AQUINAS ON CREATION AND PREAMBLES OF FAITH

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ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI is well known for having emphasized in some of his writings what he has called the "Christian distinction." By this he is referring to the Christian understanding of the distinction between God and the world. At the risk of oversimplification, I will here quote from a description he offers of this in his *The God of Faith and Reason*:

In Christian belief we understand the world as that which might not have been, and correlatively we understand God as capable of existing, in undiminished goodness and greatness, even if the world had not been.[1]

As he goes on to explain in the same context, while we recognize that the world exists, in acknowledging the Christian distinction we also recognize that the world might not have existed and that this would not have resulted in any loss in God's greatness and his goodness. As Sokolowski nicely phrases this: "When God does create, there may be 'more' but there is no 'greater' or 'better'."[2] Moreover, he points out that according to this distinction, God is not to be viewed as a part of the world but as totally distinct from the world. Nor, as we shall see below, are God and the world to be viewed as parts of some

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[1] *The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 19.

[2] Ibid. Also see the following chapters 3-5 for much more on the Christian Distinction.

greater whole, at least not according to Robert Sokolowski, nor according to Thomas Aquinas, I would add.[3]

As the title of this article suggests, here I want to concentrate on Thomas's overall understanding of creation and to determine which of his particular views about it are philosophical and which are theological, that is, held solely on the grounds of religious belief. It may prove to be the case that in his eyes some of them overlap, as it were, being included or implied in Christian revelation in some way, but also discoverable in principle and perhaps in fact by unaided human reason, and hence constituting what Thomas himself at times refers to as preambles of faith. In this sense I will be building upon a study I have published elsewhere entitled "Philosophy and the Preambles of Faith in Thomas Aquinas."[4]

By "preamble of faith" Thomas has in mind a truth concerning God or the world that can be established by natural or philosophical reasoning and that is in some way presupposed for faith or for making an act of faith. While such a preamble is not in itself an article of faith, it is logically implied by or presupposed for what is indeed an article of faith. As examples Thomas always cites our knowledge that God exists, usually also that he is one, along with other truths of this kind, a number of which he identifies for us in various texts, but without ever giving us a complete list.[5] My purpose here, therefore, will be to determine what aspects of his under-

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[3] Ibid., 107. On Thomas's refusal to include God under *ens commune* or under *esse commune* see the conclusion of the present paper.

[4] See *Doctor Communis: The 'Praeambula Fidei' and the New Apologetics,* fasc. 1-2 (Vatican City: The Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2008), 38-61; reprinted as chap. 9 under the title "Thomas Aquinas on Philosophy and the Preambles of Faith," in *The Science of Being as Being: Metaphysical Investigations*, ed. Gregory Doolan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012). Here I will cite the latter version since it contains some slight changes.

[5] For an excellent text concerning this see Thomas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 50:99.148-54): "primo ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt praeambula fidei, quae necesse est in fide scire, ut ea quae naturalibus rationibus de deo probantur, ut deum esse, deum esse unum et alia huiusmodi vel de deo vel de creaturis in philosophia probata, quae fides supponit." For discussion of this text see Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on Philosophy and the Preambles of Faith," 198-99; see also 220 for an admittedly incomplete list of twelve preambles that I propose may be found in Thomas's texts.

standing of creation, if any, are preambles of faith and thus subject to philosophical demonstration, and what aspects are not preambles of faith but articles of faith taken strictly.

I. THE MEANING OF CREATION

Very early in Thomas's career, in distinction 1, question 1, article 2 of his commentary on book 2 of the *Sentences*, he considers whether things come forth from one principle (God) by way of creation. (In the preceding article Thomas had offered three arguments to show that there is only one First Principle.)[6] After offering some opening arguments against and some for the claim that things come forth from the one first principle by being created, he proposes his own solution. His opening remark is quite explicit: "I say that not only does faith hold that there is creation, but reason also demonstrates this."[7]

Thomas argues that everything that is imperfectly realized within a given genus derives from that in which the nature of the genus is present primarily and perfectly, as is true of heat which is produced in things by fire. "Since every thing, and all that is present within the thing, participates in *esse* in some way and is mixed with imperfection, it follows that every single thing, in terms of all that is present in that thing, arises from the first and perfect being." I will return below to the term "participate," but for the present let it suffice to note that Thomas concludes this argument by commenting that we refer to this, that is to say, to the production of something in *esse* according to its entire substance, as creation. Hence it is necessary that all things proceed from the first principle by creation.[8]

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[6] Interestingly, none of these arguments is as effective philosophically speaking as that which he offered at roughly the same time in c. 4 of his *De ente et essentia*. On this argument one may see John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 137-50, 404-10.

[7] II *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2 (*Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, ed. P. Mandonnet, vol. 2 [Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929], 17): "Respondeo quod creationem esse non tantum fides tenet, sed etiam ratio demonstrat."

[8] Ibid. (Mandonnet, ed., 17-18): "Cum autem quaelibet res, et quidquid est in re, aliquo modo esse participet, et admixtum sit imperfectioni, oportet quod omnis res,

Thomas then remarks that the notion of creation involves two factors. First, it presupposes nothing preexisting that would persist in the thing that is created, and from which it would have been made. In this respect creation differs from all changes (*mutationes*) and motions that we experience and, Thomas will maintain, is not itself a change or motion. The generation of a substance, unlike creation, presupposes matter which itself is not generated but is perfected through generation by being actualized by a form. So too, in accidental changes such as alteration, a subject is presupposed which in this case is a complete being or substance into which an accidental form is introduced. To put this another way, the causality exercised by one who generates or alters something does not apply to all that is present in that thing, but only to a form that is reduced from potentiality to act. But the causality of a creating agent extends to everything present in the thing created. Hence creation is said to be *ex nihilo* or from nothing in the sense that nothing is presupposed for this that would itself not be created.[9]

Second, Thomas continues, in whatever is created *non esse* is prior to *esse*, not necessarily by priority in the order of time or duration but by priority in the order of nature. By this he means that if a created thing were left to its own devices, its nonexistence would follow. This is so because it has existence owing only to the continuing influence of its creating cause.

Hence it is in these two respects that creation is said to be *ex nihilo*. To repeat: Creation does not presuppose any preexisting factor that is present in what is created, so that to say something is produced from nothing is to say that it is not produced from something preexisting. And what is created is still ordered to nothingness in the sense that in the order of nature, though not necessarily in the temporal order, it has *non-esse* before it has *esse;* without the influence of its creative cause, it would simply not exist at all.[10]

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secundum totum id quod in ea est, a primo et perfecto ente oriatur. Hoc autem creare dicimus, scilicet producere rem in esse secundum totam suam substantiam."

[9] Ibid. (Mandonnet, ed., 18).

[10] Ibid.

Thomas then returns to the point he had made at the beginning of his *solutio.* If these two characteristics suffice for one's understanding of creation, creation can be demonstrated (*potest demonstrari)* and thus philosophers have posited creation. If, however, one includes a third factor in one's understanding of creation, and holds that for something to be produced *ex nihilo* it must have been produced after not having existed in the temporal sense (*tempore post nihil*), so understood creation cannot be demonstrated nor, Thomas adds, was it granted by the philosophers. That the world began to be can be held only on faith.[11] Hence, Thomas regards a full-fledged treatment of creation as including both philosophical and theological factors, though here I will concentrate primarily on the philosophical side.

II. The Possibility of Eternal Creation

In introducing the issue of creation in the temporal sense, Thomas is touching on a point that was much disputed by Christian thinkers during his time—whether it can be demonstrated that the world is eternal or that the world began to be—and is anticipating his first full discussion of this issue in article 5 of this same question. There, after presenting many arguments for both sides of this dispute, Thomas lists three general positions. First, there is the view of the philosophers who hold that certain things in addition to God are eternal (a position which Thomas rejects as false and heretical). Second, some hold that the world began to exist after having not existed, and that God could not have created an eternal world, not because he himself lacks the power, but because an eternal and created world is impossible. Third, others hold that everything other than God began to be, but that human reason cannot demonstrate this. It can be known only by revelation.

Thomas himself adopts the third position, and writes:

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[11] Ibid.: "Si autem accipiamus tertium oportere ad rationem creationis, ut scilicet etiam duratione res creata prius non esse quam esse habeat, ut dicatur esse ex nihilo, quia est tempore post nihil, sic creatio demonstrari non potest, nec a philosophis conceditur, sed per fidem supponitur."

I do not believe that demonstrative argumentation can be offered for this (i.e., to prove that the world began to be), just as it cannot be offered for the Trinity, even though it is not possible for the Trinity not to be. And the weakness of the arguments which are introduced as demonstrations of this manifests this, all of which have been considered and refuted by the philosophers who hold for the eternity of the world.[12]

Thomas explains that demonstrations cannot be offered for either side of this issue, that is, to prove that the world is eternal or that the world began to be, but only probable or sophistical arguments. He turns to Aristotle's *Topics* for support and concludes, as Moses Maimonides had suggested, from a remark there that Aristotle had never intended to offer demonstrative arguments for the eternity of the world, but only probable arguments. On this point about Aristotle's intention in arguing for the eternity of the world, Thomas would eventually change his mind. By the time of his commentaries on the *Physics* and still later on the *Metaphysics,* he came to the conclusion that Aristotle had indeed intended to demonstrate that the world is eternal.[13]

In subsequent considerations of whether it can be demonstrated that the world began to be, Thomas does change

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[12] Ibid., d. 1, q. 1, a. 5 (Mandonnet, ed., 27-33, opening arguments and the three positions; and 33, text quoted): "quia non credo, quod a nobis possit sumi ratio demonstrativa ad hoc; sicut nec ad Trinitatem, quamvis Trinitatem non esse sit impossibile; et hoc ostendit debilitas rationum quae ad hoc inducuntur pro demonstrationibus, quae omnes a philosophis tenentibus aeternitatem mundi positae sunt et solutae: et ideo potius in derisionem quam in confirmationem fidei vertuntur si quis talibus rationibus innixus contra philosophos novitatem mundi probare intenderet." For discussion of this issue in this and in Thomas's chronologically subsequent texts see John Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984), chap. 8, some of the results of which I will briefly summarize here.

[13] See II *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5 (Mandonnet, ed., 33-34). Note especially: "Et hoc significant verba Philosophi dicentis, I *Top.*, cap. vii, quod sunt quaedam problemata de quibus rationem non habemus, ut utrum mundus sit aeternus; unde hoc ipse demonstrare nunquam intendit." For Aristotle see *Topics* 1.11.104b12-17. For Thomas's later view see VIII *Physic.*, lect. 2 (*In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio* [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1954], n. 986, pp. 509-10); XII *Metaphys.*, lect. 5 (*In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum expositio* [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1950], nn. 2496-97, p. 584). For Moses Maimonides see *The Guide of the Perplexed*, II, c. 15 (trans. S. Pines [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963], 292).

his formulations of his own position slightly. Here, as we have just seen, he holds that it cannot be demonstrated that the world began to be. In book 2 of his *Summa contra Gentiles*, chapters 31-37 (dating perhaps from 1261),[14] he defends the view that creatures need not have always existed and presents and refutes a series of arguments in support of the eternity of the world. In chapter 38 he presents and ultimately rejects as not demonstrative a number of arguments aimed at proving that the world is not eternal. But here he is content to say that none of these arguments is demonstrative and hence that the noneternity of the world has not been demonstrated. He does not say that it cannot be demonstrated, as he had maintained in the earlier discussion in his commentary on book 2 of the *Sentences.*

In question 3, article 17 of the disputed questions *De Potentia* (1265-66), Thomas considers the question whether the world always existed. After presenting a series of thirty arguments in support of the claim that the world has always existed, and then a few to show that it began to be, Thomas writes that it must be held that the world began to be, in accord with Catholic faith. He says that this position cannot be refuted by any physical demonstration. He notes that if one speaks about the production of one particular creature, a reason can be assigned for this either by appealing to some other particular creature, or at least by appealing to the order of the entire universe to which each creature is ordered as a part to the form of the whole. But if one speaks about the production into existence of the entire universe, one cannot appeal to anything created from which a reason might be taken to explain why it is such and such, nor merely by appealing to the divine power, which is infinite, nor even to the divine goodness, which has no need of other things. One must rather fall back on the will of the one who produced it, that is, the will of God. And from our

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[14] For discussion of the dating of the *Summa contra Gentiles* see Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas,* vol. 1: *The Person and His Work*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 101-4. Unless otherwise indicated here I will follow the dates for Thomas's works proposed by Torrell (and by G. Emery in the "Brief Catalogue" in the same volume).

(natural) knowledge of the divine will, nothing can be con-
cluded necessarily about the duration of the universe so as to
demonstrate that it has always existed.[15]

But earlier within this same question 3, at article 14, Thomas
had already examined whether something that is diverse in
essence from God could have always existed. After presenting a
series of arguments to show that this is possible, and another
series to show that it is impossible, in his response Thomas
distinguishes different ways in which something is possible.
Something may be possible by reason of some power, or by
reason of no power. What is possible by reason of some power
(*potentia*) may be such either by reason of an active power (such
as a builder who is capable of building something) or by reason
of a passive power (such as wood which can be burnt). And
what is possible by reason of no power may be such only
metaphorically (as in geometry a line is referred to as a rational
power), or absolutely (when the terms in which it is expressed
are not contradictory). Conversely, something is absolutely
impossible when it is self-contradictory and hence intrinsically
impossible, and not impossible merely by reason of the absence
of an active or passive power.[16]

As regards the statement that something that differs in
substance from God has always existed, this is not impossible in
itself in the sense of being self-contradictory; for no contra-
diction is involved in joining "to exist *ab alio*" and "to exist
always" unless we are dealing with something that proceeds
from something else by means of motion. This, of course, is not
true of the procession of creatures from God. Nor does the
addition of "being diverse in substance" render this statement
impossible. Moreover, as regards God's active power, there can
be no lack in him of the power to produce something from
eternity. And of course, if we are dealing with creation, there is
no need for a passive potentiality. At this point in his text
Thomas brings in his religious faith, according to which no

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[15] *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 14 (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, ed. P. M. Pession [Turin
and Rome: Marietti, 1965], 93). Note: "Unde non potest necessario concludi aliquid de
universi duratione, ut per hoc ostendi possit demonstrative mundum semper fuisse."
[16] Ibid. (Marietti ed., 80).

passive potentiality for something to be created has, in fact, always existed. And so, if one grants the truth of Catholic belief concerning that point, under that supposition an eternally produced creature is not possible.[17]

In light of this, one might have expected Thomas to go beyond his earlier positions that it has not been proved and that it cannot be proved that the world began to be, and to conclude that an eternally created effect is possible; for now he seems to have proved to his own satisfaction that this claim is not intrinsically impossible (self-contradictory) nor extrinsically impossible because of the absence of an adequate agent (God) or of any preexisting passive potentiality (not needed in this case). But in this work he does not do so. Nor does he go that far in his subsequent discussion in question 46, articles 1 and 2 of the *Prima pars*. There in the first article he continues to reject all claims that the world has always existed and maintains that the eternity of the world cannot be demonstrated. And in article 2 he again maintains that our conviction that the world began to be rests on faith alone and cannot be demonstrated. Finally, in his *De aeternitate mundi,* which Jean-Pierre Torrell places in Thomas's second teaching period at Paris and very probably in 1271, he offers his best and fullest discussion of this issue and maintains again and in detail that that there is no intrinsic repugnance between being created by God and existing from eternity. And he now concludes that an eternally created world is "not impossible," which I take as meaning that an eternally created world is possible. As always before, of course, he continues to hold that Christians believe that the world began to be solely on the strength of revelation.[18]

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[17] Ibid.

[18] For *De aeternitate mundi* see the Leonine ed., 43:83-89. Note the key passage which has finally been clarified by the Leonine edition concerning the possibility of an eternally created universe: "si autem non est repugnantia intellectuum, non solum non est falsum sed etiam <non est> impossibile: aliter esset erroneum, si aliter dicatur (86:68-71)." On prior textual problems concerning this passage and its proper interpretation see Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, chap. 8 ("Thomas Aquinas on the Possibility of Eternal Creation"), 202-13. On the date of *De aeternitate mundi* see Torrell, *St. Thomas Aquinas,* 184-87, 348. In an interesting recent article on a number of earlier influences on Thomas's early view in his commentary on book 2 of the *Sentences*, L. X. López Farjeat says that he differs with my interpretation of

III. CREATION AS A PREAMBLE OF FAITH

As we have seen, Thomas's views on creation include both philosophical and theological factors. On the philosophical side, in his discussion of creation *ex nihilo* in the commentary on book 2 of the *Sentences* Thomas explicitly states that if we take this as meaning (1) the production of something from no preexisting subject and (2) a production in which nonexistence is prior to existence in the order of nature though not necessarily in the order of time, philosophical reason can demonstrate this. If, however, we add that it also means that the world began to exist after having not existed, this we can accept only on the grounds of religious belief. We cannot demonstrate it although, as we have now seen, Thomas ultimately concluded that an eternally created world is possible.

Since we have noted some development in Thomas's treatment of the possibility of an eternally created universe, we may now ask ourselves whether his thought might have developed or changed concerning the first two aspects we have identified in his understanding of creation. Does he always maintain that the reality of creation understood as including these two aspects can be demonstrated by reason?

IV. AQUINAS ON NON-CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS AND CREATION

One way of responding to this may be to turn to texts where Thomas discusses the views of earlier (non-Christian) philosophers concerning creation. If he attributes a doctrine of creation to Aristotle, for example, or perhaps to Plato and to

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Thomas's position because he finds certain passages in that commentary "where Aquinas, influenced by Avicenna and Averroes, does not reject" the possibility of eternal creation. See his "Avicenna's Influence on Aquinas' Early Doctrine of Creation in *In II Sent.*, D. 1. Q, 1, A. 2," *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 79 (2012): 308 n. 2; also see 333. Unfortunately he fails to recognize the distinction between denying that it can be demonstrated that the world began to be and positively asserting that it is possible for the world to be eternal. On my reading it is the latter and stronger claim that Thomas does not defend until *De aeternitate mundi.* On the importance of this distinction for Giles of Rome (a student at Paris during Thomas's second teaching period there) see the Appendix to the present article.

Aristotle, he obviously thinks that the reality of creation can be established philosophically. But for some time now there has been controversy among Thomistic scholars about Thomas's understanding of Aristotle's position concerning creation.

Etienne Gilson strongly denied that Thomas attributes a doctrine of creation to Aristotle, beginning as early as 1931 in the French edition (and in the subsequent English translation) of *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*. In this he was followed by one of his best-known students, Anton Pegis.[19] Decades later, however, Mark Johnson wrote an interesting article in the 1989 issue of *The New Scholasticism* concerning this issue. There he assembled and analyzed twelve texts where, he maintains, Thomas attributes, albeit not explicitly, a doctrine of creation to Aristotle (eternal creation, to be sure).[20] And in an article in the *American Catholic Philososphical Quarterly* of 1992, he finds a shift in Thomas's treatment of Plato concerning the same issue. There he concludes that in earlier writings Thomas did not attribute a doctrine of creation to Plato, but thought that he did not allow for the production of matter by his supreme generating principle of the universe. In Thomas's later writings, however, Johnson finds him attributing the production of matter to Plato and therefore, Johnson concludes, a doctrine of creation.[21] These findings, especially the attribution by Thomas

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[19] For Gilson see *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1950), 69: "But St. Thomas never credits the Philosopher with the notion of creation, never once does he qualify as creationism his doctrine of the origin of the world; and if in fact he does not do so it is because the first principle of all being, as Plato and Aristotle conceived it, integrally explains indeed why the universe is what it is, but does not explain why it exists." Also see the long n. 4 (438-41), where Gilson explains in more detail his denial of a doctrine of creation in Plato and in Aristotle. For the French version see *L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, rev. ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), 69, and n. 1. For Anton Pegis see his Aquinas Lecture, *St. Thomas and the Greeks* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1939; repr. 1980), 67, 70, and n. 4 (101-4); "The Dilemma of Being and Unity," in R. E. Brennan, ed., E*ssays in Thomism* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), 149-83, esp. 179-83; "A Note on St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* 1, 44, 1-2," *Mediaeval Studies* 8 (1946): 159-68; "St. Thomas and the Coherence of the Aristotelian Theology," *Mediaeval Studies* 35 (1973): 67-117, esp. 114-16.

[20] "Did St. Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?" *The New Scholasticism* 63 (1989): 129-55.

[21] "Aquinas's Changing Evaluation of Plato on Creation," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 66 (1992): 81-88.

of creation to Aristotle, have been supported by a number of other scholars.[22]

Here I will consider a few of the strongest texts that Johnson in his 1989 article and others interpret in this direction, since not all of these texts are equally clear on this point. The first text is taken from Thomas's commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard in his *expositio textus* for book 2, distinction 1, chapters 1 and 3, and dates from the early 1250s. There Peter reports that Plato held that there are three first principles (*initia*), namely, God, exemplars, and matter, and that matter itself is uncreated and derived from no principle, and that God is a kind of artisan (*artifex*), not a creator.[23] Peter reports that Aristotle posited two principles, matter and form, and a third, called an *operatarium* (which I take to be an agent) and held that the world always exists and has always existed.[24]

In his *expositio textus,* as Johnson points out, Thomas seems content with Peter's presentation of Plato's view, and comments that Plato erred by holding that exemplar forms subsist per se outside the divine intellect, and that neither they nor matter receive their *esse* from God. But Thomas has more to say about Aristotle, noting first that Peter seems to touch on his position only imperfectly by referring to two principles whereas in *Physics* I Aristotle posits three principles—matter, form, and privation. Moreover, says Thomas, Aristotle posits not only an efficient-exemplar cause (*operatarium)* but also a final cause. And Aristotle holds that the form and the agent and the end

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[22] See especially Lawrence Dewan, "Thomas Aquinas, Creation, and Two Historians," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 50 (1994): 363-87, where he is very critical of Gilson and, to a lesser extent, of Pegis, in their respective denials that Thomas attributed a doctrine of creation to Aristotle. Also see Steven E. Baldner and William E. Carroll in their *Aquinas on Creation* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1997), which contains their translation and commentary on Thomas's II *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1 (see Appendix D, at 128 n. 20 where they provide their list of texts in which "Aquinas attributes a doctrine of creation to Aristotle").

[23] See Lombard, I *Sent.*, p. 2 (Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV Libris distinctae* [Grotta Ferrata (Rome): Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971], 330:3-5): "Plato namque tria initia existimavit, Deum scilicet, et exemplar, et materiam; et ipsa increata, sine principio, et Deum quasi artificem, non creatorem."

[24] Ibid. (Grotta Ferrata ed., 331:21-23): "Aristotiles vero duo principia dixit, scilicet materiam et speciem, et tertium 'operatarium' dictum; mundum quoque semper esse et fuisse."

coincide (in *Physics* II) and therefore might seem to posit only two principles. On this Thomas comments that Aristotle did not err by positing many principles, because he held that the existence (*esse)* of all things depends only on the first principle, and so it remains that there is one first principle. Rather he erred by positing the eternity of the world. Thomas also clarifies that for Aristotle privation is not a principle per se, but only *per accidens*, and that it is this only with respect to the becoming (*fieri*) of a thing, but not with respect to its *esse*. Finally, Thomas explains that in *Metaphysics* XII the first efficient principle and the ultimate end are presented as numerically one, and that Aristotle holds there that the first moving principle moves as desired by all things. Thomas concludes that for Aristotle there is one first principle extrinsic to the thing produced, which is the agent and exemplar cause and the end; and there are two principles that are intrinsic to the thing (literally: parts of the thing) produced, namely, matter and form, which "are produced" by that first principle. Most important among these observations for Johnson's case are Thomas's remarks that the *esse* of all things depends only upon the first principle, and that the matter and form of material things are produced.[25]

Yet in this text Thomas does not explicitly state that Aristotle's First Principle is a creator unless one assumes that to produce the *esse* of other things and to produce their matter and form is to create them. Johnson assumes that this is the case, as do Lawrence Dewan and other defenders of this view, but that assumption needs to be examined more closely, as will be noted below.[26]

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[25] Mandonnet ed., 2:43, for Thomas's *expositio textus.* Note in particular: "Ad quod dicendum, quod Aristoteles non erravit in ponendo plura principia: quia posuit esse omnium tantum a primo principio dependere; et ita relinquitur unum esse primum principium. Erravit autem in positione aeternitatis mundi. . . . Forma autem quae est pars rei non ponitur ab eo [i.e., by Aristotle] in idem numero incidere cum agente, sed in idem specie vel similitudine: ex quo sequitur quod sit unum principium primum extra rem, quod est agens, et exemplar, et finis; et duo quae sunt partes rei, scilicet forma et materia, quae ab illo primo principio producuntur."

[26] For Johnson on this see "Did St. Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?", 133-35.

The second text cited by Johnson is taken from Thomas's discussion of the eternity of the world in book 2 of his commentary on the *Sentences*, which we have summarized above (II *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5). There Thomas also criticizes an opening argument he had presented against an eternal world. God either is the cause of the substance of the heaven, or only of its motion. And if he is the cause only of its motion, its substance is uncreated, and therefore it is a first principle, and as a consequence there will be many first principles and many that are uncreated, a position which Thomas has already refuted in article 1. But if God is the cause of the substance of the heaven and gives *esse* to it, since everything that receives *esse* from something else comes after it in duration, it seems that the world did not always exist.[27]

While Thomas agrees with the conclusion of this argument—that the world began to be—he does not find the argument itself demonstrative. He responds by citing from Averroës' *De substantia orbis*, chapter 2, to the effect that "Aristotle never meant that God would be the cause only of the motion of the heaven, but also that he would be the cause of its substance, giving *esse* to it." If one can judge from the medieval Latin version of this passage published in Venice, 1562, this is not quite what the Latin translation actually says. "Giving *esse* to it" is missing. It reads, in my translation: "Certain ones, not knowing that this was the opinion of Aristotle, said that he did not say that there is a cause that produces the universe [*causam agentem universum*], but only a moving cause, and that (claim) was extremely absurd."[28] But if we accept the reading of the

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[27] *Sed contra* 1 (Mandonnet ed., 2:31).

[28] Mandonnet ed., 2:38: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut dicit Commentator in lib. *De substantia orbis*, cap. II, Aristoteles nunquam intendit quod Deus esset causa motus caeli tantum, sed etiam quod esset causa substantae eius, dans sibi esse." See *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis,* vol. 9 (Venetius apud Junctas, 1562-1574; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1962), ff. 6v-7r: "Et cum ignoraverunt hoc quidam esse de opinione Aristotelis, dixerunt ipsum non dicere causam agentem universum, sed causam moventem tantum, et illud fuit valde absurdum." Also see *Averroes' De substantia orbis. Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text with English Translation and Commentary*, ed. and trans. Arthur Hyman (Cambridge, Mass.: The Medieval Academy of America; Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1986), 86: "Since people do

text as we find it in Thomas himself, it again indicates that, at least according to Averroës in this treatise, Aristotle did not want to say that God is the cause only of the motion of the heaven, but also that he is the cause of its substance, and gives *esse* to it. Once more, it should not be immediately assumed that Thomas therefore thought that Aristotle attributed creation to his God unless we assume that to give *esse* is to create. Moreover, as Johnson himself notes without agreeing with this, someone might object that in this case Thomas is presenting Averroës' understanding of Aristotle, not necessarily his own view.[29]

The next text to be considered is question 3, article 5 of *De potentia* (1265-66). There Thomas asks whether there can be anything that is not created by God. Before answering, he presents a kind of historical reconstruction of how the human mind advanced in its knowledge of the nature of things. Just as human knowledge in an individual moves from sense perception to the level of the intellect, so the first philosophers were preoccupied with sensible things, and only gradually moved from them to the knowledge of intelligible objects. Because accidental forms are sensible in themselves, whereas substantial forms are not, the first philosophers held that all forms are accidents, and that matter alone is a substance. And because substance is sufficient in itself to be a cause of those accidents that follow from the principles of substance, these first philosophers posited no other cause but matter to account for whatever appears among sensible things, and rejected any kind of efficient cause.[30]

At a second stage Thomas places later thinkers who began to consider substantial forms in some way. These did not rise to knowledge of universal forms but concentrated on particular (*speciales*) forms. They posited certain efficient causes (*causae agentes*), not those that confer *esse* on things universally, but rather those that change matter with respect to this or that

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not know that this is one of Aristotle's opinions they say that he does not speak of the acting cause of the universe, only of its moving cause. This is the height of ignorance."

[29] Johnson, "Did St. Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?", 137.

[30] *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 5 (Marietti ed,, 49).

form—such as mind (*intellectus*) or friendship and strife—and that act by separating or uniting. According to these philosophers, not all things are efficiently caused, and matter is simply presupposed for an efficient cause to act.[31]

"Still later philosophers," Thomas continues, "such as Plato, Aristotle, and their followers came to a consideration of universal *esse* itself; and they therefore alone posited some universal cause of things, from which all others come forth into existence." Thomas comments that this position is in agreement with Catholic faith and, he adds, can be demonstrated (*demonstrari potest*) by three arguments.[32]

Johnson does not pause to examine the three arguments presented by Thomas and the summarizing remark he makes at the end, but it would have strengthened his case if he had. Thomas attributes these arguments respectively to Plato, Aristotle, and Avicenna. The first argument is this. If one single characteristic (*aliquid unum*) is found to be common to many different things, it is necessary that it be caused in each of them by some one cause. This common feature could not belong to each of them by reason of that which is unique to it in itself since each of them, in terms of that which it is in itself, is distinct from the others. And diversity of causes produces diverse effects. But *esse* is found to be common to all things even though each one of them, in terms of what it is in itself, is distinct from the others. Therefore it is necessary that *esse* is present in each of them not by reason of what they are of themselves, but by reason of some single cause. Thomas notes that this "seems" to be Plato's argument, since he held that before every multitude (or many) there must be some unity, not only in the case of numbers but in the natures of things.[33]

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[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.: "Posteriores vero philosophi, ut Plato, Aristoteles et eorum sequaces, pervenerunt ad considerationem ipsius esse universalis; et ideo ipsi soli posuerunt aliquam universalem causam rerum, a qua omnia alia in esse prodirent, ut patet per Augustinum [VIII D*e Civit. Dei,* cap. iv]." Also see Johnson, "Did St. Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?", 142-43.

[33] *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 5 (Marietti ed , 49). Note: "Et ista videtur ratio Platonis, qui voluit, quod ante omnem multitudinem esset aliqua unitas non solum in numeris, sed etiam in rerum naturis."

Thomas attributes the second argument to Aristotle, and presents it this way. When something is found to be participated in by different things in diverse fashion, it must be given to all of those in which it is present more imperfectly by something in which it is most perfectly present. To support this Thomas reasons that those perfections that are said to be more or less are such because of their more remote or their more proximate approach (*accessus*) to something that is one. Otherwise, if the perfection belonged to each of them by reason of itself, there would be no reason why it would be more perfectly realized in one rather than in another. But one must posit one being which is the most perfect and the (ontologically) truest being, which is proved from the fact that there is a completely immobile and most perfect mover, as is proved by the philosophers. Therefore all other less perfect things must receive their *esse* from it. Thomas refers to this as Aristotle's proof, and this is borne out at least by the reference to the argument for the unmoved mover.[34] The working principle—that perfections are more or less insofar as they more proximately or more remotely approach something that is one—reminds one of Thomas's Fourth Way among his arguments for God's existence (*STh* I, q. 2, a. 3).

Thomas then presents what he identifies as Avicenna's argument. What exists by reason of something else must be traced back as to its cause to that which exists by reason of itself (per se). In support he reasons that if there were such a thing as heat that exists per se, it would be the cause of all hot things that possess heat by participation. But in fact there is some being which is *esse* itself, which is proved from the fact that there must be some first being which is pure act, and in which there is no composition. Therefore it is necessary that all other beings have existence from that one being, and they are not identical with their *esse* but have *esse* by participating in it.[35]

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[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.: "Tertia ratio est, quia illud quod est per alterum, reducitur sicut in causam ad illud quod est per se. Unde si esset unus calor per se existens, oporteret ipsum esse causam omnium calidorum, quae per modum participationis calorem habent. Est autem ponere aliquod ens quod est ipsum suum esse: quod ex hoc probatur, quia oportet esse

Here, then, Thomas is introducing his metaphysics of essence and *esse* in all beings that do not exist of themselves but only participate in *esse* in order to make the point that anything other than God must derive its existence from God by way of participation.

Thomas concludes his presentation of these arguments by noting that "thus it is demonstrated by reason and held by faith that all things are created by God" ("Sic ergo ratione demonstratur et fide tenetur quod omnia sint a Deo creata"). Hence at this point in his career he reaffirms the point he had made in book 2 of his commentary on the *Sentences* to the effect that creation taken strictly can be demonstrated. He also offers three arguments taken, or perhaps more accurately phrased, *developed* in varying degrees from Plato, Aristotle, and Avicenna as demonstrations of his point. It would seem that he is very close to attributing a doctrine of creation to each of them, although he has not yet stated that point in so many words. And yet one may still ask whether proving that things other than God receive their act of existing from him is in fact enough to prove that they are created *ex nihilo*.[36]

In response to this concern, Thomas's reply to objection 2 in this same article should be noted. There he reasons that when *esse* is given to a quiddity, not only the *esse* but the quiddity itself is created. This is so because "before the quiddity has *esse*, it is nothing except perhaps in the intellect of the Creator where it is not a creature but the creative essence" itself.[37] This, therefore, appears to be the key that is needed to justify the transition from proving that something receives *esse* to proving that it is created. It must be produced *ex nihilo*, that is to say, from no preexisting subject whatsoever.

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aliquod primum ens quod sit actus purus, in quo nulla sit compositio. Unde oportet quod ab uno illo ente omnia alia sint, quaecumque non sunt suum esse, sed habent esse per modum participationis. Haec est ratio Avicennae [lib. VIII, *Metaph*., cap. vii, et lib. IX, cap. iv]."

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.: " Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia."

It may be helpful to turn to two slightly later texts from Thomas's first part of the *Summa Theologiae*, question 44, articles 1 and 2. I will begin with article 1, although it is not cited by Johnson in his 1989 article. There Thomas asks whether God is the efficient cause of all things, as he indicates in the prologue to question 44.[38] Thomas immediately appeals to his now full-blown metaphysics of participation. If something is present in something by participation, it must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially. But it was shown in dealing with divine simplicity above (see *STh* I, q. 3, a. 4) that God is self-subsisting esse. And it was shown that self-subsisting *esse* can only be one (see *STh* I, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3). It follows that all things other than God are not identical with their *esse*, but participate in *esse*. Therefore, the argument concludes, things that differ by participating in *esse* in different degrees so as to exist more or less perfectly are caused by one first being which exists most perfectly. Thomas then gives credit to Plato for the point that before any many one must posit unity, and to Aristotle for holding in the second book of the *Metaphysics* that what is maximally being (*ens*) and maximally true is the cause of every (other) being and all truth (of being). This argument, therefore, is Thomas's, but he acknowledges his debt to Plato and to Aristotle for certain insights into it.[39] In this text he does

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[38] *STh* I, q. 44, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 4:455): "Primo: utrum Deus sit causa efficiens omnium entium." But the article is then entitled: "Utrum sit necessarium omne ens esse creatum a Deo," even though it only attempts to prove that every other thing that exists in any way whatsoever depends for this on God, as is indicated by the opening sentence in the response: "Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse." The Marietti edition of 1950 (p. 223 n. 1) clarifies this by commenting that in the title the expression *esse creatum* simply means *effective causatum* (efficiently caused). This explanation is also offered by Cajetan (Leonine ed., 4:456).

[39] *STh* I, q. 44, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 4:455): "Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum: sicut si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse. Necesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte, causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est." For a helpful analysis of

not explicitly attribute the doctrine of creation to either of them.

In article 2 Thomas wants to show that prime matter is created. Hence this article marks an important step beyond article 1. In preparing his response, he again offers a brief recapitulation of earlier philosophical thinking on the issue. As in his previous presentation, he notes that in the beginning, given the fact that they were, as it were, "cruder" (*grossiores*), the ancient philosophers posited only sensible bodies as beings, and among those who posited motion in such bodies, they thought of motion only in terms of accidents, such as rarefaction and condensation, and uniting and separation. Because they regarded the substance of bodies as uncreated, they posited causes for accidental changes of this kind such as friendship, strife, intellect, or something like this.[40]

Going beyond these philosophers, others reached a second stage and distinguished between substantial form and matter, and viewed the latter as uncreated. They also realized that change occurs in bodies in terms of essential forms. Moreover, they posited certain more universal causes for these changes, such as the oblique (ecliptic) circle of the sun, according to Aristotle, or ideas, according to Plato. Thomas himself observes that matter is limited (*contrahitur*) by a form to a determined species, and that a substance or essence of a given species is limited to a determined mode of existing (*modus essendi*) by an accident added to it. "Therefore each/both [*utrique*] considered being in some particular way, either insofar as it is *this* being [*hoc ens*] or insofar as it is *such being* [*tale ens*]." And so they assigned particular efficient causes to account for these particular changes.[41]

Going still farther, in a third stage "some [*aliqui*] raised themselves up to a consideration of being insofar as it is being

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this argument see Rudi te Veldi, A*quinas on God* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 129-32. Also see II *Metaphys*., lect. 2 (nn. 296-98).

[40] *STh* I, q. 44, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 4:457). Note especially: "A principio enim, quasi grossiores existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia."

[41] Ibid. (Leonine ed., 4:457-58). Note in particular: "Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est *hoc ens*, vel inquantum est *tale ens*."

[*ens inquantum est ens*] and investigated the cause of things not only insofar as they are *these* [*haec*] or *such* [*talia*], but insofar as they are beings." Here Thomas comments that the cause of things insofar as they are beings must cause them not only insofar as they are *such* through accidental forms, and not only insofar as they are *these* through substantial forms, "it must also cause everything in them that pertains to their being [*esse*] in any way whatsoever." From this Thomas concludes that one must accordingly hold "also that prime matter is created by the universal cause of beings." Here, then, Thomas is definitely assigning a doctrine of creation to those who had reached this third stage.[42]

There has been considerable controversy concerning exactly where Plato and Aristotle fit into this classification scheme, and concerning the identity of those *aliqui* who arose to a consideration of being insofar as it is being and hence to the view that even prime matter is created by God. At first sight it would seem that Thomas does not place Plato and Aristotle within this third group but only within the second group of those who managed to distinguish between substantial form and matter, the latter of which they regarded as uncreated. For Thomas states that thinkers in the second group posited certain "more universal causes" to account for changes of substantial forms, and cites Aristotle's oblique or ecliptic circle and Plato's ideas. But when Thomas refers back to those who held this view he uses the Latin term *utrique*. Gilson, for instance, has translated this term as "both" and has taken it as referring to Aristotle and to Plato.[43]

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[42] Ibid. (Leonine ed., 458): "Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens: et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt *haec* vel *talia*, sed secundum quod sunt *entia*. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt *talia* per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt *haec* per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium."

[43] See Gilson, *Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, 439-40 n. 4; also see the more general discussion in Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Greeks*, 101 n. 63. Te Velde, on the other hand, translates *utrique* as "each of these opinions," but nonetheless applies it to "philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle" (*Aquinas on God*, 136).

Against this reading Johnson has countered that it seems to involve a mistranslation of the term *utrique* which, when used in the plural, refers "not to two individuals taken separately, but to two groups taken separately."[44] But even if one agrees with Johnson on this grammatical point, the text still presents a problem. It indicates that members of groups one and two (with Plato and Aristotle explicitly included in group two) still dealt with particular causes or with "more universal causes," but not with *the* universal cause of being as being. It does not put them in the third class, with those thinkers who considered being insofar as it is being and who defended the creation of matter by the first cause. While Johnson himself acknowledges that Thomas does not include Plato and Aristotle in the third class, he maintains that Thomas *could* have included Aristotle there; but Johnson's effort to do this seems to me to involve some special pleading since this is not what the text says.[45]

At the same time, if in this text Thomas does not include Plato and Aristotle within the third class, it is difficult to reconcile this reading with the view expressed by Thomas himself a year or so previously in question 3, article 5 of *De potentia* where, as we have seen, he attributes three different arguments to Plato, Aristotle, and Avicenna respectively, and then concludes that it is demonstrated by reason and held by faith that all things are created by God.[46] The simpler solution

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[44] Johnson, "Did St. Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?", 144-45.

[45] Ibid., 145-46. Also see Mark Johnson, "Aquinas's Changing Evaluation of Plato on Creation," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 66 (1992): 84-5 and nn. 12, 13, and 14. Also see Dewan, "Thomas Aquinas, Creation, and Two Historians," 363-87, for support of Johnson's position and a critique of Gilson and Pegis concerning the same. Dewan also points out that Gilson indicated that Maritain had previously proposed the same reading as Gilson offered of *STh* I, q. 44, a. 2 (ibid., 364 n. 2).

[46] Gilson, for instance, attempted to reconcile these texts by arguing that Thomas distinguishes between *esse* taken in the strict sense as signifying "to exist," which he says is the true Thomistic understanding, and *esse* taken in the broad sense as signifying substantial being (*l'être*), which he says is the Aristotelian sense. Given this, according to Gilson Thomas could have said that Aristotle arrived at knowledge of a *causa totius esse* (substantial *esse* as including matter and form), as in VIII *Phys.*, c. 1, lect. 2, n. 5 (*principium totius esse*) and yet that Aristotle did not arrive at the notion of God as a creator, that is, as the cause of existential *esse*. For Gilson see *Le thomisme*, 6th ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1965), 154-55, esp. 155 n. 6. For a full discussion and critique of this distinction and solution see Dewan, "Thomas Aquinas, Creation, and Two Historians," 365-73.

seems to be that in the text from the *Summa* considered here Thomas has changed his mind about this point, notwithstanding the relatively short period of time between this text (1266-68) and *De potentia* (1265-66)—and apparently changed it again, as will be seen below.

But the other question then remains: If in the present text Thomas does not include Plato and Aristotle within the third class, just whom does he want to place there? Gilson argues that Thomas must have Avicenna in mind, and Rudi te Velde regards this as likely; to me this is quite plausible. Since Thomas regarded Avicenna as one of the philosophers, this interpretation would still be consistent with his claim in *De potentia* about Avicenna, though not about Plato and Aristotle.[47] If, however, in the *Summa* Thomas does not attribute a doctrine of creation either to Plato or to Aristotle, what does he say in later texts?

