REV. WILLIAM JOSEPH HILL, O.P.

William Joseph Hill, former Editor-in-Chief of *The Thomist* (1975-1983), passed away on October 12, 2001, in Washington, D.C., at the age of 77. Fr. Hill entered the Dominican Order in 1943 and became one of the best-known theologians in the United States. He taught for many years at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, D.C., and at The Catholic University of America. In addition to his many editorial projects, he published five books, including *The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation* and *Knowing the Unknown God: An Essay in Theological Epistemology.*

In this issue, we honor Fr. Hill and acknowledge his great influence upon generations of students, Dominican and non-Dominican alike. We begin with the homily delivered at his funeral by his confrere Brian J. Shanley, O.P. We follow this with a unpublished homily by Fr. Hill, on St. Thomas Aquinas as teacher.

The Thomist 66 (2002): 1-7

FUNERAL HOMILY FOR WILLIAM J. HILL, O.P.

BRIAN J. SHANLEY, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies Chapel
Washington, D.C.
October 17, 2001

THE EASTER GOSPEL that we proclaim today (Jn 21:15-19) was the one that we used when we celebrated Bill's 50th anniversary of ordination on June 10, 2000. It struck me then as providentially provided to explore the mystery of Bill's priesthood, and it still strikes me now as the best way to articulate the witness of his life. As the gospel reminds us, at the heart of Christian discipleship is a response to the invitation from Jesus Christ to follow him. It is an open-ended invitation to embark upon a life-long journey where we do not always know where we are going. The gospel tells us that there might be a marked discrepancy between the way we follow Christ when we are young and the way we might be compelled to follow him when we are older. Bill knew this, for in a remarkable 1985 homily at the Catholic Theological Society of America convention he began:

> "It is an awesome thing to fall into the hands of the living God." . . . It may help to note, in the face of the awesomeness of this task [the ministry of the Word], that Christian existence is a pilgrimage, a matter of being "on the way," that Christianity and even Christ himself were once in ancient times referred to simply as "the Way." We set out, however, not alone but in the company of Christ who is the Great Voyager. If we are indeed pilgrims of the Absolute, Christ is the great Voyager, before us and ahead of us, showing the way. Turned towards him, our life and our work finds its focus there, on He who is God's own Son. In him does there meet our faith and God's faithfulness. In life we can be aimlessly carried along, driven by forces beyond us—or we can deliberately set out on a personal pilgrimage that is acknowledged and embraced. But this

means undertaking an inner spiritual voyage with no set itinerary. And if we are to tell God's people of it—at least if we are to tell of that pilgrimage which Christ himself undertook—we must travel it ourselves . . . and so this Christian voyage takes us eventually (there is no escaping it) into uncharted waters, or to change the image, into the wasteland, into the dark wood.[1]

Presciently, the journey did end there for Bill, as it had, he noted, for Aquinas before him. But before it did, Bill had years like Peter and like Aquinas, where he went about and did as he willed.

WHEN YOU WERE YOUNG . . .

Bill's pastoral ministry, the way he fed Christ's sheep when he was young, was the ministry of the Word as a Dominican theologian. He was a scholar, a teacher, and a preacher.

A) Scholar

At a Dominican conference on Thomism in the Third Millennium held in Chicago in April of 1999, there was a session devoted to Bill's intellectual accomplishments at which Cathy Hilkert, Greg Rocca, and I spoke about Bill's achievements. This is not the place to rehearse Bill's academic accomplishments; rather, I would like to highlight the qualities of his mind that I admire most. Bill believed that Thomism must be capable of absorbing, within the perspective of its own wisdom, insights into truth originating elsewhere, but without violating its own inner coherence and character. Thomism has to be open to truth, wherever it is found, just as St. Thomas was; it needs to be self-correcting in the face of truth claims made outside of Thomism. If it is going to be viable as a contemporary mode of thought, a living tradition, then Thomism must also consider and answer contemporary questions. It would not be enough simply to repeat Aquinas's insights, but rather they must be re-thought, extended, and stretched. Bill believed that the thought of St. Thomas had

[1] "The Theologian: On Pilgrimage with Christ," Appendix B, *Catholic Theological Society of America Proceedings* 40 (1985): 230, 231.

latent depths that could be mined so as to address contemporary concerns. If you look at a typical Bill Hill article, you will be amazed at the number of dialogue partners that he had. Bill read widely and sympathetically. His aim was not so much to refute those he dialogued with as it was to learn their questions. He then would articulate an alternative approach from out of the resources of the Thomistic tradition. Bill did what Aquinas did. *Rester fidèle à ce qu'on fut, tout reprendre par le début,* as he was fond of quoting Merleau-Ponty. In this Bill was my intellectual hero and model. I think his intellectual attitude is exactly that which ought to mark a Dominican in the spirit of Thomas Aquinas.

That same night in Chicago, Leonard Boyle gave an address that was the highlight of the conference. A great man of Bill's generation, he reminded all of the Dominicans there of the ultimate purpose of the study of theology in the Dominican Order: *cura animarum* through preaching and hearing confessions. We study the Word in order to preach it to others in such a way as to lead them to conversion. Thomas Aquinas understood this: all his study was at the service of the Order's ministry of the Word. And so was Bill Hill's.

B) Teacher

One of the principal ways that Aquinas and Bill Hill served the mission of the Order was through studium teaching. For almost 20 years Bill taught Dominican students here at the House of Studies [in Washington, D.C.]. Like St. Thomas, Bill had a tremendous intellectual concentration or *abstractio mentis* in the classroom. Countless Dominicans remember his trademark way of teaching: he would stare at a spot on the wall and then begin to speak. Questions would bring him out of his thoughts and into an absolute concentration on the query. His teaching has informed literally hundreds of Dominican teachers and preachers. Even if they have forgotten how analogy works, their preaching has been

informed by the vision of God at the heart of *sacra doctrina* that they learned from Bill.

Eventually, like Thomas Aquinas, Bill was called to university teaching at the then contemporary American equivalent of the University of Paris: The Catholic University of America. There Bill really blossomed intellectually and again influenced scores of students in both their preaching and their teaching. And if the truth be told, I believe the ones whom Bill was most proud of from those years are here among us: Cathy Hilkert and Kathleen Cannon. Bill had a predilection for his women grad students; he came alive among them. Try as we might, we male students could never quite capture Bill's attention in the same way. This ease with women is a testimony to the formative influence of Bill's mother and his loving sisters here present.

C) Preacher

Bill's theological interest in preaching has been under-appreciated. The last three essays in *Search for the Absent God* are about the theology of preaching and they are splendid. In the Dominican tradition, theology is for the purpose of preaching a saving word. Cathy Hilkert articulates a common vision with Bill when she describes preaching as "Naming Grace" in human experience. Bill is remembered by the brethren as a theologically thick preacher, but he was also enamored of poetry. I never recall hearing him preach, but if the homily at the CTSA is any indication, he could be inspired.

WHEN YOU ARE OLDER . . .

The Three-Personed God, Bill's *magnum opus,* derives its title from one of the *Holy Sonnets* by John Donne. But if we look at the opening lines of the poem, we can see that it also constitutes a kind of prophetic articulation of the character of Bill's final voyage:

Batter my heart, three-person'd God, for you
As yet but knock, breathe, shine, and seek to mend.
That I may rise and stand, o'erthrow me'nd bend
Your force to break, blow, burn, and make me new.

Be careful what you pray for. From 1983 onward, Bill was bent, broken, and made new. He was bound, stretched out, and taken where he would not go: Parkinson's disease and the loss of control over his own body. It was painful to watch. Bill fought it valiantly. I remember especially accompanying him to a Washington Redskins game (one of his great passions) as he was declining steeply; he was determined to go, even though the subway ride, the walk to RFK Stadium, and the climb to our seats was painfully difficult. Bill had entered into the wasteland, the dark wood, the way of the Cross, just as Thomas Aquinas had, only Bill's time was longer. It was an extremely difficult period for Bill. But he never complained, indulged in self-pity, or gave in to bitterness. His was a kind of Christian stoicism.

Yet it was truly a dark night of the soul for him. Earlier, in the 1985 homily, he had described the pilgrimage of life as what "takes place in the deep places of our spirit, in that country of the heart whose native language is prayer. . . to not want to pray anymore is to wither and die as a Christian."[2] He was a man of prayer. But as the illness bore in on him, prayer became harder and harder. Occasionally I would ask him whether he was able to pray and he would reply, "It is very hard." And it was. I think what Bill experienced is what he himself described as God's presence in a mode of absence. *Search for the Absent God,* his final work of collected essays, expresses Bill's spiritual mood, especially in the epigraph from Simone Weil: "It is when from the uttermost depths of our being we need a sound which does mean something—when we cry out for an answer and it is not granted—that we touch the silence of God." Bill touched that silence. He traveled the failure and apparent absence of God with Christ on Calvary.

[2] Ibid., 230.

Bill's lifeline through all that time was fidelity to the Eucharist. It reminds me of Andre Dubus's description of another horse lover in "A Father's Story":

> I cannot achieve contemplation, as some can; and so, having to face and forgive my own failures, I have learned from them both the necessity and wonder of ritual. For ritual allows those who cannot will themselves out of the secular to perform the spiritual, as dancing allows the tongue-tied man a ceremony of love. And, while my mind dwells on breakfast, or Major or Duchess tethered under the Church eave, there is, as I take the Host from Fr. Paul and place it on my tongue and return to the pew, a feeling that I am thankful that I have not lost in forty-eight years since my first communion. At its center is excitement; and spreading out from it is the peace of certainty.[3]

The Eucharist that he used to celebrate here, later in the Dominic Chapel with someone from the community when he could no longer attend Community Mass, and finally at Carroll Manor Nursing Home, was like this for Bill. When his tongue was tied by Parkinson's Disease and his spirit incapable of contemplation, there was always the peace of the Eucharist. Like Aquinas, Bill's spiritual center was the Eucharist.

All through that time, Bill never wrote again and never preached a homily, but his acceptance of the Cross of Christ in his life was more eloquent witness and preaching to those of us who saw him than anything he ever wrote. His suffering enriched the community, it made us better; it was a privilege to take care of him. All the theology he had studied, contemplated, and preached came to a head in the great sermon that was his patient endurance of suffering. It is a sermon that I shall never forget. Bill never stopped preaching. And he never stopped feeding preachers.

At the end of his homily to the CTSA in 1985, Bill concluded:

> Alan Jones concludes his little book on Christ [*Journey into Christ*] by recounting a story from Mallory's *Morte d'Arthur:* A group of pilgrims put up for the night in an inn are awakened by peals of laughter coming from one of the rooms occupied by a retired archbishop who is still asleep. When they awaken him he tells them of his dream of Jesus handing men and women up a ladder into heaven, among whom is Lancelot. And he exclaims: "Ah, Jesus mercy! Why did

[3] Andre Dubus, *Selected Stories* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 460-61.

you wake me?/I was never so merry and well at ease in all my life." And he laughed and laughed and laughed. And that is the way it will be at the end of the pilgrimage. It all ends with laughter in heaven.[4]

I like to think of Bill laughing now in heaven; laughter was not something that came easily in these last years. And I like to think of one day laughing with him, and with all of you, in heaven. That is the way that all our pilgrimages should end. Bill's is over. Ours is still ongoing. And until it is over, let us take to heart as our pilgrim task the other epigraph to *The Three-Personed God* that encapsulates the passion of Bill's life:

Affairs are now soul size.
The enterprise
Is exploration into God.
—Christopher Fry
A Sleep of Prisoners

May we follow the Great Voyager who is Christ half so well as Bill, until it all ends with laughter in heaven.

[4] "The Theologian: On Pilgrimmage with Christ," 232.

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ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: TEACHER[1]

WILLIAM J. HILL, O.P.

THE MAN WE HONOR today, St. Thomas Aquinas, whose spirit we celebrate and strive to make our own, was (and is) many things to many people. But in a particular sense, he was one thing only: he was a teacher—something that should resonate for an audience of university professors and students. He saw himself single-mindedly as a "doctor veritatis"; he knew precisely what he was doing, why he was doing it, and never seriously considered abandoning teaching from the time he began in 1252 at the University of Paris until 1273 in Naples, three months before his death. He was not a parish priest, not an itinerant preacher, not a retreat master, not a foreign missionary, not even an editor. He refused the bishopric, and later when he heard rumors that he would be made cardinal (along with Bonaventure) at the Council of Lyons to which he had been summoned, he prayed that God might let him die first; for, in his own words "this will mean an end to my teaching"—and God took him at his word. He knew something that those of us who teach know intimately—that teaching is simultaneously two things: (1) it is utter joy, and (2) it is constant martyrdom. The first means for some of us that we could never do anything else even if we wished; the second means that doing it fits the paradoxical purposes of God in his mysterious work of human restoration. The true teacher knows what Thomas knew, namely that he brings to the domain of higher learning, in however frail a way, the life's blood, the vital spark that sets in motion and sustains that process of transcending

[1] A homily given on the feast of Thomas Aquinas. While the date and place are not known with certainty, it is highly probable that it was given at The Catholic University of America.

one's own limitations, of human flourishing, without which the world is surely a poorer and darker place.

THE CHRISTIAN STORY

What then did he teach? Quite simply the Christian story. In the sense that, in the ambiance of the university, he mediated it according to the most rigorous critical standards of the human intelligence, convinced that faith itself was a desire and a need to understand, and that faith and reason, far from contending one against the other, made common cause in the interest of human flourishing.

The well-spring of this lay in that he was intoxicated by the transcendent power of a universe touched by God. In Christian iconography, he is represented holding a blazing sun in his hands which flames through him, at once illuminating the mind and inflaming the heart. It is really a double-edged vision of the universe—marked on one side with stability and structure, calling forth the demanding discipline of metaphysics, representing an Archimedean point in reality where the center holds and things do not fall apart, imaging the staying power of a God who is eternal. On the other side, it is a vision open to history and to the sweet contingencies of God's love for us; here life is viewed as adventure where nothing escapes change and everything is on the verge of becoming new, under the guidance of a God who, in Christ, has made our temporal order his own; this is a history given to us by God to be at once our responsibility and our glory.

Aquinas was, in short, a man who stood in the very midst of God's creation, which he understood as summoned out of the Void for no other reason than to make the human person—who stands at its apex and gives it voice—the beneficiary of his love; a cosmos on which Aquinas readily discerned God's finger-prints. At the same time, he was a Christian believer who heard that Word, interpretive of the universe, which is derived neither from nature nor from profane history, but is exclusively God's self-utterance and self-communication; a domain of saving history in

which the very face of God lies revealed for us in the humanity of Jesus the Christ.

ITS ORIGIN IN CONVERSION

But whence came this personal vision of the Christian story that enabled Thomas to re-present it with such breadth, such depth, such power? Ultimately, surely, from nothing less than God's unexacted grace. But grace means conversion, a surrender to God's love flooding the heart. Only thereby can one appropriate in a deeply personal way such truths as the folly of a God who loves his creatures utterly. But such turning to God exacts its price; it means giving oneself over into the hands of God and that can mean a wrenching from everything in which one formerly found security and comfort; in any encounter with the living God the stakes are high and involve the taking of a great risk.

St. Thomas was large-souled enough to do so, but "he was forced to enter a wasteland, a dark wood, the painful realm of what the Bible calls 'metanoia.' He came through to the other side but was barely able to tell us something of his vision."[2] On Wednesday morning of December 6, 1273, Thomas celebrated Mass and immediately afterward declared that he would never again write or dictate a word. He underwent an experience of which he would only say, in explanation: "I have been given to understand things in such wise as to make everything else I have written seem worthless by comparison." And so his *Summa* remained ever unfinished. In itself, what occurred was only the final culmination of what had been gradually happening all his life, of what his teaching had always sprung from.

OURSELVES AS HEIRS OF AQUINAS

What then of us who stand heir to Aquinas? For us, the Christian story no longer seems able to bear the freight it once

[2] Alan Jones, *Journey into Christ* (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), 32; the play on the words *metanoia* and *paranoia* is also owed to this work.

did. We have rendered it trivial and banal, perhaps because we have so devalued the secular and profane, rendering it neutral and hollow, empty of all signs of the Transcendent. Even our humanized world has become not so much liberating as oppressive and at cross-purposes with our deepest instincts. The culture lends itself far less to that turning to God we call *metanoia* than it does to something different by far—*paranoia*. Different in that the latter brings forth, not mystics, but schizophrenics.

Now surely one must be loyal to one's own age—just as to one's family, friends, nation, or church—if for no other reason than that God's Providence has put us here at this particular time; it is after all *our* age. And so what is meant here is no blanket condemnation of the contemporary world, but only a refusal of its excesses and negativities. Yet there is a sense in which these give to our times the contours of a vast wasteland, of a dark wood. If so then perhaps those very negativities bring us face to face with the need for conversion—not of hearts alone, but of minds also—quite as was St. Thomas in his radically different culture. The context of our conversion is more public and social than was his, which appears confined to the interior of his spirit. But it is no less a genuine summons to *metanoia* to reappropriate the Christ story for our age somewhat as he did for us.

Perhaps, then, the very eclipse of God from culture will enable us to grasp again certain truths obscured and covered over:

That there are dimensions of human existence wherein we stand open to Transcendent Mystery;

Which Absolute Mystery is not unintelligibility but inexhaustible depth, so that far from being a restriction on human freedom it is its very basis and condition;

So that, in Christian life, we are pilgrims entered upon a journey to the Absolute that is filled with adventure, creativity, and discovery;

And that theology offers no final answers (as if nothing more remains to be said) because it is a process and a quest rather than a finished product.

What a wonderful irony that a theology that proceeds entirely by way of questions (as does Aquinas's *Summa*) should never have been finished—a double irony, really, in that it came to a halt in the question on penance, on conversion. This means we cannot content ourselves with what Thomas said and thought; it is rather our task to creatively carry forward his project in the crisis of our times; to dialogue with the subject matter through what he did say, and perhaps to hear therein undertones that he did not.

Heidegger has written that "the light has gone out of the West" and that Western culture can only await a new dawn—yet he urges that now is the time to get "on the way," to rejoin the path that leads back to a recovery of the Being of the beings (a phrase not terribly unlike some that we find in Thomas himself). That Way leads into the future and so we in our time and place must trace it out for ourselves. But it has been done before, and one of the values of both the life and the work of this teacher, St. Thomas Aquinas, is the assurance he gives us that down that path, God's truth, which is always gift and grace, lies in wait for us.

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AQUINAS'S REJECTION OF MIND, CONTRA KENNY

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THOMAS AQUINAS has no philosophy of mind, contrary to the central thesis of Anthony Kenny's recent *Aquinas on Mind*.[1] My argument in this paper is that there is a shift in Aquinas's discussion of cognition from an Augustinian *philosophy of mind* toward a more full-blooded Aristotelian *psychology*. Something like the account of mind that Kenny attributes to Aquinas can be found in his very early work. But there is no philosophy of mind in Aquinas precisely where Kenny says it is to be found, in the first part of the *Summa Theologiae* in the questions Kenny refers to as the "Treatise on Man."[2] Aquinas has no philosophy of mind, because he does not think there is any such thing as the mind described by Kenny. The reasons for denying the existence of this mind have to do with Aquinas's greater appropriation of Aristotle's account of the soul in the "Treatise on Man." This Aristotelian emphasis on the soul is perhaps the most important contribution that Thomists can make to contemporary philosophy of mind.

I. KENNY'S *MIND*

The mind is a single joint power essentially constituted from the subordinate and distinct powers of intellect and will. In

[1] Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (London: Routledge, 1993).

[2] I will address the *Summa* discussion because that is where Kenny says the philosophy of mind is to be found. However, it is worth noting that the shift from earlier to later takes place before the *Summa*. There is no discussion of 'mind' in Aquinas's disputed question on the soul, written just before he embarked upon the *Summa*. The *Summa contra Gentiles*, written several years earlier, is ambiguous.

Aquinas on Mind, this is the account that Kenny provides of the "Aristotelian" philosophy of mind that he argues is to be found in the *Summa Theologiae*. He hopes to distance Aristotelians like Aquinas from Cartesian accounts of the mind that he believes place misguided emphasis upon consciousness as the fundamental characteristic of mind, consciousness being understood as immediate, privileged, and private accessibility to introspection. According to Kenny, Aquinas's philosophy of mind is to be found primarily and in its most "mature and developed"[3] form in questions 75-89 of the *Prima pars*. To justify this approach, he writes:

> of course since the greatest medieval philosophers were theologians first and philosophers second, it is to their theological treatises rather than to their commentaries on *De anima* that one turns for their insights into philosophy of mind.[4]

So, on the basis of the *Summa Theologiae*, considered apart from and "rather than" the *De Anima*, Kenny attributes to Aquinas the view that the mind is a joint power, other than the powers of intellect and will alone, but one that combines the two. The intellect is most helpfully thought of as the capacity for operation with signs, and the will as the capacity for the pursuit of rational goals.[5] Contrasting the Aristotelian view of the mind with what he has identified as the Cartesian, he writes:

> only human beings could think abstract thoughts and take rational decisions: they are marked off from the other animals by the possession of intellect and will, and it was these two faculties which *essentially* constituted the mind.[6]

[3] Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind,* preface, unnumbered.

[4] Ibid., 20.

[5] Ibid., 15. Many, though not all, reviewers have pointed to the oddity of Kenny's description of the intellect as the capacity to manipulate signs: Brian Davies, *Religious Studies* 30 (1994): 128-30; James Ross, *Philosophical Quarterly* 43 (1993): 534-37; Deborah Black, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 33 (1995): 338-41; C. J. F. Williams, *International Philosophical Quaterly* 34 (1994): 375-76; Robert Pasnau, *The Philosophical Review* 103, no. 1 (1994): 745-48; John Haldane, *Philosophy* 69 (1994): 242-44.

[6] Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind,* 16. Also, "humans, in addition to the powers of animals, have mind (which combines a cognitive power, the intellect, with an appetitive power, the will). In Aquinas's system the intellect and the will are the two great powers of the mind" (ibid., 59). Alasdair MacIntyre has recently addressed Kenny's emphasis upon mind as that which "marks

And later:

Humans, in addition to the powers of animals, have mind (which combines a cognitive power, the intellect, with an appetitive power, the will.)[7]

Thus, the 'mind' is "essentially constituted" from the two faculties of intellect and will, and is a faculty other than each taken singly. Notice also that this Aristotelian mind "marks [us] off from other animals," and it is understood to be a power "in addition to the powers of animals."

Kenny does use 'mind' to refer only to intellect, when he writes, "for the Aristotelians what made [it] true that [mind is what distinguishes] human beings from other animals was that mind was restricted to intellect."[8] However, almost immediately he clarifies this statement:

the clearest insight into the nature of the mind is to be obtained from the Aristotelian viewpoint. The mind is to be identified with the intellect, that is the capacity for acquiring linguistic and symbolic abilities. The will, *too*, is part of the mind, as the Aristotelian tradition maintained, but that is because intellect and will are two aspects of a *single indivisible capacity*.[9]

What is the relationship between the intellect and the mind? Do we have here two words for the same thing? Following Augustine, Aquinas thinks of the mind as consisting not just of intellect, but of intellect plus will.[10]

Kenny never pursues this single reference to Augustine with a general discussion of Augustine's influence on Aquinas. Rather, in general he identifies his account of mind in Aquinas as distinctly Aristotelian.

The discrepancy involving intellect and will is easy to explain. Animals without intellect have a desire for the good that is appropriate to their form of life. In human beings the will is the desire for the good appropriate to the specifically human form of

off" human beings from animals; see *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues* (Chicago: La Salle, 1999), 13, 53-61.

[7] Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, 32.

[8] Ibid., 17.

[9] Ibid., 18.

[10] Ibid., 42.

life. But the desire for the good in human animals differs from the desire for the good in nonhuman animals precisely because of the way in which the desire is informed by *general* intellectual comprehension of the good, in addition to sense cognition of the good, and the estimative reason that grasps the particularities of the good here and now. It is no surprise that in Kenny's account the intellect is at times emphasized over the will. Desire for the good is will in humans because of its association with intellect, and it is intellect that human animals distinctively have. Nonhuman animals have cognitive faculties short of intellect, so they do not have will. Human beings alone have a mind on Kenny's account of Aquinas, because human beings alone have intellect, and a desire that surpasses merely animal desire for the good, a desire that comes together with intellect to essentially constitute the 'mind'. Kenny denies that 'mind' and 'intellect' are two words for the same thing. But he is not simply claiming that 'mind' refers to the collection or set of two powers. He is claiming that it refers to a power itself, essentially constituted from the two. It is a "single *indivisible* capacity," other than intellect or will taken singly; the latter are the mind's "two aspects."

One feature of this account that stands out is the absence of the cognitive powers of sensation. Descartes had included sensation within the mind, which was tied up with his denial that animals have minds; animals are mere *res extensa*. With Descartes, more recent philosophy also tends to include sensation within the mind, but rejects the metaphysical dualism of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. Sensation and intellection can then be classed generally under the heading 'cognition', so that what becomes broadly distinctive of mind is the capacity for cognition and desire associated with cognition, thus opening the door to nonhuman animals with minds.[11] One might think that on Kenny's account of Aquinas other animals could have something analogous to mind, essentially constituted by their highest powers of cognition, sensation, and the sensual desire for the good, even if they do not have minds *properly* speaking because they lack the essential

[11] See the initial classification of mental terms in the *Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

constituents of the power of mind: intellect, and the desire for the good that corresponds to it, will. But according to Kenny, Aquinas will allow no such analogous use of 'mind' since, "for Aristotelians before Descartes the mind was *essentially* the faculty, or set of faculties, which *set off* human beings from other animals."[12] Other animals are capable of sensation and sensation-informed desire. However, according to Kenny they have no minds; he agrees with Descartes at least in that judgment. Thus, in order to preserve the strong distinction between human beings and other animals, it is necessary to maintain a strong distinction between the mind and those powers that Kenny calls "animal powers."

Kenny recognizes that Aquinas argues for only one soul in a human being, unlike other mediaeval thinkers who argued for the plurality of vegetative, sensitive, and rational principles. But Kenny preserves that plurality in a weaker sense, by his emphasis upon a strong distinction within the soul between the set of powers of vegetative and sensitive life on the one hand, and mind as a thoroughly different power of the soul on the other. It is for this reason that the philosophy of mind is for Kenny himself, and not just in his account of Aquinas, a distinct philosophical discipline from whatever discipline(s) study the set of powers constitutive of sensation, as he makes clear in his book *The Metaphysics of Mind*. So, even though the "Treatise on Man" starts with question 75 of the *Prima pars*, for Kenny Aquinas's philosophy of mind only starts at question 79 with the discussion of intellect followed by the discussion of will, that is, only after finishing the discussion of the sensitive powers of the soul in question 78.[13] And though Kenny does include a brief discussion of Aquinas on sensation in *Aquinas on Mind*, it is not properly speaking part of Aquinas's philosophy of mind. The senses are usefully considered as a precursor to, but not part of the subject matter of, the philosophy of mind, "because when [Aquinas] goes on to treat of intellectual knowledge itself he will often explain what he has to say by making a contrast with his account of sense-

[12] Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, 16 (emphasis added).

[13] Ibid., 41.

perception."[14] Powers of sensation are not objects of study within the philosophy of mind, but useful foils for getting at the object of study, the joint power of intellect and will. Finally, the mind is a power of the soul but is not identical with the soul, since the soul possesses sensitive powers that are not part of the mind.[15]

In *Aquinas on Mind* Kenny provides only an exegetical account of Aquinas on mind without advocating it. But in the aspects I have summarized, it is almost identical to Kenny's own account of mind that he provides in *The Metaphysics of Mind.* For Kenny himself the mind is supposed to function as what sets us apart from animals. "Human beings . . . were marked off from the other animals by the possession of intellect and will, and it was these two faculties which *essentially* constituted the mind."[16] Again, he identifies this position as the Aristotelian view, and he adopts it for his own in *The Metaphysics of Mind,* including the exclusion of the sense powers from the mind. The mind can be defined as "the capacity for behavior of the complicated and symbolic kinds which constitute the linguistic, social, moral, economic, scientific, cultural and other characteristic activities of human beings in society."[17] So, he writes:

> we may wish to have a word to refer to the cluster of sensory capacities in the way in which 'mind', *in my usage refers* to the cluster of capacities whose major members are the intellect and will. The most appropriate word seems to be 'psyche'. If we adopt this usage we can say that whereas only humans have minds, humans and other animals have psyches.[18]

However, Kenny does not think the mind is just a "cluster of capacities." It is itself a capacity. We have to be careful to understand Kenny's use of terms. His own use of 'psyche' should be distinguished from his use of 'soul' in his analysis of Aquinas. When he argues that for Aquinas the mind is not identical to the soul, by 'soul' he means the Aristotelian substantial first principle

[14] Ibid., 31.

[15] Ibid., 31 and 42.

[16] Anthony Kenny, *The Metaphysics of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 7 (emphasis added).

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., 19 (emphasis added).

of life as Aquinas uses the Latin '*anima*'. But Kenny's use of 'psyche' should not be confused with either Aquinas's use of '*anima*' or Kenny's use of 'soul'. In Kenny's use, 'psyche' is no more identical to *anima* or 'soul' than is 'mind', since there are powers not contained within psyche, namely the mind and its constituent parts. So, for Kenny 'mind' and 'psyche' mark the major divisions of the powers within a human being.

Kenny is no substance dualist. "[Human beings] *are bodies with certain psychological capacities* [minds]."[19] Still, his account displays a strong residuum of Cartesian *methodological* dualism, the dualism that separates the philosophical study of mind from the scientific study of everything else, including the animal life of the human body. It was clear in Kenny's account of Aquinas that 'mind' and 'psyche' mark divisions within the human soul or *anima;* but it is not so clear in Kenny himself, since he avoids talk of the soul in contemporary philosophy.[20] Here Kenny departs from Aquinas. One might ask, why, after all, are we looking at Aquinas's philosophy of mind, not soul? The reason for this is rooted in the death of the Aristotelian soul in modern thought. As Kenny describes the situation in *Aquinas on Mind,*[21] philosophers still have something to do, since no matter how much the natural sciences advance in their study of human life, the formal principle of which used to be, but is no longer, called the soul, there will always be the mind for philosophers to think about. Thus, there will always be the philosophy of mind, if not soul, as an element in the "irreducible core amenable only to philosophy."[22] Kenny then reads Aquinas in such a way that the latter can make an important contribution to that core of today's philosophy, even if we must discard what he had to say about the soul.

Thus, Kenny resorts to his own use of 'psyche' to preserve the clear distinction between the principle of animal life and the

[19] Ibid., 18 (emphasis added).

[20] Kenny himself avoids using the term 'soul' because he believes that in English it is entirely too much caught up with the question of immortal Cartesian minds (cf. *The Metaphysics of Mind,* 18-19). However, he does write "the mind—considered as intellect and will together—is, if all goes well, supreme in the human soul" (ibid., 22).

[21] See Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind,* 3-5.

[22] Ibid., 5.

principle of distinctively human life; for all practical purposes, in his own account of mind these principles are distinct, not parts of the whole that Aquinas had called the soul.[23] If he did think that they are parts of a larger whole, it is a major lacuna of his philosophy of mind not to account for their place in the larger whole, since, as Aquinas often remarked, a part *qua* part cannot be understood apart from the whole of which it is a part. Kenny does have a discussion of sensation in *The Metaphysics of Mind,* but mostly for its contrast with intellect as a mental power. In his own work, in order to emphasize the strong distinction between sensitive animal life and mental life, he reintroduces the plurality of principles within each human being that Aquinas was at pains to deny, the principle that is the unity of the sensitive life of the animal (psyche) and the principle that is the unity of the the rational life of the human being (mind). As Kenny puts it, "humans and other animals have psyches," while "only humans have minds." The result is a clear distinction between the philosophy of mind and whatever discipline or disciplines study psyche as such. What is absent is any intimation of a philosophy of soul or *anima,* the principle that is the unity of sensitive and rational life in a human being. Against the background of Kenny's own philosophy of mind, Aquinas's relevance is premised upon divorcing his philosophy of mind from his philosophy of soul.

II. Absence of Mind in Aquinas

I maintain that Aquinas has no such philosophy of mind, because for Aristotelian reasons he does not think that the term Kenny has analyzed successfully refers. My argument is divided into two parts. The first looks at Aquinas's discussion of 'mind' in the *De Veritate.* There he holds a view similar to the one Kenny attributes to him, but it is Augustinian in form rather than Aristotelian. Once we recognize this early view, we can better

[23] I am aware of but one instance in *The Metaphysics of Mind* in which Kenny refers to the mind as a in a way a part of the soul, but he does so almost in a metaphorical and romantic way when he writes, "The mind—considered as intellect and will together—is, if all goes well, supreme in the human soul; but neither intellect nor will is an autocratic emperor; rather, they are joint counsuls on the model of the Roman Republic" (*The Metaphysics of Mind,* 22).

understand his rejection of it in the *Summa*, under the influence of his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*. This is the subject of the second part.

A) Augustine's "De Trinitate" and the Early Thomistic Account of Mind

The clearest Augustinian influence upon Aquinas in his early discussion of mind is Augustine's *De Trinitate*, particularly the last half of the work where Augustine turns from biblical exegesis to a systematic examination of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity.[24] Augustine's goal is to find in creation the most adequate image of the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In most of material creation one finds traces or signs of God; but it is only by turning away from sensible objects, and inward toward his own conscious experience of himself as a spiritual, rational being, that Augustine thinks he can find an adequate *image* of the Holy Trinity. This movement is the transition from the 'outer man' to the 'inner man'. Success is guaranteed, because if the mind simply recalls itself to itself from its alienation it "simply cannot not know itself";[25] all it need do is remember. The image must be adequate to the doctrine Augustine holds by faith, namely, that there is but one being, God, and three distinct Persons, who are yet each said to be the one being that is God. After trying out a number of possible images, each of which is found to be inadequate, he finds the adequate image in the mind remembering itself, knowing itself, and loving itself. The key triad is constituted by memory, intellect, and will.

Augustine argues a number of theses about this trinity in the mind. First, "love and knowledge are not in the mind as in a subject, but they too are substantially, just as the mind itself is; and even if they are posited relatively to each other, still each of

[24] For a more detailed discussion of Aquinas's relationship to Augustine's *De Trinitate* than I can present here, see D. Juvenal Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas's Teaching* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990).

[25] Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P. (Brooklyn: New City Press, 1991), 291.

them is its own substance."[26] Indeed, "the mind therefore and its love and knowledge are three *somethings*, and these three are *one thing*, and when they are complete they are equal."[27] Finally, "memory, understanding, and will are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind. So it follows of course that they are not three substances but one substance."[28] This substance is the inner man, that part of the soul that is mind, as opposed to the outer man, that part of the soul that involves sensation and bodily life. Sensation is not part of the mind, even if it is part of the soul. And the life of the mind is effectively distinguished and isolated from what we share in common with animals. Echoing his analysis of the Holy Trinity, Augustine says that 'mind', like 'God', is said absolutely of memory, intellect, and will, and it signifies being or substance; memory is mind, intellect is mind, and will is mind. 'Memory', 'intellect', and 'will', like 'Father', 'Son', and 'Holy Spirit' are said relatively, that is, with reference to another. Augustine's thesis is that memory, intellect, and will are not three minds, but one; and these are not powers or faculties of the mind; they are the three distinct acts of the one mind.

There are a number of points in Augustine's analysis that need to be noted before I move on to its influence on Aquinas. There is the simple truism that one has a mind, as well as what it consists in. Augustine asks rhetorically, "what after all is so intimately known and so aware of its own existence as that by which things enter into our awareness, namely the mind?"[29] There is also the methodological move of turning within, and away from the body and a presumed knowledge of sense objects. The methodological focus upon the mind apart from the body and its acts finds its justification in the major distinction within the soul between the outer man and the inner man. The outer man is the soul focussed upon its relation to body, while the inner man is the soul focussed upon the spiritual and the inner presence of eternal truth. This is not simply a nominal distinction, as if two words of different sense are being applied to the same thing. It finds its justification

[26] Ibid., 273.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., 298.
[29] Ibid., 248.

in a distinction within the soul between the mind and the principle that Augustine speaks of enigmatically as "quickening" the body. He writes:

> Anything in our consciousness that we have in common with animals is rightly said to be still part of the outer man. It is not just the body alone that is to be reckoned as the outer man, but the body with its own kind of life attached, which quickens the body's structure and all the senses it is equipped with in order to sense things outside.[30]

Is this "life" that "quickens the body's structure" a principle distinct from the soul, or is it a part within the soul? Augustine is not clear. That it is not part of the soul is suggested when he writes that it is the body's "own kind of life attached." That it is a part of the soul is suggested when he writes "we observe that we share even with animals those other parts of the soul which are impressed with the likenesses of bodies";[31] whatever "quickens the body's structure and all the senses" is a part of the soul rather than a distinct soul of the body; mind is another distinct part. But, however the ambiguity might be resolved, it is clear that this quickening principle is distinct from the mind, since it is not the role of the mind to "quicken the body's structure and all the senses." The mind itself has a special unity apart from the lower powers of the soul associated with this "quickening" life.

The parallel is clear between Kenny's 'psyche' and Augustine's "life which quickens the body's structure and all the senses," as is the methodological turning away from the life of the body as part of the philosophy of mind. The sensitive life of the body plays roughly the same role in Augustine as it does in Kenny and Kenny's account of Aquinas, namely, as an external foil against which to study the mind, as something to be turned away from to reach a clearer, purer understanding of mind. If we look to Augustine, Kenny seems to be right about how mind "sets [us] off" from other animals, and with his 'psyche' and 'mind' he effectively recapitulates Augustine's 'outer man' and 'inner man'.

[30] Ibid., 322.
[31] Ibid., 293.

B) The Augustinian Mind in Aquinas's "Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate"

Aquinas devotes question 10 of the *De Veritate* to the mind. This question was delivered in the second year of his first Parisian regency (1257-58), more than a decade before he produced the commentary on the *De Anima* and the "Treatise on Man." The theme of the question is Augustinian: "Concerning the mind, in which there is an image of the Trinity, in the first article it is asked, insofar as there is in the mind an image of the Trinity, whether the mind is the essence of the soul, or some power of it."[32] Augustine is cited mostly in the objections, which establishes him as the authority for the question at hand. All but one of the citations come from books 9-14 of the *De Trinitate*, the source of my discussion of Augustine. The structure of the question follows Augustine's plan of turning from the outer man to the inner, then upward to God, as Aquinas asks about the mind's cognition of material things, then its knowledge of itself, then whether God can be known in this life, ending with the question whether the Trinity of Persons can be known in this life through natural reason.

It would be a mistake to conclude that this Augustinian setting excludes the very strong presence of Aristotelian themes throughout the discussion, as if Aristotle were for all practical purposes unknown. The issue at play throughout the question is how to incorporate Aristotelian themes within Augustine's discussion of the mind as *imago Dei*. The tension shows itself in a number of ways. Where Augustine refrained from calling memory, intellect, and will "powers" of the soul, Aquinas does not hesitate to do so. In the body of the response Aquinas affirms that the mind itself is a power of the soul and not its essence. "The mind is said to be the highest power in our soul." But the image of God is said to be in us according to what is highest in us, and so the image of God is only in us insofar as it is in the mind. Aquinas introduces here an Aristotelian theme that the soul itself is named from its highest

[32] *De Veritate*, q. 10 (Turin: Marietti, 1949). Unless otherwise indicated, translations of Aquinas are mine.

power, which here he asserts is mind. The soul itself can be called 'mind', secondarily and by analogy. Augustine, on the other hand, had been careful to avoid calling the human soul 'mind' because of the soul's function of "quickening" the body, a function that is shared with animal souls. Aquinas has no such qualm.

This willingness to call the entire soul by its highest power enables Aquinas to handle a distinct challenge from Augustine's authority. Augustine had written that memory, intellect, and will are "one mind, one essence, one life." It was clear that these are not distinct powers of the soul, but three acts of the mind. But there is an ambiguity in Augustine about the mind and the soul. The mind seems to be what is essential to, and the substance of, the soul; but Augustine did not identify the mind with the whole soul, having made the distinction between the part of the soul that is the mind and the sensitive part that "quickens" the body. The problem, brought about by the Aristotelian analysis of powers, is that against Augustine's authority Aquinas has identified the mind with a distinct power of the soul, not its "essence or substance." In the body of the response he makes no reference to memory, intellect, and will, the Augustinian triad. He only writes of understanding:

> 'Mind' or 'mens' is taken from the verb to measure (*mensurando*). . . . So, the word *mind* is applied to the soul in the same way as understanding is. For understanding knows about things only by measuring them.

