contradiction
in terms is absolutely possible, or is possible by God’s absolute power,
such as the annihilation even of all spiritual creatures. But this
annihilation of souls and angels is not possible by God’s power as
ordained by His wisdom, whether this power be ordinary or ex­
traordinary, because there can be no motive for this annihilation.
SIXTH ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD CAN DO BETTER THINGS THAN
WHAT HE DOES

The answer is given in the words of St. Paul: “God is able to do
all things more abundantly than we desire or understand.” 8 St.
Thomas enunciates and proves three propositions:
1) God cannot make a thing essentially better than it is itself; be­
cause the specific difference, by which it is constituted in its essence,
does not admit of increase or decrease. Thus He cannot make the
number four greater than it is, or man essentially better, because
man is essentially and immutably a rational animal.
2) God can make accidentally better the things He made. Thus He
can make a thing brighter, a man wiser or more virtuous; also God,
by His absolute power, could increase the light of glory in the most
holy soul of Christ.10
3) Absolutely speaking, God can make something else better than
each thing made by Him. Thus He can always create more perfect
angels, who would be loftier in intellect and who would have a better
knowledge of created and possible things. Hence there is no limit
to what is possible for God, because His infinite omnipotence is in­
exhaustible.
Reply to first objection. Nevertheless God cannot make a thing
better, if the word “better” is taken as an adverb, and not as a sub­
stantive. Thus God cannot make a thing from greater wisdom and
B Eph. 3: 20.
10 Cf. Sumina theol., Illa, q.7, a. 12 ad 211m; Illa, q. 10, a.4 ad 311m.

THE ONE GOD

goodness; but He can always make something better, in this sense,
that He can always make a better thing. Thus the animal is better
than the plant, but it has not a better arrangement of its parts than
the plant has, for even in the plant there is the best arrangement of
its parts to its end.
Reply to third objection. “The universe (the present creation be­
ing supposed) cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful
order given to things by God. . . . For if any one thing were bet­
tered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string
were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp
would be destroyed.”
This orderly arrangement is true not only as regards the subordi­
nation of essences, but also as regards singulars and their charac­
teristics; it even applies to good on account of which evils are
permitted, as in the permission of persecution to try the patience of
the martyrs. But, as St. Thomas says at the end of his reply to the
third objection: “Yet God could make other things, or add some­
thing to the present creation, and thus there would be another and
a better universe,” which means it would be better, but not disposed
better, taking the word "better” as an adverb.
The above reply is the answer that must be given to the objections
of Leibnitz, who wanted to prove that the present world is the best
possible world. There is, indeed, a highest created nature, this being
the highest angel, but there can be no limit to what is possible for
God, because “He can always make something else better than each
thing made by Him.”
Reply to fourth objection. “The humanity of Christ from the fact
that it is attributed to the Godhead, and created happiness from the
fact that it is the fruition of God, and the Blessed Virgin from the
fact that she is the mother of God, all these have a certain dignity
from the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there can­
not be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything
better than God." Nevertheless, by His absolute power, God could
increase the light of glory in the most holy soul of Christ, and like­
wise in the Blessed Virgin Mary and the other saints.11
What we have said suffices for God’s omnipotence, and it confirms
the teaching of St. Thomas, who declared in a previous article:
“Since the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that
things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are
done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be
done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things,
for the building up of the universe.” 12
ii Cf. ibid.
it Ibid., la, q. 19, a.8.

CHAPTER XXVI

Question 26
Of

the

Divine Beatitude

After considering all that pertains to God’s operation, namely, to

His knowledge, His will, and His power in its relation to external
effects, we must treat of the divine beatitude, for beatitude is the
perfect good of an intellectual creature. By so doing, we complete
what pertains to the unity of the divine essence. There are four
articles to this question.
1) Whether beatitude belongs to God; (2) whether God is called
blessed in regard to His intellect; (3) whether God is essentially the
beatitude of each of the blessed; (4) whether all other beatitude is
included in the beatitude of God.1
FIRST ARTICLE
WHETHER BEATITUDE BELONGS TO GOD