Two interesting texts dealing with this are to be found in Thomas's slightly later commentary on book 8 of the *Physics*, *lectio 2* and *lectio 3*, which work Torrell dates in 1268-69. At the very least, in both of these texts Thomas attributes the causation of *esse* to Aristotle's God. In the first, Thomas offers another very brief recapitulation of the early philosophers' thinking concerning this:

The ancient natural philosophers were unable to arrive at the first cause of the whole of *esse* [*totius esse*], but considered the causes of particular changes. Among these the first considered the causes only of accidental changes, and held that every *fieri* is an *alterari*. Those who came after them arrived at a knowledge of substantial changes; but the last of them, such as Plato and Aristotle, arrived at a knowledge of the principle of the whole of *esse*.[48]

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[47] Gilson, *Le thomisme*, 155-56. See te Velde, *Aquinas on God*, 136. Te Velde also writes that "it was Avicenna who introduced the notion of creation into metaphysics by distinguishing between the possible essence of finite things and their actual existence, which they receive from the First Cause," and cites Gilson, *Le thomisme*, 155.

[48] VIII *Phys*., lect. 2, n. 975 (*In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio* [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1954]): "quia antiqui naturales non potuerunt pervenire ad causam primam totius esse, sed considerabant causas particularium mutationum. Quorum primi consideraverunt causas solarum mutationum accidentalium, ponentes omne fieri esse alterari: sequentes vero pervenerunt ad cognitionem mutationum substantialium: postremi vero, ut Plato et Aristoteles, pervenerunt ad cognoscendum principium totius esse."

At the very least, in this passage Thomas indicates that Plato and Aristotle arrived at a knowledge of the First Principle as the cause of all *esse*. Yet, as Johnson acknowledges, he does not explicitly say here in so many words that Aristotle taught creation.[49]

In the second text from this commentary, Thomas notes that Aristotle maintains that certain things have always existed and are nonetheless caused, such as a triangle which always has three angles equal to two right angles and which has a cause of this eternal property. Thomas then writes:

Therefore just as some things are always true and nonetheless have a cause of their truth, so too Aristotle thought that certain things were always existing, namely heavenly bodies and separate substances, and nonetheless had a cause of their existence.[50]

Then Thomas adds:

From this it is evident that while Aristotle posited an eternal world, he did not, however, believe that God is not the *causa essendi* for the world itself, but only a cause of its motion, as certain ones have said.[51]

In these texts from his commentary on the *Physics*, therefore, Thomas does attribute to Aristotle the view that God is the cause of *esse* for the eternally existent world. Nonetheless, in neither of them does he state explicitly that Aristotle's God produced the world from nothing whatsoever.

Johnson cites two texts from Thomas's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, which dates from the early 1270s, perhaps beginning in 1270-71, and which may have been completed in Naples in 1272. The first is taken from the commentary on book 2, chapter 1, and the second from the commentary on

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[49] Johnson, "Did Saint Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?", 150. Also see Dewan, "Thomas Aquinas, Creation, and Two Historians," 366 and n. 10.

[50] VIII *Phys.*, lect. 3, n. 996: "Sicut igitur aliqua sunt semper vera et tamen habent causam suae veritatis, ita Aristoteles intellexit quod essent aliqua semper entia, scilicet corpora caelestia et substantiae separatae, et tamen haberent causam sui esse."

[51] Ibid.: "Ex quo patet quod quamvis Aristoteles poneret mundum aeternum, non tamen credidit quod Deus non sit causa essendi ipsi mundo, sed causa motus eius tantum, ut quidam dixerunt."

book 6, chapter 1. In these texts Thomas again finds Aristotle holding that the heavenly bodies are caused not merely in terms of their motion but also in terms of their *esse* or, according to the second text, in terms of their substance.[52]

In chapter 9 of his *De substantiis separatis* (dating from the second half of 1271 or thereafter), Thomas again details a series of steps through which human ingenuity only gradually passed in investigating the origin of things. A first group of philosophers thought that the origin of things consists in nothing but accidental changes. For things to be made is nothing other than for them to undergo alteration, whereas the substance of things, which these philosophers called matter, was viewed as a completely uncaused first principle. These philosophers were unable to transcend the distinction between substance and accidents in their thinking. A second group succeeded in investigating the origin of substances themselves, and held that some substances have a cause of their existence (*esse*); but being unable to grasp things beyond the corporeal, they resolved corporeal substances into corporeal principles from which other bodies arise by condensation and separation to account for their origin. Later philosophers advanced to a third stage and reduced sensible substances into the parts of their essence, that is, to matter and form, so that natural things are made through a certain change as matter is subjected to different forms alternatively.

But, continues Thomas, as he now introduces for the first time what appears to be a fourth stage, Plato and Aristotle

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[52] For these see II *Metaphys.*, lect. 2, n. 295. Here Thomas finds Aristotle referring to the eternal principles of those things that always exist, that is, the principles of the heavenly bodies, which Thomas comments must be most true: "Secundo, quia nihil est eis causa, sed ipsa sunt causa essendi aliis." And as regards the heavenly bodies he adds: "quae etsi sint incorruptibilia, tamen habent causam non solum quantum ad suum moveri, ut quidam opinati sunt, sed etiam quantum ad suum esse, ut hic Philosophus expresse dicit." In VI *Metaphys.*, lect. 1, n. 1164, where Thomas again is referring to certain completely immobile and immaterial causes which are causes of the heavenly bodies and, he now says, are "causae entium secundum quod sunt entia" he adds: "Ex hoc autem apparet manifeste falsitas opinionis illorum, qui posuerunt Aristotelem sensisse, quod Deus non sit causa substantiae caeli, sed solum motus eius." On these texts see Johnson, "Did St. Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?", 146-48.

found it necessary to posit a higher way of being made. Since the first substance must be most simple, it cannot be thought to participate in *esse,* but is existing *esse* itself (*ipsum esse existens)*. And because self-subsisting *esse* must be unique, all other things that fall below it exist only insofar as they participate in *esse.* Therefore, there must be a general resolution by the intellect of all such things into what we may call intrinsic principles, or as Thomas puts it, "into that which they are and their act of existing" (*in id quod est et in suum esse*). Therefore, he concludes, "above the mode of being made whereby something is made because a form is introduced into matter, one must presuppose another origin for things according to which *esse* is given to the entire universe of things by the first being which is its own act of existing."[53]

Unlike in the troublesome text from question 44, article 2 of the *Prima Pars*, here Thomas distinguishes Plato and Aristotle from all lower stages of philosophy, and places them in the highest stage. What remains unclear, however, is exactly how much of his complete metaphysics of essence and *esse* and participation in *esse* he believes is really present in Plato and Aristotle, and how much of what he has said in this paragraph is owing to what may be called "reverential interpretation" whereby he reads his personal metaphysics into the thought of respected authorities from the past. Be that as it may, farther on in this same chapter, while responding to certain arguments offered by those who would not recognize this higher mode of production beyond any kind of change, Thomas explains that in this type of production, because no motion or change is involved, the influence of the agent and the existence of the effect are simultaneous, and so it is possible for such an effect to be produced and to have always existed. To illustrate this he notes that the truth of principles is the cause of the truth of

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[53] *De sub. separ.*, c. 9 (Leonine ed., 40D:57.78-118). Note especially: "Oportet igitur communem quandam resolutionem in omnibus huiusmodi fieri, secundum quod unumquodque eorum intellectu resolvitur in id quod est et in suum esse; oportet igitur supra modum fiendi quo aliquid fit forma materiae adveniente, praeintelligere aliam rerum originem, secundum quod esse attribuitur toti universitati rerum a primo ente quod est suum esse" (Leonine ed., 40D:57.110-18).

conclusions that are always necessary, since there are certain necessary things that have a cause of their necessity according to Aristotle in book 5 of the *Metaphysics* (see 1015b 9) and book 8 of the *Physics* (see 252a 32-b 6). And then he writes:

It should not be thought, therefore, that because Plato and Aristotle held that immaterial substances or also heavenly bodies have always existed that they denied for them a cause of existing [*causam essendi*]; for it was not in positing uncreated things of this kind that they deviated from the position of the Catholic Faith, but because they held that they have always existed.[54]

Here Thomas assigns to Plato and Aristotle recognition of a higher kind of production of things beyond any based on change, that is to say, a production of heavenly bodies and separate substances in terms of their *esse*.

At the same time, one might still ask whether this is enough to prove that he assigns a doctrine of creation to them in the sense of producing something from nothing whatsoever. The text just cited could be interpreted in that way, as Johnson and Dewan do, since it denies that they held that immaterial substances and heavenly bodies were uncreated; yet what Thomas's argumentation has really shown is that Plato and Aristotle assigned a cause of existing to account for them. Thus Johnson acknowledges that Thomas does not here explicitly say that they held the doctrine of creation, but regards it as a "fair inference" from what Thomas does say.[55] Dewan, in his critique of Pegis, cites a number of texts from *De substantiis separatis* to support the view that Thomas does indeed assign a doctrine of creation to Plato and to Aristotle. But throughout this discussion, he seems to assume that according to Thomas a *causa essendi* is necessarily a creative cause.[56] It is this assumption that I want to examine in the following section.

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[54] Ibid. (Leonine ed., 40D:58.180-222: "Non ergo aestimandum est quod Plato et Aristotiles, propter hoc quod posuerunt substantias immateriales seu etiam caelestia corpora semper fuisse, eis subtraxerunt causam essendi; non enim in hoc a sententia catholicae fidei deviarunt quod huiusmodi posuerunt increata, sed quia posuerunt ea semper fuisse" (Leonine ed., 40D:58.215-21).

[55] Johnson, "Did Saint Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?", 152.

[56] Dewan, "Thomas Aquinas, Creation, and Two Historians," 374-87. For his discussion of c. 9 see 380ff.

V. Is a *causa essendi* Necessarily a Creative Cause?

If the answer to this is affirmative—that for Thomas a *causa essendi* necessarily is a creative cause—then the texts we have examined so far would indicate that he attributes a doctrine of creative causality to Plato and to Aristotle and, moreover, would reinforce Thomas's personal claim that creation can be demonstrated philosophically. Some caution, however, seems to be advisable concerning this. We have already seen in question 44 of the *Prima Pars* the distinction between his effort in article 1 to prove that things other than God are all produced or efficiently caused by him and his subsequent claim in article 2 that matter is created by God. Again, in chapter 15 of book 2 of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Thomas offers a series of arguments to prove that all things other than God depend upon him for their existence (*esse*). But there, too, he then judges it necessary to prove in the following chapter that God produces things other than himself from no preexisting subject such as matter and, therefore, that he creates them.[57]

Moreover, after having entertained with Peter the Lombard in his commentary on book 2 of the *Sentences* the philosophical possibility that God could use a creature as an instrumental cause in creating (although to say that God actually did so is heretical according to the Christian faith), Thomas subsequently strongly rejects the view that this is even possible. For instance, in question 45, article 5 of the *Prima Pars* he writes: "To produce *esse* in the unqualified sense, and not insofar as it is 'this' or 'thus', belongs to the nature of creation. Therefore it is evident that creation is an action that is proper to God himself."[58]

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[57] *ScG* II, c. 15 (*Summa contra Gentiles* [Rome: Ed. leon. manualis, 1934], 101). See also near the end of c. 16 Thomas's citation of Genesis 1 ("In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram"), and his comment on this: "Nihil enim est aliud creare quam absque materia praeiacenti aliquid in esse producere" (Leonine manual ed., 103). For an interesting discussion of some of the arguments offered in c. 16 see N. Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas's Natural Theology in "Summa Contra Gentiles II"* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 70-87.

[58] *STh* I, q. 45, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 4:469): "Producere autem esse absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem creationis. Unde manifestum est quod creatio est propria actio ipsius Dei." For Thomas's apparent openness to Peter's view as

When it comes to Thomas's explanation of the relationship between God and created causes, he always maintains that *esse* is the proper effect of God; he does at times indicate, however, that while created agents cannot produce *esse* by acting as principal or first causes, nonetheless, in some way they can be used as instrumental causes by God, not in creating, to be sure, but in preserving or conserving beings in existence.

Thus in chapter 66 of book 3 of the *Summa contra Gentiles* Thomas writes that lower agents do not give *esse* except insofar as they act by divine power. The implication is that in some cases lower agents do cause *esse*, not as their proper effect, but only by acting by the power of God. In one of his arguments Thomas reasons that if *esse* is an effect that is common to all agents, it follows that created agents can produce it "only insofar as they are ordered under the First Agent and act under its power."[59] And again he writes that "*esse* is that which second agents produce by the power of the First Agent."[60] In another argument he reasons that *esse* is the first of all effects, since all other things are determinations of it. "Therefore it is the proper effect of the First Agent, and other things produce it insofar as they act in virtue of the First Agent." And he adds that second-dary agents, which particularize and determine as it were the action of the First Agent, produce as their proper effects other perfections which determine *esse*.[61]

This text is important because it distinguishes between the proper effects of second causes—the production of perfections

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defensible, see II *Sent*., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3 (Mandonnet ed., 2:22). For his fluctuation about this see IV *Sent*., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3, resp. and ad 5 (*Scriptum super sententiis*, M. F. Moos, vol. 4 [Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1947], 209, 210-11). For a brief but helpful commentary see J. de Finance, *Être et agir dans la philosophie de saint Thomas* (Rome: Université Pontificale Gregorienne, 1960), 142-44.

[59] *ScG* III, c. 66 (Leonine manual ed., 299) (first *"Amplius"*): "Cum igitur esse sit communis effectus omnium agentium, nam omne agens facit esse actu; oportet quod hunc effectum producunt inquantum ordinantur sub primo agente, et agunt in virtute ipsius."

[60] Ibid., (second *"Amplius"*): "Igitur esse est quod agentia secunda agunt in virtute agentis primi."

[61] Ibid. (*"Item"*): "Igitur esse est proprius effectus primi agentis, et omnia alia agunt ipsum inquantum agunt in virtute primi agentis. Secunda autem agentia, quae sunt quasi particulantes et determinantes actionem primi agentis, agunt sicut proprios effectus alias perfectiones, quae determinant esse."

that determine and particularize *esse* (which I take to be substantial and accidental forms)—and the production of *esse*— the effect that is proper to God which some created agents cause only by acting with the power of God or, as one might put it, as instrumental causes of God. This point is reinforced by Thomas's discussion in question 3, article 7 of *De potentia*. There he explains how God operates in four ways in the operations of created agents. In the fourth way, Thomas writes in accord with the physics of his day, no purely natural cause can exercise causality with respect to a species of lower things except insofar as it acts through the power of (as an instrument of) a heavenly body. And of greater interest to us, he also notes that a created agent cannot exercise causality with respect to *esse* except through the power of God, which is for him to say that it acts in this capacity only as an instrumental cause.[62]

Furthermore, in question 104, article 1 of the *Prima Pars*, where Thomas argues that creatures are conserved in existence (*esse*) by God, Cornelio Fabro finds confirmation of Thomas's developed thinking about the causality exercised by a created agent with respect to the *esse* of a material being. There Thomas explains that a creature so depends upon its conserving cause that without that cause it would cease to exist. He calls upon a distinction between a cause of a thing's becoming (*causa fiendi*) and a cause of its existing (*causa essendi*). If a created cause and effect belong to the same species, the cause can only cause a form of the same kind to be present in this matter, and will be a cause of becoming. If, however, the created cause belongs to a

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[62] *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 7 (Marietti ed., 58): "Hoc ergo individuum agendo non potest constituere aliud in simili specie nisi prout est instrumentum illius causae, quae respicit totam speciem et ulterius totum esse naturae inferioris. Et propter hoc nihil agit ad speciem in istis inferioribus nisi per virtutem corporis caelestis, nec aliquid agit ad esse nisi per virtutem Dei." For discussion see John Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 184-88, and the references given there in n. 42 to F. X. Meehan, *Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1940), 292-301; C. Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1961), 397-404; J. Aertsen, *Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 314ff; and R. te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1995), 164-75.

higher species than the effect, then it can cause the form of the effect insofar as it is that kind of form, and will not only be a cause of becoming but a cause of existing of that effect. In accord with the physics of that time, Thomas writes that heavenly bodies are causes of the generation of lower bodies that differ from them in species, and therefore are *causae esssendi* with respect to them.[63]

Finally, in article 2 of this same question Thomas asks whether God conserves every creature immediately. He notes that some effects depend upon a created agent for their *esse*. While God immediately creates all things, in conserving them he has established an order such that certain creatures depend upon created agents for being conserved in existence, whereas God is their primary and principal conserving cause.[64] These texts strongly suggest that one should not immediately assume that for Thomas to refer to something as a cause of existing is always equivalent to referring to it as a creating cause. Nor should it be thought that he denies that created agents can cause existence in any way, as many Thomistic scholars have maintained.[65]

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[63] For Fabro see *Participation et causalité*, 377-80. For Thomas see *STh* I, q. 104, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 5:464). Note in particular: "Sed aliquando effectus non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eamdem rationem secundum quam est in agente: sicut patet in omnibus agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem; sicut caelestia corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium secundum speciem. Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum rationem talis formae, et non solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac materia: et ideo est causa non solum fiendi, sed essendi."

[64] See *STh* I, q. 104, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 5:467): "Invenitur etiam quod ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse. Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima; secundario vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima causa est effectus conservativa; secundario vero omnes mediae causae, et tanto magis quanto causa fuerit altior et primae causae proximior. Unde superioribus causis, etiam in corporalibus rebus, attribuitur conservatio et permanentia rerum: sicut Philosophus dicit, in XII *Metaphys.*, quod primus motus, sicut diurnus, est causa continuitatis generationis; secundus autem motus, qui est per zodiacum, est causa diversitatis quae est secundum generationem et corruptionem. Et similiter astrologi, attribuunt Saturno, qui est supremus planetarum, res fixas et permanentes.—Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus conservat res quasdam in esse, mediantibus aliquibus causis."

[65] For a detailed discussion and refutation of this claim see John Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on Creatures as Causes of *esse*," in idem, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II*.

VI. SPECIAL CASES: THE PRODUCTION OF IMMATERIAL
SUBSTANCES AND OF HEAVENLY BODIES

In chapter 10 of his *De substantiis separatis*, Thomas criticizes the Avicennian view that God can produce only one immediate effect—the first intelligence—and creates all subsequent effects only mediately through a descending series of caused agents. There Thomas again distinguishes between two kinds of production, one that involves motion and change, and another that does not. As regards the first kind of production, he notes that other things may proceed from the First Principle by means of second (created) causes. Thus plants and animals are brought into existence by motion in collaboration with the powers of higher causes in ordered fashion leading back to the First Principle. But in the second kind of production, which occurs through a simple influx of *esse* without motion, this is impossible; for what is produced in this case not only becomes *this* being, but an *ens simpliciter.* This kind of production is reserved for the universal cause of existing, that is to say, for God alone, and it is known as creation. And it is only in this way, Thomas indicates, that immaterial substances can be produced, as well as heavenly bodies, since he and his contemporaries thought that they, too, were incorruptible.[66] And so he concludes: "It follows that all immaterial substances and heavenly bodies that cannot be produced in existence through motion have God alone as the author of their *esse.*"[67] As Thomas also puts it: "No agent after the first [agent] produces an entire thing in *esse* as if to produce an *ens simpliciter per se*

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[66] *De sub. separ.*, c. 10 (Leonine ed., 40D:60.89-98): "Possunt igitur per mutationem vel motum aliqua produci in esse a primo principio mediantibus causis secundis; sed eo productionis modo qui fit absque motu—qui creatio nominatur—in solum Deum refertur auctorem. Solo autem hoc modo produci possunt in esse immateriales substantiae, et quorumcumque corporum materia ante formam esse non potuit, sicut dictum est de materia caelestium corporum quae non est in potentia ad aliam formam."

[67] Ibid. (Leonine ed., 40D:60.98-101: "Relinquitur igitur quod omnes immateriales substantiae et caelestia corpora quae per motum produci non possunt in esse, solum Deum sui esse habent auctorem."

et non per accidens—which is to create."[68] I conclude from this that in the case of immaterial substances (angels) and of heavenly bodies, Thomas maintains that the only way in which such entities can receive their *esse* is by being created. They cannot be brought into existence by a process of generation or by any kind of motion or change. In their case, therefore, to receive their *esse* from something else *is* for them to be created. And in their case although not necessarily in other cases, for someone to prove that they receive their *esse* is to prove that they are created. And for Thomas to credit Plato and Aristotle with having held that separate substances and/or heavenly bodies receive their *esse* from God is for him to attribute to both of them a doctrine of creation at least of other separate substances and heavenly bodies.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that Thomas thinks that creation taken strictly as the production of something from no preexisting subject and as distinguished from creation with a temporal beginning can be demonstrated by natural reason, and therefore that it should be regarded as another preamble of faith. It also seems clear from this study of Thomas's various references to the views of Plato, Aristotle, and Avicenna that at least in some texts Thomas held that some philosophers had arrived at a knowledge of God as the universal cause of *esse* and also at a knowledge of creation. As already mentioned above, this in turn is only further confirmation for his view that the reality of creation can be demonstrated philosophically. As has also been noted above, at times Thomas clearly distinguishes between his proof that all things other than God depend upon him for their existence and his proof that God creates all things other than himself (see, for

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[68] Ibid. (Leonine ed., 40D:60.122-25: "et sic nullum agens post primum totam rem in esse producit quasi producens ens simpliciter per se et non per accidens—quod est creare, ut dictum est."

instance, *ScG* II, cc. 15 and 16). Hence I would suggest that he regards both of these as preambles of faith.[69]

There is another aspect of Thomas's understanding of creation that I have not considered in the present study, although I have dealt with it at some length elsewhere. This is his spirited philosophical defense of God's freedom to create or not to create. Limitations of space will not permit me to take up that topic here, and so I would simply refer the reader to my other treatments of this for my understanding of Thomas's views. My conclusion there is that Thomas maintains that God's freedom to create or not create is a truth that can be demonstrated philosophically and hence, I would suggest, is also a preamble of faith that follows from still another, the presence of will in God.[70]

At the beginning of this paper I referred to Robert Sokolowski's emphasis on the importance for Christian thinking of the distinction between God and the world. Thomas Aquinas would certainly support him on this point and often appeals to his own understanding of the difference between self-subsisting *esse*, on the one hand, and every being in our universe, on the other hand, in which there is a distinction and composition of essence and *esse,* in order to bring this out. Thomas also brings this out in another way by holding that God himself does not fall under the notion of being (*ens commune*) that is the subject of metaphysics, but is considered by this science only as the principle and cause of what does fall under being in general (*ens commune*). Moreover, and with ever increasing frequency in his more mature writings, Thomas constantly contrasts God as the unparticipated being and all other things that only participate in *esse* or, as he also puts it, the difference between God as the

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[69] This would be a fuller justification for my inclusion of both of them in my list of the preambles in "Thomas Aquinas on Philosophy and the Preambles of Faith," as propositions 11 and 12 on p. 220.

[70] See John Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on God's Freedom to Create or Not," in idem, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II*; as well as John Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on the Ultimate Why Question: Why Is There Anything at All Rather Than Nothing Whatsoever?", *The Review of Metaphysics* 60 (2007): 737-47, reprinted as chapter 4 in *The Ultimate Why Question: Why Is There Anything at All Rather than Nothing Whatsoever?*, ed. John Wippel (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 84-106.

only being which exists *per essentiam* and everything else which exists only by participating in *esse*. If Thomas at times speaks of *esse commune*, or the act of existing insofar as it is viewed universally, he sharply distinguishes this from self-subsisting *esse* (or God). Indeed, he also denies that God falls under or participates in *esse commune*.[71] Creatures, on the other hand, do participate in *esse commune* in that each one shares in particular fashion in the act of existing viewed universally. And creatures also participate by imitation and assimilation in *esse subsistens*. God, of course, participates in neither. He simply is *esse subsistens*.

<center>APPENDIX</center>

The distinction between holding that it cannot be demonstrated that the world began to be and asserting that an eternal world is possible was important not only for Thomas, but also for some of his contemporaries, especially for Giles of Rome. Giles himself underwent a censure by and expulsion from the Theology Faculty at Paris in March 1277 for his defense of and refusal to retract 51 theses taken from his commentary on book 1 of the *Sentences*, which dates from the early 1270s. These theses have been discovered in the form of an *apologia* in a manuscript from the library of Godfrey of Fontaines, edited, and thoroughly investigated by Robert Wielockx in his *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia III.1 Apologia* (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 1985). Giles would not be readmitted to the Theology Faculty and given permission to teach there until 1285, and then only owing to papal intervention. In propositions 30, 31, and 50 of his *Apologia*, Giles maintains that some creature could have existed from eternity and that God could have made the world from eternity (see pp. 55 and 59 for the texts and 139-45 for commentary by Wielockx). These propositions, therefore, were judged worthy of censure

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[71] For relevant texts and discussion of Thomas's refusal to include God under *ens commune* see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 14-22; on God and *esse commune* see ibid., 114-17, 122-23.

by the Theological Faculty in March 1277. In his second and definitive redaction of his commentary on book 2 of the *Sentences* (completed many years after its original oral presentation in the early 1270s), Giles distinguishes three possible positions. One might claim: (1) that the eternity of the world is possible, or (2) that one cannot demonstrate the impossibility of an eternal world, or (3) that the impossibility of an eternal world has not yet been demonstrated. Giles comments that he does not defend the first assertion although certain remarks he had made at some time or other (*aliquando*) for the sake of disputation might have given that impression; nor does he even defend the second position. He only claims that no one has yet demonstrated that an eternal world is impossible (see II *Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, q. 4, a. 2 [Venice, 1581; repr. Frankfurt, 1968], 54-70). It should also now be noted that in a *reportatio* preserved in a Munich manuscript of his commentary on book 2 of the *Sentences* recently edited and introduced by Concetta Luna, Giles is reported to have held: "Propter hoc aliter dicendum quod potuit mundus esse ab aeterno, non tamen potuerunt esse infinitae animae." See her *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia: III.2 Reportatio Lecturae Super Libros I-IV Sententiarum. Reportatio Monacensis; Excerpta Godefridi de Fontibus* (Florence: Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2003), 45:52-53.

"AND SO HE REVEALED HIS GLORY": CANA AND THE SACRAMENTALITY OF MARRIAGE[1]

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I N AN OFT-QUOTED TEXT the Second Vatican Council's Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation teaches that "the study of the sacred page is, at it were, the soul of sacred theology."[2] Such a statement points to the primacy of Scripture in the council's program of *ressourcement*. It also suggests that the sacred text along with Sacred Tradition is the life force or animating principle of the theological enterprise as a whole insofar as God's personal self-communication known as revelation is communicated in it.[3] Conversely, it can be taken to

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[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Academy of Catholic Theology Annual Conference, Washington, D.C. on May 23, 2012. I have benefited from many helpful comments and suggestions made by those present. This paper was given as part of a twofold presentation with the exegetical study on John 2:1-11 of the same name by Fr. William Kurz, S.J. which has not yet been published. I am also particularly indebted to Fr. Kurz, William Mattison, and Lawrence Welch for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

[2] *Dei verbum* 24. The citation is from *The Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (Piscataway, N.J.: New Century Publishers, 1966), 127.

[3] This self-communication takes the form of both deeds and words (*Dei verbum* 2) and finds its culmination in the person of Christ (*Dei verbum* 4). This personal act of God in revealing himself calls for an equally personal response on the part of the human being in the assent of faith (*Dei verbum* 5). Revelation is therefore mediated by Scripture and sacred Tradition but is not simply identical to it. As Joseph Ratzinger, commenting on Bonaventure's concept of revelation observes, for the Seraphic Doctor, "it would have been impossible to refer to Scripture simply as 'revelation,' as is the normal linguistic use today. Scripture is the essential witness of revelation, but revelation is something alive, something greater and more: proper to it is the fact that it arrives and is perceived—otherwise it could not have become revelation. Revelation is not a meteor fallen to earth that now lies somewhere as a rock mass from which rock samples can be taken and submitted to the laboratory analysis. Revelation has instruments; but it is not separable from the living God, and it always requires a living

indicate that when theological concepts are severed from this animating principle they can wither and become shrunken and deformed, being reduced to mere human formulations or cultural constructs.

One area in which evidence of such a rupture can be found is in some recent theological treatments of the sacramentality of marriage. The utilization of modern critical methods of biblical study challenged the sometimes facile attempts by earlier Catholic theologians to point to specific texts in the New Testament as proofs of Christ's institution or elevation of marriage to the status of a sacrament. It is true that read through the lens of historical critical study, the New Testament does not yield a definitive proof text to which one can point as the occasion on which this elevation occurred.[4] But some modern historically grounded approaches have gone further, positing a wide divergence between the early Church's understanding and practice of marriage and that which emerged in the High Middle Ages. In this view marriage in the New Testament and early Christian era was understood as a largely secular, human relationship celebrated within a familial context as opposed to a sacral event conducted under ecclesial control, as in the medieval Church.

A full consideration of this disconnect between Scripture and current sacramental theology created by certain historical critical approaches to marriage in the New Testament and the early Christian era exceeds the scope of this study. However, a case in point of this trend is provided by the treatment of the account of the wedding feast of Cana in the Gospel of John

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person to whom it is communicated" (Joseph Ratzinger's *Milestones: Memoirs 1927-1977*, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998], 127); see also his habilitation thesis, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1989). A merely historical approach to the text of Scripture fails to discern this dynamic reality of God's self-disclosure which the text mediates. It is for this reason that Pope Benedict XVI insisted on the need to recognize the limitations of historical approaches to the biblical text (even while affirming their import). On this see the "Foreword" written by Benedict XVI in Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI, *Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguation*, trans. Adrian J. Walker (New York: Doubleday, 2007), xv-xxiii.

[4] On this see Walter Kasper, *Theology of Christian Marriage*, trans. David Smith (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 28.

(John 2:1-11). It appears that the recognition that one cannot point to this text as a proof text for Christ's institution of marriage as a sacrament, coupled with historical assumptions about the status of marriage in early Christianity, has led the authors of a number of recent theological works on marriage to ignore the text altogether. This is unfortunate as the Cana account offers a rich theological treatment within the horizon of the Fourth Gospel which can shed light on aspects of what the later theological tradition came to identify as belonging to the sacramentality of marriage.[5] This study will argue that a balanced theological exegesis of John 2:1-11 confirms the best insights of the tradition: that Christ acts in a transformative way in marriage conforming the couple to his Cross and his own eschatological union with the Church, and that these insights safeguard the reality of marriage from reduction to a purely human reality which can be reshaped by cultural forces.

This essay will proceed by first briefly outlining the eclipse of Scripture in some recent Catholic theological treatments of marriage with particular reference to the Cana account in John 2. It will then contrast this apparent neglect with some of the key insights of early Christian and Scholastic teaching regarding this text: that Christ is present and active in the celebration of marriage, that marriage is ordered to the cross, and that marriage itself points to the eschatological wedding banquet. These insights will then be shown to find support in more theologically informed exegeses of the text of John 2:1-11 within the Fourth Gospel itself and in the wider horizon of the New Testament. This rapprochement of Tradition and Scripture in regard to this specific text can make a contribution to overcoming the neglect of biblical texts and categories in recent theological treatments of marriage.

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[5] The term "tradition" as used here includes the teaching of theological authorities such as the Church Fathers and Scholastic doctors and not simply sacred Tradition identified by the Second Vatican Council as (together with Scripture) the source through which divine revelation is transmitted (see *Dei verbum* 8-10).

I. THE NOT-SO-GREAT DIVORCE: THE SEPARATION OF SCRIPTURE AND THE THEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE

Among the most influential early attempts to apply the insights of modern historical critical study to marriage within the Catholic tradition was that by the Dutch scholar Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P. His two volume "dogmatics of marriage" entitled *Marriage: Human Reality, Saving Mystery* appeared against the backdrop of the renewal of theology and biblical studies inaugurated at the Second Vatican Council.[6] In this work Schillebeeckx argued that marriage in the Scriptures and in the early Church: "was regarded . . . as a family affair. . . . in the case of marriages between two Christians, clerical intervention was regarded as superfluous. All of this goes to show that marriage was above all seen as a secular reality which had to be experienced 'in the Lord.'"[7] According to biographer Erik Bourgman, for Schillebeeckx, the Church's "jurisdictional monopoly in matrimonial matters" was a much later innovation (beginning in the eleventh and twelfth centuries) which later became a "theological thesis."[8] In making this argument Schillebeeckx had in view the situation of the Dutch Church of his own day, which increasingly understood marriage in more secular terms and was at the epicenter of the emerging Catholic debate over the liceity of contraception.[9]

This line of argument concerning the essential secularity of marriage in the Scriptures and early Christianity has been continued more recently in the work of theologians such as Michael Lawler. For Lawler, marriage in the Scriptures is a "prophetic sign" of God's covenant with his People and this is

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[6] The Dutch original *Het Huwelijk: aardse werkelijkheid en heilsmysterie* appeared in the fall of 1963. The English translation was published two years later: see Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P., *Marriage: Human Reality, Saving Mystery*, vols. 1 and 2, trans. N. D. Smith (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1965).

[7] Schillebeeckx, *Marriage*, 245; cf. 194.

[8] This is the assessment of Erik Bourgman *Edward Schillebeecks: A Theologian in His History* (New York: Continuum, 2006), 214.

[9] See ibid., 276-79.

true of the New Testament as much as the Old. Marriage in the Bible is a "truly human, and therefore truly secular, reality."[10] This secular reality was overlaid by competing cultural views of the essence of marriage harmonized by Gratian: the Roman position that the consent of the couple caused the marriage and the Northern European view of sexual intercourse as its essence.[11] To this Trent would add "the entirely novel form" of solemnization.[12] But, in essence, Christian marriage is no different from human marriage: "*Christian* marriage is that very same human marriage perceived and lived into faith as a prophetic symbol-sacrament of the steadfast and graceful communion between God and God's people and between Christ and Christ's Church."[13]

In this reading of early Christian marriage as essentially secular, the treatment of the wedding feast of Cana can serve as a kind of case in point. For Schillebeeckx the text in the Gospel of John "should not be seen first and foremost as a sign of the Christianisation of secular marriage, but rather in the prophetic

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[10] See Michael Lawler, *Secular Marriage, Christian Sacrament* (Mystic, Conn.: Twenty-Third Publications, 1985), 20. The term "secular" as used in these discussions is somewhat misleading. It is true that marriage in the Scriptures (both OT and NT) and in the early Church was typically celebrated in a familial setting rather than an explicitly religious one such as the Temple, a synagogue, or a church. However, insofar as marriage was understood to be comprised of a covenant oath sworn before God, it was understood as a primarily religious reality and was therefore not "secular" in our contemporary sense of that term. On the importance of covenant in biblical and early Christian conceptions of sex and marriage see John S. Grabowski, *Sex and Virtue: An Introduction to Sexual Ethics* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 29-48. On the "religious" (though familial) character of pagan Roman marriage in general see Joseph Martos, *Doors to the Sacred: A Historical Introduction to Sacraments in the Catholic Church* (New York: Image, 1991), 344-46. For a specific example of this religious character of Roman marriage see John Cavidini's analysis of Augustine's critique of pagan religion and marriage customs in book 6 of the *Confessions* in his study "Feeling Right: Augustine on the Passions and Sexual Desire," *Augustinian Studies* 36 (2005), 207-9.

[11] See Lawler, *Secular Marriage*, 6-12.

[12] Ibid., 41. While Lawler here acknowledges that this change was "well within the powers of the Church to make" (40) elsewhere he argues for its reversal: "The time has come for Catholic theology to assert the inalienable validity of every human marriage, including the validity of the marriages of baptized persons outside of the canonical form" (Michael Lawler, *Symbol and Sacrament: A Contemporary Sacramental Theology* [Omaha: Creighton University Press, 1995], 208).

[13] Lawler, *Symbol and Sacrament,* 215.

tradition as an 'image-in action' here on earth of the inception of the messianic wedding feast. . . . Jesus' aim, by his presence at the wedding at Cana, was to describe the kingdom of God prophetically as a wedding feast."[14] The text therefore tells us nothing about Christian marriage *per se* and does not contribute to the later understanding of its sacramentality. More recent treatments of the theology of marriage influenced by Schillebeeckx's argument place even less emphasis on this text. Lawler focuses on the "household codes" (particularly Eph 5:21-33) and the Synoptic divorce texts for his analysis of New Testament teaching on marriage—Cana is not considered.[15] Other contemporary treatments of marriage also largely ignore this text from the Fourth Gospel.[16]

The fruit of this reading of marriage as an essentially secular and human reality has been a marked shift in the conception of marriage. If marriage is a merely human relationship which arises from the cultural matrix in which it occurs, then it follows that the Church should adapt its teaching on marriage to reflect changes in this matrix. Hence for Lawler, the Church ought to reconsider its positions on indissolubility (for example, admitting divorced and remarried persons to the sacraments), cohabitation (approving "nuptial cohabitators" and incorporating them into the liturgy through a betrothal ceremony), and same-sex marriage (blessing the union of same-sex couples who

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[14] Schillebeeckx, *Marriage*, 109.

[15] See Lawler, *Secular Marriage*, 11-20. The same holds for Lawler's later reworking of this material in *Marriage and Sacrament: A Theology of Christian Marriage* (Collegeville, Minn.: Michael Glazier, 1993), 41-49. See also Lawler, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 179-92.

[16] Thus the massive three-volume historical study by Theodore Mackin, S.J., *Marriage in the Catholic Church* (vol. 1, *What Is Marriage?* [Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1982]; vol. 2, *Divorce and Remarriage* [Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1984]; and vol. 3, *The Marital Sacrament* [Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1989]) does not contain a single reference to John 2:1-11.

There are exceptions to this trend of neglect, however. For example see Peter Elliott, *What God Has Joined: The Sacramentality of Marriage* (New York: Alba House, 1990), esp. 19, 26-27; and Jean-Philippe Revel, *Traité des sacrements. VII: Le marriage; Sacrement de l'amour* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2012), esp. 67-68. While these works engage the text of Cana they are, in my view, too sanguine about the value of Schillebeeckx's historical work on marriage.

manifest "sexual orientation compatibility").[17] Such proposed changes radically reconfigure marriage by reconceiving its permanence, necessity, and heterosexual nature respectively. While a logical outcome of the premise that marriage is an essentially secular phenomenon arising from and reflecting particular cultural patterns, this position radically alters not only natural marriage but sacramental marriage which is based upon it.

II. CANA WITHIN THE TRADITION: THE MORE EXCELLENT WINE

An alternative to this apparent reduction of marriage to a human institution within changing cultural matrices is provided by the patristic and medieval articulation of a theology of marriage based on the biblical witness. Again, the focus of this present study is on the text of John 2:1-11 rather than the whole of biblical teaching on marriage as utilized by the tradition. But among the key aspects of the tradition's engagement with this text are three rather basic points: the presence and transforming activity of Christ in marriage, the ordering of marriage to the cross within the larger context of sacramental theology, and the eschatological ordering of marriage.[18]

A) *Christ's Transforming Presence and Action in Christian Marriage*

It is important to recall that the Fathers did not sharply distinguish between natural and sacramental marriage, as Scholastic and modern theology has tended to do.[19] Indeed according

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[17] See Michael Lawler, *Marriage and the Catholic Church: Disputed Questions* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 2002), 92-116, 162-91; and Todd Salzman and Michael Lawler, *The Sexual Person*: *Toward a Renewed Catholic Anthropology* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 140-61, 197-213, 228-35.

[18] This is not intended as an exhaustive summary of the content of patristic and medieval commentary on this text. Rather the particular points made here are offered as key ideas important to emerging conceptions of the sacramentality of marriage which find support in the text of John's Gospel itself.

[19] Reflective of this development, the *Code of Canon Law* (can. 1055) says this of natural marriage: "The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish

to Walter Kasper it was a kind of "secularization" of worldview which distinguished the created order from a uniformly sacral view of the universe which made possible the distinction of the *Septarium* or seven sacraments from other less fundamental rites, rituals, and devotions in the Western medieval Church.[20] Hence terms used by early Christianity which are commonly rendered as "sacrament" (i.e., *mysterion* or *sacramentum*) actually betray a fairly wide range of meaning, some of which correspond to the later articulations of sacramental theology and some of which do not.[21] Likewise, these same writers did not always see a marked difference between the relationship between man and woman established and blessed by God in the opening chapters of Genesis and marriage "in the Lord" between baptized Christians.[22] After all, it was God himself in

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between themselves a partnership of the whole life, is by nature ordered toward the good of spouses and the procreation and education of offspring." The essential properties of this union are unity and indissolubility (see can. 1056). When this covenant is validly entered into by two baptized persons it is also a sacrament because "this covenant between baptized persons has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament" (can. 1055). The citations are from the *Code of Canon Law: Latin-English Edition*, trans. Canon Law Society of America (Washington, D.C.: Canon Law Society of America, 1983), 387.

[20] As Kasper expresses it: "It should, however, be clear that the fact that marriage was not until that time explicitly regarded as a sacrament did not mean that it was on the contrary seen, until about the twelfth century, simply as a secular reality and only later sacralized. The very opposite is true. The whole of reality, including marriage, was regarded almost without question as sacral, and it was only as a result of the long and difficult controversies that took place in the eleventh and twelfth centuries following the Gregorian reform of the Church, that the latter became free from involvement in the dynastic structure and political order of the Carolingian and Ottonian empire and its overemphasis of the sacral nature of reality. It was at this time that the process of secularization first began, and it was only after this secular view of reality was firmly established that individual signs and rites could be presented as sacraments. The conscious appreciation of marriage as a sacrament, then, presupposes its desacralization and recognition as a reality of creation" (*Theology of Christian Marriage*, 32).

[21] See, for example, Joseph Leinhard, S.J., "*Sacramentum* and the Eucharist in Saint Augustine," *The Thomist* 77 (2013): 173-92.

[22] The phrase is that of Saint Paul in 1 Corinthians 7:39d (NAB) and seems to designate the marriage between two baptized Christians. At least one key distinction of such a marriage is identified by Paul himself—it cannot be broken by divorce (as opposed to marriages where only one of the parties is a baptized believer; see 1 Cor 7:10-16). On this see Elliott, *What God Has Joined*, 46-47. For a balanced and fairly comprehensive overview of NT teaching concerning marriage as a whole see Francis

the person of his Word who brought the world into existence and who restored it in the Incarnation.[23] The Word, through whom male and female were created and united through marriage in Genesis, is the One who visits the marriage celebration at Cana.

The Fathers' more characteristic concerns were with the holiness of Christian marriage, the reflection of this holiness in the wedding celebrations of their day, and the moral responsebilities that follow from the celebration of this "great mystery" (cf. Eph 5:32).[24] It was to support and explicate these concerns that they typically turned to the text of John 2:1-11.[25] Yet in their preaching and commentary on the text, it is apparent that they believed that Christ's presence and activity at Cana had ongoing significance for the celebration of marriage in their own day in a number of distinct ways.

Martin, "Marriage in the New Testament Period," in *Christian Marriage: A Historical Study*, ed. Glenn W. Olsen (New York: Crossroad, 2001), 50-100.

