The Thomist 85 (2021): 1-55

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAJETAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF PURE NATURE AND ITS ORIGINS IN THE THOUGHT OF JOHN CAPREOLUS

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EVER SINCE the controversy concerning how to understand man's desire for the beatific vision as his ultimate end erupted following the publication of Henri de Lubac's *Surnaturel* in 1946, the issue of Cajetan's conception of human nature has been much debated. De Lubac's work, continuing from *Surnaturel* in the 1940s to his more mature *Augustinisme et théologie moderne* in 1965, aimed at both the theological and the historical deconstruction of what he termed the system of "pure nature," that is to say, the view that human nature must reach its complete end or perfection strictly by natural principles. For de Lubac, such a view, which entails the effective denial of a desire for the vision of the divine essence as the complete perfection of human nature as nature, is both theologically and historically problematic. From a doctrinal perspective, it leads to a purely natural end for man that effectively closes man in on himself, severing his nature from any intrinsic connection to grace and the supernatural. Moreover, historically speaking, it represents a rupture with a classical tradition of thought that runs from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas and the other great Scholastics of the thirteenth century. In purporting to find a theory of pure nature in Aquinas's writings, later Scholastic thinkers betrayed and falsified his thought.

In de Lubac's narrative, the progenitor of this view of nature was Tommaso de Vio (1469-1534), better known as Cardinal Cajetan, who was a renowned Dominican theologian of the late

fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Often remembered by historians for his disputation with Martin Luther at Augsburg in 1518, Cajetan was one of the leading theologians of his day, producing a magisterial commentary on Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* that remained influential into the twentieth century, in addition to dozens of smaller treatises.[1] According to de Lubac, Cajetan stands at the origin of the pure-nature theory that the great majority of later Scholastics, including de Lubac's own twentieth-century interlocutors, would adopt.[2] Crucially, he was also the first to impute the view to Aquinas himself, passing off his novel philosophy of nature as the latter's own. Nearly all subsequent scholarly discussion of the issues de Lubac raised has addressed the question of whether Cajetan was an accurate interpreter of Aquinas on the pure-nature question.

That the Dominican cardinal held a view of nature in which nature must reach its proper perfection in a naturally attainable end is generally not disputed, and the texts, as we shall see, are clear on the point. However, lost in the scholarly debate is sustained treatment of the question of the historical genesis of Cajetan's view. Indeed, contemporary scholars have devoted comparatively little attention to the question of how Cajetan's philosophy of pure nature developed, focusing instead on the question of his fidelity to Aquinas. When such scholars do advert to the question of the origins of the Dominican cardinal's view of *natura*, they generally do so in passing, attributing it to concerns about the gratuity of grace that supposedly arise from positing a supernaturally attained end as the complete perfection of nature *qua* nature. Indeed, scholars who find themselves on opposite sides of the debate about Cajetan's faithfulness to Aquinas, such

[1] For a comprehensive list of Cajetan's works, see Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., "Bio-Bibliographie de Cajétan," *Revue Thomiste* 39* (1934-35): 36-44.

[2] De Lubac notes that some earlier authors, such as Denis the Carthusian (1402-71), shared the view that nature must be perfected strictly by natural agency, but he suggests that Cajetan was likely unfamiliar with Denis's writings and provides textual evidence demonstrating that later proponents of the thesis referred back to the Dominican cardinal as their ultimate source. See Henri de Lubac, *Augustinisme et théologie moderne* (1965; repr., Paris: Cerf, 2008), 201-2.

as Lawrence Feingold[3] and Denis Bradley,[4] generally concur in attributing the Dominican commentator's view of nature to concerns about this or some other issue of theological orthodoxy.

Although theological concerns were foremost in the mind of later proponents of the pure-nature theory, writing in the aftermath of the Baianist controversy, there is less evidence that they preoccupied Cajetan, who was active decades before the controversy erupted. The argument Feingold adduces as proof of the fact that Cajetan's view of nature was motivated by issues of theological orthodoxy is based on a misinterpretation of Cajetan's *De potentia neutra*, a text in which the Dominican commentator argues against the claim that there can be a natural potency or inclination for an end that is only attainable supernaturally. Assessing Cajetan's argument, Feingold writes:

> Cajetan here implicitly states another very significant argument against the position of Scotus which turns on the gratuitousness of grace. He says that if one knew the existence of a natural potency for the vision of God (or for other supernatural acts), one would not only know the *possibility* of such an act, but

[3] Lawrence Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters,* 2d ed. (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2010), 132-33.

[4] Denis Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 460. "At the same time, the claim [that man has a natural desire for the vision of God], as the anxious explanations of the traditional Thomist commentators reveal, appears to offend orthodox Christian doctrine. If the vision of God is naturally desired, how then is it supernatural in character? This is the question that Cajetan resolutely posed and, as posed, answered negatively. . . . Yet the Aristotelian anxieties of Cajetan and subsequent Thomist commentators deserve sympathetic consideration; their anxious efforts to rescue Aquinas from the quasi-Aristotelian heterodoxy, that they themselves formulated and feared, confirm that Aquinas's own philosophical conception of nature is novel." See also ibid., 440: "For centuries Thomist theologians have pedantically rehearsed whether the desire to see the divine essence may be legitimately called a *natural* desire without thereby jeopardizing the supernatural character of that end. I shall look briefly at the three Dominicans who are the most eminent of the classic Thomist commentators: Thomas de Vio, O.P., known as Cajetan; Francis Sylvester of Ferrara, O.P., known as Ferrariensis; and Domingo Báñez, O.P."

one would also know the fact that at some time, in some subject, *it must be realized*.[5]

He bases this assessment on Cajetan's claim that

> we certainly know the major [premise], that no natural potency is in vain; therefore, if we know the minor [premise] that in matter or the soul, or in anything else, there is a natural potency for a supernatural act, it is necessary to concede that we know that there must be supernatural things. Thus, we would know the future resurrection of the dead, the justifying grace of sinners, etcetera, which is ridiculous.[6]

Cajetan does not explicitly mention concerns about the gratuity of grace in this passage, unlike other, later Scholastics who criticized the notion of a natural potency for a supernatural act.[7] When the text says that it would be "necessary to concede" that we would have knowledge of supernatural things, the absurdity of this proposition is located primarily in its implication that supernatural things can be *known* by natural things, not in a claim about God being compelled to bestow the supernatural gifts enumerated in the text.[8] Indeed, the crucial sentence (the second)

[5] Feingold, *Natural Desire to See God,* 132-33.

[6] Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, *De potentia neutra, et de natura potentiae receptivae in duas quaestiones divisus*, q. 2, quoad 4 (*Opuscula omnia Thomae de Vio Caietani cardinalis tituli sancti Sixti* [Lyon, 1587; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1995], 207b52-57): "Et confirmatur: quia certe scimus hanc maiorem, quod nulla naturalis potentia est frustra. Ergo, si scimus hanc minorem quod in materia vel anima, vel quacumque alia re est naturalis potentia ad actum supernaturalem, oportet concedere quod scimus supernaturalia illa debere esse, et sic sciemus resurrectionem mortuorum futuram, et gratiam iustificantem impium, etcetera, quod est ridiculum." All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

[7] See, for instance, Francisco Suárez, *Metaphysical Disputation XXX,* sec. 11, 37 (*Opera omnia,* 28 vols., ed. D. M. André [Paris: Vivès, 1856-78], 26:154a). Though it is possible that Cajetan saw in the Scotist assertion of a natural potency for supernatural perfections a threat to the gratuity of grace, this is not the objection he levels in the text of *De potentia neutra.* As I explain below, his objection is primarily epistemic, namely, that the Scotist position would imply that we know supernatural realities on the basis of natural knowledge. Thus, in examining the origins of Cajetan's view of pure nature, we must consider historical explanations other than the gratuity of grace.

[8] When Cajetan says that it would be "ridiculous" to assert a natural potency for supernatural acts because it would imply that we "know that there must be supernatural things," the word "must" (*debere*) should not be taken as suggesting that the absurdity

states that it is "ridiculous" to claim that we "know" supernatural things—not that it is ridiculous to claim that God must grant supernatural things. For his part, Bradley does not provide any specific texts from Cajetan to support his assertion that the Dominican cardinal's view of nature was the product of a desire to uphold theological orthodoxy. Rather, he includes Cajetan indiscriminately among Thomistic commentators, such as Sylvester of Ferrara (ca. 1474-1528) and Domingo Báñez (1528-1604), whose concern about the implications of affirming a natural inclination to a supernaturally attained end for the gratuity of the supernatural order led them, Bradley claims, to maintain that nature must reach its complete perfection by natural agency.[9]

Some older scholarship, including that of de Lubac himself, addressed the issue of the historical origins of Cajetan's view of nature, but again not in considerable depth. Indeed, de Lubac's brief description of the origins of the Dominican cardinal's thesis is better characterized as an aside rather than as a sustained scholarly treatment. De Lubac gestures toward several different explanations of the genesis of Cajetan's pure-nature thesis. First,

would consist in the fact that God must *grant* supernatural things. There is no reference to what God is or is not compelled to do, and consequently, the term "must be" in this context has effectively the same signification as "are." In other words, Cajetan's statement that if there were a natural potency for supernatural acts, "we [would] know that there must be supernatural things," is equivalent in meaning in this context to the statement that if there were a natural potency for supernatural acts, "we [would] know that there are supernatural things."

[9] Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*, 447: "Still, the Thomist commentators, whose exegesis [of Aquinas's texts concerning the natural desire for the supernatural vision of God] seems as much ruled by their theological anxieties as by the texts of Aquinas, must be given their due. In their attenuated explanations of Aquinas, more than Aristotle's authority or the Aristotelian conception of 'nature' is at stake. Something far more fundamental to Christian faith is at question. Does the concept of a natural desire to see God compromise the supernatural character of man's ultimate end? Fearing that it does, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and Báñez blunt Aquinas's striking affirmation of what men actually desire by nature." Bradley only cites a text from Sylvester of Ferrara in support of the claim that these Dominicans were concerned about the gratuity of the supernatural order, assuming that it is representative of Cajetan and Báñez as well.

he suggests that it developed in reaction to Duns Scotus (1266-1308). Scotus had famously—and provocatively—argued that man is "naturally" in potency to the beatific vision,[10] a claim of which Cajetan was aware. De Lubac notes that Cajetan, who received his formative theological training at the University of Padua in the early 1490s and served on the faculty there until 1496, was immersed in an intellectual environment polarized between Scotists, such as Cajetan's contemporary (and frequent opponent) Antonio Trombetta (1436-1517), and thinkers opposed to Scotus, including Dominican Thomists as well as Averroists and humanists.[11] Shaped by this milieu, Cajetan was predisposed to reject anything resembling the Scotist conception of nature, which is to say, any view that the supernatural perfects nature *as nature*. In addition to his anti-Scotism, Cajetan's understanding of *natura pura* was also profoundly influenced by the Averroist and humanist professors of the arts faculty, such as Nicoletto Vernia (ca. 1420-99) and Agostino Nifo (1473-1545). These thinkers sought to consider man in abstraction from the supernatural and hence embraced the view that human nature must be perfected by its own intrinsic principles lest it be "vain" or "frustrated," a principle they attributed to Aristotle, whose philosophy they regarded as true philosophy *tout court*.[12] De Lubac claims that Cajetan absorbed the Averroist tendency to view nature in abstraction from the supernatural during his Paduan years and that it is of central importance for understanding the genesis of his conception of nature.[13]

[10] John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, p. 1, q. 1, n. 57, 35 (Vatican City, 1950-2013).

[11] De Lubac, *Augustinisme*, 158-61. Congar puts the point in even more dramatic terms: "At Padua, whether in philosophy or theology, one necessarily thinks against someone else. It was necessary to take a position in the Averroist battle, and, moreover, to opt for St. Thomas or Scotus: for St. Thomas against Scotus, or for Scotus against St. Thomas" (Congar, "Bio-Bibliographie de Cajétan," 5).

[12] As Charles Schmitt has aptly observed of Renaissance Paduan thinkers, "each in his way wanted to shed new light on 'true philosophy,' which for all of them derived from Aristotle" (Charles Schmitt, *Aristotle and the Renaissance* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983], 99).

[13] "Cajetan reflects the formation that he received at Padua. A sincere believer, he does not reject the supernatural. Rather, he relegates it among 'miraculous' things, that is to say, among the arbitrary exceptions with which the philosopher, even within faith, hardly

I fully agree with de Lubac's view that Cajetan's conception of nature took shape during his time at Padua. It is, moreover, certainly true that there were important debates between Scotists and Thomists at Padua in the last decade of the fifteenth century, including between Trombetta and Cajetan himself. Though we will later have occasion to examine in more detail the claim that anti-Scotism motivated Cajetan's conception of nature, it is important to note at the outset that recent historiography has shown that the intellectual atmosphere of Cajetan's Padua was not as partisan as de Lubac's work suggests. On the contrary, there was meaningful, often amicable, intellectual exchange among members of all the identifiable philosophical and theological schools present there, and while disagreements certainly existed, the milieu was not so defined by them as de Lubac's comments suggest.[14] As for influence by Averroists and humanists in the arts faculty, it is true that Cajetan shared their reverence for Aristotle as well as their interpretation of the Stagirite's texts on the question of the nonvanity of nature. It is also true that he knew and was on friendly terms with many of them.[15] He may, then, have been predisposed to accept the pure-nature theory by the general tenor of intellectual life at Padua set

has to occupy himself in his rational effort" (De Lubac, *Augustinisme*, 256-57). See also ibid., 159-60, 202-3.

[14] See Matthew Gaetano, "Renaissance Thomism at the University of Padua: 1465-1583" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2013), 112-63. Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations, 865. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/865.

[15] Cajetan even dedicated the first edition of his commentary on Aquinas's *De ente et essentia* to Benedetto Tiriaca, a Mantuan arts student who received his doctorate at Padua while Cajetan was on the faculty there and who subsequently taught mathematics and astronomy: "to the most illustrious doctor of arts, lord Benedetto Tiriaca of Mantua, the best of friends, who publicly professes logic and mathematics in the Paduan *studium*" ("ad clarissimum artium doctorem dominum Benedictum tyriacum Mantuanum logicen Mathematicamque publice in Patavino studio profitentem Amicorum optimum"). See Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, *Aureum opus de ente et essentia divi Thome aquinatis cum commentariis fratris Thome Caietani sacre theologie doctoris et fratris Armandi eiusdem ordinis doctoris clarissimi* (Venice, 1496), sig.a1v. Cited in Gaetano, "Renaissance Thomism," 141.

by the Paduan arts faculty. Nevertheless, with regard to the question of influence, I believe we must look at more proximate sources. After all, Cajetan studied at Padua's Dominican *studium*, Sant'Agostino, and therefore a consideration of the sources within his own tradition, the sources from which he learned his theology, is of particular importance. Indeed, when we examine these sources, I believe we find the most important origin of his philosophy of pure nature. As I will explain, Cajetan's conception of nature as requiring completion by strictly natural agency is the outcome of a particular understanding of the science of theology that he developed at Padua, namely, an understanding of the discipline as excluding from its proper purview all rationally demonstrable truths. Once theology is defined as a science encompassing only truths that must be revealed in order to be known, philosophy is left to construct an account of man entirely on its own, according to its own exigencies, with the consequence that human nature must achieve its complete perfection by its own endowments in order to retain its integrity as nature.

This understanding of theology, though present in Cajetan's mature 1507 commentary on the *Prima pars*, does not make its debut in that text. In fact, it can be found in his earliest writing, a commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* that he composed while lecturing on the Lombard's text in the course of his theological training at Padua in the 1493-94 academic year.[16] This work contains the key to understanding the origin of Cajetan's conception of theology and hence his view of nature. It elaborates precisely the same understanding of the science of theology that would appear substantively unchanged in his *Summa* commentary over a decade later, and the textual evidence suggests that the source of the new understanding of theology was in fact a

[16] The text, which exists only in manuscript form, is housed at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. It has been the subject of very few studies, the most recent of which was published in 1966. See Armand Maurer, C.S.B., "Cajetan's Notion of Being in His Commentary on the *Sentences*," *Mediaeval Studies* 28 (1966): 268-78; M. H. Laurent, "La causalité sacramentaire d'après le commentaire de Cajétan sur les *Sentences*," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 20 (1931): 77-82; L.-B. Gillon, "La condition des accidents eucharistiques selon Cajétan," *Revue thomiste* 39* (1934-35): 319-42; Georges Frénaud, "Les inédits de Cajétan," *Revue thomiste* 41 (1936): 331-66.

Dominican theologian, namely, John Capreolus (1380-1444), the so-called *princeps Thomistarum* and arguably the most important Thomistic thinker of the two centuries between Cajetan and Aquinas himself. As we shall see, Cajetan's conception of theology derives in the first instance from his Paduan theological training, his experience of learning Thomism from the greatest Thomistic commentator of his era.