It is on the basis of its being said in the same way as 'understanding' that mind is said to be the highest power of the soul, such that the soul is appropriately called by the same name.

In the responses to the objections Aquinas does introduce the trinity of memory, intellect, and will. In response to the fifth objection, he takes up Augustine's thesis about the unity of the mind, only to reaffirm that these are three powers. Explaining what Augustine meant, Aquinas writes,

> these three are *one essence* insofar as they proceed from the one essence of the mind, . . . *one mind* insofar as they fall under the one mind as parts under a whole, just as sight and hearing fall under the sensitive part of the soul.

Notice that he is using 'mind' in two senses here. When he says "one essence insofar as they proceed from the one essence of the mind," 'mind' is used in the analogous sense applied to the soul, since the powers flow from the essence of the soul. But when he says that they are "one mind insofar as they fall under the one mind as parts under a whole," 'mind' is used in its proper sense applied to the highest power of the soul, as the comparison to the sense powers shows.

Aquinas also introduces an Aristotelian principle from *De Anima* 2.4 (415a14-16), where Aristotle begins to discuss his classifications of soul against the background of his predecessors, namely, that souls are distinguished by their powers, powers are distinguished by their acts, and acts are distinguished by their objects. This principle is the cornerstone for a clear departure in Aquinas from the Augustinian background of the *De Trinitate* toward a distinctively Aristotelian position. He achieves this departure by employing a second Aristotelian principle, namely, that a thing is known only insofar as it is in act. The mind can only be known from its powers. From the second principle, it follows that the powers can only be known from their acts. Then from the first principle it follows that the powers can only be known by their objects, since their objects distinguish their acts. But Aquinas argues that the proper object of the human intellect is the understanding of material nature. Therefore, insofar as the other powers of the mind come into act consequent upon the act of intellect, it follows that the mind can only be known by knowing how it engages the material world. But its engagement with the material world presupposes acts of sensation. So it follows that the study of the mind essentially involves a consideration of the body and its sense powers, even though they are not parts of the mind. This is a clear rejection of the Augustinian methodological claim that the mind can only be known clearly by turning away from its prior and alienating engagement with the body and the sense powers. Study of the sense powers is integral to the philosophy of mind for Aquinas in the *De Veritate,* not a contrast or foil. For Augustine the mind

separated from the world is transparent to itself, while for Aquinas it is more or less opaque.

In answer to the question whether God can be known in this life through His essence, Aquinas employs the distinction familiar from the *Posterior Analytics* between demonstration *quia* that God exists and demonstration *propter quid* about what God's existence consists in. Because of the orientation of the mind to material nature the first is available to natural reason, while the second is not. Even if Aquinas is following an Augustinian form of movement from the outer man, to the inner, up to God, his argument is also deeply Aristotelian insofar as the effects from which God's existence is demonstrated are not the eternal truths that Augustine sees within but the material objects that Aquinas sees around him.

Aristotle's influence here is neither slight or occasional. It permeates the discussion, and sets the stage for the dialectic with Augustine. Still, the controlling theme is Augustine's discussion in the *De Trinitate*. All of the articles are about the mind, not the soul. Despite the argument above about the need in the study of the mind to understand how the body engages the material world through the sense powers, in practice very little is said of the soul, other than the discussion of how memory, intellect, and will flow out of the essence of the soul. In effect, soul takes a back seat to mind.

A difficulty begins to emerge here. Even if the soul can be called 'mind' from its highest power, the mind is not identical with the soul. I noted how Aquinas argues that memory, intellect, and will are a unity by arguing that they are distinct powers flowing from the essential unity of the soul. But if that is how they are a unity, then for the same reason they form the same unity with the powers of growth, nutrition, reproduction, all the powers of sensation, and so on. All the powers of the human soul flow from its essential unity. There appears to be no particular philosophical reason for singling out memory, intellect, and will for *special* consideration as the subject of a disputed question, much less a philosophy. But from Augustine the mind is supposed to be recognizable as a special unity of three, memory, intellect,

and will, recognizable even to those who cannot recognize it as an image of the Holy Trinity. What the light of faith adds is the ability to see in it an *imago Dei,* "as in a mirror darkly."

The mind, rather than the soul, is singled out for special consideration here because Aquinas is concerned with a theological question the governing authority of which is Augustine's discussion. Like Augustine before him, and unlike Aristotle, Aquinas is pursuing a discussion of the image of God in the mind of man, not the soul. However, if there were no unity of mind other than the unity of the soul, there would be nothing to be discussed. The key to understanding Aquinas's disputed question is his ability to find a special Augustinian unity in the mind that constitutes its special status, other than the Aristotelian unity its powers share with all the powers of the human soul as flowing from its essence.

It is in the response to the objections to the first article that Aquinas finds just such a special unity. In response to the second objection Aquinas argues that, considering intellect and will as issuing from the essence of the soul, will is "on a par with intellect,"[33] unlike the other appetitive powers, which are inferior to the intellect. This is an important point for him to make, since in the body of the response he had not discussed the Trinitarian character of the mind, but simply associated 'mind' verbally with 'understanding'. Now in engaging the authority of Augustine he develops what he had done in the body of the response. "Mind includes within it will and intellect, without at the same time being the essence of the soul, insofar as it names a certain class of powers of the soul."[34] However, all that is asserted here is that 'mind' denotes a collection of the highest powers of the soul. It does not assert that there is a unity to those powers that goes beyond the unity they possess as powers of the soul.

This response is important because it singles out will as "on a par" with intellect. Augustine too had said that they are equal. A year later Aquinas will reject this position in question 22 of the *De*

[33] "in eadem coordinatione cum intellectu" (Aquinas, *Truth*, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994]).

[34] *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 1, ad 2.

Veritate, which is addressed to the will itself.[35] In article 10 of question 22, he argues that will and intellect are distinct powers of the soul. Then, in article 11, he argues that taken simply intellect is superior to will. Throughout question 22 'mind' as a relevant term disappears. The major terms used are 'soul', 'intellect', and 'will'. 'Mind' occurs only twice, in both instances within objections, one quoting Augustine's *De Trinitate* on the image of God (*De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 11, obj. 1), and the other paraphrasing Aristotle's claim in the *Metaphysics* (1027b20-25) that truth is "in the mind" (*De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 5, obj. 8). In the latter case, the objector uses 'mind' as a synonym for 'intellect'; but in his response Aquinas does not use 'mind' at all, but rather 'intellect'. In the former case, the objection requires taking 'mind' as a synonym for intellect, since the objector argues that the will is an inferior power to the intellect according to Augustine who had said that man is an image of God according to his "reason, mind, or intelligence." In responding to this argument, Aquinas substitutes intellective part of the soul for mind, and includes will within it. This may just be a terminological shift, since intellective part clearly includes intellect and will. And that use is not inconsistent with, but rather reflects, the class of powers that Aquinas had named as 'mind' back in question 10. Mind or the intellective part of the soul may be nothing more than that class of powers, which leaves unanswered the question whether they possess any special unity beyond the unity they share with all of the powers of the soul.

However, Aquinas finds just the special unity of intellect and will required in the response to the seventh objection to article 1 of question 10. The objector argues that "acts that are specifically different do not come from one power. Yet Augustine says that [memory, understanding, and will] all come from the mind.

[35] It is important to keep in mind that these disputed questions were not delivered all at once, but over a number of years. While they may have a certain thematic unity given their overall subject matter, it would be a mistake to assume that St. Thomas does not change his mind about any number of subtopics and themes that may recur throughout. See M. D. Chenu, O.P., *Toward Understanding St. Thomas* (Chicago: Regnery, 1964); Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996).

Therefore, [since these acts are specifically different], the mind is not a power of the soul, but is the essence of the soul itself." Aquinas responds,

> Just as the sensitive part of the soul is not understood to be some one power over and above the particular powers contained within it, but is a certain potential whole containing all of them as parts, so also the mind is not some one power over and above memory, intellect, and will, but is a certain potential whole containing these three, just as we see that the power to build homes contains the power to cut stones, and erect walls.

Here Aquinas argues that the three form a potential whole, distinct from that formed by the sensitive powers. The mind is a distinct part of the soul, not simply a classification of its highest powers, just as the sensitive part is not simply a classification of its lower powers. The members of the mental class form a distinct *potential whole* within the soul.

The character of that potential whole may still seem somewhat ambiguous, since it is not a power "over and above" the other powers. So what is it? It is a power of the soul, as the body of the article and the response to the next objection (ad 8) inform us. The objection argued that mind must be the essence of the soul, since a power of the soul cannot be the subject of other powers. But the mind, as Augustine had said, is the subject of the image of the Trinity which is constituted from memory, intellect, and will. Aquinas responds:

> When 'mind' names the power itself, it is not compared to the understanding and the will as subject, but more as whole to parts. But if 'mind' is taken for the essence of the soul, according as it naturally flows as a power from the soul, then it names the subject of the powers.

One of the results of Aquinas's response in the body of the article was that the soul could be named from its highest power, which is mind. But 'mind' properly speaking names a potential whole constituted by its parts, the powers of memory, intellect, and will. And that potential whole, as this response tells us, is itself a power, while the *subject* of any power is the soul.

It appears that there is a conflict with the response to the seventh objection, since Aquinas there had said that the mind *is not* a power over and above the three powers, while the response to the eighth objection suggests that it is. The mind is not identical to memory, intellect, and will each taken singly. Since it contains them, it seems it has to be a power over and above them. The conflict is resolved in the response to objection 9, the last objection and response. Objection: "no power includes within itself many powers. But the mind includes intellect and will. Therefore it cannot be a power, but is the essence of the soul." Response: "one particular power does not include under itself many powers, but nothing prohibits many powers as parts from being included under one general power, just as under one part of the body are included many organic parts, the fingers under the hand, for example." The mind is a potential whole of three powers that is itself a power, but it is a *general* power as opposed to the *particular* powers that it unites. In the case of the mind, we are to think that memory, intellect, and will are like the fingers of the hand. We can analyze them in thought apart from the mind, but they cannot exist as the powers that they are apart from the power of the mind. They cannot do what particular powers do, if they are not united as constituting the general power of the mind, just as fingers cannot do what fingers do except as integral parts of a hand. The general power of the mind just *is* the particular powers of memory, intellect, and will; it is not a power over and above them.

Here, in the Aristotelian language of powers, we see Aquinas beautifully preserving Augustine's strong emphasis upon the image of the Trinity in the unity of the mind constituted from the three; a unity of one thing absolutely, yet constituted from three relatively. The mind as a part of the soul has its own special unity beyond the unity of the soul, and is distinguished from the sensitive part of the soul that we share in common with animals. This is the philosophy of mind that Kenny had argued is to be found in its most developed form only in the *Summa Theologiae* written more than a decade later, the joint power essentially

constituted from intellect and will.[36] It is now appropriate to turn to the *Summa* to see if Kenny is correct in his assessment of it.

C) Aquinas and the Summa Theologiae on Mind

1. The Semantic Claim

There are three parts to my argument about the *Summa,* the first semantic, the second systematic, and the third philosophical. First, meaning becomes clear from use. Aquinas does use the Latin term '*mens*' in the first part of the *Summa:* 261 times according to the *Index Thomisticus* (by comparison, he uses '*intellectus*' 1900 times, and '*voluntas*' 904). But as Aquinas uses the term in the first part of the *Summa,* '*mens*' or 'mind' is simply a synonym for 'intellect'. This use is directly against what Kenny had pointedly claimed, namely, that 'mind' and 'intellect' are *not* two words for the same thing. Often times Aquinas uses '*mens*' in an informal way to cite an authority, as for example when he writes, "according to the mind of Augustine . . ." or "according to the mind of Damascene . . .", much as we might say, "according to the mind of the framers. . . ." But at the beginning of the "Treatise on Man" it is the soul that is under consideration, and now in a formal sense Aquinas consistently calls the soul "intellect or mind." Other times the power of intellect itself is the subject under consideration. In both sets of usages, the synonymy between 'mind' and 'intellect' is constant, even quasi-defined.

In his first reference to mind at the beginning of the "Treatise on Man," Aquinas argues that the intellectual principle is the substantial form of the body, which is thus incorporeal and subsistent:

> therefore, the intellectual principle itself, which is *called* mind or intellect, has a *per se* operation, which it does not communicate to the body. . . . It must be

[36] In the question St. Thomas argues that memory is in fact a mode of intellect, and thus not itself a power distinct from it. But this complication does not materially bear upon my argument here.

concluded therefore that the human soul, which is *called* intellect or mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.[37]

Notice the use of 'mind' and 'intellect' to refer indifferently to the intellectual principle or soul. In the *sed contra* Aquinas had quoted a passage from Augustine that asserted that the "human mind" is a substance, from which the *sed contra* concluded, "therefore the nature of the human mind is not only incorporeal, but a substance, that is, something subsistent."[38] So, Aquinas calls the soul "mind or intellect," and interprets Augustine to that effect, though Augustine avoids doing so in the *De Trinitate*.

Consider one instance of particular importance. In question 82, article 3, Aquinas raises the question whether the power of intellect is a power higher than the will, the issue he raised in question 22 of the *De Veritate*. There he argued that the intellect is absolutely speaking a higher power, against the Augustinian position that they are equal. In question 22, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* was quoted in one of the objections as saying that truth is in the "mind," one of the few instances of 'mind' as a term in the question. But in his response, Aquinas made no use at all of 'mind', and confined himself to using only 'intellect'. Here in the *Summa* discussion, by contrast, Aquinas argues the same point that intellect is a higher power than will. But the difference is that now he paraphrases the same quotation from Aristotle in his own response:

> The philosopher says that good and evil which are the objects of the will, are in things; the true and the false which are objects of the intellect, are in the mind.

'Mind' is a synonym for 'intellect' as distinguished from 'will'. This was how the objector in the earlier disputed question used it, but not Aquinas; now Aquinas himself has adopted that use.

If we look at Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, we repeatedly see the expression "in the mind, that is, in the

[37] *STh* I, q. 75, a. 2 (Turin: Marietti, 1948; emphasis added).

[38] Ibid., *sed contra*.

intellect."[39] The reason for this use of 'mind' seems to be that while Aristotle's Greek text had '*dianoia*' or 'thought', so that the sense of the text is that the true and the false are in thought, the Latin translation that Aquinas had has '*mente*' for '*dianoia*', not '*intellectu*'. So Aquinas is explaining that by '*mente*' or 'mind' we should understand '*intellectu*' or 'intellect.' The clarification is his, not something in the Latin *Metaphysics*. The reason for this clarification is straightfoward. Aquinas commented on the *De Anima* three years earlier, in 1268. But the Latin *De Anima* very rarely uses '*mens*' (9 times), but rather '*intellectus*' (630 times); in the few instances in which '*mens*' is used, it is a straightforward synonym for '*intellectus*'. One important instance in his *De Anima* commentary is this same *Metaphysics* passage, in the discussion of the intellect's acts of simple and complex understanding (III *De Anima,* lect. 11). Throughout the discussion he had been using '*intellectus*', not '*mens*'. '*Mens*' only appears in the direct quotation from Aristotle; indeed it is one of only two instances of '*mens*' throughout the commentary on the third book of the *De Anima*. So, in reading and in commenting upon the *Metaphysics* passage three years later, when he writes "in the mind, that is, in the intellect," he is simply rendering it consistent with the *De Anima,* which he knew well from his commentary. Question 82, article 3 of the *Prima pars,* written at roughly the same time, reflects that result, a result that was not reflected in question 22 of the *De Veritate,* written a decade earlier.

In the *Summa* calling the soul "intellect or mind" might appear confusing, since intellect is but one power of the soul, not the soul itself. Kenny argues that in Aquinas the mind is not identical with the soul. If Kenny is right about the *Summa,* then Aquinas's discussion appears to be a mass of confusions. However, Aquinas writes that the soul is *called* intellect or mind, not that it *is* intellect or mind. Why does Aquinas *call* the soul "mind or intellect"? He answers that question for us, and at the same time interprets Augustine, when in question 79 he asks "whether the intellect is a power of the soul." He answers in the affirmative,

[39] "in mente, idest in intellectu" (VI *Metaphys.*, lect. 4 [1027b20-25]; Turin: Marietti, 1950).

that "it is necessary to say . . . that the intellect *is* a power of the soul, and is not the essence of the soul itself."[40] Of particular interest is his response to the first objection, which once again cites Augustine's authority that "mind and spirit are not spoken of relatively, but show the essence."[41] Aquinas responds that just as we speak of a sensitive soul of lower animals from its primary or chief power of sensation:

> similarly, the intellectual soul is at times *called* by the name 'intellect', as from its highest power, as it is said in I *de Anima*, that *intellect is a substance. And also in this way Augustine says that mind is spirit or essence.*[42]

This is just the principle Aquinas had used in the *De Veritate*. In both discussions, calling the soul "intellect or mind" is merely a way of speaking "at times," a mere *calling*. It is a use of analogous terms. In the *Summa* we see Aquinas explicitly identifying Augustine's use of 'mind' with his own use of 'intellect', with no reference at all to memory or will. In the *De Veritate*, 'mind' was not simply a synonym for 'intellect', but referred to a general power essentially constituted from the particular powers of will and intellect, akin to the way the hand is essentially constituted from the fingers. In the *Summa* 'mind' is simply a synonym for 'intellect'—two words for the same thing.

So, in the *Summa* the soul is called "intellect or mind" analogously because of its highest power, intellect or mind in the primary sense. Time and again, Augustine is interpreted by Aquinas as maintaining roughly the same position. In the response to the very next objection Aquinas writes:

> the appetitive power is associated in part with the sensitive power and in part with the intellectual, inasmuch as in its mode of operation it employs a corporeal organ or does not, since appetite follows apprehension. And according to this, Augustine puts will in mind, and the philosopher [Aristotle] in the reason.[43]

[40] *STh* I, q. 79, a. 1.
[41] Ibid., obj. 1.
[42] Ibid., ad 1.
[43] Ibid., ad 2.

This passage might appear to support Kenny's reading if we did not already know that Aquinas now treats 'mind' as a synonym for 'intellect'. On the contrary, according to Aquinas, Augustine puts will "in the mind," not because it is a *part* of the mind, but because of its *association with* the "intellect or mind." Will is the appetite that follows the apprehension of "intellect or mind." By this account he explains what we are to take Augustine to mean when he "puts will in mind." It is just another manner of speaking. Aquinas's practice is constant when Augustine's authority is now cited. The intellective part of the soul consists in the powers closely associated with intellect or mind. No suggestion is made that they form a potential whole that is itself a power, as was argued in the *De Veritate*. Now 'intellective part' is nothing more than a phrase for the classification of the powers associated with the intellect. Most importantly, 'mind' is uniformly associated with 'intellect' alone. In the "Treatise on Man," and later in question 93 in the discussion of the *imago Dei* itself, if Augustine is quoted as asserting that mind is composed of intellect, memory, and will, Aquinas will interpret that as the manner of speaking by analogy in which 'mind' or 'intellect' applies to the soul, or where will is associated with intellect or mind.[44] No suggestion is made that there is a general power constituted from memory, intellect, and will to which 'mind' refers.

The importance of comparing Aquinas's analyses in the *Summa* and the *De Veritate* is evident, since it makes clear that he now avoids the general power he had called mind in the *De Veritate*. Semantically this result is an embarrassment for Kenny's reading of the "Treatise on Man." It suggests that if one continues to speak of a "philosophy of mind" in the *Summa* one can only mean one of two things. Either one intends to speak of a "philosophy of soul" an option rejected by Kenny as anachronistic, or one intends to speak of a "philosophy of intellect," an option woefully inadequate for both Aquinas and Kenny. It is inadequate for Aquinas since it would be a philosophy built upon a power or

[44] I intend to argue at greater length elsewhere that this practice of interpreting Augustine consistent with Aquinas's new use of 'mind' changes his *theology* of the *imago dei*, as it occurs outside of the "Treatise on Man" in question 93.

capacity without taking into account what it is a power of. In the *De Veritate* soul had taken a back seat to mind. Here in the *Summa* "intellect or mind" must take a back seat to soul. It is inadequate for Kenny, since a philosophy of intellect would not capture the broad range of topics covered in the philosophy of mind that he takes at face value from recent philosophy, the broad range of "mentalistic concepts"[45] like belief, hope, desire of the will, and so on, that "set us apart" from mere animals.

2. The Systematic Claim

Is this simply a semantic point? Even if Aquinas's use of the term 'mind' is not what Kenny's analysis would suggest, isn't it possible that Aquinas is still committed to a single joint "indivisible" power that combines intellect and will, and that Kenny is substantively correct about the *Summa?* On the contrary, there is no discussion of Kenny's mind in the *Summa*, by any name. In the *Summa* Aquinas discusses the soul (*STh* I, q. 75) and its union with body (*STh* I, q. 76). The powers are treated first in general (*STh* I, q. 77), and then in particular (*STh* I, qq. 78-82). Intellect as a power is discussed separately in question 79 from will in question 82. It is in this last question, specifically article 3, that intellect and will are compared with one another, concerning which is the higher power. But in all of these discussions, we look in vain for a discussion of the power that Kenny attributes to Aquinas, the single indivisible power essentially constituted from intellect and will. If Kenny were substantively correct, we would expect a discussion of this power once the discussions of intellect and will are on the table. Certainly, one would expect it in those articles where Aquinas compares intellect and will. We would expect an account of how they form a "general power," as we saw in the *De Veritate,* or in Kenny's words, how they are "two aspects

[45] Even a cursory examination of recent texts in the philosophy of mind will reveal the difficulty that authors have in accurately describing their subject matter, apart from the broad and amibiguous phrase "mentalistic concepts." A good survey of the field can be found in the editor's introduction to *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind,* ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

of a single indivisible capacity." There is no such discussion in the "Treatise on Man."

3. The Philosophical Claim

Granted that Aquinas does not use the term '*mens*' to refer to what Kenny describes, and granted that the *Summa* contains no discussion, philosophical or otherwise, of what Kenny describes, isn't it still possible to mine the *Summa* for philosophical insights that can be suitably extended and applied to what Kenny describes? What would Aquinas have to say about what philosophers like Kenny now call the mind, given what Aquinas does write in the *Summa*? My claim is that Aquinas would deny that there is any such thing as what Kenny describes.

There are two good Aristotelian reasons why there should be no such philosophy of mind as described by Kenny. The first has to do with the object and act of the mind. The acts of intellect and will do not occur in isolation from one another; their interaction is very intimate for Aquinas (*STh* I, q. 82, a. 4). The will like an efficient cause moves the intellect to its act, while the intellect provides the intelligible form of the will's movement. But they do not come together in a general power.

In question 77, article 3 Aquinas argues that powers of the soul are distinguished from one another by their acts, which acts are in turn distinguished by their objects. This principle from *De Anima* 2.4 was present in the *De Veritate* discussion; Kenny makes extensive use of it throughout *Aquinas on Mind* (esp. in chaps. 10 and 12). 'Object' here does not have the current metaphysical sense of "thing that exists" or "value of a bound variable," but is rather whatever affects a passive power, or whatever the goal is of an active power. Aquinas uses color as the object of vision for an example of an object of a passive power, and physical maturity as the object of an active power like growth. We might say the object of chess is to mate one's opponent, without thereby positing some thing in the world that is that object. Kenny summarizes Aquinas's discussion this way:

Powers are specified by their exercises (S 1, 77, 3). That is to say, you can only understand what the power to □ is if you know what □ing is. One power differs from another if its exercises and its objects differ; for instance the ability to swim is different from the ability to fly, because swimming is different from flying; and the ability to bake bread is different from the ability to bake biscuits, because bread is different from biscuits.[46]

Thus, the principle requires that one determine the powers of the substance by an analysis of its acts. Unless one can say what the power does, what it achieves, there is no reason for the Aristotelian to posit the existence of a power. There is a danger, as Kenny puts it, of "multiplying powers without multiplying their exercises."[47]

However, even though Kenny applies the principle to the intellect alone, and to the will alone, in his analysis of Aquinas on mind he never asks "what does the *mind* do?" Intellect has its object, namely, universal truth. Will has its object, namely, universal good (*STh* I, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1). But according to the principle, if the mind is an "indivisible power" other than the intellect alone, and other than the will alone, but "essentially constituted" from them, it must have a determinate act that distinguishes it from these powers. If we proceed according to the principle, we must distinguish its specific act by its specific object. So what is the specific object of mind? If it is a passive power, what specifically affects it? If it is an active power, what does the mind specifically achieve? Do the objects of intellect and will combine to form a joint object of mind, the true-good, or the good-truth, as opposed to the false-good, or the bad-truth? No; according to Aquinas, the good and the true are found wherever being is found. It is the act of intellect to respond to the truth of being, while it is the act of will to move toward the good of being. The unity of truth and goodness that is found in all being is not reflected in a joint indivisible power that essentially unites will and intellect. That unity is to be found in the human soul, of which intellect and will are powers, the soul that is the first

[46] Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, 155.

[47] Ibid., 156-57.

principle of life of a human being whose *telos* is to live the good life of a rational animal informed by the truth of things.

If we look back at the *De Veritate,* it is clear that Aquinas takes the existence of the mind for granted from Augustine's discussion in order to specify *what* it is, not *that* it is. Recall that Aquinas uses house building as an example of a "general power" constituted from the particular powers of stone cutting and raising walls. In that example we can specify the object of the general power, houses. And houses are other than, but constituted from, the objects of the particular powers, cut stones and walls. But Aquinas, like Kenny, only uses the principle in the *De Veritate* to distinguish will from intellect, and both from the sense powers. It is striking that he never actually applies it to the mind. In other words, in the *De Veritate* Aquinas never tells us what the mind *does*. Even if it is an *imago Dei*, that is not its act; consequently it provides no philosophical warrant for thinking that there is a mind, and a corresponding philosophy of mind. Later in the *Summa,* Augustine's 'mind' is absent precisely because it has nothing to do.

In *The Metaphysics of Mind,* Kenny himself said that the mind can be defined as "the capacity for behavior of the complicated and symbolic kinds which constitute the linguistic, social, moral, economic, scientific, cultural and other characteristic activities of human beings in society."[48] He offers no good argument that there is any such capacity. At best he has given a nominal definition of a term that might be used to argue that there is such a capacity. Kenny takes 'mind' to be a successful referring term, and attributes that commitment to Aquinas. Descartes thought simple reflection upon oneself made it impossible to doubt that one is a thinking thing. Kenny, avoiding Descartes's private introspection, still uses the same basic argument from reflection. He thinks that simple reflection upon one's activity of reading makes it clear that one has a mind. He writes, "you have a mind, as is proved by the fact that you read and understand what I have written."[49] But the existence of the mind that Kenny has defined

[48] Kenny, *The Metaphysics of Mind*, 7.

[49] Ibid., 17.

doesn't follow from that. What follows, by his own analysis of the terms, is that I have an intellect, since it is the intellect that is the power to comprehend and manipulate symbols. It might follow that I have a will, since presumably I want and have chosen to engage in the act of reading. But it does not follow that in addition I have an "indivisible power" that is essentially constituted from intellect and will. As if sensing this failure, Kenny quickly adds "that human beings in general have minds and bodies . . . is simply a truism,"[50] which is to say, in no need of proof (cf. Augustine's rhetorical question, "what after all is so intimately known and so aware of its own existence?"). There is no reason for thinking that the term nominally defined by Kenny connotes anything more than a complex of objects and acts united by the principle of human life, the soul, not the mind, of a rational, social, political animal.

The second reason for denying that there is a mind has to do with the definition of man: *man is a rational animal.* Kenny writes, "in the scholastic jargon, animal is the genus, man is the species, and 'rational' indicates the specific difference which marks out the species within the genus."[51] Aquinas writes in the *Summa* (*STh* I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4) that we can consider what is common to man and other animals separately from that by which they differ. Sensation is common, from which the genus animal is taken. The difference is taken from the "something more" that a man can do that other animals cannot, namely, reason in virtue of his intellect. Though Kenny avoids Aquinas's commentary, this is the movement of Aristotle's *De Anima* as it considers the hierarchy of souls from the vegetative, through the sensitive, to the rational, with each grade of soul including within itself the powers of the one below it; it is here that the principle from the *De Anima* that the soul is named from its highest power finds its greatest application. Kenny goes on to note that "a specific difference is, according to Aristotelian theory, a form. Therefore

[50] Ibid., 18.

[51] Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind,* 145.

the intellectual principle which is denoted by the word 'rational' must be the human being's form."[52]

Kenny then identifies the highest power with the mind, the joint power of intellect and will as he has analyzed it. If he is right, we would expect that the specific difference would be taken from mind. And in question 10 of the *De Veritate* Aquinas does just that, when he replies to objection 6 of the first article. The objection is that the mind is what distinguishes us from brute animals, and since that distinction is a substantial distinction, it cannot be grounded in a simple power of the soul, but must be the essence of the soul itself. Aquinas responds by appealing to the principle of naming the essence of the soul from its highest power. He finishes by writing:

> Hence sensible, according as it is the difference constitutive of an animal, is not taken from sense as it names a power, but as it names the essence of the soul itself, from which such a power flows. And it is similar for *rational*, or of that which has a mind.[53]

We know that in the *De Veritate* he means by 'mind' that which has a special general power constituted from intellect and will. But he returns to this same objection in the *Summa* when considering whether the essence of the soul is its power (*STh* I, q. 77, a. 1). The repetition occurs in the seventh objection. His response to the objection is almost identical to what it had been in the *De Veritate*, except that now he makes no mention of mind. Why not? Because there is no such thing as the mind essentially constituted from intellect and will.

Aquinas's negative position in the *Summa* on the plurality of souls debate is crucial for understanding this absence of mind. I claimed above that Kenny reintroduces this issue in his own distinction between mind and psyche. "Humans and animals have psyches," while human beings have minds in addition. Aquinas addresses the plurality argument in question 76. In the third article he asks, "whether beyond the intellectual soul there are in a man other souls essentially different from it?" His response is

[52] Ibid.

[53] *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 1, ad 6.

no. But objection 4 raises the problem that man is taken to be in the genus animal from his sensitive body, a "body animated by a sensitive soul," while rationality, taken from the "intellectual soul," is taken to be the specific difference or form that makes man distinctive. The "intellectual soul" must therefore be really distinct from the "sensitive soul" that animates the body. Aquinas's response is crucial for understanding his general position:

> From diverse intelligible characteristics or logical intentions, which follow upon the mode of understanding, it is not necessary to posit a diversity in the natures of things, since reason is able to apprehend one and the same thing in diverse ways.[54]

The "one and the same thing" he has in mind here is human nature, the formal principle of which is the human soul. The diverse intelligible characteristics are the nutritive, sensitive, and rational features exhibited in human life. He argues in the body of the response that the higher soul possesses "virtually" the characteristics distinctive of lower classes of soul, sensitive or nutritive as the case may be. He means nothing mysterious by this "virtual" presence. He means that characteristics flow from a single formal principle that are not distinctive of it but distinctive of others, in addition to the characteristics that are distinctive of it. The characteristics that are not distinctive give rise to the "logical intention" of the genus, while the characteristic(s) that are distinctive give rise to the specific difference. Thus the plurality that is found in our understanding of *X* is not necessarily grounded in a plurality of distinct principles in *X*. To fail to see this fundamental point is what Aquinas identifies as the "error of the Platonists," to confuse, that is, the mode of knowing with the thing known.

Insofar as Aquinas's "philosophy of mind" only begins with question 79, Kenny is not interested in question 76. *A fortiori* he is not interested in the point of the response to objection 4, that the duality of the notions does not reflect a duality in the thing defined. Aquinas's response is based upon the position that a

[54] *STh* I, q. 76, a. 3, ad 4.

definition is only adequate if the unity of genus and specific difference within it signifies an identity, the absolute unity of the thing defined.[55] For man "rational animal" works, where "flying animal" does not. However, the point is not that in defining a species two features or properties are tied together in reality by some metaphysical glue (i.e., the soul). It is that in defining a species, man for example, neither notion in the definition, rational or animal, is adequately understood without the other, since they are diverse notions taken from "one and the same thing." We can think of animal apart from rational or any other specific difference; but when we do, our thinking is inadequate to reality until we specify the form that animality takes in actual species of things like men, or horses, or bats.[56] What Kenny misses is that questions 79-89 are specifying the rational form that animality takes in being human; our understanding of animal applied to human beings is inadequate without being so specified as rational.

Conversely, Kenny fails to recognize that our understanding of what rationality consists in, as discussed in 79-89, is determined by our sensitive animal natures. In question 79, article 8, Aquinas asks whether reason is a power distinct from intellect. His answer is negative; rationality is the form that understanding takes in us, namely, to "move" discursively in our understanding from one thing known to another. This rational form of understanding is distinguished from the form that it takes in spiritual beings like angels and God that do not move from one thing known to another, but understand in one simple act the totality of what we understand partially, discursively, and rationally. The reason why (*propter quid*) our understanding must move from one thing known to another is its abstractive character, that it arrives at what it knows from its engagement with sensation, which knowledge is always incomplete, and awaits completion in the propositions we form, and the arguments we build from those propositions.[57] Consequently, even though the act of intellect is

[55] Cf. *STh* I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3.

[56] Cf. *STh* I, q. 85, a. 3.

[57] See *STh* I, q. 85, a. 3; I, q. 85, a. 4; and particularly I, q. 85, a. 5.

not the act of a bodily organ (*STh* I, q. 75, a. 2), the determinate form it takes in being human, rationality, is determined by its union in the soul with the sense powers of an animal. So, the very notion or concept of rationality that Aquinas uses throughout his "philosophy of mind" cannot be adequately understood apart from its rootedness in the animal nature that it is identical with *in re*. Thus, the actual discussion of the sense powers in the *Summa* takes on a much greater material importance than it had in the *De Veritate*. The greater importance reflects the importance given to the discussion of sensation in Aquinas's commentary on book 2 of the *De Anima*, and the transition from sensation to reason in the commentary on the initial chapters of book 3. If we are to understand reason and rationality, we must understand it as grounded in sensitive animal life; rationality is the form that understanding takes in the sensitive life of a specific kind of animal.[58]

Aquinas argues for the unity of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational principles in the human being, against those who would assign a principle or principles for the vegetative and sensitive life of the human being, and another distinct principle for the rational or mental life of the human being, which second principle would include within it the intellect and will. One can see the seed of this thirteenth-century debate in the ambiguity of Augustine's treatment of the soul and mind. According to Augustine, the soul quickens the body, and yet has a mental life clearly distinguished from the life of the body, a mental life so distinct that he identifies a part of the soul, the mind, with the substance and essence of the soul, and speaks only fleetingly of the soul's "quickening" function of the body with "its own life attached." It is ambiguous whether the quickening principle is a part of the same soul of which the mind is a part. The later plurality of souls position clarifies Augustine's ambiguity in favor of separating clearly the animal life from the mental. In the thirteenth century, employing the newly rediscovered Aristotelian terms and principles, it is clear

[58] On these grounds, of course, consistent with the *via negativa*, Aquinas would deny that God is rational while affirming that He understands, since reason is the form that understanding takes in an animal.

to almost everyone (the pluralists) that the human being, having two principles of life, in effect lives two lives. He lives the life of an animal animated by his animal soul, and he lives a distinct mental life animated by his mental soul. So the definition "mental or rational animal," in its manifest complexity, tracks two distinct forms of life, one higher and another lower. It distinguishes the human species from the genus animal, in the sense of separating or "setting off" rational life from animal life.

On the contrary, for Aquinas we live but one life, the life of a rational animal. That is the point of his response to the fourth objection. Aquinas argues that the principle of rational life just is "one and the same thing" as the principle of animal life in the human being. Thus the life of the mind or intellect is identically the life of the animal that is human. In the body of the response, he takes this position explicitly in order to preserve the integrity and unity of human life.

> If it were the case, therefore, that a man lives from one form, namely the vegetative soul, is an animal from another form, namely the sensitive soul, and is a man from another, namely the rational soul, it would follow that a man would not be absolutely one thing.

And,

> Therefore it is necessary that it is the same form through which a thing is an animal, and through which it is a man; otherwise a man would not truly be an animal, and so animal could not be predicated in the definition of man[59]

We see the fateful step taken by beginning Aquinas's "philosophy of mind" with question 79; it separates methodologically, and in practice metaphysically, the mind from the soul. Aquinas leaves no doubt about his desire to emphasize the absolute unity of human life in all its manifestations; animal could not be included in the definition of man, if the principle of animal life were not "one and the same thing" as the principle of rational life in man. The argument goes both ways: it follows that rational could not

[59] *STh* I, q. 76, a. 3.

be included in the definition of any animal; no animal could "truly be" rational.

For Aquinas, to be an animal and to be rational is the same form of life in a human being. The definition rational animal provides an account of the species, not in the sense of separating or "setting off" distinctively human mental life from animal life, but rather in marking the form of life that being an animal takes in being human. It displays the character of animal life in a human being as rational, as an animal life that eats reasonably, reproduces reasonably, grows reasonably, employs the senses reasonably, or *ought* to given what he *is*; rational is not a distinct principle preceding or following these bodily acts and interacting causally with them, but the human form of them. Among the libraries, concert halls, and stock markets that Kenny has in mind, one also finds the economic transactions of grocery stores, the construction of sewers, the licensing of sex, and the certification of birth.

It might be objected that Aquinas argues that the act of intellect is not the act of a bodily organ, from which it follows that it is not an animal act. However, that conclusion only follows if every act of an animal is the act of a bodily organ. But that is the point at issue when he argues that it is not the act of a bodily organ, and yet is the act of the being that is a living body. He is not arguing that there is a nonanimal act engaged in by human beings, but simply that there is an animal act that is not the act of a bodily organ. This thesis is reflected in the argument that it is precisely because it is an act of an animal that intellect in human beings is discursive and thus rational. Reason is the act of neither an angel nor a god, but of an animal.

In question 10 of the *De Veritate,* Aquinas showed no concern at all about the plurality of souls debate. He maintained the special unity of the mind apart from all the other powers of the soul in order to preserve Augustine's analysis in Aristotelian terms. But in the *Summa* the plurality of souls debate is one of the main topics. It is now clear that Aquinas drops the Augustinian power of mind that he had argued for in the *De Veritate* precisely because it left the door open for separating the mental life of a man from his animal life almost exactly in the way that the

plurality of souls position does. His opponents could very easily argue on Aristotelian grounds that if the mental life of intellect and will has the special unity that Aquinas attributes to it in the *De Veritate,* other than the essential unity of the soul shared with animals in the sensitive life, then such a special life can only be justified by an essential principle of mental life (a mental soul) distinct from the essential principle of animal life (an animal soul). Resistance to that move could only be *ad hoc* on Aquinas's part. By eliminating Augustine's mind in the *Summa,* Aquinas is effectively eliminating any suggestion that to be human is to be anything other than an animal whose form of life is rational. The duality manifest in the definition rational animal does not correspond to a duality in the thing defined. On the contrary, the unity of the two elements of the definition corresponds to the absolute unity of the form of human life. The unity of intellect and will is not preserved in a special power that separates man *from* animals. Rather, like all the other human powers, it is preserved in the unity of the soul that unites man *to* animals, insofar as it specifies the form that animal life takes in being human.

According to Kenny, the discussion of the sense powers in the *Summa* is supposed to form a contrast by which to understand better the distinctiveness of mind. On the contrary, nothing could be further from Aquinas's intent throughout the discussion. Reason, and consequently will, are what they are because of the way in which they are determined by their relationship to the sense powers in the human soul. The discussion of the sense powers is not a foil over against which to understand the mind, but rather an integral condition for understanding the powers of human intellect and will. In question 76 we see Aquinas arguing that in a man the principle of intellectual and volitional life is identically the principle of nutritive and sensitive life, a claim that does not sit well with Kenny's real dualism between psyche and mind. Any philosophy of "intellect or mind" in Aquinas must be a philosophical psychology.

