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THE MORAL BASIS OF LAW

THE topic of this presentation is the relationship between personal morality and conscience on the one hand, and public morality and law on the other. Personal morality and conscience are taken in the conception common to the Judaeo-Christian tradition—the tradition in which most believing Americans place themselves. Thus the word " faith " and its derivatives refer here to man's response to God's self-revelation, a response that can be indicated (though not defined) by assent to certain points: 1) that there is one God, the creator of heaven and earth; 2) that He made man in His own image and that He guides the affairs of mankind; 3) that He covenanted with mankind—with upright Noah, with Abraham, the man of faith, and with the chosen people.

Throughout this exposition I assume that the heritage of these promises still remains the central reality of human life, central even in the world of today. Thus I simply prescind from non-Western religious traditions, without denying their

value. Likewise, I prescind from the humanistic religion that is becoming rather common among those who used to have faith. Once faith is set aside, religious ideas on morality and conscience quickly become indistinguishable from the thoughts of unbelievers; thus we would have to move on a purely philosophic plane if this religious humanism were to be taken into account.

I have set some rather narrow limits for this essay. On the one hand, the specific problems that might arise from examination of the Christian scriptures will not be treated, for I wish to offer this essay as a provisional structure to be modified and developed in various ways by persons sharing according to diverse modalities in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. On the other hand, I am not attempting even in outline the vast synthesis that would be required for an ecumenical theology of morality and law. I do not imagine that my references to scripture are governed by norms that would satisfy *any* group of exegetes, but the references are only intended to suggest and to illustrate possibilities, not to prove anything. Within the common assumption of faith, the argument here is philosophic but with a philosophy itself nurtured under the inspiration of faith.

The public morality and law with which I am concerned here is that of civil society—the federal, state, and local communities. The part of the law relevant for our purpose is the criminal or penal law together with other enactments similar to criminal law in the common function of regulating behavior.

I.

There is common agreement among men that morality is a demand society makes upon its members and that conscience is an acquired disposition of practical thinking by which society's demands become effective in its members' behavior. But for those who believe, morality is only communicated—and not always perfectly communicated—by the demands of society and the disposition these demands induce in the individual's heart.

Prior to society is the wisdom of God. This prior source of morality is described in the Wisdom of Solomon:

> She is a breath of the power of God,
> pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty;
> hence nothing impure can find a way into her.
> She is a reflection of the eternal light,
> untarnished mirror of God's active power,
> image of his goodness.
> Although alone, she can do all;
> herself unchanging, she makes all things new.
> (Wis 7:25-27.)

Thus the force, the reasonableness, the value, and the stability of morality have a source beyond society, and this source is God.

This wisdom is no arbitrary force, imposed upon men and things from without. Rather it is an ordering principle which makes their being and well-being possible; in Proverbs, Wisdom claims for herself the title of firstborn of creatures:

> The Lord created me when his purpose first unfolded,
> before the oldest of his works.
> From everlasting I was firmly set,
> from the beginning, before earth came into being
> (Pr 8:22-23.)

> When he laid down the foundations of the earth,
> I was by his side, a master craftsman,
> delighting him day after day,
> ever at play in his presence,
> at play everywhere in his world,
> delighting to be with the sons of men. (Pr 8:29-31.)

This Wisdom, the firstborn of creatures, underlies not only the fabric of the universe, but also the life of man:

> The man who finds me finds life,
> he will win favour from the Lord;
> but he who does injury to me does hurt to his own soul,
> all who hate me are in love with death. (Pr 8:35-36.)

The way of life and the way of death—these were the alternatives that Moses set forth when he propounded the law of the Lord:

I call heaven and earth to witness against you today:
I set before you life or death, blessing or curse.
Choose life, then, so that you and your descendants may live,
in the love of the Lord your God, obeying his voice, clinging to him;
for in this your life consists. . . . (Dt 30:19-20.)

If we had time, we could quote and reflect upon many other passages. We would examine one by one the beautiful words of Psalm 19 in which the Lord is celebrated as creator of the heavens and as author of the law, which participates in His attributes of perfection, trustworthiness, rectitude, clarity, purity, truth, and lovability. The decree of the Lord is "wisdom for the simple"; His precepts are "joy for the heart"; His commandment is "light for the eyes"; "his words are sweeter than honey, even than honey that drips from the comb" (Ps 19:7-10). We would comment at length upon the transcendence of God to man both in the evolution of human nature and in the unfolding of human history, taking our point of departure from Psalm 93:

You existed from the first, oh Lord.
. . . . . .
The Lord reigns transcendent in the heights.
Your decrees will never alter;
holiness will distinguish your house,
Oh Lord, for ever and ever. (Pr 93:2-5.)

We would have to examine Psalm 119 with the greatest care, for in it we find not merely a testimony to the law of the Lord in a narrow sense but the most remarkable record of the devotion of the chosen people to the whole of divine revelation. For our purposes we would focus upon a single verse pregnant with meaning:

So, having sought your precepts,
I shall walk in all freedom. (Ps 119:45.)

From this meditation we could move on to a consideration of conscience. For those who believe, it cannot be merely the internalization of social demands. Conscience, rather, is the

whispering of the heart which has been formed by the word of the Lord (Ps 19:11-14). The people of God receives from His law a wisdom and understanding by which the Lord is present whenever He is invoked; unbelievers are amazed by it: "No other people is as wise and prudent as this great nation" (Dt 4:6-8).

In discussing conscience we should stress that, since the conscience of the believer is the fruit of instruction by divine law, there cannot possibly be any conflict between the claims of morality and the demands of personal conscience. The rationalizing proposal that conscience might provide a principle by which to evade the principle of the divine law already was considered in Deuteronomy:

> Let there be no root among you bearing fruit that is poisonous and bitter. If, after hearing these sanctions, such a man should bless himself in his heart and say, "I may follow the dictates of my own heart and still lack nothing; much water drives away thirst," the Lord will not pardon him. The wrath and the jealousy of the Lord will blaze against such a man; every curse written in this book will fall on him, and the Lord will blot out his name from under heaven. (Dt 29:18-20.)

We would notice that Jeremiah is sometimes perverted to argue that the law of the Lord is to be replaced with a humanitarian morality, centered in an autonomous conscience. We would explain that Jeremiah does communicate the promise of a new covenant, in which the law of the Lord is to be written in the heart (Jer 31:31-34), and he does condemn the merely external observance of religious ritual by those who do not fulfill the deeper requirements of the law, especially fidelity to the one God (Jer 7:1-28). But neither Jeremiah nor the other prophets ever imagined a morality merely human; rather they proposed that the wisdom of God would be communicated more perfectly, by an interior spirit, which would generate a more vital awareness and a more vibrant love of God.

If personal morality and conscience are understood in this way, how shall we conceive the law? The common conception is that law represents that part of morality concerning

which there is community consensus together with agreement that common utility requires a formulation of this consensus and its enforcement by specified sanctions. However, for us who believe, this common conception of the law is no more acceptable than the common conception of morality.

Not *any* community consensus is adequate to ground just laws, for law, like morality, depends upon divine wisdom. Lawmakers receive their authority from the Lord, and they must exercise this authority in accord with the divine law, which is superior to the laws of men. The Wisdom of Solomon states the situation very clearly:

> Listen then, kings, and understand;
> rulers of remotest lands, take warning;
> hear this, you who have thousands under your rule,
> who boast of your hordes of subjects.
> For power is a gift to you from the Lord,
> sovereignty is from the Most High;
> he himself will probe your acts and scrutinize your intentions.
> If, as administrators of his kingdom, you have not governed justly
> nor observed the law,
> nor behaved as God would have you behave,
> he will fall on you swiftly and terribly. (Wis 6:1-6.)
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Yes, despots, my words are for you,
> that you may learn what wisdom is and not transgress;
> for they who observe holy things holily will be adjudged holy,
> and, accepting instruction from them,
> will find their defence in them. (Wis 6:9-11.)

Just law is an expression of divine wisdom, for just law is nothing but a formulation, a defense, and a mode of realizing the claims of morality in civil society.

In the covenant with Noah, both a prohibition and an affirmative precept were included:

> I will demand an account of every man's life from his fellow men.
> He who sheds man's blood, shall have his blood shed by man,
> for in the image of God man was made.

As for you, be fruitful, multiply,
teem over the earth and be lord of it. (Gen 9:5-7.)

Corresponding to the two precepts, we can distinguish between two functions of just law in human society. First, man has an assigned task, the extension of human life and the subjection of nature. Civil society organizes cooperation for the attainment of those aspects of this task that can be achieved by such a community as the city, the state, and the nation. The laws direct cooperative action toward the good, and they prohibit interference in such positive efforts.

Second, man also is a creature, and so there are boundaries to his dominion, and these boundaries may not be transgressed. God, not man, is the lord of life; to God, not to man, not to the whole of creation, is ultimate fidelity due. Hence the laws must recognize and respect certain inviolable values and must, so far as possible, prevent attacks upon them. Even the Declaration of Independence, a document inspired by a religion which was losing its faith, recognized that just law demands more than the consensus of the community. For there are rights given man by God the creator, and these rights no one can take away. Governments derive their reason for being from their function in defending these rights.

With this foundation, we can sketch briefly the mutual relationships between morality and law. First, let us notice the ways in which law depends upon morality.

The force of law comes from its moral foundation. Mere coercion can make men conform to the demands of a tyrant, whether the tyrant be a single insane man or a whole sick society. But law needs justification, it needs a ground on which its claim is rightful. Law, the legitimate, the *de iure*—these stand against mere compulsion, the *fait accompli*, the *de facto*.

Thus law requires authority, and it derives its authority from morality. Because true morality is from God, all authority comes from Him. Unless the divine source of morality is recognized, law must inevitably seem to individuals nothing more than a subtle method by which members of society coerce

one another. The result, naturally, is insolence and disrespect for the law. This insolence is patent in the unsophisticated, since they do not know how to conceal it. Among the intellectually sophisticated, insolence takes a subtle form. The law is used as a device to extend indefinitely the scope of freedom of action for the sophisticated themselves, while the less sophisticated are consigned to the status of material for psychological and sociological experimentation.

The law also depends upon morality in that unjust laws do not have the power to bind. One can appeal from the demands of the law to a higher principle, the morality which is the source of legal authority. We recognize this fact not only in the rights protected by our fundamental documents but also, for example, in the provision for conscientious objection to military service. What is the appeal to conscience? If it is nothing but the will of the individual set against the will of the majority, then provision for such an appeal is irrational, because on this basis the force of every law would be nullified. Anyone who wishes to break a law would appeal to his own conscience. We assume that the conscience that objects is not claiming the right to set its own autonomous judgment over against the law but is appealing—rightly or mistakenly—to a superior principle from which just law derives its authority.

Since unjust laws do not bind, law depends upon morality for criticism and derives its dynamism from this criticism. Law progresses as moral judgment is applied to purify it of what is unjust. Law that is not subjected to the constant criticism of consciences that recognize a superior principle of right will necessarily stagnate or even degenerate. One hears the slogan: "You can't legislate morality." It is a half-truth, and a dangerous one. Should we legislate immorality? Although law should not enjoin every good act nor prohibit every evil one, the first standard of good law is that it be in accord with morality. Sometimes when this slogan is used, its true meaning is: "You can't legislate your morality, because I am going to legislate mine." That is either cynicism or relativism, and neither attitude can be accepted by those who see in morality the requirements of the wisdom of God.

But the relationship between morality and law is not a one-way affair. If law depends upon morality for authority, morality depends upon law for realization. Without law, civil cooperation would be impossible, and so all that part of man's moral task that requires such cooperation would remain unaccomplished. Without law, inviolable values lack effective protection, and so all that part of man's moral responsibility that requires respect for such values is liable to be cast aside.

The organization of civil cooperation is a function of regulatory statutes, such as those governing commerce; of licensing statutes, such as those governing the practice of medicine; and of the civil law of contracts, as well as of many other parts of the law. Some parts of the criminal code, particularly sections concerned with the defense of property rights, pertain more to this aspect of the law than to the defense of inviolable values, because property itself is extrinsic to the person, and its relationship to the inviolable values is only indirect.

The inviolable values that are intrinsic to the person clearly are protected by criminal law and by the restrictive provisions of our fundamental law. Life and liberty, the integrity of the person against physical and psychological constraint and restraint—the defense of these values is the law's most sacred task. Unfortunately, there has been a tendency to emphasize certain aspects of the law's task at the expense of others, which remain unrecognized in the secular city.

For example, the freedom of those who own property to hold, use, and dispose of it is protected not only by the constitutional immunity from seizure without due process but also by a very large segment of the entire legal code. Today, those of us who are more prosperous live an increasingly luxurious life, but even in America—"land of plenty" and "land of opportunity"—many have little, live in need, and can leave to their children only the same heritage of misery they themselves received from their parents. It is obvious that some other right has gone unrecognized. It is the fundamental right of each man, created in the image of God, to live in the decency that befits his dignity—a little less than a god. Every

man has a right to his crown of glory and honor, and every man has a right to dominion over a fair share of the goods of the earth. Looting and arson cannot be morally justified, but neither can a way of life which invokes law against the crimes of the poor but refuses to use law as an instrument to rectify deep and long-standing social injustices. Nor is there any validity in the argument that social justice would be too expensive. What selfish hearts cannot afford, just hearts would find within their means.

Again, the freedom of the publisher to print and sell what he likes is protected by constitutional guarantees; the right of the continent person to an environment free of unnecessary erotic stimuli is not yet recognized. Here is no question of censorship but of freedom from solicitation. It is impossible to walk down a street or open a newspaper, to turn on a TV news program or glance at a book rack without being accosted and solicited by a multitude of impersonal prostitutes, bent on seduction as a means to increased sales of automobiles and shaving cream, cigarettes and beer, swim suits and theatre tickets, vitamin pills and paperback books.

Similarly, freedom of religion is effectively and rightly protected insofar as establishment and free exercise is concerned; the right of parents to choose the form of religious education they desire for their children is not so effectively protected. Only one type of religious education is given full public sanction; it is the type that presents religion as a function of peripheral significance in a human life and a society dominated by human problems, human desires, human thoughts, human efforts, human satisfactions, human frustrations, and human anxiety. This sort of education has been so effective that many sincerely religious people have responded by trying to make religion relevant—that is, by showing how well it can play its assigned peripheral role. Human frustrations and anxieties, if nothing else, should recall the lesson that our fathers learned so often and so painfully—in the desert, in defeat, in captivity— that religion exists to make man relevant to God, to the one God, and that the gods that are relevant

to man always are pluralistic participants in the condominium of a pagan pantheon.

The law has an important function in support of the efforts of those who wish to be virtuous but who realistically recognize their own weakness. Blindness to evident facts of human psychology continually leads idealists to suppose that the law need not perform this service to morality. Yet, an honest person who knows his own heart is grateful, for example, that the law makes addictive drugs rather difficult to obtain. One easily recalls times when the influence of a crowd or the discomfort of bearable pain might have set one on the way to addiction. Again, virtue has its price, and we should be ready to pay it. But who can blame a businessman who wants the law to provide some assurance that his competitors will not gain an overwhelming advantage by cashing in on unregulated vice?

II.

Now that we have sketched in rather broad strokes the concepts of morality and law and considered their mutual relationship, let us proceed to a further point. Let us consider the most important contribution religious morality, rooted in faith, can make to the secular city in which we live. I think this contribution is a true sense of freedom.

The concept of freedom, as a self-determination governed by objective standards, has its origin in our religious faith; today this concept is gradually vanishing. On the one side are naturalists, who have room for political liberty but who do not understand what self-determination means. Freud and Dewey, though quite different from one another, both exemplify this position. Freedom in the individual is equated with maturity, with the proper termination of the process of development. Knowledge or insight is supposed to untie the knots that may interfere with this development. Thus the school and the couch are counted on to save man, for moral evil is nothing but immaturity and blocked development. On the other side are atheistic existentialists, such as Nietzsche and Sartre. They

insist against the naturalists on man's power of self-determination. But they do not see that this freedom is meaningless without God. Man cannot create values out of nothing, and he is not free if his only possible act is to say "No" to what is. The existentialists fear that, if there is a God, human freedom will be impossible; they refuse to recognize that, if there is no God, human freedom is meaningless.

For the freedom of self-determination is the ability of man, made in the image of God, to say a decisive "Yes" or "No" to the alternatives which divine law proposes. The Greeks, the Egyptians, the Persians—none had a concept of freedom. They did not believe in the one God who created heaven and earth but in gods who were part of the universe, or its necessary principle of emanation. They did not believe in a God who chose for Himself His own people but in gods who were assigned by accident or necessity, or who were created by the people themselves. But since our Lord created all things freely and since He freely covenanted with our fathers, we know what freedom means.

And we know that we men are free, for we were made in the image of God. When the Lord our God offered His covenant to our fathers through Moses, He proposed His law not as a necessity nor as a mere caprice but as an appeal to a freedom which He respected because He Himself had created it. Remember the words of Deuteronomy. There are two ways. One is the way of love of the Lord, obedience to His commandments, His laws, His customs. The other is the way of false gods, disobedience to the commandments of the Lord, violation of His laws, disregard of His customs.

> "See, today I set before you life and prosperity,
> death and disaster." (Dt 30:15.)
>
> . . . . . .
>
> "Choose life, then, so that you and your descendants may live,
> in the love of the Lord your God, obeying his voice, clinging to him;
> for in this your life consists. . . ." (Dt 30:19-20.)

Though not all of us accept the book of Ecclesiasticus or Sirach as part of sacred scripture, I think we might all accept its magnificent formulation of the biblical concept of the freedom and moral responsibility of man, for, like the Wisdom of Solomon, it echoes themes found in the common canon of scripture. Thus, of man's freedom it says:

> Do not say, "The Lord was responsible for my sinning,"
> for he is never the cause of what he hates.
> . . . . . .
> The Lord hates all that is foul,
> and no one who fears him will love it either.
> He himself made man in the beginning,
> and then left him free to make his own decisions.
> If you wish, you can keep the commandments,
> to behave faithfully is within your power.
> . . . . . .
> Man has life and death before him;
> whichever a man likes better will be given him.
> For vast is the wisdom of the Lord;
> he is almighty and all-seeing.
> . . . . . .
> He never commanded anyone to be godless,
> he has given no one permission to sin. (Sir 15:11-21.)

Thus we have freedom, precisely because we are creatures of God and precisely because He guides us with His wisdom. We cannot change the nature of right and wrong by our choice. If we could do that, there simply would be nothing evil, and then there would be nothing morally good either. What we can do by our choice, what is within our power, is to say the decisive word before God: "Your servant listens," or: "I will not serve."

This fundamental concept of freedom and moral responsibility is most important to an appreciation of law. Of course, our freedom can be limited—in extreme cases even obliterated—by psychological and social factors that inhibit or preclude our functioning as fully human persons. To the extent that this is true, sciences such as psychology and sociology

can explain human behavior. But just to this extent our action has no direct moral significance, and it cannot be regulated by law. For law appeals to the person as a free and responsible agent; it does not deal with him as a patient or a product of his environment.

In saying this I do not mean to deny an appropriate role to psychology and social science in the treatment of unfree behavior. I only wish to insist that to the extent behavior is not free, to the same extent responsibility must be exercised by others. A free society in which no one is more than a patient and product of his environment is a contradiction in terms. This elementary but neglected truth must be remembered in any discussion of crime.

Appreciation of this truth might open the way to the profound and thorough reform our penal institutions very much need. To the extent that a crime is a product of bad environment and psychic disease, it is not a human and responsible act. And so to this extent the criminal ought not to be punished; he ought to be treated in a way likely to result in his cure.

However, to the extent that a crime is the expression of self-determination, it is a human and responsible act, and to this extent the criminal must be judged guilty. But our judgment should be more like God's judgment: a sentence of compassion rather than of condescension, a sentence of mercy rather than of mere condemnation. With our present penal practice, many prisoners probably suffer graver injustices than they have committed. Crime calls for reconciliation more than for isolation, and the criminal should be held to restitution—so far as possible—rather than be subjected to useless and irrelevant suffering. But in all penal reform we should maintain the important distinction between the morally responsible aspects of criminal conduct and the psycho-social conditions that limit the freedom of that conduct.

The criminal law has attempted to draw a line between morally significant action and unfree behavior, by incorporating concepts such as "criminal intent." The line must be

maintained, though it sometimes is obscured because man often acts with a freedom severely diminished by factors beyond his control. The familiar " degrees " of homicide correspond to degrees of moral freedom. The abandonment of the dividing line not only would mean inappropriate reaction by the community to criminal acts; it also would mean the eventual control of everyone's behavior by the experts. If there is no crime, there is likewise no free act that is good. Every man with the law of God in his heart is competent to be a participant in the making of the laws, but only a trained specialist is competent to be a social engineer.

Also, in social action programs, such as those of the war on poverty, we should always maintain the distinction between unfree behavior and responsible action. Welfare programs, because of the predicament of the recipients, offer tempting opportunities for experiments in social engineering. While such experiments are being conducted, those who control society can both congratulate themselves on their generosity and enjoy the fruits of the continued exploitation that manipulation of the disadvantaged makes possible. Manipulation and coercion should be eliminated from welfare programs. The first principle of social welfare policies should be to assure everyone the means to pay as little attention to the advice of experts as the experts pay to the law of God.

Sometimes the whole question of the relation of law to social evils is confused by the supposition that a social evil is indistinguishably a moral reality and a purely factual state of affairs. If social evil is a moral reality, overcoming it will purge society of immorality and lawlessness. If social evil is a purely factual state of affairs, overcoming it is a technical problem susceptible of a technical solution. Because the two are confused, it comes to seem that social evils are opportunities for the elimination of immorality and lawlessness by the relatively simple procedures of technological manipulation.

To those who believe, the illusoriness of this view is obvious. But we must make absolutely clear to our fellow citizens that social evils—whether riots in the cities or criminal abortion or

unequal opportunities for employment—are not simple, homogeneous entities. Every such evil undoubtedly has purely factual aspects, which must be dealt with as such. Handling what already exists is not a question of directing human freedom but a problem of mastering recalcitrant matter by means of suitable techniques. When we are confronted with facts that give rise to evil, we must try to change them to make way for good. But every such evil also has aspects of a strictly moral character. There is no point in trying to find a technical remedy for these aspects. Nor can we expect that law enforcement will ever eliminate moral evil. Men are free; we sin; we can only turn to the Lord and ask for His mercy and His aid.

In a longer, more theoretical exposition, this would be the place to take up the utilitarian ethics and jurisprudence which is set up as an idol by those who lack faith in the place that rightly belongs to the morality and jurisprudence of the wisdom of God. Utilitarianism pretends to respect man's freedom and at the same time to improve him by applied science. The theory is incoherent. No one ever reached a moral decision by it, for utilitarian reasoning always assumes what is decided by moral judgment when it formulates a question for decision. Only after this assumption can utilitarianism provide a plausible rationalization for the decision that already has been made.

Unfortunately, we cannot enter upon this exposition. Suffice it to say that fundamental truths of faith are irreconcilable with utilitarianism. Among these are that God is a good and loving father, who can care for us because He is all-knowing and all-powerful; that God's goodness is boundless and that His wisdom transcends our understanding.

III.

If a true sense of freedom is the most basic contribution that moral teaching rooted in our religious faith can make to the legal institution in our day, I think that the next most important contribution would be a reiteration of the forgotten richness of our moral tradition. We hear over and over again about a few moral concepts. The concepts are good in them-

selves, but their names are perverted when they are torn from the living context of faith in God and used as slogans that are repeated until they become meaningless: love, responsibility, equality, love, commitment, dialogue, love, sincerity, interpersonal relations, love, openness, concern, and mutual love. One can understand why unbelievers, who know only problems for cold intelligence, or subconscious urges, or a hopeless yearning for power, or useless passion and nausea, should find the world empty of love and feel a constant need to speak of it as of a priceless possession that has mysteriously vanished from the earth without leaving a trace.

For those who believe, the obsession with love must be suspect. No one is obsessed about the very atmosphere he breathes, and love is the very atmosphere the spirit of the believer breathes:

> Give thanks to the Lord, for he is good,
> his love is everlasting!
> . . . . . .
> His wisdom made the heavens,
> his love is everlasting!
> . . . . . .
> He struck down the first-born of Egypt,
> his love is everlasting!
> . . . . . .
> He remembered us when we were down,
> his love is everlasting!
> . . . . . .
> He provides for all living creatures,
> his love is everlasting!
> Give thanks to the God of Heaven,
> his love is everlasting. (Ps 136.)

Like the atmosphere, genuine love does not displace everything else. Rather, it suffuses all the living and finds specific form in their specific modes of goodness. We hardly hear of these: purity, piety, gratitude, courage, courtesy, and so many more. For God, to love is enough; for us, holiness must take specific shape or it disperses as a breath.

Purity: the very concept is in danger of being lost. Purity is indissolubly linked with holiness; purity is a disposition required of those who touch the holy. Purity is singleness of heart. How can one rightly encounter the holy with ulterior motives?

Piety: we were not our own beginning. Piety recognizes the source of our being and acknowledges the love from which we came. We come forth from our mother and we take shape within her womb; we come forth from our father and we grow up within his house; we come forth from God and we live within His world. If we forget this, has the world come of age?

Gratitude: a creature must receive gifts patiently. It is more Godlike to give than to receive, but our love is a need, an aching void. Man without God thinks that love is only in giving. We talk of giving ourselves. The gift may be an empty box, for the self is nothing until it is offered to God and filled up with His riches.

Courage: how this noble concept is distorted. A woman so devoid of modesty that she approaches nearer to nudity than anyone else in her circle is credited for the courage of her fashions. Similarly, a person who abandons his faith and makes a public spectacle of himself is credited with the courage of his convictions. Apparently the only courage is in giving satisfaction to voyeurs. Where is the courage of the martyrs, the witnesses of a faith that does not die? Today men of faith are under subjection by the Greeks, who try to impose their pagan cults. They make skillful use of the exquisite torture of public opinion. Where are martyrs like those whose heroism is recounted in Maccabees?

Courtesy: the extension of the spirit of ritual into daily life. Nothing is more empty than courtesy separated from true worship of God. But nothing is more characteristic of men who see in one another the image of God than a courtesy in behavior which is an image of the ritual by which they worship God.

In mentioning these virtues, I do not mean to suggest that morality should be confined to the private sphere of life. The

task which God has set for us requires the work of vast organizations as well as the effort of single individuals and small groups. But in every case, it is individual persons who will see what can be done, who will judge what should be done, who will do what is going to be done. Social consciousness is part of individual character, not a substitute for it.

One of the most disquieting trends of this decade is the tendency of many well-intentioned young people to try to substitute the experience of activity in small groups for cultivation of personal character and cooperation in the work of existing institutions. Established structures have their defects, and so they must be purified and strengthened. But they are essential for organizing effort on the scale necessary to do anything more about great social problems than to amuse oneself with the game of social consciousness and commitment. Social activism pursued as an opportunity for experience has been known to yield its place to LSD. This degeneration reveals that the meaning of the activism was egoistic, and that the activist lacked character established on the firm foundation of the wisdom of God which, though itself unchanging, has the power to make all things new.

Some who have no faith propose authenticity as the single moral absolute. This authenticity, which also is called sincerity or honesty, is an ideal of conformity between one's inner self and his outward action. The standard is the inner self. One's own autonomous freedom is supposed to determine everything, and moral failure consists solely in allowing anything beyond oneself to distort the expression of this freedom. Even the apostles of authenticity admit that the ideal is impossible, but this admission has not prevented the standard of authenticity from exerting a seductive attraction. As a result, respect for law and adaptation of oneself to existing institutions are more and more condemned as phoneyness and surrender to hypocrisy.

Those who believe must have the confidence to point out that phoneyness and hypocrisy are not avoided by an illusory authenticity but only by an authentic humility, for humility

is the acceptance of oneself, before God, for what one is. The humble hold fast to the law that they violate, that by it they may know the truth of their guilt. The apostles of authenticity condemn such humility as hypocrisy and propose instead that a free man should reject the authority of the law which he chooses to violate. As if a consistent denial of one's deepest being, his existence as a creature of God, were somehow more honest than a failure admitted as guilty to fulfill the law of the Lord.

Others who have no faith propose "maturity" as the single moral absolute. This maturity, which also is called adjustment or personality-integration, is an ideal of inner peace. The ideal state of tension-free existence has proved to be a mirage. Most disturbing to the dream of peace are objective moral standards and the demands of laws based upon them. These demands lead to civil war within the self. If only these harsh, rigid, impersonal, legalistic, abstract, inhuman rules could be changed! Then perhaps we could do what we are inclined to do without being bothered by guilty consciences.

Those who believe have a solemn obligation to bear witness to the unchangeability of the principles which underlie the law. There is room for constant revision in man-made laws, to make them better conform to the standard of justice. But the repeal of just laws, though it may make crime respectable, does not allow the guilty man to escape. Our age is like that of Isaiah when a rebellious people told the prophets:

> Do not prophesy the truth to us,
> tell us flattering things;
> have illusory visions;
> turn aside from the way, leave the path,
> take the Holy One out of our sight. (Is 30:10-11.)

However unlikely it is that the message will be well received, it must be repeated that there is no escape from the inner conflict that we find so painful, except by repentance and the mercy of God. For Isaiah also tells us:

> For thus says the Lord God, the Holy One of Israel:
> Your salvation lay in conversion and tranquillity,

your strength, in complete trust;
and you would have none of it.
" No," you said, " we will flee on horses."
So be it, flee then!
. . . . . .

But the Lord is waiting to be gracious to you,
to rise and take pity on you,
for the Lord is a just God;
happy are all who hope in him. (Is 30:15-18.)

Others who have no faith—and some who have faith but who are deceived by a plausible counterfeit of the wisdom of God—propose love as the only moral absolute. The love in question is supposed to be a responsible care and concern for the good of others, a care and concern so diligent in seeking what is beneficial that it does not stop short at violating standards of right and wrong. Not only man-made laws but even the most solemn demands of the law of God are considered to be open to justified violation whenever love requires. The end justifies the means. Although proponents of this theory deny that it is antinomianism, that, nevertheless, is its practical effect.

Those who believe must point out that the demands of love are not a practical guide for action. If one has a question about what he should do, then certainly he will find in his heart a conflict between two or more loves, each claiming the right to guide action. More fundamentally, believers must insist that the love which transcends the precepts of the law does not violate them, since this love is directed to the Lord our God.

Within the community of Judaeo-Christian religious faith are many theologies that try to explain the absolute demand of this fundamental commandment. Among these theologies are the situational morality of Brunner, Barth, and Bonhoeffer as well as the finely drawn morality of rabbinical teaching and the moral theologies developed in the light of the authentic teaching of the Catholic Church. These theologies differ greatly from one another. Yet all of them agree in rejecting

the notion that a merely human appraisal of what is beneficial could justify the violation of what is accepted as a demand of the law of God.

Against any form of love-ethic that evades the requirements of faith stands the faith of Abraham. He was ready to do to Isaac, not what love required, but what the Lord commanded. Where there is no absolute limit, faith has been abandoned and replaced by a purely human, merely utilitarian ethics. This is the " new morality "—utilitarianism newly dressed in a costume and mask that lets it impersonate true morality based upon the law of God.

In the field of law, not everything can be reduced to love—that is, to the production of measurable benefits. Justice has an absolute aspect; we must defend it even when no benefit seems to accrue, even when the net result seems harmful. This obligation is particularly strong in regard to the defense of the inviolability of innocent human life. Human friendship is a higher value than life itself, but the higher value cannot exist if the lower is not preserved. When the link between sexual activity and the beginning of new life is broken, sexual activity becomes ambiguous and is in danger of losing all meaning. When a right is conceded to violate innocent human life in the name of love, all human activity becomes ambiguous and is in danger of losing its meaning.

For no one can know the meaning of the life of the one who is killed, and no one can calculate what would be the worth of that life.

> I will demand an account of every man's life from his fellow men.
> He who sheds man's blood,
> shall have his blood shed by man,
> for in the image of God
> man was made. (Gen 9:5-6.)

God, not man, is the lord of life. Only God knows who is truly well born, since man, the image of God, reflects the immeasurability of the Lord's meaning and goodness.

When we look back to the Nazi era, we wonder how such insanity could have taken hold of a civilized nation. In the

1920's, German intellectuals, physicians, lawyers, and clergymen discussed proposals of programs of legalized abortion and euthanasia for the elimination of those whose lives were deemed to be without value. When the Nazis came to power, the groundwork was already laid. The abortion program was rejected as a waste of potential manpower, but the euthanasia programs were put into effect. Half-a-million or so persons, many of them infants, died as a result of these " humanitarian " programs. These facilities, originally developed to eliminate sickly infants, the insane, the incurables, and the senile, were only later expanded to bring about the " final solution to the Jewish problem."

The moral basis of law is essential to defend an absolute concept of justice that will prevent that from happening again. The idea of a moral absolute is likely to meet resistance. But there are two kinds of absolutes. One is an aggressive absolute. It claims the right to obliterate everything in its path. For finite beings, such an absolute is a source of terror, for we never can resist such a thing. Those who do not believe in God fear Him because they imagine Him to be like this. Those who believe do not fear Him, only if they trust in His love.

The other kind of absolute is a defensive absolute. It claims the right only to defend something against any power that may seek to destroy it. For finite beings, such an absolute is a source of confidence, for without protection we would be at the mercy of anyone who thinks he is God and who sets out to achieve the final solution of some problem.

We all hope that the world never will experience a large-scale nuclear war. But if it should happen, how will survivors look back upon us? Will they judge that our commitment to a strategy of nuclear deterrence made us less and less sensitive to the inviolability of innocent life? Will they consider our acceptance of legalized abortion as a symptom of the decay of our respect for the law of God?

Probably the most important objection that can be raised against moral absolutes, even defensive ones, is that no one can tell in advance for every situation that a certain mode of

action, though it be evil, may not be necessary to prevent an even greater evil. It was all very well, so the objection goes, for the Stoics to say: "Let right be done though the world perish." But the fact is that the world is not a simple structure of rational necessity as the Stoics imagined. Instead, it is a dynamic interfolding of good, stemming from the creator, and of evil, stemming from the imperfection of creation and from man's abuse of his liberty in separation from God. Therefore, concludes the objection, man must exercise responsible dominion over himself and the rest of creation. This role falls to him precisely because he is made in the image of God. In this role man must build up his world, even in violation of an abstract rightness that a Stoic would have respected.

The argument is plausible. Surely faith must reject the Stoic maxim. However, the alternative proposed by the objection is the position of modern humanism, not the alternative of faith. For faith has never accepted the maxim: "Let wrong be done lest the world perish."

If believers have become aware of human freedom and responsibility, as the Stoics never conceived them, still, believers also have remembered the source of this awareness: that man is made in the image of a free and responsible God. Hence, ever since Abraham, ever since Noah the man of faith has said:

Let right be done, and pray that God not permit the world to perish. And if the world seem to perish before your very eyes, then believe, man of faith, that the Lord our God, who created both earth and heaven, stands firm forever.

GERMAIN G. GRISEZ

Georgetown University
Washington, D. C.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, AND MORALITY

LEO STRAUSS'S recently published lectures on "Jerusalem and Athens"[1] compel one to consider criticisms which have been made against him, not by positivists or existentialists but by men identified with the Christian and natural law traditions. These criticisms, provoked by Strauss's "What is Political Philosophy?" essay, were directed against his work in its entirety.[2] What disturbs these critics is Strauss's silence about the relationship between political philosophy and theology. Unlike Plato, he fails to search into the depths of the human soul to gain experience of the good and knowledge of virtue. He does not transcend the merely political order, the human things, toward knowledge of the Divine which is the measure of all things. This failure is no accident, for Strauss, according to this criticism, repudiates any connection between theology and political philosophy; or he asserts that theology has nothing to do with political philosophy. Accord-

[1] "Jerusalem and Athens: Some Preliminary Reflections," The City College Papers, No. 6 (New York: The City College, 1967). Strauss's lectures were the inaugural "The Frank Cohen Public Lectures in Judaic Affairs."