I. Pure Nature in Cajetan's Writings

Let us begin with an overview of the *explicandum* itself, that is, Cajetan's philosophy of human nature. The primary textual locus for understanding the Dominican cardinal's conception of pure nature is found in his commentary on the *Prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae*. Commenting on the first article of question 12, in which Aquinas argues that it is possible for the created intellect to see the essence of God on the grounds that, since the created intellect has a "natural desire" for knowing the essence of the first cause, its nature would be frustrated or "in vain" if it could not in principle obtain the object of this desire,[17] Cajetan raises a difficulty that is decisive for understanding his own conception of nature. Posing the objection, Cajetan writes:

> It does not seem true that the created intellect naturally desires to see God, for nature does not bestow an inclination to anything which the whole power of nature cannot bring about. The sign of this is that nature has given the organs [necessary for actualizing] any potency which it has placed in the soul; and in

[17] *STh* I, q. 12, a. 1 (*Sancti Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici Opera omnia* [Rome: Leonine Edition, 1882-], 4:115): "For there is in man a natural desire to know the cause, when the effect is considered; and from this arises wonder in men. If, therefore, the intellect of the rational creature cannot attain to the first cause of things, the desire of nature will remain vain. Whence, it is simply to be conceded that the blessed see the essence of God" ("Inest enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur effectum; et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. Si igitur intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae. Unde simpliciter concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant").

Book II of *De caelo* it is said that if the stars had the power of progressive motion [i.e., if nature had implanted an inclination in them for such motion], then nature would have given them fitting organs [for this motion].[18]

Though Cajetan poses as an objection the principle that nature does not bestow an inclination or desire for that which nature cannot attain, his response concedes the premise. He attempts to "defend" Aquinas by claiming that man "considered absolutely" does not have a natural desire for the vision of the divine essence precisely because human nature cannot desire a good, such as this vision, which natural powers cannot bring about.[19] However, Cajetan continues, if man knows something of God's supernatural effects, such as grace and glory (something possible only through revelation), then it follows that man would "naturally" want to know God in himself.[20] Cajetan's "defense"

[18] Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 12, a. 1, IX (Leonine ed., 4:116): "Non enim videtur verum quod intellectus creatus naturaliter desideret videre Deum: quoniam natura non largitur inclinationem ad aliquid, ad quod tota vis naturae perducere nequit. Cuius signum est, quod organa natura dedit cuilibet potentiae quam intus in anima posuit. Et in II *Caeli* dicitur quod, si astra haberent vim progressivam, natura dedisset eis organa opportuna."

[19] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 12, a. 1, X (Leonine ed., 4:116): "As evidence of these things, note that the rational creature can be considered in two ways; in one way, *absolutely*, and in another way, *as ordered to felicity*. If [the rational creature] is considered in the first way, then its natural desire *does not extend beyond the power of nature [to fulfill]*: and thus I concede that it does not naturally desire the vision of God in himself absolutely" ("Ad evidentiam horum, scito quod creatura rationalis potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo absolute, alio modo ut ordinata est ad felicitatem. Si primo modo consideretur, sic naturale eius desiderium non se extendit ultra naturae facultatem: et sic concedo quod non naturaliter desiderat visionem Dei in se absolute") (emphasis added).

[20] Ibid.: "But if [the rational creature] is considered in the second way [that is, as "ordered to felicity"], then he naturally desires the vision of God, because he has become cognizant of certain effects, such as grace and glory, whose cause is God. . . . However, with the effects known, it is natural to any intellectual being to desire knowledge of the cause. And therefore desire for the divine vision, even if it is not natural to the created intellect absolutely, is nevertheless natural to it, with the revelation of such effects supposed" ("Si secundo modo consideretur, sic naturaliter desiderat visionem Dei: quia, ut sic, novit quosdam effectus, puta gratiae et gloriae, quorum causa est Deus. . . . Notis autem effectibus, naturale est cuilibet intellectuali desiderare notitiam causae. Et propterea desiderium visionis divinae, etsi non sit naturale intellectui creato absolute, est tamen naturale ei, supposita revelatione talium effectuum").

of Aquinas in his commentary on article 1 of this question, was not, as an interpretation of the Angelic Doctor, convincing even to contemporaries who subscribed to a similar understanding of nature,[21] and indeed even today it strikes readers sympathetic to Cajetan's view as a rather obvious example of eisegesis on the part of the Dominican commentator.[22] Of course, it leaves no doubt as to where Cajetan stands on the question of nature. *Natura* must be able to attain its end and perfection by its own intrinsic principles lest it be in vain—a philosophical absurdity—and thus it cannot naturally desire that which is beyond its power to achieve.

The Dominican cardinal's conception of nature was, however, formulated long before he composed his commentary on the *Summa theologiae*. In fact, he had already articulated it a decade earlier in a small treatise he wrote while on the faculty of the University of Padua entitled *De potentia neutra.* Published in 1496, the text addresses the question of "whether a potency receptive of supernatural acts can be a natural potency."[23] In other words, can a natural potency be actuated by supernatural agency, or, in order to be a truly natural potency, must it be actuated only by natural agency? Cajetan denies that it is possible for a natural potency to be actuated supernaturally; rather, a potency that could only be reduced to act supernaturally would

[21] For example, Cajetan's contemporary Sylvester of Ferrara criticized his Dominican confrère on this point in his commentary on the *Summa contra gentiles*: "Some [he is referring to Cajetan] respond that this desire is not natural to rational nature considered absolutely, but *insofar as it is ordered to beatitude, and with the supposition of the revelation of effects, [such as] grace and glory, whose cause is God as he is in himself absolutely rather than [God] as universal agent*. But this does not seem to be the mind of Saint Thomas" ("Respondent quidam quod hoc desiderium non est naturale naturae rationali absolute consideratae, sed *ut est ad beatitudinem ordinata; et supposita revelatione effectuum gratiae et gloriae, quorum Deus est causa ut Deus est in se absolute, non ut universale agens*. Sed hoc non videtur esse ad mentem Sancti Thomae"). See Francis Sylvester of Ferrara, commentary on *ScG* III, c. 51, iii (Leonine ed., 14:141).

[22] Feingold, *Natural Desire to See God*, 172-73.

[23] Cajetan, *De potentia neutra,* q. 2 (Lyon ed., 207a30-33): "Utrum potentia receptiva actuum supernaturalium sit potentia naturalis."

be an "obediential" potency.[24] The reason for this, as he succinctly explains, is that "to every natural passive potency, there corresponds some proximate active potency. Therefore, [to every natural passive potency there must] correspond a natural active potency."[25] Such a claim amounts to essentially the same understanding of nature as articulated in the later *Summa* commentary. A being must have all of its natural potencies, which Cajetan understands as its natural inclinations or desires, fulfilled by strictly natural principles or endowments. In other words, for Cajetan, a thing must be able to attain by natural agency the proper acts, ends, and perfections that pertain to it in virtue of its nature. On such a view, man cannot be in a condition of natural potency to—that is, cannot possess a natural desire or inclination for—the vision of the divine essence, but must rather attain the complete end and perfection of his nature through some naturally attainable good.

We are now faced with the task of explaining the origins of the conception of nature that Cajetan articulates in these texts. As I suggested at the outset, the ultimate source of the Dominican cardinal's understanding of *natura* is his conception of theology as a science that excludes all rationally demonstrable truths, a conception that leaves philosophy to construct its own account of nature independent of the data of revelation, with the inevitable consequence that nature must be perfected by its own intrinsic principles. Such an understanding of theology as consisting solely of truths that must be revealed in order to be known emerges from consideration of Cajetan's commentary on the first question of the *Summa theologiae*, treating the "nature and extent of sacred doctrine [*sacra doctrina*]," which Cajetan identifies

[24] Cajetan, *De potentia neutra*, q. 2, quoad 4 (Lyon ed., 207b13-15): "As to the fourth, the conclusion responsive to the question is that the potency to supernatural acts is not natural but obediential" ("Quoad quartum, conclusio responsiva quaesito est, quod potentia ad actus supernaturales, non est naturalis, sed obedientialis").

[25] Ibid. (Lyon ed., 207b30-32): "Secundo, ex parte potentia sic: omni potentiae passivae naturali, respondet aliqua potentia activa proxima. Ergo, respondet potentia activa naturalis."

with *theologia*.[26] Indeed, it is in this commentary that we find his most mature articulation of the nature of theology, though, as we will later see when we consider his 1493-94 *Sentences* commentary, he had already formulated the same understanding during his time at Padua. The key to grasping the way in which Cajetan defines theology along purely epistemic lines (as a science that properly speaking excludes from its purview all rationally demonstrable truths) is an examination of his treatment of the question of what specifies theology as a science, that is, its "formal object." Aquinas himself addresses the issue of the formal object of *sacra doctrina* in articles 3 and 7 of question 1 of the *Prima pars*. While his treatment is sufficient to understand what, for him, constitutes *sacra doctrina* as a particular discipline, it is far less detailed than Cajetan's treatment, which purports to elaborate Aquinas's view.

Beginning in his commentary on the third article, Cajetan outlines a comprehensive theory of the specification of sciences, including the science of theology. Every science, he claims, has a twofold formal object which constitutes the science as the particular science that it is. First, there is the very thing that the science chiefly considers. This, Cajetan states, is the formal object of the science "as a thing" (*obiectum ut res*), and it is also the "subject" (*subiectum*) of the science.[27] For example, the *obiectum ut res* of metaphysics is being, that of mathematics is quantity, and that of physics mobility.[28] Second, there is the formal aspect under which the science studies the given thing (*obiectum ut res*) in question, which Cajetan labels interchangeably the "object as object" (*obiectum ut obiectum*) and the "object as knowable" (*obiectum ut scibile*).[29] Continuing with the aforementioned examples, metaphysics studies being considered in abstraction

[26] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, I (Leonine ed., 4:12). "In the title [of this question] *sacred doctrine* is taken for the whole theological science" ("In titulo *sacra doctrina* sumitur pro tota scientia theologica").

[27] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, III (Leonine ed., 4:12).

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

from all matter (which abstraction is its *obiectum ut scibile*), while mathematics studies being as quantity abstracted from corporeal though not intelligible matter (its *obiectum ut scibile*), and physics studies mobile being without abstraction from either kind of matter (its *obiectum ut scibile*).[30] Summarizing the contrast, Cajetan claims that the object *ut res* is "what" (*quae*) is known in the science, and the object *ut scibile* is the "aspect under which" (*sub qua*) this "what" is known; both of these objects pertain to a given science and make it what it is.[31]

These two formal objects, the *ut res* (or "subject") and the *ut scibile,* are not unrelated. In fact, Cajetan claims that they are "convertible" with each other. This is because the latter formal object is a property of the former.[32] In other words, an object of study implies a particular way of knowing it. Cajetan explains this by referring to the twofold objects of powers, to which habits, including the intellectual habit of science, are analogous. The object *ut res* of the power of sight is color, the object *ut scibile*, the aspect under which color is known, is "as visible" (*visibile*), and hence the power of sight is formally the power that apprehends "color as visible." We can see from this specific example, which is Cajetan's, the way in which a particular *obiectum ut scibile* is contained in a particular *obiectum ut res*.[33] "Visible" is a predicate contained in the very notion of "color," and hence to say that the formal object of sight is color is one and the same thing as to say that the formal object of sight is "the visible."

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.: "The formal notion of the object in a science is twofold. One is the object as a *thing*, and the other is the object as an *object*; or, [in other words,] [the object as] *what*, [and the object] *under which*" ("Duplicem esse rationem formalem obiecti in scientia: alteram obiecti ut *res*, alteram obiecti ut *obiectum*; vel alteram ut *quae*, alteram ut *sub qua*").

[32] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, VII (Leonine ed., 4:13). As he states, the object *ut res* is a *subiectum* of which the object *ut scibile* is a *passio* or property: "because those two formal notions follow upon each other convertibly, as subject and property" ("tum quia convertibiliter se consequuntur illae duae rationes formales, ut subiectum et passio").

[33] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, IV (Leonine ed., 4:12).

As Cajetan explains, the same convertibility that obtains between the objects *ut res* and *ut scibile* in the case of a power also obtains in the case of an intellectual habit, which is to say, in the case of a particular science. Returning to the examples mentioned above, it is of the very nature of the subject (or object *ut res*) of metaphysics, being in general, to be studied "by metaphysical light," which is to say, by "abstraction from all matter."[34] To say that being *simpliciter* is the specifying object of the science is the same as to say that abstraction from all matter is the specifying object, since the subject entails the latter as a predicate pertaining to it in virtue of what it is. Likewise, to say, in the case of mathematics, that the subject of the science is quantitative being is to say that it is the science that studies being as abstracted from sensible though not intelligible matter, since knowability in this form is a predicate of quantitative being. Moreover, that physics is the study of being as mobile is to say that, formally speaking, it is the science that studies being as abstracted neither from sensible nor from intelligible matter (though it does consider *ens mobile* in abstraction from any particular mobile being), since knowability in this mode is part of what it is to be "mobile being."[35]

Although the mode of knowability or object *ut scibile* follows from the *ut res* as property from subject, to the point that the two are even "convertible," the formal object *ut scibile* is nonetheless more proximate in determining the species of the *scientia*. As Cajetan writes, "it necessarily follows that the specific unity and diversity of the sciences follow from the unity and diversity of the formal aspects of the objects *as objects* [*ut obiecta*, which is equivalent to *ut scibile*], or, what is the same, of the formal

[34] Ibid.: "first, the notion of being is divided into entity simply. . . . And from this flows another knowable division, that which is knowable through metaphysical light, that is, the medium illuminated by abstraction from all matter" ("primo dividitur ratio entis in entitatem simpliciter. . . . Et ex hac fluit alia divisio scibilis, in scibile per lumen metaphysicale, idest medium illustratum per abstractionem ab omni materia").

[35] Ibid.

aspects under which the things [*res*] are known."[36] So while the object *ut res* is ultimately inseparable from the object *ut scibile* (for the *ut scibile* implies and follows from the *ut res*), nonetheless, in thinking about what makes the particular science to be the science that it is, it is the mode of knowability, the light or aspect under which the *res* are known, that is most properly said to specify the science.[37]

In the text, Cajetan explicitly applies this twofold conception of the formal object of a science to theology. The object *ut res*, or subject, of theology is something Cajetan terms *deitas,* which, in a definition we will consider later in more detail, he defines as the divine quiddity itself, or God considered *absolute* in his essence, apart from all attributes or properties.[38] The object *ut scibile*, that is, the way in which the proper *res* of the science is known, is "through the divine light."[39] At this point in his exposition, however, Cajetan adds a nuance to his explanation of

[36] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, V (Leonine ed., 4:13): "de necessitate sequitur quod unitas et diversitas specifica scientiarum attendantur penes unitatem et diversitatem rationum formalium obiectorum ut obiecta sunt; vel, quod idem est, rationum formalium *sub quibus* res sciuntur." He reiterates this point later in the commentary on question 1, stating that the science extends only as far as the proper light under which the thing is known extends, which may not always be the same as the thing taken absolutely: "Non est ergo secundum extensionem rationis formalis ut res est absolute, sed ut stantis sub ratione formali obiecti ut obiectum est, mensuranda scientia" (Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7, V [Leonine ed., 4:20]).

[37] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, V (Leonine ed., 4:13): "where there is one most specific knowable species, it is necessary that there be only one species of science" ("ubi est una species specialissima scibilis, ibi oportet esse unam tantum speciem scientiae").

[38] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7, I (Leonine ed., 4:19): "God can be considered according to his proper quiddity . . . and we speak about this quiddity [using] the name 'deity' . . . such that the quiddity of God is the formal notion of this subject as it is a thing" ("Potest considerari Deus secundum suam propriam quidditatem . . . et hanc quidditatem circumloquimur *deitatis* nomine . . . ita quod quidditas Dei sit ratio formalis huius subiecti ut res est"). See also commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 2, XIII (Leonine ed., 4:11): "although deity is one formal notion of the object . . . of theology as it is a thing" ("quamvis deitas sit una ratio formalis obiecti . . . theologiae ut res est").

[39] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, IV (Leonine ed., 4:12). "through divine light, that is, the medium shining with divine light, which constitutes the *theological knowable*" ("per lumen divinum, idest medium divino lumine fulgens, quod *scibile theologicum* constituit").

the formal object of theology that he does not apply to some of the other *scientiae* he cites in his description of the twofold specification of sciences. He adds this qualification in response to an objection he addresses in his commentary on the third article. If *deitas* is the object *ut res* of both the theology of the blessed, those who have been rewarded in the afterlife with the vision of the divine essence, and the theology possessed by those in the present life, and if *deitas* is convertible with one particular mode of knowability (such as the divine light), then how can we differentiate between the theology possessed by the blessed and that possessed by those who are still *in via*?[40]

Cajetan's answer to this objection is to qualify the convertibility of the objects *ut res* and *ut scibile*. Objects *ut res* are only convertible with objects *ut scibile* that are "adequate" to them, not those that are "inadequate."[41] In the case of theology, *deitas* is fully convertible only *in general* with the "divine light" through which it is manifested, that is, not directly with any particular kind of divine light.[42] What this means is that *deitas*

[40] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, VIII (Leonine ed., 4:13).