Kenny does look at question 76 in the last chapter of *Aquinas on Mind.* But the title of his chapter illustrates my point: "Mind

and Body." The question of mind and body is Descartes's question, not Aquinas's. Aquinas's question in his own words "concerns the union of soul and body." Aquinas's first order of business in article 1 is to establish the identity of the substantial form of the human being, that is, whether the "principle by which we primarily understand, whether it is *called* intellect or intellectual soul, is the form of the body." This is manifestly not a question about how a single joint indivisible power essentially constituted from intellect and will is related to a body. Indeed, despite the title of his chapter, Kenny's discussion of question 76 says next to nothing about the mind, as he raises problems for Aquinas's thesis in the response to the fifth objection in article 1 that the soul is a subsistent entity. Those problems are worthy of separate consideration, but beside the point here. Kenny recognizes Aquinas's claim, "if there had been a plurality of forms . . . one could not say that it was one and the same human being who thought, loved, felt, heard, ate, drank, slept, and had a certain weight and size."[60] What Kenny fails to do is examine what the unity of substantial form implies for the "philosophy of mind" that he finds only in, and subsequent to, question 79. It is not only that the same being eats as thinks, with the soul providing the metaphysical glue that makes them both the acts of one and the same being. Rather, it is that reasonable *is* the formal character of human eating, reproduction, and so on.

This is the point that Kenny fails to address in his own *Metaphysics of Mind,* namely, how his two principles, mind and psyche, can constitute the integral life of an animal whose form of life is rational. Kenny had presented his account as the Aristotelian account of the mind. If my analysis is correct, it is clear that what he provided was actually much closer to St. Thomas's understanding of Augustine than of Aristotle, with mind a match for Augustine's inner man, and psyche a match for his outer man. Indeed it is clear that Kenny's own philosophy of mind suffers from the same Augustinian ambiguity that the medieval pluralists tried to clarify and solve. If mind has its own unity that distinguishes human beings in the sense of "separating them off"

[60] Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind,* 152.

from other animals, how are we to understand its relationship to the unity of psyche that Kenny grants we share with animals? If Kenny wants to deny that this is a substance dualism, the medieval pluralists are certainly justified in asking him, just what sort of dualism is it? Methodological dualism very easily becomes metaphysical.

Kenny is really just providing us with a modified Cartesian account of mind. After Descartes, the problem with Aristotelianism, even for those like Kenny who eschew Cartesian metaphysics and introspective philosophical psychology, is that Aristotle wrote a *De Anima*, not a *De Mente*.[61] What Kenny despairs of, in his defense of the philosophy of mind, is any serious philosophical study of the unity of human life. The life sciences study in an empirical way how we are like animals (psyche), while philosophy studies in a non-empirical way how we are "set off" from animals (mind). But there is no discipline that studies what it is like to be a human animal, an animal whose form of life is rational. Does the mind distinguish us *from* animals, or does it distinguish us *as* animals?

III. Cartesian Philosophy of Mind versus Aristotelian Psychology

Kenny thinks Aquinas is important to contemporary philosophy of mind. So do I, but for different reasons. Here I can only make a suggestion. It is Aquinas's commitment to the unity of human life in the soul that philosophers working within the Aristotelian tradition can contribute to the philosophy of mind. Kenny correctly estimates the confusing set of ideas that come to mind if one uses 'soul' in contemporary discourse.[62] But that is no reason to fail to argue for the Aristotelian principle it signifies, even as one might avoid the term.

Kenny straightforwardly assumes the methodological dualism that for all practical purposes is the soul of contemporary

[61] For an excellent treatment of this theme addressed directly to our understanding of Aristotle, see Kathleen Wilkes, "Psuche versus the Mind," in M. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty, eds., *Essays in Aristotle's De anima* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 109-27.

[62] Cf. Kenny, *The Metaphysics of Mind*, 18-19.

philosophy of mind. He describes how the progress of science has carved away at the philosophical disciplines present in Aristotle's corpus. Still, the philosophy of mind is part of the "irreducible core amenable only to philosophy." The natural sciences describe man empirically, while the philosophy of mind analyzes mind nonempirically and philosophically. One does not have to advocate the type-type identity theory of J. J. Smart and U. T. Place to recognize the Cartesian methodological turn taken in the philosophy of mind when it was rejected.[63] Hilary Putnam has also recently described present-day philosophy of mind as methodologically Cartesian.[64] Despite the strong parallels with the Augustinian account, it is Descartes who provides the proximate setting for Kenny and recent philosophy, where Augustine had provided it for Aquinas. Descartes's heavy debt to Augustine for the substance of his description of mind is well known.[65] Indeed, it would be ironic if in the major arguments and controversies of recent philosophy of mind one saw, "as in a mirror darkly," the far-off traces, likenesses, and shadows of Augustine's search for the adequate image of God. Kenny leaves us with a study of the distinctively human, the mental that "sets us off" from other animals, the "[thinking] thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing and unwilling."[66] The methodological dualism very quickly becomes a quasi-metaphysical dualism, as reflected in his distinction between psyche and mind, or leaves us with the antinomy that animates recent philosophy of mind—how can the

[63] U. T. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?", in *Modern Philosophy of Mind*, ed. William Lyons (London: Everyman Library, 1995), 106-16; J. J. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," in ibid., 117-32.

[64] Hilary Putnam, *The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 110 and 170.

[65] See for example Stephen Menn, *Descartes and Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Mikko Yrjonsuuri, "The Scholastic Background of 'Cogito ergo sum,'" *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 64 (1999): 47-70. John A. Mourant, "The 'Cogitos': Augustinian and Cartesian," *Augustinian Studies* 10 (1979): 27-42. William Oneill, "Augustine's Influence Upon Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem" *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes* 12 (1966): 255-60.

[66] Rene Descartes, "Meditation II," in *Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothof, and Dugald Murdoch (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1984), 83.

thing exhaustively described empirically be related to, or identified with, the thing "irreducibly" analyzed philosophically.

Philosophers working in the tradition of Aquinas need to argue that this Cartesian methodological dualism fails to capture either human life empirically or the mind philosophically. We need correctly to identify the problem—the loss of form, of substantial form, of the soul—and remedy it. The temptation is to think that the mind tacks some level of reality onto the biological life we share with animals. That additional reality somehow engages biological life, and explains it by providing some mysterious causal relations. Here I think all the different varieties of reductive materialism or physicalism in the philosophy of mind have grasped a truth. They insist upon the unity of human life. What these approaches lack is the natural principle of form, and, in this case, soul. The problem is not with the unity of human action, but the reductionist or eliminativist stance. We need to recover the understanding of the plurality of the sciences as modes of abstraction from the unity of being, rather than hermetically sealed conceptual schemes that need to be identified with another, reduced, or eliminated.

If we return to Kenny's own description of mind, that it is "the capacity for behavior of the complicated and symbolic kinds which constitute the linguistic, social, moral, economic, scientific, cultural and other characteristic activities of human beings in society," it should be clear that one cannot adequately reflect upon that complex reality without taking into consideration that we are living bodies. If that reflection is going to be well informed, it must be informed by our scientific knowledge of ourselves as living bodies. But we do not adequately understand our human growth, nutrition, and reproduction, those characteristics that at one level of description we share with animals and plants, if we do not understand it as reasonable and chosen.

Consider the least obvious case, the power of growth. It is surely conditioned and limited by the biological properties that at one level of description we share with other animals, and even with plants. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas say that reason and choice play no part in the operation of the underlying chemical

and biological processes involved in the move toward the "perfect quantity" appropriate to human life.[67] For this reason growth is referred to as a "natural power" rather than a sensitive or a rational one. Yet when I was 10 my parents would not let me drink iced tea, because, they said, "it will stunt your growth." Perhaps that claim was *empirically* false, perhaps not. But my knowledge of its truth or ignorance of its falsehood certainly had a bearing upon the course that my growth took, insofar as it had a bearing upon the form that my choices and eating habits took. What is just as important is that the knowledge or ignorance did not function as an *efficient* cause of my growth or lack thereof. The tea functions in that way, if anything does. In general, we certainly believe that our growth is determined by diet and exercise as we pursue chosen goals, and the means necessary for achieving them. For this reason, Aquinas holds that even though it is a "natural power," the power of growth or natural augmentation takes place in a "higher way" insofar as it is a power of the rational soul.[68] In addition, the nutritive power, which in human beings is informed by reason and choice, "ministers to" the power of growth.[69] Consequently, the power of growth does not operate simply according to the underlying necessities of the biochemical processes involved, but in human beings is informed by reason. However, whatever causality our knowledge exhibits here, it is something other than efficient. It functions as the *form* of our subsequent actions, which affects our growth, as it is an aspect of the substantial forms that animate our bodies.

Readers familiar with the debate in recent philosophy of mind between reductive and nonreductive physicalists know that the argument between them may be adequately described in terms of the question whether the mind is something "over and above" the living body exhaustively described by the natural sciences. The problem of *mental causation* is perhaps the key problem for delineating how the many answers to that question are mapped

[67] See for example St. Thomas's commentary on Aristotle in VI *Nichomachean Ethics*, lect. 10, no. 1269, as well as the general discussion of the power of growth throughout the second book of Aristotle's *De Anima*, and St. Thomas's commentary on it.

[68] *Q. D. de Anima*, a.13, ad 14.

[69] Ibid., ad 15.

among one another.[70] Authors who recognize that Aquinas is not a straightforward substance dualist, and who are interested in placing Aquinas on that map, will place him squarely in the camp of the nonreductive physicalists, and then struggle with the form that his nonreductive physicalism takes.

However, readers familiar with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* or Aquinas's commentary on it should know the conceptual difficulty of posing the problem in this way about forms, particularly the substantial form that is the soul. Consider the mundane sort of example Aristotle would likely begin with. Is the sphericity of a bronze sphere some thing or reality "over and above" the bronze sphere? The answer to that question is no. The sphericity is certainly other than the bronze, since the same bronze may just as likely be fashioned into a bronze cube. But in general, the form of X is other than the matter of X, while it is not some thing "over and above" X—*mutatis mutandis* for substantial forms and living things. When the bronze is shaped into a sphere, the sculptor is not adding some thing to it, "over and above" it.[71] He is modifying its shape. Along those lines it is incoherent to ask how the sphericity acts upon the bronze, that is, what it causes in the bronze in the sense of efficient causation pertinent to the problem of mental causation. The sphericity *does* nothing to the bronze to make it a bronze sphere; that is the job of the sculptor. Rather, the sphericity *is* the actuality of the bronze being a sphere.

Adverting to the intellectual and volitional aspect of human life does not provide an additional causal explanation of human behavior in the sense of efficient causation pertinent to the problem of mental causation and the reductive/nonreductive physicalist debate; it provides the adequate description of human behavior that is to be explained. A distinct burden of article 1 of

[70] Cf among others, the entries on *Physicalism* (1&2) in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); A. D. Smith, "Non-Reductive Physicalism," in *Objections to Physicalism*, ed. Howard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophy of Mind* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), in particular, chap. 6 on mental causation, and chap. 9 on reductive and nonreductive physicalism.

[71] For a discussion of the complications of using 'thing' across the Aristotelian categories, see John O'Callaghan, "Concepts, Beings, and Things in Contemporary Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas," *The Review of Metaphysics* 53 (September 1999): 69-98.

question 76 of the *Summa* was to show that the intellectual principle that is identical to the soul is united to the body not as an agent cause of the body's motion, but as its form; to maintain the opposite would undermine the unity of human action, and the human person. The walking of a dog and the walking of a human being share a description. But when we provide that description, we have not yet provided an adequate description of what the human being does, so that we can try to find an adequate causal explanation of it. When we have provided an adequate description of human walking, which involves intellect and will, we no longer have a description that applies to dogs. And it is then that we can go about looking for an adequate explanation of a human being walking, which will no doubt involve material, efficient, and teleological environmental causes, as well as prior agency. But in providing the adequate description of the action, what we are doing is recognizing the form that human action takes, specifying its characteristics. In doing so, we recognize and specify the soul of a rational animal. "My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul," and "the human body is the best picture of the human soul."[72] The sphericity of the bronze is right there for all to see.

Kenny seems to understand this last Aristotelian point. He writes that there are certain "mentalistic concepts, such as *desire*, *belief*, *intention*, *motive*, and *reason*" that "cannot be understood apart from their function in explaining and rendering intelligible the behavior of human agents." These do not provide an "explanatory *theory*" in a "causal hypothetical form." Rather they are involved in the appropriate characterization of human behavior.[73] But Kenny is torn between what look like irreconcilable positions: namely, this Aristotelian insight and his methodological allegiance to the philosophy of mind since Descartes. Granting the Aristotelian insight about the "mentalistic concepts," why should we go on to grant that they "are the subject-matter" of something called the "philosophy of mind,"[74]

[72] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957), II.iv.178.

[73] Kenny, *The Metaphysics of Mind*, 6-7.

[74] Ibid., 5.

part of the "irreducible core" that will "always remain . . . amenable only to philosophy,"[75] after the empirical dissection of Aristotle's soul? If they cannot be understood apart from their function in explaining human behavior, how can they be understood apart from the capacities that Kenny associates with the psyche (which is not part of the subject matter of the philosophy of mind), unless specifically human behavior does not involve psyche? By contrast, for Aquinas reason is what it is precisely because human behavior involves the powers of sensation. Mentalistic concepts applied to human behavior cannot be understood apart from the behavior of human animals.

Why should we think that there is a special human capacity that is responsible for bringing all of these "mentalistic concepts" into play in human behavior? Kenny thinks that "Descartes in effect substituted privacy for rationality as the mark of the mental."[76] That's not really true. Perhaps Descartes added that to the mental. But when he reflected upon his clear and distinct idea of *res cogitans,* he did not mention privacy. He enumerated as the essential characteristics of mind that, "it is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels."[77] For all practical purposes, with the exceptions of sensation or feeling and imagination, that set is coextensive with the "mentalistic concepts" that Kenny has said is the "subject-matter of the philosophy of mind." Descartes enumerates the acts of the thinking-willing thing. With the minor modification of excluding sensation, Kenny echoes him when he writes, "the mind, as the capacity for intellectual abilities, is a volitional as well as a cognitive capacity, [which] includes the will as well as the intellect."[78] And when Kenny insists that the non-empirical analysis of this mind is part of the "irreducible core amenable only to philosophy," isn't he simply claiming for philosophers the special nonempirical insight into the mind that Descartes had insisted upon, even if he does not want to call it introspective?

[75] Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind,* 5.

[76] Ibid., 17.

[77] Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy,* II.

[78] Kenny, *The Metaphysics of Mind,* 21.

The only reason for thinking that there is such a thing as the mind that Kenny describes is that since Descartes that is what the philosophy of mind has been about. Kenny's exclusion of sensation from the mind is a difference of detail from Descartes, not a difference of substance. "We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it."[79] Insofar as we have a term, 'mind', that functions like a referring term in our use, we assume that there must be some thing, the mind, that it refers to; it is "simply a truism." Kenny's assumption of the legitimacy of the philosophy of mind is an example of that mistake pointed out by Wittgenstein. Aquinas did not make that mistake. What Kenny misses is that Aquinas does not share the Cartesian obsession with consciousness and introspection, precisely because he does not share the Cartesian obsession with the mind.[80]

[79] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books: The Blue Book* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 1.

[80] An early draft of this paper was presented as an invited talk to the 7th Annual Summer Thomistic Institute under the title "Thomas Aquinas and His Sources: Philosophy of Mind or Philosophy of Psychology?" (University of Notre Dame, July 2000). That talk is to be printed in the proceedings of the Institute. I am grateful to the participants in the Thomistic Institute for the many helpful comments they made after my talk, which served to improve this paper greatly. In particular I am grateful to the director of the Institute, Ralph McInerny.

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AQUINAS ON HUMAN WELL-BEING AND THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE

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"ARE YOU SURE you really need that?" We are all familiar with this sort of question. In allocating resources in our personal and social lives, we often assign a key role to distinguishing what people need from what they do not need or perhaps merely desire. David Macarov, for example, claims that a basic function of social welfare programs is to distinguish needs from desires.[1] Discourse about needs ("needs discourse") also plays a key role in various psycho-social theories of development and well-being.[2] But needs discourse is not merely practical in nature; it raises a host of complex theoretical problems related to defining needs, distinguishing basic needs from other needs, determining the relation between culture and needs, and so forth.[3]

[1] David Macarov, *Social Welfare: Structure and Practice* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995), 17-18.

[2] Abraham Maslow's need-based theory of psychological development is perhaps the best example in this genre.

[3] Needless to say, there is an immense contemporary literature on all aspects of needs discourse. For a small sample of some recent work, one can consult Fernando I. Soriano, *Conducting Needs Assessments: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995); Janie Percy-Smith, ed., *Needs Assessments in Public Policy* (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1996); Philippe van Parijs, *Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform* (London: Verso, 1992); D. P. Ghai, et. al., *The Basic-Needs Approach to Development: Some Issues Regarding Concepts and Methodology* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1977); Paul Streeten, *First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing Countries* (New York: Published for the World Bank [by] Oxford University Press, 1981); Edmond Preteceille and Jean-Pierre Terrail, *Capitalism, Consumption, and Needs*, trans. Sarah Matthews (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985); Conrad Lodziak, *Manipulating Needs: Capitalism and Culture* (Boulder, Co: Pluto Press, 1995); Katrin Lederer

Yet, however pervasive is the role of needs discourse in contemporary life, that role pales in face of the foundational role Aquinas assigns to it in his conception of human life, both individual and social. One of the fundamental properties of happiness is self-sufficiency, namely, that it is in itself (*per se*) sufficient as a final end of human life. Commenting on Aristotle's claim that happiness is a self-sufficient good because it needs nothing exterior (*nullo exterior indigentem*),[4] Aquinas observes that the happiness of this life "has self-sufficiency, since, namely, it contains in itself everything that is necessary for a human."[5] At the same time, the self-sufficiency of happiness entails that humans are naturally social, since "one person does not suffice for things necessary for life if he lives alone."[6] Further, the major communities in everyday human life are defined and distinguished from one another in terms of the sorts of needs they satisfy and the corresponding degree of self-sufficiency they attain.

The household (*domus*) provides those things which are necessary for daily life. The household is the locus of the most elemental human associations between man and woman, master and slave, and father and son, each of which Aquinas, following Aristotle, claims to be necessary for the generation and the preservation of life.[7] The *vicus*, which Aquinas defines in terms of the street of a medieval town in which a particular art or craft was practiced, provides the necessities required for the practice of the craft and, thus, for the satisfaction of those needs which the single family cannot provide.[8] The city, to which both the household

and Johan Galtung, eds., *Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980); William Leiss, *The Limits to Satisfaction* (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988); and John D. Jones, *Poverty and the Human Condition* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990): 159-78.

[4] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.5.1097b15.

[5] "habet per se sufficientiam, quia scilicet in se continet omne illud quod est homini necessarium" (I *Ethic.*, lect. 9). Latin texts are drawn from the editions contained in the *Index Thomisticus.*

[6] "quia sibi non sufficit ad necessaria vitae si solitarius maneat" (I *De Regim. Princ.*, c. 2).

[7] I *Polit.*, lect. 1; Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2.1252a25-1252b14. See *STh* I-II, q. 105, a. 4, for Aquinas's repetition of this view and a somewhat different take on the necessity for having slaves in the household.

[8] Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2.1252b15-1252b27, identifies this community as the village which is composed of many households and which serves to meet necessities of life which are not met on a daily basis. See *On Kingship, to the King of Cyprus*, trans. Gerald B. Phelan with

and the *vicus* are ordered, is the perfect community and the most self-sufficient, precisely because it supplies "all the things necessary to [human] life" (*omnia necessaria vitae*).[9]

Moreover, Aquinas strikingly observes that every human *communicatio* or association is ordered to something necessary for life.[10] So, too, he argues that our use of wealth (*divitiae*) should be determined by or ordered to what is necessary.[11] He makes the following blunt claim about the proper use of wealth:

> Since the use of wealth is ordered to providing the necessities of life and making such provision ought be ordinate, it is evident that the person who does not use wealth in order to provide for necessities of the present life uses wealth inordinately and recedes from virtue.[12]

These considerations amply illustrate the foundational role that Aquinas assigns to *necessaria vitae* ("things necessary for life") in understanding individual and social life, associations, and

intro. and notes by I. Th. Eschmann (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982), 9 n. 22.

[9] I *Polit.*, lect. 1. Aquinas repeats this view with his own distinctive addition in two other texts. In I *De Regim. Princ.*, c. 2, after having noted that the city is the "perfect community in regard to all the necessities of life" ("perfecta communitas, quantum ad omnia necessaria vitae"), he then goes on to add that there is greater sufficiency in "one province on account of the necessity of fighting together with mutual help against enemies" ("provincia una propter necessitatem compugnationis et mutui auxilii contra hostes"). See *On Kingship* 10 n. 23 for a discussion of the Roman and medieval background for the conception of the province. In *In Matt.* c. 12, lect. 2, Aquinas drops the reference to the *vicus* and refers to the household, city, and kingdom. Once again, the city is called the perfect community, but "in regard merely to things necessary" ("quantum ad mere necessaria"). The kingdom (*regnum*) is the consummate community (*communitas consummationis*) and is composed of many cities to deal with the fear of enemies (*timor hostium*) without which one city could not of itself subsist. Since the province/kingdom is able to marshal the means to fight against an enemy which the city cannot, it is not clear why Aquinas thinks that the city provides all things necessary to life or what he means by "all things necessary to life," since fighting against an enemy is regarded as something necessary. Also, see *In Psalmos* 45, n. 3 where Aquinas contrasts the city with the church (*ecclesia*), in which is found "whatever is necessary for the spiritual life" ("quicquid necessarium est ad vitam spiritualem").

[10] VIII *Ethic.*, lect. 9; I *Polit.*, lect. 1.

[11] *STh* I-II, q. 2, a. 1; II-II, q. 118, a. 1.

[12] "cum autem usus divitiarum sit ordinatus ad subveniendum necessitatibus praesentis vitae, quae quidem subventio debet esse ordinata; patet quod qui divitiis non utitur ad subveniendum praesentis vitae necessitatibus, vel inordinate utitur, a virtute recedit" (IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 4). So, at *STh* II-II, q. 77, a. 4, Aquinas explicitly condemns the mercantile exchange of money for money as greedy and as unlimited, that is, as not ordered to necessity.

economic exchange. Nevertheless, there is no discussion in the secondary literature that provides an exegetical or conceptual analysis of Aquinas's conception of the necessities of life or the more basic concept of necessity from an end. I will undertake such an analysis in this paper.

There are, to be sure, a host of normative, moral, and critical philosophical questions that must be asked regarding Aquinas's conception of the nature and role of "needs" in human life. It is also important to engage Aquinas with contemporary discussions of needs. But for these latter tasks to be apt and fruitful, it is important to set forth Aquinas's understanding of needs and to identify the many texts in which he discusses this matter. This is especially important because Aquinas does not provide an extended treatment of needs in any one work. His remarks are scattered throughout a number of writings. Moreover, some of the most interesting and important texts about necessities of life and necessity from an end are found in texts concerning the sacraments and the spiritual life. These texts rarely seem to be the subject of scholarly analysis.

In the first section, I will set forth Aquinas's basic understanding of necessity in relation to an end, especially as this concept applies to human ends. In the second section, I will consider the general question of the universality and particularity of what is necessary for an end. In the third section, I will take up the problem of whether Aquinas provides criteria for comparing and prioritizing needs. This problem is at the heart of contemporary discussions of "basic needs." Finally, the essentially social character of human life means that human needs, at least those that bear on the natural life of humans, are inevitably contextualized, in part at least, by the diverse, determinate, and conventional social worlds in which people live. I will briefly explore this matter in the fourth section.

I. Necessity from an End

In this paper, I am concerned with one sort of necessity: necessity in relation to an end (*necessitas ad finem*) or what

Aquinas at times calls conditional or suppositional necessity (*necessitas ex conditione* or *necessitas ex suppositione*).[13] Aquinas defines necessity in relation to an end and distinguishes it from other senses of necessity as follows:

Necessity is said in many ways. The necessary is what cannot not be. This necessity belongs to something in one way because of an intrinsic principle, whether material—as when we say that everything composed from contraries is corruptible—or formal—as when we say that it is necessary for a triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles. This is a natural and absolute necessity. In the other sense, it belongs to something that it cannot not be because of something extrinsic, whether an end or an agent. The necessity is because of the end when someone cannot attain some end or attain it well without this thing, as food is said to be necessary to life and a horse to a journey. This is called the necessity because of [or from] an end which is also called utility. Necessity because of an agent belongs to something when it is forced by some agent so that it cannot act in a contrary manner, and this is called the necessity of compulsion.[14]

[13] Aquinas generally uses the phrases *necessarium finis*, *necessarium ad finem*, and *necessitas finis* to express necessity in relation to an end. While he sometimes uses the phrase *necessitas ex suppositione* as a variation of one of these phrases, the former are not equivalent to the latter. See III *Sent.*, d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3, where Aquinas claims that God creates the world from a *necessitas ex suppositione* (namely, that he willed the creation of the world) which is not *necessarium ad finem*. See I *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, where Aquinas distinguishes *ex conditione finis* from *ex conditione agentis*.

[14] "Necessitas dicitur multipliciter. Necesse est enim quod non potest non esse. Quod quidem convenit alicui, uno modo ex principio intrinseco, sive materiali, sicut cum dicimus quod omne compositum ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi; sive formali, sicut cum dicimus quod necesse est triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Et haec est necessitas naturalis et absoluta. Alio modo convenit alicui quod non possit non esse, ex aliquo extrinseco, vel fine vel agente. Fine quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest sine hoc consequi, aut bene consequi finem aliquem, ut cibus dicitur necessarius ad vitam, et equus ad iter. Et haec vocatur necessitas finis; quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur. Ex agente autem hoc alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere. Et haec vocatur necessitas coactionis" (*STh* I, q. 82, a. 1). Aquinas is responding to the question of whether the will desires anything of necessity. The necessity of coercion (*necessitas coactionis*) appears to be a type of necessity arising from an efficient cause. This sort of necessity is violent (*violentum*), that is, against the natural inclination of the thing acted upon. Efficient causes also produce necessary effects that follow the natural "inclinations" of things. (See *ScG* II, c. 30 for the distinction between these two types of efficient causality.) However, there is one text where Aquinas seems to identify necessity *ex agente efficiente* with necessity *ex coactione* (IV *Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2). For other texts that specify the various senses in which things are necessary, see I *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1; II *Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 1; III *Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2; III *Sent.*, d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3; IV *Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2; IV *Sent.*, d. 38, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 1; *ScG* II, c. 3; *STh* I, q. 19, a. 3; I, q. 41, a. 2, ad 5; III, q. 46, a. 1;

To begin, let me take note of Aquinas's vocabulary in discussing necessity from an end, where the end is human life.[15]

(A) *Necessarium vitae [humanae]* ("what is necessary for [human] life"). One often finds the plural construction *necessaria vitae [humanae]* ("things necessary for [human] life").[16]

(B) *Necessarium ad vitam* or, in the plural, *necessaria ad vitam* ("what is necessary to/in relation to life" or "things necessary to/in relation to life").[17]

De Verit., q. 17, a. 3; II *Phys.*, lect. 15; V *Metaphys.*, lect. 6; and XII *Metaphys.*, lect. 7.

[15] The following text illustrates the apparent equivalency of naming necessity in relation to an end either by using *necessitas* or *necessarium*. "Ad secundum dicendum quod necessitas humanae vitae potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum quod dicitur necessarium id sine quo res nullo modo potest esse, sicut cibus est necessarius animali; alio modo, secundum quod necessarium dicitur id sine quo res non potest convenienter esse" (*STh* II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2). To say that someone needs something, Aquinas typically uses the verb *indigere*. See below for a discussion of the two meanings Aquinas gives *indigere* in relation to necessity from an end. Given, as we will see, that a person can say that he or she needs (*indiget*) whatever is a necessary to attain some end, we could regard something that is necessary for a person to pursue some send (*necessarium ad aliquem finem*) as something needed or a need (*indigentia*). Semantically, our notion of human needs is captured by the Latin phrase *indigentiae hominis* (see *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 7, obj. 2; V *Ethic.*, lect. 9). In this paper, I will use the phrases "a need" or "needs" as a shorthand version of the more complex phrase "something necessary for an end."

[16] See III *Sent.*, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1; IV *Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2; d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 4; d. 15, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 3; *ScG* II, c. 31; III, cc. 130, 156; IV, c. 58; *STh* I, q. 19, a. 3; I, q. 94, a. 3; I-II, q. 50, a. 5, ad 1; I-II, q. 108, a. 4; II-II, q. 2, a. 4; II-II, q. 77, a. 4; II-II, q. 83, a. 15, ad 2; II-II, q. 89, a. 5, ad 2; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2; II-II, q. 147, a. 4, ad 3; II-II, q. 186, a. 7, ad 3; III, q. 1, a. 2; III, q. 65, a. 4; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 10, obj. 12; q. 14, a. 10; *De Pot.*, q. 5, a. 6, ad 3; *De Virt. in Comm.*, q. 1, a. 10, obj. 2; q. 1, a. 10; q. 1, a. 12, ad 19; *De Ratio. Fidei* 7; I *De Regim. Princ.*, c. 1; I *Ethic.*, lect. 2; VIII *Ethic.*, lect. 1; I *Polit.*, lect. 1, 7; V *Metaphys.*, lect. 6; *In Psalmos* 45; *Reportationes ineditae leoninae* n. 2 (*In Matt.* 6.11).

[17] See III *Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 6; d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2; IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1; d. 15, q. 3, a. 3, sol. 1; d. 15, q. 4, a. 4, sol. 2; d. 16, q. 4, a. 2, sol. 2; d. 49, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1; d. 49, q. 5, a. 2, sol. 2, obj. 4; *ScG* III, cc. 37, 85, 32, 34, 54; *STh* I, q. 78, a. 1; I, q. 82, a. 1; I-II, q. 57, a. 5; I-II, q. 57, a. 5, sc; I-II, q. 66, a. 3, obj. 1 and ad 1; I-II, q. 102, a. 3, ad 8; II-II, q. 77, a. 4; II-II, q. 118, a. 1; II-II, q. 129, a. 2; II-II, q. 141, a. 5, obj 1; II-II, q. 142, a. 1; II-II, q. 147, a. 4, ad 3; *De Verit.*, q. 12, a. 3, obj. 11; q. 14, a. 10, obj. 12; *Quodl.* 7, q. 7, a. 1; *Contra impug. Dei*, c. 6, obj. 20; I *Ethic.*, lect. 2; IV *Ethic.*, lect. 10, 16; VII *Ethic.*, 4; VIII *Ethic.*, lect. 12; X *Ethic.*, lect. 13; I *Polit.*, lect. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9; X *Metaphys.*, lect. 6; XII *Metaphys.*, lect. 7; *In Job* cc. 7, 12; *Cat. aurea in Matt.*, c. 6, n. 21; c. 8, n. 2; *In orationem dominicam* 7; *In Psalmos* 45; *In Matt.* c. 6, lect. 3; c. 12, lect. 2; c. 13, lect. 3; c. 13, lect. 4; *In Cor. I*, c. 11, lect. 5; *In Cor. II*, c. 6, lect. 1; c. 11, lect. 6; *In Tim. I*, c. 2, lect. 1; c. 6, lect. 1.

(C) *Necessitas vitae* ("necessity of life") and *necessitates vitae* ("necessities of life").[18]

(D) As far as I can determine, Aquinas uses the expression *necessitas ad vitam* ("necessity in relation to life") only once, and he does not use the plural form *necessitates ad vitam* ("things necessary to life").[19]

Oddly, the phrases *necessaria vitae* and *necessitates vitae* do not appear to have the same denotation. The plural form *necessitates vitae* seems always to refer to material things necessary for ends pursued in this life.[20] However, the plural form *necessaria vitae* includes not only material things, but also moral virtues,[21] prudence,[22] prayer,[23] love,[24] revealed teaching,[25] friends,[26] the sacraments,[27] recreation,[28] etc.

It also should be noted that, while Aquinas often uses the phrase *vita humana* in a generic or unqualified manner, he

[18] See IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 4 and ad 4; d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 1, obj. 4; d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 4; *ScG* III, cc. 122, 129; *STh* I-II, q. 30, a. 4; I-II, q. 105, a. 4; II-II, q. 2, a. 4; II-II, q. 24, a. 8; II-II, q. 32, a. 2, obj. 2; II-II, q. 55, a. 7, ad 2; II-II, q. 77, a. 4 and ad 3; II-II, q. 83, a. 9, ad 1; II-II, q. 83, a. 15, ad 2; II-II, q. 141, a. 6; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, obj. 1 and ad 1; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2, 3; II-II, q. 179, a. 2, ad 3; II-II, q. 182, a. 1 and ad 3; III, q. 11, a. 2, ad 3; *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 1; q. 11, a. 3, obj. 7 and ad 7; q. 13, a. 1, ad 6; *De Virt. in Comm.*, q. 1, a. 12, ad 19; q. 2, a. 10; *Quodl.* 2, q. 6, a. 2; 6, q. 7, a. un., obj. 1; *Contra doctrinam retrahentium* 15; II *De caelo et mundo*, c. 6; I *Polit.*, lect. 6, 7, 9; II *Polit.*, lect. 6; I *Metaphys.*, lect. 1, 2, 3; *In Hieremiam* c. 17, lect. 1; *Cat. aurea in Matt.*, c. 7, n. 4; c. 18, n. 4; *Cat. aurea in Marc.*, c. 6, n. 2; *In Rom.*, c. 8, lect. 4; *In Cor. I*, c. 3, lect. 2; c. 6, lect. 2; *In Psalmos* 30; *Reportationes ineditae Leoninae* n. 2 (*In Matt.* 6.9); *In Cor. I*, c. 11, lect. 5; *In Tim. I*, c. 6, lect. 1.

[19] II *Sent.*, d. 19, q. 1, a. 5, sc 2.

[20] See IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 4; d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 1, obj. 4 and ad 5; *STh* II-II, q. 2, a. 4; II-II, q. 32, a. 2, obj. 2; II-II, q. 32, a. 5; II-II, q. 83, a. 15, ad 2; II-II, q. 188, a. 2; *De Virt. in Comm.*, q. 2, a. 10; *Comp. theol.* I, c. 2; I *Metaphys.*, lect. 1, 3; *Cat. aurea in Matt.*, c. 7, n. 4; *In Cor. II*, c. 6, lect. 1. Apart from following some conventional usage current in the thirteenth century, it is not clear to me why Aquinas uses *necessitates vitae* with a more restricted denotation than *necessaria vitae*.

[21] *STh* I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 1.

[22] *STh* I-II, q. 57, a. 5 (the entire article is devoted to the question of whether prudence is necessary for human life).

[23] IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 1; *STh* II-II, q. 83, a. 13.

[24] IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 1.

[25] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 1.

[26] *STh* II-II, q 74, a. 2; VIII *Ethic.*, lect. 1; IX *Ethic.*, lect. 13.

[27] See texts T2 and T4 below.

[28] IV *Ethic.*, lect. 16.

frequently refers to different "sorts" of human life. One finds, for example, references to what is needed for the spiritual life,[29] the bodily life,[30] the natural life,[31] the domestic life,[32] the pleasurable life, the civic life, the contemplative life,[33] the active life,[34] the religious life,[35] the Christian life,[36] etc.

Finally, it is particularly important to note a "twofold necessity" in any statement expressing necessity from an end. Ends as such exist only as the ends of some entity. This means that if X is necessary for end Y, it is necessary with respect to the end in relation to the entity pursuing the end. In other words, the formula X is necessary for Y is an elliptical way of saying that X is necessary for A to attain Y at all or very well.[37]

Thomas defines and/or characterizes "what is necessary on the condition of an end" in a number of texts.[38] I shall focus my discussion on four of them.

T1: "What is necessary on the condition of an end is that without which someone cannot attain some end or attain it very easily. Moreover, this end is twofold: either in regard to being (*esse*)—and in this sense food or nutrition are said to be necessary, since without them a person cannot exist (*esse*)—or as

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[29] *Vita spiritualia*: see, e.g., T2 below.

[30] *Vita corporalis*: see, e.g., *ScG* IV, c. 58; *STh* II-II, q. 83, a. 6; *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 1, ad 1.

[31] *Vita naturalis*: see, e.g., II *Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3; IV *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 3; *STh* I-II, q. 112, a. 4, ad 3.

[32] *Vita domestica*: see, e.g., IV *Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1; *In Cor. II*, c. 11, lect. 6 (where sleep, food, and clothing are deemed necessary for domestic life).

[33] Respectively *vita voluptuousa*, *vita civilis*, *vita contemplativa*. See, e.g., I *Ethic.*, lect. 5.

[34] *Vita activa*: see, e.g., III *Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 6; *STh* II-II, q. 152, a. 2; *De Virt. in Comm.*, q. 1, a. 12, ad 24.

[35] *Vita religiosa*: see, e.g., *STh* II-II, qq. 188 and 189.

[36] *Vita christiana*: *STh* III, q. 62, a. 2.

[37] A fine example of the complete expression is found at III *Sent.*, d 20, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3: "necessarium est homini habere navem, si debet ire ultra mare" ("It is necessary for a person to have a ship if he must travel across the sea"). We will see the importance of this matter later.

[38] In addition to T1 - T4 below and the texts cited above in note 14, cf. IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 1; d. 15, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 3; d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 4; d. 49, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1; *STh* I-II, q. 10, a. 2, ad 3; II-II, q. 32, a. 6; II-II, q. 58, a. 3, ad 2; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 1; *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 10, obj. 1; *Quodl.* 4, q. 12, a. 2, ad 3; *In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 3, a. 1, sc 3.

pertaining to well-being (*bene esse*). In this manner, a ship is said to be necessary to sail over the sea, since without it a person cannot carry out his action."[39]

T2: "The necessity from the supposition of an end is twofold. In one sense, what is necessary is that without which something cannot be conserved in being, as nutrition is [necessary] for an animal. In another sense, something is necessary as that without which what pertains to well-being cannot be attained, as a horse is said to be necessary to move about at will and medicine to this: that a person live healthfully. . . . Some [sacraments], such as baptism and penance, are necessary in the first sense, namely, those without which a person cannot live in the spiritual life. Some however are [necessary] as that without which cannot be attained some effect which pertains to the well-being of the spiritual life. Confirmation and all the other sacraments are necessary in this sense."[40]

T3: "In wanting (desiring) the end, we do not of necessity desire those things which exist in relation to the end unless they are such that without them the end cannot exist. So, desiring the conservation of life, we desire food. Desiring travel, we desire a ship. However, we do not in this way desire out of necessity those things without which the end can exist such as a horse for traveling, since we can travel without it."[41]

T4: "Something is said to be necessary in respect of an end in two senses. In one sense, as that without which an end cannot exist, as food is necessary for human life. And this is unqualifiedly necessary for the end. In the other sense, that without which the end cannot be attained fittingly is called something necessary as, for example, is a horse for a journey. But this is not unqualifiedly necessary

[39] "Necessarium ex conditione finis est illud sine quo non potest consequi aliquem finem*, vel non ita faciliter. Finis autem est duplex: vel ad esse, et hoc modo cibus vel nutrimentum dicuntur esse necessaria, quia sine eis non potest esse homo; vel pertinens ad bene esse, et sic dicitur esse navis necessaria eunti ultra mare; quia sine ea exercere non potest actionem suam" (I *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1). (* – Reading *aliquem finem* for *aliquis finis.*) See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.6.1051a20-26 for a very similar distinction between the two senses in which something is necessary for an end. Indeed, Aquinas acknowledges in this response that he is presenting Aristotle's definition from *Metaphysics* 5.6.

[40] "necessitas ex suppositione finis; et est duplex. Quia uno modo dicitur necessarium sine quo aliquis non potest conservari in esse, sicut nutrimentum animali. Alio modo sine quo non potest haberi quod pertinet ad bene esse, sicut equus dicitur necessarius ambulare volenti, et medicina ad hoc quod homo sane vivat . . . quaedam [sacramenta sunt necessaria] quidem quantum ad primum modum, illa scilicet sine quibus non potest homo in spirituali vita vivere, sicut est baptismus et poenitentia; quaedam autem sine quibus non potest consequi aliquem effectum qui est ad bene esse spiritualis vitae; et hoc modo confirmatio et omnia alia sunt necessaria" (IV *Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2).

