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THE NATURE-GRACE QUESTION IN THE CONTEXT OF FORTITUDE



THE IDEA THAT grace, though different from nature, does not destroy but rather presupposes and perfects it, is basic to what might be called the Thomistic vision.¹ Examination of this idea is often hindered, however, by the abstractness of the discussion; though the notion is echoed and re-echoed the actual working of nature and grace are not analyzed. It is hoped that materials with which to understand more fully the interaction of nature and grace may be obtained by describing and specifying the activity of both the "graced" and the "natural" man. If so, the concrete referent of natural and supernatural activity will give more content to the analysis of nature and grace. The concrete specification will be investigated by means of the distinction

¹ The fundamental references for the general notion of nature and grace are *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2 and q. 2, ad 1. See also II-II, q. 26, a. 13 and I-II, q. 113, a. 9 ad 2 for the idea that the good of a single grace is higher than the natural good of the whole universe. It is interesting to note that in I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2 St. Thomas himself gives a concrete reference for the relation.

between the natural virtues (e.g., the cardinal virtues) and their supernatural counterparts (in the usual division, the theological virtues, the other infused virtues, and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit). Fortitude is the particular model or instrument chosen to describe the activity of the "natural" and the "graced" man; these descriptions then being used to specify the notion that grace while different from nature does not destroy but rather presupposes and perfects it.²

In general the Thomistic account will be followed as there one sees probably the first and in many ways the best account of both this general idea of nature and grace and the natural virtues and their supernatural counterparts. Nevertheless, to clarify certain issues not directly or perhaps fully dealt with by St. Thomas, some references will be made both to Aristotle and to later developments. The underlying presuppositions of the Thomistic vision—God as an *a se* Creator, the supernatural end of man, the Creation as dependent but real, etc.—will not be questioned. Nor will there be any attempt to question the final adequacy of the scheme of nature/virtue/habits, etc., to depict fully and most adequately the constitution of man. Finally, there will be no attempt, except tangentially, either to defend the notion of the reality of the supernatural activity or to argue that the idea reflects the distinctive and essential core of Christianity. To that extent the undertaking is quite modest

² This kind of analysis could be done for either justice or temperance—prudence being dealt with here insofar as it informs fortitude. Fortitude was chosen because the other two present some particular difficulties: e.g., questions about the distinct nature of Christian asceticism given a world created by God—a problem often reflected in the ambiguity of Thomas's account; the general question of salvation outside Christianity arising from problems concerning the degrees of conscious intentionality of acts toward neighbor that pass beyond the strict demands of justice. Questions like these will arise here but they are less central.

In this and later references to the Gifts of the Holy Spirit there is no intention to overlook the problems presented by the peculiarities of their Biblical base, the difficulty of exactly separating out their function, etc. They are referred to because they illuminate certain points and facilitate an understanding of St. Thomas's position, though it must be noted that he may have been led into formulations he would not otherwise have made because he believed they were revealed data that needed to be brought into his analysis.

though it is important both in itself and as a first step toward answering some of these more general questions. For through giving a concrete, discernable, and discussable reference to the Thomistic idea of nature and grace, one can better understand both the idea itself and the implications arising from it.

One final preliminary point needs to be mentioned; that is, the difficulty of trying to describe and differentiate natural and supernatural activity. There are at least four reasons for the difficulty and noting them is important so that the problems and limitations of the task are recognized. First, the characteristics showing the distinctions may be clearly evident only in certain extraordinary circumstances, e.g., the facing of death or with justice the charitable love of enemy. To illustrate the differences as sharply as possible one must turn to and emphasize these crisis situations while remembering that the general characteristics are present in almost all human activity. Second, only the general characteristic of each type of activity can be set down. There is no intention to formulate a complete and clear guide for untangling and judging the conflicting cross currents of anyone's interior life; that task is impossible. This impossibility is important to keep in mind, and not only for those who have visceral reactions to the Thomistic categories in which this analysis is couched. For it may appear, or one may be lulled into believing, that a comprehensive, exhaustive, and systematic treatment of human actions is given or intended. But any systematic treatment of man is bound to mirror imperfectly the complex and particular life of man however important that treatment is, if cogent analysis is to be attempted. Third, it must be honestly admitted, and continually kept in mind, that the relation between natural and supernatural activity is difficult to understand just because the supernatural in presupposing and perfecting the natural does mix with it. There is no intention of holding to a "two-story" theory in speaking of natural and supernatural activity; in fact, part of the reason for this analysis is to show concretely how the two do interpenetrate. Fourth, and closely related to the second and third points, the difficulty of specifying or clearly

understanding the intentionality of an agent is recognized. Though particularly true when examining the actions of an agent from the outside, this is also true even if one is "inside," as the exact intentionality of an act may be unclear even to the agent himself. This difficulty has repercussions in two directions. On the one hand, it means natural acts as seen from the outside may (to use a phrase from Newman) "counterfeit" supernatural acts; that is, acts that are natural can appear from the outside to be supernatural because one does not know the intentionality of the agent. On the other hand, it also means acts may fulfill the criteria for supernatural activity in an inchoate manner, perhaps particularly if done outside a specifically Christian framework. This general problem will be discussed further in examining the perfecting of natural activity, but it must be always kept in mind.

This analysis then is bound at times to appear to involve an arbitrary categorizing of human activities and a misleading separation of nature and grace; further its application to any particular distinct case is severely limited. But even given these limitations, or perhaps more important remembering them, the task still seems possible. And the attempt itself is important as it offers an opportunity to give concrete content to an analysis of nature and grace thereby specifying more fully the complex relation of the two.

I

Before beginning the explicit analysis of the relation of natural and supernatural fortitude it may be helpful to sketch out briefly the general character of fortitude. Fortitude is one of the two cardinal virtues dealing directly with oneself, specifically with the removal of obstacles within oneself to the establishment of just or right relations both toward others and between the various parts of the self. The establishment of that rectitude can be hindered by either the concupiscent or the irascible aspects of the will; the former by being drawn to improper objects of pleasure, the latter by being dissuaded from following reason because of difficulty. Temperance con-

cerns the former, fortitude the latter. It needs to be remembered, however, that these divisions between virtues are for purposes of analysis. Though the virtues are distinct and of different value, it is impossible therefore to have one without the other as they refer to one entity—the developing acting man—and thus qualify and form each other. For example, the natural act of fortitude is based on or presupposes the perfection of the other three virtues; e.g., fortitude is actualized in part through temperance's control of passion's desire for immediate good, justice's sense of varying obligation, and prudence's organizing command and insight into reality.

But fortitude does have a distinct character; it signifies the overcoming of the difficult through knowing, loving, and holding to a good for the sake of which one will either surrender or endure the loss of lesser goods. At its simplest level it can even represent the firmness of mind necessary for meeting the difficulty presented by temporal goods like money or honor; e.g., magnificence, the mean in disposition of property, and magnanimity, the mean in relation to honor, are both made possible and formed by fortitude's constancy. Indeed even at this level one essential aspect of fortitude's character is evident, that is, that its value or praise is dependent upon the end sought. Fortitude remains a preliminary virtue aimed at the realization of rational good—standing firm against honor, in order say to pursue a woman, would not be called an integral act of fortitude. This fact also makes clear that, fundamentally, fortitude is not a passive acquiescence but rather is based in, or defined by, a resolute grasping of and holding to some good which in turn measures the value of fortitude itself. Essentially, then, fortitude is the overcoming of a difficulty by the abandoning of the self's love for some particular good in order to love a higher good.³

³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 123, a. 6 and ad 1; also q. 12, ad 2 and 3. This is seen clearly in that part of fortitude called patience, for through patience one possesses one's soul and its real good. The point is forcefully made by J. Pieper in *The Four Cardinal Virtues*, various translators (New York, 1965), pp. 117-141; an excellent study even if, at times, Pieper's own insights replace those of Thomas.

This essential character is most evident in confrontation with death, particularly when death is the possible result of an action, and thus a difficulty is involved in following out the action. Therefore Aristotle says that fortitude is most fully realized in a man freely choosing to die for his community, as in that case its ambiguous attributes are starkly clear.⁴ For fortitude, when defined more specifically, concerns withstanding things where it is most difficult to be firm, and in death one faces the greatest possible difficulty or fear. This itself makes evident that of fortitude's two major components—the enduring restraint of the difficulty of fear and the dispelling of fear by daring—it is the enduring which is fortitude's main object.⁵ In facing this sort of death the only real response is enduring and suffering. All the normal defenses—self-confidence, imagined heroism, etc.—are seen to be of no avail; still further one recognizes that even the most concerted and courageous actions cannot dispell the difficulty presented by the fear. In that situation, then, it is fully recognized that one can only suffer and endure the loss of the greatest natural good of all, one's life, for the sake of a greater good. Fortitude is clearly realized in its essence because the difficulty of fear can be overcome only by marshalling one's powers to love and hold to a good for the sake of which one's own good is seen as a lesser value needing to be given up.

Given this general analysis of fortitude, the examination can now turn to a more specific discussion of natural and supernatural fortitude centering initially on the differences between the two activities. As noted, as a natural virtue or activity Aristotle says that fortitude is most clearly realized in a man freely choosing to die for the sake of his community. For St. Thomas, as a supernatural activity and the manifestation of a

⁴ *Nicomachean Ethics*, 3, 6, 1115a-117b, 20.

⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 123, a. 6 and ad 1. The centrality of endurance is also evident because fear by its nature tends to moderate daring and endurance perceives danger as present not future. This point exemplifies the difficulty in consistently applying the idea of a mean, because fortitude is really directed more to fear than to daring.

gift or infused virtue, it is seen most clearly in martyrdom.⁶ To illustrate the peculiarity of the martyr's case and to furnish an image to which reference can be made later it may be helpful to construct an imaginary historical situation—particularly as the characteristics of the act of martyrdom are more difficult to grasp than those of the act of the citizen soldier. One may imagine the case of an early Christian faced with either denying God's sovereignty or being martyred. Further, one can suppose that the man possesses a strong sense of civic duty and believes that Rome is a reasonably just state that has brought peace to much of the world. Moreover, one may envision that he recognizes both that religion has a necessary social function and, of course, that he ought to remain alive both to protect and nurture his family and do good in the civil sphere. Yet one can suppose that he will overturn these considerations realizing that his response to this situation, to this providential call of God, may decide his destiny (and perhaps that of others) and, in any event, represents a higher obligation to which he must respond.

Given this image and the general discussion of the natural act of fortitude a beginning may be made by loosely putting the two kinds of activity into a fourfold causal scheme in order to accentuate their differences. For the natural act the end would be the good of the community; the efficacy, one's will, passions, and natural reason; the forms, the habits acquired through repeated actions; and the matter, one's natural inclinations, attributes, etc. For the supernatural activity—and emphasizing its divergent character—the end would be the relation to God and the doing of his will; the efficacy, God working in and through one directed by means of the new nature and the infused habits and gifts; the form, reason enlightened by faith or directly inspired by God; the matter, the new nature working in and through normal will and reason. Examining the end of the two activities and how that end

⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 124.

forms the actions can most fruitfully and concretely enable us to compare them.⁷

The end of the natural man's fortitude is the good of the community inasmuch as for it he will sacrifice the limited good of his own life. Because the citizen, soldier, or patriot intellectually and emotionally grasps the meaning of the good of the community he fully understands its importance and is willing to take actions that may involve giving up his life for its sake.⁸ But in the case of the martyr all temporal goods, even that of the community, would be sacrificed for the end or object of the love of God. Concomitant with or underlying that love would also be a reverence for the ultimate sovereignty of God leading to a continuing desire to do his will as particularly manifested and understood. This goal is one that cannot be grasped or loved by natural means but only by the theological virtues acting in concert with the infused virtues and gifts.

Both acts then—the sacrifice of the patriot and that of the martyr—are acts of fortitude examinable in terms of their teleology. Both are based in—and formed, understood, and

⁷ The inadequacies in such a brief account are obvious. For instance, the new *habitu* or *quiddam* given by grace is not, for St. Thomas, a distinct entity "once" given by God then independently possessed by the individual and nourished only intermittently. There is no complete, distinct, intermediate reality between God and man. For a brief but excellent study of this point in its historical context see C. Moeller and G. Phillips *The Theology of Grace and the Oecumenical Movement*, trans. R. Wilson (London, 1961), pp. 11-24.

⁸ To my mind Aquinas clarifies Aristotle's notion concerning the motivation or teleological causality of this ultimate act of natural fortitude. The clarification is necessary as, in the passage in Aristotle analyzing this activity, there are a number of unclearly separated diverging and even conflicting causes; see *Nichomachean Ethics* 3, 8, 1116a 17 ff. Seen hierarchically, the different telic causes could be articulated as: 1) an aesthetically pleasing character; 2) the judgment of the community; that is, acting bravely because the community will stigmatize a coward; 3) honor, as the attestation or reflection of virtue and 4) and closely related to # 3, the good of the community. [To my mind, Ross is mistaken in saying that there is a significant difference between honor and the good of the community. Dying for the community is the highest good of a natural man and so the ultimate virtue of which honor is an attestation. See W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (New York, 1960), pp. 183-193; 197-209.] Thomas's clarification is important as the last three are not clearly distinguished in Aristotle.

judged by—the love of an end or good for the sake of which fear is overcome and lesser goods discarded. The value, the internal nature or actuality of their act is dependent upon the end sought and the love of it; that is, the taking of death upon oneself is not in itself praiseworthy but becomes so because of the subordination and direction to the good implied in it. In fact, one might go even further and apply the Thomistic principle that the nature of the end and one's love for it can be judged, proved, or understood by what will be rejected, suffered, or lost for its sake.⁹ Thus from the perspective of that criterion it can be seen that the natural man dies for love of the community, the martyr for the love of God, and both shed all lesser goods. But the martyr includes among the lesser goods the higher or highest good of the patriot.

From this general discussion two clear differences between these types of activity can now be seen. The first is that, while the natural man dies for an obvious good, one that can be easily known and loved as constantly and empirically present, the object of the supernatural activity is beyond any knowing and thus any loving that is certainly and easily verifiable. The supernatural end can be reached and loved only means of the theological and other infused virtues. Therefore the end's character and one's relation to it are of a different order than the natural one as the supernatural end, while "fully" loved, can at best be only partially known and ambiguously hoped in.¹⁰

⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 124, a. 3. The essence of virtue consists in adhering to the end, God, not in the condemning lesser goods; acts not done out of obedience to God's will are without merit. Therefore, even if one suffered martyrdom or gave all one's goods to the poor, the act would not be meritorious unless it were directed to the fulfillment of the divine will. (*Ibid.*, q. 104, a. 3) Ultimately then, obedience, as conformity to God's will, can be called the final criterion for real virtue. Thus it is not unjust for Abraham to slay Isaac or the Israelites to steal from the Egyptians as the acts are in conformity with the will of God—who, of course, also gives life, death, and all worldly goods. (*Ibid.*, a. 4 ad 2) The value of conforming to God's will is important enough to overturn lesser, more obvious forms of virtue.

¹⁰ Of course, this point raises a host of questions about the kind of knowledge given by the theological virtues, the difference between faith and charity's relation to God and so forth. Without attempting to develop the question, it can be said

In fact, the giving up of earthly goods and the set of obligations pointed to in the act of martyrdom become intelligible only through recognizing both the mysteriousness of the object and the peculiarity of the relation to it. For, as in general the strength of desire and pleasure hoped for help a man bear the pain of loss, so more particularly the good for which one will endure the evil of loss must be more desired and loved than the good whose privation will bring sorrow. But in our normal state spiritual goods cannot present the obvious delights or attractiveness of those worldly goods or obligations unless they be present, however ambiguously, by way of the theological virtues. Therefore there must be a supernatural love of the final end to overcome our immediate attention to and love of temporal ends.¹¹ Indeed it is precisely because of considerations like these that St. Thomas stresses that the particular character of the gift of fortitude is the confidence it gives. That is, it is only by the direct movement of God to and through one—uniquely represented by the Gifts of the Holy Spirit—that one can receive a confidence akin to that available to the natural man.¹²

that, though Thomas stresses the theological virtues' real relation to God in himself, he also emphasizes both the transcendent mystery of God and the limitations of creaturely knowledge. (On the nature of faith as an example of this see *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2, aa. 1, 4, 9 and 10; q. 4, a. 7; q. 5, a. 2; and q. 10, a. 2)

¹¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 12 ad 3 and q. 136, a. 3 and ad 1. Some of the ramifications of this idea are evident in the relation of fortitude to fear because fear, arising from love, is dependent upon observing the correct hierarchy of love. For example, an inordinate fear of the loss of a temporal good is based in both an excessive love of the good itself and a deficient love of the final good.

¹² *Ibid.*, q. 139, a. 2. Also see *ibid.*, q. 52, a. 3. The question of the relation of confidence to fortitude is important particularly as some theologians and Thomistic commentators write as if the martyr were completely confident of his end, his knowledge being certain. But if the knowledge is certain and the confidence complete it would not be an act of fortitude. The ambiguity of life and the mystery surrounding the willing of God are part of what give both fortitude and hope their distinctive character; hope, for instance, being defined by its poles of presumption and despair, and its sense of the possibility rather than the necessity of one's own salvation.

Perhaps what is being pointed to is the unique quality of the action of God in the Gifts, particularly in confirmation in grace, the most radical form of that

An important corollary of this notion lies in the martyr's working from and thereby being open to a direct divine call. In part this is significant because it makes clear that one does not actively seek the consummation of martyrdom but rather only accepts it if it is recognized to be God's will for one—a point emphasized both by St. Thomas and most of the writings from the period of early persecution. But more important is the distinction here illustrated between this openness and the patriot's openness to the particular and perhaps extraordinary demands of the community. There are three differences: First, the community's commands would be more regular, or continuous with the past, than those evinced in martyrdom. Second, they would in almost all cases be more evident, and directly verifiable—even in those cases where the community's need was not distinctly spoken. Third, the communities' demands would be within certain obvious boundaries, that is, within certain norms which echoed an accepted structure of values to which the community was committed and from which it received its particular reality or life.¹³

This last point leads to the second and most striking difference, that is, for the martyr the whole perspective on life is changed. Life's meaning and real goods are seen in a different light because the center of explanation and value is moved out of the natural world. Indeed it is precisely for this reason that St. Thomas stresses the need of the gift of counsel and the infused virtue of prudence; only through them can the martyr escape from the enclosed world of natural considerations and become aware of the whole range of components to be taken into consideration when his decision is made. In fact, it might be said that natural prudence is the virtue most likely to cut

confidence. If so, it would seem that one must then make some distinction between biological and spiritual death and carefully work out the relation of the free act of fortitude to the direct movement of God.

¹³ The demands of the community are judged by the set of goods or laws the community represents; its general demands could never violate them (e.g., asking one to kill an innocent child). But the command of God might legitimately overturn those accepted goods as is exemplified generally in martyrdom and particularly in the discussion of obedience in footnote nine.

one off from one's supernatural destiny precisely because it is allied to common-sense considerations and in touch with the demands of the natural world. For natural prudence rightly points out that by normal standards the act of martyrdom is imprudent, unjust, and intemperate: it is harmful to the community by depriving it of the potentially good actions of one of its citizens; to the family by destroying its head and possibly making it endure the wrath of the community; and to oneself by causing the loss of one's own life and thus thwarting both the natural desire for self-realization and the opportunity to do good for others. Natural prudence counsels against the martyr's act in grasping fully its senselessness, its overturning of the natural order. In a sense, then, the highest actualization of natural virtue can stand most directly opposed to the highest actualization of supernatural virtue as prudence can close one off from God by restricting the determinative factors of life. As such it clearly illustrates this second distinction between the two kinds of activity.

This aspect of the discussion can be closed and summarized by briefly turning to a fictitious example that seems to raise a central problem in the analysis: the question of how to specify the activity of a Marxist who might die for the sake of the "coming" classless society. The problem is that his "natural" act of fortitude seems no different from the Christian martyr's death because the Marxist surrenders all lesser goods—his life, family, potential service to community, etc.—for the love of a good before which all mediate goods are judged and discarded. But even in such an extreme case, the two noted points of difference remain in force. For first, the end sought would be natural insofar as the Marxist is oriented to and dying for a just community, even if one in the future. Also, though he is not believing in, loving, and hoping for a purely present good, the good he seeks, or the command to which he responds, does have a base of empiric possibility, at least given his understanding of man and history. Second, the act does not contravene natural prudence if he feels that acts involving possible death are necessary for the coming of the

perfect society—e.g., capitalists of a certain kind must be destroyed by him even if his life may be lost in the process. However, were he actually “martyred” the act would be imprudent though not in the sense of the Christian martyr’s death. It is imprudent just because it violates natural prudence rather than because natural prudence is discarded for a higher good as in the martyr’s case. For the Marxist’s act is naturally imprudent in two ways: First, because one might argue that its relation is to an impossible good—a perfect earthly society making men completely happy and fulfilled. Second, because the martyrdom could not serve to further the end of the good society unless it were public and well publicized; if not, it should be avoided at all costs. That is, it would be truly prudent for the Marxist to make no heroic gestures, to mask his true feelings, and then to work to subvert the society from within; his secret death would serve no purpose and just render him useless. Therefore, even in this extraordinary case the two kinds of activity can be differentiated.

The distinction between the martyr’s and the patriot’s encounter with death can also be seen in a somewhat less radical form in the problem of meeting a normal death. Briefly sketching out the distinction seen in that case can help to illustrate the point, show that the differences are also evident in more normal circumstances, and provide the matrix for some questions to be investigated further in discussing grace’s perfecting of nature. Perhaps the distinction can be drawn best by looking again at the difference between Aristotle’s and Thomas’s treatment. On the one hand, Aristotle says fortitude is not germane to the meeting of certain kinds of death, say death by disease, as there is no meeting or overcoming of difficulty and therefore no possible nobleness or reflection of virtue.¹⁴ One might fill out Aristotle’s account by noting that a

¹⁴ *Nichomachean Ethics* 5, 11, 1138a515. Compare, for instance, *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 137 on perseverence. In his commentary on the *Nichomachean Ethics* Thomas approvingly echoes Aristotle’s idea about the lack of courage in the meeting of death by disease. But it must be noted that not only is St. Thomas working to present Aristotle in the best possible light to those hostile to him but, more

possible difficulty might be a despair about the meaning of virtue generated by the thought of one's imminent destruction. A virtuous man would not let that difficulty drive him into intemperance or injustice because overcoming the difficulty would be a genuine instance of fortitude. But even if one must, perhaps, re-affirm the integral meaning of virtuous action, this addition does not overturn Aristotle's general point. There is no real difficulty to be overcome by holding to a good.¹⁵

For St. Thomas, on the other hand, in any death whatsoever one sees the essential characteristics of the realization of supernatural fortitude that are particularly mirrored in martyrdom. One cannot, of course, include the important characteristic of losing natural goods by explicitly choosing a supernatural one, since in normal death the natural goods are bound to be lost anyway. But the central question posed by martyrdom still holds good for any death: in facing death will one reject or affirm God? In any death one faces the "difficulty" of the loss of most apparent reasons to have faith, hope, and love toward God; therefore that difficulty must be overcome through supernatural fortitude's affirmation of God and one's relation to him. The meeting of death represents a crisis because most of the natural stays—both legitimate and illegitimate—upholding one's relation to God are destroyed or called into question. Reasons such as the theological meaning one saw in human love, the sense of gratitude for one's well-being, and the feeling of purpose in one's activity, are dissolved or tested by the encounter with the finality of death.¹⁶ As one

important, his interpretation keeps strictly within the limits of the text—a study of natural virtue. His ideas on supernatural fortitude appear elsewhere, as in the articles on martyrdom and perseverance in the *Summa*. Nevertheless, it may also be noted that St. Thomas did not fully develop this point, however implicit it is in other points he makes.

¹⁵ For some of the difficulties in an oversimplified understanding of this matter see the discussion on the perfecting of natural fortitude.

¹⁶ Marcel, for instance, has observed that much of the terror and outrage at death arises not from the thought of one's own death but from the death of a beloved, because the latter's death seems to involve the destruction of a bond that appeared to be eternal. See G. Marcel, *The Mystery of Being*, trans. G. S. Fraser,

faces the fact of possible annihilation the natural reasons for relating oneself to God are called in question. Precisely because of this fact, the manner of meeting any death whatsoever can be either the highest possible actualization, or the final and complete denial, of the basic relation to God specified by the theological virtues. Therefore in any death, as with potential martyrdom, there is the possibility of the ultimate actualization of the theological virtues and the supernatural activity they represent; one can believe in and love God when purpose and love are not evident, one can hope in him when all apparent natural reasons to hope are destroyed. Indeed it is in large part because the difficulties in encountering death are so clear that St. Thomas emphasizes the need for a special grace of perseverance, itself an aspect of fortitude. From the natural perspective of Aristotle then, a normal death is seen and accepted as the end of a natural process; the only difficulty is the need to affirm the continuity of one's personhood, one's normal moral activity. But, from St. Thomas's perspective, a normal death, like that of a martyr, is viewed as a key testing point at which one either denies or affirms a relationship to God which the very death makes even more mysterious.¹⁷

II

The discussion of these two examples of fortitude's encounter with death allows us now to turn to a more schematic investigation of how the supernatural activity of fortitude differs from the natural activity, yet presupposes and perfects rather than destroys it. To begin with a précis of how they differ (a précis

2 vols. (Chicago, 1960) II, 163-185. The point is important for two reasons: First, it makes clear that it is not mere egotism that makes death seem strange and terrible. Second, it clearly shows the character and integrity of the outrage that death is, an outrage too often mollified by a Christian stoicism that speaks of the healing of time, the smallness of man, etc.

¹⁷ Augustine, particularly in his last years, probed the very depths of this problem, seeing in it one of the central mysteries of life and grace. For Augustine only too clearly recognized that no one is so well known to himself or so clear about God that he knows what his actions in the future will be. For a striking analysis of this see P. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo* (Berkeley, 1968), pp. 403-408.

because the preceding discussion of fortitude's encounter with death had examples which stressed their differences.) In the natural activity, fortitude is defined by a relation to an understandable good for the sake of which one overcomes difficulty, that is, rejects lesser goods. While the same general structure holds for supernatural activity, there are three major differences. First, the good to which one is related is neither understood nor loved in its fullness by natural means; indeed the good can be understood only partially by even the infused theological virtues. A corollary of this is the distinctiveness of both the form and type of the command coming for the supernatural object. Second, relating to the object of supernatural activity may entail the rejection of all worldly goods, including that for which the patriot dies, because that object is "above" the world. This total rejection makes the act appear imprudent or even senseless from a natural perspective. Third, the manner of meeting any death whatever is important because of the difficulty of holding to a Being above the world when most apparent natural reasons to do so are destroyed or diminished. In the natural meeting of death there is no such difficulty as there is no object to hold to in spite of death.

Having pointed out the differences between the two activities we may now examine, secondly, how supernatural activity presupposes natural activity.¹⁸ Put in general terms, natural activity is presupposed because the natural activity of overcoming difficulty by holding to a good, known and grasped naturally, is usually necessary for any correct holding to an unseen good. One must cultivate natural virtue "before" one

¹⁸ It is interesting to note that in some "textbook" presentations, "presupposes" is an innocuous concept meaning little more than the existence of something for grace to work on. For an example see L. Ott, *Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma*, trans. P. Lynch, (St. Louis, 1964), p. 102.

In explicating this idea one might also mention Pieper's interesting observation that one can distinguish a pre-moral level of fortitude, that is, a level at which one's vulnerability is admitted yet one still opens oneself to ungraspable reality whose goodness one wills to assent to and even love. This aspect of fortitude would be the basis for any enduring psychological health. On this point also see W. Lynch, *Images of Hope* (New York, 1965).

can become supernaturally virtuous. The natural perfection in turn entails or presupposes the actualization not only of fortitude but also of the three other cardinal virtues, for, as discussed earlier, the virtues all refer to one entity and form and qualify one another. This presupposing of fortitude, and through it the other three cardinal virtues, has two distinct aspects.

The first, more particular aspect arises because natural fortitude sets one into right relation with goods in the world by enabling one to recognize their value. This point is illustrated by St. Thomas's argument that fearlessness may destroy natural fortitude precisely because fearlessness arises from a lack of true understanding of, and just relation to, the values of this world. Natural fortitude is impossible without a prudentially just love of oneself and temporal goods, a love based in an acute awareness of the debts owed. Therefore, there can be no real natural fortitude if one is fearless through a prideful and imprudent belief that one can neither be dispossessed nor hurt, or more important, through a dullness of mind that does not recognize the values and obligations of this world.¹⁹

The tension here pointed to is, of course, even more acute and significant in supernatural fortitude since it may reject all natural goods. But that very tension arises because natural fortitude is presupposed, that is, the just demands of other objects or goods in life like the family or the state are recognized. Without that presupposing, the complex density characterizing the act of martyrdom would be vitiated or even destroyed for there would be no real difficulty to overcome. Rather than an act defined by the overcoming of difficulty, martyrdom would instead be characterized by its ease and lack of tension. In fact it would be very similar to the presumption that Thomas calls a pole of hope, that inordinate conversion to God that rejects both the value of his Creation and the mystery of his being because of a false relation to him and the

¹⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 125, a. 6.

world. If there is to be a real act of supernatural fortitude it must presuppose the recognition of the value of goods of the world that is essential to natural fortitude.

The second, more general aspect of the presupposing involves natural fortitude's role in the sequential development of man. Natural fortitude represents a necessary first step because holding to any sort of good, natural or supernatural, first requires overcoming what Newman called man's fearful subjection to sense, that is, overcoming man's normal tendency to be drawn to objects of pleasure that are immediately seen and desired.²⁰ Normally this tendency or difficulty can be overcome only by means of something connatural to man in his natural state, that is, natural virtue. The real objects of religion are too lofty and our relation to them is too uncertain and changing to overcome these initial tendencies. Because man is an ambivalent creature composed of body and soul he initially needs goals allied to, or aligned with, his more normal mode of being. Without the kind of guidance and control that is represented by the fulfillment of the natural virtues, man's relation to higher objects will at best probably be a febrile one, passionately involved at times, unrelated at others, and always likely to fail him at the most crucial points.

Stressing this is neither to imply, nor to say, that St. Thomas believed man's normal ambivalence and subjection to sense can be overcome only through acts of natural virtue. Nor does it mean that the image of a gradual, sequential development is absolutely binding. Obviously St. Thomas felt God could work more directly if he desired: his work on miracles, for instance, show how almost frighteningly unqualified he felt God's omnipotence was.²¹ Further, he also was aware that the history of Christianity shows conversions of the most radical sort, e.g., Paul. The radicalness of the turning that is justification is

²⁰ Newman's analysis of this aspect of the presupposing of natural activity is acute: see particularly *The Idea of A University* (Image Book, New York, 1960), pp. 147, 148; 197-199.

²¹ For instance, see the notion of two bodies occupying the same place: *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 105, a. 8; *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 101.

clearly recognized by Aquinas and must be kept in mind. Therefore, one must always be aware of the dangers involved in overstressing the "presupposed" aspect. It can be misleading both in breaking down too neatly the sequential steps and, more important, in making the assent to God too continuous and gentle a process thereby underplaying or demeaning the revolutionary change that is justification.²² God is not absolutely bound to work in any particular way, nor should any image be allowed to underestimate or demean either the radical change that is justification or the difference between natural and supernatural activity. Nevertheless, the presupposing of natural virtue does point up the kind of continuity that is normally at work and reflects St. Thomas's general approach (as further exemplified in his attitude toward the virtue of religion or the role of the sacraments.) In the normal economy of salvation the natural virtues are necessary first steps as they are the connatural aids that more readily and easily subject, control, and order sense, and thus lead man to the initially necessary control.

Supernatural activity completes and perfects natural activity basically because the fullest actualization of man's function or virtue involves a relation to an end above the naturally understood one. Because, for St. Thomas, man's nature is pointed toward God, completion can come only by a positive relation to him before death and a union with him after death. Having not only the potentiality for this end but also the positive (if not always clearly conscious) yearning for it, the full perfection of man involves some sort of actualization of the potential and at least preliminary satisfaction of the desire. The realization of the natural virtues cannot by themselves represent a full consummation of man; that takes place only through the kind of relation to God that animates supernatural activity.

²² For an interesting discussion of this see Henri de Lubac, *The Mystery of the Supernatural*, trans. R. Sheed (London, 1967), p. 108 ff. The conscious and continuous maintenance of a balance between the ideas of radical change and growth is difficult. Stressing one or the other gives a distinctive "tone" and form to a theology, as is seen in much traditional Catholic and Protestant theology.

Only that relation can fulfill man's potential and quiet his desire or need for a perfect state, one characterized by enduringness, freedom from evil, rest, etc. There can be no natural perfection without a supernatural perfection because natural actualization, however integral, is not in itself complete; it points beyond itself to a higher state of which it is only a part, however necessary.²³

Recognizing this fact also entails honestly noting that the tidy distinction between fortitude's natural and supernatural encounter with death is less clear than it seems. For any natural realization also involves some kind of relation to God, whether it be explicit or implicit, and whether it ends in rejection or affirmation. This point brings up a whole series of allied questions. Some, however important, are quite tangential to this project, e. g., the problem of the relation of the natural desire to the gratuitousness of grace. Others, however, focus around the relevant question of how the basic relation to God works and what that entails. For if the "perfecting" factor is really present (at least after the Incarnation), or if man has never had a distinct and completely natural end, the possibility of salutary, supernatural activity with its relation to God is present in any act whether explicitly "Christian" or not. That question involves the basic problem of whether, or in what sense, intentionality toward God can or must be conscious; that is resolvable into determinable propositions. In turn, that question leads to the problem of the presence or weight of sin in unconsciously Christian acts, the role of Limbo if used, as

²³ While seeming to admit the desire for perfect happiness Aristotle denies the state is achievable, therefore making man's goal those acts closest to enduringness, freedom from evil, and so on—i.e., deeds of virtue. St. Thomas objects on the grounds that nature does nothing in vain, that Creation would be a cruel joke if this most basic part of man were unfulfilled, etc. (thereby, of course, opening up the whole problem of the gratuitousness of grace). See *Nichomachean Ethics*, I, 10, 1101a, 18 and *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 48. The distinction is obviously of the utmost importance, though a full discussion involves resolving the numerous difficulties surrounding any interpretation of Aristotle's idea of contemplation: e. g., the apparent distinction between *sophia* in Book Six and *theoria* in Book Ten, and the marked change from the *Eudemian* to the *Nichomachean Ethics*.

by Dante, for virtuous pagans, and so on.²⁴ These questions are important and need to be noted, but they lie beyond the scope of this article.²⁵

For this project, however, one point does need to be clearly

²⁴ The death of Socrates is a striking example of a possible act of supernatural fortitude outside Christianity, particularly if the sources in Plato concerning it are interpreted so as to stress and substantiate three things: First, that the mission from Apollo was some kind of call from God to mediate truth to Athens—and was so understood by Socrates. Second, that the *daimon* is a divine reality rather than an evil spirit or an image of Socrates' own natural conscience (remembering, as particularly emphasized in the *Apology*, that Socrates would not act if the *daimon* objected). Third, that the myths of judgment in say the *Republic*, *Gorgias*, and *Phaedo* are more than rhetorical expressions of the importance of living virtuously. This is a possible—and to my mind defensible—interpretation of the Platonic materials concerning Socrates. The major problem is whether, even granted the divine action, the ultimate aim remains the maintenance of the state as the divine matrix for a realization that is basically natural (e.g., the *Crito*). (Xenophon, of course, gives a much different picture and even the Platonic materials are susceptible to other readings. For an example see H. Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nichomachean Ethics* [Chicago, 1961], pp. 28, 29.)

It is also interesting to note that the idea of a divine call (*T'ien ming*) might also be seen in relation to Confucius. See the *Analec*s 2, 4, and the incidents, after his fiftieth year that follow that call—3, 22; 7, 22; and 9, 4.

²⁵ At some places St. Thomas himself shows an extraordinary sense of salvation outside the Church. Passages in early works—such as the famous “man in the woods”—declare that the following of conscience and the doing of the good within one's power will result in God's giving the necessary internal inspiration or revelation, or sending a preacher to enable one to be saved (*II Sent.*, q. 28, d. 1, a. 4 ad 4; and *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 11 ad 1). These passages perhaps can be discounted as there is a notable hardening of attitudes on some of these issues. But there still remain later passages from the *Summa* (e.g., I-II, q. 19, a. 10, ad 1; II-II, q. 85, a. 2) and the exciting if perplexing II-II, q. 2, a. 7—see particularly ad 3 with the notion of mediation and the saving faith that God will deliver man in the way most pleasing to him. Obviously the notion of supernatural activity outside Christianity did not significantly form St. Thomas's vision, though there are these passages and numerous other potentially fruitful general ideas.

Karl Rahner is an example of someone whose general perspective has been so affected; his work also contains one of the fuller and more precise discussions of the general problem of salvatory activity outside a Christian framework. Particularly helpful are *Theological Investigations*, various translators, 5 vols. (Baltimore, 1961-68) V, 115-134; and “Implicit Christianity” *Theology Digest*, Sesquicentennial Issue/1968, 43-56, and *On the Theology of Death*, trans. C. H. Henkey (New York, 1967), pp. 35-48; 89-99 in particular. “On Martyrdom,” included in that edition, is also relevant to some of the more general issues.

stated. That is, that the idea of grace perfecting nature coupled with the notion of the continuing presence of the supernatural end forces the recognition that no clear, simple, and neat distinction can be made between natural and supernatural activity. The distinctions made here are important for purposes of analysis, hopefully their illuminating power has been made evident. But the analytic distinctions neither exhaust nor exhibit fully the interaction of natural and supernatural activity. The distinction must be used with the care demanded by a recognition of their limitations for they furnish an analytic model helpful only when used with an understanding of its limitations. Indeed the model itself precludes any oversimple application just because it manifests the presence of the "perfecting" element and implies the continuing existence of the supernatural end.

The final goal, then, of the natural activity of fortitude, the realization of the whole man, is clarified and fulfilled by the relation to man's ultimate, not proximate, end that characterizes supernatural activity. The idea that man's ultimate fulfillment consists in adhering to the true end, not in merely condemning or following lesser objects, is the linchpin for the notion of "perfecting"; it led St. Thomas, for instance, to focus on the importance of the realization of the theological virtues or to call obedience, in some ways, the central animating notion of human activity. In the fulfillment of both his abstract potential and his concrete desire, man's whole nature is perfected.

This general idea of perfecting can also be seen to take place in two more particular ways which help to further illuminate the more comprehensive notion. First, the perfecting occurs because there takes place a new and correct hierarchical ordering of the goods of the world. The vision of natural goods is perfected because they are related to their final end and therefore given a truer place in the general value scheme, a place that recognizes both their integrity and limitations. In this way the movement discussed in the presupposing aspect is itself completed. There remains the vision of the integral value

of objects of the world central to the idea of presupposition, but this vision is put into a new and real relation with the idea of man's final end. For example, the idea of the good of the state would be perfected by being set in a new context. That is, the state's end would be seen as more than social harmony and order as a value just in and of itself; that end would be seen as ordered to the spiritual fulfillment of its citizens. Thus, to return to the example of the Roman martyr, his action would not be just a rejecting or denying of the legitimate place of the state as a civilizing force. For he would be accepting that notion but perfecting it by calling the state to, or at least having himself, a truer understanding of the state's full value as a natural entity.²⁶

Second, the form or general structure of natural activity is intensified or perfected through the more complex and difficult act of holding to a supernatural end. That is, one holds to a greater though less obvious good, God, rather than say community, through greater difficulty, the possible loss of all—and not just some—natural goods. Thereby the very tensions implied in, or defining, the general character of fortitude are raised to a higher level. From the mere firmness of mind implied in say overcoming the good of money, the tension rises to the difficulty of giving up most natural goods to die for the community and then finally is completed in the giving up of everything for one's relation to God. The inherent tension characterizing fortitude is perfected by being brought to its highest pitch.

Supernatural activity's perfection of natural activity is then further illuminated in these two particular ways: the vision of different goods is more perfectly established as those goods are set in a new context, and the form of structure of the natural function is intensified. More generally, natural activity is per-

²⁶ This point is not contingent on the martyrdom's being socially efficacious, that is, causing the society to change. For if the martyrdom were secret—as mentioned in relation to the example of the Marxist—there might be no effect at all. But even without that effect, the natural good of the state could still be said to be perfected in the martyr's vision.

fectured because its full actualization is reached. The final goal, form, and activity of natural fortitude is clarified and fulfilled by supernatural activity's generation of a relation to man's ultimate not proximate end. For natural activity, while integral, is not complete but rather points beyond itself to a higher state, a state that fulfills both the abstract potential and concrete desire of the natural man. Thus supernatural fortitude while different from natural fortitude does not destroy but rather presupposes and perfects it.

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THE MOTIVATION OF MARTYRS: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE



MARTYRS ARE THE most widely praised and the least understood of all men. We regard the willingness of Christ or of Socrates to be martyred as being of monumental significance, and yet, in spite of countless opportunities to martyr ourselves, we invariably choose not to. All men sacrifice to some extent. Some give up great sums of money and others give up innumerable hours of their time for their fellow man. Some are even willing to suffer great pain and distress for their fellow man. They all get something in return: the enduring happiness that can only result from moral fulfillment. But what about those who die for others? The people who sacrifice their lives so that others may live on to lead happy and healthy lives seem to get nothing in return. They lose their lives, their capacity for happiness, everything. As much as we praise such men, we cannot help asking ourselves, "Was it worth it?"

If we do not understand martyrs—if we have no conception of what could have possibly been motivating them—then our praise is empty. But the people who have in the last few decades concerned themselves with motivation have provided us with a picture of man that makes our praise even emptier. For these reasons, I should like to sketch out some alternative explanations of the martyr's behavior. Before I do so, however, I want to make some comments about the explanation I am rejecting.

I

It has become fashionable in recent years to antiseptically dissect human actions with the end of uncovering some latent drive which explains the actions away. The martyr's benevolence is reduced to a psychological-physiological abnormality

or coincidence, and in such a way is the moral inertia of the majority of men justified. Advocates of this theory of motivation argue as follows: while it appears that the greater part of human behavior is the result of conscious deliberation and free, rational choice, *all* behavior is, in actuality, the result of certain *basic drives* of which, for the most part, the agent is unaware. I do not want to attribute this theory of drives to any one particular man or school of thought, although this sort of reductionism unquestionably owes its popularity in recent years to the influence of psychoanalytical and behavioristic psychologists.

In the years prior to the advent of the theory of drives, it was held that a martyr was one who, when confronted with the alternatives of expediency and justice, *chose* the latter over the former. He chose the latter because he *valued* it more highly. He was not compelled either to make that choice or to hold the values which resulted in that choice. The emergence of the theory of drives has led to the discarding of this simple analysis. The new approach to an understanding of the motivation of the martyr involves delving into the martyr's background. What sort of relationship did he have with his mother? Was he a loner? Did he get on well with women? Did he have an authoritarian personality? Did he have confidence in himself? All these questions and others like them are seen as being relevant to the question, "Why did so-and-so run into the burning house in a futile attempt to save the three children?" Each of these questions opens up a new dimension of the martyr's character, and there is a distinct possibility that, after likely answers to these questions are considered, we will realize that the martyr was not a great man at all but just a pathetic, mentally-unbalanced fanatic who was led to the act of martyrdom by an intense, latent desire to destroy himself or to sublimate away his sexual energy.

The theory of drives has brought with it a new conception of man, and while this conception of man may have done mankind a great service by enabling us to understand and even to treat many forms of mental and emotional illness, it has

done mankind a great disservice by casting a new and suspicious light on those who have embodied classical virtues like honor, dignity, justice, and compassion.

The theory of drives is neither a fact nor a set of facts; it is a theory. It is a presupposition which serves as a model to *explain* certain facts and to account for certain phenomena. It cannot be shown to be false, but neither can it be shown to be true. Presuppositions and models are not verified or falsified the way most claims are. They are not verified or falsified at all. While they cannot be shown to be true or false, however, they can be shown to be good or bad. We speak of good and bad presuppositions or good and bad models. And so, with regard to the theory of drives, we should ask ourselves, "What *justifies* this theory?" This amounts to asking why it is a good theory for explaining human behavior. The opening lines of Freud's *Outline of Psychoanalysis* suggest that no one was more aware of this than Freud himself, for he there claims that the justification of the basic assumption that psychoanalysis makes lies in its results. I have been suggesting that it is the results which necessitate our rejecting that very theory.

How is an assumption or presupposition of this sort to be justified, and what would render a particular model of human behavior a good model? Since a presupposition or model is something which underlies or explains the empirically known but is not itself empirically known, its justification or goodness must be a function of something other than correspondence to facts or states of affairs. Its goodness must be a function of some sort of practical efficacy. Indeed, the fact that Freudian psychoanalysis or behaviorist research has enabled its practitioners to cure many sick people would make the theory of drives appear efficacious in one important sense. But the appearance is, I insist, deceptive. Perhaps it is the case that many people have illnesses which stem from problems with their latent drives. But the theory of drives we are concerned with is making a much broader claim—that *all* behavior can be explained in terms of those latent drives. And such a claim is not justified by the successful treatment of one, fifty, or a

million mental patients. Many, perhaps even most contemporary psychologists would agree to this, and they have wisely chosen to separate their work from the realm of metaphysics.

One obvious method for evaluating the efficacy of a model is to invoke the criterion of *simplicity*. Is the theory of drives the simplest possible model of human behavior which explains all necessary facts and phenomena? Talk about drives clearly simplifies some matters: it is much easier to speak of the libido than to speak of a whole mass of physiological and behavioral data. Moreover, the existence of those phenomena and data cannot be denied, for *their* existence *is* empirically known. But allowing for the existence of drives is not the same as committing oneself to the theory that *all* human behavior can be traced back to the one, two, or twelve drives which one is allowing for.

Hence, we can retain both our traditional conception of the nobility of the martyr *and* the *drive*-terminology. The practical efficacy of the latter lies in its simplicity; the practical efficacy of the former lies in its consolation, for it supports abstract notions of human dignity and human freedom on which we can draw in our disillusionment and our despair. But now, if the martyr's values cannot ultimately be explained by drives, then how *are* they to be explained? This is a loaded question, for it presupposes that values *must* be explained in terms of something else. Advocates of the theory of drives do not, after all, explain *drives* away in terms of something else. They see the drives as being *basic*. Now, why cannot the martyr's *values* be taken—at least in some cases—as basic? By raising this question, we have turned the drive theorist's challenge against him, for we have underscored for him the point that somewhere along the line, *every* explanation of behavior will have to invoke a "basic," something not to be explained or reduced further. The issue becomes one of *committing* oneself to a particular basic, and there is no *reason* whatsoever for *presupposing* that in every explanation of behavior there ought to be a reduction of value but not of drive.

