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THE THEO-CENTRIC CHARACTER OF CATHOLIC LITURGY

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TO SPEAK ABOUT the theo-centric character of ecclesiology, of the Church, and, specifically, of the Sacred Liturgy, as the highest and most perfect expression of the life of the Church, could seem to be a redundancy. Is not the Church, by its very nature, divine, that is, called into being and sustained in being by God, and, therefore, centered in God? A fortiori, are not the Church herself and the Church's worship, by definition, directed to God? Otherwise, she would end up in some form of idolatry.

Why is it necessary to devote attention to the truth that the Sacred Liturgy is centered in God, that it is, in fact, the action of God the Son Incarnate, seated in glory at the right hand of the Father and, at the same time, active in the Church, on our behalf, for the salvation of the world? What has happened, in our time, to make it necessary to address the God-centered character of the Sacred Liturgy? In canonical terms, why is the discussion of the *ius divinum,* of the divine right of God to be worshiped by us in the manner in which He wishes to be worshiped, so seldom taken up in our day?

I. CONTEXT

To speak of the theo-centric character of the Sacred Liturgy or of the *ius divinum* and the Sacred Liturgy is, in simple terms, to speak of the right relationship between God and His creation, especially man, the only earthly creature created in the image of

God Himself. Clearly, such a conversation has to do, first of all, with the Sacred Liturgy as the highest and most perfect expression of the relationship between God and man. There is no other aspect of the life of the Church in which the truth about God's relationship with man should be more visible than the Sacred Liturgy.

Such a conversation, however, if I am not mistaken, has been rarely engaged in recent years, so that it causes wonder to speak of the relationship between God and man and the Sacred Liturgy, the relationship between the *ius divinum* and the Sacred Liturgy. In the time since the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, but certainly not because of the teaching of the council, there has been an exaggerated attention on the human aspect of the Sacred Liturgy, which has overlooked the essence of the Sacred Liturgy as the encounter of God with us by means of sacramental signs, that is, as the direct action of the glorious Christ in the Church giving us the grace of the Holy Spirit.

I wish to offer an initial reflection on the theo-centric character of Catholic liturgy which I hope to be able to develop and expand in the future. In light of my background as a canonist, I focus the discourse on the *ius divinum* and the Sacred Liturgy. It should be clear, however, that the canonical perspective is necessarily securely grounded in the theological reality of the Church. First, I will take up the subject in the Sacred Scriptures and in the Magisterium, and then its manifestation in canonical discipline. Since the canonical order is at the service of the objective order of our life in Christ in the Church, it is fundamental to understand, at least in its essentials, the objective relationship of the *ius divinum* and the Sacred Liturgy, in order also to understand the deepest significance of the canonical norms that govern the Sacred Liturgy. The liturgical law of the Church, after all, is at the service of the theo-centric nature of Catholic worship.

II. Sacred Scripture

When God offered the covenant to His chosen people, to repair the covenant destroyed by the sin of Adam and Eve, He

founded the covenant of faithful and enduring love between Himself and His people on the Decalogue, the Ten Commandments. The first three commandments, in fact, express the essence of the *ius divinum,* the right of God to be recognized as the Creator of the world and the Lord of history and, therefore, as the exclusive recipient of the worship of man. One recalls that Satan tempted Adam and Eve to sin against the one and only commandment of the Lord, that is, "of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die,"[1] with the words: "You will not die. For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil."[2] Our first parents were tricked, not recognizing God as the source of their being and of their every good, but taking on the pretense of being equal to God. The first three commandments of the Decalogue reestablish the just relationship between God and man, based on divine right.

The Decalogue begins with the identification of the Lord as the only God, Creator and Savior: "I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage."[3] Then follows immediately the prohibition of every idolatry, "You shall have no other gods before me";[4] the commandment to honor always the holy name of the Lord, "You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain";[5] and the precept of the observance of the day of the Lord: "Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy."[6] The other seven commandments follow from these first commandments, which establish and safeguard the divine right. In other words, the worship of God, "in spirit and truth,"[7] is, at the same time, the sanctification of the people.

[1] Gen 2:17; cf. Gen 3:3. Translations of Scripture are taken from the *Revised Standard Version, Catholic Edition.*

[2] Gen 3:4-5.

[3] Exod 20:2.

[4] Exod 20:3.

[5] Exod 20:7.

[6] Exod 20:8.

[7] John 4:24.

In the Code of the Covenant, which follows the declaration of the Decalogue, the first attention is dedicated to divine worship and specifically to the altar. God, drawing the attention of the people to the fact that He has come from heaven to speak to them, commands: "An altar of earth you shall make for me and sacrifice on it your burnt offerings and your peace offerings, your sheep and your oxen; in every place where I cause my name to be remembered I will come to you and bless you."[8] Subsequent to the ratification of the covenant, detailed norms for divine worship are listed.[9] After the account of the offering and of the ratification of the covenant in the Book of Exodus, the Book of Leviticus contains the detailed norms for the priests and Levites, in order that they might fulfill their responsibility for divine worship and, therefore, for the sanctification of the people.

From this brief look at the content of the covenant between God and man, one sees as the fundamental principle the *ius divinum,* the right of God to receive the worship of man in the manner that God commands. It is clear that divine worship together with the sanctification of the people, which is its fruit, is ordained by God Himself. It is not the invention of man, but the gift of God to man, by which God makes it possible for man to offer "the sacrifice of communion" with Him.

In the Sermon on the Mount, in which Our Lord Jesus communicates the law of the new covenant, the first Beatitude is poverty of spirit, which recognizes the Lord as the source of being itself and of every good: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."[10] All of the other Beatitudes depend upon the recognition of our relationship with God and the efficacious expression of the same.

After having announced the Beatitudes as the law of the new covenant and after having exhorted the disciples to be "the salt of the earth" and "the light of the world," so that others, seeing the holiness of the disciples, may give "glory to your Father who is in

[8] Exod 20:24.
[9] Cf. Gen 25:1–31:18.
[10] Matt 5:3.

heaven,"[11] the Lord declares His mission in what pertains to the Law:

> Think not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets; I have come not to abolish them but to fulfil them. For truly, I say to you, till heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the law until all is accomplished. Whoever then relaxes one of the least of these commandments and teaches men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven; but he who does them and teaches them shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.[12]

The words of the Lord confirm the fundamental service of the law, which is to honor and to safeguard the *ius divinum*, the divine right, and, thereby, to honor and safeguard the order written by God in His creation.

All of the norms of the law are directed to the just relationship between God and His people, upon which depends the salvation of the world, and thus the norms must be respected as the commandment of God and not the invention of man. Otherwise, the Law of God is corrupted for human purposes. After having declared the holiness of the Law, the Lord exhorted the disciples with these words: "For I tell you, unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven."[13] Only by observing and honoring the divine right that God be known, adored and served, as He commands, does man find his happiness in this life and in the life to come.

When Our Lord encountered the Samaritan woman at the well of Jacob, He revealed Himself as the Messiah with the words, "I who speak to you am he."[14] In the conversation with the Samaritan woman which precedes the revelation, Our Lord instructs her on the true worship of God, the adoration of God "in spirit and truth."[15] It is clear from His teaching that faith in Him as Messiah, as God the Son made man, is expressed, first of all, in the worship owed to God.

[11] Matt 5:16.
[12] Matt 5:17-19.
[13] Matt 5:20.
[14] John 4:26.
[15] John 4:23-24.

At the Last Supper, when Our Lord instituted the Eucharistic Sacrifice, He gave directly the command: "Do this in remembrance of me. . . . Do this, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of me."[16] The Holy Eucharist, the worship offered to God "in spirit and truth," is not an invention of man, but a gift of God to man. In a similar manner, when Christ was about to ascend to the right hand of the Father in heaven, He gave the command to the disciples:

> All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you.[17]

It is evident that true worship, for example, the conferral of the Holy Spirit with the Sacrament of Baptism, is an act of respect for the right of God, carried out in accord with the indications given by Our Lord.

III. The Catechism

Before considering some texts of the Magisterium, it is necessary to consider the Catechism, the instrument for the understanding and application of the Sacred Scriptures and the Magisterium in daily living. Regarding the First Commandment, we read in the *Roman Catechism*, edited after the Council of Trent:

> It should also be noted here that this is indeed the First Commandment, not just because it is first in order, but because it is first in rank by its very nature and excellence. God is entitled to a love and an obedience infinitely greater than what is owed to any other king or superior. He created us, he governs us. He nurtured us even in the womb of our mother and brought us into the world and still provides for us in all that we need for life.[18]

[16] 1 Cor 11:24-25.

[17] Matt 28:18-20.

[18] "[H]oc praeceptum esse omnium primum et maximum: non ordine tantum ipso, sed ratione, dignitate, praestantia. Debet enim Deus obtinere apud nos infinitis partibus majorem quam domini, quam regis charitatem et auctoritatem. Ipse nos creavit, idem gubernat; ab eo

The language of the *Catechism* underlines the truth that worship is owed to God, that is, worship is part of the divine right.

In presenting the obligation to observe the Decalogue, the *Catechism of Saint Pius X* declares: "We are obliged to observe the commandments of God, because they are imposed by Him, our supreme Master, and dictated by nature and sound reason."[19] Father C. T. Dragone, in his classical presentation of the same Catechism for catechists, comments on the First Commandment with these words:

> Religion is a duty and a fundamental need of every intelligent being. By the fact itself that we are creatures, we must recognize and honor fittingly our Creator and Lord, offer adoration, praise, thanksgiving and reparation to Him, and implore from Him what we need. Religion is the virtue which makes us recognize God as our absolute sovereign, our total dependence on Him, and leads us to give Him the worship and the honor which is owed to Him.[20]

Divine worship therefore is the first and most perfect way to observe the divine right.

The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* puts the duty of divine worship among the rights and duties "inherent in the nature of the human person."[21] Divine worship constitutes the fundamental duty of man toward God; the First Commandment, like the others, is "engraved by God in the human heart."[22] In the words

in utero matris nutriti, atque inde hanc in lucem ducti sumus: ipse nobis ad vitam victumque res suppeditat necessarias" (*Catechismus Romanus ad Parochos,* pars 3, c. 2, q. 2, n. 4 [Coloniae Agrippinae: Apud Franciscum Balthasar Neuwirth, 1765], 479; English translation: *The Roman Catechism,* trans. Robert I. Bradley, S.J., and Eugene Kevane [Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1985], 359 n. 6).

[19] "Siamo obbligati a osservare i comandamenti di Dio, perché sono imposti da Lui, nostro Padrone supremo, e dettati dalla natura e dalla sana ragione" (C. T. Dragone, S.S.P., *Spiegazione del Catechismo di San Pio X per catechisti*, 4th ed. [Verrua Savoia, Turin: Centro Libraria Sodalitium, 1964], 258; my translation).

[20] "La religione è un dovere e un bisogno fondamentale per ogni essere intelligente. Dal fatto stesso che siamo creature, dobbiamo riconoscere e onorare convenientemente il nostro Creatore e Signore, offrire a Lui adorazione, lode, ringraziamento, riparazione e implorare quanto ci occorre. La religione è la virtù che ci fa riconoscere Dio come nostro sovrano assoluto, la nostra totale dipendenza da Lui e inclina a rendergli il culto e l'onore che gli è dovuto" (ibid., 262; my translation).

[21] *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* no. 2070.

[22] *CCC,* no. 2072.

of the *Catechism*, "God's first call and just demand is that man accept him and worship him."[23]

IV. Saint Thomas Aquinas

Saint Thomas Aquinas, in the *Summa Theologica* and in the *Summa contra Gentiles,* presents divine worship as an act of religion,[24] the virtue by which we render the honor owed to God.[25] He responds to the question whether religion is a theological virtue with these words:

I answer that, As stated above (A. 4) religion pays due worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q. 1, AA. 1, 2, 4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because we believe God. Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end; and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.[26]

[23] *CCC,* no. 2084.

[24] See *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 1; *ScG* III, c. 120

[25] See *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 2.

[26] "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, religio est quae Deo debitum cultum affert. Duo igitur in religione considerantur. Unum quidem quod religio Deo affert, cultus scilicet; et hoc se habet per modum materiae et obiecti ad religionem. Aliud autem est id cui affertur, scilicet Deus. Cui cultus exhibetur non quasi actus quibus Deus colitur ipsum Deum attingunt, sicut cum credimus Deo, credendo Deum attingimus (propter quod supra dictum est quod Deus est fidei objectum non solum inquantum credimus Deo): affertur autem Deo debitus cultus inquantum actus quidam, quibus Deus colitur, in Dei reverentiam fiunt, puta sacrificiorum oblationes et alia huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non comparatur ad virtutem religionis sicut materia vel obiectum, sed sicut finis. Et ideo religio non est virtus theologica, cuius obiectum est ultimus finis: sed est virtus moralis, cuius est esse circa ea quae sunt ad finem" (*STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 5; English translation in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* complete English edition in five volumes, trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province [Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981]).

The text of the Angelic Doctor shows how divine worship is the expression of the virtue of religion, by which man offers to God acts of reverence, in accord with the objective relationship between God and himself.

In the *Summa contra Gentiles,* St. Thomas explains that the objective relationship between God and man, the relationship between the Creator and the creature capable of knowing and loving Him, capable of offering to the Creator due reverence, not only interiorly but with the body, with words and gestures, postulates three norms, as they are enunciated in chapter 20 of the Book of Exodus. Above all, the worship of other gods or idolatry is prohibited. In the second place, the divine name may not be pronounced without due reverence. And, finally, the rest of the Day of the Lord is prescribed, in order that man may dedicate his soul to contemplation.[27]

V. The Magisterium

There are more texts of the Magisterium which indicate the irreplaceable relationship between divine right and liturgical law than can be reviewed here. Therefore I limit myself to some select texts.

The Council of Trent, in treating the question of the doctrine on Holy Communion "*sub utraque specie et parvulorum,*" declared that the Church from the beginning has had the authority to order the administration of the sacraments, but that she has no authority to touch in any manner the substance of the sacraments. Here is the text from session 19 of the council:

> [The Holy Council] furthermore declares that in the dispensation of the sacraments, provided their substance is preserved, the Church has always had the power to determine or change, according to circumstances, times and places, what she judges more expedient for the benefit of those receiving them or for the veneration of the sacrament.[28]

[27] *ScG* III, c. 120.

[28] "Praeterea declarat, hanc potestatem perpetuo in Ecclesia fuisse, ut in sacramentorum dispensatione, salva illorum substantia, ea statueret vel mutaret, quae suscipientium utilitati seu ipsorum sacramentorum venerationi, pro rerum, temporum et locorum varietate, magis

The substance of the sacraments cannot be touched because they are instituted by Christ and entrusted to the Church, as the worship of God the Father "in spirit and truth."[29]

The Second Vatican Ecumenical Council repeated the constant teaching on the exclusive authority of the Church for the right discipline of the Sacred Liturgy, distinguishing two parts of the liturgy, "unchangeable elements divinely instituted" and "elements subject to change," which "not only may be changed but ought to be changed with the passage of time, if they have suffered from the intrusion of anything out of harmony with the inner nature of the liturgy or have become less suitable."[30] Regarding the elements susceptible to change, the council enunciated clear rules, namely:

> 22. § 1. Regulation of the sacred liturgy depends solely on the authority of the Church, that is, on the Apostolic See, and, as laws may determine, on the bishop.
> § 2. In virtue of power conceded by law, the regulation of the liturgy within certain defined limits belongs also to various kinds of bishops' conferences, legitimately established, with competence in given territories.
> § 3. Therefore no other person, not even a priest, may add, remove, or change anything in the liturgy on his own authority.[31]

The Sacred Liturgy is the worship owed to God, as He Himself has instituted it. As the Church has always taught, it cannot be

expedire iudicaret" (Henricus Denzinger and Adolfus Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* [Rome: Herder, 1967], no. 1728; English translation: *The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church,* rev. ed., ed. J. Neuner, S.J., and J. Dupuis, S.J. [New York: Alba House, 1982], no. 1324).

[29] John 4:24.

[30] "parte immutabili, utpote divinitus instituta . . . partibus mutationi obnoxiis . . . decursu temporum variare possunt vel etiam debent, si in eas forte irrepserint quae minus bene ipsius Liturgiae intimae naturae respondeant, vel minus aptae factae sint" (Sacrosanctum Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II, Constitutio *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, "de Sacra Liturgia," no. 21, *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 56 [1964]: 105-6; English version: *Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents*, ed. Austin Flannery, O.P. [Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1975], 9).

[31] "22. § 1. Sacrae Liturgiae moderatio ab Ecclesiae auctoritate unice pendet: quae quidem est apud Apostolicam Sedem et, ad normam iuris, apud Episcopum. § 2. Ex potestate a iure concessa, rei liturgicae moderatio inter limites statutos pertinet quoque ad competentes varii generis territoriales Episcoporum coetus legitime constitutos. § 3. Quapropter nemo omnino alius, etiamsi sit sacerdos, quidquam proprio marte in Liturgia addat, demat, aut mutet" (*Sacrosanctum Concilium,* no. 22 [*AAS* 56 (1964): 106]; Flannery, ed., 9-10).

reduced to the activity of any individual, not even a priest, but must be governed, in respect for the divine right, by the law of the Church, by the supreme authority, that is, by the Roman Pontiff and by the bishops in communion with him.

Blessed Pope John Paul II underlined the divine right in what pertains to the sacrament of Penance in his first encyclical letter, *Redemptor hominis*. Confronting a certain tendency to substitute communal forms of penance and conversion for individual confession, he called to mind that the act of conversion has always to be personal. These are his words:

> Although the participation by the fraternal community of the faithful in the penitential celebration is a great help for the act of personal conversion, nevertheless, in the final analysis, it is necessary that in this act there should be a pronouncement by the individual himself with the whole depth of his conscience and with the whole of his sense of guilt and of trust in God, placing himself like the Psalmist before God to confess: "Against you . . . have I sinned." In faithfully observing the centuries-old practice of the Sacrament of Penance—the practice of individual confession with a personal act of sorrow and the intention to amend and make satisfaction—the Church is therefore defending the human soul's individual right: man's right to a more personal encounter with the crucified forgiving Christ, with Christ saying, through the minister of the sacrament of Reconciliation: "Your sins are forgiven;" "Go, and do not sin again."[32]

Having noted the right of the individual penitent "to a more personal encounter" with Christ in the sacrament of Penance, the Holy Father quickly adds that is a also a question of "a right on

[32] "Etsi fraterna communitas fidelium celebrationem paenitentialem simul peragentium insigniter provehit actum conversionis singulorum, nihilo minus oportet denique in hoc eodem actu se exprimat quisque homo ex intimis penetralibus conscientiae suae, immo cum toto sensu culpae suae fiduciaeque Dei, coram quo sistat psalmistae similis, ut confiteatur: «Tibi, tibi soli peccavi». Propterea Ecclesia, dum fideliter asservat productum plura per saecula usum Sacramenti Paentitentiae—hoc est usum confessionis singularis, copulatae cum actu doloris propositoque emendationis et satisfactionis—ius particulare animae humanae tuetur; quod scilicet ius refertur ad congressionem, uniuscuiusque hominis magis propriam, cum Christo Cruci affixo, qui ignoscit, cum Christo, qui per Sacramenti Reconciliationis ministrum declarat: «dimittuntur peccata tua»; «vade, et amplius iam noli peccare»" (Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Litterae Encyclicae *Redemptor Hominis*, "pontificali eius ministerio ineunte," n. 20 [*Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 71 (1979): 314]; English version: Pope John Paul II, *Encyclicals* [Trivandrum, Kerala, India: Carmel International Publishing House, 2005], 1115).

Christ's part with regard to every human being redeemed by him."[33]

He continues, explaining the right and also the duty of the Church to insist on the observance of the divine right,

> His right to meet each one of us in that key moment in the soul's life constituted by the moment of conversion and forgiveness. By guarding the sacrament of Penance, the Church expressly affirms her faith in the mystery of the Redemption as a living and life-giving reality that fits in with man's inward truth, with human guilt and also with the desire of the human conscience. "Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied." The sacrament of Penance is the means to satisfy man with the righteousness that comes from the Redeemer himself.[34]

The solicitude of the Church for the correct celebration of the sacrament of Penance corresponds to the divine right, to the right of Christ, Who, at the moment of His death on the Cross, expressed the reality of His Redemptive Incarnation with one only word: "*Sitio*," "I thirst."[35] The discipline of the sacrament of Penance ought always to correspond to the objective relationship between God and man, which is constituted by the unceasing love of God for all men, without boundary, expressed so eloquently and profoundly with the word, "*Sitio*."

VI. The Canonical Discipline

In the canonical tradition, the discipline of the worship owed to God has been regulated by the highest authority, that is, the Apostolic See. Canon 1247 of the Pio-Benedictine Code enunciated the perennial discipline of the Church, that is, that it

[33] "ius Christi est, quod is habet erga quemque hominem a se redemptum" (ibid.).

[34] "Est nempe ius conveniendi unumquemque nostrum in illo decretorio tempore vitae animae, quod est momentum conversionis et condonationis. Ecclesia Sacramento Paenitentiae custodiendo profitetur aperte fidem suam in Redemptionis mysterium, ut in rem veram et vivificantem, quae etiam cum interiore veritate hominis congruit, cum humano culpae sensu et etiam cum humanae conscientiae desideriis. «Beati, qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, quoniam ipsi saturabuntur». Paenitentiae Sacramentum est instrumentum, quo homo illa iustitia satietur, quae ex eodem Redemptore emanat" (ibid. [*AAS* 71 (1979): 315; English version: Carmel ed., 1115]).

[35] John 19:28.

pertains solely to the Apostolic See "to order sacred liturgy and to approve liturgical books."[36] The Code also enunciated the responsibility of the bishops to exercise vigilance over the correct observance of the norms regarding divine worship[37] and over the introduction of abuses into ecclesiastical discipline, especially in what pertains to divine worship and the Sacred Liturgy.[38]

The present Code, promulgated by Blessed John Paul II on 25 January 1983, enunciates in canon 838 the discipline formulated in the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council. In the second paragraph of the canon, we read:

> It is for the Apostolic See to order the sacred liturgy of the universal Church, publish liturgical books and review their translations in vernacular languages, and exercise vigilance that liturgical regulations are observed faithfully everywhere.[39]

In the second paragraph of canon 392 of the 1983 Code, the responsibility of the bishop to "promote the common discipline of the whole Church and therefore to urge the observance of all ecclesiastical laws"[40] is treated. It reads:

> He is to exercise vigilance so that abuses do not creep into ecclesiastical discipline, especially regarding the ministry of the word, the celebration of the

[36] "Unius Apostolicae Sedis est tum sacram ordinare liturgiam, tum liturgicos approbare libros" (*Codex Iuris Canonici Pii X Pontificis Maximi iussu digestus Benedicti Papae XV auctoritate promulgatum,* can. 1257, die 27 maii 1917 [Rome: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis; 1917], 360; English version: *The 1917 or Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law in English Translation*, ed. Edward N. Peters [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2001], 426). Hereafter CIC-1917.

[37] Cf. CIC-1917, can. 1261, § 1.

[38] Cf. CIC-1917, can. 336, § 2.

[39] "Apostolicae Sedis est sacram liturgiam Ecclesiae universae ordinare, libros liturgicos edere eorumque versiones in linguas vernaculas recognoscere, necnon advigilare ut ordinationes liturgicae ubique fideliter observentur" (*Codex Iuris Canonici auctoritate Ioannis Pauli PP. II promulgatus*, 25 ianuarii 1983, can. 838, § 2 [*Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 75, pars 2 (1983): 153; English version: *Code of Canon Law: Latin-English Edition,* New English Translation, ed. Canon Law Society of America (Washington, D.C.: Canon Law Society of America, 1998), 276]). Hereafter CIC-1983.

[40] "disciplinam cunctae Ecclesiae communem promovere et ideo observantiam omnium legum eccleiasticarum urgere tueatur" (CIC-1983, can. 392, § 1 [*AAS* 75, pars 2:71; English version: CLSA ed., 128]).

sacraments and sacramentals, the worship of God and the veneration of the saints, and the administration of goods.[41]

The present Code puts together the various objects of the vigilance of the bishop over ecclesiastical discipline, and has lost a bit the particular emphasis on the vigilance over the discipline of the Sacred Liturgy which is found in the Pio-Benedictine Code.

In fact, after the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, but certainly not because of the teaching of the Council, many abuses in the celebration of the Sacred Liturgy took place. Pope Benedict XVI makes explicit reference to the situation in his Letter to the Bishops of the world, at the time of the promulgation of the Apostolic Letter, given *motu proprio*, *Summorum pontificum*. Writing about the desire of some of the faithful for the form of the Sacred Liturgy existing before the postconciliar reforms, he affirms:

> Many people who clearly accepted the binding character of the Second Vatican Council, and were faithful to the Pope and the Bishops, nonetheless also desired to recover the form of the sacred liturgy that was dear to them. This occurred above all because in many places celebrations were not faithful to the prescriptions of the new Missal, but the latter actually was understood as authorizing or even requiring creativity, which frequently led to deformations of the liturgy which were hard to bear. I am speaking from experience, since I too lived through that period with all its hopes and its confusion. And I have seen how arbitrary deformations of the liturgy caused deep pain to individuals totally rooted in the faith of the Church.[42]

[41] "Advigilet ne abusus in ecclesiasticam disciplinam irrepant, praesertim circa ministerium verbi, celebrationem sacramentorum et sacramentalium, cultum Dei et Sanctorum, necnon bonorum administrationem" (CIC-1983, can. 392, § 2 [*AAS* 75, pars 2:71; English version: CLSA ed., 128]).

[42] "Molte persone, che accettavano chiaramente il carattere vincolante del Concilio Vaticano II e che erano fedeli al Papa e ai Vescovi, desideravano tuttavia anche ritrovare la forma, a loro cara, della sacra Liturgia; questo avvenne anzitutto perché in molti luoghi non si celebrava in modo fedele alle prescrizioni del nuovo Messale, ma esso veniva addirittura inteso come un'autorizzazione o perfino come un obbligo alla creatività, la quale portò spesso a deformazioni della Liturgia al limite del sopportabile. Parlo per esperienza, perché ho vissuto anch'io quel periodo con tutte le sue attese e confusioni. E ho visto quanto profondamente siano state ferite, dalle deformazioni arbitrarie della Liturgia, persone che erano totalmente radicate nella fede della Chiesa" (Benedictus PP. XVI, Epistula "Ad Episcopos Catholicae Ecclesiae Ritus Romani" [*Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 99 (2007): 796]).

There is no doubt that, in many places, at the time of the post-Conciliar reform of the Sacred Liturgy, a lack of discipline was found and many abuses were introduced.

Blessed Pope John Paul II, as has been noted before, confronted the abuses regarding the celebration of the sacrament of Penance in his first Encyclical Letter, *Redemptor hominis*. Also, in his last Encyclical Letter, *Ecclesia de Eucharistia*, published on Holy Thursday of 2003, he once again confronted liturgical abuses. Commenting on the benefits of the postconciliar liturgical reform, he also noted the deficiencies which have followed it, with these words:

> Unfortunately, alongside these lights, *there are also shadows*. In some places the practice of Eucharistic adoration has been almost completely abandoned. In various parts of the Church abuses have occurred, leading to confusion with regard to sound faith and Catholic doctrine concerning this wonderful sacrament. At times one encounters an extremely reductive understanding of the Eucharistic mystery. Stripped of its sacrificial meaning, it is celebrated as if it were simply a fraternal banquet. Furthermore, the necessity of the ministerial priesthood, grounded in apostolic succession, is at times obscured and the sacramental nature of the Eucharist is reduced to its mere effectiveness as a form of proclamation.[43]

The pressing concern of the Supreme Pontiff is most evident.

In fact, at the end of the introductory part of the Encyclical Letter *Ecclesia de Eucharistia* he declared:

[43] "Dolendum tamen est quod iuxta lucida haec *umbrae non desunt*. Etenim est ubi fere tota neglegentia cultus adorationis eucharisticae deprehendatur. Accedunt in hoc vel illo ecclesiali ambitu abusus qui ad rectam obscurandam fidem doctrinamque catholicam super hoc mirabili Sacramento aliquid conferunt. Nonnumquam reperitur intellectus valde circumscriptus Mysterii eucharistici. Sua enim significatione et vi sacrificii destitutum, mysterium retinetur tamquam si sensum ac momentum alicuius fraterni convivii non excedat. Praeterea sacerdotii ministerialis necessitas, quae successioni apostolicae innititur, nonnumquam absconditur atque eucharistiae sacramentalitas ad solam nuntiationis efficacitatem redigitur" (Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Litterae Encyclicae *Ecclesia de Eucharistia*, "de Eucharistia eiusque necessitudine cum Ecclesia," 17 aprilis 2003, no. 10 [*Acta Apostolicae Sedes* 95 (2003): 439; English version: Pope John Paul II, *Encyclicals* (Trivandrum, Kerala, India: Carmel International Publishing House, 2005), 9-10]).

It is my hope that the present Encyclical Letter will effectively help to banish the dark clouds of unacceptable doctrine and practice, so that the Eucharist will continue to shine forth in all its radiant mystery.[44]

Toward the end of the Encyclical Letter, Blessed Pope John Paul II writes again about the abuses introduced with the post-Conciliar reform, in the perspective of the responsibility of priests for the correct celebration of the Sacred Liturgy. He makes an urgent appeal "that the liturgical norms for the celebration of the Eucharist be observed with great fidelity."[45] In this context, he requested the competent dicasteries of the Roman Curia "to prepare a more specific document, including prescriptions of a juridical nature,"[46] on the liturgical norms and their profound meaning, which we may define, in a summary manner, as respect for the divine right. Thus, Blessed Pope John Paul II concluded the discussion of the norms of the discipline of the Sacred Liturgy with these words:

No one is permitted to undervalue the mystery entrusted to our hands: it is too great for anyone to feel free to treat it lightly and with disregard for its sacredness and its universality.[47]

As he had done in his first Encyclical Letter, so in his last, he teaches us the divine right, the *ius divinum* of our worship, in accord with the objective reality of our relationship with God.

On 25 March 2004, the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments published the document requested by Blessed Pope John Paul II, the Instruction *Redemptionis sacramentum,* "On certain matters to be observed or

[44] "Litteras has Encyclicas Nostras conducere efficaciter posse confidimus ut doctrinarum umbrae dissipentur et usus reprobati submoveantur, unde omni in sui mysterii fulgore Eucharistia resplendere pergat" (ibid. [*AAS* 95 (2003): 439; English version: Carmel ed., 10]).

[45] "ut in eucharistica Celebratione magna quidem fidelitate liturgicae observentur regulae" (*Ecclesia de Eucharistia,* n. 52 [*AAS* 95 (2003): 468; English version: Carmel ed., 39]).

[46] "ut proprium apparent documentum cum monitionibus etiam generis iuridici" (ibid.).

[47] "Nulli quidem parvi pendere licet Mysterium nostris manibus concreditum: maius quidem illud est quam ut quisquam sibi permittat proprio id arbitratu tractare, unde nec sacra eius natura observetur nec universalis ratio" (ibid. [*AAS* 95 (2003): 468; English version: Carmel ed., 40]).

to be avoided regarding the Most Holy Eucharist."[48] The eighth and last chapter of the Instruction treats remedies of the delicts and abuses in the celebration of the Sacred Liturgy. After having listed the most serious delicts and the relative sanctions,[49] the Instruction treats other abuses, indicating that they are not to be considered lightly, but "are to be numbered among the other abuses to be carefully avoided and corrected."[50] The Instruction then indicates that all liturgical norms are to be observed and all errors are to be corrected:

> The things set forth in this Instruction obviously do not encompass all the violations against the Church and its discipline that are defined in the canons, in the liturgical laws and in other norms of the Church for the sake of the teaching of the Magisterium or sound tradition. Where something wrong has been committed, it is to be corrected according to the norm of law.[51]

The right attention to liturgical norms does not constitute a sort of legalism or rubricism, but an act of profound respect and love for our Lord who has given us the gift of divine worship, an act of profound love which has as its irreplaceable foundation the respect for the divine right.

Conclusion

I hope that this brief reflection on the *ius divinum* and the Sacred Liturgy has indicated the necessity of beginning every consideration of the Sacred Liturgy in the context of the objective relationship of God with man, a relationship which demands the worship of God, on the part of man, as God Himself has taught in

[48] Congregatio de Cultu Divino et Disciplina Sacramentorum, Instructio *Redemptionis Sacramentum*, "de quibusdam observandis et vitandis circa sanctissimam Eucharistiam," 25 martii 2004 (*Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 96 [2004]: 549-601; English version: Vatican Polyglot Press).

[49] See ibid., nn. 172-73 (*AAS* 96 [2004]: 597-98).

[50] "leviter . . . inter eos abusus sedulo vitandos et corrigendos adnumerentur" (ibid., n. 174 [*AAS* 96 (2004): 598]).

[51] "Quae in hac Instructione exponuntur, ut patet, haud omnes contra Ecclesiam eiusque disciplinam referunt violationes, quae in canonibus, in legibus liturgicis atque in aliis normis Ecclesiae ob doctrinam Magisterii sanamve traditionem definiuntur. Ubi quid mali patratum est, corrigendum erit ad normam iuris" (ibid., n. 175 [*AAS* 96 (2004): 598]).

the Sacred Scriptures and in the Tradition. In other words, every consideration regarding Sacred Worship must be essentially theocentric. In this sense, I also hope that the reflection has underlined the fundamental disposition of man in the act of worship of God, that is, care to offer worship to God in the manner that God Himself asks. Father Nicola Bux has observed:

> What more is there to say? The Church has established the matters that are to be observed in the liturgy and those that are not to be done, but the crisis and the uncertainty of the authority, and of Church and liturgical discipline, connected to the conviction that to manipulate Sacred Liturgy is not a serious sin, renders the norms a dead letter. This follows precisely from having trampled upon the divine right and the juridical dimension of the liturgy.[52]

It is in the liturgical act, above all, that man must put into the practice the way of the Beatitudes, the poverty of spirit which recognizes God as Creator of the world and Lord of history, and with humility and total fidelity offers to Him due worship.

[52] "Che dire di più? La Chiesa ha stabilito le cose che si devono osservare nella liturgia e quelle che non si devono fare, ma la crisi e l'incertezza dell'autorità e della disciplina ecclesiale e liturgica, unite alla convinzione che manipolare il culto non sia peccato grave, rendono le norme lettera morta. Questo dipende proprio dall'aver conculcato il diritto divino e la dimensione giuridica della liturgia" (Nicola Bux, *Come andare a Messa e non perdere la Fede* [Milan: Edizione Piemme, 2010], 43).

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CHANGING THE SUBJECT: THE LITURGY AS AN OBJECT OF EXPERIENCE[1]

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IN THIS ARTICLE I want to enquire into how we should begin to understand the reciprocal relationship between the external and objective aspects of the worship of the Church and the personal or individual elements of this worship. I want to pursue this discussion by considering how various themes from St. Thomas throw some light on my enquiry. This is not an overview of Thomas's system; I am, rather, picking and choosing aspects of his teaching which will help my discussion forward. Nor is it a unified or completed theory about these matters. It is rather a statement of some of the elements that ought to be part of any such final theory.

Examples from ordinary parish life show that something has gone seriously wrong with how many Catholics today understand the liturgical life of the Church. (To say "how they relate to," or "how they are affected by" that life, rather than "how they understand it," would perhaps make it clear that I am not going to describe a series of reasoned conclusions; I am trying to capture a spirit or an attitude towards worship that is pervasive and destructive.) In many Churches it is the custom at a funeral Mass, after the communion antiphon, to allow a family member or a friend to give what is in fact a eulogy of the dead person. My

[1] I have to thank several members of the Toronto Oratory for help in preparing this article. Especially, I am grateful to Fr. Philip Cleevely both for suggesting the title and for his criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper. Fr. Juvenal Merriell and Fr. Derek Cross have also been generous with their time and assistance. Fr. Robert Barringer, C.S.B., also read a draft of this paper and made many helpful suggestions.

concern is not the fact that these talks are usually of the nature of instant canonization in which Purgatory or the need for prayers for the dead are left unstated, and probably not even thought about.[2] Rather I want to capture what all too often seems to be the attitude of those attending these Masses. It is something like this: they are resentful and bored with the official liturgical aspects of the rite of Christian Burial, and they only come alive and identify with what is going on when the eulogy begins. Very often, of course, this sort of congregation is made up largely of Catholics who do not practice, and non-Catholic friends, but that only makes what I am talking about easier to see. The attitude itself, though, seems to apply right across the board, and the exceptions are few. On the one hand, any sense of the reality and importance of the objective has all but disappeared. On the other hand, the personal and the individual elements of worship are misunderstood and valued for the wrong reasons. That is the fact of the matter and unless it is recognized and dealt with, any sort of liturgical reform, or reform of the reform, or abolishing of the reform, or whatever, will be nothing more than plastering over the cracks in the foundations.

It is difficult to get a handle on this problematic of objectivity and personal experience within the maelstrom of contemporary liturgical practice and theory. We are faced with a tangle of fishing lines, fishing lines of theology and experience, of catechesis and social communication, of prayer and psychology, of Scripture and tradition, of magisterium and the claims of integrity. All of these lines have hooks attached to them which make untangling well-nigh impossible—and the hooks snag the unwary with their barbs. We are certainly not dealing with disagreements, or differences of emphasis, about a clearly delineated series of issues. Even my question about the mutual relationship between the external to the personal very quickly leads away from itself into an impenetrable mess of other disputes.

[2] I have tried to deal with this aspect of the question in *The Mass and Modernity* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), chap. 4, "Hume and Atheism: Giving up on God and Everlasting Life."

The climate of opinion that creates these difficulties for us was summed up, and perhaps also partly created by Hegel. Writing in the nineteenth century Hegel spelled out what he thought Luther's cry of justification by faith alone really entailed. Hegel takes Luther to be saying that justification by faith means the triumph of true subjectivity, and liberation from anything external. This liberation is brought about through an inner awareness of the believer's personal relationship to Christ.

> Luther's simple doctrine is that the specific embodiment of Deity—infinite subjectivity, that is true spirituality, Christ—is in no way present and actual in an outward form, but as essentially spiritual is obtained only in being reconciled to God *in faith and spiritual enjoyment*.[3]

Hegel maintains, in his analysis of the causes of the Reformation, that the corruption of the Church was not due to the moral turpitude of the clergy. "The corruption in the Church," Hegel writes, was a "native growth":[4]

> the principle of that corruption is to be looked for in the fact that the specific and definite embodiment of the Deity which it recognizes, is sensuous—that the external in a coarse form, is enshrined in its inmost being.[5]

It was owing, says Hegel, to "the time-honoured and cherished *sincerity of the German people*," that there came about a revolution "out of the honest truth and simplicity of its heart."[6] This revolution expressed itself in Luther's conviction that salvation is brought about essentially by an inner experience:

[3] G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 415.

[4] Ibid., 412

[5] Ibid., 412-13,

[6] Ibid., 414. Luther, Hegel continues, in a way that will seem blasphemous to a Catholic with its overtones of devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, was "a simple *Monk* looking for that specific embodiment of Deity . . . in the spirit and the Heart—the heart, which, wounded unspeakably by the offer of the most trivial and superficial appliances to satisfy the cravings of that which is inmost and deepest, now detects the perversion of the absolute relation of truth in its minutest features, and pursues it to annihilation."

This, then, is the Lutheran faith, in accordance with which man stands in a relation to God which involves his personal existence; that is, his piety and the hope of his salvation and the like all demand that his heart, his subjectivity, should be present in them.[7]

With this inner certainty real freedom is finally achieved, and it has been achieved in the depths of man's inmost nature; in "faith and spiritual enjoyment" man is finally at home with himself and at home with God.[8] This paean of praise on behalf of subjectivity is then contrasted explicitly with Catholic worship:

All externality in relation to me is thereby banished, just as is the externality of the Host; it is only in communion and faith that I stand in relation to God.[9]

This exaltation of subjective experience has entailed the banishment, as Hegel puts it, of "all externality in relation to me." In the first place this "banishment of all externality" has resulted, obviously, in a growing misunderstanding and even contempt of liturgical worship. And there is something more to it than that: the exaltation of subjectivity has led to a *de facto* attack on the necessity of the Church itself. At the same time as the people at the funeral Mass were evincing a visceral dislike of the formal and the objective aspects of liturgical worship, and while they were exemplifying Hegel's understanding of Luther's justification by personal authenticity, they were also engaged, implicitly anyway, in creating another sort of community.

The source of this deep distrust of the formal and objective in religion is not, of course, only an historical phenomenon. It is a deep and pervasive feature of today's intellectual climate of opinion. Charles Taylor, for example, is a well-known and powerful contemporary purveyor of this Hegelian sort of attitude. In *A Secular Age*,[10] building on Ivan Illich's interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan, he understands the parable not as

[7] G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane, 3 vols. (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), 3:149.

[8] Ibid., 3:148.

[9] Ibid., 3:149.

[10] Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2007).

a lesson in enlightened social service, but as the creative beginning of a new relationship:

> The Samaritan is moved by the wounded man; he moves to act, and in doing so inaugurates (potentially) a new relation of friendship/love/charity with this person. But he cuts across the boundaries of the permitted "we's" in his world. It is a free act of his "I". Illich's talk of freedom here might mislead a modern. It is not something he generates just out of himself; it is that he responds to this person. He also acts outside of the carefully constructed sense of the sacred, of the demons of darkness, and various modes of prophylaxis against them which have been erected in "our" culture, society, religion (often evident in views of the outsider as "unclean").[11]

The resentful worshipers at a funeral Mass are not consciously, by design as it were, building up a "relation of friendship/love/charity." They are, however, building up some sort of a relationship, if only a temporary one, and are engaged in community building, if only for a few moments, which cut across and are outside "the carefully constructed sense of the sacred" of the liturgy of the Church. Here for a few minutes they find truth, compassion, and reality; here within the setting of a liturgy that is largely meaningless to them they experience authenticity, community, and healing.

I think all this is deplorable, but I also think it is the way things are. It is the world in which we have to operate, for I do not see how it can be denied that the modern world has been marked by a growing sense of the importance of what Hans Urs von Balthasar characterizes as "the modern orientation toward personal, experiential and psychological categories."[12] Is the sacramental objectivity for which St. Thomas stood compatible with this modern attitude? I think it is, but in trying to present St. Thomas's teaching in a way that is more accessible to those who are not Thomists *ex professo* I want to take some familiar Thomistic themes and try to express them in a way that shows they in fact

[11] Ibid., 738.

[12] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics,* vol. 3, *Studies in Theological Styles: Lay Styles,* ed. John Riches, trans. Andrew Louth and others (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 106.

will help us to see our way forward—without tumbling into a bottomless pit of a subjectivity that borders on the solipsistic.

