The Thomist 76 (2012): 165-88

SCRIPTURE AS THE SOUL OF MORAL THEOLOGY: REFLECTIONS ON VATICAN II AND *RESSOURCEMENT* THOMISM

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CONTEMPORARY STUDENTS of Catholic theology who are interested in the study of St. Thomas Aquinas may be well aware of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) on the importance of Aquinas for the study of any area of theology.[1] They very likely also realize that the same council spoke of Scripture as the heart of theology.[2] A question may arise here concerning the relationship of these two teachings—a question that may interest a good number of people. My purpose in this article is to illuminate that relationship—more specifically, to lay out the importance that the sacred Scriptures enjoy in Thomist moral theology, both before and after the Second Vatican Council.[3]

[1] Vatican II, Decree on Priestly Training, *Optatam totius*, 16.

[2] Vatican II, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, *Dei Verbum*, 24.

[3] This article originated as an address delivered at The Catholic University of America on 1 December 2011, at the invitation of the School of Theology and Religious Studies Student Association (STRSSA). When I inquired on which theme I should lecture, the organizational committee replied: "Many of us are devoted to the study of St. Thomas and the Thomistic tradition. Nevertheless, in our study of St. Thomas and our positive work in the Thomistic tradition, many of us feel we have not heeded Vatican II's call that Scripture be the heart of Sacred Theology, including Moral Theology. From this arises our question. How can post-Vatican II Thomistic Moral Theology re-integrate Scripture, giving it its rightful place?" (Mr. John Meinert., email communication to the author, 23 September 2011).

I

The story begins on 18 November 1965. The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, *Dei Verbum*, number 24, sounds the theme "Sacrae Paginae studium sit veluti anima Sacrae Theologiae."[4] Though one seldom hears it remarked, this often repeated adage derives from previous papal teaching. The proximate source that *Dei Verbum*, chapter 6, note 3, indicates for this metaphorical use of "soul" is *Providentissimus Deus*, the 1893 encyclical letter of Pope Leo XIII, "On the Study of Holy Scripture." The 1965 constitution singles out the relevant passage from the *Enchiridion Biblicum*, fourth edition, published at Rome and Naples in 1961.[5] It is worthwhile to highlight what this text from *Providentissimus Deus*, as found in the official Vatican English version, says about the "anima" of theology.

> Most desirable is it, and most essential, that the whole teaching of Theology should be pervaded and animated [*sit anima*] by the use of the divine Word of God. This is what the Fathers and the greatest theologians of all ages have desired and reduced to practice. It was chiefly out of the Sacred Writings that they endeavoured to proclaim and establish the Articles of Faith and the truths therewith connected, and it was in them, together with divine Tradition, that they found the refutation of heretical error, and the reasonableness, the true meaning, and the mutual relation of the truths of Catholicism. Nor will any one wonder at this who considers that the Sacred Books hold such an eminent position among the sources of revelation that without their assiduous study and use, Theology cannot be placed on its true footing, or treated as its dignity demands. For although it is right and proper that students in academies and schools should be chiefly exercised in acquiring a scientific knowledge of dogma, by means of reasoning from the Articles of Faith to their consequences, according to the rules of approved and sound philosophy—nevertheless the judicious and instructed theologian will by no means pass by that method of doctrinal demonstration which draws its proof from the authority of the Bible; "for (Theology) does not receive her first principles from any other science, but

[4] See *Dei Verbum* 24: "the study of the sacred page is, as it were, the soul of sacred theology." In a footnote, the council fathers refer to two earlier papal pronouncements on the study of sacred Scripture: *Providentissimus Deus*, the 1893 encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, "On the Study of Holy Scripture"; and *Spiritus Paraclitus*, the 1920 encyclical of Pope Benedict XV "On St. Jerome."

[5] *Enchiridion Biblicum: Documenta ecclesiastica sacram scripturam spectantia auctoritate pontificiae commissionis de re biblica edita*, 4th ed., (Naples and Rome, 1961), no. 114.

immediately from God by revelation. And, therefore, she does not receive of other sciences as from a superior, but uses them as her inferiors or handmaids."[6]

Why should sacred Scripture remain the "soul" of the instruction given in theology? In the preceding number of *Providentissimus Deus*, Leo XIII, inspired by another metaphor, that of a tree and its bark, employed by Saint Gregory the Great in the *Moralia*, wrote "the sense of Holy Scripture can nowhere be found incorrupt outside of the Church, and cannot be expected to be found in writers who, being without the true faith, only gnaw the bark of the Sacred Scripture, and never attain its pith."[7] Because Magisterium and theological faith ensure sound theology, Leo XIII made "the divine Word of God" the soul, as it were, of the whole teaching of theology. He then goes on to explain that the text from Saint Thomas (at the end of the above quotation) repeats without appeal to metaphor that theology draws its principles only from God. To return to the words of *Providentissimus Deus*:

It is this view of doctrinal teaching which is laid down and recommended by the prince of theologians, St. Thomas of Aquin [*STh* I, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2]; who, moreover, shows—such being the essential character of Christian Theology—how she can defend her own principles against attack: "If the adversary," he [Aquinas] says, "do but grant any portion of the divine revelation, we have an argument against him; thus, against a heretic we can employ Scripture authority, and against those who deny one article, we can use another. But if our opponent reject divine revelation entirely, there is then no way left to prove the Article of Faith by reasoning; we can only solve the difficulties which are raised against them" [*STh* I, q. 1, a. 8].[8]

Leo's encyclical also reflects what the First Vatican Council (1869-70) had to say about faith and reason, especially in the dogmatic constitution on the Catholic faith, *Dei Filius*.[9] For now,

[6] Pope Leo XIII, *Providentissimus Deus* 16, quoting Aquinas, *STh* I, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2.

[7] See Leo XIII, *Providentissimus Deus* 15, toward the end, which cites St. Gregory the Great's *Morals on the Book of Job* xx, 9, no. 20.

[8] Leo XIII, *Providentissimus Deus* 16.

[9] For example, see the 24 April 1870 dogmatic constitution on the Catholic faith, *Dei Filius*, chap. 4: "Now reason, if it is enlightened by faith, does indeed when it seeks persistently, piously and soberly, achieve by God's gift some understanding, and that most

however, it is important to observe the genealogy of the well-known phrase from *Dei Verbum*. This phrase, "anima Sacrae Theologiae," finds its proximate source in an encyclical that also endorses Aquinas's view of what theology is and how it works. Moreover, "anima Sacrae Theologiae" comes from the pen of the same Roman Pontiff who gave official approbation to the whole project of St. Thomas Aquinas. As *Aeterni patris* so pleasantly puts it: "Among the Scholastic Doctors, the chief and master of all, towers Thomas Aquinas, who, as Cajetan observes, because 'he most venerated the ancient doctors of the Church, in a certain way seems to have inherited the intellect of all.'"[10] It would be difficult, then, to argue that *Dei Verbum*, number 24, should be read as an implicit critique leveled against the theology of Saint Thomas or Thomism. How could the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council have chosen to create a rupture with the continuous papal teaching of the century that preceded their convocation?

There is more to consider. The Vatican II conciliar texts include a specific reference to the study of sacred Scripture and moral theology. One finds what some have described as the "call" issued by the Second Vatican Council to moral theologians best expressed in *Optatam totius*, the Decree on Priestly Training.[11] This decree also borrows from *Providentissimus Deus*, in order to stipulate that the study of sacred Scripture "ought to be the soul

profitable, of the mysteries, whether by analogy from what it knows naturally, or from the connection of these mysteries with one another and with the final end of humanity; but reason is never rendered capable of penetrating these mysteries in the way in which it penetrates those truths which form its proper object. For the divine mysteries, by their very nature, so far surpass the created understanding that, even when a revelation has been given and accepted by faith, they remain covered by the veil of that same faith and wrapped, as it were, in a certain obscurity, as long as in this mortal life *we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith, and not by sight* (2 Cor 5, 6-7)" (Norman P. Tanner, S.J., ed., *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils,* 2 vols. [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990], 2:808).

[10] Pope Leo XIII, *Aeterni Patris*, "On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy," 17, citing Cardinal Cajetan's *Commentary on Summa theologiae*, IIa-IIae q. 148, a. 4 (Leonine edition, vol. 10, p. 174, n. 6).

[11] Proclaimed by His Holiness Pope Paul VI on 28 October 1965.

of all theology," including moral theology.[12] Number 16 of the conciliar decree specifically instructs:

> Special care must be given to the perfecting of moral theology. Its scientific exposition, nourished *more* on the teaching of the Bible, should shed light on the loftiness of the calling of the faithful in Christ and the obligation that is theirs of bearing fruit in charity for the life of the world.[13]

Now, the use of the comparative adverb "more," *magis*, raises the question, more than what? The most likely answer would be, so it seems to me, more than what was the case in the early 1960s or, more expansively, during the first six decades of the twentieth century, the period when most of the Fathers of the council attained the age of moral discretion. It would be difficult, in any case, to conclude that the council meant for us to understand the *magis* as more than one finds in the theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas and the commentatorial tradition that follows him. One simple indication of the rightness of this supposition arises from the fact that the roughly four-century tradition of moral theology that preceded the Second Vatican Council did not model itself on the moral teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas. One could never mistake Aquinas for an eighteenth-century casuist.

The text of *Optatam totius* itself offers warrant for not thinking that the Second Vatican Council intended to say that moral theology should be more scripturally based than one finds in the writings of Aquinas and the commentatorial tradition that carries them forth. In the preceding paragraph of the same number cited above (no. 16), the decree, which, as already mentioned, addresses the direction of seminary studies, establishes a general guideline for doing theology. In the same breath, as it were, that the decree encourages biblical renewal in moral theology, it also stipulates the following: "in order that they may

[12] *Optatam totius* 16 (emphasis added). The reference to Leo XIII is given from *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 26 (1893-94): 283.

[13] "Specialis cura impendatur Theologiae morali perficiendae, cuius scientifica expositio, doctrina S. Scripturae magis nutrita, celsitudinem vocationis fidelium in Christo illustret eorumque obligationem in caritate pro mundi vita fructum ferendi" (*Optatam totius* 16).

illumine the mysteries of salvation as completely as possible, the students should learn to penetrate them more deeply with the help of speculation, under the guidance of St. Thomas, and to perceive their interconnections."[14] In its own manner then, *Optatam totius*, with its insistence on *speculation*, may be read to support the view of theology that Leo XIII expounded in *Providentissimus Deus*. The pope, in that encyclical letter, went so far as to affirm that "the best preparation [for the study of the Bible] will be a conscientious application to philosophy and theology under the guidance of St. Thomas of Aquin."[15] At the same time, one notes that the conciliar Fathers, in *Optatam totius*, mention the study of sacred Scripture immediately after the affirmation that theology draws its principles from divine faith under the guidance of the Church. Leo XIII, on the other hand, places biblical studies after speculative studies, and so he couples the study of the Bible ("in re biblica"), though not sacred Scripture itself, with those theological disciplines that he describes as positive: "By this means [i.e., Thomist theology and philosophy]," the pope goes on to declare, "both in Biblical studies and in that part of Theology which is called positive, they [the students] will pursue the right path and make satisfactory progress."[16] To understand Pope Leo's cautious approach in the 1890s to "re biblica," one only has to recall the challenges posed by late nineteenth-century Rationalism.[17] Or, one may recall what Edward Schillebeeckx wrote in 1967: "The church does not

[14] "deinde ad mysteria salutis integre quantum fieri potest illustranda, ea ope speculationis, S. Thoma magistro, intimius penetrare eorumque nexum perspicere alumni addiscant" (ibid., 16).

[15] Leo XIII, *Providentissimus Deus* 16.

[16] Ibid.

[17] For an indication of the importance Fr. Lagrange attributed to Aquinas for higher biblical studies, see Bernard Montagnes, O.P., *Marie-Joseph Lagrange: Une biographie critique* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2004). The author cites a letter (M.-J. Lagrange à X. Faucher, 24 novembre 1907: Archives dominicaines de Paris, Fonds Faucher) from Père Lagrange where he attributes his good standing before the Holy See to his fidelity to Aquinas: "J'ai vu avec plaisir que pas une revue, meme des plus antipathiques, n'a fait allusion à nous comme englobés dans les documents pontificaux. Je crois que nous le devons à notre fidélité à saint Thomas" (236). Also see, M.-J. Lagrange, O.P., *Père Lagrange: Personal Reflections and Memoirs*, trans. Henry Wansbrough (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1985).

derive its dogmas from theological conclusions drawn from scripture, but it recognizes its own living dogma in scripture."[18] In other words, the Church has never endorsed a rationalist or reductionist approach to the Sacred Scriptures. For as the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* reminds us, "sacred Tradition, Sacred Scripture and the Magisterium of the Church are so connected and associated that one of them cannot stand without the others."[19]

The 1983 *Code of Canon Law* recapitulates the main features of the conciliar instruction on the renewal of theology. (One observes the hermeneutics of continuity in action, so to speak.) The *Code*, in a chapter that treats the formation of clerics, proceeds in three movements: First,

> Theological instruction is to be imparted in the light of faith and under the leadership of the magisterium in such a way that the students understand the entire Catholic doctrine grounded in divine revelation, gain nourishment for their own spiritual life, and are able properly to announce and safeguard it in the exercise of the ministry.[20]

The keen student of Aquinas will observe that the Church confirms the Thomist, and I would say Catholic, teaching that theology develops as a flourishing of the act of faith, belief, which in turn finds its authentic expression specified by the articles of faith—the science of the blessed.[21] Second, the *Code* stipulates that, "Students are to be instructed in sacred scripture with special diligence in such a way that they acquire a comprehensive view of the whole of sacred scripture."[22] Alert theology students will recognize the resonances of this second point with what Pope Benedict XVI calls a "canonical exegesis" of the Scriptures, that

[18] See his "The Bible and Theology," in E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., *Revelation and Theology* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967), 193. Father Schillebeeckx goes on to quote Yves Congar in *Vraie et fausse réforme dans l'Eglise* (Paris, 1950), 498-99: "I respect and I never cease to study the science of the exegetes, but I challenge their supreme authority."

[19] *CCC* 95.

[20] *CIC* can. 252 §1.

[21] For further discussion, see my *Christian Faith and the Theological Life (*Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996).

[22] *CIC* can. 252 §2.

is, the effort to read individual texts within what the *Code* calls a "comprehensive view of the whole of sacred scripture."[23] They will also remember that Leo XIII makes a similar point: "the Sacred Books hold such an eminent position among the sources of revelation that without their assiduous study and use, Theology cannot be placed on its true footing, or treated as its dignity demands."[24] Third, the *Code* continues:

> There are to be classes in dogmatic theology, always grounded in the written word of God together with sacred tradition; through these, students are to learn to penetrate more intimately the mysteries of salvation, especially with St. Thomas as a teacher. There are also to be classes in moral and pastoral theology, canon law, liturgy, ecclesiastical history, and other auxiliary and special disciplines, according to the norm of the prescripts of the program of priestly formation.[25]

What draws our attention remains the, perhaps for some, startling discovery that in the 1983 revised *Code of Canon Law*, Aquinas remains the master—*s. Thoma praesertim magistro*—for the development of theology, including moral theology. Aquinas, one learns from the *Code*, helps the student to discover—more specifically, "to penetrate more intimately" (*intimius penetrare*)—the mysteries of salvation that inform what one must reckon as derivative theological studies, such as moral and pastoral theology.

From this brief commentary on the pertinent Vatican II documents, *Dei Verbum* and *Optatam totius*, and on the *Code of Canon Law*, one may conclude that the Church, in her official teachings, does not exclude the happy coexistence of the studies

[23] Joseph Ratzinger / Pope Benedict XVI, *Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration*, trans. Adrian J. Walker (New York: Doubleday, 2007), xviii-xx, at xix. For a short commentary, see Peter S. Williamson, "Pastoral Interpretation in Pope Benedict's Jesus of Nazareth" in *Homiletic and Pastoral Review* (May 2008): "Benedict regards canonical exegesis, which interprets individual texts in the light of the whole Bible, as a necessary complement to historical-critical study. This method accords with the teaching of *Dei Verbum* §12 that proper interpretation requires attending to the content and unity of Scripture as a whole" (8-9).

[24] See above, note 4; Leo XIII, *Providentissimus Deus* 16.

[25] *CIC* can. 252 §3.

of sacred Scripture and of Thomas Aquinas. On the contrary, the Church assumes that the Bible and Aquinas work together toward the communication of divine truth to human beings. From 1893 to 1983, the Roman Pontiffs set forth the same pattern of interplay between divine science, its communication in divine revelation, that is, through sacred Scripture and sacred Tradition, "flowing out from the same divine well-spring," and the conception of Christian theology set forth by Thomas Aquinas when he treats the *sacra doctrina*.[26]

One thing is clear: both Leo XIII and the Second Vatican Council appeal to "speculative" studies as essential for achieving a sound theological education. In this context, "speculation" corresponds to the meaning that one finds, for example, in *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review*. It does not mean undertaking a high-risk and uncertain course of action, as in the phrase, "speculating on Wall Street." Rather, in a word, speculative theology means theology done from a sapiential point of view, that is, a theology "mainly concerned with divine things."Aquinas makes this point in the first question of the *Summa Theologiae*, when he inquires, "utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia practica." Is Christian theology a practical science? It is, says Aquinas, though more speculative than practical "since it is mainly concerned with the divine things which are, rather than with things men do."[27] To sum up, Aquinas, as Fr. Gilby has observed, "treats Christian theology as subordinate to faith, itself subordinate to the vision of the blessed."[28] The moral theologian will recall that Aquinas insists that the *sacra doctrina* "deals with human acts only in so far as they prepare men for that achieved knowledge of God on which their eternal bliss reposes."[29] Theology depends on a "scientia divina." Within this framework,

[26] The phrase comes from *Dei Verbum* 9, and is quoted in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, no. 80.

[27] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 4.

[28] See Thomas Gilby, O.P., *Christian Theology*, vol 1 (1a. 1) of the Blackfriars edition of the *Summa Theologiae* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 1, n. "e".

[29] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 4.

one can appreciate what Aquinas says elsewhere in the first question of the *Summa Theologiae*:

> Sacred doctrine sets out individual cases, not as being preoccupied with them, but in order to introduce them as examples for our own lives, as is the wont of moral sciences and to proclaim the authority of the men through whom divine revelation has come down to us, which revelation is the basis of sacred Scripture or doctrine.[30]

This "science" of God and of the blessed, as Aquinas goes on to assert, governs other forms of human discovery "sicut a summa sapientia," that is, "as by supreme wisdom."[31] Moral theology, with its application bound to individual cases, falls under this superintending divine wisdom.

Optatam totius was voted upon in the session of 28 October 1965; the Fathers approved *Dei Verbum* in the next session of 18 November.[32] It is well known that the direction given by the Church to the study of sacred Scripture is meant to address the challenges that a given historical period throws up against the proper use of the Scriptures. Recall Leo XIII's appeal to Gregory the Great's tree analogy, where he says that while heretics gnaw at the bark, believers attain the pith of the Bible.[33] 1893 is not 1965; 1965 is not 2011. Suffice it to observe that the Church's references to sacred Scripture in both 1965 and 1983, that is,

[30] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2. Father Gilby points out the identification of the Bible and Christian theology in this text. For further discussion, see Gilby, *Christian Theology*, 12 n. g. See also Pope Benedict XVI, Address at the Meeting with Representatives from the World of Culture Address, Collège des Bernardins, Paris, Friday, 12 September 2008: "The historical element is seen in the multiplicity and the humanity. From this perspective one can understand the formulation of a medieval couplet that at first sight appears rather disconcerting: *littera gesta docet – quid credas allegoria* … (cf. Augustine of Dacia, *Rotulus pugillaris*, I). The letter indicates the facts; what you have to believe is indicated by allegory, that is to say, by Christological and pneumatological exegesis."

[31] Aquinas locates Christian theology subordinate to faith, which itself is subordinate to the vision of the blessed (see *STh* I q. 1, a. 2: "Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est Dei et beatorum"). For the sapiential character of theology, see *STh* I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1.

[32] *Optatam totius* passed on 28 October 1965 (session 7) and *Dei Verbum* on 18 November 1965 (session 8).

[33] Gregory, *Morals*, xx, 9, 20, as cited in *Providentissimus Deus* 15: "non medullam attingunt, sed corticem rodunt."

after the issuance of the 1943 encyclical letter of Pope Pius XII, *Divino afflante spiritu*, attend to what is known as historical-critical investigation, whereas Leo XIII, admittedly, gives moment for pause when he turns his attention to academic biblical studies.[34] The essay "Church Pronouncements" co-authored by Frs. Raymond Brown and Thomas Aquinas Collins in *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary* provides a useful overview of the evolution through 1990 of the guidance that the Magisterium has given to students of the Bible.[35] Fifteen years later, Pope Benedict XVI's 2005 Christmas Address to the Roman Curia offered a precious clarification about how one should receive and interpret both *Optatam totius* and *Dei Verbum*. He reminds us that the hermeneutics of continuity require the theologian to locate "the study of the sacred page" (to quote *Dei Verbum* 24) within, as one author puts it, "the teaching of past centuries."[36] To these past centuries we now turn our attention.

[34] In 1893, Leo XIII found reason to suspect the biblical criticism practiced by certain scholars: "There has arisen, to the great detriment of religion, an inept method, dignified by the name of the 'higher criticism,' which pretends to judge of the origin, integrity and authority of each Book from internal indications alone. It is clear, on the other hand, that in historical questions, such as the origin and the handing down of writings, the witness of history is of primary importance, and that historical investigation should be made with the utmost care; and that in this matter internal evidence is seldom of great value, except as confirmation. To look upon it in any other light will be to open the door to many evil consequences. It will make the enemies of religion much more bold and confident in attacking and mangling the Sacred Books; and this vaunted 'higher criticism' will resolve itself into the reflection of the bias and the prejudice of the critics. It will not throw on the Scripture the light which is sought, or prove of any advantage to doctrine; it will only give rise to disagreement and dissension, those sure notes of error, which the critics in question so plentifully exhibit in their own persons; and seeing that most of them are tainted with false philosophy and rationalism, it must lead to the elimination from the sacred writings of all prophecy and miracle, and of everything else that is outside the natural order" (*Providentissimus Deus* 17). Of course one must recall the practitioners Leo may have had in mind, such as the well-known *fils prodigue* Ernest Renan (28 February 1823–2 October 1892).

[35] Raymond E. Brown, S.S., and Thomas Aquinas Collins, O.P., "Church Pronouncements," in *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 1166-74.

[36] For discussion of this important point concerning how to understand the Second Vatican Council, see *Vatican II: Renewal Within Tradition*, ed. Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), esp., Francis Martin, "Revelation and its Transmission," 55-75, at 69.

II

It is easy to forget that the Second World War disrupted the intellectual life of Christian Europe. Some scholars, however, benefitted from the suspension of classes and lecturing that the war visited upon countries like France, Belgium, and England, producing useful research based on the materials that were available to them. One such figure was the renowned Dominican scripture scholar Ceslaus Bernard Spicq (1901-92). In 1944, after the cessation of hostilities in France, he published his *Esquisse d'une histoire de l'exégèse latine au moyen age*.[37] This sketch of important biblical commentators active between the eighth and fourteenth centuries introduces the reader to a world of scriptural studies that, at least in the early decades of the twentieth century, was obscured by the extensive philosophical and theological attention paid to the major figures of the Middle Ages, especially, of course, St. Thomas Aquinas. Père Spicq describes the "terrain inexploré" that he confronted as he set about to investigate the scriptural commentaries written by St. Thomas and other scholars of the Middle Ages.[38] Nothing in the early 1940s, the author observes, existed with respect to Thomas the exegete that could compare with the studies that had been published up to that point to introduce Thomas the philosopher and the theologian. It is true that *Aeterni patris* mainly inspired research in philosophy and theology. In the 1890s, as we have seen, Pope Leo XIII counted on sound theology to safeguard the academic study of the Bible.[39]

[37] C. Spicq, O.P., *Esquisse d'une histoire de l'exégèse latine au moyen age,* Bibliothèque Thomiste, no. 26 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1944). 25 August 1944 observed the liberation of Paris from the Germans.

[38] Ibid., 5.

[39] We have already seen how Leo ordered the study of sacred Scripture, though not of the Bible itself (see above n. 6). Recall Leo XIII's 1893 advice in *Providentissimus Deus* 16: "The best preparation [for the study of the Bible–"ad studia biblica"]," he wrote, "will be a conscientious application to philosophy and theology under the guidance of St. Thomas of Aquin, and a thorough training therein - as We ourselves have elsewhere pointed out and directed." (Pope Leo, using the papal "We [*Nos*]" refers of course to his 1879 encyclical *Aeterni Patris*.) "By this means," Leo XIII continues, "both in Biblical studies and in that part of Theology which is called positive, they will pursue the right path and make satisfactory progress."

In 1944, Ceslaus Spicq set about to unearth what the Middle Ages had contributed to the study of sacred Scripture. Today then we are looking, on Fr. Spicq's account, at about sixty-seven years of modern academic interest in Thomas the exegete (1944-2011). Father Spicq's "sketch," however, reveals what a treasure lay hidden within the theretofore largely unnoticed printed texts and manuscripts that medieval students of the Bible had composed.

The theme, Aquinas and the Bible, marks out a research area, not a lecture topic. Suffice it to remark that St. Thomas did illuminate moral theology from a biblical perspective. As Cardinal Cajetan observed, St. Thomas, because of his veneration for the holy Fathers, profitably drew upon what preceded him. On Spicq's reckoning, it falls to the early twelfth-century polymath, Honorius of Autun, first to comment scrupulously on each of the four categories of scriptural interpretation that Venerable Bede (+735) and Rabanus Maurus received from Cassian and St. Augustine.[40] These readings of the Scriptures enumerate, according to the twelfth-century text, *Allegoriae in universam sacram scripturam*, the four daughters of Mother Wisdom: history, allegory, tropology, and anagogy.[41] In his Quodlibetal questions, Aquinas specifies the use that he makes of the spiritual senses: "ad duo ordinatur: scilicet ad recte credendum, et ad recte operandum. Si ad recte operandum; sic est sensus moralis, qui alio nomine tropologicus dicitur."[42] The spiritual senses of Scripture

[40] Spicq, *Esquisse*, 98-99 n. 1: "Ainsi Honorius d'Autun (*In Cant.*; PL. CLXXII, 349, 359), qui est le premier à donner un commentaire approprié selon chacun de ces sens soigneusement distingués."

[41] See ibid., 99, where Spicq credits the work to "Raban Maur." Contemporary scholarship considers the author anonymous. For an English translation, see Priscilla Throop, *Allegories in All Holy Scripture: The Complete Translation of Allegoriae in Universam Sacram Scripturam, formerly attributed to Hrabanus Maurus* (Charlotte, Vt.: MedievalMS, 2009).

[42] See Thomas Aquinas, *Quodl*. VII, q. 6 a. 2: "Veritas autem quam sacra Scriptura per figuras rerum tradit, ad duo ordinatur: scilicet ad recte credendum, et ad recte operandum. Si ad recte operandum; sic est sensus moralis, qui alio nomine tropologicus dicitur. Si autem ad recte credendum, oportet distinguere secundum ordinem credibilium; ut enim Dionysius dicit, IV cap. Cael. Hierar., status Ecclesiae medius est inter statum synagogae, et statum Ecclesiae triumphantis. Vetus ergo testamentum figura fuit novi: vetus simul et novum figura sunt caelestium. Sensus ergo spiritualis, ordinatus ad recte credendum, potest fundari in illo modo figurationis quo vetus testamentum figurat novum: et sic est allegoricus sensus vel

ordain right belief and right action. The latter sense is known as the moral or tropological sense (from the Greek, "tropos," for manner of life). Scholars variously date the seventh Quodlibet between the mid-1250s and the mid-1260s.[43] By the mid-thirteenth century in any case, Aquinas and his colleagues had settled on a method to discover within the pages of the sacred Scriptures an explicit form of moral instruction. In the fourteenth century, notes Fr. Spicq, the Franciscan Nicholas of Lyre (ca. 1270-1349) summarizes the received teaching: "Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria. Moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia."[44] "The letter speaks of deeds; allegory about the faith; / The moral about our actions; anagogy about our destiny."[45]

Father Spicq's research extends beyond what the medieval scholars held about the four senses of sacred Scripture. In order to make known the content of Aquinas's scriptural commentaries, this French Dominican braved wartime conditions to press forward with publication of his manuscript. Spicq realized—historical-critical exegete that he was—that the literary genre of Aquinas's scriptural commentaries and his use of sacred Scripture in general ran the risk of looking odd to the uninitiated modern

typicus, secundum quod ea quae in veteri testamento contigerunt, exponuntur de Christo et Ecclesia; vel potest fundari in illo modo figurationis quo novum simul et vetus significant Ecclesiam triumphantem; et sic est sensus anagogicus" ("The truth which Sacred Scripture hands on through figures of things is ordered to two [ends]: namely, to right belief and to right action. If to right action, it is the moral sense, which is called by another name 'tropological.' If however to right belief, it is necessary to distinguish according to the order of the things believed. For as Dionysius says [in chapter four of the *Celestial Hierarchy*], the state of the Church is between the state of the synagogue and the state of the Church triumphant. The Old Testament was a figure of the New [Testament]. The Old and the New [Testaments] together are figures of heavenly things. Therefore, the spiritual sense, ordained to right belief, can be founded in that mode of figuration by which the Old Testament [pre]figures the New [Testament], and thus it is the 'allegorical' or 'typological' sense, according to which those things contained in the Old Testament point to Christ and the Church. Or it can be founded on that mode of figuration by which the New and the Old [Testaments] together signify the Church triumphant, and thus it is the 'anagogical' sense" [trans. Cajetan Cuddy, O.P.]).

[43] Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, *The Person and His Work*, rev. ed., trans Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 211.

[44] Cited in Spicq, *Esquisse*, 340.

[45] Pope Benedict XVI, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, *Verbum Domini*, no. 37.

scripture scholar and theologian. Spicq's chapters illustrate that the medieval commentators, especially Brother Thomas d'Aquino, "while obviously lacking the philological and historical resources at the disposal of modern exegesis," deeply appreciate the place that the sacred Scriptures hold in theology.[46] Aquinas even places the scriptural expositions of the holy Fathers under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Spicq reports that in *Quaestio de quolibet* 12, conducted probably in 1270, Aquinas makes the startling claim that the same Holy Spirit who inspired the composition of the sacred Scriptures also inspired their holy commentators: "Expositiones Sanctorum sunt a Spiritu Sancto."[47] Aquinas considered the expositions of the saints as a necessary constituent of the "eruditio hominum" that makes up the purpose of the sacred Scriptures. In short, both Scripture and its expositions expound a divine teaching (*sacra doctrina*) concerned mainly with the divine things that are, even as this *sacra doctrina* also indicates specific directions for moral conduct.

While Fr. Spicq was researching on the Continent, the British historian Beryl Smalley (1905–84) was spending her time in the Oxbridge libraries to satisfy an intellectual curiosity similar to that of the French Dominican. Because of the wartime conditions, neither scholar was apprised of what the other was doing. *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* first appeared in 1940, and the volume saw three editions (1953; 1983). In the 1983, third edition, Smalley expresses a heightened appreciation of Aquinas "for his distinction and definition of the senses."[48] In the "Preface to Third Edition," Professor Smalley informs us that the celebrated lines, "Littera gesta docet, / quid credas allegoria, / moralis quid agas, / quid speras anagogia," were, in fact, first put into circulation not by the Franciscan Nicholas of Lyre but by a Dominican, Augustine of Denmark (d. 1285), who most probably

[46] Spicq, *Esquisse*, 374, makes this point that Benedict XVI, *Verbum Domini* 37 repeats in the words cited.

[47] Spicq, *Esquisse*, 373, citing Aquinas, *Quodl.* XII, a. 17, s.c.

[48] Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), vii.

died while the former was still a teenager.[49] Research does bring some benefits! What is more important, we recognize that by the mid-thirteenth century the clarifications that St. Thomas Aquinas introduced about the spiritual senses of sacred Scripture had acquired an accepted form and were being used by young Dominicans and other clerics: "The [three] spiritual senses," writes Smalley, "were too integral to the faith and too useful in homiletics to be dropped or even pushed far into the margin."[50]

Smalley's book introduces the reader to a period whose study will undergo revision as long as scholars continue to investigate the work of the Middle Ages. Like all historical studies, Smalley's research—the third edition being now almost thirty years old—must take account of the authentic findings of today's medievalists. The theologian should appreciate the tentativeness that accompanies the work of the historian. At the same time, Spicq, at the conclusion of his study, when he evaluates the criticisms that the Franciscan Roger Bacon in his *Opus minus* leveled against the scriptural authors of his century, wonders out loud whether the interpretation of the gospels by Albert the Great or Nicholas of Lyre "contains more errors than that of modern higher criticism."[51]

Professor Smalley, one should note, persuades us that the Middle Ages produced great scriptural commentators as well as ones of lesser illumination. Saints Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventure, and, of course, the English Franciscan Roger Bacon shine brighter than others in Smalley's constellation of medieval biblical commentators. A figure like William of Alton probably ranks a cut below these greats. He was an English Dominican who, in 1259, succeeded Thomas Aquinas as regent master at the University of Paris. It is possible but not certain that

[49] Ibid., xiii-xiv. In 1993, the Pontifical Biblical Commission, "The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church," II,B, accepted her findings.

[50] Smalley, *The Study of the Bible*, xiv. The Pontifical Biblical Commission, "The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church" (1993), II,B,2 and III,B,2, recognizes the perennial validity of this view.

[51] Spicq, *Esquisse*, 372. He cites from Roger Bacon, *Opus minus*, in Roger Bacon, *Opera quaedam hactenus inedita,* ed. J. S. Brewer, (London, 1859), 322ff.

Alton, who probably died around the year 1270, had studied under Aquinas. We do know, however, that several of his biblical commentaries and sermons survive.[52] Father Timothy Bellamah's erudite study of Alton (recently published by Oxford University Press),[53] helps us to see the tropological sense in motion, as it were. "As for the moral sense," writes Bellamah about Alton's *Commentary* on the Book of Lamentations, "it is the soul's lament for having fallen away from the state of justice by sins of thought, word or deed. Should anyone wonder whose soul is doing the lamenting," Bellamah goes on to say, "William [of Alton] once again leaves open more than a single interpretative possibility, mentioning that it could be either the ruined soul or simply the lapsed one."[54] Examples such as these abound throughout the pages of medieval biblical commentaries. As Pope Benedict XVI has observed at his Meeting with Representatives from the World of Culture, "Scripture requires exegesis, and it requires the context of the community in which it came to birth and in which it is lived."[55]

The Middle Ages is not all about allegory. Professor Smalley may be the first English author to inform her readers that the medievals' study of Aristotle and Moses Maimonides contributed mightily to urging scholars of all stripes to take seriously the literal sense of the Bible. By the end of the thirteenth century, "the 'letter' of Scripture," she writes, "has captured not only their reason but their affection too."[56] For his part, Fr. Spicq devotes a

[52] For another example of a medieval biblical commentator, see Timothy Bellamah, O.P., "The Lament of a Preacher, Stephen Langton's *Commentary Super Threnos*," in *Étienne Langton, bibliste, prédicateur, théologien*, ed. L.-J. Bataillon, N. Bériou, G. Dahan, R. Quinto, BHCMA 9 (Brepols: Turnhout, 2010), 327-52.

[53] Timothy Bellamah, O.P., *The Biblical Commentary of William of Alton* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[54] Ibid., 29. Here is the Latin text from William of Alton: "Item notandum quod secundum sensum allegoricum materia huius libri est planctus pro recessu ecclesie a statu triplici, scilicet a feruore caritatis, a luce ueritatis, a constantia soliditatis. . . . Secundum sensum moralem materia huius libri est planctus pro ruina siue lapsu anime fidelis a statu iustitie per peccatum cogitationis, locutionis, et operis (*Super Threnos*, prol., [Bellamah, ed., 233-34]).

[55] Benedict XVI, Address at the Meeting with Representatives from the World of Culture Address.

[56] Smalley, *The Study of the Bible*, 308.

great deal of attention to Aquinas's appreciation for the literal sense and to its significance as a turning point in medieval exegesis.[57] Aquinas himself numbers among the first to comment on the book of Job "exclusively according to the literal sense."[58] The way that he interprets John 15:5, "Without me you can do nothing," illustrates the profundity of the moral teaching that, with the help of St. Thomas, one can discover within the pages of the New Testament: "Holy Writ," he says in his commentary on the Fourth Gospel, "often ascribes natural effects to the divine operation: because He it is who works in every agent, natural or voluntary."[59] One cannot imagine a more literally true observation about the moral life that arises from Aquinas's reading of the Gospel of John, that is, the literal words of sacred Scripture.[60]

The history of the interpretation of the sacred Scriptures constitutes its own proper study. For our purposes, the works of Fr. Spicq and Beryl Smalley persuade one that by the mid-twentieth century serious Catholic theologians came to appreciate how the study of the Bible in the Middle Ages animated the medieval practice of theology.[61] These same Catholic scholars would have glimpsed, at least, that St. Thomas Aquinas stands out among the most important and influential of medieval scriptural commentators. Today, Pope Benedict XVI's hermeneutic of continuity requires us to take Aquinas's scriptural work seriously. The pope surely dissuades us from dismissing out-of-hand Aquinas on the Bible as antiquated or prescientific. To round off these brief remarks on the retrieval of interest in the Scripture commentaries and studies produced by medieval theologians,

[57] Spicq, *Esquisse*, 273-88.

[58] Ibid., 288.

[59] *In Joan.* 15, lect. 1 (n. 1993), cited in Steven A. Long, "Divine Providence and John 15:5," in *Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas. Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology*, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 2005), 140-50, at 150.

[60] Before the work of Spicq, Paul Synave, O.P., (1888-1937) published his groundbreaking 1926 article on Aquinas and the literal sense: "La Doctrine de S. Thomas d'Aquin sur les sens littéral des Écritures," *Revue Thomiste* (1926): 40-65.

[61] Henri de Lubac published the four volumes of his *Exégèse médiévale*, *Les quatre sens de l'Écriture*, in 1959, 1961, and 1964.

especially Thomas Aquinas, I simply comment that one may consult the work of Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., who profits from the research that scholars such as Spicq and Smalley carried out on the study of the sacred Scriptures during the Middle Ages.[62] Father Torrell, however, does not undertake the arduous work that fell on the shoulders of moral theologians after the Second Vatican Council.

III

The figure who, after the Second Vatican Council, best illuminates the contribution that the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas makes to moral theology remains the Belgian Dominican, Servais Pinckaers.[63] We also owe a debt of gratitude to Fr. Pinckaers for clearly indicating the morass in which moral theology found itself in 1965. When the council Fathers appealed for a renewal inspired—that is, "animated"—by sacred Scripture, they expressed the hope that something better could be found than the conglomerate of casuist manuals that drew inspiration neither from the sacred Scriptures nor the Fathers of the Church nor St. Thomas Aquinas. The casuist manuals of the modern period developed a jurisprudence of morals. Within this juridical system, the pope was compelled to play the role of a Supreme Court Justice. Consider the resolution of the moral problem that faced servants whose masters required them to cooperate in a bad action, for example, by holding a ladder against a window in order to assist a master to enter the place where he would commit either adultery or fornication. Certain casuist opinions about "the servant and the ladder" case drew the attention of Pope Innocent XI, who disallowed human respect on the part of the servant as a

[62] A bibliography of J.-P. Torrell's writings into 1992 has been published by Gilles Emery for the former's *Festschrift*. See Carlos-Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira, ed., *Ordo sapientiae et amoris: Image et message de Saint Thomas d'Aquin a travers les recentes etudes historiques, hermeneutiques et doctrinales* (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1993).

[63] For an introduction to this important figure in twentieth-century moral theology, see my "Hommage au Père Servais-Théodore Pinckaers, OP.: The Significance of His Work," *Nova et Vetera*, English edition, 5 (2007): 1-16.

mitigating factor to excuse him from sinning mortally when, as condemned proposition 51 reads, the servant offers the master "his shoulders and many times assists him by holding a ladder."[64] One is tempted to opine that the multiplication of tropological interpretations of the Bible may seem discreet when compared with the profusion of opinions on the cases of conscience that dominated the practice of moral theology during the four-hundred-year reign of casuistry. The same pope also had to condemn another laxist opinion, namely, that one could satisfy the Sunday obligation by hearing at the same time two different parts of the Mass celebrated by different priests.[65]

One thing is sure, as Fr. Pinckaers has demonstrated authoritatively: neither classical biblical commentary nor higher criticism of the Bible thwarted those canon lawyers and other moral theologians who by the mid-twentieth century had become highly trained practitioners of rule-dominated ethical systems—the so-called schools—from imposing harsh burdens on men's shoulders.[66] During the period of casuistry, whatever moral inspiration may have been gleaned from the sacred Scriptures became the property of the ascetical and mystical theologians who practiced their discipline in another world from that of the every-weekend parish confessional. This celebrated split between moral theology on the one hand and ascetical or mystical theology on the other inhibited the casuist authors from turning to the sacred Scriptures. After all, where would one turn in the Bible to resolve the case of the Compromised Servant or of the Two-for-One Sunday Mass-Goer? There was only one exception to the general rule that the casuistry of the modern period excluded sacred Scripture: the biblical texts that promised damnation to the

[64] See *DS* 2151. For further information, see McLean A. Cummings, "The Servant and the Ladder: Implicitly Formal Cooperation with Evil in Light of *Veritatis Splendor*" (Ph.D diss., Ateneo Pontificio Regina Apostolorum, 2009).

[65] See *DS* 2153: Proposition 53: "Satisfacit praecepto Ecclesiae de audiendo Sacro, qui duas partes, immo quattour simul a diversis celebrantibus audit."

[66] See Matt 23:4: They "bind burdens heavy and hard to bear, and lay them on the shoulders of men, but will not move them with their finger."

sinner. The casuist deontologists could not survive without the divinely warranted threat of sanctions, both temporal and eternal.

Other theologians have discussed the place of the Bible in postconciliar moral theology. For example, volume 4 of *Readings in Moral Theology* addresses "The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology."[67] Fathers Charles Curran and the late Richard McCormick edited this volume in 1984, roughly during the time that Fr. Pinckaers was preparing for publication in Paris and Fribourg his *Les Sources de la morale chrétienne: Sa méthode, son contenu, son histoire*.[68] The Curran/McCormick "readings" exhibit the outlooks of theologians with respect to moral theology and sacred Scripture from 1968 through the early 1980s. The contributors include both Protestant and Catholic authors. In retrospect, that is, after more than a quarter-century, it would be difficult to draw a consensus from these wide-ranging essays. More recently, the Pontifical Biblical Commission has issued a document entitled, "The Bible and Morality: Biblical Roots of Christian Conduct."[69] In his "Preface," William Cardinal Levada states: "the document stresses the fact that direct solutions to the numerous outstanding problems cannot be found in Sacred Scripture."[70] At the same time, the cardinal acknowledges that the commission does discover within the pages of the sacred Scriptures the broad context of world outlook and ethical values within which the proper answers to moral questions should be located. For example, the dignity of the human being and the example of Jesus afford the diligent student of the Bible an entrée into what one may call the moral horizons of the Bible.[71]

[67] *Readings in Moral Theology,* no. 4, *The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology*, ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1984).

