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CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM, CRISIS OF FAITH?

I. EXISTENCE OF THE CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM

1. *Testimony of the Supreme Pontiff Paul VI to the Synod of Bishops*

PAUL VI, having frequently deplored the existence of the crisis concerning the Magisterium of the Church, especially on the occasion of the Wednesday general audiences, deemed it his duty to manifest anew his preoccupations in his inaugural Allocution to the Synod of Bishops, Sept. 29, 1967, in these words:

The earnest concern for the faithful preservation of doctrine, which was voiced so solemnly at the start of Vatican II, must guide our post-conciliar period. Indeed, it must now be displayed with even greater vigor by those in the Church who have received Christ's mandate to teach and spread the Gospel message and to preserve the "deposit" of faith; for today the dangers threatening the deposit of faith are more numerous and more serious, enormous dangers connected with the irreligious outlook of the modern mentality and insidious dangers cropping up within the Church

itself. Some teachers and writers are trying to give expression to Catholic doctrine, but they often seem to be more concerned about adapting the dogmas of faith to secular forms of thought and expression than about following the norm of the Church's Magisterium. They thus give free run to the view that, disregarding the requisites of sound doctrine, one may select only those truths of faith that are admissible in the judgment of one's personal instinctive preference and reject the rest. As this erroneous opinion would have it, conscience is free and responsible for its own actions; it may claim its rights even in preference to the rights of truth, foremost among which are the rights of divine Revelation (cf. Gal. 1:6-9). Moreover, the doctrinal patrimony of the Church may be subjected to review in order to give Christianity new ideological dimensions quite at variance with the theological ones which genuine tradition, with its immense reverence for God's word, has traced out.[1]

2. Awareness of the crisis on the part of the Synodal Fathers

Among the subjects presented to the First Synod of Bishops celebrated in Rome in October of 1967 figured the following: *Some dangerous modern opinions. Atheism.* Among these opinions there was singled out, in the field of ecclesiology, a certain crisis of the divine authority of the Magisterium of the Church. In fact, the synodal presentation document spoke of the opinion of those who reduce the office of the Magisterium to the task of registering the religious conscience of the community, gathering together and sanctioning with its own authority those truths which flourish and are developed in such a collective conscience. Harkening back, then, to the condemnation which emanated from the Holy Office, with the decree *Lamentabili* of July 3, 1907, against the Modernists who upheld the emancipation of exegesis from the Magisterium of the Church and reduced the task of the Church to that of approving the opinions prevalent in the learning Church,[2] the same presentation document insinuated that the modern crisis could well be held as a symptom of neo-modernism.

Another, although less serious, indication of the crisis was

[1] *L'Osservatore Romano,* Sept. 30, 1967.

[2] *Enchiridion Symbolorum,* Denziger-Schönmetzer, ed. XXXIII (Herder, 1964), n. 3406.

pointed out both in the presentation document offered to the Fathers and in the report made to them by His Eminence, Michael Cardinal Browne. After calling to mind that the Magisterium, even when it does not define, remains an organ divinely instituted for the teaching of the faithful to which is due a religious submission, even though this is not to be identified with theological faith, the two documents lamented that among Catholics not all profess due submission to the authentic ordinary Magisterium of the Church.

But, notwithstanding the fact that the report had been made with moderation in judgment and without any indication of the seriousness and extension of this crisis, and in a more moderate tone than that used by the Supreme Pontiff in his inaugural Allocution, it did not draw unanimity of consent. Nor does this cause any surprise. In fact, the chronicle of the Synod has informed us that a great number of the Fathers judged the presentation document on the actual doctrinal and disciplinary situation of the Church to be *negative,* ignorant of the advances achieved after the Council, not completely responsive to the reality of the facts, which have many encouraging features, and, therefore, that the presentation document was alarmist and should be set aside. The history of Vatican II is, in part, repeated.

Not all the synodal Fathers, as was expected, shared the optimism of the protesters; opposition, then, was inevitable and it exploded with particular vigor in regard to the lamented crisis of the Magisterium. Without giving the names of the authors of the various interventions and of the Conferences represented by them (in order not to violate secrecy and to give rise to unpleasant reactions), we limit ourselves to reference to the essential content of the opposing judgments.

A. *Prevalent agreement of judgments on the existence of the crisis*

a. *Crisis of the Magisterium in the conscience of the faithful*

The synodal Fathers who, in the name of the Episcopal Conferences of the more diverse and distant countries of the

Catholic world, expressed their agreement with what was deplored in the presentation document, brought to light various aspects of it, more or less serious and widespread. The spreading of an attitude of diffidence and of neglect with regard to the ordinary Magisterium of the Supreme Pontiffs and of the Bishops was lamented by many of them. Others expressed the judgment that, among the opinions singled out in the presentation paper, there were some that were not only dangerous but also false. Someone brought up the existence of signs of doubt and uncertainty, too, in matters of faith and morals, even among priests and religious. There was one, moreover, who deplored the lack of full assent shown by some toward the solemn documents themselves of the Magisterium. The fact was likewise brought up that some claim for themselves the unlimited faculty to discuss even in public the more difficult and delicate problems of dogma and moral. The crisis of the Magisterium, another Father observed, is institutional, because some claim to submit the Teaching Authority to the judgment of the charismatics, keeping open for discussion all the things which have not been defined and limiting the normative value of the documents, even conciliar documents, to the times in which they emanated.

However, while deploring the obfuscation of faith and of obedience in the conscience of many of the faithful in their views concerning the Magisterium, the Fathers reaffirmed with the Council the right to freedom in scientific research, the duty, on the other hand, of the Hierarchy to promote studies and dialogue, in the firm conviction that the Magisterium is not an obstacle to dogmatic and scientific progress but rather a light and a salutary guide.

b. *Crisis of the Magisterium in the conscience of Pastors*

There was no lack of synodal Fathers who humbly and frankly held that one of the principal causes underlying the lamented crisis in the Christian people can be found among many Pastors, namely, in the diminished awareness of their own responsibilities. Indeed, not all the Masters of the faith

by divine right seem to have a clear awareness that the grace of the theologian is one thing, that of the bishop another; that the bishop is, at it were, the sign of the true rule of faith. Some of them, not fulfilling with zeal and firmness their proper office, namely, that of proposing with clarity and authority the certain and indisputable truths of faith and morals, have permitted surprise and scandal to arise among the faithful by the dissensions made evident to them among exegetes and theologians on points of Catholic doctrine which have been held up until today to be fundamental and definitive. The Bishops, observed one distinguished prelate with a certain wry humor, must not be dumb dogs.[3]

B. *Prevalent disagreement of judgments on the existence of the crisis*

Although not daring to contest the existence of a certain crisis of the Magisterium, both in the conscience of the faithful and in that of some Pastors, many Fathers believed it their duty and right to attentuate the seriousness and the dimensions of the crisis. Wherefore, not a few were in agreement in saying that, as with other aspects of the life of the Church, so also in the functioning of the Magisterium and of the respect due to it there is a crisis of development rather than one of decay and serious weakness. In our time, then, both Pastors and faithful would act substantially in a way more worthy of persons conscious of their own rights and duties, of the legitimate autonomy which belongs also to the faithful. Rather, the crisis must be imputed, at least in part, to the repeated impediments placed by Authority to scientific research and to the manifestations of personal opinions. Other Fathers singled out the danger of deeming erroneous what in reality are attempts at progress, at the conquest of old ideologies, at the purification and strengthening of the faith. One other made the observation that the way of Authority does not favor advancement. What is more important, today, is adaptation to modern thought

[3] Cf. "Il Sinodo dei Vescovi," *La Civiltà Cattolica* (Nov. 4, 1967), pp. 289-290.

and manner of speaking. As was expected, none of the Fathers defending the actual situation thought it opportune to promote attentiveness to the Magisterium crisis in the conscience and activity of the holy Pastors.

II. Remedies for the Crisis of the Magisterium

1. *Remedies indicated and offered by the Holy Father Paul VI*

In his inaugural Allocution to the Synod the Pope constantly indicated as the first and principal remedy for the crisis of faith, which is extended also to the Magisterium, the revival of the exact notion of faith, reminding all believers that:

> Faith is not the fruit of an arbitrary or purely naturalistic interpretation of God's word, just as it is not the religious expression which springs from the collective opinion, deprived of authorized guidance, of those who say they believe; and much less is it acquiescence in the philosophical or sociological currents of the fleeting historical moment. Faith is the adhesion of our whole spiritual nature to the wondrous, merciful message of salvation that has come down to us through the luminous and secret ways of Revelation. Faith is more than a process of inquiry; it is above all a certainty. It is not the fruit of our inquiring search; it is a mysterious gift, summoning us to take part docilely, promptly and trustingly in the dialogue which God initiates with our souls.[4]

And in the conviction that faith is not the fruit of our investigations and discussions but the *gift of God* (Eph. 2:8), Paul VI indicates that the arm of defense and the rising increase of faith lie above all in and through *prayer* and he goes on to say:

> For this reason we considered the safeguarding of the faith so imperative after the close of the Council that we invited the whole Church to celebrate a " year of faith " in honor of the two Apostles, the chief teachers and witnesses of Christ's Gospel. The purpose of this year is to meditate on the very faith handed down to us and to assess in the modern context the decisive function this fundamental virtue has for the stability of our religion and the vitality of

[4] *L'Osservatore Romano,* Sept. 30, 1967.

the Church, for building up God's kingdom in souls, for ecumenical dialogue and for the genuine contact for renewal that Christ's followers intend to make with the world of today. We wish in this way to strengthen our own faith as teachers, witnesses and pastors in God's Church, so that Christ, living and invisible, her sole and supreme Head, may find it humble, sincere and strong. We wish also to strengthen the faith of all our children, especially those who pursue the study of theology and religion, so that with a renewed and watchful awareness of the Church's unalterable and certain teaching they may give wise collaboration to the furtherance of the sacred sciences and to the maintenance, in light and in fruitfulness, of the inviolable aim of Catholic teaching.[5]

2. *Remedies suggested by some synodal Fathers*

There were those among the Fathers who, with the aim of surmounting the actual crisis of faith in the Magisterium, asked that the Synod reaffirm the duty of submission to the Supreme Pontiff. Another Father underlined the necessity of a clear episcopal magisterium, a necessity advised especially by Seminary professors; another, then, insisted on the duty of an authoritative concordant teaching, on the collegial level or at least the fruit of a continuous communion among the Bishops of individual nations, so as to avoid the situation that one Pastor would approve opinions that another shortly afterwards would declare to be false, temerarious or dangerous. It is not allowed, one Father energetically entreated, that another authority than that of the authentic Magisterium prevail in the Church.

3. *Remedies proposed by the synodal Commission and approved by the majority of the Fathers*

The members of the Synod—144 out of 188—demonstrated that they were without doubt in agreement in maintaining that *the exercise of the authentic Magisterium, singly or collegially,* is the medicine or tonic more adapted to giving vigor and firmness back to the faith and to the submission due to the representatives of Jesus Christ, *the author and perfecter of our faith* (Heb. 12:2).

[5] *Ibid.*

The dogmatic and theological motives that induced the Fathers to approve also the second principle, expressed above, as a secure antidote to the " dangerous modern opinions," were those which had been expressed by the authors of various interventions and which the text of the Report summed up in this brief synthesis: According to the doctrine of the Church the office of teaching matters regarding faith and morals *authentically*, that is, with the authority of Christ, has been confided to all the successors of the Apostles. It is the task, moreover, of the Roman Pontiff, teaching personally, and of the Episcopal College united in Ecumenical Council, to meet the spiritual needs of the Christian people with the assiduous exercise of such a magisterium. But this is not enough, because the individual Pastors in their respective dioceses or regions are abliged, according to their proper office, to the same most grave duty. In our day the sacred ministry is exercized more fittingly in collegial form, that is, through Episcopal Conferences. But it must be executed by each one of them in communion with the teaching imparted by the bishops of the whole world and principally by the Apostolic See. It will then happen that, with a regard for the needs of the whole Church, reciprocal help will be offered to us, disturbances avoided and unity reinforced.

On a subordinate but related level, remedies were indicated which the Pastors ought to suggest to their subjects.

All the faithful, then, must be clearly taught, in ways corresponding more to today's spiritual needs, about the duty which they have to offer filial obedience and sincere adherence to the declarations of the Church, although in various degrees, in keeping with the distinct character of each of these decrees, as was stated in the Acts of Vatican Council II.[6]

III. Recall to the Divine Authority of the Magisterium in the Year of Faith

Given the diagnosis and the therapy that the Synod of Bishops formulated to surmount the actual crisis of the Magis-

[6] Cf. Dogmatic Constitution *Lumen gentium*, c. III, n. 25.

terium of the Church, one must logically conclude that this crisis has its true origin in a diminished " sensus fidei " in the supernatural value of the office of *masters* that the divine Savior communicated to His legitimate representatives.

Indeed, if we look at the *teaching* Church, one has the impression that not all the Bishops are fully aware of their proper and incommunicable *charism* of teaching in the name of Jesus Christ, and thus with divine authority, to which is due the assent of faith or at least religious, internal assent even on the part of men of science, notwithstanding the human gifts and charisms which these men can boast of or believe they possess.

On the part, then, of the *learning* Church, it must be evident that many, both priests and laypersons, claim that they have the right to interpret and formulate anew the same dogmatic definitions, with the optimum intention of rendering them more intelligible and acceptable to Christians or non-Christians of our times. Moreover, they claim that they can pass judgment on the declarations or prescriptions of the authentic, ordinary Magisterium, because they maintain that it is no longer definitive, infallible and irreformable, and therefore it is to be accepted, rejected or interpreted in accordance with the value of the theological or philosophical reasons brought forward by it to reconcile the assent of the faithful.

In the expectation that the Supreme Pontiff, accepting the petition made to him by the Synod of Bishops, will issue a *positive* document on the truths " of faith and morals " which seem today to be more opportune to profess, defend and investigate, it will be useful for all good Catholics to reflect in some degree on their own *faith* in the divine Magisterium of the Church in this " Year of Faith " in the light of the documents that the Supreme Pontiffs and the Ecumenical Councils Vatican I and Vatican II have issued precisely with the intent of illuminating our path as believers and thus of leading us to the glorious goal of eternal salvation.

1. *The divine institution of the Magisterium and its object: the truth to be believed and to be practised*

The *existence* in the Church of a power, not only of vigilance and of direction but also of full and supreme right of teaching, in the name of Christ the Redeemer, all the members of the Church, and, indeed, all men, " the faith they must believe and put into practice " (" fidem credendam et moribus applicandam ") ,[7] is a dogma of faith. It is equally a truth of faith, even though not defined, that the responsible subject of such power is the College of Bishops, in communion with the Roman Pontiff, to whom such power belongs also by personal title, without any restriction as to its exercise.[8] On the other hand, the subject of authentic but not infallible power, one limited to determined territories or subjects, is every individual residential bishop.[9]

As to *object,* that is, doctrinal extension, it is a certain and incontestable truth that the power of the Magisterium is not restricted to things of a strictly religious character, but it embraces the whole domain of the natural law, determining, interpreting, applying it, under its moral aspect, that is, with reference to man's actions ordainable and to be ordained to the highest good and the ultimate end. In other words, the Magisterium does not exhaust its task only within the ambit of man's relations with God, but it has the right and the duty to interest itself, to teach and to pass laws also in the very broad field of the " reality of life." Therefore, numerous and very serious matrimonial, social, political, cultural questions, by reason of their intimate and inseparable connection with ethics, with conscience, with eternal salvation, fall under the *authority* and the pastoral *care* of holy Mother Church.[10]

[7] *Ibid.,* n. 25 A.

[8] Cf. *ibid.,* n. 22 B.

[9] Cf. *ibid.,* n. 25 A.

[10] Cf. St. Pius X, Encyclical *Singulari quadam,* Sept. 24, 1912; *AAS,* (1912), pp. 658-659; Pius XII, Alloc. " Magnificate Dominum," Nov. 2, 1954, *AAS* (1954), pp. 672-673; Conc. Vat. II, Const. dogm. *Lumen gentium,* c. III, nn. 21-25; Const. past. *Gaudium et spes;* F. Hurth, S. J., " Episcoporum triplex munus, Observationes

2. *The divine assistance promised to the Magisterium of the Church*

a. *The infallibility of the solemn, definitive Magisterium*

It is a dogma of faith, that is, a truth of divine, defined and Catholic faith, that the Roman Pontiff: " when he speaks *ex cathedra,* in virtue of the assistance promised to him in the person of blessed Peter, enjoys that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith and morals." [11] The Bishops possess the same prerogative " when gathered together in an ecumenical council they are teachers and judges of faith and morals "; therefore, " their definitions must then be adhered to with the submission of faith." [12]

b. *The infallibility of the ordinary universal Magisterium*

Of the greatest importance, in the face of the crisis of faith or of religious submission which torments the conscience of many Catholics, is a firm adherence to the three following declarations:

Pius IX:

The submission which is proper to the *act of divine faith* must not be limited to those things which have been defined by expressed decrees of the Ecumenical Councils or of the Roman Pontiffs or of this See, but it must be extended also to those things which are transmitted (" traduntur ") by the ordinary Magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world as *divinely revealed* and thus by universal and constant consent are maintained by Catholic theologians as belonging to the deposit of the faith.[13]

ad respectivas Allocutiones Pontificias mense maio et novembri 1954," *Periodica de re morali,* tom. XLIII, fasc. III-IV (Rome, Pont. Univ. Gregoriana, 1954), pp. 231-251.

[11] Conc. Vat. I, Const. dogm. *Pastor aeternus,* c. 4, Denz.-Sch., nn. 3074-3075; Conc. Vat. II, Const. dogm. *Lumen gentium,* c. III, n. 25 C.

[12] *Lumen gentium,* n. 25 B; cf. Msgr. Philips, *L'Église et son mystère au deuxième Concile du Vatican. Historie, texte et commentaire de la Constitution " Lumen gentium,"* tom. I (Desclée, 1967), pp. 325-333.

[13] Ep. *Quas libenter* to the Archbishop of Münich, Dec. 21, 1863, Denz.-Sch. n. 2879.

Vatican Council I:

By *divine and Catholic faith* everything must be believed that is contained in the written word of God or in tradition (" tradita "), and that is proposed (" proponuntur ") by the Church as a *divinely revealed* object of belief either in a solemn decree or in her ordinary universal teaching.[14]

Vatican Council II:

The Bishops . . . even when they are dispersed around the world, provided that, while maintaining the bond of unity among themselves and with Peter's successor and while teaching authentically on a matter of faith or morals, they concur in a single viewpoint as the one which must be held conclusively, pronounce infallibly the doctrine of the Church.[15]

c. *The infallibility of the Magisterium, both solemn and ordinary-universal, even in things not revealed but connected with them*

Examining the tenor and the import of the declarations referred to above, it follows that: 1° the *primary object* of the infallible Magisterium, both solemn and ordinary-universal, is those things (deeds and words, truths to be believed and to be put into practice) which are *formally revealed,* either in a clear and explicit manner or at least obscurely and implicitly; and which, as such, have been " transmitted " (" traduntur ") or " proposed " (" proponuntur "); 2° the *secondary object,* on the other hand, is the things which have not been formally revealed, not even in an obscure and implicit way, but whose connection with the revealed truths is so intimate that their denial would imply the danger of failing even as regards the primary object.[16] This is why Vatican Council II, seeking to include the primary and secondary objects, does not restrict the ambit of infallibility to the *revealed* doctrine of Christ to be believed with *divine* faith, but extends it to every matter of

[14] Const. dogm. *Dei Filius,* c. 3, Denz.-Sch., n. 3011.

[15] *Lumen gentium,* n. 25 B.

[16] Cf. F. Hürth, " Annotationes in Pii XII Nuntium Rad. 23 martii 1952 et in Alloc. 18 apr. 1952," *Periodica* XLI (1952), p. 248.

faith and morals taught unanimously by the Bishops as something that is to be retained as definitive (" tamquam definitive tenendam ") and therefore irreformable. Indeed, even in this case, the ordinary universal Magisterium " proclaims infallibly the doctrine of Christ." " This authority (the Council adds) is even more clearly verified when, gathered together in an ecumenical council, they are teachers and judges of faith and morals for the universal Church." [17] One must extend " the submission of faith " as much to the " definitive interpretation " of the Episcopate dispersed throughout the world, but unanimous in proclaiming it, as to the " definitions " of the Ecumenical Councils and to the personal " definitive act " of the Roman Pontiff.[18] Vatican II does not add *divina,* in order not to restrict the submission of faith only to the truths contained in the deposit of Revelation.

d. *The infallibility of the ordinary Magisterium of the Roman Pontiff*

It is certain that the Supreme Pontiff is infallible when he speaks *ex cathedra* (e. g., dogmatic Bulls), that is, when

[17] *Lumen gentium,* n. 25 B.

[18] *Ibid.,* n. 25 A, B, C. Msgr. Philips, commenting on n. 25 C of *Lumen gentium,* writes: " Here we are, once more, before a very compact text which touches on a great number of problems. 1. First of all, it clearly circumscribes the *object* of infallibility, a question which Vatican Council I treated only tangentially without furnishing a complete answer to it. The Constitution *Pastor aeternus,* c. 4 (Denz. 3070), simply affirms that the assistance of the Holy Spirit is assured to the successor of Peter ' to guard jealously and explain faithfully ' the revealed doctrine. The Fathers of Vatican II specify today that the privilege of infallibility extends as far as is required by the preservation and explanation of the deposit of faith confided to the Church. That far inclusively, but no farther. Once traced, this frontier encomposes a certain number of fundamental truths fixed by philosophy inasmuch as it is the expression of universal human experience. If someone, for instance, claimed that human reason is forever incapable of grasping any certain truth, he could no longer admit, logically, an article of faith. But total relativism and agnosticism are not found condemned by name by revelation, for the simple reason that neither Scripture nor the ancient Church encountered such error all along their path. Theologians bring together under the same rubric of ' indirect object ' of infallibility a whole series of other elements, among which are those they call dogmatic facts. All that belongs to the domain of professional theology; the Council, itself, is content to establish the basic principle and leave the rest to the care of technical treatises." *Op. cit.,* pp. 327-328.

" he proclaims by a definitive act some doctrine of faith or morals." [19] But one cannot argue from this that he is *never* infallible in his ordinary Magisterium, although he would not be by force of a *solemn, definitive* sentence (" infallibilis effatio ") but inasmuch as he proclaims an infallible truth (" effatum infallibile ") which is such for other reasons. Thus, for example, the Supreme Pontiff is to be held to be infallible when he declares his intention to propose, in his ordinary teaching (radio messages, allocutions, and especially encyclical letters), that which the whole Church has certainly and universally maintained and maintains even today as the doctrine of faith. Now, the universal Church cannot err about that which is intimately connected with eternal salvation.[20]

It seems to us that the Fathers of Vatican Council I wanted to include also the infallibility of the ordinary Magisterium of the Popes (in the aforementioned delineated sense) in this statement: " For we are fully cognizant of the fact that this See of St. Peter always remains untainted by any error, according to the divine promise of Our Lord and Savior made to the prince of His disciples, 'I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail; and once you have recovered, you in your turn must, sterengthen your brethern' " (Lk. 22:32).[21] It is a question, then, of preservation from error, guaranteed to the *constant* Magisterium of the Roman Pontiffs, because they are successors of Peter, with regard to the guardianship of the faith of the whole Church. In this case the *constant* teaching of the Supreme Pontiffs is free from error, not only because it is in agreement with the constant and universal doctrine of the Church and of the Ecumenical Councils but also because it is unthinkable that the Popes would have repeatedly confirmed their Brethren in the faith and the entire Church in doctrine and morals contrary to divine revelation and harmful to their eternal salvation. It must indeed be kept in mind that, given the rarity of Ecumenical Councils (21 in about two

[19] *Lumen gentium,* n. 25 A, C.

[20] Cf. F. Hürth, " Episcoporum triplex munus . . . , pp. 244-245.

[21] *Pastor aeternus,* c. 4, Denz.-Sch., n. 3070.

thousand years of the Church's history) and of solemn or *ex cathedra* definitions (Benedict XII on the beatific vision: Denz.-Sch. 1000; Pius IX on the Immaculate Conception of Mary: Denz.-Sch. 2803; Pius XII on the bodily Assumption of Mary: Denz.-Sch. 3903), the guardianship of divine truth, the progress of Christians in faith and morals, the very diffusion and authentic interpretation of the thought of the Councils, has depended principally on the ordinary Magisterium of the Supreme Pontiffs.

Finally, there seems to be no exclusion of the case of an infallible act ("infallibilis effatio") based upon a *definitive* interpretation (not defining, that is, not pronounced with the customary formula and solemnity) obliging the whole Church to the *submission of faith*.[22] This would be verified (according to some theologians), for instance, in the condemnation uttered by Pius XI in his Encyclical, *Casti connubii*, against the abuse of marriage.[23]

e. *The authenticity or divine value of the ordinary Magisterium of the Bishops and of the Supreme Pontiff*

There is the pertinent twofold declaration of the Constitution *Lumen gentium*:

Bishops are preachers of the faith who lead new disciples to Christ. They are authentic teachers, that is, teachers endowed with the authority of Christ, who preach to the people committed to them the faith they must believe and put into practice. By the light of the Holy Spirit ("*sub lumine Sancti Spiritus*"), they make that faith clear . . . vigilantly warding off any errors which threaten their flock. Bishops, teaching in communion with the Roman Pontiff, are to be respected by all as witnesses to divine and Catholic truth. In matters of faith and morals, the Bishops speak *in the name of Christ* and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religious submission. This religious sub-

[22] I. Salaverri, S. J., "From the certain and manifest intention of obliging all the faithful to absolute assent, the infallible exercise of the ordinary Magisterium can be inferred, no matter whether it is the Pope or the Church" (*De Ecclesia Christi*, n. 468 in *Sacrae Theologiae Summa*, 5 ed., [BAC, 1952], vol. I).

[23] *AAS*, 22 (1930), p. 560, Denz.-Sch., n. 3717.

mission of will and mind must be shown in a special way to the authentic teaching of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking 'ex cathedra.' That is, it must be shown in such a way that his supreme magisterium is acknowledged with reverence, the judgments made by him are sincerely adhered to, according to his manifest mind and will. His mind and will in the matter may be known chiefly either from the character of the documents, or from his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from his manner of speaking.[24]

To understand well, and not to undervaluate, the sense and the burden of these declarations, it is useful to observe, with the Council itself, that the *supernatural* value of the Magisterium of the Church does not proceed only from its divine institution—now remote in time—but from the *continual assistance* of the Holy Spirit promised to it: *usque ad consummationem saeculi*: "And know that I am with you always; yes, to the end of time" (Mt. 28:20). In short, it is said of the ordinary Magisterium of the individual Bishops that they make clear "sub lumine Spiritus Sancti" the truths of faith and morals; for the acts of the extraordinary Magisterium of the Ecumenical Councils and of the Roman Pontiff there is mention made of the "assistentia Spiritus Sancti" or, as is stated, "praelucente Spiritu veritatis."[25]

3. *The submission of the faithful to the Magisterium of the Church*

a. *Submission of divine and Catholic faith.* This is due to acts of the infallible Magisterium. It is thus a question of *divine* truths, regarding faith and morals, proposed as revealed by God or as intimately connected with them. These are the *proper object* of such assent of faith, that is, of the act of theological faith. The *formal motive,* therefore, that is, the one truly determining and internally operating, is the *authority of God revealing,* because this alone is proportioned in an absolute manner with the divine truths which are believed, through the perfect identity existing between God in Himself

[24] *Lumen gentium,* n. 25 A.

[25] *Ibid.,* n. 25 A, C, D.

and God knowing Himself (*Veritas Prima in essendo* and *Veritas perfecta in cognoscendo*). The *proposition* of the Church (in virtue of the divine assistance, that is, of the charism of truth) is only the *indispensable condition* (*conditio sine qua non*) so that our assent of faith might, even from the psychological and moral point of view, be perfectly tranquil.[26] However, the living Magisterium of the Church is the *proximate and universal norm* of faith, whose supreme rule will always remain divine revelation contained in the Sacred Books and in Tradition.[27]

b. *Submission of ecclesiastical faith to defined but not revealed truths*

It does not seem that the Constitution *Lumen gentium* authorizes the distinction of a twofold faith: one *divine* and Catholic, the act of the theological virtue by which one adheres to formally revealed truths; the other *ecclesiastical,* which would be an act of non-theological faith by which one adheres to truths which are proposed infallibily by the Church as connected with revealed truths. The Constitution speaks only of the submission of faith ("fidei obsequium")[28] due to the

[26] Cf. C. Journet, *L'Église du Verbe Incarné, Essai de théologie speculative.* I. *Hierarchie apostolique,* 2ème ed. (Desclée de Brouwer, 1955), p. 204.

[27] D. Mongillo, O.P. rightly observes: "The infallible proposition of the truth on the part of the Church, even if normally required, is *not an essential condition of the act of faith.* Before the dogmatic definition or outside the Church personal certainty that a truth is revealed by God or connected with revealed datum obliges to belief. In such a case the truth will be believed with an act of divine faith which, however, cannot yet be said to be of divine-Catholic faith. Only public certainty (that guaranteed by a definition of the teaching Church) represents for all believers the obligatory and infallible norm of the faith" (S. Tommaso d'Aquino, *La Somma teologica,* Traduzione e commento a cura dei Domenicani italiani, XIV, *La Fede e la Speranza* [Firenze, 1966], p. 19).

[28] Msgr. Philips comments: "Theologians, who are infatuated with exactness, can devote their attention in this case to a first-class challenge. The Constitution, a few lines farther on, stipulates that the *object* of infallibility extends to all assertions, even not formally revealed, but which prove themselves absolutely necessary to preserve intact the deposit of faith. These necessary affirmations would not be called into question without revelation itself being shaken by it. Indirectly, therefore, these truths also enjoy the guarantee of faith. A certain number of

c. *Religious submission of the will and the mind to the ordinary Magisterium*

It is a matter of that submission which the Constitution *Lumen gentium* mentions, especially in regard to the authentic ordinary Magisterium of the Supreme Pontiff, even when he does not speak *ex cathedra*.[29]

There is thus required on the part of the faithful (not excepting theologians with respect to the Bishops and the latter with respect to the Pope), not a simple "respectful silence" (*silentium obsequiosum*) but a "positive assent" ("adhaerere debent"),[30] that is to say, an act of the mind; *religious*, that is, to be given through a religious motive, such as submission to the ecclesiastical authority to which the assistance of the Holy Spirit is promised; *internal*, inasmuch as it is an act of the intellect moved by the free will under the impulse of grace; morally *certain*, that is, not purely opiniative or dubitative but such as is required by motives which prudently exclude doubt.