[41] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, IX (Leonine ed., 4:13): "To this it is said that that proposition, namely, *the formal notion of the object as it is a thing, and the notion of it as an object, are convertible*, is most true, rightly understood; that is, [as understood] of the formal notion of the object as *adequate* to the formal notion of the thing. It is otherwise, however, with respect to the formal notion of the object as it is an object *inadequate* to the formal notion of the object as a thing (if it is the case that some object has an inadequate notion). For it is not required that the inadequate be converted with the notion of the thing, but at least to entail it, and not necessarily to be entailed by it" ("Ad hoc dicitur, quod illa propositio, scilicet: *ratio formalis obiecti ut res, et ratio eius ut obiectum, sunt convertibiles*, verissima est, sane intellecta, scilicet de ratione formali obiecti ut sic *adaequata* rationi formali rei. Secus autem est de ratione formali obiecti ut obiectum *inadaequata* rationi formali obiecti ut res (si contingit aliquod obiectum habere rationem inadaequatam): quoniam inadaequatam non oportet converti cum ratione rei; sed inferre quidem illam, et non necessario inferri ab illa").

[42] Ibid.: "Because to deity there corresponds only one formal notion adequate to the object as it is an object, and this is the divine light. But that formal notion is not one in species, but in genus. It is divided into the *evident* divine light, the *revealing* divine light (abstracting from evidence and inevidence), and the *inevident* divine light. And the first is the notion *under which* of the theology of the blessed, the second is of our theology, the

does not imply one species of divine light[43] more than any other, for all species of *lumen divinum* belong to it by equal right; each is a property of *deitas*, something pertaining to *deitas* in virtue of what it is.[44] Conveniently, this nuance allows Cajetan to differentiate specifically the theology possessed in heaven from that possessed by those in the present life based on two distinct species of divine light, while still maintaining his broader claim that the formal subject of theology, by its very nature, admits of being known in certain particular, determinate ways and that these modes of knowability, rather than others, are properties of the subject. The theology of the blessed in heaven is *deitas* as known through a divine light that makes God's essence "evident" and fully seen, whereas our theology is *deitas* considered under the divine light as "revealing" that essence to us (and hence not yet making that essence fully evident to us). Both of these modes of knowability are properties of *deitas*, for *deitas* includes them equally in virtue of what it is.

"Our" theology is, of course, what Cajetan is examining in the treatise, and accordingly he provides a more detailed description of it. As he writes, (our) theology is the science that knows things in the light of divine revelation, and knowing *deitas* in this light is the formal object *ut scibile* or *ut obiectum* of the science: "The

third is of faith. . . . and therefore, although deity is converted with that adequate notion [i.e., divine light], and they mutually entail one another, nevertheless it is not converted with any species thereof" ("Quia deitati respondet una tantum ratio formalis adaequata obiecti ut obiectum est, et haec est lumen divinum: sed illa ratio formalis non est una specie, sed genere; et dividitur in lumen divinum *evidens*, et lumen divinum *revelans* (abstrahendo ab evidentia et inevidentia), et lumen divinum *inevidens.* Et primum est ratio *sub qua* theologiae beatorum, secundum nostrae, tertium fidei. . . . Et ideo, quamvis deitas convertatur cum illa ratione adaequata, et mutuo se inferant, non tamen convertitur cum aliqua specie illius").

[43] For instance, the divine light revealing God to us in this life and that making God evident to the blessed in the next, to mention two examples from the text cited above (n. 42).

[44] As he says, *deitas* does not imply one species "determinately," that is, one species more than any other, but rather each individual species of divine light implies a relation to *deitas*, being a property thereof: "And consequently, [deity] does not determinately entail any [of the species], but it is entailed by each of them" ("Et consequenter, nullam earum determinate infert, sed infertur a singulis"). See Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, IX (Leonine ed., 4:13).

reason why theology is one science is taken from the unity of the formal aspect *under which* [the science studies its subject], that is, the light of divine revelation, for all things are said to be considered in theology inasmuch as they are divinely revealable [*revelabilia*]."[45] What makes theology to be theology is the fact that it is the science that considers or knows *deitas* in the light of divine revelation, that is, in a word Cajetan borrows from Aquinas, as *revelabile*.

With regard to our present inquiry, the crucial question is what it means to know a *res* "in the light of divine revelation," that is, what it means for something to be *revelabile*. Prima facie, the meaning might seem obvious. To be known in the light of divine revelation, one might reasonably suspect, means nothing more than to be included in the content of divine revelation. In other words, anything that has in fact been divinely revealed, including rationally demonstrable truths such as the existence and attributes of God, would be part of the *revelabile* or object *ut scibile* of theology and hence fall within the proper purview of the science itself. This is not, however, what Cajetan means by *revelabile* or knowability in the light of divine revelation. Rather, "revealable," or "knowable in the light of revelation," is equivalent to "knowable *only* in the light of divine revelation." In other words, something is *revelabile* or knowable through revelation if the only way in which it can be known is through revelation. What falls under the specifying object *ut scibile* of theology, therefore, is only that which must be revealed in order to be known, since this is what, for Cajetan, it means to be "knowable in the light of divine revelation."

Cajetan's commentary on the first article, in which Aquinas addresses the question of whether a doctrine beyond the philosophical sciences is necessary for salvation, already makes

[45] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, III (Leonine ed., 4:13): "Et hoc est quod in littera dicitur, dum ratio quare theologia sit una scientia, assignatur ex unitate rationis formalis *sub qua,* seu obiecti ut obiectum, idest luminis divinae revelationis: omnia enim dicuntur considerari in theologia inquantum sunt divinitus revelabilia."

this point. There, we find a text that clearly suggests that the category of the *revelabile* (the "knowable through the light of revelation") encompasses only truths that must be revealed in order to be known. The text in its entirety is as follows:

> Before the conclusions [that Aquinas articulates] are proven . . . note two distinctions. The first is from *Summa contra gentiles* I, chapter 3. There are two kinds of knowable [truths] about God principally; some are demonstrable [*demonstrabilia*], and others cannot be known except through revelation. The latter include the Trinity of persons, the beatitude promised to us, and the mysteries of the Incarnation and Redemption. The former are [conclusions such as] the unity of God, his immortality, and others of the sort. The first conclusion [i.e., that it is necessary for salvation that there be a revealed doctrine containing truths above human reason] is posited in the formal notion of the revealable only [*revelabilia*], but the second conclusion [i.e., that it was necessary for God to reveal certain truths that can in principle be known to human reason] is posited in the formal notion of the demonstrable [*demonstrabilia*].[46]

In this text, Cajetan begins by invoking a Thomistic distinction between two kinds of truth, namely, truths that are demonstrable and truths that must be revealed in order to be known. That Aquinas makes such a distinction is readily visible in the chapter from the *Summa contra gentiles* that Cajetan cites and is not disputed. However, unlike Aquinas, the Dominican cardinal goes

[46] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 1, III (Leonine ed., 4:7): "Antequam probentur conclusiones, ad evidentiam distinctionis et sufficientiae conclusionum, nota duas distinctiones. Prima est ex I *Contra Gentiles,* cap. III. Duo sunt genera cognoscibilium de Deo principaliter: quaedam demonstrabilia; quaedam non nisi per revelationem cognoscibilia. Ista sunt Trinitas Personarum, beatitudo nobis promissa, Incarnationis et Redemptionis mysteria: illa vero sunt, Deum esse unum, immortalem, etc. Ratione revelabile tantum, posita est prima conclusio: ratione vero demonstrabilium, posita est secunda." By the "positing" of the two conclusions in the notions of the "revealable" or the "demonstrable," Cajetan seems to mean that the truths referenced in each of the two conclusions fall under, or constitute the scope of, these two formal categories. For example, to say that Aquinas's first conclusion in the article, i.e., that it is necessary for salvation that certain truths above human reason be revealed, is "posited in the formal notion" of the "revealable" is to say that the "truths above reason" referenced in the first conclusion constitute the *revelabile.* Similarly, to say that Aquinas's second conclusion in the article, i.e, that it was necessary for God to reveal certain truths that can in principle be known to human reason, is "posited" in the notion of the "demonstrable" is to say that the truths "knowable to human reason" that are referenced in the conclusion constitute the *demonstrabile*.

on in the text quoted above to identify the latter sort of truth with the *revelabile* (which constitutes the formal object *ut scibile* of theology),[47] excluding from its purview all that is *demonstrabile*.[48] Such a position amounts to the claim that to be *revelabile,* which as we have observed is for Cajetan the same as "to be knowable in the light of revelation," means to be knowable

[47] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, V (Leonine ed., 4:13): "for all things are said to be considered in theology insofar as they are divinely revealable" ("omnia enim dicuntur considerari in theologia inquantum sunt divinitus revelabilia"). See also commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, VII (Leonine ed., 4:13): "the formal notion of the object as it is an object, namely, revealability" ("ratione formali obiecti ut obiectum est, scilicet revelabilitate").

[48] Henry Donneaud has argued that, in the text cited above (n. 46), Cajetan does not oppose the *demonstrabile* to the *revelabile*, as if the latter excluded from its purview all truths included in the former, but rather opposes the *demonstrabile* to the *revelabile tantum*. In other words, when Cajetan claims that truths knowable to human reason are posited in the *demonstrabile* while those knowable strictly through revelation are posited in the *revelabile* "only" (*tantum*), he contemplates that some truths in the *demonstrabile* can be included in the *revelabile* (while those that are only *revelabile* are included solely in that category). Donneaud's argument is based on the inclusion of the word *tantum* in Cajetan's statement that certain truths belong to the *revelabile tantum*. Such an argument, however, is problematic in several ways. Most importantly, Cajetan never explicitly states that truths that are *demonstrabile* can be included in the *revelabile*. He never, for example, states that certain truths belong to the "*revelabile* only" while others belong to both the *demonstrabile* and the *revelabile*. One would fully expect that if he were asserting that some truths are *revelabile* only while others are both *demonstrabile* and *revelabile,* he would give some explicit confirmation of this both/and status, rather than limit himself to saying that some truths are *demonstrabile* while others belong to the *revelabile* only. Indeed, in the absence of such confirmation, it is more natural to interpret the text as asserting simply that some truths are *demonstrabile* while others are *revelabile*. In other words, it is more natural to read the statement that "some truths are *demonstrabile* while others are *revelabile* only" in this context as equivalent in meaning to the statement that "some truths are *demonstrabile*, and others are *revelabile*," that is, as posing a binary distinction which admits of no overlap. Donneaud's argument, moreover, does not address further textual evidence of the restriction of the scope of the *revelabile* to indemonstrable truths that I will adduce below, particularly Cajetan's suggestion that even if certain demonstrable truths were included in revelation, the fact of their inclusion in *revelatio* would not change the formal light or aspect under which they are known (i.e., would not render them *revelabile*, the formal aspect or light in which theological truths are known). See Henry Donneaud, O.P., "Note sur le *revelabile* selon Étienne Gilson," *Revue thomiste* 96 (1996): 645-47.

only in the light of revelation. Étienne Gilson put the significance of this distinction well when he remarked that, in holding it, Cajetan was "hesitating to equally include within theology revealed truths that necessitate a divine revelation in order to be known and revealed truths that, at least in theory, could be known by all men solely by the resources of their natural reason,"[49] the effect of which hesitation was to "return [demonstrable truth] to philosophy, where for him it belongs by full right."[50] The characteristic way in which a truth is known in theology is in the light of revelation, which for Cajetan means being knowable *strictly* in the light of revelation.

One further text in the commentary on the third article makes the point even more clearly. There, the Dominican commentator explicitly argues that it is not God's act of revealing a particular truth that makes it part of the formal object *ut scibile* of theology but rather its character as being knowable only through revelation. Illustrating this distinction, Cajetan writes, "If God were to reveal to me [the science of] geometry, revelation would not therefore be the 'formal object under which' [the *sub qua*] of my geometry, for I would still know the [revealed] geometric truths under the same formal aspect under which others would know geometric truths [that is, through rational demonstrations originating in the axioms of geometry]."[51] The clear implication of this statement is that it is not sufficient simply to be included in the divine act of revealing as part of the content thereof in order to count as "knowable in the light of divine revelation." Although everything that falls under the purview of theology has indeed been revealed, inclusion in an act of divine revelation is not what makes it part of the *sub qua* under which theology

[49] Étienne Gilson, "Note sur le revelabile selon Cajétan," *Mediaeval Studies* 15 (1953): 200. In the article, Gilson proceeds to argue, convincingly, that Aquinas's *revelabile* encompasses both demonstrable and indemonstrable truths and that Cajetan's innovation is a clear departure from the teaching of his master.

[50] Ibid., 204.

[51] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, XIV (Leonine ed., 4:14): "Si enim Deus revelaret mihi geometriam, non propterea revelatio esset ratio *sub qua* obiecti geometriae meae: quoniam ego scirem geometricalia sub illamet ratione formali, qua alii geometrae scirent."

knows things (and hence formally part of the science), but rather a distinctive mode of knowing, namely, being knowable *strictly* in the light of divine revelation.[52] The way of knowing that specifies theology as a science is cognoscibility in the light of divine revelation, that is, *revelabilitas*, which for Cajetan means cognoscibility *only* in the light of divine revelation.

The ground of this understanding of what it means to be "knowable in the light of divine revelation" is the formal subject of theology (its object *ut res*), since the object *ut scibile*, as we have seen, is really a property of the former. Indeed, the object *ut scibile* is what it is precisely because the object *ut res* is, in virtue of its nature, knowable under some particular aspect. A restriction of the scope of the *revelabile* to rationally indemonstrable truths should therefore suggest a similar restriction on the scope of the object *ut res*. If we examine Cajetan's conception of the latter, this is exactly what we find. As Cajetan conceives it, the formal subject of theology is also limited in scope to rationally indemonstrable truths, and hence it is ultimately unsurprising that the object *ut scibile* which it grounds is similarly restricted in scope.

As we have observed, the formal subject of theology, or in the Dominican cardinal's phrase its object *ut res*, is *deitas*, the divine quiddity. The way in which Cajetan goes on to characterize *deitas* in his commentary on article 7 of question 1 of the *Prima pars* suggests that the term excludes all truths about God that can be known by natural reason. In the course of his remarks he argues that a being can be considered in four ways: as a being with a

[52] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, XIV (Leonine ed., 4:14): "this science is not had except by infusion, and the things known in it are attained and assented to as they fall under the divine light in their mode of knowability. And therefore the unity of theology is inferred in the text from the unity of the divine light, not as poured out, but as it is the formal notion *under which*, in the way explained above" ("haec scientia non nisi per infusionem habita est; et res scitae in ea omnes attinguntur, et eis assentitur, ut subsunt divino lumini, ut modo cognoscibilitatis earum. Et propterea unitas theologiae infertur in littera ex unitate divini luminis, non ut infundens est, sed ut est ratio formalis *sub qua*, modo superius exposito").

specific quiddity; as a substance; as something possessing certain attributes, properties, or accidents; and in relation to other beings.[53] When, for instance, we consider man, we can consider him as a rational animal (quidditatively), as a substantial being, as gentle (a property or accident), and as the noblest of animals (in relation to other beings).[54] Cajetan applies this fourfold scheme to God, and the manner in which he does so excludes from the notion of *deitas* any truth that can be demonstrated by reason. As he writes:

> Proceeding in reverse order, God can be considered as the highest cause . . . and thus he is considered in relation to beings outside himself. He can also be considered as wise, good, just, and universally according to formal attributes, and thus he is considered, as it were, through the accidents belonging to him. He can further be considered as a being [*ens*], as act, etc.: and thus he is considered in common [with other substances]. And to these three modes of consideration, as if simple, are reduced composite considerations, such as pure act, first being, etc. . . . Before all these modes, God can be considered according to his proper quiddity . . . and this quiddity we speak about by the name of "deity" [*deitatis*]. Thus, asking whether God, under the formal aspect of his deity, as distinguished from the formal aspect of goodness, etc., is the subject of this science [theology] is to ask whether God, under the formal aspect of his proper quiddity, is the formal subject of this science, such that the quiddity of God is the formal aspect of this subject as a thing [*ut res*].[55]

In his application of this fourfold framework to the consideration of God in article 7, Cajetan excludes all demonstrable truths from the scope of *deitas*. All discourse about God's attributes (the

[53] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7, I (Leonine ed., 4:19).