I. The Object of Experience[13]

John Henry Newman remarks in the *Grammar of Assent* that "We are what we are, and we use, not trust our faculties."[14] His remark seems to cut through a good deal of misleading speculation about how I can know that I know. There is a robust realism, a realism which owes a good deal to Aristotle,[15] in Newman's phrase which warns us to against trying to show how objects "out there"—tables, trees, and other bodies—can be known by the self looked on as "in here." This sort of enterprise is condemned from the beginning both because it *is* true that we do in fact use our faculties without any sort of prior commitment to trusting them, and also because the inside-outside spatial metaphor is misleading when applied to the complex question of our recognition of truth and reality.

[13] I should stipulate here that I am not using the word *experience* as a synonym for sense experience. I am using the word in the broadest way to cover everything of which we are aware, or "go through."

[14] J. H. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent,* intro. Nicholas Lash (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), chap. 4, §1 (p. 66): "Sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory, that is, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a first principle, but we cannot properly be said to have any trust in them as faculties. At most we trust in particular acts of memory and of reasoning."

[15] "Do not suppose that in this appealing to the ancients, I am throwing back the world two thousand years, and fettering philosophy with the reasonings of paganism. While the world lasts, will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and of truth. While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many subject matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it" (J. H. Newman, *The Idea of a University,* intro. George N. Shuster [New York: Image Books, 1959], 136, in chap. 5, "Knowledge Its Own End").
It is worthwhile noting that while Newman's approach has its foundations in his reading of Aristotle, nonetheless what he took from Aristotle was based largely on the *Nichomachean Ethics,* the *Rhetoric,* and the *Politics*—not, that is, on the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. See Arthur Dwight Culler, *The Imperial Intellect: A Study in Newman's Educational Ideal* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), esp. chap. 2, "Fellow of Oriel."

If we attend to Newman's statement with some care, however, we will sense that it goes against a good many deeply rooted convictions about the relationship between the mind and reality. These convictions are usually said to find their source in the philosophy of Descartes, and certainly Descartes's philosophy does provide a handy summary of them, even if some of them probably antedated him, and most surely have survived him. These convictions are usually described as dualistic. This description is accurate enough, but it is worth exploring what is involved in this dualism, and contrasting it with what St. Thomas held.

A contemporary statement of four of the main theses of Cartesian dualism will provide us with a convenient framework for a discussion of the object of experience as modernity understands it. At the same time, this framework will furnish a structure for a discussion of what are clearly St. Thomas's views, as well as a development of those views.

The first thesis of Cartesian dualism is that the self "is most fundamentally a contingently embodied point of consciousness transparently knowable to itself via introspection."[16] That is to say, the self has no necessary connection with the body, its nature is to be understood as consciousness, and this self can be reached by looking inside oneself.

The second Cartesian thesis is that the contents of the mind are known immediately, in contrast to all knowledge of outward things which is mediated.[17] That is, I know myself in an indisputable way as a thinking substance, and everything else I know is the result of some sort of illative process based on this starting point.

The third Cartesian principle holds that first-person thinking and experience is invariably private, thus presenting, as a brute first fact of human existence, an other-minds problem.[18] Descartes's understanding of what we are and of how we think

[16] Gary L. Hagberg, *Describing Ourselves: Wittgenstein and Autobiographical Consciousness* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 3.

[17] The contents of the mind "are known immediately by contrast to all outward mediated knowledge (and that the self is thus non-evidential)" (ibid.).

[18] Hagberg adds to this, "thus presenting as a brute first fact of human existence an other-minds problem" (ibid.).

does not give us any means of access to other minds, assuming they do exist. If we accept Descartes's starting point there seems no escape from solipsism.

The fourth Cartesian principle affirms that "language is the contingent and *ex post facto* externalization of prior, private, prelinguistic, and mentally internal content."[19] This principle entails that there is a private sort of experience which can be grasped by a private language, and this language can be subsequently fitted or slotted, as it were, into a public language for purposes of communication.

We can now turn to St. Thomas's thought on these points. Descartes's picture of the self as a contingently embodied point of consciousness transparently knowable to itself via introspection is deeply rooted in the way we all think nowadays,[20] but it is most certainly false and it is not what St. Thomas teaches. Thomas says:

> Concerning the actual cognition by which one actually considers that he has a soul, I say that the soul is known through its acts. For one perceives that he has a soul, and lives, and that he exists, because he perceives that he senses, understands, and carries on other vital activities of this sort. For this reason, the Philosopher says: "We sense that we sense, and we understand that we understand, and because we sense this, we understand that we exist." But one perceives that he understands only from the fact that he understands something. For to understand something is prior to understanding that one understands. Therefore, through that which it understands or senses the soul arrives at actual perception of the fact that it exists.[21]

I have no direct awareness of myself by introspection. On the contrary, I come to know myself only through acts directed

[19] Ibid.

[20] See Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989).

[21] Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate,* q. 10, a. 8 (Thomas Aquinas, *Truth,* trans. James V. McGlynn, S.J. [repr.: Albany, N.Y.: Preserving Christian Publications, 1993], vol. 2, pp. 40-41). This nonphilosophic awareness of the self is contrasted by St. Thomas with my [philosophical] knowledge of the self. "To know that I have a soul or that there is in me that by which I perceive, desire and understand is one thing: to know the nature of the soul is another. For the later knowledge deliberate reflection, 'second' reflection, is required; but the reflection by which one is aware of the self in a very general sense is not a deliberate reflection; and it is common to all human beings" (F. C. Copleston, *Aquinas* [Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1955], 28).

towards things other than myself. The awareness of self arises concomitantly with these acts. In perceiving a tree or a table I am aware at the same time that there is an *I* doing the perceiving, that the act of perception is my act. And so this awareness involves the awareness of my existence as a self.

If the Aristotelian-Thomistic position is correct, and I think it is, then the second Cartesian thesis of establishing a starting point in an indisputable knowledge of the self through introspection, and then arguing from this starting point to a mediated knowledge of the external world, is a non-starter. There is no such knowledge to be had, and the knowledge of the self that we do possess is no more immediate than the knowledge we possess of anything else.[22]

This brings us to the third thesis of Cartesianism, which holds that first-person thought and experience is invariably private. This statement clearly needs some unpacking because in some sense it is nonsense to deny that there is something privileged or immediate in the knowledge of our own present experiences. If I am giving a lecture and a listener is bored to tears, it does seem odd to suggest that he has to make some sort of enquiry about this, or that he could be mistaken about his condition.[23] Let us call this personal experience; the question then becomes, is this personal experience in fact private, in the sense that it is inaccessible to me? I see him yawning and coughing and looking out the window and I conclude he is bored. So far, so good, but does that mean I cannot know what it is for him to be bored? Is the experience I have called personal also private in some radical sense? Cartesians would hold that mental states are private in this

[22] In Descartes's own case the argument requires the establishment of the existence of God to assure the self that it is not deceived in its belief that there is an objective reality. Roger Scruton in *Modern Philosophy* (New York: The Penguin Press, 1994), writes: "This argument exhibits a pattern that occurs elsewhere. It begins from the subject, and the sphere where he is sovereign. It then argues outwards to an 'objective' viewpoint. From that viewpoint it establishes the existence of an objective world, and the sphere of being is constructed from the result. Such a pattern of argument is typical of the epistemological position known as 'foundationalism'" (47).

[23] "[T]here is a peculiar 'privilege' or 'immediacy' involved in the knowledge of our own present experiences. In some sense it is nonsense to suggest that I have to find out about them, or that I could, in the normal run of things, be mistaken" (Roger Scruton, *A Short History of Modern Philosophy*, 2d ed. [London and New York: Routledge, 1984) p. 276.

straightforward sense of being accessible and knowable only to the person who has them.

Such a picture must be wrong. In the first place, to argue from authority, it is incompatible with the Aristotelian-Thomistic approach. And in the second place, it is internally incoherent.

Saint Thomas's complex analysis of the acquisition of knowledge is dominated by his desire to show that the mind knows a reality other than itself;[24] yet, at the same time, he holds that truth about this reality is established by a judgment of the mind.[25] The mind refers back to reality the universal that characterizes the object experienced. In doing this the intellect does not add something to reality, rather, it asserts at least a partial identity between the universal as the object of thought and as qualifying the reality thought about.

The theory works in the clearest way in connection with material objects. For St. Thomas, the form of a material thing (as opposed to its matter) is what makes it the kind of thing it is, and is therefore what makes it intelligible, that is, knowable and thinkable. When we actually know what a thing is, that is to say, when we grasp its form, that form comes to structure our minds in a way analogous to the way in which it structures the thing itself. According to St. Thomas, knower and known thus become formally identical. If this is true then we have a very strong kind of contact between our minds and a reality other than ourselves. On St. Thomas's account our minds are literally in-formed by the external things about which we think.

Saint Thomas holds that the mind is passive in so far as it has the potential to be in-formed by the things which it knows and thinks about. But it is also active, in as much as this "becoming in-

[24] In discussing the question of how the mind knows reality St. Thomas employs the Aristotelian distinction between the active and passive intellects, two distinct functions of the mind. According to him the active intellect "illumines" the image of the object apprehended by the senses; that is to say, it actively reveals the formal and potentially universal element which is implicitly contained in the image. The active intellect then abstracts this potentially universal element and produces in the passive intellect what St. Thomas calls the *species impressa*. The passive intellect reacts to this determination of the active intellect, and the result is the *species expressa*, the universal concept in the full sense.

[25] "[P]roperly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is" (*STh* I, q. 16, a. 2).

formed" is not something that just happens to the mind, but is also something the mind *makes* happen. This *making happen* is what he calls abstraction.

The theory becomes much more intelligible to the modern reader if we use the word 'concept' for the form of a thing as it exists in the mind. Questions about abstraction then become questions about the formation of concepts, and at once seem much less puzzling. Abstracting the form is not a mysterious immaterial operation conducted "in the mind." Rather, it is the ordinary and familiar activity of getting to know what something is. As these activities proceed, the mind comes to be in-formed (in the passive intellect) by the concept (in the active intellect) it is building up. Abstracting the form is simply all that is involved in coming to understand.[26]

As for the internal incoherence of the Cartesian position, I would adopt the Wittgensteinian argument that if an object were really private it could not be referred to.[27] Wittgenstein argues that the subject of an experience makes sense of himself only through applying concepts; and concepts are developed within a world of objects. The primary application of these concepts is to this world of objects, and it is within a world of objects that we learn how these concepts are applied correctly—or incorrectly. But what are concepts supposed to apply to when we start talking about private experience? There seem to be no criteria for the application of

[26] Saint Thomas's doctrine of formal identity between the knower and the known is best interpreted, I think, as an expression of an *a priori* confidence that our ordinary ways of coming to understand something do actually work, that is, they do yield a genuine understanding of the thing itself. I call it an *a priori* confidence because our ordinary ways of coming to understand cannot, taken as a whole, be tested and validated from some perspective lying beyond them (Newman's point). Certainly St. Thomas' theory of formal identity is not meant to be such a test. The thesis of formal identity tells us what must in fact be the case, if our ways of coming to understand things are legitimate; it does not give us a criterion that we can directly apply to determine whether they are legitimate or not.

Not even St. Thomas, then, gives us a sense of objectivity in things, a sense which can be justified from a perspective transcendent to our ordinary ways of coming to understand. Rather, for St. Thomas, objectivity can only be established immanently, that is, by those means which our ordinary ways of coming to understand something make available, which allow us to test and refine the adequacy of our concepts to the things they express.

[27] Wittgenstein's argument is set out, *inter alia,* in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), 288.

concepts, concepts derived from our experience of real objects, to a realm which by definition is not based on concepts abstracted from objects.[28] So, in a realm of pure privacy, what we would be left with is something like this: it *seems to me* that I am experiencing or understanding something, perhaps "something I know not what," as Locke said in another context. If this is all pure privacy can give me, then both experiencing and understanding have been robbed of any sort of objectivity, and also probably of any sort of coherence. But this is to deprive both experience and understanding of the objectivity that are essential to them.

The fourth Cartesian principle affirms that language is the contingent and *ex post facto* externalization of prior, private, prelinguistic, and mentally internal content. This must be wrong. Language is not some sort of externally related, *post factum* addition to a primitive, nonconceptual and nonverbal experience. The forming and the testing of concepts are essentially public and collaborative activities. Concept-forming is embodied in the medium of human collaboration, and this medium of collaboration is language. Thus any viable meaning of objectivity which can be ascribed to our capacity to think requires that we have the capacity to speak, and that, when we speak, others can understand us. In this way we are substituting a third-person approach to questions of objectivity for the Cartesian strategy, which begins with the first person.

The rest of this article will be based on the view that "abstracting the form," that is, knowing and thinking about something, cannot be a private transaction between the mind and its object. Knowledge and thought are necessarily embedded in

[28] One could draw out the argument by pointing out that without the possibility of telling whether or not an object *remains the same* while I am aware of it, without being able to distinguish between *looking carefully* or *looking carelessly*, without anything which constitutes *making a mistake* or *getting it right* in identifying and referring to an object previously observed, there can be neither experience of an object, nor any way to express what is experienced conceptually. But in the hypothetical domain of pure privacy there exist no criteria (other than what *seems so to me at the time*) by which such distinctions can be drawn. For these distinctions to be drawn, the object of experience has to be accessible to others, in collaboration with whom it can be stabilized, attended to, and examined, and from which alone can arise the possibility of understanding it.

linguistically structured collaborative activities of familiar kinds. Finally, these activities are directed towards things that are publicly situated and accessible.

II. Objectivity and the Moral Act

The above discussion of the object of experience began, like most such discussions, with an outline of how we can know physical objects. The mind can only know universals, and yet reality, in an easily recognized sense of the term, is about the physical world we all inhabit. And this world is made up of particular things which are distinguished from one another by their material characteristics.

I would argue that the immediate object of experience, that is, what we are first aware of in a conscious state, bears no necessary relationship to objectivity or truth. What I intend to convey by this can be understood by a consideration of St. Thomas's classic restatement of Aristotle's requirements for the goodness of an action. These requirements are four:

> First, its generic existence as an activity at all; secondly, definition by an appropriate object; thirdly, the circumstances surrounding the act; and fourthly, its relation to a goal. Actions are good in the straightforward sense of the word only when all these elements are present: as pseudo-Denys says, *any defect will make a thing bad; to be good a thing must be wholly good.*[29]

Of course, none of this is as simple as it appears on the surface. What I want to emphasize is that the activity of judging a particular action in terms of the four requirements has little relation to what goes on in the agent's mind when he does the action. The four requirements for an action to be good are a statement of what

[29] Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 4. This is Timothy McDermott's rendering of St Thomas's position (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation,* ed. Timothy McDermott [Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1989], 194); the Latin reads: "Sic igitur in actione humana bonitas quadruplex considerari potest: una quidem secundum genus, prout scilicet est actio, quia quantum habet de actione et entitate, tantum de bonitate, ut dictum est; alia vero secundum speciem, quae accipitur secundum objectum conveniens; tertia secundum circumstantias, quasi secundum accidentia quaedam; quarta autem secundum finem, quasi secundum habitudinem ad bonitatis causam."

a good action will possess, but they are not a kind of checklist that the moral agent ticks off in his head before he does a good action. Of course he may deliberate about what he should do, but the deliberation is not about the four characteristics possessed by a moral action, but about what is to be done in the here and now. Practical reason or prudence is, Aristotle says, "a true state, reasoned and capable of action in the sphere of human goods."[30] Moral reasoning about what I should do is not the same activity as reasoning about the nature of moral activity, nor is it the same thing as trying to evaluate the moral character of the act after it has been done.

Therefore, what goes on in the agent's mind when he does a moral action and how he would justify the action after it is done are not the same. Yet—and this is also important, if somewhat puzzling—while the four requirements for an action to be good were not present to the man's consciousness when he acted, we would not want to say that they were imposed, as it were, on the action after it was completed. Nor do we believe that the requirements were altogether external to the action when it was actually being done. Somehow or other the four requirements qualified the act, yet they were not in any obvious way aspects of the consciousness of the man doing the act. It follows from this that a description of subjective, or personal, experience is not enough to determine the moral goodness of real actions, that is, actions that are actually done. A man can be as authentic as he likes, and as truthful in talking about his authenticity as all get-out, but still not be engaged in moral discourse.

In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein points out the difference between descriptions of inner processes and objectivity in the following way:

> the criteria for the truth of the *confession* that I thought such and such are not the criteria for a true *description* of a process. And the importance of a true confession does not reside in its being a correct and certain report of a process.

[30] Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 1140b21.

It resides rather in the special consequences which can be drawn from a confession whose truth is guaranteed by the special criteria of *truthfulness.*[31]

To apply Wittgenstein's analysis to our discussion of the criteria for a moral action, we could say that the truth of the man's *confession* (we might want to say *avowal)* that he had done a good act is established not by a description of what went on in his mind when he did the action, but rather from the moral implications which could be drawn from what he actually did. It is these moral implications, in the sense of the four criteria for a moral act which answer to Wittgenstein's "special consequences," that establish whether or not the action done was truly a good one.

We seem to want to say two things. First, there are good reasons for saying that the significance, or simply the truth, of an act is not achieved by the description of an inner process. The truth of the goodness or badness of the action is determined by objective criteria which seem to bear little relation to what went on in the mind of the agent. If this is the case, then describing what went on in the agent's mind is not a justification for what he did. Yet, second, there must be some relation of these objective criteria to the act itself. The four requirements have to apply to, or qualify, what the particular agent actually does. Unless the criteria in some way grow out of, or are implicit in, the particular act that was actually done, the criteria for the goodness of the action would seem to be something external to it, and not enter in any way into the making of the act a good act. We should remember that we are interested in the action the man actually does and not just in the thinking and talking about the action in the process of evaluating it after it is done. The criteria for a moral action are not external and imposed on something to which they have no intrinsic connection, yet, at the time the action was actually done, these were not the object of the agent's consciousness. The temptation to base the nature of the act on what went on in the agent's consciousness must be resisted.

[31] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* second part, 222f.

How are we to understand such a contention? My answer is that the means used to establish the moral character of the act have characterized the action, as an action, from the beginning. This is the case because they have constituted the act as this particular kind of act. At the same time, though, this "integral" or "finished" or "completed" moral act has little, and often nothing at all, to do with what went on in the agent's private experience. Very often the moral character of action is better determined by a third person than by the agent himself.

III. ". . . PER ALIQUA VERBA DETERMINARETUR"[32]

I want now to tie these discussions together by showing how they are related to the liturgy of the Church. The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy (*Sacrosanctum Concilium*) of the Second Vatican Council and the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* are both based on the traditional teaching of the Church which teaches that the liturgy is rightly "considered as an exercise of the priestly office of Jesus Christ."[33]

> [T]through the liturgy Christ, our redeemer and high priest, continues the work of our redemption in, with and through his Church.[34]

Furthermore, both *Sacrosanctum Concilium* and the *Catechism* emphasize that the liturgy is something done, it is an action:

> [E]very liturgical celebration, because it is an *action* of Christ the priest and of his Body the Church, is a sacred *action* surpassing all others. No other *action* of the Church can match its claim to efficacy, nor equal the degree of it.[35]

However we are to understand the liturgy of the Church, we have to begin with the principle that, in the first place, it is an action of Christ, Christ the priest who uses his body the Church to bring about the holiness of the worshipers. Again, liturgical

[32] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 6.
[33] *Sacrosanctum Concilium* 7.
[34] *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 1069.
[35] *SC* 7; emphasis added.

action is not a free action, if by that we mean that the way the action is done is decided by a practical judgment of the person performing the liturgical function as to the most effective, or "meaningful," way of carrying out his function. The form and matter of the sacramental system of Christ's Church bind the ministers of the sacraments and the faithful, and the way in which the celebration of the sacraments is celebrated is not a matter for a practical judgment. This means we should look on liturgy as more akin to a work properly carried out, as an instance of τὸ ποιητὸν, as *an undeviating determination of a work to be done,*[36] and not as an exercise in practical reason or prudence.[37]

This conclusion is strengthened if we remember some fundamental aspects of St. Thomas's teaching on the sacraments.

A sacrament properly so-called is some sign of our being made holy, and that involves the cause that makes us holy (Christ's suffering), the nature of the holiness produced (grace and virtue), and the ultimate goal for which we are made (eternal life).[38]

Again, Thomas makes it clear that the efficacy of the sacraments as well as their matter and form depend on the will of God. It follows from this that the sacraments are not, as it were, under our control.

Sacraments are used in man's worship of God and God's sanctification of men. Since human sanctification lies in God's power, man cannot decide what should be used for the purpose, that is for God to determine. So the sacraments of the New Law, which make men holy, use things God has decided on. Just as the

[36] This is Maritain's translation of *recta ratio factibilium* (Jacques Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism,* trans. J. F. Scanlan [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947], 7).

[37] Father Roguet in his beautiful, and alas it seems forgotten, book, in speaking of the duty of the priest celebrating the sacraments, insists that he "is not free to celebrate it according to his own fancy. The ministers must conform to the rules (of the Church for liturgical celebrations) not only to have the merit of obedience and the advantage of a uniform ritual. There is a deeper reason: this obedience to the Church is necessary to ensure that the real objective bond between the minister's celebration and Christ's institution is maintained and to ensure that the acts which he performs visibly are really, through invisibly, Christ's own" (A.-M. Roguet, O.P., *Christ Acts through the Sacraments* [Post Falls, Id.: Lepanto Press, n.d.g.], 15; first published in French in 1954 as *Les Sacraments, signes de Vie).*

[38] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 4.

Holy Spirit decided the symbols this or that passage of scripture would use to signify spiritual things, so God determined what things should act as signs in this or that sacrament. For whether a thing makes us holy or not depends not on its natural power, but on God's decision.[39]

Finally, and most importantly from the perspective of this article, the sacraments require the use of language. The very notion of sacraments as signs requires words, since words have pride of place in our signifying:

To define the signification of sacraments more precisely, then, we need words as well as things: water by itself could be a sign of washing or cooling, but by saying *I baptize you* we show that in baptism we are using it to signify spiritual cleansing. Words and thing together make a unified sign in the sacraments, the thing providing a sort of material the meaning of which is formed and completed by words. The material thing, notice, can be an action as long as it is perceptible: something like washing or anointing.[40]

Words and perceptible actions are necessary for the very existence of the sacraments.[41] This insistence that the sacramental action of the Church is, first, based on divine institution and, second, carried out through perceptible signs of which spoken words are an essential aspect has always given an unmistakably objective character to Catholic worship. Or, I suppose one has to say, when Catholic worship is true to itself. When we begin to forget that we are dealing with holy things which are not under our control and a teaching that is not ours to alter, very quickly we end up not by celebrating Christ's sacraments, but by parading our own not very

[39] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 5

[40] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 6.

[41] In discussing the form of the sacrament of the Eucharist, for example, he says that in perfecting or completing this sacrament no other act is required of the celebrant than saying the words of Christ ("minister in perfectione huius sacramenti nihil agit nisi quod profert verba Christi" [*STh* III, q. 78, a. 1]). The reality of the whole Christ on the altar, brought about through transubstantiation, as well as our participation in the one sacrifice of Christ, are brought about through the use of words. In drawing attention to the central importance of words and perceptible actions for St. Thomas I am not discussing directly the question of sacramental causality. I do think, though, that a better appreciation of the importance of language in the matter of sacramental causality would be of no small assistance towards the achievement of clarity.

interesting interior quest for authenticity, or a new vision of community, or a more spiritual and meaningful understanding of the sacraments.

Elizabeth Anscombe put this curious reluctance to face up to the things we say about the sacraments in the following way:

> We Christians are so much accustomed to the idea of Holy Communion that we tend not to notice how mysterious an idea it is. There is the now old dispute between Catholics and Protestants whether we eat what only symbolizes, or really is, the flesh of the saviour when we eat the bread consecrated in the Eucharist; drink the blood only symbolically or really. Because of this dispute, it appeared as if only the Catholic view were extravagant—the Protestants having the perfectly reasonable procedure of *symbolically* eating Christ's body and drinking his blood! The staggering strangeness of doing such a thing even symbolically slipped out of notice in the disputes about transubstantiation. [42]

We may also recall Flannery O'Connor's famous remark that if the Blessed Sacrament is not the body and blood of Christ then "to hell with it."[43]

It is just this objective character which appears suspicious, at very least, to the modern mind. The resentful congregation at the funeral Mass is only an extreme example of this turning away from the objective that appears as alien and unfriendly into the subjective which is greeted with a sense of relief and even of homecoming.

[42] G. E. M. Anscombe, "On Transubstantiation," in *Collected Philosophical Papers,* vol. 3 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 110-11.

[43] "Well, towards morning the conversation turned on the Eucharist, which I, being Catholic, was obviously supposed to defend. Mrs. Broadwater said that when she was a child and received the Host, she thought of it as the Holy Ghost, He being the most 'portable' person of the Trinity; now she thought of it as a symbol and implied that it was a pretty good one. I then said, in a very shaky voice, 'Well, if it's a symbol, to hell with it.' That was all the defense I was capable of but I realize now that this is all I will ever be able to say about it, outside of a story, except that it is the center of existence for me; all the rest of life is expendable" (*The Habit of Being, Letters of Flannery O'Connor,* selected and edited by Sally Fitzgerald [New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1979], 125).

IV. "The Little Church of the Heart"[44]

The resentful mourners at the funeral Mass are a reminder to us that subjectivity is all around us. It is deeply rooted in the modern consciousness. It is here to stay. Balthasar, as I said at the beginning of this article, characterizes this subjectivity as "the modern orientation toward personal, experiential and psychological categories." On the other hand, it is a mistake to think that an interest in the personal, as distinct from the subjective, is a product of this "modern orientation." The unknown author of the fourth-century work the *Liber Gradualium* was intent on showing that the liturgy of the Church was a "pattern" that had to be internalized. Christ gives us, he says, "the icon of the Church"

> in order that faithful souls might be made one again and, having received transformation [*metabole,* a play on traditional language for the miraculous change of the Eucharistic elements], be enabled to inherit everlasting life. [45]

This internalizing of the Christian message is what the author called "the little Church of the heart." At the same time, however, the *metabole* is only possible within the liturgical experience of the Church:

> The *Liber Gradualium* speaks of "three Churches"; the heavenly church of the angels and saints, the earthly church of clergy and sacraments, and the "little Church of the heart". It is the middle term, this writer insists, the earthly church, that enables the believer "to find himself in the church of the heart, and [thence]," even if only momentarily in this life, "in the church on high."[46]

It is, then, no new or modern thing to insist that the liturgy must be reflected in the experience of the worshiper in a way that molds

[44] This is Alexander Golitzin's translation of a phrase from the *Liber Gradualium,* the work of an unknown fourth-century Syrian monk. See Alexander Golitzin, "'Suddenly Christ': The Place of Negative Theology in the Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagites," in Michael Kessler and Christian Sheppard, eds., *Mystics, Presence and Aporia* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2003), 18.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

(*metabole*) his individuality as a Christian. But how are we to understand this necessity for a personal element in liturgical experience without falling into the sort of private experience I have been arguing against? I have been at pains in this article to reject what has sometimes been called "mentalism" or "psychological internalism." In the second section of this paper I argued against this mentalism and maintained that the objectivity of thinking does not come from a report on what goes on in my mind, and that it is language that creates the possibility of objectivity. I insisted that objectivity cannot be the result of a description of private experience, and that it is our initiation into a verbal community that enables us to communicate with one another, and, furthermore, that our experience as individuals is at least partially molded by the language we use.[47]

The personal aspect of liturgical experience is no exception to this principle and it has to be understood as involving the use of language. Furthermore, this use of language is not merely a report of what went on inside the head of the priest or the mind of the laity; it also partly structures the experience itself. If we understand this principle correctly we will see that it is possible to accept Balthasar's claim that "the personal and the subjective" have indeed marked the consciousness of modernity, but that this emphasis on the personal need not involve principles and practices inimical to Catholic sacramentalism.

Balthasar links this new sense of the importance of the self to the work of the Carmelite Doctors. In an essay on St. John of the Cross he writes:

[47] See Charles Taylor, *Human Agency and Language,* on what he calls the "expressive view" of human language. "The expressive theory opens a new dimension. If language serves to express/realize a new kind of awareness; then it may not only make possible a new awareness of things, an ability to describe them; but also new ways of feeling, of responding to things. If in expressing our thoughts about things, we come to have new thoughts; then in expressing our feeling, we can come to have transformed feelings" (Charles Taylor, "Language and Human Nature," in idem, *Human Agency and Language,* Philosophical Papers 1 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 232-33). Richard Moran in *Authority and Estrangement* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), argues correctly, it seems to me, that Taylor pushes this principle too far when it comes to the actual constitution of the self (ibid., 42-44).

The challenge and the scandal of the Carmelite response to Luther lie in the fact that it incorporates the whole of monastic tradition from the Greeks up to and including the Middle Ages into the new Christian radicalism; indeed, with its psychological categories, the Carmelite response makes the new radicalism more radical than ever.[48]

What does this "new Christian radicalism" mean? In the first place, it means taking the importance of self-knowledge and the experience of the individual as the key to the practice of Christianity, and the development of prayer in the modern world. It is a key; it is not all that there is to say about its history, its practice, or its development.[49] Balthasar is arguing that we cannot ignore this key, or this clue, if we want to understand how Christianity is forced to operate within the modern world.

We should also notice, secondly, that the "new Christian radicalism" does not mean a novel demand for sincerity or simplicity in the practice of Christianity. The principle that mere formalism in religion is displeasing to God and destructive of genuine morality is as old as the prophets, and it has been an integral aspect of Catholic thought from the beginning.

Thirdly, what Balthasar is warning us against is a wrong use of this key. It is one thing to put what I have called *personal* experience at the center of the practice of Christianity in a new way. But the Carmelites were trying to heal an understanding of subjectivity that was not only destructive of Church order, but also risked turning the need for self-knowledge into a sort of idol. And the worship of idols, as we should know by now, is not only

[48] Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord,* 3:106.

[49] It might be a useful exercise to recall that self-knowledge was the foundation of St. Catherine of Siena's teaching about the soul's approach to God. Although the pattern of Catherine's approach to God is profoundly theological, nonetheless its structure is remarkably simple. She lays out this approach in the first few paragraphs of the *Dialogue*. First of all she had exercised herself for some time in virtue. The struggle to establish the virtues and to fight the vices led her to becoming "accustomed to dwelling in the cell of self-knowledge in order to know better God's goodness to her" (*Catherine of Siena: The Dialogue,* trans. and intro. by Suzanne Noffke, O.P. [New York: Paulist Press, 1980], 25). Self-knowledge is not gained by an inward gaze on the part of the one seeking to know himself; as though one part of the self can look at another part and so obtain an accurate and complete picture of his inner self. The self-knowledge that is genuine is acquired as a by-product of the effort to practice the virtues and fight the vices and this requires interacting with other people.

displeasing to the Lord, but destroys the truth that self-knowledge is a prerequisite for growth in the spiritual life. It is the wrong-headed acceptance and practice of this idol worship in the guise of a sense of bonding with like-minded people at the funeral Mass that has to be fought.

None of this entails that there is no such thing as personal experience. The fact that objectivity cannot rest on descriptions of what is supposed to have gone on in our minds in no way entails that there are no such things as individual or personal experience.[50] There has to be a subject of experience, and a view of objectivity that dismissed the reality of the subject would be in fact a very odd one. That is not to say that we have a direct perception of ourselves as a thinking subject; such a claim, as we know, St. Thomas rejects with good reason.[51] I am aware of my own existence because when I say "I exist" I know I am enunciating a true proposition, and I cannot be skeptical about its truth.[52] This, I think, is in the same spirit of Newman's "We use, not trust our faculties." The unknown fourteenth-century mystic who wrote *The Cloud of Unknowing* expressed, in another of his works, this irreducible basis of a sane approach to the reality of the self in a pithy and unforgettable way:

> For I hold him too lewd and too simple that cannot think and feel that himself is—not what himself is, but that himself is. For this is plainly proper to the lewdest cow, or to the most unreasonable beast—if it might be said, as it may not, that one were lewder or more unreasonable than another—for to feel their own proper being. Much more then is it proper to man, the which is singularly endued

[50] It should also be pointed out that Wittgenstein accepted this point: "Although he rejects the Cartesian interpretation of subjectivity, Wittgenstein does not on that account discard the subjective, but rather returns once and again to the 'experience of the meaning of a word,' and he insists on 'the visual experience' that accompanies the seeing of aspects" (Victor J. Krebs, "The Bodily Root: Seeing Aspects and Inner Experience," in William Day and Victor J. Krebs, eds., *Seeing Wittgenstein Anew* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], 135).

[51] See above.

[52] "[I]t is to be noted that Aquinas does not say that a man perceives that he has a spiritual soul or that he affirms his existence a thinking subject, if by this we mean simply a mind. The awareness of one's own existence of which Aquinas is speaking is an awareness enjoyed also by those who are innocent of all philosophy; it is anterior to any metaphysical theory of the self" (Copleston, *Aquinas,* 48).

with reason above all other beasts, for to think and for to feel his own proper being.[53]

That we are is clear enough, *what* we are is another matter.[54] The distinction, which is surely a familiar one, is important when we come to think about the liturgy. There is a subject of liturgical experience, and the subject of liturgical experience is essential for the very existence of the liturgy; but, on the other hand, this liturgical subject is partly constituted by the liturgy. The liturgy does not constitute the worshiper in his being, but in the sort of being he becomes. The complex of words and actions of the liturgy mold or shape not only the experience of the self, but also what the subject of liturgical experience actually becomes.

Let us say then that the words and actions of the Church not only create the reality of the sacraments, but also in part structure the personal experience of the worshiper. How can we understand this experience of the worshiper without falling back into the sort of subjectivism I have been arguing against?

In the first place, we must remember that we are not talking about experience, as it were, in the raw. We are talking about the sacramental experience of a Catholic. So, we are talking about the personal experience of the worshiper as already objectified. And

[53] *The Cloud of Unknowing and Other Treatises, by An English Mystic of the Fourteenth Century,* ed. Abbot Justin McCann (London: Burns Oates, sixth edition 1952), "The Epistle of Privy Counsel," 105. Lewd = ignorant, unlearned.

[54] "This is little mastery for to think, if it were bidden to the lewdest man or woman that liveth in the commonest natural wit in this life, as methinketh. And therefore softly, and mourningly, and smilingly I marvel me sometimes when I hear some men say—I mean not simply lewd men and women, but clerks and men of great knowledge—that my writing to thee and to others is so hard and so high, so curious and so quaint, that scarcely it may be conceived of the subtlest clerk or witted man or woman in this life, as they say. But to these men must I answer and say that it is much worth to be sorrowed, and of God and his lovers to be mercifully scorned and bitterly condemned, that now on these days, not only a few fold but generally almost all—except one or two in a country of the special chosen of God—be so blind in their curious knowledge of learning and of nature that the true conceit of this light work, through the which the most simple man's soul or woman's in this life is verily in lovely meekness oned to God in perfect charity, may no more, nor yet so much, be conceived of them in certainty of spirit, for their blindness and their curiosity, than may the knowledge of the greatest clerk in the schools of a young child that is at his A.B.C. And for this blindness erringly they call such simple teaching curiosity of wit, when, if it be well looked upon, it shall be found but a simple and a light lesson of a lewd man" (ibid., 105).

what might that be like? We can find the beginning of an answer by using a somewhat difficult discussion of St. Thomas about the phrase "taste and see that the Lord is good." Thomas says:

> The experiencing of a thing is gained through the senses; but in one way, of a thing present, in another, of an absent thing. Of an absent thing, by reason of sight, smell and hearing; but of a thing present, by touch and taste—of a thing extrinsically present, by touch; by taste, however, of a thing intrinsically present. God, however, is not far from us nor outside of us but in us . . . and therefore the experiencing of the divine goodness is called a tasting.[55]

I have no intention of trying to explicate how this experience fits in with St. Thomas's system.[56] The point in adducing it here is to show that Thomas is perfectly aware that there is an element of personal experience in our approach to God, tasting and seeing that the Lord is good. This personal and experiential aspect of prayer, then, is not an invention of the modern world.[57]

[55] From *Lectura in Psal. 33, v. 9,* quoted in Francis L. B. Cunningham, O.P., *The Indwelling of the Trinity* (Dubuque, Ia.: The Priory Press, 1955), 198.

[56] Fr. Cunningham comments: "The loving-knowledge rooted in grace which is implied by the inhabitation attains the Persons as objects present to us and within us. So it cannot be a discursive knowledge, which by definition has no direct contact with the thing known. . . . We know God as present in us and with us without reasoning to this presence, by a sort of contact, or, better, a sort of tasting. This does not mean, however, that we have an immediate knowledge of the Trinity, such as in the Beatific Vision or with the immediacy of sense experience . . . we know God by means of an effect produced by God operating, intrinsic in our intellective powers, known without reasoning. . . . But not any effect of God suffices as a medium for the contuition of Him: it must be an effect within man, an effect to which God is immediately present, an effect immediately perceptible, an effect supremely expressive of God. And these conditions are realised only in the gifts of grace, but especially in the gift of the Holy Ghost of Wisdom and in the supreme theological virtue of charity. . . . Simply put . . . we know the gifts of the Trinity by experiencing them; and by Their gifts we know, we experience, the divine Persons themselves. But this is to have and to possess and to enjoy (imperfectly) the Persons: God is present by this fact in a very special manner. . . . It is clear then that in the experimental knowledge that Wisdom gives birth to, whose cause and formal medium is divine Charity, the formal explanation of the Trinity in the souls of the just is found" (ibid., 198-202)

[57] Bernard McGinn has written: "Jean Leclercq, in his study of the difference between monastic and scholastic theology, expressed the difference between monastic and scholastic modes in terms of the former's emphasis on *credo ut experiar* (I believe in order to experience) and the latter's concentration on *credo ut intellegam* (I believe in order to understand)" (Bernard McGinn, *The Presence of God,* vol. 2, *The Growth of Mysticism* [New York: Crossroad, 1994], 367). He goes on to add, though, that this dissimilarity makes a difference in emphasis not in goals.

Moreover, in focusing on individuality and the personal within a context in which experience is molded by and through the sacraments, the Carmelite doctors have shown the way to a recovery of the objectivity of sacramental practice in a manner that could at least impinge on the consciousness of our contemporaries.

We have to move the modern focus of attention away from what is subjective towards the wonderful reality of Christ acting in the liturgical life of the Church. But we will never even begin to convince the resentful mourners that we believe it is Christ acting in the here and now through his priests and people unless there is an appropriation of this truth by those who participate in the liturgical life of the Church. It is not enough to appropriate the truth that it is Christ who operates through his sacraments, in a way that is only notional or abstract. Our acceptance that in the liturgy of the Church we are dealing with Christ's work, and Christ's words, has to be given a real, deep, and existential assent. This appropriation requires the practice of personal prayer. Blessed John Henry Newman treasured the words of St. Ambrose, that it was not by dialectic that God had saved his people—"non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum."[58] At the very least we can say that, somehow, the truth must be made attractive and lovable, it must not appear as alien, threatening, and indifferent.

It may be that in reaction to the messy sort of subjectivism I have been arguing against some have tended to think that it is enough merely to state the truth about public worship. It seems odd to have to remind ourselves that personal prayer is an indispensable aspect of a Christian life. This insistence is not an invention of the sixteenth century, although a heightened sense of its importance may have developed around that time. It is clear that, even in the monastic setting with its emphasis on the divine office, the practice of private prayer was indispensable.

In the "spacious days" of Cluny, it was the accepted custom that the monks remained in church in private prayer after Matins which, always longer in the monastic Breviary than in others, were longer still in Cluniac houses. Yet, when

[58] He used this saying as the motto for *A Grammar of Assent*.

some of the community found it too exhausting to do so, it was lamented as a falling off from their pristine fervour.[59]

This same insistence on the necessity of praying privately—*orare secretius*—was found also in the mendicant orders at their founding, and we are told that St. Dominic used to spend the time after Matins praying in the Church. This private prayer was also an integral part of the life of the Angelic Doctor, however little he thought it appropriate to write about it. It was while praying privately that the Angelic Doctor was touched by God:

> The celebrated incident in the life of St Thomas Aquinas, when he was divinely commended and bidden to name a reward for his labours, took place, according to one tradition, when he was praying before Matins in the church of *San Domenico Maggiore* at Naples, and there were other friars there at prayer who testified to the vision.[60]

We will have to begin to follow the example of the saint in his prayer, as well as in his teaching, if we are serious about trying to bind up the wounds that mentalism and psychological internalism have inflicted on the liturgy of Christ's body. Every one of us must seek to build the "Little Church of the Heart."

[59] A Benedictine of Stanbrook Abbey, *Mediaeval Mystical Tradition and Saint John of the Cross* (London: Burns & Oates, 1953), 4.

[60] Ibid., 4.

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PREDESTINATION IN JOHN 13-17? AQUINAS'S *COMMENTARY ON JOHN* AND CONTEMPORARY EXEGESIS

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THOMAS AQUINAS'S Augustinian doctrine of predestination is well known. Less known is the role of the Gospel of John in Aquinas's predestinarian teaching. In an excellent recent study of Aquinas's theology of predestination in light of twentieth-century commentators, for example, Michał Paluch devotes a chapter to Aquinas's *Commentary on Romans,* but he does not treat Aquinas's *Commentary on John*.[1] There are good reasons for this decision, of course: Aquinas does not cite the Gospel of John in his question on predestination in the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae,* while in the same question he quotes Romans eleven times. In this essay, however, I wish to enlarge upon Steven Long's suggestion that the Gospel of John is of significant import for Aquinas's theology of predestination.[2] At the

[1] Michał Paluch, O.P., *La profondeur de l'amour divin. La predestination dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas Aquinas* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2004), chap. 7. In this chapter he also briefly treats Aquinas's *Commentary on Ephesians*. See also John Saward's treatment of Aquinas on predestination in his "The Grace of Christ in His Principal Members: St. Thomas Aquinas on the Pastoral Epistles," in *Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to His Biblical Commentaries,* ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, O.F.M. Cap., Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum (New York: T. & T. Clark International, 2005), 197-221, at 200-209.

[2] See Steven A. Long, "Divine Providence and John 15:5," in Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering, eds., *Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 140-50. I treat predestination briefly in "Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas," in Weinandy, Keating, and Youcm, eds., *Aquinas on Scripture,* 99-126, at 109-11. In his work on predestination (defending a Bañezian position against varieties of Molinism), Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., treats the Gospel of John as a source for Augustine's and Aquinas's

same time, I wish to place Aquinas's interpretation of John 13-17 in dialogue with contemporary biblical scholarship. The essay's first section explores Aquinas's interpretation of certain passages from John 13-17 in which he finds support for an Augustinian doctrine of predestination. These passages help us to understand more clearly why predestination plays an important role in Aquinas's theology.[3] In accord with his circular hermeneutic in which theological exegesis and speculative theology are not separated from each other, Aquinas both derives a doctrine of predestination from his exegesis of John 13-17 and brings this doctrine to his exegesis. The second section of the essay examines the perspectives of three contemporary biblical scholars, Leon Morris, Ben Witherington III, and Raymond Brown. On this basis, the third and final section proposes that Aquinas's insights can assist contemporary biblical scholars. The speculative and doctrinal tools that Aquinas brings to exegesis are required, as regards the Gospel of John, even by contemporary exegesis.