The motives, therefore, for the sincere *internal* submission are not the reasons cited by the Magisterium, according to the principle: "the strength of the authority is no more than the strength of the arguments." This is true on the plane of

theologians apply here their theory (of rather recent date) of 'ecclesiastical faith.' Submission to the revealed truth commands, in the case that we are examining, an assent which excludes all hesitation, but is it opportune to speak of 'ecesiastical faith?' The term does not seem to us very happy. Certainly, if one reduces faith to intellectual assent pure and simple, the aforesaid expression incurs no reproach: the Church demands that our reason be inclined to this assent. But faith is even more than a mere knowing: it implies a homage to the living and true God, a free act caused by the grace that the Father accords us by sending us the Son and the Spirit. We cannot transfer this homage to any other subject in directing it to the Church. The latter, indeed, is only the sacrament or the means of salvation. The origin, the term, and the motive of true faith, its formal object, if you will, is found only in God alone. But God guarantees the declaration of the Church by affixing His seal to it so that we can 'believe' what it preaches, not because of her authority but having Him in mind. These last remarks, it is true, go beyond the strict commentary on the Constitution *Lumen gentium*" (*op. cit.*, p. 326).

conciliar definitions.

[29] Cf. *Lumen gentium*, n. 25 A.

[30] *Ibid.*

rational conscience, not on the plane of faith.[31] No, the true motive of assent (even when there is question of the interpretation of the natural law) to the *proposition* of the Magisterium is "the secure charism of truth (*carisma veritatis certum*) which exists, has existed, and will exist always *in the Bishops the successors of the Apostles*" (St. Irenaeus, *Advers. haer.* IV, 26, 2; *PG* 7, 1053 C). Therefore, that which seems better and more in conformity with personal thought or with that of the age in which one lives must not be upheld; on the contrary, the absolute and immutable truth preached from the beginning by the Apostles *should never be believed, never be interpreted in another sense* (Tertullian, *De praescript.*, c. 28; *PL* 2, 40).[32]

However, while the charisms, the gifts and the reasonings of the theologians cannot be convincing, both as to their existence and as to their probative value, the apostolic and episcopal charism is *indisputable* both as to its persistence in the Church and as to its genuine divine value. The reasons adduced by the Magisterium are not the true motive either of the assent to the truths of faith or of the assent to the proposition of the Church, but they render the one and the other easier, prompter and psychologically more satisfying.[33]

d. *Is it permissible, in the name of religious freedom and the freedom of science, to suspend assent and to discuss the doctrine of the Magisterium?*

The Decree *Dignitatis humanae*, on religious freedom, after having declared the right of man to freedom from every external coercion in seeking, embracing and professing divine truth, declares that the Catholic has the religious duty to adhere to the certain doctrine proposed by the Magisterium of the Church.

In the formation of their consciences, the Christian faithful ought carefully to attend to the sacred and certain doctrine of the

[31] Cf. Pius XII, Alloc. *Magnificate Dominum, AAS*, 46 (1954), p. 672.

[32] St. Pius X, Motu proprio *Sacrorum antistitum*, Sept. 1, 1910; Denz.-Sch., n. 2147.

[33] Cf. F. Hürth, "Episcoporum triplex munus . . .," p. 247.

Church.[34] The Church is, by the will of Christ, the teacher of the truth. It is her duty to give utterance to, and authoritatively to teach, that truth which is Christ Himself, and also to declare and confirm by her authority those principles of the moral order which have their origin in human nature itself.[35]

The *obligation* just noted is of its nature *grave,* because required by the duty of submitting oneself to the legitimate authority of the Church within the limits of its competence. Besides, it is a matter of avoiding a serious danger in the field of faith and morals.

But, if in an exceptional case someone had clear arguments for doubting that the doctrine of the Church, not definitive and irreformable, is true, or that its decisions are just, he would not be held to internal assent, and yet the obligation of " silent submission " would remain. However, he cannot claim to find himself in such a situation by the sole fact that he is in the process of presenting some difficulties but not of adducing *new* and *convincing* arguments in favor of the contrary opinion, or of producing some new and relevant element in regard to the extension and the weight of the arguments already known. One can even admit that in some case there is a subjective good faith, based on the judgment of a mistaken conscience, for not adhering to the teaching of the Church; but no objective justification exists for a like negative attitude.[36] On the other hand, one cannot admit good faith in one who discusses in public, especially if it is in books or reviews destined for the general public, the teaching or the decisions of the ordinary Magisterium.[37]

[34] Cf. Pius XII, Radio message, May 23, 1952, *AAS,* 44 (1952), pp. 270-278.

[35] Declar. *Dignitatis humanae,* n. 14.

[36] Cf. F. Hürth, " Tuto doceri non potest," *Divinitas* V (1961), p. 842.

[37] Pius XII: " But if the Supreme Pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter up to that time under dispute, it is obvious that that matter, according to the mind and will of the same Pontiffs, cannot be any longer considered a question open to discussion among theologians." (Enc. *Humani generis, AAS,* 42 [1950], p. 568). Msgr. Philips has observed, commenting on *Lumen gentium*: " But we cannot pass over in silence the case of a competent Christian who would have serious motives for preferring a divergent manner of thinking to

e. *Living Magisterium and dead Magisterium?*

Pius XII recognized that theologians have the task of indicating in what way are contained in Sacred Scripture and in divine Tradition, explicitly or implicitly, those truths which are taught by the *living* Magisterium of the Church; and he adds:

> Together with those two sources [Sacred Scripture and Tradition] God has given to His Church a *living* Magisterium to elucidate and explain what is contained in the deposit of faith only obscurely and implicitly. This deposit of faith our divine Redeemer has given for *authentic* intepretation not to each of the faithful, not even to theologians, but *only* to the Magisterium of the Church.[38]

From the context of the Encyclical *Humani generis* it appears to be clear that Pius XII, speaking of the *living* Magisterium, intends above all to signify the teaching of the Church of today, that is, of the Roman Pontiff and living Bishops, that is, of men of our time: it is to this Magisterium, the *sole* authentic intepreter of Scripture, of Tradition, of the Ecumenical Councils and of the pontifical documents of the past that the duty and right of being the proximate and universal norm " in matters of faith and morals " belong.

The *authentic judge*, therefore, of dogmatic and theological progress in the Church remains alone the Magisterium of the Sacred Hierarchy, just as it is the one only authentic author of dogmatic definitions, which guarantee a secure and irreversible grasp of the truth, opening at the same time the way to new investigations and new grasps. Although innumerable masters of the faith are dead, as Peter himself is dead, the *gates of hell* (Mt. 16:18), that is, the forces of error and of death,

the official directives, or who could cause founded motives to be produced for leaving the question in doubt. He would not, with the best will in the world, be forced to an interior assent. Besides, no one forbids him to continue his investigations as long as he avoids throwing discredit, through spite or intellectual pride, on the declarations of the Magisterium. In practice, this man would have to observe a great prudence in order to prevent a public debate in which sentence would be pronounced by a tribunal of incompetents. This attitude is commanded of him by the respect due not only to the Magisterium but also to his brethren in the faith, whom it is not lawful to cast temererally and without any profit into inextricable conflicts of conscience " (*op. cit.*, p. 323).

[38] Enc. *Humani generis, loc. cit.*, p. 569.

have not prevailed, nor will they ever prevail against the indefectible and infallible Magisterium.

From what has been said to this point, one will have to conclude logically that new dogmatic formulas, although activating a true conceptual progress over and above terminology, cannot render vain, surpassed and useless, or have held to be false or adapted only to the philosophical mentality of other times, the formulas with which the Magisterium has expressed divine truths in its documents. In fact, the definitions formulated by the Ecumenical Councils of antiquity, of the Middle Ages, of Trent, of Vatican I, and those pronounced personally by the Roman Pontiffs, have been the *true, proper* and *exact* expression of divine revelation and of the truths intimately connected with it, even though in a human and conceptual, and thus analogical and imperfect form. Under this aspect one can speak of only " approximate " truth, compared, that is, to the divine reality, infinite, not possibly contained within the limitations of concepts and words, ineffable. But the absolute transcendence of divine truth is not synonymous with *total* diversity, even though there is a greater diverity than similarity between uncreated and created truth.[39]

IV. Overcoming the Crisis of the Magisterium in the Year of Faith

The Synod of Bishops, in which a widespread and preoccupying crisis of faith even in the authentic Magisterium of the Church was deplored, has been celebrated, providentially, during the " Year of Faith."

Paul VI, although he lamented such a crisis also in his Apostolic Exhortation *Petrum et Paulum*, sent to all the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the 19th centenary of the glorious martyrdom of Saints Peter and Paul, has expressed the confidence that in this very year such a crisis will be overcome.

[39] Lateran Council IV: " Between the Creator and the creature so great a likeness cannot be without the necessity of noting a greater dissimilarity between them " (Denz.-Sch. 806).

But here now we have this anniversary of the Apostles, come round again on the wheel of time, to strengthen our faith in the true meaning of that term, to encourage study of the teachings of the recent ecumenical council, to sustain the energies of Catholic thought in its search for fresh and original expressions while remaining faithful to the doctrinal " deposit " of the Church, *eodem sensu eademque sententia*. This anniversary offers to every child of holy Church the happy opportunity of giving to Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the mediator and accomplisher of revelation, a humble and exalting " I believe," the full assent of intellect and will to His word, His person and His mission of salvation; it thus offers an opportunity of giving honor to those distinguished witnesses to Christ, Peter and Paul, by renewing the Christian commitment of a sincere and effective profession of faith, theirs and ours, and by continuing to pray and work for the reestablishment of all Christians in the unity of the same faith.[40]

The " Year of Faith " will thus have to revive in all Catholics the persuasion that " on the faith of Peter reposes the whole edifice of the holy Church " (cf. Mt. 16:16-19) and that, consequently, on the faith and on the Magisterium of his successors the whole dynamism of our spiritual, supernatural life, which thus irradiates its influence in apostolic action by contact with the modern world, must find conscious and tranquil solidity. In other words, the *sensus fidei* of the learning Church must be *in accord with* the *sensus fidei* of the teaching Church because, although there is only one Spirit of truth who illumines directly the minds of believers by leading them to the sweet assent to divine truth and inciting them to develop the seed of the faith received in Baptism, the full certainty of following the illuminations of the Spirit is not had except in *adhering* to the objective, authentic teaching of the Bishops, and, above all, of the Roman Pontiff.[41] If the Fathers of Vatican Council II have required such submission of all true disciples of Christ, they have done so, not from ambition to dominate or from a spirit of paternalism but because they are convinced of having received with episcopal consecration itself

[40] *L'Osservatore Romano*, Feb. 23, 1967.
[41] Cf. *Lumen gentium*, n. 25.

the certain charism of the authentic Magisterium in the service of divine truth and of the whole People of God, according to the words of Jesus Christ to His apostles: "*Anyone who listens to you listens to me; anyone who rejects you rejects me, and those who reject me reject the one who sent me*" (Lk. 10:16); "*Go out to the whole world; proclaim the Good News to all creation. He who believes . . . will be saved; he who does not believe will be condemned.*" (Mk. 16:15-16).

The Magisterium, therefore, has full awareness of being above the People of God, not as though it were not, even its Pastors, the sheep of Christ, members of His Mystical Body; but the Bishops know that they are over others inasmuch as they are true representatives of Christ the Head of the People of God, although they also are equal to others by communion in the same faith and by the bond of the same ecclesial charity. The Holy Father has nobly expressed this awareness, proper to the Hierarchy, on the day sacred to the Purification of the Blessed Virgin and the Presentation of the Child Jesus, "Light of the Gentiles," in the Temple:

Illumined obedience seeks the divine design which beholds in the People of God the presence and action of Christ's representatives as a cause which we well understand is instrumental but genetic and natural. These representatives are endowed with Christ's pastoral authority and the charisms of magisterium, of leadership and of sanctification for the service and the salvation of the community of the faithful. The Church is hierarchical, not inorganic, and not even democratic in the sense that the community itself should have a priority of faith and authority over those whom the Holy Spirit has placed at the head of Church of God (cf. Acts 20:28); that is to say, that the Lord wanted some of the brethren to have the unquestionable mandate (cf. I Cor. 4:4) of giving to other brethren the service of authority. of leadership as a principle of unity, of order, of solidarity, of efficiency, always so as to form that economy of truth and of charity which is called "His Church." [42]

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[42] *L'Osservatore Romano,* Feb. 3, 1968.

TO KNOW THE MYSTERY: THE THEOLOGIAN IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REVEALED GOD

(Concluded)

PART II

IV. THE NON-CONCEPTUAL IN THE DYNAMISM OF OUR THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT

WE HAVE elaborated a certain dynamism present in our theological knowledge of the divine Reality. In so doing we showed the possibility of by-passing certain problems in theology (e. g., in reference to Malet) by realizing i) that our concepts, though expressing something that was formally in God, looked for their verification in an order of infinite simplicity, where God is indeed the " Ineffable One," and ii) that these concepts were affirmed of the divine Reality as concretely given in salvation history.

Of itself, this would indicate a certain necessary dynamism in our knowledge before the transcendent Reality of the revealed God. It indicates, too, the direction in which we should look for a non-conceptual depth in our theological knowledge, in that the Reality that is presented to our intelligences can be apprehended only in and through faith, with its firm, dark, personal " Yes " to all that God is and has done. Accordingly, insofar as faith has a non-conceptual element, and because theology is a reflection-in-the-faith, we may look for a non-conceptual element in our theological thought. In this way we shall be able to see the realism of the theological noetic, in its attainment of its object, in that the conceptual element lives from a non-conceptual element which grounds it and gives it a depth of realism that any purely notional knowledge would not have. In other words, here is a chance to see how the " objective orientation " of our concepts occurs, to use the phrase of

E. Schillebeeckx.[140] He has drawn our attention to the fact of the non-conceptual in our knowledge, but in so doing he has lessened the formal role of the concept in our knowledge of God who was known merely in a non-conceptual way.

In this process of knowing, the whole knowing subject is involved; to this extent there must be not only an objective *signification* in our knowing but also a depth of personal *significance*.[141] This aspect of significance surrounding and enveloping our notional knowledge calls for close consideration. And an increasing number of theologians have become interested in the question.[142] On the philosophical level the problem of our non-conceptual knowledge has been one of the great preoccupations of the modern post-Kantian era.[143] This contribution will be made from the "Thomistic standpoint" (in the sense explained, with the necessary speculative flexibility in the face of more modern insights) and with a necessary limitation, for here we must be content with sketching merely the basic principles.

Implied in the notion of faith is the assent to the divine Reality through a conceptual determination.[144] Our study

[140] *Révélation et théol.*, 108 ff. Cf. also 343: "à proprement parler nous n'appliquons pas le concept lui-même à Dieu, mais le contenu conceptuel tend vers Dieu." Here we take up the question of how does the concept "tend towards" the divine Reality, having shown the fact that the concept is, in a sense, properly applied to God, not as representing Him but as formally directing our affirmation of the divine Reality.

[141] "Signification" I here define as the abstract conceptual, expressable content of our concepts. "Significance" is the non-fully conceptualizable "plus" in our consciousness, in that our whole personal life is axiologically orientated toward a given reality and implicitly recognized as such.

[142] E. Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, 106-110; 232-284, 342 ff., etc. J. Mouroux, "Présence de la raison dans la foi," *loc. cit.*, 181-200; C. Cirne-Lima, *Der Personale Glaube* (Innsbruck, 1959), engl. *Personal Faith* (New York, 1965); L. Melevez, "Théologie contemplative et théologie discursive," *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 86 (1964), 225-269; M. Dupuy, "Expérience spirituelle et théologie comme science," *ibid.* (1964), 1137-1162.

[143] Cf. J. Girardi, "Les facteurs extra-intellectuels de la connaissance," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 62 (1964), 299-364; 477-500; G. Klubertanz, "Where is the evidence for Thomistic Metaphysics," *ibid.*, 56 (1958), 294-315.

[144] "Ad fidem duo requiruntur: quorum unum est cordis inclinatio ad credendum; et hoc non est ex auditu sed ex dono gratiae. Aliud autem est determinatio de credibili, et istud est ex auditu." *Ad Rom.*, c. 10, lect. 2.

must concentrate on the connection between these two; thus by examining the dynamism of faith we can arrive at some further conclusions regarding the unique noetic of theology, which is the prolongation of faith into reflection. E. Brunner has well characterized the position of the theologian as being a wandering between two worlds, for in theological thought there is a doubleness: the theologian is at once a scientific thinker comprehending objectively and a believer darkly affirming the revealed God: " this is the particular burden and difficulty of theology." [145]

The burden enters in when the theologian, in accord with the scientific exigencies of thought, is forced to elaborate and analyze the realities of Revelation on a purely conceptual level, which of its nature seems a long way from that personal encounter with truth experienced in faith and Revelation. This sense of doubleness and burden would be mitigated, were it realized that theology, in its vital connection with the affirmation of faith, has a unique non-conceptual depth springing from a special dynamism which is at work.

1. *A philosophical note on the dynamism of personal knowledge*

There is a great deal of literature available to help us in this note. As was remarked before, it has been one of the great preoccupations of post-Kantian philosophy to ground our conceptual knowledge, to have not merely a notional affirmation of reality but a " real " affirmation of it. This distinction originated in the writings of J. H. Newman and has been much popularized by Blondel, Ollé-Laprune, and other modern philosophers.[146]

[145] E. Brunner, *Wahrheit als Begegnung* (Zürich, 1963), engl. *Truth as Encounter* (London, 1964), 113.

[146] J. Girardi, *op. cit.*; G. Klubertanz, *op. cit.*; C. Cirne-Lama, *op. cit.*; W. Kern, " Das verhältniss von Erkenntnis und Liebe als Philosophisches Grundproblem bei Hegel und Thomas von Aquin," *Scholastik* 34 (1959), 394-427; A. Forest, " Connaissance et Amour," *Revue Thomiste* 48 (1948), 113-122; M. Roland-Gosselin, " de la connaissance affective," *Revue des sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 27 (1938) 5-27; J. de Finance, *Etre et Agir dans la philosophie de S. Thomas* (Rome, 1960), J. Lebacz, *Certitude et volonté* (Paris, 1962), an excellent bibliography for modern work.

Our concern here is to stress, not so much the " real " content of our knowledge in general but the special depth of our notional knowledge regarding another person, and this again, not in general but insofar as this person is the object of our love.

The first observation that can be made is that our knowledge is situated in a larger noetic process than that represented by the formally and statically signifying role of the concept. The whole knowing subject is involved.

There is, indeed, a notional element, that is, various intelligible aspects of the reality are disengaged by the intellect; these can be formally expressed in their precise meaning and validly analyzed; they can be correlated and finally synthesized into one intuition of the known object whether it be personal or not; in the evidence of this intuition, the reality in question can be affirmed to be such and such. This is the necessary objective and formal aspect of our knowledge. As such, it is the interior necessary component of any objective appreciation of extra-mental reality; for the reality is signified, represented to us through our concepts in its essential meaning, in its formal intelligibility; we could call this type of knowledge the knowledge of " signification."

But there is another element, subjective where the other is objective, " real " or " existential " when the other is notional or essential, dynamic where the other is more statically representative. The reality in question is present to our consciousness, not merely as a thing objectively expressed but as a reality which is " lived." In this way, it is not apprehended as objected to us, exterior to our personal life, but as something or someone which intimately pertains to us. The reality is not thrown up to our minds as to an analytical faculty for speculative appraisal and notional assent, but as a reality which is part of our life, part of our " self consciousness," part of ourselves; it is " significant." [147]

This appreciation of reality as something significant as well as signified is based on what has been traditionally called

[147] J. Girardi, *op. cit.*, 302 ff.

" connatural " knowledge. This type of knowledge enables us to put the cognitive process into a more existential and personal context. Along with the conceptual attainment of the reality in itself, in its ontological essence, the knowledge of connaturality implies an axiological attainment of the reality; this axiological " touching " of the reality takes place in the object's lived-reference to the person, in its functional role toward the knowing subject, as " quid intime suum." As J. de Finance has remarked, man is by no means " pure thought "; there is, and must be, an " au-delà " to our concepts.[148]

Whatever spiritual activity we talk about, whether it be cognitive or volitional, it must not be forgotten that it is the person who is acting; knowing and loving are the two dimensions of personal life. Not only are these two operations to be considered as springing from the one spiritual subject but lived in the one consciousness: the person is present to himself in these operations, conscious of himself as the one who is, in this double way, opened out to the infinite expanse of being. Consequently, knowledge and love, despite their inverse orientations, do not exist, as it were, in two parallel and independent lines of personal life but as two aspects of the one personal openness to the unlimited horizon of being and perfection. There is in this double fecundity of personal life, on the one hand, an expression of the perfection of reality to oneself in knowing; and, on the other, through this interior expression of the other-ness of reality to oneself, within oneself, there results an inclination toward the reality as it exists, a love of reality in its actual present existence. Knowledge is terminated within the spirit; love finds its term in the real order of things, in their full existential actuality. Hence, reality has a double relationship to the person, in his openness towards the Infinite and the Absolute:

> Now a thing is found to have a twofold relationship to the soul: one by which the thing itself is in the soul in the soul's manner and not in its own, the other by which the soul is referred to the thing

[148] *Etre et Agir*, 337.

in its own existence. Thus something is an object of the soul in two ways. 1) It is so inasmuch as it is capable of being in the soul, not according to its own act of being, but according to the manner of the soul, i. e., spiritually. And this is the essential constituent of the knowable insofar as it is knowable. 2) Something is the object of the soul according as the soul is inclined and oriented to it after the manner of the thing itself as it is in itself. This is the essential constituent of the appetible insofar as it is appetible.[149]

Here we have a clear expression of the inverse orientation of spiritual life of the person, fruitful in the sense of " owning," according to the spiritual manner of being of the knowing subject, reality, in an objective interior expression of it. Together there is a complementary tendency of the knowing subject toward the reality in its real existence, affecting the spiritual subject toward the real in itself, attracting it to a good outside itself.

* * * * *

Since then it is the one reality attained under two aspects and the one person open spiritually to the totality of the existent, the life of the spirit can be expressed as a circular movement, as the person in his spiritual consciousness expresses the perfection of the reality outside of himself, within himself, and through that expression tends to the full attainment of that reality in its actual existence.[150]

This circular movement in the spiritual life of the person results in a mutual interpenetration of the two spiritual faculties: the mind understands the good as the good of the whole person and in this understanding presents it to the will to be sought for and attained; the will desires truth for the mind, so that the personal life will be based on objective reality and so that the person, through the knowing faculty, will express the perfections of reality within himself and thus be established in communion with the totality of the existent order. In other words, in the spiritual life of the person there

[149] *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 10.

[150] *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 2; *de Divinis Nominibus*, c. 4, lect. 10; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 16, a. 1.

is union and communion in that double fecundity of knowing and loving which is proper to the person as a spiritual being.[151] The spiritual presence of the objective reality within the mind of the persons enables the will to be determined, specified; thus informed by the intellect it attains or tends toward the existent reality in its full axiological and existential dimensions, as this reality is concretely referred to the person. On its part, the faculty of love adds a depth of real content to the knowledge of the intellect, especially to the purely intellectual or conceptual knowledge that it enjoys: in the one personal knowing consciousness the will, in its actual tendency toward the existent reality as it exists in its concrete existence, aligns our conceptual knowledge with the actual existent thing; our conceptual knowledge is "clothed over" with the tendency-toward-the-real under the influence of the love in the will. It is only by mutual envelopment that each faculty develops in the line of its own attainment; the will being enveloped by the knowing faculty attains the true good, and the intellect, enveloped in the movement of the will; is conscious of the whole reality. Thus the possibility of dynamism in our knowledge becomes apparent; there is in the knowing consciousness a conceptual and non-conceptual element. The conceptual element is indeed a valid, formal expression of reality, but it is completed by a non-conceptual affective knowledge which gives it an existential depth, which the concept taken abstractly, in itself, does not have.

As has been said, the reason for this mutual interpenetration of the faculties in the full dynamism of knowledge is because both faculties are pertaining to the one conscious personal life. The person, in the presence of some meaningful reality, is conscious not only of the meaning of the reality in itself but also of an existential content of that reality in reference to him. He knows it as *his* reality, as a thing not merely "known" but "lived": he knows it as something that belongs to him, pertains to his life. And this is all the more the case when it is

[151] On this interpretation of intelligence and will cf. W. Kern, "das Verhältnis von Erkenntnis und Liebe . . .," *Scholastik* 34 (1959), 415-421.

considered that through an act of " free-will," of self-commitment, he has invited this reality, whatever it be, into his conscious personal life.[152] Obviously this has the utmost pertinence when we speak of interpersonal knowledge; there is not only the conceptual knowledge of the person as an object, but in the consciousness there is the presence of this person as a " thou " because of the love experienced toward this person as part of oneself. This consciousness is heightened the more the person is affirmed as a " thou " by the supremely conscious and personal act of free commitment with regard to that person, so that the whole personal consciousness of the " I " is " affected " by the living presence of the " thou." In such a case our intellectual conceptual knowledge would be immensely enriched by an " au-delà " which, while remaining inexpressible, would give a personal and existential depth to the whole process of conceptual knowledge.

The presence of the beloved person to the consciousness of the loving-knowing subject is partially based on what he has already apprehended about the object of love; but the knowing power of the mind does not rest in the consciousness that it has exhausted the full mystery of the beloved. Impelled by love the intelligence continues to seek a deeper insight into the object of love by the contemplation of every aspect that is accessible regarding the life and personality of the " thou ":

> As to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover . . . the lover is said to be in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul.[153]

Thus the knowing life of the lover is dominated and concentrated in a striving to understand more intimately the reality of the beloved.

However, it is not only the conscious orientation of the

[152] For a good analysis of this aspect, see C. Cirne-Lima, *op. cit.*, 415-421, and J. Girardi, *loc. cit.*, 62 (1965), 336-346.

[153] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 28, a. 2.

knowing powers that is a constituting factor of the presence of the " thou " but also that consciousness of the attraction that the loved object exerts over the heart of the lover; this increases the mutual inherence of the beloved and the lover that makes the knowledge of the " thou " more and more real to the consciousness. The lover is conscious of his axiological affection toward the beloved which is mysteriously grasped as present in this tendency: " the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections by a kind of complacency. . . ." [154] This consciousnes of the beloved as a presence is completed by a sense of being " in the other," in a sympathy, in an affective oneness of life and love ". . . the lover . . . seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were . . . as though he were become one with him." [155] The beloved person is not merely esteemed as a good *for* oneself but esteemed *as* oneself, as another " I," a presence in one's consciousness that cannot be expressed in merely conceptual terms, even though these conceptual elements are necessary ones for initial knowledge, objective appraisal and communication. Nonetheless the knowing-loving subject is conscious of the inadequacy of conceptual expression to express this mystery of the " thou " which he lives.

Thus conceptual knowledge may have a depth of non-conceptual knowledge, an axiological and affective element creating the dynamism of connatural knowledge by which the mind is borne beyond its notional and conceptual grasp of reality to a more intimate yet inexpressible knowledge of this reality. There is always the objective signification of the known reality, but, through the influence of affective knowledge, there is also the factor of subjective significance.

* * * * *

This total, dynamic view of human knowing allows for attentional and intentional aspects [156] which do not pertain to the conceptual level of knowledge, as such.

[154] *Ibid.*

[155] *Ibid.*

[156] For an elaboration of this division, cf. J. Girardi, *op. cit., passim.*

a) *The attentional non-conceptual element.* Conceptual knowledge seeks to express reality in its formal and essential fulness; to do so, it must abstract, analyze, correlate, synthesize and judge. But because reality is attained in a non-conceptual as well as a conceptual manner, some aspects of that reality will draw our attention in the conceptualization of that reality more than others, and this because we are axiologically affected toward that reality. Different aspects capture our interest and draw our attention, because there is a prior connaturalization regarding those aspects; there is a previous concern; there is a " point of view." This is immediately obvious with regard to a " thou," a " subject," an expression of our knowledge which would be attentionally qualified by this person's relation to me. But to illustrate this on a general level, witness the different philosophies that have come into being, each proposing a different metaphysical system expressive of one and the same reality, e. g., the philosophies of Schopehauer, Nietzsche, Blondel, Marcel, Heidegger, the whole personalist and existential movement with all its approaches and variations. A prior non-conceptual axiological attainment of reality conditions the organization and development of our conceptual knowledge, points to holding certain principles as " key-principles " and certain categories as being the most basic. Also, in the different phases of knowing our attention can be focused on more abstract or concrete considerations, according to the direction in which our attention is turned by the mentality or point of view at that moment. As a stage in one's own personal knowledge, or as a stage in " the historical development of the metaphysical sciences," the reality subjected to our knowing could be appreciated, for example, in its essential meaning according to its position in the whole hierarchy of beings; an approach, which could be conditioned, on the axiological level, by a deep evaluation and appreciation of the order and harmony of the world. The Aristotelian " scientia," " cognitio necessaria per causas," is rightly put down as belonging to this attentional approach. While especially today our attentional approach is conditioned by concern for the development,

the emergence, the evolution, the inner dynamism of reality, the Aristotelian approach can consequently seem at once too ambitious and too static for the modern mentality.[157]

b) *The intentional, non-conceptual element.* The non-conceptual connatural knowledge makes its contribution by manifesting the reality known in a depth of significance over and above the conceptual signification. It gives more evidence than that offered by merely conceptual knowledge. In the case of interpersonal knowledge, there is a deeper and richer manifestation of the " thou." So the mind is drawn into a more vital affirmation of the other than knowledge by way of concepts alone would justify. It is in the last analysis evidence proper to mystery, that is to say, evidence proper to that personal reality with which a person is in communion as pertaining to his life and with which his destiny is bound up. Thus in the total context of knowledge, we can attain and appreciate the reality of the " other," not merely as a static quidditative expression of the reality concerned but in a more existential way, in its whole meaning, in its " significance " as well as its " signification."

c) *Interplay between conceptual and non-conceptual.* This extra-conceptual dimension in our knowledge does not lead us into an anti-intellectual relativism; on the contrary. It introduces a new rigor and penetration into our conceptual knowledge, because we see it as the formal expression of something, or someone, which in its meaningfulness to the knowing subject demands to be objectively known and expressed in all its reality. It is not a question of functional knowing, which would involve knowing the reality only in its actual reference to us; our concepts do express the inner meaning of the reality, at least in some fashion. However, there is more in our personal knowing of things than the sum total of our concepts about them. There is the axiological knowing of the reality as well. This, nonetheless, is subjected to the abstract conceptual element for ultimate evaluation, so that its authenticity can be

[157] J. de Finance, *op. cit.*, 13-15; 329-35.

gauged; for our knowing remains the knowing of realities, not our subjective impressions about them. All things considered, however, we can say that our axiological attainment of reality invests our conceptual knowledge with an unconceptualizable " plus "; the knower attains the reality, the objective reality, but in his own manner.