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.: "Ita in proposito, ordine retrogrado procedendo, Deus potest considerari ut altissima causa, et universaliter secundum quodcumque praedicatum respectivum ad extra; et sic consideratur relative ad extra: potest etiam considerari ut sapiens, bonus, iustus, et universaliter secundum rationes attributales; et sic consideratur quasi per accidens: potest etiam considerari ut ens, ut actus, etc.; et sic consideratur in communi. Et ad hos tres modos, quasi simplices, reducuntur considerationes compositae, puta ut actus purus, ut ens primum, etc. . . . Ante omnes autem hos modos, potest considerari Deus secundum suam propriam quidditatem . . . et hanc quidditatem circumloquimur *deitatis* nomine. Et sic, quaerendo an Deus sub ratione deitatis, ut distinguitur contra rationem bonitatis etc., sit subiectum huius scientiae, est quaerere utrum Deus sub ratione suae propriae quidditatis, sit subiectum formale huius scientiae; ita quod quidditas Dei sit ratio formalis huius subiecti ut res est, etc."

second way of considering God), many of which, such as his goodness, are rationally demonstrable, is excluded from *deitas*. Likewise, all consideration of God in common with other beings, that is, *qua* being or substance (the third way of considering God) also falls outside the scope of *deitas*, as does consideration of God as the highest cause (the first mode of considering God, that is, in relation to other beings). Between them, these categories, which are excluded from *deitas*, encompass nearly all demonstrable truths about God which pertain to metaphysics. Indeed, all conceivable demonstrable truths about God appear to be exhausted by these three modes of considering him. Consequently, the fourth way of considering God, quidditatively or in his essence (which is to say, according to his *deitas*), excludes demonstrable truths, thus leaving only suprarational truths, such as those concerning the persons of the Trinity.[56]

[56] This conception of the formal object *ut res* of the science of theology is for Cajetan broad enough to encompass truths that, although they are traditionally considered theological, might at first seem to fall outside the scope of a consideration of the divine essence in itself. For example, Cajetan stretches the notion of *deitas* to include not just truths about the divine persons but also about the redemptive work of Christ. He argues that the actions of Christ, insofar as they are considered actions belonging to the second person of the divine Trinity, are part of *deitas*: "The human actions of Christ, namely, loving God, voluntarily suffering, and things of this sort, have two conditions. One is that they are certain created things, and thus they are finite beings simply speaking, for they are not deity. The other is that they are things of the divine person. . . . Thus they are infinite beings personally, and are of infinite efficacy in such a genus as merit or satisfaction, from the fact that they are works of God as of the proper person doing those works" ("Actiones Christi humanae, scilicet amare Deum, voluntarie pati, et huiusmodi, habent duas conditiones. Altera est quod sunt res quaedam creatae. Et sic sunt finita entia simpliciter: non enim sunt deitas. Altera est quod sunt res personae divinae. . . . Et sic sunt infinita entia personaliter: et sunt infinitae efficaciae in tali genere, puta meriti seu satisfactionis, ex hoc ipso quod sunt opera ipsius Dei ut propriae personae exercentis opera illa"). In other words, Christ's actions *qua* human are "finite" and for this reason "are not *deitas*," but insofar as they are the actions of the second person of the divine Trinity they are "infinite" and hence, by implication, *deitas*. A science of *deitas* would thus include a study of truths about the salvific work of Christ. See Cajetan, commentary on *STh* III, q. 1, a. 3, XII (Leonine ed., 11:13).

Further proof of the exclusion of demonstrable truths from the scope of theology's object *ut res* comes in Cajetan's commentary on article 6 of question 1. There, we find explicit confirmation that of the four ways elaborated in article 7 in which God can be known (i.e., in relation to others, in his attributes, in terms of things common both to him and to other beings, and in his quiddity), the first three exhaust all metaphysical or demonstrable truths about God, leaving only rationally indemonstrable truths included in a consideration of God quidditatively, that is, a consideration of *deitas*. As Cajetan writes, "all the notions that metaphysics has of God are either common [to him and to other beings] if they are simple, such as being, true, and good; or, if they belong to him alone, they are composite notions drawn from things common [to him and to other beings], such as pure act, first being, etc."[57] As this statement explicitly confirms, all truths about God belonging to metaphysics fall into one of the three nonquidditative modes of consideration outlined in article 7. Truths of metaphysics are either about things common to God and other beings, in which case they fall under consideration of God "in common" with other beings and/or under consideration of God's attributes (the third and second modes, respectively, of considering God outlined in article 7), as in the case of "good" and "true"; or, like "pure act" and "first being," they are composite notions reducible to other notions that correspond to one of the three nonquidditative modes of considering God.[58] With these three modes thus exhausting all metaphysical, which is effectively to say all demonstrable, truths about God,[59] it follows that consideration

[57] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 6, V (Leonine ed., 4:18): "Omnes enim rationes quas de Deo metaphysica habet, aut sunt communes, si sunt simplices, ut ens, verum, bonum; aut sunt ex communibus compositae, si sunt propriae Deo, ut actus purus, primum ens, etc."

[58] For instance, "act" and "being" are notions that fall into the category "common to God and other substances or beings."

[59] Even if one considered the demonstration of an unmoved mover part of the science of physics, it would still involve a composite attribute that, although belonging to God alone, is nonetheless reducible to something common to him and to others. Just as the attribute "first being" belongs to God alone but is drawn from a simple notion (*ens*) belonging to things besides God, so also "first cause" or "first mover," though applicable

of God *secundum quidditatem* or, equivalently, *secundum deitatem,* excludes all rationally demonstrable propositions about God.

Cajetan himself seems to realize the implications of his understanding of the formal object of theology for the question of whether it includes demonstrable as well as indemonstrable truths. Commenting on article 8, in which Aquinas addresses the issue of whether theology is properly characterized as a discipline that proceeds by arguments, Cajetan maintains that demonstrations which rely exclusively upon reason fall outside the scope of theology. In his words, they are "extraneous": "absolutely speaking, theology proceeds from natural reason as from something extraneous to itself and as from probable [arguments]."[60] In response to the question of why, if it is indeed true that all demonstrable propositions are strictly speaking extraneous to theology, so many illustrious doctors have devoted so much labor to metaphysical speculation,[61] Cajetan qualifies his claim by arguing that the theologian does legitimately employ demonstrative arguments, but only "ministerially," that is, in order to rebut philosophical arguments that purport to demonstrate the impossibility of an article of faith or, more generally, to strengthen the confidence of fallen human intellect in the truths of faith.

> Metaphysical and natural demonstrations that are adduced in [the science of] sacred doctrine are, simply speaking, extraneous. But as ministers [*ministrae*] of theology, that is, for rebutting positions opposed to theological principles or conclusions, for resolving arguments made against theological [truths], or for shoring up those things about which theology is secondarily [concerned], as that God exists, that he is one, immortal, etc., [metaphysical and natural demonstrations] are not extraneous. Rather, theology proceeds from them as from something belonging to and sometimes necessary for it. Nevertheless, [it

to God alone, derives from an attribute ("cause" or "mover") common to God and other beings.

[60] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 8, VI (Leonine ed., 4:23): "absolute loquendo, ex ratione naturali procedit theologia ut ex extraneis et probabilibus."

[61] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 8, VII (Leonine ed., 4:23).

does so] ministerially [*ministerialiter*] and not by reason of itself, but on account of the weakness of our intellect.[62]

Purely rational demonstrations are not adduced in theology "by reason of itself," that is, in virtue of the science's own nature or formal object, but rather as part of a secondary or auxiliary enterprise in which the theologian can legitimately engage. That enterprise is shoring up confidence in theological truths by refuting arguments against them and by borrowing philosophical arguments, rational arguments developed independently of the data of revelation, in support of propositions that must be true if the articles of faith are themselves true (such as the existence of God) but which the human intellect, in virtue of its weakness, is prone to doubt. In this ministerial function, rational argumentation is no longer "extraneous" but is rather something that "belongs to" the theologian. But the ministerial function itself can never be reduced to theology as such and always remains extraneous to its essence, as Cajetan states: "Although it is necessary that *purely* theological [conclusions] flow from theological [i.e., revealed] principles, nevertheless it is not necessary that things that are ministerially theological [flow from theological principles]. Rather, it is enough that they serve these principles" (emphasis added).[63] Thus, for Cajetan, although it is proper for the theologian, in an ancillary capacity, to rebut errors and strengthen the intellect's grip on the preambles of faith, this ancillary or "ministerial" role does not, strictly speaking, belong to theology but rather remains something extraneous to it. To put the point succinctly, although rational demonstration may

[62] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 8, VIII (Leonine ed., 4:23): "Ad hoc breviter dicitur, quod demonstrationes metaphysicae et naturales quae afferuntur in sacra doctrina, simpliciter sunt extraneae: sed ut ministrae theologiae, ad destruendas positiones oppositas conclusionibus aut principiis theologalibus, aut ad solvendas rationes contra theologalia factas, aut ad stabilienda ea de quibus theologia secundario est, ut Deum esse, et unum esse, et immortalem, etc., non sunt extraneae; sed ex eis procedit theologia ut ex propriis, et quandoque necessariis; ministerialiter tamen, et non ratione sui, sed propter nostri intellectus infirmitatem."

[63] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 8, IV (Leonine ed., 4:23): "Et quamvis pura theologalia oporteat ex principiis manare theologalibus; theologalia tamen ministerialiter, non oportet, sed sat est eis servire."

belong to the essence of a defense of the *praeambula fidei*, this defense itself does not belong to the essence of theological science.

II. The Formal Object of Theology in the *Sentences* Commentary of 1493-94

Cajetan developed his understanding of theology as a science consisting strictly of revealed truths long before he composed his *Summa* commentary. As mentioned already, it dates to his time at the University of Padua in the last decade of the fifteenth century. Although Padua was not the only academic setting in which Cajetan studied,[64] it was the most formative, for it was at Padua that Cajetan undertook his theological studies and subsequently began his academic career. Assigned as a *studens formalis* to the Dominican *studium* of Sant'Agostino in Padua, he was elevated to a bachelor of the *Sentences* in 1493 and remained in teaching positions at Padua until 1495 or 1496, before leaving for other northern Italian universities.[65] During the 1493-94 academic year, he composed a commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, almost certainly in connection with his lecturing work as bachelor of the *Sentences* that year.[66] The text is his first known work. Some scholars have suggested, based on the fragmentary nature of this unpublished commentary, that it was likely not a formal treatise but rather a copy of his lecture notes, or even a copy of notes taken by a student who attended Cajetan's

[64] After entering the Dominican order in 1484, Cajetan was sent to the Order's *studium generale* in Bologna in April 1485. He did not remain in Bologna long, and subsequently undertook philosophical studies at the *studium* of San Domenico Maggiore in Naples. In June 1488, he returned to Bologna for further studies, but was sent back to his native Gaeta in December of that year to recuperate from illness. It does not appear that he resumed his studies until 1491, when he was sent to Padua. See Michael Tavuzzi, "Valentino da Camerino, O.P. (1438-1515): Teacher and Critic of Cajetan," *Traditio* 49 (1994): 295-96.

[65] Ibid., 299; Congar, "Bio-Bibliographie de Cajétan," 5.

[66] Congar, "Bio-Bibliographie de Cajétan," 5.

lectures.[67] Given the numerous *lacunae* in the text and the laconic style in which it is written, the lecture-notes hypothesis is certainly possible. However, regardless of the precise nature of the text, it provides unique insight into the early development of Cajetan's views and, in many instances, their historical sources. This is particularly the case with regard to his conception of the nature of theology. We find here a view of theology that is substantively identical to that expressed in his later *Summa* commentary. We also find a strong indication of its source in the writings of John Capreolus.

As in the *Sentences* commentaries of many late medieval Thomists, Cajetan's treatment of the scope of theology is found in a commentary on the Prologue, a section of the work dedicated to the nature and extent of *theologia*. The Prologue commentary is divided into four questions, and in the third we find an explicit statement of one of the two aspects of the formal object of theology presented in much the same terminology as is found in the later *Summa* commentary. Addressing the question of whether theology is one science, Cajetan begins by arguing that the specifying object of an intellectual habit—that is to say, of a given science—is the formal aspect under which its subject is known:

> I say that the specific unity of a habit is taken according to the specific unity of the knowable thing [as] knowable, that is, the unity of the formal aspect of the knowable thing insofar as it is knowable, which unity the habit respects in the first instance, that is to say, which the habit respects adequately and through itself.[68]

[67] Maurer, "Cajetan's Notion of Being," 268; Frénaud, "Les inédits de Cajétan," 335-37. Both Maurer and Frénaud conclude, however, that the evidence supports the claim that Cajetan is ultimately responsible for the composition of the work and that it therefore sheds valuable light on his early philosophical and theological views.

[68] Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, *Scriptum super quattuor libros Sententiarum*, I, prol. (2 vols. [Paris, Bibliothéque Nationale, ms. *latin* 3076], 1:23v): "Et sic penes unitatem specificam scibilis formaliter inquam scibile sumitur unitas specifica habitus, id est unitas rationis formalis scibilis inquantum scibile, quam primo, id est adaequate et per se, respicit habitus."

In other words, one aspect of what formally makes theology to be theology is the fact that it knows things in a characteristic way, and this characteristic way is the object *ut scibile*—a term that, as we have seen, Cajetan frequently employs in the *Summa* commentary.

In his treatment of the next question of the Prologue, namely, the question of whether God is the "subject" (*subiectum*) of theology, he specifies what precisely this characteristic way of knowing is in the case of theology, and he relates it to the second aspect of the twofold formal object of the science: the *obiectum ut res*, or subject—that which, formally speaking, theology studies. According to the text, the object *ut scibile* is none other than the *revelabile*, and the object *ut res* is *deitas*:

> God is the object of theology, the formal notion of which as a thing [*ratio formalis ut res*] is 'deity' [*deitas*], which is the *what* of the science. The formal notion [of theology] as an object, that is to say, as knowable [*seu ut scibile est*], is revealability [*revelabilitas*] to those who are apt for it, and this object is the formal notion *under which* or the thing *by which* [theology is knowable] on the part of the knower.[69]

The terms *revelabile* and *deitas* carry the same meaning in the *Sentences* commentary as they do in the *Summa* commentary. The latter refers to the divine quiddity or essence, as distinguished conceptually from the attributes of the divine being. As Cajetan clearly establishes, the formal object *ut res* of a science is an essence or quiddity, something from which attributes follow but which is conceptually distinct from them: "the formal notion on the part of the thing [*ex parte rei*] is that which is attained,

[69] Cajetan, *Super Sent. I,* prol. (Paris ed., 1:25v): "Deus est obiectum Theologiae cuius ratio formalis, ut res est, est Deitas, et [deitas] dicitur ut *quod*. Ratio autem formalis ut obiectum, seu ut scibile est, est revelabilitas aptis, et [haec ratio dicitur] ut *qua*, ut *quo*, ut ex parte scientis." The interpolations here are mine and reflect my interpretation of lacunae in the text of the manuscript.

from which the properties [*passiones*] flow."[70] In the case of *deitas*, the quiddity in question is God. Thus, to identify the object *ut res* of theology as *deitas* is to identify it as God in his essence, rather than (that is, as conceptually distinguished from) the attributes or properties that pertain to this essence in virtue of what it is.[71]

This understanding of the formal object of theology *ut res* grounds how Cajetan understands the object *ut scibile*. Speaking of the way in which the science of theology knows *deitas*, he writes that it knows *deitas* insofar as *deitas* is manifested through the light of faith:

> Note that to any object [*ut res*] an addition or contraction can be made in two ways, first on the part of the thing, and second . . . on the part of the knower. And in the second way, both our theology and that of the blessed [who see God in the afterlife] contract God, [ours by] the light of faith, and [theirs by] the light of glory.[72]

The formal way of knowing *deitas* in theology (the object *ut scibile* and hence the *revelabile*)—which is to say, in the terminology Cajetan employs here, the way in which the object *ut res* is "contracted" in the science of theology so as to become the object of our knowledge—is through the light of faith. In

[70] Cajetan, *Super Sent. I,* prol. (Paris ed., 1:25v-26r). "Nota quod ratio formalis ex parte rei est illa quae attingitur, ex qua fluunt passiones et [qua] probantur." The interpolation is mine.

[71] When Cajetan identifies the formal object of theology as the divine quiddity conceptually distinguished from its attributes or properties, it is important to keep in mind that for him, as for most Scholastic thinkers, the divine essence is not distinct in reality from these attributes or properties. Although one can consider God's quiddity apart from his attributes and hence distinguish them in thought or conceptually, there is no distinction *in re* between them, since there is no composition in God. As Cajetan puts it, there is "no formal distinction in actuality between the divine essence and the personal properties and attributes" that pertain to God ("nulla est distinctio formalis actu inter essentiam divinam et proprietates personales et attributa"). See Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 24, a. 3, IX (Leonine ed., 4:311); Aquinas, *STh* I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 4:336).