The answer is in the affirmative and it is of faith. St. Paul says of
God: "Who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings and
Lord of lords.” 2 The Vatican Council says that God is “of supreme
beatitude in and from Himself.” 8
Theological proof. “Beatitude is the perfect good of an intellectual
nature.” The irrational animal finds its pleasure indeed in the posses­
sion of its good, but it has not beatitude, “because it does not know
that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses.” Only an in­
tellectual nature knows what is meant by good and evil, and so it
alone is formally capable of beatitude, and it alone can “control its
own actions” for the attainment of this beatitude. In other words, it
is only an intellectual agent that knows the end as such, not merely
the thing which is the end. In this it differs from the irrational ani­
mal, and thus it alone is capable of possessing the end as such. Thus
this article gives us a complete idea of beatitude, making it clear to
us that beatitude as thus defined belongs in a most excellent way to
1 Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 100.
2 I Tim. 6: 15.
» Denz., no. 1782.
7«5

726

THE ONE GOD

God, inasmuch as God is the most perfect Being, possessing intelli­
gence in the highest degree. For God possesses the supreme Good
with fullness of intelligence.
Reply to second objection. As God has being, though not be­
gotten; so He has beatitude, although it is not acquired by merit.
SECOND ARTICLE
WHETHER GOD IS CALLED BLESSED IN RESPECT
OF HIS INTELLECT

St. Thomas follows St. Augustine and Aristotle on this point. The
former said: “Vision is the whole of the reward.” 4
The answer of St. Thomas is: “Beatitude must be assigned to God
in respect of His intellect, as also to the blessed.”
The reason is that “beatitude is the perfect good of an intellectual
nature. . . . Now that which is most perfect in an intellectual na­
ture is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps
everything.” Thus God adequately comprehends Himself and under­
stands all things in Himself as the cause.
Reply to second objection. “Since beatitude is a good, it is the
object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act
of a power. Hence, in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude
precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than
the act of the intellect,” by which God perfectly possesses His in­
finite goodness. Delight or fruition in the divine will follows from
this perfect knowledge. This fruition is therefore the complement of
beatitude, and is not its essence, which consists in the perfection of
perfect good.
Scotus attacked this conclusion. He considers that formal beati­
tude consists principally in love, giving three reasons for this view:
(1) that beatitude is a good, which is the object of love; (2) that we
must know God in order to love Him, but not love Him in order
to know Him; (3) that what we love more is beatitude, and the will
loves its act of love more than the act of the intellect.
Cajetan replies to this by making three observations: (1) Objective
beatitude is indeed a good, which is the object of love; but the will
in loving is not an apprehensive faculty, and the possession of God
is accomplished by seeing, from which follows fruition in the will.
(2) In this life, of course, we must know God to love Him, and not
vice versa, because in this life it is better to love God than to know
Him, for love tends toward God as He is in Himself, whereas our
« De civitate Dei, Bk. XXII, chap. 26. See also Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Bk. XII,
chap. 7; Ethics, Bk. X, chap. 7.

OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE

727

knowledge of God in this life draws Him to us, according to the
limitation of our concepts. But in heaven the vision of God is im­
mediate, and so it is superior to love, which necessarily follows from
it as a property from its essence. (3) The will, by an elicited appeti­
tive act, prefers what is better not for itself, but for the individual
who wills. Therefore, if the act of the intellect is a greater perfec­
tion of the individual than volition, then the correct attitude in the
will is for it to prefer intellection to volition.
THIRD ARTICLE

WHETHER GOD IS THE BEATITUDE OF EACH OF THE BLESSED

The answer is that God is objectively the beatitude of all the
blessed, but He is not formally their beatitude, for this consists in
the beatific vision, which admits of different degrees.
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER ALL OTHER BEATITUDE IS INCLUDED IN
THE BEATITUDE OF GOD

The answer is: “Whatever is desirable in whatever beatitude,
whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree
in the divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God pos­
sesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of
all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance
of the whole universe.”
Thus we finish the treatise on The One God, or the divine essence,
in which three things have been considered: (1) Whether God exists
(q. 2); (2) How God exists, or rather how He does not exist (q. 3-13);
(3) His operations, namely, His knowledge, will, and power (q. 1425). Thus the question on the divine beatitude (q. 26) completes
what pertains to the unity of the divine essence, and prepares for
the treatise on the Trinity of the divine Persons and on God the
Creator.
Praise be to God, who, as the Vatican Council says, “is of supreme
beatitude in and from Himself, and ineffably exalted above all
things besides Himself which exist or are conceivable.” 5 For He is
the self-subsisting Being, self-subsisting Intellection, essential love.
Thus “He is absolutely simple and unchangeable, and thus He is
really and essentially distinct from the world,” which is essentially
composite and changeable.®
e Denz., no. 1782.
• Ibid.