[2] What follows is based on the remarks of William C. Havard, "The Method and Results of Political Anthropology in America," *Archiv fur Rechts-und Sozial-philosophie*, XLVII (1961), 395-415 and especially 411-14, and Gerhart Niemeyer, "What is Political Knowledge?" *Review of Politics* XXIII (Jan. 1961), 101-07 and especially 101-04. However, similar criticism are made in three articles by Dante Germino, "The Revival of Political Theory," *Journal of Politics* XXV (Aug. 1963), 437-60; "Eric Voegelin's Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory," *Review of Politics* XXVI (July 1964), 378-402 (especially 386-87); and "Second Thoughts on Leo Strauss's Machiavelli," *Journal of Politics* XXVIII (Nov. 1966), 794-817. For a related criticism, more sympathetic to Strauss, see G. P. Grant, "Tyranny and Wisdom: A Comment on the Controversy between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojeve," *Social Research* XXXI (Spring, 1964), 45-72. A rather vitriolic criticism was also made by Robert J. McShea, "Leo Strauss on Machiavelli," *Western Political Quarterly* XVI (Dec. 1963), 789-97.

ingly, he fails to indicate that Christian political philosophy added anything that was relevant for understanding the right order of political life. He refuses to admit that the novel view of transcendence embodied in the Incarnation made an essential difference for political thought. But any attempt to pursue political knowledge apart from these religious insights constitutes a rejection of transcendence. Strauss's political philosophy is as earthbound as the modern political philosophy he has so soundly criticized. Consequently his thinking is often moralistic rather than metaphysical or ontological. He is content to leave the quest for fundamental truth at the level of moral approval or disapproval. In fact, he comes dangerously close to a moralism where authoritative approval rests with men whose character has been formed by a classical education, i. e., there are no objective standards outside the individual.

The lectures on " Jerusalem and Athens " are not likely to answer such criticisms. It is true that Strauss is no longer silent on the subject of Revelation, i. e., he now speaks openly of Jerusalem. But he still depreciates, not merely by his silence, the Christian tradition. Moreover, he explicitly states that Jerusalem, the Biblical faith, and Athens, Greek thought, are representative of contradictory principles. Each tradition claims to embody " true wisdom, thus denying to the other its claim to be wisdom in the strict and highest sense." He claims that we are " compelled . . . to make a choice, to take a stand " between these two contradictory principles. Yet in the very act of listening to each side, prior to deciding, " we have already decided in favor of Athens against Jerusalem." The reason for this is the following: " According to the Bible, the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord; according to the Greek philosophers, the beginning of wisdom is wonder." By wondering, we show we do not simply fear, i. e., we question the authenticity of Revelation. Yet having suggested this, Strauss immediately and characteristically blurs the picture. He defends the Bible against Biblical criticism, against that form of Biblical interpretation inspired by philosophy. By

questioning such Biblical criticism, " we avoid the compulsion to make an advance decision in favor of Athens against Jerusalem." [3] Through the remainder of his lectures, Strauss is content to bring out the contradictory character of the two principles. His own stand remains a mystery, indeed even his treatment of the contradictory and incompatible character of philosophy and Revelation is singularly enigmatic. Yet he raises, as do his critics, issues of great importance for those interested in knowledge of political things—issues which far transcend the particular dispute but which may be best considered in the light of that dispute. What is the relationship between political philosophy and political theology, i.e., a teaching based not merely on human reason but on Revelation? What is the relationship between political philosophy, Revelation, and morality? In order to explore these questions it is necessary to return to the beginning of the dispute, that is, we must carefully consider what Strauss says about the subject in his essay, " What is Political Philosophy? " [4]

I

There he attempts to delineate the nature of political philosophy and, in doing so, he discusses a number of political philosophers. Yet, with the possible exception of Locke, none of the thinkers could qualify in any strict sense as Christian thinkers. Those familiar with Strauss's interpretation of Locke are aware that especially Locke fails to qualify as a Christian thinker or as one who tried to understand political things in

[3] Strauss, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7.

[4] *What is Political Philosophy? and other Studies* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959). References to the title essay in this section will be made in the text. Subsequent footnotes will adopt the abbreviation *WIPP*. The following abbreviations will be used for Strauss's other writings: *NRH* = *Natural Right and History; Hobbes* = *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Chicago, 1952); *PAW* = *Persecution and The Art of Writing* (Glencoe, 1952); *Thoughts* = *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Glencoe, 1958); *T* = *On Tyranny* (Revised edition, Glencoe, 1963); *CM* = *The City and Man* (Chicago, 1964); *Spinoza* = *Spinoza's Critique of Religion* (New York, 1965). This latter book is a translation of *Die Religionskritik Spinoza* (Berlin, 1930), but contains a new " Preface " which shall be referred to as if it were a separate work.

the light of Judaic-Christian Revelation. Locke made a conscious effort to separate the study of politics from the study of Revelation and to establish political philosophy as an autonomous discipline.[5] Strauss avoids discussing St. Thomas Aquinas, Hooker or Augustine. Moreover, at the very beginning of his essay, apparently speaking as a Jew to a Jewish audience,[6] he declares that the nature of his subject will compel him " to wander far away from our sacred heritage, or to be silent about it . . ." (10). Subsequently he states that Machiavelli's thought is based on a critique of religion and a critique of morality. But though that critique of religion is chiefly a critique of the Biblical religion, he insists that it is better to keep those " blasphemies under the veil under which he has hidden them " (41). He is silent about Machiavelli's critique of religion. He proclaims or announces his silence about the relationship between political philosophy and theology.

His critics claim that he is not merely silent but that he rejects any connection between political philosophy and theology. This assertion apparently is based on the following remark:

> We are compelled to distinguish political philosophy from political theology. By political theology we understand political teachings which are based on divine revelation. Political philosophy is limited to what is accessible to the unassisted human mind. (13)

Is a distinction between two things the same as a rejection of any connection between those two things? Distinctions are required to set forth the essential character of a thing. They involve the conscious abstraction from that which is both related and important for complete understanding. But complete understanding, understanding of the whole, demands prior understanding of the parts.[7] This particular distinction is one of five made between things which are not political

[5] *NRH*, pp. 202-06.
[6] Cf. *Spinoza*, pp. 163-65.
[7] Cf. *CM*, pp. 19, 49, 61-2, 128, 137-38.

philosophy (namely, political thought in general, political theory, political theology, social philosophy, and political science) and political philosophy proper. Strauss does not reject any connection, for example, between political philosophy and political thought in general. He explicitly discusses their relationship.

The distinction between political philosophy and political theology is the central distinction. It is the only one where Strauss unambiguously speaks of being " compelled " to make the distinction. Moreover, it is curious for its brevity, being limited to the quoted passage. Its brevity, contrasted with the discussion of political thought, increases our perplexity. Why is he so laconic? We are reminded that silence about an important matter, where a discussion seems in order, may be an indication of a writer's position. Silence may be as significant as a lengthy discussion. It may indicate that the writer rejects the relevance of the matter or that prudence dictates not revealing one's opinions openly.[8] While " moderation is not a virtue of thought," it is " a virtue controlling the philosopher's speech " (32). Knowing this, we compel ourselves to pay close attention to his apparent silence.

Turning from the central distinction to the middle of the second part, and thus to the center of the essay, we discover the following. Strauss chooses to discuss Plato's *Laws* as the work which shows with " the greatest clarity " the nature of classical political philosophy. The choice is not the only possible one. He might have discussed the *Republic* or Aristotle's *Politics*.[9] We might ask of him what he asks in this context of Plato: " What is the artistic or logographic necessity demanding this? " His choice of the *Laws* leads him to observe that the *Laws* is the only Platonic dialogue which begins with the word " God " while the *Apology of Socrates* is the only one to end with the word " God." In the *Apology* Socrates, an old Athenian philosopher, defends himself against the charge of impiety or the charge that he does not believe that the

[8] *Thoughts*, pp. 30-32; *PAW*, pp. 53-54, 75-77.

[9] *CM*, pp. 13-14, 21, 25, 29, 53-54, 60; *PAW*, pp. 9-10.

gods worshipped in Athens exist. "It seems that there is a conflict between philosophy and accepting the gods of the city." The *Laws* indicates how an old Athenian philosopher reconciles the city and philosophy by a law which commands admission of gods whose existence can be demonstrated (32-3).

There is a conflict between philosophy and the religion of the city. The philosopher cannot accept this religion because it is not reasonable, i. e., it is unacceptable to theoretical reason. The religion of the city is embodied in tradition, in the stories told about the gods by the poets, unedifying, contradictory, even preposterous stories. Yet the city depends on belief in the gods. Obedience to the law, orderliness, and virtue are only possible when the citizens believe that there are all-seeing gods. Citizens obey the law, even without a policeman around the corner, when they fear the wrath of the gods or hope for their blessing. Moreover, moderation is encouraged. Citizens willingly endure their lot if they believe that there is a life after death where the woes and iniquities of this world are rectified. People do not expect perfection or bliss on earth when they believe that only the gods are perfect and that bliss only comes after death. Moderate courses of action are the backbone of any political order. Without belief in the gods, moderation would be endangered, perhaps destroyed.

If the philosopher proclaims his disbelief, he may endanger the city. The philosopher's love of truth makes him virtuous and orderly. But he cannot expect other men to be made virtuous by the search for truth. The city cannot be built on truth or the search for truth. It depends upon the laws and the laws depend on belief in the gods. Most men live in the cave. To deny the gods means not only to risk personal danger but to risk encouraging general disorder or permanent chaos. Chaos is not advantageous to the city. It is not advantageous to the philosopher. Socrates chose rather to remain in his Athenian prison than to flee to "a lawless country far away, where the prevailing lack of order would make his life miserable" (33). The philosopher loves order, and an inferior

order, if in any way decent, is better than no order. For practical reasons, the philosopher is compelled to respect the beliefs of the city. Socrates appears to be pious. But Socrates questioned the Delphic oracle, the agent of the god, and Socrates was accused of impiety. The philosopher cannot give up his search for truth, and he cannot always convince the city of his orthodoxy. A potential conflict between the city and philosophy always exists. The outbreak of conflict may lead to the destruction of the philosopher or of the city or both. None of the possibilities are especially propitious for mankind.[10]

Strauss is discussing the relationship between philosophy and theology. For the theology of the pagan city is still a theology, however crude and rudimentary. It asserts that the gods revealed the laws of the city, both prohibitions and commands, a long time ago, before living memory. The laws of the city gain their dignity and authority because they are laws given by the gods or the human attempts to fulfill the requirements of the gods. Ultimately this belief in the sacred character of the laws of the city depends on a perfectly respectable opinion: the identification of the old with the good or the belief that there are gods concerned with men or the belief that there is divine providence and revelation. The philosopher rejects the identification of the old with the good. The good, the highest thing for man, is philosophy. But the ancients did not know philosophy. They were ignorant of the highest good. Whatever else one might say about the providential gods, they did not give man philosophy in the beginning.[11]

It is necessary to make some distinctions. There is a difference betweent a mythical or false theology based on poetical fancy, a theology based on a revelation from God, and a natural theology based on what can be known by unassisted human reason. Perhaps the conflict between the city and the philosopher is restricted to those cities united by or based on a poetical theology. Certainly harmony exists when the religion and laws of the city are the work of the philosopher. Natural

[10] *T*, pp. 213-21; *PAW*, pp. 16-17, 105-06, 114-17; *CM*, pp. 19-21, 137-38.
[11] Cf. *NRH*, pp. 82-84, 96-97; *CM*, pp. 98-99, 105.

theology replaces poetical theology in the city of the *Laws*. The question then is whether the relationship between philosophy and genuine revelation is similar to the relationship between philosophy and poetical theology or that between philosophy and natural theology. We have no difficulty in believing that, if there is a genuine revelation, it would be compatible with natural theology and with philosophy.

The difficulty which the philosopher has with the claims of pagan religion is that the assertion that the laws originated with the gods cannot be substantiated. There are no longer any eyewitnesses to the purported event. Belief in the stories about the gods is based on hear-say evidence. Quite obviously, similar ambiguity surrounds the origins of Biblical Revelation. But while one may not be able to show that revelation originated with a god or God, still " a code given by a god, by a being of superhuman excellence, must be unqualifiedly good " (30). The question is whether Judaic-Christian Revelation, or the codes established by the Bible, are unqualifiedly good.

According to Strauss, " Jewish orthodoxy based its claim to superiority to other religions from the beginning on its superior rationality." [12] Despite this, he does not discuss whether the Jewish code is unqualifiedly good or whether it agrees with the best regime set out by the classical philosophers. The guiding question for classical political philosophy is the question of the best regime, the best way of life for the city and man. Strauss asserts that questions concerning the character of the regime are alien to the Biblical teaching. " Regime becomes the guiding theme of political thought when the derivative or questionable character of the law has been realized " (34). The law of the Bible, the code of the Jewish people, may come from God. Precisely for that reason it would be beyond question. To doubt the perfection and the authority of the code is to doubt that the code was revealed by God.

Philosophy presupposes a break with all authority.[13] The first distinction Strauss makes sets off political philosophy from political thought in general. Political thought is " the reflec-

[12] " Preface " to *Spinoza*, p. 30. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 10-11, 17-18.

[13] *NRH*, pp. 84-93.

tion on, or the exposition of, political ideas." Though related to, it differs from political philosophy since it is "indifferent to the distinction between opinion and knowledge." Political philosophy "is the conscious, coherent and relentless effort to replace opinions about the political fundamentals by knowledge regarding them." Political thought "finds its adequate expression in laws and codes, in poems and stories, in tracts and public speeches." It "is as old as the human race; the first man who uttered a word like 'father' or an expression like 'thou shalt not . . .' was the first political thinker; but political philosophy appeared at a knowable time in the recorded past" (12-3). The examples are curious. They remind us of the Bible, even of the core of the Old Testament teaching, the Decalogue. It is unlikely that the examples were chosen haphazardly. They imply that the teaching of the Bible comes to sight in the eyes of the philosopher as political thought, as opinion not knowledge. As opinion it ought to be submitted to conscious, coherent, relentless examination. Yet Strauss studiously avoids examining the claims of Judaism, and hence of Judaic-Christian Revelation, in the light of philosophy.

Only once in the essay does he quote at length. Curiously, that quotation is from a Christian theologian, St. Thomas Aquinas. Its singular character calls our attention to the quotation. The passage is used to support the claim that, despite the fact that philosophy is "essentially not possession of the truth, but the quest for the truth," it is not "futile" (11). Yet if one turns to the context, one discovers that the quotation which Strauss attributes to the Christian theologian is attributed in turn by him to the pagan philosopher, Aristotle. St. Thomas uses the authority of Aristotle to show the superiority of the study of sacred doctrine to the study of the sciences or philosophy, the superiority of the study of Revelation to the endeavors of unassisted human reason. Philosophy is the handmaiden of theology.[14] But Strauss uses the remark of the theologian,

[14] Strauss quotes from the *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 1, a. 5, while St. Thomas attributes the remark to Aristotle *de Animalibus* xi. 25.

borrowed from the philosopher, to imply that the efforts of unassisted human reason are superior to the certainties of Revelation. Revealed theology claims to have authoritative knowledge about the highest questions, the nature of God and of the cosmos. But the philosopher is aware of his ignorance or is certain that the doubts concerning the possible answers to the most fundamental questions are greater than the evidence on behalf of those answers. Dogmatism is " the inclination ' to identify the goal of our thinking with the point at which we have become tired of thinking,' "[15] and dogmatism is the special preserve of revealed religion.

Strauss is not silent about the relationship of philosophy to revealed theology. He seems to suggest that the conflict which exists between poetical theology and philosophy also exists between revealed theology and philosophy. Yet we cannot be certain. His silence and his suggestions are perplexing. We may apply to him his own words about Machiavelli: " He fascinates his readers by confronting them with riddles."[16] Differently stated, we must wonder why he is compelled to be silent or why he only hints at the issues. Certainly the mere charge of impiety would not disturb him. Nor is it likely that at this time and in this country he might risk persecution for impiety. Nor would bold proclamations of atheism or agnosticism by an academician much shock the sensibilities of his colleagues or disturb the social order. What necessity might have compelled him to use riddles or to be silent about revealed theology and to proclaim his silence which is not silence at all?[17]

II

Strauss's silence concerning theology leads to the charge that he comes dangerously close to a moralism which seems indistinguishable from moral relativism. Because he does not pay " sufficient attention to the way in which knowledge of virtue is reached," he does not know the " experience of the divine

[15] *NRH*, p. 22 where Strauss quotes from Lessing. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 163-64.
[16] *Thoughts*, p. 50.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52, 120-22, 174-76; *PAW*, pp. 22-37.

as the ground of all being" and hence is ignorant of the fact that morality originates with God.[18] But the question is whether political science, ethics, or political philosophy must be dependent upon theology, especially Judaic-Christian theology. The most important natural law teaching, that of St. Thomas Aquinas, insists on a distinction between natural law and Revelation. Natural knowledge of morality, including prudence and the principles of politics, is possible. Revelation may supplement, clarify, and specify the natural law. But belief in Revelation is a matter of faith and faith is a gift of God. The heresy that faith depends on a free choice by man, rather than on an inward movement of grace originating with God, was the heresy of the Pelagians. Natural law can be known by one who does not know that the God of Judaic-Christian Revelation is the author of that law.[19] To make natural law dependent on acceptance of Revelation, belief in the God of Revelation, is to destroy the meaning of natural law as St. Thomas understood it.

Normative political science may exist independently of Judaic-Christian theology without degenerating into moralism. To doubt this is to doubt the ability of human reason to understand what is right and just according to nature. But may a normative political science exist apart from all considerations about God? May political philosophy exist without natural theology? May it be thoroughly human, oriented to the human understanding of human things, without any consideration of the Divine? According to Strauss, an earthbound political science is undesirable. The human must be understood in the light of something other than itself, in the light of either the subhuman or the superhuman. Modern political philosophy follows the first course. It attempts to understand the higher in terms of the lower. But this distorts the higher,

[18] Havard, *op. cit.*, 412-13.

[19] *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, aa. 6, 13; I-II, q. 91, aa. 2, 4; q. 112, a. 3; II-II, q. 6, a. 1. Cf. Thomas Gilby, *Principality and Polity* (London, 1958), xxi-xxiv, pp. 233-35; also Appendix 3 on *Natural Law* in vol. 28, *Law and Political Theory, Summa Theologiae* (New York, 1966).

denies the higher its proper dignity. Strauss rejects modern political philosophy. The human things, man and the city, must be understood in the light of the superhuman. Political philosophy, as distinct from political theology, attempts to understand the human in the light of natural knowledge of the Divine. Political philosophy is essentially connected with natural theology.[20]

Philosophy is the quest for knowledge about the cosmos, about its origin, nature and destiny. Accordingly, the philosopher must wonder as to whether the world was created or whether it is eternal; if it was created, whether out of " something " or out of " nothing "; if the world was created by what kind of being; in what manner and for what possible reasons; does the Creator, having acted, continue to care for the world or does He leave it to its own resources (perhaps because He has set things in perfect order); is He open to prayer? What is the ultimate end of the world and of man or is there any ultimate end, a natural or Divine goal? Questions such as these, the attempt to grasp their meaning and to answer them as far as is humanly possible, constitute natural theology. Natural theology is the highest theme of philosophy.

How does natural theology relate to political life? More precisely, what is political philosophy? How does political philosophy relate to the highest theme of philosophy and to politics? Philosophy can exist apart from political philosophy. Presocratic philosophy looked down upon political things as conventional. Political things are subject to change, even constant change. But philosophy is interested in the eternal and immutable, not the ephemeral and changing. Political philosophy, rather than being a matter of course, had to be discovered. Socrates was the founder or discoverer of political philosophy. He discovered the naturalness of political life by reflecting on the nature of man. By nature man lives in political society, in the city. The city, being natural though not merely natural, tends toward a natural end. The end of the

[20] *NRH*, pp. 14-16, 70-75, 87-90, 120-23, 320-21; *Thoughts*, pp. 78, 207-08, 295-98; *T*, pp. 189-90 ff.

city transcends the limitations of any particular city. That end, which is above any given city, is the standard or measure for all cities. The end of the city is virtue or the fullest development of human excellence. The city serves virtue. Political philosophy attempts to understand both virtue and the city. It is inseparable from natural ethics.

Classical political philosophy took as its starting point the opinions about moral and political things held by intelligent citizens. Those opinions are sacred, but they are still only opinions. The political philosopher seeks the truth contained in those opinions. But this is not merely a matter of clarifying terminology or suggesting reconciliations between conflicting opinions. The political philosopher transcends the realm of opinion. He seeks that which is above all opinion and thus, despite his respect for opinion, he is critical of it. But one of the most sacred opinions held by the citizen, an opinion which more than touches on morality and politics, is his opinion about the Divine. The typical citizen clings to a moral teaching which is intimately bound up with the traditional religion of his city. His moral judgment, informed by his religious opinions, affects his political judgment. What is at issue between Strauss and his critics begins to be clear.

Within the Western world, the dominant religious tradition and moral code is based on the Bible. The mind of the Western citizen has been shaped by that religious tradition even when he rejects the truth of the Biblical message. If classical political philosophy originated by reflecting on and transcending the limitations of the traditional Greek moral and religious beliefs, the reconstruction of political philosophy ought to begin with an analysis of the Western moral, political and religious tradition. For the restoration of political philosophy cannot be accomplished by slavish adherence to and reiteration of the texts of the classical political philosophers. Strauss's most intelligent critic has pointed out that this would "consist not so much in an inquiry into 'the nature of political things' as into the meaning of somebody's thought." Such an enterprise would better go under the name of "political

philology" than political philosophy, the "loving penetration into the order of being." [21] However much Strauss has inquired into the Western tradition insofar as it has been shaped by classical and modern political and moral thought, he has been silent about the influence of the Biblical tradition. Yet one might suspect that the Biblical tradition has had a greater influence on citizens than have the writings of Hobbes or Machiavelli.

How might the inquiry into the Biblical tradition take place? One doubts that Strauss would rely on evidence produced by an opinion poll to tell him what the Biblical tradition means. When Socrates wished to understand the religious opinions of the Athenians he inquired into the stories about the gods told by the poet Homer and other poets. The Western tradition seems more diverse, more complicated, more intellectualized than the Greek tradition about the Divine. A sensible procedure would be to examine the coherent and intelligent pronouncements of major thinkers who believed in the message of the Bible. Just as Strauss has examined Machiavelli and Locke, and not a crafty statesman or shrewd businessman, he would seem to be compelled to examine St. Thomas Aquinas or Hooker, not a devoted minister or pious layman. Since the Western tradition is predominantly Christian, it is sensible to examine Christian theologians as opposed to the great Jewish scholars. Only when we begin to understand what political philosophy means on Strauss's terms, do we begin to appreciate the significance of his silence concerning the Biblical tradition.

Strauss is not simply silent. His proclaimed silence about Machiavelli's critique of the Biblical religion is not complete. Machiavelli's fearless thought seems to open up depths "from which the classics, in their noble simplicity, recoiled." But the classical thinkers were "thoroughly familiar" with all that Machiavelli taught. His apparent enlargement of the human horizon was, in fact, a contraction. It appeared as an enlargement only because Christianity had profoundly changed the

[21] Niemeyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104. Cf. *CM*, p. 11.

classical tradition. The contemplative life was transferred into monasteries and out of the cities, and moral virtue was " transfigured into Christian charity." Christian charity seemed infinitely to increase man's responsibility for his fellow men. It seemed " to permit, nay, to require courses of action which would have appeared to the classics, and which did appear to Machiavelli, to be inhuman and cruel. . . ." Machiavelli revolted against the pious cruelty of " the Inquisition, in expelling the Marannos from Spain. Machiavelli was the only non-Jew of his age " to protest against the treatment of the Jews.

He seems to have diagnosed the great evils of religious persecution as a necessary consequence of the Christian principle, and ultimately of the Biblical principle. He tended to believe that a considerable increase in man's inhumanity was the unintended but not surprising consequence of man's aiming too high.[22]

These remarks might express the feelings of a Jew speaking to other Jews, recalling all too well subsequent cruelties, were it not for the fact that Machiavelli's indictment of Christianity was also an indictment of Judaism or of the Biblical principle itself. Strauss insists that the classics would have agreed with Machiavelli concerning the inhumanity resulting from undue concern with the salvation of other men's immortal souls. He is silent about the fact that many pious and believing Christians might also indict such cruelty as inhumane, as unchristian. Differently stated, he does not defend the Biblical principle against the charge that it aimed " too high." He does defend classical political philosophy, though it is clear that Machiavelli also believed that it aimed " too high." [23] He defends classical political philosophy because he believes that it is necessary to understand man in the light of the higher. He does not defend the Biblical principle. Perhaps it does not need defense, or perhaps it is indefensible.

Machiavelli's rejection of the Bible was the consequence of

[22] *WIPP*, pp. 43-44. All of the quotations in the preceding paragraph occur on these two pages.

[23] Cf. *PAW*, pp. 32-33; " Preface " to *Spinoza*, p. 3.

his " anti-theological ire—a passion which we can understand but of which we cannot approve." If the Bible represents the truth about God and man, an attack on utilitarian grounds is meaningless. What may appear to some men as politically inexpedient may be necessary in the eyes of God. Machiavelli's critique of the Judaic-Christian religion is not based merely on political or practical grounds. His critique is theoretical but it is not original. It " amounts to a restatement of the teaching of the pagan philosophers, as well as of that medieval school which goes by the name of Averroism. . . ." [24] Machiavelli's critique stems from the pagan philosopher, Aristotle. Machiavelli does not accept Aristotle's natural theology, for there is no room in his cosmology for a ruling Mind and he interprets " nature " as " chance," therefore radically breaking with Aristotle's teleological approach. The locus of the agreement between Machiavelli and Aristotle seems to be on the negative side, in their mutual rejection of traditional religion.[25] But this is absurd. Aristotle did not know of Judaic-Christian Revelation while Machiavelli did. Aristotle did not reject the Bible but the poetical myths about the gods or the superstitious religion of the pagans. Is not Aristotle's ruling Mind the Providential God of the Bible? Is not Aristotle's moral teaching based on his teleological view of nature, and is not that natural morality basically the natural law teaching of St. Thomas?

Strauss's critics believe in the ultimate harmony of philosophy and Biblical Revelation. Any hesitation on the part of the philosopher in moving from the God of Aristotle to the God of the Bible must appear highly irregular. Or, again, the failure to follow the Platonic myths to the point where one can experience the " leap in being " from the Platonic God to acceptance of Judaic-Christian Revelation precludes Strauss " from considering what Christianity may yield in the way of a further dimension of man's approach to the knowledge of

[24] *WIPP*, pp. 44, 41 and 40-47 in general.

[25] *Thoughts*, pp. 178-79 ff., 186, 208 ff., 221-222 ff., 232 ff.

reality." [26] Yet it is well to recall that an essential tenet of the Bible is the belief that acceptance of the Bible as the Word of God is a matter of faith, a movement beyond (though not necessarily without) reason.

Perhaps the philosopher hardens his heart? Perhaps he precludes himself from the rich experience and insights upon which acceptance of Revelation is based? But would it not be ridiculous for the philosopher to deny himself an entire range of experience whch is apparently accessible to the most ordinary of mortals? According to Strauss, the philosopher rejects Revelation because he rejects the possibility of the experience upon which belief in Revelation claims to be based.[27]

A basic premise of the Bible is the rejection of philosophy. According to philosophy, the end of man consists in philosophic investigation. That end is human happiness. But according to the Bible and theology, the natural end of man is insufficient. Natural reason points beyond itself. It creates a presumption in favor of Revelation and supernatural happiness. It is this presumption or this interpretation of natural reason which the philosopher rejects. The Bible stands or falls on the belief in Creation, that a Providential God, a God who cares for man, is the cause of the Universe. But even St. Thomas admits that natural reason cannot prove that the Universe was created in time. The doctrine of Creation is a matter of faith, not reason. It is known through Revelation. Belief in Creation depends on belief that the Bible is the Word of God. Belief that the Bible is the Word of God depends on belief in Creation. But the philosophers maintain the eternity of the universe and deny the existence of a Providential God who cares for man. The God of the philosophers, for they are not atheists, is the final cause of the universe, not its efficient cause. He is the object of their quest for knowledge. He does not care for men because He is sufficient unto Himself. He does not intervene in human affairs either through miracles or by

[26] Havard, *op. cit.*, 413-14. On the relationship of Plato and the Bible, see Stanley Rosen, "Order and History," *Review of Metaphysics* XII (Dec. 1958), 257-76.

[27] *PAW*, pp. 104-07; *Spinoza*, pp. 144-46.

revealing Himself to man. If religion consists essentially in the worship or serving of God, then the philosopher is irreligious. But his irreligion is noble, not base. It is rooted in his natural understanding of God and the eternity of the Universe. Against this understanding not only St. Thomas but others have disputed that, though natural reason is unable to prove that the Universe was created in time, it is also unable to prove that the Universe is eternal. Hence natural reason must admit its own insufficiency. But the eternity of the Universe is one thing. Acceptance of a God who sees fit to create that Universe, Who needs make Himself known to man, Who goes so far as to incarnate Himself into the world is quite another thing. In this sense, the natural theology of the philosophers is contradicted, not perfected by revealed theology. The philosopher's quest for natural knowledge of the cosmos and the knowledge thus far available to him prevent him from accepting the doctrine of Creation and the Bible. Strauss has admitted that in the case of Plato there are striking similarities to the Biblical doctrine of Creation.

Yet the differences between the Platonic and the biblical teaching are no less striking than the agreements. The Platonic teaching on creation does not claim to be more than a likely tale. The Platonic God is a creator also of gods, of visible living beings, i. e., of the stars; the created gods rather than the creator God create the mortal living beings and in particular man; heaven is a blessed god. The Platonic God does not create the world by his word; he creates it after having looked to the eternal ideas which are therefore higher than he.[28]

By following Plato, to say nothing of Aristotle whose God is not a personal God, in his transcendence of the human, one does not arrive at the brink of knowledge of the Biblical God.

According to the classical philosophers, then, the highest

[28] Jerusalem and Athens," 21. To understand Strauss's position one would have to carefully examine such passages as the following: *NRH*, pp. 62-67, 69-71, 74-76, 81-84, 87, 89-90, 95-97, 144-45, 149-50 (especially note 24), 163-64, 257-59 (especially note 15); *PAW*, pp. 18-21, 104-08, 113-14, 118-20, 123-24, 126-27, 137; *WIPP*, 38-39; "Preface" to *Spinoza*, pp. 8-13 ff. and *Spinoza*, pp. 146-51, 185-91. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 12, aa. 6, 12; q. 22, a. 1; q. a. 4; q. 46, aa. 1, 2; q. 103, aa. 1, 2; *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, qq. 37, 39, 40, 48.

excellence of man is the most perfect development of human reason or natural knowledge about God. This excellence constitutes intellectual virtue and intellectual virtue does not point above itself to the theological virtues. But though intellectual virtue is happiness proper, the necessary condition of true happiness, it is not the sufficient condition. The philosopher does not need revealed religion. He does need leisure and leisure depends upon the division of labor and on political life. Thus it is that the philosopher is compelled to turn his attention from the Divine to political things. A stable and sound political life depends upon the morality of ordinary men. The morality of ordinary men depends upon belief in religion. The Biblical morality, the laws and codes of the Old and New Testaments depend on acceptance of a Providential God. The philosopher, by denying the God of Revelation, threatens morality and political life. The philosopher must defend himself against the charges of impiety and immorality. Political philosophy is the public apologetic of the philosopher by which he tries to show that philosophy is the ally of the city and morality, even the ally of the traditional God of the city. Assimilation to the God of the philosophers, contemplation, is superior to every action. But what is superior in principle is not always the most urgent consideration. The philosopher must concern himself with the conditions which make political life and, hence, the philosophic life possible.[29]

The philosopher defends religion, but his defense is not sincere. To maintain that worship of God is a requirement of political life is to admit that almost any worship of God, as distinguished from the true worship of God, will do. One is not a friend of religion if he is indifferent to the truth of religion. Even if the philosopher sincerely believes that religion is an indispensable condition of sound political life, this proves merely that religion is a salutary myth. "Utility and truth are two entirely different things."[30] The philosopher is more interested in morality than in religion or he is only interested

[29] *PAW*, pp. 114-17, 128-30, 137-39; cf. Arnold Brecht, *Political Theory* (Princeton, 1959), pp. 456-59.

[30] *NRH*, p. 6; *Thoughts*, p. 12; *PAW*, pp. 114-15.

in religion as a necessary support for morality. But is the philosophic defense of morality a genuine and sincere defense? The guiding theme of political philosophy is the best regime which reduces the conflict between the philosopher and the city to a minimum by allowing the philosophers to rule or by having the philosophers propose the laws which govern the society. According to Plato, the philosophers are entitled to rule, for they alone possess genuine virtue. In the light of Platonic intellectual virtue, the ordinary morality of ordinary men is but vulgar or political virtue. It is not genuine virtue. It seems merely conventional. Precisely by following Plato in his quest for the origins of virtue one endangers ordinary morality, the morality of the city. Nor is this obstacle entirely surmounted by Aristotle's teaching which sought to defend the naturalness of moral virtue. Aristotelian moral virtue is not the same as natural law. A natural law which is universal cannot be a rational law, a law of reason. The law of reason is the preserve of the few and not of the many. Although Aristotle does assert that there are things which are everywhere just or right according to nature, he adds " yet all of it is changeable." The naturally just, according to Aristotle, seems to be little more than the minimum requirements of living together, as necessary for a band of robbers as for a city. Even these minimum requirements are only the proposals of practical and not theoretical reasoning. They are not sacred requirements. The morality of the philosophers may appear to be dogmatic to the modern relativist. But " if the philosophers are right in their appraisal of natural morality " then " natural morality is, strictly speaking, no morality at all." [31] Strauss's interpretation of classical political philosophy, and not the interpretation of the classics by his critics, lends weight to the charge that he is guilty of moral relativism. For Strauss defends classical political philosophy, yet his defense leads us to understand the manner in which classical philosophy endangers morality.

[31] *PAW*, pp. 140, 96-98, 135-39; *NRH*, pp. 148-52, 157- 63; *CM*, pp. 20-21, 25-28, 44, 49; *T*, pp. 219-21. Cf. Aristotle. *Nichomachean Ethics*, V, vii, 1-4.

III

One might protest that Strauss is but a commentator or historian, interested only in understanding and not defending classical political philosophy. But the polemical character of his work seems to preclude that possibility. Moreover, it is known that the intelligent writer may avail himself " of the specific immunity of the commentator or historian in order to speak his mind concerning grave matters in his ' historical ' works, rather than in the works in which he speaks in his own name." [32] Yet, granting that Strauss comes to sight most often as a defender of classical thought, we have his explicit warning that a man's deepest and innermost thoughts need not be those he utters most frequently.[33] We must consider the possibility that there are reasons, compelling reasons, for defending classical philosophy, even if one believes in the message of the Bible and believes, moreover, that classical philosophy and the Bible are incompatible. If such reasons exist, then we would have an explanation for Strauss's silence or his caution.

According to Arnold Brecht, a powerful yet unscientific prejudice exists within science, especially social science, against " unbracketing the Divine Alternative." Scientists are more inclined to accept the hypothesis that God is not than that He is or even may be. As Brecht sees it, this prejudice cuts science off from important and relevant questions.[34] It takes no great sophistication to see that this prejudice is strongest when directed against organized or revealed religions as opposed to natural theology—though in either case the prejudice is exceedingly strong. Brecht seems to feel that this unscientific prejudice against belief in God is an accidental feature of scientific value relativism. Yet, according to Strauss's analysis, modern positivism was from the start antireligious, antitheological. It saw belief in God as the inevitable oppo-

[32] *PAW*, p. 14. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 21, 24-25, 36, 46-60.

[33] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 14, 298-99; *WIPP*, pp. 56-77, 221-32; *PAW*, pp. 22-32; 39-41, 92-94, 100, 108-09, 128.

[34] Brecht, *op. cit.*, pp. 459-76.

nent of any real improvement in the human condition. Man must be liberated from religion, from any belief in God, and enlightened to his real condition. Both religious and philosophic longing for knowledge of the Divine are futile and divisive. Modern philosophy opposed both classical philosophy and Biblical theology.[35] But while modern philosophic and academic man may have sounded the death of God, he has not yet utterly sounded the death of reason, though he may have contracted the sphere of her reliability. There are reasons for believing that any attempt to make man aware of what it means to exclude the Divine, to be oblivious of the eternal, must be advanced from the standpoint of philosophy and natural theology rather than from the standpoint of revealed religion. To cultivate reasons, without any reliance on Revelation, would constitute a prudential judgment of the highest order. This prudential or practical reason would explain the necessity of Strauss's silence or his circumlocution. However uneasy the alliance between classical philosophy and the Biblical message, it is still an alliance. Silence about the deep difficulties which exist between the partners would be as compatible with deep religious piety as with philosophic disbelief in the God of Revelation. Moreover, this would explain another curious feature of Strauss's defense of classical philosophy, his insistence that philosophy as such, including classical philosophy, constitutes a threat to man, morality, and political order. His defense of philosophy includes an eloquent warning about the dangers of philosophy and science.[36]

An alliance based on expediency is not likely to last. The expedient or the useful tends to change in the course of time. The partners to the alliance begin to seek hegemony over one another, to be critical of one another. Each forgets its need for the other or believes (whether prudently or not) that the need has ended. Perhaps one of the permanent problems of

[35] *Thoughts*, pp. 230-31; *WIPP*, pp. 54-55; *Hobbes*, pp. 71-78 with *WIPP*, pp. 182-90. In addition all of the *Spinoza* volume ought to be read in the light of *PAW*, pp. 142-201.