[41] "ea autem quae sunt ad finem non ex necessitate volumus volentes finem, nisi sint talia, sine quibus finis esse non potest, sicut volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem, volentes transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus finis esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum, quia sine hoc possumus ire" (*STh* I, q. 19, a. 3).

for an end. Three of the sacraments are necessary in the first sense. Two are necessary for the individual person: baptism unqualifiedly and absolutely as well as penance on the supposition of mortal sin after baptism. However, the sacrament of orders is a necessity of the church, since where there is no ruler the people are corrupted (Prov. 11:14). The other sacraments are necessary in the other sense: for confirmation perfects baptism in a certain manner, extreme unction perfects penance, while matrimony conserves through propagation the multitude of the church."[42]

Consider T1. Something can be necessary for an end in two senses: either as that without which the end cannot exist—I will call this "necessity$_A$"—or as that without which the end cannot be attained easily or fittingly (*convenienter*)—I will call this "necessity$_B$."[43] T1 and T2 define necessity from an end with respect to any particular end (*aliquis finis*). However, in T1, the single end with respect to which things are said to be necessary for humans is specified either as existence (*esse*) or as well-being (*bene esse*).[44] The only things necessary$_A$ for human life, then, are those things without which people cannot live or exist. Anything else that is necessary for people is necessary$_B$ for human well-being. Notice that, according to T1, the ship is given as necessary$_B$ for a person to take the voyage.[45] Hence according to TI, the ship

[42] "Necessarium respectu finis . . . dicitur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, sine quo non potest esse finis, sicut cibus est necessarius vitae humanae. Et hoc est simpliciter necessarium ad finem. Alio modo dicitur esse necessarium id sine quo non habetur finis ita convenienter, sicut equus necessarius est ad iter. Hoc autem non est simpliciter necessarium ad finem. Primo igitur modo necessitatis sunt tria sacramenta necessaria. Duo quidem personae singulari, baptismus quidem simpliciter et absolute; poenitentia autem, supposito peccato mortali post baptismum. Sacramentum autem ordinis est necessarium ecclesiae, quia, ubi non est gubernator, populus corruet, ut dicitur proverb. xi. Sed secundo modo sunt necessaria alia sacramenta. Nam confirmatio perficit baptismum quodammodo; extrema unctio poenitentiam; matrimonium vero ecclesiae multitudinem per propagationem conservat" (*STh* III, q. 65, a. 4).

[43] I will generally use necessity$_{A/B}$ as a shortened way of referring to necessity$_A$ and/or necessity$_B$.

[44] Aquinas writes that the end is "twofold" (*duplex*). I think it makes more sense to say that there is a single end—human existence or life—considered in regard to its simple existence or in regard to its perfection rather than to say that there are two ends.

[45] Aquinas offers the example of a ship as a means necessary to achieve an end in four other places: III *Sent.*, d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3; *ScG* III, c. 138; *STh* I, q. 19, a. 3; and V *Metaphys.*, lect. 6. In the last text, the ship is said to be necessary for the voyage in the sense of necessity$_B$. Following Aristotle, the focus is on the necessity of the ship for someone to obtain a particular good, namely, the money (which is the end of making the voyage), rather

is necessary for the person to make an ocean voyage in exactly the same sense that, in other texts, a horse is said to be necessary for the person to take a journey.[46]

Thomas repeats this basic schema in T2 except that "life" is analogically extended to refer to "spiritual life"; otherwise baptism could not be regarded as necessary for life in the first sense (necessity$_A$), since people surely do not cease to exist if they have not been baptized.[47] T2, then, invokes a distinction between the life of the body and the life of the soul.[48] Rather than take human life or existence in a simple or unqualified sense, as in T1, T2 distinguishes between two "sorts" of human life. Presumably, once we allow that things necessary for human life can be specified according to two different ends (viz., the natural life and the spiritual life), there is presumably no reason why we could not also posit as ends other sorts or "domains" of human life: the moral life, the contemplative life, the domestic life, the civic life, etc.

Note, however, that even with this more extensive specification of ends (various categories of human life), we still cannot clearly discriminate between the ways in which things are needed for many proximate ends that we pursue, for example, the difference between the manner in which a ship might be necessary for a voyage and a horse might be necessary for a journey. Yet, Aquinas implies exactly this sort of discrimination in T3: relative to making an ocean voyage, the ship is necessary$_A$,while relative

than on the necessity of the ship for someone simply to make the voyage. The text from the *Summa Theologiae* (T3 above) uses the ship/voyage example to illustrate necessity$_A$. The first two texts employ the ship/voyage example to illustrate necessity of an end without specifying what sort of necessity is involved.

[46] For the use of the horse example, see II *Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 1; IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1; d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2; *STh* I, q. 82, a. 1; III, q. 1, a. 2; III, q. 65, a. 4; *Quodl.* 4, q. 12, a. 2, ad 3; XII *Metaphys.*, lect. 7.

[47] Spiritual life, or the life of the soul, happens when the will is united by a right intention to God and moved by an intrinsic principle (namely, charity) to love of God and neighbor. The damned do not cease to exist even though they are spiritually dead (see *ScG* III, c. 139). See *ScG* IV, c. 58 for a detailed comparison between the spiritual life and the corporeal life or natural life.

[48] While Aquinas frequently contrasts the spiritual life with the bodily life, the distinction is better expressed as that between the spiritual life and the natural life, which includes the life of the body as well as the life of natural reason, e.g., the moral life (*vita moralia*).

to a journey on land, the horse is necessary$_B$. Implicitly, T3 extends the distinction between necessity$_A$ and necessity$_B$ to any end that we pursue, not just the end of living (*vivere*) or living well (*bene vivere*), or some sort of life such as the spiritual life. T4 allows for this distinction in regard to human ends in a clearer and more formal manner than T1 and T2. That is, even though in T4 Aquinas cites food as necessary for life to illustrate necessity$_A$, he could also have used the example of the ship as necessary$_A$ for an ocean voyage, since the end for humans is simply referred to as an end, and not human life (existence), or some specific type of life.

This extension is crucial if we are to sort out the ways in which things are needed for ends that are embedded in chains of subordinate and superordinate ends. Consider the example in which someone must sail to some city in order to obtain money.[49] Even if we grant that the ship is necessary$_A$ to make the voyage and to get the money, it can still be asked whether someone needs the money. For example, (1) Smith might need the money to buy food in time of famine, or (2) Johnson might need the money to finance a wedding in keeping with the demands of his social station, or (3) Jones, who is a merchant, might need the money to buy expensive clothing typically worn by the aristocracy. Conversely, (4) Brown might need the money to embellish her family's diet with foods that are sought for their pleasure but that, while not harmful, are certainly not necessary$_{A/B}$ for maintaining life or health.

If we assume that one has no access to food unless one has the money to buy it, then in case (1) obtaining money to buy food is necessary$_A$ for one's survival according to both T1 and T4.

Aquinas would probably grant that financing a wedding according to one's social state, in case (2), is a legitimate necessity.[50] Using T1, the ship and the money can only be re-

[49] V *Metaphys.*, lect. 6. The example is Aristotle's (see *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015a25).

[50] The reasons are (a) that we are to ask for, and be content with, material things according to our social state and the customs of the society in which we live (*In orationem Dominicam* 4) and (b) that Aquinas places limits on the alms one should give to retain one's social status by arguing that "no one should remain 'indecently' in some state" ("quia nullus debet indecenter in aliquo statu manere" [IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 1]). On this point see also

garded as necessary$_B$ for Johnson. Using **T4**, the ship is necessary$_A$ for Johnson to get the money, the money is necessary$_A$ for Johnson to finance the wedding, while the wedding itself might be necessary$_A$ or necessary$_B$ to maintain Johnson's social state according to the customs of the society in which Johnson lives, and maintaining social status is necessary$_B$ with regard to one's well-being.

For Aquinas, it is wrong to acquire clothing (and especially lavish clothing) that is not in keeping with one's social state as in case (3).[51] Not only is such acquisition not necessary for people's well-being, it is necessary that one avoid such acquisition. So according to **T1**, the ship and the money are not necessary for Jones in any sense. According to formula **T4**, the ship is necessary$_A$ for getting the money and the money is necessary$_A$ for buying the clothes, although neither the ship nor the money is necessary$_{A/B}$ for Jones's well-being. Of course, as Aristotle points out in *Metaphysics* 5.6, things may be necessary not only to achieve some good but also to avoid some harm. So, for example, if one thought that acquiring inordinate clothing was a mortal sin, then, on both **T1** and **T4**, it would be necessary$_A$ to avoid such an action to preserve one's spiritual life.

Case (4) is rather more difficult. As I noted at the beginning of the paper, Aquinas argues that material goods are licitly used only so far as they are ordered to some necessity of life. Yet, he also acknowledges that the temperate person can licitly consume foods that are pleasurable so long as they are not harmful to health even if they are not necessary to health in terms of either necessity$_{A/B}$.[52] According to **T1**, neither the ship nor the money would be necessary$_A$ or necessary$_B$ to Brown. According to **T4**, while neither the money nor the ship is necessary$_{A/B}$ regarding Brown's existence or well-being, the ship is still necessary$_A$ to obtain the money, and the money is necessary$_A$ to acquire the food (assuming that there is no other way to acquire the food).

STh II-II, q. 32, a. 6. In both these texts Aquinas distinguishes between what is necessary$_A$ as that without which one cannot live and what is necessary$_B$ as that without which one cannot maintain one's social state.

[51] *In orationem Dominicam* 4.

[52] *STh* II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2.

To sum up: T1 does not clearly provide a criterion for determining whether something is necessary$_{A/B}$ for a partial end which may be ordered to our existence or our well-being. T4 provides a more nuanced formula for assessing what is needed for any end, independently of the relation of a particular end to further ends or the final end of preserving and perfecting our existence. This more nuanced formula is important, since, as we have seen, something may be necessary in some sense for a specific end, which end may be necessary in the same or different sense with regard to a further end. The further end, though, may or may not be necessary for preserving or protecting our existence; indeed, it may be harmful to either pursuit. Consider a priest who consecrates the host in order to administer poison.[53] Putting poison in the bread is causally indifferent to performing the sacrament, yet necessary to carrying out an undetected murder of a rival, and clearly harmful to the priest if he is caught and found guilty of murder. Nevertheless, the fact that it is immoral to intend to murder someone in no way mitigates the necessity of using a poisoned host to accomplish the proximate end of an undetected murder.

Before we turn to a discussion of the universality and particularity of needs, I want to spend a moment discussing necessity$_B$. Note that the difference between necessity$_A$ and necessity$_B$ does not consist in a mitigated sense of necessity. In T1, T2, and T4 both sorts of necessity are expressed in terms of an indispensability (*sine qua non*) criterion. Yet it must be admitted that Aquinas does not always understand the indispensability criterion of necessity$_B$ in a strict sense. On the one hand, the virtues are necessary$_B$ and strictly indispensable for a person to live well, since happiness consists in activity according to virtue.[54] On the other hand, the things that are necessary to live according to one's social state are not "indivisible" in nature, since many external goods can be added or subtracted from what people have while

[53] *STh* III, q. 74, a. 2, ad 2. Aquinas cites the example for a somewhat different purpose and without the detail I am giving. Aquinas notes that the mere intention to poison someone counts as a sin. Of course, positive law might distinguish between attempted murder and actual murder.

[54] *STh* I, q. 88, a. 1.

they are still able to live according to their social condition or state in a fitting manner.[55]

Aquinas specifies the formal difference between the senses of necessity$_A$ and necessity$_B$ with reference to the condition in which the end exists: whether it exists at all or whether it exists well or fittingly (*convenienter*). But how are we to understand this notion of "fittingness"? The word *convenire* (and its related forms) appears more than eight thousand times in Aquinas's writings, and it takes on various meanings in different contexts. For example, something is said *convenienter* of another thing when it follows from the nature of the thing (e.g., as laughter follows from human nature).[56] In other contexts (typically in regard to a moral good), the *conveniens* is distinguished from what is harmful.[57] But our focus here is *conveniens* in relation to what is necessary for attaining an end. Aquinas's typical example of the necessity of the horse for the journey seems to view the *conveniens* in terms of sheer facility or convenience: it is easier to get around on a horse than by foot.[58] On the other hand, confirmation does not just make salvation easier, but rather it perfects baptism in a certain way ("confirmatio perficit baptismum quodammodo").[59] At times however, something is fitting to an end because of the customs of a particular group. For example, Aquinas argued that it was fitting and required for priests in the Greek and Latin churches to celebrate the Eucharist with leavened or unleavened bread according to the respective customs of their church.[60] In another sense, something is fitting with respect to the "dignity" of a particular office or state: rulers and popes may wear certain luxurious apparel in keeping with the demands of their office and

[55] IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 1; *STh* III, q. 32, a. 6. Of course, one could say that external material goods are strictly indispensable for one's well-being or social state even though this or that particular good may not be indispensable and necessary$_B$ for one's well-being or social state.

[56] I *Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; and *STh* II-II, q. 32, a. 6.

[57] Cf. II *Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 1; and *STh* I-II, q. 81, a. 2.

[58] XII *Metaphys.*, lect. 7.

[59] *STh* III, q. 65, a. 4. Cf. IV *Sent.*, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2; *ScG* IV, c. 58; *STh* III, q. 72, a. 2, ad 2.

[60] *STh* III, q. 74, a. 4. See below for further discussion of this text.

the respect it is supposed to be given.[61] So, in this sense, a certain dignitary might require a horse for a journey, not because the horse makes the journey easier but because the office requires it.

II. Universality and Particularity of What Is Necessary for an End

A core issue in contemporary analysis of human needs is whether needs are universal for all people or whether they can be particularized according to culture, history, or other factors. While Aquinas thinks that some things such as food and friendship are needed universally by people relative to the ends of preserving and perfecting their existence, he also allows that the necessity of something for an end can be conditioned by various circumstantial factors. So, he recognizes that people need things to live according to the customs of their society and according to their social state within a given society. One person may need certain things to fulfill certain social roles or demands that will be unnecessary and perhaps even harmful to others.[62]

Even things necessary$_A$ for the very existence of the end may be relative to historical conditions and circumstances. People caught in Pompeii could have escaped the eruption of Mount Vesuvius only if they had access to a ship. Indeed, even Aquinas's standard example of food needed to sustain life to illustrate necessity$_A$ is not without some specification a "universal need." As Aquinas notes:

> Although food is maximally necessary without qualification for the body, nevertheless this is not so for each food. For if someone abstains from one food, he can be sustained by another.[63]

[61] Cf. *Contra impug. Dei*, c. 8, ad 9.

[62] See *STh* II-II, q. 188, a. 7, where Aquinas defines the poverty lines for various types of religious orders in terms of the different material things the orders require to fulfill their apostolates. See John D. Jones, "Poverty and Subsistence," *Gregorianum* 75 (1994): 141-44, 147 for a discussion of this matter.

[63] "Quamvis esca sit simpliciter maxime necessaria corpori, non tamen quaelibet esca. Si enim aliquis ab una esca abstineat, potest alia sustentari" (*Contra impug. Dei*, c. 15, ad 9). Moreover, food is not just necessary$_A$ to sustain life. Aquinas is quite aware that food is necessary for people to achieve other ends. He offers an interesting discussion of this point in response to an objection that fasting is wrong, since it involves not only abstaining from

T4 touches on the matter of the universality/particularity of things needed for an end. Indeed, T4 contains an interesting anomaly, for it is the only text is which Aquinas defines something necessary for an end as necessary *simpliciter* (without qualification) for an end.[64] In every other text where he formally distinguishes necessity from an end from other sorts of necessity (e.g., necessity because of formal or material causes), he is careful to describe necessity from an end as necessity *ex conditione/suppositione finis* rather than as necessity from an end *absolute* or *simpliciter*.[65] Necessity from an end arises from an extrinsic relation between the means and the end, whereas formal or material necessity is due to an intrinsic relation between the things that are necessary. Typically, what is said *simpliciter* is contrasted with what is said *secundum quid* or relationally. While Thomas never describes necessity from an end as *necessarium/necessitas secundum quid*, that formulation seems implicit given the characterization of such necessity as *ex conditione/suppositione finis*. What is necessary because of intrinsic factors (either formal or material) is necessary universally: for example, all triangles have three angles. Necessity due to intrinsic factors is described as unqualified or absolute precisely for this reason. What is necessary for an end by supposition would always seem to be conditional or relational in character even if it is always required for the end,

superfluous food but also from necessary food and since to abstain from necessary food implies that one would kill oneself. Thomas notes that food is necessary for people in two basic senses. The first sense (necessity$_A$) is for survival. The second sense (necessity$_B$) is to maintain the condition or "health" (*valetudo*) of the body. Moreover, this condition can be taken in two senses: either (a) in respect to what is required for actions dictated "by one's office or the society among which one lives" ("ex officio vel ex societate eorum ad quos convivit") or (b) in respect to the "best condition of the body" ("optimam corporis dispositionem") (IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 3).

[64] See also IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 1, where Aquinas characterizes that without which a person cannot live or exist as "what is necessary without qualification as if according to an absolute necessity" ("necessarium simpliciter quasi necessitate absoluta"). See also the text from the *Contra impugnantes Dei* cited in the note above which describes food as "maximally necessary without qualification for the body." These two examples together with the text from *STh* III, q. 65, a. 4 show that over the course of his career Aquinas accepted a characterization of what is necessary$_A$ for human life as necessary *simpliciter* for an end even though this characterization never enters into the definition of necessity from an end until *STh* III, q. 65, a. 4.

[65] See the texts cited in note 14 above.

since the universality is not traced back to an intrinsic relation between X and Y.[66] Hence, it is odd that Aquinas would describe any sort of necessity from an end as unqualified or absolute.

It is even more striking that in T4 Aquinas gives two different senses in which something necessary for an end is necessary without qualification for the end. In the first sense, what is necessary$_A$ for the very existence of an end is said to be necessary without qualification (e.g., food is necessary without qualification for preserving life) while things necessary$_B$ for ends (such as a horse for a journey) are said not to be necessary without qualification. In the second sense, baptism is said to be necessary$_A$ absolutely and without qualification for salvation, whereas penance is necessary$_A$ for salvation, not absolutely or without qualification but only on the condition that someone commits mortal sin. Aquinas does not offer a parallel distinction regarding things that are necessary$_B$ for some end.

Notice that, in comparison with necessity$_B$, necessity$_A$ is not said to be unqualified because things necessary$_A$ are universally required for their ends (e.g., food for survival), while things necessary$_B$ are not universally required for their ends (e.g., a horse for a journey). Rather, Aquinas uses *simpliciter* to characterize something needed universally for an end when he describes the difference between the necessity$_A$ of baptism for salvation and the necessity$_A$ of penance for salvation. Everyone needs baptism to be saved; only those who commit mortal sin after baptism require penance. If so, then the contrast between the unqualified necessity$_A$ of food for life and the "qualified" necessity$_B$ of a horse for the journey cannot be traced to a difference in scope or universality per se.

In *STh* I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1, Aquinas draws a distinction between *ens simpliciter*—said of a being in light of its substantial being which causes it to be actual rather than potential—and *ens secundum quid*—said of something in regard to an actuality it receives over and above its mere substantial existence (e.g., that

[66] Although see *STh* III, q. 84, a. 6, where Aquinas distinguishes between what is directly or per se ordered to an end and what is necessary for an end only because of certain accidental factors. See below for discussion of this text.

something is white). Aquinas seems to be drawing a similar distinction in T4 when he calls something necessary$_A$ for an end necessary without qualification. Means necessary$_A$ for an end are necessary without qualification for the end because the end is being considered simply or without qualification: that is, merely in regard to its existence. Things necessary$_B$ for an end, then, are necessary *secundum quid,* or relatively, because the end is being considered in regard to some particular state over and above its mere existence, that is, a more perfect rather than a less perfect state.

To sum up, then, there are three senses in which the pair *simpliciter/secundum quid* can apply to necessity from an end.[67] First, in contrast to what is necessary *simpliciter* for something because of formal or material factors, nothing necessary for an end is necessary without qualification but only conditionally or suppositionally, and therefore, relationally (*secundum quid*).

Second, anything that is necessary$_A$ for an end is necessary *simpliciter* for the end, while anything necessary$_B$ for an end is necessary in relation to the more or less perfect existence of the end. In this sense, something is necessary$_A$ without qualification for an end regardless of whether it is universally required for the end (e.g., baptism) or required only under certain conditions (e.g., penance). Of course, one needs to be cautious in claiming that, in this second sense, something is necessary without qualification for an end. Food, for example, is necessary for the conservation of the body only on the condition that one refers to the body in its natural state (whether or not before the fall)[68] and not to the glorified or resurrected body (assuming that in some sense it is the same body as one's natural body).[69] So too, even baptism is necessary$_A$ for the spiritual life only given the existence of original sin.

Third, whatever is universally necessary$_A$ for an end is necessary *simpliciter* for the end, while what is necessary$_A$ for an end in certain contexts is necessary *secundum quid* for the end.

[67] Later (see note 84 below), I will specify a fourth sense in which this pair applies to necessity from an end.

[68] *STh* I, q. 97, a. 3.

[69] *ScG* IV, c. 83.

Although Aquinas does not do so, it is easy to extend this third sense to things necessary$_B$ for an end. Friendship is universally necessary$_B$ for human well-being and, therefore, necessary without qualification for human well-being. Horses might often be necessary to make a journey easier or "move about at will," but they are not always so, for example, if one is trying to chase Br'er Rabbit through a very dense thicket. Hence, they are necessary$_B$ in relation to the journey and the circumstances under which it taken.

The third sense of what is necessary *simpliciter* for an end obviously sets forth the distinction between what might be regarded as "universal" and "particular" needs. As I noted earlier, it is a mistake to formulate the notion of a need, or of something necessary for an end, simply in terms of a relation between what is needed and the end. Needs statements—in Aquinas's language, statements expressing necessity from an end—make reference to the entity, A, for which Y is an end *as well as* the context, Z, in which the end is pursued. So, a complete statement expressing necessity from an end is that X is necessary for A to attain end Y in conditions Z. Although Thomas never develops the formula for necessity from an end in precisely this way, I see no reason why he would reject it. Indeed, given the way in which he distinguishes between the conditions under which baptism and penance are necessary for salvation, there is every reason to think that he would accept it. Two examples will illustrate the importance of this precision.

In T4, Aquinas holds that baptism is unqualifiedly necessary for salvation both in the sense that we cannot have spiritual life without baptism and in the sense that everyone must be baptized in order to be saved. However, the necessity$_A$ of baptism for salvation is true only relative to humans and not relative to God. In responding to the question whether it was necessary that God institute the sacraments after the fall, Aquinas writes:

> The sacraments were not necessary according to an absolute necessity, as it is necessary that God exist, since they would have been instituted in virtue of divine goodness alone. But they were instituted according to the necessity which arises from the supposition of an end, not so that God could not save humans without them, since he does not bind his power to the sacraments . . . (as food

is necessary to human life), but since he accomplishes a more congruous reparation of humans though the sacraments, as a horse is necessary for a journey, since a person can travel more easily on a horse.[70]

So, God need not have instituted the sacraments to save humans, and he is not bound to provide salvation through them. In other words, from God's point of view and with reference to the end of securing our salvation, the sacraments enjoy only necessity$_B$ and they are not strictly indispensable even in that sense. The necessity of the sacraments for our salvation might seem to be different from the necessity of creating food so that humans can live. So, for Aquinas,

> Necessity in God's works cannot arise except from the form which is the end of operation. For seeing that the form is not infinite, it has determined principles without which it cannot exist in a determined mode of being. Thus we might say, for instance, supposing that God intends to make a human, that it is necessary and due that he give him a rational soul and an organic body, without which there cannot be a human.[71]

Moreover, "if God willed the existence of plants and animals, it was due that he should make the heavenly bodies, whereby those things are preserved. If he willed the existence of man, it was necessary for him to make plants and animals and other things like them which man needs for perfect existence."[72] God need not have created anything, yet having willed to create a universe in which there are people it was necessary, given human

[70] "Sacramenta non erant necessaria necessitate absoluta, sicut necessarium est deum esse, cum ex sola divina bonitate instituta sint, sed de necessitate quae est ex suppositione finis; non ita tamen quod sine his deus hominem sanare non posset, quia sacramentis virtutem suam non alligavit . . . (sicut cibus necessarius est ad vitam humanam), sed quia per sacramenta magis congrue fit hominis reparatio; sicut equus dicitur necessarius ad iter, quia in equo facilius homo vadit" (IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1; cf. *STh* III, q. 64, a. 7).

[71] "In operibus divinis esse non potest nisi ex forma, quae est finis operationis. Ipsa enim cum non sit infinita, habet determinata principia, sine quibus esse non potest; et determinatum modum essendi, ut si dicamus, quod supposito quod deus intendat hominem facere, necessarium est et debitum quod animam rationalem ei conferat et corpus organicum, sine quibus homo esse non potest" (*De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 16). The form which is the end of operation (activity) is the created form that God produces, for example, the created form of a human.

[72] "Si animalia et plantas deus esse voluit, debitum fuit ut caelestia corpora faceret, ex quibus conservantur; et si hominem esse voluit, oportuit facere plantas et animalia, et alia huiusmodi quibus homo indiget ad esse perfectum" (*ScG* II, c. 28).

nature, that he create humans with a sensible body and a rational soul and that he create the things without which humans could not exist or be naturally perfected. And yet God does not "bind his power to natural things so that he cannot act outside them when he wills what he accomplishes in miraculous acts."[73] Indeed, in relation to creatures, there is a sense in which God is not subject to any necessity from an end, both because God's own end, which is his goodness, does not require that he produce anything at all and because "there is no doubt that God can introduce many other means to some end than those which in some manner have been determined to an end."[74] In sum, so far as God has willed to produce effects according to the order of nature, these effects come to existence and attain perfection in light of the means they naturally require. Yet he is not bound to necessity from an end in either sense that things are necessary for ends.

To the second example: just as something may be necessary$_A$ for us to obtain a certain end while for God it is at most necessary$_B$, individuals may have to contend with certain means that are necessary$_A$ for them to pursue ends which are only necessary$_B$ or not necessary at all from the standpoint of society or collective human action. Consider someone who wishes to attend a particular graduate program in which the applicant must have a 3.5 GPA even to be considered. Certainly this requirement is humanly constructed and enforced by those who administer the program. It was probably not necessary that they establish this requirement for admittance to the program in the sense that food is necessary for life,[75] but rather it may have been selected for any number of reasons for the sake of controlling admission to the program. At most, the GPA requirement is necessary$_B$ from the

[73] "Deus non alligavit virtutem suam rebus naturalibus, ut non possit praeter eas operari cum voluerit quod in miraculosis actibus facit" (IV *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2). See also *STh* I, q. 105, a. 6 and I-II, q. 51, a. 4 where Aquinas indicates that God can produce the effects of secondary causes without those causes, and *Comp. theol.* I, c. 136 where the production of an effect outside the order of secondary causes ("praeter ordinem causarum secundarum") is called a miracle.

[74] "Non est dubium quin deus ad aliquem finem posset inducere multis aliis viis etiam quam illis quae modo determinatae sunt ad finem aliquem" (III *Sent.*, d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3).

[75] Unless, of course, they are subject to others such as an accreditation agency which mandates the requirement and has the power to terminate the program.

standpoint of those who create and enforce the requirement. From the standpoint of the individual applicant, however, the requirement is necessary$_A$ for consideration for admission (so long, of course, as the requirement is rigidly enforced by those who administer the program). In regard to the individual applicant, having the 3.5 GPA is necessary$_A$ for admission to the program just as food is necessary$_A$ for the preservation of the applicant's life. In any event, these two examples should make evident that the necessity of X for end Y is determined by reference both to the entity pursuing the end and the conditions under which the end is pursued.

III. BASIC NEEDS

The concept of basic needs is fundamental to much contemporary discussion of needs.[76] The importance of this topic is not just theoretical; it has significant moral import once we grant that "needs claims" by themselves carry no moral weight. The mere fact that A needs X for Y does not imply that A has any right to or moral claim on X. However, the concept of basic needs is often formulated to provide such moral warrant to needs, especially in the area of public policy and the distribution of scarce resources.[77] At its core, the distinction between basic and

[76] See the works listed in note 3 above for literature in this area. Perhpas the best single treatment of the problem of basic needs is found in Katrin Lederer and Johan Galtung, eds., *Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980).

[77] On the other hand, the inability of people to satisfy certain sorts of needs, e.g., minimal subsistence needs, might seem to provide some moral basis for positive rights. Aquinas, for example, follows a patristic and canonical principle that allows people in extreme necessity (*necessitas extrema*) to take from others without their permission what is required to alleviate the necessity (*STh* II-II, q. 66, a. 7, ad 2). For a general discussion of the sense and use of this principle in the Middle Ages see Giles Couvreur, *Les pauvres ont-ilt des droits?* (Rome, 1961). Since I do not want to pursue the normative aspects of identifying and obtaining things which are necessary for an end, I will not pursue this question in this paper. However, for some references in this area see: James Sterba, *Contmporary Social and Political Philosophy* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1995) for an attempt to assess various schemes of distributive justice with regard to meeting a minimalist conception of basic needs; Robert Goodin, "The Priority of Needs," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 45 (1980): 615-25; C. Dyke, *Philosophy of Economics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981); David

non-basic needs implies that needs can somehow be compared with one another to be ranked or prioritized. Since needs claims do not carry automatic moral weight, they must be ranked or prioritized within moral discourse regardless of whether one develops a concept of basic needs.

Is there any basis in Aquinas for articulating a notion of basic needs? Or, more fundamentally and accurately, in what ways does Aquinas rank and prioritize needs? From the outset, I want to emphasize that Aquinas never uses a phrase that we could translate as "basic necessities." Indeed, my answer to the first question is largely negative. I explore the second question to establish a basis for subsequent research regarding the moral weight which Aquinas might give to needs claims. Hence, let me suggest six senses in which Aquinas seems to prioritize things necessary for an end in relation to one another.

(1) "Things necessary for life" or "necessities of life" (*necessaria/necessitates vitae*) have priority over other things that people need but that are not included among the necessities of life.

(2) What is necessary$_A$ for an end is prior to what is necessary$_B$ for an end. This is the order of necessity (*via necessitatis*).

(3) What is necessary$_{A/B}$ for (human) life and perfection is prior to what is necessary$_{A/B}$ for some specific end pursued by someone.

(4) What is necessary$_{A/B}$ for the existence or perfection of an end and is directly ordered to the existence of the end (i.e., universally required by all those who pursue the end) is prior to what is necessary$_{A/B}$ for the existence of the end under certain circumstances or supervening accidents.

(5) Relative to the order of perfection (*via perfectionis*), the perfection of an end is prior to the mere existence of an end, since in the order of perfection, act takes priority over potentiality. Hence, what is necessary$_B$ for the perfection of an end is prior to what is necessary$_A$ for the mere existence of an end.

Hollenbach, *Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 204ff; and David Braybrooke, *Meeting Needs* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).

(6) So far as one end is deemed prior to another end, then what is necessary$_{A/B}$ for the first end may be prior to what is necessary$_{A}$ and/or what is necessary$_{B}$ for the second end.

In the first sense, "necessities of life" (*necessaria/necessitates vitae*) are somehow prior to other things that people need. Certainly, we often use the phrase "necessities of life" in this manner, for example, in defining poverty lines as the point at which people have only the income to provide the necessities of life. Of course, the phrase "necessities of life" has a more or less narrow sense in contemporary usage. At times, it may refer only to mere subsistence needs. At other times, it may extend to what people need to preserve some minimally decent social status (e.g., in most industrial societies this might include having a refrigerator or telephone, or being literate). Aquinas provides no settled meaning to the terms *necessaria/necessitates vitae*. As I noted earlier, while the phrase *necessitates vitae* seems to refer principally to material things needed in this life, the phrase *necessaria vitae* seems to extend to virtually anything that is necessary for humans ends related to the conservation or perfection of life. Presumably the "necessities of life" will not include what people need for proximate ends that are immoral, harmful to a person's life, or are not necessary$_{A/B}$ for our existence or perfection. On the other hand, "necessities of life" could include anything that people need for the ends that they pursue (unless the ends are immoral or harmful), since presumably all proximate ends are chosen for the sake of well-being or happiness considered as a perfect, final, and self-sufficient good. But I find no clear textual evidence that Aquinas distinguishes between what is necessary for human life (taken in the broadest sense) and what is necessary for people to pursue some end but which does not fall into the category of the "necessities of life." That is, the first sense for prioritizing needs appears to reflect a more modern distinction than one employed by Aquinas.

In the second sense, what is necessary$_{A}$ for an end is prior to what is necessary$_{B}$ for an end, since the end cannot exist at all without what is necessary$_{A}$ for it. But if this distinction is to serve as a basis for distinguishing between basic and non-basic human

needs, to which end should we refer? It is tempting to say human life or existence. But then does one mean life in an unqualified sense or in some more specified sense: natural life, moral life, spiritual life, civic life, etc.? It is tempting to take life in an unqualified sense, but then the only things necessary$_A$ for human life will be those things that are required for mere existence or survival. But this is quite minimal, since as Aquinas says, "nature is content with little."[78] Aquinas might appear to give some support to prioritizing needs in this way when he sets forth a sense in which someone is said to need (*indiget*) something.

> Necessity conditioned on the supposition of an end is twofold. On the one hand, as that without which one cannot attain an intended end, e.g., one cannot attain the conservation of life without food. On the other hand, as that without which someone cannot attain an end easily, namely, as a horse is said to be necessary for a person to take a journey. The name "utility" is common to both of these modes of necessity . . . but the name "need" is more related to the first of the modes. For we are properly said to need that without which we cannot attain an end.[79]

This text reflects a general priority of what is necessary$_A$ for an end, and apparently any end, over what is only necessary$_B$ for it. So, if one adopts this criterion as the basis for distinguishing basic from non-basic needs and, thus, specifies the end as human life in an unqualified sense, then, for example, a person properly needs only the food he or she requires to stay alive. However, the food that is required to perform one's work or to attain health is only useful but not needed.[80] On this view, we would not need

[78] "modicis natura contenta est" (IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 3).

[79] "Necessitas [conditionata ex suppositione finis] est duplex: quaedam scilicet sine qua non potest haberi finis intentus, sicut sine cibo non potest haberi conservatio vitae; quaedam vero sine qua non potest aliquis ad finem de facili pertingere, sicut dicitur equus necessarius homini ad peragendum iter: et nomen utilitatis commune est utrique modorum necessitatis . . .; sed nomen indigentiae magis se habet ad primum modum eorum: illo enim proprie dicimur indigere sine quo finem consequi non possumus" (II *Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 1).

[80] At this point, of course, normative concerns quickly arise. Even if we grant that what is necessary$_A$ for human life is more basic that what is necessary$_B$ for human life, it is controversial whether only things necessary$_A$ for human life are basic in the sense of having some exclusive moral claim for satisfaction. Surely, Aquinas would grant that being virtuous is necessary$_A$ for human well-being and that creating conditions (e.g., education of children and the establishment of positive law) in which proper moral habits can be formed is at least

(*indiget*) either moral virtues or the sacraments for our life (if "life" is taken without qualification) even though we could be said to need the moral virtues for moral life and natural happiness, and we could be said to need baptism or penance for spiritual life, since moral virtue, baptism, and penance are necessary$_A$ for the moral life and the spiritual life respectively.

Let us, then, turn to the third sense in which needs can be ranked. For Aquinas, humans tend to their own perfection and well-being, both natural and supernatural. Human life is not ordered just to living (existing) but to living (existing) well. In contrast to the narrow sense, given above, in which people can be said to need (*indiget*) something, Aquinas provides a more expansive definition:

> Someone is said to need something without qualification and relationally. Someone needs without qualification that without which he cannot be conserved in being or in his perfection. . . . But someone relationally needs that without which he cannot attain some intended end, or cannot attain it well, or in some manner.[81]

necessary$_B$ for the formation of those habits. Indeed, he follows Aristotle in viewing the education of children as one of the necessities of life which is provided by the household (I *Polit.*, lect. 7; and Aristotle, *Politics* 1.13.1260b12-15). But creating such conditions would not count as basic needs on the present interpretation any more than the virtues would count as basic needs. Seebohn Rowntree in an oft-quoted text well describes the lives of families who have access merely to subsistence good: They "must never spend a penny on railway fare or omnibus. They must never go to the country unless they walk. They must never purchase a half-penny newspaper or spend a penny to buy a ticket for a popular concert. They must write no letters to absent children for they cannot afford the postage. They must never contribute anything to their church or chapel, or give any help to a neighbor which costs money . . . nothing must be bought except that what is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of physical health" (quoted in Bradley Schiller, *The Economics of Poverty and Discrimination*, 5th ed. [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1989], 18).

[81] "Aliquis dicitur indigere aliquo et simpliciter et secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem indiget aliquis illo sine quo non potest conservari in esse vel in sua perfectione. . . . Sed secundum quid indiget aliquis illo sine quo non potest aliquem finem intentum habere, vel non ita bene, vel tali modo" (IV *Sent.*, d. 44, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 2). Aquinas's example in making this distinction is a bit unclear. He makes the distinction in response to a question of whether glorified or resurrected bodies move (i.e., engage in locomotion) as a result of any need (*indigentia*). He responds that they do not have any need *simpliciter* to move since their beatitude (i.e., uninterrupted contemplation of God) completely suffices for their perfection. On the other hand, he admits that the glorified bodies might engage in locomotion for various reasons, e.g., simply to actualize the power they have to move. Aquinas acknowledges that this motion does not diminish the beatitude of the glorified bodies; certainly it does not increase

In this text, we can say that we need (*indiget*) whatever is necessary$_A$ or necessary$_B$ for any end we pursue.[82] However, the key distinction in this text is between what is we need *simpliciter,* that is, for our life and perfection, and what we need *secundum quid,* that is, in relation to some particular end. Supposing that what is said *simpliciter* has some priority over what is said *secundum quid,* then we have a third sense for prioritizing things people need: what people need without qualification for life and perfection is prior to what people need for the existence and perfection of some particular end. In this sense, basic needs might be regarded as those things which people need *simpliciter,* that is to say, for their life and perfection. Non-basic needs would be those required relationally, that is, for some specific end which was not required to conserve someone in his or her perfection and existence. It is clear that basic needs would encompass a much broader set of needs than what is simply necessary$_A$ for maintaining life in an unqualified sense. In this more expansive sense, so-called subsistence needs, moral virtues, and the sacraments would all count as basic needs, whereas neither a horse

the beatitude. This discussion is certainly arcane, at least from our point of view, and it is not clear how the distinction between the two senses of needing something relates to human life, since many of our particular actions are ordered toward conserving our existence and perfection (e.g., individual actions of eating, studying, doing things with friends, etc.). It seems that something may be needed relatively for a particular end only if it is indifferent to conserving our existence or perfection. But the text does not clearly justify this view. It is possible that this criterion will collapse into the first criterion if we identify necessities of life (*necessaria vitae*) with what we need *simpliciter,* that is, for conserving our life and perfection. Yet, Aquinas does not make this sort of identification, and it is not clear that he restricts the concept of *necessaria vitae* in this way.

[82] Despite the rather restricted sense given to *indigere* in the text from II *Sent.*, quoted above, Aquinas typically uses *indigere* in the broader senses given in the text from IV *Sent.*, See, for example, "Ille qui dat usuram non simpliciter voluntarie dat, sed cum quadam necessitate, inquantum indiget pecuniam accipere mutuo, quam ille qui habet non vult sine usura mutuare" ("The person who pays usury does not without qualifcation do so voluntarily, but in terms of a certain necessity: he accepts the loan in so far as he needs money, because the person who has the money will not loan it without usury" [*STh* II-II, q. 78, a. 1, ad 7]). See also "Si non habeat pecuniam in promptu unde emat equum sed oportet eam acquirere per operationem alicuius artificii, ad quae exercenda iterum indigeat quaerere instrumenta alicuius artificii" ("If someone does not have money at hand in order to buy a horse, but must acquire [the money] through performing some art, for the exercise of which he needs to seek out the instrument of that art . . ." [II *De caelo et mundo,* c. 18]).

necessary$_B$ to make a journey easier nor a ship necessary$_A$ to make an ocean voyage would be basic unless they were related to conserving life and perfection.

This leads to the fourth sense for ranking needs. Suppose one needs a ship in order to survive, as did the folks in Pompeii when they tried to escape the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius. In that situation, should we regard a ship as a basic need? Imagine some kind soul setting out to satisfy the basic needs of the folks on the shore in Pompeii by distributing to them crates of food unloaded from ships in the harbor and refusing to let the people use the ships. So too, does penance count as a basic need for the spiritual life, since it is only necessary$_A$ for spiritual life on the supposition of actual sin? While the ship for the folks in Pompeii and the sacrament of penance for those committing a mortal sin might be included as what is necessary *simpliciter* for conserving life and perfection according to the third sense for prioritizing needs, Aquinas explicitly acknowledges a sense in which what is universally necessary$_{A/B}$ for an end takes priority over what is necessary$_{A/B}$ only under certain circumstances.[83] Consider the following text:

> That which exists in itself precedes naturally that which is accidental, as substance precedes accident. Now some sacraments are, of themselves, ordered to human salvation, e.g., baptism, which is spiritual birth, confirmation which is spiritual growth, and the Eucharist which is spiritual food. However, penance is ordered to human salvation accidentally as it were, and on something being supposed, namely, sin. For unless someone actually sins, he would not stand in need of penance and yet he would need baptism, confirmation, and the Eucharist; even as in the life of the body, a person would need no medical treatment, unless he were ill. Yet life, birth, growth, and nutrition are in themselves necessary to man.[84]

[83] Here, of course, I refer to the third sense in which something is necessary *simpliciter/secundum quid* for an end, which clearly is quite different from the third criterion just given for ranking needs, namely, the sense in which we need (*indiget*) something *simpliciter* for life and perfection, but only *secundum quid* in relation to a particular end. In effect, the third criterion for ranking needs yields a fourth sense in which the pair *simplictier/secundum quid* applies to necessity from an end.