[72] Cajetan, *Super Sent. I,* prol. (Paris ed., 1:26r): "Adverte etiam quod obiecto alicui dupliciter fit additio, seu contractio: uno modo ex parte ipsius ut res; secundo ut obiectum, seu ex parte scientis. Et hoc secundo modo, tam Theologia nostra quam beatorum contrahit Deum, haec lumen fidei, illa gloriae, creatum tamen quare finitum."

other words, *deitas*, in virtue of its nature, admits of being known ("contracted") in the light of faith. Since what is known in the light of faith is that which is known in the light of revelation,[73] it follows that the *revelabile*, the formal aspect under which the object *ut res* is known in theology, consists in the knowledge of the subject or object *ut res* of theology that is had through the light of revelation. As in the *Summa* commentary, the object *ut res* thus grounds a particular object *ut scibile*; *deitas*, being what it is, is knowable in the light of divine revelation, and this mode of knowability (*revelabilitas*) is a property of *deitas*.[74]

Finally, and most importantly, the text of the *Sentences* commentary suggests that the twofold formal object of theology is restricted in scope so as to include only truths that must be revealed in order to be known. That *deitas* is constricted in this fashion follows from Cajetan's remark that the object *ut res* is a quiddity considered as abstracted from all attributes, the essence from which they all flow but which can be conceptually distinguished from them. Now, for Cajetan, the only demonstrable truths that we can know about God are attributes of him. God's essence is unknown in itself to reason, and hence cannot be the subject of demonstration. Such an understanding is implicit in his analysis of why the proposition "God exists" is not "known through itself" (*per se nota*) to us. In order for the truth "God

[73] In the second article of the commentary on the Prologue, Cajetan suggests that the characteristic way of knowing in the science of theology is in the light of divine revelation, describing theology as the "science revealed in divine light" (*scientiam lumine divino revelatam*) and hence equating knowledge "in the light of faith" (which, as we have seen, he also identifies as the formal way of knowing in theology) with knowledge "in the light of divine revelation" (Cajetan, *Super Sent. I,* prol. [Paris ed., 1:22v]).

[74] Cajetan reiterates this understanding of the twofold formal object of theology elsewhere in the commentary. For example, in the context of discussing the object of the infused virtue of faith, he writes, "The formal notion of the object as a thing is Divinity, as of theology, for the same is the subject of the principles and of the conclusion. But the formal notion of the object as an object . . . is revealability" ("Ratio formalis obiecti ut res est Divinitas, sicut et theologiae: cum idem sit subiectum principiorum et conclusionis. Ratio vero formalis obiecti ut obiectum . . . est revelabilitas") (Cajetan, *Super Sent. III,* d. 24 [Paris ed., 2:496r]).

exists" to be *per se notum*, we would have to understand the predicate (existence) as contained in the essence of the subject (God). However, for Cajetan, we do not grasp the essence of the subject in which the predicate is supposedly contained, which, being the divine essence, is entirely beyond reason's capacity to grasp; in the Dominican theologian's technical language, we do not have "proper adequate notions of the terms."[75] We can, of course, demonstrate God's existence based on reasoning from created cause to effect, but the proposition is still not known "in itself" to us on account of the fact that the divine essence surpasses the capacity of the intellect to grasp. Given that God's essence is therefore unknown in itself to reason, it follows that it is indemonstrable; demonstrable truths concern the attributes belonging to God in virtue of his essence, but they do not touch upon the essence itself, that is, they do not demonstrate what this essence is in itself. Since, as the *Sentences* commentary suggests, the formal object *ut res* of theology, *deitas*, consists precisely in this essence, it follows that all demonstrable truths about God fall outside its scope, being demonstrations not of the divine essence itself but rather of its properties, just as Cajetan elaborates in greater detail in the *Summa* commentary. Thus falling outside the formal object *ut res* of theology, such demonstrable truths do not fall under the proper purview of the science.

The fact that, for Cajetan, the subject of the science excludes demonstrable truths from its purview implies a definition of the formal object *ut scibile,* which is to say, the *revelabile*, along the same epistemic lines. As we have seen, the text suggests that a particular subject, in virtue of what it is, has a particular way (or ways) of being "contracted" or known. Cajetan reiterates the point elsewhere in the same article, writing, "The formal notion on the part of the knower, or the object as it is an object, is that which limits what can be considered about the first object [i.e.,

[75] Cajetan, *Super Sent. I,* d. 2, q. 2 (Paris ed., 1:32r): "[The proposition that God exists] is not known through itself to us, because we do not have proper adequate notions of the terms, from which it would immediately be known" ("non est per se nota nobis, quia non habemus rationes proprias adaequatas terminorum, ex quibus statim cognoscitur").

the *obiectum ut res*]."[76] If the way a thing is known corresponds to and follows from the nature of a particular subject, as the text implies, it follows that the way in which a subject is known does not extend beyond the scope of the subject. Thus, if the thing or subject known extends only to rationally indemonstrable truths, then the characteristic way in which the thing is known also extends only to rationally indemonstrable truths. The formal object *ut scibile* or *ut obiectum* is, therefore, limited in scope no less than the formal object *ut res*, only encompassing truths about the divine essence or *deitas* and hence only truths that are indemonstrable to reason. To be knowable in the light of faith or in the light of divine revelation—that is to say, to be *revelabile*—is for the Cajetan of the *Sentences* commentary, just as much as for the Cajetan of the *Summa* commentary, to be knowable *only* in the light of divine revelation.

III. John Capreolus: The Historical Source of Cajetan's Understanding of Theology

Having established that Cajetan's conception of theology developed in the course of his studies at Padua in the early 1490s, the question of its historical source naturally arises. As stated at the outset, the evidence suggests that Cajetan derived his conception of the science of theology from the work of the French Dominican John Capreolus. Like many other prominent theologians of his time, Capreolus was connected with the University of Paris early in his academic career, serving as a bachelor there from 1407 to 1411, before taking up a position at Toulouse and, ultimately, returning to his native city of Rodez.[77] At Paris, Capreolus began his magisterial *Defensiones theologiae*

[76] Cajetan, *Super Sent. I,* prol. (Paris ed., 1:26r): "Ratio autem formalis ex parte scientis, sive obiecti ut obiectum, est illa quae considerabilia de obiecto primo limitat."

[77] Ruedi Imbach, "Le contexte intellectuelle de l'oeuvre de Capreolus," in *Jean Capreolus et son temps, 1380-1444,* ed. Guy Bedouelle, Romanus Cessario, and Kevin White (Paris: Cerf, 1997), 13-22.

divi Thomae Aquinatis, completing the first part in 1409.[78] The remaining three parts were only completed between 1426 and 1432, after time spent teaching at the Dominican *studium* in Toulouse.[79] The *Defensiones* is presented as a commentary on the *Sentences*, inasmuch as it follows the general order of topics contained in Peter Lombard's text, but in genre it is far more than just a commentary. Rather, it is, as the name suggests, a comprehensive defense of Thomistic teaching against nearly the whole spectrum of Aquinas's thirteenth- and fourteenth-century critics, including Scotus, Durandus (ca. 1270-1334), Peter Auriol (ca. 1280-1322), Gregory of Rimini (ca. 1300-1358), and numerous others. The work proceeds by first specifying Thomistic theses on a given topic, supported by ample quotation from Aquinas's works. It then identifies a range of objections to his view proposed by later Scholastic theologians, and concludes with a refutation of these objections and a defense of the putatively Thomistic theses articulated previously.

The *Defensiones* was, if not the very first, certainly the most encyclopedic defense and compendium of Thomistic doctrine in Cajetan's day, and as such it was highly influential.[80] Many Italian Thomists took their theological and philosophical principles from this so-called *princeps Thomistarum* and relied on the *Defensiones* for their knowledge of Aquinas's critics.[81] This influence is even visible in Cajetan's own teacher at Padua, Valentino da Camerino (1438-1515), who borrowed his views

[78] Romanus Cessario, *A Short History of Thomism* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 60.

[79] Imbach, "Le contexte intellectuelle," 13. See also Bernard Montagnes, O.P., "Le midi dominicain au temps de Capreolus," in Bedouelle, Cessario, and White, eds., *Jean Capreolus et son temps*, 54.

[80] André von Gunten, "Cajétan et Capreolus," in Bedouelle, Cessario, and White, eds., *Jean Capreolus et son temps,* 230.

[81] Denis Janz, *Luther and Late Medieval Thomism* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2009), 88; Cessario, *Short History of Thomism*, 68. In fact, Capreolus was so important to Italian thinkers that the first printed edition of the work was produced not in France, but rather in Venice, in 1483. See Romanus Cessario, O.P, and Kevin White, "Translators' Introduction," in John Capreolus, *On the Virtues*, trans. Romanus Cessario, O.P., and Kevin White (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), xxxii.

on important metaphysical questions, such as the nature of the distinction between a predicamental relation and its fundament, directly from Capreolus.[82]

The decisive evidence of Capreolus as the source of the development of Cajetan's view of theology at Padua, however, comes from the texts themselves. The *Defensiones* and Cajetan's *Sentences* commentary present their treatments of theology in a structurally identical manner. Both texts treat the nature of theology in their respective prologues, and both divide these prologues into the same four *quaestiones:* whether theology is a science, whether theology is a practical science, whether theology is one science, and whether God is the subject of theology.[83] Moreover, these four identical questions also appear in the same order in both texts, something which is not true of other prominent Dominican theologians' *Sentences* commentaries, including those of James of Metz (fl. 1300),[84] Hervé Nédellec (ca. 1250/1260-1323),[85] and Peter of Palud (ca. 1275-1342).[86]

Other noteworthy similarities also exist between the works. For instance, both reference the same Thomistic text in the context of discussing the subalternate status of the science of theology in their respective questions on whether theology is one science (viz., *STh* I-II, q. 8, a. 3).[87] Furthermore, both make the

[82] Tavuzzi, "Valentino da Camerino," 301.

[83] Cajetan *Super Sent. I,* prol., passim; John Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis,* 7 vols., ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues (Turin, 1900–1908), I, prol., passim.

[84] James of Metz, *Commentarius in Sententias: Prologus*, passim (in Mikołaj Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads: A Critical Edition and Study of the Prologues to the Commentaries on Peter Lombard's* Sentences *by James of Metz and Hervaeus Natalis* [Münster: Aschendorff, 2010], 50-81).

[85] Hervé Nédellec, *Commentarius in Sententias: Prologus,* passim (in Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads*, 114-67).

[86] Peter of Palud, *In I Sententiarum: Prologus,* passim (in Giuseppe Groppo, "La teologia e il suo 'subiectum' secondo il Prologo del Commento alle Sentenze di Pietro Da Palude, O.P.," *Salesianum* 23 [1961]: 219-316).

[87] Cajetan, *Super Sent. I,* prol. (Paris ed., 1:21r). Capreolus, *Defensiones*, I, prol., q. 3 (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:43a).

claim—in quite similar language—that the notions of "practical" and "speculative" do not formally differentiate the science of theology.[88] Cajetan's *Sentences* commentary even references Capreolus by name, including in a text examining the question of whether God can be understood by us in this life that comes just two *distinctiones* after his treatment of the subject of theology.[89]

The familiarity with Capreolus's *Defensiones* that Cajetan evinces in the *Sentences* commentary and the structural parallels that exist between the two works suggest that the former was an important influence on the latter, and these considerations, along with the fact that the two texts articulate substantively the same understanding of the nature of theology, allow us to identify with a high degree of certainty Capreolus as Cajetan's source.

Examining Capreolus's work, we find the same twofold understanding of the formal object of theology and the same restriction of the scope of the discipline to strictly indemonstrable truths that we have observed in Cajetan's writings. Cajetan develops these points in the context of a response to an objection leveled by the fourteenth-century Franciscan theologian Peter Auriol, one of the writers whom Capreolus most frequently criticizes in the *Defensiones*. Auriol, as his Dominican critic narrates, had leveled an important objection to Aquinas's statement in the *Summa* that the *revelabile* is the formal object of theology. As Capreolus explains, Auriol criticized the Thomistic claim on the grounds that a science can only have one formal object, and since Thomists wish to posit God as the formal object

[88] Articulating this point, Cajetan writes, "Note that practical and speculative distinguish humanly discovered sciences, not, however, science revealed by divine light, on account of the unity of the formal object" ("Nota quod dato quod practicum et speculativum distinguant scientias humanitus inventas, non tamen scientiam lumine divino revelatam, propter unitatem obiecti formalis"). Capreolus's articulation of the same point reads, "given that these differences, the speculative and the practical, are taken as from the object of the habit, not from the end of the habit, they essentially divide science brought forth by natural light, but not science revealed by divine light" ("dato quod istae differentiae speculativum et practicum, prout sumuntur ex objecto habitus, non ex fine habitus, dividerent essentialiter scientiam naturali lumine genitam, non tamen scientiam divino lumine revelatam"). See Cajetan, *Super Sent. I,* prol. (Paris ed., 1:22v); Capreolus, *Defensiones*, I, prol., q. 2 (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:30b).

[89] Cajetan, *Super Sent. I,* d. 2, q. 1 (Paris ed., 1:30r).

of theology (i.e., its formal object *ut res*, or subject), *revelabilitas* cannot also be what formally defines the discipline.[90]

The French Dominican is clearly exasperated by Auriol's objection, writing that, "as I have often said before,"[91] theology is constituted by a twofold formal object, namely, the characteristic subject that the science studies (which like Cajetan he terms the object *ut res*), and the way or light in which the science studies this subject (which he calls the object *ut scibile* or *ut obiectum*).[92] Like Cajetan, he identifies the former, the object *ut res*, with *deitas,* and the latter as the *revelabile*:

> I say that the revealable [*revelabile*] is the formal notion of the object or subject of theology as it is an object knowable by the theologian because, as such, it falls into that species of knowable thing that [the term] "revealable" [*revelabile*] names, [namely] that which is knowable through revelation. But God or deity [*deitas*] is the formal notion of the subject of theology as it is a certain thing, to which it falls to be the object or subject of theology.[93]

These terms, *deitas* and *revelabile*, carry the same meaning for Capreolus as they do in the writings of Cajetan. *Deitas* refers to "God insofar as he is God absolutely,"[94] or that from which, if known in itself, the attributes of God would be fully deduced—effectively, the divine quiddity.[95] Moreover, just as for Cajetan,

[90] Capreolus, *Defensiones*, I, prol., q. 4 (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:51b).

[91] Ibid. (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:57b-58a): "ut prius saepe recitavi."

[92] Ibid. (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:58a-b).

[93] Ibid. (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:58a): "Tunc ad propositum dico quod revelabile est ratio objecti vel subjecti Theologiae, ut est objectum scibile a theologo, quia, ut sic, cadit in illam speciem scibilis quam nominat revelabile, vel cognoscibile per revelationem; sed Deus aut Deitas est ratio subjecti Theologiae, ut est res quaedam, cui accidit esse objectum aut subjectum Theologiae." For further elaboration of Capreolus's understanding of the formal object of a science, see Charles Robertson, "Capreolus: Prince or Corrupter of Thomism?" *Nova et vetera* (Eng. ed.) 12 (2014): 847-51.

[94] Capreolus, *Defensiones*, I, prol., q. 4 (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:59b): "If theology had for its subject God under the aspect of deity absolutely, that is, God insofar as He is God absolutely" ("Si theologia haberet Deum pro subjecto sub ratione deitatis absolute, id est Deum in quantum Deus absolute").

[95] Ibid. (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:60b): "If we knew the notion of the subject [*deitas*], then the notion would have great evidence; to wit, our theology would consider all things

the statement that theology has the *revelabile* as its formal object *ut scibile* means that what formally constitutes theology as a particular science is its consideration of truths insofar as they are "knowable through revelation."[96] In other words, to be *revelabile* is to be knowable through divine revelation.

As with Cajetan, Capreolus restricts the scope of this formal object in a way that excludes all rationally demonstrable truths from theology. This becomes clear from his treatment of the *revelabile.* As we have observed, for Capreolus, to be *revelabile* is to be knowable in the light of divine revelation. To be knowable in the light of divine revelation, however, is to be knowable through the articles of faith. That is to say, it is to be demonstrable through the use of an article of faith as the demonstrative middle term, and as such *revelabilitas* denotes knowability through the articles of faith as the medium of demonstration. In Capreolus's words:

> The formal object by which something is considered in this science, that is, the middle term through which all the conclusions of this science are known, is the light of divine revelation, that is, the articles of faith, which we hold by the habit of faith. . . . And this, which I call the divinely revealable [*revelabile divinitus*], is the formal notion of Theology . . . as it is knowable [*ut est scibile*].[97]

that pertain to God according to the notion of deity. Now, however, it is not so" ("Si enim rationem subjecti cognosceremus, ratio haberet magnam apparentiam, scilicet quod omnia quae conveniunt Deo secundum rationem deitatis, theologia nostra consideraret; nunc autem non ita est").