[36] *CM*, pp. 1, 11; *PAW*, pp. 140-41.

mankind is that the alliance between philosophy and religion and revealed theology can never be eliminated without harm, not only to each partner but to mankind. This might suggest, however, that the alliance is based on something other than the expedient.

Modern philosophy opposed the classical viewpoint because it did not believe that the heterogeneity of nature could be demonstrated and, hence, it denied that the proper understanding of nature could offer man standards for his moral and political life.[37] Modern philosophy asserts the oneness of man with nature or the homogeneity of nature. The same natural necessity controls man as controls the rest of nature. However, modern philosophy sought to conquer nature and it admitted, therefore, a distinction between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom where the realm of freedom is the human realm. But modern philosophy denied that there was any fundamental difference between men. The realm of freedom or history becomes the realm of the equality of all mankind or the inexorable march toward the full equality of men which will overcome the accidental differences between men.[38] Man has no essential nature. He is a creature of history. In opposing the principle of heterogeneity or essential differences, modern philosophy also rejected the Bible for, as St. Thomas argues, the grace of God perfects, it does not change, the nature of man. But as long as it is denied that man has a nature, the character of that perfection can not be intelligently discussed.[39] The restoration of Christian theology

[37] In what follows the term "modern philosophy" is simply taken over from Strauss and is meant to describe the many political thinkers who take their bearings from the primacy of rights, subjective claims which originate in the human will, as contrasted with the classical and medieval view which spoke of natural law or right as an objective rule or order, independent of the human will. Cf. *Hobbes*, xi-xii, xix-xx, and the essay "What Is Political Philosophy?" in its entirety.

[38] *NRH*, pp. 252-94; *WIPP*, pp. 51-55. Cf. Joseph Cropsey, "Political Life and a Natural Order," *Journal of Politics* XXIII (Feb. 1961), 46-56. Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind* is basic for understanding this issue.

[39] *NRH*, p. 81; "Preface" to *Spinoza*, pp. 10-11.

must be preceded by the restoration of a proper understanding of man's nature entirely on the basis of reason.

Modern philosophy rejected the meaningfulness of nature and radically rejected religion or the worship of a God who is the cause of the order in nature. Classical philosophy, though skeptical of particular religions or of the belief that a satisfactory answer has been given to the question about the nature of God, nevertheless did not radically oppose religion. Classical philosophy sought to understand, imitate and cultivate nature. But according to Strauss, the belief that the old is identical with the good or the belief that there is a providential God is a " natural belief." Such a natural belief cannot be rejected out of hand, for one cannot expel nature with a pitchfork nor can one understand man as a being without sacred restraints.[40] By reflecting on nature, the classical philosopher seeks to ascend to the truth about things. But this ascent culminates in the classic case in Socrates's claim of his ignorance concerning the highest things. The classical philosopher is neither dogmatic nor skeptical in the ordinary sense. He is not opposed to religion, for he knows that he does not know, though he may oppose those who, whether for sincere or insincere motives, use religion to harm mankind or those who forget that their commitment of faith, however sincere, is beyond reason. The philosopher's position is perfectly compatible with the mysterious character of the Bible, a book sealed with seven seals whose secrets can be made known by God alone, and of the God of Revelation, who will be what He will be. As St. Thomas insists, reason informed by faith and not natural reason teaches that God is to be loved and worshipped.[41]

[40] *Spinoza*, pp. 86-87, 90-92, 107-09 *et passim*. Cf. " Comments on *Der Begriff des Politischen* by Carl Schmitt " in *Spinoza*, pp. 331-51; *Hobbes*, pp. 123-26, 166-68; *Thoughts*, pp. 92, 126, 165-66; *NRH*, pp. 201-02, 129-30, 22; *T*, p. 205; *CM*, pp. 240-41.

[41] *WIPP*, pp. 38-40; *CM*, pp. 13-14, 33-34, 180, 228-30; *PAW*, pp. 41-69; *Spinoza*, pp. 193-94 ff. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 104, aa. 1-3; Thomas More, " Letter to Dorp " in St. Thomas More, *Selected Letters*, Elizabeth Rogers, ed. (New Haven, 1961), pp. 33-35.

Modern philosophy was generated by moral objections to premodern thought more than by theoretical arguments. Its generosity and humanity objected to the strict morality of classical and Christian thought, to the belief that the city ought to play a central role in the development of moral virtue, and to the tendency to encourage men to aim too high. Modern philosophy sought to liberate man from his bondage. But to do so, it had to radically criticize the bondholders, classical philosophy and Biblical theology. To do so, it rejected teleological nature as a positive standard for morality and political order. But it retained nature as a negative standard. Man's destiny is to escape from the bondage of nature. But knowing from whence he must flee did not tell man to where he must go. The critique of order in nature culminated in utter moral relativism, the belief that all moral and political standards are entirely conventional. Upon reaching this conclusion, modern philosophy, impelled by moral fervor, discovered what was known in a sober manner by the classical thinkers and the theologians: moral virtue is weak and exposed unless it is aided by powerful allies. Moral virtue is exposed because it is and is not an end in itself or because, though it is an end for most men, it is not necessary from every point of view or for all men. According to St. Thomas, all moral virtue can be directed to something else, for moral virtues are concerned with the moderation of man's passions and the control of things. But such moderation and control is not the end of man's life or man's ultimate happiness does not consist in acts of moral virtue. The moral virtues are inferior to the intellectual virtues and the intellectual virtues, prudence aside, may exist without the moral virtues. According to the classical view, the moral virtues are the end of the city, but man and the city gain their dignity by that which transcends the city. Intellectual excellence, philosophy, is that which transcends the city for the city as city cannot philosophize.[42]

Awareness of the limitations of moral virtue may be de-

[42] *Hobbes*, pp. 123-26, 166-68; "Preface," pp. 28-29; *III Cont. Gent.*, qq. 34, 37; *Summa Theol.*, I-II q. 59, a. 5; q. 65, a. 2; q. 66, a. 3; *CM*, pp. 26-28, 49.

scribed as qualified moral relativism—a relativism which attempts to avoid both rigid moral absolutism (i. e., that moral rules are sacred and without exception) and utter moral relativism (i. e., that no moral rules are sacred or natural). Unfortunately, any such moral teaching has a tendency to collapse either into dogmatism or relativism. The question then becomes: Does the nature of man demand stressing the strictness of morality or does it permit greater flexibility? i. e., are men individually capable of sober moral responsibility? On the basis of their understanding of the strength of the human passions in most men, both the classical philosophers and St. Thomas (and the Bible which is his guide) tended to stress the strict demands of morality. On the other hand, the modern philosophers tended to believe (as in the case of Hobbes) that the very brutality of human nature insured the observance of minimum moral codes; or they believed (as in the case of Nietzsche) that modern man, at least, was so tame that one could publicly reject all sacred rights and duties. The modern philosophers were aided in their arguments by the fact that the support for moral virtue within the Western world was the sacred code of Judaic-Christian Revelation. A moral code revealed by God is more strict than a natural moral code. Exceptions to the code can only be made by God or His agents. But this extra-mundane support for natural morality led to well-known abuses. Especially after the Reformation any attempt to defend morality on religio-theological grounds was apt to result in divisiveness and to endanger morality. In the face of these facts, the prudent man who is concerned with morality will seek to defend morality on other grounds.[43] He will be silent about religion and even about God.

JAMES STEINTRAGER

The University of Texas
Austin, Texas

[43] Cf. *T*, p. 205; *WIPP*, pp. 54-55; *NRH*, pp. 2-3, 163-64; *PAW*, pp. 140-41. Cf. the closing remarks Strauss makes in "Social Science and Humanism," *The State of the Social Sciences*, L. D. White, ed. (Chicago, 1956), pp. 415-25.

GOD IN THE ETHICO-RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF HENRI BERGSON

HENRI BERGSON'S *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* appeared in 1932. There had been a lapse of some 25 years since the publication of his last work, the celebrated *Creative Evolution*. During this time, Bergson, involved in a battle with serious illness, was nevertheless putting his immense powers of research and analysis to work on the problem of God, which he thought to be inextricably bound up with the question of morality. His researches carried him into sociology, anthropology, psychology, and comparative religion. They led him also into a thorough study of the Christian mystics. The product of his long labor shows an extraordinary command of the subjects he investigated and reveals many important insights into morality, religion, and natural theology that will continue to have an influence on philosophical thought.

We propose to summarize the doctrine of the *Two Sources* and to relate it back to the dominant themes of Bergson's entire philosophy, as we find them in his earlier works. We hope to be able to show that Bergson's *Two Sources*, separated by 25 years from his earlier works though it is, and concerned with apparently quite different questions, is altogether of a piece with all his previous thought and brings it to completion.

I. Closed Morality

Bergson's ethico-religious thinking takes up from the point emphasized throughout his previous works, especially *Creative Evolution*,[1] that all life is social. Even man, coming at the end of the process and rising above the other species of life

[1] Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, tr. Arthur Mithchell (New York: Modern Library, 1944), 284-84. This work will be cited as *CE*.

by reason of his full consciousness and freedom, is naturally a social being. He needs other men to live his life. And he wants to live with others. It is from this need and this desire that morality is born.[2]

Bergson brings forward a pair of good examples to enforce his contention about man's gregariousness.[3] The first is the instance of the criminal who voluntarily gives himself up. By his crime he has cut himself off from the group. Even if he remains undiscovered, it is not his real self with whom society deals and continues amicable relations. He is as isolated in his being as if he were on a deserted island. To restore the former solidarity, even if it means punishment, he gives himself up. The other example Bergson adduces is that of the man put in solitary confinement. In solitary confinement man's spirit dies, and often he loses his mind. These two extraordinary examples reinforce the point made by history and our ordinary experience that man is a social being.

This fact of the organization of all life fits into Bergson's broad evolutionary context. It is verified at all three levels of individual organism, instinctual society, and human society.[4] In the individual organism, the cell exists entirely for the good of the whole. In the societies of ants, bees, wasps, again the individual is subordinate to the society. There is a division of labor and a kind of instinctual fidelity to duty in the interests of the group. This is pre-conscious and amounts to a strict necessity. Now man, too, is social. But it is not by the same kind of necessity.

The new factor that enters the picture at the human level is intellect. Whereas it is the *cumulative* function of life that accounts for the cohesion we have just spoken of, the *dissociative* function of life comes to the fore in man's intelligence. Its effect is to try to separate him from the group in the interests of self-aggrandizement. Man is free to follow this second kind of natural inclination.

[2] Henri Bergson, *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, tr. Audra & Brereton (New York: Doubleday, 1935), 9-10. This work will be cited as *TS*.

[3] TS, 16-18.

[4] TS, 29.

Social pressure is effective in preventing him from doing so. Working on him from his earliest days, it engenders habits of conformity in man that keep him inside the group. The pressure of society does not constitute a strict necessity but rather imposes itself on a free being as moral obligation.

> We did not fully realize this, but behind our parents and our teachers we had an inkling of some enormous, or rather some shadowy thing that exerted pressure on us through them. Later we would say it was society. And speculating upon it, we should compare it to an organism whose cells, united by imperceptible links, fall into their respective places in a highly developed hierarchy, and for the greatest good of the whole, naturally submit to a discipline that may demand the sacrifice of the part. This, however, can only be a comparison, for an organism subject to inexorable laws is one thing, and a society composed of free wills another. But, once these wills are organized, they assume the guise of an organism; and in this more or less artificial organism habit plays the same role as necessity in the works of nature. From this first standpoint, social life appears to us a system of more or less deeply rooted habits, corresponding to the needs of the community.[5]

Notice that it is not sanction but rather force of habit that makes man a moral being. "Obligation is to necessity what habit is to nature."[6] This moral habit becomes a kind of second nature, so deeply engrained as to be almost, but not quite, necessitating. Bergson does not emphasize law or law enforcement in this closed system.[7] Nor does he say anything about objective right or wrong. Society is the norm, and its power to enforce comes from man's tendency to form and live by habits. This thought was presaged in Bergson's earlier affirmation that man tends to let his freedom dissolve in habit and routine.

There is little function left for reason in this type of morality.[8] Reason can come to the assistance of the compulsion

[5] TS, 9-10.

[6] TS, 14.

[7] For this he is taken to task by W. Stark, "Henri Bergson: A Guide for Sociologists," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 10 (Oct., 1949), 422.

[8] TS, 22-26.

proceeding originally from society when man's passion rises against it. But it would never have enough force of itself to make man moral. Kant's categorical imperative, held to be from above, is really just the natural force of habit, halfway between automatism and the search for reasons.

Closed morality operates in a closed society. Man tends naturally to form small rather than large societies, and then to close his doors to the rest of humanity.[9] Even inside these societies he tends to form smaller groups with the same exclusive quality. A thing like patriotism takes a mighty effort. Only the necessity of uniting for war, or the being severally conquered in war, results in a larger-scale cohesion; and as soon as the mastering force is removed, there is disintegration again. Witness the breakdown of the Roman Empire into the manors of medieval Europe. Bergson goes so far as to say that war is natural among societies, and it is partly in defense that societies are formed in the first place. This reminds us of the general characteristic of selfishness which Bergson attributes to all life in its evolution.[10] The *elan vital* is constantly impeded by the species to which it gives rise, each of which tries to take the *elan* and make it its exclusive possession. Just as the species as a whole does this, so do smaller groups within the species (cf. groups of animals and men), and so finally does the individual in the species. This is only partially overcome by the morality of closed society. There the individual sacrifices his personal interest to the group insofar as he must, but the group turns a cold shoulder to the world. Universal brotherhood will never develop out of such an ethic.

This points up some of the shortcomings of closed morality. It is not really a human morality. It is rather the " morality " of the herd, or at best a social-contract type morality springing from motives of pure utilitarianism. It is stifling, stereotyped, dessicated. But Bergson is right in saying that it does serve a useful function, and that it does in fact exist. Whether it can really be called a morality or not is another question.

[9] TS, 275-77.
[10] CE, 142-44.

II. Open Morality

Closed morality is not really sufficient unto itself. It needs help from open morality, which strikes out in quite a different direction. Whereas the motive force in closed morality is compulsion, the motive force in open morality is attraction.[11] It is a morality of the leader taking a stand out front and calling the race after him. In every age men of this stamp are to be found. And there is in the rest of men an inclination to make a response to such an appeal. The lure is emotional, and the horizons are unlimited. This type of morality gets us back into the evolutionary stream of progress.[12] The hero, an exceptional individual, succeeds in making a renewed contact with the vital impulse, and, filled with the desire to carry forward its creative work, he makes an appeal to the rest of men in the same terms and gets an enthusiastic response. The exceptional individual becomes a kind of new species in the evolutionary process and realizes in himself what could not be realized in humanity as a whole in one creative leap because of the resistance of matter. He is a great liberator from matter and the conditions of matter, not only for himself but, gradually and to a limited extent, for the human race at large. A kind of brotherhood of all men is achievable by such a morality. It is open rather than closed. It is not interested in self-protection and self-preservation as much as it is in human progress, and hence it tends to break down barriers and unite mankind. Smaller differences are dissolved in the response to the attraction incarnate in the leader.

This second type of morality is quite different from the first, but it is not any more rational. It is dominantly emotional. Bergson devotes some space to refuting the notion that an idea must always precede an emotion.[13] Often enough, he maintains, the emotion precedes the idea, as in art. Art proceeds

[11] TS, 37-59.

[12] TS, 52-53.

[13] TS, 40-49. He says, for instance, that Christian charity comes *before* a person subscribes to the Christian *Weltanschauung* and is the principal reason for his doing so.

from a creative urge, which comes only gradually and painfully, and with some losses, into the physical form of words or forms or concepts. So too with open morality. It is not conceptual, though it can come to be conceptualized. In its pristine form, it is simply the creative urge born in the hero from his contact with the source of life. In his followers it is the emotional response to his personal attractiveness and to the opportunity to create that goes with his call.[14]

Bergson locates reason midway between his two moralities.[15] They meet in conceptualization, which is the domain of reason. In this sphere man can bandy reasons with reasons for the clarification of his obligations, or he can lend rational support to obligations constituted elsewhere. Reason is too weak of itself to have a fundamental role in morality. This is consistent with Bergson's whole approach to intellect, running through *Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory,* and *Creative Evolution.*[15] There are very few things intellect is useful for, and morality is not one of them. In the domain of morals reason has a merely ancillary role.

By contrasting the two moralities in different respects, we can perhaps get a clearer conception of both.[16] Closed morality is incomplete and minimal; open morality is complete and maximal. Closed morality is impersonal and preceptive; open morality is personal and suasive. Open morality makes an appeal, whereas closed morality compels. Open morality is human, whereas closed morality is purely conventional. Open morality is always incarnated in a hero, e.g., the sages of Greece, the prophets of Israel, the Arahants of Buddhism, the saints of Christianity. The contrast is seen in the statements

[14] One cannot help thinking in connection with this contrast between closed and open morality of the parallel contrast in Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will,* tr. F. L. Pogson (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 158-170, between acting on conceptual motives from without and acting from internal self-creating spontaneity.

[15] TS, 81-85.

For the Bergsonian critique of intellect, see *Time and Free Will,* 137-39; *Matter and Memory,* tr. N. M. P. & W. S. Palmer (New York: Macmillan, 1912), 148-54, 259-62; *CE,* 164-81.

[16] TS, 34-36.

of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, in that whole series where he says: "You have heard it said . . . but I say to you . . . ," and he proceeds to replace old eye-for-eye ideas with the new law of unlimited Christian love. Bergson finds an apt parallel for his two moralities in Spinoza's *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, the first dynamically creative and the second hardened in its situation. In Bergson's own framework they correspond respectively to the *elan* and to the species in which matter halts it. In both cases morality is radically biological and is placed by nature in the service of life. Closed morality never evolves into open morality, but in the concrete they are always found in a blend.[17] To the closed morality of social necessity open morality lends some of its attractive motive power. And to the purely emotional appeal of open morality closed morality contributes some of its compulsion.

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Bergson's moral theory has its deficiencies, but there is much merit in it.[18] He makes us see what a powerful force society exerts upon us in moulding our conduct. No one can deny that at least a great deal of *efficacy* in keeping man in line comes from this quarter. And Bergson shows us that this is not the most glorious way to live. It can become very stereotyped and effete. In his open morality of attraction and imitation Bergson again points up something important. Men do need heroes to incarnate moral ideals, to take cold precepts and convert them into personal nobility and attractiveness. Again, for efficacy in the moral life, some emotional motivation is indispensable. But in addition to the fact that, pushed to its limits, closed morality merges into totalitarianism and open morality into sentimentalism, the two systems are subject to the criticism that they pass by the heart of human morality on both sides.

[17] TS, 49-50.

[18] For a fuller critique, see J. Maritain, "Sur L'ethique bergsonienne," *Revue Metaphysique et Morale*, 64 (1959), 141-60.

Bergson's theory of closed morality dissects the psychological and sociological coordinates of the moral act, whereas his description of open morality calls attention to some of the higher, personal phases of the moral life. But the structure of morality, as a properly *human perfection*, eludes his analysis, which is attuned only to the evolutionary description of functions. Closed morality has an infraintellectual basis; open morality has a supraintellectual foundation; but there is no provision for human morality, precisely as a perfection stemming from the practical intellect and will.[19]

This shortcoming should not be surprising to anyone acquainted with Bergson's philosophical presuppositions, especially his critique of intellect. It is precisely because intellect has been long since eliminated as a significant factor in the more important phases of human speculative and practical life that Bergson has to have the kind of recourse that he does to social compulsion and emotional attraction in the moral life.

III. Static Religion

The passage from morality to religion is a passage from the part to the whole. Religion covers more ground. But their extensive coincidence results in many of the same issues coming up in the discussion of Bergson's two kinds of religion that arose in the consideration of his moralities. Closed morality is in correspondence with static religion, as open morality is with dynamic religion. We will discuss static religion first.

There has never been a society without religion.[20] It is a perfectly natural development among men. Much of it has been quite unreasonable, full of superstition, foolishness, and crude practices. But it perdures even to the present, when men are supposed to be so cultured and intelligent. Bergson links the phenomenon of religion to the possession of intelligence, for reasons which we will shortly see. Only man has religion. And he always has had it, and always will, because it is natural to him.

[19] James Collins, *A History of Modern European Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1953), 845-46.

[20] TS, 102-04.

One of the things religion does is to reinforce the moral order as social exigencies establish it. It promises " an extension and rectification of human justice by divine justice: to the rewards and punishments established by society, whose application is so far from perfect, it adds others, infinitely higher, to be meted out to us in the City of God, when we shall have left the city of men." [21] In this way, religion lends both greater precision and greater force to morality.

In addition to that, it unifies a group of men in a society more closely than their own social norms could do.

> To preserve, to tighten this bond is incontestably the aim of the religion we have found to be natural; it is common to the members of a group, it associates them intimately with each other in rites and ceremonies, it distinguishes the group from other groups, it guarantees the success of the common enterprise and is an assurance against the common danger.[22]

It is natural in the development of such a religion that each society adopt its own personal patron god, who watches over that society and takes care of its interests as against other societies and their gods. This and the common religious practices internal to the society make for a strengthened unity and solidarity among the members.

At the same time, religion and morality do not simply correspond.[23] Morality is bent on the good, but this is not necessarily the case with the gods. Gods have been known to command immoral acts. This kind of thing does not usually happen, but it is possible, and it happens often enough to warrant a real distinction between morality and religion.

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So much for the relationship between morality and religion. The important question is: what are the roots of religion? If religion is a natural phenomenon, what in nature gives rise to it? And how is it that religion has been able to perdure in

[21] TS, 98.
[22] TS, 206.
[23] TS, 205-7.

rather gross forms into our own day? Bergson's answer is intelligence.

This takes us right back into the evolutionary context in which Bergson has his bases.[24] The source of all becoming is consciousness, and from its one-many plenitude it begins to gush into actual differentiation, striving always for full realization of its consciousness. The first big evolutionary divide is that between plants and animals. Plants have a low level of consciousness, amounting almost to torpor. Animals, including man, are in quite a different case. They enjoy rather complete consciousness in different ways. In animals, consciousness is instinct, which enables them to know at a distance the things which it is immediately necessary to know for the preservation of life. Their actions are rather rigidly determined at the same time that they show a marvelous complexity in the employment of highly developed organic instruments (witness the spider). In man, the evolutionary development reaches its peak with the birth of intelligence. This faculty makes man potentially the most powerful of the species, though it will take some time for him to convert its indetermination to effective determinacy. With his endowment of intelligence, man is maximally self-conscious and free. But nature, in making such a bestowal, is taking serious chances.

There is no problem with getting the plants to fulfill their role in the universe.[25] They know not what they do. There is not even a problem with animals. The worker bee and the ant condemned by nature to play the lesser and more difficult roles in their respective societies, do not rebel. Instinct insures their cooperation. Alternatives do not occur to them, nor do comparisons; they are neither reflective nor free. And so they live out their span of life in faithful fulfillment of their assigned tasks. With man the situation is different. In Bergson, indeterminacy is practically equivalent to freedom, and man is quite indeterminate.[26] Man thinks a lot, and he is free to act

[24] CE, 109-203.
[25] TS, 116-22.
[26] CE, 160.

on his knowledge. Intelligence therefore threatens to disrupt the social solidarity which belongs to life as one its essential constituents. The individual man all too easily realizes that he could carve out a fuller existence for himself if he broke out of the role society has assigned him and put his powers entirely in the service of personal interest. This natural tendency of intelligent beings, if followed, would result in the destruction of society.

If intelligence now threatens to break up social cohesion at certain points—assuming that society is to go on—there must be a counterpoise at these points to intelligence. If this counterpoise cannot be instinct itself, for the very reason that its place has been taken by intelligence, the same effect must be produced by a virtuality of instinct, or, if you prefer it, by the residue of instinct which survives on the fringe of intelligence: it cannot exercise direct action, but since intelligence works on representations, it will call up " imaginary " ones, which will hold their own against the representation of reality and will succeed, through the agency of intelligence itself, in counteracting the work of intelligence. This would be the explanation of the myth-making faculty.[27]

Here we have the substance of Bergson's theory of static religion. It follows smoothly and naturally from his whole evolutionary philosophy. Nature endows men with intelligence with all its disruptive potential. And in the very same act it puts down with intelligence what Bergson calls the " myth-making faculty " as a counterpoise to that disruptive tendency. Man is not supposed to live for himself alone nor with himself alone. It is through the intelligence of the individual that society is to continue to make evolutionary progress. Hence social cohesion must be preserved. To secure this, nature (itself somehow never intelligent nor purposeful in Bergson) puts in man a faculty of deception to fabricate such fictions as are necessary to keep man in line. This myth-making faculty is fully as natural to man as the intelligence which demands its existence. Thus Bergsonian philosophical method states:

[27] TS, 119.

Starting from a biological necessity (social cohesion), we search for the corresponding need in the living creature. If this need does not actually create a real and active instinct (in man there is not the social instinct found in ants and bees), it conjures up, by means of what we call a virtual or latent instinct, an imaginative representation (a myth) which determines conduct in the same way as instinct would have done.[28]

The myth-making function " belongs to intelligence, though it is not pure intelligence." [29] It works through intelligence, proposing counter-representations to the representations of reality which intelligence receives from the real world.

The threat of selfishness is not the only problem in man's intelligence which the myth-making function has to take care of. Reflective man has trouble at the personal level with thoughts of ineluctable death and the general uncertainty of success in the face of the unforeseeable.[30] The specter of death would block all initiative, if death were thought to be the end of everything. This is a problem the animal kingdoms do not face. They live in the present only and do not span the course of years seeking some holistic justification for all their efforts. But man is prone to this, precisely because he is intelligent and can reflect on his own situation and on what he has learned from history. A myth must be slipped into this dead-end spot, and the myth that is called for is that of immortality in life after death. This renews man's hope, and with it his courage, and once again he takes his place in the ranks.

The problem of the unforeseeability of the future is a similar one, though it is not quite as drastic. Man's intelligence puts him in a position to recognize the gap that lies between his effort and the result at which it is aimed. Success is by no means certain, especially in long-term projects, and man cannot extend his dominion over the whole intervening gulf. Propitious forces in nature are called for to take man's interests to heart and guarantee his project's success. Here again the myth-making faculty is active, filling the interval with spirits

[28] TS, 186. Parentheses ours.
[29] TS, 205.
[30] TS, 129-31, 138-42.

or gods to be propitiated for assistance. In both these cases we can discern the basically optimistic tonality of religion. Accompanying the recognition of favorable forces in nature and happiness in the afterlife is undoubtedly the recognition of unfavorable forces and punishments, but the favorable predominate and are the more characteristic content of religion.

The occurrence of chance events does its part to enforce the claims of static religion.[31] Man naturally attributes the unaccountable to occult intention. Ordinary physical events are explained by ordinary physical causes. But when something extraordinary happens that has an effect on human life, especially a harmful effect, we do not feel that physical causes adequately explain it. Over and above the physical agencies involved, there must be some kind of conscious intention in nature; otherwise the cause is not commensurate with the effect.

> He (primitive man) sees, for instance, that a man has been killed by a fragment of rock dislodged during a gale. Does he deny that the rock was already split, that the wind loosened the stone, that the blow cracked the skull? Obviously not. He notes, as we do, the operation of these proximate causes. . . . What he explains here by a " supernatural " cause is not the physical effect, it is its *human significance*; it is its importance to man, and more especially to a particular man, the one who was crushed by the stone. There is nothing illogical, consequently nothing " prelogical " or even anything which evinces an " imperviousness to experience," in the belief that a cause should be proportionate to its effect; that, once having admitted the crack in the rock, the direction and force of the wind—purely physical things which take no account of humanity—there remains to be explained this fact, so momentous to us, the death of a man.[32]

Bergson is at his best in this kind of penetrating analysis of human events.

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Now let us look a little more closely at some of the actual fabrications of the myth-making function.[33] Religion begins

[31] TS, 142-47.

[32] TS, 145.

[33] Here Bergson's sociological studies assume considerable importance. For an evaluation of his positions, see W. Stark, *op. cit.*

with a belief in spirits rather than gods.[34] There is in it the beginning of an anthropomorphism, but not a complete anthropomorphism. Nature is at first personified only slightly, some useful function in it being attributed to a beneficent spirit, at first identical with the function itself (e.g., the god of the spring), then gradually filled in with more personal qualities and separated from that over which it presides. These spirits, or gods in fully developed form, are thought of primarily in terms of their power to help man and they are treated accordingly. They tend to become multiplied and to take up their stations over all natural phenomena. They champion certain households and certain cities. As individuals they come into existence and pass out of existence by as slight a thing as the decree of a ruler. What is permanent is the existence of *divinity*. Numbers do not matter, and neither do particular divine personalities. But the element that cannot be dispensed with is the reality and function of spirit in nature. This endures through all the flux of genealogy and office.

Bergson contrasts religion and magic, and sees them as alternative courses taken by the indigenous myth-making faculty.[35] Magic can be seen springing naturally from the helplessness man feels in trying to see his enterprises through to success. What is called for is a force working in nature which has man's interest at heart and which he can manipulate to his ends. The instrument of manipulation is magic, and the method is to describe in some sort of sketchy way the action to be achieved and then depend on the magic forces to come through.

> Magic then seems to us to resolve itself into two elements: the desire to act on a thing, even on that which is out of reach, and the idea that things are charged, or can be charged, with what we should call human fluid.[36]

The contrast between magic and religion is best brought out in the following text:

[34] TS, 152-60, 180-1, 187-201.
[35] TS, 165-75.
[36] TS, 170.

It goes without saying that religion thus conceived is the opposite of magic. The latter is essentially selfish, the former admits of and often even demands disinterestedness. The one claims to force the compliance of nature, the other implores the favor of the god. Above all, magic works in an environment which is semi-physical and semi-moral—the magician, at all events, is not dealing with a person; whereas on the contrary it is from the god's personality that religion draws its greatest efficacy. Granted that primitive intelligence thinks it perceives around it, in phenomena and in events, elements of personality rather than complete personalities, religion, as we have just understood it, will ultimately reinforce these elements to the extent of completely personifying them; whereas magic looks upon them as debased, dissolved, as it were, in a material world in which their efficacy can be tapped. Magic and religion, then, go their separate ways, having started from a common origin, and there can be no question of deriving religion from magic: they are contemporaneous.[37]

Religion has all the trappings of rite and sacrifice.[38] These might be expected, as expressions of the relationship obtaining between the gods and their human charges. Prayer and sacrifice are very much in order. But Bergson is equally interested in the function of prayer and sacrifice as substantiating the existence of gods. In other words, they are not logical deductions from the existence and nature of the gods in any greater measure than they are some of the strongest supports for the belief in gods. They induce the desired mentality, especially when they are done publicly. Bergson says that the blood of sacrifice is useful in "giving the god strength," thus enabling him better to help man and also in ensuring him "a more substantial existence." [39]

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By this time the question has probably occurred: what makes people actually believe in all these things? Bergson gives a double answer, the first part containing his deeper thought, the second lending it support. In Bergson, action

[37] TS, 175.
[38] TS, 201-3.
[39] TS, 203.

always comes before thought. The intellect of man is not for speculation but for practical operations in the interests of life.[40] Man is better named *Homo Faber* than *Homo Sapiens*. It is a mistake to think that the machinery of static religion is summoned up by man's speculations. It is all born of the needs which come with action. Man feels himself a speck in an alien universe, and he cannot take up living seriously until he has changed the interpretation of nature as unthinking necessity into that of a system of spirits with human interests at heart. So he posits spirit. He cannot throw himself into his work until he has made provision for some kind of personal immortality, so he posits immortality. He cannot succeed in his enterprises unless an impersonal force or personal gods in nature will pick up the slack in his efficacy and carry his work through to completion, so he fabricates forces and gods. Action is always first; conceptualization and formalization and the deduction of consequences always follow in a less important phase of the process. This is the big reason why magic and religion continue to be realities even to our own sophisticated day. They are needed for life.[41]

Bergson's second reason is brought out in the contrast between the artistic and the religious functions of the myth-making faculty.[42] From this same faculty, which we have been describing at length in its religious operation, come all the works of art. Art, too, is illusion. Drama is a notable example, or painting. Everyone knows that they are not reality. We submit to the illusion of the theater, but we know all the while that it is an illusion, and we drop it when we leave the stage behind. The reason why religion is held to be real is that *everybody is doing it.* It is in the blood. People have been talking about it from age to age, and its explanation of events and its recourses in need have been invoked time and time again. There are public ceremonies in which the gods are propitiated, and public buildings set up in their name, and

[40] CE, 164-82.
[41] TS, 176-7.
[42] TS, 198-99.

works of art paying them tribute. Religion gets universal assent, and there is no surer guarantee of the truth than universal assent. "Nay, truth will as a rule *be* this very assent."[43] Independent canons of scientific intellect do not have the strength to counteract this kind of movement. Hence the myths of static religion are taken for reality.

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In attempting to evaluate Bergson's theory of static religion we have to keep in mind what he set out to do. We could level the criticism that what he is speaking of is not really religion at all but fictional fabrication serving to travesty religion. He would probably agree. Besides, static religion is only half of his thought on religion. What he seems to be trying to do in his treatment of static religion is to discuss the findings of his studies in anthropology, sociology, and comparative religion, and set forth the historical facts. Here no one can argue with him. All the paraphernalia of magic and deities run through historical civilizations. Beyond this bare reporting, he is attempting to explain why things have developed this way. And he answers in terms of his biological philosophy. Everything that comes to pass comes to pass in the interests of life. When evolutionary progress reaches the point where intelligence is given to man, the interests of life demand that a counterforce be posited to intellect's selfish and crippling machinations. Hence nature bequeathes to man the myth-making function, in the same evolutionary deposit. This faculty does everything needful to hold the human-life-society together and ensure its continued development. One may not like to see such a reduction made of religion. But it must at least be conceded that the historical record has been quite accurate and that the explanation advanced for it has been plausible.

A serious question might still be raised as to how all these marvels come to be accomplished by the blind force of evolution or "nature," which possesses no intelligence. And there is a final criticism, well-stated by Maritain.

[43] TS, 198.

In my opinion what spoils the Bergsonian theory of static religion, despite his many profound observations, is his refusal to discern in it the natural energy of human reason, as it operates in the midst of those incoherences and contradictions which Bergson so well analyzes, and which relates to a mental universe bathed and inundated by the waters of the imagination; the obscure natural workings of the metaphysical intelligence, the natural pursuit of and feeling for the absolute, are thus disregarded.[44]

In other words, Bergson is content to call all static religion imaginary and fictional. Maritain thinks he sees in it at least a desire and a search for the truth. And he thinks there is a truth.

IV. Dynamic Religion

When we reach Bergson's treatment of dynamic religion and mysticism, we come to the high point of his philosophy. It is a chapter beautifully written and marvelously full of insight, especially remarkable in a man outside the Catholic Faith. Not only does it deal with the highest kind of human perfection, but it fits solidly into Bergson's philosophical framework and reveals itself in retrospect as the only culmination Bergson's philosophy could have come to.

What is mysticism?

One may give words whatever connotation one likes, provided one begins by defining that meaning. In our eyes, the ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment of a contact, consequently of a partial coincidence, with the creative effort which life itself manifests. This effort is of God, if it is not God himself. The great mystic is to be conceived as an individual being, capable of transcending the limitations imposed on the species by its material nature, thus continuing and extending the divine action. Such is our definition.[45]

Mysticism is a getting back through intuition to the source of all life. This vital principle is either " the transcendental cause of all things," or its " earthly delegate," in either case the center of gushing which is at the heart of evolution. It

[44] J. Maritain, *Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism*, tr. M.L. & U.G. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), 334.

[45] TS, 220-21.

takes an extraordinary individual to achieve this. There seems to be a potential in all of us for some approach to it, but if metaphysics is open only to the few on account of the effort it takes to put oneself directly into contact with the flowing real, mysticism is a possibility for still fewer, because it requires a second intensification. Mysticism lies a step beyond the bending back by which we enter into ourselves and get an intuition of our internal duration. It is aimed directly at the source of life, with which it somehow effects a kind of " coincidence."

From this we can clearly see the difference between static and dynamic religion. Static religion dwells on the plateaus of evolutionary stasis, at the place where a species has been put down. The movement of life has ceded to the resistance of matter and come to a halt, and static religion steps in to preserve the gains that have been made. Dynamic religion, on the other hand, is interested only in more progress.[46] In the mystic, the *elan* has succeeded in making another forward thrust, in setting down, as it were, a new species, the extraordinary individual, whose task it is to bring mankind up to his own level. When this has been achieved, another individual will be put forward, and the pull will take up again. The evolutionary effort never ceases. Although it is true that the human species is the last massive leap of the *elan*, and the term of its thrust, there is no end to the progress the human species can make within itself, in the direction of universal brotherhood and the contemplative life.[47] Dynamic religion is the only road to this goal. Static religion, with its closed societies subsisting on fictions, pales beside this second kind of religion which makes actual contact with the source of life and cooperates with it in divinizing the race.