[84] "Id quod est per se, naturaliter prius est eo quod est per accidens, sicut et substantia prior est accidente. Sacramenta autem quaedam per se ordinantur ad salutem hominis, sicut baptismus, qui est spiritualis generatio et confirmatio, quae est spirituale augmentum, et eucharistia, quae est spirituale nutrimentum. Poenitentia autem ordinatur ad salutem hominis

Hence, if X and Y are necessary$_A$ or necessary$_B$ for the same end, X is prior to Y if it is directly or per se related to the existence and or perfection of the end rather than required only in certain circumstances. This is the fourth sense for prioritizing or ranking what is necessary for some end. Notice that prioritizing needs on this basis cuts across the distinction between necessity$_A$ and necessity$_B$. Moreover, on this criterion, what is per se necessary$_B$ for the perfection of an end takes priority over what is necessary$_A$ for the end but only under certain circumstances. Taken as a criterion for basic needs, then, presumably only those things which all people need for life and perfection would be counted as basic needs. So, to return to an earlier example, if we adopted this criterion for satisfying basic needs and we were authorized only to satisfy the basic needs of the folks in Pompeii, then they would only get the food but would not be allowed passage on the ships.

Next, let us consider the fifth criterion for ranking needs. Consider the groups faith, hope, and charity on the one hand and baptism, confirmation, and the Eucharist on the other. All of them are necessary in some sense for the spiritual life of humans.[85] In the order of necessity (*via necessitatis*), faith is prior to and more necessary than hope and charity, while baptism is prior to and more necessary than confirmation and the Eucharist.[86] Yet from

quasi per accidens, supposito quodam, scilicet ex suppositione peccati. Nisi enim homo peccaret actualiter, poenitentia non indigeret, indigeret tamen baptismo et confirmatione et eucharistia, sicut et in vita corporali non indigeret homo medicatione nisi infirmaretur, indiget autem homo per se ad vitam generatione, augmento et nutrimento" (*STh* III, q. 84, a. 6). Cf. *ScG* III, c. 154.

[85] IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1; *ScG* IV, c. 58; *STh* III, q. 65, a. 4.

[86] Consider the following text, "According to the order of necessity, baptism is the greatest of the sacraments; yet from the point of view of perfection, order comes first; while confirmation holds a middle place. The sacraments of penance and extreme unction are at a degree inferior to those mentioned above; because, as stated above, they are ordered to the Christian life, not directly, but accidentally, as it were, that is to say, as remedies against supervening defects. And among these, extreme unction is compared to penance, as confirmation to baptism; in such a way, that penance is more necessary, whereas extreme unction is more perfect" ("Nam in via necessitatis, baptismus est potissimum sacramentorum; in via autem perfectionis, sacramentum ordinis; medio autem modo se habet sacramentum confirmationis. Sacramentum vero poenitentiae et extremae unctionis sunt inferioris gradus a praedictis sacramentis, quia, sicut dictum est, ordinantur ad vitam christianam non per se, sed quasi per accidens, scilicet in remedium supervenientis defectus. Inter quae tamen extrema unctio comparatur ad poenitentiam sicut confirmatio ad baptismum, ita scilicet quod

the point of view of the order of perfection (*via perfectionis*), charity is prior to faith and hope because it perfects our love of God,[87] while the Eucharist is necessary for the consummation of spiritual life and, therefore, as perfecting the effect of the sacraments of baptism and confirmation.[88] Aquinas never explicitly describes charity or the Eucharist as more necessary than faith and hope or baptism and confirmation respectively.[89] Yet relative to the perfection of the spiritual life, charity and the Eucharist are in a sense more necessary than the others, since they produce the full perfection of the spiritual life. If there can be no spiritual life without baptism or faith, there can be no fully perfect spiritual life without the Eucharist and charity. Here, then, I would suggest that we have a fifth sense of prioritizing things necessary to an end. Relative to the order of perfection (*via perfectionis*), the perfection of an end is prior to the mere existence of an end, since all things are ordered to their proper end as their actualization; hence what is necessary$_B$ for the perfection of an end is prior to what is only necesaary$_A$ for the mere existence of an end.

poenitentia est maioris necessitatis, sed extrema unctio est maioris perfectionis" [*STh* III, q. 65, a. 3]). Note that earlier in this same article, Aquinas argued that the Eucharist is the greatest or most important (*potissimum*) of all the sacraments, since it is their end and, therefore, perfects all the others. So it seems that the claim that the sacrament of orders comes first in the order of perfection needs some qualification. Second, given that in *STh* III, q. 65, a. 4 (T4 above), Aquinas holds that the sacrament of orders is necessary$_A$ for the Church, it is odd that here he would view it as first in the order of perfection. For another contrast between the order of necessity and the order of perfection see *Reportationes ineditae Leoninae* n. 3 (*In I Cor.* 12.22).

[87] For the inverse relations among faith, hope, and charity in terms of necessity and perfection see *STh* I-II, q. 62, a. 4.

[88] *STh* III, q. 73, a. 3. On the one hand, charity is the end of faith and hope, while the Eucharist is the end of baptism and confirmation (and indeed of all the other sacraments). On the other, charity and the Eucharist are themselves means to the full perfection of the spiritual life. It is in the latter sense that charity and the Eucharist are said to be necessary in relation to an end.

[89] Although note the following remark: "It is better to assist others in spiritual matters than in temporal matters to the extent that spiritual things are more important than temporal things and more necessary to attaining the end of beatitude" ("est autem maius subvenire alteri in spiritualibus quam in temporalibus: quanto spiritualia sunt temporalibus potiora, et magis necessaria ad finem beatitudinis consequendum" [*ScG* III, c. 134]).

The sixth sense of ranking needs is perhaps the most complex. So far as one end is deemed prior to another end, then what is necessary$_{A/B}$ for the first end may be prior to what is necessary$_{A/B}$ for the second end. For example, Aquinas writes that spiritual alms are in some sense more necessary to people than corporeal alms. He defends this view against objections that give a constant priority to corporeal alms over spiritual alms on the ground that what pertains to the life of the body is more necessary than what pertains to the life of the spirit. Aquinas's most nuanced response to this objection is found in IV *Sententiarum:*

> Alms have efficacy, as was said, on the part of the giver and on the part of the recipient. . . . In relation to the recipient, alms can be measured in two ways, either by reason of the good which is conferred, and in this sense spiritual alms are preeminent, or [they can be measured] by reason of what is necessary. In this sense some spiritual alms are more important than some corporeal alms, namely those [spiritual alms] which are ordered against fault are more important than any corporeal alms, since a person ought more to avoid fault than some bodily defect, even death. However, some corporeal alms, namely, those which are directed to the sustenance of life, are more necessary than spiritual alms, namely, those which are directed to well-being. But those [spiritual alms] which are directed to spiritual well-being are more necessary than those which are directed to corporeal well-being. In this way it is evident that some spiritual alms are more important than all corporeal alms and similarly in kind when speaking of both sorts of alms.[90]

Hence, even though, for example, food is necessary without qualification for human life, supplying food to people may not always take precedence over supplying spiritual alms, if the latter

[90] "Eleemosyna habet efficaciam, ut dictum est, et ex parte dantis, et ex parte recipientis. . . . ex parte autem recipientis potest mensurari eleemosyna dupliciter; vel ratione boni quod confertur, et sic adhuc eleemosyna spiritualis praeeminet: vel ratione necessarii, et sic quaedam spirituales sunt quibusdam corporalibus potiores, scilicet quae contra culpam ordinantur, quibuscumque eleemosynis corporalibus: quia homo magis debet vitare culpam quam aliquem defectum corporalem, etiam mortem. Quaedam vero corporales, quae scilicet sunt ad sustentationem vitae, quibusdam eleemosynis spiritualibus magis sunt necessariae, scilicet quae sunt ad bene esse; sed illae quae sunt ad bene esse spirituale, sunt magis necessariae illis quae sunt ad bene esse corporale. Sic ergo patet quod omnibus corporalibus eleemosynis aliquae spirituales potiores sunt, et similiter in genere loquendo de utrisque" (IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 3). Cf. *STh* III, q. 32, a. 3. Unfortunately, Aquinas does not provide clear examples to illustrate these various priorities.

are necessary to avoid some fault. The same thing would be true in relation to preserving one's moral integrity: at times it may be necessary to expose oneself to death in order to conserve moral virtue. (Consider the case of prisoners of war who can obtain food only if they disclose military secrets.) So too, even though Aquinas writes that one should never give that without which one cannot live (things necessary$_A$ for natural life), he nevertheless allows that even in conditions where someone has only enough to preserve the life of herself and her family, she might still give "to a great person through whom the church and the republic are sustained, for it is praiseworthy to expose oneself and those in one's care to mortal danger to free such a person, since the common good is to be preferred to one's own good."[91]

As I have illustrated in the previous discussion, each of these criteria might provide some basis for distinguishing between basic and non-basic needs, but this is a merely linguistic accomplishment, since it recasts one of Aquinas's distinctions in a more modern idiom. It is not clear that any of the six criteria provide some automatic moral warrant for the needs that are prioritized according to each particular criterion. Moreover, I am not certain it is worth the effort to find some basis in Aquinas for defining basic needs or, that to be relevant to contemporary discussions of needs, one must find this sort of basis in Aquinas's writings. As I have argued elsewhere, the project of conceptualizing basic needs is often mired in stipulation, driven by social and political ideology, and complicated by normative and moral concerns.[92] Rather than trying to graft the modern category of basic needs onto Aquinas in an anachronistic manner, it seems more profitable to look at the various sorts of distinctions and comparisons he makes among needs, assess them on their merits, and

[91] "alicui magnae personae, per quam ecclesia vel respublica sustentaretur, quia pro talis personae liberatione seipsum et suos laudabiliter periculo mortis exponeret, cum bonum commune sit proprio praeferendum" (*STh* II-II, q. 32, a. 6).

[92] See John Jones, "How Basic Are Basic Needs?" *The Journal for Peace and Justice Studies* 8 (1997): 44-48. Analysis of basic needs is complicated in a bad sense by moral concerns when those concerns are the driving force behind the definition of basic needs (i.e., one formulates a definition of basic needs so that it fits with the particular moral agenda one has).

determine to what extent they might be helpful to contemporary assessments of needs.

IV. The Political and Conventional Context for Human Needs

The fourth criterion for prioritizing needs relies on a belief that some things are necessary for human life and perfection as directly or per se ordered to life and perfection. This belief seems to imply that there are certain things that people naturally need or need by nature, and that these needs might be determined through a strictly rational sort of analysis that considers human nature alone (that is, humans qua humans). While this model might be appealing in the abstract, since needs presumably based on our nature would enjoy the strongest sort of priority, the model requires substantive modification when one considers what people need in their actual, determinate existence. This model does not really take into account the manner in which human needs are determined by the social contexts in which people live.

Recall that for Aquinas humans are essentially social and they must live in civil society in order to live well (at least in regard to natural happiness). Individuals stand in relation to the city as parts to a whole and, as such, the well-being of the individual is ordered to the well-being of the community in which he or she lives.[93] On more than one occasion, for example, Aquinas explicitly adopts the view that the common good of the city takes precedence over the good of the individual and that, implicitly, the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the community.[94]

[93] See, e.g., *STh* I-II, q. 90, a. 3, ad 3; I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 3; II-II, q. 58, a. 7, ad 2; II-II, q. 61, a. 1; II-II, q. 64, a. 4; and II-II, q. 64, a. 5. For a discussion of the various meanings of "common good" for Aquinas, see Gregory Froelich, "The Equivocal Status of 'Bonum Commune,'" *New Scholasticism* 63 (Winter 1989): 38-57.

[94] "Bonum multitudinis est maius quam bonum unius qui est de multitudine" (*STh* II-II, q. 39, a. 3, ad 2) is a typical version of this principle. For discussions of this controversial principle see Jamie Vélez-Sáenz, *The Doctrine of the Common Good of Civil Society in the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 1951): 67-92; I. Th. Eshmann, "A Thomistic Glossary on the Principle of the Preeminence of the Common Good," *Medieval Studies* 5 (1943): 123-65; Charles De Koninck, "In Defence of St. Thomas: A Reply to Father Eschmann's Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good," *Laval théologique et*

The common good of the city is not just the sum of the goods of the individuals who live in the city, but rather it is the good proper to the city as city.[95] For Aquinas, the city is the perfect community so far as it satisfies all the necessities of life. Yet the city can secure and maintain its self-sufficiency only so far as it has a proper order (i.e., peace).[96] The city attains its due order so far as it is ordered to the proper advantage of its members. But this proper order requires that the parts of the city (i.e., the individuals and communities within the city) be harmoniously ordered with relation to one another and the city. Hence, the ends that individuals pursue must be determined relative to the ends of the city in such a way that the ends pursued by individuals are conducive to preserving the order and harmony of the city. That is, an individual's determination of what he or she needs in order to pursue particular ends is embedded in the political context of what is required to maintain the proper order of the city or community in which the individual lives. This latter determination is not properly made by individuals as such—who look to their own private good—but by the ruler of the community who is charged with caring for the common good.[97] Aquinas gives a vivid articulation of the responsibility of the ruler in this matter when he discusses the duties of the ruler who is able to found a city. As God providentially provides all that is needed for each species,

> the founder of the city or kingdom must mark out the chosen place according to the exigencies of things necessary for the perfection of the city and kingdom. .

philosophique 1 (1945): 3-103; and Michael A. Smith, *Human Dignity and the Common Good in the Aristotelian-Thomistic Tradition* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995): 83-121. The books by Vélez-Sáenz and Smith provide bibliographies listing other studies relating to the general notion of the common good in Aquinas's thought.

[95] For a general discussion of the nature of a social community, its good , and its relation to the individuals who are its members, see Vélez-Sáenz, *Doctrine of the Common Good of Civil Society*, 3-33. See also Michael A Smith, "Common Advantage and Common Good," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 51 (1995): 111-25.

[96] IV *Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, sol.4; *ScG* III, c. 146; III *Ethic.*, lect. 8.

[97] I *De Regim. Princ.*, cc. 1 and 2. This argument provides the basis for the view that monarchy is the best form of government.

. . Indeed, he must provide for each one what is necessary for his particular condition and state in life; otherwise, the kingdom or city could never endure.[98]

Conversely, individuals should determine what they need according to their condition or state. So, in reciting the fourth petition of the Lord's prayer and in following the injunction of 1 Timothy 6:9, individuals do not beg for "daily bread" in an unqualified sense, nor are they expected to be content with food and clothing without qualification. In asking that we be given our "daily bread," we are requesting all the temporal things necessary for us, and we should ask for these things and be content with them *according to our social condition and state.*[99]

Moreover, individuals cannot determine what they need through a strictly rational analysis, since the social order in which people live is formatively shaped by custom and, therefore, it has a fundamentally conventional character to it. It is precisely in this regard that the earlier sense in which people are said to need something—either in regard to their existence or perfection (which seems specified by nature) or to some specific end proposed by the will—becomes blurred, since what individuals need is determined, in part at least, by their locus in a social order which is, in part, conventionally determined by custom.

It is not possible in this paper to provide a complete exegetical or conceptual analysis of Aquinas's conception of custom. For the present, the following will suffice: custom arises through collectively repeated actions (whether deliberate or not) that take on the character of a "habit" or second nature.[100] Customs are

[98] "Deinde necesse est ut locum electum institutor civitatis aut regni distinguat secundum exigentiam eorum quae perfectio civitatis aut regni requirit. . . . demum vero providendum est ut singulis necessaria suppetant secundum uniuscuiusque constitutionem et statum: aliter enim nequaquam posset regnum vel civitas commanere" (I *De Regim. Princ.*, c. 14).

[99] *In orationem Dominican* 4 and *Quodl.* 10, q. 6, a. 3, ad 2. I am convinced, although Aquinas never explicitly adopts this view, that the injunction to individuals to determine what they need according to their condition and state is imposed not just for the moral well-being of the individuals but also for the sake of maintaining the proper order of the community in which individuals live.

[100] See *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4, ad2; I-II, q. 32, a. 2, ad 3; I-II, q. 58, a. 1. This view compares interestingly with Berger and Luckmann's conception of institutions as collectively produced routinized typifications which easily become reified—a second nature: "this is how things are done," not "this is how we do things" (*Social Construction of Reality* [Garden City, N.Y.:

subjected to the rule of reason and they cannot licitly abrogate divine or natural law.[101] Nevertheless, people are bound to live according to the lawful customs of society in which they live.[102] So, in responding to what counts as moderation in clothing, Aquinas approvingly cites Augustine: "Those offenses, which are contrary to the customs of people, are to be avoided according to the customs generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by the custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of anyone whether citizen or foreigner. For any part is offensive which does not harmonize with its whole."[103]

More important for my purposes, Aquinas recognizes that one group can have customs that are incompatible with the customs of another group even though both sets of custom are consistent with reason and both are binding on people subjected to them. The result is that a person is required to perform actions in one community that should be avoided in another community. Consider the following solution to the question of whether the Eucharist may be celebrated with leavened or unleavened bread.

> Two things may be considered touching the matter of this sacrament, namely, what is necessary and what is fitting. It is necessary that the bread be wheaten, without which the sacrament is not perfected. However, it is not necessary for the sacrament that the bread is unleavened or leavened, since it can be celebrated with either. . . . But it is suitable [*conveniens*] that every priest observe the rite of his church in the celebration of the sacrament. Now in this matter there are various customs of the churches. . . . Hence, as a priest sins by celebrating with leavened bread in the Latin church, so a Greek priest celebrating with unleavened bread in a church of the Greeks would also sin by perverting the rite of his church.[104]

Doubleday & Co., 1967], 53-67).

[101] *STh* I-II, q. 97, a. 3, ad 1; II-II, q. 100, a. 2 and ad 4; II-II, q. 154, a. 9, ad 3; *Quodl.* 2, q. 4, a. 3.

[102] *STh* I-II, q. 97, a. 3, II-II, q. 77, a. 2, ad 2.

[103] "quae contra mores hominum sunt flagitia, pro morum diversitate vitanda sunt, ut pactum inter se civitatis et gentis consuetudine vel lege firmatum, nulla civis aut peregrini libidine violetur. turpis enim est omnis pars universo suo non congruens" (*STh* II-II, q. 169, a. 1). Augustine's text is from *Confessiones* 3.8.

[104] "Circa materiam huius sacramenti duo possunt considerari, scilicet quid sit necessarium, et quid conveniens. Necessarium quidem est ut sit panis triticeus . . . sine quo non perficitur sacramentum. Non est autem de necessitate sacramenti quod sit azymus vel fermentatus, quia

In this text, the necessary and the fitting are contrasted with regard to the matter (that is, the bread) of the Eucharist. It is necessary$_A$ for the priest to use wheat bread in celebrating the Eucharist, but only fitting (necessary$_B$?) for the priest to use leavened or unleavened bread . However, since a priest sins if he does not use the type of bread that is required by the custom of his church, it is clear that it is necessary that the priest celebrate the Eucharist with the bread required by his tradition in order to avoid sin.[105] Even though the injunction to obey the customs of one's society is not absolute if those customs run counter to natural or divine law, the injunction appears to be licit prima facie, and it does not seem to be justifiably overridden because of the preferences or desires of individuals. In any event, though, people cannot and ought not avoid referring to the social group in which they live in order to determine what they need.

The question of what people need can be raised in regard to any particular end that people pursue both in regard to merely attaining the end and to attaining it well or perfectly. But the various ends people pursue must be ordered to the final end of human life, which is our beatitude—the perfect knowledge and love of God in the next life. While beatitude transcends any natural happiness, the latter is found only within the city. Hence, the assessments of what people need to attain particular ends or even personal happiness is embedded in a political context in which the ends that people pursue ought be ordered to the common good and the peace of the city, since it is only within the city that people attain any complete natural happiness. So far as political and social life is legitimately determined by custom and so far as people are bound to follow the customs of their society, human needs are conventional in the sense that what people need

in utroque confici potest. Conveniens autem est ut unusquisque servet ritum suae ecclesiae in celebratione sacramenti. Super hoc autem sunt diversae ecclesiarum consuetudines. . . . Unde, sicut peccat sacerdos in ecclesia latinorum celebrans de pane fermentato, ita peccaret presbyter graecus in ecclesia graecorum celebrans de azymo pane, quasi pervertens ecclesiae suae ritum" (*STh* III, q. 74, a. 4).

[105] Indeed, although Aquinas regards the use of unleavened bread to be more reasonable than the use of leavened bread, he still holds that it is sinful for a priest in the Greek church to celebrate the Eucharist with unleavened bread since he "would pervert the rite of his Church."

is shaped by social and institutional roles and the conventions that determine those institutions and roles.

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NATURAL OBLIGATION: HOW RATIONALLY KNOWN TRUTH DETERMINES ETHICAL GOOD AND EVIL

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ARISTOTLE, THE MEDIEVALS, and Hume, in their own ways, held that the "good" is that which is desired or desirable in some manner. Hume concluded that reason cannot dictate to desires about values since desires determine what things are values and what are not. When reason makes value judgments, it is a "slave" of desire; it only reports what desires do. Hume was, in effect, saying that his predecessors had not gone far enough in drawing out the implications of the fact that "good" means that which is desired. But some of Hume's Scholastic predecessors had seen more of those implications than he did. In fact, they had seen enough to provide the basis for a reply to Hume about how reason prescribes to desire. I will try to make that reply explicit.

To paraphrase Aristotle and Hume, calling something "good" presupposes an inclination (a desire or a choice) toward some goal. Inclinations toward goals, in turn, presuppose dispositions for those inclinations (appetites). If there is a specifically moral kind of goodness, calling something morally good or evil must reflect an inclination toward some specific kind of goal whose achievement is what we mean by "moral" good, an inclination of which we are capable because we have dispositions to be inclined to that achievement. I hope to show that insufficient attention to the nature of that goal is what generates reason/appetite, is/ought, fact/value and deontology/teleology problems in ethics.

The implicit reply to Hume that I will explicate bases ethics on a "natural inclination" to the goal of acting "in accord with

reason."[1] I will argue that we necessarily have that goal and that "accord with reason" means accord with premoral knowledge of what things, especially persons, are. Hume failed to see that rational beings must have that goal. That goal implies that love of persons for their own sake (traditionally called "love of friendship") has priority over love of other goods ("love of concupiscence"), and that the duty to love persons, human or divine, for their own sake is both self-evident and ethically primary.[2] But if "accord with reason" refers, as it often seems to do, to value judgments reason makes by the standard of some goal other than accord with knowledge of what things are, the other goal would be a good (for example, happiness, pleasure, or even contemplation or virtue) other than persons as such, and the duty to love persons for their own sake would be neither primary nor self-evident but derived from the duty to will that other good.

I

What is the nature of moral obligation, or the nature of the good and evil that are specifically moral, rather than aesthetic, medical, economic, etc.?

Assume that by a printing error a mountain ranger's manual says that physical action X will prevent an avalanche, when in fact X will cause an avalanche. A ranger believes the manual and inculpably uses that belief in choosing to perform X. Lives are lost. Here there is evil but no moral evil. Now someone deliberately performs X with the intention of killing innocent victims. There is moral evil, but what is it? Whatever the nature of that evil is, it characterizes the internal act of choosing. It consists neither of the physical motions performed nor of the accumulation of external goods and evils in their results, because these can be the same in both cases. If it consists of a relation between the choice and results external to the choice, that relation is a property of the choice, not the results.

[1] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 94, a. 3.

[2] This primacy and self-evidence are explicit in Aquinas (*STh* I-II, q. 100, a. 3, ad 1), although standard accounts of acting "in accord with reason" cannot explain them.

When we judge choices to be morally good or bad, we imply a standard by which choices are to be judged. A standard expresses a goal, a finality, to be achieved by whatever is being judged by the standard. If the goal is achieved, the thing is good; if not, the thing is bad. Hence in judging a choice to be morally good or bad, we are judging it by whether or not it achieves some goal that we are holding it to. In calling a choice bad, we are saying that something is lacking in the behavior of choosing that "should" be there, that "ought" to be there, where "should" and "ought" are defined by the goal by which we are measuring the choice. Whatever that goal is, the achievement of it constitutes moral good and the failure to achieve it moral evil.

Further, we apply the standards we call "moral" to choices based on relevant rational knowledge, not choices based on inculpable ignorance. Choices can have many kinds of defects. I might invest unwisely, where "unwisely" refers to a defect caused by ignorance of financial conditions. But we only hold morally responsible those who have enough relevant rational knowledge. If we are obligated to obtain knowledge before we act, that obligation depends on our having enough previous knowledge. Acts that are the objects of moral choice are not just physical movements but acts of seeking this end by these means in these circumstances with rational knowledge of what these things, and the things to which choosing the act relates us, are.

Rational "knowledge" here means rational awareness, awareness at the level of reason rather than that of sensation, imagination, or memory.[3] The medievals called the disposition enabling us to make reason-based choices the "rational" appetite or the "will." They thought that these names designated a single power identifiable as such and distinguishable from other powers. That may indeed be true, but nothing I say here will depend on its being true. It is much more convenient, however, to refer to what

[3] I am not opposing rational "knowledge" to "justified belief." Belief is the kind of awareness presupposed when we apply moral standards to choices. Choices based on false beliefs can be morally good. But for simplicity what follows will assume, unless I indicate otherwise, that we are talking about choices made on the basis of beliefs that are both true and justifiably believed.

enables us to make reason-based choices as a rational appetite than as the disposition(s) enabling us to make reason-based choices. If there is such a thing as moral value, it must correspond to a specific kind of orientation to achievement resulting from our having a disposition or set of dispositions describable, even if collectively, as a rational appetite, since the achievement in question is a quality of reason-based choices. It is we who would be oriented to that goal because we have a rational appetite, not the appetite itself that has that goal, just as it is we who are oriented to seeing by means of the sense of sight, not the sense of sight alone that is oriented to seeing. But if we keep that fact in mind, it will be more convenient to speak of "the goal of the rational appetite" than "the goal to which we are oriented by means of the rational appetite."

II

Solving Hume's problem about the relation of reason to desire takes more than dubbing some appetite "rational." We need to know what goal choices based on rational knowledge have, such that success or failure in achieving that goal makes choices morally good or evil, respectively.

Diverse ethical systems state the conditions for moral value differently. However, all ethical systems agree that at least in certain cases the moral value of a choice is determined by the accumulation of "good" or "bad" consequences external to the choice. Since these consequences are external to the seat of specifically moral value, they must be good or bad in a sense that is not directly moral. Rather, moral good and evil derive from this prior good and evil. Even ethical systems that hold some choices to be intrinsically morally good or bad regardless of consequences grant that the moral value of other choices depends on consequences external to the choices. So all ethical systems sometimes apply criteria of morality that are (officially) the only criteria for utilitarian, consequentialist, or proportionalist systems.

When an ethical system applies such criteria, it is holding reason-based choices to the goal of *conforming to rationally known truths about values* (that is, about human ends and the means of achieving them), values that are not themselves moral. For example, Al is wrong to play loud music at 4 A.M., if other people are kept awake. Al may achieve more of his ends, but the total amount of human ends achieved is decreased; for sleep is more important for the achievement of further human ends than is loud music. Even utilitarianism and its cousins measure reason-based choices by the goal of conforming to rationally known truths about nonmoral values. For most utilitarians, morality is specified by the total accumulation of fulfilled human ends, not a human individual's, or a subset of individuals', accumulation of ends. Presumably this is because reason tells them that, since the inclinations to ends that exist in human beings are the measures of value, a greater accumulation of fulfilled human ends is of more value than a lesser accumulation. If reason did not tell them this, they might as well believe that a lesser accumulation of fulfilled ends is of more value.

Utilitarianism also defines "ought" in terms of the greatest accumulation of fulfilled human ends because its goal is an ethics that conforms to what reason knows about values. Any ethics is undertaken in the belief that we know truths about values and in pursuit of the goal of conforming to what we know about values. Hume, for example, wrote book 3 of the *Treatise* in pursuit of an ethics consistent with what he thought reason had informed him about values (namely, that values do not derive from reason) in book 2. And most ethicists today hold that a necessary condition for the success of an ethics is conformity to that same alleged piece (as well as other alleged pieces) of rational knowledge.

Do our choices necessarily have the goal of moral goodness as defined by conformity to reason's knowledge of values? Or does that definition state a condition that needs to be satisfied only if we happen to choose the goal of being moral? If the latter, nothing reason could tell us would make a choice that puts our

interests ahead of the totality of the interests of all persons necessarily defective.

To see how it is possible that choices necessarily have the goal of conforming to what reason knows about values, consider another aspect of our conscious life, belief. We use the word "belief" for a state that happens to include a relation to a goal (namely, truth), such that if a belief does not attain that goal, the belief is intrinsically defective, that is, defective by the standard of a finality that is part of what it is. A false belief may have relations to other goals by reason of which it is not defective. The mere existence of a belief, true or false, is an achievement relative to our prior disposition to form beliefs. But whatever goals of other kinds beliefs may have, a false belief is necessarily defective in at least one respect, because beliefs happen to be states with the conscious goal of truth.

Could reason-based choices similarly have, as part of what they are, the intrinsic goal of conforming to what reason knows about values? The answer seems to depend on answering a prior question, namely, what does it mean to "conform to" what reason knows about values. This is no more easy to answer than the question of what is the conformity of true belief to what things are. And the latter has, like all philosophy's questions, proven extremely difficult to answer. To see the parallel between a belief's conformity to what things are and a choice's, however, we need only a minimal account of what "conformity" requires.

That a true belief conforms to what things are means, at least, that for the belief to be false things would have not to be what they are in some specifiable way or ways. Likewise, for a false belief to be true, things would have not to be what they are in some way. For example, "Grass is green" would be false and "Grass is red" true if grass were red.

To say that a choice must conform to rational knowledge is to say that for a morally bad choice not to be bad, some truth known by reason about values would have to be false. But for a truth about values to be false, things would have not to be what they are; for truths about human ends and means are just a subset of

truths about what things are. So for a morally bad choice to be morally good, or vice versa, things would have to not be what they are in certain ways (ways to be described in what follows).

If reason-based choices, then, have the goal of conforming to what reason knows about values, what makes a choice morally good is that it consciously relates to things as if they are what they are, as inculpably believed by reason, while a bad choice relates to things as if they are not what they are. The level of generality represented by "truths about what things are" would have made it unclear to start the explanation of the rational appetite there, rather than at the level of "truths about values." How could the rational appetite produce a choice not in conformity with a truth like "Water is wet"? We can make defective choices based on ignorance of such truths, but that kind of defect is not moral, if the ignorance is inculpable. So most truths are not related to choices in a way that enables us knowingly to choose as if they were not true. But some truths (in other words, some *facts*), especially truths about what *persons*, human or divine, are, are thus related to choices and necessarily so.

Any desire or any affective state that is based on cognition has for its object what something is, where "something" can be an entity, event, state of affairs, action, experience, or anything else that might count as a possible existent. To a great extent, a theory of value can be neutral toward specific ontologies, but it cannot be neutral toward ontology in general. Whatever acquires the designation "value" does so because it is desired. Desires, however, are desires-for some (at least putatively) possible reality. The reason desires must have a possible reality as their object is the same as the reason sometimes given why metaphysics talks about being: there is nothing else to talk about. Likewise, there is nothing else to desire than what some possible reality is.

The result of a desire is that something has a status in our system of values that it would not have otherwise. Because of the way we desire things, some things are higher values for us than others. We desire what they are more than we desire what other things are. And we value some things as ends and other things as

means whose value derives from ends. Inasmuch as desires make what things are values for us, we can call desires "evaluations" of what things are, evaluations of what things are as being more or less of that to which, or a means to that to which, the appetite producing the desire is oriented.

Likewise, the result of a reason-based choice is that something is given the status of an end or a means to an end for us. To be given such a status is to be assigned a value; to be assigned a value is to be evaluated. So choices are evaluations of what things are. And any time a choice is required potential values are in opposition; if not, we would not have to make a choice between them. So choices are evaluations of things that give them differing places in our value system (not our system of beliefs about what our values ought to be, but the system of values that in fact motivate our actions). Any choice evaluates what something is to be more of a value than what something else is.

Also, if we are disposed to produce a desire for X when we do not have X, we are disposed to produce a state of satisfaction in X when we have X. So a desire for something evaluates it to be a certain kind of thing, the kind of thing by which the appetite will be at least partially satisfied. Since desires evaluate what things are to be that to which, or means to that to which, an appetite is oriented, desires cannot avoid relating to things as if things are this or that. Evaluations must evaluate things to be this or that, as beliefs judge things to be this or that.[4] If the thing so evaluated is not that kind of thing, the evaluation is defective by the standard of the appetite's goal. For example, disease, tiredness, drugs, excessive heat or cold, etc., can make us misevaluate an experience presented by a memory or an image to be the kind of experience that will please a sensory appetite.

But even if sensory desires could not be defective, reason-based choices can be. In the case of chosen (desired) acts, both the object of choice—an act of seeking this end in this situation by this means, knowing what these things are—and the choice (the

[4] In classical terminology, the transcendental good is like the transcendental truth in its convertiblity with what it is that exists; what is good about a thing is what it is: this or that.

desire) can be good or bad by the rational appetite's standard. A good choice is a choice of a good act, that is, an act by which we consciously relate to things as if they are what they are known to be and so fulfill the rational appetite's orientation. Fulfilling the rational appetite's orientation contributes to happiness, but what makes a choice good is not that it causes happiness or satisfaction of desire. What makes a thing good (desired) are those aspects of it for which it is desired, not its being desired; if not, then circularly, that for which it is desired, and so called "good," would be the fact that it is desired. Value is not subjective; desire is a response to what a thing is. Being desired is exterior to a thing; what is good (desired) about it is interior to it.[5]

Moral value is "objective," that is, determined by what things are, in two, more specific ways. First, acts chosen by the rational appetite are called "good" because they fulfill the appetite's orientation to choices that consciously relate us to things as being what they are. So a chosen act is good, not just because of what *it* is, which holds for the object of any appetite, but because choosing it relates us to things other than the act itself as being what *they* are. Second, conforming to reason is the natural goal of the rational appetite's acts, so their success or failure in attaining this goal makes what they are good or bad necessarily and intrinsically, not just hypothetically due to our wish to hold them to that standard. (For the rational appetite deontology is teleology, and vice versa.) Likewise, success or failure in attaining the goal of truth necessarily makes what a belief is good or bad, since the goal of truth is a standard intrinsic to an act of belief. So moral value is objective in every relevant sense.

I will now show, first, that in giving things different positions in our system of values, choices achieve or fail to achieve the goal of conforming to what things are as known by reason, and second, that acts of the rational appetite necessarily have that goal. I will focus on two fundamental moral claims, that we should love God above all things and our neighbors as ourselves.

[5] The end chosen by the rational appetite can be the satisfaction or pleasure caused by achieving the end of *another* appetite.

III

If we believe that God is an infinitely perfect being, our choices "should" give him the place, in our system of values, of being the absolutely highest value, the value to which all other values must be subordinate, where "should" is defined by the rational appetite's goal. Since desires value what things are, the infinitely perfect being possesses everything that the desires of any possible appetite could value, everything any possible desire could be a response to. If failing to give the infinitely perfect being the place of our highest value does not violate the rational appetite's goal, one of these truths is not true: the infinitely perfect being is what he is; or, the objects of desire and choice are what things are.

Again, any choice assigns something a comparative place in our values higher than something else. If we are tempted to choose acts like blasphemy, lying under oath, offering incense to idols, etc., we are being tempted so to choose that we give God the status, in our system of values, of being less than the highest and ruling value. In so doing we would be evaluating the infinite being as if there was something greater than it in respect to what the rational appetite is oriented to value: being as known by reason. It is inconsistent with rationally known truth to place a higher value on what anything else is than on what God is, because reason knows that God has as much of what the rational appetite is oriented to value as anything else can have plus infinitely more.[6]

An appetite with the goal of conforming to rationally known truths about what things are has the goal of evaluating things to be what they are, which amounts to having the goal of giving things the value of being what they are. To fail to choose in conformity with reason's knowledge of X is to fail to give X the value of being what it is. What X is in our values should, by the

[6] I will argue in section IV that if we put our interests ahead of another person's, we are really valuing what we are more highly than what the other person is. Likewise, in denying God the highest value, we would really be giving it to ourselves. This is inconsistent with reason's knowledge. Reason knows the comparative places of the infinite and the finite in being. If the rational appetite's goal is to give things the value of being what they are as known by reason, the comparative places of the infinite and the finite in our values should be the same as their comparative places in being.

rational appetite's standard, be the same as what X is in reality. Someone who loves God above all things is giving him the value of being what he is: the possessor of everything that any appetite can desire. If a choice so evaluates God that his place in our system of values is other than that of the highest and ruling value, the choice does not conform to what he is and so is defective; what God is in our values is inconsistent with what he really is.

The example of God shows how choices can fail to conform to what things are. Reason's goal is awareness of what things are, and our dispositions for choosing are dispositions for choosing on the basis of rational knowledge. So in comparatively evaluating things, choices cannot avoid relating to things as if the way they are evaluated is the way they really are. Wherever a choice can fail to conform to knowledge about what things are, an exercise of our dispositions to make reason-based choices is defective if it fails to conform to that knowledge and so treats things as if they are not what they are known to be.

Given the options for choice that happen to be open to us, certain things are so related to what we are and to what the ends we can choose are that we cannot avoid either giving them or failing to give them a value that conforms to what they are. Which beliefs these are may not be identifiable in advance. The beliefs that are so related to our choices depend on our circum-stances, not just on the finality of the rational appetite. If only God and myself existed, or if other people existed but my choices never related me to them, I could not comparatively evaluate other human beings and myself in ways that either conform or fail to conform to what we are. But though the possibility of valuing a hat, for example, to be other than what it is may not be open to me,[7] I cannot avoid situations where it is possible so to evaluate persons, human or divine. There are times when I cannot avoid choosing consciously to act toward persons as if they are what they are or as if they are not what they are.

[7] But what if I worship a hat as an idol?

IV

I will now argue that choices achieve or fail to achieve the hypothesized goal of conforming to what things are with reference to the second basic moral claim, that we should love other human beings as ourselves.

All ethical systems at times make moral judgments by calculating consequences external to choices. Conversely, all ethical systems, even utilitarianism and its relatives, make some moral judgments preceding the judgments that come from calculating consequences. Prior to any calculation we must choose whose interests should be included in the calculation and whether or not their interests should be counted equally. Calculation cannot begin until these choices (as well as other choices) are made. Since these are choices about how we *should* calculate, utilitarians presuppose moral choices not made by calculating consequences external to the choices.[8] Most utilitarians hold, for example, that we should count the interests of all human beings equally. But whom *should* we count as human beings: fetuses, children, the irreversibly insane or comatose? And not all utilitarians would agree that we should count human beings' interests equally. For example, should we provide for the interests of those who cannot defend their own interests before calculating how a choice affects everyone else? So even utilitarianism and its relatives make those moral issues which are settled by calculating subordinate to those issues settled before calculating.

In unwitting agreement with most ethical systems, utilitarianism and its relatives imply that the evil in a choice to gain goods for ourselves at the expense of the greatest good of the greatest number really consists of being *unjust* to others. We do not give others' interests the place due them, relative to ours, in our values, and so we do not treat other persons in a manner that is due them. If justice is an end by which we measure moral value, can the rational appetite's goal explain justice, that is, explain what it is for something to be "due" someone?

[8] Note that if all moral judgments are calculations of consequences, each person has, at most, the value of being a means to the accumulation of other goods for the species.

Suppose that I am competing with someone on a test to decide which of us gets a job and that our reasons for wanting the job do not make it more important for me to be hired (for example, I do not have a special need, such as a sick child who will not get medical care if I am not hired). Why is it wrong for me to cheat on the test to ensure that I get the job?