It seems to me that this is the way we *must* answer the

drive theorist's challenge. I want to add, however, that the solution we have provided here will come back to haunt us at a later stage in our inquiry, for having committed ourselves to a basic phenomenon or entity in behavior, just as the drive theorists have, we may turn out with an explanation of behavior not all that different from theirs, or at least, not as different as we would have hoped.

In the meantime, though, let us consider some responses that the drive theorist might make to *our* challenge. The drive theorist might want to hold that the "theory" of drives is not a presupposition or a model at all but a fact or set of facts, empirically verifiable. He would then be disagreeing with Freud, who tells us in those opening lines of the *Outline* that the discussion of the basic assumption of psychoanalysis falls within the sphere of philosophical thought. Two criticisms can be directed at the drive theorist's claim that the theory of drives is empirically verifiable. One criticism is that, since the theory of drives involves a universal claim, a claim about *all* manifestations of behavior, it cannot be strictly verified. But this is to invoke a somewhat positivistic notion of verification which the drive theorist might not altogether unjustifiably protest against. The other criticism, though, is simply that the very fact that there is so much disagreement concerning the theory of drives seems to be an indication that a sufficient verification of the theory has yet to be provided.

The drive theorist might insist that the theory of drives does not jeopardize our conceptions of moral goodness and the nobility of the martyr. The notions of sublimation and repression of our innate sexuality or lust for power are elements in the drive theorist's explanation of behavior which justify our praise of the martyr. But do they really? Sublimation and repression are not conscious, active processes. They are passive occurrences of which we are, for the most part, unaware. What would there be to praise in the martyr—that it *accidentally* turned out that his sexual energy was reworked in such a way as to lead him to his death? Only if sublimation and repression can be seen as conscious, active processes can the theory of

drives be reconciled with our praise of the martyr—*justified* praise of the martyr. But if the drive theorist is willing to allow for conscious, active sublimation and repression, then of what use is the theory of drives? All the stuffing is knocked out of the theory, and it no longer gives us an account of what it was designed to give an account. For we may now ask, since sublimation is a conscious, active process, “Why did the martyr sublimate in such a way?” The new question is merely an old one in new terminology, the old question being, “Why did the martyr choose to do what he did?”

The best course for the drive theorist to take, I believe, would be to take the theory of drives as one of many ways of looking at behavior. He could assert that in such-and-such a particular case, it is expedient to take an individual's behavior from the point of view of the theory of drives. As superior as this course is to the others he can take, the drive theorist is still in trouble. If it is expedient to take a *particular* action as resulting from something related to drives, why must we accept the theory of drives, with its strong claim about *all* behavior. Why can we not just say without any qualification, “*Some* behavior can be understood in terms of basic drives.” No one ever meant to deny this claim. So the talk about points of view really does not support the theory of drives but something that has already been accepted.

Now, the martyr's behavior is one sort of behavior. If the theory of drives were true, then it would encompass all sorts of behavior, including the martyr's. But we have seen that it is still possible to allow for alternative models of behavior, and in our effort to understand and thereby justify our praise of the martyr, let us consider those possible alternatives.

II

Instead of talking about drives, let us talk about interests. Interests are different from drives. We all have interests, many of them, and we know what they are. Different people have different interests. What is important to the businessman seems to be quite different from what is important to the

clergyman, the soldier, or the poet. They do share interests. Some things are important to all men, or at least most of them. But it is an interesting feature of human existence that not all men have exactly the same interests, and perhaps *no two men* have all the same interests. A man's interests, the things which are important to him, are intimately tied up with that man's values.

Anything which supports a man's total interests more than it damages them is "in his interest." Something which damages them more than it supports them is not. Now, *morality involves interests*. When we act justly with our fellow man, we consider *his* interests as well as our own. In any event, what we are considering are interests. If men had no interests, then there would be no need for morality and no need for justice. When we act justly with our fellow man, we not only consider what his interests are but how we can support them or prevent damaging them as well. We do this in much the same way as we consider how we can support and prevent damaging our own interests. Now, we have not committed ourselves to any particular ethical theory—utilitarianism, deontological ethics, and so on—by seeing morality as involving interests. For this can be seen, is seen, and must be seen by anyone concerned with morality. It is a theory-neutral claim, an analytical proposition, that *morality involves interests*.

The most persistent problem in the history of Western moral philosophy is whether or not morality ultimately rests on *self-interest*. Granted, the just man considers the interests of others. But does his so doing, and does his *supporting* the interests of others, stem from a desire to support his own interests? That is, are just men just because it is ultimately to their benefit to be so? In a paper to be found in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* for 1964-1965, D. Z. Phillips argues that morality does not ultimately rest on self-interest. In his paper, "Does It Pay to Be Good?" he offers an interesting criticism of the thesis that one should deal justly with his fellow man *on the grounds that* it is likely to pay or profit him to do so. According to Phillips, the value of just action must

not be located in considerations which refer beyond the action itself to its results; any attempt to find a non-moral justification for moral beliefs is destined to fail, for it distorts the kind of importance which moral considerations have for us.

The point of virtue is not, for Phillips, its "profitableness," and in supporting his position Phillips points to the very people we are concerned with here, the martyrs. It would certainly appear, on the surface, that the martyr's dying cannot possibly be in his own interest, and Phillips infers from this appearance that the martyr has simply chosen justice over expediency, profit, and self-interest. He concludes his paper by contrasting a successful rogue with a truly just man and criticizing Philippa Foot for concerning herself with how the just man "profits"—

The man who chooses justice may not profit as our rogue has done. None of the things that Mrs. Foot envisages as probably coming his way may prove to be his lot. Nevertheless, since his regard for decency does not depend on such probabilities being realised, in the only sense relevant to morality, he has accomplished all.

An earlier attack on Mrs. Foot's position is even stronger—

Mrs. Foot assumes that if a man's just actions bring about his death, they have ended in disaster. She fails to see that for anyone concerned about justice, death for the sake of justice is not a disaster. The disaster for him would be to be found wanting in the face of death, and to seek the path of injustice and compromise.

Now, while I sympathize with the sort of approach Phillips is taking in his paper, I am convinced that the position collapses under inspection. First of all, Phillips claims that the truly just man seeks the path of justice even when it is unprofitable. But let us consider an extreme case. Say that a soldier fighting for a just cause has been captured by the enemy and his captors are subjecting him to terrible physical torture in an effort to extract from him information as to where his fellow soldiers are hiding. In that he has refused to reveal their place of hiding even while he is being subjected to this terrible torture, we may clearly say that the soldier is pursuing the path of justice. But say now that the threat of death

finally intimidates him to the point where he is willing to, and does, reveal where his comrades are hiding. He has yielded purely on grounds of self-interest. Would it be fair to say that he was not, consequently, a truly just man? Would it be fair to say that he was following the path of injustice? Compromise, maybe, but not injustice. The man was, after all, willing to suffer great pain for the safety of his fellow soldiers and the justice of their cause. Phillips fails to realize that one's being concerned with his own interest, even ultimately concerned with it, does not preclude his being moral. In addition, the fact that the soldier had so much to lose by being just is a significant factor in our evaluation of the relative morality of his action. If his self-interest had been threatened only mildly (his captors threatened not to serve him potatoes with his dinner), and he *then* went ahead and betrayed his comrades, we should regard the soldier as being *immoral*. But the threat of death and the fact that he had so much to lose would suggest that the soldier's betrayal of his comrades was not really blameworthy but morally neutral.

Then again, since morality involves consideration of interests, should we not consider our own along with those of others? The moral man is the man who considers all interests, including his own. Whether his own is more important than those of others is another problem altogether. There is such a thing as being fair to oneself or being just with oneself. Consider this case: say that I lend a friend several thousand dollars which he subsequently refuses to pay back. I can pursue one of two options. I can pursue measures, legal or otherwise, to make him return the money which rightfully and justly belongs to me. Or, I can forget about the whole thing, feeling that one ought to make sacrifices every so often in his life. If I choose the latter option, then I have not been fair to myself. I have, so to speak, committed an injustice against myself, for the money is rightfully and justly mine. I am being immoral to myself by slighting my own interests just as I would be immoral to others (or unjust with them) by slighting theirs.

Now we may consider the question of relative importance of

interests and carry our criticism of Phillips a step further. In a sense, self-interest is *more* than just one of the many interests that must be considered by an individual. I have a privileged status because I have a special metaphysical relation to myself: I *am* myself. And when I am called upon to make a decision involving the interests of various people, including myself, I cannot act as a purely objective judge, treating myself as just one more of many people. I am not just one more of many people; I am myself.

Let me give an example of the sort of case I have in mind. Suppose that I am with a man who is virtually the same as I am. We are both of the same age, we have the same education, and most important of all, we have the same social value. Suppose now that a madman walks in and offers me the following ultimatum: "I am going to shoot you or him. Pick the one you want shot." Suppose further that I have reason to believe that this fellow means business. I suspect that, in such a situation, I would tell the madman to shoot the other fellow. Would I be immoral to do so? I do not believe I would be. But of even more importance, would I be *moral* if I told the madman to shoot me instead of the other fellow? I think not, for it is no more *just* that I die than that he die. Perhaps I would be nice, perhaps crazy, but I certainly would be no more moral if I told the madman to shoot me instead of the other fellow. For my decision would be morally neutral.

So far, though, all I have established is that one can be moral without abandoning a sense of stronger obligation to oneself than to others. I now want to consider Phillips's claim that the martyr—the man who sacrifices everything, his very life—is unconcerned with his own interest. Phillips makes the interesting move of adopting a form of hedonism, and yet he does not seem to realize it. Phillips does not really want to say that "x is good" reduces to "x produces the greatest pleasure and the least pain for individual S or society T." He wants to say something very different. And yet, look at Phillips's concept of self-interest. Phillips wants to say that a rogue's life can be profitable. But is that not to assume a

great deal? It is only in a very trivial sense that the thief who steals from the just man is leading a more profitable life than the latter. Fortune is not the end of man—or, at least, of the wise and just man. What concerns us is that Phillips fails to realize that the martyr who is willing to die for a just cause or for his fellow man does *not* apparently consider it *in his interest* to remain alive. Rather, given the circumstances, he considers it *in his interest* to die for the just cause or for the fellow man. The interests of men are not limited to financial success, sexual conquest, and things of this sort. And so, Phillips's claim that the man who chooses justice does not profit and has eschewed his own self-interest is, in the end, an empty one. Along these lines we do not find Socrates holding at his trial, "I am accomplishing all, but I am not really satisfying my self-interest." We find him saying, "I see clearly that the time had arrived when it was better for me to die and be released from trouble." (Plato, *Apology*.)¹

Now, Phillips is quite aware that the martyr's death is not a disaster in the same way that the accidental death of a good man is. He tells us explicitly that the martyr "accomplishes all" even in death and that the martyr avoids disaster. The martyr, then, even for Phillips, is seen as profiting as a result of his action, even though the profit is very different indeed from the sort of profit the thief makes when he steals something from someone. There are, we see, two sorts of profit, two sorts of self-interest. There is that ultimately hedonistic sort of self-interest which is the thief's concern. We may regard this as *lesser* self-interest. On the other hand, we find another sort of self-interest at the heart of the martyr's actions, which we may regard as *greater* self-interest. If Phillips would object to regarding a martyr's sacrifice as being in his interest *in this special sense* (as opposed to the sense Phillips had in mind in his essay, I could only reply that I was thence unable to make any sense of Phillips's claim that the martyr "accomplishes all" and "avoids disaster." For I am sure that Phillips did not

¹ Jowett translation (Oxford).

mean by these claims that the martyr accomplishes all for society *but nothing for himself* or that the martyr avoids disaster for others *but not for himself*. And, this being the case, I see no reason for not saying, providing we make the distinction between lesser and greater self-interest, that in sacrificing his life the martyr acted in his own interest as well as in the interests of others.

We now have the underpinning of the models of the explanation of the martyr's behavior that we have been seeking. What remains for us is to understand in what greater self-interest consists, that is, in what way or ways the martyr sees it in his interest to die. When we understand that, we will then understand how he is motivated. So let us consider the possible models.

III

The most obvious explanation of greater self-interest is one which involves the notion of *reward after death*. If a man believes that there exists a God who will reward him with eternal happiness for having sacrificed his worldly life for a just cause, then it is clearly in that man's interest to be a martyr. But if the promise of reward is all that is motivating the martyr, then is the martyr all that more noble than anyone else, even the thief? This martyr is merely taking a calculated risk, as he is working on the belief that if there is indeed a just God—which he believes is likely—then the small sacrifice he makes in this life will be repayed many times over in the next. What, then, is there to praise in this martyr's action? His willingness to gamble? His preference for a more promising reward? If this is all that greater self-interest amounts to, then it is not really very different from lesser self-interest, and we ought to be very cautious in our praise of the martyr motivated by it.

The second model that comes to mind involves a different promise of immortality, the immortality associated with the *fond remembrance* of the martyr. All men are motivated to some extent by a desire to leave some sort of legacy to their society after they pass on. The martyr almost always leaves

such a legacy, for he is apt to be remembered fondly and with respect even by his enemies. People will say that he was a great, or at the very least, a good man. So there is a reward for this martyr, too, although it is a reward of a much more abstract nature than that which the first martyr envisioned.

A third martyr is one who chooses to die in order to free himself from pangs of conscience; martyrdom offers this man *freedom from internal sanctions*. Say that an individual has the option of sacrificing or risking his life to save some small children and that this fellow is the sort of person who, if he did not attempt to save those children, would suffer terrible pangs of conscience throughout the remaining years of his life. Knowing that he is such a person, he is likely, for reasons of self-interest, to decide to risk his life for those children. This martyr, the man who would not be able to live with his conscience, profits from his act of martyrdom, but in a negative way. His profit, his reward, is not having to live out an unbearable life. Now this is again a very abstract sort of profit, reward, or interest. It is hard for most of us to comprehend it very clearly, but that is, after all, why we do not choose to martyr ourselves—because we can only understand motivations of this sort on a very abstract, almost unreal level.

I want to consider still another “justification” of martyrdom along the lines of self-interest, and it involves *self-fulfillment*. Few people can make the claim that they thoroughly understand what life is all about. Perhaps none can. In any event, most of us just go on living without worrying about any central theme or any central goal which ought to be at core of our life plans. All of us wonder at one time or other if life has any significance at all, and we then look back at the life we have lived and see it as being in some sense without meaning, without direction, and without purpose. It is conceivable that a man seek a fulfillment in his death which has eluded him in his life. One is reminded of Dickens’ Sidney Carton, who chose to die better than he lived. We praise a good painter because he paints well; in a sense, when we praise the martyr, we are doing so because that man chose to, and did, *die* well. And who

is to say, after all, that self-preservation is innately better than self-fulfillment? When we abandoned the theory of drives, we abandoned with it the notion of a natural hierarchy of values.

Here then are four models for the explanation of the martyr's behavior. There are, I am sure, more than four; in fact, I will offer still another shortly. These four will suffice, however, to show what I have wanted to show: first, that to sacrifice or even suffer martyrdom is not to act against one's interest but to support that interest; and second, that the martyr acts no more blindly and no more emotionally than the rogue, the philosopher, or anyone else, for he, too, can offer very sound reasons for his actions. We cannot accept those reasons in leading our own lives, and that may simply be a matter of different values or different taste, as I have been asserting. But perhaps the martyr can actually see things which we cannot, things to which we are just blind. For it is not simply a case of our rejecting his course and his rejecting ours; *he has known our course and lived by it*, but we shall have never lived by his.

If the martyr is motivated by self-interest, does he deserve to be praised? Granted, he is motivated by a different sort of self-interest than the average man; but it is still *self-interest*. We do not praise the martyr for supporting his own interest; we praise him for supporting the interests of others. We praise him for seeing that his interest lies in supporting the interests of others. We do not praise him for doing good blindly, emotionally, or accidentally; we do not praise him for doing good because "it was right to do good." We praise him for doing good *rationally*: he had the very best reason for doing good, notably, that it was in his interest to do so. Phillips is quite right when he says that any attempt to find a non-moral justification for a just action or a moral belief is destined to fail; what Phillips fails to realize is that a moral justification cannot be provided without reference to interests somewhere along the line.

IV

There are some who will be unhappy with the explanatory models I have provided. There are three objections which might be brought against these models. First, they do not account for the martyr's sense of duty, obligation, or responsibility. Second, they do not account for the martyr's altruism, his love for his fellow man. Third, they involve us in a determinism no less serious than that of the theory of drives.

In responding to the first two criticisms, I should like to bring a particular martyr into the discussion, the German theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In addition to being one of the most vociferous critics of both Nazism and the apathy which nurtured it, Pastor Bonhoeffer was one of the key figures in the German resistance to Hitler. He could have remained in America, as his friends had urged him to do, and he could have chosen to remain silent, as so many of his colleagues and his countrymen had, for he was well aware of the likely consequences of his action. But he chose instead to pursue the course of justice and humanity in the face of those very consequences, and he inevitably chose to die. The Nazis caught up with him in April of 1943 and had him sent off to Buchenwald. There he had little to eat, little companionship, and only a Bible to read. Yet, according to one of his fellow-prisoners, "he always seemed to diffuse an atmosphere of happiness, of joy in every smallest event in life, and of deep gratitude for the mere fact that he was alive."² It is said that he never complained, and he believed that his time in prison had not been wasted.³ In April of 1945, in the last stages of World War II, Bonhoeffer was removed from his cell and executed.

Now, I am not disturbed by the criticism that my models do not account for the martyr's sense of duty, obligation, or responsibility. I believe that they do, and that the concept of duty is inherent in at least some of them—the ones involving

² Terence Prittie, *Germans Against Hitler* (London: Hutchinson, 1964), p. 124.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

freedom from internal sanction and self-fulfillment. But the sense of duty embodied by these models is probably very different from the one sought by the critic. Most moral philosophers still think of duty, alas, in terms of a cold obedience to some artificial rules. In his *Ethics*, Bonhoeffer has nothing but scorn and ridicule for this view of duty, which he associates with Kant. He tells us in the section of the work devoted to "Conscience" that this view of responsibility misses the point:

From the principle of truthfulness Kant draws the grotesque conclusion that I must even return an honest "yes" to the enquiry of the murderer who breaks into my house and asks whether my friend whom he is pursuing has taken refuge there; in such a case self-righteousness of conscience has become outrageous presumption and blocks the path of responsible action. Responsibility is the total and realistic response of man to the claim of God and of our neighbour; but this example shows in its true light how the response of a conscience which is bound by principles is only a partial one.⁴

As I see it, it is only partial because it has been divorced from *interests*, which constitute the concrete reality of situations involving moral decisions. While Bonhoeffer does not employ this terminology, it is clear to me that this is what he had in mind. One's responsibility is ultimately a matter of considering and judging how to support all interests; it is not just a matter of enslaving oneself to some artificial rules.

I do not believe that my models have banished altruism and love from the explanation of martyrdom, either. I again see love as latent in the third and fourth models, and even in the second, the one involving *fond remembrance*. It is his love for his fellow man which seems to explain the martyr's desire to be remembered fondly by that fellow man. It is his love for his fellow man that results in the internal sanctions. It is his love for his fellow man that enables him to regard doing something for his fellow man as leading him to self-fulfillment.

⁴ The English translation of the two quotations from the *Ethics* is by Neville Horton Smith. The translation is published by S. C. M. Press and also by Macmillan.

I am still not satisfied with this account of the role of love, and so I am going to indulge now in a bit of mysticism, the sort of mysticism which makes philosophy palatable after all of the presuppositions and possibilities have been laid out before us. I want to offer a fifth model, but this model does not displace the second, third, and fourth; it complements them. First I shall consider Bonhoeffer's account of "deputyship," which is to be found in the *Ethics*:

The father acts for the children, working for them, caring for them, interceding, fighting and suffering for them. Thus in a real sense he is their deputy. He is not an isolated individual, but he combines in himself the selves of a number of human beings. Any attempt to live as though he were alone is a denial of the actual fact of his responsibility. He cannot evade the responsibility which is laid on him with his paternity. This reality shatters the fiction that the subject, the performer, of all ethical conduct is the isolated individual.

I shall translate this deputyship-terminology into love-terminology, by taking *love* in the following sense: when someone loves someone else, what that involves is that the one who loves sees the interest (and the component interests of that interest) of the one he loves as being his own. The interests of the loved become the interests of the *lover*: the lover combines in himself the selves of a number of human beings, and he combines in his self-interest the interests of a number of human beings. This is not to say that he is sacrificing his interests for theirs. It is not to deny the "privileged status" of the self in one's thought and action. The self is itself expanded to encompass more interests. This love-terminology may not be such a mystical device after all, for it seems to be the simplest way of dealing with the particular phenomena it is designated to signify. The practical efficacy of the terminology lies in its simplicity, and the existence of the phenomena it signifies cannot be denied, for their existence is empirically known.

This model is not meant to displace the others. It is a general model which the others grow out of. Some acts of martyrdom may not be able to be treated by the model—such

as the first martyr's. Most acts of martyrdom, however, can be explained in terms of it, in a general way, with the second, third, or fourth models representing the fleshed-out versions of this new model.

We see now where God comes into the picture of most martyrs. It is not so much the reward that matters. It is that the martyr sees his interests as being those of his God—justice, dignity, love itself—and his act is seen by him to fit in with some sort of universal plan, universal order. This is a complex metaphysical business indeed, but that does not mean that it is not at the heart of the religious martyr's motivation.

We come, then, to the third criticism, that the models involve us in a determinism no less serious than that of the theory of drives. It is here that the "basic" quality of some phenomenon or entity in our models comes back to haunt us. In the new models, those alternatives to the theory of drives, there is still some "basic," something not to be explained or reduced further. In the general model, it is the general phenomenon of *love*; in the other models, it is either conscience, internal sanctions, the desire for self-fulfillment, the desire to be remembered fondly, or something else of this sort. Love and conscience and the desire for self-fulfillment are no more explained in these models than drives are in the drive theorist's model. So, we seem to be left with a determinism in the new models, just as we were left with a determinism in the theory of drives. That determinism was a determinism of basic drives—it saw all behavior as ultimately determined by drives which were not themselves further explainable or reducible. The new determinisms are determinisms of some basic love or desire—they see some behavior as being ultimately determined by an individual's capacity for love or self-fulfillment, or whatever. One does not *love* rationally; the martyr may be said to have decided to martyr himself rationally, for he can cite reasons for his action, but he cannot cite reasons for loving his fellow man or seeking to be remembered or seeking self-fulfillment. And so, in the end, it turned out that Bonhoeffer martyred himself simply because it just so happened that he had a capacity for

love. Poor Hitler, Goebbels, and Streicher: they just did not have that capacity for love—they could not collapse the interests of others into theirs—and so it was determined that they could not martyr themselves for a just cause. It just turned out that way.

It is useless to try to avoid a determinism of basics in any philosophical realm. The logician sits down with his first principles and starts being rational after he has made himself aware of those principles. The metaphysician sits down with his dogma and starts being rational after he has made himself aware of that dogma. A logician without first principles and a metaphysician without a dogma cannot be rational, for they have nothing to work with, nothing to be rational about. In the realm of moral action, a man begins with his values—what is important to him, the component interests of his general interest—and, in *consciously* basing his actions upon *those* basics, he acts rationally. His actions become a working-out of his values.

Our models are not jeopardized by the existence of a determinism of basics, because *any* model of behavior necessarily involves basics. The only alternative sort of model could never be set down or even be conceived of, for *it would involve an infinite regression of explanations and reductions*. It does not seem reasonable that a particular action which takes place in finite time and finite space should require an endless chain of explanations and reductions at higher and higher levels.

The practical efficacy of our models does not lie in the avoidance of determinism, for a determinism of basics is not avoidable. It lies in the fact that, in not explaining the behavior of the martyr beyond the level of his values—and his allegiance to those values—the models enable us to retain our traditional conception of the nobility of the martyr. We praise a man for his commitment to values, not for his enslavement to drives. In carrying explanation one step beyond values, the drive theorist upsets the framework of our traditional conception of morality. And there is no good reason for his doing so.

Some will ask now, "But ought we praise the martyr for

his values if they themselves are, like drives, in some sense determined?" This question is self-defeating, for it amounts to asking, "*Ought* we do such-and-such if 'ought' really does not mean anything?" Diogenes Laertius's famous anecdote about Zeno comes to mind. When the slave Zeno was scourging for theft complained to Zeno that it was fated that he, the slave, should steal, Zeno replied that it was fated that the slave should be beaten. In that spirit, let us go on praising the martyrs for their commitment to their values, as we always have. They at least sense some commitment. It is the mystery of reason that reason itself rests on its adversary, this *arbitrary commitment* to a first principle, a dogma, or a value. If we try to explain these arbitrary commitments away, we shall find that there will only be new arbitrary phenomena to contend with. And in the process of trading the old phenomena in for new ones—say, interests for instincts—we shall have lost our notion of commitment, our firm sense of direction, and whatever concept of human reason we managed to salvage with that notion of commitment and that sense of direction.

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GRACE AND FREE WILL IN JUSTIFICATION: A TEXTUAL STUDY IN AQUINAS



THIS IS AN historical study in which the development of St. Thomas's doctrine on the relationship of grace and free will, divine and human action in the process of justification, is followed step by step, though it may be of identical conclusions. The resources of the historical method force this procedure upon us, not simply for the sake of erudition but for the benefit of the doctrine itself, that we may more easily follow its genesis and evolution over the changing years.¹

St. Thomas himself was conscious of the condition of progress in the thought of individuals and of society:

If anyone proceeds to an investigation of truth he is helped to find it by any preceding investigation. This is valid for the same man who now sees what he did not see before, and also for different men inasmuch as one takes what his predecessors discovered and adds to it.²

In the course of this study we will see how closely this applies to the author. We shall see him in the early works carrying on a constant dialogue with his contemporaries and in particular with St. Albert the Great and the Franciscan St. Bonaventure, accepting their discoveries and adding to them. And we shall see him gradually emancipate himself from them, see things which he did not see before, and finally arrive at the term of his synthetic sweep in the *Summa Theologiae*.

In his early period St. Thomas twice treated the complex of questions relating to grace, in the *Commentarium in Sententias* and in the *De Veritate*. As both works offer almost the same doctrine and have the same notable differences with respect to the later works, they can be studied together. The

¹ Cf. M-D. Chenu O.P. *Introduction à l'Etude de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 234-5.

² *I Ethic.*, lect. 2.

first part of this analysis will be devoted to this study, the second to the development which culminated in the *Summa Theologiae*, and the concluding section to the reasons that provoked this development.

THE EARLY TEACHING

I. *Necessity of Preparation for Grace*

Man is justified, St. Paul tells us, not by works but by faith, and this a gratuitous gift of God.³ On the other hand, turn to me, says the Lord, and I will turn to you,⁴ He who made you without your consent will not justify you without it.⁵ The apparent contradiction between these texts presents the problem of the relationship between grace and free will. In what sense is a preparation for justification, a turning to God, necessary? And if it is necessary, how can justification be gratuitous?

The theologians of the Middle Ages had worried over this problem without coming to any uniform solution. Man must prepare himself for justification, Bonaventure taught. By a special privilege God can justify him without any special preparation, as he did in the case of St. Paul. But the general rule is that man must dispose himself by a preparation which precedes the act of justification.⁶ St. Thomas is of another opinion. True, every adult must prepare himself for the grace of justification; but this preparation need not necessarily precede the infusion of grace, it suffices if it accompanies it. Paul on the road to Damascus was instantly converted from his intention of sinning,⁷ but he prepared himself by cooperating with the grace offered to him. The only preparation necessary is a simple cooperation with grace.⁸

³ Rom. 3, 28 and 24.

⁴ Zach. 1: 3.

⁵ *Qui fecit te sine te non te justificat sine te.* Aug., *Serm. ad Popul.* 169.

⁶ *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2; q. 3, corp. et ad 1 and 2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1 ad 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, sol. 1 corp.

Why is preparation for justification demanded? There are two reasons: one is based on the nature of the will, the other on the conditions of justification insofar as it is a species of generation.⁹

The nature of the will demands that it cooperate in man's justification, for justification is a perfection of the will and unless the will contributes something it would suffer violence, receiving a perfection from an agent outside itself, which is repugnant. The free will cannot be forced; *libertas a coactione* is essential to it.¹⁰ The will, then, must cooperate. As we have seen, this cooperation need not precede justification; it is enough if it accompanies it.

A further precision of this argument is given in the *De Veritate*. Justification is a perfection of the will, in effect, a change of will. Now "will" can mean both the faculty and its act,¹¹ and though the faculty can be changed without its cooperation, the act cannot, for if the will did not cooperate in an act, it would not be its act. An adult sinner by his own act is directed towards evil. He can only change this direction by a contrary act of his will, and therefore every adult must cooperate in his justification. The same is not the case with infants. They are not directed towards sin by their own free act but have only the faculty of will, and so they can be justified without any contribution on their part.¹² The same reasoning applies to those who never have the use of reason and to those who have it only occasionally, provided that in their lucid intervals they have expressed a desire for baptism.¹³

The adult sinner, we have said, must cooperate in his justification. This may give the false impression that, if he were not a sinner, he could be justified without any cooperation. Such a conclusion would be far from the thought of St.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *II Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, aa. 4 and 5. Cf. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale au Moyen Age*, pp. 226-7.

¹¹ "Voluntas accipitur et pro ipsa potentia et pro actu potentiae." *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 3 c.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

Thomas. The angels received grace in the moment of their conversion to God.¹⁴ Adam received it by turning to God the instant he was created.¹⁵ It is not because he is a sinner that man must cooperate but because justification without his cooperation would be a violation of his free will, which is inconceivable.

Can God, then, not change the will? Yes, he can change it, but he cannot force it, he cannot do it violence.¹⁶ To will something is to be inclined towards it. Force or violence is contrary to this inclination. When God changes the will, he simply takes away the inclination it had and replaces it with another, which is not to do violence to the will since it is now led to something which is not contrary, but according to its actual inclination. Just as if God were to change the inclination of gravity to an upward rather than a downward attraction, stones flying up rather than falling down would be no violation of gravity.

There is another reason why man must prepare himself for grace. A form can only be received *in materia disposita*. Sanctifying grace or justification is a form received in the will. Therefore the will must be disposed to receive it. The question arises how is it to be disposed? St. Thomas replies:

It is up to the will to draw near to God by love and desire, and to be oriented towards grace by the removal of the impediment which is sin. By turning away from sin towards God man prepares himself for grace.¹⁷

When a man so acts he is said to do what is in his power, and he receives grace.

¹⁴ *II Sent.*, d. 5, q. 2, a. 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 2.

¹⁶ "Deus potest immutare voluntatem de necessitate, non tamen potest eam cogere." *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 8. Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3; B. Lonergan, "St. Thomas' Thought on Gratia Operans," *Theol. Stud.*, III (1942), p. 538.

¹⁷ ". . . in ipsa voluntate sit appropinquare Deo per affectum et desiderium, et ordinari ad gratiam per remotionem impedimenti, quod quidem impedimentum est peccatum; et ideo per displicentiam peccati et affectum ad Deum se aliquis ad gratiam praeeparat." *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2.

This is to apply to justification the Aristotelian theory of generation.¹⁸ St. Thomas constantly refers to it without ever developing it at length, seemingly taking it for granted, which is understandable when we realize that St. Albert had already taught it.¹⁹ Justification is the movement towards justice, the passage from the state of sin to the state of grace.²⁰ This latter being considered as a form, justification is the movement towards a form, which is generation.²¹

Every generation is a movement between two extremes, the privation of the form and the form. Obviously between these extremes there is no intermediary, just as there is no intermediary between non-being and being. There is no instant in which there is an in-between non-being and being, the passage is accomplished instantaneously. So it is in the case of justification, the passage from the privation of grace to grace.²²

Nevertheless, for a subject to receive a new form it must be properly disposed, and in the case of justification there is a remarkable peculiarity. In the physical world alteration implies succession of time. Before the wood will take fire the heat must dispel the dampness.²³ But in the case of justification there is no succession of time; it all takes place *in instanti*. Two cases can arise. Either the movement of the will constitutes a sufficient disposition for grace, in which case this is given simultaneously,²⁴ or the movement of the will is not a sufficient disposition, and then there is needed a succession, each member creating a disposition closer to the necessary one until finally this itself is posited and with it, again simultaneously, is given grace.

¹⁸ Cf. H. Bouillard, *Conversion et Grâce chez S. Thomas d'Aquin*, pp 24-8.

¹⁹ *IV Sent.*, d. 17, aa. 10-11.

²⁰ "Justificatio de sua ratione importat motum ad iustitiam . . . Ad hanc iustitiam motus justificatio dicitur." *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 1. Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 1.

²¹ "Generatio est motus ad formam" *De Principiis Naturae ad Fratrem Silvestrum*, ca.

²² *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 9 c.

²³ *VII Physic.*, lect. 6, in fine.

²⁴ "Forma et dispositio ad formam completam et abiectio alterius formae totum est in instanti." *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 9 c.

Man must prepare himself to receive grace. How, then, is it gratuitous? Is it not rather that man merits grace by disposing himself towards it? Not at all, replies Aquinas. Nobody can merit grace because it completely surpasses human nature and leads to an end which no creature can attain by itself.²⁵ God does not justify us without our consent, it is true. But our consent is not the cause of our justification; God justifies us without our being in any way the cause of it.²⁶ However, do not the good works we do before receiving grace in some real sense merit it? Is it not at least convenient, *de congruo*, that when man does what he can God does what he must do?

Many theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries thought that it was so convenient,²⁷ teaching that man merits the grace of justification *de congruo* by doing what he can to prepare himself for it. St. Albert the Great opposed this view. Before receiving grace, no one can do anything to merit it.²⁸ He knows others teach that the sinner by his good works merits grace *de congruo*. But it is not true, he says, though it could be said that in virtue of his good works the sinner merits grace *de minus incongruo* than he who has no good works.²⁹ Albert's position is clear: he shows respect for a consecrated formula, but he judges it to be inexact.

Many commentators hold that, at least in the *Commentarium in Sententias*, St. Thomas was in the Franciscan stream with regard to meriting grace *de congruo*.³⁰ Several texts are quoted:

We say that by free will alone man can prepare himself for sanctifying grace. For doing what is in his power he receives grace from God.³¹

²⁵ *II Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 4.

²⁶ "(Deus) iustificat nos sine nobis virtutem causantibus." *Ibid.*, a. 2 ad 7.

²⁷ Cf. A. Landgraf, "Die Vorbereitung auf die Rechtfertigung und die Eingießung der heiligmachenden Gnade in der Frühscholastik," *Scholastik*, 6 (1931), pp. 354-70; J. Rivière, "St. Thomas et le Merite de congruo," *Rev. Sc. Relig.* (1927), p. 642.

²⁸ *II Sent.*, d. 28, a. 2 sol.

²⁹ *III Sent.*, d. 18, a. 1 sol.

³⁰ Vide Rivière, *loc. cit.*, pp. 643-644; J. Stufler, "Die entfernte Vorbereitung auf die Rechtfertigung nach dem hl. Thomas," *Z. Kath. Theol.*, 47 (1923), p. 168.

³¹ "Dicimus quod ad gratiam gratum facientem habendam ex solo libero abitrio

Evidently good works are dispositions for grace; all are agreed on that. But, they say, St. Thomas does not regard them simply as dispositions but as real causes which create in us a capacity for the supernatural: *causant quamdam habilitatem ad gratiam*.³² Every bit as much as Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure, Aquinas does not hesitate to regard good works as constituting merit *de congruo*.³³

Others opine that here, as elsewhere, St. Thomas followed his master.³⁴ As does St. Albert, he uses the formula "merit *de congruo*" out of respect for those who have consecrated it, but it does not seem to him to be exact. This appears from an examination of the texts. He puts to himself the objection: it would be unjust of God to give grace to anyone who was not worthy. But we are only worthy to receive what we have merited. Therefore anyone who receives grace has merited it.³⁵ The reply: God gives grace to those who are unworthy, in this sense that he gives it to those who are not sufficiently worthy but who have some disposition for it. Because of this disposition they are said, in some way, to merit grace *de congruo*. From this one cannot conclude that God is unjust, but that he is liberal.³⁶ St. Thomas, therefore, does not teach merit *de congruo*; he simply uses the formula,³⁷ indicating that it is exact only in a certain sense: *quodammodo*.³⁸ Finally, he expressly indicates in what sense it may be used, namely, inas-

se homo potest praeparare; faciendum enim quod in se est gratiam a Deo consequitur." *II Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 4.

³² *II Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 4.

³³ "Actibus talibus (i.e., praeparatoriis) non meretur quis gratiam sibi ex condigno, sed solum ex congruo." *Ibid.*, a. 6.

³⁴ Cf., for example, Bouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

³⁵ *II Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 4, obj. 4.

³⁶ "Deus dat gratiam indignis quia (dat) his qui non sunt sufficienter ad hoc digni, sed tamen habent aliquam dispositionem ad recipiendum, ex quo dicuntur quodammodo ex congruo gratiam mereri; nec ex hoc sequitur quod sit iniustus, sed liberalis." *Ibid.*, ad 4.

³⁷ "... dicuntur quodammodo mereri gratiam de congruo."

³⁸ Rivière, *loc. cit.*, notes this "quodammodo" and judges that it is but a difference in nuance, not a basic divergence. He cites a text of Alexander of Hales in which man is said to have "quodammodo meritum condigni per usum gratiae" with respect to glory.

much as it indicates a disposition to receive grace.³⁹ In a following article he again mentions that by acts prior to the reception of grace man merits it *de congruo*.⁴⁰ But here again the consecrated formula is simply used. He does not reject it, but neither does he make it his own. And elsewhere he clearly distinguishes disposition and merit *de congruo*. By prayer man can merit grace *de congruo* for others; for himself it is only disposition.⁴¹

It is only, then, in a non-proper sense that we can speak of merit *de congruo* with respect to grace. St. Thomas's real thought is that he who has not already received grace can in no way merit it.⁴² In the *De Veritate* there is no more mention of merit *de congruo*, and in the *Summa Theologiae* we will find it completely subordinated to merit *de condigno*.⁴³

Although the natural good works which precede justification do not cause it, they do produce a certain disposition for it.⁴⁴ Almighty God has the same design for all. The diversity of graces depends on the diversity of capacity in the recipients, which in turn depends on the complex of innate and acquired dispositions. In this way the good works of a man contribute to his share of grace. They are not active principles with regard to it; they simply create in him a material disposition.⁴⁵ It is in this way that *causant quamdam habilitatem ad gratiam* is to be understood.⁴⁶

Philip the Chancellor had opened up the way towards this

³⁹ ". . . habent aliquam dispositionem ad recipiendum, ex quo dicuntur. . . ."

⁴⁰ Vide note 33.

⁴¹ ". . . praedestinationem iuvare . . . vel ex condigno . . . vel ex congruo, sicut aliquis orando pro aliquo alio meretur ei primam gratiam . . . vel per modum dispositionis, sicut quando quis praeparat se ad habendam gratiam." *I Sent.*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 4.

⁴² *II Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 4.

⁴³ *I-II*, q. 114, aa. 3, 5, 6.

⁴⁴ "Gratia excedit omnem proportionem naturae; unde actus naturales non possunt merita respectu gratiae dici, sed dispositiones remotae tantum." *II Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. a ad 5; "Opus bonum praecedens gratiam non est causa meritoria eius, sed solum dispositio quaedam." *I Sent.*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 3.

⁴⁵ *I Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3.

⁴⁶ *II Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 4.

solution in the *Summa de Bono*.⁴⁷ But there was still a difficulty which St. Thomas saw. If God has the same design towards all, and the measure of grace is regulated by man's disposition, then he who does whatever lies in his power necessarily receives grace. Man seems to take grace by storm, God's liberty is overpowered. The rejection of this argument lies in the distinction of absolute and hypothetical necessity: man receives grace necessarily, not absolutely, for God is not subject to such necessity, but hypothetically, *de necessitate ex suppositione divina ordinis*, by which God has willed to give grace to each according to his capacity.⁴⁸ If preparation for grace necessarily results in grace being given, it is only because God has so ordained it. Grace is due to the gratuitous goodness of God with whom the initiative always rests, a fact which we will find underlined with greater emphasis in the succeeding sections.

II. *Sanctifying Grace, Principle of Justification*

The only necessary disposition for the reception of justifying grace, the only sufficient one, is the conversion of the will which coincides with it. What is the relation between these two, grace and conversion? Is grace simply a perfection which is added to the act of conversion or does it produce it? Is grace an ornament of conversion or its principle? The answer to these questions demands an analysis of the act of justification.

Four elements can be distinguished in the process of justification considered as a generation. In every generation in which which one form is corrupted, another produced, there must be a twofold disposition, one to the first form, the other to the second. In justification this twofold disposition is a movement of the will towards God and a movement of the will away from sin.⁴⁹ Therefore the four elements in the

⁴⁷ Cf. A. Landgraf, *Scholastik*, 6 (1931), p. 239.

⁴⁸ *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2 sol. 3.

⁴⁹ "Sicut per motum liberi arbitrii in Deum disponitur ille qui iustificatur ad gratiam obtinendam, ita per motum liberi arbitrii in peccatum oportet quod ad culpae expulsionem disponatur." *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3 sol. 4.

justification of the sinner are the infusion of grace, the movement of the will to God, the movement of the will away from sin, the remission of sin.⁵⁰ There is no temporal succession involved; in the one undivided instant grace is infused, the movement of the will takes place and sin is remitted. Justification is not a successive process but simultaneous.⁵¹

This theory of justification is by no means peculiar to St. Thomas. It is common Scholastic doctrine. Though there is a priority of nature among the various elements,⁵² we are concerned here only with the relation which exists between the infusion of grace and the remission of sin on the one hand, and the movements of the will disposing towards them, faith, charity, contrition,⁵³ on the other. In other words, we are concerned only with relationship between the action of God and the action of man in the process of justification.

Attempts to establish this exact relationship had been made before Aquinas. Three he rejects: the movement of the will is anterior to the infusion of grace in the order of nature, not of time; the movement of the will informed by grace necessarily succeeds the infusion of grace in the order of nature, though it precedes the remission of sin;⁵⁴ the infusion of grace and the remission of sin both precede the double movement of the will without any reciprocity.⁵⁵ The infusion of grace and the remission of sin admit no intermediate.⁵⁶ Thus the free acts must either precede both or follow both. But they cannot simply

⁵⁰ Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 28.

a. 1 Utrum iustificatio impii sit remissio peccatorum. (Sic)

a. 2 Utrum peccatorum remissio possit esse sine gratia. (Nullo modo)

a. 4 Utrum motus liberi arbitrii in Deum ad iustificationem requiratur. (Sic)

a. 5 Utrum in impii iustificatione requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum. (Sic)

⁵¹ *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 5 sol. 3.

⁵² Cf. *Ibid.*, a. 4 sol. 1.

⁵³ Cf. *Ibid.*, a. 3 sols. 3 and 4.

⁵⁴ *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 3. The movement of the will to God is characterized as a movement of *fides caritate formata*, the movement away from sin as *detestatio peccati*.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 8 c.

⁵⁶ *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 4 sol. 2.

precede, for they cannot be meritorious before grace is infused. Nor can they simply follow, for they are dispositions to the remission of sin.⁵⁷ It may be noted that here St. Thomas explicitly rejects his later seriation that places the free acts after the infusion of grace but prior to the remission of sin,⁵⁸ a position all the more surprising in view of the fact that he had already⁵⁹ formulated his view that the infusion of grace involved a change in the inclination of the will.⁶⁰

St. Thomas's own explanation is along a line already mapped out by St. Albert who had distinguished three points of view.⁶¹ If the nature is considered as a form the priority is the following: infusion of grace, double movement of the will, remission of sin. If it is considered as matter, then detestation of sin comes first, followed by conversion to God, infusion of grace, remission of sin, in that order. If one considers the genesis of the nature, then the order is remission of sin, movement of the will, infusion of grace. Other theologians had advanced similar explanations and St. Thomas did not differ from them.⁶²

Each element in the justification process has priority but from a different point of view. In the order of material causality, the double movement of the will precedes the infusion of grace and the remission of sin. In the order of formal causality, however, it is precisely the inverse.⁶³ There is therefore reciprocal priority of grace and free will in instantaneous justification. The will's movement of conversion in which grace is infused is disposition to grace insofar as it proceeds from the will, meritorious insofar as it proceeds from grace. Free will furnishes the substance of the act, grace the form which makes it meritorious.⁶⁴

What precisely did St. Thomas mean by this reciprocal

⁵⁷ *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 8 c.

⁵⁸ *Summa Theol.*, q. 113, a. 8.

⁵⁹ *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 8.

⁶⁰ Cf. Lonergan, *loc. cit.*, pp. 86-7.

⁶¹ *IV Sent.*, d. 17, a. 11.

⁶² Vide Bouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 46; Landgraf, *art. cit.*, p. 503.

⁶³ *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 8. Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 4 sol. 2.

⁶⁴ *II Sent.*, d. 5, q. 2, a. 1 corp. and ad 1.

priority? How, in his earlier thought, did he conceive the role of grace in the act of conversion to God away from sin? To understand this we must now consider the notion of sanctifying grace as a habit.

Albert had already characterized grace not just as form but as habit, the idea of which had been formulated by Philip, Chancellor of the University of Paris.⁶⁵ Now immediately following a habit there is an act,⁶⁶ it inclines to act. Grace, therefore, moves the free will the very moment it is conferred.⁶⁷ Joined to the free will it becomes the principle of merit. Free will furnishes the matter of the act, grace the form by which it is meritorious.⁶⁸

Here St. Thomas follows his master very closely. When it informs the soul, grace moves to meritorious acts not alone but in cooperation with the will.⁶⁹ What is the relationship between their two roles? It is that of matter to form. Free will furnishes the substance of the meritorious act, grace the form of merit.⁷⁰ Has not, then, the will the principle role, the substance of the act? Is not grace a mere complement added to what the will has already provided?⁷¹ Not at all. Grace has the principle role, because it inclines the will to act *per modum naturae*.⁷²

⁶⁵ Cf. Lonergan, *loc. cit.*, Vol. II (1941), p. 307.

⁶⁶ "Habitum immediate sequitur actus." *II Sent.*, d. 26, a. 6 sol.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, ad 7 ad quaest. 1.

⁶⁸ "Idco dicitur cooperans quia liberum arbitrium in merito ministrat materiam actus; sed forma per quem est efficacia meriti dat gratia." *Ibid.*, a. 6 sol.

