N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 547 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 547–48 547 Mourning for the Victims: An Open Letter I F THE PAST is any precedent, the controversy over the decision of Notre Dame to award an honorary doctorate of law to Barack Obama will soon fade entirely from view.The scene is all too familiar.As Catholic theologians, however, we perceive something unfamiliar in this familiar scene. Namely, “Rachel is weeping for her children; she refuses to be comforted for her children, because they are not” ( Jer 31:15). We are weeping because the law approves the view that might makes right: under American law, our young may be killed when they are the weakest and most dependent; indeed for those of us with birth defects, our mothers would often have been urged to kill us.We had become accustomed to such violence; when we see the dying, we “pass by on the other side” (Lk 10:31) of the road. In the face of this violence, we have not been a neighbor; we have no answer to the Lord when he tells us,“I was a stranger and you did not welcome me” (Mt 25:43). We are Catholic theologians under the shadow of abortion.The practices of our nation, our practices, inscribe violence against the weak into our very life together. There is something fundamental about refusing to kill others when they are in the womb of their mothers. At the heart of law is the commitment not to kill innocent human life at any stage. To reject this fundamental principle is to rend the bond of human communion. Of course there are the familiar efforts to change the subject, to speak about the good that is being done despite differences of opinion over the vexing abortion issue. But an honorary doctorate in law, when given to a powerful leader who defends the legality of killing human life in the womb, signals an admission that in fact any violence can receive a blessing when approved by the powerful.As Pope John Paul II taught in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae,“It is impossible to further the common good without acknowledging and defending the right to life, upon which all the other inalienable rights of individuals are founded and from which they develop” (§101). N&V_Sum09.qxp 548 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 548 Mourning for the Victims: An Open Letter The recent controversy has unwittingly uncovered the generation of Catholics who have aborted our children, who have seen our friends abort their children, but who know at the bottom of our hearts that we—all of us—are more than the choice of our parents or our government.The future belongs to those who weep with the vulnerable.“There is hope for the future, says the Lord, and your children shall come back to their own country” ( Jer 31:17). N&V Signed Robert Barron Larry Chapp Holly Taylor Coolman Michael Dauphinais Abbot Denis Farkasfalvy, O.Cist. Paul Gondreau John Grabowski Tim Gray Paul Griffiths Scott W. Hahn Michael Hanby Mary Healy Nicholas Healy III Thomas Hibbs Russell Hittinger Reinhard Hütter James F. Keating Sandra Keating Roch Kereszty, O.Cist. William Kurz, S.J. Joseph Lienhard, S.J. Matthew Levering Guy Mansini, O.S.B. Bruce Marshall Francis Martin R. R. Reno Stephen Ryan, O.P. Richard Schenk, O.P. Mary Shivanandan Janet Smith Michael Waldstein Thomas Weinandy, O.F.M. Cap. Lawrence J.Welch Thomas Joseph White, O.P. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 549 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 549–53 549 Eulogy for Fr. Servais Theodore Pinckaers, O.P. M ICHAEL S. S HERWIN, O.P. University of Fribourg Fribourg, Switzerland (Rev 21.1–5a, 6b–7; Mt 5.1–12a) 10 April 2008 The Chapel of the Ursuline Sisters Fribourg, Switzerland I F F R . P INCKAERS could speak to us today, the first thing he would say is that funerals are not canonizations. “You are not here,” he would say, “to canonize me, but to pray for me, to pray for me so that I can enter fully into the joy of the kingdom.” Alright, we shall pray for him. His life, however, like every Christian life, was rooted in the great mysteries of salvation: the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the sacramental life. Fr. Pinckaers was fascinated by the Christian vocation to participate in the life and mission of Christ, the vocation to be configured to Christ in the Holy Spirit; because of this, I am persuaded that Fr. Pinckaers would invite us to celebrate this great vocational mystery in his own life: the mystery of Providence and of grace that enabled a humble, timid kid from the village of Wonck in Wallonia to have an influence that transcends national and cultural boundaries. Right now throughout the world—in China,Vietnam, Korea, the United States,Africa, and Australia, as well as in Europe—there are seminarians and religious sisters and brothers in initial formation who are studying the works of Fr. Pinckaers. Moreover, there are theologians, preachers, and religious educators in Alaska, Krakow, Sidney, Hong Kong, Kinshasa, and even Waco, who are preaching and teaching the Beatitudes, the virtues, and the freedom for excellence that flows from living in the Spirit because of the daily labors of this humble Belgian priest.The extent of his influence is perhaps most N&V_Sum09.qxp 550 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 550 Michael S. Sherwin, O.P. clearly revealed in the Catechism. If one reads the moral section of the Catechism one discovers a remarkable convergence of ideas between it and Fr. Pinckaers’s magisterial work The Sources of Christian Ethics. He would object to the notion that he wrote this section of the Catechism, but we are still free to observe that on the level of structure and quotations, the similarities between the two works are beyond what chance would permit. No one would have expected such a far-reaching influence for a humble boy from Wonck. Born in Liege in the Fall of 1925, the young Servais Theodore (“Theo” to his family) lost his father on the eve of the Second World War. An only son, he suffered the trials and deprivations of the war by turns with his mother and with his fellow students at the boarding school he attended throughout much of the conflict. In 1945, after the war and after one year in a diocesan seminary, Servais entered the Order of Preachers. He did his studies at the Dominican Studium of the Belgian Province at La Sarte (Huy) not far from Liege. It was there that he received his license in theology under the direction of the future Cardinal Jerome Hamer, with a thesis studying Henri de Lubac’s conception of the supernatural (1952). He then undertook doctoral studies at the Angelicum, where he attended the lectures of eminent professors such as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Paul Philippe, and Mario Luigi Ciappi. His dissertation, written under the direction of Fr. Louis-Bertrand Gillon, was entitled “The Virtue of Hope from Peter Lombard to Saint Thomas” (1954). Upon concluding his studies, Fr. Pinckaers returned to the Dominican Studium at La Sarte, where from 1954 to 1965 he taught moral theology and served for a period as the assistant novice master. It was there that Fr. Pinckaers undertook his first efforts to renew our understanding of moral theology, foreshadowing the Vatican Council’s call to renewal by several years. The fruits of these labors, which were first published as articles, were subsequently drawn together in his groundbreaking study Le renouveau de la morale (Téqui, 1964). The book was described by Marie-Dominique Chenu in his preface as the work of an author “for whom the historical method, in all its richness, is placed at the service of a doctrinally penetrating intellect and applied to the most pressing contemporary questions.” Chenu concludes by affirming that “this way of employing the great masters of classical theology is definitely a means and a guarantee of the Renewal of moral theology.” In fact, it was during these years at La Sarte that the insights that would subsequently shape his thought began to germinate within him: (1) the primacy of the Word of God as a living Word addressed to each generation; (2) the fundamental importance of the Fathers of the Church, especially of Saint Augustine; (3) N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 551 Eulogy for Fr. Servais Theodore Pinckaers, O.P. 551 and the lasting value of the method and thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Equally important for his intellectual and spiritual formation were the eight years he spent engaged in pastoral ministry at the Dominican Priory in Liege, where he was assigned following the closure of La Sarte Studium in 1965.Then, in 1975, after already having spent a year there as an invited professor (1972–1973), he was appointed to the French language chair in fundamental moral theology at the University of Fribourg, in Switzerland, where he taught for the next 25 years.1 Emeritus professor since 1997, Servais Pinckaers did not pass these last ten years idly. Indeed, he recently published a new book, Plaidoyer pour la vertu (A Plea for Virtue ), which was one of three to receive an honorable mention as runners up for the Grand Prix catholique de littérature for 2007. Even more surprisingly, his publisher recently revealed that before he died Fr. Pinckaers prepared three more texts for publication: one which he had just finished, entitled Passions et vertu, and two others based on course notes: a meditation on Augustine’s De Trinitate, and a study entitled L’attrait de la parole, sur les chemins de la morale chrétienne, which promises to be a coda to The Sources of Christian Ethics. The mention of sources, however, raises the question of Fr. Pinckaers’s own sources.What was the source of all this productivity? Behold, I make all things new. . . I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end. To the thirsty I will give a gift from the spring of life-giving water. The victor will inherit these gifts, and I shall be his God, and he will be my son. (Revelation 21:5–7) In a brief meditation entitled “My Sources,” which he first offered to an informal gathering of undergraduates at the University of Notre Dame, Fr. Pinckaers mentions two things: the Scriptures and the Eucharist. In other words, the living presence of Christ in the Eucharist and the words of Christ in the Scriptures, and both encountered through a life of daily prayer.This was the twin source of his day-to-day productivity and joy. His was the joy proper to the Beatitudes, a truly strange joy if we listen carefully to the Gospel: 1 The biographical information in these first three paragraphs has been gleaned from a summary of his life and work prepared by Fr. Pinckaers’s longtime friend and colleague Romanus Cessario, O.P. N&V_Sum09.qxp 552 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 552 Michael S. Sherwin, O.P. Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are they who mourn, for they will be comforted. Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the land. Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be satisfied. Blessed are the merciful, for they will be shown mercy. Blessed are the clean of heart, for they will see God. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God. Blessed are they who are persecuted for the sake of righteousness, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are you when they insult you and persecute you and utter every kind of evil against you (falsely) because of me. Rejoice and be glad, for your reward will be great in heaven. The Beatitudes proclaim the joy of being poor, in tears, hungry, and thirsty, of being persecuted, insulted, and falsely accused:“Rejoice and be glad!” This is a strange and abnormal kind of joy. Fr. Pinckaers often insisted, however, that it is true Christian joy, because it is the fruit of our configuration to Christ.Yet this is precisely the challenge: to be configured to Christ means to follow in his path, which is the way of the cross. Here we arrive at the heart of the matter: joy in the cross. In several places Fr. Pinckaers writes that Christian joy is much deeper than simply pleasure, because this spiritual joy can even exist during suffering; it can even exist in the depths of agony: in the depths: De profundis. To have an inkling of Fr. Pinckaers’s state of mind during his final agony, it is enough to look at the book he left open on his desk. It was John Chrysostom’s commentary on the Psalms, opened at Psalm 130, the De profundis: “Out of the depths I cry to you, O Lord. Lord, hear my voice.” It’s the cry of the afflicted, but as Chrysostom notes, it is also the cry of one who retains his confidence in God, retaining it to such an extent that he proclaims that the Lord will deliver him from his sins.That Fr. Pinckaers also had this confidence is clear from his last writings. In a notebook that he kept in his choir stall, we find a final meditation. Reflecting on the mystery of our adopted filiation in Christ, which he describes as “a reality beyond words, that words only confirm as a mystery,” Fr. Pinckaers proclaims,“we are not alone, even in material solitude. Jesus’ power to heal us in our crippled state.We are not to fear weakness, sickness, and infirmity: an offering to the Father in confidence. . . . The joy of working for the Lord and for the Church.” In his weakness and infirmity, Fr. Pinckaers gives himself to God with confidence and proclaims, in his last act as a writer, his joy in serving the Lord and his Church.Thus, even if we should pray for him (as he would ask us to do), N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 553 Eulogy for Fr. Servais Theodore Pinckaers, O.P. 553 we can also find in him an example of confidence and joy to imitate in N&V our own lives. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 555 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 555–61 555 Saint Francis of Assisi : A “Grammar of Gratitude”* G UY B EDOUELLE , O.P. Catholic University of the West Angers, France N O ONE BETTER than Francis of Assisi can benefit from an alert and spontaneous style, and from a perception at once intuitive and passionate, such as we find in this early essay by Gilbert Keith Chesterton. In his Saint Francis of Assisi, which reflects the captivating genius of Francis and the bright apologetic of the author of both Orthodoxy and Heretics, we discover something destined to occur, a mutual encounter marked by profound affinity for and a common love of the creation and the Creator. Chesterton’s Saint Francis of Assisi was published in 1923,1 shortly after the author’s entrance into the Roman Catholic Church, but the attachment that Chesterton felt for this figure of the medieval Church dates from well before his conversion. As early as November 1892, Chesterton wrote a poem about the “solitary dreamer” of Assisi, and, the day after the death in Paris of Oscar Wilde, who himself had become a Catholic,2 * Translated from the French by Romanus Cessario, O.P. 1 It was translated into French as early as 1925 by Isabelle Rivière in the collec- tion Roseau d’or, which dates from the same year and which would welcome in 1927 the first part of the L’homme éternel (The Everlasting Man ). See Yves Habert, “Le Roseau d’or” in Pierre d’Angle 7 (2001): 173–95. This present essay relies on the edition of Ignatius Press (San Francisco, 2002), with an introduction by Joseph Pearce. The original French of this essay draws on the translation of Antoine Barrois, sometimes lightly corrected (Paris: Dominique Martin Morin, 1979). See my “Saint François d’Assise : une ‘grammaire de la gratitude,’ ” Pierre d’Angle 13 (2007): 41–48. 2 See Pearce, introduction to Saint Francis of Assisi, by G. K. Chesterton (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), 187. N&V_Sum09.qxp 556 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 556 Guy Bedouelle, O.P. Chesterton published in The Speaker on December 1st, 1900 an article on St. Francis.This essay already pointed out what Chesterton refers to as the enigma of Francis: why did this lover of creation, of all things good and beautiful, require of himself and of his brethren the most absolute renunciation of material things? “Why did he who loved where all men were blind, seek to blind himself where all men loved? Why was he a monk and not a troubadour?”3 Is it not best for us to proceed apace through Chesterton’s Francis? The essay is full of surprises, of connections—clarifying or incongruous depending on one’s frame of mind. It also contains approximate historical information—those things that Chesterton evidently did not research but above all borrowed by empathy, by a connaturality with his hero. This empathy developed into an overall outlook that summons the reader to happiness. It is indeed his reader that Chesterton above all thinks about; he who is at once a good journalist and a good apologist for Christianity. How to compose without putting the reader off? Chesterton is envisaging a reader who likely would be deeply influenced by the then prevailing prejudices against the Middle Ages in particular and against Catholicism in general. How to approach his reader so as to be understood at least a little? How to proceed? Chesterton obviously could have made Francis the precursor of our favorite modern causes: beyond his respect for nature, is Francis not also the friend of animals, the denouncer of profit and of the reign of money, and the pacificist? But the reader who knew Rousseau, Renan, Arnold, and Tolstoy nonetheless would reproach such a Francis for what they would consider his superstitions. Would it not be better to leave to one side the religious question? But this approach would be impossible without mutilating completely this saint who remained a tenderly devout man.An alternative approach would effect the inverse. If one insists on the asceticism of Francis, his fasts and his stigmata, his persona would become incomprehensible to the contemporary mentality. Chesterton purports to look at Francis of Assisi as if from the outside, in order precisely to explain to the curious—who more or less are wont to cherish sympathy for a figure that they do not know well—how such a man was able to reconcile the irreconcilable, to wit, austerity with merriness. So Chesterton argues that by approaching it in this way, we may at least get a glimmering of why the poet who praised his lord the sun, often hid himself in a dark cavern, of why the saint who was gentle with his Brother the Wolf was so harsh to his Brother the Ass (as he nicknamed his own body), of why 3 Quoted in Pearce, introduction, 187. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 557 Chesterton’s St. Francis of Assisi 557 the troubadour who said that love set his heart on fire separated himself from women, of why the singer who rejoiced in the strength and gaiety of the fire deliberately rolled himself in the snow, or why the very song which cries with all the passion of a pagan, “Praised be God for our Sister, Mother Earth, which brings forth fruits and grass and glowing flowers,” ends almost with the words, “Praised be God for our Sister, the death of the body.”4 To be sure, modern readers may be scandalized by the last years of Francis spent on Mount Alvernia, which they would be wont to interpret as the failure of a life. It behooves Chesterton, then, to explain to the moderns that this experience deals with a sort of “amorous folly,” an outlandish love for men and for God. However one would immediately need to clarify, in order to avoid the worst sort of misunderstanding, that this love emanates not from someone who is abstract, theoretical, intellectual, philanthropic, someone who never displeases anyone, but from a man in love with real people and with Christ. Historical Recap To start off, Chesterton intends to undertake an exercise in historical pedagogy. He aims to avoid committing the same mistakes that do a majority of his colleagues—no doubt journalists—when they use words like crusade, heresy, and inquisition, without bothering to inquire about their true signification or their true origin. Chesterton first of all sets up a somewhat somber picture of the moral and religious degeneration of classical antiquity, against which Christianity establishes itself. Chesterton insists very much on the tyranny of sexual practices that flourished throughout the last period of the Roman Empire, an era that saw no alternative to Venus and to Priapus in anyone other than Pan, that is to say, an oscillation between lasciviousness and terrorism. Chesterton even offers some formulas: “Pagans were wiser than paganism; that is why the pagans became Christians,”5 and also “the glad news brought by the Gospel was the news of original sin.”6 Only “the abrupt supernatural” could offer a chance of salvation out of such a set of circumstances.This remark introduces the second historical period that Chesterton describes, one corresponding to the first centuries of the Middle Ages. He argues that during this epoch we can observe an expiration and a purification of the faults of the pagan world, not only by the institution of a severe monasticism complete with its 4 G. K. Chesterton, Saint Francis of Assisi (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), 194. 5 Chesterton, Saint Francis, 208. 6 Chesterton, Saint Francis, 207. N&V_Sum09.qxp 558 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 558 Guy Bedouelle, O.P. terrible penances, but also by the solicitude for a perennially renewed reform of the Church, one which entailed necessarily a doctrinal purity that explains the Crusades and the battle against heresy. It is only then, according to our author, that a third period of history could emerge, from the end of the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, the period of St. Francis, a period of renewal, that took place within the flourishing of a certain recovered innocence and which harbored the expectation of a general reconciliation. Chesterton explains, for example, that the celebrated attempt by St. Francis to convert the Sultan by the naked power both of the word and of his life represents for Brother Francis the concluding stage of the violence of the Crusades. As with all rapid generalizations, a schema of this type cannot satisfy the historian. Still, Chesterton touches upon something true by trying to give an explanation as to why in St. Francis and also, he will say, in St. Thomas Aquinas, one finds a high priority given to redeemed nature. Chesterton shows this sentiment at work in the Poor Man of Assisi throughout the chapters of the book, which are at once demi-historical and demi-psychological. Fighter and Builder Francis of Assisi was a man of action, one always on the lookout for glory. Chesterton excels in describing him as alive, impetuous, gentle but not a dreamer, generous, and jolly. He shows quite well that Francis lacked all sense of money, as much when making expenditures as in observing poverty. Francis likewise amassed over the course of his life a long list of rashly uttered vows. If Francis once had wanted to be a fighter, it was in the chivalrous not the bellicose sense, for he lived, both before and after his conversion, within the demanding culture of medieval courtesy. It was a sickness that made him grow up and accept humiliations in the eyes of his fellow citizens. Having become a builder, he worked with his own hands, but this meant that he had come to understand “the idea of a new supernatural light on natural things, which meant the ultimate recovery not the ultimate refusal of natural things.”7 Accordingly in this way, he took his distance from the traditional monastic spirituality. Chesterton recounts the adventures of Francis after his conversion in a manner droll, but not at the same time without a bit of ingenuity that helps people understand the practices of his holy hero. It is said that in place of the girdle which he had flung off (perhaps with the more symbolic scorn because it probably carried the purse or wallet 7 Chesterton, Saint Francis, 232. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 559 Chesterton’s St. Francis of Assisi 559 by the fashion of the period) he picked up a rope more or less at random, because it was lying near, and tied it round his waist. He undoubtedly meant it as a shabby expedient; rather as the very destitute tramp will sometimes tie his clothes together with a piece of string. He meant to strike the note of collecting his clothes anyhow, like rags from a succession of dust-bins.8 Standing on His Head Because Francis (a name that Chesterton translates as “Frenchy”) ought to have loved the language of the troubadours, the central chapter of the book is called even in the English edition, “Le Jongleur de Dieu,” or “God’s Juggler.”This is the point: Chesterton shows poetically that Francis’s conversion to humility consists in passing from the noble and passionate songs of a troubadour to the antics and acrobatics of the juggler, who often was the servant of a knight or even of a troubadour. Chesterton develops this theme in several stages. The first step consists in seeing the consequences of the parlous jump that conversion entails.At one moment, the head is upside down, as is said of the crucified St. Peter, and at the next, Francis lands on his feet, but entirely renewed.9 We find there the experience of the reversal of all things in the discovery of their supernatural dimension. Fallen, like St. Paul on the way to Damascus, Francis will be from then on the jester of the King of Paradise, looking for nothing but rejoicing in everything. This passage reflects the resonances not only of St. Paul but also of Erasmus. This part of the text also may reflect something of the autobiographical, giving to Chesterton’s humor and eccentricity an implicit depth. The second moment is that of the praise of creation. Francis escapes at once exacerbated spiritualisms and the cerebrations of the Courts of Love, while at the same time he rejects with the same resolve the cult of nature and of pantheism. For praise is addressed to the Creator, which makes us understand, according to Chesterton, the difficult position of the atheist who finds himself without anyone to thank. The mystic himself knows well that all depends on God, that all indeed hangs “on a hair of the mercy of God.”10 Still, one must advance further. For Chesterton, the key to the paradox that I have announced from the start and which unites in Francis a spirit both of penitence and of joyful praise, is to be found in the fact that 8 Chesterton, Saint Francis, 239. 9 On the tomfoolery of St. Francis, see Christiane d’Haussy, La vision du monde chez G. K. Chesterton (Paris: Didier, 1981), 221. 10 Chesterton, Saint Francis, 251. N&V_Sum09.qxp 560 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 560 Guy Bedouelle, O.P. the debt owed to the Creator can never be repaid, and so it becomes on this account a source of joy.We arrive indeed at the mystery of Christian love where one stands as at once debtor and creditor, but which has nothing further to do with the chivalric love founded on a hoped-for recompense. Indeed, the Christian debt points to something else: There the infinite creditor does share the joy of the infinite debtor; for indeed they are both debtors and both creditors. In other words, debt and dependence do become pleasures in the presence of unspoilt love; the word is used too loosely and luxuriously in popular simplifications like the present; but here the word is really the key. It is the key of all the problems of Franciscan morality which puzzle the merely modern mind; but above all it is the key of asceticism. It is the highest and holiest of paradoxes that the man who really knows he cannot pay his debt will be forever paying it back. He will be for ever giving back what he cannot give back, and cannot be expected to give back. He will always be throwing things away into a bottomless pit of unfathomable thanks. Men who think they are too modern to understand this are in fact too mean to understand it; we are most of us too mean to practice it. We are not generous enough to be ascetics; one might almost say not genial enough to be ascetics. A man must have magnanimity of surrender, of which he commonly only catches a glimpse in first love, like a glimpse of our lost Eden. But whether he sees it or not, the truth is in that riddle; that the whole world has, or is, only one good thing; and it is a bad debt.”11 This “happy debt” of life received and of life redeemed reveals the secret of Francis. He has written, says Chesterton, a “grammar of acceptance”, a “grammar of gratitude,”12 just as Newman wrote a Grammar of Assent.“Francis understood down to its very depth the theory of thanks; and its depths are a bottomless abyss.”13 Upon this mystical vision, Chesterton allows a dramatic reading to unfold, theatrical in some ways, we today might say a theo-dramatic. One should never lose sight, he affirms, that Francis of Assisi was a true poet. Recall that before giving himself over to a beautiful and almost technical literary analysis of the Canticle of Creation, Francis did not fear to evoke for this purpose his beloved fairy tales. But the poet himself becomes the actor in a play that he himself had composed, or more precisely trans11 Chesterton, Saint Francis, 252–53. 12 “A grammar of acceptance; a grammar of gratitude.” Chesterton plays also on the English words: “St. Francis cared chiefly for the best kind of giving which is called thanksgiving.” See Chesterton, Saint Francis, 318. 13 Chesterton, Saint Francis, 318. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 561 Chesterton’s St. Francis of Assisi 561 forms himself into a divine mime. Francis modeled himself on Christ and by becoming his mirror-image, embraced better the dimensions of the Redemption than up to that moment had been his customary practice. More so, the apologist in Chesterton recognizes that for the modern reader many evangelical precepts become more attractive, even compelling, in the Fioretti than in other expressions. Chesterton himself, however, does not make much in his book of Francis’s miracles.They, in any case, would rub the scientifically minded the wrong way. . . . Moreover, the signal characteristic found in the life of Saint Francis is that “the supernatural part of the story seems quite as natural as the rest.”14 And furthermore, to whom does it fall to fix the limits of the supernatural? An effort to approach poetically a figure who himself is both a poet and poetical, Saint Francis of Assisi allows Chesterton to develop a hagiographical style that is all his own. In his desire to make the essence of Francis’s extraordinary holiness understood, the author fixes first of all on the signs, on the symbolic gestures that appear throughout in the associations of ideas and in historical approximations. He is a painter who proceeds by “rapid strokes and summaries,”15 even when he treats the mystical.This work of art, like a painting, invites us to see, to experience, and through this contact, to achieve understanding. This essay of Chesterton, it is true, includes elements of diagnosis and of judgment on the contemporary world. But inasmuch as the author already has covered this ground in his 1909 Orthodoxy, the rejection of the pagan cult of nature and of hedonism, these “values” of a world that he denounces, appear, prophetically moreover, as subordinate themes in Saint Francis. Chesterton deliberately turns rather toward a view of the supernatural that never forgets the natural but rather illuminates it. He does this so that the action of grace can flow forth, and can be seen in both the willing acceptance of and steadfastness among the most difficult of trials. Chesterton remains an apologist without a doubt. But he is one in that rare sense of a man who wants to make others share in an emerging enlightenment. N&V 14 Chesterton, Saint Francis, 303. 15 Chesteron, Saint Francis, 84. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 563 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 563–68 563 Saint Thomas Aquinas: “The Apostle of Common Sense”1 ROMANUS C ESSARIO, O.P. St. John’s Seminary Brighton, Massachusetts G ILBERT K EITH C HESTERTON (1874–1936) tackled the arduous task of interpreting Saint Thomas Aquinas a decade after the renowned British essayist had penned his thoughts about Saint Francis of Assisi. As Guy Bedouelle notes above, the “life” of the troubadour of God was published just a year after Chesterton came into (what today we call) full communion with the Catholic Church. However, even before his conversion to Catholicism, Chesterton had grown to love Francis of Assisi. The “lonely man” of Assisi, who had upset established orders both domestic and ecclesial, exercised a strong pull on the young Chesterton, at least since the 1890s, a period when decadence in European society had achieved almost a certain respectability.Americans still glamorize the “Gay 90s.” Oscar Wilde’s disgrace in the British police courts, however, marks a turning point in this trajectory of misspent energy, though not the end of elite European intellectuals’ flirtation with the culture of Transgression.At the same time, not a few of le beau monde learned to sympathize with Wilde’s lament in The Ballad of Reading Gaol: “How else but through a broken heart/May Lord Christ enter in?” By the time in 1900 when Wilde dies a Catholic in Paris, Chesterton already is waxing rhapsodically on the “inconsistency in the position of St. Francis.”2 More than two decades later, in July 1922, Chesterton followed Wilde’s death-bed example. But unlike Oscar Wilde, Chesterton discovered happily 1 For the French version of this article, see “Thomas d’Aquin, apôtre du sens commun,” Pierre d’Angle 13 (2007): 49–56. 2 In a 1 December 1900 article in The Speaker, the Liberal Review, a London publi- cation that appeared under this title from 1899. N&V_Sum09.qxp 564 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 564 Romanus Cessario, O.P. that the Catholic Church affords a good place in which not only to die but also to live. It nonetheless took Chesterton another ten years or thereabouts to explore the other side of the Catholic mystery and ethos. He had been drawn first by Dionysus, by the inconsistency of Saint Francis, half-troubadour and half-friar (what Chesterton imprecisely refers to as a “monk”), but the author of Orthodoxy, inspired perhaps by the sunburst found on baroque portrayals of Thomas Aquinas, found his quies in Apollo. Chesterton embodies greatness, as a man and as an author. So it would be unfair to pigeonhole him into categories as neat and narrow as those evoked by the Dionysiac and the Apollonian. At the same time, his 1933 Saint Thomas Aquinas demonstrates that Chesterton came to both appreciate and champion the capacity of the common man to know something for sure, what he calls, “the conclusion of common sense.”3 Were he to have known that the first Christians adapted representations of Apollo to depict Christ, Chesterton would have found no trouble grasping the symbolic transposition.4 The inter-war years in Great Britain were dominated by epistemological outlooks other than those espoused by Thomas Aquinas. Chesterton therefore was keen to clear up mythologies that colored the way that just about everybody, in this period marked by both hubristic science and uncertain politics, esteemed the overall worth of medieval writers. Like earlier Enlightenment thinkers, Chesterton’s contemporaries, so he tells us, considered the Schoolmen “all crabbed and mechanical medieval bores.”5 They were dismissed as “unscientific.” By the time that he penned these words, Chesterton had already begun to intuit that Aquinas possessed and proceeded upon a view of science different than what had become regarded as the only kind of science, namely modern, inductive science.What today 3 G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas/Saint Francis of Assisi (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), 138. Chesterton’s book on Aquinas was first published in 1933 (New York: Sheed & Ward, Inc.).The first French translation, by Maximilien Vox, with a preface by Stanislaus Gillet, O.P., appeared in 1935, a year before Chesterton’s death: Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Plon, 1935). Martin Stanislaus Gillet, a Frenchman, was the seventy-eighth master general of the Order of Friars Preachers (1929–46). References in this essay are to the Ignatius Press edition (San Francisco, 2002), with an introduction by Ralph McInerny, which combines in one volume Chesterton’s chapters on Aquinas with those on Saint Francis. 4 There is a representation of Christ as the sun-god Apollo riding in his chariot in a third-century mosaic on the ceiling of the tomb of the Roman clan the Julii in the Vatican scavi under St. Peter’s Basilica. 5 Chesterton, Aquinas, 143. Gillet, in his preface, observes:“Un des grands mérites de Chesterton, dans le portrait qu’il vient de tracer se saint Thomas, consiste précisément dans l’art avec lequel il a replacé saint Thomas dans son milieu, en plein moyen âge, non le moyen âge que la Renaissance a volontairement obscurci, mais celui que l’histoire a remis en lumière” (Gillet, preface to Saint Thomas d’Aquin, iv). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 565 Chesterton’s St.Thomas Aquinas 565 we call “research.” Chesterton’s embrace of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church helped him to see that the human mind is made for and so wants to possess more than a collection of logically interconnected probabilities. Chesterton had moved far beyond the seduction of Nietzsche’s 1872 critique of the Apollonian in The Birth of Tragedy, a text that Nietzsche himself later disparaged as smelling “offensively Hegelian.”6 A decade of Catholic belief and practice brought Chesterton to understand why the early Christians found reasons to use the symbols of Apollo, though never those of Dionysus, to represent Jesus Christ. Just as the Charioteer of the Sun brought the light of the new day, so the Son of God brings a new light of Truth. Chesterton above all praises Aquinas for his ability to recognize this Truth. When it comes to discovering Truth, we face, as Chesterton sees it, two options. Put simply, “in this world there is nothing except a syllogism—and a fallacy.”7 Chesterton’s Catholic life taught him to appreciate the importance of right thinking for everyday life. No wonder author Dale Ahlquist has dubbed Chesterton “The Apostle of Common Sense.”8 By the 1930s, the Leonine renewal of Thomism had begun to take off, at least in the Catholic countries of Europe. Although Dominican Father Gerald Vann (1906–1963) would not publish his own essay on Thomas Aquinas until 1940, renewed interest in Friar Thomas D’Aquino had begun to gain ground in England since the return in 1921 of the Dominicans to Oxford.9 Chesterton would also have learned about Aquinas from his close association with the Distributist-movement community at Ditchling, whose circle included, besides his close friends Hillaire Belloc and Dominican Father Vincent McNabb, the nowadays controversial artist Eric Gill, who would one day sculpt Chesterton’s gravestone. It stands today at his burial site in the Catholic cemetery in Beaconsfield, Buckinghamshire. • • • Saint Thomas Aquinas is not about St. Thomas Aquinas. The American philosopher and novelist Ralph McInerny even wonders how Chesterton 6 See Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy,” in Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:Vintage Books, 1989), 270. 7 Chesterton, Aquinas, 142. 8 Dale Ahlquist, G. K. Chesterton:The Apostle of Common Sense (Fort Collins, CO: Ignatius Press, 2001). 9 Gerald Vann, Saint Thomas Aquinas (London: Hague & Gill Ltd, 1940). For further information on the revival of interest in Aquinas in early twentieth-century England, see Aidan Nichols, O.P., Dominican Gallery: Portrait of a Culture (Leominster: Gracewing, 1997), 11: “In the later 1920s the [Dominican] priory [in London] was irregularly attended by a number of the Catholic literati of the period such as Maurice Baring, Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 566 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 566 Romanus Cessario, O.P. ever acquired so much intuition into the significance of Aquinas.10 For it is highly doubtful that Chesterton had actually devoted much time to reading Aquinas or to studying Thomism. In fact, it is reported that Chesterton began the book without the benefit of extended research. The volume is dedicated to Chesterton’s secretary, Dorothy Collins, who told one of his early biographers, Maisie Ward, that Chesterton had dictated the first half of the book to her before he asked her to go to London and to buy up whatever books may be available about Aquinas.11 Picture this poor woman rummaging through the bookstores of London in the early 1930s—when entre-deux-guerres intellectuals like Christopher Isherwood and W. H. Auden were courting the transgressive decadence that many savants of the late nineteenth century had the good sense eventually to eschew—asking for books on Thomas Aquinas. She must have come back with a few. In the later chapters of his pensées on Aquinas, Chesterton cites some prominent figures of the early twentieth-century Thomist revival.At the same time, this does not mean that Chesterton missed the point. On the contrary, one of the giants of Leonine Thomism, Étienne Gilson, said that he was spot on; indeed, he esteemed Chesterton’s Saint Thomas Aquinas as one of the best presentations of the Dominican teacher. Like the French Father Gillet, the Frenchman Gilson was in a position to know.12 Chesterton found in Aquinas just what the doctor ordered for the several malaises that affected the inter-war generation of Western Europe. Two major documents of the Pontificate of Pope Leo XIII (1878–1903) exercised influence upon him: the 15 May 1891 Encyclical Letter on Capital and Labor, Rerum Novarum, and the earlier 4 August 1879 Encyclical Letter on the Restoration of Christian Philosophy, Aeterni Patris. It is generally accepted that Chesterton’s attachment to the socio-economic doctrine of Distributivism grew out of his reading of the former, whereas his evident appreciation for Thomist moderate realism developed as a result of the latter. He stood up staunchly for Aquinas even before Catholic intellectuals, such as the accomplished Jesuit theologian Martin Cyril D’Arcy (1888–1976), opted to become “Thomists.” Chesterton was always spot on. For instance, he wryly observes that Father D’Arcy chose to point out some “remarkable differences” between St.Thomas and Hegel in this way: “For St.Thomas it is impossible that contradictories should exist together, and again reality and intelligibility correspond, but a thing must first be, to 10 See Ralph McInerny, introduction to Aquinas, 9. 11 See Maisie Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1943), 619. 12 Étienne Gilson provided an endorsement for Chesterton’s volume:“I consider it being without possible comparison the best book ever written on St.Thomas.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 567 Chesterton’s St.Thomas Aquinas 567 be intelligible.”13 This erudite comparison of Hegel and Aquinas provides Chesterton with his opening for the best line in the whole book:“Let the man in the street be forgiven,” retorts Chesterton, “if he adds that the ‘remarkable difference’ seems to him to be that St. Thomas was sane and Hegel was mad.”14 Chesterton wrote Saint Thomas Aquinas during a period when people generally tended to oppose faith and reason. Scientific people thought that reason is sufficient. Believing people were persuaded that reason is alien. Chesterton tried to address both audiences. He was especially keen to explain how Aquinas took on the errors of Latin Averroism. Chesterton’s success at the task stands as another testimony to his genius. Recall that about one hundred years ago in 1907, Pope Saint Pius X published his encyclical letter Pascendi Dominici Gregis, which set in motion within the Church the anti-Modernist measures that lasted until the eve of the Second Vatican Council in 1962. Pascendi and its companion decree from the Holy Office, Lamentabili, defended the authenticity of divinely revealed truths that were unavailable to reason, and thus strengthened Catholics to resist the hubris of religious scientism and of other “researchers.”15 Unfortunately, neither Pius X nor his successor, Benedict XV, was able to stabilize the uncertain political environment that pushed old Europe into the First World War. In 1914, Chesterton suffered physical and psychological exhaustion. The Condemnation of Modernism helped Chesterton to realize that Catholic faith and the act of belief that sustains it require vigilance.At the same time, he was too smart to renounce thinking about the faith in favor of a blind acceptance of whatsoever came his way from even ecclesiastical authorities.Thomas Aquinas gave him the model both for believing what is revealed and for pondering what faith teaches. There is something prophetic about Chesterton’s 1933 book on Aquinas. It clearly anticipates what Pope John Paul said of the Common Doctor in the 1995 encyclical letter Fides et Ratio: “Although he made much of the supernatural character of faith, the Angelic Doctor did not overlook the importance of its reasonableness; indeed he was able to plumb the depths and explain the meaning of this reasonableness.”16 The words come from Pope John Paul II. They also could have been composed by Gilbert Keith Chesterton. Just 13 Martin D’Arcy as quoted by Chesterton in Aquinas, 135. 14 Chesterton, Aquinas, 135. 15 Chesterton entered the Roman Church twenty-five years after the condemna- tion of the Anglo-Irish Jesuit George Tyrrell, for whom Scholasticism was a relic from a bygone age with no relevance to the modern world. 16 John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, §43. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM 568 Page 568 Romanus Cessario, O.P. as at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, popes had to defend the reality of supernatural faith, so at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, popes have found it necessary to defend man’s capacity to reason. Aquinas did both. It is strange that a book like Thomas Aquinas written almost seventyfive years ago still sells in bookshops. Again, there is something prophetic about G. K. Chesterton. For example, his views on Islam today make for very interesting reading. Chesterton’s Saint Thomas Aquinas provides a balanced address to questions no person of good will and bright intelligence can avoid.They make up the recurrent questions that human existence forces upon every member of the race: for example, about God, about the goal of human existence, about personal immortality. Chesterton holds that Saint Thomas Aquinas in his own writings presents a perennial, indeed an everlasting, philosophy that will not disappoint those who take the time to discover what he says. Chesterton remains careful to point out that he is presenting Aquinas’s philosophy.Today there are those who suggest that Aquinas may not have thought of himself as doing philosophy. I would be surprised to see that this opinion persuades many perceptive people who read, for example, the Thomist commentaries on Aristotle. At the same time, there abides a kernel of truth in the above-mentioned, overwrought proposal. Let Chesterton have the last word, and let him explain what he considers the key to Aquinas’s philosophical genius. “I emphasize, even in the first few pages, the fact that there is a sort of purely Christian humility and fidelity underlying Aquinas’s philosophic realism. St.Thomas could as truly say, of having seen merely a stick or a stone, what St. Paul said of having seen the rending of the secret heavens. ‘I was not disobedient to the heavenly vision.’ For though the stick or the stone is an earthly vision, it is through them that St.Thomas finds his way to heaven; and the point is that he is N&V obedient to the vision; he does not go back on it.”17 17 Chesterton, Aquinas, 162. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 569 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 569–77 569 What Is Happening on the Intellectual Scene in England? A IDAN N ICHOLS, O.P. Blackfriars, Cambridge General Background I T IS TYPICAL of high culture in England to be allergic to the notion of an intelligentsia, which is deemed by the reading public to be a concept distinctive to the French, though the more historically minded are aware of its origins in nineteenth-century Russia.1 And yet principled thinking plays a major part in cultural life—the advances of demotic style and idiom through the “dumbing down” effect of contemporary communications media notwithstanding. The two ideas most influential in England, at least until recently, have been, first, cultural empiricism (the English are rarely happy for long unless they can amass, or at least keep in touch with, concrete facts) and, secondly, political constitutionalism (taken as the key to the relatively harmonious historical development of the civil society).We must add that, since the late seventeenth century, natural science has enjoyed especial esteem. Where no other social, philosophical, or religious commitment intervenes, an admiring confidence in the explanatory achievements of the physical and life sciences remains the “default position” of educated English people.2 The interface of religion and science is consequently the single most important area in which Christian apologetics must succeed. Owing to the individualism—the tolerance of, and delight in, individuality and indeed idiosyncrasy—which has marked the culture for centuries, 1 S. Collini, Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain (Oxford: 2006). 2 For an egregious example of such scientism, see N. Fearn, Philosophy:The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions (London: 2005). N&V_Sum09.qxp 570 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 570 Aidan Nichols, O.P. perhaps since the Anglo-Saxon period,3 the English do not easily warm to “schools” of thought. Those that have existed in modern times (English Hegelianism in philosophy between 1870 and 1920, Marxism in social criticism in the 1930s and 1970s) have been relatively short-lived.Today PostModernism remains rather marginal, and is best observed in some departments of English: its constant “playful” refusal to settle truth-claims does not go down well with a “common sense” oriented culture. By and large, then, thinkers are influential as individual voices, a pattern especially clearly discernible in the Victorian epoch (Coleridge, Carlyle, Newman, Ruskin, John Stuart Mill, Arnold) but equally true now.4 It remains the case, as for the nineteenth century, that in quality journalism (whose flagship is The Times Literary Supplement) the best imaginative writers and commentators on politics—in the broad sense of that word—enjoy considerable respect.This reflects the regard in which the English continue to hold their own literature, and their belief in the political genius of the nation (its capacity for moderation, negotiated compromise, inclusiveness—though these qualities were called into question during the breakdown of the working relations between organized labor and the State in the 1970s and 80s, and remain vulnerable to bouts of cynicism about political life since). The formal study of philosophy and theology (unlike that of history) carries little kudos. The public image of philosophy as useless and even trivial derives from continuing impressions of the ordinary language analysis of the hegemonic Oxford philosophy of the period 1930 to 1980, for which philosophical problems were deemed to be largely pseudoissues arising from conceptual confusions. The word “theological” has attracted connotations of remoteness and impracticality, just as “doctrinal” and “dogmatic” have come to mean doctrinaire and carelessness of evidence.This suggests not only the anti-metaphysical bent of the culture but also the intellectual weakness of the historically dominant form of Christianity, Anglicanism, which, with some few exceptions, has been feeble in systematic thinking (though strong on historical theology). Theology Academic theology in English universities is on the defensive at the present time.“Religious Studies,” a phenomenological discipline deriving ulti3 For the (obviously, partial) continuity of English attitudes from the Anglo-Saxon period, see P.Ackroyd, Albion:The Origins of the English Imagination (London: 2002). 4 Thus the late Maurice Cowling saw no need to abandon a basically prosopo- graphical approach to intellectual history when he reached the last, nearcontemporary and contemporary, instalment of his Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England, published as: Volume III: Accommodations (Cambridge: 2001). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 571 The Intellectual Scene in England 571 mately from the German research universities of the early nineteenth century (notably Berlin), acquired its first institutional base at the University of Lancaster in the 1960s, and is now dominant in most of the erstwhile theology faculties. Many of the latter have changed their names, either by bracketing together “Theology and Religious Studies” or by suppressing the word “theology” altogether. Attempts to combine the two methodologically—as at Cambridge—with a view to securing the continuing support both of ordinand-sponsoring bodies, such as the Church of England dioceses, and of secular-minded university senates or bureaucracies are not widely credited. South of the Scottish border, where academic theology manages to persist, it suffers from a manifest ecclesial deficit. Even where certain posts remain tied to holy Orders in the Church of England (three canon-professorships at Oxford, one at Durham) there is a widespread reluctance to affirm an epistemological link between theology and the life of the Church.5 As the Catholic lay theologian Dr. Gavin D’Costa has pointed out, by comparison with the English nineteenth century (in, for example, different constituent colleges of the University of London) modernity has homogenized the university, making it “a place of rational discussion, without adequate attention to tradition-specific forms of enquiry or the telos of ratio.”6 Theologies which make comprehensive claims for hermeneutical sufficiency are especially controversial. Unlike Scotland, English Barthianism has proved unable to sustain itself in a university setting. An attempt to institutionalize an inculturated Barthianism (notably by invoking the somewhat cryptic theological thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge) under the leadership of the United Reformed theologian Colin Gunton at King’s College London, did not survive his death, though it left behind a journal, the International Journal for the Study of Theology. Seemingly more successful, though far more mired in polemics, is “Radical Orthodoxy,” arguably the first fully indigenous theological movement in England since Tractarianism (or possibly, given the latter’s neopatristic and therefore derivative character, the “Cambridge Platonism” of the seventeenth century). Radical Orthodoxy derives from the work of John Milbank, a Methodist turned Anglican, who, under the influence of his wife, also an academic, has identified himself with the Church of England’s Anglo-Catholic wing. For Radical Orthodoxy, which first came to prominence in Cambridge but whose “site” is now the University of Nottingham, most secular thought in the West—including Liberalism in its 5 G. D’Costa, Theology in the Public Square: Church,Academy, and Nation (Oxford: 2005). 6 Ibid., 13. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 572 Aidan Nichols, O.P. 572 ostensibly theological form—is parasitic on revelation.The de facto evolution of that Western thought which now, in Post-Modernism, has ended in a nihilistic version of Nominalism, confronts contemporaries with the challenge to embrace Christian Trinitarianism as the only kind of thinking that can deflect metaphysical despair while doing justice to human “otherness” and thereby facilitate the securing of social peace.7 The journal Modern Theology is chiefly Radical Orthodox in orientation. But the perception that Radical Orthodoxy takes no intellectual hostages has aroused much academic hostility to it (notably in Oxford and Cambridge); at the same time, its sweeping characterizations of writers from the Church’s past of whom it disapproves (such as Scotus) have gained it a reputation for slipshod and inaccurate historical reportage. Finally, Radical Orthodoxy lacks ecclesial moorings. It has been described as a theology in search of a Church. Not that Radical Orthodoxy could readily find an intimate union of Church and theology should it look toward English Catholicism.The lack of an adequate institutional base for Catholic theology in England is striking.A number of Catholics are teaching theology and ecclesiastical history in British universities (especially at Cambridge), but this is not in relation to a syllabus devised with Catholic concerns in mind. Indeed, a number of such Catholics have specialized in figures who are Anglican (Paul Murray at Durham, an expert on the Cambridge Anglican thinker Donald MacKinnon), or Jewish (Michael Purcell at Edinburgh, a Levinas scholar). Heythrop College, a Jesuit-run institution within the University of London, functions largely as an ecumenical college; the seminaries and the study-house of the Dominicans at Oxford naturally concentrate on ordination courses. D’Costa has argued for the creation of a Catholic university in Britain not least for this reason, namely, to free a theology “held captive within the Berlin-Babylonian University,”8 but also—along the lines of Newman’s The Idea of a University—to permit a new “marriage of the disciplines” in a symphonic Catholic Christian world-view.9 (Conceivably, the Maryvale Institute of adult theological education in the archdiocese of Birmingham could eventually serve such a role.) Philosophy Perhaps the most striking thing in philosophy is the—at any rate partialcrumbling of the barrier wall between English analytical philosophy and 7 For a good, brief characterisation, see R. Shortt, God’s Advocates: Christian Thinkers in Conversation (London: 2005), 103–25. 8 D’Costa, Theology in the Public Square, 215. 9 Ibid., 184–95. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 573 The Intellectual Scene in England 573 its more metaphysical—or at least epistemologically diverse—Continental counterpart. In one sense, analytical philosophy has lost its dominance. In another, its concerns are merging with an appropriation of the Continental tradition in what really needs to be called not English, or even British, but “Anglo-American” philosophical culture.10 Thanks especially to the Oxford logician Michael Dummett (as it happens, a Catholic), a new awareness dawned that the Anglo-American philosophical attempt to formalize language as a bearer of propositional meaning through contemporary logic really derives from Frege, who through a common inspiration, has an affinity to Husserl (and thus phenomenology) and Brentano (and so some version, at least, of Scholasticism).11 This discovery boosted the movement of “Analytic Thomism,” whose beginnings may be associated with Peter Geach at the University of Leeds and his wife G. E. M. Anscombe (now deceased) at Cambridge and which today is actively represented by Professor John Haldane at St. Andrews across the Scottish border. But as Dummett admits, while “most of us [that is,Anglo-American philosophers] believe once more that philosophy has a constructive task, . . . so thoroughly was the demolition [by earlier philosophers of the analytic school] accomplished, that the rebuilding is of necessity slow.”12 Though “logical positivism” has few if any defenders, the abandonment of ground once serenely occupied by such English disciples of the Vienna Circle as A. J. Ayer has not necessarily been noticed by the “metropolitan elite,” much less the media establishment. Allied to the (inchoate) recovery of metaphysics has been a more critical reading of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, who enjoyed in the 1960s and 70s an almost oracular status. In particular, Wittgenstein’s apparent insistence that the task of philosophy is restricted to describing the ontological implications of human practice (including notably its linguistic dimension, in “language games,” which are also “forms of life”) is now often regarded as excessively severe.Why, it is asked, should philosophy not revise as well as describe? (The contrast derives from the Oxford philosopher Peter Strawson for whom “descriptive metaphysics” was acceptable, “revisionist metaphysics” was not.) Characterization of academic philosophy as currently practiced in England must take into account, however, a greater pluralism than in the second half of the twentieth century. Oxford is no longer so dominant. 10 There is a typical example of this trend in S. Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard (Oxford: 2001). I am indebted to conversation with Father Francis Kerr, O.P., of Blackfriars Edinburgh for help with this section. 11 M. Dummett, The Origins of Analytic Philosophy (London: 1993). 12 Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (London: 1991), 1. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 574 Aidan Nichols, O.P. 574 At the University of Edinburgh, which early sponsored a Department of Artificial Intelligence and Perception, “cognitive science,” a synthesis of philosophy and neuro-physiology, prevails.The Universities of Essex and Warwick are redoubts (not necessarily much admired) of Post-Modernism. At the University of Reading, Professor John Cottingham, who edits the highly analytic journal Ratio, has now espoused—perhaps owing to his recent conversion to Catholicism—a broadly theistic philosophy of religion based on disparate metaphysical, literary, and religious sources, as well as psycho-analysis, which criticizes Enlightenment thinking in the name of a fuller rationality.13 The single most widely accepted revision of an earlier reductionist philosophical culture is undoubtedly in ethics. There the recovery of Platonic-Aristotelean (and in some cases frankly Thomist) “virtue ethics” is the order of the day. Such an ethics of virtue could always be found as a distinctly minority report in the otherwise subjectivist or Kantian climate of thinking about morals in the middle decades of the twentieth century in England.Though not without its critics, such “Neo-Aristoteleanism,” as it is often called, is now well entrenched.14 History Marxist historiography has almost disappeared from British universities, in contrast to the position in the 1960s and 70s.To a limited degree, Postmodernism has some impact on historical studies, not least where it is allied to “oral history,” to which its themes of discourse in relation to control and power are germane.15 Most British historians, however, adopt a briskly matter-of-fact approach to their discipline. They consider historical study to be based on the close reading of texts together with a basic sympathy of understanding generated by immersion in the artefacts and mentefacts of some given period. Thus documentary analysis and close-up interpretation are the order of the day. It has always been difficult to get a Methodenstreit going in English historiography.16 Though such topics as the “history of the body,” linked to the “history of gender,” are investigated here and there, with historiography subsumed into 13 J. Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy and Human Value (Cambridge: 2005). 14 Cottingham, Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Carte- sian and Psychoanalytic Ethics (Cambridge: 1998). 15 See C. Brown, Postmodernism for Historians (Harlowe: 2005). I am grateful to correspondence with Dr. Simon Ditchfield of the University of York for bringing me up to speed on recent trends in the study of history. 16 M. Bentley, Modernizing England’s Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism, 1870–1970 (Cambridge: 2005), 218. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 575 The Intellectual Scene in England 575 cultural studies, the predominant emphasis falls on public narrative history of a more or less traditional kind: “traditional” inasmuch as it joins, say, Thucydides with Ranke. For the median British historian, history writing consists in an interpretation which places evidenced facts in a wider context furnishing an “interesting, coherent and useful narrative about the past.”17 Curiously, such public narrative history has disappeared from much secondary education, and as a consequence is disappearing likewise from popular consciousness.18 Among the general population there is an increasing vacuum where historical knowledge of England’s past should be. At the most sophisticated level of professional historians themselves there has been a revival of interest in the origins of the Reformation, which to some extent has created a new divide between Catholic and Protestant writers (though some non-Catholics, such as Christopher Haigh, have taken the Catholic “side”). But the use of English/British history to mount a critique of Catholicism—the staple of anti-Catholic feeling in the nineteenth and early twentieth century—is now rare. (A scandalous—but instructive—exception is the burning of the Pope in effigy at Lewes, the country town of Sussex, on “Guy Fawkes Day,” which commemorates the discovery of a Recusant plot to detonate gunpowder as James VI opened Parliament.) Where the educated public is concerned, the view that the English Reformation entailed major losses, not only artistic but also spiritual and in the tenor of the life of local communities, is rather widely diffused.19 The most important debate in public narrative history concerns the main lines of the development of the English/British nation state. One school of writers insists that, owing to, in particular, the Celtic cultures on the geographic periphery, the British Isles have never been homogeneous, and that their best future lies in a multi-culturalism which would affirm not only the national and regional loyalties of (Northern) Irishmen, Scots, Welsh, Cornishmen, and others, but extend the same parity to ethnic minorities, notably those born of economically fuelled immigration from the “New Commonwealth,” that is, countries such as India 17 J. Arnold, History: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: 2000), 13. 18 For anxieties about the teaching of history in secondary schools—concerns shared by successive British governments of differing political complexion—see R. Phillips,“Contesting the Past, Constructing the Future. History, Identity and Politics in Schools,” in History and Heritage: Consuming the Past in Contemporary Culture, ed. J. Arnold, K. Davies, and S. Ditchfield (Shaftesbury: 1998), 223–35. 19 Notable here is E. Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars:Traditional Religion in England, 1400–1580 (New Haven and London: 1992). N&V_Sum09.qxp 576 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 576 Aidan Nichols, O.P. and Pakistan, which lack a sizeable British-ethnic component, and, more recently from Eastern Europe and elsewhere.20 For other writers, however, these factors are being over-stated. The bulk of the population of the island recognizes itself as English, and the chief thread which unifies its historical story is the development of the English nation-state which came to include Wales (by conquest) and Scotland (by dynastic, and subsequently parliamentary, union). Catholicism, in the opinion of the present writer, has, potentially, a unique role to play in this debate—and not just the debate but the construction of culture in a pertinent sense, because the Catholic Church combines a continuous presence in England since the formation of the first Anglo-Saxon kingdoms with a commitment to the Celtic (or Anglo-Celtic) peoples of the British Isles (above all Ireland) as well as commanding loyalties among more recent immigrant populations (notably Italian, Polish, South and East Asian). It can present itself both as quintessentially English and as generously interethnic at the same time. Conclusion The present-day intellectual scene in England carries mixed messages for the Catholic Church. It seems true to say that, thanks to the modest revival of metaphysics and the continued growth of virtue ethics, the future of philosophy is more encouraging for the Church’s mission than is that of theology, which suffers from a lack of ecclesial rooting. (From this point of view, such influence as Liberation theology enjoyed in the United Kingdom of the 1980s was beneficial to the degree that it drew attention to the proper location of theology in the Church—albeit, for Liberation theology, a “popular” Church rather than the mysteric organism of the integral hierarchical body.) The recovery of ecclesiality is the greatest need of theology in England—and this alone can render theology a help, not a hindrance, to the Church’s mission. Historiographically, few writers would now openly embrace the once influential “Whig philosophy of history,” for which ever-widening constitutional liberties, secured not least by the sixteenth-century triumph of reformed religion, was the manifest destiny of Englishmen (and, to a lesser extent, women). Doubts about the unidirectional nature of the relevant historical trends, estimates of the rights and wrongs of the constitutional crises of (especially) the seventeenth century, and awareness of the more oligarchic character of English society after a Reformation 20 N. Douglas, The Isles: A History (London: 1999). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 577 The Intellectual Scene in England 577 settlement, which by the transfer of Church land and patronage massively strengthened the territorial nobility, are among the factors concerned. Attitudes to the historical past retain a relevance to the “image,” and to some extent the fortunes, of the Catholic Church. For many English people, Catholicism remains a “foreign” religion, a prejudice aided by the High Anglican insistence that “Roman Catholicism” is a consequence of the Counter-Reformation, while pre-Reformation history and sanctity belongs in principle to the Ecclesia anglicana.21 The Catholic Church in England needs to counter this impression by deliberate and reiterated reference to its native past. Among such opinion-formers as the columnists of the daily newspapers, however, objections to Catholicism are now based less on the historically rooted Protestant “black legend” (corrupt medieval Church, internal and external conspiracies to reverse the gains of the Reformation settlement), and more on novel secular-Liberal criteria, for which Catholicism is (with Islam) a uniquely oppressive religion, in matters of—above all— sexual ethics.This is, of course, the same sexual ethics which, certainly up to the inter-war years, and in most respects until the 1960s, were common to both Protestants and Catholics in England. Recent research would seem to indicate that it was the moral revolution of the 1960s which most undermined the mental habits of the Christian population—their inhabiting an “evangelical narrative,” so that subsequently for many (though, thankfully, not all) “the search for personal faith is now in the ‘New Age’ of minor cults, personal development and consumer choice.”22 This indicates the anomie into which a self-confident Catholicism, sure of its doctrine and its health-giving effect for human beings, individually and N&V in society, could efficaciously move. 21 D. MacCulloch,“The Myth of the English Reformation,” Journal of British Studies 30 (1991): 1–19. 22 C. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation 1800 –2000 (London: Routledge, 2002), 196. Brown remarks on the near-simultaneity of the emergence of a youth culture centered on pop music (the Beatles: 1962 onwards), legalization of abortion and homosexuality (1967), the ending of censorship in the theatre (1968), the recreational use of drugs, the fashion revolution, and student rebellion (1968 onwards), easier divorce (1969). He emphasizes the crucial role played by the alienation from Christian discourse of women, who in the modern period had been, for him, its chief carriers. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 579 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 579–602 579 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination and the Authority of the First Truth M ATTHEW C UDDEBACK Providence College Rhode Island TO COUNTER widespread relativism and skepticism John Paul II and Benedict XVI have endeavored to set forth the ontological grounds of truth and our knowledge of it. A central feature of this endeavor has been the re-presentation of the traditional philosophical teaching that man participates from God a primordial, natural knowledge of truth— truth that has authority from God. Both popes speak of the “authority of truth,” and of the need for “obedience to the truth.”1 And for both popes an indispensable touchstone and resource in their common effort has been the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on divine illumination. In this essay I shall argue that for Thomas Aquinas divine illumination, God’s governance of our natural knowledge of truth, brings to bear on our truthknowing the authority of God as First Truth. The effect of divine illumination is that every one of our truth-judgments is a participated act of authority—a participation in the authority of the First Truth. 1 In his planned lecture at La Sapienza University in Rome Benedict XVI says, “Certainly, La Sapienza was once the Pope’s university, but today it is a secular university with that autonomy that, on the basis of its foundational concept itself, has always been part of the university, which must be bound exclusively to the authority of the truth.” Benedict XVI, lecture at the University of Rome “La Sapienza,” 17 January 2008. Cf. his remarks at Regensburg in September, 2006: “The scientific ethos, moreover, is—as you yourself mentioned, Magnificent Rector—the will to be obedient to the truth, and, as such, it embodies an attitude which belongs to the essential decisions of the Christian spirit.” Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason, and the University: Memories and Reflections,” Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg, 12 September 2006. John Paul II speaks of the authority of truth and of obedience to truth in Veritatis Splendor, §1. N&V_Sum09.qxp 580 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 580 Matthew Cuddeback My study will serve two purposes. First, it will fill a gap.The ontological dimension of Aquinas’s teaching on illumination—a dimension so central to his philosophical and theological anthropology—has yet to be examined and appreciated as it should.2 Indeed, at times Aquinas’s language of illumination has been dismissed as mere deference to Augustine.3 And when Aquinas’s illumination teaching is addressed, it is usually treated as part of a doctrine of intellectual abstraction and judgment.4 My focus will not be this “epistemological” dimension of illumination, however important, but the ontology that grounds it. The second purpose of my study is to support the work of John Paul II and Benedict XVI to recover the foundations and authority of truth. In section I, I shall review the two popes’ teaching. In section II, I shall set forth the outline for my study of Aquinas. I Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger’s well-publicized remark the day before his election as pope, that “we are building a dictatorship of relativism,”5 is but one manifestation of his long-standing concern with what he has called the “crisis of truth.”6 “The really critical issue of the modern age,” he says in his 1991 essay “Conscience and Truth,” is that “the concept of truth has been virtually given up, and replaced with the concept of progress.”7 One way to recover truth, he argues, is through a proper account of human 2 Though a fine introduction to Aquinas’s ontology of illumination remains Martin Grabmann, Der göttliche Grund menschlicher Wahrheitserkenntnis nach Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin. Forschungen über die augustinische Illuminationstheorie und ihre Beurteilung durch den Hl. Thomas von Aquin (Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1924). 3 An example is Joseph Owens,“Faith, Ideas, Illumination, and Experience,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), the section “Aquinas and the Rejection of Illumination,” 452–4. 4 See for example Wayne J. Hankey,“Participatio divini luminis, Aquinas’ doctrine of the Agent Intellect: Our Capacity for Contemplation,” Dionysius 22 (2004): 149–78; and Huston Smit, “Aquinas’s Abstractionism,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 (2001): 85–118. 5 “We are building a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive.” Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Mass Pro eligendo romano pontifice, 18 April 2005. 6 Meeting with Catholic Educators, Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI, Conference Hall of the Catholic University of America in Washington, DC, 17 April 2008, in Pope Benedict XVI, Pope Benedict in America (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 73. 7 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger,“Conscience and Truth,” in On Conscience (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 26. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 581 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 581 conscience: prior to the act of conscience, every person possesses a “primordial knowledge” of truth that is “implanted,” “stamped,” and “instilled” by the Creator—a knowledge that medievals call “synderesis” and that Ratzinger calls “anamnesis.” “Conscience signifies the perceptible and demanding presence of the voice of truth in the subject himself. It is the overcoming of mere subjectivity in the encounter of the interiority of man with the truth from God.”8 For Ratzinger, the dictatorship of relativism usurps the authority of the truth God speaks within us. In a 1999 essay on Fides et Ratio—an encyclical whose goal, he says, is “to rehabilitate the question of truth in a world characterized by relativism”9—Ratzinger argues that “we have been handed over to the rule of positivism,”10 to “the dictatorship of what is accidental.”11 But “God’s Torah,” spoken within each man’s conscience, permits us to “transcend what is merely subjective,”12 to break into “the wide open spaces” of a truth that is common and binding.13 In Veritatis Splendor and Fides et Ratio, yoked by their focus on truth,14 John Paul II argues for the authority of divine truth over the human mind. At the start of Veritatis Splendor he says man is called to “obedience to the truth.”15 A central argument in the document is that as reason is not sovereign in the line of being, so it is not sovereign in the line of truth: “Reason draws its own truth and authority from the eternal law, which is none other than divine wisdom itself.”16 The truth of the “knowledge of good and evil” belongs first to God.“Man does not originally possess such ‘knowledge’ as something properly his own, but only participates in it by the light of natural reason and divine revelation, which manifest to him the requirements and the promptings of eternal wisdom.”17 Man is shown those requirements of eternal wisdom by the 8 Ratzinger, “Conscience and Truth,” 24. 9 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 184. 10 Ibid., 190. 11 Ibid., 191. 12 Ibid., 207. 13 Ibid., 199, 201. Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1777: Moral conscience “bears witness to the authority of truth in reference to the supreme Good to which the human person is drawn, and it welcomes the commandments.” See also Donum Veritatis, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian, 24 May 1990, esp. para. 14. 14 See Fides et Ratio 6 at the passage where the pope refers to Veritatis Splendor. 15 Veritatis Splendor, §1. 16 Ibid., §40; cf. §36. 17 Ibid., §41. In the same section:“Law must therefore be considered an expression of divine wisdom: by submitting to the law, freedom submits to the truth of creation.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 582 9:43 AM Page 582 Matthew Cuddeback natural law, which the pope defines, with Thomas Aquinas, as the impressio of the divine light in us.18 In Fides et Ratio John Paul looks to establish the authority of truth for philosophy and theology. The first three chapters contain an extended argument that human reason aspires naturally toward belief, that is, toward adherence to authority.19 Later the pope exhorts philosophers and theologians to “let themselves be guided by the authority of truth alone.”20 Near the end of the encyclical he says that “the Truth, which is Christ, imposes itself as a universal authority that governs, stimulates, and gives increase to theology and philosophy alike.”21 As I mentioned, the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on divine illumination is a touchstone and resource for the two popes in these treatments of our participated knowledge of truth, and the authority of truth.We see this in Veritatis Splendor, §§42–45,22 in Fides et Ratio, §§43–44,23 and in Ratzinger’s account of anamnesis and synderesis.24 18 Ibid., §42. 19 By chapter 3 the pope argues that since belief is indispensable in the search for truth, and since belief is entrustment to someone who “can guarantee the authenticity and certainty of the truth itself ” (FR, §33), the search for universal truth is at least implicitly the search for a person to whom one may entrust himself. I shall take this up in section V below. 20 Fides et Ratio, §79. 21 Ibid., §92. I have modified the Vatican translation in view of the French and Latin versions, replacing “support” with “govern” (the French gouverne and the Latin gubernat ). The Italian regge, Spanish dirige, and German leiten also uphold the change to “govern.” 22 The opening lines of Veritatis Splendor appeal to divine illumination: the Creator’s light of truth “enlightens man’s intelligence and shapes his freedom, leading him to know and love the Lord. Hence the psalmist prays:‘Let the light of your face shine on us, O Lord (Ps. 4:6)’.” Psalm 4:5–6 is one of the most important texts of the Western illumination tradition. In Veritatis Splendor, §42 the pope appropriates Aquinas’s interpretation of it at Summa theologiae I–II, q. 91, a. 2, where Aquinas says that the “light” in the Psalm is the imprint (impressio) of the divine light in us by which God promulgates the natural law. In Veritatis Splendor, §§43–45, as the pope develops Aquinas’s definition of law into a teaching on participated theonomy, he remains very sensitive to Aquinas’s language concerning the way the authority of the divine light is exercised: the light of the natural law governs from within (citing ST I–II, q. 90, a. 4 ad 1); it guides gently, in accordance with our natural inclinations; it is our share in divine providence, making us provident for ourselves and for others (citing ST I–II, q. 91, a. 2).The new law of the Spirit, still more interior, inclines the affections and teaches about things to be done (citing Aquinas, In Epistulam ad Romanos, c. 8, lect. 1); it is a law for our fulfillment, rejoicing the heart. These principles drawn from Aquinas ground the conclusion that “God’s plan poses no threat to man’s genuine freedom; on the contrary, the acceptance of God’s plan is the only way to affirm that freedom” (VS, §45). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 583 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 583 II Over the course of the prima pars of the Summa theologiae Aquinas carefully appropriates the illumination tradition he inherits, and works out a teaching on the illumination of the human intellect in its own line, that is, in the line of truth.25 The distinguishing feature of Aquinas’s teaching is the explanation of illumination in terms of an intelligible sequence of mutually implying lines of causality. God illuminates the intellect as its efficient cause, exemplar cause, and governing cause, where “to govern” means to move and direct the intellect to its end, the knowledge of truth.26 Indeed, this sequence of causes, mapped out in ST I, q. 44,27 explains God’s action in any creature and orders the flow of topics in the prima pars from question 45 on. It also orders the presentation of salient texts on divine illumination: in q. 79, a. 4, God is efficient cause of the light of the agent intellect; in q. 84, a. 5, God is exemplar cause of that light; in q. 105, a. 3, and q. 106, a. 1, God is governing cause of the intellect. 23 In Fides et ratio the appeal to Aquinas’s teaching on illumination is less prominent than in Veritatis Splendor but still significant. In Fides et Ratio, §79 the pope links divine illumination and the authority of truth: “By virtue of the splendor emanating from subsistent Being itself, revealed truth offers the fullness of light and will therefore illumine the path of philosophical enquiry. . . . It is to be hoped therefore that theologians and philosophers will let themselves be guided by the authority of truth alone so that there will emerge a philosophy consonant with the word of God.”The only mention of divine illumination prior to this passage is in Fides et Ratio, §§43–44, in the treatment of Aquinas’s teaching on faith and reason. The pope settles quickly into Aquinas’s language of illumination: “the light of reason and the light of faith come from God”;“illumined by faith, reason is set free from the fragility and limitations deriving from the disobedience of sin” (as in Veritatis Splendor, §1 he links divine light, obedience to God, and freedom). Shortly thereafter he says Aquinas was “profoundly convinced that ‘whatever its source, truth is of the Holy Spirit’ ” (FR, §44), citing ST I–II, q. 109, a. 1, ad 1, where the full sentence reads,“Omne verum a quocumque dicatur est a Spiritu Sancto sicut ab infundente naturale lumen et movente ad intelligendum et loquendum veritatem.” In section V below I discuss further John Paul’s use of Aquinas in Fides et Ratio. 24 See Ratzinger, “Conscience and Truth,” 37; 38, n. 19. 25 See my “Light and Form in St. Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of the Knower” (Ph.D. dissertation,The Catholic University of America, 1998), introduction, and chaps. 3 and 4. 26 In ST I, q. 67, a. 1 Aquinas argues that the language of light and illumination can be applied properly to immaterial things. 27 “Cum Deus sit causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis omnium rerum, et materia prima sit ab ipso, sequitur quod principium omnium rerum sit unum secundum rem. Nihil tamen prohibet in eo considerari multa secundum rationem, quorum quaedam prius cadunt in intellectu nostro quam alia.” ST I, q. 44, a. 4, ad 4. N&V_Sum09.qxp 584 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 584 Matthew Cuddeback Aquinas calls each of these causal lines “illumination.” But because God’s governing illuminative causality flows from and so implies his efficient and exemplar illuminative causality, God’s governing illumination, his moving and directing of the intellect to “the truth as known,”28 is illumination in the fullest sense. This illumination is described in the “treatise on governance” at the end of the prima pars, particularly questions 105–107. My study of Aquinas on illumination will focus on selections from these three questions. The study will proceed as follows. Since God’s illuminative governance of the created intellect is an instance of His governance of all creatures, in section III I shall review some basic principles of divine governance. I shall then examine Aquinas’s application of those principles to God’s governance of the created intellect in ST I, q. 105, a. 3, where he argues that God is the intellect’s first and immediate mover. In section IV I shall examine the “execution” of God’s illuminative causality through secondary, mediate illuminators, treated in ST I, q. 106, a. 1, on whether one angel illuminates another.29 A careful account of this article’s brief but pregnant third reply will form the core of my study. Aquinas does three things in that reply: he lays out the intelligible sequence of causes according to which divine illumination is executed; he explains the way God’s immediate and a creature’s mediate illumination work together; and most important, he describes the intellect’s end in the line of truth as “adherence to the First Truth.” My account of this reply will lead me to conclude, with the help of q. 107, a. 2, that divine illumination brings to bear on our truth-knowing the authoritative rule (regula ) of the First Truth. Indeed,“First Truth” names a divine ratio gubernationis, an intelligible aspect of the eternal law, that authoritatively moves and directs the intellect to knowledge of truth. Hence, every one of our truth-judgments is a participation in the authority of the First Truth.And Aquinas’s teaching on the authority of the natural law should be understood as the extension of his teaching in ST I, qq. 105–107 on the First Truth’s illuminative authority with respect to the speculative intellect. 28 “Perfectio autem intellectus est verum ut cognitum.” ST I, q. 16, a. 2. “[P]erfec- tio autem est consummatio in finem intellectus, qui est veritas cognita.” ST I, q. 106, a. 2, ad 1. 29 In his treatments of angelic illumination Aquinas sets forth an ontology of illumination that he readily applies, often within the treatment itself, to human knowledge. See James Collins, The Thomistic Philosophy of the Angels (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1947), 139, 163. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 585 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 585 III In the first question of the treatise on governance, ST I, q. 103, Aquinas establishes that there is a natural flow from God’s creation of things to his governance of things, from his production of things (producere ) to His drawing them to perfection (perducere ).30 Divine governance is a motion from God, within the creature,31 by which he leads and directs his creature to its proper perfection.32 The first and founding effect of God’s governance is his conservation of the creature in being. For Aquinas, God is conserving cause because of the way he causes the creature’s form: he does not cause merely the becoming of the form; he causes the form as such a form. And because the form is formal cause of the esse of a creature—esse per se consequitur formam creaturae 33—the cause responsible for the form as such is the cause of the esse that flows from that form.34 Hence, divine conservation should be conceived as the continuous bestowal of esse through form, or as the continuous bestowal of the form from which esse flows.35 Because form is the principle whereby a creature appropriates esse and makes it its own, divine conservation is the ground and pattern of God’s governance from within that which is each creature’s own.36 That is, as 30 “Unde ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem perducat. Quod est gubernare.” ST I, q. 103, a. 1. “Secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum et causam earum quia eiusdem est rem producere et ei perfectionem dare quod ad gubernantem pertinet.” ST I, q. 103, a. 5. Cf. ST I, q. 22, a. 3. 31 “Gubernatio est quaedam mutatio gubernatorum a gubernante.” ST I, q. 103, a. 5, ad 2. 32 ST I, q. 103, a. 3. 33 “Esse per se consequitur formam creaturae supposito tamen influxu Dei.” ST I, q. 104, a. 1, ad 1. On form as formal cause of esse see Lawrence Dewan, O.P.,“St. Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause,” in his Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 167–74. 34 ST I, q. 104, a. 1. Cf Summa contra Gentiles III, chap. 65 at “Nullum particulare agens univocum. . .” Cf. also ST I, q. 4, a. 3. 35 See Dewan,“St.Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause,” 169–70: “What one is saying, in attributing a priority to form over existence is that the influence of the efficient cause on the caused thing will be the existence of the caused thing only inasmuch as the efficient cause also provides form for the caused thing, whereby that thing appropriates the influence. This is because ‘existence’ names a thing’s own act.” See also Aquinas, Treatise on Separate Substances, ed. Lescoe (1959), chap. 8.43–44, for example,“res participat esse proprium sibi per suam formam.” 36 “God acts in each thing according to what is its own.” “Deus operatur in unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem.” ST I, q. 83, a. 1 ad 3. Cf. ST I, q. 103, a. 5, ad 2; ST I, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3. N&V_Sum09.qxp 586 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 586 Matthew Cuddeback God bestows esse through form, he bestows any “subsequent” governing motion through and in accordance with the creature’s form, so that the creature reaches the end to which God moves it by its own striving.37 In q. 105, a. 5 Aquinas works out this deep bond between conserving causality and God’s governance from within. The third objector argues that God gives creatures their powers to act but does not continue to act within creatures.Aquinas counters:“God not only gives things [their] forms, but also conserves them in being, applies them to action, and is the end of all actions.”38 God moves the creature to every particular action from within and in accordance with the form he continuously conserves.39 This is the way God governs the intellect. In q. 105, a. 3 Aquinas addresses God’s governance of the intellect in its own line,40 and fits divine illumination squarely within the setting of divine governance.41 In doing so, he sets his teaching on illumination apart from any other in the tradition. Aquinas asks in q. 105, a. 3 whether God moves the created intellect immediately. Two preliminary remarks help us approach this important article. First, the word “immediately” alerts us to a distinction between God’s immediate moving of the intellect, treated here, and his mediate moving of the created intellect through angels and men, treated from questions 106–117.42 As we shall see, God executes his full illuminative motion 37 “Unde omnia quae aguntur vel naturaliter vel voluntarie, quasi propria sponte perveniunt in id ad quod divinitus ordinantur. Et ideo dicitur Deus ‘omnia disponere suaviter.’ ” ST I, q. 103, a. 8. 38 “Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium actionum, ut dictum est.” ST I, q. 105, a. 5, ad 3. 39 “Unde non solum est causa actionum inquantum dat formam quae est principium actionis, sicut generans dicitur esse causa motus gravium et levium; sed etiam sicut conservans formas et virtutes rerum. . . . Et quia forma rei est intra rem, et tanto magis quanto consideratur ut prior et universalior; et ipse Deus est proprie causa ipsius esse universalis in rebus omnibus quod inter omnia est magis intimum rebus sequitur quod Deus in omnibus intime operetur.” ST I, q. 105, a. 5. See also the citation of Job 10:11 at the end of the body of the article: “Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh.Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.” On God’s presence to creation see ST I, q. 104, a. 1, at the end of the corpus; q. 104, a. 1, ad 4; q. 104, a. 2, ad 3. 40 The next article treats God’s moving of the will. Distinct treatments of the moving of the intellect and the will are also found in ST I, q. 106, aa. 1 and 2. Cf. ST I, q. 103, a. 5, ad 3; ST I–II, q. 19, a. 4. 41 Martin Grabmann aptly describes q. 105, a. 3 as “one of those sweeping articles that reveals the perspective of [Aquinas’s] philosophical-theological system.” Grabmann, Der göttliche Grund, 63. 42 See ST I, q. 105, prologue: “Deinde considerandum est de secundo effectu gubernationis divinae qui est mutatio creaturarum a Deo. Et primo de mutatione N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 587 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 587 with the cooperation of mediate illuminators. Second, when Aquinas says in the sed contra that because God moves man’s intellect, God is man’s teacher,43 he begins a motif that runs through questions 106–117, and that will also run through this paper: to teach is to illuminate, and to illuminate is to move a created intellect to know the truth. In the body of q. 105, a. 3 Aquinas names two causal lines along which, in general, the created intellect is moved to know: “that is said to move the intellect which either gives to the intellectual knower the power to understand, or which impresses the likeness of the thing understood.”44 In each of these lines God is first cause and mover. He is first immaterial being, and so he is first cause of the intellectual power. He is the first being (primum ens ), in whom preexist the exemplars of all things knowable, so he is first cause of the intelligible species by which any created intellect knows, and first cause of the creatures that bear the likeness of his ideas.45 Aquinas concludes: Therefore, God so moves the intellect inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, natural or superadded, and impresses intelligible species on it, and holds and conserves both [power and species] in existence [esse].46 This text brings home the central and distinguishing feature of Aquinas’s teaching on illumination: God moves the intellect, as God moves every creature, from within and through its nature—a nature he bestows and continuously conserves. God’s illumination of the intellect in its natural knowledge is not intermittent.47 It is not, as for Bonaventure, an influence creaturarum [q. 105], secundo de mutatione unius creaturae ab alia [qq. 106ff]” (my emphasis). 43 “Sed contra, docens movet intellectum addiscentis. Sed Deus docet hominem scientiam, sicut dicitur in Psalmo. Ergo Deus movet intellectum hominis.” ST I, q. 105, a. 3, sed contra. 44 “Dicitur ergo aliquid movere intellectum sive det intelligenti virtutem ad intelligendum sive imprimat ei similitudinem rei intellectae.” ST I, q. 105, a. 3. 45 Cf. ST I, q. 12, a. 2. 46 “Sic igitur Deus movet intellectum inquantum dat ei virtutem ad intelligendum vel naturalem vel superadditam et inquantum imprimit ei species intelligibiles et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse.” ST I, q. 105, a. 3.When Aquinas says God “impresses intelligible species” on the created intellect, including the human intellect, he does not override his teaching that the human intellect acquires its intelligible species from sensible material things (for example, ST I, q. 84, a. 6). He is making the point that God is first cause of those intelligible species. 47 This is something Aquinas found in other teachings on illumination. See for example Super Boetium De Trinitate, prooemium, q. 1, a. 1 in its entirety, especially ad 6. N&V_Sum09.qxp 588 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 588 Matthew Cuddeback distinct from God’s concurrent causality,48 but is altogether continuous with it. Aquinas concludes that God is first cause in the line of intellect, but does not say that God is the intellect’s immediate mover.Why this omission? One reason is that Aquinas has already established in ST I, q. 90 that the rational soul is created immediately by God.49 So when he says in the current setting that God moves the intellectual power in bestowing (that is, creating) it, he can count on our knowing that this bestowing-asmoving is also immediate. But the more intriguing reason for the omission is that he leaves furtherance of the subject—whether God moves the created intellect immediately—until q. 106, a. 1, on whether one angel illuminates another. For Aquinas, it befits God’s wisdom and goodness to execute His governance through an order of many second causes to which he communicates the dignity of being causes.50 Aquinas situates God’s immediate moving of the intellect in the context of God’s mediate moving of the intellect, through secondary illuminators. IV From question 106 to the end of the prima pars Aquinas treats of divine governance through second causes.51 The first and most eminent instance of mediate divine governance is mediate divine illumination, treated in q. 106, a. 1.This article offers Aquinas’s most formal account of illumination in the Summa theologiae. It clearly extends the discussion in q. 105, a. 3, just treated, for angelic illumination tracks the two causal lines of God’s moving of the intellect. “To illuminate,” says Aquinas,“is nothing other than to communicate to another the manifestation of the truth known,”52 along two causal lines: the line of the intellectual power, and the line of the intelligible likeness. A 48 See Bonaventure, Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi, q. 4. Étienne Gilson notes difficulties with Bonaventure’s position in “Sur quelques difficultés de l’illumination augustinienne,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 36 (1934): 321–31. See also his “Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustine,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age 1 (1926–27): 5–127. 49 ST I, q. 90, a. 3. 50 “[A]d providentiam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis rerum provisarum in finem et executio huius ordini, quae gubernatio dicitur. . . . Quantum autem ad [gubernationem], sunt aliqua media divinae providentiae. Quia [Deus] inferiora gubernat per superiora non propter defectum suae virtutis, sed propter abundantiam suae bonitatis, ut dignitatem causalitatis etiam creaturis communicet.” ST I, q. 22, a. 3. See also ST I, q. 105, a. 6; Treatise on Separate Substances, chap. 13.79. 51 See note 42 above. 52 “Unde illuminare nihil aliud est quam manifestationem cognitae veritatis alteri tradere.” ST I, q. 106, a. 1. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 589 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 589 higher angel “strengthens” the intellectual power of a lower angel by “turning toward” it. And since a higher angel knows a truth more universally than does a lower angel, the higher angel “in a certain sense distinguishes” or “divides”53 the more universal truth and “proposes” it to a lower angel according to a more particular, less universal likeness. Aquinas applies this ontology of illumination (of truth-manifestation, of teaching) to every instance of illumination between creatures: one angel illuminates another, an angel illuminates a man (q. 111, a. 1), and one man teaches another (q. 117, a. 1). In each case illuminative causality strengthens the intellectual power of the one taught, and proposes a less universal intelligible likeness. The reason that creaturely illumination tracks the lines of God’s moving of the intellect is that one creature’s illumination of another is the participated execution of God’s moving of the intellect to truth. Aquinas returns to the subject of God’s immediate moving of the intellect in the last reply of q. 106, a. 1.An objector argues that one angel cannot illuminate another because “the rational mind is formed by God alone, with no creature in between,” as Augustine says.54 In his reply Aquinas addresses the cooperation of creaturely illuminators with the divine illuminator: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, whether as image by exemplar, for it is made to no other image but to God’s, or as the subject by the ultimate completing form, for the created mind is always considered unformed, unless it adhere to the First Truth. Other illu- minations, from man or angel, are as it were dispositions to the ultimate form.55 This reply confirms the teaching of q. 105, a. 3 that God moves the intellect immediately. But it goes further. With remarkable pith it expresses Aquinas’s entire teaching on illumination. First, it sets forth the intelligible sequence of causes: God is immediate efficient, exemplar, and moving and directing cause of the intellect and its truth-knowing. Second, God’s 53 “Et hoc quidem in angelis fit, secundum quod superior angelus veritatem universalem conceptam dividit secundum capacitatem inferioris angeli. . . .” ST I, q. 111, a. 1. 54 “Praeterea, lumen est forma quaedam mentis. Sed mens rationalis a solo Deo formatur nulla interposita creatura, ut Augustinus dicit. . . .” ST I, q. 106, a. 1, obj. 3. 55 “Rationalis mens formatur immediate a Deo vel sicut imago ab exemplari, quia non est facta ad alterius imaginem quam Dei, vel sicut subiectum ab ultima forma completiva, quia semper mens creata reputatur informis nisi ipsi primae veritati inhaereat.Aliae vero illuminationes, quae sunt ab homine vel angelo, sunt quasi dispositiones ad ultimam formam.” ST I, q. 106, a. 1, ad 3. N&V_Sum09.qxp 590 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 590 Matthew Cuddeback immediate moving is executed within an economy of “other,”“dispositive” illuminators.Third, if “adherence to the First Truth” is the intellect’s “ultimate completing form,” then fully to know the truth is to adhere to the First Truth. An Intelligible Sequence of Causes The contemporary56 Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis, article 10 makes an argument that threshes out the sequence of causes in the above reply. Man’s intellectual light can come only from the human soul’s creator. But God, not an angel, is the human soul’s creator, for “God breathed into man’s face the breath of life” (Genesis 2:7). Hence, the light of the intellect is caused “immediately by God” (efficient causality).57 And because man is made to God’s image and not to an angel’s,“the light of the agent intellect is impressed in us immediately by God” (exemplar causality). According to this light “we discern the true from the false, the good from evil,” for “the light of your face O Lord is signed upon us,” as Psalm 4 says (governing causality).58 The intelligible sequence of causes in De spiritualibus creaturis, article 10 shows the exitus-reditus pattern of the rational nature’s “immediate ordering to God”59: from God’s immediate creation of the intellect, to his stamping of it with his image, to an illuminative “impress” or “signing” that directs the intellect to discern the true and the good. Nourished by biblical passages that put God and man “face to face” (Genesis 2:7 and Psalm 4:6–7), this text develops Augustine’s teaching on the intimacy of the divine light to the mind, and of God to man.60 56 Jean-Pierre Torrell dates the composition of the Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis from 1267–1268; Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1993), 490. 57 “[C]um istud lumen intellectuale ad naturam animae pertineat, ab illo solo est a quo animae natura creatur. Solus autem Deus est creator animae, non autem aliqua substantia separata, quam angelum dicimus; unde significanter dicitur Gen. quod ipse Deus in faciem hominis spiravit spiraculum vitae. Unde relinquitur quod lumen intellectus agentis non causatur in anima ad aliqua alia substantia separata, sed immediate a Deo.” Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 10. 58 “Unde dicimus, quod lumen intellectus agentis de quo Aristoteles loquitur est nobis immediate impressum a Deo, et secundum hoc discernimus verum a falso et bonum a malo. Et de hoc dicitur in Psal.: multi dicunt: quis ostendet nobis bona? Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui domine, scilicet per quod nobis bona ostenduntur.” Ibid. 59 “Sola autem natura rationalis creata habet immediatum ordinem ad Deum.” ST II–II, q. 2, a. 3. 60 Cf. Anton C. Pegis, At The Origins Of The Thomistic Notion of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 58–59: “Whatever corrections St. Thomas introduced into N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 591 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 591 Immediate and Mediate Illumination If God immediately creates and illuminates the intellect,“other illuminations” are secondary and “dispositive.” In two treatments of creaturely illumination after ST I, q. 106, a. 1—angel illuminates man, one man teaches another—Aquinas takes care to show that a creature’s dispositive illumination presupposes and depends on God’s immediate illumination.61 For in any knowledge of truth, from one’s own discovery or from being taught, the proximate and “principal cause of knowledge” is the interior light of the agent intellect. But God alone bestows this power,62 and He alone moves it from within.63 In all learning, all truth-knowing, God is first, interior illuminator, for “ ‘the light of His face is signed upon us’ [Ps. 4:7], by which [signing] we are shown all things.” Any other teacher is an “external minister.”64 How can divine illumination be at once immediate, and executed through creatures? The assertion that adherence to the First Truth is the “ultimate completing form” gives the clue. In an ordered series of agents and their ends, the achievement of the final end belongs to the first agent. Created esse, for example, is the proper effect and end of the first and universal agent, God, a “final end” of which God must be proper cause. But though esse is first in God’s intention, it is the last effect achieved, and along Augustinianism, his purpose was to give a proper metaphysical grounding to the teaching of Augustine.” Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 10, taken as a whole, bears this out. 61 See ST I, q. 111, a. 1, ad 2: A man’s natural reason “which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel.” The implication is that God’s illuminative motion, like the act of creation from which it flows, is immediate, whereas an angel’s “strengthening” illumination of the human intellect is dispositive. ST I, q. 111 as a whole indicates how common is angelic illumination of our natural knowledge. 62 ST I, q. 79, a. 4. 63 “Deus illuminat immutando intellectum et voluntatem.” ST I, q. 106, a. 2, ad 1. Aquinas’s arguments that God alone moves the intellect immediately and from within are akin to, and located next to, his arguments that God alone moves the will immediately and from within. See ST I, q. 105, aa. 3 and 4; q. 106, a. 1, ad 3 and a. 2, ad 1. 64 “Homo docens solummodo exterius ministerium adhibet sicut medicus sanans: sed sicut natura interior est principalis causa sanationis ita et interius lumen intellectus est principalis causa scientiae. Utrumque autem horum est a Deo. Et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur [Ps. 102:3] Qui sanat omnes infirmitates tuas ita de eo dicitur [Ps. 93:10] Qui docet hominem scientiam inquantum lumen vultus eius super nos signatur [Ps. 4:7] per quod nobis omnia ostenduntur.” ST I, q. 117, a. 1, ad 1. Cf. ST II–II, q. 173, a. 2:“Homo enim suo discipulo repraesentat aliquas res per signa locutionum, non autem potest interius illuminare sicut facit Deus.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 592 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 592 Matthew Cuddeback the way esse becomes the “effect of other causes.”65 Still, as the “completion” of every form, created esse remains the proper effect of the universal cause, and “no cause gives esse unless it participates the divine action.”66 Likewise, adherence to the First Truth is a completion that is the proper effect of God as first cause of truth-first in his intention, last in achievement. Creaturely illuminators, who teach only so far as they partake of divine illuminative causality, are “other illuminators,” “other causes” of the knowledge of truth. Creaturely illuminators truly teach, truly move another intellect to truth. But the final effect, knowledge of truth as adherence to the First Truth, is the proper and immediate effect of an illuminative motion from God.67 Adherence to the First Truth When Aquinas says that “the created mind is always considered unformed, unless it adhere to the First Truth,” he presents “adherence to the First Truth” as a completion, a “being all there,” in the line of truth-knowing. Hence, I take “adherence to the First Truth” to be a constituent of the act of “approval” that consummates any truth-judgment.68 It is the full real65 “Esse ergo quod est proprius effectus et finis in operatione primi agentis oportet quod teneat locum ultimi finis. Finis autem licet sit primum in intentione, est tamen postremum in operatione, et est effectus aliarum causarum. Et ideo ipsum esse creatum, quod est proprius effectus respondens primo agenti, causatur ex aliis principiis, quamvis esse primum causans sit primum principium.” De potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 10. 66 “Per hoc autem aliquid maxime fit actu quod participat per similitudinem primum et purum actum. Primus autem actus est esse subsistens per se; unde completionem unumquodque recipit per hoc quod participat esse; unde esse est complementum omnis formae, quia per hoc completur quod habet esse, et habet esse cum est actu: et sic nulla forma est nisi per esse. Et sic dico quod esse substantiale rei non est accidens, sed actualitas cuiuslibet formae existentis, sive sine materia sive cum materia. Et quia esse est complementum omnium, inde est quod proprius effectus Dei est esse, et nulla causa dat esse nisi in quantum participat operationem divinam; et sic proprie loquendo, non est accidens.” Quodlibet 12, q. 5, a. 1. I thank Lawrence Dewan for directing me to the text in this note and in the preceding note. 67 This teaching on dispositive illuminators anticipates and undergirds Aquinas’s teaching on human positive law (the similarity of disponere and ponere should be noticed). Human law truly teaches, moves, and directs men’s actions to the common good and ultimately to God, but as partaking a motion from the eternal law. See ST I–II, q. 93, a. 3; q. 95, a. 2. 68 On the act of approval see ST I, q. 79, a. 9, ad 4:“Diiudicare vero, vel mensurare, est actus intellectus applicantis principia certa ad examinationem propositorum. Et ex hoc sumitur nomen mentis. Intelligere autem est cum quadam approbatione diiudicatis inhaerere” (my emphasis).Aquinas describes the act of judgment itself N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 593 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 593 ization of what Aquinas calls, in two texts from earlier in the prima pars that we shall now take up, judgment according to, or in light of, the First Truth. This aspect of Aquinas’s teaching on truth has received too little attention. The two texts from earlier in the prima pars are, first: “The soul does not judge of things according to just any truth, but according to the First Truth inasmuch as it results in the soul as in a mirror, by reason of the first intelligibles.”69 That is, because the first intelligibles, chiefmost ens, are a created likeness (a “mirror-image”) of the First Truth, the intellect, going forth from these principles in “the way of inquiry and discovery,” then turning back to them in the “way of judgment,”70 judges all things according to the First Truth.The First Truth is active from the start through its participated likeness in us, hence it is active in the truth-judgment that completes our knowledge.71 Second: “We understand and judge everything in the light of the First Truth, insofar as the very light of our intellect, natural or gratuitous, is nothing other than an impress [impressio] of the First Truth.”72 Because the First Truth, from the start, is exemplar and mover of the human intellect that is its impress, the intellect judges all things in the light of the First Truth. An impressio, in general and in this case, is a participated likeness through and according to which God moves and directs a creature’s action.73 “Adherence to the First Truth” implies precisely the turning back to the First Truth required to judge according to it.These texts together— as the completion of knowledge: “iudicium est completivum cognitionis.” ST II–II, q. 173, a. 2. 69 “Anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de rebus omnibus sed secundum veritatem primam inquantum resultat in ea sicut in speculo secundum prima intelligibilia.” ST I, q. 16, a. 6, ad 1. 70 ST I, q. 79, aa. 8 and 12. 71 The causality the First Truth exercises through its participated likeness in us is analogous to God’s action through participated caritas in us: “Caritas operatur formaliter. Efficacia autem formae est secundum virtutem agentis qui inducit formam.” ST II–II, q. 23, a. 2, ad 3. 72 “In luce primae veritatis omnia intelligimus et iudicamus, inquantum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri, sive naturale sive gratuitum nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio veritatis primae.” ST I, q. 88, a. 3, ad 1. 73 See the use of imprimere and impressio in ST I, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3. See also ST I–II, q. 91, a. 2, and ST I–II, q. 93, a. 6: “Sicut autem homo imprimit denuntiando quodam principium actuum homini sibi subiecto, ita etiam Deus imprimit toti naturae principia propriorum actuum.”This last use of imprimere should be read in view of the first article of the same question, wherein God is described as exemplar and governor of creatures. In other words, an impressio is a participated likeness through and according to which God moves the creature to actions that are its own, and to ends that are its own. N&V_Sum09.qxp 594 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 594 Matthew Cuddeback the two just treated and ST I, q. 106, a. 1, ad 3 above—show that the First Truth illumines our truth-knowing from origin to fulfillment through the first intelligibles that are its participated likeness in us.The emphasis of the three texts is on exemplar, moving, and directing causality. Because the principia certa 74 we grasp and judge by are a participated likeness of the First Truth, every judgment in light of them (which is every truthjudgment) comports at least a material grasp of the First Truth through the medium of its likeness in us. The First Truth as Authoritative Rule In consequence Aquinas can assert in q.107, a. 2 that illumination from the First Truth is the rule (regula) of the intellect’s knowledge of truth—a notion that brings us near to the notion of the authority of the First Truth. Those things which the mind conceives can be referred to two principles: to God himself, who is the First Truth, and to the will of the one who understands, through which we actually consider something. Since truth is the light of the intellect and the rule [regula] of all truth is God himself, the manifestation of that which the mind knows is both speech and illumination inasmuch as it depends on the First Truth, such as when one man says to another: “The heavens are created by God,” or “Man is an animal.” But the manifestation of things which depend on the will of the one understanding cannot be called illumination, but speech only, such as when one says “I want to learn this,” or “I want to do this or that.”The reason is that the created will is not light, nor the rule [regula] of truth, but something that participates light.75 To understand the First Truth as regula on which the created intellect depends for its truth, we must appreciate that in this passage Aquinas is extending “divine truth as regula” from the line of creation to the line of governance (akin to the extension from producere to perducere at the start of the treatise on governance).76 But Aquinas laid the ground for this 74 ST I, q. 79, a. 9, ad 4 (see note 68 above). 75 “Ea vero quae mente concipiuntur ad duplex principium referi possunt, scilicet ad ipsum Deum, qui est prima veritas, et ad voluntatem intelligentis per quam aliquid actu consideramus. Quia vero veritas est lumen intellectus, et regula omnis veritatis est ipse Deus, manifestatio eius quod mente concipitur secundum quod dependet a prima veritate et locutio est et illuminatio, puta si unus homo dicat alii, caelum est a Deo creatum, vel homo est animal. Sed manifestatio eorum quae dependent ex voluntate intelligentis non potest dici illuminatio sed locutio tantum, puta si aliquis alteri dicat, volo hoc addiscere, volo hoc vel illud facere. Cuius ratio est quia voluntas creata non est lux nec regula veritatis, sed participans lucem.” ST I, q. 107, a. 2. 76 See note 30 above. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 595 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 595 extension earlier in the prima pars. In ST I, q. 16, divine truth is the creative art by which God rules and measures things.77 In ST I, q. 21, a. 2 Aquinas extends truth as ratio of the divine art to truth as ratio of divine governance: divine truth is God’s “wisdom, which is His law,” the “ruling law” (lex regulans ) by which he “establishes the order of things.”78 In q. 107, a. 2 above,Aquinas is presenting the First Truth precisely as the intellect’s lex regulans, the rule and measure of its truth-knowing.79 What has come into view is that the First Truth is the eternal law, the divine ratio gubernationis in the line of intellect.80 Herein lies its authority.The First Truth imposes, promulgates,81 its rule and measure through an unbroken illuminative impressio in the agent intellect and the first intelligibles that the agent intellect naturally brings about in the possible intellect from the earliest contact with sensible things.82 These first intelligibles—ens, the terms of the first principles, and the first principles—are the active principles in every 77 More precisely, divine truth is God’s knowledge of the conformity of his being to his intellect, and of the being of creatures to his art, that is, his ideas of them. See ST I, q. 16, a. 5:“Nam esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui sed etiam est ipsum suum intelligere, et suum intelligere est mensura et causa omnis alterius esse et omnis alterius intellectus, et ipse est suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit veritas sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas.” The whole of question 16 is shaped by question 15 on God’s creation through ideas. 78 “Sicut se habet artificiata ad artem ita se habent opera iusta ad legem cui concordant. Iustitia igitur Dei quae constituit ordinem in rebus conformem rationi sapientiae suae quae est lex eius convenienter veritas nominatur.” ST I, q. 21, a. 2. “Iustitia quantum ad legem regulantem est in ratione vel intellectu. . . .” ST I, q. 21, a. 2, ad 1. A similar extension from the divine art to the divine governance is made in ST I–II, q. 91, a. 1. 79 “Lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum. . . .” ST I–II, q. 90, a. 2. Cf. Lectura super Ioannem, ed. R. Cai (Marietti), chap. 18, lect. 6, no. 2365: “Et sic veritas increata et intellectus divinus est veritas non mensurata nec facta sed veritas mensurans et faciens duplicem veritatem: unam scilicet in ipsis rebus inquantum facit eas secundum quod sunt in intellectu divino, et aliam quam facit in animabus nostris, quae est veritas mensurata tantum et non mensurans” (my emphasis). Cf. also ScG I, chap. 62. 80 In ST I–II, q. 91, a. 1 Aquinas calls the eternal law the “ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo.” 81 This is the vocabulary of legal authority in ST I–II, q. 90, a. 4:“Regula autem et mensura imponitur per hoc quod applicatur his quae regulantur et mensurantur. Unde ad hoc quod lex virtutem obligandi obtineat, quod est proprium legis, oportet quod applicetur hominibus qui secundum eam regulari debent.” 82 ST I–II, q. 51, a. 1. There is a natural, prompt (statim ) progression, activated by the light of the agent intellect, from the understanding of ens and the terms of the first principles, to the grasp of the first principles themselves, to the formation of the the first speculative habit of intellectus in the possible intellect. N&V_Sum09.qxp 596 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 596 Matthew Cuddeback act of knowledge, every habit, every science.83 They are the principles from which we go out in discovery and to which we return in judgment.And so the illuminatively promulgated divine rule is authoritative from origin to end, from emanation to return: “Illumination concerns those things that emanate from the first rule of truth”84; “illumination, properly speaking, is the manifestation of truth according as it has an ordering to God, who illuminates every intellect” (emphasis added).85 This ordering to God requires a turning back to adhere to the divine rule through its likeness in us.86 If the intellect must turn back to the divine rule to judge truth, then every judgment of truth is an act of participated authority. “Judgment,” says Aquinas, properly signifies the act of a judge with public authority who applies the law to some case, but the word can be extended to mean 83 “This means that our original and altogether first knowledge of ens is . . . the vital force for the entire development of our intellectual life. . . .Thus, I am saying that the first knowledge of ens is a perfect light, which will reveal itself in our lower-level intellectual endeavors, all having a somewhat secret movement toward the knowledge of God.” Lawrence Dewan, O.P.,“St.Thomas, Physics, and the Principle of Metaphysics,” in Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics, 60. See also by Dewan in the same volume “St.Thomas and the Seed of Metaphysics,” 35–46. 84 “Illuminatio est de his quae emanant a prima regula veritatis.” ST q. 107, a. 5, ad 3. Cf. ST I, q. 16, a. 5, ad 3:“Omnis autem apprehensio intellectus a Deo est unde quidquid est veritatis in hoc quod dico istum fornicari est verum totum est a Deo.” 85 “Illuminatio proprie est manifestatio veritatis secundum quod habet ordinem ad Deum qui illuminat omnem intellectum.” ST I, q. 109, a. 3. 86 If the First Truth is the eternal law, and if divine illumination is the exercise of its authority, the ultimate end of illumination is a political common good. That Aquinas conceives of divine illumination as the exercise of political authority can be seen in ST I, q. 108, a. 1, where he describes God as princeps of the “city” constituted by the multitude of good angels and men. Or again, he says, because God rules men and angels differently, God can be likened to a “king” who governs two cities, each with its own “laws and administrators.” The difference between God’s governance of angels and his governance of men flows precisely from the difference between the way men and angels “receive divine illuminations”—angels receive them in intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible likenesses. But this distinction rests on what is common: for angels and men God’s governing authority is exercised by illumination.The remaining seven articles of question 108 describe God’s illuminatively exercised authority over the angelic hierarchy, in which there is a “diversity of orders” determined by the way that angels receive and communicate illumination to lower angels or men. God always governs through “other illuminators.” See ST I, q. 108, a. 2, the corpus and ad 2. Fuller explanation of God’s illuminative governance of men awaits the treatise on law, where the natural law is an impressio of the divine light in us (ST I–II, q. 91, a. 2), and where human law must be derived from natural law by way of conclusion or determination (ST I–II, q. 95, a. 2). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 597 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 597 “a right determination in any matter, speculative or practical.”87 In the following text from the Compendium theologiae Aquinas spotlights the distinctive causality of the First Truth as giving the authority to judge with certitude: God helps [iuvat] man to understand not only on the part of the object, which is proposed to man by God, or through the addition of light, but also insofar as man’s natural light, by which [he] understands, is from God. Furthermore, since God is the First Truth, from which every other truth gets [its] certitude in the way that secondary propositions [get their certitude] from first [propositions] in the demonstrative sciences, [so God helps man to understand] in that no intellect can be certain except by the power of God [nisi virtute divina], just as conclusions in the sciences cannot be certain except by the power of the first principles.88 This passage makes it plain that for Aquinas divine illumination is not merely God’s bestowal of the intellectual power. It is, “furthermore,” the concurrent “help” of “the power of God,” the continuous governing motion from the First Truth as it impresses the divine likeness on the first principles of judgment and draws the intellect—with the help of other teachers—to its ultimate completing form, adherence to the First Truth. The mind’s requirement of this help in the line of nature confirms, in keeping with a leading insight of the Augustinian illumination tradition, that the first principles by which we judge truth must come from above the mind.89 They are the mind’s law. This teaching from ST I, qq. 105–107 undersets the teaching, later in the Summa theologiae, on the authority of the natural law.90 When Aquinas 87 ST II–II, q. 60, a. 1, ad 1. 88 “Deus autem ad intelligendum hominem iuvat non solum ex parte obiecti, quod homini proponitur a Deo, vel per additionem luminis, sed etiam per hoc quod lumen naturale hominis, quo intellectualis est, a Deo est, et per hoc etiam quod cum ipse sit veritas prima, a qua omnis alia veritas certitudinem habet, sicut secundae propositiones a primis in scientiis demonstratives, nihil intellectui certum fieri potest nisi virtute divina, sicut nec conclusiones fiunt certae in scientiis nisi secundum virtutem primorum principiorum.” Compendium theologiae I, chap. 129. 89 See for example Augustine, De trinitate 12.2.2:“But it belongs to the higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons. [Now] unless [these incorporeal reasons] are above the human mind, [they] would certainly not be unchangeable, and unless [they are] joined to something in us, we would not be able to use them to judge of corporeal things” (my translation). 90 On the authority of the natural law see Russell Hittinger, The First Grace: Rediscovering The Natural Law in a Post-Christian World (Wilmington: ISI, 2003), chap. 2, “Natural Law as ‘Law’ ”; chap. 4, “Authority to Render Judgment.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 598 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 598 Matthew Cuddeback describes the natural law as an impressio in us of the divine light, a divine instruction that moves to the good,91 he is merely extending the First Truth’s illuminative authority from the speculative to the practical intellect. He makes the same extension in ST I–II, q. 93, aa. 1 and 2, in which he outright identifies divine truth and the eternal law.92 In article 2, on the way we know the eternal law, he says that while no one this side of heaven can know the eternal law in itself, every rational creature knows it, either more or less, according to a certain inshining [irradiatio] of it. For any knowledge of the truth is a certain inshining and participation of the eternal law, which is unchangeable truth, as Augustine says in De vera religione (emphasis added).93 The premise in this passage is that any knowledge of the truth, speculative or practical, is an inshining of the eternal law, “unchangeable truth.” The conclusion is that everyone knows the eternal law in its effect, the inshining that bears the likeness of the eternal law. But both premise and conclusion were established in questions 105–107, in the doctrine of adherence to the First Truth and judgment by its rule: any knowledge of truth comports an implicit, virtual knowledge of the First Truth through our grasp of its likeness in the first intelligibles. Any knowledge of truth implies reference to the authority of the First Truth. Indeed, how can the natural law, divine instruction with respect to the good, be authoritative, if divine instruction with respect to the true, from which our first knowledge of natural law’s first precepts arises, is not already authoritative?94 91 “Principium autem exterius movens ad bonum est Deus, qui et nos instruit per legem et iuvat per gratiam.” ST I–II, q. 90, prologue. Recall the identification of the divine motion and teaching in ST I, q. 105, a. 3, sed contra (see note 43 above). 92 See ST I–II, q. 93, a. 1, obj. 3 and ad 3.The objector cites Augustine’s De vera religione, “above our minds is a law, which is called truth,” and concludes that “truth,” not a summa ratio in God’s mind, is the eternal law.The objector is citing Augustine, De vera religione, chap. 30: “satis apparet supra mentem nostram esse legem quae veritas dicitur.”This text is widely cited in the Western illumination tradition. In his reply Aquinas identifies summa ratio, eternal law, and truth. It must be stressed how serious and sympathetic is Aquinas’s effort, in q. 93, aa. 1 and 2, to appropriate Augustine’s teaching on truth as the mind’s law. 93 “Sed omnis creatura rationalis ipsam cognoscit secundum aliquam eius irradiationem vel maiorem vel minorem. Omnis enim cognitio veritatis est quaedam irradiatio et participatio legis aeternae, quae est veritas incommutabilis ut Augustinus dicit in libro De vera religione.Veritatem autem omnes aliqualiter cognoscunt ad minus quantum ad principia communia legis naturalis.” ST I–II, q. 93, a. 2. 94 On the authority of natural law, the role of knowledge of God in natural law, and Aquinas’s derivation of the first practical principle, see Lawrence Dewan, O.P., N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 599 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 599 V Cardinal Ratzinger writes that modern man “presupposes the opposition of authority to subjectivity” and freedom.95 Both Ratzinger and John Paul II have argued that adherence to divine authority frees and fulfills whereas relativism and a flawed assertion of subjectivity imprison.96 This is a leading theme of Veritatis Splendor, in its teaching on participated theonomy,97 and of Fides et Ratio, in its teaching that the authority of Truth “governs, stimulates, and gives increase to theology and philosophy alike.”98 The harmony between adherence to divine authority and human fulfillment finds its ontological ground in Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on God’s illuminative governance. Divine illumination, continuous with a divine conserving causality which moves “sweetly” from within,99 fosters and fulfills our yearning for truth. In Veritatis Splendor John Paul finds the ontological ground for participated theonomy in the impressio of the divine light that promulgates the natural law.100 In Fides et Ratio he finds the ontological ground of truth, natural and supernatural, in Aquinas’s account of “the role of the Holy Spirit in the process by which knowledge matures into wisdom.”101 Aquinas, says the pope, accords philosophical and theological wisdom their proper place; he gives primacy to a third kind of wisdom, the one that is a gift of the Holy Spirit.This wisdom “enables judgment according to divine truth” (quoting ST II–II, q. 45, a. 1, ad 2). The pope adds: Aquinas was “profoundly convinced that ‘whatever its source, truth is of the Holy Spirit’ (omne verum a quocumque dicatur a Spiritu Sancto est ).”102 The text he is quoting is ST I–II, q. 109, a. 1, ad 1, where the full sentence reads, “Every truth, by whomever it is spoken, is from the Holy Spirit as the one who infuses [our] natural light, and who moves [it] to understand “St.Thomas, Our Natural Lights, and the Moral Order,” in his Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays in Thomistic Ethics (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 199–212. 95 Ratzinger, “Conscience and Truth,” 23–24. 96 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 191. 97 See note 22 above. 98 Fides et Ratio, §92. Cf. §15:“Christian Revelation is the true lodestar of men and women as they strive to make their way amid the pressures of an immanentist habit of mind and the constrictions of a technocratic logic.” 99 On God’s governance of every creature according to its nature, including the intellectual creatures, who have “dominion over their actions,” see ST I, q. 103, a. 5, ad 2 and 3. On divine governance as moving the creature “sweetly,” see note 37 above, and ST II–II, q. 23, a. 2. 100 Veritatis Splendor, §42. See note 22 above. 101 Fides et Ratio, §44. 102 Ibid. N&V_Sum09.qxp 600 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 600 Matthew Cuddeback and speak the truth.” In this one sentence Aquinas sums up the illumination teaching we have examined.103 Aquinas’s teaching on illumination is what explains how the knowledge of truth can mature into wisdom from the Holy Spirit, where “maturation” implies continuity. In natural knowledge of truth we already judge according to the divine rule, since we judge according to its likeness in us. By wisdom from the Holy Spirit, says Thomas, we are moved “to judge and order all things according to the divine rules.”104 Indeed any wisdom, natural or supernatural, will imitate 105 and perfect this basic dynamism of our natural knowledge of truth. Suchwise does faith imitate and perfect the adherence of natural knowledge to the authority of the First Truth: by faith, itself a partaking of the divine light,106 the believer “adheres” to the First Truth formally and explicitly, as the authority on account of which he assents to what is believed.107 Among all these ways of knowledge and wisdom there is an ontological continuity that is explained not merely by truth’s common origin in God but also by divine illumination.108 103 “Omne verum a quocumque dicatur est a Spiritu Sancto sicut ab infundente naturale lumen et movente ad intelligendum et loquendum veritatem.” ST I–II, q. 109, a. 1, ad 1. Note once again the flow from producere, bestowal of the power, to perducere, illuminative motion to the truth as known. The three replies of ST I–II, q. 109, a. 1 are also, taken together, a concentrated distillation of Aquinas’s teaching on illumination. 104 ST II–II, q. 45, a. 1. 105 ST II–II, q. 31, a. 3:“Gratia et virtus imitantur naturae ordinem, qui est ex divina sapientia institutus.” 106 For example ST I–II, q. 109, a. 1: “Altiora vero intelligibilia intellectus humanus cognoscere non potest nisi fortiori lumine perficiatur, sicut lumine fidei vel prophetiae.” 107 “Et sic ponitur actus fidei credere Deo, quia, sicut supra dictum est, formale obiectum fidei est veritas prima, cui inhaeret homo ut propter eam creditis assentiat.” ST II–II, q. 2, a. 2. Cf. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,“Doctrinal Note on Some Aspects of Evangelization,” 7 October 2007:”In the search for the good and the true, the Holy Spirit is already at work, opening the human heart and making it ready to welcome the truth of the Gospel, as Thomas Aquinas stated in his celebrated phrase: omne verum a quocumque dicatur a Spiritu Sancto est.” 108 John Paul II’s exhortation that philosophers promote “a recovery of the determining role of [the great] tradition for a right approach to knowledge” (FR, §85), and work “in the flow of an enduringly valid tradition” (FR, §106), rises naturally from his teaching on the authority of truth. By “tradition” he means “the great tradition which, beginning with the ancients, passes through the Fathers of the Church and the masters of Scholasticism, and includes the fundamental achievements of modern and contemporary thought” (FR, §85). But this tradition can have a “determining role” for philosophy only if it has authority for philosophy, and it will have authority only if it partakes somehow of the authority of the First N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 601 Thomas Aquinas on Divine Illumination 601 In section I above I asserted that in the first three chapters of Fides et ratio John Paul presents a case that reason aspires naturally toward belief, that is, toward adherence to authority. He says the search for the truth is also the search for a person to whom one may entrust himself, a person “who can guarantee the authenticity and certainty of the truth itself.” Christian faith “comes to meet” the truth-seeker and offers Jesus Christ— the Truth, the Word, the embodiment of the “unity of truth, natural and revealed”—as the authoritative truth to whom he may entrust himself.109 In his April 2008 address to Catholic educators in the United States, Benedict XVI refers to Fides et ratio on just this point:“the one who seeks the truth becomes the one who lives by faith.”110 He asserts that the “crisis of truth” is rooted in a “crisis of faith,” and argues that faith is the way back to truth, for faith is a commitment of “our entire self—intellect and will, mind and heart—to God,” a commitment that brings “the certainty of truth.” “Only in faith,” he says, “can truth become incarnate and reason truly human, capable of directing the will along the path of freedom.”111 Such claims by the two popes about the way that reason is fulfilled by faith and becomes thereby “truly human” take on deeper meaning when supported by Aquinas’s teaching on divine illumination: faith and the wisdom of the Holy Spirit perfect an intellect already being moved by divine instruction, already under authority, already judging according to the First Truth. So faith’s explicit commitment to authority should indeed have power to awaken the insight that any truth is a teaching from and adherence to the First Teacher. When Benedict argues in the April 2008 address to Catholic educators that truth is not the mere “communication of factual data,” not just “informative” but “performative,”112 he shows that he is keen to recover truth-knowing as an illumination from God that carries the knower back to God.113 “With Saint Augustine,” Truth. By drawing on Aquinas’s teaching on illumination, the pope offers the ontology that can ground whatever authority the great tradition has for philosophy. On tradition’s authority and role for philosophy, see Josef Pieper, “Tradition: Its Sense and Aspiration,” in his For the Love of Wisdom (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 233–94. See also Kenneth Schmitz,“Josef Pieper and the Concept of Tradition,” in A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper, ed. Bernard N. Schumacher (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 171–98; and in the same volume my “Josef Pieper on the Truth of All Things and the World’s True Face,” 228–50. 109 Fides et Ratio, §§33–34. 110 Meeting with Catholic Educators, 73, quoting Fides et Ratio, §31. 111 Meeting with Catholic Educators, 74. 112 Meeting with Catholic Educators, 76, citing Spe Salvi 2. 113 See notes 84 and 85 above. Benedict’s distinction between knowledge of facts and knowledge of truth bears a striking likeness to Aquinas’s discussion, in his Lectura N&V_Sum09.qxp 602 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 602 Matthew Cuddeback Benedict exhorts,“let us say:‘we who speak and you who listen acknowledge ourselves as fellow disciples of a single teacher’.” He could also cite Thomas Aquinas: one man teaches another man from without, but God teaches from within, “for ‘the light of His face is signed upon us’, by which signing we are shown all things.”114 N&V super Ioannem, of the fallen angels’ knowledge of truth. Because their fall did not destroy their natures, demons know “some kind of truth,” but not “completively,” because they “turn away from truth, that is, from God, who is completive Truth and Wisdom.”“Sic igitur aliqua veritas est in eis, sed non completiva, a qua aversi sunt, scilicet a Deo, qui est veritas et sapientia completive.” Lectura super Ioannem, chap. 8, lect. 6, no. 1247.We might say that the feature common to knowledge of mere “factual data,” in Benedict’s words, and the demon’s knowledge of merely “some kind of truth,” is the lack of, perhaps refusal of, referral to the First Truth. Compare Aquinas’s account of the demons’ refusal with Ratzinger’s assertion that the rejection of truth brings both the precedence of “technique” and “power” over truth, and “the distorted form of being-like-God of which the account of the fall speaks” (Ratzinger,“Conscience and Truth,” 29). 114 ST I, q. 117, a. 1, ad 1 (see note 64 above). I would like to thank Russell Hittinger, Giuseppe Butera, and John Cuddeback for their comments on earlier versions of this essay. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 603 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 603–24 603 The Common Good as a Relational Good P IERPAOLO D ONATI University of Bologna Bologna, Italy The Common Good as a Relational Good I N ORDINARY language, as well as in most empirical sciences, the common good is generally meant as a “something,” an entity belonging to everyone who is part of a community.The community can be big or small, may be a family, a local or national community, or the whole humankind. In any case, the common good is seen and treated as an asset or an opportunity to be preserved and enhanced, if possible, for the benefit of the individuals. That “something,” of which the common good consists, is generally a tangible reality, but it may also be an intangible good.Tangible goods are, for instance, the natural resources that must be at everyone’s disposal (as air and water), community spaces usable by everyone (such as streets and squares; today we would consider the Web and Internet spaces as well), artistic monuments that are not to be commercialized. Intangible goods are, for instance, peace, social cohesion, international solidarity with the institutions safeguarding and promoting them. Modern thought has increasingly compared the common good with a collective, materialized, and utilitarian good, which must be available to all members of the community. The notions of affluence, development, and progress are intended as such, when they are considered “common goods.” Thus modern thought always risks reducing the sense and value of the common good to a possession (a property), whose holders are conceived as shareholders or stakeholders. Thus we understand the supremacy, up to today, of prevailingly economic and/or political concepts which reduce the common good to a sum of individual goods. N&V_Sum09.qxp 604 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 604 Pierpaolo Donati Most of the current economic theories intend the common good as “the greatest possible good for the greatest possible number of individuals.” In the best case scenario, the “greatest possible number of individuals” would mean all sentient beings.This definition of the common good presents it as an entity that is convertible, or reducible, to the sum total of all the private interests of the individual members of a society and interchangeable with them. In the definitions given by the prevailing social, economic, and political sciences, the common good is an allocation of resources that everyone takes advantage of. Of course, that means that such allocation can be also unequal and even unfair, cut off from justice. What is relevant is that everyone may take some benefit from the allocation of resources. Difficulties are not considered so much in the definition of the common good as within the rules of its implementation. Such implementation may take place based on four criteria: 1. “familiarity” (within the family, the allocation of resources consists in giving something to each one accepting the distribution by consent ); 2. merit or credit, dictated by the individual moral conscience (each one accepts the allocation because he believes himself to deserve what he has received); 3. mutual benefit (the allocation is accepted because it is based on the expectation of a cooperative action enhancing everyone’s affluence; if someone does not cooperate in creating a common good, he will be punished by exclusion from future cooperation; it is a principle of reciprocity); 4. enforcement (the use of force by a third party, generally the State). Economists think that the common good is produced only if there are sanctions for those who shirk their responsibilities. Such sanctions are different in the four cases above: a. the family takes one’s consent; b. the individual who did not deserve his individual good, arising from the common good, will feel an inner guilt; c. one loses the possibility of cooperation (one can draw no more from the common goods); d. one receives a penalty from outside (fines, sanctions of different kinds, as in the case of tax evasion). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 605 The Common Good as a Relational Good 605 From political studies’s point of view, the common good is defined as the central and essential aim of the State, consisting in granting fundamental rights to the individuals entering society, especially everyone’s right to have the opportunity to freely shape his own life through responsible acting and according to the moral law. In this case, the common good is defined as the sum total of the conditions of social life, which enables people the more easily and straightforwardly to enjoy their rights. The object of state sovereignty is the free choice of means for creating these conditions. Some political thinkers, in particular John Rawls, make the distinction between the Good, that is, actively creating a better world (however that may be defined), and the Just, which creates a fair, liberal social infrastructure that allows the pursuit of virtue, but does not prescribe what the common good actually is. Such ideas of common good are institutionalized today in the liberallabour 1 political structures, that is, in those social, economic, and political systems based on two complementary principles: from the one side, the market’s individual freedom (liberal side), from the other side, the equality of the individual opportunities granted by the political power (labour side). Such structures appear to be limited and misleading as regards a deeper and more inclusive notion of the common good, because they obscure the social conditions transforming an object into something common and into a good, according to the moral point of view. If something is a common object, it is because the individuals who share it have certain relations among themselves. If it is a good (in a moral sense), it is because people relate in a certain way to such an object, and also to one another. A good is a common good because it is generated and regenerated only together by the people involved in it. It must be at the same time produced and enjoyed together by all those who have a stake in it. For such a reason, the good is within the relation connecting the subjects. It is such a relation that includes the common good. The fruits that every individual subject may obtain derive from being within such a relation. The relational definition of the common good displays those fundamental qualities that are obscured by proprietary definitions. To understand such qualities, let us start from a consideration. If the common good is an asset belonging to the whole community, the ones belonging to that community recognize it as something preceding and going further than themselves. It is a good that they cannot freely dispose of. They can and must use it, but only under particular conditions, 1 “Liberal-labour” refers to a societal configuration (e.g. a political system) based upon the complementarity between liberal (individualistic) and labour (socialist) ideologies. N&V_Sum09.qxp 606 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 606 Pierpaolo Donati excluding its divisibility and commodification. Should they divide or alienate it, they would not be able to enjoy its fruits. What makes indivisible and not commodificable the so-called common good? Is it maybe an inner quality or power of that object (tangible like water, or intangible like social cohesion and peace)? Generally, the answer is negative. The object in itself is always potentially divisible and marketable. For instance, both water and social peace, although common goods, are susceptible to be divided and marketed. The reason why the common good cannot and must not be divided and marketed lies in the fact that, if it were divided or commodified, the relations among the members of that community would be estranged or even canceled.The common good is, before and above anything else, the guarantee of their social bond. The quality that makes an object a common good lies neither in the thing as an indivisible and inalienable “whole” in itself, nor in the will of the members of a community. It does not depend on their options, tastes, preferences, individual and aggregate choices. People generate and regenerate it, but the good has its own reality that does not depend on people desiring or receiving benefit from it.They contribute to generating it, but they do not create it by themselves. They can destroy it by themselves, however. If they do destroy it, they break the social bonds connecting them to the other persons. The common good has its own inalienable nature, with regard to the relations among the ones sharing it, because it preserves the foundations of the social bond. But the sharing must be voluntary. It cannot have a deterministic character. Precisely because the common good has a relational character, it lies in the mutual actions of those who contribute to it. Should the social bond break, there would be a collapse of the personal character of the action. Only if we see the common good as a relational good, may we understand its inner connection with the human person. That is exactly what is stated by Catholic social doctrine. As a matter of fact, the social doctrine of the Church proposes a concept of the common good quite different from the economic and political versions of it. In the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC, §1905–1912) and in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Compendium, §164–170) a vision of the common good is outlined according to which 1. the common good is the social bond joining people together, on which material and immaterial goods of the individuals depend (as the Compendium, §165, states: N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 607 The Common Good as a Relational Good 607 The human person cannot find fulfillment in himself, that is, apart from the fact that he exists ‘with’ others and ‘for’ others. This truth does not simply require that he live with others at various levels of social life, but that he seek unceasingly—in actual practice and not merely at the level of ideas—the good, that is, the meaning and truth, found in existing forms of social life. No expression of social life—from the family to intermediate social groups, associations, enterprises of an economic nature, cities, regions, States, up to the community of peoples and nations—can escape the issue of its own common good, in that this is a constitutive element of its significance and the authentic reason for its existence. 2. the common good does not consist either in a state of things, or in a sum of single goods, or in a prearranged reality, but it is “the whole of conditions of the social life that allow the groups, as well as the single members, to completely and quickly reach their own perfection” (Gaudium et Spes, 26); in particular, it consists in the exercise and conditions of natural liberties that are essential for the full development of the human inclinations (for example, the right to act according to one’s conscience, the right to freedom of religion, etc.); 3. the common good is the social and community dimension of the moral good; the common good is the moral good of a social or community relation The common good does not consist of the mere sum of the particular goods of each subject of the social bodies. Being of every and each one, it is and still is common, because it is indivisible and because it is possible to reach it, enhance it and preserve it only together, considering the future as well. As the moral acting of the individual is fulfilled in the good, so the social acting comes to its height when realizing the common good. The common good, in fact, may be intended as the social and community dimension of the moral good. [Compendium, §164] The social doctrine of the Church shows, therefore, a critical point of view as regards the materialistic, positivist, and utilitarian objectification (reification) of the common good. Its picture of the common good openly clashes with the “proprietary and utilitarian” picture given by today’s prevailing thought. It appeals to reasons based on the sociability of human beings. From human sociability, it draws conclusions according to which the common good cannot be confused with only apparently similar concepts, such as the concepts of collective good, aggregate good, total good, vested interests, general interest, and so on. N&V_Sum09.qxp 608 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 608 Pierpaolo Donati Nonetheless, the concrete application of Catholic social doctrine does not appear yet to live up to its potentiality. In fact, the concept of the common good—rather than being developed in a relational way—is often practically traced back to an organic and vertically stratified picture of society, a picture based on two mainstays: (1) the assertion of the primacy of politics as the “synthesis” of the common good (“If every human community owns a common good permitting it to recognize itself as such, its complete realization lies in the political community” [CCC, §1910]); and (2) the consequent granting to the State of the privileged role of top and center of the society, which protects, rules, and creates its civil society (“It is the State’s duty to defend and promote the common good of civil society, citizens and intermediate bodies” [CCC, §1910]). Thus, we wish to push Catholic social doctrine forward by claiming that, today, social doctrine can and must enlarge its horizons on the common good through a widening of its relational vision. It can develop its potential to illuminate and give its support to new politics and social practices, insofar as it widens the relational basis of the common good and derives the necessary consequences, on the applicatory and operative level, in the new context of globalization. This position points out some problems that cannot be bounded any more inside the political configuration to which social doctrine still refers when it claims:“The responsibility to obtain the common good, besides belonging to the individuals, belongs also to the State, because the common good is the reason for the political authority. The State, in fact, must assure cohesion, unity and organization to the civil society that it expresses, so that the common good may be obtained with the contribution of all citizens.The individual, the family and the intermediate bodies are not able to reach their full development by themselves; from that comes the necessity of political institutions, whose aim is to make necessary goods accessible to people—material, cultural, moral and spiritual goods—to lead a real human life” (Compendium, §168). Certainly,“the aim of social life is the historically feasible common good” (Compendium, §168), but the State is not the exclusive holder of such a task.The task of ensuring assure participation, social inclusion, security, and justice is certainly what justifies the existence and the action of the State, but the State must accomplish those tasks in a subsidiary way as regards the civil society (local, national, and international). A development of social doctrine is required, considering the globalized society’s differentiation into spheres increasingly distinct among themselves, both at an infra-state and at a supra-state level.The common good becomes a responsibility not only of the individuals and of the N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 609 The Common Good as a Relational Good 609 State, but also—in a completely new way—of the intermediate social bodies (“civil societarian networks”2) having a fundamental role in mediating the processes of the creation of the common good. These are not only bottom-up (realization of the common good though movements that come up from the bottom) and top-down (the creation of the common good from the State to the grassroots) processes, but also horizontal and lateral processes among organizations which neither depend on the State, nor are Market actors. Summing up what has been said so far, the common good is not the result or the sum of individuals’ actions, because it is a reality exceeding individuals and their products. On the other hand, it is not an “already given whole,” having inner properties making it indivisible and not commodifiable. It has an inalienable character as regards the fruits given by it, because without the common good those fruits cannot exist. But people can always make it divisible and commodifiable. When they do so, they destroy the common good and consequently the community ceases to exist. 2 M. S. Archer (personal communication March 20, 2008) has rightly pointed out that a network, per se, is not necessarily relational, as in the case of a distribution list. She suggests that “perhaps, that’s the key, the distinction between relational and non-relational networks (say the difference between kinship and genealogy).” I agree with that. I must at the same time say that in my language networks are always intended to be networks of relations (and not networks of material objects or simply “nodes”), and therefore, since a social relation implies a reciprocal action, what I call networks are to be understood as “relational networks.” (For my relational theory of society, see P. Donati, Teoria relazionale della società [Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1991].) That’s what distinguishes my critical (and relational) realism from others, namely, Dave Elder-Vass’s, in which social relations are understood as “real” structures (as in the relation between two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen in a molecule of water). Social reality is ontologically different from material (physical, chemical, biological) reality. And therefore relations are made up of a different stuff (which implies a different concept of “structure”).The term “civil societarian” can be explained in the following way. A civil societarian strongly supports the institutions of civil society.These include families, corporations, religious groups, private schools, charities, trade associations, and the other peaceful, voluntary, collective organizations that promote our individual and collective well-being in so far as they are relational networks.These are the civil societarian networks to which I am referring.The stereotypical libertarian might cite Ayn Rand and exalt the independent individual. Instead, a civil societarian would cite Alexis de Tocqueville, and his observation that democracy is based upon people who, whatever their age, social conditions, and personal beliefs, constantly form associations. These voluntary associations are what a civil societarian sees as the key to civilization. Government may contribute to civil society, but it also intrudes on it. The means to avoid colonization is precisely to appeal to the principle of subsidiarity. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory of the general will serves as a good contrast to the civil societarian’s view. N&V_Sum09.qxp 610 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 610 Pierpaolo Donati The common good belongs to a reality which is relational in character. (“[L]ife is relation,” affirms Benedict XVI in the encyclical Spe Salvi, §27.) Social dynamics continuously create and destroy common goods. Within modernity the processes of immunization from social relations have made the destructive forces more powerful than the creative ones. But, at the end of Western modernity, in what we call a post-modern society, the opposite may occur: society can make inalienable what was actually divisible and marketable; namely, it can generate a common good anew.What was once mistakenly viewed as divisible can be reclaimed as an indivisible value. The empirical processes are always reversible. In any case, concretely speaking (not being limited to a metaphysical notion of the common good), we observe that human society lies in a variety of common goods: there are non-negotiable common goods and others that, under some circumstances, may be subjected to arguments of utility or convenience. To trace the distinction between the common goods which can be made negotiable (let us think of some natural resources) and those which are not negotiable in any way (for example, human dignity and peace) is the task of a relational vision of the common good. Let us make this claim clearer by introducing a basic argument. The first common good is the dignity of the human person, which is—at the same time—also the basis of any common good. It is a fact that human dignity cannot be violated without all the surrounding community suffering it.To violate human dignity means to wound the possibility to pursue the common good from the beginning. But what is human dignity? What can be or cannot be negotiated within it? Human dignity is not a quality that individuals may individually own and upon which they may individually decide. On the other hand, neither is it the sum (the aggregate) of a quality of all the members of a community. It is something coming before them and going beyond them. It is something that they enjoy without being able either to divide or to alienate it. According to the Catholic point of view, human dignity takes root in the filial relation with God. Such a relation is therefore the first, originative ( fontalis), and decisive common good among human persons. It is so for all the great religions in the world. If we deny the existence of such a relation, as non-believers, atheists, or agnostics do, human dignity is hardly justifiable as a common good: in fact, where else can it otherwise take root? Many will answer that dignity resides in and is conferred by a particular community, which is exactly what the Catholic thought denies, N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 611 The Common Good as a Relational Good 611 since human dignity cannot stem from a human artefact (such as a cultural tradition or a collective social structure). So we see what can be negotiated in the common good. It is what does not touch its vital root, which root is the divine filiation of the human person and its implications in interpersonal relations.The rest can be discussed, modified, made the object of accords or contingencies, with the purpose of a further good. Outside its religious basis, human dignity, being the first among the common goods, must find some justifications, but they always seem insufficient.All the criteria at the disposal of contemporary social sciences are insufficient.They appeal to human reason, but scientific reason is not enough.They appeal to the individual’s abilities, but this criterion results in discriminating between those who are able to perform functionally and those who are not.They appeal to an abstract concept of humanity, but it appears as a purely artificial and contingent construction. That is why a certain “secularized reason” of our time appeals to “a religion without God” (as claimed, for instance, by G. Teubner). Postmodern thought needs religion to solve its paradoxes, but it does not accept the divine filiation, where the solution to those paradoxes lies. Nonetheless, Catholic thought, too, needs to take some steps forward. In fact, in the Catholic field, the “metaphysics of the common good,” which has been formulated in past centuries, needs a deep revision. Such metaphysics has defined the common good of humankind as consisting in God, and—as a consequence—the relation of each individual with him.This perspective is certainly not wrong; it is undoubtedly right, but not completely adequate. Taken in a simplistic way, it obscures the common good existing among human persons (which should not be understood as a reflex of their fundamental individual relation and as an expression of the Mystical Body). Today, such metaphysics has to be considered necessary but insufficient; it should be revised starting with the remark that the dignity of the human person is neither an individualistic (inherent to the individual qua talis ) nor a holistic reality (stemming from some collective entity, including the Mystical Body), because it is connected and inherent to each human person, as provided not only by one’s relation of filiation with God, but also by one’s relations with other human persons.The dignity of the human person, if considered as a common good, shows us that such a quality is not an individual one, but it is connected and inherent to the relations of the person with the whole creation, with God and with other human persons. Before every other reason, the good is common thanks to its dignity. And dignity is a quality that cannot be circumscribed and limited to the N&V_Sum09.qxp 612 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 612 Pierpaolo Donati single individual, but it spreads to the relations where the individual expresses himself, where he is preserved and where he flourishes. The family, for instance, is a common good if and because it is seen as a specific relation realizing the dignity of the human person. So we come to see the moral dimensions of the common good, surpassing its concretely expressible dimensions (material and immaterial), since the moral dimensions are of a transcendental nature. The moral dimensions point out that the common good is a relational good, legitimated by the fundamental criterion of human dignity. In brief: the common good is neither a “collective heritage” that may be expressed concretely in an entity existing apart from the human person, nor an aggregate of individual goods (in this case, we name it total or collective good). It is something that belongs, at the same time, to all the members of a community and to each of them, as it lies in the quality of relations among those who share it. As regards the social sciences, here intervene the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity. In fact, only a relational theory may observe the common good as an emerging effect of the combined actions of subsidiarity and solidarity of subjects (individuals or social groups) operating in the framework of a relational anthropology. From the perspective of this relational vision it is more clearly seen which are the negotiable and non-negotiable common goods. The task of discovering and understanding the relational character of the common good has just started; it must be further analyzed thoroughly in the future. Consequences for the Definition of Subsidiarity and Solidarity There is a variety of definitions of subsidiarity, as well as of solidarity. For example, subsidiarity has been defined as follows: proximity/nearness to the subjects concerned, better organizational dimension, devolution, privatization, articulation of citizenship rights, multilevel governance, and so on. Many different types of subsidiarity have been devised: vertical and horizontal subsidiarity, defensive and promotional subsidiarity, reflexive subsidiarity, strengthened subsidiarity, and so on. Solidarity, in its turn, has been conceived of as redistribution, beneficence, charity, social compensations, interdependency, and so on. What we want to point out here is that, for a correct vision of the two terms (subsidiarity and solidarity), we need not only to use them together, but also to define them insofar as one relates to the other. That is exactly what the relational approach does. It claims that, considered in their social phenomenology, the common goods are the products of action systems that have, N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 613 The Common Good as a Relational Good 613 as a value model, human dignity (referring not only to the individual as such, but also to his social relations) and operating through forms that are both solidary and subsidiary among the subjects concerned. The relational definition of the common good leads to a relational vision of the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, meaning that subsidiarity and solidarity are seen as two ways to relate to others, considering the other in his dignity. Solidarity is a relation of Ego with Alter, doing what one can to meet the responsibility that everyone has towards the common good. Solidarity means that everyone assumes his own part, according to his capabilities. Subsidiarity means to relate so as to help the other to do what the other has to do according to a relational guidance system of action.3 These two principles should generally operate together because otherwise no common good could be generated. At the same time, it is clear how one is defined in its relation with the other. As a matter of fact, if Ego wants to help Alter without oppressing him, Ego must be at the same time subsidiary and solidary. Subsidiarity (the very fact that Ego wishes to help Alter to do what Alter has to do) needs an act of solidarity. In this case, solidarity is neither (unilateral) beneficence nor charity, but assumption and practice of joint and varied responsibility that both Ego and Alter must have towards the common good. (This is also the meaning of solidarity as interdependence, which is still valid when one part of the relationship cannot give anything material to the other part.) 3 A relational guidance system of action is needed in order to avoid the fallacy that subsidiarity requires a presupposed “normative approach” to the help relation. When I say that subsidiarity means that Ego helps Alter to do what he has to (or must) do as a suum munus, I do not intend to say that Ego dictates the norms of conduct to Alter, by providing him, with a sort of Decalogue. In this case, in fact, Alter would be impeded in his internal and external reflexivity. Relational guidance, on the contrary, means that Ego acts as a stimulus to the internal and external reflexivity of Alter, since all the needs, desires, projects of Alter should be met by supporting her/him to develop her/his own capabilities, aspirations, concerns, etc. through an evolving relational setting in which Ego is charged with the task to ensure that the goals are ethically good and that the activated relations are adequate to the pursuit of these goals, which are primarily defined by Alter, or, when Alter is a child or a handicapped person, together by Alter and his in/formal helper. (See the relational guidance scheme in P. Donati, Teoria relazionale della società, ch. 5). In the case of a parent-child situation, relational guidance is not a directive command or impulse (it is not directly normative), but is a prompt to activate those relationships which lead the child to the good things he desires, whereas the guiding Ego is helping in so far as s/he makes the assessment of the goodness of the goals and makes sure that proper reflexive relations are activated in order to attain those goals. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 614 Pierpaolo Donati 614 Figure 1. The Configuration of an Action System for the Common Good. G Common good (a situated relational good) A Subsidiarity (helping the other to do what he must do) I Solidarity (sharing a responsibility through reciprocity) L Dignity of the human person (Würderationalität) (gratuitous recognition—free giving—of what is inalienable in the dignity of the human person) The common good is therefore the fruit (the emerging effect) of a relation of reciprocity between solidarity and subsidiarity, implemented by Ego and Alter in their mutual interaction. At this point, one realizes the importance of the claim that the common good is the fruit of reciprocity understood as the rule of an action, which stems from the spirit of free giving. Reciprocity exists in society as an autonomous reality, since it is neither a sharing of useful goods (do ut des : such a form concerns contracts and the sharing of equivalent goods) (as Alvin Gouldner maintains), nor a sharing for the sake of sharing (as Mark Anspach argues), namely the recourse to reciprocal giving in order to underline the sense of belonging to a common tribal entity (the Hau as interpreted by Marcel Mauss). Reciprocity is a mutual helping, performed in a certain way, or rather, is a help concretely given by Ego to Alter in a context of solidarity (that is, common responsibility, interdependency), that is, where Ego is aware (recognizes) that Alter would do the same (namely, Alter would take responsibility within the limits he can afford) when Ego would need it. Reciprocity is supported and made effective as long as it is grounded by the recognition of the dignity of the other. Under these premises, we can understand the specific configuration of the action system generating a common good (Figure 1). The relation between the human person and the common good is the referential axis, which is needed to link the rationality of what has an inalienable dignity in itself with the situated relational good in a given context (the axis L–G). To be made operative, an action system turned to the common N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 615 The Common Good as a Relational Good 615 good needs means and rules (the adaptive axis A–I), which must befit the value model of human dignity. Only such an action system can avoid both holism and individualism.What makes the action system for the situated common good performatory (namely a concrete common good that must be produced here and now, context after context, situation after situation) are the two principles of subsidiarity and solidarity.They have the task of identifying the means and rules of the acting “system.”Without them, the common good could not be actually generated. We may say therefore that the common good is the emerging effect of an action system operating as the “combined provisions” of subsidiarity and solidarity to increase the value of the dignity of the human person (Figure 1). The principle of subsidiarity is an operating instrument. It is not to be confused with the principle of competence attribution (the distribution of the munera ) (as clearly stated by Russell Hittinger).The distribution of tasks lies on the axis that connects the dignity of the human person to the common good. Subsidiarity is a way to supply the means; it is a way to move resources to support and help the other without making him passive. Subsidiarity allows the other to accomplish his tasks, namely to do what he should do, what is up to him/her and not to others (munus proprium ). For its part, solidarity is a sharing of responsibility, operating according to the rule of reciprocity. To provide some means, resources, aid, and benefits to Alter could have the consequence of making him dependent on Ego, or of exploiting him for some other purpose. That is why subsidiarity cannot work without the principle of solidarity, through which Ego recognizes that, when helping Alter, there is a joint and several liability (with Alter), namely an interdependency linking Ego and Alter (interdependency as a moral category according to the encyclical Centesimus Annus). The above-mentioned framework explains why the common good is not equivalent to justice. Sure enough, the common good is a right good. Justice is a mean to reach the common good (being the aim). By itself, justice runs the risk of being purely legal.What makes it “substantial” (or rather “fully adequate”) is that its constitutive criterion (suum cuique tribuere) works through the connection between subsidiarity and solidarity. For instance, the person committing a crime must be sanctioned because he violated the common responsibility (solidarity), but the sanction must not have a merely punitive or revengeful aim; it should aim at helping the guilty person to do what he has to, namely, to re-establish the circuit of reciprocity. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 616 Pierpaolo Donati 616 Figure 2. Justice Produces the Common Good Only If It Passes Through the Combined Work of Solidarity and Subsidiarity. Solidarity Justice Reciprocity Subsidiarity } Common Good If an action of solidarity towards those who commit a crime is not subsidiary to them (in order to have them re-enter the networks of social reciprocity) it is not a right one. Solidarity by itself does not produce the common good: quite often, it becomes pure charity or a kind of egalitarianism that does not take differences into account, not to mention the cases where solidarity can lead to real evils (such as “Cosa Nostra”). On the other hand, neither does subsidiarity by itself produce the common good. It may be easily interpretable by itself in a reductive way as a devolution, the system of balanced powers, the laissez-faire at its lowest, and so on. Justice generates the common good only if it works through an active complementarity between solidarity and subsidiarity (Figure 2).We must remember that, according to the Catechism of the Catholic Church (§1905), “in conformity with the social nature of the human person, the good of everyone is necessarily in connection with the common good. It must be defined in relation to the human person: ‘Do not live isolated, falling back on yourself as if you were confirmed in justice; gather together instead, to find what is useful to the good of everyone’ ” (my translation). In short: the common good is that relational good coming from the fact that Ego freely recognizes the dignity of what is human in Alter, and he moves through actions jointly inspiring solidarity and subsidiarity towards Alter. The common good of a plurality of subjects is generated based on the assumption of equal moral dignity of persons as an emerging effect of actions combining reciprocity (pertaining to the principle of solidarity) with the empowerment of the other (pertaining to the principle of subsidiarity). Great consequences come from all this for the configuration of society. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 617 The Common Good as a Relational Good 617 Implications for the Relationship Between the State and Civil Society The relational understanding of the common good leads to various implications for society’s organization, beyond the liberal-labour configuration typical of the twentieth century. Firstly we see that the common good coincides neither with the State nor with the State-Market compromise, but it is the product of a system of social action, involving a plurality of subjects orientating themselves one to another, based on reciprocal solidarity and subsidiarity. Secondly we see that subsidiarity does not concern only the vertical relations existing inside a society conceived as a sort of pyramid going from the supranational to the national level (State, regions, municipalities), to the family, and to the human person. Such a version of subsidiarity is quite limited and is suitable for the internal hierarchic relations of the political-administrative system (that is why it is called “vertical subsidiarity”). When we affirm that subsidiarity means that responsibility is closer to the citizens (subsidiarity means taking responsibility at the actual level of actions ), generally we refer to this kind of subsidiarity (as defined by Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno, §80). But it is not always like this, because the idea of closeness to citizens implies other modes of subsidiarity: (1) there is a principle of subsidiarity between State and organizations of civil society (for instance, municipalities and volunteer organizations) called “horizontal subsidiarity”; and (2) there is a principle of subsidiarity among subjects of civil society (for instance, between family and school; between an enterprise and the employees’ and clients’ families, etc.) which may be called “lateral subsidiarity.” The distinction of subsidiarity in these various modalities (vertical, horizontal, and lateral) is possible only if one has a generalized idea of subsidiarity.This is relational subsidiarity, consisting in helping the other to do what he should. Such a generalized concept is vertically, horizontally, and laterally developed, according to the nature of the problems and subjects at issue. Thirdly we see that, as happens with subsidiarity, solidarity too can take various shapes. There is solidarity through redistribution, but also through free giving, solidarity by contract or through reciprocity. Solidarity as a sharing of responsibility unto interdependency is its more generalized meaning (namely always effective as a value model), defined in one way or another according to subjects and circumstances. In brief, the relational approach leads us to understand what is meant when we say that the global society can and must extend and enlarge (the concept of) subsidiarity and solidarity. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 618 Pierpaolo Donati 618 Figure 3. The Extension of the Solidarity-Subsidiary Relation in Its Various Articulations. G Vertical subsidiarity with redistributive solidarity (the center or vertex collects the resources and redistributes them to every level according to its needs) A Horizontal subsidiarity with contractual solidarity (contracts of solidarity) I Lateral subsidiarity with solidarity of reciprocity (“associational” engagement) L Relational subsidiarity with free giving solidarity (structural coupling in recognizing alterity and its dignity) To extend these two principles of social action means to be able to generalize and differentiate them at the same time. So, for instance, to extend subsidiarity means to have a generalized concept (relational subsidiarity) structured in its different modalities (vertical, horizontal and lateral) and applied from time to time, according to the exigencies of the various social spheres involved and of their actors. The same applies for solidarity. Thus we identify a generalized system of the creation of the common good through the extension of the solidarity-subsidiary relationship (Figure 3).4 4 One might ask whether this is a typology of subsidiarity rather than an action system. From a theoretical point of view this question goes back to the meaning of the Parsonian AGIL (a scheme based upon four functional prerequisites: A means Adaptation, G means goal attainment, I means Integration, and L means Latency). In the relational version, the AGIL scheme is never a pure typology, but is a compass to observe the structure and dynamic of an action which is supposed to be reciprocal (in the sense of being an action in response to another action). This is where reflexivity comes in. The paper by M. S. Archer “Education, Subsidiarity and Solidarity; Past, Present and Future” [in M. S. Archer and P. Donati (eds.), Pursuing the Common Good: How Solidarity and Subsidiarity Can Work Together (Vatican City:Vatican Press, 2008), 377–415] is a fine example of how the scheme can work when applied to the field of education. The four dimensions of subsidiarity must, and in fact do, interact and work together if we want to get out of the modern system, which is now producing a loss, instead of N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 619 The Common Good as a Relational Good 619 The norm of reciprocity nourishes the recourse to the subsidiary-solidarity relation (complementarity between subsidiarity and solidarity) among distinct, varied, and differentiated spheres, like an enterprise and the employees’ families, or the local political-administrative institutions, a volunteer organization and the beneficiaries of the voluntary work. Nonetheless, reciprocity needs a reason to be activated (who gives first?). In fact, the “structural coupling” of the various spheres that are distant and varied from one another, and probably scarcely disposed to create subsidiary-solidarity relations with each other (for example, a local government and an organization of mutual aid, an enterprise and the employees’ families, etc.) needs a free act of recognition (a “gift”) as a starting act moving solidarity and directing it towards subsidiarity. A symbolic, even if rare, case is that of an enterprise not only activating family friendly services for employees, but conceiving more widely the professional work as subsidiary to the family rather than the contrary (it is called “corporate family responsibility”). A society that, because of its organization, is inspired by the common good must extend its subsidiary-solidarity relations through all the spheres of life. It is clear how such configuration is different from all those theorized in the modern age, starting from T. Hobbes to F. Hegel, K. Marx and the great theorists of the welfare state of the twentieth century, to the current liberal-labour structures.The liberal-labour welfare systems do not take inspiration from the model of systems oriented toward the production of the common good through the principle of subsidiarity combined with that of solidarity.They are based instead on the compromise between Market and State (profit and political power); that is, they stand on two legs: on the one side, individual liberties to compete in the market; on the other side, state interventions to ensure equality of opportunity for all. It should be underlined that the relational model of the common good is necessary today not only to solve the failures of the couple State + Market. It is not a model simply understandable in terms of better evolutionistic adaptation. It arises from a new “relational anthropology of the civil society,” that is, from a new way to mean and practice human reflexivity in civil relations (those which are not “political” because they do not an increase, of common goods (as relational goods) in education. For an empirical investigation, see Capitale sociale delle famiglie e processi di socializzazione. Un confronto fra scuole statali e di privato sociale, ed. P. Donati and I. Colozzi (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2006). The same holds true for health care and many kinds of social services (particularly family services: see Buone pratiche e servizi innovativi per la famiglia, ed. P. Donati and R. Prandini [Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2006]). N&V_Sum09.qxp 620 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 620 Pierpaolo Donati refer to the political-administrative system, though not excluding it or operating against it). On this basis, we may better point out the implications of the relational theory of the common good in configuring, in a new way, the relations between state and civil society. The discontinuity with the past does not lie in the key concepts (person, subsidiarity, solidarity, common good). The discontinuity lies in the interpretation and implementation of such concepts, which is not only of the functionalist, but of the meta-functionalist kind. In the context of the functionalist approach, the common good is a state of affairs that, other things being equal, improves the position of at least one participant. It does not need solidarity, not to mention reciprocity. It says nothing about human dignity. Subsidiarity is meant as a kind of smooth functioning. Solidarity is understood as a social compensation (redistribution, charity) necessary to make the system run. In the context of the relational interpretation, things are different.The common good is a quality of relations on which the concrete goods (in the plural) of the participants of a situation depend, the goods of all those belonging to a community, according to their different needs. In short: the State (or the political-administrative system, from the supranational to the local one) has four ways to relate to civil society (Figure 3): (G) a vertical modality, maintaining solidarity through redistributional measures; (A) a horizontal modality, supporting the organizations of civil society with relational contracts, called “contracts of social solidarity,” namely, not acting by a political command and not oriented to mere profit, but operating on the basis of mutual subsidiarity; (I) a lateral modality, applying subsidiarity among subjects of civil society that are “pairs,” among which solidarity is exercised through the norm of reciprocity; (L) a generalized relational modality simply recognizing the dignity of the other and giving him the gift of such recognition through free acting (the opening of a free credit that sets reciprocity in motion). Such a configuration seems to be able to produce common goods far beyond the current configurations, where the State relates to civil society as an absolute power (Hobbes’s Leviathan), or as an ethical State (Hegel), or as an expression of the hegemonic forces of the civil society (A. Gramsci), or as the political representation of the Market (R. Dahl). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 621 The Common Good as a Relational Good 621 In such “relational” configuration, the third sector and the fourth sector (constituted by families and informal networks) play a central role, precisely because they are moved by free giving and reciprocity.These two sectors are put in the position to express their potentialities (namely to develop their own munera) rightly because they are not treated as residual subjects, as if they needed only aid, rules, and control by the complex State + Market. Third sector organizations and family associations become social actors with their own powers, independent from State and Market. Concrete instances are the community foundations widespread in many countries, charter schools in the U.S.A., the Forums of family associations in Italy, Spain, and other countries. A New Sociocultural Order Suited to a Globalized Society We ask ourselves: can these new actors, generating the common good through the joint work of subsidiarity and solidarity, indicate a generalized action model for the governance of a globalized society? The answer may be affirmative. In fact, the society of the twenty-first century is neither pyramidal nor hierarchic anymore, but reticular and self-poietic in its structures and in its morphogenetic processes. In such kinds of structures and processes, common goods are produced more effectively, efficiently, and fairly through modalities maximizing criteria based on subsidiarity and solidarity, rather than confiding in the primacy of command and/or profit (as the liberal labour systems). Concrete instances are fair trade, NGOs for health assistance in developing countries, the so-called “epistemic communities” transferring knowledge and learning outside the commercial circuits. The main problem here is represented by the political system, no longer able to represent and govern civil society. Civil society enhances its developing potentials far beyond the ruling and controlling abilities of the political systems (local, national, and supranational) In some cases, in fact, we see that the political systems try to corrupt civil society, because they introduce into civil society such ideological and interest-based divisions typical of the political parties, rather than directing the civil actors towards the promotion of the common good. The principles of Catholic social doctrine—as regards the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity—have been expressed as having the political constitutions of the national states and of the supranational political systems (such as the EU) as a horizon. But the age of political constitutions of state-nations is disappearing (it survives in those areas having yet to pass through the construction of a state-nation, as the ex-Yugoslavia, the Balkans, some geopolitical areas of Africa and Asia). National states cannot N&V_Sum09.qxp 622 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 622 Pierpaolo Donati govern globalization. Nor can we think of the UNO as a supranational state.To cope with globalization, new political configurations are necessary on a supranational and infranational level, for which it can be useful to draw on the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity. Such principles must be interpreted in a new perspective, not of the national states, but rather of an emergent global civil society, not limited and bound to the frontiers of the national states any more. The principles that are the foundation of the action systems fit to generate common goods may constitute the fundamental axes of new modalities to elaborate and promote the rights-duties of persons and social formations in the networks of civil society, emerging form the processes of globalization: this is the theme of civil constitutions. It has to do with charters or statutes drawn up by civil bodies, rather than by the political apparatuses of the national states, self-regulating the actions of the civil subjects operating in a certain activity sector.The activities may be economic, mass media, social, and cultural ones.We may find some examples in the statutes of ILO and WTO, internationally forbidding juvenile work, or in the charters approved by journalists’ international organizations, forbidding the exploitation of children in television advertising. Civil constitutions are normative dispositions having the following features. (1) They are “constitutional” because they concern the field of the fundamental rights of the human person (let us think of bioethics, labour, and consumption). (2) They are civil because the social subjects, to which these constitutions are addressed to define a complexity of rights and duties, have a civil, rather than political, feature (they are not the expression of political parties or political coalitions, but of the associational world in the economy and in the non-profit sectors, for example, WTO, NGOs, etc.). (3) They give shape to deliberative, rather than representative, forms of democracy, since the social subjects to which civil constitutions are addressed (and applied) are, at the same time, the subjects that have to enhance them through forms of societary governance (not political government); in other words, the subjects of such constitutions are at the same time the bearers of rights and duties and the actors responsible for their implementation. These civil constitutions are quite independent from territorial boundaries, because they are elaborated and implemented by global networks, often international ones, made of civil subjects. So they place themselves alongside of (not against) the classical political relation of citizenship (namely the relation between the individual citizen and the national State), assuming certain functions, particularly of advocacy and empowerment of rights-duties of persons and social bodies. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 623 The Common Good as a Relational Good 623 This is the new scenario making obsolete the liberal-labour configuration of society. Social sciences have coined several terms to capture this new reality.We talk of “society of networks” or “network society” (Manuel Castells), of “city by projects” (Luc Boltansky and Eve Chiapello), of “atopia” (what exists anywhere), which takes the place of utopia (what exists nowhere) (Helmut Willke).We talk of a “relational society.” All these expressions suggest the birth of a society that is a pluralist whole of spheres, somehow de-territorialized, where different criteria of justice (and ultimately of justification) are valid. The phenomenon of “pluralization of the spheres of justice” spreads without solving the problem of how to put the more and more differentiated spheres of justice in relation with one another (a problem left unsolved by Michael Walzer). To address that problem, we need a “relational reason” that is capable of “meta-reflexivity”. From this point of view, the principles of social doctrine that configure a social system capable of generating the common good appear to be exactly what we need in order to meet the new demands of a “relational” society. The mix of subsidiarity and solidarity (the axis A–I of Figure 1) may lead to building social practices that, from the one side, are sensitive to basic human rights and, from the other, are able to generate those common goods that neither political command nor the economic motive of profit can realize. There are many examples of social practices reflecting, in some ways even if not completely, such a new spirit.We may mention some of them: the économie solidaire, the economy of communion, the local Alliances for the family (Lokale Bündnisse für die Familie ), the food bank, electronic giving and sharing, NGOs like Médecins sans Frontières, the microcredit run by non-profit entrepreneurs, the ethical banks, and so on. We need to start a new process of reflection to examine whether, how far, and in what ways these initiatives are sensitive to human rights and allow new common goods to emerge through the joint work of solidarity and subsidiarity, each of them operating in its “sphere of justice.” The task of analyzing the aforesaid concrete examples in the light of the theory summarized here (Figures 1, 2, and 3) is still unfinished. Such an analysis should show under which conditions so-called “good practices” actually produce new common goods or are lacking in this. In the current state of things, it seems that the initiatives mentioned here need a more precise and shared theoretical-practical context, underlining how subsidiarity and solidarity cannot currently produce common goods if they do not operate as forms of recognition of the dignity and rightsduties (munera ) of the human person, in the various social spheres. N&V_Sum09.qxp 624 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 624 Pierpaolo Donati To pursue the common good in a generalized way, we need to widen the range of reason; namely, human reason has to be put in the position to see and handle the qualities of the action systems generating common good. In such systems, the subsidiarity-solidarity relation has certainly a central role. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the more delicate and critical dimensions are the forms of recognition of human rights, always running the risk of being ideological or reductive of human dignity. Contemporary Western culture urgently needs to elaborate a theory of recognition of human rights while not losing the peculiar quality of the human. Surely modernity has expressed a strong ethical tension in elaborating the forms of recognition based on love (friendship), rights (legal relations), and solidarity (community of value). Nevertheless, the current phenomena of de-humanization go far beyond the forecast of modernity. We talk of the coming of a post-human, trans-human, in-human, suprahuman era.We talk of hybridization and metamorphosis of humankind. These phenomena create such radical challenges that we need a new vision: we have to re-configure human rights from the point of view of the common good, that is, to conceive human rights as common goods. A society wanting to pursue the common good in a progressive and not regressive (not to mention ideological) way must reformulate its recognition of what is human through good practices, that is, practices which can be called “good” insofar as they combine four elements: the gift of dignity conferred to the human person, interdependency among people, acting to empower the other, and caring for the relations among persons as goods in themselves (the common good as a relational good). These elements are relational in themselves and relational to one another. Each element is a relation endowed with its own sense, having to realize itself at the same time in relation with the other. Each one makes sense in relation with the others, not according to a sequence of “dialectic overcoming” between a thesis and an antithesis that should “unite them while preserving their inner truth without any contradiction to each other” in a utopian “synthesis” (the common good is not like this), but as relations (reciprocal actions!) concurring to actualize the common good in the different social spheres. N&V N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 625 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 625–52 625 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason DANIEL P. M AHER Assumption College Worcester, Massachusetts T HE MOST widely noted aspect of Pope Benedict’s speech at the University of Regensburg in September of 2006 has been his quotation of a brief passage from an otherwise obscure text that, with “startling brusqueness,” speaks ill of Islam.1 The Holy Father stated that he found this brusqueness “unacceptable,” but, evidently, not so unacceptable as to preclude his quoting it. His willingness to use the text has been judged still more unacceptable by large numbers of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. And this reaction in its various forms has diverted attention from and nearly overwhelmed the central message of the speech.That message focuses on the adequacy of human reason for coming to know God. According to Benedict’s text, the quotation that has received so much attention serves merely as a starting-point for his reflections on the relation of faith and reason. He begins with Islam as one foil against which he presents the harmony of faith and reason.The second and main foil is not Islam, but what he calls “modern reason,” “positivistic reason,” or reason under a self-imposed limitation. Against a faith that denies God’s reasonableness and against a rationality that denies faith’s reasonableness, Benedict articulates the harmony of faith and reason.2 The present essay 1 Pope Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflec- tions” (University of Regensburg, 12 September 2006), ¶3. The translation is taken from www.vatican.va and will be cited parenthetically in the text as “Faith” along with the paragraph number.The German text is available from the same source and retains the same paragraph divisions. 2 James Schall emphasizes the significance of Benedict’s speech for reinvigorating the proper understanding of the university as the proper place for the cultivation of this harmony. See his The Regensburg Lecture (South Bend, Ind.: St.Augustine’s Press, 2007), especially 18–40. N&V_Sum09.qxp 626 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 626 Daniel P. Maher examines Benedict’s argument for this harmony and then turns to the encyclical Deus Caritas Est for illustrative examples of various kinds of harmonious co-operation between faith and reason.3 Introductory Remarks It is helpful to begin with an initial sketch of a few distinctions that are operative in Benedict’s speech.The title,“Faith, Reason, and the University: Memories and Reflections,” announces the main theme of faith and reason. Benedict uses each of these terms in multiple senses. The most prominent senses of “faith” distinguished in the speech are Christianity and Islam. In addition to these opposed forms of faith, of course, there also are opposed forms of Christianity. Similarly, “reason” has multiple, opposed meanings in the speech. One form of reason is modern scientific reason and another form is philosophical reason. Again, philosophical reason, too, appears in multiple and opposed forms. When Benedict goes on to speak of harmony between faith and reason, not all forms of reason are equally harmonious with all forms of faith. Indeed, it seems that one of the goals of the speech is to show that, despite the distinction between faith and reason, Christian faith and philosophical reason may have more or more important things in common with one another than either has with Islam or with modern rationalism. Benedict’s portrayal of possible harmony between faith and reason makes intelligible the activity of theology, understood as rational inquiry that begins with the acceptance of the deposit of faith.4 In addition to developed or sophisticated rational activities like theology, philosophy, and science, Benedict also draws our attention to the ordinary human rationality that is presupposed by each of them.We must recognize that human rationality does not originate in the form of science or philosophy. Ordinary experience and the effort to understand the world precede the appearance of philosophy, which comes on the scene as part of the human effort to remedy and correct the fallibility and error ingredient to ordinary opinion. Philosophy is originally the attempt to perfect our rationality, which we first exercise in ordinary experience. 3 Encyclical Letter Deus Caritas Est of the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XVI to the Bishops, Priests, and Deacons, Men and Women Religious, and All the Lay Faithful, On Christian Love (25 December 2005).The translation is taken from www.vatican.va and will be cited parenthetically in the text as DCE along with the section number. 4 Benedict speaks of theologians “inquiring about the reasonableness of faith” (“Faith,” ¶1) and, using almost the same formulation, he refers to theology “precisely as theology, as inquiry into the rationality of faith” (als eigentliche Theologie, als Frage nach der Vernunft des Glaubens ) (ibid., ¶15). He also says, “theologians seek to correlate [faith] with reason as a whole” (ibid., ¶1). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 627 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 627 Whereas modern science tends to depreciate the epistemic significance of the ordinary grasp of the world and to prefer the results of science as the decisive or final truth, Benedict wants to appeal to our common rationality that precedes science and to defend philosophy and theology as belonging to “the right use of reason” (“Faith,” ¶1). Our common rationality needs his support because human confidence in ordinary rationality comes under tremendous pressure both from some theological views (Christian and non-Christian in origin) and from some scientific views. In this speech Benedict emphasizes the way in which Islam can be used to stress divine transcendence to such a degree that all trust in human reason is voided. Also, he emphasizes the way in which the power of modern science, as the authoritative form of human knowing, leads us to dismiss as false or unreliable our ordinary grasp of the world. According to the positivistic view of reason Benedict criticizes, the sorts of questions that animate philosophy and theology—because they cannot be addressed in scientific ways—must be set aside as meaningless or nonrational. Benedict aims to separate faith and theology from the irrationalism of some forms of Islam and to separate reason and philosophy from the truncated form of modern scientific rationalism.This opens the door to the harmony of faith and reason. The preceding sketch provides some indication of the analysis of Benedict’s argument that follows below. The first two sections of this essay deal with the two parts of the Regensburg speech.The first part of Benedict’s speech is especially devoted to articulating the rationality or reasonableness of God and God’s actions in contrast to claims that God’s ways are so far beyond human reason as to be unintelligible to us. And the first section of this essay explains how Benedict presents the accessibility of God to human reason. The second part of Benedict’s speech analyzes the effort to dehellenize Christianity as an attempt to replace the Greek conception of rationality with the modern scientific conception. The second section of this essay explains Benedict’s argument that reason must extend more broadly than the modern scientific form of reason, at least insofar as we must recognize the rational legitimacy of philosophy and theology.The two parts of Benedict’s speech together can be understood to create the space for the harmony of faith and reason because in them Benedict shows how the recovery of a broadened understanding of reason makes it possible for us to recognize the intelligibility of God.The third section of this essay turns to Deus Caritas Est in order to show how Benedict has displayed there three distinct modes of the harmonious cooperation of reason and faith. N&V_Sum09.qxp 628 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 628 Daniel P. Maher Reason and God The pope began his speech at Regensburg by telling a joke about atheism. More precisely, Pope Benedict repeated a former colleague’s gibe that pokes fun at professors and at believers. Believers amuse because they are sometimes naive and professors amuse because they are sometimes, at least from the point of view of common sense, senseless in their pursuit of rationality.This sort of joke has such a long pedigree that it deserves to be considered with some seriousness.5 The originator of Pope Benedict’s joke made professors who are believers the target of his ridicule: “a colleague had said there was something odd about our university: it had two faculties devoted to something that did not exist: God” (“Faith,” ¶4).The surface of the joke ribs the academics and their penchant for pointless investigations and tedious repetition. The heart of the joke is the declaration of atheism.The heart of the joke divides people into those who “know” there is no God and those who, nevertheless, continue to investigate or seek or speak about him. The character of the “knowing” here is not specialized, academic, insider’s knowledge, as if this were a joke that only economists or physicists could find funny.The knowing mentioned is ordinary, everyday knowledge, and the joke is about the persistence of what might be called superstition.6 The charge of persistent superstition is softened and made friendly by its being covered over with an image of academic buffoonery, as if theism were nothing more than a charming eccentricity. 5 Seriously rational men have been entertaining Thracian maids and others at least since Thales. See Plato, Theaetetus 174a–b. Diogenes Laertius records a slightly different version (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers I, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 34). For a modern appreciation, see Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing? trans.W. B. Barton and Vera Deutsch (South Bend, Ind.: Regnery/Gateway, 1967), 2–4. Heidegger draws attention to Socrates’s claim in Plato’s version: “This jest also fits all those who become involved in philosophy.” Socrates himself has always been associated with awareness of the conditions presupposed by his own activity. For a modern image of senseless rationality in its scientific form, see Friedrich Nietzsche,“The Leech,” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans.Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), 248–51.This version could easily be turned against Benedict’s former colleague. 6 See “Faith,” ¶12, where Benedict asserts that the modern concept of reason and the standard imposed by modern scientific method causes the question of God to appear “unscientific or pre-scientific.” Faith appears to be identical with credulousness, that is, naive, uneducated opinion. For a contemporary articulation of the distinction between theological faith and ordinary opinion, see Robert Sokolowski, “Philosophy and the Christian Act of Faith,” in Christian Faith and Human Understanding (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 25–37. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 629 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 629 Because this simple joke arises from and reflects the modern form of reason Benedict wants to discuss, it serves to introduce the central theme of the speech. The joke characterizes Christian faith as superstition and atheism as comparatively respectable. To some extent, the plausibility of these views is itself an expression of the popular influence of the successful part of the modern form of reason: modern natural science. The prominence of science in contemporary life exerts tremendous influence as the authoritative form of knowing. What is not known or not yet known according to scientific methods or procedures is ordinarily regarded as not genuinely known, but only believed. To cling with faith to what is not scientifically known or not scientifically knowable is, in the presence of science as the standard of knowledge, hard to distinguish from superstition or what Pope Benedict calls “the realm of the subjective” (“Faith,” ¶13). Common sense itself has become informed by science. More precisely, it has become informed by a popular and somewhat superficial appreciation of the power of science. Especially (but not exclusively) through the pervasiveness of technology in our lives, modern scientific reason dominates our world and comes to shape our thinking to the point that awareness of sophisticated, rationalist atheism becomes a component of common opinion. Even if we do not hold atheistic opinions, we remain aware of the modern tendency to regard Christianity as unscientific and as belonging to the past.These matters are so thoroughly a part of our thinking that when a pope repeats a German professor’s fifty-year-old joke, without explanation, everybody gets it. We are aware that we live peaceably, side-by-side with atheists, many of whom base their atheism on modern science (or claim to do so).The Christian and the atheist agree on the reliability of the science that enables them both to conceive of the earth as a planet orbiting the sun and to travel by airplane or communicate by telephone.7 Science unites us, even if our moral and religious beliefs, which we are accustomed to regard as personal or private, remain fundamentally opposed.8 Our reliance on technology is only the most obvious way in which modernity shapes our common life. People who consider themselves un-modern or even anti-modern often do not realize the extent to 7 Cf. Deus Caritas Est, §30a:“Today the means of mass communication have made our planet smaller.” It is not insignificant when a pope uses an astronomical term to designate the earth. 