Hence, set in its proper noetic dynamism, human personal knowledge looks to the reality of a " thou " above all, not merely as a problem to be solved or a puzzle to be pondered over but as a " lived " reality, a personal mystery, a subject with which the knower is, here and now, conceretely involved. It attains this reality as fraught with significance, which significance is partially expressed in the formal conceptual categorical type of knowledge significative of that reality. Now this signification on the conceptual level is itself, in a reflexive manner, the object of an axiological evaluation; it is seen as a presence of the reality known to the knowing subject, a weak, more abstract expressive presence than that of the affective order, it is true, but nevertheless authentically and ontologically revealing the real formal nature of the object known. Furthermore, this conceptual knowledge is appreciated in its dialogal service in interpersonal exchange, thus rendering the relationship ultimately more significant and more personal.

To sum up this philosophical excursus in the content of our conceptual knowledge in the sense of its complementary non-conceptual depth, it may be said that knowledge is one manifestation of the person-in-action; as persons we are open to the whole expanse of being in our spiritual nature. We are open to the good through the faculty of love and to the truth through the faculty of intelligence. Through these two basic spiritual activities the person exists in fulfilled relationship to the unlimited expanse of being. Because it is the person-in-action in both cases, because the person is living all reality in his consciousness, there is a reciprocal penetration of knowledge and love which brings our conceptual knowledge closer to reality, in its non-conceptual depth, and makes love authentic in the attainment of the true good. In studying this interplay

and interpenetration, my primary interest has been to see the non-conceptual depth of our knowledge. Having shown this, principally because of this interpenetrating and the resulting dynamism it can now be seen that our conceptual knowledge is part of the whole vital context of our knowledge. There is an evidence and a depth of reality, especially of a personally meaningful reality, greater than conceptual knowledge can give.

Now we are in a position to take our findings to the area of divine faith and, consequently, to theology in its affirmation of the revealed God.

2. *The non-conceptual in the dynamism of the act of faith*

The foregoing section has shown that our knowledge is at once conceptual and non-conceptual; in the dynamism in which these two elements are linked vitally together, the knower has a perception of, and an intuition into, the known reality; his affirmation of it is "real" as well as "notional." The same applies, though in a far higher way, to the affirmation of faith.

In the discussion of faith there are two aspects which demand consideration and which in a living integration make for a uniquely personal yielding to Christ: "Two things are required for faith: one of them is the inclination of the heart to believe; and this comes, not from hearing but from the gift of grace. The other is the determination of what is believable, and this comes from hearing."[158] There is the interior movement of the heart, provoked directly by the action of God, and the propositional or conceptual determination of the assent. First a word on this latter.

a) *Conceptual element in faith.* The conceptual element of our affirmation of the divine Mystery comes to us radically from the history of salvation, mediated to us here and now through the Church. The affirmation of faith demands that there be present in our minds concepts about the mystery to which we give our assent, for God has spoken to us revealing Himself to us through the terms of our knowledge in analogies

[158] *Ad Rom.*, c. 10, lect. 2.

taken from this world. He has spoken in language we can understand, even if we do not see the full evidence of the Reality expressed. Speaking in our language, He has spoken using our concepts, and by means of these concepts, each with a definite intelligible content, He calls forth our affirmation of the divine Reality. To this extent our assent is to a " proposition," that is to say, the divine Mystery is conceptually proposed to the believer, presented to him through specific concepts. Thus our assent is determined in a precise direction, and our affirmation is terminated by the God of Salvation, the Blessed Trinity, and is not some kind of blind assent to a God, absent and unknown. Because what comes to the believer " ex auditu " immediately represents some conceptual content, and because this conceptual content expresses a precise even if limited intelligibility in the terms of the proposition, the affirmation can be made: " For man cannot assent by believing what is proposed to be believed without understanding it in some way." [159]

b) *Love and the act of faith.* Whilst this propositional and conceptual element is a necessary part of God's dialogue with man, the whole process is sublimely interiorized within the heart of every believer. There is a supernatural inclination of the heart, a love given to the " heart " of the believer which enables him to affirm the mystery of divine Love in all its infinite gratuity and power as a " supernatural " mystery. This inclination within the heart of the believer is the direct result of the action of the three divine Persons within the human spirit, just as the propositional-conceptual element arises from the hearing of God's Word from an external source. Man does not yet " see " the Reality he is called upon to affirm, for intellectual evidence is lacking, and must be lacking, for that matter, in this life. However, there is a true manifestation of the Reality in this inner personal call, in this " inclinatio cordis " which supplies for any defect on the part of the intelligence. Thus faith " moves," as Thomas says, not by way

[159] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 8, a. 8, ad 2.

of the intelligence in clear evidence but more by the way of the will,[160] by way of love, by way of connaturality toward the divine, the proper " light " of faith.[161]

St. Thomas in his profound meditations on the doctrine of St. Paul and St. John identifies this inclination of the heart as the " interior call which is nothing else than a certain instinct of the mind by which man's heart is moved to assent." [162] In his commentary on St. John, Aquinas calls it the " tractio Patris ": " thus the Father draws many to the Son through the instinct of the divine operation moving man's heart to believe."[163] This call of the Father is further identified as Christ, the Truth of God: . . . " the interior instinct by which Christ could manifest Himself without exterior miracles pertains to the power of the first faith which interiorly enlightens and teaches man." [164] And Christ Himself works this instinct within us through the operation of the Holy Ghost: ". . . the very Son of God speaking in the organ of His humanity does not avail, except He work interiorly through the Holy Spirit." [165]

This whole life of intimate communion produces an affirmation which, working through the conceptual content of the propositions, terminated not in the complexity of these concepts and propositions but in the Persons they represent, in the mystery of Love which is the Blessed Trinity.[166]

And so, the believer, in his personal act of yielding to the divine Mystery, has his life based not only on propositions, or knows it merely in its conceptual expressions, but attains to the Reality itself: " the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition but in a thing." [167]

[160] *In Boeth. de Trinitate,* q. 3, a. 1, ad 4.

[161] J. Alfaro, " Supernaturalitas fidei iuxta sanctum Thomam," *Gregorianum* 44 (1963), 765.

[162] *Ad Rom.*, c. 8, lect. 6.

[163] *In Joan.*, c. 6, lect. 5.

[164] *Quodl. II,* q. 4, a. 6, ad 3.

[165] *In Joan.*, c. 14, lect. 6; *I Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1.

[166] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 11, a. 1; q. 2, a. 7.

[167] *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

Thus, in the divine dynamism of the affirmation of faith there are two elements: i) the propositional with its conceptual basis, and ii) the divinely worked inclination of the heart toward the divine reality, the light of evidence in which the assent is made.

c) *The non-conceptual and faith.* Already it can be seen that there is a non-conceptual depth in the affirmation of faith. In the ordinary human case the extra non-conceptual depth comes from the presence of subjective as well as objective elements in our knowing. This subjective depth arises because the person is connaturalized toward the reality in question, in love, in free committment of self; hence there is a non-conceptualizable presence of affection to the knower over and above his conceptual knowledge. By this non-conceptual element there is a manifestation of the beloved object in the consciousness of the knower which conceptual knowledge alone cannot give; the depths of the loved object enter into his knowing; he knows the loved person as a " thou."

Likewise here in the loving knowledge of faith; the believer is connaturalized toward the divine Mystery by the supernatural instinct worked in his heart and by the consequent free commitment of himself to that Mystery. In his knowledge he can be conscious of God as a " thou," not merely as the sum total of his concepts, or as a Reality expressed merely through propositions. There is the added significance over and above the bare signification, but there is also far more.

Whereas in the case of the non-conceptual dimension of " significance " in our knowing the reality is known as a lived " presence," that is, as a subjectively present reality penetrating the consciousness by way of love, the presence of the Divine, founding the non-conceptual " plus " in the affirmation of faith, is more real. There is the subjective presence in that the believer realizes that what he conceptually knows is his mystery, intimately belonging to his personal life. Yet over and above this there is the actual reality of the presence; it is an objective as well as subjective presence; it is a real as well

as an affective presence. He is present not only as evoking our assent, as the supremely attractive Reality, but as causing it in the sheer gift of His grace. He is at once manifesting Himself, exteriorly through the proposition and concept, interiorly through the attraction of grace toward the ultimate Truth; and at the same time He causes us to recognize and to acknowledge this manifestation by way of real assent and personal affirmation.

Thus the presence at the heart of the act of faith is affective, real, and dialogal: affective, in the sense that the believer affirms the divine Reality, through force of love of that reality, as the absolute Truth for him; real, because the divine Persons cause this response of loving affirmation; and dialogal, in that in the " here and now " of salvation history the divine Persons are manifesting themselves through the concepts and propositions that determine our assent and give us through force of their intelligible content a conceptual knowledge of the divine Reality in itself.

Thus, the concept in its role in the act of faith looks not merely to a depth of significance but to a depth of Personal presence. In the full unfolding of ordinary human knowledge the conceptual signification has a depth of significance. But here, in the knowledge accessible to us in faith, there is an interplay of thought and presence.

The presence is identified by the thought, by the objective signification, in its static conceptual components, as being that of the divine Reality. The thought, the conceptual signification, lives from, and leads to, the depth of personal presence, which conceptual knowledge does not express.

Thus our affirmation with its conceptual determinant does really attain the divine Reality. The concept directs our judgment to the inner depths of the Mystery of God through its formal intelligible content; and thus we preceive a non-conceptualizable depth to our affirmation of faith which is in fact the presence of the divine Reality as a term, as an Agent, and above all as a divine " Thou."

Now we shall treat of the noetic of theology in the perspectives that have been opened up by the preceding comments.

3. *The non-conceptual in the dynamism of theological knowledge*

a) *Faith and theology.* Theology comes into being from the very nature of the act of faith. There is a complete self-commitment of the believer with regard to the divine Mystery; but this is made in the darkness of love's impulse, not by the clear sight of the mind. Nonetheless the believer seeks to reduce this tension as much as possible, to remedy this fundamental conceptual inevidence as much as he can: " When a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes; he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof." [168] Theology becomes in truth the extension of the life of faith into the rational life of man. But it is a prolongation into reflection of the act of faith, not a distinction from it; it cannot find the Reality it considers except in faith, and in this sense faith is the foundation of theological activity. Thus, in this living relationship within the thinking believer there is not an abdication of the perception of faith in favor of an evidence that theology can furnish; rather, theology contains within itself all the conceptual and non-conceptual depth that faith itself possesses. Faced with the Mystery of God, theology will ask, reverently and lovingly, " Quomodo " and " Cur " and find its systematic reflection capable of being influenced by the non-conceptual element inherent in faith, in an " attentional " and " intentional " manner.

b) *Theology is influenced " attentionally."* The quality of theological thought should be attentionally influenced, first of all, in a general way. Even though the theologian embarks upon an extremely abstract and speculative speculation with regard to the divine Reality, it will always be " in view " of the present personal Mystery which he lives in the darkness of faith. Speculative knowledge will not be mere theorizing, but a true " speculatio " of God in His present Reality; for, grounding

[168] *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 10.

and suffusing the whole speculative effort of theology is that unique non-conceptual depth to our knowledge arising from the dynamism of faith. Theology will always be a " personal " knowledge, even though the notional expressions signifying the divine Reality may not at a given stage of theological development be notably so. The whole concern of this theological thought is to give a greater expression of the beloved Personal Mystery of God, which is " lived " and known in a non-conceptualizable depth through faith.

Then again, this attentional element can be evidenced in a particular fashion. Through the conceptual and non-conceptual elements of his knowledge, the theologian is orientated to the fulness of the revealed Reality. The conceptual element lives from the dynamic connaturalization of the believer towards the Reality in which he believes, and therefore in its static signification it is only a partial expression of it. In different ages of the Church, under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, the minds of the believers will be attracted to different aspects of the divine Reality which a mere analysis of the notional contents of dogma could not explicate of itself. Theology, though it worked from these static dogmatic principles, is attentionally affected along a certain line, toward certain values in the mystery of salvation which in the providence of the Lord are most necessary for that age or situation in the Church. In this way theology is guided, in a sense, by its non-conceptual depth to a vital and dynamic theological life in the Church. Indeed, if we consider the presence of the non-conceptual in our theological thought, we will see that " theology " will demand " theologies " according as different connaturalizations of the Church to different aspects of the mystery she lives will impel her theological thought along ever fresh and relevant lines and preclude the possibility of theology ossifying in a static, abstract conceptualism.

c) *Theology is influenced " intentionally."* Intentionally, i. e., regarding the evidence we have of an object of knowledge, the non-conceptual depth which our theological knowledge has through faith will have its influence. This non-conceptual di-

mension which is the basis of our real affirmation of God makes us perceive the divine Reality above all as a Mystery of Personal communion, as the divine " Thou " revealed to our faith in its non-conceptual depths. This evidence should never desert our theology with the result that we would come to regard the evidence of theology as being purely according to the norms of human logic. We must be content with evidence proper to the mystery we study. God has revealed Himself as the Three communing with us in the working out of redemption, each divine Person being the " Thou " in reference to the believer in a distinct personal relationship to man. Purely conceptual evidence can take us only so far. The " thou-ness " of the Three in relationship to the redeemed, explained on a notional level, will always be something of a puzzle to the rational mind. One can consider grace, for instance, as a participation in the common divine nature and explicate the personal element through appropriation, or the category of " quasi-formal causality " can be used, with its own advantages and difficulties.[169] The notional evidence is limited of necessity; to be kept strictly faithful to Revelation it must take into account the non-conceptual attainment of the divine Reality, which is personal and inter-subjective, and thus have a deeper evidence that the notions and categories of this world can offer. In this manner, theology will prevent itself from being " logicized " to the detriment of its personal content. It must be faithful to that first and fundamental perception of God, experienced in the non-conceptual attainment of faith: " non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum." [170]

On the other hand, there will always be need of the rational process and conceptual analyses for the full appreciation of the content of faith; but in this objective, conceptual expression, there should be a place for a truly personal language, based first on the data of Scripture and the experience of faith, and

[169] Cf. the discussion amongst P. de Letter, " Divine Quasi-Formal Causality," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 27 (1960), 221-228; K. O'Shea, " Pure Formal Actuation," *ibid.* 28 (1961), 1-15; B. Kelly, " Divine Quasi-Formal Causality," *ibid.* (1961), 16-29.

[170] St. Ambrose, *de Fide* 1, 5 n. 42: *PL* 16, 537.

second, on the human categories of interpersonal relationship. The non-conceptual element in our theological knowing will be more adequately conceptualized in this manner, and there will be a stricter correspondence between the two orders of our knowledge. In this way theology will become not a rigorously impersonal analytical science in the sense of being too objective but will be a discipline of faith interpreting in personalist categories, and in language of love and union, the immediacy of God to our faith.

d) *The via negativa in this context.* This last point concerning the personal character of theological knowledge brought about by the evidence on its " intentional " dynamic will be clarified by examining the concrete exercise of the " via negativa."

The darkness of " unknowing " enters into every aspect of our theological knowledge. As such, it purifies our conceptual knowledge and directs it to the eminent order of God-in-Himself and, analogously, to God-in-Himself-for-us of salvation history where the divine Mystery is concretely revealed. All this has been treated in the discussion of the formal and mysteric moments in our knowledge.

Now when we take account of the dynamism of our knowledge by which faith enables it to open into a non-conceptual depth of knowing, the " via negativa " can be see in its concrete reference and bearing. The inherent negative character of our knowing leads us, not to a noetic darkness before an anonymous Divinity, not even before the revealed God merely objectively considered and irrespective of the knowing subject, but before the divine Mystery " lived " and perceived as " Our Mystery." Hence it is part of a concretely personal noetic, as it brings the abstract and objective affirmations a termination in the present and supremely Personal Mystery of our faith.

Though we conceptually affirm God as a divine " Thou " in the dialectic of our affirmations, in the life of theology as concretely exercised the " via negativa " awakens us to the obscure presence of the divine " Thou." It functions in purifying our concepts of finite significations when applied to God;

it directs our attention to salvation history where God is concretely revealed; and it reaches its achievement in making us aware of the presence of an ineffable Mystery which is personally ours and present to us. The use of the " via negativa " can be taken as an indication that theology realized its non-conceptual dimensions and the obscure presence of the divine Reality therein implied.[171]

e) *Value of our conceptual knowledge.* This analysis enables us to see the value of our conceptual knowledge. It lives in a complex dynamism; it is a prolongation of faith into reflection; it is a true " cogitatio fidei." Consequently we can speak of this conceptual knowledge itself having a significance for us, as believers and theologians, greater than its mere objective signification would warrant. Just as we can be axiologically affected by the divine Reality, we can be similarly affected regarding the *knowledge* of that Reality; it can be appreciated as a value and esteemed as a knowledge of *God.* Despite its abstract and inadequate character, it will appear to the possessor in its positive achievment, i. e., as truly and validly expressing something of the Reality of God, no matter how weak that conceptual representation may be, for it can truly direct our affirmation to the divine depths. As a formal expression of the divine Reality it is a share of God's knowledge of Himself, as St. Thomas says.[172] From this point of view it has a place in the total dialogal context of God's dealings with man; it is part of the " Incarnation " of the divine Word in the rational life of man, the hallowing of that life by the presence of God in it. And thus the pursuance and cultivation of theology has a deep significance for man, the believer, and a deeply religious value. It is part of the reverent response to Revelation that man must make and part of his service to his brethren in the Church in their striving to know God.

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The above philosophical note outlined for us the whole

[171] L. Malevez, *art. cit.,* 248; J. Mouroux, *art. cit.,* 190 ff.
[172] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 1, a. 2; a. 3, ad 2.

dynamic complex of our knowledge wherein it was seen that our knowledge wherein it was seen that our conceptual knowledge is the abstract expression of a reality attainable in a non-conceptual manner, above all when it is the knowledge of a " thou." We applied the conclusions of this philosophical note to the consideration of divine faith, that personal " Yes " to the divine Mystery and all its implications for us. Here we saw that the conceptual propositional element of faith, lived from, and lead to, a depth of personal presence of the divine Reality towards which the mind was opened by an intimate connaturalization worked in it by the divine action. Theology being faith prolonged into reflection has, from the previously elaborated principles, not a self-made object of conceptualizations, nor even for its aim a static representation of the divine Mystery in its laboriously abstract notions, but it is polarized completely by the presence of the Mystery to which it is a response and to the real affirmation of which, in its present actuality, it proceeds. It does this first (logically taken) through its formal conceptualizations, which are objectively orientated through the dynamism of faith, to a non-conceptual attainment of the Reality they weakly but formally signify.

Thus we come to consider the noetic of theology as a truly charismatic one, for the non-conceptual element will influence our conceptualizations, according to divinely worked connaturalizations of the theologian in the Church, to different aspects of the fullness of the Mystery. We recognize, fundamentally, that our theological knowledge is necessarily charismatic because of the transcendence of the divine Reality with regard to our theological knowledge; no theologian and no age of the Church can ever express the Mystery she fully possesses. And whilst theological principles can remain the same, their application will vary according as our attention is drawn to more immanent or transcendent aspects of the revealed God; but always HE will remain ineffable in His Mystery and transcendent in His presence.[173]

[173] This transcendence-in-presence is a translation into theological language of the mysterious character of revelation: " God, no man has ever seen . . . His only

Conclusion

Against the background of all the problems that we have treated, we can immediately conclude that our theological knowledge of the transcendent revealed God is not a static representational conceptual framework but a complex and dynamic noetic. This implies a movement in darkness towards the divine Reality of God-in-Himself, not merely as an ontological Object but as the concrete " Thou," identified through His Self-Revelation in salvation history, now darkly present to the believing mind.

This conclusion was reached by exploiting the Thomistic doctrine of negative knowledge and by placing it always in the context of salvation history and faith.

To express the matter in a different way, there is in our theological knowledge of the revealed God a non-systematizable " plus " and a non-conceptualizable " plus ": *non-systematizable,* because, despite the validity of the formal categories which we use to designate the Deity, their usefulness relies completely on an accompanying awareness of the radically unknowable character of God-in-Himself. This must exist with the recognition of God's free, historical relationship with man as a divine " Thou." Hence we have postulated the duality of the formal and mysteric moments in our theological knowledge of the revealed God. Everything that is formally and darkly stated of the divine Reality " in abstracto " we see concretized in an historical and experienced fashion that no theological system can explain. The living God eludes systematization in the recognition of His ineffable ontological Personality along with the originality of His historical Self-disclosure.

On the other hand, the *non-conceptualizable " plus "* is present in that it arises from the non-conceptual depth that our knowledge possesses, giving our concepts a dynamic orientation toward the divine Mystery in its totality that no purely notional knowledge could achieve. Thus, our theological knowl-

Son has made Him known," Jn. 1 :18; also I Tim. 6 :16; summed up in the words of St. Thomas, " Deo quasi ignoto coniungimur," *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 12, a. 13, ad 1. schichte,' *Mysterium Salutis* II, 317-398, (Einsiedeln, 1967).

edge in its full range has a unique real content. Our concepts are pointing to the presence of the divine Mystery, realized consciously to be inexpressible, in the sense that we know more about God than our concepts express: the believer is always affirming God in the connaturality established by faith, far more significant to him than the abstract signifying power of mere conceptualization.

In short, theological knowledge of the transcendent Mystery of the divine Three possesses a noetic structure of conceptual and non-conceptual components of static signification and the depth of personal significance; of darkness, because of the necessary negativity of our knowledge, yet of positive direction: because this darkness is always leading the theologian into a deeper knowledge of the divine " Thou ": " Deo quasi ignoto coniungimur." [174]

Now we can reflect very briefly on the three main problem areas that have provided the framework for the greater part of the discussion.

The first frame of reference was St. Thomas's approach to the Mystery of the Trinity, through his " ordo doctrinae," in the " de Deo Uno-Trino " schema, that was typical of him and the great Thomists that came after. The more modern approach, represented above all by K. Rahner,[175] would find this schema and the method of approach not altogether adequate to the Mystery of the Trinity, because of its divorce from the concrete setting of revelation, salvation history. Our attention is not to reconcile the two approaches, but, after what has been said, a few remarks are in order: 1) Both approaches work in the same unique theological noetic in an effort to conceptualize the divine " Thou," obscurely present to the believing mind and expressed in the Sacred Scriptures as read in the Church, in His concrete relationship with sinful man. 2) The objective expression of both these approaches lives and has its meaning from a non-conceptual depth of theological knowledge which is not fully expressed by either, so that in the rather abstract

[174] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 12, a. 13, ad 1.

[175] K. Rahner, ' Der dreifaltige Gott als Transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschicte, *Mysterium Salutis* II, 317-398 (Einsiedeln, 1967).

and formal expressions of the one there is a personal content, and in the inter-personal expressions of the other there must always be understood to be present that God is the Transcendent Reality in the ontological sense (despite the fact that this might not be formally expressed). 3) Though the theological noetic at the basis of these two approaches is many-sided and complex, it can be stated as a general principle that any methodological approach must adopt a certain temporal order, because it cannot hope to express the fulness of its insight all at once, without there first being a precise clarification of principle and presupposition. The Thomistic approach passes from God-in-Himself to the " economia," whilst the salvation historical approach reverses, in general, this procedure. In this latter, a certain attentional influence is discernible: the great appreciation of intersubjective dialogal values. This attentional influence was presumably not so intensely felt by St. Thomas, who is rather more taken by the fact that God is *really acting* in our world and history (effectus naturae et gratiae), and thus putting man in possession of a supreme form of knowledge, that of " God in Himself " . . . " id quod notum est sibi soli de seipso et aliis per revelationem communicatum." [176] So, in this more objective appreciation of the divine Reality there is a more transcendentally sapiential point of view, since through this knowledge the theologian enjoys the highest form of human wisdom.[177]

It does not seem to imply an exaggeration to postulate the possibility of these two approaches complementing one another, as reflection takes place in the Church on the transcendent Reality of God. The adoption of one system cannot imply the fundamental invalidity of the other.

The Thomistic approach can be reminded by the other method that all theology is an attempt to know a divine Subject, in the full modern sense of the word, not merely to categorize an ontological object. Though God is not measured by His concrete reference to man as a divine " Thou," He is

[176] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 6.

[177] *Ibid.*: ". . . sacra doctrina maxime dicitur sapientia."

known first and foremost in this reference, which is not a merely abstract metaphysical relation, though, of course, abstract metaphysical objectivization must follow if the believer is humanly to realize that it is GOD who is communicating Himself. The salvation historical method alerts the Thomistic approach to the uniqueness of the Reality it is considering. It reminds the classic Thomist that he must make explicit within theology an awareness of the mysteric moment in our knowledge, in the consciousness that the living God cannot be adequately affirmed in the abstract formal content of our conceptualizations.

A directly salvation historical approach can be aided by the Thomistic one to appreciate adequately that the God that is encountered is an ontic Reality, in the sense that He is in Himself what He reveals Himself to be, and is not confined or measured by the concrete " economia " of His communication. In fact, this is a necessity if the believer is going to appreciate thereality of God's Self-gift and the efficacy of our salvation in Christ.

Thus, the transcendence of the Revealed God really demands the existence of both these approaches and affects each with the need to learn from the other.

The second problem we examined as background for our study was the Essence-Person problematic of Malet.[178] This was with regard to the Trinitarian theology of St. Thomas. In retrospect it would seem that this author did not fully realize the true character of our knowledge of the revealed God. If it is to be considered purely as something of the conceptual order, with no realization that our concepts are meant to yield to a higher process of negation before the fulness of what God is in Himself, a problem is bound to arise. Our knowledge would then be fragmented into a static distinction of concepts where nature is not person, goodness not wisdom, etc. Thus, it becomes possible to overlook the fact that these concepts are

[178] Cf. First Part of this present study, *The Thomist* XXXII (1968), no. 1, pp. 3; 41-43; 56.

being applied to God, in His infinite simplicity, transcending the limited conceptual expressions we use about Him. It seems, then, that this is Malet's main problem: failing to take into account the radical transcendence of God over our concepts about Him, he worked out a primacy of person in the order of our concepts alone, and then he found it necessary to keep a distinction in the divine Reality itself.

Another reason for the existence of this Essence-Person problem is the failure to realize the mysteric givenness of the Mystery of the Trinity with regard to our knowledge. This is not confined to the formal abstract order, but it begins from and returns to the concrete reality of Revelation as found in the history of salvation. If this is not realized, difficulties readily present themselves, which arise not from the revealed Reality of the Trinity but from a conceptually fabricated Deity. Thus, we are forced to labor to see how the Father alone is Father, why the Son, too, does not have the power to generate, etc. In these cases we take the divine simplicity too abstractedly and draw conclusions from it irrespective of THIS Father, THIS Son . . . THIS Mystery of God. The elaboration of such abstract thought does not take place as it should, within the Mystery of faith, but in abstraction from it. The givenness of the Mystery is not sufficiently realized before reflection takes place about it. So it became necessary to " prove " a personalism in the Trinity that could not have really been doubted, and in an effort not to sacrifice nature to person, the divine simplicity was sacrificed, through the introduction of a distinction into it, to a failure to realize the true character of our theological knowledge when faced with the Transcendence of God.

Lastly, with regard to the problem of the " concept of God " as we outlined it, the following remarks suggest themselves in retrospect. On the one hand, the abstract nature of the concept was mentioned, on the other, care was taken to place it in the affirmative context of judgment. In this way it can be legitimately said that the concept we have through the affirmative power of judgment turns our minds to the unconcept-

ualizable Reality of God in Himself. Our conceptual knowledge is polarized, not within itself but beyond itself, of necessity yielding to the darkness in which our minds are positively directed the divine ineffable Mystery. In this way there is truly a dynamism in our knowledge, which is complemented by a non-conceptualizable " plus " of the special personal order of our knowledge as was described. There in modest fashion we tried to give the general principles of the " objective orientation " of our conceptual knowledge of God, which E. Schillebeeckx postulated but did not sufficiently explain. An attempt was made to indicate how our conceptual knowledge was set in the dynamic of faith's attainment of reality; hence we suggested that in all theological thought there is a non-conceptual depth present and that our conceptualizations are in fact living from and leading back to the personal presence of the divine " Thou." The darkness inherent in all our conceptualizations of the divine Reality was seen to be opening out into an immensely personal type of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of theological thought. Because of this non-conceptual " plus " in our knowledge, there is room for theology to be influenced, not only in the evidence it has of the reality it considers but in its attentional consideration of different aspects of that reality. According as theology is attentionally influenced by its non-conceptual depth, in this or that direction, the number of " theologies " will increase, e. g., as is already the case with different religious orders in their appreciation of the Mystery of Christ. The recognition of this non-conceptual depth enables us to see our theological noetic as demanding a variety of charismatic expressions (always with respect for the dogmatic articulations of the Magisterium). This would be a practical recognition of the transcendence of the God who has spoken over, not only a specific theological system but over our conceptual expressions and over our whole theological awareness. God is always the " Beyond," the abiding Mystery, transending our knowledge in His union with the believing mind.