I. Predestination in John 13-17: Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas brings to John 13-17 a metaphysical understanding of God's eternity that accords with Jesus' "I am" sayings in the

theology of predestination, and he quotes once from Aquinas's *Commentary on John*: see Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination: The Meaning of Predestination in Scripture and the Church* (1939; repr., Rockford, Ill.: TAN Books and Publishers, 1998), 78. For Augustine's interpretation of the Gospel of John as teaching predestination, see for example Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, 8.13-16, in St. Augustine, *Four Anti-Pelagian Writings,* trans. John A. Mourant and William J. Collinge (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 233-37.

[3] Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., locates the doctrine of predestination within Aquinas's theology of deification (configuration to Christ): see Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas,* vol. 2, *Spiritual Master,* trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 115-16, 126, 143-45. As Torrell points out, for Aquinas "grace is a deiform structure, which is why God alone can give it to us" (126). Torrell provides a lengthy quotation from Aquinas's *Commentary on Romans* (c. 8, lect. 6, nos. 703-6), but in his remarks on predestination he does not cite Aquinas's *Commentary on John*. For a similar view of deification, see Colman E. O'Neill, O.P., *Sacramental Realism: A General Theory of the Sacraments* (1983; repr., Chicago: Midwest Theological Forum, 1998), 208: "In sacramental practice the salient aspect of faith that is brought to light in prayer is the church's total dependence on Christ, the mediator who holds from the Father the mission of sending the Spirit on mankind to draw it away from sin and into the mystery of the Trinity."

Gospel of John.[4] In Aquinas's view, Jesus offers in his Farewell Discourse an increasingly clear testimony to God's eternal election of the blessed. Rather than treating the entirety of Aquinas's commentary on John 13-17, I will focus on certain central passages.

A) Jesus' "Hour"

The first verse of John 13 signals a transition, "Now before the feast of the Passover, when Jesus knew that his hour had come to depart out of this world to the Father, having loved his own who were in the world, he loved them to the end" (John 13:1). Aquinas interprets "Jesus knew that his hour had come" as confirming God's providence over all things. Jesus' "hour" is not random, but rather is providentially arranged so that Jesus' Pasch might fulfill that which symbolized it, namely, the sacrifice of the Passover lamb. Aquinas observes that the Gospel of John thus separates its world view, as regards Jesus' "hour," from ancient notions of fate and astrological determinism: "this hour was not a matter of fate, as though governed by the course and arrangement of the stars; it was determined by the disposition and providence of God."[5] God's disposing providence does not introduce determinism into Jesus' free action, by which Jesus redeems human beings from sin

[4] Regarding the "I am" sayings, the biblical scholar Richard Bauckham comments, "Only one who truly shares the unique divine identity can give eternal life and reveal God's glory in the world. Jesus' absolute 'I am' sayings express his unique and exclusive participation in God's unique and exclusive deity. Just as 'I am he' in the Hebrew Bible sums up what it is to be truly God, so in John it identifies Jesus as truly God in the fullest sense. . . . In Deutero-Isaiah, the divine 'I am he' is linked closely with the uniqueness of YHWH's eternal sovereignty as the One who precedes all things and whom none shall succeed (Isa. 41:4; 43:10; 48:12). It is this uniquely divine eternity Jesus claims in John 8:58: 'Before Abraham was, I am'" (Richard Bauckham, *The Testimony of the Beloved Disciple: Narrative, History, and Theology in the Gospel of John* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2007], 248).

[5] Aquinas, *In Ioan.* 13, lect. 1 (§1733) (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of John,* vol. 2, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P., and James Weisheipl, O.P. [Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1999], 272). Paragraph numbers in this translation are taken from S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Super evangelium s. Ioannis lectura,* ed. R. Cai, O.P. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1952).

and brings his human nature to perfection as "a partaker in the glory of the Father."[6]

The phrase "having loved his own" (John 13:1) leads Aquinas to the central dimension of God's providence, namely, predestination. The phrase "having loved his own" underscores that Christ's love is prior to ours. This priority has to do with the Son's eternal, creative love. Aquinas states that "he loved us before he created us: 'For you love all things that exist, and have loathing for none of the things which thou hast made' (Wis 11:24)."[7] The priority of Christ's eternal love also involves his gracious drawing of us to himself in his work of redemption, as Aquinas underscores by quoting Jeremiah 31:3, "I have loved you with an everlasting love; therefore, I have drawn you, taking pity on you" (to which Aquinas adds John 15:13).[8]

Given the eternal creative and redemptive priority of Christ's love, who are Christ's "own"? Aquinas identifies three ways in which created persons belong to the divine Son. These ways of belonging to the Son depend not upon creatures, but upon God's (nontemporally) "prior" love, his communication of goodness from eternity. The first way is by creation: all persons are Christ's "own" as regards their created nature, which is preserved in being by God. This relatively limited meaning of "his own" is found in John 1:11, "He came to his own home, and his own people received him not." This first way of belonging to the Son does not involve, on the part of created persons, a love for Christ.

Aquinas describes the second way of belonging to the Son as "by donation."[9] The Gospel of John is replete with statements by Jesus that thank the Father for those persons whom the Father has given him. The Father gives persons to the Son by infusing faith in them. God preserves in them not only the gifts of created nature, but also the gifts of supernatural grace. The third way is a more excellent form of the second. Some of those who receive grace do

[6] Ibid. (§1734) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 272).
[7] Ibid. (§1735) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 273).
[8] Cited in ibid. (§1735) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 273).
[9] Ibid. (§1736) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 273).

so in extraordinary forms, and God "loves these by consoling them in a special way."[10]

While providence therefore extends to all created persons, insofar as God preserves all in being, predestination applies only to the second and third ways of belonging to God, by which God from eternity wills to make certain persons "his own." Regarding these persons, God's eternal love does not fail. Aquinas explains the phrase "he loved them to the end" as signifying both that Christ loves us unto eternal life (in which we enjoy "Christ in his divinity")[11] and that Christ loves us by dying for us. This love triumphs over death and unites in eternal communion with the Trinity all those who are "his own" by faith and love.

In this way Aquinas interprets John 13:1, "having loved his own who were in the world, he loved them to the end." Does this interpretation, which draws upon earlier sections of Aquinas's *Commentary on John,* make sense within the context of the Farewell Discourse? For answering this question, the next key passage is John 13:18, "I am not speaking of you all; I know whom I have chosen."

B) God's Grace and Human Cooperation

Interpreting John 13:18, Origen emphasizes that (in Aquinas's words) "if Judas had done these things, he would have been blessed."[12] By comparison, while granting the necessity of human cooperation with grace, Aquinas denies that Judas's freedom has the primary role in determining whether or not Judas will be blessed. Rather, God's grace, working through Judas's freedom, has (nontemporal) priority. None of Christ's disciples will perish spiritually other than Judas, not because God wills to damn Judas, but because God wills to save the other disciples and to permit Judas's free rebellion. Commenting on Jesus' statement that "I know whom I have chosen," Aquinas remarks, "This was like saying: Those who have been chosen will not perish; but not all

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid. (§1738) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 274).

[12] *In Ioan.* 13, lect. 3 (§1787) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 294).

have been chosen. So, the one who will perish will be the one who has not been chosen, that is, Judas: 'You did not choose me, but I chose you' (Jn 15:16)."[13]

Aquinas is aware of the objection that Jesus did in fact choose Judas, and that despite this choosing, Judas rebelled permanently against Jesus' love. In John 6:71, Jesus observes, "Did I not choose you, the twelve, and one of you is a devil?" Does Jesus' choosing therefore reflect simply his historical action, which unrepentant sinners such as Judas can frustrate? In this respect Aquinas makes a distinction: some are chosen to follow Christ for a time, but are not chosen to attain eternal glory. Although God's grace is not deficient, nonetheless God does not predestine all equally to share in his life by grace and glory. Aquinas states that "one can be chosen in two ways. One is for a present righteousness; and Judas was chosen for this. The other is for final glory; and Judas was not chosen for this."[14] Jesus chose all twelve disciples, but in the deepest sense he did not choose Judas—as expressed by the divine choosing that one finds in Jesus' words, "I am not speaking of you all; I know whom I have chosen."

Aquinas's distinction between being chosen for grace and being chosen for glory is theologically creative, but does the Gospel of John have in view such a nuanced account of chosenness? Aquinas takes up this topic again when he comments on John 14:3, "I will come again and will take you to myself"; John 14:6, "no one comes to the Father, but by me"; and John 15:16, "You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you that you should go and bear fruit and that your fruit should abide."

C) Jesus' Promise and Divine Election

Jesus promises to prepare the disciples a place and to "come again and . . . take you to myself" (Jn 14:3). Such a promise, having to do with eternal life, can only be made by God. Since God is eternal, this promise entails predestination from eternity. Aquinas explains that Christ's promise means that "it is in my

[13] Ibid. (§1788) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 294).
[14] Ibid. (§1789) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 294).

[Christ's] power to predestine you to this place. For he, with the Father and the Holy Spirit has predestined them to eternal life: 'He chose us in him' (Eph 1:4)."[15] Christ's preparation of our place in heaven, however, does not reduce solely to his eternal will. On the contrary, his works of love in history prepare our place. Aquinas lists five ways in which this is so: Christ establishes our faith, models for us the path of salvation, prays for us, inflames our hearts with love of eternal realities, and sends the Holy Spirit.[16]

Commenting on Jesus' statement that "no one comes to the Father, but by me" (John 14:6), Aquinas observes that "God, wanting to be known by us, takes his Word, conceived from eternity, and clothes it with flesh in time. And so no one can arrive at a knowledge of the Father except through the Son."[17] Christ's love, Aquinas goes on to say, "works in us but not without us: the result of this is faith, by which the impious are brought to life."[18] Yet God retains (nontemporal) priority: "No one can love God unless he has the Holy Spirit: because we do not act before we receive God's grace, rather, the grace comes first: 'He loved us first' [1 John 4:10]."[19] By cooperating with the grace of the Holy Spirit, we share in the Spirit (and therefore also in the Son), so that our good works both glorify God and enable us to share in the joy of Christ.[20] As Aquinas remarks regarding John 15:10, "Keeping the commandments is an effect of divine love, not only of the love by which we love, but also of the love by which God loves us."[21]

Jesus underscores the divine priority when he teaches his disciples, "You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you that you should go and bear fruit and that your fruit should

[15] *In Ioan.* 14, lect. 1 (§1857) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 332).

[16] See ibid. (§1859) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 333).

[17] *In Ioan.* 14, lect. 2 (§1874) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 339).

[18] *In Ioan.* 14, lect. 3 (§1900), (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 349).

[19] *In Ioan.* 14, lect. 4 (§1909) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 354); see also *In Ioan.* 14, lect. 6 (§1955) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 373), and elsewhere.

[20] See *In Ioan.* 15, lect. 1 (§1996) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 395); *In Ioan.* 15, lect. 2 (§2004) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 398).

[21] *In Ioan.* 15, lect. 2 (§2002) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 398).

abide" (John 15:16). Jesus has called his disciples his "friends" (John 15:14); does the credit for the friendship belong to the disciples, or even to Jesus and to the disciples equally? Aquinas remarks that "[i]t is the usual practice for each one of us to say that he is the cause of friendship: 'Every friend will say, I started the friendship' [Sir 37:1]."[22] When we credit ourselves for our own meritorious actions, we imagine that we are the cause of our friendship with God.

By contrast, Jesus' statement in John 15:16 makes clear that our friendship with God does not arise from ourselves. Aquinas observes, "He is saying in effect: Whoever has been called to this sublime friendship should not attribute the cause of this friendship to himself, but to me, who chose him as a friend."[23] What does it mean to say that Christ chose us? This choice unfolds temporally in Christ's historical calling of his disciples, and indeed in the entirety of the history of salvation. But since Jesus is the Word made flesh, his words also point to a divine, eternal choosing. In this regard Aquinas cites Ephesians 1:4, "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world."

But on what basis did God, in his wisdom and goodness, choose? Aquinas describes the view that our merits, as "preexisting in the foreknowledge of God," cause God to choose us.[24] He explains, however, that Jesus' statement "I chose you" would not make sense if Jesus chose us because he foreknew that we would choose him. In such a case the cause of his choice would be our choice, contrary to his claim that "[y]ou did not choose me." If our choice is prior to God's choice, then Jesus' words would be mistaken. But if God's choice is prior, on what basis does he choose between one person and another? This question, Aquinas notes, misunderstands the nature of God's choice. God does not choose on the basis of an already existing good (e.g., a person). Rather, "God's choice is the cause of an influx of good, greater in one than in another."[25] Put another way, God causes all created

[22] *In Ioan.* 15, lect. 3 (§2019) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 404).
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid. (§2023) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 405).
[25] Ibid. (§2024) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 405).

good. Why, however, does God cause such diversity among free creatures? Aquinas appeals to St. Paul: "'The Lord knows those who are his'. . . . In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver but also of wood and earthenware, and some for noble use, some for ignoble" (2 Tim 2:19-20).[26] The result is an ordered arrangement in which both mercy and justice are displayed; beyond this Aquinas cannot go. This ordered arrangement unfolds temporally in a dramatic fashion: Christ's Pasch brings salvation to the world and heals those who receive its fruits in faith.[27] Of course, this drama is not random: as Aquinas comments regarding Jesus' statement that "the hour has come" (John 17:1), this is "[n]ot an hour fixed by fate, but chosen by his own plan and good pleasure."[28]

Taken together, Jesus' statements that "I will come again and take you to myself," "no one comes to the Father, but by me," and "You did not choose me, but I chose you" articulate quite a strong doctrine of election. Although Aquinas develops this doctrine in metaphysical terms that make clear the doctrinal influence upon his exegesis, nonetheless the basic point about God's eternal priority and causality seems present in these passages of the Farewell Discourse. These passages strengthen the persuasiveness of Aquinas's earlier interpretation of Jesus' loving "his own . . . to the end" and of Jesus' assurance that "I am not speaking of you all; I know whom I have chosen."

D) Jesus' Gift and His Prayer

The persuasiveness of Aquinas's interpretation is further strengthened by the final chapter of the Farewell Discourse. In John 17:2, Jesus depicts the Father's relationship to the Son: "you have given him power over all flesh, to give eternal life to all whom you have given him." Only God can give eternal life, and God has "power over all flesh." The Father gives the Son power over all flesh and power to give eternal life, and the Father also

[26] Ibid. (§2024) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 406).
[27] *In Ioan.* 16, lect. 8 (§2176) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 472).
[28] *In Ioan.* 17, lect. 1 (§2181) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 478).

gives the Son the people who belong to the Son. Aquinas explains that the divine power is self-giving love: "you have power, not to wrest things from your human creatures, but to give yourself to them."[29] Those who receive this gift do so because God draws them, and so Jesus gives "eternal life to all whom you have given him." Commenting on John 17:6, "I have manifested your name to the men whom you gave me out of the world," Aquinas makes the same point: "Those who come to Christ do so through the gift and grace of God: 'For by grace you have been saved . . . it is the gift of God' (Eph 2:8)."[30] From eternity, God wills to give Jesus some human beings who receive grace and glory.

Does the historical unfolding of predestination require that Jesus pray only for some, as suggested by his statement that "I am not praying for the world but for those whom you have given me, for they are yours" (John 17:9)? Aquinas reflects first upon other biblical texts that indicate that Jesus prays for all and that God wishes all human beings to be saved. In particular he cites 1 John 2:1, "We have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the expiation for our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world"; and 1 Timothy 2:4, "God our Savior, who desires all men to be saved." On this basis, Aquinas affirms that Jesus prays for all, and Jesus' prayer is not deficient in power. Yet Jesus' statement that "I am not praying for the world" remains true, because his prayer has its effect "only in the elect and saints of God."[31] Is this because God places an obstacle in the hearts of the nonelect, so that Jesus' prayer does not convert them whereas it does convert the elect? Aquinas suggests that God is in no way to blame for our free sins that deflect his love. It is not God that is deficient, but sinful human beings.

If God is so powerful, however, why does he not convert all, in the same way that he is able to convert some? In accord with Jesus' statement that he prays "for those whom you have given me," Aquinas notes that the reason consists in God's eternal plan

[29] Ibid. (§2185) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 480).

[30] *In Ioan.* 17, lect. 2 (§2196) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 486).

[31] Ibid. (§2207) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 489).

of predestination, whereby God wills to save some without God thereby being responsible for the freely chosen sins that bring about damnation. Aquinas interprets Jesus' words "they are yours" to describe the fact that the Father, from eternity, wills to draw some human beings "to enjoy the Son as well as the Father."[32] These are those "who possess holiness or sanctity, who are set apart . . . through faith" and who thereby join the company of the saints.[33] The disciples require Jesus' prayer, especially now that he no longer is physically present, so that they will be able to follow Jesus on the path to eternal life.[34] In the midst of our tribulations, Jesus' prayer recalls us to "the power of your [God's] name and of your knowledge, for in these lie our glory and our well-being: 'Some trust in chariots, and some in horses. But we will call upon the name of the Lord our God' [Ps 20:7]."[35]

Aquinas does not resolve the tension regarding why the Father does not give the Son all humans, or why Jesus' prayer has its transformative effect only in some. Once one affirms the priority and causality of God's gift and prayer, the tension about why only some are saved cannot be resolved by insistence upon human free will and responsibility, no matter how true this is. But Aquinas's position certainly appears faithful to the teaching of the Farewell Discourse, in which the divine priority/causality and human responsibility are both affirmed. By distinguishing between Christ's prayer and its effect, Aquinas also manages to affirm that Christ prays for all, just as Christ dies for all.

E) Jesus and the "Son of Perdition"

Does Christ's saving work possess universal scope in the Gospel of John, as Aquinas suggests by affirming that Christ prays for all? Jesus chooses the twelve disciples, and he proclaims that "I have guarded them, and none of them is lost but the son of perdition" (John 17:12). If Judas is the "son of perdition," what would be the

[32] Ibid. (§2209) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 490).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid. (§2211) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 490-91).
[35] *In Ioan.* 17, lect. 3 (§2213) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 493).

point of Jesus praying for all? Discussing the phrase "the son of perdition," Aquinas corrects the Gloss's description of Judas as "predestined to perdition." As Aquinas points out, "predestination is always directed to what is good, because it has the double effect of grace and glory; and it is God who directs us to each of these."[36] Predestination is "double" only in this sense.

How then is God involved in Judas's plight? Regarding Judas, God causes nothing but the good of punishment; he does not in any way cause Judas's guilt. Yet neither do Jesus' words provide grounds, in Aquinas's view, for supposing that Judas's sin overthrows Jesus' choosing. Jesus' temporal choosing of Judas was, as Jesus says, so "that the scripture might be fulfilled" (John 17:12). In his dialogue with his Father, Jesus also makes clear that he has lost none of those whom the Father gave him, and who therefore belong to the Father and to the Son. Judas is not among those who belong from eternity to the Father and the Son. In this sense, Aquinas notes that Judas "is called the son of perdition as though foreknown and foreordained to eternal perdition," even though God does not cause his perdition, which is solely due to his own unrepentant sinfulness.[37] Yet as the good shepherd, does not Jesus have an obligation to guard Judas unto salvation? Aquinas answers no, on the grounds that Jesus' guardianship serves the temporal unfolding of God's wise and good plan, with regard to which "[t]he effectiveness of Christ's protection is complete."[38] Judas loves the world, whereas those whom the Father gives Jesus (those whom Jesus protects) love God. Aquinas points out in this vein that "the reason why the saints are hated by the world is the same as the reason why God loves them, that is, their disdain for the world: 'Has not God chosen those who are poor in the world to be rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom which he has promised to those who love him?' (Jas 2:5)."[39]

[36] Ibid. (§2218) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 495).
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid. (§2227) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 497).

II. Predestination in John 13-17: Contemporary Biblical Scholarship

When contemporary biblical exegetes turn to the Farewell Discourse, they are much more terse as regards predestination than is Aquinas, but they too find this subject in the Farewell Discourse. In this section, I briefly treat three exegetes, each of whom represents a different ecclesial and theological perspective: Leon Morris, Ben Witherington III, and Raymond Brown. Although I can only give a taste of their views, I hope to say enough to provide a basis for drawing them into dialogue with Aquinas's interpretations.

Morris, an Anglican who writes from a broadly Reformed perspective, observes that while Jesus "makes a distinction between the little band of disciples and the world," nonetheless "[t]his does not mean that 'the world' is beyond God's love" (cf. John 3:16 and Luke 23:34).[40] In Morris's view, when Jesus prays in John 17:9 for those whom the Father has given him rather than for the world, this does not mean that Jesus does not pray for all persons. Rather, Jesus' prayer indicates the disciples' mission to convert the world away from its worldliness. Similarly, commenting on John 15:6, Morris grants that "Jesus' disciples did not hold the initiative," but he suggests that the verse refers simply to the fact that Jesus selected the Twelve and gave them their mission.[41] Yet in discussing the exclusion of Judas (John 13:18), Morris states that "the [divine] choosing is the decisive thing. Once again we have the divine initiative."[42]

Morris's comments on John 17:12, "I have guarded them, and none of them is lost but the son of perdition," offer a particularly clear example of his approach. He notes on the one hand that "God used that man's evil act to bring about his own purpose. There is a combination of the human and the divine, but in this passage it is the divine aspect rather than the human that receives

[40] Leon Morris, *The Gospel according to John,* rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), 642.

[41] Ibid., 600.

[42] Ibid., 552.

stress."[43] Carefully avoiding the notion of predestination unto damnation, he points out that Judas is not "predestined to be 'lost'" but instead freely acts against God's love.[44] On the other hand, since God uses Judas's sin for the accomplishment of his purposes, Morris affirms that God's will is ultimately not frustrated by Judas's free rebellion. In short, Morris's interpretation favors predestination understood as the efficacy of divine grace, although he carefully distinguishes his view from double predestination.

In accord with the traditional Methodist view, Ben Witherington III strongly rejects predestination. He argues that "the belief structure of early Johannine Christianity basically was inclusive rather than exclusive in character, not only because it was missionary in nature but also because it understood that God sent Christ to manifest divine love for the world."[45] In speaking of passages that appear to indicate the divine choosing or election of some, he explains John 13:18 as indicating Jesus' recognition of Judas's change of heart, albeit a change of heart that finds itself "incorporated into God's plan."[46] On this view John 13:18 "refers to the fact that there is one who, while chosen by Jesus to be one of the Twelve (cf. 6:70), nonetheless is no longer properly called one of the chosen, for he will betray Jesus."[47] Witherington rightly explores the interaction of Satan's temptation and Judas's freedom, but one wonders whether his focus does justice to the full scope of Jesus' choosing.

Commenting upon a similar verse, John 15:16, Witherington examines the divine choosing more directly. He finds that Jesus teaches that "believers, like Jesus, are people under authority, agents of a higher power. Believers are chosen, although of course they must respond to the choice, and if they do not continue to

[43] Ibid., 645.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ben Witherington III, *John's Wisdom: A Commentary on the Fourth Gospel* (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 276; cf. 257. See also Miroslav Volf, "Johannine Dualism and Contemporary Pluralism," in *The Gospel of John and Christian Theology,* ed. Richard Bauckham and Carl Mosser (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008), 19-50.

[46] Witherington, *John's Wisdom,* 238.

[47] Ibid.

respond positively and bear fruit, they can be broken off by the Father."[48] Witherington thus affirms that Jesus and the Father choose believers, but he gives particular weight to the human response, which he thinks can undercut the divine choice. Does human chosenness depend upon continuing to "respond positively and bear fruit"? Or does God's eternal election graciously bring about believers' fruitful, free response? Witherington's interpretation of Jesus' reference to Judas as the "son of perdition" (John 17:12) confirms his weighting of human response. He states that "[c]hosenness did not preclude apostasy in the case of Judas."[49] He likewise reads John 17:9, "I am not praying for the world but for those whom you have given me," in light of human response. According to Witherington, Jesus is calling upon the disciples to go into the world and evangelize, and Jesus knows that they will need "this prayer, and the consecrating and equipping it speaks of," in order to have strength for their mission.[50] When Jesus speaks of those whom the Father has given him, Witherington interprets such discourse not in terms of eternal divine election or predestination, but rather in terms of the response of the twelve disciples and those who will respond to the call of evangelization in the future.

Earlier in his commentary, Witherington sets forth his view of predestination quite clearly. He does so with regard to John 6:37, "All that the Father gives me will come to me"; John 6:39, "this is the will of him who sent me, that I should lose nothing of all that he has given me"; and John 6:44, "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him." As we would expect, he emphasizes that human choice can decisively thwart God's will: "God's will is that Jesus lose none of those the Father has given him. . . . That is God's will clearly enough, but we are not told here that someone God draws, or even Jesus chooses, may not

[48] Ibid., 260. For exegesis of Paul that reaches the same conclusion, see Ben Witherington III, *The Problem with Evangelical Theology: Testing the Exegetical Foundations of Calvinism, Dispensationalism, and Wesleyanism* (Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2005), 59-89, 139, 207-16.

[49] Witherington, *John's Wisdom,* 270.

[50] Ibid.

commit apostasy or rebellion."[51] If the Father draws a person and Jesus chooses that person, the person can still rebel permanently against God. Witherington's point hinges on the fact that God does not will sin. Since Judas sins even though Jesus chooses him to be among the twelve, Witherington argues that Judas's sin proves the incompleteness of "God's sovereignty."[52]

Witherington concludes his discussion of John 6:37-44 by offering his most precise summary of the relationship of divine election to human freedom: "Both God's sovereign grace and human response play a role in human salvation, but even one's human response is enabled by God's grace. God's role in the relationship is incomparably greater than the human one, but the fact remains that God does not and will not save a person without the positive human response, called faith, to the divine leading and drawing."[53] Witherington here aims to preserve human freedom while also affirming God's "sovereign grace." It is clear that his interpretation is shot through with theological and philosophical concerns that he brings to the biblical text.

With respect to Jesus' description of Judas as the "son of perdition" (John 17:12), the Catholic exegete Raymond Brown argues on the basis of other New Testament texts that this "refers to one who belongs to the realm of damnation and is destined to final destruction."[54] Although he does not specify whether for John or Jesus this status of being "destined to final destruction" involves God's will, one can assume that in some manner it does. Similarly, commenting on John 17:10, "all mine are thine, and thine are mine," Brown draws the following conclusion: "A man cannot accept Jesus unless he belongs to God, and a man cannot belong to God unless he accepts Jesus."[55] Brown does not specify where the priority lies in this circle, but one would expect that the

[51] Ibid., 158.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Raymond E. Brown, S.S., *The Gospel according to John (xiii-xxi)* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), 760. By contrast, the Catholic exegete Francis Moloney denies that Judas is necessarily lost: see Francis J. Moloney, S.D.B., *The Gospel of John* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1998), 468.

[55] Brown, *The Gospel according to John,* 758.

priority lies with God, who chooses some to belong to him. At times Brown focuses on Jesus' temporal choice rather than identifying in the text a reference to God's eternal election. This is the case, for example, in Brown's discussion of John 13:18, where Morris finds a strong emphasis on the divine initiative. Brown remarks, "Apparently the idea is that Jesus chose Judas even though he knew the kind of man Judas was, and thus the Johannine Jesus made no mistake."[56] On this reading, Jesus' statement that "I know whom I have chosen" (John 13:18) would seem to be an epistemological claim rather than one having to do with an eternal divine choosing.

Elsewhere, however, Brown specifically raises the issue of election, although he does not discuss in what sense this election is from eternity. Commenting on John 15:16, where Jesus says "You did not choose me, but I chose you," Brown observes that "[t]he constitution of the disciples as his beloved is part of their election by Jesus."[57] Does this election refer solely to Jesus' choosing, during his lifetime, of certain disciples? For Brown the answer is clearly no: "In speaking of those whom he has chosen the Johannine Jesus is undoubtedly addressing himself to all Christians who are the 'elect' or 'chosen' of God (Rom viii 33; Col iii 12; I Pet ii 4)."[58] Brown does not spell out further, however, what election means.

For each of these exegetes, then, John 13-17 has predestinarian resonances.

Morris finds God's "choosing" or "initiative" to be "the decisive thing," although he does not consider Jesus' prayer for his disciples (rather than for the world) to be an expression of God's choosing.[59] Witherington, who clearly rejects predestinarian interpretations, nonetheless considers that "even one's human response is enabled by God's grace."[60] In his argument against predestinarian interpretations of John 13-17, Witherington

[56] Ibid., 553.
[57] Ibid., 683.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Morris, *The Gospel according to John,* 552.
[60] Witherington, *John's Wisdom,* 158.

appeals especially to Judas's rebellion on the ground that it shows that God's electing will can be frustrated. Brown holds that for Jesus in John 13-17, Christians "are the 'elect' or 'chosen' of God."[61] Brown carefully does not ask speculative questions about what this means, but his view that Judas belongs to "the realm of damnation and is destined to final destruction"[62] cries out for speculative precisions.

III. Aquinas and Contemporary Exegesis of John 13-17

How does Aquinas's exegesis of John 13-17 fit with that of the three contemporary exegetes? Morris emphasizes the disciples' mission to convert the world, a mission rooted in the divine initiative of love for the world. Brown depicts "Johannine dualism," with its "realized eschatology,"[63] as the primary context for Jesus' Farewell Discourse. Within this dualist eschatology, Judas is "destined to final destruction,"[64] whereas others are elected for salvation. Witherington argues that John's gospel is missionary, revealing God's love for the whole world. God chooses humans for salvation, but human cooperation is needed and ultimately humans can frustrate God's choosing, thereby leaving God's sovereignty in an ambiguous position.

With these contemporary authors, Aquinas rules out double predestination, holds that Judas is not among the saved, and affirms human freedom and responsibility for sin. Aquinas develops these points in light of his metaphysics of divine eternity, according to which God is the transcendent source of all created goodness, including the goodness that humans freely choose. In Aquinas's view, by promising his disciples that he will lead them into his Father's house, Jesus reveals that he actually gives the gift of eternal life. Jesus' ontological status as the giver of eternal life accords with John 1:14, 16: "And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth. . . . And from this fulness

[61] Brown, *The Gospel according to John,* 683.
[62] Ibid., 760.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.

we have all received, grace upon grace." Morris, too, emphasizes God's initiative, whereas Brown seeks to interpret such passages as epistemological claims or as indicating a circular relationship between God's initiative and our free choice, without going further than this. Witherington interprets Judas's rebellion as a thwarting of God's eternal election. Aquinas's interpretation of "having loved his own" (John 13:1) underscores that the Farewell Discourse does not limit God's initiative. Aquinas appeals in this regard both to John 15 and to Jeremiah 31:3, "I have loved you with an everlasting love; therefore, I have drawn you, taking pity on you."[65] Since God's grace brings about our meritorious actions, his grace is not given on the basis of his foreknowledge of our merit. The Farewell Discourse, in accord with the whole of Scripture, makes clear that we cannot boast of being the primary source of our friendship with God.

Morris is concerned to avoid double predestination and to insist that Jesus prays for all persons, and Witherington too emphasizes God's love in Christ. In this regard, rather than sticking strictly to the Gospel of John, Aquinas goes in search of other biblical texts that suggest that Jesus prays for all and that God wishes all human beings to be saved, notably 1 John 2:1 and 1 Timothy 2:4. Aquinas also assumes that there must be a sense in which Jesus' statement "I am not praying for the world" (John 17:9) is true. Rather than ascribing Jesus' statement to the Gospel of John's dualist world view, as Brown does, or to the disciples' mission to convert the world, as Morris does, Aquinas argues that it makes sense within the doctrinal context of predestination. The saving effect of Jesus' prayer does not take hold in all persons, but only in those who, moved by grace, freely accept Jesus' love. Thus Aquinas interprets Jesus' words "they are yours" as describing the Father's will to draw the saints "to enjoy the Son as well as the Father."[66]

Brown holds that when Judas is called "the son of perdition" (John 17:12), this means that Judas belongs to "the realm of

[65] *In Ioan.* 13, lect. 1 (§1735) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 273).
[66] *In Ioan.* 17, lect. 2 (§2209) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 490).

damnation and is destined to final destruction."[67] For Witherington, by contrast, this is just the thing that John's gospel does not intend to say. Morris too urges that Jesus does not mean to suggest that Judas is "predestined to be 'lost.'"[68] Aquinas again can help contemporary interpretation. As we noted, when he discusses the phrase "the son of perdition," he goes out of his way to correct the Gloss's claim that Judas was "predestined to perdition." In accord with the Gospel of John's emphasis on Jesus' and the Father's fruitful choosing—"You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you that you should go and bear fruit and that your fruit should abide" (John 15:16)—Aquinas here emphasizes that "predestination is always directed to what is good, because it has the double effect of grace and glory; and it is God who directs us to each of these."[69] There is no predestination unto damnation. Jesus does not mean to place the "son of perdition" on the same level with those "whom I have chosen" (John 13:18); God does not "choose" those who rebel permanently in the way that he chooses those who embrace him in love. Jesus' temporal choosing of Judas to be one of the disciples was so "that the scripture might be fulfilled" (John 17:12), but this was not an eternal choosing of Judas to be damned: "one can be chosen in two ways. One is for a present righteousness; and Judas was chosen for this. The other is for final glory; and Judas was not chosen for this."[70] Yet although Judas is the sole cause of his own damnation due to his free sin, Aquinas carefully does not evacuate the phrase "the son of perdition" of all its force: Judas "is called the son of perdition as though foreknown and foreordained to eternal perdition," despite the fact that God is not the cause of this perdition.[71] This point accords with Brown's observation that Jesus, in his temporal choice of Judas, does not make a mistake.

[67] Brown, *The Gospel according to John,* 760.
[68] Morris, *The Gospel according to John,* 645.
[69] *In Ioan.* 17, lect. 3 (§2218) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 495).
[70] *In Ioan.* 13, lect. 3 (§1789) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 294).
[71] *In Ioan.* 17, lect. 3 (§2218) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 495).

Conclusion

Commenting on the beloved disciple (John 13:25), Aquinas observes that "the more a person wants to grasp the secrets of divine wisdom, the more he should try to get closer to Christ."[72] Friendship with Christ in love is the path to wisdom. Because the full attainment of such wisdom awaits eternal life, the Christian task now is to draw close to the humility of Christ, who gives all good gifts through the Holy Spirit. This task pertains as well to the interpretation of Scripture, where we should strive to say neither too much nor too little. Arguably, Brown says too little when he concludes that all that John 13:18 means is that Jesus did not make a mistake in choosing Judas as a disciple, and when he argues that John 17:12 means that Judas "is destined to final destruction." Brown needs to say more in order to enable us to appreciate the fullness of what Jesus is teaching in the Gospel of John. Equally, one can say too much, and it seems to me that Witherington does so when he argues that the Farewell Discourse presents Judas' rebellion as an indication that the Father's drawing and Jesus' choosing can be thwarted. Morris's position is closest to that of Aquinas. Although Aquinas's theological and metaphysical arguments generally support Morris's interpretation, Aquinas and Morris differ on whether Jesus' high-priestly prayer expresses the divine election of some (John 17:9). Does Aquinas here say too much, or does his reading conform to what Jesus says? I think that the evidence favors the latter.

We need a doctrine of predestination that makes two affirmations without attempting to unite them: God loves each and every rational creature superabundantly, without any lack or stinginess in his causal love; and God from eternity draws some rational creatures to intimate union with himself. The first affirmation is often the implicit or explicit concern of Witherington and (I think) Brown. In their interpretations of the Gospel of John, Aquinas and Morris highlight the second affirmation, while recognizing that "the secrets of divine wisdom" become manifest only within Christ's love. Is it possible to affirm

[72] *In Ioan.* 13, lect. 4 (§1807) (Larcher and Weisheipl, trans., 303).

both the fullness of Christ's love and the mystery of God's eternal election of some rational creatures, and thus to say neither too much nor too little? In answering this question, we would need to canvass more completely the Gospel of John and the commentaries that we have studied, in the context of the entire Scriptures. As I suggest in *Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths*, we might also find ourselves introducing other voices, among whom Catherine of Siena and Francis de Sales deserve a prominent place.[73]

[73] Matthew Levering, *Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

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THOMAS AND DANTE ON THE *DUO ULTIMA HOMINIS*[*]

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The human person is both part of the body politic and superior to it through what is supra-temporal, or eternal, in him, in his spiritual interests and his final destination. . . . Thus the indirect subordination of the body politic,—not as a mere means, but as an end worthy in itself yet of lesser dignity—to the supra-temporal values to which human life is appendent, refers first and foremost, as a matter of fact, to the supernatural end to which the human person is directly ordained.[1]

JACQUES MARITAIN'S precision of the "indirect subordination" of the *polis* to the human person's supernatural

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[1] Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 148-50; see also idem, *The Person and the Common Good,* trans. John J. Fitzgerald (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947). Maritain's views on this matter were embroiled in a debate also relevant for the present essay; see Charles De Koninck, *De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes* (Quebec: Éditions de l'Université Laval, 1943); the review of *De la primauté* by Yves Simon, "On the Common Good," *The Review of Politics* 6 (1944): 530-33; the critique of the same by I. T. Eschmann, "In Defense of Jacques Maritain," *The Modern Schoolman* 22 (1945): 183-208; and De Koninck's response, *In Defense of St. Thomas: A Reply to Father Eschmann's Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good* (Quebec: Éditions de l'Université Laval, 1945). The present essay is intended to extend Maritain's claim of a political end "worthy in itself yet of lesser dignity," while nonetheless being in agreement with De Koninck's main theses. Needless to say, any error herein should be attributed neither to Maritain's theory nor De Koninck's, but to the present author alone.

end is relevant for two closely related questions that have been actively debated in recent Thomistic scholarship.

First, how is Thomas Aquinas's notion of an end proportionate to man's natural powers to be reconciled with his insistence on the uniquely final and supernatural end of the beatific vision, to which man has no proportion without elevation by grace?[2] This debate has turned mainly upon the intelligibility of a proximate natural end (the knowledge of God available to unaided human powers) in precision from grace, even though man as actually created (*in concreto*) was from the very first elevated by grace to be ordered to the beatific vision—in comparison to which a natural end, if intelligible, is still vastly imperfect. Thus the two main sides of the debate agree in denying that *in concreto* man has a natural end that can be called "ultimate," an end *ne plus ultra:* for one side denies any natural end whatsoever (man is "naturally endless"),[3] while the other maintains only a proximate natural end—which might in principle have been ultimate, absent the supernatural end, but in fact is not.[4] Yet Thomas does occasionally speak of a

[2] The present *status quaestionis* has been shaped especially by reaction to Henri de Lubac's thesis in *Surnaturel: Études historiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946). See Denis J. M. Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997); Steven A. Long, "On the Possibility of a Natural End for Man," *The Thomist* 64 (2000): 211-37; idem, *Natura pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010); Peter A. Pagan-Aguiar, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Finality: Paradox or *Mysterium Fidei*?," *The Thomist* 64 (2000): 375-99; Reinhard Hütter, "Aquinas on the Natural Desire for the Vision of God: A Relecture of *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 25 *après* Henri de Lubac," *The Thomist* 73: (2009): 523-91; Lawrence Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas and His Interpreters,* 2d ed. (Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2010); and the symposium on the first edition of Feingold's work in *Nova et Vetera* 5:1 (2007).

[3] E.g., Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good,* esp. 514-34, at 520: "Human nature, so Aquinas reasons, has no satisfying and, in that sense, no ultimate end; it is, in other words, naturally 'endless'."

[4] E.g., Long, *Natura pura,* 225 n. 5: "Obviously there cannot be at once two ultimate finalities, but God need not have elevated man to the supernatural *finis ultimus,* but could have ordered man exclusively to his natural end whence the species of human nature is derived."

twofold ultimate end or good, and these troublesome texts have not been adequately explained.[5]

Second, how exactly does Thomas conceive of the relationship between the moral virtues that can be acquired by human action and those which can only be infused by God, whereby man orders his actions to the supernatural end?[6] A common (if not ubiquitous) feature of this latter debate has been the presumption of a particular answer to the former: "There are not two human ends, one natural and the other supernatural, as was thought in older, erroneous versions of two-tiered Thomism."[7] Yet the denial of an ultimate natural end has left unexplained Thomas's claim that acquired moral virtues can be relatively perfect, as connected and ordered to an absolute good or ultimate end in some respect, while yet inferior to their infused counterparts.

The present essay argues that there is indeed a distinction between two ultimate ends or goods for man in Thomas's ethics, and that only such a distinction can make coherent the relation

[5] E.g., Bradley mentions the passage most stubbornly inhospitable to his thesis (*De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 2) only in passing to trump it with other texts: "Although Aquinas sometimes refers to both the imperfect and perfect good as last ends, it is clear that Thomistic man has only one last or ultimate end" (*Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good,* 398). Neither is this passage entirely amenable to the other position, since it gives no indication that the second end is called "ultimate" hypothetically, in precision from grace; to all appearances it says simply that two different goods do in fact move man's will as ultimate ends.

[6] For a comprehensive introduction to this topic, see Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 3 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1949), esp. 459-535. For recent debate, see Thomas F. O'Meara, "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies* 58 (1997): 254-85; John Inglis, "Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 27 (1999): 3-27; Brian J. Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," *The Thomist* 63 (1999): 553-77; Thomas M. Osborne, Jr., "The Augustinianism of Aquinas's Moral Theory," *The Thomist* 67 (2003): 279-305; idem, "Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas," *The Thomist* 71 (2007): 39-64; Angela McKay, "Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue," *The Thomist* 69 (2005): 535-55; Angela McKay Knobel, "Can Aquinas's Infused and Acquired Virtues Coexist in the Christian Life?," *Studies in Christian Ethics* 23 (2010): 381-96; Michael S. Sherwin, "Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice: A Test Case for the Thomistic Theory of Infused Cardinal Virtues," *The Thomist* 73 (2009): 29-52; William C. Mattison III, "Thomas's Categorizations of Virtue: Historical Background and Contemporary Significance," *The Thomist* 74 (2010): 189-235; Gregory M. Reichberg, "Aquinas on Battlefield Courage," *The Thomist* 74 (2010): 337-68.

