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LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY: AQUINAS'S FIRST REQUIREMENT OF A JUST WAR

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IN THE OPENING *respondeo* of his "Question on War" (*Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 40, a. 1) Thomas Aquinas famously writes that a war will be just only when it is conducted under the authority of a prince, for a just cause, and with an upright intention. In what follows I examine the first of these three conditions.

The centrality of legitimate authority within Aquinas's doctrine of just war has often been affirmed but its exact contours have rarely been studied. This is due in large measure to the terseness of his account. He leaves key steps in his reasoning unstated, and says little about the underlying textual sources. To fill in these gaps, the present article proposes a close reading of legitimate war-making authority as it appears in Aquinas's "Quaestio de bello." Supplementary reference is made to his short treatise on kingship (*De regno ad regem Cypri*) and to some related passages within his wider corpus of writings. The historical antecedents are likewise considered, Augustine certainly, but also and especially Aquinas's immediate predecessors in just war theory: Pope Innocent IV, the penitential lawyer Raymond of Peñafort, and his glossator William of Rennes.[1] Their more elaborate expositions

[1] For summary presentations on each of these thinkers and their place in the development of just war theory, see the relevant chapters in Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, eds., *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

on legitimate war-making authority open a valuable window on the *status quaestionis* as it stood in Aquinas's day.

Aquinas proposes two arguments why special authority is needed for war-making, one based on the juridical principle "no higher redress" (just war becomes operative only in the absence of established judicial procedures) and the other based on the idea that defense of the common good requires a chain of command with the prince at its head. Both are brief to the extreme, rendering their interpretation difficult and leaving much room for his successors to advance competing views. Organizing my treatment around these two prongs of Aquinas's account, I begin (section I) with an examination of his first argument, treating it in light of its historical antecedents. Then (section II) I consider how he deals with two seeming exceptions to the rule that princes alone may use force, namely, self-defense and tyrannicide. Why effective war-making requires a commander-in-chief—Aquinas's second argument for legitimate authority—is subsequently taken up in section III. As this argument is chiefly about the prince's responsibility to protect the polity from harm, it entails a conception of virtuous leadership, which I discuss in section IV.

Before embarking on this investigation, a few preliminary comments are in order.

First, Aquinas employs several different terms to describe the *auctoritas* which is needed for a just war. In the first article of the "Quaestio de bello" this authority is initially characterized as pertaining to the "prince" (*princeps*).[2] Several lines later it is termed "legitimate" (*legitima*),[3] which suggests how more is at stake than *de facto* possession of power. To be legitimate, princely power must be acquired and exercised in accordance with the rule of law. Finally, in a parallel passage within the same sequence of *quaestiones*, competence to decide on war is attributed to the

[2] "Primo quidem auctoritas principis, cuius mandado bellum est gerendum."

[3] Apropos the condition of right intention: "For it may happen that a war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered illicit through a vile intention." The term *legitima* is borrowed from Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, 22.20 (cited in *STh* II-II, q. 40, a. 1, ad 1): "no one can take to the sword without the command or acquiescence of a superior or legitimate power" (*superiori aut legitima potestate*).

"public" (*publica*) authority.[4] The discourse thereby shifts from the person of the prince to the underlying subject of this competence—the political community—which acts through its leadership to protect the common good.

Second, Aquinas's employment of *princeps* in the plural[5] suggests a remove from the legal theory advocated by Hostiensis and others, who held that war-making authority is *de iure* vested in a single prince, namely, the emperor. Aquinas opts for the competing view, advanced some twenty years earlier by Pope Innocent IV, that war-making authority rightly pertains to a multitude of individual princes.[6] And whereas Aquinas's predecessors generally acknowledged that the popes also possess this war-making competence, on this score he remains silent in the "Quaestio de bello."[7]

Third, whereas the authorization of a prince appeared last on Raymond of Peñafort's earlier list of just-war requirements,[8] Aquinas moves it to the top of his own list, but without stating his rationale for this choice. One interpretation[9] holds that he does

[4] "In order for a war to be just, it must be carried out by authority of the public power [*auctoritate publicae potestatis*], as said above" (*STh* II-II, q. 41, a. 1, ad 3, with reference to q. 40, a. 1). The term "public authority" is expressly used in *De regno* I, c. 7, where Aquinas writes that tyrants may be removed only by *auctoritate publica*, and not by the private presumption of the few.

[5] "Cum autem cura reipublicae commissa sit principibus." Gratian had earlier used the plural *principes* in his famous canon *Quid culpatur* (drawing from *Contra Faustum,* 22.75), subsequently cited by Aquinas in *STh* II-II, q. 40, a. 1, apropos the condition of just cause.

[6] For the general trend in medieval thought toward independent princes with war-making authority, see Gaines Post, "Two Notes on Nationalism in the Middle Ages," *Traditio* 9 (1953): 281-320.

[7] The pope receives no mention in "Quaestio de bello," a. 1. Oblique reference is made to episcopal war-making authority in the objections to article 2, but with no direct comment on this issue in the responses.

[8] *Persona, res, causa, animus,* and *auctoritas* (person, object, cause, state of mind, and authority), as listed in *Summa de casibus poenitentiae*, II, §17; translation in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 134.

[9] See James Turner Johnson, "The Right to Use Armed Force: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and the Common Good," in A. F. Lang, Jr., C. O'Driscoll, and J. Williams, eds., *Just War: The State of the Art* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming 2013). Johnson advances this interpretation of Aquinas as evidence that the U.S. Catholic Bishops in their 1983 pastoral letter *The Challenge of Peace* departed from the traditional teaching when they gave precedence to just cause (putting it before legitimate authority) in their list of just-

so to indicate how the sovereign[10] alone is competent to determine just cause in concrete cases. In this sense legitimate authority stands as a formal precondition of just cause. Alternatively, it could be said that Aquinas places princely authority at the head of his list because it is the most visible mark of a just war. A nominal definition of the subject to be investigated thereby emerges from this first requirement. On this interpretation the authorization of a prince is what distinguishes the phenomenon termed "war" from the other manifestations of violence—brawling (*rixa*), civil insurrection (*seditio*), and the like—that Aquinas intends to examine in the same sequence of questions.

I. The First Argument: No Higher Redress[11]

I respond that in order for a war to be just, three things are required. First, the authority of the prince by whose mandate the war is to be waged. It is not the business of a private individual to resort to war, because he can pursue his right before the judgment of his superior.[12]

This argument is framed normatively around the idea of supreme temporal jurisdiction. It builds on the premise that war-making will be ruled out as a procedure for achieving justice between two parties whenever *de iure* their dispute can be adjudicated by a superior with authority over them both. For this reason (second

war requirements.

[10] "Sovereign" is the term that Johnson employs to render Aquinas's *princeps*, under the rationale that "in contemporaneous English and French the word 'sovereign'/*souverain* was already being used" to indicate "a temporal ruler with no temporal superior" (ibid., first note). This translation should in my opinion be avoided, as it removes an ambiguity from the text that was later astutely noticed by Cajetan (see note 58 below).

[11] "Non est recursus ad superiorem" (no available recourse to a superior) to quote from a formula that appears in Aquinas's II *Sent*., d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 (Pierre Mandonnet, ed. [Paris: Lethielleux, 1929], 1130).

[12] *STh* II-II, q. 40, a. 1: "Respondeo dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquod bellum sit iustum, tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, auctoritas principis, cuius mandato bellum est gerendum. Non enim pertinent ad personam privatam bellum movere, quia potest ius suum in iudicio superioris prosequi."

premise), private individuals are prohibited from waging war.[13] Hence the conclusion: solely those who have no temporal superior—namely, princes—are permitted to initiate war.

This was not an original argument in Aquinas's day. His brief statement is meant to sum up a reasoning that had been more amply developed by his predecessors. They had sought to explain why the medieval feud (*faida*)—a practice whereby private individuals had employed violence to avenge perceived wrongs—should no longer be allowed.[14] Within the highly decentralized political culture of the early Middle Ages, procedures of justice were regularly exercised by units well below the level of the polity. Heads of clans and feudal lords were entitled, even expected, to enforce punishments for violations of justice. Far from being an extralegal procedure this practice was itself an integral part of the recognized political order. As such, the feud was not only tolerated, but was also deemed a matter of honor; this was at once a moral and legal obligation that served to maintain justice and equilibrium in society.[15] Moreover, in this setting, the distinction between internal and external, public and private violence had little or no bearing. These multifaceted forms of violence were all grouped together under the Germanic term *guerra* (a throwing into confusion, a violent confrontation, a

[13] The text includes no mention of intermediate authorities; while their resort to the sword seems excluded by the conclusion, this implication is not explicitly drawn out by Aquinas, hence the ambiguity alluded to above (n. 10).

[14] The nature and scope of the medieval feud remains a much-debated topic among medieval historians. The starting point for this literature remains Otto Brunner, *Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria* (original German edition 1939), trans. H. Kaminsky and J. Van Horn Melton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); see also Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, vol. 2, trans. L. A. Manyon (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962).

[15] For an overview of this practice, see Peter Haggenmacher, *Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983), 76-82. The author points out how the feud should be distinguished from the related practice of vendetta (or blood vengeance). The latter was meant to address the most serious of crimes, murder in particular, and could be resorted to by any family member of the victim. The former practice, by contrast, could be undertaken only by the titled nobility and could be directed against a broad range of crimes.

bloody imbroglio) from which, from the root *wirren*, our English term *war* derives.[16]

Already in the eighth and ninth centuries, a concerted attempt at establishing a monopoly over violence was initiated by the emperor Charlemagne. Despite some success, decentralized feudal violence again became the norm in the century that followed, leading the Church to promote its own solution through the Peace of God movement beginning in the late tenth century.[17] As the Middle Ages progressed, the overall trend was to replace this feudal justice with centralized institutions by which violations of rights could be dealt with according to regular and impartial procedures.

From the point of view of theory, a central point of crystallization was Gratian's canon *Quid culpatur*. Citing Augustine's *Contra Faustum* (22.75), to the effect that "this natural order which seeks the peace of mankind ordains that the authority and resolve to undertake war lies with princes [*principes*],"[18] and using *bellum* in the broad sense mentioned above, Gratian removed Augustine's phrase from its original context where it functioned as a subordinate part of an argument about the unconditional obedience due to divine commands. Now treated on its own terms as the centerpiece of a normative assessment of the use of force by Christians,[19] Gratian gave legitimate authority a prominence that it did not have within the writings of Augustine. Its special status within the theory of *bellum iustum* was summed up by a much-cited gloss on *Quid*

[16] See ibid., 81-82. *Guerra* was also imported into Latin (Aquinas employs it for instance in his commentary on the Book of Job), where it functioned as an equivalent of *bellum*. The latter was the term favored by theorists (lawyers, theologians, etc.) while the former was the term of more common usage.

[17] For a good discussion of Charlemagne's monopolizing initiatives as reflected in his capitularies, and the subsequent Peace of God movement, see Warren C. Brown, *Violence in Medieval Europe* (Harlow, Scotland: Pearson Education Limited, 2011).

[18] Gratian, *Decretum*, part II, causa 23, question 1, canon 4 (in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 109); cited by Aquinas *STh* II-II, q. 40, a. 1 (in the passage on just cause).

[19] See the editors' introduction to "Gratian and the Decretists," in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 107.

culpatur which succinctly stated that "[n]o one . . . may go to war without the authorization of a prince [*auctoritate principis*]."[20]

As one reads Gratian's *causa* 23, it becomes clear that appeal was made to the authority condition not so much for forcible defensive action (which could be waged even by private individuals),[21] but rather for any armed initiative that has punishment for its aim. Indeed, "the basic distinction between merely defensive and full-fledged offensive war conditions the overall structure of causa 23."[22] The passages that most clearly emphasize the requirement of princely authority are those that seek to explain why the gospel prohibition against the spilling of blood, as voiced in Matthew 26:52 ("Put your sword back into its sheath, for all who take the sword will perish by the sword"), does not apply to the corporal punishments that public officials direct against wrongdoers. Thus in the influential glosses to canon 36 (*Ille gladium accipit*, "Who should be said to resort to the sword?") and canon 47 (*Ea vindicta*, "By the sanctioning of evildoers the almighty God is pleased") the Decretists discussed war by reference to three terms that had previously been only loosely connected: *vindicta* (punishment), *potestas gladii* (power of the sword), and *princeps* (the prince).[23] On the one hand, these terms functioned as enabling conditions that explained how war could be exercised by a Christian; on the other hand, they indicated how persons without the needed competence (primary or delegated) are prohibited from engagement in war.

Reflecting on the wars (*guerras*)[24] waged among princes and knights (*principes vel milites)*, Raymond of Peñafort observed that the required authority can assume two forms, spiritual and secular. When wars are fought for the faith (*pugnatur pro fide*), an authorization of the Church (*auctoritate Ecclesiae*) will be needed;

[20] English translation of the gloss (and reference to the Latin text) may be found in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 112.

[21] See the gloss *Qui repellere possunt* (Resist injury), in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 109-11.

[22] Ibid., 105.

[23] See Haggenmacher, *Grotius*, 97.

[24] Raymond uses *guerra* and *bellum* as synonyms.

in other sorts of wars the authorization of a temporal prince (*auctoritate principis*) will ordinarily suffice. Later in the same paragraph, Raymond clarifies that the authority condition—whether of the prince or of the Church—does not apply to all just wars regardless of their kind. Indeed, when a force is used by private individuals for the protection of self, recovery of property, or defense of the fatherland (*defensione patriae*) no special authorization is needed, "as *de iure* it is permitted for anyone to repel force with force,"[25] provided of course that this defense is undertaken in the heat of the moment and with due moderation. By contrast, using force *to punish* wrongdoers[26] requires the authorization of a superior.

In manuscripts and later print editions, Raymond's penitential account of just war usually appeared alongside the commentary (*Apparatus ad Summam Raymundi*) that had been written in the mid-thirteenth century by his Dominican confrère William of Rennes, who accorded a prominent place to the problem of legitimate authority.[27] Well acquainted with the *Summa de casibus poenitentiae*, it is possible that Thomas Aquinas read this work in the company of William's commentary. At the very least, this commentary opens a window on discussions then underway within the Dominican milieu regarding just war. William discussed in greater detail than his predecessors what sort of agents might be competent to wield the sword of war. In so doing he stated emphatically that *de iure* the mandate to wage war does not pertain to all princes whatsoever: only those having no superior, such as a king or emperor, can provide the needed

[25] *Summa de casibus poenitentiae*, II, §17 (in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 139).

[26] "iustu bellum exercet cotra nocentes" (just war is directed against the guilty [ibid.]).

[27] See Ludwik Ehrlich, "Guillaume de Rennes et les origines de la science du droit de la guerre," in *Mélanges en l'honneur de Gilbert Gidel* (Paris: Librairie Sirey, 1961), 215-27. William's *Apparatus* has sometimes been erroneously attributed to John of Freiburg. This error is explained by the fact that both the *Summa de casibus* and its gloss had long since fallen into disuse when they were first edited in print on the occasion of Raymond's canonization in 1601. This confusion was definitely cleared up by 1715.

authorization.[28] *De facto*, however, this authority could be delegated downward, for a prince, he wrote, "may also grant to his subordinates the authorization to wage war against a foreign prince as well as against his subjects, if there is a just cause and it seems to be expedient."[29]

William took care to note that there are certain limits to be placed on the exercise of war against subordinates. Even when he stands under no higher authority a prince must nevertheless accord his internal opponents the right to a trial in the event of their alleged wrongdoing; only when they resist this procedure (or its outcome) can he be justified in using force against them. By the same token, should a count have a grievance against the king, he could, through the court of his peers (*pares curiae*) ask for a hearing before the king. In the event that this request was refused, the count is entitled to resist by force of arms, yet within the bounds of strict self-defense. A broader right of resistance is permitted only after appeal has been made to the pope, who, upon issuing a decree of excommunication, could permit the count to raise arms against his superior. The exercise of supreme temporal authority *ad intra* is accordingly, on William's account, far from being absolute; it is subject to a set of feudal checks and balances.

William listed no parallel limitations a propos external war. In opposition to the exponents of Roman law, the legists, who had maintained the primacy of the emperor in declarations of war, William emphasized that the emperor as such enjoys no special status within this domain: "when a king has a [just] cause of war against the emperor, or vice versa . . . neither one nor the other is obliged to seek justice by judicial means, since neither of them

[28] "Princeps qui nullum habet superiorem, sive sit Rex sive Imperator, auctoritate propria si iusta causa subsit, potest mouere bellum" (in *Summa de casibus poenitentiae*, II, §17). The idea of "a prince having no superior" was borrowed from a formula which had been introduced in the decretal *Per venerabilem* (Gregorius IX, *Decretales* IV, 17, 13), where Pope Innocent III spoke of a "princeps superiorem in temporalibus non recognoscens." William innovated by applying this formula to the problem of war.

[29] In *Summa de casibus poenitentiae*, II, §17 (in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 135).

has a superior."[30] Princes without a superior are thus all on an equal footing, and could, in the presence of a just cause, resort to force against their peers. Such a resort could surpass the strict limits of self-defense, of which even private individuals could avail themselves without special authorization from above.

William nonetheless added a restriction. In the event that an offending prince offers suitable satisfaction for his commission of a wrong, the counter-party would sin if he spurns this offer and thereby proceeds to war. This was an expression of what Raymond and other medieval lawyers termed *necessitas*.[31] In contrast to the domestic sphere, where expressions of regret and offers of restitution may result in the reduction of a sentence but ordinarily do not excuse the criminal from punishment altogether, in the sphere of war, by reason of its wider depredations, an offending prince's acquiescence to legitimate demands and his offers of restitution including payment of damages were considered by William sufficient to nullify any ground for resort to war. Refusal to accept an offer made in good faith—in line with the reasonable judgment of good men[32]—would show that in going to war the prince in question did not fulfill the condition of necessity. To prosecute war in its absence showed his wrongful intention, even though he might be in possession of a just cause.

Turning now to Innocent IV, whose authoritative formulation was surely known to Aquinas, we can note how this jurist-pope took care to differentiate *bellum* from the lessor forms of violence that Gratian and Raymond had earlier placed under this heading. Faithful to the terminology of the ancient Roman jurisconsults, Innocent maintained that force employed in self-defense does not count as an instance of *war*.[33] Nor does *war* suitably describe a lord's application of coercive measures against his recalcitrant

[30] Ibid. (in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 137).

[31] Apropos the requirement of just cause Raymond (*Summa de casibus poenitentiae*, II, §17 [in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 134]) states that a war should be fought only "out of necessity" (*propter necessitate pugnetur*).

[32] "Si iniuriator offerret ei debitam satisfactionem ad arbitrium bonorum virorum . . .".

[33] See "On the Restitution of Spoils," cited in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 150.

subjects. This use of force *ad intra* Innocent preferred to designate an "execution of jurisdiction"[34] ("law enforcement" as would be said today). In either case the requirement of authority was set nowhere so high as in the special domain of war. Whereas in the heat of the moment anyone is permitted to defend himself from attack without special authorization from his superior, and while intermediate princes could enforce the law against criminals under their jurisdiction, only a *princeps qui superiorem non habet* is entitled to wage war.[35] He alone has license to punish members of another polity for their wrongdoing against his own.[36] War, on this understanding, has an offensive character. Initiated against adversaries *ad extra* it brings into play a set of juridical effects that do not apply within the domestic setting.

While Aquinas's account is brief to the extreme, we can detect in it elements that are borrowed from Innocent IV. The Angelic Doctor's conceptualization of war as a violation of peace between independent polities borrows from Pope Innocent's notion that war is qualitatively different from either private self-defense or internal policing.[37] Both authors supposed (albeit Innocent more explicitly than Aquinas) that war-making authority is the prerogative not of one but of several independent princes. And both viewed this arrangement as beneficial insofar as it enables each individual prince to ensure the common good of the polity under his care.

II. Exceptions to the Authority Requirement? Self-defense and Tyrannicide

From the prominence accorded to princely authority within Aquinas's account of just war, it should not be inferred that he

[34] "[I]n such cases it is not properly called 'war' (*bellum*), but rather an 'execution of jurisdiction,' or 'justice'" (ibid. [in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 151]).

[35] "War properly speaking can only be declared by a prince who does not have a superior" (ibid.).

[36] "He [the prince] can declare war against those who would not be liable to an execution of jurisdiction, for example against those who fall under the rule of some other prince" (ibid).

[37] See Gregory M. Reichberg, "Aquinas' Moral Typology of Peace and War," *Review of Metaphysics* 64 (2011): 467-87.

views this requirement as an unconditional absolute. The exercise of self-defense by private individuals is accorded a special status; it is understood that recourse to the protection of a superior is ordinarily impossible in the heat of an unforeseen attack. Repelling an attack can be just, provided it is a necessary and proportionate response to unjustified violence; but this response Aquinas terms "self-defense" (*se defendit*) not "war." In this respect he follows the newly introduced nomenclature of Innocent IV, rather than the older wording of his confrère Raymond, who had placed the application of private force for defensive ends under the heading of *bellum*.[38] Aquinas reinforces this separation when he examines individual self-defense and war in two quite different sections of the *Secunda Secundae*, apropos justice (q. 64, a. 7, on self-defense) and charity (q. 40, on war). In this respect his treatment reflects the ancient Roman division between that branch of law (*ius*) which regulates private relations, and another which applies to the public sphere of inter-state relations.[39] Self-defense was situated in the first while war was typically held to be a concern of the latter.

Moral reflection on violent resistance to unjust rule—treated in the medieval literature under the heading of "tyrannicide"[40]—also contributes to a tempering of the authority requirement. Aquinas deals with this issue in three places.

His first treatment may be found within the *Sentences* commentary (ca. 1253), where apropos the broader question "whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers, and tyrants in particular,"[41] he emphasizes how tyrants can be forcibly

[38] *Summa de casibus poenitentiae*, II, §18 (in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 138) opens with the words "Yet there seems to be a case in which war might be waged without the special authority [*sine auctoritate speciali . . . moueri bellum*] of the prince or the church, namely for the recovery of things." The gloss by William of Rennes clarifies that "to wage war" (*bellum moueri*) means here to fight with weapons defensively (*ad defendendum*), not offensively (*non ad impugnandum*).

[39] In particular the Roman law which stipulated appeal to the Fetials for declarations of war; see the selected passages on the Fetials in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 47-49.

[40] Famously treated ca. 1160 by John of Salisbury in the *Policraticus* (selections in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 125-30).

[41] II *Sent*., d. 44, q. 2, a. 2 (Mandonnet, ed., 1127-30). Translation in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 194-95.

deposed solely when their acquisition of political authority is shown to have come about by unlawful means (e.g., by fraud or violence). These tyrants hold authority in appearance only; removing such individuals from power accordingly does not violate the precept that human authority, deriving from God, must always be obeyed, however unworthy the possessors might be.[42] Excluded by contrast is forcible action to depose rulers who have acquired power by legitimate paths, but who are subsequently proven to be incompetent, repressive, or corrupt. With respect to the first group—usurpers—Aquinas states in surprisingly strong terms that "anyone [*aliquis*] can reject such authority [*dominium*] when the opportunity arises."[43] In his response to the fifth objection, he clarifies that this liberty to oppose tyrants presumes there exists no possibility of recourse to a higher authority (*quando non est recursus ad superiorem*), who otherwise would have exclusive competence to pass judgment on such usurpers. Should this higher authority be absent, "he who delivers his country by slaying a tyrant is to be praised and rewarded."[44]

Aquinas's second discussion of tyrannicide arose over a decade later (ca. 1267), within his short treatise written for the king of Cyprus, *De regno ad regem Cypri*. The position he stakes out here is markedly different from the one adopted in the *Sentences* commentary. Whereas individual initiative in committing tyrannicide against usurpers of power is permitted and even praised in the earlier work such initiative is strongly discouraged in *De regno*. "It would be dangerous," he writes, "if certain persons should attempt on their own private presumption to kill . . .

[42] "Those who achieve ruling power by violence are not truly rulers [*non sunt veri praelati*]: hence nor are their subjects bound to obey them, except in the circumstances already mentioned" (II *Sent*., d. 44, q. 2, a. 2 ad 4 [Mandonnet, ed., 1130]).

[43] "[P]otest aliquis tale dominium repellere" (ibid. [Mandonnet, ed., 1129). Aquinas adds the caveat that "unless perhaps the ruler is subsequently made a true lord either by the consent of his subjects or by the authority of a superior" (ibid.).

[44] Ibid.

tyrants."[45] Indeed, Aquinas qualifies as "not in accord with apostolic teaching" the view, which some had advanced on the basis of Old Testament passages,[46] that "if the excess of tyranny is unbearable, it would be an act of virtue for strong men to slay the tyrant and to expose themselves to dangers of death in order to set the multitude free."[47] Admittedly, Aquinas does not build his argument in *De regno* around the distinction between the two sorts of tyrannicide—usurpers, on the one hand, and legitimate rulers turned bad, on the other—and consequently there is uncertainty whether his treatment is meant to target the first, the second, or both sorts of tyranny together.

Significantly, however, the argumentation of *De regno* does not result in an unqualified condemnation of tyrannicide. Violent overthrow of a political leadership is deemed illegitimate when it results from "the private presumption of a few." But inversely, Aquinas avers that tyrannicide can be justified when it is undertaken at the initiative of "public authority" (*auctoritate publica*).[48] To drive the point home he explains how kings can be appointed in two different ways. Sometimes this is by the initiative of a higher authority, as when Caesar Augustus named kings in Judea. Should such a king become a tyrant, the oppressed multitude could seek his removal only by appealing to the decision of his superior. By contrast, under another political arrangement, the multitude is entitled to designate its own ruler.[49] This leads Aquinas to affirm what he had previously denied in the *Sentences* commentary, namely, allowance of tyrannicide in

[45] *De regno ad regem Cypri* I, c. 6. References are to *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII*, vol. 42 (Rome: Editori di san Tommaso, 1979); translation: Gerald B. Phelan, *On the Governance of Rulers* (rev. ed. [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1938], 58).

[46] Particularly Judges 3:21. In this story Ehud slew the king of Moab, who (in Aquinas's words) "was oppressing the people of God under harsh slavery" (*De regno* I, c. 6 [Leonine ed., 455, ll. 77-79; Phelan, trans., 57]). Aquinas interprets this biblical passage as a story about warfare against an external enemy, rather than an account of killing one's tyrannical ruler ("Aioth iudicandus est hostem interemisse, quam populi rectorem, licet tyrannum").

[47] *De regno* I, c. 6 (Leonine ed., 455, ll. 52-60; Phelan, trans., 57).

[48] Ibid. (Leonine ed., 456, ll. 88-90; Phelan, trans., 58).

[49] "[A]d ius alicuius multitudinis pertineat sibi providere de rege" (ibid. [Leonine ed., 456, ll. 91-92; Phelan, trans., 58]).

circumstances other than usurpation of authority. On this new account, even a king who had assumed power through legitimate paths could justifiably[50] "be destroyed or [have] his power restricted should he tyrannically abuse the royal power." The next line reinforces this assertion even further:

> It must not be thought that such a multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself to him in perpetuity; because he himself has deserved that the covenant with his subjects should not be kept, since, in ruling the multitude, he did not act faithfully as the office of a king demands.[51]

Strong words of admonition in a work written for a king. Whereas in the *Sentences* commentary deposition of the tyrant appears as a quasi-exception to the authority principle, here, by contrast, deposition is presented as an instantiation of the self-same principle. What accounts for this change is a subtle shift in Aquinas's understanding of what constitutes authority. The earlier treatment was centered on the person of the prince as the embodiment of authority. In later discussions, there appears a growing emphasis on the underlying function of authority, which is to promote the well-being of society by facilitating collective action toward beneficial ends. Having come to a more explicit recognition that authority is for the sake of society, not vice versa, Aquinas could think of it as a competence embodied *in* society itself (hence the notion of "public authority") rather than as standing *over* society (as in the fealty due to a feudal lord).[52]

The problem of tyrannicide was taken up by Aquinas on a third occasion within his account of sedition in the *Summa Theologiae* (*STh* II-II, q. 42, a. 2). This text sets up a sharp contrast between

[50] Ibid. (Leonine ed., 456, ll. 92-93; Phelan, trans., 58-59). Literally, Aquinas says it is "not unjustly" (*non iniuste*) that such a king should be deposed.

[51] Ibid. (Leonine ed., 456, ll. 94-100; Phelan, trans., 59).

[52] The authority thus embedded in the political community would ultimately have God for its first cause, insofar as "He is the principle of our being and government in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country [*patria*]" (*STh* II-II, q. 101, a. 3, ad 2). This allows Aquinas to infer (*STh* II-II, q. 60, a. 6, ad 2) that the authority to use force in punishing can sometimes be conferred on someone by way of divine inspiration, as he conjectures may have happened when Moses slew the Egyptian (Exod 2:12).

tyrants and "those who defend the common good." Emphasizing how the former subordinate the common good to their private interests, Aquinas affirms that they can make no claim to represent public authority[53] (or, as must be said in the case of usurpation, never did). This authority accordingly passes to the defenders of the common good. Far from contravening the first requirement of *bellum iustum*, by their just resort to force they affirm the principle's validity. "There is no sedition in disturbing a [tyrannical] government. . . . Indeed it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition."[54] This is of a piece with Aquinas's earlier assertion that a ruler, qua *persona publica*, must exercise his office precisely as a vice-regent of the people (*vicens gerens multitudinis*), thus in view of the common good.[55]

III. The Second Argument: Authority Is the Source of Coordinated Action

Moreover it is not the business of a private person to summon together the multitude, as must be done in wartime. Since care of the polity is entrusted to princes, protecting the common weal of the cities, kingdoms or provinces that lie under their authority is a task that pertains to them. And as they licitly defend it against internal disturbers [of the peace] by resorting to the material sword in order to punish these malefactors, according to the words of the Apostle (Rm. 13:4) "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so too, they use the sword of war to protect the polity from external enemies. And thus of princes it is said (Ps. 81:4) "rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner." For this reason Augustine says in *Contra Faustum* (XXII, 75) that "the natural order

[53] "*Auctoritas publica*" does not appear in question 42 (*De seditio*), but it was used in the previous question 41 (*De rixa* [a. 1, ad 3]), cited above. This concept of "public authority" would subsequently lead Cajetan (in his commentary on *STh* II-II, q. 40) to identify war-making authority with the commonwealth itself, insofar as it is a "perfect community": "When therefore it is said that to declare a just war the authority of the prince is required, this should be understood either of a perfect commonwealth, or of someone perfectly standing for a commonwealth (*perfecte gerente vices reipublicae*), as for example kings or other similar rulers" (translation in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 150, 243).

[54] *STh* II-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3.

[55] *STh* I-II, q. 90, a. 3. See also I-II, q. 97, a. 3, ad 3. For discussion, see Yves R. Simon, *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 158-60.

conducive to peace among mortals demands that the authority for initiating and counseling war should fall to princes."[56]

This second argument for legitimate authority is framed by Aquinas on the basis not of right, but of efficacy. Victory in war will be most assured when it proceeds as the effect of a unified force, "for many persons acting together can pull a load which could not be pulled by each one taking his part separately and acting individually."[57] As the collective activity of a multitude-in-arms, engagement in war depends on a chain of command that can be set in motion and effectively coordinated only by a unitary first agent. Mobilization for such a task cannot be achieved by the initiative of private persons, which would likely result in disorder and defeat.

That princes alone should occupy the office of supreme command, "calling the multitude to action as happens in wars," Aquinas deduces from their principal duty which is "to care for the polity." While all upright citizens should act for the promotion of the common good, they do this mainly by carrying out their own limited tasks. By contrast, deciding on matters that impact the entire community is proper to those who have been entrusted with oversight of the common good; first and foremost this role falls to "princes," the term used in Aquinas's day to signify the holders of executive power within polities. In overseeing their respective realms, princes, in addition to the normal tasks associated with governance—framing laws, ensuring the provision of needed goods, etc.—must also provide effective protection against internal disturbers (*interiores perturbatores*) of

[56] "Similiter etiam quia convocare multitudinem, quod in bellis oportet fieri, non pertinet ad privatam personam. Cum autem cura reipublicae commissa sit principibus, ad eos pertinet rem publicam civitatis vel regni seu provinciae sibi subditae tueri. Et sicut licite defendunt eam materiali gladio contra interiores quidem perturbatores, dum malefactores puniunt, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. XIII, *non sine causa gladium portat, minister enim Dei est, vindex in iram ei qui male agit*; ita etiam gladio bellico ad eos pertinet rempublicam tueri ab exterioribus hostibus. Unde et principibus dicitur in Psalm., *eripite pauperem, et egenum de manu peccatoris liberate*. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Faust., *ordo naturalis, mortalium paci accommodatus, hoc poscit, ut suscipiendi belli auctoritas atque consilium penes principes sit"* (*STh* II-II, q. 40, a. 1).

[57] *De regno* I, c. 3 (Leonine ed., 452, ll. 12-14; Phelan, trans., 43).

the peace. Likewise princes must adopt measures to safeguard against attacks launched by external enemies (*exterioribus hostibus*). To this dual end of protection, princes are accorded the power of the sword.[58]

Aquinas is very sparing in the details. While he mentions in passing authorization to administer punishment (citing Rom 13:4, "He beareth not the sword in vain"), this theme is related not so much to external war as it is to the repression of internal criminality.[59] Moreover, in this passage, the "sword of war" is closely tied to the idea of defense. The supposition that the authority condition was formulated by Aquinas for the special case of offensive war (using force to seek satisfaction, by punishment and other means, for past wrongs) is within the logic of the first argument ("no higher redress") although Aquinas never pauses to give it express mention. This interpretation was first advanced by Cajetan, who reasoned that self-defense, being a right even of private individuals, does not require for its legitimacy an appeal to the authority of a prince;[60] by default,

[58] The fact that Aquinas here refers to two swords, internal and external, prompted Cajetan (in his commentary on *STh* II-II, q. 40, a. 1, *praeterea*) to observe that the term *prince*, as employed in this article, does not unequivocally designate the *supremus princeps*, for in Aquinas's day it was understood that the internal sword might be legitimately exercised also by lower princes and judges ("Sed contra intraneos non requiritur princeps carens superiori. Ergo nec ad movendum bellum"). *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII, cum commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. 8 (Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1895), p. 313; trans. in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 242.

[59] Gerhard Beestermöller ("Thomas Aquinas and Humanitarian Intervention," in H-G Justenhoven and W. A. Barbieri, eds. *From Just War Ethics* to *Modern Peace Ethics* [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012], 71-98) interprets Aquinas's reference to "internal disturbers" of the peace as an allusion to princes who have disrupted the unity of Christendom (ibid., 75-80). In my opinion this argument is built on uncompelling linguistic grounds and results in a conflation of Aquinas's conception of political order with that of Hostiensis. As I have indicated already, Aquinas showed an affinity for the competing conception of Innocent IV (see Reichberg, "Aquinas's Moral Typology of Peace and War, 479-86).

[60] Cajetan, commenting on *STh* II-II, q. 40, a. 1: "In order to ascertain the authority needed to wage war, it should be understood that this is not a discussion of defensive war, namely when someone makes a war in defense against a war made on himself; for any people has a natural right to do this. But here the concern is with declaring war: what authority is required for this?" (trans. in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 242).

legitimate authority stands as a requirement for any resort to offensive war.

While Cajetan's interpretation is consistent with Aquinas's first argument for legitimate authority, it misconstrues the thrust of the second argument, wherein the Angelic Doctor shows that in war there must be a unitary source for the chain of command. By employing the verbs "protect" and "defend"[61] at this juncture, Aquinas signals how forcible *defense* against enemy attack is his principal concern.[62] The coordinated response of an army repulsing an invasion, the defense in question refers not to the individual initiative of singular agents acting alone or in small groups, but to the corporate agency of an army.[63] Cajetan, by contrast, framed the issue of legitimate authority in terms of a binary dichotomy whereby the necessity of such authority for public *offensive* war stands in contrast to its irrelevance for the exercise of private self-defense. In so doing he failed to see how Aquinas is chiefly concerned with a third case, namely, a polity's engagement in *defensive* war. Echoing Raymond of Peñafort (who

[61] In *STh* II-II, q. 40, a. 1, it is said that provinces are "protected" (*tueri*) by their respective princes, who "licitly defend" (*licite defendant*) their lands from internal and external harm. Defense is likewise the point of reference in the parallel text of *De regno* II, c. 4 (numbered as I, c. 15 in the English translation).

[62] This point has been well noted by Peter Haggenmacher (*Grotius*, 129), who explains how Aquinas functioned with a unitary concept of war, never distinguishing explicitly between the defensive and offensive variants, but including both under the heading *bellum*. Haggenmacher speculates however that Aquinas showed a preference for the first (defense), while not excluding the validity of the second (offensive war to punish wrongdoing). Aquinas's focus on defense, in the second argument for legitimate authority, has been overlooked by James Bernard Murphy ("Suárez, Aquinas, and the Just War: Self-Defense or Punishment," in Justenhoven and Barbieri, eds., *From Just War Ethics* to *Modern Peace Ethics*, 175-96) who expresses regret that Aquinas and later Scholastics (Suárez in particular) prioritized the paradigm of offensive war. But if my analysis is correct, the emphasis on offensive war is attributable to Cejetan's reading of Aquinas, and not directly to the Angelic Doctor himself. See Gregory M. Reichberg, "Culpability and Punishment in Classical Theories of Just War," in A. F. Lang, Jr., C. O'Driscoll, and J. Williams, eds., *Just War: The State of the Art* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming 2013).

[63] The image of a general commanding his army was favored by Aquinas as an example of corporate agency that acts in view of a common good and under the direction of a supreme executive. See for instance VII *Metaphys.*, lect. 2 and XII *Metaphys.*, lect. 12. For discussion of these and similar passages, see M. S. Kempshall, *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought* (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1999), 87-88.

had spoken of the *defensio patriae*)[64] and the Decretist glose *Qui repellere possunt* (which introduced the Roman notions of proportionality and immediacy into canon law), Aquinas opens up a space in theological discourse for nonpunitive modes of warfare between polities.

Whereas for the Roman jurists the idea of legitimate defense had applied to private individuals only, for Aquinas and the medieval canon lawyers it could also designate a special, more restricted type of public war. In contrast to *bellum offensivum*, defensive war would be under the more stringent conditions imposed by proportionality and immediacy.[65] This would subsequently lead Vitoria and Molina to deny any necessary connection between the *causa belli* and the adversary's subjective guilt: defense against wrongful attack, apart from any ulterior aim of punishment, could be a valid reason for waging "limited" public war.[66]

Apart from deriving the authority needed for a coordinated defense against external attack from the prince's leadership responsibility over matters affecting the entire polity, article 1 of the "Quaestio de bello" offers little elaboration on the details. A more extensive account can however be found in Aquinas's earlier treatise on kingship.

De regno ad regem Cypri proceeds from the conviction that political authority is natural to mankind. The necessity of such authority follows not *de iure* from our sinful nature, as leaders would have been requisite within human society even before our original fall from grace. An assembled multitude is more than an atomistic collection of individuals who happen to live in proximity to each other; rather, it has the form of a community with *ipso facto* a shared ("common") good. This good is dynamic. It arises when the manifold activities of the community's

[64] *Summa de casibus poenitentiae*, II, §17 (trans. in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War*, 139.

[65] See Haggenmacher, *Grotius*, 94-95.

[66] This is particularly visible in Vitoria's account of defense war waged against the American Indians. For discussion of the relevant passages see Reichberg, "Culpability and Punishment in Classical Theories of Just War."

individual members over time conduce to the well-being of the whole, a unitary goodness which in turn redounds upon each of the community's many individual members. "Peace" is another name for this dynamic unity.[67] Such peace would be impossible were there not "a general regulating force . . . which watches over the common good of all the members."[68] For "the multitude to be established in peace"[69] there must, in other words, be "some governing power . . . which impels toward the common good of the many, over and above that which impels toward the private good of each individual."[70]

Having shown the necessity of supreme leadership within the political community,[71] Aquinas subsequently elucidates how the common good which is this leadership's chief objective is inseparable from "living together well" (*ad bene vivendum*): "[f]or friendship unites good men, preserves and promotes virtue."[72] By consequence, the ruler's "principle concern will be to establish a good life [*bonam vitam*, i.e., a virtuous life] in the multitude subject to him."[73] But since this collective life is spread out over time, the effective ruler must ensure that what he has thus

[67] "Multitudinis autem unitas quae pax dicitur est per regentis industriam est procuranda" (*De regno* II, c. 4 [appears in the translation as I, c. 15] [Leonine ed., 467, ll. 54-56; Phelan, trans., 103]).

[68] *De regno* I, c. 1 (Leonine ed., 450, ll. 76-78; Phelan, trans., 35).

[69] "[U]t multitudo in unitate pacis constituatur" (*De regno* II, c. 4 [Leonine ed., 467, ll. 58-59; Phelan, trans., 103]).

[70] *De regno* I, c. 1 (Leonine ed., 450, ll. 85-88; Phelan, trans., 36). The same point is summed up in c. 2: "[T]he good and safety of a multitude formed into society is the preservation of its unity, which is called peace, and which, if taken away, the benefit of social life is lost and moreover the multitude in its disagreement becomes a burden to itself. The chief concern of the ruler [*rector*] of a multitude, therefore, should be to procure the unity of peace. . . . The more efficacious, therefore, a government is in keeping the unity of peace, the more useful it will be" (Leonine ed., 451, ll. 9-23; Phelan, trans., 40-41).

[71] For a systematic analysis of this argument, see Simon (*Philosophy of Democratic Government*, 19-71) who explains how Aquinas's argument for the necessity of authority does not hinge on any specific form of government.

[72] In *De regno* I, c. 10, Aquinas explains how friendship binds citizens to each other, and citizens to their rulers. Tyrants, by contrast, cannot gain the friendship of citizens; consequently they seek to undermine the bond of friendship between citizens whenever possible (ibid., c. 3).

[73] "In subiecta multitudine bonam vitam instituat" (*De regno* II, c. 4 [Leonine ed., 467, ll. 50-51; Phelan, trans., 102]).

established is preserved and brought to greater perfection. This happens when "the multitude thus united in the bond of peace [is] guided to good deeds."[74] It is at this juncture that the authority to wage war in brought into the picture.

To frame this consideration, Aquinas notes how the union of men in the bond of peace is a precondition for any virtuous collective action: "for just as a man can do nothing well unless unity within his members be presupposed, so a multitude of men which lacks the unity of peace is hindered from virtuous action by the fact that it fights against itself."[75] Internal unity of the political community is imperiled from within when some of its members transgress the bounds of justice and in so doing disturb the security of their neighbors. But this internal unity can also be endangered from without by the attack of enemies. The guardians of unity,[76] princes must take measures to combat both sorts of dissolution; thus against the first they impose penal sanctions to protect against internal violations of justice, and against the second they assemble their armies to ward off attack. "It would be useless, in effect, to prevent internal dangers if the multitude could not also be defended [*defendi*] against threats which arise externally."[77] A dual charge is accordingly laid on princes apropos the use of force: to punish wrongdoing *ad intra* and to fend off aggression *ad extra*. Both measures are undertaken in order to safeguard unity; their purpose is to secure peace. This peace is not itself a final goal, however. The prince is called to apply diligent effort toward establishing peace so that the assembled multitude will live together in mutual enjoyment of virtue. The due order

[74] "[U]t multitudo uinculo pacis unita dirigatur ad bene agendum" (ibid. [Leonine ed., 467, ll. 59-66; Phelan, trans., 103]).