Since our theological knowledge is of this unique type, with its special noetic structure when faced with the transcendence

of God, some results for pedagogy in this area should follow from the principles that have been outlined.

The first thing that stands out is that the student of theology, when faced with the ever present Mystery of the Revealed God, must be alerted to the precise nature of the knowledge he is looking for. If this does not happen, he will conceive theology either after the pattern of the positive sciences, and so look for the wrong type of evidence and so expose himself to a greater or less degree of dissatisfaction throughout the whole course of his theological education, or, on the other hand, he might conceive of theology as merely abstract conceptual theory and so see the whole purpose of his task in the categorization of the living God in neat easily memorized formulas. The backlash of this type of approach would be predictable.

Also, when solutions are arrived at or positions established, there must be this accompanying awareness of what we are about. Theological positions must be expressed in conceptual terms; thus they appear to be limited static representations of the divine Reality. Only when both student and educator are alive to the dynamism of our knowledge of the living God can the true relevance of an acquired position be appreciated. The theological attempt is not to encapsulate the Divinity in our concepts but to open our minds, in however dark a fashion, to the ineffable Mystery of the Trinity.

One can believe, then, that an alertness to the dynamics of the theological noetic can do much to take the impression of excessive and arid abstraction out of the "courses" that are given on the Revealed God.

And so we conclude, remarking merely that, because our theological knowledge is of God, it is at once limited and rich: limited because God is infinitely beyond it; rich, because God has spoken and called us to Himself, an abiding Mystery of Truth and Love.

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LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND INFERENCE ABOUT GOD

I. The Challenge of Analytic Philosophy

ANYONE WITH even a superficial knowledge of analytic philosophy will readily grant that some of its currents represent a great challenge, if not a threat, to theistic philosophers. And it would be unscientific, if not puerile, to dismiss this challenge with a few well-chosen words and rest secure in the sanctuary of tradition.

The purpose and limits of this presentation are indicated in its title. Hence, it will not be necessary to trace the history of analytic philosophy. As far as this topic is concerned, practically all analytic philosophers would refuse to admit the validity of any philosophical demonstration of the existence of God based upon the inference from empirical data.

Some, still under the spell of Hume and Kant, would dismiss any claim for our philosophical knowledge about God. Thus, after discussing the principle of causality and the notion of a timeless being, John Hospers concludes:

> However a timeless God (or any timeless entity) might be related to the temporal universe, the relation could hardly be a *causal* one, for the causal relation is a relation among temporal events.[1]

Others would reject a philosophical demonstration for the existence of God on the grounds that the conclusion of such a demonstration is meaningless and absurd. In discussing the existence of God, J. J. C. Smart has this to say:

> The greatest danger to theism at the present moment does not come from people who deny the validity of the arguments for the

[1] John Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1953), p. 331.

existence of God, for many Christian theologians do not believe that the existence of God can be proved, and certainly nowhere in the Old or New Testament do we find any evidence of people's religion having a metaphysical basis. The main danger to theism today comes from people who want to say that " God exists " and " God does not exist " are equally absurd.[2]

And the author goes on by assuming that the question " Does God exist? " is a proper question. He then asks himself:

> Can a study of the traditional proofs of the existence of God enable us to give an affirmative answer to this question? I contend that it can not.[3]

And the author's argument for defending his contention is based on the logical analysis of the expression " necessary being " used by traditional philosophical theism to describe God. In modern logic the term " necessary " is a predicate of propositions, not of things. The conclusion of the cosmological argument, therefore, would be a proposition that is only logically necessary.[4]

Faced with this atheistic attitude, a number of theistic analysts have limited themselves to making an attempt to show that theistic convictions are significant independently of any philosophical grounding. Farrer, for example, takes the position that, since nothing can be really demonstrated, religious utterances, as well as statements about science and art, find their own justification in their own use.

> The old method of philosophizing about theology was the endeavor to prove. . . . Such a method or proceeding is now out of fashion, not so much because theology cannot be philosophically demonstrated as because nothing can; not, that is, in the implied sense of "demonstrated." Every science, art, or manner of speaking is now supposed to find its own justification in its own use.[5]

[2] J. J. C. Smart, " The Existence of God," in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, ed. by A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 28-9.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[5] Austin Farrer, " A Starting-Point for the Philosophical Examination of Theological Belief," in *Faith and Logic*, ed. by Mitchell (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1957), p. 9.

Farrer does not seem to realize that statements about God, if they are to possess any universal validity and significance, should be grounded in a philosophical demonstration of the existence of God.

A similar line of thought is persued by Crombie. In his reply to A. Flew and A. M. Quinton, who contend that religious utterance are meaningless, he says:

> Let us begin by dismissing from our inquiry the troublesome statement " There is a God " or " God exists." As every student of logic knows, all statements asserting the existence of something offer difficulties of their own, with which we need not complicate our embarrassment.[6]

And referring to the logical structure of religious belief, whose logical mother he calls *undifferentiated theism,* Crombie states that:

> Her function is, not to prove to us that God exists, but to provide us with a " meaning " for the word " God." [7]

As in the case of Farrer, Crombie does not seem to see the need for relating analytic theism to a philosophical demonstration of the existence of God. It is to be admitted that both Farrer and Crombie have a point. The significance of religious discourse is explained by them in terms of personal experience. This, of course, has its value and should not be minimized. But the approach is too exclusive. For one may wonder whether a truly significant language about God would have a solid consistency if based only on emotive grounds. Crombie, however, discovers the claim to an existential significance of our religious statements in Christ. " Christ, then, is the word of God to us; both the evidence of the reality of God, and also the declaration of Him to us." This approach is very

[6] I. M. Crombie, " Theology and Falsification," in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology,* p. 110.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 116.

[8] I. M. Crombie, " The Possibility of Theological Statements," in *Faith and Logic,* p. 68.

fruitful, for it makes appeal to the history of redemption and thus avoids the difficulties that may be implied in a philosophical demonstration of the existence of God. Yet, man's rational exigencies would seem to demand some philosophical foundation even for a belief in the mysteries of redemption.

In *Religion in the Making,* Whitehead points out that, without some metaphysical foundation, religion would be in danger of emotional degeneration.

> Religion requires metaphysical backing; for its authority is endangered by the intensity of the emotions which it generates. Such emotions are evidence of some vivid experience; but they are a very poor guarantee for its correct interpretation.[9]

II. The Nature of Causal Inference

The general reluctance on the part of theistic analysts to ground our language about God in a philosophical demonstration seems to be due to the fact that the terms " proof " or " demonstration " have now taken on a more specialized meaning than in the past.[10] By " proof " today is meant a purely formal process reducible to the principle of contradiction. Now, since all our philosophical language about God is based on causal inference, the question facing us is this: is the principle of causality or of sufficient reason reducible to the principle of contradiction? If it is, then there should be no quarrel between analysts and modern scholastics who, in their explanation of the traditional proofs for the existence of God, make use of this method. If, on the other hand, the principle of causality cannot be reduced to the principle of contradiction, then what would be the nature of the " proof " for the existence of God and other natural religious truths? The answer to this question will come as a corollary to our general analysis of causal inference.

[9] Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making,* Meridian, p. 81.

[10] Cf. W. Norris Clarke, S. J., " Analytic Philosophy and Language about God," reprinted from *Christian Philosophy and Religious Renewal,* ed. by George F. McLean, O. M. I. (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1966), p. 47.

1. *Inference and Personal Identity*

The office of a philosopher is to give a rational explanation of the reality of human experience. Now, if in the realm of human experience there should be things which cannot account for their existence or activities, the inquiring mind will have to seek for an explanation and try to find a principle or cause which would be responsible for the deficiency of the things under consideration. Or, to put it in a different way, how can we account for things which are not immediately evident to our experience? The answer to this question will reveal to us both the dynamism of the human mind and the peculiar character of causal inference.

A brief analysis of our own personal identity or unity will make these things more intelligible. This mode of procedure is justified by the simple reason that, if we do know anything at all, we ought to know ourselves, because nothing is closer to us than we are to ourselves.

The question may be stated this way: do I have a direct insight into my personal unity? It is a fact that in our ordinary language we say, "I am gaining weight," "I see and hear," "I understand," "I want this or that." Is this sort of language justified? And if so, how?

Now, if I had a direct insight into my ego, there would be no reason for asking such a question. I would be able to see the very source of my activities and thus have a comprehensive knowledge of them. The fact, however, is that our knowledge of the self proceeds in an exactly opposite direction. I know myself first as acting. Our knowledge starts from the operations, the immediate fact of our experience, and, by following an inductive method, tries to grasp their source.[11]

But why must the immediate consciousness of my activities postulate a central principle of unity? The answer is to be found in the very nature and purposive character of my activities. These activities are many and irreducible. My intel-

[11] "The nature of each thing is shown by its operation," *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, a. 1.

lectual activities cannot be reduced to my volitional activities, and my rational activities cannot be reduced to my sensitive activities, and these latter cannot be reduced to my vegetative activities. To put it crudely, I " catch " myself in a variety of ways.

Now, considered in themselves, all these irreducible activities would require a distinct source or principle. I am conscious, however, that all of them have a common intrinsic purpose, namely, the good of the whole, my individual self. And this realization will serve as the basis for the causal inference: all these irreducible operations must have a common principle, a source or cause which directs them toward the good of the individual self.

But what is the nature of such an inference? Two answers can be given: a) since the activities work for a common goal, it follows that there is a common principle or cause; b) since the activities have a common goal, this fact would be unintelligible unless there were a common principle or cause. There is a remarkable difference between the two types of conclusions. The first would go directly to the source of the activities, the second, on the other hand, points to it. The first says " it is there "; the second states " it must be there." The first type of inference does not seem to correspond to reality, for we never have a direct grasp of the individual nature itself but only through the mediacy of the operations—which, however, should not be conceived as intellectual eyeglasses or binoculars. Even when, by a more penetrating introspection, we succeed in having a better knowledge of ourselves, the ego will always remain, as it were, shrouded in mystery.

The function of the operations, therefore, have the character of " vectors," of arrows pointing to something beyond themselves without giving us the vision of the reality that lies beyond. This fact, however, does not by any means imply that the existence of a principle of central unity can be subject to doubt. This existence is required by the intelligibility of the common intrinsic purpose of the operations we experience. And

because of this intelligibility, the intellect thrusts itself into the affirmation of the existence of the cause.

2. *Inference and Things Other than Ourselves*

If our own personal nature is a mystery to us requiring a humble intellectual attitude, it follows that the natures of things outside us are even more mysterious. Things of the external world are known by us according to the pattern of our own nature. And the more they differ from us, the less we experience them; and the less we experience them, the more the intellect will have to thrust itself byond the screen of the empiriological manifestations. This fact reveals to us the analogous character of the causal inference. We are only able to grasp the specific, abstract nature of man. In respect to realities on the subhuman level, we have to content ourselves with a rather generic and vague definition. Thus, we define animals in terms of irrationality in opposition to rational animals, men. Even the positive description, " a living sensitive substance," is rather generic and does not say much. And should we try to define a horse or a dog, we would find ourselves completely lost. St. Thomas was very much aware of this fact, so much so that he seems to be amused by this particular problem, as the following words will testify.

> Our knowledge is so imperfect that no philosopher has ever been able to make a perfect investigation of the nature of one fly. We are told that a certain philosopher spent thirty years in solitude in the endeavor to know the nature of the bee.[12]

This quotation alone should be sufficient, though others could be adduced in order to show St. Thomas's mind on the matter. The natures of things are not known to us. We know them in a vague, very generic way. It follows then that the scholastic expressions, " essentiae rerum cognoscuntur non per se sed per accidens," or, " essentia rei materialis est sensibilis per acci-

[12] *In Symbolum Apostolorum*, Prologus, 864, *Opuscula Theologica*, ed. Marietti (1954).

dens," need not have the meaning usually given in textbooks. The essences of corporeal things are known in a manner analogous to the knowledge we have of our individual self.

3. *Inference and Knowledge about God*

If what has been said stands to reason, it follows that when we attempt to explain the whole realm of human experience in terms of a supramundane or transcending cause, the task of the human mind becomes even more difficult. Here the human mind comes, as it were, face to face with its own limited power, and only its dynamic character will allow it to make the leap beyond the realm of experience. Let us briefly analyze this problem.

All the traditional proofs for the existence of God are based on the principle of causality or sufficient reason. The contention of many modern scholastics is that the denial of the conclusion reached by this demonstration would involve the denial of the principle of contradiction. Let us see how this is done by analyzing the most fundamental characteristics of the being of human experience, namely, becoming and *esse*. This mode of procedure will at the same time show the weakness of the modern scholastic analysis and the true nature of the causal inference about God.

a. *Analysis of Becoming*. The problem is this: is becoming or change self-explanatory? The answer to this question demands an analysis of the elements implied in becoming. First, we have an existing subject, e. g., water. Secondly, a capacity in the subject to become in some sense " other," e. g., hot. Thirdly, the process of becoming itself, e. g., water no-longer-cold, and not-yet-hot. Finally, the *terminus ad quem* of becoming, e. g., hot.

Are all these factors self-explanatory? Could water become hot by itself? If this were the case, then the subject which undergoes the change (water) would itself be the source of change, and no patient, as such, can be its own agent. For a potential existent that would be able to fill by itself that

capacity is a contradiction in terms; for it would both not be that perfection (because being only capable of it) and be that perfection (because having its source within itself). Hence, " quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur."

Now, there is nothing wrong with the principle itself, provided, of course, it is properly understood. But is it really true that the denial of this principle would involve the denial of the principle of contradiction? To my knowledge, St. Thomas, whom such scholastics say they are following, never says this—and, I believe, for a very good reason, namely, because there is no contradiction. Contradiction is always between two contradictory terms, such as being and non-being, living and non-living; and in our present case the contradiction should be between capacity for being and non-capacity for being, and this is obviously not the case; for what is contrasted in the contention is not capacity for with non-capacity for, but capacity for with to-be. The conclusion, therefore, should be this: unless we admit a source of becoming, becoming itself would be unintelligible. And this is the meaning of the principle. This point will be elaborated in our next analysis.

b. *Analysis of Esse.* The problem is this: do the things of human experience contain within themselves the whole explanation of their *esse*? The common solution given to this problem may be expressed as follows.

It is a fact that there are many existents. They are of such and such a nature. Hence none of them possesses the fulness of *esse,* but each one of them participates in *esse.* In other words, they *have esse;* they are not *esse.* Now, a participated *esse* is a caused *esse,* for an uncaused participated *esse* would be a contradiction in terms, because an uncaused *esse* is the fullness of *esse, esse* itself. Hence, whatever exists by participation is caused by another.

As is evident, this case is analogous to the foregoing. I am not saying that a participated *esse* is not a caused *esse.* What I am saying is that there is a contradiction between participated *esse* and non-participated *esse,* but not between uncaused

esse and participated *esse*. It is quite true that the expression " uncaused participated *esse* " does not make sense. And it does not make sense because it is unintelligible. A comparison might clarify the issue. Let us take these two expressions: " a square circle " and " an uncaused participated being." It is evident that in the first expression the predicate adjective denies the subject, whereas in the second there is no such denial. Both expressions are unintelligible but for different reasons: the first because it is a contradiction in terms, the second because a participated being must be explained in reference to a cause. And this, it seems to me, is the mind of St. Thomas. Here is one of his statements on the subject:

> Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing.[13]

As is clear, St. Thomas does not equate " being by participation " with " caused being." The fact of being caused follows (*sequitur*) from the fact of being by participation, as the faculty of laughter follows from rational nature. This doctrine may be explained briefly by the following analogy: being-caused : being by participation :: risibility : man. And as risibility is a property of man, so being caused is a property of participated being; and as man cannot be without risibility, so participated being cannot be without being caused.

This, however, does not mean that should I deny risibility I would, *eo ipso*, deny man. Let me explain. To use scholoastic terminology, the propositions " man is risible " and " participated being is caused " belong to the second mode of *per se* predication. Now, it is quite true, as St. Thomas says, that man cannot *exist* without the capacity for laughter, nor can such a capacity *exist* without man; this refers to the existential order of reality, and it is in this sense, it seems to me, that a

[13] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1.

property is convertible with its subject. On the strict logical level, however, the case is not quite the same, because a property is a part of the subject, the whole, and no part can be equated with the whole. And this is the reason why I can think of a property apart from the whole. In a contradictory proposition the predicate denies the whole of the subject, and a property, being a part of the subject, does not perform this function. Now, to be caused is a property of participated being. Hence, its denial does not necessarily involve the denial of the participated being itself.

These considerations perhaps point out the logical mistake of those who contend that the denial of the principle of causality would necessarily imply the denial of the principle of contradiction. These two principles are altogether different in character. The principle of contradiction is static, like any other logical rule; the principle of causality, or of sufficient reason, on the other hand, is dynamic. This should be sufficiently evident from what has been said.

As a further clarification of the present problem, however, we may ask ourselves: what is the function of risibility or of any other property in general in relation to its principle or cause? We are told that properties *manifest* the nature of a given entity. And this statement is quite true. St. Thomas himself makes use of it rather frequently. But what is its meaning? Again, we cannot equate the verb " to manifest " with the verb " to render evident " in the sense that we have a direct insight into the nature or cause. The properties put us, as it were, on the path leading to their respective principle or source, but they will never allow us to enter the sanctuary itself. They are vectors, indicators pointing to something beyond—nothing more. And they are all the mind needs in order to make the affirmation: the " something beyond " must be there, or else I cannot account for the intelligibility of my experience.

If what has been said is correct, then the nature of the causal inference from the world of human experience to God will be analogous to the nature of the other causal inferences based on

our existential world. There is no need to repeat our basic theme. Briefly, just as I cannot say: " since the activities work for a common intrinsic purpose, therefore there is a common principle or cause," so I cannot say: " since the world is intelligible, therefore God exists." On the other hand, just as I can say: " the common intrinsic purpose of the activities would be unintelligible if they had no common principle," so I can say: " the world would be unintelligible, if God did not exist." The analysis of the world of human experience reveals the insufficiency of such a world, and this insufficiency is the vector pointing to the existence of a self-sufficient cause, God. This fact will also reveal to us that:

> . . . at the roots of man's entire intellectual life there is uncovered a radical act of what might be called natural faith, in the sense of commitment to what cannot fully be seen and justified without residue by one's own powers, in response to a mysterious summons or invitation issuing from the depths of the innate natural dynamism of one's created intelligence.[14]

* * * * *

If the foregoing makes sense to the reader, then it would seem that the challenge of analytic philosophy can be accepted by the Thomist with fruitful results. A re-evaluation of the principle of causality along the lines indicated in this presentation might also prove to be acceptable to analysts with theistic convictions and thus open the way to a structuring of language about God upon contemporary philosophical grounds.

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[14] W. Norris Clarke, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

THE SYNTHESIS OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

TEILHARD DE CHARDIN inherited the fragmented world of our age. Due to many factors, among these the evolutionary theory, the idealistic strain in philosophy, the wars, the man of our times had become dissociated from his past traditional views, from his environment, from himself, and from God. Like many other thinkers of our age, Teilhard too sought to re-establish man in his world. He attempted a *synthesis* in which man, God, and the universe would once more been seen as a harmonious whole.

This task was not easy. Many today feel that Teilhard failed in his venture. It is our purpose here to examine this synthesis in the context which nurtured it, for only in this way may it be properly understood. Particular attention will be paid to the argument for the omega point. As it stands, the omega point furnishes Teilhard with the unity he desired, and its arguments could be proposed as evidence for the existence of God. Finally, we will treat a few of the contemporary objections against Teilhard's synthetic approach to the problems about man, God, and the universe.

I. Teilhard's Personal Awareness of the Problems of His Age

Teilhard de Chardin was privileged to feel within himself the very agonizing issues of our day. And his resolution of these personally-felt dichotomies gives to his synthesis its personal flavor. The major problem of his life was to resolve the apaprent discontinuity he experienced between his love of the world and his love of God.

Paraphrasing *Genesis*, we might say that " in the beginning " Teilhard first loved the world. This is evident, for example, in his apparent passion for stones which preoccupied him as a young student. Nothing else seems to have interested him.

He never lost this interest in what were, for a French Catholic of his day, " worldly matters." His love of the earth led him to paleontology, an area in which he became in later life a recognized authority. A summary of the issues highlighting his concern for the world would read as follows: a concern for scientific research, for personal self-development made available to all men, and for human achievement which would advance the progress of the world. Research, development, and achievement. These three issues dominate his love of the earth.

However, Teilhard held a deep interest in religion as well. Taught the Christian faith according to the standards of the times, he gradually became aware that the teachings on God and man he received were not in accord with his own well-developed love of the world. This doxic dichotomy was especially notable in three areas corresponding to the " three loves " of the world mentioned above. Apparently opposed to scientific research was the data of revelation. Standing against a deep self-development in the world was a formidable call for Christian detachment from the world. Finally, how was he to reconcile human efforts and achievements with his call, as a Christian, to the Kingdom of Christ, a Kingdom not of this world?

Turmoil is bound to result when two profoundly-rooted facets of a man's life seem to conflict so readily. In one so sensitive as Teihard, this became all the more evident. Obviously a way out had to be sought. The usual historical pattern is a rejection of one irreconcilable element for the other; faith rejected for the world, or more rarely, the world for faith. The Jesuit priest did neither.

Teilhard went through an acute period of experience of the absurdity of the world. In this " religious experience " he did not abandon the world. What kept him on an even keel was his anxiety about unbelief. He was aware that a lack of faith often led to a profound pessimism about the world.[1] Through faith,

[1] C. F. Mooney, S. J., *Teilhard de Chardin and the Mystery of Christ* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 192. For a more detailed exploration of Teilhard's life,

both in God and in the world, he was able to resolve the turmoil within him. As a result of this victory of faith, a constant optimism flowed from his pen. What furnished the source of this optimism about the world was a personal religious conviction. This conviction, simply stated, was that Christ was *physically* conjoined to the universe. God could not abandon the world. As God, man, and the world were unified in Christ, neither God, nor man and his world could perish from Teilhard's life. Man was not faced with a choice between God or the world. Rather he was faced with a synthesis of God and the world in Christ.

Therefore unity became Teilhard's " way out." His was a poetic vision of unity. " Pull a flower, trouble a star," said Francis Thompson. This was the type of vision which Teilhard constantly sought to render clear, even to himself.[2] The universe, man and God become in his writings a super-cosmic whole.

We have mentioned a scientific, religiously poetic, and theological Teilhard. These three facets are continually interlarded in the writings of the French Jesuit, and these facts are not always clear to the reader. Mooney offers a helpful hint in reading Teilhard. In speaking of the evolution of the universe, Teilhard is concerned as a scientist; as a theologian, he reflects upon Christ's physical union with the cosmos; and it is as a religious visionary that Teilhard seeks to help others work out their salvation, in Christ, but also in the world.[3]

II. Problematics: the Context of Teilhard's Synthesis

" What a wretched man I am! Who will rescue me from this body doomed to death? " (Romans 7:24) In speaking for the anguish of mankind, St. Paul also asks the same question which troubled Teilhard. We will see this to be the case, by pointing out the principal problems about the world, about man, and

see *ibid.*, pp. 1-32; De Lubac, S. J., *Teilhard de Chardin: The Man and His Meaning* (New York: Mentor, 1967).

[2] Mooney, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-5.

about God which challenged Teilhard. How could these challenges, which spelled pessimistic doom for the universe in his eyes, be answered?

1. *The Cosmic Problem*

We have already seen that the challenges offered by science to Christian thought were staggering. Science had developed its firmest theses outside of, if not in direct contradiction to, the Church. The vitality of science could be seen in direct contrast to a seemingly stagnant Church. Foremost among the scientific theses which opposed the authority of the Church as well as the latter's traditional thought were Galileo's discovery that the universe was not geocentric, Newton's apparent destruction of the theory of natural place and intrinsic final causality of inanimate things, and Darwin's introduction of historical process for the previous specific identities. The chief ecclesiastical thesis opposing science, in Teilhard's view, was the notion that moral life " transcended " the world.[4]

Nevertheless Teilhard faced an even greater problem, parallel to St. Paul's humanity in *Romans* quoted above. His love of the world made this problem all the more pressing; is the earth to pass away? [5] The scientific evidence points vividly to the fact that it will. In the ultimate analysis, some five million years from now the sun will burn up its nuclear, life-giving energy. The earth will come to a frigid end. If the earth is doomed to death, so are man's endeavors, all of them. In view of this evidence, a very real pessimism about the world seems to be sufficiently justified. In his optimism, Teilhard wants the earth to last and man's endeavors with it. How will he solve this dilemma to his own satisfaction?

2. *The Human Problem*

The predominant challenges about man came from two quarters, from Marxism and from existentialism. Since science

[4] *The Future of Man*, pp. 260-70.

[5] For a taste of how deeply Teilhard loved the world, see *Hymn of the Universe*, p. 33.

seemed to show the world to be self-sufficient, the Marxist offered this challenge to Christian thinking about man: either man is to work for a this-worldly utopia, or his life is drugged by escapism as he turns to a " spiritual " God whose existence seems superfluous if not insidious. What troubled Teilhard most about this challenge was not the denial of God as much as the either/or alternative in which it was couched. The alternative is a dichotomy between God and the world. In addition, Marxism seemed to Teilhard to deny and destroy something of the dignity of man himself. For even though it stressed work as the highest dignity of man, it also presented production of goods for the use of others as a type of Hegelian self-alienation. Man was alienated from his labor in the very act of laboring for others. Furthermore, the dialectic of history seemed to depersonalize man. He was trampled on by the inexorable " course of history." [6]

As we are learning today through Marxist-Christian dialogues, the view of the Christian as an " escape-hatch " human has been an historical determinant. By " escaping " through his " hatch " of supernatural reward, the Christian falsely justified both his defense of the status-quo and its deprivations and his own withdrawal from the world of everyday matters. This view of the Christian as essentially one who chooses the supernatural in opposition to the world grows naturally out of the conditions prevalent in the age in which Marxism and existentialism were first formulated. We can readily see that Teilhard agreed with the existentialist challenge about man. In total unanimity with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche he could deride such " escape-hatch " Christians as lukewarm humans.[7] In place of escapism he will offer collective effort based upon a profound cosmic-Christic communality; in place of a herd mentality, he too will offer a deep personal commitment to God in the world.

[6] *The Future of Man,* p. 268. As we shall see, Teilhard's synthesis is not altogether free of the same objection. The person seems to be lost in the cosmic process.

[7] *Ibid.*

3. *The Divine Problem*

The principal challenge offered Teilhard about God, and this was a direct challenge placed at his feet by the followers of Sartre in Paris, was this: does an examination of the phenomenal world leave an opening for a transcendent Being, a God? If Sartre's postulational atheism is correct, then the world *is* absurd.[8] As we have already mentioned, there seemed to be good scientific evidence for an ultimately pessimistic view as well. This was the challenge which evoked the *Phenomenon of Man.*

As we will see, Teilhard will turn to the scientific record of evolution in order to show that the world's process has meaning. Being in the process, man himself derives a direct meaning from it, even if this meaning would be only to the extent of self-development, a notion with which Sartre would agree. However, and this is Teilhard's strong point, being in process is not the only meaning in the world. Another meaning, *the* meaning, is derived from the end of the process, the omega point. The totality of the meaning of the cosmos, and of man in the cosmos, is to be *for* the omega point. "For" here is the key term. What, in effect, Teilhard has done, is to re-introduce the idea of an intrinsic finality into the process of Life, or more specifically, into the process of increasing consciousness in the world. In short, then, Teilhard's answer to the Sartre school is that the world has a meaning. It is not absurd. And this revelation should make Sartre's postulational atheism untenable.

We have briefly observed some of the problematics which faced Teilhard and whose answers composed his synthesis. Hence we may turn to the elements of the synthesis of God,

[8] The basic reason for the rejection of God in Sartre can be traced to his notion of consciousness as developed in *The Transcendence of the Ego.* If consciousness has no content, then it is nothingness, pure freedom, pure creativity of all meanings, even of the self and the ego. In short, there is no substantially given meaning. Even though it is an absurd pressure, man continually tries to become like a God in that he continually is creating meanings. Teilhard's view of consciousness differs considerably from Sartre's and will lead him to an answer about the problem of God.

man, and the world, to see how the French thinker felt they answered the problems posed him by his age.

III. The Synthesis of Teilhard: the Groaning Cosmos

One of the deepest urges of the human spirit, Henri Dumery calls it the basic religious experience, is a drive for unity. Teilhard is hardly exempt from this urge. In fact, it is the dominant feature of his life. As a result, his synthesis mirrors his own drive for union. Like St. Paul's vision of creation, Teilhard's universe is groaning toward the omega point.[9] Only at the omega, the end, will the universe and man with it find a full expression.

There is no question that Teilhard's synthesis itself owes a great deal to Blondel; his letters to Blondel clearly indicate this.[10] We might point to the most obvious similarity, that in which the natural order is seen to press toward another higher order of existence, commonly called the supernatural. In Blondel's thought, the action of willing, thinking, and of being all progressively lead to an awareness of the infinite and to a confrontation with it. The supernatural order is seen as a necessary complement to the natural. This view has caused no end of difficulties, especially with the problem of the gratuitous nature of the supernatural order of salvation. The same difficulty appears in Teilhard's synthesis, and it is subject to an identical critique. For the priest-scientist examines nature to the same effect. Since we are doing no more than indicating a similarity of vision with Blondel at this juncture, we could conclude this observation with a passage from Paul Chauchard:

> For Teilhard, what is essential is not the historical analysis of nature. It is rather that such analysis, sometimes claimed as

[9] However, there is this difference: Paul's was a static vertical view common to the Greeks, while Teilhard's is a horizontal process in time. "From the beginning till now the entire creation as we know, has been groaning in one great act of giving birth; and not only creation, but all of us who possess the first-fruits of the Spirit, we too groan inwardly as we wait for our bodies to be set free." Rom. 8:22-3.