8 It is not quite true to say this of some manifestations of Islam, which do seem to want to reject modern science and its manipulation of nature. But it does remain true that the contemporary Islamic opponents of the West acknowledge that there is no effective substitute for Western technology when they learn how to use and become reliant upon, for example, airplanes, the Internet, and plastic explosives detonated by cell phones. N&V_Sum09.qxp 630 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 630 Daniel P. Maher which modernity, especially through common opinion, has shaped them before they have begun to reject it. The unreflective way in which very many people resort to modern understandings of rights or culture or history are simple manifestations of this. It goes without saying that ideas are not bad or false because they are modern any more than they are true or good because they are old. The point is that these ideas dominate our common discourse and thus tend to shape our thinking without our awareness. For all of us, taking critical distance from modernity in order to understand it is a matter of learning and of un-learning habits of mind. In a sense, then, the rationalist professor’s joke is on all of us who get it. We are the ones who are under the sway, more or less, of the modern form of reason and we are more or less aware of that fact. To return, now, from these matters to the Holy Father’s use of this joke, we note that he seems to have taken no offense from it. He does not respond with a joke of his own at the expense of atheists.9 Instead, he appropriates the joke to make an observation about the role of reason for believer and unbeliever alike: despite the serious and fundamental division between atheism and faith and despite the ridicule contained in the joke, the “profound sense of coherence within the universe of reason was not troubled” (“Faith,” ¶1).10 Precisely because believers and unbelievers can share laughter about the silly manner in which some pursue rationality we see that reason itself unites the believers and the atheists. Indeed, reason makes them the same. Reason is what they share and the medium in which they communicate with and understand one another, despite their profound differences. The sense of reason at issue here is more fundamental than the highly specialized form of scientific reason. One of the main goals of Benedict’s speech is to recover some respect for this 9 One could say that Benedict gently turns the lesson of the joke against people like its author. If the point of the joke is that those who exercise reason must not forget the condition of the possibility of the exercise of reason (lest they fall in a well, as it were), Benedict’s concluding remarks issue the same cautionary warning without the mockery: “The West has long been endangered by this aversion to the questions which underlie its rationality, and can only suffer great harm thereby” (“Faith,” ¶16).Virgil Nemoianu notes the same pastoral gentleness in Cardinal Ratzinger’s exchange with Habermas. Cf. Nemoianu, “The Church and the Secular Establishment,” Logos 9 (Spring 2006): 36–38. 10 Pope Benedict interprets the joke generously and, since he was there and he knows the original speaker of these words, one must concede to him that no serious attack on the theology faculties lies within the joke. Nevertheless, in light of what the Holy Father goes on to say about the second stage of dehellenization (“Faith,” ¶11–13 and ¶15–16), one must also recognize that some serious members of the “universe of reason” may in fact look forward to the withering away of theology from the university. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 631 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 631 more basic sense of reason. Human beings are rational not only when we are scientific; we are rational also in the pre-scientific and ordinary use of reason.The Holy Father needs to appeal to this more fundamental level in order to indicate the path to overcoming the division between an Islamic extremist, a Christian believer, and a rationalist atheist.11 Reasonableness makes all of us the same as one another. Moreover, as he argues in the first half of the speech, reasonableness makes us one with God. Benedict’s argument requires the recovery of ordinary rationality and of the rational grasp of God. The joke’s role in this argument is ambiguous. As originally delivered, the joke appeals to common sense as informed by the specialized rationality of modern science. It both relies upon ordinary reason and exhibits the scientific depreciation of ordinary reason. As appropriated by the Holy Father, the joke serves a different purpose. Whereas the professor meant to disparage ordinary reason, the pope means to rehabilitate it as part of an attempt to rehabilitate the rationality of other non-scientific forms of reason, namely, philosophy and theology.12 The first half of the speech is especially devoted to articulating the coherence of faith and philosophical rationality; the second half of the speech is especially devoted to showing that even modern science requires a philosophical form of reason. All of this is folded into the joke. Because of the way the joke implies the incompatibility of faith and reason, it serves to introduce each of the central ideas of the whole speech. We must admire the complexity Benedict has incorporated into such a simple joke. Let us return once more to the speech itself and see how Benedict enters into the topic treated in the first half. He mentions this joke in the process of recollecting certain aspects of his days at the University of Bonn. It is not the experience of being at Regensburg and of being once again in the university atmosphere that calls up these recollections. The joke is not merely an amusing anecdote, marginally related to the central 11 In his reply to this speech—”Ein Bewusstsein von dem, was fehlt über Glauben und Wissen und den Defaitismus der modernen Vernunft,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 10 February 2007—Jürgen Habermas disagrees with Benedict regarding what constitutes “common reason,” but he agrees that that is the focal point: “Fides quaerens intellectum—so begrüssenswert die Suche nach der Vernünftigkeit des Glaubens ist, so wenig hilfreich scheint es mir zu sein, jene drei Enthellenisierungsschübe, die zum modernen Selbstverständnis der säkularen Vernunft beigetragen haben, aus der Genealogie der ‘gemeinsamen Vernunft’ von Gläubigen, Ungläubigen und Andersgläubigen auszublenden.” 12 See, for example, Benedict, “Faith,” ¶15: “The intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening our concept of reason and its application.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 632 Daniel P. Maher 632 theme of the speech. Instead, he says, the recollections (including the joke) are called to mind by his reading of Professor Theodore Khoury’s edition of a fourteenth-century dialogue, between a Byzantine emperor and an educated Persian, treating, among other matters, the relation between three laws (corresponding to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). The pope selects one point from the dialogue to begin his reflections on faith and reason:“[H]ere I would like to discuss only one point—which, in the context of the issue of ‘faith and reason’, I found interesting and which can serve as the starting-point for my reflections on this issue” (“Faith,” ¶2). The reflections concern the issue of faith and reason. The reflections take as their starting-point a remark by the emperor about the attempt to spread faith through violence. “Not acting reasonably (rt̀m kócx is contrary to God’s nature. . . . Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats. . . .To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind.”13 As a preliminary observation, it should be noted that, despite their being made in the context of the use of violence by members of a particular religious tradition, these claims are non-sectarian. Any religious attempt to use violence would serve the essential purpose here.14 It should also be noted that the joke is equally non-sectarian. The joke could be made in the context of any theology faculty. The form of reasoning that ends in the joke begins with the dismissal of all faith as superstition.At this point, these considerations make it seem that the joke and the emperor’s remarks contribute more or less equally to the identification of the theme of Benedict’s reflections.Whereas the joke presents a modern form of tension between faith and reason, the emperor’s words evoke the problem in a different way, which precedes modernity and yet remains with us today. Against the conception of God as utterly transcendent and unintelligible in his power, the Holy Father affirms the “profound harmony” (“Faith,” ¶5) of the God of faith with human reason. At the same time, the Holy Father affirms the legitimacy of inquiry into God as a proper exercise of human reason, over against those Ï 13 The words quoted are those of the emperor. They appear in paragraph 3 of Benedict’s speech. Benedict cites this source:Theodore Khoury, ed., “Manuel II Paléologue, Entretiens avec un Musulman. 7e Controverse,” Sources Chrétiennes, n. 115, (Paris, 1966). 14 It seems that for the pope’s essential point about the relation of God, soul, faith, reason, and violence, the specific case of Islam is accidental. He might have chosen a different example to make the same point.That said, it does not seem to be accidental that, in present circumstances, he chose Islam. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 633 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 633 who view all speech about God as belonging to myth (“Faith,” ¶6) and as a failure to be rational.15 He navigates between two poles, one that locates God far above human reason and one that locates God beneath. The focal point is the articulation of reason (1) against those who agree that God has revealed himself, but claim that God’s revelation squelches rationality, and (2) against those who agree that human reason reveals to us the world, but claim that it reveals a world without God. The same focus on the proper grasp of reason can be framed negatively: (1) on the one hand, if reason genuinely were only the modern, shrunken form of reason, it might deserve condemnation in the name of God; (2) on the other hand, if God were understood as God is presented by those who use violence to spread belief, reason suggests or supports atheism.16 To address the substance of the emperor’s claims, we note that Benedict uses two formulas to express the focal point, one negative and one positive. Negatively, he returns again and again to the thesis that “not acting reasonably” or “not acting with logos” is contrary to God’s nature. Positively, Benedict asserts that God has revealed himself as logos. The conviction that acting unreasonably contradicts God’s nature is, Benedict says, a Greek idea.The opening of the Gospel of John (“In the beginning was the logos”), Benedict says, pronounces “the final word on the biblical concept of God” (“Faith,” ¶5). In view of the title and central assertion of his encyclical Deus Caritas Est, this is an extraordinary statement from Benedict. James Schall points in this direction when he writes, “Thus as the Pope’s first Encyclical might be called ‘Deus est agape,’ so this lecture is ‘Deus est logos.’ ”17 Indeed, where the Regensburg speech tends to make the biblical and Greek view of God sound almost the same, the encyclical tends to emphasize the fact that the biblical or Christian view transcends the philosophical view: “The world of the Bible presents us with a new image of God” (DCE, §9).18 Saying that God is love is not the same as saying that God is logos, even if it is true that God is both logos 15 See Benedict, “Faith,” ¶6. Benedict presents the biblical revelation of God as a challenge, analogous to the Socratic challenge, to mythical presentations of the divine. For the Socratic challenge see, for example, Plato’s Republic 377e–391e. 16 Compare Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, ed. Florian Schuller, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 64–66. 17 James Schall, The Regensburg Lecture, 123. 18 Also in Deus Caritas Est, §11, Benedict writes,“The first novelty of biblical faith consists, as we have seen, in its image of God.” Additionally, Benedict refers to Aristotle’s thought as “the height of Greek philosophy,” but notes that his view of God falls short of the biblical view precisely on the understanding of whether God is the object of love or himself a personal lover (ibid., §9). N&V_Sum09.qxp 634 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 634 Daniel P. Maher and love. In Deus Caritas Est, Benedict writes: “God is the absolute and ultimate source of all being; but this universal principle of creation—the Logos, primordial reason—is at the same time a lover with all the passion of a true love” (DCE, §10).Also,“The ancient world had dimly perceived that man’s real food—what truly nourishes him as man—is ultimately the Logos, eternal wisdom: this same Logos now truly becomes food for us— as love” (DCE, §13).The thesis that God is good in himself and the thesis that God is benevolent toward human beings, whether taken separately or in combination, obviously are not equivalent to the thesis that God, in himself, is love. It has been revealed that God is love; this does not seem to be the sort of thing that might have been discerned by reason. It seems, rather, to require revelation (like the doctrine of the Trinity), since it concerns the inner life of God.The encyclical unambiguously preserves the difference between the pagan and the biblical understandings of God. This helps us avoid misreading the speech as if its emphasis on the congruity of philosophy and theology implied identical understandings of God. Perhaps when Benedict calls this the final word on the biblical concept of God, he understands logos as Word and as implying the doctrine of the Trinity. Obviously, if this is the case, the theological or biblical sense of logos exceeds the philosophical sense and yet Benedict can still assert that agreement obtains between the philosophical and theological understandings. Thus Benedict is able to declare, “From the very heart of the Christian faith and, at the same time, the heart of Greek thought now joined to faith, Manuel II was able to say: Not to act ‘with logos’ is contrary to God’s nature” (“Faith,” ¶6).19 The careful formulation Benedict uses here preserves Greek thought and Christian faith as two distinct elements; it does not collapse their difference and fuse them into an identity, even when both faith and reason use the same formula to speak about God. Preserving the duality of Christian faith and Greek thought suggests that philosophy and theology coincide or agree in this thesis and yet it underscores the fact that they assert this thesis in two distinct ways.The Socratic critique of the irrationality of myth “stands in close analogy” to the biblical revelation and its “new understanding of God,” which “separates this God from all other divinities” (“Faith,” ¶6).Whereas the Socratic critique rejects the ignobility of the mythical gods from the standpoint of rationality, the biblical revelation goes deeper than the philosophical grasp of 19 “Manuel II. hat wirklich aus dem inneren Wesen des christlichen Glaubens heraus und zugleich aus dem Wesen des Griechischen, das sich mit dem Glauben verschmolzen hatte, sagen können: Nicht ‘mit dem Logos’ handeln, ist dem Wesen Gottes zuwider.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 635 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 635 the divine and yet confirms, in a way, the philosophical view that God is not against reason. Philosophic reason recognizes that irrationality is not worthy of God and yet does not and cannot attain to the content of revelation. God alone reveals himself as logos in a way that transcends every mythical presentation of the divine, every man-made idol, and even the divine nature grasped by the philosophers. Benedict speaks of a harmony here between the Greek philosophical idea and the biblical revelation that begins in the Old Testament and culminates in John’s thesis. Philosophy and philosophy’s distinctive manner of grasping this thesis are not simply absorbed into theology and the theological mode of grasping the divine with faith.“Harmony” between philosophy and theology requires them to remain distinct from one another. Philosophy retains its autonomy and integrity and, thus, its distinctive understanding, as a genuine achievement of reason.20 Reason and Science The first eight paragraphs of the Regensburg speech are devoted mainly to this encounter of the Greek and biblical understandings of the divine. In the remaining eight paragraphs of the speech, the Holy Father traces the relation of Christian faith and human reason from what he identifies as an initial consonance in the recognition of the reasonableness of God and God’s ways to the rejection of this integration and the effort to dehellenize Christianity. Benedict identifies three waves or stages in the project of dehellenization. He characterizes the first stage as part of the Reformation-era attempt to bypass philosophy and to eliminate rational metaphysics in order to return to faith rooted solely in Scripture (“Faith,” ¶10). He gives only a brief mention of the contemporary, third stage of dehellenization, which he characterizes as the attempt to separate the Hellenistic culture surrounding the early Church from the simple and 20 For a complete discussion of the distinction summarized here between the Chris- tian sense of the divine and the sense of the divine evident to pagan philosophers and theologians, see Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology (Washington, DC:The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), especially chapters 5 and 10, and Christian Faith and Human Understanding, especially chapters 1 through 4. Sokolowski emphasizes the “shift” in human thought that is required once we come to understand the sense of the divine required in Christian belief. Christian faith does not simply add to the understanding of God that is achieved by reason; Christian faith presents a new understanding of the divine, which, as a matter of historical fact, was simply not achieved apart from revelation (see Deus Caritas Est, §9). The achievements of reason independent of revelation are not negated, but appreciated anew in the context of a deeper understanding. N&V_Sum09.qxp 636 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 636 Daniel P. Maher prior and presumably universal New Testament message (“Faith,” ¶14). Benedict devotes by far the greater part of his remarks to the second stage of the dehellenizing process. To illustrate this stage, he singles out as its “outstanding representative” Adolf von Harnack, whose “goal was to bring Christianity back into harmony with modern reason, liberating it, that is to say, from seemingly philosophical and theological elements, such as faith in Christ’s divinity and the triune God” (“Faith,” ¶11). He meant to set theology in its rightful place within the university shaped by modern scientific reason. The “harmony” between faith and reason that would be the goal of this project mimics the harmony between faith and reason that emerged from the original and, in Benedict’s view, providential encounter between the biblical message and Greek thinking (“Faith,” ¶5). The original harmony obtained when a philosophically purified understanding of the divine nature was coordinated with the elevating message of Christian revelation; the new harmony attempts to rid theology of those elements that cannot be drawn down to a “self-limitation” (Selbstbeschränkung ) (“Faith,” ¶11) and “reduction” (Verkürzung ) (“Faith,” ¶12) of reason.The critique of this modern concept of reason is the Holy Father’s target in the whole speech (see especially “Faith,” ¶15). Modernity constricts reason, and then the second stage of dehellenization attempts to constrict faith to the standards laid down by the constricted form of reason. These standards are, according to Pope Benedict, Cartesianism (which he identifies as a form of Platonism) and empiricism (“Faith,” ¶11). The story of modernity remains complex and controversial; doubtless, there will be criticisms brought against his claim concerning the synthesis of these two poles of thought.There is need for a much fuller development of Benedict’s understanding of the synthesis of Cartesianism and empiricism.At the present time, it is useful to add a few comments about modernity, even if they must remain brief and incomplete. Cartesianism, or Platonism, “presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its intrinsic rationality, which makes it possible to understand how matter works and use it efficiently” (“Faith,” ¶11). The empirical component is “nature’s capacity to be exploited for our purposes, and here only the possibility of verification or falsification through experimentation can yield decisive certainty” (“Faith,” ¶11). In these formulations, Cartesianism and empiricism are essentially epistemological in their focus. They express the relation between the soul, or mind, and nature, or matter. In order to understand the synthesis of these two elements, we note that their point of contact is the use or manipulation of nature. Modernity comes to light, then, as a search for certain knowledge of nature for the N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 637 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 637 sake of mastery. Benedict does not expressly say so, but it is possible to understand the synthesis of Cartesianism and empiricism in terms of this overarching goal of mastery. In this understanding, the mathematical conception of nature is not accidentally related to the goal of mastery. Instead, we recognize that the drive to master nature effectively requires that nature be conceived mathematically.The modern concept of nature, in Hans Jonas’s memorable phrase, contains “manipulability at its theoretical core.”21 As Cartesianism and empiricism agree in the understanding of nature, so they agree in the concept correlative to nature: soul, or mind. Rationalists like Descartes and empiricists like John Locke, whatever else their differences, share to a certain extent what may be called the modern doctrine of the soul. According to this view, the soul is the principle of human knowledge, but it is not the form of the body and not the source of motion in the living body. Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, and Thomas Aquinas, to name a few important representatives of the premodern tradition, understood the soul to be the principle of human knowledge, but also the principle of vital motion in the body. The modern approach, by contrast, conceives soul essentially as a mind or ego or self, which remains problematically related to the human body.22 The human body is understood to be one part of the larger material whole, called nature, the manipulable object of modern science.23 Thus, the epistemological standards of modern thought (expressed in Cartesianism/ Platonism and empiricism) can be understood to be intimately related to the modern goal of the mastery of nature.24 Mastery of nature is pursued for the relief and benefit of man’s estate, that is, with a humanitarian 21 Hans Jonas,“Seventeenth Century and After:The Meaning of the Scientific and Technological Revolution,” in Philosophical Essays (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 48. The significance of the new concept of nature is stressed by Ratzinger in his dialogue with Habermas. See Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, 69–71.The separation of reason from nature is another way of expressing the distinction of soul, or mind, from body, or nature. 22 This conception of soul explains why, in Deus Caritas Est (§5), Benedict finds it necessary to correct a prevalent misunderstanding and emphasize the union of soul and body in order to articulate the proper understanding of human erotic love. 23 Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, 65. 24 See Jacob Klein, “Modern Rationalism,” Lectures and Essays, ed. Robert B. Williamson and Elliott Zuckerman (Annapolis, Md.: St. John’s College Press, 1985), 53–64; Richard Kennington, “The ‘Teaching of Nature’ in Descartes’s Soul Doctrine,” Review of Metaphysics 26 (1972): 86–117; Richard Kennington, “Descartes and Mastery of Nature,” in Organism, Medicine, and Metaphysics, ed. Stuart F. Spicker (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1978), 201–23. N&V_Sum09.qxp 638 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 638 Daniel P. Maher intention. And, according to the founders of modern thought, it is this beneficence, more than anything else, that distinguishes the modern form of reason from the pre-modern form.25 The goal is to solve, through human agency, the troubles besetting human life. This humanitarianism arises in the image and likeness of the service of charity, but it is not charity. It is a this-worldly solution to this world’s problems. It substitutes for the theological solution to original sin. At its heart, it is the modern origin of what, in Deus Caritas Est, Benedict calls “social assistance.” It is thus also unsurprising to see that the attempt to conform Christian revelation to modern scientific reason “would end up reducing Christianity to a mere fragment of its former self ” (“Faith,” ¶13). Against this constriction of faith to a shrunken reason, Benedict proposes that faith and reason must come together “in a new way” (“Faith,” ¶15). He deems it not enough to return to previous formulations and to repeat what was once adequate. It is not sufficient to declare that “truth does not contradict truth” and pronounce a blessing on modern science with naive optimism that, in the end, all it shows will prove to be in harmony with one’s catechism. Modern science is a form of reason, but a constricted form. The second stage of dehellenization shows that some advocates of modern science do not rest content with coexistence alongside Christian faith. The second stage asserts or presupposes the illegitimacy of faith in the face of that form of reason. In this conflict, modern scientific reason, owing especially to its apparent confirmation in our reliance on the technology science generates (“Faith,” ¶11), has tremendous rhetorical superiority over Christian faith for most people. Science is the authority we acknowledge in common by the way we live. Naive optimism that truth does not contradict truth is, in this context, akin to laying down one’s arms and giving away the store, so to speak. Benedict himself takes up metaphorical (as opposed to real) arms to stake out and defend a broadened grasp of the role of reason in human life.The scientific form of reason must be given its due, but the broader claims of a more complete sense of reason must also be advanced. Consequently, we are faced with a reduction of the radius of science and reason, one which needs to be questioned. . . . If science as a whole is this and this alone, then it is man himself who ends up being reduced, for the specifically human questions about our origin and destiny, the questions raised by religion and ethics, then have no place within the purview of collective reason as defined by 25 See Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, ed. G. W. Kitchin (London and Melbourne: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1973), 34–35. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 639 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 639 “science,” so understood, and must thus be relegated to the realm of the subjective. (“Faith,” ¶12–13) Benedict’s “critique of modern reason from within” (Selbstkritik der modernen Vernunft ) (“Faith,” ¶15), then, aims at the reinvigoration of a broader sense of human reason. The proper exercise of human reason does not begin with and is not to be identified with modern science. He wants to reassert the use of reason that precedes science and that helps us discover the need for science and establish the goals and methods of science. In our pre-scientific or extra-scientific lives, we properly exercise reason in non-scientific ways.As Robert Sokolowski has argued, we exert our rationality not only in traditional logical functions of judgment and inference, but also and most broadly in the introduction of syntax into our experience.26 Reason is at work in all intelligent perception and in the formation of opinion. These sorts of exercises of reason prepare for the specialized form that is science, which never completely replaces the need for the original, intelligent encounter with the world. Pope Benedict is not only reminding us that modern science presupposes pre-scientific experience in the world. He is more fundamentally defending philosophy and theology as the proper forms of reason for addressing essential human questions, which arise necessarily from ordinary experience. He is defending them as proper forms of rational inquiry. Theology, as “inquiry into the rationality of faith” (“Faith,” ¶15), and philosophy, as inquiry into the rationality of ordinary human experience, belong in the university alongside modern science.27 The rationality of philosophy and theology needs to be rearticulated in the context of modern science, over against the tendency to reduce all that precedes science and all that is not science to mere opinion, prejudice, or superstition (“Faith,” ¶13). Descartes provides the paradigmatic expression of the attitude animating this tendency when he formulates his methodical doubt as the dismissal, as utterly false, of all opinions that can in the least be doubted. His subsequent re-admission of some of these opinions occurs on the terms of his rational method, which he brings forward as the sole arbiter of 26 See Sokolowski, “The Autonomy of Philosophy in Fides et Ratio,” chapter 1 in Christian Faith and Human Understanding. See also his book Phenomenology of the Human Person (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 27 Again, it is important to preserve philosophy and theology as two forms of rational inquiry.The two may even consider the very same experiences as starting points, but they do so in different ways.“For philosophy and, albeit in a different way, for theology, listening to the great experiences and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and those of the Christian faith in particular, is a source of knowledge” (“Faith,” ¶16) [emphasis added]. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 640 Daniel P. Maher 640 truth and falsity.28 It is undeniable, however, that Descartes’s method and the argument he makes for its superiority to “the speculative philosophy of the schools” are themselves the fruit of a philosophical exercise of reason and not the fruit of scientific reason.29 Science is a derivative form of human reason and we suffer great harm if we acquiesce to the widespread aversion to the non-scientific thinking that underlies scientific rationality (“Faith,” ¶16). Benedict pursues this line of argument in his concluding paragraph. He locates the necessary origins of modern scientific reason in uses of reason more fundamental than science itself. Moreover, ultimate questions belong to “other modes and planes of thought—to philosophy and theology” (“Faith,” ¶16). This kind of argument opens the way for those who are formed by modern science and respect its achievements to catch sight of the fact that science is not self-sufficient and cannot be exclusively the perfection of human reason. Thus Benedict’s speech is primarily philosophical. More precisely, in the name of theology he calls for the completion of what is essentially a philosophical task:“The courage to engage the whole breadth of reason, and not the denial of its grandeur—this is the programme with which a theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into the debates of our time” (“Faith,” ¶16). His “self-critique of modern reason” (“Faith,” ¶15) points to the need to draw in the claim of modern scientific reason to hold exclusive power to determine the true and the false and the need to expand our recognition of the range of reason’s activities. Benedict’s speech does not reject modern reason, but rationally displays that it represents a “reduction of the radius of science and reason” (“Faith,” ¶12). He calls for us to re-create the logical space necessary for the philosophical exercise of reason, which space is closed off whenever the positivistic interpretation of reason dominates. This philosophical achievement also makes room for a genuinely rational theology.The completion of Benedict’s proposal, then, requires us to articulate the proper character of philosophical reason such that it may be brought together with faith “in a new way” (“Faith,” ¶15).The model for the new harmony is the original harmony identified by Benedict earlier in his speech (“Faith,” ¶5–8). The new harmony cannot, however, be a simple repetition of old formulas.The old formulas will not hold the same power until we reinvigorate the philosophical exercise of reason in the contemporary context. The new way of bringing faith and reason together, consequently, also requires us to articulate a broadened concept of human reason that can acknowl28 Compare Descartes’s “First Meditation” with his “Sixth Meditation” in his Medi- tations on First Philosophy. 29 Consider the first, second, and sixth parts of Descartes’s Discourse on Method. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 641 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 641 edge the achievement of modern science without being overwhelmed by the constriction of reason that has characterized the dominant interpretation of modern science. Reason and Faith in Harmony In the Regensburg speech Pope Benedict articulates the possibility of the harmonious interaction of faith and reason. In the encyclical Deus Caritas Est, he displays the harmonious exercise of faith and reason in the contemporary context. In the speech, Benedict carves out the space for theology and philosophy between an Islamic form of anti-reason and a scientific form of self-constrained reason.The emphasis in the speech falls on the poles against which he distinguishes the common and broader form of reason. In the encyclical, Benedict displays the co-operative relationship between philosophical and theological uses of reason. The final section of this essay draws attention to three ways in which our reason in its ordinary and its philosophical forms can function in harmony with Christian faith.What follows does not provide a summary or analysis of the doctrine of the entire encyclical, but only illustrates the relation of reason and faith discernible within it. Reason as Preparatory for Faith Just as the Regensburg speech concludes with the necessity of recognizing the activity of reason that precedes science, so the encyclical recognizes that reason operates prior to one’s encounter with revelation. Indeed, the necessary exercise of reason and of philosophy prior to the emergence of science has a kind of parallel in the uses of reason that are presupposed by revelation and theology. Faith does not do away with the need for the natural and rational grasp of things. Instead, any effort to make the faith known must appeal to and draw upon the natural exercise of reason in order to make its content accessible. In the words of the Byzantine emperor, “Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats” (“Faith,” ¶3). The soul’s reasonableness precedes acceptance of the faith, and the one who spreads the faith must respect and appeal to this reasonableness. Without drawing explicit attention to it, Benedict carefully displays his awareness of this rhetorical situation. One illustration, then, of harmony between reason and faith arises because our natural experience of the world and our understanding of that experience provide the basis for our understanding the content of divine revelation.As Benedict puts it, Christianity is not “detached from the vital relations fundamental to human existence” and not “cut off from the N&V_Sum09.qxp 642 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 642 Daniel P. Maher complex fabric of human life”; he goes so far as to say that philosophical reflections on that experience can bring us to the threshold of faith (DCE, §7). Our natural understanding of the world, especially as it is perfected in philosophical reasoning, can be preparatory for faith. If we cannot ascend by our own powers from ordinary experience to faith, revelation must descend to our level and be expressed with reference to that ordinary experience.30 Thus, when it is revealed or when we are told, for example, that God is our father, we already have experience of and understanding of what fatherhood is.Whether our personal experience of fathers is good or bad, skewed or insightful, we know that there are good and bad fathers and we know something of what constitutes the excellence of a good father.This cognitive grasp of fatherhood precedes and conditions our access to what faith proposes about God as father. We understand, at first, the meaning of the revelation of God as father in light of our natural understanding of fatherhood and—apart from direct and miraculous illumination by God—our grasp of this revelation is limited by the imperfections of our knowledge of the natural meaning of fatherhood.The newly revealed theological teaching becomes accessible because of what we already know about fathers. A similar thing happens when we try to understand the mystery of God’s love and the statement that God is love.The explication of the theological meaning of love requires preliminary attention to the ordinary understanding of love:“we cannot simply prescind from the meaning of the word in the different cultures and in present-day usage” (DCE, §2).Thus, in the first part of the encyclical, the Holy Father emphasizes that the word love has many different meanings in human discourse, and he begins from this multiplicity of meanings (DCE, §2). About these multiple meanings, he asks essentially a philosophical question—whether love is one in form or many. Benedict tries to show that “the message of love proclaimed to us by the Bible and the Church’s Tradition has some points of contact with the common human experience of love” (DCE, §7). God’s revelation about love does not confront us with something wholly new, something completely alien from our experience, and Benedict emphasizes the “intrinsic link” between God’s love and human love (DCE, §1). In addition to the human experience of love, there are whole schools of thought about what love is or means and what God is, and it is in this context that 30 In the first paragraph of the encyclical, Benedict quotes the First Letter of John (4:16): “We have come to know and to believe in the love God has for us.” In the very next sentence he writes, “We have come to believe in God’s love: in these words the Christian can express the fundamental decision of his life.”The decision is necessarily preceded by some knowledge or understanding of what is to be accepted in faith. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 643 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 643 God’s revelation about love and about God as love appears. The Holy Father appeals not only to experience but especially to the authoritative opinions and thoughtful appropriations of that experience.31 Revelation does not obliterate human reason and it does not teach something so unprecedented that we have to abandon what we already know about the world and human nature. Instead, revelation first draws from and then transcends our ordinary understanding of love and the philosophical reflections on that ordinary understanding.32 Faith preserves the sphere in which natural human reason must be cultivated and perfected. In revelation we find the completion of reason, and we find unanticipated truths that are intelligible in their difference from what reason has disclosed already about nature. Just as our appreciation of divine paternity as first in itself never allows us to dispense with the understanding of the fatherhood that is first for us, so our understanding that God is love requires our thoughtful grasp of love as we meet with it naturally and as we grasp its several forms through reason and experience.This is one way in which philosophy assists theology; it helps prepare our understanding of the distinctively Christian as something that confirms reason and goes beyond it. Reason as Self-Critical Sometimes, instead of preparing us to grasp the content of revelation, our natural grasp of things becomes an obstacle to our acceptance of the faith. We have seen a prominent example of this in the Regensburg speech.The modern form of scientific reason presents a formidable obstacle to faith. Benedict’s response to this is a “critique of modern reason from within” (Selbstkritik der modernen Vernunft ) (“Faith,” ¶15). As pope, as a religious leader, he advances an argument that takes part in the self-correction of reason. He does not simply condemn positivistic science in the name of faith. Instead, he makes a rational argument about the proper use of reason.33 In the encyclical, we see another illustration in Benedict’s recounting of an objection against Church teaching on charity. The objec31 The very first footnote in the encyclical is to a text of Nietzsche, in which Niet- zsche declares that Christianity has corrupted the natural understanding of eros (Deus Caritas Est, §3). Benedict appeals to a philosopher to make revelation clear. 32 When Benedict presents the biblical view of God as both logos and love (discussed above), he adds:“Eros is thus supremely ennobled, yet at the same time it is so purified as to become one with agape” (Deus Caritas Est, §10). 33 James Schall emphasizes this in his introduction to The Regensburg Lecture (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007): “We are not asked to ‘believe’ the Pope in some theologically technical sense of that noble word.We are asked rather to grasp his argument” (10). Again, “Thus, this whole lecture is based upon a sustained argument about reason” (16). N&V_Sum09.qxp 644 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 644 Daniel P. Maher tion is raised in the name of justice as understood in Marxism (DCE, §26). Benedict introduces Marxism as insisting that the Church’s charitable activity participates in the preservation of an unjust social order.Through the construction of a just society, Marxism aims to eliminate the need for charity, which, to the Marxist, seems to be an ineffective or deplorable substitute for justice. Benedict says,“There is admittedly some truth to this argument, but also much that is mistaken” (DCE, §26). He goes on to say both that Marxist claims about the solution to social problems have proven to be illusory and that there must be “dialogue with all those seriously concerned for humanity and for the world in which we live” (DCE, §27). The correction of the illusions of Marxist thought can be made authoritatively on the basis of revelation, but it is also important that this take place at the level of practical reason and political philosophy.34 Benedict refers to the illusions, but the responsibility for achieving justice in the political order remains with practical reason and political philosophy. It does not become the responsibility of the Church’s charitable activity to produce a just social order. In light of the faith, the pope urges a corrected exercise of practical reason. This correction of reason does not involve replacing reason with something else. Faith does not supplant reason in any of its forms, as if faith could render mathematics or medicine or political thought unnecessary. The pursuit of justice as properly the function of practical reason is emphatically reaffirmed by the encyclical (DCE, §28). One could go so far as to say that the encyclical enjoins on us the rational pursuit of the question that animates Plato’s Republic: The State must inevitably face the question of how justice can be achieved here and now. But this presupposes an even more radical question: what is justice? The problem is one of practical reason; but if reason is to be exercised properly, it must undergo constant purification, since it can never be completely free of the danger of a certain ethical blindness caused by the dazzling effect of power and special interests. Here politics and faith meet. Faith by its specific nature is an encounter with the living God—an encounter opening up new horizons extending beyond the sphere of reason. But it is also a purifying 34 Virgil Nemoianu (“The Church and the Secular Establishment,” 17–42) makes a similar point in regard to Cardinal Ratzinger’s approach to Habermas in their dialogue held in January 2004 and published, in English, as The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion. Nemoianu writes:“Thus it appears that Joseph Ratzinger was wise to accept a sociohistorical level of reference, rather than to withdraw haughtily into the domain of dogmatic theology as had been often done in the past. Such a withdrawal inevitably closes a number of doors and raises perhaps insuperable difficulties to a genuine dialog” (34). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 645 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 645 force for reason itself. From God’s standpoint, faith liberates reason from its blind spots and therefore helps it to be ever more fully itself. Faith enables reason to do its work more effectively and to see its proper object more clearly. (DCE, §28a) This purification of reason urges that reason be reason. It does not add missing insights that are in principle inaccessible to reason.There are cases where revelation opens up an understanding of God or of love that does not appear to natural human reason. There, revelation takes us “beyond the sphere of reason.” Here, Benedict claims that faith helps reason accomplish better the activities that are proper to the realm of human reason.35 The inquiry into what justice is and the attempt to achieve justice in deed are tasks that belong to the secular realm (“the State”), and Benedict denies that the Church or religious leaders should usurp this function. The Church’s role is limited to encouraging and assisting the political agents in their own proper activities. This means, among other things, that Benedict and the Church urge the pursuit of political life precisely as the achievement of practical reason and political philosophy, not as expressions of faith or the work of the Church. Political movements and forms of political thought like Marxism require a reasoned, philosophical response, not simply a theological one. The Church is not indifferent to the character of the political order, but she recognizes that the care of the political order does not belong to her, but requires the cultivation of reason.36 Much of the encyclical appeals to this self-critical form of reason. Just as we have seen that a central goal of the second part is to purify the desire for justice from its corruption into Marxism, it seems true to say that a central goal of the first part is to purify eros from its corruption into bodily eroticism. For example, in his response to the objection made by Nietzsche (that Christianity had poisoned eros) (DCE, §3), Benedict repeatedly emphasizes that the Christian confirmation of the goodness of the body is an attempt to heal and purify eros. He says that the merely 35 This is what was meant when we concluded the second section of this essay by saying that Benedict’s Regensburg speech is primarily philosophical. It primarily aims to correct reason’s grasp of reason’s proper activity. 36 There is need for additional reflection on the relation of the political community to the message of the Gospel. In particular, such reflection may help to explain why the Holy Father refers to God’s wish to make all of humanity “a single family” (Deus Caritas Est, §19). In order to understand why he says it should be a single family—as distinct from, for example, a single political community—we require an intelligent grasp of the distinctions among forms of human association. N&V_Sum09.qxp 646 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 646 Daniel P. Maher bodily or “biological” indulgence in eros, its reduction to “pure ‘sex,’ ” amounts to a dehumanized and degraded manifestation of erotic love (DCE, §§4 and 5 et passim).The Christian approach is to “restore” eros to its proper and “authentic grandeur” (DCE, §5). It is not the theological meaning of eros that is at issue here, but the natural meaning of human sexual love. The restoration occurs when human beings recognize their nature as a union of body and soul and reject misinterpretations of their nature as either pure spirit or pure body. Benedict uses a brief anecdote concerning the philosopher Descartes and the scientist Gassendi to illustrate these mistaken views (DCE, §5).We note that the anecdote illustrates the modern doctrine of the soul discussed above. In the re-assertion of body-soul unity, Christian faith confirms and reinforces what natural reason first shows us about ourselves and urges that philosophy continue to do its own proper work.While it is possible to condemn bodily eroticism and materialist Marxism from the superior vantage point of divine revelation, it is also true that the proper exercise of reason can show the way to overcoming the defects of each of these misunderstandings of human nature. Benedict displays his understanding of the role of faith in facilitating just this corrected or purified exercise of reason.37 Reason as Preserving Distinctions We saw that the first way in which philosophy harmonizes with faith involved preparing for the reception of the understanding revealed by God. In this third way, philosophy helps preserve the distinctiveness of what is revealed. It helps us recognize that faith really is different from what reason shows us. For example, a clear understanding of pagan accounts of divinity 37 In addition to the examples discussed in this paragraph, it is worth noting that certain formulations in the encyclical suggest Benedict is pointing subtly to various philosophical errors. For example, he writes,“When we consider the immensity of others’ needs, we can, on the one hand, be driven towards an ideology that would aim at doing what God’s governance of the world apparently cannot: fully resolving every problem” (Deus Caritas Est, §36). Contrast John Stuart Mill: “Yet no one whose opinion deserves a moment’s consideration can doubt that most of the great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society combined with the good sense and providence of individuals.” Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), 14. In another case, it would be interesting to investigate whether Benedict’s treatment of the possibility of a commandment to love (see Deus Caritas Est, §§14 and 16–18) is or is not meant to correct Kant’s thesis: “Love as an inclination cannot be commanded.” Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd ed., trans. Lewis White Beck (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), 15. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 647 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 647 permits us to appreciate what is distinctive in the Christian sense of God. However similar Greek philosophical accounts might seem to the Christian account, the God who freely creates out of nothing is genuinely different from any understanding of God arrived at by the philosophers. Recognizing these differences helps us to see that Christian faith is not just one more religion alongside the others (DCE, §§9 and 11).38 In the first way, then, reason or philosophy prepares for theology by helping us to understand natures before we articulate the Incarnation, by helping us to understand opinion before we articulate faith, and by helping us to understand signs before we articulate the sacraments as effective signs of grace. In the third way, we use philosophical understanding to prevent the misunderstanding of the Incarnation as a kind of hybridization, of faith as just another opinion, or of the sacraments as ordinary reminders or symbols of absent things. Philosophy helps preserve the distinction and resist the reduction of Christian mysteries to simpler, natural understandings. Unless we resist it, our grasp of the natural order inclines us to reinterpret divine things in a merely natural way. This pull toward the earth and earthly meanings continues to exist even for believers.As we become familiar with Christianity we are liable to forget how strange it is and how much it requires us to transcend our ordinary grasp of things. The robust exercise of philosophical reason can preserve the otherness of faith to reason. One important example of this tendency and its correction on display in the encyclical has already been touched upon to some extent.The preference for earthly justice to divine charity may be traced at least as far back as Judas, when he objected to the anointing of the Lord’s feet ( John 12:4–5). This objection, that there is nothing more important than the elimination of worldly sorrows, has never really and finally gone away.The urge toward an idealized, material equality as justice seems to belong to human nature. At any rate, it is repeatedly necessary to avoid confusing Christian charity, understood as service, especially to the poor, with its look-alike, mere humanitarianism or “social assistance” (DCE, §31) or humanitarianism.The possibility of this mistake is evidenced by Julian the Apostate. He tried to initiate a pagan “equivalent” to the Christian service of charity (DCE, §24). One can perhaps produce, in parallel to the Church’s charity, a secular system of “social assistance” such that the two operations yield identical material results. Both activities would be recognizably good, but Christian charitable activity is always something more 38 Additionally, this awareness of the contrast between the Christian and the pagan senses of divinity helps us to think about the emperor’s rejection of the God of Islam. To speak of a God that exceeds logos is to speak of a different God. This insight helps us recognize that not every form of faith is faith in the same sense. N&V_Sum09.qxp 648 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 648 Daniel P. Maher than its material manifestation.The service of charity is always for the sake of something beyond the worldly good it accomplishes. Its meaning is not limited to and its success is not defined by the degree to which it eliminates worldly evils.The inability to understand this sort of distinction leads to a corruption of charity.39 Even some Christians seem to believe that charity is nothing more than faith-based “social assistance” (DCE, §31). They allow their natural desire to eliminate human suffering (see DCE, §20) to overwhelm their understanding of the full good of human beings. This leads to the inability to recognize that there are evils worse than bodily suffering, with the result that they come to think the proper Christian attitude is to eliminate all forms of suffering by any available means.The practical consequences of this confusion appear when people come to think that the Church must advocate condom use in response to AIDS or that physician-assisted suicide provides genuine relief of suffering. Often we take it for granted that Christian faith must agree with what makes sense to us rationally. Sometimes, however, as was articulated in the previous section, the faith points to a correction of reason. On other occasions, the faith also requires us to transcend reason and to recognize something higher. Thus Christian faith articulates an understanding of the role of suffering that goes beyond philosophical reason. Clear recognition of the difference between “social assistance” and charity preserves the distinctiveness of the Christian response to suffering. The key to exercising reason in this role is attending to and preserving what may appear to be small differences between the faith and our natural understanding. In the Regensburg speech, one such small difference comes to light through what appears to be a misquotation or mistaken paraphrase of Plato’s Phaedo. The apparent impossibility of removing controversy and disagreement from philosophical arguments has always led some to want to dismiss philosophy altogether. Plato’s dialogue presents characters frustrated with confusion by the arguments they are considering. Benedict attributes the following statement to Socrates (“Faith,” ¶16): It would be easily understandable if someone became so annoyed at all these false notions that for the rest of his life he despised and mocked all talk about being, but in this way he would be deprived of the truth of existence and would suffer a great loss. 39 See Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, 4–8 and 34–35. Bacon articulates a kind of scientific humanitarianism that preserves the use of the word “charity,” but not the meaning. Once again, because of the connection to mastery of nature, the humanitarian goal of modern philosophy is of tremendous significance for the Regensburg speech. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 649 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 649 A more literal and complete translation of the text runs as follows: “Then, Phaedo,” he said, “his condition would be a pitiable one if, when there was in fact some argument that was true and stable and capable of being detected, somebody—through his associating with the very sort of arguments that sometimes seem to be true and sometimes not—should not blame himself or his own artlessness but should end up in his distress being only too pleased to push the blame off himself and onto the arguments, and from that moment on should finish out the rest of his life hating and reviling arguments and should be robbed of the truth and knowledge of the things that are.”40 Plato places in the mouth of Socrates an exhortation to avoid the error of misology; the exhortation borders on accusing those who hate philosophical discourse of embracing a great evil.41 It is a sin that consists in ignorance and the rejection of the means to its remedy. Benedict recasts Socrates’s statement as an exculpation and almost as an expression of forgiveness. As Benedict sees it, there is forgiveness for those who fail in this serious task.When the horizon of faith transcends the boundaries of reason, the work of reason itself must be re-appraised in this new light. In Deus Caritas Est, another instance of this sort of contrast between natural understanding and Christian faith comes to light when we attend to the fact that Benedict singles out eros as the form of love that is most suitable for expressing the teaching that God is love. Erotic or sexual love is the first form of human love that Benedict speaks of at length (DCE, §3). He highlights it as the form that is especially useful for bringing out the meaning of divine love. It is not the only form he might have chosen. The example of Aquinas alone is enough to show that friendship might have been used to explicate charity. Benedict himself points to the importance of friendship in the following way. Near the end of section 12, he identifies the contemplation of the pierced side of Christ as the way to understand the truth that God is love, which is the starting-point of the encyclical and, he says, the point from which to begin defining love. But, as we learn in §19, the character of this love is friendship, which 40 The translation is from Plato’s Phaedo, trans. Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem (Newburyport, Mass.: Focus Classical Library, 1998), 68 (at 90c8–d7). In this translation, the four uses of “argument” correspond to four uses of forms of kócoy. For the Greek original, see Plato’s Phaedo, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911). Benedict’s citation runs as follows: “Cf. 90 c–d. For this text, cf. also R. Guardini, Der Tod des Sokrates, 5th edition, Mainz-Paderborn 1987, pp. 218–21.” 41 “ ‘[F]or it’s not possible,’ he said, ‘for anybody to experience a greater evil than hating arguments.’ ” Plato’s Phaedo, trans. Eva Brann, 67 (at 89d2–3)). N&V_Sum09.qxp 650 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 650 Daniel P. Maher is identified by the reference in this passage to John 15:13: “Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” It is not that Christ was slain that is indicated by the pierced side, but that he had laid down his life for friends. Friendship is central for Benedict.This forces the question upon us: why does Benedict not devote more attention to friendship? The answer to this question appears from a consideration of what Benedict does say about friendship. He mentions “love between friends” among the initial senses of the meaning of the word, but it “fades” from prominence, along with “love of work” and “love of one’s profession,” in comparison to “the very epitome of love,” that between man and woman (DCE, §2). It does not seem to be accidental that friendship recedes into the background. Benedict appeals to three New Testament words for love: eros, philia (the love of friendship), and agape (DCE, §3). In the next few pages, Benedict reduces these three to “two fundamental words: eros, as a term to indicate ‘worldly’ love and agape, referring to love grounded in and shaped by faith” (DCE, §7). Indeed, the title of the section in which he identifies the three New Testament terms for love mentions only eros and agape. Articulating the proper unity of these two dimensions in the one reality of love (see DCE, §§7, 8, and 10) is the focus of the first part of the encyclical.What happened to friendship? It has not been simply excluded, but invested with a new meaning. Benedict points out that the love obtaining between Jesus and the disciples is friendship, but it is friendship “with added depth of meaning” (DCE, §3). The pierced side of Christ (DCE, §12) shows us that Christ’s love for his disciples is expressed in an act of self-oblation and the Eucharist draws us into this act (DCE, §13). “This sacramental ‘mysticism’ is social in character, for in sacramental communion I become one with the Lord, like all the other communicants. . . . Union with Christ is also union with all those to whom he gives himself ” (DCE, §14).The result is that the commandment to love others is “now universalized” and embraces all mankind as neighbors (DCE, §15). “The parable of the Good Samaritan remains as a standard which imposes universal love towards the needy whom we encounter ‘by chance’ (cf. Lk 10:31), whoever they may be” (DCE, §25b). In this light, Jesus’ love for his disciples comes to be, not the singling out of his preferred companions, but a few instances of Jesus’ universal love for all mankind. Needless to say, such universal love is not something Aristotle, at least, understood among the many forms of friendship. In Benedict’s presentation of the commandment to love all human beings, there is little or no room for the selectivity of the ordinary form of human friendship. Benedict seems to assert as much in the paragraph concluding the first part of the encyclical. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 651 Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason 651 Love of neighbour is thus shown to be possible in the way proclaimed by the Bible, by Jesus. It consists in the very fact that, in God and with God, I love even the person whom I do not like or even know.This can only take place on the basis of an intimate encounter with God, an encounter which has become a communion of will, affecting my feelings.Then I learn to look on this other person not simply with my eyes and my feelings, but from the perspective of Jesus Christ. His friend is my friend. (DCE, §18) This does not seem to be a rejection of the natural phenomenon of friendship, but the addition of a new sense of friendship that far transcends the ordinary meaning. Benedict does not begin with ordinary friendship and extend to this new meaning. He begins with erotic love and articulates only this highest and universal friendship. It would be interesting to see this account of friendship developed more fully and related to the ordinary understanding of friendship, which Benedict mentioned at the beginning. We are left wondering what place remains for ordinary friendship within the context of the universal command of love. For the present, it is sufficient to note that the manner in which Benedict uses the word “friendship” in this encyclical often has this theological or universal meaning, but only our awareness of the natural or philosophical understanding helps us recognize the distinctiveness of Benedict’s sense of friendship, which seems to be what he means when he refers to the “added depth of meaning” belonging to this term in John’s Gospel (DCE, §3). Conclusion The three modes of reason operating in harmony with faith should not be conceived as rigorously separate from one another.We separate them mostly in order to be able to clarify the complexity of the harmonious co-operation between faith and reason, but it is hard to imagine that any one of them could operate in full independence of the others.The important claim is that our reason is necessarily active when we encounter the faith for the first time or when we try to deepen our grasp of it and that faith calls for “the right use of reason” (“Faith,” ¶1). In the best case, reason or philosophy makes familiar to us the natural realities in relation to which the propagation of the faith takes place. In another case, faith urges the correction of reason in order to eliminate philosophical errors that stand as competitors against faith. In a third case, the philosophical use of reason helps to prevent the distinctiveness of faith from sinking back into a merely natural account of things. In light of the Regensburg speech, a corrected understanding of reason itself seems to be what Benedict thinks we need most urgently. Whereas N&V_Sum09.qxp 652 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 652 Daniel P. Maher dependence on the natural exercise of reason and on ordinary opinion had been recognized by philosophical reason at least since Socrates, modern science begins with a rejection of ordinary opinion and of the non-scientific exercise of reason. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this posture toward ordinary, non-scientific human intelligence. The dominance of science as the authoritative and sole proper use of reason tends to exclude other forms of reason as illegitimate and extra-scientific questions as unanswerable or meaningless. In this way, science tends to exclude the possibility of philosophy and theology and faith itself. From another direction, some conceptions of God as beyond human reason tend to exclude the possibility of any solid reliance on our reason. Benedict’s speech aims to recover the significance of the ordinary form of reason as the unifying element that underlies all developed forms of reason: theology and philosophy as well as science. Benedict’s speech presents an argument that some forms of faith or theology on the one hand and some forms of modern scientific rationalism on the other can be recognized as deficient by reference to the ordinary form of reason and its philosophical exercise.This is possible only if we take ordinary human rationality seriously. Consequently, the goal of the speech is to reinvigorate this sense of rationality in order to pave the way for the harmonious interaction of reason with faith. Pope Benedict, then, attempts to defend a broadened understanding of reason against both Islam and modern scientific rationalism, with a view to making intelligible the harmony of faith and reason. N&V N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 653 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 653–78 653 Wojtlya’s Personalistic Norm: A Thomistic Analysis K EVIN R ICKERT Saint Mary’s University of Minnesota Winona, Minnesota T HE FIRST principle of practical reason is “do good and avoid evil.” Nearly everyone agrees to this general starting point of moral theory, but the real challenge for moral philosophers is to formulate, in more specific terms, a way to systematically determine, in particular cases, what is good and what is evil. Karol Wojtyla offers a formula that purports to do this; he calls his principle “the personalistic norm.” Borrowing language from Immanuel Kant,Wojtyla formulates both a negative and a positive statement of the personalistic norm: This norm, in its negative aspect, states that the person is the kind of good which does not admit use and cannot be treated as an object of use and as such the means to an end. In its positive form the personalistic norm confirms this: the person is a good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love.1 Since this norm seems to be the foundation of Wojtyla’s moral philosophy, and since the truth contained in it is not self-evident, a person who hopes to conduct a careful study of Wojtyla’s thought ought to give serious consideration to the origin, the meaning, and ultimately the truth of the norm thus formulated. From a Thomistic point of view, the positive formulation is not a point of concern. Since this formulation is perfectly in line with natural law and traditional Catholic theology, the truth of this formulation can be granted and set aside. The norm in its negative 1 Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, trans. H.T. Willetts (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, Inc., 1994), 41. N&V_Sum09.qxp 654 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 654 Kevin Rickert aspect, however, as it is often repeated by Wojtyla (with a variety of minor modifications) requires clarification. Wojtyla’s personalistic norm, in its negative formulation, may cause some degree of discomfort for a Thomist, because it is essentially a formulation borrowed from Immanuel Kant.2 Kant put forth his “practical imperative” (the second formulation of the categorical imperative) as part of a system of morals designed to replace the natural law, among other systems. Since Kant would not admit any knowledge of an objective world of being and values underlying the subjective realm of phenomena, he was forced to develop a moral norm that makes no reference to objective human nature.3 In his mind, his categorical imperative, in its three formulations, provided the necessary a priori basis for his non-realist moral theory. Why then does Wojtyla, who embraces metaphysical realism and the natural law, employ the language of Immanuel Kant? Why does he, like Kant, formulate his personalistic norm in a way that makes no explicit reference to objective human nature? Wojtyla reveals his motivations for this mode of expression in Love and Responsibility. He says that Kant’s position in the history of philosophy renders the Kantian formulation especially effective in the contemporary intellectual milieu.