[75] "[S]icut enim homo nichil bene agere potest nisi praesupposita suarum partium unitate, ita hominum multitudo pacis unitate carens, dum se ipsam impugnat, impeditur a bene agendo" (ibid. [Leonine ed., 467, ll. 60-64; Phelan, trans., 103, modified]).

[76] It was the paramount importance of maintaining unity within society that led Aquinas in *De regno* to endorse monarchy as the best form of government (I, c. 2). For the parallel discussion in the *Summa Theologiae*, see *STh* I-II, q. 105, a. 1.

[77] "[N]ichil enim prodesset interiora uitare pericula, si ab exterioribus defendi non posset" (*De regno* II, c. 4 [Leonine ed., 469, ll. 105-7; Phelan, trans., 105]).

has it that just war is directed to peace, and peace itself should be intended for the sake of communal virtue.

Since for Aquinas the civic peace is thus ordered to the collective life of virtue, those who lead their polities to war—princes—ought to be virtuous themselves, and their initiation of war should flow from a choice that is inwardly regulated by the appropriate virtues. By the same token, the obedience that is due to these leaders on the part of the citizenry must itself be tempered by virtue. Consequently, defense of the homeland (*patria, respublica,* or *civitas*) cannot, on Aquinas's understanding, be erected as a self-contained absolute. Precisely insofar as it is a mediate good which is defined by its further reference to virtue, the temporal peace of the multitude cannot justify protective actions that would be inconsistent with the demands of virtue. Aquinas's argumentation would accordingly exclude the sort of coercive measures (e.g., "dirty hands") that today go under the label of "Machiavellianism."[78]

To sum up, this second argument for legitimate authority is built around the idea that war is a collective enterprise of the highest political community, the polity (*respublica*). This enterprise is ordered first and foremost to defense. Only the prince, precisely in his capacity as supreme protector of this community, has the authority to "summon the multitude," namely, his army, for military action. Just as princes defend the polity from internal disturbances when they use the "material sword" (for instance in punishing criminals), likewise the polity is protected from external enemies when princes draw the "sword of war." Aquinas emphasizes how both swords are manifestations of the chief responsibility incumbent upon the prince, namely, to safeguard the peace of the *respublica*. This peace is not an end in itself: it is ordered to the collective life of virtue. Consequently,

[78] See Jacques Maritain, "The End of Machiavellianism," in idem, *The Range of Reason* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 134-64. For a recent workup of this theme see C. A. J. Coady, *Messy Moralism: The Challenge of Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008). Aquinas's *De regno* discussion of the tyrant's strategy of domination, how it is bound to fail, and why the virtuous prince will assure a more long-lasting rule, could usefully be contrasted to Machaiavelli's account in *The Prince*.

the very nature of peace implies that those who would wage war for its sake will acquire the relevant virtues.

IV. Leadership in War: The Relevant Virtues

Apart from devoting a single *articulum* to military prudence,[79] Aquinas indulges in little explicit reflection on the virtues requisite for moral leadership in matters of war. The terrain does not however go entirely unexplored, as three of the virtues that he outlines in the *Secunda Secundae*—justice, regnative prudence, and obedience—also have clear applicability to decision-making about war.

A) Justice

"The perpetual and constant will to render each his due,"[80] justice is a virtue seated in the rational appetite (the *voluntas*). Its object is the *ius*, something due to another (whether an individual or a collective) in strict conformity (*aequalitas*)[81] with an objective measure. The measure in question may be instilled in us by nature (*ius naturalis*), drawn by inference from natural principles (*ius gentium*), or established by legal convention (*ius positivum*). When Aquinas outlines these three sorts of *ius* in question 57 of the *Secunda Secundae*, their relevance to war-making is not expressly mentioned. The recognition that laws of war (*iura belli*) could be reciprocally binding on all nations by virtue of natural or positive law emerges only much later.[82] Consequently, what Aquinas terms "ius gentium" should not be conflated with "public

[79] *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 4; See Gregory M. Reichberg, "Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence," *Journal of Military Ethics* 9 (2010): 261-74.

[80] *STh* II-II, q. 58, a. 1.

[81] This *aequalitas* represents a mean between an excess (receiving more than one's share) and a deficiency (less than one's share); see Michel Villey, *Questions de saint Thomas sur le droit et la politique* (Paris: PUF, 1987), 127.

[82] See Peter Haggenmacher, "Le Droit de la guerre et la paix de Grotius," *Archives de philosophie de droit* 32 (1987): 47-58. For a summary of the relation of *ius gentium* to international law, see idem, "Kant et la tradition du droit de gens," in *L'année 1795. Kant: Essay sur la paix*, ed. P. Laberge, G. Lafrance, and D. Dumas (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 122-39.

international law," a doctrinal postulation that can be traced to the mid-seventeenth century.[83]

These cautions aside, it can be noted how Aquinas does provide a rudimentary list of some norms applicable to war.[84] The context is his discussion of the judicial precepts of the Old Law. Unlike the ceremonial precepts of the ancient Hebrews, which were binding for a limited time only, these judicial precepts were considered to have a more lasting value and as such could be subsumed into the teaching of the New Law. Basic rules dictating how men should behave toward one another,[85] some of these judicial precepts were framed specifically in view of relations that might obtain in wartime. Under the heading of "hostile relations with foreigners,"[86] Aquinas thereby assembles a diverse set of precepts that could be gleaned from the Old Testament. First he observes that a war is "justly initiated" (*iuste iniretur*) only when its necessity has antecedently been shown; in this connection he cites Deuteronomy 20:10, which stipulates that prior to besieging an enemy city its inhabitants should be given an opportunity to make amends—with the implication that only their refusal to offer satisfaction would justify the aggrieved party's resort to war.[87] Second, a war thus entered into should be prosecuted perseveringly, with confidence in the assistance of God. Third, men unfit for battle should be sent home. Finally, moderation should be shown in victory, such that women and children are spared and fruit trees not cut down. This list is admittedly very rudimentary; moreover, it blends moral and pragmatic considerations. But it does open a window on concerns that today

[83] See Villey, *Questions de saint Thomas sur le droit et la politique*, 126, and 163-66.

[84] Under the heading of "[p]recepts pertaining to strangers, as for example against enemies in wars [*praecepta pertinentia ad extraneos; puta de bellis contra hostes*]" (*STh* I-II, q. 104, a. 4).

[85] *STh* I-II, q. 99, a. 1: "Judicial precepts . . . are determinations of justice to be maintained among men." Ibid., ad 3: "The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs to the judicial precepts."

[86] "[Q]uantum ad hostilem communicationem cum extraneis" (*STh* I-II, q. 105, a. 3).

[87] Aquinas literally says (ibid.) that before war is initiated "peace should first be offered to it [the besieged city]" ("offerent ei [ad expugnandum civitatem] primo pacem").

would classified respectively as *ius ad bellum*, *in bello*, and *post bellum*.

While Aquinas acknowledges that justice can take several forms, central to his account of legitimate authority is an insistence that the justice possessed by civic leaders should be defined by reference to the common good. This he terms "legal justice" in order to signify how it encompasses everything that might conduce to the common good, as ordained by natural or positive law. Since we are rightly ordered in the great diversity of our individual acts by the different virtues (fortitude, temperance, etc.) all of these virtues are subsumed under this form of justice insofar as their respective acts are needed for the common good.[88] Entrusted as princes are with care of the common good, they especially must cultivate legal justice,[89] and in so doing they must likewise cultivate the full range of other virtues. Aquinas takes for granted that only those who are virtuous themselves are in a position to command of others the performance of virtuous deeds for the sake of the common good. Among the acts that can thus be commanded by the prince, Aquinas specifically indicates those that pertain to courage in war.[90]

When Aquinas discussed the exercise of legal justice by civic leaders, his focus is most often on the virtuous deeds they enjoin on their subordinates. However, he also takes into consideration the virtuous dispositions that should be acquired by the leaders themselves. In this respect he emphasizes how the binding judgments issued by those in power should proceed from an inward inclination of justice.[91] The judgments in question would include but are in no wise limited to the formal pronouncements

[88] *STh* II-II, q. 58, aa. 5-6.

[89] "Legal justice . . . is in the prince principally and quasi architectonically [*in principe principaliter, et quasi architectonice*], while secondarily and quasi administratively it is in subjects [*in subditis autem secundarie et quasi administrative*]" (*STh* II-II, q. 58, a. 6).

[90] *STh* I-II, q. 100, a. 11, ad 3: "The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good. . . . Regarding the act of fortitude, there is the order given by commanders exhorting [their soldiers] in a war that is undertaken for the common good [*De actu autem fortitudinis datur praeceptum proponendum per duces exhortantes in bello, quod pro bono communi suscipitur*]."

[91] *STh* II-II, q. 60, "De iudicio."

of a judge.[92] Other authoritative determinations also presuppose an inclination of justice. In this connection, Aquinas warns against the erroneous judgments that can arise from a defective appetite for justice. The possibilities include forming judgments based solely on suspicion ("when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him"), interpreting doubts to the disadvantage of the one judged, or judging matters that lie outside the scope of one's authority (usurped judgment). This moral epistemology of judgment falls within the logic of Aquinas's doctrine of just war, although he hardly pauses to draw it out explicitly.[93]

Unlike the other moral virtues, such as courage or temperance, which presuppose prudential judgment but do not take the form of a judgment themselves, justice is unique insofar as the mental appreciation of another's right, the judgment of what is or is not owed to him, implies strict conformity with an objective standard. In other words, within this domain (determination of *ius*), the judgment is itself an instantiation of justice, and for this reason it presupposes an upright inclination of the will. In this respect Aquinas indicates a synergy with the virtue of prudence: "judgment is an act of justice [i.e., a moral virtue]," he writes, "insofar as justice inclines one to judge rightly, and of prudence [i.e., an intellectual virtue] insofar as prudence pronounces judgment."[94] And for those judgments that bear directly on the common good—as with determinations involving resort to war—it is specifically the prudence of governance (*prudentia regnativa*) that comes into play.

[92] This broadening becomes apparent in ibid, a. 1, ad 4. Where the objection had stated that "judgment would seem to belong only to judges [*iudices*]," the reply substitutes the wider term "prince" (*principe*): "justice is in the prince as a master virtue."

[93] For an application of Aquinas's ethics of judgment to just war, see Gregory M. Reichberg, "Preventive War in Classical Just War Theory," *Journal of the History of International Law* 9 (2007): 5-33, at 11-12.

[94] "Sic ergo iudicium est quidam actus iustitiae sicut inclinantis ad recte iudicandum, prudentiae autem sicut iudicium proferentis" (*STh* II-II, q. 60, a. 1).

Aquinas explains[95] that judging another will be licit solely when three requirements are cumulatively met: (1) that the judgment proceed from an inclination of justice, (2) that it be issued by someone with the requisite authority (*ex auctoritate praesidentis*), and (3) that it be pronounced according to a right ruling of prudence. Extrapolated to political judgments about war, this teaching would imply in the first place a right orientation to the common good; we have seen that such a good includes more than safeguarding the material *interests* of the community as the fostering of *virtue* is also (and especially) at stake. It is also the case, second, that forward-looking judgments about just cause—the resolution that in these concrete circumstances this particular wrong can and should be righted by resort to arms—presupposes a special competence (*auctoritas*) that is *de iure* possessed solely by the prince.

B) Prudence

The inclusion of prudence is meant to underscore how a judgment of this sort depends on a set of underlying cognitive skills. Attention to the relevant circumstances and ability to analyze them, knowledge of the moral and legal principles applicable to such an assessment, and due reflection on the consequences likely to follow from a resort to force are necessary preconditions of a just judgment. Likewise, even in the absence of any immediate military threat, preparedness for such an eventuality, through the construction of defenses, establishment of alliances and other diplomatic measures, as well as the appointment of personnel trained in the military arts, necessarily falls under the special competence of the prince. Linked as they are to a central task of governance—safeguarding peace—the cognitive skills enumerated above are among the attributes that Aquinas associates with legitimate authority. And in light of the

[95] *STh* II-II, q. 60, a. 2; this passage bears a close structural similarity to the earlier II-II, q. 40, a. 1, as both make the licitness of their respective acts (*bellare* for the one, *iudicare* for the other) hinge on conformity with three requirements. Both underline the centrality of authority.

fact that actual warfare entails its own distinctive challenges, alongside the "prudence of rulers" (*prudentia regnativa*), he designates a "military prudence" (*prudentia militaris*) that applies to battlefield commanders.[96] In so doing, Aquinas implicitly earmarks a division of labor *ad bellum* and *in bello*, between those who decide on war as an act of governance, and those who decide in war to achieve victory. The right order of ends requires, moreover, that military prudence be actively subordinated to the overarching prudence of rulers.

To complement his treatment of *prudentia regnativa*, Aquinas discusses how another cognitive virtue, *prudentia politica*, is also concerned with our deliberations about the common good.[97] Whereas the first represents an upright and skillful deliberation as carried out by public authorities (especially the prince or king), the second looks to the implementation of their decisions by subjects of the realm. The designation of a special "political" form of prudence is borrowed from the *Nicomachean Ethics* (6.8.1141b23-29), although the meaning conferred on it in the *Summa Theologiae* is patently different from what Aristotle had intended.

The Stagirite conceptualized political prudence as a counterpart to the prudence expected of legislators. While legislative prudence is deliberation about matters of universal

[96] *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 4. In ad 3, Aquinas notes how military prudence is found most especially in army commanders (*in duce exercitus*). While he would surely recognize that a prince could assume such a role (as was the case of his contemporary King Louis), by speaking of the "dux" rather than the "rex" as the underlying possessor of military prudence, Aquinas emphasizes how the skills needed for leadership in war are of a different nature from those ordinarily associated with the governance of a polity. See Reichberg, "Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence," 273-74.

[97] See *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3; in this passage the sphere of personal prudence (whereby individual subjects direct themselves to their proper good) is contrasted to the sphere of political prudence (whereby the same individual subjects direct themselves to their common good). In his description (*STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 1) of *prudentia regnativa,* Aquinas notes how it is a disposition for the good governance of a perfect community, namely, a city or kingdom ("communitatem perfectam civitatis vel regni"). Subsequently, in ad 1, to establish its coordination with [general] justice, he elucidates how the execution of justice also stands in need of prudence, *insofar as it is directed to the common good* ("ordinatur ad bonum commune").

scope (framing laws), political prudence focuses on specific cases, as happens for instance in the issuance of a government decree. Despite this difference, it is nonetheless implicit in Aristotle's account that both forms of prudence represent qualities of leadership; each denotes a deliberative skill to be applied solely by those who govern. Aquinas, by contrast, conceptualizes political prudence as a virtue to be exercised by the *governed*.[98] Moreover this virtue is universal in scope, as it pertains to all subjects in the *respublica*, regardless of their special tasks or social rank—all, in other words, who are capable of exercising reason. To be governed is to be moved by another; but unlike nonrational animals who are, as it were, passive recipients of an ordinance from above, human beings undergo external ordering though the mediation of their own reason and free will. For this reason, the condition of being governed requires a special form of prudence consisting in skillful deliberation about matters to be obeyed for the promotion of the common good.

C) Obedience

The relationship between these two forms of prudence, of rulers and of the ruled, reflects a parallel distinction within the virtue of justice. Legal justice, as already noted, consists in an upright inclination toward the common good on the part of political leaders; responsibility for overseeing the common good rests "principally and architectonically" with them. This justice must however be implemented; thus, by extension, a similar

[98] That Aquinas was consciously innovating is confirmed by his commentary on the relevant passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which closely follows Aristotle's understanding of political *phronesis* as a virtue that pertains to a limited class of citizens: "Because this implementation of the enacted law [*executive legis positae*] retains for itself the general name of 'political' [*politicae*], it follows that solely [*soli*] those who see to the implementation of the enacted laws are said to be engaged in civil affairs [*conversari civiliter*] since they alone [*isti soli*] are active among the citizens as *chirotechnae*, that is as manual laborers in things to be built, and legislators bear the same relation to them as do architects to those who execute their plans" (*Sententia Libri Ethicorum* VI, c. 7 [*Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII*, vol. 47/2 (Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969), 357, ll. 64-69]).

inclination to do what is requisite for the common good is to be found "secondarily and administratively" in subjects.[99] "Obedience" is the name given by Aquinas to this willing participation of citizen-subjects in the government of their polity.

Obedience comes into play whenever action proceeds at the behest of some authority (whether in a family or in other "imperfect societies" such as a corporation or a sports team). Within the "perfect" society of the *respublica*, obedience stands as the correlative to political authority. The issuance of a precept by the prince implies its reception by mode of obedience on the part of subjects. But to be humanly exercised civic obedience requires a special mode of deliberation; in this respect purely personal prudence is an incomplete guide, for in addition to reflecting on the implications for my private good I must also weigh the concordance of my superior's command with the common good of the polity of which I am a member:

> Men who are subjects in any sense, even slaves, are moved by the precepts of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free will; consequently [on the part of all subjects] there is required as it were a rectitude of government [*quaedam rectitudo regiminis*] by which they direct themselves in obeying their princes; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called *politica*.[100]

Far from connoting subservience and a sharp dichotomy of ruler and ruled, obedience represents the subject's participation in the very act by which he is governed. The doctrine of obedience thereby implies that all government is in some measure *self*-government.[101] It holds out the possibility that by reason of their

[99] "Et sic [iustitia generalis] est in principe principaliter, et quasi architectonice, in subditis autem secondarie et quasi administrative" (*STh* II-II, q. 58, a. 6). The same point is made (*STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 2, ad 2) apropos of *prudentia regnativa*: as its name indicates, it is found in rulers most especially (in this respect it is likened to an *ars architectonica*), yet by extension this same prudence of governance, under the heading *politica,* also pertains to subjects (whereby it is likened to the hand by which the architect accomplishes his art).

[100] *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 2.

[101] In emphasizing how obedience must be free and reflective, a participation in the act of governance, Aquinas gave voice to what later would be called "the democratic spirit." See Jacques Maritain, *Christianity and Democracy* (1943), who aptly explained how democracy, understood broadly as a "state of mind" designates a general philosophy of human dignity and

commitment to the common good subjects must sometimes say no to their rulers.

Aquinas's account of obedience[102] is two-pronged. On the one hand, he is at pains to explain how obedience follows from a "necessity of justice";[103] it is accordingly a matter of strict duty. Promptitude of response and reverence for the superior are desirable traits. Disobedience can be a grave sin. On the other hand, Aquinas does not hesitate to set limits on obedience: of lower stature than the theological virtues, it is situated as a mean between extremes of deficiency and excess. Moreover, the precept of a superior is limited by the precise scope of his authority.[104] Military obedience receives special mention in this connection.[105] Usurped authority nullifies a command (although prudence can dictate that it be followed nonetheless, to avoid scandal or immediate risk of harm), as does any order that runs counter to the moral law.[106] Finally, the order of a lower authority, however legitimate, will be likewise nullified should his superior stipulate the opposite. While Aquinas himself has little to say about obedience in war, his successors (Vitoria especially) were quick to draw out the obvious implications, for instance that there is an obligation to withhold participation in manifestly unjust

political life that does not exclude any of the different "regimes" or "forms of government" (e.g., monarchy) that classical authors (including Aquinas) had recognized as legitimate (in Jacques et Raïssa Maritain, *Oeuvres completes*, vol. 7 [Fribourg, Switzerland: Editions Universitaires, 1988], 719).

[102] *STh* II-II, q. 104.

[103] *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 4: the "necessity of justice," which presupposes freedom, is contrasted to the "natural necessity," which excludes it.

[104] "Subditi autem non subiiciuntur suis superioribus quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad aliqua determinate" (*STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 5, ad 2).

[105] "Tenetur subditus suo superiori obedire secundum rationem superioritatis, sicut miles duci exercitus in his quae pertinent ad bellum" (*STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 5).

[106] *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 2. Compliance with an order to do something illicit Aquinas terms "indiscreet" (*indiscreta*) obedience, thereby suggesting that it falls outside of the virtuous disposition which is termed obedience simply. Moreover, while an evil command should *never* be followed ("nunquam per obedientiam malum fieri," citing the *Moralia* of St. Gregory [*STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 3, obj. 3, not denied in the corresponding reply]), some inherent goods can rightly be set aside out of obedience (e.g., acceptance of bodily harm for a soldier on the battlefield), provided they are not of transcendent goodness (e.g., no one can be ordered to abandon the love of God [ibid., ad 3]).

wars—"selective conscientious objection" as we would say today.[107]

Conclusion

Of Aquinas's two arguments for the just-war requirement of legitimate authority, the second demonstrates greater originality, as the first had already been articulated more fully by his predecessors, and he contents himself with giving a broad sketch of its main terms. Whereas the first argument is focused on the prince's sole *right* to wage war and his monopoly over the use of force to secure redress for past wrongs, the second argument looks rather to the prince's *obligations* toward the common good and the attendant acquisition of the relevant virtues. In the process, Aquinas prioritizes the newly emergent idea of "defensive war," and prompts a line of reflection that would emphasize nonpunitive rationales for resorting to armed force. Despite these innovations, the second argument has been largely ignored by students of Aquinas. This article has aimed to restore the balance.[108]

[107] Although the authenticity of the passage is difficult to determine (as it derives from lecture notes taken by a student), Aquinas is reported to have said that "soldiers are not bound to obey in an unjust war" (Commentary to the Epistle to Titus, 3:1; translation in Crysostom Baer, ed., *Commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon* [South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2007], 185). Vitoria developed this idea in his *De iure belli*, q. 2 "Doubts concerning the Justice and Conduct of War" (translation in Francisco de Vitoria, *Political Writings*, ed. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991], 306-9).

[108] I thank David Gallagher for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

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IS THERE STILL HOPE FOR A SCHOLASTIC ONTOLOGY OF BIOLOGICAL SPECIES?

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THOMISTIC AND OTHER SCHOLASTIC philosophies of nature are committed to hylomorphism, and thus to a thoroughgoing essentialism. That is, they are committed to the view that the world is divided up into objects belonging to various natural kinds, the essences of which—or substantial forms of which, prescinding from common matter—ground the properties associated with the kinds and determine the range of behaviors of their individual members. The standard Scholastic view maintains that this essentialist picture obtains universally in nature; from fundamental physics right up through biology, all substances are partly constituted by substantial forms.

However, this view has become more difficult to uphold in the biological realm. The large majority of contemporary philosophers of biology and theoretical biologists are decidedly antiessentialist when it comes to biological taxa, with the predominant view being that the identity conditions of taxa are wholly relational. The species taxon *Felis catus* is the species taxon it is because of its lineal relations, its occupation of a certain slot on the tree of life. *Felis catus* descended from a certain ancestor species, and that descent determines its identity. Correspondingly, for a particular organism to be a cat is not to have a certain genetic code, or certain morphological features, or indeed any sort of intrinsic nature or essence. Instead, to be a cat

is to have cats as parents.[1] This is a far cry from the idea that all cats are cats because they are all partly constituted by the same kind of substantial form.

The arguments in support of this broad consensus against intrinsic biological essentialism constitute an important challenge to a Scholastic philosophy of nature. No Scholastic thinker would wish to concede that hylomorphism is inapplicable to biological taxa. Moreover, it is not clear how standard natural-law theories of ethics would play out in a nonessentialist view of biological kinds—in an ontology in which living things, including humans, lack intrinsic natures. Indeed, the lack of engagement between contemporary natural-law theory and contemporary philosophy of biology could end up being seriously detrimental to the former. Yet despite the importance of the issue there have been few exchanges between recent Scholastic thought and the antiessentialist majority in analytic philosophy of biology. With the notable exception of David Oderberg,[2] recent work in the Scholastic philosophy of nature tends to pass it by (e.g., the work of Leo Elders),[3] while older studies by such well-known figures as Mortimer Adler,[4] John Deely,[5] and Etienne Gilson[6] remain valuable but are in need of supplementation and further development in the face of new challenges.

[1] It should be clarified at the outset that although most contemporary philosophers of biology are antiessentialist with respect to species taxa, this does not entail that they are antiessentialists with respect to other biological entities. For instance, T. Reydon ("Gene Names as Proper Names of Individuals: An Assessment," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 60 [2009]: 409-32), while rejecting the idea that species have essences, takes a fairly essentialist line when it comes to genes.

[2] D. Oderberg, *Real Essentialism* (London: Routledge, 2007).

[3] L. Elders, *The Philosophy of Nature of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Peter Lang, 1997).

[4] M. Adler, *Problems for Thomists: The Problem of Species* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1940).

[5] John Deely, "The Philosophical Dimension of the Origin of Species, Part I," *The Thomist* 33 (1969): 75-149; idem, "The Philosophical Dimension of the Origin of Species, Part II," *The Thomist* 33 (1969): 251-341.

[6] E. Gilson, *From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again: A Journey in Final Causality, Species, and Evolution*, trans. J. Lyon (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

My goal here is to lay the foundations of an updated defense of Scholastic biological essentialism. Specifically I will defend the core idea that biological species are definable at least in part by the possession of intrinsic properties. In other words, to be a cat is not only a matter of being part of a certain lineage, but also (and necessarily) a matter of having certain intrinsic properties. Affirming this idea is a necessary though not sufficient condition for affirming a specifically hylomorphic essentialism in biology.

The paper is divided into several sections. To begin, I take up three highly influential antiessentialist arguments, replying to each along the way. Some of these replies are original, while others are borrowed from the growing proessentialist literature in analytic philosophy of science. Indeed, the antiessentialist consensus in philosophy of biology is under attack from within, and though Scholastic thinkers have not been active in contributing to this literature (again with the exception of Oderberg), they can certainly make use of it. This constitutes the longest section, which is appropriate given the overall aim of this paper: to make Scholastic philosophers of nature more acquainted with this debate and with some of the resources available for use in defending a Scholastic stance here. In section II I switch from defense to offense and briefly present a positive argument in favor of intrinsic biological essentialism. Space limitations dictate a truncated presentation, but I develop and defend the argument at much greater length elsewhere.[7] I conclude by remarking upon the need for future work extending the basic essentialist case to hylomorphism.

I. Antiessentialist Arguments and Replies

Among various antiessentialist arguments, three are particularly compelling and have been especially influential in both recent and past debates, and it is these three on which I will focus in this section. Furthermore, as the existing literature focuses almost

[7] See T. Dumsday, "A New Argument for Intrinsic Biological Essentialism," *Philosophical Quarterly* 62 (2012): 486-504.

entirely on essentialism with respect to the species taxon (as opposed to taxa higher or lower on the Linnaean hierarchy) I will do likewise.

A) Repeated Essences Are Not Required as Identity Conditions of Species Taxa

Two electrons share all of the same types of fundamental intrinsic properties (same mass, charge, and spin) and hence are taken to belong to the same natural kind. The essence of an electron is both repeatable in principle and actually repeated in our world, such that any particle not sharing precisely this type of essence will not be considered an electron by physicists. By contrast, complete qualitative identity is not taken as a requirement for kind-membership in the biological realm. Two giraffes may or may not share all of the same types of fundamental intrinsic properties, whether genotypic or phenotypic; regardless, biologists still consider them both genuine members of the species taxon *Giraffa camelopardalis* because they are both part of the same biological lineage. Variation is recognized as no barrier to identity of taxon membership. In fact, far from being a barrier, variation is considered normal and expected; it is, after all, the *sine qua non* of natural selection. What is important for species membership is placement in the appropriate line of descent.

One response to this sort of point is as follows:

> No one would deny that . . . to be a horse one must be born a horse. (Hull 1978, p. 349). But that is not the end of it. The fact that all horses are begot by horses is something to be explained. To suppose that an explanation is possible and to suppose further that the explanation is the same for all horses is to suppose that horses have some property in common which they do not share with the members of any other species.[8]

[8] B. Kitts and J. Kitts, "Biological Species Are Natural Kinds," *Philosophy of Science* 46 (1979): 613-22, at 618.

The basic idea is that the facts of lineage are to some extent dependent on the intrinsic properties of the relevant organisms. A mare gives birth to other horses not only because the mare was in turn conceived by a horse, but because it has the inherent capacity to give birth to other horses by virtue of its intrinsic properties. That capacity is of course inherited from its ancestors, but it is nonetheless real and a genuine explanatory factor in the continuance of the lineage. Thus it makes some sense to think that historical explanation in biology is incomplete if it is divorced from reference to the set of intrinsic properties of the relevant organism.[9]

Moreover, why think that only historical, evolutionary explanation should count as genuine explanation in biology? Researchers in this field are certainly concerned to discover distal causes of the present state of organisms, but, as Michael Devitt points out,[10] this does not negate the importance of proximate causes, including intrinsic developmental factors rooted in the genotype. When the differing purposes of explanation are taken into account, there does appear a place—indeed, a necessary place—for fundamental intrinsic properties. If we want to explain why some individual zebra has stripes, for instance, reference to descent will hardly be sufficient.

Marc Ereshefsky replies to Devitt by noting that while intrinsic developmental factors are significant in explaining an organism's traits, there is no need to invoke an essential nature as part of that explanation.[11] Indeed, there is positive reason not to do so in the case of developmental mechanisms, since they cut across multiple distinct taxa. He asks his reader to

> consider how a biologist explains the occurrence of stripes in a zebra. In its embryonic state, a zebra has an ontogenetic mechanism that causes it to develop stripes. That developmental mechanism is neither necessary nor sufficient for

[9] For a similar argument see C. Elder, "Biological Species Are Natural Kinds," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 46 (2008): 339-62, at 349-50.

[10] M. Devitt, "Resurrecting Biological Essentialism," *Philosophy of Science* 75 (2008): 344-82, at 353-54.

[11] M. Ereshefsky, "What's Wrong with the New Biological Essentialism," *Philosophy of Science* 77 (2010): 674-85, at 680.

membership in Zebra. Some zebras lack that mechanism. Moreover, the developmental mechanism that causes stripes in zebras causes stripes in a variety of mammals. . . . Generally, the intrinsic properties that cause organismic traits do not correspond with taxonomic boundaries: they crosscut such boundaries. The belief that such intrinsic properties are essential for taxon membership is not part of biological theory.

Ereshefsky is correct in denying that the developmental mechanism that causes stripes is by itself necessary and sufficient for membership in the zebra taxon. But Devitt can grant that. All his point requires is that the intrinsic properties and structures constituting the explanatory mechanism for the possession of some trait are a *part* of the essence of the kind under consideration. (Of course, there is also the question of whether this particular developmental mechanism can be considered a part of the essence if indeed some zebra can lack it. More on this issue in section B below.) And a recognition of this partial status lessens the force of Ereshefsky's further criticism that the developmental mechanism crosscuts taxa; for since the mechanism is only part of the essence, not providing identity conditions all by itself, it can be present as a component in multiple distinct essences. The essentialist can admit that individual components of some kind-essence in the biological realm (as in other realms) may be present in multiple kinds, given the inherent complexity of kind-essences.

One may draw an analogy with the electron's resting mass, plausibly an essential property. If one were to interpret the essentialist as claiming that the resting mass constitutes, by itself, the identity condition for an electron, then one could point to another kind of particle, the positron, which has the very same resting mass. One could then argue that since the purported identity condition cuts across multiple kinds, the property in question cannot constitute the essence of any kind. But the essentialist need not (and certainly should not) identify the entire essence within any one intrinsic property. The essential notes of substantial forms are invariably complex, even at the level of fundamental particles.

In addition to this question of whether purely historical criteria of species membership miss something important for causal explanation in biology, there is also the question of whether they allow for speciation. Crawford L. Elder writes:

> But that the members of a given species all descend from the same ancestor organisms as one another cannot be the whole story on what unites those members as a species. On a broad enough historical scale, members of what intuitively seem to be *different* species all descend from common ancestors; it may even be that all forms of life are ultimately descendant from the same unicellular organisms. To account for speciation, it seems that non-historical factors must somehow enter into the defining features of taxa.[12]

Further, Gerry Webster and Brian Goodwin argue that when one analyzes what descent actually consists in, it is found that mere spatio-temporal continuity plus causal origin is insufficient.[13] A degree of similarity between parent and product is required, and hence an acknowledgment of kind-membership based on qualitative similarity lurks in the background. What is really key for the predication of descent, they hold, is ultimately the repetition of form. "What is required is the occurrence *at some time* of a form which can be regarded as a *repetition* of an earlier form. In practice, talk about 'descent' seems to involve talk about repetition or similarity, therefore putative kinds."[14]

An objection will naturally arise at this point: how does this view cohere with the fact that the central interest of biological taxonomy is in the tracing of lines of descent? Even if one claims that some background notion of biological form is presupposed by lineal relations, it remains the case that biology is primarily concerned with those relations, not with the forms. As Ereshefsky puts it, essentialism "assumes that all scientific classification should capture similarity clusters. However, that is not the aim of

[12] Elder, "Biological Species Are Natural Kinds," 349.

[13] G. Webster and B. Goodwin, *Form and Transformation: Generative and Relational Principles in Biology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 44-47.

[14] Ibid., 45.

biological taxonomy. Its aim is to capture history."[15] So the perspective advocated by Webster and Goodwin, and essentialists more generally, could at best be seen as supplemental to the central, nonessentialist concerns of researchers in evolutionary biology.

Several replies could be made here. For one, different fields of biology have different concentrations of interest. The essentialist could argue, for instance, that where essentialism really comes to the fore is in discussions of developmental biology.

Besides this appeal to the legitimacy of pluralism with respect to research interest,[16] the essentialist has another response available, one that makes a stronger claim with respect to the use of essentialism even by the evolutionary biologist and phylogenetic taxonomist. Even they are interested in history precisely because it is a history of similarity in and variation of form. To draw this out, one can imagine a scenario in which all actual members of the highest-level kind, 'organism', all carry out their metabolic and reproductive functions in the same ways, and that the structures enabling those functions also differ little from organism to organism. Now one can imagine a tremendously complex tree of life emanating from the first such organism. Many populations of these organisms will become isolated from one another. But if one imagines further that the environmental pressures et cetera that they all face are remarkably similar, and that no major evolutionary changes take place, after a million years, all members of these populations will be intrinsically qualitatively indistinct (as much as one can expect from a biological kind, that is). Now, someone making species divisions on the basis of differences in important functions of life will look at this situation and say that all living things are members both of the same high-level kind 'organism' and of the same species *x*.

[15] Ereshefsky, "What's Wrong with the New Biological Essentialism," 676. In this quotation he is referring specifically to Boyd's homeostatic property cluster theory, the essentialist credentials of which are disputed. However, the point applies to all forms of essentialism that place a primary emphasis on intrinsic properties and qualitative similarity.

[16] I take up that issue at greater length in "A New Argument for Intrinsic Biological Essentialism."

This seems an intuitively plausible take on the situation. Further, recognizing the qualitative indistinctness of all of the separate populations, would a researcher be interested in tracking the particular lineal relations among these organisms? Probably not. What makes lineages interesting in our world is that they correspond to important changes in traits. Take away those differences and why care about the lineages? There would simply be a drab uniformity. Lineage of course plays a role in explaining similarity and difference between organisms, but minus such differences the interest in lineage would dry up for many.

Of course, the real situation is very different. There is tremendous diversity. And wide divergences in lineage generally correspond to differences in metabolic and reproductive functions, to differences in the specific kinds of organism that there are. The question is, when biologists draw out the tree of life, are they really interested in the lineage relations *qua* lineage relations, or are they interested in the distinct *kinds* of organism under examination and the mechanisms by which those distinct kinds arose? Typically the latter. For the most part, an interest in phylogeny presupposes an interest in the delineation of kinds. At the very least, this is a perfectly legitimate research interest that can coexist alongside a purely historical focus.

As a further argument for the background dependence of phylogenetic classification on qualitative features, Webster and Goodwin claim that if taxon membership were predicated solely on the basis of descent, a regress would ensue.[17] While a genuine identification of an instance of descent might be sufficient to establish that two organisms belong to the same taxon, descent is never sufficient to identify *which* taxon some individual organism actually belongs to. The question will simply recur with respect to the ancestor. Thus a purely historical/relational perspective on taxa will not allow one to provide a complete answer to the question why it is that some organism belongs to some species taxon. Intrinsic qualitative features must also play a role.

[17] Webster and Goodwin, *Form and Transformation*, 46.

Ereshefsky once again supplies a reply. He argues that descent has to be the key element for taxon identity because it is the one fact about an organism that cannot be changed without taxon membership changing as well. No intrinsic trait, including reproductive mechanism, can boast this identity-securing feature. "To reinforce this point, consider which aspects of an organism can be changed while it remains a member of the same species and which aspects cannot be changed. The intrinsic reproductive mechanisms within the organisms of a species can be changed, but being part of the same lineage or gene pool cannot be changed."[18] In other words, descent is a genuine necessary condition for an organism's membership in a taxon, unlike any intrinsic feature that could be cited.

However, the idea that lineage is the only necessary condition for taxon membership will be disputed by the essentialist. Webster and Goodwin would want to say that if the organism were somehow to exchange its morphogenetic field for another, it would thereby change its taxon membership. Similarly, Elder and Oderberg would want to say that if the genetic and phenotypic alterations were sufficiently great the organism would thereby change its taxon membership. The argument here might then be thought to beg the question against the essentialist, who would be unwilling to grant that descent is the only key factor. Yet Ereshefsky could reply that the question is not being begged because there is independent reason for thinking that descent, as opposed to any of the other essentialist candidates, is the key factor, for the simple fact that contemporary biological taxonomy is centered around phylogeny—not genes, not phenotype, indeed not any intrinsic properties. To which the essentialist might reply: this only shows that the begging of the question has been driven back a step. The essentialist, for better or worse, will dispute the sole use of phylogeny in the drawing of taxonomic lines.

[18] Ereshefsky, "What's Wrong with the New Biological Essentialism," 681.

Reference to current scientific practice is unlikely to sway the essentialist, who may implicitly desire a reform of that practice.[19]

Ereshefsky himself notes that it is not clear whether this argument answers the regress worry.[20] One can still ask what makes it the case that the lineal relations under consideration are lineal relations of *this* particular taxon. Yet he believes a further reply is available here, and argues that one must make reference to the speciation event giving rise to some particular taxon:

> Why are [organisms] O1 . . . n members of [species] S? Because Os have certain intrinsic reproductive mechanisms that are bound by population and genealogical relations that are anchored to a particular speciation event. According to a standard model of speciation, allopatric speciation, a new interbreeding species must be reproductively isolated from other species, and there must be successful interbreeding within its founding population. No particular mechanisms are required: the particular mechanisms that the species members have could have been different. But the particular relational properties they have—namely, of being reproductively isolated from neighboring species and being reproductively compatible among themselves—cannot be altered. . . . To put it more starkly: the occurrence of certain relations *is* the species. It is the occurrence of those relations that makes the organisms engaged in them members of one species versus another species.

However, the Scholastic will wish to emphasize that facts about reproductive compatibility are still dependent on facts about the intrinsic dispositional properties of the relevant organisms. Moreover, even if Ereshefsky's point is an effective response to the regress worry,[21] the earlier point made by Webster and

[19] By a "reform of practice" I do not mean that the essentialist needs to be committed to the denial that taxonomic lines can legitimately be drawn by reference to phylogenetic trees. The essentialist can grant that such a method of taxonomy is perfectly legitimate and may in fact be preferable for the practice of biology, if the concern of the biologist is to track the evolutionary lineages of different populations. The essentialist will, however, want to insist that underlying such a method of taxonomy is a recognition that phylogeny relies on the repetition of form in individual organisms, and that for at least some research purposes it is legitimate to place one's principal focus on that form rather than on the relations of descent that perpetuate and/or alter the form.

[20] Ereshefsky, "What's Wrong with the New Biological Essentialism," 682.

[21] Oderberg (*Real Essentialism*, 219) presents a different sort of regress argument that would not face quite the same challenge: "Further, cladism suffers from a regress problem. For if classification is by descent, then what about the very first organism, which by definition had

Goodwin would still hold, namely, that a degree of qualitative similarity is required for a predication of descent. Reproduction, lineage-making, is a biological process that presupposes repeatable kind-essences on the part of individual organisms, however those kind-essences are precisely to be characterized. Put simply: descent requires qualitative similarity, which implies kind-membership. Therefore descent implies prior kind-membership.

This last point by itself goes a long way to showing that there must be something amiss in the positions of those authors, such as Brian Ellis,[22] who adopt an essentialist ontology in other areas but refuse to admit kind-essences in the realm of biological taxa due to the variation across organisms. This, in turn, strikes a blow against the second traditional antiessentialist objection. It seems that there must actually be repeated kind-essences in biology, even if it is not immediately clear how the variation found in the biological realm is consistent with this fact (which variation is of course the focus of that objection). We may now turn our attention to that objection.

B) Repeated Essences Are Not Found in the Biological Realm

Some go further and claim that not only are identical intrinsic kind-essences unnecessary for species taxon-identity, but that such identity is mostly or even wholly absent from biology. As Ereshefsky notes, "biologists have been hard-pressed to find traits that occur among all and only the members of a particular species."[23] This holds for both phenotypic and genotypic traits. With respect to the former, John Dupré writes:

no descent? How is it to be classified?" I expect the antiessentialist would simply bite the bullet here and say that the application of a species-concept to the very first organism is inappropriate. Mohan Matthen, for instance, would almost certainly reply in this fashion, given his view that questions regarding speciation (and presumably, by extension, initial species origination) can only be asked at the population level (M. Matthen, "Chicken, Eggs, and Speciation," *Noûs* 43 [2009]: 94-115).

[22] B. Ellis, *The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002).

[23] M. Ereshefsky, *The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy: A Philosophical Study of Biological Taxonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 98.

It is now widely agreed that gross morphological properties are not sufficient for the unambiguous and exhaustive partition of individuals into species. Crudely, this is because there is considerable intraspecific variation with respect to any such property, and the range of variation of a property within a species will often overlap the range of variation of the same property within other species.[24]

With respect to the latter, Elliott Sober writes that "no genotypic characteristics can be postulated as a species essence; the genetic variability found in sexual populations is prodigious."[25] Indeed, even Ellis, a staunch defender of essentialism within physics and chemistry, claims that there is insufficient genetic or other repetition to allow for *species* essences—at least, for essences that conform to the species classifications of contemporary biology.

The overwhelming biological evidence is that the intrinsic natures of animals and plants—that is, their genetic constitutions—show exactly the same variability as the animals and plants do themselves. Animals of the same species have similar genetic constitutions, and those of different species different ones. But the genetic constitutions of organisms are rarely, if ever, the same, *even within the same species*.[26]

Hence on his view the species of standard taxonomy are not themselves natural kinds, but clusters of similar natural kinds.[27]

In order to address this second objection, we need to clarify just what can and cannot be legitimately expected of a specifically *biological* essence. It is a commonplace that one distinguishing mark of the life sciences as compared with chemistry and physics is the greater complexity of the entities with which biology is concerned. Any organism, even at the level of bacteria, is astonishingly complex. And with this complexity comes a greater potential for variability. This appears to be a basic fact about

[24] J. Dupré, "Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa," *Philosophical Review* 90 (1981): 66-90, at 84.

[25] E. Sober, "Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism," *Philosophy of Science* 47 (1980): 350-83, at 372.

[26] Ellis, *The Philosophy of Nature*, 29-30.