[10] Cf. de Lubac, *op. cit.*, various places throughout the book; Mooney, "Blondel and Teilhard," *Thought* (winter, 62).

atheistic, necessarily leads the reason not to agnosticism, or vague religious sentiments, or to dim notions of a marginal God for philosophers and scholars, but straight to mystic encounter with Jesus Christ, the God of love.[11]

It is precisely the *necessity* of this outcome which will preoccupy us in the following pages. What are the reasons advanced for the necessity of the ever-present omega point? What is the evidence?

Another interesting parallel in methodology can be noted between Teilhard and the principles enunciated by Engels in his *Dialectics of Nature.* The now-familiar principles of dialectical materialism are three-fold: (1) the law of transformation of quantity into quality; (2) the law of the interpenetration of opposites; (3) the law of the negation of the negation.[12] Corresponding to the law of transformation might be seen Teilhard's law of complexity / consciousness. By development through stages of qualitative leaps to higher forms of consciousness, this law merges with another which Teilhard calls the law of tangential / radial energy. In this sense, then, Teilhard accords with observations of the dialectical materialist. He too regards the qualitative leaps, e. g., from non-life to life, as being due to a greater quantitative complexity or at least accompanied by such. The law of complexity / consciousness might also be seen as a form of the law of interpenetration of opposites. The latter is supposed to explain all changes and events in terms of immanent principles, inherent in the universe. No " useless " god need be posited. It is here, however, that Teilhard departs from pure materialism. He identifies complexity in the same way as the dialectical materialist. But his consciousness is another matter altogether, somehow identified as a part of the Divine Milieu. Thus an " external " principle is introduced at this point, external, that is, insofar as this principle is not part of the process itself. We will see later

[11] P. Chauchard, *Teilhard de Chardin on love and suffering* (Glen Rock, N. J.: Paulist Press, 1966), p. 9.

[12] F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (New York: International, 1960), p. 26.

on how this Divine Milieu lifts Teilhard by the bootstraps out of the pantheistic mire. Finally, the law of the negation of the negation is the logical and cosmological principle of dialectical contradiction upon which the whole of Marxism is based. But it is exactly in this matter that we feel Teilhard differs mostly from any Hegelian procedure in examining process.

Although containing certain resemblances with an Hegelian dialectic, Teilhard's synthesis is definitely not an Hegelian system. In support of this contention we would offer the following observations. The three terms of the synthesis are not seen as antithetic or contradictory. God, man, and the world are not viewed as vigorously engaged in negating one another or in alienating themselves. In other words, the synthesis does not obliterate the uniqueness of each of the individual elements. The reason for this difference lies in Teilhard's personal center of unity, the person of Christ. In one sense, the synthesis has already taken place in the person of Christ. In another, we are still developing toward Christ as Lord of the Universe, the end or omega point. The universe and man are caught between the already and the not yet. Because of the different conception of the Absolute, Teilhard's synthesis might be characterized as a discontinuity in continuity. The transcendent affirmation of God and the immanent affirmation of the world, like two right-angle vectors, are resolved in a third vector, in Jesus Christ.[13] Teilhard's union of seeming contradictions does not obliterate the differences in a higher stage of process but differentiates them.[14] His synthesis differentiates in the same way that the higher form

[13] *The Future of Man,* pp. 260-70.

[14] *The Divine Milieu,* p. 108; *The Phenomenon of Man,* p. 258. E. g., the synthesis in *The Divine Milieu* of both attachment to the world and detachment from it, is accomplished by viewing both as renunciations in an impluse toward the omega point. A good commentary and critique of Teilhard's *Divine Milieu* and *Phenomenon of Man* can be found by J. J. Duyvené de Wit, "Pierre Teilhard de Chardin," in ed. Hughes, *Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdman's press, 1966), pp. 407-50. We will cite this work as an example of strict Dutch calvinistic thinking on Teilhard.

of life in its organization does not destroy the functions of its parts held in common with lower forms but in its greater unity demands of the parts a greater differentiation of function. A human brain is more highly differentiated in functional parts than that of any other animal.

This type of union, a unification of individual elements, is dominated by the end, the purpose of the functions. And this is the secret of the value of Teilhard's slogan: Whatever rises must converge. Going forward means going upward. Previously we noted the importance of the word " for " in Teilhard's thought. It is being *for* the omega point that will constitute the meaning of the cosmic process as it groans forward and upward.

We are now prepared to investigate Teilhard's thought on the elements of his synthesis: the world, man, and God. In particular the focus will remain centered on his arguments that God is not a " useless " adherent of the cosmos but both produces and is the finality of the groaning of the universe.

1. *The cosmos*

As we have briefly indicated, evolution answered Sartre. At least this was the conviction of Teilhard. In itself, evolution can neither prove nor disprove the existence of a God.[15] But it does seem to contradict Sartre's view of the absurdity of the world and further suggests that his postulate of atheism might in fact be wrong. For Teilhard there is order and not chaos.[16] And man is very much a part of this contextual order, this whole.

The *point du depart* of Teilhard from Sartre actually lies in the former's view of the nature of consciousness. For Teilhard, man has an identity. The polarization of life's activities would

[15] Teilhard will offer the additional premises required however.

[16] R. J. Nogar, O.P., *The Lord of the Absurd* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966). Fr. Nogar in speaking with Simpson finds himself in the surprising position of stressing change more than that famous evolutionist. This stress allows Nogar to emphasize the unexpected and the absurdity of faith. In this sense, he has advanced further than either Teilhard or Sartre.

demand that a person would have a frame of reference, an axis within himself, to which he relates the whole of his experiential life. This " within " is directly observable in man. It is the principle of intelligibility or consciousness. The noosphere, the layer of life in which consciousness knows that it knows, constitutes the starting point of the analysis of the universe for Teilhard. Contrary to Sartre's view, consciousness must have a content, since it can be an object to itself.

By a further step which Teilhard calls extrapolation, he extends the reality of the power of consciousness to all living and non-living entities. In these latter, consciousness is not directly phenomenal. But the important point is that in man it is. The core of the phenomenon of man is consciousness. And it is upon this basis that radial energy towards ultrahominization and the cosmic person of Christ is constructed.[17] It is clear that at this point Teilhard does not feel that his faith has entered his conditions at all. We wonder if it has.

What, then, is the evidence for the evolution of the universe toward the omega point? For if the evidence is phenomenal at its root, Teilhard's arguments would be a form of reaching the existence of God through the evidence of an immanent act of consciousness. It would be an argument from immanence in the universe to transcendence, from the Divine Milieu of conscious energy to the omega point.

2. *Scientific observation and theory?*

Clearly, Teilhard spoke in the *Phenomenon of Man* as if his synthesis flowed from a detailed examination of the facts of the scientific record along with a precise reflection: " We have seen and admitted that evolution is an ascent towards consciousness. That is no longer contested even by the most materialistic, or at all events by the most agnostic of all humanitarians. Therefore it should culminate forwards in some sort of supreme consciousness." [18] The missing premise is

[17] *The Phenomenon of Man,* p. 298.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 258.

obviously that an ascent towards consciousness will culminate in some one point. But is this argument simply a pursuing of the " logic and coherence of facts to the very end? " [19] Let us examine the premise more closely. In this examination we will take a notion of " scientific fact " a bit more broadly than is usually assumed by positivistic thinkers. It will cover not only the phenomenal event, a happening directly observable by the senses, but also the probable events of which we have only meager or scant evidence.[20] In this sense then, evolution is strictly called a " scientific fact." The thinking of Teilhard is then seen as a theory to explain the facts.

The first premise, that the scientific record shows an evolution in an ascent towards consciousness, seems at first sight to be a conclusion based upon the evidence. Indeed it is this. But it is also more. There is some reflection already built in as is evidenced by the word " ascent." The law of complexity / consciousness is certainly verified by the facts of the record. The greater the complexity, the greater the consciousness. But Teilhard also feels that the reality of things does not disappear. In order to explain this, he posits another law about the energy which keeps things in existence. This is the law of tangential / radial energy, which is designed to explain the notion of ascent towards greater consciousness. Tangential energy is the power and preservative force which both increases the number of living things in a phylum (evolvitive group of forces) and causes greater complexity in the members of the phylum. In short, tangential energy is an aggregational link with the other members of a class. Radial energy, on the other hand, is responsible for drawing an entire phylum toward a higher centricity. That is to say, it segregates a class from previous environs and causes a qualitative leap to a higher form of consciousness.[21]

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] For a complete discussion on the nature of a scientific fact, see: R. J. Nogar, O.P., *Evolutionism: its Power and its Limits* (Washington: The Thomist Press, 1962).

[21] *The Phenomenon of Man,* p. 65.

It is evident, then, that the first premise rests upon the observation of evolution, the fact that higher forms of conscious life have appeared in the history of the cosmos. In addition, it is supported by two laws, observations upon the facts. Thirdly, it rests upon the judgment that the reality of beings does not disappear. In all of this we would consider the type of thinking to be scientific. Here " scientific " is taken in the sense contrary to positivism. Science need not be confined strictly to the enumeration of facts. The mind also plays a part by elaborating a theory to explain the facts if possible.

However, when we turn to the second premise, the missing one, we are confronted with a more *metaphysical* approach. What evidence is there that consciousness is converging to a single ultimate point of supreme consciousness? One could cite the two laws mentioned above which, taken together, seem to lead to this conclusion. If this is true, then the premise, too, would be scientific in the sense elaborated above and the argument would not be metaphysical. The without of things is directly, phenomenally visible and observable. To explain the without of things (their complexity) we posit a within.[22] Nor have we departed from a scientific mode of thinking, since the within, though only indirectly observable in complexity, is directly observable in man.[23] Man's act of consciousness is aware of its own act. To extend this consciousness back into even inanimate objects seems to be anthropomorphism, a type of metaphysical stance. Teilhard considered it rather to be *extrapolation* and a legitimate scientific procedure.[24]

But our contention that the second premise contains metaphysical presuppositions ultimately derived both from Teilhard's personal insight and faith is not limited to pointing to what seems to be anthropomorphism. The two presuppositions which appear most obvious to us are that consciousness is too great a phenomenon to recede back to nothingness, and that space-time is of a convergent nature. The first seems to stem from Teilhard's respect for life, and the second from his judg-

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 49. [23] *Ibid.*, p. 55. [24] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

ment that the structure of the noosphere is a closed and centered whole. Both his poetic vision of unity and his religious faith in a personal center of the cosmos (Christ) contribute to the latter metaphysical view. Apparently, Teilhard's whole view, in the ultimate analysis, is both poetic and religious. It is not strictly scientific nor is it clearly metaphysical.[25] Let us turn now to some references which would support this contention.

3. *Evolutionism?*

The personal intuition of Teilhard about the necessity of the omega point rests ultimately upon a religious experience both poetic and religious in scope.[26] Due to this necessity, Teilhard's evolutionary theory is now elevated to an evolutionism in which the necessity of the outcome is assured.[27] His faith allows him to hypostasize " evolution " as a personal center of the cosmos. The question remains, is this necessity merely hypothetical or is it absolute? If it remains hypothetical, the force of its conclusions are merely probable but confirmed by one's faith in Jesus Christ. This is the position of Mooney, and it is the one being opted for in this consideration.[28] If its necessity is absolute, it presents us with a metaphysically certain argument for the existence of God. Many interpret Teilhard in terms of a metaphysical stance by pointing to his evolutionism in which the transmission of life is more real to him than individual lives.[29] Others of a more positivistic bent accuse

[25] Some criticisms of Teilhard accuse him of reversion to " outdated " Greek notions of act/potency as the ultimate basis for his arguments. We do not agree; complexity and consciousness bear only a remote kinship with potency and act; for the necessity does not flow from this law of consciousness itself either. We are contending that it comes from a personal intuition of faith. See: L. Dewart, *The Future of Belief* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), pp. 43-6; Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* (1953), I, pp. 181-3.

[26] E. g., *Hymn of the Universe,* p. 33.

[27] *The Phenomenon of Man,* pp. 140; 218.

[28] Mooney, *Teilhard de Chardin and the Mystery of Christ,* p. 196.

[29] For example, the interpretation of Cuenot in his many writings. We feel that the usual critiques of Teilhard go astray by missing the fundamental *theologal* vision which characterizes his thought. This is certainly the case with the otherwise

Teilhard of transformism beyond the scientific " facts." In this sense, then, he acquires an abominable metaphysical coloring.[30] But neither approach allows the interpreter to accept Teilhard's vision. Interpreting his argument as absolutely metaphysically certain leads to a rejection of it simply because, under the metaphysical gaze, it is at best inconclusive and at worst pure dribble.

In support of the view that Teilhard's argument for the existence of the omega point is meant to be taken merely as an hypothesis which is confirmed by a religious vision, we would offer the following remarks. First of all, as Mooney has indicated, Teilhard continually spoke in conditional terms about all of his thinking. He was constantly trying to verify it and clarify it, even to himself. To interpret him " metaphysically " is to miss his own words, e. g., the " should culminate " in the argument quoted from the *Phenomenon of Man.*

Undoubtably there are ambiguities in his writings for this very reason. And the progression of the *Phenomenon* does seem to indicate that Teilhard thought that his science led him to the assurance of an ultra-hominization pole. It seems to begin as a cosmology based on the principles of moving things, move into a metaphysics upon the discovery of necessity of the omega point, and conclude as a " surprising " footnote that this very omega point is the God of Christianity. But upon closer examination we see that this is not the case. True, it does begin as a cosmology. However, the basic principles of this cosmology, we have already indicated, are ultimately based upon a religious vision. Furthermore, the *Divine Milieu,* written some years before the *Phenomenon,* attributes the source of the segregative and aggregative activity of evolution (later the law of radial / tangential energy) to the center of the unity of the universe,

good critiques by W. A. Wallace, O. P., and M. Stock, O. P. in *The New Scholasticism,* XXXVI (July, 62), 3, 353-80.

[30] De Wit, *op. cit.,* pp. 430 ff. De Wit's position as a more positivistic interpreter of the " facts " is in accord with his Calvinistic faith. Instead of a broad interpretation of the record, he offers instead a " spontaneous generation " as the only judgment warranted by the evidence.

the omnipresence of action, the " omnipresence of christification." It is clear, therefore, that what appears as a supplement in the *Phenomenon* is actually the starting point of the synthesis: the religious experience of Christ's physical conjunction with the universe. In addition, we have indicated that the intermediate " metaphysical " stage of the discovery of necessity is actually only of hypothetical necessity. This is the necessity proper to a cosmology in the highest stage of its argumentation. Underlying this hypothesis are admittedly what could be termed metaphysical presuppositions. One example of such a supposition was that consciousness is too noble a reality to vanish from the cosmos. Nevertheless, these suppositions as well are further traced to their root in faith. Consequently, we must investigate briefly the role of faith in Teilhard, the root of all his necessity and suppositions.

4. *The Role of Faith*

The cosmic vision of Teilhard is an intellectual synthesis built upon an originary religious experience and justified by the same. If one has had this same experience, one can accept it wholeheartedly. If one has not had the vision, he must be satisfied with the *suggestion* that the universe leads one upwards and forwards toward unity.

In this originary religious experience two kinds of faith can be discerned. The first is Teilhard's faith, a fundamental faith in the forward progress of the world. To be sure, this faith has a scientific basis, namely, the evidence of past irreversibility. But it remains a faith in the necessity of the future, a faith demanded by all reductive (inductive) processes of thought. Coupled with this " natural " faith is the religious conviction that the universe is also moving upward to God. This conviction Teilhard receives from God. From Christian revelation Teilhard synthesizes the upward-forward movement in the person of Christ. Within the confines of what we have chosen to call the " natural faith " of Teilhard we can further distinguish two levels. The first is his confidence about the without of things, i. e., his evolutionism; the second level is his

humanistic confidence about the within of things, the creative freedom of the universal process, a sort of Leibnizian " divine within." [31]

How could we best characterize Teilhard's synthesis? From what has been said, it might be best to call it in its origins and ultimate justification a *theologal vision* of cosmological proportions. By " theologal " is meant simply the relation of man to God in faith.[32] By coupling " theologal " with " vision " we wish to emphasize the poetic character of his work. It is not a *theological* synthesis in the sense that what results is a science of theology available to all who accept the principles of the science. No, Teilhard's vision is definitely *not* available to all. For full commitment, it demands that one have the same vision. In the last analysis, therefore, his method is not scientific but poetic. It is an attempt to recreate his vision or at least to point to the possibility of this vision in the minds of his readers. By adding the words, " of cosmological proportions," we mean not only to indicate the sweep and scope of the vision but the hypothetical nature of any of the " scientific arguments " advanced within. The arguments are built upon scientific theory and are not meant to be taken in the absolutist Cartesian sense of " metaphysical."

Having discussed Teilhard's answer about the world in some detail, we can now turn to his observations about man and his place in the world. One could note once again how faith, both in the world and in God, crops up here as well.

The key to the understanding of Teilhard's view of man is his notion of hominization. What is it? It is a term describing all processes after the advent of man upon the evolutionary scene which lead to greater complexity in socialization. It is a natural process akin to that of greater complexity caused by tangential energy in all the lower phyla. Because of homini-

[31] This entire area of " faith " in science is strongly objected to by De Wit, *op. cit.*, p. 496. Could it be that his own Protestant heritage leads him to react to reason and reliance upon hypothesis as a corruption of faith?

[32] This term is borrowed from E. Schillebeeckx, O. P., *Christus, sacrament van de Godsontmoeting* (Bilthoven: H. Nelissen, 1961), p. 25, footnote 13.

zation and the future it foretells of man, Teilhard can cry out: "The age of nations is passed; our task is to build the earth!" [33]

The evidence for hominization is the same as that for the omega point; hominization is the present stage which will lead eventually, and after even greater social complexity, to the qualitative leap of a new form of consciousness—the omega point. To explain the hominization process, then, it is sufficient to produce the two laws of complexity / consciousness and tangential / radial energy. However, the role of faith becomes even more evident in this process than in the lower forms. For in the lower phyla, there is some record of a continual evolution of species, e. g., the horse phylum. But in the case of man, no evidence in the fossils is present which could point to the evolution of man from some lower species.[34] The evidence of where, when, and how man appeared on the scene is totally absent. He just arrived! What we have, then, is a simple case of trust or faith in the powers of human reason to extrapolate, theorize, and fill in the gaps in the record through the transformist principle of the evolutionary theory. This constitutes a very real part of the sweep of Teilhard's vision and the hardest part for a just-the-facts-man scientist to swallow. Unlike the previous record providing a faith in future development by the irreversible process in the past, the evolution of man from lower forms demands of us an additional act of faith in our hypothesis about the past. We are willing to make this act of trust, *provided* its hypothetical character is preserved. Once again, to insist upon a metaphysical certitude seems absurd.

By the force of the law of tangential / radial energy, we have a real possibility for the future of mankind opened before us. For if tangential energy is responsible for the greater social complexity, its complement form of radial energy, too, will

[33] *Building the Earth*, p. 6 (introductory leaf).

[34] See: Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (1962), p. 187 and F. Mayr, *Animal Species and Evolution* (1963), p. 637.

enter the science. Ultrahominization, the qualitative leap to the omega point, must eventually take place, i. e., in the context of the hypothesis. There are at least grounds for optimism, according to Teilhard. Hominization offers a thrilling vision of the future of man. The first ground for optimism is that man is totally and radically unified with the whole universe.[35] Were the universe to perish, then this ground would appear ridiculous. Man would perish with it. But the second ground for optimism is the unity of Christ with the universe, precisely in his physical humanity. Since Christ is God, the universe cannot perish! Christ dies now no more. Consequently, man's work in the world is assured.[36]

The seeds of answers to both Sartre and Marxism are contained in what we exposed above. In response to Sartre, Teilhard counsels men that a commitment to the world and not to the self is demanded by ultrahominization. Man finds his fulfillment in being-for the universe and not for himself. And being for the cosmos is to be for Christ: "But if they [humanity] are to share in this joy and this vision they must first of all have had the courage to break through the narrow confines of their individuality, cease to be egocentric and become Christocentric."[37] Since Teilhard's synthesis is based upon a union that differentiates, Marxian depersonalization is overcome. Man's organizational identity in the universe does not deprive him of self-fulfillment but fosters it. This is not to say, however, that Teilhard is not faced with serious problems, especially that of freedom and necessity and lack of concern for the individual in the face of the sweeping process.[38]

We have now arrived at the final term included in the synthesis, God. The ultimate necessity of evolution towards the omega point stems from faith. In addition there is present

[35] *The Phenomenon of Man,* whole first chapter.

[36] *The Divine Milieu,* p. 101. This insight and similar emphases by Teilhard influenced the writing of the widely incarnational document on the *Church and the Modern World* of Vatican II.

[37] *Hymn of the Universe,* p. 120; also see p. 112.

[38] This problem is frankly faced by Mooney, *op. cit.,* pp. 199-213.

a hypothetical approach to it in view of the laws of energy and consciousness. God is at the core of evolution. He is the immanent divine energy in all things spurring them on toward the omega point. If such an immanent God were all Teilhard had to offer, we would be dealing with just another form of pantheism. However, Teilhard seems to be more open to criticism as a panpsychic thinker than a pantheist. It is important to see, however briefly, how Teilhard avoids pantheism. Apart from his own disavowal of a pantheistic stance, he seems to rise up from the quagmire of pantheism in at least two other ways.[39]

In the first place, pantheism is expunged in his synthesis of disparate elements into a whole. It is usually at this juncture, when a thinker becomes aware of the unity of the whole of the cosmos, that he is tempted to include all of this unity under the notion of "god." Hegel can be convicted of this fault. The reason is that the contradictories, the Absolute and the world of Nature, are synthesized in a unity only by the self-alienation of the Absolute itself into Nature. In other words, distinctions are obliterated in the final whole. Nevertheless, for Teilhard, who also began with the insight of the tremendous unity of the cosmic whole, the unity is achieved without such an obliteration. Although at the core of evolution, God is also distinct from this process. He is not the process itself but its energy, its milieu, its driving, creative force. This is the brunt of the distinction, the reason for extrapolation, to discover within the process, but different from it, its inner dynamism.

Closely related to the inner dynamism or energy is the culmination of the process. The culmination, too, is not the process of evolution but its end. The omega point, then, furnishes us with the second way in which Teilhard avoids pantheism. For he identifies the omega point with God. God is not the process but its *terminus*. He is the transcendent omega point which is actively engaged in drawing the entire process to the unity which is himself. And it should not be

[39] Cf. *The Future of Man*, pp. 260-70; *The Phenomenon of Man*, p. 261-69.

feared that the " utopia " such a culmination represents would obliterate all distinctions. All men and creation, in Teilhard's view, will not be conglommerated in a sticky mass of unity; rather, in consistent accord with Teilhard's notion of the unity which maintains differentiations, the leap to the omega point will be a transformation to an even higher level of differences. The law of complexity / consciousness continues to operate. The unity of consciousness at the omega point will also be accompanied by the highest degree of complexity, of differentiation of roles and attitudes.

What Teilhard has done, then, is to introduce teleology into the process of evolution, a concept of end which has been missing for some ages in cosmic philosophy. His God is the dynamism of the process and its term, without being totally identified with the process itself.

This latter point can better be illustrated by projecting Teilhard's synthesis against the screen of two other process-philosophies, those of Dewey and Whitehead respectively.

Only in Dewey do we find a consistently processional philosophy. All things are in process, man, the world, thinking, technology. Nature with a capital " N " summarizes the entire whole-in-development and is Dewey's basic philosophical principle. In fact, he uses this principle to critize all other previous thinking (e. g., in *Experience and Nature*). Were Dewey to consider himself in any way a theist, and this is doubtful, he would have to espouse an open pantheism. For there is found no principle outside of or apart from the process which is Nature.

Whitehead wished to accomplish something similar to Dewey on a more traditionally metaphysical plane, that is, in the context of a rationalistic system of philosophy. He wished to account for the creativity of the universe in process without seeking a principle apart from the process itself. There is no beginning nor end to the process, unless we would consider the notion of the " superjective " nature of " god " as an end. The latter is hardly to be taken in a teleological sense, however, for it simply accounts for the relative stability of patterns of

actual entities as complexes which endure for some length of time. Yet these patterns too are in process. Nevertheless, Whitehead's attempt to describe the creativity of process without appealing to an " external " principle breaks down in his notion of " eternal ideas." These latter are indeed found in the process as the summary of the possibles for all actualities. However, they themselves are not processionally evolving.

By comparison, Teilhard has at least two agencies " outside " of the process. Unlike Dewey and like Whitehead's " eternal ideas," the French Jesuit finds a place in the evolution of the cosmos for a permanent, non-evolving principle within that very evolution . . . and this is the " Divine Milieu," the energy. The energy within things does not evolve but is responsible for the evolution of these things. In addition, unlike either of the two thinkers mentioned above, Teilhard has a teleology, another principle " apart from " the process. This is the famous omega point. It is interesting that he identifies both principles as one and the same God, apart from the process yet within it, transcendent and immanent; in this way, panthesism is avoided.

Therefore the argument for the existence of God from immanence to transcendence may be presented in the following fashion:

(1) The world is evolving toward higher forms of complexity / consciousness. [This premise has scientific certitude, for it is based upon the record of evolution, a theory of evolution, and the law of complexity / consciousness.]

(2) But everything that rises must converge, ultimately at an omega point. [This premise is based upon the law of radial energy, several presuppositions, which are ultimately based upon a theologal vision. Consequently, it has both hypothetical certitude and a confirmation in the faith of the reader.]

(3) Therefore the world is evolving towards the omega point. [conclusion]

(4) In addition, evolution is a necessary process. [hypothetical necessity flowing from the record and evolutionary theory,

plus a theologal necessity should one be privileged to have had the same religious experience as Teilhard.]

(5) Hence the world is necessarily evolving toward the omega point, God. [conclusion having no more certainty than expressed in 1, 2, and 4.]

(6) But the omega point is a conscious force already drawing the universe in the present, as is directly observable through the within of man. [Again a premise composed of extrapolation, theory, and the faith.]

(7) So that the omega point is clearly an ontic reality.

In view of the multifarious justifications for the various steps in the argument, the very admixture we might expect of a poet, scientist, and theologian who thinks simply as one single man, what sort of persuasion does the argument have? If one were to have had the religious experience of Teilhard, then the argument is *confirmatory* of what one already has by faith. If he were not to be graced by this vision, then the argument at best would indicate a *possibility* that there might be a God. It remains to treat of a few major objections to Teilhard.

IV. Objections to Teilhard's Synthesis and Conclusion

Rambaud objects to Teilhard in this way: everything must fit the system. Life seems more important than individual lives; progress more important than truth. And most uncongenially, Christ also seems subsumed in the system. We are not presented with a loving Christ but with a sort of impersonal goal and source of evolution.[40] Fr. Raymond Nogar brings to bear another objection. Teilhard's system leaves no room for what is called the absurdity of faith, for the unexpected, for the chancy. Caught up in a vision of order, he clearly forgot the tentative hesitating steps of man's progress both in the world and in faith. And how in this vision can he account for

[40] Henri Rambaud, *Tradition française* (1964). Another critique of Rambaud is to be found in de Lubac, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-7.

the ugliness of war, social injustice, and the lack of personal freedom we feel in this " scientific " and " technological " age? [41]

These are truly difficulties. They can only be resolved in part and, in many cases, are precise critiques of Teilhard's failings. We might point out, as we have before, that Teilhard's is a unity which still preserves the individuals in the whole. There is some room, advanced by Teilhard himself, for a true personalistic humanism in the faith. One fulfills oneself by becoming Christocentric. Then, too, Rambaud seems to have misunderstood the primal place of Christ in Teilhard's view. He is the beginning, middle, and end. Christ is the resolution of our doubts about God and about the world. He is not subjected to the " system " but is its source, its life, its energy, and its goal. It is hard to imagine anything more scriptural and Christian than this view. Nogar's objection is more telling. Nevertheless, he himself seems to have ignored the order in the universe by which the absurd is measured. And again there is a definite opening for a development of absurdity in Teilhard, which he cerftainly did neglect, in the one pole of Christian resignation discussed in the *Divine Milieu.* Moreover the omnipresence of christification means that there is an omnipresence of suffering like Christ in the world as well.

The principal suggestion we might make towards a resolution of difficulties with Teilhard is this: we have deliberately avoided the word " system " as descriptive of Teilhard's thought. And this is the very way that Rambaud and Nogar view him. He is not, decidedly not, just another metaphysical systematizer. We have chosen the term " synthesis " instead. Whitehead gave the best definition of a system we have: " a coherent, logical, necessary [structure] of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted." [42] Teilhard's vision is coherent and somewhat logical but it is not a necessary structure, as we have taken pains to show. In addition, the synthesis is open-ended, capable of constant progres-

[41] Nogar, *The Lord of the Absurd,* pp. 111-126.

[42] Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 4.

sion and novelty. As such, elements or ideas of the synthesis are capable of being either changed or rejected without a necessary rejection of the whole of his thought. However, once the theologal vision is attained, the whole does become a system to this extent—there is a necessity in faith, and all elements of experience are interpreted in terms of this faith-vision. Nevertheless, even in this case, the "system" could not be seen as an absolute closed vision of reality. For faith is about the unknown, the mysterious; it is constantly developing, and, in the light of the expression of Fr. Nogar, faith is often absurd.

St. Paul has been cited twice to show the affinity of Teilhard's thought with his. In conclusion we quote the passage which best expresses the sweep of the French Jesuit's christocentric thought: "Everything is yours! . . . the world, life, death, the present or the future; they all belong to you! For you belong to Christ, and Christ belongs to God!" [43]

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[43] I Cor. 3 :21 ff.

THE *SUMMA* IN SYMBOLS : A REPLY

IN A RECENT issue of *The Thomist,* Fr. Dennis C. Kane undertakes to show that the problem presented by the opposition between the proponents of the Traditional and those of the Mathematical schools of logic are not insoluble.[1] So much has been written to demonstrate the basic unity of formal logic, by whatever method presented, that it is disappointing to discover that such opposition still goes on.[2] The discovery is the more disappointing to me in that I also have made some efforts in the interest of irenicism.[3]

Several points in Fr. Kane's paper seem to me to be not altogether satisfactory, but in view of my complete agreement with his thesis it would be ungracious of me to pick flaws in his manner of developing it. Some passages, however, appear to be so misleading as to impede rather than to advance the cause of ecumenism. These occur in the treatment of two articles of the *Summa Theologiae,* which he employs to illustrate the application of the methods of Mathematical Logic to the interpretation of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. About these passages I wish to make four observations.