[23] This is a central theme of Athanasius's treatise *De incarnatione verbe dei* (c. 318), though it is articulated with reference to human nature as a whole rather than marriage in particular. See especially chapters 2 and 3 of this work (which deal with "the divine dilemma and its solution in the Incarnation"). However, Athanasius does make the connection to Cana at the end of chapter 3: "Again, consider the miracle at Cana. Would not anyone who saw the substance of water transmuted into wine understand that He who did it was the Lord and Maker of the water that He changed?" *De incarnatione verbi dei* 3.18 (*PG* 25:128). The quotation is from *Saint Athanasius on the Incarnation*, trans. and ed. a religious of C.S.M.V. (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary, 1982), 47.

[24] Modern readers might be thus tempted to characterize the thrust of the Fathers' teaching on marriage as "pastoral," but this can imply a dichotomy between truth and life which would also be foreign to their outlook.

[25] However, the Cana episode could be invoked to support more doctrinal and polemical points. Thus Irenaeus cites John's account of the miracle as an example of the Fourth Gospel's refutation of Gnostic beliefs. While Christ could have produced the wine from nothing, instead the Lord chose to use an element of the material creation to work this sign: "Thus he showed that God who made the earth, and commanded it to bring forth fruit, and established the waters, and brought forth the springs, also in these last times through his Son gives to the human race the blessing of food and the favor of drink, the incomprehensible [acting] through the comprehensible and the invisible through the visible, since there is none beyond him, but he is in the bosom of the Father" (Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses*, 1.11.5 [*PG* 7:461]). The quotation is from *Early Christian Fathers*, ed. and trans. Cyril Richardson et al. (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 381. Likewise Theodoret, writing against Gnostic opponents of marriage, saw the "new wine" of Cana as Christ's own gift of marriage. See his *Haereticum fabularum compendium* 5.25 (*PG* 83:537).

In a number of cases Cana is evoked as an instance of Christ's own example and teaching of virtue. Thus Epiphanius sees Christ's action as aimed at teaching temperance and overcoming the carnal state of marriage:

For there was a real wedding there, in Cana of Galilee, and water which really became wine <and Christ> was invited for two purposes. [One was] to dry the wetness of the world's carousers up, <through> marriage to a state of temperance and decency. [The other was] to cheer what was wanting in good spirits through cheering wine, and through grace.[26]

John Chrysostom sees Christ's presence at the wedding feast to be an example of his humility: "just as he condescended to accept the form of a servant, so he did not hesitate to come to the marriage of servants."[27] Christ's example and teaching of virtue at the wedding celebration therefore provides a theological rationale in other of Chrysostom's homilies for the reverence of its celebration as a "mystery," an image of the union of Christ and the Church.[28]

But Christ's action at Cana was not merely a past event whose value was pedagogical and moral, it was also an invitation for future couples to seek his transforming activity in their own wedding celebrations. Thus Chrysostom also uses Cana to exhort couples in his congregations to shun lavish displays of wealth and bawdy songs in their wedding celebrations:

If you drive away the other things, Christ himself will come to your wedding, and where Christ goes the angels' choir follows. If you ask Him, He will work

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[26] Epiphananius, *Adversus haereses Panarium* 51.30 (*PG* 41:941). The translation is from *The Panarion of Epiphinarius of Salamis Books II & III*, trans. Frank Williams (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 62.

[27] *Hom. In Io.* 21.1 (*PG* 59:129). The translation is from Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of John Chapters 1-5*, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. and James A Weisheipl, O.P., introduction and notes by Daniel Keating and Matthew Levering (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 134.

[28] See *Epistolam ad Colossenses Homilia 12* (*Homily 12 on Colossians* [on Col 4:18]) (*PG* 62:387). On the sacramentality of the love of husband and wife within the Christian household in Chrysostom's thought see John Cavadini, "The Sacramentality of Marriage in the Fathers," *Pro Ecclesia* 17 (2008): 444-48.

an even greater miracle than he worked in Cana: that is, He will transform the water of your unstable passions into the wine of spiritual unity.[29]

In other homilies he goes on to specify that the way that those preparing to marry can invite Christ is by inviting the poor and members of the clergy to their wedding celebrations.[30] Cana thus provides a textual referent for a growing ecclesial locus of marriage in the Eastern Church.[31] More than this, it reflects the theological conviction that Cana was not merely a miracle which occurred at the outset of Jesus' ministry. Rather it was an indication and pledge of his presence and transforming activity in the future weddings of his disciples as well. Like other Fathers of the Church, Chrysostom sees the biblical text as descriptive of the reality of the Church's liturgical worship in his own day.[32]

Still other patristic authorities view this transforming effect in more sweeping and permanent terms. Cyril of Alexandria sees Christ's presence at the wedding feast as indicating his

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[29] *Epistolam ad Colossenses Homilia 12* (*Homily 12 on Colossians* [on Col 4:18]) (*PG* 62:389). The quotation is from *On Marriage and Family Life*, trans. Catherine Roth and David Anderson, ed. Catherine Roth (Crestwood, N.Y.: Saint Vladimir's, 1986), 78.

[30] See *In Illudi* (Sermon 1 on Marriage) (*PG* 51:210).

[31] This early ecclesial locus for marriage in the East is overlooked by Schillebeeckx in his argument for the "secularity" of marriage in early Christianity. Ignatius of Antioch emphasized the importance of episcopal permission for two Christians to marry (*Letter to Polycarp* 5.2). Chrysostom's homilies cited above give witness to the growing impetus for couples to secure the presence and blessing of a priest. The rite of crowning of newly married couples in the liturgy after their wedding at around the same time also gives evidence of the ecclesial weight of marriage. By the seventh century the whole of the marriage celebration in the East had been moved into the Church. On this progression see Catherine Roth, "Introduction," in Roth, ed., *On Marriage and Family Life*, 12-13; Elliott, *What God has Joined*, 77. Cf. the analysis of the Byzantine marriage rite provided by Mark Searle and Kenneth Stevenson in *Documents of the Marriage Liturgy* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 6-7, 55-56.

[32] Adam Cooper sees this method of reading biblical texts through the lens of liturgical worship as characteristic of patristic exegesis. Though he makes the point with regard to Cyril of Alexandria's understanding of the Eucharist, he sees it as illustrative of a wider approach. He writes of "an apparently conscious dialogue between his [i.e., Cyril's] sacramental experience in worship and his engagement of the historical details of Christ's life and ministry as recorded in the Church's scriptures" (Adam Cooper, *Life in the Flesh: An Anti-Gnostic Spiritual Philosophy* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 77-81, at 81).

blessing and sanctification of the very beginnings of human generation.[33] Augustine holds that Christ came to the wedding feast to assure us that marriage was his own institution "to confirm conjugal chastity, *and to show forth the sacrament of marriage.*"[34] While current scholarship has highlighted the range of meaning in Augustine's use of the term *sacramentum*, in regard to marriage it refers primarily to the indissoluble bond which cannot be broken even by civil divorce.[35] For Augustine even the bond between unbelievers is rightly regarded as unbreakable, but marriage among Christians can be dissolved only by death.[36] Such a bond is a reflection of the union

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[33] "Many most excellent things were accomplished at once through the one first miracle. For honourable marriage was sanctified, the curse on women put away (for no more *in sorrow* shall they *bring forth children,* now Christ has blessed the very beginning of our birth), and the glory of our Saviour shone forth as the sun's rays, and more than this, the disciples are confirmed in faith by the miracle" (Cyril of Alexandria, *In Ioan.* 2.1 [*PG* 73:224]). The translation is from Cyril of Alexandria, *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, Library of the Fathers vol. 43, trans. P. E. Pusey (Oxford, 1874), 157. Emphasis in the original.

[34] The original reads "et ostenderetur sacramentum nuptiarum" (*In Ioannis evangelium tractatus* [*Tractates on John*] 9.2 [*CCSL* 36:91]). The translation is from *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, first series, vol. 7, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. John Gibb, (Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1888), 63; emphasis added. Elsewhere he notes that the fact of Christ's presence at the wedding feast justifies the effort to explain why marriage is itself good. See *De bono conjugali*, 3 (*PL* 40:375).

[35] The previous consensus among scholars was that the term *sacramentum* in Augustine's day had the meaning of a sacred oath and so here indicates the unbreakable bond which unites the couple in marriage. See Émile de Backer, "Tertullien," in *Pour l'hstoire du mot "Sacramentum,"* ed. Jospeh de Ghelnick et al. (Paris: É. Champion, 1924), 66-71; and David Hunter, "General Introduction," *Marriage and Virginity*, part 1 vol. 9 of *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century* (Hyde Park: N Y: New City Press, 1999), 18. More recent scholarship has highlighted the range of meaning in Augustine's use of the term. On this see Leinhard, "*Sacramentum* and the Eucharist in Saint Augustine." Yet Leinhard's argument refers to Augustine's theology in general and his theology of the Eucharist in particular. In the case of marriage the *bonum sacramenti* in Augustine's writings seems to refer to an unbreakable bond between the couple which reflects and participates in that between Christ and the Church. Cavadini goes so far as to argue that there is continuity between Augustine's usage and the later Scholastic view of marriage as an efficacious sign ("The Sacramentality of Marriage," 454). Cf. Emile Schmitt, *Le Mariage chrétien dans l'oeuvre de Saint Augustin: Une théologie baptismale de la vie conjugale* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1983), 298-301.

[36] On the indissolubility of even natural marriage see *De bono conjugali*, 7 (*PL* 40:378); on the indissolubility of marriage "in the city of God" see *De bono conjugali*,

between Christ and the Church.[37] The Cana account thus points to the goodness of sexual reproduction and the permanence of the bond of marriage.

Aquinas, drawing on this patristic testimony, sounds a number of these themes in his own commentary on the text of Cana. Echoing Chrysostom, Aquinas sees in Christ's presence at the wedding feast a demonstration of his humility: "For among his other acts of humility, the Son of the Virgin came to a marriage, which he had already instituted in paradise when he was with his Father. Of this example it is said: 'learn from me, for I am gentle and humble of heart' (Mt. 11:29)."[38] Furthermore, this first of his miracles was performed "in order to confirm his teaching, and in order to demonstrate the divine power that was his" as well as to refute the teaching of those who deny the goodness of marriage.[39] But to these ideas he joins a more fully articulated theology of marriage as a sacrament which derives its efficacy from the cross and orders us to eschatological beatitude.

B) *The Ordering of Marriage to Christ on the Cross*

In the understanding of the Fathers, the reality of Christ's presence in the Incarnation was continued in the liturgical life and worship of the Church. Speaking of the mode of Christ's presence after his ascension, Pope Leo the Great could therefore write: "What was visible in Christ has passed over into the sacraments of the Church."[40] This "incarnational" view of sacramental efficacy was developed further in Scholastic teaching.

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15 and 24 (*PL* 40:385 and 394). In this last text Augustine draws a parallel between the bond of Christian marriage and the permanence of the sacrament of orders.

[37] Cf. *De nuptis et concupiscentia* 1.10.11 (*PL* 44:420).

[38] Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of John,* 134.

[39] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 43, a. 3. The citation is from the Blackfriars edition, vol. 53 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), 113. Subsequent references to the *Summa Theologiae* proper will be to this edition.

[40] Leo the Great *Sermon 74,* 2 (*PL* 54:398). The quotation is from Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P., *Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1963), 45. It should be recalled that by "sacraments" Leo has in mind more than the seven signs which would later be identified as such by the Church.

For Aquinas, the visible signs of the sacraments together with the sacramental words have their "sanctifying cause" in "the Incarnate Word."[41] This is because his human nature was united to the person of the Word in such a way that his humanity was able to manifest his divinity.[42] This is precisely what Aquinas sees displayed in Christ's miracles, the first of which was worked at Cana.[43] This efficacy is extended in space and time in the sacraments of the Church.[44] As the divine Word is joined to sensible human flesh in the mystery of the Incarnation, so in the sacraments the sacramental words (the form) are added to a sensible sign (the matter) to enable it to communicate sanctifying grace.

But Aquinas is more specific about the relationship between the Incarnation and human sanctification effected through the sacraments. While the whole of Christ's life, death, and resurrection in varying ways cause the salvation of the human race,[45] this is accomplished in a particular way by the Passion.[46] Thus the sacraments, as the principal means by which this salvation is communicated to us, also have a particular connection to Christ's Passion. As Aquinas puts it, "in a special way the sacraments of the Church derive their power from the Passion of Christ."[47] Hence through the reception of the sacra-

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[41] *STh* III, q. 60, a 6.

[42] Benoît-Dominique de la Soujeole, O.P. refers to this as the "entitative sacramentality" of Christ. See his fine study "The Economy of Salvation: Entitative Sacramentality and Operative Sacramentality," *The Thomist* 75 (2011): 537-53 (esp. 543-46).

[43] Speaking of Cana as the first of Christ's miracles, Aquinas states, "it was proper that he should so demonstrate his divinity by miracles that men would believe in the reality of his humanity" (*STh* III, q. 43, a. 3).

[44] De la Soujeole calls the efficacy displayed in the miracles that Christ worked as well as that manifested in the sacraments "operative sacramentality" ("The Economy of Salvation," 545-46).

[45] So, for example, Aquinas sees Christ's resurrection as the efficient and exemplar cause of our own resurrection (cf. *STh* III, q. 56, a. 1, ad 3) and his ascension as also an efficient cause of our salvation (cf. *STh* III, q. 57, a. 6, ad 10).

[46] See the discussion of the efficiency and effects of the passion in *STh* III, qq. 48-49.

[47] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 5. Cf. *STh* III, q. 61, a. 3, ad 3; and q. 64, a. 3. For an examination of the significance of this teaching for Aquinas's understanding of the moral life see Thomas P. Harmon, "The Sacramental Consummation of the Moral Life according to Thomas Aquinas," *New Blackfriars* 91, no. 1034 (2010): 465-80.

ments, Christians receive in a very direct way the manifold effects of the Passion—deliverance from sin and its punishment, deliverance from the devil, reconciliation with God, and access to heavenly beatitude.[48] Aquinas sees this sacramental efficacy as signified by the blood and water which flowed from the side of Christ on the cross.[49]

What is true of the seven sacraments in general is also true of marriage in particular. In his early commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*, Aquinas treated the relationship between marriage and the Passion of the Lord. While the other sacraments are conformed to Christ's Passion through participation in its pain, this cannot be true of marriage in which the pleasure of sexual intercourse is typical to the state that follows the reception of the sacrament.[50] Marriage, however, can be said to be conformed to the Passion of Christ not through pain, but through his great charity, "whereby He suffered for the Church who was to be united to Him as His spouse."[51] In spite of its uniqueness, marriage is therefore like the other sacraments in drawing its efficacy principally from the cross.[52]

Thus Aquinas builds on the patristic testimony concerning the presence and transforming activity of Christ in Christian marriage. Marriage derives its efficacy from the Incarnate Word hypostatically joined to the humanity of Christ as disclosed through the whole of his life, particularly the intensity of love manifested in his Passion. When viewed in this light the Passion itself can be understood as nuptial—the act of Christ the

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[48] See *STh* III, q. 62, a. 5; cf. *STh* III, q. 49.

[49] Though these signs primarily point to the principal sacraments of the Eucharist and baptism respectively. See *STh* III, q. 62, a. 5.

[50] For Aquinas, as for other Scholastic theologians, while intercourse is not the cause of the sacrament nor a necessary consequence of it, it is typical to its lived expression. See the material from Aquinas's commentary on the *Sentences* in *Summa Theologica*, *Supplementum*, q. 42, aa. 1 and 4; q. 46, a. 2; q. 48, a. 1. See the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948), vol. 3. References to the *Supplementum* are to this edition.

[51] *STh Suppl.*, q. 42, a. 1, ad 3.

[52] It should be noted that in making this connection between the sacraments in general and marriage in particular to the Cross, Aquinas does not explicitly cite the text of John 2:1-11. However, as will be shown below, this connection corresponds very well with the Fourth Gospel's theology of "signs," including the specific sign at Cana.

Bridegroom laying down his life for his bridal Church.[53] As such, both the Passion and Christian marriage which reflects it look forward to the eschatological fulfillment of the sacramental economy in the wedding feast of the Lamb.

C) The Eschatological Ordering of Marriage

In the teaching of Aquinas every sacrament has three aspects:

> the actual cause of our sanctification, which is the Passion of Christ; the form of our sanctification, which consists in grace and the virtues; and the ultimate end of our sanctification, which is eternal life. . . . Hence as a sign a sacrament has a threefold function. It is at once commemorative of that which has gone before, namely the Passion of Christ, and demonstrative of that which is brought about in us through the Passion of Christ, namely grace, and prognostic, i.e., a foretelling of future glory.[54]

Marriage therefore not only derives its efficacy from the Passion like the other sacraments, it also has an eschatological dimension, ordering us to the heavenly beatitude of Christ's wedding banquet. The precise way in which it does this is not fully developed by Aquinas. As will be seen below, his thought does point to the idea that each sacrament confers graces that are distinctive to it. It is likely that the eschatological dimension of marriage and how the sacrament orders us to it would have been more fully developed had Aquinas been able to complete the *Tertia pars* of his *Summa theologiae*. Some intimation of the direction this development would have taken might be found in the treatment of the love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) in the

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[53] That Aquinas is aware of this connection can be seen in his understanding of the connection of the Eucharist to marriage. He states, "And Matrimony, is connected with this sacrament, at least in its meaning, to the extent that it signifies the union between Christ and the Church, and the sacrament of the Eucharist is a figure of this union. That is why Saint Paul tells us that *this mystery is great, but I speak in regard of Christ and the Church*" (*STh* III, q. 65, a. 3).

[54] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 3.

earlier parts of the *Summa*, insofar as this love is at the heart of both marriage and the life of grace.[55]

That Aquinas remained aware of this eschatological referent of marriage is corroborated by his *Commentary on the Gospel of John*.[56] Commenting on the text of Cana, Aquinas moves from the Gospel account to what is signified by marriage in the economy of salvation as a whole:

In the mystical sense, marriage signifies the union of Christ with his Church, because as the Apostle says: "This is a great mystery: I am speaking of Christ and his Church" (Eph. 5:32). And this marriage was begun in the womb of the Virgin, when God the Father united a human nature to his Son in a unity of person. So the chamber of this union was the womb of the virgin: "He established a chamber for the sun" (Ps. 18:6). Of this marriage it is said: "The kingdom of heaven is like a king who married his son" (Mt. 22:2), that is, when God the Father joined a human nature to his Word in the womb of the Virgin. It was made public when the Church was joined to him by faith: "I will bind you to myself in faith" (Hos. 2:20). We read of this marriage: "Blessed are they who are called to the marriage supper of the Lamb" (Rev. 19:9). It will be consummated when the bride, i.e., the Church, is led into the resting place of the groom, i.e., into the glory of heaven.[57]

While these remarks do not serve to specify further the exact manner in which the grace of the sacrament of marriage orders those who receive it to the eschaton, it makes clear that part of what marriage signifies is eschatological—the final nuptial union of Christ and the Church.

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[55] See, for example, the analysis of love and its effects in *STh* I-II, q. 28, aa. 1-3. On the centrality of friendship in human moral living and the role of the virtues in capacitating us for it see Paul Wadell, *Friends of God: Virtues and Gifts in Aquinas* (New York: Peter Lang, 1991); and David Gallagher, "Person and Ethics in Aquinas," *Acta Philosophica* (Rome) 4, (1995): 51-71. For an excellent study of friendship in marriage in the thought of Aquinas see Thomas Petri, O.P., "Locating a Spousal Meaning of the Body in the *Summa Theologiae*: A Comparison of a Central Idea Articulated in the Theology of the Body by Pope John Paul II with the Mature Work of Saint Thomas Aquinas," S.T.D. Diss. (The Catholic University of America, 2010) especially chapter 7.

[56] Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., locates the composition of this commentary between 1270 and 1272, shortly before the end of Aquinas's life. See *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, *The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 199.

[57] Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, 133.

III. Text and Tradition in Dialogue

The insights found in patristic and Scholastic engagement with the text of the Cana account—at once simple and profound—are not impositions on the horizon of the Fourth Gospel by later commentators and theologians. A careful reading of John's account within the framework of the Gospel and the wider New Testament witness indicates that these ideas are indeed found within the biblical text. This section aims to demonstrate that the use of the Cana episode by patristic and medieval authors considered above, while at times joined to a spiritual reading of the Scriptures or undertaken in the service of a more fully elaborated sacramental theology, generally proceeded as an elaboration of the text's own ideas and thought world.

A) Christ's Transformative Action at Cana: He Revealed His Glory

To turn to the first of these insights considered above, it is clear that the Gospel itself highlights Christ as the principal actor in the drama surrounding the wedding feast. Mary might be presented as a catalyst and an intercessor in the text, but even as an intercessor she points those around her to her Son: "Do whatever he tells you" (John 2:5b). The decisive action in the passage, the transformation of the water into the more excellent wine, is the work of Jesus.[58] The concluding verse of the text (2:11) highlights the effect of this sign. As William Kurz observes:

The same verse 11 further states the reason why the Cana wedding sign enabled the disciples to believe in Jesus: because it "*manifested* [or revealed] *Jesus' glory.*" . . . The context of this account is transposed beyond a historical

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[58] Cf. William Kurz, S.J., "And So He Revealed His Glory: Cana and the Sacramentality of Marriage" (unpublished paper), 7, commenting on Mary's intercession described by *CCC* 2618. For a more extensive study of the presentation of Mary in John 2:1-11 and its reception within the tradition see Francis Martin, "Mary in Sacred Scripture: An Ecumenical Reflection," *The Thomist* 72 (2008): 525-69.

wedding to the beginning of the eschatological fulfillment of the purpose why the Word, the Son of God, "became flesh and dwelt among us" (John 1:14)—namely, so that we could see his glory (John 1:14).[59]

This "first of his signs" (John 2:11) is thus the action of the preexistent divine Word acting in space and time to create faith in his followers.[60]

But Christ's activity in the text effects the transformation of more than merely water into wine. The words of Mary to the servants "Do whatever he tells you" (John 2:5) recall Pharaoh's words to his people regarding Joseph in Exodus 41:55.[61] This fact, along with the cryptic mention of "the third day" (John 2:1), has led some scholars to suggest the giving of the Torah in Exodus as interpreted in Jewish liturgical worship as the primary allusive backdrop for John's text.[62] Christ's revelation of his glory at Cana thus parallels the theophany of Yahweh's descent on Mount Sinai in Exodus 19. Given this background, it follows that that which is transformed by this revelation of Christ's glory is the whole of the Mosaic law and ritual. It is noteworthy that the text refers to "six stone jars" used for "Jewish ceremonial washings" (cf. John 2:6). The number six in the Scriptures often carries overtones of incompleteness and imperfection.[63] In this case it bespeaks the radical incompleteness the Jewish cult as opposed to the efficacy of Jesus' cross and baptism (cf. John 3:5-6). Jesus' action at the wedding feast thus anticipates the transformation of the Mosaic Law in the

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[59] Kurz, "And So He Revealed His Glory," 3.

[60] On the function of signs as causes of faith in the Fourth Gospel see ibid., 3-6.

[61] Cf. ibid., 6.

[62] On this see in particular J. Potin, *La Fête juive de la Pentecôte: Étude des textes liturgiques. I Commentaire, II Textes, Lectio Divina 65a, 65b* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1971). A helpful overview of evidence for this reading is provided by Martin, "Mary in Sacred Scripture," 530-35.

[63] On the number six as indicative of "incompleteness, imperfection and even evil" in biblical literature see Adela Yarbro Collins, *The Apocalypse*, New Testament Message Series 22 (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), 97. She makes this comment in a discussion of the number 666 as a designation for the beast of Revelation. One can find the same dynamic at work in the numerical ordering of the days of creation in the Priestly account of Genesis 1:1–2:4a.

New Law, made available through his death and resurrection and the gift of the Holy Spirit.[64]

Included among the elements of the Old Testament cult and legislation here transformed by Christ is marriage itself. This contention is supported by a number of factors. First, scholars have argued that the Exodus theophany which Cana evokes was itself understood in nuptial terms by rabbinic commentators. Mary's direction to the servants at the wedding "do whatever he tells you" (John 2:5) also echoes the threefold assent of the people of Israel to the terms of Yahweh's covenant—"all that the Lord has said we will do" (Exod 19:8; 24:3, 7)—which has been understood as effecting a marital relationship between Yahweh and his people.[65] Such an association is buttressed by the widespread use of marriage as a covenant symbol in the teaching of the prophets, particularly Hosea, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. Second, the wider context of New Testament teaching, particularly the divorce texts of the Synoptic Gospels, make clear Jesus' prophetic challenge to and repudiation of the concession allowing divorce in Deuteronomy 24:1-4. John does not allude to Jesus' teaching on divorce as do the other evangelists, but instead depicts his transformation of marriage in more dramatic and symbolic form. Third, there is the obvious fact that it is a wedding celebration that is the setting and locus for this decisive first revelation of Jesus' glory in the Fourth Gospel. Hence marriage itself is among those aspects of Jewish cult symbolized in the incompleteness of the six stone jars now transformed by the presence and action of Christ at Cana.

Thus the insight of the tradition, inchoate in the Fathers but articulated more definitively in Scholastic teaching—that Christ transforms the very nature of marriage—has a basis in John's presentation of the Cana event in his text. Marriage in which Christ is present is as qualitatively different from that of the Old Covenant as the "new wine" is superior to the water which preceded it.

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[64] Cf. Martin, "Mary in Sacred Scripture," 535.
[65] See the rabbinic and modern authorities cited in ibid., 532.

B) *Cana as a Revelation of Jesus' Cross/Glorification*

As Kurz points out, this first of Jesus' signs in the Fourth Gospel, "initiated or at least foreshadowed Jesus' 'hour' that had been willed and established by the Father, when Jesus' glory will be fully revealed through his crucifixion and exaltation."[66] This is true of the signs in general as well as the Cana event in particular. The sign at the wedding feast both anticipates and participates in Jesus' definitive glorification. The narrator's comment in verse 11 says as much, but this connection is underscored also by Jesus' allusion to his "hour" and his designation of his mother as "woman" (*gynai*)—the same term with which he will address her at the zenith of this hour from the cross (John 19:26-27).[67] In fact, a careful reading shows that there are numerous parallels between the Cana episode and John's description of the Passion later in the Gospel, reinforcing the connection that the Gospel makes between the two events.[68] For the Fourth Gospel the full meaning of what occurs at the wedding feast is disclosed in the cross and resurrection in its final chapters.

The teaching of Aquinas noted above, that the sacraments of the Church derive their efficacy from the Passion, thus receives support from the Johannine understanding of signs. This is not to identify John's notion of sign with that of later sacramental theology.[69] For Aquinas a sacrament has a "specific connection to the sacred, namely that of a sign" which causes sanctity in the

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[66] Kurz, "And So He Revealed His Glory," 4.

[67] Cf. ibid., 5.

[68] A more complete list of these parallels would include the following: "the mother of Jesus" (2:1) and "his mother" (19:25); "woman" (2:4) and "woman" (19:26); "no wine" (2:3) and "common wine" (19:29); "my hour" (2:4) and "from that hour" (19:27); "six stone jars" (2:6)   and "a vessel" (19:29); "water" (2:7) and " blood and water" (19:34); "and so revealed his glory" (2:11) and "An eyewitness has testified and his testimony is true" (19:35); "and his disciples began to believe in him (2:11) and "so that you may come to believe" (19:35). I am indebted to Michael Waldstein for pointing me toward these parallels.

[69] It should be noted that Aquinas is clearly aware that Jesus' "hour" referenced in John 2:4 refers to his Passion as he cites the text as evidence that Christ dies at a suitable time of his own volition. See *STh* III, q. 46, a. 9.

recipient.[70] Such signs are ordered to the worship of God and the sanctification of men[71] and are comprised of both words which are their form and sensible things which are their matter.[72] This is a fully developed and philosophically elaborated understanding of sacramental signification which goes beyond, without violating, the framework of the Gospel's witness.[73] Aquinas's teaching completes a trajectory already found within the teaching of the Fourth Gospel.

Aquinas also notes that marriage is unique among the sacraments as it belongs to the natural law, insofar as human reason is directed to it through the inclination toward the procreation of offspring and the inclination to live in society.[74] But marriage is most perfect as a sacrament since it was instituted by Christ to provide a remedy against the power of sin.[75] In his early work Aquinas rejected the ideas that marriage merely foreshadows grace or serves only as a restraint on concupiscence.[76] Christ's act of joining the Christian couple to his Passion transforms marriage—both as a natural reality and as a "sacrament of the Old Law."[77] In his mature teaching on

[70] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 1.

[71] Cf. *ST* III, q. 60, a. 5.

[72] Cf. *STh* III, q . 60, a. 7.

[73] It can be argued that the biblical theology of marriage as a covenant provided the soil out of which the Church's sacramental theology of marriage later grew. On this see Grabowski, *Sex and Virtue*, 45. There may be a similar organic development in the relation between the biblical—particularly Johannine—conception of signs (even if not always the particular sign of Cana) and later sacramental theology. However, tracing such lines of development exceeds the scope of this study.

[74] Cf. *STh Suppl.*, q. 41, a. 1.

[75] Cf. *STh Suppl.*, q. 42, aa. 2-3.

[76] Rather, with Bonaventure (IV *Sent.*, d. 26), he views as more probable the opinion that: "matrimony inasmuch as it is contracted in the faith of Christ, is able to confer the grace that enables us to do those works that are required in matrimony . . . since wherever God gives the faculty to do a thing, He also gives the helps whereby man is enabled to make becoming use of that thing" (*STh Suppl.*, q. 42, a. 3). Elliott points out that this is superior to the position of the Scotists who identified sacramental grace as an aspect of sanctifying grace. For Aquinas, sacramental grace is distinct from the sanctifying grace from which it flows as a kind of infused habit. This opens the way for a treatment of the distinctive character of the grace of each sacrament even though in the case of marriage this was not completed in the *Summa Theologiae*. See Elliott, *What God Has Joined*, 98-99.

[77] Cf. *STh Suppl.*, q. 42., a. 3.

the sacraments in the *Summa theologiae* he holds that this grace is more than a mere *remedium concupiscentiae* and even "over and above" the communication of "grace as commonly defined" and the virtues and gifts of grace, it confers a "special kind of divine assistance in attaining the end of the sacrament concerned."[78] In the case of marriage this means that this grace empowers the couple to do the good works necessary to their state.[79] As noted above, the precise form that this grace takes is not fully specified in part due to the unfinished treatment of the sacraments in the *Summa theologiae*.

C) *Cana and the Wedding Supper of the Lamb*

Aquinas's association of the wedding of Cana with the economy of salvation and its nuptial conclusion in the wedding feast of the Lamb has an extensive provenance in patristic and earlier medieval sources.[80] Modern scholars will tend to view this association as an appeal to the "spiritual sense" of the text[81] or as requiring the support of other key biblical texts such as Ephesians 5:21-33 where nuptial symbolism is more explicitly applied to the relationship of Christ and the Church.[82] It is true that the description of the "great mystery" in Ephesians does much to provide "the missing logical steps between the marriage at Cana as the first of Jesus' signs, to human marriage as a two-in-one union, to the Church as being in a two-in–one union with Christ as his Bride."[83]

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[78] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 2.

[79] This idea is present even in Aquinas's early work. See *STh Suppl.*, q. 42., a. 3.

[80] See the extensive overview of sources provided by Martin, "Mary in Sacred Scripture," 556-59.

[81] Cf. Martin, "Mary in Sacred Scripture," 540.

[82] See Kurz, "And So He Revealed His Glory,"12-16.

[83] Ibid., 17. In particular this text provides a linguistic bridge between the biblical theology of the covenant and later sacramental theology since the word *mysterion* in Ephesians 5:32 was rendered as *sacramentum* by the ante-Niceaen authors of the western Church. See Grabowski, *Sex and Virtue*, 43. Furthermore, it supplies an even stronger theological basis for the later tradition's notion of the sacramental efficacy in marriage by its designation of Christ's sacrificial love (*agape*) as the animating principle of the relationship between Christian spouses (cf. Eph. 5:25, 28).

But is there a foundation for this association in the text itself? It would seem that there is. The designation of Mary as "woman" noted above evokes not only her appearance in John's Passion narrative, but also the "woman" of Genesis and hence her role as the New Eve in the economy of salvation.[84] The relationship between Mary and Christ thus becomes "nuptial"— at least in a spiritual sense.[85] She becomes a type of the bridal Church. Furthermore, the Fourth Gospel itself will describe Jesus and his mission in nuptial terms. John the Baptist identifies himself as the male attendant or "best man" of Christ the Bridegroom (cf. John 3:27-30) in his mission from the Father. On the basis of this adamic and nuptial language in the Gospel one can make connections to the nuptial imagery of other Johannine texts such as the eschatological wedding feast of the Lamb in Revelation 19:7-9 on historical-critical as well as canonical grounds.[86] Such a connection is reinforced by the Church's liturgical worship insofar as texts like Revelation 19 were read Eucharistically as well as nuptially within the early Church.[87] All of these considerations suggest that Aquinas's invocation of the "mystical" sense of the Cana account is not wholly disconnected from the horizon and meaning of the text itself when considered in the wider context of the Fourth Gospel and the Johannine corpus.

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[84] See Kurz, "And So He Revealed His Glory," 5-6, 13; and Martin, "Mary in Sacred Scripture," 537-39.

[85] As Martin puts it: "the preceding term 'woman' should be understood as a declaration that from now on the relationship between Jesus and his mother is founded, not on the ties of human birth, but on the nature of Jesus' mission as determined by the Father. If one accepts the allusion to Eve in the term 'woman,' then Jesus' words mean that the relation is no longer son and mother but 'Adam' and 'Eve'" ("Mary in Sacred Scripture," 538).

[86] Cf. Kurz, "And So He Revealed His Glory," 14. Kurz makes this connection primarily through canonical criticism. This point does not rest upon an assumption of common authorship for the Fourth Gospel and the Book of Revelation, only that they share a common attribution in the biblical text and subsequent tradition and certain commonalities of ideas and symbols. For a nuanced and insightful discussion of theories of authorship of the book of Revelation see Ian Boxall, *The Revelation of Saint John* (London: A & C Black, 2006), 5-7.

[87] See Scott Hahn,, *The Lamb's Supper: The Mass as Heaven on Earth* (New York: Doubleday, 1999). While the book is largely a popular presentation, Hahn does collect significant patristic testimony on this association.

Pope Benedict XVI offered an elegant synthesis of these converging elements of the tradition in a homily on the text of Cana:

> he [Jesus] gives a sign which proclaims his hour, the hour of the wedding feast, the hour of union between God and man. He does not merely "make" wine but transforms the human wedding feast into an image of the divine wedding feast, to which the Father invites us through the Son and in which he gives every good thing, represented by the abundance of wine. The wedding feast becomes an image of that moment when Jesus pushed love to the utmost, let his body be rent and gave himself to us forever, having become completely one with us—a marriage between God and man. The hour of the cross, the hour which is the source of the sacrament, in which he gives himself really to us in flesh and blood, puts his body into our hands and our hearts; this is the hour of the wedding feast. . . . Jesus' hour is the cross; his definitive hour will be his return at the end of time.[88]

There is thus, for the pope, a threefold referent evoked by the text: the event in the life of Jesus already described in light of the cross, the appropriation of this event in the Church's ongoing sacramental worship, and the fulfillment of the sacramental economy in the eschatological completion of Christ's saving work. The Cana account thus sheds light on the nuptial character of the economy of salvation both in the present life of the Church and in the eschaton. As such it is a resource not just for the theology of marriage but for sacramental theology and soteriology as well.

CONCLUSION

The widespread dismissal of Cana from the elaboration of a contemporary theology of marriage is both unfortunate and unwarranted. A careful and theologically informed exegesis of the text corroborates some of the best insights of the patristic and medieval tradition: that Christ acts in marriage to transform it, that this transformation is linked to the cross, and

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[88] Pope Benedict XVI, "Homily (on John 2:4-11)" (September 11, 2006). The citation is from *The Joy of Knowing Christ: Meditations on the Gospels* (Ijamsville, Md.: The Word among Us Press, 2009), 57-58.

that it points toward the eschatological fulfillment of both marriage and the Eucharist in the wedding feast of the Lamb. As such, the text bears witness in its own way to what the author of Ephesians describes as "the great mystery" (Eph 5:32) of the union between Christ and the Church.

The evidence considered in this paper concerning the way in which the Cana account was read by the Fathers and by Scholastic authorities such as Aquinas does not support the thesis that marriage in the New Testament and early Christianity was understood as an essentially secular reality which was experienced "in the Lord." This idea put forward by Edward Schillebeeckx, and widely echoed in more recent treatments of the history and theology of marriage posits a fundamental disconnect between early Christian theology and practice and that of the medieval Church. In fact, there are already in the text of John's Gospel very strong indications of Christ's transformation of marriage (in the context of his transformation of Old Testament law and ritual), its ordering to his glorification in his cross and resurrection, and its eschatological orientation. These insights were developed in patristic preaching and catechesis and given more systematic expression in the more developed Scholastic sacramental theology. The consideration of the specific text of Cana as a kind of case study thus points to a trajectory of continuity and organic development in the unfolding theology of marriage within the tradition. The argument concerning the "essential secularity" of marriage in early Christianity overlooks this trajectory and the evidence on which it is based.[89]

The issue of the reception and use of a text such as John 2:1-11 is not of merely historical or academic interest. The reality of Christ's presence and transforming action in marriage is vital for an understanding of marriage as a sacrament. Cut off from the awareness of these truths mediated by the nourishing influence of Scripture, the horizon for considering marriage

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[89] A full examination of the adequacy of the secularity thesis would have to engage other NT texts on marriage and the history of their reception in early Christianity in a similar fashion.

shrinks. Marriage becomes another human relationship constructed from the culture around it to be approached through social scientific or anecdotal accounts of human experience. The resources available to the couple are those which they bring to the union or which their community can provide to them. The Church provides religious symbols and motivation to live out the relationship, but, in essence, its role is akin to that of any other supportive human community or agency.[90] Or more negatively, the Church can be seen as an obstacle to a more humane and inclusive view of marriage which can include those traditionally marginalized by its teaching—cohabiting couples, the divorced and remarried, or same-sex couples. Deprived of public commitment, the requirement of lasting fidelity, or the irreducible difference of man and woman, marriage loses its integrity not just as a sacrament but as the natural institution which is its basis.[91]

A careful reading of John 2:1-11 on its own terms and in the light of the Church's theological and liturgical tradition shatters this narrow horizon. In the mystery of marriage it is Christ the Bridegroom who draws near to the couple, who unites them to himself in the act of love in which he offered himself to establish the New Covenant, and who empowers them to live out their vocation as well as to prepare them for his own eternal wedding feast. The water of human endeavor is replaced by the new and surpassingly excellent wine of grace. Marriage transformed by Christ is still an opportunity for those who behold it to come to faith. In the lives of those made holy in marriage, Christ still reveals his glory.

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[90] Even some well-intentioned popular programs encourage Catholic dioceses and parishes to engage in the task of becoming "marriage-building" churches. A sacramentally realistic assessment of marriage must recognize that it is Christ within it who is the primary builder of marriage.

[91] On the integrity of natural marriage as necessary for its sacramentality in the teaching of Aquinas see Paul Gondreau, "The Natural Ordering to Marriage as Foundation and Norm for Sacramental Marriage," *The Thomist* 77 (2013): 41-69.

CAJETAN'S HARP: SACRAMENTS AND THE LIFE OF GRACE IN LIGHT OF PERFECTIVE INSTRUMENTALITY

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I T IS NO LONGER common to hear discussion of the sacraments as causes in theological circles.[1] Where the concept does resonate, moreover, it may well be associated only with a bygone theological era, in which topics like "sacramental causality" might have seemed to be little more than fodder for neo-Scholastic polemics. Upon closer examination, however, the teaching of the authentic Thomistic commentatorial tradition may be seen to represent a long and painstaking engagement with the texts of Aquinas, which has at once yielded both disagreement and deeper penetration of the mystery of *sacra doctrina*. Despite the ditch of history that may seem to separate the classical Thomistic commentators from modern concerns, the sapiential nature of the Thomistic project renders the fruit of their inquiry still ripe, with as much to say in the present as in the past.

This study concerns a particular moment within this commentatorial tradition in which a shift—or rather a development—in Thomistic doctrine can be observed in progress. As I will show, this development does not represent a departure from the thought of the Angelic Doctor, but rather parallels a development within the texts of Aquinas himself. Specifically, I will examine the doctrine of Thomas de Vio

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[1] A happy exception can be found in Romanus Cessario, "Sacramental Causality: Da Capo!" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Catholic Theology, Washington, D.C., May 22-24, 2012).

Cajetan on sacramental causality as an interpretation of Aquinas's later thought (as expressed in the *Summa Theologiae*). Unlike his Thomistic predecessors, Cajetan argued that the sacraments are instrumental efficient causes in a true and unqualified sense, able to cause even supernatural effects because of the power of the God who wields them. Although eventually adopted by the vast majority of Thomists, Cajetan's doctrine of perfective instrumental causality met with some initial disagreement within the Thomistic school.

The implications of Cajetan's interpretation will be unfolded first by examining the doctrinal disagreement on this subject between Cajetan and Sylvester de Ferrara, who represents the older Thomistic commentatorial tradition on this matter. Close attention will be paid to the role played by the doctrine of grace in this disagreement.[2] Focusing on this moment of development within the commentators highlights both the underlying textual development within the works of Aquinas and the value of Cajetan's work as an interpretation of Aquinas within the con-text of the broader Thomistic tradition. Following this, we will examine the implications of Cajetan's doctrine for contem-porary sacramental theology in light of the doctrine of sacraments as signs, comparing Cajetan's integrated approach to the signate and causal dimensions of sacramentality with that of Louis-Marie Chauvet, for whom the categories of sign and cause are necessarily opposed.[3]

I. A COMMENTATORIAL DISPUTE

A) Cajetan

In question 62 of the *Tertia Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas describes the sacraments as instrumental causes of

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[2] The importance of grace in the context of sacramental causality is accurately described by J. Gallagher. See John F. Gallagher, *Significando Causant: a Study of Sacramental Efficiency*, Studia Fribugensia New Series 40 (Fribourg: The University Press, 1965), 138-41, et al.

[3] See Louis-Marie Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence*, trans. Patrick Madigan and Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1995), 9-36, et al. See note 103.

grace, which is the final end of the sacraments.[4] He teaches that where instrumental causality of this kind is concerned, the effect is properly attributed not to the instrument, but to the principal agent whose intended finality governs and directs the movement of that same instrument towards an end. Aquinas views the relationship of the instrumental efficient cause to the finality of the principal agent as a kind of analogical participation.[5] The sacraments are real instrumental causes, yet because grace is understood most fundamentally as a participation in the divine nature, the effect of the instrumental action of the sacraments is attributable not to the instruments as such but to the principal agent, who is God himself.