[68] English edition: Servais-Th. Pinckaers, O.P., *The Sources of Christian Ethics*, trans. M. T. Noble (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995).

[69] Pontifical Biblical Commission, "The Bible and Morality: Biblical Roots of Christian Conduct" (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008).

[70] Ibid., 8.

[71] The Church also teaches by correcting and rebuking. For some indications of what happens when the teaching authority of the canonical Scriptures is compromised, see "Notificazione su Alcune Publicazioni del Prof. Dr. Reinhard Messner," issued on 30 November 2000 by the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith in Congregatio Pro

Finally, I would like to point out the encyclical letter of Blessed Pope John Paul II *Veritatis splendor*, issued in 1993, whose twentieth anniversary is quickly approaching. In my view, this encyclical letter best indicates the proper response to the question, "how can post-Vatican II Thomistic Moral Theology re-integrate Scripture, giving it its rightful place?" As many commentators have pointed out, *Veritatis splendor* draws upon the Thomist heritage in moral theology. It would be impossible to interpret the encyclical without some training in the moral theology found in the *Summa Theologiae*. The genius that Pope John Paul II brought to this innovative form of papal teaching in moral theology instructs us about how Scripture finds its place within Thomist moral theology. In a word, *Veritatis splendor* accomplishes exactly what the Second Vatican Council called for. That is, the encyclical points out man's high calling and indicates in a general way how the Christian believer can reach this end, which concretely appears as the beatific vision of God. The encyclical uses Scripture to sustain its argument. The chapters where the sacred Scriptures control the exposition include the first: "'Teacher, What Good Must I Do . . .' (Mt 19:16)?" and the third, "'Lest the Cross of Christ Be Emptied of Its Power' (1Cor 1:17)."[72] The second chapter, however, though it also carries a title from Scripture, "Do Not Be Conformed to this World" (Rom 12:2) does not follow the method of biblical exposition. Not at all. Instead, it follows, in its main lines, the substance of the *Prima Secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae*: freedom and law, conscience and truth, fundamental choice and specific kinds of behavior, the moral act. These themes are set within a teleology of morals. Chapter 2 also provides the remedies for the wrong-headed proposals in moral theology that followed the twenty-five year period after the Second Vatican Council, if we mark the end of the council's work by the year that witnessed a widespread rejection of the 1968

Doctrina Fidei, *Documenta inde a Concilio Vaticano Secundo Expleto Edita (1966-2005)*, (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2006), 539-47.

[72] The Gospel of Matthew and the Epistles of Paul are the books of the Bible that Saint Dominic carried with him and had committed to memory.

encyclical letter of Pope Paul VI on the transmission of human life, *Humanae vitae* (1968-1993).

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To conclude, I summarize three findings that form the basis for my reply to the question about sacred Scripture and the moral theology of Aquinas today.

(1) Nothing in the Church's official statements may be read to suggest that the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas suffers from its lack of attention to the sacred Scriptures. On the contrary, as I have endeavored to demonstrate, the Second Vatican Council assumed that the study of sacred Scripture and the theology of Thomas Aquinas reciprocally serve each other. In my view, the 2010 Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation *Verbum Domini*, which cites Aquinas three times, further supports this view of how the Church regards Aquinas the exegete.[73]

(2) As for moral theology, one must accept the limits that moral science imposes on theology, including biblical science. The 1998 encyclical letter of Blessed John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, makes this point:

> Moral theology has perhaps an even greater [than the other branches of theology] need of philosophy's contribution. In the New Testament, human life is much less governed by prescriptions than in the Old Testament. Life in the Spirit leads believers to a freedom and responsibility which surpasses the law.[74]

In other words, as Cardinal Levada has observed, one cannot expect the sacred Scriptures to solve every moral problem. Chapter 2 of *Veritatis splendor* draws on philosophical arguments to instruct about the basic principles that govern Catholic moral theology. When reference to the sacred Scripture is made, the reference serves both to support and to illuminate the magisterial teaching, much as was the practice of Thomas Aquinas when in the *Secunda Pars* he took the virtues of the philosophers and

[73] See Benedict XVI, *Verbum Domini* 9, 29, 37.

[74] Pope John Paul II, encyclical letter *Fides et ratio* 68.

showed how the gift of divine grace creates an analogous world of Christian living.

(3) How should the theologian today practice Thomist moral theology? This question in fact inspired the inauguration some twenty years ago of the "Catholic Moral Thought" series published by The Catholic University of America Press. The series has published, so far, four volumes that aim to implement the moral theology required by the Second Vatican Council. Each volume treats problems in the major fields of moral theology so as to "shed light on the loftiness of the calling of the faithful in Christ and the obligation that is theirs of bearing fruit in charity for the life of the world."[75] To the best of my knowledge and judgment, one finds little in these volumes to which Thomas Aquinas, were he alive today, would take exception.

[75] "Specialis cura impendatur Theologiae morali perficiendae, cuius scientifica expositio, doctrina S. Scripturae magis nutrita, celsitudinem vocationis fidelium in Christo illustret eorumque obligationem in caritate pro mundi vita fructum ferendi" (Vatican II, *Optatam totius* 16).

The Thomist 76 (2012): 189-209

BEATA TRINITAS: THE BEATITUDE OF GOD AS PRELUDE TO THE TRINITARIAN PROCESSIONS

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THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE* of St. Thomas Aquinas was written, by the author's own admission, for beginners in theology. Nevertheless, the principles at work for determining the order in which the material is treated sometimes lie hidden beneath the deceptively simple layout of the text. This article aims to show that the axiom, often cited by Aquinas, that "the highest in a lower order touches upon the lowest in a higher order" can be applied to the case of our natural knowledge of the divine beatitude in relation to the revealed truths that there is procession in God and that man's beatitude consists in the vision of the divine essence. More specifically, this article aims to show that the truths established in the question on divine beatitude (I, q. 26) fittingly touch upon the truths established in the question on the divine processions (I, q. 27) and the questions on man's beatitude (I-II, qq. 1-5).[1]

Reading the *Summa Theologiae* with this ordering principle in mind not only highlights the great importance of the question on

[1] Some authors, such as F. E. Crowe, perceive a certain discontinuity in the text of the *Pars Prima* of the *Summa Theologiae* between questions 26 and 27. Crowe proposes to insert a new question (26A) so that "the unitary God is linked naturally with the Trinitarian God, and the Trinitarian God is continuous in human thought with the unitary God, and we have the Trinity emerging from within the nature of God instead of being considered in a separate set of questions" ("For Inserting a New Question 26(A) in the *Prima Pars*," *The Thomist* 64 [2000]: 565-80, at 579). If the thesis of this article is correct, there would be no need to insert a further question to manifest the contiguity between *De Deo uno* and *De Deo trino*.

the divine beatitude as an interpretive key for the rest of the text,[2] it also has significant consequences for understanding the relationship between philosophy and theology and the relationship between nature and grace.

I will first examine in a general way the meaning of the axiom that "the highest in a lower order touches upon the lowest in a higher order," as applied to both the order of being and the order of knowledge. Next, I will argue that this axiom applies to the question on the divine beatitude in the *Summa Theologiae* in relation to the revealed knowledge of the divine processions and human beatitude. In this section, I will argue (1) that knowledge of the divine beatitude is the highest instance of our natural knowledge about God, and (2) that knowledge of the divine processions is the lowest instance of revealed knowledge about God. The section will conclude with an examination of the way in which the divine beatitude touches upon the processions in God. Finally, I will examine how, in the context of the *Summa Theologiae*, our natural knowledge of God as the beatitude of creatures touches upon what has been revealed about human beatitude.

[2] It is interesting to note that in the beginning of the question on the beatitude of God, St. Thomas states: "Last of all, after the consideration of those things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence, the divine beatitude ought to be considered." What is striking about this statement is the word "after." St. Thomas does not say "after the consideration of the *other* things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence," but simply states that this is after "those things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence." It leaves the reader with the impression that the treatment of the divine beatitude is something not included in the treatment of the unity of the divine essence, but rather something after this treatment. Yet in concluding question 26 he says: "The things said suffice about those things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence;" and in introducing question 27 he restates: "Having considered those things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence, it remains [for us] to consider those things which pertain to the trinity of Persons in divine matters." This textual oddity is perhaps St. Thomas's way of giving the reader a clue that the treatment of the divine beatitude is in some way a middle between the consideration of the unity of the divine essence and the consideration of the Trinity of persons.

I. Contiguity in Being and in Knowledge

Experience shows that both in being and in our knowledge of beings there exists a certain contiguity.[3] Saint Thomas expresses his conviction about this contiguity with the axiom: "the lower in its highest point touches the higher in its lowest point."[4] He applies this principle to the order of nature in his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*:

> In order that the universe should be perfect, no degree of perfection is passed over in things, but little by little nature proceeds from imperfect things to perfect ones. For this reason also, Aristotle, in the eighth book of his *Metaphysics* likens the species of things to numbers, which little by little advance in size. Hence, in living things certain have only one of the aforesaid [powers], namely plants, in which there exists only the vegetative, which is necessary for existence in all material, living things, since to this power are attributed operations pertaining to material existence. In others, however, namely animals, there is present both the vegetative and the sensitive [powers].[5]

It is easy enough to find more specific examples that illustrate this principle from our experience. In the natural world we see the highest of nonrational beings, primates, have a certain likeness to men. Man, in turn, has a certain likeness to separated substances,

[3] I prefer to use the term 'contiguity' instead of 'continuity' since contiguity communicates more distinctly the idea of an essential difference between two orders that touch but do not fuse together. This is also the way that St. Thomas prefers to express himself: "Natures which are ordained to one another are related to each other as contiguous bodies, the lower in its highest point touches the higher in its lowest point." (*De Verit.*, q. 16, a. 1). Nevertheless, there is a sense in which contiguous orders can also be called continuous inasmuch as there is nothing between them.

[4] *De Verit.*, q. 16, a. 1: "Inferius in sui supremo tangit superius in sui infimo."

[5] II *De Anima*, lect. 5: "Quod universum sit perfectum, nullus gradus perfectionis in rebus intermittitur, sed paulatim natura de imperfectis ad perfecta procedit. Propter quod etiam Aristoteles, in octavo metaphysicae, assimilat species rerum numeris, qui paulatim in augmentum proficiunt. Unde in viventibus quaedam habent unum tantum praedictorum, scilicet plantae, in quibus est solum vegetativum, quod necesse est in omnibus viventibus materialibus esse, quia huic potentiae attribuuntur operationes pertinentes ad esse materiale. Aliis autem, scilicet animalibus, inest vegetativum et sensitivum." Notice that Aristotle finds a suitable analogy in numbers, a species of discrete quantity, which underlines the fact that each species and order remains formally distinct from the other and does not blend into the other by strict continuity.

since, of all animals, man alone has a soul capable of existing apart from matter: "For our souls in the order of nature are as if touching upon the angels, just as an inferior angel [touches] a superior one."[6] Moreover, among certain plants (e.g., the Venus Fly-Trap) we find a likeness to the sensation of touch found in the lowest animals (e.g., barnacles). Viruses in turn seem to be very much like living things, even though, by themselves, they seem to lack activities essential for life. Again, in the categories of being, we find a certain likeness between substance, which is being in the highest degree, and quantity, which is being in a participated way.[7] Hence, the word "body" is used equivocally, sometimes to mean the lowest kind of substance, and sometimes to mean the most complete kind of quantity: a volume extended in three dimensions.[8]

The powers of knowing also stand in an ordered relationship to one another, with the higher senses bearing a likeness to intelligence, and human intelligence bearing a likeness to angelic intelligence:

> This power is fittingly called a spark since just as a spark is a small particle flying out from a fire, so this power is a certain small participation of intellectuality with respect to the intellectuality which is in an angel: and on account of this also the superior part of reason is called a spark since it is the highest thing in a rational nature.[9]

As a consequence of this contiguity among beings and knowing powers, a corresponding contiguity exists in our knowledge of beings. Euclid concludes his thirteen books of the *Elements* with the treatment of the five regular solids. This implies that the highest in the science of mathematics is the treatment of quantity extended in three dimensions. At the beginning of natural

[6] *Quodl.* IX, q. 4, a. 5, ad.2: "Animae vero nostrae ordine naturae quasi contiguantur ipsis Angelis, sicut Angelus inferior superiori."

[7] For example, see Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, part I, principle 53.

[8] Cf. *De Ente et essentia*, c. 1.

[9] II *Sent.*, d. 39, q. 3, a. 1: "Haec virtus scintilla convenienter dicitur, quod sicut scintilla est modicum ex igne evolans; ita haec virtus est quaedam modica participatio intellectualitatis, respectu ejus quod de intellectualitate in Angelo est: et propter hoc etiam superior pars rationis scintilla dicitur quia in natura rationali supremum est."

philosophy, simple, extended, material bodies (i.e., the elements) are considered.[10] At the other end of the spectrum, at the highest limits of natural philosophy, the human soul is treated, which again has a likeness to the separated substances treated in the science of metaphysics. The same principle holds in regard to the relationship between the practical and speculative sciences. Logic holds a certain pre-eminence among the practical sciences, and hence has a certain likeness to the lowest among the speculative sciences, mathematics. As a consequence of this likeness, hybrid arts like Boolean algebra and symbolic logic have been established. This cursory glance at the various orders of being and knowledge reveals that there seems to be a contiguity among orders of being and a contiguity in our knowledge of these orders.

However, even if the universality of this principle can be manifested inductively, we encounter a particular difficulty in applying this principle to the case of truths that can be known about God from reason alone and truths that can be known[11] about God from revelation. The difficulty is this: There is no contiguity between the being of God and the being of creatures, since God's being infinitely exceeds created being (which is being only by participation), and therefore God and creatures are not called beings univocally.[12] It seems to follow that there cannot be a contiguity between our knowledge of God and creatures, nor of our knowledge of God derived from revelation and our knowledge of God derived from creatures.

To overcome this difficulty it is essential to see the reason why there is contiguity among beings. Addressing this question, St.

[10] The likeness between mathematical extension and simple, extended, material bodies resulted in confusion between them by early thinkers such as the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, as well as by modern thinkers such as Newton, who posited mathematical principles of natural things.

[11] Although, strictly speaking, the truths that are revealed to us by God are believed rather than known, any truth that is certain (i.e., determines the mind to one side of a contradiction) can be said to be known in a broad sense of the word "knowledge." Saint Thomas himself often uses the word "knowledge" in this broad sense: "Faith is in some sense knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to something knowable" (*STh* I, q. 12, a. 13, ad 3).

[12] See *STh* I, q. 13, a. 5: "Impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce." Also see *De Verit.*, q. 2, a. 11.

Thomas states: "Every inferior nature in its highest touches upon the lowest of a superior nature *according as it shares something of the superior nature, albeit deficiently*."[13] So long as there is a share or participation of the lower nature in the higher nature, there can be some kind of contiguity in being and, consequently, in knowledge. For this reason, being is not said purely equivocally of God and creatures, but analogously, so that knowledge of creatures can lead to true, albeit imperfect knowledge of God.[14] As Cornelio Fabro states it: "The Thomistic notion of participation, founded in *esse* as supreme intensive act, makes it possible to pass from finite to Infinite Being through analogical discourse, which has in participation its beginning, middle and conclusion."[15]

The fact that the contiguity found among beings and our knowledge of them is a result of the participation of the lower orders of being in the higher orders leads to a deeper understanding of this contiguity. This participation, while imperfect, is still a share in something proper to the higher order. For example, the human soul, though essentially a form of something material, really shares in the mode of being and acting of a separated substance. Logic, though essentially an art, shares in the mode of a science insofar as necessary relations can be shown to exist among the intentions of reason.[16] Consequently, wherever we find this contiguity in being and knowledge, we expect to find also some kind of a medium in which what is possessed properly and perfectly by a higher order is possessed by participation and imperfectly in a lower order.

[13] III *Sent*., q. 26, q. 1, a. 2: "omnis natura inferior in sui supremo attingit ad infimum naturae superioris, secundum quod participat aliquid de natura superioris, quamvis deficienter" (emphasis added). See also *De Verit*., q. 16, a. 1: "natura inferior attingit in sui supremo ad aliquid quod est proprium superioris naturae, imperfecte illud participans;" and *In Div. Nom*., c. 4, lect. 5: "superiora sunt in inferioribus, secundum participationem; inferiora vero sunt in superioribus, per excellentiam quamdam et sic omnia sunt in omnibus."

[14] See *STh* I, q. 13, a. 5; and I *Sent*., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4.

[15] C. Fabro, "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation," trans. B. M. Bonansea, *The Review of Metaphysics* 27 (1974): 479.

[16] Saint Thomas sometimes makes a distinction between *logica docens* and *logica utens* to explain these different aspects of logic. For example, see IV *Metaphys*., lect. 4.

II. The Beatitude of God: The Highest Instance of Our Natural Knowledge of God

From reason, unaided by faith or revelation, we can know that God is happy. I will argue that this knowledge of God's beatitude is higher than any other knowledge we can have of God from reason alone (e.g., our knowledge that God exists, is good, is wise, etc.). However, before discussing whether our knowledge of the divine beatitude is higher than our knowledge of other divine attributes, a prior question must be answered: Is it possible for one knowledge about God to be higher than another knowledge about God? The difficulty is that in God there is no order among essential attributes, for order implies real distinction, which is opposed to the divine simplicity. Order also implies before and after, which is also not found in God, since this is contrary to the perfection of God. Everything in God must have the notion of a first principle, and hence cannot come after anything. Therefore, if there is any order in our knowledge about God, it seems that this order is arbitrary and does not have a foundation in God, but only in our mind. For this reason, it seems that no knowledge about the divine attributes can really be higher than any other knowledge.

At the beginning of his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, St. Thomas considers the question whether or not the distinct names that signify various divine attributes have a foundation in God himself, or only in our mind. After a careful analysis of the various positions and difficulties, he concludes:

> The plurality of these notions is not only from the part of our intellect, but also from the part of God himself, inasmuch as by his perfection he exceeds any one concept of our intellect. And therefore, to the plurality of these notions corresponds something in the reality which God is, not indeed a plurality of things, but a full perfection, from which it happens that all these conceptions befit him.[17]

[17] I *Sent*., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3: "Pluralitas istarum rationum non tantum est ex parte intellectus nostri, sed etiam ex parte ipsius Dei, inquantum sua perfectio superat unamquamque conceptionem nostri intellectus. Et ideo pluralitati istarum rationum respondet aliquid in re quae Deus est: non quidem pluralitas rei, sed plena perfectio, ex qua contingit ut omnes istae

Because what God is exceeds any created likeness, no single created concept can adequately express what he is in himself. Therefore, we use a plurality of names, having corresponding notions, each of which signifies and expresses a "part"[18] of what God is. And therefore, these different names and their corresponding concepts do have a foundation in God.

From this we can further deduce that some names applied to God signify what God is more perfectly and completely than other names, insofar as some of these names communicate more fully the reality which God is. And so, those names which more fully express what God is correspond to a higher knowledge about him.

Here a further distinction ought to be made. It is one thing to say that a name is "higher" (i.e., more fully expresses what God is) and another thing to say that a name is the name most proper to God, or that it most perfectly applies to God.[19] Indeed, because of the infinite distance between God and creatures the name that is applied to God least inadequately is the name "being."[20] And it is the least inadequate precisely because it says the least about him. The name "being" says very little about God, even though it says that very little in the best, most proper way. Other names could say more about God (albeit in a less proper way).[21] Indeed,

conceptiones ei aptentur."

[18] By "part" here we do not intend to signify the parts of an integral or universal whole. This would introduce division in God. However, God can in some sense be called a potential whole insofar as every created effect is contained in God's power. Knowledge of God from these effects is, therefore, partial knowledge. See C. Fabro: "In the moral and in the strictly metaphysical order participation concerns properly speaking the mode of having and receiving, in the sense that the 'whole' remains intact and undivided, while an aspect or form of the object is being participated." (Fabro, "Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy," 453).

[19] It is important not to confuse a name that is most proper with a name that is highest in the sense we are using here, as W. J. Hankey seems to do: "[St. Thomas] determines that *esse* is the highest of them [i.e., the names said of God]" (*God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 5).

[20] See *STh* I, q. 13, a. 11.

[21] Cf. ibid., ad.1: "Hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est. Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum naturam divinam"

a name (and corresponding concept) which in itself contains other, more universal notions, such as being, goodness, life, etc., would say more about God, or express what God is more fully. For as St. Thomas teaches: "our intellect ascends to God from the multiplicity of creatures."[22] A concept that contains within itself the other concepts about God so as to express in a most full way what God is would in some way, therefore, constitute the highest knowledge about God.

The fact that St. Thomas treats the divine beatitude last among the divine attributes is a sign, though not a necessary indication, that our knowledge of the divine beatitude is the highest knowledge we can have about God by means of reason unaided by faith. One way in which one knowledge can be shown to be higher than another is that the higher knowledge includes the lower knowledge, so that he who has the higher knowledge knows, in principle, what is contained in the lower knowledge. For example, one who knows how to form demonstrations also knows how to define, since part of every demonstration is a definition of the middle term; and unless that definition is seen by the one framing the argument, he does not see it as a demonstration. Most properly, one knowledge is called higher than another when the lower knowledge is directed to and for the sake of the higher knowledge. For example, the political art is higher than the art of economics, since the science about national wealth is ordered to and for the sake of the good of civil society.

Now in both of these ways the knowledge of the divine beatitude can be shown to be the highest instance of our natural knowledge about God. First, our knowledge of God's beatitude presupposes a knowledge of his life, will, and intellect, as well as all of his entitative attributes, such as his perfection, goodness,

("This name 'who is' is a more proper name of God than this name 'God' with regard to that from which it is imposed—namely, from 'to be'—and also with regard to the mode of signifying and consignifying, as was said. But with regard to that for the sake of which the name was imposed for signifying, this name God is more proper, which is imposed for the sake of signifying the divine nature").

[22] *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 6, ad 5: "In intellectu nostro ex multiplicitate creaturarum in Deum ascendente."

and unity. For beatitude is found in an intellectual operation which, as a good, is an object of the will and, as an operation, is a kind of living activity. Therefore, knowledge of God's beatitude includes a knowledge of all God's other attributes.[23] Second, the knowledge of the other divine attributes is for the sake of knowing the divine beatitude. For as beatitude is nothing other than the perfect good of an intellectual nature, so the divine beatitude is nothing other than the perfect good of God. And although nothing in God is caused, nevertheless, beatitude has the notion of an ultimate final cause, so that in our knowledge it serves as an ultimate explanatory principle. Therefore, the beatitude of God has the notion of the ultimate explanation for God's being and operation. For this reason Aristotle expresses a certain wonder and admiration when he finally arrives at a consideration of the divine beatitude: "If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better, this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state."[24] Wonder comes about when one desires to know the cause of something great, but is unable to do so. Aristotle is implying that he has reached the limit of explanation here: he cannot seek a further cause, but must simply wonder at this divine attribute.[25]

These considerations manifest why it is that St. Thomas treated the divine beatitude last of all, as if arriving at the limit of natural knowledge the human mind can have about God. We now move on to consider the beginnings of revealed truth about God.

[23] See Hankey: "Beatitude gathers together all the preceding perfections" (*God in Himself*, 112).

[24] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b24-25 (trans. W. D. Ross in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon [New York: Random House, 1941] 880).

[25] Certainly one with a rectified appetite will immediately appreciate that knowledge of the beatitude of God is much more wonderful and important than mere knowledge of his existence. Yet so much research is dedicated to coming to know the existence of God, and so little to know God's beatitude more perfectly.

III. The Divine Processions as the Lowest among Revealed Truths about God

A preliminary objection to the statement that the lowest instance of our knowledge of God derived from divine revelation is the knowledge of the processions of the divine persons is that among the revealed truths considered in sacred doctrine, many concern angels, men, the moral life of man and even the body of man. Such truths are certainly not higher than a knowledge of the processions in God. This objection is helpful in clarifying what we mean by the expression "knowledge of God derived from divine revelation." Sacred doctrine treats, as its primary subject, God in himself; but in a secondary way the subject of sacred doctrine is creatures insofar as they are referred to God as revealed by God.[26] When we speak here about the knowledge of God derived from divine revelation, we are considering the knowledge about God in himself, not the knowledge of creatures as referred to God.[27]

Having made this clarification, let us consider why one knowledge is said to be lower than another. Just as the highest knowledge of a subject is that which includes all lower knowledge and which is the end of lower knowledge about that subject, so conversely the lowest knowledge about a subject is that which is included and presupposed in all other knowledge about that subject and which is for the sake of that other knowledge.

In all of our knowledge about the Trinity of persons in God, the truth presupposed and included is the truth that there is procession in God. The knowledge about the divine persons is the end of all theology. But the divine persons cannot be understood rightly without understanding the relations in God which constitute the persons. Moreover, the relations cannot be

[26] See *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7: "All things are treated in sacred doctrine under the aspect of God: either because they are God himself, or because they have an order to God, as to a principal or an end."

[27] Hence, my contention is that there is a certain contiguity between our natural knowledge about God himself and our supernatural knowledge about God in himself. Likewise, there may also be a certain contiguity between our natural knowledge of creatures as referred to God and our supernatural knowledge of creatures as referred to God.

understood without understanding the processions in God.[28] Therefore, the processions are understood for the sake of understanding the relations, and the relations are understood for the sake of understanding the persons. Any further properties of the divine persons (e.g., their equality), presupposes a knowledge of the persons themselves, since these persons are the proper subject of such properties. From this it follows that the knowledge of the processions in God is presupposed in and for the sake of all the other knowledge about God derived from revelation and, therefore, the knowledge of the divine processions is the lowest in this kind of knowledge about God.

IV. How the Divine Beatitude Touches upon the Processions in God

"Beatitude is the perfect good of an intellectual nature."[29] Therefore, divine beatitude is the perfect good of God. Since the intellectual operation of an intellectual being is its good and perfection, this perfect good of God is the immanent activity of the divine understanding which has God himself as its object.

[28] Our knowledge about the processions in God does not depend upon or presuppose some other revealed truth. Hence the revelation that there is procession in God has a certain primacy in the order of our knowledge. However, to understand this correctly, it is important to consider the distinct ways in which we can know a revealed truth. In *Quodl.* IV, q. 9, a. 3, St. Thomas observes that a theological disputation can be ordered to removing a doubt whether some revealed truth is so (*an sit*) or to expounding some mystery of faith for the sake of more fully understanding in what way it is so (*quomodo sit*: cf. Luke 1:34). In the first way, the simple authority of what is more obviously revealed in Scripture and accepted by the disputant is the basis for the argument. In the second way, the bases for the argument are the rational relationships between the various passages in Scripture, as well as their analogies with things known from nature. Therefore, in one way it could be held that the existence of distinct divine persons is better known than the existence of the processions in God, while from the perspective of understanding more deeply the nature of the divine persons through an analogical conception of the rational relationships between the processions, relations, and persons, the processions serve as the foundation for understanding everything else. This is why the truth that there is procession in God (cf. John 8:42) is the first revealed truth used as a principle in a demonstration in the *Summa Theologiae*. The genius of St. Thomas as a theologian is that he knows what is first in our knowledge among revealed truths, and so he is able to order that knowledge rightly: *sapientis est ordinare*.

[29] *STh* I, q. 26, a. 1.

Hence, St. Thomas concludes that the divine "beatitude is found in an act of [his] intellect."[30]

Compare this to what St. Thomas says about the first of the processions found in God. Having taken from divine revelation the principle that there is procession in God, St. Thomas goes on to determine what kind of procession it is. After excluding all processions which imply change or defect in God, St. Thomas considers the procession which is an act of the intellect which, while remaining in the intellect, proceeds to something in it, namely, to the concept of the thing understood. In us this concept is an intelligible, interior word. Hence, St. Thomas concludes that the procession in God is to be taken "according to an intelligible emanation which remains in him, just as [the emanation] of an intelligible word from the one speaking."[31]

It is clear that the notion of the divine beatitude is very close to the notion of this intelligible procession: both are immanent acts of the divine understanding in which the object understood is God himself. Indeed, they are so alike that it is difficult to see their difference.[32] One way to see the distinction between these two acts is to recognize that the divine beatitude names this act precisely as the perfection and end of the one performing it, while this act is called a procession insofar as it is an activity from an origin. However, there seems to be a more fundamental distinction: the notion of procession also involves a term which is really distinct from the origin of the procession, for every real procession is from an origin to a term which is really distinct from

[30] *STh* I, q. 26, a. 2, ad 2: "In actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo." In article 3, St. Thomas makes it clear that the object of this act of God's intellect must be God himself.

[31] Ibid.: "Secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso."

[32] Crowe observes a certain likeness between natural and supernatural theology: "Questions 2-43, instead of being two treatises (God as one, God as three) can be seen as one treatise on God, with no jump to a new consideration at question 27" ("For Inserting a New Question 26(A) in the *Prima Pars*," 565. However, while Crowe does see a connection between question 26 of the *Pars Prima* and the beginning questions of the *Prima Secundae*, he does not seem to see the particular likeness between the divine beatitude and the first of the Trinitarian processions. Rather, he seems to think that an additional question could be inserted between questions 26 and 27 to bridge the gap between them.

that origin.[33] When this procession is an intelligible procession, the term of the procession is called a word or concept. Thus, the notion of procession in God adds a further notion not found in the concept of divine beatitude, namely, the formation of a word, a concept really distinct from the conceiver.[34] The existence of such a really distinct word in God is something that can only be known from revelation.

In a certain sense, the notion of intelligible procession in God stands to the notion of the divine beatitude as act to potency. The general notion of the divine beatitude as an immanent act of the divine mind understanding itself remains open to a further determination. The procession in God specifies this general notion by adding the notion of a really distinct intelligible term of this act. However, "divine procession" is not a species under the genus "divine beatitude." For a genus is determined to a species by some principle already precontained in the power of the genus, as "sentient" is something already in the power of the genus "living." But in this case, a further principle outside the genus from a higher order of perfection is added which goes beyond the power of the genus. It is important to see correctly the difference between these two concepts of an immanent act of the divine mind understanding itself—otherwise, the essential distinction between our knowledge of God based upon reason and our knowledge of God based upon revelation will not be preserved.[35]

Let us consider a case which is similar in some respects. The notion of body as a kind of quantity extended in three dimensions differs from the notion of body which is found in the category of substance. Saint Thomas draws attention to this difference in the *De Ente et essentia*:

[33] I *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1, a. 1: "Processio enim, inquantum processio, dicit realem distinctionem et respectum ad principium a quo procedit, et non ad aliquem terminum."

[34] See *De Verit*., q. 4, a. 2, ad 7; I *Sent*., d. 10, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; d. 27, q. 2, a. 2; and *ST*h I, q. 28, a. 4, ad 1.

[35] Confusion between two essentially distinct orders of being or knowledge can lead to serious errors. For example, Newton's confusion between the mathematical and the natural led him to reject contingency in nature and to hold a mathematical determinism in the natural world. Similarly, confusion between the natural and supernatural orders can lead to the false attribution of the characteristics of one order to the other.

Therefore, the name "body" can be taken in many ways. Body according as it is in the genus of substance is called such from the fact that it has the kind of nature in which three dimensions can be designated. But these three designated dimensions themselves are what is signified by the term body which is in the genus of quantity.[36]

In the one case, body signifies that which is perfect in the category of quantity: a solid figure extended in all three dimensions. In the other case, body signifies something very imperfect in the category of substance: the genus of living and nonliving substances. Here again, the highest of the lower order of being (quantity) touches upon the lowest in the higher order of being (substance). The body that is a substance is not merely a further determination of what was already present in the concept of body in the category of quantity. Instead, a new principle outside the genus of quantity is found in the concept of body in the category of substance, namely, matter. Matter is a substantial principle which cannot be reduced to quantity precisely because it belongs to a higher order of being. As a consequence, body that is in the genus of quantity is closed to further perfection, since it exhausts all the principles proper to quantity: there can not be *per se* quantitative extension in more than three dimensions. Body that is a genus in the category of substance adds a further principle (i.e., matter) which opens the concept of body up to further perfections. The perfection of vegetative life or sensation cannot belong to body which is in the category of quantity since these perfections depend upon matter.

Like the notion of body, the notion of an immanent act of the divine mind understanding itself may be taken in two ways: it can be taken as something completing (in a way exhausting) our knowledge of God based upon reason, since it is the perfect good of God, in which case it is called the divine beatitude; or it can be taken as something which is the foundation of real relationships in God that makes it possible for the divinity to be communicated

[36] *De Ente et essentia*, c. 1: "Hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accipi potest. Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim tres dimensiones designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis."

to multiple persons. In the former case, it is conceived as something closed off to further perfections; in the latter case it is conceived as something open to further perfection, such as procession and communicability to multiple supposits.[37]

Not only is there a likeness between the divine beatitude as known by natural reason and the procession in God by way of intellect as known by faith: the second procession in God also finds a counterpart in natural theology. Just as beatitude is a good, and therefore is, according to our mode of understanding, the object of a further act of the divine will resting in that good,[38] so also the procession by way of intellect in God becomes the principle of a further procession by way of love[39] which completes and, so to speak, brings to rest the processions in God.[40] For this reason, St. Thomas notes that not only love but "enjoyment" (*fruitio*) is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, since it belongs appropriately to the Holy Spirit as love to be that "by which the Father and the Son enjoy one another."[41]

Another text in which St. Thomas notes the likeness between the act of love knowable by reason and the procession of love known by revelation is helpful here:

> Love in divine things is taken in three ways. For sometimes it is taken essentially, sometimes personally, sometimes notionally. When it is taken essentially, it does not signify some procession or real relation, but only a relation of reason, just as when we say about God that he is understanding and understood. For one and the same person is able to be understanding and understood. When, however, it is said personally, then it imports procession and real relation, and signifies the person himself, or a proceeding being, just as love is something proceeding. But

[37] It seems true too that just as matter is the new principle of a higher order which belongs to body in the category of substance, so also there is some principle belonging to the order of divine being which is the reason why this immanent act of the divine mind is not only an operation but an action that can be the foundation for real relation in God. Perhaps Crowe is seeking to identify this divine perfection by the proposal of a new divine attribute which he calls "*ipsum quia*" (*"*For Inserting a New Question 26(A) in the *Prima Pars,*" 572, 575-78).

[38] *STh* I, q. 26, a. 2: "Beatitudo, cum sit bonum, est obiectum voluntatis. Obiectum autem praeintelligitur actui potentiae. Unde, secundum modum intelligendi, prius est beatitudo divina, quam actus voluntatis in ea requiescentis."

[39] *STh* I, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3.

[40] *STh* I, q. 27, aa. 3 and 5.

[41] *STh* I, q. 39, a. 8.

when it is taken notionally, it signifies the very reason for the procession of the person: since love is not only something proceeding, but also signifies the reason for which other things proceed.[42]

Saint Thomas's account of beatitude and the Trinitarian processions therefore manifests the intelligible connection between the divine beatitude and the mystery of the Trinity: it manifests how the Trinitarian communion constitutes God's very happiness and enjoyment.[43] Saint Thomas's account also manifests how the Trinitarian communion is the ground and rationale for the communion and beatitude of creatures which proceed from God *ad extra*.[44]

There is a certain additional fittingness to the revealed truth that the beatitude of God is actually something communicable to many.[45] For it belongs to the very notion of a perfect good that it be common, that is, able to be diffused to and shared by many without being diminished. A good that is private in its very notion is totally exhausted by a single subject and, hence, less perfect than a good that is by its nature capable of diffusing beyond a

[42] I *Sent.*, d. 10, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

[43] Pope Pius XII seems to imply this connection in his encyclical *Mystici Corporis* where he writes: "In that celestial vision it will be granted to the eyes of the human mind strengthened by the light of glory, to contemplate the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in an utterly ineffable manner, to assist throughout eternity at the processions of the Divine Persons, and to rejoice with a happiness like to that with which the holy and undivided Trinity is happy" (*Mystici Corporis* 80). M. J. Scheeben expresses an intuition of this truth without giving the intelligible account found in Aquinas: "The supreme delight of God's own beatitude is the fellowship and mutual relationship of the Persons" (*The Mysteries of Christianity*, trans. Cyril Vollert, S.J. [London: Herder Book Co., 1964], 129). Interestingly, Hankey includes q. 26 of the *Prima Pars* as part of the tract *De Deo trino*, but provides no commentary or explanation for this move (*God in Himself,* 115). It seems that Hankey believes that if Aquinas had been consistent he would have held that the trinity can be known from reason and therefore that there should be no essential separation between *De Deo uno* and *De Deo trino*.

[44] As Gilles Emery puts it, "the immanent action in God (knowledge and will, the processions of the Word and the Holy Spirit) undergird His action in the world: the immanent action is the ground of the latter" (*The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. F. A. Murphy [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007], 42). The words of the First Epistle of St. John seem to reveal this truth: "That which we have seen and have heard, we declare unto you, that you also may have communion with us, and our communion may be with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ. And these things we write to you that our joy may be full." (1 John 1:3-4).

[45] See *STh* I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2.

single subject. Thus, even if it happened that the divine beatitude were the beatitude of a single supposit (divine person), such a good would only be private accidentally. It would be a common good according to its nature, that just so happened not to have other divine persons to communicate in it. By its very notion, the divine beatitude is a common good. This leads the mind that knows of God's beatitude to a certain openness to the possibility of that beatitude being communicated to many.

V. How God as the Beatitude of Creatures Touches upon the Beatific Vision

Sacred doctrine is not only speculative or theoretical; it is also practical. The divine beatitude also touches upon the beginnings of the moral part of sacred doctrine. It can be known by reason unaided by faith that God is the beatitude of every rational creature,[46] but by revelation we discover that God seen through his very essence is the beatitude of rational creatures.[47] Hence, at the beginning of the moral part of sacred doctrine it is shown that the ultimate end of human life consists in seeing the divine essence, which is nothing other than a share in the divine beatitude.

Although there is this likeness between the ways one knows God as the beatitude of creatures from reason and revelation, there is also an essential difference between these two ways of knowing God.[48] From reason alone, we can know that God is the beatitude of rational creatures insofar as he is knowable by them through their active natural principles. Revelation further manifests that God can and wills to communicate the knowledge of his essence in a way that is above these active natural principles, yet possible because of the rational creature's capacity for this vision of the divine essence. What we can know from reason alone inclines us to see that there is a greater perfection which is fitting to rational nature than that which is possible by

[46] *STh* I, q. 26, aa. 3-4.

[47] *STh* I-II, qq. 1-5; I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2.

[48] Cf. Vatican I, The Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith, *Dei Filius,* chap. 4.

our active natural principles.[49] By reason alone, we can see that if a rational creature is to be perfectly happy, he would have to see the first cause in itself. Yet there is no necessity that God fulfill every passive ability which belongs to a rational nature, otherwise it would follow that God must do whatever he is able to do.[50] And so, an essential difference remains between the truths we can know from reason alone and the truths that are revealed by God concerning the beatitude of rational creatures.

Similarly, there is an essential difference between the natural love that a rational creature has (and ought to exercise) toward God, and supernatural charity which loves God as a friend sharing the same good (i.e., divine beatitude). Charity does not merely mean loving God more than oneself or more than other creatures. This is true also of that natural love for God found in rational creatures. Since the natural love a rational creature has for God is greater than that creature's love for himself,[51] it stands to reason that the right moral disposition towards God is to will his beatitude above all things (even above our own beatitude). After all, God is the best among all beings, so that it is only right that we should be more interested in his happiness than in our own. But even though the natural love for God is essentially different from supernatural charity, it is not indifferent in relation to it. Even our natural love for God is ordered to union with God: a union which is as perfect as possible. And since the kind of union with God possible by charity through faith is a more perfect union

[49] Santiago Ramirez, in his tract *De hominis beatitudine*, summarizes his own position on the two ways in which God is the object of human beatitude: "God is the objective, natural beatitude of man only indirectly, that is, according to the proper and formal notion of First Cause and Ultimate End of natural works *ad extra*, especially of the rational soul itself; but He is the objective, supernatural beatitude of man directly, that is, according to the proper and formal notion of Deity just as it is in itself" (*De hominis beatitudine*, vol . 2 [Salamanca: Matriti: 1943], 275-76; translation mine). While this work by Ramirez does not directly consider divine beatitude in its relationship to the remainder of the *Summa Theologiae*, it is nevertheless an extensive treatment of human beatitude as developed in the *Summa Theologiae*.

[50] See III *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4.

[51] See *STh* I, q. 60, a. 5; and I-II, q. 109, a. 3. It is important to note that in a fallen human state this love is wounded, so that even the inclination of our nature to love God more than ourselves is inhibited by original sin.

than the union produced by natural love through natural knowledge, it can be seen that a supernatural love of God does not do violence to the natural order of love, but rather perfects, elevates, and even heals this order.[52] The perfection of natural love for God is at the same time the ultimate natural disposition for grace and supernatural charity. The highest in the lower order of love touches upon the lowest in the higher order of love.

CONCLUSION

Aristotle expressed his wonder when he came to understand the divine beatitude. Yet there was no further account which he could offer in explaining this supreme joy of God: he was at the end of reason's journey. Through faith St. Thomas was able to begin this journey anew where Aristotle left off: he began to plumb more deeply into the mystery of the divine happiness through an understanding of the mystery of the Trinitarian life of God. If my thesis is correct, Trinitarian theology is an extended reflection upon the happiness of God. It is as if St. Thomas, in contemplating the mystery of the Trinity, has merely responded to the Lord's command: "enter into the joy of your Master."[53] And so, the relationship between the divine beatitude and the mystery of the Trinity is not accidental, but part of that wisdom which "reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things *suaviter*."[54] This ordering wisdom is present in an eminent way in the writings of St. Thomas. Nevertheless, among the commentators of St. Thomas, ancient and modern alike, we find too little attention paid to this important question about the divine beatitude. The divine beatitude touches upon and is a natural

[52] In the context of this article, I cannot do justice to the topic of the relationship between the natural love for God and supernatural charity. My reason for introducing this topic is simply to exemplify how the more universal principle of the contiguity of a higher and lower order has application to the case of questions 26 and 27. For a more in-depth consideration of the natural love of God, see M. R. Gagnebet, "L'amour naturel de Dieu chez saint Thomas et ses contemporains," *Revue Thomiste* 48 (1948): 394-446; and *Revue Thomiste* 49 (1949): 31-102.

[53] Matt 25:21.

[54] Wis 8:1.

beginning for investigation into revealed truth and, therefore, it provides a privileged perspective for understanding the boundary between philosophy and theology, reason and revelation, nature and grace. An investigation of these relationships that concentrates almost exclusively upon human beatitude (for example, the natural desire to see God) provides too limited a perspective on the precise way in which grace perfects nature and revelation perfects reason. It is my hope that this article will help to remedy this defect and prompt further research into St. Thomas's understanding of the divine beatitude.