“It should be noted that Kant made this statement [that is, the practical imperative] in the intellectual climate of the epoch that ushered in our own and that is especially fruitful in it.”4 In addition to the rhetorical utility of Kantian language, Wojtyla thinks that Kant’s practical imperative is useful in confronting utilitarianism.5 Be that as it may, there are a number of effec2 “The practical imperative will therefore be the following: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” Immanuel Kant, The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 36, (section 429). Concerning the link, in Wojtyla’s mind, between his personalistic norm, and Kant’s formulation of his practical imperative, see Karol Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,” in Person and Community: Selected Essays, trans. Theresa Sandok (New York: Peter Lange, 1993), 267:“Kant recognized this truth [that is, that humans should not become an object of use] and expressed it in his famous practical imperative. . . .” 3 Kant’s moral theory is divorced, not only from an objective understanding of human nature, but from key elements of human nature, such as the passions, habits, virtues, vices, etc. On the importance of these elements in a Thomistic understanding of the natural law, see Kevin E. O’Reilly, “The Vision of Virtue and Knowledge of the Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas,” Nova et Vetera, 5 (2007): 41–65. 4 Karol Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,” 267. 5 Ibid. Cf. also Love and Responsibility, 37 and 39. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 655 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 655 tive ways of refuting utilitarianism without adopting the language of Immanuel Kant.6 Insofar as Thomists have been in the business of refuting utilitarianism, they have also been in the business of refuting Kant’s anti-natural law formulation of ethics. Both of these moral systems are opposed, in their origins and their express principles, to a moral philosophy grounded in the natural law. There should be no confusion, however, about Wojtyla’s intention to ground his moral theory in the natural law. Unlike Kant, who formulated his practical imperative as an attempt to avoid any link to objective human nature, Wojtyla explicitly intends to establish just such a link between human nature and his personalistic norm: All norms, including the personalistic norm, as based on the essences, or natures, of beings, are expressions of the order that governs the world.This order is intelligible to reason, to the person. Consequently, only the person is a particeps legis aeternae et conscia legis naturae, which means that the person is conscious of the normative force that flows from the essences, or natures, of all beings.7 There can be no question, then, as to the philosophical roots of Wojtyla’s moral thinking.While he uses Kantian language in an attempt to present his moral views to the contemporary world, his views are fundamentally rooted in natural law. Although Wojtyla does not agree with the essentials of Kant’s ethical system,8 his use of Kantian language, nevertheless, can be a source of 6 This is not the place for a rebuttal of utilitarianism, but the most effective refu- tation would presumably entail a revelation of internal inconsistencies (for example, the incommensurability of pleasures and pains), rather than a simple reference to the obvious fact that utilitarianism allows one to use a person. A utilitarian would simply respond that this is a virtue of the system. 7 Wojtyla,“The Problem of Catholic Sexual Ethics: Reflections and Postulates,” in Person and Community, 287. 8 For two examples of Wojtyla’s criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy, see “The Problem of the Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Max Scheler,” and “In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism in Ethics,” in Person and Community, 23–56. For a general criticism of Kant’s moral theory, see Richard Taylor, Good and Evil:A New Direction (New York:The Macmillan Company, 1970), 103–15:“It is probably safe to say that virtually no men think in Kantian terms in any of the practical affairs of life . . . ” (103).Taylor summarizes Kantian ethics as follows: “To be genuinely moral, a man must tear himself away from his inclinations as a loving human being, drown the sympathetic promptings of his heart, scorn any fruits of his efforts, think last of all of the feelings, needs, desires, and inclinations either of himself or of his fellows and, perhaps detesting what he has to do, do it anyway—solely from respect for the Law” (113). N&V_Sum09.qxp 656 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 656 Kevin Rickert confusion on several levels. At the outset, there are problems with the distinction between using and not using a person, the distinction between treating a person as a means and an end, and the use of the logically restrictive term “merely.” Further problems arise with Wojtyla’s analysis of the experience of shame in relation to the “use” of a person. Finally, the alleged connection between Kant’s imperative and the command of Jesus Christ to love one another is questionable.9 To the extent that a moral theorist associates himself with Kant and these particular problems, the formulations of that moral theorist will be called into question. A Thomist may ask himself the following question: how could St. Thomas Aquinas—who thoroughly understood the verb utor (to use) as well as the distinction between means and ends, etc.—have failed to see this essential moral insight? More importantly, a Thomist may ask, what should students of Wojtyla think, given his use of such traditionally antirealist philosophical terminology? Wojtyla has gone out of his way in an effort to reach out to the contemporary world with Kantian terminology. The difficulties of this effort, however, are several. One is that the richness, the depth, the complexities, and the very basis itself of a sound moral philosophy founded upon the natural law cannot be conveyed in the limited philosophical language of Immanuel Kant. Not only does the Kantian language fail to provide clear distinctions between morally right and wrong actions, but it also fails to indicate accurately a sound basis for these kinds of judgments. On the practical level, there is a difficulty as well, that doctrines put forth by Wojtyla, which are logical conclusions according to the natural law, simply do not follow when one attempts to derive them from the moral theory of Immanuel Kant. One can see, therefore, the need to clarify Wojtyla’s position regarding the natural law and his use of Kantian terminology. In keeping with St.Thomas’s deep respect for the truth, and for papal authority on matters of faith and (in this case) morals, a modern Thomist 9 This claim to be in line with the teaching of Jesus Christ is highly suspicious, and to some degree, amusing. Note that both Kant and Mill, who are diametrically opposed in the principles of their moral theories, claim to be in line with the command of Jesus Christ to love one’s neighbor. Cf. Immanuel Kant, The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 12, (section 399): “Undoubtedly in this way also are to be understood those passages of Scripture which command us to love our neighbor and even our enemy.” Cf. also John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1979) 16–17: “In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. ‘To do as you would be done by,’ and ‘to love your neighbor as you love yourself,’ constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 657 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 657 may want to clarify definitions and find distinctions which will reveal, to the extent that it is possible, a sound resolution of this matter. An essential part of this task involves a careful analysis of the language and the underlying moral theory of Kant as well as the language and the underlying moral theory of Wojtyla. In final analysis, one appreciates more clearly the degree to which Wojtyla is genuinely opposed (in theory, if not in language) to the philosophical grounding of Kant’s “metaphysics of morals.” Analysis of the Verb “To Use” According to Wojtyla’s personalistic norm, it is wrong to use a person. In his words, a “person is the kind of good which does not admit use.”10 Such an assertion would seem, from a common-sense point of view, to require some clarification, for, in the strict sense, the “use” of a person is irrelevant to the morality of an act. Innumerable situations abound that illustrate ways in which one can use a person (himself or another) in a morally acceptable fashion. For example, when Sally’s frisbee lands on the roof, Sally could, in good conscience, use Pete’s hands and his shoulders as a ladder, in order to reach her frisbee.The mere use of another person, per se, does not seem to imply moral evil; in fact, Pete’s allowing himself to be used, as a ladder on loan to Sally, can be seen not only as morally permissible, but also as generous, charitable, and morally praiseworthy. On the other hand, if Sally were to use Pete’s face (with or without his consent) as one rung on her ad hoc human ladder, most common-sense observers would question the moral uprightness of her judgment. In actions involving the use of a person, the relevant moral factor is not so much the use of a person per se, but the way in which the person is used. From the perspective of the natural law, in most circumstances, purposely stepping on someone’s face is judged to be evil, primarily because of the nature of the human person, the nature of the human face, the nature of the act of stepping, and the significance of these factors in regard to the human person as a whole. Other considerations, of course, come into play, namely, intention and circumstances. If, in some strange set of circumstances, stepping on Pete’s face were the only means of saving their lives (for example, in order to reach a latch to open the door and escape from a burning building), then using him in this way might be morally permissible, and possibly even obligatory. Even then, one would have to consider the intentions of both willing parties. If Sally’s motives were not pure, that is, if she did not will to use Pete in as respectful a 10 See note 1 above. N&V_Sum09.qxp 658 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 658 Kevin Rickert manner as possible under the circumstances, then even stepping on his hands could be seen as immoral. From the point of view of natural law, the key lies not in the use or non-use of a person, but in the nature of the beings involved, in the nature of the act, in the degree to which the agents know and will the act, in their motives, and in the relevant circumstances. In other words, the key lies in factors that are intentionally excluded in Kant’s practical imperative and that are not mentioned directly in Wojtyla’s personalistic norm. From a Thomistic point of view, it would be a strange situation for people under the impression that they are employing “Catholic” moral theory to think that the key factor in moral decision-making is simply the distinction between using and not-using a person. Probably the most significant reason why the distinction of use is not immediately rejected by most people as a morally insignificant factor, is that, in common parlance, the term carries with it a fairly strong negative connotation. Everyone can relate to the negative experience of having been “used.” Upon figuring out the real intentions of a seducer, a woman may say to her friend that she feels she has been used. A similar experience may be encountered by an entrepreneur who is tricked by his business partner into signing over the rights to his own inventions and the fruits of his own labor. An unlimited number of examples can be produced, but they all seem to share something in common. The negative connotation attached to the term “use” derives not essentially from the fact of the use itself, but from the fact that, in some instances of use, the persons being used are, in Wojtyla’s terminology,“objectified”; that is to say, they are treated only with the level of respect due to a sub-human being. In more traditional terminology, they are not treated in accord with the dignity of their nature. In other words, the negative connotation of the term “use” derives from the injustice involved in that particular kind (or instance) of use.Thus the “use” itself is not unjust, but the term “use” carries with it a negative connotation, because it implies, in some cases, a derogation of the natural law. According to the natural law, matters of justice and injustice are traceable to the natures of the participants, and, to some degree, the circumstances involved. For Kant, however, these a posteriori factors are extraneous to the discussion. Having rejected such factors as irrelevant in the a priori realm of the “metaphysics of morals,” the approach of his moral theory differs radically from that of the natural law. Instead of judging particular instances of use by the standards of justice, Kant attempts to make judgments of justice based on whether or not the action involves use.The negative connotation of the term helps to gloss over the fact that N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 659 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 659 the denotation of the term, by itself, does not bear the weight of the moral distinction he is trying to draw.11 Even Kant, however, would admit that “use” itself is not the sole deciding factor in moral issues. Perhaps the critical distinction with respect to moral good and evil to which both Kant and Wojtyla are attempting to direct our attention lies not in an analysis of the verb “to use,” but in the treatment of a person as a means rather than an end. The Human Person Considered as a Means Versus an End In some texts,Wojtyla’s presentation of the personalistic norm is focused on the alleged evil in treating a person as a means rather than as an end. In Love and Responsibility, Wojtyla states his position in these words: “Nobody can use a person as a means towards an end, no human being, nor yet God the Creator.”12 Once again, a Thomist will notice that Wojtyla is not explicitly focusing attention on the full analysis of the objective nature of a human being, as St. Thomas does, for example, in the second part of the Summa theologiae. In order to determine the moral status of any act, St. Thomas would be interested in what the person is doing (or what the person is failing to do); he would want to know how the action affects the person’s natural perfection; he would want to know about the intent, the nature of the circumstances, etc. According to Wojtyla’s personalistic norm, on the other hand, the main factor is the status of a person as a means or as an end. For Wojtyla, it is wrong to treat another person as a means, primarily because in doing so, one places that person in service of an artificial goal not set by the person who is being treated as a means: For a person is a thinking subject, and capable of taking decisions: these, most notably, are the attributes we find in the inner self of a person.This being so, every person is by nature capable of determining his or her aims.Anyone who treats a person as a means to an end does violence to the very essence of the other, to what constitutes its natural right.13 11 The practical imperative does have some rhetorical value because of the nega- tive connotation of “use.”W. D. Ross points to this utility of the second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative in his book Kant’s Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 53: “The second formula has in fact a great homiletic value; it is a means of edification rather than enlightenment. . . . For the bare logical notion of universalizability, the second formula substitutes something that makes a much warmer appeal to the human heart—the notion of the value of human personality wherever it exists.” 12 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 27. 13 Ibid., 26–27. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 660 Kevin Rickert 660 Here, Wojtyla is attempting to express morality in terms of a norm that is based on one aspect of the human being, namely, the intellectual power that allows persons to set their own goals. If the term “person” is understood in the modern sense, Immanuel Kant, who denies any objective knowledge of being, is able to say the same thing (that is, one may not use a person as a means to an end).14 Using this distinction of means and ends as a key factor in moral theory, however, presents several problems. Consider, for example, a simple case of prostitution. Assuming that both Kant and Wojtyla would agree that this act is morally evil, how can the means/end distinction help in identifying the moral evil? According to the personalistic norm, the problem lies in the treatment of the prostitute by the client as a means to his own end. He wants pleasure, and he uses her as a means to his end; but in this case, his end is also, in a way, her end. She directly wills his end, and in freely choosing to will his end, she makes it her own. Unlike seduction or rape, where the perpetrator’s will is imposed by trickery or by force, the end or goal of the client in prostitution is freely, knowingly, and implicitly, if not explicitly (that is, professionally) accepted by the prostitute. His end becomes, in an important respect, her end. She wills it as a proximate end, which is directed in turn to her further end, namely, the reception of payment.15 Just as the client wills her end as a means to his own end, she wills his end as a means to her own end. Both parties accept and incorporate each other’s ends, to some degree, as their own. As is the case with any other business deal, they agree on a “common goal,” namely, the satisfactory trade of goods and services. Wojtyla would have to say that “violence” is done in treating the person as a means, but in this case, no violence can be found with respect to this particular distinction, that is, with respect to imposing one’s ends upon another. In this example, we do not find the violence of conflicting ends; on the contrary, we find (as we do in any legitimate business deal) a harmony of mutual cooperation. Neither is being used as a “blind tool” by the other.16 Wojtyla himself says the following:“When two different people consciously choose a common aim, this puts them on a footing of equality, and precludes the possibility that one of them might be subordinated to the other.”17 The key factor indicated 14 See note 2 above. 15 Note: not even the reception of payment is her final end. Money is obviously an instrumental goal, a means to some further end. 16 Wojtyla says that it is wrong to use another as a “blind tool.” Cf. Love and Respon- sibility, 27. 17 Ibid., 28. Note: the issue of subordination is as questionable in moral theory as the distinction of use itself. If the subordination of one person with respect to N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 661 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 661 by Wojtyla, which allegedly accounts for moral evil in using another as a means, does not seem to apply to this situation. The failure of the means/end distinction to accurately identify evil in particular actions becomes clearer in light of a comparison between prostitution and massage therapy. In the case of massage therapy, the client pays the therapist to rub parts of his body in order to fulfill his own desired end, namely, to improve circulation, relax tension, etc. Both the client and the therapist agree to use the therapist’s body and subordinate the therapist’s body to the client’s own individual ends in exchange for money. If one can assume that there is a significant moral difference between prostitution and massage therapy (or any other legitimate business deal), that difference does not rest essentially on the means/end distinction; the two situations simply do not admit of a means/end distinction in which a moral differentiation can be found.To find a morally significant difference, one must abandon the means/end distinction and turn instead to an analysis of human nature, a move that Kant is not willing to make. Another problem arises with the practical imperative in its command to always treat persons as ends in themselves. When Kant tells us that one should never treat a person, whether himself or another, as a means to an end, but that one should always treat a person as an end in himself, what does he mean? How does one treat a person as an end? What does it mean to treat someone as an end? Within the context of the Kantian metaphysics of morals, the answer to this question is far from clear.18 Literally, to treat something as an end means to seek it or pursue it, to focus one’s energy on attaining it. Neither Kant nor Wojtyla intends this. It would be absurd to suggest that all persons demand to be pursued as an end or a goal.19 From the perspective of the natural law, one could say that a moral agent is required to treat another in a way that is respectful of that person’s natural end (that is, in a way that does not intentionally frustrate that person’s end). In this context, however, the term “end” is intended to signify a person’s final end, the end written into his objective nature. Yet this is something that Kant, from his anti-realist, anti-natural-law perspective, expressly rejects. another person were immoral, what would we be expected to think about the subordination of children to parents, monks to abbots, priests to bishops, etc.? 18 For a discussion of this problem and criticism of the practical imperative, see Ronald M. Green, “What Does it Mean to Use Someone as ‘A Means Only’: Rereading Kant,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 11 (2001): 247–61. 19 Strictly speaking, only the final end (that is, God) can be an end that is not in some way directed to another end. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1948), I–II, q. 1, aa. 4–6. N&V_Sum09.qxp 662 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 662 Kevin Rickert Wojtyla, at this point, attempts to clarify his position.Without explicitly identifying man’s final end (the final end written into human nature) as the end that demands respect, he identifies the “personal ends” of the person, rather than the Kantian notion of the person himself, as the ends to be pursued and respected: [T]his principle should be restated in a form rather different from that which Kant gave it, as follows: whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not treat that person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but must allow for the fact that he or she, too, has, or at least should have, distinct personal ends. This principle, thus formulated, lies at the basis of all the human freedoms, properly understood, and especially freedom of conscience.20 Note that here Wojtyla is not referring explicitly to the final end that, according to the natural law, inheres in every human being by necessity. Not only is he pointing to “personal ends,” but he says that these ends are ends that the person has, or should have. The final end, as viewed by the natural law, and any proximate ends linked to it, are ends that every person has.There is no room for the idea that one “should have” such an end. A final end is a necessity of human nature, and the concepts of “should,” and “necessity” are mutually exclusive. At the same time, nothing would prohibit the correspondence of the freely chosen particular “personal ends” (that one “should have”) and man’s objective, final end. A problem still remains in Wojtyla’s formulation. In some cases (for example, the care of children, of some teens, or of others who are persons but who are not sufficiently responsible for themselves) it would seem morally acceptable, if not morally obligatory, to identify for the person his proper end, even if it is contrary to that person’s own subjective “personal ends” (even, in some instances, if it is contrary to that person’s conscience). In addition, legislation necessary to a just society restricts by coercion certain personal ends. As St. Thomas says, “It is evident that every lawmaker intends to direct men by means of laws toward his own end, principally.Thus, the leader of an army intends victory and the ruler of a state intends peace.”21 According to Wojtyla’s formulation of the norm, such actions would be immoral. 20 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 28. 21 Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, trans.Anton Pegis et al. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), III, ch. 115, par. 2: “Manifestum est enim quod unusquisque legislator ad suum finem principaliter per leges homines dirigere intendit: sicut dux exercitus ad victoriam et rector civitatis ad pacem.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 663 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 663 Regardless of the formulation (by Kant or Wojtyla) of the prohibition against using a person as a means to an end, the distinction, by itself, fails as a universal moral standard.The fact is that we can, in good conscience, use a person as a means to an end.The means/end distinction, by itself, cannot help one to differentiate good from evil. The Significance of the Term “Merely” So far it is evident, not only that the distinction of use, by itself, is problematic in moral theory, but also that the distinction between means and ends is equally problematic. Kant apparently was able to recognize this, and he attempted to fix the problem by adding the term “merely.”While it is not wrong per se to use a person as a means to an end, it is wrong, according to Kant, to use a person merely as a means to an end. Following Kant’s lead,Wojtyla employs the same strategy in some texts.22 What does Kant hope to gain from the use of the term “merely”? What does it add to the practical imperative? In essence, the addition of this term is an attempt by Kant to shore up the “use/non-use” and “means/end” distinctions. It is essential to Kant’s a priori moral theory that he find a way of distinguishing that mode of treatment due to persons from that mode of treatment due to non-persons without making reference to being or to the objective natures or faculties proper to various levels of beings. Since moral philosophy is a practical science, a good moral theory has to function; it has to allow people to identify, in real-life cases, the difference between good and evil.The problem with Kant’s practical imperative is that it is not as useful as it might appear at first glance.Without the term “merely,” the imperative prohibits too much; with the term “merely,” the imperative prohibits almost nothing. The practical imperative, without the term “merely,” would prohibit nearly all business dealings and a large portion of social interactions, including a significant number of friendships. A tremendous amount of human interaction involves treating a person, to some degree, as a means to an end. Aristotle considers friendships of utility in his Nicomachean Ethics, and most morally upright readers of Aristotle agree that there is nothing intrinsically evil about such friendships, as long as they are respectful, honest, just, etc. It would be difficult to pass even one day without treating someone as a means to an end, yet all such instances would be prohibited if it were morally wrong simply to treat a person as a means to an end. 22 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 26:“[A] person must not be merely the means to an end for another person.This is precluded by the very nature of personhood, by what any person is.” Note: neither Kant nor Wojtyla consistently employs the term “merely.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 664 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 664 Kevin Rickert On the other hand, if using another merely as a means to an end were the key to finding an action morally evil, one would be hard-pressed to find many evil actions at all.When one takes seriously the restrictive significance of the term “merely,” the scope of the imperative tightens considerably. Aside from Hitler, Stalin, and a few strange characters like them, it is hard to discover anyone who treats others merely as a means to an end.23 When one considers issues of sexuality from this point of view, as Wojtyla so often does, the practical imperative and the parallel formulation of the personalistic norm (including the term “merely”) simply fail to produce the conclusions that Wojtyla intends. In the case of contraception, an example of something Wojtyla considers to be immoral, it would be absurd to say that spouses, by the mere intention to contracept, are thereby reducing themselves or their spouses to merely (simply, only, exclusively) a means. In no way does it follow, of necessity, that a contraceptive spouse does not will any further end (or good) whatsoever for himself or his partner. While it may be true that contraceptive spouses intend to use each other as means to the end of pleasure, it does not follow that they must, at the same time, exclude all other ends. Some of the natural ends of the marital act are, partially or fully, thwarted by contraception, but this does not prove that such ends, and others as well, are not in any way intended by the people involved. If the practical imperative were the key moral imperative, contraception would not be prohibited, because the contraceptive act does not necessarily entail using a person merely as a means to an end. The same can be said of fornication, adultery, and prostitution. In none of these acts is it necessary that one use the other merely as a means to an end. Each involves some degree of use, but there is no reason to conclude that people involved in these acts do not intend goods or ends benefiting, belonging to, and willed by the other. It simply is not true to say that every fornicator is using his partner merely as a means to his own end. He may very well be willing the other’s consciously intended end, while enjoying his own benefits that happen to be attached. There certainly is evidence that some fornicators place the act with altruistic intentions. A young girl, for example, may agree to subordinate her own ends, goals, and purposes to those of her boyfriend. In this case, she is obviously not treating him merely as a means to an end. Part of what separates fornication, adultery, and even prostitution (to some degree) from rape, in fact, is that the other’s ends are not completely subordinated to one’s own. The other is not merely used for one’s own 23 Even Bin Laden, in addition to using his suicidal pawns, may have intended some good for those pawns, namely, their bliss with Allah and seventy-two virgins. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 665 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 665 ends; on the contrary, each agrees to cooperate and act for the other’s “distinct personal ends.” The discriminating fornicator will not accept just any means merely as a means to his end of pleasure. He prefers, instead, a partner that shares his end as her own, as he shares hers as his own. In other words, he would prefer a partner who actually likes him and freely wills to please him.Their mutual use of each other, in contrast to rape, emerges precisely as a kind of use that does not reduce either one to merely a means to an end. If acts such as these are truly cases of moral evil, they certainly are not morally evil on the grounds that they are instances of using a person merely as a means to an end. One text seems to suggest that Wojtyla recognizes, to some degree, the problem of the logical severity of the term “merely.” He seems to be aware that terms such as “only,” “merely,” “exclusively,” etc. would restrict the scope of prohibition much more than he would like, so he introduces the term “mainly”: [A] human being cannot be solely or mainly an object to be used, for this reason, that the role of a blind tool or the means to an end determined by a different subject is contrary to the nature of a person.24 In this text, Wojtyla’s personalistic norm departs from Kant’s practical imperative.The distinction between good and evil is apparently a matter of degree: the degree to which a person is used. That is to say that a person must not act without at least some minimum degree of “good intentions” concerning the other person.Wojtyla, however, does not give any scale by which one can distinguish the degrees of use that are permissible from those that are not permissible. Must the “distinct personal ends” of the person being used be given a fifty percent or greater priority, or must the level of priority be higher? Where is one to draw the line? Are personal ends sufficiently commensurable? If a moral theory is to be practical, these issues must be clarified.25 Since the negative formulation of the personalistic norm, as well as Kant’s practical imperative, are not sufficiently precise to serve as universal norms of morality, there must be some more fundamental moral norm 24 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 28. Note that even with this modification, adul- tery, fornication, prostitution, etc. would not be prohibited. In none of these cases is either party reduced to the status of a blind tool whose ends are determined by a different subject. The ends are decided individually by each person and happen to coincide in the mutual agreement of cooperation. 25 From the point of view of the natural law, it is insufficient (no matter to what degree) to have “good intentions” for another person when the good intended for that person is inconsistent with that person’s final end. N&V_Sum09.qxp 666 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 666 Kevin Rickert by which to judge the good or evil of human actions. Because Wojtyla is a realist, and is not confined by the a priori Kantian restrictions, perhaps his real intention underlying his formulation of the personalistic norm can be interpreted (despite his explicit association with Kantian moral language) as signifying something radically different from Kant’s practical imperative. Perhaps the imperative prohibiting treatment of persons “merely as means to an end” can be interpreted essentially as a prohibition against the treatment of a person as an inanimate tool, as a thing owned simply to be used or abused as the owner sees fit. While Pete normally uses his screwdriver to drive screws, nothing prohibits him from using his screwdriver as a pry bar, a weed digger, etc.; in fact, nothing seriously prohibits him from destroying it, qua object of his act, on a grinder for the sheer pleasure of seeing a display of sparks.26 If the practical imperative were simply intended to indicate that human persons are not to be misused or abused as one might misuse or abuse a tool (that is, if it were intended to indicate the natural dignity of a human being and the fact that this kind of being should never be used without regard to its nature and its ultimate end), then, to that extent, a Thomist would have no objection to it. If the imperative, in the final analysis, really can be reduced to a prohibition against abuse, against actions in general that inhibit or prevent a person’s natural tendency toward his final end, then a Thomist will recognize it as merely a vague statement of the famous precept of the natural law, to wit, “do harm to no one” (or “render to each one his due”).This may be what Wojtyla means when he affirms his personalistic norm, but it certainly is not what Kant means in his practical imperative. One could argue that the natural law is at the root of Kant’s moral system, but Kant explicitly denies any such link to a realist metaphysics. The Relationship of Use to the Experience of Shame Another problem that arises with the Kantian language employed in Wojtyla’s personalistic norm can be seen in Wojtyla’s analysis of shame. For Wojtyla, an analysis of the concept of use is a key to understanding the root of shame. According to Wojtyla, at the root of the experience of sexual shame is the perception of using a person or of being used: 26 This claim that nothing prohibits Pete from using, and even destroying, his screwdriver presupposes that other issues, such as intent and circumstances, do not prohibit this particular amusement. If screwdrivers were rare, he might be obligated to give it to a needy workman and find some other scrap steel to play with on the grinder. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 667 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 667 Shame is not only a response to someone else’s sensual and sexual reaction to the “body as an object of use”—a reaction to a reaction—it is also, and above all, an imminent need to prevent such reactions to the body in oneself, because they are incompatible with the value of the person.27 Following (to some extent) the theory of Max Scheler, Wojtyla claims that the main cause of shame is that a person has been, or potentially could be, reduced to an object of use. The problem with this theory is that it contradicts abundant evidence from common experience. While innumerable examples can be produced in which persons experience shame while not being treated as objects of use, one can also find an abundance of examples in which persons are reduced to objects of use and yet do not experience shame. Use, therefore, does not function as the deciding factor. It seems much more reasonable, from a Thomistic point of view, to locate the roots of shame not in use or the subject/object distinction, but in the awareness of a wide range of values inherent in the nature of the human being and human experience. From this perspective, the experience of shame can be seen to take root in a natural desire to hide the commission of morally evil actions, the cowardly submission to evil actions,28 and other morally neutral or even positive (but private) situations.29 The root of shame is not found in “use as an object”; on the contrary, it is found in the violation of the privacy naturally called for by particular situations in the human experience. A few examples will make this clear. Why is it that some fornicators experience a profound sense of shame, while many others, who are equally aware that they are being used, do not experience shame at all? The dilemma dissolves when we realize that shame is not essentially linked to use. A few generations ago, a girl aware of the sense of shame linked to fornication would ask her partner, “are you going to respect me in the morning?” If shame were rooted in an 27 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 177. 28 For Socrates, committing evil is more shameful than suffering evil.The addition of the word “cowardly” is intended to leave open the possibility that one could suffer evil, in some cases, without any shame at all. 29 Often, but not always, shame is associated with a sense of guilt. Examples of morally neutral actions that are frequently accompanied by a sense of shame (a desire to be concealed), and not by a sense of guilt, may include undressing, defecating, etc. Even some morally positive actions can be a source of shame. Cf. Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 174: “We must not over simplify the matter by maintaining that people endeavor to conceal only what is regarded as bad—for we often feel ashamed of what is good, of a good deed, for instance.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 668 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 668 Kevin Rickert awareness of use, an increase in fornication (and other such mutual use) ought to produce an increase in shame. What we find, however, appears to be just the opposite. In the present climate, it is not uncommon to find an abundance of fornicators who feel no shame (desire to hide) in their act of mutual use; in fact, as long as the use is mutual (and the consent is mutual), it is relatively common to find those who are proud of it and willing to make it public (the direct opposite of shame). 30 Since these fornicators without shame (not to mention people being used in legitimate business dealings and the like) are aware that they are using and being used, it does not seem plausible to locate the root of shame in use. If we see shame instead as a defensive response to potential abuse, or to some transgression against values inhering in the human person, this phenomenon of fornicators without shame can easily be explained.While fully aware that they are using and being used as objects, these people are relatively inattentive to the values inherent in the sexual act, and to the abuse suffered by those who commit such acts.The difference between those experiencing shame and those who do not experience shame, therefore, is not the awareness of use, but the awareness, to some degree or other, of the particular values transgressed in the act.This view, in fact, helps to account for the reduction of the sense of shame that occurs concomitantly with the rise in utilitarianism.Trained utilitarians, as well as our largely utilitarian society, find no shame in the fact of use because it is not there to be found. Shame finds its roots instead in a defensive concern for potential or actual transgressions against perceived values, presumably values inhering in human nature to which the utilitarians are blind, or at least inattentive.31 The Personalistic Norm and the Command to Love If the personalistic norm is so problematic in its negative aspect, what does this mean for its positive form? Are the two linked? According to Wojtyla, they are not only linked, but the command of Jesus Christ to love is dependent upon the personalistic norm. The command finds its basis in the personalistic norm: [I]t becomes obvious that if the command to love, and the love which is the object of this commandment, are to have any meaning, we must 30 Bob Seger publicly, without shame, points to this kind of mutual agreement of use found in casual fornication: “I used her; she used me, but neither one cared; we were getting our share. . . .” 31 For Bentham and Mill, at least, there are no morally significant values other than pleasure. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 669 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 669 find a basis for them other than the utilitarian premise and utilitarian system of values.This can only be the personalistic principle and personalistic norm.32 Wojtyla says that one cannot both love and use a person: “There is a fundamental contradiction between ‘loving’ and ‘using’ a person.”33 This statement, which would evidently be false if “using” were taken literally, may tell us something about the connotation of the term in the mind of Wojtyla.Taken in the literal sense, the distinction between use and nonuse, between means and ends, seem to be unrelated to love. It is certainly possible to treat someone as an end (to act for their personally desired ends) without loving that person, and at the same time, it seems possible to love another person and to use that person at the same time.The only way this Kantian language can be understood to express the full content of Wojtyla’s concept of love is if the essential content of the natural law is implied in it, that is, if his language is reinterpreted in the light of being and the values involved with the fullness of being. From the viewpoint of natural law (and of Wojtyla), the lover plumbs the depths of being. He recognizes, appreciates, and affirms the ontic (and moral) value of the perfections found inhering in the being of the beloved. The lover is attentive not only to the full array of present perfections actualized in the beloved, but also to the potential perfections latent in the beloved. He perceives them, reverences them, and makes their fulfillment the primary object of his will.All of this he does in the real world of being. If love is directed towards good, and if good is convertible with being, then both Kant and Mill are incapable of accounting for true love, understood in this sense. Both of them are systematically inattentive to the fullness of love’s object; they are axiomatically inattentive to the fullness of being.34 What Does St. Thomas Say About Using People? St. Thomas is always supremely attentive to being. In his philosophy, goodness is convertible with being. To be good means to be, to be fully; it means to actualize, as much as possible, the perfections proper to one’s nature. Unlike Kant or Mill, St.Thomas never would have formulated a 32 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 41. 33 Ibid., 231. 34 Concerning Kant’s lack of respect for real human beings, the complete and inte- grated beings recognized in John Paul II’s “total vision of man,” see Michael Neumann, “Did Kant Respect Persons?” Res Publica 6.3 (2000): 285–99: “What Kant respects is a somewhat Platonic and somewhat Protestant creature . . . [that is, homo noumenon ]—a noble rational self, strictly segregated from a base empirical self [that is, homo phaenomenon, animal rationale ]” (at 290). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 670 Kevin Rickert 670 moral theory without mentioning the perfection of beings in accordance with their proper natures.With this in mind, it is easy to see why, for St. Thomas, the distinction per se between using and not-using a human being does not present itself as a significant moral factor. In the mind of St. Thomas, a human being is the kind of being that does admit of use. The question is never focused on whether a person is used, but rather on how a person is used. Several texts will show both the moral neutrality of the concept of use in St. Thomas’s mind, and the general irrelevance of the notion of use in the context of the natural law. In the Summa contra Gentiles, St.Thomas explains that rational creatures are governed by divine providence in a special way. Unlike lesser creatures, which may be used for the sake of another, rational creatures are governed “for their own sake.”35 This special status, with respect to divine providence, is rooted in their natures.They “stand out above other creatures, both in natural perfection and in the dignity of their end.”36 St. Thomas recognizes that rational creatures rise above lesser creatures in two ways. First, rational creatures are able to move themselves freely and direct themselves to their ends. In other words, they are endowed with knowledge and will. Second, rational creatures are able, with the help of grace, to reach the ultimate end of all creation.They are able, with intellect and will, to know and to love God. No lesser creature is able to attain this final end, except in part, and by participation. St.Thomas concludes, therefore, that man is by nature free; man is governed for his own sake and not for the sake of any other creature. At first glance, it may appear that St. Thomas’s terminology (“for his own sake and not for the sake of another”) is in agreement with the formulations of the practical imperative and the personalistic norm.This appearance, however, is misleading. St. Thomas’s purpose in this context is to show the difference between lesser creatures and human beings— and the implications of this difference for their providential governance. Because of the elevated dignity of rational creatures, they are intended, in the fullness of their nature, to be free—free to direct themselves to their final end. Plants or animals, on the other hand, lacking the dignity proper to intellectual creatures, may be raised for slaughter as one might raise cattle or swine: Through these considerations we refute the error of those who claim that it is a sin for man to kill brute animals. For animals are ordered to 35 ScG III, ch. 112. 36 Ibid., ch. 111: “Praecellunt enim alias creaturas et in perfectione naturae, et in dignitate finis.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 671 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 671 man’s use in the natural course of things, according to divine providence. Consequently, man uses them without any injustice, either by killing them or by employing them in any other way.37 St. Thomas does not, however, imply that using another person (artificially directing another person to an end) is the key to morality. On the contrary, he provides examples in the very same chapter (112) of situations in which one may use others, and direct them to an end, that is, situations in which some humans may be subordinated to the ends of other human beings: Thus, for instance, the end of an army is victory, and this the soldiers may achieve through their own act of fighting; that is why only soldiers are needed for their own sake in an army. All others, who are assigned to different tasks—for instance, caring for the horses and supplying the weapons—are needed for the sake of the soldiers in the army.38 Here St.Thomas admits that there are cases in which some people rightfully function, in a certain mode and to some degree (that is, are used), for the sake of another and not strictly for their own sake. It is significant that St. Thomas uses the example of an army, because, unlike ordinary business dealings, the business of an army entails strict subordination of men to the orders of their superiors, subordination to the point of risking their very lives (sometimes against their own wishes—under threat of court marshal) for an end set by another. The deciding moral factor for St. Thomas, therefore, is not the distinction between use and non-use. Moral evil is not to be located simply in the subordination of one person’s ends to those of another person. Of course, in the ideal situation, a mature, responsible, rational creature ought to direct himself by his own free acts to his own final end, but this does not preclude, in any way, other orders of providence by which individuals may be directed (by cooperation, and in some cases by coercion) to the common good and finally to God. In order to prevent this confusion, St. Thomas brings his reader back to the very basis of the natural 37 Ibid., ch. 112, par. 12: “Per haec autem excluditur error ponentium homini esse peccatum si animalia bruta occidat. Ex divina enim providentia naturali ordine in usum hominis ordinantur. Unde absque iniuria eis utitur homo, vel occidendo, vel quolibet alio modo.” 38 Ibid., ch. 112, par. 3: “sicut finis exercitus est victoria, quam milites consequuntur per proprium actum pugnando, qui soli propter se in exercitu quaeruntur; omnes autem alii, ad alia officia deputati, puta ad custodiendum equos, ad parandum arma, propter milites in exercitu quaeruntur.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 672 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 672 Kevin Rickert law, and clarifies what he means when he says that intellectual creatures are governed “for their own sake”: However, we do not understand this statement, that intellectual substances are ordered for their own sake by divine providence, to mean that they are not more ultimately referred to God and to the perfection of the universe. In fact, they are said to be providentially managed for their own sake, and other things for their sake, in the sense that the goods which they receive through divine goodness are not given them for the advantage of another being, but the things given to other beings must be turned over to the use of intellectual substances in accord with divine providence.39 St.Thomas is simply pointing to the hierarchy of beings in the order of creation and showing that human beings are endowed by nature with higher dignity than the lower creatures.Animals may be used by humans, but humans are not intended (ultimately) to be used by animals. St. Thomas shows that human beings should not be treated as if they were animals, but he does not in any way imply that the use or non-use of human beings by other human beings is, per se, an indicator of moral good or evil. Several other texts will show further the insignificance of the idea of use in Thomistic moral theory. In his Commentary on the Letter of St. Paul to the Ephesians, St.Thomas explains that, while wives should be subject to their husbands, husbands should not lord it over their wives (or their children) as one might over a servant. The intention of the husband and father, according to St. Thomas, must never be selfish; on the contrary, he should always have as his primary intended goal the good of the family and the good of the larger community.With this loving and benevolent attitude, however, the husband and father can, and ought to, use his wife and children: [T]he difference [between the master/servant relationship and the husband/wife relationship] is that the master uses his servants for his own benefit, but a man uses his wife and children for the common benefit.40 39 Ibid., ch. 112, par. 10: “Per hoc autem quod dicimus substantias intellectuales propter se a divina providentia ordinari, non intelligimus quod ipsa ulterius non referantur in Deum et ad perfectionem universi. Sic igitur propter se procurari dicuntur et alia propter ipsa, quia bona quae per divinam providentiam sortiuntur, non eis sunt data propter alterius utilitatem; quae vero aliis dantur, in eorum usum ex divina ordinatione cedunt.” 40 Commentarium super ad Ephesios, ch. 5, l.8 (my translation): “[S]ed differentia est in hoc, quod dominus utitur servis suis quo ad id quod est sibi utile: sed vir utitur uxore et liberis ad utilitatem communem.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 673 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 673 To the modern mind (and especially one steeped in the practical imperative or the personalistic norm) this may sound harsh, brutal, and barbaric, but to one who understands the fullness of the natural law, it makes perfect sense. St.Thomas recognizes that we all use each other on a regular basis. As lovers of Christ, we are willing to be used by a loving master.As lovers of spouses and parents, we are willing to be used by loving spouses and parents.As employees, we are willing to be used equitably by our employers. Enlisted soldiers are willing to be used by their country, even to the point of death.At the core of love is the desire to serve, to be useful, to be a servant in service of the needs of the beloved.What St.Thomas is pointing out in this context is that while a man may govern his wife and children, he must do so with a view to the common good, just as Christ, who governs the Church, does so with a view to the good of the Church. He says that Christ is the head of the Church,“not for his own utility, but for that of the Church.”41 Once again, the key is not to be found in use, but in the way in which a person is used. To see that St. Thomas draws no moral distinction between using a person and using any other object, one can turn to a rather blunt passage in the Disputed Questions on Evil: [I]f someone superfluously uses his food, he sins venially, just as the one who superfluously uses his wife, unless there is something else that makes either one a mortal sin. If someone, however, were to use food that is stolen or that is prohibited by law, he sins mortally; less however than the fornicator, insofar as food, or any other exterior thing, is more remote from the life of man than human semen, as was said.42 For St.Thomas, the important factors are the conditions of the use rather than the use itself. The glutton is at fault, not for using food, but for doing so outside the boundaries of reason. The fornicator (or lustful husband) is at fault, not for using another, but for doing so outside the boundaries 41 Ibid. (my translation): “et hoc non ad utilitatem suam, sed ecclesiae. . . .” Note that with confidence in the goodness of the will of God, John Henry Cardinal Newman is able to say to God,“I am born to serve Thee, to be Thine, to be thy instrument. Let me be thy blind instrument. I ask not to see—I ask not to know—I ask only to be used.” John Henry Cardinal Newman, Lead, Kindly Light, ed. Hal M. Helms (Orlean: Paraclete Press, 1987), 8. 42 Questiones disputatae de malo, q. 15, a. 2 (my translation):“[S]i quis utitur superflue cibo suo, venialiter peccat sicut qui superflue utitur sua uxore, nisi aliud sit quod utrobique peccatum mortale. Si quis autem cibo furtivo utatur, vel prohibito per legem , peccat mortaliter; minus tamen quam fornicator, quanto cibus vel quaelibet res exterior a remotiori se habet ad vitam hominis quam semen humanum, sicut dictum est.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 674 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 674 Kevin Rickert of reason. In both cases, the factor that adds malice is not use, but misuse. In the first case, it is the misuse of food—the failure to direct the food and the faculty of digestion to their proper ends. In the case of lust, it is the misuse of the sexual faculty (in oneself and in another)—the failure to direct that action to its natural end. A parallel text can be found in the Commentary on the Sentences, which further clarifies St.Thomas’s views about the moral neutrality of using a person. In this article, he addresses the question “whether someone sins mortally in knowing his wife while not intending some marriage good, but intending pleasure alone.”43 In the sed contra, he says the following: “[O]ne who uses food for pleasure alone does not sin mortally. Therefore, it is similar for one who uses a wife only on account of desire.”44 Once again, the key is in the intention, that is, in the willful direction of goods and human acts toward, or away from, their natural ends. In the body of the article, St.Thomas shows that it is wrong to attempt to identify the level of moral malice with the degree to which one uses his spouse for the sake of pleasure. In his mind, seeking pleasure can be good or bad, depending on other concomitant factors. In this case, the relevant factors are the marriage goods and the boundaries of marriage: [A]nd therefore it must be said that if pleasure were to be sought outside the honesty of marriage, in such a way that someone, with respect to his wife, would not care that she is his wife, but only that she is a woman, if he were prepared to do it with her even if she were not his spouse, it is a mortal sin; . . . If, however, pleasure were sought within the limits of marriage, namely, in such a way that pleasure would not have been sought in another other than his wife, then it is a venial sin.45 For St.Thomas, the marriage act should only be placed within respect for the boundaries of marriage and with the intention of a marriage good (in modern terminology, for the purpose of the unity of spouses or of procreation); in other words, the marital act should only be placed within the context in which it can serve its natural purpose and reach its natu43 Commentary on the Sentences, d. 31, q. 2, a. 3. 44 Ibid. (my translation): “[Q]ui cibo utitur propter delectationem tantum, non peccat mortaliter. Ergo, pari ratione qui utitur uxore tantum causa libidinis.” 45 Ibid., d. 31, q. 2, a. 3: “[E]t ideo dicendum, quod si delectatio quaeratur ultra honestatem matrimonii, ut scilicet quia aliquis in conjuge non attendat quod conjux est, sed solum quod mulier est, idem paratus facere cum ea etsi non esset conjux, est peccatum mortale; . . . Si autem quaeratur delectatio infra limites matrimonii, ut scilicet talis delectatio in alia non quaereretur quam in conjunge, sic est veniale pecatum.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 675 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 675 ral goals. If the act is placed within the primary intention of marriage goods and pleasure is sought at the same time, there is no sin at all. For St.Thomas,“pleasure in a good action is good, and in an evil action, it is evil.”46 Pleasure is not an evil; seeking pleasure is not an evil, and using another for the sake of pleasure, per se, is not evil.47 On the other hand, if one were to use his wife “only on account of desire,” such use would enter the realm of sin. Here again the key is not the use, but the other relevant factors. When one uses his wife for pleasure, failing to intend the natural fulfillment of the act, he abuses or misuses his sexual faculty and the sexual faculty of his spouse—he fails to use them correctly, reverently, naturally. In this case, if he respects the boundaries of marriage—if he uses her in such a way that, without intending the proper end of the marriage act (that is, the marriage goods) he, nevertheless, respects the fact that she is his wife—he sins venially.This is the sort of sin that arises from man’s weakness as a result of his fallen nature; it is the sort of sin, according to St. Augustine (and St. Thomas), for which we say daily the Our Father.48 If one were to move another step away from the redemptive power of the institution of marriage and a step closer to the corruptive power of lust, if one were to use his wife, not intending a marriage good, but for the sake of pleasure, while also being apathetic as to whether she is his wife or not (that is, as if she were a harlot), then he sins mortally. In all three cases (no sin, venial sin, and mortal sin) one may recognize the use of a person for pleasure.The difference lies not in the use, but in the abuse or misuse of the sexual faculties found in oneself and in one’s spouse. In this view of sexuality, St.Thomas actually preserves, in a sense, a beautiful seed of self-sacrifice at the core of the experience of human love. A lover ought to want to be used (lovingly—and not abused) by the beloved. He hopes to serve the beloved, to be a servant for her, to be used by (that is, to be useful to) her. Every lover (in the sense of eros) wants to be used by the beloved, in a respectful and loving way, for pleasure. A lover would rightly be saddened, and insulted, were the beloved to say, “I’m doing this for the 46 Ibid: “operationis bonae est delectatio bona, et malae mala.” 47 Cf. St.Thomas, Commentary on the Ethics, bk.VIII, l. 3, n. 17 (my translation):“So then it is obvious that the friendship of virtuous men comprehends not only good in an unqualified sense, but also pleasure and utility.”“Sic ergo manifestum est quod amicitia virtuosorum non solum habet bonum simpliciter, sed etiam delectationem et utilitatem.” 48 St.Thomas quotes St. Augustine in the Commentary on the Sentences, d. 31, q. 2, a. 3, sed contra. N&V_Sum09.qxp 676 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 676 Kevin Rickert sake of the marriage goods, but I can assure you I am not touching your body as a means to pleasure.”A similar reaction might be expected if one were to say to the beloved,“I have no use for you.” In a special sense, eros is, by nature, linked to a respectful, mutual use of persons for the end of pleasure, always in accordance with the more primary pursuit of higher, more essential goods. According to St.Thomas, such use is not evidence of moral evil unless it excludes the marriage goods or exceeds the bounds of the marriage itself, that is, unless it excludes the natural end of the marital act or involves disregard for the confines of marital fidelity. In this view, St. Thomas keeps his focus trained on the fulfillment of human beings. He draws our attention to the perfection of nature. His concern is not with the distinction between use and non-use of persons; instead, he is concerned with the distinction between proper use and misuse or abuse. This distinction, however, rests essentially on a realist anthropology rooted in metaphysical realism, the very realism that was rejected by Immanuel Kant. Conclusion Karol Wojtyla’s adoption of Kantian language in the field of morality does not follow upon an adoption of Kantian epistemology and a Kantian rejection of metaphysics. On the contrary,Wojtyla explicitly rejects antirealist epistemology.49 How then is one to reconcile Wojtyla’s manifest metaphysical and moral views with his strange choice of Kantian language in the moral sphere? In Wojtyla’s mind, he can engage in dialogue with contemporary moral theory; he can employ the Kantian language and, to some degree, the Kantian methodology, and nevertheless emerge from the process with essentially the same conclusions as one would find in the natural law. This, at least, seems to be the project that Wojtyla has set out to accomplish. Given the nature of this project and the present analysis of the personalistic norm, several challenges come to mind: 1. Those interested in understanding the mind of Wojtyla and the basis of his moral doctrine, are challenged to recognize the immeasurable abyss that separates Wojtyla’s moral theory from that of Immanuel Kant. They are challenged to take up, once again, a careful study of the rich and complex machinery of traditional natural law as it is articulated by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, for this body of 49 Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, see especially sections 55 and 82. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 677 Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm 677 moral theory is the foundation that supports Wojtyla’s moral theory and separates his thought from Kant’s rationalism.50 2. Thomists are challenged to look beyond the theoretical and practical difficulties in Wojtyla’s Kantian terminology and to recognize that the natural law provides the basis in which Wojtyla claims that the personalistic norm is rooted. A Thomist who continues to consider moral matters in accordance with traditional formulations of the natural law, therefore, should not feel out of touch with the mind of Wojtyla. A Thomist, in fact, may rest assured that his own conclusions in the long run may actually represent the intentions of Wojtyla more accurately than those drawn from Wojtyla’s own quasi-Kantian formulations. Since distinctions of “use” and of “means and ends” cannot be expected to express the fullness of truth found in the natural law, the viability of the project of translating the moral doctrine of the natural law into Kantian terms is, at minimum, theoretically problematic as well as practically dangerous and misleading.51 Since Wojtyla, in fact, is a realist as well as a proponent of the natural law, perhaps the best solution, from a Thomistic point of view, is to offer a formula for translating his words.Whenever Wojtyla expresses the negative form of the personalistic norm, namely, “it is wrong to use another as a means to an end,” one should translate the whole phrase as follows: “it is wrong to ab-use or mis-use another person.” Better yet, one should simply replace the phrase with the famous precept of the natural law:“do harm to no one” (or “render to each one his due”). In this way, one will draw the expression back down to the objective realm of the natural law, where it is more likely to convey the realist mind of Wojtyla. Here we find a formula that successfully bridges the gap between the general command of the first principle of practical reason 50 Cf. Karol Wojtyla,“The Problem of the Separation of Experience,” in Person and Community, 42–43.“At this point I am convinced that the ethics of Aristotle and St.Thomas is based on a proper relation to experience and, moreover, that their view of the ethical act is the only proper and adequate description of the ethical experience.” 51 Another danger arises in placing emphasis on the value of persons, rather than on the value of human beings. As opposed to the traditional notion of person, defined by Boethius (that is, an individual substance of a rational nature), the modern notion of person (that is, a conscious subject of understanding and will) can be interpreted to exclude certain human beings who are considered as nonpersons.This, in fact, is the tactic used by many who argue in favor of abortion and euthanasia. N&V_Sum09.qxp 678 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 678 Kevin Rickert and the specific commands needed in the practical realm of human experience. Here we find a formula that is unambiguously rooted in the source of value—in the objective being of the participants in the moral sphere. Here we find a formula that works, that avoids the labyrinths of confusion, and that accurately and clearly distinguishes good actions from evil actions. Here we find a formula that respects traditional philosophical language52 and properly links the moral philosophy of Wojtyla with N&V the basis of natural law in which it ultimately is rooted. 52 Note that John Paul II himself, in Fides et Ratio (section 55), makes the follow- ing plea in favor of traditional philosophical language: “My revered predecessor Pope Pius XII warned against such neglect of the philosophical tradition and against abandonment of the traditional terminology.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 679 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 679–95 679 Marriage Vows and “Taking Up a New State” M ARY C ATHERINE S OMMERS University of St.Thomas Houston,Texas Introduction T HE TITLE of this paper requires some defense, because, in one sense, it is indefensible. Thomas Aquinas never uses the term “marriage vows” and, indeed, never discusses “marriage” and “vows” together except to explain how one can bring to naught or make impossible the other. A vow, for Thomas, is a promise to God and marriage is not between God and man, but between man and woman.While the term votum is used in connection with marriage in post-classical Latin, notably in the Justinian Codex1 and in Gratian,2 there is not one such usage to be found among 1 For example, Codex 5.4.24 (www.faculty.cua.edu/Pennington/Canon%20Law/ RomanLaw/DigestCode.htm): “Imperator Justinianus: Sancimus, si quis nuptiarum fecerit mentionem in qualicumque pacto, quod ad dandum vel faciendum vel non dandum vel non faciendum concipitur, et sive nuptiarum tempus dixerit sive nuptias nominaverit, non aliter intellegi esse condicionem adimplendam vel extenuandam, nisi ipsa nuptiarum accedat festivitas, et non esse tempus inspiciendum, in quo nuptiarum aetas vel feminis post duodecimum annum accesserit vel maribus post quartum decimum annum completum, sed ex quo vota nuptiarum re ipsa processerint. sic etenim et antiqui iuris contentio dirimetur et immensa librorum volumina ad mediocrem modum tandem pervenient.” * iust. a. ad senatum. * [a 530 d. constantinopoli xi k. aug. lampadio et oreste conss.] 2 Decretum, II, C. 27, Q. 2:“Sequitur secunda questio, qua queritur, an puellae alteri desponsatae possint renunciare priori condicioni, et transferre sua uota ad alium.” The term vota, however, appears only in the statement of the question and not in the subsequent discussion. N&V_Sum09.qxp 680 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 680 Mary Catherine Sommers the 1761 instances of forms of voveo in the Corpus thomisticum.3 Even the term promissio, which is perhaps the genus of votum, is used in conjunction with matrimonium only as the definition of sponsalia, or betrothal.4 Nevertheless, the taking of a vow and consenting to marriage have a significant moral symmetry, which Aquinas recognizes and utilizes.While all moral acts are formative of a power or some aspect of a power, taking a vow or contracting marriage “front-loads” form into a life.While acquiring a virtue through repeated deliberation and choice is like building a structure from the ground up, making a vow or contracting marriage is more like “topping off ” the superstructure of a building at its highest point—one is not done, but neither can one undo.These unusual effects are owing to the properties of vows and vow—like contracts, such as marriage.Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of them is primarily contained in distinction 38 of the fourth book of his commentary on the Sentences and in the secunda secundae pars of the Summa theologiae, question 88, although the polemical mendicant tracts Contra impugnantes, De perfectione spiritualis vitae, and Contra retrahentium, as well as Quodlibets III, IV, and X, are also important texts for this issue. Vows In considering whether it is “more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something as a result of having vowed to do it rather than without a vow,” Thomas Aquinas answers an objection about the alleged redundancy of vows.A vow, on his account, is supposed to “firm up” the flabby human will with respect to the thing vowed. But nothing is better able, runs the objection,“to firm up the will to do something than the act of doing it.”5 Adding a vow, then, adds nothing: “Just do it,” as the Nike commercial urges. Thomas replies that the scope of our power to order our acts is far beyond the “it” and the “now.” The “immobile will,” which executes “that single work,” does not remain “wholly fixed” beyond the now and into the future. 3 Interestingly, neither does the term “vow” appear in any article on marriage in the Catholic Encyclopedia of 1907–1913, except as an impediment to marriage and in a discussion of vows of continence within the married state. 4 Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, lib. 4, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 co. (www.corpus thomisticum.org/opera. html): “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, consensus in conjugalem copulam per verba de futuro non facit matrimonium, sed matrimonii promissionem; et haec promissio dicitur sponsalia a spondendo, ut Isidorus dicit.” 5 Summa theologiae II–II, q. 88, a. 6, arg. 3 (Ottawa: Insitute of Medieval Studies, 1942):“Praeterea, votum necessarium est ad hoc quod firmetur voluntas hominis ad rem quam vovet, ut supra habitum est. Sed non potest firmari melius voluntas ad aliquid faciendum quam cum actu facit illud. Ergo non melius est facere aliquid cum voto quam sine voto.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 681 Marriage Vows and “Taking up a New State” 681 The one making a vow, however, fixes the will on the work to be done even before the moment of its execution, and perhaps on doing it many times.6 That “through a vow, the will is fixed immovably on a good”7 is only one of the reasons why “it is better and more meritorious to perform the same work with a vow than without.” A vow is “an act of religion, which is chief among the moral virtues.”8 It is a commonplace of Thomistic ethics that the act of an inferior virtue becomes better and more meritorious when it is commanded by a higher virtue or ordered to a higher end: fasting as an act of abstinence and self-control as an act of chastity become acts of religion as well, when we do them as a result of a vow. Virginitas non est tantum virginitas when it is dedicated to God. There is, then, a “powering up” of a good act through making it the material of a vow, both because the fixity of the will brings it closer “to the perfection of virtue” and because the act is fundamentally re-ordered to “divine worship.” Following from this re-ordering, however, is something more radical. While all virtues are commanded by God,“the one who vows something and does it, subjects himself to God more than he who simply does it.”9 6 ST II–II, q. 88, a. 6, ad 3: “Dicendum quod ille qui facit aliquid sine voto habet immobilem voluntatem respectu illius operis singularis quod facit, et tunc quando facit; non autem manet voluntas eius omnino firmata in futurum, sicut voventis, qui suam voluntatem obligavit ad aliquid faciendum et antequam faceret illud singulare opus, et fortasse ad pluries faciendum.” 7 ST II–II, q. 88, a. 6: “Dicendum quod triplici ratione facere idem opus cum voto est melius et magis meritorium quam facere sine voto. Primo quidem quia vovere, sicut dictum est, est actus latriae, quae est praecipua inter virtutes morales. Nobilioris autem virtutis est opus melius et magis meritorium. Unde actus inferioris virtutis est melior et magis meritorius ex hoc quod imperatur a superiori virtute, cuius actus fit per imperium; sicut actus fidei vel spei melior est si imperetur a caritate. Et ideo actus aliarum virtutum moralium, puta ieiunare, quod est actus abstinentiae, et continere, quod est actus castitatis, sunt meliora et magis meritoria si fiant ex voto; quia sic iam pertinent ad divinum cultum, quasi quaedam Dei sacrificia. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro De Virginitate, quod neque ipsa virginitas quia virginitas est, sed quia Deo dedicata est, honoratur . . . quam fovet et conservat continentia pietatis. Secundo, quia ille qui vovet aliquid et facit, plus se Deo subiicit quam ille qui solum facit. Subiicit enim se Deo non solum quantum ad actum sed etiam quantum ad potestatem, quia de cetero, non potest aliud facere, sicut plus daret homini qui daret ei arborem cum fructibus quam qui daret ei fructus tantum, ut dicit Anselmus, in libro De Similitud. Et inde est quod etiam promittentibus gratiae aguntur, ut dictum est.Tertio, quia per votum immobiliter voluntas firmatur in bonum. Facere autem aliquid ex voluntate firmata in bonum pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis, ut patet per philosophum, in II Ethic., sicut etiam peccare mente obstinata aggravat peccatum, et dicitur peccatum in spiritum sanctum, ut supra dictum est.” 8 ST II–II, q. 88, a. 6. 9 ST II–II, q. 88, a. 6. N&V_Sum09.qxp 682 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 682 Mary Catherine Sommers This is because he not only performs an act ordered to the good, but relinquishes his power to do otherwise. Aquinas offers this analogy: the one who gives someone the tree along with its fruit gives more than he who gives the fruit alone. This is the “holocaust” aspect of making a vow.10 The votum in Latin is not only the “vow,” but also refers to the “thing vowed,” for example, the “burnt-offerings.” It is this aspect of vowing which gives it its life-altering possibilities. The material proper to vows is wide and various: not, certainly, something “illicit” or “simply evil” or something “wholly outside one’s power, like vowing not to die; nor even something “indifferent”;11 but any act of virtue, most properly a supererogatory act or “a greater good.”12 One can vow to give money,13 a chalice or house,14 to fast or perform any act of abstinence; one can vow to go on a pilgrimage, or one can vow to take up the cross15 to protect the most important place of pilgrimage, the Holy Land, or to defend the Church.16 “Religion” 17 for Aquinas always presupposes vows, since it requires that “someone bind herself through faith to God and to his proper worship.” 10 Contra impugnantes, c. 1 (in Opera Omnia XLI [Romae, Ad Sanctae Sabinae: Editio Leonina, 1970],A14: 117–124):“Nec solum sacrificium per haec tria Deo offertur; sed holocaustum, quod erat in lege acceptissimum. Unde Gregorius in VIII Homil. secundae partis super Ezech.: cum quis suum aliquid Deo vovet et aliquid non vovet, sacrificium est; cum vero omne quod habet, omne quod vivit, omne quod sapit, omnipotenti Deo voverit, holocaustum est.” 11 Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, arg.2. 12 Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 co.:“[I]deo si votum accipiatur secundum propriam sui rationem, est proprie de bonis illis ad quae non omnes tenentur, quae supererogationis sunt; et ideo dicuntur meliora bona, quia superadduntur illis bonis, sine quibus non est salus; et ideo votum proprie acceptum, dicitur esse de meliori bono.” Contra retrahentes, c. 8 co: “Hoc etiam ostendere nituntur ex voti definitione. Dicitur enim votum esse sponsio melioris boni animi deliberatione firmata. . . .” 13 ST II–II, q. 88, a.3, arg. 2: “vir qui vovet pecuniam dare. . . .” 14 ST IIª–II, q. 88, a.10, ad 1: “aliquis rem quam vovit, iam consecratam, puta calicem vel domum. . . .” 15 ST II–II, q. 189, a. 3, arg. 3:“Praeterea, per votum minus utile non potest derogari voto magis utili. Sed per impletionem voti religionis impediri posset impletio voti crucis in subsidium Terrae Sanctae. . . .” 16 ST II–II, q. 189, a. 3, ad 3: “Ad tertium. Dicendum quod votum religionis, cum sit perpetuum, est maius quam votum peregrinationis terrae sanctae, quod est temporale.” De perfectione spiritualis vitae, c. 13 (Opera Omnia XLI [Romae, Ad Sanctae Sabinae: Commissio Leonina, 1970], B83: 181–83: “et voventibus ire in subsidium terrae sanctae vel alias in defensionem Ecclesiae. . . .” 17 Contra impugnantes, c. 1 (A53: 46–54):“Ex his ergo patet quod duplex est religionis acceptio. Una secundum sui nominis primam institutionem, secundum quod aliquis N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 683 Marriage Vows and “Taking up a New State” 683 Thus “every Christian participates in baptism, renouncing Satan and all his pomps,” “a vow required of everyone”18 who desires to be saved. Those who, over and above this, “renounce the world,” “are called ‘religious’ antonomastically” giving their whole selves over to divine service, “as if offering a holocaust to God.”19 By taking vows to follow the counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience, religious give over irrevocably the good and proper use of property, sexual activity, and their own wills. Solemnity Vows which have no hint of necessity about them,20 are not temporary,21 and not limited to particular acts22 have most fully the character of vows. The profession of these vows is, therefore, properly accompanied by solemnity.23 se Deo ligat per fidem ad debitum cultum; et sic quilibet Christianae religionis fit particeps in Baptismo, abrenuntians Satanae et omnibus pompis eius. Secunda prout aliquis ad aliqua opera caritatis se obligat, quibus specialiter Deo servitur vitae abrenuntians saeculari. . . . 18 Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 38, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 co:“Cum enim votum sit obligatio ex voluntate facta, necessitas autem voluntarium excludat; illud votum quod nihil habet necessitatis, dicitur per prius votum, quasi habens complete rationem voti; et hoc est votum singulare, quod est de illis ad quae non tenemur. Illud autem votum quod habet aliquid necessitatis, habet incomplete rationem voti, et ideo dicitur per posterius, votum; et hoc est votum commune, quod est de his ad quae omnes tenentur, quorum est necessitas conditionata, non absoluta, ut ex dictis patet.” 19 IIª–IIae, q. 186 a. 1 co.Religio autem, ut supra habitum est, est quaedam virtus per quam aliquis ad Dei servitium et cultum aliquid exhibet. Et ideo antonomastice religiosi dicuntur illi qui se totaliter mancipant divino servitio, quasi holocaustum Deo offerentes. Unde Gregorius dicit, Super Ezech., sunt quidam qui nihil sibimetipsis reservant, sed sensum, linguam, vitam atque substantiam quam perceperunt, omnipotenti Deo immolant. In hoc autem perfectio hominis consistit quod totaliter Deo inhaereat, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Et secundum hoc, religio perfectionis statum nominat.” 20 Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 38, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 co: “Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod divisio illa qua votum dividitur in singulare et commune, est divisio analogi quod praedicatur per prius et posterius de suis dividentibus, sicut ens de substantia et accidente. Cum enim votum sit obligatio ex voluntate facta, necessitas autem voluntarium excludat; illud votum quod nihil habet necessitatis, dicitur per prius votum, quasi habens complete rationem voti; et hoc est votum singulare, quod est de illis ad quae non tenemur. Illud autem votum quod habet aliquid necessitatis, habet incomplete rationem voti, et ideo dicitur per posterius, votum; et hoc est votum commune, quod est de his ad quae omnes tenentur, quorum est necessitas conditionata, non absoluta, ut ex dictis patet.” 21 Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 4, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod votum terrae sanctae obligat hominem ad serviendum Deo temporaliter, et quantum ad determinatum tempus; sed votum religionis quantum ad omnia, et secundum omne tempus.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 684 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 684 Mary Catherine Sommers The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on its condition: thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes the fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God: wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual pertaining to God; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration.24 The analogy which Thomas draws among solemnities merits some attention.What is it about knighthood, marriage, religious profession, and holy orders that makes it proper to “add” solemnity to their inception? Elsewhere, Aquinas says that solemnity is added to those obligations “which among men possess perpetual fixity.”25 One is bound to another, it is forever, and something is irrevocably surrendered. And the reason for this is that solemnities are not customary except when someone is given over totally to some thing: for there is no nuptial solemnity, except in the celebration of matrimony, when each spouse hands over to the other the power of his own body. And, similarly, solemnity is added to taking a vow when someone, through undertaking holy orders, is appointed to divine ministry; and in the 22 ST II–II, q. 88, a. 12, ad 1: “Dicendum quod omnia alia vota sunt quorundam particularium operum; sed per religionem homo totam vitam suam Dei obsequio deputat. Particulare autem in universali includitur.” 23 ST II–II, q. 88, a. 7, ad 2: “Dicendum quod particularibus actibus non consuevit solemnitas adhiberi, sed assumptioni novi status, ut dictum est. Et ideo cum quis vovet aliqua particularia opera, sicut aliquam peregrinationem vel aliquod speciale ieiunium, tali voto non congruit solemnitas, sed solum voto quo aliquis totaliter se subiicit divino ministerio seu famulatui; in quo tamen voto, quasi universali, multa particularia opera comprehenduntur.” 24 ST II–II, q. 88, a. 7:“Dicendum quod unicuique rei solemnitas adhibetur secundum illius rei conditionem; sicut alia est solemnitas novae militiae, scilicet in quodam apparatu equorum et armorum et concursu militum; et alia solemnitas nuptiarum, quae consistit in apparatu sponsi et sponsae et conventu propinquorum. Votum autem est promissio Deo facta. Unde solemnitas voti attenditur secundum aliquid spirituale, quod ad Deum pertineat, idest secundum aliquam spiritualem benedictionem vel consecrationem, quae ex institutione apostolorum adhibetur in professione certae regulae, secundo gradu post sacri ordinis susceptionem. . . .” 25 ST II–II, q. 184, a. 4:“Sed ille proprie est servus qui obligatur ad serviendum, et ille est liber qui a servitute absolvitur. Secundo requiritur quod obligatio praedicta cum aliqua solemnitate fiat, sicut et ceteris quae inter homines obtinent perpetuam firmitatem, quaedam solemnitas adhibetur.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 685 Marriage Vows and “Taking up a New State” 685 profession of a given rule, when through renunciation of the world and one’s own will, someone assumes the state of perfection.26 Solemnity, according to Aquinas, does not attach to “particular acts,” but rather to “the taking up of a new state.”27 In addition, “having a state” is said “solemnly and perpetually, as is clear in the ‘state of liberty’ or the ‘state of matrimony’ and of similar [states].”28 Knighthood, marriage, religious profession, and holy orders, therefore, are all “states” which one assumes through binding oneself to another perpetually and thereby surrendering the power over something essential, for example, one’s body or even one’s will. Change of “state” does not result from all contracts or vows.29 In the De perfectione spiritualis vitae, Aquinas provides a cursus: 26 ST II–II, q. 88, a. 7: “Et huius ratio est quia solemnitates non consueverunt adhiberi nisi quando aliquis totaliter mancipatur alicui rei; non enim solemnitas nuptialis adhibetur nisi in celebratione matrimonii, quando uterque coniugum sui corporis potestatem alteri tradit. Et similiter voti solemnitas adhibetur quando aliquis per susceptionem sacri ordinis divino ministerio applicatur; et in professione certae regulae, quando per abrenuntiationem saeculi et propriae voluntatis aliquis statum perfectionis assumit.” Cf. De perfectione, c. 28 (B107, 19–32): “Hi enim qui matrimonio iunguntur, in statu aliquo ponuntur, quia ex tunc vir non habet potestatem sui corporis, similiter neque mulier, ut dicitur I Cor. VII; est enim in matrimonio perpetua obligatio unius ad alterum, ad quam significandam ab Ecclesia solemnis benedictio nuptiarum exhibetur: non tamen in statu perfectionis ponuntur, sed in statu matrimonii. Unde et his qui in statu perfectionis ponuntur, in signum perpetuae obligationis solemnis consecratio aut benedictio exhibetur; sicut etiam cum civiliter aliquis statum mutat, sicut cum servus manumittitur, aliqua civilis solemnitas exhibetur.” 27 ST II–II, q. 88, a. 7, ad 2: “Dicendum quod particularibus actibus non consuevit solemnitas adhiberi, sed assumptioni novi status. . . .” 28 Quodlibet I, q. 7, a. 2, ad 2 (Opera Omnia XXV, 2 [Roma & Paris: Commissio Leonina, 1996], 197: 98–106):“Quicunque ergo vel voluntariam paupertatem vel castitatem servant, habent quidem preparatorium perfectionis, set non dicuntur habere statum perfectionis, nisi qui se ex solempni professione ad huiusmodi obligant: secundum aliquid enim solempne et perpetuum dicitur aliquis habere statum, sicut patet de statu libertatis vel matrimonii et similium.” 29 De perfectione, c. 18 (B 90: 22–44): “[N]on ergo in aliquo mutatur eius conditio, sicut mutatur eius qui vovet. Nam et apud homines, si quis alicui obsequatur, non ex hoc conditionem mutat; sed si se obligat ad serviendum, iam alterius conditionis efficitur. Sed considerandum quod potest aliquis sibi libertatem adimere vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Si enim aliquis se Deo vel homini obliget ad aliquid speciale faciendum et pro aliquo tempore, non simpliciter libertatem amisit, sed solum secundum illud ad quod se obligavit; si autem se totaliter in potestate alterius ponat, ita quod nihil sibi libertatis retineat; simpliciter conditionem mutavit factus simpliciter servus. Sic ergo dum aliquis Deo vovet aliquod particulare opus, puta peregrinationem, aut ieiunium aut aliquid huiusmodi, non N&V_Sum09.qxp 686 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 686 Mary Catherine Sommers For in human relationships, if one performs an act of obedience to another, this does not cause a change of condition; but if one binds oneself to serve, this does produce a change of condition. But it is necessary to take into consideration that one is able to give away one’s liberty either absolutely or relatively. For if someone binds himself to God to do some particular thing and for some time period, he does not give up his liberty absolutely, but only with respect to that to which he has bound himself. If, therefore, he places himself totally in the power of another, so that nothing of his liberty is retained, then he has changed his condition absolutely, having become absolutely a servant. Thus, then, when someone makes a vow to God about some particular work, for example a pilgrimage or a fast or something similar, he has not changed his condition or state absolutely, but only relatively; if, on the other hand, he bound over his whole life to God by a vow, that he might serve him in the works of perfection, then he has absolutely assumed the condition or state of perfection. “State” Aquinas (for many reasons) frequently compares the religious state and the married state and likens the religious state to “spiritual knighthood,”30 comparisons which depend upon the rather peculiar concept of status, which denotes civil, moral, and even ontological form in human life. The term “state,” for Aquinas, signifies a certain permanent disposition from which one’s fundamental activities are oriented. The human body may be “posed” sitting, lying, or curled up, but it is only “disposed” insofar as it is standing, since it is proper to the human body to be erect— only this has “a certain immobility.”31 It is, likewise, in human acts, that a matter is said to have a state according to an ordering of its proper disposition, with certain immobility or rest. Consequently, for human beings, matters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do not constitute a state, for instance that someone be rich or poor, of high or low rank, and so forth. . . . But that alone seemingly pertains to a human state, which regards an obligation binding his person, in so far, namely, as someone is subject to himself or subject to another, not indeed from any slight or easily changeable simpliciter conditionem vel statum mutavit, sed secundum aliquid tantum.; si vero totam vitam suam voto Deo obligavit ut in operibus perfectionis ei deserviat, iam simpliciter conditionem vel statum perfectionis assumpsit.” 30 Quodlibet IV, q. 12, a. 1, ad 18 (354: 632–39): “Ad XVIII dicendum quod status religionis, quantum ad eos qui in eo profecerint, est spiritualis milicia; quantum vero ad eos qui de novo intrant, est quasi cuiusdam tyrocinii exercitium et oportet ad maiorem profectum quod a puero aliquis huiusmodi exercitium subeat, sicut et de exercitio milicie temporalis Vegetius docet in libro De re militari.” 31 ST II–II, q. 183, a. 1. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 687 Marriage Vows and “Taking up a New State” 687 cause, but from a permanent cause; and this is something pertaining to the nature of freedom or servitude. Therefore state properly regards freedom or servitude whether in spiritual or in civil matters.32 Aquinas’s concept of “state” reflects the fundamental “law of persons” in the Justinian Institutes: In the law of persons, then, the first division is into free men and slaves. (1) Freedom, from which men are called free, is a man’s natural power of doing what he pleases, so far as he is not prevented by force or law; (2) slavery is an institution of the law of nations, against nature subjecting one man to the dominion of another.33 Applying this framework to spiritual “estate,” Aquinas asserts that there are only two basic options: a person can be free from sin and so enslaved to justice or free from justice and so enslaved to sin. 32 Ibid., “Et inde est quod etiam in ipsis humanis actionibus dicitur negotium aliquem statum habere secundum ordinem propriae dispositionis, cum quadam immobilitate seu quiete. Unde et circa homines, ea quae de facili circa eos variantur et extrinseca sunt, non constituunt statum, puta quod aliquis sit dives vel pauper, in dignitate constitutus vel plebeius, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi; unde et in iure civili dicitur quod ei qui a senatu amovetur, magis dignitas quam status aufertur. Sed solum id videtur ad statum hominis pertinere quod respicit obligationem personae hominis, prout scilicet aliquis est sui iuris vel alieni, et hoc non ex aliqua causa levi vel de facili mutabili, sed ex aliquo permanente. Et hoc est quod pertinet ad rationem libertatis vel servitutis. Unde status pertinet proprie ad libertatem vel servitutem, sive in spiritualibus sive in civilibus.” 33 Institutiones I, 3 (www.faculty.cua.edu/Pennington/Canon%20Law/RomanLaw/ DigestCode.htm; translated by J. B. Moyle, 5th edition, [Oxford, 1913]): “Summa itaque divisio de iure personarum haec est, quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi. (1.) Et libertas quidem est, ex qua etiam liberi vocantur, naturalis facultas eius quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid aut vi aut iure prohibetur. (2.) Servitus autem est constitutio iuris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subicitur.” The term used here is conditio, which Aquinas recognizes as a synonym of status, for example, Quodlibet III, q. 6, a. 3 (269: 120–270: 125): “[C]um dicimus aliquos esse in statu perfectionis, accipitur status pro condicione, secundum quod libertas vel servitus dicitur status; prout consuevit dici, quod error personae aut condicionis vel status impedit matrimonium.” This concept has not disappeared entirely from the law: see J. Budziszewski, True Tolerance: Liberalism and the Necessity of Judgment (New Brunswick [USA] and London [UK]: Transaction Publishers, 2000). Budziszewski cites a U.S. Supreme Court decision of 1888, Maynard v. Hill, as support for his contention that marriage is a status relationship rather than a contractual relationship:“A status relationship differs from a contractual relationship in that its terms are arranged by law or custom rather than by the principals. But although individuals cannot contract the terms of a status, sometimes they can contract to enter it” (15). N&V_Sum09.qxp 688 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 688 Mary Catherine Sommers Nevertheless, since the human being by natural reason is inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to natural reason, it follows that freedom from sin is true liberty, which is united to servitude to justice, since through both a human being inclines to what is appropriate.34 As with civil state, one option is “natural” and the other “against nature.” Justice constitutes a “state” when the person possessing justice “is situated in the proper order towards God, neighbor and himself, so that in him the lower powers are subordinated to the superior. . . . And thus, every kind of sin is opposed to this sort of justice, because through any kind of sin something of this order would be corrupted.”35 Likewise, there is a “state” of sin, because “the one who through his own volition falls into mortal sin, places himself in a state from which he cannot be pulled out, except with divine aid: for from this, that he wills to sin, he wills as a consequence to remain perpetually in sin.”36 Marriage is conditioned by questions of “state,” both civil and spiritual. “An error of person,37 or of condition or state is an impediment to matrimony, not, however, an error of fortune or rank.”38 Thus, the person behind 34 ST II–II, q. 183, a. 4:“Veruntamen, quia homo secundum naturalem rationem ad iustitiam inclinatur, peccatum autem est contra naturalem rationem, consequens est quod libertas a peccato sit vera libertas, quae coniungitur servituti iustitiae, quia per utrumque tendit homo in id quod est conveniens sibi.” 35 De veritate, q. 28, a. 1 (Opera Omnia XXII, 3 [Romae ad Sanctae Sabinae: Editio Leonina, 1972], 819: 141–52): “Tertio modo iustitia nominat quemdam statum proprium, secundum quem homo se habet in debito ordine ad Deum, ad proximum et ad seipsum, ut scilicet in eo inferiores vires superiori subdantur, quod appellat philosophus in V Ethicorum iustitiam metaphorice dictam, cum consideretur inter diversas vires eiusdem personae, [iustitia] proprie dicta semper existente inter diversas personas. Et huic iustitiae omne peccatum opponitur, cum per quodlibet peccatum aliquid de praedicto ordine corrumpatur. . . .” 36 Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 46, q. 1, a. 3 co.: “Qui enim in peccatum mortale propria voluntate labitur, se ponit in statu a quo erui non potest, nisi divinitus adjutus; unde ex hoc ipso quod vult peccare, vult consequenter perpetuo in peccato manere.” 37 Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5:”Sed si error nobilitatis vel dignitatis redundat in errorem personae, tunc impedit matrimonium; unde si consensus mulieris feratur in istam personam directe, error de nobilitate ipsius non impedit matrimonium. Si autem directe intendit consentire in filium regis, quicumque sit ille, tunc si alius praesentetur ei quam filius regis, est error personae, et impedietur matrimonium.” 38 Quodlibet III, q. 6, a. 3 co. (269: 120–270: 125):“[C]um dicimus aliquos esse in statu perfectionis accipitur status pro condicione, secundum quod libertas vel servitus dicitur status; prout consuevit dici, quod error personae aut condicionis vel status impedit matrimonium, non autem error fortune aut qualitatis.” Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2 co:“Duo autem includit matrimonium ipsum; scilicet personas quae conjunguntur, et mutuam potestatem in invicem, in qua matrimonium consistit. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 689 Marriage Vows and “Taking up a New State” 689 the veil must prove upon the unveiling to be the one you intended to marry, and must be free to marry or else have the consent of those he or she is subject to. If, however, he is not as rich as rumor has it or she lacks sixteen quarterings of nobility, such things are subject to Lady Fortune and mutable, and so not matters of “state.” Further, marriage itself constitutes a different disposition depending on the moral and historical state of humankind.39 Aquinas reports favorably the position that marriage should be assessed in accordance with “a threefold state”: first, in the state “before sin,” when it was only a function of nature. Secondly, as “under the law,”“where, through its sanctification the marital act was rendered excusable”; and thirdly,“under the state of grace,” “where, in addition, it confers grace in order to restrain concupiscence.”40 While Thomas Aquinas compares the marriage contract and religious profession because each produces a change of state, those changes are not identical. Both states, namely that of religion and that of marriage, have something similar, namely a perpetual obligation, and thus both are states, as it were, of some servitude.The obligation of matrimony, however is not to the work of perfection, but to render the carnal debt; therefore it is a certain state, but not the state of perfection.41 If contracting marriage effects “a certain state,” what are its characteristics as a state? Does it have eschatological implications as its comparison to the “state” of perfection implies? Thomas Aquinas recognizes certain stages in the life of charity, which, while marking the interior journey of the soul to God, are also made manifest in the life of the Church through Primum autem tollitur per errorem personae; secundum per errorem conditionis, quia servus non potest potestatem sui corporis alteri tradere sine consensu domini sui; et propter hoc hi duo errores matrimonium impediunt, et non alii.” 39 De veritate, q. 13, a. 1, ad 1 (Opera Omnia XXII, 2; 417:188–192):“Et sic, si in statu viae elevetur ad hoc quod cognoscat Deum secundum statum patriae, hoc erit contra naturam, sicut esset contra naturam quod puer mox natus haberet barbam.” 40 Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 co:“Et propter hoc alii dicunt, quod matrimonium consideratur in triplici statu. Primo ante peccatum et tunc erat tantum in officium. Secundo sub lege, ubi ex ipsa sanctificatione sua excusabilem reddebat matrimonii actum, qui absque hoc turpis fuisset.Tertio sub statu gratiae, ubi ulterius gratiam confert ad concupiscentiam reprimendam. . . .” 41 De perfectione, c. 29 (B109: 47–56):”Uterque enim status, scilicet religionis et matrimonii, aliquid simile habet, scilicet perpetuam obligationem; et ideo uterque status est quasi alicuius servitutis. Sed obligatio matrimonii non est ad opus perfectionis, sed ad reddendum carnale debitum: et ideo est quidam status, sed non perfectionis. Status autem religionis habet obligationem ad opera perfectionis, quae sunt paupertas, continentia et obedientia; et ideo est status perfectionis.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 690 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 690 Mary Catherine Sommers the “estates” of its members. Does marrying dispose the couple “with a certain immobility or rest” with respect to the end of this journey? Aquinas compares the three stages of charity as “spiritual growth” to the stages of human bodily growth, which development, although continuous, has a discernible beginning, middle, and end. The three bodily stages are as follows: (1) “the period of infancy, before one has the use of reason”; (2) “afterwards, another human state can be distinguished when now one begins to speak and to employ reason”; (3) “again, a third state is puberty, when the power to reproduce is present, and thus, the human being goes on from there to reach full development.”42 Likewise, the growth of charity can be distinguished into three stages, each characterized by “some determinate actions and pursuits.” In the first or beginner’s stage, the person’s occupation is “chiefly avoiding sin and resisting her concupiscences.” Charity here is a weak infant “needing to be fed and fondled” lest it be destroyed. This stage is succeeded by a second, in which the person’s principal intention is that she should become proficient in the good, strengthening it through increase. The work of the third stage is that the person “primarily intends that she may have union with God and take joy therein.”43 The stages are defined through their primary work and intention: none of them is a pure condition. While the persons who are “beginners” will certainly be progressing, their central preoccupation, however, is resistance to those sins with which they are locked in deadly struggle. Those further along in their 42 ST II–II, q. 24, a. 9:“[S]pirituale augmentum caritatis considerari potest quantum ad aliquid simile corporali hominis augmento. Quod quidem quamvis in plurimas partes distingui possit, habet tamen aliquas determinatas distinctiones secundum determinatas actiones vel studia ad quae homo perducitur per augmentum; sicut infantilis aetas dicitur antequam habeat usum rationis; postea autem distinguitur alius status hominis quando iam incipit loqui et ratione uti; iterum tertius status eius est pubertas, cum iam incipit posse generare; et sic deinde quousque perveniatur ad perfectum. Ita etiam et diversi gradus caritatis distinguuntur secundum diversa studia ad quae homo perducitur per caritatis augmentum. Nam primo quidem incumbit homini studium principale ad recedendum a peccato et resistendum concupiscentiis eius, quae in contrarium caritatis movent. Et hoc pertinet ad incipientes, in quibus caritas est nutrienda vel fovenda ne corrumpatur. Secundum autem studium succedit ut homo principaliter intendat ad hoc quod in bono proficiat. Et hoc studium pertinet ad proficientes, qui ad hoc principaliter intendunt ut in eis caritas per augmentum roboretur.Tertium autem studium est ut homo ad hoc principaliter intendat ut Deo inhaereat et eo fruatur. Et hoc pertinet ad perfectos, qui cupiunt dissolvi et esse cum Christo. Sicut etiam videmus in motu corporali quod primum est recessus a termino; secundum autem est appropinquatio ad alium terminum; tertium est quies in termino.” 43 ST II–II, q. 24, a. 9. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 691 Marriage Vows and “Taking up a New State” 691 moral development, the “proficient,” will be less troubled by such struggles and can safely fix their sights on the goal: building the moral edifice, to be sure, but keeping one hand close to the sword to guard against an outbreak of their besetting sins. The perfect will also make progress in charity, but this will not be their principal concern, which is focused on cleaving to God. This is, of course, what those at all stages of spiritual growth seek, but they are relatively less free to do so. When Aquinas turns, at the end of the secunda pars, to the consideration of the diversity of graces, lives, states, and offices in the Church, the three grades of charity make another appearance, this time as descriptive of the three states of the Christian life.Aquinas argues that, since spiritual liberty, that is,“liberty from sin, is accomplished through charity. . . . there is an identical division of charity and of the states pertaining to spiritual liberty.”44 There are three “states,” then, as defined with respect simply to the goal of the spiritual life: the beginners, the proficient, and the perfect. This spectrum of spiritual liberty and servitude, for Aquinas, exists in two spheres: (1) the first is interior, where a person’s spiritual condition or state is established with respect to divine judgment; (2) the second is concerned with one’s exterior actions, where spiritual state is defined in relation to the Church.45 In the first sphere, a state of perfection is achieved “through interior spiritual growth”; in the second, through exterior actions,46 namely through “binding oneself perpetually with some solemnity to [do] those things which pertain to perfection.”47 Perfection as an interior state is the goal of all Christians; the ecclesiastical “state of perfection,” according to Aquinas, is occupied only by religious “because they bind themselves by vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might lawfully use, in 44 ST II–II, q. 183, a. 4, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod libertas a peccato fit per caritatem, quae diffunditur in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis, ut dicitur Ad Rom.V; et inde est quod dicitur II ad Cor. III: Ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas. Et ideo eadem est divisio caritatis, et statuum pertinentium ad spiritualem libertatem.” 45 ST II–II, q. 184, a. 4:“Et quia, ut dicitur I Reg. XVI, homines vident ea quae parent, sed Deus intuetur cor, inde est quod secundum interiorem hominis dispositionem accipitur conditio spiritualis status in homine per comparationem ad iudicium divinum; secundum autem ea quae exterius aguntur, accipitur spiritualis status in homine per comparationem ad Ecclesiam.” 46 ST II–II, q. 184, a. 4, ad 1:“Et similiter per augmentum spirituale interius aliquis adipiscitur perfectionis statum quantum ad divinum iudicium. Sed quantum ad distinctiones ecclesiasticorum statuum, non adipiscitur aliquis statum perfectionis nisi per augmentum in his quae exterius aguntur.” 47 ST II–II, q. 184, a. 4:“Sic igitur et in statu perfectionis proprie dicitur aliquis esse, non ex hoc quod habet actum dilectionis perfectae, sed ex hoc quod obligat se perpetuo cum aliqua solemnitate ad ea quae sunt perfectionis.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 692 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 692 Mary Catherine Sommers order more freely to give themselves to God”; and by bishops because they bind themselves to a pastoral duty “to which it belongs that a shepherd lay down his life for his sheep.”48 No classes of persons in the Church are specifically assigned to the state of beginners or that of proficients: this is because “initiation and growth are not sought for their own sake, but for the sake of perfection.”49 Notwithstanding, it is clear that baptismal vows effect a beginning, committing the person to those things that are required for salvation.50 Thus the “state of beginners” would seem to be occupied by those who have made these commitments, but no others, and whose form of life will be determined by the daily battle, undertaken lest they lose charity altogether, with those sins with which they are particularly prone. Further, we can speculate about the members of the class of “proficients,” who, because of further commitments, are able to intend the increase of charity and can keep their eyes on the prize despite its distance. We might begin to populate this class by considering, first, those whom Aquinas finds do not meet the criteria for the “state of perfection.” This would include (1) those, in sacred orders, who on account of their care of souls or the Western practice of clerical celibacy, give over some part of their lives to God, but not the whole, as do religious and bishops. “And thus a comparison between the state of religion and their duties is like the universal to the particular and like a holocaust to a sacrifice, which is less than a holocaust.”51 (2) There are also those living a form of religious life which makes use of marriage, who “are not the religious simply and absolutely speaking, but in a restricted sense, in so far as they have a certain share in those things that belong to the religious state.”52 Both groups 48 ST II–II, q. 184, a. 5: “Utrumque autem horum competit et religiosis et epis- copis. Religiosi enim se voto adstringunt ad hoc quod a rebus saecularibus abstineant quibus licite uti poterant, ad hoc quod liberius Deo vacent, in quo consistit perfectio praesentis vitae. . . . Similiter etiam episcopi obligant se ad ea quae sunt perfectionis, pastorale assumentes officium, ad quod pertinet ut animam suam ponat pastor pro ovibus suis, sicut dicitur Ioan. X.” 49 ST II–II, q. 184, a. 5, ad 1:“Dicendum quod inchoatio et augmentum non quaeritur propter se, sed propter perfectionem. Et ideo ad solum perfectionis statum aliqui homines cum quadam obligatione et solemnitate assumuntur.” 50 ST II–II, q. 88, a. 2, ad 1: “Dicendum quod sub voto baptizatorum cadit abrenuntiare pompis diaboli et fidem Christi servare, quia voluntarie fit, licet sit de necessitate salutis.” 51 ST II–II, q. 184, a. 8:“Et ideo comparatio status religionis ad eorum officium est sicut universalis ad particulare, et sicut holocausti ad sacrificium, quod est minus holocausto. . . .” 52 ST II–II, q. 186, a. 4, ad 3: “Dicendum quod illi modi vivendi secundum quos homines matrimonio utuntur, non sunt simpliciter et absolute loquendo religiones, N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 693 Marriage Vows and “Taking up a New State” 693 seem to be characterized by perpetual commitments which make over some part of their liberty to God, but do not render them “simply servants,” like those in the state of perfection. Since it is the perpetual and irrevocable nature of the pactio conjugalis which makes it comparable to vows undertaken in religious profession, it seems reasonable that on Aquinas’s terms, it effects a change of eschatological state from beginning to proficient. The relationship in marriage has “inseparability,”53 a term which Aquinas uses only to describe “state,” with reference to the state of perfection, matrimony, and the Trinity. Indeed, this characteristic of marriage “is chiefly caused insofar as it is a sign of the indissoluble relationship between Christ and His Church.”54 Further, Aquinas uses marriage as an example of a change of state, which although celebrated with solemnity, does not place the participants in the state of perfection, but in a state of “striving” for perfection (statum quemcumque adipiscentibus ).55 In another place, Aquinas describes the sed secundum quid, inquantum scilicet in aliquo participant quaedam quae ad statum religionis pertinent.” 53 Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 31, q. 1, a. 3 co:“Si autem dicatur principalius quod est essentialius, sic distinguendum est: quia fides et proles possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo in seipsis; et sic pertinent ad usum matrimonii, per quem et proles producitur, et pactio conjugalis servatur; sed indivisibilitas, quam sacramentum importat, pertinet ad ipsum matrimonium secundum se; quia ex hoc ipso quod per pactionem conjugalem sui potestatem sibi invicem in perpetuum conjuges tradunt, sequitur quod separari non possint; et inde est quod matrimonium nunquam invenitur sine inseparabilitate; invenitur autem sine fide et prole, quia esse rei non dependet ab usu suo; et secundum hoc sacramentum est essentialius matrimonio quam fides et proles. Alio modo possunt considerari fides et proles secundum quod sunt in suis principiis, ut pro prole accipiatur intentio prolis, et pro fide debitum servandi fidem; sine quibus etiam matrimonium esse non potest, quia haec in matrimonio ex ipsa pactione conjugali causantur; ita quod si aliquid contrarium hujusmodi exprimeretur in consensu qui matrimonium facit, non esset verum matrimonium; et sic accipiendo fidem et prolem, proles est essentialissimum in matrimonio, et secundo fides, et tertio sacramentum; sicut etiam homini est essentialius esse naturae quam esse gratiae, quamvis esse gratiae sit dignius.” 54 Super Romanos, c. 7, lect l. (www.corpusthomisticum.org/opera. html): “Alligata est legi, scilicet qua tenetur convivere viro, secundum illud Matthaei XIX, 6: quos Deus coniunxit, homo non separet. Et haec quidem inseparabilitas matrimonii praecipue causatur in quantum est sacramentum coniunctionis indissolubilis Christi et Ecclesiae, vel verbi et humanae naturae in persona Christi. Eph.V, 32: sacramentum hoc magnum est in Christo et Ecclesia, etc.” 55 De perfectione, c. 28 (B107: 13–27): “Ubi primo considerandum est, quod solemnis consecratio aut benedictio non est causa quod homo sit in statu perfectionis, sed inducitur quasi signum. Non enim adhibetur nisi illis qui in aliquo statu ponuntur; non quidem semper in statu perfectionis existentibus, sed statum quemcumque adipiscentibus. Hi enim qui matrimonio iunguntur, in statu aliquo N&V_Sum09.qxp 694 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 694 Mary Catherine Sommers second effect of love as caritas proficiens “because the primary work in this state is ‘striving’ after goods” (quia in hoc statu praecipua cura est de adipiscendis bonis ).56 If the married state is one of those states structured to strive after perfection, and if the mark of those states is “love proficient,” rather than merely “love beginning,” yet short of “love perfected,” it appears that entering into marriage does effect a change of eschatological state from beginning to proficient. Conclusion Aquinas’s preoccupation with what may seem an accident of medieval law and society, namely, a person’s “state,” is, on the contrary, a significant element of his moral theory and one with contemporary lessons.Why he finds it so important emerges explicitly in answering an objection to the requirement of perpetual continence for religious perfection, which argues that Abraham, a married man, was the “first exemplar of perfection shown to us.” What the patriarchs were capable of, Aquinas replies, should not lead the weak to presume that they can reach perfection loaded down with the baggage of money and marriage.“So neither does a man unarmed presume to attack his enemy, just because Samson slew many foes with the jaw-bone of an ass.”57 The human condition is dangerous: reason and revelation alike bid us to make provision for our spiritual as well as physical survival. Under the New Law58 we can freely put aside some portion or even all of our freedom to face each incipient temptation with a new and undeliberated response. We can put it aside for now or forever. This act of binding ourselves with respect to the means of salvation constitutes a strategy, ponuntur, quia ex tunc vir non habet potestatem sui corporis, similiter neque mulier, ut dicitur I Cor.VII: est enim in matrimonio perpetua obligatio unius ad alterum, ad quam significandam ab Ecclesia solemnis benedictio nuptiarum exhibetur; non tamen in statu perfectionis ponuntur, sed in statu matrimonii.” 56 Super Sent., lib. 3, d. 29, q. 1, a. 8, qc. 1 co:“Secundus effectus est ut jam fiduciam de liberatione peccatorum habens ad bonum adipiscendum se extendat; et quantum ad hunc effectum dicitur caritas proficiens: non quin in aliis statibus proficiat, sed quia in hoc statu praecipua cura est de adipiscendis bonis, dum homo semper ad perfectionem anhelat.” 57 ST II–II, q. 186, a. 4, ad 2:“[S]icut nec aliquis praesumit hostes inermis invadere quia Samson cum mandibula asini multos hostium peremit.” 58 Cf. Super Sent., lib. 4, d. 30, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 1 and 2: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod beata virgo fuit confinium veteris et novae legis, sicut aurora diei et noctis; et ideo votum ejus sapuit novam legem, inquantum virginitatem vovit; et veterem, inquantum conditionem apposuit. Ad secundum dicendum, quod perfectio consiliorum quantum ad consummationem incipere debuit a Christo; sed quantum ad aliquam inchoationem convenienter a matre ejus incepit.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 695 Marriage Vows and “Taking up a New State” 695 either for now or for the long haul.The more we commit and the more irrevocably we commit it, the greater the strength of our disposition towards the final end of human striving. Indeed, any good thing surrendered simply and perpetually establishes a base from which the ordering of one’s life—one’s possessions, one’s body, and even the will—can begin. Thomas Aquinas, the great defender of religious life, nevertheless, recogN&V nizes that sacramental marriage is similarly architectonic. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 697 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 697–709 697 Children as the Common Good of Marriage M ICHAEL WALDSTEIN Ave Maria University Ave Maria, Florida I N RECENT discussions of marriage, explicit attention to the common good is relatively rare. Much attention is focused on the individual person, on his or her dignity, on the mutual love between two unique persons, yet in such a way that the importance of the common good, its importance precisely as the good of the person, tends to fade from view. The Primacy of the Common Good In 1943, Charles De Koninck, then dean at the faculty of philosophy at Laval, published a book entitled The Primacy of the Common Good:Against the Personalists, in which he attempted to counteract what he saw as a widespread eclipse of the common good. In the preface, Jean-Marie Cardinal Villeneuve, Archbishop of Quebec, offers an excellent summary of De Koninck’s main thesis. Here is the thesis of this work: the primacy of the common good, in society, in the family, for the soul itself, provided that the notion of a common good is well understood, as the greatest good of the singular, not by being a collection of singular goods, but best for each of the particular individuals who participate in it precisely on account of its being common.Those who defend the primacy of the singular good of the singular person suppose a false notion of the common good as if it were alien to the good of the singular; whereas it is natural and proper that the singular seek more the good of the species than his singular good. . . . Rational creatures, persons, are distinguished from irrational, by being more ordered to the common good and by being able to act expressly for its sake. It is true also that a person can perversely prefer N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 698 9:43 AM Page 698 Michael Waldstein his own singular good to the common good, attaching himself to the singularity of his person, or as we say today to his personality, set up as a common measure of all good. Furthermore, if the reasonable creature cannot entirely limit himself to a subordinate common good, such as the family or political society, this is not because his particular good as such is greater; it is because of his proper ordination to a superior common good to which he is principally ordered. In this case, the common good is not sacrificed to the good of the individual as individual, but to the good of the individual insofar as the latter is ordered to a more universal common good, indeed to God.1 The primacy of the common good in every order of goodness is a consistent teaching of St.Thomas.“It is clear that the good of the part is for the sake of [ propter ] the good of the whole.This is why by a natural inclination or love every particular thing loves its proper good [bonum suum proprium ] for the sake of the common good of the whole universe, which is God.”2 This primacy is not a thesis peculiar to Latin as opposed to Greek theology. Clement of Alexandria, for example, writes, This is the one “after the image and likeness,” the true knower, who imitates God as far as possible, leaving aside none of the things for possible likeness, practicing self-restraint and endurance, living justly, reigning over the passions, giving a share in what he has as far as possible, and doing good both by word and deed. “He is the greatest,” it is said, “in the kingdom who shall act and teach” by imitating God in conferring like benefits. For God’s gifts are for the common good.3 Likewise John Chrysostom: If in matters of daily life no man lives for himself, but artisan, and soldier, and farmer, and merchant, all of them contribute to the common good and to their neighbor’s advantage, much more ought we to do this in things spiritual. For this is most properly to live, since the one who lives for himself alone and overlooks all others is certainly superfluous and not a human being, nor of our race. . . . Since we are persuaded by all these things that it is not possible for a person to be saved who has not looked to the common good . . . let us choose this way, that we may also reach eternal life. . . .4 Peter and John . . . were both unlearned and ignorant men; but nevertheless, since they showed zeal and did all things for the common 1 Charles De Koninck, “On the Primacy of the Common Good: Against the Personalists,” Aquinas Review 4 (1997): 1–71, here 5–6. 2 Summa theologiae I–II, q. 109, a. 3. 3 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 2.19. 4 John Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, 77.6 (58.710). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 699 Children as the Common Good of Marriage 699 good, they reached heaven. For nothing is as pleasing to God as living for the common good.5 John Chrysostom sees this primacy of the common good as one of the core elements of the teaching of Jesus. It was for this that he brought his teaching from heaven above, that he might place our thoughts there, that we might be imitators of the teacher according to our power. But how can we become imitators of Christ? By acting in everything for the common good, and not seeking our own. “For even Christ,” Paul says, “did not please himself, but as it is written, The reproaches of those who reproach you fell on me” (Rom 15:3). Let no one therefore seek his own. For one [truly] seeks one’s own good when one looks to that of one’s neighbor, for what is their good is ours. We are one body, and parts and limbs of one another. Let us not then be as though we were torn apart. Let no one say, “Such a one is no friend of mine, or relative, or neighbor, nor do I have anything to do with him. How shall I approach, how address him?” Even if he is neither a relative nor a friend, he still is a human being, who shares the same nature with you, has the same Lord, and is your fellow-servant and fellow-sojourner, for he is born in the same world. And if besides he shares the same faith, then, take note, he has also become a member of yours. For what friendship could work such union, as the kinship of faith? And our familiarity with one another like people who live in the same house must not merely be such nearness as friends ought to show to friends, but as exists between limb and limb. For nobody can possibly discover any familiarity greater than this sort of friendship and communion. As no limb could say, “Where does my familiarity and closeness with this limb come from?” (that would be ridiculous) so neither can you say so in the case of your brother. “We are all baptized into one body” (1 Cor 12:13), Paul says.“Why into one body?” So that we may not be torn apart, but preserve the coherence of that one body by our coming together and friendship with one another.6 One of the key points made by Chrysostom in this text lies in the claim that the common good is truly “one’s own good.” It is the person’s good.The most insidious and destructive error about the common good is to conceive it as an alien good, as the good of the community as opposed to the person. It is a likely error, given the traditional topos that individuals should sacrifice their good for the sake of the community. To clear up this error, one must take firm hold of Chrysostom’s point: the common good is “one’s own good.” It is the good of the person. 5 Ibid., 78.2 (58.714). 6 Chrysostom, Homilies on John, 15.3 (59.101). N&V_Sum09.qxp 700 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 700 Michael Waldstein There is a profound difference between imperfectly and perfectly common goods and this difference bears immediately on a profound difference between different kinds of wholes and parts.When the city collects a tax, it acts as a quasi individual in its own right. It takes for itself a sum of money which was the private good of its citizens. It places that money in a bank account identified as belonging to the city, just as private citizens place their money in their own private bank accounts.When the city has taken my money, the money is an alien good for me. It is no longer in my own possession. It has become the good of another as other. It therefore fails to fulfill the most basic requirement for a true common good, namely, that it be truly common. It is a good of the totality, a good of the whole, but still not a true and full common good. In fact, money is the quintessentially private good. The only way it can be common is for its benefits to flow back to the persons who make up the city, for example, by the building of schools and roads, etc. As a quasi individual in possession of its own private good, the city can compete against the individual persons that are part of it. One can define a totalitarian regime partly in these terms: a regime is totalitarian when it makes citizens as parts subservient to the good of the whole city considered as a quasi individual. [T]he common good does not have the character of an alien good— bonum alienum—as in the case of the good of another considered as such. Is it not this which, in the social order, distinguishes our position profoundly from collectivism, which latter errs by abstraction, by demanding an alienation from the proper good as such and consequently from the common good since the latter is the greatest of proper goods? Those who defend the primacy of the singular good of the singular person are themselves supposing this false notion of the common good.7 In this text, “proper good” refers to a good that is truly possessed by the persons of whom the city is composed. A true common good is common only if it is a “proper good” or “personal good” in this sense. If one takes the city as a quasi individual and claims that goods belonging to it as such an individual, for example, tax money, must have primacy in the hearts of its citizens over their own private good, one has alienated the citizens from their own good and sacrificed them to the city. The result is slavery in the sense of a complete subservience to purposes that are not one’s own, but those of another as other. 7 De Koninck, “Primacy of the Common Good,” 18. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 701 Children as the Common Good of Marriage 701 By contrast, when there is a genuine common good, such as the peace and justice of a city, the city appears as a whole that does not stand as a competing individual over against the persons that constitute it, but as a whole built up precisely by a truly common good genuinely participated in by each and every person. The Primacy of the Common Good in Marriage The primacy of the common good is evident in St.Thomas’s discussion of the sacrament of marriage in the Scriptum on the Sentences, later incorporated into the Supplement of the Summa. When he first divides the text of Peter Lombard, he appeals to the common good of the Church as the principle of division. “After the Teacher discussed the sacraments ordered to the good of one person, he now discusses the sacraments ordered to the good of the whole Church. His discussion is divided into two parts: in the first he treats the sacrament of Holy Orders, which is ordered to the spiritual multiplication and governance of the Church; in the second Marriage, which is ordered to the material multiplication of the faithful.”8 This division shows that St. Thomas understands Peter Lombard’s—and his own—account of marriage as standing under the formality of the common good. “Marriage is principally ordered to the common good because of its principal end, which is the good of offspring.”9 “Intercourse is ordered to the common good of the whole human race.”10 The common good is also decisive in establishing the communion of husband and wife. “Offspring is the common good of husband and wife.”11 St. Thomas’s account of the sacramental grace specific to marriage brings out the role of the common good from a more comprehensive angle. “The sacrament [of Marriage] confers on the spouses a grace 8 Scriptum super Sententiis IV, d. 24, q. 1, prologue; see also Sent. IV, d. 26, prologue. In ST III, q. 65, a. 1, St.Thomas adopts this division as the fundamental division of the sacraments into those that aim at the perfection of the individual person and those that aim at the common good of the whole Church, namely, orders and marriage:“Man is perfected in order to the whole community in two ways. He is perfected in one way by accepting the power to rule the multitude and to perform public acts. In spiritual life the sacrament of Orders takes this place. . . . [He is perfected] in a second way with respect to natural propagation, which occurs through marriage both in bodily and spiritual life, since marriage is not only a sacrament, but a service of nature.” 9 Sent. IV, d. 33, q. 2, a.1 ad 4. 10 ST II–II, q. 154, a. 2; see also Summa contra Gentiles IV, ch. 78, par. 2, where St. Thomas distinguishes various common goods to which marriage is ordered: the good of the human race, the good of a people or city, and the good of the Church. 11 Sent. IV, d.33, q. 2, a. 1. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 702 Michael Waldstein 702 through which they belong to the union of Christ and the Church: which is most necessary for them, in order for them to attend to matters of the flesh and the earth in such a way that these are not disconnected from Christ and the Church.”12 The sacramental grace of marriage connects the earthly concerns of married life with the larger community of the Church to which the communion of husband and wife is ordered as part to whole, and with the supreme common good of the Church, Christ himself. An eloquent account of this ordination of marriage to the common good of the Church is given by Matthias Joseph Scheeben (1835–1888), whom Balthasar calls “the greatest German theologian to-date since the time of Romanticism.”13 When they bind themselves to each other [man and woman] can do so in justice only for the same purpose which Christ pursues in his bond with the Church, namely, to extend the mystical body. They can only act in the Spirit of the union of Christ and the Church and by the same token they can only act in the name of Christ and the Church, because their bodies belong to Christ and his Church, and consequently the right of disposing of them pertains in the first instance not to the earthly couple, but to the heavenly marriage (connubium ). Therefore their union presupposes the union of Christ with his Church, and carries it further to cooperate with it for a single supernatural purpose. They must cooperate precisely as members of the body of Christ in his Church, and hence as organs of the whole, and therefore they must unite with each other as organs of Christ’s body, as organs of the whole that was brought into being by the union of Christ with the Church. Thus their union, their covenant, becomes an organic member in the great and richly articulated covenant between Christ and His Church, a member which is encompassed, pervaded, and sustained by this mystical covenant, which participates in the lofty, supernatural, and sacred character of the whole and in its innermost essence represents and reflects that whole.14 Scheeben’s argument is deeply scriptural, based mainly on the Pauline image of the body of Christ and on the “great mystery” in Ephesians 5. Scheeben understands the marriage bond as a “covenant” (Bund ), anticipating the teaching of Vatican II about marriage as a “covenant of love” ( foedus dilectionis).15 Marriage is a covenant that receives its inner power from the Spirit of love that animates the encompassing covenant between 12 ScG IV, ch. 78, par. 4. 13 Balthasar, Herrlichkeit, 1:98; Glory of the Lord, 1:104. 14 Matthias Josef Scheeben, Die Mysterien des Christentums (Freiburg: Herder, 1865 [1941]), 496–97. 15 Gaudium et Spes, §48. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 703 Children as the Common Good of Marriage 703 Christ and his Church. With great emphasis Scheeben uses the word “organ(ic)” four times in the text just quoted to insist that the covenant between man and woman must be understood as a part of a great whole, the mystical body, as pervaded by the power of that whole, and as serving a common good of that whole.This purpose is not an alien good for man and woman, but their own good without ceasing to be the good of the whole body, that is, of every person in that body. As Cardinal Villeneuve puts it, that good is “best for each of the particular individuals who participate in it precisely on account of its being common.”16 John Paul II formulates the essential point with great acuteness. “The more common the good, the more properly one’s own it will also be: mine, yours, ours.”17 The great theologian of the mystical body, Émile Mersch, speaks in a similar way about the love between man and woman. We mean to say that, in marriage, the individuals are the instruments, almost the passive instruments, of a force which overpasses them, which is in them, but not for them, and which, in making use of them, does more than they do, themselves. In marriage, it is humanity which, as far as is possible to it, asserts itself, takes a definite position, completes itself, and finds its unity and its fullness, in individuals and not in itself, for in itself it cannot exist. Incarnating the unity of humanity, love is august and venerable with all the nobility of our race.18 Love, in fact, has its reason for being, its energies, and thence its requirements, not from the individual, but from the species. The individual is the carrier and the agent of it, not the master. Love is an act of the species, in this sense, that it is destined to perpetuate the species, and that, in it, the species realizes itself and acts in the measure in which it can be realized and can act.19 The final sentence of the first text is particularly important. “Incarnating the unity of humanity, love is august and venerable with all the nobility of our race.” Love itself, as a personal love, carries the august and venerable nobility of the common good of the human race.The authentic notion of the common good must be presupposed, of course: a common good is not an alien good. It is not a good of the species as 16 De Koninck, “Primacy of the Common Good,” 5. 17 John Paul II, Letter to Families, §10 18 Émile Mersch, Love, Marriage, Chastity (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939), 209. The chapter of “Morality and the Mystical Body,” in which this text is found, goes back to Émile Mersch,“Amour, Mariage, Chasteté,” Nouvelle Revue Théologique 50 (1928). 19 Mersch, Love, Marriage, Chastity, 210. N&V_Sum09.qxp 704 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 704 Michael Waldstein opposed to the persons; it is a good of the persons; this is precisely what it means for it to be common. It may well be that awareness of the common good of the human species is only dimly present in many men and women. For a Christian, who is aware of “the old Adam” and “the new Adam,” that awareness should be second nature. The Personalistic Norm and the Common Good Some personalist philosophers and theologians with whom I shared these texts of Scheeben and Mersch have rejected them rather sharply. Marriage, they argue, should be seen in terms of the individual personal dignity of husband and wife and their personal love for one another as unique and irreplaceable persons. It should not be seen in terms of the common good of the human species and of the body of Christ, because in this latter perspective men and women are seen as mere means used for the ends of the community.20 What Wojtyla calls “the personalistic norm” forbids such a use of persons. Let us take a close look at this personalistic norm. In the form in which it is usually formulated, it goes back to Kant. While man is unholy enough, the humanity in his person must be holy to him. In all of creation, everything one might want and over which one has power can be used as a mere means. Only man himself and with him every rational creature is an end in itself. For, in virtue of the autonomy of his freedom, he is the subject of the moral law, which is holy.21 Only that which has intrinsic value, Kant argues, can be an end in itself.“The only condition under which something can be an end in itself is when it has a value that is not merely relative, i.e., a price, but an inner value, i.e. dignity.”22 The one and only thing that has dignity is the autonomy of the person. 20 The position of St.Thomas, Scheeben, and Mersch is, on this reading, essentially the same as the Puritan view of marriage, which Wojtyla summarizes as follows. “This view, in its developed form, holds that in using man and woman and their sexual intercourse to assure the existence of the species Homo, the Creator Himself uses persons as the means to His end. It follows that conjugal life and sexual intercourse are good only because they serve the purpose of procreation. A man therefore does well when he uses a woman as the indispensable means of obtaining posterity. The use of a person for the objective end of procreation is the very essence of marriage.” Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993) 58–59. 21 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, AK 5.87, cf. AK 5.131; see also Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals, AK 4.429, and Metaphysics of Morals, AK 6.434. 22 Kant, Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals, AK 4.435. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 705 Children as the Common Good of Marriage 705 Concerning man (and thus every rational being in the world) as a moral being one cannot ask further, For what end (quem in finem ) does he exist? His existence has the highest purpose in itself. He can, as far as possible, subject the whole of nature to this purpose. At the least, he must not submit himself to any influence of nature contrary to this purpose. Now if the beings of the world as beings that are contingent in their existence are in need of a highest cause that acts according to purpose, then man is the final purpose of creation. For, without man the chain of purposes subordinate to each other would not be explained in its entirety. It is only in man, and in man only as the subject of morality, that an unconditioned legislation concerning purposes can be found, which thus enables him alone to be a final purpose to which the whole of nature is teleologically subordinated.23 It is interesting to observe how Wojtyla restates the Kantian teaching. [A] person must not be merely the means to an end for another person. This is precluded by the very nature of personhood, by what any person is. For a person is a thinking subject, and capable of taking decisions: these, most notably, are the attributes we find in the inner self of a person.This being so, every person is by nature capable of determining his or her aims.Anyone who treats a person as the means to an end does violence to the very essence of the other, to what constitutes its natural right.24 In Kant, the key point is not that the person can understand and pursue ends, but that the person is the ultimate end. The dignity of the person, which lies in autonomy, is itself the highest value and, therefore, the one and only true end. Everything in the entire cosmos can and must be subordinated to it. In this respect, the personalistic norm as Kant understands it is the direct opposite of the same norm as Wojtyla understands it. Immanuel Kant . . . formulated . . . the following imperative: act always in such a way that the other person is the end and not merely the instrument of your action. In the light of the preceding argument this principle should be restated in a form rather different from that which Kant gave it, as follows: whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not treat that person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but must allow for the fact that he or she, too, has, or at least should have, distinct personal ends. This principle, thus formulated, lies at the basis of all the human freedoms, properly understood, and especially freedom of conscience.25 23 Kant, On a Recently Assumed Noble Tone in Philosophy, AK 8.435–36. 24 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 26–27. 