[27] Evan Fales is another prominent advocate of essentialism in physics and chemistry who disavows it for biology: E. Fales, "Relative Essentialism," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 30 (1979): 349-70; idem, "Natural Kinds and Freaks of Nature," *Philosophy of Science* 49 (1982): 67-90.

natural kinds: as complexity increases, so does the potential for variability. As we move up the ladder of ontological complexity—from fundamental kinds to higher-level chemical kinds to simple biological kinds to more complex biological kinds—we see more and more variability in the internal constitutions of these kinds. Thus any two instances of a fundamental kind such as an electron are qualitatively identical, sharing precisely the same kind-essence. Moving up a step on the ladder of complexity we begin to see kinds with parts that are themselves members of different, lower-level kinds, such as an atom and its distinct subatomic parts. Now, even with these marginally higher-level kinds we begin to see a degree of variability of constitution, and hence we are faced with the question of how to classify isotopes. Isotopes arise because the potential for variability has increased at the atomic level over and against the subatomic. Still, the variability here occurs within fairly restricted bounds, and we can feel confident in affirming that what we have with isotopes are subkinds of the same generic kind (for instance, uranium 235 is a subkind of uranium) and that all instances of the subkind are intrinsically qualitatively identical.

So far, the ontology here seems relatively straightforward, and an essentialist has little difficulty integrating these empirical facts into her theory. However, as we move still further up the ladder of complexity, we find that the potential for variability within what are *prima facie* members of the same kind increases exponentially. The potential for genetic and morphological variability in the simplest of insects (for instance) is scales of magnitude beyond the variability of a uranium atom. And indeed this is to be expected; given the complexity of such a higher-level kind we can expect it to feature many spatially distinct parts, with many different layers of parts belonging to lower-level kinds. Given the increased complexity, there is also an increase in the potential for certain parts of some entity to be removed or altered without the entity as a whole undergoing a corresponding radical change. Generally speaking, the more complex the entity, the more robust it becomes in its ability to undergo alterations in its

constituent parts. The reason is that there are so many other parts to pick up the slack, as it were, maintaining the entity's overall character and dispositional properties. To put it crudely, a centipede can lose a single leg and cope better with the loss in terms of its overall character and functionality than a dog can after the loss of one of its legs (with respect to leggedness, a centipede is more complex than the dog). To use another example, a bacterium can alter some of its genetic material and still retain its overall character, while an atom cannot lose a constituent proton without being altered to a comparatively large extent—in part because the atom has far, far fewer parts than a bacterium.

To further clarify the point at issue: we see something similar in the realm of chemical kinds as we do in biological kinds, when one considers not an isolated single sample of a kind, but an aggregate. A single H_2O molecule cannot lose one of its constituent atoms without altering radically in character, indeed without ceasing to exist *qua* H_2O molecule. Now, most people would say that a drop of water, with its millions of constituent molecules, is an instance of H_2O, even though the drop is almost certainly not pure H_2O. Most likely it contains some samples of other, stray, non-H_2O molecules in the mix. Moreover, drop x's mix of non-H_2O molecules will almost certainly be different from drop y's particular mix. And if the example is not a single drop but, say, a cup from a river, the "almost certainly" becomes "certainly." Yet in common parlance (and even in scientific practice) we would still not hesitate to call the sample in question a sample of water, of H_2O. We implicitly recognize that complex aggregates of some instance of a chemical kind need not be 100% uniform in order to count as instances of that kind. The larger the aggregate, the greater the potential for variability. The larger the sample of river water, the more it will contain non-H_2O constituents, and a different precise set of such constituents than other samples. But that variability does not tell against their all being samples of water, because we recognize that a degree of internal variability is consistent with kind-identity when dealing

with a large, complex sample. I would submit that we are reasoning in the same commonsense way when we recognize that two giraffes are both giraffes even if they are not genetically identical. We recognize that the strict criterion of kind-identity used for a fundamental particle—namely, complete qualitative identity—is inappropriate for a tremendously complex higher-level kind. The underlying mistake being made by Ellis and others in this second objection is a common one in philosophy of science, namely, the mistake of taking some fact or standard that obtains within physics and assuming that it holds just the same across all sciences. Thus the fact that all electrons share a qualitatively identical kind-essence is taken to be a standard for identifying kind-essences in all other sciences. But why should one hold to the truth of that claim? Especially when, in this particular instance, such a privileging of physics seems wholly out of place?

However, Elder, drawing on David Hull,[28] argues that such analogies between biological variability and variability in macrolevel instances of chemical kinds are liable to miss a point that holds distinctly for biological species, namely, that "the very processes that bring biological species into existence guarantee that there will be ceaseless departures, among the members of a species, from both the 'typical' genotype and the 'typical' phenotype."[29] Natural selection operates in such a way that variability is part and parcel of the process.

In reply, I do not believe this point weakens the force of the analogies from complex nonbiological kinds, for much the same could be said of them. The natural processes that lead to the aggregation of water molecules into a discernible drop of water are such, by their very nature, as to allow for various non-H_2O molecules to enter into the mix. A truly pure drop of liquid water would likely only occur under artificially controlled laboratory conditions. Again, variability is a function on complexity. Biological kinds are among the most complex kinds to be found

[28] D. Hull, "The Effects of Essentialism on Taxonomy: Two Thousand Years of Stasis," *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 15 (1965); reprinted in M. Ereshefsky, ed., *The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of Species* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).

[29] Elder, "Biological Species Are Natural Kinds," 347.

in the natural world. Hence they will be highly variable. It is this background complexity that in turn allows for the variability inherent to natural selection. The difference here between biological and nonbiological kinds is merely one of degree.

The principal idea I am trying to advocate here is that Scholastic thinkers need not downplay the high variability of biological kinds, nor need they abandon essentialism. Rather, they should affirm that biological essences are specifically and irreducibly *biological* essences, that is, essences of higher-level kinds, with a degree of variability appropriate to kinds of such staggering complexity. Aquinas likewise leaves room for a degree of variability between individual, instantiated substantial forms, a variability associated with differences in the secondary matter associated with that form. Moreover his justification for this view is very much in keeping with the line of thought we have just been considering: "The difference of form which is due only to the different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a numeric difference: for different individuals have different forms, diversified according to the difference of matter."[30] All of this does of course raise the question, just how much variability can be allowed before it has to be admitted that we are dealing with a different kind-essence? Where precisely does one draw the line? Perhaps a natural-kind member can vary up to the point where the features that once allowed us to make reliable inductions with respect to it no longer allow for the same important inductions. Still, a degree of uncertainty here seems ineliminable, at least from an a priori perspective.[31] But the extent to which this might be seen as a problem for essentialism is surely lessened by Devitt's observation that

> there is just the same level of indeterminacy about species *whatever one's (Darwinian) view of them and of essentialism*. . . . For, *everyone agrees* that there

[30] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 7, ad. 3.

[31] This is significant, for surely there are many cases where, empirically, the occurrence of a speciation event is fairly obvious, even if the a priori criteria for such shifts in kind are not themselves entirely clear. The fact that there are difficult and borderline cases should not blind us to the fact that there are also clear instances, instances that follow the pattern of substantial shifts in reliable inductions.

comes a point where two organisms that have some common ancestor are nonetheless of different species. Yet there is no determinate matter of fact about precisely where that point is.[32]

On Devitt's view then, this is a worry pertinent to any concept of what it is to be a species, whether or not that concept makes reference to essences or even to intrinsic properties.

To strengthen Devitt's argument here, one might point out that this issue cannot be skirted by referring to the objective lineal relations present in the history of life, that is, to whatever phylogenetic tree is objectively correct, independently of the species concept one favors. For as Velasco points out, there are vagueness issues even here (which he regards as unproblematic):

When we zoom in very carefully at particular portions of the phylogeny, the relationship of individuals is reticulate and does not appear tree-like. At the 'nodes', or lineage splits, there is no instantaneous separation of one lineage into two, but rather, the borders are fuzzy. However, if we are looking at a current time slice of the phylogeny, the genealogical pattern between the tips is clear. This is not surprising in the least—taking a very careful look at the borders of a material object in space, say a table, will produce equally vague results. Here, we are attempting to find the precise temporal borders of a lineage which is surely vague in precisely the same way.[33]

So by drawing attention to the necessary complexity of biological kinds, it becomes apparent that any particular organism will be such as to have a species-specific essence allowing for a degree of variability of internal constitution in the organism. This will hold regardless of the particular theory of essence being advocated (hylomorphic, genetic, phenotypic, morphogenetic fields, etc.).

C) Essentialism Is Inconsistent with Evolution

The basic idea of this third objection is that species undergo significant genetic alteration over time. This seems incompatible

[32] Devitt, "Resurrecting Biological Essentialism," 373.

[33] J. Velasco, "Species Concepts Should Not Conflict with Evolutionary History, but Often Do," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biology and the Biomedical Sciences* 39 (2008): 407-14, at 413.

with a hylomorphic view of species; if the fundamental properties used to define the kind are changing over time, such that the substantial form is apparently being altered, then it can no longer perform a key part of the job that essentialists have traditionally assigned it, namely, to provide identity conditions. The essence cannot serve to define a kind if the essence itself is not stable. Since it appears that the fundamental intrinsic properties characteristic of the kind 'giraffe' change over time, it seems reasonable to think that such intrinsic properties fail to provide identity conditions for membership in that kind. Hull puts the point as follows:

> According to evolutionary theory, species develop gradually, changing one into another. If species evolved so gradually, they cannot be delimited by means of a single property or set of properties. If species can't be so delineated, then species names can't be defined in the classic manner. If species names can't be defined in the classical manner, then they can't be defined at all.[34]

To the extent that this worry is distinct from worries about vagueness and indeterminacy of species boundaries, I believe Devitt provides a compelling reply:

> Suppose that *S1* and *S2* are distinct species, on everyone's view of species, and that *S2* evolved from *S1* by natural selection. Essentialism requires that there be an intrinsic essence *G1* for *S1* and *G2* for *S2*. *G1* and *G2* will be different but will have a lot in common. This picture is quite compatible with the Darwinian view that the evolution of *S2* is a gradual process of natural selection operating on genetic variation among the members of *S1*.[35]

It seems, then, that an essentialist picture can allow for both short-term and gradual species evolution.[36] Indeed, as we have seen,

[34] Hull, "The Effects of Essentialism on Taxonomy," 203. One might think that the theory of punctuated equilibria could mitigate this criticism, proposing as it does that evolutionary change takes place in relatively quick and periodic bursts. But Ereshefsky (*Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy*, 96-97) argues that essentialism finds no ally here.

[35] Devitt, "Resurrecting Biological Essentialism," 372.

[36] See Sober, "Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism," 355-58 for a comparable argument. For a reply, see D. N. Stamos, *The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2003), 122. For an effective counterreply see Oderberg, *Real Essentialism*, 204-5.

essentialism not only allows for evolution but is plausibly required for it. Lineal relations are causally dependent on the intrinsic capacities of organisms, repeated across a population of organisms.

Note that the point being made here was made in the Scholastic literature some time ago; compare R. P. Phillips: "Considering, then, natural species in the strict sense, do our principles allow us to say that they could be transformed? There seems to be nothing in them to render it impossible for we should only have a striking example of substantial change."[37]

Other objections to intrinsic biological essentialism could be discussed.[38] For reasons of space, I will not attempt to address them all here, and it seems to me that the three I have discussed are the most potentially damaging. In what follows I will briefly present a positive argument on behalf of biological essentialism. Once again, I am not aiming at the more ambitious target of a distinctively hylomorphic account, but simply one that will achieve one of the core requirements of a hylomorphic theory, namely, a view of biological taxa that accords a key and irreducible place to intrinsic properties. And as noted earlier, this

[37] R. P. Phillips, *Modern Thomistic Philosophy: An Explanation for Students,* vol. 1: *Philosophy of Nature* (London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne Ltd., 1934), 342.

[38] These include: (1) The idea that essentialism has been done in by the shift in biology from typological to population thinking, and (2) the idea that species are not natural kinds at all but rather individuals. On the former claim see E. Mayr, "Typological versus Population Thinking," in B. J. Meggers, ed., *Evolution and Anthropology: A Centennial Appraisal* (Washington, D.C.: Anthroplogical Society of Washington, 1959); and Sober, "Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism." See also D. Walsh, "Evolutionary Essentialism," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 57 (2006): 425-48, at 434-44, for an essentialist reply, and T. Lewens, "What Is Wrong with Typological Thinking?" *Philosophy of Science* 76 [2009]: 355-71, for helpful further discussion. On the latter claim see for instance M. Ghiselin, "Species, Concepts, Individuality, and Objectivity," *Biology and Philosophy* 2 (1987): 127-44; and D. Hull, "A Matter of Individuality," *Philosophy of Science* 45 (1978): 335-60. S. Okasha ("Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism," *Synthese* 131 [2002]: 191-213, at 193-94) and Devitt ("Resurrecting Biological Essentialism," 348) argue that, even if true, the species-as-individuals thesis would not tell against essentialism. For additional critiques of the ontology and scientific utility of the thesis, see M. Ruse, "Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What?" *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 38 (1987): 225-42; and Elder, "Biological Species Are Natural Kinds."

will be a much-abridged treatment of an argument I develop at greater length elsewhere.

II. A Brief, Positive Argument for Intrinsic Biological Essentialism

It will surely be agreed to by all that 'organism' is a real (though highly generic) natural kind. It is in fact the basic or foundational category for all of biology. No organisms (i.e., no living things), no biology. Furthermore, it is a fact that any member of that kind is a member solely by virtue of intrinsic properties. This is evident from standard lists of the distinguishing features of life, which all consist of intrinsic properties such as the capacities for metabolism, reproduction, adaptation, etc.[39] Living things are distinguished from nonliving things by virtue of intrinsic properties. Now, when the identity conditions of a generic natural kind consist *entirely* of intrinsic properties, the identity conditions of more specific subkinds of that generic kind must consist *at least partly* of intrinsic properties. This is a basic fact about the logic of classification (if 'cat' shared nothing with 'mammal', cats would not be mammals) from which it follows that if the generic kind 'organism' has subkinds, those subkinds must have identity conditions consisting at least in part of intrinsic properties. And it is obvious that 'organism' has subkinds. Therefore those subkinds must have identity conditions consisting at least in part of intrinsic properties.

This is actually quite a modest conclusion, and one that can plausibly be thought to be presupposed by biologists even if not employed by them in taxonomic practice. The argument simply draws attention to the fact that to belong to a biological taxon is also to be an organism, and that to be an organism is necessarily to have a certain set of intrinsic properties. To extend it to a more robust form of essentialism, a form that would allow for

[39] See for instance H. Curtis and N. Barnes, *Biology*, 5th ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 1989), 26-27; K. Kaneko, *Life: An Introduction to Complex Systems Biology* (New York: Springer, 2006), 1-3; and D. Koshland, "The Seven Pillars of Life," *Science* 295 (2002): 2215-16.

biological classification in accordance with intrinsic properties (instead of in accordance solely with relational/historical properties, as in the majority position) a further argument is needed.

Assuming then that there are subkinds of the generic kind 'organism', and these subkinds must have identity conditions consisting at least in part of intrinsic properties, then *qua* members of the generic kind 'organism' these subkinds must be distinguishable from one another at least in part in terms of differences in their intrinsic properties. In support of this point, one may recall that the subkinds of 'organism', in order to be members of 'organism', must have identity conditions that overlap with its identity conditions ('cat' and 'mammal' again). Consequently, if there are multiple subkinds under 'organism', those subkinds must be distinguishable among themselves by virtue of differences in the characteristics that make them organisms. Otherwise, while these taxa may differ amongst themselves, they will not differ amongst themselves *qua* organisms. For example, the subkinds 'mammal' and 'reptile' are both members of the more generic natural kind 'organism' because they have among their defining traits such intrinsic properties as capacity for adaptation, capacity for reproduction, etc. Yet as subkinds they differ from one another, in that they have different modes of reproduction, different adaptive abilities, etc. They both reproduce, and they both adapt, and so they are both organisms. But the ways in which they reproduce and adapt are very different, which makes them very different kinds of organism (hence distinct subkinds falling under 'organism').

Now, if it is permissible in biology to classify subkinds of 'organism' in terms of the ways in which they are distinguishable as subkinds of 'organism,' then it is permissible to classify subkinds of 'organism' at least partly by their intrinsic properties. As the antecedent is clearly true, there can therefore be no theoretical barrier to classifying subkinds of the highly generic kind 'organism' at least partly by their intrinsic properties. And that is enough to derail the majority antiessentialist position in

philosophy of biology, which claims that only classification according to lineal relations is legitimate.

Perhaps the application of the argument to taxonomic practice could use a bit of additional clarification. One can consider the case of two organisms that differ in no significant ways in any of the intrinsic characteristics that make them organisms (so they have the same types of metabolism, capacities for growth, etc.), but that have come to occupy very different ecological niches. A Scholastic biologist, thinking in essentialist terms, might well think of these two organisms as belonging to one and the same species. By contrast, a taxonomist working with the ecological species concept (one of several dozen competing species concepts employed in theoretical biology) might classify them as belonging to two different species (since, on that species concept, to be a certain species is to be a group of lineally related organisms sharing the same ecological niche). Yet even if one adopts the ecological species concept and views these organisms as belonging to different taxa, it will remain the case that these organisms do not differ *qua* organisms. That is, they do not differ in any of the characteristics that make them organisms as opposed to nonorganisms, which means that they are not really distinct subkinds of organism. This is not to say that differences in niche are unimportant or uninteresting, nor is it to disqualify the ecological species concept as a legitimate basis for taxonomic division. It is simply to say that in order for two taxa to be considered two different kinds of organism, they must differ in one or more of the identity conditions definitive of 'organism.' Any other differences will, from the point of view of that generic kind, be viewed as accidental and not definitive of a real subkind of organism (though it may be a subkind of some other legitimate category). One thing that makes ecological niche so important is its impact on evolution: organisms often change to adapt to a certain ecology. Consequently, if two populations of the same species come to occupy very different ecologies, chances are they will gradually begin to diverge in their intrinsic characteristics in order to accommodate their differing environments. Taking a

long view, differences in ecological niche will in fact track speciation. But from the perspective of biological essentialism, differing ecological niches are not *constitutive* of different populations belonging to different subkinds of 'organism', but rather *causes* of different populations coming to belong to different kinds.

Conclusion

I do not claim that an essentialist mode of classification is the only legitimate mode of classification in biology. I am a pluralist with respect to classification, and tend to think that the legitimacy of a taxonomy is tied up with the research goals of the taxonomist. What I hope to have shown however is that an essentialist mode of classification is just as legitimate as any other. Of course, from a Scholastic perspective there *is* a privileged goal in taxonomy, namely, definition in accordance with real essence as opposed to accidental division by relational or other criteria. If one's chief concern is fundamental ontology, this is clearly the way to go; but biologists are not necessarily concerned with fundamental ontology, and we should hardly be surprised that alternative modes of classification are employed by them.

In consequence, intrinsic essentialism is an acceptable option in thinking about the ontology of species. There is no theoretical barrier to maintaining that what makes a cat a cat is not merely its lineage, but its intrinsic nature, however exactly that is defined—whether in terms of genotype, phenotype, morphogenetic field, or substantial form. Clearly that is a necessary first step to the defense of a more thoroughly Scholastic ontology of biological species, one in which a recognition of substantial form plays an ineliminable role. I lack the space to begin developing that more robust defense here; however, I will note that any essentialist philosophy of biology will be faced with the question of what, if anything, grounds and unifies the collection of intrinsic properties generally taken to be definitive of 'organism' (properties such as metabolism, capacity for

reproduction, capacity for adaptation, etc.). This issue is often left wholly unaddressed in the existing literature on the nature and origin of life, and constitutes one possible opening for the introduction of substantial form into the discussion (an introduction that would in turn help draw out the tight connection between classification and explanation that is such a prominent feature of Scholastic philosophy of nature).

There is a good deal more work to be done relating and (sometimes) integrating Scholastic philosophy of nature with recent developments in philosophy of biology, and analytic philosophy of science more generally. It should be clear that such discussion is both necessary and potentially productive.[40]

[40] I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Marc Ereshefsky, Crawford Elder, and an anonymous referee for *The Thomist* for many helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper.

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PHILOSOPHY IN THE TEACHING OF THEOLOGY BY THOMAS AQUINAS[1]

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THE MORE FULLY we understand the historical context of the life, work, and thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, the more completely we are able to grasp the meaning and value of his philosophical and theological insights as well as the importance of his sources to the formation of his thought. Here I wish first to provide a brief biographical account of Thomas with emphasis on his work as teaching assistant and professor. As we shall see, the young Thomas wrote works of different literary genres early in his career which contain revealing aspects of his thinking on the relation of philosophy and theology. For present purposes I will focus on just two of these: first, his use of philosophical citation (*auctoritas*) in an instance of theological reasoning; second, the massive use of philosophical authority within his commentary on the *Sentences*. With respect to the first we shall see Thomas draw upon Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*

[1] This paper was presented at Marquette University at the 2008 conference on Aquinas and the Arabic Philosophical Tradition, at the invitation of Prof. R. Taylor, whom I thank very much. I also wish to thank the late Fr. L. J. Bataillon as well as Fr. D. Ols, both of whom read this study and whose advice was profitable. In addition I thank Prof. M. Johnson who, in collaboration with Prof. Taylor, translated this text into English, and Fr. B. Davies, who kindly revised this translation. A first French version has been published in *Université, Eglise, Culture: L'Université Catholique au Moyen Age*, Actes du 4ème Symposium de la "Fédération Internationale des Universités Catholique," Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 11-14 mai 2005 (Paris, 2007), 233-68. I thank the director of the Fédération for permission to reproduce here part of that text.

in explicating Isaiah and Jeremiah; in the second, we shall see how deeply Thomas, with explicit citation, drew upon Aristotle as well as works of the Arabic and Jewish philosophical tradition (including those by Avicenna, Averroës, the author of the *Liber de causis*, Maimonides, et al.), in addition to Cicero, Boethius, and many other related philosophical sources of the Latin tradition. I will conclude with a consideration of some key texts in which Thomas treats explicitly of the relationship between philosophy and theology.

I. The First Intellectual Formation and the University Career of Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas was born around 1225 during the reign of Emperor Frederick II, in a region of the Kingdom of Sicily at the boundary of the Papal States. He grew up in a noble family in the service of the emperor, and his father was the governor of the region, near the military theater where the armies of the emperor and those of the pope battled.[2]

Raised until the age of five in the castle of Roccasecca, Thomas was then brought to the nearby abbey of Monte Cassino, where he received his first intellectual education. Probably in the year 1239, when the abbey itself was an object of a violent conflict between the emperor and the pope, Thomas was sent to the

[2] Cf. F. Scandone, "La vita, la famiglia e la patria di S. Tommaso," in *S. Tommaso d'Aquino O.P. Miscellanea storico-artistica*, ed. I. Taurisano (Rome: Società tipografica A. Manuzio, 1924), 46-51. Regarding the year of the birth of Aquinas and the chronology of his life, see A. Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la "sacra doctrina." Avec édition du prologue de son commentaire des Sentences* (Paris: Vrin, 2006), 188-202 and 252 n. 173. Since this work does not indicate particular bibliographical references, see J.-P. Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin. Sa personne et son œuvre* (2d ed.; Paris: Editions du Cerf 2002); English trans., *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal (rev. ed.; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005). For the chronology of Aquinas's works, see R. A. Gauthier, *S. Thomae de Aquino, Opera omnia,* t. 22/2, *Quaestiones de quolibet* (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1996), 479-500; for the *Sentences* commentary, see above; the Leonine Commission does not regard "Adoro [te] devote" to be an authentic work of St. Thomas.

university *studium* of Naples,[3] founded by Frederick II in 1224, and restructured by him ten years later.[4] We still know only poorly this first stage of the university-level formation of the young Thomas. However a letter of 1239 written by the masters and students attests that in this period the *studium* was full of activity and informs us of the matters studied at the time: the sciences of the *quadrivium*, logic, philosophy (probably metaphysics), and theology.[5] One can rule out the possibility that during this period Thomas was able to study under Peter of Ireland; the presence of Peter at the *studium* is not attested to before the year 1250,[6] and Andrea Robiglio has shown well the hagiographical origin of that legend.[7]

It was probably in 1242 at Naples that Thomas entered the Order of Preachers.[8] He was then compelled to spend about a year under a house arrest with his family and in 1246 at the latest he arrived in Paris,[9] where friar Albert of Cologne taught. It was

[3] S. Tugwell, "The Life and Works of Thomas Aquinas," in *Albert & Thomas: Selected Writings*, ed. and trans. S. Tugwell, Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press 1988), 201-3.

[4] See F. Delle Donne, "La fondazione dello *Studium* di Napoli: note sulle circolari del 1224 e del 1234," in *Atti della Accademia Pontaniana*, n.s. 42 (1993): 179-97, especially the edition of the letter of 1234 (196-97).

[5] F. Delle Donne, "'Per scientiarum haustum et seminarium doctrinarum': Edizione e studio dei documenti relativi allo *Studium* di Napoli in età sveva," in *Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano per il medioevo* 111 (2009): 101-225, especially n. 146.

[6] M. Dunne, "The Person of Peter of Ireland," in *Magistri Petri de Ybernia, Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis Librum de longitudine et breuitate uitae, (ex. cod. Vat. lat. 825, ff. 92r-102r)* (Louvain, 1993), 1-9.

[7] A. A. Robiglio, "'Neapolitan Gold': A Note on William of Tocco and Peter of Ireland," in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 44 (2002): 107-11; idem, "'Et Petrus in insulam deportatur': Concerning Michael Dunne's opinion on Peter of Ireland," in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 46 (2004): 1-4. See also the response of Dunne to the first note of A. A.Robiglio: M. W. Dunne, "Concerning 'Neapolitan Gold': A Note on William of Tocco and Peter of Ireland . A Response to Andrea Robiglio," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 45 (2003): 61-65.

[8] See Tugwell, "Life and Works," 204-7; 1242 is the date that medieval biographers seem to indicate for Thomas's taking of the Dominican habit.

[9] See Torrell, *Initiation*, 28. It must be remembered that from around 1241 up to 1246 the provincial of the Roman Province of Dominicans which Thomas entered was the Savoyard Humbert of Romans (d. 1277), who in 1246 went to Paris for the General Chapter meeting, following which he was elected provincial of the Dominican Province of France. Afterwards, he became Master of the Order from 1254 to 1263. For further reading on Humbert of

during the years 1246-1248 that the young Italian friar first came into contact with the University of Paris. Rene-Antoine Gauthier has noted that Thomas Aquinas, during the span of his teaching career, displayed a detailed knowledge of the *Ethica vetus*, the *Ethica nova*, and the commentaries made on these works at Paris during the 1240s. Yet Thomas could not have acquired that knowledge either at Naples before 1246, or at the Parisian faculty of arts after 1252, when those discussions were superseded; this confirms for us, then, that at Paris between 1246 and 1248 the young Italian friar not only came into contact with the teaching of philosophy at the faculty of arts, but also came to be imbued with this teaching for the rest of his career.[10]

After a period of three years at Cologne, where he was the assistant to Master Albert, Thomas returned to Paris to "read" the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. However, a university career also involved the "cursory" reading of some books of the Bible before the reading of the *Sentences*, and we have precisely this in the teaching of Thomas: his lectures on the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah.[11] Here a "cursory" reading means, as the word indicates, a short commentary which presents the global content of the chapters bringing out the key points around which the material of the books is organized to reveal the design of the divine author. Thomas's commentary on Isaiah is extant and one

Romans, see Humberti de Romanis, *Legendae sancti Dominici*, ed. S. Tugwell (Rome: Institutum Historicum Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum 2008), xxff.

[10] Without gainsaying R. A. Gauthier's remark that Thomas had access to certain commentaries on the *Ethics* of the period, it must be said that this does not necessarily imply that Thomas attended the faculty of arts, which was forbidden to him since he was a religious. See Torrell, *Initiation*, 29-30, and also 33-36; A. Oliva, "La contemplation des philosophes selon Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 96 (2012): 585-662, esp. 618-30.

[11] Regarding Thomas's teaching at the University of Paris, see O.Weijers, *Terminologie des universités au XIIIe siècle* (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1987); *Le maniement du savoir: Pratiques intellectuelles à l'époque des premières universités (xiii^{e}-xiv^{e} siècles)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996). For the faculty of theology, see L. Sileo, "Università e teologia," in *Storia della teologia nel Medioevo*, ed. G. D'Onofrio, vol. 2, *La grande fioritura* (Casale Monferrato: Piemme, 1996), 471-550. Also see L.-J. Bataillon, "Les conditions de travail des maîtres de l'université de Paris au xiii^{e} siècle," *Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologique* 67 (1983): 417-32; and idem, "Il lavoro intellettuale al tempo di san Tommaso," in *Studi 1996* (Rome: Istituto San Tommaso 1996), 13-21.

part of it, which is in his handwriting, allows us to place this teaching at Paris.[12]

In the autumn of 1251, or 1252 at the latest, Thomas began his career teaching at the University of Paris reading "cursorily" two books of the Bible. We should note that this case of Thomas Aquinas constitutes the first certain attestation that religious were required to comment "cursorily" on the Bible at the University before they were permitted to "read" the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Moreover, we have a document of the University of Paris dating to 1252, in which it is expressly requested of religious that they bind themselves to the regulation that envisages this "cursory" commenting on the Bible as a precondition for commenting on the *Sentences*.[13]

In course Thomas commented on the first and the second books of the *Sentences* during the school year 1252-1253, or 1253-1254, and the year following he taught the third and fourth books. The editorial redaction of the commentary on each of the books was contemporary with, or immediately followed, the teaching of the book itself; indeed, we can be certain that the model-version (*exemplar*) of the *Commentary* on the first book of the *Sentences* was already available for being copied for distribution even before Thomas had begun to teach the treatise on faith in the third book, in the following year.[14]

[12] James A. Weisheipl, O.P., in *Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1974; 1983 with corrigenda and addenda), believed he could locate this at Cologne, during the time when Thomas was Albert's assistant. For a contrary view, see Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement*, 207-24.

[13] Cf. *Cartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 1, *Ab anno 1200 usque ad annum 1286,* ed. H. Denifle and A. Châtelain (Paris : Delalain, 1889), n. 200, 226-27; cf. Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement*, 210-13. The document of 1252 has been very well studied in J. Verger, "Le conflit entre séculiers et mendiants à l'Université de Paris dans les années 1250: Une affaire de pouvoir?", in *Université, église, culture: L'Université catholique au moyen-âge* (Paris: Fédération internationale des Universités Catholiques 2007), 125-40. The beginnings of Thomas's teaching of the *Sentences* at the University of Paris have been well-studied by Clarie Angotti, "Les débuts du *Livre des Sentences* comme manuel de théologie à l'Université de Paris," in *Université, église, culture*, 57-124.

[14] I *Sent.,* d. 2, a. 3, the so-called Roman disputation on the divine attributes, was also included in the first *exemplar* (of 1253 or 1254) of the commentary on book 1 of the *Sentences:* cf. Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement*, 164-66.

The "cursory" teaching of the Bible and lecturing on the *Sentences* constituted the two fundamental stages toward application for a "license to teach" (*licentia docendi*), which would lead to teaching at the level of a master. Before obtaining the license, one had to be received by the college of masters in order to obtain a chair for teaching. At that time, only one who had obtained a chair and had taught as a regent master could have the title of "Master" of the University of Paris. Between obtaining the *licentia docendi* and beginning to teach as a Master one would have to pass a certain time during which the candidate for the Master's position had to assist a regent master. This type of assistant came to be designated by the phrase "trained bachelor." The reading of the *Sentences* was in fact an integral part of the teaching that was to take place under the oversight of one of the chairs of the University; and each bachelor commenting on the *Sentences* read the work as an assistant of a regent master, whom he thereafter assisted in disputations. We know practically nothing about the Master for whom Thomas was the assistant. It was probably Elias Brunet, from whom we have only a few fragments.[15]

Thomas completed teaching the *Sentences* at the end of the 1253-1254 school year or, at the latest, the following year, 1254-1255. However, he did not immediately obtain the "license to teach" (*licentia docendi*) from the chancellor of the University of Paris and the pope had to intervene in March 1256 on behalf of Thomas and Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, so that the two mendicant friars could become regent masters.[16]

The reason for this delay was the famous quarrel between the secular clergy (i.e., diocesan clergy) and the mendicant friars, concerning which J. Verger has provided new discoveries. If we consider that the document that initiated the fight dates to February 1252 and that the one that brought it to a close is dated 12 August 1257, we see that Thomas had to perform his first teaching on the Bible and on the *Sentences* all in a period of

[15] See Th. Kaeppeli, *Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum medii aevi,* v. 1 (Rome, 1970), 363.
[16] See Torrell, *Initiation,* 73-78.

turbulence. The matter was of such great concern that during the winter of 1255-1256 the Dominican convent of Saint-Jacques had to be guarded by the king's archers. Friar Thomas had to wait probably two years before being received into the consortium of masters (*consortium magistrorum*), around June 1256; on the other hand, Bonaventure, who had read the *Sentences* two years before Thomas, was made to wait three or four years.[17]

During the two years that immediately followed his teaching of the commentary on the *Sentences*, Thomas devoted himself to finishing the editing of his, which is designated with the term "Scriptum." During this time he also assisted his master in disputations and teaching.

Thomas did not take on the responsibilities of regent master until 1256, and he discharged them up to 1259.[18] To allow for a high number of its members to obtain the title of Masters in Theology, the Order of Preachers had decided to limit the duration of teaching to three years. It was by exception that Thomas was called to teach at Paris a second time, 1268 to1272.

The extraordinary reasons Thomas left teaching in Rome in 1268 to assume a second mandate as a professor in one of the two chairs held by the Dominicans at Paris are well known. They had to do with the second phase of the quarrel between the seculars and the mendicants. If during the first phase of these struggles

[17] See Verger, "Le conflit entre séculiers et mendiants," 125-40.

[18] Concerning the years 1259-1269 see Torrell, *Initiation,* 141-259. For a second commentary on the *Sentences* see Thomas Aquinas, *Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, ed. L. E. Boyle and J. F. Boyle (Toronto: Pontifical Mediaeval Institute 2006); A. Oliva, "L'enseignement des *Sentences* dans les *Studia* dominicains italiens au XIII^{e} siècle: L'*Alia lectura* de Thomas d'Aquin et le *Scriptum* de Bombolognus de Bologne," in *Philosophy and Theology in the "Studia" of Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts*, Acts of the XVth Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie médiévale, marking the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Société, University of Notre Dame, 8-10 October 2008, ed. K. Emery, Jr., and W. J. Courtenay (Turnhout: Brepols, forthcoming). For the beginning of *Summa Theologiae*, see L. Boyle, "The Setting of the *Summa theologiae* of Saint Thomas," The Etienne Gilson Series 5 (Toronto, 1982), 14 (this article was included in L. Boyle, *Facing History: A Different Thomas Aquinas* [Louvain-la-Neuve, 2000], 65-91); B. Davies, ed., *Aquinas's "Summa Theologiae": Critical Essays* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); A. Oliva, "La *Somme de théologie* de Thomas d'Aquin. Introduction historique et littéraire," in *Chôra. Revue d'études anciennes et médiévales* 7-8 (2009-10): 217-53.

Bonaventure figured largely, Thomas's engagement was nonetheless quite vigorous, all the more so because the secular clergy had set out to deprive the Dominicans of one of their two chairs. During the second phase of these struggles it was Thomas who led the defense of the mendicant religious life.[19]

To conclude this presentation of the "university biography" of Aquinas, we must say something about about the Neapolitan period of his teaching. There can be no doubt that the *studium* of the Kingdom of Sicily conducted university-level courses. Thomas taught there when Charles d'Anjou reorganized the *studium* in 1272. The reform of 1234 had already foreseen the teaching of theology and in 1272 Thomas was charged with it, as the acts of King Charles indicate . On 15 October 1272, Charles assigned friar Thomas an honorarium of one ounce of gold each month for the expenses tied to his teaching: "Since our beloved religious man brother Thomas Aquinas must teach theology at Naples, we wish to provide him a subsidy in his expenses, and for this reason want him to be provided with one ounce of gold (common weight) for each month as long as he teaches there."[20] The document says "because friar Thomas Aquinas must teach theology at Naples" (*aput Neapolim in theologia legere debeat*). This phrasing is explained by the fact that the task of teaching theology in a Dominican convent in the Roman province (upon which the whole Italian peninsula depended at that time) was assigned to Friar Thomas by the provincial chapter of Florence in 1272; but it was Thomas who decided to establish a Dominican *studium* in Naples, where he would perform this teaching.[21]

In choosing this city Thomas answered a wish of King Charles d'Anjou, who had invited students from the University of Paris to

[19] See Torrell, *Initiation,* 109-39 and 261-86.

[20] "Cum religiosus vir frater Thomas de Aquino dilectus noster aput Neapolim in theologia legere debeat, nos volentes sibi exhibere subsidium in expensis et propter hoc de una uncia auri ponderis generalis pro quolibet mense quamdiu ibidem legerit sibi providere velimus" (M.-H. Laurent, "Documenta," in *Fontes Vitae S. Thomae de Aquino*, fasc. vi [Saint-Maximin: Revue thomiste, 1937], 579-80).

[21] "Studium generale theologie quantum ad locum et personas et numerum studentium committimus plenarie fr. Thome de Aquino" (Th. Kaeppeli and A. Dondaine, *Acta Capitulorum provincialium Provinciae Romanae [1243-1344]* [Rome, 1941], 39).

go to Naples when there was another strike in the winter of 1272.[22] During these two years, Thomas was also often occupied with complex dealings with his family. What is more, the foundations of numerous Dominican houses resulted from his exchanges with various prelates. All of this sheds light on a new dimension of Professor Thomas Aquinas.[23] The image of a man whose intellectual concentration isolated him from the world and left him in the clouds disappears. Thomas appears instead as someone well aware of the concrete matters of daily life and politics. It was not without reason that Roger d'Aquila, Count of Traetto (d. 26 August 1272) designated his brother-in-law Thomas Aquinas executor of his last will and testament.[24]

II. The Literary Genres of Thomas's University Teaching

A) The "Cursory" Reading of the Books of Isaiah and Jeremiah

It is worth remembering that Thomas's first university responsibility was commenting on books of the Bible. As far as we can tell from the present state of our knowledge of the university's regulations, the choice of books to be commented on was open. Thomas chose the books of the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah. It would seem that Bonaventure had similarly commented "cursorily" on Luke's gospel two years earlier.[25] The

[22] See *Cartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 1, n. 443, 501-2.

[23] On 27 December 1269, when Thomas was already in Paris, the abbot of Monte Cassino, Bernard Ayglier, in consideration of his friendship with Brother Thomas and also Brother Troiano, gave the Dominicans authorization to build a convent at San Germano (see Laurent, "Documenta," 571-72). In March 1272, the archbishop of Salerno, Mathew della Porta, in consideration of his friendship with Friar Thomas gave the Dominicans the abbey of Saint-Paul of Palearia for the establishment of a convent (ibid., 573-74).

[24] Three documents come from the chancellery of the King of Sicily, Charles the First of Anjou, attesting that Brother Thomas Aquinas must devote himself for a certain period of time to the handling the problems of succession posed by the inheritance (ibid., 575-79).

[25] See the testimony of certain manuscripts of the *Postille super Lucam* in J. G. Bougerol, *Introduction à saint Bonaventure* (Paris: J. Vrin 1988), 170-80. One can also see this in the description of the manuscripts given by the editors of the Quaracchi edition in the "Prolegomena" of *S. Bonaventurae, Opera Omnia*, ed. Quaracchi (Quaracchi, 1948), vol. 7, pp. ix-xi. See likewise the discussion in Th. Reist, *Saint Bonaventure as a Biblical*

"cursory" character of Thomas's first biblical commentaries does not prevent us from anticipating a few of the young theologian's personal interests. Particularly revealing here are his expositions of the Isaian text's spiritual or mystical sense, which appear in this commentary's "gatherings of authorities" (*collationes auctoritatum*).[26]

Worth noting here is that the largest part of these *collationes* has Christ as its subject: as savior, liberator, doctor, shepherd, and also as model for his faithful. To be sure, the Isaian text lends itself to such a reading. But this aspect of the young Dominican's spirituality is nonetheless worth emphasizing. Many of the themes of the spiritual life developed in his later writings, such as the moral part of the *Summa Theologiae*, already appear here in germ. One notices, for example, the action of the Father and of the Holy Spirit in the sanctification of the faithful. The other "gatherings" concern the spiritual life of the faithful: they are to render their acts virtuous by imitating Christ and the saints and by nourishing themselves with the Word of God.[27] An analysis of the commentary on Jeremiah—conducted, unfortunately, on a text

Commentator: A Translation and Analysis of His Commentary on Luke, XVIII,34 – XIX, 42 (Lanham-New York-London: University Press of America, 1985), 68-70. See also B. Faes de Mottoni, "Introduzione," in *San Bonaventura, Commento al Vangelo di San Luca / 1, (1-4)*, *S. Bonaventurae Opera*, vol. 9/1 (Rome: Città Nuova, 1999), 7-26.

[26] P.-M. Gils, "Les *Collationes* marginales dans l'autographe du commentaire de S. Thomas sur Isaïe," in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 42 (1958): 255.

[27] Jean-Pierre Torrell and Denise Bouthillier have devoted several valuable studies to these short texts: "Quand saint Thomas méditait sur le prophète Isaïe," in *Revue thomiste* 90 (1990): 5-47, reprinted in J.-P. Torrell, *Recherches thomasiennes: Études revues et augmentées* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2000), 242-81; D. Bouthillier, "Le Christ en son mystère dans les *collationes* du *Super Isaiam* de Thomas d'Aquin," in *Ordo sapientiae et amoris: Image et message de saint Thomas d'Aquin à travers les récentes études historiques, herméneutiques et doctrinales. Hommage au professeur Jean-Pierre Torrell OP à l'occasion de son 65e anniversaire*, ed. C.-J. Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1993), 37-64; idem, "*Splendor gloriae Patris*: Deux collations du *Super Isaiam* de S. Thomas d'Aquin," in *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans: Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers*, ed. K. Emery, Jr., and J. Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1998), 139-56.

not critically edited—finds forty such *collationes*, whose themes mainly concern moral theology.[28]

This brings us to a second notable aspect of these youthful works: within an eminently theological context, Thomas shows no hesitation in employing philosophical authorities to develop theological arguments. In so doing, he gives expression to two domains of a believer's thought: philosophy and theology. What follows is an example that is curious and interesting for more than one reason. At the outset of his exposition of Isaiah 4:1 ("And on that day seven women will take hold of one man"), Thomas seeks a few reasons for the admissibility of this act, noting that "the Lord is not consoled by that which is illicit." He immediately turns to Aristotle: "It is necessary to observe, as the Philosopher says, that the union of a male and a female, among human beings, is not only for generation, as is the case for the animals, but also for a better life [*ad commodum vitae*]. There are thus different actions of the man and of the woman with which they reciprocally help each other."[29] Thereafter he shows that the legislator could recognize, in certain cases, the licit character of polygamy, for nature allows the man to impregnate more than one woman, while it dies not allow the opposite, that is, for a woman to bear children simultaneously for more than one man. He concludes by saying that it is not good that a man have more than one woman, "because that prevents the community of life, given that the complete or total friendship that should exist between husband and wife, for which reason a man leaves his father and his mother, cannot be had towards many wives."[30] It is noteworthy that the

[28] See H.-F. Dondaine and L. Reid, "Préface," in Thomae de Aquino, *Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 28, ed. Leonina (Rome, 1974), 20* n. 7.