The Thomist 76 (2012): 211-31

A THOMISTIC REVISION OF DUMMETT'S PROOF FOR GOD

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IN 1996 THE BRITISH analytic philosopher Michael Dummett delivered the Gifford Lectures, and a decade later the edited talks were published as *Thought and Reality*.[1] Towards the conclusion of the small volume, the author offers an intriguing and rather novel proof for God's existence.

The late Dummett was a known Catholic, but his argument for God offers a strange blend of analytic tone and idealistic content, and so is jarringly outside the standard metaphysical proofs that have come to be associated with Catholic philosophers. The proof has received little attention,[2] possibly because the conclusion is not calculated to be popular with most analytic philosophers and the argument is not calculated to be popular with most theistic philosophers. I propose to present Dummett's argument as clearly and concisely as I can, and then engage it from the standpoint of Thomistic realism. Although this process will topple some supports that Dummett might consider essential to the proof, I believe the argument can be salvaged within the classical framework.

[1] Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.

[2] Cf. W. J. Mander, "On Arguing for the Existence of God as a Synthesis between Realism and Anti-Realism," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion,* forthcoming; Andrew Beards, "Dummett: Philosophy and Religion," in *The Philosophy of Michael Dummett,* ed. R. Auxier and E. Hahn (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 2007), 863-88.

I. DUMMETT'S ARGUMENT

The key element in Dummett's philosophy is his theory of truth and meaning. This theory takes as its starting point the question, what does it mean to understand a sentence? Dummett first considers Wittgenstein's answer to the question, which posits that to understand a sentence is to know what the world is like if the sentence is true (the "truth-conditional" theory of meaning). He rejects this answer on the grounds of circularity, since it explains knowledge in terms of the same knowledge, or understanding a sentence in terms of understanding that sentence. In other words, one cannot explain the act of understanding A by appealing to the act of understanding that if A, then the world is thus, since understanding that if A, then the world is thus assumes that A is already understood. For that the world is thus is precisely what A expresses. Therefore, to explain understanding proposition A by describing it as understanding that if A, then the world is thus, is to explain that understanding proposition A is equivalent to understanding that if A, then A. Which is, of course, not much of an explanation.[3]

To escape this circularity, Dummett proposes that understanding a sentence can only be explained in terms of a skill-set, an ability to know how to accept the truth of the sentence in question.[4] One has acquired the ability of recognizing the truth of sentences in a way similar to acquiring the ability to perform a

[3] See Dummett, *Thought and Reality*, 50-51, 78. See also Dummett's original statement of this problem in an early article: "But in order that someone should gain from the explanation that *P* is true in such-and-such circumstances an understanding of the sense of *P*, he must already know what it means to say of *P* that it is true. If when he enquires into this he is told that the only explanation is that to say that *P* is true is the same as to assert *P*, it will follow that in order to understand what is meant by saying that *P* is true, he must already know the sense of asserting *P*, which was precisely what was supposed to be being explained to him" (Michael Dummett, "Truth," in idem, *Truth and Other Enigmas* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978], 7). One can also find the same problem presented in its current version in Michael Dummett, "Meaning and Justification," in *Language, Logic and Formalization of Knowledge*, ed. Brian McGuinness (Gaeta: Bibliotheca di Gabriele Chiusano, 1998), 15-19.

[4] See Dummett, *Thought and Reality*, 56-57.

certain dance, like the rhumba,[5] and it is only this ability that can adequately characterize the art of understanding a sentence. There is no danger of circularity with this account, Dummett thinks, since it does not explain understanding a sentence in terms of understanding the sentence, but rather in terms of a kind of know-how, that is, the capacity to recognize when the sentence is true.

However, this model of understanding a sentence entails that a proposition is only meaningful for a person insofar as that person knows how to recognize the proposition as true (or not true). Dummett uses the term "justify" to signify the recognition of a proposition's truth,[6] and therefore christens his theory of meaning "justificationist." Consequently, a sentence only has meaning if it can be justified. If, on the other hand, a sentence cannot even in principle be justified—if we know in advance that we are and always will be unequipped to recognize the truth or falsity of a given proposition—the utterance or proposition can have no meaning. And, presumably, if a sentence/proposition has no meaning for us, then we cannot take the additional step of calling it true. Indeed, for Dummett, truth and meaning are correlative notions that "must be explained together."[7] How can a sentence be true if it has no meaning? Indeed, how can we assert the truth of a proposition if it has no meaning? But if, as has been claimed, an unjustifiable proposition has no meaning, and if the truth of a meaningless proposition can never be asserted, then the truth of an unjustifiable proposition could never be asserted.[8]

Dummett goes on to infer a number of antirealist doctrines from this initial description of meaning, but for our purposes it is enough to stress the point that for him statements that we could

[5] Dummett calls this kind of ability a "midway" or "intermediate" knowledge, since it lies somewhere between practical and theoretical knowledge (ibid., 48-49).

[6] Care must be taken not to confuse this use of the term "justify" with the use that frequently arises in epistemology discussions at least since Gettier, wherein "justify" means to have good reasons for a belief.

[7] Dummett, *Thought and Reality*, 65.

[8] "By what means could we possibly come to know in what a statement's *being* true consists, when we have no means of telling that it is true? What would constitute our having such a piece of knowledge?"(ibid., 61).

not, even in principle, recognize as true or not are meaningless statements. Thus, for instance, statements regarding infinite totalities are absurd, since no one could establish that an infinite totality would be actually infinite; to do so would require that one could have finished counting (i.e., come to the end of) an infinite aggregate.[9] Similarly, since we cannot, even in principle, measure the exact physical magnitude of an object beyond a certain interval, it is unintelligible to speak of such an exact magnitude.[10]

Nonetheless, there is a class of statements that would initially seem to be rendered meaningless by this criterion, but that Dummett is not prepared to dismiss as absurd. These are those statements regarding "things-in-themselves," that is to say, things as they exist independently of human perception. We tend to think that things exist in a fullness that exceeds our awareness of them, and it is just this fullness that physical science increasingly seeks to discover.[11] It is a human urge, a human ideal, to achieve the "view from nowhere," or as Merleau-Ponty put it, the "view from everywhere." In any case it is a view that presupposes that things actually exist differently than we can perceive them,[12] since we can only perceive such things from a limited and partial perspective.

Given the stipulation that no statement is meaningful which we cannot even recognize as being true, how can the statement "External things exist differently than limited minds can perceive them" ever count as meaningful? It is hard to see how we could recognize the statement as true, since we cannot know beyond our

[9] "The reason why we cannot survey an infinite totality is not the deficiency of human capabilities: it is that it is *senseless* to imagine an infinite task completed. An infinite task is by definition one that cannot in principle be completed" (ibid., 71).

[10] Ibid., 85-88. Although the notion of precise magnitudes is originally treated as meaningless, after Dummett finishes his proof for God's existence, he seems to allow that the notion *may* be meaningful, although we still may not presume that such exact magnitudes actually exist. See ibid., 107, 109.

[11] "[W]e seek a description quite independent of our experience, knowing that that experience is determined in part by what we observe but in part also by our contingent sense organs, size, location, and other characteristics. . . . We are striving to find a description of the physical universe that is independent of our modes of observation" (see ibid., 94).

[12] Again, "The urge to get behind the appearances and discover how things are in themselves remains with us: it is one of the motivations of science" (ibid., 93).

knowledge in order to know about things that are not being known by us.[13] However, the statement would be justifiable, and therefore meaningful, if some intelligent being that is not finite could recognize the fullness of such things. In the case of things-in-themselves (i.e., things-not-known-from-a-particular-perspective), only an intelligence that is not bound by a particular perspective could really know such things as they are.

> Since it makes no sense to speak of a world, or the world, independently of how it is apprehended, this one world must be the world as it is apprehended by some mind, yet not *in any particular way*, or from any one perspective rather than any other, but simply as it is: it constitutes the world as it is in itself. . . . There is no possibility of conceiving the world as a single reality, apprehended differently by different creatures within it, otherwise than as known in its totality by a mind that apprehends it as it is.[14]

We believe that things—and the totality of things which we call the world—exist independently of how we see them. We believe in things-in-themselves. But we know we cannot see things as they are in themselves; we are bound to particular, limited viewpoints. And yet, if a statement's truth requires that someone be able to recognize it as true, then the very meaningfulness of our conviction that things-in-themselves exist differently than any finite mind can apprehend requires an infinite intelligence who can apprehend such things in all their multifaceted richness.

> [H]ow things are in themselves consists in the way God apprehends them. That is the only way in which we can make sense of our conviction that there is such a thing as the world as it is in itself. . . . To conceive of the world as it is in itself requires conceiving of a mind that apprehends it as it is in itself.[15]

To summarize the argument: (a) a proposition cannot be meaningful unless it can be at least theoretically justified; (b) "things exist differently than we apprehend them" is a proposition that we cannot justify, and yet we feel a powerful conviction that

[13] "There is no way of conceiving anything independently of the store of concepts that determine the propositions we can entertain and of whose truth we can judge" (ibid., 99).

[14] Ibid., 101-2.

[15] Ibid., 102.

this proposition is true; (c) to vindicate the meaningfulness of our conviction, we must posit the existence of someone else who can at least theoretically recognize it as true, someone whose intelligence transcends human intelligence (and, indeed, all partial intelligences). This intelligence is the divine intelligence.

This is not the first time God has been invoked to validate our convictions about things-in-themselves. Descartes, for instance, needed God to vouch that the ideas give us solid information about things as they are, and not just as we think them to be. Nor is it the first time a philosopher has begun with the principle "What cannot be known cannot be" and used it to prove God's existence. Indeed, if we are to believe Berkeley, this was the core motivation of his entire system.[16] The originality of Dummett's natural theology, however, lies in the way he combines a theory of propositional meaning with an analysis of our conviction that there is more than what we can know. Consequently, although he may be justly situated in the Christian Idealist tradition, the proof is something of a new one. Since the argument hangs on the notion of a meaningful proposition and the conviction that there are things that in principle exceed human comprehension, it will be worthwhile to evaluate these two linchpins from the perspective of Thomistic realism.

II. Aquinas on Things as God Knows Them

As we have seen, Dummett's proof involves a subscription to the following three articles:

[16] "For after all, what deserves the first place in our studies, is the consideration of *God*, and our *duty*; which is to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual, if by what I have said I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the presence of God" (George Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues*, ed. Howard Robinson [New York: Oxford University Press, 2009], 95). Granted that Berkeley's *esse est percipi* is much stronger than Dummett's principle, they at least overlap in that neither philosopher considers it coherent to assert what cannot be known. Dummett is aware of the similarity, and remarks that his delivery of the Gifford Lectures "turned out very Berkeleyan." See "Intellectual Autobiography of Michael Dummett," in *The Philosophy of Michael Dummett*, ed. Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court 2007), 31.

An Idealist Thesis (I): Every meaningful statement is one which can, in principle, be recognized as either true or not.[17]

A Realist Thesis (R): Things exist differently than finite minds can apprehend them.

And from *I* and *R* Dummett goes on to argue: *Theism (T):* God exists.

As might be expected, Aquinas subscribes to *I*, *R*, and *T* as well,[18] but the line of reasoning he takes to reach them is quite different, for whereas Dummett concludes to *T* from *I* and *R*, Aquinas proves the Idealist and Realist Theses from God's existence.

In their basic outline Aquinas's proofs for God are well known, and it is enough for our present purposes to note in passing that they are generally arguments from causality. Once the first cause has been proven, moreover, Aquinas does not require much space to ascribe to him the traditional attributes of infinitude, omnipotence, and omniscience. We thus begin with *T*, the existence of an infinite, omnipotent, omniscient creator.

But if *T*, then surely *I*, for every meaningful statement can, in principle, be recognized as either true or not true by an infinite intelligence. Whatever can be known is known by God, and this must include the truth of all true propositions and the falsity of all false propositions.[19]

Aquinas also believes that *T* implies *R*. Once we recognize that the ultimate cause of all that exists is an infinite being, we come to realize that everything created has an incomprehensible origin. But if we cannot comprehend the efficient cause, then to some extent we cannot comprehend the effect:

[17] This is simply a restatement of the principle that no proposition which cannot be justified is meaningful.

[18] Needless to say, this does not exhaust the areas of overlap in their natural theology. For instance, as J. J. Haldane points out, both Aquinas and Dummett are agreed that God's knowledge does not merely correspond to the world, but constitutes it (J. J. C. Smart and J. J. Haldane, *Atheism & Theism,* 2d ed. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003), 239-40.

[19] *De Verit*., q. 2, a. 7: "Consequently, God knows whether or not each and every thing exists; and He knows all other propositions that can be formed about universals or individuals" (*omnia alia enuntiabilia quae formari possunt vel de universalibus, vel de individuis*).

For some say that all who see God in His essence see all that God sees by His knowledge of vision. This, however, is contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that according to faith all the angels see God in His essence. *Wherefore others say that others than Christ, although they see God in His essence, do not see all that God sees because they do not comprehend the Divine essence*. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause should know all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not in the competency of a created intellect.[20]

By the same token, only God can ultimately and completely know the reasons for created things. Therefore, the final cause, which on Aquinas's view must be fully known in order fully to know an effect, can only be fully known by God:

For, the reason for everything that has been made is derived from the end which its maker intended. But the end of all things made by God is divine goodness. Therefore, the reason for the things that have been made is so that the divine goodness might be diffused among things. And so, one would know all the reasons for things created if he knew all the goods which could come about in created things in accord with the order of divine wisdom. This would be to comprehend divine goodness and wisdom, something no created intellect can do.[21]

Although human and other finite intelligences can know things in an unimaginably excellent mode when united to the divine essence in the beatific vision, even there they cannot know creatures the way God knows creatures. Only God, who comprehends himself as the complete context for understanding what he has made, can perfectly know things the way they are. We cannot see existing things as they exist in themselves;

[20] *STh* Suppl., q. 92, a. 3, emphasis added. While Aquinas did hold that the human soul of Christ knew all existing things in the beatific vision, he admitted that Christ did not see these things as clearly as they were seen by God. See *STh* III, q. 10, a. 3: "The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge. Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created light received by the soul of Christ." It seems then that we may still say that things exist differently than even the human soul of Christ can see them, since Christ's human soul sees things less clearly than God sees them.

[21] *ScG* III, c. 59.

although we may indeed see them, and see them well, we cannot see them in their full clarity or in the fullness of their relation to God as efficient and final cause—a relation which is, of course, constitutive of the creature.[22]

To repeat: whereas Dummett begins with the doctrines that every meaningful proposition can be recognized as true or not, and that things exist differently than human beings can know them, and proceeds to the conclusion that God exists, Aquinas proceeds from God's existence to the justifiability of meaningful propositions and the unknowability (to humans) of things as they are in themselves.

Our question, then, comes down to this: given a Thomistic framework, is it possible to know *I* and *R* without previously knowing *T*? Furthermore, if *I* and *R* can be known without previously knowing that God exists, do they imply God's existence? If so, then we would have found a powerful congruence between Aquinas's Catholic realism and Dummett's Catholic antirealism, and a new proof for God's existence would be vindicated by Thomistic principles.

III. Aquinas on Truth and Meaning

For Dummett the affirmation of *I* (Every meaningful statement must be, in principle, recognizable as true or false) results from his theory of truth and meaning. For Aquinas, however, following Aristotle, it does not seem that the meaningfulness of statements requires justifiability, only that the individual terms within a statement have sense and are used to "signify that something belongs to something," that is, to predicate something of a subject.

According to Aquinas the intellect engages in two operations: in the first, simple ideas are grasped, and these simple ideas are expressed in individual words, or, more precisely, in names and verbs.[23] In the second act of the intellect, simple ideas are

[22] *STh* I, q. 44, aa. 1 and 4.

[23] Commenting on Aristotle's dictum that "Names and verbs are like understanding without composition or division," Aquinas says, "To understand this we must note again that one of the two operations of the intellect is the understanding of what is indivisible. The

combined and separated in the act of judgment, and it is this second act which is expressed in speech that combines names and verbs in "signifying that something does belong to a subject . . . or that something does not belong to a subject."[24] Consequently, when a name and a verb are put together in order to predicate something of a subject, "enunciative speech . . . in which there is truth and falsity," has been produced.[25] The mind understands simple things like what it means to be a cat, or what it means to be white; these simple things are signified by the words "cat" and "white." Then, when the mind judges that the cat is white, this judgment is expressed by putting these simple words together in the proposition "The cat is white." Since this enunciable states that something (whiteness) belongs to something (the cat), and since both the predicate and the subject signify,[26] the statement as a whole possesses truth or falsity. It is therefore a meaningful statement.

If then we join any signifying predicate to a signifying subject in order to ascribe the predicate to the subject (or deny the predicate of the subject), it will entail truth or falsity, and will therefore be meaningful, regardless of whether the statement can be determined to be true or not. For instance, "Jane turns invisible when her eyes are closed and no one is looking and no camera equipment is directed her way." Each relevant part of that statement signifies—"Jane," "turns invisible," "eyes," "closed," "no one," "looking" "camera equipment," "directed Jane's way"—and the speech is used to ascribe a predicate (turning invisible under highly specified conditions) to a subject (Jane).

intellect does this when it understands the *quiddity* or essence of a thing absolutely, for instance, *what* man is or *what* white is or what something else of this kind is. The other operation is the one in which it composes and divides simple concepts of this kind. He says that in this second operation of the intellect, i.e., composing and dividing, truth and falsity are found; the conclusion being that it is not found in the first" (I *Exp. Periherm.*, lect. 3). For a discussion of this first function and the nature of its indefectibility, see John I. Jenkins, *Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 104-23.

[24] I *Exp. Periherm.*, lect. 8.

[25] Ibid., lect. 7.

[26] Cf. ibid., lect. 6.

There is no good reason on the Thomistic-Aristotelian account to claim that this sentence is meaningless. For Aquinas, as we have seen, that statements are true or false is based upon their structure and whether they correspond to the facts.[27] Their truth or falsity is therefore independent of whether we can recognize them as true or false. Nonetheless, it seems safe to say that, unless we already know that God exists, we could not hope to know whether the statement is true or false.

To most this will likely appear a very common-sense account of meaningful statements. Why then, does Dummett find it unacceptable? For him the trouble begins when we ask what it means to understand a statement. If we say that it means knowing what the facts are if the statement is true, he will respond that this account is circular. Take the above sentence which states, roughly, that Jane turns invisible when no one is looking. What is expressed by "Jane turns invisible when no one is looking" is simply that Jane turns invisible when no one is looking. Thus, we cannot helpfully say that understanding "Jane turns invisible when no one is looking" means knowing what the fact is if it is true—to do so is equivalent to saying that understanding "Jane turns invisible when no one is looking" means knowing that Jane turns invisible when no one is looking if "Jane turns invisible when no one is looking" is true. And although this characterization of understanding a sentence is accurate, it is only trivially accurate, which is to say that it cannot serve as an adequate description of understanding a sentence.

Instead, as we have seen, Dummett's strategy is to explain understanding a statement, not as a form of propositional knowledge, but as a special kind of skill or ability which allows one to recognize whether the statement is true or not. But if we lack such an ability, as we would in the case of the statement "Jane turns invisible when no one is looking" (we are presuming, remember, that we do not yet know that God exists), then on a

[27] See ibid., lect. 7: "for it is from the facts of the case, i.e., from a thing's being so or not being so, that speech is true or false."

justificationist model such a statement must be completely unintelligible and therefore meaningless.

But perhaps a realist might concede that understanding a statement is an ability, and yet characterize that ability in a way that would yield less radical conclusions. For instance, instead of describing understanding a statement as a special kind of skill which allows one to recognize whether the statement is true or not, we could describe understanding a statement as a special kind of skill which allows one to recognize whether the statement is *possibly* true or not. It is difficult to see how the charge of circularity could be leveled against this more modest account, for it does not describe understanding a sentence in terms of understanding what the sentence expresses, but rather in terms of being able to determine whether or not the subject and predicate of the sentence are able to go together.[28]

Thus in the case of "The bachelor is unmarried," and "The mountain is golden," because we understand the sense of the individual terms we can know whether these states of affairs are possible or not. Both sentences have meaning and truth-values, although we may not know what the truth value is in a given case. By contrast, in the case of the statement "The widgin zunks toofooloo," since neither the subject nor the predicate signifies, we cannot know whether they are able to be joined or not. Or, what is to say the same thing, we cannot know whether the sentence expresses what is necessarily true, possibly true, or necessarily false;[29] it is therefore right to say that the sentence is meaningless. For an affirmation composed of a subject and a predicate that signify, we can in principle come to know whether a statement is possibly true, or conversely whether it is not possibly true (as in the case of a contradiction, which is necessarily

[28] See IX *Metaphys*., lect. 1: "for those things are called possible whose opposites can be true, whereas those are called impossible whose opposites cannot be true. This difference depends on the relationship of predicate to subject, because sometimes the predicate is repugnant to the subject, as in the case of impossible things, and sometimes it is not, as in the case of possible things."

[29] For Aquinas's discussion of these modal categories, see ibid., lect. 3.

false). In such a case we could say that the statement is meaningful, even if it is not justifiable.[30]

It seems to me that this description of understanding a statement harmonizes with the Thomistic-Aristotelian understanding of propositional meaning, while at the same time satisfying Dummett's requirement of noncircularity. It also entails that sentences like "Jane turns invisible when no one is looking" are, even without the presumption of God's existence, meaningful but unrecognizable as either true or not true. It therefore seems that without knowing God's existence we cannot know that the Idealist Thesis (Every meaningful statement is, in principle, recognizable as either true or not true) is true.

Is, then, Dummett's argument for God wholly undone? Recall that he also uses our conviction of the Realist Thesis to make his case; it may be that *R* is a basic conviction and that on its strength alone we can conclude to the existence of an omniscient mind. It is to this thesis that we will now turn.

IV. The Realist Conviction

Dummett clearly thinks that we believe in the truth of *R* (Things exist differently than we can know them), and, as we noted in the first section of this paper, makes a strong argument to that effect.[31] It is, as he says, a basic urge (and one which motivates science) to know what things are like independently of any particular perspective.[32] This implies a conviction that knowing things from a particular perspective is not to know

[30] Of course, Dummett might respond by demanding a full account of what it is for a sentence to be possibly true, but such a demand would not be consistent with his own understanding of what is required for a satisfactory description of meaning. For, in defense of his justificationist model he writes, "An account of linguistic practice requires the concept of recognizing-as-true, that of accepting-as-true, and that of acting-on-the-truth-of; it is unclear that it needs the concept of *being-true*" (*Thought and Reality*, 62). But in that case it seems to follow that a realist account of linguistic practice would not need the concept of being-possibly-true.

[31] See section I above.

[32] Such a view "should arrive at an account of how things are in themselves, not depending at all upon the particular way we experience them or observe them directly or indirectly" (Dummett, *Thought and Reality*, 94).

things as they are. Yet it is impossible for us, as limited beings with a distinctive mode of knowing, to know things except from a particular perspective.[33] Consequently, we cannot know things as they are, which is in effect to admit that we are convinced that *R* is true.

The Aristotelean-Thomistic characterization of meaningful propositions as presented above is equally based on the Realistic Thesis, since, as we have seen, according to such a model it is reality that makes a meaningful sentence true or false, even if we cannot know what that reality is. We cannot know whether the statement "Jane turns invisible when no one is looking" is true or false, but we believe in a reality that makes it one or the other. That means reality exceeds what we can know of it, which involves a subscription to the Realist Thesis.

Dummett clearly thinks that, apart from God, realism is an unfounded position, and it would appear initially that he is right. How can we know, by our own powers, that things are other than we can know them to be? We cannot know things otherwise than we can know them, just as we cannot see things otherwise than we can see them. To pursue the analogy, if there is an imperfection in our vision, our vision cannot inform us of the fact. A person suffering from rod monochromacy (total colorblindness) will not discover the inadequacy of his own visual experience by looking around carefully. His eyes cannot detect the difference between what they can see and what is there to be seen. So too, if finite minds are constitutionally incapable of knowing things as they are, how could finite minds know this? How could our minds detect the difference between what they can know and what is there to be known?

To put it in the context of language: how can we know that affirmative statements with a signifying subject joined to a signifying predicate are either true or false? True and false are contraries, which means there is no logical trouble about rejecting both with regard to a given meaningful proposition. We could, if

[33] "Our spatio-temporal perspective is a quite particular one, and our observational and intellectual faculties are, contingently, limited" (Michael Dummett, *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics* [London: Duckworth, 1991], 345).

we wanted, say that for certain meaningful propositions truth and falsity apply no more than they do to a question or an imperative. The trouble is, we do not want to say that. Why not?

It might be claimed that we know external things transcend our ability to comprehend them because experience has taught us that, no matter how much we already know, there is always more to find out. But this is only to say that habit has conditioned us to expect that when we go out looking, we find things; this cannot, in itself, inform us of the existence of things, or facets of things, which we do not or cannot find.[34] If we base our claims only on our experience, in which we only ever know things when we are knowing them, we would be more likely to hold that things are coextensive with our knowledge of them, that we are like "blind explorers encountering objects that spring into existence as they feel around for them."[35] But we know that this is not really the relationship between knowledge and things, which means, it would seem, that we base our claims on more than our experience. But then what are we going on?

In general, of course, we can only know of a defect in our mode of knowing when we encounter someone without the defect. In the case of total colorblindness, a person uninformed of his handicap will not know that physical objects reflect light as more than black, grey, and white, or that he is incapable of perceiving that "more." Indeed, there is no reason for him to suspect any such thing, and pooling his visual experience with that of other people with the same disorder will put the notion further out of his mind. So too, there seems little grounds for finite minds, whether individually or collectively, to suspect that they are constitutionally insensitive to some dimension of reality—unless, that is, they encounter someone with superior mental powers in a way that assures them that they really are missing something, that things-in-themselves exist in a fullness

[34] "Although facts indeed impose themselves upon us, however, we cannot infer from this that they were there waiting to be discovered before we discovered them, still less that they would have been there even if we had not discovered them" (Dummett, *Thought and Reality*, 92).

[35] Ibid.

that they cannot perceive. The only way totally colorblind people come to realize that they are incapable of seeing color is if someone who can see color tells them. So how can finite minds realize that they are incapable of knowing things-as-they-are except by means of someone who does know things fully?

V. A New Route to God

We have shown that on a realist model of meaning propositions can be meaningful even if they cannot be justified (i.e., recognized as true or false). Nonetheless, it remains that an unjustifiable proposition is not normally asserted by the person for whom the proposition is unjustifiable. It would be strange for a completely colorblind person to hold up an unmarked crayon and say, "This is blue," since he cannot determine, at least by his own powers, that such a statement is true. It would be stranger still for any person to say, "Jane turns invisible when no one is looking and no camera equipment is directed her way," since the statement could not be recognized as true or false by anyone. But then if *R* (Things exist differently than finite minds can know) falls into the category of propositions that no one can justify, what explains our strong conviction that it is true? In other words, instead of giving an account of the meaningfulness of *R*,[36] what we are after here is an account of our conviction that *R* is true. We know that the Realist Thesis is an accurate description of things. How do we know this?

We can dispense with observation as source of the knowledge that things exist differently than finite minds can know. It is obvious that we cannot observe those things which lie outside the scope of our knowledge in order to perceive them existing

[36] In Dummett's argument God's existence is initially invoked not to make *R* true, but only to make *R* meaningful. See, "Reply to McGuiness," in *The Philosophy of Michael Dummett*, ed. Brian McGuiness and Gianluigi Oliveri (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 358-59. Nonetheless, it seems to be tacitly assumed that the meaningfulness of *R* should be vindicated because *R* is true. In any case, once God's existence is invoked, *R* is implied to be true as well, since if God exists and sees things, then he must see them as they are, in a manner superior to that of finite intelligences.

differently than we know them. Inferential reasoning seems a much stronger candidate, especially since we have already discussed how from Aquinas's proof of God's existence and nature it is short work to show that he alone can know things as they are in their fullness. But conviction *R* is a widespread conviction, and most people who ascribe to it cannot be thought to do so based on a complicated metaphysical demonstration. There must be some other way for them to come to know that *R* is true.

Perhaps we could conscript the notion of belief in the testimony of another, which so prominently features in Aquinas's treatment of the virtue of faith. Aquinas makes it plain that what is known neither by observation nor by inference is generally known by belief. This is the third source of knowledge, distinct both from immediate experience and demonstration.[37] It is the acceptance of a proposition as true based on the testimony of someone else who knows already. "Everyone who believes assents to the testimony of someone."[38] It is this source of knowledge which serves as the basis for our convictions about what we cannot know on our own. If the person with colorblindness knows of his colorblindness, or knows that the unmarked crayon in his hand is blue, it may be presumed that he has spoken to someone with a sensitivity to colors. The same sort of thing happens regularly in almost every possible field of knowledge; we are led to believe, on the strength of what is communicated to us, that there are a great many real things that are true and extend beyond our own knowledge, and sometimes beyond our possible knowledge (as when, for instance, a woman assures a man that childbirth is more painful than kidney stones). We may call this typical belief personal belief.

But there is also belief in the superpersonal, according to which God expresses propositions not naturally knowable to the human

[37] *STh* II-II, q. 1, aa. 4 and 5, where Aquinas differentiates belief from observation and demonstration.

[38] *STh* II-II, q. 11, a. 1. Again, here "belief" must be carefully distinguished from either "opinion" or "acceptance of a proposition as true." It means the acceptance of a proposition as true based on the knowledge of someone else.

person, and the human person chooses to accept both the witness and the testimony. This form of belief is usually called "faith."[39] Among such propositions are included those which again give the believer cause to accept that certain dimensions of reality lie beyond his epistemic competence: "Oh the depths of the riches and the wisdom and the knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, how inscrutable his ways!" (Rom 11:33).

Acceptance of the difference between the way things are able to appear to us and the way they really are cannot typically have its origin in reason, and observation is ruled out on principle. And, since other human beings' faculties are no more unconditioned than our own, their testimony cannot be the foundation for our conviction. But then our conviction, which is very dear to us, cannot be explained by observation, reason, or human faith. Are we left then only with superpersonal faith? Must we invoke God as the default foundation for our conviction that there is a difference between things as they are and as they are known? If so, a modified version of Dummett's proof—minus his justificationist theory of meaning—would ultimately be vindicated. Dummett says the realist conviction implies God because we know it is meaningful; it seems more plausible to say that the realist conviction implies God because we know it is true. If we know that *R* is true, it can only be because we have already proven God's existence and omniscience, or because God has somehow revealed the knowledge to us.[40]

I can think of only one final objection to this conclusion, namely, the possibility of subpersonal faith. Maybe we are convinced that things are other than we can know because reality tells us that such is the case. Here phenomenological language like "disclosure," and "horizon," and "promise" would come into

[39] On the transition from natural belief (Aristotelian *pistis*) to theological belief (Thomistic *fides*), see Romanus Cessario, O.P., *Christian Faith and the Theological Life* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 92-96.

[40] This is why, given his atheism, it is quite consistent for Bertrand Russell to state that "Belief in the existence of things outside my own biography exists antecedently to evidence. . . . But from the standpoint of theoretical logic it must be regarded as a prejudice, not as a well-grounded theory" (*The Analysis of Mind* [London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1921], 132-33).

play; we could use any such term analogically of being itself, and say that things tell us that there is more to them than we know.[41] Things assure us that they are ontological for-themselves, that their being is not dependent on being known, nor is it limited to what is known.[42]

To state the matter yet again: we have a conviction about the fullness of things which we humans cannot reach through observation and do not typically reach through inference. If this conviction is to pass for real knowledge, we are left only with knowledge from another.[43] Urban has called it "animal faith [which] has been transformed into a moral faith."[44] Faith in what? In whom? Other finite persons are disqualified by the nature of the problem. We are left only with God or with the subrational world.

And yet how can we believe in the subrational? How can the subrational communicate and be trusted? "'Credibility'," says Pieper, "is a quality of persons and can only be known in the same manner as we apprehend the other personal qualities of a

[41] To take just one citation from Merleau-Ponty, "Each part arouses the expectation of more than it contains" (*The Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith [Routledge: New York, 1994], 4).

[42] Maritain calls the thing-in-itself the "transobjective subject," "because it is itself grasped as object and yet constitutes something irreducible in which the possibility of grasping new objects always remains open (for it can give rise to an endless series of necessary or contingent truths)" (*The Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. Gerald B. Phelan [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995], 99-100).

[43] A reliabilist might object that "faith" or "testimony" is not needed to supply knowledge that things exist differently than we can know them. All that is required to supply such knowledge is that a reliable, properly functioning, true-belief-producing mechanism yield such a belief. But this objection ignores the more basic question: what qualifies a mechanism as reliable or functional in its production of true beliefs which count as knowledge? It seems to me that the qualification consists in the mechanism's success at making contact between truth and the mind, and there are only so many conceivable ways in which the mind can make contact with a given truth, namely, directly (observation), indirectly through other truths (inference), and indirectly through the communication from some person or persons who already have knowledge (belief in testimony). For a fine historical survey on recent discussion on warrant and related issues, see Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant: The Current Debate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), particularly pp. 3-29.

[44] Wilbur Marshall Urban, *Beyond Realism and Idealism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1949), 82.

person."[45] This certainly seems to be true; although the subrational world may be the site of our realist convictions, it cannot tell us more than we can know through observation or inference. Therefore there can be no such thing as subpersonal faith, and we are left only with the acceptance of a divine communication as the explanation for our knowledge that *R* is true.

Conclusion

We have reached a rather strong claim: a conviction about the fullness of things not known and not knowable to human beings, singly or collectively, is typically the result of information transmitted from God. The fact that we want to access the truth in a manner not possible for us, that is, not from a particular perspective, indicates that we accept realism as a basic, albeit perhaps unformulated, doctrine. It is implausible that this acceptance commonly comes as the term of a demonstration, nor can it come from a subpersonal communication since the subpersonal does not communicate. It seems that we are left with a divine communication, with an assurance that humanity's powers cannot grasp the whole of what is.

Based on the foregoing we can, perhaps, enumerate three modes of belief: a supernatural belief in God's testimony, a natural belief in human testimony, and a natural belief in God's testimony. This last is the prerequisite for asserting the existence of what cannot be known by the human mind, such as "things-in-themselves."

As with all belief, this last form is gained only through choice. "No one who believes *must* believe; belief is by its nature a free act."[46] There may be, and in fact there certainly have been, those

[45] Josef Pieper, *Faith, Hope, Love* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 47.

[46] Ibid., 49. On the voluntary nature of faith in Aquinas, see James Ross, "Aquinas on Belief and Knowledge," in *Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter*, ed. W. A. Frank and G. J. Etzkorn (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1985), 245-69; and idem, "Believing for Profit," *The Ethics of Belief Debate*, ed. Gerald D. McCarthy (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 221-35. See also Eleonore Stump, "Aquinas on Faith and Goodness," in *Being*

who refuse to believe that there is more than what can be known, or more than what is known, or even that there is more than the contents of their own minds. And, as is often the case with theological faith, we may find it hard in the case of this natural belief in God's testimony to pinpoint when and how such testimony was given and accepted.

But if, in an unguarded moment, we accept the proposition, "Things exist in a manner that is richer than any finite mind can know," then it seems we are rationally bound to admit that this proposition implies as well the existence of an omniscient Deity. Likewise, if we accept the proposition, "The world of things is incalculably complex, detailed, and rich," it is most likely that this acceptance is the result of God having told us that it is so.

and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1991), 179-207.

The Thomist 76 (2012): 233-72

DID CHRIST WORSHIP THE TRINITY?

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THE CATHOLIC TRADITION holds that the worship central to its liturgical life is grounded in the grace of Christ and conforms believers to this same grace. Such is the case, arguably, with regard to the *latria*, or worship of God, which Thomas Aquinas expounds within the context of the virtue of religion. Religion is a key moral virtue for Aquinas, one that builds upon the natural law and enters into the right supernatural ordering of the soul and all of its acts to God. The question remains, how does this moral virtue, building upon its natural foundation, rise to the level of a graced encounter with the true God? The answer to this question and the essential key to understanding Christian worship can be found within Christ's own worship: Christ's worship, in his humanity, stands at the heart of the Church by providing the basis for her worship of the Trinity in *latria*. This worship consists most significantly in the priestly offering of Christ's own life on the cross, which is made present in the Church's daily worship in the holy sacrifice of the Mass. Therefore, understanding the precise nature of Christ's worship and of the Church's participation in it is of utmost importance.

In particular, this essay will examine the object of Christ's worship: to whom did he offer worship? If the Church's worship is a participation in Christ's own, the object of Christ's worship becomes the object of Christian worship. Did Christ worship the Trinity in such a way that Christian worship of the Trinity shares

in his own? The question at hand can be broken into two distinct questions. First, did Christ offer worship? Second, did the second person of the Trinity in his humanity worship the entire Trinity, which includes his own person? The question of the object of Christ's worship is not common and was not taken up explicitly by Aquinas. Most contemporary treatments of Christ's prayer focus on the method of prayer that he taught or on the nature of his priesthood without engaging the Trinitarian implications of this prayer.

I would like for the purposes of this essay to treat the question of Christ's worship against the backdrop of a previous exchange between Matthew Levering and Thomas Joseph White regarding this subject. White has argued: "Aquinas never ascribes either *adoratio* or *latria* to Christ as a subject, in relation to the Father as object or to himself as object."[1] Rather, Christ offers devotion to the Father, which consists of a "peculiar mode that is hypostatic. It is a recognition by the Son *in his human nature* of having the Father as the origin of his divine and human natures."[2] Matthew Levering's position can be found in *Christ's Fulfillment of Temple and Torah*, where he states: "For Aquinas, true worship

[1] Thomas Joseph White, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision," *The Thomist* 69 (2005): 527 n. 60. The criticism in its entirety reads thus: "I differ on this point from Matthew Levering (*Christ's Fulfillment of Temple and Torah*, 92-93, 143), who attributes to Aquinas the idea that Jesus adores the three persons of the Trinity in his human soul. To the best of my knowledge there are not texts to support this view (which resembles Scotus's doctrine) in Aquinas's writings. Aquinas never ascribes either *adoratio* or *latria* to Christ as a subject, in relation to the Father as object or to himself as object. It seems, rather, that devotion in Christ receives a peculiar mode that is hypostatic. It is a recognition by the Son *in his human nature* of having the Father as the origin of his divine and human natures. As with obedience and prayer, therefore, it designates the procession of the Son from the Father in human terms, and demonstrates that Christ receives the impetus of all acts of providence from the Father's will. H. Diepen ('La psychologie humaine du Christ selon saint Thomas d'Aquin,' 540), also envisages the prayer of Christ as directed to all of the three persons as objects, citing as his authority Thomassin, *De Verbo Incarnato*, l. 9, c. 11, and in this respect resembles Levering. Diepen's inconsistency on this point with regard to his own teaching that there is no 'psychological autonomy' (535-56) of a unique *human* subject in Christ is evident. In my opinion the positions of both Levering and Diepen justly incur the objections of Weinandy concerning an implicit Nestorianism by attributing to the human Christ an adoration of the Word."

[2] Ibid.

inevitably means worship that is implicitly ordered to the trinitarian worship in which Christ, through his passion, enables us to share."[3] He adds that "Christ's passion thus fulfills all justice and constitutes perfect worship of the Trinity."[4] Ultimately, White holds that Levering's position leads to an "implicit Nestorianism by attributing to the human Christ an adoration of the Word."[5] Concern over the idea that Christ gives honor to himself within the Trinity can also be found within the context of the French school of spirituality.[6] Commenting on the thought of Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle (1575-1629), Gérard Yelles also posits that Christ's worship of himself would lead to Nestorianism: "Bérulle does not speak of Christ as a servant of himself," but rather "speaks of the servitude of Christ, according to his humanity, toward the Father."[7] Although I will engage White's articulation of the problem primarily, I will also demonstrate secondarily how, contrary to Yelles's interpretation, Bérulle's thought actually supports the view that Christ honored and served himself.

While agreeing with White that Christ's worship primarily consists of honor that he gives the Father in a hypostatic mode, I will attempt to prove both that this honor, or devotion, is adoration, and that this honor gives adoration to the Trinity. The worship of adoration, or *latria*, is known as latreutic worship, the particular worship due to God alone.[8] Before delving directly into

[3] Matthew Levering, *Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 92.

[4] Ibid., 143.

[5] White, "Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ," 527 n. 60.

[6] An overview of the French School's position on prayer and adoration can be found in Eugene Walsh, *The Priesthood in the Writings of the French School: Bérulle, De Condren, Olier* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1949). See also *Bérulle and the French School: Selected Writings*, ed. William M. Thompson, trans. Lowell M. Glendon, S.S. (New York: Paulist Press, 1989).

[7] Gérard Yelles, S.S., *Le mystère de la sainteté du Christ: Selon le Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle* (Montréal: Grand Séminaire, 1938), 102. Servitude in the French School, and for Aquinas, is understood within the context of reverence and worship.

[8] The USCCB's Committee on Doctrine provides a definition of latreutic worship: "'Latreutic' worship is divine worship in the strict sense, the adoration given to God alone, as opposed to *dulia*, which is the veneration given to the angels and saints" (*Popular Devotional Practices: Basic Questions and Answers*, n. 34). The occasion for this definition comes from a quotation from *Lumen gentium* 51, which itself seems to imply that Christ

the questions at hand, it will first be crucial to define what it means to worship, particularly what it means to offer latreutic worship. This will be done by engaging Aquinas's thought on worship in all of its different dimensions. After presenting Aquinas's teaching on worship, I will then engage the two questions above by looking for evidence in Aquinas's thought concerning whether Christ demonstrated worship and then specifically by looking for evidence concerning whether Christ's worship was directed to the entire Trinity, including himself. Finally, I will look at the implications for Christian worship.

I. The Terminology of Worship

The most important, preliminary point for understanding whether Christ offered latreutic worship is to define what worship itself means for Aquinas.[9] Worship, as a general concept, is a translation of the Latin word *colere*, whose participle is *cultus*, from which we take our word "cult." The etymology of the word is associated with cultivation. Aquinas plays on the dual meaning of the word when commenting on John's gospel:

possessed this form of worship: "Let them therefore teach the faithful that the authentic cult of the saints consists not so much in the multiplying of external acts, but rather in the greater intensity of our love, whereby, for our own greater good and that of the whole Church, we seek from the saints 'example in their way of life, fellowship in their communion, and aid by their intercession' [*ex praefatione, aliquious dioecesibus concessa*]. On the other hand, let them teach the faithful that our communion with those in heaven, provided that it is understood in the fuller light of faith according to its genuine nature, in no way weakens, but conversely, more thoroughly enriches the latreutic worship we give to God the Father, through Christ, in the Spirit."