I. My first observation is that, whatever is the correct answer to the question whether Aristotle's syllogisms are implications or inferences,[4] Aquinas's arguments are certainly inferences. For he states not only that the premises imply the conclusions but also quite definitely that the premises are true and that

[1] " Ecumenism in Logic," *The Thomist* 31 (1967), pp. 321-359.

[2] E. Moody, *Truth or Consequence in Medieval Logic* (Amsterdam, 1956); P. Boehner, *Medieval Logic* (Chicago, 1952); I. Bochenski, " On the Categorical Syllogism," (Dordrecht; Holland, 1962); Manley Thompson, " On Aristotle's Square of Opposition," *Philosophical Review* 62 (1953), pp. 251-265.

[3] J. Doyle, " John of St. Thomas and Mathematical Logic," *New Scholasticism* 27 (1953), pp. 3-38; " The Square of Opposition in Action," *New Scholasticism* 35 (1961), pp. 41-75.

[4] D. Kane, *op. cit.,* p. 324, n. 8.

in consequence the conclusions are true too. Fr. Kane presents the arguments in the form: $p \supset q$; Aquinas would state them in categorical form as: $p \therefore q$.[5]

II. Secondly, in the analysis of each article the antecedent of the conditional proposition contains superfluous material, having no bearing on the truth of the consequent and thus contributing nothing to the force of the argument. In one example, the first member of the tripartite antecedent is redundant, for the conjunction of the second and third entails the consequent, neither needing nor getting added strength from the first member. Fr. Kane presents the argument in this manner:

$$[(p \supset q) . (r \supset s) . r] \supset s$$ [6]

It is equally valid in this form:

$$[(r \supset s) . r] \supset s$$

In the other example, the second member of the conjunctive antecedent is excess baggage, since the first member entails the consequent. It is stated thus:

$$[(p \supset q) . (q \supset r) . [(\text{—}r \supset (s . t)]] \supset (p \supset q)$$ [7]

The argument would be complete in this form:

$$[(p \supset q) . (q \supset r)] \supset (p \supset r)$$

St. Thomas does not clutter up his arguments with verbose irrelevancies; his style is notably succinct and parsimonious, often not stating propositions that can be gathered from the context but allowing the reader to supply them for himself. He does indeed interject explanatory or supplementary re-

[5] John of St. Thomas distinguishes these two kinds of arguments as *argumentatio rationalis* and *argumentatio conditionalis*. The truth of the latter requires only that there be a *bona consequentia*; for the former to be true it is also necessary *quod antecedens et consequens sint vera*. *Cursus Philosophicus I Ars Logica* (Turin, 1932) P. I, bk. II, ch. 5, p. 23.

[6] D. Kane, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 356.

marks, but these are clearly distinguishable from the main line of his demonstrations. I am sure that he would not construct an argument like either of those here shown.

III. Thirdly, in the former of these examples, the conclusion presented is not the proposition Aquinas is proving. The question he answers in this article is simply this: "Is there a will in God?" Moreover, all three objections try only to show that God has not a will; and the "On the contrary" merely quotes the admonition of the Epistle to the Romans that we should seek "to discern the will of God." [8] Nowhere is there even a remote allusion to the identity of will and essence in God; nor does any part of the proof have a bearing on this point. The conclusion, which alone follows from the premises, is only this: "There is a will in God." Nothing in the premises justifies the affirmation that God's will is his essence. To be sure, the final sentence of the article is: "And as his intellect is his existence, so is his will." But this sentence seems to be one of those supplementary remarks to which I have referred, a sort of corollary. It certainly refers to an earlier Question in the *Summa*, wherein St. Thomas proves that God's act of understanding must be his essence and his existence.[9] Here, with his characteristic economy, he refrains from repeating the demonstration, suggesting that the interested student can make his own proof by substituting "will" for every occurrence of "intellect" in that other article.

The basic argument in the present article is whole and entire in the first sentence. It is a categorical syllogism, which can be reworded without any distortion of its meaning in the mood *Barbara*:

> Every being having an intellect has a will.
> God has an intellect.
> Therefore, God has a will.

Since the minor premise has been proved in the earlier Question,[10] Aquinas does not bother with it but devotes the

[8] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 1. [9] *Ibid.*, q. 14, a. 4. [10] *Ibid.*, a. 2.

remainder of this article, except for some explanatory remarks, to the proof of the major. The argument seems to be far more elaborate than anyone examining Fr. Kane's truth table would suspect. The propositions making it up I take to be these:

p . . Everything has this aptitude towards its natural form that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it rests therein.
q . . Everything has a like aptitude towards its natural perfections.
r . . A natural perfection of a being having an intellect is actually understanding through an intelligible form.
s . . A being having an intellect has an aptitude towards the good as apprehended through an intelligible form so as to rest therein when possessed and when not possessed to seek to possess it.
t . . Every being having an aptitude to seek a good apprehended when not possessed and to rest in it when possessed has a will.
u . . Every being having an intellect has a will.
v . . God has an intellect.
w . . God has a will.

The argument proceeds in this manner:

1. p	5. $(q \,.\, r) \supset s$	9. $\therefore u$
2. $p \supset q$	6. $\therefore s$	10. v
3. $\therefore q$	7. t	11. $(u \,.\, v) \supset w$
4. r	8. $(s \,.\, t) \supset u$	12. $\therefore w$

In addition to the final sentence, two others seem to be explanatory and parenthetical. These are:

This aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called natural appetite.

In every sensitive being there is animal appetite.

Certainly these add nothing to the force of the argument, for only by analogy does the existence of natural or sensitive appetite intimate that there is also an intellectual appetite,

and St. Thomas does not resort to arguments so weak as that. The premise necessary for the proof is that *everything* has some kind of appetite for its natural perfections; this premise is stated elliptically as a special case of the principle that everything has an inclination toward its natural form. That the other two kinds of appetite exist follows from the same principle; St. Thomas's mention of them seems to stem from his penchant for making his enumerations complete.

Proposition *r* I take to be the meaning of the sentence: " As natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form." This interpretation is borne out by a statement in the Question referred to before: " The act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding." [11]

The argument contains eight propositions and would require a truth table of 256 rows to show its validity; such a method of validation is, of course, out of the question. All the proofs, however, are by *modus ponens* and so are acceptable to all. One of them may not be intended as a proof at all: perhaps, instead of the application of a general rule to a special case, Aquinas considers propositions *p* and *q* to be equally self-evident and states the former merely to clarify the latter.

IV. My fourth observation concerns the second truth table,[12] intended to illustrate the proof that the Son of God assumed a true body.[13] Here the oversimplification is more strongly marked than in the former case. For here, though St. Thomas clearly and emphatically states that his argument is threefold and presents three independent proofs, Fr. Kane presents it as a single proof with all the premises coordinated along one line of reasoning. Furthermore, the implicative character of the presentation is even more pronounced than in the former case; for here even the consequent is itself not a categorical proposition but a mere conditional. Since the argument is threefold, its analysis must present three separate proofs.

[11] *Ibid.*, a. 4: " *Nam intelligere est perfectio et actus intelligentis.*"
[12] D. Kane, *op. cit.*, p. 356.
[13] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 5, a. 1.

A.

The first proof is again a syllogism in *Barbara*. These are the propositions:

p . . Whoever assumes human nature assumes a true body.
q . . The Son of God assumed human nature.
r . . The Son of God assumed a true body.

The proof is:

1. p 2. q 3. $(p \,.\, q) \supset r$ 4. $\therefore r$

B.

The second proof is more complex. It really comprises two proofs, but since one is merely an abbreviation of the other, they are presented as one. The propositions entering into these proofs are:

p . . The Son of God assumed a true body.
q . . The Son of God underwent a real death and did the deeds the Gospels narrate.
r . . The real salvation of man has taken place.
s . . Every effect is proportionate to its cause.
t . . A fictitious death is proportionate to the real salvation of man.

The proofs are as follows:

(a) 1. $-p \supset -q$
2. q
3. $\therefore p$

(b) 1. $-p \supset -q$
2. $-q \supset [r \supset (s \supset t)]$
3. s
4. $-t$
5. $\therefore s \,.\, -t$
6. $\therefore -(s \supset t)$
7. r
8. $\therefore -[r \supset (s \supset t)]$
9. $\therefore q$
10. $\therefore p$

C.

The third proof has these propositions:

p . . The Son of God assumed a real body.
q . . The Son of God does some fictitious things.
r . . The Son of God is the Truth.

The proof then is as follows:

1. $\text{—}p \supset q$ 2. $q \supset \text{—}r$ 3. $\therefore \text{—}p \supset \text{—}r$ 4. r 5. $\therefore p$

In several places I supply propositions that St. Thomas takes for granted without putting them in words; these are all so evident, however, that it seems unnecessary to mark them. The order in which I have presented the arguments is in some instances arbitrary, for it is impossible to know in just what sequence St. Thomas orders the propositions; in particular, proposition B. (b) 2. could be replaced by any one of a large number of other propositions, each of them leading with equal validity to the same conclusion. There is in these two articles a notable variety of arguments: categorical syllogisms; *modus ponens; modus tollens;* the contradiction of a conditional by a conjunctive affirming the antecedent and denying the consequent. I should venture to say that a study of a representative sample of articles of the *Summa* would turn up a considerable number of the axioms, postulates, rules, and theorems contained in a treatise on Mathematical Logic, and would find no form of argument not contained therein.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Toward a Christian Ethic. A Renewal in Moral Theology. By WILLIAM H. M. VAN DER MARCK, O.P. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967. Pp. 176. $3.95.

Das Peccatum Mortale ex toto genere suo. Entstehung und Interpretation des Begriffes. (Studien zur Geschichte der kath. Moraltheologie 14). By ANTON MEINRAD MEIER. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1966. Pp. 405. DM 45.

This little book of Fr. van der Marck contains so many theological novelties that it must be regarded as an attempt to renovate not only moral theology but theology *tout court*—dogmatic, moral and fundamental —together with revolutionizing the philosophical basis of all sound theological thinking as well. And all this he proposes doing in the name of St. Thomas (see p. 6). The author is well aware that he is attempting something daring and revolutionary and it is quite obvious that he is not altogether at ease in his undertaking, as witness the frequently recurring restrictive " as I see it," " as it seems to me," " I have the impression," etc. He is fully conscious that others may very well not see things as he sees them and, as is no more than right, he makes full allowance for that eventuality. Many of his contentions and assertions, in fact very many of them, appear at first sight so extraordinary and far-fetched as to be both theologically and philosophically inacceptable. But then there are so many such contentions and assertions concerning Church teaching and St. Thomas's mind that one is constrained willynilly to come to the conclusion that he is using language in a novel and personal way. That, I suppose, he has a perfect right to do. It is, however, a great pity that he does not make perfectly clear in what precise sense he is using language. Had he but done that, the dialogue between him and his readers would be, it is hoped, very much more profitable. The following examples, taken more or less at random, will show what I mean. We are told that nature is grace (p. 14); God did not become man by being born of the Virgin Mary in Bethlehem, for the Incarnation is seen to be a salvational event from the very foundation of the world and in that way the jarring dualism of the divine and human natures in Christ is successfully overcome (p. 16); man's body is his soul (p. 24); end is the same thing as means and means as end (p. 24); person is community (p. 27); divine and infused virtue is human and acquired virtue (p. 84); will is intellect, intellect is will (p. 160-161). On the face of it, these are all strange and novel sayings. Had the

author only told us clearly what he understands by the verb " to be " and the copula " is," all would have been well. Then we could perhaps have entered into dialogue with him. For that, indeed, the question of linguistics or semantics is obviously of prime importance. It is not my intention to go into these matters. I merely wish to record them for their intrinsic interest and on account of their direct or indirect bearing on the matter formally in hand, namely, the renewal of moral theology, which is the main concern of the author.

As to renewal *of* or *in* moral theology, which is van der Marck's prime concern, the author's theory may quite legitimately be reduced to two fundamental positions: a new conception of moral science as such in general and a completely new understanding of the Christian or theological ethic in particular. Everything the author has to say in his book must be understood in the light of his new and very personal approach to these two fundamental questions. With regard to moral science as such the renewal proposed and demanded by him may be put very briefly in this way. Moral science must no longer be regarded as normative, at least not in any generally accepted sense of that term; it is merely descriptive of what people do in this or that particular community, in this or that age. He writes: " neither the concrete ethic nor the fundamental ethic is normative, unless and insofar as they are taken precisely to be the formulation and expression of the ethos proper to the community. . . . Not ethics, but ethos and thus the community itself establish norms." (p. 4) In other words, to put the matter succinctly and clearly, the norm of moral activity is what people do in fact. It is the business of the reflexive or scientific ethic to keep step with, to describe and explain carefully the actual behavior of the community; it is not its business to direct that behavior. And for that reason the reflexive or scientific ethic is " always some steps behind the factual situation." (p. 5) The fundamental principle—the only one that would appear to be universally valid—of this renewed moral science might be put in this way: *everyone (or the majority) does it; therefore it is the right thing to do.* The author realizes that such a principle may well cause difficulty in the domain of theology and for that reason he hastens to insist: " the theological tradition itself *is* normative, but it is normative precisely, primarily, and formally as a theological tradition and not as an ethical one." (p. 146)

And that brings me to the author's new and very personal understanding of the Christian or theological ethic. *For him there is no such thing as a revealed morality.* God did not speak to men in order to tell them how to live and fashion their lives but only to tell them what to believe. The teaching and example of Christ have no bearing on the way men, followers of Christ and children of God by grace, fashion their lives. Man is called to live independently of all that, to shape his life and living autonomously.

" Scripture," proclaims the author, " does not give us an ethic, but only the certainty that the human ethos itself signifies salvation or the lack of it." (p. 19-20) Or more insistently still: " What scripture and revelation brings us is not primarily an ethic. They do make it clear to us, however, that ethos and ethics are man's concern, just as man's autonomy is man's own concern, and that an autonomous, human ethic is part of the task entrusted to us in the context of God's plan of salvation." (p. 28) " Thus we speak of a Christian ethic," he elaborates, " not in order to indicate a conviction that there might be a non-Christian ethic as well, but simply in order to say that the human ethic is, in fact, Christian." (p. 15) From that it necessarily follows that the Church may never set itself up as the custodian of faith and morals; it has to do with matters of faith alone. What is good or bad, right or wrong, is determined by the ethos of the community, by what the community (all, or the majority) does and practices here and now, whether it be a question of practices of mortification, fasting and abstaining, or lying, or abortion, or birth control, or whatever else. Nothing, in fact, maintains the author, is intrinsically good or evil, right or wrong; all that depends on the actual behavior of the community and ultimately on what he calls intersubjectivity. (cf. pp. 55, 69 ff.)

That is the substance of van der Marck's renewal in moral theology. It should be scarcely necessary to point out that traditionally moral science has never been considered as a mere phenomenologically descriptive science of what people actually do but rather a normative science of what people should do (whether they do it nor not is beside the point!) and, if it be a question of moral *theology,* of how men should live in the light of the moral message of the gospels as children of God and brothers of Christ Jesus. One has only to read the New Testament with one's eyes open to realize that it contains a moral message. It is difficult to know which is more pernicious, to deny, as van der Marck does, that the New Testament contains a moral message at all, or admitting it, to proclaim that it is impossible to live, as other would-be moral theologians would have it.

In recent years much has been done towards the renewal of moral theology. Many serious works have appeared on the subject and very much progress has in fact been made in the serious business of revitalizing the science of Christian morals and that, above all, by a return to the sources. Van der Marck unfortunately seems to be unaware of all this effort. The ruminations he presents in this present volume would appear to be a beginning *ab ovo.* His work must unfortunately be judged as a most inadequate presentation of Church teaching and as a complete missing of the point in the matter of St. Thomas's mind on the matter. His work can in no way be regarded as a *serious* contribution to this very serious discussion on the renewing of Moral Theology.

A more successful contribution to the goal of renewing moral theology is that of Anton Meier. As a very important element in the serious business

of revitalizing the Church and bringing it up-to-date (aggiornamento) to meet the needs of modern man and play its part as the salt of the earth in the world of today, the Second Vatican Council in its decree on the formation of priests (*Optatam totius Ecclesiae renovationem*) has pointed out and insisted upon the urgent necessity of rejuvenating and revitalizing theology and the whole organization of theological studies. Sacred Scripture is declared to be the very soul of all theology (*loc. cit.*, n° 16 § 2), and this is seen to apply in a special way to moral theology (*ibid.* § 4). However, the Council has been very careful to point out that all this work of renewing theology in general and moral theology in particular must be done " in the light of faith " and " under the guidance of the teaching authority of the Church " (*ibid.* § 1). And precisely this point would seem to be of the utmost importance. For if it be forgotten or neglected, then the return to the sources,—the *ressourcement* of theology, as the French have it,—has shown itself over and over again to be a not unmixed blessing. Thus it is that some advocates of a rejuvenation of moral theology tell us that the Bible does not offer us an ethic, nor does it proclaim a specifically Christian way of life and living. They go so far as to insist that the criterion of good and bad, of right and wrong, is not what Christ practised and taught but common opinion and practice. How that fits in with the Pauline paraenesis is very difficult to see, to mention just one very obvious moral section of the New Testament. St. Paul insists, for instance: " Do not model yourselves on the behavior of the world around you, but let your behavior change, modelled by your new mind " (Rom. 12: 2).

Others, on the other hand, tell us that there *is* an ethical teaching of Jesus, but that right now it is impossible to live. Common sense and experience, they will insist, tell us that man cannot accept the ethical teachings of Jesus as laws of conduct which are always obliging in similar circumstances. St. Paul, again, fully conscious of the difficulty inherent in the Cross and in the putting on of Christ proclaims, for all that, that with the grace of God everything is possible (cf. I Cor. 15 :10; Phil. 4 :13). What would seem to be lacking in all such attempts to renew moral theology is another element upon which the Council insists, namely, the scientific and speculative exposition of *revealed* morality, of the " *donné révélé moral.*" And here precisely lies the great interest of Meier's work on the origin and meaning of the notion: *peccatum mortale ex toto genere suo.* His prime concern is with the revealed reality and mystery of sin (p. 34).

That moral theology as presented in the manuals of the last hundred years, let us say, was in need of reform and renewal no one will deny. Whereas the scathing criticisms directed by the French physiologist and politician, Paul Pert (*La Morale des Jésuites,* Paris, 1880), against Catholic moral theology may well be regarded as grossly exaggerated, it must, however, be admitted that there were grounds, indeed very serious grounds, for dissatisfaction. In fact, during the past 100 years or more, since the

time of J. M. Sailer (1751-1832), valiant efforts have been made to present Christian moral teaching in a new way, with emphasis on the biblical foundation of it all and on its essentially christocentric character, together with insistence on growth in innerliness and Christlikeness and a breakaway from the exaggerated preoccupation with the negative aspect of human and Christian life, with sin. This preoccupation with sin, a preoccupation that amounted almost to a fascination, brought it about that moral theology gradually came to be regarded as a kind of theological discipline the object of which is to show how far one may go without committing serious or mortal sin. In passing let it be said that a contributory cause of this state of affairs was the setting up of ascetical and mystical theology as a discipline or science distinct from that of moral theology. Were one to attempt to pinpoint the root cause of all this dissatisfaction with the moral theology as taught in study houses and seminaries through the medium of the moral manuals, then one might justifiably maintain that it is to be found in the teaching on the *peccatum mortale ex toto genere suo* and on the term and concept of *parvity of matter* so closely linked with the other. In the manuals (Prümmer, Merkelback, Noldin, etc.) we are told that a sin is called mortal *ex toto genere suo* when its object or matter admits of no degrees as, for instance, blasphemy, idolatry, murder, and all sins against the sixth and ninth commandments. In this connection there is also to be found in the manuals a tendency to determine with almost mathematical precision when a disordered human act becomes exclusive of the kingdom of heaven, in other words, become mortal! This approach to the Christian life has been undoubtedly the main source of much mental anguish and scrupulosity and has given rise, to a very great extent, to what modern psychologists have come to call " ecclesiogenous neurosis." Now Meier set himself the task of tracing, in the long history of theology, the origin of these two cognate terms (parvity of matter, and mortal sinfulness *ex toto genere suo*) and of identifying the various meanings attributed to them in the course of centuries.

Meier in the course of his meticulous investigation has some extremely interesting things to tell us. The term *parvitas materiae* (or *obiecti*) made its appearance in moral science at a very early date; the expression *ex toto genere suo* is not met with until modern times, not until the 18th century in fact. The investigation begins with Gilbert Porreta (1080-1154), whose followers were the first to use the technical term *peccatum genere mortale—peccatum genere veniale,* and finishes with the work of the Cologne Jesuit, Claudius Lacroix (1652-1714), with an indication of the continuation or reassumption of Lacroix's work by his confrère Peter Scavini (1790-1869) about a hundred years later. That is, it covers a span of just 600 years and in its thoroughness has recourse not only to printed works but also to unpublished manuscript material.

The term *parvitas materiae* has its remote origin in the Aristotelian doctrine of the ὀρθὸς λόγος and μεσότης, of right reason and the virtuous mean, which does not consist in a mathematical point but may be attained and realized with *more or less* exactitude, in a *greater or lesser* degree of perfection. The term itself is found for the first time, it would appear, in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. He uses it, however, principally in the domain of the virtue of justice; there the *medium rationis* is precisely the *medium rei* (cf. p. 388). That is by and large true; but, I think it should be pointed out, too, that St. Thomas does apply it also to the vice or the sin of envy (cf. *de Malo,* q. 10, a. 2 in fine corp.), which is in the domain not of justice but of charity. And that, it seems, is of vital importance. The term and concept were of very secondary importance for St. Thomas, and continued to be so right up to the 16th century. The all-important thing for him was the greater or lesser disorder caused in the order of charity (the *subiectio hominis ad Deum* and the *foedus humanae societatis* [see *II Sent.,* d. 42, q. 1, a. 4; also *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 88, a. 2; *de Malo,* q. 7, a. 1; q. 10, a. 2]), together with the intensity and depth of personal involvement. I think Meier's penetrating exposé would have gained much in clarity and precision had he gone to the trouble of explaining in a special section the very important notion of a moral object. St. Thomas, then, was ever conscious of the immense complexity of human action and ever avoided the pitfall of over-simplification. For that reason, I cannot altogether agree with Meier when he maintains that St. Thomas understands the term exclusively of the material object of an act of justice (*nur sachbezogen,* p. 350) and proceeds to see in that a discrepancy between the mind of Aquinas and that of Cajetan (p. 353-354). St. Thomas always sees human activity *in its totality,* in its objective or essential determinedness and in its subjective, intersubjective and existential relatedness. Meier very rightly sees in that the special genius of Aquinas (p. 391). From the 16th century on there appears a complete shifting of emphasis that utlimately leads to the heated discussions caused by the teaching of Sanchez that *delectatio venerea* admits of levity of matter (p. 360-361). St. Thomas's comprehensiveness of view was gradually and definitively lost sight of and all human activity was reduced to legal and lifeless categories. It is in this theological climate that the *peccatum mortale ex toto genere suo* first makes its appearance in the *Theologia moralis* (Cologne, 1707-1714) of Claudius Lacroix. The expression is the crowning product of a depersonalized and devitalized moral theology. It was not immediately accepted by moral theologians, as its absence from the works of Billuart and Alphonsus de Liguori witnesses. However, it was taken up again over a century later by Scavini in his *Theologia moralis universa ad mentem S. Alphonsi de Ligorio* (Novara, 1847) and put forward as an Alphonsian category! Thence in passed into the manuals of today.

It is impossible to do justice to Meier's work in a short review. It is a piece of historico-speculative research competently and even brilliantly done. Strange as it may seem for such a technical and scientific work, it pulsates with life and must certainly be regarded as one of the major contributions towards an authentic renewal in moral theology produced in recent times. Meier is convinced that no true advance and no true renewal can be realized in the field of theology unless it be built upon tradition. Through study and pastoral experience he is fully aware of the modern *Problematik* and of the pressing need for new answers to new problems and questions. And with that in view he sets about attempting to point up the authentic theological tradition in one single, but very important, corner of the immense field of Christian moral theology. His historical investigation is fully documented, meticulous and, according to the demands of the problems under examination, complete. His speculative and scientific presentation and understanding of an extremely complex and delicate problem —the mystery, namely, of sin—is subtle, profound and satisfying.

Meier is careful to point out that right along the line of the authentic tradition in Christian moral theology sin was always and ever understood in the context of the history of salvation, of the *Heilsgeschichte*; it was always understood with reference not so much to a law of some kind or other but to a person, to the person of God and of Christ the Savior, and then and only then in reference to a law, when that law is understood as the law of charity which implies, of necessity, the *subiectio et reverentia hominis ad Deum* and the *convictus societatis humanae* (cf. *de Malo*, q. 7, a. 1, in fine). In that sense moral theology, and in a special way its approach to sin in the life of Christ's followers, may be considered not only theocentric and christocentric but also nomocentric.—The only important critical remark with regard to Meier's work as a whole has been made above, namely, with reference to the absence of any special treatment of the meaning of *moral object*. The notion, technical as it may appear, is of the utmost importance in both the sphere of speculative and scientific investigation and in that of practical life. Meier does touch on the question frequently in passing. But in the end one is left wondering what a " moral object " really is. As the present reviewer sees things, it is only through a very precise notion of what a moral object is that one can attain to an understanding of the full meaning of parvity of matter with all its implications. That St. Thomas's concept of the object (and end) of vice or virtue, of sin or merit or of the whole moral life as such, was not exclusively matter-centered or object-centered (as Meier would seem to imply on p. 350) is clearly shown by this word of Thomas: " bonum illud ad quod virtus ordinatur non est accipiendum quasi aliquod obiectum alicuius actus; sed illud bonum est ipse actus perfectus, quem virtus elicit " (*de Verit.*, q. 14, a. 3, ad 3: this text is to be found verbatim in

the commentary of St. Thomas's favourite student, the later Cardinal Annibaldo degli Annibaldeschi, on the third book of Lombard's sentences, dist. 23, art. 2 ad 2, a work that was often attributed to St. Thomas himself and is found is the complete edition of his works by Vivès, t. 30, p. 539b). For St. Thomas the whole of moral theology, and the whole of moral life *a fortiori,* is at one and same time both object and subject centered. That is why he insists so strongly on the fact that human actions are specified by the end (cf. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 1, a. 3; q. 18, aa. 4 & 6) and receive their moral structural specification, their *ratio boni et mali,* not from the matter or object alone of the act, but also from the subjective disposition of the moral agent, *ex aliqua dispositione agentis* (*ibid.,* I-II, q. 88, a. 2 in fine corp.). That is why, too, one may be allowed to think that St. Thomas would have answered Lacroix and the rest: there can be no such thing as a *peccatum mortale ex* TOTO *genere suo!* On one other point—and it is not unconnected with what has just ben said—one ventures to express a certain disagreement with Meier: St. Thomas's teaching on the *parvitas materiae,* as far as it goes, is seen to be an application, on the theological level and in the context of the life of those striving to attain to the full stature of the grace of Christ, of Aristotle's teaching on the virtuous mean: as "the man of practical wisdom would determine it" (Aristotle, *Eth. Nich.,* ch. 6, 1107 a 1), that is, as the man enlightened by attachment to Christ in a faith shot through with love for and devotedness to the person and example of the Savior would determine it.

Meier's book is so important that one dares to hope that the translator and publisher will be found to bring out an English version of it.

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The Pilgrim Church. By GEORGE TAVARD. New York: Herder & Herder, 1967. Pp. 176. $4.95.

Today in the American Catholic Church we are witnessing a widening gap between a relatively small but sophisticated group of people who are already moving well beyond the newer insights of Vatican II and the vast majority of Catholics who lag behind and whose ideas about the Church have undergone little change since the Council. What is needed, at least in part, is a greater abundance of solid, yet popularized theological literature. Many a Catholic, layman or priest, is lost between the superficialities of *Time* magazine on the one hand and the obscurities of Rahner and Schillebeeckx on the other. George Tavard's new book, "The Pilgrim

Church," is admirably suited to this large section of the Catholic population that has yet to assimilate fully the teaching of the Council. What we have here, then, is not another theological specialist writing for his fellow-specialists but a knowledgeable theologian who succeeds in elaborating the main themes of the Council Constitution on the Church in a simple, yet not over-simplified language.

" The Pilgrim Church " is, in the main, a collection of lectures given by Tavard on various occasions since the Council on the principal themes of the Vatican II document on the Church. When he does touch on other declarations of the Council, it is only insofar as they relate to the central topics of the Constitution on the Church. Tavard's book is not, however, a chapter by chapter commentary on the Council document. Thus, while he has separate chapters on chapters I (the Mystery of the Church), II (the People of God), III (the Hierarchy) and VI (Religious), he combines his treatment of chapters V (the Universal Call to Holiness) and VII (the Eschatological Nature of the Pilgrim Church) of the Constitution in one chapter. Tavard has no separate consideration of the chapters on the Blessed Virgin Mary and the Laity, although the latter theme is necessarily included when he speaks of the people of God in general.

The professional theologian will perhaps be most interested in his opening chapter where he writes of the theological setting of Vatican II. The author gives a brief but balanced over-view of the theological context of the Council, particularly the post-war period leading up to the opening of the Council. It is Tavard's judgment that the theologians who usually got the major share of publicity during the Council were not " the true pioneers without whose prophetic work the Council could not have taken place." (35) On the whole this reviewer agrees, but it is difficult to understand how Tavard can exclude Rahner from the ranks of the true pioneers of the Council.

Throughout these essays Tavard is at pains to emphasize the continuities between the teaching of Vatican II and past Church teaching. Any Catholic whose theological knowledge has remained on the level of superficial slogans will be surprised to read: " I would tend to rehabilitate the Counter-Reformation as a providential link between the great theology of the Middle Ages and that which may characterize, let us hope, the dawning 21st century." (36) Tavard himself has already begun this rehabilitation process in the area of scripture and tradition in his worthwhile " Holy Writ or Holy Church." At this point, however, it is good to keep in mind the distinction between the Counter-Reformation and the post-Tridentine period. Oftentimes the latter period did little more than parrot the answers of the previous age.