⁶⁹ "Habitus effective causat opus. Ita gratia motum meritorium voluntatis operatur eliciendo ipsum." *II Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 5 ad 2; "Quia inclinat (gratia) in talem actum per modum cuiusdam naturae ideo ipsa sola dicitur operari, non quod sine libero arbitrio operatur, sed quia est principalior causa." *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 5 ad 3. "Ex hoc enim quod voluntas est informata aliquo habitu, sequitur quod in actum volendi exeat." *Ibid.*, ad 2; cf. Lonergan, *loc. cit.*, p. 314s.

⁷⁰ "Liberum arbitrium administrat substantiam actus et a gratia est forma per quam meritorius est; . . . et propter hoc dicitur cooperans, quasi complens illud quod per liberum arbitrium ut praeiacens exhibetur." *II Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 5 ad 4. Cf. the resemblance of these texts of St. Thomas to those of St. Albert cited above.

⁷¹ Vide note 70, "quasi complens."

⁷² Vide note 69.

Is grace a formal or efficient principle? It is, in fact, both, though its efficient causality depends on an already existing formal causality. The formal causality of grace with respect to the act of the will is easily explained, for

as the habit formally perfects the faculty, whatever in the faculty's act is from the habit is formal with respect to the substance of the act. And so the habit is the formal principle of an accomplished act.⁷³

Its efficient causality flows from this. The faculty and the habit which perfects it are in the same category of causality since the habit supplies what is lacking in the faculty. But the faculty is efficient cause of its act. Therefore the habit also is in the category of efficient causality.⁷⁴ Faculty and habit, will and grace, exercise a common efficient causality on the free act. However, their functions are not to be confused. The habit, form of the faculty which produces the act, is the efficient cause of the formation of the act,⁷⁵ which again underlines the fact that the premier role of the habit is that of formal cause; its role as efficient cause depends on this.⁷⁶

In this way St. Thomas demonstrates the intimate relationship of free will and grace. They are not simply coordinated principles but one single principle, as matter and form are one single being. The moment grace is given the will moves towards God and away from sin, for when the will is informed by any habit it produces an act of willing.⁷⁷ One single act proceeds from the one principle of grace and free will. From grace it has the form of merit, from free will it has the char-

⁷³ "Sicut habitus formaliter perficit potentiam, ita quod ex habitu relinquatur in actu est formale respectu substantiae actus quam potentia ministrat; et sic habitus est formale principium actus formati. . . ." *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 8 ad 4 in contr.

⁷⁴ *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 8 obj. 4 in contr. This part of the objection is not rebutted in the answer, and therefore is assumed to be St. Thomas's teaching. Cf. note 69 "Habitus effective causat opus."

⁷⁵ *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 8 ad 4 in contr.

⁷⁶ For a discussion of this cf. Lonergan, *loc. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 316-17.

⁷⁷ "Ex hoc quod voluntas est informata aliquo habitu, sequitur quod in actum volendi exeat." *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 5 ad 2.

acter of final disposition for grace. Without the free will grace cannot be given, justification is impossible.

III. *Divine Motion, Ultimate Principle of Justification*

The ultimate disposition for justification is produced under the influence of grace which inclines the free will to meritorious act. In this process the will is not simply passive, it cooperates with grace. This cooperation is not determined by grace-habitus which does not set the will in action but only inclines to it. The question then arises, does the will require another grace to set it in motion towards cooperation or does it move under its own power?

This question had already been discussed before St. Thomas.⁷⁸ The tendency of the Franciscan school had been to affirm that to prepare oneself for justification a grace quite distinct from sanctifying grace, *gratia gratum faciens*, was necessary. It was called *gratia gratis data*. St. Bonaventure explained why it was necessary. Free will cannot dispose itself for sanctifying grace as it ought—*de congruo*—because grace so exceeds natural knowledge that it cannot be known or asked for without a movement from God; without, in other words, a *gratia gratis data* which is a grace midway between sanctifying grace and the free will.⁷⁹

The opposite solution was proposed by William of Auxerre, followed by the growing Dominican school. No sinner is deprived of every grace; the free will by its own power can turn to God.⁸⁰ St. Albert followed this path. No sinner is deprived of every grace: fear, hope, *fides informis*, angelic influence, with these he can avoid sin and even without them he can resist temptation.⁸¹ Note Albert's point of view. He speaks of avoiding sin without grace, not of disposing oneself for justifi-

⁷⁸ Vide A. Landgraf, "Die Erkenntnis der heiligmachenden Gnade in der Frh-scholastik," *Scholastik*, 3 (1928), pp. 28-64; 6 (1931), pp. 42-3, 245-6, 501; *Z. Kath. Theol.*, 55 (1931), p. 206.

⁷⁹ *II Sent.*, d. 28, a. 2, q. 1.

⁸⁰ Cf. Bouillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-5.

⁸¹ *II Sent.*, d. 25, a. 6 sol.

cation, for he does not admit disposition to grace and so does not need to speculate on its conditions.

St. Thomas again follows his master and opposes the Franciscans. If *gratia gratis data* is accepted as a habit, it is not required to move the will to cooperate with *gratia gratum faciens*, for if the ultimate disposition is under the influence of this latter, there is no need for another habit to influence the remote dispositions. Free will is enough. He justifies his position by three arguments.

Preparation for grace is not made by acts proportionate to grace, as merit is proportionate to its reward. Therefore it is not necessary that man prepare himself for grace by acts which surpass the natural power of his faculties. His nature is a material power with respect to grace, so the acts of the natural virtues are material dispositions for it. To prepare himself for grace man has no need of another, preceding grace.⁸²

If it is admitted that another grace-habit is necessary to prepare oneself for habitual, sanctifying grace, then it must be admitted that another is need to prepare oneself for that, and so on indefinitely. As there must be a beginning somewhere and, as there is no reason to stop at this grace rather than that, it is better to admit from the beginning that man by his own power can prepare himself for grace.⁸³ If the free will has not the power to prepare itself for grace, no perfection added to it will sufficiently prepare it.

Besides, to prepare oneself for grace is to do what one can according to the adage: God gives grace to him who does what lies in his power. But we can only do what is within the power of our free will, and so if man cannot prepare himself for grace by his free will alone, then to do what is in one's power is not to prepare oneself for grace.⁸⁴ The conclusion is as before: if man cannot prepare himself for grace by free will alone, he cannot do it in any way.

Man, therefore, does not need an infused habit to prepare

⁸² *II Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 4.

⁸³ *Ibid.* Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 15.

⁸⁴ *De Verit.*, *loc. cit.* Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 4.

himself for the grace of justification. He can do it by free will alone. But does he not at least require an actual grace, a divine help distinct from the natural concursus? Aquinas replies in the affirmative. To prepare himself for grace man needs special divine help, but as to the nature of this help he, Thomas, hesitates in the *Commentarium in Sententias* and the *De Veritate*.⁸⁵

The necessity of this divine help is deduced from the general principle: *omne motum necesse est ab alio moveri*. The movement of a living thing which has been at rest must necessarily be preceded by other movements which excite it to action.⁸³ And so it is with man whose will, preparing for justification, turns towards God and away from sin. He must be moved either by external events such as a monition, an illness or the like, or by an internal impulse manifesting the divine action on the soul, or perhaps by both at the same time. All of these are granted to him by the mercy of God. If one, then, understands by *gratia gratis data* divine providence mercifully directing man towards good, it is undoubtedly true that without it man cannot prepare himself for justification.⁸⁹

There is a text which seems to teach that for the final disposition or meritorious conversion no other grace is necessary beyond sanctifying grace itself. With this free will alone suffices.⁸⁸ St. Thomas forgot to mention—maybe for him it was too obvious to mention—that the act of conversion itself has God for first cause, since he operates in every nature.⁸⁹ The

⁸⁵ Bouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁸⁶ *VIII Physic.*

⁸⁷ *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 15.

⁸⁸ "Ad eliciendum actum conversionis sufficit liberum arbitrium quod se ad habendam gratiam per hunc actum proeparat et disponit. Sed efficacia conversionis ad meritum non potest esse nisi per gratiam; unde unus et idem motus est in quo gratia infunditur, qui est dispositio ad gratiam secundum quod exit a libero arbitrio, et meritorius secundum quod gratia informatur." *II Sent.*, d. 5, q. 2, a. 1.

⁸⁹ "Cum dicitur quod habens caritatem diligit Deum propter seipsum, ly 'propter' denotat habitudinem finis et efficientis, quia ipse Deus superaddit naturae unde in eius dilectionem tendit. Sed cum dicitur de carente caritate quod diligit Deum propter seipsum, ly 'propter' denotat habitudinem finis et non efficientis proximi, NISI SICUT DEUS IN OMNI NATURA OPERANTE OPERATUR." *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, unic ad 1.

divine help which is necessary is sometimes the very act of will which God accomplishes in us and by which we are prepared for grace.⁹⁰

As has been demonstrated, the grace necessary to prepare man for justification is not to raise his action to a supernatural level but simply to bring it into being. It does not confer on the will any transitory elevation but merely sets it in motion. Its necessity is explained by the principle, *omne motum necesse est ab alio moveri*, to which St. Thomas expressly alludes.⁹¹ Therefore if we accept grace not as a habit but as the mercy and providence of God, it is as necessary for non-meritorious action as for meritorious, for man can do natural good without grace, but not without God. When we speak of grace, however, we usually mean a justifying habit,⁹² and so we can conclude that for St. Thomas the grace necessary to prepare oneself for justification is not *gratia gratum faciens* but simply a divine motion.

From this consideration it appears how unjust it is to accuse St. Thomas of being Semipelagian. He teaches clearly that man cannot prepare himself for grace without the help of God. True, this divine help is not necessarily in the interior of the soul; it is enough that the will be set in motion by some exterior occasion. But the initiative always lies with God who arranges all with a view to salvation. This is quite in accord with Augustinian doctrine⁹³ and equally opposed to that condemned at the Second Council of Orange.

It is true that certain phrases taken out of context surprise us with their resemblance to Semipelagian propositions. Certainly

⁹⁰ *II Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 4 corp. and ad 2.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 14. Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1.

⁹³ "Attendant et videat non ideo tantum istam voluntatem divino muneri tribuendam, quia ex libero arbitrio est, quod nobis naturaliter concreatum est; verum etiam quod visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut velimus et ut credamus, sive extrinsecus per evangelicas exhortationes, ubi et mandata legis aliquid agunt, si ad hoc admonent hominem infirmitatis suae, ut ad gratiam iustificantem credendo confugiat; sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in potestate quid ei veniat in mentem, sed consentire vel dissentire propriae voluntatis est." *De Spiritu et Littera*, c. 34, n. 60. *PL* 44, 240.

had St. Thomas known this similarity to condemned doctrine he would have avoided such ambiguous expressions. But he did not know, and so we cannot reproach him with doctrinal error, but only with a lack of information on a point of positive theology.⁹⁴ We shall see that, when he became aware of the difficulties and of his divergence from Augustine, he modified his doctrine as a consequence.

THE SYNTHESIS

After the completion of the *Commentarium in Sententias* (1254-1257) and the *De Veritate* (1256-1259), St. Thomas left Paris for Italy where he taught for nine years (1259-1268).^{94a} It was only on his return from there that he took up again, probably in 1271, the compilation of the *Summa Theologiae* at the second part. Herein we find his perfected theory of the relationship of grace and free will. In this section of our study, we shall expose the new doctrine, compare it with the old, and note where they agree and where they differ.

I. *Necessity of Preparation for Grace*

Sanctifying grace and the supernatural virtues which accompany it are infused by God as the principal cause. But man cooperates by acts of faith, hope, fear, charity⁹⁵ which dispose him for it. Insofar as these acts are supernatural, they proceed from the infused virtues and so do not dispose towards grace. They dispose inasmuch as they are free acts. Preparation for grace does not mean a series of supernatural acts by which man moves progressively nearer to justification; rather, it is the free act by which he cooperates in the very act of his justification. In the *Summa*, as in the earlier works, preparation for grace means cooperation with grace. It is the part of man in justification.

Why is this preparation necessary? Aquinas is content to

⁹⁴ Cf. Bouillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-87.

^{94a} These dates are accepted from Mandonnet, Destrez, Chenu, *Bibliographie Thomiste*, pp. xiii and xv.

⁹⁵ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, aa. 3, 4, 5.

repeat the two reasons already given: God moves each being according to its nature; it is natural for man to have freedom of choice; therefore he is not moved to justification without a free act on his part.⁹⁶ No form can exist except *in materia disposita*.⁹⁷ Therefore, since justification is a generation,⁹⁸ the acquiring of a form,⁹⁹ man must be disposed and only when he is sufficiently disposed is the form received. In natural generation the disposing agent needs time, but with his infinite power God can dispose instantaneously, especially in the case of the will whose movement by nature is instantaneous. Therefore it is by a single free act, simultaneous with the infusion of grace, that man is disposed for grace.¹⁰⁰

The classical example is that of St. Paul. While he was on his way to sin, God completely changed his heart: Paul heard the voice of God, heeded it, cooperated with it and instantly received grace.¹⁰¹ This is what happens in every case. Justification is never effected without the free cooperation of man,¹⁰² which is at the same time an act of faith, charity, contrition, a movement away from sin and towards God.¹⁰³ It is worth noting that no longer is it called "ultimate disposition" but "sufficient disposition"¹⁰⁴ or "perfect preparation"¹⁰⁵ for grace.

Another noteworthy characteristic is that now St. Thomas delays less over justifying the necessity of man's cooperation than he did in the earlier works. Now he insists more on the fact that cooperation itself is a gift from God. No human preparation precedes the divine movement, it all comes from God who moves the soul to good. Even the free movement of

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 113, a. 3 c.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 112, a. 2 c.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 113, aa. 1 and 7.

⁹⁹ "(Generatio) est ex privatione ad formam." *Ibid.*, a. 1 c.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 113, a. 7.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, q. 112, a. 2 ad 2.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, q. 113, a. 3 and a. 7 ad 1.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, aa. 4 and 5.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 7 c.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 112, a. 2 ad 2.

the will by which man cooperates in the reception of sanctifying grace has God for its principal cause. If a disposition or preparation is necessary, it is not in this sense that God cannot act unless he finds it already accomplished but rather that he causes it.¹⁰⁶ Preparation for grace is the work both of God and of man. In the *Commentarium in Sententias* and *De Veritate* it appears more as man's work; in the *Summa Theologiae* more as God's.

Given this principal causality of God in the act of preparation for grace, there is no difficulty in reconciling the necessity of preparation with the gratuity of justification. Is grace given necessarily to him who does what he can? Not at all, if doing what one can is considered as being from the free will. Certainly, if it is considered as being from God; for the intention of God who moves the free will to preparation precisely that it may be justified cannot not be fulfilled, *non quidem coactionis sed infallibilitatis*.¹⁰⁷ The gratuity of justification is assured by the infallible intention of God relative to the individual, who is justified by a particular decision of God and an interior action in the will which cooperates.

In the corresponding article in the *Commentarium in Sententias*¹⁰⁸ St. Thomas had sought to give a different assurance to this question. The man who prepares himself necessarily receives grace, not of absolute necessity but hypothetical—*ex suppositione divini propositi*¹⁰⁹—inasmuch as God has willed to give grace to each according to his capacity. Preparation on man's necessarily results in the infusion of grace, which is nevertheless a gratuitous gift of God because God in his goodness has willed to give it to all who do what is in their

¹⁰⁶ "Nulla praeparatio requiritur ex parte hominis quasi praeveniens divinum auxilium; sed potius quaecumque praeparatio in homine esse potest ex auxillio Dei moventis animam ad bonum. Et secundum hoc ipse bonus motus liberi arbitrii quo quis praeparatur ad donum gratiae suscipiendum est actus liberi arbitrii moti a Deo." *Ibid.*, q. 112, a. 2 c.; "Ad hoc quod Deus gratiam infundat animae, nulla praeparatio exigitur quam ipse non facit." *Ibid.*, ad 3.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 112, a. 3 c.

¹⁰⁸ *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2 sol. 3.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. pp. 608-609 *supra*.

power. Therefore, the gratuity of justification is assured by a general decision of God, established once for all, to give grace to all who do what they can to obtain it.

Everything, therefore, even the disposition to grace, depends on God; justification is entirely gratuitous. There is no longer any question of meriting grace, even *de congruo*, in any real sense of the word. Merit *de congruo* which had been retained at least verbally in the earlier works is now completely subordinated to merit *de condigno*. It depends entirely on sanctifying grace, insofar as

it seems convenient that God should reward according to his power the man who does what lies in him.¹¹⁰

II. *Perfect Preparation and the Infusion of Grace*

A free act of faith and charity, we have seen, constitutes the perfect preparation for grace. We must now consider what is the principle of this act. Is it sanctifying grace itself, or is it that divine movement of the will which St. Thomas calls *auxilium Dei moventis*, and we actual grace? Both positions have had their adherents¹¹¹ and both can be authorized by texts from the Master.¹¹² Are we to conclude, then, that Aquinas's position was fluid or was it perhaps more complex than his commentators have realized?

In the *Prima Secundae*¹¹³ St. Thomas enquires: Is the infusion of grace first in the order of nature among the elements which are required for the justification of the sinner? His

¹¹⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 114, a. 3 c.; cf. aa. 5 and 6.

¹¹¹ Cf. Bouillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6, 8, 12; Stuffer, *De Deo Operante*, pp. 342ss.; Boyer, *Tractatus de Gratia Divina*, pp. 383-386; John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus*, disp. 28, a. 2 n. 12; Suarez, *De Gratia*, 1. 8, c. 14, nn. 5-10.

¹¹² i Perfect preparation depends on habitual grace:

"Tota iustificatio impii originaliter consistit in gratiae infusione. Per eam enim et liberum arbitrium movetur et culpa remittitur." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 7.

"Ipsa igitur Dei moventis motio est gratiae infusio." *Ibid.*, a. 8.

ii Perfect preparation depends on divine motion:

"Ita infundit donum gratiae iustificantis, quod etiam simul cum hoc movet liberum arbitrium ad donum gratiae acceptandum. *Ibid.*, q. 113, a. 3.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, q. 113, a. 8 corp. and ad 2.

answer clarifies the question under consideration and so must be given in full.

In the order of nature there is a priority among the elements required for the justification of the sinner. First is the infusion of grace, second the movement of the will towards God, third the movement of the will away from sin, fourth the remission of sin. The reason is this: in every movement, first is the action of the mover, then the disposition of the matter or the movement of the thing moved, and last the term of the movement. The action of God-mover is the infusion of grace; the disposition or movement of the thing moved is the double movement of the will; finally the term of the movement is the remission of sin.

In the order of nature, the disposition of the subject precedes the reception of the form, but it comes after the action of the agent which disposes it. That is why in the order of nature the movement of the free will precedes the reception of grace but follows the infusion of grace.

The order of elements now given, infusion of grace, movement of the will towards God, movement of the will away from sin, remission of sin, is precisely the one he had already rejected.¹¹⁴ Thomas now favors it, interpreting it in a different way. The free act which is the perfect preparation is considered less as a material disposition than as a movement having the infusion of grace for its principle, the remission of sin for its term. Sanctifying grace is considered less as a form than as the action of God in the soul. The act of perfect preparation proceeds from grace, no longer considered in its term of created form-habit but in its source, divine action. The notion of created form is subordinated to that of divine action, the scheme of matter-form gives way to that of moved-mover.

From now on habitual grace and divine motion are correlatives, each having a role in the meritorious act.¹¹⁵ Habitual grace and the virtues which accompany it give the soul the ability to accomplish supernatural acts and incline towards them; divine motion moves it to actually accomplish them. The habit is at once the formal and efficient cause of the

¹¹⁴ *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 8.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Bouillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-164.

action,¹¹⁶ but divine motion is the ultimate efficient cause because it determines the form to produce its act. Habitual grace and divine motion are both indispensable to the birth of the meritorious act¹¹⁷ and so to the act of faith, charity, and repentance which is the perfect preparation for grace.

The reciprocal implication of these two aspects of grace explains why in the *Summa Theologiae* St. Thomas relates merit to divine motion. He does not mean actual grace but sanctifying grace considered as the action of God in the soul, the notion of habit fading into the background. It will be well to consider some examples.

The meritorious act can be considered in two ways: either as proceeding from the free will or as proceeding from the grace of the Holy Spirit. . . . If we consider it as proceeding from the grace of the Holy Spirit, then it merits eternal life in strict justice. In this case merit is evaluated according to the power of the Holy Spirit who moves us to eternal salvation (*secundum virtutem Spiritus Sancti moventis nos in vitam aeternam*).¹¹⁸

Clearly the *virtus Spiritus Sancti* is identical with the *virtus gratiae*,¹¹⁹ the *donum supernaturale quod gratia dicitur*,¹²⁰ required for merit, which elsewhere is characterized as divine motion.

Our act has the form of merit from a twofold source: first, from the divine motion and in this way it merits *ex condigno*. . . . Each of us is moved by God through the gift of grace that he may come to eternal life.¹²¹

The gift of final perseverance does not fall under merit because it depends entirely on the divine motion which is the principle of all merit.¹²²

¹¹⁶ "Relinquitur igitur quod oporteat esse quemdam habitum caritatis in nobis creatum, qui sit formale principium actus dilectionis. *De Carit.*, a. 1.

"Habitus igitur sunt causae effectivae actuum." *De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 12 ad 5.

¹¹⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 110, a. 2.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 114, a. 3.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 109, a. 5.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 114, a. 2.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, a. 6.

¹²² *Ibid.*, a. 9.

The grace by which God moves man to eternal life cannot be other than sanctifying, habitual grace, for merit is impossible without an infused habit to elevate the soul to the supernatural order. If our good works have their value from a divine motion, it can only be insofar as this implies habitual grace. Only in this sense can the Holy Spirit move us to merit.¹²³

DISCOVERIES

In the course of our study we have noted a considerable divergence between the earlier writings and the final synthesis in this question of grace, free will, and justification. This divergence bears mainly on three points: first, St. Thomas puts in greater relief the divine initiative and the necessity of divine help to prepare oneself for grace; second, he characterizes this divine help as an immediate and interior motion of the will; third, he subordinates the idea of sanctifying grace-habitus to that of sanctifying grace-divine motion. In general we can say that the cause of this evolution, traceable to the period of his sojourn in Italy, is to be found in an increased acquaintance with the biblical, patristic, and philosophic data which enabled him to investigate the sources more fully.¹²⁴ We must now enquire more specifically.

The decisive cause was, undoubtedly, the discovery of the Semipelagian controversy. The theologians of the Middle Ages knew the dispute about the *initium fidei* and used the writings it provoked. Hincmar of Rheims, for example, who died in 882, quotes the letter of Prosper of Aquitaine to Augustine exposing the Semipelagian arguments and the latter's replies in the *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* and *De Dono Perseverantiae*. He also knows the writings of Fulgentius on predestination, the role of Caesar of Arles at the Second Council of Orange, and the doctrine of the Council.¹²⁵ But the theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were less well informed. The

¹²³ Cf. Bouillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-166.

¹²⁴ Chenu, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

¹²⁵ Cf. Bouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

Lombard makes no mention of *initium fidei*. He does quote from the *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* a passage¹²⁶ which is precisely a refutation of the Semipelagian position, as indeed is the entire work, but he does not grasp the context. And as his *Sentences* became the standard theological textbook,¹²⁷ subsequent theology and theologians suffered from his ignorance. The treatises of Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, on grace, merit, faith, justification, will be searched in vain for the characteristic terms "*initium fidei*" or "*initium salutis*." The Semipelagian struggle might just as well never have taken place.

How is this ignorance to be explained? Quite simply by the method then in use. Texts were not as available as the advent of printing was to make them and for the most part theologians relied on the Florilegia, collections of the most important scriptural and patristic texts and authorities grouped together in treatise form.¹²⁸ There was no means available of relating these texts to their context and, if difficultly arose, it was solved by dialectic or distinction. Under such a procedure it was easy to know doctrine without having any knowledge of its genesis. That is why the Semipelagian controversy and the Council of Orange were unknown to the thirteenth-century theologians.

St. Thomas was no exception to the general ignorance. His treatment of the problem of the preparation for grace in the early works indicates that he has no idea that the question has already been discussed and the Church's position taken. He affirms the necessity of preparation for grace in order to have a reason on man's part why it is given to some and not to others.¹²⁹ Man can prepare himself for grace by free will alone, else there would be no meaning in the adagium: God gives grace to him who does what he can.¹³⁰ He can prepare himself

¹²⁶ *II Sent.*, d. 28, c. 3.

¹²⁷ Cf. Chenu, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-229.

¹²⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 106-131; M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode*, t. I, p. 184.

¹²⁹ *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 15.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 4.

by natural acts and by his own power can posit an act of faith.¹³¹ Evidently Aquinas has no knowledge of the controversy in which Augustine taught that though man's assent of faith to what the preacher says is free, it is nevertheless a gift of God,¹³² which requires an inspiration and illumination from the Holy Ghost.¹³³ We have already pointed out¹³⁴ that, in spite of appearances, St. Thomas does not fall into the Semipelagian error. But it was not because he deliberately avoided it. If such were the case, we could reasonably suppose he would have taken greater care to avoid all possible ambiguity.

The first sign of acquaintance with Semipelagianism is found in the third book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Aquinas does not, of course, employ the term "Semipelagian."¹³⁵ In fact, he attributes the error to Pelagius. But what is important is that the doctrine itself is well defined. The chapter on the impossibility of meriting grace is to exclude the Pelagian error that we have merited the help that is given us and that therefore the initiative in our justification is from ourselves, its consummation from God.¹³⁶ Grace is established as the principle of faith against the error that the preliminaries in the act of faith are from man, not from God.¹³⁷ The same teaching is reiterated in the Scriptural commentaries¹³⁸ and again in the

¹³¹ *III Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1 ad 1.

¹³² *De Praed. Sanct.*, c. 3, n. 7.

¹³³ Council of Orange, can. 7, *DB* 180.

¹³⁴ Cf. pp. 617-618 *supra*.

¹³⁵ The *initium fidei* controversy was first characterized as "Semipelagian" in the sixteenth century. Cf. M. Jacquin, "A Quelle Date Apparaît le Terme 'Semipelagien'?", *Rev. Sc. Phil. et Theol.* (1907), pp. 506-8.

¹³⁶ "Per hoc excluditur error pelagianorum qui dicebant huiusmodi auxilium propter merita nobis dari; et quod iustificationis nostrae initium ex nobis sit, consummationis autem a Deo." *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 149.

¹³⁷ "Per hoc excluditur error Pelagianorum qui dicebant quod initium fidei in nobis non erat a Deo sed a nobis." *Ibid.*, c. 152.

¹³⁸ *II ad Cor.*, c. 3, lect. 1, commenting on the text: "Non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est." *ad Philipp.*, c. 1, lect. 1; commenting on the text: "Qui coepit in nobis opus bonum, ipse perficiet."

first part of the *Summa Theologiae*,¹³⁹ indicating the importance which St. Thomas attached to it.

We can conclude, then, that when he wrote the third book of the *Contra Gentiles*¹⁴⁰ St. Thomas had acquired a knowledge of Semipelagianism which produced in him a change of attitude towards preparation for grace. Now he emphasizes the divine initiative; to prepare himself for grace man must first have the help of grace. When it is a question of doing good, divine grace precedes rather than follows as merit, the movement of the free will. Our conversion to God is preceded by divine help which converts us. The *initium fidei* is from God, not man.¹⁴¹

From the foregoing it appears that the evolution in St. Thomas's thought with respect to preparation for grace can be attributed to the discovery of the Semipelagian controversy. The question remains: how did he make this discovery? The scope of this study does not permit a full discussion of this question. Suffice it to say that the answer is twofold: a greater familiarity with Christian sources, especially St. Augustine, and philosophical reflection upon a principle provided by Aristotle.¹⁴² The first half of this answer we have already treated, albeit summarily. The second requires a little explanation.

In his *Commentarium in II Epistolam ad Corinthios*, after opposing the Semipelagian error to the doctrine of St. Paul, St. Thomas adds a *ratio accedens* which he attributes to the *Liber de Bona Fortuna*, but which is in reality a fragment of the *Eudemian Ethics*.¹⁴³ Man does good because he has so decided; this decision is from a principle superior to him moving him to

¹³⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 23, a. 5.

¹⁴⁰ Chenu, *op. cit.*, p. 251, note 1, indicates that, when he left Paris for Italy in 1259, St. Thomas had completed only up to Book III, chapter 45, of the *Contra Gentiles*. Mandonnet, Destrez, Chenu, *op. cit.*, p. xiii, give the date of the completed *Contra Gentiles* as 1264, that is, during the first period (1259-1269) in Italy. The pauline commentaries and the *Quodlibet I* also belong to a period following this Italian sojourn (cf. Chenu, *op. cit.*, p. 211; Mandonnet, etc., *op. cit.*, p. xv).

¹⁴¹ *Contra Gentiles*, III, 149.

¹⁴² For a full discussion, cf. Bouillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-122.

¹⁴³ Cf. T. Deman, "Le 'Liber de Bona Fortuna' dans la Théologie de S. Thomas d'Acquin," *Rev. Sc. Phil. Et Theol.* (1928), pp. 38-58.

act; this principle is God.¹⁴⁴ The same argument is repeated in the *Quodlibetum I* with greater precision. It is not enough that Providence provide for man exterior occasions of salvation, preaching, good example, illness, and the like; God must interiorly move him to accomplish good.¹⁴⁵

A greater knowledge of the Christian sources led Aquinas to emphasize divine motion as preceding man's in preparation for grace. Philosophic reflection led him to deduce this divine motion as necessarily interior. Both contributed to his final conclusion: no one can prepare himself for grace, or do the least good, without the help of God.¹⁴⁶ It has been noted that the texts advanced to illustrate the divine motion are vague or intellectualist.¹⁴⁷ Others explicitly place it in the will.¹⁴⁸ Therefore the final conclusion is: no one can prepare himself for grace or do the least good without being interiorly moved to it by God.

In the articles just quoted, grace is called *auxilium divinum* or *auxilium gratiae*. In the *Contra Gentiles* these same terms are applied to sanctifying grace, sometimes considered as a habitus, more often as divine motion. Sanctifying grace is, above all, the action of God leading man to his final end, which is the vision of God. Man cannot attain this end without the

¹⁴⁴ "Hoc etiam Philosophus vult quod numquam homo per liberum arbitrium potest quoddam bonum facere sine adiutorio Dei . . . qui et homines movet et omnia quae agunt. . . . *II ad Cor.*, c. 3, lect. 1; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 9, aa. 2-6; Lottin, *op. cit.*, pp. 258-260.

¹⁴⁵ "Indiget autem divino auxilio non solum quantum ad exteriora moventia, prout scilicet ex divina providentia procuratur homini occasiones salutis, puta praedicationes, exempla . . . sed etiam quantum ad interiorem motum; prout Deus cor hominis interius movet ad bonum." *Quod I*, a. 7.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Lonergan, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 539 note 48.

¹⁴⁸ "Relinquitur ergo, sicut concludit Aristoteles in cap. *De Bona Fortuna*, lib. VII *Moral. ad Eudemum*, quod id quod primo movet voluntatem et intellectum sit aliquid supra voluntatem et intellectum, scilicet Deus. Qui cum omnia movet secundum rationem mobilia . . . etiam voluntatem movet secundum eius conditionem, non ut ex necessitate, sed ut indeterminate se habentem ad multa." *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1; "Necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in quodam cap. *Ethic. Eudomicae*, cap. XVIII, circ. princ. (a)." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 4.

help of God,¹⁴⁹ a help he can do nothing to merit.¹⁵⁰ This help is not actual grace but sanctifying grace, for not only is it *gratis data*, it is also *gratum faciens*.¹⁵¹ The idea of grace-habit, therefore, is subordinated to that of grace-divine motion. What is emphasized is the action of God in the soul, not the immanent form resulting from this action. In placing these two ideas side by side St. Thomas was simply following in the footsteps of St. Albert, who sometimes conceived sanctifying grace as a form, sometimes as the divine action in the soul.¹⁵² Still, we may ask what provoked this change of emphasis in St. Thomas's thought.

The answer would seem to be that Aquinas realized more and more that the notion of grace-habit did not fully satisfy or explain the Biblical data on grace. In the Gospels and in the epistles of St. Paul grace appears as the action of God in the soul, and it is precisely in his *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Romanos* that we see this Biblical notion effecting a change in St. Thomas. The good works of a man can be considered from two points of view: in their substance from which they have nothing worthy of merit; or in their principle, divine motion, from which they derive their merit. For they who act by the Spirit of God are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also.¹⁵³ Evidently, the formula "*ex impulsu Dei aguntur*" is imposed by Paul's "*qui Spiritu Dei aguntur*." St. Thomas is led to conceive grace, the principle of merit, not as a permanent habit informing the soul but as a divine action in the soul. He was too attached to Aristotle to completely abandon the notion of grace-form, but he subordinates it to grace-divine motion.

The years between the *De Veritate* and the *Summa Theo-*

¹⁴⁹ *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 147.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, c. 149.

¹⁵¹ "Hoc auxilium dicitur gratia, non solum quia gratis data . . . sed etiam quia hoc auxilio homo . . . redditur Deo gratus." *Ibid.*, c. 150.

¹⁵² Cf. H. Doms, *Die Gnadenlehre des Albertus Magnus*, pp. 96-101.

¹⁵³ "Alio modo possunt considerari secundum suum principium, prout scilicet ex impulsu Dei aguntur . . . et secundum hoc eis debetur merces praedicta secundum debitum. Quia ut infra VIII, 14 dicitur: qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, his sunt filii Dei; si autem filii et heredes." *Ad Rom.*, c. 4, lect. 1.

logiae were fruitful in discovery and in new ideas. The discovery of Semipelagianism led to a greater emphasis on the divine initiative in the preparation for grace. The discovery of the *Liber de Bona Fortuna* indicated this initiative as necessarily interior in the will. And finally, following Holy Writ, the idea of grace-habitus was subordinated to that of grace-divine motion.¹⁵⁴ The final synthesis was accomplished.

CONCLUSION

An historical study reveals to what extent theology is bound to time. It spotlights what is contingent in it and what is relative, it traces the origins and evolution of the problems and indicates how important truths are temporarily obscured only to emerge again. In our study we have noted how St. Thomas differs from modern theologians in his concept and his manner of confronting the problems, how his theology depends on its time, its milieu, and the tendencies of its author, and especially how it is bound to Aristotelian categories. Touching, however lightly, on his predecessors, we have been able to follow the origin and evolution of the problem under review, and from the mass of relative and contingent explanations have been able to separate the constant, fundamental affirmation: justification is a gift of God. It is by grace that man is freed from sin and enabled to do good.

Historical theology, therefore, does not lead to relativism. True, it establishes that concepts and systems are relative, but it also establishes the permanence of divine truth. It enables us to seize the absolute among the relatives, an absolute not of representation but of affirmation. Whoever wishes to seize this absolute, to understand theology as an ever vital, personal knowledge of divine mystery, must perforce have recourse to history.

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¹⁵⁴ Cf. Bouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

OF GOD AND MAN: CONSEQUENCES OF ABELARD'S ETHIC



ETHICS IS A suitable starting-point for investigating the interrelationship between God and man in Peter Abelard. Ethics must attempt to determine man's moral responsibility, and this responsibility must entail a certain autonomy on man's part. Autonomy means that man has an authentic role in determining his actions and the moral quality of his actions according to a consistent structure. This raises the question, however, in a Christian context, about the relationship between man's autonomy and God's autonomy. How does man's activity fit into God's activity in the world? How does man's determination of the good relate to God's ultimate determination of the good? Does God's ultimate autonomy leave room for man? Finally, does man's autonomy restrict the autonomy of God?

I

THE TEACHING OF THE *Ethica*

The *Ethica* of Peter Abelard demonstrates a considerable autonomy on man's part. The act of consent or intention holds a primacy over all man's activity. Among all the psychological and moral elements of man, pleasure, passion, habit, will, and consent, only consent has moral meaning and brings that moral meaning into the other elements of man. Furthermore, only consent bestows moral significance on the external factors of the human act and law. Thus, the act of consent or intention is crucially determinative and fixes to a great extent the autonomy of man. This autonomy is further confirmed by Abelard's insistence on the justice owed to man in terms of merit or recompense. From the *Ethica* emerges a self-consistent explication of the moral reality of man.

there is always some aspect of violence about them.⁸ One is forced, in a situation of passion, to want something unjust to happen; or else one is forced to want something just not to happen. An example of passion is martyrdom: we tolerate the suffering of the saints for the goodness of their act.⁹ Another example is the situation of a man who wishes to fornicate with a woman who is married; he must tolerate the sin of adultery, which he does not wish, for the sake of his fornication, which he does want.¹⁰ Similarly, a man will tolerate the substitution of his son for himself in fulfilling a prison sentence.¹¹ Because passion will not be present at the resurrection of the body, passion is not a necessary constituent of man.¹²

Habits (*habitus*) are regular, residual patterns of action (*mores*) that have greater permanence than other ephemeral dispositions (*dispositiones*) of men.¹³ They are parallel to knowledge (*scientia*) in the intellectual sphere and can be described as *scientia agendi*.¹⁴ Abelard cites Boethius's statement that one act of adultery does not make an adulterer, nor one just act a just man.¹⁵ By definition, habits are ambivalent: they can be good or bad, in which case they are called "virtue" and "vice" respectively.¹⁶ In this way, a virtue is defined

⁸ PL 178, vol. 806C.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 951A.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 639D.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 637C.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1664B-C.

¹³ Peter Abaelard, *Philosophische Schriften*, ed. and intro. by Dr. B. Geyer, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, 21 (Munich, 1919-1933) in the "Logica 'Ingredientibus,'" p. 227: "Differentiam assignat inter habitum et dispositionem, quod videlicet habitus non facile movetur sicut dispositio. Quod autem ait: permanentior et diuturnior, . . ." Hereafter, this work will be abbreviated by Geyer, LI. The work also contains Abelard's "Logica 'Nostrorum Petitioni'" and will be referred to as Geyer, LNP. Cf. also PL 178, col. 1651C.

¹⁴ Geyer, LI, p. 227; Geyer, LNP, p. 505: "Scientia alia enim agendi, alia discernendi. . . ."

¹⁵ Boethius, *Lib. de Divis.*, PL 64, col. 242: "Neque enim qui semel iuste iudicat, iustus est neque qui semel adulterium facit, adulter est . . ." PL 178, col. 1652A.

¹⁶ PL 178, col. 633D, 1642A.

as "a spirit's best habit"; and a vice as "a spirit's worst habit."¹⁷ In some of Abelard's writings habits appear to be open for more definite specification as good or bad—for if a habit, such as prudence, can be used both for good and bad, it cannot be called a virtue.¹⁸ This is so because habits entail a note of zealous application which is not present in either pleasure or passion. Thus, if a virtue comes easily, it is not a virtue.¹⁹ Unfortunately, Abelard does not develop vice in the same way. Despite the later specification of habits as definitively good or bad, in the *Ethica* they have only the function of making man *prone* to good or bad acts²⁰ and, as such, much be differentiated from the central moral act itself.²¹ In the *Ethica* Abelard resists the tendency to make virtue and its practice the ultimate end of man, that by which he is happy;²² thus, habits are ambivalent and must be distinguished from the core of moral activity.

Will (*voluntas*) must be carefully approached in the *Ethica*. It has none of the modern characteristics of will in the sense of a clear, conscious directing of oneself. Will seems to mean the same as concupiscence,²³ although concupiscence itself can be seen as consequent upon will.²⁴ Because "will" is almost synonymous with "desire,"²⁵ few sins can be called "voluntary" since there are always displeasing aspects to sin.²⁶ With this understanding of will, Abelard can affirm that some-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 178, col. 1651C for definitions of virtues and vices; and col. 895D for definition of virtue.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 1652B-C.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 1651C-D.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 633D, for example.

²¹ *Ibid.*, col. 645D.

²² Cf. *ibid.*, col. 1642D-43A; 1641D-42A. This is a development for which Abelard is dependent on philosophical influences. So O. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles*, Tom. 3A, (Gembloux, 1949), p. 103 says, "Nous sommes ici sur un terrain purement philosophique."

²³ *PL* 178, col. 639A.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 648D: "non enim concupiscere vel desiderare aliquid nisi volendo possumus. . . ."

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 639 B.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 639D.

one might sin without any bad will at all;²⁷ this is precisely because the will, as such, is not sinful.²⁸ In the *Ethica* there is an evolution of terminology about the will.²⁹ For example, in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, "*volo*" means "*approbo*" which is equivalent to "consenting through reason."³⁰ But Abelard's attempt, in the *Ethica*, to distinguish bad will from sin forces him to use "will" in the sense of spontaneous movement or desire.³¹ In order to clarify the imputability of guilt, Abelard puts rigor into his concepts, maintaining consent as alone constitutive of sin and relegating concupiscence and bad will to lower psychological roles.³² Although in places the terminology appears to regress (e.g., Abelard uses the phrase "*voluntatem vel consensum*" as if they were synonymous and parallels "*velle*" and "*voluntatem implere*" with "*peccare*" and "*peccatum perficere*"),³³ generally in the *Ethica* "will" means a desire, usually spontaneous, based on what is pleasing or not, or on what one would like to do or not. Abelard's point comes down to saying this: the desire to rob is not the same as the consent to rob.

Pleasure, passion, habit, will: all these are only constituents of a moral act; of themselves, they possess no strict moral quality. They can be either good or bad, depending on a more fundamental act by which one becomes either innocent or guilty. That central act is the act of consent.

2. Consent: The Center of Moral Act

After meticulously distinguishing consent from all other facets of human behavior, Abelard makes consent the fundamental decision of man in terms of good and bad. Consent is more important than will, because one can consent to what he does not will or wish.³⁴ It arises from and determines will in a direction; it precedes action; but consent is neither will or

²⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 636C.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 638A.

²⁹ R. Bloome, *art. cit.*, p. 341.

³⁰ *PL* 178, col. 894AB.

³¹ Bloome, *art. cit.*, pp. 332-333.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 339.

³³ *PL* 178, col. 643A, 645C.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 640A.

action.³⁵ Sin is, strictly speaking, consent; when consent is absent, there is no sin.³⁶ Abelard uses "*intentio*" and "*animus*" as synonyms for consent. Negatively, consent means one does not hold oneself back;³⁷ positively, consent is an assent.³⁸ But consent obviously is the core of man's moral determination; it runs through and beyond all the other elements of man's psychology and directs them well or evilly. If consent can be erroneous,³⁹ or deceived,⁴⁰ it still remains absolutely determinative of moral quality.

Consent has a twofold basis. First, consent belongs only to the soul because reason and knowing (*ratio* and *notitia*) reside in the soul;⁴¹ accordingly, it is impossible to sin in ignorance.⁴² Secondly, belief is also a basis of consent; when one sins, he acts against what he believes should be done.⁴³ And, following on this, one can in no way go wrong if one believes he is pleasing God.⁴⁴

Abelard has affirmed consent as man's morally crucial act. Man seems quite passive in all of this: he reacts to drives and movements within him and either consents or refuses to consent to these drives and movements, in this way bestowing on them moral imputability. "Intention" is used interchangeably with "consent" and seems to indicate a more active quality to man's moral activity. But whether one speaks of consent or intention, one has narrowed and defined moral activity so that it is clearly and decisively in man's control. Through consent or intention, man does good or evil and makes aspects about himself good or evil. Man's moral autonomy has a firm foundation in Abelard's precise notion of consent.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 642BC.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 636A and 639B.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 639B.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 646A.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 653A: "*erronea est eorum intentio. . .*"

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 1619BC.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, col. 648C.

⁴² *Ibid.*, col. 653C.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, col. 636B.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 653B.

3. *The Primacy of Interior Act*

In Abelard's thought, the act of consent or intention enjoys a primacy over external acts. Exterior acts (*opera, operatio*) are sharply distinguished, indeed, almost opposed, to consent. Because all sins are of the soul,⁴⁵ morality must reside in the intention rather than in the exterior act.⁴⁶ Thus, God weighs the *animum* and not the *actionem*.⁴⁷ The intention is so primary that it renders inconsequential one's state in life. For example, if a layman and a monk were to fornicate, the layman's sin would be as great as the monk's if he would sin even if he were a monk.⁴⁸ Indeed, the internal state of a person determines his morality more than any external work he might perform. If a person's conscience, for example, dictates something as wrong, even though it is not wrong, he still stands judged in terms of his conscience because he believes it to be wrong.⁴⁹

There are two reasons for Abelard's position, one practical, the other theoretical. On a practical level, often an intention is formed but the deed, for one reason or another, cannot be carried out;⁵⁰ on a theoretical level, the intention forms the essential moral quality which lies behind and informs the work. The intention functions like an *id quo*: it makes the reality to be what it is; the work itself is only the *id quod*. Between the two, the *id quo* has the priority.⁵¹ The good intention is good *in se*; the external act is good only *ex intentione*.⁵² Thus, morality is not concerned with whether an act is good or not

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 648C.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 644A.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 638D: "cum ipse animus potius quam actionem in remuneratione penset, nec quidquam ad meritum actio addat sive de bona sive de mala voluntate prodeat, sicut postmodum ostendemus."

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 649D-650A.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 959A.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 802A where Satan and Simon Magus are presented as damned although they did not accomplish their intention.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, col. 650BC.

⁵² *Ibid.*, col. 652C.

(*bonum* or *malum*) but rather whether an act was done well or not (*bene* or *male*).⁵³

If deeds can be bad or good only according to the intention,⁵⁴ then deeds themselves are indifferent.⁵⁵ The same act can be done for a variety of motives. For example, two men can execute another; one man does it because of his earnestness for justice, the other out of hate for an enemy.⁵⁶ Again, someone can speak words which are only accidentally true; his actual intention could be to lie, in which case his words do not really signify his true inner state.⁵⁷ The external act, in this line of reasoning, has been severed from its formal principle. It is indifferent, material without form, open to diverse meaning and intention. It is almost completely devaluated. Since there is, for example, only the essential goodness which informs an externally good act (the good intention), then increasing external acts does not add to or affect that essential goodness. The number of concrete instances of an intention does not affect the goodness or badness of the act.⁵⁸ There is a cleavage between the interior and exterior aspects of human behavior, and this cleavage can be used in two ways. First, the external act can recede to such insignificance that it makes no difference whether it is done or not. Thus, if two men decide to build an almshouse and one is prevented from building because he is robbed, nevertheless his good intention is not lost because of the violence he incurred.⁵⁹ Second, if the intention can be viewed apart from the external act, the external act can be viewed apart from the intention. Thus, the Jews who crucified Christ sinned only *in operatione* but not *in intentione*.⁶⁰ In fact, they would have sinned more in not killing Jesus because they would be violating their conscience.⁶¹

⁵³ *Ibid.*, col. 650B; also 1677C.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1676AB; also 1652B.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 650B.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 644B, col. 1676D, and Geyer, LI, pp. 163-164.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 910B.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 652BC.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 651A.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 656B.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, col. 657D.