[9] For an overview of Aquinas's position on religion, see: Georges Cardinal Cottier, "La vertu de religion," *Revue Thomiste* (Jan-Juin 2006): 335-52; Joseph Bobik, *Veritas Divina: Aquinas on Divine Truth: Some Philosophy of Religion* (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2001); M.-D. Philippe, *The Worship of God*, trans. Dom Mark Pontifex (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1959); Nicolas Joseph de Ponton D'Amecourt, *The Moral Goodness of Worship: Thomas Aquinas on the Virtue of Religion* (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1999); Maxime Allard, *Que rendrai-je au Seigneur? Aborder la religion par l'éthique* (Montréal: Lés Éditions Médiaspaul, 2004); Erich Heck, *Der Begriff religio bei Thomas von Aquin* (München: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1971); and Odon Lottin, O.S.B., *L'ame du cultue: La vertu de religion d'après s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain, Belgium: Bureau des Oevres Liturgiques, 1920).

God cultivates us to make us better by his work, since he roots out the evil seeds in our hearts. As Augustine says, he opens our hearts with the plow of his words, plants the seeds of the commandments, and harvests the fruit of devotion. But we cultivate God, not by plowing but by adoring, in order that we may be made better by him: "If anyone is a worshiper," that is, a cultivator, "of God and does his will, God listens to him" (9:31).[10]

It is particularly important to note that *colere* in ancient usage did not simply denote the worship of the deity, but could be used for more general forms of reverence. One gave worship to parents and to the state. This fact reveals that worship most generally should be understand as a form of honor that can be exercised in diverse fashions. This more general use of *colere* applies also to *religio*, as Augustine notes in book 10 of *De civitate Dei*.[11] How then did Catholic theology distinguish the reverence owed to God from other forms of reverence? Augustine argues that Christians should use the word *latria* since it was the word for worship employed in the New Testament.[12] He thought that *latria* could be used to refer to the kind of reverence or worship due to God alone. *Latreia*, a Greek word, however, also has a broader connotation, which is based in service (as in hired service) rather than in reverence.[13] Discussions of *latria* (as transliterated in Latin) became standard in Scholastic theology following Lombard's discussion of whether Christ is owed *latria* in distinction 19 of book 3 of his *Sentences*. In these treatments of

[10] *In Ioan.* 15, lect. 1. The reference to Augustine is to *Sermones de verbis Domini*, 61. Cf. *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 1, ad 4.

[11] Augustine states: "The word 'cult' (*cultus*) by itself would not imply something due only to God. . . . This word is employed not only in respect of things which in a spirit of devout humility we regard above us, but even some things which are below us. For from the same word are derived *agricolae* (cultivators), *coloni* (farmers) and *incolae* (inhabitants). . . . Thus although it is quite true that 'cult,' in a special use of the term, is due only to God, still the world *cultus* is used in other significations. . . . The word 'religion' would seem, to be sure, to signify more particularly the 'cult' offered to God, rather than 'cult' in general . . . but . . . 'religion' is something which is displayed in human relationships in the family . . . and between friends. . . . The word 'piety' (*eusebeia* in Greek) is generally understood as referring particularly to the worship of God. But this word also is used of a dutiful attitude towards parents; while in popular speech it is constantly used in connections with acts of compassion" (*The City of God*, trans. Henry Bettenson [New York: Penguin Books, 2003], 10.1).

[12] Ibid. Cf. John 16:2; Rom 9:4; Rom 12:1; Heb 9:1.

[13] Cf. *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 1, obj. 3.

latria the words *adoratio*, *pietas*, and *dulia* emerged as other key terms related to worship.

Aquinas attempts to resolve the complexities associated with the interchangeable usages of these different terms in his own commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*:

> Similarly, when obedience can be exhibited to different ones, in some special and supreme way it is owed to God, because in him is found the supreme reason of majesty and lordship. And therefore the obedience or service owed to him is named by a special name and is called *latria*. . . . And this virtue is expressed by four names. For it is called piety inasmuch as it is ordered toward the bringing about of devotion, which occurs first. It is also called *theosebeia*, that is divine worship, or *eusebeia*, that is good worship, inasmuch as it is ordered toward a specific intention; for that object is said to be cultivated to which one is directed zealously, as a field or one's soul or some other thing. It is also called *latria*, that is, service, in as much as it is ordered toward works which are exhibited in recognition of the lordship which belongs to God by the law of creation. It is also called religion in as much as it is ordered toward the determination of works to which man dedicates himself in the worship of God. Nevertheless, by all these names one and the same virtue is indicated, but according to the diverse things which are associated with them.[14]

This passage represents an important step toward gaining clarity concerning the various ways one can give reverence toward God by linking them together under a common heading. This move by Aquinas makes clear that the distinct terminology regarding worship simply reflects different aspects of the same reality. In the *Summa* we can see even more clarity.[15] By this point, *latria* is largely equated with religion (though it still appears in Aquinas's usage in crucial places such as question 25 of the *Tertia Pars*); however, it makes the important contribution of adding a notion of service to complement worship (which harkens back to the original notion of *latria*). Therefore, *latria* cannot be examined apart from the virtue of religion because the two have become

[14] III *Sent.*, d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 1 (*Scriptum super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi*, ed. R. P. Maria Fabianus Moos, O.P. [Paris: Sumptibu P. Lethielleux, 1933]).

[15] Another important intermediary step is taken in Aquinas's commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*, where he begins clearly to link piety with the honor due to parents.

fused into a single reality for Aquinas.[16] Therefore, to determine whether Christ offered *latria*, it is necessary to examine the virtue of religion and its particular acts in detail.

Significantly, Aquinas places religion as the first of many potential parts of justice, which are meant to give reverence toward others in response to a debt. These parts are as follows:

Religion: "Now the good to which religion is directed is to give due honor to God."[17]

Piety: "Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country."[18]

Observance: "Therefore, just as, in a manner, under religion, through which worship is given to God, piety is to be found, so under piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity."[19]

Dulia: "Wherefore *dulia*, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from *latria*, which pays due service to the lordship of God."[20]

Obedience: "Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors."[21]

Gratitude: "Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, and

[16] Aquinas uses the terms interchangeably, although in the following passage they seem to be distinct: "Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as 'latria' in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion." However, *latria* belongs to religion in the sense that it is only in the virtue of religion that one offers God the worship and service that is due to him. Worship actually entails the acts that give God true service.

[17] *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 4. English translation from the 1920 English Dominican Province translation (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947).

[18] *STh* II-II, q. 101, a. 1.

[19] *STh* II-II, q. 102, a. 1. Our hesitancy to use *colere* in nonreligious terms can be seen in the fact that the phrase, "*per quam coluntur parentes,*" has been left out of the English translation of this text on piety. In the translation it should have followed "piety is to be found."

[20] *STh* II-II, q. 103, a. 2.

[21] *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 1.

observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors."[22]

What should be clear from this string of quotations is that the honor we owe God is an intensification of the honor, even worship (as classically understood), that we give to all of those who are above us or to whom we owe a debt. Once again, it is the connection to *latria* that makes the worship that pertains to religion distinct from the worship or honor that is given to creatures, which is referred to as *dulia*. As mentioned above, religion entails honor and service. Thus, the manner in which these are given to God exceeds the honor and service due to any other. This is based on the fact that the debt to God far exceeds the debt owed to any other. The clear connection between all of these virtues listed above has to do with the order of justice. It is a natural law, a clear directive of justice, that honor, thanks, and sometimes even service be given to those above us from whom we have received good things and upon whom we depend.

Religion, then, is the particular mode of giving reverence to God in recognition of a debt. The debt concerns a few aspects: thanking God for benefits received (which relates to gratitude),[23] recognizing his lordship (the particular honor of *latria*, which is akin to *dulia*),[24] honoring his excellence (which is similar to observance),[25] and subordinating oneself to him as the source of one's perfection (which relates to obedience).[26] Aquinas draws all of these aspects together under the virtue of religion. He does not specifically state that Christ exercised latreutic worship; however, one can examine the acts of religion in order to determine whether or not Christ exercised the virtue of religion. The acts of religion are as follows:

[22] *STh* II-II, q. 106, a. 1.

[23] *STh* II-II, q. 83, a. 17. See also I-II, q. 102, a. 3 on the role of sacrifice in recognizing God as the giver of all good things.

[24] *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 1, ad 3.

[25] *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 4.

[26] *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 7.

Devotion: "Devotion is an act of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the service of God."[27]

Prayer: "Now man shows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the Author of his goods."[28]

Adoration: "Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person adored";[29] "We offer God a twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in the internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which consists in an exterior humbling of the body."[30]

Sacrifice: Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in himself, and in which he needs help and direction from someone above him. . . . Hence it is a dictate of natural reason that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority.[31]

Oblation and First Fruits: "The term 'oblation' is common to all things offered for the Divine worship"; and, "First-fruits are a kind of oblation . . . being a special part of the fruits of the earth."[32]

Tithes: "Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things."[33]

Vows: "A vow is a promise made to God."[34]

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[27] *STh* II-II, q. 82, a. 3.

[28] *STh* II-II, q. 83, a. 3.

[29] *STh* II-II, q. 84, a. 1. The article is titled, "Whether adoration is an act of *latria* or religion?" This is a departure from an earlier tradition, which equated adoration with *latria* itself. Aquinas does not speak of adoration as the virtue itself, but as one of its acts. An example of the prior usage of adoration can be found in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* (Alexander of Hales [attributed], *Summa theologica* [*Summa Fratris Alexandri*] [Florence: Quaracchi, 1948], lib. 3, inq. 3, tr. 2, sect. 1, q. 2, tit. 1, c. 2).

[30] *STh* II-II, q. 84, a. 2. The full quotation reads as follows: "As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 12), since we are composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer God a twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in the internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which consists in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts of *latria* that which is without is referred to that which is within as being of greater import, it follows that exterior adoration is offered on account of interior adoration, in other words we exhibit signs of humility in our bodies in order to incite our affections to submit to God, since it is connatural to us to proceed from the sensible to the intelligible."

[31] *STh* II-II, q. 85, a. 1.

[32] *STh* II-II, q. 86, a. 1; q. 86, a. 4. Aquinas notes that an oblation is distinct from a sacrifice in that the latter is destroyed in the offering.

[33] *STh* II-II, q. 87, a. 1.

[34] *STh* II-II, q. 88, a. 2.

Oaths: "Oaths are taken for the purpose of confirmation . . . to call on a Divine witness."[35]

Adjuration: "If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name or of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully employed in respect of anyone."[36]

Praise: "We need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is aroused towards Him. . . . The praise of the lips is also profitable to others by inciting their affections towards God."[37]

Worship, as comprised of the acts of the virtue of religion, uses visible signs to recognize and render the debt owed to God under its various aspects. Worship is meant to be accompanied by service, which can be understood as placing one's life in subordination to God to honor him. Worship employs the acts listed above as means of offering worship and enacting, manifesting, and deepening service.

Two acts in particular deserve special attention and therefore are quoted at greater length. The first is adoration, which White describes as an act particularly tied with *latria* and therefore, in his position, an act denied to Christ. While Aquinas does not equate the words adoration and *latria* as clearly as do some earlier Scholastic writers,[38] one can see adoration's importance for the topic of Christ's worship. First, it is significant because it is reverence directed to a person. This invites the question concerning Christ, which must be answered below: if he does adore, to which person is this adoration directed? Second, adoration implies an act of physical humility that attempts to manifest interior devotion, which flows from humility as well. If Christ makes an act of adoration, how is this subjugation to be understood for him?

The second most significant act to consider is sacrifice. It is considered an act peculiar to the virtue of religion, a special act that can be given to no one but to God. That it is an act of *latria*

[35] *STh* II, q. 89, a. 1.

[36] *STh* II-II, q. 90, a. 1.

[37] *STh* II-II, q. 91, a. 1.

[38] As can be seen in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri.*

can be seen from this statement in the *Tertia Pars*: "A sacrifice properly so called is something done for that honor which is properly due to God, in order to appease Him."[39] The very definition of *latria* is a form of worship or honor that is due to God alone.[40] Augustine first made this distinction and, in doing so, explicitly linked sacrifice to *latria* as its proper act.[41] Therefore, if we are to examine Christ's worship, we must pay special attention to the acts of adoration and sacrifice.[42] The other acts of religion will be considered alongside of these.

II. Christ's Acts of Worship

In answering the question, did Christ worship?, I will begin by looking at whether there are general indications that Christ offered worship and manifested service and then look in particular at whether he performed the acts of religion. Since sacrifice is the chief expression of worship due to God alone, I will give this act of religion greater emphasis. I will also examine how Christ's life as a whole reflects the disposition of worship.

Did Christ worship? Worship first entails offering signs of reverence, and second it involves service. The signs of reverence refer to thanks, recognition of lordship, honor, and subordination (which is ordered in expectation of perfection).[43] We can see Christ acting in such a manner in Scripture: first, he gives thanks: "Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me";[44] second, he subordinates himself: "Not my will, but thine, be done";[45] third, he gives honor: "I honor my Father";[46] fourth, he expresses

[39] *STh* III, q. 48, a. 3.

[40] Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 102, a. 3.

[41] Augustine, *City of God* 10.1.

[42] Their importance can be seen from the following quotation from *STh* II-II, q. 84, a. 1: "And since external actions are signs of internal reverence, certain external tokens significative of reverence are offered to creatures of excellence, and among these tokens the chief is adoration: yet there is one thing which is offered to God alone, and that is sacrifice."

[43] Aquinas refers to this as humbling oneself to God, recognizing that he is both origin and end of human life. See *STh* I, q. 103, a.2; I-II, q. 102, a. 3; II-II, q. 81, a. 1.

[44] John 14:11 (RSV, second Catholic edition).

[45] Luke 22:42.

[46] John 8:49.

expectation: "Glorify thy Son."[47] We can also see that he offered service: ". . . but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men."[48]

These passages do not offer speculative arguments that Christ worshipped, but rather point toward the fact that Christ in his humanity approached the Father with the general disposition of worship and service.[49] Yet Aquinas does offer grounds for a more speculative argument that Christ indeed offered worship and service. Aquinas is clear that Christ does indeed offer acts of religion. Further, Christ must possess the virtue of religion because, as Aquinas recognizes, Christ possessed all the moral virtues: "Since the grace of Christ was most perfect, there flowed from it, in consequence, the virtues which perfect the several powers of the soul for all the soul's acts; and thus Christ had all the virtues."[50] Thus, religion helped perfect the soul of Christ. Religion is essential to his perfection because "by the very fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior."[51] Religion was especially important for Christ's soul, being the "chief of the moral virtues," because religion's acts are ordered directly to God as their end.[52] It also has the special function of ordering the acts of all the other virtues (moral and theological) to God for his honor.[53] Thus, it is fitting that Christ possess this virtue so that his entire life be religious, completely ordered toward the honor of God. This religious disposition relates in general to Christ's possession of a just, moral

[47] John 17:1.

[48] Phil 2:7.

[49] According to Yelles, Cardinal Bérulle held that Christ is "le serviteur infini de la majesté divine" (*Le mystère de la sainteté du Christ*, 101).

[50] *STh* III, q. 7, a. 2. It must be noted that "all the virtues" refers to the intellectual and moral virtues, but not the theological virtues, since he did not possess faith or hope. Cf. *STh* III, q. 7, aa. 3 and 4.

[51] *STh* II-II, q. 81, a.7.

[52] *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 6.

[53] *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 1, ad 1.

ordering of the soul to God. His soul clearly possessed the virtue of justice and its associated virtues, of which religion is one.[54]

Although Aquinas does not speak specifically of Christ having the virtue of religion, that Christ did so is clearly inferred through his religious acts.[55] The first time that we see Christ participating in religion comes at his circumcision. Through this act it is clear that he subjected himself to the ceremonial precepts, which order one to God through worship. While Aquinas lists many reasons why Christ should have undergone such a practice, it is his obedience that pertains most to this discussion. He adhered to this ceremony, obediently recognizing the validity of its institution, so that "by taking on Himself the burden of the Law, He might set others free therefrom."[56] It is important to remember that circumcision was given as a figurative "sign of faith in Christ's future Passion,"[57] and further "was to be a remedy against original sin . . . [and] for carnal concupiscence."[58] Christ's death fulfills circumcision by actuating the reality it prefigured. Aquinas makes this clear as follows:

[54] Christ is spoken of as having obedience, also a part of the virtue of justice. See *STh* III, q. 20. Thomas Ryan points out that Aquinas "asserts that one of the virtues that Christ embodied in his passion was the cardinal virtue of justice ([III] 46.3). As we have seen, one of the subsidiary virtues arranged under justice in the *secunda-secundae* is that of religion, which is the rendering unto God that which is due God (cf. II-II.81.2). One of the acts of religion, i.e., one of the expressions of the virtue of religion is prayer (II-II.83). And Thomas, as we have seen, speaks explicitly of Christ's prayer in III.21" (*Thomas Aquinas as Reader of the Psalms* [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000], 98).

[55] Leo Elders, though speaking of the Christian, also implies religion in Christ on the basis of acts: "Like the Savior himself, the Christian who dedicates himself to God in love and obedience performs an act of *religio*" ("The Inner Life of Jesus in the Theology and Devotion of Saint Thomas Aquinas," in *Faith in Christ and the Worship of Christ: New Approaches to Devotion to Christ*, ed. Leo Sheffczyk, trans. Graham Harrison [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986], 79). Elders points out that love and obedience in religion can be seen most fully in the highest act of religion, sacrifice (which will be treated below): "Thomas points out that, properly speaking, a sacrifice is an act of reverence due to God in reconciliation. . . . In Jesus' freely willed self-offering as atoning sacrifice, Thomas sees the paradigm of sacrifices whatsoever. Together with Augustine, however, he indicates that Christ's sacrifice has the greatest possible power of union through love" (ibid., 75-76). Christ's life is full of acts of religion, which manifest his love and obedience, the highest of which can be seen on the cross.

[56] *STh* III, q. 37, a. 1.

[57] *STh* III, q. 70, a. 4.

[58] *STh* III, q. 70, a. 3, ad 1.

> Christ likewise by His Passion fulfilled the ceremonial precepts of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for sacrifices and oblations, in so far as all the ancient sacrifices were figures of that true sacrifice which the dying Christ offered for us.[59]

The ceremonial precepts were ordained for the worship of God and find their fulfillment in Christ's perfect worship, which achieves their true end. It could also be argued that his circumcision is an act of adoration, inasmuch as "exterior adoration is offered on account of interior adoration, in other words we exhibit signs of humility in our bodies."[60] Circumcision, as an act of adoration, is a symbol of the Son's self-emptying in his mission of redemption. It religiously marks his life as one fundamentally offered in humility to the Father for the salvation of humanity. Therefore, this initial act of adoration points toward the most perfect one on the cross.

Christ not only performed religious acts pertaining to the Old Law; we also see him performing the religious actions that Aquinas lists as the acts of the virtue of religion. The first act is devotion, which Aquinas says clearly guides the sacrifice of the cross:

> Two things may be considered in the offering of a sacrifice by any priest—namely, the sacrifice itself which is offered, and the devotion of the offerer. Now the proper effect of priesthood is that which results from the sacrifice itself. But Christ obtained a result from His passion, not as by virtue of the sacrifice, which is offered by way of satisfaction, but by the very devotion with which out of charity He humbly endured the Passion.[61]

Devotion is defined as the will's readiness to engage in acts of religion. Christ showed himself willing and ready to offer sacrifice when his hour had come. His self-offering was guided by the interior religious disposition required for proper worship.

A further action that manifests Christ's worship is clearly visible in the gospels. Christ's prayer is used by Aquinas to point

[59] *STh* III, q. 47, a. 2, ad 1.
[60] *STh* II-II, q. 84, a. 2.
[61] *STh* III, q. 22, a. 4, ad 2.

toward the conformity of his human will with the divine will. Once again, worship can be recognized in Christ insofar as it pertains to his human soul, which maintains right order toward God. Aquinas defends Christ's ability to pray against the objection that it is not proper for a divine person to receive anything. Aquinas replies to this objection as follows: "Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of their nature, whereas prayer belongs to the one who receives through grace. The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e., His human nature and not in respect of His Godhead."[62] In particular, Aquinas posits that Christ "gave thanks to the Father for gifts already received in His human nature, by acknowledging Him as the author thereof"; and "also, in recognition of His Father, He besought Him in prayer for those gifts still due to Him in His human nature, such as the glory of His body."[63] Aquinas holds up Christ's prayer as an example to be followed, implying that Christ's prayer should be followed in a manner consistent with the virtue of religion. His prayer manifests the order of his will to God by giving thanks and calling upon God to bestow good things upon himself and others.

Oblations, first fruits, and tithes are the acts of religion least clearly associated with Christ's life. Christ does pay the temple tax as an example of paying tithes and taxes.[64] An oblation can be seen simply as a general offering of something to God, in which case Christ's life itself can be seen as an oblation to God: "Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God."[65] Another act of religion not usually associated

[62] *STh* II-II, q. 83, a. 10, ad 1. It is interesting to compare Aquinas's assertion that the divine persons do not pray since they do not need to receive anything to Bonaventure's claim that the divine persons show each other piety (see below at n. 113). Rendering honor and praying are different aspects of religion; to my knowledge, Aquinas does not specifically address the rendering of honor within the Trinity. Cf. Yves Congar, "The Prayer of Christ," in *Jesus Christ*, trans. Luke O'Neill (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), 86-106. Congar affirms that "it is as man, and with a fully human prayer, that Christ prays," since, "the Incarnate Word assumed a Jewish humanity, a religious humanity" (ibid., 87, 100). Although Aquinas makes the distinction that Christ prays as a human, this is still the action of the Word and proceeds from "the human nature deified" (*STh* III, q. 16, a. 5, ad 2).

[63] *STh* III, q. 21, a. 3.

[64] Matt 17:24-27.

[65] Eph 5:2.

with Christ is a vow. However, we can see the foundation for Christ's sacrifice in his prior vow to make this sacrifice at the Last Supper, a vow that creates a new covenant with man. Aquinas describes a vow as a promise to God to perform an action:

> A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another.[66]

In the case of the Last Supper, Christ makes an act of the will to offer his Body and Blood to the Father on behalf of mankind. This is a religious promise, one that extends throughout time, and draws those who believe this promise to be true into its saving reality. This promise is enacted the next day. In addition to this vow, Christ can also be seen performing oaths. He calls upon the Father as a witness[67] and often invokes formal language, akin to an oath, to draw attention to his veracity and to encourage belief: "Amen, Amen I say to you."[68] The oath-like language that seeks to heighten attention to a statement is also used to move others to action, the purpose of adjuration: "Truly, truly, I say to you, he who hears my word and believes him who sent me, has eternal life."[69] While these examples are more indirect, they are a further indication that Christ possessed and exercised the virtue of religion.

The clearest example that Christ did perform worship (in a way fitting with adoration and *latria*) can be seen in his priesthood. His priesthood culminates in the most important act through which he demonstrates worship—the offering of himself to the Father on the cross. Aquinas treats this as an act of worship in his account of Christ's priesthood. In offering sacrifice, Christ offered to the Father the act of worship due to God alone. Conversely, he bestows upon the people the merits and gifts

[66] *STh* II-II, q. 88, a. 1.
[67] John 5:32.
[68] E.g., John 3:11.
[69] John 5:24.

obtained by this worship. It is precisely this dual function, of offering worship to God on behalf of others and then in return acting on God's behalf to the people, that constitutes his priesthood.[70] Therefore, Aquinas states:

> The office proper to a priest is to be a mediator between God and the people: to wit, inasmuch as He bestows Divine things on the people, wherefore *sacerdos* means a giver of sacred things [*sacra dans*] . . . and again, forasmuch as he offers up the people's prayers to God, and, in a manner, makes satisfaction to God for their sins. . . . For through Him are gifts bestowed on men. . . . Moreover, He reconciled the human race to God.[71]

Christ acts as priest by virtue of his relationship with the Father. The true worship he offers is received by the Father, on account of the unity between the Father and Son; Christ's humanity, the true locus of his priesthood, shares this unity and expresses it in loving obedience.[72] Christ elevates worship by perfectly fulfilling the natural dictate of the moral order and also by exceeding it in

[70] Cf. Matthew Levering, "Christ as Priest: An Exploration of *Summa theologiae* III, Question 22," *The Thomist* 71 (2007): 379-417; Roger Nutt, "From Within the Mediation of Christ: The Place of Christ in the Christian Moral and Sacramental Life according to St. Thomas Aquinas," *Nova et Vetera,* Eng. edition, 5 (2007): 817-42.

[71] *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1. In an essay on Aquinas's commentary on Hebrews, Thomas Weinandy describes Christ's ability to be priest through his threefold perfection. He states: "First, it [Christ's priesthood] pertains to his relationship to the Father as the all holy Son. Secondly, it pertains to his relationship with his fellow human beings in that being 'innocent' he has never been found guilty of sin, that is, he has never sinned against anyone, but instead, in his innocence, has consistently loved everyone. Thirdly, it is in relationship to himself, in that he is himself holy and without blemish in his own being. . . . therefore his priesthood has merited for him an everlasting superiority that exceeds all others" ("The Supremacy of Christ: Aquinas' *Commentary on Hebrews*," in *Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to His Biblical Commentaries*, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum [New York: T & T Clark, 2005], 237).

[72] The fact that Christ's humanity shares in the filial relation of the Son is brought out by Thomas Joseph White: "The classical theory of the immediate vision, then, can be seen to be necessary in order to safeguard the personal unity of Christ's obedience and prayer as instrumental, *filial* actions, even while respecting the distinctly human character of these actions"; "Consequently, his prayer life is also a tangible manifestation of the same relation of origination from the Father, expressed in a specifically human way" (White, "Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ," 522; 523).

a supernatural fashion.[73] He communicates this perfection to others by enabling them to share in his own worship.

While all of Christ's life can be seen within the context of his priesthood (his action and example, teaching of continual prayer, and the bestowal of honor on the Father), there is one act that stands out as the climax of his worshipful mediation. Aquinas makes clear that "the priest's office consists principally in offering sacrifice."[74] As explained above, this pertains especially to Christ's priesthood. The general nature of sacrifice consists of contemning some good in order to show honor to God as the origin and end of all one's goods. Of all the good things that the world has ever possessed, Aquinas emphasizes that Christ's own life stands out chiefly among them. He states: "Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son. . . . Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ 'delivered Himself . . . to God for an odor of sweetness' (Eph. 5:2)."[75] The only gift truly worthy of the Father that Christ could offer was his own life. Not only did Christ

[73] Serge-Thomas Bonino argues that Christ's priesthood fulfills not only the priesthood of the Old Law, but also that of the law of nature, as expressed by Melchizedek. He states: "Il faut donc tenir simultanément *et* la nouveauté *et* la continuité du sacerdoce chrétiene par rapport au sacerdoce de la Loi ancienne. Bien plus, la référence au mystérieux sacerdoce du roi païen Melchisédech suggère qu'au-delà de la relation binaire entre l'Ancienne et la Nouvelle Alliance, le sacerdoce de Jésus-Christ assume et accomplit aussi le sacerdoce tel qu'il a pu se réaliser dans l'économie de la roi de nature, c'est-à-dire dans l'état théologique de l'humanité qui fait suite à la chute originelle et précède, pour le peuple hébreu, le don de la Loi" ("Therefore, it is necessary to hold simultaneously both to the newness and the continuity of the Christian priesthood in relation to the priesthood of the Old Law. Furthermore, the reference to the mysterious priesthood of the pagan king Melchisedech suggests that beyond the dual relation between the Old and the New Covenant, the priesthood of Jesus Christ assumes and fulfills also the priesthood as it has been able to be realized in the economy of the law of nature, which is to say in the theological state of humanity, which follows the Fall and precedes, for the Hebrew people, the gift of the Law") ("La sacerdoce comme institution naturelle selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomiste* 99 [1999]: 33-34). Though Bonino acknowledges that Aquinas does not specify a natural priesthood in his treatment of religion or priesthood, he argues that is implied in the social character of religion, the necessary role of intermediaries, and the practice of sacrifice (see ibid., 56).

[74] *STh* III, q. 22, a. 4, s.c.

[75] *STh* I-II, q. 102, a. 3.

worship, his life also consisted of the matter[76] of the worship: "Therefore, Christ Himself, as man, was not only priest, but also perfect victim, being at the same time victim for sin, victim for a peace offering and holocaust."[77] This sacrifice constitutes the perfect act of worship as regards both the one worshipping and what is offered.

The manner of Christ's action reflects that he both takes on the mode of worship as presented by the natural law and even custom, and perfects it in a manner surpassing any other. In speaking specifically of the Old Law, Aquinas stresses that "Christ was the culminating sacrifice of all."[78] The "all" seems to signify "all people" since the objection to which it responds specifies that certain animals were offered for certain individuals. Christ offers the most perfect sacrifice. Since sacrifice is the key visible act of religion, which is due to God alone (and hence is *latria*), Christ in his perfect sacrifice also offers the most perfect act of religion.[79] His sacrifice not only exemplifies religion, or *latria*, most fully, but also constitutes the greatest act of bodily adoration, honoring the person of the Father.[80] Cardinal Journet follows Aquinas's logic in presenting sacrifice as the chief act of *latria* to conclude

[76] According to Aquinas (*STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 5), God is not the object of religion, but its end, since only the theological virtues touch God as object. The object is "that which it offers to God," which should be distinguished from my question at the beginning of this essay as to the object of religion, comprised of the one to whom it is offered.

[77] *STh* III, q. 22, a. 2.

[78] *STh* III, q. 22, a. 3, ad 3: "…idest Christi esset sacrificium consummativum omnium aliorum." Charles Journet affirms that "in this priesthood, in this cultus, in this unique sacrifice, all that was legitimate in the priesthood, the cultus and the sacrifice of the Old Law—and before that of the law of nature—finds its meaning, its justification and its fulfillment" (*The Church of the Word Incarnate*, vol. 1, *The Apostolic Hierarchy*, trans. A. H. C. Downes [New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955], 52). Bonino sees the reference in the Roman Canon to the sacrifice of Abel, Abraham, and Melchizedek as an indication that Christ's sacrifice recapitulates all others (Bonino, "La sacerdoce comme institution naturelle," 57).

[79] While Yelles held that Cardinal Bérulle did not think that Christ was a servant of himself, he did make clear that Bérulle held that Christ offered perfect religion to the Father: "The oblation of Christ, begun at his entrance into the world, consummated at Calvary, is the most sublime act of the devotion of the virtue of religion" (Yelles, *Le mystère de la sainteté du Christ*, 98).

[80] Walsh notes that for the French School, "Adoration is the essential attitude of religion, and sacrifice is the essential expression of adoration" (Walsh, *Priesthood in the Writings of the French School*, 9).

that Christ must offer latreutic worship: "Sacrifice, unlike offering, is 'an essentially latreutic symbol,' it is '*in its essence* a rite significative of that homage which is due to God alone.'"[81] Thus, it is clear that Christ truly does offer latreutic worship, possessing to the highest degree the virtue of religion, manifest in the great priestly offering of himself on the cross.

Describing the position of the French School, Eugene Walsh goes beyond stating that Christ exercised the virtue of religion to point out that for Bérulle, de Condren, and Olier, Christ is religion itself. He summarizes their thought as follows:

> Because of His 'state' of servitude in the Incarnation, Jesus is the supreme model of all religion. In the union of the humanity of Christ with the Divinity in the Person of the Word, the Masters of the French School see the relation that is fundamental religion. Jesus is more than supreme adorer of God, more than the 'Great Worshipper,' He *is* subsisting religion: He is the living religion of creature before God. The relation of the humanity to the divinity which the hypostatic union is, is by its very being the relation of religion. . . . Simply by the fact that He is God-man, a relation in which His humanity is completely given over to God, Jesus eternally established the creatural position of man before God, which is adoration.[82]

[81] Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 1:53 n. 4, quoting I. Mennessier, O.P., "La notion de sacrifice," in *De Religione* (Paris, 1932), 350. He also quotes Matthias Scheeben: "The latreutic character of the sacrifice of Christ is seldom strongly emphasized. . . . We believe that the propitiatory and impetratory character of the sacrifice of Christ cannot be fully brought out save when its latreutic character is properly appreciated" (Matthias Scheeben, *The Mysteries of Christianity*, trans. Cyril Vollert, S.J. [New York: The Crossroad Publishing Co., 1946], 432). Journet himself states that "Jesus then wished once and for all to merit eternal life and the reconciliation and renewal of the world by a sacrificial act, that is to say by an exterior act, a rite significative in itself of the 'latreutic' homage, the homage of adoration, due to God alone—the generic end of all sacrifice being the homage of adoration" (Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 1:53). Scheeben explains the significance of latreutic worship as follows: "The most perfect and effective glorification of God consists admittedly in sacrifice. Therefore, if the God-man is to promote the infinite glorification of God in the most effective and perfect manner, as He can, He must offer to God a latretutic sacrifice of infinite value. I say, a latreutic sacrifice, for in latreutic sacrifice the full capabilities and highest meaning of sacrifice are realized" (Scheeben, *Mysteries of Christianity*, 431).

[82] Walsh, *Priesthood in the Writings of the French School*, 8. Walsh speaks of the importance of the word "state," in Bérulle as follows: "The term 'state,' therefore, in the second and most characteristically Berullian sense designates ontological relationships which give honor of themselves, by their very modes of being, independently of all spiritual effort on the part of an intelligent and free creature to express and celebrate them" (ibid., 7).

This position of the French School is the perfect summary for understanding Christ as possessing the virtue of religion. It is not simply by possessing this virtue, which he does in its fullness and all its acts, but by his entire incarnate life that he is religious and offers adoration. He is the perfect expression of religion and worship in the fullest sense of the words.

III. Did Christ Worship the Trinity?

Having established that Christ offers worship and exercises the virtue of religion, it is now crucial to examine this worship further to determine the person or persons who constitute its object. Thomas Joseph White poignantly presents the difficult nature of the question:

> Significant in this respect is the fact that, in praying, Christ does not regard himself (the Word) as an object to whom he offers petitions. He does not adore the Trinity [83]. Rather, the scriptural evidence suggests that his prayer is directed to the Father: it is primarily, therefore, a human mode of expression of his intra-Trinitarian filial identity. It can only be this because of the perfection of the prayer of Christ: it mirrors the will of the Father, due to the fact that Christ's heart is always "in the Father" (John 14: 8-11). For Aquinas, then, Christ's exemplarity in prayer is not a kind of docetic play-acting, but a human expression and enactment of his eternal relation to the Father, meant to reveal to us that all things are received from the Father. His prayer initiates us into an analogous "Trinitarian" relationship as sons of the Father adopted by grace.[84]

Since Christ does offer worship, the question raised by White's comment is this: can we really say that Christ worships himself? As White points out, it seems clear that Christ offers prayer to the Father. This prayer, flowing from "a human mode of expression" is still the prayer of the second person of the Trinity offered to another divine person with whom he possesses a common substance. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how the human prayer of Christ relates to each of the divine persons and the divine nature they all possess.

[83] White includes here a footnote, which is the source of the engagement with Matthew Levering discussed in the introduction of this article.

[84] White, "Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ," 524-25.

White contends that Christ does not offer adoration or *latria* to the Father or to himself. This seems to solve the problem of whether Christ worships himself by stipulating that Christ does not offer the worship which is particularly owed to God alone. If Christ simply gives the Father honor, then there is no need to address the difficulty of Christ worshiping himself or worshiping the divine nature the Father possesses.

As I made clear above, however, the question should really be framed as whether Aquinas holds that Christ exercised the virtue of religion. Adoration is an act of the virtue of religion; thus, at least for Aquinas, *latria* is equivalent to religion itself. If Christ exercises the virtue of religion, then he performs actions of worship and service that belong to God alone. It may be possible to abstract these actions by affirming that they are directed simply to the divine nature and not particularly to the divine persons (although this would not really be possible), but this does not solve the problem itself of worship being directed to the divine nature by one who possesses this nature. The virtue of religion is personal in nature, directing the worshiper to God as origin and end. Honoring the divine nature as creator, sustainer, and end necessitates direction toward the entire Trinity. In order to address this problem, I will examine Christ's worship in relation to each of the divine persons, including himself, and then how worship directed to any divine person necessarily entails worship of each of the persons.

I have shown in section II that Christ's acts of religion, especially his prayer and sacrifice, are primarily ordered toward the Father. Aquinas affirms this when discussing Christ's prayer:

> And therefore, as He gave thanks to the Father for gifts already received in His human nature, by acknowledging Him as the author thereof, as we read (Matthew 26:27; John 11:41): so also, in recognition of His Father, He besought Him in prayer for those gifts still due to Him in His human nature, such as the glory of His body, and the like.[85]

[85] *STh* III, q. 21, a. 3. This is the closest Aquinas comes to saying that Christ offers the Father *latria*. *Latria* is specifically ordered toward giving thanks for what has been received through the lordship of God: "Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently

As noted above, White points out that the acts of prayer for Christ are filial. They are human acts, but are still the acts of the second person of the Trinity. Hence, White states:

> This is particularly evident with respect to Jesus' obedience and his prayer, two activities that do not occur between the uncreated persons of the Trinity *per se*, and that are proper to created nature, yet that in Christ express something of his filial identity through distinctly human acts.[86]

Aquinas too unites the earthly and divine aspects of Christ's prayer, as follows:

> Christ wished to pray to His Father in order to give us an example of praying; and also to show that His Father is the author both of His eternal procession in the Divine Nature, and of all the good that He possesses in the human nature.[87]

Thus, the Son's earthly mission is completely ordered toward the Father. Christ is sent by the Father, his mission being an extension of his eternal procession, which is reflected in the Incarnation.[88] Ultimately, the acts of prayer of the humanity of Christ reflect this proper order from and to the Father.

Aquinas does not say anything directly concerning reverence shown by Christ to the Holy Spirit. There is one implication that can be drawn from what has been said above, however. Worship, both that of Christ and that of the Church, is directly ordered to the person of the Father. The Father is the origin of the Trinity and is therefore given the attribute of being the source of creation (though of course this is a common act of the Trinity). The Son

a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as 'latria' in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion" (*STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 1, ad 3). Jesus acknowledges that he is from the Father both eternally and in his human nature, thanking him and serving him through obedience and giving honor.

[86] White, "Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ," 522.

[87] *STh* III, q. 21, a. 3.

[88] Cf. *STh* I, q. 43. Although the Son is sent by the Father as the one from whom he proceeds, we can also say that "if, however, the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the whole Trinity sends the person sent" (*STh* I, q. 43, a. 8). Hence, the entire Trinity also is responsible for the good that he possesses in his humanity, which can be seen as a foundation for the prayer to the Father reaching to the entire Trinity, which will be explored further below.

receives all that he is from the Father and responds to the Father in love. We share in the Son's love for the Father in our reception of the Holy Spirit. Thus, human beings are also from the Father and toward the Father, both through creation and even more directly through adoption. We share in Christ's eternal sonship, but we also share in the privileges given to his humanity. It seems that among the chief graces of Christ's humanity is his anointing by the Holy Spirit. Christ (literally, the "anointed one") was constituted priest, prophet, and king by the Spirit. Thus, he offers his sacrifice to the Father in this anointing. He offers his life in love as his humanity participates in the eternal love of the Father and Son through the Spirit.

Although Aquinas does not speak of the role of the Holy Spirit in Christ's prayer directly, he does relate worship in the Spirit to the gifts of Spirit, which refer primarily to Christ. This occurs in the discussion of the gift of piety, which is the gift corresponding to justice, of which religion is potentially a part. Aquinas states:

> The gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial affection towards God, according to Romans 8:15, "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.[89]

This worship is clearly linked to adoption, which enables us to share in Christ's sonship. Indeed, this link shows how Christ himself prayed through the Spirit, piously relating to his Father.[90] This is not yet worship of the Spirit directly, but this will come by implication, as I will argue below.

Turning now to the question, how does worship relate to the Son?, it is important to note that White is correct in pointing out that Christ does not *directly* (at least) worship himself. He does

[89] *STh* II-II, q. 121, a. 1.

[90] This point is supported by Aquinas's discussion of the Spirit moving Christ to have reverence, in *STh* III, q. 7, a. 6.

not directly pray to himself. He does not directly offer himself sacrifice. His prayer and sacrifice (and worship more broadly) all proceed as actions of the second person of the Trinity, even if they proceed from his human intellect and will. To say that Christ as a man does not worship (offer acts of adoration and *latria*) himself as divine as a separate subject is crucial in upholding anti-Nestorian doctrine. There is only one person in Christ. Yet this does not mean that we must *de facto* rule out Christ's worship of the Holy Trinity, for two reasons. First, there is reverence in the human soul of Christ toward God, to whom, in the second person, this human soul is hypostatically united. Second, the worship which is directed to the person of the Father is communicated to the other persons.

In his discussion of Christ's possession of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, Aquinas helps us conceive how Christ could have reverence for God. In speaking of the gift of fear, he explains:

> It is plain that no one is feared except for some preeminence. And in this way it is said that in Christ there was fear of God, not indeed as it regards the evil of separation from God by fault; but inasmuch as it regards the Divine pre-eminence, on account of which the soul of Christ, led by the Holy Spirit, was borne towards God in an act of reverence. Hence it is said (Heb. v. 7) that in all things "he was heard for his reverence." For Christ as a man had this act of reverence toward God in a fuller sense and beyond all others. And hence Scripture attributes to Him the fullness of the fear of the Lord.[91]

This line of thought indicates that Christ worships God through his human and creaturely soul in respect of God's preeminence both as creator and as end. Assuming the truth of this it is clear that, although acts of worship are directed toward the Father in particular, Christ still possesses a general fear of God in his three persons. While Christ's created soul shared the beatific vision of

[91] Ibid. Cf. Francis B. Sullivan, C.PP.S, "The Notion of Reverence," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 23 (1953): 5-35. Sullivan traces the history of the theology of the gift of fear from Augustine to Aquinas. He focuses some attention on its relation to religion, which emerges primarily through "the explanation of reverence in terms of subjection to God" (ibid., 27). He notes particularly that Alan of Lille, in his attempt to equate the gifts with virtues, tied the gift of fear to "the virtue of reverence, the virtue which inclines one to show the proper cult of honor to dignitaries" (ibid., 11).

God on earth (as Aquinas holds), nevertheless Christ's soul still has an order toward God and is borne towards him. This bearing towards God does not indicate movement toward a future union, but rather points toward a present union. This indicates that Christ's worship, while fulfilling the order of justice, is propelled by the union of charity present within his will.

Exploring the topic of reverence toward God, it is important to consider the subjection of Christ's humanity to God. Aquinas argues that Christ's humanity is subject not only to the Father, but even to himself. In reference to the Father, Aquinas makes it clear that Christ in his humanity shares in man's triple subjection to God: participation in God's goodness, subjection to his power, and obedience to his will[92] However, Aquinas makes clear that this subjection should not be seen simply in regard to the Father. "Now whoever is the servant of the Father is the servant of the Son; otherwise not everything that belongs to the Father would belong to the Son. Therefore Christ is His own servant and is subject to Himself."[93] This statement is a crucial affirmation by Aquinas of the proper disposition required for adoration, or *latria*, of the entire Trinity. Service composes one of the chief elements of the virtue of religion; moreover, this service led to Christ's worshipful offering of self through "obedience unto death."[94] Although Christ is clearly obedient to the Father, there is also a subordination of his human will to the divine will. This subordination serves as the foundation for understanding the worship he gives to the Father as reaching the entire Trinity.