[7] Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 555; cf. Osborne, "Perfect and Imperfect Virtues," 43, 56.

between acquired and infused moral virtue as Thomas presents it. This distinction has not featured in the abovementioned debates, because it turns upon more than the distinction between nature and grace in an individual. The natural end is ultimate, while yet inferior to the supernatural (as Maritain indicates, "an end worthy in itself yet of lesser dignity"), because the subject it perfects is not any individual soul, which can indeed have only one ultimate end *qua* perfectible individual, but the earthly *civitas* as a whole—that is, the natural ultimate end is the *bonum civile* ("civil good") which Thomas calls the end of acquired or political virtue, and which is truly ultimate for man *in concreto*. In short, there can be two ultimate ends of man because man is twofold, being essentially both a part (as member of a composite species) and a whole (as an intellectual being).[8] The argument will proceed by comparison with Dante's *Monarchia,* which happens to illuminate the central point with the concision and attention to imagery one expects of a poet: if there is a risk of a "two-tiered" ethics in this distinction, it must be hazarded if one wishes truly to speak of man, who is the horizon of creation, partaking of both corruptible and incorruptible natures.

I. DANTE'S *MONARCHIA* ON THE *DUO ULTIMA HOMINIS*

To turn to Dante for aid in these debates may seem a *non sequitur;* while the poet was certainly influenced by some of Thomas's work,[9] and respected him greatly for both his sanctity

[8] Gregory Froelich, "Ultimate End and Common Good," *The Thomist* 57 (1993): 609-19, seems to accord with the thesis of the present essay, without fully addressing the difficulties of claiming two ultimate ends, of which only one is "absolute": "In fact, insofar as it is perfect, the life of the community contains all other natural human goods and for this reason can be considered an ultimate end (though, of course, not the absolute ultimate end)" (611).

[9] Dante certainly knew, at least in part, the *Summa contra Gentiles* and the commentaries on *De caelo [et mundo]* and the *Nicomachean Ethics,* and very likely those on the *Metaphysics* and *De anima* as well. Evidence regarding the *Summa Theologiae* is suggestive but less certain. Of course, the poet's knowledge of Thomistic doctrine may have been mediated in various other ways, especially by Remigio de' Girolami, O.P., who was at Paris during Thomas's second regency, and lector at Santa Maria Novella in Florence for forty years, spanning the time of Dante's intellectual formation. See Charles T. Davis, "Education in Dante's Florence" and "An Early Florentine Political Theorist: Fra Remigio de' Girolami," in *Dante's Italy and Other Essays* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 137-65, 198-223; and

and his wisdom,[10] his relation to Thomism is much-controverted, and recent scholarship has tended to distance the two. Indeed the poet's account of human teleology in his *Monarchia* (a Latin tractate in favor of a universal empire and against papal political authority) is one of the now widely accepted points of divergence between them.[11] But this has been exaggerated; behind very different political applications lies an instructive agreement in principle.

At least one cannot accuse Dante of over-subtle distinctions when he comes to the present point. After various arguments for a universal (Roman) empire derived from reason, history, and Scripture, which take up most of the treatise, in the very last chapter he states the basic theoretical principle of his claim that papal and political power derive with equal directness from God, not one by way of subordination to the other:

> Man alone among all beings holds a middle place between things corruptible and incorruptible; whence philosophers have well compared him to a horizon, which is the medium between two hemispheres. For man, if considered according to both of his essential parts, is corruptible; if considered according to one part alone—the soul—he is incorruptible. . . . And since every nature is ordered to a certain ultimate end, it follows that there is a twofold end for man: so that, just as he alone among all beings participates in both corruptibility and

Emilio Panella, *Per lo studio di fra Remigio dei Girolami († 1319)*, *Memorie Domenicane*, n.s. 10 (1979).

[10] The blessed soul of St. Thomas is given the largest speaking role in the *Commedia* outside of the pilgrim himself and his primary guides (Virgil and Beatrice): *Paradiso* X.82-138; XI.19-139; XIII.34-142.

[11] For the twentieth-century turn away from largely Thomistic readings in Dante scholarship, see Bruno Nardi, *Saggi di filosofia dantesca* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1967), esp. "Il Tomismo di Dante e il P. Busnelli S. J.," 341-80; idem, *Dante e la cultura medievale,* new ed. (Rome: Laterza, 1983), the introduction of which may be found in English as "Dante and Medieval Culture," trans. Yvonne Freccero, in *Dante: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. John Freccero (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 39-42; Étienne Gilson, *Dante the Philosopher*, trans. David Moore (London: Sheed & Ward, 1949); and Kenelm Foster, "St. Thomas and Dante," in *The Two Dantes and Other Studies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 56-65. On the *Monarchia* in particular vis-à-vis Thomas, see Nardi, "Il concetto dell'impero nello svolgimento del pensiero dantesco," in *Saggi di filosofia dantesca,* 215-75; and Gilson, *Dante the Philosopher,* 162-224.

incorruptibility, he alone among all beings is ordered to two ultimate ends, of which one is his end *qua* corruptible, the other his end *qua* incorruptible.[12]

At first blush, bluntness may seem the only virtue of such an argument. Dante wants an irreducible duality of authorities for his polemical purpose; it comes at the cost of a frank anthropological dualism (one quite inconsistent with his other work): man has two natures, and hence two ends. Perhaps he might be excused on account of overweening zeal for a cause more defensible than this anthropology, but what can he add to the present debate?

The first point to note is that this distinction of ends is not simply according to nature and grace—as if Dante were contrasting the knowledge of God attainable by natural powers with that made gratuitously available in the beatific vision. That distinction applies equally to the angels: they too have a certain fulfillment of their desire to know God available to their innate powers operating alone, which pales in comparison to the supernatural fulfillment of those same powers in the vision of God's essence.[13] But such an end Dante would not call ultimate: for he says that man alone has two ultimate ends, and this not by virtue of a distinction between nature and grace, but because of his unique status as both corruptible and incorruptible.

The second point to note is that the argument is not in fact so dualistic as it might seem: Dante does not say that man has one end *qua* soul and another *qua* body, but one *qua* composite of body and soul and another *qua* soul alone—the soul does double duty. This much is comparatively uncontroversial for Dante's Christian-Aristotelian milieu: the single, composite substance which is a human being will come to an end as a composite, while

[12] *Monarchia* 3.16.3-6 (ed. Prue Shaw [Florence: Le Lettere, 2009], 434): "Homo solus in entibus tenet medium corruptibilium et incorruptibilium; propter quod recte a phylosophis assimilatur orizonti, qui est medium duorum emisperiorum. Nam homo, si consideretur secundum utranque partem essentialem, scilicet animam et corpus, corruptibilis est; si consideretur tantum secundum unam, scilicet animam, incorruptibilis est. . . . Et cum omnis natura ad ultimum quendam finem ordinetur, consequitur ut hominis duplex finis existat: ut, sicut inter omnia entia solus incorruptibilitatem et corruptibilitatem participat, sic solus inter omnia entia in duo ultima ordinetur, quorum alterum sit finis eius prout corruptibilis est, alterum vero prout incorruptibilis." All translations are the author's unless otherwise noted.

[13] Dante notes the elevation of angelic intelligence through grace in *Paradiso* XXIX.58-63.

one part of that composite, the soul, goes on existing alone—to be restored to composite life at the last trump, indeed, but only through a necessarily supernatural restoration whereby the manner of composite existence will be profoundly changed. In that sense, a man obviously has two different ends, in the sense of *termini:* continuous composite life, maintained through material sustenance of the body, has an absolute stopping-point in this world (as is the natural fate of any sublunar composite, dictated by its composition), and hence he has a truly ultimate terrestrial end, which is yet not the utter end of his whole substance. This may seem quite a different matter from the two ends in question, which are *teloi* or final causes, not just the *termini* of some continuum. But there is a connection between these two senses of 'end'.

To understand why Dante regards the terrestrial end of man as simply *ultimus,* even though it is obviously inferior to heavenly bliss (and even "in some way" subordinate thereto—as he qualifies with placid reticence at the very end of the treatise),[14] one must go back to the first book of the *Monarchia*.

There, in laying the groundwork for his argument on behalf of a universal monarch ruling all living men in a single political body, Dante seeks to identify on a purely philosophical basis—relying especially on book 1 of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*—"what may be the end of the whole civilization of the human race."[15] This end must be some operation, since essences exist for operations, not vice versa (1.3.3) Moreover, the "end of the whole civilization" is more than the aggregate of individual ends; Dante takes Aristotle's analogy (*Nic. Ethic.* 1.7) between the end of the eye or hand and that of the whole man, and applies it to the units of human civilization:

[14] *Monarchia* 3.16.17 (Shaw, ed., 437): "The truth of this last question should not be taken so strictly as to imply that the Roman Prince is not in some way subject to the Roman Pontiff, since this mortal happiness is in some way ordered to immortal happiness" ("Que quidem veritas ultime questionis non sic stricte recipienda est, ut romanus Princeps in aliquo romano Pontifici non subiaceat, cum mortalis ista felicitas quodammodo ad inmortalem felicitatem ordinetur").

[15] Ibid. 1.2.8 (Shaw, ed., 339): "siquid est, quod est finis universalis civilitatis humani generis."

There is some proper operation of the human whole, to which the whole of men in all their multitude is ordered; and neither one man, nor one household, nor one neighborhood, nor one city, nor one particular kingdom is able to achieve this operation alone.[16]

The argument goes well beyond Aristotle's in *Ethics* 1, and differs also from the *Politics* in its identification of the ideal maximum political body, but it is an extension of an Aristotelian principle, namely, that the governments of, for example, a family and a *polis* differ in kind and not merely in magnitude.[17] The operation in question—in which the end of human civilization as a whole consists—is the one unique to human nature, the actualization of the possible intellect:

And because this potency cannot be fully actualized at once by one man—nor by any of the particular communities distinguished above—it is necessary that there be a multitude in the human race, through which this whole potency might indeed be actualized; just as it is necessary that there be a multitude of generable things, so that the whole potency of prime matter might always be under act: otherwise there would be separate potency, which is impossible.[18]

[16] Ibid. 1.3.4 (Shaw, ed., 340): "Est ergo aliqua propria operatio humane universitatis, ad quam ipsa universitas hominum in tanta multitudine ordinatur; ad quam quidem operationem nec homo unus, nec domus una, nec una vicinia, nec una civitas, nec regnum particulare pertingere potest."

[17] *Politics* 1.1; cf. Gilson, "Dante the Philosopher," 166. While Aristotle makes the city-state the whole that maximizes human potential, whereas Dante expands this whole to a universal empire, the difference is less stark than it may seem. Dante implicitly recognizes that beyond the *polis* larger communities do not make new operations available, but simply increase their reliability; see *Monarchia* 1.5.5-8 (Shaw, ed., 344-45): the end of a city is "to live well and sufficiently" ("bene sufficienterque vivere"), and for a kingdom it is "the same as belongs to a city," only secured "with greater assurance of tranquility" ("is qui civitatis sed cum maiori fiducia sue tranquillitatis"); the universal empire maximizes that assurance. Thomas also suggests, in passing, an extension of the subject of the political good beyond the *polis* to the whole human race; see *Sentencia libri Ethicorum* I, 2 in *Opera omnia* (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1882–), vol. 47.1, p. 9.

[18] *Monarchia* 1.3.8 (Shaw, ed., 341-42): "Et quia potentia ista per unum hominem seu per aliquam particularium comunitatum superius distinctarum tota simul in actum reduci non potest, necesse est multitudinem esse in humano genere, per quam quidem tota potentia hec actuetur; sicut necesse est multitudinem rerum generabilium ut potentia tota materie prime semper sub actu sit: aliter esset dare potentiam separatam, quod est inpossibile."

This argument may appear more controversial than it is in truth. It has been read as positing a single, separate possible intellect for all men—Dante even cites Averroës immediately following this passage—but this is quite incompatible with the poet's commitments elsewhere, and is in fact not necessitated *in loco*.[19] The link between the potentiality of intellect and that of matter is not just comparative but causal: it is not just that neither can exist without a corresponding actuality (to that extent the analogy is only approximate), but that the need for a multitude of human beings to fulfill human intellectual potency is precisely the consequence of human materiality or composition.

To be a corruptible composite is to belong to a specific nature whose full potential *qua* composite can only be actualized across many individuals over time. In specifying the different ends of the smaller units of humanity he has enumerated—individual, household, neighborhood, city, and particular kingdom—Dante conspicuously omits any distinct content for the individual man, giving him merely the generic end of happiness, with the intellect dominant: "For if we consider one man . . . all his powers are ordered to happiness [*felicitatem*], [and] the intellectual power is the ruler and regulator of all the others."[20] This lacuna follows from his principles: a single human being is, in a sense, "naturally endless"—but not relative to grace and the supernatural end. For Dante, this or that man is naturally endless as a composite individual, because the same is true of all such individuals, insofar as the ultimate end is the good consummately perfective of a subject—the composite individual is not consummately perfectible *qua* individual.

This may seem rather extreme; it is meant to be banal, at least for the Aristotelian:

> For the most natural act of a living thing . . . is to produce another like itself—animal from animal, plant from plant—so that it might participate in the

[19] For discussion of the extent of Dante's Averroism here, see Nardi, "Il concetto dell'impero." passim; and Gilson, *Dante the Philosopher,* 166-71.

[20] *Monarchia* 1.5.4 (Shaw, ed., 344): "Si enim consideremus unum hominem . . . cum omnes vires eius ordinentur ad felicitatem, vis ipsa intellectualis est regulatrix et rectrix omnium aliarum."

eternal, divine, and immortal, so far as it can. This all things desire; for this they do whatever they do by nature. . . . And as they cannot share continuously in the eternal and divine—since no corruptible thing can ever remain one and the same in number—each thing partakes of it as it can, one more, one less; and it remains not the same, and yet like the same: not one in number, but one in species.[21]

The highest operation of, for example, a particular vegetable species is simply *vivere*, continued existence according to its powers. But any given plant, *qua* individual, very quickly (in cosmic terms) turns out to be an abject failure at continued existence: its powers pursue nutrition and growth to that end, it strains continually after life, and nonetheless it soon dies. But this does not mean that all sublunar nature is in vain, incapable of attaining its connatural ultimate end of imitating the continuity of

[21] Aristotle, *De anima* 2.4, as in Thomas, *Sentencia libri de anima*, in *Opera omnia* (Leonine ed.), 45.1:95: "Naturalissimum enim operum uiuentibus est . . . facere alterum quale ipsum, animal quidem animal, planta autem plantam, quatinus ipso semper et diuino et inmortali participent secundum quod possunt. Omnia enim appetunt et illius causa agunt quecunque agunt secundum naturam. . . . Quoniam igitur communicare non possunt ipso semper et diuino continuatione, propter id quod nichil contingit corruptibilium idem et unum numero permanere, secundum quod potest participare unumquodque, sic communicat, hoc quidem magis, illud uero minus, et permanet non idem, set ut idem, numero quidem non unum, specie autem unum." Cf. Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 8, in *Quaestiones disputate,* vol. 2, ed. P. Bazzi and others (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1949), 398, which in arguing against the multiplication of individuals of angelic species implicitly illustrates the tension belonging to man as the horizon between corruptible and incorruptible creation: "In all generable and corruptible things . . . a multitude of individuals of one species is necessary so that the nature of the species, which cannot be ever conserved in one individual because of its corruptibility, might be conserved in many. But in the higher part of the universe is found a higher grade of perfection, wherein one individual—say, the sun—is so perfect that nothing belonging to its species is lacking to it, and hence the whole nature is found in one individual (and likewise for the other celestial bodies). Much more so, then, in the highest part of creation, closest to God—the Angels—is this perfection found, such that nothing belonging to the whole species is lacking to the individual." ("In omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus . . . necessaria est multitudo individuorum unius speciei, ut natura speciei, quae non potest perpetuo conservari in uno individuo propter eius corruptibilitatem, conservetur in pluribus. In parte autem superiori universi invenitur altior gradus perfectionis, in quibus unum individuum, ut sol, sic est perfectum, ut nihil ei desit eorum quae ad propriam speciem pertinent. Unde et tota natura speciei concluditur sub uno individuo; et similiter est de aliis corporibus caelestibus. Multo ergo magis in suprema parte rerum creatarum, quae est Deo propinquissima, scilicet in angelis, haec perfectio invenitur ut uni individuo nihil desit eorum quae ad totam speciem pertinent.")

divine life: this end is perfective of the nature as a whole, across many individuals over time.

Much more would have to be said to do justice to the *Monarchia* altogether, but that is not the present concern. The principles already indicated will suffice to show how the Dantean notion of *duo ultima* might shed light on a comparable distinction in Thomas, which in most cases appears under different terms.

II. The Thomistic *Duo Ultima*: *Bonum Civile* and Beatitude

A) Unicity of Ultimate End: Sic et Non

In many places, Thomas seems to reject any notion of *duo ultima hominis* outright—at least in those terms. When treating "of the ultimate end of human life . . . in general" in the first question of the *Prima Secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae,* he states unambiguously, "it is impossible that the will of one man should at once relate to diverse things as ultimate ends," and the first of three proofs of this claim is as follows:

> Since everything desires its own perfection, what something desires as ultimate end it desires as the perfect good completing its very self [*ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius*]. . . . Thus the ultimate end must so entirely fill a man's desire as to leave nothing else to be desired; this would not be, if some other thing were needed to perfect him.[22]

It must be noted that the article's question is put explicitly in terms of the ultimate end of an individual man ("unius hominis"). It is true that in the third proof of his claim Thomas argues from the "whole human race" to the individual:

> As the ultimate end of man *simpliciter* relates to the whole human race [*totum humanum genus*], so the ultimate end of this man relates to this man. Whence it

[22] *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 1, a. 5, in *Opera omnia* (Leonine ed.), 6:13: "Impossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis simul se habeat ad diversa, sicut ad ultimos fines. . . . Cum unumquodque appetat suam perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. . . . Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur. Quod esse non potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius perfectionem requiratur."

must be that, just as there is by nature one ultimate end of all men, so the will of this man is set upon one ultimate end.[23]

But the *totum* here is clearly a universal whole, predicated of individual men as subjective parts—that is, just as the species "human" is predicated of each man taken alone, so the ultimate end of the species considered universally belongs to each man. This does not exclude the possibility of another kind of *totum humanum,* namely, a community of men having unity of order.[24] Such a whole (like an army, Thomas's preferred example) has an end different from, and greater than, the end of any of its parts taken alone (just insofar as they are parts of this whole), for in its unity of order it is a distinctly perfectible subject as a community, achieving its good through common operation. In other words, its good is common *in causando* and not merely *in praedicando*.[25] Thomas certainly does speak of such human wholes in the context of political theory, that is, the different ends of individuals, families, and cities.[26]

[23] Ibid.: "Sicut autem se habet ultimus finis hominis simpliciter ad totum humanum genus, ita se habet ultimus finis huius hominis ad hunc hominem. Unde oportet quod, sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter unus finis ultimus, ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine statuatur."

[24] On different kinds of wholes, see *STh* I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 1.

[25] For a very clear summary of the different senses of *bonum commune* in Thomas's work, see Gregory Froelich, "On the Common Goods," *The Aquinas Review* 15 (2008): 1-28. Cf. also De Koninck, *De la primauté,* esp. 54: "The commonality of this good should not be understood as a commonality of predication, but of causality. The common good is not common as 'animal' is to 'man' and 'brute', but as the universal means of knowledge, which in its unity attains the things known in what is most proper to them" ("La communauté de ce bien ne doit pas s'entendre d'une communauté de prédication, mais d'une communauté de causalité. Le bien commun n'est pas commun comme 'animal' par rapport à 'homme' et 'brute', mais comme le moyen universel de connaître, qui dans son unité atteint les connus dans ce qu'ils ont de plus propre").

[26] E.g., *Sent. Ethic.* I, 1 (Leonine ed., 47.1:4): "This whole, which is the civil multitude or household, has only the unity of order, whence it is not one thing absolutely; and thus a part of this whole can have an activity which is not the activity of the whole, as a solider has an activity which does not belong to the whole army. Nonetheless, the whole itself also has an operation which does not belong to any of the parts but to the whole—such as the battle of the whole army" ("Hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo vel domestica familia habet solum ordinis unitatem, secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum; et ideo pars huius totius potest habere operationem quae non est operatio totius, sicut miles in exercitu habet operationem quae non est totius exercitus; habet nihilominus et ipsum totum aliquam

Nonetheless, Thomas's concern here early in the *Prima Secundae* is the unicity of the ultimate end of any man taken *singulariter*. That end is, of course, soon identified with God himself, and not merely insofar as God is the end of all creatures whatsoever, as the extrinsic common good of the whole universe. As an intellectual creature, man has a higher ordination to that same good as directly perfective of his intellect. Hence he "will have his perfection through union to God as object [of the intellect]; in this alone does man's beatitude consist."[27] This, then, is the unique ultimate end of the human will, desired "ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius"—that is, perfective of this individual soul.

What then of the "twofold beatitude" discussed in the questions that follow? It presents no threat to the unicity of the ultimate end. This is not to say that it is unproblematic; recent debate over the status of a proximate natural human end has indeed centered on the imperfect beatitude which Thomas discusses here, namely, the best operation of the human intellect in this life. As has been amply discussed, to claim that "man has a natural desire for a supernatural end" or that "man is a naturally endless creature" risks making the offer of the *visio Dei* in grace a *debitum naturae*, owed to the nature and thus not gratuitous over and above the gift of natural being. To maintain that gratuity, one must distinguish man's natural desire for universal goodness from his mode of understanding, in which the possible realization of that desire through face-to-face vision of God cannot be known and hence specifically desired without elevation through grace; this is to distinguish innate or unconditional desire from elicited or conditional desire.[28] But while these distinctions are crucial to the question of "the natural end of man" as it has recently been discussed, they do not directly concern a natural end properly called "ultimate." The beatitude available in this life is defined

operationem quae non est propria alicuius partium sed totius, puta conflictus totius exercitus"). Cf. *STh* II-II, q. 58, a. 7, ad 2, quoted *infra*.

[27] *STh* I-II, q. 3, a. 8 (Leonine ed., 6:36): "Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit." Cf. *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 25, in *Opera omnia* (Leonine ed.), vol. 14.

[28] See esp. Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God*.

precisely as an imperfect participation in true beatitude, and no one could at once desire both imperfect, participated beatitude and perfect beatitude as equally ultimate, both entirely perfective; rather, desire for the former is virtually included in desire for the latter.[29] Insofar as the two beatitudes concern two different possible relations of one man to the good consummately perfective of his individual soul, they do not trouble the principle at hand: of one perfectible subject there can be only one wholly perfective good, and hence only one ultimate end.

Hence it must seem passing strange that, while arguing for the conditional necessity of the theological virtue of faith in the disputed questions *De veritate* earlier in his career, Thomas wrote the following:

> There is a twofold ultimate good for man, which first moves his will as ultimate end. One of these is proportionate to human nature, since man's natural powers suffice for obtaining it; and this is the happiness of which the philosophers spoke: whether contemplative, which consists in the act of wisdom, or active, which consists first in the act of prudence, and thence in the acts of the other moral virtues. The other is a good out of proportion to human nature, since man's natural powers do not suffice to obtain it, nor even to know or desire it.[30]

In the passages of the *Summa Theologiae* already discussed, it seems that, whatever may be said of the greatest good which man can know and desire according to his natural powers, it cannot be called "ultimate"; attainment of the *ultimus finis* is precisely what distinguishes perfect beatitude from imperfect. To be sure, there

[29] E.g., *STh* I-II, q. 3, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 6:33): "The study of the speculative sciences is a certain participation in true and perfect beatitude" ("Consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis"); ibid., ad 2: "One naturally desires not only perfect beatitude, but also any similitude of or participation in it" ("Naturaliter desideratur non solum perfecta beatitudo, sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo vel participatio ipsius").

[30] *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate* q. 14, a. 2, in *Opera omnia* (Leonine ed.), 22.2:441: "Est autem duplex hominis bonum ultimum quod primo voluntatem movet quasi ultimus finis, quorum unum est proportionatum naturae humanae quia ad ipsum obtinendum vires naturales sufficiunt, et hoc est felicitas de qua philosophi locuti sunt, vel contemplativa quae consistit in actu sapientiae, vel activa quae consistit primo in actu prudentiae et consequenter in actibus aliarum virtutum moralium. Aliud est bonum hominis naturae proportionem excedens quia ad ipsum obtinendum vires naturales non sufficiunt, nec etiam ad congnoscendum vel desiderandum."

are various degrees of finality, and a given end may be most final with a limited sphere of activity; but such limitation is just what the superlative *ultimus* excludes in the early part of the *Prima Secundae:* the *finis ultimus* is the unique end absolutely *ne plus ultra*. How, then, in *De veritate,* can the end proportionate to human nature be ultimate—so as to move the will as a first principle—when there is another such end, and two such ends cannot coexist for one will? One might argue that Thomas does not exactly claim two ultimate ends, only two ultimate goods, which move the will "as [*quasi*] ultimate end," but this only delays the problem: the uniqueness of the ultimate end in question 1 of the *Prima Secundae* rests precisely on the uniqueness of the ultimate good moving the will of the subject as the "bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius."

The text from *De veritate* already relocates the question of a natural end to the context of the virtues, that is, the dispositions whereby man's powers are perfected in accordance with some good. It will be in this context that the solution emerges, although not without first bringing the tension to a head. Returning to the *Prima Secundae*, Thomas likewise—in distinguishing infused virtues from acquired—makes a curious twofold use of *ultimus:*

> Only the infused virtues are perfect, and are called virtues *simpliciter,* since they order man well to his ultimate end *simpliciter*. But the other virtues—the acquired—are virtues *secundum quid,* since they order man well with respect to the ultimate end in a certain genus [*finis ultimi in aliquo genere*], not the ultimate end *simpliciter*.[31]

Since, in question 1 of the same work, the qualifier *ultimus* is apparently sufficient to distinguish the absolute end from a *finis in aliquo genere* (i.e., "ultimate end" is itself equivalent to "end *simpliciter*"—the end which is fully and without qualification end-like), to apply it here to both an inferior and a superior end seems

[31] *STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 6:423): "Solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et simpliciter dicendae virtutes: quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, scilicet acquisitae, sunt secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter: ordinant enim hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem respectu finis ultimi simpliciter."

needlessly confusing (yielding, as it were, a distinction between "end *simpliciter secundum quid*" and "end *simpliciter simpliciter*"). Perhaps it could be explained as merely a case of mild terminological inconsistency, if there were no doubt about the overall argument of the passage; but the long-standing scholarly difficulties in appreciating Thomas's regard for acquired virtue indicate that perhaps his meaning here is not, in fact, quite pellucid.

There is no doubt that the acquired virtues are inferior to the infused, as the former are good only "as ordered to a good which does not exceed man's natural faculty," and the latter "as ordered to the ultimate supernatural end"—hence only the latter "have the character of virtue perfectly and truly."[32] While acquired and infused moral virtues of the same name share a common material, they are of different species, since they "differ not only in their ordering to the ultimate end, but also in their ordering to their proper objects"—that is, they seek a different mean in the same material.[33] For example, acquired temperance produces moderate eating according to bodily health, while infused temperance produces fasting for submission of the body.[34] That much is agreed upon. But if one were to suppose that the difference "in their ordering to the ultimate end" means that the acquired virtues altogether are ordered to a proximate end—itself directly subordinate to the supernatural end—one should then expect that

[32] Ibid.: "Virtutes morales prout sunt operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic acquisitae sine caritate esse possunt: sicut fuerunt in multis gentilibus. Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem virtutis; et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a Deo."

[33] *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 6:411): "Virtus infusa et acquisita non solum differunt secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem; sed etiam secundum ordinem ad propria obiecta."

[34] *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 6:410): "E.g., in the consumption of food, the mean established by human reason is that one should not harm bodily vigor, nor impede the use of reason; but according to the rule of divine law, man must *chastise [his] body and bring it into subjection* [1 Cor. 9:27], by abstaining from food and drink, and suchlike" ("Puta in sumptione ciborum, ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini corporis, nec impediat rationis actum: secundum autem regulam legis divinae, requiritur quod homo *castiget corpus suum, et in servitutem redigat*, per abstinentiam cibi et potus, et aliorum huiusmodi").

for Thomas (as for Augustine), there can be no virtues properly so-called in the absence of charity, which alone allows man to order his actions to the supernatural end.

But this is not exactly what Thomas holds. Rather like his inclusion of the peculiar middle case of *ultimus secundum quid* in the *Prima Secundae,* in his disputed question on the cardinal virtues he gives three grades of virtues, where only two might have been expected. The lowest grade is straightforward: isolated perfections or inclinations, "which exist without prudence, not attaining right reason," do not fully deserve the name of virtue: they are altogether imperfect virtues because they "render man and his work not perfect *simpliciter* but only in a certain respect."[35] Yet perfect, necessarily connected virtue is itself twofold:

> The good *simpliciter* is found in human acts insofar as they follow the rule of human acts: there is one rule which is, so to speak, homogenous and proper to man, viz., right reason; another which is, as it were, the first transcendent measure, viz., God.[36]

According to these two rules, there are two kinds of perfect virtue:

> The second grade of virtues is of those which attain right reason, but nevertheless do not attain God himself through charity. These are somewhat [*aliqualiter*] perfect, in relation to the human good; but they are not perfect *simpliciter,* since they do not attain the first rule, which is the ultimate end.[37]

[35] *Quaestio disputata De virtutibus cardinalibus,* a. 2, in *Quaestiones disputatae,* vol. 2, ed. P. Bazzi and others (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1949), 818: "Illa est virtus perfecta quae perfecte opus hominis bonum reddit, et ipsum bonum facit; illa autem est imperfecta, quae hominem et opus eius reddit bonum non simpliciter, sed quantum ad aliquid. . . . Sunt enim quaedam virtutes omnino imperfectae, quae sine prudentia existunt, non attingentes rationem rectam."

[36] Ibid.: "Bonum autem simpliciter in actibus humanis invenitur per hoc quod pertingitur ad regulam humanorum actuum; quae quidem est una quasi homogenea et propria homini, scilicet ratio recta, alia autem est sicut prima mensura transcendens, quod est Deus."

[37] Ibid.: "Secundus autem gradus virtutum est illarum quae attingunt rationem rectam, non tamen attingunt ad ipsum Deum per caritatem. Hae quidem aliqualiter sunt perfectae per comparationem ad bonum humanum, non tamen sunt simpliciter perfectae, quia non attingunt ad primam regulam, quae est ultimus finis."

In this case, the term "ultimate end" (needing no further qualification) has recovered the absolute character it had in question 1 of the *Prima Secundae,* but the ambiguity troubling that term in question 65 (ultimate ends *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*) remains, now transferred to, as it were, "imperfect perfect virtue" and "perfect perfect virtue." Indeed, by the end of the response, Thomas seems to contradict the distinction with which he began: "Whence [connected acquired virtues] also fall short of the true character of virtue, just as moral inclinations without prudence fall short of the true character of virtue."[38]

The problem is not that there cannot be various degrees or senses of perfection, but that the article seems to apply two different senses in a conflicting manner—unless a separate distinction, not fully elaborated here, should mediate between them. The first sense of perfection is the connected ordering of virtues to the good *simpliciter,* so that the character of perfect virtue is not merely a disposition towards a particular good (which may not be a good object of choice in given circumstances), but an ordering towards the good of human action altogether; hence connected acquired virtue is said to be perfect, because prudence takes account of circumstances and orders the other virtues to the human good *simpliciter*. The second sense of perfection is the superiority of one good *simpliciter* (the "ultimate end") to another (the "human good"), such that the character of perfect virtue now demands ordering to the former; hence only infused virtue is perfect. But if the human good is imperfect with respect to the ultimate end, why is it not simply another particular good, rather than a good *simpliciter*? If an allegedly virtuous pagan is disposed towards a certain good—even the whole "human good"—but lacks ordering to the true ultimate end (which requires the infusion of charity in grace), then it would seem that he fails entirely (not *aliqualiter*) to have the character of perfect virtue; the first two grades of virtue ought to be only one. A sliding scale of

[38] Ibid.: "Unde et deficiunt a vera ratione virtutis; sicut et morales inclinationes absque prudentia deficiunt a vera ratione virtutis."

imperfection will not suffice to make sense of this article.[39] Unless the human good is really a good *ne plus ultra*, connected acquired virtue is still, from the Christian perspective, relatively unconnected—it is not ordered to the *summum bonum*. The scheme is fundamentally confused, unless the article implicitly relies upon a more robust distinction between two goods *simpliciter,* and hence even two ends which might be called "ultimate."

B) The "bonum civile" as Natural Ultimate End

In fact there should be no doubt that for Thomas, the end of acquired virtue is an ultimate end, *qua* good consummately perfective of a certain subject. It must be, for the subject it perfects does not persist beyond this life:

> Of moral virtues, some are infused, and some acquired; and . . . the acquired direct in civil life, and so have the civil good [*bonum civile*] for their end. Because this city will not remain in Heaven, no act will remain for them, neither concerning their end, nor their proper matter wherein they incline to their end; and so the habits will be removed.[40]

The term *bonum civile* has certainly been recognized as important in scholarly discussions of Thomas's regard for acquired virtue.[41] To call the acquired cardinal virtues "civil" or "political" is indeed

[39] *Pace* valiant interpretive efforts on that line: see esp. Osborne, "Perfect and Imperfect Virtues," who distinguishes three grades of imperfect virtue below infused (not including altogether false virtue). It is certainly true to Thomas's text to say that there is "acquired virtue which is perfect when compared to unconnected acquired virtue, but imperfect when compared with the fifth state of virtue, which is infused virtue" (ibid., 51), but by the same token the third state would be perfect virtue compared to the second (which does not fit Thomas's usage), and at any rate, since this scheme makes all but the fifth state good only *secundum quid,* it does not explain why the fourth state is also said to be ordered to a good *simpliciter*.

[40] *Commentum in IV libros Sententiarum* III, d. 33, q. 1, a. 4 in *Opera omnia* (Parma: Fiaccadori, 1856-58; repr., New York: Misurgia, 1948), 7:356: "Virtutes morales quaedam sunt infusae, et quaedam acquisitae, et . . . acquisitae dirigunt in vita civili; unde habet bonum civile pro fine. Et quia haec civilitas non remanebit in patria, ideo non remanebit eis aliquis actus, nec circa finem, nec circa materiam propriam, secundum quam tendunt ad finem; et ideo habitus tollentur." Cf. *De virt. card.,* a. 4.

[41] E.g., Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue"; Osborne, "Perfect and Imperfect Virtues."

a medieval commonplace, having roots in Plato and more proximately Macrobius; and in Thomas's texts, the civil good regularly features as the distinct end of acquired virtue (which most scholars have assumed to be at best a proximate end, directly subordinate to the supernatural). Yet the full significance of the term has been missed. *Bonum civile* does not merely pick out the greatest legitimate good to which a man without grace might be ordered—as if "civil" denoted nothing other than "natural." It also identifies a perfectible subject greater than and including the individual *qua* natural composite: the civil good is perfective of the whole earthly *civitas,* whereas the supernatural end is perfective of individual souls.[42]

This does not mean, of course, that the blessed enjoying the supernatural end are not also citizens of a *civitas,* nor that the heavenly good is not also an essentially common good (of a

[42] Of course, the *civitas* is not a separate substance whose good is a *bonum alienum* to any individual citizen; the *bonum civile* is the *bonum commune in causando* of its citizens, which is to say that it is a greater good for each individual than his private good (*qua* composite). In its very commonality—the fact that it is the good of many members of the species—it is a higher perfection for each individual, since the individual's very being depends upon and belongs to the species as a whole. See *STh* I, q. 60, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 5:104): "Any natural thing, whose very being by nature belongs to another, inclines more fully and principally towards that to which it belongs than to itself. . . . For we see that the part naturally exposes itself for the preservation of the whole: as a hand is instinctively exposed to a blow for the preservation of the whole body. And because reason imitates nature, we find this kind of inclination in the political virtues: for the virtuous citizen will risk his own death for the preservation of the whole republic" ("Unumquodque autem in rebus naturalibus, quod secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est, principalius et magis inclinatur in id cuius est, quam in seipsum. . . . Videmus enim quod naturaliter pars se exponit, ad conservationem totius: sicut manus exponitur ictui, absque deliberatione, ad conservationem totius corporis. Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, huiusmodi inclinationem invenimus in virtutibus politicis: est enim virtuosi civis, ut se exponat mortis periculo pro totius reipublicae conservatione"). Cf. Thomas M. Osborne, Jr., *Love of God and Love of Self in Thirteenth-Century Ethics* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), esp. 88-89; and De Koninck, *De la primauté,* 8-9: "The common good is a greater good for each of the individuals who participate in it, just because it is communicable to other individuals: its communicability is the very reason for its perfection. . . . The common good is not a good outside of the good of individuals, belonging only to the collective regarded as a sort of singular" ("Le bien commun est meilleur pour chacun des particuliers qui y participent, en tant qu'il est communicable aux autres particuliers: la communicabilité est de la raison même de sa perfection. . . . Le bien commun n'est pas un bien qui ne serait pas le bien des particuliers, et qui ne serait que le bien de la collectivité envisagée comme une sorte de singulier").

different mode).[43] Yet it remains that the heavenly city is not the perfection of the earthly city, in the sense of a further actualization of the same corporate subject: "this city will not remain in Heaven." A blessed human soul is an earthly human soul elevated, but the City of God is not an earthly city elevated. Hence, as the *bonum civile* is the good perfective of that earthly city precisely as an ordered whole (a single perfectible subject, according to its unity of order), it simply cannot be directly subordinate to the good of the heavenly city in the life to come—that is, the *bonum civile* cannot stand to beatitude as a proximate perfection of a given subject to a further perfection of that same subject. The *civitas* of the heavenly Jerusalem will be newly constituted of members taken from across earthly *civitates;* and there, the *ratio* of human community will be quite different from that of the earthly city.[44] The subject of the *bonum civile* really comes to a final end in this life, and so its highest good in this life is really an ultimate end.

[43] *Quaestio disputata De caritate,* a. 2, in *Quaestiones disputatae,* vol. 2, ed. P. Bazzi and others (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1949), 578: "Thus, as man through divine grace is allowed to share in celestial beatitude, which consists in the vision and enjoyment of God, he is made, as it were [*quasi*], a citizen and member of that blessed society, which is called the Heavenly Jerusalem. . . . Therefore, to the man thus enrolled in heavenly things, there belong gratuitous virtues, which are the infused virtues; and the right operation of these virtues presupposes love of the common good of that whole society—which is the divine good, insofar as it is the object of beatitude" ("Ita cum homo per divinam gratiam admittatur in participationem caelestis beatitudinis, quae in visione et fruitione Dei consistit, fit quasi civis et socius illius beatae societatis, quae vocatur caelestis Ierusalem. . . . Unde homini sic ad caelestia adscripto competunt quaedam virtutes gratuitae, quae sunt virtutes infusae; ad quarum debitam operationem praeexigitur, amor boni communis toti societati, quod est bonum divinum, prout est beatitudinis obiectum").

[44] That is, in earthly society it is the very multitude and ordering of the citizens which makes available to each of them more perfect operations than would be available to any of them living alone. Contrariwise, in celestial society, the ordered multitude of blessed citizens is a consequence of and presupposes the gratuitously perfected operation of each individually—e.g., a multitude of human beings is no longer requisite for the optimal sustenance of bodily needs and thus the leisure requisite for contemplation. For both the blessed and the reprobate after the resurrection, composite life will be sustained not through communal activity but by the power of God; for the blessed, the vision of God will itself, by a kind of overflowing, glorify the body. See, e.g., *ScG* IV, c. 86.

C) Two Modes of Perfection, Two Ultimate Ends

There is indeed but one *summum bonum* to which all creatures whatsoever are ordered as the common good ultimately perfective of themselves. But there are two different modes of perfectibility that may pertain to a creature:

> One mode [is] according to the perfection of its own being, which belongs to it according to its proper species. However . . . in any given creature, its perfection of this kind lacks perfection *simpliciter* insofar as other perfections are found in other species; hence the perfection of any thing, considered in itself, is imperfect, being a part of the perfection of the whole universe, which arises from the perfections of singular things gathered together. Thus, that there might be some remedy for this imperfection, there is another mode of perfection in creatures, whereby the perfection proper to one thing might be found in another: and this is the perfection of a knower, insofar as it is a knower . . . and according to this mode, it is possible for the perfection of the whole universe to exist in one thing. Hence this is the highest perfection the soul can attain, according to the philosophers, such that in the soul the whole order of the universe and of its causes might be described: and in this they also placed the ultimate end of man, which according to us will be in the vision of God.[45]

The first and lesser mode is maximal for composite creatures *qua* composite, whereby the individual subject's highest perfection is necessarily as part of a created whole. The composite individual's own being "belongs to it according to its proper species," of which it is a part individuated by matter; the species, in turn, belongs to a larger whole, "being a part of the perfection of the whole universe," that is, the *ordo universi* or intrinsic

[45] *De Verit.,* q. 2, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 22.1:44): "Uno modo [est] secundum perfectionem sui esse quod ei competit secundum propriam speciem. Sed . . . in qualibet re creata huiusmodi perfectioni in unaquaque re tantum deest de perfectione simpliciter quantum perfectionis in specibus aliis invenitur, ut sic cuiuslibet rei perfectio in se consideratae sit imperfecta veluti pars perfectionis totius universi, quae consurgit ex singularum rerum perfectionibus invicem congregatis. Unde ut huic imperfectioni aliquod remedium esset invenitur alius modus perfectionis in rebus creatis secundum quod perfectio quae est propria unius rei in re altera invenitur: et haec est perfectio cognoscentis in quantum est cognoscens . . . et secundum hunc modum possibile est ut in una re totius universi perfectio existat; unde haec est ultima perfectio ad quam anima potest pervenire secundum philosophos ut in ea describatur totus ordo universi et causarum eius, in quo etiam finem ultimum hominis posuerunt, quod secundum nos erit in visione Dei."

common good of the universe; and that, in turn, is the greatest created similitude of the extrinsic common good, God. In this, necessarily mediated, way even the lowest creature has God as its common good.