[29] "*Et apprehendent septem mulieres* [*uirum unum in die illa* ...]. Sed ex hoc uidetur quod sit licitum habere plures uxores, quia Dominus numquam consolatur per illicitum. Preterea, omne peccatum est innaturale; sed habere unum uirum plures uxores est naturale, quia unus potest fecundare plures. – Ad quod dicendum quod, sicut dicit Philosophus, coniunctio maris et femine in hominibus non est tantum propter generationem, sicut in brutis, sed etiam ad commodum uite: unde et maris et femine sunt diuerse operationes in quibus auxiliantur sibi inuicem" (*Super Isaiam*, c. 4 [Leonine ed., 28:33, ll. 1 and 28-38]).

[30] "Et adhuc magis impedit communem uitam, quia perfecta amicitia qualis est inter uirum et uxorem, propter quam etiam homo patrem et matrem derelinquit, Gen. ii_{24}, non potest esse ad multas" (ibid. [Leonine ed., 28:33, ll. 64-68]).

authority of the Philosopher—Aristotle—is invoked not only at the beginning of the argument, but also in the conclusion, where Thomas links the reference to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* with the Book of Genesis.[31]

It is remarkable that the Thomas who so juxtaposes philosophical and theological authorities is a young entrant at the University of Paris, not yet thirty years old (possibly just twenty-five). But this gives rise to an obvious question: on what basis does he do this?It is certainly the truth of the philosophical proposition that lets Thomas integrate it into a theological discourse, because the truth, as such, transcends these two domains of research which constitute two different disciplines. Indeeed, for Thomas the theologian every truth is a participation in first truth, God. If we make a quantitative comparison between the citations of Aristotle and those of Augustine in these two commentaries (Isaiah and Jeremiah), we find that the Philosopher is cited ten times and Saint Augustine twelve; and we also find similar proportions in the subsequent commentary on the *Sentences*.

B) The Commentary on the Sentences

We are fortunate enough to have most of Thomas's commentary on the third book of the *Sentences* in his own handwriting; we also have one of the archetypes of the university tradition, the *exemplar* found today at the Cathedral Library of Pamplona (Spain). This enables us to study in a quite precise way the manner itself in which Thomas composed the commentary on the four books and how the publication of works of this kind took place in the thirteenth century.[32]

[31] Regarding the application of citations and philosophical axioms in theology, D. Ols, *Le Cristologie contemporanee e le loro posizioni fondamentali al vaglio della dottrina di S. Tommaso* (Vatican City: Editrice Vaticana, 1991), 125-36.

[32] P.-M. Gils, "Textes inédits de S. Thomas: Les premières rédactions du *Scriptum super Tertio Sententiarum*," in *Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologique* 45 (1961): 201-28; 46 (1962): 445-62 and 609-28; idem, "Codicologique et critique: Pour une étude du ms. Pamplona, Catedral 51," in *Scriptorium* 32 (1978): 221-30; idem, "S. Thomas écrivain," in Thomae de Aquino, *Super Boetium de Trinitate. Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus*, in *Opera omnia* 50, ed. Leonina (Rome and Paris, 1992), 175-209. Regarding the production

When Friar Thomas Aquinas applied himself to this teaching, the method of commentary on the text of Peter Lombard had long been fixed: the study of each section of the *Sentences* text commented upon opened with the division of the section and closed with its exposition. Elsewhere I have shown that the matter of an individual lecture (*lectio*) corresponded to one distinction or to one part of a distinction.[33] The "division of the text" (*divisio textus*) and the "exposition of the text" (*expositio textus*) constitute what remains of the original manner of commenting on the *Sentences*. It consisted in the explication of Lombard's text, sometimes with the use of short questions. This method often appears in Thomas's written "expositions of the text." But by his time the overall procedure had changed. Towards the middle of the 1240s it had become customary to insert real questions, subdivided into articles, between the division and the exposition. Designated by the word "gloss," the older method is well represented by Alexander of Hales's *Commentary*.[34] Of the same genre is the commentary of the first Dominican master to teach the *Sentences* at Oxford, Richard Fishacre, around 1242.[35] The commentary of Odo Rigaldus (1240-1244) also remains close to

of books in the Middle Ages, see *La production du livre universitaire au Moyen-Age, "exemplar" et "pecia." Actes du Symposium tenu au Collegio San Bonaventura de Grottaferrata en mai 1983*, textes réunis par L.-J. Bataillon, B. G. Guyot et R. H. Rouse (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1988); R. H. Rouse and M. A. Rouse, *Manuscripts and their Makers: Commercial Book Producers in Medieval Paris 1200-1500*, 2 vols. (London: Harvey Miller Publisher, 2000).

[33] Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement*, 225-41.

[34] Regading the teaching of the *Sentences* in the faculty of theology at Paris, see F. Del Punta-C. Luna, "La teologia scolastica" in *Lo Spazio letterario nel medioevo. 1. Il medioevo latino*", vol. 1, t. 2, ed. G. Cavallo, Cl. Leonardo, and E. Menesto (Rome: Editrice Salerno 1993), 323-53; and for an overview of the teaching of the *Sentences*, see P. Glorieux, "Sentences," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. 14/2, ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, and É. Amann (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1941), col. 1860-84.

[35] His teaching of the *Sentences* was after 1241 and before 1246: see R. J. Long and M. O'Carroll, *The Life and Works of Richard Fishacre OP.: Prolegomena to the Edition of his Commentary on the Sentences* (Munich: Bayerischen Academie der Wissenschaften 1999), 39-46.

this method.[36] On the other hand, Albert the Great, who taught at Paris at the same time as Odo, or perhaps a little later, follows the newer method of commenting with the introduction of questions.[37] Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas both adopted the newer procedure.[38] One observes a parallel evolution at the faculty of arts: an anonymous *Lectura in librum De anima* (c. 1245) attests to the use of a method similar to that of Albert in his *Sentences* commentary.[39]

The evolution of the teaching of the *Sentences* gradually diminished the importance of Lombard's text, all the while granting an ever-larger place to contemporary theological and philosophical developments. Contrary to what one might have expected, this evolution did not involve a loss of interest in Greek and Latin Fathers. At the same time, the study of the works of Aristotle's works on the philosophy of nature, psychology, and metaphysics assumed a capital role in the theological development of certain authors, particularly Aquinas.

To get an idea of the sources Thomas employs, one can refer to the "Index of Authorities" on Thomas's *Scriptum* on the *Sentences* drawn up by Charles Lohr.[40] Though this index is based

[36] The reading of the *Sentences* by Eudes Rigaud has to be placed between 1240 and 1244. According to L. Sileo, it can be set more precisely between 1240 and 1242. See L. Sileo, *Teoria della scienza teologica. "Quaestio de scientia theologiae" di Odo Rigaldi e altri testi inediti (1230-1250)*, vol. 1 (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum 1984), 90-93.

[37] See J. A. Weisheipl, "Life and Works of St. Albert the Great," in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1980), 21-22 ; for the chronology of the works of Albert, see H. Anzulewicz, *De forma resultante in speculo des Albertus Magnus. Handschriftliche Überlieferung, Literargeschichtliche und Textkritische Untersuchungen, Textedition, Übersetzung und Kommentar*, vol. 1 (Münster: Felix Meiner Verlag 1999), 6-17.

[38] It is generally agreed that the reading of the *Sentences* by Bonaventure took place in two years, from 1250 to 1252. For the chronology of Bonaventure, see Bougerol, *Introduction à saint Bonaventure*. The classroom reading of the *Sentences* by Thomas must be set between 1252 (or 1253) and 1254 (or 1255 at the latest). See Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement*, 252-53.

[39] Anonymi, Magistri Artium (c.1245-1250), *Lectura in librum De anima a quodam discipulo reportata (Ms. Roma Naz. V.E. 828)*, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Grottaferrata: Editori di Quaracchi, 1985).

[40] Ch. H. Lohr, *Saint Thomas Aquinas "Scriptum super Sententiis": An Index of Authorities Cited* (Amersham: Avebury 1980). See also the additions of Cl. J. Vansteenkiste, *Rassegna di Letteratura Tomista* 16 (1983): 45-48, n. 111.

on noncritical editions, which sometimes integrated into Thomas's text passages not found in the manuscript tradition, the listing of quotations is nonetheless revealing. It shows, for example, approximately 2304 quotations of Aristotle, 63 references to the *Liber de causis*, 9 references to Socrates and "Socratics," 32 to Plato, 5 to "Platonists," and 10 to Pythagoras or "Pythagoreans." It indicates 7 quotations of Porphyry, 150 of Cicero, and 6 references to Macrobius's commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*. Further, it shows that Boethius is quoted 164 times. There are 177 references to Averroës, while Alexander of Aphrodisias appears only in 3 indirect quotations. Al-Ghazali and Al-Farabi each count for 6 quotations. From Avicenna Lohr obtained 178 quotations and Clemens Vansteenkiste 171.[41] Avempace is present with 3 quotations. The Jewish authors are also used: the *Fons uitae* of Avicebron appears 3 times and Moses Maimonides 19 times, with Isaac Israeli 11 times.

The massive presence of Aristotle should not be surprising. The work most quoted is the *Nicomachean Ethics*, with 946 references, which Thomas knew very well, since a few years earlier in Cologne he had helped Albert prepare the latter's first commentary.[42] This work of Aristotle is used not only to determine questions of moral theology. It seems, for example, that Aristotle's effort to establish that ethics is a science inspired Thomas in his development of the scientific status of the "teaching of theology" (*doctrina theologiae*) in his prologue of the commentary on the *Sentences*. The *Physics*, with 309 references, is also quite present, especially in book 2, which is devoted to creation. *De anima* and the other works of psychology, taken together with *De animalibus*, account for approximately 380 references, while the *Metaphysics* on its own presents approximately 354. We also observe in connection with Boethius that most quotations come from the *Consolation of Philosophy* and *De trinitate*; few come from his writings on logic.

[41] C. Vansteenkiste, "Avicenna-Citaten bij s. Thomas," in *Tijschrft voor Philosophie* 15 (1953): 457-507. A first index was made by A. Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin,* Etudes de philosophie médiévale 14 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1931).

[42] See Torrell, *Initiation*, 36-40.

To be sure, a report of this type tells us little about Thomas's direct knowledge of the works he cited. And yet, a systematic analysis of all the quotations of the *Metaphysics* in the commentary on the first book of the *Sentences* has shown that Thomas had direct recourse to the text of Aristotle.[43]

For the references to Avicenna, beyond the census done by Charles Lohr, I have already cited the census done by Clemens Vansteenkiste. The divergence between the totals obtained by Lohr and Vansteenkiste probably stems from the fact that the latter checked the manuscripts to verify the passages attributed to Avicenna; his results are therefore probably more accurate. While a complete account of this divergence lies beyond our present purposes, it is opportune to give a precise account of the problem of fifteen passages the editions cite as coming from a book called *De intelligentiis*, attributed to Avicenna. In his review of Lohr's *Index*, Vansteenkiste denies that this work is by Avicenna and notes that these citations are attributed to *De intelligentiis* only in editions, not in the manuscripts (on these grounds, he completely eliminates a reference to Avicenna, which the editions indicate at I *Sent.*, d. 42, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 3). My own consultation of the manuscripts confirms Vansteenkiste's result, which ascribes these 14 citations to Avicenna, but without attributing them to *De intelligentiis*.[44] In fact, as long ago as 1934 Roland de Vaux

[43] See the recent study prepared by Marta Borgo in collaboration with the Leonine Commission, *La Metafisica di Aristotele nel Commento di Tommaso d'Aquino al primo libro delle Sentenze di Pietro Lombardo*, Tesi di laurea in Storia della Filosofia Medievale, presentata presso l'Università degli Studi di Pisa (Pisa, 2003). A study by the same author was published on the basis of this dissertation: idem, "La *Métaphysique* d'Aristote dans le Commentaire de Thomas d'Aquin au I^er^ livre des *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard. Quelques exemples significatifs", *Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologique* 91 (2007): 651-92. Borgo continues this work by taking into consideration the citations of the *Physics.* As for the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as indicated, it is questionable whether Thomas had direct access to the text. See R.-A. Gauthier, "Saint Thomas et l'Éthique à Nicomaque," in Thomae de Aquino, *Sententia libri Politicorum. Tabula libri Ethicorum*, in *Opera Omnia,* vol 48, ed. Leonina, vol. 48 (Rome, 1971), xv-xvi (appendix).

[44] In the early editions the quotations' sources were noted in the margins more precisely than in the original manuscripts. It is only with the edition of Venice, 1747, that these references were first integrated into the text to facilitate printing. This source information, then, was provided by editors but was absent from the manuscripts. It would appear that the first edition to integrate them into the text without brackets is that of Vives (Paris, 1873). This

cleared up the problem by restoring these citations to the authentic Avicenna.[45] The *De intelligentiis* edited by de Vaux in that volume with the title *On First and Second Causes and the Outpouring That Follows upon Them* was handed down with the authentic works of Avicenna in some medieval manuscripts, but it is never cited in the works of Thomas.[46] While Thomas's *De Veritate* and his *Quodlibetal Questions* contain explicit references to a *Liber de intelligentiis*, this work is by Adam of Puteorumvilla. The fourteen passages that the editions attribute to a Pseudo-Avicenna should therefore be credited to the authentic works of Avicenna.

As for theological sources, Augustine predominates with 1095 quotations; Ambrose is responsible for 97, Jerome approximately 130, Hillary of Poitiers 72, Leo the Great 12, Isidore of Seville 41, and Gregory the Great 319. At the time, Thomas did not know the Greek Fathers as well: there are 14 references to Origen, 14 to Basil, 12 to Gregory of Nyssa and Nemesius combined, 25 to John Chrysostom's authentic works , as well as 9 to the *Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum*, 589 to Pseudo-Dionysius, 5 to Maximus the Confessor, and 264 to John Damascene.[47] As for more recent authors, Bede is present with 24 quotations, Anselm with 82, Bernard with 62, Hugh of Saint-Victor with 90, Richard of Saint-Victor with 30, and Prepositinus with 9.

Finally, if one compares the number of the authoritative citations of non-Christian authors and Boethius's philosophical

was continued in the edition of Mandonnet (Paris, 1929).

[45] Roland de Vaux, *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin aux confins des xiie-xiiie siècles* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1934), 64-65. At note 2 of p. 64, de Vaux includes the citation of I *Sent*., d. 42, q. 1, a. 2, that the manuscripts do not attribute to Avicenna and omits the reference to Avicenna at II *Sent*., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4.

[46] Regarding this text and its manuscripts, see M.-T. d'Alverny, "Une rencontre symbolique de jean Scot Érigène et d'Avicenne. Notes sur le *De causis primis et secundis et fluxu qui consequitur eas*," in *The Mind of Eriugena*, ed. J. J. O'Meara and L. Bieler (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1973), 170-81; cited from eadem, *Avicenne en Occident: Recueil d'Articles de Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny*, ed. D. Jacquart (Paris: J. Vrin, 1993).

[47] See L. J. Elders, "Thomas Aquinas and the Fathers of the Church," in *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists*, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden–New York–Cologne: Brill, 1997), 1:337-66.

works to the number drawn from Christian authors, one finds approximately 3060 of the former and approximately 3000 of the latter. It should be noted, however, that these figures do not include references to the Scriptures. Nor do they include references to either the *Decretum* (which contain numerous extracts from the Fathers) or to the *Corpus iuris civilis*, since the quotations of these two works cannot be categorized a priori as either philosophical or theological. I also leave aside references to the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, since this work is a compilation of other authors' opinions, which similarly cannot be categorized prior to individual analysis. In any case, these figures, rough as they are, suffice to give a broad impression of the extent of the doctrinal references to which Thomas gave specific attention in writing this youthful work.[48]

Before turning to a few of the doctrinal characteristics of the prologue of the *Sentences* in connection with the relation between philosophy and theology, it is worth considering the other works Thomas produced within the framework of his university education.[49]

C) The Master of the Sacred Page

1. The "Ordinary" Commenting on the Bible in Class

The tasks of university professors in the Middle Ages are well-described in Peter Cantor's famous triad : to read, to dispute, and to preach (*legere, disputare, praedicare*).[50] "To read," that is to say,

[48] The totality of citations that Thomas makes to a given author has been studied in articles that have shown well what his doctrinal effort owes to these precursors. See R.-A. Gauthier, "Introduction," in *Anonymi, Magistri Artium. Lectura in librum De anima*, 22*; R. Imbach and A. Oliva, *La philosophie de Thomas d'Aquin: Repères*, Repères philosophiques 1 (Paris: J. Vrin, 2009).

[49] Regarding the great syntheses that were not the result of teaching, the *Summa contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologiae*, see R.-A. Gauthier, *Introduction*, in *Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Somme contre les Gentils* (Paris: PUF, 1993); and Oliva, "La *Somme de théologie* de Thomas d'Aquin," 217-53.

[50] "In tribus igitur consistit exercitium sacrae Scripturae: circa lectionem, disputationem et praedicationem" (Petrus Cantor, *Verbum abbreviatum* [*PL* 205:25A]); idem, *Verbum adbreuiatum*, textus conflatus, I, 1: "In tribus autem consistit exercitium sacre Scripture: in

to comment on the Bible, was certainly the principal obligation of any master who held a chair (at Paris the commentary of a regent master was designated as "ordinary").[51] Yet it is curious that we have relatively few surviving biblical commentaries whose definitive redaction was due to the masters themselves. In the case of Thomas Aquinas, it should be noted that we still do not know which of the books of the Bible he commented on during his first Paris regency (1256-59). On the other hand, with respect to his second Paris regency (1269-72), our sources indicate an apparentlyexcessive number of commentaries for a period of less than three years. It seems an inescapable fact, however, that during this time Thomas commented on the Gospels of Matthew and John; in addition, he probably commented on part of the Pauline corpus.[52]

All of these commentaries have been preserved. The lecture on the Gospel of Matthew has made its way to us by the reports (*reportationes*) of two students.The fact that this work was not edited carefully, but left in the state of a student's *reportatio*, says much about why it was not widely diffused.The commentary on the Gospel of John presents a very different case. Though it, too, originated in a *reportatio*, it was recorded by a professional secretary, rather than a student, and was subsequently edited with great care. All of this resulted not only in a wide diffusion, but also in its reproduction by the system of *exemplar* and *pecie*,[53] which was exceptional for a Scripture commentary originating in

lectione, disputatione, predicatione" (CCCM 196, ed. M. Boutry [Turnhout: Brepols, 2004] 9, ll. 4-5).

[51] See Weijers, *Terminologie des universités au XIII^e siècle*, 308; see also A. Maierù, "Tecniche di insegnamento," in *Le scuole degli Ordini mendicanti* (Todi: Accademia Tudertina 1978) 307-52, esp. 327-28. Regarding biblical exegesis in the Middle Ages, see T. Bellamah, *The Biblical Interpretation of William of Alton,* Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[52] See Torrell, *Initiation*, 80-86 and 287-92.

[53] Very few biblical commentaries based on a *reportatio* were transmitted by this system. See L. J. Bataillon, "Les textes théologiques et philosophiques diffusés à Paris par *exemplar* et *pecia*", in *La production du livre universitaire au Moyen-Age*, 155-63, esp. 159. The taxation list of 1275 has been edited along with other documents related to this system in G. Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar e pecia* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005) 86 ; at 779-780 and 784-785. For these works we have the list of manuscripts recopied under the pecie system.

a *reportatio*. This says much about the demand this commentary generated at Paris and bears witness, albeit indirectly, to its great quality.

The recent French translations of Thomas's commentaries on the Letters to the Corinthians, with Gilbert Dahan's remarkable introductions,[54] go far in facilitating our appreciation ofThomas's exegetical talent. At the same time, the facts that these works have benefitted from little editing and reflect mainly oral teaching allows us to see the complexity of the textual traditions by which they have been transmitted to us.[55]

In this respect, it is worth noting the famous comment on the Prologue to the Gospel of John, where Thomas proposes a short history of philosophy concerning the beginning of the world (ch. 1, lect. 2), which he resumes in chapter 19 (lect. 4).

2. The Disputed Questions and Questions *de quolibet*

During the second part of the thirteenth century, there were two kinds of magisterial disputations at the University of Paris. In one, the subject was fixed in advance by the master and was an integral and required part of his teaching. In the other, the subject was chosen not by the master in advance, but by the public during the session. This *quodlibetal* sort of disputation was taken up only by particularly competent masters (or those who thought themselves to be such).[56] In the context of struggles between secular clergy and mendicants, a master who decided to undertake

[54] G. Dahan, "Introduction", in Thomas d'Aquin, *Commentaire de la première Epitre aux Corinthiens*, completed by Pierre de Tarantaise, *Postille sur la Première Epitre aux Corinthiens*, French trans. J.- É. Stroobant de Saint Éloy, annotated by J. Borella and J.- É. Stroobant de Saint Éloy (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2002), i-xxxix ; idem, "Introduction", in Thomas d'Aquin, *Commentaire de la Deuxième Épître aux Corinthiens*, French trans. J.- É. Stroobant de Saint Éloy, annotated by J. Borella and J.- É. Stroobant de Saint Éloy (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2005), i-xlviii.

[55] See L. J. Bataillon, "La diffusione manoscritta e stampata dei commenti biblici di San Tommaso d'Aquino," in *Angelicum* 71 (1994): 579-90. Regarding the commentaries on the Pauline corpus, see the remarkable introduction of G. de Gandpré to the Leonine edition of the *Super Ep. Ad Romanos* (forthcoming).

[56] Cf. *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétales dans les Facultés de Théologie, de Droit et de Médecine*, ed. B. Bazán and others (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985).

disputes *de quolibet* exposed himself to discussions that could easily become virulent.[57]

Thomas has left us two sets of non-*quodlibetal* disputed questions from his Parisian university teaching that date after the completion of the commentary on the *Sentences*: the questions *De ueritate*, from his first regency, and the questions *De malo*, *De uirtutibus*, and *De unione Verbi incarnati*, from his second.[58] That Thomas devoted himself to preparing a careful draft of these questions shows the importance of this genre in the thirteenth century. This importance derived mainly from the significance of the disputes themselves—they were major events at the university, for which attendance was required of the entire university community.

Thomas has also left us two series of questions *de quolibet*, one from his first regency (*Quodlibets VII-XI*), and the other from the second (*Quodlibets I-VI* and *XII*).[59] Among the most hotly disputed subjects in Thomas's *Quodlibeta* is religious poverty. The matter brought the Dominicans and Franciscans into opposition with each other, and more importantly, gave rise to a broader conflict between secular masters and mendicants regarding religious life and the propriety of teaching by religious, particularly at the university.

[57] V. M.-M. Dufeil, *Guillaume de Saint-Amour et la polémique universitaire parisienne 1250-1259* (Paris: Éditions A. et J. Picard, 1972); and *Die Auseinandersetzungen an der Pariser Universität im XIII. Jahrhundert*, ed. A. Zimmermann and G. Vuillemin-Diem (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1976).

[58] See Torrell, *Initiation*, 293-301. With the exception of the two latter disputes (*De uirtutibus* and *De unione Verbi incarnati*), these two sets of questions can be studied in the critical editions of the Leonine *Opera Omnia*. For the questions *De ueritate* we have the manuscript as dictated by Thomas to one of his secretaries. See A. Dondaine, *Secrétaires de saint Thomas* (Rome: Editori di San Tommaso–Santa Sabina, 1956); idem, "Autour des Secrétaires de saint Thomas," in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1963), 745-54 ; see also idem, "Préface," in Thomae de Aquino, *De ueritate*, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. 22/1, ed. Leonina (Rome, 1975),:5*-182*.

[59] Critical texts, with extensive source apparatus, of these two series are also available in Leonine editions. The dating of each *Quodlibet* is difficult; on some questions expert opinion remains divided. See R.-A. Gauthier, "Préface," in Thomae de Aquino, *Questiones de quolibet*, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. 25/1 (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1996), 1*-160*.

3. Friar Thomas, Preacher and Pedagogue

Before the second half of the twentieth century, few medievalists adequately appreciated the importance of a regent master's preaching as teaching at the University of Paris. It is now well known that the texts of sermons are an important source of otherwise inaccessible historical knowledge.[60] There should be no need to say that preaching as an historical phenomenon merits study for its own sake.[61] And yet, it is worth mentioning that all of this recommends consideration of an important sermon of Thomas, namely, one on the text: "The child Jesus progressed" (*Puer Iesus proficiebat*).

The intellectual and religious life of a university like that at Paris was the life of a community of clerics. All masters were required to preach and some felt it important to form collections of their sermons. In the latter case, the notes taken by students during the sermon (*reportationes*) were written out and given to the Master, who used them as the basis for his collection .[62] As Louis Jacques Bataillon has shown, Thomas did not prepare a

[60] See Ch. H. Haskins, "The University of Paris in the Sermons of the Thirteenth Century," in *Studies in Mediaeval Culture* (New York: F. Ungars, 1929), 36-71; L. J. Bataillon, "Les crises de l'Université de Paris d'après les sermons universitaires," in Zimmermann and Vuillemin-Diem, eds., *Die Auseinandersetzungen an der Pariser Universität im XIII. Jahrhundert*, 155-69; reprinted in L. J. Bataillon, *La prédication au XIII^e siècle en France et en Italie: Etudes et documents* (Aldershot-Brookfield: Variorum, 1993), VIII.

[61] Among numerous valuable studies on this matter, I refer only to a few: N. Bériou, *La Prédication de Ranulphe de la Houblonnière: Sermons aux clercs et aux simples gens à Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1987), 2 vols.; F. Iozzelli, *Odo da Châteauroux: Politica e religione nei sermoni inediti* (Padua: Bottega d'Erasmo–Aldo Ausilio Editore 1994); K. L. Jansen, *The Making of the Magdalen: Preaching and Popular Devotion in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); D. L. d'Avray, *Medieval Marriage Sermons: Mass Communication in a Culture without Print* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001); idem, *Medieval Marriage: Symbolism ans Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[62] Cf. N. Bériou, "La prédication au béguinage de Paris pendant l'année liturgique 1272-73," *Recherches augustiniennes* 13 (1978): 105-229; L. J. Bataillon, "Sermons rédigés, sermons réportés," *Medioevo e rinascimento* 3 (1989): 69-86 (repr. in Bataillon , *La prédication au XIII^e siècle en France et en Italie*, III).

collection of his university sermons.[63] As a result, fewer than twenty of his university sermons are known to survive, none of which is attested to by more than three manuscripts.[64]

It was on the first Sunday after Epiphany during his second regency at Paris that Thomas preached the aforementioned sermon on the text, "the child Jesus progressed in age and wisdom and grace before God and men" (Luke 2:52).[65] In the prologue he says plainly that he is addressing himself to the young, to whom he wishes to propose the example of the young Jesus' progress: "the adolescence of Christ is proposed to adolescents as an example . . . as an example for adolescents the progress of Christ is proposed." The young people he addresses are students. Though he advises them on their life of study, his main purpose is to offer them counsel on their personal growth. After telling them that man must grow in his totality, body and heart, he invites them to attend to their growth and to focus on finding the means of correcting possible deficiencies: "the one who grows in one foot but not in the other will devote all his effort to seeing a doctor so that he may grow similarly in his other foot. Similarly, you who grow in years in your body should put all your effort into growing in years in your mind." Later he tells them that acquiring God and his goods is the most important matter of all, and that just as one may be concerned to avoid missing an hour of useful reading, so also one should avoid missing the opportunity to turn oneself to God. The expression "to gain God" (*lucrari Deum*) is strong and expresses well the primacy of man's relationship to God, as does the parallel expression "to gain

[63] L. J. Bataillon, "Les sermons attribués à saint Thomas: Questions d'autenticité," *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 19 (1988): 325-41 (repr. in Bataillon, *La prédication au XIII^e siècle en France et en Italie*, XV.

[64] L. J. Battalion's work will appear in the forthcoming critical edition of Thomas's sermons (*Opera omnia*, Leonine ed., vol. 44). For an English translation of this sermon, see Mark-Robin Hoogland, ed. and trans., *Thomas Aquinas: The Academic Sermons* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010); on this sermon, see the *Jaarbook 2011* of the Thomas Institut Utrecht, 31 (2011): 5-103, esp. 69-103.

[65] For the text of this sermon see the aforementioned Leonine edition. The text also appears in two collections of the *Opera omnia* of Thomas: Parma: Fiaccadori, 1879, 24:220-24; Paris: Vivès, 1879, 32:663-71.

Christ" (*Christum lucrari*). This primacy is a constant feature of Thomas's theological anthropology.[66]

In evidence here is Thomas's method of addressing students, as he tells them:

> It is a pity to grow in one's body and not in one's spirit. But you say: "I'm young. I want to play in my youth. When I am old I will turn to the Lord." Certainly you commit yourself to heavy work; that to which a man habituates himself in his youth is easy, which is clear because it is easy for a peasant to work in the field, because he has become used to it, but for you it is hard.[67]

These words show something of Thomas's spirit—as is his wont, he puts himself in the place of his interlocutors.[68] Without threatening the adolescents to whom he speaks, he invites them to realize their responsibility before God: "Rejoice, O young one, in your youth. But know that God will bring you to judgment" (Letare iuuenis pro adolescentia tua; scitote [!] quod pro hiis

[66] See Aquinas, *Super ad Philip*. 3, lect. 2. The bibliography on this subject is extensive. Regarding the understanding of human nature by Thomas in the context of this era, see E. H. Wéber, *La personne humaine au xiii^e siècle: L'avènement chez les maîtres parisiens de l'acception moderne de l'homme* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1991).

[67] "Item crescere etate corporis non mentis est laboriosum. Sed dices: 'Iuuenis sum; uolo ludere in iuuentute mea; cum ero senex conuertam me ad Dominum'. Certe committis te magno labori: quod homo assuescit a iuuentute sua facile est ei; quod patet quia facile est rustico in campo laborare quia consueuit, quod tibi est difficile" (Leonine ed., t. 44/1, ll. 164-70).

[68] R.-A. Gauthier writes the following regarding the duty of the wise man as defined by Thomas not only in general but also with reference to himself: "the task of the wise man is complete only when he has shown that the reasoning itself on which an adversary founds his error is in reality in accord with the truth that has been demonstrated. This way of conceiving the refutation of error implies that we are concretely engaged with our adversary not only in order to persuade him but to clarify what is at stake for ourselves. We are able to discover where he is mistaken only retracing his steps. This too Aristotle does or at least tries to do. . . . Saint Thomas does not conceive the refutation of error, the second task of the wise man, any differently from the way Aristotle conceived it. . . . [T]he theologian who wishes to do his task in the way of the wise person must not content himself with establishing the truth of the faith based on revelation; rather, he must show the cause of Aristotle's error, the particular character of his reasoning. This does not serve Aristotle but rather assures the full intelligibility of the Christian faith" (R.-A. Gauthier, "Préface," in Thomae de Aquino, *Sentencia lib. De Anima*, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Leonina, vol. 45/1:293*). See also B. Montaigne, "Les deux fonctions de la sagesse: Ordonner et juger," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 53 (1969): 674-86.

adducet te Dominus in iudicio). He adds, however, with respect to the moment of judgment, "do not despair of the mercy of God" (noli desperare de Dei misericordia).

After having encouraged his young listeners to take stock of their need to progress in their entire education, he discreetly shows them several ways to do so: "How do we grow in spirit? Surely it is when one grows in wisdom and grace. . . . Among the effects of grace none is more evident than peace."[69] Next, he notes four conditions for this peace to be real, and in doing so engages in a bit of indirect educating prompted by the struggles between the secular clerics and the mendicant friars.

In this sermon Thomas appears above all as one who educates adolescents for their human and religious flourishing. In the second part he expatiates on the means of progressing in wisdom and human relations (profectus conversationis humane). Two things are worth noting in this afternoon "collation" (*collatio)*. First, Thomas says that "Just as progress in grace shows itself in peace, so progress in wisdom shows itself in contemplation" (sicut profectus gracie ostenditur in pace, ita profectus sapiencie in contemplatione). This might surprise Thomas's twenty-first-century readers, for whom the word "contemplation" (*contemplatio)* often suggests a hidden, secret, or private activity. For Thomas, the word is much broader, encompassing a range of intellectual acts extending from scientific research all the way to religious adoration, and which, insofar as it reaches its end, is the source of joy: *gaudium de veritate*. This brings us to the second point. The counsels Thomas gives to students to accomplish their studies well are, in fact, counsels for the practice of contemplation (*contemplatio*). As he tells them, progressing in wisdom requires four things: listening freely, inquiring diligently, responding with circumspection, and meditating attentively.[70] The exposition of these lines begins with a little guidance that reveals once again the character of Thomas's pedagogy. As he puts it, what is required is

[69] "Quomodo crescit homo mente? Certe quando crescit sapencia et gracia. . . . Inter autem omnes effectus gracie, nullus est ita manifestus sicut pax" (ll. 202-10).

[70] "Ad hoc autem quod homo proficiat in sapiencia, quatuor sunt necessaria, scilicet quod libenter audiat, diligenter inquirat, prudenter respondeat et attente meditetur" (ll. 356-59).

listening freely (*libenter audiat*), listening joyfully, and cultivating the disposition to listen. Since it is to lectures that students most often listen, it is in this connection that Thomas gives some practical advice:

> But how must one listen? Certainly with perseverance. Some wish to listen to a lecture casually, but they do not pay attention. . . . A single professor is not competent in every matter. Saint Gregory knew how to present moral lessons, Saint Augustine how to resolve problems, Saint Gregory how to discover allegorical meanings . . . What you do not learn from one of your masters, you learn from another. I do not mean to say that I believe it useful for those who begin in one domain to follow several masters; they must first follow just one until they are formed, though once they are formed, they may follow several so they may pick the flowers, that is, what is useful, from each.[71]

Realizing that "contemplation" must be free and critical, Thomas reminds his students: "Some follow the opinion of the masters because they study with them; but no one should have a friend when it concerns the truth; one should only adhere to the truth, for, as the Philosopher says, disagreement in opinions does not damage friendship."[72]

He explains that contemplation should be open and inquisitive: "You must not content yourself with questioning those present to you, but you must question the ancients and those not present. If you do not have an abundance of persons (to consult), you nonetheless have an abundance of writings."[73]

[71] "Sed quomodo debes audire? Certe perseueranter. Quidam unam lectionem uolunt audire in una sciencia transitorie; non ponunt ibi cor. . . . Sed unus [docens] non est perfectus in omnibus. Beatus Gregorius optime sciuit moralitates, beatus Augustinus questiones soluere et beatus Ambrosius optime allegorizauit. Quod non addiscis ab uno, addiscis ab alio. . . . Quod non narrat unus, narrat alius. Non dico quod credam utile esse quod qui incipiunt primo audire scientiam aliquam [quod] diuersos audiant, sed debent audire unum quousque sint fundati, et cum sint fundati, audiant diuersos ut possint carpere flores ex diuersis, id est que sunt utilia" (ll. 370-91).

[72] "Aliqui sequuntur opinionem magistrorum quia audiunt eos; sed nullus debet habere amicum in ueritate sed solum debet ueritati adherere, quia dicit Philosophus quia discordia in opinionibus non repugnat amicicie" (ll. 395-400).

[73] "Item non solum debes esse contentus ut interroges presentes, sed debes interrogare antiquos et absentes. Si non habes copia quantum ad personas, habes tamen quantum ad scripta" (ll. 429-32).

Thomas goes on to remark that study must confront ideas and check them against reality: "But you must not only content yourself with people and books, you must also take into consideration the created world because it is said in Ecclesiastes: God has poured forth his wisdom on all his works."[74] He tells his students that they are not to content themselves with listening passively, but must work through the learning they acquire, and that this process of acquiring wisdom requires (*est debitum*) communication and dialogue: "the best means of progressing in knowledge is to communicate to others what one knows" (nullus ita bene potest proficere in scientia sicut in communicando aliis quod ipse scit [ll. 476-78]).

After discussing listening and communicating, Thomas provides practical advice on responding. In the medieval university this was an institutional action. Though intended for students obliged to respond to questions, these considerations are equally valuable for bachelors and masters who have to respond in disputes. As Thomas well sums it up: "The response must be suited to the question, not put forward for the glitter of words, but for responding to what has been asked; otherwise it will be hot air" (responsio sit proportionata questioni, ut sit non cum faleris uerborum sed ad questionem; aliter esset responsio uentosa [ibid.]).

Thomas's instructions for living well in society are no less concrete. He says that the advice one may draw from the passage of the gospel taken as the sermon's theme could concern both prelates and their subjects. However, since in the audience there are more subordinates than prelates, he will simply evoke the advice on which the former, the students, can make good progress. This observation also carries the tone of a criticism addressed to the prelates in the period already mentioned, namely, the ongoing quarrel between the secular clerics and the mendicant friars.

[74] "Item non solum sufficit quod ipsos interroges uel etiam scripta, sed debes considerare in consideratione creaturarum, quia dicitur in Ecclesiastico: Deus effudi *sapienciam suam* super omnia opera *eius*" (ll. 437-41).

His counsels for the young students consist in the practices of piety, purity, humility, and discretion. He explains that piety enables us to bring ourselves to the level of our interlocutor (descendere per pietatem ad proximum [l. 541]), and purity helps us to place ourselves on the level of others when it comes to what is good, in imitation of Christ and in contrast to those who condescend excessively, because sinfully (condescendunt aliis, sed nimis, quia usque ad peccatum [ll. 542-43]). It should be noticed that Friar Thomas is concerned not to reprove particular actions, but rather to recommend a right measure in condescending. Humility makes it possible to be devoted to study, while avoiding concentrating one's energies on becoming a prelate. The last counsel is for discretion in obedience: it is necessary to obey prelates only in what is good; and thus it is necessary to practice understanding of the orders one receives. This advice evokes an article from the *Summa Theologiae*, where Thomas points out to those who owe obedience to someone that with regard to the interior movement of the will man is held to obey not men but God alone; and it is the same for matters pertaining to the nature of the human body, because by nature all men are equal.[75] This last counsel may therefore also be taken as an invitation to the students to act responsibly.

Louis Bataillon, who edited the sermon, comments: "the pedagogical development [of the sermon *Puer Iesus*] is original and of very great interest. I do not know another case of a sermon giving precise, detailed counsels for undertaking studies well."[76] This pedagogical interest appears elsewhere Thomas's work, and

[75] "in matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone. Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the like" (*STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 5, in *Opera omnia,* t. 9, ed. Leonina [Rome, 1897], 390; trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Now York: Benziger, 1920)]; see also ibid., ad 2; and II-II, q. 104, a. 1, ad 1 [Leonine. ed., 383]).

[76] From the introduction to the edition of the sermon, soon to be published.

is often explicit in his remarks on methodological matters, such as the relationship between philosophy and theology, a recurring theme in the sermon, "A certain man made a great feast" (Homo quidam fecit cenam magnam).[77] Under consideration there is the important matter of the difference between the principles of philosophy, which are "from creation" (*ex creatura*) and those of theology, "from the revelation of the Holy Spirit" (*ex revelatione Spiritus sancti*).

III. Thomas's Responses to Requests for His Expertise and His Conception of the Relationship between Philosophical Science and the *Doctrina Fidei*

After having considered the university career of Friar Thomas and the different works that are the fruit of his academic teaching, it is appropriate to consider two tasks Thomas took up as a professor at the university: the commentaries on Aristotle and the responses to different questions that were put to him as an expert. Since the Aristotelian commentaries have been the object of other studies, it is the latter that will be the focus of what follows.[78]

[77] Cf. Thomae de Aquino, *Sermo* "*Homo quidam fecit cenam magnam*": "Hec est differentia inter doctrinam sacre Scripture et philosophie quia doctrina philosophie est ex creatura, sed doctrina sacre Scripture est ex inspiracione, unde dicit$: Si quis aperuerit michi, intrabo ad eum, scilicet per inspiracionem Spiritus sancti" (Leonine ed., t. 44/1, ll. 189-223; L. J. Bataillon, "Le sermon inédit de saint Thomas *Homo quidam fecit cenam magnam*," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 67 [1983]: 353-69, at 363 (repr., Bataillon, *La prédication au XIII^e siècle en France et en Italie*, XVII).

[78] See Gauthier, "Préface," in *Opera omnia*, Leonine ed., 47/1:288*-294*; R.-A. Gauthier, "Préface," in Thomae de Aquino, *Expositio Libri Peryermenias*, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Leonina, vol. 1*, 1, 85*-88*; and idem, "Préface," in Thomae de Aquino, *Expositio Libri Posteriorum*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Leonina, vol. 1*, 2, 76*-77*. See also Thomas von Aquin, *Prologe zu den Aristoteleskommentaren*, edited, translated, and introduced by Fr. Cheneval and R. Imbach (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993), lvii-lxiv. For the edition of the letter from the faculty of Arts to the general chapter of the Dominican Order in 1274, see A. Birkenmajer, "Der Brief der Pariser Artistenfacultät über den Tod des hl. Thomas von Aquin," in *Vermichte Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie*, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, bd. XX.-5. (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung 1922), 1-35, at 2-5; and idem, "Neues dem Briefe der Pariser Artistenfacultät über den Tod des hl. Thomas von Aquin," in *Xenia Thomistica*, ed. S. Szabó (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1925), 57-72.

The writing of shorter works (*opuscula*) on different subjects constitutes no negligible part of Thomas's activity. One that can be dated precisely is the *Response to master John of Vercelli about 43 articles* (Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de quadraginta tribus articulis), dated Holy Thursday, 2 April 1271. This response is preceded by a letter of Thomas to the master of the Order of Preachers, John of Vercelli, in which Thomas complains of having to respond to these questions (*articuli*) without knowing the reasons for which the articles are affirmed or denied (*asseruntur uel impugnantur*). Such knowledge, he says would have allowed him to respond more adequately to the intention of those who submitted the articles to him (*potuissem magis intentioni dubitantium respondere*).[79] Going on to say that he has responded as well as he can, he notes that many of the articles do not concern the doctrine of the faith (*fidei doctrinam*), but rather philosophy (*philosophorum dogmata*), and adds: "It is very detrimental to affirm or deny as pertaining to sacred teaching what does not concern it" (Multum autem nocet talia que ad pietatis doctrinam non pertinent uel asserere uel negare quasi pertinentia ad sacram doctrinam). Then he quotes two long passages from Saint Augustine and concludes the letter by saying: "It seems to me safer that things of this sort that philosophers commonly felt and which do not attack our faith neither should be asserted as doctrines of the faith, even if sometimes they are introduced under the name of philosophers, nor should they be denied as being contrary to the faith, lest an occasion be furnished to the wise of this world to condemn the teaching of faith."[80]

At the end of many responses there are observations of this sort, for example, in the response to the seventh article: "And, to

[79] Thomae de Aquino, *Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 43 articulis*, in *Opera omnia*, t. 42, ed. Leonina (Rome, 1979), 327, ll. 1-58 ; cf. also the preface of H. Dondaine, in ibid., 300-301.

[80] "Vnde mihi videtur tutius esse ut huiusmodi que philosophi communiter senserunt et nostre fidei non repugnant neque sic esse asserenda ut dogmata fidei, etsi aliquando sub nomine philosophorum introducantur; neque sic esse neganda tamquam fidei contraria, ne sapientibus huius mundi contemnendi doctrinam fidei occasio prebeatur" (ibid., 327, ll. 51-58).

say this quickly, all the previous articles have to do either with little or nothing of the doctrine of the faith, but are thoroughly philosophical," and in the fortieth article: "But this in no way pertains to the teaching of the faith, neither asserting anything, nor refuting anything."[81]

One article, concerning Averroës' interpretation of a passage of Aristotle, is particularly significant. To it Thomas responds: "Nor do I see what might pertain to the faith in expounding the words of Aristotle."[82] He aims at safeguarding the independence of domains and disciplines: the historical interpretation of the Philosopher does not as such concern theological reflection. The point is not to prohibit the faith from expressing itself, but to avoid confusion between the philosophical and theological domains, between the formal object of the one and the formal object of the other, to use the wording of the Schoolmen.[83]

It may be added that the letter's conclusion leaves no doubt about the matter: "These are, most reverend father, the things that presently occur to me as responses to the articles sent by you, though many of them are beyond the limits of the theological faculty; but from your insistence a debt was imposed on me that the profession of my office in no way required."[84] The clear distinction that Thomas so forcefully affirmed here in the last years of his life was already quite clear at the beginning of his teaching at the university.