When commenting on this teaching from the *Tertia Pars*, Cajetan insists that the sacraments, as instrumental causes, do not simply act as dispositions leading to the reception of grace but actually "touch" instrumentally (*attingere*) the finality of the motive action, which is sacramental grace.[6] That is to say, the finality that specifies the direction, purpose, and scope of the instrumental action is the reality of grace itself present in the person who receives the sacraments worthily.

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[4] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1. Aquinas teaches that the sacraments have a secondary end as well, which is sacramental character (*STh* III, q. 63).

[5] "Proprie loquendo, neque instrumentum est causa univoca neque aequivoca. Posset tamen reduci ad utrumlibet, secundum quod principale agens, in cujus virtute instrumentum agit, est causa univoca, vel non univoca" (IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1, ad 4). Aquinas's teaching about the analogical relationship that exists between principal and instrumental efficient causes is seen here in the *Sentences* commentary, and is clearly still operative in the *Summa*, where the instrumental cause is described as a kind of participant in the finality of the principal agent (*STh* III, q. 62, a. 1).

[6] "Dicitur quod sacramentum instrumentaliter *attingit* gratiam sacramentalem; et non oportet recurrere ad dispositionem praeviam ad gratiam" (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, n. VI [Leonine ed., 12:21]; emphasis added). In what follows, the words *attingere* and *pertingere* will be generally translated as "touch." Although both words have shades of meaning which elude this definition, in this context both terms are employed (all but interchangeably) by Aquinas and his commentators to refer to the contact of an instrumental cause with the final end of the principal cause. As such, "touch" does communicate with clarity the conceptual meaning of Aquinas, if not the full semantic field of the terms involved.

B) *Historical Context*[7]

   According to Cajetan, Aquinas holds that the sacraments are real causes of grace without qualification—a teaching that seems uncontroversial. Thanks to the Baltimore Catechism, modern Catholics are accustomed to think of the sacraments as outward signs instituted by Christ to give grace.[8] This notion finds its proximate source in the decrees of the Council of Trent[9] and is reflected in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* as well.[10] The concept of the sacraments as imparting or conferring grace did not, however, originate in the Tridentine period. Analogous concepts can be found in patristic thinkers such as Augustine, who affirmed that the sacraments transmit grace in a manner similar to an aqueduct, which carries water to the soil it is intended to fertilize.[11] Augustine's sacramental teaching was highly influential during the Middle Ages. Taking hold among the Victorines, it found an all but universal audience during the Scholastic period when taken up by Hugh of St. Victor's brightest pupil, Peter Lombard.[12] The medieval use of the category of causality as a means of describing the efficacy of the sacraments began formally in Lombard's *Sentences*,[13] and can be understood broadly as an attempt both to preserve the common

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   [7] A more extensive treatment of the historical context for sacramental causality can be found in Reginald Lynch, "The Sacraments as Causes of Sanctification," *Nova et Vetera*, English edition, 12 (forthcoming).

   [8] *Baltimore Catechism*, n. 4, lesson 14, q. 136.

   [9] Conc. Trid. Sess. 7, decl. 1, c. 7.

   [10] *CCC* 1127-29. The *Compendium* of the *Catechism* is in some ways more explicit in this regard: "It is Christ who acts in the sacraments and communicates the grace they signify" (*Compendium: Catechism of the Catholic Church* [Washington, D.C.: The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2006], n. 229). "The sacraments . . . are necessary for salvation because they confer sacramental grace" (ibid., n. 230). The word "confer" in the context of sacramental efficacy recalls the explicit teaching of the Council of Trent in this regard (Conc. Trid. Sess. 7, decl. 1, c. 6).

   [11] *Jo. Ev. Tr.* 5.15 (*PL* 35:1422). See also *de Baptismo* 3.10.15. See also Lynch, "Sacraments as Causes of Sanctification," 796 n. 10.

   [12] Lombard studied under Hugh of St. Victor while Hugh was completing his *De Sacramentis christianae fidei*. See Philipp W. Rosemann, *Peter Lombard* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 27. Lynch, "Sacraments as Causes of Sanctification," 800 n. 25, et al.

   [13] IV *Sent.*, d. 1, c. 4. Lombard's phrase, the "invisible form of grace" is a reference to Augustine, who saw the sacraments as the visible form of invisible grace (*Epistola* 105.3.12 [*CSEL* 34]). Lynch, "Sacraments as Causes of Sanctification," 800 n. 27.

teaching on the efficacy of the sacraments and to articulate it with more specificity. Lombard saw the category of causality as the concept that distinguishes the Old Law from the New. The sacraments of the New Law of grace are not only signs but also causes of what they signify. As a result, causality became very important for both Christology and sacramental theology during the Scholastic period. However, the language of causality did bring new speculative difficulties: is it possible to describe the sacraments themselves—that is, the actual water used in baptism, for example—as a cause of supernatural life in the strict sense? Is not God alone able to cause such a thing? Questions such as these immediately raised the issue of natural potency in relation to supernatural ends. How is it possible for a natural efficient cause to achieve a supernatural end, even when used instrumentally by God? The further development of the theory of instrumental causality during the Scholastic period as a means of explaining sacramental efficacy would produce a variety of responses, from the analogically nuanced position of the Thomist school to the radical univocity that would come to characterize the Nominalist approach to causality.

However, one underlying assumption that slowed further development on this subject was the common understanding of grace as a kind of *creatio ex nihilo* in the strict sense. Since the modern period, many have been accustomed to speak of grace as created in as much as it is received by the human person, "uncreated grace" by contrast being taken to refer only to God himself.[14] This language is certainly acceptable, but the direct comparison between the infusion of the rational soul at conception and the infusion of grace could lead to an understanding of grace as created in the strongest sense of the term, creation *ex nihilo*, despite the fact that grace is properly

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[14] For a description of this distinction, see Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, Iᵃ IIᵃᵉ, Q. 109-114*, trans. The Dominican Nuns of Corpus Christi Monastery, Menlo Park California (St. Louis: Herder, 1952), 110-15. Garrigou-Lagrange distinguishes between grace as the eternal love of God and as a potency produced in the human person by which we participate in his divinity. Aquinas describes grace as a created accident in *STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 2.

an accident, and not an independent substrate. During the medieval period as well, it was commonly assumed that grace was created *ex nihilo*, and infused into the soul in a manner similar to the infusion of a rational soul at conception.[15] Although Aquinas did not use the language of creation *ex nihilo* to describe grace in the proper (non-metaphorical) sense, many of his contemporaries did.[16]

Using the metaphor of human generation to describe the sacraments has its advantages. It allows for an understanding of the instrumental use of natural potencies (such as water and other material elements, including human actions), which leaves space for the completive action of God, who infuses the final element acting according to his own power alone. As causal theories of the sacraments became more developed during the Scholastic period, this understanding of grace gave rise to theories such as dispositive causality.[17] First advanced by Alexander of Hales,[18] the theory of dispositive causality describes the sacraments as instrumental causes which dispose for the reception of grace rather than causing it in a direct and immediate sense. Versions of this theory were popular in the early Scholastic period and remained so during the early careers of both Bonaventure and Aquinas.[19] While Bonaventure would respectfully set the idea of the sacraments as dispositive instrumental causes aside, Aquinas did in fact advance a version of this theory in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, adapting the

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[15] *DTC* s.v. "Sacraments, Causalité," 14:586.

[16] Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, and Scotus all taught that grace was created *ex nihilo*. See Gallagher, *Significando Causant*, 148-49. See also Bernhard Blankenhorn, "The Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments: Thomas Aquinas and Louis-Marie Chauvet," *Nova et Vetera*, English ed., 4 (2006): 262.

[17] Bernard Leeming, *Principles of Sacramental Theology* (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1963), 328-31.

[18] Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theol.* (*Halensis*), pars IV, q. 5, a. 5. Willibrord Lampen, ed., *De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta scholam franciscanam*, Florilegium Patristicum tam veteris quam medii aevi auctores complectens, vol. 26 (Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1931), 6-17. *DTC* s.v. "Sacraments, Causalité," 578-79.

[19] Both Bonaventure and Aquinas cite dispositive causality favorably, as a theory in good standing among their peers. For Bonaventure, see IV *Sent*., d. 1 p. 1, a. 1 q. 4. See also Lampen, *De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta scholam franciscanam*. For Aquinas, see IV *Sent*., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1.

concept of instrumental efficient causality derived from Aristotle to explain the efficacy of the sacraments.[20]

C) Dispositive Causality in the "Sentences"

When commenting on the *Sentences*, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of instrumental causality: dispositive and perfective.[21] In the case of dispositive causality, the action of the instrument does not "touch" (*pertingere*) the finality of the completed act but awaits a completion that is accomplished by the principal agent beyond the scope of the individual instrument in question.[22] In perfective instrumentality, on the other hand, the action of the instrument actually reaches or "touches" the completion of the action.[23] One of the principal reasons Aquinas gives for understanding the sacraments as only dispositive causes of grace is the very nature of grace itself: because grace is a supernatural reality, only God has the potency to cause it. For the early Aquinas, the core of the issue has to do with the connection between the natural form of the instrument and the scope of its effective instrumentality: he argues that the instrument has both the power associated with its natural form and the power imparted to it by the principal agent. While the principal agent may or may not elevate the instrument to "touch" the finality of his overall intention, the instrument always reaches the end specified by its nature. To illustrate the sacraments as dispositive causes, Aquinas gives the example of natural generation, which in the case of humans involves the infusion of the soul directly by God, the material

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[20] IV *Sent*., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1.

[21] "Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est, quod causa efficiens dupliciter potest divide . . . scilicet in disponentem, quae causat dispositionem ad formam ultimam; et perficientem, quae inducit ultimam perfectionem. . . . Ad ultimum autem effectum, quod est gratia, non *pertingunt* etiam instrumentaliter, nisi dispositive, inquantum hoc ad quod instrumentaliter effective pertingunt, est dispositio, quae est necessitas, quantum in se est, ad gratiae susceptionem" (IV *Sent*., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1; emphasis added).

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

potency involved not being sufficient of itself to "touch" this finality.[24] Likewise, God uses the natural potency of the sacramental elements to dispose for the direct infusion of grace, the finality of which is accomplished directly by God.

D) *Cajetan and His Critics*

Cajetan's use of the word *attingere* in his commentary on the *Summa Theologiae* appears far more significant in light of Aquinas's early teaching.[25] Although the text of question 62 of the *Tertia Pars* clearly says that the instrumental activity of the sacraments causes grace, there is no reference to the term *attingere* (or *pertingere*) itself, nor is the distinction between dispositive and perfective causality mentioned. Cajetan's use of the term, then, can be taken as a direct reference to Aquinas's *Commentary on the Sentences*, indicating his support for a teaching which Aquinas himself explicitly denied in his early writings. By using this term, Cajetan asserts that Aquinas's later teaching on sacramental causality differs from his earlier teaching: whereas the sacraments were once regarded as only dispositive causes of grace, they are now seen to be instrumental causes in the perfective sense.

The implications of this position were not lost on Sylvester de Ferrara, who reacted strongly in support of Aquinas's early teaching on dispositive causality.[26] He rejects the teaching that

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[24] "Sed sciendum, quod actio instrumenti quandoque pertingit ad ultimam perfectionem, quam principale agens inducit aliquando autem non; semper tamen *pertingit* ad aliquid ultra id quod competit sibi secundum suam naturam, sive illud sit ultima forma, sive dispositio, alias non ageret ut instrumentum: sic qualitates activae et passivae elementorum *pertingunt instrumentaliter ad formas materiales educendas de materia, non autem ad productionem animae humanae*, quae est ab extrinseco" (ibid.; emphasis added). Again, the term *pertingere* distinguishes between dispositive and perfective efficient instrumental causality. In this case, Aquinas uses the example of natural generation to illustrate a case in which the finality intended by the principal agent escapes the scope proper to the natural form of the instrument.

[25] See n. 6.

[26] "Considerandum secundo, quod duplex est instrumentum: quoddam quod sua actione attingit ultimam perfectionem quam principale agens intendit; quoddam vero quod ipsam *ultimam perfectionem non attingit*, sed aliquam ipsius dispositionem. Semper tamen instrumentum, inquantum est instrumentum, pertingit ad aliquid ultra id quod competit sibi secundum suam naturam. Sacramenta ergo dicuntur causa salutis et

sacramental instruments "touch" (*attingere*) grace as the effect of their instrumental actions because an instrument only touches that end which it is competent to reach by its natural form.[27] This is in clear agreement with Aquinas's teaching on this matter in the *Sentences*, as I have already shown.[28] De Ferrara reinforces his point by articulating once again the comparison between sacramental causality and the infusion of the rational soul at conception to illustrate that only a supernatural potency can be responsible for the creation of a form that exceeds the potency of the material involved.[29] Thus far, de Ferrara is generally in accord with Aquinas's teaching in the *Sentences*.[30] When speaking of grace itself as a sacramental effect, however, de Ferrara begins to overextend himself. To maintain the supernatural quality of grace itself, he insists that it must be understood as created.[31] Thus far, he is generally in accord with Aquinas. For de Ferrara, the difference between that which is properly created and that which is educed from the potency of matter has to do with the distinction between natural and

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gratiae, *non quia sua actione gratiam attingant, cum gratia solo Deo creetur in anima*: sed quia ad ipsam gratiam disponunt" (Sylvester de Ferrara, Commentary on *Summa contra Gentiles* IV c. 57, n. III [Leonine ed., 15:192]; emphasis added).

[27] Ibid.

[28] IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1. Text as in n. 21.

[29] "Non inconvenit enim formam principalem esse omnio supernaturalem, non posseque nisi ab agente supernaturali produci; et tamen dispositionem ad talem formam posse instrumentaliter ab agente naturali produci, licet non virtute naturae, sed virtute supernaturali sibi data: sic*ut videmus virtute humani seminis causari dispositionem ultimam ad animam intellectivam, et tamen a solo Deo anima intellectiva creatur*" (De Ferrara, Commentary on *ScG* IV c. 57, n. IV [Leonine ed., 15:192]; emphasis added).

[30] Although the early commentators followed Aquinas's teaching in the *Sentences*, they were not unaware of the textual differences found in the *Summa Theologiae*. Like de Ferrara, Capreolus also rejects the assertion that the doctrine of sacramental causality in the *Summa* is different from that of the *Sentences* commentary, demonstrating that awareness of this textual difference did not originate with Cajetan in the sixteenth century. Capreolus, *Defensiones Theol.*, lib. 4, dd. 1, 2, 3, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 3; emphasis added). See Johannis Capreoli, *Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, ed. Ceslai Paban and Thomae Pègues, vol. 6 (Turonibus: Alfred Cattier, 1906), 4. Notice that here Capreolus is responding to the assertion that the sacraments "touch" (*pertingere*) the effect of grace as instruments. Unlike de Ferrara, however, Capreolus makes no mention of grace or creation.

[31] Ibid.

supernatural potency, and therefore any reference to grace as educed from matter is unacceptable because it would be associated with the limitations of natural potency.[32] De Ferrara is of course correct that no supernatural end can be educed from natural potency, but here it seems that a degree of analogical nuance escapes him, as will be made clear from the following: de Ferrara insists that grace be understood as created, not in a qualified manner applicable within the created order, but *ex nihilo*. In this, he fails to appreciate the nature of Cajetan's argument, and indeed the implications of the text of the *Summa* itself, proposing a teaching contrary to that of the later Aquinas, as I will show.

It should be clear that Cajetan's position is at odds with the teaching found in Aquinas's *Commentary on the Sentences*. Far from disagreeing with Aquinas outright, however, Cajetan asserts that a real development has taken place within the writings of Aquinas, and that the *Summa* in fact gives a more developed presentation of Aquinas's views than does the *Sentences*.[33] Cajetan acknowledges that in the *Commentary on the Sentences* Aquinas held a different position, but he insists that in the *Summa* Aquinas clearly teaches that grace is caused in the soul principally by God and instrumentally by the sacraments, without the qualification of dispositive causality. Cajetan notes the different division of the question in the *Summa*, where the principal effect of the sacraments—grace—is dealt with first, and the secondary effect—character—in the following article. He recalls the *divisio textus* of question 62, which states explicitly that grace is not only caused sacramentally but is also the principal effect of the sacraments.[34]

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[32] "Ad hoc enim ut forma solius creationis terminus esse possit, requiritur ut non sit de potentia materiae educibilis et quod nullo modo ab agente naturali, neque inquam virtute propria neque aliena, possit produci" (De Ferrara, Commentary on *ScG* IV, c. 57, n. IV [Leonine ed., 15:192]). When speaking of that which can be educed from matter, de Ferrara refers to all natural potencies, both active and passive. For a treatment of this distinction, see Lawrence Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters*, second ed. (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2010), 106-8.

[33] Cajetan, Commentary on *ST* III, q. 62, a. 1, n. VI (Leonine ed., 12:21).

[34] "Deinde considerandum est de effectu sacramentorum. Et primo, de effectu eius principali, qui est gratia; secundo de effectu secundario, qui est character" (*STh* III, q.

The conclusion that grace is caused by the sacraments is stated explicitly in the *sed contra*, and the following explanation of the nature of instrumental causality in the body of the article is offered in light of this. By contrast, while Aquinas does affirm in the *Sentences* that the sacraments are instrumental causes of grace in the dispositive sense, the primary causal emphasis is placed on sacramental character.[35]

De Ferrara explicitly rejects this interpretation of question 62 of the *Tertia Pars*, asserting that it does not accurately reflect the doctrine of Aquinas.[36] Despite the arrangement of the articles dealing with sacramental causality in the *Tertia Pars*, de Ferrara claims that the omission of the concept of dispositive causality does not change the fact that grace must be understood as created from nothing, to avoid the pitfall of attributing a supernatural effect to a natural instrument.[37]

Cajetan's interpretation was adopted by the Thomistic school under the label "perfective physical causality," the term "perfective" denoting an explicit rejection of the dispositive

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62, proe.). See Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, nn. I and VI [Leonine ed., 12:20, 21]).

[35] IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1. *STh* III, qq. 62-63.

[36] "Sunt autem qui teneant de mente Sancti Thomae esse gratia non creetur, sed instrumentaliter attingatur a sacramentis.—Tum quia in *Tertia Parte*, q. LXII, a. 1, dicitur absolute gratiam instrumentaliter a sacramento causare, nulla facta mentione de causatione dispositiva.—Tum quia, cum gratia desinit esse, non annihilatur. Sed hoc ad mentem Sancti Thomae esse non puto. Nam cum creari sit ex nihilo aliquid fieri; et manifeste appareat gratiam ex nihilo fieri, relinquitur quod creetur, eo modo quo formae inhaerenti convenit creari, quia scilicet secundum ipsam aliquid creatur; secundum quem modum inquit Sanctus Thomas Iᵃ IIᵃᵉ, q. CX, a. 2, ad 3, gratiam creari, *quia secundum ipsam homines dicuntur creare, idest in novo esse constitui*" (De Ferrara, Commentary on *ScG* IV c. 57, n. V [Leonine ed., 15:192]). Notice that de Ferrara also uses the concept of "touching" (*attingere*) to refer to the perfective form of instrumental causality that Cajetan defends. De Ferrara's use of *STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3 is somewhat misleading in this context. In response to an objector who asserts that grace must be created *ex nihilo*, Aquinas affirms this statement not in an ontological, but in a moral sense: unlike accidental qualities which pass away with the destruction of a substrate, grace endures and is in fact responsible for the recreation of the human person as a new being "from nothing"—that is, from no potency possessed by the creature, or *not from merit* (*STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 2, obj. 3 and ad 3). See also n. 69.

[37] De Ferrara, Commentary on *ScG* IV c. 57, n. V (Leonine ed., 15:192).

causal model.[38] Cajetan's argument presumes that it was Aquinas's developed understanding of the created status of grace that allowed him to make this change, and in his commentary he explicitly rejects the assertion that a perfective understanding of sacramental causality is not possible because grace is created *ex nihilo*. He grants that there can be no proper instrumentality at work in creation from nothing, but asserts that grace is not properly created in this sense.[39] This undercuts directly the argument put forth by de Ferrara, which hinges on the idea of grace as created *ex nihilo* as the only alternative to attributing to natural potency a supernatural effect.

One of the reasons that Cajetan was able to circumvent this objection is a shift in Aquinas's understanding of the natural form of the instrument with respect to its principal agent. We have seen that in the *Sentences* Aquinas clearly taught that the natural form of the instrument is somehow retained in instrumental action, despite the fact that the instrument is taken up by the principal agent as a kind of tool.[40] In the *Summa*, however, Aquinas is very clear that, when something is taken up as an instrument by the principal agent, the form or power that governs the instrumental action belongs to the principal agent rather than to the instrument. This means that, although the instrumental use of a tool requires the exercise of the action proper to its natural form (the sharpness of the axe cutting wood),[41] the final effect of the instrumental action is

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[38] Aloisius Ciappi, *De Sacramentis in Communi: Commentarius in Tertiam Partem S. Thomae (qq. LX-LXV)*, Pontificum Institutum Internationale Angelicum (Turin: R. Berruti & co., 1957), 67-70. Leeming, *Principles of Sacramental Theology*, 288.

[39] "Ad obiectionem autem quod nulla creatura potest etiam instrumentaliter creare, respondetur hoc concedendo: sed negando quod gratia proprie creetur. Quod patet ex eo quod, cum desinit esse, non annihilatur: nam, si crearetur, quia creatio est ex nihilo, cum desineret conservari, oporteret quod eius desitio esset annihilare" (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, n. VI [Leonine ed., 12:21]). See also Leeming, *Principles of Sacramental Theology*, 328.

[40] IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1.

[41] Aquinas teaches consistently in both the *Sentences* and the *Summa* that there are two "actions" present in instrumental motion—that of the instrument's natural form, and that proper to its function as an instrument of the principal agent (IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1 ; *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2). As will be shown, once the category of dispositive causality is put aside, Aquinas is free to describe the natural action of the

attributable not to the power of the instrumental cause in itself, but to that of the principal mover.[42] When the axe is used by the builder to make a table, its natural action is moved by the potency and finality of the builder, and cannot be attributed to the axe in itself. In question 62 Aquinas shows implicitly that this attribution of the effect of the instrumental action to the principal mover alone removes any suspicion that the action of the instrument may compromise in some way the causal responsibility of the principal mover. When considering supernatural ends this is particularly auspicious, because it avoids the problem of claiming in some way that a supernatural effect has issued from a created natural potency. Thus God is the cause of grace simply put; and yet, because grace is not understood as created *ex nihilo*, God is able to use instruments within the created order as analogical participants in his own causal motion towards that end. Further, because the instruments do not retain the potency of their natural forms in reference to their instrumental ends, there is no causal rivalry established between natural and supernatural potencies.

Cajetan gives this point particular emphasis in his commentary, insisting that while God alone is principal cause of grace because grace is a participation in his nature, the sacraments are real instrumental causes because of their participation in his power. For Cajetan, this kind of instrumentality results in an understanding of grace in relation to the human person as a kind of change in the soul, from the status of one not graced to one who is graced by God. This conception of the life of grace allows for the sacraments as instrumental causes to "touch" the finality of grace itself. Other conceptions of grace which rely on a kind of intermixing of a

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sacramental instrument (water washing) as not only a sign of an interior effect for which it is a dispositive precursor, but a true sign and instrumental cause in the proper sense.

[42] "Causa vero instrumentalis non agit per virtutem suae formae, sed solum per motum quo movetur a principali agente. Unde effectus non assimilatur instrumento, sed principali agenti, sicut lectus non assimilatur securi, sed arti quae est in mente artificis. Et hoc modo sacramenta novae legis gratiam causant, adhibentur enim ex divina ordinatione ad gratiam in eis causandam" (*STh* III, q. 62, a. 1).

newly created reality within the human person do not allow for the role of sacramental instrumentality in the actual causation of grace in the same way.[43] Although the language of creation and re-creation must certainly be retained in a qualified sense, the teaching of Cajetan and the later Aquinas frames grace more directly in the language of potency.[44] In this regard, the doctrine of obediential potency, which is so important for the Thomistic conception of grace and theological anthropology, can be seen as related to sacramental instrumentality by the concepts of potency and act, and by principal and instrumental efficient motion.[45]

De Ferrara explicitly rejects this understanding of grace. Because he is unable to reconcile supernatural potency with the deduction of a supernatural accident from an already existing

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[43] "De creatione gratiae, distinguere potes quod causatio gratiae dupliciter sumi potest. Vel quatenus est mutatio animae de non-grata in gratam Deo: et sic attingitur instrumentaliter a sacramento. Vel quatenus creatio ibi aliquo modo immiscetur: et sic fit gratia immediate a Deo" (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, n. VI [Leonine ed., 12:21]). Cajetan continues to argue for the likelihood of the instrumental solution by appealing to the humanity of Christ, which in its creaturely dimension is clearly instrumental—surely the sacraments can function instrumentally by extension.

[44] The concept of grace as a kind of new creation is of course of biblical origin. For examples of this theme, see Rom 6:1-11; 7:1-6; Gal 2:19-20; 2 Cor 5:17. See Moyer V. Hubbard, *New Creation in Paul's Letters and Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Aquinas's doctrine is not in conflict with St. Paul's teaching but rather concerns our speculative understanding of that teaching.

[45] When speaking of the sacraments, Aquinas describes grace as "nothing other than a participation in the divine nature" (*STh* III, q. 62 a. 1); see n. 42. In question 62, Aquinas argues that God, as the principle cause of grace, causes, by his own power, a participation in his nature. An instrumental cause, by its nature, achieves the effect not according to its own power or form but according to that of the principal cause. The finality of the stool is not attributed to the form of the saw as such but to the formal causality of the artist. In the case of natural instrumentality, passive natural potency might be enough to explain the saw's instrumental participation in the finality of the stool. In the case of the sacraments, Aquinas argues that they respond in a way similar to the saw in relation to the artist: "Et hoc modo sacramenta novae legis gratiam causant, *adhibentur enim ex divina ordinatione ad gratiam in eis causandam*" (*STh* III, q. 62 a. 1; emphasis added). The language of obediential command is significant, however. What enables a created nature to function as an instrument of divine agency in relation to supernatural ends in the same way as a created nature (the saw) can function as an instrument of a natural principal cause (the artist) cannot be the passive dimension of natural potency responding to the movement of a natural, exterior agent. In reference to a supernatural end, a created nature can become a true instrument that responds to God as primary agent, not from any passivity that comes from a potentiality of nature, but from the obedience of a creature before the author and sustainer of its being. See Feingold, *Natural Desire to See God*, 101-65.

natural substrate,[46] he insists that grace must be created in the strictest sense—a sense in which no instrument can participate directly in the finality of the action. Thus he advances a version of sacramental efficacy that Cajetan describes as a kind of "mixing" of created and uncreated potencies, rather than authentic instrumental causality.[47]

E) Thomistic Hermeneutics

Given the strong disagreement over the correct interpretation of the texts of Aquinas that we have seen here in the early sixteenth century, something about the hermeneutical assumptions of the commentatorial tradition needs be said. From a contemporary perspective, the idea of historical development is all but assumed—the assertion that the thought of Aquinas may have developed over time, his later works appearing as more advanced than his first, would meet with little controversy in our day. Indeed, the contrary assertion would require the most detailed and painstaking demonstration to gain acceptance. In contemporary Thomistic circles therefore, it is commonplace to understand the *Summa* as the capstone of Aquinas's work, and since the modern period scholars have turned to it as the principal—perhaps at times even the exclusive—source for the doctrine of Aquinas. However, this assumption was not always held. Until the sixteenth century, Lombard's *Sentences* remained the universal

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[46] "Si dicatur quod non creatur, quia fit in aliquo subiecto: - constat quod hoc non tollit rationem creationis formae, apud Sanctum Thomam. Ad hoc enim ut non creetur, requiritur ut de potentia materiae educatur: ut dicitur *Pot. Dei*, q. III, a. 8, in responsionibus ad argumenta. Gratia autem de potentia materiae non educitur: ut ibidem dicitur; et I *Sent.*, d. XIV, q. III" (De Ferrara, Commentary on *ScG* IV, c. 57, n. V [Leonine ed., 15:192]).

[47] Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62 a. 1, n. VI (Leonine ed., 12:21). Text as in n. 43. Cajetan affirms that for the later Aquinas, the power of God at work in the sacraments cannot be conceived of as a kind of superadditive power, in addition to the natural power of the instrument (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62 a. 4, n. III [Leonine ed., 12:25-26]).

standard for theological education at the university level,[48] which means that the *Commentary on the Sentences* was presumed by most to be the principal and most systematic expression of a theologian's teaching. This focused attention on Aquinas's *Commentary on the Sentences* in a way that may seem strange to contemporary students. Moreover, the *Summa*, which Aquinas describes itself as an introductory textbook for students of theology[49]—and at that an unfinished project—was not always viewed as obviously superior from a doctrinal perspective. In the case at hand, because the distinction between dispositive and perfective causality is not mentioned in the *Summa's* treatment of sacramental causality, many simply assumed that in the *Summa* Aquinas had simply glossed over an issue which he had discussed with more precision in the *Sentences*. Jean Capreolus, for example, claims that the teaching on sacramental causality is identical in the *Sentences* and the *Summa*, despite the absence of explicit reference to dispositive causality in the latter.[50] The young Cajetan, in his own *Commentary on the Sentences*, seems to have made this same assumption, following the pattern of Aquinas's early text.[51] As we have seen, however, his later commentary on the *Summa* gives a different assessment.[52]

This is not to say that Cajetan shared our modern sense of historical consciousness, assuming automatically that later works necessarily represent a later stage of speculative development. Apart from the matrix of historical development, however, how are we to interpret the variety of texts found in Aquinas's corpus? How can we adjudicate between different sources when faced with instances of intellectual tension in his

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[48] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 3. See also Lynch, "Sacraments as Causes of Sanctification," 810-12.

[49] *STh* I, prolog.

[50] See note 30.

[51] Cajetan, IV *Sent.*, q. 1, a. 1. See Gallagher, *Significando Causant*, 191.

[52] Cajetan wrote his *Commentary on the Sentences* in 1493 at the age of 25, while a Bachelor at the University of Padua. His commentary on the *Summa* was written between the years of 1507 and 1522. See Lottie Kendzierski and Francis C. Wade, "Introduction," in *Cajetan: Commentary on St. Thomas Aquinas' On Being and Essence*, trans. Lottie Kendzierski and Francis C. Wade, *Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation* (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 2011), 1-2.

works? From the perspective of the Thomistic commentators, it is the speculative intellect that drives speculative development, rather than the historical narrative.

Cajetan and other commentators are committed with Aquinas to a speculative pursuit of perennial wisdom, and by their engagement with his thought they continue his project. Although in this particular case the lens of historical development supports his thesis, Cajetan's methodology transcends this category. Although his work is not without great historical and textual sensitivity, his strongest contribution is doctrinal synthesis. Cajetan is concerned to penetrate with care and precision the depths of the angelic doctor's teaching, and to do that effectively he will rely not only on the text of the *Summa*, which forms the immediate subject of his commentary, but implicitly on concepts already present in the *Sentences* and in other earlier Thomistic texts as well. In the end, both Cajetan and de Ferrara are distorted by an exclusively historical lens, because they represent a discursive tradition which is engaged with the texts of Aquinas in pursuit of sacred truth.

F) Aquinas, "Super Sententiam"

Before returning to a discussion of Aquinas's later thought, it is worthwhile to examine more deeply the actual text of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, moving beyond those texts which refer directly to sacramental causality.

Speaking broadly, the comparison between creation and re-creation is very strong in the *Sentences*.[53] Aquinas even goes so far as to say that creation and re-creation are "similar in all ways."[54] There is a degree of hyperbole here, however, because when read in context it appears that Aquinas is referring primarily to formal causality; viewed through this lens, the world created by God *ex nihilo* and the human person recreated in grace both share a common frame of reference in the

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[53] Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, *The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 43.

[54] I *Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.

exemplarity of God.[55] Aquinas's *Sentences* commentary proposes a theological hermeneutic which is in all aspects centered on God who creates from nothing and subsequently draws all of reality back to himself. From the outset, the role of God as first principal is assumed, and Aquinas considers everything else in reality as gathered around him, as either coming from him as its first cause or returning to him as its final end.[56]

Aquinas describes re-creation as conferring a "created habit" on the person.[57] Although the language of creation is used, there is no mention here of creation *ex nihilo*. In fact, Aquinas specifically employs a category—that of *habitus*—which falls under the accidental categories of being. Under natural circumstances, accidents are educed from the potency of matter within the context of an already existing substrate.

The *Sentences* commentary assumes a definition of creation proper which can only be applied to God, as distinct from the actuation of potency in the created order. The distinguishing principle here is that of motion: God, who creates subsistent being out of nothing, does not require the motion of potency to act to reach his intended end. In this respect he is to be distinguished from a creaturely artist who merely fashions new things from existing matter.[58] To account for this difference, divine and creaturely causality must be clearly distinguished. One of the principal ways in which this difference is evident is in the order of efficient causality. Aquinas is clear that motion— that is, the actuation of potency in matter—is not applicable to God's efficient causation of the world, but only to created secondary causality.[59] He therefore uses the concept of motion to distinguish between principal and secondary efficient

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[55] M. Sorondo argues to the contrary, relying heavily on Aquinas's Pauline commentaries and other early texts in an attempt to show that grace is created from nothing. Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, "Grace as 'New Creation,'" *Doctor Communis* (June 2009): 219-36. Although hermeneutically distinct, his conclusions are similar to those of de Ferrara. See nn. 36 and 69.

[56] Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, 43.

[57] I *Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3. Text as in note 54.

[58] II *Sent.*, d. 1, prol.

[59] I *Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1.

causality. However, the sovereignty of God's principal causality extends even to the secondary order of created causality, so much so that in Aquinas's *Sentences* commentary the terms "secondary causality" and "instrumental causality" are all but interchangeable; instrumental causality in this sense is understood most fundamentally as secondary efficient causality with explicit reference to the principal efficiency of God.[60] This means that any created motion or efficient causality is positioned in relation to its creator as an instrument. Although this does not take into account the phenomenon of supernatural ends, it should be noted that, even in the *Sentences*, Aquinas's theory of principal and instrumental efficient causality sets up a relationship between God and the world which defines even the smallest form of natural motion from potency to act as a kind of efficient motion that relies on sustained divine agency for its existence and movement to act. The use of the concept of instrumental causality in reference to the sacraments presumes this natural relationship between creator and creature, even if the way in which such instruments can be moved towards a supernatural end is yet to be fully explained.

Concerning the act of creation proper, Aquinas is clear in the *Sentences* that no instrumentality can be involved precisely because the concept of instrumentality is tied to motion. Creation *ex nihilo* is the result of God's action alone, and although Aquinas might seem to make a univocal comparison between creation and re-creation in book 1 of his commentary, even here he does not say that grace is created *ex nihilo*. He teaches that the sacraments are only dispositive instrumental causes because of the impossibility of natural potencies attaining to a supernatural end, and although he uses the image of the infusion of the rational soul at conception to illustrate this, he

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[60] Aquinas distinguishes between principal and secondary efficient causality, at times using the term "instrumental cause" as a synonym for secondary efficient causality. See II *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad s.c. 5; IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 4. The concept of a secondary cause participating in its primary cause instrumentally occurs across Aquinas's writings, beginning with his commentary on the *Liber de causis*, where he argues that all secondary causes participate in the eternity of God as final cause (I *Liber de causis*, lect. 2 and 3).

does not use the concept of creation *ex nihilo* because he has already acknowledged that grace belongs to a category—that of *habitus*—which requires an existing substrate and cannot come from nothing in the strict sense. In the *Sentences*, therefore, Aquinas characterizes the infusion of grace as a new creative initiative on the part of God involving an already created thing.

G) "De Veritate," "De Potentia Dei," and Further Development

The distinction between subsistent and inhering forms of being will remain significant as Aquinas begins to distinguish the relationship between the concept of creation and the infusion of grace in both *De Veritate* and *De Potentia*.[61]

In *De Veritate* Aquinas rearticulates the same argument for the sacraments as dispositive instrumental causes that he first proposed in the *Sentences*. Because instruments taken up in the hand of a builder are used according to their natural potencies, we cannot attribute perfective instrumentality to natural instruments when considering a supernatural act.[62] Although the concept of dispositive causality is retained until a late stage of Aquinas's writings,[63] the language he uses in the *Summa* to describe the reality of grace begins to be developed much earlier. Already in *De Veritate*, which was composed shortly after Aquinas finished his *Commentary on the Sentences*,[64] he distinguishes the manner in which the category of creation can be used when discussing the infusion of grace. Although he does use the term *creatio* to describe grace in the *Sentences*, in *De Veritate* he qualifies this by introducing the term *concreatio* to

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[61] Gallagher's work shows a significant development in these works which clarifies further the issue at hand for us. See Gallagher, *Significando Causant*, 102-13, 138-40.

[62] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 4. Aquinas uses the same image that he used in the *Sentences* (IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1): an artist or builder uses a saw to make a stool, which falls within the natural potency of the saw as an instrument. When we consider the finality of grace, natural instrumentality can only be dispositive.

[63] The *Summa contra Gentiles*, upon which de Ferrara commented, is the first of Aquinas's writings to describe sacramental causality without reference to the distinction between dispositive and perfective instrumental causes. See *ScG* IV, c. 57.

[64] Aquinas commented on the *Sentences* from 1254 to 1256, and composed the disputed questions *De Veritate* between 1256 and 1259 (Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, 328).

account for the accidental status of grace. He is very clear that this distinction is intended to preserve the difference between creation *ex nihilo* and that re-creation which takes place within an existing substrate.[65]

Question 27 of *De Veritate* treats the topic of grace at length in relation to accidental potency and instrumentality. In response to an objector who claims that grace cannot be educed from the potency of created matter, Aquinas develops the implications of the accidental being of grace (an idea already present in the *Sentences*). Because accidents subsist *in* an already existing substance, grace is not created in the strict sense of the word, which would imply the creation of a new subsistent being from nothing. Rather Aquinas says that grace is *concreated*, meaning that it is brought about as an accidental form of being. In this case God's creative act does not bring something to be from nothing, but rather it works from within an already existing nature. Aquinas is clear that creation properly speaking is reserved for substances (*rei subsistentis*). But because created substance has the property of potency or becoming (*fieri*), accidental potency is a necessary feature of its being. This accidental potency cannot be created from nothing because it does not have being *per se*, but rather has its being *in another*. And yet accidents, as a necessary feature of created reality, are just as dependent on God for their being as are substances—for Aquinas, God is no mere watchmaker. The categories of motion, act and potency, and accidental being are most definitely created, although not from nothing. The being an accident has is not *from* matter (*ex qua*—it is not individuated by matter as a new substance); rather, its being is *in* matter, on which it depends, and through the change of which (the actuation of accidental potency) its being is educed (*per cuius mutationem in esse educuntur*).[66] Concreation, therefore,

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[65] It should be noted that Aquinas uses the term *concreatio* to refer to all nonsubsisting forms, both substantial and accidental. See n. 66.

[66] "Ad nonum dicendum, quod illa ratio non est usquequaque sufficiens. Nam creari proprie est rei subsistentis, cuius est proprie esse et fieri: formae autem non subsistentes, sive substantiales sive accidentales, *non proprie creantur, sed concreantur*: sicut nec esse

applies properly to the coming-to-be of accidental properties in already existing substances, from whose potencies a new accidental being can be drawn forth. While the idea of concreation is mentioned several times in the *Sentences*, Aquinas does not apply the concept to sacramental grace until *De Veritate*.[67]

Already in *De Veritate*, then, Aquinas makes a distinction that undercuts the objection that de Ferrara would raise in the sixteenth century. De Ferrara erects an unqualified dichotomy between creation (for him necessarily *ex nihilo* by definition) and the eduction of material potency. He objects that, because grace cannot be understood within the later category, it must be understood as *ex nihilo*. But even as early as *De Veritate*, Aquinas introduces a terminological distinction that allows for the discussion of not only subsistent form, but accidental being as a kind of creation in an analogically qualified sense. Although he still teaches in *De Veritate* that the sacraments are dispositive causes, the notion of accidental being as *concreated* opens the way for a new understanding of grace in relation to sacramental instrumentality. This path highlights further the relationship between creator and creature which, in the order of efficient causality, is understood as the relationship between a principal cause and his instrument. Because all secondary created efficient causality can be referred to as instrumental, the category of instrumental causality is now applicable to the causation of grace in a way that it would not be otherwise.

Subsequent works such as *De Potentia* reinforce the teaching of *De Veritate* on this point, describing the comparison between

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habent per se, sed in alio: et quamvis non habeant materiam ex qua, quae sit pars eorum, habent tamen materiam in qua, a qua dependent, et per cuius mutationem in esse educuntur; ut sic eorum fieri sit proprie subiecta eorum transmutari. Secus autem est de anima rationali, quae est forma subsistens; unde proprie ei creari convenit" (*De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 3, ad 9; emphasis added).

[67] Aquinas does use the concept of concreation in the *Sentences*, but not in connection with the efficient causation of grace. In addition to distinguishing it from the creation proper to substance, Aquinas uses concreation to describe the infused virtues, (III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 5) and the manner in which the *lumen gloriae* is imparted to angels (III *Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 2; IV *Sent.*, d. 50, q. 1, a. 1).

the sacramental infusion of grace and creation as a similitude that holds only in a certain respect: like the act of creation, grace can have no efficient cause within the soul, nor is there matter from which grace could be educed by a natural agent.[68] Aquinas teaches that the infusion of grace follows the *ratio* of creation in as much as it can have no cause within the subject or from the potency of any other natural agent. In the *Summa*, Aquinas further reinforces this teaching, arguing that because grace is understood as an accidental quality and not a substance, it can only be described as created from nothing in the sense that it is not derived from merit.[69] That is, it is not educed from any natural potency possessed by human nature.

Although in *De Veritate* and *De Potentia* the concept of concreation places natural potency and instrumentality within the context of divine creative agency, in the case of the sacraments Aquinas must still resolve the question of the relationship between natural potencies and the supernatural end

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[68] *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 8, ad 3. Gallagher, *Significando Causant*, 111.