728

THE ONE GOD

Thus in the whole of this treatise on The One God, we find veri­
fied the words spoken by God to Moses, which may be considered as
the definition of God: “I am who am,” 7 which is tantamount to say­
ing that, compared to Him, creatures are non-existent. Of themselves,
indeed, creatures are non-existent, but for God they are something,
because they are loved by Him. In fact, “God so loved the world
as to give His only begotten Son.” 8
1 Ex. 3: 14.
«John 3: 16.

INDEX
Abelard: denial of free will in God,
509; proposition of omnipotence con­
demned, 722
Accidents excluded from God, 189
Actual-formal distinction of Scotus, 6,
166
Aeviternity: different from time, 287;
simultaneous totality of, 289; unicity
of, 290
Agnosticism, empirical and idealist, 12427
Agnostics, objection to principle of
motion, 140 note
Algazel on possibility of infinite magni­
tude, 246
Analogous perfection and analogates,
212
Analogous term, definition of, 396
Analogues, different from universals,
406
Analogy: of attribution, 396; division
of, 397; of proportionality, 396; solu­
tion of objections to, 400; Thomist
and Suarezian definitions of, 209
Anselm (St.), proof for God's existence,
97-101
Ante praevisa merita, explanation of,
540 note
Antecedent will of God, objections to,
546’53
Antimodernist oath: agnostics con­
demned by, 101; and fideism, 110
Aristotle: description of essence, 30
note; divine intellection, 428, 476
note; God as efficient cause of world,
206; necessity of world, 509; teaching
on motion, 121; on unity, 295; view of
God and free creation, 229
Attributes, the divine, 163: classification
of, 164; and divine essence, 165-70
Augustine (St.): efficacy of divine will,
527, 563; gratuity of predestination,
664; medium of divine knowledge,
436; predestination defined, 663: prin­
ciple of predilection, 675, 678; prob-

Augustine (St.) (continued)
lem of evil, 155, 583; universality of
salvation, 542
Augustinians on natural desire of seeing
God, 325
Aureolus: created species, 345; defini­
tion of eternity, 281; free act of God,
514; theology as a science, 46
Averroes on general providence of God,
429
Avicebron on spiritual substances, 174
Avicenna on possibility of infinite mag­
nitude, 246

Baius on natural desire of seeing God,
312, 321
Bannez: antecedent will of God, 536:
formal constituent of divine nature,
158: on natural desire of seeing God,
330
Beatific vision: accidental word not ex­
cluded, 342; Augustinians’ defense of
innate desire of, 325; comprehension
of God excluded, 374; created species
excluded, 377; definitions of Church,
309: demonstration possible, 332-39;
divine essence as species in, 347; errors
condemned, 310-14; inequality of,
372; and natural desire of seeing God,
338; necessity of light of glory for,
364-74; no imperfection for divine
essence to be species in, 349; non­
Christian philosophers on, 317; not
of the sensible order, 352: not possible
by natural powers of the intellect,
355; possibility in this life, 379; possi­
ble for created intellect, 307; requi­
sites for, 339-45; St. Thomas on
possibility of, 318-25; St. Thomas’
mode of defense not de fide, 341;
simultaneity of, 379; testimony of
Scripture, 314-17
Beatitude: attributed to God, 725; the
exemplar of all, 727; in God’s in­
tellect, 726

7*9

730

INDEX

Beghards: on beatific vision, 379; refuta­
tion of. 380
Being: relation to one, 294-98; tran­
scendental unity of, 296
Bellarniine (St.) on antecedent will of
God, 539
Benedict XII on beatific vision, 310, 341
Berti: innate desire of beatific vision,
325; principle of predilection, 605
Billot: formal constituent of divine
nature, 158; on predestination, 673
Billuart: distinction concerning God’s
nature, 156; formal constituent of
divine nature, 158; God’s love for
creatures, 503; motive of incarnation,
682; nature of sanctifying grace, 365
Blessed, the: God not seen equally by
all, 372: simultaneity of vision by,
379; their mode of knowing creatures,
377; those who see God equally, 374:
what they see in God, 375
Boethius, definition of eternity, 276
Book of life: meaning of, 718; and pre­
destination, 718
Bossuet on God's permission of sin, 711
note