[92] *STh* III, q. 20, a. 1.

[93] *STh* III, q. 20, a. 2, s.c. In his response in the same article, Aquinas makes clear that this subordination must be seen in the human nature alone and not as a personal subordination. This is drawn out in his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*: "Thus, in saying that Christ will be subject in him who subjects all things to himself, the Son is not contrasted with the Father with respect to the divine nature, but rather with respect to the human nature of the Son relative to the Father's divinity, which is common to the whole Trinity" (Thomas Aquinas, *Faith, Reason and Theology: Questions I-IV of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius*, trans. Armand Maurer [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987], 83).

[94] *STh* III, q. 20, a. 2.

This understanding of subjection is related to the obedience of Christ's human will to his divine will, which does not entail Nestorianism.[95] As Christ's human will is subject to the divine will, so his human will becomes subject to the divine excellence through religion.[96] To deny this would actually tend in the direction of eliminating the proper human acts of Christ, thwarting the natural movement of his human will in subordination to the divine.[97] Christ divinely wills that his human will should manifest appropriately its origin from God and its (realized) order toward God.[98] This manifestation includes order toward the second person of the Trinity to whom the human soul of Christ is hypostatically united. The human body and soul

[95] Cf. White, "Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ," 527 n. 60.

[96] Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange explains the possibility of Christ's subjection to himself as follows: "This can be said of Christ, because of the diversity of natures in the same person. But this diversity must not be understood in the sense that there are two persons in Christ, one of which would be subject to the other, for this would be the heresy of Nestorius" (Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christ the Savior: A Commentary on the Third Part of St. Thomas' Theological Summa*, trans. Bede Rose, O.S.B. [St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1950], 488). If this distinction can be made in relation to subjection, then the same can be said of worship without falling into Nestorianism.

[97] "Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at the bidding of the divine will; yet it does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature"(*STh* III, q. 18, a.1, ad 1). Latreutic worship is certainly a constitutive part of the will's proper relation to God, and even the highest element of justice (*STh* II-II, q. 122, a. 1).

[98] Marie-Dominique Philippe details the significance of the subjection of Christ's human will, not only in his own humanity, but as an act representative of humanity itself: "Through His act of adoration, Jesus acknowledges that everything that exists comes from God and depends on Him, that nothing can occur without His almighty will. Jesus entirely surrenders His human will to the will of the Father. He offers to the Father His own human will in order to glorify the will of the Father. By the complete surrender of His own will, Jesus pays homage to the supreme majesty of the Father. The *dominum* over His human nature—made in the image of God—is allowed to give way before the *dominum* of God, before God's omnipotence. Thus, He declares the supreme rights of His God over Himself, over the whole human race, over the whole universe, of which He is King. Through Him, the whole human race, the whole universe honors in its Head the almighty majesty of God. We see, then, how the eminent dignity of this sacrifice manifests, more than any others, the omnipotence of God's grandeur. The greater the value and price of the victim offered to God, the more the rights of God and His omnipotence are glorified by its immolation" (Marie-Dominique Philippe, O.P., *You Shall Worship One God: The Mystery of Loving Sacrifice in Salvation History* [Charlotte, N.C.: St. Benedict Press, 2010], 112-13).

receive their origin and find their end in each of the three persons of the Trinity. Thus it is clear, as White has pointed out, that the humanity of Christ shares in the Son's filial relation to the Father. This is why the Son can be the subject that offers worship, because worship is not being directed to his person, but to the Father. However, it should also be clear that Christ's human soul has reverence (and therefore worship in the broad sense) that extends even toward his own self, the second person of the Trinity.

At this point it is appropriate to respond to Yelles's assertion that, out of fear of falling into Christological heresy, Cardinal Bérulle does not hold the idea that Christ serves himself. Fernando Guillèn Preckler makes it clear that Bérulle actually does hold that Christ in his humanity gives reverence and even adoration to himself as Word. Preckler states:

> The adoration of Christ, more than a conscious act, is a state, which of itself imitates a trinitarian reality: the temporal birth thus adores the eternal birth of the Word. Christ, in himself, is an adoration of the divine Paternity and the eternal filiation, that is to say that by the condition of his human existence, he gives glory to these trinitarian realities.[99]

This is not simply an interpretation at variance with Yelles, but is also based on the writing of Bérulle himself, as found in *The Grandeurs of Jesus*. Bérulle states:

> And this state of human Birth and Filiation is a state truly imitating, regarding, and adoring the eternal Birth and Filiation…. And as the Son of God is so much so the Son of man that he will always be the Son of man, there is also in himself a permanent state, and a perpetual quality, which incessantly regards the divine filiation as its exemplar and its origin…. by this Mystery, he is in a state and has a quality which adores the eternal Father in the quality of the Father and which adores the divine Birth of his only Son and his eternal filiation.[100]

[99] Fernando Guillèn Preckler, *Bérulle aujourd'hui 1575-1975: Pour une spiritualité de l'humanité du Christ* (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1978), 66.

[100] Pierre de Bérulle, *Discours de l'etat et des grandeurs de Jesus*, 11.5, in *Oeuvres* (Monsoult: Maison d'institution de l'oratoire, 1960), 347, quoted in Preckler, *Bérulle aujourd'hui*, 65-66.

For Bérulle, Christ is in a perpetual state of adoration by which he honors his own eternal procession from the Father. Christ initiates perfection contemplation of Father and of himself, so that others can partake therein.[101] Thus, it seems clear that Bérulle affirms, not only that Christ offers adoration, but also that he offers it to himself; further, Bérulle affirms this without falling into the problems of Nestorianism.

The second point to be made about Christ's worship of himself concerns the way in which worship of the Father reaches the other two Trinitarian persons. Although Christ may not directly worship and adore himself in acts of religion (Bérulle argues for a state of adoration), by giving personal reverence to the Father in his human nature this honor is communicated to him as Son. Christ acts for the honor and glory of the Father, but who would deny that this does not redound to his own honor and glory also? Aquinas's discussion of subjection, as presented above, makes it clear that Christ's statement—"I and the Father are one"—includes the sharing in the honor the Father receives from his humanity. This is implied in the following two passages from the *Summa*:

> Since there is one excellence of the three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is due to them and consequently one adoration. It is to represent this that where it is related (Genesis 18:2) that three men appeared to Abraham, we are told that he addressed one, saying: "Lord, if I have found favor in thy sight," etc. The triple genuflection represents the Trinity of Persons, not a difference of adoration.[102]
>
> The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion is one virtue.[103]

Following the second quotation, it is clear that the Triune persons, and not just the Father, are the principle of creation and governance of Christ's humanity and thus all deserve the honor of

[101] Ibid., 11.6 (*Oeuvres*, 348).
[102] *STh* II-II, q. 84, a. 1, ad 3.
[103] *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 3, ad 1.

reverence from this humanity. While Christ is not a human creature, his humanity is created and thus stands in need of recognizing its dependence on God. Aquinas states, in reference once again to Christ's dependence, that "whoever has a nature is competent to have what is proper to that nature. Now human nature from its beginning has a threefold subjection to God. . . . This triple subjection to God Christ professes of Himself."[104] Christ's humanity is subject to the Holy Trinity and thus owes it the honor due from all human beings (though Christ is not a human person). The natural law specifies that this created nature must recognize this dependence and subordination through acts of worship. Christ would not have withheld this just honor coming from his human soul from himself or the other persons of the blessed Trinity.

Further, Aquinas specifies, as quoted above,[105] that religion is one virtue and that one honor and reverence is given to the entire Trinity.[106] Even if Christ's worship was directly ordered to the Father, by virtue of the unity of the divine nature the worship would find its proper object in the entire Trinity. Not only is it fitting that this worship would extend to the second person of the Trinity by virtue of the subjection of the humanity, but it is also necessary in light of the unity of nature and circumincession of

[104] *STh* III, q. 20, a. 1.

[105] *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 3, ad 1. The objection specifically argues that there is a worship that could be distinct for each divine person: "It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion directs us to God, as stated above (Article 1). Now in God there are three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above (50, 2, ad 2). Therefore religion is not one virtue."

[106] Aquinas affirms this unity of worship for the entire Trinity as he affirms the unity of worship of Christ in his two natures: "In the Trinity there are three Who are honored, but only one cause of honor. In the mystery of Incarnation it is the reverse: and therefore only one honor is given to the Trinity and only one to Christ, but in a different way" (*STh* III, q. 25, a. 1, ad 1). This concept is strengthened further by the following: "For, as God, He (Christ) does not differ from the Father and the Holy Ghost in nature and power of dominion: nor have the Father and the Holy Ghost anything that the Son has not, so that He be able to communicate to others something belonging to the Father or the Holy Ghost, as though it were belonging to others than Himself" (*STh* III, q. 26, a.2). The Father does not have a worship that belongs to him alone that he does hold in common with the Son.

the divine persons.[107] The Council of Florence accordingly affirms the unified worship of the three persons: "The catholic faith is this, that we worship one God in the Trinity, and the Trinity in unity, neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance. . . . So that in all things, as has been said above, the unity in Trinity and the Trinity in unity is to be worshipped."[108] Latreutic worship is properly offered to the entire Trinity, united in substance.

With these two points being established, it is also possible to look at a deeper and more Trinitarian foundation for Christ's worship. The person of the Son offers fitting worship of the Trinity, because there is a foundation for this worship in the Trinitarian processions itself. White affirms the foundation for this point as follows:

> As Aquinas makes clear, Christ's prayer is an expression of his created, dependent nature, and does not pertain to his divine nature. Consequently, it does not imply an eternal subordination or obedience within the uncreated Trinity. Yet this prayer is expressive of an inner-Trinitarian relation. It reveals to us the relation that the person of the Son has with respect to the Father: Jesus receives all that he is and has, both as God and man, from the Father as his origin."[109]

The *ratio* for this position is similar to the explanation of Christ's obedience. Although there is no obedience proper in the Trinity, the fact that the Son receives all that he has from the Father and offers it back to him in the Spirit is the foundation for understanding the subordination of his human will to the divine will.[110] Cardinal Bérulle does not speak of prayer to the Father directly reaching the Son, but he speaks of our prayer to Jesus as reaching the Father and entering into his own inter-Trinitarian reverence for the Father. He states: "In honoring him (the Son),

[107] "There are three points of consideration as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the relation, and the origin; and according to each the Son and the Father are in each other" (*STh* I, q. 42, a. 5).

[108] Council of Florence, session 8, "Bull of Union with the Armenians."

[109] White, "Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ," 527.

[110] Cf. ibid., 498-99.

we honor in him his Father who has given him to us, by the excess and abundance of his love, which is a chain of love and honor, which links us to the Father and to the Son, and renders us capable of imitating and adoring the reciprocal love and honor which is between them."[111] Sharing in Christ's worship entails not only entering into his human virtue of religion, but also sharing in the mutual honor between the Trinitarian persons themselves.

Two eminent theologians, one a Doctor of the Church, provide further support for seeing piety (or honor) and glorification in the Trinitarian relations.[112] First, St. Bonaventure in the *Hexaëmeron* offers an account of piety in the Trinity. In describing how grace enables one to fulfill the natural precept of piety, Bonaventure turns to an appropriation of the first three commandments to the persons of the Trinity. In the twenty-first collation of the *Hexaëmeron*, he proposes a bold theory of piety, which turns to the Trinity as a model. He states:

> It should be understood, then, that concerning God triune and one, there come about appropriations of essential properties appropriated according to this number nine. Some of them concern the Trinity as originating principle, others, as governing means, others, again, as final completion, in the act of beatifying all things. . . . The second appropriation is made to the Eternal Sun (the Trinity) insofar as it is the medium that governs all things. In this regards, three [attributes] are appropriated, to wit, piety, truth, and holiness, for all governing and law-giving is pious, true, and holy. . . . Out of these three come forth three laws, and there cannot be more; that is, of nature, of Scripture, and of grace. The law of nature is appropriated to the Father, the law of Scripture to the Word, and the law of grace to the Holy Spirit. The law of nature is the law of piety. Now piety is found to exist within every nature, even insensible. . . . Likewise,

[111] Bérulle, *Discours de l'etat et des grandeurs de Jesus*, 5.10 (*Oeuvres*, 240). He goes on to affirm not only that the Father and Son honor each other in the Trinity but also that they honor themselves.

[112] There is also an example from one of the great mystics of the Benedictine tradition, St. Gertrude the Great. Her prayer, "Acts of Praise in Honor of the Most Blessed Trinity," reads as follows: "I venerate and glorify Thee, O Most Blessed Trinity, in union with that ineffable glory with which God the Father, in His omnipotence, honors the Son and the Holy Spirit forever. I magnify and bless Thee, O Most Blessed Trinity, in union with that most reverent glory with which God the Son in His unsearchable wisdom, glorifies the Father and the Holy Spirit forever. I adore and extol Thee, O Most Blessed Trinity in union with that most adequate and befitting glory with which the Holy Spirit, in His unsearchable goodness, extols the Father and the Son forever."

in animals, piety is seen in the relationship between parents and offspring, for whatever they taste and eat that is beyond their need—and even within their need—they convert into milk and food for their young. The law of Scripture is the law of truth, for it consists in a sense in a pronouncement of a true promise. The law of holiness is the law of grace. . . . Through these three, God the Trinity is pious, true, and holy, offering a pious law of nature, a true law of Scripture, and a holy law of grace. And through these three He governs the world, and according to these three, He imprints laws in the rational mind. For all moral law is dependent upon these three. . . . And everyone of the Persons is in a state of piety, truth, and holiness in relation to Himself and in relation to the others: so that the Father is pious toward Himself, toward the Son, and toward the Holy Spirit, and true, and holy. And from this fact, that He is the pious worshipper of Himself, the true witness to Himself, and the holy lover of Himself, there comes down from heaven a threefold radiation in the mind, according to the three commandments of the first tablet. For the creature must behave in relation to God in a manner that is pious, true, and holy.[113]

Thus, according to Bonaventure, worship no longer stands as a mere precept of nature concerning the creature's relation toward the Creator, but rather stems from an imitation of the very being of God. God justly honors himself for his excellence and so the creature must honor him as well, clinging to him for life and redemption. This makes it clear that, for Bonaventure, nature exists as a reflection of God himself, reflecting him through the laws that flow through it. The law of piety particularly runs throughout nature as all things point toward and glorify their maker. Humanity appropriates this law in a special way through a rational comprehension of it, and, therefore, offers a free act of worship, which knows and loves the recipient. Christ himself unites the natural precept with its foundation in Trinitarian life.

The second theologian to offer arguments in favor of seeing Christ's human worship as being rooted in the Trinity is Matthias Scheeben. In his *Mysteries of Christianity*, Scheeben argues for the significance of both Christ's latreutic worship and the giving of glory within the Trinity, which is its foundation. First, he says concerning Christ's latreutic worship:

[113] Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* 21.4-8 (*Collations on the Six Days*, vol. 5 of *The Works of Bonaventure*, trans. José de Vinck [Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1970]).

The meritorious and expiatory power of Christ's sacrifice is based on its latreutic character. This latreutic character may not be regarded as a subordinate factor. It is the primary and most important element. It is willed not merely for the sake of the effects to be achieved for creatures, for the sake of pardon and reconciliation, but also for its own sake, namely that the Son of God may manifest in His external mission, by a real and perfect surrender of Himself, the honor which He is to give to His Father.[114]

On the relation of this worship to the Trinitarian relations, Scheeben states:

It was remarked above that even in His humanity the Son of God honors and glorifies His Father as the latter's natural Son, and that He thus continues in the outer world to render to the Father the honor which as the eternal Word He renders within the Godhead. Since He communicates His own dignity and power to His mystical body, the human race, the latter is enabled and summoned in its supernatural head to glorify the eternal Father with infinite honor.[115]

Christ's worship forms the basis of the Christian's worship, which finds its highest value precisely in that it enters into the Trinitarian life. Scheeben goes on to say that "as we enter into Christ's personal relationship with the Father because of this connection of ours with Him, we can infinitely glorify the eternal Father in His fatherhood through Christ's prayers, His works, and His sufferings."[116] We are able to render fitting Christian worship, latreutic worship, only because Christ has offered it for us. It is to this participation in Christ's worship that we will now turn.

IV. Christian Worship as a Share in Christ's Worship

Although it has been established that Christ offered worship, it must now be demonstrated how he communicates this worship to others. *Lumen gentium* describes Christian worship as "the latreutic worship we give to God the Father, through Christ, in the Spirit."[117] This worship draws directly upon Christ's own

[114] Scheeben, *Mysteries of Christianity*, 452. Cf. ibid., 431.
[115] Ibid., 396. Cf. ibid., 359.
[116] Ibid., 397.
[117] *LG* 51.

worship, which we share in through our union with the Holy Spirit. As Journet states: "Christ is the principal cause of the Christian cultus."[118] Not only does Christian worship flow from Christ, Aquinas even implies that Christ's worship would be incomplete if it did not extend to us.[119] While treating Christ's priesthood, he states: "In the priestly office, we may consider two things: first, the offering of sacrifice; secondly, the consummation of the sacrifice, consisting in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is offered, obtain the end of the sacrifice."[120] It belongs to Christ's priesthood not only to offer sacrifice on behalf of others, but also to communicate the effects of this sacrifice.

Christian worship itself presupposes Christ's own worship. The identity between them is so strong that we could say that Christ "*is* man's religion."[121] Christ's sacrifice unites believers by binding and conforming them to him, allowing them to share in the merits of his worship and even in his priesthood itself. Walsh draws out

[118] Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 1:68.

[119] Cecile Bruyère, the first Abbess in the Solesmes Congregation, affirms this point: "For our Lord Jesus Christ as Man, the Adorer by excellence, in strict obedience offered Himself, and unceasingly offers Himself to the glory of the Father. He never comes into us to inoculate us with His divine and human virtues until He has paid the debt of an adoration which surpasses the homage of all creatures. How then will He not form us to become true adorers who 'being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself' [Phil 2:6-7]. And He humbled Himself to the death of the cross in order to offer His Father a tribute of adoration and praise."And further: "Our Lord Jesus Christ . . . is the first to render to God this supreme worship decreed from all eternity by the Divine Will. . . . He came as a creature to pay to His Father a homage the most complete that God could possibly receive, a glory proportionate to God, since it is offered by God Himself, the hypostatic union giving to the human nature of the Incarnate Word a dignity and splendor unparalleled. . . . That which our Lord had in view is very evident; the end or purpose of His Incarnation was to enable Him to become priest and victim, that He might thus offer to the Divine Majesty the most perfect and exalted worship that an intelligent creature could offer" (Cecile Bruyère, *The Spiritual Life and Prayer according to the Holy Scripture and Monastic Tradition*, trans. The Benedictines of Stanbrook [London and Leamington: The Art and Book Co., 1900], 360; 407-8). This position is important for Bruyère, because she is rooting the recitation of the Divine Office, and thus the center of Benedictine life, in Christ's own prayer.

[120] *STh* III, q. 22, a. 5.

[121] Walsh, *Priesthood in the Writings of the French School*, 11. Walsh continues in expounding the position of the French School: "Christ is the perfect *'Worshipper'* of God, not only in Himself and for Himself, but principally for all men. . . . And He accomplishes in Himself the religion of all men because the mystery of the Incarnation draws to Himself all humanity and forms with it one mystic reality" (ibid.).

this point: "Jesus is the only one who can render to God adequate religion; Jesus is the perfect 'Worshipper' of God. The Christian is enabled to share in the religion of Jesus by the fact that with Christ he forms one mystical person in the unity of the mystical body."[122] Christ's worship comes to the individual through the worship of the Church, his body, and particularly through the mediation of her sacramental ministry.

> The whole rite of the Christian religion is derived from Christ's priesthood. Consequently, it is clear that the sacramental character is specially the character of Christ, to Whose character the faithful are likened by reason of the sacramental characters, which are nothing else than certain participations of Christ's Priesthood, flowing from Christ Himself.[123]

The faithful share in the priesthood of Christ by receiving his character in baptism, and, by virtue of this character, they make acts of worship, which participate in his own. The character of baptism is especially ordered toward worship. Aquinas specifies that this character is the character of Christ, which must then unite us to his own worship. Journet unfolds the significance of this point as follows: "All those who possess, in any degree whatsoever, the power to continue the Christian cultus, participate directly in the sacerdotal consecration of Christ. The simple sacramental power given at Baptism is already enough to incorporate us with Christ, Chief and Head of the Christian cultus."[124] This sacramental participation forms the essence of Christian worship; it makes it not only acceptable to God, but also salvific for the individual.

Sharing in Christ's worship reveals an even deeper participation in his relation to the Father. It is his love and devotion to the Father that makes his sacrifice so exceedingly worthy and redemptive. Therefore, for the Christian's worship to

[122] Ibid., 18. Elders further states that "in this connection Thomas points out we and Christ form one mystical person (*quasi una persona mystica*). This implies, first, that Christ's atonement is regarded by the Father as if he has not performed it alone, but together with us" (Elders, "Inner Life of Jesus," 76; quoting *STh* III, q. 48, a. 2, ad 1).

[123] *STh* III, q. 22, a. 5.

[124] Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 69.

avoid a superficial participation in Christ's worship, there must be conformity to Christ in his very relation to the Father.[125] It was the love, not the sacrifice itself, that was most pleasing to the Father.[126] To share in this worship, one cannot share only in the act of worship, but must share also in the Sonship of Christ. This occurs through adoption. In a question devoted to this subject, Aquinas makes clear that "adoptive sonship is a certain likeness of the eternal Sonship"[127] so that "by adoption we are made the brethren of Christ, as having with Him the same Father."[128] Aquinas notes an important distinction, that human persons are

[125] Levering affirms this point as follows: "We share in his (Christ's) sacrifice sacramentally by becoming like him, thereby accomplishing God's purpose in Israel of forming a holy people in and through holy worship" (Matthew Levering, *Sacrifice and Community: Jewish Offering and Christian Eucharist* [Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2005], 92). Holy worship comes from sharing in Christ's self-offering to the Father in love and obedience. Therefore, Levering affirms that "to abide in Christ's love, we must imitate his obedience to the Father's commandments" (ibid., 99).

[126] Walsh makes an important note on this issue in light of the French School. To share in Christ's religion means to share in his sacrifice and self-emptying. "It is precisely in terms of the victim life of Christ that the French masters achieve their most beautiful and inspiriting developments of the doctrine of the mystical body. In their eyes Christ never more effectively exercises His function of His mystical body than when He communicates His victim state to His Church" (Walsh, *Priesthood in the Writings of the French School*, 89). And further: "It is His design, and the inexorable pattern of religion and sacrifice, that His members with Him go through the same course,—back to God in sacrifice. There is no other way" (ibid., 91).

[127] *STh* III, q. 23, a. 2, ad 3. Romanus Cessario links the notion of adoption specifically to sacramental worship. See Romanus Cessario, O.P., *The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from St. Anselm to Aquinas* (Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1990), 176.

[128] *STh* III, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2. Joseph Wawrykow points out that this adoption brings about a new relationship of justice with God, which he describes in terms of merit. He argues that "Thomas's teaching in the *Summa* is clearly 'juridical': He explains merit to be a quality of an act by which one deserves, in justice, a reward from God. Yet Thomas's 'juridicism' is highly nuanced, and he is careful to focus our attention on the context in which justice can govern divine-human relations. Most important, he argues that his justice only holds sway when there exists a special community between God and the human person, and this community is itself created by the gift of God. The 'communal' basis of justice is disclosed by Thomas's description of grace in terms of sonship. By grace, God freely elevates people to God's own level, treating them as 'sons' to whom what belongs to the Father can also belong. As the term 'sonship' suggests, the community which lies behind merit is itself Christ-centered. It is through the action of the Son of God that others are enabled to be adopted as God's children" (Joseph Wawrykow, *God's Grace and Human Action: 'Merit' in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995], 203-4).

"likened to the splendor of the Eternal Son by reason of the light of grace"[129] not by "natural generation."[130] As adopted sons and daughters, Christians share more fully in Christ's worship because they too approach God as Father and offer him a sacrifice out of love.

The importance of this discussion is that if Christ did not offer the Father (and consequently the entire Trinity) latreutic worship, then Christian worship would not be able to realize this goal. Christian worship is precisely a participation in Christ's own worship. Aquinas states that "by His Passion He [Christ] inaugurated the Rites of the Christian Religion by offering 'Himself—an oblation and a sacrifice to God' (Ephesians 5:2)."[131] His sacrifice is not only the foundation for Christian worship, but is Christian worship itself. Aquinas makes this even clearer when speaking of the rite of the Eucharist: "The celebration of this sacrament is an image representing Christ's Passion, which is His true sacrifice. Accordingly the celebration of this sacrament is called Christ's sacrifice."[132] Our sacrifice requires Christ's sacrifice. Aidan Nichols describes this reality as follows:

> The sacrifice of our great high priest is the source of whatever is valid for salvation in the sacrificial worship of the Church. In a Thomist perspective, the entire Liturgy of the Church thus shares in the "liturgy" of Jesus's life—the worship he gave the Father through the visible signs which were the "mysteries," the chief events, of that life—and the Church's worship is effective only by their power.[133]

[129] *STh* III, q. 23, a. 2, ad 3.

[130] *STh* III, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2. Aquinas also notes that this adoption occurs "through a voluntary operation, which is common to Him (the Father) and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost: so that Christ is not the Son of the whole Trinity, as we are" (*STh* III, q. 23, a. 2, ad 3).

[131] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 5. Journet states that "the Christian cultus, initiated by Christ, is continued in the Church in all its essentials, in two ways: by the bloodless sacrifice and by the sacraments" (Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 1:61).

[132] *STh* III, q. 81, a. 3.

[133] Aidan Nichols, O.P., "St. Thomas and the Sacramental Liturgy," *The Thomist* 72 (2008): 586. Philippe unites the conformity to both the inner and the outer elements of Christ's worship as integral to Christian worship: "This presence of love can only be compared to the presence of the Father in relation to that of His only Son. The presence of the Father to His Son is the presence of friend to friend in its deepest and most intimate

The Church necessarily participates in Christ's worship because it has no distinct worship of its own. Sacrifice is the most distinct act of religion, an act of *latria*, which can be offered to God alone. We can offer worship to God, because Christ our high priest has enabled us to share in his priesthood and in his sacrifice, the worship of his priesthood.

Conclusion

I began by asking the question of whether Christ offered worship to the Trinity. In particular I sought to engage the position of Thomas Joseph White that Christ does not offer latreutic worship: "Significant in this respect is the fact that, in praying, Christ does not regard himself (the Word) as an object to whom he offers petitions. He does not adore the Trinity."[134] I have sought to engage constructively White's position, showing that Christ does not directly regard himself as an object of worship, but that he does offer true latreutic worship to the Father, which does, in effect, give adoration to the Trinity.

What is the ultimate significance of the question of whether Christ worships the Trinity? Following the logic of Aquinas's theology of the Eucharist, it is profoundly significant. Aquinas says that in the Eucharist we share in Christ's own worship of the Father, that is, we share in his sacrifice on the Cross. Further, we share in Christ's honor, love, and obedience to the Father. We can do so for two reasons: First, as Christians we have been adopted by the Father and thus share in Christ's own Sonship. Second, we have been anointed (initially in baptism and more fully in confirmation) by the Spirit to share in Christ's priesthood. We have been constituted as part of Christ's Body and so share

element. Loving worship in spirit and truth in union with the worship of the Cross, in and through the mystery of the Eucharist, allows us, through faith, to draw life from this presence of love and from the infinitely tender care of the Father. Worship is then carried out in a filial abandonment, through which we discover how much the merciful love of the Father surrounds us, supports us, feeds us, and transfigures us" (Philippe, *You Shall Worship One God*, 131).

[134] White, "Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ," 527.

intimately in his identity. Ultimately, the reality of his worship is of great significance because it directly influences the reality of our worship.

The Mass is clearly directed to the Father as the object of its adoration. The Father is addressed in the Church's prayer through the Son and in the Spirit. Christian worship is Trinitarian, but the question still remains whether it is simply adoration of the Father or whether it is an adoration of the entire Trinity. It is the Mass that enables us to render in a supernatural way the debt that we owe to God, the Blessed Trinity, in thanksgiving not only for our creation and natural order toward him as end, but also for him as the principle of our salvation and source of happiness in the beatific vision. We share in the disposition of subjection and union that is seen in the humanity of Christ, which becomes perfectly fulfilled in the Eucharist that flows from the offering of his life on the cross.

Ultimately, we can offer fitting worship of the Father because we share in Christ's Sonship. Christian worship both fulfills and exceeds the just ordering that creatures owe to God out of reverence and service. Christians are adopted as sons and offer prayer through Christ in the Spirit, as *Lumen gentium* observes. We share in the latreutic worship that Christ offered the Father, which redounds not only to the glory and honor of the Father, but also to the entire Trinity.

The Thomist 76 (2012): 273-304

THOMAS AQUINAS ON WHOLE AND PART

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THE DOCTRINE OF whole and part (mereology) plays an important and irreplaceable part in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas uses these concepts in his account of many crucial problems such as the structure of being as such, the properties of substantial and accidental being, the ontological composition of supposit or person, the structure of common nature, the ordering of all created world and each individual being with respect to the ultimate end (God), the properties of quantitative beings, the properties of cardinal virtues, the determination of the properties of univocal categorical concepts and their relationship to subordinate natures, and so on.[1] Yet it is

[1] The secondary literature devoted to the problem is not vast. The following are particularly useful and fundamental contributions to Aquinas's mereology. B. Bro, "La notion métaphysique de tout et son application au problème théologique de l'union hypostatique," part 1, "La notion de tout en Saint Thomas," *Revue Thomiste* 67 (1967): 32-61; part 2, "Analytiques de la notion de tout," *Revue Thomiste* 67 (1967): 561-83; L. Oeing-Hanhoff, "Das Ganze und seine substantialen Teile," in *Ens et unum convertuntur*, *Stellung und Gehalt des Grundsatzes in der Philosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Münster, 1953), 155-63; idem, *Ganzes/Teil*, in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, ed. J. Ritter and K. Gruender, Band 3 (Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe und Co. AG, 1976), col. 3-11; P. H. Desmond, *Medieval Mereology*, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 16 (Amsterdam: B. R. Gruener, 1992); C. A. Lofy, "The Meaning of 'Potential Whole' in St. Thomas Aquinas," *The Modern Schoolman* 37 (1959): 39-48. Also useful are R. Cross, "Ockham on Part and Whole," *Vivarium* 37 (1999): 143-67; A. W. Arlig, *A Study in early Medieval Mereology: Boethius, Abelard and Pseudo-Joscelin* (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 2005); idem, "Is There a Medieval Mereology?", in *Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500–1500*, ed. M. Cameron and J. Marenbon (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 161-89; idem, *Medieval Mereology*, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2011 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta,

remarkable that the Angelic Doctor did not pay much attention to the analysis of these concepts in his vast work. Aquinas considers whole and part in various parts of his writings, mostly in the context of solving other problems which provide occasion to formulate some fundamental thoughts concerning mereology. The most extensive explication of the concept of whole (and part) is to be found in his commentary on the fifth book of *Metaphysics*, but this is by no means a complete and comprehensive exposition. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Aquinas's concept of whole (and part) as such and thus contribute to clearer understanding of this topic.

The article is divided into three main parts. The first part presents the basic division of wholes (and parts) that can be found in Aquinas's work. In the second part I shall explain the fundamental characteristics of whole in successive steps, that is, its integrity and the ordered unity of its parts. Finally I shall attempt briefly to summarize the issue.

I. Fundamental Division of Whole and Part

It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a complete account of all types of wholes (and parts) and their respective characteristics. I shall therefore distinguish and explain only such wholes the undertanding of which will enable the reader to follow the subsequent exposition more easily. Aquinas divides the concept of whole in a number of ways, two of which occur most frequently in his work.[2] The first is based on the fact that a whole

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology-medieval/#SelSecSou; D. Svoboda, "The Logical and Metaphysical Structure of a Common Nature (A Hidden Aspect of Aquinas' Mereology)," *Organon F* 17, 2 (2010): 185-200.

[2] I have attempted to present the division and thorough characteristics of all types of wholes elsewhere: D. Svoboda, *Metafyzické myšlení Tomáše Akvinského* (Prague: Krystal, 2012). Aquinas divides the concept of whole in several ways: according to the type of its *unity*, which is how a quantitative whole (e.g., a man who is a unity absolutely) differs from an aggregate, which is absolutely many and one only in a certain respect (see *STh* I-II, q. 17, a. 4); according to the *form of the whole* (the principle of the unity and ordering of the parts of the whole), which is how an animal as an integral whole (the principle of the unity and ordering of integral parts of which is, together with quantity, the soul proper and immanent to the animal) differs from a collective whole (e.g., a state society, whose principle of unity

is what has parts. Since a whole is constituted by its parts, the concept may be divided according to the type of parts of which it consists: *quantitative*, *essential*, or *potestative*.

The first and basic type of parts are quantitative parts to which the *quantitative whole* corresponds. Quantity is of its nature divisible into parts, which is why the concepts of whole and part originate in our experience with quantitative beings.[3] That is probably why Aquinas pays most attention to this kind of whole and carefully distinguishes among its various types. The first and best-known type of quantitative whole is a material substance determined by the accidental form of quantity.[4] This type of whole is further divided into *homogeneous* and *heteroogeneous*.[5] As we shall see, a homogeneous whole consists of similar parts and each of its quantitative parts has the same form and the same conceptual definition as the whole: for example, water consists of similar parts which have the same form and conceptual definition as water. Conversely, a heteroogeneous whole consists of dissimilar parts and none of its quantitative parts has the same form and the same conceptual definition as the whole: for example, a man does not consist of similar parts and no integral

and ordering of its parts is not a form intrinsic to the whole, but an external form, e.g., the common good) (see I *Ethic*., lect. 1 [Leonine ed., n. 5]); according to the *type of division* (whereby a whole can be divided into various parts), which is how a quantitative whole, which can be materially divided into quantitative parts, differs from an essential whole, which can be divided by essential division into parts of the essence (see *STh* I, q. 76, a. 8); according to the *type of parts of the whole* (see *ScG* II, c. 72); or according to the *manner of the relationship of whole to parts and parts to whole*, which is how, for example, a universal whole differs from a quantitative whole, since a universal whole is as to its essence completely present in all its subjective parts, whereas a quantitative whole is not as to its essence completely present in any of its integral parts (see *De spir. creat*., a. 11, ad 2). The various ways of division frequently yield similar or same types of wholes, and it is therefore necessary correctly to choose such ways of division within the overall classification of wholes that will allow us to appropriately distinguish all types of wholes.

[3] *In De Div. Nom*., c. 4, lect. 8; *De Pot*., q. 7, a. 10. Cf. Oeing-Hanhoff, *Ganzes/Teil*, col. 5-6.

[4] See *STh* I, q. 76, a. 8. See also *STh* I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 3; *ScG* II, c. 72; *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 10, etc.

[5] *STh* I, q. 11, a. 2, ad 2: "duplex est totum, quoddam homogeneum, quod componitur ex similibus partibus; quoddam vero heterogeneum, quod componitur ex dissimilibus partibus."

part of man is a man.[6] The quantitative whole may further be divided into *natural* and *artificial whole*, for example, man and house. These types of wholes primarily differ in that the parts of a natural whole are united by a substantial form which is intrinsic to it, and thus constituted wholes are one absolutely (*unum simpliciter*). Conversely, the parts of an artificial whole are united by an accidental form which causes the unity of the given whole as an external bond; the whole is one only in a certain respect (*unum secundum quid*).[7]

The second basic type of parts are essential parts to which the *essential whole* corresponds. An essential whole is either real or intentional, the difference being determined by a different type of existence. A real essential whole may either be a material substance (considered without accidents) consisting of (physical) essential parts, that is, substantial form and prime matter;[8] or a real (categorial) being consisting of the act of existence and essence.[9] An intentional essential whole consists of essential logical parts, that is, genus and specific difference; for example, the concept "man" consists of the essential logical parts "animal" and "rational."[10] These parts are called essential because they establish the essence of the species.[11]

[6] Ibid.: "In quolibet autem toto homogeneo, totum constituitur ex partibus habentibus formam totius, sicut quaelibet pars aquae est aqua . . . toto heterogeneo, quaelibet pars caret forma totius, nulla enim pars . . . hominis est homo." Aquinas frequently uses this type of whole to describe and explain the structure of living beings, especially man.

[7] *ScG* II, c. 72. A quantitative whole is also a whole resulting from a cumulation of quantitative parts in one place, e.g., a heap of stones, or quantitative number.

[8] *STh* I, q. 76, a. 8: "Est etiam quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes . . . essentiae . . . sicut . . . compositum resolvitur in materiam et formam."

[9] I *Sent*., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1.

[10] *De spir. creat.*, a. 4: "Secunda totalitas attenditur secundum perfectionem essentiae, cui totalitati etiam respondent partes essentiae . . . logice vero genus et differentia." Apart from these two essential logical parts, however, the essential logical whole "man" actually comprises further essential parts: since man is rational animal, this whole actually comprises also the essential logical parts "living being" (*animatum*), "body," "substance," etc.

[11] In his commentary on the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* Aquinas (following Aristotle) further distinguishes between *parts of species* and *parts of matter*. Parts of species are in fact the essential parts of a species, i.e., parts on which the perfection of the species depends and without which the species cannot exist. The parts of species therefore determine the species, e.g., "soul" and "body" determine "animal." Parts of matter are such parts on which the

The third fundamental type of parts are potestative parts to which the *potestative whole* corresponds. Aquinas sometimes uses the terms *potestative part* (*whole*) and *potential part* (*whole*) to signify the same thing. The primary instance of such a whole is the human soul which according to Aquinas is the inner formal principle of all vital functions of man the realization of which requires various organic and nonorganic faculties—sight, hearing, sense appetite, intellect, will, etc. The various faculties are potestative parts in the sense that they are parts of the overall power of the soul, which manifests itself in them in a partial manner.[12]

However, according to Aquinas the soul is not a potestative whole only with respect to its faculties as its potestative parts. In a certain way it is also a potestative whole as to its whole power. Following Aristotle, he distinguishes three "kinds" of life which may be progressively ordered according to their degree of perfection and power as follows: vegetative, sensual, and rational life.[13] The soul as the principle of life has the greater power, the higher the degree of life that it causes as the form of the body. Thus the human rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul of animals and vegetative soul of plants, as it is the formal principle not only of the vegetative and sensitive life of man, but also of his rational life.[14] The human soul as the formal principle of the highest degree of life has all the power of the soul, since the powers of the sensitive and the vegetative soul are contained in it in a higher way and it further has the power of the rational soul.[15]

essence of the species does not depend and by which the species is not determined. These parts therefore do belong to the species as such, but only "accidentally," e.g., it "belongs" to a statue to be made of copper or bronze. Iron or bronze are in this case parts of matter. See V *Metaph*., lect. 21 (1089). Parenthetical page numbers in references to the commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* refer to paragraph numbers in Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia super Metaphysicam* ed. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1971).

[12] I *De Anima*, lect. 14: "Anima enim est quoddam totum potentiale, et pars accipitur ibi potentialis respectu totius potestativi"; *ScG* IV, c. 36.

[13] See, e.g., *STh* I, q. 18, a. 1.

[14] *STh* I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2: "anima rationalis est perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis."

[15] *STh* I, q. 76, a. 3: "anima intellectiva continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anima sensitiva brutorum, et nutritiva plantarum."

That is why Aquinas says that the rational soul is "the whole soul, since it has all the power of the soul." The sensitive soul of an animal and the vegetative soul of a plant are parts of soul, since they only have part of the power of the soul, not all of it.[16] Thus it is clear that the power of the soul is not complete in all the parts, it is complete only in the rational soul; in the other parts (the sensitive and vegetative soul) it is in a lower degree.[17]

Another important way in which Aquinas divides the concept of whole is found in the context of considering the relationship of whole to parts and parts to whole.[18] This division partly leads to the same results as the previous one, but we also come to discern further previously undistiguished wholes (parts) and their properties. In this respect, Aquinas distinguishes among three types of wholes: *universal*, *integral*, and *potential*.

[16] III *Sent*., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1: "Rationalis enim anima tota anima dicitur, eo quod in ipsa omnes animae potentiae congregantur. Sensibilis vero in brutis, et in plantis vegetabilis, dicuntur partes animae, quia aliquid de potentia animae habent, sed non totum."

[17] IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 2: "virtus totius potentialis in partibus ejus, quae quidem complete in una invenitur, et in aliis diminute: sicut tota virtus animae invenitur in rationali; sed in sensibili anima invenitur diminute, et adhuc magis diminute in vegetabili: quia anima sensibilis includit in se virtutem animae vegetabilis, et non convertitur." The soul is a potential whole in the primary and proper sense, but apart from that Aquinas distinguishes further "secondary types" of potestative wholes: the sacrament of holy orders, whose potential parts are priesthood, diaconate and subdiaconate (IV *Sent*., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 2); the vow, whose potential parts are solemn vow and private vow (IV *Sent*., d. 38, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 2); the remission of sins, whose potential parts are the sacraments of baptism and penance (IV *Sent*., d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, qcla. 1); the sacrament of penance, whose potential parts are contrition, confession, and satisfaction (IV *Sent*., d. 16, q. 1, a. 1); speculative rational virtue (*virtus intellectualis speculativa*), whose potential parts are wisdom (*sapientia*), knowledge (*scientia*), and "understanding" (*intellectus*) (*STh* I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2); the basic or cardinal moral virtues—prudence (*prudentia*), justice (*iustitia*), fortitude (*fortitudo*), and temperance (*temperantia*)—the potential parts of which are further moral virtues (*STh* II-II).

[18] For what follows, see *De spir. creat*., a. 11, ad 2: ". . . triplex esse totum. Unum universale, quod adest cuilibet parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem; unde proprie praedicatur de suis partibus, ut cum dicitur: homo est animal. Aliud vero est totum integrale, quod non adest alicui suae parti neque secundum totam essentiam neque secundum totam suam virtutem; et ideo nullo modo praedicatur de parte, ut dicatur: paries est domus. Tertium est totum potentiale, quod est medium inter haec duo: adest enim suae parti secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam suam virtutem. Unde medio modo se habet in praedicando: praedicatur enim quandoque de partibus, sed non proprie. Et hoc modo quandoque dicitur, quod anima est suae potentiae, vel e converso." See also III *Sent*., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1; *STh* I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1; *STh* II-II, q. 48, a. 1.