[69] In question 110 of the *Prima Secundae*, an objector argues that grace cannot be understood as a quality, because upon the dissolution of the substrate no qualities may remain. And yet grace remains, and is not subject to corruption along with the body. We are made a new creature *from nothing* in grace, according to the text of Galatians, and therefore if grace were to be corrupted, it would be reduced to nothing (*STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 2, obj. 3). (Here, the concept of creation *ex nihilo* is interpolated by the objector when reading the text of Gal 6:15 "For neither circumcision counts for anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creation" [RSV]). Aquinas argues in the body of the article that the effects of God's gratuity in the human soul can be understood as an habitual gift poured out by God into the soul, the presence of which functions as a principle of action—a form or supernatural quality—inclining the graced person to seek not only natural goods but supernatural ones as well, in a manner connatural to the person's created nature (*STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 2). Aquinas's direct response to the objector clarifies that the concepts of generation and corruption are more applicable to subsistent beings than to the accidents that inhere in them. By framing grace clearly within an accidental category of being—that of quality—Aquinas indicates that re-creation in grace is to be understood not against the backdrop of generation or corruption proper to substances, but in terms of the dynamic of act and potency present in an already created nature. In this language, grace as a supernatural quality inhering in the essence of the soul extends the creature's horizon of the good to the eternal gift of heaven. As a result, the language of creation from nothing can be applied to grace in so much as it refers to the creature's lack of merit (*STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3). This passage was misinterpreted by de Ferrara. See n. 36. Sorondo engages this same passage from the *Summa* and reaches different conclusions, materially similar to those of de Ferrara. Sorondo, "Grace as 'New Creation,'" 227-30. See n. 55.

of grace, and at this early stage he still relies on the concept of dispositive causality to fill this gap. By the time of the *Summa*, however, he resolves this issue implicitly. We have already noted that in the *Sentences* Aquinas adverts to the power of the natural form of the instrument in the case of instrumental action, and that the absence of this in the *Summa* allows both Aquinas and Cajetan to teach that the sacraments as instrumental causes "touch" the finality of grace.[70] In this understanding, all instrumental motion is determined, not by the potency that an individual tool might have apart from its role as an instrument, but rather by the formal cause of the motion itself, which is the finality intended by the principal agent. In this way, when the saw functions as an instrument, it participates in the final end of the artist: the completion of the chair as envisioned by the builder, for example. Because the saw is moved instrumentally by the builder's power solely for the purpose of moving towards his intended end, whatever natural form the saw might have when it leaves his hands is not immediately relevant to the end it achieves as an instrument. In the case of perfective instrumentality, the *ratio* that explains the action of the saw as it moves in the hand of the builder is not anything native to the saw, but comes rather from the formal cause existing in the builder's mind.

H) Aperiam in cithara enigma meum[71]

Cajetan illustrates the functioning of a perfective instru-mental cause with the example of a harp. Apart from the hands of a musician, the harp has only the natural potency for noise. When placed in the hands of an artist, it has the capacity for music, and this music is governed by the *ratio* of the musician's

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[70] This development is noted by T. Tschipke, who focuses on its Christological implications. Theophil Tschipke, *Die Menschheit Christi als Heilsorgan der Gottheit: unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lehre des Heiligen Thomas von Aquin*, Friburger Theologische Studien 55 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder and Co., 1940), 139.

[71] Ps 48 (49):5b. Hieronymus, *Liber Psalmorum iuxta hebraicum translatus*. Text as in *Biblia Sacra: Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem*, ed. Robert Weber and Roger Gryson, 5th ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2007), 829.

intent, not anything natural to the form of the harp itself.[72] And yet the harp is still physically moved in a way that reflects the scope of its natural form, the difference being the formal and final causes, and the power associated with this new finality.[73] If its instrumental causality were merely dispositive, the exercise of the power of the harp's natural form would produce noise, which would subsequently be directed by the principal agent towards his own finality of music: but the harp does not produce two sounds.

Cajetan explains the significance of this by distinguishing three principles: motion (*motus*), power (*vis* or *virtus*), and artistic motion (*motus virtuosus*).[74] In the case of simple motion, a thing functions according to its natural form alone, without any additional instrumental finality to direct its movement. In the case of artistic motion, a thing is moved instrumentally according to the form of the principal agent. In this later case, there are not two motions—one according to natural form and one *qua instrumentum*—but one.[75] Cajetan's explanation

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[72] "Exemplum utriusque motus perspice in cithara: cuius fides si moveantur a non-musico, sonabunt tantum; si vero moveantur a musico, efficient non solum sonum, sed sonum musicum, qui est effectus proprius artis musicae" (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 4, n. IV [Leonine ed., 12:26]). See also Lynch, "Sacraments as Causes of Sanctification," 819 n. 72.

[73] Aquinas is consistent in both the *Sentences* and the *Summa* that the natural action of the instrument is retained in instrumental motion. In the *Summa*, however, he clarifies that instrumental ends are in no way attributable to the natural form of the instrument. See n. 41.

[74] "Tria ergo cum hic considerentur, scilicet motus, et vis seu virtus, et motus virtuosus" (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 4, n. IV [Leonine ed., 12:26]). The translation of this phrase as "artistic motion" is based on its usage in Cajetan's commentary, rather than on a strict definition of the word "virtuosus." (Lewis and Short defines this term simply as "virtuous, good." This definition clearly falls short of its meaning in this context). Aquinas repeatedly describes the relationship between the principal agent and instrumental causes by using the example of an artist in relation to his tools. See *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1. Cajetan invokes this same image (with a specific reference to q. 62, a. 1) in the present context.

[75] "In responsione ad ultimum, perspice quam bene definita sit vis sacramentalis, et universaliter instrumentalis. Nam sicut diversa instrumenta nihil aliud habent ab arte una nisi suos motus virtuosos ad effectum artis; et omnes illi motus, quia sunt motus partiales, sunt unus motus totalis, ac per hoc una vis principalis agentis inventa instrumentaliter in diversis instrumentis" (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 4, n. V [Leonine ed., 12:26]).

reflects the later doctrine of the *Summa*, where Aquinas teaches that the power of the instrument's natural form (*virtutem suae formae*) is not what moves the instrument, but rather the form of the principal mover.[76]

The concept of power (*virtus*) associated with the form that directs the action further distinguishes artistic motion from simple. Power and motion must be distinguished at least in the order of being: unlike physical motion which actuates material potency, power has only intentional being.[77] In what Cajetan terms simple motion, a thing (instrument or no) functions according to its natural form, rather than the form of the principal agent (the harp, in the absence of artistically directed finality, simply produces noise).[78] In the case of simple motion, a degree of difference between the motion of the harp and the power of the mover is conceivable. For example, if the harp were knocked accidentally or used as a hammer, it would exercise the motion of its natural form and yet fall short of true instrumentality. (In the case of the harp used as a hammer, it would function as an instrument in one sense, but its natural capacity for sound would not be directed towards that instrumental end.) In both of these cases, the noise produced by the motion of the harp's natural form would be materially distinct from the motion imparted by the mover. However, in artistic motion the two coincide entirely, such that there is only a formal difference to distinguish them—the formal distinction between the intentional being of power and the actuated potency of physical motion.[79] For Cajetan, instruments, *qua*

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[76] "Principalis quidem operatur per virtutem suae formae, cui assimilatur effectus: sicut ignis suo calore calefacit" (*STh* III, q. 62, a. 1).

[77] See n. 79.

[78] "Distingue motum quo potest instrumentum moveri, in motum simplicem, et motum virtuosum. Est siquidem instrumenti simplex motus ille ad quem ex parte moventis sufficit potentia motiva; ex parte vero termini, naturalis effectus instrumenti. Motus autem *virtuosus* est ille qui ex parte moventis, ultra potentiam motivam, exigit artem, seu aliquid proportionale arti; ex parte vero termini, ducit ad effectum principalis agentis, puta artis seu alicuius proportionaliter se habentis sicut ars se habet ad instrumenta sua" (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 4, n. IV [Leonine ed., 12:26]).

[79] "Ratione diversitatis quae est inter motum et vim seu virtutem, dispares valde conditiones assignantur utriusque, puta quod vis seu virtus est de genere qualitatis (reductive tamen), quod habet esse intentionale, quod est spiritualis, etc., quae non

instrumentum, function according to the form intended by the principal agent, not according to their own form. Their own natural action (water washing, for example) is of course retained, but the presence of the *virtus* of the principal agent is responsible for their motion towards the final cause, uniting them to the intended finality of his form or *virtus*. The natural action of the instrument (the axe splitting wood or water washing the body) is not the result of a separate movement attributable to the natural form of the instrument. There are not two motions present in their actions *qua instrumentum*—for Cajetan they are moved not *simply*, but *artistically*, towards the end determined by the power of the principal agent. The axe is wielded by the builder *so that* a stool may be made; the water of baptism is poured *so that* a heart might be cleansed. Because it is the power of the principal agent that moves the instrument (and not the power of its natural form), multiple instrumental movements are united by the single power of the principal agent which moves through them all.[80] Cajetan compares this to the united individual motions required to row a ship—the ship itself has one motion, comprised of the partial motions of many instrumental actions, which only result in the motion of the ship if they are united in one common purpose, achieving a single motion.[81] For Cajetan, this understanding of sacramental

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convenient motui; ratione vero coincidentiae seu identitatis motus et virtutis in tertio, hoc est in motu virtuoso instrumenti, ut dictum est, quod instrumentum agit per solum motum quo movetur a principali agente. Ratione autem solius formalis distinctionis inventae inter motum et virtutem in motu virtuoso instrumenti, apponitur motui instrumenti vis seu virtus: et non ad denotandum quod sint duae res; sed quod haec duo coeuntia in instrumento, inveniuntur constituentia illius motum virtuosum" (ibid.).

[80] "In responsione ad ultimum, perspice quam bene definita sit vis sacramentalis, et universaliter instrumentalis. Nam sicut diversa instrumenta nihil aliud habent ab arte una nisi suos motus virtuosos ad effectum artis; et omnes illi motus, quia sunt motus partiales, sunt unus motus totalis, ac per hoc una vis principalis agentis inventa instrumentaliter in diversis instrumentis" (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 4, n. V [Leonine ed., 12:26]).

[81] Ibid. Cajetan's image of a ship and its oars moved by a single motion recalls Aristotle's description of the soul directing the body as a sailor directing his ship (*De Anima* 2.1.413a3-10). This points to Aquinas's Christology, which relies on the same concept of psychological instrumentality. See n. 82.

efficacy begins with Aquinas's treatment of the hypostatic union, where the many operations of Christ's humanity are instrumentally united with the principal motion of his divinity.[82]

Cajetan's example of the harp shows that even in natural instrumentality the potency of the natural form of a thing (apart from its role as an instrument) does not bear directly on the finality it achieves when functioning as an instrument under the motion of the principal agent. And yet the nature of the instrument is not arbitrary. Instrumental motion and finality build upon the natural action of the instrument itself: the natural action of the harp resonating and the water washing are directed by the principal agent towards their instrumental finalities.[83] Like a ship moved by many oars, a great number of actions proper to individual instruments are united in a single movement. Cajetan's development of a theory of perfective instrumental causality paves the way for a more integral understanding of the sacraments as instrumental efficient causes, spelling out more fully the implications of Aquinas's later teaching on the subject. Because instruments are not moved towards their instrumental ends by the power of their natural forms, the question of achieving a supernatural end by means of natural potency is simply removed from discussion.

Aquinas originally proposed the theory of dispositive causality as a means of describing the sacraments as instrumental causes with respect to a finality that is clearly beyond the scope of their natural potency. Along with many other thinkers at that

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[82] When speaking of the hypostatic union, Aquinas describes the bodily and immaterial operations of the human soul as united instrumentally under the principal movement of Christ's divine nature (*STh* III, q. 19, a. 1, co. and ad 2). In his commentary on this passage, Cajetan implicitly draws out the sacramental implications of this instrumental union of natures. When the touch of Christ heals, there are necessarily two operations: the physical contact, willed and effected as a human operation, and the healing itself, which is properly divine; and yet the first of these operations is united under the principal agency of the second (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 19 a. 1, n. I [Leonine ed., 11:241]). This anticipates what Aquinas will say later of the efficacy of the sacraments themselves: "the proper operation that the sacraments exert on the body, which they touch, has an instrumental effect on the soul, by virtue of divine power" ("Sacramenta corporalia per propriam operationem quam exercent circa corpus, quod tangunt, efficiunt operationem instrumentalem ex virtute divina circa animam" [*STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2]).

[83] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2. Text as in n. 41. See also nn. 70 and 93.

time, Aquinas likened this to human procreation. The infusion of grace, which is the ultimate effect of the sacraments, is beyond the instrumental potency of sacramental action in the same way that the creation of a human soul is beyond the potency of human parents: their instrumental actions cannot be perfective of the ultimate effect, but only dispositive.[84] In the same way, Aquinas argued that the finality of the sacraments, which is the sanctification or justification of man, is beyond the reach of such perfective instrumentality. Objections based on the created status of grace having been removed, Aquinas is free in his later writings to assert that the sacraments are instrumental causes *simpliciter*. Because instruments participate in the finality of the action according to the motion of the artist rather than according to their natural form, there is no longer any need for the category of dispositive causality. Cajetan's harp shows that, because instrumental causes are moved artistically by the hand of the artist, a created instrument can be moved according to its proper action towards a natural or supernatural end, touching (*pertingere*) the final effect of the one who moves it.

Because even in the actions of an individual person, there remains a formal distinction between motion and power—between the form and finality of the artist and the actions he takes to accomplish his end—Cajetan's concept of artistic motion can be compared to the actions of an individual, even in the case of the sacraments. When understood as a form of artistic motion, sacramental instrumentality can be likened to a man who conceives a finality in his mind and moves an instrument—be it a tool he takes up or his very own arm—to effect the purpose he desires. Here the power and intentionality rest solely with the man himself, even as individual tools—the hammer or his own hand—exercise their own proper actions in moving towards that end. Similarly, Aquinas describes the sacraments as separated instruments (as a tool in the hand), working in tandem with the humanity of Christ, which is itself

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[84] IV *Sent*., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1. See also Gallagher, *Significando Causant*, 98.

an instrument conjoined to Christ the head through the incarnation, as a hand to a body. According to the salvific intent conceived in the mind of God, hand and tool are moved as instruments to effect our sanctification.[85]

II. CAUSES AND SIGNS

A) *The Sacraments as Signs of Their Effects*

Cajetan's system of perfective instrumentality integrates the natural motion of the instrument within the finality and power of the principal agent, such that in the end there is only one motion—that imparted by the power of the principal mover. This development affects not only the instrumental causality at work in the sacraments but also the way in which sacramental causality is understood in relation to the sacraments as signs.

Cajetan portrays the sacraments as true effective signs, driven towards their finality in a single motion by the power and intentionality of the principal agent. As a result, sign and cause are united as different aspects of a single motion.[86] In the sacraments, the natural action of the instrument is moved by the power of the principal agent as a harp in the hands of a musician; this motion not only causes instrumentally the effect of music, but signifies both the end of music and the one whose power has accomplished it. Cajetan's integrated approach is reinforced by Aquinas's own teaching on the subject in the *Summa*, where Aquinas affirms that the sacraments are not only

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[85] *STh* III, q. 48, a. 6; q. 62, a. 5.

[86] Leeming argues incorrectly that Cajetan's approach proposes two separate lines of causality: one for sacramental sign and another for effect (Leeming, *Principles of Sacramental Theology*, 314-15). It seems that Leeming relies on an historically conditioned perspective, which views the distinctions between *sacramentum tantum*, *res et sacramentum*, and *res tantum* as components surrounding a liturgical/ecclesial event in history, represented by the *res et sacramentum*. For a variety of reasons, Leeming prefers the dispositive causal model because of its focus on the *res et sacramentum*. Although the sacraments are obviously features of the Church's life in time, space, and history, Cajetan's use of the speculative category of physical motion presents a different view of reality and, by extension, sacramentality, avoiding many of the implicit metaphysical limitations of Leeming's vantage point. This difference of perspective seemingly leads Leeming to misjudge Cajetan's position.

visible signs of a hidden cause at work, but true signs and causes as instruments of the principal agent.[87]

For Cajetan, the natural motion of an instrumental cause is *artistic* rather than *simple*. He affirms that even in the unified motion that characterizes perfective instrumentality there must always be at least a formal distinction between motion and power. This is necessarily the case because even within the actions of an individual agent, motion and power are not entirely congruent—the power, form, or intentionality which delineates the finality and directs the movement towards that specified end is necessarily distinct from physical motion, even if motion and power are united in the single movement of an individual agent. The physical motion of potency achieving act is necessarily governed by form, which is a spiritual/intellectual reality.[88]

In natural terms, the idea in the mind of the artist governs and directs the physical motion of his tools towards that end. In dispositive causality, however, this gap is widened, implicitly presuming the operative presence of two powers: that of the principal agent and that of the natural form of the instrument, which governs the natural scope of its action. It is the conflict between these two potencies which gave rise to the category of dispositive causality in the first place, in an attempt to prevent the attribution of a finality reserved for God alone to a created instrument. Because in the *Summa* Aquinas attributes the effect of the instrument to the principal agent alone, this conflict of potencies no longer exists, and Cajetan is free to argue that in artistic motion (which alone constitutes true instrumental causality), there exists *only* a formal distinction between motion

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[87] "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod causa principalis non proprie potest dici signum effectus, licet occulti, etiam si ipsa sit sensibilis et manifesta. Sed causa instrumentalis, si sit manifesta, potest dici signum effectus occulti: eo quod non solum causa, sed quodammodo effectus, inquantum movetur a principali agente. Et secundum hoc, sacramenta novae legis simul sunt causa et signa. Et inde est quod, sicut communiter dicitur, efficiunt quod figurant. Ex quo etiam patet quod habent perfecte rationem sacramenti: inquantum ordinantur ad aliquid sacrum non solum per modum signi, sed etiam per modum causae" (*STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 1).

[88] See n. 79.

and power—there is no material distinction between the power of God working towards the end of grace and the physical motion of the instrument's natural form.

Already in the *Sentences*, however, Aquinas seemingly applies to sacramental sign what he is unwilling to apply to cause. Although the status of the power of the instrument's natural form is as yet unresolved, in the case of natural instrumentality Aquinas argues that the natural motion of an instrument—the sharpness of the axe cutting—is both a sign and cause of its effect. This is an example of natural instrumentality which is causally perfective, not dispositive. Aquinas acknowledges that the sharpness of the axe cutting participates in (*pertingere*) the finality of the stool as an instrumental cause, and argues that the same action of cutting is a sign of the finality it effects as an instrument.[89] He then transfers this model to the realm of sacramentality, saying with Lombard that the sacraments effect what they signify.[90] In doing so, Aquinas claims that in the order of sign the sacraments touch (*pertingere*) their interior effects, and that in this way the sacraments effect what they signify.[91] Of course, for the early Aquinas the motion of a natural instrument cannot touch (*pertingere*) the finality of grace *as a cause*; the sacraments as causes, therefore, must be dispositive.[92] However, because the

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[89] In most other instances, I have translated *pertingere* as "touch." Although this translation captures with clarity the fundamental meaning of Aquinas in this regard, it does not capture the full meaning of the term (see n. 6). In this instance, the term "participate" seems more appropriate, as it more accurately articulates the concept of an instrumental power actively sharing in the end of its principle (in an analogous manner, appropriate to its instrumental status).

[90] "Et quia omne instrumentum agendo actionem naturalem, quae competit sibi inquantum est res quaedam, *pertingit* ad effectum qui competit sibi inquantum est instrumentum, sicut dolabrum dividendo suo acumine *pertingit* instrumentaliter ad formam scanni: *ideo etiam materiale elementum exercendo actionem naturalem, secundum quam est signum interioris effectus, pertingit ad interiorem effectum instrumentaliter.* Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, quod aqua baptismi corpus tangit, et cor abluit; et ideo dicitur, quod sacramenta efficiunt quod figurant" (IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1; emphasis added). For Lombard, see IV *Sent.*, d. 1, c. 4.

[91] IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1.

[92] Although the text cited above in n. 90 does not mention that the sacraments are only dispositive instrumental causes, Aquinas has already made this clear earlier in the same article. See n. 21. In the *Sentences*, the natural action of the water washing touches the body directly (*pertingere*); the interior effect of cleansing the heart is effected

reason for attaching the dispositive qualifier to the causality of sacraments stems from a (perceived) conflict of potencies within the sacraments as efficient causes, there is no reason to apply this same qualifier in the order of sign, where the question of potency and efficient motion does not apply. Aquinas holds, beginning in the *Sentences*, that the motion or natural action of the instrument (the axe cutting, the water washing), functions as both sign *and* cause of the finality of the sacraments. However, although the natural action of the instrument is sufficient to *signify* the end which is caused perfectively, it is not sufficient actually to *cause* this same end in the perfective sense, and so a disconnect between sign and cause necessarily arises concerning the natural action of the instrument. The natural action of the instrument touches (*pertingere*) the finality of grace as a sign, but not as a cause. The natural motion of the water of baptism washing is a sign of the interior effect of grace, but this same motion does not directly cause the same effect as an instrument.

As Aquinas gradually resolves the issues surrounding natural potency in relation to supernatural instrumental ends, the form or natural power of the instrument ceases to be an obstacle to perfective instrumental causality in the case of the sacraments. This has implications for the sacraments as signs, because this same resolution makes possible a deeper unification between sign and cause, similar to that which can be found in natural instrumentality. In perfective instrumental causality, the natural action of the sacramental instrument (water washing) is both a sign *and* a cause. As an instrument, the axe cutting is both a sign and cause of the finality of the artist, to whom alone the finality of the stool is attributed.[93]

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dispositively. In the *Summa*, however, Aquinas comments that, aside from the reasons already mentioned in this article, the water that cleanses the exterior of the body can cleanse the soul as well, because body and soul are one. See text quoted in n. 42. The Augustinian text cited by Aquinas derives from Augustine's Tractates on John: *Jo. Ev. Tr.* 80.3 (*CCL* 36). See n. 97.

[93] The significance of the natural form of the instrument in relation to the power of the principal agent for sacramental causality and sacramental sign can be seen by comparing two passages from the *Sentences* and the *Summa* that are in many ways close

In *artistic movement* or true instrumentality, the natural action of the instrument is moved by the artist's power towards the artist's ends—the harp is directed by the musician towards the end of music. It of course retains its natural and proper act, but the motion of that action is now imparted by the power of the artist alone, and as such this action itself becomes not only an instrumental cause but a sign of the artist's power and finality.

Cajetan comments that Aquinas's shift towards a perfective system of causality in the *Summa* not only unites the categories of sign and cause but actually heightens the sign-quality of the sacraments by removing any natural power associated with their own form of which their movement could be a sign. Because their natural action is now attributable only to the movement or *virtus* of the principal agent, this same natural action is necessarily a sign only of the power which has moved it and the end towards which it is directed by that power. The natural action of the instrument only gives further testimony to the presence of the artist's power working through his instruments,

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textual parallels: IV *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1 and *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2. See nn. 41 and 90 for the texts of these passages. The development of Aquinas's teaching on the role of the natural form of the instrument can be seen in his treatment of the "sharpness of the axe." While somewhat ambiguous in the *Sentences*, in the *Summa* Aquinas makes a clarification which reflects his later position. Where in the *Sentences* he described the natural instrumental end of the stool as in some way delineated by the form of the axe, in the *Summa* he is more precise, saying only that the sharpness of the form of the axe has the potency for cutting; the finality of the stool as an instrumental end is attributable exclusively to the potency of the artist who wields the axe. However, it is of course necessary for the instrument to exercise its natural action—it is necessary for the axe to cut in order to produce a stool. As a result the action of the instrument is not removed entirely or rendered arbitrary; it is repositioned, as it were, in relation to the power of the principal agent. In the *Sentences* the potency of the natural form of the instrument seems to have been placed in a kind of proportional relationship with the final cause, in such a way that its instrumentality could be either dispositive or perfective. For example, under this model, the motion of water is sufficient to participate instrumentally in the finality of washing the body, but it cannot participate directly in conferring the new life of grace by washing the soul in baptism. In the *Summa*, Aquinas reaffirms that the action of the natural form of the instrument is in fact necessary to achieve the end of the instrumental action—the axe must cut to fashion the stool. However, the limitations of its natural power are no longer a limiting factor with respect to its role as an instrument.

just as the finished table points to its builder.[94] In line with this, in the *Summa* Aquinas clarifies that even in the natural example of the axe cutting, the sharpness of the axe's natural form must be directed towards the instrumental end of cutting by the power of the artist; the splitting of wood—and certainly the creation of the stool—are properly instrumental ends, not delineated by the power of the axe's natural form.[95] The conflict of potencies having been removed even at the level of natural instrumentality, Aquinas is free to transpose the example of the axe in relation to the stool to the supernatural case of the sacraments without qualification even in the order of causality, drawing a much stronger causal analogy between the axe cutting and the waters of baptism washing in the *Summa* than in the *Sentences*.[96] In accord with the later Aquinas, Cajetan can say that the water of baptism *causes* the heart to be cleansed without qualification because, as an instrument in the hands of God, it participates in his saving finality and is not limited by the created scope of its natural form.[97] It is moved artistically according to Christ's intentions in the way that the axe is moved artistically by the craftsman towards the end of the stool.

For Cajetan, the washing of the body and cleansing of the heart in baptism forms one single artistic motion, as the water is

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[94] "Principalis causa est quae agit virtute suae formae, cui assimilatur effectus. Et iuxta hoc membrum ponitur una conclusio: *Solus Deus est causa principalis gratiae.* Probatur. Solus Deus est cuius est participata similitudo gratia. Ergo solus Deus est gratiae causa principalis. . . . Tertio, ponitur conditio causae instrumentalis. Et iuxta hoc membrum ponitur alia conclusion, scilicet: *Sacramenta sunt causae agentes instrumentaliter ad gratiam.* Probatur. Causa instrumentalis est quae non agit virtute suae formae, sed per solum motum quo ab agente principali movetur. Sed sacramenta Deus adhibet ut per ea causet gratiam. Ergo sunt causae instrumentales. Maior patet ex signo, quia effectus non assimilatur instrumento: et ex exemplo de lectulo respectu serrae et artis" (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, n. II [Leonine ed., 12:20]).

[95] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; text quoted in n. 42. See n. 93.

[96] Ibid. See n. 93.

[97] The Augustinian image of the waters of baptism washing the body and cleansing the heart was widely employed during the Scholastic period because of its use by Lombard in the context of sacramental causality. IV *Sent.*, d. 3, c. 1: "Accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit Sacramentum, etiam ipsum tamquam visibile verbum…Unde ista tanta virtus aquae, ut corpus tangat et cor abluat, nisi faciente verbo" (*Jo. Ev. Tr.* 80.3 [*CCL* 36]). See Lynch, "Sacraments as Causes of Sanctification," 796 n. 9.

used instrumentally by Christ to cleanse the soul.[98] Unlike a human mover who moves water to wash the body alone, Christ moves sacramental signs instrumentally by his artistic power to cleanse the soul.[99] These disparate finalities are distinguished not by the capacity of the water, but by the potency of the respective movers, whose instrumental ends the water serves. The natural motion of the water is now moved by the power of the principal agent, so that the visible motion (washing the body) signifies the cleansing of the soul *because* its motion is directed by the power which effects that aim. Because the sign-value of the sacrament is tied to the visible form and natural motion of the instrument (in the case of baptism, the visible motion of the water washing the body), the singular nature of artistic motion allows both the visible sign and the power working towards the final effect to be united as different aspects of the same motion.

B) Sign and Cause in Contemporary Sacramentology

As a synthesis drawn from across Aquinas's corpus, Cajetan's perfective theory of sacramental causality represents a moment of deepened understanding in the Thomistic commentatorial tradition. Historically interesting in light of contrasting views held by de Ferrara and other commentators, Cajetan's theory is of contemporary significance as well. Although recent sacramental theology is not usually concerned with the subject of causality, Cajetan's perfective theory offers a way of reading

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[98] "Sacramentalia signa et verba moverentur simplici motu tantum, utpote a solo homine, et nihil aliud efficerent nisi corporalem ablutionem. Cum vero quis hominem abluit servatis servandis iuxta institutionem Christi, moventur tunc sacramentalia signa motu virtuoso, utpote a Iesu Christo" (Cajetan, Commentary on *STh* III, q. 62, a. 4, n. IV [Leonine ed., 12:26]).

[99] It should be noted that in sacramental administration, human action itself becomes instrumental, in the form of the minister's *intentio*. Because the human minister is capable of self-motion, the movement of the will is necessary, by which the minister subjects himself to the principal agent. See, e.g., *STh* III, q. 64, a. 8, co. and ad 1; q. 67, a. 5, ad 2; q. 82, a. 5, ad 3. For Aquinas on self-moved secondary causes, see also *Super Librum de Causis*, lect. 1 (Marietti ed., 38-42); idem, lect. 3, et al. Cajetan's understanding of *motus virtuosus* can be applied to the minister's *intentio*, which is united to Christ in the movement of sacred signs. See Gallagher, *Significando Causant*, 197-98.

Aquinas that presents sacramental causality as something more than a obsolete manualism. Cajetan shows that the emergence of perfective instrumental causality in Aquinas's later works actually deepens the integration between cause and sign. However, not all contemporary sacramental theologians interpret these same textual developments in so positive a light.

Louis-Marie Chauvet, who objects to Aquinas's sacramental theology on Heideggerian grounds, is generally uncomfortable with the topic of sacramental causality.[100] Although Chauvet acknowledges that Aquinas's theory of sacramental causality develops from the *Sentences* to the *Summa*, he claims that the doctrine of perfective instrumentality found in the *Summa* places an unwelcome emphasis on the concept of causality—an emphasis which can only overshadow the primary identity of the sacraments as sacred signs.[101] Although Chauvet makes no

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[100] Louis-Marie Chauvet has argued strongly in favor of a post-metaphysical approach to sacramentality, relying largely on Martin Heidegger's critique of metaphysics to support his rejection of the Scholastic tradition. Chauvet asserts that, although Aquinas categorizes the sacraments within the genus of sign, his onto-theological presuppositions lead inevitably to an overly mechanized and "productionist" scheme of sacramentality dependent on the Socratic and Aristotelian categories of cause and becoming (e.g., Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 9-36, 46-58). While our present study does not afford the opportunity to offer an adequate response to Heidegger or to unravel the philosophical assumptions that undergird Chauvet's conclusions, Cajetan demonstrates that an emphasis on the causal dimension of the sacraments need not come at the expense of sign. Fergus Kerr has recently commented that "Chauvet's understanding of Heidegger . . . is convincingly dismantled by Hal St John Broadbent in his forthcoming Heythrop College dissertation: *Heidegger-Chauvet-Benedict XVI: The Call of the Holy*" (Fergus Kerr, review of *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump, in *New Blackfriars* 94 [January 2013]: 113-14). In *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, Dominic Holtz addresses Chauvet's critique of Aquinas on causality, arguing for the merits of efficient instrumentality on largely personalist and Christological grounds; see Dominic Holtz, "Sacraments," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 452-56. For a useful engagement with Chauvet's approach to sacramentality from a Thomist perspective, see Blankenhorn, "Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments"; idem, "The Place of Romans 6 in Aquinas' Doctrine of Sacramental Causality: A Balance of History and Metaphysics," in *Resourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life*, ed. Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 136-49.

[101] "It is generally understood that Thomas' understanding of sacramental causality underwent several important changes between the composition of the *Commentary on the Sentences* (1254-1256) and that of the Third Part of the *Summa Theologica* (1272-1273) . . . in the *Sentences*, Thomas 'grants only a disposing causality to grace,' while in

mention of Cajetan in his assessment of Aquinas, his work is indebted to him. Chauvet's interpretation of Aquinas builds on a consensus of Thomistic scholarship which, by the mid-twentieth century, took for granted Cajetan's perfective interpretation of sacramental causality in the *Summa*.[102]

While Chauvet does make claims about the text of the *Summa* itself, his interpretation of the textual developments within Aquinas's teaching on sacramental cause arises largely from more categorical, extratextual preconceptions. Chauvet's brand of Heideggerianism introduces an intellectual paradigm that is foreign to the thought-world of Aquinas, and his objections to sacramental causality stem largely from this. Chauvet believes that the categories of sign and cause are mutually antagonistic, and that an increased profile for causal language must necessarily impoverish the identity of the sacraments as signs.[103]

Cajetan's hermeneutical lens shows that, on Aquinas's own terms, the opposite is in fact the case. Cajetan's careful treat-

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the *Summa*, its causality becomes 'perfective'" (Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 11). Although he has Cajetan to thank for first articulating this development, Chauvet makes no mention of him, citing instead a number of reputable mid-twentieth century sources, such as A. M. Roguet, *S. Thomas d'Aquin, Somme Théologique: Les sacraments* (Paris-Tournai-Rome: Revue des Jeunes, 1951), 266. Chauvet argues that the development from dispositive to perfective causality in Aquinas's sacramental theory leads to a decreased emphasis on the sacraments as signs; see Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 9-21. Chauvet even acknowledges that developments in the doctrine of grace made this shift from dispositive to perfective instrumentality possible, but again makes no mention of Cajetan (ibid., 19).

Prior to Chauvet's book (first published in French in 1987), Karl Rahner also opposed the categories of sign and cause, arguing that the emphasis placed on sacramental causality had overshadowed the identity of the sacraments as signs. See Karl Rahner, *The Church and the Sacraments*, 3d ed., trans. W. J. O'Hara (New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 24-40. Chauvet engages some of Rahner's work in the context of his own discussion of ecclesiology (e.g., Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 321-22).

[102] See n. 101.

[103] "The whole problem [of sacramental causality] consisted in *harmonizing two categories as completely foreign to one another as are "sign" and "cause,"*. . . . It is Thomas' great achievement in sacramental theology to have attempted to reduce, insofar as this could be done, the heterogeneity between sign and cause, all the while recognizing the impossibility of complete homogeneity" (Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 17-18). Chauvet claims that Aquinas's causal language reduces the "symbolic scheme (of sacramental signs) to the technical scheme" (ibid., 22-26).

ment of the speculative issues surrounding sacramental causality reveal that, far from alienating sign from cause, the developed theory of sacramental causality present in the *Summa* actually unites these categories more fully. As a commentator and interpreter, Cajetan remains faithful to the first principles of his subject and shows that in the shift towards perfective instrumentality from the *Sentences* to the *Summa* the same natural action of the instrument comes to touch (*pertingere*) the finality of grace as both sign and cause. This unifies sign and cause and even emphasizes further the category of sign because the only remaining frame of reference for the natural action of the instrument is the principal agent's finality, of which the instrument's natural action is both sign and cause. By contrast, Chauvet's assessment of the speculative meaning of these same texts shows him to be a comparatively poor interpreter of Aquinas. Although Chauvet asserts that Aquinas's adoption of perfective instrumentality in the *Summa* drives a wedge between sign and cause, this interpretation appears more as an eisegetical imposition than an implication drawn from the text itself.

The teaching of Aquinas and Cajetan on the sacraments as signs and causes poses a further challenge to Chauvet, however. His early use of dispositive causality notwithstanding, Aquinas consistently teaches that in many cases of natural instrumentality the natural action of the instrument is both a sign and a cause of the instrumental effect. Even in the *Sentences*, the motion of the axe both causes and signifies the finality of the stool in the perfective sense. Although Chauvet asserts that sign and cause are categorically opposed, ordinary experience would seem to challenge this. Naturally speaking, a sign must be something that is appetable (i.e., observable and well suited to) to one or more of the senses—the axe moving, for example. Prescinding for the moment from philosophical assumptions, Heideggerian or otherwise, we must ask the following question: would it be possible for the visible movement of the axe to signify the stool if it were not actually being moved to cause this end? While natural instances in which sign and cause do not directly coincide may be conceivable, the assertion that they

must always be opposed seems inconsistent with experience. If sign and cause are not necessarily opposed at the natural level, why must they be so in the case of the sacraments?

CONCLUSION

The preceding pages have shown that Cajetan's system of perfective instrumental causality, which came to be the standard position of the Thomist school in the modern period, is in fact an outgrowth of a development within the texts of Aquinas. This textual development in turn reflects a number of deeper, speculative developments in Aquinas's thought on such topics as grace, creation, and natural potency as related to supernatural ends.

Cajetan's interpretation of Aquinas was initially opposed from within the Thomist tradition by de Ferrara and others, and it has found implicit opposition even in our own day. The speculative objections raised by these two groups are distinct: while earlier Thomistic commentators such as de Ferrara raised questions concerning grace and natural potency, some contemporary sacramental theologians are concerned that Aquinas's later teaching on sacramental causality may compromise our understanding of the sacraments as signs. These groups are distinguished from each other in their textual approach as well: while earlier Thomists such as Capreolus and de Ferrara denied that the textual differences between the *Sentences* and the *Summa* indicated a doctrinal shift, Chauvet accepts the consensus of the later Thomistic school, which followed Cajetan in asserting that these differences indicate a development in Aquinas's teaching on sacramental causality; Chauvet is concerned only with the theological implications of this development.[104] Cajetan's theory of perfective instrumental causality speaks to both parties in different ways, demonstrating both Aquinas's speculative development on the subject of sacramental causality and the deeper unity between cause and sign that results. For these and other reasons, the import of Cajetan's

[104] See n. 101.

theory is not limited to historical theology, but is of perennial relevance, speaking to the speculative concerns of our own day, even beyond the confines of sacramental theology.

For contemporary theology, Cajetan's treatment of the relationship between divine and natural potency in the context of the sacraments should be of interest. A stumbling block for nominalists and an absurdity to moderns, the question of the supernatural now vexes those (e.g., those of the *nouvelle théologie*) who worry that the categories of Scholasticism might impose false dichotomies between nature and grace, to the impoverishment of theological anthropology. The teaching of Aquinas on sacramental causality, as presented by Cajetan, can offer a more nuanced understanding of natural potencies in relation to the supernatural end marked out by the life of grace. Although the relationship between grace and nature was highly contended in the twentieth century,[105] the connections between grace, anthropology, and sacramental theology are not well explored. The disconnect between grace and the sacraments is further accentuated by the current state of sacramental theology, the doctrinal aspect of which is at times obscured by an exclusively liturgical hermeneutic. Because this discipline has become so historically and ritually oriented, a speculative treatment of the importance of grace in relation to sacramental activity occurs infrequently, if at all. A fresh appreciation for the significance of Cajetan's theory of perfective causality can offer a renewed awareness of the rich speculative fabric that connects Christian anthropology and sacramental action in the Thomist tradition.

Concerning sacramental theology itself, Cajetan's theory of perfective causality can speak to the concerns of those who may worry that a renewed emphasis on the sacraments as efficient causes will impoverish their symbolic dimension. Furthermore, Cajetan's work shows that attention to speculative doctrines such as causality can reconnect the sacraments with other

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[105] For a recent summary of the debates that surrounded the emergence of the *nouvelle théologie*, see William Murphy, "Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie: A Dialogue Renewed?" *Josephinum* 18 (2011): 4-36.

important speculative considerations of current concern in theological circles, such as the relationship between grace and human nature. In this, Cajetan and the commentatorial tradition he represents can offer a great deal to contemporary theology. As a Thomistic commentator, Cajetan shows himself to be more than an able interpreter of Aquinas's texts—he demonstrates a unique ability to bring forth their full doctrinal import, integrating sacramentality and other theological subjects within a much broader speculative and doctrinal framework. In the case of the sacraments, Cajetan's project transcends the categories of contemporary liturgiology not only with technical ease but with intellectual elegance, offering a penetrating and vibrant speculative integration between sacramental sign and cause, anchored by the finality of grace. It is as an interpretation of Aquinas, within the commentatorial tradition, that the enduring value of Cajetan's work emerges, as an exercise in *sacra doctrina*.[106]

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[106] An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the University of Dayton on October 24, 2012.

THE THEOLOGICAL PRIORITY OF *LUMEN GENTIUM* AND *DEI VERBUM* FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL

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IN 1985, ON THE TWENTIETH anniversary of the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council, an Extraordinary Synod of Bishops proposed six norms for the interpretation of the council.[1] Among these norms were the propositions that each council document must be interpreted in the context of all the other council documents[2] and that the four constitutions of the council are the "hermeneutical key" to the other twelve documents.[3] Unfortunately, the synod did not provide any clues about the relative authority of one constitution to another.

Theologians have proposed a number of different combinations of the constitutions as having theological priority over the other constitutions. The difficulty with much of the discussion surrounding the issue of the relative importance of one constitution to another is that scholars have often been imprecise in identifying the exact way in which a particular constitution

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[1] For the 1985 Synod of Bishops, see Xavier Rynne, *John Paul's Extraordinary Synod: A Collegial Achievement* (Wilmington, Del: M. Glazier, 1986); Giuseppe Alberigo, James H. Provost, and Marcus Lefébure, *Synod 1985, An Evaluation* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986); Peter Hebblethwaite, *Synod Extraordinary: The Inside Story of the Rome Synod, November-December 1985* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1986); Johannes Baptist Metz, Edward Schillebeeckx, and Philip Hillyer, *World Catechism or Inculturation?* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989).

[2] "The Final Report: Synod of Bishops," *Origins* 15 (19 Dec. 1985): 444-50; Avery Dulles, "Vatican II: The Myth and the Reality," *America* 188, no. 6 (24 Feb. 2003): 7-11.

[3] Dulles, "Vatican II: The Myth and the Reality," 9.

takes precedence over another.[4] In this article, I will propose
that while all the council documents should be read as a whole,
the council intended that the two dogmatic constitutions,
Lumen gentium and *Dei verbum,* would have a theological
priority for understanding the other documents of the council,
including the two other constitutions. I will argue that neither

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[4] For five decades theologians have been proposing one or more of the constitutions
as the hermeneutical key for the interpretation of the council. In the immediate
aftermath of the council, a theory arose which placed *Gaudium et spes* as the center of
the council. "An interpretation of the Council that understands its dogmatic texts as
mere preludes to a still unattained conciliar spirit, that regards the whole as just a
preparation for *Gaudium et spes* and that looks upon the latter text as just the beginning
of an unswerving course toward an ever greater union with what is called progress—
such an interpretation is not only contrary to what the Council Fathers intended and
meant, it has been reduced *ad absurdum* by the course of events. Where the spirit of the
Council is turned against the word of the Council and is vaguely regarded as a
distillation from the development that evolved from the 'Pastoral Constitution,' this
spirit becomes a specter and leads to meaninglessness" (Joseph Ratzinger, "Church and
World: An Inquiry into the Reception of Vatican Council II," in *Principles of Catholic
Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology* [San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1987], 393). On *Gaudium et spes* as the "Schlüsseldokument für die Konzils-
interpretation," see Joachim Schmiedl, "Visionäerer Anfang oder Betriebsunfall der
Geschichte? Tendenzen der Forschung zum Zweiten Vaticanischen Konzil," *Theo-
logische Revue* 108 (2012): 3-18, at 15-18. For the theological priority of *Gaudium et
spes* at least in the field of moral theology, see R. Gallagher, "The Significance of a
Note: The Implications of *Gaudium et spes* for Fundamental Moral Theology," *Studia
Moralia* 41 (2004): 451-62, at 457. Francis Sullivan has consistently upheld the
theological priority of *Lumen gentium* and *Dei verbum*. See Francis A. Sullivan, *Creative
Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the Magisterium* (New York: Paulist,
1996); idem, "Evaluation and Interpretation of the Documents of Vatican II," in
Contemporary Catholic Theology--A Reader, ed. Michael A. Hayes and Liam Gearon
(New York: Continuum, 1999), 335-48. Sullivan is not alone in this; the same position
is also held by John Paul II, Joseph Ratzinger, and Avery Dulles. On the central role of
Dei verbum as a "Schlüsseldokument," see Thomas Söding, "Die Zeit für Gottes Wort:
Die Offenbarungskonstitution des Konzils und die Hermeneutik der Reform,"
Theologische Revue 108 (2012): 443-458, at 443. Also see Jared Wicks, S.J., *Doing
Theology* (New York: Paulist, 2009); idem, "*Dei verbum* Developing: Vatican II's
Revelation Doctrine 1963-1964," in *Convergence of Theology* (New York: Paulist Press,
2001), 109-25; idem, "Vatican II on Revelation: From behind the Scenes," *Theological
Studies* 71 (2010): 637-50. Recently a new theory has arisen that gives theological
priority to *Sacrosanctum concilium*. See Massimo Faggioli, "*Sacrosanctum concilium*
and the Meaning of Vatican II," *Theological Studies* 71 (2010): 437-52; idem, *Vatican
II: The Battle for Meaning* (New York: Paulist Press, 2012), 104; idem, *True Reform:
Liturgy and Ecclesiology in "Sacrosanctum concilium"* (Collegeville, Minn.: The
Liturgical Press, 2012). Faggioli seems dependent on Giuseppe Dossetti, Giuseppe
Alberigo, and Giuseppe Ruggieri, *Per una "chiesa eucaristica": Rilettura della portata
dottrinale della Costituzione liturgica del Vaticano II: lezioni del 1965* (Bologna: Società
editrice il Mulino, 2002).