Causes: directly and accidentally con­
nected, 122: efficient, 122: final, 122;
formal, 122: requirements for proper,
11619; validity of notion of, 114
Chrysostom (St.), two wills in God, 541
Comprehension of God by Himself, 423
Congruism of Suarez and Bellarmine
different from Molinism, 469, 671
Conservation of energy, constancy of,
141 note
Contenson, formal constituent of divine
nature, 158
Creatures, likeness to God, 208-13

Damascene (St. John): antecedent will
of God, 529: necessity of grace, 544
Dante: eternal punishment, 706; pre­
destination, 718 note
Decrees, divine: Calvinism and efficacy
of, 582; created liberty not destroyed
b)’. 559-79; predetermining, 439, 519,
530; relation to foreknowledge of
futures, 460, 470
Definition, inductive search for, 1.7-20
Definition of God, 163
Deity: formally divine perfections con­
Cajetan: antecedent will of God, 536;
tained in eminence of, 403-10; identi­
cal with God, 174
communication of good in God, 500;
criticism of Aureolus on created
Del Prado: formal constituent of divine
nature, 158; identity of essence and
species, 345; difference between uni­
formity and immutability, 281; differ­
existence in God, 179; distinction
ent concepts of God, 80; efficacy of
between essential and participated
providence, 650; identity of attributes
being, 182
in God, 408: identity of existence and
Democritus, objection to providence,
understanding in God, 410; natural
642
desire of seeing God, 328; objective
Demonstrability of God's existence,
beatitude, 726; one formal concept
proved by Scripture. 109
in God, 54; potentiality of created Demonstration: foundation from effects,
bodies, 273; proof for will in God,
119; kinds of, 112: middle term of,
492: relation between divinity and
19-22
paternity, 305; speculative and prac­ Descartes: divine liberty exaggerated,
tical sciences, 62
490; St. Anselm's proof for God's
Calvinism: condemnation of, 670: differ­
existence, 102
ent from Thomism, 585: and the di­ Desire of rational creature to see God,
vine decrees, 582
307-31: transcendental relation to
Capreolus on formal constituent of
beatific vision, 338 note
divine nature, 158
Diekamp, the scienlia media, 461 note
Cassian, gratuity of predestination, 543
134
Causality: absolute necessity of, 114;
Diffusiveness of good by God. 499
how formulated, 113; principle of, Discursive knowledge not in God, 435
112; and principle of contradiction, Durandus: light of glory, 365; primary
1! «
object of God’s knowledge, 426

INDEX
Eckhart, condemned propositions of,
*
39
Eclectics on analogy, 396 note
Efficacious grace; see Grace
Emanatism, 196, 200
Energy, conservation of, 525
Enunciable things, known by God, 473
Equivocal term, definition of, 396
Essence (created), real distinction be­
tween existence and, 179-86, 202
Essence of God: and divine attributes,
165-70: formal constituent of, 15761; requirements for vision of (see
Beatific vision)
Eternity: definition of. 276-81; different
from aeviternity, 287; different from
time, 285; of God, 281-85; participa­
tion of, 285; presence of created
things in, 284
Evil: kinds of, 586; none in God, 477;
willed per accidens, 587
Existence of God: convergent end of
proofs for, 153; demonstrability of,
107-33; and His essence identical, 17886; not self-evident for us, 97; pos­
sibility of proving the, 109-33; St.
Thomas proofs for, 135-53; *n things,
253-62
Expressed species in its relation to
knowledge, 348

Faith: and beatific vision, 319; God’s
existence article of, 130; and theology,
47
Falsity: and the created intellect, 483;
not in God, 483
Fate, providence different from, 635
Fideists, demonstrability of God's exist­
ence, 10g
Finality: of natural agents, 150; prin­
ciple of, 151
Florence, Council of: inequality of
beatific vision, 373; Manichaeism con­
demned, 230
Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis): Cajetan’s view of beatific vision, 328;
Cajetan’s view of prudence, 651
Free act of God: formal constituent of,
514-17; and His immutability, 513;
how present in God, 456
Futurables: how known by God accord­
ing to Thomism, 471; Molinist and

73’

Futurables (continued)
congruist views, 460-70; view of
Scotists and others, 472
Futures: definition of, 450 note; how
known by God, 449-59; how present
in eternity, 284, 456; nature of con­
tingent, 450