[81] "Et, ut breuiter dicam, omnes predicti articuli uel parum uel nichil faciunt ad doctrinam fidei, sed sunt penitus philosophici" (ibid., a. 7 [Leonine ed., 329, ll. 159-62); "Sed hoc nichil ad doctrinam fidei pertinet nec asserere nec improbare" (ibid., a. 40 [Leonine ed., 335, ll. 589-90]).

[82] "Nec uideo quid pertineat ad doctrinam fidei qualiter uerba Philosophi exponantur" (ibid., a. 34 [Leonine ed., 333, ll. 476-83]).

[83] Cf. Thomae de Aq., *Super Boetium De Trinitate,* q. 2, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 50:86-88).

[84] "Hec sunt, Pater reuerende, que michi respondenda occurrunt ad presens articulis a uobis transmissis, quamuis plures eorum sint preter limites theologice facultatis ; sed ex uestra iniunctione factum est michi debitum quod proprii officii professio nullatenus requirebat" Thomae de Aq., *Responsio ... de 43 articulis* (Leonine ed., 335, ll. 614-19).

Conclusion

In the first of the five articles of the prologue to his commentary on the *Sentences*, treating the "teaching of theology" (*doctrina theologie*), Thomas speaks of the relation of theology to the other sciences.[85] Worth noting here is that while he affirms that the latter are at the service of the *doctrina theologiae*, he nonetheless refrains from calling theology the "queen" (*domina* or *regina*) of the sciences because he considers it a science subalternated to the knowledge of God.[86] Considerable discussion has surrounded the question of whether this is the reason for Thomas's refusal so to name theology. It is often said that while he avoided calling theology the "queen" (*domina*), he nonetheless named the other sciences "handmaids" (*ancillae*). And yet, to my knowledge this designation appears only once in all of his writings, namely, in the first question of the *Summa Theologiae*.[87] It is certain that Thomas considers all the philosophical sciences, the human sciences as we now call them, to be at the service of the "doctrine of theology" (*doctrina theologie*). But precisely so that these sciences can be useful to theology it is necessary that

[85] On the Thomistic conception of theology, see J.-P. Torrell, "Le savoir théologique chez saint Thomas," *Revue Thomiste* 96 (1996): 355-96; M. Johnson, "God's Knowledge in Our Frail Mind: The Thomistic Model of Theology," *Angelicum* 76 (1999): 25-46; A. Oliva, "Quelques éléments de la *doctrina theologie* selon Thomas d'Aquin," in *What Is "Theology" in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (11th-15th Centuries) as Reflected in Their Self-Understanding*, ed. M. Olszewski, Archa Verbi. Subsidia 1 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2007), 167-93; idem, "*Doctrina* et *sacra doctrina* chez Thomas d'Aquin," in *Vera doctrina. Zur Begriffsgeschichte ders Lehre von Augustinus bis Descartes. L'idée de doctrine d'Augustin à Descartes*, ed. Ph. Büttgen R. Imbach, U. J. Schneider, H. J. Selderhuis, Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 123 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009), 35-61; idem, "Artificialis sacrae doctrinae modus," in *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach*, ed. I. Atucha, D. Calma, C. König-Pralong, I. Zavattero (Porto: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2011) 105-17.

[86] Concerning the role of the *desiderium naturale* to see the divine essence in the articulation between philosophy and theology, see Oliva, "La contemplation des philosophes," 635-54. On the the notion of sacred doctrine in the plan of the *Summa Theologiae*, see Oliva, "La *Somme de théologie* de Thomas d'Aquin," esp. 239-44.

[87] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 5, s.c. and ad 2 (Leonine ed., t. 4, p. 16): in the two cases the adjective is applied to theology's relation to the other sciences or to the function that these can have in relation to theology.

they seek to attain their own ends, according to their own methods, and that they thus offer to theology their own conclusions. It is not with regard to their principles that these sciences are subalternated to theology. They therefore remain functionally independent of it. The "control" the doctrine of the faith can exercise upon them is "external."[88] Thomas knew this well and so justified his crossing of the "limits of the theological faculty" (*limites theologice facultatis*) and he seems right in his mild reproach of the Master of the Order for requiring him to cross those limits.

Hence, we should recognize in Thomas's teaching a suitable distinction between two kinds of knowledge, a distinction that does not however imply a lack of communication between the two. The previous consideration of the commentary on Isaiah suggested that the foundation for the possibility of such communication is the truth that both disciplines have ends to attain. But, as we saw in our discussion of the sermon "A certain man made a great feast" (Homo quidam fecit cenam magnam), each of the two disciplines proceeds from different principles and methods: whereas philosophy takes creatures as its starting point, theology begins with revelation. If safeguarding the independence of methods is necessary for ensuring the viability of the two disciplines, the truths reached in them can be called "philosophical" or "theological" for only two reasons: either because of their subject-matter, or because of the methods by which they are known. In either case, however, truth for Thomas is philosophical or theological only *accidentally* (*per accidens*). This is particularly clear wherever philosophy and theology investigate the same objects. In such cases, the truth both disciplines attain is truth through itself, though known by different processes. On this account, even the problem of a double truth can be posed only accidentally, that is, with respect to the

[88] Certainly Thomas admits a subalternation of the ends of the philosophical sciences in relation to theology (the final cause is considered extrinsic), but not a subordination of the principles of these sciences in relation to theology; see Oliva, "La contemplation des philosophes," 654-61.

method followed to attain the truth in question.[89] When Thomas incorporates into his theology the philosophical insights of pagan thinkers such as Aristotle or the Arabic philosophers, he does so only insofar as they are true.[90] In this he does not limit himself to integrating single truths, but embraces entire sets of doctrines, such as in the cases of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *De anima* and the *Metaphysics*. The regard that Thomas has for the teachings of pagan philosophers derives from his awareness that they dedicated themselves to the search for truth and to the contemplation of God *ex creaturis*.

[89] See A. de Libera, "Introduction," in Thomas d'Aquin, *L'unité de l'intellect contre Averroès* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1994), esp. 56-58. Cf. L. Bianchi, *Pour une histoire de la double vérité* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2008).

[90] "Ad quartum dicendum, quod quando aliquid totaliter transit in alterum, non dicitur esse mixtio, ut dicitur in I De generatione, sed quando est mixtio utrumque miscibilium convertitur in unum tertium. Et ideo quando aliquid adiungit sacrae Scripturae de sapientia saeculari quod cedit in fidei veritatem, *vinum sacrae Scripturae non est mixtum, sed purum remanet*; tunc autem mixtum fit quando aliquid adiungitur quod corrumpit Scripturae veritatem: unde Glosa ibidem dicit "Qui praecepta sacrae Scripturae quibus debet auditores corrigere ad illorum voluntatem emollit, sensu suo admixto vinum corrumpit" (Thomae de Aquino, *Contra impugnantes*, c. 12, § 3 in *Opera omnia,* t. 41, ed. Leonina [Rome., 1970], p. A 136-137, ll. 212-25).

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LOST IN *TRANSLATIO*? *DIAKRISIS KAT'EPINOIAN* AS A MAIN ISSUE IN THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY PALAMITES AND THOMISTS

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AS IS WELL KNOWN, the emphasis of the disciples of St. Gregory Palamas on the distinction between essence and energy in God poses a stumbling block for Western theologians. When the latter point to the fact that such a distinction would entail composition in God, the former answer that this distinction does not exclude God's utter simplicity. To the question, why there is no contradiction in assuming a real distinction in the midst of God's simplicity?, it is generally answered that this is not a contradiction, but an antinomy which the ratiocinating Western mind is simply incapable of grasping.[1] Usually, the discussion ends with more or less courteous

[1] The following assessment of J. Van Rossum is quite typical of what I have in mind: "the Palamite distinction between essence and energies does not have to be conceived of in a human and logical sense. According to human logic, 'distinction' implies the notion of *separability*. Palamas emphasizes that this distinction in God is not according to our human understanding of 'distinction', but in a manner that is known to God alone. Palamas never attempted to give a philosophical explanation of this distinction. His approach was thoroughly apophatic, and that is why 'Palamism' remains unsatisfactory for philosophically minded theologians, especially for those who are trained in western scholasticism. Indeed, his theology raises the problem of the relation between philosophy and theology. Palamas makes clear that the mystery of God cannot be expressed adequately in the terms of our human logic. All philosophical and logical notions get a new meaning when applied to the divine mystery: essence, nature, hypostasis, distinction" ("Deification in Palamas and Aquinas," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 47 (2003): 368.

considerations regarding the extent of the partner's intellectual openness.

This is most regrettable, since it can be argued that the distinction frames the dogmatic core of the neo-Palamitic opposition between the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Christian world views. Other issues, taken one by one, are no more than *theologoumena* or mutually exclusive views that are all equally possible, for lack of official determination, in the framework of a common confession of faith. However, the simplicity of God's essence is the object of solemn definition in the West, paralleling the distinction between essence and energies in the East. What makes a group of *theologoumena* either Eastern or Western is, therefore, their reliance on one of these defined truths rather than on the other. Accordingly, the impossibility of reconciling the two definitions displays the core elements of the separation between the Western and Eastern ecclesial entities. The question is whether the two definitions are truly as irreconcilable as they appear. Before leaving the issue to the One whose truth transcends all human religious and cultural boundaries, it might be beneficial to mine the content of Palamas's distinction with some degree of theological accuracy.

Unfortunately, systematic comparison of the types of distinction developed in the framework of Western Scholasticism is rarely attempted by contemporary scholars. The only serious academic work I can think of is S. Guichardan's dissertation on *Divine Simplicity*, which dates back to 1933.[2] The result was unilaterally negative. Mindful of the fact that G. Scholarios himself, vibrant admirer of Aquinas though he was, could not reconcile the thought of the latter with the Palamite distinction,

[2] *Le problème de la simplicité divine en Orient et en Occident aux XIVe et XVe siècles* (Lyon, 1933). A considerable number of contemporary theologians, either Orthodox, Catholic, or Protestant, have taken up the issue regarding the "reality" distinction and discussed its compatibility with the dogmatic standards of the Western tradition. M. Jugie's repeated professions of anti-Palamism and the marked criticism of the Western tradition by J. Meyendorff and other neo-Palamites set up the terms and limits of the debate. Among many others, J.-M. Garrigues, A. de Halleux, C. Journet, J.-C. Larchet, A-N. Williams, R. Williams, D. Wendebourg, and K. Yannaras, have taken part in it. Few, however, have paid even slight attention to the Scholastic typology of the *distinctio*.

Guichardan contended that even Scholarios's use of Duns Scotus's *distinctio formalis* failed to substitute for Aquinas's *distinctio rationis* as a better equivalent to Palamas's "real distinction." It remains to be seen to what extent Scholarios effectively rejected any possibility of accommodation between Aquinas and Palamas on that point.[3] At any rate, even if Scholarios was as uncompromising as Guichardan argues, it is still to be considered whether he was right to be so. By taking a closer look at the background of Aquinas's and Palamas's respective understandings

[3] V. Grumel harshly criticized the work of Guichardan, questioning both the alleged Palamism ("reality" of the *distinctio minor*) and the alleged Scotism (equivalence between Palamas' "real distinction" and Scotus's *distinctio formalis*) of Scholarios (cf. "Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot et Georges Scholarios devant le problème de la simplicité divine," *Echos d'Orient* 34 [1935], 84-96). More recently, G. Podskalsky pointed out that Scholarios had never abandoned the hope of reconciling Thomism with Palamism (cf. "Die Rezeption der thomistischen Theologie bei Gennadios II. Scholarios," *Theologie und Philosophie* 49 [1974]: 305-23. Examining the evolution of Scholarios's thought from his treatises against Barlaam and Akyndinos to his *Commentary on "De ente et essentia*," Podskalsky writes that: "Based on the current results of our analysis, we would describe [the position of Scholarios] as being on the threshold of an understanding rather than leaning towards the definitive impossibility of agreement" (ibid., 319). In the page of Scholarios's treatise from which Podskalsky draws, the patriarch explains that Aquinas has restricted the notion of *distinctio realis* to cases when the elements distinguished are really two different things (δύο πράγματα), as opposed to cases when these two elements are said of an identical thing ("δύο τινά, τοῦ τε πράγματος ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῷ πράγματι"). In order to simplify (ἐξηπλωμένως), Aquinas has called all the latter *distinctio rationis* ("τὴν τοῦ λόγου διάκρισιν ἐλαμβανεν"). However, Aquinas knew that these "weaker" distinctions are themselves divided into two groups whereas the "weaker among the "weak" distinctions are accorded a duality which exists only in the soul of the one that conceives it. These are said to be *distinctiones rationis* in the most proper sense (κυρίως). According to Scholarios, the second group of distinctions (the "stronger among the weak"), those which are related to the "nature" of the thing, can also be called formal (διάκρισις εἰδική); see M. Jugie, L. Petit, and X. A. Siderides, *Oeuvres complètes de Georges (Gennadios) Scholarios*, vol. 6 (Paris: Maison de la bonne presse, 1933), c. 94, ll. 93-124.ps; the "stronger" among them are those "that have to do with the nature of the elements thus distinguished from one another, whenever they exist in the thing beyond the soul [that conceives them]" ("ἢ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅρων αὐτῶν φύσει τῶν γε διακρινομένων, ἐ
ἐν τῷ πρά
and Aquinas's *distinctio cum fundamento in re*, an issue that would deserve a not-less-careful investigation than the present one, I will focus on the heart of the problem, which pertains to Aquinas's distinction. It is a remarkable fact, though, that the views of the last patriarch of Constantinople, turned into a staunch Palamist and an opponent to the union with Rome under the influence of Mark Eugenikos, seem to converge with mine on that particular issue.

of the distinction, this article aims to show that there is no contradiction between the two.

My approach to this topic involves going back to the time when the discussion emerged, namely, the brutal and dramatic encounter between Thomism and Palamism in Byzantium. By the middle of the fourteenth entury, soon after St. Gregory's death, the Christian East and the Christian West unexpectedly discovered how fundamentally different their ways of understanding God's reality had become.[4] Although theologians proved incapable of coping with this difference in a peaceful manner, this dramatic confrontation provides, I will argue, a unique opportunity to identify the problem with the necessary degree of precision, so as to point the way towards its potential solution.

I will start by examining the precipitating context of the discussion. I will then give an overview of the patristic sources of the Palamitic position. I will conclude by comparing this Byzantine background to the Latin context which lies behind the Thomistic position.

I. A Question from the Italian Legate to Johannes Kantakuzenos

In hindsight, the year 6877 according to the Byzantine calendar (1368-69 according to that of the Latin world) appears to have been placed under the auspices of Gregory Palamas. For one thing, it was the year of the monk's canonization. It simultaneously witnessed the disintegration of the anti-Palamite party in Byzantium, with the condemnation of Prochoros

[4] On both sides, the issue regarding the *filioque*, originally raised by the Patriarch Photios (+893), had been treated as a typical divergence on a point of doctrine, a definite matter of orthodoxy or heresy that did not affect the fundamental points of agreement between East and West. As regards liturgy and Church discipline, one could always grant room to legitimate diversity. It is certainly not wrong to say that, on the occasion of the Palamite crisis, West and East came to an awareness of the different meaning they gave to aspects of the doctrine they previously were thought to hold in common. Both also discovered the very different religious logic that underpinned divergences on matters of liturgy and discipline.

Kydones.[5] More discreetly, the same year, the official visit to Byzantium of Paul of Smyrna, an Italian legate pitchforked into the position of (obviously Latin) Patriarch of Constantinople, gave rise to a stimulating conversation regarding the theology of the great saint. Eager to serve as a harbinger of the pressing reconciliation between the Latin West and the Byzantine East, the legate manifested some curiosity about the controversial doctrine that had been newly adopted by the Greeks. He was advised to discuss the matter with the monk Joasaph, who was none other than the former *basileus* John Kantakuzenos. Explaining the doctrine of the new Byzantine saint in his first letter to Paul, John declares:

> We believe in the essence of God, as possessing the energy which proceeds from it without division. The energy does not exist as separate from the essence [οὐ διϊσταμένην] but differs from it according to the notion [διαφέρουσαν ἐπινοίᾳ] as warmth differs from fire or brightness from light.[6]

In his response, the legate asks for some additional clarification:

> What is different with regard to the reality [πράγματι] will necessarily also differ with regard to the notion [ἐπινοίᾳ], but the converse does not hold true. My question is whether the essence and the energy differ both according to the

[5] Prochoros Kydones, a learned monk of the Athos, was the most systematic proponent of Thomism in the Byzantine anti-Palamite party. He is the author of a lengthy refutation of Palamas, constructed according to the pattern of the *Summa Theologiae* and falsely ascribed to G. Akyndinos by Migne ("De essentia et operatione" [*Patrologia Graeca* (*PG*) 151:1189-1243]) I will refrain here from describing how Prochoros Kydones came into contact with Thomism through the mediation of his brother, the *megas domestikos* Demetrios, who had himself been initiated into the writings of Aquinas by a Dominican friar at the convent of Pera—an Italian like the legate, naturally, cf. *Apologia*, in G. Mercati, *Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Theodoro Meliteniota ed altri appunti per la storia della theologia e della letteratura Bizantina del secolo XIV* (Vatican City, 1931). The fact is that, after the condemnation of Prochoros and the canonization of Palamas, there was no longer place for an official anti-Palamitic party in Byzantium. It is from Italy that Demetrios continued the fight with his circle of Greek intellectuals who had, like himself, converted to Catholicism. The most prominent among them, such as Manuel Calecas and the three brothers Chrysoberges, would eventually enter the Dominican Order.

[6] *Epistula Cantacuzeni* 3, 1, 15 (*Iohannis Cantacuzeni Refutationes duae Prochori Cydonii; et, Disputatio cum Paulo Patriarcha Latino: epistulis septem tradita*, ed E. Voordeckers and F. Tinnefeld, Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca 16 [Turnhout-Leuven: Brepols, 1987]).

reality and according to the notion, or only according to the notion, as a distinction that merely pertains to our way of perceiving realities.[7]

The Thomistic substrate of the legate's question is clear. There are only two types of distinction, *de ratione tantum* (ἐπινοίᾳ μόνη) or *realis* (πράγματι)—subjective or objective, to express it in contemporary language. Hence the dilemma: either Kantakuzenos believes that the distinction he perceives corresponds to a real or objective partition in God, in which case he will face the daunting task of reconciling God's perfection with the ghost of a composite being, or he concedes that this distinction is merely subjective, relative to our human way of grasping the divine reality, thus depriving the Palamitic dogma of substance.[8]

In his answer to the legate, Kantakuzenos avoids falling into this logical pitfall by making a distinction within the distinction, as it were:

> According to the teaching of the theologians and the decision of the Synod, the essence and the energy of God are, I assume, neither totally identical nor totally distinct. In actual fact, both statements are true according to a different logical criterion [οὐ μὴν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ]. True, an object cannot be both the same and different according to the same logical criterion [κατὰ τὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λὸγον]. However, the union as well as the inseparability and the indivisibility are accorded to the reality [τῷ πράγματι], whereas the distinction [διάκρισις] is merely accorded to the notion [μόνῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ].[9]

For Kantakuzenos, real antinomy is not about letting a self-contradictory statement simply be, as lazy theologians are inclined to do. Rather, it is about distinguishing two points of view according to which one and the same reality appears as the carrier

[7] *Epistula Pauli*, 1,1, 222 (ibid.).

[8] Actually, one finds in a treatise of Demetrios Kydones on the Trinity exactly the same use of the *distinctio rationis* against the Palamitic distinction. According to Demetrios, Palamas cannot draw on the reality of the distinction between the divine hypostases and the divine essence to justify the reality of the distinction between essence and energies, since this distinction is merely a *distinctio rationis*, cf. M. Candal, "Demetrio Cidonio y el problema trinitario palamitico," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* (*OCP*) 28 (1962): 94. It is most likely that, previous to his visit or in its course, the prelate had been briefed regarding the dangers of Palamism by Demetrios and the members of his circle.

[9] *Epistula Cantacuzeni*, 3, 5, 17.

of two simultaneously opposite sets of properties. Christ is one with regard to the hypostasis; with regard to his human nature, he has limited knowledge, whereas with regard to his divine nature, he has infinite knowledge. Similarly, the essence and the energy of God form an indivisible whole with regard to the reality, while they remain distinct with regard to the intellect. Assuredly, the concept of *epinoia* which is used by Kantakuzenos is very different from the one used by the legate. The fact that the distinction *kat'epinoian* points to the structural reality of the object, as it were, does not imply that this object is really composed, as claimed by Paul. Conversely, the fact that, for Kantakuzenos, the object discussed is not really composed does not imply that the distinction *kat'epinoian* exists only in our brain and not in the object, as claimed by the legate. The objectivity of Kantakuzenos's *diakrisis kat'epinoian* seems, therefore, at odds with what Thomists see as the condition of a *distinctio realis*, namely, the assumption of a potential or actual separation in the object itself. Kantakuzenos assumes that the distinction grasped by the intellect points to a real property of the object without implying the slightest composition, not even a virtual one, in the object.

Kantakuzenos's third letter is not the first instance in which the distinction of Palamas was formulated in these terms. Kantakuzenos had used the same argument in a treatise written in response to Prochoros's extensive refutation of Palamas.[10] Against Prochoros's predictable objection to the idea of God's composite being, Kantakuzenos argued that, according to Palamas, the distinction implied no separation, being merely grasped by the intellect: "[Gregorios] teaches only the divine distinction and the union, the former according to the epinoia, the latter according to the reality."[11] The first question, of course, is whether this is the personal view of a disciple trying to salvage the doctrine of his master as he sees adversaries savaging it. Indeed, to what extent

[10] E. Candal has shown that the considerations on the Thaboric light edited in *OCP* 28 (1962) and the *De essentia et operatione* ascribed by Migne to Akyndinos belonged together to a single treatise which has been lost. Unlike the one of its opponent, the treatise of Kantakuzenos was integrally preserved; cf. *Iohannis Cantacuzeni Refutationes*.

[11] *Epistula Cantacuzeni*, 2, 18, 70.

can the solution of Kantakuzenos be taken as representing the thought of Palamas and genuine Palamism, if there ever was such a thing?

In his letter to the legate, Kantakuzenos alludes to a *Synodikos*, which I would suggest may be identified with the *Tomos* issued by the synod of 1351.[12] As is well known, the religious controversy regarding the ideas of Palamas went through a succession of stages until the *Tomos* of 1368 which marks the end of the quarrel in Byzantium. In the interval between the episode with Gregorios Akyndinos and that with the Kydones, Nikephoros Gregoras, a distinguished and unabashedly self-assured scholar, found himself at the head of the anti-Palamite party. Both the *Tomos* and the writings of Gregoras attest to the crushing victory of Palamas and his supporters. Besides the importance of the synod itself in the development of the quarrel, there is an obvious reason why the monk Joasaph, alias John Kantakuzenos, relies on its decisions: the one who summoned it and presided over it was none other than he himself, as he was still reigning at the time.

Theologically speaking, the position of Gregoras on the issue of the divine essence and energies differed from that of Akyndinos. Ignoring the original dispute regarding the correct and incorrect ways of approaching God's reality, both Gregoras and Akyndinos were concerned with the faithfulness of Palamas's distinction to the genuine thought of the Fathers. However, while Akyndinos denied any real difference between the essence of God and his energy, arguing that God's operations are part of created realities, Gregoras admitted to a distinction *de jure* between God considered according to his essence and God as creatively active. As is clear from his *Antirrhetika Priora*, what Gregoras loathed was the notion of a real separation between the two aspects, which made him speak of Palamas's polytheism. On the side of Palamas and his followers, the question was whether a real distinction needed to be identified with a real separation. It is in this sense that Philotheos, in his own *Antirrhetika* against Gregoras, opposed what he calls the adamant witness of the Fathers: "they say that this difference is according to the epinoia,

[12] *PG* 151:717-63.

not the reality. It is rather the union which is according to the reality."[13] As Philotheos repeatedly emphasized in his treatise, Palamas's distinction implies a real difference (διαφορά) with regard to the notion, *kat'epinoian*, whereas the aspects which are distinguished subsist in a state of union according to the reality, *pragmati*.[14] Indeed, the position of Philotheos is explicitly echoed in the *Tomos*, when it is said that the *separation* between the divine essence and its energies is merely operated by the mind (τῷ λογισμῷ χωρίζειν), the difference being contemplated solely by the intellect (μόνη τού νού).[15]

Is there a doubt that the content of the *Tomos* faithfully reflects the position of Palamas himself? There is no marked presence of the *epinoia* notion in the refutation that Palamas wrote against Gregoras, although the treatise deals abundantly with the priniciple of distinctions within the divinity that do not imply composition or separation.[16] At one point, however, Palamas, dwelling on a passage from Pseudo-Dionysius's *Divine Names*, affirms that one should apply a specific type of distinction to the "greater and lesser" realities that can be intellectually perceived in God's uncreated existence, lest one fall prey to Gregoras's errors:

> For those who use their intellectual sight with discernment, it is impossible not to see to the following points in the distinctions dealing with God alone; namely, that there should not happen some blasphemious mutilation, but rather a pious distinction which divides without dividing (ἀδιαιρέτως διαιρεῖ) and refers the realities that have been distinguished back to the unique cause.[17]

[13] Φιλοθέου Κοκκίου δογματικὰ ἔργα, Μέρος Α', Thessalonian Byzantine Writers 3, ed. D. V. Kaimakes (Thessalonica: Centre for Byzantine Research, 1983), *Discourse* 8, l. 203.

[14] Ibid., *Discourse* 5, 6 (title); *Dis.* 5, 77, 1225, 1322, 1333; *Dis.* 10, 755, 1046, 1054.

[15] *PG* 151:739b.

[16] Palamas repeatedly emphasizes that the distinction between the essence and the energies does not disrupt the simplicity of God, see e.g. *Theophanes* (*PG* 150:929ab, 940c). The original treatise of Palamas against Gregoras, edited by P. Christou in the fourth volume of his *Gregoriou tou Palama Syngrammata* (Thessalonica, 1988) is neither available in Migne's *Patrology* or in the *Thesaurus Lingua Graeca*. Without the possibility of conducting automatized searches, the conclusions of a superficial enquiry can neither be fully reliable nor sufficiently refined.

[17] *Against Gregoras* II in *Syngrammata,* 283, ll.17-21. Cf. *Divine Names* 2.6 (*PG* 3:641ab).

How should we understand "dividing without dividing"? The only way to discard the accusation of self-contradiction is to conceive of a distinction that, existing in the mode of a division in the intellect, does not imply an actual division in the object itself. One finds in the *One Hundred And Fifty Chapters* (a work that, according to the conjectures of R. Sinkewicz, was written just before the council of 1351) a parallel passage which elaborates on the philosophical tenets of this distinction without division. In chapter 81, Palamas rebukes the "Akyndinists" for being incapable of knowing the "indivisible distinction [ἀδιαίρετον διαίρεσιν]" between the essence and the energies in God. Obviously, what Palamas criticizes is the idea that accepting the distinction in God implies confessing a ditheism or a least a composition in God *de facto*. Palamas's counter-argument runs as follows:

> If a man has never learned to separate in his mind [χωρίζειν τῷ νῷ] the body from the properties around it, how can he entertain nature in itself [πῶς ἀκούσει περὶ φύσεως καθ' ἑαυτην]? Nature as it inheres in bodies is not only inseparable from natural properties [οὐ μόνον ἀχωπριστός ἐστι τῶν φυσικῶν ἐυπάρχουσα τούτοις], but it can never exist without them [οὐδ' εἶναί ποτε δύναται χωρὶς αὐτῶν]. How can he entertain the universals [περὶ τῶν καθόλου] which exist as such in particulars [ἐν τοῖς μερικοῖς] but are distinguished from them by mind and reason alone [νῷ καὶ λόγῳ μόνῳ τούτων διαιρούμενα]? . . . If in such instances he is unable to speak of or entertain indivisible realities as distinct, how will he be able either to speak of or be taught any such thing in God's case, where according to the theologians, there are said to be many unions and distinctions.[18]

Here again, Palamas refers to a passage from Pseudo-Dionysius's *Divine Names*: "the unions prevail and have precedence over the distinctions [αἱ ἑνώσεις τῶν διακρίσεων ἐπικρατοῦσι], neither eliminating them nor being hindered in any way by these."[19] In other words, what introduces composition into some indivisible continuum, such as nature and physical properties or universals and particulars (man in Callios) has nothing to do with the structure of the analyzed object and everything to do with that of

[18] Gregory Palamas, *The One Hundred And Fifty Chapters*, ed. R. Sinkewicz (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1988), 49-54.

[19] *Divine Names* II, 11 (*PG* 3:652a).

the mind trying to analyze it. The only way in which a finite mind can understand how a consequence is enveloped in its cause or stems from it in a simple and uniform manner is by conceiving the consequence and the cause as separate realities. Once again, we are brought back to the idea of the *diakrisis kat'epinoia* as opposed to the *henôsis kata pragma*.

The answer of Kantakuzenos to the legate refers, therefore, to a dogmatic construct that had been part of the Palamite party's logical apparatus prior to the encounter with Thomism, channeled, a couple of years later, by Italian clerics present in Byzantium and heartily welcomed into the circle of Demetrios Kydones. Accordingly, the whole conflict between Thomists and Palamists seems to hang upon the existence of a type of distinction, in the Eastern theological tradition, unknown to that of the Latin Western. Is it true? What about the existence of a *tertia via* between the *distinctio rationis* and the *distinctio realis*, namely, an intellectual distinction that, correlating transcendent, extramental objects without implying composition, would therefore escape the dilemma formulated by the pontifical legate? This third way is what I would like to investigate now.

II. *DIAKRISIS KAT'EPINOIAN* IN THE BYZANTINE TRADITION: A LEAP FROM THE SUBJECTIVE TO THE OBJECTIVE

Sometimes names indicate real properties of objects; sometimes they do not refer to more than the way we relate to objects.[20]

[20] By promoting the term *epinoia*, together with *ennoia*, the Stoics aimed at stressing the discontinuity between reality and how we think of reality, which lay at the core of their ontology and logic: "I see a horse; I do not see 'horsitude'" (*Antisthenes fragmenta*, D. Caizzi, ed. [Milan: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1966], frag. 50c [p. 42]). Being a thought, an incorporeal *lekton*, an *epinoia* was said to be endowed with subsistence (τὸ ὑφιστάναι) rather than with existence. From the start, *epinoia*, as to its philosophical use, was therefore connected with the sphere of the human mind, delighting in the vague universality of concepts, as opposed to the realm of individual realities that it apprehends relying on such concepts. Theo Kobush writes: "The most significant result of this intra-Greek evolution was the crystallization of human consciousness as a definite quantity, as a specific dimension standing in relationship to an objective reality, of either a perceptive or and intelligible kind" ("Die epinoia," in *Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II: An English Version with Supporting Studies - Proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa [Olomouc, September 15-18, 2004]* [Boston: Brill, 2007], 5). The problem is that the subsistence of

epinoiai does not say anything about the type of existence of things they refer to. The species of horse and the species of goat-stag are equal as to their type of mental existence, but not as to the type of existence of their objects. Against the idea that that extramental existence merely regards propositional logic and physics, ought one not introduce *logical* distinctions between *epinoiai* that would reflect the different ways in which they refer to their extramental objects? In the most famous passage of his *Isagogue* or *Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle*, Porphyry overturns the Stoic self-referential notion of linguistic truth as he formulates an epistemological restriction that will become the basis of the medieval discussion on the status of universals: "I shall refrain from speaking about *genera* and *species*, as to whether they subsist [in the nature of things]or in pure and simple conceptions only [εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται] and also whether if subsistent, they are corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from, or inside sensibles, and subsist alongside these, for such a treatise is most profound, and requires another more extensive investigation" (A. Busse, *Porphyrii isagoge et in Aristotelis categorias commentarium,* Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.1 [Berlin: Reimer, 1887], b.4.1, p. 1, l. 1t. Subsistence no longer designates the intramental mode of existence that characterizes the Stoic *epinoia*. Now it designates its exact opposite, namely, the extramental mode of existence that corresponds to the mental *epinoia*. The school of Ammonius son of Hermias, in fifth-century Alexandria, widely draws on Porphyry's insight. A commentary of Elias on Porphyrius's *Isagoge* states the distinction that draws a line between two kinds of *epinoiai*, depending on the status of their extramental object: "It is not the same to speak of a notion, on the one hand, and of a simple and pure notion on the other [διαφέρει ἐπίνοια ψιλῆς ἐπινοίας]. The first makes us understand an existing entity in another manner, as for example when one separates the shape [χωπί
realize what a triangle is in itself. The second frames pictures of things which are naturally impossible, like a goat-stag" (A. Busse, *Eliae in Porphyrii isagogen et Aristotelis categorias commentaria*, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 18.1 [Berlin: Reimer, 1900], 49, l. 17. A couple of centuries later, John Damascene will give an almost identical account regarding the two kinds of *epinoia* in his *Dialectica*. The first kind "analyzes and elucidates an understanding and knowledge of things which are still unrefined and lacking articulation [ἀδιάρθρωτον], whereby a simple phenomenon becomes complex speculatively; for instance man becomes a compound of body and soul. The second, by a union of perception and fancy, produces fictions of realities; i.e., divides wholes into parts, and combines those parts, selected arbitrarily, into new wholes; e.g. Centaurs, Sirens " (P. B. Kotter, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, vol. 1 [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969], s. 65, l. 84. Specifying the binary type of correspondence between mental notions and the single entities that compose the physical world was a first step towards reconnecting the mental world of the Stoics with Plato's ideal world—all this without letting the substantial reality of the Aristotelian universe dissolve into the thin air of Platonic *fainomena*. According to the tripartition which played a major role in the epistemology developed at the school of Ammonius Hermias, a universal could be *ante rem* (Plato's *idea*), *in re* (Aristotle's *eidos*) or *post rem* (the Stoic *epinoia*). On this seminal contribution of late, Aristotle-ridden Platonism to the history of ideas, see P. Hoffmann, "Catégories et langage selon Simplicius: La question du *skopos* du traité aristotélicien des *Catégories*," in I. Hadot, ed., *Simplicius: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie. Actes du colloque international de Paris* (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1987), 61-90; A. de Libera, *La querelle des universaux de Platon à la fin du Moyen Age* (Paris: Seuil, 1996), 103-9; see as well introduction and notes to the translation of Porphyrius's *Isagoge* (Paris: Vrin, 1998), pp. LVII-

From the beginning, *diakrisis kat'epinoian*, as a theological issue, was tied to the discussion on the type of reality to which the names of God refer. From a Christian point of view, the most fundamental names of God are personal: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. If what Origen writes in his *Commentary on the Gospel of John* is reliable, certain people whom historians called Monarchianists denied to such names a referent κατὰ ὑποστασιν, since God, according to them, could be but one οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ.[21] Monarchianists thought of these names as merely reflecting the different ways God had manifested himself to human beings, so that they express the diversity of the *epinoiai* or notions that human beings derive from these manifestations. However, this is, according to Origen, a mistaken alternative: the numerous *epinoiai* or titles of Christ point to relative as well as absolute aspects of the eternal Son who is one with his eternal Father.[22]

Eunomios, the main theoretician of a revised version of Arianism in the fourth century, in one instance accords with the relativism of the Monarchianists, when he denies to *Agennetos,* "Ungenerated," the status of an *epinoia*. According to him, "Ungenerated" is the name that God has revealed to human beings as granting the knowledge of his essence, relegating thus the "Generated," that is, the Son, to a rank inferior to himself. For Eunomios, the main division runs between names that are given by God, including *Agennetos*, the name relating to his own

LVI; pp. 32-34.

[21] "Now there are some who fall into confusion on this head of the Father and the Son, and we must devote a few words to them. They quote the text, 'Yea, and we are found false witnesses for God, because we testified against God that He raised up Christ, whom He raised not up', and other similar texts which show the raiser-up to be another person than He who was raised up; and the text, 'Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up', as if it resulted from these that the Son did not differ in number from the Father, but that both were one, not only in point of substance but in point of subject, and that the Father and the Son were said to be different in some of their aspects [κατά τινας ἐπινοίας διαφόρους] but not in their hypostases" (Origen, "Commentary on the Gospel of John," in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 10, c. 21; cf. *Origène. Commentaire sur saint Jean*, vol. 3, trans. C. Blanc, Sources chrétiennes 222 [Paris: Cerf, 1975], 37.246).

[22] A. Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)* (London: A. R. Mowbray & Co., 1965), 142-43.

essence, and names that are produced by human beings, qualified as *epinoiai*. These can be either totally devoid of signification or they can carry a meaning that does not reach beyond a synthesis of properties existing only in the human mind.[23] Human artificial and arbitrary linguistic compositions stand in contrast to the supposedly one-to-one correspondence between realities and the names given by God, according to the Cratylean perspective consummately described by Daniélou.[24] The problem is that Christ gives to himself a plurality of names, like "shepherd," "bread," "door," etc. Accordingly, Eunomios is obliged to concede that certain names given by God, and therefore referring to extramental objects, are different from the sacred names that conform to the "one-to-one" correspondence rule. Eunomios treats them as a special kind of *epinoiai*, established by God, not by human beings, in order to indicate aspects of the truth manifested in Christ. This implies that not all *epinoiai* are necessarily purely intramental, *psilai epinoiai*; without ceasing to be notions in the human mind, some of them can also designate extramental objects. But which, or rather, how? Eunomios claims, rather vaguely, that such *epinoiai* point to the "difference of energies, together with definite analogies and relationships [διά τε τὰς ἑτερότητας τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ ἀναλογίας τινὰς καὶ σχέσεις]."[25] This is not about simple, straightforward extramental or absolute objects, like houses or dogs. If my interpretation of Eunomios's thought is correct, what he means is that, although the Son is one and has one name, Christ gives us indications related to who he is through the different ways in which he deals with us, acting now as protectively as a shepherd, now as sharply as an axe, etc. These are analogies and relationships adjusted to our faculty of understanding. In other words, "non-pure" *epinoiai* are generated by differences that have an extramental existence—the fact that we perceive Christ now as mild, now as

[23] Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.178 (W. Jaeger, ed., *Gregorii Nysseni opera*, vols. 1.1 and 2.2 [Leiden: Brill, 1960]).

[24] J. Daniélou, "Eunome l'arien et l'exégèse néoplatonicienne du Cratyle," *Revue des études grecques* 69 (1956): 412-32.

[25] Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.363.

uncompromising has an objective basis in the behavior of Christ—and yet, at the same time, all these "impure" *epinoiai* point in the direction of a unique essence, with a unique name, from which they ultimately derive. Relative aspects, with metaphorical names, stand on one side, that of consequences; the One, absolute reality with its personal name stands on the other, that of cause and principle, while an impervious logical boundary separates the two sides.

In their fierce battle against Eunomios, the Cappadocians accomplished a simple logical move. They claim that there are no such things as names established by God. *Agennetos* is a human, and not a divine *epinoia*, exactly as "axe," "shepherd," "dogs," and "houses" are. All the names concerning God belong to human language. Basil refers *epinoia* to the specific mode in which created minds, investigating what appears at first sight as "simple and wholesome entities [τοῦ νοῦ ἁπλα δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ μοναχὰ]," discover them to be complex upon enquiry, so that these are found "divided only with regards to the intellect [ἐπινοίᾳ μόνῃ διαιρετὰ λέγεται]."[26] For Basil, fantasies of the mind, *psilai epinoiai*, are simply intellectual divisions which have no corresponding entity in the extramental world. Accordingly, non-*psilai epinoiai*, being the normal case, are defined as an intellectual grasp of the structure of an extramental object which does not imply any actual division in the object itself.[27]

By transferring Eunomios's *agennetos* to the other side of the boundary, from the realm of God's essence to that of human words, the Cappadocians could secure the transfer of the Son of

[26] Basil of Caesarea, *Contra Eunomium*, c. 6 (*PG* 29:521c-524a).

[27] Real *epinoia* does not merely reflect the structure of the human mind, as claimed by the Eunomians who contrast it with the ontological simplicity of God's essence. It tells something about the structure of the extramental reality it designates. Unsurprisingly, Basil and the whole Cappadocian group are able to integrate the considerations of Porphyry and post-Plotinian Neoplatonism on *epinoiai* into their own theological reflection. Their command of philosophical notions cannot be compared with the more ostentatious, but still rudimentary apparatus of their adversaries. In the following considerations, I will not dwell on the intellectual debt that the great figures of the Greek patristic tradition—Ps.-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene among others—owe to the philosophical insights of late Neoplatonism.

God in the opposite direction, from the side of creatures to the side of God's essence, since this essence is no longer identified with a personal property of the Father. Simultaneously, this radical humanization of language suppresses the claim of Eunomios to know God's essence and speak adequately about it. The essence of God, as the principle of all things, is unknowable, unspeakable; all names of God, like "powerful," "eternal," and so on, derive from the multiplicity of ways in which God is perceived by human beings when dealing with them, "energizing" them as it were.[28] Gregory writes:

> As we apply these different notions [ἐννοί
> we do not tear it apart [συνδιασχίζοντες], but we believe that whatever God is according to the essence [κατ᾽ οὐσίαν], He is one with respect to the fact that we have conceived [ὑπειλήφαμεν] this series of concepts [ὑπολήψεις] as being apposite [οἰκείως ἔχειν] when it comes to the object of our thinking [τὸ νοηθὲν].[29]

In other words, the distinctions existing in our intellect, as it strives to apprehend God, do refer to extramental realities, since God does affect creatures in a variety of ways. However, these distinctions do not divide the divine essence, since the extramental realities to which they refer are multiple only insofar as they express the way God relates to us, not the divine essence which contains all these aspects in an unfathomable, unspeakable, and absolute unity. Accordingly, the intellectual distinction, *diakrisis kat'epinoian*, that grasps the different names-energies of God as real properties of God does not imply the slightest actual composition in the essence of God as the subject of these properties. The main difference between the *diakrisis kat'epinoian* that applies to the objects of sensory perception and that which applies to the divine essence is that the latter is beyond the reach of finite perception: one cannot compare the elements that are mentally distinguished with the extramental continuity of the

[28] Gregory of Nyssa writes, it is "according to the differences of energies and the relationship associated with what is energized [κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν διαφορὰς καὶ ἐνεργετούμενα σχέσιν]" that one ascribes these names (*Contra Eunomium* 2.1.353).

[29] Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.477.

object, as one is able to compare the shape and the surface of a triangle to the actual triangle whence these are mentally derived. The finite mind will always deal with the energies of God or the ways in which God relates to it, since it will never be able to grasp an essence which, being divine, is *per definition* infinite. However, by directing its intellectual sight towards this unknowable essence, what the finite mind knows is that the properties it perceives are "apposite" to this essence, although the boundaries that separate these properties from one another are not, since they pertain to the "epinoetic" nature of the finite mind.