[96] Ibid. (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:58a): "I say that the revealable is the notion of the object or subject of Theology as it is an object knowable by the theologian, because, as such, it falls into that species of knowable thing which 'revealable,' or 'knowable through revelation,' denotes" ("Tunc ad propositum dico quod revelabile est ratio objecti vel subjecti Theologiae, ut est objectum scibile a theologo, quia, ut sic, cadit in illam speciem scibilis quam nominat revelabile, vel cognoscibile per revelationem").

[97] Ibid.: "Formale objectum quo consideratur aliquid in hac scientia, hoc est, medium per quod cognoscuntur omnes conclusiones hujus scientiae, est lumen divinae revelationis, scilicet articuli fidei, quos habitu fidei tenemus. . . . Et hoc quod dico, revelabile divinitus, est formalis ratio Theologiae . . . ut est scibile." As Capreolus says elsewhere, theology "takes the demonstrative middle terms through which it proves its conclusions from the divine light" ("sumit media, per quae probat suas conclusiones, a lumine divino"), and this divine light of revelation consists in "the articles of faith, from which certain things about God can be proven" ("articuli fidei; ex quibus aliqua possunt

Thus, the formal way in which something is known in theology is as demonstrated through an article of faith, and hence to be *revelabile* is to be knowable or deducible from an article of faith. As such, only those things which are demonstrable through the articles of faith can fall within the scope of the *revelabile* and hence of the science of theology. It is precisely this identification of *revelabilitas* with knowability through the articles of faith, however, that limits *revelabilitas* to truths that are knowable to us only through revelation. As Capreolus remarks in his discussion of the virtue of faith further on in the *Defensiones,* to be knowable through the articles of faith is to be knowable only through revelation and hence to be rationally indemonstrable, since the articles of faith and those propositions which can be deduced from them do not admit of rational demonstration. The articles of faith are "not about all things revealed by God, but *only* about those things revealed by God to which one adheres *solely and precisely* on the basis of divine revelation" (emphasis added).[98] Indeed, properly speaking, they exclude anything to which one adheres "not only on account of divine revelation, but rather on account of evident deduction from first principles known through themselves."[99] Since the articles of faith and those things deduced from them are thus by definition rationally indemonstrable, to be knowable through these articles or, equivalently, to be *revelabile* is to be knowable strictly through the light of divine revelation, and hence the science of theology

probari de Deo"). See, respectively, Capreolus, *Defensiones,* I, prol., q. 3 (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:36b); ibid., q. 4 (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:60b).

[98] Capreolus, *Defensiones*, III, d. 25, q. 1 (Paban and Pègues, ed., 5:330b-331a). "Fides, proprie loquendo, non est de omnibus revelatis a Deo, sed solum de illis revelatis a Deo, quibus adhaeret quis solum et praecise propter divinam revelationem."

[99] Ibid. (Paban and Pègues, ed., 5:331a): "Of those things, however, to which the faithful person adheres not only on account of divine revelation, but rather on account of evident deduction from first principles known through themselves, he has not faith, but science" ("De illis autem quibus fidelis adhaeret non solum propter divinam revelationem, immo propter evidentem deductionem ex primis principiis per se notis, non habet fidem, sed scientiam"). See also Capreolus, *Defensiones*, I, prol., q. 1 (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:18a).

of which *revelabilitas* is the formal object extends only to those truths that cannot be rationally demonstrated.

What ultimately grounds the definition of the *revelabile* as excluding all demonstrable truths, however, is Capreolus's understanding of the object *ut res* of theology, *deitas*. As the divine quiddity, or God considered in himself *absolute*, *deitas* is something "indefinable" and as such not known to us through reason.[100] The logical consequence of this position is that it is only through the articles of faith that *deitas* can be known to man in the present life, and for this reason the formal way of knowing proper to theology—*revelabilitas*—must be identified with the articles of faith and thereby restricted to rationally indemonstrable truths. In other words, it is because Capreolus posits *deitas*, something unknown to reason, as the formal object *ut res* of theology that the formal object *ut scibile* comes to be defined in a way that excludes all truths that can be demonstrated through reason, such as God's simplicity or eternity (to name two examples of rationally demonstrable truths cited by Capreolus as excluded from theology in virtue of its formal object).[101]

The French Dominican's treatment of the nature of theology in the *Defensiones* is thus substantively the same as that of Cajetan. For both thinkers, the discipline is defined by a twofold formal object, an object *ut res,* the thing or subject that is formally known in the science, and the object *ut scibile*, the formal way of knowing proper to the discipline. The former is God considered in himself or in his quiddity (*deitas*), while the latter is knowability in the light of revelation (*revelabilitas*). Moreover, for both Cajetan and Capreolus, theology so defined consists strictly of rationally indemonstrable truths, and it is specifically the identification of the object *ut res* with *deitas* that leads both thinkers to the conclusion that to be *revelabile* is to be knowable

[100] Capreolus, *Defensiones*, I, prol., q. 4 (Paban and Pègues, ed., 1:60b): "The subject of this science is indefinable, for it has neither genus nor difference, since we do not know what it is" ("Subjectum hujus scientiae sit indiffinibile, nec enim habet genus aut differentiam, cum nesciamus quid sit"). Also ibid.: "the notion of deity, which is not properly known to us in itself" ("rationem deitatis, quae non est nobis proprie cognita in se").

[101] Ibid.

only in the light of divine revelation. These theological parallels, along with Capreolus's prominence in late fifteenth-century Italian Dominican theological circles and the identical structure of the treatments of theology found in the *Defensiones* and Cajetan's *Sentences* commentary, strongly suggest that Cajetan ultimately derived his conception of theology from his encounter at the University of Padua with his predecessor's work. As Maurer aptly notes with regard to the similarity between Cajetan's conception of the relationship between existence and essence in the *Sentences* commentary and that of Capreolus in the *Defensiones*:

> There can be no doubt that [Cajetan] had Capreolus's article on the real distinction in front of him when he composed his own notes on the subject. Faced with the formidable assignment to teach this difficult matter for the first time, he acted as most young teachers would do: he looked about for the best textbook to help him prepare his lecture. Who could be a better guide than Capreolus, the acknowledged Prince of the Thomists? His impressive Commentary on the *Sentences* was at hand, and Cajetan used it for the statement of the problem of essence and existence, for his understanding of the terms of the problem, and for its solution. Thus from the beginning of his teaching career Cajetan was indebted to Capreolus for his notion of being. [102]

Substituting "formal object of theology" for "real distinction" would yield no less accurate a description of Cajetan's thought, for it is equally clear that he arrived at his conception of the science of theology on the basis of his engagement with the writings of the *princeps Thomistarum*.

IV. Theology and the Origins of Cajetan's Doctrine of Pure Nature

Granted that Capreolus is the source of Cajetan's understanding of theology as a discipline that excludes all rationally demonstrable truths, what relevance does this have for Cajetan's doctrine of pure nature? As I briefly noted at the outset but will

[102] Maurer, "Cajetan's Notion of Being," 275.

now explain in greater depth, such a conception of theology is of decisive importance for understanding the development of the notion that nature must reach its proper end by its own agency lest it be frustrated or "in vain"—in other words, the notion of pure nature. This is not to say that other historical data are of no import for Cajetan's *natura pura*. Indeed, other facts are relevant. For example, Cajetan attributes the claim that nature would be in vain if it could not attain its end by natural agency to Aristotle. In the *Summa* commentary, for example, the passage in which the Dominican cardinal argues against a natural inclination for the vision of the divine essence cites the *locus classicus* for debates about Aristotle's conception of the nonvanity of nature, namely, a text in *De caelo* in which Aristotle states that if nature had given stars the capacity for progressive motion, then it would have given them the organs necessary to accomplish it.

That Cajetan was deeply influenced by Aristotle is not in doubt. Indeed, in his *Summa* commentary, he describes himself as having been raised on "peripatetic milk," almost certainly a reference to training he received during his formative years as a student.[103] The fact that he had so much reverence for the Philosopher, along with the fact that he perceived the concept of pure nature as Aristotelian in origin, certainly would have confirmed his confidence in the thesis, yet this datum alone is not sufficient to account for Cajetan's view of nature. Historically speaking, it is inadequate to argue that he picked up Aristotle's *De caelo*, found pure nature contained within its pages, and adopted the theory as his own, precisely because the doctrine of *natura pura* is not to be found there. To understand this, we must consider what the Aristotelian text in question does—and, more importantly, what it does not—say. When we do so, we find that Cajetan's interpretation of the passage as containing the doctrine of pure nature rests on an extratextual assumption, for which reason his Aristotelianism is not enough to explain his conception of *natura*.

Let us first examine Aristotle's argument:

[103] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 15, a. 1, VIII (Leonine ed., 4:200): "Ego autem, peripatetico lacte educatus." Quoted in De Lubac, *Augustinisme,* 160.

Another argument is that it would be absurd for nature to have given [stars] no organs of motion. Nature makes nothing in haphazard fashion, and she would not look after the animals and neglect such superior beings as these. Rather she seems to have purposely deprived them of every means of progressing by themselves, and made them as different as possible from creatures which have organs of motion. The assumption is therefore justified that both the heaven as a whole and the separate stars are spherical, for the sphere is at once the most useful shape for motion in the same place—since what is spherical can move most swiftly and can most easily maintain its position unchanged—and the least suited to progression.[104]

Aristotle argues here that if nature had ordered stars to progressive motion, then it would have given them the organs or endowments necessary to realize such motion. It has clearly not given stars the ability to move progressively; therefore, we can conclude that it did not intend for them to do so, which is to say, that they do not have a natural inclination for such motion (and hence we can also conclude that they are spherical in shape). Now, Cajetan is not mistaken to think that a certain view of nature is implied here. As the text suggests, if nature inclines a being to the end of progressive motion, then it gives that being what is necessary to realize such motion. But what kind of an end is progressive motion? As all parties to the debate would concede, it is a *naturally attainable* end, requiring no supernatural assistance for its actualization. The only general conclusion about nature that we can draw from the text, therefore, is that, for Aristotle, if nature inclines a being to a *naturally attainable* end, then it must give that being the necessary endowments to reach its end.

Cajetan, however, goes well beyond this limit in his interpretation of the passage. As we have observed, he interprets the text as meaning that nature does not bestow an inclination to something that the power of nature cannot attain.[105] In other

[104] Aristotle, *De caelo* 2.8.290a30-290b5 (*On the Heavens*, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014], 189-91).

[105] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 12, a. 1, IX (Leonine ed., 4:116). For the quotation, see above, n. 18.

words, if nature inclines a being to an end (which is to say, to *any* end), then it must give that being what is necessary to attain that end. Aristotle, however, does not say that nature must give what is necessary for *any* end to which it inclines but only for any *naturally attainable* end to which it inclines. Now, if nature only inclines to naturally attainable ends, then it is indeed true to say that "any end" of natural inclination is a "naturally attainable" end, and thus the text really would mean what Cajetan says it means. On the contrary, however, if nature can in fact incline to a supernatural end, it follows that "any end" of natural inclination is *not* equivalent to "any naturally attainable end" of natural inclination, and hence Cajetan's view would contradict Aristotle's text.[106]

Whether Cajetan's position is identical with that which Aristotle puts forward in *De caelo* is thus entirely determined by the answer given to the question of whether nature can have an inclination for a supernaturally attained end. Answered in the negative, Aristotle's claim that nature must give the means necessary to attain a naturally attainable end to which it inclines would indeed amount to Cajetan's doctrine of pure nature in which nature must give the means necessary to attain *any* end to which it inclines. If, however, the question is answered in the affirmative, Aristotle's view would not equate to that of Cajetan. The historical problem, however, is that either answer to the question is an extratextual assumption that is not demonstrable on the basis of the Stagirite's writing. Aristotle is silent on the question of whether nature can be inclined to an end that is above its capacity to attain. All he says in *De caelo* is that nature must give a being with a naturally attainable end the endowments necessary to attain that end. Considered on its own terms, this statement is entirely neutral with regard to the question of

[106] Juxtaposing the two thinkers' positions better illustrates their contrast. For Cajetan, nature must give what is necessary for the attainment of *any* end to which it inclines. For Aristotle, nature must give what is necessary for the attainment of any *naturally attainable* end to which it inclines. If "any end" is equivalent to "any naturally attainable end," the two formulations are the same. However, this is only true if we assume that nature does not incline to a supernatural end, for only on such an assumption is "any end" to which nature inclines a naturally attainable end.

whether nature can incline to a supernatural end, for one cannot extrapolate an answer to this question from the statement itself.[107] On the contrary, the meaning of the statement is determined by the answer one gives to the question. If one assumes that it is not possible for nature to incline to a supernatural end, then Aristotle's claim that nature must give all that is necessary for the attainment of a *naturally attainable* end to which it inclines really does mean that nature must give all that is necessary for the attainment of *any* end to which it inclines[108] (since any end of a natural inclination would be a naturally attainable end). Yet, if one assumes that nature can give an inclination to a supernatural end, then in fact Aristotle's statement is *not* equivalent in meaning to the claim that nature must give all that is necessary for the attainment of *any* end to which it inclines; indeed, the former statement would tell us nothing about how nature stands in relation to the supernatural.

Cajetan's claim that Aristotle's text asserts that nature must give the means to attain any end to which it inclines thus necessarily presupposes a negative answer to the question of the possibility of a natural inclination to a supernatural end, an

[107] Some of Cajetan's near contemporaries, such as the Spanish Dominican Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), also maintained that the text from *De caelo* is neutral with regard to the question of whether there can be a natural inclination to a supernatural end. Commenting on the passage, Soto explains that, because Aristotle knew nothing of the supernatural, he was not in a position to state that a thing can have an inclination to an end without having the power necessary to attain that end. By implication, however, nor was he in a position to state that a thing is *not* able to have an inclination to an end above the power of nature to attain. Philosophizing in ignorance of the category of the supernatural, the Stagirite's claim that stars, which have a naturally attainable end, must naturally possess the ability to attain their end cannot be taken as a pronouncement either way on the question of whether a being such as man can have a natural inclination for an end that cannot be attained by unaided nature. In other words, for Soto we cannot extrapolate from Aristotle's claim that nature must give a being with a naturally attainable end the power to reach that end the claim that nature must give a being the endowments necessary to attain *any* end to which it inclines. See Domingo de Soto, *Commentarii in quartum Sententiarum,* d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 (2 vols. [Venice, 1584], 2:656b).

[108] Or, equivalently, that nature does not bestow an inclination to an end that is above the power of nature to attain.

answer that renders *any* end of natural inclination by definition a naturally attainable end. The Dominican cardinal's interpretation is therefore not an act of exegesis but rather of eisegesis—in this case, the interpolation of the assumption that there can be no such thing as a natural inclination to a supernatural end. Rather than opening *De caelo* and appropriating the Philosopher's understanding of nature, Cajetan opens the text and discovers there his own preconceived idea of *natura*, and it is for this reason that Cajetan's Aristotelianism is ultimately insufficient to account for the genesis of his doctrine of pure nature.[109]

[109] Cajetan further claims that Aristotle's argument for the existence of the agent intellect in *De anima* 3.5 also represents an articulation of the pure-nature thesis. In *De anima* 430a10-25, Aristotle argues that because "in every class of objects, just as in the whole of nature, there is something which is their matter, i.e., which is potentially all the individuals, and something else which is their cause or agent in that it makes them all," there must be an agent intellect which makes forms that are potentially understood to be actually understood. Cajetan sees in this argument an admission that natural potencies must always be capable of fulfillment by strictly natural agency, which would rule out the possibility of a natural potency or desire for a supernatural end. However, as we have observed, Aristotle lacked access to the category of the supernatural, and it is thus implausible to attribute to him a conception of natural potency that, as in Cajetan's case, is defined in terms of its opposition to supernatural, obediential potency (indeed, Cajetan's term "natural potency" does not appear in the *De anima* text, precisely because a "natural" potency is defined in reference to its being capable of actualization *without supernatural agency*). Moreover, even if such an attribution could be made, it would still be necessary to show that, for Aristotle, natural potency is equivalent to natural desire. While Cajetan takes this identification for granted, not all Scholastics do. For instance, the anonymous author of a treatise on beatitude housed in the Biblioteca de Santa Cruz in Valladolid, whom scholars identify as a disciple of Suárez, maintains that man has a natural desire or inclination for the vision of God as his highest good but not a natural potency for it, since potency refers to a subject's capacity to attain an object while desire or inclination only refers to the object as good for or perfective of the subject. To prove that Aristotle's *De anima* text contains a theory of pure nature, one would thus have to show that he equates natural desire with natural potency in the same way as does Cajetan. For the Aristotelian text and Cajetan's treatment of it, see Aristotle, *On the Soul,* 3.5. 430a10-25 (trans. W.S. Hett [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957], 171); and Cajetan, *De potentia neutra*, q. 2 (Lyon ed., 207b, 32-42). For the manuscript, see *De beatitudine* [Valladolid, Biblioteca de Santa Cruz, Ms. 404], 86v, in Jose Martin Palma, "El manuscrito 404 del Colegio de Santa Cruz de Valladolid," *Archivo teológico granadino* 35 (1972): 126-29. The attribution of the manuscript to a disciple of Suárez has been made by Elorduy. See Eleuterio Elorduy, "Cartas y manuscritos de Francisco

The other explanation of the Dominican commentator's conception of nature sometimes advanced by historians such as de Lubac—namely that it arose as part of a hostile reaction to Scotism at Padua—is similarly inadequate. In the first place, Cajetan does not always equate Scotus with his Scotist interlocutors at Padua. It is certainly true that he criticized some of Trombetta's ideas,[110] but in texts that are key for understanding Cajetan's conception of nature, such as his criticism of Scotus's argument for a natural potency to the vision of God in *De potentia neutra*,[111] Trombetta's name never appears. Indeed, the evidence does not support the claim that Cajetan's knowledge of Scotus's thought was primarily mediated through a contemporary Paduan Scotist, rather than coming from direct engagement with the Subtle Doctor's work.