Genus, God not in a, 1.86-90
Gilbert de la Porrée: anthropomor­
phism of, 392: extreme realism of, 234
Gonet: on motive of the incarnation,
682; on negative reprobation, 684
Good, diffusiveness of, 499
Goodness: of beneficence, 230, 489, 496;
different from being, 214; different
logically from beauty, 223; diffusive
of itself, 224, 230, 498; division of,
225; of every being, 221; infinity of,
236-41; moral, 225; ontological, 214;
priority of being to, 217-21; relation
to final cause, 222; in what its es­
sence consists, 224
Goodness of God. 229-35
Goudin on the divine concurrence, 258
note
Grace, efficacious: foundation of distinc­
tion between sufficient and, 530, 579;
and human liberty, 575-79; intrinsic
efficacy of, 566-71 ; objections to, 57075
Grace, sufficient: foundation of distinc­
tion between efficacious and, 530, 579;
given to all, 556; not an insufficient
help, 579; power to act given by, 554;
virtual efficacy of, 582
Graces, compensation for inequality of,
702
Gunther, love of benevolence in God
doubted by, 502
Heraclitus: infinity, 237; principle of
contradiction, 196; unity of being,
294
Heresies opposed to predestination,
663-70
Hermes, love of benevolence in God
doubted by, 502
Holiness of God, 593
Hypostatic union: and divine decrees,
682; nature of, 199

732

INDEX

Ideas in God: 476; exemplary, 477;
plurality of, 477
Identity, principle of, 154
Imitation of Christ on predestination,
712
Immateriality, foundation of intellec­
tion, 416
Immateriality of God, 171
Immensity of God, distinct from omni­
presence but not from omnipotence,
«53
Immutability of God, 268-75: and His
free act, 513
Impressed species in its relation to
knowledge, 348
Incarnation, not demonstrable apodictically by reason, 336
Infinity: of God, 236-41; of magnitude,
241
Intellect, adequate object of created,
359. 506
Intellect of God, identical with His sub­
stance, 424
Interior life: indebtedness to study, 32
Irenaeus (St.) on beatific vision, 316

Jansenism, condemnation of, 670
Jansenists, scientia media admitted by,
473
John (St.) on beatific vision, 314
John of St. Thomas: on negative repro­
bation, 684; on proof for will in God,
49«
Justice of God, 605-16: principal act of,
610-15
Kant: denial of reality of time, 275;
doubt about love of benevolence in
God, 502; objections to proofs for
God's existence, 108, 122, 152
Knowability of God, 306-81
Knowledge of God: common and scien­
tific, 137-53; by grace, 308; by light of
glory, 364-72; natural and super­
natural, 380; by natural reason, 108*3
Labertonnièrc, doubt about love of
benevolence in God, 502
Lateran Council IV, on creatures' like­
ness to God, 209

Ledesma, formal constituent of divine
nature, 158
Leibnitz: optimism of, 499; proof for
God's existence, 102-4; restriction of
free will in God, 490, 508
Lepidi, ontological proof for God's
existence, 104-6
Lequier, formal constituent of divine
nature, 159
Life of God, 485
Light of glory: concurrence with intel­
lect in beatific vision, 371; necessary
for beatific vision, 364-72; not con­
natural to creature, 371; opinions of
theologians on nature of, 365; solu­
tion of objections to, 369
Likeness, kinds of, 210
Love, God’s, 595: for all things, 598;
for better things, 601-5; °f Himself,
595; not equal for all things, 599; for
us, 598
Love of benevolence and concupiscence
in God, 502
Luther, implicit denial of God's justice,
607

Magnitude: infinity of, 241; possibility
of infinite, 243-51
Maimonides: distinction between divine
attributes, 404; objection to provi­
dence, 643; on predication of names
to God, 387
Manichaeism condemned by Council of
Florence, 230
Marin Sola: on propositions, 395 note;
on theological conclusions, 54
Matter and form, God not composed of,
>73
Matthew (St.) on beatific vision, 314
Melchior Cano, theological sources of,
85
Mercy of God, 615-24: universality of,
619-24
Molina: on cause of predestination,
693; criticism of his teaching, 539;
criticism of scientia media of, 462-69;
on divine antecedent will, 536; on
light of glory, 366; and principle of
predilection, 654
Molinism: criticism of, 470; on efficacy
of grace, 665; on God's antecedent
will, 535; interpretation examined by
Thomists, 453; on predestination, 672;