A soul strong enough, noble enough, to make this effort would not stop to ask whether the principle with which it is now in touch is the transcendent cause of all things or merely its earthly delegate. It would be content to feel itself pervaded, though re-

[46] TS, 213-16.

[47] TS, 233-35. On this point Bergson's thought corresponds closely to Teilhard de Chardin's.

taining its own personality, by a being immeasurably mightier than itself, just as an iron is pervaded by the fire which makes it glow. Its attachment to life would henceforth be its inseparability from this principle, joy in joy, love of that which is all love. In addition it would give itself to a society, but to a society comprising all humanity, loved in the love of the principle underlying it.[48]

The *elan* seems to pervade and completely take over the privileged individual. Sometimes Bergson's language of cooperation passes into the language of identification, so that the mystic *is* the *elan* in its creative activity.[49] In authentic mysticism there are two moments. The first is the moment of vision or contact. The individual loses himself in the source of life. Then comes " a boundless joy, an all-absorbing ecstasy or an enthralling rapture: God is there, and the soul is in God." [50] But there can be no stopping there in this life, because all life is movement and creation. Mysticism is complete and genuine only if the mystical transport of love issues in practical action on behalf of the human race. The text cannot be improved upon.

For the love which consumes the mystic is no longer simply the love of man for God, it is the love of God for all men. Through God, in the strength of God, he loves all mankind with a divine love. This is not the fraternity enjoined on us by the philosophers in the name of reason. . . . It is not the extension of an instinct, it does not originate in an idea. . . . Coinciding with God's love for his handiwork, a love which has been the source of everything, it would yield up, to anyone who knew how to question it, the secret of creation. It is still more metaphysical than moral in its essence. What it wants to do, with God's help, is to complete the creation of the human species and make of humanity what it would have straightaway become, had it been able to assume its final shape without the assistance of man himself. Or to use words which mean, as we shall see, the same thing in different terms; its direction is exactly that of the vital impetus; it *is* the impetus itself, communicated in its entirety to exceptional men who in their turn would fain impart it to all humanity and by a living contra-

[48] TS, 212.
[49] TS, 234.
[50] TS, 230.

diction change into creative effort that created thing which is a species, and turn into movement what was by definition a stop.[51]

This is a rather complete summary. We might call attention also to the mystic's detachment from matter, which in Bergson is the practical equivalent of barrier. The mystic generally is an overcomer of barriers, and very notably of those almost insuperable barriers which split mankind up into a medley of hostile island societies. This is something which we saw static religion to be incapable of doing. No gradual expansion of sociability from family to state to world-at-large is possible within the limits of static religion. Says Bergson: " The social instinct would be far more likely to prompt societies to struggle against one another than to unite to make up humanity." [52] What is needed is an impulse of a different kind, and dynamic religion supplies it in the form of God's creative love for all his creatures, now taking over and operating through the mystic. This love transforms the individual first, in a painful " dark night " experience. And then it begins to move through the species at large. In the soul of the leader there is a " boundless impetus; there is an irresistable impulse which hurls it into vast enterprises; a calm exaltation of all its faculties makes it see things on a vast scale only, and in spite of its own weakness, produce only what can be mightily wrought." [53]

* * * * * *

Dynamic religion has a long history, even though it reaches its perfection only in the great Christian mystics. Bergson traces it through the Greeks, the Buddhists, and the Jewish prophets.

He points out that Greek philosophy both begins and ends with mysticism. Platonism, which might be viewed as the center of Greek philosophy, looks backward to Dionysian frenzy

[51] TS, 234-36.

[52] TS, 234.

[53] TS, 232. For a comparison between Bergson's mysticism and Nietzsche's superhumanism, see F. Copleston, S. J., *Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosopher of Culture* (London: Burns & Oates, 1942), 205-13.

and forward to Plotinian ecstasy. Platonism springs immediately from Pythagoreanism, which is continuous with Orphism, which develops out of the orgiastic cult of Dionysius. And at the end of the road is Plotinus, himself something of a mystic and the high point of the Greek development. But dynamic religion is not perfect in Plotinus because it is not dynamic enough. His mysticism does not overflow into action. He goes into God and remains there, and so his mysticism lacks the second fundamental characteristic. Its impulse is too weak.

Indian mysticism, in its twin forms of Brahminism and Buddhism, has the same basic notes and the same basic failure. Indian mysticism aims at escape. It runs from life in a kind of hopelessness fostered by the extreme poverty and hardship under which the Indian people have so long lived. What is sought is personal liberation in the state of Nirvana, high above the plain of mortal cares, beyond the realm of desire. There is something mystic about this, but it is not dynamic religion. There is no genuine self-giving in such mysticism, no vast enterprise on behalf of the race. Perhaps there hardly could be in a culture which has no hope.

The Jewish prophets come closer. They make contact with God. And the divine impulse which fills the prophets is always communicated to the Jewish people. They are urged to maintain a closer contact with the living God, to do penance and put off their vices, to house the widow and the orphan, and to free the slave. Bergson's criticism of Jewish mysticism is that it is still too much confined to a closed society. The Jewish God is an improvement on other gods, but he confines the exercise of his power and his justice to his Chosen People, and they themselves are anxious to preserve their nationalism at all costs. The God of the Jews is not yet the God of love.

Mysticism comes to full flower in the giants of Christianity.

> For the complete mysticism is that of the great Christian mystics. Let us leave aside for the moment their Christianity, and study in them the form apart from the matter. There is no doubt that most of them passed through states resembling the various culminating phases of the mysticism of the ancients. But they merely passed

through them: bracing themselves up for an entirely new effort, they burst a dam; they were then swept back into a vast current of life; from their increased vitality there radiated an extraordinary energy, daring, power of conception and realization. Just think of what was accomplished in the field of action by a St. Paul, a St. Teresa, a St. Catherine of Siena, a St. Francis, a Joan of Arc, and how many others besides! [54]

Bergson is singularly taken with the Christian mystics, despite his personal commitment to Judaism. He finds in them all the requisite characteristics: the personal integrity, the detachment, the vision, the enterprise, the powered success. What he fails to recognize is the radically supernatural quality of their distinctive attributes and the helplessness of any man to reach such heights unless God calls him. No mere natural intuitive effort, however intense, suffices to reach the kind of contact with God that is at the heart of authentic Christian mysticism. Bergson does not realize this; but he does recognize excellence when he sees it.

We have pointed up the contrast between static and dynamic religion already. Let us complete this consideration by showing their interpenetration.[55] Bergson gives to both the common name of religion because both are biological in origin, and both serve the same purpose of giving the soul security in life. Then, too, though they are essentially different, they mingle in a whole continuum of degrees in the various societies of the world. The mixture can be seen to advantage in Christianity, which has both static and dynamic elements. These elements exert a mutual causality on each other, with the priority going to mysticism. Christianity inherits a great deal from older static religions and philosophies, and this is the base from which the mystic begins. This is where he gets the theology in terms of which he will try to express his experience. His experience in turn will pattern itself on static religion. He pours his newfound wealth back into its moulds, and communicates to its doctrine something of his own ardor. In this way, dynamic

[54] TS, 216-28, 227-28, 239-40.
[55] TS, 213-16, 237-39.

religion becomes in some measure available to the masses, and the next mystic has better foundations for a new leap. The priority in this seeming circularity goes to mysticism primarily because of Christ, who, whether or not he be called a man, stands at the origin of Christianity. And " if the great mystics are indeed such as we have described them, they are the imitators, and original but incomplete continuators, of what the Christ of the Gospels was completely." [56]

V. Bergson's Natural Theology

The question is not inappropriately raised at this point whether Bergson the ethico-religious thinker, with his literary flair for a philosophy of the changing and for mysticism, has a genuine natural theology. Do we find in his works a science of the existence and nature of God? The answer is yes. There seems to be a rather deliberate natural theology in the latter part of *Two Sources*, though, of course, the character of that theology is of a piece with the rest of Bergson's methodology and emphasis.

The Bergsonian natural theology is not continuous with the Greek tradition. It is rather a reaction against it. The critique of Greek thought begins in *Creative Evolution*,[57] and it is completed specifically on the God question in the *Two Sources*.[58] Aristotle's God is the apex of the Greek propensity to glorify immobility. In all Greek philosophy, the immobile is more noble than the mobile, and the Idea or Form suffers diminution when it is plunged into matter and the changing conditions of concrete existence. God, therefore, as the supreme being, must be at the far distant pole from this degradation, the Idea of Ideas, the Self-Thinking Thought, absolved from all fluctuation and operative only by the appeal of his perfection. In Bergson's view, this is a sketch not only of the Greek God: this is the God of traditional natural theology, and he is in dire need of replacement.

[56] TS, 240.
[57] CE, 341-57.
[58] TS, 241-44.

So remote is this conception from the God most men have in mind that if, by some miracle and contrary to the opinion of philosophers, God as thus defined should step down into the field of experience, none would recognize Him. For religion, be it static or dynamic, regards him above all as a Being who can hold communication with us: now this is just what the God of Aristotle, adopted with a few modifications by most of his successors, is incapable of doing.[59]

Such a God has given rise to insoluble problems in natural theology, and he is, in any case, " a being whom mankind has never dreamed of invoking." [60]

It is plain that Bergson must strike out in quite a different direction in natural theology, if only in view of his metaphysics and his theory of knowledge.[61] Both preclude the use of any of the ordinary " ways " to the existence and nature of God. There is no radical contingency in the beings of Bergson's universe, no temporal suspension over nothingness. There are no efficient causes at work in the evolutionary process. There is no intelligence directing the forward movement. Nor is there any substantiality in the flux of our experience. In a word, there is no toehold whatever in the Bergsonian universe from which a philosopher might begin the ascent to God. Furthermore, man's intellect is not serviceable in such an attempt. It makes no contact with being. It attains only to its shadow—geometric solids which can be turned to some practical use. The true nature of reality, through which alone an approach could be made to the source of that reality, passes intellect right by.[62] It is therefore not only consistent with Bergson's previous philosophy that in the *Two Sources* he should espouse a natural theology of intuition; there is no other way; it is the only open road.

There are two things to be noted about such a natural theology. One is that it is a theology of testimony, the other is

[59] TS, 241.

[60] TS, 244.

[61] J. Maritain, *Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism*, 180-203.

[62] Henri Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, tr. T. E. Hulme (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1912), 64-67.

that it is a theology of probability. It must be based on testimony, because only the privileged few, the mystics, can make the kind of intuitive contact with God that is needed for a knowledge of his existence and nature. And because it is a theology of testimony to an experience which the philosopher himself cannot reach, and because the domain in which it operates is fraught with the perils of illusion, it can only be a theology of probability. But we should not sell this probability too short. For "probabilities may accumulate, and the sum-total be practically equivalent to certainty." [63]

> A surveyor measures the distance to an unattainable point by taking a line on it, now from one, now from the other of two points which he *can* reach. In our opinion this method of intersection is the only one that can bring about a decisive advance in metaphysics.[64]

The intersecting lines Bergson has in mind here are the line of evidence for the source of life from biological data and the line of evidence for the same source from mystical data. Being asked at the end of his life about the certitude of this approach to God, Bergson replied: "Philosophicament, non; mais humainement, ma conviction est entière." [65]

He first establishes the sanity of his mystic witnesses, as this has sometimes been called in question.[66] His recourse is to the principle that a good tree bears good fruit, and a bad tree bad fruit. The mystics are great personalities, who make light of their visions and ecstasies and show a marvelous practicality, simplicity, and devotedness in their work for men. As to their testimony, it is strengthened by the fact that they agree. To a great extent, they relate the same experience and in the same language. They take up the testimony of previous non-Christian mystics and continue it in the same direction. And they all go through basically the same purifying process to their lofty goal.

[63] TS, 248.
[64] TS, 248.
[65] A. D. Sertillanges, O. P., *Avec Henri Bergson* (Paris: Gallimard, 1941), 18.
[66] TS, 229-30, 246-47.

One of the great difficulties with a natural theology of this kind is that the intuitive cannot be adequately conceptualized in intellectual terms. This is why the language of the mystics, and likewise the language of the philosopher of intuition, is so fraught with metaphor. All ordinary words and concepts are merely symbols. Each is "invariable by definition, being a diagram, a simplified reconstruction . . . , in any case a motionless view of the moving reality." [67] We have to keep this essential inadequacy of the language of the mystics in mind as we review their testimony.

* * * * * *

The fact of mysticism itself testifies to the existence of God. For it is God who is the object of the mystical experience. We accept this on their word. Again, it seems to be a matter of the extraordinary type of experience the ecstatic mystic has, the kind of enthusiastic witness he subsequently bears to the reality of the unseen, and the kind of loving enterprise he launches on behalf of men, that lets us know he has made contact with God.

And what is the nature of this God?

> God is love, and the object of love: herein lies the whole contribution of mysticism. About this twofold love the mystic will never have done talking. His description is interminable, because what he wants to describe is ineffable. But what he does state clearly is that divine love is not a thing of God: it is God himself. It is upon this point that the philosopher must fasten who holds God to be a person, and yet wishes to avoid anything like a gross assimilation with man.[68]

This is the heart of the mystic testimony. God is love, and love is identical with his being. Love is generative, and it joys in generation. Hence God is the source of life, and from him all creation springs with love's impulsion.

As a matter of fact, the mystics unanimously bear witness that God needs us, just as we need God. Why should he need us unless

[67] *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 47-48.
[68] TS, 252.

it be to love us? And it is to this very conclusion that the philosopher who holds to the mystical experience must come. Creation will appear to him as God undertaking to create creators, that he may have, besides himself, beings worthy of his love.[69]

This love overflows from God into the mystic, who becomes in turn a creator from whom love overflows onto the human race, drawing the whole of conscious being into a unity. This participated divine love enables man to rise above the conditions of sluggish matter and return to God in love. And this is the completion of Bergson's evolutionary philosophy.[70]

There is one other point of mystical natural theology to which we should call attention. It is that God is completely " other," and should not be thought of in terms of the ordinary reality of our experience. The object of mystic contemplation and the source of mystic creative operation is " an energy to which no limit can be assigned, and a power of creating and loving which surpasses all imagination." [71] The mystics " teach us of a Being who transcends tangible reality as he transcends human consciousness," [72] and it is the grossest kind of philosophical incompetence to attempt to make him conform to *a priori* conceptions or standards.

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Bergson has often been charged with pantheism, and it will be worth our while to review some of the evidence on this question by way of a critique of his natural theology.

It should be said at the outset that pantheism is foreign to the *intention* of Bergson. For instance, to Father de Tonquedec he writes:

I speak of God as of the fountain-head from whence come one after the other, through an effect of his liberty, the ' currents ' or ' impulses ' each one of which will form a world: he therefore remains distinct from them.[73]

[69] TS, 255.

[70] Bergson himself gives us an excellent resumé of his whole philosophy, somewhat too lengthy to quote here, in *Two Sources*, 256-58.

[71] TS, 262.

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] *Études*, Feb. 20, 1919, I^re^ *Lettre* (May 12, 1908), p. 517.

And again:

From all this we get a clear idea of a creative and free God, generator of both matter and life, whose effort of creation continues on the side of life, through the evolution of species and the constitution of human personalities. From all this, consequently, we get the refutation of pantheism and monism in general.[74]

In actual practice, we get three kinds of statements. The first suggests an attempt to flee the issue; the second seems to renounce pantheism; the third seems to affirm it. As an instance of the elusive type, we have such statements in the *Two Sources* as: "Whether the principle with which it (i. e., the mystic soul) is now in touch is the transcendent cause of all things or merely its earthly delegate." [75] And: "This effort (i. e., the creative effort which life manifests) is of God, if it is not God himself." [76]

There are several texts which declare a distinction between God and the world.

Creation will appear to him as God undertaking to create creators, that he may have, besides himself, beings worthy of his love.[77]

Distinct from God, who is this energy itself, they (men) could spring into being only in a universe, and therefore the universe sprang into being.[78]

Granted the existence of a creative energy which is love, and which desires to produce from itself beings worthy to be loved, it might indeed sow space with worlds whose materiality, as the opposite of divine spirituality, would simply express *the distinction between being created and creating*.[79]

Finally, there are a number of texts which make pantheistic conclusions very difficult to escape.

Everything is obscure in the idea of creation if we think of *things* which are created and a *thing* which creates, as we habitually do, as the understanding cannot help doing. . . . Things and states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are no things, there are only actions.[80]

[74] *Ibid.*, II[e] Lettre (June 12, 1911), p. 515.
[75] TS, 212.
[76] TS, 220.
[77] TS, 255.
[78] TS, 257.
[79] TS, 256.
[80] CE, 270-71.

Now if the same kind of action is going on everywhere, whether it is that which is unmaking itself or whether it is that which is striving to remake itself, I simply express this probable similitude when I speak of a center from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fire-works display—provided, however, that I do not present this center as a thing, but as a continuity of shooting out. God thus defined, has nothing of the already made; he is unceasing life, action, freedom.[81]

Then the Absolute is revealed very near us and, in a certain measure, in us. . . . It lives with us. Like us, but in certain aspects infinitely more concentrated and more gathered up in itself, it *endures*.[82]

At the risk of belaboring the issue, we quote at some length from a letter Bergson wrote in 1915 to Professor Kallen, author of *William James and Henri Bergson.*

In a general way, you have, it seems to me, exaggerated the transcendental elements of my doctrine. No doubt you are right in saying that I am nearer than James to traditional metaphysics; you have even divined my sympathy for Plotinus, a sympathy which I never had an opportunity to express in my books, but which is well known to those who follow my courses. But I fear you have misunderstood the relation which I establish between "duration" and "eternity." Far from interpreting duration in terms of the eternity of the ancient philosophers, it is eternity as they conceive it that I have sought to bring down from the heights it occupied to duration, that is, to something which grows, which enriches and creates itself indefinitely. On the other hand, it is not true that I admit the existence of an absolute reality, distinct from appearances, as does traditional metaphysics. On the contrary, for me all that we perceive is an absolute reality. Only it is a reality which has to be completed by us . . . and the object of philosophy is to arrive at a knowledge of that reality more complete than what we generally call by that name, though it has not another nature, since it contains it as the whole contains its parts. . . . One of the main objects of my works has been to show . . . that the phenomena taken integrally, i. e., replaced in real duration, are truly an absolute, this absolute being possessed of such a nature that necessarily it lends itself to intellectual or

[81] CE, 271.
[82] CE, 324.

mathematical knowledge when it is matter, and to intuitive knowledge when it is life or spirit.[83]

All this apparently conflicting evidence makes the question of pantheism difficult to resolve. But Bergson's strong reaction against the static God of the Greeks totally separated from the world; his recognition of becoming only, and never of being that is not becoming; his constant insistence on the continuity of the whole evolutionary process, from its intensely vibrating source all the way out to its most fragmented vibrating complexity; [84] and his affirmation that the mystics, in turning within to their own duration and then one step deeper to the source of duration, are making contact with the living God—this general tenor of his entire philosophy seems to lend support to the above texts in establishing Bergson's pantheistic interpretation of the universe.

We can conclude with a criticism of Bergson's religious thought in general, in both its static and dynamic forms.[85] It has the same weakness as his dualistic thought on morality. It passes the heart of the matter on both sides.[86] He gives us a static religion which is just a collection of fictions put forward to hold society together. He gives us a dynamic religion which is accessible only to the privileged few. Between these two extremes is where the religious life of most people is located. It is a matter of rational recognition of God's dominion, and a free adherence to him in a love that manifests itself in deeds. And its foundation is faith. Bergson seems for the most part to be treating real but subsidiary issues.

VI. Conclusion

We have attempted to trace Bergson's thought on morality and religion, both in what they tell us of man and in what

[83] *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, vol. XII, no. 22, Oct. 28, 1915, pp. 615-16.

[84] CE, 109-11.

[85] E. Gilson, *The Philosopher and Theology* (New York: Random House, 1962), gives a fuller critique. He says the *Two Sources* is a book entirely out of focus, but he has nothing but admiration for Bergson's effort and aspiration.

[86] Collins, *op. cit.*, 846.

they tell us of the existence and nature of God. We relied primarily on the *Two Sources* for this doctrine, but we showed how it looks back to and fulfills almost all of the major themes in Bergson's evolutionary philosophy as a whole. It might be said that Bergson's philosophy is itself evolutionary, as well as revolutionary, and that a definite progress is discernible in his thought from its beginnings in *An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* all the way through the *Two Sources* forty-three years later. Bergson's quest begins with the philosopher looking within and ends in a full-blown cosmic evolution, reaching its term in the supermen whose privileged participation in divine creative love endows them with the mission and the power to bring creation back to its Source. The whole course is impressive as the trail of a genuine and gifted seeker after truth, looking ultimately for, and in good measure finding, God.

Bergson's closed morality and static religion, which are related to each other roughly as part to whole, correspond to the material principle in his philosophy. They come to the fore at that plateau where the life force is opposed and brought to a stop by the impediments of matter—i. e., at the level of species-man. They serve to preserve society. In morality, those practices are prescribed and come to be engrained in habits which are minimally essential for the preservation of social unity. In religion, a myth-making function is put in man by nature to counteract the disruptive proclivities of selfish intelligence and tighten the societal unity. These things are most clearly manifested in primitive societies, but they can also be discerned in modern man, if we get beneath the accretions of cultural sophistication and lay human nature bare.

Open morality and dynamic religion, which seem to be largely synonymous, correspond to the vital principle, and come to birth in those rare individuals whose intuitions put them into immediate contact with the source of life. This source is most probably God himself. His nature is love. This love is communicated in mystical experience to extraordinary species-individuals, who carry forward the evolutionary movement until

the human race is brought together in universal brotherhood, in a life free enough from practical cares to allow for contemplation. The call of these leaders evokes an emotional response which is not confined. The best models of dynamic religion are the great Christian mystics.

It is from the testimony of the mystics that Bergson's natural theology springs. For they alone can make the kind of intuitive contact with the source of life that enables us to carry metaphysics to its term in natural theology. The mystics bear witness to God's existence, and to the essential identity of his Being with Love, which impels him to create new beings to be loved and in turn creatively to love. While this God is " other " in the sense of different from anything we can imagine, there is serious question whether he is really transcendent. He seems rather to be the " center of gushing " in an emanationist pantheistic theology.

Bergson reposes all hope for the future, and he is hopeful, in dynamic religion. He expects that the frenzy for material comfort and luxury, which now has such a hold on men, will soon give way, according to evolutionary law, to a counter-frenzy of unselfishness and asceticism.[87] Human science and the mechanization to which it leads, often called down as ruinous of genuine human values, can rather be expected to help man free himself from the grosser cares of earthly life, so that, raised to a level of material sufficiency, he can give himself to specifically human activity, both cultural and contemplative. We live in a critical age, an age of decision. If we take the future into our hands and make the extra effort needed to turn our immense potential into constructive channels, we can help fulfill the " essential function of the universe, which is a machine for the making of gods." [88]

THOMAS N. HART, S.J.

St. Louis University
St. Louis, Missouri

[87] TS, 291-303.
[88] TS, 317.

THE EFFECT OF GOD'S LOVE ON MAN ACCORDING TO ST. AUGUSTINE

THE many writings of St. Augustine against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians have led many to think that St. Augustine made light of the Catholic doctrine of renovation grace or as it is otherwise known in Western theology, sanctifying grace.[1] A cursory examination of Augustine's anti-pelagian writing would certainly give this impression.

The enormity of this heresy was such that St. Augustine was obliged to emphasize aspects of incipient, persevering and

[1] The Bibliography is so great in this field that it would be useless to begin to cite even the best works. There are the works of both a general and specific nature that we have cited in the compilation of this article. V. Capanata, "La deificacion en la soteriologia Augustiniana," *Augustinus Magister,* II (International Congress on St. Augustine, August 1954), Paris, 1954, pp. 745-754; E. M. Carney, *The Doctrine of St. Augustine on Sanctity* (Washington, D. C., 1945); J. Chene, "Saint Augustin et la Grace Sanctifiante," in *La Théologie de Saint Augustin* (Lyon, 1961), pp. 53-57; I. Chevalier, *Saint Augustin et la pensée grecque. Les relations Trinitaires* (Fribourg, 1940); G. Eyren, *The Augustinian Conception of Grace* II (Studia Patristica: Texte u. Unt., 64, Leiden, 1957), pp. 258-269; N. Merlin, *Saint Augustin et les dogmes du péché originel et de la grace* (Paris, 1931), pp. 17-25; F. Moriones, ed., *Enchiridion Theologicum S. Augustini* (Madrid, 1961), pp. 399-549; E. Portalié, *A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine* (Chicago, 1960), pp. 190-229; H. Rondet, *Gratia Christi* (Paris, 1948), pp. 99-143; J. A. Stoopio, *Die deificatio hominis in die Sermones en Epistulae van Augustinus* (Leiden, 1952), pp. 60-78; A. Turrado, "La inhabitacion de la S. Trinidad en los justos segun la doctrina de San Augustin," *Augustinus Magister,* I (Paris, 1954), pp. 583-593; F. Bourassa, "Adoptive Sonship: Our union with the divine persons," *Theological Studies,* 13 (1952), 309-355; G. Brady, art. "Divinisation," in *Dictionnaire de la Spirit.,* III, 1957, Col. 1390-1397; J. Grabowski, "The Holy Ghost in the Mystical Body of Christ according to St. Augustine," *Theological Studies, 5* (1944), 453-483; i. d., "St. Augustine and the Presence of God," *Theological Studies,* 13 (1952), 336-358; Ch. Moehler, "Theologie de la grace et oecumenisme," *Irenikon* (1955), 19-56. English translation from *The Fathers of the Church* (FC), *Ancient Christian Writers* (ACW) and *The Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers,* First Series (NF) whenever available. Latin texts from *Patrologia Latina* (*PL*) supplemented by the *Corpus Scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (CSEL) when available.

consummating grace.[2] The whole Pelagian system was basically naturalistic and rationalistic in spirit and intent. This last point was especially felt in Augustine's polemics with Julian, bishop of Eclan.[3] Pelagianism was a system with a completely abstract and superficial psychology which did not sufficiently take into account the universality of sin in the original fall of Adam.[4] With this denial of original sin on the part of the Pelagians, the mystery of Redemption and salvation, as well as the act of faith, change completely. Man could sin but human nature did not fall; it was intact just as it came from the Creator's hand.[5] In such a view, human nature did not need to be redeemed. In baptism, for instance, the child received a higher generation, but there was no question of a regeneration.[6] The human birth of the Son of Man was thereby reduced to a simple moral example given to men for their edification and example, not for their spiritual life and salvation.[7] Christ became a master and a model; He did not become another life for and in the Christian. Thus, by really freeing man from God in this way, Pelagianism ruined a great part of the Christian religion. It reduced religion to a coarse moralism; man had only to obey the law and do his duty. God had only to ascertain whether this duty was fulfilled or not and whether His law was faithfully observed or not. Creditor and debtor kept their accounts by active and passive calculations. In such a conception, there is really no room for the goodness of the Creator, for the richness and necessity of redemption, for humility and confidence, for the total gift of the soul to God. Prayer, too, is more or less a

[2] *De Gestis Pelagii*, 23 (*PL* 44, 334).

[3] See the many texts in Julian's *Opus Imperfectum* II, 93 (*PL* 45, 1178); VI, 27 (*PL* 45, 1568), etc.

[4] For a definition of this aspect against the Pelagians, see the sacred Council of Milevis in 416 and that of Carthage in 418 approved by Pope Zosimus, *DB* 101-108 as reconstructed in *Mansi*, III, 811A.

[5] *De Perf. Justitiae Hominis*, II, 4 (*PL* 44, 294); *Opus Imperfectum*, VI, 8 (*PL* 45, 1513); etc.

[6] *Opus Imperfectum*, I, 53 (*PL* 45, 1076).

[7] Cf. *De Gratia Christi*, I, 8 (*PL* 44, 364); *Opus Imperfectum* I, 94 (*PL* 45, 1111).

useless activity since one does not ask for what one can do for oneself. The Christian idea itself simply disappears.

There can be no question but that Augustine had to react violently to such a caricature of Christian faith. According to him, Adam sinned, and in some mysterious and true way his sin has attained every man born into this world.[8] By this sin, death has come into the world, since bodily death is nothing more than the result of that death of the soul which all contracted in being born from the seed of Adam.[9] Fallen man now belonged to the *massa damnata* which was not delivered by grace. Still, man retains his free will even though this power remains inefficacious, since it does not, in fact, apply itself to the seeking of the good. Even if the good is desired, the will is still incapable of accomplishing it. Without the prevenient grace of God man can do nothing but sin.[10] Grace is absolutely necessary to believe God's truth; [11] it is necessary to act supernaturally.[12] Such terms as "prevenient graces," "auxiliary graces," are very frequent throughout the works of St. Augustine.[13]

This type of argumentation and defense was the main preoccupation of St. Augustine for almost twenty years before his death in 430. Little wonder, then, that many authors have seen him as only a defender of the doctrine of actual grace. Yet, there are many texts spread throughout his other non-polemical works which clearly indicate and develop his doctrine of the indwelling of the Trinity in the soul of the Christian, as well as what later theologians would call the created gift of "sanctifying grace." This terminology will seem strange only to him who has not seen the historical development of the notion of grace through the centuries. The created gift of "sanctifying grace" is nothing more than a

[8] *Op. Imperfect* (*PL* 45, 1169); *Contra Julianum*, VI, 75 (*PL* 44, 868); *Sermo* 294, 2 (*PL* 46, 1336).

[9] *Contra Julianum*, V, 17 (*PL* 44, 794).

[10] *Contra duas Epistolas Pelag.*, III, 24 (*PL* 44, 607).

[11] *De Praedest. Sanctorum*, 5 (*PL* 44, 963).

[12] *Epist.* 217 (*PL* 33, 983).

[13] *Epist.* 217 (*PL* 33, 830); *De Spiritu et Littera*, 48 (*PL* 229-230).

means whereby we are elevated and rendered capable of possessing God as He is, He who is the uncreated gift to men. It is the effect which God's love has on man. It is a necessary means but still only a means whereby a man is rendered capable of attaining and possessing (or, in the words of St. Bonaventure, being possessed by)[14] the uncreated gift, who is God Himself, one and triune.

This is perhaps one of the reasons why we find so little development of the notion of created grace in the early Fathers of the Church. Any cursory glance at the pages of any of the Greek Fathers will readily reveal this. This divinization (*theosis*) of the Christian and his divine filiation form one whole with the Christology of these same Fathers. Their theology was essentially Christo-centric. One can conceive the grace of redemption and elevation (*gratia Christi capitis, gratia Christi Redemptoris; influxus gratiae,* etc.), only in function of and complete dependency on Christ who is the origin and ultimate culmination of the whole process of the justification, sanctification and divine filiation of the Christian. This idea of incorporation into Christ was so certain in the eyes of the Greek Fathers that they used it as a proof for the true humanity and divinity of Christ. If Christ is not God, then we are not divinized, since we would be incorporated into a simple man and not into the God-man. "The Son does not exist by participation. All created beings possess the grace of God by participation, but the Son is the wisdom and the Word of the Father in whom all created things participate. He by whom the Father divinizes and illuminates, He in whom all is divinized and verified, cannot, it is clear, be a being of another essence than the Father. Participating in Him, moreover, we become participants of the Father because He is His proper word."[15] This notion of divinization and incorporation is very clear in the texts of St. Cyril of Alexandria. By the Incarnation Christ entered into a true fraternity with all men, for as God He was infinitely above them; but as man He can

[14] *Breveloquium*, p. 1, c. 5 (214A).
[15] *De Synodis*, 51 (*PG* 26, 784A).

now be called our brother, because He has physically united Himself with us in the union of the one flesh.[16] This solidarity of Christ with men is brought out as well by the fact that we possess the Holy Spirit. Christ has given us His Spirit who dwells in us in order to bring forth Christ in us.[17] Thus we participate in the life of Christ primarily and principally because the Spirit of Christ is substantially in us. The union of the Spirit with men is, then, " consubstantial." [18] This presence is so real and effective that the Holy Trinity, and especially the Holy Spirit, makes us participate in the divine nature.[20] St. Cyril concludes that by this union with the Spirit there is a new relationship of the faithful with the Son of God. The Holy Spirit brings forth the perfect imitation of the Son in those whom He inhabits and thus the Spirit renders us similar to the Son.[21] Sanctity is, therefore, defined as the participation of the Christian in the Holy Spirit.[22] We are the brothers of the one Son of God because we participate in His divine nature and are rendered conformed to Him by the communion and presence of the Holy Spirit.[23]

We cannot go into a fuller exposition of the doctrine of the Greek Fathers. Suffice it to say that St. Cyril sums up well the teaching of the Greek Fathers as regards our divine filiation by the indwelling of the uncreated gift (the Holy Spirit, the Holy Trinity). We wish to show that, in spite of the great amount of time and effort which St. Augustine spent on the doctrine of actual grace (movement of the will) against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, this doctrine of the Greek Fathers of the divine renovation and filiation of the Christian is well developed in the works of St. Augustine. In a true sense he continues this doctrine of divinization of the Christian

[16] *De Recta Fide* (*PG* 75, 1305A).
[17] *In Hab.*, III, 2 (*PG* 71, 904A).
[18] *De Trin. Dial.*, VII (*PG* 75, 1089C).
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *In Joan.*, XV, 1.
[21] *Ibid.*, XVII, 18, 19.
[22] *Ibid.*, XVI, 6.
[23] *Glaph. Gen.*, I, 5 (*PG* 78, 260A).

in Western theology. We consider that this aspect of his teaching on grace has not been exposed in all its richness. While it is true that much of his doctrine on actual grace has been defined by various Church Councils, there is that whole segment of Augustine's doctrine on the divinization of the Christian which has gone almost unnoticed among Catholic theologians and textbooks of theology. This is unfortunate for a double reason: first, because it is commonly thought that Western and Eastern theologies of grace have developed along different lines. The truth of the matter is that in St. Augustine, the greatest Father of the West, we have a developed doctrine of both; we have only to examine the texts for ourselves. Second, because of the tendency in Western theology to overemphasize the role of sanctifying grace and because of its failure to place it in its total context of means for and adaptation of man to that which is essential in the Christian's life of grace: the union of the Christian with God Himself, one and triune. This emphasizing of sanctifying grace is a rather recent development in theology; its origins do not go back much further than the anti-Protestant polemics of the 16th century. Certainly this was not the tradition of the great scholastics of the 13th century. St. Augustine's doctrine of the divinization of the Christian will help to bring about this healthy balance in theology, a balance so ably developed in St. Thomas Aquinas.

The present study will attempt to show this continuation of the Greek theology of grace in the works of St. Augustine. The matter will be divided into his notion of charity, which he conceives to be essential in understanding the divine state of the Christian, and his notion of the divinization of the Christian by the indwelling of the Trinity itself. The term "sanctifying grace" as we know it today was unknown to St. Augustine, and to restrict our study only to those places where the word *gratia* is explicitly mentioned would not bring out all the riches of his doctrine. We must analyze all the passages where he speaks of the interior and real renovation of the Christian by the action of the Holy Spirit. He describes

this union of God with the Christian in a very personal, intimate, and real way, one which he attributes to the direct workings of both Christ the Redeemer and the Holy Spirit who inhabits the soul of the Christian. Thus, we shall see that any clear-cut distinction between created and uncreated grace is not as yet formulated by Augustine. This, however, does not mean that the reality of these two graces is not in his works. Sometime after the year 400 he began to formulate this doctrine of grace as a real participation in the divine nature. He expresses this reality in terms of images of the divine image as well as the commonly used expression of "divinization" which we have seen used in the Greek Fathers. Thus the Father, by the crucified and resurrected Christ, truly adopts us as His sons and thus truly and really inhabits the souls of the just.