A universal whole is a specific or generic concept, the subjective parts of which are natures subordinate to it; for example, parts of the universal whole "animal" are concepts such as "man" or "horse." A universal whole is present in each of its subjective parts as to its whole essence and power, and therefore the whole can be univocally predicated of its parts, for example, "man is animal."[19] A further characteristic of a universal whole is that it is not composed of its parts: the concept "animal" is not composed of its subjective parts in the sense that "animal" is "man," "horse," and "dog," just as the concept "man" is not composed of its subjective parts, which are individual humans such as Socrates, Plato, and so on. Universal wholes are further characterized by containing their parts only potentially and not actually, and therefore we call them universal *potential* wholes.[20] In this respect a universal whole differs from an essential logical whole, which contains its parts actually. The parts of a universal whole are called "subjective" (probably) because when a universal whole is predicated of its part, the part is in the position of the subject of the proposition, that is, the part is the subject of the predication.[21] The universal whole may comprehensively be characterized as follows: its parts do not compound the whole, the whole is present in each of its parts as to its essence as well as power, and the whole can be properly predicated of its parts.[22]

The integral whole is primarily and properly a quantitative whole. It is characterized by being composed of parts, the parts are necessary for the perfection of the whole, the whole is not present in any of its parts as to its essence or as to its power, and it cannot be properly predicated of any of its parts. An example of integral whole Aquinas frequently cites is a house. A house consists of its integral parts (roughly speaking, the foundations, walls, and roof) which are necessary for the perfection of the

[19] In addition to the passage quoted above, see II *Sent*., d. 9, q. 3; *STh* I, q. 85, a. 3.

[20] Cf. *STh* I, q. 85, a. 3: "totum universale, in quo partes continentur in potentia."

[21] Oeing-Hannhoff, "Ganzes/Teil," col. 5-13.

[22] Aquinas also uses the concepts "universal whole" and "subjective part" when considering the cardinal virtues, which he calls universal wholes the subjective parts of which are other virtues.

whole constituted by them. However, the house is not present in any of its parts as to its essence or as to power, therefore "house" cannot be properly predicated of any of its integral parts.[23]

We have described the potential whole above, but it is possible now to make some precisions. Potential parts do not compound the whole; a potential whole is present as to essence in each of its parts, but it is not present in each of its parts as to all its power; sometimes it is present in one of its parts completely and in other parts incompletely. A potential whole can be predicated of its parts in a certain way, though not properly: that is how Aquinas interprets Augustine's statement that the essence of the soul is memory, intellect (*intelligentia*), and will.[24]

We have thus become acquainted with two important ways of dividing the concept of whole, which allow us to discern the basic types of wholes distinguished by Aquinas.[25] This poses interesting questions. Do the various types of wholes share some common characteristics? What does Aquinas say of the whole as such? Is the concept of whole univocal, equivocal, or analogical? We shall now attempt to answer these questions successively. We shall begin by explaining Aquinas's conception of whole as such.

II. The Concept of Whole

Whole and part are correlative concepts expressing—roughly speaking—mutually opposing relationships.[26] Aquinas repeatedly

[23] Aquinas also uses the concepts "integral whole" and "integral part" in his analyses of wholes such as the cardinal virtues. Prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance are integral wholes, the integral parts of which are various further auxiliary virtues.

[24] *STh* I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1: "Totum vero potentiale adest singulis partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo quodammodo potest praedicari de qualibet parte; sed non ita proprie sicut totum universale. Et per hunc modum Augustinus dicit quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una animae essentia."

[25] Space is too limited for us to distinguish and thoroughly describe all types of wholes distinguished by Aquinas. Other types of whole not yet mentioned are the whole of the supposit, the metaphysical essential whole, various wholes of order (army, nation, the whole created universe and others), and number as a quantitative whole (along with many other types of quantitative wholes).

[26] An object can be in various respects both whole and part, e.g., the substance of a man is a whole consisting of essential physical parts (substantial form and prime matter), but a man can in another respect be a part of a whole, e.g., a state community or a nation. It would

states that "whole is what has parts" or "whole is what is by its nature divided into parts" and conversely "part is that, into which the whole is divided."[27] We may tentatively construe the mutual relationship of whole and parts as follows: "parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole" while "whole [with respect to parts] has the nature of form."[28] The relationship of parts to whole is that of something imperfect to something perfect, analogous to the relationship of matter to form.[29] A whole therefore consists of parts which are as it were its matter. On the other hand, it is evident that parts in a whole are somehow formed and therefore whole relates to parts as form relates to matter.

These statements allow us to understand the two fundamental characteristics of whole as such mentioned by Aquinas, who follows Aristotle in this point. One is based on the material perfection of the whole and consists in the integrity (completeness) of its parts: "Whole is what lacks none of its parts."[30] The second characteristic is closely related to the first. A whole is not formally constituted by a mere sum of parts or their arbitrary grouping, rather, the formal aspect of the perfection of a whole is established by the unity of its ordered parts: a whole is always an ordered one.[31]

We shall attempt to give closer account of these two characteristics of whole in turn, starting with the first, which consists in the completeness of its parts.

express the repugnance of the correlative concepts and their mutually opposing relationships more accurately if we were to mention explicitly the proper respect and object of the relationship which the given concepts represent. As my aim is to expound the concept of whole as such, I leave these specifications aside.

[27] *STh* I, q. 10, a. 1, obj. 3: "totum dicitur quod habet partes"; *De spir. creat.*, a. 4: "totum . . . dicitur quod natum est dividi in partes"; *ScG* II, c. 72: "Totum dicitur per relationem ad partes"; V *Metaph.*, lect. 21 (1093): "pars dicitur, in quam dividitur aliquid"; *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 8: "pars est in quam dividitur totum"

[28] *STh* I, q. 65, a. 2: "Partes sunt quasi materia totius"; *STh* III, q. 90, a. 1: "Partes ponuntur in genere causae materialis, totum in genere causae formalis"; *STh* I, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3: "Totum . . . se habet in ratione formae."

[29] II *Phys.*, lect. 5: "omnes partes comparantur ad totum ut imperfectum ad perfectum, quae quidem est comparatio materiae ad formam."

[30] See V *Metaph.*, lect. 21 (1098).

[31] Ibid.

III. Definition of Whole by Integrity of its Parts

In his commentary on the fifth book of *Metaphysics* Aquinas explains the concept of whole and presents, following Aristotle, a conceptual definition of whole as such. The first characteristic of whole consists in the integrity of its parts and in the following I shall call it *the material perfection* of the whole. "Whole is what lacks none of the parts of which it by nature consists."[32] A similar definition of whole is to be found elsewhere: "whole is what lacks nothing: as we say that a man is whole when he lacks none of what he should have. . . . this is definition of whole: whole is that no part of which is outside it."[33]

The above definitions characterize whole by expressing its material perfection—the completeness or integrity of its parts. Whole is therefore something "complete" or "integral," since whole is what lacks none of the parts it should by nature have.

However, it is worth noticing that Aquinas defines whole in a similar way as the concept "perfect" (*perfectum*). According to Aquinas, perfect is "what lacks none of what it should have."[34] The definitions of the concepts "whole" and "perfect" are almost identical. That is why Aquinas, following Aristotle, often states that whole and perfect are the same or at least signify almost the same.[35] A closer account of the concept "perfect" and comparison with the concept "whole" will be helpful in grasping the first characteristic of the whole.

In his commentary on the fifth book of *Metaphysics* Aquinas states that "perfect" is not predicated univocally, rather, three basic meanings of the term can be distinguished. In the first way,

[32] Ibid.: "ponit rationem communem totius, quae consistit in duobus. Primo in hoc quod perfectio totius integratur ex partibus. Et significat hoc, cum dicit quod totum dicitur cui nulla suarum partium deest, ex quibus scilicet partibus dicitur totum natura, idest totum secundum suam naturam constituitur."

[33] III *Phys.*, lect. 2: "totum esse cui nihil deest: sicut dicimus hominem totum . . . quibus nihil deest eorum quae debent habere. . . . haec est definitio totius: totum est cuius nihil est extra."

[34] *STh* I, q. 73, a. 1, obj. 3: "perfectum dicitur cui nihil deest eorum quae debet habere."

[35] III *Sent.*, d. 27, q. 3, a. 4: "Totum et perfectum idem est"; III *Phys.*, lect. 2: "Perfectum et totum aut sunt idem, aut fere idem significant."

perfect is said to be "that no part of which can be conceived as being outside it." In this sense we say of a man that he is perfect when he lacks none of his parts.[36] Aquinas further specifies his explanation by stating that the first characteristic of perfect is taken from the fact that the thing lacks no part of the dimensional quantity it should naturally have.[37] Thus a man is perfect when he has the dimensional quantity proper to his nature—roughly speaking he is neither too short nor too tall, nor does he lack any of his natural quantitative (integral) parts, such as arms, legs, etc.

In the second way, something is perfect as to its power when it has neither a "surplus" (*superexcellentiam*) nor lack (*defectum*) of what belongs to the nature of the given power. Thus a man is said to be a perfect doctor when he lacks none of what belongs to medical art and power on the basis of which a man is said to be a good doctor.[38] The second characteristic of perfect is taken from the fact that the thing lacks nothing of the "quantity of power" it should have by nature.[39]

In the third way, perfect is what has reached its end, for example, a perfect man is one who has reached his end and is blessed.[40] If a man reaches his *final* end, then it can be said that such a man has realized the "highest" or "perfect" way of existence with respect to his nature.[41] Such a man has developed

[36] V *Metaph.*, lect. 18 (1034): "perfectum uno modo dicitur, extra quod non est accipere aliquam eius particulam; sicut homo dicitur perfectus, quando nulla deest ei pars."

[37] Ibid. (1038): "primus modus perfecti accipiebatur ex hoc quod nihil rei deerat de quantitate dimensiva sibi naturaliter determinata."

[38] Ibid. (1035): "Alio modo dicitur aliquid perfectum secundum virtutem; et sic dicitur aliquid perfectum, quod non habet hyperbolem, idest superexcellentiam vel superabundantiam ad hoc quod aliquid bene fiat secundum genus illud, et similiter nec defectum. . . . Et sic dicitur perfectus medicus . . . quando non deficit ei aliquid, quod pertineat ad speciem propriae virtutis, secundum quam dicitur, quod hic est bonus medicus."

[39] Ibid. (1038): "hic secundus modus accipitur ex hoc quod nihil deest alicui de quantitate virtutis sibi debitae secundum naturam."

[40] Ibid. (1039): "tertium modum ponit . . . dicens, quod illa dicuntur tertio modo perfecta quibus inest finis, idest quae iam consecuta sunt suum finem . . . sicut homo, quando iam consequitur beatitudinem."

[41] Aquinas distinguishes imperfect and perfect final end, and therefore also imperfect and perfect bliss. Imperfect bliss consists primarily in rational contemplation, secondarily in the activity of practical reason; perfect bliss is the beatific vision of God caused by grace and the associated love of God. See *STh* I-II, q. 3, a. 5: "Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae

and actualized the proper natural and elicited inclinations, and therefore we say that he is blessed.

At the end of his exposition Aquinas distinguishes things perfect in themselves and things perfect with respect to other. Something is perfect in itself in two ways: first, absolutely, because it lacks nothing at all, and the only instance of this is the absolute perfection of God; second, within a certain category, when it has achieved the perfect specific way of existence, as a man is said to be perfect when he has attained bliss.[42]

Further, a thing is said to be perfect with respect to other, namely, when it is somehow related to a thing perfect in itself. So, for example, medical art is perfect when it causes perfect health, or a picture is perfect when it perfectly depicts a man, or something is perfect because it has something perfect (e.g., a man is said to be perfect when he has perfect knowledge).[43]

Aquinas amends and specifies some of the above claims in many other places, above all in the context of considering the transcendental concept "good."[44] However, his detailed discussion

expectatur in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione. Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem et principaliter consistit in contemplatione, secundario vero in operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones humanas." Cf., e.g., A. Speer, "Das Glück des Menschen," in *Thomas von Aquin: Die Summa theologiae: Werkinterpretationen*, ed. A. Speer (Berlin, 2005), 141-67.

[42] V *Metaph.*, lect. 18 (1040-41): "quaedam dicuntur secundum se perfecta: et hoc dupliciter. Alia quidem universaliter perfecta, quia nihil omnino deficit eis absolute. . . . Et haec est conditio primi principii, scilicet dei, in quo est perfectissima bonitas, cui nihil deest de omnibus perfectionibus in singulis generibus inventis. Alia dicuntur perfecta in aliquo genere . . . sicut homo dicitur perfectus, quando iam adeptus est beatitudinem."

[43] Ibid. (1043): "ponit modum, secundum quem aliqua dicuntur perfecta per respectum ad aliud: et dicit, quod alia dicuntur perfecta . . . per comparationem ad perfecta, quae sunt secundum se perfecta. Vel ex eo, quod faciunt aliquid perfectum aliquo priorum modorum; sicut medicina est perfecta, quia facit sanitatem perfectam. Aut ex eo, quod habent aliquid perfectum; sicut homo dicitur perfectus, qui habet perfectam scientiam. Aut repraesentando tale perfectum; sicut illa, quae habent similitudinem ad perfecta; ut imago dicitur perfecta, quae repraesentat hominem perfecte. Aut qualitercumque aliter referantur ad ea, quae dicuntur per se perfecta primis modis."

[44] See J. A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters (Leiden and New York, 1996), 291-334. On Aquinas's concept of good see the following literature: B. Welte, "Thomas von Aquin ueber das Gute, Entwurf eines Systems," in idem, *Auf der Spur des Ewigen* (Freiburg, 1965), 170-84; E. Smith, *The Goodness of Being in Thomistic Philosophy*

of this concept is very complex and difficult. Since we are only interested in Aquinas's concept "perfect" here, we restrict our attention to some basic texts concerning the "good" and consider them as far as they are related to the concept "perfect."

In countless places Aquinas adopts the definition of good mentioned by Aristotle at the beginning of his *Ethics* (1.1), "the good is what all things desire," and explains it in accord with other principles of his own philosophy.[45] Normally, a definition states the essence of a thing by reducing it to something more general (genus) and by adding to the genus a specific difference. In his commentary on the *Ethics* Aquinas explains why the definition of the good is not, nor can it be, of this character. Since the good is reckoned among the first concepts of our intellect (*prima*) and is convertible with being, it cannot be reduced to something more general nor manifested by something earlier (*per priora*). In the definition the good is according to Aquinas made known by its effect (*per posteriora*) as causes are manifested through their effects. In this case the appetite and its inclinations are the effects through which the good as its (final) cause is made known: the good is what all things desire.[46]

The definition of the good is closely connected with the problem of final causality of the good. In his mature work (*STh* I, q. 5, a. 4) Aquinas considers the question, to which type of cause does the good pertain? From the definition of the good it immediately follows that it has the characteristic of a final cause:

and its Contemporary Significance (Washington, D.C., 1967); M. Hoenes, *Ens et bonum convertuntur: Eine Deutung des Scholastischen Axioms unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Metaphysik und der Ethik des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Bamberg, 1968); S. MacDonald, ed., *Being and Goodness*: *The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 1991); D. M. Gallagher, ed., *Thomas Aquinas and His Legacy* (Washington, D.C., 1994).

[45] See, e.g., *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1; q. 21, a. 1; q. 21, a. 5; *ScG* I, c. 37; I *Ethic.*, lect. 1; I *Metaph.*, lect. 4 (71); lect. 11 (179) *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 1, lect. 3; c. 4, lect. 22; *STh* I, q. 5.

[46] I *Ethic.*, lect. 1: "bonum numeratur inter prima . . . secundum rei veritatem bonum cum ente convertitur. Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus . . . philosophi bene enunciaverunt, bonum esse id quod omnia appetunt." Hereafter Aquinas emphasizes that the definition expresses the good in general (*bonum comuniter sumptum*).

"since the good is what all things desire, and this has the *ratio* of an end, it is obvious that the good has the *ratio* of end."[47] The concepts "good" and "end" share the same characteristic, since "being appetible" is the influence proper to the final cause.[48]

Here we could ask why the good and end are desired by all things at all. Aquinas answers this question in passing (*STh* I, q. 5, a. 1) when he inquires into the problem of the convertibility of good and being.[49] He opens his discussion with the statement that the *ratio* of good consists in being desirable (*appetibile*). Of course, he refers here to Aristotle's definition of the good. He then identifies the *ratio* of the good with being perfect. "It is clear, however, that a thing is desirable only insofar as it is perfect, for all things desire their own perfection."[50] Then he establishes for us very important connection between being perfect and being actual: "things are perfect insofar they are in act." A thing is not perfect until it has received its proper act and its potentialities have been actualized. Aquinas then makes the final step in his argument with the help of the following premise: "existence [*esse*] is the actuality of every thing."[51] Since there is no being (*ens*) without an act of existence, it follows that every being

[47] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4: "cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat. " In this article Aquinas considers the Neoplatonic conception of goodness and its principle that *bonum est diffusivum sui*, which seems to express the efficient causality of the good. Aquinas firmly holds that the good is said to be self-diffusive in the manner in which an end is said to move and therefore rejects the efficient causality of the good. Cf. the rather critical interpretation of Aquinas put forth by N. Kretzmann, "A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?", in MacDonald, ed., *Being and Goodness*, 202-28; and the more "benevolent" account given by Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 301-3.

[48] *De Verit*., q. 22, a. 2: "influere causae finalis est appeti et desiderari"; see II *Metaph*., lect. 4 (317); *ScG* III, c. 16, et al.

[49] Aquinas discusses this problem in a different manner also in *De Verit*., q. 21, a. 2. See Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 303-14.

[50] Aertsen stresses that Aquinas here makes a transition from the *ratio boni* to the nature of the good; Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 305. See also *ScG* I, c. 37.

[51] Aquinas's understanding of existence (*esse*) as actuality is crucial for the argument and represents his innovative solution to the problem. All other perfections are, according to Aquinas, desirable only insofar as they are actual and therefore in as much as they have existence. For this reason *esse* is called "the most perfect of all things, for it is related to everything as act" (*STh* I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3).

qua being is good. So it is obvious, Aquinas concludes, that good and being are really identical, yet they differ conceptually, since the good expresses the *ratio* of "appetible" which being does not (explicitly) express.[52]

The part of Aquinas's argument relevant to us can be summarized as follows: a thing is perfect because it is in act and has its own act of existence (*esse*), since existence is the actuality and perfection of all things. Aquinas, however, further qualifies this general characteristic of the concept "perfect" (and "good") mostly when he discusses the problem of the (real) difference between goodness and being (*ens*).[53] We may now sum up and consider his reply to the first objection to the convertibility of the good and being (*ens*) in question 5, article 1 of the *Prima Pars*.[54]

Aquinas states that although being and good are the same in reality, since they differ conceptually we do not say in the same way that something is being absolutely (*ens simpliciter*) and good absolutely (*bonum simpliciter*). The proper meaning of *being* is that something is in act. An act is properly related to a potency. That is why something is called *ens simpliciter* insofar as it is primarily distinguished from something that is merely in potency.

[52] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 1: "Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu, unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens, esse enim est actualitas omnis rei. . . . Unde manifestum est quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed bonum dicit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens."

[53] Other sources to the problem: *In De Hebdom*., lect. 3; *De Verit*., q. 21, a. 5; *ScG* III, c. 20; *De Malo*, q. 1, a. 2; *In De Div. Nom*., c. 4, lect. 1; *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 1. See Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 314-19; J. F. Crosby, "Are Being and Good Really Convertible? A Phenomenological Inquiry," *The New Scholasticism* 57 (1983): 465-500; J. Owens, "Unity and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies* 23 (1961): 240-59; R.A. te Velde., *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden, 1995), 44-65.

[54] The first objection refers to a dictum from Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus*: "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing, that they exist is another." So it seems that there is a real difference between the good and being, not only conceptual (*STh* I, q. 5, a. 1, obj. 1: "Videtur quod bonum differat secundum rem ab ente. Dicit enim boetius, in libro de hebdom., intueor in rebus aliud esse quod sunt bona, et aliud esse quod sunt. Ergo bonum et ens differunt secundum rem"). We will leave aside Boethius's solution to the problem as well as a closer historical description of the context in which the issue was brought up. Our interest here is solely in Aquinas's solution to the problem of the nonidentity of being perfect and being.

This primary act is the substantial existence (*esse*) of each thing. Therefore a thing is called *ens simpliciter* thanks to its substantial existence, for example, a human being. However, by actualities added to the substance, such as white existence (*esse album*), a thing is called being in a certain respect (*ens secundum quid*), since these actualities belong to something which is already in act.[55]

The converse holds in the case of the good. The good means that something is perfect, and that is why it has the *ratio* of being final (*rationem ultimi*). Hence something is called *bonum simpliciter* when it is ultimately perfect. Conversely, when something does not possess the ultimate perfection it ought to have, although it has a certain perfection insofar as it is in act, it is not called perfect absolutely, nor *bonum simpliciter*, but only perfect or good in a certain respect (*bonum secundum quid*). So it is clear that there is an inverse order between *ens simpliciter* and *bonum simpliciter*: what is called *ens simpliciter* is, as substantial existence, only *bonum secundum quid*; what is *bonum simpliciter* is, as accidental existence, *ens secundum quid*. Hence, Aquinas concludes, the difference between being good and being must be referred to *bonum simpliciter* and *ens simpliciter* because something is *ens simpliciter* thanks to the first act and *bonum simpliciter* through the ultimate act. Yet something is *bonum secundum quid* through its first act and *ens secundum quid* thanks to its ultimate act.[56]

[55] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1: "licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem, quia tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter, et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid, non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu."

[56] Ibid.: "Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile, et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid, idest inquantum est ens, secundum vero ultimum actum

It is important for us that Aquinas distinguishes between perfect "absolutely" and perfect "in a certain respect." The necessary and sufficient condition for a thing to be perfect in a certain respect is that it possesses a substantial act of existence (*esse*). However, the substantial act of existence is only the necessary condition for a thing to be perfect *simpliciter*, not its sufficient condition. The sufficient condition for being perfect absolutely is the ultimate perfection of a thing (it must be a certain accidental existence, since *bonum simpliciter* is *ens secundum quid*), which must be added to the substantial being so that it can be called perfect *simpliciter*. Aquinas, however, does not specify in the text we have been considering wherein this ultimate perfection consists. We must therefore consider what he says to the problem elsewhere.

In the question 6, article 3 of the *Prima Pars*, Aquinas asks whether it is proper to God to be good through his essence. At the beginning of the discussion he says that only God is good through his essence. He then establishes the connection between being good and being perfect: everything is called good insofar as it is perfect. However, the perfection of a thing is threefold: it consists in its substantial existence (*esse*), which a thing possesses through its substantial form; in the accidents that are necessary for its perfect operation; and in the attainment of its end. Since no created thing has these three perfections through its essence, none of them is good or perfect *per essentiam*. Only God is good (perfect) thanks to his essence, since only God`s essence is his existence (*esse*), no accidents can be added to him, and God is not related to anything as to his end—on the contrary, God is the ultimate end of all things.[57]

dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter. Sic ergo quod dicit boetius, quod in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona, et aliud quod sunt, referendum est ad esse bonum et ad esse simpliciter, quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter. Et tamen secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum, et secundum ultimum actum est quodammodo ens."

[57] *STh* I, q. 6, a. 3: "solus deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem alicuius rei triplex est. Prima quidem, secundum quod in suo esse constituitur. Secunda vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia superadduntur, ad suam perfectam operationem necessaria. Tertia vero perfectio alicuius est

These three perfections represent the sufficient condition for a created thing to be perfect absolutely. It is worthwhile to add a note regarding the second perfection. The perfection to which the thing is directed via its added accidents is perfect operation, because through activity the faculties and powers inhering in a substance are actualized and the actuality of the whole supposit is completed. This actuality or operation is called "the second act" and is distinguished from the first act, which is the specific (substantial) form whereby a thing has substantial existence.[58] It is clear that it is the first act by which a thing is *ens simpliciter* and the second act by which is called *bonum simpliciter*.[59] However, as Aertsen properly points out, these two acts are "continuous": the first act is for the sake of the second act, and both are necessary for a created thing to have the "highest" or "optimal" mode of existence with respect to its nature (*perfectum simpliciter*).[60] This perfect mode of existence manifests itself in that the thing is capable of producing something similar to itself, since perfect things can produce something similar to them-

per hoc, quod aliquid aliud attingit sicut finem. . . . Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato competit secundum suam essentiam, sed soli deo, cuius solius essentia est suum esse; et cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia. . . . Ipse etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus deus habet omnimodam perfectionem secundum suam essentiam. Et ideo ipse solus est bonus per suam essentiam."

[58] See *De Verit*., q. 1, a. 10, ad 3: "duplex est perfectio; scilicet prima, et secunda: prima perfectio est forma uniuscuiusque, per quam habet esse; unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum manet; secunda perfectio est operatio, quae est finis rei, vel id per quod ad finem devenitur et hac perfectione interdum res destituitur." See also I *Ethic*., lect. 1; *STh* I, q. 48, a. 5; q. 105, a. 5.

[59] *STh* I, q. 54, a. 1 We leave aside Aquinas`s detailed discussion of the moral good, which is a special mode of goodness of human action. Aquinas explains the goodness in human actions by analogy with the natural goodness in things (see, e.g., the extensive treatment in *STh* I-II, q. 18, aa. 1-5). One should keep in mind that a human being is called good (perfect) absolutely in virtue of his good will, i.e., thanks to his good moral actions that the will (in cooperation with reason) commands: an absolutely good human being is a morally good human being. See W. Kluxen, *Philosophische Ethik bei Thomas von Aquin*, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1980), esp. part III, pp. 166-217; Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 319-30.

[60] V *Metaph*., lect. 19 (1044): "Perfectum . . . habens ea quae sibi secundum suum genus competunt"; see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 318-19.

selves.[61] I would suggest that the above-mentioned characteristics express the proper nature of being perfect because they explain it by its (analogical) formal principles (act and existence) and by the concept of final causality.

In summary, Aquinas distinguishes various ways in which something is said to be perfect, of which the following two seem to be relevant to us. In the first way, perfect is that no part of which can be conceived as being outside it. This definition is based on the fact that a thing lacks no part of the dimensional quantity (or the "quantity of power") proper to its nature. Since this characteristic is determined by the integrity of the quantitative (integral) parts and powers that are required by the very nature of the material thing, it can be applied only to material beings. Let us call this characteristic *the material perfection* of a thing.

In the second way, perfect is what is in act, lacks nothing of what belongs to it in accord with the mode of its perfection, and thus has the supreme mode of existence proper to its nature. A thing is perfect in this way when it has reached its (final) end. Perfection in this sense means "actuality," the possession of the mode of existence proper to the nature of the thing, the measure of which is the final end of the thing. Perfection thus conceived manifests itself in that a perfect thing can produce something similar to itself. I suggest that these characteristics express *the formal perfection* of a being.[62] It is clear that *being perfect* in this sense can be said not only about material things, but also about spiritual beings, including God.

We may now compare the concepts "whole" and "perfect." It is evident that perfect and whole share the characteristic "what lacks none of its parts" or "what lacks nothing." Since whole and perfect share this property, one can be defined by the other. That is why Aquinas frequently states that whole and perfect are the same or at least signify the same. Some statements concerning the

[61] II *Sent*., d. 18, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 6: "perfectum unumquodque est quando sibi simile potest producere"; *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4: "unumquodque tunc perfectum est, quando potest sibi simile facere."

[62] See Bro, *La notion de tout en Saint Thomas*, 34-35.

relationship of whole and parts are to be understood in this sense as well, such as "the goodness of the whole is perfection . . . integrity is the good of the whole."[63] As we have stated, the integrity of parts expresses the material perfection of a whole or perfect thing, because having its parts in completeness is proper to both a whole and a perfect thing.

On the other hand, it is evident that whole and perfect cannot be fully identified. Formal perfection of a whole consists—as we shall see—in the unity of somehow ordered parts, while that which is formally perfect is what is in act and has the supreme way of existence proper to its nature. In this sense also God is said to be (the most) perfect being, whereas God as an absolutely simple being has no parts and thus cannot be called whole.[64] Similarly, many created simple entities are perfect but cannot as such be whole (e.g., one as the principle of number).[65]

Full identification of whole and perfect would mean losing the real benefit that arises from comparing the concepts and would lead to incorrect conclusions. Comparing whole and perfect helps us to grasp the first constitutive property of the whole which consists in the completeness of its parts. Integrity or completeness of parts is the material perfection of whole.

IV. Whole and Its Privative Opposite ("Partial")

Aquinas amends and specifies the stated characteristics of the material perfection of a whole while considering its (privative) opposite. Such an opposite is something partial, for example, a torso or a cripple.[66] A torso is an unfinished or incompletely preserved work of art which lacks some of its quantitative parts. We normally understand a torso as one work of art which is not

[63] See *ScG* III, c. 94; III *Phys*., lect. 2.

[64] See, e.g., *STh* I, q. 30, a. 2, obj. 4: "in deo ponere totum et partem . . . simplicitati divinae repugnat"; see also *STh* I, q. 3, a. 7 ("Utrum Deus sit omnino simplex"); and q. 4, a. 1 ("Utrum Deus sit perfectus").

[65] III *Phys*., lect. 2: "Totum non invenitur in simplicibus, quae non habent partes: in quibus tamen utimur nomine perfecti."

[66] In his considerations Aquinas uses the term "colobon" which means "mutilated, curtailed, cut off."

complete, but its parts nevertheless form a unity and are properly ordered. The case of a cripple (in the instance of a man lacking a limb) is analogous. A cripple is a man and as such has his own unity, but he does not have all the integral parts proper to his nature. Thus what is partial is (from the material aspect) an imperfect, incomplete whole. It is therefore necessary to deal with the integrity of a whole and its privative opposite from the point of view of the material perfection of the whole.

Aquinas (following Aristotle) considers this issue in his commentary on the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*. His discussion is motivated by the question, what are the (necessary) conditions of calling something partial? The answer is divided into two parts: he explains first what conditions must be satisfied on the side of the whole, and then what conditions must be satisfied by the missing part.[67]

In order to say that a certain whole is incomplete or partial, seven conditions must be satisfied. (1) An incomplete whole must be a quantitative thing (*quantum*) having parts. That is why a universal whole cannot be called partial when one of its species is removed.[68] (2) That which is partial is only a quantum which can be divided and consists of distinct parts. The "last parts" of a whole (e.g., the flesh or nerve of a man) are according to Aquinas not "partial" although they have quantity, because they do not consist of distinct parts.[69] (3) If a whole consists of only two parts and one of them ceases to exist, the resulting entity is not partial. Only something "bigger" than its missing part is partial. In other

[67] V *Metaph*., lect. 21 (1109): "Est ergo intentio philosophi ostendere quid requiratur ad hoc quod aliquid dicatur colobon. Et primo quid requiratur ex parte totius; secundo quid requiratur ex parte partis deficientis."

[68] Ibid. (1110): "illud totum sit quantum habens partes. . . . Non enim totum universale potest dici colobon si una species eius auferatur." As we have already mentioned, a universal whole does not consist of its subjective parts in the same way a quantitative whole does. Clearly, the concept "animal" does not consist of the concepts "man," "horse," "dog," etc. in this way, just as the concept "man" does not consist of particular humans as its parts. See *STh* I, q. 85, a. 3; Oeing-Hannhoff, *Ganzes/Teil*, col. 5-13.

[69] V *Metaph*., lect. 21 (1111): "non quodlibet quantum potest dici colobon, sed oportet quod sit partibile, idest distinctionem habens, et totum, idest ex diversis partibus integratum. Unde ultimae partes, in quas aliquod totum resolvitur, licet habeant quantitatem, non possunt dici colobae, sicut caro vel nervus."

words, what is missing from something partial is never equal to what remains.[70] (4) The substance of something that is partial remains the same: for example, if a part of a chalice is missing, it nevertheless remains a chalice. In the case of numbers, by adding or removing one the kind of number changes; therefore a number cannot be partial.[71] (5) The partial necessarily consists of dissimilar parts. Only a so-called *heterogeneous whole* is and can be partial.[72] A *homogeneous whole* can never be partial, because the *ratio* of whole belongs to each of its parts. If we remove a part of a homogeneous whole, the remaining part cannot be called partial.[73] (6) Only things the nature of which requires determined positional ordering of parts can be partial (e.g., a house or a man). If a positional change causes no difference in the thing, then such a thing cannot be partial (e.g., water or fire).[74] (7) Further, only something having continuous quantity can be partial. Musical harmony, for example, consists of dissimilar parts which have a determined position, yet it is not called partial.[75]

[70] Ibid. (1112): "duo non sunt coloba, vel aliquid habens duas partes, si altera earum auferatur. Et hoc ideo quia nunquam colobonium, idest quod aufertur a colobon, est aequale residuo, sed semper oportet residuum esse maius."

[71] Ibid. (1113): "numerus nullus potest esse colobus quotcumque partes habeat; quia substantia colobi manet parte subtracta; sicut si calix truncetur, adhuc manet calix; sed numerus non manet idem, ablata quacumque parte. Quaelibet enim unitas addita vel subtracta, variat numeri speciem."

[72] A heterogeneous whole is a whole that consists of dissimilar parts and none of whose integral parts has the form of the whole (e.g., the hand of a man is not a man). *STh* I, q. 11, a. 2, ad 2: "totum . . . heterogeneum, quod componitur ex dissimilibus partibus. In quolibet autem toto heterogeneo, quaelibet pars caret forma totius, nulla enim pars domus est domus, nec aliqua pars hominis est homo." The opposite of heterogeneous whole is homogeneous whole, which conversely consists of similar parts and each of whose quantitative parts has the form of the whole (e.g., every part of water is water; see V *Metaph*., lect. 7 [Marietti ed., 849-59]).

[73] V *Metaph*., lect. 21 (1114): "oportet quod habeat partes dissimiles. Ea enim, quae sunt similium partium, non possunt dici coloba, quia ratio totius salvatur in qualibet parte: unde, si auferatur aliqua partium, altera pars non dicitur coloba."

[74] Ibid. (1115): "nullum eorum potest dici colobon, in quibus positio non facit differentiam, sicut aqua aut ignis. Oportet enim coloba talia esse, quod in suae ratione substantiae habeant determinatam positionem, sicut homo vel domus."

[75] Ibid. (1116): "oportet esse continua coloba. Harmonia enim musicalis non potest dici coloba."

Aquinas further states three conditions that the missing part must satisfy. (1) It may not be a principal part of a substance, that is, a part that constitutes the substance of the thing, without which the substance cannot exist. That is why a man cannot be called "partial" or cripple when his head has been cut off. A cripple is a man who stays alive, even though he lacks an integral part. (2) The missing part may not come from an arbitrary place of the whole, but it must be an "extreme" part of the whole. Thus we do not say that a man is a cripple if he lacks a part of his flesh or the spleen, but if he lacks a limb. (3) The missing part must not only be "extreme," but also one that neither regrows when it has been removed, nor regenerates when it has been damaged. That is why a bald man is not a cripple.[76]

In sum: "Partial" is the privative opposition of quantitative whole, more specifically of a quantitative whole that is a heterogeneous whole consisting roughly speaking of more than two different, dissimilar parts. A heterogeneous whole is partial only if it lacks none of the main parts which constitute the substance of the thing, and the missing part must further be an "extreme" part which neither regrows nor regenerates when damaged. "Partial" clearly expresses privation of parts which are desirable with respect to the material perfection of the given heterogeneous whole. Whole and partial are therefore privative opposites expressing the mutually opposing relationship of things that are (materially) perfect and imperfect.

Since according to Aquinas only a heterogeneous whole can be partial, it is impossible to speak of incompleteness in the case of other types of whole; other types of whole are not and cannot be

[76] Ibid. (1117-18): "quae sunt conditiones colobi ex parte partis diminutae; et ponit tres . . . primo quod pars ablata non sit pars substantiae principalis, quae scilicet rei substantiam constituit, et sine qua substantia esse non possit; quia, ut supra dictum est, colobon oportet manere ablata parte. Unde homo non potest dici colobus, capite abscisso. Secundo, ut pars subtracta non sit ubique, sed sit in extremitate. . . . homo non dicitur colobus, si amittat aliquid de carne . . . sed si amittat aliquam eius extremitatem, ut manum aut pedem. Tertio vero, ut non omni particula in extremitate existente ablata, aliquid dicatur colobum; sed, si sit talis pars, quae non regeneratur iterum, si tota auferatur, sicut manus, aut pes. Capillus autem totus incisus iterum regeneratur. Unde per eorum subtractionem, licet in extremitate sint, non dicitur colobus. Et propter hoc calvi non dicuntur colobi."

partial.[77] We can say that a whole requires completeness of its parts, since the whole is what lacks none of its parts. In certain cases a whole can lose some of its parts without ceasing to exist. In such cases we speak of a materially imperfect, incomplete whole. However, an incomplete whole retains the formal perfection of whole which consists in the unity of its ordered parts. On this perfection of whole we shall now focus our attention.

V. Definition of Whole by the Unity of Its Parts

Aquinas, following Aristotle, states the other characteristic of whole which consists in its unity. A whole is something the parts of which form a unity. "The second [characteristic of whole] is that the parts of a whole are united. . . . a whole contains the contained, i.e., parts, so that the contained [things] are one in the whole."[78] The concept of whole therefore comprises not only the completeness of its parts but also their unity. As we have already seen, whole relates to its parts as something perfect to imperfect, as form to matter. The material perfection of a whole consists in the integrity of its parts; the formal perfection of a whole is the unity of its parts.[79]

In the case of the first characteristic of a whole we have considered the relationship of the concepts "whole" and "perfect." Similarly, we now need to consider how the concepts "whole" and "unity" are related to each other.[80] From the above

[77] Incidentally, some of the wholes which cannot be partial are necessarily complete, in two senses: (a) the loss of a part results in the annihilation of the whole, e.g., the substance of a man as a physical essential whole which consists of prime matter and substantial form is necessarily a complete whole, because when the substantial form (soul) is separated from the body, the man dies; (b) the whole cannot lose any of its parts at all, e.g., the logical essential whole (concept) "man" necessarily consists of its essential parts such as the concepts "animal" and "rational," etc.

[78] V *Metaph.*, lect. 21 (1098): "Secundum est quod partes uniuntur in toto. . . . totum continens est contenta, scilicet partes, ita quod illa contenta sunt aliquid unum in toto."

[79] See Bro, *La notion de tout en Saint Thomas*, 35-44.

[80] Aquinas's concept of unity is a very difficult and complex issue and that is why in the following we restrict our attention to a few relevant issues relevant. Concerning Aquinas's conception of unity see Oeing-Hanhoff, *Ens et unum convertuntur*; T. O'Shaughnessy, "St.

it is clear that every whole is a one, the parts of a whole are always united in some way. If every whole is a one, is conversely every one a whole? The answer is no; however, in order to grasp this properly, we need to consider the following.

According to Aquinas, unity comprises two aspects: an entity and its indivision.[81] Unity can be predicated not only of things that are actually undivided, but also of things that are indivisible by nature because they have no parts at all. Indivisible things are simple and as such have the "highest degree" of unity.[82] Unity can therefore be both the unity of something simple and the unity of something composite, that is, the unity of a whole. God is absolutely simple, he is supremely one, but he is not whole because he does not and cannot have any parts; the same holds in the case of a geometrical point or one as the principle of number.[83] From this it is clear how unity and whole differ. Whole comprises unity but it precludes simplicity because it necessarily comprises some parts. One and whole are therefore not fully identical; they differ in the above stated way.

Furthermore, while unity in the proper sense means the indivision of an entity, whole includes not only the indivision of its parts but also the integrity of parts which are in some way *ordered*.[84] The ordering of the parts of a whole follows its unity

Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of the One", *Gregorianum* 41 (1960): 665-79; J. Owens, "Unity and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies* 23 (1961): 240-59; J. B. Lotz, "Zur Konstitution der transzendentalen Bestimmungen des Seins nach Thomas von Aquin," in P. Wilpert, ed., *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung* Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2 (Berlin, 1963), 334-40; P. C. Courtès, "L'un selon saint Thomas," *Revue Thomiste* 68 (1968): 198-240; R. E. Houser, *Thomas Aquinas on Transcendental Unity: Scholastic and Aristotelian Predecessors* (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1980); te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, 56-58; Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 201-42; B. Blankenhorn, "Aquinas on the Transcendental One: An Overlooked Development in Doctrine," *Angelicum* 81 (2004): 615-37.

[81] IV *Metaph*., lect. 2 (553): "Est enim unum ens indivisum." X *Metaph*., lect. 4 (1988); *De Pot*., q. 9, a. 7.

[82] See I *Sent*., d. 24, q. 1: "Secundum enim quod aliquid se habet ad indivisionem, ita se habet ad unitatem."

[83] III *Phys*., lect. 2: "Totum non invenitur in simplicibus, quae non habent partes."

[84] See Bro, *La notion de tout en Saint Thomas*, 36-40. Aquinas's conception of order cannot be expounded here in detail, but it can be outlined as follows: Order is a proportion (VIII *Phys*., lect. 3: "omnis ordo proportio quaedam est") or generally speaking a relationship

and comes from the form of the thing. This can be seen clearly if we consider the nature and structure of so-called quantitative wholes.

A quantitative whole is primarily a material substance determined by an accidental form of quantity.[85] A material substance considered absolutely (i.e., without quantity) is not

which can be intentional or real. Order can be conceived as a special kind of relationship of priority and posteriority, of procession of one from another. In this sense, as many different types of order can be distinguished as there are ways in which principle, i.e., that from which something issues in any way, is predicated. If the principle is something intentional, then the order is merely intentional, e.g., when a conclusion follows from premises. The principle can be real in two ways. It can be something negative, as, e.g., "privation" is the (physical) principle of the generation of a substance, and then the order is merely intentional. It can also be something positive, from which something really proceeds, and then the order is real. Real order is of two kinds, depending on whether the principle causes real being of the principiate, or does not cause it but is merely the beginning of the principiate. If the principle causes the real being of the principiate, then different orders of causality can be distinguished according to the four kinds of causes. Thus, e.g., act of existence and essence or substantial form and prime matter, which affect and are causally dependent on each other, are ordered. The other case is order of quantitative parts, mere next-to-each-other-existence, when one part does not receive existence from another, but one part is merely the beginning of another part. Such order is based on dimensional quantity. In general, it can be said that order requires the fulfillment of the three following conditions: first, it is a relationship of priority and posteriority; further, it is the distinctness (*distinctio*) of the ordered things; and finally, it is the ordering of the things itself. According to different kinds of ordering we distinguish different kinds of order, e.g., order with respect to place, with respect to "dignity," with respect to origin, etc. (I *Sent*., d. 20, q. 1, a. 3: "ordo in ratione sua includit tria, scilicet rationem prioris et posterioris; unde secundum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo aliquorum, secundum quos aliquis altero prius dicitur et secundum locum et secundum tempus et secundum omnia hujusmodi. Includit etiam distinctionem, quia non est ordo aliquorum nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc magis praesupponit nomen ordinis quam significet. Includit etiam tertio rationem ordinis, ex qua etiam ordo in speciem trahitur. Unde unus est ordo secundum locum, alius secundum dignitatem, alius secundum originem"). On Aquinas's conception of order see E. A. Pace, "The Concept of Ordo in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," *New Scholasticism* 2 (1928): 51-72; B. Coffey, "The Notion of Order according to St. Thomas Aquinas," *The Modern Schoolman* 27 (1949): 1-18; Oeing-Hanhoff, *Ens et unum convertuntur*, 169-78; W. Huebner, "Ordnung," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, ed. J. Ritter and K. Gruender, eds., Band 6, (Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe und Co. AG, 1976), col. 1268-73; J. Gredt, *Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, vol. I-II, 13th ed. rev. and augmented by Euchario Zenzen, O.S.B. (Barcelona: Herder,1961), n. 315.