INDEX
Molinism (continued)
on predestination to glory, 666; St.
Thomas on divine knowledge inter­
preted by, 452
Motion, proof of God’s existence from,
•39-42
Mysteries, supernatural: not strictly
demonstrable, 332-39

Name of God: communicability of, 412;
of nature or of operation, 412; pos­
sibility of, 384, 387, 390; proper, 413
Names of God: how predicated, 382415; not predicated primarily of crea­
tures, 402; not predicated temporally,
403; not predicated univocally of
creatures, 395-400; not synonymous,
39‘95
Nature of God, formal constituent of,
157-62
Necessity: absolute and conditional
necessity of consequent and conse­
quence, 560-80
Neoplatonists, emanation theory of, 522
Nominalists: divine names declared
synonymous by, 391; mental distinc­
tion between divine attributes, 165
Noris (cardinal): innate desire of bea­
tific vision defended by, 325; prin­
ciple of predilection denied by, 605
Obediential power: definition of, 366;
denial of actual, 366
Object (adequate) of our intellect, 359
Object (primary): of divine knowledge,
421-26; of divine will, 492, 505
Object (proper), 359
Object (secondary): of divine knowl­
edge, 433-37; of divine will, 497
Omnipotence of God, 262-64, 721
Omnipresence of God, 263, 266
Ontological argument; see Anselm
Ontologism: approach to pantheism,
202; condemned by Holy Office, 107
Orange, Second Council of: on necessity
of grace, 562; on predestination, 664
Order in the world, proof of God's
existence from, 150
Origen on cause of predestination, 693
Original sin, and sufficient motive for
positive predestination, 709

733

Palamites, denial of beatific vision, 311
Pantheism: forms known to St. Thomas,
194; and God's personality, 591; mode
of refuting modern, 200; refutation
of, 182, 197-200
Parmenides: monism of, 196; unity and
unicity of being, 294
Paul (St.): on beatific vision, 315; on
divine election and predilection, 579;
on gratuity of predestination, 691;
predestination concluded from epis­
tles of, 662; on purpose of divine
will, 491; relation of election to pre­
destination, 688
Pelagians on cause of predestination,
693
Per se notum, quoad se et quoad nos,
96
Perfection of God, 204
Perfections (created) in God, 206
Perfections (divine): absolutely simple.
163; and creative act, 518; distinction
formally and eminently in God, 402·
10; infinity of, 205; mode of identifica­
tion of, 408
Personality of God, 591
Philosophy and revelation, 41
Pius IX: absolute evolutionism con­
demned by, 154; moderate rationalism
condemned by, 75; pantheism con­
demned by, 201; on salvation, 556,
612
Pius X, false systems of apologetics con­
demned by, 313
Pius XI, doctrine of St. Thomas praised
by, 27
Plato: attempted solution of problem of
unity, 295; difficulty about creation
from nothing, 522 note; error con­
cerning species and goodness, 233;
exemplarism of, 477; formal constitu­
ent of divine nature, 159; on God's
goodness, 489; good placed above es­
sence, 217; on the supreme beauty,
329
Plotinus: beatific vision and Neopla­
tonism of, 311 note; definition of
eternity, 277; formal constituent of
divine nature, 159; on the One-Good,
489. 499
Power of God, 720
Predestinarianism: condemnation of,
670; declarations against, 667

734

INDEX

Predestination: cause of, 690-98: clarify­
ing principle of, 654; effects of, 680;
and election, 688; etymological def­
inition of, 676; gratuity of, 658: mys­
tery of mercy, 712; natural gifts the
effect of, 682; an objective part of
providence, 679; and prayers of
saints, 716; signs of, 714; what it adds
to providence, 679
Predestined, definite number of the, 715
Predilection: importance of, 604, 674;
key to predestination, 654; principle
of, 580, 600, 604
Proofs of St. Thomas for God's exist­
ence, 135-53: one convergent end of,
153
Propositions about God, possibility of
affirmative, 414
Prospei (St.) on universality of salvation,
544
Providence, 625-52: acts concurring in,
632: aspects of, 635; and chance, 640:
declared by Scripture, 626; declared
de fide by Vatican Council, 638: dif­
ferent from fate, 635: different from
predestination, 634: distinct from
God's practical knowledge, 633; and
evil, 641; execution of, 645; extension
to least detail, 644; infallibility of,
648; necessitating nature of, 649-51;
and predestination, 679; proved from
Scripture, 638; scope of, 637-41; and
sin, 649; solution of objections to,
646; what is presupposed by, 633