25 Ibid., 27–28. N&V_Sum09.qxp 706 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 706 Michael Waldstein Wojtyla’s understanding of the personalistic norm is indeed “rather different” than Kant’s. Being an end is different than having an end; being the highest good is different than being the beneficiary of the highest good; being God is different than having God. In Kant, the dignity of the person would be violated if the person were ordered to a common good.26 In Wojtyla, the dignity of the person consists in the ordination of the person to the good. Immediately after his discussion of the personalistic norm in Love and Responsibility, Wojtyla raises the question of how man and woman can treat each other as persons, as having ends, rather than as mere means. Obviously, I may want another person to desire the same good which I myself desire. Obviously, the other must know this end of mine, recognize it as good, and adopt it. If this happens, a special bond is established between me and this other person: the bond of a common good and of a common aim. This special bond does not mean merely that we both seek a common good, it also unites the persons involved internally, and so constitutes the essential core around which any love must grow. In any case, love between two people is quite unthinkable without some common good to bring them together.27 There is a necessary and organic connection between the personalistic norm and the common good.When the end toward which a man and a woman direct themselves is one and the same end, that is, when that end is a genuinely common good, the essential core of love is formed.Without this core, one cannot avoid using the other person. “Man’s capacity for love depends on his willingness consciously to seek a good together with others, and to subordinate himself to that good for the sake of others, or to others for the sake of that good.”28 The sexual relationship between man and woman, Wojtyla argues, is particularly prone to the mere use of the person by another, partly because of the great intensity of sexual pleasure. It is particularly necessary in that relationship for love to form around the common good. How is it possible to ensure that one person does not then become for the other—the woman for the man and the man for the woman— 26 “Kantian personalism. According to Kant, man is an end unto himself.The ulti- mate end . . . is the persons themselves in their proper dignity.This dignity does not come from the person by himself being able to attain to the ultimate end of the universe, that is to an end other than the person; the person receives his dignity from himself because he is his own end and accomplishes in himself the liberty of autonomy.” De Koninck, “Primacy of the Common Good,” 68, n. 72. 27 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 28. 28 Ibid., 29. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 707 Children as the Common Good of Marriage 707 nothing more than the means to an end—i.e., an object used exclusively for the attainment of a selfish end? To exclude this possibility, they must share the same end. Such an end, where marriage is concerned, is procreation, the future generation, a family, and, at the same time, the continual ripening of the relationship between two people, in all the areas of activities which conjugal life includes.29 In his Letter to Families, John Paul II returns in more detail to the discussion of the common good of marriage.Taking his point of departure in the sacramental words of consent spoken by husband and wife,30 he points to the communion of persons created by it: “love, fidelity, honor and the permanence of the union until death.”31 This good of the communion of persons in marriage is the good of both and at the same time the good of each. “The common good, by its very nature, both unites individual persons and ensures the true good of each.”32 It ensures the true good not by giving to the persons severally their own private advantage, but by being the good of both. Since marriage is a sacrament, the common good in question is deeper than a mere human communion of persons. It is a “great mystery” (Eph 5:32) of grace, of participating in the life of the Trinity.33 The common good of the communion between husband and wife then becomes the common good of the family. Before the spouses give their consent, the Church asks them if they are prepared to accept children and to educate them in the faith. Procreation and education are key common goods of husband and wife that specify the very nature of their consent. The words of consent, then, express what is essential to the common good of the spouses, and they indicate what ought to be the common good of the future family. In order to bring this out, the Church asks the spouses if they are prepared to accept the children God grants them and to raise the children as Christians.34 29 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 30.Wojtyla’s statement has a certain surface simi- larity with the Puritan view of sexuality (see footnote 12), according to which one is supposed to use persons as mere means for having children.The difference is that Wojtyla does not view the child in a utilitarian framework as a mere external result produced by certain acts (this is a positivistic and mechanistic understanding of the means-end relation), but in agreement with St. Thomas as the common good of husband and wife, as an “end” in the full and proper sense, namely a good to be pursued, to be reached and to be rejoiced in by both, a good of the persons, not an alien good. 30 See John Paul II, Letter to Families, §10, par. 1 31 Ibid., §10, par. 2. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., par. 3. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 708 Michael Waldstein 708 The common good of the family is particularly evident in family prayer. Prayer strengthens this good, precisely as the common good of the family. Moreover, it creates this good ever anew. In prayer, the family discovers itself as the first “us,” in which each member is “I” and “thou”; each member is for the others either husband or wife, father or mother, son or daughter, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild.35 Each person has particular relations of membership in the family as a whole.“Every particular person is compared to the whole community as a part to the whole.”36 Being part of a whole under a common good does not threaten the dignity of the persons, but on the contrary affirms, expresses, and increases it. At the very end of his discussion of the common good, John Paul II widens the perspective by focusing on the common good of the whole universe. Is not every child a “particle” of that common good without which human communities break down and risk extinction? Could this ever really be denied? The child becomes a gift to its brothers, sisters, parents and entire family. Its life becomes a gift for the very people who were givers of life and who cannot help but feel its presence, its sharing in their life and its contribution to their common good and to that of the community of the family. This truth is obvious in its simplicity and profundity, whatever the complexity and even the possible pathology of the psychological makeup of certain persons.The common good of the whole of society dwells in man; he is, as we recalled, “the way of the Church.” Man is first of all the “glory of God”: “Gloria Dei vivens homo,” in the celebrated words of St. Irenaeus, which might also be translated:“The glory of God is for man to be alive.” It could be said that here we encounter the loftiest definition of man:The glory of God is the common good of all that exists; the common good of the human race.37 Again, to say that the glory of God is the common good of the human race is not to say that it is the good of the race as opposed to the persons, but rather the good of the race that belongs to each of the persons in it. We seem to have come full circle from the personalism of John Paul II back to St.Thomas’s teaching on the common good. “Marriage is principally ordered to the common good because of its principal end, which is the good of offspring.”38 “It is clear that the good of the part is for the 35 Ibid., par. 5. 36 ST II–II, q. 64, a. 2. 37 John Paul II, Letter to Families, §11. 38 Sent. IV, d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 709 Children as the Common Good of Marriage 709 sake of the good of the whole.This is why by a natural inclination or love every particular thing loves its proper good for the sake of the common good of the whole universe, which is God.”39 The sacramental grace of marriage, according to St.Thomas, is ordered precisely to allow man and woman to order their union and its end, children, to a more encompassing common good.“The sacrament [of Marriage] confers on the spouses a grace through which they belong to the union of Christ and the Church: which is most necessary for them, in order for them to attend to matters of the flesh and the earth in such a way that these are not disconN&V nected from Christ and the Church.”40 39 ST I–II, q. 109, a. 3. 40 ScG IV, ch. 78, par. 4. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 711 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 711–29 711 The Cultural and Ecclesial Situation 1964 to 1967: Paving the Way for Dissent From Church Teaching on Contraception* W ILLIAM E. M AY John Paul II Institute Washington, DC I WILL FIRST briefly summarize the cultural situation in the United States that paved the way for acceptance of contraception and then offer a much more substantive account of the ecclesial situation that did so. The Cultural Situation in the United States In his essay of almost 100 pages, “The Bitter Pill the Catholic Community Swallowed,”1 Msgr. George A. Kelly did a splendid job of summarizing the cultural situation in the United States regarding contraception from 1934, when Margaret Sanger, noted as a pioneer of contraception for eugenic purposes, wrote an article for The American Weekly in which she proposed an “American Baby Code,” until publication of Pope Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae in 1968. I will use Kelly’s work, focusing on what he has to say about the situation from 1963 to 1967, while noting some events from 1959 on. I will also note some developments in secular culture that Kelly does not comment on. Kelly points out that in 1959 President Dwight Eisenhower buried a report by William H. Draper, a Planned Parenthood activist, calling for government financed and managed population programs. Eisenhower did * This essay also appears in the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly 32.3 (Fall 2009), 10–19. 1 George A. Kelly, “The Bitter Pill the Catholic Community Swallowed,” in Human Sexuality in Our Time: What the Church Teaches, ed. George A. Kelly (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1979), 13–101. He also discusses the ecclesial situation but does so in a quite different way than I will do. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 712 9:43 AM Page 712 William E. May more than that; he also banned all government involvement in family planning for the duration of his term in office (it would end in early 1960).2 Eisenhower’s opposition spurred champions of contraception to curry the favor of other politicians, including Catholics. Planned Parenthood held a World Population Emergency Conference in 1960, persuading the National Council of Churches to take a stance favorable to contraception and sterilization. Planned Parenthood also enlisted the support of prominent public figures such as former Secretary of State Christian Herter.3 Moreover, by 1961 John D. Rockefeller III, a firm supporter of government supported contraceptive programs, used his considerable wealth to achieve this goal.4 In 1962 and following years, Planned Parenthood sought to enlist support of Catholics who seemed sympathetic to their ideas. Cass Canfield, chairman of the editorial board of Harper and Brother Publishers (one of the country’s most prestigious at the time) and a dedicated supporter of Planned Parenthood, made overtures to some Catholic organizations. But Canfield was subtle and did not show all his cards. One major one he was counting on was a book in the works in 1962 and published in 1963 by John Rock, M.D., called The Time Has Come: A Catholic Doctor’s Proposal to End the Battle Over Birth Control. Alfred A. Knopf and Company published the book, endorsed by Herter and others, and the author was praised as a “dedicated Roman Catholic.” Rock’s Catholicism was questionable, to say the least, since he had for thirty years been a dedicated member and advocate of Planned Parenthood. In his book Rock endorsed abortion as well as contraception.5 Partially as a result of all this propaganda Lyndon Johnson, on becoming president of the United States after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, endorsed government sponsored programs of contraception in January, 1965.6 This act, coupled with the sexual revolution associated with the 1960s, the widespread use of contraception made possible in large part by the anovulant pill, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965 (all of which Kelly did not consider) brought it about that by the middle of the decade American secular culture had warmly embraced contraception as a way of life. Griswold v. Connecticut 2 Kelly, “The Bitter Pill,” 21–22. 3 Ibid., 22–23. 4 I want to point out that in the late fifties and sixties both the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations were ardent supporters of contraception and Planned Parenthood. Kelly does not note this. 5 Kelly, “The Bitter Pill,” 25–27. 6 Ibid., 37. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 713 The Cultural and Ecclesial Situation 1964–1967 713 discovered in the U.S. Constitution a so-called “right to privacy” that led the Court to strike down as unconstitutional a Connecticut state law (passed principally by Protestant legislators in earlier years) forbidding the distribution of contraceptives. It was to the same alleged “right to privacy” that the Burger-Blackman Court would appeal in 1973 in its infamous Roe v.Wade decision invalidating state laws against abortion. The Ecclesial Situation Until 1964 no Catholic theologian had ever said that contraception could possibly be morally permissible. Until then Catholic theologians unanimously accepted this teaching of the Church.What is more, so did educated Catholic laymen and women, as a sociological study in the early 60s by Andrew Greeley (who later dissented from Church teaching and is still bitterly opposed to it) clearly showed.7 One of the reasons why these men and women gladly embraced Catholic teaching on the subject was that during the fifties Catholic colleges and universities, and among them a great many operated by Jesuits, were proud of their Catholic faith and loyal to the Magisterium.This was also true of Catholic high schools, at that time most of them being for either boys or girls, with those for boys under the direction of Jesuits, Christian Brothers, Brothers of Mary, Benedictines and other religious congregations for men, and those for girls under the supervision of the Sisters of St. Joseph, various Franciscan communities, Dominicans,Visitation nuns, Loretta nuns, and others. The year 1964 marks a turning point. One great book, by Germain Grisez, then professor of philosophy at Georgetown University, was published that year to support the teaching that contraception is always gravely immoral. It was called Contraception and the Natural Law.8 In his book Grisez severely criticized inadequate arguments against contraception rooted in what he called the “conventional natural law theory” based on a Suarezian understanding of natural law and developed a new argument rooted in St. Thomas’s understanding of natural law. But that year also witnessed the publication of several books and articles advocating 7 Andrew Greeley, “Family Planning Among American Catholics,” Chicago Studies (Spring, 1963). On the basis of these sociological studies Greeley concluded that “the success of the Church’s efforts to induce the younger generation of Catholic couples to adopt approved methods [contradicts] assertions occasionally made that Catholics are increasingly adopting appliance [contraceptive] methods,” and that “the more education, the more income, the higher the occupational category, the more likely Catholics are to keep the Church’s law and the more likely they are to have or to want larger families.” 8 Germain Grisez, Contraception and the Natural Law (Milwaukee, WI: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1964). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 714 William E. May 714 contraception. Among the books were Louis Dupré’s Contraception and Catholics, Dorothy Dunbar Bromley’s The Experience of Marriage, and two collections of essays that I will examine here insofar as I consider them typical of the arguments given and influential because of the prominence of their authors among intellectually elite Catholics. The first, entitled Contraception and Holiness,9 carried an introduction by retired Jesuit Archbishop Thomas Roberts, and included essays by Justus George Lawler, Rosemary Ruether, Julian Pleasants, and others.William Birmingham, who with Joseph Cunneen was co-editor of the highly regarded journal Cross Currents, edited another, called What Modern Catholics Believe About Birth Control.10 It included one essay defending the Church’s teaching by Vernon Bourke, professor of philosophy at St. Louis University, but all other essays in the book championed contraception, and among their authors were Birmingham himself and his wife Mary Louise, Michael Novak, James Finn, Sally Sullivan, Sidney Callahan, and others. In addition to the book already noted, Dupré, at that time Grisez’s colleague at Georgetown University, wrote an influential pro-contraception essay called “Toward a Re-examination of the Catholic Position on Birth Control” for Cross Currents, an essay that I think merits careful examination. In 1965 John T. Noonan’s very influential work Contraception:A History of Its Treatment by Catholic Theologians and Canonists, was published by the prestigious Belknap Press of Harvard University. In his introduction Noonan wrote as follows: The propositions constituting a condemnation of contraception are . . . recurrent. Since the first clear mention of contraception by a Christian theologian, when a harsh third-century moralist [falsely] accused a pope of encouraging it, the articulated judgment has been the same. In the world of the late Empire known to St. Jerome and St. Augustine, in the Ostrogothic Arles of Bishop Caesarius and the Suevian Braga of Bishop Martin, in the Paris of St. Albert and St. Thomas, in the Renaissance Rome of Sixtus V and the Renaissance Milan of St. Charles Borromeo, in the Naples of St. Alphonsus Ligouri and the Liège of Charles Billuart, in the Philadelphia of Bishop Kenrick and in the Bombay of Cardinal Gracias, the teachers of the Church have taught without hesitation or variation that certain acts preventing conception are gravely sinful. No Catholic theologian has ever taught,“Contraception is a good act.” The teaching on contraception is clear and apparently fixed forever.11 9 Contraception and Holiness (New York: Herder & Herder, 1964). 10 William Birmingham, ed. What Modern Catholics Believe About Birth Control (New York: Signet Books, 1964). 11 John T. Noonan, Contraception:A History of Its Treatment by Catholic Theologians and Canonists (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1965), 6. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 715 The Cultural and Ecclesial Situation 1964–1967 715 But he ended by claiming that new conditions and the spirit of Vatican II would lead the way to change Church teaching on this point. In addition, in the summer of 1965, before Griswold v. Connecticut, Richard Cardinal Cushing, commenting on a proposal in the Massachusetts state legislature to repeal the state’s birth control law banning the use of contraceptives, gave us an example of one who “is personally opposed but . . . ” Cushing noted that previously Catholic leaders had opposed any effort to alter laws prohibiting contraception. “But my thinking has changed on that matter,” he reported,“for the simple reason that I do not see where I have an obligation to impose my religious beliefs on people who just do not accept the same faith as I do.” I have added emphasis to show how Cushing reduces the Catholic position to a matter of purely sectarian belief—as if it would be impossible for a non-Catholic to support the purpose of the birth control law. Cushing ended by giving Catholic members of the Massachusetts legislature this advice: “If your constituents want this legislation, vote for it. You represent them. You don’t represent the Catholic Church.”12 Cushing’s message did not go unheard.Although Kelly did not refer to Cushing’s remarks, he nonetheless showed, in the essay noted earlier, how Catholic legislators quickly caved in and endorsed laws encouraging contraceptive use. Reasons Advanced Between 1964–1967 to Justify Contraception I will now look more closely at the reasons given to support contraception by influential Catholic authors between 1964 and 1967, the year before the publication of Humanae Vitae. I will examine the 1964 essays by Rosemary Ruether, Michael Novak, and Louis Dupré because they both illustrate the kinds of arguments used to justify contraception and foreshadow the more systematic arguments developed by the so-called “Majority” of the Papal Commission on Population, the Family, and Natality and the anthropological and moral presuppositions underlying those arguments. I will then examine in more depth the arguments of the “Majority,” which were written in 1966 and released to the public in 1967. 12 For Cushing’s talk see Diogenes, “Personally Opposed, but . . . ” Catholic World Report, December 2003. N&V_Sum09.qxp 716 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 716 William E. May Rosemary Ruether In her essay,“Birth Control and the Ideals of Marital Sexuality,”13 Ruether (1) denies that there is any moral difference between contraception and use of the rhythm method; (2) offers an analysis of the levels of meaning in the marital act; and (3) proposes the “best” way for helping married couples strive for the ideals of marital union, which includes procreation. Ruether first attacks what she considers the Church’s inconsistency.The Church condemns all forms of “artificial” contraception, but it advocates the “rhythm” method.This method, Ruether claims, is also contraceptive. She thinks it ludicrous to say that an act of intercourse, deliberately chosen during a time when the wife is thought to be infertile, could possibly be “procreative.” “Hence, sexual acts which are calculated to function only during the times of sterility are sterilizing the act just as much as any other means of rendering the act infertile. It is difficult to see why there should be such an absolute moral difference between creating a spatial barrier to procreation and creating a temporal barrier to procreation.”14 In short, couples who practice periodic continence by using the rhythm method are adopting by choice a proposal to place a temporal barrier between sperm and ovum; just as couples who use diaphragms or condoms are placing spatial barriers between them.Why is there a moral difference between the two? Later in her essay Ruether returns to rhythm and attacks it as a most “unnatural” way to solve the problems married people face. She then analyzes the sexual act. She says that at its biological level it has as its purposive goal the generation of a new human being. But as an act of love, it expresses the interpersonal union between the spouses. Ideally, the sexual act should take place when all these purposes are realizable. But unfortunately that is not possible, especially in our fallen world. For one thing, one can never be sure when the act will in fact be procreative. Moreover, one is able to say “yes” to procreation only if one is able to say “no,” and in order to say “no” he must have an effective means of birth control, to prevent “accidents” from occurring. In addition, “the demands of living in the sexual union are real and meaningful demands which impose a far more frequent use of the sexual act for its relational function than could ever be brought into harmony with procreation itself. . . . [T]he sexual act as a relational act is [moreover] a genuinely purposeful act, and not mere play or unleashing of passion. 13 Rosemary Ruether,“Birth Control and the Ideals of Marital Sexuality,” in Contra- ception and Holiness, introduced by Archbishop Thomas Roberts, S.J. (New York: Herder & Herder, 1964), 72–91. 14 Ibid., 74. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 717 The Cultural and Ecclesial Situation 1964–1967 717 Since this is the case, the couple cannot well dispense with the act and yet continue to live in a sexual relationship without doing extensive emotional damage to the basic stability of their marriage.”15 From this it follows that couples have no real choice “but to find some method of birth control which allows [them] to continue to use the sexual act for its relational purpose and to do this under as ideal emotional circumstances as possible.”16 Ruether repudiates periodic continence as an unrealistic, inhumane option. She thinks periodic abstinence is psychologically unbearable as well as ineffective, and it is also dehumanizing.17 She is not too happy over barrier methods for aesthetic, not moral, reasons, and concludes that the best way to solve the problem is to use the oral-steroid pills.18 In short, Ruether holds that the Church’s position, championed by clerical celibates who simply cannot appreciate the realities of married life, is dehumanizing and unnatural. The biological needs of procreation can be satisfied by a relatively few marital acts; the psychological needs of intercourse for relational, personal reasons demand regular marital intercourse, unhampered by the psychological duress imposed by the ineffective method of rhythm, which, after all, is just as contraceptive as other forms of birth control. Comment Ruether, with other advocates of contraception, sees no moral difference between contraception and use of fertility awareness or natural family planning as ways of regulating conception. This, of course, is nonsense as the following analysis shows. Ruether and others reason as follows: Contraception prevents conception. “Rhythm” (fertility awareness or natural family planning) prevents conception.Therefore “rhythm” is contraception.That is like arguing: Crows are birds. Eagles are birds. Therefore eagles are crows. Obviously the reasoning here is fallacious. Moreover, no one uses “rhythm” in order to become pregnant, whereas couples seeking to conceive frequently do so in order to engage in the conjugal act at a time when the wife is ovulating. Ruether’s claim that those who practice “rhythm” are placing temporal barriers between sperm and ovum is ludicrous. That is simply not what they are “doing,” that is, choosing to do here and now.19 15 Ibid., 79. 16 Ibid., 80. 17 Ibid., 81, 83, 91. 18 Ibid., 83. 19 For a thorough discussion of what couples rightly practicing periodic continence in order to avoid causing a pregnancy when it would not be prudent to cause N&V_Sum09.qxp 718 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 718 William E. May Note too that Ruether sharply distinguishes between the “biological” level of an act of intercourse and its level as “an act of love,” its “relational” or “interpersonal” level. This dualistic understanding of human sexuality (and the human person) will be developed more fully in the “Majority Papers.” Ruether also uses a form of consequentialist reasoning, claiming that contraception is needed if couples are to avoid serious problems.This is not true, as there are other ways of avoiding the problems that could arise. As we will see, the “Majority Papers” develop in detail much of Ruether’s reasoning. Michael Novak (Nota bene: Novak later changed his mind and repudiated contraception and embraced Church teaching.) Novak’s essay “Toward a Positive Sexual Ethic,”20 has some interesting features. I will focus on the “argument” he mounts to justify the practice of contraception by married couples because of the anthropology and moral theory it presupposes. Early in the essay he says that marriage and the marital act are ordered to the good of the species, not of individuals.21 He stresses that in recent years people have begun to discover the close relationship between sexuality and personality,22 and elaborates on what he terms the “totality principle.” He sees two levels of moral imperatives in the sexual act:“the first level is the biological, and its end is the preservation of the species; its imperative is ‘do not allow the species to become extinct.’The second level is psychological: its end is the harmony and development of the human psyche, intelligence, will, emotions, and sentiments. Its imperative is ‘act toward one another as person to person; do not treat the other as an object or a means.’ ”23 In Novak’s view, today the “biological imperatives of the [natural] law are receding,” while the “psychological imperatives” are becoming more and more insistent.24 He then writes: “The crux of this newly underone are “doing,” see Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, and William E. May,“ ‘Every Marital Act Must Be Open to New Life’:Toward a Clearer Understanding,” The Thomist 52 (1988): 399–408. 20 Michael Novak,“Toward a Positive Sexual Ethic,” in What Modern Catholics Think About Birth Control, ed. William Birmingham (New York: Signet Books, 1964), 109–28. 21 Ibid., 110. 22 Ibid., 111. 23 Ibid., 112. 24 Ibid. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 719 The Cultural and Ecclesial Situation 1964–1967 719 stood moral imperative . . . is whether it can be obeyed without at the same time obeying the biological imperative.”25 He admits that we must obey the biological imperative, but holds that the moral (psychological) imperative is “even more demanding.”26 He wants to get away from a negative criterion,“don’t use contraceptives,” because he deems it “inadequate,”27 as it surely is. He thinks that Catholics have been conditioned to regard contraception with revulsion,28 that they have overly spiritualized the marital relationship or reduced the conjugal act merely to rendering a debt, etc. He recognizes that the sexual impulse must be regulated and ordered. Nonetheless, he believes that the absolute condemnation of contraception is inadequate and the reasons for it weak. He says that “the standard Catholic objection to my argument will be that I am dividing the sexual act between its biological and psychological imperatives. I will be told that these imperatives form a unity, indeed a ‘dynamic’ unity. One cannot do anything to interfere with the biological mechanism of the act in order to exercise only the psychological upper reaches of the act. I am also aware that many persons who use contraceptives or anovulants do so selfishly. My answer to the second objection would be that neither the use of contraceptives nor the nonuse of contraceptives guarantees the authenticity of the love between the couple. . . . My answer to the first objection would be that the fundamental issue is how to define the marriage act.”29 He opines that “sexuality and fertility seem to be two separate orders” and that the conjugal act receives its nature from what it “symbolizes, and its morality is governed by the conformity of its performance to its intention: the outward expression of an inner, permanent bond.”30 Since procreation includes education and since the exercise of marital sexuality is good for its own sake, he then concludes that “in the total good of marriage [the totality principle] anovulants or contraceptives seem at times to be the lesser of two evils.”31 Moreover, he contends that “if the couple has no control over pregnancy, intercourse may create anxieties that make marital love both a torture and a lie. . . . Unless, therefore, one is ready to argue that continence is a universal ideal, of itself and without reference to the natural 25 Ibid., 113. 26 Ibid., 114. 27 Ibid., 115. 28 Ibid., 117. 29 Ibid., 121. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., 123. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 720 William E. May 720 expressiveness of marital love, one must admit that at times and in the total context of a married life continence can be an evil. For at times either the biological or else the psychological imperatives of married love must be violated. In actual experience there simply are some situations in which it is imperative ‘not to have children’ and yet to express one’s love according to its natural sign.”32 Comment It seems clear from what Novak writes here that he does indeed distinguish sharply between the “biological” meaning and the “psychological,” or “personal,” meaning of the conjugal act and that he regards the latter as more imperative and of higher value.This is a clue to his dualism that distinguishes between the “person” as experiencing subject and his or her biological fertility that is in some way under the dominion of the personal subject. He also invokes the so-called principle of totality to claim that at times contraception is necessary to foster the education of children and also to avoid some bad consequences for the couple, their marriage, and their children. Like Ruether, he adopts a consequentialist kind of moral methodology, justifying contraception because it allegedly helps couples avoid serious problems. All these ideas, as we will see, are more ambitiously developed by the “Majority” theologians. Louis Dupré In the introduction to his essay, “Toward a Re-examination of the Catholic Position on Birth Control,”33 Dupré says that he will not present any conclusions. He nonetheless clearly calls for the acceptance of the contraception of individual acts within marriage when necessary to achieve the ends of marriage (procreation and fostering of love) within the whole of marriage. Much that Dupré says is similar to what Ruether and Novak say. However, he introduces new considerations. Of these, one of the most important is advanced in part 1 of his paper. There Dupré advances the view that the Church’s teaching on the intrinsic malice of contraception has not been proposed infallibly, either by solemn definition by council or ex cathedra pronouncements of the pope, nor by the ordinary and universal exercise of the Magisterium.34 In part 2, on natural end and natural law, he seems to me to articulate some of Grisez’s arguments against the conventional natural law argument 32 Ibid., 126. 33 Louis Dupré, “Toward a Re-examination of the Catholic Position on Birth Control,” Cross Currents 14 (Winter, 1964): 66–73. 34 Ibid., 63–64. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 721 The Cultural and Ecclesial Situation 1964–1967 721 against contraception—that it prevents the act of coition from attaining its natural biological end. But in his discussion of human nature he distinguishes between unchangeable aspects of human nature and aspects subject to somewhat radical change. He questions whether the norm against contraception involves violation of primary natural law precepts or secondary precepts, which he holds (and claims, falsely, that he has the support of St. Thomas) are not universally binding.35 He holds that the norm against contraception involves violation of a secondary, not primary precept, of natural law. In part 3 he asks when artificial interference with the functioning of nature (the procreative aspect of marital coition) becomes arbitrary and therefore evil.36 He then asks: “[A]re the two ends of marriage [for him these are (1) the procreation and education of children, and (2) mutual aid of spouses] so independent as to allow the dilemma that one cannot be abandoned without seriously harming basic human values and the other cannot be pursued without compromising equally essential values? We do not think that the two ends must be thus separated.” He then continues as follows: “Since the primary end of marriage is not simply procreation (as is the ‘natural’ end of the act of marriage) but the procreation and raising to adulthood of the offspring, it would seem that, at least in those cases where continence creates a tension between the parents which seriously harms the education of the children, the pursuit of the secondary end itself is essential for the full accomplishment of the primary end.”37 In part 4, Dupré considers the argument (he refers to it as a “psychological” argument) advanced by people like the Jesuit Paul Quay, who had argued in 1961, as John Paul II was later on to argue, that contraception is immoral because it violates the meaning of the conjugal or marital act as an act of spousal “self-giving.” According to this argument against contraception, husbands and wives, by contracepting, fail to “give themselves” unreservedly and thus violate the marital act as a true act of love. They in effect “hold back something of themselves, namely, their procreativity.” He thinks this argument provocative, but not compelling because “for two marriage partners who have repeatedly proven their intention of complete surrender in creative acts of love, to exclude occasionally the fertility of their love when circumstances prevent them from taking proper care of new offspring, does not necessarily contradict the objective meaning of the marital act.” Continuing, he says, “[I]t would 35 Ibid., 67–72. 36 Ibid., 77. 37 Ibid. (emphasis added). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 722 William E. May 722 seem to me that the full meaning of these occasional acts can be grasped only by connecting them with the totality of all the others. . . .” 38 Comment First, I should note that Dupré, writing before Vatican Council II, retains the distinction that had become common between the “primary” and “secondary” ends of marriage. Second, and more important, he introduces two new arguments to justify contraception. The first is his claim that Church teaching against contraception has not been infallibly proposed by the Magisterium of the Church either by solemn definition or through its ordinary and universal exercise.The second is his assertion that for St.Thomas secondary precepts of natural law do not bind absolutely and universally but only for the “most part” and admit of exceptions, and that the norm against contraception is a norm of this kind. These claims must be challenged. Regarding the first, a very substantive argument can be—and has been—made that the Church’s teaching on the grave immorality of contraception has been proposed infallibly by the ordinary and universal Magisterium of the Church according to the criteria set forth in Lumen Gentium, §25.39 Regarding the second, Dupré appeals to a text of St.Thomas in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 94, a. 5 in which he says that the natural law in its secondary precepts, which are conclusions from its primary precepts, while unchangeable “for the most part” (non immutatur ut in pluribus ), can be changed “in some particular case” ( potest immutari in aliquo particulari ). Dupré, with many dissenting theologians/philosophers (for example, Charles E. Curran, Richard McCormick, Franz Scholz), gravely misinterprets this passage. St. Thomas did not say that all specific secondary precepts of natural law can be changed in some particular cases. In fact, he clearly held that many specific secondary precepts are absolutely immutable and admit of no exceptions whatsoever (for example, the intentional killing of the innocent—see ST II–II, q. 64, a. 5).40 Moreover, with 38 Ibid., 81 (emphasis added). 39 ohn C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez,“Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” Theological Studies 39.2 ( June, 1978): 258–312. 40 For a superb study of St.Thomas’s teaching on the absolute immutability of the precepts of the second tablet of the Decalogue, for example, see Patrick Lee, “The Permanence of the Ten Commandments: St. Thomas and His Modern Commentators,” Theological Studies 42.3 (September 1981): 422–43; see also John Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), chapter 3, where he takes up in depth St.Thomas’s thought and shows how utterly false to Aquinas is the interpretation given by authors like Dupré. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 723 The Cultural and Ecclesial Situation 1964–1967 723 respect to contraception Aquinas considered this to be a crime analogous to murder, more serious than fornication.41 I think the dualistic view of the human person (anthropology) and consequentialistic moral reasoning (morality) employed by Dupré is evident since in positively justifying contraception he offers the same kind of reasoning as that given by Ruether and Novak and later by the Majority theologians. Majority Papers Before taking up the so-called Majority Papers and the reasoning employed in them to justify contraception, I want to say a few things about this Commission, the thesis of the “Majority,” and its tremendous impact on Catholics.The story of the Commission and its work has been told very sympathetically by the journalist Robert McClory in his book Turning Point. The subtitle of this book, published in 1995,42 is most revealing: The Inside Story of the Papal Birth Commission and How Humanae Vitae Changed the Life of Patty Crowley and the Future of the Church. In it McClory shows how Patty Crowley and her husband Patrick, who were the president couple of the U.S. Catholic Family Movement and whom Paul VI had appointed to the Commission, persuaded the majority by the massive evidence they provided that showed that a great number of Catholic couples who practiced “rhythm” nonetheless conceived children when they had hoped that conception would not take place, were bitterly angry, and wholeheartedly resented the teaching of the Magisterium. Their eloquent plea that the Church accept contraception persuaded the majority to argue for its acceptance.The papers produced by the “Majority,” written in 1966, were published in 1967 in France in Le Monde and in the U.S. in the National Catholic Reporter to put public pressure on Paul VI to accept contraception. When he rejected the arguments of the “majority” in publishing Humanae Vitae, the objection was raised that he simply ignored their advice (he did not). Patty Crowley and her husband were especially upset and continued their advocacy of contraception and dissent from Church teaching. Patrick Crowley died in 1974, but Patty lived until November 2005 and McClory wrote her obituary in the 41 See Summa contra Gentiles III, ch. 122.There St.Thomas says that if one deliber- ately impedes procreation (contracepts), one does something akin to homicide. By homicide “a human nature already in existence is destroyed.” He then says that this type of sin (contraception) “appears to take next place, for by it the generation of human nature is precluded.” One can see how badly Dupré has used Aquinas. 42 Robert McClory, Turning Point (New York: Crossroad, 1995). N&V_Sum09.qxp 724 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 724 William E. May December 9, 2005 issue of National Catholic Reporter, still a champion of contraception. In his obituary, McClory praises Patty Crowley as deeply involved in the Call to Action group, a group that vehemently repudiates the teaching of the Magisterium on moral and faith issues.43 Now to the papers of the “Majority.” The Papal Commission prepared four papers. One, known as the “Minority Report,” defended the Church’s teaching and argued that it could not be changed. It also argued that the reasoning used by the authors of the “Majority Papers” to justify contraception were not good and would, if true, lead to the rejection of other firm teachings of the Magisterium. There were three “Majority Papers”: (1) the Documentum Syntheticum or “Rebuttal”—translated in the Hoyt edition used here44 as “The Question Is Not Closed:The Liberals Reply”; this was prepared by Josef Fuchs, S.J., Canon Philippe Delhaye, and Raymond Sigmond, O.P.; (2) the Schema Documenti de Responsabili Paternitate, or “Majority Report,” translated as “On Responsible Parenthood: The Final Report”; this was prepared by Fuchs, Sigmond, Alfons Auer, S.J., Paul Anciaux, M. Ladourdette, and Pierre de Locht; and (3) a French text, Indications pastorales, “Pastoral Approaches.” I have not included this third text here because it adds nothing to the first two. With respect to the first two texts I intend to focus on the following issues, central to the claim made in both that married couples can rightly choose, in given circumstances, to practice contraception: namely, (1) man’s dominion over nature; (2) the criteria for determining the moral meaning of human acts; and (3) the meaning of marriage and of marital acts as a “totality.” I omit discussion of other elements in their presentation, for example, their understanding of the competence and extent of the ecclesial Magisterium in moral questions. In presenting the thought of the “Majority” of the Commission on these issues I will draw from material in both the first and the second of the reports identified above. Man’s Dominion over Nature A key idea in the defense of contraception mounted by the “Majority” is that man’s dominion over physical nature, willed by God, justifies the use of contraceptives by married couples to prevent pregnancies that 43 For McClory’s obituary see ncronline.org/NCR_Online/archives2/2005d/ 120905/120905o.php, accessed July 17, 2008. 44 See The Birth-Control Debate: Interim History from the Pages of the National Catholic Reporter, ed. Robert Hoyt (Kansas City, MO: The National Catholic Reporter, 1969). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 725 The Cultural and Ecclesial Situation 1964–1967 725 would be irresponsible. In “The Question Is Not Closed” they note that, “in the matter at hand,” namely, contraception, there is a certain change in the mind of contemporary man. He feels that he is more conformed to his rational nature, created by God with liberty and responsibility, when he uses his skill to intervene in the biological processes of nature so that he can achieve the ends of the institution of matrimony in the conditions of actual life, than if he would abandon himself to chance.45 In “On Responsible Parenthood” they write as follows: It is proper to man, created to the image of God, to use what is given in physical nature in a way that he may develop it to its full significance with a view to the good of the whole person.46 According to this idea, the biological fertility of human persons and the biological processes involved in the generation of human life are physical or biological “givens,” and as such need to be “assumed into the human sphere and be regulated within it.”47 The person, according to this idea, is not to be the slave of his biology (moral rightness does not consist in conformity to biological or physical laws), to have his choices determined by the rules and conditions set in physiology.To the contrary, the biological givens confronting the person are to be controlled and regulated by the person’s intelligence and freedom. And this leads to the justification of the use of contraceptives. With respect to all this, the following passage from “On Responsible Parenthood” is quite illuminating: The true opposition is not to be sought between some material conformity to the physiological processes of nature and some artificial intervention. For it is natural to man to use his skill in order to put under human control what is given by physical nature.The opposition is to be sought really between one way of acting which is contraceptive and opposed to a prudent and generous fruitfulness, and another way which is in an ordered relationship to responsible fruitfulness and which has a concern for education and all the essential human and Christian values.48 45 “The Question Is Not Closed,” in The Birth-Control Debate, 69. 46 “On Responsible Parenthood,” in The Birth-Control Debate, 87. 47 “The Question Is Not Closed,” 70. 48 “On Responsible Parenthood,” 90–91. N&V_Sum09.qxp 726 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 726 William E. May This passage is instructive because it distinguishes between the use of contraceptives to regulate nature and what it calls a “way of acting which is contraceptive and opposed to a prudent and generous fruitfulness.” In other words, contraception by married persons is morally bad only when motivated by selfish reasons. Otherwise, it simply reflects human intelligent control of “what is given in physical nature.” Comment The principal difficulty with this idea, however, is that it presupposes a dualistic understanding of the human person. According to it, the body becomes an instrument of the person. The procreative dimension of human sexuality (biological fertility, the biological processes of human generation, etc.), according to this view, is of itself subpersonal and becomes personal only when “assumed into the human sphere and regulated within it.” The Criteria for Determining the Moral Meaning of Human Acts Here we come to the moral methodology advocated by the “Majority,” that is, the criteria they propose for distinguishing between alternatives of choice that are morally good and alternatives of choice that are not morally good. This theme overlaps with considerations to be taken up below, on the “totality” of marriage and of marital acts, but it is somewhat broader in scope. A clue to the moral methodology adopted by the authors of “The Question Is Not Closed” is provided in the following passage: To take his own or another’s life is a sin not because life is under the exclusive dominion of God but because it is contrary to right reason unless there is question of a good of a higher order. It is licit to sacrifice a life for the good of the community. It is licit to take a life in capital punishment for the sake of the community, and therefore from a motive of charity for others.49 I call this the “Caiaphas” principle. I prescind here from the question of capital punishment and its justification. I wish to draw attention to the general normative principle set forth in this passage. It is the following: one ought not to take a human life unless there is question of a good of a higher order. This provides a built-in exception clause to a norm such as “one ought not to kill innocent human persons.”The exception is, unless there is question of a good of a higher order. If such a good is present, then it 49 “The Question Is Not Closed,” 69. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 727 The Cultural and Ecclesial Situation 1964–1967 727 follows that one can rightly kill innocent human persons. “It is licit to take another’s life if there is question of a good of a higher order.” And this would be true of every specific moral norm; that is, every specific moral norm (called “concrete moral norms” in “On Responsible Parenthood,” p. 81) is open to exception; that is why they “must not be pushed to an extreme,” that is, made absolute.50 In evaluating human acts, the authors suggest, one must take into account the totality of the act in question.They imply that one can make a moral judgment on an act only when it is seen in its “totality,” that is, in relationship to the end for the sake of which it is chosen.51 This leads us to the third theme. The Totality of Marriage and of Marital Acts Here the basic idea underlying the “Majority” reports is set forth luminously in the following passage: When man intervenes with the procreative purpose of individual acts by contracepting he does this with the intention of regulating and not excluding fertility.Then he unites the material finality toward fecundity which exists in intercourse with the formal finality of the person and renders the entire process human. . . . Conjugal acts which by intention are infertile [here the authors are referring to conjugal acts chosen during the infertile period of the woman; they see no moral difference between “artificial” and “natural” contraception] or which are rendered infertile [by the use of artificial contraceptives] are ordered to the expression of the union of love; that love, however, reaches its culmination in fertility responsibly accepted. For that reason other acts of union are in a certain sense incomplete and they receive their full moral quality with ordination toward the fertile act. . . . Infertile conjugal acts constitute a totality with fertile acts and have a single moral specification.52 This is a remarkable passage and sums up the basic argument used to justify contraception; it also illustrates the moral methodology of the authors. Note that they here claim that individual conjugal acts do not have a moral specification of their own. If they are contracepted marital acts, they are not specified precisely as acts of contraception. Rather, they receive their moral species from the whole ensemble of marital acts, and these, the authors maintain, must be ordained both to love and to a generous fecundity. Thus we could say that the “single moral specification” of 50 “On Responsible Parenthood,” 81. 51 Cf. “On Responsible Parenthood,” 72. 52 “On Responsible Parenthood,” 72. N&V_Sum09.qxp 728 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 728 William E. May these individual acts is “the fostering of love responsibly toward a generous fecundity.” But this is obviously good, not bad; therefore the individual contracepted marital acts ought properly to be described not as “contraceptive” acts but as acts of fostering love responsibly toward a generous fecundity. I believe that this is an accurate rendition of the central argument.The problem with it, however, is that it redescribes the action one chooses to do (namely, to contracept) in terms of the hoped for consequences of the act (namely, the fostering of love responsibly toward a generous fecundity). While it is true that one cannot judge an act to be morally good unless one takes it in its “totality,” including the end for the sake of which it is chosen—bonum ex integra causa —it is not true that one cannot judge an act to be morally bad unless one takes it in its “totality”; one can judge an act to be morally bad if any element of the act is morally bad—malum ex quocumque defectu.Thus, if one knows that the object of choice is bad, then one can judge the whole act morally bad, even if the end for the sake of which the act is chosen is good and if the circumstances in which it is chosen are good. The authors of the “Majority Report” claim that the object of choice is the whole ensemble of marital acts; the choice is to procreate responsibly within the marital covenant. They need to distinguish different kinds of choices. A couple can choose, in the sense of a commitment, to procreate responsibly within the marital covenant. But this commitment entails further choices, namely, what to do in order to procreate responsibly within the marital covenant. Those who contracept choose to contracept; one can hardly deny this! Whether the choice to contracept is morally good or morally bad is another question. But one cannot justify the choice to contracept simply because it is the means adopted to carry out the commitment to procreate responsibly within the marital covenant. One can ask whether this means is indeed compatible with responsible procreation. I hope you see the point. The authors of “The Question Is Not Closed” maintain that their standards are really strict and would in no way justify anal/oral sex, asserting that “in these acts there is preserved neither the dignity of love nor the dignity of the spouses as human persons. . . .”53 But this is no explanation at all, since an act accords with human dignity in the morally relevant sense by being reasonable and right in accordance with the truth.54 53 “The Question Is Not Closed,” 76. 54 Cf. Gaudium et Spes, §14, where it is said that “human dignity itself involves that one glorify God in one’s body” by “not allowing it to serve the depraved inclinations of one’s heart”. Also cf. Gaudium et Spes, §16). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 729 The Cultural and Ecclesial Situation 1964–1967 729 Conclusion Unfortunately even today many Catholics reject the teaching of the Magisterium on contraception. But, as I hope I have shown, contraception, because of the dualistic anthropology at its heart and the consequentialist/proportionalist moral methodology that it uses, is at the root of the culture of death. Moreover, today social scientists, such as W. Bradford Wilcox of the University of Virginia, and economists are amassing evidence that supports the teaching of Pope Paul VI in Humanae Vitae. Let those who have ears to hear, listen.55 N&V 55 I have summarized the evidence marshaled by Wilcox and others in my recent essay, “Humanae Vitae at Forty,” Catholic World Report, July 2008. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 731 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 731–50 731 The Anthropological Vision of Humanae Vitae K AROL WOJTYLA T RANSLATED BY W ILLIAM E. M AY John Paul II Institute Washington, DC Translator’s Introduction T HE I TALIAN text of Karol Cardinal Wojtyla’s “La Visione Antropologica della Humanae Vitae” was published in Lateranum 44 (1978), pages 125–45, the tenth anniversary of the publication of Pope Paul VI’s encyclical. It is a most important and helpful essay. In particular, Cardinal Wojtyla’s painstaking analysis/comparison of relevant texts from Vatican Council II’s pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes and from Humanae Vitae enables us to see that Paul’s encyclical deepens and enriches the “personalistic” understanding of human beings and of the conjugal act. By doing so, Wojtyla shows how totally false is the claim, commonly made by dissenting theologians such as Louis Janssens, Charles Curran, and Bernard Haering that the “personalism” of Gaudium et Spes, to which they contrast the “biologism” or “physicalism” of the encyclical, actually justifies contraception. Moreover, in his analysis of the “principle of totality” Wojtyla shows that the “integral vision of the human person” set forth in Paul’s encyclical fully respects the truth that the human body is integral to the being of the human person, whereas the “partial vision” championing contraception looks upon the human body as material over which the “person” has been given dominion. This essay by the future Pope John Paul II simply ought not and cannot be ignored. It provides one of the strongest and most profound defenses of Paul VI’s great encyclical that I know of. It also offers invaluable background not only to his teaching in Familiaris Consortio, §32, N&V_Sum09.qxp 732 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 732 Karol Wojtyla where he says that the differences, both “anthropological and moral, between contraception and recourse to the rhythm of the cycle . . . are ultimately rooted in irreconcilable concepts of the human person and of human sexuality,” but also to the ideas he developed so magnificently in his “theology of the body.” I think it highly fitting to make this essay, written to commemorate the tenth anniversary of Humanae Vitae, available in English. The text of Wojtyla’s great essay in English translation follows. A Question of Method In a series of themes dedicated to consider the encyclical Humanae Vitae, which is one of the key documents of the pontificate of Paul VI, it is necessary to take into consideration the theme of anthropology. The encyclical Humanae Vitae contains not only a definite vision of man—a properly anthropological vision—but is, in addition, based on this vision as a foundation. This corresponds, after all, to the nature and content of the document. Humanae Vitae is concerned with principles of conjugal morality and is a document of the pontifical Magisterium in the field of ethics. It is evident that ethics presupposes anthropology.The truth about man is at the basis of all the principles of human morality.Thus this truth about man is a premise in the encyclical Humanae Vitae, the truth without which the relevant principles of morality would not be fully founded and, even more, would in a certain way be suspended in the air. The author of Humanae Vitae is aware that, by reminding us of and confirming these principles of conjugal morality to which his encyclical is dedicated, he proclaims the law of God. The law of God, with its entire content, is concerned with man. It obliges him, but at the same time it serves him. It always tends to a good objective, which is the “good of the person,”1 the good by means of which the essential value of man is confirmed and his very “humanness” (humanum ) is strengthened. It is therefore evident that a document such as the encyclical Humanae Vitae characterized by this content embraces an adequate concept and vision of man. Such a concept and vision is indeed its basis.This anthropological stratum of the document does not appear in the form of a systematic exposition, but is rather “outlined” in it and in this way 1 The concept of “the good of the person” (das objektive Gut für die Person ) has been elaborated in contemporary ethics by Dietrich von Hildebrand. See his Ethik [English translation: Christian Ethics (New York: David McKay Co., 1953)]. Both components of this concept are important, whether that indicating the objectivity of this good or that giving evidence for its relationship with the personal object and its connaturality with respect to the person. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 733 The Anthropological Vision of Humanae Vitae 733 permeates the whole content and the entire text from beginning to end. By analyzing the encyclical Humanae Vitae we can discover a broad portrait of anthropological thought, and we can also see the possibility of enriching it with a content that will be simultaneously more detailed and more systematic. A penetrating reflection on individual formulations of the text allows us to ascertain how these are fitted into the whole of the truth about man and how from this emerges that coherent image that we can rightly call the “anthropological vision” of the encyclical. In what has been said thus far are contained already the premises for defining the method that must serve us in this present study. In broad lines we are dealing with an exegetical method.We propose above all to analyze the text of Humanae Vitae and, in a certain way, the whole text, focusing our attention particularly on those points that directly present, as was already said, its anthropological stratum. But we will not limit ourselves only to interpreting the text from the viewpoint of its anthropological content; we will also try to penetrate into the profound significance of this content, searching for the coherence among the formulations that seem to be “dispersed” throughout the document, given that they are matched in various parts of the text and, in a certain way, in the different circumstances created by the guiding thread of the encyclical. Thus the exegesis (analysis) of the text (in different contexts), by means of a search for coherence among its individual formulations, must be transformed simultaneously into a synthesis of its concept of man, of that truth about him that is explicitly presupposed in the encyclical Humanae Vitae and, what is even more important, constitutes both the basis and the support of the normative text of the document. Humanae Vitae, in which the normative content is the most essential (we are, in fact, dealing with a document of the Magisterium on morality), precisely for this reason gives its greatest attention to the consideration of human actions.Therefore the anthropological vision proper to the encyclical is a vision of the man who acts in a quite specific relationship to another man; specifically, in the reciprocal relationship between man and woman as spouses, and, indeed, in their marital embrace.The principal theme of the document is thus that particular action, and at the same time the mutual cooperation of the man and the woman, that constitutes the “conjugal act.” Nonetheless, according to the ancient adage “operari sequitur esse” (action follows being), in the sphere of human acts is revealed a most profound image, the image of the acting subject precisely in what properly constitutes his being.2 Thus the many enunciations proper to the 2 The author of the present article has already expressed his view on this matter in Osoba I czyn (Krakow: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, 1969) (The Acting N&V_Sum09.qxp 734 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 734 Karol Wojtyla encyclical on action, and particularly on the action and cooperation of husband and wife, concretized in the acts of marital embrace, allow us to draw conclusions regarding the nature of the acting and cooperating subjects.These enunciations permit us to investigate the way in which the author of the document sees the person through the prism of his acts, how he sees the person who is the man and the woman through the prism of these individual acts that reveal not only the masculinity and femininity of the acting subjects but also their personal subjectivity. Our method of anthropological analysis must therefore be in a certain way a posteriori; it must be deduced from judgments on human action with this aim in view: to formulate judgments on man himself. The Context: Man in a Period of Progress These considerations of the method to be used in this study are in no way changed by the fact that the encyclical Humanae Vitae introduces us from beginning to end into the context of some general judgments about man that explain the genesis of the ethical problem that will be the object of the document. A general judgment of this kind is, for example, the affirmation that “man has made enormous progress in the dominion and rational organization of the forces of nature, so that he strives to extend this dominion to his whole being: to his body, to his psychical life, to his social life, and finally to the laws that regulate the transmission of life” (Humanae Vitae, §2).This global characteristic is enough to show that the ethical problem to be treated in the document and the anthropological truth that must support the resolution of this problem point to contemporaneity, that is, to the level of thought about human acts that is reached by means of all the conquests of man himself in the field of nature.Thus on the horizon of this encyclical appears contemporary man,“economical man” or “technical man,” the one who in the name of the premises of that same “progress in the dominion and organization of the forces of nature” would like to take a position with respect to himself, to his own humanity, not foreseeing that a position of this kind could include in itself a certain alienation from what is decisive for his very being. By this is meant an alienation from what immutably constitutes man as the object of morality: “ethical man,” the man who has entered into the perennial era of the “knowledge of good and evil” (cf. Gen 3), that is, the man of conscience. The level of his responsibility for the world of objects—things that constitute the exterior criterion of progress—is one Person [Boston: Riedel, 1979]). In a more concise form he has expressed it in his essay “Teoria-Prassi: un tema umano e cristiano,” during the inaugural session of the International Homonymous Congress at Genoa, September 8, 1976. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 735 The Anthropological Vision of Humanae Vitae 735 thing; quite another is the level of his responsibility for the humanity in his essence, his own and that of others: for the world, that is, of the personal subject. This pervasive way of speaking about the man of the epoch of progress provides a clear context in which the encyclical Humanae Vitae tends to direct its lens on the man who has entered once for all into the era of the knowledge of good and of evil and can never abandon it without putting his very humanity at risk. The “ethical man” is not interchangeable; it is impossible to replace him with respect to his own proper being with the formula “technical man” or “economic man.”To render judgment about questions that concern the person in the essence of his humanity, and also precisely there where procreation is at stake, that is, in a certain way the reproduction of humanity in every new human being through the cooperation of persons, man and woman, we must again ascend to the concept of the humanity of man himself. The “ethical man” cannot be obscured by any of his incarnations, the fruit of civilization. Incarnation or perhaps alienation? Does the “technical man,” the “economic man,” signify only the man who dominates the forces of nature or also the one who subordinates himself to them, who considers his own humanity only as a function of these forces? Where is the limit between the one and the other? One can suppose that these profound reflections and these thoughts about man emerged in the heart of Paul VI when he prepared his encyclical, when he had to respond to the questions posed to the supreme Magisterium of the Church by the contemporary “man of progress”:“the conclusions which the Commission3 had reached could not be considered by us as definitive, nor could their judgment dispense us from a personal examination of a serious question. . . .” The author of the encyclical Humanae Vitae, “having attentively evaluated the documentation and after mature reflection and assiduous prayer,” is certain that, “in virtue of the mandate entrusted to us by Christ” (HV, §6), he cannot respond in any other way to the question addressed to him, a question that pertains to most delicate matters in the field of human morality, in the field of the self-realization of man, except by doing so in the name of “an integral vision of man.”The author of the encyclical, moreover, is aware that he has an obligation to the man of today, who in a way perhaps not perceptible to himself succumbs to alienation from his own proper 3 Here Paul refers to the Commission established by John XXIII in 1963, whose composition and field of research had been amplified by Paul VI the following year.The task of this Commission, one of strictly consultative character, was the study, possibly in its various aspects, of the problem of the regulation of births in conformity with the principles of ethics. N&V_Sum09.qxp 736 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 736 Karol Wojtyla humanity and, in the name of progress, becomes only the “economic man” or the “technical man,” to call to mind, humbly and firmly, the integral vision of man, through which, so to speak, Christ lives and dies: a vision in which man finds once more and confirms himself as “man the human—homo humanus.”4 It might even appear strange that the response to a concrete question in the field of conjugal morality can have such strong anthropological implications, that it can become the field of this struggle for the value and meaning of humanity itself. Nonetheless, the analysis of the encyclical Humanae Vitae seems to persuade us of this, above all if we take into account not only the text but also the context. The “context” signifies here the concurrence of the circumstances that accompanied this document of the Magisterium of Paul VI. In fact, it is well known that the encyclical Humanae Vitae is not only a document but an event that immediately had many phases and repercussions.5 It seems that at the deepest level of this event must be considered the controversy and the struggle for man himself, for the value and meaning of humanity, that is, for the most fundamental vision of man. The controversy and struggle unfolds, in a certain way, in each man, and at the same time it is carried on by men of the modern stage of history. It is necessary that in this controversy the word of Christ be heard, the word of the One of whom Vatican Council II has said: “he fully reveals man to himself ” (Gaudium et Spes, §22). Certainly, indeed, the fullness affirmed by Vatican Council II was in the mind of the author of Humanae Vitae when he appealed to an integral vision of man. Dimensions of the Person The encyclical Humanae Vitae, at the end of its introduction of the positive meaning of the integral vision of man, calls to mind the analysis of conjugal love, referring to what has been set forth on this subject in the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes of Vatican Council II.Without any doubt there had been made the affirmation that, in considering the prob4 This integral vision of man was expressed in the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes of Vatican Council II, where almost the whole of part 1, “The Church and the Vocation of Man,” was dedicated to this issue. See in particular Gaudium et Spes, chapter 1, §12 ff, especially §22. 