Similarly, the claim that Cajetan's view of nature developed as part of a hostile reaction to Scotism understates the substantive nature of the Dominican cardinal's engagement with Scotus. Rather than approaching Scotus's text from a posture of instinctive partisanship, Cajetan shows a meaningful engagement with Scotus's thought. Though he often disagrees with his Franciscan predecessor, he is quite willing to cite him as an authority in support of his own views. For example, in Cajetan's commentary on the first article of the *Summa*, he states his view that sacred doctrine is necessary for man to attain his ultimate end. He claims that he is in full agreement with Scotus on this point, and his words are in fact quite sympathetic: "Concerning this part, it should be noted that Scotus . . . is discordant neither

Suárez," *Miscelánea Comillas: Revista de ciencias humanas y sociales* 20, no. 38 (1962): 272.

[110] For example, he explicitly criticizes Trombetta's understanding of what individuates members of a species, a topic of great significance for medieval metaphysics. Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, *Super librum "De ente et essentia" sanctae Thomae Aquinatis, in septem capita divisus*, q. 5, quoad 2 (*Opuscula omnia Thomae de Vio Caietani Cardinalis tituli Sancti Sixti* [Lyon, 1587; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1995], 233b6-15).

[111] Cajetan, *De potentia neutra*, q. 2, passim (Lyon ed., 207a30-207b71).

with the conclusion nor with reason."[112] In other words, Cajetan does not refrain from commending Scotus's work when he believes it merits commendation. To attribute Cajetan's conception of *natura pura* primarily to a partisan animus toward Scotism does not do justice to the nature of his engagement with Scotus's ideas.

Explanations such as Aristotelianism or a reaction to Scotism, though they may provide insight into the context surrounding the development of Cajetan's theory of pure nature, cannot in themselves account for the phenomenon. As I have suggested, what ultimately explains his view is a certain understanding of the nature of theology and its relationship to philosophy. As we have seen, his understanding of the formal object of theology entails that the science consists strictly of truths that must be revealed in order to be known. When theology is understood as excluding all demonstrable truths from its proper purview, the result is that it has an entirely different sphere of competence from philosophy. Theology exclusively considers matters such as the persons of the Trinity and the redemptive work of Christ, while philosophy considers matters such as the demonstration of an uncaused cause; the nature of being, act, potency, and movement; and the natural moral life of man. Insofar as a thinker considers issues of the latter sort, he has properly speaking left theology.[113] With no overlap between the content formally belonging to each science, neither has a role in shaping the trajectory or conclusions reached by the other.[114]

[112] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 1, VII (Leonine ed., 4:7): "Circa hanc partem, est advertendum quod Scotus, in 1 qu. Prologi Primi *Sententiarum*, nec a conclusione nec a ratione discordat." Moreover, the fact that he explicitly cites the precise text in which Scotus outlines his views is further confirmation that he engaged directly with Scotus himself rather than with Scotus as interpreted by Paduan Scotists such as Trombetta.

[113] Though, as we have observed, the theologian can, in a purely "ministerial" and extrinsic capacity, make philosophical arguments concerning such issues in order to strengthen the confidence of the intellect in the truths of faith.

[114] Such an understanding of the effective independence of philosophy from theology found expression in other aspects of Cajetan's life and work, including his ecclesiastical work. For example, he was one of only two delegates to the Fifth Lateran Council (1512-17) to vote against the decree *Apostolici regiminis* (1513), which mandated that all

The result of this state of affairs, in which theology exerts no influence on the development of philosophical conclusions, is that philosophical reason is left to construct an account of nature strictly according to its own exigencies,[115] with the inevitable

university professors "explain the principles of Christian doctrine and make [that doctrine] clear, supporting it with persuasive arguments and refuting arguments to the contrary," notably with regard to the philosophical question of the immortality of the soul. For Cajetan, such a mandate would have represented an encroachment of theology on the proper prerogative of philosophy. See Leen Spruit, "The Pomponazzi Affair: The Controversy over the Immortality of the Soul," in *The Routledge Companion to Sixteenth Century Philosophy*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Benjamin Hill (New York: Routledge, 2017), 230.

[115] By contrast, when certain rationally intelligible truths about God belong by full right to theology, this science can have a role in shaping the trajectory of philosophizing. When theology properly contains rationally demonstrable truths about God and creation, the believing philosopher who accepts the truth of Christian theology begins his philosophical activity with these truths already in his possession, and he proceeds to explicate them rationally and to unpack their implications. The result is a philosophy that, although fully demonstrable by reason, is closely accommodated to—and, indeed, derives its general orientation from—what revelation tells us about God and the world. It is, to use Gilson's terminology, "Christian philosophy," that is, a philosophy in which "supernatural [revelation] must descend as a constitutive element . . . into the work of its construction" and which has the specific content that it has "only because a Christian religion existed and because [philosophical reason was] ready to submit to its influence." This is what Gilson suggests occurred with Aquinas's understanding of the identity of God's essence with his act of being. When God tells Moses in Exodus 3:14, "I Am Who Am," Aquinas believes that God is revealing the fact that *what he is* is his own act of being. This is by full right a theological truth inasmuch as it is contained in revelation, but it is also rationally intelligible. Possessing this truth in virtue of his theology (in advance, as it were, of his philosophical activity), Aquinas can then explain it rationally (that is, philosophically) and draw from it rationally demonstrable conclusions, such as the createdness of the world. The result is a body of philosophical theses that, although rationally demonstrable, closely conform to the message of Christian revelation. However, if theology formally excluded rationally intelligible truths about God and the world from its proper purview, a thinker would not be in possession of such truths in virtue of his theology, and he would instead be left to build up an account of things strictly according to the exigencies of philosophy, without taking into account the data of revelation. For Gilson's account of Christian philosophy, see Étienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, trans. A. H. C. Downes (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 21-41. The quotation can be found on page 37. For Gilson's treatment of Aquinas's understanding of God's revelation of his essence as his act of being,

outcome that nature must be perfected by natural powers. Such a conclusion is precisely what philosophical reason operating without recourse to revelation requires. If the end of man's natural inclination or desire is not in some way attainable, then it does indeed follow that human nature is frustrated and absurd—in Scholastic terminology, "in vain." From the vantage point of a philosophical reason that is building up an account of reality without any knowledge of the data of revelation,[116] this is precisely what would appear to be the case with regard to an end of human nature that can only be achieved by supernatural agency, such as the vision of the divine essence. Unaided reason can see no way to achieve such an end, since it knows nothing of the possibility of supernatural elevation to this vision. Seeing no way for a supernatural end to be attained, and seeing that nature would thus be in vain if it were naturally inclined to such an end, unaided reason has little choice but to conclude that it is impossible for nature to have as its end something that cannot be attained by natural powers. Were it otherwise, the integrity of nature and of philosophy itself would be compromised. By leaving philosophy to construct a theory of nature without taking into account the data of revelation, a view of theology such as Cajetan's thus leads to an understanding of nature as having to be perfected strictly by natural agency.[117]

see Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L. K. Shook, C.S.B. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 93-95.

[116] For instance, without the revealed datum that God has in fact bestowed the grace that elevates man to a supernatural end.

[117] I have suggested that a view of theology as excluding rationally demonstrable truths leads to the conclusion that nature must be able to attain its end by its own endowments. However, the converse is not necessarily the case. Including rationally intelligible truths within the formal scope of theology allows the data of revelation to shape the trajectory of one's philosophizing (as Gilson argues; see above, n. 115). However, thinkers may diverge in their assessment of the content of revelation. Some might regard pure nature as most responsive to the exigencies of theology, while others might regard a view of nature as being perfected by a supernatural end as the most responsive. Therefore, it would not be surprising if thinkers who shared a view of theology as including demonstrable truths within its scope and hence as shaping the orientation of philosophy came to divergent conclusions as to nature's relation to the supernatural.

Concluding Reflections: The Centrality of Pure Nature in Cajetan's Thought

The significance of Cajetan's view of nature, and of the view of theology that underlies it, can hardly be overstated, for it decisively shapes many other important aspects of his thought. This is especially the case with regard to his ethics. In order to illustrate the far-reaching significance of his understanding of theology and its attendant view of nature, I will conclude by considering the implications of Cajetan's position for a crucial issue in medieval moral science, namely, the question of the relationship between the acquired, natural virtues of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and the infused virtues of Christian revelation. The consequences of the doctrine of nature's perfection by strictly natural principles, and of the conception of theology as excluding all demonstrable truths which underlies it, are particularly visible in the context of this question.

The primary text in which we see Cajetan working out the implications of his view of pure nature for the relationship between acquired and infused virtue is found in the *Summa* commentary. Commenting on question 23, article 7 of the *Secunda secundae*, in which Aquinas argues that, simply speaking, there is no true virtue without charity inasmuch as only charity orders man to the end that is ultimate *simpliciter* (that is, the vision of God), Cajetan inserts the concept of a naturally attainable end that is fully complete and perfect (the implication of his doctrine of pure nature) to claim that acquired virtue itself is perfect *simpliciter*:

> Note here in the seventh article the distinction between what we are to think about the matter in reality [*in re*], and what to think about the matter according to a particular mode of speaking [*sermonis ratione*], so that you do not excite laughter among philosophers and the wise of this world. In reality [*secundum rem*], there can be, without charity, true virtues in man absolutely considered [*absolute*], and [virtues] perfect with the perfection required for human virtue. But because any artisan ought to judge according to the proper causes of the art that pertains to him . . . [we must note that] there is a different way of speaking

[*ratio sermonis*] characteristic of theologians as opposed to others. The theologian, whose object is God, only locates man's good in an ordering to what is simply speaking [*simpliciter*] the ultimate end, which end is the object of charity. By way of distinction he says that the perfection of virtue is twofold, generic and simple, and that without charity and faith there are virtues perfect according to genus but not simply. The philosopher, however, who locates the good [of] man in an ordering to an *ultimate natural end*, does not know the higher end and calls human virtues without faith and charity virtues simply speaking. Nor therefore do the theologians and philosophers contradict each other, but the imperfect knowledge of philosophy concerning the good of man is the issue. For that which the philosopher calls perfect simply, because it is not his [prerogative] to consider the higher end, the theologian calls perfect in a genus and imperfect simply, because it is his [prerogative] to consider the higher end. (Emphasis added)[118]

As we see in the text, Cajetan begins his analysis of the relationship of the acquired to the infused virtues by introducing a distinction as to how we can consider them. We can, he says, consider the acquired virtues as they are in reality—that is, *in re* or *secundum rem*—or we can consider them from a particular disciplinary vantage point, that is, *secundum modum sermonis*. To speak about them *in re* is to speak about them in a neutral fashion, to speak about them as they really are and as considered absolutely (*absolute*). To speak about them *secundum modum sermonis* is to speak about them from a particular perspective—that is, to speak about them not as they really are in themselves,

[118] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 7, I (Leonine ed., 8:172): "In articulo septimo adverte hic discrete quid in re, et quid in sermonis ratione sentiendum sit, ne apud philosophos et mundi huius sapientes risum excites. Secundum rem quidem absque caritate esse possunt in homine absolute considerato verae virtutes, et perfectae perfectione requisita ad virtutem humanam. Sed quoniam quilibet artifex iudicare debet secundum proprias sui generis causas . . . inde diversa est ratio sermonis apud theologos et alios. Theologus siquidem, cuius obiectum est Deus, et hominem bonum constituit solum in ordine ad finem ultimum simpliciter, qui est obiectum caritatis, distinguendo dicit quod perfectio virtutis est duplex, in genere et simpliciter; et quod sine caritate et fide etiam sunt virtutes perfectae in genere, sed non simpliciter. Philosophus autem, qui hominem bonum constituit in ordine ad ultimum finem naturalem, nec superiorem novit finem, virtutes humanas sine fide et caritate veras et perfectas virtutes simpliciter dicit. Nec propterea contradicunt: sed imperfecta notitia philosophiae de hominis bonitate in causa est. Quod enim philosophus vocat perfectum simpliciter, quia non est eius altiorem finem considerare, theologus vocat perfectum in genere et imperfectum simpliciter, quia eius est altiorem finem considerare."

but rather in relation to the aims and methods of a particular discipline. As he says, *in re* and *absolute*, the acquired virtues are both true and perfect. This is tantamount to saying that, considered objectively and in abstraction from any particular disciplinary perspective, the acquired virtues are true and perfect virtues, simply speaking. Only when we consider them from a particular vantage point, that is, the vantage point of the theologian who analyzes how these virtues stand in relation to the beatific vision, can we conclude that they are somehow imperfect, since they do not order us toward this end. The acquired virtues are thus imperfect only in a relative sense, that is, by comparison to another end. Absolutely speaking, they do not lack anything, and in reality they are true and perfect virtues.

What ultimately grounds the claim that *secundum rem* the acquired virtues are complete virtues *simpliciter* is that they direct man to an "ultimate natural end." The fact that an end in the natural order is intrinsically complete and perfect, which is the implication of the claim that nature must be able to reach its complete, perfect end by natural agency, allows the virtues that direct us to that end to be likewise intrinsically complete and perfect virtues *simpliciter*. Of course, if we consider them in relation to a higher, supernatural end, then they are relatively incomplete in comparison with the preeminent goodness of that end, but because the *finis* that human nature as nature achieves naturally is complete and perfect (for a supernaturally attained end could never, as we have seen, constitute for Cajetan the complete end of nature *qua* nature), so are the virtues that direct us to it.

As this example shows, the view of theology Cajetan developed at Padua explains much more than his understanding of human nature. Indeed, through that understanding of *natura pura*, it reverberates across his ethics, establishing a conception of the moral life as self-sufficient in the natural order, without reference to the light that revelation shines on the nature and destiny of the human person.

The Thomist 85 (2021): 57-85

DIVINE INNASCIBILITY IN THE THEOLOGY OF SS. GREGORY NAZIANZEN AND THOMAS AQUINAS

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GOD THE FATHER can be known distinctly in three ways: (1) insofar as he is unoriginate, or proceeds from no one and has no principle—on account of which he is said to have innascibility; (2) insofar as he is the principle of the Son—on account of which he has paternity; and (3) insofar as he is the principle of the Holy Spirit—on account of which he has spiration. There is no way to tell the Father apart from the other divine persons besides these three notions.[1] This article will consider the first of these three notions—the Father's innascibility, or unbegottenness—in the thought of St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Thomas Aquinas.[2]

It should come as no surprise that these two doctors agree on key doctrinal points. Yet because they come from different times and places, living in different cultures and writing in different languages, it should similarly come as no surprise that they articulate their doctrines in different ways. Even so, given the

[1] One cannot distinguish the persons by any pure perfections in God, because the three persons possess all pure perfections equally.