Quierzy, Council of: on predestination,
676; reprobation affirmed by, 683; on
salvation, 667

Ravaisson, on the God of Aristotle, 428
Reason: beatific vision not demonstra­
ble by, 332-39; ontological validity of
first ideas of, 126; possibility of prov­
ing God’s existence from, 112-28
Reasoning, nature of illative, 49
Reprobation: effects of, 709; motive for
negative, 698-704; negative and posi­
tive, 684; objections to motive for,
704-9: signs of, 710; theological proof
for, 684
Rosmini: his ontologism condemned,
108; on immediate vision of God,

Rosmini (continued)
311; moral necessity of creation con­
demned, 510
Sacred doctrine: more speculative than
practical, 61; nature and extent of,
39; a science, 43
Salraanticenses: formal constituent of
divine nature, 158; on motive of the
incarnation, 682; on negative repro­
bation, 684
Salvation: declaration of Pius IX, 556;
sufficient means for, 554; of unbap­
tized infants, 556; universality of, 553
Sanctity of God, 593
Scientia media: criticism of, 462-69;
theory of, 437, 460
Scotists: objections to St. Thomas' doc­
trine of God's existence in things,
259-62
Scotus, Duns: actual-formal distinction,
157, 166, 408; connaturalness of light
of glory, 372; contingent distinction
between natural and supernatural,
362; disagreement with St. Thomas
on two points, 6; distinction between
divine attributes, 392; distinction be­
tween nature and grace, 42; on es­
sence of beatitude, 726; on God's
knowledge of Himself, 474; innate de­
sire of beatific vision, 326; on light
of glory, 365; possibility of natural
knowledge of Deity, 363
Semipelagians: denial of principle of
predilection, 667; doctrine of salva­
tion, 532; error about cause of pre­
destination, 693; on necessity of grace,
663; on predestination, 663, 693
Sens, Council of: Abelard's definition
of omnipotence condemned, 722
Simplicity of God, 171-204
Sins: God not the cause of, 710 note;
God’s knowledge of future, 587;
meaning of God's permission of, 686;
not willed by God, 586
Speculative knowledge, kinds of, 474
Spinoza: denial of God's free will, 508;
finite modes in God, 190, 252; infinite
extension in God, 241, 251
Suarez: active obediential capacity. 327;
on antecedent will of God, 53g; denial
of real distinction between essence
and existence, 238; on light of glory.

INDEX
Suarez (continued)
366; objection to first proof of God’s
existence, 142 note; possibility of
created species in beatific vision, 347;
on unity of concept of being, 405 note
Substance: impossibility of created
supernatural, 372
Sufficient grace; see Grace
Summa theologica: division of, 94;
structure of, 16

Theological conclusions, those defin­
able as dogmas, 50-56
Theological systems, classified with ref­
erence to predestination, 670-75
Theology: argumentative nature of, 83;
certainty of, 65: descriptive definition
of, 43; divisions of, 59; a natural habit,
71 : necessity of, 40; nobler than other
sciences, 64-71; object and subject of,
78; objectum formale quod and quo,
57 note, 58 note; one science, 56; prin­
ciples accepted from other sciences,
67; relation to faith, 47; relation to
interior life, 31; subordinated to sci­
ence of God, 44; as wisdom, 72
Things: external to God known by
Him, 427-30; God's knowledge of evil,
444; God’s knowledge of future, 44959; God’s knowledge of potential,
443; God’s knowledge the cause of,
436-41; God’s will the cause of, 51823; how known, 433; infinite, 448
Thomas (St.): actually infinite multi­
tude, 250: adequate object of created
intellect, 359; the adequate object of
divine will, 559; analysis and synthesis
combined in his method, 23; ante­
cedent and consequent wills in God,
18; Aristotelian foundation of method
of, 13-17: Aristotle on divine intel­
lection, 428: on beatific vision (see
Beatific vision); the beauty of God,
594; Boethius’ definition of eternity,
277; cause of predestination, 690-98;
contemplation the source of doctrine
of, 26-29; criticism of method of, 1317; distinction between necessary and
contingent, 564; on divine names,
383-415; divine providence, 625-52;
the divine will as cause of things,
518-23; doctrine praised by popes, 5;