In choosing to cheat, I am not giving the other person's interests a value equal to mine; for I am not giving him an equal opportunity to attain the end we both seek. Why is it wrong to value our interests unequally? Both my child and my rose bush need food to live, but I do not consider the interests of a plant equal to those of a child. Neither the need for food nor the desire for a job exists in abstraction; each exists as a feature of a concrete entity. I do not consider the interests of a plant to be equal to those of a child because I do not give that concrete entity, the plant, a place in my values equal to that of the child. If my choices treated features, like the need for food or the desire for a job, as anything other than features of the concrete entities they belong to, my choices would be defective by the standard of the rational appetite's goal of conforming to reason's knowledge. Reason knows that only concrete entities, not their features in abstraction from the entities, exist. To give the interests of another person a value equal to mine is to treat the other person as in some sense equal to me.

The goal that measures morality is not equality but valuing things to be what they are. Unequal evaluation is a way to violate that goal: If two things are the same in respect X, but I do not value them to be the same in that respect, what they are in my values cannot be what they are in reality. But people are unequal in many ways; when we so value them, are we not valuing them as if they are what they are? Since reason can know all aspects of things, there might seem to be no link between the rational appetite and any *specific* aspect of things. Unless there is a specific feature or features of things that obligates by being what it is, the only obligation the rational appetite's finality could impose would be to evaluate hierarchically by degrees of being. If reason knows

that dogs are higher on the scale of being than plants, why would I not be obligated to sacrifice my rose bush rather than my dog, if I have to choose between them?

In fact, there is a feature of things necessarily linked to the rational appetite's goal with respect to which, if I put my interests ahead of another person's, I necessarily violate the rational appetite's goal. First, since we are in a conflict of interests, I must give myself a higher status *as a pursuer of ends*. To give my pursuit of ends a higher place in my values is the same as giving myself a higher place as a pursuer of ends. The recipients of the evaluations are concrete entities insofar as they are the agents and subjects of conflicting interests. The comparative positioning does not stop at our desires because reason is aware of the desires as emanating from and belonging to the other person and myself. In valuing myself to be higher as a pursuer of ends, I am valuing myself to be higher as being a maker of reason-based choices.

But, second, while most human adults are alike in having *some* rational knowledge, the knowledge on which our choices are based is not equal. Does the mere fact that another person has *some* rational knowledge determine whether a choice to cheat him conforms to what things are? Yes, because of a feature all rational pursuers of ends share that, due to the way it is linked to the rational appetite's goal, obligates the rational appetite by being what it is. The rational appetite necessarily orients us to the goal of making evaluations by *freely* choosing our own ends.

At issue in the finality of the rational appetite is not the degree of our rational knowledge but our orientation to use whatever knowledge we have to pursue ends that are our own because we choose them freely. We can evaluate our diversities only by freely choosing some end as the standard for evaluating. So the basis of any unequal evaluation is a prior sameness that is more fundamental than our diversity by the standard of a goal prior to the end by which we evaluate our diversity, the goal of making free choices of the ends that give value to acts like evaluating differences. Suppose a person commits murder but then kills himself; he has failed to treat his victim equally in the respect that

enables us to make any evaluation at all and determines the value of all subsequent evaluations. In a conflict of interests, we cannot avoid treating ourselves and others as equal or unequal with respect to being free choosers of ends, since that is the point of conflict.

But inequality is not the most precise reason why putting our interests ahead of others' misevaluates free beings; we are valuing them as if they are not what they are because we are valuing them as if they are not *ends-in-themselves.*[9] The only function of choices is to give, or to refuse to give, things the value of being our ends or means to our ends. We can evaluate other persons by whether they contribute to, frustrate, or are indifferent to our ends. If so, we are evaluating them as, and so giving them the value of being, means to our ends. Since we freely determine our own ends, we can evaluate everything else only by reference to our chosen ends. How is it possible, then, to relate to other persons in any way other than valuing them as means to our ends? We can choose the end of treating other persons as things that, like ourselves but unlike nonpersons, pursue their good by directing their action to freely chosen ends. Thus, we can choose our ends in a way that gives other people the status in our values of things whose action is directed to their own freely chosen ends or to our ends as opposed to theirs. If the former, we are evaluating them as ends-in-themselves, things whose action is for the sake of ends of their own choosing, not our ends to the exclusion of theirs.

Since reason knows that other persons freely determine the ends to which their action is directed,[10] our choices cannot avoid

[9] Aquinas, *ScG* III, c. 112; also, *STh* I, q. 22, a. 2 ad 3; II-II, q. 1, a. 2; II-II, q. 25, a. 3.

[10] If the rational appetite had a concrete mode of being, such as a kind of sensory experience, as its ultimate end, it would desire that end, and so hierarchically evaluate everything else by reference to it, necessarily. With the exception of a being whose infinite perfection would exhaust the idea of being, the rational appetite does not have such a concrete end. For that reason the rational appetite is necessarily oriented to making free choices of whatever concrete ends we will actually pursue. (See Yves R. Simon, *Traité du libre arbitre* [Liège: Sciences et Lettres, 1951]; Eng. trans., *Freedom of Choice*, trans. Peter Wolff [New York: Fordham University Press, 1969]; John C. Cahalan, "Making Something Out of Nihilation," in *Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Metaphysics*, ed. John F. X. Knasas

either being or not being in accord with reason with respect to other persons being pursuers of ends that they determine for themselves. When we choose the end of treating a person as something whose action is directed to ends he gives himself, what he is in our evaluations is what he is in reality. When we value him only as a positive, negative, or indifferent means to our ends, what he is in our evaluations contradicts what he is in reality. In our evaluations he is something whose action is directed to our ends to the exclusion of also being directed to ends he gives himself.

To evaluate the actions of another person as not being for the sake of ends set by that person is intrinsically defective—just as is the belief that persons do not set their own ends—by the standard of the rational appetite's goal. Valuing another person as someone who sets the ends of his actions, however, fulfills the rational appetite's goal; we value him as if he is what he is. Although we can evaluate things only by reference to our own chosen ends, one of the ends we can choose is the end of being moral by fulfilling the rational appetite's goal.[11] We choose the end of being moral when we choose to treat other persons as being what we know them to be, determiners of the ends to which their action is directed.

In my evaluations, it is not only a person's actions but also his existence that either are or are not for the sake of his own ends. I cannot place a value on his orientation to pursue ends in abstraction from placing a value on him; the way I value his orientation to ends is the way I value him. When I give his interests a status equal to mine, he has the place in my values of someone "worthy," by the standard of the goal of the appetite doing the evaluating, to pursue his own freely chosen ends. When

[American Maritain Association, 1988], 197-99.) But the rational appetite's necessary end, infinite being, is necessary only because the rational appetite is ordered to valuing things according to rational knowledge, which has being in its fulness as its object. So that which gives the rational appetite freedom of choice is also what gives the rational appetite the goal of *freely* evaluating things to be what they are, and vice versa.

[11] "Goal" and "end" are synonyms. For clarity, I have most often used "goal" for what we are oriented to prior to choice. That usage should not obscure the fact that *moral* value is measured by the relation between the prior and posterior orientations.

I give his interests a status subordinate to mine, the place his actions, and hence he himself, has in my values is that of existing to accomplish my ends as opposed to his. If so, the comparative places that we have in my values are not the places that we have in reality. Equality is not the core issue. To evaluate another person as if he were not the same as I with respect to being the determiner of his ends violates the rational appetite's goal because it evaluates him as being other than he is.

Another way to put it is to note that the rational appetite cannot avoid being oriented to evaluating things according to rational knowledge specifically for the sake of freely making things ends or means. Any appetite's acts evaluate things to be the kind of thing, or a means to it, that the appetite is oriented to. The rational appetite must have the goal of evaluating things according to our knowledge of them concerning the rational appetite's own orientation freely to make things ends or means. So in setting our own ends, we cannot avoid giving other people the place in our values of being oriented to the pursuit of their own freely chosen ends or the pursuit of our ends to the exclusion of theirs.

The fact that persons must evaluate other things by ends they freely choose provides another important way to put it. Since the value of other things must be measured by the freely chosen ends of persons, to evaluate persons as being what they are, we must evaluate them to be that for the sake of which every other value, that is, everything else, exists. If I do not value a person as something for the sake of which everything else exists, I am not valuing him as being what he is. (I can also misevaluate myself as if I were not something for the sake of which everything else exists—see section VIII.)

It would be contradictory for the rational appetite's goal to require us to will someone's achievement of ends chosen in violation of that goal. To exist for the sake of our own ends is to exist for the sake of achieving our *good* by our free choice of ends. We do not choose ends in a vacuum but to fulfill goals we are oriented to prior to making choices. Valuing a person as oriented

to his own ends means willing his good as my own; if I am indifferent to his good, I am evaluating his orientation to goods by my ends to the exclusion of his. And prior to making choices we are oriented to goals other than being moral, goals such as contemplation and nutrition, that we must will for persons or fail to evaluate persons as being what they are. If I know that reason, which gives us free choice, also orients us to the goal of contemplation, I cannot consistently value persons as oriented to freely choose their own ends, unless I will that they achieve the good of contemplation; I cannot value them to be things with one orientation but not the other. And I must choose to ensure, if I am able, that ends-in-themselves have enough food to achieve goods that the rational appetite's goal requires them to achieve, if they are able; otherwise, in my values they are not oriented to have what they need to achieve their ends, and so not oriented to achieving their ends.

To value someone as being what he is, I need not will his achievement of goods that the rational appetite's finality does not require him to seek. What he is makes it intrinsically defective for him not to freely choose ends in accord with reason; what he is does not make it intrinsically defective for him to fail to achieve a chosen end that is itself morally neutral.[12] But giving his *pursuit* of such ends a place equal to mine in my values is required by the goal of valuing persons to be free pursuers of ends. The rational appetite's goal can also settle disputes about degrees of importance in the pursuit of goods by what we need, as determined by what we are prior to making a choice, to achieve morally required goods. If Al's loud music at 4 A.M. deprives me of something that human nature makes more necessary than music to achieve ends that I am required to achieve, if I am able, he is not giving my achievement of ends a place equal to his in his values, and so is evaluating me by his ends to the exclusion of mine.[13]

[12] On moral neutrality, see section VIII.

[13] Equality does not mean that I must refrain from using abilities superior to another's if we are seeking the same end. We do not pursue ends by choices alone; choices direct our other abilities in the pursuit of ends. If the end we seek is itself morally neutral, and what we are prior to making the choice does not cause a moral difference in the importance of our

Finally, for finite things the rational appetite's goal of conformity to what things are does not imply a scale of value based directly on a scale of being. For the rational appetite to value things as this or that is not to value them as animal, vegetable, or mineral. It is to evaluate them with respect to whether they are free choosers of ends, since freely making things ends and means is what reason-based choices do. So our use of nonfree beings should conform to knowledge, not of their place on a scale of being, but of their relation to the ends of beings that are ends-in-themselves; human nature makes water more necessary for achieving our ends than dogs.[14]

V

Morality does not exist by accident. If reason exists, an appetite naturally oriented to freely valuing things as being what reason knows them to be must exist also. And if an appetite has that natural goal, its failure to achieve that goal is of necessity evil.

We cannot avoid using reason in directing our actions toward ends. Our ideas of future ends pursued while we are rationally aware, and of the means to achieve them, must be founded on our knowledge of what things are that already exist. But our use of reason is superfluous if the purpose is not to be guided by (and therefore conformed to) what reason knows. Also, our satisfaction in attained ends comes from rational awareness of what exists when the ends exist. But appetites produce satisfaction in the attainment of that to which they are oriented. Only an appetite

achieving it, evaluating us to be what we are as pursuers of ends requires equality in the opportunity to use our other abilities, of any degree; for they belong to what we are. It would be a failure to correctly evaluate us as pursuers of ends to evaluate our abilities to pursue them as if what they are existed separately from what we are as choosers of ends.

[14] The rational appetite's goal also rules out valuing animals, nonfree beings, as persons. Disgust at physical suffering comes from an evolved disposition that is the same for human and animal suffering. That disgust is aesthetic, not moral per se; if not, our disgust at animal suffering would not be a correlative of our ability to find them "lovable," in an emotional sense. But disgust at physical suffering is important for achieving human ends, so treating animals in ways that risk weakening that disposition is not morally neutral.

whose orientations are linked to the objects of rational awareness will produce satisfaction as a result of that kind of awareness.

Also, if none of our appetites had the goal of conforming to what we know by reason, either we would not make use of reason's awareness of what things are in seeking ends, or if we did, we could not achieve our ends except by accident, since only by accident would our appetites move us to ends in a manner that conforms to the object of rational knowledge, what things are.

Also, if we did not have an appetite oriented to valuing being in the broadest sense, we would not have free choice; for all our appetites would be for particular modes of being. The only desires we would then have often come in conflict with rationally known truths about values. So our desires would often necessitate our behaving in ways contrary to the only nonarbitrary standard for ethical value. For as we saw above, even utilitarianism must measure ethical value by rationally known truths about what things are, which is the one standard able to be nonarbitrary.

Also, since choices are able to relate to things as if they are not what reason knows them to be, note how paradoxical it would have been for nature (not to mention God) to give us both reason and will and not give us the goal of willing things in conformity with reason. Unless beings with reason were oriented to pursue ends in accord with reason, evolution would not have selected reason since reason would not have enhanced survival.

I will briefly state two more technical arguments. First, the fact that "good" is a description of a thing by a being of reason which states that the thing is a term of a relation of desire does not make goodness subjective. Since goodness is not a real feature added to those making a thing what it is, what is good (desired) about something is not really distinct from, but is identical with, what it is (a fact the post-Humean "naturalistic fallacy" fails to grasp).[15]

[15] Aquinas, *STh* I, q. 5, a. 1. These more technical arguments derive from principles of Aquinas. For him, the rational appetite's acting "in accord with reason" cannot merely be conforming to value judgments reason makes using as the standard some goal(s), X, other than that of treating things as if they are what reason knows them to be. In his ethics, love of friendship has priority over love of concupiscence (see David M. Gallagher, "Person and Ethics in Aquinas," *Acta Philosophica* 4 [1995] 51-71; Janice L. Schultz, "Love of Friendship

Moral good, then, requires that a specific kind of identity with what things are be associated with a goal of our dispositions for reason-based choices, moral good being a property of such choices. The "what something is" that is the good for the rational appetite must be the same as a "what something is" that is a truth known by reason; so evil in the rational appetite's act must be a privation of what something is for reason being the same as what the rational appetite desires. And the convertibility of the good with being implies that love of friendship for persons has priority over love of concupiscence for other things.[16]

Second, the rational appetite evaluates things by causing the intellect to make an ultimate practical judgment such as "Action

and Perfection of Finite Persons in Aquinas," in *Medieval Masters*, ed. R. E. Houser [Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1999] 209-32), and the obligations to love of friendship for God and neighbor are primary and self-evident. Goal X would be other than valuing divine and human persons to be what they are, and that is what love of friendship *is*. Since those obligations and our knowledge of them would derive from love of concupiscence for goods like happiness, contemplation, or the "basic human goods" of Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle, etc., they would be neither primary nor self-evident. The basic obligation must be to value divine and human persons to be, in their own ways, things for the sake of which everything else exists, as Aquinas knew them to be (see n. 9). We are not "obligated" to so choose that we relate to things *as if* they are what they are in our values. We cannot avoid doing so. That is why choices are intrinsically defective when what things are is not what they are in our values; if such choices were not defective, the true and the good would not both be convertible with being. What gives value to all possible ends is in God; free beings are ends-in-themselves, and other beings are not. So choices that make things ends and means in our values cannot avoid relating us to things as if they are or are not what they are. Since there is such a thing as divine and human persons not being, in our chosen values, what they are in reality, why would Aquinas need any other criterion to explain the moral evil of those choices? The moral obligation to will X, as opposed to the natural inclination to X, must come from the natural inclination to value persons, including ourselves, to be what they are, not vice versa.

[16] Aquinas, *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 4.These loves are not distinct acts; love of friendship wills other goods for the friend. Love of friendship relates to ethics presented from the viewpoint of goods loved by concupiscence, such as happiness, contemplation, or "the basic human goods" thus: Love of friendship's duty to will, by love of concupiscence, the good for persons does not tell us what that good is. But human nature makes it impossible to value human beings as we are without willing, or declining to will, by love of concupiscence, many specific goods for us. Goods loved by concupiscence provide content (*matter*) for acts for which love of friendship provides the moral *form*, the form of being a moral duty: It is for the sake of persons that we have the duty to will other goods. This fact is implied by, even if it is not the same as, charity's being the form of the other virtues (*STh* III, q. 23, aa. 7 and 8); they provide content for acts informed by charity, which is principally love of friendship.

X is my good."[17] The goal that measures the correctness of this judgment is not speculative truth. X may accidentally cause my death; if so, "X is my good" is speculatively false. Still that judgment may have *practical* truth, if it conforms to right desire (good will).[18] But "rightness" of desire depends on what I inculpably believe. If I believe X will cause my death, "X is my good" may not conform to right desire. Since practical truth presupposes rightness of desire, the beliefs on which rightness of desire depends must be beliefs about what is speculatively true, especially truths about the ends for which chosen acts are means. Rightness of desire depends on conformity to the speculative *truths* of moral *knowledge*, but moral knowledge must be awareness of conformity to speculative knowledge. We have a vicious circle unless, in the final analysis, what makes the desire that causes ultimate practical judgments morally "right" is conformity to truths of speculative, not practical, knowledge (see section VII).

VI

What is the value of a person so brain damaged that he cannot make reason-based choices?

The interests of an agent that first exists as a zygote are equal to ours because orientations to goals are what measure value. The orientation to future free choices of ends is what makes us ends-in-themselves. The agent existing at the zygote stage, and at every stage of human development, is oriented to future free choices of ends and so is an end-in-itself.[19]

Features acquired later cannot make an agent that first exists as a zygote into an end-in-itself. Acquired features get their value by serving the agent's interests, as determined by orientations to goals

[17] Simon, *Freedom of Choice*, 97-127; Aquinas, *De Veritate* q. 24, a. 1, ad 17 and 20; q. 24, a. 2.

[18] Yves Simon, *Practical Knowledge*, ed. Robert J. Mulvaney (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), 11-17; Aquinas, *STh* I-II, q. 57, a. 5 ad 3; *In Ethic.* VI, lect 2 (n. 1131).

[19] John C. Cahalan, "A Prolegomenon to Any Future Ethics of Abortion," *Life and Learning VIII: Proceedings of the Eighth University Faculty for Life Conference*, ed. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. (Washington: University Faculty for Life, 1999), 327-62.

that exist from the zygote stage on.[20] AIDS is an acquired feature that does not bestow value on its subject, since it is against its subject's interests. Acquired features bestow only a *relative* value, a value relative to orientations to goals that remain in existence, at least at the genetic level, as the agent that first exists as a zygote makes itself into each succeeding human stage. If a zygote's genetic orientation to choice were not that of an end-in-itself, nothing would be an end-in-itself.

If a brain-damaged human agent also were not an end-in-itself, nothing would be. The failure to develop a feature, or to be able to use a feature, that would be in his interest cannot make a brain-damaged human being cease being an end-in-itself. If it did, his value would depend on his acquired features, rather than their value depending on their relation to him; so he would not have been an end-in-itself to begin with as a zygote. Treating a brain-damaged person as if he is not an end-in-itself is treating him as if he is not what he is.

Another way to put it is that a brain-damaged person has, at the least, an orientation to free choice of the same kind as the zygote: the genome by which the zygote is oriented to develop the proximate dispositions for choice. A brain-damaged person may no longer share with the zygote the ability to develop those dispositions. But he still shares the ability to, and the orientation to, keep himself in existence; and he keeps himself in existence as an agent with an orientation, at the genetic level, toward free choice. His orientation to keep himself in existence as such an agent even includes the zygote's way of doing that, by cellular division passing the genome to new cells. The activity of keeping itself in existence as an agent with a genetic orientation to free choice is the underlying feature making any agent an end-in-itself. In an adult the continued existence of proximate dispositions for

[20] We could *choose* not to speak of "goals," "interests," "ends," etc. before that agent is conscious, but only of its orientations to produce "effects." That choice, however, would get its "value" from an effect I am aiming at, and an effect has value because of what it is, not what it is called. Zygotes are oriented to produce effects of the same kind as I am, effects chosen by the rational appetite. So I could achieve nothing by that choice of terminology, or any other choice, that is of higher value than what zygotes are oriented to.

choice is caused by the underlying actions by which the adult maintains its existence. The actions by which an adult maintains its existence are more complex than the zygote's. But we would not be living adults if cells in our body did not continue to reproduce our genome the same way the zygote's causality does. A brain-damaged agent keeps himself in existence—and has an interest in doing so, since he is oriented to doing so—as an entity that also has, at the most fundamental level, an orientation to free choice. He maintains his existence as an end-in-itself until the death of the brain stem, when he no longer keeps himself in existence as an agent with an orientation to free choice.

When I put my interest ahead of another's, my comparative evaluation cannot stop at our interests in abstraction from the entities whose interests they are; for reason is aware of our needs and desires as effects of dispositions belonging to us. If the fact that our desires are actualizations of dispositions requires evaluations made by the rational appetite not to stop at the desires, the same fact requires evaluations not to stop at the more proximate dispositions but to extend to the most fundamental dispositions of which the more proximate are actualizations. In an adult, the orientation to free choice does not require the existence of proximate dispositions for choice, such as a fully alert adult has; sleepers, the drunk, and the comatose have orientations to free choice at deeper causal levels. A choice that devalues a brain-damaged person's way of being oriented to goals has value for us only because we share with him an orientation to goals more fundamental than the choice. Our choice to value him as less than an end-in-itself treats him as if he were not what he is, a being with an orientation to free choice of the same kind that most fundamentally gives value to our choice. And the choice violates the rational appetite's goal in another way: it is *ir*-rational because arbitrary; it cannot have a reasoned basis. It is a choice of which way of being oriented to goals will be our measure of value. But a choice of any way of being oriented to freely chosen ends other than the most fundamental way must be arbitrary since *that* choice

has value for us only because our most fundamental orientation to the free choice of ends gives value to it.[21]

VII

"Evaluate things to be what they are" is not a moral principle. Consider that its epistemic analogue, "Judge things to be what they are," is not a principle that any science can use to determine what judgments to make about what things are. That epistemic "principle" comes from a reflexive, after-the-fact analysis of what goes on in first-order, non-reflexive inquiries that use principles like "Expect similar causes to have similar effects," "Do not multiply entities without necessity," etc. Likewise, "Evaluate things to be what they are" does not directly help us decide what choices are defective or not defective, though indirectly it might, just as epistemology might indirectly help the first-order sciences.

So the rational appetite's goal does not give us moral principles like "Choose in conformity with reason." It gives us principles, like "Do not put your interests ahead of another person's," "Treat persons as ends, not means," and others, that express causal conditions without which a choice cannot achieve the goal of evaluating things to be what they are. The reflexive analysis of what it means for such principles to obligate requires reference to the fact that choices have the goal of valuing things in conformity with reason. But we no more need that analysis to know that other

[21]What *good* are a brain-damaged person's orientations to him if they cannot be fulfilled? Ends-in-themselves are that for the sake of which everything else exists. They are the good, for an appetite that evaluates things to be what they are, to which all other goods are relative. To put an end-in-itself out of existence because he cannot attain other goods is to treat his existence as if it is not the existence of a good that is absolute by the rational appetite's standard; we are valuing the good he lacks more highly than him. Also, to value an entity as not being an end-in-itself since it lacks features that would be in its interest, as measured by its orientation to goals, amounts to valuing features in abstraction from the entity. But it is the entity whose interests give value to features, not vice versa. Also, his malady is defective as measured by whose orientation to goals, his or ours? He has the reachable goal, and so the interest, of maintaining his existence as a certain kind of being; if that kind of being has orientations that make him an end-in-itself, we must value his interests as those of an end-in-itself, and hence as goods of ours. But to end his life, we must choose our own ends in a way that excludes his achieving any end. So we are valuing him as if he is not what he is, a being whose orientations are those of an end-in-itself.

persons deserve treatment as ends-in-themselves from reason-based choices than we need the philosophy of logic to know that *modus ponens* is valid or epistemology to trust our senses.

Our original, prephilosophic knowledge that choices are morally good or bad comes from the inclinations that are the reasons why we call things good or bad. Without an awareness of those inclinations we could not have our awareness of things as good or bad, since to be good or bad is to be a term to which we are related by such an inclination. We need concepts to understand moral value. But the experience from which moral concepts derive is an awareness of inclinations, an awareness that cannot depend on mental states, such as concepts, other than the inclinations themselves; if it did, those inclinations would not themselves be conscious states.

When a child reaches the age of reason, he acquires a nonreflexive awareness that he sets his own ends; for that is what his conscious choices do. He is also aware that behind the behavior of other people are unobserved states like those he nonreflexively observes in himself; for he can ask others to think of a number, remember, close their eyes and imagine, etc. He is aware, then, that others are like him in being able to set their own ends. So when he ponders choice X, which puts his interests ahead of another's, he can know that X is wrong.

Beyond his awareness that X would evaluate himself and another person unequally, and so contrary to what he knows them both to be, he gets his awareness that such an evaluation is morally wrong from the fact that the rational appetite's finality simultaneously enters his awareness as a conscious inclination to choose in conformity with what he knows about the other person.[22] That inclination makes him aware of X as conflicting with a goal of what he is doing in making a reason-based choice.

[22] Awareness of the rational appetite's inclination is not a special tingle or twitch. Included, implicitly or explicitly, in the awareness that we are faced with a choice is the fact that we cannot avoid basing the choice on rational knowledge, and so the fact that we cannot avoid the culpability or credit that comes from the choice's being based on knowledge of what the things the choice relates us to are. So normally we are nonreflexively aware that we are oriented to making choices that have the goal of conforming to reason's knowledge.

To ask how we first become aware of a choice as morally good or bad is to ask how we first become aware of it as achieving or not achieving the rational appetite's goal. The only possible origin is an awareness of the choice as the term, or as contra-term, of the rational appetite's inclination to its goal, which requires an awareness of the rational appetite's inclination. This is the origin of "practical" knowledge of a moral, rather than technical, kind.

The rational appetite's inclination is to conform to knowledge we already have; so that knowledge precedes the inclination the awareness of which makes moral knowledge moral. The knowledge that we possess prior to being aware of the rational appetite's inclination must be either practical knowledge of a technical kind like "To achieve end Y, make choice X," or speculative knowledge like "The other person can set his own ends," not moral knowledge. Moral knowledge cannot originate from an inclination to conform to merely technical truths. If the end in question, Y, is not the goal of the rational appetite *prior to choice,* failure to act as if knowledge of how to achieve it is true does not violate the standard of morality. *After* I have chosen end Y, to act as if what I inculpably believe true about how to achieve Y were not true would amount to absence of sound mind, not immorality. Knowledge of how to achieve the rational appetite's goal, however, is moral, not technical, by hypothesis. So the goal of conforming to premoral knowledge must be that of conforming to speculative knowledge, like the knowledge that persons can set their own ends or that God's being is infinite. If not, moral knowledge would exist before that awareness of the rational appetite's finality that initiates moral knowledge.

We express our initial moral awareness by forming concepts that are the moral meanings of "good," "bad," "right," "wrong," "ought," "should," etc. Then, when we ask "Ought I do X," about reason-based choices, awareness of the meaning of "ought" is presupposed in the asking. We cannot ask the question if we do not have an awareness of the orientation that gives "ought" its meaning. So when I ask "Is it right to do X," it would be irrelevant to ask "'right' by the standard of whose goal or of what goal?" The

finality that provides the standard by which to answer that question is presupposed in the asking. Here "presupposed" does not refer to a logical premise but to the conscious state of affairs that causes reason to function morally.[23]

When we ask "Should we love God above all things or other persons as if they are ends-in-themselves," the moral principles in question are self-evident, known true by the meanings of their terms, to practical reason. It is self-evident to *speculative* reason that a choice to love the infinitely perfect being above all else values his being according to what it is, and that, if we do not give a being who sets his own ends the place in our values of someone ordered to ends he gives himself, what he is in our values is not what he is in reality. And since awareness through inclination of the rational appetite's goal of valuing things to be what they are is presupposed when we use "should," it is self-evident to *practical* reason that we should love God and other people in these ways.

VIII

The moral defect in a choice that does not conform to what things are is intrinsic to the choice just as falsehood is an intrinsic defect in a belief. So all morally evil choices are intrinsically evil. But some choices have as their *objects* acts that we can also call intrinsically evil. An act that is an object of choice makes a choice evil by causing it to value things as if they are not what they are. The choice of some acts is evil only under certain conditions. But the definitions of terms like "suicide," "murder," "artificial contraception," "getting drunk," and others include causal factors

[23] Immoral choices conflict with both practical knowledge (belief) of the moral kind and speculative knowledge, the former knowledge telling us that the latter conflict is evil. The truth of items of moral knowledge can be explained speculatively, as I am trying to do, without making moral knowledge speculative. The statement, "'We should love God above all things' expresses a requirement for fulfilling the rational appetite's goal," is speculative knowledge about an item of moral knowledge. The moral knowledge is not deduced from speculative knowledge of the rational appetite's goal. That speculative knowledge enters the reflexive speculative analysis of the nature of moral value, not into practical awareness of a choice's moral value. The speculative knowledge that enters our moral knowledge that we should love God and our neighbor is knowledge of what these entities are.

sufficient to make a choice of *any* such act evil by the rational appetite's standard. Such an act is "intrinsically" evil in the sense that, no matter what good effects it may have, choosing it requires us to value things to be other than what we know they are.[24]

Murder and suicide put out of existence that for the sake of which everything else exists; so choosing them values the end achieved as if it were a higher good than ends-in-themselves. Also, if a choice gives sex the status in our values of not existing for the sake of making persons, persons do not have the status in our values of being that for the sake of which everything else exists; for the existence of persons is not even that for the sake of which a means of making persons exists. But by refraining from sex, we can sacrifice other goods rather than value sex as if it did not exist for the sake of making persons and so value persons as if they

[24] We can see why choosing a certain kind of act is immoral under all conditions only by seeing why the act's nature would cause any choice of it to violate the rational appetite's finality. Thus, Aquinas always assumes that moral evil is by nature a property of the interior act of choice. "*Principium bonitatis et malitiae humanorum* [i.e., moral] *actuum est ex actu voluntatis*" (*STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 2; see *De Malo* q. 2, a. 2, ad 3, 5, 10, 11, and 12). Even *De Malo* q. 2, a. 3, where at first we might not expect it, calls "moral" only *culpa*, not *peccatum*. Why a choice has this property is a different question. The *cause* of a choice's being morally evil can be the object, the intention, and/or the circumstances. The physical evil of a chosen act may alone be sufficient to determine that a choice would violate the rational appetite's goal. "Moral evil" is primarily said of a choice, not the chosen act, as "healthy" is said first of bodies, not food; but the features that constitute the *ratio* of a chosen act can determine a choice's moral value, just as what food is can cause health in a body. For example, the phrase "killing an innocent person" describes an act whose evil is physical rather than specifically moral (*STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 1, obj. 3 and ad 3); the phrase could describe an animal's act. But once reason recognizes that *ratio*, a different act, the act of choosing to kill, must be defective in a specifically moral way. And so the nonmoral *ratio* (the described act was not yet morally characterized; "innocent" makes a moral reference, but to something other than the act described) acquires a moral property, that of being a cause of moral evil in reason-based choices, required by its defining notes; as a result, the act belongs to a moral, as well as physical, category. "*Inquantum* [*objectum*] *cadit sub ordine rationis pertinet ad genus moris* (the object does not belong to a moral type insofar as it is what it is, but insofar as the performance of the act is directed by reason [cf. "*secundum quod est in apprehensione*," *De Malo* 2, 3]), *et causat* [*malitiam*] *moralem in actu voluntatis*" (it belongs to a moral type because what it is would cause the rational appetite's goal to be violated) (*STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 1, ad 3; and see *De Malo* q. 2, a. 2, ad 12). In other words, what the chosen act is, "*quantum est in se*" (*STh* III, q. 23, a. 7), is not suitable matter to receive, from a will with charity, the form of being a virtuous act.

were not that for the sake of which everything else exists.[25] Also, drunkenness differs from drug-caused unconsciousness in that we continue to act in ways that would otherwise be under the control of the rational appetite. Since we are valuing some other good over rational control of our acts, which is what makes us ends-in-themselves, we are evaluating being an end-in-itself as if it were not being that for the sake of which everything exists.

Definitions of other acts also express necessary conditions for choices to conform to reason. But the definitions of some acts, like "breaking a promise," include causal factors sufficient to make a choice defective *unless other factors exist that involve something that the rational appetite should value more highly* than keeping a promise, value more highly by the standard of what human ends-in-themselves need in order to achieve their ends. Reason tells us that achieving ends requires social arrangements such as promises, but reason also tells us that there are some things we need more, like food. If keeping a promise to play golf would put a child at risk of starving, we would be sacrificing the greater good of one end-in-itself to the lesser good of another and so fail to treat the child's interests as equal to those of other persons.

In some cases, we know that the combination of notes defining an act produces the effect that choosing the act is wrong. If so, the relation of those notes to a choice's defectiveness can be stated in unqualified formulas like "Killing an innocent person is always wrong." In other cases, we know that the defining notes produce this effect unless impeded from doing so by other causes, or unless other causes produce the opposite effect, although the possible mitigating factors are too numerous to include in a definition of a term. If so, the relation of the defining notes to a choice's defectiveness must be qualified by a *ceteris paribus* clause as in "Breaking a promise is wrong, all other things being equal."

The latter cases, however, are not morally neutral. Failure to follow the general principle *always* requires justification; if no mitigating causes are present, the notes in the definition are sufficient to cause a defective choice. Likewise, the law of

[25] A detailed version of this new birth-control argument is available from the author

induction tells us that similar causes have similar effects, all other things being equal; so in the absence of other causes, we know the kind of effect that will occur.

Other action terms, such as "playing loud music," refer to morally neutral acts. Their definitions do not include conditions sufficient to make the choice of the act either successful or defective by the standard of the rational appetite's goal. Effects of individual cases (effects other than those defining an act) on people's ability to pursue ends determine whether choosing the act puts our interests ahead of others'. Loud music at 4 A.M. can deprive other persons of sleep, which human nature makes us need more than entertainment to achieve our ends.

IX

This analysis of moral obligation is implied by our everyday beliefs. Before we are misled by philosophy or pseudo-social science, we know that a deliberate injustice done to a person is something evil independently of our subjective preferences, evil in its nature. To believe that act X does not give someone his due is to believe that *what he is* is due something, and hence that to deprive him of his due is to treat him as if he is not what he is. But does X treat him as if he is not what he is *because* something is due what he is; or is something due him because treating him otherwise would treat him as if he is not what he is? To answer this question note that what is "due" him must also be due him by the standard of some goal to which we are oriented. We know that it is not due him from his cat but from beings with a certain goal. What goal?

From our own case we also know that, once we have achieved rational awareness, directing ourselves to an end amounts to choosing to use one consciously conceived causal connection rather than another as the plan by which we direct our action.[26] We can bomb a factory because we use our belief that bombing it

[26] See my comments on *De Malo* q. 1, a. 3 in "Making Something out of Nihilation," 192-93.

will help win a war to direct ourselves to that end, or not bomb it because we use our belief that not bombing it will save a loved one's life to direct ourselves to that end.[27] But we cannot avoid choosing to use a consciously conceived causal connection (even a superstitious hope we choose to view as consistent with rational knowledge) as our plan, nor can we avoid knowing that we must choose a consciously conceived causal connection *for the purpose* of being guided by, and so of acting in conformity with, rational knowledge. So we know that contravening that purpose would violate a naturally necessary goal of reason-based choices. Is that purpose the goal that makes something due someone from us?

We also know that we cannot blame for an injustice someone who is inculpably deprived of the relevant rational knowledge, which is *knowledge of what some thing or things are*, since that is what reason knows. So we know that it is knowledge of what someone is that causes knowledge of what he is due. Hence, the answer to our question whether X fails to treat someone as if he is what he is because something is due him is no; something is due him because treating him otherwise would fail to treat him as if he is what he is. And we know that treating him as if he is not what reason knows him to be is intrinsically evil because we know that it violates a naturally necessary goal of reason-based choices. For a rational appetite, what *ought* to be (what achieves the appetite's goal) is that what something is in our values be the same as what it *is* in itself.[28]

[27] Note that what is inside or outside of our intention is determined by which causal connection we choose to use as a plan.

[28] I am grateful for the kind help of Janice Schultz Aldrich, Lawrence Dewan, Thomas Hibbs, Michael Pakaluk, and an anonymous reviewer.

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CATHOLIC BIOETHICS: THREE RECENT STUDIES[1]

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THERE IS A LAW that goes into effect when buying a new computer: it will be outdated and cheaper to buy six months later. Something similar happens when a theologian writes a book on the subject of medical moral theology: some new moral problem will emerge after the book is sent to the printers. It is also very difficult to explain and defend the Church's teaching on medical moral questions and much easier to create one's own norms while criticizing the Church for being obstinate or behind the cultural times. This article discusses three recent books that attempt to do the former rather than the latter.[2]

I. TWO TEXTBOOKS: ASHLEY AND O'ROURKE AND MAY

A) Complementary Approaches

Since 1978, Benedict Ashley, O.P., and Kevin O'Rourke, O.P., have published four editions of their *Healthcare Ethics: A Theological Analysis.* The first edition ran 14 chapters and 506

[1] The author of this article wishes to thank Bro. Nicanor Austriaco, O.P., for his timely criticisms of this manuscript.

[2] Benedict M. Ashley, O.P., and Kevin D. O'Rourke, O.P., *Health Care Ethics: A Theological Analysis,* 4th ed. (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997), pp. 530 + xiv. William E. May, *Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Life* (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 2000), pp. 340; Peter Cataldo and Albert Moraczewski, O.P., eds., *Catholic Health Care Ethics: A Manual for Ethics Committees* (Boston: National Catholic Bioethics Center, 2001).

pages; the latest revision has 15 chapters and 520 pages. It would be very valuable for the community of scholars and students who have specialized in this field if someone would write an overview of all these editions. It must be noted that the theology and moral conclusions of Ashley and O'Rourke evolved over the years, yet newer and newer medico-moral problems confronted the Church and world just as the latest of their editions came out. It was not their fault, for example, that when this edition was finally printed (1998) it contained nothing on Alan Shewmon's latest scientific doubts about brain death, the human genome project, or ethical questions concerning the separation of Siamese twins; the book was being printed when these issues surfaced. Similarly, when William May's *Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life* was finally printed, it contained nothing either on the Siamese question or on Pope John Paul's assertion that there is a moral certainty that total brain death can still be used as a criterion for true death. It is presently impossible to write the definitive and complete text in this field because scientific and medical advances or moral problems occur very quickly, and new moral perplexities emerge sometimes it seems on a monthly basis. Still, both books, each in its own way, are invaluable tools for learning the basic principles of this theological and philosophical science. What may not be found in one text can often be discovered in the other. They are in agreement for the most part on the mainline problems associated with medical ethics but also disagree on several key issues, including the use of artificial hydration and nutrition for permanent-vegetative-state (PVS) cases and the use of methotrexate as a method for coping with tubal pregnancies. These issues have not yet been settled by the Church's magisterium, so lively disagreement is reasonable. On other controversial issues both resolved and unresolved by the magisterium, they manage to agree but from different perspectives.

Ashley and O'Rourke come from a long Thomistic natural-law tradition in their analysis of the field of Catholic medical moral theology, but they also attempt to synthesize, coordinate, and criticize a whole gamut of authors who have written in the field

of medical moral ethics both within and outside the Thomistic and even the Catholic tradition. Their guiding light is called "prudential personalism." Many moral answers to medical problems are not moral absolutes. The virtue of prudence is necessary to solve these problems (e.g., what is ordinary and extraordinary medical care in particular clinical cases) in the concrete order of health care. The solutions must be such that the dignity of the human person is upheld and perfected rather than harmed. But what is perfecting or harmful is not always easy to determine in some cases.

Ashley and O'Rourke divide their book into five parts, three sections dealing with pastoral concerns and the other two with the core of medical moral problems. The first three sections deal primarily with the meaning of being human as an ensouled body, responsibility for one's health, uses of stewardship, patients' rights, the healthcare profession itself, and the team that surrounds healthcare administration. They raise the dilemmas facing many Catholic hospitals today concerning institutional identity, relations with the state, and the purpose of ethics committees. In the final chapter of the book (chap. 15, which could have been placed in the earlier sections), the authors rightly argue for a holistic view of care which must include the spiritual dimension of the human person. In this light they offer timely advice to priests, religious sisters, and other spiritual counselors.