In the higher mode, available only to intellectual creatures, "it is possible for the perfection of the whole universe to exist in one thing," by a certain intensive possession of the same universal common goods, both intrinsic (in an individual's contemplation of the universe and its order) and extrinsic (in an individual's contemplation of God as the cause of the universe and its order). Thus in this mode, the individual is, in a way, a perfectible whole in itself. Now *secundum naturam* it is not absolutely or in every way a whole with respect to its highest perfection: its intensive perfection involves the existence of the *ordo universi* in its intellect, which presupposes the existence *in re* of the rest of the universe of which it is a part. Thus with regard to its highest natural perfectibility, the "knower insofar as it is a knower" is both a part and a whole. But with respect to the supernatural end offered in grace, "which according to us will be in the vision of God," the knower *qua* knower is absolutely a perfectible whole in itself, no longer dependent upon a greater created whole of which it is a part: for to see the extrinsic common good *per essentiam,* not merely as the cause of creation, transcends the whole *ordo universi*.[46]

The distinction between natural and supernatural beatitude—that is, between that account of "the highest perfection to which the soul can attain" which is "according to the philosophers" and that which is "according to us"—admits no duplication of ultimate end. Philosophically known beatitude, or a hypothetically ultimate

[46] See *STh* I-II, q. 113, a. 9, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 7:341): "The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if both goods are taken in the same genus. But the good of one through grace is greater than the natural good of the whole universe" ("Bonum universi est maius quam bonum particulare unius, si accipiatur utrumque in eodem genere. Sed bonum gratiae unius maius est quam bonum naturae totius universi"). Cf. De Koninck, *In Defense of St. Thomas,* 40: "When we consider God 'as He is in Himself the supreme good by His essence' and the intellectual creature as 'capable of being, by knowledge and love, united to God as God is in Himself,' the good in question is beyond that universe to which the intellectual creature is compared as part to a whole. In this respect, the intellectual creature is not to be considered formally as part of the universe at all."

end of the knower *qua* knower in precision from grace, is superseded *de facto* by an infinitely greater response to the very same kind of perfectibility in a creature, in the gratuitous offer of the vision of God. These are two possible realizations of the second mode of perfection, and only the latter is ultimate *in concreto*. But this distinction never touches the first mode of perfection, which is not susceptible of elevation to the supernatural end, because in it the individual subject (*qua* composite) is assimilated to the *summum bonum* only mediately, by way of the species of which it is a part; only explicit, unmediated perfectibility as an intellectual being, perfectibility as a whole in oneself even *secundum naturam,* is *capax summi boni*. The lesser mode of perfection demands a different kind of perfectible subject; it is not by chance that, regarding the human case in particular, Thomas says that "the soul," not man, attains the higher mode.[47]

Man, the horizon of creation, is a unique and uniquely difficult case.[48] A creature of any other kind has only one mode of perfectibility or the other, as its nature is either simply intellectual (and incorruptible) or simply nonintellectual (and corruptible).[49] But man is both corruptible and incorruptible, intellectual but not

[47] Cf. III *Sent.,* d. 27, q. 1, a. 4 (Parma ed., 7:297), in which Thomas makes a parallel distinction of modes of perfection among creatures: the highest mode is found "in Angelis et animabus," not in angels and men.

[48] Cf. III *Sent.,* prol. (Parma ed., 7:5), where Thomas introduces the matter of the third book of the *Sentences* with Eccl. 1:7 ("Unto the place from whence the rivers come, they return, to flow again"): "These rivers are the natural goodnesses which God bestows on creatures. . . . In other creatures they are found severally, but in man they are in a way found gathered together: for man is like the horizon and border between spiritual and corporeal natures, and like a medium between them, participates in both corporeal and spiritual goodnesses" ("Flumina ista sunt naturales bonitates quas Deus creaturis influit. . . . In aliis creaturis inveniuntur distincta; sed in homine inveniuntur quodammodo aggregata: homo enim est quasi orizon et confinium spiritualis et corporalis naturae, ut quasi medium inter utrasque, bonitates participet et corporales et spirituales").

[49] The celestial spheres are, of course, a peculiar case in Thomas's cosmology, being indeed composite, but not univocally with sublunar composites (cf. *STh* I, q. 66, a. 2). This does not affect the present point; the spheres still belong to the first mode of perfectibility (necessarily mediated by a larger created whole), but unlike any other composite individuals, the spheres exhaust specific perfectibility in an individual, and thus have a proper operation perfecting a whole genus, rather than a whole species; hence they simply have fewer levels of mediation in their perfectibility as part of the universe (cf. *ScG* III, c. 24).

wholly intellectual, and both modes pertain to him. Because the individual man alone in creation is both an incomplete part of a larger species, and an intellectual being capable of possessing virtually the whole perfection of the cosmos, he alone is ordered towards both the ultimate end which belongs to the multitude of individuals in his composite species as an ordered whole (and is not susceptible of further elevation as such), and towards the ultimate end which belongs to him as a intellectual whole in his individual soul (and is not exhausted by the contemplation of God as cause of creation and its order, but is susceptible of further elevation to the vision of God's essence).

Of course, man's life *qua* composite is also intellectual; pursuit of the *bonum civile* is not the sensitive life of brutes, which happens to coexist with intellectual activity ordered to the supernatural end. But neither is man's intellectual life that of a crippled angel, which happens to be weighed down by a body ordered to the life of a brute. In lower creatures, one individual does not have the perfection of the whole species, and one species does not have the perfection of another; thus the perfection of the universe exists in them *extensive and diffusive*—in other words, incompletely in each individual. Intellectual creatures in general are the "remedy for this imperfection" insofar as an intellect may possess the perfection of the whole universe *intensive et collective,* that is, as gathered together in a single individual.[50] But to man God gave a strange gift: to be intellectual *extensive et diffusive*.

What intensive perfection human intelligence might achieve in this life (short of the perpetual vision of God in the next) still depends upon and partakes of, in varying degrees but no less certainly, a certain diffused and extensive perfection in a multitude of the human species. This dependence is manifold: while in itself, speculation is the most self-sufficient of human activities, it

[50] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 2, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 5:403): "The universe is more perfect in goodness than an intellectual creature, extensively and diffusely. But intensively and gathered together, the similitude of divine perfection is found more in the intellectual creature, which is capable of the highest good" ("Universum est perfectius in bonitate quam intellectualis creatura, extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in intellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi boni").

nonetheless requires at least some practical goods;[51] moreover, not only will one man need the help of others for these goods, but for many men the contemplative life will be largely unavailable because of the demands of temporal affairs—indeed, without many devoted to the active life, not even a few could have the leisure requisite for contemplation[52] (hence Aristotle noted that speculative science began in earnest in Egypt, once that society as a whole was able to give leisure to a priestly caste from its material abundance).[53] Moreover, even within the contemplative class, the search for wisdom takes a great deal of time, not just in an individual life but across generations. Finally, even the contemplative who has achieved wisdom will achieve more with

[51] *Sent. Ethic.* X, 10 (Leonine ed., 47:594): "For human nature does not in itself suffice for speculation, because of the condition of the body, which must be sustained with external goods, whereas an incorporeal intellectual substance is sufficient in itself for speculation; for a man to speculate, he must first have a healthy body (since bodily infirmity debilitates the sensitive powers man uses in speculation, and distracts the mind's attention therefrom); and he also needs food to nourish his body, and other service, so that all the necessaries of human life might be provided him" ("Humana enim natura non est per se sufficiens ad speculandum propter condicionem corporis quod ad sui sustentationem indiget exterioribus rebus, substantia autem intellectualis incorporea per se sufficiens est ad speculandum; homini autem ad hoc quod speculetur opus est primo habere corpus sanum, quia per infirmitatem corporis debilitantur vires sensitivae quibus homo utitur in speculando, distrahitur etiam intentio mentis ab attentione speculationis; indiget etiam homo cibo ad nutritionem corporis et reliquo famulatu, ut scilicet sibi ministrentur omnia alia quae sunt sibi necessaria ad vitam humanam").

[52] *ScG* I, c. 4 (Leonine ed., 13:11): "If the truth of this kind were left to rational inquiry alone . . . few men would have knowledge of God. . . . Some are impeded by the necessity of mundane affairs: for among men there must be some devoted to administering temporal things, who cannot devote enough time to the leisure requisite for the pursuit of contemplation to reach the summit of human inquiry, viz., knowledge of God" ("Si huiusmodi veritas solummodo rationi inquirenda relinqueretur . . . paucis hominibus Dei cognitio inesset. . . . Quidam vero impediuntur necessitate rei familiaris. Oportet enim esse inter homines aliquos qui temporalibus administrandis insistant, qui tantum tempus in otio contemplativae inquisitionis non possent expendere ut ad summum fastigium humanae inquisitionis pertingerent, sicilicet Dei cognitionem").

[53] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.1; see Thomas, I *Metaphys.,* lect. 1, in *In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio,* ed. R. Spiazzi, O.P. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1950), 11: "Thus the mathematical arts, which are especially speculative, were first discovered in Egypt, by the priests, who were allowed leisure to study and lived at public expense, as is also said in Genesis" ("Unde et circa Aegyptum primo inventae sunt artes mathematicae, quae sunt maxime speculativae, a sacerdotibus, qui sunt concessi studio vacare, et de publico expensas habebant, sicut etiam legitur in *Genesi*").

associates in the task.[54] In all these ways, terrestrial contemplation is the product of the *civitas,* not of the individual alone, though its operation be solitary *in se*.

Thus the speculative activity which is the apex of pursuit of the *bonum civile,* for the sake of which other political goods are sought, is still the perfection of the *civitas* as a whole, a perfection existing *diffusive et extensive* in a multitude of men—and thus it is mediated as a part by that whole, and belongs to the first mode of perfectibility. It differs, of course, from the extensive perfection of a brute species as a part of the common good of the universe. For brutes, this further ordering (to the universe and thence to God) is a fact external to their operations, which do not explicitly seek a good beyond that of the species. For man, on the other hand, operations can be explicitly ordered to God (even *secundum naturam,* in principle, ordered to God as First Cause)—and not only speculative but also moral operations, since religious obeisance recognizes human dependence on God as a part of justice.[55] Yet insofar as this explicit ordering is the product of the

[54] *Sent. Ethic.* X, 10 (Leonine ed., 47:584): "Nor is this [viz., that contemplation is self-sufficient] said because society does not aid the one contemplating; for, as was said in Book VIII, two working together can both do more and understand more. Thus [Aristotle] adds that it is better for the wise man to have partners in the consideration of truth: for betimes one will see what did not occur to another, wiser though he was" ("Nec hoc dicitur quia contemplantem non iuvet societas, quia, ut in VIII dictum est, duo simul convenientes et intelligere et agere magis possunt, et ideo subdit melius esse sapienti quod habeat cooperatores circa considerationem veritatis, quia interdum unus videt quod alteri, licet sapientori, non occurrit").

[55] Even without grace, men ought to know of their debt to God as cause of the universe and duty to express it, by natural law—which is revealed, however dimly, in the *de facto* ubiquity of some sort of religious sacrifice; see *STh* II-II, q. 85, a. 1, s.c. (Leonine ed., 9:215): "In every age and with every human race, there has always been some offering of sacrifice: and what is found in every case would seem to be natural" ("In qualibet aetate, et apud quaslibet hominum nationes, semper fuit aliqua sacrificiorum oblatio. Quod autem est apud omnes, videtur naturale esse"). Perfect religion, of course, requires faith and the other theological virtues; but it is not itself theological, as it does not have God as its object—it does not give man a new relation to God. Rather, presuming such relation (whether merely that of nature, the relation of effect to total cause, or also that of grace, the relation of friendship), religion orders men and their acts to God under the precise formality of rendering God his due (whence it is part of justice, even though it is more explicitly directed to God than any other moral virtue); see *STh* II-II, q. 81, aa. 1, 5; and *Super Boetium De Trinitate,* q. 3, a. 2, in *Opera omnia* (Leonine ed.), 50:110-11. Thus the virtue of religion concerns both man *qua*

civitas as a whole, it belongs to the first mode of the perfection of creatures—it is mediated, because its individual subjects *qua* composites cannot attain it as wholes in themselves, but only as parts of a larger whole.

D) Summary

Once again, to say that a brute and an angel have different ultimate ends is not to identify materially different objects towards which they ultimately tend, since both ultimately tend to God; it is simply to identify the profound difference in the manner by which these respective subjects are assimilated to the same *summum bonum:* the one mediately, through the species of which it is a part and thence through the entire universe of which the species is a part; the other immediately, through the individual intellect's contemplation of God, imperfectly available to natural power and perfectly available in the gratuitous offer of the beatific vision. Immediate perfectibility as a whole is vastly greater in dignity than mediated perfectibility as a part; but this does not mean that the latter is directly subordinated to the former as a means.[56] God chose to make both kinds of perfectible creatures, as distinct modes of partially reflecting his own infinite perfection,

individual soul (and thereby man's elevation in grace, and the theological virtues) and *qua* composite, i.e., as ending in this life. If man does not know of the supernatural end, he ought still to know that he owes all he is and has to the First Cause; if he does, that knowledge entails a new debt of gratitude for the offer of celestial beatitude, while not eliminating but perfecting knowledge of and gratitude for the *debitum Deo* as cause of man and his goods *qua* composite (since without faith, fallen man does not will even that latter *cultum Dei* adequately). Which is to say, religion *in communi* would seem to pertain to both modes of human perfectibility, viz., as part of cosmic perfection through the *bonum civile,* or as *capax summi boni* in the beatific vision.

[56] It is true that "God takes care of intellectual creatures as for their own sakes, and other creatures as ordered to rational creatures" ("Disponuntur igitur a Deo intellectuales creaturae quasi propter se procuratae, creaturae vero aliae quasi ad rationales creaturas ordinatae") (*ScG* III, c. 112 [Leonine ed., 14:356]). But the existence of a composite intellectual creature—the reason for the shift from "intellectuales" to "rationales" above—shows that as a whole composite creation is indeed willed for its own sake, insofar as purely intellectual creatures (angels) need not (indeed cannot) use material creation as an instrument for attaining their end, and yet God chose to create as well the kind of intellectual creature who would need such an instrument.

and amid them man, a single creature partaking of both kinds, and thus having two ultimate ends: one responding to his perfectibility as composite part (the *bonum civile*), the other to his perfectibility as intellectual whole (beatitude).

Hence the Dantean notion of *duo ultima hominis* bears fruit for the above-mentioned Thomistic debates by suggesting that the "ultimate good . . . proportionate to human nature" of *De veritate* might be identified not with the *beatitudo imperfecta* of the *Prima Secundae* but with the *bonum civile* of Thomas's discussion of acquired virtue—since beatitude refers to man's ultimate end *qua* intellectual (thus incorruptible and individual), not *qua* composite (thus corruptible and part of a whole). This would resolve as far as possible the tension between the two texts—"it cannot be that an appetite so inclines to two things as if both were its perfect good" (*STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 5) versus "there is a twofold ultimate good for man, which first moves his will as ultimate end" (*De Verit.,* q. 14, a. 2)—without merely trumping one text with the other. A will can only move towards one good as wholly perfective of itself: nothing, including the *bonum civile,* can compete with the supernatural good of the vision of God as perfective of this or that soul. But this or that soul is not coterminous with this or that man; and through his body, a man in this life is a corruptible part of a composite species. Just insofar as he is such a part, he must also by nature incline to the *bonum commune in causando* of his species—a good in principle achievable only through the communal actualization of his nature's specific powers across many individuals over time. This good moves his will as an ultimate end; it is the first principle of those actions which promote the earthly *civitas*. Yet it does so without being a second "bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius," because the subject it perfects is not coterminous with the *ipse,* the individual willing it.[57]

[57] Hence the individual man living in earthly society is necessarily pulled in two different directions, not mutually opposed but in different dimensions. As an intellectual individual, all other goods whatsoever (including the *bonum civile*) are subordinate to his innate desire to know God, which through grace is made consummately realizable in the beatific vision. As a member of a composite species, his own, individual speculative activity may be rightly suspended at times for service to the *civitas:* "Nevertheless, *secundum quid* and on occasion, the active life is to be preferred, because of the necessities of this life" ("Secundum quid

This would also resolve the tension, present in both the *Prima Secundae* and *De virtutibus cardinalibus,* between two senses of *simpliciter* or *perfectum* regarding the acquired and infused moral virtues. Virtues ordered to the *bonum civile* can be perfect—rendering a man and his act *bonum simpliciter*—and yet imperfect relative to the infused virtues, because a distinction of ultimate ends mediates the two modes of perfection involved. Acquired moral virtues, if connected under prudence, are really ordered to a human end not directly subordinate to any further end; hence acts which take this end as their first principle need not be disordered, even if they lack ordering to a greater end available to the agent *qua* individual soul in grace. The civil good is truly ultimate; yet as natural and terrestrial, belonging to the horizontal axis of man's uniquely biaxial nature, it is inferior to the supernatural end which perfects the same agent but as a different perfectible subject—insofar as the individual man, through his immortal soul, is a whole susceptible to beatitude, and not merely that known to the philosophers, but the friendship with God made possible by grace and effected by the gift of charity, which entails new virtues perfecting man's activities concerning means to that new end.

III. Objections and Replies

Objection 1. If Thomas thought the *bonum civile* a truly ultimate human end distinct from individual beatitude, he would surely have said so at some point in questions 1-5 of the *Prima Secundae,* wherein he moves precisely from "the ultimate end in general" (q. 1) to beatitude, the ultimate end of man *qua* intellectual (qq. 2-5). But he does not do so; the only distinction of a twofold end in these questions is that between imperfect beatitude according to nature and perfect beatitude according to grace, which is agreed not to yield a second ultimate end *in concreto*. Since he says nothing of the *bonum civile qua* ultimate

tamen, et in casu, magis est eligenda vita activa, propter necessitatem praesentis vitae") (*STh* II-II, q. 182, a. 1 [Leonine ed., 10:441]). This could not be, if the active life were in every way subordinate to the contemplative.

natural end in the section of the *Summa Theologiae* where it would belong, such a doctrine is very dubiously extracted from other articles and texts.

Reply. Beatitude does indeed name "the perfect good of an intellectual nature,"[58] one mode of ultimate end or perfection, whereas the *bonum civile* is an ultimate end or perfection of another mode. But the treatment of the ultimate end of man "in communi" in question 1 of the *Prima Secundae* already presumes a relatively exclusive treatment of man *qua* immortal individual.[59] Thomas introduces the *Summa*'s study of man altogether in the *Prima Pars* by qualifying that "it belongs to the theologian to consider man on the part of his soul [*ex parte animae*], not on the part of his body, except according to the body's relation to the soul;"[60] the whole *Secunda Pars* falls under this heading, as it is the delayed treatment of the exclusively theological study of man *qua* rational soul in his appetitive operations.[61] Certainly, the "body's relation to the soul" is very frequently relevant; the theologian does not treat of earthly man as if he were already a separated soul. But these proemial distinctions would be senseless if they did not exclude another legitimate way of considering man, namely, just *qua* composite. The *Summa* rather presumes such study as part of the philosophical sciences which sacred doctrine

[58] *STh* I, q. 26, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 4:301): "Nihil enim sub nomine beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae."

[59] This is confirmed by a. 5, which denies two ultimate ends precisely "of one man"; it is a general treatment, compared with qq. 2-5, because it considers beatitude in its generic character as end, i.e., as moving the appetite, whereas qq. 2-5 consider in what beatitude consists.

[60] *STh* I, q. 75, pr. (Leonine ed., 5:194): "Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam."

[61] *STh* I, q. 84, pr. (Leonine ed., 5:313): "Next we must consider the acts of the soul, just as regards the intellectual and appetitive powers—for the other powers of the soul are not directly the theologian's concern. Now the acts of the appetitive part pertain to the study of moral science, and so they will be treated in the second part of this work, in which morals will be considered" ("Consequenter considerandum est de actibus animae, quantum ad potentias intellectivas et appetitivas: aliae enim animae potentiae non pertinent directe ad considerationem theologi. Actus autem appetitivae partis ad considerationem moralis scientiae pertinent: et ideo in secunda parte huius operis de eis tractabitur, in qua considerandum erit de morali materia").

presupposes,[62] and hence it contains no thorough study of, for example, sensory powers—nor of political theory as such. The theologian considers man the composite in view of that part of him which will outlast continuous composite existence, that is, man *qua* incorruptible; in itself this view does not deny the legitimacy of another consideration, *qua* corruptible, which may entail a distinct ultimate end. Hence it is in accord with the *Summa*'s organization that an ultimate end *qua* composite and especially *qua* political, if recognized, should appear only incidentally in the context of other considerations (especially the moral virtues)—its independence as an ultimate end is the very reason that it comes only incidentally under the theologian's study.

Objection 2. Thomas's opusculum *De regno* is certainly concerned with political theory as such, and it flatly contradicts the proposed thesis:

> But because man living according to virtue is ordered to a further end, which consists in the enjoyment of God . . . and there must be the same end for the human multitude as for one man, the ultimate end of the gathered multitude is not to live according to virtue, but through virtuous life to come to the enjoyment of God.[63]

No more patent denial that the *bonum civile* is an ultimate end could be desired; hence the proposed thesis is a dubious interpretation of Thomas's other texts.

Reply. *De regno* has not been taken into account thus far because of its troubled status in Thomas's *opera,* as indicated even by the Leonine editors who favor the authenticity of the first part of the work (to II, c. 8; the rest is certainly inauthentic):

[62] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 4:6): "Thus it was necessary for man to have, beyond the philosophical disciplines investigated through reason, sacred doctrine through revelation" ("Necessarium igitur fuit, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, quae per rationem investigantur, sacram doctrinam per revelationem haberi").

[63] *De regno ad regem Cypri*, II, c. 3, in *Opera omnia* (Leonine ed.), 42:466: "Sed quia homo uiuendo secundum uirtutem ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur, qui consistit in fruitione diuina . . . oportet autem eundem finem esse multitudinis humane qui est hominis unius, non est ultimus finis multitudinis congregatae uiuere secundum uirtutem, sed per uirtuosam uitam peruenire ad fruitionem diuinam."

Incomplete, perhaps rough, we recognize that this opusculum presents itself under somewhat difficult conditions, which demand prudence and discretion in recourse to the text as expressing the thought of its author.[64]

Tension between the authentic part of the treatise and Thomas's other works is already well observed.[65] The crucial principle of the passage quoted in the objection is that "there must be the same end for the human multitude as for one man." If the multitude were considered as a universal whole, of course, this would be identical to the claim of question 1, article 5 of the *Prima Secundae* (meaning simply that the end applies to each individual man as subjective part of the universal nature of man), and hence would present no new difficulty. If, as the objection presumes (and indeed the context of *De regno* suggests), it means that a *civitas* of men as a unity of order has no end other than that of an individual man, the principle is clearly at odds with Thomas's other works, even prescinding from the present application to the *bonum civile* vis-à-vis eternal life:

The common good of a city and the singular good of one person differ not only according to many and few, but formally: for there is a different *ratio* of the

[64] H. Dondaine, "Préface," in *De regno* (Leonine ed., 42:419-46, at 424): "Inachevé, peut-être accidenté, reconnaissons que cet opuscule se présente dans des conditions un peu difficiles; elles imposent prudence et discrétion dans le recours à son texte comme expression de la pensée de l'auteur." Cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas,* vol. 1: *The Person and His Work,* rev. ed., trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 171.

[65] Dondaine, "Préface," 424: "In this work one no longer recognizes St. Thomas's thought [elsewhere] on the best form of government" ("On ne reconnaît pas non plus en cet ouvrage la pensée de saint Thomas sur la meilleure forme de gouvernement"). Cf. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas,* 1:170. On this particular chapter, compared to the passage of Thomas's *Sentences* commentary to be considered shortly, see I. T. Eschmann, "St. Thomas Aquinas and the Two Powers," *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958): 177-205, for whom the tension is sufficient to imperil the authenticity of *De regno* altogether; and L. E. Boyle, "The *De regno* and the Two Powers," in *Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis,* ed. J. Reginald O'Donnell (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 237-47, who argues for compatability (aligning *De regno* with the dualism of powers given in the *Sentences* commentary).

common good and the singular good, as the *ratio* of the whole differs from that of the part.[66]

As to the present thesis, the independence of the *bonum civile—pace* this reading of *De regno*—is put explicitly in a well-known reply concluding the commentary on the second book of the *Sentences:*

> Both the spiritual and the secular power are given by divine power; and so the secular power is under the spiritual just to the extent that God has subordinated it thereto, namely, in those things pertaining to the salvation of the soul: and so in these matters, the spiritual power is more to be obeyed than the secular. But in those things pertaining to the civil good, the secular power is more to be obeyed than the spiritual—as in Mt. 22:21, *Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's*—unless perhaps the spiritual and secular powers should be found together, as they are in the Pope, who holds the apex of both powers.[67]

If the civil good were directly subordinate "to the salvation of the soul" then the secular power would be subordinate to the spiritual in all things without remainder. As it is, both derive independently and equally directly from God, and the coherence of such independence—that is, how it can be grounded in man's nature without splitting him in half, as it were—turns upon the coherent independence of the *bonum civile,* and thus on its status as a second ultimate end for man.

Objection 3. Whether or not it can be shown to fit certain of Thomas's texts, the proposed solution, as regards the truth of the matter, is simply untenable—for it does split a man in half. To suppose that an individual's obligations to the *bonum civile* never

[66] *STh* II-II, q. 58, a. 7, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 9:15): "Bonum commune civitatis et bonum singulare unius personae non differunt solum secundum multum et paucum, sed secundum formalem differentiam: alia enim est ratio boni communis et boni singularis, sicut et alia est ratio totius et partis."

[67] II *Sent.*, d. 44, exp., ad 4 (Parma ed., 6:790-91): "Potestas spiritualis et saecularis utraque deducitur a potestate divina; et ideo intantum saecularis potestas est sub spirituali, inquantum est ei a Deo supposita, scilicet in his quae ad salutem animae pertinent; et ideo in his magis est obediendum potestati spirituali quam saeculari. In his autem quae ad bonum civile pertinent, est magis obediendum potestati saeculari quam spirituali, secundum illud Matth. 22.21: *reddite quae sunt Caesaris Caesari*. Nisi forte potestati spirituali etiam secularis potestas conjungatur, sicut in Papa, qui utriusque potestatis apicem tenet."

conflict with those to eternal life, such that both may be pursued independently, would be hopelessly naïve. And in any conflict, which demands a conscious subordination of one good to the other if the agent is to choose rationally, it would be absurd to suppose that the Christian ought ever to subordinate eternal life to the civil good. Moreover, even outside of such cases, the alleged independence of the civil good partakes of the baleful modern notion that religion or spiritual life is a wholly private affair to be kept well away from the *res publica*. A Catholic ethical ideal is utterly different; a man's whole life, including actions in which the pursuit of earthly goods does not immediately conflict with the pursuit of heavenly goods, is to be lived in light of the latter:

> Perfect love of God is prescribed to man, in the first place so that he might refer all things to God as end, as the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 10:31: *Whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do all for the glory of God*.[68]

Hence this is the only ultimate end.

Reply. The *bonum civile* is an ultimate end not directly subordinated to any other, not because its merits are weighed against eternal life and found competitive, but because it is not susceptible of direct subordination thereto—the notion is incoherent. Pursuit of the civil good will indeed in many accidental or indirect ways affect individual movement towards eternal life, but it cannot be made a pure means to that end, as it is movement in a different dimension.

The question is not whether there is some part of human life, some set of activities or goods, which lies outside of the scope of man's elevated ordering to the supernatural end and should be unaffected thereby. The question is rather, what are these things which are to be elevated? A man should do *x* for the love of God: what is *x*? And if *x* is defined as movement towards an end—that is, if it is teleological—what is the relation of that *telos* to the doing of *x* for the love of God?

[68] *De perfectione spiritualis vitae,* c. 6, in *Opera omnia* (Leonine ed.), 41.B:71): "Et haec divinae dilectionis perfectio datur homini in praecepto. Primo quidem ut homo omnia in Deum referat sicut in finem, sicut Apostolus dicit ad I Cor. X[31]: *sive manducatis sive bibitis vel aliquid aliud facitis, omnia in gloriam Dei facite*."

In trivial cases the distinction is patent, and presents no difficulty. A man in the state of grace chooses to play soccer. He should do this, like all that he consciously does, for the love of God. In addition to affecting his ultimate motivation, the grace informing his whole life may affect how he regulates his competitive spirit, and so forth—even if doing otherwise might bring greater success in the game. Subordination is evident; apparently his ultimate goal in playing soccer is to gain eternal life. All the same, the thing that he is trying to do for the sake of God, playing soccer, has its own goal; he cannot kick the ball at God (nor can the goalkeeper simply rely on the fact that Jesus saves). The subordination is indirect.

The triviality of such an example may seem to put it in the objector's favor: of course a game has its own internal rules and proximate end, but that whole teleological pursuit is itself utterly subordinate to a further end. Aristotle recognized as much, even for the relatively self-contained activity of play,[69] and it is all the clearer for the Christian: if playing soccer, whatever proximate benefits might derive therefrom, were to interfere with, for example, religious obligations, it ought to be rejected in the circumstances. Why is not the *bonum civile* precisely comparable, only on a broader scale?

The broader scale yields a difference in kind and not just in degree when it becomes so broad as to comprehend an entire perfectible subject *secundum naturam*—that is, when the question of defining the set of activities at hand (the activities which are to be done for the sake of eternal life, whatever that will mean in particular application) is no longer "What is it to play soccer?" but "What is it to be human?". This is what the *bonum civile* comprehends, *secundum naturam*. The *dictum* that "man is a political animal" does more than identify a proper accident of rational animality; it indicates the character of this nature's comprehensive good, just as a nature:

> Because man by his nature [*homo secundum suam naturam*] is a political animal, such virtues, as they are in man according to the condition of his nature, are

[69] See Aristotle, *Nic. Ethic.* 10.6.

called political, since according to these virtues man acts rightly in human affairs [*in rebus humanis gerendis*].[70]

To call a virtue "political" (or to call a good "civil") is to say that it pertains to the whole scope of *res humanae gerendae,* according to nature; the *res publica* is the *res humana*. It must be emphasized that the phrase "homo secundum suam naturam" does not invoke a hypothetical state of nature in precision from grace, nor some aspect of the world as it is untouched by grace; it is simply that which may be elevated by grace, in the world as it is. As a composite, physical nature, humanity is a nature in motion and existing in many parts, and thus cannot be defined without reference to the end towards which those parts move as an ordered whole. That which is to be elevated by grace, called to a supernatural end and hence to refer all actions thereto as far as possible, is each individual soul, *qua* individual, existing in the parts of that whole which is defined by movement towards an ultimate terrestrial end.

If, *per impossibile,* all of human life—the totality of *res humanae gerendae*—were a game of soccer, and such men were offered the supernatural end in grace, winning the game would remain an ultimate end for man—not because he would be as happy with kicking a ball into a net as with the vision of God, but because the things to be elevated, the activities gratuitously allowed to be referred to a supernatural end, would be defined as activities by a terrestrial goal towards which they move, one not susceptible of direct subordination to intellectual union with God, simply because it is not on the same plane. This nonsubordination would be most patent in the fact that achievement of the natural end would be necessarily corporate—the individual player would stand or fall with his team as a whole—whereas achievement of the supernatural end would be individual, and independent of the outcome of the game, even though any number of the actions which the player could through grace refer to the supernatural end

[70] *STh* I-II, q. 61, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 6:398): "Quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur, prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habent in rebus humanis gerendis."

would be actions defined by their ordering towards team victory in soccer. (The incompleteness of this analogy will be addressed in the following objection.)

Objection 4. The *bonum civile* is the end of acquired moral virtue; but the practice of the moral virtues is itself ordered to that of the intellectual:

> To this [viz., the contemplation of God] all other human actions seem to be ordered, as to their end. For contemplative perfection requires . . . freedom from the disturbance of passions, which is had through the moral virtues and prudence; and freedom from exterior disturbances, to which the whole regimen of civil life is ordered.[71]

If the *bonum civile* is not an ultimate end desirable for its own sake even on natural terms, it can scarcely be so in the context of grace and the supernatural end.

Reply. This is, of course, the factor complicating analogies such as the one given above—indeed any analogy, since there is nothing else in creation comparable to man in this respect. The activities of other composites, moved by subrational appetite for the common good of the species as a whole, might perhaps be compared to a game pursued on a horizontal axis relative to the vertical axis of elevation to a supernatural end; yet *ipso facto*, such creatures have no obediential potency to vertical elevation. But man does, after all, "kick the ball at God": as an intellectual being he naturally desires to know the First Cause, and the active, political life is subordinate to the contemplative.

Yet this subordination is irreducibly complex, as a necessary consequence of the composite nature of this intellectual creature. Simple subordination is not possible, because the whole perfected by the *bonum civile*—and which at its apex in the well-functioning *civitas* will produce the best possible speculative activity—cannot, by the very nature of the human composite, achieve that activity

[71] *ScG* III, c. 37 (Leonine ed., 14:93): "Ad hanc etiam omnes aliae humanae operationes ordinari videntur sicut ad finem. Ad perfectionem enim contemplationis requiritur . . . quies a perturbationibus passionum, ad quam pervenitur per virtutes morales et per prudentiam; et quies ab exterioribus perturbationibus, ad quam ordinatur totum regimen vitae civilis." Cf. *Sent. Ethic.* X, 11.

as a universal whole in which all the parts are equally contemplative. A contemplative life and its prerequisite leisure are built on the backs of many active lives; and when pursuit of the *bonum civile* yields a peaceful community supporting contemplative leisure for some, it is still immeasurably short of maximally actualizing the intellectual potency of each one of its members continuously—that is, of maximizing the specific potency of human nature individually.[72] Such a state is impossible in this life; it is the natural life of an angel, not a man.[73] What the whole human community might in principle achieve in the *bonum civile* is thus not to be measured by the height of this or that individual's speculative activity; that activity *qua* operation of an individual soul has no ultimate end (*in concreto*) save the supernatural. Rather, the *bonum civile* is realized over time in the ordered whole which includes that kind of activity (for some of its parts some of the time) as well as the activity of practical reason and the moral virtues (which are more proper to man *qua* composite multitude); it is not subordinate to any given individual activity, even speculative, on the natural order. The *bonum civile* remains ultimate *qua* corporate, since what speculative heights can in principle be achieved through natural powers are fleeting for the individual, and even then are the product of a whole *civitas*. It is indeed that fleeting participation in a life more than human which

[72] Cf. Froelich, "Ultimate End and Common Good," 618: "No matter how solitary, therefore, a contemplative's life remains an essential and integral part of human society. While contemplation is the pinnacle of human excellence, it is not its totality. Indeed, since a single individual could never fulfill every human potential . . . the contemplative necessarily finds himself or herself united in the human endeavor to overcome the limitations inherent in the individual."

[73] Cf. Aristotle, *Nic. Ethic.* 10.7, as in Thomas, *Sent. Ethic.* X, 11 (Leonine ed., 47.2:586): "But such a life will be entirely more than human; for not insofar as he is man will he live so, but insofar as there is something divine in him" ("Talis autem utique erit melior vita quam secundum hominem. Non enim secundum quod homo est sic vivet, sed secundum quod divinum aliquid in ipso existit"). Cf. also Thomas, *De virt. card.,* a. 1 (Marietti ed., 814): "The contemplative life is not properly human, but superhuman; and the life of pleasure, attachment to sensible goods, is not human, but bestial. Thus the properly human life is the active life, which consists in the exercise of the moral virtues" ("Vita contemplativa non est proprie humana, sed superhumana; vita autem voluptuosa, quae inhaeret sensibilibus bonis, non est humana, sed bestialis. Vita ergo proprie humana est vita activa, quae consistit in exercitio virtutum moralium").

is, for Aristotle as for Thomas, the most desirable thing known by natural light. But as it is itself a passing good for a passing individual, the ultimate good is not any one instance of activity of the kind, nor the mere aggregation of various passing instances, but the perfection of the continuing whole which contains that contemplating individual *qua* composite and the morally virtuous activity which makes his fleeting role possible. Indeed, just insofar as this or that human soul belongs to a man ordered to other men, the active life is superior to the contemplative, though the order be reversed for the individual regarded alone:

> The character of the good is twofold. For something is called good which is desired for its own sake: and hence the contemplative life is *simpliciter* better than the active, since it is closer to that life to which we endeavor to attain through both the contemplative and active lives; whence the contemplative life is the end of the active, and closer to the ultimate end. But something is also called good as desired for another; and in this way the active life is preeminent over the contemplative. For the contemplative life, in him in whom it exists, is not ordered to anything else: for eternal life is but the consummation of the contemplative life, of which in this world there is a certain foretaste; whence it is not ordered to another, except insofar as the good of one man is ordered to the good of many—and this belongs more to the active life than to the contemplative.[74]

Objection 5. Even if the *bonum civile* were a naturally available ultimate end in principle, in the postlapsarian world a man lacking grace cannot achieve perfectly even the virtuous activity commensurate to his nature. Hence to speak of reality and not a hypothetical state is to speak of a world in which man can achieve no ultimate end whatsoever without grace. But the ultimate end

[74] III *Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1 (Parma ed., 7:406): "Duplex est ratio boni. Aliquid enim dicitur bonum, quod propter seipsum est desiderandum: et sic vita contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam activa, inquantum magis assimilatur illi vitae ad quam per activam et contemplativam nitimur pervenire; unde et contemplativa est finis activae, et fini ultimo vicinior. Aliquid vero dicitur bonum quasi propter aliud eligendum; et in hac via vita activa praeeminet contemplativae. Vita enim contemplativa non ordinatur ad aliquid aliud in ipso in quo est: quia vita aeterna non est nisi quaedam consummatio contemplativae vitae, quae per vitam contemplativam in praesenti quodammodo praelibatur: unde non restat quod ordinetur ad aliud, nisi secundum quod bonum unius hominis ordinatur ad bonum multorum, ad quod propinquius se habet vita activa quam contemplativa."

man achieves with grace is surely the supernatural alone. Hence man as he is has no natural ultimate end.

Reply. It is not man's ordination to the *bonum civile* that is altered by the Fall, but his ability to pursue that end (however profound the alteration). Thomas's unmistakable teaching on man's need for *gratia sanans,* even to be virtuous with respect to his connatural good, is perfectly coherent with the ultimate character of the *bonum civile*. Indeed it requires it, as the prerequisite for specifying such a thing as "being virtuous with respect to his connatural good" in the world as it is—and hence for a real distinction between two effects of grace, one healing man from his corruption as regards his connatural end, the other raising man to his supernatural end.[75]

Objection 6. The acquired moral virtues do not remain as such under grace, but are elevated or absorbed into the infused virtues.[76] But the *bonum civile* is asserted to be the end of acquired virtue as such. Hence it could only be the ultimate end for men lacking grace, and is made obsolete by ordering to the supernatural end.

Reply. This account of the relation between acquired and infused moral virtue in Thomas's texts cannot stand.[77] There do

[75] *STh* I-II, q. 109, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 7:291): "In the state of unfallen nature . . . man could by his natural powers have both willed and done the good proportionate to his nature, as is the good of acquired virtue, but not the transcendent good, as is the good of infused virtue. . . . Human nature is not totally corrupted by sin, so as to be deprived entirely of the good of its nature; even in the state of fallen nature he may through natural virtue do some particular good but not the whole good connatural to him, such that he should in no way fall short of it. . . . Thus man needs gratuitous virtue added to natural virtue . . . in two respects, in the state of fallen nature: to be healed; and further, to do the good of supernatural virtue, which is meritorious" ("In statu naturae integrae . . . poterat homo per sua naturalia velle et operari bonum suae naturae proportionatum, quale est bonum virtutis acquisitae: non autem bonum superexcedens, quale est bonum virtutis infusae. . . . Natura humana per peccatum non est totaliter corrupta, ut scilicet toto bono naturae privetur; potest quidem etiam in statu naturae corruptae, per virtutem suae naturae aliquod bonum particulare agere . . . non tamen totum bonum sibi connaturale, ita quod in nullo deficiat. . . . Sic igitur virtute gratuita superaddita virtuti naturae indiget homo . . . in statu naturae corruptae, quantum ad duo: scilicet ut sanetur; et ulterius ut bonum supernaturalis virtutis operetur, quod est meritorium").

[76] This is claimed by Inglis, "Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues."

[77] Various problems with this account are indicated by McKay Knobel, "Can Aquinas's Infused and Acquired Virtues Coexist?" Inglis's argument in particular, for the absorption of acquired virtue by infused, is based on a misreading of *STh* I-II, q. 51, a. 4, ad 3 (Leonine ed.,

remain puzzling aspects of that relation, but it seems evident that acquired and infused virtue can be possessed together and distinctly, whatever their mutual interaction. This is clearest in the case of baptism, whereby both a child and an adult receive infused virtue in equal measure, but the adult goes on possessing acquired virtues which the child has not. Thomas takes this as patent, serving as a premise: "But infused virtue coexists with acquired, as is evident in the adult who comes to Baptism having acquired virtue, and receives no less infused virtue than a boy; hence acquired and infused virtue differ in species."[78] Again:

> The circumstances [of virtuous action] are determined by acquired virtue in proportion to the civil good, but by infused virtue in proportion to eternal glory: and so even something superfluous according to civil virtue can be moderate according to infused virtue, such as when a man fasts, or willingly submits to death for the defense of the faith.[79]

6:329): "The acts produced by an infused habit do not cause another habit but confirm the one already existing, as medicinial remedies applied to a man healthy by nature do not cause a new health, but confirm the health already possessed" ("Actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem: sicut medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant"). In context, this cannot refer to an infused virtue strengthening a preexisting acquired virtue of the same name. Acquired virtues and their infused counterparts differ in species, as Thomas asserts many times; the present objection assumes that difference, and on that basis makes the novel suggestion (in view of a *reductio*) that this scheme would entail a third sort of virtue, one acquired on the basis of infused virtue and thus a sort of infused-acquired hybrid. (This would violate the principle that two forms of the same species cannot exist in the same subject, only because the alleged new habit would belong to the same species as the infused virtue from which it proceeds; at no point is natural acquired virtue part of the argument at all.) The objection's premises are: (1) a newly infused virtue allows a man to act in a new way, repeatedly (true); and (2) a new kind of action if repeated always produces a new habit (false). Thomas explains: since infused virtue gives a disposition at once and completely, actions proceeding from that disposition do not cause a new disposition (even though they may be unprecedented in the agent's history and repeated), but rather strenghten the already-existing infused disposition.

[78] III *Sent*., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 4, s.c. 2 (Parma ed., 7:352): "Sed virtus infusa est simul cum virtute acquisita, ut patet in adulto qui habens virtutem acquisitam ad Baptismum accedit, qui non minus recipit de infusis quam puer. Ergo virtus acquisita et infusa differunt specie." While this is a *sed contra,* and thus not unambiguously *in voce Thomae,* nothing in the article indicates that Thomas disagrees with its premises.

[79] Ibid., ad 2 (Parma ed., 7:353): "Per virtutem acquisitam collimitantur circumstantiae secundum proportionem ad bonum civile, sed per virtutem infusam secundum proportionem ad bonum aeternae gloriae: unde etiam aliquid superfluum secundum virtutem civilem est

These examples certainly confirm the superiority of infused virtue, but they do not (*pace* some readings)[80] show it to be simply stronger or stricter than acquired virtue; in fact they illustrate the independence of the specifically different virtuous ends. Since a true virtue of acquired temperance is connected to the other moral virtues under prudence, it is not just ordered to bodily vigor, but to the *bonum civile*—the circumstances of the city, not just the body, limit it. Thus in civil circumstances of plenty, the rule of acquired temperance does indeed allow a man to eat more at times than the rule of infused temperance (since the latter includes periodic fasting). But in other cases, it allows less: in circumstances of famine, it allows a father willingly to starve in order to give the food available to his children—whereas fasting to starvation in order to discipline the body for the sake of eternal life would be excessive by the rule of infused temperance. The body whose health acquired temperance seeks to maintain is ultimately the body politic, the ordered community of family, city, nation; that is why it is called "civil virtue." *Per se,* it is neither more nor less strict than infused temperance; it simply seeks a different ultimate goal, the perfection of a different subject, and this pursuit is *per se* neither towards nor away from the supernatural goal.