735

Thomas (St.) (continued)
efficacy of grace, 566; efficient cause
of divine will, 523; election of the
predestined, 688; evil things known
by God, 444; evils willed per accidens
by God, 587: execution of predestina­
tion, 680: falsity, 483; formal constit­
uent of divine nature, 160; formal
constituent of God’s free act, 514-17;
forms of pantheism known to, 194;
freedom of divine volition, 509-19:
futurables known by God. 471; future
sins known by God, 587; future things
known by God, 449-59; God not the
cause of sin, 586; God’s greater love
for the better things, 601-5; God's
knowledge the cause of things. 43843; God’s universal will to save, 532:
heavenly bodies incorruptible. 292
note; on ideas, 476-79; identity of
suppositum and nature in angel, 197
note; immutability of divine will.
559; importance of the Summa the­
ologica, 1-9: infinite things known by
God, 448; justice and mercy of God.
606-24; kinds of change, 418; on life
of God, 485; literal senses of Scripture,
88; love in God, 595; method of ar­
gumentation, 20; nature of obedien­
tial power, 367; necessity of light of
glory, 367; objections to freedom of
divine will, 511; possibility of actual
infinite multitude, 247; potential
things known by God, 443: power of
God, 720-24; predestination, 677;
preservation of the truth destroyed by
pantheism, 202: principles for refut­
ing modern pantheism, 200; refuta­
tion of pantheism, 197-200; relation
between wills of expression and good
pleasure, 590; reprobation, 683-87;
St. Anselm's argument, 346; St. John
Damascene on wills of God, 545; sec­
ondary causes of divine will, 524; self­
diffusiveness of good, 498; singular
things known by God, 446; things
not loved equally by God, 599; on
truth, 480
Thomists: on antecedent will of God,
535; belief in God's existence, 132;
and Cajetan on communication of
good in God, 400; complete predes­
tination, 666; created species in vision

73θ

INDEX

Thomists (continued)
of God, 349; effects of predestination,
681; explanation of formally and
eminently, 407; on God’s free act, 515;
innate desire of beatific vision, 326;
on natural desire of seeing God, 330;
on obediential capacity according to
Suarez, 327. 366: on predestination,
672; suspension of God’s act, 518:
virtual efficacy of sufficient grace, 582
Thuzey, Council of: on salvation, 668
Traditionalists, and demonstrability of
God’s existence, 109
Trent, Council of: errors of Protestant­
ism and Jansenism condemned, 66g;
freedom of human will, 560; inter­
pretation of reprobation, 707; God
not the cause of sin, 582, 586; on
perseverance, 665; predestination af­
firmed, 677
Trinity, intrinsic possibility not demon­
strable, 336
Truth: doctrinal summary of, 480;
formally implicit revealed, 49-55
Understanding of Himself, God’s, 421
Unity: relation to being, 294 98; rela­
tion to multitude, 298
Unity of God, 300-305
Univocal term, definition of, 395

Valence, Council of: on gratuity of
predestination, 668
Vasquez: acquired faith as sufficient for
theology, 47; on light of glory, 366

Vatican Council: absolute evolutionism
condemned, 155; creatures' likeness to
God, 210; on definable dogmas, 52;
distinction between natural and su­
pernatural, 362; on freedom of divine
will, 510; modern pantheism con­
demned, 200: on providence, 629;
providence declared to be de fide,
638; purpose of creation, 502
Vienne, Council of: Beghards con­
demned, 379; on necessity of light of
glory, 364
Virtual distinction, explanation of, 168
Vision of God; see Beatific vision
Voluntarism of Scotus, 6
Will of God, 487-594: act of God and,
494; antecedent and consequent. 528
31; cause of things, 518-23: efficacy of.
525; existence of, 488-97; expression
in, 588; five expressions of, 589: free.
508-18; immutability of, 556: no
efficient cause of. 523; not always
necessitating, 559-70; object of, 506:
secondary causes of, 524; and things
apart from God, 497-508
Will of good pleasure in God, 536
Wills of expression and good pleasure
in God, 590
Wisdom (gift of), different from the­
ological wisdom, 76
World: freely created, 508-14; really
and essentially distinct from God,
182; relatively the best, 722

Zeller on the God of Aristotle, 590