After Arianism, another major discussion involved the use of a mental distinction correlating the structure of an extramental object which remains one according to its reality. It was the struggle regarding the two natures of Christ. From a Chalcedonian perspective, the two natures of Christ are real, but can only be intellectually distinguished, since they are "inseparably united" in him. Thus, what the intellect *distinguishes* does not imply any real *separation* in the object, which in this case happens to be a living subject, that is, Christ himself. However, the fact that the two natures of this living subject, Christ, cannot be divided in actual reality does not mean that they could not be so virtually. If the Son of God is hypostatically one of the Trinity, does this not imply that there was a time, before his Incarnation, when he subsisted without a human nature?

In the ebullient aftermath of the Council of Chalcedon, Leontius of Byzantium—or whoever wrote the works attributed to him—focused on this issue as a refutation of Severus of Antioch. Indeed, why should not the notions, *epinoiai*, that distinguish between the two natures of Christ correspond to a real composition in Christ and give way to the Cyrillo-Severian *mia fusis* as soon as extramental reality is involved? In this discussion, Severus of Antioch revives the use of the *epinoia* concept by Eunomius, merely transposing it from the Trinitarian to the Christological sphere: Christ's human and divine *epinoiai* have no referential validity beyond the realm of finite intellects—they are but the ways in which the one, unique and unfathomable divine

nature of Christ made itself known to human beings.[30] However, for Leontius and all the Neo-Chalcedonians, the *diakrisis kat'epinoian* relate to the two natures of Christ, reach beyond the united living whole that eyes can see and imagination draw, going directly to the invisible reality of Christ's composite hypostasis. This is a Christological restoration of the Cappadocians' criticism of Eunomius: *epinoiai* point to the structure of an objective, extramental, and unknowable reality, although the mode in which they point towards it is inadequate, because reflecting the limitations of the human mind. Thus, according to Leontius, if natures remain objectively *distinct* in Christ *kat'energeian*, the distinction *kat'epinoian* does not imply that these natures are *separate kat'energeian,* although they cannot but appear as such to the human mind that considers them.[31]

The logical core of the quarrel regarding the one or the two energies/wills in Christ did not differ from the quarrel that immediately preceded it, that regarding the one or two natures of Christ. Just as Monophysites had claimed regarding the nature(s) of Christ, Monoenergists claimed that the distinction between the human and the divine operation-activities of Christ is entirely dependent on the human intellect, being deprived of any corresponding feature in the objective structure of Christ's exclusively divine energy. However, no dogmatic dispute of the first millennium stands closer to the issue discussed by the Palamites and the anti-Palamites in the fourteenth century than the quarrel over Christ's energy(ies). The relationship between nature/essence on the one hand and operation/will/energy on the other comes to the fore for the first time. True, in contrast to the supporters of Palamas, Dyoenenergists are not interested in the distinction between essence and energy, but in the distinction between human and divine energies. Nevertheless, in order to establish the objective existence of Christ's human energy, they

[30] Severus characterizes the distinction between Christ's human and divine idioms as "μόνῃ τῇ θεωρίᾳ" (existing only for the mind that considers it); see J. Lebon, "La christologie du monophysisme syrien," in *Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1951), 500-505.

[31] Leontius of Byzantium, *Solutio argumentorum Severi* (*PG* 86:1932c).

emphasize the idea that no essence whatsoever could exist without having an energy corresponding to itself. Admitting the objective reality of Christ's human nature, in line with the Council of Chalcedon, one is therefore forced to concede the objective reality of the human energy that flowed from it. Such argumentation was of primary importance to the Palamites, as a first attempt to formulate the relationship between essence and energy. It comes as no surprise that Dyonenergists should describe this relationship in terms that underline their continuity with Chalcedon Christology. This is precisely what the author of a treatise attributed to Anastasios the Great claims when he states that "the distinction [between the essence and the energy] is notional whereas the union [between the same] is real [ἡ μὲν διάκρισις ἐπινοίᾳ, ἡ δὲ ἕνωσις πραγματικη]."[32] The union between the two essences and their two energies in Christ is as real as the union between his two natures, although the mind is just as entitled to distinguish between each essence and its energy as it is entitled to distinguish between Christ's human and divine natures.

We finally come across the original source of the formula that Kantakuzenos brings forward to solve the dilemma raised by the Roman legate: he borrows it from the treatises of Philotheos Kokkinos against Gregoras, who himself borrows it from writings dating from the sixth and seventh centuries, thus going back to the time of the quarrel about Christ's energies.[33] In his struggle

[32] The text has been edited by J.-B. Pitra, *Anastasiana* (Rome, 1866), 76, ll. 23-36. As is well known, two distinct figures stood behind the one that medieval authors used to call "Anastasius the Great," namely, Anastasius I, Patriarch of Antioch (559-98) and Anastasius of Sinai, the monk theologian of the seventh century. The latter is now generally believed to be the author of the treatise.

[33] There is little doubt that the issue relates to the distinction between essence and energy, whether human or divine, in the passages quoted by Philotheos Kokkinos: "They are one according to the uncircumscribed character, just as Anastasius the Great has precociously taught: 'here the energy makes manifest that from which it proceeds; indeed, each one is uncircumscribed, which is the reason why they are mutually inseparable'. And again, 'the distinction is according to the *epinoia* while the union is according to the reality (. . .)'" (*Antirrhetici duodecim contra Gregoras,* Discourse 5, line 1301 [Kaimakes, ed., Φιλοθέου Κοκκίνου δογματικὰ ἔργα Μέρος Α΄]). See also Kantakuzenos, *Refutationes Prochori,* II, 3, 4 (Voordeckers and Tinnefeld, eds.). We know that Palamas and his supporters rediscovered

against Barlaam the Calabrese, what Gregory Palamas did was merely to develop the mystical dimension of a theological construct: it is through his divinizing energies that monks and spiritually alive Christians come to know God, while his divine essence remains hidden to all finite intellects.

We have come full circle. There is hardly a better proof that a distinct insight is faithful to the tradition that precedes it than to find it explicitly formulated in this tradition. Does that mean that the Western tradition, that to which the legate belongs, has remained completely foreign to an understanding familiar to the Byzantine one? Or, is the dilemma of the legate still relevant? Let us take a closer look to the Latin tradition now.

III. *Distinctio secundum intellectus* in the Western Tradition: A Leap from the Objective to the Subjective

The philosophical insight that, in the East, enabled the theological use of the *diakrisis kat'epinoian* did not remain unknown in the West. From this point of view, the Eastern and Western traditions can be said to share one and the same founding moment: the issue raised by Porphyry on the status of universal concepts (*genera* and *species*) in his *Isagogue* or introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*.[34] However, the fact that the West developed its own, absolutely crucial, understanding of Porphyry's issue in the Middle Ages gave to its theological application a historical turn that appears to be directly opposite to its equivalent in the East. Delving into this history will help us to understand why the Italian legate, at the twilight of the Middle Ages, was less than prepared to accept the logic of the Palamitic approach to the distinction between the divine essence and energies.

the thought of the Fathers that prepared the Ecumenical Council of 681-82, of St. Maximus the Confessor in particular. Hence the affirmation of the *Tomos* of 1251, which issues the condemnation of Gregoras, according to which the theology of Palamas is but a disclosure (*anaptyxis*) of the sacred teaching contained in the Sixth Ecumenical Council (cf. *PG* 151:722b).

[34] See above, n. 18.

As Alain de Libera has profusely shown, Boethius's translation of the *Isagogue*'s decisive passage is fraught with an essential—and most probably deliberate—philosophical ambiguity.[35] When Porphyry states that he will "refrain from speaking about *genera* and *species*" as to "whether they subsist [in the nature of things]or in pure and simple conceptions only," Boethius renders "εἴτε ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοί
Like the adjective "bare"in English, the Greek ψιλός can either mean "stripped, separated, pure" or "simple, elementary, lacking value." Plato uses this latter, pejorative, register of ψιλός when designating the speech of sophists and rhetoricians as "ψιλοὶ λόγοι," mere speech unsupported by evidence.[37] There is little doubt that Porphyry and, after him, the Alexandrian school of Ammonius Hermiae had a similar semantic register in mind when commenting on the *skopos* of Aristotle's *Categories*. A concept is either a mental entity to which a reality corresponds or a mental entity devoid of any such correspondence. By favoring the alternative, positive, semantic line of ψιλός in his translation, Boethius gives scope to another, quite different, philosophical issue: do we have to think of *genera* and *species* as real things existing in the world or do they have a "purely" intellectual existence? The truth-value of an intellectual entity, a concept, changes completely according to whether it is deprived of the external correspondence that it should have in order to be relevant (Porphyry-Ammonius), or whether it is relevant *in spite of* the external world being composed of entities that are foreign to it (Boethius). In the first case, the truth of the concept is inferior to that of the world; in the second, it is superior. Thus, the first discussion paves the way towards reconciliation between Aristotle and Plato (*genera* and *species* can correspond to natural

[35] See for instance Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux: De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris: Seuil, 1996), 29-46.

[36] Boethius, *In Porphyrii Isagogen commentorum edita secunda* 1.10 (S. Brandt, *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum* [*CSEL*] 38 [Vienna: Tempsky; Leipzig: Freitag, 1906], 161).

[37] See Plato, *Theaetetus* 165a; *Phaedrus* 262c; *Laws* 811e; and Aristotle, *Rhetorica ad Alex*. 1483b27.

things provided these things are patterned according to divine ideas) whereas the second discussion bluntly opposes them ("*genera* and *species* are quintessentially integral to the forms of natural things" vs. "*genera* and *species* are quintessentially separate from the material world"). Actually, Boethius, in his two *Commentaries on Porphyry's Isagogue*, shows that he does not dismiss the first type of philosophical investigation, as long as it takes place in the framework of a thorough discussion about the second. He starts by establishing that there is no point looking for the existence of *genera* and *species* in the material realm, since these concepts result from the mental abstraction of substances which remain distinctive in the material world. He then investigates the nature of the correspondence between the universal nature of mental concepts and the singularity of material substances. Ultimately, Boethius contends that this correspondence rests on the notion of likeness, as producing universality in the mind while deriving from the material aspects that singular substances have in common.[38]

Be that as it may, the emphasis of medieval theologians who, from the twelfth century onwards, reflected on the *Logica vetus*—the set of writings including Aristotle's *Categories*, Porhyry's *Isagogue*, and Boethius's commentaries on the *Isagogue*—was not on epistemology, but rather on metaphysics. They were not so much concerned about the difference between correct and uncorrect ideas, in line with the original intention of Porphyry, as about the ontological status that should be accorded to *genera* and *species*, in line with its Boethian interpretation. It is not difficult to guess why. Indeed, following Boethius's translation, nothing could seem more urgent than to discuss the ontological substrate of *genera* and *species*, since the understanding of the whole purpose of the *Logica vetus* depended on it. Is the *Logica* describing concepts, natural realities, or words? The quarrel over the universals started with the same question that was raised and peacefully resolved at the school of Ammonius: what is, ultimately, the *skopos* of Aristotle's treatise

[38] Boethius, *In Porphyrii Isagogen commentorum* 1.11 (Brandt, ed., 166).

on the *Categories*? However, in the West, Boethius's line of reflection opened the door to a vast and almost endless discussion regarding the ontological requisites of human knowledge.

The main competing lines of thought that surfaced in the twelfth century, this "Aetas boethiana" as Marie-Dominique Chenu called it, are well-known: *Genera* and *species* are but *voces*, linguistic signs referring to singular extramental entities (Roscelin). They have an existence *in re* from where our mental concepts are derived (William Champeaux). As such, they exist merely in the mind, although they correspond to certain configurations (states) of things in the extramental world (Abelard).

If there is a need to remind ourselves of these rival theories here, it is because medieval thinking regarding the different types of theological distinctions relies on the logical alternatives they entail. By far the most eminent among twelfth-century disciples of Boethius, Gilbert of Poitiers adopted his master's understanding and use of intellectual abstraction as a method of inquiry about the structure of reality. Boethius's "mental separation" between the subject, *id quod est* (lit. "that which it is"), and *id quo est* ("that by which it is"), the set of the subject's properties in each substantial reality, became the cornerstone of Gilbert's metaphysical vision.[39] No less than Boethius, Gilbert is aware of the issues pertaining to the distance between ordinary language and the expression of God's reality. Actually, Gilbert is among the most radical theorists of what medieval schools called the art of "translatio" (lit. "transfer").[40] In his commentary on Boethius's *De*

[39] As Gilbert writes in his *How Can Substances Be Good in Virtue of the Fact That They Have Being When They are not Substantial Goods,* one of the greatest metaphysical hits of the Middle Ages, "Many things cannot be separated in actuality, but they can be so by the soul and the intellect, like the triangle" (*Patrologia Latina* [*PL*] 64:1312c).

[40] The term is derived from Donatus's *Ars grammatica*: "A trope is an expression transferred [*dictio translata*] from its proper signification to a nonproper similar signification for the sake of stylistic embellishment, or out of necessity" (3.6) (L. Holtz, *Donat et la tradition de l'enseignement grammatical: Etude sur l'Ars Donati et sa diffusion (IVe-IXe siècle) et édition critique* [Paris: Centre nationale de la recherche scientifique, 1981], 667). On the notion of *translatio*, see S. Ebbesen, "Theories of Language in the Hellenistic Age and the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," in idem, *Greek-Latin Philosophical Interactions* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2008).

Trinitate, Gilbert argues that no Aristotelian category whatsoever—be it genus, accident or even substance—can be applied to God according to its proper meaning.[41] Such categories have to undergo what Gilbert calls an analogical transposition, a *translatio* or *transumptio proportionalis*. Substance, for instance, can no longer be defined as the substrate of accident, but designates the fact of being for a subject. Only from this point of view can we see a definite proportion shared by created beings and their Creator.

At some point, however, Gilbert was blamed for betraying Boethius's exclusively critical use of linguistico-logical analysis when it came to the understanding of God's nature. The difficulty had to do with Gilbert's attempt at "translating" (transferring) the distinction between *id quod est* and *id quo est* to the divine sphere. Gilbert claims—or was accused of claiming—that one could "separate" in God a subject, *Deus*, and that through which God is what he is, *divinitas*, the Godhead, a concept that includes all the attributes of God. What is remarkable, here, is the role played in the controversy by the twelfth-century philosophical quarrel on universals. If Gilbert emphasizes that a *translatio* of the distinction is possible, it is because he believes that the distinction between what God is and what God "has" (that through which he is), his attributes for instance, is not a mere *vox*, a *modus loquendi*, in contrast to what a number of *magistri* of his time would claim.[42] Accordingly, in theology (as well as in philosophy), Gilbert behaves as a realist opposing the nominalists. By the same token, he comes close to the Greek notion of *diakrisis kat'epinoian*: the fact that God is totally simple should not prevent the mind from thinking that the distinction it draws between the two aspects tells something real about God's way of

[41] *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*, ed. N. M. Häring (Toronto: Institute for Medieval Studies, 1966), 119, ll. 26-31.

[42] This is the case in the *Sententiae Divinitatis* which are probably slightly prior to the council of Reims; see A. Hayen, "Le concile de Reims et Gilbert de la Porrée," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 27 (1927): 166.

being and of being simple.[43] "Deus non est divinitas quae Deus est, sed qua est": obviously, Gilbert is struggling to conceptualize the relationship between God's essence and his attributes. One will probably be left wondering forever whether he was entitled to claim victory. Indeed, the problem was that, in the context of the twelfth-century quarrel on universals, there was no other alternative to a *distinctio* according to the words (a *modus loquendi*) than a *distinctio realis* or a separation *in re*. Hence the condemnation issued by the council of Reims in 1148:

> We believe and confess that God is not wise if He is not so in virtue of the wisdom which He himself is; not eternal, if not so in virtue of the eternity which He himself is; not one, if not so in virtue of the Unity which He himself is; not God, if not so in virtue of the Deity which He himself is [*non nisi divinitate, quae est ipse, Deum*]; that is, that God is wise, great, eternal, one in virtue of nothing but Himself.[44]

Be that as it may, could one be satisfied with the idea that the distinction between God's essence and God's attributes, as well as that between his attributes themselves, were simply a *modus loquendi*, as still claimed by the chancellor Prevostinus (+1210), without any bearing on God's reality? In his *Glossa* on Peter Lombard's *Liber Sententiarum*, a work which goes back to the 1230s, Alexander of Hales, at the time a young *magister* at the newly founded Paris University, shows great understanding for Gilbert.[45] He refers to Peter Lombard's distinction "secundum rationem intelligentiae," as opposed to "secundum rationem rei," when accounting for the difference between the persons of the Trinity and the divine essence.[46] In this manner, Alexander

[43] It is most likely that Gilbert found, on this precise point, a source of inspiration in his extensive readings from the Greek Fathers. We know, for instance, that he brought with him lists of such "testimonia" at the council of Reims, cf. N. M. Häring, "The Porretans and the Greek Fathers," *Medieval Studies* 24 (1966): 181-209.

[44] Labbe, *Conciliorum Collectio Regia Maxima*, t. 12, col.165 (Ad P. O. Labbe and P. G. Cossartii Labores, ex tipographia regia [Paris: 1714])

[45] "It is not probable that such experts on the Holy Scriptures should have fallen prey to heresy" (Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 33, 6c [ed. Pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (Florence: Quaracchi, 1951), 334]).

[46] Ibid.

indicates that the *ratio intelligentiae*, by separating the modes of predication about God, leads the mind into a genuine understanding of God's being: "This is said to be reached that becomes the object of an intellectual grasp [*tactus intelligibilis*]." Alexander integrates his reading of John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* into his reflection on God's triune being: "What is common is conceived according to the reality [*re*] while it is divided according to the concept [*ratione*]."[47] Behind the reassessment of Lombard's *ratio intelligentiae*, there is Damascene's Trinitarian use of the *diakrisis kat'epinoian*.

However, John Damascene is not the only source of the "realistic" reassessment of Lombard's *ratio intelligentiae* in thirteenth-century reflection on God's attributes. Regarding this evolution, one should not minimize the role played by the *Falasifa*. Damascene provided the logical instrument to solve the issue, but the *Falasifa* displayed the issue itself, with all its theological implications.

As a matter of fact, in the Arabic world, the discussion regarding the reality of the *Shifat* in God, the substrate of the ninety-nine names, is as old as the eighth century, with the dispute between theologians of the Mutazila school, keen on rationality, and the traditionalists keeping to the *Sunna*. In the name of *Tawhid*, the unity of God, the former deny any reality to the multiplicity of attributes that were contemporaneously professed by the Sunnites. This discussion took a new turn sometime earlier than the development of academic theology in the West, with the flourishing of two new schools: the philosophers on one side, and the *Ash'arites* on the other. Avicenna/Ibn Sina, the great philosopher of the eleventh century, goes so far as to claim that the term "essence," let alone all the other attributes, did not apply

[47] Ibid., 3 (Quaracchi ed., 332). The *diakrisis kat'epinoian* plays a pivotal role in Damascene's treatment of the Trinity: "One should keep in mind that it is one thing to conceive [an object] according to the reality (πράγματι) and another according to the *epinoia*." Human beings are distinct πράγματι, whereas what they have in common (humanity) is perceived ἐπινοίᾳ. It is just the opposite in the case of the Trinity: what hypostases have in common (being essentially God) exists πράγματι, whereas they are distinguished from one another ἐπινοίᾳ; see P. B. Kotter, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos,* vol. 2 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973), s. 8, l. 224f.

to the reality of the One divine Being, whose nature infinitely transcends the thinking abilities of human beings. Meanwhile, Algazel/Al-Ghazali, the "destroyer" of the *Falasifa*, a title on which he prided himself, argues that each attribute should really be distinguished from God's essence, although not separated from it. In a way that is not without similarities to the positions of both Gilbert of Poitiers and Gregory Palamas, the *Ash'arites* maintained that divine attributes could not be said either to be the essence of God or not to be this essence.[48] Be that as it may, approximately at the time when Gilbert was condemned in the West, Averroës/Ibn Rushd, the last of the great Arabic philosophers, suggested an original—at least in the Arabic world—approach to this vexed issue. Averroës aims at tracing a middle way between the two opposing parties. According to him, both Avicenna and Algazel had forgotten that "by its nature, the intellect divides existing wholes [*adunata in esse*] into their constitutive parts [*ex quibus componuntur*], even if they are not actually divided [*quamvis non dividuntur in actu*]."[49] In other terms, the distinction between divine attributes and divine essence is not without foundation in the extramental object of human thinking, since these are two parts of one whole. However, this objectivity gets lost when the intellect no longer distinguishes, but divides these two parts that exist *actu* as a united whole. Obviously, Averroës simply rediscovered the *diakrisis kat'epinoian*, which probably resulted from the reading of thinkers associated with the school of Ammonius Hermias, such as Philoponus and Simplicius. Applied to the dilemma between the unity of God and the distinct significance of each of his attributes, the solution of Averroës led to considering the existing multiplicity of the divine attributes as

[48] This stance is mocked by Maimonides: "some people engaged in speculation have ended by saying that His attributes . . . are neither His essence nor a thing external to His essence—these are things which are merely said" (*Guide for the Perplexed,* l. 1, c. 51). However, as is well known, Albert and especially Thomas, no matter how indebted to the reading of the *Guide*, equally reject Maimonides' radical denial of all possible mode of *translatio* from the divine perfections as participated in by creatures to their nonparticipated reasons in the divine essence.

[49] Averroës, *In Metaphysica* IV, fol. 32, cited in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, s.v. "Dieu."

deriving from our finite way of conceiving God, while the being of God retained the distinctiveness of each attribute as an absolutely transcendent whole *in actu*.

The convergence between Greek patristic and Arabic philosophical sources, which was by far the most important intellectual event that happened in the Latin world of the early thirteenth century, led to further elaboration of Lombard's "ratio intelligentiae." It is a well-known fact that the "Hellenizing" theology upon which rained the condemnations of 1241-44, with their renewed emphasis on the simplicity of the divine essence, is a direct consequence of this Greco-Arabic interaction.[50] Notwithstanding, a brilliant Parisian *magister* of the immediately next generation and foremost advocate of this Greco-Arabic legacy proved that one could avoid the fate of his "Hellenizing" peers through intelligent use of the *diakrisis*. Albert the Great fully accepts the simplicity of God as regards the *res*. However, as a reader of Dionysius's treatise *On the Divine Names* in the light of Aristotle and his Arabic interpreters, Albert forthrightly dismisses the idea that the "distinctio per intelligentiae rationem" between the divine attributes should be reduced to a "modus loquendi."[51] The fact that our imagination treats the simplicity of God's essence as a confused uniformity and our language cannot express its distinctiveness without implying some heterogeneous composition does not mean that such names as "Good," "Just," "Beautiful," and so on do not correspond to something real in the divine essence.[52] Lombard's *ratio intelligentiae* does not refer to

[50] P.-M.Contenson, "Avicennisme latin et vision de Dieu au début du XIIIe siècle," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 26 (1959): 29-97; H.-F. Dondaine, "Hugues de S. Cher et la condamnation de 1241," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 33 (1949): 170-74; idem, "L'objet et le medium de la vision béatifique," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952): 60-130; A. Lévy, *Le créé et l'incréé, Maxime le Confesseur et Thomas d'Aquin*, Bibliothèque thomiste (Paris: Vrin, 2006).

[51] See F. Ruello, *Les 'noms divins' et leurs 'raisons' selon Saint Albert Le Grand, commentateur du "de divinis nominibus*," Bibliothèque thomiste (Paris: Vrin, 1963), 33. See the whole book on this issue.

[52] Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, II, q. 3, ad 1: "opportet in ipso sapientiam accipere secundum veram rationem sapientiae in ordine ad proprium actum et similiter bonitatem et ita de aliis, sed simplicitas non patitur ut illa different in ipso secundum substantiam," quoted in Ruello, *Les 'noms divins' et leurs 'raisons'*, 120; cf. Albert the Great,

a *modus loquendi*, but to a *modus attribuendi* or *supponendi*. Actually, unlike "symbolic names" such as "Rock," which need to be "translated" by means of Gilbert's *transumptio proportionalis*, "mystical names" such as "Wise" and "Just" refer to God's absolute reality.[53] It is true that creatures participate in God's wisdom, but our intellect, through the consideration of participated wisdom, comes to conceive of a nonparticipated Wisdom which is nothing other than God's essence or substance.[54] Accordingly, the reality that is distinguished by the finite intellect as it examines the *ratio* of a mystical name refers to God *per se*, independent of his relationship to the world. God is contemplated on the absolute level of his existence, although in the fragmentary mode associated with one of his names. Of course, since grasping the nature or quiddity of the divine substance lies beyond the ken of the finite intellect, the latter will never be able to embrace the reality that is the substrate of all mystical names. However, not *knowing* the divine essence (*quid est*) cannot prevent the finite intellect from *conceiving* its existence (*quia est*). Albert interprets the Dionysian (actually Maximo-Erigenian) notion of *theophania* as the immediate vision by the elect of the reality which is merely conceived by the theologizing intellect *in via*—that *res* for which the name stands.[55] Here, the *quia est* of God is known *per modum*

Liber Sententiarum, d. 8, a. 4, ad 1: "It is therefore manifest that whatever be the way in which the intellect achieves a composition, it has some foundation in the Godhead as regards the elements which it treats as components provided they are understood according to their own *rationes*," in *Opera omnia,* ed. Borgnet, v. 25 (Paris, 1893), 226.

[53] Albert, *Sent*., d. 1, a. 17, sol. (Borgnet, ed., 73).

[54] "venimus in cognitionem ipsius sapientiae divinae quae est, secundum quod est ipsa, non participata" (quoted in Ruello, *Les 'noms divins' et leurs 'raisons'*, 84).

[55] "intellectus attingendo ad substantiam ipsius cognoscit ipsum vel in sua similitudine, sicut in via, per speculum et aenigmate, vel immediate, sicut in patria. Ad hunc autem tactum proportionatus est intellectus non per suam naturam, sed per lumen gloriae descendens in ipsum, confortans eum et elevans eum supra suam naturam, et hoc dicitur theophania" (Albert, *Super Dionysium de div. nom.,* XIII, q. 12, sol., quoted in Ruello, *Les 'Noms divins' et leurs 'raisons'*, 90). Regarding the misunderstanding of the Dionysian origin of the notion of theophania, due to the interpolations of excerpts from Erigena's *De divisione naturae* in the *scholiae* of the thirteenth-century *Corpus Areopagiticus*, see H-F. Dondaine, *Le corpus dionysien de l'université de Paris au XIIIe siècle* (Rome, 1953); Lévy, *Le créé et l'incréé,* 83-126.

ignorantiae, according to the beatifying rays that continuously flow from the divine essence or quiddity.[56]

In its substance, the teaching of the *Magister* on divine names passed on to that of his even greater disciple. Without losing the mystical horizon of Albert, Thomas Aquinas develops the coherence of Albert's doctrine on both a philosophical and a dogmatic level. Integrating it into the fundamentals of a perfectly Catholic doctrine on God could not proceed without slight adjustments. However, they do not alter the basic intuition of Albert: as such, the distinctions that the mind establishes between the divine perfections have no existence *in re*—and still, when it comes to what they distinguish, these mental distinctions are said to correspond to a *res* that gives determination to God's essence without affecting its simplicity. The *Scriptum super sententiis* already contains a clear statement of Aquinas's unwavering position on this particular issue:

> in God, wisdom and goodness are totally one as to the reality [*omnino unum re*] and are distinguished as to the reason [*differunt ratione*]; and this reason not only rests on the one who does the reasoning [*ex parte ipsius ratiocinantis*], but on the property of the reality itself [*ex proprietate ipsius rei*].[57]

In the same passage, Aquinas writes that there are three ways in which one can speak of a notion of the mind as existing in a reality: when it is a likeness (*similitudo*) of an existing thing, like "man"; when it is a concept (*intentio*) which has only a remote foundation in reality, like "quality" as designating the genre itself; and when it has no foundation whatsoever in reality or is extrinsically wrong, as the idea of a chimera. Divine attributes are of the second sort: like the notion of quality, we know that they do not correspond as such to the reality that is contemplated by

[56] "Et ista cognitio habetur per *unitionem super mentem*, idest quando anima unit seipsam his quae sunt supra ipsam, *quando recedit ab omnibus aliis et* etiam *seipsam dimittit*, quae plus aliis imitatur deum, sic *unitur* divinis *radiis* adhuc *supersplendentibus*, quia semper accipit ut supra se et numquam perfecte comprehendit eos" (Albert, *Super Dionysium de div. nom.,* VII, 30 [in *Opera omnia,* vol. 37/1, ed. P. Simon (Aschendorff, 1972), 359, l. 50]).

[57] Aquinas, I *Sent*., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3 (electronic edition by R. Busa, "Corpus thomisticum" [http://www.corpusthomisticum.org]).

our mind, since they are derived from the mode in which our mind analyzes this reality. Still, they correspond to this reality as a sign (*signum*) corresponds to the thing which is signified (*significatum*). Leaving aside the first alternative (pure conformity), which does not involve the idea of distinction, one recognizes John Damascene's notion of *diakrisis kat'epinoian* (second alternative), as distinguished from the *psile epinoia* (third alternative), a classification which, as we have said, goes back to the fifth-century school of Ammonius Hermias.[58]

Surpassing Albert, Aquinas expands upon the necessary reasons that lead us to posit a *fundamentum* for each perfection in God's reality. Here, he appears to be taking issue with the views of Maimonides, according to whom finite intellects are not allowed to rise from the contemplation of created perfections to that of the uncreated ones. For "rabbi Moyses," as Aquinas calls him, an apophatic use of created perfections (stating that God is far superior to any perfection that can be contemplated by finite intellects) is permitted, but not a kataphatic one, due to the indefinite distance between what God is and what God does: it is not because God acts *like* a living being as he creates the world and reveals himself that his essence should be conceived as having something in common with what finite intellects mean by "life." In actual fact, Maimonides' epistemological skepticism threatens the very idea of participation as the fundamental principle on which a Christian vision of the universe rests. That created realities are perfect to the extent that they participate in God's perfection implies that they do have something in common with God's perfection: "It is necessary that the perfections [*nobilitates*] of all creatures should be found in God in the mode which is the most perfect [*nobilissimo modo*] and deprived of any kind of deficiency."[59] Conceiving wisdom in its most perfect state is not identical to conceiving kindness in its most perfect state. In this matter, confusion is a sign of deficiency, whereas distinction is the mark of perfection, as long as it does not impair the unity and

[58] See above, n. 18.

[59] I *Sent*., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2.

simplicity of the being who is both wise and kind. Accordingly, "the reasons [of the divine perfections], are not only in our intellect [*non sunt tantum in intellectu*]. They have an immediate foundation in the reality which is God [*habent proximum fundamentum in re quae Deus est*]."[60] The relationship between God and creatures induced by the various degrees of perfection is not, therefore, merely metaphorical: without being homological, it is nonetheless analogical.[61]

Finite intellects can develop a concept of the one divine essence containing an indefinite series of sovereign perfections *in actu*, as they strive to synthesize the multiple ways in which God's unity is reflected throughout the created universe. Things in their materiality represent God in a deficient way, so that when the mind acquires an adequate concept of things through their forms, it naturally yields a mental representation of God, "nam scientia est assimilatio intellectus ad rem scitam."[62] However, as things represent the essence of God in a deficient way, due to their material finiteness, likewise, the mind's representation of God's essence is deficient, due to its formal finiteness. In actual fact, the mind is unable to forge an adequate representation of the mode in which distinct perfections can determine one simple reality, because this mode is infinite.[63] Accordingly, what prevents the distinction between the divine perfections from being real is not

[60] I *Sent*., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.

[61] See the parallel discussion in *Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 5.

[62] I *Sent*., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2.

[63] It is only in our mind that wisdom exists as genus, with distinct boundaries that separates it from other perfections, so that it cannot coexist in one being with other perfections without making it composite and therefore finite. In God, however, wisdom is not a genus but one of the ways in which we conceive actual and simple infinity as a determined reality. This is the thought Aquinas develops in one passage of his Commentary on the Divine Names: "[It must be understood] that the realities that are composed in themselves exist in God in a mode simple and infinite, since the particular names that signify some content specifically distinct from the rest do no longer signify it in a finite but in an infinite mode when they are taken to ascribe a divine property. Accordingly, the name ´wisdom´ when it is used in relationship to created realities means something distinct from justice, as for example something existing in a certain genus and species, whereas it does not longer signify something definite as to its genus and species or something distinct from the rest of the perfections, but something infinite when used in relationship to the divine realities" (*In De div. nom.*, c. 1, l. 3 [Busa, "Corpus thomisticum"]).

the reality of what is distinguished but the mode in which it is distinguished—the fact that the mind needs to separate what exists as a unity in order to conceive God's transcendent extramental reality: "This multiplicity of names comes from the fact that our intellect is incapable of collecting the different modes of perfection in one single notion [*una conceptione diversos modos perfectionis accipere*], since it derives knowledge from creatures, in which the modes of perfection exist according to different forms."[64] The only adequate representation of God's perfection is the eternal Word of God, the Son, *imago Deitatis*, because he is merely manifesting the infinite essence that he is himself, together with the other divine persons.[65]

Be that as it may, finite intellects are not entirely bound by the finiteness of their *modus concipiendi*. They can diminish the deficiency of their representation by focusing on the one reality that lies beyond the divine names, as their common substrate. However, this implies a renunciation of clarity, a removal of all familiar concepts, in order to delve into the divine obscurity which is the condition of mystical experience. According to Aquinas, Dionysius does not mean that God is deprived of

[64] I *Sent*., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.

[65] "conceptio perfecte repraesentans eum est verbum increatum; et ideo est unum tantum" (ibid.). This transcendent *imago* stands in immediate conformity to its extramental object, as when we conceive, *mutatis mutandis*, the notion of man. In contrast, the immanent variety of divine names refers to this extramental object only as a remote *fundamentum in re*, as when we conceive the notion of "quality." A passage from *De Veritate* clearly expounds the difference between the two representations: "if there was something that could represent God in a perfect way, it could not be other than one itself, since it would represent in one mode and according to one form. This is why there is only one Son, who is the perfect image of the Father. In a similar way, our intellect represent the divine perfection according to a variety of of concepts since each one of them is imperfect. Indeed, if it was perfect, it would be only one, just as the Word of the divine intellect is one. There are therefore a number of concepts in our intellect which represent the divine essence. The divine essence corresponds to each of them as a thing to its imperfect image. In this manner, all the concepts of the intellect are true, although this multiplicity is related to a unity. In addition, since names cannot signify things except by the means of the intellect, as it is said in the first book of *De Interpretatione*, this is why it ascribed a number of names to a unique reality according to the diverse modes of understanding, or according to the multiplicity of reasons which it is itself. Indeed, something in the thing itself corresponds to all of them" (*De Verit*., q. 2, a. 1 [Busa, "Corpus thomisticum"]).

substance when he calls God "supersubstantial." On the contrary, Dionysius aims at drawing our attention to the reality of God's substantial being, at developing an inner "sense" of it, by emphasizing the inadequacy of the terms we use to designate it.[66] This apophatical approach, which applies to all divine names ("superwise," etc.) conveys the sense of actual infinity to intellects that can have no experience of it within the created realm.

This is an important point, which is seldom brought forward by commentators. The fact is that Aquinas's understanding of the vision of the elect is intimately connected with his appraisal of Dionysian apophatism. There is only a difference of degree, no matter how significant, between the confused, obscure knowledge of God's infinite being that finite intellects can develop *in via* and the culminating, dazzling knowledge that the elect experience in *patria*.[67] Nothing will ever bridge the distance between finiteness and infinity, not even the direct influence of the divine, uncreated actuality on the minds of the elect, granting them access to itself

[66] "The names that we give signify according to the mode in which realities come to be known by us. Since what God is falls beyond our ken as shown previously, while our knowledge is proportionate to created realities, the names that we give do not signify in a mode appropriate to the divine greatness, but in a mode corresponding to the existence of created realities" (*In De divin. nom.*, c. 1, lect. 1 [Busa "Corpus thomisticum"]).This knowledge of God beyond the relativity of the human *modus significandi* is an "unknowledge" in the mystical sense of the term, as underlined in a passage from *De Potentia*: "Our intellect is incapable of adjusting to the divine substance. What the substance of God is remains, as such, beyond our ken and therefore ignored from us. This is why the ultimate point that the human knowledge of God can reach is the knowledge of being ignorant of God, insofar as it comes to know that whatever we know about God remains below the knowledge of what God is" (*De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 5, ad 14).

[67] If Dionysius speaks of God's revelation as a light, it is because it is one and the same, *quoad se*, with the divine light that illuminates the elect. However, since this light manifests itself according to the *similitudines* of the created world, the intellect has no direct experience of it, so that the intellect encounters obscurity as it strives to perceive God by means of this light: "in order not to believe . . . that we could embrace the truth and intelligibility of divine realities in a perfect manner, he adds that we let ourselves delve in the contemplation of the super-substantial beam; that is, for the sake of the knowledge of the truth pertaining to God, not perfectly however, but according to what is proper; 'seated' so to say; that is, setting our mental activities at rest, so that they will not be carried beyond what is given to us . . . as if saying . . . even at that point something pertaining to the divine realities remains hidden from us, our duty being to refrain the propensity of our intellect to inquire about it" (*In De divin. nom.*, c. 1, lect. 2 [Busa "Corpus thomisticum"]).

through the *lumen gloriae* that it produces in them. Since God's uncreated actuality/energy exceeds the capacity of finite intellects, the latter can never fully grasp the reality they are actually contemplating, even if they fully understand that this reality is indefinitely different from whatever they know:

> For the created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God to an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.[68]

Contrary to Albert, Aquinas is not prepared to say that what the elect see is merely the *quia est* of God, his existence, and not his *quiddity* or essence.[69] Rather, the impossibility of comprehending God's essence for a finite mind, the fact that its actual knowledge capability is continuously exceeded by the intelligibility of this object, implies that the elect, as well as the angels, see the essence of God in the mode of an endless succession of fragmentary aspects flowing from it. In the article of the *Scriptum* on which we have been commenting, Aquinas emphasizes that, although the elect can give one name to God as what they see is but one reality, one *res* encompassing all the *significata* of the distinct perfections, they still need to apprehend these perfections successively in order

[68] *STh* I, q. 12 a. 7. The direct contemplation of God is not apophatical due to the poverty of our knowledge, as in mystical experience *in via*; it is so due to an abundance of intelligibility that supersedes the intellect, as stated in Aquinas's *Commentary on the Divine Names*: "Although the angels see the essence, the unions of holy powers that befit angels remain ineffable and unknown to us, unions according to which they unite to the divine essence through knowledge, attaining something of its reality without comprehending it . . . indeed, it is not due to its obscurity that [the divine essence] remains unknown, but due to its overflowing radiance" (*In De divin. nom.*, c. 1, lect. 3 [Busa "Corpus thomisticum"]).

[69] Not seeing the essence of God can only mean seeing something other than his essence, as when it is contemplated in a finite *similitudo* (cf. *STh* I, q. 12, a. 2). One cannot perceive an existing man without perceiving a man. By claiming that the elect see God as an existent without seeing his essence, Albert rejected the possibility of a "Wesenanschauung," an intellectual grasp of the essence of God, by the elect. However, not being able to grasp the essence of an object that one sees does not imply that one does not see it, lest one fall prey to an obvious self-contradiction. The intellectual sight of the elect has a sensory dimension attached to it which is absent from the theoretical "Wesenanschauung" of our common experience. There, *in patria*, seeing and understanding are two different things.

to *understand* what they see: "[our intellect in glory], after seeing a unique reality, would form different concepts of it, and consequently different names. As Chrysostom teaches, angels glorify God, some of them as Majesty, others as Goodness, and so on, implying that they do not see him by means of a comprehensive vision." Exactly as the finiteness of our intellect requires us to do *in via*, that of the elect *in patria* forces them to forge different "divine names." However, due to the superintelligibility of its object, the *modus concipiendi* of the subject is no longer an obstacle to the intellectual sight of each divine name's real content. The elect perceive what our intellect *in via* is incapable of conceiving: the mode in which each name is one with the others without losing its distinctness. The intellect of the elect contemplates without ceasing a multiplicity that is wholesomely anchored in a simple unity.

Thus, following in the footsteps of Albert the Great, relying like his master on John Damascene and the *Falasifa*, Thomas Aquinas made a significant contribution to the reintroduction of the Fathers' *diakrisis kat'epinoian* into the realm of theology. Previously, Boethius's textual *translatio* of Porphyrius's *Isagogue* had undermined Gilbert of Poitier's attempt at a theological *translatio* of philosophical principles. Theologians of the twelfth century had only two options as they addressed the issue regarding the reality of God's attributes: the realist approach, postulating a real distinction in God, and the nominalist one, claiming that the distinction was a sheer *modus loquendi*, a deceitful reflection of the structure of human language in the field of theological realities. John Damascene and Arab philosophers, however, showed the way towards a third type of distinction: a mental concept that spoke about the reality of God's being without straightforwardly representing it. In this manner, the Latin world rediscovered the original problematic that lay behind Boethius's translation of Porphyrius's *Isagogue*: the distinction between the two kinds of *epinoiai*, the "impure" one, which implied an extramental object, and the "pure" one, which had to do with fancies such as the goat-stag. The species in the mind bore

on a reality that subsisted (ὑφέστηκεν) if it referred to a *distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re* while it referred to a *distinctio de ratione tantum* if this species consisted of "pure and simple conceptions" (ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται). In the theology of Aquinas, nowhere is the difference between the two kinds of *distinctio rationis* more crucial than in the discussion regarding the relationship between the unity of God's essence and the multiplicity of his perfections.

This enquiry into the Latin reception of the *diakrisis kat'epinoian* enables us to take up anew the object of the controversy between the legate and Kantakuzenos. What can we say about the reality of the divergence that occurs between the two positions? By way of conclusion, let us go back to the point where we started.