I. *The Virtue of Charity in St. Augustine*

The grace of God interiorly justifies the sinner from all stain of sin. The sacrament of Baptism communicates this justification to the sinner, and in it the Christian receives a true forgiveness of sin and an interior renovation.[24] This interior renovation is not something which is complete once and for all in its reception; it is a continuous reality, a continuous perfection and a continuous struggle against the old man whose concupiscence remains even in the baptized for their purification and trial.[25] Baptism has truly regenerated the Christian and made of him a son of God. Yet, he remains a son of this world, in a state of tension which opens for him the possibility of sin.[26] If sin is a possibility even in the life of the regenerated, so that the Christian might well lose this glorious state of his, still St. Augustine continues to assure the Christian that divine pardon descends upon him if he but has the humility to humble himself each day according to the words of the Lord's prayer: "Forgive us our trespasses." This

[24] *In Joan.*, Tract. XXVI, 1.
[25] *De Natura et Gratia*, I, 58; *Contra duas Epist. Pelag.*, VIII, 13.
[26] *De Pecc. Merit. et remiss.*, VII, 9; VIII, 10; XIII, 18.

prayer, if said faithfully and lived, will give us the grace to die without sin in the state of pure charity.[27]

Thus this interior justification can be summed up by the name of charity. If one possesses true charity, one does by that very fact possess true justice.[28] The spiritual renovation created in us by God's grace consists entirely in charity. If it does not bear the fruits of charity, then grace (justification) is not present at all.[29] As a matter of fact, St. Augustine explicitly states that it is the very same charity whereby we love God and our neighbor. To truly love our brother is not simply not to hate him but also to be willing to give up our lives for him.[30]

This charity, however, can only be born and exemplified in Christ. Thus the state of grace for Augustine is simply the state of charity in the person incorporated into Christ. This incorporation is an absolute necessity for the state of grace and its perseverance. No one is justified without this incorporation into Christ.[31] Throughout these pages of St. Augustine the image of the vine and the branches is very frequent as expressing the union of the Christian in Christ in the one principle of incorporated life. This is further emphasized in his doctrine on the Eucharist. Since we are all nourished and fed with the Eucharistic bread, we cannot but live together the one life with Christ. This union is so great and so intimate that he gives it as one of the main arguments for the Christian's immortality.[32]

Yet, what is this charity for St. Augustine? We know that the fruits of charity are obedience to God and the ability to keep His commandments. On the other hand, charity cannot be simply identified with these fruits. Charity is certainly not a sentimental emotion of any kind. In speaking of charity Augustine keeps the fundamental meaning of the word: love

[27] *De Natura et Gratia*, XXXV, 41.

[28] *In Joann.*, LXXXVII, 1.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] *Sermo* 265, VIII, 9, where he says: " Non alia charitas diligit proximum quam illa quae diligit Deum." See also *Tract. in Epist. Prim. Joann.*, V, 4-7; VI, 10.

[31] *De Gratia Christi et de peccato originali*, II, XXVI, 31.

[32] *Tract in Epist. Prim. Joann.*, LXXX, 1-2; LXXXI, 1-3.

is an inclination, the movement of the soul towards a transcendent reality who is absolute beauty and love and who draws us to Himself:

> Not with uncertain, but with assured consciousness do I love Thee, O Lord. Thou has stricken my heart with Thy word and I loved Thee. . . . But what is that I love in loving Thee? Not corporal beauty, nor the splendor of time, nor the radiance of the light . . . nor the sweet melodies of songs. . . . I love not these things when I love my God; and yet I love a certain kind of light and sound, and fragrance, and food, and embracement of my inner man—where that light shineth unto my soul which no place can contain, where that soundeth which time snatcheth not away . . . where there is a food which no eating can diminish, and where that clingeth which no satiety can sunder. That is what I love, when I love my God.[33]

Thus charity takes on a double form: the form of a desire of union and possession of God and the form of what theology calls a sentiment of benevolence. This latter aspect wishes—in a sense—good to God, wishing to give or add something to God. This giving cannot be to His Being but rather to the exaltation of His Being. Both of these aspects—union and benevolence—are clearly underlined in the works of St. Augustine. At times he emphasizes one and at other times the other—" Thou has made our hearts for Thee," goes the famous phrase of the saintly doctor. His conception of charity is somewhat different from the concept of the virtue of charity which has come down to us from the time of Duns Scotus. The Scholastics saw two forms of charity which were properly distinct: the first form of charity (that of union) has as its formal object God insofar as He is our good; the second (benevolence) has as its formal object God insofar as He is *the* good. The first form of charity is, therefore, inferior to the second because of the second's total gratuity and disinterestedness. As a matter of fact, only this second form of charity can be called true charity (*amor charitatis*) while the first form of charity belongs more to the virtue of hope.[34]

[33] *Confessions*, X, C. VI, 8 (NF Trans.).

[34] Cf. Suarez, *Tract. de Spe.*, disp. I, sect. II, 4 (*Opera Omnia*, T. XIII, p. 604).

St. Augustine does not systematize as did the Scholastics. A cursory glance at his works reveals a different and opposite position. For him, charity is both of these objects (union and benevolence) united in one whole. The human element of union (*ex parte hominis*) is in no way imperfect or secondary; it was simply part of the gift of God's love to men, the product of a disinterested love on the part of God having as its necessary counterpart and effect the union of the ones to whom God gives it.[35]

"I define charity as a motion of the soul whose purpose is to enjoy God for His own sake and one's self and one's neighbor for the sake of God. Lust, on the other hand, is a motion of the soul bent upon enjoying onself, one's neighbor, and any creature without reference to God." [36] Thus, the soul is entirely turned to God in true charity and lost therein. If this abandonment is complete, true charity does not seek the pleasure of itself—as if God could ever be an instrument of our pleasure—but it simply intends God who gives it. One may object at this point: is this not an unconscious fulfillment of our pleasure and desire? St. Augustine answers that this is so but only because it is a deep instinct inseparable from our being such as it came forth from the creating hand of God. In other words, we are creatures; to wish or long to go contrary to this bent is to object against nature itself and ultimately to question God's wisdom and designs in so creating man.[37] What is clear is that for Augustine the virtue of charity is one whole, even though it is directed to two objects, God and neighbor. This charity makes of us true sons of God, and by it the Holy Trinity comes to dwell in the soul of the Christian. It is true, however, that this spiritual renovation and regeneration of the justified by charity, which defines this state of justification, is not the whole of the state of grace. Yet, charity constitutes, as it were, a prerequisite for the indwelling of the Trinity in

[35] "Hoc est enim Deum gratis amare, de Deo Deum sperare. De Deo properare impleri, de ipso satiari." *Sermo* 334, 3 (*PL* XXXVIII, 1469).

[36] *De Doctrina Christiana*, III, C. X., 16 (*PL* XXXIV, 72; trans. F. O. C.).

[37] *De Trinit.*, XIII, C. VIII, n. 11 (*PL* XLII, 1023).

the soul of the Christian. We shall investigate this latter aspect in the second part of this article. Suffice it to say here that these two aspects (charity—indwelling) form two parts of one whole in the sanctification (justification) of the Christian.

There is another problem in the works of St. Augustine with regard to the virtue of charity which we wish to investigate before leaving this section. During the Middle Ages it occupied a great deal of attention in the tarly and later Scholastics. The question was whether the virtue of charity was a separate virtue or was it the Holy Spirit Himself. Even in more modern times with such theologians as Petau we have a return to the Greek Fathers, who, these writers claim, taught that the Holy Spirit Himself was the charity in the heart of the Christian and, therefore, was not a " separate infused virtue " as are the virtues of Faith and Hope. The famous defender of this thesis during the Middle Ages was Peter Lombard, author of the *Libri Sententiarum*, who tried to adduce the Doctor of Grace as one of his authorities for this opinion.[38] What can the texts of St. Augustine tell us about this theory? What is certain is that in his works it is not sufficient to say that charity is *from* God; it is much more than this. Charity is, simply speaking, God Himself and, consequently, when we love, we love of God (*amamus de Deo*). The question is, however, whether St. Augustine considers charity as it exists in us as a (created) gift and a supernatural virtue or does he, like Peter Lombard, simply identify it with the Holy Spirit? The question is difficult to answer in a black and white manner for we have two sets of texts in this regard, each proving one or the other thesis.

The first set of texts seems to argue for an identification of charity as it exists in the soul of the Christian with the very person of the Holy Spirit.

[38] Among other texts, cf. *I Sent.*, dist. 17, c. 1, 2; others include Pascasius Tabertus, *De Fide, Spe et Charitate*, III, 2 (*PL* 120, 1460); William of St. Thurry, *De natura et dignitate amoris 5* (*PL* 184, 387); St. Bernard, *Epist. 11 ad Carthus.* (*PL* 182, IIID); St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 23, a. 1; *De Charitate*, q. unica 1, art. 1.

Let no one say, I do not know what I love. Let him love his brother, and he will love the same love. For he knows the love with which he loves, more than the brother whom he loves. So now he can know God more than he knows his brother: clearly known more, because more within him; known more, because more certain. Embrace the love or God, and by love embrace God. That is love itself, which associates together all the good angels and all the servants of God by the bond of sanctity, and joins together us and them mutually with ourselves, and joins us subordinately to Himself . . . this same brotherly love itself (for it is brotherly love by which we love each other) is set forth by so great authority, not only to be from God (*ex Deo*), but also to be God (*sed etiam Deum*). When, therefore, we love our brother from love, we love our brother from God; neither can it be that we do not love above all else that same love by which we love our brother.[39]

The text would seem to identify charity and God in a very definite way. In still other texts, St. Augustine explains that charity is God not simply because He is only a gift but because it is the very substance of God Himself. The scriptures, he argues, do not affirm that God is " my " charity but simply define God as charity. In the following text, he insists on the difference between charity and the other virtues because of its more intimate connection with God in the Scriptures.

We are not going to say that God is called love because love itself is a substance worthy of the name of God, but because it is gift of God, as it is said to God, " Thou are my patience." For this is not said because our patience is God's substance, but *in that He Himself gives it to us*; as it is elsewhere read, " Since from Him is my patience." For the usage of the words themselves in Scripture sufficiently refutes this interpretation; for " Thou art my patience " is the same kind as " Thou, Lord, art my hope " . . . and it is not said, " O Lord my love," or " Thou art my love," but it is said thus, " God is love," as it is said " God is Spirit." [40]

Another passage, classical in calling the Holy Spirit the gift of God, has a Greek flavor about it, as we have seen very briefly in our exposé of St. Cyril's theology.

[39] *De Trinitat.*, VII, 8, 12 (*PL* 42, 852 ss.) trans. N. F. See also in this same vein *Epist.* 186, 37 (*PL* 33, 818); *Serm.* 156, 5 (*PL* 38, 852 ss).

[40] *De Trinit.*, XV, 17, 27 (*PL* 42, 1080), trans. N. F.

Love, therefore, which is of God (*quae ex Deo*) and is God (*et Deus est*), is specially the Holy Spirit, by whom the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts, by which love the whole Trinity dwells in us. And, therefore, most rightly is the Holy Spirit, although He is God, called also the gift of God.[41]

Yet, we must be very careful to compare this set of texts with another which would seem to argue against this identification of charity and the Holy Spirit. In them Augustine simply seems to call charity a virtue which in some is " more " and in others " less." This would be patently impossible if it were a question of simple identification of charity with the Holy Spirit: " Love is the virtue with which that which ought to be loved is loved. This is in some greater, in others less, and there are men in whom it does not exist at all." [42] And again: " I define charity as a motion of the soul whose purpose is to enjoy God for His own sake and one's self and one's neighbor for the sake of God. . . . The more the power of lust is destroyed, the more the power of charity is strengthened." [43] Thus charity is a *motus animae* which is properly said only of a virtue. " The charity of God is said to be infused into our hearts, not by that charity by which He loves us but by that by which He makes us His lovers." [44]

From an objective examination of both sets of texts, *salvo meliori judicio*, it would seem that the doctrine of St. Augustine must be understood in the sense that the Christian is given some participation in charity who is God. This can, however, be said, strictly speaking, only of charity and not the other infused theological virtues. Charity is born solely from the fact that the Holy Spirit is given to us. Therefore, there is a definite notion of *participated* charity in the creature *as well as the actual presence of the Spirit Himself who is Charity*. This participation can truly be called a virtue in which the

[41] *Ibid.*, XV, 18, 32 (col. 1083).

[42] *Epist.* 167, 4, 15 (*PL* 33, 739), trans. N. F.

[43] *De Doctrina Christ.*, III, 10, 16 (*PL* 34, 72). See also, *De Mor. Ecc.*, I, II, 19 (*PL* 32, 1319), Trans. F. O. C.

[44] *De Spiritu et litt.*, 32, 56 (*PL* 44, 237).

creature who participates in it can increase and even decrease. This interpretation of participated charity as a virtue is strengthened by other reasons. For instance, Augustine asserts that we love God " de Deo " and not simply that it is God who loves in us.[45] He also teaches that the Wisdom of God becomes the wisdom of men by participation.[46] Lastly, it can further be argued that, although the Holy Spirit is unchangeable in Himself, He can be had by some more and by others less.[47] This would definitely lead us to believe that Augustine conceived charity as a participated theological virtue.

II. *Participation in Divinity and Immortality According to Augustine*

By charity, then, the Trinity comes to inhabit the soul of the Christian. Charity, as we have said, is not the whole of the state of grace. It also includes the prerogatives of the divine filiation and the indwelling of the Holy Trinity in our souls. Both are related to charity and, in a sense, proceed from it. By loving, we become sons of God, and only He is born of God who has charity in Him.[48] This divine filiation is intimately described by an analysis of the Incarnation of Christ in the theory of exchange (*admirabile commercium*) in which Christ communicates His divine prerogatives to us. This exchange and communication is not simply a metaphor but rather implies a real, " ontological " communication of the divine gifts. It is certainly not a moral adoptive union of the Christian with Christ. The word of the Christian's sanctification is attributed to the whole of the Trinity by the word of the Incarnation who alone is both the natural Son of God and man among us. The whole notion of filiation and divine adoption is in, through and by Christ. In other words, St. Augustine's system, like that of the Greek Fathers, is above all Christo-centric.

[45] *Serm.* 34, 2, 3 (*PL* 38, 210); *Serm.* 169, 14 (*PL* 38, 923).
[46] *De Trinitat.*, XIV, 12, 15.
[47] *In Joann.*, 74, 2 (*PL* 35, 1827).
[48] *Tract. in Epist., Prim. Joann.*, tract. V, 4-7; *De Trinit.*, XV, CXVIII, 32.

By participating in His divinity, we shall also be immortal for life eternal. And this has been given to us as a token in the Son of God . . . so that even before we have become participants of His immortality, He Himself became a participant in our mortality. For just as he was mortal—not of His own substance but of ours—so too we are immortal, not of our own substance, but of His. No one can doubt that we shall be participants in His immortality.[49]

He continues the Christo-centric idea of our conformity to the Son in his commentary on the prologue of St. John.[50] In these texts he develops the thought that we are not born of the substance of God, as was the only begotten Son, but adopted sons engendered by grace. God has not wished this Son to be alone and has thus given Him many brothers and by that very fact these brothers have become co-heirs with Christ, the only naturally begotten Son.

Marvel not, then, O man, that thou art made a son by grace, that thou are born of God according to His word. The Word Himself first chose to be born of man, that thou mightest be born of God unto salvation and say to thyself, not without reason did God wish to be born of man, but because he counted me of some importance, that He might make me immortal. . . . When, therefore, he had said, " born of God," lest we should, as it were, be filled with amazement and trembling at such grace, at grace so great as to exceed belief that men are born of God, as if assuring thee, he says, " And the word was made flesh and dwelt among us." Why doth thou marvel that men are born of God? Consider God Himself born of men.[51]

Much like Origen's theory of the image of God restored in many by the Incarnation of the Word, St. Augustine developed his own theory of the divine image in man. According to this theory, man was originally created in the image of God, but this image was lost by the sin of Adam. It was once again (at least in potency) restored to men by the Incarnation of the Son of God; since Te is the divine exemplar, we must seek to follow if we wish to restore this divine image.

[49] *Enn. in Ps. 146*, 11 (*Corpus Christianorum*, t. XL, p. 2130). See other texts in *Epist.* 140, 4, 10 (*PL* 33, 5415); *Serm.* 166, 4 (*PL* 38, 909).

[50] *In Joan.*, II, 13-15; *In Prim Epist. Joann.*, V, 4-7; *Contra Faustum*, III, 3; *Epist.*, 140, 9, 9.

[51] *In Joan.*, II, 15 (Trans. N. F.).

And by the example of Him who is the image, let us also not depart from God, since we also are the image of God: not indeed that which is equal to Him, since we are made so by the Father through the Son, and not born of the Father, . . . It is therefore, not to be wondered at, if, on account of the example which the Image, which is equal to the Father, gives to us, in order that we may be refashioned after the image of God. . . .[52]

St. Augustine develops this notion in a deeper way in the following texts where he says that this participation in the divine nature is not simply one of imitation of an " exemplar " but an actual participation in the light and wisdom by which God himself is wise and which God gives to men. In other words, by this participation a man adheres or is related to Him whose image he is.

Let him worship the uncreated God, who gave him the power to receive and participate in Himself. . . . A man is wise by participation in that greatest light . . . so too it is called man's wisdom which pertains only to God . . . just as the justice of God is so called not only because He is just, but also because He gives it to man when He justifies man.[53]

Augustine does not hesitate to use the word " deification " as did the Greek Fathers. Yet, in using it, he is careful to bring out the difference between the natural generation of the only begotten Son and that of the adopted sons in Christ. He alone can deify who is Himself God, whether it be the Son or the Holy Spirit. This was the favorite argument of the Greek Fathers against the heretics who denied the divinity of the Son or of the Spirit or both. How can the Son or the Spirit deify us if they are but simple creatures? Augustine continues this same line of thought, making our deification even more realistic than that of the Greek Fathers. If we are not born of the very substance of God, touched by it, participate in it, we cannot be deified. God's substance in the form of the Holy Spirit is in us and, therefore, we are deified by participation in Him:

[52] *De Trinit.* VII, 3, 5 (*PL* 42, 938) trans. N. F.
[53] *De Trinit.*, XIV, 12, 5 (*PL* 42, 1048).

He called men gods, deified by His grace, who were not born of His substance. He alone justifies who by Himself, not by another, is just; and He alone deifies, who by Himself, not by another's participation; it is God who justifies and who deifies because by justifying them, he makes of them sons of God. He gave to them the power to become sons of God. If we have become sons of God, and have become gods, this is due to gratuitous adoption, not by natural generation. The only begotten Son of God is God with the Father . . . others who becomes gods, are so by grace; they are born not of the substance of God . . . in order that they might be what He is; but it is by God's pleasure that they come to Him and are co-heirs with Christ.[54]

This deification is a true filiation, even though it is an adoptive one by grace. It is obvious that this generation must be adoptive, since no creature can issue forth from the substance of God. Therefore, our adoption must consist in an extended and participated filiation of that of the natural Son of God who has become incarnate. This relationship, although adoptive, is not simply a fiction, as might be the case with human adoption. This new adoptive filiation implies a real and ontological relationship of filiation to the Father. Thus, with St. Paul, we can truly, not fictitiously, cry in our hearts: "Abba, Father." We are co-heirs of the Kingdom by God by this adoption as sons of God into Christ, the one natural Son of God.

God has an only Son, whom He begot from His own substance, of whom it is said, "Being in the form of God . . ."; He begot us not of His own substance, for we belong to the creation which is not begotten but made; but that He might make us the brothers of Christ, He adopted us. That act, then, by which God, when we were not born of Him, but created and formed, begot us by His Word and grace, is called adoption. So John says, "He gave them power to become Sons of God." [55]

The famous phrase of St. Augustine in this respect is known by all: He became man in order that men could become God.

[54] *En. in Ps. 49*, 2 (*PL* 36, 565); see also *En. Ps. 94*, 6 (*PL* 37, 7221); *Serm.*, 192, 1 (*PL* 38, 1012).

[55] *C. Faust*, III, 3 (*PL* 42, 215), trans. N. F.; see also *Serm.* 57, II, 2 (*PL* 38, 702-703).

We have already seen how he tries to explain to Christians the utter astonishment that men naturally feel when they are told that they have been raised to a supernatural and divine plane. It is not so unbelievable, explains Augustine, especially if we consider the fact that God has already become man. If we are not astonished that He can do the one, we ought not to be astonished that He can do the other as well.[56]

Moreover, by this filiation we are truly and ontologically related to the Father of Christ as brothers of this first and only begotten Son of the Father. We are born of the Holy Spirit who makes us sons whom the Father can see and love. There is a striking resemblance between St. Augustine in this notion of filiation and that of the Greek Fathers (particularly St. Cyril).

> He who is born of the Holy Spirit is the Son of God, the Father, not of the Holy Spirit. For what I have said of the heir and of the other things is sufficient to show us that not everything which is born of another can be called the son of that of which it is born. . . . And some men are called sons of hell, not as being born of hell, but as prepared for it, as the sons of the kingdom are prepared for the Kingdom.[57]

Thus, to sum up, the Christian is the temple of the Holy Spirit as well as of the Trinity. This indwelling of the divinity is the reason why the Christian is divinized and deified. He is deified, however, by the filiation which the Holy Spirit brings about, so that the Christian is now an adopted Son of the Father and is his son in Christ. Therefore, sanctification for St. Augustine is the work of the whole Trinity, even though each person has a distinctive role to play in that sanctification. We can sum this up in three points:

1. This indwelling of the Trinity in the soul of the Christian is totally different from the universal presence of God in all things. Although God is present to all things, He does not dwell in all in the same way, neither does He dwell in an equal

[56] *Serm.* 109, 5 (*PL* 38, 675).
[57] *Ench.* 39, 12 (*PL* 40, 252).

way in all men. This is the explicit teaching of the *Epistle to Dardanus* and can be cited as a defense of the created gift of grace.[58]

2. The indwelling is of the whole Trinity and not only of the Holy Spirit. This, of course, does not mean that all three persons of the Trinity have *the same form of participation.* As a matter of fact, the texts of Augustine seem to indicate that each of the divine persons has a definite form of participation—distinctive to our mind—in the sanctification of the Christian. "Who would dare to think that the Holy Spirit can dwell in anyone, without the Father and the Son there also?"[59] What is certain is that the presence of the whole Trinity and our sanctification comes from the whole Trinity.

3. The presence of the Trinity in the souls of the just "in the state of grace" is also a mystical experience of the hidden God. The intelligence of the believer in elevated to understand divine things in a greater and clearer fashion, and thus he can "taste" the things of God, reaching to the heights of mystical experience.[60]

III. *Final Observation*

An interesting question is whether St. Augustine taught the Catholic doctrine of sanctifying, created grace. There can be no doubt that, as to substance, this teaching is certainly present in his works, even though he did not explicitly formulate it. We have all the elements of this theology. In his arguments against the Semi-Pelagians, he implies, but does not explicitly state, that grace is some kind of a permanent condition of regeneration in Christians. Obviously, this is not as yet called an *infused virtue.* This personal relationship is kept by putting

[58] *Epist.* 187, *Ad Dardanum,* 14-16.

[59] *In Joann.,* LXX, 6; *Serm.* 71, XX, 33 (*PL* 38, 463), where Augustine explicitly states: "Inseparabilis quippe est habitatio, quorum est inseparabilis operatio . . . Societas unitatis Ecclesiae Dei. . . . Tanquam proprium est opus Spiritus Sancti, Patre sane et Filio Co-operantibus, quia societas est quodam modo Patris et Filii ipse Spiritus Sanctus."

[60] *Tract. In Prim. Epis. Joann., III,* 13; *In Joann.,* XCVI, 4.

the Christian in relation to the Holy Spirit. Yet a permanent and adhering quality is presupposed as existing in the regenerated Christian. Augustine explicitly says, "*Qua ergo gratia homo ille ab initio factus est bonus, eadem gratia homines qui sunt membra eius ex malis fiunt boni.*" [61] He also explains the indwelling in terms of loving knowledge. This indwelling and loving knowledge is not the same in all. We have already seen the texts where Augustine says that charity can be in some men to a greater or a less degree. Some can therefore be more holy than others because "*abundantius habent habitatorem Dei.*"

Probably the greatest argument for and development of created grace can be seen in his evolution of how infants are saved, for it is most evident that some sort of infused virtue must be present to the soul of the newly born-baptized, since conscious life is not as yet developed. St. Augustine sees in the infant an *occultissimam gratiam* which God infuses into infants who cannot as yet imitate the example of Christ by and through a virtuous life. The text is classical:

> For by His grace He engrafts into His body even baptized infants, who certainly have not yet become able to imitate anyone. As therefore He, in whom all are made alive, besides offering Himself as an example of justice to those who imitate Him, gives also to those who believe in Him the hidden grace of His Spirit, which He secretly infuses even into infants.[62]

He goes on to explain in his famous letter to *Dardanus*:

> Little children, sanctified by the sacrament of Christ and regenerated by the Holy Spirit, do belong to the temple of God, although it is certain that they cannot yet know God because of their age.[63]

We can sum up the teaching of Augustine on created grace in the following way:

1. The sacrament of Baptism demands a personal act of the will and intelligence. Even infants must in some way be

[61] *Op. Imperf. C. Jul.*, I, 138 (*PL* 45, 1137); *Praed. Sanct.*, 15, 31 (*PL* 44, 982).
[62] *De Natura et gratia*, I, 58.
[63] *Ad Dardanum*, 14-16.

directed to this act. They already have God even before they know Him.

2. In the meanwhile, until they can answer for themselves, the infants are saved. This was first explained by " the faith of the Church " and, since Augustine has not as yet come to an explicit formulation of the *habitus* of grace, his solution is precarious.

3. In the text cited in *De Pecc. Merit. et remiss.*, he affirms the presence of a grace which is infused and hidden and distinct from the indwelling of the Spirit or of the Trinity. To argue *e contrario*, we might say that, just as by original sin we are given the impulse for the imitation of Adam's son, so also Christ excites His faithful to imitation of Him by infusing grace. In *Epistle* 187 faith is present in the infant by means of a " germ " which has not yet evolved. Its development will come with the free exercise of the will when he shall have become an adult. This is certainly only a small step away from affirming the gift of a created *habitus* in the soul. The Scholastics will later formulate these notions more clearly.

REV. PETER J. RIGA

Saint Mary's College
California

THE LAMBDA-ENNEA CASE

I. *Introduction*

"Book Λ is rightly regarded as the coping-stone of [Aristotle's] *Metaphysics*." [1] Doctrinally it is the coping-stone because it contains the Stagirite's last edited words concerning the first separated substance (God), including the famous eighth and ninth chapters, which have been, as it were, bones of contention since the time of Aristotle. Because of the attempts of such philosophers as Philo, Avicenna, and especially Averroes to complete the dialectical procedure presented therein, Chapter Nine seems to have been one of the chief reasons for the thirteenth-century papal reserves concerning the "physical" writings of Aristotle.[2]

Lambda is the textual coping-stone of the *Metaphysics* since, if it is true that Lambda contains the notes for the Stagirite's final lectures at the Lyceum, then it is probable that Aristotle wrote most of Mu and Nu at Chalcis, placed the papyri of the previous books in the order which we have now (after he added the disputed section of Chapter Eight), sent all the papyri back to Eudemus, and asked him to insert Delta where we find it at present. The historical problem about Lambda, then, touches upon the question about the doctrinal order of the parts of the *Metaphysics*.

The stated hypothesis, however, gives rise to many questions. If Aristotle organized the papyri at Chalcis, what was the extent of the editorial work done by Eudemius? Why

[1] Ross, W. D. *Aristotle*. London: Methuen and Co., 1937, p. 179.

[2] ". . . libris illis naturalibus, qui in Concilio provinciali ex certa causa prohibiti fuere, Parisiis non utantur, quousque examinati fuerint et ab omnium errorum suspitione purgati" (Gregory IX, *Parens scientiarum*, April 13, 1231). This decree was strengthened and established in its full vigor by Urban IV, March 19, 1263. Cf. also M. Grabmann, "Guglielmo di Moerbeke O. P. il traduttore delle opere di Aristotle," *Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae* (Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1946), pp. 15-30.

would Aristotle direct that Delta be placed where we actually find it? Why would he place Alpha Elatton and Kappa in their actual positions? What is the historical relation between Kappa and Beta? If the Stagirite really organized all the books of the *Metaphysics* (inasmuch as, according to the hypothesis, he directed Eudemus to insert Delta, the one manuscript he did not have with him at Chalcis), why are these books variously enumerated in the catalogues of his works? Some of these questions will be answered before we actually establish the historical probability of the hypothesis, others afterwards. At any rate, we should first examine the positions of others and analyze the procedures whereby they hold these positions, and then establish the historical probability that Lambda consists, for the most part, of the notes for Aristotle's final lectures at the Lyceum.

The Authenticity and Unity of the Metaphysics. Before taking up the particular historical problem about Lambda, however, we should note that the whole currently proposed text of the *Metaphysics* is truly from Aristotle and that the parts of the text form one coherent book. This does not mean that every minimal portion of the text has literary continuity with the parts preceding and following it. For example, much of Alpha Elatton does not have literary continuity with Alpha and Beta. Rather, our foregoing statement means that all the parts of the *Metaphysics* form one *doctrinally coherent* work, whether these parts are fully developed texts (like Alpha), texts which are not fully developed (as is most obviously the case of Lambda), texts the parts of which lack stylistic unity (as in the case of Kappa and Mu), or texts which, while having a metaphysical orientation, can serve other disciplines (notably Alpha Elatton and Delta). We should mention also that two books of the *Metaphysics* seem to have served Aristotle especially as directives for other books, namely, (1) Delta, inasmuch as the definitions contained therein were an aid to the Stagirite in his development of the preparatory dialectics for the demonstrations from which the definitions would be drawn; and (2) Lambda, which enabled

him to produce the dialectics of Mu-Nu, wherein he excludes not only the doctrine of his predecessors concerning separated substances but also their respective methods.[3]

The authenticity of the *Metaphysics* has been disputed from ancient times. According to Strabo (*Geogr., XII,* I, 54) and Plutarch (*Vita Sul.,* 26),[4] the *Metaphysics* papri were given by Theophrastus to a certain Neleus, who took them to Scepsis in Troas, and were eventually hidden in a cave where humidity and worms ravaged them. Eventually a certain Apellicon gained possession of them and made a copy containing erroneous readings and occasional additions aimed at filling the *lacunae* of the manuscripts. A basic difficulty with Strabo's story is that it removes accessibility to Aristotle's manuscripts over a period of some centuries, whereas there is considerable testimony that even the adversaries of Peripatetism (Megarians, Epicureans, Stoics) made constant use of the Stagirite's scientific writings. Other reasons, too, invalidate this story. Men of the Italian Renaissance (e. g., Pico della Mirandola and especially Patrizzi), too, contested the authenticity of the *Metaphysics,* but only with a view to discrediting Scholasticism. During the nineteenth century, Brandis, Bekker, Bonitz, Ravaisson and their followers claimed that the Renaissance scholars had good reason to deny this authenticity and cited various segments of the text to support their point.

We shall not undertake a critique of the nineteenth-century procedures here. What is astonishing as regards Bekker and Bonitz is that, whereas they produced excellent critical Greek texts of the works of Aristotle, they seemed unable to use the Stagirite's logical *corpus* as a basis also for textual criticism. The first twentieth-century scholar to assume a defense of the

[3] Despite the material similarities between Mu-Nu and Alpha, the formal orientations relevant respectively to Mu-Nu and Alpha are quite different. Mu-Nu is specifically orientated to the problem about separated substances, Alpha to the question about the first principle as a principle.

[4] For a fuller account, cf. Aristotle: *La Métaphysique,* nouvelle édition entièrement refondue, avec Commentaire par J. Tricot (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1964), p. x.

authenticity of the *Metaphysics* was Werner Jaeger, notably in his *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles* (1912) and *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development* (1923).[5] This he did especially by the process of *textual comparison*, although without the precision demanded by the proper use of this procedure. Taking the dialogues which Aristotle penned at the Academy as a point of departure, he showed that most of the text of the *Metaphysics* conforms to the content of these dialogues and hence that there is a historical continuity between the dialogues and the *Metaphysics*.[6] Because Jaeger failed to recognize the limitations in his use of the textual comparison procedure, W. D. Ross has introduced the process of *cross reference* to disprove conclusions which were drawn by Jaeger's extreme dependence upon the inaccurate use of his method. However, inasmuch as Ross seems to have applied his own method to such an extent as to draw his own unwarranted conclusions, there is currently an intensive study of *Greek philology*[7] and concentrated investigation about the veracity of the historical documents cited by the nineteenth-century scholars.[8]

In reference to the *unity* of the *Metaphysics*, there are two general problems, one direct, the other indirect. The direct problem concerns the inserts. Inasmuch as the text as we

[5] Translated with the author's corrections and additions by Richard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934).

[6] In reference to Jaeger's work, one can profitably consult A. Mansion, "La genèse de l'oeuvre d'Aristote d'après les travaux récents," *Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie* (1927), 307-41, 423-66.

[7] Cf., e.g., M. D. Philippe, O.P., "'Αφαίρεσις, πρόθεσις, χωρίζειν dans la philosophie d'Aristote," *Revue Thomiste*, XLVIII (1948), 461-79.

[8] Cf. e.g., A. H. Chroust, "A Brief Account of the Traditional 'Vitae Aristotelis,'" *Revue des Études Grecques*, 77 (1964), 50-69 (wherein he points out that the *Vita Aristotelis* of Diogenes Laertius is largely derived from Hermippus, whose original work is a strange mixture of reality and fiction, praise and calumny, as well as that most of the other *Vitae* are derived from the Neoplationist Ptolemy, who overpraises Aristotle); "A Brief Analysis of the *Vita Aristotelis* of Diogenes Laertius (DL V. 1-16)," *Antiquité classique*, XXXIV (1965), 97-129 (wherein Chrout indicates that this work is a compilation uncritically made up of heterogeneous materials derived from various traditions); "Aristotle's 'Self-Portrayal,'" *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, XXI (1965), 161-174.

presently have it is divided into books, we may aptly distinguish these inserts as they are whole books (Alpha Elatton, Delta, Lambda, and, apparently, Kappa) or portions of books (as, for example, M 1086a 27-1087a 20). *Alpha Elatton* was apparently a lecture which Aristotle gave to the students, who, having completed their study of the whole Σώμα λόγικον (or *corpus logicum*), were ready to pursue the investigation of the physical sciences.[9] Because it indicates the basic procedural error of the thinkers whose opinions are recorded in Alpha, and this with an evident metaphysical orientation, Alpha Elateton is most aptly placed. The list of Aristotle's works offered by Diogenes Laertius mentions *Delta* under the title Περὶ τῶν ποσαχῶς λεγομένων ἢ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν. Whether the book was ever published independently under this title, either during Aristotle's lifetime or later, is highly questionable, in view of the general weakness of Laertius's authority. It is interesting to observe, however, that the title indicates the metaphysical orientation of the book, the ποσαχῶς λεγόμενα being analogical terms.[10] We shall examine the case of Lambda in the main

[9] Probably on the basis of a scholion connected with the text of Alpha Elatton, many ancient thinkers deemed that Pasicles, nephew of Eudemus and one of Aristotle's students, composed this text. Jaeger holds that the text comprises fragmentary notes taken from one of the Stagirite's discourses. In both cases, the opinions are traceable to the aforementioned scholion, but the former opinion seems to be based upon rather poetic elaborations of the original scholion. Jaeger seems to base his position about " fragmentary " notes upon the concise style of Alpha Elatton, and this in striking contrast to *the Kulturkampf and Victorian practice of writing down every word to be given in a lecture, no occasion being permitted for improvisory remarks or explanations in the course of the lecture.* This latter bias seems to have hindered Jaeger in his philological analyses of Aristotle's writings. If, in fact, Alpha Elatton is a lecture such as we have indicated, the conciseness would be in keeping with the mental capacities of the students at that stage of their development; and, in this light, the book may, in fact, contain the whole lecture, rather than mere fragments.

[10] In this regard, the following statement from Albert the Great is most apt: " Sicut in antehabitis diximus, ista sapientia sicut praestituit quaesita et principia, ita praeponere habet analogorum, de quibus intendit, multiplicitaltem; potestas enim subiecti non scitur nisi per divisionem subiecti in partes et partium ulterius in partes. Et ideo cum de principiis entis et ipso ente et partibus entis primis, secundum quod ad ens reducuntur, intendat ista sapientia, oportet in ea tangere divisionem istorum, ut sciatur, in qua sunt multiplicitate. Tunc enim sciemus nos habere scientiam

section of this study and shall touch upon the case of Kappa in our investigation of the methods of textual criticism.

The indirect problem concerning the unity of the *Metaphysics* results from the various lists of Aristotle's works.

The oldest list of Aristotle's works, that of Diogenes Laertius, which is probably based on Hermippus (c. 200 B. C.),[11] does not contain the *Metaphysics*, but mentions [Delta] under the title of *περὶ τῶν ποσαχῶς λεγομένων ἢ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*. The list in *Anonymus Menagii* gives *μεταφυσικὰ κ* and in an appendix *τῆς μετὰ φυσικὰ ι*. Both of these references probably point to a ten-book *Metaphysics* (stigma being excluded in the first reckoning and included in the second). The List of Ptolemaeus Chennus (c. A. D. 100) includes the *Metaphysics* in thirteen books (i. e., without *α*, or counting it as an appendix to A). The name *Metaphysics*, which occurs first in Nicolaus of Damascus, in the time of Augustus, has been commonly supposed to have been affixed by Andronicus (c. 60 B. C.) when he issued his great edition of Aristotle's works;[12] but Jaeger (*Stud.* 180) points out that additions to the canon of classical writers do not seem to have been made after this date. If this be so, Andronicus' *Metaphysics* must have contained fourteen (or thirteen) books, and the ten-book *Metaphysics*, and therefore, of course, the name *Metaphysics*, must be earlier than Andronicus, though pre-

perfecte, cum omnium illarum partium assignatae fuerint diffinitiones et propriae passiones . . . potius distinguimus principia et ens et partes entis primas, ut totus ambitus eorum quae consideranda sunt, sciatur, et cum de omnibus erit tractatum, perfecta sciatur esse doctrina" (Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, Bernhard Geyer, ed. Münster: Aschendorff, 1960; Lib. V, Tract. 1, Cap. 1). Despite the position of most modern critics who consider Delta to be a non-metaphysical treatise, the Greek commentators (e. g. Alexander, 344, 20) defend the contradictory position. As J. Tricot says: "it is . . . natural that, having determined the object of First Philosophy in Γ, Aristotle should experience the need to specify and establish the meanings of terms which he plans to use" in the subsequent lectures. "The imperfections and *lacunae*, cited by all the commentators, can . . . be the result either of a hasty or incomplete redaction or of freedom in explanation and form characteristic of a work connected with oral teaching" (Tricot, J., *op. cit.*, I, xviii).