Thomas's account of fortitude exhibits the same distinction. The preeminent act of infused fortitude is martyrdom; but the apex of acquired fortitude is also a willing death for a greater good, namely, death on the battlefield in defense of the *bonum civile*.[81] Now such a death can itself be referred to Christ, and thus become martyrdom, but that referral lies in the soul of the individual soldier, independent of the fact that he is defending the *civitas* (which is the rule of his acquired virtue). Moreover, the

moderatum secundum virtutem infusam, sicut quod homo jejunet, et se voluntarie morti offerat propter defensionem fidei."

[80] E.g., Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 559: "When it comes to the infused virtue of temperance, however, the rule is set by divine law and may involve a call to abstinence far beyond what is required by the rule of reason."

[81] Cf. Reichberg, "Aquinas on Battlefield Courage," 338: rather than simply trumping the acquired virtue with the infused, Thomas "elaborates a two-stage theory in which military heroism is put forward as the exemplar of acquired fortitude, while martyrdom is praised as the paradigm of infused fortitude."

sacrifice of lesser goods—goods which cannot be the occasion of paradigmatic acquired fortitude—can also be the occasion of martyrdom.[82] This is only coherent if the two rules of fortitude lie on different axes, and that on the basis of two truly ultimate ends.[83]

* * *

That the proposed solution leaves a significant tension in human teleology must be readily granted. Anything else would be suspicious for that very reason: earthly human existence was in

[82] *STh* II-II, q. 124, a. 5, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 10:41): "The good of the republic is preeminent among human goods. But the divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom, is greater than the human. Nevertheless, because the human good can be made divine, if referred to God, any human good can be the cause of martyrdom insofar as it is referred to God" ("Bonum reipublicae est praecipuum inter bona humana. Sed bonum divinum, quod est propria causa martyrii, est potius quam humanum. Quia tamen bonum humanum potest effici divinum, ut si referatur in Deum; potest esse quodcumque bonum humanum martyrii causa secundum quod in Deum refertur").

[83] This duality of orders is also evident in Thomas's treatment of justice; *STh* II-II, q. 58, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 9:14): "For just as charity is called general virtue insofar as it orders the acts of all the other virtues to the divine good, so also legal justice, insofar as it orders the acts of all the other virtues to the common good" ("Sicut enim caritas potest dici virtus generalis inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum divinum, ita etiam iustitia legalis inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum commune"). The crucial distinction lies between the subjects hierarchically ordered and perfected by the respective general virtues of the acquired and infused orders. Legal justice is the general acquired virtue, because it orders the whole political community to the common good (*qua* part-to-whole)—its hierarchy includes many human beings, and thus it can only be found perfectly in the political ruler. Charity is the general infused virtue, because it orders the acts of an individual to the divine good (which is common in a different mode)—its hierarchy is within a single soul, and its degree of perfection is independent of the political hierarchy. Hence in commenting upon the Macrobian scheme of virtue in *STh* I-II, q. 61, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 6:398), when moving from "political" virtue to "purgative" (evidently corresponding to the difference between acquired and infused cardinal virtues in this life), Thomas gives the cardinal virtues newly individualized and internalized effects: "Prudence despises all earthly things for the contemplation of divine things . . . temperance dismisses, as far as nature allows, whatever the use of the body requires; fortitude keeps the soul from fear of leaving the body and coming to heaven; and justice gives the whole soul to consent to this proposed path" ("Prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat . . . temperantia vero relinquat, inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam").

tension even before the Fall, precisely on account of man's composition.[84] That man must, because of that composition, belong at once to two cities, and endeavor rightly to order himself towards both—obeying both a priest and a king, each of whom has, in a different way, an ultimate claim on him—should not, after all, admit of any easy resolution into unity, prior to the appointed time,

as disposed by Him who is priest and king forever, according to the order of Melchisedech, King of Kings and Lord of Lords, whose power shall not be taken nor kingdom be corrupted *in saecula saeculorum*. Amen.[85]

[84] Hence the gift of original justice was given to the first man, in addition to the grace offered to all intellectual creatures—*De Malo,* q. 5, a. 1, in *Opera omnia* (Leonine ed.), 23:131: "But beyond this aid [viz., grace] man needed another supernatural aid, by reason of his composition. For man is composed of soul and body, and of intellectual and sensible natures: if he were left to his nature, the latter would to some extent aggravate and impede the intellect from coming freely to the pinnacle of contemplation. This aid was original justice, whereby man's mind is so subject to God that his lower powers and the body itself are totally subject to the mind, that reason may tend to God without impediment" ("Set preter hoc auxilium necessarium fuit homini aliud supernaturale auxilium ratione sue compositionis. Est enim homo compositus ex anima et corpore et ex natura intellectuali et sensibili: que quodammodo si sue nature relinquantur, intellectum aggrauant et impediunt ne libere ad summum fastigium contemplationis peruenire possit. Hoc autem auxilium fuit originalis iustitia, per quam mens hominis sic subderetur Deo ut ei subderentur totaliter inferiores uires et ipsum corpus, neque ratio impediretur quominus posset in Deum tendere").

[85] II *Sent.,* d. 44, exp., ad 4 (Parma ed., 6:791): "hoc illo disponente qui est Sacerdos et Rex in aeternum, secundum ordinem Melchisedech, Rex regum, et Dominus dominantium, cujus potestas non auferetur et regnum non corrumpetur in saecula saeculorum. Amen."

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THE CATHOLIC AND RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENTS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE overview of the Catholic Enlightenment has recently been published. Co-edited by Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy, *A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe* includes substantial contributions from nine distinguished international scholars.[1] The collection draws on a vast range of primary sources and synthesizes several decades' worth of scholarship in multiple languages. With all these resources to hand, one might ask, what has taken so long?

The beleaguered but still entrenched principal narrative of Western intellectual history from the Middle Ages to the present helps to explain why such a publication, which in principle could have appeared many decades ago, has only now seen the light of day. In 1908 the German Church historian Sebastian Merkle conceptualized and called for the study of the *katholische Aufklärung,* but at the time the Enlightenment as such was widely regarded as an inherently anti-religious or at least anti-Catholic movement. The dominant narrative that then held sway was one still rooted in the Enlightenment's own rhetoric. According to this narrative, the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation transcended medieval Catholicism in its revolutionary appeal to

[1] *A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe,* ed. Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy, in Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), pp. 466, $230 (cloth), ISBN 978-90-04-18351-3.

Scripture alone as the standard for Christian faith and life, undermining the foundations of papal tyranny and thus laying some of the first paving stones of modernity. Then the most advanced thinkers of the Enlightenment transcended creedal Christianity and revealed religion altogether, finding in reason alone the sole and sufficient basis for morality and the useful organization of society aimed at this-worldly progress and human happiness. Virtually the essence of the Enlightenment as the intellectual high road to modernity was the rationalist rejection of authority, tradition, hierarchy, faith, and dogmatic religion—all of which were inextricable from early modern Roman Catholicism. A light shone in the darkness and dispersed the obscurantist gloom especially of Catholic superstition and backwardness.

Certainly some versions of rationalizing, progressive Protestantism could have contributed and did contribute to the Enlightenment, whether in England, Scotland, Holland, or Germany. But how could there have been a "Catholic Enlightenment?" The standard narrative required that the very expression function as a virtual contradiction in terms. The story all but demanded that eighteenth-century Catholicism play its prescribed part as a reactionary source of an *anti-philosophe* Counter-Enlightenment ignominiously continuous with post-French Revolutionary, ultramontane papal retrenchment in the nineteenth century. Ironically, although anti-modernist Catholic theologians and Church historians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries evaluated the relevant historical phenomena in diametrically opposite ways, they agreed that "Catholic Enlightenment" was fundamentally an oxymoron. In an odd alliance of unlikely intellectual bedfellows, adamant post-Christians and staunch ultramontanist clericalists shared a similar interpretation of an alleged Catholic Enlightenment.

Plenty of eighteenth-century Church leaders and laity alike were apparently content with the religious status quo, hostile both to new philosophical ideas and to calls for sweeping ecclesiastical and social reforms. Nevertheless, nonspecialists unacquainted with the work of scholars such as Bernard Plongeron and Louis Rogier since the 1960s, and with the burgeoning recent scholarship on

the relationship between the Enlightenment and religion more generally, are likely to be surprised at just how widespread, diverse, and substantive the Catholic Enlightenment was in its expressions from the Iberian peninsula to the Baltic states.[2] By no means was it a unified whole. Partly this is because despite Roman Catholicism's textbook reputation for monolithic uniformity, it was in fact enormously variegated and many-layered, with contested and cross-cutting theological, ecclesiological, and devotional traditions. It is well worth debating the best categories for characterizing the relevant phenomena, and on this score several contributors to this new collection weigh in—"Enlightenment in a Catholic country" (Harm Klueting), or "enlightened Catholicism" (Richard Butterwick), or Mario Rosa's preference for "the more neutral term of *Aufklärung*" with reference to Italy (217). But there seems no more reason categorically to reject "Catholic Enlightenment" because it was complex and diverse than there is to reject analogous rubrics that cover similarly pluralistic historical realities (e.g., "Gregorian Reform," "Industrial Revolution"). Nor will a mere pluralizing of the term resolve questions about the relationships of historical particulars to larger patterns, as if adding an "s" to "Catholic Enlightenment" adds substantively to our understanding. The contributions to this collection of essays amply demonstrate that what Evergton Sales Sousa says about the Catholic Enlightenment in Portugal applies to the Catholic Enlightenment as a whole: "The understanding that there is a plurality within the Catholic enlightenment should not serve as an impediment to consider it as a flexible whole which can shelter distinct theological and ecclesiological tendencies, according to the circumstances of the time and space under observation" (396).

[2] See, e.g., Louis J. Rogier, "L'Aufklärung catholique," in *Nouvelle histoire de l'Église*, vol. 4 (Paris, 1966); as well as Plongeron's seminal essay, "Recherches sur l'*Aufklärung* catholique en Europe occidental, 1770-1830," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 16 (1969): 555-605. Examples of significant recent contributions on religion and the Enlightenment include *Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe,* ed. James A. Bradley and Dale E. Van Kley (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001); and David Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews and Catholics from London to Vienna* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008).

A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe opens with a synthetic essay by Lehner followed by eight contributions organized geographically and accompanied by detailed individual bibliographies. They cover France, Austria and the other Habsburg lands, the Holy Roman Empire, Italy, Malta, Poland-Lithuania, Portugal, and Spain, respectively. This organizing principle shows an awareness of differences among national Enlightenment traditions emphasized by other scholars in recent decades.[3] It also underscores the extent to which, in every instance, the institutional and practical realities of eighteenth-century Catholic ecclesiastical life in Europe were inseparable from oversight and increasing control by secular governments. The differences among these regimes and their leaders was one of the most important factors contributing to the contingency and diversity of the Catholic Enlightenment. This pertains to the France of Louis XV or XVI, the Austria of Maria Theresa or Joseph II, the Malta of the Knights Hospitaller grand masters, and to Poland-Lithuania, a "confessional noble republic" and the only Catholic regime in Europe dominated by its nobility rather than a monarchy (299). To unprecedented extents and especially by the 1770s and 1780s, states controlled the Church in Catholic regimes. As a consequence, in Lehner's words, "If the Church wanted to retain any influence on society at all, it had to prove the usefulness of religion by making a contribution to the moral welfare of the state" (27).

Whatever else the Catholic Enlightenment may have been, it involved concrete contestation about institutional Church-state relations plus debates about proper jurisdictional control and the exercise of power with respect to religious practices and institutions. These disputes tended to be conducted on extra-Catholic terms that stressed social utility and sought to show the rationalist reasonableness of Catholic dogmatic claims and religious practices. Continuing a late medieval trend further strengthened by the confessional divisions of the Reformation era, Catholic rulers in the eighteenth century everywhere extended

[3] See, for example, *The Enlightenment in National Context*, ed. Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

their control over ecclesiastical life at the expense of the papacy and religious orders, including monastic institutions (and sometimes dramatically so, as in the secularization of monasticism under Joseph II in Austria in the 1780s). Increased independence of individual bishops from Rome under royal oversight was a common goal of Gallicanism in France, Josephinism in Austria, and Febronianism in the Holy Roman Empire. All of these exerted an influence outside their respective countries of origin. In numerous instances, Catholic rulers found enthusiastic supporters among those clergy, who were sometimes inspired by one or more of the many strands of eighteenth-century Jansenism. They were clerics who regarded the state as the best instrument for properly educating and catechizing the laity, curbing the perceived excesses of popular piety, and inculcating a more rigorous morality that would foster the common good of the state and its citizens.

It is no accident that some of these basic objectives overlapped with mandates of the Council of Trent (1545-63). Several of the volume's contributors note that multiple broad goals of the Catholic Enlightenment should be seen as the long-term continuation of post-Tridentine aims. The circumstances were of course very different from those of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Then, for example, the Jesuits had been the vigorous vanguard of a revivified Catholicism, pace-setting pedagogues in its institutions of higher education, distinguished intellectuals in multiple disciplines besides theology and philosophy, and confessors and counselors to princes across Catholic Europe.[4] By the 1750s this picture had changed dramatically. Opposition to the Jesuits became a widespread feature of the Catholic Enlightenment (but not a universal one,

[4] See, for example, the relevant essays in *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773,* ed. John W. O'Malley et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); and *The Jesuits II: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773,* ed. John W. O'Malley et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); as well as Marcus Hellyer, *Catholic Physics: Jesuit Natural Philosophy in Early Modern Germany* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005). On the Jesuits' engagement in politics during the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, see, for example, Harro Höpfl, *Jesuit Political Thought: The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Robert Bireley, *The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War: Kings, Courts, and Confessors* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

since as Jeffrey Burson notes, numerous French Jesuits must be viewed as part of the Catholic Enlightenment especially from the 1730s into the 1750s).[5] The Jesuits retained a near monopoly on a Catholic higher education that was still dominated by Renaissance rhetoric and Baroque Scholasticism and frequently resistant to Newtonian science. They had close ties to the papacy in regimes whose rulers wanted to extend control over ecclesiastical institutions, as well as a reputation as lax moral theologians and confessors. All these factors led to their serial exclusion from Catholic countries beginning with Pombal's Portugal in 1759 and ending with the papal suppression of the order by Clement XIV in 1773. In a sort of inversion of the Roman Index, the Portuguese government prohibited the reading of works by many Jesuit authors by the late 1760s, something that would have been unimaginable even a generation earlier (373). Still, Catholic rulers in countries from Carlos III's Spain to Maria-Theresa's Austria sought to ensure that well-trained parish priests preached and taught effectively, and that well-catechized laity practiced an informed piety free of perceived superstition and ignorance. These were concerns articulated by the Council of Trent and indeed had still earlier roots in pre-Reformation desires for reform of the Church as expressed by major figures from Jean Gerson to Erasmus.

Little in the long-standing narrative about the Enlightenment as the triumph of reason and learning over (especially Catholic) superstition and ignorance, a story recycled from the best-known *philosophes'* own rhetoric, would lead one to expect that the Catholic Enlightenment included multiple scholars of formidable erudition. Here too it is rather arbitrary to draw any sharp distinction between the post-Tridentine historical-critical pursuits of the Maurists and biblical scholars such as the Oratorians Jean Morin (1591-1659) and Richard Simon (1638-1712), for example, and the extension of their insights by eighteenth-century

[5] See also the much more extensive treatment in Jeffrey D. Burson, *The Rise and Fall of Theological Enlightenment: Jean-Martin de Prades and Ideological Polarization in Eighteenth-Century France*, foreword Dale Van Kley (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010).

Catholic *érudits*. The latter included scholars such as Ludovico Antonio Muratori (1672-1750) in Italy, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo (1674-1764) in Spain, and Luis Antonio Verney (1713-92) in Portugal, who simultaneously engaged with post-Newtonian scientific ideas and post-Cartesian philosophical currents. Other Catholic intellectuals, such as Roger Joseph Boscovich (1711-87), were innovative scientists in their own right.[6] Many of the leading intellectuals of the Catholic Enlightenment were Benedictines. The order's decentralized structure permitted a discretionary openness to new ideas on a house-by-house basis that had no parallel among the Jesuits or mendicant orders. Thus it could and did foster in the Holy Roman Empire, for example, the penetrating critiques of post-Grotian, Pufendorfian natural law by Anselm Desing (1699-1772) as well as the wide-ranging historical erudition of Martin Gerbert (1720-93).[7] Of course, a premise of the Catholic Enlightenment was that Roman Catholicism was what it claimed to be. New scholarly methods, scientific discoveries, and historical knowledge were to be marshaled so as better to understand and promulgate the faith, to preach and teach and catechize as well as possible. New philosophical claims were to be discriminatingly assessed and appropriated if they served these ends, much as Aristotle's ideas had been in the thirteenth century, or renewed Stoicism and Epicureanism in the Renaissance. As Harm Klueting bluntly and accurately puts it, "Followers of radical anticlericalism and deniers of the dogmas of the church were not Catholic" (143). Those who, for whatever reasons and on the basis of whatever influences, rejected the Church's teachings were not part of the Catholic Enlightenment, even as many of the protagonists of that Enlightenment warmed to the ideas of Protestant thinkers such as Locke, Wolff, or Kant, and even while ecumenical initiatives made

[6] On Boscovich's post-Newtonian, unified theory of a single attraction-repulsion force that anticipated developments in chemistry, optics, magnetism, thermodynamics, and electricity between 1780 and 1820, see Ugo Baldini, "The Reception of a Theory: A Provisional Syllabus of Boscovich Literature, 1746–1800," in O'Mally et al., eds., *Jesuits II,* 405-50; on Boscovich more generally, see Hellyer, *Catholic Physics,* 177-78, 229-32. Boscovich does not appear in the *Companion*.

[7] See the recent study by Ulrich L. Lehner, *Enlightened Monks: The German Benedictines, 1740-1803* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

an appearance.[8] But that there *was* a vibrant Catholic Enlightenment diversely manifest from Portugal to Poland in the eighteenth century is beyond question, as this important collection makes clear.

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Jonathan Israel's elegant essay, *A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy,* is a very different sort of book about a very different Enlightenment.[9] Based on a series of lectures delivered at Oxford in 2008, the book offers a prelude to Israel's monumental trilogy's forthcoming and final volume, entitled *Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights, 1750-1790*. Anyone familiar with his *Radical Enlightenment* (2001) or *Enlightenment Contested* (2006) cannot fail to be impressed by his multilinguistic erudition and multinational range, but *A Revolution of the Mind* has the advantage of stating his key arguments in a more digestible format.[10] Notwithstanding his vast learning and awareness of the complexities of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century intellectual history, what really mattered in the end is, according to Israel, quite simple:

> Beyond a certain level there were and could be only two Enlightenments—moderate (two-substance) Enlightenment, on the one hand, postulating a balance between reason and tradition and broadly supporting the status quo, and, on the other, Radical (one-substance) Enlightenment conflating body and mind into one, reducing God and nature to the same thing, excluding all miracles and spirits

[8] For one example of an ecumenically minded Enlightened monk, see Beda Mayr, *Vertheidigung der katholischen Religion sammt einem Anhange von dem Möglichkeit einer Vereinigung zwischen unserer und der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche* (1789), ed. Ulrich L. Lehner (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Lehner, *Enlightened Monks*, 215-21.

[9] Jonathan Israel, *A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy* (Princeton, N.J., and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. xvi + 276, $26.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-691-14200-5.

[10] Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and idem, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670-1752* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

separate from bodies, and invoking reason as the sole guide in human life, jettisoning tradition. (19)

Enlightenment thinkers were either boldly moving forward on the basis of these Spinozistic breakthroughs, opposing injustice and hierarchy, arguing based on reason alone, rejecting traditional religion, and promoting human happiness; or they were compromising with the status quo, tolerating or even exacerbating injustice and hierarchy, capitulating to tradition and authority in various ways, making some place for religion, and hampering human happiness. All participants in the Catholic Enlightenment obviously fall into the latter camp. (Israel nowhere uses the term "Catholic Enlightenment," although he refers to a "Christian Moderate Enlightenment" [174] and notes a number of eighteenth-century French Catholic writers, such as Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier [1715-90], who opposed the Radical Enlightenment.)

In effect, Israel's view of the Enlightenment is the traditional Third-Republic French argument repackaged. Only now his Radical Enlightenment, pioneered by Spinoza, is seen as the high road to human liberation and modern progress. By contrast, many major thinkers with important roles in the traditional story are to varying degrees cast down from their patron-saint pedestals for having unheroically compromised with established institutions, social hierarchies, and traditional customs. These include Locke, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume, Ferguson, Smith, and Kant. Indeed, the progress-inhibiting Moderate Enlightenment becomes in Israel's retelling the historical prelude to the reactionary Counter-Enlightenment, beginning already during the French Revolution. In dramatic contrast,

An originally clandestine movement of ideas, almost entirely hidden from public view during its earliest phase (the late seventeenth century), and maturing in opposition to the moderate mainstream Enlightenment dominant in Europe and America in the eighteenth century, radical thought burst into the open in the 1770s, 1780s, and 1790s during the revolutionary era in America, France, Britain, Ireland, and the Netherlands, as well as in underground democratic opposition circles in Germany, Scandinavia, Latin America, and elsewhere. Radical Enlightenment is now widely seen as the current of thought (and

eventually political action) that played the primary role in grounding the egalitarian and democratic core values and ideals of the modern world. (vii)

These two sentences from the first page of Israel's preface suggest why he is so invested in the Radical Enlightenment, and why, by the time his third book appears, he will have spent nearly three thousand pages endeavoring to make his case. What occurred first as a "revolution of the mind" was subsequently enacted, beginning in the late eighteenth century, in "revolutions of fact" that have achieved all that is most prized in the modern world, but that from the start have faced and still face reactionary resistance. Hence the Radical Enlightenment needs not simply historians but advocates for the ongoing revolution still threatened and yet to be fully accomplished.

Leaving aside how "widely seen" the Radical Enlightenment is as the source of modern democratic and egalitarian ideals—Samuel Moyn has recently argued, for example, that the notion of universal human rights as understood today owes little if anything to the Enlightenment, radical or otherwise, and did not gain widespread purchase until the 1970s[11]—it certainly is seen this way by Israel. Whereas the Moderate Enlightenment compromised with monarchy and hierarchy, the Radical Enlightenment included "an emphatic, anti-Rousseauist preference for representative democracy" (64). Whereas the Moderate Enlightenment in thinkers such as Turgot, Beccaria, and Adam Smith championed free markets in ways that justified enormous socioeconomic differences between rich and poor, Diderot and d'Holbach (Israel's two most important Radical Enlightenment protagonists of the 1770s and 1780s) and their followers, because of their foundational commitment to equality, made the new science of economics "subject to immediate suspicion and opposition from among the radical bloc" (94). The Radical Enlightenment was more opposed to wars than was the Moderate Enlightenment, its protagonists arguing that true moral values and representative

[11] Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), with discussion of the Enlightenment and human rights at pp. 19-28.

democracies would eliminate practically all wars. And whereas the Moderate Enlightenment continued to cling to faith, tradition, and religion as crucial to a morality that mistrusted the passions and placed restrictions on the pursuit of self-determined pleasures, the Radical Enlightenment adopted a "purely secular moral philosophy" (93) of "utilitarian rationalism" ostensibly based on reason alone, which held that "only pleasure-seeking harmful to others, or oneself, is morally wrong" (166). In effect, Israel wants to persuade the reader that we are indebted to the Radical Enlightenment for all that is best in the modern world: "democracy; racial and sexual equality; individual liberty of lifestyle; full freedom of thought, expression, and the press; eradication of religious authority from the legislative process and education; and full separation of church and state" ([vii]-viii).

The protagonists of the Radical Enlightenment regarded themselves as breaking sharply with the past, with tradition, authority, and religious beliefs. Israel seems to believe their rhetoric: for example, "the only way to ground a true universal morality, according to the radical thinkers, is by discarding all existing moral systems" (185). *A Revolution of the Mind* reads like the work of an apologist and confessional historian, a scholar who so identifies with his favored protagonists that he neglects to subject their claims to criticism or their assumptions to analysis. What they believe, he believes. Of course, considering Israel's argument about the tight fit between the Radical Enlightenment and contemporary democratic values, this would mean that he would also have to subject such values to critical analysis, rather than merely defending and promoting them. Space prevents a consideration of all the ways in which Israel fails to analyze the claims of his privileged advocates, but a few are worth briefly mentioning.

First, "reason" is an altogether more problematic category in modern philosophy than Israel implies. "It was a dogma [note the irony] of the radical thinkers that reason, and only reason, can raise man's dignity from the depths of degradation, error, and ignorance" (100). Whose reason? Or in Alasdair MacIntyre's

phrase, "which rationality?"[12] The history of modern philosophy from Descartes into the twentieth century is peopled by major thinkers who claim to base their assertions on reason alone, and yet who disagree radically with one another about everything from metaphysics and morality to philosophical anthropology and politics. Given this fact, it is unclear why Israel believes, say, the self-proclaimed rationality of Spinoza and d'Holbach, but not, for example, that of Hume or Kant (or Hegel, or Husserl, and so forth). Allegations of the "plain intellectual cogency" of Radical Enlightenment ideas will not quite do (35). There is a striking absence of anything remotely resembling convergence about truth based on reason alone in philosophy between the early Enlightenment and the early twenty-first century. Why, then, on the basis of the historical evidence, ought one to think that "reason alone" in modern philosophy is even a plausible means for answering questions about the nature of reality or how human beings should live? The erudite English divine Jeremy Taylor (1613-67), a contemporary of Spinoza, wrote in 1660 that "every mans reason is not right, and every mans reason is not to be trusted."[13] Fair enough. But why should we follow Israel in preferring the protagonists of the Radical Enlightenment absent any arguments about why, among all the competing assertions, *their* claims to rationality are convincing?

On a related point, Israel apparently believes that moral values such as equality and reciprocity, as well as a commitment to democracy, somehow follow logically from the monistic naturalism of Spinozistic philosophy. This is strange to say the least. "Without classifying radical thought as a Spinozistic tendency, combining one-substance doctrine or philosophical monism with democracy and a purely secular moral philosophy based on equality, the basic mechanics of eighteenth-century controversy, thought, and polemics cannot be grasped" (21). This linkage might indeed be valuable for illuminating important

[12] Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).

[13] Jeremy Taylor, *Ductor Dubitantium, or The Rule of Conscience. . . .* (London: James Flesher for Richard Royston, 1660), 1.2.51, p. 56.

dynamics in eighteenth-century intellectual history. What is utterly mystifying is why anyone should have believed then, or should believe now, that metaphysical naturalism or materialism somehow entails a commitment to equality or democracy. The modern natural sciences have gone rather farther than the pious speculations of Enlightenment philosophers in their understanding of the natural world (although some of the latter, such as La Mettrie, turn out to have been closer to the mark on this count than were Israel's philosophical champions). It turns out that from materialism and naturalism nothing moral or political follows, one way or another. Christian Smith sums it up well: "Matter and energy are not a moral source. They just exist and do what they do."[14] That includes the matter and energy doing what they are doing, whatever they are doing, in the bodies of members of the species *Homo sapiens*. No equality, reciprocity, or democracy anywhere in sight. These might be nice things to believe in, but they have nothing to do with monistic metaphysics, materialism, or naturalism.

Similarly, Israel notes that over against Christian theology and the idea of a special status for human beings as created in God's image, "In radical thought, by contrast, man is merely an animal among others with no specially privileged status in the universe" (33). Yet if this is so, it is difficult to see what the basis could possibly be for a putative "philosophical grounding of human rights" (31), or indeed, even for a belief in the existence of "universal human rights" (237), as though these were somehow either the rationally demonstrated products of pure reason or discoveries pursuant to the careful empirical investigation of those merely animal human bodies. Given the assumptions of a materialistic naturalism, never at any point since the eighteenth century has the slightest empirical evidence for rights been detected in any scientific investigation or medical examination. So

[14] Christian Smith, "Does Naturalism Warrant a Moral Belief in Universal Benevolence and Human Rights?" in *The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion*, ed. Jeffrey Schloss and Michael J. Murray (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 292-317 at 307.

why did Israel's putatively rational Radical Enlightenment protagonists believe in them?

On this point Carl Becker's classic essay, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (1932), remains more insightful than Israel, who does not raise and apparently does not see the problem.[15] Becker argues that the fundamental moral and political beliefs of the *philosophes* (whether Radicals or Moderates in Israel's terminology) were in fact derived and adapted from the assumptions of the Christian culture they thought they were transcending. In other words, there *was* no "new secular morality stripped of theology" (98), no "purely secular moral philosophy, excluding theological notions" (93). There were instead only putatively rationalist philosophers unaware of the extent to which they remained the heirs of the religious culture from which they so stridently insisted they had broken. No basis for rights, equality, reciprocity, compassion, or anything similar can be discovered on the basis of empirical investigation or conjured up on the basis of "reason alone." One must believe in them. If rights and related values such as human dignity are *real*—and, as John Rist, Charles Larmore, Russ Shafer-Landau, Stephen Smith, and others have argued, turn out to be not simply the atavistic residue of wishful thinking—they must have a ground in something other than mere matter-energy in motion, and indeed reality must *be* more than mere matter-energy in motion.[16] Otherwise Nietzsche would seem to have gotten it right in declaring that "there are no moral facts whatsoever."[17] The conviction that reality is more than the monistic materialism and naturalism claimed by the champions of the Radical Enlightenment was, of course, a core belief of the

[15] Carl L. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1932).

[16] See John M. Rist, *Real Ethics: Rethinking the Foundations of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Charles Larmore, *The Morals of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Russ Shafer-Landau, *The Fundamentals of Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Steven D. Smith, *The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[17] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Götzen-Dämmerung* [1889], in Nietzsche, *Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe,* ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, pt. 6, vol. 3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), 92.

Catholic Enlightenment, which for Israel places its participants at best among the foot-dragging advocates of the Moderate Enlightenment.

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There is something ironic about reading *A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe* and *A Revolution of the Mind* side by side. A long-standing narrative about Western modernity that was shared by radical secularists and radical ultramontanists long prevented the Catholic Enlightenment from coming to light. But now that it has, it is revealed as a complex and variegated phenomenon notwithstanding the long-lived textbook reputation of Roman Catholicism as a hierarchical monolith. That the Catholic Enlightenment is over allows it to be approached historically. In Michael Printy's words, "Now that we can recognize that the divisive issues of Church and State, Nation and Religion that were at the core of the Catholic Enlightenment are things of the past—for Western Europe and Christianity, in any case—we can come afresh to its history" (208). By contrast, despite perhaps knowing more than any other living scholar about the Enlightenment in all of its remarkable variety and complexity, Jonathan Israel ultimately slots it all into the single mega-dichotomy between Radical and Moderate Enlightenments as the supposed key not only to explaining the eighteenth century, but also to accounting for modern democratic moral and political values. This is perhaps why, for him, it cannot and should not be approached simply as history, and why the claims of his privileged protagonists should be accepted as gospel.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Forum and the Tower: How Scholars and Politicians Have Imagined the World from Plato to Eleanor Roosevelt. By MARY ANN GLENDON. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 280. $18.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-19-978245-1.

It is difficult to review a book that does just what it sets out to do and does it with clarity of expression and logic of presentation. Mary Ann Glendon has given us such a book with an unusual theme: the relation between political or legal theory and the practice of politics and the law. The book presents a series of portraits of people who are, at the same time, philosophers, political scientists, practicing lawyers, and political leaders, each one battling interiorly to find the equilibrium necessary to find his or her authentic calling among these vocations. Each "imagines the world" from the tower of legal theory and in the forum of political practice.

The book examines figures from Plato, in the fifth century B.C., to Charles Malik in the middle of the twentieth century A.D. The sequence is temporal, not imposed by theory; yet the book's genre is close to that of a history of ideas, particularly ideas that are meant to be realized in practice. It examines the relation between ideas and action in particular contexts that see similar notions return in different settings, like the themes of a fugue rather than the development of a symphony. The contexts are radically different, but the ideas return like ringing changes on a carillon. Political contexts are always less universal than are philosophical theses, and persons theorizing in particular social contexts are yet more individual than either their ideas or their societies. Thematizing becomes complex.

The theme of the book itself therefore challenges a review or a resume. Should one read for the well-researched biographical details rarely found in discussion about even well-known intellectuals, politicians and diplomats? Should one follow the lines of thought that reappear in different guise from time to time or concentrate on the historical settings that are presented just enough to illustrate the main theme? Any of these approaches would entail rewriting a book that is a *tour de force*. Each chapter concentrates on a different personage or on a few characters that are acting together in the same milieu. Each chapter stands on its own, but the chapters are interwoven by a common concern for the formula for good government and its expression in legal and political theory. The connecting

link lies in the question of how best to influence the social order. The pathos of many chapters is the discovery that many who started well as theorists ended as unsuccessful actors and vice versa. Few succeeded in both areas of endeavor.

Two who combined both theory and practice to impressive degrees were Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.) and Edmund Burke (1729-97 A.D.). While centuries apart in time and half a continent separated in space, both Cicero and Burke illustrate how students of law can be political actors of great influence. Both also saw their most cherished goals and purposes stymied and, in part, defeated. Cicero lost his life defending the Roman republic as it was being transformed into an empire. Burke died believing he had lost his fight to defeat in court the worst abuses of the British Raj in India and had failed to advance significantly the cause of liberty in his native Ireland. Both were men of high principle, able in the midst of the shifting winds of politics to adjust their course of action without losing sight of their ultimate goals. Both felt isolated in their public activity and appreciated the anchor of private family life. Both are appreciated in history because their writings escaped the trap of their times, and their example shows how to withstand the abuse of governmental power in any age. Most of all, however, the integrity of their character preserves their influence in the history of the relation between thought and action. They anchor and best illustrate the theme of Professor Glendon's book.

Finally, the book weaves into intellectual history the influence of legal codes and various declarations of human rights. The Justinian Civil Code, the Napoleonic Code, and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights are documents perhaps too little pondered in considering the sources of political and philosophical theory. The circumstances of their creation highlight the way political inheritances are preserved in public discourse.

Other issues that appear and add intrigue to the book without being pursued in detail are the relation between laws that guarantee individual rights vis-à-vis other individuals and the development of rights theories that protect individuals from government itself. Roman law accomplished the first but failed to develop the second. Why were the various medieval and modern charters more successful? How did the development and then decline of natural law theory correspond to different political experiments in modern times? How did the rise of commerce and international banking and financial institutions affect the development of law and the character of public life itself? For religious actors, how did belief in God's Kingdom influence the development of positive law, including the Church's canon law, in earthly realms? The book raises these and other questions in the reader's mind without being obliged to answer them definitively within the limits of its own purpose.

This is a book enjoyable to read and easy to recommend.

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Medieval Trinitarian Thought From Aquinas to Ockham. By RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 206. $85.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-521-11714-2.

The complexity and intricacy of Scholastic reflections on the Trinity can easily overwhelm even the most diligent of readers, which makes Russell Friedman's short book an especially welcome addition to scholarship on medieval Trinitarian thought. Friedman balances breadth and depth with great skill and provides a work of substantial value to readers with varying degrees of exposure to Scholastic theology, medieval philosophy, and Trinitarian debates. Friedman defines his aim thus:

> My purpose in this book is to give a broad overview of some of the central aspects of and developments in the trinitarian theology written in the Latin West between roughly 1250 and 1350 AD. The emphasis here will be on philosophical theology, on the rational investigation of the Trinity by later-medieval theologians using the full range of tools available to them from especially the Aristotelian tradition of philosophical analysis. Nevertheless, the philosophical nature of the discussion as it is presented here should not obscure the fact that the intense interest with which later-medieval theologians approached the issue is an indication primarily of the immense *religious* importance it had for them. (1)

With this purpose in mind, Friedman investigates two aspects of medieval Trinitarian thought. The first concerns metaphysical issues of identity and distinction, issues supremely important in Scholastic efforts to express the perfect unity of the divine essence together with the real distinction between the three divine persons. Friedman refers to the second aspect as the "psychological model" and traces it to Augustine's considerations of the second divine person as Word. Taken together, these two aspects grant access to a wealth of debates, strategies, and dispositions within medieval Trinitarian thought. Both aspects also underwent major changes when confronted with what Friedman calls "the search for simplicity" in the fourteenth century, and he spends much time examining the ramifications for Trinitarian thought of prioritizing absolute divine simplicity.

Two strategies emerged by which thirteenth-century theologians sought to explain the distinction of Trinitarian persons, and both strategies depended upon Aristotelian philosophy. Friedman labels one the 'relation account of personal distinction' and the other the 'emanation account of personal distinction'. Thomas Aquinas advocated the former strategy, which came to define the Dominican Trinitarian tradition. Bonaventure defended the latter strategy, which came to define the Franciscan Trinitarian tradition. These two accounts agreed that each divine person was constituted a distinct person through a personal property (*proprietas personalis*) unique to that person. This agreement is particularly noteworthy given that it began to erode in the fourteenth century, a phenomenon Friedman discusses in chapter 4.

Friedman offers a helpful synopsis of the Aristotelian categories of relation, action, and passion and their foundational use in Trinitarian thought by Augustine and Boethius. Relation was used to argue that the Trinitarian persons were essentially identical but relatively distinct. Medieval Trinitarian thought further specified this as distinction according to 'opposed relations', which Friedman glosses as 'mutually implicative' relations, the general idea being that one side of the relation requires the other side of the relation. Paternity as a relation depends upon filiation as an opposite relation; the relations define each other. Aquinas can thus argue that relations are really identical with the divine essence and only introduce distinction insofar as they are mutually implicating. The essentially identical divine persons are relationally distinct, and this affirmation lies at the heart of the 'relation account'. The 'emanation account' trumpets the insight that the opposed relations of paternity and filiation depend upon the *action* of paternal generation and the *passion* of filial generation. The action and passion of emanation must be logically prior to the relations founded upon that emanation. Bonaventure, formulating an emanation account, highlights the categories of action and passion for explaining the logical foundation of personal distinction, placing the emphasis not on opposed relations but "on the three irreducibly distinct ways in which the persons originate: unemanated, emanated by way of nature, and emanated by way of will" (18).

The relation and emanation accounts in Aquinas and Bonaventure, Friedman stresses, mainly concern how one conceives of personal distinction in God. Though mainly conceptual, this divergence of opinion led to further disagreements, which Friedman indicates through a series of 'flashpoints'. The first flashpoint developed over the question "whether God the Father is the Father because he generates or whether he generates because he is the Father" (21). As confusing as this may seem, Friedman does an admirable job of laying it out clearly and of explaining the larger import of the question. The divergence of opinion changed, Friedman argues, when late-thirteenth-century Franciscans embarked on "a 'reification' of Bonaventure's conceptual ordering of emanation *vis-à-vis* relations" (31). John Pecham, for example, denies the coherence of Aquinas's relation account on the grounds that the personally constitutive opposed relations seem both to precede the emanations and to follow from them. Pecham argues that the Father's innascibility or primity functions as a personal property, rendering the Father personally distinct emanationally as the unemanated person. Friedman describes Pecham's view in terms of 'nested distinctions', where the Father's emanational distinction based upon innascibility is nested within a hypothetically dispensable relational distinction. Pecham grounds personal distinction primarily in emanational distinctions and secondarily in opposed relations based upon the emanations. Friedman even characterizes Pecham as allowing the emanational property of innascibility to mark off a 'proto-Father' (Friedman's term) sufficiently distinct to serve as the source for the Son's generation. Henry of Ghent takes this notion a bit further, rejecting the relation account completely and presenting personal distinction wholly due to emanational distinction.

The second chapter delves into the 'psychological model', according to which human psychology provides some means for explaining and exploring the Trinity. The Franciscan Trinitarian tradition, with its stress on the emanational account of personal distinction, came to favor a strong use of the psychological model: "the Franciscans thought that the Son quite literally is a Concept produced by the Father's intellect, and that the Holy Spirit is Love produced by the will shared by the Father and the Son" (51). Friedman reconstructs how this strong use developed through surprising channels and then discusses some Dominican objections to it, formulated by John of Naples and Durand of St. Pourçain, including Durand's view that the psychological model can only be applied to God metaphorically. These challenges set up Friedman's examination of concept formation and its application to Trinitarian thought in Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus. Friedman labors to explicate this dense topic and the overlap of Trinitarian thought with philosophy of mind in a clear and accessible manner, but this section remains difficult.

Interest in the psychological model continues in chapter 3, where Friedman investigates fourteenth-century Franciscan debates on whether the psychological model can be applied to God properly or only metaphorically. The investigation covers Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, and William Ockham. Great continuity unites thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Trinitarian thought, but this continuity does not exclude discontinuity grounded in innovations. The most important innovation Friedman labels the 'search for simplicity', which designates the prominent fourteenth-century trend of prioritizing absolute divine simplicity over explanatory value in Trinitarian theology. Scotus, following Henry of Ghent's argument that distinct emanations require distinct sources for the emanations, holds that the divine attributes grounding the distinct emanations (i.e., divine intellect, will, and essence) are 'formally' distinct. Rejection of Scotus's formal distinction underlies much of fourteenth-century Franciscan Trinitarian thought.

Peter Auriol rejects Scotus's formal distinction but allows 'connotative' distinction such that the "divine essence is one absolutely simple thing, and yet it connotes various things and actions that are extrinsic to it, and on the basis of these different connotations we can assign to it different attributes that are then connotatively distinct" (116). Francis of Marchia favors the notion that God contains eminently the functions of intellect and will; in this way Francis balances an eminent grounding for emanational distinction with absolute divine simplicity, applying the psychological model to God only metaphorically. William Ockham's repudiation of a formal distinction cuts deeper. He presents the divine essence as the indistinct source of the emanations, dispenses with the link between attributes and emanations maintained by the psychological model, and stresses knowledge of Trinitarian realties based on faith alone. Ockham defends the psychological model as properly applied to God but qualifies this defense with the admission that we know the propriety of this application by faith alone. Friedman presents all of these as various attempts to prioritize divine simplicity, an impulse that is equally prominent in chapter 4.