When one compares the dilemma raised by the legate with the evolution of theological tradition that precedes it, one cannot avoid being struck by its anachronistic character. The legate does not seem to take into account the third type of distinction, that is, the *distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re*. The alternative with which he tries to confront Kantakuzenos is between a "real distinction" (διάκρισις πράγματι) in the sense of the realist *conformitas objecti* and a distinction "that merely pertains to our way of perceiving realities" in the sense of the nominalist *modus loquendi*. Was the legate really ignorant of a third kind of distinction? The Greek wording that he uses to translate *distinctio rationis tantum* betrays a sort of hesitation: διάκρισις ἐπινοίᾳ points towards a *fundamentum in re*, in contrast to διάκρισις λόγῳ, which is a purely verbal distinction—but, still, διάκρισις ἐπινοίᾳ μόνῃ seems to refer to Porphyrius's ψιλαί ἐπινοίαι or fancies without any bearing on reality. There is hardly any doubt that the legate oversimplifies the logical apparatus of Latin theology in order to back Kantakuzenos into a corner. At no point does he express the thought that there might be a way of reconciling the Latin, Thomistic approach to the divine reality and the Byzantine, Palamite one. This is a remarkable fact, when one bears in mind that Aquinas's *distinctio rationis cum fundamento*

in re, as applied to the relationship between divine essence and divine attributes, is the precise Latin equivalent for the *diakrisis kat'epinoian* that Kantakuzenos applies to Palamas's distinction between essence and energies in God. Both distinctions are such that, while pointing out a real mode of distinctiveness in God, they do not prevent him from remaining an absolutely simple unity. Moreover, when Palamas and his disciples, mostly relying on Maximus the Confessor, claim that the angels and the elect see God by means of his uncreated energies "without beginning or end," his account does not seem to differ much from Aquinas's theory of the divine vision, since what both theologians have in mind is the endlessly changing perception of God's radiant perfections: Goodness, Wisdom, etc.[70]

There are many reasons that could account for the lack of ecumenical fervor on the side of the legate, from a superficial theological education to various *Kirchenpolitische* interests. However, none of these reasons would have played a significant role in the discussion, had the legate not been convinced that, quintessentially, the Latin and the Byzantine positions were mutually exclusive. It is not difficult to understand why. While Kantakuzenos argues that the distinction between God's essence and God's energies is merely *kat'epinoian*, he states that the unity or union between the two is *kata pragma* or real. Unity (ἕνωσις πραγματική) is not identity (ταυτότης). The denial of a real separation can still be construed as the maintaining of a real distinction in God between the essence and something that would not be his essence. In actual fact, it is crucial to the Palamite understanding of the universe that the principles of God's activity in creating and conserving the material world as well as

[70] Cf. Palamas, *Triads* 3.2.7: "Thus, neither the uncreated goodness, nor the eternal glory, nor the divine life nor things akin to these are simply the superessential essence of God, for God transcends them all as Cause. But we say He is life, goodness and so forth, and give Him these names, because of the revelatory energies and powers of the Superessential"; 3.3.8: Thus, just as God would not be called "more-than-God" if the grace of deification did not exist, so he would not be called "more- than-unoriginate," unless, as St. Maximus has rightly said, "immortality, infinity, being and all those realities which by nature are contemplated as qualities appertaining to God are the unoriginate works of God" (trans. J. Meyendorff [New York: Paulist Press, 1983], 95 and 105); cf. Maximus, *Cent. gnost*. 1.48 (*PG* 90:1100D).

illuminating the minds of saints and angels are not identical to what God is in himself or essentially, though they eternally flow or radiate from the divine essence. Since the created world partakes of God according to its mode which is foreign to the uncreated nature of divine realities, God's energy seems to "bend" according to the relativity of created time and space. For the creatures who conjecture the existence of the divine energies theoretically or experience them mystically, the essential and super-transcendent source from where these energies originate remains incommensurably remote. By contrast, Aquinas emphasizes that the perfections as well as the operation of God are identical to his essence. Whereas Aquinas claims that the elect see the essence of God when they contemplate his eternal perfections, Palamas, together with the whole Eastern tradition, teaches that the essence of God remains ignored by the elect who, meanwhile, contemplate his eternal energies.

At the same time, one is not forced to interpret Kantakuzenos's ἕνωσις *kata pragma* as implying a *distinctio realis* in the Thomistic sense. Could we not be dealing here with the *fundamentum in re* of the *distinctio rationis*? Although God is a simple unity, what the human intellect perceives when it distinguishes between God's essence and perfections (or God's operation) is something real within this unity, not according to the relationship between a *similitudo* and its *res* (that would become a *distinctio realis*), but between a *signum* and a *significatum*. After all, this is the core of the teaching of Aquinas: claiming that the perfections and the divine essence are identical does not imply that there is no *fundamentum in re* to their distinction. In this case, the issue would be similar to the difference between the Latin and the Byzantine formulas regarding God's tri-unity. The Byzantine tradition is not ready to accept the Latin (Augustinian) notion according to which a divine *persona* is [identical to the] divine *essentia* or *substantia* of God. Rather, the approach of the Cappadocian Fathers, starting with Basil of Caesarea, emphasizes that the divine *hypostasis* is not God's *ousia*, but the *ousia*'s mode of subsistence (*tropos*

hyparxeos). Plainly said, the Latin tradition envisages God's essence as encompassing the three divine persons, whereas the Byzantine tradition sees God's essence as the *koinon*, the common element to the three hypostases. At the same time, there is no doubt that East and West are in dogmatic agreement regarding the Trinity. Here again, the East emphasizes the *diakrisis kat'epinoian*, while the West emphasizes real identity. Why not accept the idea that the relationship between the Western, Thomistic and the Eastern, Palamitic views on the distinction between the divine essence and its perfections presents a similar case? Aquinas's and Palamas's views can be understood as two different but equally acceptable expressions of the same mystery regarding the divine being.

Indeed, there is hardly any other possible path towards a recovery of genuine unity between the Eastern-Byzantine and Western-Latin ecclesial entities. As long as one of the two theological perspectives is rejected as dogmatically incompatible with the other, the view of the universe that it carts along will remained ignored, as will the religious world of the rival segment of Christianity. It is only when dogmatic equivalence is conceded that the full contrast between the two worldviews comes into sight. In the West, the emphasis on the subjective dimension of the *distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re* is inseparable from an anthropological standpoint that locates the source of God's immanent action in God's eternal and motionless being, identified with his essence. In the East, the emphasis on the objective dimension of the *diakrisis kat'epinoian* is inseparable from a theocentric perspective where God's eternal being-in-energy is motionlessly "curved" towards the spatiotemporal *continuum* that contains human beings. Here, the reality of God is understood from a human, immanent point of view; there, human reality is understood from a divine, cosmic point of view.

The translation of *distinctio rationis cum fundamento in* re in Greek is a blindspot in the legate's dilemma. Behind this false problem of translation, there lies the immeasurable distance between two understandings of the world, of the relationship

between God and human beings. Latin and Byzantine theological and religious universes had been growing apart from each other for centuries, without even suspecting it. Admittedly, this was too much to take into account for a Latin prelate on a short diplomatic mission to Byzantium. After the last reply of Kantakuzenos, the correspondence broke off. More than six hundred years later, it is high time we resumed this first attempt at a *translatio* of Palamas's doctrine in Thomistic terms. Indeed, as inchoate as it was, the dialogue seemed promising.

BOOK REVIEWS

Philosophers of the Renaissance. Edited by PAUL RICHARD BLUM. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010. Pp. 323. $36.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8132-1726-0.

This volume contains twenty essays covering Renaissance philosophers from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries. For the most part, each chapter focuses on one thinker, offering a portrait of the philosopher's biography, literary production, and philosophical contributions. Apart from one new chapter, the essays were first published in German in 1999, and they have been revised for the English edition with updated bibliographical information. The essays collectively offer concise, reliable overviews written by well-established scholars and specialists in the field of Renaissance intellectual history. The authors do not seek to present novel or controversial views of the thinkers examined, but to provide reliable portraits and to correct common misperceptions about Renaissance philosophers. The collection is uniformly of very high quality, and the portraits emphasize the epistemological, metaphysical, cosmological, and, to a lesser extent, moral thought of a great variety of Renaissance philosophers.

Some of the figures covered in this volume are quite well known. Niccolò Machiavelli, Nicolaus Cusanus, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Marsilio Ficino, and Michel de Montaigne each receive a chapter. One chapter collectively treats the Byzantine thinkers George Gemistos Plethon, George of Trebizond, and Cardinal Bessarion, who each produced works in the mid-fifteenth century giving rise to a controversy over the relative merits of Plato and Aristotle. Some chapters cover thinkers probably better known for their contributions to other disciplines than to philosophy: the artistic polymath Leon Battista Alberti and the Protestant Reformer and theologian Philipp Melanchthon. Several essays examine figures who to varying degrees have acquired reputations as anti-Aristotelians, such Petrus Ramus, Bernardino Telesio, Francesco Patrizi, Giordano Bruno, and Tommaso Campanella. Other chapters in turn chronicle the life and works of those who belong to the Aristotelian tradition, such as Pietro Pomponazzi and Jacopo Zabarella. The remaining chapters concern Ramon Lull, Lorenzo Valla, Agrippa von Nettesheim, Juan Luis Vives, and Francisco Suárez.

As the book covers figures taken from a period of five centuries, some justification may be sought for the inclusion of those whose lifetimes appear within periods traditionally described as medieval or early modern. One might even question, for instance, whether there exists a period of Renaissance philosophy of sufficient distinction to merit a position between medieval and modern thought. Collectively, the chapters seem quite attuned to such concerns. For example, Emmanuel J. Bauer contributes an essay on Francisco Suárez (d. 1617), one of the latest figures treated in the volume, and while the chapter underscores the Thomistic, Scotist, and nominalist strains in Suárezian metaphysics, Bauer argues persuasively that Suárez employs a revolutionary new method. This new method "unites a mode of presentation that is oriented to the questions themselves with an illumination of the truth that is based on the history of the problems; the latter is inspired by humanist scholarship" (243). With such a method, we are told, Suárez "moves on the border between the methodology of medieval scholasticism and of the philosophy of the modern period" (ibid.). On Bauer's account, Suárez's humanist orientation separates him from the medieval tradition and he produces the "first comprehensive systematic presentation of metaphysics" (246). Such a concern for locating Renaissance thinkers in relation to their medieval predecessors and modern successors is further exemplified in the many chapters that argue that a particular philosopher retrieves a distinctive position of the past or anticipates some doctrine more commonly identified with better-known modern philosophers. The volume provides many examples. One chapter notes that a particular aspect of Cusanus's thought "entails a Copernican revolution *before* Kant" (48), and another observes that "Telesio's philosophy even seems to have left its traces on Thomas Hobbes" (170). Montaigne is championed as a "precursor of the modern theory of identity" (197), and we hear that the empiricism present in Agrippa von Nettesheim's occult philosophy "points toward the modern period" (131). Additionally, Vives's novel account of the human soul "is not breaking with tradition entirely" because it presupposes much from medieval faculty psychology (141). Such references to medieval forebears and modern successors greatly assist in establishing and refining the boundaries of philosophy in the Renaissance.

In a similar vein, several chapters treat of the possible objection that a figure in question might not count as a philosopher. Given the interdisciplinary interests of many Renaissance intellectuals, there might be difficulty in establishing whether a given thinker's work can be principally described as philosophical, since humanistic concerns often privileged other disciplines, such as rhetoric and philology, over philosophy. These conceptual issues regarding who counts as a philosopher are addressed throughout the volume, and particularly sharp discussions appear in the chapters on Cusanus, Vives, Melanchthon, and Montaigne.

One of the many highlights of the volume is Jill Kraye's lucid contribution on Pietro Pomponazzi's place in the development of secular Aristotelianism in the Renaissance. In a lively manner, Kraye traces Pomponazzi's repeated attempts to

provide accurate interpretations of Aristotle's texts on the soul, beginning with his exegesis that favored Averroistic monopsychism and concluding with a later period that privileged Alexander of Aphrodisias's mortalist account of the soul. In careful detail, Kraye also considers Pomponazzi's positions on whether an Aristotelian framework can account for miracles and for free will. Kraye argues against the long-held view that Pomponazzi was disingenuous in appending autobiographical affirmations of his Christian faith to his treatises that present interpretations of Aristotelian texts in a way that conflict with religious doctrines. She concludes that Pomponazzi "did not want to challenge or abandon Christian beliefs but to set them aside temporarily, in an effort to determine what precisely the pagan philosopher Aristotle had thought on a given issue" (114). On this account, Pomponazzi is not "a pioneer of modern attitudes toward the separation of reason and religion" but rather is a distinctive representative of the tradition of secular Aristotelianism, which attempted to preserve the autonomy of philosophy from perceived threats by ecclesiological authorities (115). In her presentation, Kraye notes briefly the opposition of Tommaso de Vio (Cajetan) to a papal attempt to restrict the teaching of philosophy, explaining that Cajetan was objecting to "the idea of entrusting philosophers to teach the truths of faith" (97).

Another particularly notable contribution to this collection is Günter Frank's essay on Philipp Melanchthon. The chapter skillfully retrieves the philosophical Melanchthon long occluded by those interpretations that focus on his relationship to Luther or those that assume early Reformation scholars were uniformly hostile to philosophy. While acknowledging the Aristotelianism present in much of Melanchthon's work, Frank explores the Platonic elements that are at times overlooked. Frank traces the evolution of Melanchthon's philosophical thought from an initial rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics to a more developed "metaphysical optimism" that is fundamentally Platonic in origin (156). On this account, the later Melanchthon adopts an anthropology that exhibits "an unambiguously optimistic view of the human ability to acquire knowledge" (158).

Stéphane Toussaint's excellent contribution presents Giovanni Pico della Mirandola as an unqualified syncretist whose "universalistic thinking" sought to demonstrate the concord of "all ancient and modern systems" (74). Toussaint covers the main events of Pico's brief but remarkable life, including his ambitious but ill-fated plans to dispute his *Conclusiones nongentae* or 900 theses in Rome and his unfinished goal of reconciling the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. In sketching Pico's major works, Toussaint gives the traditional rendering of 15 July 1484 as the date of Pico's famous letter to Lorenzo de' Medici, in which Pico contends that Lorenzo's poetry fares well against the vernacular poetry of Petrarch and Dante. This presentation does not account for the work of Francesco Bausi, however, who has argued that Pico's nephew and literary executor Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola likely back-dated the letter from 1486 to 1484 to give the appearance that Pico's interest in poetry belonged to an earlier period of his life.

One is bound to have quibbles with a wide-ranging book of twenty contributors and an equal number of essays, where the essays are conceived separately and possess minimal cross-referencing. One chapter refers without qualification to Ficino's Florentine Platonic Academy, but in well-known articles James Hankins has argued that the Platonic Academy was neither Platonic nor an academy in the usual sense. Additionally, a pair of chapters offers inconsistent dates for Marsilio Ficino's completion of his Latin translation of all of Plato's dialogues, and Niccolò Machiavelli's surname appears under different spellings. More significantly, a portion of the concluding paragraph of Peter Schulz's chapter on Byzantine philosophy appears to abbreviate, without attribution, the concluding paragraph of the chapter titled "The Plato-Aristotle Controversy" in John Monfasani's *George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of His Rhetoric and Logic* (Leiden, 1976). Schulz's concluding paragraph states, from the beginning: "The controversy ended with Bessarion's death in 1472. In the course of the scholarly debates, a large number of Platonic, Neoplatonic, and patristic texts were published. The controversy not only generated heated discussions of philosophical questions among the humanists [...].[21]" [Note 21: "We find an echo of this controversy toward the end of the century in *Pico della Mirandola's* work *De ente et uno*. On this, see Kristeller 1970, 1-55."] (31-32). Similarly, Monfasani's conclusion states, from the beginning, "The Plato-Aristotle controversy of the fifteenth century ended in 1472 with the death of Cardinal Bessarion. It had exposed a great number of Platonic, Neoplatonic, and patristic texts. It had provoked philosophical discussions among the humanists [...]. There were echoes of the controversy at the end of the century after the appearance of Pico della Mirandola's *De ente et uno* and in the works of Ambrosius Flandinus[166]." [Note 166: "Cf. Kristeller, 'Religious Orders,' 40-41."] (228-229). This parallelism in content, word choice, and structure is reflected in the original German version of Schulz's chapter as it appeared in *Philosophen der Renaissance: Eine Einführung*, ed. Paul Richard Blum (Darmstadt, 1999): "Mit dem Tode Bessarions im Jahre 1472 endet die Kontroverse, in deren Verlauf eine Vielzahl von platonischen, neuplatonischen und patristischen Texten veröffentlicht wurde und die nicht nur Anlass zu bewegten Diskussionen unter den Humanisten über philosophische Fragen geführt hatte [...].[21]" [Note 21: "Einen Nachklang dieser Kontroverse findet man gegen Ende des Jahrhunderts in Pico della Mirandolas Schrift ›De ente et uno‹. Vgl. dazu Kristeller 1972, 1-55."] (30). Should the anticipated success of this collection warrant that the publisher produce a second edition in the future, additional documentation in Schulz's chapter would ameliorate the present reviewer's concerns.

This is an impressive collection. All of the chapters are clearly written and offer concise presentations of the philosophical outlook of the philosophers covered. Of course, one might speculate that other figures could have been included in a volume on philosophers of the Renaissance. Perhaps Francis Bacon, Petrarch, Cajetan, Angelo Poliziano, Coluccio Salutati, Agostino Steuco, or Justus Lipsius might have warranted essays, but various arguments against inclusion could certainly be made. Without question, this volume establishes itself as an

outstanding guide to an important and often neglected period of the history of philosophy.

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Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617). By JOHN P. DOYLE. Edited by VICTOR M. SALAS. Leuven: De Wulf-Mansion Centre/Leuven University Press, 2010. Pp. xvii + 416. 69.50€ (cloth). ISBN 978-90-5867-737-2.

> Suarez enjoys such a knowledge of medieval philosophy as to put to shame any modern historian of mediaeval thought. On each and every question he seems to know everybody and everything, and to read his book is like attending the Last Judgment of four centuries of Christian speculation by a dispassionate judge, always willing to give everyone a chance, supremely apt at summing up a case and, unfortunately, so anxious not to hurt equity that a moderate verdict is likely to be considered a true verdict. Rather than judge, Suarez arbitrates, with the consequence that he never wanders far from the truth and frequently hits upon it, but, out of pure moderation of mind, sometimes contents himself with a "near miss."

So wrote Étienne Gilson in one of the more rhetorical passages of one of his more rhetorical books, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1952 [p. 99]). A lesser writer might have been content to damn Suárez with faint praise. Gilson damned the Jesuit with great praise and, with uncommon stealth, turned the Scholastic virtues of moderation and modesty into vices unfit for the bolder frontiers charted by existentialism. For good or for ill, Gilson's rhetoric still prejudices academic studies of Francisco Suárez, and the eminent Burgundian's long shadow is cast over many of the studies in this fine collection, which reprints several classic articles on Suárez published over the last forty years by John Doyle. As Doyle says, "my progression has been uneven, marked by visions and revisions. As I have gone on, there have been inconsistencies and perhaps even contradictions, which a charitable interpreter may see as developments. Connected is a clear change of tone in the articles themselves. A Gilsonian Thomist, I started out very critical of Suárez. But learning more, I gained respect for him not just as an historian, and himself a figure in history, but also as a deep and clear thinker. While I am to this day a Thomist, who owes his basic philosophical outlook to Gilson, I believe that from Suárez I have learned how to write history in a less critical and more sympathetic, albeit not less truthful way" (xv). Over the course of these essays, as Victor Salas says in his thoughtful

introduction, we see that "what emerges in Doyle's more mature work . . . is the realization that, simply put, Suárez is swimming in much different, and one could even argue, deeper waters than Thomas Aquinas" (viii).

Suárez, who was taught theology by the Dominican Juan Mancio (1497-1576), the student and fourth successor of Francisco de Vitoria (1492/3-1546) to the *Catedra de prima* of Theology at the University of Salamanca, not only towers above his peers in Doyle's telling, but also shines among many of the greatest minds in the early modern era, Scholastic or otherwise. The first group of eight essays is "theoretical, centering on the Suarezian conception of being and metaphysics" (xi). The basic conception and motivation of these essays is Gilsonian, although Doyle does remark that he would most likely modify these essays along the lines suggested by the work of Rolf Darge's *Suárez' transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition* (Brill, 2004). This group of essays ranges over topics such as the reality of possibles, the analogy of being, Suárez's proof for God's existence, the unity of the 'scientific' habit, and the importance of extrinsic denomination in Suárez. The second theme, which is covered by the final four essays, concerns the "practical side" of Suárez's philosophical and theological interests, including his views on society, law, sovereignty, jurisdiction, war, conquest, and human rights. The reprinted essays are rounded off with a new introduction to Suárez's life and works, which should be especially appealing to both the specialist and the casual reader of Scholastic philosophy. Among the highlights, Doyle includes a chronological description of Suárez's commentaries on Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*, a basic outline of the *Disputationes metaphysicae*, and a reproduction of Iturrioz's list of authors cited in that work. For the record, apart from cross references to his other disputations, the top ten are Aristotle (1,735), Thomas Aquinas (1,008), Duns Scotus (363), Augustine (334), Cajetan (299), Socinus (192), Averroës (179), Durandus (153), Francesco Sylvestri (124), and Gregory Nazianzen (117). It may interest Dominicans to know that Capreolus (115 citations) and Hervaeus Natalis (77 citations) get rather long hearings at this particular Last Judgment.

In light of Doyle's introduction, I would suggest that readers begin with the chapter "Suarezian and Thomistic Metaphysics before the Judgment of Heidegger," a programmatic essay first published in 1972 with the title "Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics." Here, we see Doyle level Heidegger's charge of 'forgetfulness' (*Vergessenheit*) of Being against Suárez, as he exonerates Aquinas from the same charge. This accusation, which grounded much of Gilson's *animus* towards non-Thomist forms of Scholasticism and non-Gilsonian forms of Thomism, seems a bit dated now, but reading this essay first allows the reader to enter the mindset in which the other early essays were written. Once the occasional Gilsonian prejudice has been bracketed, all of the distinctive features of Suárez's metaphysics make an appearance: the importance of distinguishing 'being' as a participle and 'being' as a noun, the definition of metaphysics in terms of real 'being' whether in act or potency, the analogy of intrinsic attribution, the importance of extrinsic denomination, etc. Doyle is a sure guide through these complex topics, and he provides a wealth of primary

texts that enable the reader to follow Suárez's argument closely. The non-Gilsonian might quibble with minor aspects of Doyle's presentation. That Suárez includes potential 'being' within the ambit of metaphysics in no way negates the importance of actual 'being', and the accusation that any such metaphysics results in a "logomachy" (38) is as baseless as accusing a metaphysics based on the *actus essendi* of positivism. Similarly, it is somewhat misleading to refer to aptitude for existence as a "'lowest common denominator' of being" (xi, 30, 36), since the metaphor implies the exact form of the analogy of proper proportionality that Suárez rejects. On a more minor note, in light of Doyle's comments about Suárez's *Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* (cf. 7, 12), it might bear noting that Suárez provides a chart in this latter work for rearranging the *Metaphysical Disputations* as a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* so those who have claimed that the *Doctor eximius* launched 'modernity' by disregarding the commentarial tradition should cease and desist.

Doyle generally refrains from offering Gilsonian judgments in the later essays and, as a result, the reader gets a better sense of Suárez's unique contribution to Scholastic philosophy. Two essays are particularly interesting here, "Suárez on Preaching the Gospel to People like the American Indians" and "Suárez on Human Rights." These two essays provide a magnificent introduction to the beginnings of international law in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The first, which covers almost sixty pages in this edition, is a minor masterpiece of Scholastic exposition. Of particular interest are four questions of Suárez's *Tractatus de fide* (1583) that address the powers and rights of the Church to preach the gospel to unbelievers; whether Church or State can force unbelievers to listen to preaching; whether unbelievers may be forced to believe after the gospel has been preached to them sufficiently; and whether the unbeliever may be forced to abandon notions and practices that are contrary to faith and reason. Doyle takes us through each of these questions in some detail, but frames his exploration of Suárez's arguments with a discussion of the colonization of Central and South America, a clever conceit that gives both context and body to his philosophical arguments. These themes get a more general treatment in the next essay, "Francisco Suárez on the Law of Nations," where Doyle steps behind the more technical discussion of Suárez's *De fide* to present his more general arguments about the relationship of eternal, human, and natural law. "Suárez on Human Rights" demonstrates Suárez's contribution to the history of the philosophical development of rights by comparing the Jesuit, point by point, with Thomas Jefferson's *Declaration of Independence*. Although it repeats much of the material in the previous articles, it focuses on the reasons that Suárez rejected Aristotle's claim that some people were slaves by nature and the resulting emphasis on the so-called subjective notion of rights.

The most compelling and challenging statements in this collection come in the "Postscript and Prospectus" that conclude Doyle's work. Here, Doyle the Gilsonian looks back over his essays, some of which were published forty years ago, and offers an unblinking assessment of his earlier work and some adventurous suggestions for how to correct, expand, and build upon the essays

collected in this volume. Doyle's fans will note that he has already acted on some of the suggestions here, such as the need to explore the notion of the 'supertranscendental' in early modern philosophy after Suárez. More radically, following the work of Theo Kobusch, Doyle suggests that we explore the notion of the *ens morale* that paralleled and developed similar notions of the *ens rationis*. In doing so, we might see that early modern Scholasticism did not merely influence considerations of what was "thinkable" before Kant, it also pioneered theories of the legality of wills, the value of coinage, social status, promises, and signs generally—in other words, the whole range of things that are "dependent upon human willing and which introduce new, not evidently categorical, facts into the world of human persons" (392), the greater study of which would effect a great philosophical dialogue between Vitoria, Suárez, and Molina with the great traditions of French and Scottish political theory. Doyle even suggests that we might want to consider seventeenth-century Bonaventurians who have taken account of Scotus and Suárez, as a possible alternative to Doyle's own criticisms of the "abstract ontological character" of Suárez's metaphysics. With such far-reaching suggestions, it is rather modest for Doyle to remark, "Readers may see now how many nuggets remain to be mined from the texts I have used and cited in the present essays as well as from other texts which are germane to them" (ibid.). The amount of philosophically rich material in early modern Scholasticism might be better compared to oil reserves.

This richness belies the great problem in Gilson's rhetoric of decline. For all Gilson did to champion St. Thomas Aquinas, his rhetoric encouraged a generation of scholars to think that there was little of value in figures such as Cajetan, Suárez, or Molina. Thankfully, Doyle has begun the massive excavation of these sources so necessary for a dynamic Scholastic philosophy. Still, if Doyle learned from Suárez how to write history in a less critical and more sympathetic way, but still owes his basic philosophical outlook to Gilson, we might wonder how he himself negotiates this tension. Can one be a Gilsonian without Gilson's genealogy? I certainly hope so. Indeed, if Doyle's collection teaches us one lesson, it might very well be that, in the long view afforded by the history of philosophy, the moderation and modesty of the *Doctor eximius* will be greatly preferred to Gilson's grand, but now tired, rhetoric.

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Maurice Blondel: A Philosophical Life. By OLIVA BLANCHETTE. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2010. Pp. xvi + 820. $45.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8028-6365-2.

As Oliva Blanchette points out on the first page of his magisterial and massive exploration of the life and writings of Maurice Blondel, as both a Catholic and a philosopher Blondel trod a singular path in late nineteenth-century France. He was a very pious young man who had come from the provinces (Dijon) to study at the most prestigious schools in Paris (L'École Normale Supérieure, La Sorbonne), where the philosophical climate was decidedly anti-religious. "At first he was seen as a defender of religion in philosophy in a University that was resolutely secular, and as a threat to the autonomy of reason" (1). Not only was this rather audacious provincial demanding that there be a place in philosophy for the study of religion, he insisted that when properly done philosophy did not exclude religion but rather showed an inevitable human need for supernatural religion. As one might expect, Blondel had to overcome considerable opposition among the faculty at the Sorbonne to obtain approval of his dissertation, *L'Action*. Blanchette quotes the reaction from one member of his board: "Here is what people would like to know: are you all by yourself, coming in from the wild, or are you the spokesman or even the instigator of a concerted campaign against the conception we have here of philosophy and its role?" (6-7).

By contrast, soon after the publication of *L'Action* in 1893, Blondel was welcomed by those who were defenders of religion in France. Yet he was not an apologist in the usual sense, and did not defend religion in the usual way. Blanchette notes that the joy at having a philosopher defend religion

> soon turned to suspicion on the part of some, when it became clear how Blondel proposed to "defend" religion, not by cutting reason short, as even many philosophers were quite willing to do in the spirit of neo-Kantianism, but by extending its power of inquiry into the very idea of supernatural religion, thus apparently bringing the very content of such religion, supposedly the exclusive domain of a theology based on revelation, under the domain of critical philosophy. (1)

Blondel would make no compromises in philosophical method or abridge the scope of philosophical investigation. For him, this rigor was in the interests not only of philosophy, but also of religion. He insisted: "*Non libera nisi adjutrix, non adjutrix nisi libera philosophia*. Philosophy is not free unless it helps and does not help unless it is free" (143). Blanchette explains:

> Philosophy will serve the cause of religion all the better only "if it is not changed into an apologetic." This is a distinction that the more theologically inclined interpreters of Blondel (Bouillard, de Lubac, Saint Jean) have not always had clearly in mind, thereby reintroducing a theological confusion into his philosophy that he had

> tried to avoid, even in what could be called his apologetic intent. It is a distinction that was probably better understood by earlier theologians like Aquinas, but tends to get lost in the reaction of modern theology against modern philosophy or rationalism. (143)

Blondel argued that if philosophical inquiry is carried forward consistently, with no arbitrary halting points or omissions of matters to be left unexplored, it will eventually lead to the acknowledgment of a need for the supernatural and thus for supernatural religion. He avoided subsuming religion under philosophy, as other modern philosophers had done, because he clearly recognized that what is needed is precisely supernatural, to which philosophy cannot attain. "Blondel made no claim of entering into the supernatural itself as a philosopher, or of discovering what is its content" (19). In his view, there is no need for an extrinsic limit on philosophy to prevent it from encroaching on the domain of religion. Philosophy comes to acknowledge its own limits (151). Philosophy finds in human action an inevitable "necessity" for the supernatural, which philosophy by definition cannot provide (23).

Blondel's concern here is properly philosophical, not theological. What he wants to rule out above all is a *philosophie séparée* that would see itself as being able to investigate the natural order without ever coming upon a natural insufficiency that calls for the supernatural—a philosophy that would be self-sufficient and that therefore "could ignore the question of religion or the supernatural" (11). Blondel found it ironic that both the anti-religious philosophers and the modern scholastics seemed to view the natural order as self-contained and self-sufficient and seemed to have the same understanding of the relation of philosophy to religion as purely extrinsic.

Blondel's philosophical rigor eventually convinced the members of his dissertation board of the genuinely philosophical nature of his argument and he obtained approval, even though most objected strongly to his conclusions. Nevertheless, the French philosophical establishment would deny him a teaching post in France for two years until he was finally granted a position, not surprisingly, far from the intellectual center of Paris (21).

The opposition that Blondel encountered afterwards came mainly from certain segments of the Catholic world, particularly representatives of the Scholastic tradition. Blondel was accused of being a Kantian, a pragmatist, an immanentist, an idealist, a subjectivist, anti-metaphysical, anti-intellectual, etc. In the tense and polarized climate of the modernist crisis and its aftermath, the subtleties of Blondel's thought were often lost or ignored as battle lines were drawn. In this situation it did not help Blondel that his thought was admired by some people who could justifiably be termed modernists, as this immediately gave rise to suspicion among anti-modernists. For example, the theologian Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange saw Blondel's philosophy as a source of modernist deviations. Caught up in the heat of anti-modernist polemics, however, Garrigou-Lagrange unfortunately never engaged in a careful or thorough study

of Blondel's own writings (he later admitted that he had never read *L'Action* [284]).

Blondel was not a modernist, but he did develop his thought in dialogue with modern philosophers. Not that the sources of his thought were exclusively modern: for example, his original idea of action was inspired by certain passages taken from Aristotle, passages which appear (always in Greek) in *L'Action* and various other writings. Nevertheless, Blondel believed that his vocation as a philosopher required him to speak to those who do not believe, which meant that he would have to immerse himself in modern philosophy and to address the current questions of contemporary thinkers in a language that they could understand (102). As a student in the 1880s he found little of interest in the manual Scholasticism prevalent at the time (130).

If Blondel was not able to get a fair hearing in the climate of the modernist crisis and its aftermath, it is also true that his own critical remarks concerning *le thomisme* or *la scolastique* that appear in his early works were based on a reading not of Thomas's own writings but of the contemporary manuals. It was only after the publication of his major early works, *L'Action* and the *Lettre* of 1896 "on the Exigencies of Contemporary Thought in Matters of Apologetics and on the Method of Philosophy in the Study of the Religious Problem" (in English often referred to as the "Letter on Apologetics"), that Blondel began to read seriously the works of Thomas himself (ibid.). He came to acknowledge that his criticisms apply not to the thought of Thomas but only to the overly rationalistic interpretations of his thought common at that time (132, 386).

From 1911-12, Blondel began to lecture extensively on Thomas, with a focus on part 3 of the *Summa contra Gentiles* (267-68). Here he found Thomas's idea of the natural desire to know God, an idea missing from the contemporary manuals. He learned that Thomas had addressed in his own way the theme that was so central for Blondel. "He took delight in finding the same kind of aporia in Aquinas that he had argued for" in *L'Action*, that is, that "between a necessity of fulfilling a religious need and an impossibility of doing so through human initiative alone" (268). Contrary to the impression given by the manualists, Thomas did not conceive of the natural and the supernatural as two parallel orders that were entirely self-contained and self-sufficient. On this point and others, by studying the texts of Thomas, Blondel learned that he had much more in common with Thomas than he had realized.

While the reception of Blondel's thought suffered from an intellectual climate in which any thought that was not expressed in the familiar Scholastic language was immediately suspect in some quarters, a contributing factor was the inherent limitation of *L'Action* as a dissertation—it represented only one aspect of his thought. Blondel always insisted that *L'Action* was written to fulfill an academic requirement and not as a complete presentation of his philosophical project (327, 657). From the beginning he had a much broader philosophical enterprise in mind, but it would not be for many years—until the mid-1930s—that he would be able to publish his five-volume trilogy on thought, being, and action and thus present the full scope of his philosophical vision.

For example, in *L'Action* and the early articles following it Blondel focused on the role of action and tended to downplay the role of metaphysics in his concern to establish the significance and importance of practice. However even before the publication of *L'Action* he came to realize that he had not said enough about metaphysics. After the defense, he decided to add an extra chapter on the topic to the dissertation before it was published, but this would not prove a satisfactory solution, as the rather hastily written chapter would become the target of criticisms. Blondel himself was never satisfied with this chapter and acknowledged that its language remained ambiguous (90-94, 285). He was never anti-metaphysical or subjectivist, but the role of realist metaphysics in his thought was not completely presented before the publication of the trilogy (50, 595-96).

One of the great contributions of Blanchette's book is to show in detail the continuity in Blondel's basic intention from the beginning to the end of his career. This is of course a matter of controversy in Blondel interpretation. Some admirers of Blondel's early works, such as *L'Action* and his *Lettre* of 1896, thought that in his later works he gave in to pressure from his Scholastic critics and betrayed his original inspiration. Most prominent among these were theologians such as Henri Bouillard. Others took Blondel at his word that he had a larger intention in mind all along, that "the thesis of 1893 was only one chapter and not a summation" (285), and that only the later trilogy does full justice to his thought. Blanchette's work clearly aligns itself with the latter mode of interpretation (599).

Blondel left behind a great deal of written material, which Blanchette has had to synthesize. He has read not only Blondel's books and articles, but also his class notes, personal journals, and much of his voluminous correspondence with other scholars. One of the unique aspects of this book, however, is that Blanchette also has had access to an oral tradition, through Mademoiselle Nathalie Panis, who served as Blondel's indispensable secretary and amanuensis from 1931 until his death in 1949. By 1927, at the age of sixty-six, Blondel had gone virtually blind and was no longer able to read. He had no more than notes for his long-projected trilogy on thought, being, and action that he envisioned as the culmination of his philosophical work. After a few years of unsatisfactory experiments working with various people as assistants, in 1931 Mlle. Panis, a former graduate student of his who had been for several years teaching at a lycée, agreed to dedicate herself "to the support of Blondel in his work, becoming his eyes and his hands, as it were, by reading to him and taking down dictation, and most importantly by being there consistently at his side day in and day out with her enthusiasm and her interest in seeing that Blondel's work be brought to completion" (417). Most of what Blanchette recounts about the details of Blondel's life he learned from numerous conversations with Mlle. Panis (xvi). The book is dedicated to her memory.

The bulk of the book is devoted to an analysis of Blondel's published words, his books and articles. After an introductory presentation of the drama of Blondel's dissertation defense, Blanchette proceeds chronologically, offering an

exposition of the main arguments and analyzing the significance of almost all Blondel's works, generally solicitous to use as much of his language and vocabulary as possible (in fact, those familiar with Blondel's works will recognize that certain passages from his writings have been only lightly paraphrased for inclusion in the book).

Yet the book not only examines Blondel's philosophical ideas, it examines these ideas in the context of his life. Thanks to what he has learned from Blondel's personal correspondence and journals, but most importantly from Mlle. Panis, Blanchette is able fill in the biographical and historical context in which Blondel wrote his various works. Blanchette observes that his book "is in many ways the story of Blondel's life as told by Blondel himself to Mlle. Panis during these many years of working together on a personal as well as an intellectual level" (ibid.).

Maurice Blondel: A Philosophical Life certainly stands as a milestone in Blondel scholarship. There is nothing comparable in scope and erudition. It allows one to view Blondel's long career in its entirety. It will help clear up various misconceptions about the man whose intellectual life was often marked by battles on two fronts. Most importantly, it will help introduce people to "a religious man who had to think his religious life philosophically," a man who at the same time was "a philosopher for whom religion, even in its supernatural aspect, had to be seen as a necessary part, not only of human life itself, but also of philosophical reflection on that life" (1).

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The Existence of God and the Faith-Instinct. By HOWARD P. KAINZ. Cranbury, N.J.: Susquehanna University Press, 2010. Pp. 152. $45.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-57591-143-4.

For Catholics at least, proofs for the existence of God entail a paradox. In its decree *Dei Filius* (1870), the First Vatican Council decreed as a matter of *faith* that the existence of God could be proved by *reason*: "If anyone says that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with *certainty* from the things that have been made, by the *natural* light of human reason, let him be anathema" (*DS* 3026; emphases added). At first glance, one would think that if God's existence can really be proved by reason operating on its own resources, then the task at hand for the council fathers would be, not to order the faithful (on pain of excommunication!) to *believe* that God's existence can be proved by reason, but to *provide* the demonstration—and then let the individual reasoner

find that proof convincing by his own powers of reason, such as they are. Catholics, after all, don't "believe" the Pythagorean theorem; like everyone else, they either see or don't see its entailment from prior agreed-upon Euclidian axioms, with no bearing on their salvation one way or the other.

But of course the bishops of Vatican I were not trying to define what specific proof(s) might avail with any particular reasoner; nor were they adjudicating the various proposed demonstrations then being mooted in the nineteenth century. Rather, they were insisting, against the so-called fideists, that faith in God is eminently rational. Scripture too—it ought to go without saying—teaches the same (Rom 1:20). So the paradox is not in fact of purely Catholic provenance but is located in the Bible: *revelation* tells us that we can rely on *reason* to bring us to an acknowledgment of God's existence, however inchoate our initial idea of that "God of reason" might be.

Of course this is not to say that proofs for God's existence by strict logical entailment will do much good psychologically, especially for those who do not already have the gift of faith. As Blaise Pascal pointed out: "The metaphysical proofs of God are so far removed from man's reasoning, and so complicated, that they have little force. When they do help some people, it is only at the moment when they see the demonstration. An hour later they are afraid of having made a mistake" (*Pensées* no. 222 [Levi translation, 63]). Not that Pascal had any truck with fideism either: "If we submit everything to reason, our religion will contain nothing mysterious or supernatural. If we shock the principles of reason, our religion will be absurd and ridiculous" (no. 204 [Levi, trans., 60).

So just what is the relation between faith and reason, between proof and devotion? This is the question taken up by Howard Kainz's fine (albeit too brief) *tour d'horizon* of nearly all the issues touching on this question. The author frankly concedes the weighty voices who object to the standard proofs for God's existence, like Franz Werfel in his novel *The Song of Bernadette*: "For those who believe, no explanation is necessary; for those who don't believe, no explanation is possible." Søren Kierkegaard, too, insists in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* that "to prove the existence of one who is already present is the most shameless affront." Finally, Karl Barth, as is well known, thought the philosophical approach sought God elsewhere than where he could alone be found—in revelation.

But the world is now filled with the noise of atheist arguments, which must be answered—the only alternative being pusillanimity and obscurantist flight from the fray. So after this initial nod to the fideists, Kainz girds for battle. After reviewing in the first three chapters various atheist arguments, from David Hume to Richard Dawkins, and the rejoinders made by recent defenders of theism, Kainz introduces in the next two chapters a theme often neglected in this debate: Thomas Aquinas's notion of a faith-*instinct*. According to Kainz, Thomas means this to be taken quite literally: the faith-instinct is univocally parallel to the instincts for self-preservation, sexual congress, and hunger for knowledge, differing only in the object of the instinct's exigent craving. Although in this

passage Thomas uses the milder term "inclination," he does so in the context of speaking of those drives that later biologists will call "instincts," especially that of self-preservation:

> In man there is first of all an inclination [*inclinatio*] to good in accordance with the nature he has in common with all substances—inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature; and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life and of warding of its obstacles belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specifically, according to that nature which he has in common with the other animals; and in virtue of this inclination those things are said to belong to the natural law which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man [alone] an inclination to good according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him; thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God. (*STh* I-II, q. 94, a. 2)

Although *inclinatio* is the word of choice here, Thomas uses the stronger word "instinct" in other passages to explain not biological drives but, fascinatingly, the universality of natural religion. Religion is an anthropological constant, says the Common Doctor, because man has an instinctive drive to worship God: "under the state of the law of nature, man was moved, by inward instinct alone [*solo interiori instinctu*] and without any outward law, to worship God; [furthermore] the sensible things to be employed in the worship of God were also determined by inward instinct [*ita etiam ex interiori instinctu*]" (*STh* III, q. 60, a. 5, ad 3). Elsewhere Thomas says: "man feels that he is obligated [*obligatum*] by some sort of natural instinct [*quodam naturali instinctu*] to pay in his own way reverence to God, from whom comes the beginning of man's being and of all good" (*ScG* III, c. 119).

On the basis of these passages, shall we say, as Henri de Lubac famously did, that Thomas holds that each human being has an innate natural desire for God, an exigency for the beatific vision? There is, after all, no biological drive without a corresponding craving, and no instinct without an exigency (including the drive to know, as per the Scholastic axiom: *intellectus caret omnibus illis quas natus est intelligere*). Actually, Kainz does not address this knotty question, since the aim of his book is not to get into intra-Thomist debate but solely to address the question of atheism by juxtaposing it with the Thomist notion of a faith-instinct. But he does point to this fascinating passage from Thomas's *Commentary on the Gospel of John*:

> Not only does exterior revelation, as the object of faith, possess an attractive power; but an interior instinct, impelling and leading to belief [*sed etiam interior instinctus impellens et movens ad credendum*], also has this same attractive power. Thus the Father draws many to the Son through the instinct of divine operation

> moving the interior heart of man to belief [*per instinctum divinae operationis moventis interius cor hominis ad credendum*]. (*Super Evangelium S. Joannis*, *lectura ad caput* 6, *lectio* 5 [Marietti edition, 176]). (95)

Furthermore, Kainz points out that—far from giving any validation to semi-Pelagianism (whereby man is responsible for the *initium fidei* independent of grace, "on his own," as it were)—Thomas used the term "instinct" as his preferred way of refuting semi-Pelagianism, and that fact must surely say something about the operation of grace in the soul of every human being. As Max Seckler says in his monograph *Instinkt und Glaubenslehre nach Thomas von Aquin* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1961), on whom Kainz heavily relies:

> [Aquinas] constantly asserted the necessity of an inner assistance as preparation for justification. He then resolutely gives this assistance the name "instinct," especially in connection with his dogmatic psychology of faith, where this instinct is presented as the uniquely necessary, sufficient, and efficacious motive force to faith. (94; author's translation [Seckler, 98]

This linkage of a faith-instinct with the refutation of semi-Pelagianism might at first sound paradoxical, since instincts after all are usually understood to determine behavior; but the act of faith surely is free, at least in the sense that no one is obliged by nature to believe, as the phenomenon of atheism proves. The paradox, though, is only superficial. For one thing, in the case of man (in contrast to the other animals), instinct does not truly determine behavior: martyrs and suicides can trump the instinct for self-preservation; celibates, bachelors, and spinsters do not procreate; and the universal desire to know can be suppressed by obtuseness and a blithering lack of curiosity, as teachers of high-school sophomores know only too well. For another, according to both Aristotle and Thomas, instincts (in both men and animals, and however defined) are there for a reason, specifically a teleological reason, placed there by God. As Aristotle says: "What is the commencement of movement in the soul? The answer is clear: as in the universe, so in the soul, it is God. For in a sense the divine element in us moves everything. The starting point of reasoning is not reasoning, but something greater" (*Eudemian Ethics* 7.14 [Barnes translation, II:1979; cited by Kainz at 93 n. 10]). Thomas of course agrees: "It is necessary that the movement of human free will finally be traced back to some exterior principle that transcends the human mind—in other words, to God" (*STh* I-II q. 109, a. 2, ad 1 [cited by Kainz at 93 n. 11).