To summarize the place of external acts in Abelard's thought, it can be asserted that the external act is consequent upon the internal act and extrinsic to its moral value. The external act may or may not bear the meaning of the internal act; if it has moral meaning, it has it only by virtue of that internal act.

What must be noted here is that in both the internal, psychological constituents of human activity and the external constituents of human activity there is, in Abelard's thought, ambivalence. *Abelard has consistently moved to the act of consent or intention to resolve that ambivalence.* All human reality is a field for the activity of man's moral judging, a field which has to be given moral meaning through the central, interior, and essential act of consent. Thus, this interior act of man is the element which gives coherent moral meaning to man's world. Man is central; he makes the good or the evil. He is, thus far, morally autonomous.

The internal act also gives meaning to man's observance of law. Abelard is hardly a subjectivist because law does properly teach and prohibit; nevertheless, law must extend to man's dispositions and acts of consent and cannot merely content itself by regulating external behavior.⁶² In presenting the laws of the Old Testament Abelard is quite traditional. However, he is careful to point out internal dispositions called for in the observance of law; thus, one can murder both in deed and in will.⁶³ His sound condemnation of homosexuality testifies to his objective approach to law.⁶⁴ Indeed, law is capable of justifying if there is love and will (*voluntas*) present in man's observance of law; fulfillment of law lies in the *voluntas*.⁶⁵ From this, however, arises Abelard's persistent criticism of the law of the Old Testament. It never reaches to or motivates the interior of man. Rather, its motivation is fear, earthly desires,

⁶² *Ibid.*, 643A.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, col. 807AB, col. 947CD-948CD.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 764C.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 814C. Note here that "voluntas" is used in a different sense than that employed in the *Ethica*.

and earthly gains.⁶⁶ It caused the Jews to pay more attention to works rather than the dispositions behind the works, the *quae fiunt*, not the *quo animo fiunt*.⁶⁷ It remained basically on the level of external purity and never quite reached the level of purity for the soul.⁶⁸ Finally, the law gave the Jews a false sense of pride, making them secure in the idea of their obedience to it.⁶⁹

The law was a great dispensation to the crude Jewish people,⁷⁰ and there was a possibility that it might lead them to an interiorization of its values as they morally developed.⁷¹ But the Jews used it badly; its useful and health-bestowing intention was frustrated. The motivational failure of the Old Covenant law, however, remains as Abelard's sharpest objection; only Christ, the consummation of the law,⁷² could give mankind the proper example of universal love which the prophets and laws of the Old Testament could not supply.⁷³ This, despite the possibility of love and moral meaning within the law, remains Abelard's final judgment.⁷⁴

If there is moral and formative value to the law, it still maintains that ambivalent character so characteristic of Abelard. Temporally prior to the internal act, law has moral meaning only when informed by an act of consent or intention. While it appears difficult to accuse Abelard of excessive subjectivism, nevertheless it remains clear that man's moral act of consent or intention is primary before all.

The primacy of the interior act of consent rests on a conceptual pattern that is present in much of Abelard's writings. With the help of some examples of this type of logic Abelard's

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 722B, 883C.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 801BC: "non tam attendant quae fiunt quam animo fiunt" describes the Christian view of the law, as opposed to the Jews'.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 1633B.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 889C.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 890B: "magnae dispensatio providentiae. . ."

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, col. 1616B.

⁷² *Ibid.*, col. 884C: "Christus, qui est finis et consummatio legis. . ."

⁷³ *Ibid.*, col. 890C-891A.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1624B, 1627BC.

conceptual pattern can be clearly outlined. With reference to God's decrees, God may at times appear to change them. Actually, God's ultimate *consilium* remains fixed, though his particular *sententia* may be changed.⁷⁵ Churchmen use both *words* and *works*; at times it is necessary only to listen to what they say and to disregard what they actually do.⁷⁶ In reading Scripture there are both in the bare *words* and the *sense* of the words; anyone can hear the words, but the Holy Spirit must give us the sense of the words.⁷⁷ Two elements are involved in martyrdom, the actual *dying* and the *cause* for dying; only the cause makes the martyr.⁷⁸ In preaching, there is involved the *word of Christ* bringing faith through *our own words*; but our words do not bring faith.⁷⁹ In creation, God is motivated by the *general good* itself before he looks to specific *individual goods*.⁸⁰ So when we praise God, we praise him for *himself* and not for the *works* he has done.⁸¹ Again, there are two aspects to death, death of the *body* and death of the *spirit*.⁸² In anthropology, concerning the *body* and the *soul*, does the body add anything to the soul?⁸³ Likewise, the combination of *divinity* and *humanity* in Christ is not better than God himself from whom all goodness comes.⁸⁴ Perhaps the prime analogue for this theoretical pattern is from grammar: the same *word* can be used with different *meanings* and the same meaning can be expressed through different words; the solution is to find the meaning.⁸⁵

In every one of these instances, two elements are present: one element always gives meaning and intelligibility; the other,

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 655C.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 671C.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 514A.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 903B: "martyrem non facit poena, sed causa. . . ."

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 926-927.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 1323D.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, col. 937D-938A.

⁸² *Ibid.*, col. 877C.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, col. 651D: "licet ad dignitatem vel meritum animae bonitas corporis nihil referat."

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 651D.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 1339B.

whether singular or plural, receives its meaning from the first element. The second element is depicted as indifferent, or as a manifestation of the primary element. To claim something is indifferent, however, is to claim that it is in need of meaning. And to present something as a manifestation of something else is to present it as contributing little to what is being manifested. Thus all ambivalent situations receive meaning from an underlying and interior form or intention. *Abelard consistently moves to this interior meaning in solving problems or in offering explanations: it is his constant theoretical pattern.*

4. *Conflict in the "Ethica": the Autonomy of God and Man*

Man's autonomy receives confirmation in Abelard's thought by his insistence on just recompense for man's moral acts. But recompense also brings to light a determination outside of man's activity. *God* judges the intention for reward. In fact, the justice of *God* is precisely his remuneration of reward or punishment for the elect or reprobate.⁸⁶ Because of the cleavage between the interior and exterior act, only *God* can judge moral worth, for he alone can probe the internal act.⁸⁷ In this first clear confrontation between *God* and man's autonomy Abelard works to secure man's autonomy. First, Abelard roots merit squarely on the basis of man's responsibility. External acts are indifferent and cannot be a basis of merit.⁸⁸ Because deeds can be in discrepancy with intentions, only intentions gain merit.⁸⁹ Second, Abelard establishes merit on clear grounds of justice. If one argues that there is only one fundamental act of love which lies behind all other virtues, and therefore all men are equally rewarded because of this act of love one either has or not, Abelard will sharply rejoin.⁹⁰ Individuals have different degrees of love and virtue. Some people

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 801A.

⁸⁷ A constant theme of Abelard. *Ibid.*, col. 648D, 649A, 489C, 810A, 959B, 1346BC.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 1676AB.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 644A.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 1647D-1648A.

have wills more evil than others, and the degree of one's intention determines the recompense he will receive according to the quality of virtue or vice in one's acts.⁹¹ Finally, Abelard's doctrine of penance secures man's autonomy. Penance is the counter-movement to contempt, inspired by our love for God.⁹² Love and contempt are mutually exclusive,⁹³ and Abelard attempts to make penance as pure as possible, as selfless as possible. Penance should spring from love rather than fear.⁹⁴ The reversal of contempt is only half of the problem, however; recompense must be removed too. Sins are forgiven by God when he removes the punishment owed for them.⁹⁵ Penance makes us worthy of forgiveness, which is to say that damnation is not owed to a person anymore.⁹⁶ It is clear that God inspires repentance, but this remains on the motivational plane. Man is inspired so that *he* can repent. Man keeps his role. This is corroborated by the security that comes from repentance. If God finds no sin, he finds no grounds for damnation. So penance, which drives out all contempt—since they are mutually exclusive—means that salvation is necessary for the penitent.⁹⁹ God is needed primarily to remove the very element beyond man's control, the recompense.

The self-consistent pattern of man's moral autonomy is set. Man acts in terms of lower psychological elements and infuses moral meaning in them by his act of consent. This act of consent also bestows meaning on man's external act and on his observance of law. He is rewarded in justice for his activity. If man sins, he reverses his act of contempt by an act of love; God, finding no contempt present, finds no cause for damnation either.

Original sin, however, disturbs this self-consistent pattern. The sin involved in original sin is not strictly sin (*culpa*) but rather only the penalty for sin (*poena*); this explains how

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, col. 1648C-1649C.

⁹² *Ibid.*, col. 664C.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, col. 665C.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 663D.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 1634B.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 666B.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 665D.

David can be said to have been born in sin.⁹⁸ Children are born under this penalty of sin despite their lack of any owed recompense for good or evil done by them.⁹⁹ How is Abelard to solve this problem, a problem which directly attacks the autonomy of man's moral life and the consistency of Abelard's teaching? For here is clearly a determination absolutely beyond man's act of consent or intention. What does Abelard do with it?

Abelard proceeds to an interior principle to solve his problem: the will of God. With reference to Adam's sin, although it was "most slight," his transgression redounds to the rest of his posterity so God could give us a lesson about how he would treat even greater faults.¹⁰⁰ Here the intention of the Lord overrides all consideration of justice and equal recompense for moral acts. Children are saved without merit, so likewise this permits them to be damned without merit too.¹⁰¹ It can be quite properly claimed that this is not a doctrine of sin but a doctrine of collective punishment; perhaps the germinal reason for this is an overly stressed identification of concupiscence with birth.¹⁰²

If Abelard's thought about original sin rests on the double sense of sin as fault and penalty, he develops analogous conclusions by working out the double sense of sin as fault and mistake to explain the fate of those who reject Christ out of ignorance. For those who crucified Christ and those who have not heard of the Gospel have ignorance as their quite legitimate excuse.¹⁰³ But the Jews received at least temporal punishment,¹⁰⁴ while those who do not accept the Gospel are punished with damnation.¹⁰⁵ Baptism, once it has been commanded, can-

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 641D: "a qua jam poenam contrahit, etsi non culpam. . . ."

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 866D. Also col. 641C-642A.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 662B.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, col. 655D.

¹⁰² J. Gross, "Abälards Umdeutung des Erbsündendogmas," *Zeitschrift für Religions-und Geistesgeschichte*, 15 (1963), p. 21, 25. Gross sees an Augustinian influence here.

¹⁰³ *PL* 178, col. 655D-656A. Also 657C.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 655D-656A; also 657C.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 656A.

not be dispensed with: no one is saved without the sacrament.¹⁰⁶ In order not to rely too exclusively on the sacrament alone (an external reality), Abelard affirms that love (an internal reality) must be present with the sacrament. Baptized children who die before the age of reason receive love on entrance into heaven; those who have love but not the sacrament will lose their love and despair before they die; those who have neither love nor the sacrament are damned.¹⁰⁷ Recompense according to intention has lost much of its meaning and Abelard is in quite a difficult position. His only solution is the will of God. God disposes all things according to his most profound plan.¹⁰⁸ So, for example, because all things happen for the best in God's plan, this unmerited punishment for unbaptized babies is actually the "slightest punishment" because God foresaw more terrible things that the child would have done if it had been allowed to live; after all, God's will is the basis for distinguishing good from evil.¹⁰⁹

Abelard has solved the problem arising from the theological datum of original sin by absolute recourse to God's will. The ambiguity of the situation, namely, whether for innocent people to be damned was good or not, has been resolved in terms of God's absolute autonomy. And his autonomy has ruptured, in effect, all the autonomy Abelard had claimed for man.

II

THE AUTONOMY OF GOD AND THE AUTONOMY OF MAN

Investigation into the *Ethica* has shown that in Abelard's thought man enjoys moral autonomy in the sense that his act of consent establishes the goodness or badness of his acts; for

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 838A: "fixam Domini sententiam de baptismo . . ." And col. 654A: "solummodo per sacramenta salvantur."

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 838A-C. A. Landgraff, "Studien Zur Theologie Des Zwölften Jarhunderts: I. Nominalismus in den Theologischen Werken der Zweiten Hälfte des Zwölften Jarhunderts," *Traditio*, I (1943), p. 217 traces this theme into Robertus Pullus's work.

¹⁰⁸ *PL* 178, col. 656D: "profundissimo dispensationis suae consilio. . ."

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 870; and col. 869.

without his consent, all is indifferent. Man's autonomy, furthermore, is confirmed in that he receives merit strictly according to the quality of his moral act. Yet, because of original sin and other theological data, God's will must intervene to resolve certain inconsistencies in man's moral life. Thus, God makes all good by bringing all events into his design and informing all indifferent reality with his good will. God enjoys an ultimate autonomy, then, into which man's moral autonomy must fit. The task now is to expand the study to all of Abelard's thought and discover his fundamental perspective on the problem.

1. *The Autonomy and Will of God*

Both with reference to himself and with reference to the world, God's will is good. But, with reference to himself, it is a *necessary* will. God can do what he does only as he does it; he can only do what is good, and so he can do nothing which is not good for him to do.¹¹⁰ There are three reasons for this. In the first place, God is rational. He would be irrational if he saw that there was something good to be done and did not do it.¹¹¹ Second, God is the perfect substance, in need of no other thing.¹¹² Therefore, he is an unchanging norm always faithful to himself; any change man experiences must come from creatures and not from God.¹¹³ Because of this substantial quality, there can be no question of God's having to choose among particulars. In the third place, God's will, power, and necessity are all interrelated.¹¹⁴ As J. G. Sikes says,

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 1096A.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, col. 1324CD.

¹¹² *PL* 178, col. 1235CD: "His itaque rationibus patet divinam substantiam omnino individuum, omnino informem perservare, atque ideo eam recte perfectum bonum dici, et nulla alia re ingens, sed a seipso habens, non aliunde quod habet accipiens. Creaturae autem quantumlibet bonae, adjunctione egent alterius, ex qua quidem indigentia imperfectionem suam profitentur."

¹¹³ Geyer, *LI*, p. 428.

¹¹⁴ *PL* 178, col. 1099C: "manifeste ita ejus potestatem et voluntatem consociant. . . ." And also col. 1101C: "Hic enim quaedam naturae vel bonitatis ejus necessitas ab ejus voluntate non est separata."

Abailard, however, mainly as the result of his own inability to distinguish adequately between God's will and his power, placed unwarrantable restrictions upon the power of God. Anxious to preserve intact both the rationality and the absolute goodness of everything that God accomplishes, he denies that God can act in any other way than he actually does.¹¹⁵

Abelard is concerned with God's necessary goodness because God is the ultimate resolution of all the moral indifference in the world. He must be necessarily good if the goodness of the world is to be sustained. This, however, does not mean that there is only necessity in the world; God is not dictating all the events that happen. In fact, with reference to the world, God's will appears to be capricious.

There are two reasons for this apparent capriciousness. In the first place, God's will is the ultimate basis of what is called "good." One may talk of a "good vice" or may even make an assertion such as "it is good that there is evil"—although one may never assert that "an evil is good."¹¹⁶ Abelard attempts to define the good by assigning a functional meaning to the word. Something may be called "good" when it is fit for some sort of use and when it does not impede the suitability or dignity of anything else.¹¹⁷ Conversely, something may be designated "evil" when some suitability or dignity is missing; the evil thing has hindered and blocked the quality of something else.¹¹⁸ An indifferent thing, then, is something which is neither good or bad; nothing is impeded or detracted from as a result of its existence.¹¹⁹ The only difference between the concepts of

¹¹⁵ J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (New York, 1965, first published at Cambridge, 1932), p. 120; cf. also pp. 131-132 for further criticism of Abelard on this matter.

¹¹⁶ *PL* 178, col. 1675CD.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 1676A: "Quantum tamen mihi nunc occurrit, bonum simpliciter id est bonam rem dici arbitror, quae cum alicui use sit apta, nullius commodum vel dignitatem per eam impedi necesse est."

¹¹⁸ E. Buytaert, "Abelard's *Collationes*," *Antoninum*, 44 (1969) cites this definition; he suggests the following emendation to line 8 of col. 1676 (although he erroneously writes col. 1675) in *PL* 178: "E contrario malam rem vocari credo per quam alterum horum conferri necesse est." This statement is present in another manuscript.

¹¹⁹ *PL* 178, col. 1676A: "Indifferens vero, id est rem, quae neque bona est, neque

"good" and "indifferent" is that of *use*: a good thing is "fit for some sort of use." An indifferent thing must be put to some sort of use if it is to be called "good." But to talk about the idea of "good" in terms of use is to presume that there is a *user*; something must be appropriated in a context of use. Man may use something well or badly; when he does, a thing is called either "good" or "bad." Hence, the priority of consent in the *Ethica*. God, however, determines the ultimate goodness of reality because something is ultimately good when it fulfills the disposition or arrangement of God—although that disposition remains hidden from us.¹²⁰ God resolves the ambiguity and indifference of reality; his will is the only norm for distinguishing good from evil. *Reality has meaning only insofar as it fits into God's design*; just as man's consent makes moral meaning, so God's design gives moral quality to reality which is otherwise indifferent. Thus, if good and bad are distinguished only according to God's will, the qualities of good and bad can be interchanged on God's command or prohibition.¹²¹

The second reason for the capricious aspect of God's relation to the world is his power to change the natures of things.¹²² "Since it is his creature, Nature cannot be hostile to God and, accordingly, cannot restrict his omnipotence. . . . God can change the very character of things even against their customary habits."¹²³ While this position will have to be qualified when the autonomy of nature is explicitly treated, it does indicate God's absolute power over his creation. In fact, the position is an obvious consequence of Abelard's notion of creation. God creates in two steps: the first step is the creation of material elements; the second step is the creation of substantial forms.¹²⁴ Only God can create substantial forms; there-

mala, illam arbitror, per cuius existentiam nec ulla bona deferri, nec impediri necesse est. . . ." Examples of indifferent things Abelard mentions are moving a finger and actions of that sort.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 1680D-81A.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, col. 869B-D.

¹²² *Ibid.*, col. 1111D: "ipsas rerum naturas quocunque modo voluerit permutare."

¹²³ Sikes, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

¹²⁴ Petrus Abaelardus, *Dialectica: The First Complete Edition of the Parisian Manuscript*, ed. and intro. L. M. De Rijk (Assen, 1956), p. 419: "Primas vero

fore only he can change substantial forms according to Abelard.

The combination of God's necessary goodness and his seemingly arbitrary power—bestowing both being and moral quality to the world—allows Abelard to assert God's omnipotence. Omnipotence is important because it assures the ultimate resolution of the indifference of the world. For only one who can effect his will despite all obstacles and hindrances can be called omnipotent.¹²⁵ Only an omnipotent being can bring good from evil, take evil and convert it into good.¹²⁶ Abelard relies upon an interior principle, God's omnipotent will, to bring about a resolution of ambivalence. Just as man resolves the indifference of his psychological dispositions and his external acts, God resolves the ultimate indifference of the world.

Abelard has affirmed principles which insure that creation will be good; in fact, it could not be better.¹²⁷ Assurance is also given that the world will run its course within God's good design. But two points must be made in order to assure a place for man; for a God of absolute, necessary, and unrestricted power poses a serious threat to man's freedom and the autonomy of his world. First, God's foreknowledge does not impose necessity on the world. While an extensive treatment of foreknowledge would be extraneous to this study, it suffices to say that the contingent and the free are known by God from all eternity as contingent and as free.¹²⁸ For if God's infallible knowledge were to impose necessity on man, man would be forced to sin and there would be no guilt arising from man's responsibility for his actions. God would be responsible for man's sin.¹²⁹ Second, God's will does not impose necessity on

creationes dicimus per quas rerum materiae prius inceperunt esse. . . . Secundae vero creationes sunt iam creatam materiam per adiunctionem substantialis formae novum facit ingredi esse, veluti cum de limo terrae hominem Deus creavit." Hereafter, this work will be abbreviated as: *Dialec.*

¹²⁵ *PL* 178, col. 1680B.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 898D.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 804A: "Deum nullatenus potuisse mundum meliorem facere quam fecerit."

¹²⁸ Geyer, *LI*, p. 429: "Sic enim providet et stabilit futura, sicut sunt evenientia, ipsa autem sic evenientia sunt, ut queant etiam non evenire. . . ."

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*: "alioquin ipse me compelleret peccare nec reus essem qui coactus peccarem, sed ipse per quem peccare cogerer."

the world either. Abelard makes a distinction in God's will: God can will "according to the decree of providence" in such a way that there can be no resistance by any creature to his will; or he can will "according to the encouragement of his plan" in such a way that man's free will can fulfill or frustrate God's will.¹³⁰ This distinction develops further the analogy between God's willing and man's willing. Just as man tolerates something for the sake of another thing in a situation of passion, so God can tolerate the frustration of his plan for the sake of man's free will and the ultimate fulfillment of his own design.¹³¹

2. *Free Will in Man*

Abelard's mature formulation of free will complements his teaching in the *Ethica* quite smoothly. He followed the definition of Boethius on free will: "*liberum nobis de voluntate iudicium.*"¹³² From this, free will becomes for Abelard the deliberation or judging of the spirit by which someone proposes to do or not do something.¹³³ It is easy to see how this concept would lead Abelard to differentiate the act of consent from other psychological acts of man. It is also easy to conceive free will as somewhat passive in the sense that the soul judges in terms of its *voluntas*, of suggestions and feelings that are present. Finally, because the definition situates free will in the soul, free will demands reason and intelligence as its basis.¹³⁴

¹³⁰ PL 178, col. 1093B-D. See also col. 1323B-D.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, col. 895 where Abelard develops the analogy between human passion and God's double will.

¹³² Boethius, *In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione, Editio Secunda*, PL 64, col. 492D-493A: "... sed est liberum arbitrium quod ipsa quoque vocabula produunt, liberum nobis de voluntate iudicium. Quotiescumque enim imaginationes quaedam concurrunt animo, et voluntatem irritant, eas ratio perpendit, et de his iudicat, et quod ei melius videtur cum arbitrio perpenderit et iudicatione collegerit, facit, atque ideo quaedam dul(cem) speciem utilitatis monstrantia spernimus, quaedam amara, licet nolentes, fortiter sustinemus. Ideo non in voluntate, sed in iudicatione voluntatis liberum constat arbitrium, et non in imaginatione, sed in ipsius imaginationis perpensione consistit, atque ideo quarumdum actionum nos ipsi principia non sequaces sumus." The parentheses enclose conjectured letters, since the copy of the text was not clear.

¹³³ PL 178, col. 1110A.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1110AB.

Free will is part of the contingency of nature and must be taken as a fact which God's knowledge and will do not violate.

An important aspect about free will is that it is open to diverse possibilities. Where there is inevitability, there can be no free will, no merit, and no guilt.¹³⁵ Because free will has this quality, it is radically different from God's will which is necessary. Abelard must develop a somewhat analogical notion of free will which can allow him to affirm it of God and of man, but in different respects. The central analogical notion of freedom for Abelard is a judgment made without any constraint according to reason. In this sense, God can be called free.¹³⁶ Man, too, judges without constraint and according to reason; but he does so while choosing between diverse possibilities, between opposites. This position assures man a clear role in resolving the indifference of his world: by his consent or intention he is free to use things well or badly, to love God or sin. This position also establishes a clear basis for merit, for merit rests on man's responsible consent to sin or not.¹³⁷

3. *The Will of God and the Will of Man: Their Inter-relationship*

If nature has an authentic autonomy, a structure of its own, this will find its reflection in man's moral structure: thus, there will be a natural law. Does God grace man, redeem man, and beatify man, however, in such a way that his natural structure is altered or compromised? The investigation of nature and grace will highlight the autonomy of God and man and help illumine Abelard's ideas on their inter-relationship.

The concept of nature, and consequently, the concept of natural law, does not yield a clear, self-consistent meaning in the writings of Abelard. Because nature would not receive its complete explication until the thirteenth century,¹³⁸ it is an

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 907C.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 1110C-D.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 1662D-63A.

¹³⁸ M. D. Chenu, *La Théologie au Douzième Siècle*, (Paris, 1957), in English, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West*, trans. and ed. J. Taylor, L. K. Little, University of Chicago Press (Chicago, 1968), p. 15.

elastic term in Abelard's writings; it can be used for such notions as God's plan, God himself, mind, and world-soul.¹³⁹ The operations of nature are considered operations of God, and this is especially so in the generation of human life¹⁴⁰—which is the creative bestowal of the human form and therefore a work of God. But these God-centered notions of nature must be qualified by a more autonomous notion of nature which Abelard also develops. Nature is a power (*vis*) in things which comes from God's primal preparation of them; nature explains the becoming of things in that nature is sufficient for effecting them.¹⁴¹ In this can be recognized a "rigorous distinction between the properly creative act of God and the forces of nature; these forces . . . operate autonomously."¹⁴² Miracles therefore operate "above or against nature"—and such a statement can be made only after some distinct and self-consistent notion of nature is developed.¹⁴³ God's power over the nature of things is seen at least as exceptional to the course of nature. So there is confusion in Abelard's concept of nature; it pertains both to God and the world. But this overlapping of the domain of God and man may conveniently be used to support the autonomy of either man or God.

The overlapping quality of nature finds expression in the overlapping quality of natural law. "It is perhaps less realized that Abelard held a kind of double source theory of revelation. Not only the written law but the law of nature and reason as well were the *utraque doctrina* which the best men accepted and studied."¹⁴⁴ The realm of faith and reason are confused here, just as the realm of God and the world are confused in the

¹³⁹ PL 178, col. 1088A and 1317B.

¹⁴⁰ Geyer, LI, p. 298: "Unde puer ipse non hominis opus est, sed naturae, id est Dei, hominum autem operatio alterare tantum materiam videtur secundum accidentia, veluti dum donum componit vel gladium, non etiam in substantiam generare."

¹⁴¹ PL 178, col. 746C-D.

¹⁴² Chenu, *op. cit.*, in English, p. 16, in French, p. 29.

¹⁴³ Cf. note 141 *supra*.

¹⁴⁴ D. E. Luscombe, "Nature in the Thought of Peter Abelard," *La Filosofia della Natura nel Medioevo* (Milan, 1966), p. 319.

concept of nature. This is intelligible because the Old Testament and the New Testament contain natural law.¹⁴⁵ Natural law means reason for Abelard; he affirms, in dependence on Cicero,¹⁴⁶ that it is present among all men.¹⁴⁷ Whether ultimately natural or supernatural, Abelard has a very optimistic view of its role. For the Gentiles, it was equivalent to circumcision;¹⁴⁸ and through it, through reason, Gentiles even came to know about the Trinity.¹⁴⁹ In fact, the pagans lived an evangelical life because of the natural law. For what is the Gospel but a renewal of the natural law? Even the name "philosopher" is equivalent to the name "christian" because Christ is man's "*sophia*"—his wisdom. Although Abelard retracted some of his enthusiasm for natural law in his later works,¹⁵⁰ his thinking on it does advance the role of man quite considerably. For it is man's reasoning and his following of the conclusions of reason which remain decisive aspects about natural law.

Although natural law has a confusing complexity about it in Abelard's thought,¹⁵¹ and does not receive much concrete specification, it still begins and even moderately accomplishes an elaboration of a quite autonomous moral structure for man. Even the lawyers of the twelfth century had not as yet differentiated natural and divine law,¹⁵² and Abelard shared in the confusion. But if elements of a distinctly Christian belief are conflated with natural law, still, were the Gospel not given to man, man's reason, when applied and followed, would suffice.

¹⁴⁵ *PL* 178, col. 1656D.

¹⁴⁶ O. Lottin, *op. cit.*, (Cf. note 22 *supra*), vol. IIIB, p. 284: "Abélard est le premier théologien du XII^e siècle qui ait exploité Cicéron . . . marquant la distinction entre justice naturelle et justice positive. . . ."

¹⁴⁷ *PL* 178, col. 1656C.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 821B.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 802C, 805B; cf. especially col. 1179B-D.

¹⁵⁰ *Dialec.*, pp. 558-559 for his greatest reversal; also *PL* 178, col. 1180A where he insists it is blasphemy to state Christ learned from Plato.

¹⁵¹ J. Jolivet, "Elements du Concept de Nature Chez Abélard," *La Filosofia della Natura nel Medioevo* (Milan, 1966), p. 303: "On voit que dans tout cela le concept de nature a un contenu assez complexe pour ne pas dire confus. . . ."

¹⁵² Sikes, *op. cit.*, p. 71: "It seems clear that both lawyers and theologians in Abailard's day were unable to distinguish clearly between Natural and Divine law. . . . Abailard certainly could not separate the teaching of Natural Law from much of the teaching which he found in the Gospel."

Man's reason and his moral categories have their established place; it is the Gospel that fits into them.

Grace has not been mentioned in all of this. Grace offers, however, the final opportunity for examining the roles of God and man. How man and God relate in grace must be balanced with enough delicacy to do justice to each; any imbalance in the relationship will affect the roles of each. Thus, this study of man under grace brings to its climax the study of the autonomy of God and man.

There is no question that grace is needed by man. Abelard's interest with the Gentile philosophers convinced him that their highly moral life and intuitions of the Trinity, immortal life, and just recompense for deeds had to be ascribed to God.¹⁵³ Indeed, if their faith was at least as strong as that of the Old Testament prophets, this is due only to God's gracious revelation.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, in the conflict between concupiscence and reason which man experiences, concupiscence would always be the victor were it not for grace.¹⁵⁵

In fulfillment of man's need for grace, grace achieves a primarily moral effect on man. Grace is functional: it allows man to do, it effects his activity. When one lives the new life of the Gospel, the kingdom of justice is built up in him; his lusts are ruled, his illicit movements are checked. In this way, man is prepared for eternal life.¹⁵⁶ Grace means that one puts off the old man with his actions and puts on the new man in recognition of God.¹⁵⁷ The new law frees man from sin and from the suggestions of concupiscence. Thus, he becomes a son, motivated by love for God.¹⁵⁸ By grace, the Holy Spirit rules man,¹⁵⁹ bestows his gifts,¹⁶⁰ and stirs up spiritual desires.¹⁶¹

¹⁵³ *PL* 178, col. 1179B-D.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1007A. See also 1006C, 1008B.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 896D-897A.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 874B.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 875C.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 897D-898A.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 899A: "sed gratia Dei, id est Spiritu sancto regimur. . . ."

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 899B: "experiendo dona ipsa Spiritus sancti."

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, col. 899C: "Vos autem gratia jam . . . id est non in carnalibus, sed spiritualibus desideriis."

According to these texts, God has an essential role in all these descriptions of grace. Moral renewal appears to be the work of God, and chiefly his work.

Yet Abelard's key affirmation about grace is that it operates *motivationally*. For grace is bestowed equally on the just and the reprobate: some are incited by grace to do good; some remain negligent in the face of it. This primal motivation of grace is all that is needed; as in one sailing trip a merchant may stop at many ports, so with this fundamental incentive, man is led to do many things.¹⁶² If this is the central affirmation of Abelard, that grace is primarily motivational, then the place of human activity must be strong and prominent. For motivation stands outside the one motivated; one who is motivated maintains a solid kernel of autonomy, a kernel that decides to act or not in terms of the motivation. Thus, the center of attention must shift from the motivator to the motivated, from God to man.

To confirm this prominent place for man and his activity, merit, which is opposed to grace and insufficient without grace,¹⁶³ takes on an importance which secures its value. Although it is true, Abelard claims, that justification does not come *ex meritis*, nevertheless it does come *per merita*.¹⁶⁴ Indeed, once man is graced, he does not discount his merits; quite the contrary—through grace he can trust in his merits.¹⁶⁵ Grace operates on man the way the sun's rays operate on the earth, through efficacy.¹⁶⁶ Thus, God's working in grace and man's own work cannot be distinguished. *Anything* we have can be attributed to divine grace.¹⁶⁷ Man's activity, the con-

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, col. 918D-919A.

¹⁶³ See, for example, *ibid.*, col. 903D and col. 881C and 906C.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 928C: "*Si autem gratiae, id est per gratiam, subaudi salvae factae sunt, jam non ex operibus, id est ex meritis suis. Non dicit per merita, sed ex meritis, quia et gratia Dei merita Pauli et aliorum non excludit.*"

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 860A: "*nos ipsi quam alii de nostris per gratiam Dei meritis confidamus.*"

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 1667B.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 785CD: "*sed totum divinae tribuat gratiae quidquid valet, a qua quidem recognoscat se accepisse quidquid boni habet.*"

firmation of God's efficacy, must move to the center of attention because grace is God's motivation of man.

Abelard's theory of grace demands an exemplarist explanation of the redemption. The Son has taken on human nature primarily to set up for man an example of true charity; he comes to fill man with love instead of fear, a love that frees him from slavery to sin.¹⁶⁸ Christ came to show man how to love his neighbor and to pray for him.¹⁶⁹ Christ, then, is model and motivator. Exemplarism must be the central crux of Abelard's thought on redemption, for only exemplarism adequately leaves untouched Abelard's notion of grace as motivational.¹⁷⁰ Christ's death provides the essential motive which leads man to love. Man is the one who loves; he only needs someone to instruct him in love; Christ fulfills that need. Christ helps man to fulfill the natural law of love. An indication of Abelard's basic exemplarism is the fact that it is difficult to differentiate God's work in Christ from God's work among men in general. God's presence in Christ means that new effects arise through God's will¹⁷¹—and this is strikingly similar to his activity among all men. It is like the sun's operation through its rays: efficacy is the only mode of his presence and his work.

The picture that emerges is this. Man seems fairly capable of his own activity. He has his domain and his powers. His

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 836A: "nos tam verbo quam exemplo instituendo. . . ." See also col. 836B.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 865C.

¹⁷⁰ Sikes, *op. cit.*, p. 207 has the following statement: "Since he did not regard the work of Christ as a ransom paid either to God or to the devil, Abailard somewhat naturally fell back upon the exemplarist theories which we have found both in St. Paul and St. Augustine, but, unlike them, he made exemplarism the centre of his doctrine." And also, p. 209: "The mere performance of some things and the omission of others is not enough; the motive of charity was needed, and this Christ's death supplied. This intimate connexion between Abailard's ethics and his doctrine of the Atonement has not been sufficiently brought out."

¹⁷¹ *PL* 178, vol. 1104C-D: In the context of "In qua etiam virgine Deus homo factus adeo mutari videtur," Abelard concludes: "Cum ergo dicimus eum aliquid facere, dicere est juxta ejus voluntatem aliquid contingere, ut in ipso nihil novi contingat, sed novum aliquid sicut in ejus voluntate fixum permanet, fiat."

dignity is to use those powers for the good, although he can use them for evil too. God's role is to handle whatever is outside the domain of man: he creates, and assures the overall intelligibility of the world, and bestows the recompense owed to man for his moral activity. He also inspires and motivates man to love. But, in the end, the activity of God and the activity of man are extrinsic to each other. Whatever man does, God's ultimate intention for the good will be achieved. And whether Christ comes or not, man is still capable of pursuing the good. God is needed to implant the natural law (reason) and to insure the ultimate end; man is sandwiched between these functions of God, standing full, tall, and autonomous.

Abelard's treatment of the ultimate end is the final point of this study. In the *Ethica*, it has been noted, Abelard successfully resisted the temptation to make virtue and its practice man's ultimate end. He has intentions of resisting that temptation in the *Collationes* too. Abelard insists that virtue is a means to an end and not the end itself.¹⁷² The end of man is beyond man and not within him. Thus, a distinction must be forged between the *Summum Bonum in se* and the *Summum Bonum* for man. The *Summum Bonum in se* is God as he is happy from himself; he is man's *Summum Bonum* inasmuch as man receives joy and rest according to his merits through the vision of God. Man's highest good is divine; only God is the *Summum Bonum*.¹⁷³ Man's good consists in the otherness of God and is strictly beyond himself.

But Abelard reverses himself, almost inadvertently, and with this he eliminates his clearest assertion that God is intrinsic to man in grace. When Abelard comes to specify in what heaven and hell consist, he locates the end of man *precisely in man's activity*. For if *culpa* is worse than *poena*, man's ultimate misery must lie in *culpa*. Therefore, hell is essentially *man hating God*. And, conversely, heaven is *man loving God*. On God's part, there is his bestowal of either *poena* or *fruitio*, but

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, col. 1645CD-1646A; note that Abelard wants virtues to be "utilia."

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, col. 1646B.

the ultimate end of man remains immanent to himself.¹⁷⁴ The significance of this conclusion in terms of the primacy of man's act of consent or intention, which the *Ethica* affirmed, is obvious. The interior act of man, arising from a monad-like center, perdures. Man's ultimate destiny lies in the use of his own will to love or to hate.

A consistent image of man has emerged—that of a man who enjoys absoluteness in his own domain, whose absoluteness remains constant from his moral acts to his ultimate end. Man, by his activity, informs himself and his world with either goodness or badness. By his activity, he lays the basis for his ultimate end and achieves that ultimate end. God establishes the starting-point for man; and he is needed as a somewhat extrinsic ending-point. Man abides fully, however, between those two points. The only difficulties left for Abelard are those which emerge when God's domain and man's domain come into conflict, such as in recompense. At this point, God acts analogously to man by bringing all to good, even when there seems to be injustice in the recompense. Abelard's other difficulties arising from the conflation of the supernatural and the natural in natural law and grace are rather convenient ambiguities which permit him to insure both God's concern and man's autonomy. Yet difficulties or not, man, for Abelard, has arrived.

CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions will also serve as a summary to this study.

1) The fundamental principle which Abelard uses is what may be called the priority of the interior. The principle works like this: there are two elements generally involved in understanding something; one element is exterior, the other interior. The exterior element, whether singular or plural, receives its meaning from the interior element which is some abiding form bringing intelligibility to the exterior element. Examples of

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1660C-1661B.

this are acts of consent and exterior acts, God's providence and the world, the soul and its body, etc.

2) Because this fundamental line of reasoning tends to empty the exterior element of meaning, exterior reality becomes flat and indifferent. Its indifference is resolved only by principles of meaning which bestow intelligibility (whether intellectual or moral) on the exterior reality.

3) There are two moral centers which resolve the indifference of reality. One is God, the other is man. God, by his providential vision and his overall good intention insures that the world is the best of all possible worlds and that all will work out ultimately for the good. Man, by his act of consent, brings indifference into his act and informs them with his moral meaning, whether bad or good, according to how he uses them.

4) Thus, the notions of "good," "bad," and "indifferent," must be derived from centers of moral activity, God's or man's. Goodness or badness depends on how man disposes of reality according to his will; the ultimate goodness of things depends on God's disposing of reality according to his will.

5) From this follows a certain absoluteness or autonomy to God and man. The autonomy is expressed by the determinative stance of will which focuses a complex of meaning in that will. So the strands of reality can only be tied together by autonomous centers which instill meaning in indifferent reality.

6) God's absoluteness is expressed in terms of his necessary nature. Power, will, and necessity are intrinsically implicated in the substance of God, so that God must do what he does as he does it; and whatever God does is best.

7) Man's absoluteness, which can be sharply differentiated from God's because of Abelard's firm conceptualization of the substantial difference between God and man, is expressed by the decisive character of his consent, by the innate and sufficient principle of natural law, and by just claim to recompense according to the quality of his act of consent or intention.

8) God's autonomy and man's autonomy conflict chiefly in the area of recompense; innocent children or ignorant men can

be punished without evil consent on their part. In areas of conflict, God's autonomy is primary.

9) God's role in general is to fix the starting point of man's world (creation, grace, natural law); because of imprecision in the notion of nature Abelard can preserve much of man's freedom and initiative as well as God's agency at the same time (e.g., notions of reason and natural law, grace and merit). God also assures an ultimate end for man.

10) Between the initiation and the termination of man's moral life, man has charge over his own destiny. His autonomy, expressed by his moral acts, can be easily subsumed into God's overall intention no matter what man does. But within man's domain, man is free, responsible, and his will is determinative of his moral meaning and the moral meaning of all he uses. This position can only be sustained after God's intellect and will have been sufficiently nuanced so as to eliminate a threat to man's free will. Whether by natural law or grace, reason or redemption, after these are granted, man is working by his own will. His will remains constant into the next life, and constitutes the basis of his eternal happiness or eternal wretchedness.

11) If there is incongruity between the interior act and the exterior work, whether this be in terms of man's act or God's creation, the inconsistency must be only apparent; for the reality ultimately exists in the interior act, the interior intention, and from there alone does it flow into the exterior work.

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THEISTIC REALISM AND MONISTIC IDEALISM



IT HAS BECOME a common methodological device for Thomistic philosophers to emphatically distinguish their own evidentiary and logical foundations from those of modern idealism. In this way they hope to show that the anti-metaphysical criticisms inspired by opposition to idealism are quite provincial and fail to deter a metaphysical effort conceived in an alternate fashion. Whether this device is fully successful or not, there do seem to be emphatic differences between the two outlooks. I wish to clarify the often misunderstood contrast between these two metaphysical positions, while pointing out certain similarities that are often overlooked.¹

Although it is quite true that neither Thomas Aquinas nor F. H. Bradley are quite the philosophical fashion these days, they do provide excellent specimens of their respective metaphysical types. Few other theistic realists have attained the stature of Aquinas in Western philosophy, and due to the special interest he has held for subsequent Catholic scholars, no other philosopher's doctrines have been more closely examined and refined. Hence, a comparison of any other type of philosophy with that of Thomism would not suffer from any deficiency of delineation on the part of theistic realism.

Bradley, furthermore, is an appropriate specimen of monistic idealism. Not only was he the leading British idealist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and as such the

¹ That there are similarities is illustrated by the effort of A. E. Taylor to identify his Bradleian inspired metaphysics with that of Thomism. His effort to interpret the Absolute as the Thomistic God and the appearances as the Thomistic participations is not entirely successful, since he is unwilling to make the radical re-interpretation of evidentiary foundations that this would require. Nevertheless, it does bring to the forefront certain analogies between the systems that are often overlooked. See Taylor's *Elements of Metaphysics*, London: Methuen and Co. (University Paperbacks), (1903, 1909) 1961, both prefaces and dedication.

prototypical philosophical villain for Anglo-American empiricists, pragmatists, and analytical philosophers, but he is also more critical and skeptical than his great German mentor, Hegel. Bradley learned much from Hegel, but he always resented being called an hegelian or neo-hegelian, since the ultimate dialectical rationality of the Absolute, so dear and essential to Hegel, was what Bradley could not accept. Hence, it is possible to reject certain fundamental doctrines of Hegel's dialectical monistic idealism and yet maintain a monistic idealism akin to Bradley's.

A comparison of theistic realism with Bradley's version would be, therefore, much more direct and elucidating than with Hegel's more specialized version of monistic idealism. The clarification of metaphysical types is much better served in this fashion.

I. EXPERIENCE AND EXISTENCE

1.

Although on the question of what it is that makes something real a realist and an idealist must part company, there is a common commitment for St. Thomas and Bradley that is easily overlooked. Both subscribe to what Whitehead was later to call the ontological principle, that is, that all real explanations must be in terms of actual entities. In Thomism this takes the form of the basic dictum that absolutely considered act is prior to potency. This means that, while in a changing being potency has a certain temporal priority to act, real causal efficacy and absolute priority resides in actuality. The world of potency and possibility exists only in abject dependency on act.

Ultimately, to be is to be actual. The so-called world of possibles is neither real in itself nor some intermediate realm between actual being and nothingness. Much less is it a broader, more extensive realm conveying the primary meaning of being. Rather the possibles are defined in reference to the actual; they are possible precisely as conceivable participations

in the actuality of God. Hence, in one sense the primacy of existence in Thomism means the primacy of actuality.

With this Bradley would quite concur. Indeed the worst philosophical sin for Bradley was to commit the fallacy of vicious abstraction. Vicious abstraction is the process of confusing the products of our own abstraction with concrete actuality. Metaphysics is the intellectual search for the concrete, and the concrete is the actual. Although Bradley dislikes using the term "existence" for maximal actuality, in contrast to standard Thomistic usage, this terminological difference is not really the significant issue. The issue is in regard to that by which the finite beings of our world possess their limited actuality.

2.

A philosophical realist holds that objects can be real independently of experience and, therefore, insists upon distinguishing the conditions of being from the conditions of being-known. He does not merely assert that there can exist things of which we are not aware but that even the things of which we are aware are not real because we experience them. Although their reality is revealed to us in our experience, nevertheless we recognize and acknowledge their reality as independent of our experience of them.

A Thomistic realist claims that we directly experience other beings, which are real in the same sense that we are. We intellectually acknowledge their existential reality² and conclude that they are finite substances. Nevertheless, Thomists must find a basis for their existential reality that is not reducible to their substantiality, in order that these substances not be interpreted as absolutely independent metaphysically. In recent decades an increasing number of Thomistic metaphysicians have settled on a doctrine of the real distinction between

² Thomists disagree on exactly how this takes place. On the one side there is Maritain who claims an intellectual intuition of being. On the other side there is Lonergan who rejects any claim to intellectual intuition and for whom our metaphysical knowledge of being is subsequent to the existential judgment.

essence and existence as the ontological character of finite substantiality.

To those upholding the distinction not only is the doctrine philosophically sound but it is also the authentic position of St. Thomas Aquinas and provides the basis for distinguishing his genuine existentialism from other philosophical systems. Led by Étienne Gilson as its most prominent advocate, upheld by Jacques Maritain after apparently some early hesitation, it is now vigorously maintained by a strong cadre of Jesuit Thomists.³

Nevertheless, not only was the doctrine opposed by non-Thomists but it also found opposition within Thomism itself. The advocacy of an exaggerated version of this doctrine by Giles of Rome, who had studied under Thomas, provoked a very strong reaction at the University of Paris led by Henry of Ghent. Ever since that time the controversy has raged, and some have insisted that it was Giles and not Thomas who invented the real distinction. Hervé of Nedellec, who as general of the Dominican order worked for Thomas's canonization and secured the teaching of Thomism in the Dominican houses of study, denied that Thomas had ever held the doctrine. And so it went, until even recently such eminent thinkers as Pedro Descoqs and Garrigou-Lagrange, each for his own reasons, found cause to object to the doctrine.⁴

Nevertheless, the doctrine seems to have predominated among recent Thomistic metaphysicians and provides an advantageous perspective for our comparison with Bradley. According to this view, the beings of our experience do not exist because they are experienced, nor because they are material or physical, nor in virtue of being a specific being of any kind. They exist, rather, in virtue of a special and irreducibly distinct principle called the act of existence (*esse* or *actus essendi*).

³ The thesis of the real distinction became a standard doctrine in the metaphysics textbooks used in Jesuit institutions.

⁴ A good summary of the history of the real distinction, both pro and con, can be found in Louis De Raeymaeker, *The Philosophy of Being*, tr. by Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer, St. Louis: Herder, (1947) 1954.