Tavard's stress on continuities is evident at many other points. Thus " the common priesthood has ever been an essential point of Catholic

teaching." (75) He also sees nothing new in the Council's statements on the collegiality of the bishops, "except, to some extent, the word." (95) Tavard certainly has historical evidence on his side. Such doctrines as the universal priesthood and the collegiality of the bishops have been propounded in some way down through Christian history. However, we must be less sanguine when we refer to popular preaching, especially in the period between Vatican I and II. The average layman was completely unaware of his share in the priesthood of Christ. Indeed, the Council debates showed that many bishops had a very poor realization of their own collegiality. Now the primary exercise of the Church's teaching office is in and through the liturgy. Therefore we can find small consolation that such doctrines were taught in some past age or on some higher level when they were neglected in ordinary preaching.

The only place in the book where Tavard develops his own thought beyond the Council documents in a significant way is in his chapter on religious. He finds the specific characteristic of religious life in community rather than in the three traditional counsels.

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A New Catechism: Catholic Faith for Adults. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. 510. $6.00.

This generally excellent translation presents to English-speaking peoples the effort of many Dutch Catholics—bishops and theologians, priests and lay folk—to express Catholic doctrine in contemporaneously meaningful terminology and in a style judged suited to present Western culture. The prevailing "mood" of this book is existentialism and Teilhardism ecumenically oriented. Consequently, it will appeal very strongly to a rather well-defined segment of Western society. The sustained, vigorous effort to present the faith to that segment, and to all twentieth-century men, is completely admirable.

The work qualifies as a true catechism for it is a highly systematic, even lengthy, presentation of Christian doctrine and morality. Unlike most catechisms, it is written in continuous narrative form; its approach is more historical than dogmatic; its discussion of the meaning of doctrine usually begins from human experience rather than from the implications of the terms in which God's revelation is communicated to us. But the Catechism's most striking single characteristic is its embrace and extensive use of the existentialist—Teilhardian categories and rhetoric.

By a familiar paradox this outstanding strength is closely related to the book's most remarkable vulnerability. The near-total embrace of the favored outlook and terminology (other factors may be involved) often works to hide full Catholic doctrine rather than to communicate it, to suppress rather than to express. To discuss, even to cite, all instances of this would be undesirable, perhaps impossible, in a brief review. Instead, in two areas, namely, Catholic dogma and morality, this review will suggest a few " samples " illustrative of tendencies characteristic of the work as a whole.

1. *In the field of Catholic dogma.*

a) Catholic faith holds that Christ " was born of the Virgin Mary " and that Mary is " ever-virgin." Discussing what this dogma says or means, the author writes that the evangelists Matthew and Luke " proclaim that this birth does not depend on what men can do of themselves . . . This is the deepest meaning of the article of faith ' born of the Virgin Mary ' . . . The gospels do not say that she (Mary) had other children after him (Jesus)." (pp. 75-77) Both the statement that the mystery's " deepest meaning " is mystical and the statement about the silence of the gospels are patently true. But do the two statements adequately communicate the Church's understanding of this mystery? Never denying a " deepest " mystical sense to the mystery, the entire Catholic community has always affirmed that the dogma has an obvious, physical sense also, namely, that " the Mother of God, the holy and ever-virgin Mary . . . conceived God the Word without seed . . . and without corruption brought him forth " (Council of the Lateran, a. 649, can. 3; Denz.-Schön. 503), so that " the unspotted virginity (of Mary) did not know (experience) . . . coitus " (Council of Toledo XI, *Symbolum fidei*, Denz.-Schön. 533). The Catholic tradition understands this physical meaning to be the basis of the deeper, mystical interpretations of the mystery; and this first meaning the Catechism leaves simply unmentioned.

In the question of the perpetuity of Mary's virginity is Catholic belief communicated by stating only that the gospels are silent on the point? Conceding evangelical silence, the Catholic community nevertheless asserts that Mary's perpetual virginity is divinely revealed, so that " if anyone shall not confess (that the Word of God) was incarnate of the holy . . . and ever-vigin Mary . . . " he is in heresy (II Constantinople, can. 2; Denz.-Schön. 422). Catholic liturgy expresses the same truth in the way appropriate to liturgy.

One is aware that some persons today and in the past find all this " a hard saying," but an open exposition of Catholic faith cannot successfully evade the fact that the Church has said, and does say, that Mary is ever-virgin in the realest sense.

b) Catholic faith asserts that Christ "descended into hell"—again an unwelcome affirmation, perhaps, in our culture and in many cultures. The Catechism discusses the mystery: "The expression 'descended into hell' is obviously composed of elements which are no longer part of our world of thought . . . By saying 'he descended into hell' Christians affirm that he was really dead. It means the humiliation of being dead . . . Jesus was imagined as announcing the redemption, immediately after his death, to the souls in hell." (pp. 176-177)

But the Catholic community understands this article of faith to mean more than the Catechism states. Scripture teaches that when Christ "had died . . . in the spirit he went to preach to the spirits in prison" (I Peter 3:18-19). An event is here described; an event subsequent to Christ's death, therefore distinct from it; an event in which a certain mysterious activity is ascribed to Christ in his "spirit" or soul. If this is Petrine "imagining," if no corresponding event or activity occurred, Scripture would be deceptive.

The Fourth Lateran Council defined that Christ "suffered and died, descended into hell, arose from the dead, and ascended into heaven; but he descended in his soul, arose in his body, and ascended in both." (Cap. 1; Denz.-Schön. 801). Each of the four is a distinct article, as signified by identifying (inadequately) distinct subjects for each. In particular, the descent into hell, manifested according to Scripture in his preaching "to the spirits in prison"—an activity other than the condition of being dead—is more than a restatement of the Lord's death, as well as more than the work of imagination, granted, of course, that imagination is at work in every human statement.

c) The Catechism's account of the holy Eucharist, especially of Christ's Real Presence therein, is, as an account of Catholic faith, troublesome. The dogma of transsubstantiation (defined by the Mystical Body as divinely revealed, cf. Trent, sess. XIII, can. 2; Denz.-Schön. 1652) receives a one-sentence mention after being identified as a medieval way of "expressing the mystery." Then we read: "when we consider the matter in terms of present-day thought we should say that the reality, the nature of material things is what they are . . . for man. Hence it is the nature of bread to be earthly food for man . . . at Mass, however . . . the bread is essentially withdrawn from its normal human meaning or definition and has become the bread which the Father has given us, Jesus himself." (p. 343)

To the revealed doctrine which the Catholic community expresses in terms of transsubstantiation, the Cathechism's theory of transsignification (or transfinalization) need not involve opposition. The two are not at all answers to the same question. Transsubstantiation answers the question: in the Eucharist, what existing reality underlies the sense-perceptible

appearances of bread and wine; whereas transfinalization, directly concerned only with " meanings for man " and not with reality in itself, seeks to answer the question: what meaning should man see in the Eucharist? Each question and each answer has validity in its own way.

The Catechism's presumptions that the two *are* different answers to the same question, that they are opposed as medieval and present-day answers, that the value of the dogma of transsubstantiation was restricted to the Middle Ages (one wonders at the reckoning which places the Council of Trent, which defined this dogma, in the Middle Ages) do make one pause. All are aware that in his encyclical on the Eucharist Pope Paul VI writes: " These formulas (Tridentine formulas proposing the eucharistic mystery) express concepts that are not tied to a certain specific form of human culture, or to a certain level of scientific progress, . . . Instead they set forth what the human mind grasps of reality through necessary and universal experience, and what it expresses in apt and exact words . . . these formulas are adapted to all men of all times and all places . . . it is the teaching of the First Vatican Council that ' the meaning that . . . the Church has once declared is to be retained forever and no pretext of deeper understanding ever justifies any deviation from that meaning . . .,' " so that no one may " take doctrine that has already been defined by the Church and consign it to oblivion, or else interpret it in such a way as to weaken the genuine meaning of the words or the recognized form of the concepts involved " (Ency. *Mysterium Fidei*, Sept. 3, 1965).

Catholic faith in the holy Eucharist does not describe transsubstantiation as a medieval " way of expressing the mystery," a way to be now supplanted by transsignification. The Catechism here misrepresents authentic Catholic understanding and Catholic teaching.

d) Of the Catechism's treatment of original sin many aspects, quite predictably, invite discussion. The following observations merely suggest the tenor of some of them.

" The sin which stains others was committed by . . . every man . . . It includes my sins . . . Original sin is the sin of mankind as a whole (including myself) insofar as it affects every man . . . It may be said that it only takes on concrete form in our personal sins," (p. 267) even in the ultimate sense that " no one is condemned for original sin alone," (p. 267) which implies, of course, that " there must be a way by which unbaptized infants are saved." (p. 252) Neither the views expressed nor the manner of expression lacks appeal. But how do these views relate to the Catholic faith which the Catechism sets out to present?

The inspired Scripture teaches that " by one man sin entered the world," (Rom. 5 :12) so the Catholic community holds as revealed by God that " when the first man Adam had transgressed God's commandment he immediately lost sanctity and justice . . . for himself and his offspring, and

transmitted . . . sin . . . to the entire human race" (Trent, Sess. V, can. 1, 2; Denz.-Schön. 1511, 1512).

In Catholic doctrine "original sin is contracted without consent" |Innocent III, Ep. "Majores ecclesiae causas"; Denz.-Schön. 780), so that it was the *act* of "the first man Adam" alone, and not a sin committed by "every man," (though it infects mankind). Again, in us, prior to any personal sin, or any personal act at all, this sin has "form" in the sense that it is the real deprivation of "holiness and justice"; it is a true modification of our nature, consequently, the statement that it "only takes on concrete form in our personal lives" distorts more than reports Catholic thinking. And the outlook that "no one is condemned for original sin alone" hardly expresses the Catholic teaching that "the punishment for original sin (as distinct from personal sin) is lack of the vision of God" (Innocent III, *loc. cit.*).

e) Discussing life-after-death, that is, the condition of the dead prior to the general resurrection, the Catechism in unsatisfactory, incomplete. It reads: "we should keep to the words of Scripture 'they have fallen asleep' . . . They wait—they are about to rise." (p. 474) Are such men (or souls) beatified? Even the question is not raised; no activity except "waiting" is assigned to the dead. Yet the Church holds *as divinely revealed* that "the souls of all the saints . . . even before the resumption of their bodies . . . see . . . the divine essence . . . the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin descend to hell immediately after death . . ." (Benedict XII, Const. *Benedictus Deus;* Denz.-Schön. 1000-1002). "They wait"—but not for ecstatic fulness of life which is already theirs. "They are asleep"—in the body, not asleep to infinite fulfillment. What the Catechism teaches is truth, a partial truth and obvious in one sense. The awesome, God—revealed truth goes undisclosed.

The Catechism's teaching on who are members of, or belong to, the Church (p. 235 and elsewhere) is different from the Magisterium's teaching and simply does not report the Church's position on the point.

The existence of angels and of the devil the Catechism treats as an open question. (cf. p. 482) Yet an ecumenical council has defined that "from nothingness" God created "the spiritual and the bodily creature, namely, the angelic and the earthly, then the human creature" (IV Lateran, cap. 1; Denz.-Schön. 800; I Vatican, cap. 1; Denz.-Schön. 3002). These two positions, that angelic existence is a question and that God created "the spiritual . . . namely, the angelic creature" seem not to be identical. As to Satan, the ordinary Magisterium teaches that he was "a good angel, made by God" (and not the substance of evil). (cf. Council of Braga, can. 7; Denz.-Schön. 457). In Catholic doctrine the question left unanswered by the Catechism has an answer.

On the doctrinal points mentioned (and on some others) it seems clear

that the Dutch Catechism is less than a straight-forward, frank report of Catholic teaching.

2. *In the field of morals.* The moral sections of the Catechism, which have often struck reviewers as ideally addressed to teenagers, present some related difficulties, which can be more briefly suggested in very few "samples."

Predictably, given the book's characteristic "mood," the general problem of sin is treated most subjectively. "Is it (sin) not folly and blindness? Is it really done knowingly? Is the will really free? Sin is . . . so impenetrable. We recognize nevertheless that it exists. Something in our Christian experience tells us that it is more than things taking an unfortunate turn . . . The good is comprehensible . . . Evil is a breach of good order . . . Hence one cannot do evil with as full knowledge as one does good." (p. 451)

Beyond "something in our Christian experience" as giving awareness of sin (which in a given instance may be real enough) is the objective revelation of God and the instruction of that apostolic college to which Christ said: "He who hears you hears me . . . whatsoever you shall bind on earth shall be bound also in heaven" (Luke 16:16, Matt. 18:18). Sinful unease within "Christian experience" is neither alone nor ultimate in the Christian's moral judgment, for this latter is instructed, guided by God's explicit law and by the directives of Christ's authority within the community. These give objective, reliable norms of moral good, and evil; they are truly directive even of Christian moral experience.

The statement that "one cannot do evil with as full knowledge as one does good" is pregnant with metaphysico-psychological implications, but these are not directly moral, for the most part, nor much concerned with Catholic truth. But to any reader of the book whose own philosophy is one of realism, the outlook succinctly expressed in the statement would be intriguing, if perhaps also questionable.

More in particular, the Catechism's discussion of birth control practices is summed up in the simple statement, "The last word lies with the conscience." (p. 403) This is no doubt true in the pragmatic sense that each person makes his own decision and for his own reasons. But as a statement of the Catholic position on birth control, it is not adequate. Catholic discussion cannot simply ignore (as does the Catechism) that the authority of Christ in the person of Pope Paul VI has reaffirmed as binding the directives of Pius XI and Pius XII in this matter. Even if one considers that the natural reasons to which these directives appealed are questionable (as many honest Christians seem to consider), it remains true that to ignore the Papal moral teaching is to ignore Christ's authority here speaking.

The Catechism's teaching about cases in which Christian persons freely,

knowingly, and validly married, divorce and marry other persons (outside the Church, necessarily) is subject to similar criticism. (cf. pp. 396-397) It again ignores Catholic belief and conviction that Christ's authority is found, dynamic, within the Christian community.

It should be noted that Christian exegetes who accept the Church's Magisterium would have special problems with this Dutch Catechism. One illustration suffices. In Christ's miracles of exorcism, the possessed, we are told, are to be understood as " men who give . . . signs of insanity." (p. 109) The interpretation is hardly new; but as a statement of Catholic faith it is new, together with its inevitable implication that the Lord was indeed a giant in the practice of " instant " psycho-therapy. In general, the Catechism's account of miracles simply as events in which men see the power of God at work, although men cannot know whether in fact purely natural forces are at work, (cf. p. 107) is less than a restatement of the Catholic understanding expressed by Vatican Council I, namely, that miracles a) *are* divine deeds (*facta*) which clearly indicate God's omnipotence and infinite knowledge, b) are most certain signs (of divine revelation), c) are proportionate to all men's understanding, and d) can be known with certainty (in some instances, at least) (cf. Sess. III, Const. *De Fide Catholica,* cap. 3; Denz.-Schön. 3009; and can. 4 *de fide*; Denz.-Schön. 3034).

It seems to the reviewer that this work must appeal to many intelligent, vocal, zealous Christian men and women, keenly alive to outlooks and convictions current in contemporary Western society. But it also seems that the work needs important revisions. What divides, and will divide, readers into " revisionists " and " non-revisionists " is faith's attitude toward the Magisterium of the Church. The Dutch Catechism at times obscures the teaching of the solemn Magisterium, at time departs from the ordinary Magisterium. Is the resulting work truly a Catholic catechism as it stands? Or is it, in part, some person's private reinterpretation of Catholic teaching? Pope Paul VI declared: ". . . There are limits which cannot and must not be imprudently exceeded by the exegete, the theologian. . . . These limits are marked by the living Magisterium which is the proximate norm of truth for the faithful " (Allocution, *Siamo particolarmente lieti,* July 11, 1966), and Vatican II declared that " sacred tradition, sacred scripture, and the teaching authority of the Church . . . are so linked and joined together one cannot stand without the other " (Const. *De Revelatione,* Chap. 2, n. 10). To those who accept the papal and the conciliar teaching there is no sure way of grasping the word of God except through the voice of Christ. His voice speaks within the Church, through her Magisterium. It is this voice of Christ's body, this voice of the Magisterium, which is so often muted in the Dutch Catechism.

Each reader of this work is faced perhaps by the important question: shall he or shall he not believe in action as in theory that he who hears the Magisterium hears Christ?

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Divine Science and the Science of God. A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas. By VICTOR PRELLER. Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. 281 $8.50.

The ruthless honesty with which a number of basic questions relating to our knowledge of God are treated makes this book a work of importance. The intention of the author is a worthy one: he is attempting to rethink the problem of the meaningfulness of religious language " in the context of the explicit rejection of the epistemological presuppositions of traditional empiricism " (p. vii). The problematic in which the matter is treated is the linguistic discussions of the past decade in the Anglo-Saxon world. Though the author is not a " Thomist " of any recognizable school, his constant reference point is the work of St. Thomas, whose positions he revises and corrects when necessary in terms provided by the philosophy of Wilfred F. Sellars (with particular reference to his book, *Science, Perception and Reality* [London, 1963]).

It would be unjust in this short space to attempt to give even the main lines of the author's argument. However, the general movement of the book is as follows: first, we are introduced into the real problem of referring to God in language. This is developed further in a special note on the use of philosophy in theology, especially as performed by St. Thomas. (Ch. 1) The next chapter is no less than an attempt to reform basic positions in Thomistic epistemology. Thus, the way is opened for a direct consideration of special problems in our linguistic reference to God. Through an analysis of the relation of experience to the conceptual system that informs it, and by showing that the intelligibility of what is known is derived from the logic of the syntax of the system, which in turn originates from the " radical intentionality " of the intellect itself (p. 74), what results is an extremely negative qualification of our knowledge of God. God can never be understood in an affirmative judgment by appealing to the intelligible content of our particular conceptual system. Consequently, Chapter Three shows that the " Five Ways " are significant in that the existence of an unknown entity is posited, whose relationship with the world remains also unknown. A more positive interpretation of these proofs would mean an unjustifiable extrapolation from our own conceptual system. The final

chapter treats on the role of faith in our discourse on God. The " material moves " of theological language are rendered intelligibile only in the light of faith, interpreted as a radical conformity to the divine intentionality.

Whereas Professor Preller's aim is laudable and the performance suggestive, it will be surprising if there is not much stringent comment from even the more flexible of Thomists. There is so much that is not quite clear, e. g., the key notion of concept and conceptual system. Furthermore, it seems that many Thomistic positions on analogy, even if influenced by Cajetan, are not as " horrendously naive " (p. 19) as the author suggests. It is hard to see how the author could hope for a convincing performance without a more ample viewpoint. One feels that at least some cognizance of modern theories on analogy is demanded (e. g., that of Schillebeeckx and de Petter in their clear rejection of Cajetan). Likewise, the distinctly Kantian slant of the author's position might have been remedied by an incorporation of some elements of the transcendental method as favored by so many modern Thomists. However, that is to anticipate the dialogue that must result. Though this book may suffer (and merit) quite drastic refutation, honest questions have been asked and a highly intelligent attempt has been made to reinterpret the best of St. Thomas in the light of the best in modern linguistic philosophy.

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Infallibility of the Laity. By SAMUEL D. FEMIANO, C. S. B. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. 155. $4.95.

The growing interest in the thought of John Henry Newman has produced several recent studies which have attempted to trace the historic development of Newman's thought in particular areas. The present work carries the catchy title of " Infallibility of the Laity." The author's own phrase which designates the purpose of his undertaking, viz., " Newman's thought on the voice of the laity in the Church " (p. 3), more accurately reflects the major portion of the book.

Newman's prevailing interest was focused on the continuity and witness, especially doctrinal, of the Church with her beginnings, as evidenced by his researches on tradition and the development of doctrine. It is in this sense that " the gradual evolution of Newman's thought on the laity was linked to his studies on the Church and on tradition." (*ibid.*) The " legacy of Newman " has exerted its influence upon the *periti* of this century and found echoes in the teaching of Vatican II and more recently and explicitly

in the collective pastoral of the American hierarchy, *The Church in our Day*. One of the contributions of this legacy regards the infallibility of the laity.

The " infallibility which the Roman Pontiff, the head of the college of bishops, enjoys in virtue of his office " is that " infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed in defining a doctrine of faith and morals " (Vatican II, *Lumen Gentium*, n. 25; Vatican I, *Pastor Aeternus*, ch. 4). Thus the Church as a whole, " the holy People of God, . . . spreads abroad a living witness to Him. . . . The body of the faithful as a whole . . . cannot err in matters of belief . . . it manifests this unerring quality when ' from the bishops down to the last member of the laity,' it shows universal agreement in matters of faith and morals " (*Luman Gentium*, n. 12).

In what does the infallibility of the laity consist? Father Femiano traces the thought of Newman on this point by the current method of formative years, Anglican years, Catholic years, and special problems, in this case Newman's controversy in the *Rambler* on " consulting the faithful." For Newman the laity's role in the communication of the truth of the faith is one of bearer of tradition and of witness to the church's doctrine; witnessing, not judging or defining, is the laity's function.

From his earliest years Newman had regard for the position of the laity in the Church. Here, as with the broader topics of his reflections, his thought had fundamentally crystallized by the time of his entrance into the Catholic Church. He had always been impressed by the doctrinal steadfastness of the faithful in the Arian crisis. The statements of Pius IX that he had sought the opinion of the faithful regarding the Immaculate Conception weighed heavily with him as an argument in his later writings on the *sensus fidelium* and in his controversy in the *Rambler*.

This book brings together in a short survey one area of Newman's investigations in which he was in advance of his time, misunderstood and suspected, but which today is the subject of considerable theological and pastoral inquiry.

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The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle's " Politics " (The Inedited Part: Book III, less. I-VI). Introduction and critical text by GUNDISALVUS M. GRECH, O. P. Rome: Desclée (Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas), 1967. Pp. 137.

The value of a commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* should be gauged on a twofold basis, namely, a firm grasp of the science of politics as the

Stagirite presents it in this work and as much pertinent erudition as possible. This erudition is indispensable, inasmuch as politics demands far more experience than that required for simple ethics, whether this experience is the investigator's own experience or information gleaned from other observers, past or present. In his paraphrase, St. Albert expresses considerable doubt anent many portions of the *Politics,* probably because he could not get the pertinent information. Thomas Aquinas has penned the most outstanding commentary on the first three books (up to about half of the fifth chapter of Book III [lesson 6]). The Peter of Auvergne who, a native of Crocq (Auvergne), became a student and master in the Faculty of Arts, and for some time Rector, of the University of Paris, and eventually Bishop of Clermont, has produced what presently seems to be the most fruitful work on the latter portion of the *Politics* by way of a *continuation* of the Aquinas commentary. " The [printed] texts, however, of the commentaries of Peter and Thomas are far from reliable. They were produced by humanists who not only removed from them the inelegant, non-classical Latin elements, but also made regrettable changes—interpolations, modifications, additions and omissions—which affected the technical aspect of the text and also betrayed the author's thought." (pp. 10-11) This editorial note suggests the urgency of a critical edition of Peter's *Continuation,* notably as regards his explanation of Aristotle's teaching about education under its civic aspect (Book VIII).

" Out of twenty-seven extant manuscripts containing St. Thomas's commentary, sixteen also give Peter's *Continuation,* and twelve of these include the six parallel lessons on the Third Book." (p. 11) The editor's report on his evaluation of these twelve manuscripts (pp. 63-66) is a model of clarity through consciseness and serves as a guide for those who may be encouraged to edit at least portions of the *Continuation.* Grech's presentation of the established history concerning Peter, the authenticity of Peter's commentary on the *Politics,* the relation of the inedited part of this commentary to the six parallel lessons of St. Thomas, the critical apparatus relevant to the reconstructed text, and his indices of manuscripts and names make this book a necessary reference for future studies concerning this most famous Auvergnian.

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The Chinese Mind, Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Edited by CHARLES A. MOORE with the assistance of ALDYTH V. MORRIS. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, University of Hawaii Press, 1967. Pp. 402 with index. $9.50.

This book, together with *The Japanese Mind* and *The Indian Mind,* comprises a series of three studies of the Oriental mind. All articles selected for this anthology were given at the East-West Philosophers' Conferences at the University of Hawaii and published subsequently in its *Proceedings* of 1939, 1949, 1959 and 1964. The purpose of this anthology is to give Western readers a comprehensive picture of the Chinese mind from the philosophical perspective. There are fifteen articles in all, not counting the *Introduction* by C. A. Moore. The last six papers deal with the same topic: the individual in Chinese philosophy. Each article is reviewed in the order as it appears in the book.

1. *Chinese Theory and Practice, with Special Reference to Humanism.* By Wing-Tsit Chan. (pp. 11-28) The author presents, first, the Chinese notion of truth and, second, its relation to practice. The Chinese conceived truth to be the discoverable and demonstrable principles in human affairs. Thus all truths have a moral quality. Since truth has to do with human events, human history at once becomes the test as well as the deposit of truth. While Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) is of the opinion that truths exist primarily in the mind, Chu-Hsi (1130-1200) thinks that truths are inherent in things and human events.

Because of the Chinese unique conception of the relation between truth and history, all historical events are considered as the unfolding and functioning of eternal principles. Consequently, Chinese classical history exercises supreme authority as a natural law over government, religion, society and other spheres of Chinese life.

If truth is moral, then it implies an ethical ought. Confucius was the first to advocate the unity of knowledge and action. This doctrine was accepted by all Chinese thinkers and expressed in the Chinese maxim: "knowledge is the beginning of action and action is the completion of knowledge." The consequence of this theory is the practical orientation of all sciences, including philosophy, which has been considered not a science of pure speculation but also of doing.

The discussion on truth is too brief, and the major portion of the article is devoted to practices in poetry, art and drama. The author also fails to observe the distinction between truth and knowledge and used the two terms interchangeably.

2. *The Story of Chinese Philosophy.* By Wing-Tsit Chan. (pp. 29-76) The history of Chinese philosophy is divided into three symphony-like movements: from 600 to 200 B.C. a period of three major themes of

Confucianism, Taoism and Moism, plus four minor ones of the Logicians, Neo-Moism, the Legalists and Yin-Yang Interactionism. The second movement from 200 B. C. to 1100 A. D. is that of synthesis of Chinese philosophy with a counternote of Buddhism introduced from India. The third movement from 1100 to the present unfolds the melody of Neo-Confucianism.

This article is neither profound nor original. It seems futile to recount in a brief article the whole history of Chinese philosophy.

3. *Epistemological Method in Chinese Philosophy.* By E. R. Hughes. (pp. 77-103) The author aims to prove two things: that there is an epistemology in Chinese tradition and that this epistemology is primarily linguistic, as shown in their linguistic experiments and their use of abstract categories. He believes that the Chinese consider philosophy a critique of language and a checking of this critique by a critique of history. Therefore, Northrop's theory that Chinese thinking is intuitive and not postulational is questionable, since linguistic method is postulational, not intuitive. He concludes that, in comparative philosophy, linguistic method is the most useful.

I agree with the author that, unless we have an adequate understanding of the nature of Chinese language, we would never fully appreciate Chinese philosophy. However, many of his suppositions are by no means correct. For example, he says that Chinese philosophy is a critique of language or communicated meaning. This opinion is totally unwarranted. On the contrary, the Chinese consider language a poor vehicle for philosophy. Oftentimes silence is preferred over dialogue. Zen Buddhism is a perfect example of this development. When the author claims that the Chinese thought in terms of abstract categories, he again makes an unverified supposition. It is a common teaching that the Chinese think *modo concreto* not *modo abstracto*. There is a Chinese term for *this man* and a term for *man* as all men, a generic term, but no term for manhood. What the author considers to be abstract categories, such as *Yin, Yang,* the five *Hsings,* are generic terms. The only possible abstract terms are *Tao* in Taoism and *Fa* (*Dharma*) in Buddhism.

4. *The Scientific Spirit and Method in Chinese Philosophy.* By Hu Shih. (pp. 104-131) F. S. C. Northrop has expressed the opinion that the East's failure to develop natural sciences was due to the fact that "the method of intuition and contemplation became the sole trustworthy modes of inquiry." This Dr. Hu considers to be historically untrue. He says that no race or culture ". . . admits only concepts by intuition." Man, being a thinking animal, is compelled by his daily needs to make inferences. That sciences were neglected in the East was due to historical reasons.

The author points out that the Chinese had a scientific spirit and method which were first embodied in Confucius's teachings, such as his agnosticism and naturalism. By rejecting ancient myths Confucius was truly the

Socrates of China. During the Neo-Confucian renaissance this scientific spirit and method were further developed by Chu-Hsi, whose school singled out the *The Great Learning* from the *Book of Rites* for special study because it contained a new logical method as a *Novum Organum*. Chu-Hsi writes: "Investigate with an open mind. Try to see the reason with an open mind. And with an open mind follow reason wherever it leads you." Chang Tsai has said: "The student must first learn to be able to doubt. If he can find doubt where no doubt was found before, then he is making progress." To this Chu-Hsi adds: "but should also learn to resolve the doubt after it has arisen. Then he is making real progress." This the author considers to be Chu-Hsi's scientific method of hypothesis and verification by evidence. He further points out Wu Yü's literary investigation of phonetics in the *Book of the Odes* as a shining example of the Chinese scientific spirit.

There are some flaws in the author's argument. First, Confucius never developed a Socratic method. Second, Chu-Hsi's method was nothing but a method of literary criticism. All the doubting, searching and verifying were concerned with commentaries on the classics.