5 See Wprowadzenie do encykliki Humanae Vitae w “Notificationes” e Curia Metropolitana Cracoviensi, A.D. 1969, Nn. 1–4. Italian translation: Introduczione all’Enciclica Humanae Vitae da “Notificationes” e Curia Metropolitana Cracoviensi A.D. 1969 ( Januarius-Aprilis) Nn. 1–4 (Vatican City:Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1969). See also “Analecta Cracoviensia,” 1969, Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne w Krakowie (Associazione Polacca di Teologia a Cracovia). N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 737 The Anthropological Vision of Humanae Vitae 737 lem of procreation, one must keep in mind “man in his integrity and his vocation in its integrity.” The constitution Gaudium et Spes places at the very first the integral vocation of man, whose basis is nothing else than the truth about man, the full reality of humanity, that is, the dignity of the person.These terms show with sufficient clarity the intimate relationship between the ontology of man and his axiology: being and value together must be the hermeneutic principle of man.This becomes particularly so when we unite hermeneutics, or the science of understanding man, with the analysis of love, as happens in the constitution Gaudium et Spes and subsequently in Humanae Vitae. In fact, the meaning of love is for man a most peculiar value [la ragione dell’amore è l’uomo quale valore peculiare]. Consideration of this value allows us to understand better the very being of man as person and gift. An understanding of this kind seems to be an essential and constitutive condition of any enunciation whatsoever on the theme of love. In Humanae Vitae we read: “Through their reciprocal personal gift, proper and exclusive to them, the spouses seek the communion of their being in view of a mutual personal perfection, to cooperate with God in the generation and education of new life” (HV, §8),The document here emphasizes “the communion of their being,” but the use of the concept of “person” seems to be very sparse in the entire document. It speaks simply of man; and in speaking of love it does not call it “personal” but rather “human” (“it is first of all a truly human love”). In this regard it is possible to say that the encyclical Humanae Vitae is a document that can be called “humanistic” rather than “personalistic.” At the same time, it is difficult to understand this humanism in any other way than as personalistic. If Humanae Vitae places as a fundamental condition for the integral vision of man (or of the correct concept of him) the so-called principle of integrity or totality, that is, the necessity of considering him beyond “partial perspectives—be they of the biological or psychological, the demographic or sociological orders” (HV, §7)—the encyclical seems by this to indicate that the ethical order must be based on what is essentially human.And this precisely seems to be what is essentially personal. Moreover, the whole argumentation of the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes, to which Humanae Vitae explicitly refers,6 authorizes this way of 6 See Humanae Vitae, §7: “[I]t is good to state very precisely the true concept of these two great realities of married life [the author notes that Paul here is referring to conjugal love and responsible parenthood], keeping foremost in mind what was recently set forth in this regard, and in a highly authoritative form, by the Second Vatican Council in its pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 738 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 738 Karol Wojtyla thinking: the dignity of the human person is the basis of man’s vocation; it thus constitutes the essential content and meaning of that vocation. Even if we note that Humanae Vitae rarely uses the term “person,” there is nonetheless no doubt that it considers man as person and understands the reciprocal gift of man and woman in marriage in the same way that Gaudium et Spes does, that is, as that reciprocal gift of persons,“who,” we read, “mutually give and receive each other” (GS, §48), in such a way, indeed, that there arises “this intimate union, insofar as it is the mutual gift of two persons” (ibid.). By seeking, in conformity with the directives of the encyclical itself (HV, §7), its bases in an analysis of the concept of love in the pastoral constitution of Vatican Council II, we reach in this way the anthropological vision of the aforesaid constitution, which is profoundly “personalistic.”7 Certainly, this document is not content solely with the term “person,” but seeks to clarify what reality corresponds to this term and this concept—in particular, what reality corresponds to it in revelation, and therefore also in theology. It is here that we encounter the bold analogy by means of which the pastoral constitution seeks to respond to the whole tradition of theological anthropology that conceives man above all as made “in the image and likeness of God.” This image and likeness concern not only his spiritual nature, by means of which he is constituted a person in his individual unrepeatableness, but also the dimension of relation, that is, the reference to another person inscribed within the interior structure of the person. This dimension reflects in a certain way the Trinitarian mystery in God. In the pastoral constitution we read: “The Lord Jesus, in praying to the Father,‘that they may all be one . . . even as You, O Father, are in me and I in You’ ( Jn 17:21–22), has suggested to us . . . a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons and the union of the children of God in truth and love.”The following phrase explains what this likeness consists 7 It suffices to compare the formulations that we find in the constitution Gaudium et Spes, part 2 (chapter 1:“The dignity of marriage and the family and their valuation”).There, for example, we read of the “human act” by means of which there arises the institution of marriage and “personal progress.” Of conjugal love it is written that it is “directed from person to person,” and that it embraces “the good of the whole person.” Marriage is defined as a covenant of personal love rooted in the “irrevocable personal consent” of the spouses. Of the spouses we read that they have been “created to the image of the living God and have been established in an authentic personal dignity.” It seems that, in Gaudium et Spes, the term “person” is the equivalent, in a certain way, to that of “eminently human.” We read, for example, that conjugal love, precisely because it is “eminently human, is directed from person to person with a sentiment rooted in the will, and embraces the good of the whole person.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 739 The Anthropological Vision of Humanae Vitae 739 in: this likeness shows that man, “who is the only creature on earth that God has willed for his own sake, can discover his own self only by means of a sincere gift of himself ” (GS, §24). If the encyclical Humanae Vitae makes reference to this analysis of conjugal love that we find in the pastoral constitution of Vatican Council II, it indirectly also refers to the personalistic anthropology that in Gaudium et Spes constitutes the basis of the argument on the subject of love, “in a very authoritative way,” as we read in Humanae Vitae (§7). If in the document cited it is said that “the spouses seek by means of their reciprocal gift . . . a communion of their being,” then behind a formulation of this kind, of necessity short and laconic, lies concealed the whole truth about man as a person, that is,“the only creature God has willed for his own sake . . . ,” the man who “can fully discover his own self only by means of a sincere gift of himself.”This communion of persons to which, according to the words already cited from Humanae Vitae, “the spouses tend by means of their reciprocal personal gift” is the communion that comes to birth from the mutual gift of persons, from the gift of one person to the other.8 The encyclical Humanae Vitae affirms the personalistic vision of marriage, in which man, considered as person, signifies not only his being (“an individual substance of a rational nature”) but also his quality. In fact, only when considered as a quality can this being become a gift: it can objectively offer a gift and at the same time be accepted as a gift and be experienced as such. Love also means to give, that is, to make a gift, which is simultaneously to receive; in addition, this receiving becomes at the same time a giving. In this way the spouses “tend to the communion” that becomes always more intimate and perfect (see HV, §8). If we make our exegesis of the document of Paul VI on the basis of “this very authoritative formulation” of Vatican Council II—and therefore in conformity with the methodological directive of the document itself (see HV, §7), we will see to what extent this global anthropological vision penetrates the concept of love that we find in both these documents, and to what extent and in what form it emerges from this conception. It seems that we can have no doubt of its personalistic concept of man, conformable to the tradition of the entire Christian anthropology that is expressed in the doctrine of Vatican Council, particularly in the constitution Gaudium et Spes. The reality of the person has become the key for resolving many humanistic problems and many ethical dimensions of our day. Among these, marriage and the family have a particular place. 8 Very significant is the formulation in the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes, §12, where this “community” is defined as a “communio personarum.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 740 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 740 Karol Wojtyla Subjectivity Humanae Vitae in its own analysis of conjugal love affirms that “it is first of all a fully human love, that is to say of the senses and of the spirit” (§9). In the following it explains what this simultaneously twofold and unitary character of conjugal love consists in. It is not, then, “a simple movement of instinct or sentiment, but is also and principally an act of free will, destined to maintain itself and to grow by means of the joys and sorrows of daily life, in such a way that the spouses may become one only heart and one only soul, and together attain their human perfection” (ibid.).All this must be present if we are able to verify conjugal love as “fully human.” Ethical and psychological elements that are successfully integrated belong to such a verification.This reciprocal compenetration brings it about that conjugal love is “fully human” and at the same time “of the senses and of the spirit.” Since the integrality of the anthropological vision seems above all to refer itself to the person, it simultaneously also reveals the full complexity of the person himself, that is, the “human composite.” Both the traditional concepts of man, the personalistic and the dualistic [understood in the sense that the tradition affirms man as a composite of body and soul (translator’s clarification)], are present in the encyclical Humanae Vitae. But perhaps the dualistic tradition is expressed in a more explicit way in the text itself. The personalistic tradition is found more as the implication of many formulations that derive from the dualistic tradition. In particular, this stands out when we pass from the analysis of the paragraphs devoted to conjugal love to those that concern responsible parenthood.The aforementioned methodological directive (cf. HV, §7) permits us, even here, to call to mind the parallel exposition of this theme presented in the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes (§51). By taking this approach we can take into account the fact that the relevant text of the pastoral constitution, which presented in 1965 the teaching of the Church on the “harmony between human love and respect for life” as the expression of the supreme Magisterium of the Church, is related in a very special way to Humanae Vitae, to what Paul VI taught in 1968. The comparative analysis of both texts in which the principal concern was the formulation of the ethical principle shows clearly a noteworthy progress in this matter with respect to the anthropological vision.“For when it is a question of harmonizing conjugal love and the responsible transmission of life,” we read in Gaudium et Spes, §51, “the moral character of the behavior does not depend only on sincere intentions and the evaluation of motives; but this must be determined by objective criteria that have their foundation in the very nature [Wojtyla’s N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 741 The Anthropological Vision of Humanae Vitae 741 Italian text has dignità and not natura ] of the human person and of his acts, and that preserve the full meaning of mutual giving and of human procreation in the context of true love.” The parallel text in Humanae Vitae contains fewer elements of a general nature, but deepens and synthesizes what is pertinent to the specific problem, confirming the “inseparability of the two aspects: unitive and procreative” (§12). Under this heading we read what follows: “This doctrine, often expressed by the Magisterium, is based on the inseparable connection, willed by God and that man may not break on his own initiative, between the two meanings of the conjugal act, the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning.” In what follows, Humanae Vitae explains the fundamental thesis of the ethical problem treated here. “Indeed, by its own intimate structure, the conjugal act, while it unites the spouses in a profoundly intimate way, makes them fit (worthy) [the Italian of Wojtyla’s text has “li rende atti”; the Latin text has “eos idoneos facit”] of generating new lives according to laws inscribed into the very being of man and woman. By safeguarding both these essential aspects, the unitive and the procreative, the conjugal act preserves integrally the meaning of mutual and true love and its orientation to the most high vocation of man to parenthood” (§12). The author of Humanae Vitae closes this paragraph, which seems to be the central one of the encyclical, with a meaningful expression. “We think that men of our time are particularly capable of affirming the profoundly reasonable and human character of this fundamental principle” (§12). If we consider certain reactions to the encyclical, in particular those given the widest publicity, we can doubt whether the men of our day are truly prepared, that is, in an adequate way, to comprehend the teaching that the encyclical contains. Moreover, beyond those clamorous and spectacular reactions, we must take into consideration the objective moral good and also the state of contemporary science, to which the author of the document appeals in what follows. It is necessary to take into account the level of knowledge and of self knowledge of man, in other words, the state of contemporary anthropology. Paragraph 12 of Humanae Vitae, essential from the viewpoint of the moral doctrine contained in the document, presents very significant anthropological implications. In regard to this we can point out a certain progress with respect to Gaudium et Spes, §51, perceiving at the same time that this progress follows the line of the theses contained in the earlier document. The constitution Gaudium et Spes appeals in this matter to the “nature of the human person and of his acts,” emphasizing that these are fundamental objective criteria that must “preserve the integral sense of mutual N&V_Sum09.qxp 742 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 742 Karol Wojtyla donation and of human procreation in a context of true love.” If the nature of the human person is considered as an objective criterion, it will be necessary to let oneself proceed objectively in the whole question and to avoid every error of subjectivism.The human person, being by nature the determining element of objectivity and of the objective order, enters into this consideration as an objective reality.9 Equally, both the constitution Gaudium et Spes 51 and the encyclical Humanae Vitae 12, rigorously distinguishing between what is objective and what is subjective, agree on, and therefore impose, the consideration of the objective reality of the human person from the perspective of the subjectivity of this person. Indeed, they exhort us to concentrate not only on acts, that is, on the human acts of the man and the woman, but they give essential significance to the meaning of these acts (see Gaudium et Spes, §51): concern focuses on “the mutual donation of the spouses and of human procreation in the context of true love.” If we wish to analyze this action, we cannot do this without detaching it from the person as the subject who is conscious of the meaning of his own acting.The indispensable objectivism of the ethical order, so emphasized in Gaudium et Spes 51 and in Humanae Vitae 12, must be, as we can note in both these documents, essentially united with the dimension of personal subjectivity, such that man can see himself as the author of his act and of its meaning, that is, of its significance. If we affirm that Humanae Vitae, §12, represents a certain progress with regard to the constitution Gaudium et Spes, §51, we do this because the formulations of the encyclical seem to make more precise and to advance the anthropological analysis, or at least they furnish explicit premises. Indeed, it seems that by engaging in an analysis of the act, or rather the cooperation of the spouses in the act we call the “conjugal act,” Humanae Vitae 12 emphasizes even more the subjectivity of the cooperating persons. The constitution Gaudium et Spes on this matter appeals to the “nature of the human person and of his acts” as the criteria of the action (cooperation) of the spouses. One can say that man as the subject of action is here [in Gaudium et Spes, §51] conceived above all objectively and essentially in relationship to the nature of the person that is proper to him.The text of Humanae Vitae, presupposing the entire objective dimension of the anthropological vision at the basis of the action-cooperation of the spouses, stresses the subjective moment proper to this action-cooperation. In the objective dimension it is necessary to understand that the “conjugal act, while uniting the spouses intimately, makes them fit to generate 9 With respect to this matter, I have elaborated the concept of the “personalistic norm.” See my Love and Responsibility, trans. H.Willetts (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1981), 41. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 743 The Anthropological Vision of Humanae Vitae 743 new human lives” (HV, §12).To this objective dimension of the act-cooperation of the spouses corresponds “the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning” of the act-cooperation. Objectively, of its nature, the conjugal act “signifies” the one and the other “according to laws inscribed into the very being of the man and of the woman” (§12). However, the same act is considered in Humanae Vitae as an act realized subjectively by concrete persons—a man and a woman—as an act effected and experienced together.The author of Humanae Vitae does not limit himself to ascertain, therefore, what that act, that singular act-cooperation of man and woman, objectively “signifies” (significa ) but broadens his analysis to the “meaning” (significato) that the man and the woman can and must attribute to themselves as acting and cooperating subjects.The author of the encyclical Humanae Vitae therefore affirms that, in this subjective dimension of the act-cooperation,“man may not break on his own initiative [the bond] between these two meanings (significati ) of the act.”There must be actualized a harmony between what the conjugal act objectively “signifies” (significa) and the “meaning” (significato) that the spouses—the acting and cooperating persons—confer on it in the subjective dimension of their action-cooperation.This dimension, which stands out in the text, is at the same time a direct dimension of obligation since in it the moral value of the conjugal act is affirmed. The personal subjectivity of man is therefore fulfilled in a definitive way in his “right conscience” (HV, §10). A right conscience makes its decisions from the maturity and fullness of human subjectivity; it determines (judges) because it is “the faithful interpreter” (one would rather say,“the truthful interpreter”) “of the objective moral order established by God.” As a consequence, an equitable objectivity that is expressed by means of the observance of that “just hierarchy of values” is the condition and, at the same time, the expression of a mature subjectivity. This true objectivity, the objectivity of a right conscience, allows the spouses to establish an authentic harmony between what the conjugal act objectively “signifies” (significa ) and the “meaning” (significato) that the spouses themselves attribute to it in their own inner attitude, in their subjective action and in their intimate experience. In fact, we cannot doubt that the experience, in our case the intimacy of the conjugal act, belongs to the subjective dimension of man. Humanae Vitae equally formulates the ethical norm and the personalistic postulate, requiring that the man and the woman live their marital act in the truth.This interior truth of the act is indicated by the text of Humanae Vitae that stresses the unbreakable bond “between the two meanings (significati ) of the conjugal act” and insists on this so that the spouses may safeguard both those meanings (significati ) of N&V_Sum09.qxp 744 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 744 Karol Wojtyla that act. This attitude is a confirmation of the right conscience and the mature subjectivity of the persons. If the author of Humanae Vitae has thought it necessary to declare expressly in this context that “the men of our time are particularly capable of affirming the profoundly reasonable and human character of this fundamental principle” (§12), without doubt he had in mind this particular sensitivity of contemporary man regarding the subjectivity of his action and of his experience. The development of anthropology in contemporary philosophy also corresponds to this sensitivity.10 As is evident from our analysis, this sensibility does not lead man to the position of pure subjectivism.Thus man becomes capable of seeing in a more mature way the authenticity, the reasonableness, and the beauty of the objective moral order when he conceives it with his own conscience as subject. Perhaps then is accomplished precisely what St.Thomas Aquinas wanted to express by speaking of the “participation of the eternal law in the rational creature.”11 The encyclical Humanae Vitae follows the same direction, postulating that man “observes with intelligence and love” the laws “written by God in his nature” (§31). Surely he is not speaking of the subjectivity of the person in the sense of the autonomy conceived by Kant and even less in the sense Sartre gives to it, but rather that concept of acts and of the subject that leads to the triumph of a sound liberty without license, by means of a respect for the moral order (see Humanae Vitae, §22). Anthropological Implications of the “Principle of Totality” In harmony with the analyses already made, we must seek to understand the “principle of totality” recalled in Humanae Vitae.12 Paul appeals to the principle of totality “illuminated by our Predecessor Pius XII” (HV, §17), and insists on its “proper understanding” because, 10 We find this thought in Decartes, Kant, Husserl; it also reverberates in the devel- opment and contemporary state of Thomistic anthropology based on the premises of realism and objectivism. 11 See Summa theologiae I–II, q. 93, a. 2. 12 See Pius XII, Address to the Participants in the 26th Congress of the Association of Italian Urologists, 8 October 1953, AAS 45 (1953), 673–79: “In virtue of this principle the individual members are subordinate to the body in its totality, and must be subordinated to it in case of conflict.As a result, the one who has received the use of the whole organism has the right to sacrifice a particular member if the preservation or functioning of this member causes notable harm to the whole, a harm impossible to avoid in any other way.” In what follows the pope declares that sterilization that prevents pregnancy is not morally admissible because it does not correspond to the conditions set forth in the “principle of totality.” Fertility itself does not pose a danger to the organism. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 745 The Anthropological Vision of Humanae Vitae 745 as is clear from Humanae Vitae, §3, this principle can be interpreted in an erroneous way. The proper understanding of the principle of totality, to which he refers, is strictly tied to the integral vision of man, a vision that is the point of departure of the whole doctrinal reasoning of the encyclical. In this way, as we have already said, anthropology enters into the document from beginning to end, even if its ethical power must be discovered by taking leave of the anthropological elements of the text, of its formally ethical and normative content. “If the mission of generating human life is not to be exposed to the arbitrary decrees of men,” we read in Humanae Vitae, §17, it is necessary “to recognize unsurpassable limits to the possibility of man’s dominion over his own body and its functions . . . these limits cannot be determined except by the respect due to the integrity of the human organism and its functions, according to the principles noted above and according to the proper understanding of the ‘principle of totality’.” In fact, the whole line of reasoning in favor of the inseparability of the two meanings of the conjugal act had been based—as we have sought to show—on the anthropology of the personal subject. In the following also the reasoning on the moral licitness of the recourse to the so-called infertile periods (see Humanae Vitae, §16) obliges us to consider not only man the person, man the subject, but at the same time this specific, concrete man: the man and the woman whose action is above all a cooperation having as its common object the body, specifically in its sexual structure, the body proper to a human.The entire balance of Humanae Vitae, as a document of the Magisterium of the Church that it seeks to express, refers principally to this concrete reality. The elements of the anthropology of the person-subject, thus outlined, stand at the base of the document; while the importance of this, its reasonableness, the force of the conviction, and its efficacy depend essentially on the way in which these anthropological elements of the person-subject succeed in unifying themselves within the concrete reality of the actions and sentiments, the immediate substrate of which is the body and the sexuality of man. As the author of Humanae Vitae emphasizes from the beginning of his document, there is widespread in the contemporary world the tendency to consider the whole problematic regarding human life under partial aspects, “be they of the biological or psychological, the demographic or sociological order” (HV, §7). We cannot deny that each of these aspects enriches, each in its own sphere, the global vision of man.13 But none of these can take the place of this integrality or totality. We will have 13 Thus in the encyclical we read, among other things: “The Church is the first to praise and commend the use of intelligence in a work which associates the creature N&V_Sum09.qxp 746 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 746 Karol Wojtyla committed the mistake of absolutizing an aspect, which would be most serious both for anthropology and for ethics.The integral vision of man serves as the base for ethics.That is particularly important in the present field in which there is such a great tendency to consider everything in the light of definite biological processes (or—according to another way of looking at the matter—of physiological processes).14 Precisely here is the field of the problematic directed at Humanae Vitae.The vision of man under different partial aspects is the indirect fruit of particular sciences that, in order to know the same object—because of his complexity (therefore also because of his sovereign richness)—use different methods. With these methods we can surely succeed in reaching a richer knowledge, but indirectly this leads to the dividing and destruction of what is in itself the supreme unity of man. The history of anthropology, of methodical thought about man, manifests different moments of this division and destruction. In particular, there seems to weigh on the modern mentality the division of a Cartesian type that opposes in man his understanding, his consciousness, and his body. As a result of this division it is too easy to examine everything regarding the body as exclusively and solely in the light of somatic processes that, as the progress of medical sciences shows, can be directed and dominated artificially. It is precisely here, among other things, that the problem of the practice and technique of contraception is situated. If the author of Humanae Vitae noted “the unsurpassable limits to the possibility of man’s dominion over his own body and over their functions,” arguing that “these limits cannot be determined except with the respect due to the integrity of the human organism and its functions,” he considers the body not as an autonomous being, with its own structure and dynamic, but as a component of the whole man in his personal constitution; therefore he appeals to the “principle of totality” in a context of the global vision of man. The respect due to the body, particularly in its procreative functions—functions rooted in the whole specific somatic quality of sex—is respect for the human being, that is, for the dignity of the man and the woman. This personal dignity is precisely in such a close way with his Creator, but she affirms that this must be done with respect for the order established by God” (Humanae Vitae, §16). 14 These concepts have caused equivocations in the polemic that took place after the promulgation of Humanae Vitae and, among other things, have led to the charge that the encyclical is biologistic. See Wprowadzenie do encikliki Humanae Vitae w “Notificationes” e Curia Metropolitana Cracoviensi, A.D.. 1969, No. 1–4, translated into Italian as Introduzione all’Enciclica Humanae Vitae. Here we read, among other things:“The encyclical adopts the integrally anthropological norm and not a ‘biological’ norm in the narrow sense.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 747 The Anthropological Vision of Humanae Vitae 747 what determines those “unsurpassable limits to the possibility of man’s dominion over his own body and over its functions.”To think and to act correctly, we cannot confine ourselves to any partial aspect that one or another particular science with the greatest “technical” efficacy suggests. We must, on the other hand, integrate these aspects continually in order to reach the integral vision of man, the personal subject. Only on the basis of this vision can we correctly judge the one or the other technique of action (in this case we are dealing directly with the so-called technique of contraception) that assert themselves in the field of particular sciences—for example, those techniques that interfere efficiently in the bio—physiological processes themselves. These unsurpassable limits of man’s dominion over his own body are rooted in the profound structure of personal being and stand in relationship to a specific value, that is, the personal value of man. It is absolutely indispensable to put these structures and values into evidence, if our aim is the interior correctness in the conjugal act that is destined, above all, to realize the “communion of beings” (see Humanae Vitae, §8). It is this that creates the basis for a just criterion in this matter. Man cannot exercise power over his own body by means of interventions or techniques that, at the same time, compromise his authentic personal dominion over himself and that even, in a certain way, annihilate this dominion.This way of exercising dominion over one’s own body and over its functions, although effected with a method elaborated by man’s intelligence, is in contrast with the profound and “global” “given” that man is himself, namely, a person with dominion over himself and that this dominion over himself enters into the integral definition of his freedom.15 The encyclical Humanae Vitae justly exhorts us to see that sound freedom triumphs over license (see §22). In a particular way the conjugal act demands this, the act where the spouses “by means of a reciprocal personal donation, proper and exclusive to themselves . . . tend to the communion of their being” (HV, §8). The 15 Allow the author to make here a connection between the “principle of totality,” according to the meaning that has been attributed to it in the enunciations of Pius XII and, later on, in the encyclical Humanae Vitae and the “global vision” of man, particularly accentuated in the latter document. Also allow the author to introduce here, in the consideration of this integral vision of man, the concepts elaborated in his own thought on the subject of the human person. See his The Acting Person, especially chapters 5 and 6; see also his intervention at the Congress of St. Thomas held in Rome and Naples on 17–24 April, 1974, “Struttura personale dell’ autodeterminazione.”The direction of the analyses in this part of the text of Humanae Vitae is explained by the fact that the encyclical not only treats of the “principle of totality” but of the anthropological implications of that principle. N&V_Sum09.qxp 748 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 748 Karol Wojtyla authentic donation, which must express and form the communion of persons, demands dominion over one’s self (HV, §21).This is the logic of this reciprocal donation of persons: it results necessarily from the control over oneself that is strictly joined to the dominion over oneself with which the encyclical is concerned. Only those who have this dominion over themselves, those who are thus self disciplined, can authentically make a mutual gift of themselves at the level of a person who is aware of his own dignity, that is, to give himself in true freedom. In a donation of this kind is realized equally the personal value of each one of the spouses and the essential value of conjugal love, which is expressed in the communion of persons, in their authentically personal union. If at this level we seek the just criterion relevant to morality, if at this level we are authorized by the “principle of totality” cited by the author of Humanae Vitae, it is obvious that, in order to determine the limits of man’s dominion over his own body, we must penetrate into the structures of the personal being and base ourselves on these. One can say with certainty that the anthropological vision of Humanae Vitae implies a “personalism,” and undoubtedly that form of humanism that, in principle, is opposed to any kind of theory of a materialistic concept of man. This is stressed, for example, by the phrases in which Paul VI (starting from the position of John XXIII) exhorts men, in their efforts to resolve the difficult problems of conjugal morality, not to have “recourse to methods and means that are unworthy of man, that find their explanation only in a materialistic concept of man himself and of his life” (HV, §23). It has already been said at the beginning of this study that the problematic of the encyclical Humanae Vitae introduces us into the very center of essential problems of anthropology and obliges us to give a response to fundamental questions concerning the very being and value of man. “The materialistic conception” of which Humanae Vitae 23 speaks can be understood in the sense of a practical and theoretical materialism. Moreover, there are tight and reciprocal bonds between the one and the other form of materialism. Precisely for this reason the author of the encyclical repeatedly appeals to the “principle of totality” in the context of the integral vision of man, a vision essential for a correct concept of morality. For the same reason he admonishes us not to stop with only “partial” aspects (pertaining to biological, psychological, demographic, and sociological orders). Different forms of the materialistic concept of man are a product of the application of only “partial” methods, a product of the absence of an integral vision of the being and value of man in the fullness and depth that are appropriate to him. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 749 The Anthropological Vision of Humanae Vitae 749 The encyclical Humanae Vitae explicitly points out the connection between theory and practice in the ambit of anthropology and, above all, of ethics.When he expresses fear that “man, habituating himself to the use of contraceptive practices, ends up by losing his respect for his wife . . . and begins to consider her simply as an instrument of his selfish enjoyment” (HV, §17), he undoubtedly uses very severe words, but he does so, solicitous for the dignity of the person, of his inviolable value; he does so, basing himself also on the “principle of totality,” understood within the context of the integral vision of man that demands that we pass beyond the “partial” aspects in order to penetrate the structures of being and action proper to man as person, in order to determine on this level the truth of human acts. One can say that the entire ontology and together with it the entire axiology of the person find their meaning in the affirmation that man cannot be for another man “an instrument.”This truth we find in the philosophical tradition in various formulations. Perhaps Kant has defined this in its most radical form in his so-called second categorical imperative.16 The doctrine of Vatican Council II, summarizing the traditions of Christian thought and therefore also of Christian anthropology, has expressed this truth in the affirmation that “man . . . is the only creature on earth that God has willed for itself ” (GS, §24). Hence he can never be treated as a means, prescinding from his personal dignity. The integral vision of man excludes of itself utilitarianism as a principle of action. Man Seen in the Light of the Intellect and of Faith The analysis of the different paragraphs of the text of Humanae Vitae, taking into account the character of the document, which proposes as its end to present above all the doctrine of conjugal morality, permits us to observe how rich and many tiered are its anthropological implications when it treats, among other issues, the “principle of totality.” Certainly, in a sketch such as the present, one can only point out those implications that help to reconstruct the anthropological vision that stands at the basis of the doctrine set forth and of the practical directives of the encyclical. Nonetheless, this anthropological sketch shows itself verified and completed by a coherent content.The author of Humanae Vitae has before his eyes concrete men, applying to them the fundamental dimension of humanity, and it is to this dimension above all that he refers himself. At the same time he appeals to everything that unites man in a very essential way to God. First, to God as Creator.The theme of the encyclical is directed, in a way quite special, precisely to this bond between man 16 See I. Kant, Die Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Leipzig: Philipp Reclam, 1904), 65. N&V_Sum09.qxp 750 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 750 Karol Wojtyla and his Creator. Therefore the author of Humanae Vitae devotes a paragraph in the section dealing with the question of the fidelity of the spouses to the level of their fidelity to God,“by whom marriage has been established,” emphasizing that the spouses must conform themselves to “the will of the Author of life” (HV, §13). “One who uses the gift of conjugal love,” so we read in what follows, “respecting the laws of the generative process acknowledges that he is not the arbiter of the sources of human life but rather the minister of the design established by the Creator” (ibid.).The pope is speaking to Christian spouses, but it is certain that his words refer to all who accept the fundamental principle of the relationship between the Creator and the creature; and, recalling to mind the statement of John XXIII, he affirms:“Human life is sacred. . . . Indeed, from its very beginning it requires the creative action of God” (ibid.). This theological realism permits the introduction into the whole of the vision of man apparent in the document of a just proportion between the dignity of man and his fragility. This proportion permeates as it were all the considerations and permits us, after formulating the principle of the divine law, to examine the possibilities of putting it into practice; nor does the encyclical conceal the fact that,“just as with all good things outstanding for their nobility and utility, [keeping] this law requires strong motivation and much effort,” in order to emphasize in what follows that “this cannot be done without the help of God who supports and strengthens the good will of man” (HV, §20). In another part of the document, the Eucharist, the sacrament of reconciliation, and prayer are indicated as the means that strengthen human fragility in this difficult way. There is, therefore, no doubt that the integral vision of man, to which the author of Humanae Vitae makes appeal from the very beginning of the document, is a vision of faith. It considers in the light of Revelation the full vocation of man “not only earthly and natural but also supernatural and eternal” (HV, §7). No reader of the document can have doubts on this point. A deep study of the text and, among other things, a study of the anthropological implications of the “principle of totality” to which the text of Humanae Vitae refers on so many occasions, clearly shows how this vision of faith penetrates into the picture of man shaped by perennially human reflections and by a persevering search for the truth about himself. This truth is at the center of the encyclical of Paul VI, which N&V begins with the words “of human life.” N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 751 Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 751–61 751 Book Reviews Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes by Gregory T. Doolan (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008) , xviii + 277 pp. I N THIS extensive work, ostensibly re-cast from his dissertation with John Wippel at Catholic University, Gregory Doolan explores Aquinas’s exposition and use of “divine ideas,” offering an admirable tour d’horizon of this contested subject. He canvasses Aquinas’s works thoroughly, explicitly highlighting ideas as exemplar causes, their very existence and their multiplicity, before identifying exemplar ideas, along with the causality proper to them, to finally broach the ways Aquinas uses divine ideas to elucidate his critical strategy of participation. Daunting metaphysical issues all, and those who are drawn to explore them will find a virtual roadmap for Aquinas’s treatment in this well-composed study. So the suggestions which I shall offer, for author and readers alike, are meant to assist in the quality of inquiry which he initiates, realizing that it will never be finished (see Thomas Hibbs, Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion: Metaphysics and Practice [Bloomington IN: University of Indiana Press, 2007]). Building on Etienne Gilson, the author insists that “to have a complete understanding of Thomas’s metaphysics, . . . one must be familiar with his account of the divine ideas as exemplar causes” (xiv). So we are offered a study in Aquinas’s metaphysics, yet the causality in question can only be that of creation. So neatly bifurcating “philosophy” from “theology” cannot work here, though the author presumes it in a crucial passage culminating chapter three on the “multiplicity of divine ideas”: [W]e now have a sense that for Thomas, the doctrine of divine ideas is no mere theological concession to Augustine. Indeed, it is not principally a theological doctrine. Rather it is a philosophical one that plays a key role in Thomas’s metaphysical thought (122). N&V_Sum09.qxp 752 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 752 Book Reviews Yet if we recall that the causality in question must be that of creation, and in Aquinas’s context, free creation, the sharp bifurcation between philosophy and theology (imbedded in Catholic institutions of higher learning since Aeterni Patris) is not only anachronistic for Aquinas but counterproductive as well, as Josef Pieper reminded us, to the effect that the “hidden element in the philosophy of St. Thomas is free creation.” Nor is this a quibble, for recalling how artificial is the bifurcation that we have come to presume should allow us to exploit the richness of Aquinas’s account of the causality of “divine ideas” precisely by imbedding it in his nuanced teaching on creation. In other words, showing how the effective context for the “divine ideas” is that of creation will offer us a better chance of adopting Aquinas’s presumptions in reading him, and save us from importing our own—an essential initial hermeneutical step. My next observation is more explicitly philosophical, and has to do with the author’s blithe use of “possible” as a substantive—a move which should alert philosophical readers to expect hidden antinomies in the ensuing discourse. As he canvasses Aquinas’s various discussions of this issue, the author inadvertently lays out the antinomies but seems rather oblivious to their import: [A]ccording to the strict sense of the term, an idea belongs to practical knowledge, either actual or virtual.Thus, the ideas that belong to actually practical knowledge pertain to those things that God makes at some point in time, but those that belong to virtual practical knowledge pertain to those things that God can make but never does. The difference between the two types of ideas is that those things toward which the possibles are directed are not determined to exist by God’s will. For this reason, Thomas concludes, the possibles are in a certain sense indeterminate ideas.Thus we see in the De veritate Thomas allows for the divine ideas of possibles (140–41). This passage implicitly defines “possibles” as “those things that God can make but never does.” At the risk of verbosity, it would be best always to substitute this phrase for “possible,” to emphasize the ambiguity which Aquinas always respects in employing “thing” in this context; for if they are considered to be “things,” they are at best “indeterminate things”— whatever that might be! Now we have no other recourse in such metaphysical thickets but to respect the limits of our language, as both Aristotle and Wittgenstein remind us. Which Aquinas does, so the author simply cannot conclude, as he does, that “Thomas allows for divine ideas of possible,” since the ‘idea’ in question must be “indeterminate,” so Aquinas deliberately substitutes the Latin notio to inscribe this difference. So one cannot N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 753 Book Reviews 753 be true to Aquinas in speaking of “two types of ideas,” for a notion is not equivalent to a full-fledged idea, as we have already been told.Again, close attention to language—ours and Aquinas’s—is indispensable lest we deceive ourselves in this arcane domain. So what might an “indeterminate idea” be, and what sort of thing would “those things toward which the possibles are directed” be? Again, these antinomies leap out from a page which pretends to offer a simple exposition of Aquinas, while my own struggle with these matters has convinced me that Aquinas himself was quite aware of their presence (see Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993]). A similar blind spot leads the author to misrepresent James Ross’s trenchant criticism of “a ‘photo-exemplarist’ reading of Aquinas’ divine ideas, [namely] that God has a multiplicity of ideas, each acting like a photograph or blueprint for both actual and possible things” (112). It must be noted that the author is stepping into a sharp dispute between Jim Ross and his mentor ( John Wippel), which may have hindered him from exploring Ross’s real objections, which he limits to the multiplicity of “divine ideas.” To that in a moment, but first note how his own description of Ross’s objection turns on “each [idea] acting like a photograph or blueprint for both actual and possible things.” So the burden of Ross’s objection turns on what we have just noted: speaking in the same voice of both “actual and possible things,” and so of “two types of ideas.” And I have suggested why that cannot be Aquinas’s way of proceeding, given how he sharply differentiates between idea for actual things, and notion for “those things that God can make but never does.” As for the touted “multiplicity of divine ideas,” the author is candid enough to acknowledge that Henle, Gilson, and Ross are quite right that ontologically, there is but one exemplar of all things, which is God.As the fullness of being (esse ), the divine essence is imitable in diverse ways. Still, when Thomas addresses the subject of divine ideas, it is not simply to this imitability that he is referring. Rather, for him a divine idea consists in God’s knowing his essence as imitable in these diverse ways. It is this knowledge which constitutes an idea. Since these ways are themselves diverse, so is God’s knowledge and, hence, his ideas (116). I leave it to the reader to assess Doolan’s conclusion here: must the knowledge that something is multiply imitable be itself multiple? Yet beyond this muddle, Doolan’s inability to grasp the import of Ross’s objection turns on his own blithe use of “possible” as a substantive, which obscures Aquinas’s need to distinguish notions from ideas, properly speaking, N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 754 Book Reviews 754 calling the former “indeterminate.”The very thought of an “indeterminate idea” referring (determinately) to anything at all should alert the reader to ask why Aquinas needs to do such fancy footwork.The short answer must be that he wants to avoid readers being misled by using “possible” as a substantive, as though there were something to which it referred! Ross is extraordinarily sensitive to these matters because he has had to be in conversation with philosophers whose stock in trade is “possible worlds,” a venue of which Doolan seems quite innocent. Finally, to the subject of participation, which turns out to be the pièce de résistance of Aquinas’s treatment of creation and of the causal role of “divine ideas.” Here the author explicitly relies on Louis Geiger (1953) and Cornelio Fabro (1861), as well as his mentor, John Wippel (1984), and only tangentially on the more recent work of Rudi te Velde (1995). In fact, he only engages him in the context of a dispute between his mentor and te Velde about the activity of creating.Yet again, the point of contention is that of “possibles.” Citing from Aquinas from the very fact that esse is attributed to a quiddity, the quiddity is not only said to be but to be created, since before it has esse it is nothing— except perhaps in the creator’s intellect, where it is not a creature but the creative essence (De potentia q. 3, a. 5, ad 2), the author then concludes: Thomas affirms precisely what teVelde claims that he does not, namely that the ideas in the divine intellect are ontologically (but not temporally) prior to created essence. It is because God bestows esse upon a possible essence that it is created, and the finite being that results from this composition is what participates in the likeness of the divine nature (241). Here again, there is little recognition of the antinomy resulting from the phrase “bestows esse upon a possible essence.” Is this the “creative essence”; and if so, is esse bestowed upon an idea? We need to be aware of the limitations of our language in attempts to describe the divine act of creating, realizing that disputes may well be fueled by the resulting ambiguities, so rather than pretend that a straightforward description could resolve them, we need to engage in a kind of “intellectual therapy,” which might appreciate both sides of a dispute, to bring us to the modicum of understanding available to us in these remote regions. But then perhaps I am asking too much of an initial foray into these recondite matters. So I must conclude by praising what Doolan has done, and recommend it as a first step to any student attempting to negotiate N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 755 Book Reviews 755 these metaphysical shoals.Yet the animadversions noted will also help that reader to avoid places where the author’s own presumptions keep him from noting some crucially sensitive moves of the magisterial author he purports to expound.Yet it is that author who continues to fascinate us all, and with N&V whom this work has helped us to grapple in an ongoing inquiry. David Burrell, C.S.C. University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana Uganda Martyrs University Nkozi, Uganda Sacrifice and Community: Jewish Offering and Christian Eucharist by Matthew Levering (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005) , ix + 210 pp. I N HIS relatively short but very productive professional life, Matthew Levering’s first solo monograph was Christ’s Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas (2002).The book under review extends the principles and results of that earlier work to the Eucharist (cf. 28n82). Levering’s thesis is that the Eucharist in its lived practice and reality as a sacrament of Jesus Christ and his Church can only properly be understood as both sacrifice and communion.This requires sensitivity to the historical (and here Levering limits himself to the Jewish as opposed to any broader anthropological) context of the Eucharist’s institution. The sacrificial and communal elements of the Catholic Eucharist draw upon parallel elements within the covenantal faith and religion of the ancient Israelites.The book serves as an attempt to draw forth these aspects of the Eucharist, with particular reference to the theology of St.Thomas Aquinas, whom Levering respects for his relevance for contemporary theology. Developments in Catholic sacramental theology over the last halfcentury provide the background to Levering’s project. In the Introduction, the author charts an historical trajectory, beginning with reviews of Luther, Calvin, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, then turning to Schillebeeckx and Rahner. These latter two are clearly Levering’s focus, for many Catholic sacramentologists have followed them.The first emphasized the Christian’s contact in the Eucharist with the risen, as opposed to crucified, Christ (19–22), while the second held that the Eucharist acts as an agent whereby the community can realize the potential of grace already latent within it (22–24). Levering contends that such thoughts have led to the present state of “Eucharistic idealism” in Catholic sacramental theology, with the sacrificial aspect neglected or rejected and with the communal element disproportionately exalted. Levering characterizes “Eucharistic N&V_Sum09.qxp 756 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 756 Book Reviews idealism” as “the linear-supersessionist displacement of the Jewish mode of embodied sacrificial communion by spiritualizing accounts of Eucharistic communion with God” (8). It is of interest that Levering critiques Schillebeeckx using his 1959 edition of Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, not The Eucharist, which was published in 1967 and which continues further along the trajectory of Eucharistic idealism. Levering’s analysis of the departure of Schillebeeckx from the tradition of sacrifice in the first work illustrates that the thoughts of the later Schillebeeckx have roots in his earlier theology. The first chapter examines the nature of Israelite sacrifice as atonement for sin and as creative of communion. Levering focuses on contemporary (and, through them, earlier rabbinical) Jewish understandings of the aqedah, the near-sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham. Jon D. Levenson, Avivah Gottlieb Zornberg, and Michael Wyschogrod have described how communion between God and Abraham personally and the Israelite people at large entails individual and/or social self-sacrifice as a precondition. Levering rejects aspects of Levenson and Wyschogrod that tend towards the idea that God actively wills the suffering of his beloved. Of overall interest for Levering in these Jewish theologies is the setting of and valuable contribution of sacrifice in a postlapsarian world. Secondarily, the father-son relationship of the aqedah holds relevance to the sacrifice of Christ to God the Father. Levering ends the chapter with the conclusion that the Church follows in the pattern of Israel by finding communion—fully attained in heaven—with God through the sacrifice of the incarnate Son of God on the Cross and in the Eucharist. The second chapter illustrates how, beyond the aqedah, the Old Testament considers the Jewish sacrificial rites to be formative of the Israelite community. Contemporary scholars diversely interpret the spiritual effects of these sacrifices, running the gamut from having no causal result upon the divine-human relationship to underpinning and restoring the relationship between God and men by the forgiveness of sins. Levering favors the latter, highlighting its communal dimension: “sacrifice is completed in feasting; far from being simply renunciatory, sacrifice is profoundly fulfilling” (65). The chapter also displays the biblical witness concerning Jesus’ death and its role in the formation of the people of God as a saintly community. With this scriptural background, Aquinas develops his theology of Christ’s passion. Due to the obligations owed by the Creator and creatures to each other (though in different orders), the God-man’s death provides the fitting interpersonal conditions (i.e., satisfies) for the alleviation of sin and the restoration of the divine-human relationship. Some recent thinkers N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 757 Book Reviews 757 (e.g., Balthasar) believe that Christ’s self-offering must include estrangement from God. Disagreeing, Levering illustrates carefully how—in line with the theological tradition—the Thomistic anthropology of Christ and theology of the passion hold for the full suffering of Christ, one indeed more intense than any theoretical estrangement, precisely because of Christ’s metaphysical, moral, and psychological union with God the Father (75–82). The fruits of Christ’s satisfaction are made available in the Eucharist:“To share Eucharistically in Christ’s sacrificial Cross means to be drawn into communion, in the Mystical Body on earth, with the risen life of blessedness” (82), a “blessedness” characterized by charity (92). In the third chapter, Levering explores more fully this subject of charity, a virtue constitutive of Christ, the Church, the Cross, and the Eucharist. From the discussion initiated by de Lubac concerning the history of the term “corpus mysticum,” Levering follows Aquinas in linking the Eucharistic Body of Christ and the mystical Body of Christ which is the Church. Chapter four examines how the sacrifice and charity of Christ are made present today in the Eucharist through Christ’s Real Presence, as explained by the dogma of transubstantiation. Herein Levering introduces the critiques of the Orthodox theologians Sergius Bulgakov and Alexander Schmemann. The first faults transubstantiation for reducing the glorified Christ to the parameters of the material world (and not vice versa) and for emphasizing the change of the bread and wine rather than the transformation of communicants. The second blames transubstantiation for failing to understand how materiality was created to be deified and is deified in the Eucharist. In reply, Levering explicates the mature Eucharistic theology of St. Thomas.“Not as an eschatological absorption of the world into divinity, but instead through a this-worldly making present and offering of the body and blood of Calvary, can the eucharistic sacrifice truly embody a participation in Christ’s salvific Cross and thus in his heavenly communion” (134). In the mind of Aquinas, this Eucharistic Real Presence of Christ, best defined by transubstantiation, is driven by God’s desire to bring the fruits of Christ’s work to bear on the Christian’s present and future well-being. Personal faith in, or “spiritual contact” with, Christ is insufficient (135). So Levering expounds step-by-step Aquinas’ theory of transubstantiation, helpfully showing its similarities with and corrections of Bulgakov and Schmemann. There are two keys to understanding Aquinas’ and Levering’s thought on transubstantiation.As a methodological key, Levering states that “metaphysical ascesis . . . [concerning] our imagistic understanding of ‘bodily’ ” N&V_Sum09.qxp 758 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 758 Book Reviews is necessary to see philosophically and theologically the uniqueness of the Eucharistic “conversion,” the way in which the Eucharistic consecration moment is similar to other real changes, but also different (150).This does not mean the abolition of metaphysics, but the energetic and creative use of metaphysical tools. More properly, one should say that it is not men who are creative with metaphysical tools, but God: “ ‘Metaphysics’ does not describe ‘being’ in a state autonomous from God the Creator and fount of being (as infinite, unfathomable Pure Act). On the contrary, Aquinas’s ‘metaphysics,’ as a spiritual exercise, instructs believers on the radically participatory and contingent status of created being, which is a finite created (and continually sustained) sharing in God” (156–157). From this “metaphysical ascesis” concerning divine creativity,Aquinas shows that the Eucharist is different from all other worldly beings in that “by God’s power, conditioned to his purposes in the sacrament, the mode of substance here sublates the mode of accidents, rather than the other way around” (154).This is the “sacramental mode” of the real, bodily, substantial presence of the living Christ, which by way of concomitance makes his soul, divinity, and bodily accidents present as well (163). In the fifth chapter, Levering describes aspects of the Israelite sacrificial liturgies and the Old Testament prophetic critiques of sacrifice. Shifting to Aquinas, Levering delimits the virtue of communal, bodily, sacrificial worship—an act of justice that demands the living of all types of justice. Levering draws especially upon the insights of Catherine Pickstock as to how the Eucharist, towards the end of building community, is centered on the notion of “sacrificial gift-offering,” the Eucharist being God’s gift in Christ so that human beings can offer the same gift—with themselves included—to God (177). Levering shows how this is realized by walking through St. Thomas’ theological and spiritual description of the liturgy of the Mass. Throughout the book, Levering is in careful dialogue with a range of theologians—whether Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish, general systematicians or specialists in the sacraments or the Scriptures. Levering’s extensive research is shown in the footnotes. These should not be glanced over nonchalantly! They contain gems of bibliography and brilliance, especially in Levering’s assessment of various theologians. Some of the theological ideas could very profitably have been introduced into the main text. The book is written at an advanced level, integrating the theological disciplines, such that, besides proficient theologians, it could advantageously be appreciated by upper-level university students and graduate students.This penetrating synthesis would also serve well for the clerical and lay faithful who desire to be led more fully into the saving mysteries of the Mass. N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 759 Book Reviews 759 In the language of scholasticism, Levering’s overall goal is to show the depth of Aquinas’ theology of the res tantum of the Eucharist, the communion in charity between God and human beings united as the Church of Christ. As Levering demonstrates, this unity cannot occur without the res et sacramentum of the Eucharist, the Real Presence of Christ crucified who gives us the benefits of his sacrifice. As such, the book is noteworthy for illustrating the importance of Thomistic sacramental instrumental causality. The physical personalism of the Real Presence of the Eucharist is not limited to the Eucharist alone. One of Levering’s main terms and themes through the book is “cruciformity.” It refers to how the Cross forms and molds Christians, especially in the moral life. “If the Church, as embodied in its members at a particular time and place, does not bear these sacrificial marks, then its ‘communion’ with its Head is a façade” (189). Beyond the idealism of some modern Eucharistic theologies and in conjunction with recent theology emphasizing the lifelong building of moral virtue, Levering nicely lays the groundwork for further study of the role of daily sacrifice—no wishing-upon-a-star moral idealism!—in the individual Christian’s growth in holiness. When Levering has to deal with these real and physicalist aspects of the Eucharist, he is at his finest. His presentation and analysis of Thomas’ theology of transubstantiation in chapter four is the best section of the book. It marches forward with depth, asking interesting questions and answering them with clarity and resoluteness, even if it should mean the correction of major theologians such as Bulgakov or Schmemann. It is often said that St.Thomas was at his liveliest, most engaged, and most personal when treating of the Eucharist in the Summa theologiae. In more ways than one, LeverN&V ing follows in the footsteps of the Common Doctor. Dominic M. Langevin, O.P. University of Fribourg Fribourg, Switzerland Praeambula fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers by Ralph McInerny (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2006) , xi + 313 pp. IN HIS previous book Characters in Search of Their Author Ralph McInerny broke with the typical behavior of Gifford Lecturers, who have usually given the lectures and then worked for some years to publish something of a magnum opus developed out of the lecture material. In that earlier book McInerny had presented the lectures as they were given in Glasgow. In the N&V_Sum09.qxp 760 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 760 Book Reviews present work, Praeambula Fidei, we have the fully worked out account of the ideas covered there, along with a considerable number of other topics, with all of the arguments, exegesis and documentation. The book is divided into three parts. The first is merely a general introduction.The second is a critique of some influential contemporary Thomisms.The main purpose of this section is to show that many varieties of Thomism on the academic marketplace have a marked tendency to undermine the role of the praeambula fidei and, thereby, vitiate the role of philosophy in its relations with theology. McInerny begins his case by examining the attack on the Aristotelian Thomism of Cajetan that was launched by Gilson and de Lubac. Gilson argued that Cajetan had failed to see the differences between Aquinas and Aristotle in the realm of philosophy by developing his metaphysics in terms of substance, rather than esse. In reply McInerny offers a close reading of Cajetan in light of Gilson’s points and offers a step by step defense of the Dominican commentator. Special attention is then given to comparing Cajetan and Gilson’s reading of Summa theologiae I, question 90, article 2 on whether the soul is made or is the substance of God, and the doctrine of being in the De ente et essentia. In contrast to Gilson, McInerny finds a clear awareness of the several senses of esse, even if this is not accompanied by the kind of fanfare Gilson expected to find (51 and 55). McInerny also provides a detailed comparison between de Lubac and Cajetan on the much discussed issue of the natural desire to see God. McInerny shows convincingly that the widely celebrated account of de Lubac is based upon a radical oversimplification of the thought of Cajetan and Aquinas. He shows that Cajetan distinguishes between the end of the human person as a rational creature and as a creature ordered to happiness. In view of this, Cajetan shows that the desire for God is natural only in the latter sense, not the former (84). McInerny concludes this section with chapters addressing Gilson’s view of Christian philosophy and Chenu’s assessment of Thomism. In part three McInerny presents and defends the metaphysics of Aristotelian Thomism. This begins with a discussion of the nature of metaphysics as a science.The following chapter discusses the debate concerning separatio as the origin of our apprehension of being. Here McInerny argues that metaphysics as the science of being qua being depends upon knowing immaterial beings, against the influential reading of John Wippel.There is then a defense of a “genetic” reading of Aristotle’s metaphysics, one which takes the work as a literary whole. McInerny defends his well known view that Aquinas’s Aristotle commentaries not only express Aquinas’s philosophical thought but also are generally accurate N&V_Sum09.qxp 11/11/09 9:43 AM Page 761 Book Reviews 761 readings of the Philosopher’s texts.This method is then put into practice in an extended discussion of Thomas’ reading of Aristotle’s theology in Metaphysics book XII.A further chapter addresses some problematic cases: the eternity of the world, God as pure act, and God as noesis noeseos.The final chapter of the book defends Aristotelian Thomism as a viable alternative to Gilson’s “existentialism.” Overall, McInerny’s presentation of Thomism flies in the face of much that has become received dogma for many scholars today. But his arguments are clear, balanced and carefully articulated. However, it is worth noting that Gilson’s shadow hangs over much of this book. In dealing with the undermining of the praeambula fidei, it is almost always Gilson that is either explicitly or implicitly the target of McInerny’s attention. One regrets that there is no discussion of other versions of Thomism that have been highly influential in theology while, perhaps having similar problematic implications for the praeambula fidei.Authors such as Blondel, Marechal, Rahner, and Lonergan are not even mentioned. Nevertheless, Praeambula Fidei is a profound and important work. It offers a path through the intellectual fashions prevalent amongst Thomists today and provides a solid defense of Aristotelian Thomism. McInerny’s concludes this remarkable work by noting that not only would Aristotle remain silent were it not for St.Thomas, but that we cannot hear what St.Thomas has to teach us without Aristotle.This view has much to recommend itself and the N&V time is long past due for giving it renewed consideration. J. L. A.West Newman Theological College Edmonton, Canada