Friedman's study of Walter Chatton, Robert Holcot, and Gregory of Rimini in chapter 4 serves many purposes, including examining extreme forms of the search for simplicity that resulted in what Friedman labels 'Praepositinianism' and qualifying historiographical conventions, most notably expressed by Étienne Gilson, that sharply disparage the fourteenth century as a fideist retreat from the highpoint of thirteenth-century Scholasticism. The label of Praepositinianism harkens back to the late-twelfth-century theologian Praepositinus and his contention that the personal properties are identical with the Trinitarian persons, such that, for example, paternity simply is the Father. Beginning from a principle of absolute divine simplicity, Walter Chatton denies that there could be anything in God aside from the essentially identical and personally distinct divine persons. This approach rejects the various attempts, analyzed by Friedman in chapter 1, to explain personal constitution through personal properties. For Chatton the divine persons are irreducibly essentially identical and personally distinct, and nothing more can be said. With some minor though interesting differences, Robert Holcot and Gregory of Rimini repeat Chatton's basic stance. Again, Friedman makes a strong case that the motivating factor underlying this fourteenth-century Praepositinianism is the prioritization of absolute divine simplicity.

Friedman's stress on the search for divine simplicity provides an opportunity to qualify Gilson's denigration of fourteenth-century theology as a decline from thirteenth-century rationalism. Friedman grants that fourteenth-century Scholastics tended to appeal to faith and to limit the scope of reason, but he takes this change, far from signaling the decline of Scholasticism, as a testimony to the remarkable diversity of medieval Trinitarian thought and to the preservation of absolute divine simplicity as a paramount intellectual commitment. In other words, Friedman contends that the motivation for fourteenth-century fideism is as important as the fact of that fideism. While some may not be convinced by Friedman's contention and may still prefer to contrast the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Friedman's careful attention to divine simplicity adds nuance to our appreciation of continuities and discontinuities between them.

Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham provides a tremendous contribution to scholarship on medieval Scholasticism and Trinitarian theology. Friedman does an impressive job of condensing protracted debates into readable summaries, of highlighting two vastly important themes in medieval Trinitarian thought, and of exploring changing intellectual and theological dispositions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Nonspecialists will appreciate his clear and patient description of issues as well as his restraint in providing quotations and secondary sources, and specialists will appreciate his attention to theologians beyond Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham, who often drown out the contributions of their lesser-known contemporaries. For those interested in more extensive discussions of the material, Friedman's *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250-1350* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, forthcoming) will satisfy that interest. Friedman's work establishes him as a

leading voice in historical theology and a model for scholarship that is erudite, careful, challenging, and accessible.

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Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham. By Marilyn McCord Adams. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. viii + 318. $55.00 (cloth). ISBN 978-0-19-959105-3.

In the Introduction to her study of later medieval Eucharistic theology, Marilyn McCord Adams informs the reader that "the core of this book" consists of chapters 4-9. In fact, it seems fair to say that this core is really a complete book unto itself which can be read as it stands apart from the rest. However that may be, these chapters which comprise part 2: "The Metaphysics and Physics of Real Presence," do make for very interesting reading. Those familiar with Adams's work on medieval Scholastic thought (most notably her comprehensive *William Ockham* [1987]) have come to expect deeply learned discussions of some very complicated material, and have also grown accustomed to the clarity with which she presents such material. They will not be disappointed by her treatment of the four major figures indicated in the subtitle of this volume: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham. A word of caution, however, to the avid Thomist: Thomas Aquinas does function as something of a foil for Duns Scotus in these discussions. Nevertheless, Adams presents the arguments of all concerned with precision and sympathy. She explains the fundamental problems these theologians face, the objections they must meet, and the means by which they attempt to integrate their doctrine of real Eucharistic presence into a larger coherent view of the universe.

Among the myriad questions that the Eucharist raised for medieval theologians the central one is this: how does the one body of Jesus Christ—the very same body that was born of the Virgin Mary, died on the cross, was raised on the third day, and ascended into heaven—manage to turn up on so many different altars at the same time? On the one hand, an explanation of real presence must allow for the fact that Jesus Christ now possesses a glorified and impassible body which is located at the right hand of God the Father. On the other hand, one must address the following philosophical premises: two bodies cannot be extended in the same place at the same time, and one body cannot be extended in two different places simultaneously. Nor can a suitable explanation propose anything less than 'real' or 'substantial' presence; it is not enough for the consecrated host

to function as a symbol (*sacramentum*) of a nonpresent reality (*res*). The body of Christ on the altar must be a real thing (*res*) in itself even as it also serves as a symbol (*sacramentum*) for the further reality (*res*) of the believer's mystical union with the Lord. That much was agreed upon in the thirteenth century; precisely how this could be accomplished had not yet been officially determined.

This last point is worth bearing mind, because the medieval thinkers under review here often felt constrained by the Fourth Lateran Council's use of the term 'transubstantiation', which they took to affirm one specific explanation of real presence. The term itself appeared in the council's opening statement of faith, which was subsequently incorporated (under the title *Firmiter*) into the official decretal collection promulgated under Pope Gregory IX in 1234. One can add to this the letter that Pope Innocent III had sent to the Archbishop of Lyons in 1202 which also used the term 'transubstantiation' and entered the collection as *Cum Marthae*. In any event, canonists from Johannes Teutonicus to Hostiensis had no qualms about counting conversion, annihilation, and consubstantiation all as orthodox Eucharistic theories, precisely because each theory in its own way preserved the real presence of Christ's body over against bare symbolism. One could even say that Scholastic theologians got out ahead of the Church in defining the limits of acceptable Eucharistic formulations when they read their own metaphysical explanations back into earlier documents.

At any rate, Thomas Aquinas settled on a theory of substantial conversion (rather than consubstantiation or annihilation) largely because it seemed to him to be the only way to account for the presence of Christ's body without having it pass through various intermediary places on the way from heaven to some altar in London or Rome. Yet this divinely wrought conversion of bread into body would be unlike Aristotle's natural substantial change, since there would be no common material subject. It is, as Adams puts it, "whole-being conversion" comprising both new matter and new substantial form. The accidents of the bread remain, of course, under which exists the substance of Christ's body; and this is where things get tricky.

The principal hurdle that every medieval theologian had to deal with at this stage was the accident of quantity—both with respect to Christ's own body and with respect to the consecrated host. If the bread's quantity remains following consecration—and serves as the subject for the rest of the accidents as Thomas claims—how can Christ's body occupy that same place? Given the fact that Thomas believes that quantity is a real thing that must be accounted for, he argues that whereas the substance of Christ's body is present by the power of the sacrament (*ex vi sacramenti*), his quantitative dimensions are present concomitantly. This means that his body does not relate to the remaining quantified accidents of the bread by way of his own dimensive quantity. Instead, his body relates to these accidents after the manner of a substance such that it is present whole to the whole host and whole to every part of the host, much like the whole substance of air is wholly present to each particle of air. In that sense, then, Christ's body is not competing with the bread's accidents for the same space since it does not relate to that space in the same way. Thus, as Adams notes,

Thomas tries to solve the problems of multiple location and incommensurate size by ordering Christ's substance immediately to the bread's accidents and mediately to the place on the altar by way of those accidents.

Giles of Rome was certainly indebted to Thomas, but he had some interesting contributions of his own to make. Noteworthy is his contention that God can act on matter in its sheer quiddity, beneath its quantified and thus individuated state. This helps to overcome the 'No-Common Constituent Problem' (as Adams calls it) without lapsing into Aristotelian natural change, since the matter in question during transubstantiation is not individuated by quantity but is instead matter as simple quiddity. It would seem, therefore, that this is an attempt to obviate the outright annihilation of the bread—in which case the *terminus ad quem* of conversion would be nothing, rather than Christ's body—and thereby preserve conversion without positing the continued existence of a common quantified material substratum. Indeed, it was no easy feat to explain how the bread could pass into the body of Christ in a seamless conversion process without the two terms possessing common matter and without the two whole substances coexisting for an instant in the same place. The annihilation/succession theory surmounts these problems, but (as we shall see below) late medieval theologians shied away from boldly positing such a theory much as they also recoiled from consubstantiation.

If Thomas and Giles were basically on the same page, Duns Scotus took a wrecking ball to large sections of Thomistic transubstantiation. Many of the principles which the Dominican Angelic Doctor regarded as axiomatic were held up to intense, even withering, scrutiny by the Subtle Doctor of the Franciscan order. One of Scotus's principal objections to Thomas's theory of transubstantiation is that, while it might explain how the bread becomes Christ's body, it fails to explain how the body of Christ actually comes to exist here on this altar. Hence the question is not so much one of being (*esse*) but of being here (*esse hic*). It would seem, on the face of it, that if bread is converted into Christ's body then the bread should wind up in heaven where Christ's body is located; after all, Christ is not being converted into the bread on the altar. Scotus therefore severs the nexus between substantial conversion on the one hand and real presence on the other. He can do this because he regards presence as an external relation which must be considered separately from the absolute being of a substance. Hence the body of Christ never has to move, but can remain in heaven with no loss of place, even as it gains multiple external place relations to different altars.

What is more, Scotus insists that the body of Christ, as a truly organic body, must be quantified even as it exists on the altar. In order to accommodate this principle he draws a distinction between intrinsic or quantitative position on the one hand, and extrinsic or categorial position on the other. The first allows for the proper ordering of Christ's body parts whereas the second pertains to the ordering of those parts to a place. Insisting that these two sorts of quantification are logically distinct, Scotus contends that Christ's body retains its intrinsic quantification even as it is not commensurate part to part with the place it

occupies. Indeed, as these two types of quantification are really separable there is no reason why a body could not retain its internal ordering were God to place it outside of the universe where it would have no external relation to any place. Thus the body of Christ remains a quantified body in the host, but is present whole to the whole host and whole to every part of the host, not part to part.

Typically, of course, physical bodies are commensurate with the place they occupy part to part, whereas an immaterial substance like the soul can be wholly present to every part of the body. Thus Christ is not present in the host in the natural way of bodies, but in a miraculous way achieved by divine power. Fair enough, but Scotus is always on the lookout for the superfluity of miracles. Surely, Scotus concludes, if God can make Christ's body present in a non-natural way, he could just as easily make it present in a natural way and thereby cut this additional miracle out of the process. Actually, there is really no need for Christ's body to exist anywhere under the natural mode of existence, according to Scotus, since the natural and non-natural modes are not dependent upon one another. There could even have been Eucharistic presence prior to the Incarnation.

Given his fondness for the less-complicated solution wherever possible, Scotus chafed under the constraints of the substantial conversion theory. Consubstantiation seemed so much simpler: the body of Christ can still be present, but without having to remove the subject that upholds the bread's accidents. Besides, substantial bread is an even more suitable sign of Christ's corporeal presence than are mere accidents. Nevertheless, Scotus believed that consubstantiation had been ruled out of bounds by the aforementioned Lateran IV statement codified as *Firmiter* in canon law. The Church does not err in matters of faith; hence God in his infinite freedom must have chosen substantial conversion as the means to real presence even if it is a more cumbersome process. Although Thomas went so far as to claim that consubstantiation was heresy, this remained his own private opinion, since that had not been officially settled at this time. Scotus was clearly not happy with Thomas's own conversion theory, and yet he did not want to posit an outright annihilation theory either, since he thought that too was out of bounds. His solution is truly subtle: the process of transubstantiation merely requires that the bread's substance loses its place on the altar while Christ's body acquires that place. The fact that the bread also ceases to exist is a concomitant but separate change, and thus not the direct result of transubstantiation.

By now the dedicated Thomist may be growing weary of Franciscan critiques, but they keep coming. William of Ockham (picking up the mantle of his earlier confrère Peter John Olivi) turned his sights on that great culprit: the accident of quantity. The nominalist Ockham simply denies the real existence of quantity, insisting that it is a connotative term that directly signifies substance and quality while connoting their extension. Hence it cannot possibly serve as a subject to uphold the rest of the bread's accidents. Moreover, if quantity is not a really distinct thing in itself, then there is no reason why Christ's body has to be quantified in the host even intrinsically (contra Scotus). As it is, the body of Christ is present definitively in the host, rather than circumscriptively (as it is in

heaven), and thus whole to whole and whole to every part. Like Scotus, however, Ockham also believed that consubstantiation was the most plausible scenario to account for real presence; and like Scotus he rejected it on the strength of canon law. He also nuanced annihilation, arguing that while the bread is indeed reduced to nothing it is not a state of nothingness that precludes it being converted into the body of Christ. Incidentally, John Wyclif (who falls beyond the purview of this book) was convinced that, no matter how one slices it, the doctrine of transubstantiation inevitably leads to the complete annihilation of the bread's substance and thus—according to Wyclif's brand of metaphysical realism—to the utter destruction of the entire universe.

Even if all of our theologians here accept the basic premise that, following the words of consecration, the substance of Christ's body comes to exist underneath the remaining accidents of the bread, one is still left with a serious problem. How can accidents continue to exist when their proper subject has been taken away? Maybe quantity fulfills the role of subject for the rest, or maybe they are all simply upheld by divine power, but either way we are left with a bunch of bread accidents and no bread substance. As Adams notes, this raises three concerns: (1) the Definition Problem: that it belongs to the very definition of an accident to inhere in a substance; (2) the *Esse* Problem: an accident's act of existing is its inherence in a subject; and (3) the Individuation Problem: accidents are individuated by their respective subject and thus are perceptible (as the bread's accidents surely are). In fact, Wyclif believed that just such problems rendered the doctrine of transubstantiation metaphysically incoherent. The notion of accidents detached from their proper subject does not make any sense, he contended, since the whole point of an accident's existence is to modify a substance. The accident of quantity is nothing but the quantification of a given substance, just as quality is the qualification of a substance. The bread's accidents are only real insofar as they inhere in the substance of the host—the very substance that no longer exists following consecration. At any rate, Thomas admitted that while it may indeed be naturally appropriate for accidents to inhere in substances, God is free to change these arrangements on occasion through a miracle. As First Cause, he can conserve the accidents even when their usual proximate efficient cause has been removed. As for individuation, God can make it be that the quantitative dimensions exist *per se* apart from their original matter and thereby serve to individuate the rest of the accidents as quantity would in any case. Scotus, on the other hand, contends (among other things) that inherence in a subject is not essential to an absolute accident's existence; inherence is actually an external relation.

As one can imagine, the material is much more intricate than this brief summary might indicate. The careful reader of this volume will be repaid, however, for Adams proves to be a sure-footed guide through this *selva oscura*. A further benefit of this book is that its specific attention to medieval theories of Eucharistic presence sheds light on a larger point: medieval Scholastic theology was extremely dynamic; theories were posed and challenged in the best tradition of the Catholic search for truth. All the great doctors (Angelic, Seraphic, Subtle,

etc.) were engaged in a common enterprise in which another master's positions might be respected but they were not sacrosanct. The medieval schools were vibrant hubs of intellectual activity where no mere mortal opinion was given a free pass. So it was that, far from being destructive forces, theologians such as Scotus and Ockham pressed epistemological boundaries to see what reason could finally bear. Nor was the truth of the faith ever in question for them; witness their unwavering adherence to the Eucharistic statements found in canon law. Whether or not one is satisfied with their metaphysical conclusions, Scotus and Ockham did not undo the essential bonds of *fides et ratio*. They posed legitimate questions that had to be addressed if one is to remain true to the theological task itself: *fides quaerens intellectum*.

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The Triune God: Doctrines. By BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN. Edited by ROBERT M. DORAN and H. DANIEL MONSOUR. Translated by MICHAEL G. SHIELDS. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, volume 11. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009. Pp. xxiii + 776. $95.00 (cloth), $45.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8020-9967-9 (cloth), 978-0-8020-9667-8 (paper).

The Triune God: Systematics. By BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN. Edited by ROBERT M. DORAN and H. DANIEL MONSOUR. Translated by MICHAEL G. SHIELDS. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, volume 12. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pp. xxiv + 823. $95.00 (cloth), $39.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8020-9168-0 (cloth), 978-0-8020-9433-9 (paper).

A classmate used to complain that Lonergan's copious reflections on method would be much clearer if he had produced a few examples of theology. It would be difficult to propose a finer example than the work contained in the present volumes. They make available, for the first time with an interleaf English translation, Lonergan's monumental textbook, *De Deo Trino, 1. Pars Dogmatica* and *2. Pars Systematica* (Rome, 1964), together with an excellent selection of supporting materials. This is theology of a very high order, composed with methodological awareness and philosophical acuity. Although subject to the requirements of the genre then in force at the Gregorian University, these volumes are a welcome departure from the eclecticism and oversimplification typical of textbooks today. Lonergan develops a cogent interpretation of the doctrinal tradition, illuminated in turn by a profound analogical theory.

In his preface to *Doctrines,* Lonergan explains that, while the task of the positive part of theology is to understand the particular as particular—the mind

of Paul, say, or of Athanasius—the task of the dogmatic part is to grasp the universal in the particular, the one faith in the many witnesses. *Doctrines* is divided into two sections. The first section (previously published, in a translation by Conn O'Donovan, as *The Way to Nicea*, 1976) deals with the way from the New Testament to the dogmatic context of the fourth century, that is, from the particularities of the New Testament and patristic witnesses to the formulation of the one faith in a simple rule: what is true of the Father is true of the Son, except the name Father. It would be a mistake, however, to expect original research, novel interpretations, or doctrinal history; Lonergan called his exercise here "dialectic," which he compared to an x-ray's bringing into view the issue behind the issues (736). On the surface were questions about the divinity of the Son raised by the Christian message; underneath was the formation of the notion of dogma itself, wrought by the truth-claims of the word of God. What none of the ancient writers envisioned or intended, the conflict of interpretations nevertheless brought about: the emergence of a dogmatic theological context to secure the meaning of the word of God as true. Against those who would maintain that the criterion of theology is praxis rather than truth, or that Christianity is a mission only and not a message, or that doctrines are but models or symbols or practical prescriptions, Lonergan insists upon the ineluctable realism of the word of God, and therefore upon the dogmatic character of Christian faith.

The second section of *Doctrines* consists of five dogmatic theses, in which Lonergan assembles the scriptural, patristic, magisterial, and Scholastic authorities regarding (1) the consubstantial divinity of the Son and (2) of the Spirit, (3) the distinction of the persons by relations of origin, (4) the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, and, finally, (5) the impossibility of understanding the mystery in this life, except analogically. Only one who understands the science can judiciously relate its history, and one of Lonergan's distinctive contributions here is how he situates the materials within the developmental course of theology. Thus, for instance, he relates the *filioque* problem to the different trajectories of Greek and Latin Trinitarian theology. The Greek Fathers affirmed that the persons are distinct through relations of origin; they affirmed that the Spirit is from the Father mediately through the Son; but the emergence of Christological controversies (among other reasons) preempted the further conclusion, drawn by Augustine, that there is a relation of origin distinguishing the Spirit from the Son.

Doctrines concludes with the most surprising, compelling, and, frankly, the loveliest apologia for the psychological analogy I have ever read. Lonergan dispatches the sturdy canard that it has little foundation in Scripture and has forgotten the economy. Apparently written after the systematic part, this scholion suggests tantalizing and unexploited possibilities for deepening the analogy still further, which anticipate some of Lonergan's later indications about the development of his thinking.

Systematics opens with a lucid and thorough discussion of the goal and method of systematic theology, in relation to the dogmatic and positive parts of

theology. The dogmatic or analytic way begins from the first-for-us, the missions of Word and Spirit attested in Scripture, and moves toward the first-in-itself, the divine persons in relation to one another. The synthetic or systematic way begins from the mystery of the divine persons in relation to one another, discovers a fruitful analogical principle of understanding, and proceeds to develop its concepts so as to return, with enriched understanding, to what is first-for-us. The goal of systematic theology, then, is that limited, analogical, but highly fruitful understanding of the mysteries sought by Thomas Aquinas and praised by Vatican I. If in 1964 Lonergan's burden was to vindicate theological understanding as a good distinct from dogmatic certitude, today his clarity about the subalternation of systematic theology to the articles of faith may be equally important; for though theological understanding has yet to come into its kingdom, dogma is reduced to titular sovereignty. Lonergan distinguishes between the "antecedent truth" of the revealed mysteries, infallibly declared by the Church and held with the certitude of faith, and the "consequent truth" of a theological theory. Analogical reasons for the mysteries can never be proven, but are indirectly verified in the measure that they illuminate the problematic.

The subsequent chapters illustrate the fecundity of Lonergan's approach. Albert Patfoort's encomium on the 1959 edition of the systematic part is as true today as it was then:

> For this speculative work and its pedagogical communication, Fr. Lonergan has a very vivid and extremely lucid sense, and he realizes his design in a powerfully structured work, following a method profoundly rethought and truly re-created. . . . It is long since anyone has spoken of the grandeur and fruitfulness of speculative theology with such conviction and such precision; and it is long, we will add, since anyone has exemplified it so vigorously. (*Bulletin thomiste* 10/2, p. 532; my translation)

Lonergan brings to his task a Thomistic clarity about principles that, in the opinion of this reviewer, has been sorely lacking in much Trinitarian theology of recent decades. His speculative volume is far removed from the dilettantism that regards principles (such as divine simplicity) as up for grabs because it has not troubled to investigate them with any seriousness. By the same token, it is a salutary reminder that serious Trinitarian theory is difficult.

For Lonergan, it is not the generically metaphysical efficient cause, but rather intelligible emanation, which is to say, the intelligently, rationally, morally conscious *because,* that is the key to conceiving Trinitarian order in God. Although this is no synopsis or commentary, Lonergan builds upon Thomas Aquinas who, he argues, first exploited this key in a methodical and systematic manner. Lonergan appropriates and enlarges the theory of intelligible emanations in God over the course of five chapters, treating (chap. 2) the processions, (chap. 3) the relations, (chap. 4) the persons individually and (chap. 5) compared to each other, and (chap. 6) the missions. These chapters are subdivided into assertions and questions, the assertions developing the basic position, the

questions applying it to particular, knotty problems—some still current, others now Scholastic arcana. Because Lonergan's purpose is pedagogical as well as speculative, the questions and appendices also contain valuable, if all-too-brief, expositions of Thomas Aquinas. For instance, he contends that for Thomas Aquinas, "the beloved in the lover" is not a term produced by love (*pace* John of St. Thomas and, more recently, Gilles Emery), but rather is constituted by the act of love itself.

Lonergan conceives the divine processions in terms of the conscious dependence of true judgment on the grasp of evidence, and again of holy love on the grasp and rational affirmation of value. Within one, simple, infinite act of loving understanding, the true Word is uttered *because* of the grasp of ultimate value, and holy Love is spirated *because* value is grasped and affirmed. Lonergan calls spiritual processions of this kind "autonomous" because they proceed according to the immanent norms of rational and moral consciousness. For Lonergan, then, relation is a fundamental category not merely because it is the metaphysically "least" distinction, but because the divine relations are analogically conceived as a real, intrinsic order within divine consciousness. Thus the relation of the Father to the Son is the conscious ordering of understanding to the word, and conversely the relation of the Son to the Father is the conscious dependence of the judgment of value upon the grasp of sufficient evidence. Similarly, the relation of Father and Son to the Spirit is the conscious ordering of insight and judgment of value to the spiration of love, and conversely the relation of the Spirit to Father and Son is the conscious dependence of right and holy love upon the grasp and affirmation of value.

Theologians of the psychological analogy are sometimes reproached for implying a single divine subject. Lonergan maintains that, rightly understood, the psychological analogy implies not one but three psychological subjects, three conscious identities, in God. Each in his own way is a conscious subject of one and the same infinite, ordered act of rational and holy love; each has his identity in relation to the others. Lonergan concludes that the perichoresis or circumincession of the divine persons is not only "ontological" but also "psychological," because the three persons are conscious subjects of a shared, eternal subjectivity.

The concluding chapter returns to the first-for-us, the divine missions, whose purpose is to communicate to us a share in Trinitarian intersubjectivity. The Word assumes a created human nature to initiate a new order of personal relationships in history. Those brought into relation with Christ receive the Spirit, the love of God poured into our hearts, as the pledge of their inheritance and master of their living, not for themselves, but wholly for Christ. They, in turn, by knowing and loving the man Christ, know and love the unseen God. The human life of Christ—both as he historically lived it and as we enter into relation with him in prayer—mediates the immediate and unspeakable gift of the Spirit to the world of meaning and value. According to Lonergan, the relational order brought about through the divine missions not only imitates but confers a share in the relational order of the Trinity. The state of grace, he suggests, though

founded on habits and best known through acts, is constituted by a divine-human interpersonal situation.

The editors and translator are to be congratulated for producing editions of great value to specialists yet accessible to graduate- and divinity-level students. Parallel texts from earlier versions and other writings of Lonergan are incorporated as appendices. The editors supply numerous explanatory footnotes. Unfortunately, only the English translation is indexed. The translator fulfilled a difficult office with competence and care. The meaning of the Latin is rendered into generally straightforward English, if not quite an echo of Lonergan's style and idiom. But not even the seventy-two could please everyone; it is strange, for example, to read "conceptual relation" for the recurring *relatio rationis,* always, in Lonergan's English, "notional relation." Then, too, the biblical and theological timbre of Lonergan's Latin sometimes gets unaccountably muffled: new life in Christ "bears fruit" in the Latin (*fructum . . . affert*: cf. Mt 13:23 Vulg.), but, in English, "produces benefits" (*Systematics,* 496/7); and the student who reads that the hierarchy "regulates and develops" the Church is unlikely to hear the resonances of *ordinat atque perficit,* literally "orders and perfects," in the context of the ecclesial order brought about by the divine missions (*Systematics,* 496/7). Now and again, finally, there is more serious loss of meaning, as when terms Gregory Nazianzen (and Lonergan in citing him) applies to the procession of the Spirit (*proiector, proiectum*) are made to refer to the Son (*Doctrines,* 562/3; cf. ed. Gallay, *Sources Chretiennes,* vol. 150, p. 180).

Such inevitable quibbles should certainly not, however, be allowed to detract from the importance of this work or the value of these editions. *The Triune God* is a substantive contribution to Trinitarian theology and, in its way, a serious critique of its current state. Now that this work is no longer cocooned in brittle pages and a forgotten tongue, it would be a sad commentary if it failed at last to gain a hearing. Thomists, at least, may be delighted at so robust an entry on behalf of their tradition; and the seemingly innumerable critics of that tradition may themselves appreciate a fresh taste. For those who wish to teach or to study theology according to the principles, method, and doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, here is a worthy textbook. Those, finally, who have been intrigued or puzzled by Lonergan's writings on method in theology, or who have wondered what the philosophy developed in *Insight* might portend for theology, now have a splendid illustration of his practice.

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The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's "De Nominum Analogia." By JOSHUA P. HOCHSCHILD. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010. Pp. 280. $35.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-268-03091-9.

Hochschild's book is a reappraisal and even defense of Thomas de Vio Cajetan's *De nominum analogia* (1498), which provided a Thomistic account of analogous names that persisted through the early part of the twentieth century. In the last fifty years it has been fashionable to dismiss Cajetan's work in general, and especially his understanding of analogous naming. Some older Thomists, such as Garrigou-Lagrange, Anderson, and Simon, found Cajetan's basic schema to be philosophically fruitful. But most scholars now think that Cajetan's work fails both as an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas and as a logical or metaphysical account. Hochschild's book is a response to the latter view.

The most damaging criticism of Cajetan has been over his threefold division of analogy into inequality, attribution, and proportion. It is helpful briefly to consider this division, which has roots in an earlier Thomistic tradition. An instance of the analogy of inequality occurs when a word is used univocally even though there is an ordered inequality among what is signified. For example, there are many kinds of bodies, including those of plants and animals. The statements "A tulip is a body" and "A horse is a body" are verified by forms which are hierarchically ordered. Nevertheless, the semantic properties of the word "body" remain the same. From a logician's perspective, the word is univocal rather than equivocal. In contrast, when a word is predicated according to the analogy of attribution, the names signify different relationships to the same nature (*ratio*). For instance, the word "healthy" has different significations in the statements "medicine is healthy" and "urine is healthy". In the first case, medicine is a cause of health, whereas in the second it is a sign of health. In these instances, although "healthy" is not univocal, its different uses are not related by mere chance but by reference to some one and the same *ratio*. According to Cajetan, such names are predicated by extrinsic attribution.

The analogy of proportionality resembles attribution in that it is not univocal, but it is distinct because there is no common *ratio* to which the analogous terms are related. For example, fields and faces both smile. But there is no one meaning common to the smiling of fields and faces. In contrast with this purely metaphorical or improper proportionality is the analogy of proper proportionality, which Cajetan argues is the most proper kind of analogy and the one that is used in philosophical argument. Consider the statements "the intellect sees" and "the eye sees." Understanding is related to the intellect as seeing is to the body. In this context, the term "sees" calls to mind that on which these relations are based. The *ratio* of "to see" is present in both in such a way that it is not simply metaphorical. The word is predicated by intrinsic attribution.

Both Cajetan's contemporaries and such twentieth-century Thomists as Ramirez saw that this threefold schema does not accurately and exhaustively represent Thomas Aquinas's teaching on analogy. McInerny thinks that Cajetan's misrepresentation of Thomas on this point vitiated Cajetan's whole approach.

Hochschild does not address this historical criticism directly, but he argues that it misses the historical context in which Cajetan was trying to address the Scotistic criticism that analogous terms have insufficient unity to serve as middle terms in a syllogism. Hochschild convincingly argues that Cajetan's description of the analogy of proportionality is a good and perhaps successful attempt to show how analogous terms can be used in metaphysical demonstration. He leaves aside the question of whether it is faithful to Thomas.

In the course of his discussion, Hochschild at least mentions most of the varied attacks on Cajetan's view. His responses to three show that they are a straightforward misreading of Cajetan's text. First, McInerny and others criticize Cajetan for saying that analogy applies properly only to proper proportionality and only "abusively" to the other kinds. Hochschild notes that in this passage Cajetan is merely talking about the etymological source of the word; the point carries no great philosophical weight. Thomas himself makes the etymological point in the *Sententia Libri Ethicorum*, lib. I, lect. 7. In addition, the Latin word "*abusio*" does not necessarily have a negative connotation but simply indicates less proper uses of a word. Second, some scholars (McInerny, Deely) criticize Cajetan for thinking that a study of analogous naming belongs to metaphysics rather than logic, whereas other scholars (Gilson, Burrell) criticize him for thinking that it belongs to logic rather than metaphysics. Hochschild shows that although there are metaphysical implications of analogy, Cajetan follows a long-standing tradition in thinking that a discussion of analogous naming belongs to logic, or what we might now call "semantics."

A third and more serious criticism is that, according to Thomas and common usage, the analogy of attribution covers some names which are predicated by intrinsic denomination. For instance, substances can be called "being" by relation to the "being" of substance, and yet being inheres in them both. Hochschild notes that Cajetan accounts for such "mixed" cases by explaining how some words can be analogous both by attribution and proportionality. Insofar as "being" is predicated of an accident because of a relation to a substance's being, the accident's "being" can be denominated extrinsically by analogy of attribution. The metaphysical inherence is compatible with a merely semantic extrinsic attribution. On the other hand, since a substance is related to its being in proportionally the same way that an accident is related to its own being, an accident's "being" can be denominated intrinsically by analogy of proportionality. An accident has its own intrinsic being. How is this predication of "being" compatible with Cajetan's rule that secondary analogates are always denominated extrinsically by analogy of attribution? Cajetan states that this rule must be interpreted "formally" rather than "materially," since the same analogous term can signify a secondary analogate by both analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality.

Although Hochschild responds to Cajetan's critics, his primary aim is to shift the focus towards how Cajetan responds to one of Scotus's criticisms of the use of analogous naming in metaphysics and theology, namely, that only univocal terms can function in syllogisms. Hochschild describes this shift perhaps

overenthusiastically as a Kuhnian paradigm shift. The first half of the book, chapters 1-4, is an argument for the view that Cajetan's theory should be seen as an arguably defensible response to Scotus's belief that analogous terms cannot be used in valid syllogisms. The second half of the book, chapters 5-9, is an analysis of *De nominum analogia*.

The first two chapters attempt to put Cajetan in historical context. Although Scotus was probably more concerned with Henry of Ghent's account of analogy than that of Thomas, Thomists were from the beginning concerned about Scotus's claim that only univocal terms avoid the fallacy of equivocation. Consider the following example from Cajetan: "Every perfection simply speaking is in God; wisdom is a perfection simply speaking; wisdom is in God." According to Scotus, the conclusion follows only if "wisdom" is univocally used in the minor premise and in the conclusion. Otherwise, the syllogism is invalid on account of the fallacy of equivocation.

Hochschild explains the problem in the context of the "semantic triangle," according to which the name signifies a thing by means of a concept. If a name is used univocally, there is only one concept. If a name is used equivocally, then the same word signifies different things through more than one concept. In analogous naming, there seems to be more than one concept. If there is more than one concept, then it is unclear how the same word can be used without equivocation in a syllogism.

In chapter 3, Hochschild considers two major objections to Cajetan's semantic assumptions. First, Ashworth and Ross criticize Cajetan's traditional assumptions that the meanings of propositions depend on those of terms, and that the meaning of terms is explained by the semantic triangle. It seems to me that Hochschild sketches an adequate response to these criticisms, although there is much more to be said. Second, Gilson, Burrell, and other scholars criticize Cajetan's focus on the concept rather than on judgments, which they argue is Scotistic. Hochschild convincingly refutes their claim by showing the central role that concepts play in medieval semantics. In chapter 4, Hochschild argues that alternative Thomistic accounts of analogous names are insufficient. His criticisms of Cajetan's predecessors and contemporaries are not strong. His criticisms of McInerny seem restrained in that he does not show the full idiosyncrasy and weakness of McInerny's account of how analogous naming requires diverse *modi significandi*.

Chapters 5-7 follow the organizational structure of Cajetan's work. Chapter 5 is on the general semantic principles that Cajetan presupposes. If, as he suggests, these principles are in large part also held by Thomas, this chapter does not shed light on Cajetan's particular contributions (210 n. 24). In chapter 6, Hochschild shows why Cajetan thinks that the analogies of inequality and attribution insufficiently account for analogous naming in metaphysics and language about God. In chapter 7, Hochschild focuses on the proportional unity that supports Cajetan's semantic theory of how the analogous concept is one, and he successfully replies to some standard objections against the use of proportional unity in semantic theory. Hochschild does not develop the point that Cajetan's

semantics entails or requires a metaphysical understanding of proportional unity—which may be relevant to McInerny's claim that according to Cajetan analogy belongs to metaphysics rather than logic.

In chapters 8 and 9, Hochschild shows how proportional unity makes it possible for us to abstract imperfect concepts which signify that which is proportionately one. The analogous concept, since it is imperfect, can apply to diverse *rationes*. Since there is a proportional unity among the diverse *rationes,* the *ratio* is signified either by one imperfect concept or by one of the many diverse concepts which have a proportional sameness. Scotus does not recognize that proportional unity makes it possible for there to be a proportional likeness of the concepts, which in turn makes possible the use of such concepts in syllogistic reasoning. Hochschild writes, "In short, Scotus's semantic objections ignored the metaphysical classification of proportional unity, and failed to recognize that the kind of unity that is the foundation of contradiction, like that which founds superiority and comparison, includes this proportional unity" (170). Nevertheless, although this response to the Scotistic criticism is plausible, Hochschild himself shows that there are some difficulties in interpreting Cajetan's understanding of the concept's unity and the way in which such a concept signifies.

Hochschild convincingly argues that, considered as a philosophical response to a Scotistic criticism, Cajetan's discussion of analogous naming is sophisticated and initially plausible. In general, the book is well written, enjoyable to read, and includes many rich discussions which cannot all be mentioned in a short book review. However, Hochschild's case for a "paradigm shift" as a hermeneutic tool for reading Cajetan may be implausible. First, many common objections to Cajetan are plainly false from almost any perspective. Second, Cajetan, at the beginning of his treatise, claims to be presenting a doctrine which is misunderstood only among his contemporaries. There is no indication that he wishes to depart from Thomas's view. Moreover, in his examination of Cajetan's historical context, Hochschild does not discuss at any length Thomists who were Cajetan's predecessors and contemporaries, and so it is hard for the reader to judge Cajetan's relationship to the Thomistic tradition and controversies, other than those concerning the fallacy of equivocation. Nevertheless, as Hochschild himself notes, his book does not provide the last word on either the interpretation or defense of Cajetan. It is an accomplishment just to remove some unfounded scholarly bias and to attempt a sympathetic reading that is attentive to historical context.

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Intellectual Appetite: A Theological Grammar. By PAUL GRIFFITHS. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009. Pp. 600. $24.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8132-1686-7.

In the Thomist lexicon, "intellectual appetite" denotes the inclination toward good as apprehended by intellect; it is another name for *voluntas* or *appetitus rationalis*. Departing from Thomistic usage, Paul Griffiths takes "intellectual appetite" as a name for the desire to know. How should this desire be understood and formed? Griffiths aspires to set forth a "theological grammar" for asking and answering this question. The grammar begins with a basic contrast between two conceptions of the desire to know. One is *studiositas,* the well-formed appetite that aims to intensify our participation in the divine source of knowledge, taking "gift" as the mark of all that can be known. The other is its "deformed kissing cousin," traditionally named *curiositas* (20). *Curiositas* too seeks knowledge, but interprets the field of knowledge as a series of ever-new objects to be conquered, possessed, and sequestered by the knower.

Intellectual Appetite is divided into three main parts. The first specifies "the grammar of the world," a task that requires a preliminary clarification of the meaning of "world" (chap. 3) along with a construal of the world in terms of damage (chap. 4), gift (chap. 5), and participation (chap. 6). The second part coincides with the book's central and longest chapter on appetite (chap. 7). The third part unfolds a "series of contrasts between curiosity and studiousness" (28), beginning in wonder (chap. 8), moving through owning, kidnapping, spectacle, novelty and loquacity (chaps. 9-13), and ending in gratitude (chap. 14).

The first part begins on a Wittgensteinian note. The world is everything that is the case, all that is sensed and unsensed, thought and unthought. Though the world is "given to us without our request or consent" (25), it does not become a world that we can live in until we sort and catalog what is given. We construe the world; we do not construct it. Many, perhaps "infinitely many" world-construals are possible, but "only a few are of deep and lasting importance for the history of human thought"—the ones that "we would now (not very usefully) call 'religious': Buddhist, Christian, Islamic, Confucian, and so on" (28). Griffiths acknowledges the possibility of secular world-construals. He proceeds to dismiss them as "the more-or-less malformed and corrupted bastard offspring of their religious parents" (ibid.). He seems to take as a *fait accompli* John Milbank's deconstruction of a purely "secular reason" unmarked by theological origins. Any world-construal is either explicit theology, disguised theology, or bastard theology.

What does it mean to construe the world in terms of damage, gift, and participation? Griffiths answers this question by drawing upon the tradition's metaphysics of light: "the world, the array of particulars with which we are faced whether we like it or not, is bathed in light" (30). Not everything in a fallen world is radiant; the world is "light shot through with darkness" (42). Since light comes in varying intensities, and admits of a distinction between one source and multiple streams, gradation belongs to the Christian construal of the world. The

most fundamental distinction within the hierarchy of being is between *intelligibilia* and *sensibilia*. That *sensibilia* can change, being vulnerable to corruption and decay, places them lower in the hierarchy of being than *intelligibilia*. One can accept this claim, and yet wonder why Griffiths categorizes some things as *sensibilia*. "When you read a sonnet, hear a harmony, stroke silk, smell sassafras, or taste truffles you are engaging with sensibilia, all of which are extended in space and through time and are therefore themselves physical and changing" (34). It is not controversial to hold that the words of a sonnet, taken as combinations of letters printed on a page, are *sensibilia*. But is the sonnet itself a sensible thing? It is, if we identify the sonnet with the words on the page, or the noises we make when we read the words aloud. This identification, however, collapses the intelligible thing, the sonnet proper, into its visible and audible signs. To distinguish adequately between those who are able to read a sonnet aloud, and those who can not only make its noises but actively understand and participate in it, we should regard the sensible letters and noises as the material occasion for the intelligent reader's reconstruction of the intelligible content of the sonnet. (Here I am evoking, while severely abbreviating, R. G. Collingwood's argument in the *Principles of Art*.) That the *sensibilia/intelligibilia* distinction itself is fundamental to any Christian theological grammar, as Griffiths claims, I see no reason to deny. But his discussion of the distinction would benefit from additional clarity regarding its application.

The chapters on gift and participation are among the most brilliant in *Intellectual Appetite*. Griffiths draws a sharp distinction between an "economy of gift" and "economy of obligation," arguing that gift by its nature is non-obliging. To say that the best response to divine gift is one of gratitude, evidenced by a desire to participate more fully in what has been given, is importantly different from saying that because God has done things for us we are thereby obliged to do (or not to do) certain things for him. This latter view models the human relation to God on the subset of relations between human beings that are governed by exchange and obligation. It idolatrously conceives God as a party to a contract, or a bargainer in relation to whom we have to "keep our end of the bargain." Griffiths does not claim that all notions of obligation should be thrown out. He does reject (rightly, I think) the view that "moral obligation" belongs to the fundamental grammar of a Christian construal of the world. Whatever is done from love, as thankful response to divine gift, occurs beyond good and evil—at least when good and evil are understood in terms of obligation.

In the chapter on participation, Griffiths drives a stake through the heart of much contemporary "philosophy of religion." He does so in two main ways. First, he exposes the presupposition common to recent efforts to safeguard the possibility of free human action by understanding it as radically independent of divine causality. The presupposition is that if God acts, then the action of human beings is diminished or displaced. This "competitive" scenario, Griffiths argues, is possible only when God is regarded as one being among others. To say this is to defy the grammar of participation, whose "first syntactical principle" is that "God is not one being in the world over against other beings and is not one agent

in the world over against other agents and is not one good in the world over against other goods." From such denials, "it follows that God's being, agency, and goodness do not compete with the being, agency and goodness of others" (76). (Here one sees the salutary influence of David Burrell, whom Griffiths thanks in the concluding acknowledgments.) Second, he shows that the same idolatrous presupposition underlies recent efforts to dispense with the metaphysics of participation in favor of the "machinery of existential qualification and the modalities of necessity and possibility" (80). Such efforts, as Griffiths observes, suppose themselves capable of adequately distinguishing God from other particular beings by listing his properties and specifying his mode of existence as necessary rather than contingent. But any univocal account of being, "applicable identically and indiscriminately to God and creatures," suggests that "your existence and mine, together with that of all creatures and God, their creator, is of the same sort: we each belong to a kind and are individuated from other members of that kind by a list of our unique properties" (82). While identifying God's unique attributes may succeed in making God the only member of a genus, it does nothing to mark his radical distinction from creatures. Zeus and Superman, as Griffith observes, can easily be described as being the only members of their kind. Those who insist that what distinguishes God from creatures is that the former has unique particular properties will say (as he notes) that Superman is vulnerable to kryptonite, while YHWH is not; that YHWH became incarnate as Jesus Christ, while Superman did not; that Superman loved Lois Lane, while YHWH chose the people of Israel. Griffiths comments:

> All this is both blasphemous and ridiculous, but it is what you will be drawn to if you think about God's existence in terms of existential quantification. Such thinking is unlikely to be about God. It will be about William Blake's Old Nobodaddy, about a being among beings in the world. It will be, in short, idolatrous rather than theological. (83)

The temptation is not merely academic. Such thinking, he adds, is "also, probably, what most Christians (and, I suppose, most Jews and Muslims) engage in when they think about God. It is a deep and seductive temptation" (ibid.). No small part of Griffith's aim in setting forth a theological grammar is to equip us with the means to identify and resist the temptation, diagnosed memorably by Jean-Luc Marion in *God without Being* as "conceptual idolatry."