This principle of existential actuation is related to the other principles of a being's metaphysical constitution as entitative act to potency.

3.

The contrast with Bradley is here extremely helpful in elucidating the less obvious issues latent within the general problem of the relation of essence to existence. Bradley himself holds a doctrine of the distinction between essence and existence, although he seldom uses this terminology and never relates them as act and potency.

In contrast to theistic realism Bradley does not recognize substantiality anywhere short of the Absolute. He agrees that we encounter public objects that are just as real as ourselves. But, for Bradley, both the public world and the private self are ideal constructions from the basis of immediate feeling. Both the self and the public objects are ideal and abstract; they are universals and not concrete individuals.⁵

A Thomist appeals to the naive realism of common sense in asserting the substantiality of these objects. He places his confidence in the deliverance of direct perception and natural reflection, and *then* employs his technical analysis to yield his doctrine of finite substance. Bradley, however, appeals to his own technical doctrine of immediate experience in order to convict these objects of being ideal and abstract. He is quite willing to abandon the common sense assumption of their ultimate concreteness on behalf of what he considers to be a higher evidence and ultimate logical consistency.⁶

Since these objects are abstract and not substantial, Bradley faces no threat of their being independently real. The question is, Why are they real at all? They are not real by virtue of their essence, their "what," since it is an abstraction. Nor,

⁵ For an introduction to Bradley's metaphysics see Gary L. Bedell, "Bradley's Monistic Idealism," *The Thomist*, XXXIV, 4 (Oct. 1970), 568-583.

⁶ See Gary L. Bedell, "The Relation of Logic and Metaphysics in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley," *The Modern Schoolman*, XLVIII, 3 (Mar. 1971), 221-235.

however, are they real by virtue of an existential actuation of essence by esse. An abstraction can hardly be actuated by anything, since it is an abstraction from actuality and not a co-principle in a real composition of being.

According to Bradley, something is real only because it falls within actual sentient experience. Just as a Thomist makes his negative judgment of separation, in which he denies any identity of essence and existence, so Bradley denies that any abstraction (essence) by which we attempt to express reality is identical with that reality. All objects arise within the felt and feeling continuum of immediate experience, and so too all distinction. A thing is real only insofar as it enters into actual sentient experience, and if things are real outside of our private experience, this means that sentient experience is not limited to private states of awareness. All reality must fall within sentient experience as a minimal requirement.

All the content of our ideas is drawn from sentient experience. This is Bradley's analogue to the Thomistic maxim that all knowledge begins in the senses. But in Bradley's hands it becomes not only an epistemological but also a metaphysical theorem. For, not only is all content drawn from sentient experience but also all content is referred back to sentient experience in the act of judgment.

Judgment for Bradley is the direct qualification of reality by ideal content (abstracted content), but the only reality directly encountered is the immediate sentient reality. Hence we qualify reality only through the mediacy of qualifying sentient experience. But since all content is taken from sentient experience and referred back to it through the qualifying function of judgment, it is understandable why Bradley should conclude that reality *is* sentient experience and nothing else.

Although both Bradley and the Thomist interpret the subject-predicate form as the essential form of judgment, they have moved in opposite directions in using this logical doctrine as an instrument of metaphysical analysis. If the S-P form is the essential form of judgment, then in the existential judgment existence (or reality) must become either the subject or

the predicate. According to Bradley, in every judgment we affirm ideal content of reality itself as the subject. According to the Thomist, existence must become the predicate, albeit of a very special sort, in every existential judgment.⁷

4.

Both Bradley and the Thomist advocate some distinction between essence and existence, but their meanings differ considerably. What is meant, first of all, by "essence"? I think we can say that in general "essence" refers to that which would respond to the question, What is it? In this sense it is similar to the term "quiddity." "Quiddity," however, connotes the humanly articulable response to the question, such as could be framed in a definition, whereas "essence" connotes that in the being itself which would ground our response.

In other words, "essence" may be considered the *what* of a being, in the sense of being that which grounds our response to the question, What is it? Now the first thing to notice is that when we attempt to answer, What is it?, we are inevitably forced to respond in abstract terms. This is so, because we know the concrete being only by encountering it in sensible experience. Not all dimensions of concreteness are translatable into intellectual terms, and so our response to, What is it?, must perforce be abstract. In other words, we must leave out some of the concrete content.

Both Bradley and the Thomist believe in the reality of universals, that is, that there exist (not independently, of

⁷ Both Bradley and the Thomist resist accepting the ultimate accuracy of this description. Ultimately for Bradley we must see that the subject-predicate form must be transcended, although we are dependent upon it as the most adequate form of discourse. In the end reality cannot be a mere subject for qualification. It is a self-qualifying, self-diversifying and re-integrating, subject-superject. Similarly, Thomists recognize the inadequacy of calling existence a predicate, since a predicate presupposes a subject in which it inheres and to which it adds some determination in the order of (individual) essence. The problem here is one of deciding whether the deficiency is due to the inadequacy of the mode of expression available for a sound insight or the inadequacy of the insight itself and its analysis.

course, but as part of the concrete content of finite beings) specific identities of content which ground our abstract knowledge by becoming explicitly universal in knowledge-usage. These elements of identity ground our classifications, comparisons, and distinctions between kinds of things, and, hence, our response to the question, What is it?

But "essence" in this sense is obviously abstract, and if we ask whether it is distinct from existence or reality, we must surely answer yes. A distinction between essence-as-abstract and reality (or the fully existent) is, however, a very obvious point. Anyone who agrees that essence is abstract must necessarily concur with this distinction. Bradley's distinction is precisely this, and hence his effort is directed to establishing the inevitable abstractness of all knowledge of essence.

But Thomists cannot mean merely this, for an abstraction is not a candidate for being a constitutive ontological principle, nor for being perfected by existence. An abstraction, or the content which is abstracted, must, as Bradley surmised, be adjectival to that from which it is abstracted. What can Thomists mean by "essence," then, when they use the term in the doctrine of the real distinction?

We can only respond to, What is it?, incompletely and abstractly. But yet, we can reflectively acknowledge the incompleteness and abstractness of our response. Hence, we can conceive of an ideally perfect response that would, if it were attainable, transcend the practical limitations of abstractive intellection and capture the full concreteness of the being. Although such a response is unattainable by the human intellect, we can conceive that in the being itself there is the ground for such a response. Just as the universal elements (essence in the first sense) ground our actually imperfect quidditive knowledge, so the concrete structural make-up of the being would ground the ideally complete quidditive knowledge conceived as the limit of progressive inquiry. This latter ontological ground for putatively perfect quidditive knowledge might be called the "individual essence."

It is clear, however, that the basis for a distinction between

the individual essence and existence cannot be the same as the basis for the distinction between the abstract essence and existence. Furthermore, it is clearly not an issue of whether the isolated individual essence is distinct from being-as-such, for if a being is one among many it is obvious to all that by its own isolated individual essence a single finite being cannot exhaust the plenitude of being. In order to make clear what the precise issue is, let us further distinguish between meanings of the term "essence." We already have 1) the abstract essence (the abstract universal), which is the ontological basis for the kind of quidditive knowledge we do have, and 2) the individual essence, which is the ontological ground for a putatively perfect quidditive knowledge. Now let us distinguish two senses of the individual essence: 2a) the isolated individual essence, and 2b) the relational individual essence.

This distinction is obviously important in examining our problem, for if the individual essence is considered in itself in isolation from any relations to the rest of the universe of being, then to show that this isolated essence is inadequate to account for the very existence of the being would not necessitate that a supra-essential principle of existence be required, since it may require the full network of essential relations to the rest of the universe to account for the existence of the being. It is one thing to show that, no matter how concretely we take a being in isolation, the finite individual essence (2a) cannot account for its existence; and quite another to assume that the complete relational individual essence (2b) cannot account for the being of the thing.

It is the fully concatenated network of essential relations that leads both Bradley and Hegel to a monism, for the reality of a finite being *is* this totality of relations, or, in Bradley's case, a supra-relational totality. Hence, a theism must maintain both that the essence of a finite being is sufficiently independent to resist being totally incorporated into a larger whole of essential relations, and yet that it is not sufficiently independent to account for its own actuality.

II. METAPHYSICAL DEPENDENCY AND THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGIBILITY

1.

We have already seen that both Bradley and St. Thomas insist on the absolute priority of actuality over possibility. Here already is a fundamental metaphysical appraisal. But, furthermore, even in regard to those beings we regard as actual, further discriminations may be made. Both Bradley and Aquinas assume a hierarchy of actual entities (in quite different senses, of course). There are degrees of being even within actuality.

A thing is real for a Thomist if it has *esse*, and for Bradley if it falls within sentient experience. But both agree that to be maximal actuality a thing must not only meet the minimal requirements for existence but must do so with full intelligibility. Intelligibility, therefore, becomes a test for the ultimate reality of the actually existent beings which we encounter in experience. Both Bradley and the Thomist require, therefore, some means of determining the intelligibility of things.

It is true, of course, that for a Thomist existence itself does in a sense establish the intelligibility of things. First, the fact of existence establishes intelligibility in the sense that what exists cannot be utterly unintelligible, and that what exists is open to intellectual inquiry, which it invites us to pursue precisely by its lack of full intelligibility when taken by itself in isolation. If mere existence guaranteed full intelligibility simply as given, no questioning of a being's status in being would be elicited and no basis could ever be established for arguing to its dependency-in-being on a higher being.⁸

⁸ This was the crucial point in the debate on whether the existence of God could be demonstrated between Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston. Russell insisted that intelligibility was merely an external relation that reflected our ability to explain things. The beings of our experience were merely there. No question could legitimately be raised about why they existed. Copleston insisted that intelligibility was an intrinsic quality in reference to which we could raise the question of why

Secondly, for the Thomist *esse* is considered the principle which is the being's intrinsic source of intelligibility, since it is its highest act. But since in finite beings *esse* is limited, so too is its intrinsic intelligibility; which is another way of saying that its intrinsic intelligibility is incomplete. Thus, to insist on interpreting it as completely intelligible in itself would render it unintelligible. In other words, the intelligibility promised by its very being would be aborted by our failure to transcend the limits of the finite essence. In this sense, therefore, existence does not, independent of our interpretation of it, establish *full* intrinsic intelligibility.

For neither Bradley nor the Thomist, therefore, will the mere fact that something exists establish its full intelligibility. And yet anything completely unintelligible would not exist at all. Hence, it will not be the case that dependent beings are absolutely unintelligible but that they are unintelligible *insofar* as they are taken as independently real. Hence, unintelligibility will be due to the restricted perspective in which they are viewed.

Therefore, each needs some means of convicting these objects of unintelligibility insofar as they are viewed as independently real and also of dissipating this threatened unintelligibility when this perspectival error is corrected. Both appeal to the axiom of non-contradiction in this regard. The unintelligible is neither merely the not understood nor the unimaginable but that which shows explicit self-contradiction or self-discrepancy. Both, therefore, interpret intelligibility as an intrinsic quality and not merely an extrinsic relation. In other words, it is a quality that concerns the degree of reality of the being and is not merely a reflection of the limits of our explanation.

these beings existed. Both agreed, in other words, that the question of intrinsic intelligibility was crucial and only if the question could be raised whether something was or was not fully intrinsically intelligible could any demonstration of ontological dependence be possible. See John Hicks, ed., *The Existence of God* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1964), p. 174, for a reprint of a debate originally carried on the BBC.

2.

In making a metaphysical appraisal of finite beings a Thomist wants to establish vertical dependence of a causal nature. That is, he wants, first, to show that the finite being is dependent in ways other than merely by virtue of relations to other finite beings. If dependency were shown only in that respect, then the finite being would ultimately be dependent as a part within some kind of whole, an instantiation of some natural law or an appearance of the Absolute. In contrast to these horizontal or contextual dependencies the Thomist wants to establish a vertical dependency on a higher being.

Secondly, he wants the dependency to be of a nature of efficient causality, albeit of a very special kind. It is special both because he wants it to be a creationist efficient causality, in contrast to a merely making or altering causality, and also because it is to be simultaneous to its effect and not prior to it as is most finite causality. The problem here is to get this speciality without completely losing the *ratio* of efficient causality, without, that is, permitting the creature to be absorbed into the source of its intelligibility and being.

The crucial concept is the concept of a finite, dependent substance, which the monist claims is self-contradictory. How can something be a substance, which connotes independence in being, and yet be finite and dependent? Of course, we can say in general that this concept means that the being is to be dependent but not as an adjective or mode or accident. It is to be dependent as an effect on an efficient cause.

But this clarification does not resolve the problem, since it appeals to the category of efficient causality which itself needs to be justified in the special sense in which the Thomist means to employ it. The ordinary category of efficient causality implies (or almost always implies) temporal priority and some independence in the effect, such as some pre-existent matter. But the creationist concept of causality implies both simultaneity and, most importantly, that the effect is *entirely* a product of the cause.

The use of efficient causality in this context must, therefore,

be justified and not presupposed. Hence, we return to the concept of a vertically dependent finite substance as logically prior to the concept of a creationist efficient cause, since, if the former is not justified, there can be no excuse for the use of the latter.

What can be meant by a substance that is dependent? First, substance must imply some sort of independence. What is this independence to be, if it is not to be absolute? It means, first of all, contemporary independence from horizontal or contextual relations. In other words, a finite being is substantial only if, however causally dependent on finite causes for its coming to be, it has in its present immediacy some inwardness of being which is not the mere product of these causes. In other words, an essential analysis of the being of this finite substance is not able to reduce it to its present finite relations and thereby dissipate its perseity into contextual otherness.

Even if it can be established that finite beings possess this contemporaneous horizontal or contextual independence, there still awaits the theist a further threat to finite substantiality. For this finite substance is supposed to be utterly dependent upon a creator. How then do we avoid absorption of the created into the creator? Here we cannot employ the same tactics we used to avoid absorption into the context of horizontal relations, since there we could appeal to a residual perseity. In its relation to the creator, however, the finite being is to be a simultaneous and total effect.

If we are to save the concept of finite substantiality from reduction to a mode or adjective of the creator-absolute, we must turn to the concept of the creator itself. Although the creature is to be utterly dependent on the creator, the creator is not to be dependent on the creature. In contrast to a monism or any form of immanentism in which the relation is mutual, even if unequal, the relationship here is one-directional. This means that the creator is conceived as complete in itself independently and prior (metaphysically) to the creature. The creature does not contribute to the perfection of the creator, and, hence, cannot be reduced to a mode or adjective, which,

however, trivial, would imply some contribution to the very being of the absolute.

Here we have the justification of the application of the category of efficient causality, which implies some degree of externality between cause and effect (and here obviously not in the spatial sense). Externality implies that there is some independence-in-being of cause and effect, even though in another sense there must be some relationship between them.⁹ Here the independence is provided entirely by the cause, God, insofar as he is perfect and complete in his Being.

The use of efficient causality is justified by this Divine independence and unicity precisely because it permits the finite substantiality of creatures to be maintained even in the face of their total dependence on God. In other words, creatures would retain substantiality not through their own independence from God but through God's independence from them. The residual independence of creatures that preserves their substantiality is precisely their resistance to absorption into the being of God, not by virtue of themselves but by virtue of God's self-completeness. In contrast, Bradley's appearances are absorbed into the being of the absolute not only by virtue of their own deficiency as finite but also in virtue of the nature of the Absolute as the supra-relational unity of all appearances.

3.

Such is the theistic project and the requirements for fulfilling it. But proper philosophical order of evidence requires us to begin not with God but with creatures. A theist may know what he wants in advance of explicit demonstration, but a philosophical theism requires a demonstration with rigorous evidentiary foundations.

The first step is to establish finite substantiality in the sense indicated, in order to save the finite being from reduction to

⁹ Efficient causality is, properly speaking, a relation of extrinsic principles. Without some externality and independence between cause and effect the relation would collapse into a relation between intrinsic principles, such as between substance and mode.

horizontal relations and a possibly monistic interpretation and to establish a foundation for vertical dependency. Secondly, the theist must convict the finite substance of being merely dependently real by showing its intrinsic unintelligibility when taken as *absolutely* independently real. In other words, when taken as absolutely independently real, finite substances show self-discrepancy, or at least the constricted interpretation of them as independently real shows self-contradiction. Since horizontal independence has already been justified, the inconsistency of an interpretation that would posit absolute independence would thus establish the need for vertical dependency as the only alternative that can save intelligibility by introducing appropriate qualifications.

Just as Bradley does, the Thomist must assume that the axiom of non-contradiction is not merely formal but also expresses the conjunction of incompatible states or qualities, and that the way to eliminate the contradiction is to reconcile the discrepant qualities by distinguishing the levels or spheres to which they belong.

For example, Thomists claim to eliminate any inconsistency between the identity and difference of finite beings by distinguishing between substance and accident. Similarly, they claim to eliminate the threatened inconsistency of the existentially actuated finite substance by distinguishing between what the being has of itself and what is contributed by an extrinsic cause. In order for this analysis to be efficacious, however, they must establish the threat of contradiction in regard to the conjunction of elements in question.

Presupposing the finite substantiality of the being, the threatened contradiction cannot be removed by introduction of additional horizontal conditions. If the contradiction is to be avoided by introduction of an additional condition, it must be a condition of another order, the vertical order.

This movement in the vertical direction is also promoted by the special relationship that characterizes this conjunction of elements, that is, the relationship of act and potency. It is assumed, first, that this conjunction of elements is something

that must be accounted for. In this way it is hoped to undercut Hume's objection and leave only two alternatives: either the finite being is itself responsible for what it possesses or some extrinsic cause is responsible. The Thomistic way of doing this is to establish one of the elements in question as a perfection (act), since a perfection is not the kind of thing you merely find lying around, and its possession by a passive potency must be explained.

Secondly, the thing itself is so identified or defined as to exclude (at least by not explicitly including) the perfection. A passive potency does not include the acts which at different times it may possess, and, hence, even when it does possess an act, it itself cannot be what accounts for it. Since the being itself is not responsible for the perfection, and since a perfection or act is the kind of thing for which something must be responsible, it is assumed that it is to be accounted for by another individual being.

For both Bradley and the Thomist the axiom of non-contradiction serves as an instrument of metaphysical appraisal. But how can it be established that contradiction threatens *all* finite being (or at least our interpretation of them) when considered as independent? Contradiction would be the conjunction of discrepant qualities, but how establish that this discrepancy threatens *in principle* any finite being?

Bradley's method is to argue that any conjunction of different qualities is itself discrepant unless subjected to harmonizing conditions. But since the harmonizing conditions are contextual, and since anything short of the absolute itself is thereby discrepant, the monistic conclusion is inevitable. The Thomist does not identify just any conditionless conjunction of differences as discrepant but only the conditionless conjunction of differences related as act to passive potency. The conjunction of an act and potency is the perfecting relation of that act to that potency, and for a passive potency to possess a perfection for which it itself cannot account would be positively unintelligible (involve explicit discrepancy), unless subjected to conditions that would reconcile the imperfection of the potency

with the perfection of the act possessed. Hence, a being so composed of principles related as act and potency is defined as dependent on an extrinsic source for the conjunction of that act and potency.

III. GOD AND THE ABSOLUTE

1.

Having established the existence of a conjunction of discrepant qualities, or, in the case of a Thomist, the threat of discrepancy, and with the assumption that the self-contradictory cannot be ultimately real, both the Thomist and Bradley can argue to the reality of that state of affairs which will remove the contradiction or threat of contradiction. If contradiction is threatened unless an extrinsic cause is acknowledged, then that cause *must* be acknowledged, since 1) the contradictory cannot be real or true, and 2) the being itself is somehow real, since we do encounter it in experience.

For Bradley, although the contradictory cannot be real, the content of the finite object is in some sense real, because it falls within actual sentient experience. According to Bradley's interpretation of contradiction there are no natural contraries. Qualities become discrepant only when merely conjoined apart from the conditions that would distinguish and reconcile them. The occurrence of contradiction is a sign and product of a restricted perspective that excludes the conditions that would adjust and harmonize the clashing elements. What is required, therefore, is a change in perspective that will introduce these reconciling conditions.

The ideal is itself the source of contradiction and therefore that which harmonizes the clashing elements cannot be ideal. The conditions must be made good by that which does not suffer from the deficiencies to be corrected. In this both Bradley and the Thomist agree. For the Thomist the ultimate source of existential actuation in finite beings must be that which accounts for its own existence; in other words, that in

which there is no real distinction between essence and existence. For Bradley that which accounts for the actual content of the ideal and which can reconcile the apparent discord must be that which in itself is not ideal and is not content loosened from existence. It must be that in which there is no distinction between content and reality.

Both Bradley and the Thomist agree, therefore, that the ontological character of all finite being is a distinction between essence and existence. That is, to be dependent is to be distracted from within, and this internal disruption or real distinction is a metaphysical sign of external dependency. The finite shows itself to possess a reality which it does not include or account for within its own proper limits.

Whereas for the Thomist all that is required is an acknowledgement of the dependent status of finite being, for Bradley the ideal (the finite) must be degraded to the level of appearance. For the Thomist the essence (individual essence) is interpreted as a concrete finite substance actuated by existence which it exercises only by the gratuity of a creative efficient cause. For Bradley the essence is an abstraction of identical character from the continuum of actual sentient experience, which is the source of its reality. The content is said to qualify actual sentient experience and to be conditioned by it.

The difference is that between a finite being discovered to be self-incomplete and contingent, and therefore dependent upon an extrinsic cause, and a finite being convicted of being self-discrepant appearance and thus adjectival to an encompassing whole. In fact, Bradley's ideal objects, in sharp contrast to Thomism's finite substances, are not only adjectival but subject to transmutation of character when taken up into the Absolute. This is the essential metaphysical difference between creatures and appearances.

2.

Within the philosophical order of evidence the metaphysical differences between God and the Absolute reflect the different concepts of dependent being that they are supposed to ground.

God for the Thomist is an efficient cause of a unique sort. He is a free creator who gratuitously makes creatures *ex nihilo*.

Bradley's Absolute, on the other hand, is a totality of actual sentient experience in which all aspects are relevant to all others and to the whole. It is the only perfect individual, and all finite beings are but abstractions from the intimate oneness of the Absolute reality. Both God and the Absolute, however, are conceived as being identical with their own essence. In contrast to creatures and appearances there is no distinction between essence and existence.

Both Bradley and the Thomist have their own special problems in explaining the relationship between finite beings and God or the Absolute. The Thomist has the serious problem of explaining why a God, perfect and complete in himself, should create other beings which could add nothing to the perfection of the universe of being.

Thomists generally argue that goodness is diffusive of itself, and, in contrast to imperfect beings which act for the good in the sense of obtaining it for themselves, a perfectly good being tends to diffuse its goodness and to multiply it, since it itself is in need of nothing. Although there is no reason that God should create rather than not, or that he should create this particular world rather than another, he freely chooses to do so. In such a world creatures are the gratuitous products of free creation, and a world more radically contingent can hardly be conceived.

According to Hegel's dialectical monism infinite being constricts itself into finitude as an essential moment in the logical process that is the very essence of infinite being. Self-alienation is an element of that essence-which-is-existence of the infinite being. Absolute Spirit must alienate itself by its very nature. But, for a theist, this kind of answer is not possible. First, creation is free and not a logico-metaphysical necessity of divine nature. Second, in creation the divine substance is not dialectically parcelled out to creatures, for while they depend upon it, it is not related to them. Hence, finitude cannot be the result of something that happens to divine substance, even if that

happening be nothing more than the immanent activity of dialectical self-alienation.

Some Thomists, therefore, have appealed to essence as the passive potency and the intrinsic principle of limitation. *Esse* is supposed to be diversified and limited by being received into essence. This is determination by way of imperfection, since of itself *esse* is act. However, according to Thomism's own analysis of *esse* as the ultimate act, it is difficult to see how essence can be available to receive and limit it, since apart from *esse* there would be no reality at all. The problem here is not, of course, one of temporal priority but one of sufficient entitative independence to ground a causal contribution on the part of essence.¹⁰

If it is any consolation to the theist, it is clear that the monist has his own analogous problems. Since the Absolute is not independent of finite beings, he does not face the problem of explaining a free creation. He does have a problem in explaining why, in principle, and how, the Absolute can appear. This is not a problem of showing in detail but of showing in principle how it is compatible with the self-identity and oneness of the Absolute that there should be many finite beings.

Having rejected Hegel's doctrine of determinate negation,

¹⁰ Even prime matter, although pure potency, has some residual *ratio* not reducible to what is provided by substantial form by virtue of which it contributes something to the relationship, even if that something be by way of imperfection. But if *esse*, as it must be, is the complete source of all reality, then essence can have nothing, literally and absolutely speaking, that it does not derive from *esse*. How then can it provide anything, even by the way of imperfection, to the relationship.

In answer to this problem William Carlo ("The Role of Essence in Existential Metaphysics: A Reappraisal," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, II [Dec. 1962], 584-589) reinterpreted the concept of essence, not as that which limits *esse* but as the limit of *esse*. Essence is where *esse* stops, so to speak. Others have appealed to a doctrine of the auto-determination of *esse* to resolve the paradox. See Leo J. Sweeney, S. J., *A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), ch. 5, 101-132, and Maurice Holloway, "Towards the Fullness of Being," *Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Convention of the Jesuit Philosophical Association*, (Woodstock, Maryland: Woodstock College Press, 1962), 6-37. Sweeney cites the support of Etienne Gilson as the first to maintain this doctrine in *Le Thomisme*, 5th ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), p. 54.

Bradley cannot appeal to some concept of self-alienation of the Absolute as Hegel does. Bradley's harmonious Absolute, in which all conflicts are resolved, shows no reason why it should alienate itself from itself, or how it could possibly do so. Bradley's harmonization of hostile elements loses Hegel's machinery of self-perpetuating and continually sublated contradiction.

The self-discrepant, ideal objects are the result of a constricted perspective which excludes the conditions of reconciliation. Limited perspective is expressed by Bradley by the term "finite centre," which does not denote the self but the limited perspective on reality whose content is the world and self in one. The existence of finite centres might explain a restricted view that would leave out the reconciling perspectives, but what will explain finite centres? Just as the theist cannot appeal to essence to do a job that the very concept of essence presupposes already done, neither can Bradley logically appeal to finite centres to provide a function apart from which there could be no finite centres.

Somehow Bradley needs the finite centres as privileged concretions of the Absolute, but not only does he not have the necessary dialectical machinery to provide them, he himself has insisted that they themselves are also appearances.

The most serious problem that Bradley faces is that his concept of transmutation of appearances in the totality of the Absolute seems to imply that there are *really* no finite things at all; there only appears to be finite beings.¹¹ But, furthermore, unless there first appear to be finite centres, there could appear to be nothing else. Nothing in Bradley's metaphysics seems able to account for the appearance of finite centres.

CONCLUSION

Both Thomism's theistic realism and Bradley's monistic idealism make the classical metaphysical assumption that it is

¹¹ This was pointed out almost immediately by Bradley's critics, but its most memorable expression was given by G. E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 36.

logically possible to assess the intrinsic intelligibility of the beings of our experience by an existential employment of the axiom of non-contradiction. Each grants that anything that exists is by that very fact *somehow* intelligible and self-consistent but also insists that the metaphysical question is *how* they must be interpreted in order to acknowledge this intelligibility. Anything encountered in experience is in some sense real, but only that which is self-sufficiently intelligible is also self-sufficiently real.

They differ, however, both in what they take as the basic sense of actual reality and in what they take to be the manner of resolving the threat to self-consistency. For both Bradley and the Thomist the index to actual reality is immediate experience. But, whereas the Thomist claims to discover within actual sentient experience evidence of a meaning for existential actuation which is not reducible to the sentient experience in which it is encountered, Bradley takes the actual sentient experience as the very sense and meaning of the object's reality as well as an index to its actuality.

Both agree that the mark of finitude is a distinction or loosening of essence and existence or of the "what" from the "that." For some Thomists, at least, the essence is a co-principle in a real composition of metaphysical principles, serving as the receiving and limiting function for *actus essendi*. For Bradley, on the other hand, the essence or content is an abstraction from sentient experience, and its most appropriately, although inadequately, expressed function is to qualify and be conditioned by that sentient experience. For the Thomist, essence is the more or less substantially independent being which depends on existential actuation from above; for Bradley, however, essence is a mere abstraction which simply ignores the context which vitally influences its very being.

For a Thomist a contradiction is threatened insofar as we tend to view the finite being as independently real. The threat is removed by attributing the existential actuation, for which the essence cannot account, to an extrinsic cause. For Bradley the contradiction is introduced by the finite being itself, since

as ideal it itself is responsible for the exclusion-by-ignoring of conditions that would reconcile the conflicting ideas of its being.

Both Bradley and the Thomist feel justified in arguing to the actuality of a reality which is at one with its own existence as the presupposition of the finite beings which are distinct from their own existence. But for Bradley it is monism's perfect individual of which the finite beings are but appearances. For the Thomist it is theism's God who is perfect and complete independently of the creatures he freely creates from an overflowing of his own goodness.

The resulting universes of being are quite different. For the monistic idealist the universe is a perfectly concatenated system of the completely determined aspects of one perfect individual. The manifold of finite beings only appears to be there, and no element is anything but an abstraction from the supra-relational unity of the Absolute.

For the theistic realist, on the other hand, the universe is radically contingent, since it is the product of a radically free choice. At the same time, the theist grants to the finite being a degree of substantiality that the monist cannot countenance. The finite beings are finite substances, and not subject to transmutation. Here is a fundamentally different concept of dependent being, according to which the theist hopes to hold open some possibility of free and dependent creativity on the part of the finite.

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BOOK REVIEWS

God and Rationality. By THOMAS F. TORRANCE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 228. \$9.00.

Thomas Torrance, Professor of Christian Dogmatics in the University of Edinburgh, dedicates this collection of essays to the memory of Karl Barth, "Doctoris Ecclesiae Universalis, Magistri Mei Cari In Universitate Basiliensi." In his earliest writings, Torrance followed Barth in teaching that faith was self-vindicating and that to search for apologetic evidence is to reject justification by God alone through Jesus Christ. The present book's title as well as its central thrust, an attempt to show the rationality of Christian faith and theology, would suggest that Torrance has modified his position. We will restrict our analysis here to the central theme of these essays and certain difficulties we find with it. Torrance's views have an importance, both for his real contributions and for the stimulus they give us to reflect on theological method today.

Torrance sees the current crisis in theology as due largely to the emergence, in the shift from a Newtonian to a post-Einsteinian physics, of a new scientific view of the world and a new scientific method. Scientific changes in the past have brought about crises in theology; this was the case particularly in the shift from Greek astronomy to the Ptolemaic universe during the second to the fourth centuries, and in the change from medieval science to the universe of Copernicus and Newton during the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. Arianism was a theological aberration dependent in part on the emerging Ptolemaic universe, whereas the true development went through Nicea and Athanasius; so too today, Bultmannianism is a theological casualty of the contemporary scientific development, while the true development today will come from a renewed realization of the intrinsic rationality of the Christian mystery and the use of a strict scientific method in theology appropriate to this mystery's distinctive nature.

Torrance presents his analysis of the rationality appropriate to theology through analogy with the method of contemporary physical science; and in studying the latter, Torrance depends largely on Michael Polanyi (e.g., his book, *Personal Knowledge. Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy*). Polanyi emphasizes, in his important book, the personal character of scientific knowledge. He studies science particularly at the point of its breaking out into the discovery of a new theory. He shows that discovery emerges not simply from an objective submission to empirical data but rather from the adoption of another structure of interpretation, a structure that the scientist

cannot verify at the time but adopts for such personal reasons as its simplicity, its aesthetic value, and its suspected future possibilities in interpreting a large range of data. The scientist cannot demonstrate the validity of his theory to those who do not accept his standpoint of interpretation; demonstration here is essentially dependent on persuading the other to adopt the new standpoint and look at the data from that perspective. Positivism and empiricism can explain neither such discovery nor the scientist's more fundamental confidence in the intelligibility of the universe and his own ability to know it. The scientific endeavor is based on a belief, and it is only through this belief that the scientist is introduced to the inherent rationality of his sphere of study. As Augustine wrote, "*nisi credideritis, non intelligitis.*"

For Torrance, theology's future is dependent upon its use of a scientific rigor as strict and as appropriate to its object as physical science uses in its own sphere. This has a number of implications, of which we may mention a few. It displaces medieval objectivism, for even as early as the sixteenth century,

Calvin made it clear that there is a mutual relation between the knowledge of God and the knowledge of ourselves. That can be taken to mark the beginning of modern theology, for it is within this orbit that all our theological thinking since has moved. We do not know God in the abstract as He is in Himself, but only in the reciprocal relation which He has established through His revelation between God and us and us and God. (31)

On the other hand, and it is on this that Torrance's main emphasis lies, this implies that modern interpretations of theology as non-objective or non-conceptual knowledge, or as simply an objectification of the belief of the Christian, are misreadings of the implications of modern science. It is true that if scientific objectivity means the objectivity of mechanistic and instrumentalist science, then our knowledge of God cannot be objective because this would subordinate God to us. But to interpret science in this fashion, as so many theologians still do, is simply to take an outdated view of science. Objectivity means rather to submit one's mind to the rationality of its object in accord with the nature of this rationality; and so objectivity in theology, while attaining the intrinsic rationality of its object, is as proportionately different from that of science as the objects are different. (For his views in this area Torrance is dependent also on the long-time professor of philosophy at Edinburgh University, John MacMurray.) The words and concepts of faith and theology are, no more than those of science, expressive simply of the feelings and beliefs of the speaker; they have primarily an objective intentionality, and their appropriateness is judged more through their relation to the object than their relation to the individual subject speaking or the culture of which he is a part. Torrance adds that the presence of the subject in his concepts and words, in short,

in his knowledge in both science and theology, does not imply that the object is related only to the subject, because the theological object (as the physical object in science) is related as well to other objects. The greatest danger in theology today is a subjectivism; a great need then is for us to "think out more carefully and stringently the interrelation of object and subject and build into our thinking remedies for the inveterate preoccupation with ourselves from which we all suffer." (52)

Torrance's insistence on the "intrinsic rationality" of the Christian mystery and his theological approach to it are a real contribution to the theological dialogue today, but there are some major difficulties with it, two of which I would like to mention. In the first place, he has not sufficiently recognized that the widespread current sense of a loss of meaning in the Christian mystery is due not simply to Bultmann's and others' subjectivism and reductionism; it is also due in part to Barth's rejection, in his attempt to preserve the transcendence of God, of a developed *Vorverständnis* or preunderstanding of man as an integral part of the theological enterprise. Although Torrance shows an understanding of modern science (as shown also in his book *Space, Time, and Incarnation*), he does not analyse modern man's experience of life. His references to secularity or secularization (48, 71, 75, 78 f.) are all negative. This approach makes impossible an adequate unfolding of the intrinsic intelligibility or rationality of the Christian mystery. As Jean Piaget shows in his studies of the development of man's knowledge from infancy through adolescence, the condition for man's understanding a new dimension of his environment is a process of assimilation to schemes or structures of knowledge formed by previous experience and an accommodation of these schemes to the new dimension that now faces the subject. If this is the case, then there is no approach to the intrinsic intelligibility of the Christian mystery that can bypass modern man's distinctive experiences and his self-understanding that emerges from these. Justification, grace, the Spirit, the Church must be articulated theologically today in relation to modern man's experiences of secularity, of change, of his self-making, of urban life, of alienation. Langdon Gilkey is one theologian who has made a good start in analyzing those current experiences that offer a point of contact for our articulation of the Christian message; this he does particularly in his book *Naming the Whirlwind*.

Secondly, Torrance has not departed from Barth's views on the relation between man's Christian and preChristian knowledge as much as the title of his book and his use of the modern scientific method would suggest. For example, he writes:

The transcendent rationality of God . . . is ultimate and as such can be known only out of itself. . . . The Truth of God cannot be demonstrated from other ground or derive support from lesser truths for He is the ultimate ground and support of them all. (97)

And:

Without the Spirit, we have no opening to the transcendent Being, but through the Spirit our concepts are opened in such a way that He is accessible to us. . . . (188)

Torrance finds support for this position in Polanyi's views that the basis of scientific knowledge is fiduciary and that one can appreciate the intrinsic rationality of a new theory only by adopting its standpoint.

One can question aspects of Torrance's epistemology of faith and theology on biblical bases. But we can also question Polanyi's views on the bases of our scientific knowledge. These views may seem congenial to the classical Protestant understanding of how to turn men to Christian faith, and they have been adopted by other theologians (e.g., by Gilkey, in his book *Religion and the Scientific Future*). There is a truth in stressing the fiduciary bases of the scientific enterprise, particularly because this enterprise is a human action that demands a stepping out of the present into the future (e.g., in initiating or adopting a new theory), and this depends on a faith. But it is also a very specific kind of human activity, an intellectual activity that has its proper bases. It is true that science is based on an expectation of intelligible order in the world and a confidence in one's ability to know it, but whether this expectation and confidence are properly faith or knowledge depends in turn on their bases. This question cannot be decided simply by attempting to reflect on the bases current in the adult when he is engaging in scientific activity, if the bases of his adult form of knowledge have been established genetically by a succession of structures of knowledge developed from infancy through childhood and into adolescence. Piaget is also a help to us here, because he argues effectively for the genetic approach to human knowledge, and he gives a vast amount of data and an analysis of man's growth and structures of knowledge that support and articulate this approach. Piaget's own explanation does not adequately answer the question we posed above, because he (rightly for his science) treats knowledge as a behavior modeled on but not reducible to biological behavior, and he seeks to know the mechanisms of knowledge rather than its nature. But a philosophical reflection that, on its own level, would explain Piaget's data would, I suggest, show that the basis of science is not properly faith but the child's growing insights into an expanding environment and into his own intellectual relation to this environment. It is true that to accept the Christian faith one must accept the standpoint proper to Christian faith, and one can do this only under the Holy Spirit. But part of the conversion involved here is an intellectual conversion, and part of the basis for changing one's intellectual standpoint or perspective can be rationally available data that show the insufficiency on one's previous intellectual perspective, as Catholic theologians have traditionally (though frequently onesidedly) held.

Torrance's work is a welcome contribution to the dialogue today on the meaning of theological statements. His present work does not pretend to a complete treatment of this issue; his work *Theological Science* deals with it more at length. Torrance's use of science would seem to be an integral part of the answer to this problem, although it would have to be supplemented by a study of how we know ourselves, the objectives of our life, and other persons to be adequate for the task.

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The Future of Philosophical Theology. Edited by ROBERT EVANS. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1971. Pp. 190. \$6.95.

Whether philosophical theology has a future and if so what form it will likely take are the matters discussed in the present work. The essays that are presented here were originally papers read in a conference held at McCormick Theological Seminary in April of 1970. Their authors are Schubert Ogden, David Burrell, Van Harvey, and Heinrich Ott. In addition to doing the editing, Robert Evans has written a Preface and an Introduction that provide useful background information and set the tone for what follows.

Despite the diverse philosophical and theological convictions of the major contributors, something of a consensus seems to have emerged. It is a very limited one, perhaps more implied than clearly expressed, but real for all of that. There is agreement on the need for a distinction between philosophy and Christian theology; furthermore, the latter cannot dispense with the services of the former. Finally, one ought to take seriously at least the *possibility* that Christian theology has something of truth and value to offer philosophy.

To understand the origin of the differences that exist between the views expressed in this book, one must look to the nature of philosophy. As for a definition of the latter, none is given on which everyone agreed; indeed no effort seems to have been made in this direction. Still there is a description that is applicable to the various instances of philosophical endeavor spoken of and exemplified in the observations of the major contributors to the conference. Philosophy is not assumed to be the knowledge of all things in their ultimate causes. There is clear recognition of the fact that what it means to know universally and through ultimate causes is too much in doubt at present. But what then is the broad area of human thought designated by the adjective *philosophical* and related to theology so positively in the view of these authors?

I submit that the following description does justice to the intellectual endeavors they have in mind. Philosophy is a broad, general inquiry in which every meaningful question is legitimate including "Is question *Q* meaningful?" and "What is philosophy?" This type of inquiry is to be regarded as distinct from the activity one engages in when believing as a Christian. But what is more, such inquiry and its results are important for Christian theology in the future. How and why?

Perhaps one would proceed best by answering the second question first. Christian theology is a methodical attempt to understand human existence in dependence on the historically determinable experience and expression that is Christian Faith. But to understand in this particular fashion remains incomplete unless the same phenomenon of human existence is analyzed and scrutinized from other perspectives. To be sure, the understanding that accrues to human existence from the a-priori of Christian Faith must be brought into relation with other types of understanding of that same reality. But how is that broad endeavor of seeking understanding in dependence on something other than Christian Faith to be conceived? Here the consensus obviously disappeared. David Burrell and Schubert Ogden provide clear examples of this.

They differ as to the nature of philosophical theology in the future. For Ogden, the process of understanding involves something that is positively constructive. What man does and makes by way of mental constructs precisely in understanding is something that the Christian theological enterprise needs very much. Philosophy comes to grips with problems that are evidently presupposed for an encounter between Christian understanding and that which is non-Christian. It thereby becomes necessary for Christian theology. For Burrell, on the other hand, a more important purpose of philosophical thought is to keep the human mind open and to revive ever again man's sense of mystery that concepts and systems of thought may dull. Through this clearing operation the human mind recognizes once again that its previous efforts are not adequate to grasp the mystery of existence as lived and experienced. One is not unfair in noting the similarity between the type of understanding Ogden envisions with that sought by the field theorist in physics and that which Burrell has in mind with the endeavors of the literary critic. Science and the analysis of esthetics provide different options for the type of understanding that will be needed in critical efforts to reflect on Christian Faith in the future.

An understanding explicitly dependent on that Faith stands isolated unless it engages in a give-and-take with other, broader (because less specified) forms of understanding. To avoid the ghetto, the enterprise of Christian theology will need a functional specialization called philosophical theology. But how does the understanding that belongs to a Christian as such relate itself to other types even in the same individual, to say nothing of his

non-Christian peers? Here philosophical theology comes into play. But how does it seek to achieve its purpose? Is it to lay the grounds for attempts to answer the questions that arise ever anew from such an encounter? Or is it to keep the frontiers of thought open and in that sense to offer hope that room will always be left for Christian understanding as a viable, intellectually respectable, but free option? Philosophical theology would be primarily constructive in the first hypothesis and therapeutic in the second. No consensus on this matter was reached by the major contributors and twenty other consultants who took part in the conference reported here.

Another significant issue raised during the conference is that to which Van Harvey addressed himself and which others referred to as the morality of knowing. He employed a long allegory to illustrate that the old dilemma of the Enlightenment is that of the alienated Christian theologian today. Foundational questions deal with the grounds on which others rest and are as such the most important. Newman was right in finding it hard to understand how men could become more concerned when they heard it reported that murder had just been committed in Japan than when someone noted that God *may* exist! The problem of the alienated theologian is to be located right here. Inquiry into ultimate questions is crucial, but no one has any moral right to jump to conclusions in answering those questions. Evidence must be the decisive factor, and that evidence is so hard to come by. The alienated theologian today is one who asks questions about the implications of the God-talk of believers, one who does so in close connection with a Christian community asking and answering those questions with more equanimity than he, and one who is yet unable either to agree completely with the answers given or to rule the latter out of court.

In the discussion that followed the presentation of the papers and that is summarized by Dr. Donald Mather in a very helpful concluding Report, Dr. Carl Armbruster is described as taking exception to Dr. Harvey's unwillingness to accept beliefs one cannot account for. Dr. Harvey replied, as reported, that this nevertheless is in fact his position. In my opinion this issue is just as crucial as Dr. Harvey makes it. The Death-of-God theologians were not wrong in asking their questions; they were mistaken by and large in the hasty answers they gave to those questions. This issue of ground for believing what one believes as a Christian is too important theoretically and pastorally for theologians to neglect. It merits much more consideration from Christian scholars who consider it important not merely to believe but to be ready to render an account of the hope that is consequently in them.

Why does the Christian believe this rather than that to be true? Surely this is one of the most fundamental questions bothering reflective men and women of the East and West today. The role of proof, of evidence, of

warranties for truth claims—what is it in the case of Christian Faith? In that Faith one experiences and affirms in dependence on a norm that makes the experience and affirmation Christian. The objective content of that affirmation, its claim to truth, the quality of that experience, its claim to be appreciated—these are all determined by relation to that norm, which makes the specifically Christian what it is. As such that norm must be compared with others exercising a similar function for expressions that make no pretension of being Christian but simply of being true and for experiences that lay no claim to be Christian values but simply to be appreciable and valuable.

In this demand for evidence, Dr. Harvey may be closer to John Locke than to John Newman, with whom he nevertheless sympathizes. At least the Newman of the *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* took issue with Locke precisely on the issue of the morality of knowing and affirming without probative evidence. Still Dr. Harvey does raise the question that I likewise am convinced is central and that will in my opinion be ignored further only at the cost of theological disarray hitherto unparalleled among Christians in modern times.

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Theology Today Series. 10. *The Theology of Inspiration*, by JOHN SCULLION, S. J. 11. *The Theology of Tradition*, by ANTHONY MEREDITH, S. J. 12. *The Theology of the Word of God*, by ALOYSIUS CHURCH, S. J. 16. *The Theology of St. Paul*, by HENRY WANSBROUGH, O. S. B. 18. *Theology and Spirituality*, by JOHN DALRYMPLE. 21. *The Christian Social Conscience*, by RODGER CHARLES, S. J. Each 95-96 pp. \$0.95.

The editor and the publishers of this series deserve applause for keeping their promises. The books are coming strictly to time.

The author of *Theology of Inspiration* is lecturer in Old Testament Exegesis at the Jesuit Theological College, Parkville, Melbourne. He presents briefly but adequately the theology of Inspiration. His treatment of its development between the two Vatican Councils is very interesting. He summarizes the opinions of the great theologians who contributed to the more perfect formulation of the Church's teaching as it is found in the Constitution on Revelation of Vatican II, e. g., Franzelin, Newman, M. J. Lagrange, Benoit, Rahner, Congar, John McKenzie. It is remarkable that Fr. Lagrange's approach has remained valid and acceptable.

Fr. Scullion deals with the teaching of the Church in the encyclicals of

Leo XIII, Benedict XV, and Pius XII. But I wonder if his criticism of *Humani Generis* on literary forms is quite fair. The Pope does not write as an exegete; his purpose is the very practical one of safeguarding the interpretation of the Bible. There are literary forms that are in practice incompatible with "God's sanctity and truth." One has only to read the scriptures of other religions to see that. It is enough to read Allegro's interpretation of our own to see what Pius XII feared.

The treatment is adequate for those who have studied and mastered the theology of Inspiration; for the layman this little book may be either a help or a hindrance. Synopsized theology is certainly useful for the *cognoscenti*.