The implications of these passages of course go far beyond issues of grace, free will, and semi-Pelagianism. For Kainz anyway, the existence of a universal faith-instinct means that atheism, in a real sense, is what Barth calls an "impossible possibility": Atheism exists, yet it can't exist. The author quotes to great effect the commencement address of the novelist David Foster Wallace to

the 2005 graduating class of Kenyon College: "In the day-to-day trenches of adult life, there is actually no such thing as atheism. There is no such thing as not worshipping. Everybody worships. The only choice we get is what to worship."

In other words, the task of apologetics, Kainz claims, at least by implication, is not to face the atheists head-on but to direct the faith-instinct of non-Christians (of whatever stripe) to its proper object. It is here especially that the brevity of the book (a mere 140 pages of text) works against its own purposes. Provocative as it is, nearly everything in it cries out for further treatment. Granted, the book does not intend to be a technical monograph and could even serve as a textbook in courses on the philosophy of God, amplified with readings from primary sources. But in the book's final paragraphs, the author comes close to contradicting himself: On the one hand, for Kainz true, aggressive, committed atheism seems to be conceptually impossible; yet on the other, he says atheists have a real case to argue. In fact, he concludes his book with a fascinating passage in which he tries to get into the mind of a contemporary atheist. Like Thomas in the *Videtur quod* section of his second *Summa*, Kainz certainly lets his opponent put forward his best case:

> Formidable and seemingly insuperable obstacles to faith stand in the way of the unbeliever. What he or she usually perceives in persons of faith is a strange gravitation to nothing less than *adult fairy tales*. . . . But the most egregious fairy tale of all seems to be the belief of some that the Creator of the universe made humans in His own image, sent His Son to take on flesh, and is preparing eternal happiness for each of His adopted sons and daughters. . . . If a Christian realizes the enormity of what he himself believes in ("Good News" is an understatement), he should have nothing but empathy for the hesitance of the atheist to open his mind to faith. (139-40)

This passage comes from the third- and second-to-last paragraphs of the book; the theist case is put in the last paragraph (quoted in full): "On the other hand, for a person of faith whose mind is hardwired to look for *causes*, the notion that we and our universe or multiple universes simply emerged out of nothing by an infinite number of chance developments seems to be an incomparably incredible fairy tale, a threat to rationality itself" (140). True enough, but such a point should initiate the discussion, not end it.

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Creation and the God of Abraham. Edited by DAVID BURRELL, JANET SOSKICE, AND OTHERS. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 286. $95 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-521-51868-0.

Creation and the God of Abraham is an excellent collection of articles resulting from the gathering of Jewish, Christian, and Muslims scholars at Castel Gandolfo in July 2006 around the theme "*Creatio ex Nihilo* Today." To judge by the fourteen scholarly contributions from around the world, the workshop was an outstanding success, and the book promises to become an important resource on this topic for years to come.

At the core of the workshop was the question whether the traditional doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* has anything to say within the context of modern scientific theories of the origin of the universe. In response, each of the articles takes up a particular expression of the doctrine within the three religious traditions and concludes with a reflection on its potential compatibility with the theory of the Big Bang. The result is a fascinating presentation of an array of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim thinkers whose work sheds light on this important topic.

The book is roughly divided into three sections beginning with the earliest Jewish and Christian formulations of creation *ex nihilo* (Ernan McMullin) as well as medieval expositions of the doctrine (Janet Soskice, David Burrell, Alexander Broadie, Daniel Davies). A second grouping deals with Muslim conceptions (Rahim Acar, Pirooz Fatoorchi, Ibrahim Kalin). The third group includes various topics such as the Trinity, motion, and creation *ex nihilo* (Simon Oliver), an argument for the complementarity of creation *ex nihilo* and the Big Bang theory (William Stoeger), the issue of double agency (James Pambrun), God's creative activity and the activity of created things (Thomas Tracy), and, finally, the contribution of Aquinas's theology of knowledge (Eugene Rogers). The editors must be commended for their organization of these wide-ranging articles. The resulting book is clear and coherent, carrying the reader forward both historically and thematically.

In his introductory remarks, Carlo Cogliati notes that Aristotle and the Greeks would have found the concept of creation *ex nihilo* incoherent, since "from nothing, nothing comes." For the Greeks, beginning with a conception of the universe as everlasting, "God" was an Intelligence unable to be concerned about or aware of the created world. Cogliati states that "*Creatio ex nihilo* was the product of the confluence of biblical teaching and Hellenistic Judaism, and was the means by which theologians of the early Church defended the God they saw to be revealed in Scripture: loving, living and active" (7). Muslims followed this understanding, recognizing its compatibility with the Qur'an. *Creatio ex nihilo* thus becomes the foundation on which answers to all later questions of God's relationship to creation, freedom and predestination, grace, revelation, and a host of others are built.

Space limitations only allow us to draw out a few of the important points made in the collection. The first of these is that although the question of creation

ex nihilo does not seem to have been a concern for the biblical writers, the early Church found the parameters of the doctrine in Scripture as soon as she began to reflect on the challenges posed first by the limits Gnostic dualism placed upon on God, and then by Neo-Platonism. In response, second- and third-century Jews and Christians rejected the notion that there had been any ungenerated principle over and against God at the time of creation that could be held responsible for disorder and evil. The demands of biblical monotheism, accordingly, require a God who creates everything intentionally without pre-existing matter. A significant moment in the formulation of creation *ex nihilo* comes when Augustine, building on the Stoic idea of *spermatikos logos*, proposes the notion that seed-like principles, *rationes seminales*, come to fruition in the proper conditions posterior to the event of creation. Although the idea owes more to Stoic and Neo-Platonic than biblical sources, Augustine made it possible to conceive of creation *ex nihilo*, while still allowing for potentialities that exist from the beginning to mature and develop in time. This opens the door for further discussion on evolution and the expansion of the universe (McMullin, 21-23).

From the medieval period, Davies' comparison between two important Jewish thinkers, Maimonides and his critic Hasdai Crescas, illustrates the extent to which creation *ex nihilo* became central to Jewish faith, even when there was serious disagreement on what follows from that premise. For both thinkers, revelation and reason (here guided by Aristotelian science) must be respected, and what can be rationally demonstrated is binding for the believer. Maimonides, however, is more confident in the rational power of Aristotle's system. With respect to creation *ex nihilo*, which he wished to maintain, Maimonides holds that Aristotle failed to provide a convincing rational demonstration when he posited an eternal universe. He made a mistake, so Maimonides argues, in seeing creation as an instance of generation like that *within* the created world, rendering his position on this matter not rationally binding. Thus, the disagreement with Aristotle on this point is not an instance of faith against reason but one where reason has not properly determined a position (73). Crescas, on the other hand, relies more on theological sources for determining what is possible with respect to creation, and is less confident in the conclusions of Aristotelian science in general. What is important for Davies is that neither of these great thinkers posit the doctrine over and against the demands of reason; instead, both Crescas and Maimonides feel obligated to consider and accept rationally demonstrated scientific doctrines, which they believe are consistent with creation *ex nihilo* (75-76).

A lesser known figure of the sixteenth century, the Sufi philosopher and monist Mulla Sadra, offers a different approach. Sadra tries to move beyond the duality of the positions of the Mutakallimun (theologians who insisted the Qur'an carried authority over philosophy) and Peripatetics to a solution that emphasizes the intrinsic meaning and intelligibility of creation without positing creation *ex nihilo*. As a follower of Ibn al-'Arabi, Sadra wants to maintain the

mystery of creation in its unity with God. In order to avoid pantheism, Sadra follows the distinction between absolute and relative contingency, concluding that nature is created as the principle of change by an unchanging Creator. This distinction allows for the necessary separation between Creator and creature upheld by Islamic doctrine, while maintaining the primary cause of creation as eternal and unchanging. Sadra argues that it is meaning and intelligibility ingrained in existence itself, which are directed toward the divine *telos*, that relate all parts of creation to the Creator (Kalin, 122-25). Creation is not so much *ex nihilo* as it is a monistic theophany, with existence at its beginning and its end. Although it is not argued explicitly here, Sadra belongs among those who reject the creation *ex nihilo*, and so potentially offers a completely different approach to relating religious faith to modern scientific discovery.

Throughout the book, the theory of the Big Bang, or "concordance model," is placed in conversation with the various conceptions of creation *ex nihilo* presented by the authors. Very helpful on this score is the article by Fatoorchi, who provides a brief description of the current Big Bang model as an having a finite past with an initial point, a "singularity," in which the density of matter and gravitational force are infinite, causing "time" to disappear. Fatoorchi suggests that this concept of the origins of the universe offers the possibility of renewed discussion of the compatibility of the Big Bang theory and creation *ex nihilo* (100). He divides a wide range of scholars into two broad categories of those who hold a strong interpretation of the Big Bang and those who hold a weak interpretation. The first encompasses figures such as Pope Pius XII, Edmund Wittaker, Frank Tipler, and John Barrow, each of whom tends toward accepting the initial singularity as the first instant of the universe where "its coming-into-being supervenes upon a true 'nothingness' in the strict sense of the word" (102). The second group, including Andreas Albrecht, Alexander Vilenkin, Michael Heller, and others, has expressed concerns about the limitations of terms and models for constructing a doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* on the basis of the Big Bang theory. Nonetheless, Fatoorchi concludes, there is no reason to say at this point that those who hold creation *ex nihilo* are contradicted by current Big Bang cosmology (105).

In one of the most fascinating articles, Stoeger lays out in understandable terms what has been discovered about the universe by physicists and astronomers and its implications for theology. He begins with a brief explanation of the Big Bang and the Planck era, turning then to quantum cosmology, concluding with the problem of "from where does it all come?" Ultimately, the insight of creation *ex nihilo* is that there must be a necessary condition for what exists, and this is a self-subsisting, self-explanatory "cause" (170). In the end, Stoeger summarizes the position taken by most of the contributors to the book: "quantum cosmological scenarios or theories . . . simply do not account for what *creatio ex nihilo* provides—the ultimate ground of existence and order" (175). Neither does creation *ex nihilo* offer models of the processes that generated our universe, thus it does not contradict these in the strict sense.

Perhaps the greatest contribution made by this collection of articles is its illustration of a clear point of agreement among Jews, Christians, and Muslims on the concept of creation *ex nihilo*. At the center of each of these religions is the belief in an uncreated Creator who is the source, cause, and sustainer of the universe. This conviction can provide a substantial foundation on which to build further conversation, as well as a unifying point of view from which the three communities can address questions of common concern. *Creation and the God of Abraham* is an outstanding model in this regard.

But consensus in metaphysics does not mean an agreement on how human beings should respond to what God has made known. Soskice notes that the question of metaphysics does not even enter into the biblical account of creation until the disclosure of God's name to Moses (25-30); before this point the emphasis is instead on God's Covenant with Israel and its implications. For this reason I would argue that the title of the book is somewhat misleading, as it implies that Jews, Muslims, and Christians concur on attributes of the One they identify as the God of Abraham, something that is not demonstrated in the articles. At the same time the title fails to convey the important topic addressed in the book: the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* and its compatibility with the Big Bang theory. Many of the articles do in fact raise questions of God's continuing relationship with creation and hint at issues surrounding revelation and divine disclosure, but these were not the focus of the conference.

The epithet "the God of Abraham" was surely chosen by the editors to communicate the adherence of the participants in the conference to Judaism, Christianity, or Islam. The term "Abrahamic Religions" has become common for these three, replacing "monotheistic," "Semitic," and most recently "People of the Book" as the preferred designation. Because it has been deemed to convey both religious particularity and inclusivity, it has rapidly gained acceptance. But I am uneasy with this current trend precisely because there is a great diversity of opinions among the three religions over the person and role of Abraham, and consequently the meaning of the Covenant, none of which are taken up in any way in the book. Indeed, Soskice reminds us that in Maimonides' opinion creation *ex nihilo* is the only teaching on which all three of the communities would agree (24). I am inclined to concur but go further: agreement on creation *ex nihilo* does not necessarily result in agreement on how God continues to interact with creation or on the wider implications of this interaction. Indeed, I would argue that it is difficult to see how one moves from metaphysical consensus to more fruitful dialogue on what separates the religions, although that is not to say that it is ultimately impossible. *Creation and the God of Abraham* sets the stage for continuing exploration for consensus among Jews, Christians, and Muslims, but the title suggests that agreement has been reached on something that has yet to be demonstrated.

Nonetheless, there are very few limitations to this extremely well-edited text. I would have chosen to place Fatoorchi's article before Acar's, since it gives an overview of Muslim contributions and helps situate Ibn Sina within the greater

conversation, and I would recommend reading those two articles out of order. It is also unclear why the editors did not insist on a standard referent for some of the figures discussed; one finds, for example, both "Ibn Sina" and "Avicenna," which can be confusing for the uninitiated. My greatest complaint is the lack of a bibliography. Even a limited bibliography of major works would have increased the book's value as a general source on the topic. Although, the price of the hardcover is prohibitive, it can be read on-line by subscribers to Cambridge University Press and is available as an ebook.

Creation and the God of Abraham is to be highly recommended and I hope it will be widely read by scientists, philosophers, and theologians engaged in questions of the origins of the universe, and become a standard for students and scholars alike.

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The Law of Love: From Autonomy to Communion. By STEPHEN F. BRETT. Scranton, Pa.: University of Scranton Press, 2010. Pp. 204. $18.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-1-58966-207-0.

This interdisciplinary essay takes up the more important challenges surrounding the meaning and importance of autonomy as it has been developed in theological, philosophical, and legal traditions. A work of broad and foundational exploration, the essay focuses its particular energies on the issue of human sexuality. Brett's fundamental thesis is that an inadequate notion of autonomy has co-opted much of our legal and ethical conversations surrounding marriage and sexuality. He appeals, in the end, to the recovery of the virtue tradition and to the work of Servais Pinckaers, O.P., in seeking to retrieve a notion of human flourishing that is better situated within the drama of the Christian theology of creation, grace, and redemption.

With this objective in mind, Brett moves the reader through a series of reflections designed to illustrate how the Enlightenment (read Kantian) notion of autonomy has (de)formed the moral, cultural, and legal landscape. Epitomized in the now famous "mystery passage" of *Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)*, Brett's autonomous figure stands in defiance of any objective moral order, at liberty "to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Brett's interpretive narrative in this regard is consistent with a chorus of others who have written on this now famous episode

of American jurisprudence. His originality lies in his effort to weave together a variety of implications and connections concerning this thesis.

At times, the trail of his argument gets a bit lost in a thicket of allusions, and sometimes Brett moves too quickly for this reader from philosophy to law, to theology, to culture, and back. Overall, however, the thrust of his essay illuminates well the context and challenges that face contemporary Catholics, especially in the arena of sexual morality.

In the first chapters, Brett reflects on Enlightenment philosophical tradition, giving special attention to Kantian ethics. He asserts that "the brilliance of Kant and the fiery force of Enlightenment have essentially led to the cul-de-sac of relativism," and that the overall turn to the subject, coupled with a mechanistic view of the natural order, has lead to the deracination of the human person as a citizen of an ordered cosmos. The argument proceeds in broad strokes and lacks on occasion some of the nuances that could have furthered its aims. Surprisingly, there is no mention of Descartes as the predecessor of Enlightenment epistemology, for instance, and Kantian ethicists would bristle at the suggestion that Kant is a relativist. That Kantian morality set in motion a vision of the moral life utterly alien to Thomistic thought is a thesis not a few in Brett's circles would be comfortable with, but more attention to some of the very real challenges facing the philosopher of Königsburg would have been helpful. Brett is eager to demonstrate how the notion of an unmoored autonomy is devastating to Catholic sexual morality, a thesis I share, but he is at times too eager to make causal connections in an effort to secure his thesis.

In chapter 3, Brett turns his attention to legal matters. It is the strongest chapter in the work and is worth the price of admission, for here he provides critical linkages between Enlightenment distortions of autonomy and American jurisprudential notions of privacy.

In Brett's analysis, traditional sexual mores are caught in the grip of twin forces. On the one side there is the encroachment of "substantive due process." Introduced into jurisprudence on the occasion of *Dred Scott,* the theory allowed the Taney court to assert its interest in matters of slavery. While this infamous case was eventually undone with the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, the principle on which this disastrous ruling was based—substantive due process—nonetheless lingered in the courts. Citing Judge Robert Bork, Brett argues, "[*Dred Scott*] was the first appearance in American constitutional law of the concept of 'substantive due process,' and that concept has been used countless times since by judges who want to write their personal beliefs into a document that, most inconveniently, does not contain those beliefs." It is precisely those personal beliefs that judges wish to write into the Constitution which comprise the other pincher: specifically, radical personal autonomy—the *enfant terrible* of Enlightenment philosophy.

These two features of jurisprudence now firmly in place and further buoyed with the ideology of the sexual liberation movements of the sixties constitute the

metastisis in our present body politic. *Buck*, *Griswold*, *Eisenstadt*, *Roe, Casey,* and (one can presume) *Lawrence,* serve as bio-markers in Brett's cultural assessment. His diagnosis is compelling. What is the prognosis? Or better still, what is the treatment plan?

Brett argues that we should return to the virtue tradition, especially as developed by Thomas Aquinas and more recently renewed in the work of Pinckaers. In this tradition, the person is not seen as some isolated individual raging (or blogging, or twitting) against the machine that is his universe, rather, the person is set within the theological framework of a provident creation, personal mystery, sin, grace, and redemption. Participated theonomy, not a distopic autonomy, captures the thrust of Christian living. Its recovery in contemporary culture will be essential in establishing an authentic humanism.

In addition to Pinckaers, Brett appeals to Charles Taylor's *A Secular Age* for establishing his thesis about the nature of the problem and directions for a solution. He recognizes that he is perhaps pushing Taylor in a direction Taylor might not wish to go, to include in his account "a way that requires an ordering of sexual desires." And yet, Brett poignantly remarks, "The whole point of transcendence is that human desires are ordered to a horizon that surpasses human finitude. How can we exempt or exclude sexual desire from this kind of ordering?"

Setting aside Taylor's work for purposes of this review, Brett is correct in being somewhat exasperated by "seekers of the transcendent" and their reticence to embrace traditional mores. Could it be that the T/trancendent who is sought is merely the echo of the transcendental ego who purportedly seeks? A doppelganger of reason's own insatiable self-centeredness? Kant may have been pious enough to check the penchant for divinity making, but subsequent generations, no longer chastened by Christian faith, saw increasingly fewer incentives to curb reason in order to make room for it. At the heart of this new-found liberty, remember, is not the freedom to submit to the moral law, and certainly not to God, but rather the freedom "to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."

By way of conclusion, Brett argues that retrieving the notion of *telos* and the natural law, as well as the Christian revelation of God as triune, would restore an authentic humanism and, with it, a more adequate notion of autonomy and community. "This is not an appeal for substantive due process," he insists. "It is not a claim that religious beliefs should enjoy a privileged or normative status in American jurisprudence."

Underscore jurisprudence; the legislative process is a different matter. In that arena, Brett suggests room has been made to advance claims for autonomy that nonetheless recognize an informed tradition respectful of both belief and unbelief. In sum, he argues for judicial restraint coupled with a hope for a renewal of Christian witness in the culture. "Democracy may not be tidy," he says, "but it cannot be short-circuited by an approach to law and social policy that has no time for transcendence, grace, mystery, or transformation." Notwithstanding the ambitious scope of his essay as well as the sometimes quick

pace and many allusions, Brett has made an important contribution to the conversation. His legal analysis and jurisprudential narrative seem especially insightful and Catholics committed to the public square and the common good would be well served in considering his work.

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The Ethics of Abortion: Women's Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice. By CHRISTOPHER KACZOR. New York: Routledge, 2010. Pp. 246. $30.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-415-88469-3.

Given the plethora of scholarly articles and books concerning the moral permissibility of abortion, one may wonder whether there is a place for another volume on the topic. Christopher Kaczor's powerfully argued text, though, definitely merits any reader's careful attention. Public and academic debate over the morality of abortion has not waned over the past thirty-plus years, with new arguments being marshaled in postures of attack, defense, and counterattack representing each side. One of the most recent texts arguing in favor of abortion's moral permissibility is David Boonin's *A Defense of Abortion* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), and Kaczor presents an effective counterpoint to Boonin. Anyone reading these two texts side-by-side will come to understand the complexity of the ethical issues involved and appreciate the sophisticated metaphysical and moral argumentation required to resolve what sometimes appears to be a perpetually intractable debate.

The first half of Kaczor's volume focuses upon the ontological question of when a human person comes into existence. No conclusion arrived at concerning this ontological question can by itself determine the moral permissibility of abortion. One may accept that a person begins to exist at conception and yet conclude that abortion is permissible under many, if not all, circumstances. Alternatively, one may hold that a person does not begin to exist until some point after conception but yet maintain that abortion is morally impermissible—or that its general permissibility is restricted in various ways—due to an embryo or fetus's potential to develop into a person, or simply due to its being a member of the species *Homo sapiens*. After establishing his conclusion that a person begins to exist at conception, Kaczor proceeds in the second half to argue in favor of an embryo or fetus's inviolable right to life, which entails the general moral impermissibility of abortion, and addresses several "hard cases." Kaczor concludes with a novel argument—involving the

utilization of artificial wombs—that may allow society to side-step the issue to some extent, although certain ethical concerns will undoubtedly persist.

Kaczor carefully analyzes four possible views of when a person's life begins: after birth, at birth, during pregnancy, and at conception. The first view, argued by Michael Tooley, underwrites the moral permissibility of infanticide as well as abortion. Tooley's central thesis is that one can have a right to life only if one has the capacity to desire one's own continued existence, which requires having the capacity for self-consciousness (by "capacity" Tooley means an *immediately exercisable* ability that does not require any further development in order to be actualizable). Kaczor invokes Aristotle's concept of "active potentiality" to show how a being without a capacity, in Tooley's sense, for self-consciousness may yet have the intrinsic potentiality to develop such a capacity, which in turns identifies the being as one whose essential nature includes such a capacity, even if circumstances preclude his ever being able to actualize it. In other words, since an embryo or fetus, if allowed to develop normally, will come to possess self-consciousness, it is of the same *ontological kind* as the actually self-conscious being into which it may develop, even if abortion or some other impediment prevents it from ever being actually self-conscious.

One question that arises in this context is how far Aristotle's concept of active potentiality extends. There is a clear line between an embryo or fetus that is able *on its own*, requiring only a supportive environment—a uterus—to develop into an actually self-conscious being, and a sperm or ovum, each of which requires the other gamete in order to develop into such a being; each gamete thus has only a "passive potentiality" for self-consciousness. What about human beings who are dependent upon some form of external assistance, beyond a supportive environment, if they are to possess or be able to develop self-consciousness? What about a human being who suffers severe neural damage or who, from conception, lacks the intrinsic potentiality to develop a functioning cerebrum? Kaczor contends that a severely brain-damaged human being may still be a person, even if he lacks the "functional neural hardware" necessary for self-consciousness (28-29).

While I agree that certain types of brain-damaged human beings still count as persons with an active potentiality for self-consciousness, despite their dependence upon some sort of external intervention to actualize this potentiality, we must be cautious not to stretch the concept of active potentiality too far. Consider the case of cryopreserved corpses. What if technology that does not currently exist, but may one day be developed, is utilized to repair and revive a cryopreserved body, such that a self-conscious person returns to existence who is psychologically continuous with the person who had previously died? Given the mere possibility that a dead body may be cryopreserved and revived at a later time, it would seem—per Kaczor's argument—that such a body still possesses an intrinsic active potentiality for self-consciousness and thereby counts as a person.

In chapter 3 Kaczor effectively counters the view that birth results in a morally relevant ontological change in a fetus. In chapter 4 he critically analyzes several positions that identify the shift from being a nonperson to being a person

at some point during the course of pregnancy: formation of conscious desires/interests, viability, quickening, spontaneous movement, sentience, a recognizable human form, brain formation, and uterine implantation. He also engages the "developmental" view that characterizes personhood not as resulting from a sudden ontological change from one state to another, but as a quality that gradually emerges in the developing fetus, such that a late-term fetus is "more of a person" than an early-term fetus. Kaczor acknowledges the intuitive strength of the moral judgment that aborting a late-term fetus is morally worse than aborting an early-term fetus or embryo; however, despite the possibility that some killings may be worse than others—killing the President of the United States is worse than killing an ordinary citizen—there is still an equal right to life possessed just as much by the citizen as by the President, grounded in their shared ontological status as persons.

Kaczor concludes that human personhood begins at conception, based upon Aristotelian essentialism, in which the definitive qualities of persons are understood as "endowments" all human beings possess by virtue of being members of the same ontological kind. This strikes me as the right approach; however, the issue of defining the members of the ontological kind to which human persons belong persists. According to Kaczor, any member of the biological species *Homo sapiens* is a member of the same ontological kind. This would include *anencephalic* fetuses who lack the intrinsic potentiality to develop a cerebrum supportive of self-consciousness, rational thought and volition, or any of the other properties typically understood to define personhood. Since an anencephalic fetus is biologically human in all other respects, perhaps we should presume that active potentialities for self-consciousness, rational thought and volition, etc. are present, though latent.

A distinction may be drawn, however, between an anencephalic fetus whose condition is caused by some sort of extrinsic cause that precludes proper development according to the "blueprint" encoded in his genome, and one whose condition is genetically determined from conception where the cause of the anencephaly is intrinsic to the organism from the first moment of its existence. While the first type of anencephalic fetus could reasonably be understood as having active potentialities for self-consciousness, rational thought and volition, etc., the expression of such potentialities being inhibited by environmental conditions that impacted fetal development, the second type arguably never possesses an active potentiality to develop a functioning cerebrum. The fact that, in other respects, the fetus exhibits "human-like" qualities does not necessarily indicate the presence of the human essence any more than analogous cases of hydatidiform moles or embryos produced through altered nuclear transfer with oocyte-assisted reprogramming, both of which possess the human genome but lack the ability to develop into a self-conscious, rational, autonomous entity, would be considered persons. While one could argue that the presence of the human essence may be inferred from the fact that an anencephalic fetus is produced naturally through sexual intercourse between

two human beings, the same could be said of a hydatidiform mole, which nonetheless is not a human being.

In this way, Kaczor's otherwise commendable view appears to go too far; in another way, it does not go far enough. Kaczor rejects the psychological-continuity view of personal identity, noting that "we do identify various persons by their bodily identities and not by their mental contents" (108). He contends that one's bodily identity, including membership in the biological species *Homo sapiens*, is essential for one to persist as the numerically same person: "to cease being a member of this kind [*Homo sapiens*] is for *you* to cease to exist" (115). Consider, though, the possibility of replacing one's gradually degrading biological parts with cybernetic devices until one's entire body, including the brain, is cybernetic in nature. Kaczor considers dependence upon technological assistance to be compatible with possessing an active potentiality for self-consciousness. It would thus seem that technological assistance—in terms of replacing one's worn-out biological components—is compatible with the human essence and a fortiori a person's persistent numerical identity. But then it would seem that being a member of the biological species *Homo sapiens* is not essential to being a person or the numerically same person. Consider also the possibility of a person persisting beyond death as a disembodied soul. While it is debatable—even among Thomists–whether a person may persist as composed of his soul alone between bodily death and resurrection, the reasonable possibility of such a mode of existence calls into question whether we are essentially "biologically" human.

The second half of Kaczor's analysis focuses upon the moral rights of embryos and fetuses, given the conclusion that all such entities are essentially persons, and concludes that directly intended abortion is morally impermissible, including certain "hard cases" in which the moral intuitions of even ardent pro-life supporters sometimes contrast with the demands of consistent moral reasoning. Among the cases Kaczor addresses are those in which a pregnant woman's life is at stake and the value of her life and her moral rights are in direct conflict with those of the fetus she is carrying. Kaczor considers three examples: an ectopic pregnancy, a pregnant woman with uterine cancer, and a case necessitating fetal craniotomy (187-91). His analysis of each of these examples is sound, but there is a significant lacuna as he does not directly address the "even harder case" in which a pregnant woman's life is at stake due to her pregnancy and there is no reasonable hope that she could survive long enough for the fetus to reach the minimal age of extrauterine viability. This is the type of situation that was recently publicized in the Diocese of Phoenix in which an ethicist at a Catholic hospital was excommunicated for authorizing the direct abortion of a previable fetus after physicians judged that the mother would likely not survive carrying the fetus to term, nor even to the point of viability. Thus, the dilemma presented was one in which either the fetus dies through abortion and the mother survives, or both the mother and fetus die. This case challenges the absolute condemnation of directly intended abortion; even if one agrees that direct abortion is generally morally impermissible, a situation in which there is no

reasonable hope of fetal survival and the cost of not aborting the fetus is another human life, a more nuanced moral analysis may be called for—albeit one that does not reduce to mere consequentialism and that recognizes that the fetus has a *prima facie* right to life.

The rigor of Kaczor's metaphysical and ethical arguments concerning when a person begins to exist and the moral rights that pertain to embryos and fetuses should help disarm many alternative views that have been popular in both scholarly and public arenas. Nevertheless, certain difficult questions persist even among those who agree with his overall view. Kaczor's contribution should definitely move the debate forward in ways that will allow scholars to focus their attention on these and other related questions that have heretofore been relatively neglected in the literature.

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The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism: And Why Philosophers Can't Solve It. By THADDEUS KOZINSKI, Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2010. Pp. 288. $53.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-7391-4168-7.

In this work Thaddeus Kozinski tackles the prickly problem of religious pluralism. His main target is liberal political theory, or more specifically the liberal solution to the problem of religious pluralism. We are told by liberal theorists that in order to respect the religious beliefs of others we should not rely on our personal religious beliefs in developing our political positions and advocating them, as to do so would involve imposing our personal beliefs on others who do not share them. Instead, liberal political theorists offer to provide a way of structuring and governing society (including our political debates), which is either compatible with all rival comprehensive doctrines (neutralist liberalism) or at least a wide range of such doctrines (perfectionist liberalism).

Kozinski seeks to address this problem through an examination of three different philosophical proposals for how we ought to understand and deal with the problem of religious pluralism: those of John Rawls, Jacques Maritain, and Alasdair MacIntyre. All three take different positions on the liberal solution. Rawls is the liberal theorist par excellence, providing one of the most sophisticated defenses of liberalism. Maritain is a Thomist who attempts a synthesis of the Christian and liberal traditions to address the problem of pluralism. And MacIntyre, also a Thomist, offers perhaps the most unrelenting philosophical critique of modernity and liberal political theory. The work is divided into six chapters with a very clear exposition-critique structure. Each

chapter explaining the political philosophy of one of these three theorists is followed by a chapter of critique.

Kozinski begins with Rawls in chapter 1. His focus is Rawls's revised political theory, "political liberalism," in which Rawls claims to have developed a "political" as opposed to a comprehensive theory of justice that all "reasonable" citizens will be able to affirm without having to give up or change their commitment to their existing comprehensive beliefs. This political conception is claimed to be "freestanding" (not dependent on any particular comprehensive doctrine) and therefore allows for the possibility of an "overlapping consensus" by those who affirm rival reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls's work is not particularly easy to navigate, so Kozinski must be congratulated for providing a good, clear summary of his arguments. In chapter 2, Kozinski develops a sophisticated philosophical and theological critique of Rawls, outlining and building on the most important criticisms of his political liberalism so far developed. Of particular importance is his discussion of the theological nature of Rawls's political liberalism. Kozinski convincingly shows that Rawls's political liberalism is guilty of relying not simply on controversial metaphysical positions—which Rawls claims to avoid and indeed must avoid for the success of his theory—but also on a controversial theological position. In brief, when considering fundamental political matters, Rawls requires that one's theological beliefs be subordinated to what is considered most "reasonable" (understood in a Rawlsian way). This is a succinct critique of Rawls's political liberalism.

Kozinski next turns to the work of Catholic convert and philosopher Jacques Maritain, whose response to the problem of pluralism involves an attempt to effect a synthesis of the Christian and liberal political traditions. Maritain, a kind of "Catholic Rawls," according to Kozinski, seeks to develop what he calls a "personalist democracy," where citizens holding "different, even opposite metaphysical or religious outlooks can converge . . . on practical principles" (50). They would share what Maritain refers to as a "practical secular faith" constituted by a commitment to the secular values of "truth, intelligence, human dignity, freedom, brotherly love and the absolute value of moral good" (ibid.). However these secular values are said to be the embodiment of Christian values, and get their theoretical justification from a Christian theological framework. According to Maritain this would be a "new Christendom," a more authentic Christendom. While not denying the essential goodness of medieval Christendom, he argues that our contemporary emphasis on human freedom better resounds with gospel values. The Old Christendom stunted the "temporal order," with the Church or the sacral dominating the temporal, whereas in the contemporary age "the order of temporal society has gained complete differentiation, and full autonomy in its own sphere" (53), which according to Maritain is how God intended it to be. This third chapter provides a very good summary of Maritain's political theory and throughout Kozinski offers comparisons to Rawls's project, drawing out both the similarities and differences, and concluding by arguing that Maritain's theory provides a persuasive explanation of the deficiencies in Rawls's treatment of pluralism.

In the fourth chapter Kozinski develops a critique of Maritain's political theory, drawing on the work of Robert Kraynak, William Cavanaugh, and Aurel Kolnai. He challenges Maritain's claim that democracy is essentially required by the gospel; his construal of the relationship between the temporal and the sacral orders (in particular his confidence in the autonomy of the temporal order); his argument that authentic practical agreement is possible under conditions of serious and profound religious disagreement (theoretical disagreement); and his claim that it is possible and desirable to hold both a secular democratic faith and religious faith.

More generally, Kozinski questions the authenticity of Maritain's Thomism, arguing that there is an unresolved (and perhaps irresolvable) tension between his explicit commitment to Thomism and his use of Kantian concepts and ideas. Kozinski argues that this is particularly evident with regard to Maritain's use of the concept of natural/human rights. This chapter not only develops one of the most comprehensive critiques of Maritain's political theory, it also develops a philosophically sophisticated case against the compatibility of Christianity and liberal political theory and political orders.

In chapter 5, Kozinski turns to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, to determine whether he offers a better way of dealing with the problem of pluralism, and whether his work can better explain why the respective projects of Rawls and Maritain are unsuccessful. In this chapter Kozinski focuses on three main elements of MacIntyre's work: first, his theory of rationality as tradition dependent, from which we are to understand pluralism as a clash of rival traditions of rational enquiry; second, his critique of political liberalism; and third, his political theory of small-scale communities of acknowledged dependence. Kozinski provides a good summary of MacIntyre's arguments.

Drawing on MacIntyre's work, Kozinski argues that both Rawls's and Maritain's respective political theories fail to develop adequate political solutions to the problem of pluralism, because they have not properly understood the tradition-dependent nature of human rationality and therefore the true nature of the pluralism with which we are confronted. Kozinski maintains that MacIntyre has shown that there can be no practical agreement in the face of deep theoretical (metaphysical or theological) disagreement, as the practical is always inescapably the embodiment of the theoretical or some particular tradition of rational enquiry. The practical is always already the embodiment of some theoretical way of conceiving and understanding how things are. Liberalism's attempt to remain neutral between rival conceptions of the good is therefore illusory. Its supposedly content-free political framework and/or procedures for impartial governing turn out to be the embodiment of a liberal metaphysic, one at odds with the metaphysics found in rival traditions such as Thomism.

In the final chapter, chapter 6, Kozinski develops a partial critique of MacIntyre's work and offers his own political solution to the problem of religious pluralism involving a recasting of MacIntyre's philosophical theory. He argues that MacIntyre's conception of rationality as tradition dependent is not without problems, and he strongly disputes MacIntyre's negative assessment of

the modern nation-state's ability to foster and sustain an authentic common good.

However, Kozinski maintains that the crucial problem with MacIntyre's philosophical Thomism is its refusal to move beyond the realm of philosophy into theology, and that it is this which leaves him unable to respond effectively to the liberal tradition, and in particular, a form of liberalism which he refers to as 'honest pragmatic liberalism'. MacIntyre's philosophic methodology only takes us so far, according to Kozinski. When two traditions are equally invulnerable to criticism by this methodology, as Kozinski is suggesting is the case with 'honest pragmatic liberalism' and Thomism, the only way of resolving conflict between them would be "to address the concrete claims of each tradition" (227). In other words, it is necessary to address the theological/metaphysical claims such as 'can truth be known?' 'can the truth revealed by God be known with certainty?' etc.

Further, Kozinski argues that by seeking to develop a purely philosophical moral and political theory, which seeks to avoid engaging theological claims, MacIntyre *is* nevertheless taking a theological position. He claims that MacIntyre is implicitly denying the Church's claim to have the authority "to define the ultimate meaning of goodness and politics" (229), and the assertion "that God has spoken authoritatively regarding the proper construction of the political order, [and] . . . the intellectual and political authority of revealed political theology" (232). These are strong claims indeed and of course have serious implications for those Catholic scholars who would try to develop purely philosophical moral and/or political theories.

To develop this theological critique of MacIntyre further Kozinski enlists the work of John Milbank, specifically Milbank's criticism of MacIntyre's attempt to remain solely within the realm of philosophy. Drawing on Milbank, Kozinski argues that philosophy is ultimately limited by its own methodology, its abstractness and formalism. As such it cannot defeat the liberal tradition because "there are no [pure] arguments against nihilism of this general kind" (ibid.). According to Kozinski, using a content-free methodology to try and defeat liberalism is like using liberalism to defeat liberalism.

Yet Kozinski argues that Milbank's own proposal, which seeks to radicalize MacIntyre's approach, is ultimately too purely theological, and lacks an adequate philosophical defense. Kozinski seeks a way of addressing the problem of pluralism that strikes the right balance between theology and philosophy. He concludes by briefly outlining such an approach, which he describes as a "theologically informed tradition constituted political philosophy" (237), a kind of theological recasting of MacIntyre's theory. He sees tradition-transcendent norms as providing the basis for "a *modus vivendi* political order suitable for pluralistic nation states not unified by the Thomistic tradition" (ibid.). These norms would be the norms required for the "communal discovery and consensual political establishment of the *true* tradition" (ibid.), which according to Kozinski "is not an impossible goal" (240). Dialectically skilled representatives

of these diverse traditions would serve as the main interlocutors in the search of the true tradition of rationality.

As neutrality is impossible, and thus a confessional state of some kind unavoidable (that is, in developing and implementing government policy, lawmakers necessarily rely on some conception of the nature and purpose of human existence to guide them, no matter how fragmented and underdeveloped this may be), the state should, according to Kozinski, embody the true human good or true tradition. His "theologically informed tradition constituted political philosophy" outlines how we might realize a communal consensus on the true tradition. However, if this communal consensus were in fact to be achieved, he does not say what a "theologically informed, MacIntyrean-Thomist, ideal political order might actually look like" or how it could be effectively implemented, as Kozinski believes this is "a distinctly *theological* task," which he does not attempt, being a philosopher and not a theologian (ibid.).

This will sound like an outrageous proposal to most, and it fundamentally goes against the dominant positions within political philosophy, and indeed Western society, which simply accept radical philosophical/theological pluralism as a given, if not a good thing. Yet the argument developed by Kozinski is persuasive.

In this final chapter Kozinski does expose a number of important weaknesses in MacIntyre's work, in particular his reticence to discuss matters theological. There is clearly a deliberate effort on MacIntyre's part to avoid and even prevent his work from moving into the theological realm (in what might appear to be a very un-Thomistic way). This creates an unresolved tension in MacIntyre's work between his commitment to the Thomist tradition (in the form of a purely philosophical Thomism), and Thomism's ineliminable theological nature. Kozinski is to be congratulated for offering one possible way of resolving this tension. However it also raises the controversial question of the proper relationship between philosophy and theology. Is it possible to separate the so-called philosophical elements of Thomas's work from the theological? It would have been helpful if Kozinski had situated his theological criticisms of MacIntyre within this more general debate over the relationship between philosophy and theology, particularly within the Thomist tradition.

Liberals and those sympathetic to liberal political theory will of course find this work unsettling. It is an unrelenting critique of liberal political theory and the attempt to synthesize elements of the liberal tradition with Christianity. Yet we do not find caricatures of Rawls, Maritain and MacIntyre in this work. Kozinski takes time and effort carefully and faithfully to outline the positions he critiques, which helps to make his criticisms all the more compelling.

Where I part with Kozinski is over his belief that by adopting something like his proposed theological recasting of MacIntyre's theory we might realistically overcome the problem of religious pluralism (or as he puts it achieve "large-scale political unity in the truth") (ibid.). Despite his efforts to make his philosophical theorizing more theologically aware and engaged, Kozinski does not discuss possible theological explanations for religious pluralism, such as original sin, and

how they might affect his proposal. He also does not discuss whether there are other complementary ways to arrive at the true tradition apart from that of reason (argument and dialectic aimed at truth). This is not to say that he denies that there are other ways, but there is no developed discussion of these ways. This therefore tends to give the impression that he believes reason alone can overcome the problem of religious pluralism.

From a theological perspective, however, human reason has been impaired by original sin (there is of course disagreement over the exact nature of this impairment) and our ability to arrive at the true tradition solely through the use of reason (argument and dialectic aimed at truth) is therefore not guaranteed.

Further, when Kozinski speaks of his proposal to deal with religious pluralism as facilitating the "communal discovery of the true tradition," in reality what he is speaking of (if I have understood him correctly) is nothing other than religious conversion, the movement from one religious tradition to another. From a Christian perspective, conversion is never simply the work of reason alone (intellectual argument aimed at truth), but to varying degrees also goodness (the example of others) and beauty (the attractiveness of the narrative). Above all, however, it is always the work of grace and therefore something over which we have no absolute control. Yes, rigorous intellectual debate and discussion between religious traditions on fundamental metaphysical and theological questions is required and necessary, yet this by itself will not solve or overcome the problem of pluralism. There is no rational methodology that will guarantee movement to the true tradition. Kozinski is not explicitly claiming that reason alone can overcome the problem of pluralism or that such a rational methodology exists, but the presentation of his argument tends to give this impression.

I therefore believe that to help clarify these matters and strengthen his theological recasting of MacIntyre's theory Kozinski needs to offer a more explicitly theological discussion of the problem of religious pluralism (focusing, in particular, on the problem posed by original sin), and what if any impact this would have on his proposal as it stands. It would also be helpful if he offered a more explicitly theological discussion of the different ways in which the process of (religious) conversion to the true tradition might take place in individuals seeking to find it. (Both discussions would presuppose a particular theological anthropology which it would also be helpful to outline explicitly.)

Despite these issues, this remains an immensely important work that challenges the dominant religious and secular positions on how we ought to understand and deal politically with religious pluralism. It raises a number of important questions, foremost among them how Christians ought to understand and operate within contemporary political structures where there is no neutrality. It also develops a sophisticated critique of the supposed compatibility of the Christian tradition with liberal political theory. Finally, it convincingly shows that we cannot avoid taking a position on theological questions when developing political theories and policy. This is required reading not simply for those seeking to address the problem of religious pluralism in contemporary

Western societies, but indeed for anyone seeking better to understand what is at stake when theorizing and doing politics.

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