In the second part of his book, Griffiths seeks to specify the universal grammar of appetite. Appetite is not identical to wanting; it is a certain kind of wanting. It is "wanting to make a particular absence present, and wanting to do so under a particular description" (94). Griffiths's divergence from the Thomist grammar of appetite is striking. For Aquinas, *appetitus* names the basic capacity of a being to be attracted to what is (or is perceived as) suitable to it, along with its repugnance to what is (or is perceived as) unsuitable. More simply: the basic

form of appetite is attraction to good, and repulsion from evil. The grammar of love, the first act of appetite and the root of all the others, does not itself advert to the distinction between presence or absence. By contrast, other appetitive acts do involve this distinction, since they "regard good under some special condition, as joy and delight regard good present and possessed, whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good in general, whether possessed or not possessed" (*STh* I, q. 20, a. 1). What Griffiths takes to be the universal grammar of appetite—"wanting to make a particular absence present"—is, from a Thomist perspective, not the grammar of appetite in its full amplitude. It is the grammar of desire, which Aquinas understands as a particular act of appetite. An advantage of Aquinas's grammar is its power both to display the specific differences among diverse acts of appetite and to exhibit what unifies them (their rootedness in love of the good). Within sensitive appetite, these acts are the passions; within intellectual appetite, in Aquinas's sense of the term, they are affections of the will.

Another striking difference between Griffiths's grammar and Aquinas's is Griffiths's claim that negative appetites (e.g., hatred or loathing) are well described as instances of wanting to make an absence present. "The absence whose presence is sought by those in the grip of loathing or boredom is best characterized negatively: it is, for example, the end of the committee meeting, and, therefore, the blissful beginning of its absence" (94-95). According to Griffiths's proposed grammar, to loathe committee meetings, a negative desire, is translatable into a positive desire to see the meeting end. But it seems easy to imagine cases where this translation program does not succeed. I may loathe the committee meeting, and yet fall short of actively desiring its end because I suspect that something even worse is to come. What seems correct in Griffiths's formula would be described by Aquinas as the causal dependence of negative repulsion on positive attraction. I loathe committee meetings because they interfere with my attainment of any number of contrary goods. But my loathing, while causally dependent on attraction to a contrary good, cannot be identified with that attraction, or be redescribed as an instance of that attraction. Repugnance from evil is distinct, ontologically and phenomenologically, from attraction to good, though the former would not exist and is not intelligible apart from the latter.

In attending to the contrast between Griffiths's grammar and the Thomist account, I do not mean to insinuate the unambiguous superiority of the latter. On the contrary, Griffiths's formula is quite useful. It valuably reminds us that negative loathings and hatreds should never be taken as ultimate. They are foreground estimates, depending as they do on positive attractions lurking in the background, whether or not we are conscious of them. What actually drives human action is often opaque, not easily discernible by either introspection or observed behavior. "Your repeated visits to the local coffee shop may be taken to show that you have an appetite for coffee, but what you really have an appetite for is the company of a particular person who serves the coffee in that shop" (103). Similarly, a person can be clinically depressed without knowing it. Griffiths valuably reminds us that in many domains, large and small, we are not

knowers of ourselves; those who claim exceptional self-awareness are generally not to be trusted. The phenomenogical insight displayed by this part of *Intellectual Appetite* is impressive and should not be understated. Nor should one overlook the possibility that Griffiths's proposed grammar for appetite possesses an elegance and simplicity that Aquinas's more complex scheme may not have. But its tendency to identify repugnance with attraction, along with its apparent collapsing of appetite into desire, suggests that its elegance and simplicity come at a price.

After his discussion of appetite's universal grammar, Griffiths moves to consider what is distinctive about the Christian construal of appetite. "The object of every appetite is the presence of some now-absent creature, and thereby the increase of intimacy with that creature" (116). This may initially strike some readers as a surprising claim. Would not a Christian construal hold that God is the ultimate object of appetite? But if one takes Griffiths's formula strictly, it follows that God cannot be its object, since God is not an object that is sometimes absent and sometimes present—or any kind of object at all. The claim that our appetite is for the intimate presence of a beloved creature implies that our appetite is inexhaustible. No intimacy with the beloved, however deep it goes, will reach the bottom of the beloved's being, since that being is nothing other than inexhaustible divine gift. To say this another way, her being is finite being—conceived not as fixed or limited quantity, but the sort of finite being that (as Vico says) is *nosse, velle, posse finitum, quod tendit ad infinitum*. The metaphysical claim that creatures are inexhaustible participations in God has a stark implication for appetite: "At the very deepest level of her being, your beloved escapes your gesture of intimacy, and that this is so is no contingent fact about either you or her" (118). What is evidently true of Aeneas in his embrace of Anchises turns out to be true of all of us. Yet this is not tragic, if we can accept that our desire for intimacy will inevitably outstrip what we are able to attain. Such acceptance can be difficult, because the human attempt to love creatures as God loves them, with exhaustive intimacy, is a "characteristic deformation" of the "vestige or trace of the divine in us, which we have in virtue of being human" (119). One remedy against this deformation is to bear in mind Griffiths's insight that the extent to which you seek to exhaust your fellow creatures by being intimate with them "is the extent to which you fail to become intimate with them" (118). Nietzsche observes that while human eros all too often assumes the form of a desire to have "unconditional and sole possession" of the other, there remains the possibility of a different kind of love, whose proper name is friendship (*Gay Science*, aphorism 14).

The third part of *Intellectual Appetite* elaborates a series of contrasts between *studiositas* and *curiositas*. Here I will pass over the chapters whose formulations strike me as compelling, noting instead a reservation about chapter 10's treatment of plagiarism. Plagiarism has a bad name among both the curious and the studious, Griffiths claims, but for different reasons. The curious oppose the plagiarist, because they fear that he will successfully accomplish his malign goal of stealing the words that properly belong to another, deceptively claiming them

as his own. The studious, by contrast, laugh at the very idea of plagiarism: there is no such thing as word-theft, because words are not the sort of thing that can be owned as private property, and therefore cannot be "stolen" in any significant sense. "For them, it is the very idea of plagiarism that needs criticism, not its practice" (164). Griffiths does allow that the studious have reasons for criticizing "the unacknowledged taking and public use of word-ensembles composed by others" (185). If the goal of a teacher is to instruct students in the art of literary composition, he says, the student who merely copies others will not learn the art very well, just as a person who sends others to practice in his stead will not learn how to play football very well. But the power of this objection is limited, Griffiths claims, since growth in an art typically requires imitation of exemplary models. For such imitation, "the distinction between your words and those of others is not very important; what is important is the expression of beauty and truth, not the question of who first uttered or wrote the words that do the expressing" (ibid.).

Here I think Griffiths obscures a vital point. What is important is not only the expression of beauty and truth. No less important, and possibly more important, is the understanding and appropriation of truth, as manifested in its expression. Any university student can express beauty and truth by copying a passage from Augustine or Pascal. But if they are to show that they are thinking for themselves what Augustine or Pascal thought, and are implicitly asking them to think, they must be able to put the matter into words that occur to them more or less spontaneously. The student who creates the appearance of having done this, while actually cutting and pasting from a Web site, lyingly frustrates the teacher's aim of putting her into a position where she can think for herself what Augustine and Pascal thought. In this context, "thinking for oneself" does not mean "thinking new or original thoughts." It means taking what has been thought by another and making it one's own. Montaigne's advice is to the point: "Let him be made to show what he has just learned in a hundred aspects, and apply it to as many different subjects, to see if he has properly grasped it and made it his own" (*Essais* 1.26). This sense of "making one's own" should not be confused with the conception of intellectual ownership that Griffiths repudiates. On the contrary, such a notion of appropriation goes well with the view that "truth and reason are common to everyone, and no more belong to the man who first spoke them than to the man who says them later. It is no more *secundum Platonem* than *secundum me*" (*Essais* 1.26). Appropriation in this sense has nothing to do with ownership as possession of private property. It signifies the difference between understanding something and merely hearing about it.

Griffiths convincingly argues that what makes plagiarism an evil is not its theft-like character. Less persuasive is his handling of what does make it a serious evil, worthy of the sharpest criticism in the context of the student-teacher relationship. In favor of Griffiths's wider argument, one can agree that not every context is relevantly similar to the academic exercise. When it comes to the production of art, individualistic theories of authorship deserve rejection, not only because they are intrinsically questionable, but also because belief in them

tends to produce bad art. "If an artist may say nothing except what he has invented by his sole efforts, it stands to reason he will be poor in ideas. If he could take what he wants wherever he could find it, as Euripides and Dante and Michelangelo and Shakespeare and Bach were free, his larder would always be full, and his cookery might be worth tasting" (Collingwood, *Principles of Art,* 325). I take it that Griffiths would agree, even as he would give the point a more theological expression.

A supreme virtue of *Intellectual Appetite* is that its author has borrowed liberally from the entire tradition. The book bristles with insights. Its formulations bear serious consideration. Griffiths has freely given us a valuable contribution to theological grammar, one that we should acknowledge with gratitude and from which we can learn much. This is true, even if (on his own premises) it would not be correct to say that we stand in his debt.

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The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy. By A. EDWARD SIECIENSKI. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 368. $49.95 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-19-537204-5.

Edward Siecienski has written a valuable history of the doctrinal controversy of the *filioque,* the Western addition to the Creed of Constantinople I (381) meaning that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *and the Son*. Siecienski says that his book "is, first and foremost, a theological work" (vii). He gives not merely a review of the evidence from one of the longest and most complicated disputes in Christian history, but an explicit theological interpretation that will illuminate and challenge a spectrum of interested readers.

After the introduction, ten chapters trace the history from the New Testament witness concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit to the study of the *filioque* in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This last chapter ends with an examination of the important 2003 Agreed Statement of the North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation. In succinct treatments of individual authors and events, Siecienski elucidates a great number of competing theologies concerning the Holy Spirit's procession. His perspective through this historical narrative features Maximus the Confessor's *Letter to Marinus,* which offers what Siecienski calls "a theologically sound hermeneutic capable of bringing together the East and West on the issue of the procession" (215). Because so much of the book hinges on the argument from Maximus in his letter, it is worthwhile to consider at some length Siecienski's study of that seventh-century monk whose

life bridged East and West and whose teaching developed orthodox theology through the Monothelite controversy.

Relying upon the pioneering scholarship of Polycarp Sherwood, Siecienski dates the *Letter to Marinus* to 645 or 646 as an authentic work by Maximus. This means that Maximus records the earliest Greek animadversion against the Western use of the *filioque,* and no further objection is known from the East until the controversies during the time of Photius of Constantinople (d. 895). Maximus wrote this letter to the priest Marinus so as to defend the living Bishop of Rome, Pope Theodore, an ardent opponent of the Monothelites, from Constantinople's attack on two doctrinal points, one concerning the Incarnation and the other concerning the theology of the Holy Spirit's procession. Siecienski believes that the *Letter to Marinus* clearly explicates not only the thought of Maximus and of Rome in the seventh century, but also, as he boldly claims, "the patristic mind on the procession of the Holy Spirit" (11; cf. 80).

Siecienski writes: "Maximus began the *Letter* by addressing the accusations made against Pope Theodore's confession that 'The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son' (ἐκπορεύεσθαι κἀκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον), starting with the charge that the teaching was novel: 'In the first place they [the Romans] produced the unanimous evidence of the Roman Fathers, and also of Cyril of Alexandria, from the study he made of the gospel of St. John" (80). Maximus thus wants to show that Pope Theodore's teaching has a certain widespread acceptance in the West, and is not without support in the East. Maximus then makes a distinction between procession and progression, which Siecienski argues continues the teaching of Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria on the Son's "possessing some mediatory role in the Spirit's eternal progression (προϊέναι), even if they had been clear that this did not involve the Spirit's unique ἐκπορεύεσθαι (procession) from the Father, nor in any way compromised the Father's role as μία αἰτία within the godhead" (80). Siecienski gives this translation from Maximus concerning the authorities for Rome's teaching: "From this [the writings of the fathers] they showed that they themselves do not make the Son the cause of the Spirit for they know that the Father is the one cause of the Son and the Spirit, the one by begetting and the other by procession, but they show the progression through him and thus the unity of the essence" (80-81). Maximus thus assures his reader that Rome upholds the monarchy of the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, while expressing the Holy Spirit's progression through the Son. Symptomatic of an ongoing problem in discussions between East and West, one of the difficulties for Maximus in defending Pope Theodore's teaching is the difference of language between Latins and Greeks. "At your request," Maximus writes Marinus, "I asked the Romans to translate what is unique to them in order to avoid such obscurities. But since the practice of writing and sending letters has already been observed, I do not know if they will comply. Especially, they might not be able to express their thought with the same exactness in another language as they might in their mother tongue, just as we could not do" (83). Siecienski interprets Maximus to mean that the Greek is a poor translation of Pope Theodore's Latin and is capable of misinterpretation.

In upholding this *Letter to Marinus* as the model for proper theological reflection, Siecienski is indebted to Jean-Miguel Garrigues. Siecienski offers some criticism against Garrigues, such as in the strict distinction between ἐκπορεύεσθαι and προϊέναι, which Siecienski knows "cannot be applied universally, since there was still a lack of linguistic rigidity in the Greek fathers that allowed them at times to use ἐκπορεύεσθαι and προϊέναι synonymously" (82). Yet, Siecienski seems to follow suit when he writes of Maximus: "Perhaps his greatest contribution to the discussion was in distinguishing between the Spirit's ἐκπορεύεσθαι from the Father and his προϊέναι through the Son, explicating a theological principle that he believed to have been part of the *consensus patrum,* and which he himself held to be true" (85). But Siecienski knows that Maximus does not consistently teach the precision of what is supposedly the Confessor's "greatest contribution." Siecienski earlier noted that Maximus in his *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* 63 "spoke of the Spirit's coming forth (ἐκπορεύμενον) from the Father through the Son" (83; cf. 77-88 and see also *Quaestiones et dubia* I. 34). Moreover, Siecienski also later analyzes Bessarion's use of *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* 63 at the Council of Ferrara-Florence, where the Eastern prelate, who would remain in union with Rome after the council, finds that Maximus means that the Holy Spirit's procession, not merely progression, occurs through the Son (163). Not all would want to give Siecienski's tidy distinction to the entirety of Maximus's work. In fact, Siecienski's methodology seems inconsistent in his confidence in his knowledge of Maximus's position and his lack of equal interest in understanding some others with a variety of expressions, such as Gregory the Great whose "true views on the procession are difficult, if not impossible to discern, especially given the variety of ways in which he described the mysterious nature of the Spirit's relationship to the Son" (70-71). In any case, Siecienski's casting of Maximus as a hero in the long drama over the *filioque* is worthy of consideration today.

One feature of this book that may be considered standard for a doctrinal history but raises particular interest is Siecienski's decision to study the New Testament witness through select modern scholarship in the first chapter. While he wants to show that the New Testament provides some basic patterns of Trinitarian thought, he makes this sweeping assessment about the biblical witness for or against the doctrine of the *filioque:* "In short, we must conclude that the proof-texts prove nothing" (30). Take the example of the verb from John 15:26, ἐκπορεύεσθαι, used in the Creed at Constantinople I. Siecienski finds that for most scholars "ἐκπορεύεσθαι simply describes the mission of the Spirit, who like Jesus comes forth from the Father and is sent by the Son into the world to continue his work of revealing God to humanity" (23). Thus, the verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι seems, in Siecienski's reading of biblical scholars, not meant to reveal anything about an eternal procession.

Indeed, the New Testament uses that verb in a variety of cases, such as in these examples provided by Siecienski: Mark's gospel uses forms of it to mean leaving a town (6:11) and coming out of a human being (7:15-23); Acts 19:12 speaks of

evil spirits leaving human beings; and the Book of Revelation uses it several times, such as in the double-edged sword coming forth from the Son of Man (1:16) and "in the New Jerusalem the water of life flows (ἐκπορεύμενον) from the throne of God through the middle of the city (22:1)" (22). With respect to this last example, Siecienski does not accurately convey Revelation 22:1. The verse speaks of the river of the water of life "proceeding from the throne of God *and the Lamb*." (In the third volume of his magisterial *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, Yves Congar understands the verse as an indication of the Holy Spirit, who is the living water [cf. John 7:37-39], coming from God and the Lamb in the economy's eternal fulfillment.) Moreover, granted that the Latin verb is rather general and is not an exact translation of the Greek term, it seems odd for Siecienski later, in discussing medieval theology, to chastise Thomas Aquinas by quoting Michael Torre: "while it may be true that the Latin '*procedere*' refers to originating 'in any way at all' this is just what ἐκπορεύω does not mean in Greek!" (130). Those who want to make much out of a precise definition of the Greek verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι should return to early nonbiblical and biblical sources to see its broader semantic field—a context so frequently overlooked—and to appreciate the late fourth-century admission of innovation by Gregory of Nazianzus (εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ καινοτομῆσαι) when he proposed to differentiate the Holy Spirit's way of coming forth from the Son's way of coming forth as ἐκπορευτῶς (*Or.* 39.12).

Finally, it can be said that Siecienski describes Western theology, at times, through categories that favor a Greek perspective. Why does he study "The Greek Fathers" in chapter 2 and "The Latin West" in chapter 3? In Siecienski's book, Tertullian provides the earliest noncanonical theology of the procession of the Holy Spirit. How would a historical narrative look different if Latin writers were featured before Greek? Would it matter if chapters 2 and 3 had been called "The Latin Fathers" and the "The Greek East"? Constantinople I (381) was obviously an ecumenical council held in the East, but the *filioque* seems to have been taught by the Bishop of Rome (Damasus I) just before that time. While acknowledging that the twenty-four *Anathematisms* (perhaps dating to 377 or 378) speak of the Holy Spirit "proceeding from the Father and the Son, always co-eternal with the Father and the Son," Siecienski dismisses the significance with a quick gesture: "Here the intention was simply to acknowledge the equality of the Spirit rather than to delve into the question of the procession proper" (57). Moreover, Siecienski makes some reference to the avoidance of the language of causality in certain Western ways of explaining Trinitarian processions, but he never explains the reason for that avoidance (see *STh* I, q. 33, a. 1). To take two examples of this bias in explaining Latin theology, Siecienski says "by the councils of Lyons and Florence the Latins also spoke of the Son as 'cause' of the Spirit" (42), and he paraphrases the teaching of Thomas Aquinas (that the Father and the Son are two spirating, but not two spirators) as proclaiming "not two principles or causes, but one" (129).

While this review has focused on some areas of concern, Siecienski's work is recommended as a thoughtful theological exposition of a history that too often

seethes with a rancor far from the Spirit whom Christians believe to be the Consoler.

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Aquinas: A New Introduction. By JOHN PETERSON. New York: University Press of America, 2008. Pp. 243. $33.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-7618-4104-3.

This is the latest monograph on Scholastic philosophy from the pen of John Peterson. This reviewer recalls reading Peterson's *Realism and Logical Atomism* a quarter-century ago, when fewer philosophers in the general tradition of analytic philosophy were giving Scholastic philosophy much credence. Certainly times have changed, and Peterson's latest book on Thomas Aquinas is a welcome addition to the growing list of studies utilizing what John Haldane often refers to as "Analytical Thomism." While Aquinas certainly is not reducible to a late twentieth-century analytic philosopher, the too quickly articulated criticisms put forward against reading Aquinas through some of the lenses of analytic philosophy are often misplaced and strident. Peterson does not refer to Haldane's category, but throughout this monograph he uses the tools and techniques of analytic philosophy and he often refers to philosophers in the analytic tradition.

This book is unequally divided into six chapters, covering the general topics of change, being, truth and knowledge, universals, free will and determinism, and moral theory. While Peterson's self-proclaimed subtitle for his study is "A New Introduction" to Thomas Aquinas, this reviewer demurs from that claim. What one finds in this study are the thoughts and reflections of a mature philosopher who has ruminated at some length, trying to sort out the meaning of difficult and deep philosophical propositions found in the many texts and commentaries of the man from Roccasecca. What is particularly significant at the present time in Aquinas scholarship is that Peterson takes Thomas to be the first- rate philosopher that he is. Recent studies have emphasized—too much, in the mind of this reviewer—the theological aspects and presuppositions in Aquinas's work. This book is a mild corrective to this trend.

Peterson regards Aquinas as an externalist in his philosophy of mind and a realist in his ontology; this analysis is in accord with the recent work of Eleonore Stump and in conflict with some of the more recent internalist accounts of Aquinas offered by Scott MacDonald and Alvin Plantinga, among others. Moreover, Peterson affirms realism as a foundation for Aquinas's moral theory—what this reviewer calls "ontological foundationalism"—which is in

opposition to the general trend of what is called the "New Natural Law" theory. Peterson's philosophical dialectic seems to be directed towards philosophers of the analytic tradition from the early and mid-twentieth century like Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, and Strawson. While this conversation is not to be neglected, it might be suggested that these discussions have been going on for some time. What is needed now is a worked-out realism based on the texts of Aquinas that would be part of an ongoing dialectic with postmodernist philosophers. In discussing Aquinas in *New Blackfriars* a decade ago, Catherine Pickstock raised the issue of how Aquinas might be approached now that philosophical realism is moribund. Given the prevalence of this position in contemporary philosophy, an alternative query might be posed: how does this dialectic go forward when philosophical realism is almost held hostage? That Peterson affirms this philosophical realism is not to be denied; that his dialectical audience is a bit dated is worrisome.

A reviewer must always be on guard lest he read a monograph through positions that the reviewer himself might have taken. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that this book disregards the recent cohort of philosophers who have been working in the vineyard of Aquinas studies. John Haldane, who is not mentioned, and Anthony Kenny, who is graced with a single reference, are two notable cases of philosophers who have generally worried about rendering Aquinas's thought in patterns consistent with analytic philosophy. Fergus Kerr's work too, which is illustrative of this direction, is excluded. John O'Callaghan's philosophy-of-mind studies along with the analytic work of Brian Davies offer significant rigor and analysis to these Thomist discussions, but they too are absent from this work.

There are many strengths in and insights to be gleaned from the set of analytical expositions and arguments Peterson spells out. His account of the role of "judgment" in Aquinas's philosophy of mind is one of the better discussions to be found in the recent literature. The exact relation of subject and predicate and how this so-called second act of the mind relates to simple apprehension is elucidated clearly. Falsity, it follows, is a privation of being in much the same structural sense that evil is a privation. The same holds for Peterson's comprehensive yet enlightening analysis of how free will—better known in the Aristotelian tradition as "free judgment" that is not reducible to libertarianism—works in Aquinas's action theory. The exact yet difficult set of relations holding between intellect and will are discussed with care and comprehension. Using classical categories in the free will/determinism discussion, Peterson suggests that, given that Aquinas argues that the will is determined in search of the good as an end, his action theory of free will is a form of soft determinism. One might question how foursquare this reduction is, but it does strike one as at least interesting philosophically. For Aquinas, deliberation centers on the choice of the "means" by which the action is undertaken. Peterson argues that as the principles are first in every speculative or theoretical undertaking, the end is the first in each practical matter. Peterson's analysis renders a clear pattern for the claim that Aquinas's action theory is not reducible to the voluntarism of Scotus and Ockham.

Furthermore, the analysis offered on Aquinas's account of the theory of universals is wonderfully clear and succinct; this chapter is a significant section of the book. Throughout Peterson's analysis, the importance of the essence/existence distinction is paramount. This reviewer has often argued that Aquinas's development of first and second intentions as rendered in his early *De Ente et Essentia* remains one of the more provocative accounts offering a solution to the *Parmenides* problem of participation adduced by the later Plato. Peterson knows his history of medieval philosophy and notes correctly that the proposition that "Nature is neither one nor many" is found in Avicenna. This proposition argues for a strict distinction between essence and universal and renders a universal a second intention. This first and second-intention distinction—also referred to by analytic logicians including Quine and Goodman as categorematic and syncategorematic terms—is a necessary condition for providing a way around the cluster of muddles provoked by Plato in the *Parmenides*. Sadly, this resolution of the one/many problem is overlooked continually in discussions of medieval logic and metaphysics. In addition, in his chapter on universals, Peterson provides a clear elucidation of the four principal divisions: Platonic realism, nominalism, conceptualism, and moderate realism. Within this latter division, Peterson distinguishes between Aristotle and Thomas. By means of the category of "ontological truth" which is reducible to the divine ideas in God's mind, Aquinas steps beyond the limits of the Aristotelian analysis.

Of particular interest to historians of medieval philosophy and Thomism in general is the set of analyses that Peterson provides offering insights regarding how Aquinas and Kant differ philosophically. Often there is much hand waving on this set of issues, but Peterson offers intellectually challenging arguments on how, when the chips are down, Kant and Aquinas do differ on important ontological and epistemological issues. Peterson suggests that Kant and Aquinas are closer in theory than most of the other major figures in Western philosophy; nonetheless, there are significant differences, resulting principally from what Henry Veatch once called "the Transcendental Turn" that Kant accepts with abandon.

There are several issues that Peterson does not treat as adequately as one might wish. The structure of the *intellectus agens* demands a more thorough analysis than Peterson offers in this book. The same holds for a general discussion of sensation and perception, where the significant insights from Aquinas's theory of intentionality are rushed over too quickly. This is unfortunate, because no less an Aquinas commentator than Anthony Kenny once wrote that Aquinas's theory of intentionality rooted in the possibility of an "intentional" sharing of forms was one of the genuine contributions to the philosophy of mind offered by Aquinas. A further development missing in this monograph is a serious discussion of the important role of inner sense in Aquinas's account of intentionality. Peterson does refer to "instinct" in animals—the *vis aestimativa*—as an account of "rudimentary judgment"; this reading as "judgment," however, does not always square with the texts on the internal senses. One might propose that the elusive inner-sense faculty of the *vis cogitativa* requires more analysis along with its role in the process of abstraction by means of the *intellectus agens*.

In some ways, this book could have profited from a closer and more demanding copy editor. The unequal lengths of the chapters do not help the reader to work through the book. In addition, every analytic philosopher must always be attuned to the warning expressed by Peter Geach some time ago: only appeal to formalization in a philosophical analysis when it is absolutely needed because of the set of problems under discussion. Peterson at time falls prey—especially in the Ethics chapter—to this alluring temptation that all analytic philosophers must resist.

In conclusion, this is a philosophically sophisticated monograph from which philosophers who have worried conceptually about thorny issues in Aquinas can find light. To profit from Peterson's analyses, one needs to bring to the table a thoughtful sense of the structure of the many issues that Aquinas brings front and center in philosophical discussions. This is not, for the most part, a book for beginners in Aquinas. The late Ralph McInerny's *A First Glance at Thomas Aquinas: A Handbook for Peeping Thomists* would be more appropriate for a novice inquirer. For a specific audience versed in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, this book is thoughtfully recommended; it is well worth plodding through the more than ample arguments that fill its pages.

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Death and the Afterlife: A Theological Introduction. By TERENCE NICHOLS. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos Press, 2010. Pp. 224. $22.99 (paper). ISBN: 978-1-58743-183-8.

Alexander Schmemann once said that while theology was traditionally defined as the study of God, modern theology had been reduced to the study of theology. In the years following the Second Vatican Council, the dominant school of American Catholic theology was characterized by two things: first, a penchant for discussions of theological method which highlight the "messy" (historical, cultural, partial, etc.) nature of theological truth claims, and, second, a turn from theory (which divides) to praxis (which unites). The first of these moves allowed theologians to downplay the normativity of Scripture and Tradition in order to allow for greater dialogue; the second allowed theology to become increasingly political, and usually political in a particular way.

This situation made for an especial dearth of books dealing with eschatology, except the purely realized sort. The appearance, then, of Terrence Nichols's new book, *Death and the Afterlife: A Theological Introduction,* is yet another hopeful sign that a theological corner has been turned. Nichols's book takes the classic

questions of eschatology—individual salvation, the state of the soul immediately after death, the nature of the final judgment, heaven, hell, purgatory, and the like—with the utmost seriousness. He writes, unapologetically I might add, as a believer. This is a theology that once more presupposes faith, in both its *fides qua* and its *fides quae* dimensions.

The book focuses on questions of the soul, the resurrection, judgment, heaven, purgatory, and hell, with an entire chapter dedicated to near-death experiences, and along the way responds to distinctively modern challenges. In other words, Nichols doesn't set out simply to write a book on eschatology as if the past few hundred years of skepticism regarding such things had not occurred. This is clearly a book written on the other side of the so-called passage to modernity, so that, after a solid and succinct walk through the eschatologies of both Testaments and major Christian thinkers up through Luther and Calvin (and even Descartes), Nichols quickly gets down, in chapter 4, to the "Scientific Challenges to Afterlife." Indeed, it is this chapter and those following that set the book apart from simple catechesis—though it must be said that the survey of the biblical and historical background to these questions is very well done and betrays a great deal of careful reading and reflecting on the latest scholarship.

Still, the heart of Nichols's project is answering the so-called scientific objections to the Church's traditional eschatological teachings. He enumerates these challenges as four: (1) modern cosmology, which has shown that "the heavens" are made of the same sort of matter as the earth; (2) the science of history, which resulted in the historical-critical reading of the Scriptures; (3) the developments surrounding the theory of evolution; and (4) the more recent challenges of evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences. It is to each of these challenges that the subsequent chapters respond, beginning with a somewhat bizarre chapter on near-death experiences (NDEs)—"bizarre" not because Nichols includes a discussion of such experiences in a book of this nature, but because of the weight he gives them, both in the course of this chapter and throughout the book. This has to do with a weakness in the book that I will mention below.

The chapter on NDEs, which is both fascinating and frustrating, and which Nichols admittedly handles with requisite sobriety, soon gives way to more standard theological and philosophical topics. A particular strength of the book is its treatment of the soul's immortality. It has become quite fashionable in recent theology to pit Hellenistic ideas against those which are more purely and properly Christian (or Hebrew). It is often alleged that the biblical picture knows nothing of the dualism between body and soul found in classical Greek thought, and opts instead for a more holistic, if not monistic, account. This, furthermore, would rule out the traditional notion of the soul entering immediately into the presence of God after death, while awaiting the general resurrection of the body. In order to address these topics Nichols offers a survey of the biblical theology of the soul and afterlife before delving into five different contemporary perspectives on the relationship between the soul and the body. These are metaphysical materialism (reductive physicalism), emergent monism

(nonreductive physicalism), substance dualism, holistic or emergent dualism, and reincarnation. In each case Nichols offers the strengths and weaknesses of the position in order, eventually, to make a case for his own position, "holistic dualism." For instance, with regard to nonreductive physicalism, Nichols points out the overwhelming biblical evidence for the notion of the immediate presence of the soul to God after death and prior to the bodily resurrection. Philosophically, he points out that this approach cannot really account for the newness in the human organism of spiritual qualities such as freedom which clearly appear to transcend the merely material and biological realm. Furthermore, he asks, if thought is simply a by-product of the brain, how does God, who is immaterial, think? After pointing out the fatal weaknesses of the positions which he rejects, he states his own position: "This position argues that the person in this life is an integrated unity of body and soul but that, nonetheless, the soul can survive bodily death and carry personal identity from the death of the body into the resurrected state, in which the soul is united with a resurrected body" (129).

The remaining chapters follow a similar format: Nichols lists contemporary "scientific" objections to, say, the resurrection of the body and then, after reiterating the biblical and traditional teaching, offers a response. In many cases his responses will be familiar. For instance, why would Christ's disciples make up a story of a bodily resurrection in the light of the fact that such a teaching was radically out of keeping with Hellenistic views of the body? What would they stand to gain from such a story, that is, if it really were merely a story? But some of his responses venture into new territory. It is when Nichols begins to speculate about such things that his theology occasionally gets muddled. Such muddling stems from a tendency on Nichols's part, throughout the work, to allow contemporary science (and Enlightenment notions of reason and matter) to establish the terms of the debate. In short, the book is often overly *reactive* in mode. With regard to the body-soul problematic, Nichols congratulates some of the positions—like metaphysical materialism—because they "adhere closely to scientific explanations" (119). But what, given its own methodological restrictions, can science possibly tell us about the relationship between the body and the soul? Or, how could metaphysical materialism adhere closely to scientific explanations? Or again, when speaking about nonreductive physicalism, Nichols states that "the strength of these positions is their attempt to fully integrate the findings of contemporary science, especially neuroscience, with philosophy and theology" (122). In the chapter on resurrection, he opts against the notion that the new heaven and new earth will be a transformation of the matter of *this* world because modern science teaches that the matter of this world will "burn out, collapse, and go cold" (139). He therefore concludes, "Thus while I do believe in Paul's vision of a transformed creation freed from the bondage of death, I am wary of arguing that it must be the very matter of *this* creation that is transformed. As I have argued above, what carries identity is the form of a person, not the matter" (140).

These are admittedly complicated questions, but it seems to be a lapse back into the very dualism Nichols is supposed to be critiquing to say "the form" and "*not* the matter"? Why not the form *and* the matter? Doesn't the Christian teaching on the resurrection of the body at the very least suggest that something of personal identity would be lacking in a purely spiritual resurrection? I am not denying the intermediate state of the soul in heaven after death, nor am I suggesting that Nichols believes in a purely spiritual resurrection (he clearly does not), but I do question his apparent willingness to let modern science have the final say on the nature of the matter of this world, as if science deals with matter and theology and philosophy deal with the rest. It is in fact the case that Aristotle and Descartes differ precisely in their respective notions of *matter*. I mention this tendency to lapse back into dualistic language with regard to the worlds of matter and spirit because I think it is related to the chief weakness of the book: its tendency towards a dualism of the natural and the supernatural (this world and the next, etc.). Nichols shows little familiarity with the critiques of modern science that have recently arisen in the light of de Lubac's critique of the notion of pure nature, John Paul II's theology of the body, or John Milbank's critique of secular reason. It is at least a little strange that a book dealing at such length on questions of the body and resurrection would not make a single reference to John Paul II's groundbreaking work in this area. One thinks also of the critique of modern science's treatment of matter (and the body) found in the work of thinkers like Robert Spaemann or Hans Jonas. I am not suggesting that Nichols must agree with these approaches, but he shows no awareness that the debate has moved beyond, say, John Polkinghorne.

In John Paul II's view, for instance, matter is not simply Descartes' "extension in space" to which Christianity then adds a spiritual dimension. Strangely missing in Nichols's study of these issues is the sort of sacramental view of the cosmos that we find in people like Alexander Schmemann or G. K. Chesterton. Throughout the book Nichols seems content with the disenchanted cosmos of modern science and then simply insists that this is not all there is. This helps to explain his fixation on near-death experiences: first, they offer the sort of "empirical" evidence that modern science finds appealing; second, they give witness to "another" realm besides this *merely* physical one. What I would want to argue, however, is that modern science of the dominant sort doesn't even get *this* world right, and as long as it doesn't, it simply will not do for Christians to appeal to another one! As Hans Urs von Balthasar (to whom Nichols refers as an "extremely conservative" theologian) has repeatedly reminded us, the person who is unable to see the beauty (in the full metaphysical sense) of the created cosmos will be the last to recognize the glory of Christ.

Nichols's book contains very solid and highly readable treatments (accessible both to undergraduates and intelligent lay people) of biblical and traditional eschatology, provides a number of fine arguments against modern reductionism, and offers a robust and thoughtful defense of classic Christian beliefs about the afterlife. I would likely use it (in conjunction with other texts) in an undergraduate (or even early graduate) course in eschatology. The entire

argument would have been strengthened from the inside out, however, and even kept from more than occasional dualistic miscues, if Nichols had shown greater awareness of the more integrated (postliberal) approaches to theology mentioned above. In short, in spite of Nichols's rather traditional conclusions, he is still doing theology in a modern (i.e., Enlightenment) key.

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Vattimo and Theology. By THOMAS G. GUARINO. London and New York: T & T Clark Press, 2009. Pp. 183. $ 29.95 (paper) ISBN: 978-0-567-03233-1.

Gianni Vattimo is one of the leading proponents of contemporary postmodern philosophy. Heavily influenced by Nietzsche and Heidegger (and, to a lesser degree, Hans-Georg Gadamer), Vattimo has become famous for what he calls "weak thought," that is, a decidedly antimetaphysical thought that does not oppose itself to Christianity but interprets itself as the fulfillment, or consummation, of the Christian understanding of reality. He argues, for example, that we need to be more nihilistic in order to be more Christian. "Kenosis" and "caritas" have thus become key concepts of his radical hermeneutics. Postmodernism, he consequently maintains, makes it possible for Christianity (understood along the lines of his own interpretation of it) to play a new role. In the "age of interpretation" Christianity is, as he points out, no longer dependent on alien standards of rationality (nor excluded from any public or theoretical significance), but can rediscover its own (proper) claims. Thomas Guarino summarizes nicely Vattimo's position vis-à-vis Christianity as follows: "To be a Christian, indeed, to be a religious person, is to recognize that all thinking is 'weak,' that all knowing is interpretative, that 'metaphysics,' with all its assertion of absolutes, must always be diluted into tolerant charity" (17).

If postmodernism needs to be taken seriously (as the kind of challenge that it clearly is), it also needs to be taken seriously in the shape that it has found in Vattimo's thought. Vattimo's constant dialogue with the Christian theological and philosophical tradition explains, more specifically, why his philosophy deserves close attention and criticism both from a Christian philosophical and from a theological perspective. *Vattimo and Theology* provides such a criticism of Vattimo's thought. It offers in its first two chapters a very accurate and accessible account of Vattimo's thought and discusses key themes such as his understanding of modernity and its end, truth, Being, interpretation, history, and the kenotic dimension of Christianity. Anyone merely looking for a short, yet concise introduction to Vattimo's thought will clearly benefit from reading

Guarino's book. Guarino, however, does not limit himself to such an introduction. His interest is to host a critical dialogue between the Christian tradition and Vattimo (he considers himself "hardly an apologist for Vattimian thought" [3]). Before he goes on to examine Vattimo's thought critically, however, he discusses from a historical (but also a systematic) point of view the question as to whether or not a Nietzschean can speak to Christian theology. The third chapter of his book shows—very convincingly—that thinkers such as Nietzsche and his followers may have something important to offer to Christian thought and that a Christian thinker must not be afraid to engage in a dialogue with Nietzschean thought. This may well be the case with Vattimo's postmodernism, too. In the following two chapters, Guarino takes up the challenge of a theological dialogue with Vattimo. The first of these two critical chapters deals with postmodernity and theology; the second one with truth and interpretation.

Both chapters provide a convincing critique of Vattimo's thought that is interesting not only for theologians. Philosophers, too, will benefit from Guarino's critical remarks about the Italian philosopher and value the balanced nature of his reading of Vattimo's works. Guarino is without any doubt right in appreciating Vattimo's desire for God and for Christ; he is also right in pointing out that there are many important parallels between Vattimo's thought and the Christian tradition (particularly the mystical tradition) and that his emphasis upon practice needs to be taken very seriously. Guarino does not, however, overlook the limits of Vattimo's hermeneutical nihilism. They concern, among many other things, his somewhat fideistic understanding of the relation between reason (or metaphysics) and faith and the overemphasis on interpretation that clearly entails internal contradictions. Does he not, many philosophers would want to ask, totalize hermeneutics at the cost of hermeneutics proper?

It goes without saying that from a Christian theological point of view, too, Vattimo's understanding of truth and interpretation is deeply problematic. No one who follows Vattimo will be able to speak of truth as traditionally (and commonly) understood in the Christian tradition. What is left are merely different interpretations of reality that have the structure of an event. Truth is for him, as Guarino shows, "evanescent and transitory, not stable and fixed. It is precisely a fixed understanding of truth that leads inexorably to claims of certitude, to limitations on human freedom, to exclusionary violence" (97). Vattimo, therefore, questions the preoccupation with truth that he finds in Christian thought (as well as in the history of Western philosophy). His criticism of truth and of truth claims is closely related to his emphasis on, and retrieval of, charity. Charity and the radical rejection of violence is, as he argues, not only at the heart of Christianity. It is also at the heart of his weak thought that is tolerant and radically open towards other interpretations of reality. While there is no doubt that Vattimo rightly puts emphasis on charity as the heart of Christian thinking, it is an altogether different question whether he is at all right in his radical understanding of charity and of truth.

It is one of the (many) strengths of Guarino's book that he says—with a clear and convincing voice—what needs to be said about Vattimo's understanding of interpretation, truth, and charity. He not only shows that Vattimo intensifies Heidegger's view of Christianity in a problematic and hardly convincing manner. He also points out that Vattimo misconstrues the proper Christian understanding of truth (and of doctrine) and proposes a concept of charity that sounds Christian (and claims to be so) without really being the Christian concept of charity. Vattimo is ignorant, it seems, of substantial Christian beliefs, their complex character, and theological justification. He is also, as Guarino shows, ignorant of important insights of the theological tradition that found new theological consideration in the twentieth century (it is very helpful that Guarino provides his criticism of Vattimo against the background of his excellent knowledge of the nineteenth-century Tübingen school of theology and of de Lubac's and von Balthasar's theologies, that is, theologies that critically engage in a substantial dialogue with modern thinking without being proper subjects of Vattimo's criticism of Christianity). Vattimo, therefore, defends and criticizes Christianity at a very high cost—the cost of substantially simplifying and transforming it.

There is no doubt that Vattimo would benefit from a dialogue with the Christian tradition and with contemporary Christian theology in its richness and complexity at least as much as Christian theology could benefit from a dialogue with his thought. The Christian understanding of reality is so complex as to be able to integrate truth and charity. There is, as Guarino shows, no need radically to oppose truth and charity. Nihilism does not need to be the "truth" of hermeneutics. Christianity is, one could argue, more radical than Vattimo's thought without needing to deny the kind of metaphysical realism that Vattimo intends to overcome (without, in the end, being able to do so). Vattimo's claims and his own kind of "rationalism," as it were, need to be criticized and limited. It is here that Guarino argues that Vattimo may in fact be more modern than he himself suggests or would want to claim. The Gnostic follower of Nietzsche and Heidegger, he concludes, sublimates rather than rediscovers religion philosophically. This is, indeed, a convincing conclusion.

Readers will be indebted to Guarino's book: in showing the limits of Vattimo's thought, he not only exercises a great deal of fairness to the Italian thinker (so often missed in the discussion and criticism of postmodernism); he also remind his readers of the strength and significance of Christian (philosophical and theological) reasoning.

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