[11] Cf. A. H. Chroust, *loci citati.*

[12] Ross adds this footnote in connection with this passage: "The earliest title is *τά περὶ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας* (M. A. 700b 9). The title *τὰ μετὸ τὸ φυσικά* is due to the place of the work in complete editions of Aristotle's works (As. I. 19), which in turn was probably dictated by the view that it is proper to proceed from *τὰ γνώριμα ὑμῖν* (material things, treated of in the physical works) to *τὰ γνώριμα ἁπλῶς* (Al. 171. 6, Asc. I. 7)."

sumably later than Hermippus. But as we have no other trace of an earlier edition than that of Andronicus, this conclusion must remain very doubtful; it is equally probable that Aristotle is an exception to the rule that the canon of classical authors was fixed by the beginning of the imperial period.[23]

It should be noted that Jaeger and Ross suppose that additions were made to the original text of the *Metaphysics*. In fact, Jaeger refers to a so-called "tradition that the collection known as the *Metaphysics* was not put together until after its author's death."[14] But what is the historical documentation to support the theory about this tradition?

With regard to the time at which the various treatises were put together to form the *Metaphysics* we have little to go on. Alexander (515. 20) expresses the opinion that two particular passages were "placed together by Aristotle but separated by Eudemus." Asclepius (4, 9) has a different story, that Aristotle sent the whole work to Eudemus, who thought it unfitting "that so great a work should be published"; and that after his death, and the loss of parts of the book, later scholars filled up the gaps by drawing upon Aristotle's other works and piecing the whole together as best they could. Zeller has pointed out that Asclepius' story implies the notion of an esoteric doctrine, which certainly does not go back to Eudemus, and that the *Metaphysics* is not in point of fact pieced together with extracts from the other works of Aristotle. The authority of Asclepius does not in any case count for much. Alexander's suggestion is more probable; Eudemus may have done some editorial work on the metaphysical as on the ethical treatises.[15]

Alexander's opinion supposes that he compared a pre-Eudemus edition of the particular *Metaphysics* text in question

[13] W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), I, xxxii.

[14] W. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, translated with the author's corrections and additions by Richard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), p. 168.

[15] Ross, *ibid.*, xxxi-xxxii. He adds a footnote relevant to the whole passage: "A casual allusion like Alexander's is more significant than an elaborate story like that told by Asclepius. The story connecting A or α with Eudemus' nephew (Asc. 4. 21 and *Schol.* 589a 41 Brandis) agrees well with the view that Eudemus did some editorial work on the *Metaphysics*."

with an Eudemus edition, or, what seems most probable, *the* Eudemus edition. If our hypothesis is true regarding this edition, Eudemus directed his scribe to insert Delta between Gamma and Epsilon. The scribe, being well acquainted with Pasicles, knew his role in reference to the composition of Alpha Elatton and penned a scholion in this regard. Knowing that Eudemus directed him to insert Delta, he penned a scholion relevant to this book in which he speaks about Eudemus's role in "editing" the *Metaphysics*. Jaeger claims that "the true account" about Pasicles "is given by the scholiast on little *a* in the codex Parisinus."[16]

It seems, then, that the opinion holding that the present text of the *Metaphysics* embraces both an "original" text and additions made in the course of the centuries up to the time of Augustus is based upon the following: (1) Alexander's reference to an insertion by Eudemus, (2) very imaginative elaborations upon two lost scholia (or one, if the scholion in the codex Parisinus is genuine) (elaborations such as can be encountered in the various *Vitae Aristotelis*), and (3) the varying number of books according to various lists. As we have seen, the first basis can be interpreted in the sense whereby the Stagirite directed Eudemus to make the insertion. The second basis is extremely weak and can be discredited along with the *Vitae* in which these elaborations are encountered. As regards the third basis, the problem about the different number of books given in the various lists of Aristotle's works can be resolved by the probability that the books of the extant text of the *Metaphysics* were not identically distinguished for or by those who produced these lists. Thus, after the first division of the complete text into ten books (mentioned in the list of the Stagirite's work in *Anonymus Menagii*), there were at least two further divisions: one (two, or three) into an extended use of the capital letters (apparently accomplished by inserting the capital letter into the needed place and adjust-

[16] Jaeger, *Aristotle*, etc., p. 169, note 1. While the comparatively recent origin of this codex may lead us to doubt the accuracy of the scholiast, its presence in the codex seems to confirm our position.

ing the subsequent letters),[17] and another whereby Alpha Elatton was set off from Alpha. The use of the small alpha in this case indicates that this division was made much later, that is, about the time of Andronicus.

The Need for Precision in Textual Criticism, especially through Specific Philological Analyses. It seems that what most basically underlies the theory about additions to an original *Metaphysics* is an overreliance upon that very generic critical procedure we have been terming the "textual comparison" method. This method enables us to perceive segments within texts, as well as to have a superficial knowledge about development of doctrine, as, for example, between Aristotle's dialogue *On Philosophy* and Lambda; but of itself this method fails to give us much in the line of strict historical data. The "cross reference" method is much more contributive in this respect, since phrases like "as we have treated in the *Physics*" or "as we shall treat later in this book" are much more indicative of temporal succession than are mere textual comparisons.

However, while Aristotelian scholars have touched upon the problem of Greek philology, many have apparently failed to examine this philology independently of other European philological traditions. For example, although the Romans excelled in developing a legal language, with its corresponding excellence in *abstract* terms, the Greeks excelled in developing a vocabulary of very precise *concrete* significations. We may see this basic difference in the comparison of such terms as ὁ νόος and *intellectus*, ἡ ἀγάπη and *dilectio*; ὁ νόος and ἡ ἀγάπη have directly concrete signification, whereas *intellectus* and *dilectio*, bearing a direct abstract signification, have a concrete meaning only through logical supposition. Again, the use of

[17] The purpose of referring to the books of the *Metaphysics* by the letters of the Greek alphabet is to make a clear reference to these books. Even during the Middle Ages the use of numbers tended to be confusing. For example, Albert the Great's Book XI paraphrase concerns Lambda, whereas Thomas Aquinas's Book XI commentary concerns Kappa. With the advent of Italian Renaissance there are further occasions for confusion. In the commentaries of Albert and Thomas Alpha Elatton is designated as Book II, whereas in Bessarion's translation it is designated as "i."

the infinitive as indicating continuous concrete action (e. g., τοῦ λέγειν) is in complete accord with the rules of Greek grammar, whereas a corresponding usage in Latin (e. g., *ipsius praedicare*) is a considerable departure from the rules of classical Latin.[18]

The wealth of Greek philology is the source of the two following points: (1) No adequate translation of a Greek philosophical or theological text can be produced without a concomitant paraphrase or commentary, since the terms of the non-Greek language will ordinarily fall short of the fullness of meaning in the corresponding Greek words; (2) This wealth as contained in the abundance of concrete terms enables the Greek author to produce notes which can sufficiently indicate his arguments without a complete verbal exposé of these arguments. This, as we shall see, is verified in Lambda. The reader, however, must be fully aware of the concreteness in the Greek terminology, that is, as clear formal meanings can be discerned in the direct concrete references indicated by the words. No other language seems to have this excellence in the communication of philosophical and theological truth, inasmuch as (a) the concrete terms of the language lack the capacity also to convey distinct formalities (e. g., English) or (b) the communication even of concrete signification must, at various times, be achieved through abstract terms employed in concrete logical supposition (as is abundantly manifested especially in German, French, and Spanish philosophical and theological treatises). In view of these basic characteristics of

[18] Medieval translators seem to have been very much aware of the difference between the two philological traditions. For example, all the extant medieval translations of the *Metaphysics* aptly represent τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι as *quod-quid-erat-esse*, the concocted Latin expression here having an aptly direct concrete signification. When the late medieval scholastics and many Renaissance scholastics used the term *essentia*, they had apparently failed to grasp the logical supposition intended by the pre-Black Death scholastics, that is, as referring to the Greek expression, yet distinguishing the τὸ τί ἦν from the εἶναι. A thorough reading of the Moerbeke translation of the *Metaphysics*, along with a critical edition of the Greek text, manifests Moerbeke's outstanding grasp of Greek philology as promoted by his ability to *speak* the Greek language, possibly better than the Latin language.

Greek philology, *the scholar must carefully avoid the temptation to establish a parallel* between Greek philology and the philology of some other language (e. g., between Greek and Latin).[19]

The history of the development of Greek philology can be traced, as in other languages, by the discernment of the root common to a group of words, especially when these words are employed within one context, as we shall exemplify by taking up the question about the historical relation between Beta and Kappa. Which was written first, Beta or Kappa? According to a general application of the method of textual comparison, Kappa would seem to be the earlier writing, since Beta, Gamma, etc., seem to be a development of the first part of Kappa. There are no important cross references to help us solve this problem. Let us, then, see whether Greek philology can throw any light on the matter, and let us use the ordinary " sounding " texts (*textes de sondage*) consulted in this regard, namely, the beginning of Beta and the beginning of Kappa.

Beta reads as follows:

'Ανάγκε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡυᾶς πρώτον περὶ ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ πρῶτον, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπειλήφασί τινες, κἄν εἴ τι χωρὶς τούτων τυγχάνει παρεωραμένον. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς. ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμὸν, ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος. ᾗ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ, ταύτῃ παρακλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις. ἀδυνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. διὸ δεῖ τάς

We must first approach the science we are seeking by doubting positions which must be questioned. These comprise the divergent opinions held by some thinkers, as well as what they have overlooked. Persons seeking to investigate matters, however, should especially have a good, penetrating doubt about these matters, since further investigation relies upon the solution of whatever has been previously questioned, and the person who does not know what binds him cannot break the bond. Now

[19] There seems to be sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation of this fault among the scholars of the Renaissance who, in an attempt to translate Greek texts into elegant Latin, lapsed into a Greek-Latin philological parallelism.

δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν ἢ μὴ γιγνώσκειν.

doubt in the mind exhibits this fact, inasmuch as a thinker is like a bound person to the extent that he doubts; it is impossible for both of them to go on to what lies before them. For this reason one must first consider all difficulties and their causes. Furthermore, those who seek [a science] without first having a thorough-going doubt [about matters in that science] are like persons who do not know where they must go. Moreover, such an investigator does not know when he has discovered what he has been seeking.

The underscored terms represent three philological families (ἀπορῆσαι, ἀπορία, ἀπορεῖ; εὐπορῆσαι, εὐπορία; διαπορῆσαι). Although they have an immediate contextual denotation relative to investigation, the proper connotations of each family are quite distinct. Ἀπορία signifies an ordinary doubt, διαπόρησις indicates a thorough-going doubt, εὐπορία (etymologically "good opening") means that the investigation consequent upon the doubt is so well ordered that the solution of the doubt is genuine. If, then, we take ἀπορία and διαπόρησις according to the connotations of their respective families, we can see that Aristotle is saying that we must not only doubt, but have thorough-going doubts about current opinions concerning metaphysical matters, then put the questions arising from these doubts into a good order, so that their resolution may be genuine (εὐπορία). It should be noted that the terms εὐπορία and διαπόρησις represent a highly refined state of development based upon the root πορία.

Now let us examine the first statement in Kappa:

Ὅτι μὲν ἡ σοφία περὶ ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστι, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐν οἷς διηπόρηται πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν

That wisdom is a science concerning principles is evident from the first statements expressing

ἄλλων εἰρημένα περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν. our thorough-going doubt about what others have said concerning principles.

If Aristotle had written Kappa before Beta, he most probably would have used the term ἠπόρηται rather than the term διηπόρηται. The use of this latter term presupposes that the students are already acquainted with the distinctions given in the opening statements of Beta. If we combine the use of this term with clearly indicated orientation of Kappa to the consideration of separated substances (1059a 35- 1060b 30), we can see that, in fact, the first part of Kappa appears to be a review of matters treated in Beta, Gamma, and Epsilon, in order that the minds of the students may be well prepared to take up the investigation about separated substances.[20]

Our purpose here has been, not to try to offer a complete solution to the problem about the relation between Kappa and Beta but to indicate how a procedure other than the general use of textual comparison and cross reference, yet used along with them, can help to solve a problem which the latter procedures, used isolatedly, cannot validly solve. In our procedure we have compared two texts, but we have done this under a precise aspect, namely, as regards their possession of a common philosophy at a highly refined state of philological development. In a sense, too, the search for cross references is similar to the procedure we have followed, inasmuch as this search involves the comparison of texts as one refers to the other. It appears, then, that the comparison of texts is the most general act in textual criticism and that the precise aspects under which they are compared make textual criticism a science, at least in the sense whereby logic is a science.

The guiding aspect, however, must be a precise aspect. When

[20] Those who have held that Kappa is an earlier statement of Beta-Gamma-Epsilon seem to have been misled by a misinterpretation of the expression ἐκ τῶν πρώτων, inasmuch as, the expression referring to Alpha III-X, they judged that the Stagirite necessarily used this expression in an "original" book immediately following upon Alpha X. In fact, even stylistically considered, it is much more apt in a review quite remote in position from Alpha.

we referred to Jaeger's overextended use of the " textual comparison " method, we meant that his guiding aspects are not sufficiently precise. Ideological comparisons and comparisons of style are insufficient for the precision demanded in textual criticism unless account is taken of the norms of logic, as, for example, whether the text is poetic, rhetorical, dialectical, or demonstrative . We shall see that much of Jaeger's position on Lambda is traceable to this lack of precisely analyzed aspects.

II. *The Lambda Problem: Lambda as a Basis for a General View of the Metaphysics*

According to Jaeger, Lambda was written, along with Nu, during Aristotle's years at the Academy.[21] On the basis of this claim, he holds that " the prevailing view that the *Metaphysics* is a late work has been rendered untenable by our discovery that it contains large portions or an earlier version belonging to the first half of the forties." [22] Jaeger's position was published in 1923. The following year, W. D. Ross discounted both the claim and the conclusion in the introduction to his edition of the *Metaphysics*.[23] He established that the *Metaphysics* is a late work especially on the basis that the text contains references to other late Aristotelian tracts,[24] and disproves many of the reasons offered by Jaeger in his *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles* [25] for placing the origin of Lambda in the Academy period.[26]

Jaeger's basic error is a very subtle one. After making a most impressive presentation of the development of Aristotle's metaphysical thought at the Academy,[27] he goes on to say:

The fundamental conceptions of the *Metaphysics* were undoubtedly already determined when Aristotle wrote the dialogue *On*

[21] Jaeger, *Aristotle*, etc.. pp. 219-227.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 194.
[23] Pp. xiv-xv, xxviii-xxix.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. xiv-xv.
[25] Berlin, 1912. Cf. especially p. 122.
[26] Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. xxviii-xxix.
[27] Jaeger, *Aristotle*, etc., Chapter 6.

Philosophy. Even if we knew nothing else but that it contained the doctrine of the unmoved mover, we should thereby be assured that he had already established the conceptions of matter and form, of potency and act, and his own conception of substance. Moreover, *the three separate inquiries of which the dialogue was composed, the historical, the critical, and the theological, have their counterparts in the Metaphysics, the first in the first book, the second in the concluding books and throughout, the third in Book* Λ. A more difficult question is *how far the dialogue contained any parallel* to the so-called central books of the *Metaphysics*, those which develop the theory of substance and of potency and act. We may say either that Aristotle considered these investigations too hard and too esoteric for publication, or that it is simply an accident that no fragment of this portion remains. In any event it cannot have occupied so large a space as in the *Metaphysics*, where it outweighs everything else, especially if we omit the introduction (A-E). Theology, on the contrary, was developed much more thoroughly than it is in Book Λ, for our accounts tell us much of which the *Metaphysics* by itself would have given no inkling.[28]

What we should note especially in this citation is the rather vague division of the *Metaphysics* into "counterparts" of "the historical, the critical, and the theological," as well as the search for a "parallel" of the "so-called books of the *Metaphysics*" in the dialogue *On Philosophy*. It is evident that he fails to see that the dialogue and the later text differ as much as a poetic presentation of dialectics and a scientific treatise. He fails to recognize that, in producing the texts which constitute the *Metaphysics*, the Stagirite was reconsidering matters under the critical light of dialectics in the strict sense of the term.[29] Presupposing the already discredited "tradition that the collection known as the *Metaphysics* was

[28] *Ibid.*, Chapter 7, pp. 167-68; italics mine.

[29] Jaeger seems not to have seen, sufficiently, the difference between a dialogue and a dialectical treatise. While the written dialogue gets its name from the fact that it represents at least one dialectical discourse, it is in itself a poetic representation of this discourse, and frequently, at least, even the language of the discourse takes on poetic characteristics. Thus, although at least some of Aristotle's dialogues do not represent social situations or persons in dialogue, yet they have the poetically-dressed language and abound in poetic imagery.

not put together until after its author's death" (in the sense that additions were made even some centuries after his death),[30] Jaeger seems to have neglected to investigate whether the extant text does, in fact, have scientific unity as Aristotle explains this unity in the *Posterior Analytics*.[31] In the place of the Stagirite's delineation of scientific unity he seems to have substituted the Hegelian-derived "higher-criticism" view of literature.[32] Failing to recognize that Aristotle's non-poetic analyses of logical procedures and of nature itself led him to question almost everything he had written in his dialogues, Jaeger is very much disturbed that the extant text of the *Metaphysics* lacks a further development of the "theology" contained in the dialogue *On Philosophy*[33] and goes on to make the following unsubstantiated conjectures: "the editors themselves" of the *Metaphysics* "did not believe that with the order they established they were giving posterity the com-

[30] Jaeger, *Aristotle*, etc., p. 168.

[31] Jaeger's failure in this regard seems to be based upon the Hegelian prejudice that logic offers *a priori* rules of procedure, rather than rules drawn from the analysis of procedures. Thus even if, according to his position, the *Metaphysics* was written before the *Posterior Analytics*, the latter work can and should be consulted for verifying whether the extant text of the *Metaphysics* has scientific unity.

[32] This is manifested in the following passages: "The first attempt to illustrate on a grand scale the 'rule of reason' over matter was the doctrine of star-souls. This went far beyond the needs of mere natural science, but its myth of the soul opened up unsuspected opportunities for the construction of a *Weltanschauung*" (Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 155). "Aristotle's simile" in Fragment 12 of his dialogue *On Philosophy* "also breathes a new attitude towards the world. His men, however, have not lived in caves. They are modern, cultivated, satiated, miseducated persons, who bury themselves like moles in the sunless and comfortless splendour in which they are seeking their dubious happiness. He makes them ascend one day into the light, there to perceive the drama that he himself sees, the immeasurable marvel of reality, the divine structure and motion of the cosmos. He teaches them to contemplate, not a supernatural world, but that which is visible to all and yet seen of none . . . What he gives us instead of the Ideas is the contemplation of the wonderful shapes and arrangements of the cosmos, a contemplation which, intensified until it becomes religion, leads up to the intuition of the divine director of it all" (*ibid.*, p. 164). Actually the citation from the fragment hardly admits of Jaeger's commentary, and, in fact, his poetic fancy generally vitiates much of his impressive presentation of the fragments of Aristotle's dialogues.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

plete course of lectures on metaphysics. They realized that they were offering an unsatisfactory makeshift, which was all that the condition of their materials allowed. The postscript to the introductory book, the so-called little *a*, comes after big A simply becaus they did not know where else to put it." [34] Basically Jaeger is very much disturbed that the composition of the extant text of the *Metaphysics* should be attributed to the man he calls " the greatest logical architect of all time "; [35] but the difficult and most disciplined logic of the *Metaphysics* just seems to be beyond Jaeger's grasp.[36]

Our foregoing considerations should make it clear that, before reading the *Metaphysics*, one should become well acquainted with the whole of Aristotle's Σώμα λόγικον (*corpus logicum*),[37]

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 169. Had Jaeger read Alpha correctly, he would have seen that the basic error of the persons and schools seeking the first principle lay in the fact that they were seeking this principle by completely univocal procedures, rather than by an analogical procedure whereby they would recognize principles which can exceed the material order. Alpha Elatton, which, as we have said, is probably a talk which Aristotle addressed to the students who had just completed their courses in logic and mathematics (about the year 331 B. C.), is most aptly inserted between Alpha and Beta to suggest the correction of this basic error to the mind of the student.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

[36] We have made a considerable analysis of Jaeger's position because the idealistic dogmatism which runs through his writings does violence to the freedom of textual criticism; this freedom demands at least an order to such precise aspects as make textual criticism a genuine science. We have see that this dogmatism (which can be discerned also in the writings of those who pursue the " textual comparison " method in Jaeger's manner) leads him to make much of such small indications as the aforementioned scholia connected with the first continuous copy of the *Metaphysics*, as well as to establish such strict bonds between the dialogue *On Philosophy* and the *Metaphysics* as are inadmissible under careful analysis. However, Jaeger has made many textual observations which can be evaluated independently of his dogmatism, as W. D. Ross and J. Tricot have done in their own studies.

[37] Namely, *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics*. There are two advantages in substituting the expression Σώμα λόγικον for the more familiar " Organon ": (1) The former terminology serves to avert useless debate concerning the contents of the Organon. Unlike the Arabians, the post-Aristotelian peripatetics did not include the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* under the Organon denomination. The reason for the Greek omission being uncertain, the Arabian position is surely preferable, as Aquinas indicates in the preface to his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*. (2) The expression Σώμα

since one can truly evaluate the extant text of the *Metaphysics* only if one is habitually familiar with the *Topics* and the *Posterior Analytics* and has such a knowledge of the other tracts of this Σώμα as to be able to consult them when necessary. Having this knowledge, one can readily see that Aristotle has not given adequate clarifications about the relation between the formal object of metaphysics (being as being) and its principal material object (separated substance), had not arrived at the respective methods for explaining some metaphysical truths (such as transcendental truth and transcendental goodness),[38] and lacked the opportunity to revise many of the books in keeping with his eventual discovery of the general metaphysical method which would establish the particular methods related with particular problems in clear focus.[39] Generally viewed, then, the extant text of the *Metaphysics* is like the ordered cumulation of notes (including both finished and revisable sections) which an author sets on his typewriter table as he starts producing a definitive text. In this case, the cumulation is so orderly that one can suspect what the revision would have been by making cross references and noting the progression of thought, as well as what the final version would have been had the Stagirite lived to carry out the plan manifested i nthe present text.[40]

The Historical Origins of Lambda on the Basis of Internal Evidence. In general, it must be admitted that Lambda *appears* to be a primitive text, especially because of the abrupt succession of statements and the extremely brief development of certain themes. This seems to be the most basic reason leading Jaeger to posit its composition at the Academy, along with

λόγικον indicates the tracts *directly* related to the body of logic, the *Elenchi sophistici* being related only indirectly, as removing certain impediments to genuine logic.

[38] One reason for his failure in this respect was a lingering suspicion about Plato's facile theory concerning exemplarity (Cf. e. g., N 1087b 34-1088a 14).

[39] As we shall see later, a comparison between Lambda and Mu manifests a possible intention to make this revision.

[40] There is no need here to list particular problems regarding many of the books in the *Metaphysics*. This cataloguing has been most expertly done by W. D. Ross in the introduction to his cited edition of the *Metaphysics* (pp. xv-xxxi), as well as by J. Tricot (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. xvii-xxxviii).

Alpha and Beta.[41] Trying to support his position by the rather worthless observation that Lambda lacks the terms *θεολογικὴ* and *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*,[42] Jaeger develops arguments with a considerable dosage of poetic fancy:

the treatise commonly referred to simply as 'the theology,' namely Book Λ of the *Metaphysics* . . . is really a small independent work. The style and the choice of ideas show that it is an isolated lecture, composed for a special occasion, giving us not merely the part of metaphysics that is called theology but something much more comprehensive—a complete system of metaphysics *in nuce*. Aristotle here offers us a compact sketch of his whole theoretical philosophy, beginning with the doctrine of substance and ending with that of God. It is obviously his intention, not to introduce his hearers to technical inquiries, but to lift them out of themselves with the selfcontained swing of his great picture of the whole. With confident blows of the hammer he chisels magnificent sentences which even to-day we involuntarily read aloud, in spite of the abbreviated nature of notes made for oral delivery. 'The creative activity of thought is life.' 'All things are ordered towards an end.' 'On this principle hang the heavens and nature.' The conclusion, where he addresses the Platonic dualists in the words of Agamemnon ('the rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be'), is positively stirring in effect. It is a document unique of its kind, for here, and here alone in his lectures, Aristotle boldly sketches his picture of the universe in its totality, disregarding all questions of detail. At the same time it is invaluable as a source for the history of his development, for in date it belongs to the theological period whose existence we have demonstrated.[43] It enables us to see what relation the doctrine of immanent forms had to that of the transcendental mover before the first-named became a part of metaphysics itself.[44]

. . . Book Λ represents the stage that we have discovered to come before the traditional metaphysics, a stage that was still purely Platonic and did not recognize the doctrine of sensible substance

[41] "The real proof of the early date of Λ is its form" (Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 222). Although Alpha gives evidence that Aristotle wrote it while he was still associated in some way with other disciples of Plato, there is nothing to place the composition of Beta before the opening of the Lyceum.

[42] Jaeger, *Studien*, etc., p. 123.

[43] Namely, in *Aristotle*, etc., Chapter VI.

[44] Jaeger, *Aristotle*, etc., pp. 219-20.

as an integral part of first philosophy. In Aristotelian language, metaphysics as Λ understands it does not study the whole category of substance, but takes a particular part of it. Its object is confined to the part of the category of substance that is perfect and good, namely God or reason. It seeks for a transcendental entity such as Plato's Idea, combining absolute reality (*οὐσία*) with absolute value (*ἀγαθόν*). According to Λ values and realities are two separate ascending series, converging towards the top. They meet at the point where the highest value (*ἄριστον*) coincides with the purest reality (*οὐσία*). This is the Platonic notion of the most perfect being (*ens perfectissimum*), which we have already found set out in the proof of God's existence in the dialogue on Philosophy.[45]

Obviously here poetic fancy has taken the upper hand over textual criticism. It should be noted that, in the subsequent paragraph, Jaeger contradicts the foregoing citation without recognizing the fact of this contradiction.

Of greater importance to our study, however, is his relating Lambda to a concocted " original version " of the *Metaphysics*: " Whereas [the] relation [of Λ] to the final version of the *Metaphysics*, as we have it, is entirely negative, it evinces the closest connexion with the fragments of the original version, to which it stands near in time, and especially with Book N." [46]

We may, then, summarize Jaeger's reasons for positing the " Academy " composition of Lambda as follows: (1) The " form " of Lambda; (2) Lambda manifests the Platonic influence characteristic " of the period at Assos, by its theological conception of a personal God, which comes before the ontological conception of a metaphysics of Being as being "; [47] (3) Its exclusive object consists of " suprasensible substances, whereas sensible substances are known from the study of Physics, a preparatory science for the supreme science, wherein " Physics " finds its achievement and perfection." [48] H. Tredennick, who seems to represent an early position of W. D. Ross, holds that " Book XII. (Λ) is an independent treatise, probably of earlier

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 221-22.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 223.
[47] Tricot, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. xxxii.
[48] *Ibid.*, pp. xxxii-xxxiii.

date; but the astronomical passage in chap. viii. is inconsistent with its context and must belong to the last stage of Aristotle's thought (cf. Jaeger, *Aristotles* 366-379). This book contains expressions (iii. 1, 2; v. 1) which clearly indicate that it consists of Aristotle's own notes for a course of lectures." [49]

J. Tricot gives us a splendid summary of the positions of various critics concerning Lambda:

The general interpretation of Λ and the position it has in the *Metaphysics* have given rise to considerable difficulties. With the exception of Hamelin (*le Syst. d'Ar.*, pp. 34-35), modern interpreters, from Bonitz to Jaeger and Ross, astonished at its desultoriness, agree in deeming Book Λ (the authenticity of which is not otherwise disputed) as an independent treatise (*reliqua cum disputatione nullo modo connectuntur*, as stated by Bonitz, 9) which has the sole aim of establishing, dogmatically, the existence and spiritual nature of an eternal, immovable mover of the Universe. Here is a thesis against which, along with Hamelin, one can hardly object too strongly. It is true that Λ contains no explicit references to the other books and especially that the discussion on substance makes no allusions to Z. Furthermore, the references of the other books to Λ are few in number or uncertain (Z, 11, 1037a 12 refers rather to M N; but, contrarily to the opinion of Ross, I. *Introd.* XXVII, we think that E, 2, 1027a 19 and K, 7, 1064a 36 actually refer to Λ). Finally, although one should reject the hypothesis of Krische (*Forschungen auf dem Gebiele der alten Philosophie*, I, 1840, pp. 263 ss.) and Goedeckemeyer, who connect Λ, 1-5 with K, 1-8, one should by no means conclude that Λ is sufficient to itself and is not connected by any bond with the other parts of the *Metaphysics*.[50]

He states his own position and the reasons for this position in the following way:

We are firmly convinced that Book Λ follows, chronologically and logically, upon ZHΘ (This does not mean that K, which serves as an introduction to Λ, should be eliminated). The theory about substance and act explained by the group ZHΘ is completed in Λ by the theory about the Prime Mover and Pure Act. On the other

[49] *Aristotle: The Metaphysics*, with an English translation by Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), Vol. I, Introduction, p. xxxii.

[50] Tricot, *loc. cit.*, pp. xxx-xxxi.

side of the succession of books, Λ is related to books MN, which, like Λ, are concerned with supra-sensible substances. (Naturally an exception should be made as regards chap. 8, the style whereof, too, is different; this chapter belongs to the very last period of Aristotle's life and must be decidedly put into a separate classification. As one knows, it constitutes an incursion of the author into the field of cosmology, and this to the prejudice of his metaphysical system, which could have seemed to him insufficient as regards the explanation of the movements of the heavenly bodies, once the works of Eudoxus and Callippus became known).[51]

The question about references is secondary here. First there can be implicit references. For example, as Brandis and Hamelin have aptly pointed out, the discussion of Λ, 4 is ordered by certain questions of B (*aporia* 6, for example, which opens the third chapter of B). Moreover, the intrinsic connexion of certain passages in Λ with passages in other books cannot be doubted; thus, the problem about the existence of an immovable substance, the object of Theology, which (problem) was posited in E, 1, *in fine*, announces the important developments in Λ, 6-8, on the nature of the First Mover. The relations between Λ and Z are equally clear. Λ prolongs and completes Z.[52]

It is well to note that, among all the cited positions on Lambda, those of J. Tricot represent the best acquaintance, not only with the text of Lambda but with the whole text of the *Metaphysics*. In other words, Tricot has gleaned more internal textual evidence than has any of the other cited critics. He will glean even more evidence as he becomes better acquainted with the differences between dialectics and demonstration as these are employed in the *Metaphysics*, but his positions are sufficiently well developed to be in major accordance with the external evidence we shall offer here.

The Historical Origins of Lambda on the Basis of External Evidence. Unlike the vast majority of Aristotle's other scientific treatises, the *Metaphysics* is of special value to the historian. In the other treatises the dialectics are sufficiently

[51] *Ibid.*, p. xxxiii. We shall see later how Chapter 8 fits within the dialectical scope of Lambda.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. xxxi-xxxii. Tricot also establishes that Lambda is not a physical treatise (against the position of Bonitz) but a metaphysical treatise using physical considerations.

resolved,[53] whereas the status of the *Metaphysics* informs us that Aristotle had not discovered all the appropriate methods for resolving many of the questions he proposed even by the end of his life. This status conforms to the order of learning the Stagirite suggests in the sixth book of the *Ethics* for his son Nicomachus, namely, Logic, Mathematics, the Physical Sciences (including what are now termed Astronomy, Biology, Zoology, and Human Psychology), and Moral Sciences (Ethics, Domestics,and Politics) and finally Metaphysics. The explicit reason given for this order is the condition of the mind as regards the types of experience prerequisite for each science, metaphysics itself presupposing a mental strength developed through the exercise of the mind in the lesser sciences.[54]

The Stagirite had started to recognize the need for this order during his later years at the Academy,[55] and it can be safely

[53] By " sufficiently resolved " we mean that the method of the science is so firmly established that one can easily pursue the dialectics to resolve at least the vast majority of the remaining problems. This is true even of such incomplete treatises as *On the Heavens* and *Concerning Meteors.*

[54] *Σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. Αἴτιον δ'ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δὲ ἄπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν (πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν). ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ. Ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαι ἐξ ἐμπειρίας. καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; Ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. Ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερὸν. τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. Ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον. στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. Ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δὲ ἄλλο εἶδος* (*Ethics to Nicomachus* VI. 8. 1142a 12-30). As regards metaphysics, we should distinguish between virtual metaphysics (contained in the physical and moral sciences) and explicit metaphysics. Experience concerning physical objects (in the sense of using the big muscles through appropriate applications of hand and finger pressures, whereby accurate discernment can be made between hard and soft, hot and cold, etc.) precludes the current existentialist dilemma about distinguishing the real from the artificial, since it is experience gleaned, not merely from visual and auditory perceptions but especially through the sense of touch.

[55] Beta (1000a 14, 18) furnishes indirect information in this regard inasmuch as it refers to Aristotle's discontent with the Academy practice of offering doctrine

held that the difficulties he encountered between his departure from the Academy (about the year 347 B. C.) and his establishment of the Lyceum (about the year 334 B. C.) served to clarify this need to such an extent that he instituted this order when he opened the Lyceum.[56] It is probable that both beginners (like Pasicles) and those who had already pursued the study of philosophy (like Eudemus) were involved in this new order of learning, although the latter more by way of quasi-private conversations with Aristotle.[57] What especially concerns us here, however, is the span of years required to cover the courses in the Stagirite's plan. If we consider the number of scientific treatises related to each science, and Aristotle's requisite of "experience" relevant to each group of sciences, we can draw up the following approximative table: [58]

through dialogues staged by some students, others serving as the audience. Had these dialogues retained a simple message, there would have been little motive for irritation. As the meaning of the dialogues became more recondite, however, their doctrinal purpose was more frustrated. Moreover, the vagabond way of life which the Stagirite pursued upon his departure from the Academy indicates that he at least suspected that the growing softness in teaching methods was related to a general softness in the way of life at the Academy.

[56] His visits to the Academy upon his return to Athens about the year 336 and his sharpened awareness of the moral and intellectual disorders as they had intensified during the years of his absence, too, would serve to make him adamant in this decision.

[57] If Aristotle wrote the treatises comprising the Σώμα λόγικον during his last years at the Academy (so that the *Poetics* was not completed as a result of circumstances related with Plato's death), Eudemus was probably so proficient in logic that he was engaged in teaching this field and took part in expounding the doctrine represented in the physical tracts. At any rate, he was so well grounded in the Stagirite's plan that he was selected to be the head of the Lyceum upon Aristotle's final departure.

[58] The time required to cover the fields of physics and the moral sciences, of course, is represented very conservatively in this table (that is, the very least period of time demanded according to the number and length of the tracts involved). We should keep in mind that Aristotle's writings on these subjects represent summaries, as it were, of discussions at the Lyceum and with various persons of the Academy, studies of pertinent papyri, exercises written on wax tablets, and what we now term "field trips." The histories of opinions in the *Physics*, the treatise *On the Soul*, and the first book of the *Metaphysics* alone must have required great periods of time which the students needed for their own verification of and preparation for the Stagirite's summaries.

334-331 B. C.: Logic and Mathematics
331-327 B. C.: Physics (as embracing the sciences previously mentioned)
327-325 B. C.: Moral Sciences (Ethics, Domestics, Politics)
325-323 B. C.: Metaphysics

There is, then, only a span of two (or at most three) years for covering the field of metaphysics *according to the critical methods exhibited in the extant text,* the critical methods in Beta-Gamma, Epsilon-Kappa probably being the result of " preparatory " work with the advanced students.