The author of *The Theology of Tradition* is perhaps the youngest of the contributors, three years ordained with the same in teaching experience at Stonyhurst. But he has produced one of the most satisfying books of the series.

In the fourth chapter he seems to be careening toward a tangent, where he says that "the nature and exercise of authority in the Church is one of the crucial issues in any theology of Tradition." He then cites the crisis about *Humanae Vitae*. However, he kept away from the question of pills and gave an excellent judgment on the harmonizing of personal conscience with the commands of authority. Nevertheless, I am still wondering how the chapter fits in. The book is brief and concise and a good commentary on the recent Conciliar teaching.

In *The Theology of the Word of God* Fr. Church has written a fairly complete theology of preaching, teaching, and catechizing. A teacher of eight years' experience in Jesuit schools in North England, he spent two years giving retreats, missions, and some conferences for catechists. He now works in Guyana. His approach, though orthodox and logical, is thus not purely academic.

There is some lack of sympathy with the pieties of the Counter-Reformation, although they were inspired by the Society of Jesus. To me, a Jesuit, while moving with the Church, should be able to make a case for the valid survival of individualism in the spiritual life. Even the present renewal of community worship—which borders on communitarianism—needs the powerful check of Ignatian spirituality. The quotation from *Mediator Dei* of Pius XII, which he contrasts, I think unfairly, with what Vatican II says about Lent, is inspired by Ignatian spirituality and is perfectly sound, "doleful" though it may seem to the author.

The chapters on preaching are excellent, especially the seventh where calling on lay people to preach is discussed. "The doctrinal pronouncements of the Teaching Authority," the fourth listed among the sources of preaching today, is too brief. It is a pity not to include the personal teaching of the Roman Pontiff as a necessary source for the preaching of bishops and priests.

Fr. Wansbrough, still in his thirties, is now Housemaster at Ampleforth where he teaches classics. A student of the Ecole Biblique of the French Dominicans at Jerusalem, he once taught at The Catholic University, Washington. His *The Theology of St. Paul* is in a way an introduction to all of St. Paul's letters. Singled out for special attention is the development of St. Paul's theological ideas as they occurred to his mind while confronting the practical problems of the infant churches. The author's classical background is evident, but, benefitting also from being a teacher of boys, his scholarship is not oppressive.

The danger of touching so briefly the huge canvasses of Pauline theology is one of saying too little or of giving only one point of view, as in dealing with original sin on page 44. I do not agree that the letters to Timothy as "less inspiring reading than the earlier ones" because "they present the institutional side of the Church." Is it fair to say that the Pauline theology of marriage "is too much conditioned by the social presuppositions of Paul's own milieu to serve as a perfect guide for present-day husbands and wives"? Still, the author's insights into St. Paul are worth having.

John Dalrymple, *Theology and Spirituality*, is a Scot and a late vocation, for he served in the Scot's Guards and was ordained in 1954. Founder of a hostel for women in distress, he serves also as spiritual father at St. Andrew's College, Drygrange.

Spirituality is a vague word with a wide meaning, embracing the practical side of the Christian life. The author here generally considers it under the title of Christian Response, its elements and development. He is slightly impatient with distinctions, admits them but sees no practical purpose in them. This I believe leads him to apply the *via negativa* of our natural knowledge of God to God's supernatural knowledge of himself. Thus he agrees with the Bishop of Woolwich that the first step in Christian maturity is to "sit loose to the image," which is very well for spirituality in heaven. However, I see no sense whatever in trying to get beyond God the Father, and apparently God does not either! Is it quite right to call the notions of the Trinity anthropomorphous?

The author's liturgical approach to Christ's place in our prayer, as the One in whom and with whom we approach the Father, is a bit rigid; he says this is more "biblical and authentic." Yet I find the adoration of the Lamb in the Apocalypse; from that liturgy St. Thomas borrowed much of the language of his eucharistic hymns.

In *The Christian Social Conscience* Fr. Charles, lecturer at Heythrop College, begins with a short treatise on conscience and the development of the socially alert conscience in modern times. He devotes a most interesting chapter to the growth of the social teaching of the Church. It is refreshing to find a modern author who is not ashamed to quote St. Thomas on law and the common good.

In the third chapter the main points of the teaching of the modern

social encyclicals is given with the historical context which called for special emphasis. The author rightly remarks that "*Rerum Novarum* outlined the basic standards for a free industrial society. Other documents of the Church have built on them but little that is new has been added in the way of principle. Such was the achievement of this great encyclical, the Magna Carta of the Church's social teaching."

There is a special chapter on the response of the Magisterium to the international discussion on the cold war, the arms race, and aid to under-developed countries. A wisely devised comment follows on two contemporary problems, racism and political cynicism. Finally, there is a most helpful appendix on the authority of the social encyclicals.

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Tommaso Campanella. Renaissance Pioneer of Modern Thought. By
BERNARDINO M. BONANSEA, O.F.M. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1969. Pp. 432; \$14.50.

"The journey through the maze of Campanellian writings has not been an easy one," says the author of this substantial work, and we can well believe him. Campanella's literary output was enormous; much of it is still imperfectly edited; and as a philosopher he is not only highly original but, to our way of thinking today, often extremely bizarre. Part of this oddness in his subject is indeed avoided by Fr. Bonansea, for he hardly touches on Campanella's philosophy of nature, which was saturated with astrology and magic, and says relatively little about his fantastically theocratical politics. What he gives us in the main is a very clear and well-considered critical exposition of the Campanellian theory of knowledge and metaphysics. These two topics occupy the main body of the work, (pp. 46-247) being introduced by a section on Campanella's life and philosophical background and followed by fifty pages on his moral philosophy and politics. There are nearly a hundred pages of Notes, inconveniently placed at the end of the book but in themselves of the greatest value and interest, since they largely consist of copious extracts from Campanella's writings (which very few readers will have read for themselves, at least as regards the more important ones, the *Metaphysica* and the *Theologia*). There is an excellent bibliography (to which, however, the following items may be added: P. Mandonnet's article—for its time a good one—in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, II, col. 1443-7; D. P. Walker, *Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella*, London, The Warburg Insti-

tute, 1958; F. A. Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, ch. 20, London, 1964; E. Gilson, *Études de philosophie médiévale*, Paris, 1921, pp. 125-45). There is a name-index, of course, but unfortunately no subject-index.

The author keeps his exposition distinct from his critique by inserting three purely "evaluative" chapters after the sections, respectively, on Campanella's theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and ethics. The expositions are scholarly and objective; every important statement is carefully and sufficiently documented. As for the critical part, some may find it excessively Thomist. The Thomist point of view is never indeed explicitly adopted, but it seems implicit everywhere, and it becomes quite evident in the evaluation of Campanellian metaphysics. This is not, of course, a defect as such, but in the event it has, I venture to think, resulted in a certain restriction of intellectual sympathy—not precisely because Fr. Bonansea reasons like a Thomist (or better perhaps, an Aristotelian) but because on some important points his understanding of the relevant Thomist thesis seems rather unsubtle and unimaginative, as I hope in part at least to indicate. I could not help wondering at times why a Franciscan should make so little use of the great thinkers of his own Order in evaluating this most "Franciscan," in a sense, of Dominican philosophers. Scotus is mentioned from time to time; the use Campanella makes of his "formal distinction *ex natura rei*" is well brought out in the discussion of the Campanellian structure of all being in terms of the three "primalities," power, knowledge, and love. But Bonaventure is conspicuously absent, his name appearing only twice, and marginally, in the whole book; and yet Campanella's theses on the soul's *notitia innata* of God, and on the discernible presence of the Trinity in the universe, are at least *prima facie* very similar to the Franciscan master's positions.

Let us glance now at some characteristic Campanellian theses on knowledge and on being and note briefly how F. Bonansea assesses them.

Knowledge. Adequate knowledge, for Campanella, is a thorough comprehension of *particulars*. As bearing on the concrete, the particular, all knowing may be called sensation, *sensus*; a use of terms which makes for confusion, as Fr. Bonansea often remarks. But as comprehensive, as a thorough *intus legere* of an object in its totality, knowledge is best called *sapientia* and is proper to the more "divine" part of the human soul, the *mens*. Everything in the universe has knowledge of a sort, just as everything has "power" and "love"—power, knowledge, and love being the three "primalities" which reflect in the created world the divine Monotriad, the Trinity. This universal knowing appears on two levels, the corporeal and the incorporeal, denoted by *spiritus* and *mens* respectively. *Mens* begins in man and extends upwards through the angels to God. In man the knowing proper to the corporeal *spiritus* includes not only sensation, external and internal, but the power to form universal ideas and to

reason, which Aristotle and his school mistakenly supposed to be incorporeal. In fact the universal is only an internal sensation bearing on similarities between sense-objects. As such it is doubly defective; it lacks both the certitude that is the mark of external sensation and the comprehensiveness, the total *intus legere* proper to true intellectual intuition, the act of *mens*. Conceiving the universal in this way, it is no wonder that Campanella rejects the Aristotelico-Thomist theory of abstraction by an *intellectus agens*, and indeed the whole theory of knowledge that this presupposes—that knowing is the non-material reception of forms. Two further characteristics should be noted: Campanella's insistence on doubt as a necessary prolegomenon to metaphysics, and his stress on self-knowledge as the primary and most radical form of knowledge.

It is not difficult for Fr. Bonansea to point out the confusions and obscurities of the Campanellian noetic; and this part of his evaluation need not be repeated here. More positively, he draws a clear distinction between Campanella's methodical universal doubt and that of his younger contemporary Descartes; and between Campanella's empiricism (so to call it) and that of Locke and Hume. On two matters, however, it seems to me that he might have pressed his analysis further. The first concerns one of the weakest points in Campanella's system, the link between sense-knowledge, the work of *spiritus*, and full understanding, the work of *mens*. Gilson, in one of his earliest essays (referred to above), asked himself how on earth Campanella could combine an apparently sensist epistemology with a quasi-mystical natural philosophy and metaphysic full of "fantasmagorie poétique"; and he found the answer in Campanella's persistent habit of reasoning by analogy, of treating all discursive understanding as a discovery of similarities, of *sensus similis in simili*. Gilson did not go into the metaphysics underlying this analogical "habit" and I had hoped that Fr. Bonansea might take the matter up, but he has very little to say on this aspect of Campanella. The other matter is Campanella's stress on the primacy of self-knowledge; a consequence of the strange-sounding doctrine of the three "primalities," as Fr. Bonansea shows: the whole universe has an "embryonic consciousness" which comes, as it were, to the surface in the soul's self-cognition through self-presence (*notitia praesentialitatis*). To speak personally, I find this a very exciting idea and one that Thomism by no means simply rules out (as Fr. Bonansea seems to imply, e.g., pp. 124-5), though, of course, it needs to be carefully rethought and restated. The strongest thing in Campanella was his sense of God's immanence in the world: it enabled him sometimes to write great poetry. His weakness was overconfidence and a lack of critical (and self-critical) finesse. He flung himself against a desiccated Aristotelianism without (it seems) ever really trying to understand in depth the principles from which, after all, it derived. More precisely, as regards his noetic, he lacked what Aquinas had not lacked, an exact and clear conception of the degrees of knowledge.

Being. Fr. Bonansea, though he is not directly concerned with biography, follows R. Amerio and others in seeing a development in Campanella from an earlier "naturalistic" phase to the "Christian philosophy of his later years." This Christian emphasis was related, of course, to the friar's lifelong anti-Aristotelianism, and in passing it is interesting to observe what a different course this attitude took in the other great Dominican rebel of that time, Giordano Bruno, whose break with the Aristotelian cosmos led him in the event away from Christianity. Why Campanella's mind went in the direction opposite to Bruno's is known to God alone; Fr. Bonansea in any case does not raise the question (nor was he obliged to). One factor perhaps was an underlying Platonism, such as comes out in the statement "*res cunctae constituuntur ex primi entis participatione.*" Another, surely, was that admittedly somewhat reckless zest for analogy which (reinforced no doubt by simple piety) led Campanella, with a magnificent naivety, to read into being in general his own self-awareness—seeing in a grain of sand or blade of grass the three "primalities" that he found in his own soul: power, knowledge, love; so that in the physical cosmos itself he thought he discerned the Holy Trinity. And he thought he discerned It *metaphysically*; the "primalities" were for him the basic principles of being as *naturally* intelligible; they replaced the Aristotelian correlatives, act and potency. But his new metaphysics, his rethinking of the basic notions of essence and existence, centered inevitably on the first "primality," power. And the result, as Fr. Bonansea shows, was confusion. For in effect what Campanella meant by *potentia* or *potestas*, in this fundamental sense, involved a blurring of two concepts which, as St. Thomas had shown, have to be kept distinct if one is to preserve any essential difference between the created world and God: the notions of potentiality with respect to activity (*operatio*) and potentiality with respect to existence (*esse* (cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, qq. 54, aa. 2-3). But this point is worth examining a little more closely.

In passing, I could wish that Fr. Bonansea's exposition of the Campanellian teaching on essence and existence had been a little clearer; no doubt this teaching is already rather confused in the texts, but the ambiguities have not, to my mind, been very acutely sorted out; moreover, in this very important part of the exposition we really need more quotations *verbatim* from Campanella than we are given in fact (I refer especially to pp. 150-1, 228-31). This said, let me say that, so far as I understand it from the account here given, Campanella's theory of essence and existence may be reduced to five points. (1) The "primality" that is "power to be" is the same as essence, *essentia*. (2) Essence, in this radical sense of a relation to existence, *esse*, is never conceived by Campanella as mere potentiality to *receive* existence (as in St. Thomas, when speaking of creatures) but always as *having* existence in some way, either imperfectly or perfectly. (3) An essence has imperfect existence while it

is still only "in its causes"; but this existence is also called (and the term makes for confusion) "*intrinsic*." (4) It has perfect existence when, being now caused, it "stands outside its causes"—having, therefore, now an "extrinsic" existence. (5) The difference, as regards existence, between an essence as "in" its causes and as "out" of them, as "imperfect" and as "perfect," is purely modal—the *esse* of the essence has simply changed its "mode," that is all. Now on all this, two observations seem called for. The first and more general is that Campanella seems always to conceive of being as a kind of *force* and of existence as a sort of *deed* or action. As Fr. Bonansea paraphrases certain texts (which might well have been quoted more fully), "just as power is needed for acting, so it is need for being"; and again, *potentia essendi* is that whereby a thing "maintains itself in being." And this might have been just an emphatic way of stating the *positivity*, so to say, of that which is, but in fact it is clearly due to some confusion between *operatio* and *esse* in creatures such as St. Thomas was at pains to avoid. The second observation is made, very succinctly, by Fr. Bonansea when he points out Campanella's conception of a merely modal difference between possible and actual existence "logically leads to pantheism." If the essence of things as merely possible is an essence that already exists, how do you distinguish, ultimately, between the world of creatures and the mind of God?

Earlier I remarked that Fr. Bonansea's criticism of Campanellian positions is sometimes deficient in "intellectual sympathy." This phrase may be questioned, but I think that the careful reader will see what I mean if he considers, for example, the way the idea of our having "innate knowledge" of God is refuted, (pp. 229-30) and still more the treatment of the thesis that "we love God by an innate and essential love more than we love ourselves, for what we love in us is what God really is" (p. 163)—a statement which, I should have thought, was substantially in line with St. Thomas's teaching in the *Summa* I, q. 60, a. 5, and in any case did not deserve the slick comment (p. 234) that this point in Campanella's teaching "is contradicted by the fact that many people love themselves more than God. This . . . is enough to show that our love for God is neither an essential part of human nature nor a necessary property of it. It is only an accidental (*sic*) act, depending on our free will." One further criticism, concerning the subtitle of this book. Whether Campanella was or was not a "Pioneer of Modern Thought," the reader interested in this question will remain unenlightened by Fr. Bonansea; for, apart from a passing allusion to Campanella's influence on Leibniz, the question of his relevance to modern philosophy is left entirely in the air.

Still, all in all, this is a substantial contribution to Campanellian studies and should find a place in any decent philosophical library. And Campanella himself, for all his waywardness and confusions, is a giant among the later scholastics and one of the glories of the Dominican Order. It is

pleasant to remember that after nearly thirty years in prison, and having been physically tortured both by the Inquisition and the Spanish civil authorities, this extraordinary man was declared a Master in Sacred Theology by the General Chapter which met at Rome in 1629.

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Grecia e Roma nella Storia delle Religioni. By GIUSEPPE GRANERIS. Studi e Ricerche di Scienze Religiose, No. 1. Edizioni della Pontificia Accademia Romana. Città Nuova Editrice, 1970. Pp. 393.

This book could be described as an attempt to place the religions of Greece and Rome in historical perspective and to situate them in the general history of religions. It contains, however, no general introduction to the whole series nor any explicit outline of the aims and method of this particular book. After a brief introduction the religions of Greece and Rome are dealt with separately. Finally, the author discusses some common elements and problems.

The introduction accepts much of the commonly shared orientations of contemporary historians of religions. The limitations of archaeology in unearthing the religions of the past is readily admitted. The author rightly rejects the archaic endeavors to draw up stages of religious evolution. And again he admits that ethnological and cultural elements are related to religious facts.

The rest of the book does not, however, live up to this promising introduction. Over one-third of the chapters are given over to describing the various Greek and Roman gods. Their history, attributes, religious functions, and family relationships are all portrayed in monotonous sequence. The often concise and accurate statements about these gods make useful encyclopedic references. But the reader is given no idea of the part gods played in the daily lives of their adherents. The importance of each of these gods to the Greeks and Romans is not shown; the reader is left to make his own imaginative conclusions.

In spite of the early admittance of the importance of cultural elements, the author does not supply his readers with enough cultural material to make the subject-matter of his book intelligible. Consequently the reader is not able to see Greek and Roman religions as ways of life nourishing the day-to-day living of the believers, supplying them with meaningful explanations of the world around them, and presenting ideals worth following. To give one example, prayer is never related to culture.

Prayer-forms are not seen as part of a cultural style, and prayer-content is not envisaged as an expression of the cultural needs of a people. Or again, immortality is singled out as an important attribute of the gods. But why this is the case is never spelled out; nor does the author put much emphasis on immortality as a human ideal which leaves enormous impact on burial customs, legal practices of child-adoption, and so on. At one point the author makes the appropriate remark that anthropomorphic elements, which are characteristic of the gods, are symbolical in nature. Much light would have been shed on these religions had the symbols been examined and analyzed.

One is never sure of what the author is really doing in the final section of his book. His claim might be that he is trying to place Greece and Rome in the general framework of the history of religions. His most important statement is that the two classical religions have features common both to Indo-european and Mediterranean religions. Such features are not examined, and the significance of the similarities referred to is not explored. Most of what the author writes in these final eighty pages could be described as haphazard reflections. Why he has to end with a theological postscript which explains all religions—Islam excepted, or left out, or possibly ignored—as a “*praeparatio evangelica*” to Christianity is not clear at all.

In short, this book says a lot about Greek and Roman religions, but it still leaves the reader in the dark. One can hardly say that his understanding of these religions has been enhanced. How the various gods and cults formed part of the people's religious experience—a concept the author ignores—remains a mysterious puzzle to be solved by the reader himself.

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Johannes Blund, Tractatus de Anima. Ed. by D. A. CALLUS, O. P. and R. W. HUNT, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, 2. London: Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 147. \$20.00.

When Father Daniel A. Callus died in Malta, May 26, 1965, in the 78th year of his life, he left many unfinished projects behind him. Before he died he asked that Dr. Richard Hunt and Miss Beryl Smalley be his literary executors. One of the more important projects in his mind was the publication of John Blund's *Tractatus de Anima*. Both John Blund and his treatise on the soul were, in a sense, Fr. Callus's personal discovery

while working on his D.Phil. from Oxford. One of the more important studies to come from his pioneering research was his paper on "The Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford," published by the British Academy in 1943. At that time only one MS was known of the *Tractatus de Anima*, that of Cambridge, St. John's College Library 120. In 1955 he announced the discovery of a second MS in Vatican, Vat. lat. 833. A third MS of this work was later discovered by Père B.-G. Guyot, O.P., in Prague, Bibl. Univ. cod. IV. D. 13 (667). Father Callus was unable to collate the text of either the Vatican or the Prague MSS. Before he died he had transcribed the whole of the Cambridge MS with variant readings and most of the sources. But it remained to Dr. Hunt to collate the three known MSS, supply the variant readings and complete the *apparatus fontium*. This was a formidable task for anyone not specializing in the intellectual history of the period and for one who had to step into the middle of a project only half completed. No one but Dr. Hunt with the help of Fr. Daniel's friends in Oxford and on the Continent could have managed so courageously and faithfully the rendition of this important text.

The importance of the *Tractatus de Anima* lies basically in its scholastic antiquity, being an early work, falling between the years c. 1197 and 1204, that is, before Alexander Nequam entered the abbey at Cirencester c. 1197 and before news of the fall of Rouen on June 24, 1204, reached him. Very little is known for certain about the career of John Blund. He was a clerk in the service of Henry III of England by 1227, elected archbishop of Canterbury on Aug. 26, 1232, but never consecrated, and finally appointed chancellor of York Cathedral in 1234, an office which he held until his death in 1248. On his early life we have only pure conjecture. It would seem that John was born about 1175 and that he studied first at Paris, where he incepted in arts, then returned to England to teach at Oxford. Perhaps during the interdict laid upon England by Pope Innocent III, 1209-1214, he returned to Paris to study theology. P. Glorieux places his regency in theology from 1218 to 1225, when he was succeeded by Alexander of Hales.

The *Tractatus* itself must have been written in the first decade of the 13th century, probably at Oxford while he was teaching arts. It is a highly sophisticated treatise, treating in detail the physiological and psychological aspects of the soul and its faculties in 26 short chapters, following the interpretation of Avicenna. Clearly John Blund knew the text of Aristotle extremely well, but it was Avicenna's *De anima* (*Liber sextus naturalium*) which served as the immediate source for John's *Tractatus*. The chapters on the five external senses and the four internal senses are replete with concrete physiological details, as one would expect from an English empiricist.

His discussion of the human intellect (XXV. ii, 337-361) is most

illuminating, for he does not follow Avicenna's teaching entirely, although he does hold for the four kinds of intellect mentioned by Avicenna: "the material or potential intellect" entirely without form; "the formal or adept (*adeptus*) intellect" meaning the formal images and species of external things; "the intellect in effect," that is, the union of the material and formal intellect producing knowledge; and the "agent intellect," which abstracts universals from their accidents. The interesting point in this explanation of Avicenna's four kinds of intellect is that the agent intellect is not unique for all men and separated from all mankind but is a power of the individual soul, *vis anime apprehensiva*. (341) For John the "formal intellect" is impressed upon the soul in order to produce the intellect in effect "by means of the first giver of forms," (*mediante primo datore formarum*). (344) Without making the suggestion his own, he notes that many authors say that this "giver of forms" is an angel given to each man in order to perceive the truth. (344) But nowhere does he suggest that the agent intellect is the tenth separated intelligence, as Avicenna did, nor that it is identical with God, as some of John's Christian contemporaries did. In this regard John is closer to Aristotle than he is to Avicenna and his Latin contemporaries.

In discussing the internal sense faculties John emphasized the role of reminiscence, a kind of memory proper to man, capable of knowing universals, while memory is a sense belonging to all animals capable of knowing both singulars and universals. (275) It would seem that John attributed to reminiscence many of the same functions that later commentators would attribute to the *vis cogitativa*, a higher function of *vis aestimativa* not mentioned by John.

As for free will, John argues that it is not a special power of the soul distinct from reason or will. For him "reason and free will are one and the same in essence." (385) It is "a power in the soul of choosing good and evil according to a consideration (*examinationem*) proceeding from reason." (283) Instead of making free will a power distinct from intellect and will, as some of his contemporaries did, or a special modality arising from both intellect and will, as Aquinas did, John makes it identical with the reasoning power of the intellect. For John this follows from the literal meaning of *liberum arbitrium*, which is not properly rendered by our English expression "free will."

For Fr. Callus there were two aspects of John Blund's work that struck him as significant. The first was John's teaching concerning the unicity of the substantial form and soul in man. In a little known study by Fr. Callus called "The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form," which appeared in *THE THOMIST*, 24 (1961), 120-149, he pointed out the older tradition of unity followed by John Blund. The controversy over this question occupied the whole of the 13th century. The main sources for this medieval speculation, as Callus pointed out, were Avicenna for the

unity thesis and Avicenna (ibn Gebirol) for the pluralist theory, "Gundisalinus being the immediate channel through which the same problem reached the schools." (*ibid.*, 136) The whole issue was confused by schoolmen who refused to consider the "soul" identical with "substantial form." They held that there were at least four substantial forms in man, including the *forma corporeitatis*, but only one soul; others said that there were three substantial forms in man, the vegetative, sensible, and rational, constituting three separate souls. Blund is unequivocal in his discussion of the problem, insisting with Avicenna that man has only one soul and one substantial form. (35-45) Fr. Callus found in John Blund "the earliest, clear and unmistakable account" of the controversy in which John sided with Avicenna in defending the unity theory. Clarification of the issue came only when Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas taught that the human soul is the substantial form of man and that the substantial form is the first, immediate, and total actualization of first matter, which is a pure potentiality. But even then, pluralists, such as John Pecham, considered the unity teaching to be heretical.

The second aspect which Fr. Callus found to be most significant was John Blund's acquaintance with the whole of the Aristotelian corpus (except, of course, for the *Ethics*). In the *Index Auctorum* of the present edition, Dr. Hunt shows us at a glance the extent to which Blund was familiar with the works of Aristotle; he quoted Aristotle twice as often as Avicenna. For the most part it is from the vulgate translation of James of Venice that he quotes. John Blund is but one witness to the extent that Aristotle and Avicenna penetrated the faculty of arts at the turn of the 13th century.

From an otherwise impeccable edition there is only one typographical error on p. 103, line 9, where the reading given is "con contingit" when it should read "non contingit." This edition may well stand as a model of how medieval texts should be published. There is only one problem: the cost of the book.

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My Conversations with Teilhard de Chardin on the Primacy of Christ. By GABRIEL M. ALLEGRA, O.F.M. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971. Pp. 126. \$3.75.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the priest-paleontologist whose writings have so greatly influenced contemporary Christian thought, wrote his spiritual manifesto, *The Divine Milieu*, in 1927. Since its publication after Teilhard's

death in 1955, *The Divine Milieu* has come to be recognized as a classic of spiritual theology, a magnificent presentation of Catholic spirituality, and a work of unquestionable orthodoxy. Although it seems unbelievable today, Teilhard was, despite heroic efforts, unable to get the book past ecclesiastical censors. And so, in 1942, fifteen years after completing the manuscript, Teilhard was still trying to get a *nihil obstat* for *The Divine Milieu*. The apostolic delegate to China appointed Father Allegra to censor the manuscript. Father Allegra found things that appeared to him to be "shocking," "daring," and "even wrong." He disapproved the work on the grounds that it was ambiguous, confused the natural and supernatural orders, and was inadequate in its treatment of sin, the Cross, and redemption. The apostolic delegate instructed Father Allegra to tell his findings to Teilhard, and so began a series of weekly conversations between the author of this book and Teilhard de Chardin.

These conversations are more or less reconstructed and presented here in the form of a dialogue between Teilhard and the author. This work, then, is not a scholarly study but a memoir of some conversations, written decades later in the form of a dialogue.

The general topic of the dialogue is John Duns Scotus's doctrine of the primacy of Christ; the book is, in fact, simply a popular explanation of the Scotist doctrine. There is little of substance of Teilhard de Chardin's thought; Teilhard serves merely as a foil, somewhat in the manner of Anselm of Canterbury's Bozo, for Allegra's explanation of the Scotist teaching on Christ's primacy. It is really just as well that Father Allegra is the star of his book rather than Teilhard, for the author shows almost no understanding of Teilhard's thought. For a thorough and scholarly discussion of the relationship between Scotus's idea of Christ primacy and Teilhard's Christ-Omega, the reader is referred to Robert G. North, *Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1967.)

The book is attractively presented, and the translator's notes are excellent.

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The Scientific Enterprise and Christian Faith. By MALCOLM A. JEEVES.
Downers Grove, Ill.: Inter-Varsity Press, 1971 Pp. 168. \$2.25.

In the late summer of 1965, a one-week conference was held in Oxford, England, of thirty-six participants from ten countries. All of them were professed Christians and the large majority practicing scientists holding academic positions in their specialties. Each prepared a position paper in

advance which was shared with all the others. The author, a professor of Psychology from Australia, drew the material for this book from these papers and from the conference discussions.

The first half of the book is devoted to the possibility of maintaining simultaneously without contradiction a Christian view of reality and a scientific view of reality. This problem is first approached by contrasting the Greek and Hebrew views of God and nature. In Greek thought nature is uncreated and eternal, therefore, divine. Man with his reason tries to understand nature but never to change it. By contrast, in the Biblical view nature is created by God and sustained at every moment by his power. It is neither eternal nor divine and the worship of any part of nature is always idolatry. Man has been given dominion by God over all other creatures. Man continually changes nature either blessing it or cursing it. It was the peculiar combination of Greek rationalism with Biblical contingency beginning in the late sixteenth century and flowering in the seventeenth which led to the scientific enterprise and the full development of modern science.

Against this background, the question of God's activity in the world as related to the laws of nature is discussed. Several ways of looking at this relationship are considered, but no one of them is found to be satisfactory. The key to a solution to the problem is felt to lie in the continual activity of God in holding the whole of creation in being. The treatment concludes with a rather good and certainly helpful discussion of miracles. My own feeling is that most readers will not derive very much benefit from this chapter of the book. One difficulty with it is an apparent tacit agreement that the laws of nature as known in science imply that the course of events in nature is always orderly, dependable, and predictable. In fact, they are observed to be so only in the laboratory where apparatus has been designed to reveal them, or in technology where an artificial situation has been created to optimize dependability. In nature as a whole everything happens at once, the course of events is characterized by chance and accident, and the novel and the unpredictable continually emerge. In a universe which is continually running down in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics, new achievements and new creations are continually made at the expense of the general degradation and decay. It is in this context, it seems to me, that the problem of God's action in the world needs to be dealt with. Relevant to it is Whiteheadian process philosophy and the poetic insights of Teilhard de Chardin. Contemporary treatments of the problem by Langdon Gilkey, Eric Rust, Ian Barbour, and others are much superior to that in this book.

The discussion turns next to the nature of the scientific enterprise. Here the impersonality, rigorous methodology, and thorough objectivity which characterize science as it appears in textbooks and papers in scientific journals is contrasted with the enterprise of science as it is actually carried

out in the community of science by human beings with personal commitments to the enterprise. The discussion is heavily dependent on Michael Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge*. Considered in this way as human communities with a common commitment and a shared faith and convictions, there are many parallels between science and Christianity. The discussion here is well done and helpful.

The final topic in the first section of the book deals with the role of explanations, models, and images in both science and Christianity and their relationship to the reality they are designed to represent. Explanations in science are often given on several levels in quite different terms as, for example, in biology in terms of nucleic acid and protein molecules, in terms of whole organisms, or in terms of physiological structure and glandular secretion. In physics different models of electrons and atoms have been used and discarded at different stages of explanation. The same holds true in religion where various images and models are used in the Bible or in subsequent theological explanations. Both in science and Christianity the hazard that must always be guarded against is that of identifying the image or model with the reality it is designed to describe or explain.

The remainder of the book is devoted to specific problems between science and Christianity. These are cosmology, evolution, the origin of life, psychological accounts of religious experience, and physico-neurological determinism versus human freedom. There have been so many new developments in cosmology since 1965 that the discussion of this subject is rather out-of-date as well as inaccurate in places. The long section on evolution is inconclusive and not particularly helpful. Its rather cavalier disposal of Teilhard de Chardin is disappointing, especially from a conference of scientists who are also Christians. Much better treatments of this subject have been given elsewhere in current literature. The short section on the origin of life is acceptable but does not add very much of interest.

The remaining two topics are covered in the last chapter. The treatment of them is excellent and illuminating. For this reviewer they are the high point of the whole book.

One of the problems with a book which attempts to reflect the consensus of a fairly large conference is the necessity to seek positions which do justice to all the participants. This results in a cautious approach to problems and a certain amount of indecisiveness. There are many reservations about each possible position and few problems are solved although a number are identified and their nature well described. Yet the book has a strong and positive Christian orientation, is honest, and is reasonably well informed. For any scientist who is concerned about possible conflicts between his science and his Christian faith, this would be a good book with which to start. For him it will be reassuring and hopefully will entice him to further exploration of the issues raised in it. If so, he will find that

there are other currently available books which go more deeply into the several problems raised in this book and emerge with considerably more satisfying theological perspectives on them.

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Sex: the Radical View of a Catholic Theologian. By MICHAEL VALENTE.
New York: The Bruce Publishing Co.; London: Collier-Macmillan,
1970. Pp. 158. Paper, \$2.95.

In this small book, Michael Valente uses the widespread dissent from *Humanae Vitae* as a fulcrum upon which to gain leverage against the entire traditional Christian sexual ethics and against the Roman Catholic ecclesiology of Vatican I and Vatican II. The book defies easy summary, since it is not tightly organized theological argument; rather, it is theological vulgarization—a diatribe aimed at the widest non-professional audience.

Valente's position is that "there is no intrinsic moral valuation in any species of sexual act." Rather, the value derives from "the context of an individual's life" or from "the personal judgment of the individual." (p. 24) Valente does not notice that context and judgment are not identical; he is not concerned with theoretical precision.

Neither does Valente systematically examine either the older or newer arguments against the morality of practices such as contraception. Of polygamy, he simply asserts that "there is no clear-cut, supposedly intrinsic or 'natural' reason why being monogamous, as opposed to being polygamous, is any more virtuous than having blue eyes instead of brown." (p. 23) Masturbation is not unnatural and is no more harmful than cigarette smoking. (pp. 73-74, 132, 136-137) Contraception is an ethical imperative. (p. 118) The quality of the relationship and the intention with which it is carried on are the factors that count, not whether the couple are married, use a contraceptive, or are of opposite sex. (p. 96) If sex can be non-procreative, then the sanctions against masturbation, homosexuality, and even bestiality are removed. (pp. 126, 135, 140) Adultery is not absolutely wrong. (pp. 130-131) Loveless, casual relationships may have some value, and in any case are not intrinsically sinful. (pp. 136, 143)

Valente does admit some moral guidelines for sexual behavior, although he makes clear that such guidelines have no validity as absolute, objective precepts. One should ask oneself if anyone, including oneself, will be hurt by one's action. (p. 136) Guilt feelings are to be avoided. (p. 132) Meaningful and loving relationships are desirable, but empty, promiscuous, and

unfaithful ones are not on that account to be regarded as sinful. (pp. 128-130) In the last analysis, what is at stake is individual comfort in life. (pp. 139, 149)

Valente's positions in themselves are not particularly new. Many liberal, secular writers who treat sexual ethics in utilitarian terms, and who base their judgments exclusively on psychological and sociological data relevant in a utilitarian approach, share all of the same positions. (Even in such writers one seldom finds so much obvious sympathy for some of the perversions.) What is peculiar about Valente's book is that he presents himself as a Catholic theologian and weaves into this secular sexual ethics a polemic against the ecclesiastical "Establishment"—that is, the institutional Church. The demise of the institutional Church is being completed today through a Protestant dynamic which extends beyond and generalizes the process begun by Luther. (p. 112)

Valente holds that all creedal statements are subject to revision and evolution; the opposite position is the "hierarchical heresy of institutionalism." (p. 92) "Even if all creedal statements fell into disuse, however unlikely that may be, faith would still remain." (p. 97) Infallibility does not imply the exclusion of error under specified conditions; what it really means is "the indefectibility of the believing community's existential commitment to its Lord Jesus." (p. 109) Characteristically, Valente does not explain what this means; he never tells us whether, for example, an atheist who regards Jesus as one heroic figure among others shares in the "existential commitment" or not.

Valente disposes of theological sources in a cavalier manner. Scriptural teachings relative to moral issues are excluded from the argument by a simple assertion that the moral teachings in the Bible are culturally relative and that only the message of salvation taken as a whole is revealed truth. (p. 147) Tradition is excluded by the now-familiar device of the presentation of a simplified schematized historical account of the development of traditional teaching, an account which ignores the unity and continuity of Christian moral teaching and which emphasizes the variation and peculiarity of various theological explanations of that moral teaching. (pp. 31-64) Valente's history contains several important statements that are not documented and that to the best of my knowledge are simply false, for example, the following:

It is interesting to note that, despite the detailed consideration he gave to the sins of lechery, Thomas Aquinas took a tolerant attitude toward prostitution; he believed it to be a necessary evil without which great good would be lost or greater evil fostered. His justification was not based on a recognition of the futility of a civil-law prohibition, but rather represented consent to a male-centered, double-standard view on questions of sexual morality. (p. 50)

Valente at various points in the book expresses his dedication to a number of values, including reason, freedom, truth, love, and life. (pp. 15-29) It

is difficult to know which of these values justified such a treatment of Thomas Aquinas.

Basic to Valente's "theological" position is a totally dialectical theory of reality and of human life. Modern man is fundamentally changed; he has a radically altered psychic world view. (p. 90) "Evolution" is Valente's key-word; he neither tells us what it is nor seems aware that the general sort of theory he is espousing is at least as old as the Greek Sophists and has always represented an alternative to other philosophical views of man and nature.

What is the use of Valente's book? The fact that it is relatively inexpensive and that its positions are bluntly stated, even if not well organized, might make it useful as a foil for serious study of the morality of sexual conduct. In particular, the relationship between theological dissent on the issue of contraception and a radical revision both of traditional moral teaching and of ecclesiology appears more clearly in this work than in more technically competent theological studies.

On the other hand, Valente is professor of theology and former Chairman of the Department of Theology at Seton Hall University. One can only feel sorry for unsophisticated young people, including his own students, who will be persuaded by this book that they can embrace both Christian faith and a completely secularized sexual ethics. Perhaps someone like Valente himself, brought up with a sense of faith and guilt, can maintain for a time this unstable synthesis of incompatible elements. The next generation surely will choose, and then there will be no further call for "theology" such as this.

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Concordant Discord. The Interdependence of Faiths. By R. C. ZAEHNER.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. Pp. 464. \$15.00.

R. C. Zaehner is one of a coterie of older British scholars who have written prolifically over the years in comparative religions and have exerted remarkable influence on the place of religion in England today. Along with E. O. James, Geoffrey Parrinder, and S. G. F. Brandon, Zaehner and his colleagues have brought the discipline of comparative religions into the forefront of religion study in England. In fact, the discipline of comparative religions may have a firmer position in England than anywhere else in the world today. For the past century the British have been orientated towards Asia and Africa and, consequently, have taken great interest in advancing the study of other religions. The discipline has taken root in the

British educational system with some ease, and this has resulted in a demand for materials and scholarly works on the religions of Asia and Africa.

The British school of comparative religions, as represented by those mentioned above, differs markedly from Continental and American scholars in this field. In both America and on the Continent the phenomenology of religion and the history of religions, strictly speaking, have dominated the direction of those studying world religions. *Religionswissenschaft*, in its classical sense for this discipline, is an attempt to integrate the research of the phenomenology and history of religions, and this is the goal, with the exception of the British school, of most comparative religionists today. R. C. Zaehner and his colleagues are by and large less concerned with this methodology and, consequently, are working within this discipline much as their predecessors did. It means that the British school is primarily concerned with the "comparing" of religions as was the fashion with the great pioneers in this discipline some decades ago. A redeeming factor, however, is that several of the British scholars, for example, Geoffrey Parrinder and S. G. F. Brandon, are more astute than Zaehner in drawing upon anthropological data and pertinent historical studies respectively.

In England the scholar in comparative religions has become frequently the apologist for religion and, moreover, because of his Christian heritage, the Christian apologist of religion in the latter half of this century. It has effected the type of research and scholarship done in England. This is especially true of R. C. Zaehner. The British school, with R. C. Zaehner in the lead, has taken on a polemical and solipsistic approach in dealing with the religions of other men. Zaehner, for example, has waged a lifelong polemic against Aldous Huxley, Arnold Toynbee, and Hendrick Kraemer, and this appears in nearly all of his major works. Moreover, Zaehner's Christian orientation is quite overt in his comparative studies; Christianity or Roman Catholicism, as in Zaehner's case, is the prime norm against which comparison is made. The type of objectivity desired and sought after by those attempting *religionswissenschaft* in both America and on the Continent has not been the concern of Zaehner. Nonetheless, he is a respected scholar in his discipline today.

In 1953 Zaehner was called to Oxford University and awarded the prestigious Spalding Chair in Eastern Religions and Ethics. Since that time he has written close to a dozen works extending from Zoroastrianism, the area of his original expertise resulting in three scholarly works, to Hindu and Muslim mysticism. Several of his books will surely become classics in the area of Indian studies which he has developed with adeptness since becoming Spalding Professor. *Hinduism* (1962) is an excellent survey integrating the Indian religious traditions; likewise, his work on the *Bhagavad Gita* (1967) is probably one of the finest interpretations developed in the Western world. Two predominant interests emerge from

his scholarship: mysticism and the relationship of Christianity to other religions. It could be said that his scholarly work has been principally a study of comparative mysticism. This is specifically true in many of his studies, namely, *Mysticism: Sacred and Profane* (1957), *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism* (1960), *Matter and Spirit: Their Convergence in Eastern Religions, Marx, and Teilhard de Chardin* (1963), and the present volume under review, *Concordant Discord*. In these studies Zaehner considers religion and religious experience, in particular, in its highest and most manifest expression as mystical phenomena. No student of comparative mysticism in the future can ignore Zaehner's contribution to this field. His other books establish the relationship of Christianity to the faith of other men, namely, *The Comparison of Religions* (1958), *The Catholic Church and World Religions* (1964), *Christianity and Other Religions* (1964), and again the present volume, *Concordant Discord*. This most recent work of Zaehner's brings to focus a lifetime of scholarship in both comparative mysticism and the comparison of religions from a Christian perspective.

Concordant Discord represents the Gifford Lectures in 1967-1969. Surprisingly, both Lord Gifford, the founder of these famous lectures, and H. N. Spalding, the founder of Zaehner's Chair of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford, looked forward to a renaissance of ethical and religious thought respectively in this country. Lord Gifford based his assumption on the advance of what he called natural theology, and the latter, H. N. Spalding, looked to the religious and ethical systems of the East. Both were probably universalists who anticipated a harmony of religious and ethical man in the twentieth century. Zaehner, early in his career, exploded the naiveté of such a dream. From his earliest writing (*The Comparison of Religions*), Zaehner was more impressed by and certainly stressed more in his writing the differences and the discord among religions. In selecting this current title, *Concordant Discord*, for a work which is the culmination of years of scholarship, he again states that a "concordant discord" or a "discordant concord" is the most that can be hoped for among the classical religions of East and West. (p. 7) He culls the phrase from the first book of *Traité de l'amour de Dieu* of St. François whom he uses freely throughout this study. Thus, the differences among religions speak more to Zaehner than the often simplistic and undefined similarities, and this has proven to be factually and methodologically sound. In his Introduction to *The Concise Encyclopedia of Living Faiths* (1967) which he edited, he referred to the "sharp differences," "the irreconcilable beliefs," the contention that "religions readily divide themselves":

The resemblances are of structure, not of content. It is in the matter of content that the two streams are so radically divided. . . . It is, then, methodologically quite wrong to treat the great religions of the world as parallel phenomena and to saddle them, as Toynbee does, with purely subjective essential truths. (*The Concise Encyclopedia of Living Faiths*, pp. 16-20.)

How then does professor Zaehner extract a "concordant discord" among world religions? He neither goes to the philosophical, poetical, or devotional literature of a religion; nor is he concerned with artistical, sociological, or anthropological phenomena. But he finds concord in "those texts that each religion holds sacred and in the impact that these have caused." (p. 19) It is in the interpretation of the sacred texts of the Asian world that Zaehner achieves an excellence as a comparative religionist. This is, however, only a partial dimension of his general orientation for there is, according to Zaehner, sharp discord among the great religions. This is due to Zaehner's belief that coherency in religion is found only in Christ. "For me the centre of coherence can only be Christ." (p. 16) With this theological statement he would have to be placed among those religionists who see in Christianity the fulfillment of all religions. In 1958 in *The Comparison of Religions* he clearly stated his thesis that Jesus Christ not only fulfills the law and the prophets of Israel but also the prophet of Iran and the sages of India. "In Christianity then, it would appear that the highest insights of both the Hindus and the Buddhists are fulfilled . . ." (*The Comparison of Religions*, p. 193). This theological and Christian orientation has influenced all of Zaehner's work and even the present volume. It will cause great difficulty for those scholars attempting *religionswissenschaft*, strictly speaking, and those writing in terms of religious dialogue.

Although the twenty chapters of *Concordant Discord*, consisting of the two years of the Gifford Lectures, cover all the great religious systems (Christianity, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Neo-Confucianism, and Zen), it cannot be considered a comparative study of religion. It is, in short, a study of comparative mysticism. Zaehner draws upon a threefold, hierarchical division of mysticism which he worked out previously in *Christianity and Other Religions* (1964). He speaks of it in this way in his current book:

First, there is nature mysticism, of which Whitman is an almost perfect example: it sees the human self as encompassing all Nature, the subjective 'I' is merged into the cosmic All, and all distinction between subject and object seems to be obliterated. Secondly, there is the mysticism of 'isolation'—the isolation of the eternal soul from all that has its being in space and time, 'to isolate eternity from origination' as Al-Junayd, the tenth-century Muslim mystic, puts it. Lastly, there is the mysticism of the love of God in an ecstasy of eternal love. (p. 59)

With these distinctions in mind he examines sacred texts and the writings of mystical personalities of the world. He begins in an early chapter (III) by identifying Richard Maurice Bucke, a Canadian mystic of the early part of this century, and Walt Whitman, the American poet, as nature mystics who achieved a sense of cosmic consciousness. From this point onwards he treats in the following seven chapters (IV-X), the first year of the Gifford Lectures, the mystical traditions of Hinduism. This is hardly disproportionate, for "Hinduism is both the fountain-head and the typical

manifestation of mystical religion in all its forms." (p. 194) The second half of the book, and the second year of the Gifford Lectures, covers the religious traditions of China: mystical Taoism, classical Confucian humanism, the synthetic Neo-Confucianism of Chu Hsi, and the intuitionism of Zen. In the final six chapters (XV-XX) a potpourri of classical Christian mystics (Hugh and Richard of St. Victor), French writers (Balzac, Voltaire, Rousseau), and French Catholics (Peguy, Bernanos, Teilhard de Chardin) are treated with far less thoroughness or satisfaction. Woven throughout the entire book is François de Sales' insight into "unity in diversity/diversity in unity" which keeps the rather unwieldy material in focus.