The reason for all these chapters, which deal with moral theology or ethics in the broad sense of the word, is quite simple. The authors' goal is to reach a wide audience in the healthcare profession, some of whom may not be Catholic or even Christian. However, all medical personnel need to understand their own work as fully human, and not merely technical; doctors and nurses especially need to communicate to patients a great deal of compassion. The authors therefore want to show nurses and doctors alike that there are many nuances involved in healthcare that extend beyond simply giving people medicine or operating on their bodies. Ashley and O'Rourke also show the problems that emerge from a for-profit healthcare system and why such a system

has the tendency to neglect people's medical needs, thus violating their rights. In doing so, the authors remind the Catholic community at large how important it is to care for the human person even if he or she cannot afford the medical expenses such care involves. Also, it is necessary for the government to be aware of its obligation to take care of its poorer citizens, an obligation that arises from the dignity of the human person which grounds civil society.

Chapters 7 and 8 begin the more formal treatment of ethics. Here the authors begin to reflect on principles and methodologies, teleology, and higher norms coming from Christian faith, hope, and love. They also ask whether there is such a perspective as Christian ethics or whether this is simply natural-law ethics.

Chapter 9 begins the heart of the book which deals with the critical issues of artificial reproduction, fetal testing, abortion, contraception, genetic interventions, experimentation, mental illness, death, truth telling, euthanasia, and letting people die. Here the authors face the moral dilemmas head on and come down on the side of the Church's teaching. They do have some disagreements with other loyal theologians and students in matters that have not been pronounced upon by ecclesiastical authority. For example, in the area of assisted reproduction, they do not favor GIFT, a procedure that others loyal to the magisterium claim respects the moral integrity of the conjugal act. Also, Ashley and O'Rourke disagree with many on the issue of artificial feeding and hydration of those locked in what is unfortunately called the "persistent vegetative state" (as if humans became vegetables in a specific illness). They argue that since these human persons cannot function with their higher centers of life, nor feed themselves, such care as tube feeding is disproportionate to their needs; these people are really imminently dying and so should be allowed to die by withdrawing food and drink. Ashley and O'Rourke do not label such withdrawal as euthanasia but maintain that it is simply letting a person die. According to them, the artificial tubal feeding and hydrating merely prolongs the dying process (a conclusion

that both the Pennsylvania Bishops and the American Bishops' Pro-Life Committee, along with William May do not accept).

William May's work, *Catholic Bioethics*, is arranged in a different order with a somewhat different audience in mind. He makes no mention of pastoral theology as part of medical moral theology and simply divides his material into eight chapters of mostly direct moral questions with his replies and criticism of other theologians, including Ashley and O'Rourke.

Chapter 1 begins with a clear presentation in summary form of the major contemporary documentation relating to medical moral ethics from John Paul II and the Congregation of Doctrine and Faith: namely, *Evangelium Vitae*, *Veritatis Splendor*, *Donum Vitae*, *Declaration on Procured Abortion*, and the *Declaration on Euthanasia*. Chapter 2 is a very precise and critical review of what theologians call "fundamental moral theology" with the help of *Veritatis Splendor* and St. Thomas Aquinas. It leads to an identification of the first principles of natural law, and a discussion of how they differ from norms and why they are so necessary for integral human fulfillment as perfected by the redemption of Jesus Christ. As one reads these first two chapters, it is quite clear that this book is for theologians who wish to follow the teaching of the Church doing theology, not simply from reason alone but with the light of the magisterium. It will become quite clear throughout the text that May is trying to root his conclusions deeply in sacred sources. By contrast, Ashley and O'Rourke, whose intended audience includes more than Catholics, appeal more to reason and refer to the magisterium of the Church more in their notes than in the text itself.

In chapters 3 to 8, May takes up most of the same questions as Ashley and O'Rourke but adds newer problems: rescuing frozen embryos (not found in Ashley and O'Rourke); abortion (direct and indirect) and management of ectopic pregnancies; cloning (not mentioned by Ashley and O'Rourke); a critique of GIFT; a critique of Grisez, Boyle, and Lee on craniotomy (not found in Ashley and O'Rourke); experimentation on human subjects; gene therapy and screening; euthanasia, assisted suicide, and care of the

dying; caring for the permanently unconscious; experimenting on the newly born (contra the U.S. Bishops' older *Directives* which left a loophole and also not commented upon by Ashley and O'Rourke); PVS cases; defining death in light of Shewmon's challenge against total brain death as normative clinical sign of death; and finally, Shewmon's criticisms of using total brain death as the criterion for organ transplantation. Other subjects taken up by May in which he comes to positions that are contrary to those of Ashley and O'Rourke are the following: extreme caution in the use of fertility drugs; the ordinary comfort care of PVS patients (artificial feeding and hydrating as ordinarily obligatory); and methotrexate and salpingostomy as immoral management of tubal pregnancies (contra Moraczewski).

For professors and students of Catholic medical moral theology alike, these two books—taken together and notwithstanding the legitimate disputes among them—are a veritable gold mine because most of the main-line questions at present in this area of theology are discussed by each text. They disagree on several key questions on which the Church has yet to rule, and the debate is informative. What May will leave out of, for example, his consideration of the pastoral practice of holistic care of the patient, Ashley and O'Rourke provide. When Ashley and O'Rourke argue their convictions without direct recourse to the magisterium, May, often coming to the same conclusions, readily supplies the basic references to the salient texts in the text or endnotes. One could almost say these books bespeak a spring-time for theology wherein a homogeneous evolution of moral doctrine is taking place.

B) Criticisms

Looking back over Ashley and O'Rourke, we seem to find times when they could be less ambiguous on some of their minor positions. For instance, in the introduction, it might have been better said that *some* positions in the Catholic ethical systems are complete and fixed (moral absolutes forbidding certain acts for

example) while at the same time some solutions are historical and dynamic in character because they depend more on prudence than on matters of principle. Furthermore, on page 20, when making reference to Aquinas's list of needs in the *Summa Theologiae* (I-II, q. 94, a. 2), it might have been better to say that this is not a taxative and static but a dynamic list. Finally, one wonders if a view of healthcare as being concerned about all levels of activity, bodily as well as spiritual, blurs some distinctions between the ethicist, the counselor, and the medical doctor. Ashley and O'Rourke are quite right to point out the need for these people to work together. Perhaps, however, it would be most helpful to give one definition simply for the healthcare personnel, another for the ethicist, and another for the counselor, taking into account their specific roles.

It would seem that Ashley and O'Rourke give a poor example of counseling the lesser evil where they encourage someone to take the anovulant pill rather than the abortifacient pill (58). In this instance, the doctor seems to be a proximate material cooperator in an evil act. This is different from the case where a mother tells her abusive and drunken husband not to beat their son with a baseball bat but use only a belt instead. She does not give him the belt (unlike the doctor who encourages the taking of the anovulant pill) but merely, by advice, tries to lower the threshold of physical evil inflicted on her son. A Catholic doctor especially should not directly encourage his patients to take—or worse, give them—something the use of which appears to be intrinsically evil.

Ashley and O'Rourke address the problems of transsexualism, and give some criteria that would have to be met in order for surgery to be morally viable (341ff.). They believe that the problem is primarily psychological, and therefore that psychotherapy is in order. I am even less sanguine than Ashley and O'Rourke that surgery could ever conceivably be morally viable. It is worth noting that more psychological treatment is usually needed after the procedure because the operation offers mere temporary not permanent relief from undue anxiety. To undergo

such a mutilation to end a serious anxiety temporarily does not seem to square with the principle of totality especially since one's genetic sexual make-up is largely determined by the X and Y chromosomes. Therefore the problem seems to be not biological but environmental. If this problem is not biological but psychological, how can one justify an operation to change one's sex, as it were? The sex is really not changed and the psychological problem remains.

Like May, Ashley and O'Rourke neglect to speculate about the question of experimenting on spontaneously aborted or miscarried dead embryos. This is unfortunate, especially since it is possible in theory to establish "banks" of those embryos rather than using fetuses from recently procured abortions. The latter procedure, now federally funded in the United States for sixty stem-cell lines, would seem to be in complicity with those engaged in the abortion "industry" (material cooperation in evil); the former, assuming the consent of the parents, would not.

At the beginning of chapter 13, Ashley and O'Rourke seem to adopt the position of Boros, Rahner, and others that death is somehow a ratification of life or an active consummation, a maturing self-realization. While this may have been true for the majority of saints as they faced death, it was not true for all (St. Alphonsus Liguori had a most difficult death to endure psychologically). Most people do not experience death as Ashley and O'Rourke describe it but more negatively as a punishment which Catholic teaching says flows primarily as a result of original sin (*CCC* 400, 402 etc.).

Since the treatment of AIDS is mentioned from time to time by Ashley and O'Rourke (not discussed at all by May), they might have done a great service if they had given some insight regarding other sexually transmitted diseases as well. Today, there is an even more pandemic problem in the United States called HPV or the human papilloma virus which, according to the *Washington Times* (7 Nov. 2000, p. 2), has infected an estimated 24 million people. There are over thirty-one strains, one of which can actually cause cancer. This is a serious medical problem that deserves some

moral reflection. It is a side effect of (usually wrongful) sexual intercourse that affects heterosexuals as much as homosexuals, and is in no way prevented by the use of condoms.

Finally, Ashley and O'Rourke have left out the distinction between neurosis and psychosis. This was done perhaps for the sake of simplification, but such a distinction explains why there are some radically different types of psychiatric treatment.

Ashley and O'Rourke's book is more extensive than May's, and thus presents more grounds for criticism. This does not mean that May's book is a paragon of perfection. At times, May clips his arguments too quickly when it might have been helpful if several more paragraphs were inserted. This is true especially in the sections dealing with cloning and the danger of rape. Also, a history of the Holy See's position on craniotomy might have been a more effective way of dealing with Grisez et al.'s position. Furthermore, the work done by the diocese of Peoria could have been mentioned in the analysis of rape because its protocol for Catholic hospitals seems to be the most articulate moral solution to the problem and is consistent with May's thinking.

In his treatment of Shewmon's thesis concerning total brain death, May could have said more about how Shewmon has changed his conclusion twice based upon newer observations of the problem. Shewmon persuaded the Holy See to incorporate into its documents brain death as the criterion for death. Recently, as a result of newer research and reflection, he has attempted to show that it is not a valid criterion for death. After pondering John Paul's speech to the Transplant Congress (*L'Osservatore Romano*, English edition, 30 Aug. 2000, 1-2), the theologian who is sympathetic to May's perspectives could argue that while the Church accepts from the community of science that total brain death is a criterion for death with "moral certainty," she does not yet officially endorse it fully because it is in the area principally of a scientific conclusion rather than a direct moral question. Science deals with the clinical signs of death rather than a philosophical or theological question of death, which falls under the Church's sacred deposit. And Shewmon among others, since August 2001,

has raised grave scientific doubts concerning total brain death as the criterion for death itself.

May says very little about the questions surrounding the evil of sterilization such as vasectomy and tubal ligations which can have serious evil side effects on wives and husbands both medically and morally. A few paragraphs should have included something regarding the possibilities of reversing the various operations. Finally, May leaves out of his treatment altogether a consideration of psychiatry and its methods in treating mental illness. This would seem to be a serious omission that needs to be addressed in a later edition of the book. Fortunately, Ashley and O'Rourke deal with these vital questions, ranging from neurosis to homosexuality (which the association of psychotherapists still claims to be a mental illness, contrary to the association of psychiatrists).

Neither May nor Ashley and O'Rourke attempt to explore the right or wrong kinds of "Living Wills." Ashley and O'Rourke seem to think that these wills should not be binding (432). However, it would seem that it might be possible to write out the key principles in such tight legal language that one would be protected from abusive medical behavior on the part of the medi-cal staff of a hospital or even the local government. In any case, a solid criticism of some suggested forms already available for leaving instructions to health-care proxies or advanced medical directives is necessary for even the ordinary parish priest so that he may guide his parishioners away from signing documents that could lead to their being euthanized. May, on the other hand, while also opposed to writing up a "living will," has some important things to say about the "durable power of attorney."

These and other gaps in the subject matter in these books might be due to limitations of space placed on the authors by the publishers. Possibly Georgetown University Press was more generous in that regard in giving Ashley and O'Rourke a great deal more room to develop their arguments than Our Sunday Visitor did with May. Notwithstanding, it would be very helpful for future editions if both books had cases presented after each

chapter with questions for students to debate, as is done in more secular treatments of bioethics.

C) An Appeal to the Magisterium

There are some questions in dispute of notable importance, and both sides are convinced they are right. One is reminded of the sizable majority of theologians from the 1970s until the 1990s who were convinced that the "uterine isolation" for women who had many caesarian operations was morally correct until the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith taught that it was morally incorrect and essentially another form of sterilization since the uterus "as such" is not directly life threatening to the woman. Similarly, there were some who taught that stimulating an early birth of an anacephalic fetus was legitimate as a means to help the mother cope with such a birth, until the Holy See corrected them. It would seem that in these perplexing and complicated matters, one should be more cautious in presenting one's own analysis as the correct or final solution. Sometimes, Ashley and O'Rourke seem a little too eager to withhold hydration and nutrition from PVS cases. May would have built an even stronger case in this matter if he had cited John Paul's words to the bishops of California, Nevada, and Hawaii: "The presumption should be in favor of providing medically assisted nutrition and hydration to all patients who need them" (in *L'Osservatore Romano,* English edition, 7 Oct. 1998, 6).

The disagreements between these theologians on some major medical moral issues indicates that there are several topics ripe for the magisterium to make a decision one way or the other regarding the truth or falsity of certain moral conundrums, such as artificial feeding and hydration of PVS patients. For now, three fine authors and many bishops are at loggerheads on whether PVS patients are imminently dying or are better understood as being severely handicapped or impaired. If the former, perhaps they do not truly "need" artificial hydration and feeding; if the latter, they surely do. If the answer to these questions is not simply for

doctors to decide but for philosophers and theologians as well, it would seem to be within the competence of the magisterium to settle. Is it sheer "vitalism" (life for life's sake) to artificially feed and hydrate these patients? If not, then to withhold these vital means would be objectively a form of euthanasia. If the inability to feed oneself the normal way is not "imminent death," then this would obligate the next of kin to take care of these patients within reason, unless there were excessively burdensome factors impeding those taking care of them.

There are other questions on which the arguments have come to a standstill. For example, in an area where both May and Ashley and O'Rourke agree, does GIFT as a means for an infertile couple to have children interfere with the conjugal act or assist it? Further, is non-therapeutic research on babies in conformity with the statements of the Holy See against non-therapeutic experimentation on fetuses, or are the circumstances substantially different once the child is born? Further, is rescuing frozen embryos by married or unmarried relatives intrinsically evil by its very object or is the object morally good? Thomists in general prefer to let theologians argue things out, leaving some wiggle room for personal freedom of choice in obscure matters of morals. However, with respect to some of these particular questions, if not most, so many people in the concrete order are left to make decisions on their own. Therefore, it does seem reasonable for the sake of ordinary people's consciences that the Church's teaching office, like an umpire or referee, teach officially and make a judgment on whether certain more difficult conclusions of these authors are in conformity with the gospel or not. The reasons for both sides of the disputes are in both textbooks and it would seem that no new arguments will be forthcoming.

II. A Manual: Cataldo and Moraczewski

Catholic Health Care Ethics: A Manual for Ethics Committees, is not a textbook for those beginning in the field of medical moral ethics in the Catholic tradition but for those already schooled in

medical moral theology. It is composed of six parts broken down into thirty-one chapters written by twenty-six very competent individuals working in their respective fields of expertise, each and all, attempting to follow the Church's official teaching. The text is not bound but comes with a binder so that when future solutions are received from the magisterium or new medical problems or solutions arise, the National Catholic Bioethics Center can easily send supplements to the text since this field is an on-going challenge for the ethicist. The spirit of the all the authors of this manual or handbook can be summed up by citing a paragraph written by Peter J. Cataldo and Albert S. Moraczewski, O.P., in their article "Pregnancy Prevention after Sexual Assault" (part 3, chap. 11, p. 17):

> This conclusion represents our considered theological and ethical opinion (and that of the other NCBC staff ethicists). If this opinion is found in error by the magisterium, or is found to be in any way inconsistent with the teaching of the magisterium, then we will gladly retract the opinion and uphold the teaching of the magisterium.

Questions disputed among theologians such as May and Moraczewski are treated without bitter polemics as the "Editorial Summation" will say:

> Generally, if there are two compelling but contrary bodies of theological opinion about a moral issue by experts whose work is [in] accordance with the Magisterium of the church, and there is no specific magisterial teaching on the issue that would resolve the matter, the decision makers may licitly act on either opinion until such time that the Magisterium has resolved the question. Because less is known about the effect of methotrexate on the embryo and the possibility of the direct destruction of its life, the position of the National Catholic Bioethics Center is that this drug ought not be used in the treatment of ectopic pregnancy at the present time.

The *Manual* contains selected statements of the papal magisterium together with an extensive bibliography and an index. There are selected references and bibliography after each individual essay as well. Some of these studies have been crafted on previous issues of *Medics and Ethics* by the same authors but

more often than not the *Manual* contains first-time material of a very high quality. After each essay, there is an "Editorial Summation" where from time to time, the editors will state that a particular problem has not yet been solved by the magisterium and so one is free to follow what he or she thinks is the truth even after the editors give their personal opinions or the judgment of the Center.

Part 1 begins with the material studied in fundamental moral theology with certain adaptations for bioethics. This is a good review of some aspects of fundamental moral theology. Part 2 reflects on the moral responsibilities of ethics committees themselves—something left out of Ashley and O'Rourke as well as May. Parts 3 and 4, the more difficult sections of the *Manual,* take up "Beginning-of-Life Issues" and "End-of-Life Issues" respectively. Part 5 develops selected clinical issues for understanding wisely organ donation, genetic medicine, experimentation, and religious freedom and treatment restrictions. Part 6 concludes with institutional issues (note particularly chapters 27 and 28 on the problems of cooperating with non-Catholic partnerships).

Since the *Manual* was written for ethics committees and not beginners in the field, much of the material presupposes a great deal of familiarity with the subject matter and its methodology. Nevertheless, as a supplement to May and Ashley and O'Rourke, it takes its readers, intellectually speaking, to some very clinical or "on-site" practical problems whereby one has to apply the principles learned from the other two textbooks reviewed herein. Ashley and O'Rourke will speak about holistic medicine and some problems with for-profit hospital care today, and the *Manual* expands these questions from different points of view. Also, the *Manual*'s treatment of the responsibilities of ethics committees in hospitals also includes the bishop's committee, if he chooses to have one.

One might make a few minor critical observations of moral theory. One wonders if the principle of double effect could be applied in preeclampsia (a disease of the placenta) prior to

viability unless one could show that the placenta belongs to the mother not the child (part 3, chap. 10A, p. 3). Further, a deeper treatment of neurological criteria for death is needed in light of Dr. Alan Shewmon's brilliant address given to the 18th International Congress of the Transplantation Society on 29 August 2000. And Grisez's treatment of formal and material cooperation as found in *Difficult Moral Questions* (appendix 2) should be further studied and commented upon since he raises questions there not heretofore discussed by theologians.

The selection of texts of the magisterium or bishops could have been edited down to the salient points of bioethics, thus allowing the addition of more sources, such as the *Charter for Health Care Workers* (May 1994) issued by the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Assistance, several passages from the *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* and other documents on cloning, stem-cell research, and the like.

Textbooks on Catholic teaching of medical moral theology for at least the next ten years will have to begin with both Ashley and O'Rourke and May because together they lay such strong foundations for future speculation and practical decision making. One would hope that someday other problems not referred to in these texts such as indicated above will be mentioned and included in new editions of these fine works, which can be so easy for any reviewer to criticize but very difficult to produce himself. As newer scientific discoveries are made in this field, John Paul's guiding words will have to be taken into more account:

> We have devised the astounding capacity to intervene in the very wellsprings of life: man can use this power for good, within the bounds of the moral law, or he can succumb to the short-sighted pride of a science which accepts no limits, but tramples on the respect due to every human being. . . . ("O Mother, intercede for us," *L'Osservatore Romano* [11 Oct. 2000], 7)

BOOK REVIEWS

The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being. By JOHN F. WIPPEL. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000. Pp. xxvii + 630. $59.95 (cloth), $39.95 (paper). ISBN 0-8132-0982-X (cloth), 0-8132-0983-8 (paper).

John Wippel, Professor of Philosophy at the Catholic University of America, has presented us here with the richest fruits of his long and distinguished career as a scholarly interpreter of the philosophical thought of St. Thomas. In some 600 pages of text (plus 17 pages of bibliography) he has reconstructed for us the basic themes of the metaphysical thought of Aquinas in their strictly philosophical content and order of exposition, tracing the development of each theme through all the relevant texts in their historical order. Although much has certainly been written about the individual themes of Thomas's metaphysics, nowhere that I know of have all the basic topics been collected together in one place, with their interconnections, and each one laid out in its historical development through all the relevant texts of Thomas. This is a unique resource book for Thomistic scholars interested in exactly what Thomas's own thought on these topics was, not what was reconstructed by later disciples and interpreters. Contrary to Gilson, who in his later period believed it was impossible either to understand properly or to teach Thomas's philosophy outside of the theological context in which he developed it, Wippel is convinced that the philosophical arguments, even when used within theological expositions, are philosophically self-contained, and that, in the light also of the commentaries on Aristotle, Thomas has given clear enough indications as to the appropriate philosophical method for developing these topics. I think Wippel is quite right. It is worth adding that any literal following of Gilson on this point would result in rendering inaccessible the richness of Thomistic philosophy to any but theological students and Catholic ones at that—an entirely unacceptable practical consequence, as the practice of the majority of contemporary teachers of Thomism has made clear.

The contents of the book (condensed) and their ordering are as follows:

Introduction:

1. The Nature of Metaphysics
2. The Subject of Metaphysics

Part I: The Problem of the One and the Many in the Order of Being:

1. Parmenides and the Analogy of Being
2. Participation
3. The Essence-*Esse* Composition

Part II: The Essential Structure of Finite Being:

1. Substance- Accident Composition
2. Prime Matter and Substantial Form (change is included in these two)

Part III: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being:

1. Introduction (Anselm, etc.)
2. Arguments in Earlier Writings
3. The Five Ways
4. Quidditative Knowledge of God and Analogical Knowledge
5. Concluding Remarks

One of the special merits of the book is that Wippel gives us not only his own exposition—and interpretation, where controverted—of Thomas's texts, but also his own judgment on the significant controversies over them now going on among contemporary Thomists, always in his own characteristic courteous, objective, and carefully balanced style. Thus in the Introduction he shows that the subject matter of metaphysics for Thomas is *ens commune,* or the whole community of finite beings as available to our natural knowledge. God is not included directly in this subject matter, since he is knowable to us not directly but only through his finite effects; he enters in, however, as the ultimate cause of the whole order of finite beings, and therefore is the capstone of our human metaphysics itself. Wippel takes his stand in the often hotly debated controversy as to whether the existence of God as immaterial must first be proved in the philosophy of nature (as the Aristotelian Prime Mover) before we can begin metaphysics, as has been held by one tradition of very Aristotelian-inspired Dominicans. He shows that despite the fact that Thomas often speaks this way in Aristotelian contexts, his own exposition of the nature and structure of metaphysics goes beyond the somewhat ambivalent position of Aristotle to show how metaphysics has its own autonomous structure, and concludes by demonstrating the existence of God from his finite effects within the structure of metaphysics iself. This is an important conclusion for the authentic understanding—and presentation—of Thomistic metaphysics today, and I think Wippel has made a convincing case for it.

In part 2, in the section on essence-*esse* composition, the most important single conclusion, to my mind, that emerges from Wippel's long and careful exegesis of all the relevant texts on the real distinction is that, contrary to certain other contemporary Thomists (including, I believe, Joseph Owens), the essence-*esse* distinction in St. Thomas does not presuppose the existence of God as already established, but can be validly argued for on intrinsic metaphysical grounds of its own. Even though Aquinas does often start off with God and argue to the real distinction, the nerve of the argument does not require this. It works equally well even if one expresses it in hypothetical terms: *if* there were one being whose essence were identical with its act of *esse,* then all other real

beings would have to have a distinct limiting essence in order to be distinct from it; and since there are in fact many distinct real beings, then all save possibly one must have an *esse* plus a diverse limiting essence in order for them to be distinct from each other.

The generalized form of the argument is this: given any two actually existing beings, at least one of them must have a composition of *esse* and limiting essence in order to be distinct from the other. Among all the various arguments Thomas uses for the real distinction, the above turns out more and more, as his thought matures, to be the preferred structure underlining his texts. I think Wippel is right on the money here. His treatment of this and a number of other disputed interpretations shows clearly that he is no mere neutral repeater of Thomas himself but an astute metaphysical thinker in his own right.

Wippel is willing to admit that Thomas occasionally changed his position significantly as his thought matured. A clear example is his solution to the problem of the principle of individuation of individuals within the same species (chap. 9, sect. 4). Wippel maintains that in Thomas's earlier works this principle is judged to be matter under indeterminate quantitative dimensions, whereas beginning with the *De Ente* and henceforth it is quantity under determinate dimensions (*materia quantitate signata*). This also seems to me definitely the better philosophical solution in its own right.

With regard to the arguments for the existence of God, Wippel works his way carefully through all the relevant texts of the earlier works, then focuses in a separate chapter on the Five Ways. His presentation of the progression of thought through the succession of texts is especially helpful. What impressed me most here was the honesty of John Wippel, not just as a disciple of St. Thomas, but as an objective scholar and philosopher in his own right. He is not afraid to indicate that in at least two places in the Five Ways the argument, or part of an argument, as actually put forth in the text is of dubious validity or simply not philosophically evident as it stands. This occurs precisely in the two most controverted arguments among the Five Ways, namely, (1) the first part of the Third Way, arguing from beings that are generated and corrupted (if all beings were such, then at some time in the past all together did not exist, and then nothing would exist today); and (2) the first part of the Fourth Way, where it is asserted that wherever there is found gradation in the levels of being of being of a given perfection, such as ontological truth or being, there must exist a maximum in the same order, which is then the cause of all the others in the same genus; hence there must be a maximum in the order of being itself, which must then be the cause of all other beings. The well-known difficulty in the Third Way is how to pass from the fact that each one of such contingent beings at some time does not exist to the conclusion that at some time (*aliquando*) all together did not exist. Wippel sees no way that this argument can be made to work unless it is equated with the earlier argument in the *Summa contra Gentiles* (*ScG* I, c. 15), as a number of commentators in fact do. The latter is indeed a valid argument, but a close textual reading indicates that it must be considered an irreducibly

distinct argument—unless, of course, one is willing to admit that St. Thomas himself has written an extremely convoluted and carelessly worded text (*aliquando* would have to mean "always") that could have been expressed in much simpler and clearer terms: for example, "Lacking an adequate causal source, none of these contingent beings could ever have begun to exist at all; there would *always* [not just 'at some time'] have been nothing." I think Wippel is entirely correct here in his reading and judgment on the actual text of the Third Way as it stands.

In the second case, the difficulty is that the argument in the Fourth Way first concludes directly to a maximum from the mere fact of higher and lower grades of perfection in being; then this maximum is declared to be the efficient cause of all others in the same genus, on the authority of a text of Aristotle in book 2 of the *Metaphysics*. Presumably efficient causality is not the operative principle in the first part of the argument as it stands, but only comes in the second part. But as Wippel correctly points out, in his realistic metaphysics Thomas ordinarily passes from finite degrees of perfection in being to a maximum, which must itself be infinite, only through the mediation of efficient causality (a finite being needs an efficient cause to explain why it actually possesses this limited mode of being and not some other one). It is not possible to pass directly through exemplary causality alone to a maximum, unless the framework of efficient causality is first presupposed. Furthermore, there is no way of justifying a general principle that in every genus where there are degrees of perfection there must always be a maximum in that same genus. This adage was widely and uncritically accepted among thirteenth-century thinkers on the authority of Aristotle's text. Thus there was a maximum in the genus of animals, of jewels (the pearl), of flowers, of heat, of light, etc. Saint Thomas seems to refer to this principle as well known, without further jusification needed. But it is obviously a highly dubious principle, at least if the maximum is taken as really existing and not just ideal. It is easy enough to fix up the argument by inserting efficient causality as the nerve of the ascent from finite to maximum in the first part, with no second part needed. But that is not what Thomas actually does. Wippel rightly judges that the text does not contain sufficient evidence for validity as it now stands; the proper order is reversed.

Wippel stops here. He does not go on to mention how Thomas came to follow this strange order, which would partly excuse Thomas. The trouble arises from the fact that both Thomas and other thirteenth-century writers were relying on a serious mistranslation of Aristotle's text, reversing its proper order. As all standard modern translations clearly show, what Aristotle actually said was: "That which is the cause of all in a genus is the maximum in that genus," where the maximum follows from the causality, not the opposite, as in the older translation. The remarkable thing is that when Thomas finally gets the later, more accurate translation of William of Moerbeke and comments explicitly on the same text, he gets it right! Unfortunately Thomas never goes back to revise

the Fourth Way or inform us of the mistranslation. Still, he should never have allowed himself to accept uncritically this dubious adage in the first place.

Both of the above cases, where Wippel does not hesitate to be quietly critical of the validity of some of Aquinas's arguments, bear impressive witness, it seems to me, to Wippel's primary dedication to scholarly objectivity in textual interpretation and to his own independent metaphysical astuteness.

Lastly, the reader should note that Wippel has deliberately omitted full treatment of the philosophy of God. He has treated the basic ascent from finite being to infinite being, together with a few key attributes of God such as simplicity, unicity, and infinity, and how we get to know God by analogy, but not all the philosophically accessible attributes, and in particular not the divine mode of providence and governance of the created world, including such much-debated topics as God's knowledge of free future actions. I think we would all be keenly interested in how Wippel would handle such questions, but he has judged that this would lengthen beyond measure an already unusually thick volume.

The one topic that surprised and somewhat disappointed me, by its extremely brief treatment, is that of the transcendental properties: of being as one, true (intelligible), good, and beautiful. Only three pages are given to it, and none to beauty (admittedly, there is a debate among Thomists whether beauty is a distinct transcendental property belonging to all beings, including God). Some Thomistic scholars like Jan Aertsen consider this "Treatise on the Transcendentals" to be the central pillar of all medieval metaphysics, including that of Thomas. I think myself this is going too far as regards St. Thomas, at least in view of the modest amount of textual attention he pays to it, though it is of profound importance in itself and is pervasively presupposed all through Thomas's work.

We should be more than grateful for what Wippel has given us: a rich and reliable treasury of Thomistic scholarship on the key themes of Thomas's metaphysical thought that will remain an irreplaceable resource tool for Thomistic scholars for many years to come.

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Facing History: A Different Thomas Aquinas. By Leonard E. Boyle, O. P. With an Introduction by J.-P. Torrell, O.P. *Textes et Études du Moyen Âge*, 13. Louvain-La-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2000. Pp. xxxiv + 170 (paper).

As the great Dominican medievalist Leonard Boyle struggled against the ravages of cancer at the end of his life, the project that was dearest to him was the compilation of his writings on Thomas Aquinas. While he did not live long enough to see that dream come to fruition, we are fortunate enough to see the fruits in this collection from the International Federation of Institutes of Medieval Studies (of which Boyle was the founding President). The chronologically arranged essays span some twenty-five years (1974-1999) and specialists in Aquinas have probably already read them along the way. Nevertheless, their collection into one volume provides a whole that illuminates the parts in new ways, especially with the aid of Jean-Pierre Torrell's masterful "Introduction." Taken as a whole, Boyle's studies shed light on the meaning of his life as a medievalist and a Dominican, the mission and spirituality of the Dominican Order, the Church in the thirteenth-century, and especially the thought of Thomas Aquinas. As the title indicates, what emerges from Boyle's essays is a different picture of Thomas Aquinas from the one often presupposed by his interpreters. Instead of an isolated, insulated, abstract, university intellectual, Boyle discloses to us the historical Thomas Aquinas: a Dominican friar whose theological work was animated and finalized by the Order's charge from the Church to engage in the *cura animarum* through the preaching of the Word and the hearing of confessions.

The earliest essay, "The *De regno* and the Two Powers," is a study in how to read a medieval work in context, both internal and external. In the respectful way characteristic of all his work, Boyle takes issue with I. T. Eschmann's claim that the *De regno* cannot be an authentic work of Aquinas because it contradicts the *Sentences* on the relationship between the spiritual and temporal powers. According to Eschmann, whereas the *Sentences* reflects the broadly Gelasian dualism whereby the secular and the ecclesiastical have original *imperia* in their own orders regarding distinct ends (the civic good and eternal salvation respectively), the *De regno* supposedly argues for theological Gregorianism because it attributes both the *potestas sacerdotalis* and *saecularis* to the Church. Boyle's case against Eschmann is based on reading the apparently problematic text of chapter fourteen of the *De regno* against the larger context of the work. When read in this way, and taking into consideration that the question at issue in the *De regno* is not the same as in the *Sentences* (the former concerns the limits of secular power by spiritual power while the latter considers the problem of conflicting obediences), the *De regno* reflects the consistent teaching of Aquinas: the secular power has its own intrinsic end and *potestas*, but it is always subordinate to the spiritual power and so must defer to papal power when it comes to what pertains to salvation. Boyle concludes by showing that his own reading of Aquinas has external corroboration in John of Paris.

"The *Quodlibets* of St. Thomas and Pastoral Care" emphasizes one of the central themes in Boyle's *oeuvre*: pastoral care of souls as the motivation for theology. *Quodlibetal* sessions were academic free-for-all debates held bi-annually in Advent and Lent. They tested first the bachelors in the *disputatio*, and then the masters in the *determinatio*; what we have in written form are refined *determinatios*. What interests Boyle primarily is how these works reflect the contemporary concerns of the audience posing the questions. A survey of the quodlibetal literature contemporaneous with Aquinas reveals a surprising preoccupation with the pastoral care of souls. Boyle provides copious and intriguing examples of the contents of *quodlibets*, showing that they often look more like *casus* books on practical theology than speculative treatises. An examination of the *Quodlibets* of Aquinas reflects that same pastoral concern; nearly all of his sessions contain some pastoral questions, especially during his second Parisian period. Boyle shows how Aquinas himself explains why such concerns belong to the task of theology in *Quodlibet* 1, 7, 2: "Teachers of theology function like the principal craftsmen of the spiritual edifice who inquire and teach others how to procure the salvation of souls." Teaching theology is a higher activity than simple pastoral care of souls because "it is better to educate in what pertains to salvation those who can profit both themselves and others, than simpler people who can only profit themselves." Bishops and theologians are the skilled workers, while those engaged in direct pastoral care are like manual laborers. As Boyle indicates in the next selection, the moral teaching of Aquinas in his *Quodlibets* and the *Secunda-Secundae* would have a long but largely indirect influence on the pastoral care of souls through the medium of the popular *Summa confessorum* of John of Freibourg. From its earliest days, the Dominican Order had produced a rich literature of practical manuals dedicated to the pastoral care of souls; the most influential of these had been Raymond of Penyafort's *Summa de casibus*. John of Freiburg realized that Raymond's work needed to be revised canonically and especially theologically. Hence he reset Raymond's work within the context of a more systematic presentation of moral theology drawn from Ulrich Engelbrecht, Albert the Great, Peter of Tarentaise, and especially Thomas Aquinas. The *Summa confessorum* was destined to be the most influential practical and popular treatment of moral theology until 1500, and Boyle's account of its influence through the ages displays his extraordinary ability to detect literary traces in the tradition of pastoral literature.

Boyle's most important work on Aquinas is the justly-celebrated 1983 "The Setting of the *Summa theologiae* of Saint Thomas" and in slightly revised form it is the heart of the collection. The setting in question is the twofold mission of the Dominican Order: to preach and to hear confessions. To those ends, the Order immediately began to produce literature to aid the *fratres communes*, the average Dominican charged with pastoral care of souls without extensive theological training in either a *studium generale* or even a provincial studium, in the pastoral care of souls. It was the special responsibility of conventual lectors to oversee the ongoing theological education of their brethren, especially with respect to "useful and intelligible matters." Thomas Aquinas assumed this role at Orvieto from 1261-1265, where he must surely have had the occasion to

experience first-hand the problems inherent in an approach to theology dominated by practical concerns. It is Boyle's central hypothesis that dissatisfaction with this kind of theological training motivated Thomas Aquinas to attempt something new in his *Summa theologiae*. Having been given carte blanche by the Roman province to set up a studium program according to his own lights, Aquinas set out to broaden the narrow tradition of Dominican pastoral training by setting moral theology in its larger context. While he initially thought to remedy the narrowness by taking his students through Book I of the *Sentences*, he came to realize that his vision of a revitalized Dominican theological training would require him to compose his own textbook according to his own theological vision. So when Thomas famously complains in the prologue to the *Summa* about the inadequacy for *incipientes* of the current practice of teaching and the texts used, he is complaining primarily about the practices of the Dominican Order. The *Summa theologiae* is Thomas's attempt to set Dominican practical theological training within the larger whole of theology, and the tenacity with which Thomas pursued this project until the end of his life despite other pressing tasks is a testimony to how much it meant to him. Rather ironically, however, it seems that Thomas's overarching purpose was not appreciated even by his own confreres. For soon the "moral part" of the *Summa*, the *Secunda Pars* in general and the *Secunda-Secundae* in particular, were detached from their larger context and circulated independently. The *Secunda-Secundae* is something of *summa de virtutibus et vitiis* in its own right, since Thomas consciously attempted to provide an improved alternative to the extant works of the same genre (e.g. William Peraldus), and soon it was circulating on its own as such. As Boyle documents, the extant manuscripts of the *Summa* reveal that it was rarely found as an integral unity and that the *Secunda-secundae* is by far the most extant part. So much for the integrated vision, even among Dominicans.

The following three selections return to closer textual analysis. First, there is a manuscript of Aquinas's commentary on Book I of the *Sentences* that has several marginal references to "Alia lectura fratris thome." The marginal annotations constitute a kind of commentary reflecting differences with the text that are close to parallel passages in the later works of Aquinas. Dondaine concluded that these annotations do not constitute good evidence for a second or Roman commentary by Aquinas himself on the *Sentences*. Boyle disagrees, arguing ingeniously that the *alia lectura* is actually a reference to Thomas's original commentary on the *Sentences* by someone (perhaps Jacobus Raynucci) in possession of a *reportatio* of the later Roman commentary who is trying to correlate it with the text of the Parisian commentary. The parallels with passages from the *Compendium theologiae* are explained by postulating the Roman commentary as the source of the former. Torrell expresses serious reservations about Boyle's hypothesis, however, since there is at least once instance where a claim made in the annotations (regarding the possibility of establishing on rational grounds the plurality of persons in the Trinity) does not cohere with a contemporaneous work of Aquinas; until all of the annotations are published and checked against the parallel passages in Aquinas, Torrell's caution seems prudent.

With respect to "Thomas Aquinas and the Duchess of Brabant", there can be no serious question that Boyle has settled the mystery of the addressee of Thomas's brief *Epistola ad ducissam Brabantiae* concerning such matters as the treatment of Jews, taxes in general, and the sale of offices. Boyle expertly demonstrates by internal and external evidence that neither of the usual suspects, Adelaide of Burgundy and Margaret of France, could be the addressee. The internal evidence is twofold: Thomas's farewell wish that the duchess might rule even longer (*per longiora tempora*) and his address to her as ruling in her own right (*potentia vestra, dominatio vestra*). These remarks would not be appropriate in a letter to either Adelaide or Margaret, since neither ruled in her own right and so could not be wished a longer rule. Boyle therefore returns to an older tradition (from Tolomeo de Lucca) that identifies the addressee as the Countess of Flanders, Margaret of Constantinople, who ruled in her own right from 1245-1278 and was a well-known patron of the Dominicans. As further external evidence of her interest in such matters, Boyle notes that Margaret solicited a letter from the Franciscans in the person of John of Pecham on the same set of topics. The final piece of paleographical art is an analysis of "An Autograph of St. Thomas at Salerno." Thomas copied out five of his master Albert's commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius while a student at Cologne and Paris. A fragment of one of those autographs eventually became ensconced in a reliquary in the Museo de Duomo in Salerno. Boyle's analysis of this fragment leads him into the larger question of the original purpose of Thomas in copying Albert's texts. Gils and Shooner had earlier argued that Thomas made the copies at the direction of Albert to serve as exemplars at the stationers. Boyle argues that this is highly unlikely for two reasons: first, Aquinas's handwriting is so poor (*littera inintelligibilis*) that he is an unlikely candidate to produce an exemplar; second, the many errors in his copy do not show up in later versions, so it is highly unlikely to be their source. Boyle concludes that Thomas made the copies for his own use, following the pecia form already in practice at Paris.