Moreover, even if we grant that the treatises of the Σώμα λόγικον were completed during Aristotle's last years at the Academy, that the theoretical sections of the *Politics* were written during his sojourn with Hermias, that the historical sections of the same work were penned during his stay at the Macedonian court as the teacher of the young Alexander, that some of the shorter physical tracts were produced before his return to Athens, and that the text of the *Ethics for Nicomachus* was edited by Nicomachus after his father's death, the amount of work entailed in writing the remaining pre-metaphysical books appears staggering.[59] It is most probable that, besides Alpha, Alpha Ellaton, and Delta, the remaining books of the extant *Metaphysics* were not started long before the year 326.[60] To this historical data we must add that the pre-

[59] After speaking about the " coherent and intelligible . . . result " which " the works in the main present," as well as their " uniformity of style," Ross goes on to say: " There can be no doubt . . . of the close connection of most of the written works with the teaching in the Lyceum. Aristotle *may* have written out his lectures complete before delivering them, and the written works may be his lectures in this sense; but it seems likely that he lectured more freely than this, and that the books as we have them were written down subsequently by him as memoranda to show to those who missed the lectures, and by way of having a more accurate record of his views than the memory or the notes of his students could provide. The repetitions and the slight divergences of view which have been observed in his works are to be explained by the fact that he did not deal with a subject once and for all, but returned to it again and again " (Ross, *Aristotle*, pp. 16-17).

[60] As regard Alpha, Ross notes: " In A, Aristotle several times says ' we ' where it is clear that ' we ' means ' we Platonists,' i. e., A belongs to the time when

metaphysical treatises manifest the security of the teacher who has solved all the doubts (or at least most of the doubts) pertinent to the respective disciplines of these tracts, and that the Stagirite had to spend considerable time even in bringing the completed texts to the perfection they have.

The tentative character of the *Metaphysics* [61] should not surprise us. In addition to the tremendous difficulties involved in establishing the subject and method of metaphysics, it seems that, already in 326, Aristotle was laboring under the illness which would terminate in his death. Keeping these circumstances in mind, we can marvel that most of this text was accomplished within a two- or three-year period. Finally, there was the harrassment of the manifold anti-Macedonian manifestations directed against the Stagirite himself because of his association with the Macedonian court and especially with Alexander himself. The precise date for the commencement of these manifestations is not known, but the intensity they

Aristotle was still a Platonist, though a critical one; Jaeger's conjecture (*Stud.* 34, n. 2) that the book may have been read to the Platonic circle at Assos among whom Aristotle lived from 348 to 345 is highly probable" (Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Introduction, p. xxii). Thomas Aquinas makes the following parenthetical note relevant to the first part of Ross's statement: "quod ideae sint aequales numero, aut non pauciores sensibilibus, de quibus Platonici inquirunt causes (*quibus Aristoteles se connumerat quia Platonis discipulus fuit*)" (*Super Metaphysicam*, A, lect. 14; italics mine). We have already noted that Alpha Elatton was probably a talk which Aristotle gave to the students who had just completed their courses in logic and mathematics (about the year 331 B.C.). It is almost impossible to establish the date of Delta, although it is almost certainly from the Lyceum period.

[61] In reading the *Metaphysics*, one shares the concerns of the teacher. One learns the difficulties of the subject in the resumptions and different approaches to the same problems, always with a view to establishing the most solid dialectics whereby one can arrive at the greatest number of conclusions directly related to one and the same problem. Yet one is secure in the recognition of the basic logic regulating the order of the books, Mu (ix. 18 to end) and Nu contain highly summarized criticisms which may have been composed during the conversations with advanced students or they may be short answers to questions proposed by students who came to visit the Stagirite at Chalcis. The very strong position which the Pythagoreans had attained at the Academy by the year 323 may have urged the students to make such visits. At any rate, the more extensive investigation of the Pythagorean position in Mu seems to correspond to the actual status of the Pythagoreans at the Academy.

attained in 323 would seem to indicate that they started at least in the latter part of 325 or the early part of 324. The style of Lambda seems to point out that it was written at the height of the anti-Macedonian pressures, that is, shortly before Aristotle made his definitive departure from Athens.[62]

As regards the first part of Lambda, that is, the first five chapters, Ross makes the following observation: "That it represents rather notes for a treatise than a substantive treatise is indicated plainly by the two sentences (1069b 35, 1070a 4) beginning with *μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι* 'after this remember to say that.'" [63] We can add that, by a similarity of style (although without the aforementioned expression), chapters six, seven, nine, and ten are also "rather notes for a treatise than" substantive treatises. The rapid succession of themes reminds us of the teacher who, facing the need for covering very much matter within the few remaining school days of a term, doles out the class matter so rapidly that the students can hardly be expected to absorb it.

The Relation Between Lambda and Mu. The position of Chapter 8 in Lambda can be more easily grasped if we first examine the relation between Lambda and Mu. To facilitate this investigation, let us start by comparing an excerpt from Lambda with an early segment of Mu.

δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει. εἰς χεῖρον γὰρ ἡ μετανολή, καὶ κίνησις τις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ μὴ νόησίς ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὔλογον ἐπίμονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως. ἔπειτα δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χείριστον νοοῦντι. ὥστ' εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὁρᾶν

It is evident, then, that [the mind of the first separated substance] understands what is most divine and honored. Furthermore, it is not subject to change, since change here would be to what is less worthy and such would already be a motion. First, then, if it is, not intelligence but a potency, it is reasonable to hold that continuation

[62] In this light one can understand why there are no cross references in Lambda, as well as why the text has many doctrinal *lacunae* (cf., e. g., 1069a 18-30; 1069b 33-1070a 4; 1072a 30-34; 1074b 25-1075a 10).

[63] Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Introduction, p. xxviii.

ἔνια κρεῖττον ἢ ὁρᾶν), οὐκ ἄν εἴη τὸ ἄριστον ἡ νόησις νόησις. αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστι τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.

in knowledge is laborious for him. It is evident, too, that something else will be worthier than the mind, namely, the object known, and that the act of knowing and the mind will be least worthy in the knowing subject. Hence this position must be avoided (indeed, not seeing some things is better than seeing them); otherwise the act of knowing would not be the best of acts. If it is most powerful, then, it understands itself and its knowledge is the knowledge of its knowledge.

Φαίνεται δ' ἀεὶ ἄλλον ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ. ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εὖ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ. ἢ ἐπ' ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία.

However, science, sensation, opinion, and consideration seem to be distinct from one another, but each of these is secondary in relation to [the first intellect]. Furthermore, if understanding is something other than being understood, under which aspect does [the first mind] have its well-being? The act of understanding and the object of knowledge do not have the same existence. Or is the thing known the science in some cases? Yes, in the productive sciences, but without matter, since there are the substance and the essence [of the thing]. In theoretical sciences, however, there are reason, the thing, and understanding. Therefore, whenever the thing understood and the intellect are not distinct, whatever do not have matter are one and the same thing. Furthermore, the act of understanding is identical with the object known.

Ἔτι δὴ λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον. μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἄν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου. ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην. ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, ἢ ὅ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἔν τινι χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ ἐν τῳδί, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὅν ἄλλο τι). οὕτως δ' ἔχει αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἡ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα (Λ. 9. 1074β 25-1075a 10).

However, there still remains the question as to whether the object known is a composite, since [the mind] will be changed in examining each of the parts of the whole. Or is everything lacking matter indivisible, as, for example, the human mind? Or what composite does it have for a time (since it does not have its well-being in this or that, but the best, some other being, in some whole). This is the case also of the subsistent intelligence in reference to itself, for the whole of eternity.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίας εἴρηται τίς ἐστιν, ἐν μὲν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν περὶ τὴς ὕλης, ὕστερον δὲ περὶ τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ σκέψις ἐστὶ πότερόν ἔστι τις παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ἀκίνητος καὶ ἀΐδιος ἢ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἐστι τίς ἐστι, πρῶτον ὅπως τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόμενα θεωρητέον, ὅπως εἴτε τι μὴ καλῶς λέγουσι, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔνοχοι ὦμεν, καὶ εἴ τι δόγμα κοινόν ἡμῖν κἀκείνοις, τοῦτ' ἰδίᾳ μὴ καθ' ἡμῶν δυσχεραίνωμεν. (M. 1. 1076a 8-15).

Concerning the substance of sensible things we have said what it is: as regards its matter in the tract on physics, later on as regards its act. Since our inquiry is whether, besides sensible substances, there is some immovable and eternal substance or not, and, if there is, what it is, we must first examine the statements of other thinkers, so that, if there is anything they state wrongly, we may not lapse into the same errors, whereas, if there is any opinion common to them and to us, we can avoid bickering among ourselves about such a position.

The first excerpt, of course, is the famous passage wherein Aristotle discusses the object of God's knowledge, the second excerpt comprises the introductory words to Book M. We should note, first, that, according to the second passage, Mu should come before Lambda, but probably not in the condition in which the latter exists. The Lambda argumentation is very brief indeed. Since this degree of brevity is rare in the

context of the Stagirite's writings, we rightfully suspect that the lectures were much more comprehensive than the notes we have here (the case of the inserted Chapter 8 being the exception).[64] In the excerpt from Mu, however, we have a splendid example of the Stagirite's accustomed manner of teaching. But there is more. The style has an ease which excels that which we encounter in most of his Lyceum writings. Indeed, the passage seems to have been penned by a man who was relieved of all other cares; and since the only period which we know to have been a comparatively free one for Aristotle came with his sojourn at Chalcis,[65] we can say that he probably wrote Mu (and most of Nu) at Chalcis. Our consideration of the probable locale for the composition of Mu and Nu helps to understand the situation of the last three chapters of Lambda. The eighth chapter was probably an independent discourse in itself, but related to the Stagirite's main concern about the problem of separated substances and hence inserted by Aristotle himself when he arranged the scrolls at Chalcis. The ninth chapter is, of course, a series of *aporías*, none of which are fully resolved textually. The tenth chapter remains incomplete.

Doctrinal Import of this Position concerning Lambda: We have seen (1) that Lambda consists of notes for lectures, rather

[64] That the lecture was much more comprehensive than the notes in this section of Lambda seems to be clearly indicated in the unusual brevity of the written answers immediately consequent upon each of the listed *aporías*. Under this aspect, the arrangement of *aporías* in the ninth chapter is similar to the arrangement of objections as adopted by the scholastics.

[65] We have already noted the intensity of Aristotle's activity from the opening of the Lyceum to his departure therefrom. The analyses offered in Mu presuppose an established knowledge of the previous books and a greatly advanced knowledge over the content of Alpha. Concerning the educative portion of the Stagirite's life, we refer the reader to A. H. Chroust, "Some Comments on Aristotle's Sojourn in Athens," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, XXII (1966)), 186-196. Focussing his study upon the role of the Stagirite's associations with the Macedonian court, Dr. Chroust emphasizes the political motivations which played an important part in Aristotle's decisions to move from one locale to another. If there are any discrepancies between Dr. Chroust's well-documented study and this article, they are of minor moment. What is important is that, whereas Dr. Chroust stresses the aspect of politics, our approach to the questions concerning Aristotle's life is predominantly from the aspect of his literary activity.

than complete lectures; (2) that the whole of Lambda, including Lambda 8 (1073b 17- 1074a 38), is, in fact, oriented to specific truth about separated substances, and especially the first separated substance. A full understanding of these two points presupposes a solid grasp of the orientations signalled in Alpha Elatton.

The position of Averroes in this context is unusual. He is an Aristotelian in the sense that he vaguely represents the Peripatetics in his *Epitomes* and *Great Commentary* on the Metaphysics, yet not an Aristotelian in the sense that (a) although he starts his comments with an explanation of the contents of Alpha Elatton, he seems to lose sight of the orientations indicated therein and (b) seems to have no grasp of Metaphysics as a discipline as well as a science. By failing to grasp this more basic aspect of Aristotle and his school, Averroes represents a considerable departure, not only from the Peripatetics but also from Greek philosophy as a tradition.[66] Averroes is a garrulous writer who has little esteem for precision in aspects.

The lack of discipline in Averroes's writings is evidenced in two ways: (a) by the extensive elaborations as these elaborations are contained by way of extrapolations in his *Epitomes in Librum Metaphisicae Aristotelis*[67] and by way of extravagant dialectics in his *Great Commentary*; (b) by a shift of logical supposition within one and the same context. The two following segments from the commentary on Lambda, Chapter 9, give sufficient evidence of this second, and more serious, fault:

Quia illa questio est nobilissima omnium que sunt de Deo, scilicet, scire quid intelligit et est deliberata ab omnibus naturali-	Since that question is the noblest among those which concern God, namely, knowing what he knows; and since this problem has been

[66] Although Averroes can hardly be blamed for all the later-scholastic deviations from the Greek philosophical tradition, he offers an abundant example of what was to occur once a complete severance of the Greek-speaking areas from the West became an accomplished fact.

[67] *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice: 1562), Vol. VIII, 391v-396v.

ter, et quia Caldei valde sunt perscrutati de ea, vocavit eam sententiam patrum . . . Videtur enim ex apparentibus quod est valde divinum, idest, videtur enim quod manifestum est et apparens nobis quod necesse est ut sit nobilissimum omnium entium, ita quod nihil sit nobilius eo . . . questio non est in hoc quod Deus debet esse perfectissimum et nobilissimum omnium, sed questio est quomodo erit hoc quod est in fine perfectionis in se secundum quod est talis dispositionis. Deinde dicit 'quoniam si nihil intelligit, etc.,' idest, quoniam necesse est si est intellectus ut semper sit secundum alterum illorum duorum, aut secundum dispositionem in qua sciens non utitur sua scientia aut in qua utitur . . . Et si est secundum dispositionem in qua sciens utitur sua scientia, quid igitur est illud quod intelligit *in illa hora* [sic]? Oportet quidem ut sit valde nobile in fine. Quapropter erit aliud ens nobilius isto; intellectum enim est perfectio intelligentis, et hoc intendebat quum dicit 'et si intelligit habet alium dominum.'[68] Deinde dicit 'quoniam substantia eius non est hoc intelligere sed potentia in eo,' idest, et causa in hoc est quia si intelligit aliud, tunc substantia eius non est actio eius, sed substantia eius erit potentia qua fit illa actio. Quapropter

naturally deliberated by all persons and the Chaldeans investigated it, [Aristotle] called it the ancestral opinion . . . For it seems to us that he must be the noblest of all things, so that nothing is nobler than him . . . The question is not whether God should be the most perfect and noblest of all things; rather the question is how he will be inasmuch as, of himself, he has such a disposition at the apex of perfection. Then [Aristotle] says, 'since if he does not know anything, etc.,' that is, if [God] is a mind, he must always be disposed in one of two ways, namely, either according to that disposition wherein a knowledgeable person uses his knowledge or that wherein such a person does not use [this knowledge] . . . And if [God] is disposed in such a way wherein a knowledgeable person uses his knowledge, what, then, is the thing that [God] knows *in that hour*? He must be very noble in his [possessed] finality. Hence there will be something nobler than him, since what is known is the perfection of the knower, and this is what [Aristotle] means when he says, 'and if he uses his mind, he has another master.'[68] Then [the Philosopher] says, 'since his substance is not the act of knowing this [other thing], but a power in

[68] This statement is not found in the Arabic>Latin translation attributed to Michael Scott, nor in the Greek text. Possibly it is an adaptation made by Averroes or a translator of the Arabic text of the *Great Commentary*.

perficitur necessario per hanc actionem, sicut intellectus perficitur in nobis per illud quod intelligit. Deinde dicit ' ergo non erit substantia nobilissima omnium entium, quia nobilitas non est ei nisi quia intelligit,' idest, ergo substantia eius non erit ei nobilissima omnium entium, quia nobilitas non est ei nisi quia perficitur per aliud quod aliud necesse est ut sit nobilius eo, quia intellectum est perfectio intellectus. Deinde dicit ' et etiam si substantia eius est intellectus et intelligere est sui ipsius aut alterius,' idest, etsi substantia eius est in hoc quod intelligat, necesse est ut intelligat se aut ut intelligat aliud extra se. Deinde dicit ' etsi alterius, quid igitur est quod semper est et non aliud?,' idest, etsi suum esse semper est in hoc quod intelligat aliud, quid est igitur illud quod semper est unum per se sine alio? Hoc enim non est, quid primum principium est illud quod semper est sine hoc quod indiget altero (Magnum Commentarium Λ, 9).

him,' that is, and the cause is that, if he knows something else, then his substance is not his function, but his substance will be a potency from which that action flows. Hence he is necessarily perfected by this action, just as the mind in us is perfected by what it knows. Then [Aristotle] says, ' His substance, then, will not be the noblest of all things, since it has nobility only inasmuch as it knows,' that is, his substance, then, will not be, for him, the noblest of all things, since it has nobility only because it is perfected through something else, which other thing must be nobler than it, since the thing known is the perfection of the mind. Then [the Philosopher] says, 'And even if his substance is the mind and his act of knowing concerns himself or something else,' that is, even if his substance is his act of knowing, he must know either himself or something outside himself. Then [Aristotle] says, 'And if [this knowledge concerns] something else, how is it that he is always himself and not something else?,' that is, even if his being lies forever in the fact that he knows something else, how is it that he is always one in himself, without anything else? For this is not the case, inasmuch as the first principle is what exists forever without needing anything else.

After a lengthy discussion of the possibility of permutation in the divine substance, a protracted explanation of psychological aspects as he deems them necessary for the solution of

the problem about divine knowledge, that is, psychological aspects in keeping with his own theory about knowledge, and an analysis of the positions of post-Aristotelian Peripatetics, he produces the following argument and draws his conclusion therefrom:

Et veritas est quod primum scit omnia secundum quod scit se tantum scientia in esse quod est causa eorum esse. . . . qui scit calorem ignis tantum non dicitur nescire naturam caloris existentis in reliquis calidis; sed iste est ille qui scit naturam caloris secundum quod est calor. Et similiter primus scit naturam entis in eo quod est ens simpliciter quod est ipsum. Et ideo hoc nomen scientia equivoce dicitur de scientia sua et nostra. Sua enim scientia est causa entis, ens autem est causa nostre scientie. Scientia igitur eius non dicitur esse universalis neque particularis. Illud enim cuius scientia est universalis scit particularia que sunt in actu in potentia scita, quum universale non est nisi scientia rerum particularium. Et quum universale est scientia in potentia et nulla potestas est in scientia eius, ergo scientia eius non est universalis, et magis manifestum est quoniam scientia eius non est particularis; particularia enim sunt infinita et non determinantur a scientia. Ille igitur primus non disponitur per scientiam que est in nobis neque per ignorantiam que est ei opposita, sicut non disponitur per istes illud quod non est natum habere alterum. (*Ibid.*).

And the truth is that the first [principle] knows all things inasmuch as he knows himself only by the real knowledge that he is their cause. . . . The person who knows only the heat pertinent to fire is not said to have no knowledge about the nature of heat existing in other warm things, although such a person is the one who knows the nature of heat as heat. Likewise, the first [mind] knows the nature of being in what is simply being, that is, himself. Hence the noun 'science' is said equivocally in reference to his knowledge and ours, for his knowledge is the cause of being, whereas being is the cause of our knowledge. His knowledge, then, is not said to be universal or particular, inasmuch as the person having universal knowledge knows particulars which, existing in fact, are known potentially, and this because a universal is only the knowledge of particular things. And since a universal is potentially a science, and no potency is in his knowledge, therefore his knowledge is not universal; and even more manifestly his knowledge is not particular, since particulars are infinite and are not determined scientifically. That first [mind], then, is not dis-

> posed through science as it is in us, nor through its opposite, ignorance, just as what lacks the nature for having something else is not disposed through these [science and ignorance].

At first sight, the two cited exposés seem to be very good. However, in the former, the textual coherence is spoiled by two expressions which seem to produce a mélange of metaphysical argumentation with physical and moral aspects (the two expressions being "in illa hora" and "in fine"), so that one could say that the argumentation flounders between physics and metaphysics.[69] In the second cited argument, Averroes starts with an ambiguous statement of his conclusion ("secundum quod scit se *tantum* scientia in esse quod est causa eorum esse"), proceeds with a good analogy ("qui scit calorem ignis . . . ens autem est causa nostre scientie"), then goes on to argue about the character of divine knowledge without investigation about luminosity as a quality of perfect knowledge.[70] Having omitted this consideration, he fails to recognize the character of exemplary causality as pertinent to this argument and lapses into the mathematical consideration of particulars ("particularia enim sunt infinita"), his conclusion bearing the implication that God is not the cause of specific natures.

The Commentator's failure in this regard may be traced to the fact that the text at hand may have lacked a considerable portion of Alpha (inasmuch as the *Great Commentary* on Alpha starts with the last third portion of the fifth chapter [987a 2]), as well as the whole of Mu and Nu. It is probable, then, that Averroes lacked all resources for learning the complete history of the development of metaphysics in Greece, and hence he could not grasp the character of metaphysics as the

[69] Inasmuch as the cited phrases ("in illa hora" and "in fine") may be the fault of the translator rather than defects in the Arabic text, we should not push this point beyond the stage of what is offered in the Latin translation.

[70] In this regard, one wonders whether Averroes was acquainted with the Aristotelian physical treatises related to the *De Anima* segments dealing with sense knowledge.

Stagirite derived this character from the successive evolution of metaphysics from the earliest Greek thinkers up to his time. At any rate, this deprivation of Aristotle's complete perspective for the *Metaphysics* seems to be the chief source of the Commentator's failure to be an adequate representative of Aristotle's doctrine.

The unwarranted position that in Lambda 9. Aristotle is denying that God has any knowledge of singulars in any way whatsoever and thereby removing a basic foundation for the truth about divine providence, can result, to some degree, from ignorance of Greek philology. The Stagirite states his principle in such concrete terms as to make the foregoing position ridiculous: *ἔπειτα δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χείριστον νοοῦντι* (1074β 30-31). Inasmuch as *τὸ νοούμενον* has a concrete reference to *a total object as producing knowledge*, the formal distinction between universal and particular is unwarranted here unless "universal" and "particular" are taken to indicate a difference between *concrete* objects, such as the difference between God and creatures. In this sense, then, Aristotle implies that *creatures cannot produce* God's knowledge; he does not deny that God can know creatures as imitations of himself.[71]

From the aspect of the Greek tradition, the commentary which Thomas Aquinas wrote concerning Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is surely the most outstanding by its fidelity to the Greek text. Although the historical details of Thomas's work have not, as yet, been fully determined, the work itself is surely the result of collaboration, at least between Aquinas and Wil-

[71] Relying more upon textual comparison than upon contextual supposition of terms, J. Turcot tries to establish a pseudo-context delineated by the tracts *On the Heavens* (II, 12, 292a 22), *On the Soul* (III, 6, 430b 20 ss.), *Ethics to Nicomachus* (VIII, 8, 1158b 35, 1159a 4; X, 8, 1178b 10), *Magna Moralia* (II, 15, 1212b 38-1213a 4), *Eudemian Ethics* (VII, 12, 1245b 16), and *Politics* (VII, 3, 1325b 28) (Cf. J. Turcot, *op. cit.*, II, note 2, pp. 701-704). The *Magna Moralia* and the *Eudemian Ethics* are, in fact, still dubiously of Aristotelian authorship. While this citation of other texts is of some accidental utility, questions of Greek philology and the actual supposition of terms in the Lambda context are of greater importance.

liam of Moerbeke. The critical insights, notably concerning Kappa, could have been furnished only by a person who had such familiarity with Greek literary practices and Greek philology as William manifests in his translation of the Greek text.[72] Indeed, for an easy, yet secure, entry into the world of Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries, one can most profitably start by comparing the eleventh lecture of his Lambda commentary with the corresponding portion of Aristotle's text as the latter is found in a critical Greek edition. By making this comparison, one can easily note that Thomas (a) always accepts the Aristotelian text in its actual condition (e. g., as offering notes or complete lectures) and (b) explains the contents of the text with a most accurate evaluation of the precise types of argumentation the Stagirite is using.

F. C. LEHNER, O. P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

[72] Monsignor Grabmann has an excellent summary of positions concerning this collaboration in his "Guglielmo di Moerbeke O. P. il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele," *op. cit.*, pp. 40-48. One of the most important positions, commonly shared by such noteworthy critics as P. Mandonnet, A. Pelzer, F. van Steenberghen and Marcel de Corte, is that William did his work as translator also in the papal court of Urban IV, who had renewed the prohibition against Aristotle, March 19, 1263, and who, at least apparently, encouraged William to pursue his work with a view to having an accurate Latin representation of the Sagirite's Greek texts. It is possible, too, that Urban promoted the collaboration between William and Aquinas.

A NOTE ON WILLING THE FIRST TIME

IT is commonplace today to argue against the existence of the will and volitional acts. The example often cited as grounds for a crucial argument against its existence involves the case in which a person " wills " to move a part of his body for the first time. According to this example, one " wills " that a part of his body move, and this occasion is the first time that one has tried to move this particular part of the body—eyebrow, toe, finger, etc. The *argument* is that previous experience of the movement of a particular part is necessary before one can will it to move for the first time; *otherwise* one would be completely surprised at the result.

The argument has been used by many philosophers. Prichard,[1] for example, finds this argument so persuasive against his belief that the will exists that he says: " To this objection I have to confess that I cannot see an answer." Melden uses the argument as a basis to reject acts of volition:

> . . . to say that one wills the movement of certain muscles is not to answer the question, " How does one move those muscles? "; it is in fact to reject it. If this is the outcome, why not refuse to plunge into the morass and reject the initial question, " How does one raise one's arm? ", by saying, " One just does." If, on the other hand, " willing a muscle movement " does not mean " moving a muscle," what on earth can it possibly mean? [2]

Finally, the argument is found in the writings of William James, and it was his presentation which was relied upon by Prichard and Melden: [3]

> The movements we have studied hitherto have been automatic and reflex, and (on the first occasion of their performance, at any

[1] Prichard, *Moral Obligation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 197.

[2] Melden, " Willing," *The Philosophical Review*, LXIX (October, 1960).

[3] W. James, *The Principles of Psychology* (London: Macmillan Co., 1902), Vol. II, p. 469. Italics mine.

rate) unforeseen by the agent. The movements to the study of which we now address ourselves being desired and intended beforehand, are, of course, done with full prevision of what they are to be. It follows from this that *voluntary movements must be secondary, not primary functions of our organism.* This is the first point to understand in the psychology of volition. Reflex is instinctive, and emotional movements are all primary performances. The nerve centers are so organized that a certain stimuli pull the trigger of certain explosive parts; and *a creature going through one of these explosions for the first time undergoes an entirely novel experience.* . . . Of course, if such a reaction has many times occurred, we learn what to expect of ourselves, and can then foresee our conduct, even though it remains as involuntary and uncontrollable as it was before. *But if, in voluntary action properly so-called,* the act *must be foreseen, it follows that no creature not endowed with divinatory power can perform an act* voluntarily for the first time.

When a particular movement, having once occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an image of itself in the memory, then the movement can be desired again, proposed as an end, and deliberately willed. But it is impossible to see how it could be willed before.

James here maintains that because voluntary actions are done with prevision of what they are to be, we must have learned through previous experience what follows from a particular volition. Hence no person, he argues, can perform a voluntary act for the first time, as there is no way of knowing what would happen.

The best way to examine this argument is to begin by noting the two classes of changes allegedly caused by volition: physical (muscle movements) and mental (thoughts).[4] These two classes are reflected by the two claims that I can will to raise my arm and I can will to change my thoughts. Now the traditional argument represented by James, Pichard, Melden, etc.,

[4] I am here neither claiming that there is such an entity as the will nor asserting that the phenomenon willing occurs. I take no position on this. I simply assert that many writers (James, Prichard, Melden, etc.), who have claimed that the argument under discussion refutes the possibility of the existence of either the will or the act of willing, have based their argument on questionable grounds. Nor am I taking a stand on the mind-body problem.

is that if one has a will, then he would be surprised at the results when for the first time he willed, e. g., the movement of a particular part of the body. But if it is true that there are at most two classes of volitional movements (physical and mental), then we will not be surprised at any movement *within* a class. This is because I know I can move a particular type—say, any of my several extremities (fingers, nose, toes). I am not surprised that my ears wiggle when I attempt to do so for the first time. This is a common experience. How much my ears move may surprise me a bit, but that the muscles controlling my ears move does not surprise me at all. So that within the whole class of muscle movements, I am not surprised at first movements. The traditional arguers might accede to the above but then argue that the surprise came at the first moment we moved any of our muscles whatsoever voluntarily. But it is obvious that our first voluntary muscle movement occurred at such an early age that we could not possibly remember whether we were surprised or not. In sum, my points are: first, we are not now surprised with new muscle movements, and second, we could not possibly remember when at a very early age we willed a movement for the first time.

It is my contention that the traditionalists' (James, Prichard, Melden) cases rest upon some question-begging assumptions. I should now like to turn to three of these. The first assumption is the classical or Humean concept of causality. If the traditionalists are correct that we are surprised upon first occurrences of voluntary movement, it is only within the framework of classical causality, which involves the concept of repeated associations of events. With many associations required for knowledge of causal relationship, it would follow that the traditionalists would claim that the first association is surprising. But the assumption of classical causality begs the issue, because the voluntarists claim there is a necessary relationship between the volition and the act. The claim of a necessary causal relationship has long been argued by Whitehead, Parker, Hartshorne, and others. Consider Whitehead's following example:

Let us now turn to the private experience of the blinking man. The sequence of percepts, in the mode of presentational immediacy, are flash of light, feeling of eye-closure, instant of darkness. The three are practically simultaneous; though the flash maintains its priority over the other two, an dthese two latter percepts are indistinguishable as to priority. According to the philosophy of organism (i. e., Whitehead's philosophy), the man also experiences another percept in the mode of causal efficacy. He feels that the experiences of the eye in the matter of the flash are causal of the blink. The man himself will have no doubt of it. In fact, it is the feeling of causality which enables the man to distinguish the priority of the flash; and the inversion of the argument, whereby the temporal sequence "flash to blink" is made the premise for the "causality" belief and has its origins in pure theory. The man will explain his experience by saying, "The flash made me blink"; and if his statement be doubted, he will reply, "I know it, because I felt it." [5]

This is a significant alternative position to Hume, and to argue against the existence of voluntary acts on the grounds of classical causality is to beg the very point at issue. Now I should like to turn to the second and third question-begging assumptions and the dilemma which Melden alleges must arise for those [6] who hold that it is intelligible to speak of an act of volition where "the very notion of such an act does not involve a reference to the relevant bodily event." [7]

If in thinking of v_1 (some particular act of volition) we are of necessity to think of it as the willing of m_1 (some particular muscle movement), then v_1 cannot be any occurrence, mental or physiological, which is causally related to m_1, since the very notion of a causal sequence logically implies that cause and effect are intelligible without any logically internal relation of one to the other. If, on the other hand, we think of v_1 and m_1 as causally related in the way in which we think of the relation between the movements of muscles and the raising of one's arm, we must conclude that when first we perform v_1, we should be taken completely by surprise to find that m_1 does in fact ensue.

I have already shown that there is no reason for a person to be faced with this second part of the dilemma. For it is quite

[5] A. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 264.
[6] Prichard, *loc. cit.*
[7] Melden, *op. cit.*, p. 482.

possible for one to will for the first time and not be surprised. Such being the case, then neither of the consequences which Melden believes follows from this second part of the dilemma, nor, as I shall now show, that which is implied by the first part. Melden claims that a contradiction arises for those who hold that there are interior acts of willing, viz., "Acts of volition are alleged to be direct causes of certain bodily phenomena (e. g., brain movements) . . . . But no account of the alleged volitions is intelligible that does not involve a reference to the relevant bodily phenomena. And no interior cause, mental or physiological, can have this logical feature of the acts of volition." [8] Notice that this alleged contradiction (which Melden relates to the second horn of the dilemma) involves the same idea as the undesirable consequent Melden believes present in the first horn of the dilemma, viz., "the very notion of a causal sequence logically implies that cause and effect are intelligible without any logically internal relation of the one to the other." What precisely is the difficulty that Melden finds in each horn of the dilemma? He says in both points that there is a logical difference between an interior event like an act of volition and the relevant bodily phenomena. What does he mean by a logical difference? This is a phrase from Ryle. By logical difference Melden means that there is—in Ryle's language—a "category mistake" present when one relates acts of volition with bodily phenomena. Melden is claiming that bodily movements represent one category and interior events like acts of volition represent another, and he says that one commits a category mistake (i. e., one uses two terms which are completely incompatible grammatically) when one uses them together in a sentence. The category mistake doctrine of Ryle is well known, but so are the criticisms of it.[9] Thus Melden's argument depends upon the extremely tenuous doctrine of category mistakes. In addition, Melden often objects to the belief in the existence of interior events like acts of volition because they are "unintelligible." "Unintelligible"

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 483.

[9] Gould, "Ryle on Categories and Dualism," *Downside Review*, Summer, 1959.

for Melden means only that something does not exhibit empirical aspects. Yet, to demand that intelligibility (empirical verification) be determined by a criterion of empirical verification is in this case to beg the issue. For the claim of the volitionist is that an interior (i. e., non-empirical) act determines a bodily movement. Melden cannot then refute such a position on the grounds that it is not empirical. It never claimed to be such. If it is to be refuted, it must be on other grounds. Thus the whole case of Melden against the existence of acts of volition rests upon three question-begging assumptions: Humean causality, the doctrine of category mistakes, and an empirical theory of meaning.

In summation: However convinced some thinkers may be that neither the will nor volitional acts exist, the argument they employ based on "willing for the first time" does not justify that conviction.

JAMES A. GOULD

University of South Florida
Tampa, Florida

BOOK REVIEWS

Scholasticism and Welfare Economics. By Stephen Theodore Worland. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 306. $7.50.

In his *Economics of Welfare*, regarded by many as the holy writ of welfare economics, the late Professor A. C. Pigou of Cambridge University distinguished clearly between economic welfare and what he called total welfare, the latter to include social, cultural, spiritual (and perhaps military?), welfare. His book, he claimed, was

> restricted to that part of total welfare that can be brought directly or indirectly into relation with the measuring rod of money—economic welfare.

He added that

> economic welfare will serve as a barometer or index of total welfare. . . . What we wish to learn is, not how large welfare is, or has been, but how its magnitude would be affected by the introduction of causes which it is in the power of statesmen or private persons to call into being. . . . Any rigid inference from effects on economic welfare to effects on total welfare is out of the question. In some fields the divergence between the two effects will be insignificant, but in others it will be very wide. Nevertheless, I submit that, in the absence of special knowledge, there is room for a judgment of probability (*Economics of Welfare*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929, pp. 11 *et seq.*).

Such a quotation will serve as a useful starting point for a review of Professor Worland's book; but let it be said from the outset that it is an extremely useful addition to the literature available on welfare economics. Pigou raises early in his great work the central (and as yet unresolved) problem of welfare economics—the relationship which exists, or should exist, between the science of ethics or moral philosophy and that of economics. He also describes the main thrust of welfare economics when he speaks of the "causes which it is in the power of statesmen or private persons to call into being," for welfare economics is concerned with economic *policy* and not merely with economic *analysis*. The welfare economist makes no bones about his concern for society and its ills.

The central concept of Pigou's elaborate analysis is that of marginal productivity or utility. The usefulness of the concept is indicated by Professor Worland when he writes that

> the distinction between one sector of the economy and another for the purpose of evaluating economic activity and performance reduces to this: Is the marginal

utility generated by an increment of resources in one sector of the economy equal to, less than, or more than, its marginal utility in another sector? (p. 263)

Suffice it to say here that, if the marginal utility of the resources is greater in one sector than it is in another, then it is in the interests of the economy that these resources should be moved. Marginal utility, however, is measurable only in monetary terms; and a movement of resources of any kind may be deemed to be economically desirable as a result of such measurement—even though it is socially undesirable, or at least has socially undesirable overtones. This is the problem. Pigou circumvented it (but did not *solve* it) by distinguishing between economic and total welfare and postulating his "judgment of probability." Provided one accepts his *caveat* and the consequent conclusion that a maximization of economic welfare will simultantously maximize total welfare, one can proceed to accept his general conclusions about economic policy. However, the gap between economic and total welfare cannot be closed merely by an assumption of probability. The recognition of the existence of such a gap, and of its social implications, has led to a further refinement of welfare economics by economists like Nicholas Kaldor and J. R. Hicks, a refinement which is indicated by the term New Welfare Economics and to which Professor Worland devotes a great deal of his attention.

The crux of the question lies in the distribution of purchasing power throughout the economy. The concept of marginal utility is useful to economic analysis, provided one is dealing with a market economy; it is of maximum usefulness to economic *policy*, when one is dealing with the "perfect market" economy, and welfare economists are constantly concerned with the establishment of such a system. The market, however, is responsive, not to human needs as such but to human wants and demands, that is, demands backed by purchasing power. If purchasing power is inequitably distributed, then the market system *cannot*, by definition, do other than reflect and continue the inequity. Recognizing this difficulty, the New Welfare Economics came up with the concept of Social Welfare Function, and this involves a more equitable distribution of purchasing power according to the "social significance" of the various sectors, and in them the various groups or persons, in the economy. This is the point of contact between welfare economics and scholasticism, for there is an obvious affinity between the redistribution, or rather the rearrangement, of purchasing power according to "social significance" and the scholastic concept of distributive justice. With such a rearrangement of purchasing power the market system, or, if one prefers, the free enterprise system, comes into its own, and its inequities are eliminated. If the rearrangement according to social significance is made according to what scholastics would call distributive justice, then the convergence is complete.