5. *Synthesis in Chinese Metaphysics.* By Wing-Tsit Chan. (pp. 132-148) The author lists four periods in the history of Chinese philosophy when metaphysical syntheses were supposed to have taken place. The first synthesis took place in the classical times when the *Yin-Tang* Interactionism was absorbed into the Great unity of Taoism and the Confucian doctrine of the Mean. The second synthesis was found in the meeting of Buddhism and Taoism; the third in the synthesis of Buddhism and Taoism into Neo-Confucianism. The last synthesis is now taking place between Western and Chinese thought. However, the main article is concerned with the following topics of synthesis: being and non-being; *Li* (reason) and *Ch'i* (ether, matter); the one and many; man and the universe; good and evil and knowledge and conduct.

This article leaves something to be desired. To equate *Yang* with being and *Yin* with non-being is grossly misleading. Some of the topics in no way represent a process of synthesis but a quest for unity in thought which is the life of all philosophies.

6. *The Basis of Social, Ethical and Spiritual Values in Chinese Philosophy.* By Y. P. Mei. (pp. 149-166) First of all, the author believes that all classical Chinese philosophers were religious thinkers and that their teachings truly established the foundation of all values. Confucius was a religious man who affirmed life in his doctrine of *Jen* (love). Mencius was not only religious but in fact a mystic. Mo-Tzu believed in a personal God and preached universal love for all men. Though Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu rejected God, they both insisted upon Good and Tao as the highest reality. Historically, however, many of these assertions are

debatable. Mei displays certain theistic bias. His exposition is good, but it is too broad to provide any deep insight.

7. *Filial Piety and Chinese Society.* By Hsieh Yu-Wei. (pp. 167-187) The Chinese as a race is best known as a family people. This is not without a long historical tradition and a philosophical foundation, which this article eloquently explains.

In the Confucian scheme of things, filial piety is the root of all virtues and of social and cosmic harmony. The Confucian *Jen* (love) is the cardinal virtue, and its germination and development depend upon the cultivation of filial piety. As Mencius says: " The substantiation of *Jen* begins with service to one's parents."

The Confucian notion of man is primarily relational, i. e., man has five dimensions in society, the principal of which is that between children and parents. Once this primary relation is made harmonious, then the others would follow. It is said in the *Classic of Filial Piety:* " Filial piety at the outset consists in service to one's parents; in the middle of one's path in service to his sovereign; and in the end, in establishing oneself as an authentic man." Unfortunately, the exaltation of filial piety was not without some ill effects. It hindered the development of individuality and freedom and perpetuated the subjugation of women and paternalism in politics.

8. *The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Values in Chinese Philosophy.* By T'ang Chün-I. (pp. 188-212) A value is considered spiritual if: 1) created or realized by the spirit; 2) presented or revealed to the spirit, that is, " for the spirit "; 3) self-consciously recognized as such in 1 and 2. The author believes that the history of Chinese philosophy is a history of the development of such values. The author's assertions seem to be *non-sequiturs,* since he has not first established (I don't think he can) that the Chinese have looked upon the spirit in the same way as the West. What others call humanistic values, he terms spiritual.

9. *Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy.* By John C. H. Wu. (pp. 213-237) The foundations of Chinese political authority, according to the author, are three: the mandate of heaven, the people's will and the ruler's virtue. The government has a double function: to enforce laws and promote morality. This is because the Chinese consider law and morality to be identical. This identity is based on the notion of law as a system of duties rather than of rights. As Lao-Tzu says: " The man of virtue attends to his duties; while a man of no virtue attends to his rights." This emphasis on duty has rendered all laws subject to ethics. Only a virtuous ruler can be a good ruler and only a virtuous citizen is a loyal citizen.

The purpose of both government and law is to achieve harmony in human affairs. The author's arguments are cogent and his documentation relevant. However, he omitted the discussion of *Li* (propriety) and music, which are considered integral parts of the whole legal system.

10. *The World and the Individual in Chinese Metaphysics.* By Thomè H. Fang. (pp. 238-263) This article covers all three major Chinese schools: Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. The Confucian metaphysics takes the Tao of Heaven as the creative power whereby the dynamic world of all beings comes into existence and considers man as a participating nature in congruence with the cosmic order. Individual dignity and finality consist in man's cooperation and reciprocation with nature for the harmonious completion of the total order.

With Taoism the emphasis was shifted from man to Tao-in-itself. It is anti-social in that man's total concern is not with his fellow men or society but with union with Tao. They are extreme individualists. With the advent of Buddhism a metaphysical synthesis took place and resulted in Chinese Buddhism, which teaches the search for the Ultimate through self-annihilation. The author's thought is often obscured by his style, which is at times terse and at times pedantic.

11. *The Individual and the World in Chinese Methodology.* By T'ang Chün-I. (pp. 264-285) This is an epistemological study of the principles of individuation. The most important discussion is found in the first part.

For the Moist, there is only species and no individual. Universal love is fostered at the expense of individuality. Mo Pin, a later Moist, holds that all names are class-names, whether of a species or genus. There is no proper name, since every such name is universalizable. Logicians concede that individuals can be known and pointed to but not conceptually determined. Hün-Tzu teaches that an individual is spatio-temporally determined. Attributes and properties do not determine an individual, because they are universal terms. Therefore, things are determined by the ways in which they variously relate to each other. Yin-Yang School considers the individual to be a ultirelational system. An individual is one of the reciprocal relations with others.

It is unfortunate that the author does not mention whether or not the Chinese philosophers ever discussed the intrinsic principles of individuation. To my knowledge, the *Classic of History* and the *Book of Changes* contain some pertinent passages on this subject.

12. *The Individual in Chinese Religion.* By Wing-Tsit Chan. (pp. 286-306) No native Chinese religion was ever institutionalized, and this, the author believes, was due to their religious convictions: 1) the purpose of Chinese religions is self-realization; 2) this is achieved through natural and self-oriented means; 3) ultimate salvation is union with Heaven in Confucianism, identification with Nature in Taoism and Nirvanā in Buddhism. The author fails to distinguish between Chinese religions and the philosophical schools, even though the public has often confused the two. Confucianism never has been a religion nor has the Taoist religion followed faithfully the Taoist philosophy. A religious Taoist believes in earthly

immortality, not identification with Nature, which is a philosophical doctrine.

13. *The Status of the Individual in Chinese Ethics.* By Hsieh Yu-Wei. (pp. 307-322) This article reads like an apologetics. The author tries to prove that the status of the individual in Confucian ethics is that of equality and freedom. However, he fails to add that equality is an equality of duties, not of rights, and freedom is that of doing the necessary, not a freedom of autonomy. In the Confucian family system and social structure equality and freedom were indeed very limited, if they existed at all.

14. *The Status of the Individual in Chinese Social Thought and Practice.* By Y. P. Mei. (pp. 323-339) This is another apologetic. To determine the exact status of the individual, all facts, whether favorable or unfavorable, must be submitted for judgment. The author discusses only what favors the individual status and omits all the social practices which had subjugated millions of Chinese under the benign tyranny of Chinese tradition.

15. *The Status of the Individual in the Political and Legal Traditions of Old and New China.* By John C. H. Wu. (pp. 340-364) This article is by far the most objective discussion on the individual status in Chinese tradition. The discussion on the old legal system is fascinating. All laws in China were penal laws. There was no civil law. Any immoral act constituted a crime. The principle was: "whoever does what ought not to be done shall be punished." All persons, including the Emperor, were equal under the law, but the law itself was discriminating. Eight categories of people were exempted from punishment unless imposed personally by the Emperor. The law decreed that members in a family be unequal according to their status. The law also discriminated against women, who were made totally dependent upon men. Man was allowed to divorce his wife, but a woman was never permitted to divorce her husband. These inequalities were remedied only after the promulgation of the new law under the Republic.

The book as a whole shows a total lack of editorial control. Being an anthology, it is not expected to have a uniform theme and style, but some of the repetitions and even contradictions in the various articles could be eliminated. However, these flaws do not alter the fact that it is a rich source of Chinese philosophy in the English language. Though the Chinese mind is not made totally scrutable, it has been unveiled.

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The Indian Mind: Essentials of Indian Philosophy and Culture. Ed. by CHARLES A. MOORE. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967. Pp. 458. $9.50.

The East-West Center at the University of Hawaii provides a bridge of communication between philosophers from both sides of the world. Its East-West Philosophers' Conferences were held in 1939, 1949, 1959, and 1964. *The Indian Mind* is a selection of papers from those conferences brought together and edited by the late Professor Charles A. Moore. All but one of the essays were re-edited by the authors themselves especially for this publication.

This reviewer is strongly convinced that Western thinkers, and especially "Thomists," should become broadly acquainted with Eastern thought, since much is to be found there that blends with and leads to a better understanding of Western thought. *The Indian Mind* will serve well those who seek a starting-point for extended reading in this area.

Raju's "Metaphysical Theories in Indian Philosophy" is a distinctive contribution as a general introduction to Hindu thought. Raju presents a comprehensive view of many Hindu schools and gives special place to Vedanta as "the essence of Indian Philosophy" and to Śaṁkara's Advaita [meaning non-duality] as "the most popular expression of Vedanta thought." This reviewer does not disagree with Raju's evaluation of Śaṁkara, but he does feel that thomistically orientated thinkers will find the later Vedantist Ramanuja's doctrine of non-duality-with-differences (Vishiṣṭādvaita) more compatible with their doctrine of analogy and their moderate realism.

Even though it is difficult to pick and choose among the essays, this reviewer found "Buddhism as a Philosophy of 'Thusness'" by Takakusu to be a most informative presentation of the Buddhist doctrine of causality and some of its allied principles. Despite the technical language, this essay brings into rather clear focus some of the basic elements of Buddhism and gives Western thinkers specific grounds for comparison and judgment. Some may find the Buddhist notion of causality too polaristic, but they can also see in it some of the implications of finite causality.

In view of contemporary Western concern with the relations between the religious and the secular dimensions of human life, there should be much interest in Radhakrishnan's "The Indian Approach to the Religious Problem," Nikhilananda's "The Realistic Aspect of Indian Spirituality," and Raju's "Religion and Spiritual Values in Indian Thought." Mahadevan in "Social, Ethical, and Spiritual Values in Indian Philosophy" brings into his discussion of the metaphysical basis of the Upaniṣadic value structure the same prayerful fragments from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad as were quoted by Pope Paul during his visit to India.

Five of the authors discuss the individual from different aspects: Bhattacharyya, the metaphysical; Murti, the religious; Desgupta, the ethical; Saksena, the social; and Chand, the institutional aspect. These present a well-rounded approach to the problem of individualism so prominent in the West today.

In the limits of so brief a review, all essays could not be treated individually. All are informative and important. The book is highly recommended as a doorway to more extensive reading in Indian thought.

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The Making of Men. By Paul Weiss. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967. Pp. 152 with index. $4.95.

In this book, which is a series of reflective glances at the educative process in the twentieth century in the United States, the author, a philosopher, offers philosophical evaluations of the various ingredients which comprise the present-day system of schooling young men from early grades to college. The book is more evaluative than descriptive. Moreover, it is not argumentative nor even insistently persuasive; the style is simple didactic and the content represents the matured judgments of the long-trained philosopher and educator, expressing with a certain finality the wisdoms which years of thoughtful experience have refined. Therefore, the book's impact does not derive from the power of its syllogisms but from the character and authority of the man who is presenting in it the best results of his years of involvement.

As must be expected, the man whose making interests Paul Weiss is the civilized, cultivated, perceptive, virtuous man; he is concerned with the educational process insofar as it is ordained to the formation of wise, urbane, creative, humane and sensitive human beings. Several touchstones are consistently applied to gauge the worth of all the educational ingredients at each stage of the process. To be truly educative, the materials offered to the developing skills, talents and mind of the growing person must be challenging enough to stir interest but not so difficult that they frustrate, nourishing in a way which satisfies the appetite and still whets it for more. At every stage, the growing individual must be treated as he is at that stage, the child as child, the youth as youth, the young man as young man, each with his proper needs and aspirations, which are different from those of an adult and not merely those of an adult-scaled-down-to-size, but each qualitatively appropriate. While the mind is taught, the spirit

must also be formed, in the childhood by stories, in teen-age by heroes, in youth by the records of great men and events in history. Techniques and procedures are not part of the properly educative process; they are appropriately taught in vocational institutions. True education prepares the mind to grasp and assimilate final goods, the goods which make life worth living, and men truly men. These materials are the materials which embody universal principles and values, as opposed to those which are particular and technical: philosophy, for example, as opposed to forestry, chemistry and physics as opposed to engineering, biology as opposed to medicine, art as opposed to craft.

Inevitably the author is designing his criteria with an eye to his key evaluation, his ultimate evaluation of the genuine good life and the genuinely fulfilled man. This is, of course, not only the heart question of the book but one of the heart questions of the whole history of philosophy. Whoever in any compelling way answers this question, which is also a great question in theology, religion and politics, will be called greatest of the great, and therefore it cannot be expected that Paul Weiss, although he is wise, will have finally located the key to the mystery. He examines the claims of pleasure, knowledge, wealth, power, fame and security; he estimates the contributions of engineers and other producing people, politicians and other organizing people, humanitarians and other serving people, scholars and other thinking people; he beautifully balances the values of each and the limitations inherent in each and acknowledges that none of them is the answer to the ultimate good life and happy man. But then he must provide his own answer. He frames first a subjective answer: the good life must be correlative to man, must fulfill the promises of mind, body and emotions in a harmonious way and enable good men to live in harmony with each other. Hardly anyone will argue with this, but the crucial question remains: what is objectively correlative to man in this way? What objects respond thus to his needs and promises? The author's answer is a kind of weighted blend of things permeated with reflectiveness: a happy man is primarily involved in the dedicated use of one power while all his other powers have some play; he is vitally concerned in one great area of endeavor while appreciative of all the others. He will find a center in himself which will leave him open to the clustering riches around him.

This is all true and good and broad enough to include almost any good life, even a life which finds its center in some way outside itself. But it is not a definite answer and not truly an objective answer. The blend of all good things adapted to the individual's individual wants truly describes what will make life good, but the defining process seems to be a subtle projection of the subjective criteria to the objects proposed rather than a recognition of a goal as ultimate in its own right. Moreover, attractive as it is, it does not seem to be for all men—only men capable of deep thought

and enjoying considerable leisure can achieve it. It is a philosopher's answer for the philosophically oriented.

Nevertheless, within these bounds, important things are being said about man's ultimate goods and his happiness, which education, as an institutionalized, civilized procedure, should take into account. It must be acknowledged that even the finest educational process will not by itself produce the good man; other factors enter into the mixture even at the level of essential constitutives, e. g., sexual and familial love. And at the level of actual constitutives, still other elements must be considered; how is suffering integrated into the full life's plan, and how are men to achieve the maximum possible of the good life in view of the myriad compromises and compensation they are obliged to make because of personal deficiencies and unyielding circumstances? These questions are outside the scope of this book, but they must be recognized and answered before the whole design of the good life is clear. In the meantime, Dr. Weiss has written an illuminating and even moving account of the part that schooling should handle.

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St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, vol. 10 (1a. 65-74) (Cosmogony), ed. WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O. P. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. $7.25.

Volume 10 of the new English translation of the *Summa theologiae* contains St. Thomas's cosmogony or hexaemeron. The editor, William A. Wallace, O. P., makes no exaggerated claims for this section of the *Summa*. He notes that " the fact that St. Thomas's treatment of the Hexaemeron is so immersed in patristic exegesis and in the science of the Middle Ages has long made it an antiquarian piece even for Thomistic scholars " (p. xxi), and he refers to this as one of St. Thomas's " weakest expositions " (p. xxiii). And yet it is Father Wallace's contention that " the marks of his genius are still discernible. . . . On the difficult topic of the Hexaemeron he could not offer a correct and definitive solution. Even in error, however, his efforts compare so favourably with those of others that they deserve careful analysis and thoughtful appreciation " (p. xxiii).

The section in question is, of course, a commentary on the *Genesis* account of the six days of creation. Here St. Thomas is forced to deal with such traditional problems as the creation of light on the first day and of the luminous celestial bodies (the principal sources of light) three days later, the perplexing claim that there are waters above the firmament, and the

suitability of the various terms employed in the Scriptures to describe God's creative work. Other problems appear to have acquired new urgency for St. Thomas through the recovery of the whole corpus of Greek and Islamic science in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Thus he inquires into the possibility that God employed intermediaries in producing the material world; he asks if the celestial bodies are animate; he questions whether matter was formless for a time before diversification.

St. Thomas reveals his ample knowledge of science and natural philosophy as he faces the exegetical problems associated with Genesis 1 and 2; contemporary astronomy, physics, optics, biology, and metaphysics are all brought to bear on the text. This fact reflects St. Thomas's relatively strict " scientific concordism ": the Scriptures are to be interpreted literally, and the Scriptural and scientific accounts of the world must agree in detail. But as Father Wallace points out, in spite of St. Thomas's concordist views and his command of scientific knowledge, this particular section of the *Summa* is predominantly Biblical and patristic—it was so determined by the great abundance of patristic literature on the subject of the Hexaemeron. Thus on each question St. Thomas faithfully records the views of the various Fathers of the Church and attempts to mediate between their differing viewpoints; and his solution to a problem is more often drawn from a Scriptural text than from a scientific argument.

As editor of this volume, Father Wallace has brought to bear on the text of St. Thomas's Hexaemeron not only the " careful analysis and thoughtful appreciation " which are its due but also a vast amount of erudition. His explanatory notes will surely be helpful to those not versed in medieval natural philosophy. Similarly, appendices 3-6, although sometimes going beyond the minimum required to understand St. Thomas, present a succinct and nearly impeccable summary of ancient and medieval astronomy, Aristotelian physics, medieval optics, and medieval biology. Appendices 7-10 provide a most illuminating introduction to literature on the Hexaemeron from the patristic period to the present, thus enabling the reader to view St. Thomas in historical context. The translation is always lucid and usually faithful, though occasionally the attempt to be modern and colloquial strains the meaning of the text ever so slightly.

Inevitably there are quibbles. One wonders why, in this entire edition, references in the text to particular treatises are always left untranslated (is it really advantageous, for example, to render " ut habetur *Matt.*" as " as Scripture records "? [pp. 138-9]) and why punctuation is omitted at the end of footnotes. Minor errors appear occasionally in the notes and appendices: a Newtonian view of inertia was not held by Kepler, as Father Wallace suggests (p. 123). The great circle in which the sun moves is more properly referred to as the ecliptic than as the zodiac (pp. 185, 219). An epicycle is not the path traced out by a point moving about a small circle,

the center of which is moving about a larger deferent circle; rather, the epicycle is the small circle itself (p. 186). The commonly accepted date of Roger Bacon's death is not 1294 but 1292 (p. 194). But surely these objections are of a most trivial sort, and they in no way detract from the high standard of scholarship displayed throughout the book. Father Wallace has performed a most valuable service for both Thomistic scholars and historians of medieval natural philosophy.

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Reflections on the Analogy of Being. By JAMES F. ANDERSON. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967. Pp. 88.

Imagine that twenty years ago you wrote a book which (along with brilliant chapters on the history of analogy) set down Thomistic analogy according to the schema of Cajetan. Subsequently a vast literature on the subject appeared through which runs an anti-Cajetanian thread: by and large, people argue that Cajetan's views on analogy are not those of Aquinas, make not much sense considered in themselves and ought to be discarded. Knowing this literature, having the opportunity to write another book, what would you do? If you are Professor Anderson, what you do is offer substantially the same book minus the historical chapters.

The book is divided into discussions of analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution, metaphor and analogy of proper proportionality. I would like to report that, in his restatement of his position, Professor Anderson has achieved a tightness and clarity which surpass the measure of clarity reached in *The Bond of Being.* I would like to say that Professor Anderson, recognizing as he does the difference between establishing a position as being that of Aquinas and arguing for it convincingly *in propria persona,* has done one or the other or both. Professor Anderson makes no effort to show that his views are those of Aquinas, though he seems certain of the coincidence. He makes nothing like a convincing case for his own views.

In order to convince his reader, Professor Anderson needs more precision in his statement. His book begins with the promising reminder that "analogy" has first of all a mathematical meaning, but he immediately rejects the significance of this. We are then told that there are many kinds of analogies which are analogously analogies because they participate in various ways in what is truly analogy, analogy of proper proportionality. The latter has never before been so firmly equated with being. Analogy of proper proportionality involves proportional—that is, analogous—unity. Being is explained in terms of proper proportionality and proper proportion-

ality is explained in terms of being. One cannot help wondering what would have happened if Professor Anderson had asked himself what kind of analogy is operative in his claim that his three (or four) kinds of analogy are analogously analogies. From the very outset of the book, what is to be explained is invoked to explain itself.

This reviewer hopes that the present book represents a warm-up exercise and that Professor Anderson will soon turn his genial and cultivated mind to some, at least, of the difficulties that have been advanced against his Cajetanian views during the past several decades. As an echo of his past work, this book is disappointingly anachronistic; as possible fanfare for further and more persuasive stuff, it whets the intellectual appetite.

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A Short Account of Greek Philosophy. By G. F. PARKER. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1967. Pp. 194. $5.00.

Plato and His Contemporaries. By G. C. FIELD. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc. Pp. 242, University Paperback Edition, 1967, $2.25.

Deny to the life of mankind any semblance of continuity, deny any value to history and the role of the historian amounts to little more than a collector of facts, interesting perhaps but unrelated to modern life. Affirm a community to life, accept the experience of living as a fact which, while ancient with years, has maintained its identity through the passage of time, the appearance and disappearance of cultures, of social and political institutions, then the search into the past of life must be viewed as a labor capable of yielding authentic values for life in the twentieth century.

The authors of these two works share the conviction that life is an experience of both the past and the present. They also share a commitment to the thesis that history, the recorder of the experiences in living from the past, can be profitable for life in the present. It is this double assent which explains the two studies of Greek Philosophy.

G. F. Parker's *A Short Account of Greek Philosophy* draws its incentive from an awareness of the gulf that separates the "two cultures." And its purpose is to provide a bulwark against the possible tragedy of "Science, adrift from its moorings in humanism and history, (becoming) a ravening monster, while the Arts, oblivious of new areas of reality revealed by Science, (become) as arid as the deserts of the moon" (p. 4). For the author, the study of Greek Philosophy is one "of a number of common platforms on which those who wish to be both literate and numerate can

meet" (p. 5), since "Greek civilisation is the common source from which the divergent streams of art and science flow down to us" (*ibid*).

G. C. Field is more modest in his appeal to history. He addresses his study on *Plato and His Contemporaries* primarily to those whose interest in philosophy is already assured. Describing the book as a "preliminary or supplementary essay to a study of the philosophy of Plato" (preface, p. v), Field directs his major effort to the task of bringing into proper focus the circumstances of history in which that philosophy emerged and developed. Only in a minor way does the platonic system itself occupy the author's attention.

In the pursuit after his purpose Field achieves an admirable success. His study of the platonic historical milieu offers the initiated valuable insights into the genesis of the problems to which Plato addressed himself. It gives that philosophy a sense of being involved in the cross currents of the life of those days. For those who have yet to encounter Plato through a systematic study of his philosophy the work makes that philosopher and the problems with which he wrestled something more than academic incidents far removed from life.

And Parker, too, achieves a goodly measure of success in his effort to construct a bulwark against the tragedy of mutually distrustful science and art. His invitation to today's men of science to spend time in the company of the philosophers of the 7th to the 4th centuries B. C. is cleverly couched in terms that should elicit something more positive than a hasty, unthinking refusal. His portrayal of the thinkers and searchers of those times as men made restless by the challengers offered them by the universe cannot impress the modern man of science as a sort of self-portrait. The invitation is attractive and its benefit, if accepted, makes available history's story of intellectual life which is not without consequence to living today.

There is, however, a phase of the portrait of the thinkers of Greece which, to my mind, merited more care in its delineation than the author actually gave it. It seems to me that, in his effort to woo the scientist to cultivate an acquaintance with the era of Greek philosophy, Parker fails to present with sufficient vibrancy the figures of those philosophers whose forte was located outside and beyond the limits of the Philosophy of Nature. These are indeed mentioned and their thought presented with commendable fullness. But their relevancy is not adequately emphasized. And they are relevant. The paths traversed by Socrates in his ethical philosophy, of Plato and Aristotle in their search for a First Philosophy were the result of the demands of the spirit of man who found himself threatened with being engulfed almost to the point of insignificance by the world of the naturalists. Modern man is experiencing a like feeling.

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The Moral Philosophy of Mo-Tze. By AUGUSTINUS A. TSEU. Taiwan: China Printing LTD, 1965. Pp. 207. $6.00.

This book (originally a doctoral dissertation) is published under the auspice of Fu-Jen Catholic University on Taiwan. Since the philosopher Mo-Tze is so little known in the West, this study of his moral philosophy is a welcome addition to the English sources of Chinese philosophy.

A contemporary of Mencius, Mo-Tze was a unique Chinese philosopher, because he, unlike Lao-Tze or Confucius, was not of scholarly or aristocratic stock but a common man. Furthermore, he reacted against the naturalistic tradition of Taoism and Confucianism and replaced it with a religious philosophy of Heaven. The basic tenets of his system are: Heaven is loving and intelligent, provident and just; and the will of Heaven is the moral law for man. This will of Heaven as discovered by the ancient sages and Mo himself is universal love for all men. Good or evil, rewards or punishments, prosperity or misfortune, all hinge on whether or not the will of Heaven is realized in one's life. Being of poor origin, Mo-Tze shunned luxury and extravagant rituals. He advocated absolute equality among men and a pacifistic policy among nations. He instituted a tightly organized fraternity with numerous loyal followers.

However, Mo-Tze's teachings declined immediately after his death, partly because the Han dynasty adopted Confucianism as the orthodox teaching of the Empire, and partly because Mo-Tze's philosophical spirit was at variance with the tradition and temperament of the Chinese people. Universal love without distinction and absolute equality of all men were considered lofty doctrines but too impractical if the social and family structures of that time were taken into consideration. Therefore, Mo-Tze remained almost unknown until the Nationalist Revolution in this century. Since that Revolution, as every revolution, initiated a strong anti-traditional sentiment, Mo-Tze as the antagonist of Confucius again captured the imagination of the modern Chinese. Many works on Mo-Tze's philosophy have come off the press in recent times.

The author's study is detailed and cogent; however, his scholastic background has prejudiced his judgments on controversial issues, and also his exposition is too argumentative. His digression in Chapter two, section one, is cumbersome, and typographical errors abound in the book. Nevertheless, I feel that sinologists may find the book valuable.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Alba House: *Restructuring Religious Life,* by Patrick J. Berkery, S. M. M. (Pp. 192, $3.95); *Catechism of Vatican II,* by Franco Pierini, S. S. P. (Pp. 260, $4.95); *Personality Types and Holiness,* by Alexander Roldan, S. J. (Pp. 384, $6.50); *Newman on Justification,* by Thomas L. Sheridan, S. J. (Pp. 265, $6.50); *The Literary Genre Midrash,* by Addison G. Wright, S. S. (Pp. 164, $2.95).

Barnes & Noble, Inc.: *Elementary Formal Logic,* by C. L. Hamblin (Pp. 182, $2.25 paperback, $2.75 hardback); *Plato and His Contemporaries,* by G. C. Field (Pp. 242, $2.25 paperback, $4.00 hardcover).

Desclée de Brouwer: *Thomisme Ou Pluralisme?,* by Jean Racette (Pp. 127, 111 FB); *Temps, Dieu, Liberté,* by Simon Decloux, S. J. (Pp. 262).

East-West Center Press: *The Japanese Mind,* by Charles A. Moore (ed.) (Pp. 357, $9.50).

Free Press: *The Concept of the Primitive,* ed. by Ashley Montagu (Pp. 267, $6.95); *Modes of Thought,* by Alfred North Whitehead (Pp. 179, $1.95).

Harper & Row, Publishers: *America's Forgotten Priests,* by Joseph H. Fichter, S. J. (Pp. 254, $6.95).

Herder and Herder: *The Relevance of the New Testament,* by Heinrich Schlier (Pp. 258, $6.50).

Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.: *The Peasant of the Garonne,* by Jacques Maritain (Pp. 277, $6.95).

Inst. d'Études Médiévales: *Le Retour à Saint Thomas, A-T-Il Encore Un Sens Aujourd'hui?,* by Fernand van Steenberghen (Pp. 60).

MacMillan Company: *Structures of Christian Priesthood,* by Jean-Paul Audet (Pp. 112, $4.95).

Martinus Nijhoff: *Tulane Studies in Philosophy,* Vol. XVI (Pp. 161, $2.50).

Miniverse Services: *Divination & Historical Sources of I Ching,* by Joe Everett McCaffree (Pp. 64, $4.00).

Ohio University Press: *Reason and Virtue,* by Antonio S. Cua (Pp. 196, $5.00).

Oxford University Press: *The Second Vatican Council,* ed. by Barnard C. Pawley (Pp. 262, $3.75).

Presses de L'Université Gregorienne: *Éthique Générale,* by Joseph De Finance, S. J. (Pp. 448, 3000 lires).

Philosophical Library, Inc.: *The War Against the Jew,* by Dagobert D. Runes (Pp. 192, $6.00).

Sheed and Ward: *Redeeming the Time,* by James V. Schall, S. J. (Pp. 244,

$5.50); *The Spiritual Journey of St. Paul,* by Lucien Cerfaux (Pp. 236, $5.00); *Life in the Spirit* (Theological Meditations, Vol. IV), ed. by Hans Küng (Pp. 157, $3.95); *The Church,* by Hans Küng (Pp. 515, $6.95).

Twayne Publishers, Inc.: *J. F. Powers,* by John V. Hagopian (Pp. 174, $3.95).

University of New Mexico Press: *Directory of American Philosophers,* Vol. IV, ed. by Archie J. Bahm (Pp. 439, $13.95).

University of Notre Dame Press: *Integration of Man and Society in Latin America,* ed. by Samuel Shapiro (Pp. 356, $6.50); *Cluny under Saint Hugh-1049-1109,* by Noreen Hunt (Pp. 228, $6.95); *Trilogy on Wisdom and Celibacy,* by J. Massingberd Ford (Pp. 298, $7.95).

Wayne State University Press: *Prophetic Faith in Isaiah,* by Sheldon H. Blank (Pp. 241, $2.50).

Whittemore Associates, Inc.: *Art Studies in the Life of Christ,* by C. Fraser Keirstead, D.D. (Pp. 64, $.65).