Sacrosanctum concilium nor *Gaudium et spes* can bear the weight of being the hermeneutical key to the council and that there is no historical foundation either in the *Acta* of the council or in the conciliar documents for granting these two constitutions this status. I will examine what the council intended with respect to the relative authority of the different constitutions and documents. Finally, I will examine the different ways that the various council documents were dependent on the constitutions both textually and theologically.

I. The Relative Theological Authority of the Four Constitutions

That the council wished to invest dogmatic constitutions with a theological priority over other types of constitutions was already clear in the preparatory stage of the council. The preparatory commissions composed a number of schemata, which they labeled as dogmatic constitutions, doctrinal constitutions, constitutions, and decrees; but by the middle of the summer of 1962, only the first seven were thought to be ready. As a result of this assessment, on July 13, 1962, John XXIII decreed that these first seven schemata should be sent to all the council fathers. [5] Of these, the first four were designated "dogmatic constitutions," while two of the remaining three were designated as constitutions and the last one as a series of decrees.[6] Later in 1962, John XXIII authorized the distribution of other schemata to the council fathers, including the two doctrinal constitutions, *Schema constitutionis doctrinalis de ordine sociali* and the *Schema constititutionis doctrinalis de communitate gentium*. By 1963, the council had dropped the

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[5] *Schemata constitutionum et decretorum de quibus disceptabitur in Concilii sessionibus,* Series prima (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1962), 5.

[6] *Schemata constitutionum et decretorum de quibus disceptabitur in Concilii sessionibus,* Series prima, 269-71. This volume contains: (1) Schema Constitutionis dogmaticae de fontibus Revelationis; (2) Schema Constitutionis dogmaticae de deposito Fidei Pure custodiendo; (3) Schema Constitutionis dogmaticae de ordine morali Christiano; (4) Schema Constitutionis dogmaticae de castitate, matriomonio, familia, et virginitate; (5) Schema Constitutionis de Sacra Liturgia; (6) Schema Constitutionis de instrumentis communicationis socialis; (7) Schema Decreti de Ecclesiae unitate.

category of "doctrinal constitutions."[7] It was understood by the preparatory theological commission that the initial four dogmatic constitutions would serve as the basis of the other texts of the council.[8]

When the first seven schemata were sent out to the bishops, they were accompanied by a letter which asked the fathers to send in their initial evaluations, with the aim of helping to establish the order of treatment of the schemata. The four dogmatic constitutions were found wanting by the French, the German, and the Dutch bishops;[9] consequently they could not be taken up immediately at the council. There were a number of incisive critiques from various bishops, including Josef Cardinal Frings, whose opinion was written by Joseph Ratzinger.[10] The Dutch bishops decided that a commentary should be prepared pointing out the weaknesses of the dogmatic constitutions and the strengths of the liturgical constitution. This commentary, composed by Edward Schillebeeckx, was eventually distributed to the other council fathers[11] in mimeographed form.[12] As a result of these efforts of the Dutch bishops, a number of petitions were submitted to the council presidency asking for a delay in the treatment of the dogmatic constitutions.[13] The council presidents decided, with the approbation of John XXIII, to take up the *Schema constitutionis de sacra liturgia* first, and this was announced in the second general congregation on

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[7] *Schemata constitutionum et decretorum de quibus disceptabitur in Concilii sessionibus,* Series tertia (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1962), 283.

[8] Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak, *History of Vatican II* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1995), 1:415. Roberto De Mattei, *The Second Vatican Council: An Unwritten Story* (Fitzwilliam, N.H.: Loreto, 2012), 214.

[9] Alberigo and Komonchak, *History of Vatican II*, 1:423-26.

[10] Jared Wicks, S.J., "Six Texts by Prof. Joseph Ratzinger as *peritus* before and during Vatican Council II," *Gregorianum* 89 (2007): 233-311, at 240-41.

[11] This commentary is now in print in volume 2 of Sebastian Tromp's secretary's diary. *Konzilstagebuch Sebastian Tromp SJ, mit Erläuterungen und Akten aus der Arbeit der Kommission für Glauben und Sitten, II.Vatikanisches Konzil,* edited and annotated by Alexandra von Teuffenbach, vol. 2, pts. 1 and 2 (1962–63) (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 2011), 948-91.

[12] Jared Wicks, S.J., "Still More Light on Vatican Council II," *Catholic Historical Review* 98 (2012): 476-502, at 495.

[13] Ralph M. Wiltgen, *The Rhine Flows into the Tiber: The Unknown Council* (New York City: Hawthorn Books, 1967), 24.

October 16, 1962.[14] Upon this decision, Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani wrote to Cardinal Eugène Tisserant, expressing his frustration that the council was going "to begin the discussion in the council about the liturgy and not about the doctrine of the faith, thus inverting the order already established in the volume of schemas that is in the fathers' possession."[15] Thus, the fact that *Sacrosanctum concilium* has a chronological priority as the first constitution to be promulgated by the council on December 4, 1963 can simply be regarded in human terms as an accident of history and not as suggestive of some deeper design by the council.[16]

The practical nature of the liturgical constitution was already clear in the preparatory stage of the council. During this stage, Cardinal Arcadio Larraona, C.M.F., explained in a *relatio* that the writing of the constitution on the liturgy by the commission was guided by five criteria. Of these five, only one is theological, and its aim is to give a "theological foundation" for any change of practice.[17] Furthermore, the cardinal explains that given the practical end (*finem practicum*) of the constitution, that is, the reform of the liturgy, only the "theological principles" that are common to all parts of the liturgy are given.[18] This practical orientation of *Sacrosanctum concilium* is confirmed by an article written by Cipriano Vagaggini, O.S.B., which appeared in *L'osservatore romano* at the end of the first session in 1962. Vagaggini summarized the work accomplished in the first session on the *Schema constitutionis de sacra liturgia,*

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[14] *Acta synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1970), 1/1:214.

[15] De Mattei, *The Second Vatican Council: An Unwritten Story*, 214.

[16] On February 14, 2013, Benedict XVI, in one of the last speeches to the clergy of Rome, noted that the fact that the council took up the liturgy before other more controversial theological topics was "an act of Providence" (Benedict XVI, "To the Council with Enthusiasm and Hope," *L'Osservatore Romano*, English edition [20 Feb. 2013], 9).

[17] *Acta et documenta Concilio Oecumenico Vaticano II apparando* (Romae: Typis Vaticanis, 1960), 2:2/3:49.

[18] "Haec sollicitudo determinandi essentialia principia, evidentius apparet in capite I constitutionis quod finem practicum sibi proponit, idest: semel agere de illis rebus, ideis vel conceptibus quae communia sunt omnibus partibus sacrae liturgiae" (*Acta et documenta,* 2:2/3, 50).

and he asserted that this schema is neither a theological nor a pastoral treatise on the liturgy. Instead, its purpose is to establish general principles in order to promote and reform the liturgy, and any theological or pastoral issues are only discussed in order to frame the practical nature of the document.[19] Vagaggini's insight is helpful since he clarifies exactly the type of document the liturgical constitution was intended to be, that is, practical. As we will see, this was later confirmed by comments made to the council fathers by the secretary general.

The second constitution to be promulgated by the council was the *Constitutio dogmatica de ecclesia* (*Lumen gentium*), and its development reveals the theological importance of the category of dogmatic constitutions. In 1962, the initial draft of the document, entitled *Schema constitutionis dogmaticae de Ecclesia,* was distributed to the council fathers as a dogmatic constitution.[20] A second draft was sent out in 1963 and was discussed into the third session in 1964.[21] The third draft of the schema of the constitution on the Church was sent to the fathers in July 1964, and the term "dogmatic" was removed as a modifier of "constitution" in the title.[22] It is not entirely clear why the term was removed, though various explanations are given. It may have been accidental; more probably Sebastian Tromp, S.J., removed the term "dogmatic" because he thought that the content was too pastoral.[23] At any rate, a number of the fathers objected to the removal of this modifier, and the term was returned.[24] The *relatio generalis* that accompanied this draft attempts to describe the difference between a dogmatic constitution and a simple constitution such as that on the sacred

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[19] "Alle basi teoretiche, teologiche e pastorali, si ricorre solo per inquadrare quelle norme generali d'ordine pratico nella loro giusta prospettiva ideale" (Cipriano Vagaggini, O.S.B., "I principi generali della riforma liturgica approvati dal Concilio," *L'Osservatore Romano* [8 Dec. 1962], 3).

[20] *Acta synodalia*, Indices 75.

[21] Francisco Gil Hellín, *Constitutio dogmatica de ecclesia: Concilii Vaticani II synopsis in ordinem redigens schemata cum relationibus necnon patrum orationes atque animadversiones* (Vatican City: Libreria editrice vaticana, 1995), xxii.

[22] *Acta synodalia*, Indices 76.

[23] Alberigo and Komonchak, *History of Vatican II*, 4:41.

[24] Sullivan, *Creative Fidelity*, 170. Alberigo and Komonchak, *History of Vatican II*, 4:41.

liturgy. The *relatio* explains that the constitution on the liturgy is concerned with "practical applications" and is "rarely concerned with the exposition of doctrine." It was suggested that a new procedure be adopted so that the proper care could be devoted to doctrinal issues, requiring votes on particular formulations, even in some cases single sentences.[25]

The theological importance of a dogmatic constitution is further confirmed by some fathers' confusion over the theological qualification granted to the contents of a dogmatic constitution. The confusion probably resulted from a compareson of this dogmatic constitution to the dogmatic constitutions of Vatican I, that is, *Pastor aeternus* and *Dei Filius,* both of which had solemnly defined a series of truths infallibly. In response, Cardinal Pericle Felici, the secretary general of the council, issued a *notificatio* in the 123rd general congregation on November 16, 1964. In this *notificatio* he stated that according to the council, only those things which were expressly intended as infallible were infallible but that everything else a document proposes "as the teaching of the supreme magisterium of the church" is to be acknowledged and accepted by each and every member of the faithful according to the mind of the council.[26] There are two points to be made about this notification. First, the council itself makes it clear that one should look to the intent of the council when attempting to discern what level of authority the contents of a document have, and that this intent is specified by the nature of the document itself. Second, the council fathers did not even bother to raise this question with respect to *Sacrosanctum concilium* precisely because they understood that a simple constitution was not attempting to do theologically what a dogmatic constitution was attempting to do.

The nature of conciliar constitutions is further clarified in the debate over the title of *Gaudium et spes* at the council. The first schema of what was to become *Gaudium et spes* was merely titled *Schema de Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis* and

[25] *Acta synodalia* 3/1:180.
[26] *Acta synodalia* 3/8:10.

was distributed to the fathers in 1964.[27] On October 20, 1964, Bishop Emilio Guano delivered the *relatio* in which he tried to explain the "idea" of the work. He noted that it was difficult to express in the title exactly what was expected from this work. This was not a general theology "de rebus temporalibus," but rather it treated of the actual state of contemporary reality in light of theology.[28] Guano also noted that the subcommission thought it rightly interpreted the intention of the document as "strictly pastoral" so that it addresses Catholics in such a way that non-Catholics and even non-Christians can be reached.[29] This fact alone is suggestive that the council fathers did not intend this document to have theological priority; after all, if the fathers intended that even non-Christians be able to comprehend the document, then it was going to have to be relatively simple. Clearly then the council fathers did not intend to make this draft, which at that point was not yet even a constitution, a nuanced theological treatment of the relation of the Church to the world.

On May 11, 1965, a new schema of *Gaudium et spes* was produced, now designated a "pastoral constitution."[30] This second schema was taken up by the fathers on September 21, 1965.[31] The *relatio generalis* accompanying this constitution attempted to explain what the drafters were trying to express with the term "pastoral," meant as a modifier of "constitution." The *relatio* explains that the constitution is called "pastoral" since it is simply applying doctrine to the conditions of a particular time and place rather than treating doctrine as such. As a consequence, the *relatio* notes that this schema does not require as rigorous a discussion of each word as if it were a dogmatic constitution.[32] This is an important point since it shows that the council fathers did not intend either to examine

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[27] *Acta synodalia* 3/5:116.
[28] *Acta synodalia* 3/5:145.
[29] *Acta synodalia* 3/5:146.
[30] Gallagher argues that it is not clear whether it was G. Philips or E. Guano who first suggested the term in 1965. This term "pastoral" was already being applied, albeit not yet in the title, in 1964. See Gallagher, "The Significance of a Note," 457.
[31] *Acta synodalia* 4/1:435.
[32] *Acta synodalia* 4/1:521.

or to develop the theology of nondogmatic constitutions in the same way as dogmatic constitutions.

This explanation of the meaning of a pastoral constitution was apparently unsatisfactory, and a number of the council fathers still had difficulty labeling the document as such.[33] Later, on November 18, 1965, Cardinal Felici invited the council fathers to give their opinion "regarding the title and quailfication of this constitution," instructing them only to submit comments if they were displeased with the title *Constitutio pastoralis*.[34] Finally on December 2, 1965, the mixed commission rejected the proposal of a large number of bishops who wanted to change *Gaudium et spes* from a pastoral constitution to either a "pastoral letter" or a "declaration."[35] At a press conference, Bishop Marcos McGrath, a member of the mixed commission, said that given the importance of the document, the commission would consider changing the title as long as this change did not suggest a decrease in the importance of the document.[36]

The ongoing confusion surrounding the title led to the footnoting of the title of the schema proposed on December 2, 1965, in order to clarify what a pastoral constitution is.[37] The footnote explains that "the constitution is called 'pastoral' because, while resting on doctrinal principles, it seeks to express the relation of the Church to the world and modern mankind." It concludes by pointing out that "some elements have a permanent value; others, only a transitory one," further stating that interpreters of the constitution must "bear in mind the changeable circumstances which the subject matter, by its very nature, involves."[38] While part 1 of *Gaudium et spes* certainly

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[33] *Acta synodalia* 4/1:565. Cardinal Silva Henriquez, for example, devotes his entire speech to this problem.

[34] *Acta synodalia* 4/6:702.

[35] *Acta synodalia* 4/7:468.

[36] National Catholic Welfare Conference and Floyd Anderson, *Council Daybook, Vatican II, Session 4* (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1965), 262.

[37] *Acta synodalia* 4/7:234-36.

[38] Norman Tanner, ed., *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* (London: Sheed and Ward; Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 2:1069.

contains some important if controversial theological anthropology and some doctrinal work, part 2 is largely a series of judgments in the prudential order that was appropriate for a particular time and place. As we will see below, the council clearly understood the place of *Sacrosantum concilium* to be similar to that of *Gaudium et spes*.

What is clear from this brief narrative is that the titles of these four conciliar constitutions were neither accidental nor poorly considered. In the end, the council fathers distinguished between the four constitutions, calling two "dogmatic constitutions," one a "pastoral constitution," and the last simply a "constitution." The fathers intended not only to distinguish the constitutions from decrees and declarations[39] but also to rank the relative theological importance of one constitution to another. As noted above, scholars have often either failed to identify or have been imprecise in identifying the exact way in which a particular constitution takes precedence over another. Clearly, if one is asking which document had the greatest effect on the pastoral life of the Church, then either *Gaudium et spes* or *Sacrosanctum concilium* is probably the most significant. The issue at hand here, however, is which constitution (or constitutions) has (or have) theological priority over the others. The preceding makes it clear that the council intended that *Gaudium et spes* and *Sacrosanctum concilium* be read in light of the dogmatic constitutions.

II. INTERTEXTUALITY OF THE CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS AND THE FOUR CONSTITUTIONS

Another way to determine the theological importance of a particular document is to examine the way in which the other promulgated documents either cross-reference it or show a

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[39] On November 19, 1965, Bishop Marcos McGrath was a guest speaker at a U.S. bishops' press panel, where he commented on the distinction between the various documents. First, he explained that the various designations were not following the use of past councils. Second, he ranked the decrees of the council in the following descending order of importance: constitutions, decrees, and declarations. See *Council Daybook, Vatican II, Session 4*, 262.

linguistic and/or a theological dependency on it. If the council fathers intended that *Sacrosanctum concilium* be the foundational text, for example, we would expect to see it cross-referenced repeatedly in the other documents or its major themes present in an identifiable way. It may be recalled that of the four constitutions, *Sacrosanctum concilium* was in the best position to influence the other council documents, since it was the first constitution to be promulgated. The reality, however, is that it is rarely cross-referenced by other documents, nor do the other documents often look to it for their theological themes. Instead, an examination of the cross-references of one conciliar document to another reveals the fundamental importance of *Lumen gentium*.

The following enumeration of the cross-references shows precisely this point. *Lumen gentium* cites *Sacrosanctum concilium* three times, but none of the citations reflect the dominant theological themes of the liturgical constitution. [40] *Gaudium et spes* cites *Lumen gentium* eighteen times and *Sacrosanctum concilium* once. [41] *Dei verbum* does not cite either *Lumen gentium*, *Gaudium et spes*, or *Sacrosanctum concilium*. If we turn to the decrees and declarations, one notices a similar pattern. *Christus Dominus* cites *Lumen gentium* ten times, *Sacrosanctum concilium* once, and *Dei verbum* not at all.[42] *Ad gentes* cites *Lumen gentium* thirty times, *Sacrosanctum concilium* twice, *Gaudium et spes* and *Dei verbum* once. [43] *Orientalium Ecclesiarum* cites *Sacrosanctum concilium* once.[44]

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[40] *LG* cites *SC* at: 28 n. 68, 50 n. 18, 51 n. 25.

[41] *GS* cites *LG* at: 21 n. 17, 22 n. 31, 32 n. 13, 40 n. 4, 40 n. 5, 40 n. 6, 40 n. 7, 42 n. 10, 42 n. 12, 43 n. 18, 43 n. 19, 43 n. 21, 44 n. 22, 44 n. 23, 45 n. 24, 48 n. 6, 62 n. 15, 76 n. 9; *SC* at: 62 n. 13; *OT* at: 62 n. 14; *IM* at: 64 n. 2; *GE* at: 62 n. 14.

[42] *CD* cites *LG* at: 2 n. 5, 3 n. 6, 4 n. 1, 4 n. 2, 4 n. 3, 4 n. 4, 5 n. 6, 12 n. 2, 12 n. 3, 15 n. 11; *SC* at: 15 n. 8; *UR* at: 16 n. 14; *IM* at: 13 n. 7; *OE* at: 11 n. 1, 23 n. 16.

[43] *AG* cites *LG* at: 1 n. 1, 2 n. 6, 3 n. 8, 4 n. 24, 4 n. 25, 7 n. 40, 9 n. 52, 14 n. 17, 14 n. 22, 15 n. 24, 15 n. 27, 15 n. 29, 15 n. 30, 15 n. 31, 15 n. 33, 15 n. 34, 16 n. 41, 18 n. 44, 20 n. 3, 22 n. 9, 22 n. 11, 23 n. 1, 25 n. 21, 28 n. 5, 29 n. 6, 38 n. 6, 39 n. 11, 40 n. 13, 41 n. 17, 41 n. 19; *SC* at: 14 n. 18, 16 n. 36; *DV* at: 15 n. 28; *GS* at: 13 n. 16; *UR* at: 6 n. 38, 16 n. 39, 36 n. 3; *DH* at: 13 n. 16; *OE* at: 15 n. 32; *AA* at: 15 n. 34; *OT* at: 16 n. 35, 16 n. 37, 19 n. 2, 25 n. 15, 26 n. 24; *PO* at: 19 n. 2, 20 n. 4, 27 n. 28; *CD* at: 30 n. 11, 31 n. 12, 32 n. 13, 38 n. 9.

[44] *OE* cites *SC* at: 20 n. 25.

Presbyterorum ordinis cites *Lumen gentium* sixteen times, *Sacrosanctum concilium* six times, and *Dei verbum* twice. [45] *Gravissimum educationis* cites *Lumen gentium* three times and *Sacrosanctum concilium* once. [46] *Nostra aetate* cites *Lumen gentium* once.[47] *Apostolicam actuositatem* cites *Lumen gentium* ten times and *Sacrosanctum concilium* twice.[48] *Optatam totius* cross references *Lumen gentium* eight times and *Sacrosanctum concilium* only three times. [49] The overwhelming numbers of cross-references, ninety-six, are taken from *Lumen gentium*, while only twenty are taken from *Sacrosanctum concilium*. Some documents (e.g., *Inter mirifica*, *Unitatis redintegratio*, *Perfectae caritatis*, and *Dignitatis humanae*) do not cross-reference any of the four constitutions.

The cross-references to *Lumen gentium* are often not just quantitatively greater; they are frequently qualitatively greater. *Optatam totius*, for example, mentions both *Lumen gentium* and *Sacrosanctum concilium*, but what is interesting is the way it discusses the two constitutions. Thus, *Optatam totius* states that in the teaching of canon law and of Church history one "should take into account the mystery of the Church, according to the dogmatic constitution 'De Ecclesia' promulgated by this sacred synod"; however, the teaching of sacred liturgy "should be taught according to the mind of articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy."[50] Canon law and Church history are to be taught simply according to *Lumen gentium*, while the teaching of liturgy should be taught according to only two specified articles of *Sacrosanctum concilium*. This is rather

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[45] *PO* cites *LG* at: 1 n.1, 2 n. 5, 2 n. 7, 2 n. 8, 2 n. 9, 2 n. 11, 4 n. 4, 5 n. 14, 6 n. 20, 7 n. 32, 7 n. 38, 9 n. 55, 9 n. 58, 16 n. 34, 16 n. 40, 18 n. 56; *SC* at: 1 n. 1, 4 n. 10, 4 n. 11, 5 n. 12, 5 n. 18, 13 n. 15; *UR* at: 9 n. 57; *OT* at: 1 n.1, 11 n. 65, 11 n. 67, 19 n. 59; *DV* at: 18 n. 55, 19 n. 58; *CD* at: 1 n. 1, 6 n. 30, 7 n. 40, 19 n. 60; *PC* at: 18 n. 55.
[46] *GE* cites *LG* at: Intro n. 4, 2 n. 9, 3 n. 12; *CD* at: 2 n. 10, 4 n. 16; *SC* at: 4 n. 17; *IM* at: 4 n. 18; *UR* at: 11 n. 35.
[47] *NA* cites *LG* at: 4 n. 11.
[48] *AA* cites *LG* at: 1 n. 2, 2 n. 2, 3 n. 3, 3 n. 4, 4 n. 6, 4 n. 7, 25 n. 4, 27 n. 10, 28 n. 1, 29 n. 3; *SC* at: 1 n. 2, 4 n. 5; *IM* at: 1 n. 2; *UR* at: 1 n. 2, 27 n. 9, 27 n. 10, 28 n. 1; *CD* at: 1 n. 2; *GE* at: 1 n. 2; *PC* at: 25 n. 6.
[49] *OT* cites *LG* at: 4 n. 7, 9 n. 17, 9 n. 19, 14 n. 28, 16 n. 31, 19 n. 42, 20 n. 45, 20 n. 46; *SC* at: 8 n. 15, 16 n. 37, 16 n. 39; *UR* at: 16 n. 40; *CD* at: 2 n. 5; *PC* at: 2 n. 5, 19 n. 42.
[50] *OT* 16 n. 39.

curious since one would have expected the council to command that the liturgy be taught according to the liturgical constitution's beautiful principles contained in articles 5-10, instead of simply commanding that the professors be trained in liturgical institutes (article 15) and that liturgy be taught according to its theological and "juridical" aspects (article 16).

Of course in some cases a document may not cross-reference another document but may still be theologically dependent on it. If we examine the number of documents that are theologically dependent on the various constitutions, the importance of *Lumen gentium* again stands out. *Unitatis redintegratio*, for example, does not cite a single document of the council, and yet it is clearly deeply dependent on *Lumen gentium* and is in fact best described as an implementing decree of *Lumen gentium*. The beginning of the decree affirms in article 1 its dependency on *Lumen gentium*'s "doctrine of the church."[51] Moreover, the decree borrows a number of elements directly from *Lumen gentium*—such as the teaching that it is in the Catholic Church that the Church of Christ subsists. [52] The decree is also dependent on *Lumen gentium* for its discussion of the necessity of the spiritual purification of the Church and the existence of "elements" of sanctification and truth outside of the Church.[53]

This same dependency is apparent in *Lumen gentium*'s other implementing decrees as well. *Orientalium Ecclesiarum*, for example, depends on articles 13 and 23, *Ad gentes* on article 17, *Christus Dominus* on articles 18-27, *Presbyterorum ordinis* on article 28, *Optatam totius* on article 28, *Apostolicam actuositatem* on articles 30-38, and *Perfectae caritatis* on articles 43-47. So not only is *Lumen gentium* the most frequently cross-referenced constitution, but entire sections of other documents are deeply dependent on its ecclesiological themes.

There are a number of important theological themes in *Sacrosanctum concilium*, such as the paschal mystery or the centrality of Scripture, which could appear in other documents,

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[51] *UR* 1.
[52] Johannes Feiner, "Commentary on the Decree," *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967) 2:85.
[53] Feiner, "Commentary on the Decree," 2:87, 73.

but the other conciliar documents do not appear dependent in any important way on the liturgical constitution. Perhaps the best candidate for demonstrating this dependency is the paschal mystery, which has been called the "Herz-wort"[54] of the council. Indeed, this theme is present in a number of other important conciliar texts, including *Christus Dominus*, *Ad gentes*, and *Gaudium et spes*; however, an examination of these texts does not show that there is any clear dependency on *Sacrosanctum concilium*. *Ad gentes*, for example, explicitly cites *Sacrosanctum concilium*,[55] but only one sentence is devoted to the topic, and even it follows a citation from *Lumen gentium*. Moreover, the ecclesiological themes in *Ad gentes*, which emphasize "cultivating a deep appreciation of the mystery of the Church," are clearly stronger than its liturgical themes.[56] *Christus Dominus*, too, refers to the paschal mystery, but it does not cross-reference the liturgical constitution; instead it cites Pius XII's *Mediator Dei* (1947) and Paul VI's *Mysterium Fidei* (1965).[57] Finally, *Gaudium et spes* has perhaps the longest reflection on the paschal mystery outside of *Sacrosanctum concilium*, but it, too, does not cross-reference the liturgical constitution, preferring instead to cite biblical passages, nor does it borrow thematic lines of development from the liturgical constitution.[58] It would seem, then, that *Sacrosanctum concilium*'s discussion of the paschal mystery had little effect on the other documents. The more likely origin of this theme in the other documents is the theological milieu of the two decades preceding the council.[59]

Another important theme of *Sacrosanctum concilium* is the centrality of Scripture, but this too shows little influence on the

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[54] Cited in Faggioli, *True Reform*, 9.

[55] *SC* 14 n. 18.

[56] *AG* 16.

[57] *CD* 15 n. 9.

[58] *GS* 22.

[59] See for example Louis Bouyer, *The Paschal Mystery; Meditations on the Last Three Days of Holy Week* (Chicago: Regnery Press, 1950); idem, *Liturgical Piety* (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1955); Joseph Schmitt, *Jésus ressuscité dans la prédication apostolique; Etude de théologie biblique* (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1949); F.-X. Durrwell, *The Resurrection: A Biblical Study* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960).

other documents.[60] There is no direct evidence of influence since none of the other documents cross-reference *Sacrosanctum concilium* in this respect. Moreover, it is far more likely that this theme is derivative of the themes ubiquitous throughout theological discussions amongst French and German theologians in the decades leading up to the council. These theologians eventually either became *periti* of the council or accompanied their bishops and ended up assisting most of the commissions in writing and revising schemata.[61] A case in point is *Dei verbum*, which drew many of its ideas from previous magisterial documents and theories which were prevalent in the 1950s. Thus *Dei verbum* cross-references *Sacrosanctum concilium* exactly zero times but cites Vatican I's *Dei filius* seven times and cites Pius XII six times.

One could ask why *Dei verbum*, the other dogmatic constitution, is more authoritative than *Sacrosanctum concilium*, given that it is cross-referenced less frequently than *Lumen gentium* and even less than *Sacrosanctum concilium*. We can recall of course that the council fathers intended that a dogmatic constitution have more teaching authority than a simple constitution, and the council made its intention clear when it labeled *Dei verbum* a dogmatic constitution. *Dei verbum* underwent a development similar to *Lumen gentium* with respect to its title: the term "dogmatic" was dropped from the title of the second schema only to be replaced in the third.[62]

Another curious event makes it clear that *Dei verbum* and *Lumen gentium* have the same authority. A number of fathers apparently asked what theological qualification was to be given to the dogmatic constitution *Dei verbum*. Cardinal Felici said on November 15, 1964, that the answer was identical to the

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[60] Faggioli, "*Sacrosanctum concilium* and the Meaning of Vatican II," 451; idem, *True Reform*, 50.

[61] Jared Wicks S.J., "Theologians at Vatican Council II," in Wicks, *Doing Theology*, 187-223, esp. 214-20. See also Jared Wicks's substantial contributions to this problem in his articles, "New Light on Vatican Council II," *The Catholic Historical Review* 92, no. 4 (October 2006): 609-28; "More Light on Vatican Council II," *The Catholic Historical Review* 94, no. 1 (January 2008): 75-101.

[62] Francisco Gil Hellín, *Concilii Vaticani II Synopsis: Constitutio Dogmatica De Divina Revelatione Dei verbum* (Vatican City: Libreria editrice vaticana, 1993), 3.

notificatio concerning *Lumen gentium*.[63] The text of this *notificatio* was then distributed to the council fathers the next day.[64] The fundamental importance of *Dei verbum* is further confirmed by two important remarks made during the council. First, the theological commission on September 20, 1965, stated that *De revelatione* was "in a certain way the first of the all of the constitutions of this council, so that it is introduces them all as their preface in a certain way."[65] On October 29, 1965, in preparation for the final vote, Cardinal Ermenegildo Florit noted in his *relatio* for the doctrinal commission that *Dei verbum* "formed the very connection among all the questions treated by this Council. It places us at the very heart of the mystery of the Church and at the epicenter of ecumenical problems."[66]

I would contend that the paucity of references to *Dei verbum* in the other conciliar documents is simply in human terms an accident of history. The *Schema constitutionis dogmaticae de fontibus revelationis* of 1962 was thought to be too scholastic.[67] Consequently, in later 1962 and early 1963, it was revised by the Mixed Commission amid much contention over the relative extent of Scripture and Tradition and was delivered to the

[63] *Acta synodalia* 4/6:419.

[64] *Acta synodalia* 4/6:571. While almost all English editions contain the *notificatio* given concerning *Lumen genitum*, Tanner, Flannery, and Abbott all fail to give the *notificatio* concerning *Dei verbum*. Even Hünermann only mentions it in the historical material but without specifying the content, and he does not give the text: Peter Hünermann, Helmut Hoping, Robert L. Fastiggi, Anne Englund Nash, and Heinrich Denzinger, eds., *Compendium of Creeds, Definitions, and Declarations on Matters of Faith and Morals*, 43rd edition (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2012), 968. This notification is given at the end of *Dei verbum* in the Latin edition of the documents of the Second Vatican Council. Vatican Council, *Constitutiones, decreta, declarationes* (Rome: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis, 1966), 456. The Vatican edition, however, gives both the incorrect date (Nov. 15) and session (171) for the distribution of the document.

[65] "quod haec Constitutio quodammodo est prima omnium Constitutionum huius Concilii, ita ut eius Prooemium omnia quodammodo introducat" (*Acta synodalia* 4/1:341).

[66] "Ante oculos habetis exiguae quidem molis documentum, at simul momenti doctrinalis summi. Ipsum relationem plerumque directam dicit cum omnibus ab hoc Concilio pertractatis quaestionibus; nosque ponit in corde ipso mysterii Ecclesiae et in epicentro problematis oecumenismi" (*Acta synodalia* 4/5:741).

[67] Riccardo Burigana, *La Bibbia nel concilio: La redazione della constituzione "Dei verbum" del Vaticano II*, Testi e ricerche di scienze religiose, n.s. 21 (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 1998), 514.

Coordinating Commission on May 24, 1963. This text also failed to please a significant number of fathers, as they indicated by letters. At the end of the second period, Paul VI put *De revelatione* on the agenda.[68] An emended text was finally sent out to all the fathers on July 14, 1964.[69] The point is that *De revelatione* was simply not in a condition to be mined for use by other documents, and therefore we do not see the same type of cross-referencing that we do with *Lumen gentium*.

It is not only *Dei verbum's* status as a "dogmatic constitution" that merits its theological priority. Its deeply theological content too merits its theological priority over the other nondogmatic constitutions. It draws richly from the biblical and patristic renewal in theology—as is evident in its citations—but it also makes repeated citations from magisterial documents. Moreover, the opening line sets the tone of the entire document as the council hears and proclaims the theological priority of God's word and the fellowship that God desires to have with man. This is an important point about the nature of God's Word: it is not only normative as it is transmitted in Scripture and Tradition, but it also establishes a relationship whereby God enters in a loving dialogue with human beings so that he can, through Christ and the Holy Spirit, bring men into communion with himself.[70] God the Father sent the Son as the fulfillment of revelation, and his "gospel is the source of all saving truth and moral discipline" (*DV* 4). This brief treatment should make it clear that the council has situated its doctrine of revelation in its proper theological and soteriological framework.

[68] *Acta synodalia* 2/6:566-67.
[69] *Acta synodalia* 4/1:49.
[70] Avery Dulles, "Revelation, Scripture, and Tradition," in Charles W. Colson and Richard John Neuhaus, eds., *Your Word Is Truth: A Project of Evangelicals and Catholics Together* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans, 2002), 38; Albert Vanhoye, "The Reception in the Church of the Dogmatic Constitution *Dei verbum*," in José Granados, Carlos Granados, and Luis Sánchez-Navarro, eds., *Opening up the Scriptures: Joseph Ratzinger and the Foundations of Biblical Interpretation* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans, 2008), 113. Gregory Baum, "Vatican II's Constitution on Revelation: History and Interpretations," *Theological Studies* 28 (1967): 59.

This short account of the internal theological merits of *Dei verbum* also helps to clarify the relationship between it and the other constitutions. We see immediately the relationship between *Dei verbum* and *Lumen gentium*. Like *Dei verbum*, *Lumen gentium* begins with an affirmation that the goal of the council is to bring Christ to all men "by proclaiming the Gospel to every creature" (*LG* 1). *Lumen gentium* affirms that God chose to create the universe and "raise men up to share in his own divine life" (*LG* 1), while *Dei verbum* affirms that God communicated himself in the very act of creation; so by creation and supernatural revelation we may come to know God (*DV* 3). The Church was instituted in order to carry out this desire of the Father (*LG* 3), and so the task of announcing the gospel to the whole world belongs to the body of pastors (*LG* 23). *Dei verbum* makes clear that the bishops succeed to the teaching office of Christ's apostles "in order that the Gospel might be preserved completely and vitally in the Church" (*DV* 7). The "authentic interpretation of the Word of God . . . has been entrusted to the living teaching office of the church alone"; but the magisterium is not "superior to the Word of God, but is its servant" (*DV* 10). In these ways one can see the theologically symbiotic relationship between *Dei verbum* and *Lumen gentium*.

Finally, *Dei verbum* is key to understanding both *Gaudium et spes* and *Sacrosanctum concilium*. First, while *Gaudium et spes* is an implementing constitution of *Lumen gentium*, it also depends on *Dei verbum*, for, in so far as the Church is the servant of God's Word, revelation remains essential for understanding the Church's relationship to the world. So *Dei verbum* states that "the gospel is the source of all saving truth and moral discipline." The Gospel must remain the root of all the Church's pastoral action, which is ordered to a soteriological end. Consequently, it must be recalled that whatever is "pastoral" finds its origin in the Gospel and must be judged against the Gospel.[71] Second, *Dei verbum* also gives the under-

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[71] Consequently, one should note the important pastoral orientation which, some rightly argue, *Gaudium et spes* gave to moral theology. Surely, the importance of God's Word to moral theology is one of the most important fruits of *Dei verbum* after the

lying reason for *Sacrosanctum concilium*'s call for the re-
discovery of the centrality of Scripture in the liturgy. The
Scriptures are not important because they are present in the
liturgy, but rather they are present in the liturgy because they
are the Word of God. Moreover, it must be stated that the
liturgy itself is a response to God's Word, and therefore God's
Word provides the theological basis for any liturgical reform.[72]

III. THE GENIUS AND LIMITS OF
SACROSANCTUM CONCILIUM AND *GAUDIUM ET SPES*

The theological priority of *Lumen gentium* and *Dei verbum*
does not lessen the ecclesial significance of either *Sacrosanctum
concilium* or *Gaudium et spes*; rather it properly situates the
latter two constitutions in their historical and theological signi-
ficance. The two dogmatic constitutions provide the doctrinal
basis for the pastoral explanations and decisions of the other
two constitutions. The entire council is fundamentally a pastoral
exercise, as John XXIII made clear in his opening speech to the
council. In this speech, the pope asserted that while defending
and promoting doctrine are the principal tasks of the council,[73]
this task was not to be understood as simply guarding the
deposit of faith or repeating that which was said in the past.
Instead, the pope argued that it is necessary that "the whole of
Christian doctrine" be preserved "with no part of it lost," and
that because this doctrine is "certain and unchangeable," it must
always have "the same meaning and the same judgment."[74] But
this deposit of faith must be investigated and presented in the
way demanded by the needs of the time, and thus the pastoral
nature of the teaching office consists in presenting the undiluted
faith in a new way. John finally noted that this task "will
require a great deal of work" and patience befitting a teaching

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council. See M. Cathleen Kaveny, "The Spirit of Vatican II and Moral Theology," in
James Heft and John W. O'Malley, *After Vatican II: Trajectories and Hermeneutics*
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans, 2012), 43-67.
    [72] Söding, "Die Zeit für Gottes Wort," 443.
    [73] John XXIII, *Gaudet mater ecclesia*, 5 (*Acta synodalia* 1/1:170).
    [74] Ibid., 6 (*Acta synodalia* 1/1:172).

authority which is "primarily pastoral in character." [75] Ultimately, for John XXIII the council was pastoral, not in the sense of being less than doctrinal but in the sense of being more than merely doctrinal,[76] seeking in a new way to bring people to know Christ and his gospel, which is the primary reason the Church teaches through her magisterium. While *Lumen gentium* and *Dei verbum* are both pastoral texts, they are also fundamentally doctrinal documents.

The pastoral nature of the council documents, however, can be understood in both a broad and narrow sense, as Walter Cardinal Kasper has observed. In the broad sense the dogmatic constitutions are pastoral, in so far as any authentic teaching that results from the pastoral magisterium is by definition pastoral. In a narrower sense, the conciliar documents are

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[75] Ibid.

[76] O'Malley often emphasizes the "style" of Vatican II and no doubt its style was important to its message; however, his discussion of "style" is often inscrutable and philosophically and theologically misleading. He writes, "Style? Is that really important? Indeed it is. The style of our nation is democratic. Without that style, there is no United States. What made Michelangelo a great painter was not what he painted but how he painted, his style. My 'how,' my 'style' better expresses who I am than my 'what.' The 'what' of John O'Malley—priest, historian and so forth—is important, but style is the expression of my deepest personality. 'The style is the man.' Style makes me who I am. 'What kind of person is John O'Malley?' Kind and considerate, or cunning and contrived? That is a question about style. If I am loved, I'm loved for my how; and if I get to heaven, I will get there because of my how" (John W. O'Malley, "The Style of Vatican II," *America* [23 Feb. 2003], 13-14). See also John W. O'Malley, *What Happened at Vatican II* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2008), 305-13. There are three fundamental problems with O'Malley's misleading emphasis on the style of Vatican II. First, his analogy seems to locate the significance of the human person in his style; but it is not, to use O'Malley's analogy, primarily even the priest and historian that make O'Malley significant, much less his style, but rather the fact that he is a person. As a person, he is a "who" which precedes his "how." After all, there can be no style of Michelangelo without Michelangelo. What is more, some persons never develop while others eventually lose their style, such as those in a vegetative state, but this does not subtract anything from their value precisely because they are humans made in the image and likeness of God. Second, when it comes to salvation, any person is saved, if he is saved, not principally on account of his style or how but because of the "who" (i.e., Christ), and the "what" (i.e., created grace) that is bestowed on him in baptism. Third, the fundamental reason that the Church teaches through her magisterium is in order to assist persons to come to know a "who" (i.e., Christ himself as the Son of the living God), and to deliver his salutary message (i.e., the gospel). Thus, the point of the teaching of the Church's magisterium is principally not about how a message is delivered but about the "who" and the "what" of that message. This is made clear in one of the most celebrated affirmations in *Dei verbum,* that it is "Christ the Lord in whom the full revelation of the supreme God is brought to completion" (*DV* 7).

pastoral insofar as they apply moral principles to particular situations.[77] This is precisely the genius of *Sacrosanctum concilium* and *Gaudium et spes*: each in its own way is ultimately to be understood as applying to the concrete historical reality of the Church a series of norms that flow from general principles—not only the principles contained within themselves, but more fundamentally the principles contained in the two dogmatic constitutions.