[85] Cf. *STh* I, q. 76, a. 8: "est enim quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes quantitativas." See also *STh* I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 3; *ScG* II, c. 72; *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 10.

materially divisible and as such has no quantitative parts.[86] A composite substance gains quantitative parts and their ordering from quantity. Dimensional quantity as a formal cause causes primarily *order* (*ordering*) of quantitative parts in the composite substance. By quantity a substance gains a plurality of quantitative parts and these parts are ordered as to position so that one part has existence next to another part. The primary formal effect of quantity is therefore the "ordering of parts in a whole" (*ordo partium in toto*).[87] Properly speaking, quantitative parts are parts of a quantitative whole, which is composed of substance and quantity (e.g., the integral parts of a man are arms, legs, head, body, etc.). In a wider sense it can be said that material substances themselves are integral parts (e.g., soldiers are integral parts of an army) or that sets of things are integral parts (e.g., a regiment is an integral part of an army).[88]

Since quantity primarily causes the ordering of the parts of a whole, the integral parts of every quantitative whole are always ordered in some way as to position. In his commentary on the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* Aquinas distinguishes three ways in which quantitative whole is related to the ordering of parts as to position.

First, in a homogeneous whole a change in the ordering of its integral parts as to position has no effect on the nature of the whole. For instance, all parts of water can be rearranged and mixed, and water remains water. That is why in such cases we refer to the whole with the word "all" and not "whole". We speak of all water, all wine, not whole water or whole wine, except metaphorically.[89] Aquinas says that such homogeneous wholes

[86] *ScG* II, c. 49: "divisio materiae secundum quantitatem . . . nec aliter quam divisione quantitatis, sine qua substantia est indivisibilis."

[87] *STh* I, q. 14, a. 12, ad 1: "De ratione quantitatis est ordo partium"; *ScG* IV, c. 65. As we already know, Aquinas often refers to quantitative parts as integral parts. *STh* III, q. 90, a. 3.

[88] See, e.g., *STh*. III, q. 90, a. 3, ad 3.

[89] V *Metaph*., lect. 21 (1105): "Quaedam enim tota sunt in quibus diversa positio partium non facit diversitatem, sicut patet in aqua. Qualitercumque enim transponantur partes aquae, nihil differunt: et similiter est de aliis humidis, sicut de oleo, vino et huiusmodi. In his autem significatur totum per hoc quod dicitur omne, non autem ipso nomine totius. Dicimus enim, omnis aqua, vel omne vinum, vel omnis numerus; non autem totus, nisi secundum

have *unity of continuousness* which manifests itself in that the quantitative parts of these wholes are not divided as to position.

Second, in a heterogeneous whole a change in the ordering of its integral parts as to position results in a change of the character of the whole. It is clear that the integral parts of a man or a house cannot be ordered arbitrarily. Unlike a homogeneous whole, a heterogeneous whole requires a specifically determined ordering of its integral parts and has another type of unity besides the unity of continuousness. The ordering of its parts must be such as to allow every part of the heterogeneous whole to fulfill its function properly and thus participate in the perfection and goodness of the whole.[90] The same holds for the unity of a heterogeneous whole. This unity, different from the unity of continuousness, comes from the form of the thing due to which the thing is a whole and belongs to a certain species.[91] We would not say that a man is one human being if his integral parts were arbitrarily united and ordered; the unity of this whole requires a specifically determined ordering of integral parts.[92] The ordering of the integral parts of a man, and indeed of every heterogeneous whole, follows its unity and is ontologically founded in the form or essence of the thing. This manifests itself in that in such cases we refer to the whole with the word "whole" and not "all," as we speak of a whole man or a whole house.[93]

When Aquinas compares heterogeneous and homogeneous wholes, he comes to the conclusion that only a heterogeneous whole is whole in strict sense of the word. In a homogeneous

metaphoram."

[90] V *Metaph*., lect. 8 (870): "totum et perfectum . . . habet aliquam unam speciem, non quidem sicut subiectum homogeneum . . . sed secundum quod species in quadam totalitate consistit requirens determinatum ordinem partium."

[91] X *Metaph*., lect. 1 (1925): "Hoc igitur unum supra unitatem continuitatis addit unitatem quae est ex forma, secundum quam aliquid est totum, et speciem habens."

[92] Aquinas develops this idea with respect to another (more or less identical) example of the unity and ordering of parts of footwear. See V *Metaph*., lect. 8 (870).

[93] V *Metaph*., lect. 21 (1106): "Quaedam vero sunt in quibus positio differentiam facit, sicut in homine, et in quolibet animali, et in domo et huiusmodi. Non enim est domus qualitercumque partes ordinentur, sed secundum determinatum ordinem partium: et similiter nec homo nec animal; et in his dicimus totum, et non omne. Dicimus enim de uno solo animali loquentes, totum animal, non omne animal."

whole many other wholes are included as in potency: since every part of water is water, many waters are included in water as in potency. Although water can be called one, its indivision seems to be "lower" than the indivision of a man, as no man can be divided into his integral parts which would have the same specific existence as the whole composed of them: no integral part of a man is a man. A man as a heterogeneous whole cannot be divided into species-identical integral parts and as such has a "higher degree" of unity than a homogeneous whole. Since "whole" expresses a set of parts in a certain one, a whole in a proper sense is something the parts of which taken simultaneously form perfect unity. Perfect unity of all simultaneously taken parts is a heterogeneous whole, which is clear from the example of a man.[94] Thus Aquinas shows that formal perfection of a whole follows its unity, or more precisely that a "higher or more perfect degree" of ordering of a whole's parts presupposes and includes a "higher or more perfect degree" of unity.[95] The formal perfection of a whole therefore follows the degree of its unity and is ontologically founded in the essence of a thing.

Third, some quantitative wholes are such that a change in the position of their integral parts results in a change of the whole in a certain way. When we mold wax in our hand we change the shape and ordering of the parts of the wax, but in the process of the change the "matter" remains the same: wax remains wax. A change in the position of the parts of the wax results in a change in its shape (figure), but not in annihilation of the wax. That is why we refer to such wholes with both the word "whole" and the word "all"; we speak of both whole wax and all wax.[96]

[94] Ibid. (1108): "quaelibet pars aquae est aqua, in unaquaque aqua sunt multae aquae . . . in potentia . . . Totum vero significat collectionem partium in aliquo uno: et ideo in illis proprie dicitur totum in quibus, ex omnibus partibus acceptis simul, fit unum perfectum, cuius perfectio nulli partium competit, animal."

[95] See I *Sent.,* d. 24, q. 1; Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 239-40; Lotz, "Zur Konstitution der transzendentalen Bestimmungen des Seins," 336.

[96] V *Metaph.*, lect. 21 (1107): "Contingunt ambo, quia positio quodammodo facit differentiam in eis. In his autem dicimus utrumque, scilicet et omne et totum; et ista sunt in quibus facta transpositione partium manet eadem materia, sed non eadem forma sive figura; ut patet in cera, cuius qualitercumque transponantur partes, nihilominus est cera, licet non

On the issue of the ordering of parts of quantitative wholes we can in sum say that every such whole requires some ordering of its integral parts, either only order as to position, mere next-to-each-other-existence, or some further "higher" and more complex ordering of parts.[97] Aquinas summarizes the matter as follows:

> all integral parts are somehow mutually ordered. Some <parts> are ordered only as to position . . . either they touch, as parts of a heap; or they are connected, as parts of a house; or they are continuous, as parts of a line. Some parts are further ordered as to power, as the parts of an animal, of which the first as to power is the heart, and others which are mutually dependent as to the order of power.[98]

For a quantitative whole (and in fact for every whole) it is characteristic that the plurality of its parts is united and ordered by a form. Furthermore, depending on the nature of the form which is the principle of the unity and ordering of the parts of a quantitative whole, *natural whole* and *artificial whole* can be distinguished.[99] A natural whole is generated naturally and the form as principle of its unity and ordering is intrinsic to it; the generation of an artificial whole is caused by an agent extrinsic to it and the given form as principle of unity and ordering of its parts is always extrinsic to it (it is an "external bond"). That is why a natural whole has a "higher degree" of unity than an artificial whole and as a result it is a whole of a "higher degree." An example of a natural whole is a man as a quantitative whole; an example of an artificial whole is a house. The principle of unity and ordering of the integral parts of a man is (along with quantity) the soul, individually proper and immanent to man, and the unity

eiusdem figurae."

[97] V *Metaph.*, lect. 8 (Mareitti ed., 870): "secundum quod species in quadam totalitate consistit requirens determinatum ordinem partium"; X *Metaph.*, lect. 1 (Mareitti ed., 1925): "quae est ex forma, secundum quam aliquid est totum, et speciem habens."

[98] *STh* III, q. 90, a. 3, ad 3: "omnes partes integrales habent ordinem quendam ad invicem. Sed quaedam habent ordinem tantum in situ . . . sive se tangant, sicut partes acervi; sive etiam colligentur, sicut partes domus; sive etiam continuentur, sicut partes lineae. Quaedam vero habent insuper ordinem virtutis, sicut partes animalis, quarum prima virtute est cor, et aliae quodam ordine virtutis dependent ab invicem."

[99] X *Metaph.*, lect. 1 (1926): "aliquid est totum per naturam, aliquid vero per artem."

of a man is unity absolutely (*simpliciter*). On the other hand, the unity of a house is merely unity in a certain respect (*secundum quid*); the principle of the unity and ordering of the parts of a house is an external bond, which according to Aquinas is an accidental form (certain composition and connection of the parts of the house).[100]

Conclusion

These considerations allow us to grasp the above statements concerning the nature of a whole and its relationship to its parts better. Aquinas repeatedly states that the whole has the nature of form, that whole relates to part as form relates to matter, or that parts belong to the order of material causality and whole to the order of formal causality.[101] Formally, whole means unity of ordered parts, but because this unity and ordering comes from the form of the thing, the relationship of whole to parts can be conceived as the relationship of form to matter. Of course, whole is not identical with form; Aquinas's statements are rather based on a certain analogy of relations between whole and its parts on the one hand and between form and matter on the other hand. However, this correspondence of proportions seems to have some real basis. Aquinas discusses the issue in the *Summa Theologiae* when considering divine simplicity (*STh* I, q. 3, a. 7). There he employs several arguments in an effort to show that compositeness contradicts absolute divine perfection. One of the arguments is based on the fact that every composition involves some potentiality, and it is therefore impossible for God as pure actuality to be composite in any way. Aquinas gives the whole as an example and claims that "all parts relate to the whole as

[100] *De spir. creat.*, a. 4, ad 4: "forma domus, cum sit accidentalis, non dat esse specificum singulis partibus domus, sicut dat anima singulis partibus corporis"; *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 10, ad 16: "forma domus, sicut et aliae formae artificiales, est forma accidentalis: unde non dat esse et speciem toti et cuilibet parti; neque totum est unum simpliciter, sed unum aggregatione."

[101] *STh* I, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3: "Totum se habet in ratione formae"; *STh* III, q. 90, a. 1: "Partes ponuntur in genere causae materialis totum autem in genere causae formalis"; II *Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1: "totum <se habet> ad partem, et sicut forma ad materiam."

potency to act."[102] By that Aquinas clearly means that the parts as such are the matter of the whole, its material cause. When it comes to forming the whole, the whole as form actualizes the potentiality of parts, since it requires unity of parts according to a certain order proper to it. The formal perfection of the whole consists in the unity and ordering of its parts. Further, the whole requires completeness of its parts and its material perfection consists in the integrity of parts. To summarize we can say that the whole with respect to its parts has the nature of form, in so far as —like form—it requires completeness and unity of ordered parts.[103]

These conclusions lead us to say that the concept of whole is not properly comprehended and defined by means of the proximate supreme genus and specific difference, but through various related concepts (part, integrity, actuality, perfection, unity, and ordering).[104] Examining these concepts from different perspectives and in their various relationships allows us to perceive the characteristics of the whole as such. It seems therefore that the concept of whole is an analogical concept. However, Aquinas himself does not explicitly consider the analogy of the concept of whole (and part) and almost the same can be said about the relevant secondary literature devoted to the issue.[105] This problem should be solved and it is a pressing task for a future investigation.[106]

[102] *STh* I, q. 3, a. 7: "in omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum, quod in deo non est, quia vel una partium est actus respectu alterius; vel saltem omnes partes sunt sicut in potentia respectu totius."

[103] See Bro, *La notion de tout en Saint Thomas*, 40-44.

[104] In mereology it is often asked what, if anything, a whole adds to its parts; whether, in other words, a whole is something over and above the sum of its parts or whether it is just the sum of its parts. Aquinas's answer should be clear. A whole adds to its parts two perfections: the integrity of parts and the unity of somehow ordered parts. Hence, a whole is not just the sum of its parts.

[105] See Bro, *La notion de tout en Saint Thomas*, 40-44; Oeing-Hanhoff, *Das Ganze und seine substantialen Teile*, 155-63; Oeing-Hanhoff, *Ganzes/Teil*, col. 4-7.

[106] I would like to express my gratitude to Svetla Jarosova for translating the paper into English and thank an anonymous reviewer of *The Thomist* for stimulating comments on the previous version of my paper.

BOOK REVIEWS

God's Permission of Sin: Negative or Conditioned Decree? A Defense of the Doctrine of Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P., based on the Principles of Thomas Aquinas. Studia Friburgensia 107. By MICHAEL D. TORRE. Fribourg: Academic Press, 2009. Pp. viii + 537. 65.00 € (paper). ISBN: 978-3-7278-1659-8.

In the mid-1920s, Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P., published three substantive articles on the nature of the divine permission of sin and the nature of sufficient grace, systematizing what he understood to be elements of a common doctrine among Thomists antecedent to the *De auxiliis* controversy and subsequent to the Jansenist controversy. Proposing that God's permission of sin must be understood as a conditional (instead of an unconditional negative) decree and sufficient grace as an actual, transient, albeit impedible divine motion, Marín-Sola was concerned to maintain the absolute innocence of God in regard to moral evil—God neither directly nor indirectly causes moral evil—and to argue that the first cause of the absence of grace comes from the human being (*STh* I-II, q. 79, a. 1; q. 112, a. 3, ad 2). His proposal set off a controversy with Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., who in 1926 attacked what he regarded as Marín-Sola's crypto-Molinist doctrine.

Very little has been published about Marín-Sola in the past few decades, but in 1983 Michael Torre completed a dissertation on Marín-Sola at the Graduate Theological Union at Berkeley, and this has now been published by the Dominican editors of the Studia Friburgensia. Torre's study is as relevant in the second decade of the twenty-first century as it was when it was defended in 1983. For at the same time it offers a commendably careful, rigorous, and extensive examination of the philosophical and theological substance of the controversy—the precise nature of God's permission of sin and of sufficient grace—and provides a window into the mind and the works of an exceedingly erudite, rigorous, and brilliant yet unjustly forgotten modern Catholic theologian, who was one of the great Dominican Thomists to have taught dogmatic theology at the University of Fribourg.

In order fully to appreciate the importance and ongoing relevance of Torre's study a word about Marín-Sola's life is necessary. Francisco Marín-Sola was born in 1873 in Cárcar, Spain, and made his vows as a Dominican in 1889 in Ocaña. After his studies in philosophy (Ocaña) and theology (Ávila), he was ordained a

priest in 1897 in the Philippines, where he first worked as a missionary and later as a lecturer at the Colegio de San Juan and at the University of Santo Tomás in Manila, where he received his doctorate in theology in 1909. From 1911 to 1913 he taught at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana, which in 1916 bestowed on him an honorary doctorate in Civil Law. From 1913 to 1918 he taught at the *studium generale* of his Spanish missionary province in Rosaryville, Louisiana, and finally from 1918 to 1927 at the University of Fribourg, where in 1920 he received the Master of Sacred Theology of the Dominican Order. The controversy with Garrigou-Lagrange led in 1927 to Marín-Sola's dismissal by Master General Paredes from the chair of dogmatic theology at Fribourg. Reassigned to the Dominican convent in Ocaña, Spain (together with Paredes, who had to step down as Master General at the order of the Holy See), he was reassigned a year later to Manila, where he continued teaching at the University of Santo Tomás until his death in 1932. He is remembered best for his magisterial work, *La Evolución homogenea del dogma católico* (1923; French trans., 1924; English trans., 1988).

Marín-Sola's texts that pertain to the questions of the nature of the divine permission of sin and of the nature of sufficient grace consist first and foremost of three substantive articles buried in the 1925 and 1926 issues of the Spanish Thomistic periodical, *Ciencia Tomista*. There Marín-Sola argues that the majority of Dominican Thomist commentators before the *De auxiliis* controversy and again from the Jansenist crisis on embraced a position on the relationship between sufficient and efficacious grace that would, on one hand, offer a clear alternative to the Molinist position (while addressing Molinist concerns) and, on the other hand, offer a clear alternative to the Jansenist position (while addressing Jansenist concerns). Marín-Sola systematizes what he understands to be elements of a common doctrine on the divine permission of evil and on the nature of sufficient grace. While demonstrating most extensively that this strand of the Thomistic tradition is rooted in Aquinas's principles and advancing a spirited defense against objections from the Molinist, Bañezian, and Jansenist positions, he acknowledges at the same time that his own systematization of these elements constitutes a development of the Thomistic tradition, a development necessitated by the rival accounts of Molinism and Jansenism. Possibly in virtue of his previous extensive work on the development of doctrine, Marín-Sola saw the need of a synthetic proposal that would not only be able to respond successfully to the concerns as well as to the errors of Molinism but that would especially be able to differentiate itself unmistakably from the Jansenist position. As a historian of doctrine Marín-Sola was, of course, keenly aware of the fact that the Jansenist position had been repeatedly declared heretical by the Magisterium while Molinism had never suffered any such censure. Furthermore, in the years 1926-32, from his defense against Garrigou-Lagrange's attack until his death, Marín-Sola marshaled an extraordinary compilation, the *Concordia Tomista*, that covers the whole Thomistic tradition on the question of divine motion and created freedom. This massive work, originally forty notebooks, still awaits publication. Torre's analysis and defense of Marín-Sola's theory is based

on the published articles from the *Ciencia Tomista* as well as on the *Concordia Tomista*.

After his death in 1932, Marín-Sola was quickly forgotten outside a small circle of students and friends. But his doctrine persevered, albeit anonymously. Jacques Maritain, first in *Existence and the Existent* and later in *God and the Permission of Evil*, made Marín-Sola's doctrine popular, although without acknowledging him as a source. Then Francisco Muñiz, O.P.—Garrigou-Lagrange's colleague at the Angelicum—enshrined it in the important commentaries on providence, predestination, and grace in the first and the sixth volumes of the sixteen-volume Latin/Spanish edition of the *Summa Theologiae*. Other eminent Spanish Dominicans also supported the teaching, first and foremost Juan Arintero, O.P., and Santiago Ramirez, O.P., the editor of the Latin/Spanish edition of the *Summa Theologiae* and an eminent commentator on Aquinas's oeuvre.

Instead of allowing the reader to become lost in the thick foliage of extensive historical narration and textual interpretation, Torre organizes his study in the format of a formal encounter between the two disputants, Garrigou-Lagrange and Marín-Sola. In a substantive but concise introduction (1-35), Torre offers a brief account of the controversy itself, explains his methodology, and defines the precise circumference of the disputed question. In a nutshell, Marín-Sola and Garrigou-Lagrange "disagree concerning the relation between the 'efficiency' of God's permissive will and the deficiency of man's sinful one" (16). How is human defect related to divine permission? The difficulty, as Torre aptly characterizes it, is the following: "If it is said that the defect follows infallibly from God's permission, then it is difficult to see how God is not the first cause both of the defect and the matter of the act, in short, the true cause of sin. If, on the other hand, one affirms that the defect does not follow infallibly from God's permission, then it is difficult to see how something has not occurred both outside God's will and beyond His power to know of it infallibly. Yet one of these two alternatives must be the case: either the defect follows infallibly from God's permission or it does not follow infallibly from it. Garrigou-Lagrange takes the former position, Marín-Sola the latter" (20).

The rest of the book falls into three major parts. The first part (37-195) is mainly descriptive and analytic and lays out the two contending positions, first Garrigou-Lagrange's (37-87), then Marín-Sola's (88-127). According to Torre, Garrigou-Lagrange holds axiomatically that God's will *qua* first cause is always infallibly efficacious and thus determinative, and that God's permission is no exception to this rule. God's permissive will is equally predeterminative, such that, given God's permission, sin infallibly occurs. There obtains a strict symmetry between the lines of good and evil. Garrigou-Lagrange's understanding of the difference between efficacious and sufficient grace is determined by the same guiding principle: "Efficacious grace is nothing other than a physical premotion of the supernatural order, one that moves man to an end above his nature. Its efficacy is rooted in the nature of such motion, which infallibly obtains its effect, whether that effect be of the natural or the supernatural order"

(75). Unlike efficacious grace, sufficient grace is not a motion, but a mere potency. It is formal and dispositive cause; by it the subject is made ready to receive efficacious grace (78). (At this point, Torre rightly recalls Pascal's biting remark from the *Provincial Letters* about this notion of sufficient grace, namely, that it is a sufficient grace that does not suffice.) According to Garrigou-Lagrange, God refuses to give efficacious grace on the basis of the human being's "prior disinclination to the true good that is offered in sufficient grace" (80). Torre tersely observes: "It is true that man would not in fact resist sufficient grace were he to be given efficacious grace. Yet God need not elect to give him this grace, electing instead to permit him to fall into sin. Nor is man thus provided with an excuse, for the defect that infallibly follows from God's permission is to be attributed solely to the defective will of a creature" (ibid.). Torre judges rightly that for Garrigou-Langrange, "this entire question of God's permission of sin and of His negative reprobation finally comes down to a simple choice on God's part from which all else follows. Some God loves in such a way as to elect for glory; from such an election comes the ordering of means to glory (predestination), which are then infallibly executed and the person is brought to glory. Some God does not love such as to elect for glory; from such a non-election comes the permission of a sin not to be forgiven, from which this sin infallibly follows, and the person is damned on account of it. The blessed manifest God's mercy; the damned manifest His justice" (86-87).

Where Garrigou-Lagrange perceives a strict symmetry between the lines of good and evil (God is in both lines the ultimately determining cause), Marín-Sola perceives a fundamental asymmetry (God is the determining cause in the line of good, and the human is the determining cause in the line of evil). In order not to misrepresent the latter position from the outset, Torre emphasizes at the beginning of his presentation that Marín-Sola unequivocally rejects Molinist middle-knowledge as metaphysically erroneous and that he equally unequivocally affirms the Thomistic doctrine of physical premotion. On both of these positions, he and Garrigou-Lagrange share a common Thomistic ground. At the same time, however, Marín-Sola proposes that there must be physical premotions that can be and are resisted by the human being—impedible divine motions. While for Garrigou-Lagrange the will's first failure and the connected judgment of the intellect follow infallibly from God's permission, for Marín-Sola the failure is not infallibly connected with God's antecedent permission, nor is this permission, consequent upon the human's first failure, inevitably given. Torre states: "this impediment or initial moral failure is the non-use of the intellect by the will and connected non-consideration of the rule by the intellect. It occurs at the moment when the will moves the intellect to judge and the intellect judges. This faulty judgment is the beginning of sin. The election that is formally sinful follows infallibly upon this judgment unless God should will to intervene in a special way" (126).

The second part (190-326) is committed to a sustained defense of Marín-Sola's position, which unfolds by way of considering first a range of objections to the position of Garrigou-Lagrange and subsequently a range of objections to

the position of Marín-Sola. This part is of great conceptual and discursive acuity, following the format of objections and their responses. Even merely adumbrating the complexity of the issues raised and discussed in exacting detail as Torre follows the line of Marín-Sola's careful defense of his proposal would go beyond the scope of this review. Torre astutely organizes the *disputatio* around the core metaphysical issue at stake, the nature of the motion of the first cause. Garrigou-Lagrange holds that "created activity does not operate nor continue to operate *save under the motion of the first cause* which is not only unimpeded but unimpedible. It concerns *a most universal metaphysical principle*" (286). Marín-Sola unequivocally rejects this position: "That which to F. Garrigou appears to be a universal Thomistic metaphysical principle to me appears contrary to the entire Thomistic metaphysics. This principle refers to *special* providence, where sin does not occur. If it were a true and *universal* principle, there would not be *sin* or God would be its fount and author" (287).

After unfolding the philosophical entailments of both positions with commendable rigor and precision and subjecting each to the objections of the other position, Torre advances to what in medieval disputations was the *determinatio magistri*. Consequently, in the third part (328-492), Torre offers a detailed examination of Aquinas's own position, first and foremost regarding God's permission of sin, but also regarding other truths of faith. Here, Torre incontrovertibly establishes that the very center of Marín-Sola's theory, the concept of the impedible divine motion, is deeply rooted in Aquinas's own thought and most clearly developed in the works of the later Aquinas, especially in *De Malo* and in his very late commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo*. Torre offers an exemplary interpretation of the demanding commentary on *De Caelo* where Aquinas advances most extensively his doctrine of the intrinsic defectability of material causality: "Failure in being requires no more than a material cause that can fail in order to be explained. Man's will is one such cause. The first failure involved in sin issues from it and one need look no further than it for an 'explanation' of its defect. Defect follows from defectability. The defect in sin issues from the will's order to non-being, just as the corruption of a material substance derives from the matter's capacity for the privation of the form to which it is united. Between the [divine] permission that makes sin possible and that which makes it actual, there is a defect of man as first cause of the malice that is his own" (427). Torre demonstrates in this important section that for Aquinas in the occurrence of sin there are at play two distinct meanings of permission involving two different suppositions. The first supposes a defectible agent that need not fail. God's first permission makes sin possible, but not infallibly actual. The second supposes a defective agent who is already inclined toward evil. God's second permission supposes sin and, in virtue of God's not impeding it, sin is infallibly actual. Torre argues that while Marín-Sola differentiates rightly between these two meanings of permission and their respective suppositions, while Garrigou-Lagrange conflates them and thus arrives at the thesis of a negative reprobation *ante praevisum defectum*.

In his conclusion (471-92), Torre offers a crisp summary of the simple intuition that drives Marín-Sola's doctrine: "In order to explain failure, it is only necessary to posit a fallible cause, moved according to its fallible nature. Man's absence of being or his failure in the moral good does not require a determinative decree on God's part in order to be explained. Because this is so, one can affirm unequivocally that it is not through a lack of divine love that man is not saved. Rather, he is damned because he impedes that love from bearing fruit in him" (471). Subsequently, Torre goes beyond the confines of the Thomistic school and shows how Marín-Sola's core intuition accords with the thinking of two modern doctors of the Church, St. Robert Bellarmine and St. Alphonsus Liguori. Finally, Torre compares Marín-Sola's interpretation of Aquinas with the one that the Augustinian Athanase Sage offers of Augustine. Sage argues extensively that according to the proper, non-Jansenist reading of Augustine, the determination of evil is not grounded in a decree of God but in the human being's decision to abandon God. According to Sage's reading of Augustine, "every fall from grace is not determined by God's will, but only by the will of the spiritual creature" (483). Torre concludes that Marín-Sola's doctrine is not only fully concordant with Aquinas's principles but also in fundamental agreement with a highly defensible reading of Augustine as well as with Liguori's theology of grace and prayer.

In an appendix (493-527), Torre offers pertinent passages from the unpublished and very hard-to-access *Concordia Tomista*.

The significance of Torre's considerable scholarly achievement is threefold. First, apologetic: Torre has advanced a sustained and—to this reader—convincing argument that Marín-Sola's interpretation and systematic development of Aquinas's thought is (a) fully congruent with and a legitimate development of the principles of the latter and is (b) neither a version of nor a half-way point on the way to Molinism. In short, Marín-Sola's position is vindicated as a defensible development and systematization of Aquinas's thought, deeply rooted in Thomistic principles.

Second, dogmatic: Torre advances a lucid and spirited analysis and defense of Marín-Sola's sophisticated Thomistic synthesis on providence, sufficient grace, and God's universal will for salvation that seems to have been held implicitly and in various segments among Dominican Thomists from Capreolus until the *De auxiliis* controversy and again from the Jansenist crisis on—a position in deep accord with the Second Vatican Council's teaching on the universal offer of salvation to all humanity.

Third, ecumenical: Marín-Sola's position as presented and defended by Torre is of considerable significance for Christians of various traditions. It would allow mutually exclusive Protestant approaches (Calvinist and Arminian) to see their respective concerns (divine sovereignty and human free will) fully acknowledged, yet profoundly reconciled in their proper order. In other words, Marín-Sola's position could help overcome a Protestant deadlock on the crucial matters of divine motion and created freedom in regard to the mystery of iniquity. Furthermore, Eastern-Orthodox theologians could recognize in Marín-Sola's

doctrine a compelling theological way of affirming unequivocally God's universal will for salvation without falling into the theological error of teaching irresistible universal salvation.

Torre's book points to an urgent *desideratum*—a translation (with commentary) of Marín-Sola's three central essays together with a major selection from the *Concordia Tomista*.

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Christ the Key. By KATHRYN TANNER. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 322. $30.00 (paper) ISBN: 978-0-521-73277-2.

Kathryn Tanner has fulfilled her promise of a sequel to her brief systematic theology entitled *Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity* (2001). In that volume she began with Jesus to situate the entire spectrum of Christian doctrinal loci. Although "brief" it displayed her virtuosity of theological engagement, revealing a consistency in thinking within the classical Christological and Trinitarian categories that inform and shape the praxis of Christian faith and life. Her interlocutors were many, but primary attention was given to the Greek Fathers and the Reformed tradition, the latter under the guidance (in the main) of its two greats doctors, John Calvin and Karl Barth. Neither slavish in her imitation, nor cautious in her speculative reach, Tanner offered a gem of a book, one that demonstrated the relevance of Christian dogma for life in the world. The present text, *Christ the Key*, follows up on the prior project, now dealing in depth with issues that require attention but would have interrupted the flow of her brief systematics. If the previous book was all about grace (in the best Barthian terms) the present one is all about the parsing of what we mean by such grace. To deal successfully with this, some intricate issues require sustained attention.

Tanner's first move is in the direction of theological anthropology that builds on two basic principles from the prior volume, namely, a "non-competitive relation between God and creatures" and a "radical interpretation of divine transcendence." The former has been captured in the long-familiar axiom of Karl Rahner that the divine-world relation varies in direct, not inverse proportion. The latter accentuates Tanner's Barthian provenance and is a signature of the Reformed theological tradition. In *Christ the Key* Tanner argues for a "Christ-centered treatment of our creation in the image of God" (1), intended to affirm both the distinction between God and creature as well as the necessity of seeing how this is instantiated throughout creation in Christ. Hence she is critical of Augustine and those in the Latin tradition who locate the divine image in some

aspect of the human soul such as intellect. Rather, the image of God is something given to them, not of their own possession (the perennial Barthian worry), borrowed from the gift bestowed. The emphasis is on image as participation, realized in Christ, whose image in his human nature through the hypostatic union is, nevertheless, "a low-level image of God . . . insofar as the end product is a human state" (17). Thus Tanner can even speak of this gift as something "alien" to us (12), given beyond our created nature, and requiring a "gift of grace" (19). The language is typical of the Reformers' doctrine of justification, intending that the original state was characterized by "living off God . . . drawing their very life . . . from the divine image to which they cling" (15). If readers, especially Catholics, are begging for more nuances, Tanner does not disappoint. Two chapters follow, on the intricacies of the theology of grace that informs these positions.

In chapters 2 and 3, respectively entitled "Grace (Part 1)" and "Grace (Part 2)," Tanner engages in a sustained conversation with the Catholic theology of grace. In both chapters she attempts a new solution to Protestant-Catholic differences, albeit with a Protestant twist. Two issues are the primary focus of chapter 2: (1) nature-grace and sin-grace as emblematic of Catholic and Protestant approaches respectively, and (2) the distinction between justification and sanctification relative to interior transformation. On the first issue Tanner's account and, therefore, solution is quite unique. To put it simply, by her lights, nature without grace (more on "pure nature" in the next chapter) is equivalent for all intents and purposes to the Reformed notion of total depravity. Shocking as this may sound to Catholic ears it makes sense within the paradigm that she is offering. From her perspective (including her reading of the Catholic tradition), one is given to ponder a rather astounding sentence: "The very created character of our existence, the fact, that is, that we are not divine, forms the major impediment to our receiving what God intends to give us in creating us, and constitutes therefore the major impetus behind the gift of God's grace" (60). Note the characterization of our createdness as an impediment. Thus the Catholic notion that grace perfects nature sounds to her as a form of "Protestant pessimism" (of all things!) since it implies that human nature is already broken, that it cannot lead to its "own properly human fulfillment," and that the gift of grace remedies what human nature lacks, not simply perfecting its own possibility. Therefore, the move from nature to grace possesses a "disjunctive character," a "discontinuous radical leap between different conditions," even reversing our natural direction (60-62). Catholics may recoil at the shock value of such statements—intended or not—and wonder about whom she is reading—Aquinas is mentioned not Baius or Jansen!—but it is worth pondering where she ends up as evidenced in the following statement: "A Protestant stress on total depravity becomes in this way perfectly compatible with a Catholic affirmation that our good nature has been left intact" (67). How so?

For Tanner the corruption and depravity caused by sin affects the operations of human nature—no doubt causing harm—but basically leaves human nature intact. It is the "proper functioning of human capabilities" that is deformed, but

this is already the case without sin since it is the loss of "divine inputs" that is at the source of this deformation. Of course, for Tanner there is no state of pure nature, but if there was it would not be much different from the postlapsarian condition of human nature since any absence of divine input negates the flourishing of human nature. Moving beyond the confessional standoff as to whether human nature is totally corrupted by sin (Reformed) or just severely wounded (Catholic), it is more of a question of recognizing that the "loss of divine power totally corrupts our operations . . . in toto and at their root" (66), still very much an expression of Reformed sensibility. If there is an axiom to describe this condition—she does not provide one—it would be something like this: the absence of grace corrupts nature.

Combine this observation with the relational ontology that informs Tanner's work and we are set for her account of justification and sanctification. Indeed she speaks of the "natural consequence" of sin, a "second nature contrary to what God intended us to be" (70). If the relationship between nature and grace evokes discontinuity, the movement from sin to grace manifests the disjuncture to an even greater degree. It is a transition by divine mercy that is "not sweet and congenial but a violent one that seems to be doing us harm" (69). Here she abides within the framework of the magisterial Reformers but also relies heavily on the patristic emphasis on the Incarnation. Christ's assumption of human nature is the necessary foundation for the Reformation distinction between justification and sanctification in order to articulate the need respectively for both imputation and interior transformation based upon the Spirit at work in us. The former reinforces the primary Protestant posture of humility while the latter gives rise to "new powers and capacities in us" (83), thereby answering the Catholic concern about the efficacy of divine grace even as these dispositions are never independent of the (gift of the) Holy Spirit who is the "irreplaceable motor for everything we achieve" (84).

As already implicated, questions of nature and grace have been hovering around this text, so Tanner directly takes up the issue in chapter 3 ("Grace, Part 2"). Tanner is aware of the twentieth-century Catholic conversation with the advent of the *nouvelle théologie*, which she characterizes as primarily Augustinian in its appropriation of Thomas Aquinas. She accepts, on the one hand, their critique of the neo-Scholastic position regarding a two-tiered extrinsic understanding of grace relative to nature (as least as characterized by its critics), but, on the other hand, launches into an extended critique of Henri de Lubac and company in order to make way for her own constructive proposal. She is unaware, or, at least, makes no reference to the more contemporary revival of the classical Thomistic position articulated by Lawrence Feingold, Steven A. Long, and Thomas Joseph White among others. Essentially, Tanner opposes any distinction between nature and grace; the former simply indicates that creation is not God. So, she critiques de Lubac for whom the natural desire for God includes a supernatural end that can only be fulfilled by grace that exceeds natural capacities. Her argument is that humans are created with grace that is necessary not just for supernatural ends, but for "the excellent exercise of

our ordinary functions as human beings" (109). De Lubac fails on two counts: the gratuity of grace and the integrity of human nature.

Tanner contends that the gratuity of grace—so intensely debated with magisterial intervention by Pope Pius XII in *Humani Generis*—is preserved by the gratuity of creation. On the basis of this "grace-centered account of the creature" (116) it is entirely appropriate that "grace is required by our nature" and "is demanded by the sort of creatures we are" in order to realize God's gracious intent (117). Her concern about the Catholic position—whether neo-Scholastic or de Lubacian—is that it leads to some form of naturalism and the self-sufficiency of the human creature. The de Lubacian schematic is simply a graduated paradigm in which the transition to the grace-centered creature takes place, not nearly as cut-and-dried as in the neo-Scholastic position. The key for her Protestant account is the linkage between "strong anti-naturalism and the gratuity of grace" (120). With the qualification that our desire for God is "not something properly ours by nature, if one considers the character of human nature in and of itself"—we lay no claim to it as de Lubacian "natural desire seems to suggest" (129)—grace nevertheless becomes something natural for us. It leaves our nature intact—no need for elevation of the natural powers of the intellect beyond the human—yet grace raises our fallen human nature to a "divine level of existence and functioning" (138) including victory over our sinful impulses, all of course, by the work of the Holy Spirit.

I have belabored this exposition because for the Catholic interlocutor all sorts of buttons are being pushed and any sort of response will be a complicated affair. I have already referenced Baius and Jansen, and one is reminded of traditional Catholic polemics against the Protestant susceptibility to collapse nature into grace. Clearly another round of inquiry into the prelapsarian original state is called for. I will leave that to other readers. However, in pursuit of a substantial ecumenical engagement, the old charge is worth consideration. Does Tanner, despite her antinaturalist protestations, reduce grace to nature/the natural? Admittedly, for Tanner, this is not a matter of substance (or accident!) but of operations and functions. With this caveat the remaining chapters prove to be quite interesting.

Tanner hones an orthodox and finely tuned Trinitarian theology in chapter 4. She is careful, nuanced, and innovative. Not shy about speculatively exploring the intra-Trinitarian relations, she consistently relates these to the unity and the perichoretic distinction of the divine persons as well as to the missions of the Son and the Spirit. By adhering to the formula of "distinct but inseparable" she not only provides a rich account of the immanent and economic dimensions of God's triune being but also of a Spirit-oriented Christology that does not compromise but, in fact, accentuates the divinity of the Incarnate Word. Although Tanner is critical of the filioque, she does give an account of the eternal relationship between the Son and Holy Spirit by arguing that the spiration of the Spirit from the Father accompanies the generation of the Son, thereby preserving the distinction of persons. One divine person cannot be substituted for another. She concludes with an exposition of the Trinitarian aspects of the Church's

sacramental life in which the Eucharist in particular embodies the ascent-descent motifs of the Trinitarian missions—we return to the Father by the Spirit with the Son even as the Father has come to us through these missions.

The relationship between Trinitarian theology and "politically progressive theologies" (218) has been a significant stream in the renaissance of Trinitarian theology in the last half century. Jürgen Moltmann, whom Tanner references, is perhaps the most prominent advocate of this trend. Tanner is well known for her own engagement in the relationship between theology and political economy. Yet she dismantles any one-to-one correspondence between the relationality of the triune God and a nonhierarchical, egalitarian, and communitarian politics. One cannot simply read off the relationship of humans to one another in the body politic from the divine persons' relational subsistence in the triune being. This is an excellent piece of Trinitarian constructive theology consistent with and building on the previous chapter. The difference between divine persons and human persons cannot be surmounted. It does not mean that there are not political implications to the gospel. They proceed, however, not from some human instantiation of Trinitarian relationality—"not the direct translation of trinitarian relations into a human form" (237)—but from union with Christ in the economy of salvation with its deep Trinitarian structure, namely, our relationship to the Father in Christ by the power of the Spirit. This approach also disallows the theological temptation to negotiate "political questions without socio-historical mediation" (233).

Tanner's skill at re-envisioning classical categories continues in chapter 6, "Death and Sacrifice." It deals specifically with soteriology and atonement and, not unlike many contemporary soteriologies, begins with a critique and deconstruction of prevailing theories, with vicarious satisfaction and penal substitution theories taking the biggest hit. One should be mindful that the combination of diverse atonement theories with no one theory possessing the status of dogma, and the critique exercised by feminist and womanist theologies, open the door to the possible evacuation of the cross of its soteriological density. This is especially the case when the traditional atonement theory is interpreted to neglect the soteriological value of Jesus's life and ministry, not to mention his resurrection. Tanner's strategy is to acknowledge the "outdated character of the mechanism of atonement" (250), for example, the loss of the honor code and a penitential culture vis-à-vis Anselm's satisfaction theory as well as "the unappealing or one-sided character of God that many of the models imply" (249), for example, the restriction of divine love by the rigidity of the law in penal substitution.

Tanner's alternative is to argue for a "model of the atonement based on the incarnation" (252), one that emphasizes the at-one-ment of humanity and divinity in Christ. Even though this undermines the vicariousness of both the satisfaction and penal substitution models, Tanner intends to uphold the *pro nobis* of Christ's mission to the extent that she is willing to say that Christ "does for us what we cannot do for ourselves" (258). In the person of the Word incarnate the "the sinful, conflictual, and death-dealing world" is exposed in the

crucifixion so that even there the healing ministry of Jesus continues through his costly steadfast dedication to his mission and his intimacy with the human condition. The re-envisioning applied to vicariousness is also deployed for the language of sacrifice that feminists and womanist theologians find most offensive. Sacrifice as a rite of expiation (propitiation is excluded) is directed not from us to God but from God to us. It is an act of sanctification whereby God purifies human life by the "life-enhancing power of the Word" in a sinful world, and elicits our lives as living sacrifices of service to our neighbor (272).

Since theology is embroiled in much controversy over atonement and soteriology one must situate Tanner's contribution within this context, as she readily acknowledges. Her desire to limit or even evacuate atonement of its forensic dimension will certainly be deemed as lacking by more traditional Protestants. I share their concerns and find that the sacrificial aspects of the atonement are also not adequately dealt with. Jesus's self-offering certainly reaches its decisive climax on the cross, and the oblation enacted there does possess soteriological value in the act itself, not simply in Jesus' costly dedication that the life-giving Word sanctifies. There is much at stake here, not the least of which is a sound Eucharistic theology that Tanner is quite aware of. Perhaps I am over-reading Tanner here, but I wonder whether she could sing with cognitive assent what Charles Wesley so eloquently put in poetry.

> He left His Father's throne above,
> So free, so infinite His grace;
> Emptied Himself of all but love,
> And bled for Adam's helpless race:
> 'Tis mercy all, immense and free;
> For, O my God, it found out me.
> 'Tis mercy all, immense and free;
> For, O my God, it found out me.