This is the main theme of Professor Worland's book. He develops his thesis with considerable skill and cogency, and in the process gives us

an exceptionally lucid analysis of the origins and development of welfare economics, as well as deep appreciation of the scholastic approach to *economia*. For this reason his book is warmly recommended to students of economics and ethics alike.

It is understandable that he should try to fit some rather disconcerting theories into his main theme. For example: he claims that Adam Smith altered decisively the orientation of political economy by placing the state in a subordinate position and treating the production of goods to be consumed by the population as the basic objective of economic policy. In this his approach was radically different from the mercantilists who preceded him and who were principally concerned with, Professor Worland claims, the enhancement of national prestige and military power. Such a basic distinction between Smith and the mercantilists is difficult to substantiate. After all, one of the best known *dicta* of Smith is that "defence is better than opulence." It is true that his was a consumption-orientated economy and one that could best operate through the market system (guided, of course, by "the invisible hand"), but for him, as for most of the classical economists after him, "consumption" meant the consumption of the nation-state, and that included military power. Where he differed from the mercantilists was not in the end to be achieved but in the means by which this end might best be achieved. His basic argument was that the policies of the mercantilists were in the long run self-defeating.

Similarly, Professor Worland's suggestion that "as pure moral doctrine utilitarianism provides a point of departure very little different from that required by scholastic natural law" (p. 81) will come as quite a surprise to those familiar with scholasticism, not to mention the utilitarians themselves. It was, after all, the father of utilitarianism in its economic manifestations, Jeremy Bentham, who described natural law theory as "nonsense, nonsense upon stilts." In fact, it was the same Bentham whose definition of the common good as the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" brought about the ultimate confusion between economics and ethics. For if happiness was to be measured in material terms, then the problem reduced itself to finding an economic and political organization wherein material satisfaction would be maximized. It was a short step from there to the decision that that which was economically efficient was taken to be morally good. That which was economically inefficient was taken to be morally bad. Admittedly, Professor Worland is careful to avoid such a confusion, but this is one of the advances of welfare economic analysis; one does not have to claim, as he seems to do, that there never was a basic clash between utilitarianism and natural law theory. Nor does Adam Smith and the whole classical tradition need to be fitted into the picture. It appears to at least one observer that what is involved in the latest recommendations of welfare economists, including Professor Wor-

land, is no less than an utterly radical transformation of the economic scene where markets are retained, not for their inherent worth (which is how the classical economist would have approached them) but because they are indispensable for rational calculation and decision.

But there is a more fundamental matter to be considered, arising not so much from the present work as from the whole course of welfare economic analysis. One has the uneasy feeling that the latter is being made irrelevant by the chain of events both in economic and political life as a whole. The concept of the "perfect market" is the cornerstone of the analysis: it provides it, through the price mechanism, with a standard, a measuring rod, by means of which we can assess the relative merits of different economic policies. What is being increasingly questioned nowadays is not the validity of the analysis but the very existence of the reality upon which it is based. The economic scene is becoming more and more dominated by huge industrial corporations which seem to spend a great deal of time and effort (not to mention money) in trying to do away with the market system altogether—at least as far as their own internal policies are concerned. It is not simply a matter of the accumulation of monopoly power or of a spectacular increase in profits—these could be coped with relatively easily by various forms of government control. *Size*, as J. K. Galbraith conclusively demonstrates in *The New Industrial State*, is the inevitable product of technology and of technological change. The time span between the initiation of a particular project and its completion, the enormous resources involved in research and development, the increasing degrees of specialization, and so on, have made planning imperative; and planning involves the superseding of the market. This is done by vertical integration (buying up or controlling the source of raw materials), retail control of the market through modern advertizing techniques, the monopoly position assured by the mere fact of size, and, not by any means least important, the government subsidized research and government guaranteed markets. There is good reason to believe that the market economy, beloved of the classical economists, is vanishing into the mists (into the rubbish-can, Lenin might say!) of history. The enemy of the market, as Galbraith points out, is not ideology or socialism: it is the engineer.

What is needed of economists now is a totally new approach, a totally new analysis which will take such radical developments into account and which will not be so dependent on the existence of the market. For this reason the economists of the western world might do well to pay a great deal of attention to what is presently happening in Russia and Eastern Europe. Marxist economists like Professor Libermann may have more to offer than we realize. After all, they have been endeavoring to cope with the difficulties posed by the absence of free or perfect markets for quite some time.

In his *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, published as long ago as

1926, R. H. Tawney remarked that "the true descendant of the doctrines of Aquinas is the labour theory of value. The last of the Schoolmen was Karl Marx." Professor Worland now invites us to consider the proposition that the true descendant of the doctrines of Aquinas is the theory of New Welfare Economics, and that the last of the schoolmen is, perhaps, J. R. Hicks. There must be a moral here somewhere—especially for those who consider the doctrines of Aquinas to be a closed and barren system! *Qui potest capere capiat.*

GABRIEL P. BOWE, O.P.

Aquinas Institute
River Forest, Illinois

Ethique Générale. By Joseph de Finance, S.J. Rome: Presses de l'Université Grégorienne, 1967. Price 3,000 Lire.

Ethique Générale is a textbook, the author's own translation into French of a previous Latin edition which itself was the fruit of his teaching experience at the Gregorian University in Rome. This alone could easily discourage a suspicious and, to the scholastic form of thought, unsympathetic reader from taking the pains to read some four hundred and forty pages of familiar arguments, names and references. Such at first was the feeling of this reviewer It persisted almost to the end of the first part of the book, entitled *Moral Value.* This part is devoted to an analysis of the great ethical systems of the past with the usual prominence given to Kant and the Utilitarians. Such an initial feeling, however, proved to be a false anticipation. Although less conspicuous on the surface, other more recent and still influential ethical currents such as marxism, logical positivism and existentialism are, for the size of the textbook, adequately and critically examined. It is from this analysis also that there gradually emerges the author's central preoccupation: a critical investigation into what constitutes the moral value and obligation to which the universal human consciousness gives an historically unintermittent testimony. The second and the third parts of the book, entitled respectively *Moral Order* and *Beatitude and Morality,* complete this investigation and, predictably enough, find the answer to moral value and obligation in God.

Fr. de Finance follows the philosophy of Saint Thomas and endorses his position on all traditionally controversial issues, such as the primacy of the intellect, rational foundation of the law, immutability of the divine will, impossibility of morally indifferent acts in the individual, etc. But he intentionally departs from the formal structure of the *Prima Secundae* and explains his reasons.

Philosophy, he writes quoting Saint Thomas, is unlike theology. It

studies the creatures in themselves and from them it progresses toward the knowledge of God. Thus, continues the author, " our method will be first analytical and inductive. It will begin with the data of moral conscience and through interpreting them and revealing their ultimate meaning it will reach the principles which will make deduction possible (p. 25)." By ending with the chapter on *Beatitude* rather than beginning with it, *Ethique Générale* symbolically admits that it is only an introduction to moral theology which alone can give a satisfactory answer to man's moral query. Such is the author's conclusion and the fact that Saint Thomas himself commented upon but never wrote an ethics seems to support it.

This, however, raises some important questions in regard to both the relationship of ethics to moral theology and the nature of ethics as a science and academic discipline in the present structure of our curricula. Thus, if ethics is only a philosophical introduction to moral theology without ever reaching any scientific conclusions of its own, its position among the sciences becomes shaken, if not, indeed, untenable. In view of this, it is as dangerous to make ethics a department of moral theology as to make it a department of psychology or history of philosophy. In each case the assumption would be that there is no rationally objective evidence as to what is morally good and evil besides the evidence supplied by other sciences or a religious system. A moral dialogue on a purely human and rational level would become impossible and moral scepticism inescapable.

The author, of course, makes no such suggestions, nor does his analysis lead to such conclusions. " Our business," he writes, " is to find out how moral value is related to God and founded in God (p. 198)." The reality of an objective moral order known by natural reason and the reality of the revealed God are clearly stated. It is their relationship that seems to become the formal object of ethics. If such is the case, one can certainly see a continuous need of ethical studies, since new data on man are continuously provided by positive sciences; but one cannot help asking why this should be a specific preoccupation of ethics and not also, or even more specifically, of moral theology. For centuries and in all great cultures ethics and religion have been closely linked. Christianity, moreover, asserts unequivocally that God is the ultimate answer to man's moral questions. There is, therefore, no reason, even if it were possible, for Christian ethics to avoid reference to moral theology. But, then, there still remains the practical question of how to maintain ethics as a special discipline in our academic curricula without excessive anticipation and duplication of moral theology.

Aware of this problem, Fr. de Finance makes a considerable effort in its regard. He is brief on dispositions and virtues, which constitute the central theme of the thomistic moral theology, and more thorough on such subjects as law, rights and conscience. But here also a demarcation line of General Ethics is not easy to draw. A discussion on law and right

is hardly complete outside of a discussion of society, which is the subject of *social ethics*, and the subject of conscience brings him back into theological waters. But these topics, as well as those of natural law and the unchangeability of moral norms, give him an opportunity, which he takes, to dispel certain contemporary confusions about the meaning of objective morality and to take issue with unfounded criticism of the traditional, especially thomistic, moral theology.

Although there are abundant bibliographical notes in the text, the book lacks a systematic bibliography. There is an index of proper names, but a subject index is also missing. These, however, are minor defects in a book sufficiently updated to be useful both to the students and teachers of ethics.

JANKO ZAGAR, O.P.

St. Albert's College
Oakland, California

The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes. By Mortimer J. Adler. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. Pp. 421 with notes and index. $7.95.

Having read this book carefully, I will be surprised if it does not exert a large and lasting influence over the directions of humanistic thought in our era. Having done extensive research and a little writing concerning the very problem which this book's title so neatly circumscribes, it would be impossible for me not to concur in the author's preliminary assessment of his task: "It will be impossible to review and interpret the literature of this subject without calling attention to the inconsistencies or obscurities of statement and thought that arise from want of an adequate framework of analytical distinctions" (p. 35).

Thus Adler engages the problematic of human uniqueness by first attempting "to set forth, exhaustively, the range of possible answers to a more general question, namely, how any object that we can consider differs from any other" (p. 15). In terms of this general question, Adler reasons in Part I of his study, "The Modes of Difference," that man *could* differ from other products of the evolutionary process in any of three ways.

He could differ according to what Adler calls an "*apparent* difference in kind," or, equivalently, a "difference in degree": "when, between two things being compared, the difference in degree in a certain respect is large, and when, in addition, in that same respect, the intermediate degrees which are always possible are in fact absent or missing (i.e., not realized by actual specimens), then the large gap in the series of degrees may confer upon the two things being compared the *appearance* of a difference in kind" (p. 23).

Again, man could differ according to a "*superficial* difference in kind": "an observable or manifest difference in kind may be based on and explained by an underlying difference in degree, in which one degree is above and the other below *a critical threshold* in a continuum of degrees" (p. 24). Thanks to this critical threshold in the series of degrees, no intermediates are possible with respect to that property in terms of which comparison is being made.

Finally, man might differ as man according to a "*radical* difference in kind": "An observable or manifest difference in kind may be based on and explained by the fact that one of the two things being compared has a factor or element in its constitution that is totally absent in the constitution of the other; in consequence of which the two things, with respect to their fundamental constitution or make-up, can also be said to differ in kind" (p. 25). Here it is not a question of a mere critical threshold which marks the difference but of a manifest difference in kind bespeaking an underlying one as well.

And just because delineating the basic issue in this formal or abstract way, by defining and exhausting the alternatives, enables us to determine the kind of evidence required to support each of the possible types of answer "and to determine the conditions under which evidence might some day decisively favor one answer as against the other two" (p. 29), Adler is able to make for his study a claim exactly parallelling in anthropology Kant's claim in metaphysics, "namely, that it provides the basis for understanding and criticizing all the writing that has so far been done on this subject, as well as whatever remains to be written in the future as new evidence accumulates and new theories or arguments develop." Adler provides us, in short, with "a prolegomenon to future research and thinking on this subject" (p. 47). (It might be pointed out that, so far as contemporary discussions are concerned, it would seem that the most important of the above formal distinctions is not that between superficial and radical modes of difference but that between apparent and superficial: it is here that most of the equivocations in the contemporary anthropological literature lie.)

Granted, then, that man *might* as man differ in any one of the stated possible ways, by which of them does he *in fact* differ? With the possible lines of evidence thus untangled and set within an adequate frame of analytical distinctions, Adler proceeds in Part II of his book, "The Difference of Man," to survey in the light of presently available evidence the positions set forth by scientists and philosophers who have inquired into the difference of man; and he finds in doing so that "it is impossible for anyone who understands the distinction between difference in degree and difference in kind to assert . . . that a man differs only in degree from other animals."

Whether man's *de facto* difference in kind is a superficial or a radical

one, however, depends on whether conceptual acts can be identified with events in the nervous system or not. The argument that they can not Adler designates as the "immaterialist" position or "non-identity hypothesis"; while the argument that they can be so identified he calls the "materialist" position or the "identity hypothesis."

Likely to be of particular interest to readers of this review is Adler's demonstration that a tenable and defensible presentation of the position that conceptual acts cannot be identified with nervous events was "first formulated by Aristotle and Aquinas and to my [Adler's] knowledge," can "be found only in the philosophical tradition that stems from them" (pp. 216-7). But this is no point of mere partisan interest; rather is it a very pivotal point on which a grasp of the thrust of Adler's dialectical presentation depends, because "the non-identity hypothesis that I have described as moderate immaterialism—the theory of intellect or mind developed by Aristotle and Aquinas," in addition to being defensible on the basis of all data presently at hand, "appears to be totally neglected in the contemporary discussion" (p. 223) "so far as I can judge from my own fairly extensive reading"—a studied understatement—"of the contemporary literature" (p. 220).

What is most novel in Adler's development of the issue at this decisive juncture is his proposal of an indirect way of resolving the issue either for or against the today generally advocated position of "moderate materialism" termed the "identity (of conceptual thought with nervous events) hypothesis." By "indirect argument" in this context Adler envisages an argument which has simultaneously (1) a "simplicity comforting to those who have little taste or aptitude for philosophical disputation and metaphysical reasoning," and (2) an "immediate intelligibility" in terms of pure empiricism or positivism, being structured exclusively throughout in terms of scientific data or technological results. Adler terms this proposal for indirect resolution of the outstanding issue concerning man's difference "Turing's Game" after the late British mathematician Alan M. Turing; and this proposal amounts to the challenge, which originates with Descartes but which is clearly spelled out anew by Adler for today's technologists, to produce "a machine that can simulate conceptual thought as that is exhibited in the flexible and unpredictable give-and-take of human conversation" (pp. 241-2). Failing that, after repeated and sustained efforts, the logic of disappointed expectations *ought* (cf. fn. 1, pp. 354-5, fn. 2, pp. 359-60) to result in a progressive undermining of the tenability of the currently dominant materialist position.

But for what there is of feasible alternative to the identity hypothesis, for what its failure to meet the "Cartesian challenge" or successfully play "Turing's game" (within the next 50-100 years) would mean for man and human values, according to Adler's prognostics, we shall be thrown back, not upon Descartes or any other form of Idealism but upon the resources of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.

In the third and final part of his book, "The Difference It Makes," Adler seeks to convey something of the import of the outcome (whether directly or indirectly achieved) to what was portrayed at the conclusion to Part II as "the one remaining issue" in the question as to how man differs. Whether man's difference is superficial or radical—what difference does it make? As Adler has little trouble making clear, it makes a great deal of ethical, scientific, philosophical, religious, and theological difference. Suffice it to remark here simply that at the heart of the difference it makes as to how man differs is the issue on which the moral fabric and quality of human life depends, the issue of human responsibility; since only if man differs according to the mode called radical is there a dimension in human being which provides a ground for praise and blame, a ground for principled as well as expedient conduct in our treatment of other men.

Thus this reviewer would like to suggest that the "new twist" Adler gives to the subject of his book does not so much concern (as suggested by *Time's* reviewer [January 12, 1968]) any 'asserting that man's nature is defined not only by his difference from the beasts but by his difference from machines,' as it "concerns the somewhat paradoxical character of introducing an argument drawn from Aristotle and Aquinas into the dispute of the mind-body problem as that has developed in modern thought since the time of Descartes" (p. 217); for herewith the suggestion is made that the deepest and truest insights into the nature of man lie in a tradition of thought that is almost entirely neglected in the universities of our era.

JOHN N. DEELY

University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Canada

Personality Types and Holiness. By Alexander Roldan, S. J. Trans. by Gregory McCaskey. Staten Island, N. Y.: Alba House, 1967. Pp. 384. $6.50.

The study of the psychology of constitutional or temperamental differences seems to be perennially fascinating, for there is no doubt that there are different basic "types" of people and that an understanding of the varieties, aside from the intellectual satisfaction it would provide, is important and even essential in practical dealings with people. One man's meat is another man's poison, and educators, counsellors, salesmen and administrators, to mention a few, have to take this into account. So do spiritual directors, and to serve their need Fr. Alexander Roldan has written his book on personality types and holiness.

However, the psychology of temperamental differences is also one of the most controversial parts of a generally controversial science, and it is safe to say that there is presently no generally acceptable system of classification of basic human types. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no substantial hope that a generally acceptable system can be produced at the present stage of development of psychological sciences, as a result of which, as the author notes, constitutional psychology is largely discounted, especially in the United States. It seems evident, for instance, that early infantile experiences can produce deep attitudes and tendencies which will persist virtually unchanged throughout life, and that these acquired modes of response cannot presently be distinguished from genuine temperamental factors.

The author accepts the three component typology of W. H. Sheldon as the best theory yet proposed, defending it with a number of arguments of convenience, e. g., that it accords with tri-dimensional psychologies of basic human capacities. He seems to give much more weight to the relationships of somatotypes to blastodermic layers than Sheldon himself was willing to do. He sees many congruencies between Sheldon's theory and the theories of other constitutional psychologists, which he accepts as further confirmation of Sheldon. When, however, he applies Sheldon's methods to the problem of determining hagiotypes (basic personality components in relation to Christian spirituality), he reports negative results and falls back on intuitive descriptions which merely parallel Sheldon's types. Thus agapetonia is for viscerotonia, prasotonia for somatotonia, and deontotonia for cerebrotonia (constitutional psychologists are prone to jaw-breaking neologisms—saints typifying one or another spiritual component are hagionorms; Christ is the hyperhagionorm, typifying all components at their best). The third type, incidentally, the deontotonic, which is characterized by high moral rectitude and rigid sense of obligation, would more likely be classified today as having a strong super-ego than as representing a basic constitutional tendency. After determining the hagiotypes, the author gives advice on their spiritual guidance which is reminiscent of classical ascetical treatises, and then he exemplifies the types with well-known saints. In the final chapter of the book he presents Christ as representing the highest degrees of the three components, citing evidences from the Gospels as empirical supports for a position which is, however, basically a theological conclusion.

MICHAEL STOCK, O. P.

St. Stephen's College
Dover, Mass.

Facing The Unbeliever. By Maurice Bellet. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. 223. $3.95.

In a period of unrivalled preoccupation with the problem of faith, inquiries into unbelief are, if anything, multiplying even faster than those on belief. Heightened interest in unbelief will inevitably influence the demand for new analyses of the theology of faith, updated in view of the sharp confrontation of belief and its opposite number. The essay must eventually take a decidedly dialectical turn, and belief and unbelief must be explicitly compared over a wide range and at various levels. The theological understanding of the patterns of faith in human existence can profit immensely from such an exploration in depth. The approach has yet to be made, but the materials for it are being assembled, and the likelihood that it is imminent increases. The field of unbelief still awaits thorough mapping, but at least a beginning has been made and, most importantly, awareness of the extent and gravity of the problem is measurably greater than ever before. Thus far, however, inquiry and analysis of the phenomena of unbelief, as widespread as they are obscure and ambiguous, have been one-sidedly theological and philosophical. One thinks of the work of Rahner, Metz, Dondeyne, Steeman, Novak, Pieper, and others. Sound empirical studies, by competent political theorists, literary critics, anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists, are still woefully few and sketchy in character.

Bellet's work is, to my knowledge, unique in subject matter and orientation. The unbeliever of the title is, specifically, the lapsed or defected believer, one who has abandoned or drifted away from a faith once held. Narrowing the arc of vision in this fashion is a distinct aid to accuracy of delineation and sureness of evaluation, for " the unbeliever " is not one but legion. It is highly useful, not to say imperative, to distinguish from the outset those who have and those who have not professed religious beliefs in a meaningful way and for some substantial period of their lives. Bellet's unbeliever may move, more or less consciously or imperceptibly, to any number of diverse positions, but his point of departure is taken to be that of faith. This is the unbeliever met with most commonly; the " cradle atheist " is a rarity in our society, at least up to the present. Precisely because it is a pioneer work, I daresay a first of its kind, Bellet's essay is at pains to impress one with the tremendous complexity and subtlety of the problem with which it deals. This concern makes for difficult reading, but the effort is worthwhile.

Disillusionment with the inadequacies, real and imagined, of institutional Christianity both exacerbates the incidence of religious disaffection and raises a host of questions about the inner dynamics of unbelief as a post-Christian stance. Bellet grasps the significance of growing unbelief as a threat to those who remain attached to organized religion. He would

not, presumably, seriously dispute Charles Davis's contention that the crisis of faith is absolutely paramount in the disintegrating situation which faces churchmen at the present moment. Out of this realization, however painful, there emerges the urgency of reflection and a civil exchange of views. There is not much profit, no point, in fact, in rehearsing the hoary polemics that represented standard apologetics until recently. The burden of effort falls largely on the believer, in Bellet's estimate, and it is he who must seize the initiative out of a loving concern for his neighbor's spiritual need. It is not a question of sympathy or commiseration; it should not be supposed that the unbeliever as such is unhappy or has a feeling of inferiority vis à vis the believer. Bellet argues convincingly that understanding the other is the primary desideratum, the indispensable prerequisite to a fruitful interrelationship and dependent upon a host of circumstances.

Unbelief can be understood only gradually, moving towards its center from a survey of the contexts in which it develops and seeking to uncover its roots and the many facets under which it reveals itself. Practical action is the goal, approached from two directions at once, to wit, a reexamined and strengthened acceptance of one's own Christian commitment and a personal engagement with the unbeliever in respect and love. The personalist approach is imperative: one's concern, ultimately, is the unbeliever and not merely his unbelief. This complicates the course of action, unavoidably, but the justification is undeniable. Bellet makes a series of practical suggestions, based on his analysis of the nature and causes of unbelief, but with an awareness that, at this point, any steps taken must be somewhat tentative and experimental. The need for psychological probes and sociological investigation is highlighted by the caution and hesitancy with which Bellet is forced to reach his conclusions.

One is on absolutely sure ground in asserting that unbelief is primarily and invariably a life option rather than a speculative position or a doctrinal preference reflectively adopted. By the same token, faith can meet unbelief on equal terms only when it is a free and living choice, realistic and courageous. Believer and unbeliever share, completely and unequivocally, the nature and destiny of man, a common condition which is, itself, both a challenge and a threat. Here, certainly, understanding is necessary, but it is neither easy to achieve nor to be taken for granted. Bellet does not, perhaps, appreciate sufficiently the obstacles which stand in the way of a sustained dialogue with unbelievers. The encounter he envisages is a person-to-person, largely informal and loosely structured relationship, an unofficial contact of human beings. The section on interpreting unbelief, indispensable to fruitful contact, is the most original and most highly provocative in the book. Through the complex tangle of emotional and intellectual factors with which the option of unbelief is confirmed and reinforced, Bellet weaves his way, illuminating from many angles the mystery of man's refusal of faith. In a chapter entitled, " The Masked

Heresy," the subterfuges and tactics one may employ to conceal, even from himself, a real defection from faith are exposed with striking effectiveness. Bellet follows an analysis with observations which are at once critical and constructive; the chapter on the system in which Christian faith is expressed is admirable proof of the author's skill in establishing the need for what he calls a "new language." It is an appeal for a thoroughgoing re-education of Christian consciousness, separating out what is essential to true faith from all that corrupts or confuses it.

Facing the unbeliever calls for "the illumination of life by faith rather than the imposing of faith upon life." Bellet proposes not "things to say" or immediately practical formulas but the vigorous self-expression of living faith through the analysis of human existence as it appears, as it is, for those who live it. The unbeliever is not, in the end, so easily exonerated; he, too, ought to be made to feel the full weight of the responsibility that is his for the course he pursues, the path he has chosen. The literature on the subject of unbelief is growing, becoming more searching and more highly specialized. *Facing The Unbeliever* is a welcome addition on this side of the Atlantic where so much awaits doing.

JOHN P. REID, O.P.

Providence College
Providence, R. I.

The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Paul Edwards, Editor-in-Chief. 8 vols. of approximately 500 pp. each, with index of about 150 pp. in last volume. New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1967. $219.00.

By the nature of their task, most encyclopedists—and especially those who prepare specialized encyclopedias—are amateurs. It is rare that such works are issued more than once every fifty years, and when they are prepared, the large staff that is required must be recruited from among those who have little or no experience in encyclopedia construction. The work under review is no exception to this rule, and yet it is truly an admirable contribution to the encyclopedia field. The editors took their task seriously, they planned a comprehensive treatment of philosophy and its history that articulates into about 1500 titles (over 900 of these are biographical entries), and they recruited an outstanding list of over 500 contributors to do the actual writing. The result is a highly competent and up-to-date treatment of philosophy in all its aspects, including its relationships to other fields of knowledge such as theology and religion.

The volumes are very Anglo-Saxon in tone, and most of the contributors

are drawn from the English-speaking world, with heavy accent on the larger universities in the U. S. and Great Britain. Very few Thomists or Catholic thinkers are represented, although the number who did write—Vernon J. Bourke, Allan B. Wolter, Thomas Gilby, and James A. Weisheipl among them—were more than adequate to the task assigned. The solicitation of contributors, after all, had to follow on the selection of article titles and the assignment of their approximate length, and when this task was completed there was not a vast field of endeavor left for Catholic scholarship. Most of philosophy, for example, is treated as a modern development culminating in analytical philosophy, with the Greek and medieval periods supplying a background against which this development can be understood. The lengths of articles assigned to individual thinkers reflect this viewpoint. Plato, for example, is given about 19 pages and Aristotle about 11; St. Augustine gets 9 pages and St. Thomas Aquinas 11; then Descartes is allotted 10 pages, Leibniz 11, Kant 18, Hegel 15, and Bertrand Russell a generous 23. These, of course, are the longer biographical entries; practically every thinker who can be identified as a philosopher is covered in one way or another, and even when the treatment is brief, ample bibliographies are provided that direct the reader to the best sources for further information.

Logic and its history dominate the topical entries with an expanse of some 120 pages, again reflecting the strong analytical influence. Philosophy of science and psychology are given substantial treatment also. It is in these areas that the encyclopedia will undoubtedly prove of great value, for the expositions are clear and comprehensive, yet written with an interest verging on enthusiasm that is unexpected in such subject matters.

The editors seem generally to have shied away from systematic expositions of the various fields of concentration within philosophy. They prefer, instead, to use the historical and problematical approach, having entries such as "Aesthetics, History of," followed by "Aesthetics, Problems of." They are generally weak on their treatments of the histories of movements within philosophy: "Aristotelianism" gets only three pages, and "Augustinianism" and "Thomism" less than three each, and these are far from adequate expositions. Scholasticism is not given a special entry at all, being accorded only scant treatment in a five-page survey article entitled "Medieval Philosophy." Even "Monism and Pluralism" are held to only two pages ("Dualism" is included as a sub-section), while "Rationalism" gets only six. When it suits the editors' purpose, however, they can be more prolix: "Atheism," for example, is allotted 16 pages and "Atheismusstreit," for some curious reason, three more.

Perhaps because of the analytical emphasis, there are few good articles on concepts in philosophy, or on the history of ideas. Surprisingly enough, there is no entry on "Man" or "Human Nature," and only a short article on "Persons." "Man" is included in the index, but it refers the readers

to a number of articles (mostly on individual thinkers), leaving him the task of making his own synthesis of the matter presented. As may perhaps be expected, there is no article on "Spirit" or on "Soul" (although strangely there is an entry for "Animal Soul"), and the treatment of the "Mind-Body Problem" is rather thin. The human soul is treated explicitly only as a sub-section of the article on "Immortality," admittedly a context in which man's soul should be discussed, but certainly not the exclusive one. An accidental juxtaposition that is perhaps revealing is an exhaustive article on "Gödel's Theorem" following on the heels of a perfunctory treatment of "God, Concepts of."

This is not to say that philosophy of religion is neglected or that personalities and areas of thought of special interest to Catholics are not treated in the encyclopedia. The point is rather one of emphasis. Generally Protestant contributors are favored for specifically religious issues, and the metaphysical underpinnings of Catholic theology are allowed to go by default. Yet phenomenology is treated in a good survey article of 17 pages, and existentialism in an adequate one of eight. Since biographies of living philosophers are included, moreover, all of the important currents in existentialist and phenomenological thought are contained in the encyclopedia in one place or another, and the index is remarkably well constructed to assist the reader in finding them.

There are many articles of great utility to the researcher, and others of general reference will assist the beginner in philosophy. Noteworthy in the latter category are the entries "Philosophical Bibliographies," "Philosophical Dictionaries and Encyclopedias," and "Philosophical Journals." Almost all of the articles are written in a simple expository style that permits their being read and understood by the thoughtful college student.

On the whole, Catholic philosophers and theologians will enthusiastically welcome this comprehensive reference work. Those who feel that "Christian philosophy" (no entry on this!) should have received more favorable treatment may console themselves with the following two reflections. First, the English-speaking Catholic has not always understood what other professional philosophers were saying and not infrequently has been knocking down straw men; now he has at his fingertips a lucid statement of many of the distinctive positions of non-Catholic intellectuals, and he can only benefit from studying them, even if his purpose be narrowly apologetic. Second, if the encyclopedia does not say all that a Catholic thinker might wish, it *is* truly representative of what English-speaking philosophers are saying in the latter 1960's. For this the editors are surely not to be blamed. They did their work superbly well, and lovers of truth can only stand graciously in their debt.

WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

Augustine of Hippo. By Peter Brown. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. 463 with bibliography and index. $10.00.

In an age of intellectual and political turbulence it is both refreshing and reassuring to recall that other men in other times have lived through similar, and perhaps more violent periods of upheaval. Mr. Peter Brown, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, serves as an excellent pedagogue as he situates Augustine, the Catholic Bishop of Hippo, in the midst of the ferment that accompanied the dissolution of the Late Roman Empire, and more particularly in the ultimate capitulation to change that occurred on the African frontier.

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this remarkable book is that Augustine, classically considered either as saint or scholar, comes through as a very real person who reacts in a real way to the demands of his situation. At the risk of using a fatigue-wearied word, the " whole " Augustine lives in these pages acting in his time and reacting to it in turn and thereby influencing the course of Christian thought in the centuries to come.

Of the many questions to which Augustine addressed his attention, that of human freedom emerges as pivotal for both his personal life and his intellectual achievement. In his middle years Manichean determinism was as unacceptable as would be the self-determinism of the Pelagians whom he relentlessly confronted at the close of his life. Like all men, Augustine was on pilgrimage, and he experienced both freedom and its lack within himself. Meditating anew on the writings of St. Paul he discovered the key to his problem's resolution in the notion of delight. As conceptualized, " delight " transcends the naked operation of intellect and will and fuses with them feeling and love as well as something apart from and beyond man himself. The resultant vital capacity goes far beyond man's powers of self-determination, so that he must grow in his freedom, and this growth is accomplished only by healing. It is this healing, the *gratia sanans*, that brings man to maturity, so that he moves while being moved to that complete freedom that transcends choice, with the result that any alternative is inconceivable.

Not all of the questions that vexed Augustine receive consideration in this biography—and this by deliberate intent of the author—nor are all of the practical problems that beset a rich and varied life treated. Particularly rewarding, however, is the figure which emerges of the scholarly Bishop of Hippo who fought to establish the Roman Church in a Donatist-dominated land and who went on to place his seemingly indelible mark on the whole of the Latin Church itself. The pressure of events convinced Augustine that truth is served not only in scholarly retreat but in the market-place of men and that God's designs are executed in time by the unremitting and uncompromising endeavors of men.

Mr. Brown's accomplishment should serve as a paradigm for those who would assay a biography worth writing. To read this book is a delightful and transforming experience.

WILLIAM B. RYAN, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

The One Mediator. Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 50 (3a. 16-20). Translated with introduction, notes, appendices and glossary by Colman O'Neill, O.P. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. Pp. 296. $7.50.

The Names and Titles of Jesus. By Leopold Sabourin, S.J. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. 352. $7.95.

In his theological reflection on the Incarnation in the *Summa* St. Thomas, after considering the fact of the Incarnation and the qualities of Christ's humanity, treats of the consequences of this union. This section is particularly concerned with Christ's unity and with His relation to the Father and to us. St. Thomas's technical language is not easy to translate into readable English, but Fr. O'Neill's smooth translation helps us to grasp the thought of the Angelic Doctor. It reflects the precision of the Latin text, but it is more concerned with an accurate expression of St. Thomas's thought than with a rigid adherence to the sentence structure and terminology. The notes, while not too extensive, are useful. Of greater value are the six appendices: statements about Christ; unity of existence in Christ; the problem of Christ's autonomy; the merit of Christ; the priesthood of Christ; adoptive sonship. The work also includes a glossary and index.

The work of Father Sabourin, a Canadian Jesuit now teaching at the Biblicum in Rome, appeared in French in 1963. It is not as scholarly or original as his significant *Redémption sacrificielle*, for the present work is not intended for the scriptural specialist but for the "cultivated public anxious to deepen its faith and eager to learn about the Christology of the New Testament." Since, to the semitic mind, the name is expressive of the inner reality, Fr. Sabourin explains about fifty names or titles of Jesus in order to introduce the reader to the main lines of New Testament thought about Christ. Each short chapter hints at the erudition of the author, but his clear exposition of the topic is remarkably non-technical. The notes for each chapter give some suggestions for those who wish to examine the question in greater depth. An index of biblical texts adds to the usefulness of the work.

ROBERT J. HENNESSEY, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Alba House: *What Does Christ Want?*, by Bernard Haring, C. SS. R. (Pp. 234, $4.95); *A Prophetic History of the West,* by Sergius Wroblewski, O. F. M. (Pp. 200, $3.95.)

Bantam Books, Inc.: *The Terrible Choice: The Abortion Dilemma,* ed. by Robert E. Cooke, André E. Hellegers, Robert G. Hoyt, and Herbert W. Richardson. (Pp. 110, $.95.)

Central Press, The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities: *Scholasticism After Thomas Aquinas and the Teaching of Hasdai Crescas and His Predecessors,* by Shlomo Pines. (Pp. 101.)

Craig Press: *Evolution and the Reformation of Biology,* by Hebden Taylor. (Pp. 92, $1.50); *Foundations of Theory,* by William Young. (Pp. 121, $3.75.)

Fides Publishers, Inc.: *Essays In Seminary Education,* by John Tracy Ellis (Pp. 278, $5.95); *The Responsible Church,* by Emmanuel Cardinal Suhard. (Pp. 258, $4.95.)

MacMillan Company: *Contemporary Spirituality,* ed. by Robert W. Gleason, S. J. (Pp. 343, $6.95.)

Marquette University Press: *The Subject,* by Bernard Lonergan, S. J. (Pp. 48, $2.50.)

Mouton & Co.: *John Dewey's Theory of Inquiry and Truth,* by Lowell Nissen. (Pp. 112.)

Ohio University Press: *Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics,* by Stanley Grean. (Pp. 296, $7.50.)

Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co.: *The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark,* ed. by Ronald H. Nash. (Pp. 516, $9.95.)

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1967, Vol. XLI. (Pp. 273.)

Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 1967, Vol. 22. (Pp. 352.)

University of Minnesota Press: *The Wall and the Garden,* ed. by A. W. Plumstead. (Pp. 390, $8.50.)

University of Notre Dame Press: *History of Eastern Christianity,* by Aziz S. Atiya. (Pp. 486, $13.50.)

University of Washington Press: *Civil Disobedience and Moral Law in 19th Century American Philosophy,* by Edward H. Madden. (Pp. 214, $7.50.)

Westminster Press: *The Situation Ethics Debate,* ed. by Harvey Cox. (Pp. 285, $1.95 paper; $3.95 hardbound.)