What does *Sacrosanctum concilium* set out to accomplish? It does not make the assertion that it is the theological key to understanding the other conciliar documents. Its stated aim is important but modest: the "promotion and reform of the liturgy" (*SC* 1). The liturgical constitution does not intend to give a comprehensive account of the liturgy or a particular theological account of the supernatural mysteries, unlike *Lumen gentium* and *Dei verbum*. Rather it gives sound but brief theological principles on which the practical norms for the actual reform of the liturgy can depend. This is why the overwhelming portion of the text is devoted to matters of the prudential order, which simply do not require the same kind of assent as does doctrine. For example, one need not even believe that the council's decision that there should be a revision of the rites is either good or prudent. One need not believe that "an even more radical adaptation of the liturgy is needed" (*SC* 40). This is not a matter of faith and morals and therefore does not require either the assent of faith or that it be firmly accepted and held; it simply requires obedience.

The principal reason that *Sacrosanctum concilium* will not bear the weight of being *the* theological key to the conciliar documents is that it is often a series of pastorally inspired juridical directives with little theological reasoning. Certainly articles 5 through 12 of chapter 1 are not only deeply theological but even partly dogmatic in character. But when a comparison is made between the theological portions of the constitution and those that are juridical/pastoral, it is difficult to

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[77] Walter Kasper, *Theology and Church,* trans. Margaret Kohl (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 173-74.

see how *Sacrosanctum concilium* can bear the weight of having theological priority. Thus in chapter 1, eight articles (5-12) are properly theological while the remaining articles (13-46) discuss norms for the reform of the sacred liturgy. Some of these norms contain important theological principles, but they are not developed theologically. Chapter 2, on the Eucharist, contains only two articles (47 and 48) that are theological, while ten articles (49-58) are about the revision of the liturgical texts associated with the Eucharistic liturgy. Similarly, in chapter 3, on the sacraments and other sacramentals, there are three theological articles (59-61) devoted to five sacraments and all the sacramentals, while twenty-one articles (62 to 82) are concerned with revision of the liturgical texts associated with these. In chapter 3, the discussion on the use of vernacular in sacramental administration is almost as long as the theological discussion of the six sacraments other than the Eucharist. In chapter 4, on the divine office, four articles (83-86) are theological, and fourteen articles (87-100) discuss the reform of the divine office. Within chapter 5, on the liturgical year, five articles (102-6) are theological, while five articles (107-11) merely advise revision. Chapter 6, speaking on sacred music, only devotes one article (112) to a theological discussion of the role of music in the liturgy, while nine articles (113-21) discuss practical issues about types of music, inculturation, the role of instruments, and composers. On the role of instruments or types of sacred music, for example, the council fails to give the theological justification for its assertions. We are simply told that "the church recognized Gregorian chant as being specially suited to the Roman liturgy" and "the pipe organ is to be held in high esteem." Similarly chapter 7, on sacred art, has only one article (122) that is theological in nature, while eight articles (123-30) are not theological. Clearly, then, the bulk of almost every chapter is devoted to the rather practical matter of reforming the liturgy with proportionately little accompanying theological material. This becomes even more obvious when one quantifies this proportion: 2025 words in the Latin text are

devoted to the theology of the liturgy, while 5664 words are devoted to a consideration of the reforms of the liturgy,[78] which means that only approximately 26 percent of the text is devoted to a theological discussion of the liturgy.

The genius of *Sacrosanctum concilium* is precisely its practical orientation. From the very beginning, the plan of the constitution on the liturgy, *Schema constitutionis de Sacra liturgia*, had a practical orientation, which is why, according to the initial seven schemata sent to the council fathers, it was supposed to be considered fifth in line, after the four dogmatic constitutions.[79] This is confirmed in the preface to the document, where its goal is not that something be defined dogmatically but that principles "be called to mind, and that practical norms should be established."[80] Each successive draft of this schema shows its largely practical orientation.[81] As noted above, Vagaggini's article asserted that the purpose of the schema was to establish general principles in order to promote and reform the liturgy.[82] During the second period of the council, work continued on the schema and maintained this practical and pastoral orientation. Ultimately this practical orientation of *Sacrosanctum concilium* is confirmed both by the decree itself and by Pope Paul VI's speech immediately after its promulgation. The decree states that its intent is for the "reform and promotion of the liturgy" (*SC* 1, 4), to which, as shown above, the overwhelming majority of the document is devoted.

[78] The breakdown by chapter of the words devoted to theology as compared to those dealing with the reform of the liturgy is as follows: chap. 1: 958/2164; chap. 2: 137/535; chap. 3: 173/819; chap. 4: 224/780; chap. 5: 243/431; chap. 6: 126/457; and chap. 7: 164/478. It must be admitted that there are theological claims in the reform sections, but these are occasional and almost never developed.

[79] Alberigo and Komonchak, *History of Vatican II*, 1:415. *Schemata constitutionum et decretorum de quibus disceptabitur in Concilii sessionibus*, Series Prima, 269-71.

[80] "Quare sacrosanctum concilium, dum declarat se in praesenti Constitutione nihil velle dogmatice definire, de fovenda tamen atque instauranda Liturgia quae sequuntur principia censet in mentem revocanda et practicas normas statuendas esse" (*Schemata constitutionum et decretorum de quibus disceptabitur in Concilii sessionibus*, Series Prima, 157).

[81] See Francisco Gil Hellín, *Concilii Vaticani II synopsis in ordinem redigens schemata cum relationibus necnon patrum orationes atque animadversiones: Constitutio de sacra liturgia Sacrosanctum concilium* (Vatican City: Libreria editrice vaticana, 2003).

[82] See note 23.

In Pope Paul VI's allocution on December 4, 1963, after the promulgation of *Sacrosanctum concilium,* there is not a single word about any of the main theological themes of *Sacrosanctum concilium.* Instead he sums up the document in a mere four paragraphs as a pastoral concern about the revision of the liturgy.[83] This can be contrasted with his allocution after the promulgation of *Lumen gentium,* where he reflects on the theological insights of the document for seven pages.[84]

The same pastoral genius is at work in *Gaudium et spes,* but this strength also points to its limits. Three important facts must be recalled about this "pastoral constitution" which speak to its theological limits. First, the constitution presupposed the doctrinal content of *Lumen gentium.* As we have noted, both the text and the appended note state its dependence on the dogmatic constitution on the Church. This is not to deny that a number of its articles, particularly in the first part of the document, are still theologically crucial for how the Church looks at the world. Article 22 especially is one of the most theologically significant passages of the entire council. Other assertions on moral issues such as abortion and euthanasia in part 2 remain doctrinally significant, as Pope John Paul II repeatedly asserted.[85] Ultimately, however, whatever is stated in

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[83] *Acta synodalia* 2/6:565-66.

[84] *Acta synodalia* 3/8:910-17.

[85] John Paul II repeatedly speaks of the authoritative nature of the moral judgments of *Gaudium et spes* and authoritatively reaffirms those judgments. Thus he writes, "The Second Vatican Council, in a passage which retains all its relevance today, forcefully condemned a number of crimes and attacks against human life. Thirty years later, taking up the words of the Council and with the same forcefulness I repeat that condemnation in the name of the whole Church, certain that I am interpreting the genuine sentiment of every upright conscience: 'Whatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia, or willful self-destruction, whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, torments inflicted on body or mind, attempts to coerce the will itself; whatever insults human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and children; as well as disgraceful working conditions, where people are treated as mere instruments of gain rather than as free and responsible persons; all these things and others like them are infamies indeed. They poison human society, and they do more harm to those who practice them than to those who suffer from the injury. Moreover, they are a supreme dishonor to the Creator'" (John Paul II, *Evangelium vitae* 3).

Gaudium et spes finds its broader theological context in *Lumen gentium* and *Dei verbum*.

Second, *Gaudium et spes* was addressed not only to Catholics but "to the whole of humanity," and so its theological claims are often left undeveloped and remain on a relatively simple level. This helps to explain why, even in part 1, the most theological part of the document, it rarely goes beyond simple catechetical assertions. Thus in its discussion of "the dignity of man," one is informed that man is made in the image of God, but without any discussion of what an image is. In the following section on sin, we learn that man frequently serves creatures rather than creator, that man is drawn to many evils, that man is divided in himself, and that man is unable to overcome the assaults of evil by himself. In the section on the essential nature of man, man is made of body and soul, man must honor his body, and man's life is not exhausted in bodily pursuits. In the section on the dignity of moral conscience, we are told that "conscience is man's most secret core, and his sanctuary," a beautiful but hardly adequate theological definition of conscience. Much more could be said, but as can be seen in this brief summary, *Gaudium et spes* hardly provides the basis for a theological reading of the other constitutions, even if it remains the basis for a pastoral approach to engagement with our times.[86]

Third, the document was intended to be a response not to the Church in "the modern world,"[87] as if the modern world were a static entity with clearly defined boundaries, but rather to "the Church in these times," that is, the 1960s. This is evident from the note appended to the title, which states that

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[86] The importance of the pastoral language of the council, which is "values-expressive," cannot be overlooked, as O'Malley has repeatedly shown (see O'Malley, *What Happened at Vatican II*, passim).

[87] Many translations of the title of the pastoral constitution give this impression. Thus, Flannery's translation is "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World" and Abbott's is the same. Tanner's is perhaps closest: "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the World of Today." To the unreflective reader, however, this could give the impression that "today" is actually today and not the 1960s. This problem of the concept of "modernity" and the "modern world" in relation to *Gaudium et spes* has been raised by Tracey Rowland, *Culture and the Thomist Tradition: After Vatican II* (London: Routledge, 2005), 12-13.

some of its subject matter is "contingent," warning that the constitution should "be interpreted according to the general norms of theological interpretation and with due regard, especially in the second part, for the naturally changing circumstances of the matters treated."[88] This helps to explain why this document is often criticized for being the most dated of the conciliar documents.[89] Of course, some of its claims remain as true today as they were in the 1960s. One need only think of its discussion of atheism or the observation that "many of our contemporaries seem to fear that a closer bond between human activity and religion will work against the independence of men, of societies, or of the sciences."[90] But others seem increasingly less applicable, such as, "Believers and unbelievers all agree almost unanimously that all things on earth should be ordained to man as to their source and summit."[91] Moreover, there are a significant number of claims that are not at all theological, such as "As for the family, discord results from population, economic and social pressures, or from difficulties which arise between succeeding generations, or from new social relationships between men and women."[92] These limits must not be seen as flaws of the document or something that renders it

[88] Tanner, ed., *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 2:1069.

[89] After spending nine pages examining "what *Gaudium et Spes* missed," George Weigel concludes, "Read from the vantage point of today, *Gaudium et Spes* does suffer from a kind of historical myopia. The document's description of the key cultural challenges of 'the modern world' sheds some light on the situation in the period 1945–1965; but that analysis does not anticipate, much less describe, the end of late modernity and the rise of post-modernity that followed the flashpoint of '1968.' Yet the Pastoral Constitution's analysis is both correct (for its time) and prescient (with reference to the impending future) on what is perhaps the crucial point: in both the late modern world of Vatican II and the post-modern world of today, the anthropological question is fundamental" (George Weigel, "Rescuing *Gaudium et Spes*: The New Humanism of John Paul II," *Nova et Vetera*, English Edition, 8 (2010): 251-67, at 259-60. For some there is probably no more telling indication of *Gaudium et spes*' temporal limitation than the change from its largely positive account of culture to John Paul II's language of "the culture of death." On "the culture of death" see the collection of essays in Luke Gormally and the International Conference on "The Great Jubilee and the Culture of Life," *Culture of Life - Culture of Death: Proceedings of the International Conference on "the Great Jubilee and the Culture of Life"* (London: Linacre Centre, 2002).

[90] *GS* 36 (*DH* 4336).

[91] *GS* 12 (*DH* 4312).

[92] *GS* 8 (*DH* 4308).

"outdated" but rather as a necessary part of the Church's pastoral response to an ever changing world. As long as the world continues to change, the Church, as it did in *Gaudium et spes*, will have to find ever new modes of expression for its pastoral response.

<div align="center">CONCLUSION</div>

While luminous in their content and normative in their fundamental judgments, *Sacrosanctum concilium* and *Gaudium et spes* simply cannot bear the weight of being the hermeneutical keys to the Second Vatican Council, since this claim cannot be justified on either theological or historical grounds.

Several things are clear about *Sacrosanctum concilium*. First, even though *Sacrosanctum concilium* was the first document of the council, it had little influence on subsequent documents. Moreover, the other documents did not rely on *Sacrosanctum concilium* for their theological themes. Further, most of the document is concerned not with a theological explanation of the liturgy but with certain briefly treated principles for the "promotion and reform" of the liturgy, with very practical directives for the revision of the various rites and determination of who has the authority to administer the reform.

Lumen gentium emerges as the most influential document of the council, and it is cross-referenced more than any other document. Its theological themes form the basis for substantial aspects of at least nine other documents, which are in meaningful ways dependent on it.

Lastly, the council's deliberate designation of *Lumen gentium* and *Dei verbum* as dogmatic constitutions raised their authoritative level above the other documents, so that these two together form a kind of *primus inter pares* and, as such, a key to all the other documents as well as to the two other constitutions, *Gaudium et spes* and *Sacrosanctum concilium*.

The analysis contained in this article seeks to restore a basic but essential heurmentical principle, found in the documents themselves, that has been obscured during the postconciliar

period. *Lumen gentium* 25 laid out a basic principle for understanding documents of the ordinary papal magisterium, namely, that the pope's mind and will in doctrinal matters "may be known either from the character of the documents, from his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from his manner of speaking." This is equally true of other magisterial texts; the mind of the council can be known in part from the "character of the documents." Establishing the relative importance of texts is, consequently, an essential first step in evaluating precisely what was in the mind and will of the council for the Church, a step, moreover, which has been overlooked by much of current scholarship on the council.

BOOK REVIEWS

This massive collection of essays will prove indispensable for anyone familiar with the English language who wishes to know, in depth and detail, the story of Catholic theology in recent times. And the surprising thing is, it will serve almost equally well those who want not so much to chronicle the past as to find inspiration now.

That this text can simultaneously serve such different ends reflects the quality of much of the contributors' thinking. But the editors must be allotted their fair share of the praise as well, not only for the competence with which they have selected these contributors, but also, and especially, for the comprehensiveness of their overall vision. Their roving eye takes in not only historic Modernism, itself a defective predecessor of the "new theology," but also the Scholasticism that was *ressourcement* theology's chief competitor—and yet also knew a "going back to the sources" in the historical St. Thomas himself. Their view ranges over not only the philosophical culture which gave this theological movement some of its characteristic preoccupations but also the relations with theology in other Christian traditions (specifically the Reformed and the Eastern Orthodox) to which it was indebted and which in turn it influenced (if, in the Protestant case, with less effect). Given the revisiting of a single overall theme from many angles, there is inevitably going to be some repetition in the narrative element. This is so most notably in the case of the difficulties involving Marie-Dominique Chenu's manifesto for that celebrated school of theology, Le Saulchoir, and the events which led the Society of Jesus to sideline the person and publications of Henri de Lubac for a decade.

Some will find rather out of place the treatments of Karl Rahner and Teilhard de Chardin who, by *ressourcement* criteria, are for the most part eccentrics even if each was also outstanding, respectively, in his conceptual and his imaginative power. But insofar as either was influenced by the patristic revival, at least in his early work (Rahner), or shows some sort of affinity to patristic thought or sensibility, albeit impressionistically (Teilhard), their inclusion is presumably justified. Certainly it testifies to the editorial desire to leave no stone unturned. In that perspective, an opening chapter on Jansenism, considered as a precursor to the neo-patristic writers, is another case in point. Oddly, this essay does not consider the doctrinal crux of Jansenism in the theology of grace or pay much attention to the unilaterally Augustinian nature of its patristic

concern. Rather, the question on which it focuses is the consonance of *ressourcement* with Jansenism's method and pastoral policy.

In this study as a whole, the matter of theological method is never far beyond the horizon. Though highly sympathetic to the approach of the *ressourcement* school, the editors recognize that this movement is not without its limitations, or disadvantages. While the chapters on biblical exegesis and the liturgy read a trifle complacently, elsewhere the currently resurfacing anxieties about the movement's deficits—notably the lack of a clear ontological underpinning for Catholic theology and too rich a diet of historical pluralism for a coherent ecclesial culture—find their due acknowledgment.

I hope these remarks suffice to give an idea of the book's implicit program and amplitude. The resultant *embarras de richesse* is, however, something of a problem for the reviewer. An adequate discussion would require an article as substantial in its own genre as this book. If instead I concentrate now on what I take to be weaknesses, or at any rate *lacunae,* in the arguments rehearsed, it is not because of any lack of admiration for its achievement (and that of the movement it celebrates), but it is rather that I would like to see certain themes further explored and the movement as a whole more fully related to the intellectual needs of the Church.

From this perspective, an absolutely crucial topic is the relation of the "new theology" to historic Modernism—the "new theology" defined here as biblical, patristic, and liturgical *ressourcement*, or the recovery of pre-Scholastic sources. Internal evidence suggests that the editors may have encouraged authors to bear each other's material in mind where this question was concerned. Rightly so. If, as Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange held, *la nouvelle théologie* was essentially heading back to historic Modernism, then Catholic apologetics would face a problem, given the new theology's impact on the Second Vatican Council, an impact Garrigou's mental deterioration in the years immediately preceding his death saved him from witnessing. There is a difficulty here for the coherence of Catholic doctrine between the pontificates of Pius X and Paul VI, and, as a consequence, for the wider credibility of the Catholic Church as, in the words of the New Testament, the pillar and foundation of the truth. The contributors to this volume are in dispute about the matter, chiefly because they are not in agreement on what degree of apophaticism is appropriate, or tolerable, when describing the relation between the revealed divine mystery, the conceptual and imagistic vehicles of revelation, and the doctrinal propositions put forward for our assent by the Church. It is curious, though perhaps not astonishing in the present-day context, that a Reformed theologian is far more cautious in ascribing to *la nouvelle théologie* a covert intellectual sympathy with Modernism than is a co-writer who happens to be in communion (if not also at peace) with the Holy See. What is agreed between Hans Boersma and Gerard Loughlin is that Modernists (of whom, fairly enough, Tyrrell is taken as emblematic) and the protagonists of the new theology strongly disliked neo-Scholasticism (or, more widely the "Baroque" theology Yves Congar and Chenu sought consciously to displace). What is not agreed is whether Tyrrell, say, desiring to restrain an excessively affirmative theology insufficiently respectful of mystery, espouses a quasi-agnosticism that differs *in kind* from the reaction against an exclusively propositional

view of revelation accepted by, say, Henri de Lubac. In the course of their exchange, if it may be called such, the name of St. Thomas is invoked, notably via such influential commentators as the English Dominicans Victor White and Herbert McCabe, both of whom strongly emphasized St. Thomas's self-restraint in his doctrine of God. The questions about the interrelations among language, truth, and logic, especially against the background of St. Thomas's theology of God, have immediate ecclesial import for Catholics when the point of raising them is to clarify the relationship (or lack thereof) between Modernism and the "new theology."

That is one area which cries out for sharper analysis. Another concerns St. Thomas as well. Though, plainly, commentatorial Thomism differs considerably from *ressourcement* Thomism and the wider *ressourcement* project in genre, manner, and ethos, the extent to which disagreements on substantive issues divide these two groups of writers is not always so clear. On the theological unknowability of the divine essence, for instance, few statements could be more radically apophatic—and ostensibly less threatening to the new theology—than Garrigou's assertion that the quiddity of God is utterly unknown. To my mind, the role played by Blondelianism also figures here. Contemporaries found Blondel's philosophy of immanence to be an alternative to the *philosophia perennis* of the established schools. Yet the (otherwise excellent) essay on Blondel found in this collection stops short of the "Thomistic turn" of his later philosophy, and hence leaves us ignorant of how the author views the possible complementarity between Blondel's later trilogy and his early philosophy of action. Blondel's *L'Action* itself suggests that a theistic ontology not necessarily so different from that of Christian Scholastics comes into view once the reflective person has reached the culminating point of the anthropological dialectic which is its subject-matter.

More widely on the issue of St. Thomas and the Thomists, one should note that de Lubac was happy to salute Thomas as the "common doctor" though not as the "exclusive doctor." How should the distinction between commonness and exclusivity best be understood? I do not think the last word on "Thomism and the *nouvelle théologie*" has been spoken. Anecdotally, I remember visiting the cell of Marie-Michel Labourdette, O.P., in Toulouse in the summer of (I believe) 1973. Though I was too much of a beginner in the history of theology to know of his role as the hammer applied to the *ressourcement* Jesuits in the controversies that underlay the encyclical *Humani generis*, I could still note enviously how the walls of his room were lined by volumes of . . . *Sources chrétiennes*.

I said that this book is frequently inspiring as well as informative, and it will be well to close with some examples to whet the appetite. I think of the pages devoted to Louis Bouyer's account of the interrelation of word, mystery, and liturgy; to the consonance between the *ressourcement* writers and Charles Journet on the Church as theological person; to Joseph Ratzinger's retrieval of the Christian Platonism of Augustine; and on an ecumenical rather than an intra-Catholic note, to the "mutual benefit" that accrued in the French patristic revival and the renewal of Russian Orthodox theology at the Institut Saint-Serge and elsewhere.

I strongly believe that, the rightful pluralism of Catholic theology notwithstanding, there is a real ecclesial need to move forward to a fresh

synthesis, comparable in its range and quality to that offered by Thomas in his own time. The thinking surveyed in this book will play its part in such an undertaking, and indeed, so may the book itself (not least in the highly original essay in [historically referenced] speculative theology offered by the American Jesuit Stephen Fields). There can be no perfect unification of Catholic theology till the Parousia. But before then there can and should be imperfect attempts *ad utilitatem nostram totiusque Ecclesiae suae sanctae.*

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Thomas Aquinas and the Philosophy of Punishment. By PETER KARL KORITANSKY. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011. Pp. 209. $25.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8132-1883-0.

In *Thomas Aquinas and the Philosophy of Punishment*, Peter Karl Koritansky places the thought of Aquinas within the context of modern theories of punishment, each of which Koritansky finds inadequate. The two main schools of thought concerning punishment correspond to utilitarianism and deontology. Utilitarianism, the topic of examination in chapter 1, justifies punishment entirely in terms of its consequences, namely, its deterrent and medicinal effects; there is no sense that the person "deserves" the punishment or that things are being set right by way of the punishment. Utilitarianism is entirely forward-looking: what good will be brought about by this punishment? In particular, punishment aims to effect a reduction in criminal behavior by causing fear of punishment. According to the principle of utility, then, the punishment must be severe enough to prohibit future crimes; at the same time, it must not be so severe as to cause unnecessary suffering.

Utilitarianism, then, is concerned with the effectiveness of punishment; it places no stock in whether the punishment is deserved or not. Punishment thus becomes unhinged from justice since we can punish someone even if he is innocent, as long as it will bring about more good. To remedy this glaring defect, certain modern utilitarians, such as H. L. A. Hart, have tried to cut-and-paste dessert into the overall theory: a condition is simply added to the theory, namely, that no one can be punished who has not committed a crime. Ultimately, Koritansky argues, this attempted remedy is unsuccessful. One cannot use dessert to limit punishment without thereby recognizing dessert as a legitimate principle, a principle which has no motivating force within utilitarianism. Hart's attempt to mix oil and water is doomed to failure.

Chapter 2 examines deontological theories of punishment which may be described as "modern retributivism," a kind of outgrowth of Kantian

retributivism. Kant emphatically rejects deterrence as the sole motive for punishment since no person, even the criminal, can be used as a means to an end. Rather than deterrence, punishment should always seek to give the criminal his just desserts; Kant will advocate strict adherence to "an eye for an eye."

The most viable modern retributivist view is the "unfair advantage" theory, first introduced by Herbert Morris. It presupposes liberal political theory, in which society is a cooperative venture between individuals seeking mutual benefit. Each individual must assume a fair share of burdens in exchange for the benefits found in society; in particular, he must restrain his desires and actions, so as not to interfere with others. A criminal is precisely someone who refuses to take on his share of burdens; he seeks to gain an unfair advantage over others. What is the nature of this unfair advantage? The failure to answer this question, thinks Koritansky, is the greatest weakness of the unfair advantage theory. The unfair advantage is not any material benefit, but seems to be the liberty to act as one pleases. How this liberty is some kind of gain never becomes clear.

The treatment of Aquinas's view begins in chapter 3 with his general ethical and political theory. Aquinas's view is similar to utilitarianism in that it is teleological, that is, actions are evaluated by their relationship to an end. Ultimately, however, it cannot be classed with utilitarianism. Aquinas, for instance, emphasizes the importance of moral absolutes, which find no place within utilitarianism. Koritansky spends some time showing the importance of natural inclinations as the foundation for Aquinas's natural law; later, he will show that Aquinas bases the need for punishment upon a natural inclination. Koritansky, wishing to distance this natural inclination from mere revenge, claims that the inclination must be rooted in reason. It never becomes clear, however, where this reason originates, if not from the inclination.

Koritansky also wishes to distance Aquinas from liberal political theory and, therefore, from the interpretation of Aquinas given by John Finnis. According to Aquinas, political society is not a convenient bargain for the sake of mutual benefit. Rather, human persons are naturally parts of a greater whole. Koritansky uses Lawrence Dewan to good effect in emphasizing the importance of the political common good.

Chapter 4 provides the basic moral justification of punishment, which is a kind of suffering, or undergoing harm, as an opposition to the voluntary evil of sin. To count as punishment, the suffering must be contrary to the person's will; indeed, punishment must put down the will of the sinner, who has indulged his will too much. Furthermore, punishment must refer to some guilt or offense. Clearly, then, Aquinas's account of punishment fits somewhere within retributivism. It will differ significantly from modern retributivism, however, since Aquinas rejects the foundation of modern liberal political theory.

The need for punishment is founded in the natural inclination to repress that which acts against oneself and one's good. Koritansky locates this inclination in the passions—in particular, in the irascible passions and in the emotion of anger. As a human passion, this natural inclination must be guided by reason. Koritansky's account might have benefited, at this point, from a distinction between the conscious inclination of anger and

the natural inclination of the irascible power itself. He could have more easily avoided the worry that Aquinas is justifying anything to which we have an inborn desire. As it is, Koritansky emphasizes that the anger must be based upon an intellectual apprehension. What is lacking in Koritansky's account, then, is a more detailed analysis of justice, which is what the intellect apprehends, and in which retribution takes a place prior to any conscious inclination for retribution.

Koritansky ably distinguishes Aquinas's retributivism from that of Kant. Most significantly, Kant is concerned with a categorical imperative, a duty that holds, apart from the human good. In contrast, for Aquinas, punishment is itself a certain kind of good; it is a restoring of the order of justice. Furthermore, Kant focuses upon the external criminal activity and the corresponding equal act of retribution. In contrast, Aquinas focuses upon the guilt associated with the internal act of will; as such, he is not bound so tightly, as is Kant, to the notion of "an eye for an eye."

In chapter 5 we discover how Aquinas differs from modern retributivist views, such as the unfair advantage theory. Aquinas is not concerned with providing a fair share of benefits and burdens, as Finnis portrays him; rather, he is concerned with the political common good and the order that must be sustained for this good. As such, punishment is more concerned with the good of the whole than with the good of the victim, who, after all, is himself a part of the political community.

Aquinas, rather than claiming that the criminal gains an unfair advantage, affirms that sinful behavior is never to the individual's own advantage. Punishment, then, does not seek to take away any supposed advantage, but to restore the order of legal justice, which is the common good of political society. A distinction must be made between punishment and restitution. The former restores the order of justice; the latter seeks a balancing of burdens and benefits and more fittingly belongs to civil suits than to punishment.

Chapter 5 also includes a lengthy discussion of capital punishment. In particular, Koritansky is concerned with what appears to be an oddity of Aquinas's justification of capital punishment, namely, that he does not refer to retribution but instead justifies capital punishment in medicinal terms. It benefits society by eliminating the threat of the criminal and by deterring other criminals; it even benefits the criminal himself by preventing him from committing further sins and possibly by leading him to conversion. If retribution is so central to Aquinas's account of punishment, then why is it absent from his explanation of capital punishment?

Koritansky shows that human punishment, as opposed to divine punishment, is largely medicinal. Retribution must be present, or there will be no punishment, but the primary reason that God has given human beings the authority to punish is to keep order in society. After all, divine punishments will suffice for retribution. Because God's punishments sometimes come after this life, however, they do not always serve the purpose of deterrence within political society. Koritansky speculates that Aquinas emphasizes the medicinal aspect of capital punishment because, for him, retribution concerns the guilt of the will, which guilt cannot ultimately be determined by human beings. The authority to impose such a drastic punishment as the death penalty, then, is more fitting to God,

who can determine such things, and is given to human beings only as it is necessary to restore order.

Chapter 6 provides an interesting comparison between Aquinas's teaching on capital punishment and the teaching of Pope John Paul II in the encyclical *Evangelium Vitae*. In this encyclical, John Paul seems to sap capital punishment of its retributivist element by claiming that it can be used only in defense of society. Koritansky considers the interpretation of *Evangelium Vitae* offered by Christian Brugger, who claims that capital punishment can be justified only as a form of self-defense. Brugger, however, provides only suggestive indicators of his interpretation, and the ecclesial tradition concerning retribution and capital punishment should not be jettisoned on the basis of hints and intimations, some of which are mere absences. Koritansky also considers Steven A. Long's interpretation of both Aquinas and *Evangelium Vitae*. He finds Long's interpretation of Aquinas adequate but his interpretation of *Evangelium Vitae* wanting. Both Long and Brugger, then, fail to provide a satisfactory interpretation of *Evangelium Vitae*. Koritansky offers a middle road, in which *Evangelium Vitae* is seen as not opposing retribution but as emphasizing medicinal motives for punishment, as Aquinas himself does when it comes to capital punishment.

In all, Koritansky provides a good introduction to the thought of Aquinas on punishment. He places Aquinas's thought within the context of modern views and shows how it can remedy many of the defects found in contemporary thought.

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The Architecture of Theology: Structure, System, and Ratio. By A. N. Williams. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 239. $110.00 (cloth). ISBN 978-0-19-923636-7.

Anna Williams has been teaching in Cambridge's faculty of divinity for over a decade. She has previously published books on patristic and medieval theology, as well as several articles on Aquinas's thought.

In the present volume she is concerned, as the title indicates, with the general structure of theological rationality, particularly what she calls the "systematicity" of theology. Her intent is to "probe the ways in which Christian theology could be said to be systematic so as to arrive at greater insight concerning both its own character and its relation to other disciplines" (3-4). Williams argues that because theology is a rational enterprise in its very essence, one cannot logically hold an exaggerated *sola Scriptura* or "total depravity" position (10). Indeed, throughout the volume she consistently defends the power of reasoning in religious matters, noting that even those who stress the depravity caused by the Fall

continue to engage in sophisticated theological deliberations. But while she holds that theological rationality is not expunged by sin, she makes equally clear that theology is under no compulsion to adhere to a foundationalist standard. Theology does not guarantee certitude since its task is "in some sense provisional" (12) and it need not meet criteria approved by secular philosophy; however, both the theologian and the foundationalist philosopher share the same goal, intending to state what is true.

Williams goes on to discuss various models of justification and truth. The knowledge that lies behind her summary of various debates in contemporary analytical epistemology is appreciable. She notes that critiques of foundationalism have been popular for decades and that justified true belief, when strictly understood, unacceptably narrows possible areas of inquiry. She adds that "the travails of epistemology in general and foundationalism in particular are significant for those seeking to defend Christianity at the secular bar" (50). Given the demise of strict positivism and empiricism, philosophers and theologians are, so to speak, "in the same epistemological boat" (55). Her point, of course, is that the collapse of universally acceptable warrants for certitude allows all thinkers to see more clearly the rationality of theological claims. A philosophy less wedded to positivism can more easily appreciate theology's structural admixture of faith and reason. She concludes, therefore, that "the cautions coming from the side of both the philosophy of science and cultural anthropology regarding the conditioned nature of any rationality actually harmonize quite well with the insights of the Christian tradition" (64). This is a point that has been made by several thinkers in recent years. One is reminded of John Caputo's attempt to bring philosophy and theology closer together by coupling Kuhn's philosophy of science with insights purveyed by various hermeneutical and postmodern thinkers.

As part of her examination of theology's architecture, Williams also discusses the warrants adduced by theology for the truth of its statements. A warrant is "any assertion that provides grounds for a theological claim" (116). She rightly points to the role of tradition (and therefore development) in early Christian theology. Gregory Nazianzen and Basil, for example, argued at length for the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit from Scripture, but also from tradition and the liturgy. Williams's argument is that one can hardly justify *sola scriptura* historically, given the developments that took place in fashioning the Church's Trinitarian creeds. And she remarks that the teachings of the Reformers are often broadly compatible with those of medieval theologians (in atonement theology, for example). She insightfully concludes, "if Reformation theology was grounded on the sole foundation of Scripture, and that of the schoolmen on a poisonous cocktail of tradition and human reason, it is hard to explain the marked similarities between the theology of the two periods" (97). Of course, it should be said (as Williams recognizes) that many Protestant theologians will argue that *sola Scriptura* cannot mean "apart from tradition." This phrase must be understood, rather, as a protest against the presumption of an easy identification of Scripture with ecclesial tradition (with Scripture thereby stripped of its critical power).

Towards the end of the book, Williams engages in an extended and welcome reflection on beauty, noting that to speak of coherence, patterns, and harmony (as theology does) is to imply aesthetics. In recent years,

Hans Urs von Balthasar has emerged as the paladin of those theologians interested in the forgotten transcendental. But Williams argues that Balthasar's focus on the cross is so intense that he "parts company with the patristic and a good deal of the medieval tradition," neither of which treated the cross in isolation from the incarnation and the resurrection (203). Balthasar's aesthetics are not necessarily misguided, but they "must be considered as rather anomalous" (204), with the Swiss theologian showing greater proximity to Reformation thinkers than to the earlier tradition. Williams might have mentioned that while Balthasar approved of Luther's (and Barth's) insistence that the transcendental beauty of revelation cannot be equated with inner-worldly natural beauty, he cautioned that a fraternal warning should not boil over into a separatist negation. Further, Balthasar was attracted to Pascal and Kierkegaard precisely because of their admonitions about natural aestheticism. Even with their philosophical inadequacies, their thought was superior to German Idealism, which refused to come face-to-face with the crucified Christ. Williams is not unaware of these points, stating that any theology of beauty must ultimately be rooted in Scripture; otherwise, one may fall into an aestheticism that leads away from God (209).

While I enjoyed Williams's book, I also have several reservations about it. First, she clearly wants to show that the strict warrants for justified true belief adduced by epistemological foundationalism have collapsed (thereby opening the door to seeing the rationality of theology more clearly). But her argument would have benefitted by adducing the contributions of hermeneutical thought as well. There is no mention in her volume of either Heidegger or Gadamer, an omission I found extraordinary given the continuing influence of these two philosophers—and of hermeneutical theory generally—on theological reasoning. (Can one still plausibly chalk this up to the Continental/Anglo-American divide given the continuing rapprochement between post-positivist pragmatism and hermeneutical thought, found for decades now in philosophers such as Richard Rorty and Richard Bernstein?) In her discussion of truth, for example, there is no mention of Gadamer's attempt (later qualified by Habermas) to rehabilitate Aristotelian *phronēsis* as the only notion of truth congruent with our immersion in provisionality and historicity. And what of Heidegger's vaunted rethinking of the *Seinsfrage* for the sake of overcoming rationalist modernity, a theme which is ultimately confluent with Williams's own intentions?

Second, Williams is at pains to argue, and rightly so, that theologians must neither ignore philosophical discussions, nor be held captive to secular norms (104). Since at several junctures in the book she refers to the relationship between philosophy and theology (one example is her analysis of truth and justification, another is her discussion of beauty and Platonism), I wish she had given this important correlation more sustained attention. There has been a long and distinguished history of reflection on how Christian theology properly uses secular reasoning, starting with Origen and continuing up to John Paul II's *Fides et ratio*. A thicker treatment of this issue, and particularly of the Hellenization thesis (referred to only briefly by Williams), would have strengthened her argument on theology's proper structure.

Third, the author, who has a literary background, often discusses the figurative and metaphorical language found in the Bible, noting that "theology ultimately reasons from a trope-laced text" (125). She remarks that the Bible harbors diverse genres and patterns, so that the text gives us knowledge "only through the veil of human language" (126). While she is sensitive to the nature of biblical language, and versed in the thought of Aquinas, she shows no interest in Aquinas's understanding of how terms may be properly predicated of the Godhead. How, and under what conditions, may polysemous biblical tropes be attributed to God *formaliter et substantialiter*? A discussion of this point would have helped in her attempt to explain how the Bible uses figurative and, at times, ambiguous language which is also theologically reliable.

Aquinas's insights on analogical predication remain, in my judgment, one of the most vibrant and philosophically satisfying elements of his thought, but Williams avoids the theme altogether. Perhaps the reason may be found in her comment that "Aquinas is very far from espousing the *analogia entis* of which he has sometimes been accused" (150). The context for this remark indicates that she likely means only that Aquinas eschews a naked analogy of being separated from the *unicus ordo supernaturalis* (Barth's charge). But I nonetheless found this an odd statement, one which can be understood as denying the metaphysical roots of the analogical predication of names with respect to God.

Fourth, Williams appropriately states that Christian life "is built on the assumption that ultimate truths do exist, that human beings can know these truths to at least some extent and that knowledge of these truths is important, spiritually and existentially" (222). But doesn't this statement imply a further question: in a world profoundly circumscribed by historicity, and riven by socio-cultural-linguistic diversity, where does one find a philosophy capable of defending the very possibility of enduring truth across cultures and generations so that the continuity, identity, and universality of Christian teaching can be philosophically established as well as theologically taught? In other words, isn't a more robust account of substantial identity amidst diversity, as well as relative invariance of meaning over time (of the creed for example), necessary? I wish Williams had spent more time on these pressing questions in her examination of the rationality proper to theology.

Even with these criticisms, it remains the case that Williams's well-crafted volume is an enjoyable book, one that I would re-title a "sketch" of theology's architecture. Several aspects of theology are sketched, and indeed, well sketched. But this book is a learned essay rather than a comprehensive monograph on theology's fundamental structure. The author offers well-informed discussions of various dimensions of theological methodology, particularly those aspects related to analytical epistemology. She has an attractive and polished literary style that makes for pleasant reading. And she ranges over an impressively wide spectrum of thinkers, Eastern and Western, ancient and modern, profitably taking account of the entire Christian tradition. Williams clearly and cogently defends the rationality of theology, insisting that the discipline is reflective of God, the very fountainhead of intelligibility. She ends the book with some fine pages on the relationship between theology and

contemplation. In all, this is a worthwhile volume that, despite its omissions, will repay close reading.

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Biomedicine and Beatitude: An Introduction to Catholic Bioethics. By NICANOR AUSTRIACO. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011. Pp. 336. $17.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8132-1882-3.

Some of us know that we can expect that someone who is a Thomist, a priest with extensive pastoral experience (including hospital work), a trained scientist, and a teacher of undergraduates, graduate students, and parishioners would write a terrific book on bioethics. Our expectations are amply satisfied in Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco's *Biomedicine and Beatitude: An Introduction to Catholic Bioethics.* Austriaco uses his multiple talents, impressive education, and diversified experience to wonderful effect as he presents a thoroughly up-to-date treatment of bioethics, wherein he follows closely *Veritatis Splendor* and the *Catechism*. He is also greatly influenced by the marvelous resituating of Catholic moral theology by his Dominican confrere Servais Pinckaers. Indeed, Pinckaers's thought was the directing force behind *Veritatis Splendor* and the *Catechism*. In my view, *Biomedicine and Beatitude* is now the finest general book on Catholic bioethics available.

Pinckaers, a premier Aristotelian Thomist, rightly insisted that virtue is the key principle of ethics: the most important achievement of the ethical life is the character created by the agent's free choices, for that character (through the graces of redemption, of course) makes it possible for man to achieve his ultimate end, which is beatitude. Austriaco also rightly moves specifically Christian concerns to the forefront in a discipline that has been too often dominated by a concern for a rational knowledge of ethical principles. Presentations on prayer, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the meaning of suffering, for instance, are too often absent or tacked onto the end of treatments of Catholic bioethics. It is certainly refreshing to find them included at the outset of Austriaco's book and appropriately referenced throughout.

Biomedicine and Beatitude is not an apologetical work but a closely reasoned presentation of the best Catholic thinking on bioethical issues. Austriaco does a first-rate job of treating various bioethical issues; he efficiently responds to the most powerful arguments against his position and gives forcefully persuasive counter arguments, utilizing science and philosophy, with appropriate appeal to authoritative Church teaching. He deals well with the immense body of literature on bioethics by providing an impressive sampling of articles from a wide variety of sources and

disciplines. I especially appreciate that he is clear about when there is no definitive Church teaching on issues, such as the adoption of embryos or brain death; he clearly and fairly presents divergent views as he defends his own position.

Austriaco's chapter "Bioethics and the Clinical Encounter" is an unusual one to find in a bioethics text and a very valuable one. Here he includes a discussion of the role of the priest in the clinical situation. He also has a marvelous discussion of illness as an opportunity for the patient to grow in the virtues. He beautifully supplements the list of virtues that some scholars have proposed as necessary for patients with the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity as applicable to the demands of being a patient. He mentions the need for health-care professionals to be docile to the teachings of the Church and could have said this about patients as well. Very welcome is his example of a prayer suitable for health-care professionals.

Also of great value is his concluding chapter, "Catholic Bioethics in a Pluralistic Society." Here Austriaco gives an excellent analysis of the challenges that face Catholic bioethicists when trying to convey the importance of Christian values to a culture that esteems autonomy over truth, indeed, that denies the existence of objective truth. I would like to have seen some treatment of the tensions among Catholic moralists. The heyday of proportionalism is blessedly over but its influence is still widespread, and readers need to know that not all who wear the mantle of "Catholic bioethicist" are trustworthy.

I intend to use Austriaco's book when I teach bioethics to seminarians and other graduate students. They are, perhaps, the ideal audience for the book. It is not quite an introduction since it assumes a fairly high level of knowledge of philosophy and moral theology (and an ability to track down some medical terms such as "asystole"). The first chapter reviews many of the fundamental principles of moral theology. The choice to introduce the principle of double effect early is very well advised since so many bioethical decisions involve its application. For the most part, with admirable efficiency and useful examples, Austriaco provides sufficient explanation of the essential matters, though I would insist that my students read many of the explanatory footnotes and would likely supplement a few of the discussions. Some matters may be somewhat underexplained for the general reader. It is difficult to know how much one needs to explain metaphysical terms such as form and matter, and substantial and accidental change, and how much anthropology to explain, such as the interplay of the intellect, the desires, and the will. Those who do not have a solid background in Aristotelian Thomism would be well advised to get some of that background before using this text.