Tanner's final chapter negotiates recognition of the presence and working of the Spirit. She attempts to overcome the bifurcation between two views of pneumatological agency in creatures. Is the Spirit's work immediate or mediated? She favors the latter. Drawing upon radical Puritan claims for immediate inspiration during the period of the English Civil War Tanner demonstrates the credibility of those who countered by appealing to reason, interpretation of Scripture, and ecclesial life. It is a fascinating read. Indeed she does not discount the import of the former position. However, it is only acceptable within the mediated framework of human fallibility and the Spirit active in the public realm from which we cannot divorce our interiority. Her pneumatology serves as a capstone to the book and follows the logic of its incarnational center. The work of the Spirit embraces the human, as did the Divine Word in Jesus Christ. In both, human agency is enhanced, not depreciated by the divine.

Tanner is formidable in her constructive efforts, offering perceptive diagnostics of the tradition and yet pursuing its contemporary articulation.

Ultimately for this reader, the most spirited engagement will take place around the theology of nature and grace, as already indicated. It will no doubt surface traditional confessional differences. Added to that is Tanner's deployment of Barth's accentuation of divine agency relative to the human reception of grace. As already noted she intends no diminishment of the latter. Grace as our natural disposition (a tradition that goes back to Schleiermacher) may aspire to the new creation. However, a sound theology of nature and the human person is required to account for the new creation in its supernatural mode both as created grace in us and in the sacramentality that is constitutive of the life of the Church, in other words, the whole supernatural organism of grace. This is not an issue of the self-sufficiency of human nature but rather of the permutation of all aspects of our humanity by the grace that the Holy Spirit imparts. Whether in light of her critique there will be new conversations between de Lubacians and neo-Scholastics remains to be seen.

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Studien zum Ökumenischen Konzil: Definitionen und Begriffe, Tagebücher und Augustinus-Rezeption. By HERMANN-JOSEF SIEBEN. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010. Pp. 281. $68.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-3506768797.

Sieben, a renowned scholar on ecclesial councils, joins six previously published essays (slightly reworked) to a new study on the development of conciliar theology in the West. Two essays lay the groundwork for subsequent scholarly studies: the first examines in detail the influence that St. Augustine exercised over councils both in his lifetime and especially after his death; the second studies the conciliar diary (*Tagebuch*), identifying its genus, specifying its differences from other literary types, listing the principal diaries (from the Renaissance on) as well as earlier anticipations. Another chapter studies de Lubac's diary with respect to two integralisms already present at Vatican II: the earlier curial integralism which reduced faith's content to declarations of the magisterium and what followed from them, and the second integralism which was the secularism that started at the council and worked its havoc in subsequent decades. De Lubac perceptively recognized the latter's beginnings and predicted its baneful effects. His own position straddled the extremes, staying firmly oriented to Christ, the personal object of the Church's faith. (While this reviewer agrees with de Lubac's insight that both extremes flow from opposed understandings of the natural-supernatural relation, he laments that the French

Jesuit failed to recognize how the paradox central to his own view has difficulty in maintaining itself: why is a paradox only apparently a contradiction? Men seek coherent rational systems in which to express their faith, and more than a paradox is required to prevent them from rushing to extremes.)

Another article studies the meaning and context of Gregory of Nazianzus's oft-cited dictum, "I avoid every synod of bishops, for I have seen no felicitous end to any council nor has any council resolved a problem instead of increasing it." The remark doubtless reflects his own experience at Constantinople I, where after his elevation to the patriarchal see of Constantinople the Alexandrian delegation arrived to eject him because Nicaea's canon prohibits a bishop from migrating from one episcopal see to another. That negative experience was confirmed by the Arian, imperial Council of Seleucia (359), which condemned his hero Athanasius. Yet Sieben notes that Gregory professed the highest esteem for Nicaea, the "sweet, beautiful source of our ancient faith," where the Holy Spirit guided bishops. Gregory's disdain for bishops' councils was probably due to the Church's own incomplete appreciation of an ecumenical council's institutional position in her life. Only gradually did she recognize an ecumenical council's necessary role in defending the faith. Nicaea's "miracle" could not be unique, and its "monopolistic" position was definitively overcome when Chalcedon culminated dogmatic development by accepting previous councils as authoritative judges of the Christian faith.

Most interesting for dogmatic theologians are three central essays dealing with the definition and essential requirements of an ecumenical council. These expand and revise an article in Sieben's *Studien zur Gestalt und Überlieferung der Konzilien* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005). One essay first traces the gradual development of individual criteria as expressed by various Fathers and early theologians and then examines the later catalogues of criteria propounded explicitly for an ecumenical council's recognition or reception. "Ecumenical" first seemed to designate any action undertaken by the emperor for the whole empire. Yet while he did call the first councils, not all such imperial councils were recognized because they failed to fulfill other conditions. Seeking to secure its own position, Nicaea II in particular established conditions for a legitimate council. Although no catalogue offers a complete list of requirements, Sieben provides a summary definition reflecting the conditions most frequently demanded: "An ecumenical council is a ecclesial assembly summoned by the Emperor (1), supported by the consent of the whole Church, more exactly, by the consent of the five patriarchs (2), primarily organized with the pope's cooperation [*in Sonderheit vom Papst mitgestaltet*] (3); in the assembly a question concerning the entire Church, particularly one touching upon faith (4) would be treated according to prevailing law (5), i.e., especially in freedom [of discussion and voting] (6); the assembly's outcome agrees in content with previous councils (7) and is received by the entire Church (8)" (106). These criteria, which, apart from (1) and (2), can sometimes be hard to verify, were elaborated primarily in the East. When Athanasius Bibliothecarius, seeking to

validate the 869/70 version of Constantinople IV, introduced the criteria of Nicaea II to the West, he made validity depend primarily upon papal cooperation. Before him Augustine, who submitted the *concilium generale* to Scripture's norm, had not recognized the full import of ecumenical councils; neither had Pope Gelasius, who in expounding a legitimate council's conditions followed Augustine in insisting primarily on its agreement with Scripture (a condition omitted in the East). Hincmar of Rheims, who upheld the rights of local churches, also listed necessary papal cooperation for an ecumenical council's legitimacy, but omitted entirely its summoning by the Emperor. Since he also opposed Nicaea II, his only other criterion was agreement with previous tradition. Although Ivo of Chartres cited Nicaea II's requirements, he too insisted on papal cooperation. Not surprisingly Gratian omitted Nicaea II's list, and it was consequently lost in the Western Middle Ages until rediscovered by Cusanus.

Sieben's second major essay traces Western conciliar theologies after the Great Schism (1054). The Gregorian Reform, Gratian, and consequently the decretists and decretalists concentrated on papal authority, demanding at least the pope's permission for a valid council; some ascribed to him its convocation or required his presence. This tradition persisted against conciliarism until Vatican II (*LG* 22) and finds expression in the current *Code of Canon Law* (can. 337-38). Another medieval tradition, espoused primarily by Marsilius of Padua and Ockham, understood the council as deriving from and standing for the whole Church; insofar as a council represents all the faithful, it possesses *plenitudo potestatis* and can depose a pope. This tradition employed a notion of representation stemming from the thirteenth century's reception of Aristotle and was developed at Constance and Basel, especially by John of Ragusa. The Western Schism occasioned two other major variants. The third tradition grounded validity in a council's essence, that is, consent; Cusanus, after noticing that earlier councils never mentioned representation, attempted to overcome schism by insisting on a council's necessary reception. Cusanus was followed by many with various papal or conciliarist emphases. A final tradition understood the council as consisting of the college of bishops, which possesses full authority. This position was initiated by Gerson, developed by John of Segovia, and found acceptance in *Lumen Gentium* 22.

Sieben makes clear that such traditions were not always advocated in their purity; the historical investigation of previous councils led to mixed forms. Nonetheless the difference between the older Eastern tradition and the later Western tradition, which is oriented on the papacy (be it for support or rejection), might well lead some to question the unity of ecumenical councils. The fact that many have questioned the validity of councils, not only Constantinople IV but also various medieval councils, supplies the topic for Sieben's third major essay. Actually the theologians of Constance and Basel first numbered medieval councils successively after the eight (seven) primitive councils. Theologians drew up diverse lists of approved ecumenical councils.

Arnauld de Pontac's list was taken over by Bellarmine who, however, relegated Constance and Basel to the *concilia partim confirmata partim reprobata*; his list was accepted in 1595 by the papal commission publishing the Roman edition of ecumenical councils that remained the standard until G. Alberigo and his collaborators stripped the medieval councils of the title "ecumenical" in their recent edition of conciliar documents (because the Eastern Church was not represented). Sieben points out the disastrous effects of such a decision so contrary to ecclesial practice: the Church's Magisterium, East and West, would be "frozen" in the first millennium and the decisions of Trent, Vatican I, and Vatican II would be relativized. While Sieben admits that, lacking an official list of approved councils, it is still possible to question the ecumenical character of this or that council, Alberigo's radical proposal ignores the normative role of the papacy already apparent in the earliest councils. Ecumenical councils are *traditio* in passive and active senses; they have to stand in historical continuity with previous conciliar decisions; their universality must be horizontal, from generation to generation, which their very numbering symbolizes. Surely "ecumenical" must be applied analogously to councils, some treating issues of greater importance and more universal interest than others. A hierarchical ordering of the councils emerges also from their greater or lesser universality, depending upon the number of bishops present. Even in the first millennium the pentarchy was not equally represented at all councils, and bishops often failed to be present. Given the pope's role as the Church's head with full authority to enact laws for the Church, his presidency can supply universality to councils, even if they are considered to be of a second order. History witnesses to many such councils. So Sieben suggests the division of *principaliora* or *digniora concilia* and *simplicia concilia*, a recognition parallel to Thomas's distinction of baptism and the Eucharist as *potissima sacramenta* vis-à-vis the other sacraments.

Because history deals with the ephemeral and limited, its judgments are always subject to revision. Nonetheless, because the Absolute entered history, the essential structure of Christ's message and reality can be identified in history. Sieben has achieved a comprehensive study of ecumenical councils, with which all subsequent studies have to reckon. Yet much remains to be done by dogmatic theologians on the basis such studies. Has Vatican II successfully transmitted the full reality of a council? While the tension remains between pope and episcopal assembly as two polar subjects enjoying ultimate jurisdiction in the Church—a question still debated—did the council do justice to the other historical traditions? Did its consideration of the Church as the people of God previous to her hierarchical structure validate the tradition upholding the council's representative authority? Does that tradition, arising so late, manifest a legitimate development? How does "consent" or "reception" affect a council's authority? How does it stand vis-à-vis the insistence of Vatican I that papal infallible definitions in matters of faith and morals are "irreformable *ex sese*, not from the Church's consent" (*DS* 3074)? What touches the pope touches also universal councils joined to him. Finally, how can a council remove a heretical

pope? Sieben has provided the historical foundation; dogmatic theologians must evaluate the data and answer the remaining questions.

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Good and Evil Actions: A Journey through Saint Thomas Aquinas. By STEVEN JENSEN. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010. Pp. 324. $35.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8132-1727-7.

Steven Jensen explores issues central to the contemporary debate about the proper understanding of Thomas Aquinas on the specification of human acts in their interior and exterior dimensions. He divides his work into seven chapters, dealing with human actions, intention, exterior actions, love of others, difficulties, teleology, and moral species.

Human actions, as opposed to acts of a human being, are those actions that are knowingly and willingly performed rather than operations that can be done while unconscious such as circulating blood or growing. Jensen contrasts, in this chapter and throughout the book, two schools of thought in approaching these matters which he calls "physicalism" and "Abelardianism." A physicalist approach regards the exterior act as able to have a moral species simply in virtue of its material properties considered independently and separately from the will of the acting person. By contrast, the Abelardian approach focuses on the intentions of the acting person which alone gives moral character to the exterior action. The latter approach Jensen associates with such authors as Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, as well as Martin Rhonheimer. Steven Long, Jean Porter, and Kevin Flannery are identified as defenders of the physicalist approach . On Jensen's view, both physicalism and Abelardianism capture some element of truth but remain defective.

In treating intention, Jensen distinguishes what he calls "a broad expansive view, a lean view, and a middle view" (45). In the first approach, all foreseen consequences count as intended, in the second approach only those effects of the action that are desired as an end count as intended, and the third view holds that intention includes both the means and the end though disagreements may arise concerning whether any particular effect is intended as a means or an end. Jensen notes the myriad of difficulties and the various senses and meanings of intention which arise in part from conflicting interpretations of Aquinas (in particular, his treatment of self-defense in *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7) but also from rival intuitions about the moral permissibility of particular actions (such as craniotomy).

In the chapter on exterior actions, Jensen highlights the difference between the exterior action as executed and the exterior action as conceived in the mind of the agent. The exterior action as executed receives its moral character from the intentions of the agent. But the intentions of the agent themselves receive moral character from the exterior act as conceived by the agent. Jensen then considers what it is that specifies the exterior act as conceived. "[T]he exterior action has an order or direction to some natural form, abstracted from its moral character" (78). This order can arise from nature, from a further intention, or from reason, and Jensen thinks that primarily reason gives order to exterior actions as conceived. Reason in turn is not merely active and constructive but also must act in accordance with the realities, including causal links, that constrain the possibilities of human behavior. One cannot travel from Seattle to New York by means of eating popcorn. Jensen writes also that there is a difference between the order that a conceived action in fact has and the order that the action should have. When these two orders are in conflict, then the action is evil.

The order of love, the subject of chapter 4, is the order that an action should have, and so actions that are incompatible with this order are morally wrong. The love of friendship seeks the good of the beloved for the beloved's own sake and refuses to use anyone for the sake of any further end. By contrast, the love of cupidity loves an object but not for the object's sake, as the man who loves wine loves wine for the sake of his drinking it. Proportionalism, on Jensen's view, attempts to justify making use of other people and fails to love them with the love of friendship but at best loves them with the love of cupidity. We ought to love the chief parts of the common good, especially the innocent, so there is never a justification for killing innocent human beings. This love of the common good justifies punishment whereby a disorder introduced by the wrongdoer in the community is rectified and the common good is vindicated and defended.

Before considering the order of reason in greater detail, in chapter 5 Jensen addresses various difficulties including the question of who is innocent, divine commands to kill the innocent, whether evil actions can become good, and what constitutes "fitting material" for a particular action. This chapter also addresses, as did some earlier chapters, concrete issues in medical ethics such as craniotomy, hysterectomy, palliative sedation, various treatments for ectopic pregnancy, the trolley case, and self-defense. In this section, as in others, Jensen engages important contributions made to the debate by William E. May, Stephen Long, Kevin Flannery, Elizabeth Anscombe, and others.

Chapter 6 takes up the subject of teleology which sets the standard to which human actions must conform if they are to be good. The teleology of sexuality is ordering to new human life. The teleology of speech acts is ordering to truth. All human actions, either directly or indirectly, should be directed to the common good, and the love of self, neighbor, and God. Actions that do not accord with this teleological ordering are morally impermissible.

The final chapter treats the issue of moral species. Jensen observes that Aquinas distinguishes moral actions that are evil in their species from those that

are not evil in species, and he notes that Thomas holds that moral norms forbid the former kind of actions (murder, adultery, theft, false witness, idolatry). Contrary to proportionalist claims, Jensen points out that the moral norms forbidding these actions are not mere tautologies. "You shall not murder" does not simply mean, "You shall not unjustly kill," and "You shall not commit adultery" does not only mean, "You shall not have unjust sexual intercourse."

The subjects taken up in this work are of great importance, and Jensen has offered a broad and comprehensive treatment of major issues discussed by Thomistic scholars over the last forty years. He helpfully and carefully notes how words like "intention" have one meaning in contemporary Anglo-American debate, but a different sense in the work of Aquinas. Against a Kantian perspective that the will alone matters, Jensen highlights that the performance of the exterior act is itself morally relevant. He also helpfully highlights that circumstances can give species to an action even when the circumstance is not itself intended. For example, when a chalice is stolen it is a sacrilege even if the thief did not take the cup precisely on account of its being a blessed vessel. He rightly focuses on the centrality of love to Thomistic ethics. Most importantly, his highlighting of the importance of the distinction between exterior acts as conceived and exterior acts as performed helps to unravel some of the tensions and ambiguities that have been hampering the discussion.

I think that the work could be improved through a reorganization of its contents. Certain topics, such as craniotomy, appear again and again in various chapters and often the discussion of the topic in a later chapter repeats without much development what was said in an earlier chapter. The overall readability of the book might have been helped by a less dialectical structure that would avoid returning to and going over the same topic several times in different chapters. The work could also be improved by a more sustained and focused attention on Jensen's interlocutors. In particular, at various points, the work of John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle on the topics in question could have been dealt with in a more precise and generous manner. Similarly, "proportionalism" is treated as if it were all of a piece without making explicit what I take to be significant differences in the views of say, Peter Knauer and Richard McCormick. Of course, the book is not intended as an analysis of the nuances of proportionalism, yet Jensen might have found a better proportionalist target in the late Louvain theologian Louis Janssens, who attempted to use the texts of Thomas to justify proportionalism. At this point in the discussion of moral theology, I also wonder whether proportionalism is much of a live option or whether the view has been so thoroughly discredited and rejected (outside of some retired professors) that it no longer merits sustained attention.

Nevertheless, Jensen's book makes an important contribution to a debate that surely will continue for some time. I wonder if it might be the case that the texts of Thomas dealing with these matters do not lend themselves to answering the questions that are being posed. I do think, and Jensen shows, that the texts of Aquinas, cannot support proportionalism. But in terms of adjudicating between the views of Rhonheimer, Brock, Long, Flannery, and Finnis on the specification

of the object of the human act, I wonder if the texts of Aquinas are open, legitimately open, to a variety of plausible interpretations which—though incompatible with each other—are reasonably credible readings of the Angelic Doctor.

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The Turn to Transcendence: The Role of Religion in the Twenty-First Century. By GLENN OLSEN. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010. Pp. 404. $50.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-8132-1740-6.

Scholarly analysis of the nature and origin of modernity has exploded in recent years with a vast array of works devoted to unpacking the intellectual genealogy of how we got to where we are now. One of the common themes that has emerged from much of the best Christian theological analysis of modernity is that the putative "neutrality" of secular Liberalism toward all metaphysical and theological claims is deeply problematic. From John Milbank to David Schindler to Charles Taylor, the pretensions of modern secularity to metaphysical and theological neutrality are exposed as a colossal ruse, meant to mask, under such code words as "diversity" and "inclusiveness" and "pluralism," a deep commitment to a set of metaphysical/theological values that are directly opposed to the Christian world view. Furthermore, the so-called neutrality of modern secularity toward metaphysical claims is an absolutely essential aspect of the Liberal project, since to admit that it does, indeed, contain metaphysical/theological entailments undercuts the very foundations of its historical justification as the preferred political arrangement for a pluralistic world. Thus, and by extension, the contemporary scholarship devoted to exposing the falsity of these pretensions is some of the most important Christian intellectual work being carried out today.

Glenn Olsen's new book on this topic fits nicely into this genre. Olsen is a historian, and a good one, and the text is a vast labyrinth of thickly descriptive expositions of an amazingly wide collection of thinkers. But Olsen is not content simply to exposit the thought of others, and he moves easily from exposition to analysis to application in a deft and masterful manner. The reader is often left rather breathless at the sheer scope of Olsen's ownership of the sources that he has marshaled to make his argument. And as befits the historical approach he adopts, the analysis of modernity emerges out of the dialectical interplay of competing ideas, some approved of, some rejected, some left hanging suspended,

but always with an eye toward the main line of his argument. For impatient readers this can be daunting as one must walk Olsen's path with him, drinking deeply from the authors he discusses, and waiting for the argument to emerge from the organic development of competing ideas held in tension. But it is a walk well worth taking.

The main theme of Olsen's text is that human beings are constitutively oriented toward some kind of Transcendence and, therefore, that all cultures too instinctively seek justification and grounding in a Transcendent reference point. All cultures seek this constitutive grounding in Transcendence and encode this foundation in all of the embodied institutions, myths, rituals, codes, and moral customs of society. Olsen does not attempt to "prove" through philosophical, theological, or scientific analysis that human beings have such an orientation. Rather, as a historian, he allows the evidence for the universal quest for Transcendence that one finds in all cultures to speak for itself as a powerful testimony to the existential impossibility of avoiding the question. What becomes clear in his analysis is that it is only a deeply ingrained modern prejudice against theological and metaphysical claims that can account for modernity's continuing insistence upon the unimportance of such issues for a truly modern, Liberal democracy. Indeed, the "Big Lie" inherent in the modern project is that the question of society's relationship to Transcendence is not only irrelevant, but dangerous, since it raises a series of questions that cannot be resolved in a universally agreeable fashion by the Esperanto of secular, technocratic reason. As Olsen shows, this is a dangerous and naïve conceit, since the question of Transcendence is unavoidable and thus to ignore it is to court disaster; nature abhors a vacuum and so the issue is never whether or not we will have culturally sanctioned notions of Transcendence, but rather what the quality of those notions will be. To ignore them only encourages a kind of vulgarian, falsely egalitarian, democracy of ideas that will lead to a nation of competing cracker-barrel philosophies that render any notion of genuine culture otiose.

Olsen unpacks this argument around an analysis of three fundamental premises. First, he affirms that the individual and the communitarian go hand in hand but in a fashion that allows the individual to flourish precisely as a member of a community. This is directly contrary to the modern notion that communities are voluntarist constructs, that society is a mere aggregate of loosely associated individuals. Second, ideas of secular progress continue to animate postmodernity. Olsen refers to this as the "Whig narrative" that views history as a steady progression toward Liberal secularity. Third, modernity is premised on the notion that all politics must be antiutopian since all utopianisms are inherently intolerant and tend toward fascistic resolutions of social problems.

With regard to the first premise, Olsen notes that people still want to live in community with an overarching sense of something that transcends the self. But in an era of the disestablishment of religion and the impersonal secular state, a formally empty notion of individual choice pushes to the front. He reminds us that America began as a godly commonwealth but that this notion gradually died

as America became increasingly fixated on a secular notion of liberty and individualist autonomy. Thus, where there was originally a cultural center and shared common ends oriented around a notion of theistic Transcendence, there is now simply raw, individual "choice" and an empty notion of Transcendence.

For Olsen, this raises the question of the relationship between the universal and the particular. Modernity got rid of the universalism of the Church and replaced it with the universalism of Enlightenment reason: Liberalism. But this tended in practice to nationalism and colonialism as one simply universalized one's own culture (e.g., France) and then tried to make this sit (uneasily) with notions of tolerance and pluralism. Modernity is thus characterized as a kind of simulacrum of the universalism of the Church, replacing the Christian notion of Transcendence and its relationship to the social order with the empty universalism of capitalist "liberty."

The formally empty notions of freedom that animate modernity's universalism raise a series of troubling questions. Can a secular ethos provide a cultural "center" oriented around shared aims? Can "individual choice" alone do this? And can nation-states assimilate traditional religious people into this anomic vision without simply asking them to give up their own vision? If not, will this not simply create simply an aggressively secular dogmatism that replaces the old Christian one without the added benefit of providing a true center? And without true metaphysical warrant—a rational foundation in a sense of Transcendence and morality—how does a secular state avoid an even worse fideistic authoritarianism? And does not the glue that holds these nations together end up being a simple shared hatred for a common foe which is why the rise of the modern nation-state, justified in its inception as an attempt to guarantee the peace, ended up creating the most destructive wars the world has ever seen? And can multiculturalism as an ideology really do the trick? Is it not ultimately an empty attempt to make disparate cultures coexist at all costs, an approach that rarely works without simply destroying what is truly unique in those cultures by dissolving them in the acid of Liberalism?

With regard to the second premise, Olsen notes that most contemporary people continue to accept the "Whig Grand Narrative of History," that is, history as a progressive story of increasing liberty which had, initially, a strong sense of Providence, but which has gradually been secularized due to the need to defuse religious intolerance and violence. The Whig version of this modern narrative is decidedly upbeat, with a powerful sense of the successes of modern Anglo-American technological culture. There is precious little in this narrative about the tragic nature of human history or the mysteriousness of human freedom, or of the inherently intractable nature of many social problems. All problems have a solution and usually a technological one. The Whig narrative thus prefers a "metaphysics of clarity" and does not like the messiness of the Christian historical narrative of fall and redemption. Furthermore, insofar as modern culture still buys into this narrative, it is simply untrue to say that we are now in a "postmodern" era. The Western nation-state is still animated by this narrative of progress, no matter what Derrida says.

Unfortunately, as Olsen notes, this essentially anti-Christian narrative is often aided by what he calls "secularization under the cover of religion," as Christian groups, both liberal and conservative, redefine the Christian faith under the rubric of liberty and "family values," conforming the gospel to the ethos of American, middle-class, capitalist individualism. The "city set on a hill" has morphed into the gospel of wealth. This trend takes on a leftist patina among liberal Christians where the social gospel is reduced to an ever-more strident advocacy for statist solutions to social problems, coupled with a revolutionary redefinition of human sexuality along largely secularist lines.

Finally, Olsen notes that the modern Whig narrative of progress required the creation of the abstraction called the "nation-state" in order to justify its tale of continuing political progress. It was also necessary therefore to caricature the more theologically informed social structures of premodernity as singularly backward and benighted. However, it should be noted that Olsen is not an anarchist who believes that the modern nation-state is a thoroughly illegitimate construction. For example, he is somewhat critical of the attempt by some in the Radical Orthodoxy movement to view the modern state as a unique evil. This ignores the tradition of the theocratic monarchy in the medieval world as a precursor to the idea of the divine right of kings and their role as the total sovereign, which led in turn, rather directly, to the notion of state sovereignty in a more secular garb. The answer does not lie, therefore, in either a romantic return to the past, or in a robust secularism. Rather, the answer lies in a reinvigorated discussion of Transcendence and its relationship to the social order, with an open-minded readiness to adopt structures of governance that more adequately reflect the natural human desire for Transcendence, community, hierarchy, aristocracy, and moral authority. This is indeed a daunting task, and given our current cultural climate of runaway egalitarian populism, Olsen is well aware of the obstacles such a dialogue faces.

The third premise, concerning the danger of utopianism, would require far too detailed an analysis here to do it justice. But based on what has already been pointed out with regard to the first and second premises, suffice it to say that all cultures, even modern, secular, Liberal cultures, embody in various ways a view of the proper ends of human nature, the nature of the good, and the meaning of history. Thus, it is simply naïve to say that a belief in the ultimate resolution of the most pandemic human problems is any more dangerous than a cynical pessimism that regards human misery as a natural human condition to be managed by elitist technocrats. Indeed, it is one of the marks of the constitutive human orientation to the Transcendent that human beings regard the common misery of our race as a disfigurement to be overcome, rather than as a fate to be passively endured in nihilistic resignation.

As I said at the outset, this is a richly textured text full of wisdom and insight on a vast range of issues. No single review can do justice to the plenary scope of its vision. I can only hope that I have captured something of that wisdom in this review. It is a text well worth the effort and should be read by anyone with an

interest in the nature of modernity and its implications for the role of religion in the twenty-first century.

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Christians as Political Animals: Taking the Measure of Modernity and Modern Democracy. By MARC GUERRA. Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2010. Pp. 216. $26.95 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-933859-92-7.

In his engaging and thought-provoking study, Marc Guerra asks Christian citizens of liberal democracies to reflect on the political implications of their faith. Many contemporary Christian political thinkers have argued that the Christian faith finds its only legitimate political expression in liberal democracy. Taking a stand athwart this trend, Guerra argues that Christians need to reflect perennially on the relationship of their religion to political order. Christ's teaching to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's implicitly points to the legitimacy of political life, yet leaves open the precise relationship between religion and politics among his followers. Guerra argues that Christianity is a transpolitical faith, and can make its home in a variety of political communities. Trying to settle a question that must remain open is bad for both Christianity and liberal democracy.

The argument begins with an examination of Leo Strauss, who Guerra claims did more than any other twentieth-century thinker to reinvigorate interest in the theologico-political question (15). Strauss famously believed that the West was threatened by a loss of purpose stemming from a nihilism that is attendant on modern rationalism. He sought both to trace the origins of this loss and to seek an alternative. For Strauss, the fundamental question is whether human beings can acquire knowledge of the good by the unaided effort of their natural powers, or whether they are dependent for that knowledge on divine revelation (17). For Strauss, modernity's pursuit of absolute certainty and its efforts to overcome biblical faith sowed the seeds for the self-destruction of reason and the eventual emergence of radical historicism or nihilism (21). Turning to classical and medieval thinkers to work out of this crisis, Strauss concluded that a life of philosophical inquiry is at odds with both a life of faith and a life of moral and political virtue (28). People have to live in society because every human act and speech is directed to another. This means that people are not free to act in any way they see fit; nature imposes discernable limits on our freedom that make society both necessary and elevated (30). Yet a philosopher like Socrates judged the right ordering of the soul not on the basis of justice and nobility but on the

ground of man's perfection as a rational being (31). For Strauss the Socratic way of life reveals the incompleteness of the moral-political horizon (32). At the same time, revelation remains for Strauss an unproven possibility. Man needs to know the whole in order to be assured that he is acting morally. Revelation gives him a glimpse into this whole and a faith that it grounds his morality. However, the possibility of revelation can be neither proven nor disproven (39), and so a life of faith and a life of inquiry are radically opposed.

Guerra turns to James Schall to challenge Strauss's account of the conflict between faith and reason. Schall argues that Strauss fails to appreciate Catholicism, a faith open to reason (43). Schall argues that the way the New Testament presents political life suggests that it is largely capable of being understood on its own terms (45). Political philosophy helps reveal the nature of human being and human excellence. Yet the account of man it brings into focus is deficient. Justice is the political virtue. Yet on its own terms, political philosophy cannot know whether justice exists by nature or by convention. Christianity addresses reason's need for answers to its deepest practical questions by revealing that Christ is the Logos through whom the world is created. In this way, human reason is revealed as both capacious and limited. Following John Paul II, Schall believes Catholic philosophy has two aspects. The first is a subjective aspect: faith purifies reason. In other words, faith collaborates with reason's own nature and assists reason in its own virtue. Second, revelation also proposes truths that reason might never have discovered, even though they are not inaccessible in reason. Philosophy should be drawn to reflect on these truths. "The universe cannot be rationally proven to be a place where God and man can be friends or where all men can be friends in the beatific vision. However, Roman Catholic political philosophy is capable of showing that these claims offer internally consistent, reasonable solutions to puzzles that political philosophy is incapable of solving on its own terms" (54-55).

Guerra's next chapter focuses on the political thought of Ernest Fortin. Fortin calls Christianity's encounter with classical philosophy a "refounding," achieved above all by Augustine. Augustine viewed philosophic reason as being subsumed into a larger whole brought into sharper focus by Christian revelation. For Fortin, the philosophical problem with Augustine's account is that it requires faith in unproved revelation, an act "philosophers are by definition reluctant to make" (94). By contrast, Aquinas conceived of philosophy and theology as "complete, independent sciences within their own respective orders" (95). Aquinas affirmed the intelligibility of nature and nature's total dependence on God. However, Fortin thinks that Aquinas gave greater emphasis to God's will than God's intellect, making philosophy more doctrinaire than it was in classical thought. For Fortin the philosophic mind is determined to withhold judgment on any issue for which human reason alone is unable to arrive at a definitive conclusion (101). Guerra continues, "Since the possibility of Biblical revelation cannot be proved or disproved by unaided reason, Fortin argues, the Socratic philosopher must recognize that the life of Biblical faith remains a serious, although obviously not chosen, alternative to the philosophic life. At the same

time, Fortin insists that the believer must recognize that however reasonable his account of the whole may be, it ultimately requires an act of faith" (101).

In the next chapter, Guerra turns to his own account of the political implications of the thought of Augustine and Aquinas. These thinkers represent "the two poles of Christian citizenship." "Despite their different and at times conflicting approaches, Augustine and Aquinas reveal the full range of concerns that inform Christianity's response to the theologico-political question. Awareness of these concerns can help Christian thinkers to understand why their religion can only forge a prudential accommodation with the modern liberal regime" (148). Augustine's account of the place of charity in the political life of a Christian reformulates the way Christians relate to politics. While Christians are on pilgrimage to the City of God, they should engage the goods of political life as wayfarers without much hope for substantive political reform. By contrast, Aquinas's emphasis is more on the common good and his account of the natural-law basis for political life legitimizes and elevates politics.

Guerra concludes by arguing that Christians ought to take up a new orientation to liberal democracy. Liberal democratic citizens think of themselves as individuals. Individuals as such believe themselves to be free from all familial, social, political, and religious ties. In this understanding, human actions are interpreted as matters of consent, and individual choice is the sole source of legitimacy. This fosters a propensity to feel detachment from political society. Thus Guerra believes that philosophical liberalism tends to dissolve political life into the subpolitical realms of the 'individual' and 'society' (161). Therefore, philosophical liberalism erodes the humanizing—because limiting—effects of political life in favor of a retreat into either individual freedom unconstrained by the common weal or an abstract love of humanity that places few demands on our hearts and minds (161).

In this situation, people still live as political and religious beings. "Yet given liberal democracy's tendency to foster a view of the artificial or constructed character of human life, men currently find it difficult to understand, let alone explain, the meaning of the kinds of lives they naturally desire to live" (156). At the same time, Catholic social thought's adoption of the language of individual rights and freedom also creates confusion for believers. Guerra argues that Catholic social thought tries to cobble together premodern Christian teachings with modern and late-modern moral and political doctrines. He argues, "As a result of this eclecticism, many of its teachings are theoretically incoherent." All too often, it uses language that "looks in two different directions at once: that of rights or freedom on the one hand, and of virtue, character formation, and the common good on the other" (140). Guerra continues, "Catholic social thought . . . clings to the untenable position that one can affirm (along with modern political philosophy) that we do not live in a naturally ordered universe and still hold a teleological science of man. Consequently, it advances its teachings only by engaging in a massive retreat: hesitant to argue seriously on behalf of Christianity's traditional account of man's place within the created teleological order, Catholic social thought typically lets philosophic modernity set the terms

of the debate in a desperate attempt to show the enduring relevance of Christian thought" (142).

Guerra argues that the task of Christian political thought is not to argue that liberal democracy is the only possible incarnation of the gospel. Rather, Christian political thinkers need to realize that "by its very nature liberal democracy seeks to pit the rights of the sovereign individual against democracy's political need of an ordered liberty under God" (160). So Christian political thinkers must seek to moderate their regimes from the inside, prudently working to curb their tendencies and excesses. "They should remind citizens of liberal democracies that the ever-expanding proclamation of the demands of human rights needs to be moderated by a firm and steady recognition of the moral, political, and spiritual requirements of natural law" (160).

There is much to recommend Guerra's book. It is a lucid, lively, and spirited account that unsettles the typical way Christians view the relationship of their faith to their citizenship. Despite my own admiration for Strauss's contribution to political philosophy, I do wonder whether beginning with Strauss's articulation of the theologico-political problem does full justice to the issues Guerra raises. Strauss collapses the theologico-political problem into the problem of the relationship of faith to reason. These issues overlap, but also remain distinct. Further, Strauss's idiosyncratic account of the philosopher and his relationship to religion often obscures the way the theologico-political question actually arises in practical affairs.

Guerra's discussion of Catholic social thought is powerful. Yet I wonder whether he overlooks some of the democratic political traditions that push back against the philosophical liberalism and individualism he targets. This is clearly a vexed question, but it is not clear that Hamilton, Madison, or Lincoln are straightforward followers of Locke or Hobbes, for example. Pierre Manent, a thinker Guerra admires, sees possibilities in the traditions and practices of Western liberal democracies for mitigating their own excesses. Guerra seems to believe that the task of Christian political thought is to resist the corrosive tendencies of philosophical liberalism and this seems right. Yet given the existence of these other traditions and practices in Western democracies, and given Guerra's observations about the deficient rhetoric of Catholic social thought, I finished the book wondering if part of the Christian task is also to learn about the real demands of democratic citizenship from the best traditions of democracies themselves. This might moderate the kind of rhetoric in Catholic social thought that Guerra criticizes.

These reservations aside, Guerra's book is a welcome and sobering challenge to some of the reigning assumptions among Christians who are trying to think about the relationship between their faith and their political life in late liberal democracies.

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Living the Truth: A Theory of Action. By KLAUS DEMMER. Trans. by BRIAN MCNEIL. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010. Pp. 164. $35.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-1-589-01697-2.

To thine own self be true. Such is the overarching theme of this book, although Demmer does not say it so well as does Shakespeare's Polonius.

To the contrary, although Demmer praises precision and the necessary effort to get down to the details of the concrete situation, his book provides little more than generalities that are often open to multifarious interpretations. One can hardly object to the injunction to do good and avoid evil, but one wishes that a book-length treatment might provide more details about what is good and what is evil.

Of course, Demmer does get more specific than "Do good and avoid evil." Still, in a book on morality, he considers only four specific cases—a doctor providing information to a patient, the seal of confession, celibacy, and poverty—and these but briefly. After reading the whole book, one can reach few conclusions about what Demmer might say concerning particular cases. One can gather, at any rate, that he thinks celibacy is usually unhealthy.

The whole book seems either to be written in code—requiring constant deciphering—or to be written by an author who simply cannot commit himself to anything. Take the following passage: "It is the task of conscience, and the complex actions that it performs, to take the existing empirical realities in their inalienable referential character and fill them with the meaning that it has grasped in such a way that an anthropologically grounded image of *ordo* is generated" (120). What does this mean? My deciphering came up with the following: "Don't expect conscience to tell you what is right and wrong simply by considering the observable characteristics of an action; a difficult act of interpretation—indeed, a creative act of interpretation—is needed before any moral evaluation can be made." But then I could be wrong. After all, we never get an account of "inalienable referential character" or of "an anthropologically grounded image of *ordo*." Nor does it become clear how conscience can fill empirical realities with meaning.

Demmer might defend himself by noting that the book does not concern ethical content but moral methodology. True enough. But moral methodology, like anything else, requires concrete details, details not provided by Demmer. As Demmer himself says, "A person who does not submit to the constraint of concreteness is fleeing from the truth" (109). By this standard, the book is a long and torturous escape flight. Demmer praises natural law, which "resists the tendency to a vagueness that withdraws into unassailable niches" (13). Demmer himself, however, is indeed unassailable. He rests safely behind the ironclad defense of obscurity.

Many passages are especially obscure. Consider the following: "The person is the proleptic outreach of the act of knowing and willing toward Being as the fullness of all its individual aspects" (27). This definition comes shortly after Demmer has criticized Boethius's traditional definition as being overly abstract.

Clearly, Demmer does not offer great improvements. He provides only hints as to what a proleptic outreach might be, and he has no analysis of knowing and willing, or any explanation of how to reach all the individual aspects of being with a capital "B." He does not even acknowledge that defining a person as a kind of activity might be problematic.

So much for the style of the book. What of its content? As already mentioned, living the truth means being true to oneself. In this life journey of honesty, however, many pitfalls present themselves, chief among which is a kind of moral rigorism or legalism, which Demmer thinks—so it seems—most of the Catholic intellectual tradition has fallen into, at least since St. Thomas Aquinas.

This rigorism is itself a symptom of cowardice. The spiritual coward is unwilling to take risks and attempts to evade the burdens of life, so he seeks refuge in moral norms, from which he hopes to attain certainty. Following rules is comforting to him.

He is, however, living a lie. Universal norms can never give us absolute certainty in the concrete situation. Of course, norms have their value. They are a kind of pithy summary of the life-wisdom of previous generations. Like any summary, however, they leave out details, and they cannot possibly address every aspect of the new situations that individuals confront in their lives.

Ethical knowledge requires not merely universal norms. More importantly, it demands "a non-thematic, pre-conceptual act of knowing in which the fullness of all individual aspects is grasped in a confused manner" (28). It demands the "hard task of weighing things up," which means looking beyond the object of an action to its consequences. The object does not tell us all we need to know about the morality of an action; it must itself be given meaning by being taken up in the agent's *finis operantis*.

Demmer is correct, of course. A certain kind of spiritual self-righteousness takes satisfaction in following rules. Saint Paul had little time for such nonsense. For Demmer, the problem is that the spiritual coward takes what is only a guiding principle, a kind of rule of thumb, and turns it into an absolute norm, in order to give himself the comfort of certainty. For St. Paul, the problem is not certainty but the spirit with which the laws are kept. Are the laws kept from the individual's own resources or from the grace and mercy of God?

Demmer does speak of the mercy of God, but his whole system seems to encourage a grandiose self-made man. We must all bear the burden of determining our own moral judgments by way of a constant review of our own life history. We must determine the purity of our motivations. The list goes on, revealing a kind of navel-gazing that is a symptom of the worst self-righteousness.

Demmer proceeds by introducing, in the first chapter, the importance of this historical soul-searching. Moral theology must operate within one's own personal reflection on God's actions in one's life. In chapter 2 he develops the ideal of the moral personality, someone who is honest with herself and seeks to integrate her freedom, her goals, and the conflicts that she encounters in life. Moral theology must likewise seek this truthful integration. Demmer further

develops these ideas in the final chapter, where he looks at the dangers of untruthfulness. These dangers seem to be especially exemplified in the Church and the magisterium. He also emphasizes the importance of individual conscience, warning against too great a dependence upon ethical norms, cautioning especially against the idea that some actions are wrong in all circumstances. What matters is not so much the individual actions performed as the fundamental decision with which they are performed.

Faith itself is not, according to Demmer, a humble act of submission, a believing in truths unseen. Rather, it is a creative act of interpretation. The community of believers, he says, is a community of interpretation. As usual, Demmer is impossible to pin down on this point, but he seems to be saying that faith is not an acceptance of what is but a construction unique to each person, based upon his self-understanding; faith is an achievement of the knowing subject. Truth is not found in ecclesial loyalty but in freedom of spirit.

Demmer is concerned about the dangers of institutions, particularly the Church. Institutions move slowly; they speak in abstractions; they are the last to bring needed revision; their moral credibility is in inverse proportion to their power; they are likely to emphasize norms, perhaps for the good purpose of certainty but at the expense of spiritual growth. The Church should not be a place where ethical truths come from above; it should be a place of discovery of the truth. The Church will be tempted to overdo directives and give excessive definitions that prove to be a burden. The Church should not present a system of norms but should seek to cut through compulsions that arise from guilt.

Demmer has more to say, but this short survey gives at least a flavor of what to expect.

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CORRECTION

In the July 2011 issue of *The Thomist,* the review by Ian Christopher Levy of Marilyn McCord Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist,* contained two typos, introduced during the process of editing, that led to a misrepresentation of the reviewer's meaning. The review as posted on the *Thomist* website has been corrected. Below are the two pertinent sentences, in their corrected versions.

Page 485, beginning line 10: "It would seem, therefore, that this is an attempt to obviate the outright annihilation of the bread—in which case the *terminus ad quem* of conversion would be nothing, rather than Christ's body—and thereby preserve conversion without positing the continued existence of a common quantified material substratum."

Page 485, beginning line 22: "Many of the principles which the Dominican Angelic Doctor regarded as axiomatic were held up to intense, even withering, scrutiny by the Subtle Doctor of the Franciscan Order."