The final and crowning piece in the collection is the French version of an address that Boyle originally gave in April of 1999, only a few months before he died, to fellow Dominicans at a symposium on Thomism at River Forest in Chicago: "St. Thomas d'Aquin et le troisième millénaire." (The English version was to be published elsewhere, but as yet it is only available on the web at www.op.org.) Torrell aptly describes it as a kind of "spiritual testament," and it has the feel of a family valedictory. Boyle begins with a reference to Aquinas's interpretation of Jesus's encounter with the Samaritan woman in his *Commentary on the Gospel of John*. Jesus is a model for Dominican preaching in the way that he gently reaches out to her. In response to her encounter with the Word, she becomes the first gentile apostle and a model for all those who follow the *vita apostolica*. As soon as she understood what Jesus had to say, she immediately and excitedly left everything (her jar of water) in order to preach the good news to the rest of her village. Boyle remarks that this sequence must be paradigmatic for Dominicans: first, encounter with the Word; second, contemplative appropriation; then preaching to others--*Contemplare et aliis tradere*. Once again, Boyle stresses his leitmotif of contextualizing the work of

Aquinas within the pastoral mission of the Order and indeed the whole Church. For the novelty of the Dominican charge to aid the bishops through preaching and hearing confessions bears witness to a truth too little recognized about the thirteenth-century: it was one of the greatest intellectual centuries in the history of the Church, but it was also "truly the first century in the life of the Church in which a general sensibility for pastoral concerns manifested itself"(148). When it comes to the intellectual work of the Dominican Order, the thirteenth-century was one of its greatest precisely because it was at the service of that pastoral concern. The intellectual output of the Dominican Order was directed precisely to aid in the pastoral care of souls. This was especially true of its theological work, since it was an attempt by the more educated members of the Order to aid the *fratres communes* in their pastoral labors. Dominican theologians passed on to others what they themselves first contemplated and studied for the sake of the salvation of souls. Indeed, as Boyle claims in the case of Aquinas, it would be wrong to describe his theology as at the service of the *cura animarum* in some extrinsic sense, but rather in an intrinsic sense: it is theology precisely as *cura animarum*. Everything that Aquinas ever read, studied, and wrote was with this end in view; this was the common vision of the purpose of study in the Dominican Order. Hence every Dominican convent ought to constitute what Aquinas describes as a *societas studii* at the service of the care of souls where what binds the community together as its ongoing source is a common love of the Word contemplated. Eventually the Samaritan woman had to accept the truth that her role as apostle had a limited time-span when the members of her village went to Jesus on their own. Boyle finds in her experience a paradigm for Dominican preachers: they must labor with the acknowledgment that they are inadequate instruments of a Truth that surpasses all that the human mind can compass this side of the veil and who will inevitably be superseded by others. Indeed, they must even face the possibility of rejection by others as Aquinas did. Boyle reminds Dominicans that they cannot make Thomas's achievement into an idol or forget his ultimate purpose in writing. Dominicans must study for the sake of the care of souls so that they can preach an intelligent and contemplative word which will always fall short of the Word.

I was blessed to be present when Boyle gave this last address, and it moved me deeply. It was not just because it was sorrowful to see him so frail. It was also because he articulated for me and all the Dominicans present the truth about Thomas Aquinas and the meaning of the intellectual apostolate of the Order by revealing, in the end, the truth of his own life. For his fellow Dominicans, Boyle's work recalls us to our original roots and our final end. For all those who would read and understand Thomas Aquinas, Boyle's work recalls a different Thomas Aquinas, the real Thomas Aquinas: Friar Preacher theologian at the service of the Church in the *cura animarum*.

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Introduction to Phenomenology. By ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 Pp. 238. $49.95 (cloth), $18.95 (paper). ISBN 0-521-66099-8 (cloth), 0-521-66792-5 (paper).

This thoughtful and beautifully crafted book introduces the reader to the fundamental themes of phenomenology. It focuses principally on the work of Edmund Husserl but also discusses the subsequent phenomenological tradition and situates this tradition within a broader philosophical context. For many years, scholars and teachers have lamented the fact that there existed no readable and reliable introduction to phenomenology that one might recommend to students (both graduate and undergraduate) and to colleagues from other philosophical traditions. Some earlier attempts to provide such an introduction have either relied on excessively technical jargon or misinterpreted key aspects of Husserl's thought. By contrast, Sokolowski writes with admirable clarity and offers a coherent and convincing account of Husserl's philosophical method. In short, he gets it right and says it well. Indeed, he manages to communicate the basic insights of phenomenology much more clearly and forcefully than did Husserl himself.

Husserl's principal contribution to philosophy was his retrieval and development of the concept of intentionality. He often described phenomenology as a response to the problems created by the modern account of mind. Modern philosophers interpreted the mind as an inner space set off from the rest of nature, a "cabinet" (Locke's metaphor) filled with impressions and concepts. Sokolowski calls attention to a phrase in Samuel Beckett's novel *Murphy* that perfectly captures the "egocentric predicament" of modern philosophy: "Murphy's mind pictured itself as a hollow sphere, hermetically closed to the universe without." Against this modern view Husserl reasserted and revitalized the pre-modern thesis that our cognitive acts are intentional, that is, that they reach out beyond sense data to things in the world. When we think or speak about things in their absence, and when we perceive them, we deal with those things and not with mental substitutes.

The opening chapters describe the formal structures of phenomenology: presence and absence, parts and wholes, identity in manifolds. Commenting on the first of these themes, Sokolowski observes that many readers of Husserl are initially skeptical of his claim that we truly know what is absent. We are so accustomed to thinking of cognition in terms of the modern metaphor for mind that we feel obliged to require something present, such as an image or a concept, as the immediate target of our signitive intentions of absent things. But Husserl insists on our capacity to intend what is absent precisely because this is what constitutes us as rational beings who can name things as identities across presence and absence and thus communicate through words rather than merely through signals. He also deals effectively with the objection that we sometimes experience hallucinations and often make mistakes in our perceptual encounters with the world. Husserl's analysis of perception highlights its perspectival character. Our perceptions are always partial. The perceived thing is, therefore,

a mix of the present and the absent. This situation makes for the possibility of error but also permits correction of error. Sokolowski illustrates Husserl's account of how presence and absence function in manifold ways by developing several instructive examples: the perception of a cube; the multiple presentations of the Normandy invasion as lived in first-hand experience, as later remembered, as depicted in films; a baseball game as first anticipated and then experienced; the same Mozart symphony interpreted by different orchestras; our self-awareness in the flow of interior time.

There follows a discussion of Husserl's distinction between the "natural attitude," in which we are preoccupied by things in the world, and the "phenomenological attitude" in which we reflect on the intentions at work in the natural attitude and on the objective correlates of those intentions. We achieve the latter point of view by employing a method that Husserl calls "reduction" which is achieved by suspending or neutralizing our natural attitude of belief in the reality of things and the world. Nothing in Husserl's work has been more misunderstood than this philosophical method. The purpose of this procedure is not to call natural convictions into doubt but rather simply to achieve a distance that will enable us to reflect upon them. The method is called "reduction" for it "leads back" from lived acts and attitudes to reflective consideration of those acts and attitudes. For example, we step back from our participation in the positing of things as real, but continue to maintain that positing as something upon which we reflect. The same things in the world are still there for our consideration, but the change in focus initiated by the reduction now permits us to appreciate them as intended objects. We now notice them precisely as perceived, as judged, as posited, as doubted, as imagined. Phenomenology thus helps us to notice and highlight the accomplishments that we take for granted in the natural attitude. It also helps us to retrieve the ancient and medieval sense that the disclosure of things, their truthfulness, is an aspect of their being. Here, and indeed throughout the book, Sokolowski emphasizes the continuity between the approaches of Husserl and Heidegger.

Sokolowski next shows how phenomenological descriptions elucidate three domains of experience: the internal field of memory and imagination; the external field of perceived objects, pictures, and symbols; and the intellectual field of categorial objects. Each of these studies is brilliantly executed. Sokolowski everywhere sweeps aside the superfluous mental entities that modern philosophers have invented in order to explain how inner images relate to outer objects. He writes with such lucidity that one sometimes has the impression that the matters in question must surely be more complicated. In fact, however, this is only because we are still under the spell of the modern metaphor for mind and still accustomed to the cumbersome modern theories of how images and concepts function as mediators between mind and reality.

Consider, for example, the discussion of Husserl's revolutionary account of the status of concepts and propositions, a theme that had been almost totally neglected in earlier introductions to phenomenology. Husserl explicitly rejects

the modern view that concepts and propositions serve as mediating entities that somehow link speech acts to their intentional referents. When we think, we do not rearrange or "work up" sense data and ideas; we do not use concepts as special sorts of transparent signs; we directly articulate the world and things in it. Concepts and propositions appear only when we change our focus from some part of the world to the way in which that part of the world is being articulated. When we consider a judgment or proposition we are still referring to some state of affairs in the world, but to this state of affairs precisely as it has been articulated, as it has been proposed by someone, whether that someone be myself or someone else. A proposition, therefore, is simply a state of affairs taken as articulated. Sokolowski suggests that the tendency to regard concepts and propositions as reified intermediaries is probably due to a confusion between object-oriented and reflective stances of consciousness. We move easily back and forth between ontological and propositional attitudes. The very mobility of our consciousness inculcates a forgetfulness of the change in attitude requisite for the manifestation of concepts and propositions. Concepts and propositions then easily come to be thought of as having a status analogous to things and facts. We thus come to think of them as separate entities situated in some psychic or semantic realm.

Consider also the discussion of categorial objects, that is, states of affairs that emerge as a result of our intellectual articulations. Such higher-level objects are not in the world in the same way as are simple things. When we constitute categorial objects, we introduce the syntactical connections made possible by language. The things and situations we perceive are thus brought into the field of rationality where logical connections form a network rather than a merely perceptual flow. Sokolowski emphasizes that this elevation of perceived objects and situations into the "space of reasons" does not distort or subjectivize things in the world. We still have to submit to the way things disclose themselves. Indeed, our speech acts make possible a more complete and intersubjectively verifiable manifestation of things. Our speech thus brings about "the triumph of objectivity." The discussion of these themes is designed to help the reader who is more familiar with the tradition of analytic philosophy to understand how phenomenology addresses topics also explored by Frege and Wittgenstein.

Husserl observes that there could be no sense of self-identity if we were not beings whose mode of existence is temporal. His account of the different levels of time-consciousness is notoriously complex and difficult to comprehend. He claims that the "living present" includes within its span a sense of lingering (or "trailing off") and of "coming into presence" which gives us our most primitive sense of past and future. Sokolowski elucidates what Husserl means by inviting us to consider what experience would be like if it were made up of a succession of "nows" that followed one another like frames of a film. If this were the case, our experience would be nothing but a succession of momentary flashes without any sense of continuity. Husserl also calls attention to our "dual status" as empirical entities within the world and as "transcendental centers of disclosure"

to whom the world is manifested. Sokolowski concretizes this analysis by giving examples of how our transcendental status is activated whenever we recognize ourselves as agents of reason and truth, as rational beings belonging to what Kant called "the kingdom of ends." When we use the words "I think" or "I believe" in a way that signals public commitment to a truth claim, we enter into the realm of rationality and thus become responsible agents of truth. Self-identity, therefore, is more than a mere continuity in conscious life. Its higher forms require the taking of positions and the accepting of responsibility.

Sokolowski next develops another neglected theme in Husserl's work, his distinction between two types of truth: truth as correctness and truth as actual presence. Truth as correctness occurs when a proposition is verified by matching it to the relevant intuited state of affairs. Truth as actual presence is simply the display of a state of affairs. The latter mode of truth is more fundamental and often occurs without being preceded by any focus on a proposition. Sokolowski also points out that Husserl interprets evidence as an active process, a bringing about of truth, an "evidencing." Husserl's emphasis on disclosure as the principal condition of truth is designed to counter the emphasis on method and proof first introduced by Descartes at the beginning of modern era. Descartes found the notion of evidence understood as disclosure too "unpredictable and unmasterable" because it made truth dependent on the commonsense judgment of human beings. His preference for method and proof over evidence testifies to the modern desire for mastery of everything: "It is an attempt to get disclosure under our control and to subject it to our wills." This is a perceptive analysis of one of the central themes of modernity.

Husserl constantly calls attention to the continuity between philosophy and the accomplishments of prephilosophic life. According to Husserl, philosophy's role is to clarify but never to replace these accomplishments. Sokolowski reminds us that the direct intrusion of philosophy into the life of political action and scientific inquiry usually culminates in ideological excess. He asks us to consider, for example, the many attempts of philosophers from Plato to Marx to impose utopian schemes upon everyday life, or the efforts of Bacon and Hobbes to substitute the power of philosophical reason for commonsense convictions. These remarks prepare for Sokolowski's comments on modernity and postmodernity. Modern philosophy is all about mastery, mastery of nature and mastery of human life. The latest swing of the pendulum has taken philosophy from this excessive confidence in reason's powers to the equally excessive postmodern reduction of all truths to pleasing or powerful illusions. Sokolowski's interpretation of Husserl offers a balanced alternative to these extremes. Husserl proposes a more modest and hence more viable account of the role of philosophy. Because of his nonreductive approach to the whole range of rationality, he is able to clarify how the world of ordinary experience is related to the world described by the sciences. Science requires special modes of intentionality but they are still human modes of knowing, indeed all too human. Sokolowski observes that many recent developments in physics and mathematics call for a more developed phenomenology of the kinds of intentionality at work

in such discoveries as the indeterminacy of measurement. This approach makes it possible to correct confusions about the scope and limits of the practical and theoretical sciences. It also encourages a more contemplative attitude towards the natural and the human world which in turn evokes a sense of wonder.

The book concludes with a concise historical survey of the phenomenological movement, and with some helpful remarks on the relationship between the phenomenological tradition and Thomistic philosophy.

This is the introduction to phenomenology that many of us have been waiting for. It offers rich and illuminating insights both for the first-time reader and for the long-term scholar. It also offers many original and evocative reflections on the nature and role of philosophy in our time.

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Descartes on the Human Soul. By C. F. FOWLER, O.P. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. $168.00. Pp. 452 (cloth). ISBN 0-7923-5473-7.

Not since Henri Gouhier's *La penseé religieuse de Descartes* (1924) has there been a study that presents the religious intentions of Descartes so well. Most studies of the last half-century, while focusing on Descartes's scientific or epistemological side, neglect his apologetic intentions. Sometimes they take his religious writings to be a camouflage to hide his ambition to replace Scholasticism without challenging the religious establishment. Not so Colin Francis Fowler, O.P., who takes Descartes at his word and studies his attempt to establish personal immortality by natural reasons. Fowler is not concerned to review Descartes on the existence of God; he properly concentrates on the literature that is concerned with showing that some part of our own being survives this life. This is a splendid piece of research and deserves the attention of Cartesian scholars, as well as those who study seventeenth-century religious thought.

Like a movie director who begins his film with the ending and then goes back to show how the action led to that conclusion, Fowler's opening chapter treats of Descartes's writing being condemned and placed on the *Index librorum prohibitorum* on 20 November 1663. His name was spelled "Renatus des Chartes" and the decree from the Cardinal Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of the Index forbade printing, possession, or reading of his works. The next year the 1644 edition of the Index gave an explicit list of some of his writings, but failed to mention the *Discourse* and the *Essais* of 1637 as well as the *Principia*

Philosophiae of 1644. The 1930 edition of the Index spells his name correctly and includes the all-embracing *Opera Philosophica*. Fowler reviews the speculations of Cartesian scholars regarding what provoked the placing of Descartes's works on the Index, but he does not settle the question. He notes that it was normal for such a Roman condemnation not to specify the reason for the censure. He presents an interesting summary of the speculations about the condemnation, including the opinion of Adrien Baillet (1649-1706), Descartes's original biographer, that Descartes was the victim of Jesuit intrigue. While Fowler does not go into this it should be remembered that Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) was a leading supporter of Descartes, and in the seventeenth-century controversy between the Jesuits and the Jansenists one way of scoring against the Port Royal group might be to malign Descartes. This hypothesis makes more sense than the usual theory that Descartes's attempt to explain the Eucharist in terms of his mechanistic philosophy was the source of his trouble with Church authorities; this last guess would hardly bring about a condemnation of the *opera omnia*. Fowler's account of this matter indicates the thoroughness with which he will investigate the whole topic of Descartes and the personal immortality of the soul. Incidentally, Fowler shows that it is only now and again that Descartes will use the terms *anima* or *animas;* he much preferred to speak of *mens* or "mind." This, of course, is only consistent since he repudiates the Aristotelianism in which "body" and "soul" are the usual hylomorphic terms.

When Fowler reviews the Scholastic arguments for immortality his Dominican training makes him a skilled and sympathetic interpreter. He reviews the controversies over these attempted proofs, showing how the challenges of Averroism opposed the Thomistic arguments, and why the controversies surrounding Pietro Pompanazzi's essay on immortality created such a sensation in the early sixteenth century. Fowler follows this literature down into the seventeenth century, including the work of Francis Suarez (1588-1648) and Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) as well as the more obscure Louis Richeome (1544-1519) and Antonio Possevino (1533-1611). The knowing way he treats such Church councils as Vienne (1312) and the Fifth Lateran (1512-1519) is one of the rewarding features of this book.

All philosophy students know that Descartes tried to establish personal immortality by claiming that he was "a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think" as he put it in part 4 of the *Discourse on the Method*. Thus when it came to his *Meditations* he was confident that, being a *res cogitans* substance, once created he would go on forever. What makes Fowler's study so valuable is his examination of the many issues this raised for Descartes as he tried to contend with the objections raised by his friend and agent Fr. Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), Antoine Arnauld, Pierre Gassendi, and others with respect to the immortality of an immaterial mind. It is not just the text of Descartes's books that Fowler handles so well; it is the writings of his contemporaries, especially the letters which to me confirm the sincerity of Descartes's apologetic intentions.

Fowler is very thorough in his study of Descartes's quest to establish personal immortality by natural reason, apart from appealing to Scripture or the authority of Church councils. He shows that Descartes before 1637 in his correspondence was working on metaphysical problems such as the existence of God and immortality. With the scrapping of the *Le Monde* project in 1633 when he learned of Galileo's troubles, Descartes went on in 1637 to publish his *Essais* and the *Discourse on the Method* in which he indicates the direction his approach was to take: inferring that he was a thinking substance which had no need of body in order to be.

Fowler follows this chapter with a review of the Scholastic attempts to prove personal immortality, taking into account the difficulties faced by Aristotelianism, with its insistence on the need of the senses for any act of understanding.

The treatment of immortality in the *Meditations* receives extensive study since the subtitle of the first edition (presumably added by Mersenne to whom Descartes gave authority to see to its printing) promised to establish the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. In his letter of dedication to the theologians of the Sorbonne, Descartes made much of his devotion to serving the cause of religion. After its publication both Mersenne and Arnauld were disappointed that while Descartes maintained the mind's independence of the body, he did not give what they had hoped for in the way of a proof of personal immortality. Descartes's response was to write the *Synopsis* and to arrange to have it inserted between dedication and before the first meditation.

Fowler devotes a special chapter to the notion in the *Synopsis* that "the human mind is a pure substance." For Descartes every substance is incorruptible and thus, excepting only the logical possibility of God withdrawing his concurrence and annihilating it, all substances, once created, are immortal. What we tend to forget, since we don't think always in Cartesian terms, is that the whole physical universe, the vast extended body, is a *res extensa*, and hence incorruptible. Our own individual bodies, animals, plants, and physical things are simply modes of this one substance (pace Spinoza) and thus change with the slightest movement. For Descartes all minds and the one physical substance are immortal. Again we have here an instance of Fowler's insight in setting forth this basic Cartesian teaching.

Having stressed the independence of the mind from the body as a substance in its own right, Descartes was undermining what we call the "unity of man." The fact that we experience ourselves as one being was explained very well by the hylomorphic theory of Aristotle and Aquinas, which regarded body and soul as co-principles of man's being. Descartes was always sophisticated enough to know what was at stake here, and consequently he always asserted the unity of man. However, his Dutch disciple Henry Regius (1588-1679), who was more interested in Cartesianism for its physics than for its metaphysics or apologetics, wrote of the Cartesian man as only a unity *per accidens*. For this he was rebuked by Descartes even before the falling out that came between them in the late 1640s. Again Fowler explores this controversy very expertly, as he does the

controversy with Gisbert Voetius (1588-1676), the Dutch theologian who campaigned against Regius and to whom Descartes replied through Regius.

Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680), who was living in exile in the Netherlands, was another correspondent of Descartes who challenged him to explain better the interaction of the mind and the body. Descartes was always consistent in affirming the unity of man but again he failed to come up with any explanation that would satisfy the princess. At last in a letter of 21 May 1643 he blustered that the unity was a primitive notion that was most difficult to explain. His attempt to defend personal immortality was trumped by his failure to give a satisfactory account of our obvious unity.

Fowler's book is most readable; the print is large with generous white spacious margins; the quotations are in English, the French and Latin originals are in the footnotes at the bottom of the page; references are given to both the sources in the Adam-Tannery (AT) edition and the CMS (Cottingham, Stoothioff, Murdoch) translations. Whenever a person is first mentioned his or her dates are given; reference to the writings of the others besides Descartes and his correspondents (e.g., Mersenne, Gassendi, Arnauld, and others) are well cited. The bibliographies are divided into "Lexica, Indecas, Bibliographies," "Primary Sources," and "Secondary Sources"; the last is quite extensive, including journal articles as well as relevant books. It is puzzling that the Haldane/Ross translation, which was the stand-by of graduate students from 1911 until 1985, is mentioned neither here nor in Stephen Gaukroger's biography of Descartes.

The book is expensive, but no library can afford to be without it. It is an outstanding study of an essential part of Descartes's work.

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Morality: The Catholic View. By SERVAIS PINCKAERS, O.P. Translated by MICHAEL SHERWIN, O.P. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2001. Pp. 121. $19.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-890318-56-6.

The publication and subsequent translation of Fr. Servais Pinckaers's *Les Sources de la Morale Chrétienne* performed an invaluable service for the professional theological world. Now Fr. Pinckaers's popular *precis* of that seminal work, entitled *La Morale Catholique*, with its attendant skilled translation by Michael Sherwin, O.P., *Morality: The Catholic View*, may reach a broader audience with profound pastoral effect.

Pinckaers divides his work into two main sections. The first offers a summary of the history of Catholic moral thought. In this section Pinckaers treats Scripture, the Fathers, the classical period of high Scholasticism, the period of the moral manuals, the Second Vatican Council, and the period following upon the council. Building on his historical narrative, Pinckaers proceeds more systematically in the second section in which he treats of freedom and happiness, the Holy Spirit and the new law, and natural law and freedom. This brief review will tie together three themes that appear in in both the historical and systematic sections. The first is history and *ressourcement*. The second is the relationship between morality as the search for happiness and morality as obligation. The third is the relationship between the natural law and the New Law.

Pinckaers begins with a tour of history. However, he is not interested in the history of moral theology for its own sake. The historical synthesis advances substantive claims about moral theology and the authentic forms of its renewal. It should be remembered that Pinckaers belongs to that generation of theologians who came of age nurtured in the promise of *ressourcement*. These theologians believed that the Church would be able to read the signs of the times and renew its mission in the modern world precisely by renewed contact with the Word of God in all of the modes of its transmission. Thus, the scientific study of the Scriptures, the Fathers, the liturgy, and the development of the whole theological tradition of the Church served no merely antiquarian interests but rather would "equip the saints for the work of ministry" in the midst of their world. In a phrase, these theologians believed that *aggiornamento* could only be secured by *ressourcement*.

The Second Vatican Council did not exclude moral theology from renewal and *ressourcemnt*. Indeed, the council mandated in its Decree on Priestly Formation (*Optatam totius* 16) that moral theology be marked by "livelier contact with the mystery of Christ and the history of salvation," that it be "more thoroughly nourished by scriptural teaching," and that it stress the obligation of Christians "to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world." *Morality: The Catholic View* places the reader in the happy position of reaping the fruits of just such a program pursued over the course of a lifetime. Pinckaers does indeed acknowledge the force of the obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world and yet he locates that and all other obligations in the context of living charity which responds to the good first and only then and in that context to the obligatory.

As if in obedience to the conviction of the council that Scripture should be at the heart of a renewed Catholic moral theology, Pinckaers rediscovered the wider realms of a morality tied to the life-giving impulses and inspirations of the Holy Spirit. For while Scripture does indeed in a few key texts (notably the Decalogue) refer to the key obligations of the chosen people of God, the heart of Scripture is found in the New Law which is chiefly the presence of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of believers. The Spirit enlivens and enables believers not only to meet obligations but to surpass the logic of obligations by living the beatitudes in inspired friendship with God. The pursuit and deepening of this friendship

sets believers on the path to happiness. On this path they are nourished by the whole word of God which deals with so much more than obligations. The Scriptures show the path to authentic blessedness. They illumine the struggle with suffering. They explore in both narrative and expository fashion the human and more-than-human struggle with human and more-than-human twistedness. They tell the tale of God's wonderful deeds and envelop the reader and hearer in acts of dazzled praise. Any patient effort to hear the whole word of God contained in the Scriptures makes it clear that, as Karl Barth once claimed, the first command of God to man is *"thou mayest live"* and that the whole Scripture is proposed for the sake of illuminating the true paths of life. So the council's instruction to nourish moral teaching with the whole of Scripture actually supports one of the governing convictions of Pinckaers's work—namely, that moral teaching is more properly and formally about the pursuit of beatitude than it is about the detailing of moral norms and obligations.

Pinckaers supports this reading by treating the beatitudes in Matthew's Gospel and the apostolic *paraclesis* in Romans 15. He notes that one of the most persistent and difficult questions of the interpretation of the beatitudes is the question of their practicability. By seeing the beatitudes as an invitation to a whole way of life rather than as injunctions of binding legal obligation, one can experience them as liberating rather than as oppressive. If one follows the inspired intuition of St Augustine in interpreting the beatitudes in the light of the gifts of the Spirit set forth in Isaiah 11, one is enabled to see that it is precisely the gift of the Spirit that makes the journey to heaven already a foretaste of heaven.

Pinckaers again makes clear the specific nature of Christian ethics by his discussion of apostolic *paraclesis* in the Letter to the Romans. *Paraclesis* is not a genre that issues specific obligations nor is it a genre that discusses formal rather than material qualities of good human action. Rather, as apostolic exhortation, it is a style of moral teaching that presupposes and deepens bonds of friendship since it hands on and thus communicates a share in the good of friendship with the Lord. This sharing in the good is personal and authoritative since it is not finally to be traced to the created structures of the world but rather to the life, death, and resurrection of Christ communicated in the preaching of the Apostles. This quality of moral teaching in Romans has sometimes been obscured by commentaries that artificially divide the letter into doctrinal and moral sections. This division has thus severed *paraclesis* from its roots in the teaching about the New Adam, grace, justification, and the gift of the Holy Spirit, making it sound like mere general uplift instead of the translation of God's election through Jesus Christ into graced and holy human action. And so the New Testament has no difficulty in locating the specificity of the way that leads to life in the truth about Jesus, in the truth about the Father to whom he leads, and the truth of the Spirit whom they send.

Neither do the Fathers of the Church lose sight of the specificity of the gospel way of life. The Fathers welcome as their own birthright the treasures of Greco-Roman civilization and yet they, as St. Paul did before them, subject all human

wisdom to the critique of the cross. Notwithstanding the gospel evaluation of the prospects for human moral self-sufficiency, the Fathers do share with the pagan sages the conviction that the moral life is at bottom nothing other than the search for true happiness and that virtue is that state of character which makes happiness truly possible.

The difference between the happiness made possible by unaided human resources and the happiness of the gospel is, of course, the New Law. The New Law is, as previously stated, the presence of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of believers, transforming them into true children of God by the gift of grace. This gift grounds the theological virtues of faith and charity. Here human capacities for knowing and loving God are transformed by God into a participation in God's own act of self-knowledge and self-love. These virtues and their accompanying gifts of the Spirit form the centerpiece of St. Thomas's understanding of the moral life.

Pinckaers sees St. Thomas through the sources he used rather than through the tradition he inspired. He appreciates Thomas's roots in the biblical and patristic emphasis on beatitude. According to Pinckaers, matters changed greatly and for the worse with the advent of the modern era. Nominalism, explained at length in *Les Sources* and barely alluded to in this shorter text, set the stage for a conception of freedom that detached it from human nature. In a word, for the nominalists and their successors, we are free in spite of our natural inclinations to truth and goodness rather than because of them. The freedom of indifference has sway over any inclination so that we could choose, if we so chose, to will unhappiness or evil as such. God is supremely free and his will is therefore constrained by nothing. It follows from this that the moral law is dependent upon a divine will that is, in the final analysis, arbitrary. The communication of this will to human beings is made in the genre of commandments. Moral behavior is defined in terms of free obedience or disobedience to the law of God and it is the task of conscience to determine whether the law has prescribed a contemplated course of action, proscribed it, or left it to the discretion and pleasure of the agent. Law and freedom are structurally adversarial, obligation is the key moral category, and the readiness to assign presumptive favor to law or to freedom does nothing to alter the fundamental assumption that God's law and human freedom are in necessary tension. It is only when God's law is seen as an ordering wisdom rather than as positivistic legislation, when freedom is understood as flowing from a spiritual nature which is naturally ordered to the good and to the true, that God's saving designs for human life are experienced, not as extrinsic impositions on human freedom, but rather as the liberation of that freedom for the attaining of its deepest desire.

Understanding freedom in this light can help us to see how freedom is not frustrated but fulfilled when understood in consort with the most basic inclinations of the human being. Our freedom is engaged, not smothered, when it is directed towards the good, the preservation of our being, our inclination to marry, our necessary orientation to knowledge of the truth, and our inclination to life together in society. These orientations are simply a way of describing the

way we were created. Any being who truly had no orientation towards truth could not be described as human. The same could be said of the other orientations as well. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these inclinations, which can be spelled out as moral precepts, are very general. They do not, of themselves, yield sufficient information or insight to make long experience, disciplined reflection, or the moral virtue of prudence superfluous for the moral agent. More importantly for our purposes, however, is the fact that these general inclinations are open-ended. They imply openness to analogical and graced modes of realization. The inclination to live in society is on one level an openness to communal deliberation. It is on another level an openness to live in God's own society in charity. While Christian revelation offers a critique of a purely horizontal ethics, it also affirms and deepens all that is authentically human. Christian morality may demand liberating renunciations that feel for the moment like impositions from without. But that is only for the moment. The promise of the gospel is that the same God who redeemed us is the one who created us for himself. God promises that nothing authentically human is alien to the gospel.

Father Pinckaers has done the whole Church a great favor in reminding us that the tensions between the pursuit of moral goodness and the pursuit of happiness are only apparent and temporary. The heart of the gospel is the promise of beatitude. The New Law already is at work in our hearts, gradually suffusing our lives with the only necessary and sufficient condition for true happiness, which is sanctity.

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"Guiados por el Espíritu": El Espíritu Santo y el conocimiento moral en Tomás de Aquino. By JOSÉ NORIEGA. Roma: Pontificia Università Lateranense, 2000. Pp. 609. L30,000.

This book is the author's doctoral dissertation from the Pontifical Institute for Studies on Marriage and the Family at the Lateran University in Rome, directed by Professor Livio Melina. It is a study well worth taking note of for its content, its method, and the conclusions the author draws concerning the teaching of St. Thomas.

The author, José Noriega Bastos, is a priest of the Disciples of the Hearts of Jesus and Mary, currently a professor of Ethics on the Faculty of Theology of San Dámaso at Madrid. The nucleus of the study is the text of Romans 8:14:

"*Qui Spiritu Dei aguntur.*" Noriega attempts to arrive at an adequate understanding of how St. Thomas understood the role of the Holy Spirit in the dynamic of moral knowledge, that is, how the Spirit cooperates with free human activity, so that man is able to do the good. This is one of the central questions of Christian morality, which in the post-conciliar era seeks to bridge the chasm between moral theology, dogmatic theology, and spirituality. Interest in these themes has led many specialists to examine the thought of St. Thomas, and with surprising results. Thomas was a pioneer in orienting moral theory from the point of view of the subject, in describing the exercise of freedom, and in illustrating the intrinsic presence of the end throughout the course of human action. He uses the *exitus-reditus* scheme to penetrate the dynamism that he calls the "motus rationalis creaturae in Deum." The studies of Pinckaers and Abbá, among others, concerning this topic have been groundbreaking. The ethics of the person, virtue, the understanding of charity as friendship with God, knowledge by connaturality, and the primacy of the Spirit, have emerged as new Thomist horizons. Such studies have made enormous contributions. But there has been lacking a study of the sources that inspired St. Thomas, and of the evolution that we find in his writings concerning the role of the Spirit, active within the free human act. Noriega seeks to fill this void.

This undertaking is difficult and demanding, for it presupposes a critical knowledge of all the works of Thomas and access to the abundant contemporary literature. The author has achieved his purpose and presents the material with mastery, in such a way that the reader, instead of being conscious of its difficulty, is able to delight in the logical clarity of the discussion. In this review we must be content to give a synopsis of the book's outline, along with a brief evaluation.

The work opens with an introduction presenting the book as a response to a lacuna in the field of morals: "one of the most fundamental necessities in modernity's moral reflection [is caused by] the loss of the conception of the practical originality of reason as it guides action" (13). Morals concerns human action, and hence one cannot exclude reason from it, nor the influence of the Spirit; nor should it be the province solely of technical reason. "For Aquinas, the influence of the Trinity on practical rationality centers principally around reflection on the power of the Holy Spirit's influence in the dynamism of human activity: thus the work attempts to rediscover the originality of this influence on the concrete action that man constructs upon a singular *notitia finis*" (14). Thomas does not always resolve this problem in the same way: in his early works he has recourse to the relation between prudence and the virtues, whereas later he prefers to consider the gift of wisdom and its influence on human action.

The book is divided into two parts, the first entitled "Génesis de un pensamiento" (19-237), and the second, "La síntesis de la *Summa Theologiae*" (329-552). "Génesis" is given to detailing Thomas's sources and analyzing the works he wrote prior to the *Summa Theologiae*. Thomas took his basic orientation from the biblical sources, two texts of St. Paul being pivotal: Romans 8:14, which speaks of the "Spirit's lead," and 1 Corinthians 2:15, which praises the judgment of the "spiritual man." The Aristotelian source of greatest influence

we find in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which explains the role of virtue and speaks of the judgment of the virtuous man in the famous expression "qualis est unusquisque talis finis videtur ei" ("as a man is, so does the end appear to him" [3.7.1114b1]). Thomas is always in dialogue with Augustine on essential matters, and he absorbed the latter's distinction between *ratio inferior* and *ratio superior*, and the doctrine of the knowledge of the mission of the Son. Pseudo-Dionysius left his mark in *The Divine Names*, in which he speaks of a new mode of knowledge, "not merely learning but also experiencing" (2.9). Noriega also numbers among Thomas's sources the Bonaventurian doctrine of wisdom in its affective dimension. "When Thomas begins his reflection on the moral life and the proper knowledge of the Christian, he encounters these five different traditions in a highly polemical environment. He is aware of them all from the beginning of his academic career, but will not make equal use of them throughout his life" (56).

A precise analysis of relevant points of each one of Thomas's works makes clear how all these sources become integrated in his thought. In the *Scriptum super Sententiis*, rectitude of action is explained by the circularity of understanding and will, elevated by the theological virtues (150); in the *De Veritate*, rectitude of action is explained by the "correct application" of the principles of synderesis mediated through conscience; and in *De Bono* Thomas insists more on the affective order (192). In the *Summa contra Gentiles* he explains the ascending movement of the natural desire to see God, led by divine governance and reason, and the descending movement of the Holy Spirit's presence, which makes us "lovers of God," doubly free, from both the law and sin (225). Noriega dedicates a large portion of his text to the "period between the two *Summas*," in which he analyzes the disputed questions *De Malo* as well as the commentaries on *The Divine Names* of Dionysius and the *Ethics* of Aristotle. The biblical commentaries on the Gospel of Matthew, the Gospel of John, and the Pauline epistles merit special attention. In this period Thomas decisively accentuated the role of affectivity and instinct in acquiring upright judgment. This affectivity is achieved by the work of the Holy Spirit, the Gift of God that rectifies appetite by charity and transforms it by friendship with God (327).

At the end of this long journey Noriega arrives at the synthetic moment, which he situates in the *Summa Theologiae*, Thomas's masterwork, which he began in Rome, continued writing in Paris, and brought to (near) completion in Naples. The entire *Secunda Pars* is devoted to moral action. It is here that one finds Thomas's response to the question, "How does the trinitarian God intervene in the dynamism proper to *ratio practica*?" Or, which is the same thing, "How does God help man to know the good that is to be done?" (338). God moves and leads man as an internal principle of action, of the infused virtues and of the gifts, and as external principle who instructs us through the law and saves us through grace. The development of this synthetic part begins with the analysis of the finality of human action, since it is the end that initiates the entire process; it is centered on the complex structure of the act, on actions

with respect to the passions, and examines the role of love in the action, preferably the love of friendship and its relation to knowledge of the good. Love consists of an *unio affectus,* and is man's radical passion. Grasping the disposition that love causes in the subject is a key to understanding the *bonum conveniens,* since there arises a certain connaturality between the lover and the thing loved. The human act, in its moral dimension and its elevation by Christian grace, implies three factors that have decisive influence in moral knowledge: the virtues, operative habits which perfect the potencies in which they are seated; charity as friendship with God, which is at once *communicatio* and *mutua amatio;* and finally the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which give to man a superhuman mode of operation. In order to give an account of the human act and of the knowledge practical reason affords, Thomas has synthesized his sources in an original doctrine. The Holy Spirit operates in the graced soul through his gifts, principal among which is wisdom by which man is "led by the Spirit" and capacitated to judge the ultimate causes, order his life according to divine commands, and direct himself toward his end, who is God.

Thomas's teaching on the activity of the Holy Spirit in the moral act is of decisive importance. He has posed the problem from the point of view of the subject, and therefore his analysis takes place from within. The cooperation of God with man and man with God constitutes the circularity of love that transforms man and renders possible for him a mode of action that is *ultra humanum.* Thomas makes use of his diverse sources, without identifying himself with any one of them, and achieves a true synthesis. "Therefore the wise Christian, who is the true 'spiritual' man (Pauline tradition) unites in himself the capacity to judge (Augustinian tradition) and to order [his activities] through knowledge of the end (Aristotelian tradition) in virtue of a special knowledge of God (Neoplatonic tradition), while being himself the rule and measure of his action (Pauline and Aristotelian traditions)" (558-59). The gift of the Holy Spirit makes human action to be a gift that seeks to share what it possesses. Between the human subject and the Spirit a unique synergy is produced. Man knows the end and is attracted to it. God who is love attracts him, and this attraction is stronger than man's own impulse to tend toward the good. It is in this way that Christians gain a moral plenitude of operation that is "led by the Spirit," as Paul describes it (Rom 8:14).

This work deserves attention for its content, its method, its analysis of sources, the documentation one finds in the notes, and its penetration in the work of Thomas from the concrete viewpoint of the knowledge had by practical reason in human operation. Both its merits and its demerits arise from the fact that it is a doctoral thesis. It has posed the problem of practical reason's knowledge in moral activity as found in the work of Thomas Aquinas, and has not only given a satisfactory response, but has made clear Thomas's originality in this field. Its exposition is clear and adjusted to the topics covered. There is a constant concern—one might say an obsession—over certain matters, over arriving at conclusions and giving definitive proofs. The author is much to be praised for his erudition, for his knowledge of the literature of both the wider

topic of moral action and the writings of Thomas himself. The indices (of names and of subjects) and bibliography are first-rate. Thomas the theologian is presented in his integrity, as master of the spiritual life, who unites the three wisdoms: philosophical, theological, and the gift of the Spirit. In the era of the recovery of Christian humanism, this work points out to us in convincing fashion the somewhat forgotten Thomist path. (Translated by Peter Fegan, O.P.)

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