The general context of *Concordant Discord* presents several difficulties. It is questionable whether the selection of materials, especially with reference to the Western traditions, is representative. Zaehner has certainly drawn upon the most pertinent literature of the Asian spiritual traditions; yet, in the West he has totally ignored the mystical literature of John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila, the German and Flemish mystics, and even the medieval mystics. Consequently, it is not a comprehensive mysticism. The unfortunate factor is that Zaehner draws upon the great Indian and Chinese scriptures in treating of Asian mysticism, but his exposition of the Western spiritual traditions is limited to a particular type of religious writer, for example, Teilhard de Chardin and his predecessors in France. What really determines the context of Zaehner's work, and the selection of materials, are two central presuppositions which he has continually tried to work out in previous books. First, he is thoroughly convinced of the validity and usefulness of a hierarchical formulation of mystical states and achievements. He is determined to exegete a religious text into the categories of nature mysticism, isolation mysticism, or the mysticism of love. This distinction finds favor more among theologians and apologetes than among comparative religionists. Whether one accepts these categories or not determines whether one accepts a great deal of Zaehner's work.

A second presupposition which determines the context of the present work and much of Zaehner's previous writing is the manner in which a particular religious tradition or spiritual process resolves the dichotomy between spirit and matter. A spiritual tradition, according to Zaehner, will either seek liberation from matter or find liberation in matter. Again, this thesis, if it is considered important to the interpreter of a sacred text or a religious personality, determines greatly the limits and dimensions of the interpretation. Zaehner clearly sees the line of demarcation between India and the West drawn on this point:

The principal difference between Indian mysticism and its Christian counterpart is that salvation is understood by the Indians, both Buddhist and Hindu, as necessarily implying liberation from matter-matter in the Marxian sense understood

as the basis of all that moves and strives, acts and thinks; while for the Christian mystic salvation ultimately means union with a God who is not only a static Absolute (as in Sankara and other Indian monists) but also being *in act*. This is true of the *Bhagavad-Gita* too, and therein lies its importance. (p. 209)

Since he wishes to follow through on this theme, he relies in the last five chapters of this book upon the French writers, especially Teilhard de Chardin whom he calls the "mystic of matter," and the one who saw "the potential holiness of matter." (p. 405)

These overriding concerns frequently obscure what *Concordant Discord* is about. It is poor methodology to compare religious scripture with a religious personality or a spiritual tradition with a particular literary, scientific, or religious writer. In short, the context of this book is obscured because of its ambitious attempt to include too much material, questionably selected, based upon sundry presuppositions. It in no way, however, makes for dull reading. Professor Zaehner's writing has always been illuminating and at moments challenging to both neophyte and scholar. This is also true of *Concordant Discord*. Nonetheless, the context of this book reminds one of the generalist approach to comparative studies taken by Frazer, Eliade, and other pioneers in this field. Such a massive work is not attempted by many scholars today.

Although one may be somewhat critical of what Professor Zaehner is about, in terms of context and approach, the content of *Concordant Discord* evidences brilliant scholarship and interpretation. The seven chapters (IV-X) which speak of the Hindu mystical experience beginning with the early Vedic literature and culminating in the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the devotional (*bhakti*) traditions must rank as a singular achievement. Das Gupta's *Hindu Mysticism* has been considered a most acceptable survey of the Indian mystical experience, but Zaehner's perceptions are deeper, more integrated, and reflect a better grasp of the Indian scriptural tradition and its historical development. He identifies from the scriptural tradition four types of Hindu mysticism:

1. The transcending of spacial limitations and the consequent feeling that one is the All.
2. The transcending of temporal limitation and the consequent realization that one cannot die.
3. The intuition of oneness outside both space and time in a realm in which there is no becoming, only Being. This state is normally achieved by a process of *Yoga*—of introspection and integration of all the faculties into a timeless inner core. This is a "contraction" into the One rather than an "expansion" into the All. All three experiences invariably bring peace and joy: sometimes they are considered to transcend good and evil. Of love there has hitherto been no hint.
4. The love of God in the context of pure spirituality beyond space and time and beyond the "One." In the Hindu tradition this first appears in the *Bhagavad-Gita*. (p. 204)

He is able to view the convergence of Hindu and Christian mysticism because of the significance and interpretation he gives to the *Bhagavad-Gita*, the classic of Hindu devotionalism, which gave birth to Indian theistic mysticism. According to Zaehner, this is "the most significant sacred text in the whole history of religion." (p. 117) It is the basis for "concord" between Asian and Western mysticism because it offers a basis for a theistic mysticism. Although much that has been said within these chapters can be found in Zaehner's *Hinduism* and *Bhagavad-Gita*, he has integrated and interpreted his texts so brilliantly that *Concordant Discord* can be considered a high achievement on these chapters alone.

Finally, mention must be made of those chapters, and especially the final chapter of this book (XX), which treat of Teilhard de Chardin. Undoubtedly, Teilhard has influenced Zaehner greatly and has given direction to much of his research. He sees in Teilhard the convergence of *all* mysticism:

His mysticism is a fusion of the mysticisms of the Buddha and that of Walt Whitman: he confirms and completes the mysticisms of the Upanishads and the Bhagavad-Gita as well as that of the neo-Confucians in China; and he gives a new dimension to Christianity itself. (p. 407)

Teilhard is the "first Christian Marxist," "perhaps an answer to Marx"; and "the only form of Christianity that may prove acceptable to modern man is perhaps the gospel according to Teilhard." (pp. 422-423) He sees in Teilhard the fulfillment of Balzac's dictum that "the flesh will become Word," implying the ultimate correlation of spirit and matter. (p. 427) This will be great fare for Teilhardians, but more importantly it gives to Zaehner an optimism unparalleled among comparative religionists.

Concordant Discord is an excellent attempt to overcome many of the simplistic works which view high religious experiences, both subjectively and objectively considered, as somewhat similar or identical. Zaehner is one of the few comparative scholars who has worked out the complementarity of religious experiences within a tradition and from one tradition to another. One may be wary of his presuppositions, but there will be more to agree with than not after examining his argumentation and conclusions. To grasp the spiritual history of mankind in its complementarity may be as far as comparative studies can take us at this time. Professor Zaehner has merited a place in the history of this discipline because he has achieved this to a significant degree.

This book will appeal more to the literary critic and the theologian than to the comparative scholar. It offers material especially for a theology of religions. Because of its comprehensiveness, its literary and theological interpretations, *Concordant Discord* should find a large audience. For comparative studies, however, it may mark a turning point in the dis-

cipline as did Frazer's *Golden Bough* and Eliade's *Patterns in Comparative Religion*. The sophistication and complexity of *religionswissenschaft* in gathering and integrating anthropological, sociological, and linguistic data do not lend themselves to this general type of study in the future.

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Situationism and the New Morality. Edited by ROBERT L. CUNNINGHAM.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970. Pp. 281. \$3.50.

Situationism and the New Morality is apparently intended as an introduction to the recent debates centering on the status of moral principles which have interested not only theologians and philosophers but have at times been the subject of popular discussion.

The editor has divided the book into two main parts. The first is an original essay of fifty-one pages in which the editor explains at an introductory level the background from which the situationist movement seems to have developed and the issues with which it is concerned. Each of us would, of course, choose slightly differing ways to introduce such a subject, but it would seem unprofitable for me to quarrel with small points in the Introduction in this space.

The second part of the book consists of selected readings and is itself divided into three sections. The first section is a set of exchanges between Professor Joseph Fletcher (surely the best-known exponent of situationism) and Father Herbert McCabe. The second section consists of eight essays, concerned in some cases with the situationist debate directly, but in others merely with issues relevant to the debate. In this section such secular writers as B. J. Diggs and Jonathan Bennett are included as well as religious writers. Thus, this section illustrates even in its selection of writers one of the best things about the situationist movement—it has led to discussion in depth between secular and Christian moral philosophers of a kind which is all too often lacking. The third section of readings is a critique of Fletcher's position and defense of "intrinsicism" by Professor Aurel Kolnai with a response by Fletcher written for this book. The book does not, alas, contain an index which would have been particularly helpful given the wide range of interrelated views and topics scattered throughout its contents.

A book divided into so many discreet units obviously presents a reviewer with difficult choices, and these choices are made more difficult in the present case by the fact that as a secular moral philosopher I have a certain

feeling of entering a family quarrel in discussing the two most interesting (to me) parts of the book—the debates between Fletcher and McCabe and Kolnai and Fletcher. Since, however, I can hardly take the space to introduce and comment on each essay in the second section, it seems best for me first to make some comments on the two debates just mentioned and then to raise some general issues about situationism which arise as one reflects on the whole book. In this way I can perhaps best illustrate the philosophic interest and usefulness of the work as a whole.

Professor Fletcher's version of situation ethics is, of course, that which most of us have in mind when we discuss situationism, and most readers of this journal will not need any introduction to it.¹ The first essay in Fletcher's exchange with Father McCabe does, however, present a good introduction to his views, and it will facilitate later discussion if we are reminded of their basic outline. Generically, situationism is a thesis about the status of principles of rightness. Basically, the situationist recognizes as binding only one principle of rightness, namely, the promotion of whatever he takes to be ultimate intrinsic value. All other principles of rightness are employed only as guides or illuminators and may be overridden in any situation if this value is better promoted by doing so. Thus, as Fletcher sees clearly, there may be as many versions of situationism as there are positions on value. Fletcher's own theory makes agapic love the focus of value, and he may most properly be called an agapic or Christian situationist. Since Fletcher is the primary exponent of situationism in the current debates, there is at times a tendency to conflate these two aspects of his view, but for critical purposes it is important to keep them distinct.

Father McCabe's criticism of Fletcher is interesting in that he does keep aspects of the theory distinct but nevertheless advances an interesting attack on Fletcher's particular position both as to love and to situationism. McCabe argues that, having made love the standard of both good and right, Fletcher is not in a position to continue to maintain (as a situationist would) that no kind of acts are always wrong. McCabe's argument is a version of Wittgensteinian criteriological argument. He argues that, if the term "love" is to function in a public language, there must be criteria by which we can recognize cases of non-love and that these criteria will mention actions which thereby are part of our criteria for love. By Fletcher's own theory then, some actions will always be wrong. While McCabe's argument is interesting (as well as clearly and carefully advanced), it seems to me that Fletcher can escape it without much trouble. As long as Fletcher provides a more general, although no less public, characterization of love he can escape McCabe's point. If, for example, he says something such as that love seeks to promote the neighbor's interest,

¹ The most nearly complete statement of Fletcher's view is his *SITUATION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966).

he can answer McCabe. This is not to say that Fletcher does not have serious difficulties over his use of agapic love. I have argued at length in this journal that his use of love is hopelessly circular, but that is a different point, and it seems to me that he is not caught by McCabe's point.² McCabe also charges Fletcher with viewing the situation in which he acts too narrowly, with presenting situations which seem to include only a few possible neighbors, while the whole suffering world should be our situation. This point is probably true, but if it is, it is simply a corrective and does not undermine Fletcher's theory although it might improve his practice.

My experience in reading the Kolnai-Fletcher exchange was rather like the experience one has when one meets the family of an irritating associate and suddenly feels a wave of sympathy for him since he has come so far after starting with such handicaps. For Kolnai is a representative (a very able and articulate one) of one sort of view in Christian (and secular) moral thought against which Fletcher must originally have rebelled. Basically Kolnai is one of those exasperating souls who intuit their own moral convictions as part of the basic structure of the universe. As against this kind of view Fletcher is a breath of fresh air—we may disagree with him, but we can argue with him without ending against a stone wall of intuition.

Kolnai's article is a defense of intrinsicism against situation ethics. The article is long and detailed, covering many points. It is strongly polemical. I shall comment only on the central issue of intrinsicism versus situationism, or as he calls it extrinsicism.

The heart of Kolnai's argument against Fletcher seems to be that Fletcher's position is not strictly speaking philosophic at all because he is not concerned to interpret "moral experience" but to reform it. According to Kolnai, at least some kinds of action have intrinsic moral properties which we grasp in what he calls moral experience. Fletcher, then, distorts the nature of morality with his claim that moral terms such as "good" or "right" apply as judgments on how actions stand in regard to the external standard, love. This contrast is apparently what Fletcher has intended by his somewhat puzzling insistence that moral terms involve predicates not properties. Fletcher is, of course, completely unmoved by Kolnai's complaint here because he has specifically intended to deny that moral qualities are inherent in certain actions. The disconcerting point about this dispute is that Kolnai charges Fletcher with undermining the objective validity of moral principles while Fletcher admits that in his view ethics comes in the end to a decision not a conclusion. It may be

² My paper, "The Inadequacy of Situation Ethics," (*The Thomist*, July, 1970, pp. 423-437), presents a detailed argument for the view that Fletcher's use of love makes his argument hopelessly circular. I also attempt to show that Fletcher does not present any telling critique of a complex and flexible morality of principles.

called, he says, emotivist, attitudinal, or positivist. Now, depending on how Fletcher defends his claim that love is the first principle of value, his theory may in fact be emotivist or attitudinal, but there is nothing in situationism as a generic view about rightness which requires this. A situationist view may easily hold that moral judgments are objectively true. The term "objective" probably proves misleading in this context since to some it apparently denotes existence as an object rather than only a rationally justifiable or defensible claim. The heart of the matter is this. The really important question here is whether a theory holds that moral judgments may be justified by a rational means. A theory which does not allow such justification is in fact merely a version of moral scepticism. But many moral theories have been advanced which, while they do deny that moral terms refer to intrinsic properties of kinds of action, do maintain that moral judgments can be rationally justified. A view which is generically situationist can certainly maintain such a claim. In fact, Fletcher can maintain that moral judgments are rationally justifiable if he can give us criteria for determining what love is or demands and can give us reason to take love as a guide. It is important, therefore, to see that situationism need not involve emotivism or any other version of moral scepticism.

Another issue of special interest arises in Fletcher's reply to Kolnai when Fletcher denies Kolnai's claim that Fletcher's view on Rightness is a species of act utilitarianism with love replacing the classical pleasure as chief value. Fletcher asserts that his view is neither act nor rule utilitarianism but a modified rule utilitarianism. His reason is that he does accept the importance of rules and principles (and is thus more nearly rule utilitarian) but is willing to override them if love is better served (so that he modifies rule utilitarianism). It seems to me that Fletcher is simply mistaken on this point. Classical act utilitarians such as Bentham and Mill (part of the time) describe the status of moral rules and principles in just the way Fletcher uses them. They take the received basic rules to be useful guides to utility in most cases, especially when time for thought and calculation is short, but are in principle always ready to appeal directly to utility if the situation indicates. Thus they use traditional rules as rules of thumb embodying the result of past thought just as Fletcher wishes to use rules. Mill in fact remarks that to suppose that every decision must be recalculated without the aid of past experience summarized in received rules (thus always requiring much time before action) is supposing his view conjoined to universal idiocy, in which case any view would work ill. Thus it seems clear that Fletcher's view is act utilitarian especially since in his view moral rules (other than his first principle) simply do not have the binding force attributed to them by rule utilitarians.³

³ Fletcher's relation to act utilitarianism is also discussed at length in my paper to which I referred in note two.

In summary, it seems to me that the crucial point concerning the Kolnai-Fletcher exchange is to see that situationism is not necessarily committed to the view that moral judgments are not rationally justifiable. In fact, I am more inclined to hold that it is Kolnai's sort of intuition of intrinsic properties which fails to give us any rational justification of moral judgments. It is after all of very little help merely to learn that Kolnai (or W. D. Ross or any other intuitionist) has decided to call his moral beliefs cognitions of how things are in the universe, thus avoiding the arduous task of presenting a rational defense of them.

In reflecting again on the whole issue of situation ethics as illustrated in this book I am struck with the feeling that the debate is in danger of becoming sterile with continual repetition of positions from which neither side will budge. This would be a most unwelcome outcome particularly because the popularity of Fletcher's book has afforded the occasion for debate between secular and Christian moral philosophers. I would like therefore to make some general points concerning the issues both in regard to the way situationism as a generic view is debated and in regard to the use of *agapic* love in moral philosophy.

First, it is misleading to draw a contrast simply between situationism and intrinsicism or between extrinsicism and intrinsicism in the theory of right and debate these as the options. Situationism does, of course, characterize the right in terms of producing or promoting the good. As such it is a teleological theory of right. But the label "extrinsicism" invites a contrast with intrinsicism only. This is misleading in that the proper contrast with teleological theories is deontological theories, and a deontological theory does not necessarily rely on claims of the intrinsic right and wrong of certain acts. The claim that acts are intrinsically right is only one kind of foundation for a deontological theory. By a deontological theory of right I mean any theory of right which does not rely in its formulation or justification of principles of right and justice on a specific conception of the good. It is important to see that such theories need not rely on claims of intrinsic right or intuited right. For it seems to me that one of the intuitionist's most persuasive devices is to point out some of the serious difficulties with teleological theories—the most serious seems to me to be the fact that teleological theories cannot give a sound basis for individual liberty and are thereby without an adequate theory of justice—and then to present their intuitionism as the only alternative. I wholly agree that teleological theories will not do, but it then becomes crucial to see that intuitionist or other intrinsicist theories are not the only option. For example, a modern version of contractarianism remains as a plausible deontological theory of right.

Second, and more directly related to Fletcher, some people have understood situation ethics to maintain that what act you do really doesn't matter as long as you do it with an attitude of love. Some things Fletcher

says may indeed be taken as supporting this view. But, we are also reminded that one of Charles Manson's followers thought she did no wrong in killing Sharon Tate and her companions because she loved them as she killed them. This monstrous view is clearly not what situationists such as Fletcher are maintaining, whatever some popularizers may say. Fletcher does not have an ethic without principle. He has a theory of right with only one principle, but that principle is absolute. I myself believe that his principle itself and the one-principle-only procedure are demonstrably unacceptable, but he should be met at this level, not pilloried because of popular misconceptions of his view. Fletcher would do well himself to be more careful in his use of the term "right" so as to avoid these confusions. His comments on right and good actions on pages 278 and 279 of this book, for example, could easily leave the impression that he shares the kind of interpretation I am rejecting.

Finally, I would like, as a secular moral philosopher, to raise some issues about the use of agapic love in moral philosophy. Agapic love is, of course, in most of our minds the most characteristically Christian contribution to moral thought. It seems to me, however, that the very difficulties Fletcher encounters in his attempt to use love as both standard of value and of right—in brief he falls into a vicious circle using love as a criterion of both good and right but needing these notions to characterize genuinely loving conduct—argue against over-use of love even in Christian moral philosophy. This is not to deny that the position of agapic love will be an all-important distinguishing feature of a Christian moral position, but it is to deny that love can do the whole job even for the Christian moralist who after all faces most problems in common with the secular moral thinker. Basically, we must all have a theory of value (including a theory of the good life or best life style); a theory of right and justice which regulates what is incumbent on us in dealing with each other, as well as what is good but merely permissible, not our duty; and finally, a theory of moral worth by which we evaluate ourselves and others as persons. Further, we all face the need both for cognitive aspects of our theories to tell us how to pick out what is good and right and motivational aspects of our theories to tell us what reason we have for acting on the principles of good and right. It would seem to me important to see that even for the Christian moralist love cannot answer all these questions as Fletcher tries to have it do. Thus, both secular and Christian moral philosophers can work on many problems together. Roughly, I would suppose that the Christian philosopher will find his conception of agapic love most helpful in his account of what kind of life is best—not at more basic levels of value theory; in giving his account of reasons (rational motivation) for doing what is right and just; and in his account of supererogatory acts and goodness of character.

These remarks are perhaps too schematic to be readily evaluated, but

they illustrate, I hope, the fact that Christian and secular moralist alike stand to profit from fuller communication. To this communication situation ethics has made a major contribution, and one hopes that *Situationism and the New Morality* will help to increase that contribution since it makes the heart of the situationism debate easily and effectively available to both Christian and secular audiences.

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Authority and Freedom: the Case for Orthodoxy in the Catholic Church.

By CHARLES E. RICE. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1971. Pp. 253. \$5.95.

Charles E. Rice, Professor at the School of Law at the University of Notre Dame and editor of the *American Journal of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy*, joins an ancient and honorable tradition of lay apologetics with this volume, which is primarily aimed at fellow Catholics, especially at fellow laymen. Avoiding the excesses of both right and left, he tries to clarify the principles at stake in the present crisis of authority in the Church, and then he brings these principles to bear in balanced treatments of several concrete issues of most immediate practical concern. The resultant work exemplifies what used to be meant by "thinking with the Church" and "loyalty to the Holy See" by those whose Society once promoted these attitudes most vigorously.

Prof. Rice recognizes that the crisis of authority and obedience is not as basic as the crisis of faith. But he wishes to clarify the immediate issues in their own terms so far as possible, without pursuing his inquiry to the ultimate theological and philosophical principles. He makes clear the distinctions between faith, religious assent, the obedience to disciplinary decrees, but he also recognizes the dynamic unity of the attitude of faithfulness which has always been characteristic of Roman Catholics true to their religious tradition.

As a background for his discussion of the paradigm instance of the crisis of authority—that is, the reaction to *Humanae Vitae*—Prof. Rice reviews (pp. 16-35) the aspects of the contemporary anti-life movement. This movement subordinates the sanctity of life to individual and social convenience, and this subordination leads to the widespread acceptance of abortion, sexual permissiveness, public indecency, marital instability, contraception, and even coercive public programs of birth control. This movement is totally opposed to the entire Christian moral tradition. Many

who are not even Christian call attention to the threat to human dignity implicit in the anti-life movement of our time.

Prof. Rice next summarizes (pp. 36-57) the controversy prior to the publication of *Humanae Vitae*, the teaching of that encyclical, and the controversy following it. His balanced treatment of the essential facts is very valuable; unfortunately, all too many Catholics have received partial and distorted views from brief reports in the public media and from biased presentations in certain journals calling themselves "Catholic" which hardly deserve the name. Therefore, the summary in this book should be very useful for correcting misunderstandings.

Prof. Rice sees two factors underlying dissent from the teaching of *Humanae Vitae*. One is the authority crisis itself; the other is liberal secularist thought leading to doctrinal errors and issuing in the so-called "new morality."

The chapter on authority (pp. 58-82) briefly summarizes the common Catholic understanding of the origin and locus of authority in the Church, the scope of such authority, which includes the precepts of the natural moral law, and the relationship between the magisterium and the properly formed conscience of the faithful Catholic. Here careful distinctions are made between disciplinary and teaching authority, as well as among the modalities of the hierarchical teaching authority.

The chapter (pp. 83-100) on the ideas which have led up to the present crisis reviews the conceptions signified by the expression "the new morality" and shows how these ideas conflict with Catholic teaching. This chapter also relates the contemporary moral crisis to the wider ideological crisis brought about by the attack of secularism upon religious faith, and by the compromises made by some "theologians" and others in the name of religious faith—for example, in the form of the "modernism" condemned early in this century.

With the preceding as a foundation, Prof. Rice goes on to consider the authority crisis as it affects several important areas: priestly and religious life, ecumenism, the liturgy, Catholic education (both at the lower and at the higher levels), and Church-State relations. In each of these areas Prof. Rice makes a fair and balanced summary of the immediate causes of the crisis, then he clarifies these immediate causes, and finally he outlines a practical approach that can be taken by faithful Catholics.

Lastly, the author emphasizes three points in a brief concluding chapter. First, we must maintain a balanced outlook and avoid extremism of the right or of the left. Second, we must begin to renew the Church following the spirit of Vatican II by first renewing our own lives interiorly. Third, we must continue to strive confidently not only to keep the faith but to spread it, thus saving the secularized modern world from itself.

An appendix to the volume includes the complete text and Pope Paul's prefatory address to the "Credo of the People of God."

This book is admirably balanced. It is sound and practical. Priests and teachers should find it useful in counseling and the book could well be adopted for high school and adult C.C.D. groups. Even those trained in theology may find much food for thought in this work, which expresses a simple and straightforward—but not simplistic—faith in Christ and in his Church.

Unfortunately, many who could profit by meditation upon the truths outlined in this work will refuse to give Prof. Rice's book an openminded reading, due to their "liberal" prejudice that no case for Catholic orthodoxy can be worthy of their attention.

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The Messianic Idea in Judaism. By GERSHOM G. SHOLEM. New York: Schocken Books, 1971. Pp. 350. \$15.00.

There is a delightful story about Gershom Sholem's service in the German army in World War I. I found it in my colleague Herbert Weiner's excellent book of essays, *9½ Mystics, The Kabbala Today* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969). Sholem was a pacifist, yet he was drafted into the Kaiser's army. He confronted his commanders with an ability to speak only Latin. He was so good both at the Latin and in performance that he was hastily released from active duty. Two sides of Prof. Scholem's personality surface in this story: he is a "ham" with a bit of pixy in him; and whatever he knows about, he knows a lot about. He holds a degree in mathematics. He knows a lot about natural science, about all the behavioral disciplines, about all the humanities. But he knows most about Jewish mysticism, to which has devoted the past 45 years. (He is now Prof. Emeritus at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem where he has lived since 1924-5).

Martin Buber, who was Scholem's jousting partner on many occasions, as well as his friend (see pp. 227 ff. and 314 ff. of the book under review for a fine expression of each aspect of their complex relationship), said of Scholem, with a touch of sarcasm, "he made a science out of Kabbala (Jewish mysticism)." A Jerusalem Kabbalist was less kind; he called Scholem an accountant: "... accountants know where the wealth is, its location and value. But it doesn't belong to them. They cannot use it." (Weiner, *op. cit.*, p. 57) Whether or not Scholem "uses" his encyclopedic knowledge of mysticism is a question. That he knows incredibly about it, that is unquestionable.

Scholem's *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* remains the best book in the field in English, though it was published more than 35 years ago. *The Messianic Idea* is a wide-ranging collection of essays previously published in various languages in several kinds of journals. It is good that they have been collected, for the selection includes some of Scholem's most perceptive and penetrating work.

Christian religionists will not be excited about all the essays. For example, his appraisal of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* (Science of Judaism) over the past 100 years will not mean much to any but the most specialized Christian scholars. On the other hand, most of the essays have two great values: the information they contain is seminal, essential to an understanding of many aspects of Judaism; and there will be constant ear-perking over the comparisons and contrasts between Jewish mystical thought in its evolution and Christian mysticism. It is important for Christians to discover just how deep-rooted and how complex is Jewish Messianism. Little is known by most Christian scholars of the Sabbatean movement of the 17th century and its ongoing expressions within the Jewish community. As Christians read here about Frankish literature, about the fascinating crypto-Jewish Turkish Muslims called Dönme—parallel in medieval Christian thought will come to mind rapidly.

Several of the essays are goldmines of factual data about concepts and aspects of Judaism. Scholem's exploration of "devekut," close communion with the Divine, is important. I was delighted to reread the essay on the "Sheld (or Star) of David," whose evolution the author traces painstakingly. Anyone who has read Andre Schwarz-Bart's poignant *Last of the Just* needs to read the essay on the 36 hidden just men (Tzaddikim) for whose sake God does not destroy the world.

When the Weizmann Institute of Science in Israel dedicated its first giant computer, Scholem named it Golem Alef (Golem I). As a result he was invited to speak at the dedication ceremony. His brief statement—*The Golem of Prague and the Golem of Rehovot*—is a fine climax to this exciting intellectual feast. The Golem of Prague is an immortal legend within Kabbala about a "man" brought to life by the great mystic Rabbi Judah Löw of Prague in the 17th century. Scholem's comparisons and contrasts with the computer are a little shaking, but good for us.

I only wish the book were not so expensive. But it belongs in every good library, and perhaps one day soon it may come out in paperback, for wider distribution to thinking, growing Christian students and scholars. For Prof. Scholem not only knows everything about Jewish mysticism; he and his translators have given us a readable and stimulating adventure.

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Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times: From Mendelssohn to Rosenzweig.

By NATHAN ROTENSTREICH. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, Pp. 282. \$6.50.

Modern Judaism is usually considered to have begun about the time of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. This period marked a transition within the Jewish community from isolation (where the Jew was accepted on sufferance) to new-found equality. This new status of the Jew as a "supposed" equal or citizen in the land in which he lived had a profound impact upon the Jewish intellectual community. Prior to the actual granting of Jewish citizen rights, and following it, there was an abundance of philosophic writings in which Jewish philosophers attempted to relate contemporary philosophical thought to Jewish (religious) thought. This was a response to what might be called a re-entering of the Jewish people into history. The process received further impetus when the third Israeli Commonwealth was established in 1948.

There were at least two basic problems inherent in this development. The first was the necessity in the minds of the various writers to force or interpret Judaism in terms of contemporary philosophy no matter how alien it might have been to the spirit of Judaism. (It has often been pointed out that Judaism does not become too involved with philosophical or theological speculation except in response to other challenging systems of thought). The second problem (often related to the first) was the conflict between the universalist and the particularist approach. There is the need in every religious tradition to validate its universalist claims and then its particularistic claim that its universal truth can be attained either solely, or especially, through its uniqueness. (It is my understanding, for example, that the prophets who preached universal concepts were particularists who believed that the universal values were to be found in and through the community of Israel.)

In *Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times* Dr. Nathan Rotenstreich, rector of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, explores the Jewish philosophical trends of the modern period. He considers, first, those philosophers of the latter half of the eighteenth, the nineteenth, and the early twentieth centuries who emphasized the primacy of ethics in the sphere of faith. The author indicates that moral imperatives have always been an inseparable part of the religious life of the Jew. Moses Mendelssohn viewed Judaism as primarily a system of legislation while S. D. Luzzatto argued that Mendelssohn's conception of Judaism rested on the performance of commandments and not on faith. Nevertheless Luzzatto considered religion as dear to God because of its importance for morality. Moritz Lazurus expanded this identification of religion with ethics and viewed God as the Archetype of ethical attributes. Hermann Cohen saw the role of ethics as the incessant striving after an ever-receding goal. God served as the

Guarantor of the reality of the correspondence between nature and reality. God is an idea, not a reality. In his later period Cohen attempted to discover a new personal dimension in religion through his search for ethical concepts in the domain of religion. Dr. Rotenstreich sees in all these early modern Jewish philosophers a blending of traditional Judaism with Kantian ethical principles.

The second group of philosophers that is discussed by Rotenstreich regarded Judaism as a religion of the spirit. The emphasis here shifted from the ethical to the ontological. The philosophers covered in this section are S. Formstecher, S. Hirsch, and N. Krochmal. Their metaphysical principles were drawn from Schelling and Hegel. German idealism served as the basis for their concern with the ontological concepts of Judaism. They accepted a basic distinction between nature and spirit. Their Judaism was cut off from traditional Jewish sources. Krochmal, for example, in his search for the Absolute Spirit, rejected the particularistic tradition of Judaism. Judaism was submerged, in Krachmal's philosophy, under the current philosophic system of his day.

Rostenstreich then considers S. L. Steinheim and Franz Rosenzweig, who he believes helped return Judaism to an authentic tradition based upon its uniqueness. Steinheim considered faith an independent sphere of knowledge, and he rejected rationalistic knowledge. He based faith on Revelation and rejected the need for reconciling the faith of Israel with a philosophic system. Rosenzweig, while in this pattern, did not unite his particularistic Jewish values and ideals with his existential views. He considered man as separated by a distance from ultimate truth, and he postulated a distinction between the truth and God in his Perfection. Faith was the attempt to bridge the gap among the three separate entities, God, man, and the world. Man was destined to remain on the way, proceeding toward life. Toward life is directed toward existential man and not man redeemed.

The last two philosophers whose concepts Rotenstreich explores are Rav Kook and A. D. Gordon. Kook considered time as a dimension for man but not for God. Although man is subject to the dimensions of change and decay, the true existence and the Source of all existence is not subject to time; there are no time limitations for God. Events related to time disappear in a realm beyond time and change, where all things, past, present, and future are united in the light of the Source. The world is thus one harmonious whole. Because there is no world but only God present in all things, there is no distinction between the sacred and the profane. The world is harmonious because God is in harmony. Man by reaching for the unchanging scene, and by his desire for the fellowship of God, discovers the road back to himself. Toward the conclusion of the chapter on Rav Kook there is an interesting comparison between Judaism and other religions in which Rav Kook's belief in the superiority of Judaism is expressed.

One may wonder if Rotenstreich concludes with A. D. Gordon to end with an emphasis of Judaism identified with the concept of history. Gordon stresses the harmony between man and the world, and this ideal, in turn, requires action directed toward the world. Another aspect of Gordon's work that has great appeal to the contemporary Jew, especially the Israeli Jew, relates the essence of religion to the creative genius of the people from whom it stems and to the unity between man and the world. These two basic elements of religion are, of course, contained within Jewish monotheism.

Rotenstreich ends his presentation by posing two questions for the contemporary Jew. The first question may be expressed as follows: Now that Judaism has re-entered the stream of history, does the present generation have any need for a revealed, pre-ordained Judaism? The second question asks: What meaning historical continuity can have for the Jewish people if it is devoid of Jewish content? The ancient challenge of the universal within the context of the particular is an ever-recurring theme. Will the experience of the Jewish people in Israel present new opportunities for the development of authentic Jewish thought with universal relevance? Will it be able to validate itself out of its unique and particular insights and experiences? Through his interesting, challenging, and thought provoking presentation we, together with Rotenstreich, have an opportunity to engage in study about past philosophic formulations—which indicate a continuing concern on the part of Jewish theologians and philosophers to relate Jewish religious thought to contemporary life and thought. This exploration of the past, through this valuable and interesting presentation, will enable us to walk with Rotenstreich toward the future in the spirit of bold adventure.

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The Star of Redemption. By FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, tr. WILLIAM W. HALLO.
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, N. Y. 1970. Pp. 463. \$10.00.

Kachav HaG'ulah ("The Star of Redemption"). By FRANZ ROSENZWEIG.
(Hebrew), tr. JOSHUA AMIR, intro. Moshe Schwartz, Mossad Bialik
and Leo Baeck Institute, Jerusalem 1970. Pp. 437.

W. Hallo's English translation and J. Amir's Hebrew translation of Franz Rosenzweig's *Stern der Erloesung* make accessible to the readers of these languages one of the most important and influential works in twentieth-

century Jewish philosophical theology—and an extremely important work at any time and for many purposes. Previously there had been good reason to believe that this book could never be successfully translated: it tackles a large number of extremely difficult and complex tasks (among them a very high-level metaphysics, an ambitious universal historiography, an involved philosophical theology, elaborate theologies of Judaism and Christianity largely in terms of their liturgies, etc.)—it does all this within the ambience of classical German culture in general and largely as an extrapolation of the philosophical configuration of Hegel and Schelling in particular—and it does it with an extraordinary amount of reliance on the meaningfulnesses of the philology and implications of the German language. Let it be said, then, at the very outset that, in the face of these and other seemingly insurmountable obstacles, Hallo and Amir have brought off the miracle of rendering *The Star of Redemption* into not only comprehensible but even smooth English and Hebrew respectively. Substantively the book remains, of course, extraordinarily difficult. Even so, if only because from the frequently multiple simultaneous levels of meaning in the German only one could be preserved in translation, the English and Hebrew versions are in some way more easily understandable than the original, albeit at the price of some unavoidable de-complexification.

The history of the edition of *The Star* is itself a significant part of twentieth-century history. Rosenzweig wrote most of the book on postcards which he sent home from his army-stations during World War I. (Cf. N. N. Glatzer, *Franz Rosenzweig—The Man and His Thought*, N. Y. 1953) The first edition appeared in Frankfurt-on-Main, where he spent the rest of his short life, in 1921. The Hebrew motto on the title-page is taken from *Psalms* 45:5: "Ride on the word of truth!" In accordance with the author's direction, the second edition, which appeared after his death in 1929, completed the quotation: "Succeed in riding on the word of truth!", for, according to his "existentialist," "messianic" theory of truth, only the completed life of a man testifies to the extent of his success. This edition also incorporates his own marginal sub-titles, which have now been moved into the body of the English and Hebrew texts. They are, indeed, very helpful in what is otherwise a thicket of ideas and arguments—so much so that the present writer would suggest that in the future they be also incorporated into the table of contents, which, as it stands, is really no more than the widest possible structuring of Rosenzweig's quasi-Hegelian construction. It took until 1954, for obvious historical reasons, before the third edition appeared in Heidelberg. By now second-hand reports about his writings and work, the influence of his friend and colleague Martin Buber, and, no doubt, indirect dissemination through his German-Jewish compatriots who, if they survived, dispersed throughout the world, had made Rosenzweig one of the three or four most effective religious and intellectual forces in the Jewish world. In America, for example, M.

Himmelfarb had to say in 1966: "The single greatest influence on the religious thought of North American Jewry, therefore, is . . . Franz Rosenzweig." (*The Condition of Jewish Belief*, p. 2) In Israel a symposium 'Al F. Rosenzweig was published at the Hebrew University in 1956 in connection with the twenty-fifth anniversary of his death. In Britain the present writer's *F. Rosenzweig—Guide to Reversioners* was published in 1960. Emmanuel Levinas, the French phenomenologist who may well be the most significant Jewish thinker on the scene at the present time, says at the beginning of his *Totalité et Infini* (The Hague, 1961, p. XVI; English: Duquesne University Press 1969): "The *Stern der Erloesung* of F. Rosenzweig is present in this book so much that it cannot be cited." And now, precisely all of fifty years after the first edition, the thinker's *magnum opus* makes its own entry into very different linguistic and historical cultures.

It is an open question whether the book's accessibility to the Israeli and American reader (a British edition is in preparation) will increase or possibly even diminish its effectiveness, at least in the short-run. Up to now it was more the myth of Rosenzweig (the alienated Jewish intellectual who becomes a profound Jewish scholar, the youthfully paralyzed man who manages to continue his literary and personal productivity), and at most the practical, religious teacher (the theoretical and practical educator, the interpreter of the liturgy, and the model for a reasoned Jewish-religious "praxis"), who influenced a considerable number of people in the quest for "Jewish authenticity." Now Israelis and Americans will suddenly find themselves confronted, if they take the trouble of trying to understand him at all, with the real thinker: a doctrinal non-Zionist (actually at the time of *The Star* he may be said to have been more anti-Zionist than non-Zionist), an extremely European, German sort of a Jew who devotes many more pages to Goethe than to Maimonides, and a metaphysician whose style of thought could not be further from the tenor of the prevailing contemporary mode. Some early, popular reviews of the book make it plausible that henceforth more people will turn away from, rather than toward, him.

The new reader who really wants to try conscientiously to fathom what goes on in *The Star* can be given some propadeutic advice. Just opening it and beginning, cold, to read it, without some introduction, background, or guidance, is almost bound to fail or may even prove to be counter-productive. This will be true not only for the general reader but even for the typical sophisticated product of the presently dominant kinds of philosophical and theological education—unless he happens to be hip to at least Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit* and Schelling's *Ages of the World*. The "Foreword" in the English translation by Prof. Glatzer, himself an associate of Rosenzweig's and certainly the most knowledgeable man on the subject in the English-speaking world, is, unfortunately, a

peculiarly apologetic, peripheral, and useless exercise. The introduction to the Hebrew translation, to the contrary, supplies a very good, albeit brief description of the place of *The Star* in modern general and Jewish thought and of the motivations and basic goals operative in the work. In general, one may say that if you understand Rosenzweig you will understand *The Star*—but then, of course, you do not need to read it anymore; if you do not understand Rosenzweig and, therefore, need to read him, you will not be able to understand *The Star*. The best way of breaking out of this bind, in English, is, then, to read the chapter on Rosenzweig preferably in Jacob Agus's *Modern Philosophies of Judaism* (N. Y. 1941, now finally re-published in paperback) or in Julius Guttman's *Philosophies of Judaism* (N. Y. 1964, unfortunately out of print). Having obtained a general overview from Glatzer's previously mentioned book and once having digested one of these philosophical analyses, one should be able to get through the volume with some initial profit.

The potential new reader will also, beforehand, want some kind of synopsis of what the book deals with. To try to give it to him is a risky and necessarily distorting enterprise, but it shall, nevertheless, be attempted.

The Star of Redemption consists of three Parts, and each Part is divided into three Books (plus introduction and transition). Indeed, Hegelian triadism crops up all over the place: being—negation—sublation, now formulated in Schellingian terms as yes—no—and, take form in God—world—man, creation—revelation—redemption, in the two triangles of “the star of David,” etc. The introductions and transitions express, then, the dynamic processes leading from one stage to another. Each section tackles its assigned task in both an historical and a “systematic” way, i. e., as is the case with Hegel and Schelling, it is held that logic and history are ultimately identical, and, therefore, what is true of the former must be demonstrable in the latter.

Part I begins with an introduction which surveys the history of philosophy from Greek idealism to modern personalism and synchronizes the latter with the discovery of the individual, through confrontation with death, as the ultimate stubborn reality. Thus shattered by the extrusion of the individual, the idealistic uni-verse falls apart, in thought, into its components—God, world, and man. The three Books of the First Part then go about constituting the theoretical structures of these respective components in mathematico-symbolic form. Book I constitutes God in thought as substance and free action living in and by himself. This is the pre-personal God of eternal paganism. In Book II the world is constituted as materiality and change following its “laws of nature” without relationship to human history. This is the real, self-subsisting nature of eternal materialism. Man is constituted, ideally, in Book III as the substance of self and free will unable, however, to affect either God or nature. This is

the eternal hero of Greek tragedy. In the conclusion of this Part the whole cosmos constituted by these three theoretical entities, which is ontogenetically and phylogenetically identical with paganism, is found to be characterized by the lack of relations between its monadic parts—the lack of structure which, in modern parlance, is often spoken of as directionlessness in terms of time and values.

The introduction to Part II reviews the history of philosophic thought once more, this time oriented not toward the discovery of the individual but around an understanding of the notion of "miracle." A miracle is discovered to be not the creation of a new reality but the "revelation" of a pre-existing one. Revelation is then the process through which the monadic entities of the first Part "discover," enter into relations with, one another. Entry is an act in time, and relationship occurs in the form of language. Part II thus transforms the ideal constructions of philosophy into the realities of theology. Book I unpacks (continuous) "creation" as the realization of relation between God and the world through the former's activity. *Genesis* I is exegetized in this sense. Book II unpacks (continuous) "revelation" as the realization of relation between God and the individual components of the world, especially men, through love. The *Song of Songs* is exegetized in this sense. And Book III unpacks "redemption" as the extension of the love-endowment to literally all components of the universe through divine and human activity. *Psalms* 115 is exegetized in this sense. In the conclusion of this Part the three points, the monadic entities of Part I, are thus found to have drawn lines between, entered into relations with, one another and to constitute the upper triangle of what is destined to become "the star of redemption."

The introduction to Part III coordinates three different forms of prayer with the three Joachimite ages and arrives at the conclusion that the modern age—defined by the French Revolution, Jewish emancipation, and secularity—is the Johannine age, the drawing of the night, when God will again be "all in all" and the star will shine. I. e., the cosmos is being "eternalized," taken back into God. The eternalization of men and nature is brought about through the liturgy. In Book I the Jewish liturgy is shown to be the expression of a community living even now in eternity, outside of history, having long since arrived at the end. In Book II the Christian liturgy is interpreted as the expression of a community "on the way" through history toward the *eschaton*, increasingly absorbing the as yet unredeemed portions of the pagan world. Book III is a vision of the eschatological end, when the existent eternity of Judaism and the emergent eternity of Christianity coincide in "the truth," which is God. The conclusion of this Part and the book as a whole is symbolized in the Star of David, when the two sets of relations, the ontogenetic triangle of Part II and the phylogenetic triangle of history, overlap in "the star of redemption." All that is left now is "to do," to live the Jewish and Christian realities toward salvation.

Even so inadequate a summary of the content of the book suffices to indicate its overweening ambitions in philosophy, theology, and history. Some sections are brilliant and extraordinarily provocative, others are inordinately complex and obscure. The sheer bulk of its cumulative cleverness and literate ponderousness can, after a while, grow oppressive and even boring. Much in it can and should be argued with: for example, the argument against idealism and rationalism, the dangerous and perhaps even invidious Schellingian theosophy of Part I, the view of Judaism as meta-historical and Christianity as historical (cf. D. Clawson, "Rosenzweig on Judaism and Christianity," *Judaism* XIX/1, Winter 1970), the notion of continuousness as used in Rosenzweig's doctrine of creation and revelation and his interpretation of "the law" that emerges from it. (In his discussion with Martin Buber several years after *The Star*, "The Builders," in *On Jewish Learning*, N. Y. 1955, a much improved understanding of the law developed.) With an eye toward the readership of this journal (my son Maimon punned that writing this review during the summer would make it "a long, hot 'summa'") the present writer will take up only one issue, resuming the theme of an article "Rosenzweig on Judaism and Christianity" in *Conservative Judaism*, Winter 1956.

The publishers of the Hallo translation, no doubt hoping thereby to increase the market for the book, lay special stress on the dust-jacket and in their release on the "ecumenical" character of Rosenzweig's theology of Judaism and Christianity, that, according to him, both religions are "true," that dialogue in the world between them is, therefore, called for, etc. (It is telling that the Israeli edition would engage in no such sheenanigans.) Now, it is true, as even our excessively brief synopsis indicates, that Rosenzweig assigns to Christianity a more significant and valid role in *Heilsgeschichte* than perhaps any other serious Jewish thinker in history—even more than is done in the two famous passages from Rabbi Y. HaLevy's *Kuzari* and Maimonides' *Mishneh Torah* which he cites respectively at the very beginning and very end of Part III, Book II. It is also true, of course, that Rosenzweig came to Judaism in effect from Christianity, not only in the biographical sense but also in the philosophico-theological sense. Though his theologizing is authentically Jewish, he could not have done it except coming, as he did, out of a Europeo-Christian milieu: at the time that he wrote *The Star* he did not know enough *Kabbalah* to do the theosophy of Part I, nor was he sufficiently acquainted with Hassidism to be able to put as much emphasis on the roles of love, atonement, and prayer as he did based on Jewish sources alone; the crucial influence of his close friend, the Protestant theologian Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, makes itself heavily felt here and elsewhere. (Cf. Rosenstock-Huessy, *Judaism Despite Christianity*, University of Alabama, 1969) Rosenzweig has, furthermore, none of the horror of what to "simple Jewish instinct, compounded of incomprehension and pitying contempt"—as he called it in a

similar context (*Briefe*, ed. E. Rosenzweig and E. Simon, Berlin, 1935, p. 670)—must be the heathenism of so much in Christianity. Finally, it is true that some interesting Jewish and Christian thinkers of the mild-twentieth century, like H.-J. Schoeps (cf. *The Jewish-Christian Argument*, N. Y., 1963), James Parkes, and Reinhold Niebuhr, derived a theory of “the two covenants”—Sinai and Calvary, equally valid and authentic for Israel and “the nations of the world” respectively—from *The Star of Redemption*.