I hope I have sung the praises of the book adequately for now I want to turn to three criticisms, criticisms that do not vitiate my recommendation of the work in any significant way but do deserve some extended discussion. (1) Austriaco's accentuation of virtue and spiritual gifts leads him to underemphasize the importance of a commitment to objective truth from the outset (he gets to it eventually). Thankfully this inadequacy does not govern his treatment of various issues. (2) Even so, I find his infusion of virtue into the discussion of bioethics to be unsystematic and unfocused. There could be a more explicit acknowledg-

ment, from the outset, of the importance of natural law and objective truth, as well as a fuller, more focused discussion and application of virtue. (3) Finally, Austriaco does not sufficiently distinguish the task of the theoretical bioethicist from the task of the bioethicist as counselor.

Regarding my first criticism, while I share Austriaco's conviction that virtue and beatitude are the right places to start teaching about ethics, I believe he may have swung the pendulum a little too far in the direction of virtue and particularity and away from the demands of natural law. Ethics, of course, is a practical science, and as such is ultimately directed to the particular action. As Aristotle famously asserted, the purpose of the study of ethics is not to understand ethics but to live an ethical life. Nonetheless, the "scientific" part of ethics is in fact directed to establishing the truth of principles essential to the ethical life without reference to particular cases.

Austriaco states: "Catholic bioethics focuses on the acts of the individual patient, clinician, or scientist in order to evaluate their morality; which ones would respect the dignity of the person and promote his well-being and ultimate beatitude? Which ones would be detrimental to the perfection of his nature? Thus, when the Catholic bioethicist asks whether it is morally permissible to do experiments with human embryos, he does so by reflecting upon how this type of research would contribute to the personal and spiritual development of the scientist." Now, while it is true that those are concerns that have been too frequently absent from Catholic bioethics, the core of bioethics needs to be an explanation of why certain kinds of acts (not particular acts of individuals) do not accord with God's *ratio*, with his ordering of reality, that is, with his eternal law. These are the kinds of acts that produce vice and not virtue. The insistence on the primacy of virtue, human dignity, and beatitude is essential but so too is an insistence on the existence of objective truth, indeed on the splendor of truth, accessible to us all. In my view, natural law takes too much of a backseat in Austriaco's presentation of the guiding principles of bioethics; I will need to supplement his book for my students in that regard.

With respect to my second criticism, I think the work would have profited from an explicit acknowledgment that it is going to treat the virtues of four groups of individuals: bioethicists, health-care professionals, patients, and scientists. Austriaco begins the book by speaking of the virtues needed by the bioethicist particularly in counseling situations. I think this is a bit of a misstep in that he doesn't focus on the importance of the intellectual virtues for bioethicists (he does mention later that scientists need them). Indeed, the primary work of bioethicists involves the intellectual virtues that are usually developed by good philosophical training, such as logical reasoning, an awareness of what information is relevant, an ability to assess arguments fairly, and an ability to understand biomedical science well enough to make good decisions. And, of course, the Catholic bioethicist needs to have proper docility towards Church teaching. Austriaco manifests his own possession of these virtues and nods towards them from time to time but does not treat them as explicitly as one would hope.

The virtue most needed by the bioethicist, Austriaco claims, is prudence. Prudence is the ability to discern which moral principle is operative or which facts are relevant in each situation. Anyone involved in the discussion of cases involving bioethical issues knows that all sorts of "details" can radically change one's evaluation of the proper moral response. The age of a patient, the availability and expense of various treatments, the overall health of a patient, can greatly influence the discernment of whether the principle of prolonging life or the principle of just use of resources comes more heavily into play. Nonetheless, I think Austriaco overstates the need for such prudence on the part of the theoretical bioethicist. This is my third criticism. Certainly the bioethicist must know that prudence is the premier virtue for those who would make good particular decisions, but the bioethicist who is largely a theoretician (e.g., a professor of bioethics) would not have as great a need for prudence as the bioethicist who serves as a consultant for a hospital.

Indeed, Austriaco sometimes conflates the task of the bioethicist with that of the counselor. He claims: "The Catholic bioethicist also needs to be able to convince a seventeen-year-old teenager living in Overland Park, Kansas, who is scared of disappointing her mother and of angering her boyfriend of the truth of this teaching [about the intrinsic evil of abortion] so that she will not have an abortion." While I greatly appreciate Austriaco's awareness that counseling the individual agent is where the rubber hits the road, I think the expectation that all Catholic bioethicists will be so gifted is unrealistic and somewhat misplaced. I believe a bioethicist who, for instance, is able to refute all the arguments put forward by theologians, philosophers, scientists, and politicians on behalf of embryonic stem-cell research but who does not have the gifts to dissuade someone from engaging in stem-cell research is not thereby an inadequate bioethicist. The person persuading a young woman not to have an abortion may, in fact, be wise not to utilize the arguments a bioethicist would use to establish the wrongness of abortion, but may instead need to be very knowledgeable about what resources are available in Overland, Kansas for single mothers, for instance. Austriaco has conflated the value of the theoretical study of a practical science with the very different enterprise of counseling individuals who need moral guidance about personal decisions involving bioethical issues.

Apart from the first chapter (wherein he speaks of the virtues needed by the bioethicist), when Austriaco speaks of virtue at the end of each chapter, he generally addresses the virtues needed by the agent of the problematic act, such as the woman contemplating an abortion or the couple considering contraception. For instance, when he turns briefly to the question of virtue at the end of his discussion on abortion, he notes that most women procure abortions out of fear and that helping them develop the virtue of fortitude would be the proper way to dissuade them from abortion and, further, that a way to help women develop fortitude would be to show them how many resources are available to them. This analysis does not ring completely true to me—though, of course, there is truth in it, most significantly the truth that offering women resources helps dissuade them from abortion. But I am not certain that a focus on a specific virtue, such as fortitude, is of paramount importance. Virtues are the result of multiple good choices over time; it is not possible to develop

fortitude quickly in a woman, though we can help her even uncharacteristically perform an objectively courageous act. Although offering women assistance is a major way to help a woman overcome the fear of facing an unwanted pregnancy, that is not the same as her having achieved the virtue of fortitude.

I have personally found that the best way to get an abortion-minded woman to reconsider her intent is to convince her that she is carrying a baby who needs her love. The best way to do this is not to give her scientific or philosophical arguments about the personhood of an embryo (those of us who have done sidewalk counseling outside of abortion clinics know how useless such arguments would be there) but, as studies overwhelmingly indicate, to show her an ultrasound of her unborn child. The objective truth about the humanity of the unborn child resonates with the innate respect all human beings have for life. That is natural law at work; objective truth combined with the natural inclination to respect life. That natural inclination, combined with the natural inclination of a mother to care for her child, is often the best basis for dissuading a woman from an abortion. In fact my most successful ventures have involved asking a woman if she believes in God (the women generally do) and then assuring her that God loves her and that he loves the child growing within her and that he has entrusted this child to her and will provide help for her. Here, claims to justice and appeals to hope work to help a woman do the just, hopeful, and courageous thing that is giving life. If she keeps doing such acts she will eventually develop virtue, but virtue is not the primary motivator in the scenario.

Nonetheless, for all his talk of virtue, in his treatment of issues, Austriaco puts enormous emphasis on the question of truth. For instance, his treatment of abortion is much more the work of the theoretical bioethicist than it is the work of dissuading a woman from having an abortion. His discussion on abortion is rightly dominated by arguments for the personhood of the embryo not about how to find resources for single mothers or the acquisition of virtue.

For all the demurrals made above, I think this book is a marvelous attempt to meld the many diverse elements that are involved in Catholic bioethics. It is a book that brings forward the best from the past but is situated firmly in the twenty-first century. Austriaco has performed a great service for those of us who teach bioethics and those who want a clear but sophisticated overview of Catholic bioethics.

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God the Father in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. By JOHN BAPTIST
KU. New York: Peter Lang, 2012. Pp. 378. $94.00 (cloth). ISBN
978-1-4331-2068-8.

In six highly organized and readable chapters, the author contributes to
the scholarship on St. Thomas Aquinas's Trinitarian theology that has
enjoyed a steady stream of attention in the last two decades. Some of
these efforts have also, like the present work, investigated Aquinas's
theology of God the Father; however, Ku hopes to augment this
scholarship by delving more fully into the Thomistic corpus, providing
important insights regarding the development of Aquinas's own theology
of the Father.

Chapter 1, the briefest of the six, is entitled "The Revelation of the
Father." Ku is aware of the critique that would characterize the
Trinitarian theology of Aquinas as highly speculative and philosophical to
the point of being detached from the scriptural data. He shows that the
Dominican Master, a master in *sacra pagina*, provides a theology that,
although culminating in a robust speculative effort, is rooted in revelation
as found in the Holy Scriptures. Aquinas, guided by the faith, provides a
theological exegesis based on the Catholic theological tradition in order
to achieve a theology that is both philosophical/abstract and biblical/
exegetical. In order to demonstrate this, Ku includes important citations
from Aquinas's scriptural commentaries on key texts dealing with the
Father.

Chapter 2 delves into Aquinas's understanding of the innascibility of
the Father as a property of the first person. Ku provides texts from three
different Thomistic sources, the *Commentary on the Sentences,* the
disputed questions *De potentia,* and the *Summa theologiae* in order to
show the continuity and development of Aquinas's thought on this
question. Also helpful is the contrast he demonstrates between the
thought of Aquinas on innascibility and that of St. Bonaventure. Ku points
out that Aquinas, unlike Bonaventure, maintains that innascibility is a
notion of the Father distinct from the property of paternity. For Aquinas
innascibility, although a notion of a person, is not a person-constituting
notion because it does not indicate a relation to another divine person,
the persons of the Trinity are constituted precisely by opposed subsistent
relations. Innascibility is a notion, therefore, that is logically posterior to
our understanding of the Father as constituted by the relation of
paternity. Ku succeeds in showing the theological strength of Aquinas's
position as a bulwark opposed to any kind of Eunomian theology that
would have the Father constituted as a person prior to and apart from the
opposed relation with the Son.

Chapter 3 is an explication of Aquinas's understanding of the Father as
the principle or author of the Godhead. Ku is correct to caution here that
Aquinas does not name the Father a principle as if he generates or spirates
another God. Instead the Father is principle in that he generates the Son
and spirates the Holy Spirit, two other divine persons; of course, what is
communicated in these acts is the divine essence. Yet the emphasis for
Aquinas is on the relation of origin that exists between the divine persons.
Although standing clear of causal language to describe the origin of the
Son and the Spirit from the Father, Ku points out that Aquinas can use

the language of author (*auctor*) to describe the relation of origin. However, since the term *author* also carries the meaning of "not from another," Aquinas would prefer to use the term only of the Father as principle of the Son; nevertheless, he still defends a more general use of the term *author* as used by St. Hilary. For Aquinas, since only the Father is a "principle without principle," the term *author* is more appropriately applied to him than to the Son, even if the Son is, with the Father, the principle of the Holy Spirit. What Aquinas does not want to do is to imply any kind of hierarchy in the Godhead. Here again Ku points out a difference between the theology of Aquinas and his contemporary, Bonaventure. After presenting the conceptual differences in Aquinas's Trinitarian thought between origin and relation, Ku once again brings out a stark contrast between the understanding of the hypostasis of the Father in Bonaventure and Aquinas. With ample citations it is demonstrated that for Aquinas, unlike Bonaventure, it is impossible for the Father to be a person outside of the relation of paternity. This ensures the equality and co-eternity of the persons as opposed to any Arian tendency.

Chapter 4 explores Aquinas's use and understanding of the term "Father" for the first person of the Trinity. As a proper name, "Father" is the first person's own identifier; this name distinguishes the first person from the other two persons, a distinction that is based on the relations of origin within the Godhead. More than this, as Ku notes, the persons of the Trinity are identical with these subsistent relations of origin. Also included in this chapter are brief but helpful sections on analogy, modes of signification, and aspects of the Son's generation.

The common spiration of the Father and the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit is explored in chapter 5. The various issues attendant to this teaching are rehearsed. Ku explains that Aquinas's understanding of common spiration as a subsistent relation does not result in a sub-ordination of this relation to the other three (paternity, filiation, and procession). Although common spiration is not person-constituting, without it procession or passive spiration would in no way be relatively opposed to it. This would result in the Holy Spirit being in no way distinct from the Father and Son. The chapter also explores Aquinas's naming of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love and/or bond of love for the Father and Son. Ku briefly mentions the differing views on this among various scholars, relegating most of the critique and engagement of these various positions to the endnotes.

The sixth and final chapter of the work deals with the Father and his proper relationship to the economy of creation and salvation. This proper role of the Father in the economy is correlative to one's understanding of the proper roles of the Son and Holy Spirit in creation and salvation. Of course, how to understand Aquinas on the proper invisible missions of the Son and Holy Spirit in the life of grace recalls a long and vast Thomistic debate going back to the first half of the twentieth century. However, sticking to his mission to exposit the texts of Aquinas, Ku does not delve into the various sides to this intramural debate; instead he offers an exposition of Aquinas's understanding of the Father's relationship to creation and the just soul.

This final chapter, besides continuing Ku's exposition of Thomistic texts, also makes ample use of other like-minded Thomists such as Gilles Emery, Emmanuel Durand, and Émile Bailleux. For Ku, there is evidence in the Thomistic corpus that supports the position that the Father has a proper role in the economy, with regard to both creation and the life of grace. Ku is careful to point out, as Aquinas himself does, that one must uphold the ontological divide between Creator and creature. Furthermore, one must be attentive to the rule that says that all operations of the Trinity *ad extra* are done without distinction of persons; although there are three divine persons, there is only one Creator, not three creators. Nevertheless, Ku argues, each divine person is Creator "according to his personal identity," even though "creatures do not have the ontological weight to cause or even manifest these distinctions of the divine persons" (309). If in creation there is a proper role of the Father, then in the life of grace that is even more the case, argues Ku. Going beyond mere appropriation, Ku wants to show that Aquinas's understanding of grace, although a work of the undivided Trinity, produces effects of wisdom and love that assimilate the justified soul to the Son and Holy Spirit respectively. The *telos* of these gifts is none other than the Father who "is experienced as the innascible source and ultimate end of all things to whom the Son and Holy Spirit lead us" (320). In this way, the Father has a proper role to play in the life of grace.

Ku's effort provides the reader ample texts from the Thomistic corpus on God the Father which will occupy even those scholars most familiar with Aquinas's writing on the topic. As the author intends, the work is mainly expository in nature. On this score, those readers who are nonspecialists will benefit from Ku's familiarity with the Thomistic corpus and his ability to expound Aquinas's position with clarity and depth.

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Aquinas's Notion of Pure Nature and the Christian Integralism of Henri de Lubac: Not Everything Is Grace. By BERNARD MULCAHY, O.P. New York: Peter Lang, 2011. Pp. 259. $80.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-4331-1393-2.

This book offers a well-constructed defense of the legitimacy and usefulness of the notion of pure nature in theology. It revolves around two contrasting notions and three theologians. The two opposing notions are pure nature and integralism, and the three theologians are St. Thomas Aquinas, Henri Cardinal de Lubac, and John Milbank.

Pure nature is understood here as human nature considered in itself, in its constitutive principles, and with regard to what is due to it as such. In other words, this notion considers human nature, abstracting from its

supernatural elevation to the order of grace and glory. Thus Mulcahy understands pure nature as "the idea of human nature which can be had by any reasoning person" (2). He argues that St. Thomas Aquinas in particular abundantly presupposes this notion throughout his theology.

The concept of pure nature is defended against a certain Christian "integralism" which seeks to view everything within a unitary or integral supernatural perspective, denying legitimacy to the notion of pure nature, such that it could meaningfully and usefully be considered on its own. This integralism is associated with two theologians in particular: Henri de Lubac and John Milbank.

De Lubac rejects the notion of pure nature because he claims that: (1) pure nature has never been the state of any real human being, (2) it is alien to Christian tradition (not found in the Fathers or even St. Thomas), (3) it denies an intrinsic link between natural human life and the life of faith, and (4) it is to blame for the marginalization of Christianity in the Western world. Mulcahy concedes the first point, but contests the second and fourth. The third objection (extrinsicism) is not dealt with.

Milbank radicalizes the position of de Lubac and uses the term "integralism" to describe the rejection of the validity of all nontheological knowledge, which implies that "no sphere of life or society, no art or science, can be autonomous or self-sufficient; everyone and everything is an integral part of a single whole, and this whole can only be ordered and understood in a fully Christian theological vision" (13). Although de Lubac does not use the term "integralism," Mulcahy applies it to de Lubac's rejection of pure nature, for that rejection entails that man can only be viewed in an integrally theological perspective.

After discussing the meaning of the notion of pure nature and the challenge of integralism in chapter 1, in chapter 2 the author investigates the notion of nature as it was understood before St. Thomas. In the Hellenistic world, the *philosophical* notion of nature (*physis*) was ubiquitous, and thus the notion of human nature as such is not foreign to divine revelation in the latest books of the Old Testament, the Septuagint translation, and the New Testament. Furthermore, the notion of pure nature is implied in the central Jewish and Christian notion of election. Israel was elected with a gratuitous election that does not belong to human nature as such. Finally, the early Christian understanding of the relation between Church and State, as we find it sketched out, for example, in the *Letter to Diognetus*, also implies that the Christian lives a supernatural life within a natural order, to which the domain of politics and culture belongs.

In chapters 3 and 4, Mulcahy defends the notion of pure nature in the theology of St. Thomas. Instead of focusing on the exegesis of particular texts, Mulcahy focuses on six broad themes: human mortality, the infused virtues, limbo, kingship, natural law, and the autonomy of the sciences. The notion of pure nature enables theology to recognize the special gratuitousness of gifts that are above what is due to nature. This was the case with man's immortality in Eden. In order to recognize this gift as preternatural, we recognize that it is above human nature as such. Without a concept of pure nature, no gift could be seen to be preter- natural or supernatural. The importance of pure nature is even more

clearly seen with regard to the gratuitousness of grace and the theological virtues. The notion of pure nature points out the breathtaking elevation to which sanctifying grace brings us, and shows the absolute necessity of that grace for salvation, for it is only through grace that we are given a participation in the divine nature. Similarly, pure nature shows the reason why the supernatural virtues have to be infused and cannot be acquired. Since they are proportionate with the divine life and thus infinitely exceed pure nature, they must be infused by God as a purely gratuitous gift.

A third theological question in which St. Thomas's position presupposes pure nature is that of limbo. Saint Thomas holds that the unbaptized who die before the age of reason are deprived of the vision of God but do not experience any suffering at all. Rather, they rejoice in their natural gifts. Although deprived of the supernatural good for lack of baptism (and their incapacity for baptism of desire), after this life they can still experience the full happiness proper to the natural order. Saint Thomas's position is based on the notion of a consistent natural order, and the possibility and meaningfulness—limited only to this case—of the attainment of natural fulfillment without supernatural beatitude.

Saint Thomas's treatment of the natural political order, as for example in his treatise on kingship, recognizes a relatively autonomous sphere for secular political government, which is directly ordered to the natural common good. This order is intelligible and legitimate, abstracting from man's elevation to the supernatural order. In a similar way, St. Thomas's understanding of natural law and of the relative autonomy of the philosophical sciences also presupposes a natural order that is intelligible independent of grace.

Chapter 5 presents a brief excursus on Baianism and Jansenism. Several centuries before de Lubac, these two systems of thought also denied the validity of the notion of pure nature, rejected the Scholastic tradition, and embraced a kind of Christian "integralism."

Chapter 6 examines the position of de Lubac. Mulcahy, in my view, gives a balanced and sympathetic presentation of his life and thought, situating him in his historical context, and noting his many great merits and his sound intentions in stressing the supernatural in an increasingly secularized world. This section would have benefited from more engagement with de Lubac's texts on pure nature and the natural desire to see God, and further mention of the decisive influence of Blondel on de Lubac's understanding of the supernatural. Another lacuna is a lack of exploration of the added nuances in de Lubac's position regarding pure nature in the 1949 article, "Le mystère du surnaturel," which modified his earlier position in *Surnaturel*. In the later article, de Lubac affirms the possibility of a state of pure nature, but insists that such a possibility concerns a "different" human nature. This more nuanced presentation keeps de Lubac from being directly condemned by *Humani generis* 26. Ironically, Milbank in *The Suspended Middle* (36-42) criticizes de Lubac precisely for these added nuances.

One further quibble. Mulcahy gives the impression that de Lubac's reference to our "concrete" humanity (humanity as it was in fact created, with a supernatural end) is due to the influence of Suarezian metaphysics (156). I think this is mistaken, for Suarez takes a strong view of what is due to human nature as such and vigorously defends the possibility of a

state of pure nature, whereas de Lubac, more in line with Ockham, denies the notion of *debitum naturae* altogether. De Lubac speaks of our "concrete nature" for a theological purpose: to maintain its intrinsic supernatural finality while attempting to preserve the gratuitousness of that finality with respect to an "abstract human nature" on which a natural desire to see God would not be imprinted. Whether this position is philosophically and theologically coherent is ultimately the root question in this debate.

Chapter 7 treats Milbank, who is presented as an heir of de Lubac and who further radicalized the position of his mentor. This chapter shows where de Lubac's principles can lead, although de Lubac himself did not draw these conclusions. Among other things, Milbank takes the rejection of pure nature in a fideist and postmodernist direction to imply the impossibility of any nontheological knowledge of man and of any spheres of relative autonomy, whether political, cultural, or scientific. These jarring conclusions serve, on the contrary, to highlight the importance of the notion of pure nature.

On the basis of the preceding chapters, the final chapter summarizes the problems with de Lubac's rejection of pure nature. These problems are both historical and theological. On the level of history, Mulcahy has shown that the notion of pure nature is not an exclusively modern category, although it has been increasingly developed since the thirteenth century. Nor can it be held to be principally responsible for the progressive marginalization of Christianity in the contemporary world, for that process is extremely complex. If anything, the notion of pure nature enhances the Church's ability to dialogue with the contemporary world, promote natural law, and engage in the New Evangelization. Indeed, the lack of sufficient development of this notion (as well as its vehement rejection by Jansenism and Calvinism) may well have been an element in the marginalization of Christianity in the last three centuries.

Perhaps the most interesting contribution of this book is the way it highlights the importance of the notion of pure nature for Catholic theology in carrying on a dialogue with the secular world and with other religions. Every dialogue has to presuppose a common foundation. In order to converse with those who do not share the Christian faith, it is necessary to presuppose shared convictions about human nature, human flourishing, and human reason, independent of grace (which the non-Christian does not acknowledge). It follows that a robust notion of the consistency of human nature in itself (pure nature) and of the power of unaided human reason is necessary to implement the call to engagement with the contemporary world and to interreligious dialogue proclaimed by the Second Vatican Council. This also explains why this notion became more developed in the sixteenth century, as the borders of the known world expanded and contact with non-Christians increased. Far from being a modern corruption, this notion is part of the Christian patrimony that has developed especially in modern times and is needed now more than ever.

Furthermore, without the notion of pure nature, it is easy to fall into the integralist presumption that the theologian alone has competence in every field, failing to recognize the relative autonomy of philosophy,

culture, and the temporal sphere—contrary to the luminous teaching of *Gaudium et spes* 36 and *Apostolicam actuositatem* 7. Milbank is an example of this danger. The supernatural beauty of the Christian revelation about man and his destiny must be seen against the backdrop of the goodness of human nature as such. The Christian theologian today increasingly has to defend, not only the prerogatives of grace, but also those of rational nature, especially in the sphere of ethics and natural law. The Church has the right and duty to put forth her moral doctrine in the public square because this doctrine is in profound accord with the natural law written on the human heart and discoverable there by every sincere seeker of truth.

Integralism has close ties with fideism, and Milbank makes this connection explicit. Fideism is clearly opposed to Aquinas's entire theological project as well as to the Church's consistent defense of the power of human reason to discover truths of the natural order. Again this shows the very wide implications of the notion of pure nature.

Another theological problem discussed in Mulcahy's final chapter concerns the gratuitousness of grace. Mulcahy finds de Lubac's defense of this gratuitousness incomplete because it tends to reduce it to the gratuitousness of creation itself. Mulcahy here emphasizes the notion of election. As Israel was freely elected from the nations, so now all men are freely called to enter the Church. This election, although now directed to all, is still free because we need not have been called. If we need not have been called, then we have the notion of pure nature.

Mulcahy ends his book by observing that integralism is attractive to some because it promises a simpler picture of man and society, recognizing only a supernatural end and thus only a supernatural order. The notion of pure nature, on the contrary, is linked with the distinction of two orders: natural and supernatural. Because of this distinction, philosophy and the empirical and human sciences are distinct from theology and enjoy a relative autonomy and complementarity. These two orders correspond with two ends of man: natural (through human powers) and supernatural (through grace and glory). These two ends, in turn, define two distinct societies: civil society and the Church. This distinction (but without separation!) defines human life in its redeemed state. Mulcahy concludes: "It is God, and not graced nature, that is simple."

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There is no doubt that the philosophy of nature is absolutely necessary
for achieving a proper understanding of nature and its activities, and the
contributors to this volume offer a very good defense of its worth and
utility. All of the arguments present in this volume in favor of the validity
of philosophy of nature are guided and inspired by the philosophical
works and ideas of Jacques Maritain, who, as an ubiquitous figure, allows
authors to use his words and to express their own. In a proper Scholastic
fashion, the editor has ordered the chapters to follow a classic structure of
knowledge: the first part deals with modern science and the philosophy of
nature; the second part studies the relation that the philosophy of nature
has with metaphysics; the third part discusses issues pertaining to what it
means to be a human being; and the last part examines human action
from the perspective of the philosophy of nature.

The editor sets the tone of the volume in the introduction. After
acknowledging the fruitfulness of Thomistic thought—in particular the
realism guiding its engagement with nature, and the temptation of our age
to suppose that there is nothing real to know (that there cannot be any
objective knowledge of reality)—he presents an *apologia pro opera* in the
form of a Pascalian wager: it is more rational to bet that we can know
reality, that we can achieve objective and truthful knowledge, than to do
otherwise, because this would mean to put our bet on nothing at all. This
is the "natural faith" (x) in our intellectual capacities that characterizes the
spirit of the chapters to follow.

Michael Augros opens the discussion about the relationship between
modern science and the philosophy of nature by asking why scientists
seem to agree while philosophers tend to disagree on their conclusions.
His answer is somewhat puzzling: given that philosophical principles are
more certain than scientific statements, it is only expected that
philosophical principles will awake more disagreement about themselves,
while scientific statements, due to the amount of evidence required to
hold them, would lead to general acceptance and consensus. The
argument seems to suggest that the more difficult a statement is to prove,
the less certain it will be, but the more consensus it will achieve.

The following two chapters discuss the issue of Maritain's under-
standing of modern science and, in particular, his position regarding the
question of scientific realism. This question seems to be the most
important one posed in the volume since it models the framework for all
subsequent discussion. Examining Maritain's understanding of Aquinas's
commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate* in *The Degrees of Knowledge*,
Jennifer Rosato argues that Maritain's position is to be characterised as a
"highly restricted scientific realism" (29) because it is not a mere holistic
Duhemian position, nor is it a robust scientific realism relying on logical
positivism. In Rosato's interpretation of Maritain's position, modern
science attains some knowledge of natures by reaching the empirical
phenomena (even though theoretical systematizations cannot be

determined by the essences of the beings studied by those phenomena). By contrast, Matthew S. Pugh asserts that Maritain's position on scientific realism is something closer to a "qualified instrumentalism" (55). After a detailed presentation of scientific instrumentalism, Pugh stresses the fact that Maritain's position was that modern science deals with empirical phenomena without reaching the essences of natural things, a step reserved for the philosophy of nature. Nevertheless, even though "mathematical physics cannot give us knowledge of essences or causes" (ibid.) because it rests upon infrascientific experience, it can never go too far away from reality. Thus Maritain's instrumentalism requires the character of being "qualified." This qualification means that natural sciences open the door to a different kind of knowledge of nature, that is, the philosophy of nature, which in Maritain's view (as explained by Rosato and Pugh) is the only natural knowledge that can attain the essences of natural reality.

Anthony Rizzi's chapter calls for a renovated and informed dialogue between scientists and philosophers of nature. The picture presented of contemporary academia is rather worrying, emphasizing the growth of skepticism as the offspring of the progress of science and the departure from the philosophy of nature. Rizzi's solution, however, is simple: "physicists should become explicit Thomists" (74) and Thomist philosophers should learn science. Gregory J. Kerr finishes the first part of the book with a consideration of the reasons that led Anthony Flew to change his mind about the existence of God. It is usually understood that these reasons were mainly scientific, of the sort that supporters of intelligent design would wield. Kerr, by contrast, suggests that Flew's change of mind was due to an acceptance that the scientific data required a different philosophical understanding of the world, that is, that of theism.

Part 2 begins with James G. Hanink's discussion of the importance of the intuition of being for Maritain's philosophy of nature. This intuition refers to the realization that things, roses for example, exist—that they "are" besides and beyond our act of cognition. There is, however, something that remains unclear in Hanink's chapter. What does it mean to be "open to the intuition of being" (108) for the philosophy of nature? Is this intuition—which poets, metaphysicians, or anybody else can have—what is required for the philosophy of nature to rise to the challenge of naturalism? Or is it rather the metaphysical analysis of it? It seems that Hanink's solution comes from an understanding of the analogy of being. This would mean, however, that it is not the intuition of being that is at stake here but rather the metaphysical analysis of it.

Travis Dumsday and Andrew Jaspers engage contemporary issues in the philosophy of science. Dumsday discusses the problem of laws of nature and its implication for theism, while Jaspers disputes whether twentieth-century relativity theory gives enough grounds to support a perdurantist ontology. Dumsday presents an appealing argument, suggesting that only a theistic account of laws of nature would fulfill the externalist criteria for the existence of laws of nature (assuming that a dispositionalist account would negate the existence of laws altogether). Jaspers plays a most difficult (and perhaps dangerous) game by challenging the ontology that Einstein's theory of relativity seems to support. The argument basically states that were Einstein's theory to be true then

reality would exist within a four-dimensional perdurantist ontology. Jaspers wants to suggest that this ontology is not able, for example, to distinguish people from rocks. There is some confusion in this chapter: the reader might find it difficult to see whether the critiques are directed at the perdurantist ontology or at Einstein's theory of relativity itself.

Part 3 begins with Nikolaj Zunic's chapter on human nature. Zunic argues for the unity of human nature and against materialist and action-based conceptions of it. Both these schools tend to misunderstand what is philosophy and how it should be carried out, assimilating it to the empirical sciences. From this misconception of philosophy, neither account reaches out to explore the full intellectual capacities of human beings. By contrast, a Maritainian perspective would provide us with ontological insights into human nature, something which empirical science cannot do.

Marie I. George analyzes the implications that the differences between human beings and apes (in their use of language and in their understanding of emotions) have for rationality. George concludes that even if we admit that apes have emotions and knowledge of them, we cannot conclude that they share rationality with human beings. Along the same lines, given that even those apes that have been taught symbolic forms of language cannot carry on conversations for the sake of understanding the world, we should conclude that they lack the rational capacities of human beings.

John G. Trapani, Jr., completes part 3 by examining the possibility of freedom and the challenge of determinism. Trapani makes it clear that allowing for random processes to happen in the brain (or even at the level of genes) is not enough to hold a doctrine of free will. Something else is required, because an entirely materialistic explanation of human nature cannot give place to human freedom. Trapani concludes that only a spiritual principle within human nature can completely account for freedom.

Part 4, dedicated to human doings, starts with Peter Karl Koritansky's chapter on punitive justice. It is unfortunate that the title of the chapter suggests something different (namely, a chapter on natural law) because it is a concise and very good description of how Aquinas understood that punitive justice finds its basis in natural human inclinations. The argument is simple and straightforward: against the modern view that anger (the natural inclination) should not be followed as a guide when deciding on punishments, Koritansky shows how Aquinas understood anger to be the inclination that leads towards the requirement of punishment, while the judgment of reason is what decides on the punishment. In the two following chapters, Elinor Gardner discusses human rights and their basis in human nature, while Mario Ramos-Reyes analyzes why so many Catholics in France and Latin America followed the political teachings of a materialistic thinker like Maurras. Gardner concludes that unless humanity finds some clear basis and foundation on which to sustain human rights, these rights will never have the force to guide moral decision-making. Ramos-Reyes finds that most Catholics who followed Maurras's teachings did so because he seemed to have an Aristotelian foundation but, more importantly, because they lacked political imagination. The final chapter of the book, by John J. Conley, S.J., is

dedicated to an analysis of Maritain's rejection of art as the imitation of nature. Conley explains that in Maritain's times the schools of art that used the idea of mimetism were surrounded by a materialistic framework, while Maritain's idea of art was the embodiment of spiritual reality in matter. Hence, Maritain found no other option than to reject mimetism.

Even though many of the arguments offered in this book are compelling, I have one concern with the volume as a whole, which mainly has to do with Maritain's understanding of the stature of science, the philosophy of nature, and metaphysics. Almost all the arguments in this volume accept Maritain's "qualified instrumentalism" for modern science and "essential realism" for the philosophy of nature, which, according to Maritain, follows from Aquinas's understanding of the hierarchy of knowledge. This conception of empirical science as only having access to the phenomenal reality of things without reaching their essential core is the foundation of the worrisome assessment about science and contemporary society found on many pages of this volume. Although it is not difficult to agree with many of the statements about the poverty of contemporary philosophical discourse and the decline of metaphysical thought, given the importance of Maritain's doctrine to this volume, it would have been stimulating to see some engagement of challenges to this perspective raised within Thomism. Filippo Selvaggi, for example, working in Italy during the fifties and the sixties, argued that because science works with the proper accidents of material substances, which emanate from the very essences of the substances, empirical science knows the essences of natural substances. By contrast, Maritain's assertion that science does not attain essences but remains within the phenomenal realm resembles Kant's ontological distinction. In Selvaggi's perspective, the philosophy of nature deals with the first principles of motion and of things that move (but not with the essences of natural things).

I do not want to claim that Selvaggi's philosophy of science is correct and Maritain's is not. I would have simply liked to see some engagement with those who do not share Maritain's ideas. These are too important and too fundamental to be left unchallenged. The richness of the Thomistic tradition offers many ways of understanding the basic relationship between the modern sciences and the philosophy of nature, which could provide us with different perspectives on the situation of contemporary science, academia, and society. As Thomists, following the example of Thomas Aquinas, we should make it our priority to engage the culture of our times positively, finding its share of truth and beauty.

Reading the Cosmos is, overall, a good book, full of arguments which, whether or not one finds them persuasive, reflect a unity of thought. This is a volume that, if properly engaged by the reader, will invite him to re-examine his own positions on issues related to our understanding of the cosmos and ourselves. It is a volume that transforms the reader into a philosopher of nature, which, paraphrasing the editor, is the first step to take in order to achieve wisdom.

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The Betrayal of Charity: The Sins That Sabotage Divine Love. By
MATTHEW LEVERING. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2011.
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Matthew Levering has written a unique and engaging book which is
creative in its treatment of sins against the theological virtue of charity.
The Betrayal of Charity: The Sins That Sabotage Divine Love evidences
Levering's intellectual acumen, as he brings Thomas Aquinas into con-
versation with current scholarship and current issues. In the process of
doing so, Levering shows himself, not only to be a thoroughly competent
Thomist, but also to be conversant with a significant amount of current
scholarship. Levering's own scholarship is meticulous, and the number
and variety of works he cites also evidence a wide-ranging approach to
the subject matter.

In the introduction, Levering states that the purpose of his book is "to
reclaim the centrality of love for moral theology and indeed for all areas
of theology" (2). To do so, Levering attends especially to St. Thomas
Aquinas's treatment of charity, in which Aquinas not only examines the
effects of charity but also gives attention to charity's opposites: hatred,
sloth, envy, discord, contention, schism, war, strife, sedition, and scandal
(ibid.). Levering notes that the sins against charity have not received much
attention, even in studies of charity (10), but he claims that "nonetheless,
each of them has a prominent role within specific contemporary
discussions" (2-3). He then lists the contemporary discussions that he
examines throughout the book:

> As we will see, hatred comes up in recent critiques of
> monotheism by such scholars as Regina Schwartz,
> Laurel Schneider [chap. 1], and Harold Bloom [chap.
> 2]; the problems associated with sloth are raised by
> Timothy Jackson's effort to dissociate Christian charity
> from belief in life after death [chap. 3]; envy plays a
> major role in American understandings of self-reliance,
> informed by Ralph Waldo Emerson [chap. 4]; ecclesial
> discord and contention form the subplot of John
> O'Malley's presentation of the Second Vatican Coun-
> cil's breakthroughs [chap. 5]; Walter Brueggemann and
> others critique liturgical hierarchy as a masked power
> play that foments schism [chap. 6]; the theology of
> John Howard Yoder aims to help Christianity embody
> an alternative to war, strife, and sedition [chap. 7]; and
> René Girard's theology of the cross hinges on his
> interpretation of scandal [chap. 8]. (3)

Levering acknowledges that these discussions "are widely separated, so
that their leading figures rarely interact with each other" (ibid.), but he
sees a unifying thread in all of them, claiming that "controversy over the
nature of charity (and thus of the sins against charity) drives the
discussions" (ibid.). It is here that Levering evidences a creative approach

to bringing compartmentalized discussions into dialogue with a common theme that is central to Christian theology.

In his introduction, before delving into any of the contemporary discussions that he relates to charity, Levering provides a fine overview of Aquinas's theology of charity. He stresses that "as a participation in the divine love, charity enlarges our hearts and enables us always to increase in charity during this life, but charity also can be lost" (7). Included in this synopsis is an excellent explanation of how Aquinas delineates sins against charity according to whether they oppose the interior or the exterior effects of charity (9). Levering also explains the benefits of studying sins against charity (10-12). However, the final section of the introduction, dealing with "The Spiritual Soul and the Sins against Charity," which addresses whether persons suffering severe neurological damage can sin against charity, while making some important points, seems somewhat disconnected from the rest of the introduction.

Throughout the eight main chapters of the book, Levering enters into specific contemporary discussions that he sees relating to charity, using Aquinas as his main reference point. While this approach is effective, it would strengthen the text to refer also at times to officially defined Catholic teaching, at least to prevent the perception that Aquinas is to be equated with the definitive word in Catholic theology.

In the first chapter, "Is Charity Violent?" Levering responds to the accusation that embedded in Trinitarian monotheism is "a violent principle of exclusion within human communities" (15). Utilizing Aquinas, Levering argues that "the Trinitarian pattern of love . . . liberates us from enslavement to empire-building" (27), and that "loving God actually fuels and nourishes love of neighbor, including love of enemy" (25).

In the second chapter, "Hatred and the God of Israel," Levering engages contemporary scholars who claim that Judaism and Christianity worship a literary God of hatred who is vengeful, untrustworthy, unjust, and worthy of hatred (36-37). Referencing Aquinas, Levering argues that the living God of Jews and Christians "enters into our broken condition from within and turns it inside out" (38).

The third chapter, "Sloth and the Joy of the Resurrection," focuses on those who spurn divine goodness because they would rather rest in temporal goods to avoid the demands of divine love. Using Aquinas's theology of joy and sloth, Levering argues "that without faith in resurrection, we cannot sustain the joy that flows from charity, but instead fall into the sin of sloth regarding what God is doing for us" (41).

"Envy and God-Reliance" is the fourth and one of the best chapters of Levering's book, oftentimes reading like a spiritual reflection. After exploring envy in the account of Cain and Abel in the Book of Genesis, Levering appeals to Aquinas to show that relying upon God, while receiving and being secure in his love, allows us to avoid sorrowing when confronted with the good that others possess.

The fifth chapter, "Discord, Contention, and Ecclesial Peace," reads like a lecture that has been inserted into Levering's book. Using Aquinas's theology of peace as an effect of charity to critique John W. O'Malley's interpretation of the Second Vatican Council, it explores "an often discordant and contentious question – namely that of how to receive the Second Vatican Council" (79). While the chapter is interesting, the

connection between the reception of Vatican II and peace as an effect of charity seems somewhat strained.

The sixth chapter, "Schism and Liturgical Mediation," provides a creative treatment of schism as a sin against charity by invoking Aquinas and focusing upon "the role of (hierarchical) liturgical action in uniting the people of God" (93) in charity. Drawing on Numbers 15, Levering effectively shows that for the people of God, "unity in charity comes through embodied liturgical action that cannot have its source in us, but rather must have its source in God" (104).

In "War and the Interpretation of Scripture," Levering explores the pacifist scriptural interpretation of John Howard Yoder and compares it to Aquinas's scriptural interpretation and treatment of war. Through his use of Aquinas, Levering allows the reader to see the legitimacy of wars of self-defense which have a charitable peace as their ultimate end.

The last chapter, "Scandal, Scapegoats, and Spiritual Downfall," compares Aquinas's view of scandal with that of René Girard. Levering notes similarities in the thought of Girard and Aquinas regarding scandal. He simultaneously shows how Aquinas's more complex understanding of scandal permits us to analyze instances of scandal with more precision than Girard's vision of scandal as "a violent contagion arising necessarily from rivalistic/mimetic desire" will allow (142).

The conclusion is a spiritual reflection that very effectively illustrates how sins against charity prevent us from saying to God or our neighbor: "It's good that you are; how wonderful that you exist!" (144). Levering also explains that, throughout the book, by "studying the sins against charity, we have in a roundabout way been studying this God of outpouring love" (145).

If one were to skip the introduction to this book, its unifying thread would not be immediately evident. The title itself does not make the content of the book abundantly clear to the potential reader. Levering himself states in the introduction, "By engaging such diverse discussions in a relatively brief fashion, the book's chapters on the sins against charity may appear disjointed to those who fail to perceive the unifying purpose" (3). While this unifying purpose is to underscore the "centrality of charity" in all of the issues under discussion, at times the book reads more like a collection of essays. This is due to the fact that three of the eight chapters were initially crafted as presentations delivered by Levering in different venues, and one chapter was previously published as an article in a different form (ix-x). Having been subsequently reworked for inclusion in this book, these chapters, and the other chapters of this book, do not cohere as well as they would have if they had been originally envisioned as pieces of a unified whole.

Also, although the scholarly nature of Levering's work is evident from the sheer number of endnotes, those same endnotes can at times overwhelm the reader. While the main body of the text is 147 pages, the endnotes comprise an additional 43 pages. It is cumbersome for the reader to follow the citations and ample commentary in the endnotes while reading the main narrative.

The above critiques notwithstanding, on the whole, *The Betrayal of Charity: The Sins That Sabotage Divine Love* is a piece of scholarship that

is unique and creative in its approach and well worth reading. It offers the reader an engaging, scholarly treatment of sins against love and how these sins relate to current issues.

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