Just the same, to claim that Rosenzweig presented “Judaism and Christianity as equally ‘true’ and valid views of reality” (as the publishers do on the dust-jacket, and in form of an unspecified quotation yet!) is to misrepresent him badly, though this may well describe what some people have made of his views and what “indifferentists” of various stripes think it would be useful to “inter-religious good-will” projects to represent him as having taught.

As Rosenzweig sees it, the issue is that divine providence must be universal (the synthesis)—any defined entity, e.g., Judaism or Christianity, is defined, among others, as different from what it is not (the thesis)—and the question, therefore, arises as to how something can be universal and yet leave out that which, though real, is not part of it (the antithesis). In a general way Rosenzweig’s answer to this question is that Judaism (thesis) is, from the start and inherently, universal (synthesis) and, therefore, has no need to sublimate an antithesis, whereas Christianity (thesis) goes out into its own and others’ prior pagan substance (antithesis) and sublates them into faith (synthesis). Thus, Christianity must and does risk infection by the antithesis, while Judaism, if only by its silent existence and stubborn persistence, calls it back to its true eschatological (synthetical) goal. Put more simply, the Jew is naturally pious, and the power of (divine) nature is immune to temptation, whereas the Christian is pious by adoption, and adoption is subject to historical distortions and disruptions. More specifically, if revelation-redemption is the relationship between God, man, and the world, then this triadic relationship is subject to two dangers: a part of it can be taken for the whole (idolatry), and its eschatological realization can be proclaimed before its time (pseudo-messianism). Judaism is, according to Rosenzweig, “at the goal,” i.e., with God, outside of history, in the messianic fulfillment, and it is, therefore, essentially immune to these dangers: in the end all is God anyway, and at that point it can, therefore, not be false to say that God is man and world; i.e., idolatry is here not so much abolished as impossible. In the second place, as Rosenzweig puts it in another and very interesting connection (*Jehuda Halevi*, Berlin n.d. [1927], p. 239), not to know that the fulfillment has been attained when it has been is at least as much pseudo-messianism as to think it has been attained when it has not been,—and for Jewry, says Rosenzweig, it has

been. (He is, therefore, quite indulgent to pseudo-Messiahs like Sabbetai Tzevi.) In Christianity, on the other hand, these dangers always exist and sometimes become real: the Orthodox Church tends to identify spirit with God, while it is not yet divine, the Roman-Catholic Church tends to identify the world with God while it is still nature, and Protestantism tends to identify man with God while he is still unredeemed. (The overlapping of triadic antitheses becomes positively dizzying at this point.) "Thus they are dangers which Christianity never overcomes—spiritualization of God, apotheosis of man, pantheification of the world. . . ." (p. 402) And since Christianity is not, according to Rosenzweig, "at the goal" but "on the way," i. e., it has not yet experienced the eschatological fulfillment, spirit, world, and man taken as God are what they would no longer be in the *eschaton*, namely, pre-messianic idolatries. It is true that also Judaism runs certain dangers, and dangers of particularism: it can think that God is only the God of Israel, the world is only "the four ells of the law," and that the Jew is the only man. But Rosenzweig can afford to talk much more calmly about these: the God of Israel is, after all, the God of the universe—the Torah does, after all, embrace everything—and the Jew is, after all, "universal man," and, therefore, the more deeply one goes into the particularistically Jewish God, world, and man the more one ends up with universality. In short, the Jew heals himself out of his Judaism, the Christian must be healed by the Jew. (For all this cf. pp. 298-308, 341-351, 399-416.)

Now, all this may well be—and this writer thinks that it is—significantly wrong. Many Jews and many Christians would want to say, if anything, the exact opposite, that Christianity, by virtue of the first advent, thinks that it is in some sense "at the end," and Judaism, still awaiting the Messiah, thinks that it is "on the way." Few, if any, of the religionists whom Rosenzweig talks about—and he insists that he is talking about Jewry and Christendom, not the "isms" of Judaism and Christianity—express their faith as he claims they do. We will not even speculate what Moslems would want to say about the really outrageous analysis of Islam that he intersperses in hefty chunks in *The Star*: he displaces practically all the theological criticisms that Christianity has traditionally leveled at Judaism and projects them onto Islam; to be able to do this he has to read Islam very selectively and, at that, in its most simple-minded version. (This writer, for one, would hold that, to the contrary, Judaism and Islam are monotheistic brothers in opposition to Christianity. [Cf. the notes in the Hebrew translation on pp. 205, 361.] The history of Jews and Arabs since Rosenzweig's death may, in some part, be due to the Eurotop-centrism which Rosenzweig manifests, and it makes our counterthesis, apart from its theological and historical correctness, also an urgent normative notion.) As a result, also the respective liturgies might have to be interpreted very differently from Rosenzweig's way.

One might thus well think that Rosenzweig's view of Judaism and Christianity is substantially false. But one can scarcely speak of what is imputed to him, "indifferentism," a doctrine of real "equality of validity" between them. In the by now famous passage (p. 415): "Before God, then, Jew and Christian both labor at the same task. He cannot dispense with either. He has set enmity between the two for all time, and withal has most intimately bound each to each"—in this passage the phrase about "enmity" is usually, and conveniently, muted. He explicates its meaning (and what we have outlined above) in the very next paragraph: "And thus we both have but a part of the whole truth . . . A direct view of the whole truth is granted only to him who sees it in God. That, however is a view beyond life. A living view of the truth . . . can become ours too only from out the immersion into our own Jewish heart and even there only in image and likeness. As for the Christians, they are denied a living view altogether. . . ." There is, thus, a real relativization of Jewish and of Christian truth in Rosenzweig—and that seems fair enough, but it is a very unequal relativization—and that again seems fair. The question remains whether it is correctly, and unequally, relativized.

Finally a few technical remarks about the two translations ought to be added. They are so excellent that they will undoubtedly remain standard texts, and future editions can be expected. Excellence is not synonymous with perfection, however, and there are many minor corrections which need to be made. The last quotation from *The Star of Redemption* in the Hallo translation in the previous paragraph, for example, uses "too" where the import of the original is clearly "even." Hallo has "Christians" where Rosenzweig says "*Jenen*"—"those there," which carries the overtones of a simple, colloquial, and somewhat derogatory Yiddish euphemism. "Too," if at all, should obviously have been put between commas, and presumably one needs "from out of the immersion." There is a goodly number of similar and other minor such corrections that are desirable, printing errors, punctuation, some small translational points, etc. In order not to burden the general reader with these the writer has forwarded a list of them to the translator. The few footnotes in the English version, usually restricted to matters of translation, occasionally begin to argue with the author. Either this would need to be done much more frequently and extensively, or, preferably, it should be omitted altogether in the book and done elsewhere: let the man, right or wrong, at least have his own say in his own book! The real and bothersome problem is the indices. The "index of Jewish sources," adapted from Glatzer's compilation for the second edition, contains many Biblical, very much fewer Rabbinic, and no Kabbalistic references—which badly misrepresents the nature of Rosenzweig's thought. Entries are listed by numbers not carried in the body of the text, and the page references follow these numbers—altogether an unfathomable and certainly useless procedure. The "index of names" and the "index of

subjects," compiled for the third edition by Rosenzweig's widow and now adapted by the translator's mother (the Hallo's, a prestigious family from the German-Jewish aristocracy, were close friends and associates of Rosenzweig, and W. Hallo is now professor of assyriology at Yale University), are, in the first place, quite incomplete. (E.g., to "Buddha," add: "p. 390;" to "Goethe," add: "pp. 282, 292, 302;" under "Jesus," omit "p. 277," which is really a Talmudic reference; to "Kant," add: "p. 214;" add: "Stirner, p. 9;" to "Islam," add: "p. 280;" to "Mysticism," add: "p. 207 f.") Above all, the index of names is organized alphabetically; as a result, it is next to impossible to determine the source of a quotation or allusion, often deeply and obscurely buried in the text, unless you know its authorship in the first place; even the products of German humanistic education two generations ago might have had trouble ranging widely and often esoterically through the classics, mediaevals, and modern European literature, and this is altogether too much to ask, and unnecessarily, of the contemporary English reader. Here if anywhere numbers in the text and index would be called for. In any case, many more allusions need to be explicated.

The Hebrew translation has no indices at all, which should be remedied. Here, too, the footnotes sometimes argue. On the other hand, they supply many more Rabbinic and non-Jewish cross-references, and they give very useful historical, philosophical, as well as linguistic explanations. In one case, p. 254, an interesting emendation to the original German text is even suggested. It might not be a bad idea to add English translations of the Hebrew footnote apparatus in future editions of the Hallo translation. One thing the Hebrew does that cannot be done in English: a goodly number of Rosenzweigian phrases and thoughts, when rendered in Hebrew, turn out to be much more authentically Jewish than their denotations in Western languages indicate. For example, the Hebrew for "the peoples of the world" (which Rosenzweig uses essentially in the sense of "the worldly peoples") evokes an entire complex of Talmudic concepts and laws which are at best left in a half-shadow even for the initiate in Occidental languages. The author of the Hebrew introduction, M. Schwartz, aptly quotes Rosenzweig—and the *Mishnah*—to the effect that "every translation is a sort of messianic act, which brings redemption nearer," because it communicates between the diverse languages and cultures of mankind. Rosenzweig was himself powerfully conscious of the fact that in Hebrew it brings Jews and non-Jews back to their common root, in "God's language." Schwartz hopes—as Rosenzweig himself had prayed—that this may be true of the Amir translation. In the jubilee-year of *The Star of Redemption* one hopes that it is true to some extent of both translations.

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Brothers in Hope (*The Bridge: Judaeo-Christian Studies. Volume V*).

Edited by JOHN M. OESTERREICHER. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970. Pp. 350. \$7.50.

This fifth volume in the series called *The Bridge* comes eight years after the fourth volume and follows in the wake of the Second Vatican Council's Statement on the Jews. Like its predecessors, it is a work of scholarly collaboration which should go far toward bridging the gap between Jews and Christians by helping Christians to be more aware of their Jewish heritage and by helping Jews to see that fulfillment of their hopes has been renewed. One of its most important, and best, features is its variety of content and viewpoint. The pre-conciliar volumes presented the studies and views of Catholic scholars exclusively, while in this volume Jewish as well as Catholic scholars explore the implications of the conciliar Statement on the Jews in careful, probing essays.

The structure is similar to that of previous volumes. There is an *Introduction* together with the text of the Statement on the Jews, followed by ten contributions called *Studies*. Next follow another three contributions called *Perspectives*, which are shorter, more specialized or more tentative essays. These are followed by eight *Documents*, which include relevant statements by Pope Paul, the American Bishops, and members of the Institute of Judaeo-Christian Studies. Following three excellent *Book Reviews* come *Notes and Acknowledgements*, *Contributors*, and a very welcome three-part index of names, subjects, and Biblical references.

While each of the essays is distinctly commendable, the preferences of this reviewer lie with the eloquent study of Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich on "What Vatican II Means to Us Jews," the expert treatment of "Jesus and His People's Tradition," by Herbert Haag, the practical implications developed in "Religious Instruction," by Sofia Cavalletti, and the very sensitive "The Theologian and the Land of Israel," by the editor, John M. Oesterreicher.

One does not find a perfect harmony of views in the volume, and, as the editor remarks, the contributors do not resemble the members of an orchestra flawlessly performing a symphony. They are rather like players at a rehearsal who time their various instruments so that they may truly complement and support one another. They are courageous and forthright as they take the conciliar Statement as their point of departure and ask themselves, "where do we go from here?" This question and the title itself *Brothers in Hope*, may be taken together as the overriding and guiding theme of the work. There is a spiritual bond that ties the people of the New Covenant to Abraham's stock. Judaism is founded on the same Covenant and the same promises that Christianity is, and the God of the Covenant is the God of both Christians and Jews. The usual way of describing the difference between the two communities—that Christians

believe that the Messiah has come while Jews still await His coming—is neither exact nor complete. While the traditional Jew hopes that the Messiah will come, so does the Christian who expects Christ's return in splendor and majesty, when the full glory of God will be disclosed and the rich first fruits of our redemption made manifest, when a new heaven and a new earth will be a reality and the petition, "Thy kingdom come," lastingly fulfilled. Thus Christians and Jews are bound together, not only by their faith in the one living God and their love for him but also by their hope in the ultimate realization of God's reign. They are an *ecumene*, a brotherhood, sharing in this eschatological hope.

A greater or more appealing theme cannot be imagined for our despair-ridden age, and this volume admirably and beautifully continues the conciliatory work of its predecessors.

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The New American Philosophers. By ANDREW J. RECK. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968. Pp. 349. \$8.95.

A sequel to his *Recent American Philosophy* (New York, 1964) which treated of American philosophy between the two world wars, Reck's *The New American Philosophy* concentrated on American philosophy since World War II. While the latter book stands on its own, it is nonetheless similar to its predecessor in purpose and format. In each case Reck's aim is to "demonstrate the richness, diversity and originality of American philosophy during the Twentieth century." And in each book he accomplishes his end by expounding in general terms the thought of well-known American philosophers who have expressed their views on a variety of philosophical fields and in a number of book-length works. Moreover, his general purpose is served by keeping criticism to a minimum. For Reck feels that to pause to criticize is to interrupt the process of revealing the total development of the thought of the philosopher under consideration.

In *The New American Philosophy* Reck presents essays on no less than twelve philosophers. These are: C. I. Lewis, Stephen Pepper, Brand Blanchard, Ernest Nagel, John Herman Randall, Justus Buchler, Sidney Hook, F. S. C. Northrop, James K. Feibleman, John Wild, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. We shall here comment on just three of Reck's essays, namely, his expositions of the philosophies of C. I. Lewis, Brand Blanchard and John Wild respectively.

The author's account of C. I. Lewis's "conceptualistic pragmatism" has

much to recommend it. While correctly classifying Lewis as a logical empiricist, Reck takes pains to show not only how Lewis's account of analytic truth differs from that of the Vienna Circle version of logical empiricism but also how this difference is rooted in Lewis's rather sophisticated neo-Kantian epistemology. As Reck fully recognizes, analytic statements for Lewis are true not by reference to linguistic meaning but by reference to what Lewis calls sense meaning. And this sense meaning of an analytic statement is something akin to Kant's concept of a schema. Further, Reck ably unfolds the pragmatic feature in Lewis's analysis of meaning as well as the paradox which attends that feature. For on the one hand, the relation between the sense meanings of an analytic statement are necessary and unalterable according to Lewis; but on the other hand, it is, for Lewis, we human beings who for our own purposes decide what characteristics are to be packed into these meanings. But this paradox is not an inconsistency.

In Reck's essay on Blanchard two items especially stand out for the insight they provide into Blanchard's thought. First is the account given of Blanchard's concept of the teleological relation between idea and object and the relationship that that account has both to the Platonic paradox of knowledge and to Blanchard's overall rationalism. This important aspect of Blanchard's philosophy is not often stressed. To the extent that an idea is its object *in posse*, the two are both identical and different. But this identity in difference is exactly what is called for to explain the fact of knowledge. Moreover, this same purposive identity of idea and object leads to and supports the rationalist's thesis that the rational is the real. For what satisfies thought as its end is what is real. Second, Reck's analysis of Blanchard's treatment of universals also is instrumental to understanding Blanchard's thought. In particular, the author's discussions of Blanchard's distinction between the abstract and the concrete universal shows Blanchard's indebtedness to the English idealists Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet. Of special merit is Reck's acknowledgement of Blanchard's emphasis on the potential indeterminate character of abstract universals in contradistinction with the actual determinate character of the real. For Blanchard, then, abstract universals are not real, i.e., do not exist independently of mind.

To turn to Reck's description of the philosophy of John Wild, what immediately strikes the reader about this essay is the way in which the author finds and clearly presents the deeper unity or continuity between Wild's older philosophical stance, namely, classical realism, and his more recent self-styled existentialism. Reck's approach is especially helpful since Wild's abandonment of classical realism in favor of a type of existentialism has been so radical a change in viewpoint that we tend to forget or overlook the element of continuity between the two. This factor of continuity Reck locates in Wild's insistence on the necessity of the

methodological priority of phenomenology to metaphysics. Even when Wild argued for the primacy of metaphysics in his realist period against the tendency in recent philosophy to establish a logic and a theory of knowledge independent of metaphysics, Wild insisted that the revival of metaphysics be preceded by careful and detailed phenomenological descriptions. But, whereas in his classical realist period Wild took these descriptions to be descriptions of the objects of awareness, in his present existentialist period he requires that these descriptions be descriptions of the awarenesses *themselves* along with subjective feelings such as care and guilt, and in general the data of the human existential situation.

Admittedly, in a book of this sort, devoted as it is to exposition, criticism should be kept to a minimum. At the same time, however, since criticism is often a fruitful means to clear exposition, Reck's purposes would have been even better served had he made more use of criticism than he did. For example, as a way of elucidating Blanchard's notion that an idea is its object *in posse* one might have raised the objection that the relation between an idea and that which it is the idea of appears more to be one of act to potency than one of potency to act. Presumably, in showing how Blanchard might answer this and perhaps other criticisms, one would be gaining greater insight into that philosopher's thought and doing so by means of criticism. Or again, to gain deeper insight into Lewis's conceptualistic pragmatism one might raise the rather commonsensical objection that, if Lewis holds that it is *we human beings* who for our own purposes decide what features are to be packed into the meanings of concepts, how can he also hold that the given data provide us with some clue as to what is to be included in the meaning of these same concepts. It appears *prima facie* as if Lewis is both denying all intelligibility to the given data while at the same time according some intelligibility and determinateness to this data. Now it is precisely by raising and trying to answer a criticism of this sort that one would achieve a clearer picture of Lewis's philosophical program.

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Cajetan's Notion of Existence. By JOHN P. REILLY. The Hague: Mouton, 1971. Pp. 131. 25 Dutch guilders.

This book, which is divided into six chapters, begins the first chapter with a textual analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas's notion of existence. The point stressed is that existence and participation are the cornerstone of the Thomistic metaphysics. In chapter two, the author presents Cajetan's

explanation of two points: God is essentially subsisting *esse*; as such he transcends all categories and is infinitely perfect. God as the subsisting act of existing is the First Cause of all other beings.

Chapter three is the main section in the book and is composed of three parts: (a) the metaphysical constitution of material substances; (b) the real distinction between essence and existence; and (c) the problem of the supposit. The aim and purpose of the book, and especially of chapter three, is to establish Cajetan's existentialism in his analysis of being¹ and to show that Cajetan's notion of existence is fundamentally the same as that of St. Thomas Aquinas. The texts of Cajetan that are used to prove this point are: *In Summa Theologiae Commentarium*, *In De Ente et Essentia Commentarium*, *De Nominum Analogia* and *In De Anima Commentarium*. In his textual analysis, the author tries to reconcile texts in Cajetan which imply an essentialism with texts that are existentialist in tone and thus answer the charge of essentialism in Cajetan raised by Gilson. According to Gilson, Cajetan's position on *esse* is the same as that of St. Albert the Great, where *esse* is not the act of form but is only the relation of an actual being to its efficient cause. Gilson's view is supported by texts which strongly suggest an essentialism;² the view is further supported by Cajetan's use of terms that appear to be those used by Scotus. Against Gilson, the author argues that terms such as *esse actualis existentiae* and *esse essentiae* were used by other Scholastics besides Scotus, especially Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent who used the terms in an essentialist framework, and Thomas Sutton, Capreolus and Sylvester of Ferrara who used the terms in an existentialist framework.

Cajetan's terminology and thought is extremely complex and difficult to interpret, and the charge of essentialism directed against him is understandable. Whereas St. Thomas Aquinas uses *esse* as the act of existing, Cajetan speaks of an *esse actualis existentiae* or *esse existentiae* as opposed to *esse quiditativum* or *esse essentiae*.³ *Esse essentiae* seems to imply that essence has an actuality of its own. Yet Cajetan argues that essence of itself is not, properly speaking, real being. It is a pure potency for *esse*.

¹ Chapter six is an analysis of three difficult texts in Cajetan which are interpreted to convey an existentialism in Cajetan rather than an essentialism.

² In chapter four, the author presents evidence from Gilson's *Elements of Christian Philosophy* for an essentialist concept of being in Cajetan because of his denial of the demonstrability of personal immortality. The author argues that to deny personal immortality is not to deny that *esse* is the act of form; Cajetan had difficulty in reconciling how the human soul could be both the substantial form of the body and a subsisting form.

³ On the use of these terms in his Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia* of St. Thomas, see L. H. Kendzierski and F. C. Wade, S. J., *Cajetan, Commentary on Being and Essence*, tr. from the Latin with an Introduction (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964), p. 4, fn. 8.

When essence receives *esse* it becomes real and actual; essence in itself, therefore, is the proper subject of *esse actualis existentiae*. *Esse actualis existentiae*, according to the author, has the same meaning for Cajetan as *esse* does for St. Thomas, namely, the actuality of essence.

The reviewer would like to insert the following points on Cajetan's notion of being.⁴ Cajetan distinguishes between *ens* used as a participle and *ens* used as a noun. *Ens* as a participle is transcendental and is divided into the ten categories. It includes the subject and means "one existing." *Ens* taken as a noun is *esse actualis existentiae*. Here the subject is left out; it is not a transcendental nor is it divided in the categories. *Ens* taken as a noun, that is, abstractly so as not to include its subject, is *quo res est*. It is ultimate actuality in the line of substance, not accident. It unites with essence but does not constitute essence. Its function in the union is not to make an essence but to make essence exist in nature. Correlative to *esse* accounts for its being itself but not for its being in nature. It is open real of itself, and to that extent it has *esse* but only an *esse essentiae*. This *esse* accounts for its being itself but not for its being in nature. It is open to the ultimate reality of *esse actualis existentiae*. Thus essence must be something that makes it real enough to be ready for ultimate actuality or *esse essentiae*. This *esse* is not from *esse actualis existentiae*, but is the condition requisite for the ultimate actuality. For Cajetan, *esse existentiae* is both essential (constituted in some sense by the principles of essence) and is accidental (*esse* is other than essence). Cajetan defended both points in order to be true to St. Thomas. Actual existence can be constituted only by the proper principles of essence (essentiality); actual existence comes from an efficient cause to an essence fully constituted as essence (factor other than essence). Thus essence is in some way prior to actual existence, and there is a real distinction between essence and *esse actualis existentiae*, but it leaves doubts about the *esse* that is ultimate only in the way that is most proper to accidents.

The last section of chapter three, devoted to the supposit, indicates Cajetan's view that the supposit is an essence. The relation of the supposit to existence is, therefore, that of a potency; the supposit becomes being through the act of existence. The supposit is *id quod* and through *esse* it becomes *id quod est*. The author argues that Cajetan would rather say that the supposit composes with *esse* to give being and that the form and the supposit are not properly real in themselves but are only real through *esse*, which is what St. Thomas would say.

The final point covered in the book (chapter five) deals with the being of accidents and is based, for the most part, on chapter seven of Cajetan's Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia* of St. Thomas.

⁴ See L. H. Kendzierski and F. C. Wade, S. J., *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19, where Father Wade has given a developed account of Cajetan's notion of being.

The book is carefully written and the author has used the basic texts in Cajetan dealing with his notion of being. The problem of understanding Cajetan's terminology has been handled very well. The attempted purpose of establishing Cajetan's existentialism is commendable for its thorough treatment; the conclusion, however, remains debatable.

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L'Enciclica "Humanae vitae." Analisi e orientamenti pastorali. By LINO CICCONE, C. M. Rome: Edizioni Pastoral, 1970. Pp. 214. L. 2.000.

This work brings together into one volume four successive articles on the encyclical *Humanae vitae* which appeared in the renowned review of philosophy and theology *Divus Thomas* of Piacenza (1969-1970). The author, Father Lino Ciccone, of the Collegio Alberoni and editor of the above periodical, sets out to answer in a scientific and documented manner two questions: what did the pope really say? and what are the pastoral directives which he has effectively given?

The author prefaces his work with a treatment of the relationship of theologians to papal encyclicals. The structure of the text itself follows the outline of *Humanae vitae*: 1) actual terms of the problem, 2) doctrinal solution, 3) faithful realization in practice of the moral doctrine. By textual analysis and comparison with other ecclesiastical documents, such as *Gaudium et Spes*, Fr. Ciccone brings into focus the meaning of the text and its pastoral implications and demands. The method employed in unfolding the teaching of the encyclical is more scientific and more complete than in most literature on the subject. This work is perhaps the last of its type we shall see on the encyclical.

The ideas exploded by the impact of the publication of *Humanae vitae* rapidly moved beyond the question of the regulation of birth to the reevaluation of positions on conscience, authority, infallibility, etc. The fullness, richness, and extent of the meaning of the papal document have become overshadowed or forgotten in the subsequent contestations. Thus this work is of immense value to those who are interested in the moral problem of birth regulation as presented by the encyclical, for they have available a thoroughly competent study which is analytical in method, doctrinal in evaluation, and pastoral in orientation.

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Fabricated Man. By PAUL RAMSEY. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. Pp. 174. \$7.50 (cloth), \$3.75 (paper).

The Patient as Person. By PAUL RAMSEY. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. Pp. 305. \$10.00.

Princeton ethicist Paul Ramsey, in his two newest books, confronts problems in medical ethics which have occupied his attention increasingly in recent years. *Fabricated Man* incorporates two of his previously published essays, apparently with little editing. This makes for some repetitiousness, but the book as a whole is nevertheless a clear and readable study of major moral issues raised by advances in genetic science and technology. *The Patient as Person* discusses a wider range of medico-moral problems with emphasis on obtaining the patient's consent especially for experimental measures (with special reference to the ethics of experimenting on children), the duty of caring for the dying, the determination of the moment of death, and the morality of transplant surgery. This book is based on the Lyman Beecher lectures on medical ethics given at Yale in 1969, a task for which Ramsey had prepared by means of two semesters' work as visiting research professor of genetic ethics at the Georgetown University Medical School.

Both books are premised on a view of man, stated in consciously Barthian terms, as a being "created in covenant, to covenant, and for covenant," (FM, p. 38)¹ such that "covenant-fidelity is the inner meaning and purpose of our creation as human beings, . . . of even the 'natural' or systemic relations into which we are born and of the institutional relations or roles we enter by choice." (PP, p. xii) Respect for the "sanctity of human life" is one essential facet of the attitude of "any man who, so far as he is a religious man, explicitly acknowledges that we are a covenant people on a common pilgrimage." (PP, p. xiii) Moreover, since Christians understand "the *humanum* of man to include the body of his soul no less than the soul (mind) of his body," (FM, p. 47) man is a "sacredness in the natural, biological order" as much as in the socio-political order. (PP, p. xiii)

Accordingly, a sound ethics must recognize that just as man's sacredness as a social being prohibits his subjection to "complete dominion by 'society' for the sake of engineering civilizational goals," (PP, p. xiii) so also the sacredness of his physical existence forbids abuses of his body even if he freely undertakes them. Put simply, "something voluntarily adopted can still be wrong" (FM, p. 32); certain kinds of bodily behavior "are of quite questionable morality, and questionable for reasons that the voluntariness of the practice would not remove." (FM, p. 45) An ethics

¹ Where necessary, the initials FM and PP are used in page references to indicate *Fabricated Man* and *The Patient as Person*, respectively. Italics in all quotations are original.

which supposes otherwise, denying any intrinsic morality to bodily acts and stipulating only that the freedom of the agent or agents be respected (as though coercion, pressure, or deceit were the only ways to violate personhood), suggests to Ramsey a kind of Cartesian dualism which depersonalizes the human body; such a position, which in effect puts man's bodily life "in the class of the animals over whom God gave Adam complete dominion," (FM, p. 36) is alien to authentic Christianity. Ramsey sees this erroneous view as more or less implicit in the eugenic proposals of certain scientists, (FM, p. 31) and in the exaggerated campaign of some liberal Catholic theologians against the alleged "physicalism" of traditional moral theology. (PP, pp. 178-187)

Indeed, to the surprise of no one familiar with Ramsey's many earlier writings on general Christian ethics and on the morality of war, both of the present books show their author in close accord with traditional Catholic thought not only in affirming the view of man referred to in the previous paragraph but also in the strong rejection of situationism and subjectivism, and in the respect accorded to such classical principles as the double effect, the doctrine of ordinary vs. extraordinary means of preserving life, and the principle of totality. For all this, Ramsey's work is not to be taken as simply a replica of Catholic teaching (a charge sometimes made by his own Protestant coreligionists). To begin with, as the author is at pains to point out, much of what is commonly considered as peculiar to Catholic doctrine is actually the traditional Judaeo-Christian consensus; he takes particular notice of the affinity between Catholic and Jewish attitudes in medical ethics, especially their "common concern for the integrity of men's bodily life." (PP, pp. 187-188) Nor by any means does Ramsey adhere slavishly to the older Catholic moralists; while praising their efforts to encompass "hard cases" within the discipline of moral reasoning, he is generally critical of what he considers their excessive pretensions to "solve" such cases definitively as though a prudential judgment could be simply deduced from general premises. (PP, pp. xvi-xvii) Moreover, he appears to concede some validity to the accusation of "physicalism" brought against traditional Catholic ethics, even while reserving stronger criticism for the liberals' overreaction. (PP, pp. 158n, 178) Finally, Ramsey disagrees significantly with the traditional Catholic approach to the issues of contraception, sterilization, euthanasia, and transplant surgery; these points warrant some detailed comment here, at the admitted risk of exaggerating their importance in relation to the many other areas where Ramsey would meet with no opposition from moralists in the Catholic tradition.

Contraception and Sterilization

These practices are approved in *Fabricated Man* as voluntary means of preventing the transmission of genetic defects. While acknowledging

that "the nature of human parenthood" involves a basic connection between the procreative and unitive dimensions of sexuality, so that "an ethics (whether proposed by nominal Christians or not) that sunders *in principle* these two goods . . . falls out of the bounds which limit the variety of [possible] Christian positions," (p. 33) Ramsey maintains that the requisite connection is present as long as procreation (if there be any) and love-making take place within the sphere of the marriage covenant:

Most Protestants, and nowadays a great many Catholics, endorse contraceptive devices which separate the sex *act* as an act of love from whatever tendency there may be in the act (at the time of the act, and in the sexual powers of the parties) toward the engendering of a child. But they do *not* separate the sphere or realm of their personal love from the sphere or realm of their procreation, nor do they distinguish between *the person* with whom the bond of love is nourished and *the person* with whom procreation may be brought into exercise. . . . (pp. 33-34)

This position does not depend on viewing acts of contraceptive intercourse as connected in an ensemble with other conjugal acts which are allowed to be procreative, justifying the former by seeing them in a moral unity with the latter. Even if spouses have a good reason (eugenic or other) to "adopt a lifelong policy of planned *unparenthood*," they still do not by habitual contraception "put completely asunder what God has joined together—the sphere of procreation, even the procreation they have not or have no more, and the sphere in which they exchange acts that nurture their unity of life with one another." (pp. 34, 41-42) Nor, in this reasoning, is there any intrinsic moral difference between contraception and sterilization; indeed, "even in terms of the more static formulations of the past, . . . a vasectomy may be a far less serious invasion of nature than massive assault upon the woman's generative organism by means of contraceptive pills." (p. 42) (This last statement is actually irrelevant, inasmuch as Catholic objection to contraceptive pills is precisely on the ground that they effect a temporary sterilization. Ramsey is aware of the traditional Catholic view that sterilization entails, besides contraception, the additional formality of a mutilation; but he does not refer to this in the present context.)

This whole section of the book antedates *Humanae Vitae*; an updating footnote simply remarks that Pope Paul missed what Ramsey sees as the essential point. Since the pope in his encyclical had singled out only the "ensemble of acts" defense of contraception as a possibly significant objection to his own position, he is reproached not only for himself adhering to an outmoded "single-act analysis" approach to the problem but for failing even to recognize that the issue might be discussed in other terms. (p. 165, n. 50) As Ramsey mentions in the same footnote, many opponents of the encyclical have alleged other instances of gaps or weaknesses in its

reasoning. Concerning all such criticisms it should be noted that, when popes exercise their magisterial authority in declaring what is to be held as Catholic teaching, they need not and ordinarily do not undertake detailed scientific reasoning or an exhaustive refutation of every possible opposing position. It seems clear in the present instance that, if papal teaching on contraception could not accommodate the more modest departure of the "ensemble" theory, which would still be somehow within the "act analysis" tradition, the pope would have to reject *a fortiori* the more radical departure which Ramsey proposes.

Ramsey's defense of contraception is consciously devoid of situationist or subjectivist bias. "Their [the spouses] morality is not oriented upon only the genetic consequences which are believed to justify any voluntary means; nor is it only an ethic of inner intention which is believed to make any sort of conduct right." (p. 42) Nor could one rightly make the accusation, which adherents of papal teaching often bring against proponents of contraception, that Ramsey's thesis would open the way to sexual perversions of all kinds. Clearly Ramsey's understanding of the connection between procreative and unitive values in human sexuality enables him to endorse contraception (and contraceptive sterilization) while condemning extra-marital sex as well as more extreme eugenic measures such as AID (artificial donor insemination, which is reductively extra-marital sex) and cloning (the asexual replication or "xeroxing" of persons); evidently his principles would also exclude solitary gratification through masturbation, and homosexuality. In all of these there is a sundering of the "sphere" of procreation from that of love-making, either by seeking the procreative good apart from the conjugal union of spouses (AID, cloning) or by seeking sexual satisfaction without reference to a person with whom procreation would be physically or morally possible (the other cases). At the same time, however, one is hard put to see how this reasoning would prohibit perversions within marriage, such as mutual masturbation or sodomy. If Christian morality requires of sexual acts only that they be reserved for the sphere of the marital covenant, it should follow that as long as a man and woman are married they are permitted any kind of sexual expression which they find mutually satisfying. In other words, within marriage anything goes. What then is the marriage covenant for?

Finally, we suggest that Ramsey's language is somewhat farfetched in describing the meaning of the contraceptive intercourse he seeks to justify. Repeatedly he says that spouses using contraception still maintain procreation, "even the procreation they have not or have no more," within the sphere of their conjugal union. (pp. 36, 41-42, 44) "Neither the husband (or wife) who practices artificial birth control nor the husband who decides to have a vasectomy is saying by the total course of his life anything other than that *if* either marriage partner has a child, or more children, it will be within their marriage covenant" (p. 41); but granted that this is what

he may be saying "by the total course of his life," it is surely *not* what he is saying specifically by his choice of contraceptive or sterile intercourse. Again, the spouses "through a whole course of life . . . actually unite their loving and their procreativity (which, incidental to this, they have not)" (p. 42); but non-procreativity can hardly be called "incidental" to a conjugal life which is deliberately contraceptive.

The unanswered question persists: When man and wife make love, when they celebrate their covenant of complete mutual self-giving by the union of their procreative organs, how does the act maintain its integrity as an expression of their total self-donation if their procreative potential is being purposely withheld? No answer to this is given by simply dismissing "act analysis" as outmoded or "static."

Euthanasia

Chapter Three of *The Patient as Person*, entitled "On (Only) Caring for the Dying," presents the thesis that there is a radical difference between our duty toward the sick who may recover and our duty toward the sick who are irreversibly in the process of dying. "Just as it would be negligence to the sick to treat them as if they were about to die, so it is another sort of 'negligence' to treat the dying as if they are going to get well or might get well." (p. 133) The exposition of this thesis necessarily entails a discussion of ordinary vs. extraordinary means to save life; Ramsey pursues this discussion with copious citations from medical ethicists in the Catholic tradition, and his position is in substantial accord with their consensus. Pointing out that physicians and moralists tend to differ in the specific meanings they assign to the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary," he emphasizes that easily available procedures which might be considered routine practice (and therefore ordinary in medical terms) can be quite extraordinary in the moral sense, e.g., because they are futile or because they would entail excessive hardship for the patient despite their certain or likely effectiveness in preserving his life. Once we prudently judge that a person's life cannot be saved or prolonged except through morally extraordinary means, the choice not to use (or to cease using) such means opens the way for exercising our obligation now to attend the dying person with proper care, i.e., to make him as comfortable as possible and to console and support him with the warmth of human love and companionship as he prepares to make his passage.

The problem of euthanasia is introduced in the course of a vigorous refutation of Joseph Fletcher, who acknowledges no morally significant difference between direct euthanasia and the rejection of extraordinary life-sustaining measures, approving either as justifiable in proper circumstances. For Ramsey, the distinction between these two procedures derives its meaning from the duty of caring for the dying; the abandonment of

extraordinary efforts at prolonging life frees us to administer appropriate premortem care, whereas direct euthanasia intends to hasten the dying person to a realm beyond our care. "This is the ultimate ground for saying that a religious outlook that goes with grace among the dying can never be compatible with euthanasiac acts or sentiments" (p. 153); on the other hand, in a secularistic culture which lacks realistic perspectives on death, it seems understandable that some are inclined to ward off death by extravagant means as if "to make an absolute of saving life for yet a bit more spatio-temporal existence," while simultaneously there are "equally powerful currents of thought toward the arbitrary taking of life for the sake of earthly good to come." (p. 156)

However, the very reasoning which motivated the rejection of euthanasia in principle now leads Ramsey to admit qualifications. Having put forward the duty of properly caring for the dying as the sole basis for distinguishing between the choice to kill and the choice not to intervene any longer against death, Ramsey finds himself forced to concede that this distinction loses its moral import in the case of a patient so far *in extremis* as to be irretrievably beyond the reach of any human care. If a slowly dying person is irreversibly comatose, "it is then a matter of complete indifference whether death gains the victory over the patient in such impenetrable solitude by direct or indirect action." (p. 162) Similarly, if a terminal patient is in such severe and unconquerable pain that no ministration of care can really be communicated to him, a situation which Ramsey considers unlikely, then "one can hardly hold men to be morally blameworthy if . . . dying is directly accomplished or hastened." (p. 163)

As with contraception, no concession to situationism is intended in the above suggestions; Ramsey would not have us dismiss a moral principle according to circumstantial exigencies but merely refine our understanding of the principle itself. Nor, again, does the "wedge argument" serve as a ready objection; Ramsey is confident that his qualifications are formulated carefully enough to exclude abuse. Though remembering that the Nazi horrors originated from small beginnings, he acknowledges the need for caution. But, as he recognizes, to accept even his narrowly circumscribed permission of euthanasia it would have to be "agreed that directly death-dealing or death-hastening actions are not inherently or always necessarily wrong" (p. 163)—indeed, that such actions worked upon *innocent* persons are not inherently wrong! An ethics that forbids all direct killing of the innocent (and even, in Thomistic ethics, direct killing of a criminal or an unjust aggressor by private authority) will insist that the moral difference between deliberately administering death to a dying person and ceasing to oppose his death unreasonably cannot be simply reduced to the duty of "caring" for him—a duty which admittedly, like all specific positive obligations, has limits. It is not palpably implausible to hold that a dying person retains his right to life even after he has irrevocably lost the

capacity to appreciate our respect for it, or that in any event we should not force the hand of the Lord of life and death, whose rights in the matter are supreme.

Transplant Surgery

Ramsey's differences with Catholic teachings on this subject appear to be more in the area of remote theological perspectives than in specific conclusions. The difficulty for Catholic moralists has been that the principle of totality, as traditionally understood, cannot easily accommodate the mutilation of a well person for the sake of the life or health of an ill person, e. g., in the case of a kidney transplant. In *The Patient as Person*, Ramsey notes the tendency among contemporary Catholic theologians to reinterpret the principle so as to justify physical self-mutilation for one's own good in the order of fraternal charity, whereas Gerald Kelly, S.J., is cited to the effect that the requirement of greater personal welfare as a motive for legitimate self-mutilation is perhaps merely an operating principle intended to encompass "ordinary" cases. (p. 176) The author is dissatisfied with the principle in general and is less enthusiastic with the attempted reformulation than with the traditional version. Crediting the older approach with a sound concern for physical integrity as an essential element in personhood, he fears that efforts to expand the totality principle by appealing to "sticky" theories of the mutilated person's higher spiritual or psychological benefit may herald that persistent Cartesian tendency to depersonalize the body.

Both the "conservative" and "liberal" views of totality suffers, Ramsey suggests, from being locked into the Catholic theology of supernatural charity as a virtue perfecting man's natural appetite for his own greatest good. While it is misleading to contrast classical Protestant theology with Catholic theology by saying that the former sees charity as "a free act of grace" (p. 185) while the latter sees it as being "in continuity with 'nature'" (p. 177) and hence by implication not quite gratuitous, be it granted that Catholic teaching has characteristically maintained the *congruity* (if not "continuity") of the natural and supernatural orders. From this it certainly follows with immediate necessity, in the moral realm, that an intrinsically (or "naturally") wrong action cannot be rectified by appealing to a motive of supernatural charity. But in the present context the point in question is precisely whether the principle of totality is a matter of intrinsic natural morality, i. e., whether or not, apart from procuring one's own greater benefit (physical for the conservatives, spiritual or psychological for the liberals), a reasonable self-love must always forbid depriving oneself of an organ even to relieve another's grave need. If, as Kelly suggested, the totality principle is only a guideline which may not be adequate to all situations, this is the same as saying that it is not always necessarily implied by the requirement of

reasonable self-love. Whatever inadequacies the principle of totality may have should not, then, be blamed on the doctrine that grace (charity) perfects nature. The natural moral obligation to love oneself reasonably can retain its universal validity, even though the principle of totality may be found not to be the embodiment of that obligation in every case.

Ramsey forthrightly acknowledges that his suggested Protestant perspective, while it may more easily allow the welfare of the recipient to be the decisive motive for sacrificing one's own physical wholeness, is also fraught with danger; "precisely because of its freedom from the moorings of self-concern, [it] is likely to fly too high above concern for the bodily integrity of the donor, higher than one finds in even the most 'liberal' Roman Catholic thought." (p. 187) To offset this risk, he urges that we cultivate the "very realistic view of the life of man who is altogether flesh (*sarx*)," which the Bible teaches just as emphatically as it enjoins "love of God and neighbor." (p. 187) Interestingly, Ramsey omits to mention the love of oneself in this reference to the biblical precept of charity. Let us note that, for Catholic theology, the obligation to love oneself arises not only from natural morality but also from its being specifically included in that very biblical injunction to reflect divine love by loving our neighbor *as ourselves*. The insistence on a proper self-love is not, then, a hangup with the natural order which must be balanced against the promptings of supernatural charity; it is an explicit requirement of charity itself.

Despite any differences in theological outlook, however, no responsible Catholic moralist is likely to find significant fault with Ramsey's treatment of the prudential aspects of the mutilation-transplantation problem. In his words, we dare not forget that the mutilation of a live donor "makes a well person ill," (p. 183) and so "bodily integrity must be a norm operating in the assessment of the morality of the self-giving of organs, even if it is outweighed." (p. 195) While offering no strict rules for determining just what a person may or may not reasonably have done to himself for another's welfare, Ramsey cites with approval the criterion of proportionality between risk to the donor and benefit to the recipient as variously proposed by medical writers. Noting the characteristic concern of the medical profession for the donor's physical well-being, which now motivates intensified research into the feasibility of transplanting cadaver organs so as to make the mutilation of living donors unnecessary, he remarks that "the physicians may have to save us from the moralists" whose calculations take the donor's bodily integrity too little into account.

Concluding Comments

We noted earlier the danger of distortion arising from concentration on those relatively few areas in Ramsey's works which are "sensitive" from

the viewpoint of Catholic moral tradition. It remains for us now to emphasize that the above criticisms do not prevent an enthusiastically favorable reception from being given to the two books as a whole.

The problem of contraception and sterilization notwithstanding, *Fabricated Man* is a solid Christian evaluation of the goals and the means of genetic control. Basically Ramsey favors efforts at minimizing the transmission of hereditary defects (preventive eugenics) but balks at projects aimed at the breeding of a "better" human species (positive eugenics). He warns that only an appreciation of man's embodied personhood and a sound Christian eschatology can prevent our being stampeded, by scientific pessimism about mankind's present state and/or by a misconceived revolutionary "eschatologism" (which he attributes to Karl Rahner and to "Roman Catholic omega-pointers," pp. 139-142), into the blasphemous and suicidal goal of transforming man into an altogether new species of creature.

Even in pursuing legitimate eugenic goals, Ramsey insists on proper circumspection regarding the means. Besides respect for the "nature of human parenthood" which rules out certain measures as intrinsically immoral, we must beware of circumstantial dangers which may warrant avoidance even of procedures that are unobjectionable in themselves, such as genetic surgery. Similarly, an important objection to cloning, besides its intrinsic violation of human parenthood, is that the very first experiment with such a procedure must involve the willingness to subject human fetuses to cruel risk; hence we cannot even morally find out whether the feat is possible.

In *The Patient as Person* the insight into man as embodied spirit, although definitely present, is exploited perhaps less fully than in the other book. Heavier emphasis tends to be placed instead on the obligation to obtain the patient's informed consent to any therapeutic or experimental measures; and a little confusion arises from the suggestion, never elaborated, that even the requirement of consent (understood to embrace presumed consent in extreme need) may not be unexceptionable. (pp. 9-10) But all of this still leaves substantially intact the author's soundness of principles, the hard discipline of his reasoning, and the reasonableness of his conclusions.

Most instructive in this book is the chapter on the redefinition of death; no clear or more judicious analysis of the problem is available. Ramsey argues that the current proposals for "updating death" are:

proposals for updating our procedures for determining that death has occurred, for rebutting the belief that machines or treatments are the patient, for withdrawing the notion that artificially sustained signs of life are in themselves signs of life, for telling when we should stop ventilating and circulating the blood of an unburied corpse because there are no longer any vital functions really alive or recoverable in the patient. (pp. 88-89)

By "scotching the rumor that people are going to be declared brain dead while having natural activity of heart and circulation," we can "effect a return to a rather traditionalistic understanding of the procedure for stating that a man has died." (p. 68) However, we are cautioned that "there is something a little sinister" in the repeated practice of associating the discussion of "updating death" with the prospect of organ transplantation (p. 103); hence it is imperative to insure that "neither the procedures for stating death nor a decision that death has occurred are distorted by any reference to someone else's need for organs." (p. 112) In a subsequent brief chapter on heart transplants it is argued that the only morally questionable aspect of these operations was the tendency of some physicians and of the public press to oversell them as therapeutic instead of acknowledging their chiefly experimental nature.

For anyone desiring to understand current issues in medical ethics in the light of the Judaeo-Christian moral heritage, both of Paul Ramsey's new works will be of immense profit. If not to be accepted uncritically in all particulars, they should nevertheless be very warmly received and seriously studied.

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