[2] For more on the Father in the theology of Aquinas, see John Baptist Ku, *God the Father in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Peter Lang, 2013); and Emmanuel Durand, *Le Père, Alpha et Oméga de la vie trinitaire* (Paris: Cerf, 2008). For more on the Father in the theology of Nazianzen, see Domingo García Guillén, *Padre es nombre de relación: Dios Padre en la teología de Gregorio Nacianceno* (Rome: Gregorian and Biblical Press, 2010). For a comparison of Nazianzen and Aquinas, see John Baptist Ku, "Divine Paternity in the Theology of Ss. Gregory Nazianzen and Thomas Aquinas," in *Thomas Aquinas and the Greek Fathers*, ed. Michael Dauphinais, Roger Nutt, and Andrew Hofer (Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2019).

common doctrinal ethos in the Church, such as we find preserved in creeds, and the fact that Aquinas was an inheritor of some of Nazianzen's work, many of the expressions they use are the same.[3]

Recent scholarship has sought to manifest the harmony between ancient Eastern theologians and Augustine and Aquinas, while taking note of their differences.[4] This article intends to advance that fruitful line of inquiry. Although it is unremarkable that Nazianzen and Aquinas would agree in their articulation of Trinitarian theology, it is important to prove that we are not harmonizing the two authors by force. For those who would expect agreement, this article intends to provide clarifying documentation; for those who would be suspicious of such

[3] By 400, Rufinus had translated nine of Nazianzen's orations (2, 6, 16, 17, 26, 27, 38, 39, and 41) into Latin; these could have been available to Aquinas in whole or part. He mentions Nazianzen by name fifty-one times in his whole corpus—although twenty-five of these appear in the *Catena aurea*. Thus in the context of his own theological argument, Aquinas refers to Nazianzen on twenty-six occasions. Three of these cases refer to Nazianzen's personal life (*De sub. separ.*, c. 18; *Contra impugn.* II, c. 1; and *Contra impugn.* IV, c. 2), leaving twenty-three occurrences where Aquinas invokes Nazianzen's theological opinion (on angels [I *Sent*., d. 37, q. 3, a. 1; II *Sent*., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, corp. and obj. 1; *STh* I, q. 61, a. 3; *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 18, obj. 1]; on Christ's human nature [*STh* III, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 3; q. 2, a. 3, ad 1; q. 16, a. 7, obj. 3; q. 17, a. 1, ad 2; q. 31, a. 2, ad 2]; on genealogy in Scripture [*STh* III, q. 31, a. 3, ad 2]; on Christ's baptism [*STh* III, q. 39, a. 1; q. 39, a. 2; q. 39, a. 3, ad 1]; on Church law [*STh* III, q. 39, a. 3, ad 3]; on the six days of creation [*De sub. separ.*, c. 18]; on the Holy Spirit [*Contra error. Graec.* I, c. 8; I, c. 9; II, c. 24; II, c. 27]; and on unleavened bread [*Contra error. Graec.* II, c. 39]). In eleven of these cases, Aquinas quotes text verbatim and with reasonable accuracy. Three of these eleven cases, all from the *Contra errores Graecorum*, concern the Trinity. Aquinas's profound respect for Nazianzen is expressed in *STh* I, q. 61, a. 3, where, when he rules out an opinion that Nazianzen held, he concludes that the rejected opinion "is not to be judged erroneous, especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, whose authority on Christian teaching is so great that no one has ever dared to raise an objection to his words, as neither to the instruction of Athanasius, as Jerome says."

[4] See, for instance, Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Dauphinais, Nutt, and Hofer, eds., *Thomas Aquinas and the Greek Fathers*; *Orthodox Readings of Augustine*, ed. George Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou (Yonkers, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2008); Leo Elders, *Thomas Aquinas and His Predecessors: The Philosophers and the Church Fathers in His Works* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018); Ian Jones, "The Procession of the Holy Spirit: Exploring Points of Contact and Divergence between Augustine and Eastern Trinitarian Theologies," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 61 (2017): 273-300.

agreement, this article hopes to offer some interesting discoveries.

This article will examine three topics: (1) the identity and distinction of the divine persons in terms of relations and properties (the result of which will give us confidence that Nazianzen and Aquinas are truly speaking the same language), (2) the Father being unoriginate (our principal interest), and (3) the Father's action through the Son and the Holy Spirit in the created order (a consequence of the Father not being from another).

We will verify a deep resonance between these two saints. We will see that they are in agreement on the following formulations of doctrine. Each divine person is the one identical divine essence, and yet each is distinct from the others in the real order by their properties, which are distinct on account of the relations that each person has the others. The unoriginate Father is the source of unity in the Trinity; and "unbegotten" properly applies to the Father, not the divine essence—although "unbegotten" can be taken in a more general sense to mean "uncreated." The Son and the Holy Spirit may be said in some sense to be led back to the Father. The Father acts through the Word and the Spirit in the created order; and thus, in grace, we are drawn by the Holy Spirit to the Son and by the Son back to the Father, our ultimate end.

There are differences. Whereas Aquinas places a strong emphasis on the Father's identity as being rooted in his paternity, Nazianzen manifests an inclination to think of the Father as the Unoriginate One. We find in Aquinas a greater coherence and consistency in articulation as well as some conceptual advances. Yet the precision and clarity of Nazianzen's assertions about the persons being distinct by property on account of their mutual relations could surprise disciples of Aquinas who might have expected this understanding to be in its embryonic stage in this period when, for instance, the definitive affirmation of the Holy Spirit's divinity was still being worked out.

I. The Equality and Distinction of the Divine Persons in Terms of Relations and Properties

In *Oration* 20, Nazianzen supplies us with a succinct expression that identifies how the Father can be known distinctly: "the individual properties will be maintained if, in the case of the Father, we think and speak of him as being *both source and without source*."[5] Aquinas adopts the expression "principle not from a principle," which appears in Augustine, and gives it pride of place in his own theology regarding the Father's identity.[6]

In dealing with the Eunomian problem, Nazianzen sought a way to understand how "Father" is neither simply the activity of the Unbegotten nor simply the divine essence in a way that would deny that the Son is also the divine essence.[7] That is, if the essence

[5] *Oration* 20.7 (*PG* 35:1073, ll. 11-14): "Αἱ δὲ ἰδιότητες, Πατρὸς μὲν, *καὶ ἀνάρχου, καὶ ἀρχῆς* ἐπινοουμένου καὶ λεγομένου" (emphasis added). Translation in *St. Gregory of Nazianzus: Select Orations*, trans. Martha Vinson, Fathers of the Church 107 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 111.

[6] *STh* I, q. 33, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 4:362): "principium non de principio." Augustine of Hippo, *Contra Maximinum* 2.17.14. This idea predates Nazianzen in the Latin tradition, for instance, in Marius Victorinus (d. ca. 364), who speaks of a "sine principio . . . principium" in his *Letter to Candidus* (*Liber de generatione divini Verbi*), no. 16. See *Marius Victorinus: Theological Treatises on the Trinity*, Fathers of the Church 69 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 72.

All citations from the *Summa theologiae* and the *Summa contra Gentiles* are taken from the Leonine edition. All citations from the disputed questions *De potentia* and *De veritate*, as well as the commentaries on Matthew, John, and Dionysius's *De divinibus nominibus*, are taken from the Marietti edition.

[7] Eunomius, a second-generation Arian, asserted that the Son is "not without an act of begetting prior to his existence . . . [and] so not without beginning" in his *Confession of Faith* (*Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition*, vol. 1, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003], 106). Eunomius argued that since the divine essence is unoriginate, it cannot be communicated: "Being unbegotten . . . God would never accept a begetting whereby he would share his proper nature with the begotten, but rather he escapes all comparison and communion with the begotten. For if one wanted to communicate this essence to something else or share it with something else, one would do so either by separation and division or by comparison" (Eunomius, *Apology* 9 [*PG* 30:844B, ll. 1-8; *SC* 305:250]). For Eunomius, even the name "Father" does not signify the divine essence but rather an action of God, an energy (*energeia*) that is distinct in the real order from God's essence: "The name 'Son' shows his

is not simply the Father, then how is the Father more than the activity of the One who is the essence? Nazianzen succeeded in articulating a solution through the concept of relation (σχέσις),[8] making the Son simultaneous to the Father, who is the divine essence. For Nazianzen, each divine person, who is indeed the divine essence, is distinct by personal property (ἰδιότης), which may also be described as what is around (περί) the essence. Aquinas, for his part, makes relation the linchpin of his Trinitarian theology, understanding the divine person to be a subsisting relation. And properties are simply relations, or the denial of a relation, by which the persons are distinguished from each other.

In this section, we will briefly examine the basic Trinitarian principles espoused by these two doctors with respect to equality and distinction, mutual relative opposition, and properties of the persons. As we will see, they make the same distinctions—albeit in two different languages and notably different styles of prose—in order to articulate as far as possible the mystery of three divine persons distinct in the real order who are each one numerically same divine essence and God. Aquinas is unmistakably more precise than Nazianzen, but the important concepts are already outlined by the latter.

essence, and that of 'Father' shows the activity (*energeia*) of him who begot him" (Eunomius, *Apology* 24 [*PG* 30:860D-861A, ll. 29-31; *SC* 305:282]). If one were to insist that "Father" signifies the essence, argues Eunomius, one may as well say the same for the Son, and just say that the Father is the Son and the Son the Father (ibid. [*PG* 30:861A, ll. 31-37; *SC* 305:282-84]). Translations of Eunomius are my own.

[8] Guillén, *Padre es nombre de relación*, 344. Given Aquinas's success with the concept of relation, it can be tempting to overemphasize it in Nazianzen, especially if one reads only the *Theological Orations*. This would be a distortion; for Nazianzen, relation is one way among others to distinguish the persons. In his *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* ([New York: Oxford University Press, 2007], 80), Gilles Emery maintains that Basil of Caesarea was the first to introduce the idea of the divine person as a relation. Emery holds that the doctrine of subsistent relations is original to Aquinas (ibid., 84). Others, like J. N. D. Kelly, believe that it is already in Augustine (J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 5th ed. [New York: Continuum, 1977], 274).

A) Equality and Distinction

Oration 6 makes clear that Nazianzen wishes to defend the perfect identity of being as well as the real distinction of the divine persons. He uses ἕν in the neuter ("one [thing]") to refer to the identity of being in the divine nature; and to designate distinction in the real order he uses εἷς in the masculine gender ("one [who]") and ὑπόστατος ("with individual reality," literally "hypostasistic"). But he deploys the latter with a double negative—the persons are *not ἀν*-υπόστατος. This, he teaches, is not just a matter of our knowing and naming: it is a matter of πρᾶγμα ("actual fact," or "reality"):

> Knowing the Father in the Son, the Son in the Holy Spirit . . . dividing them before combining them and combining them before dividing them, and not regarding the three as *one 'who'* [ἕνα] (for they are not *without individual reality* [ἀνυπόστατα] nor do they comprise a *single hypostasis* [μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως], as though our treasure lay in names and not in *actual facts* [πράγμασι]), but rather believing the three to be *one thing* [ἕν]. For they are *one thing* [ἕν] not in *individual hypostasis* [ὑποστάσει] but in divinity, a unity worshipped in Trinity and a Trinity summed up into unity, venerable as one whole, as one royal, sharing the same throne, sharing the same glory, above space, above time, uncreated, invisible, impalpable, uncircumscribed.[9]

The more paradoxical language of Nazianzen—"dividing them before combining them and combining them before dividing them"—does not come across in Aquinas. In its place, Aquinas establishes that immanent procession is the key to articulating the both-and of perfect equality and real distinction: immanence secures perfect identity of the divine essence since anything in God is God, and procession secures real distinction since nothing

[9] *Oration* 6.22 (*PG* 35:749, ll. 30-32, 33-42): "ἐν Υἱῷ τὸν Πατέρα, ἐν Πνεύματι τὸν Υἱὸν γινώσκοντες, εἰς ἃ βεβαπτίσμεθα . . . πρὶν συνάψαι διαιροῦντες, καὶ πρὶν διαιρεῖν συνάπτοντες, οὔτε τὰ τρία ὡς ἕνα (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυπόστατα, ἢ κατὰ μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως, ὡς εἶναι τὸν πλοῦτον ἡμῖν ἐν ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πράγμασι), καὶ τὰ τρία ἕν. Ἓν γὰρ οὐχ ὑποστάσει, ἀλλὰ θεότητι· μονὰς ἐν Τριάδι προσκυνουμένη, καὶ Τριὰς εἰς μονάδα ἀνακεφαλαιουμένη, πᾶσα προσκυνητὴ, βασιλικὴ πᾶσα, ὁμόθρονος, ὁμόδοξος, ὑπερκόσμιος, ὑπέρχρονος, ἄκτιστος, ἀόρατος, ἀναφὴς, ἀπερίληπτος" (Vinson, trans., 20, slightly modified; emphasis added). Clear language about equality and distinction can be found in other letters, such as *Oration* 20.6-10 (*PG* 35:1072ff.) and *Oration* 29.13.

proceeds from itself.[10] Aquinas structures his exposition in a more logical way than Nazianzen does, as exemplified in the *Prima pars* of his *Summa theologiae*. There he unfolds questions on processions (q. 27), relations (q. 28), and persons (q. 29), followed by considerations of person in general, each person individually, and person in comparison to the essence, relations, properties, and notions. This dominant synthesizing vision is typical of Aquinas's thought.

Despite this difference, there is perfect agreement between the two doctors on the theological point and even in the formulation that appeals to the neuter rather than the masculine. In his *Letter 101 to Cledonius*, Nazianzen observes that Christ, one person with two natures, and the Trinity, three persons with one nature, present opposite cases with respect to person and nature:

> The Savior is one thing [ἄλλο] and another [ἄλλο] . . . yet he is not one "who" [ἄλλος] and another [ἄλλος]. . . . It is the opposite of what is the case in the Trinity. For there we acknowledge one "who" [ἄλλος] and another [ἄλλος] so as not to confuse the persons, but not one thing [ἄλλο] and another [ἄλλο], for the three are one and the same in Godhead.[11]

When discussing the Trinity in the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas adopts this very language of "one" and "another" in the masculine and in the neuter:

> And therefore, because in God distinction is according to persons and not essence, we say that the Father is another [*alius*] than the Son but not other [*aliud*], and conversely, we say that they are one thing [*unum*], not one "who" [*unus*].[12]

[10] *STh* I, q. 27, a. 1.

[11] *Letter 101 To Cledonius* (P. Gallay, *Grégoire de Nazianze: Lettres théologiques*, SC 208 [Paris: Cerf, 1974], sect. 20, ll. 1-2, 3-4; sect. 21, ll. 3-6): "ἄλλο μὲν καὶ ἄλλο τὰ ἐξ ὧν ὁ Σωτὴρ . . . οὐκ ἄλλος δὲ καὶ ἄλλος· μὴ γένοιτο. . . . ἔμπαλιν ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς Τριάδος ἔχει. Ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος, ἵνα μὴ τὰς ὑποστάσεις συγχέωμεν· οὐκ ἄλλο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο, ἓν γὰρ τὰ τρία καὶ ταὐτὸν τῇ θεότητι."

[12] *STh* I, q. 31, a. 2, ad 4 (Leonine ed., 4:345): "Et ideo, quia in divinis distinctio est secundum personas, non autem secundum essentiam, dicimus quod pater est alius a filio, sed non aliud, et e converso dicimus quod sunt unum, sed non unus." Similar language appears in III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; and *In Matt.*, prol.

Later in the *Summa*, in his treatment of Christ's two natures, Aquinas quotes this passage from Nazianzen's letter to Cledonius explicitly:

> Whence Gregory Nazianzen says in the *Letter to Cledonius*, "The Savior is one thing and another, yet he is not one 'who' and another. But I say that one thing and another is the opposite of what is found in the Trinity. For there we say one 'who' and another so that we do not confuse two subsistences, but not one thing and another."[13]

There is no doubt for Aquinas that "the persons are really distinguished from each other."[14] On this major theological point, we see that these two doctors concur not only on substance but even to a significant degree on its formulation.

B) Mutual Relative Opposition

Again with respect to mutual relative opposition, we see agreement. In *Oration* 31, Nazianzen understands the divine persons to be distinct by mutual relative opposition:

> It is their difference in, so to say, "manifestation" or mutual relationship, which has caused the difference in names. The Son does not fall short in some particular of being Father. Sonship is no defect, yet that does not mean he **is** Father.[15]

As we saw above, he firmly asserts the perfect identity of the divine essence and the real distinction of persons; as we see here,

[13] *STh* III, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 11:30): "Unde Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, in epistola ad Chelidonium, *aliud et aliud sunt ea ex quibus salvator est, non alius autem et alius. Dico vero aliud et aliud e contrario quam in Trinitate habet. Ibi enim alius et alius dicimus, ut non subsistentias confundamus, non aliud autem et aliud*."

[14] *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1, ad s.c. 5 (Marietti ed., 1:4): "personae realiter ad invicem distinguantur."

[15] *Oration* 31 (J. Barbel, ed., *Gregor von Nazianz: Die fünf theologischen Reden* [Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1963], sect. 9, ll. 3-6): "τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐκφάνσεως, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, ἢ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως διάφορον, διάφορον αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν κλῆσιν πεποίηκεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ υἱῷ λείπει τι πρὸς τὸ εἶναι πατέρα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλλειψις ἡ υἱότης, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο πατήρ." Translation in Frederick W. Norris, ed., *Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning: The Five Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen*, trans. Lionel Wickham and Frederick Williams (New York: E. J. Brill, 1991), 283.

he understands mutual relations as the reason for personal distinction.

Aquinas concurs completely:

> Since in God there is relation in the real order, as was said [in article 1], it is necessary that there be opposition in the real order here. But relative opposition includes distinction in its meaning. Hence it is necessary that in God there be real distinction, not according to what is absolute—which is the essence, in which there is the highest unity and simplicity—but according to what is relative.[16]

Nazianzen effectively equates manifestation and mutual relation;[17] by Aquinas's time a debate will have forced a distinction. For Aquinas, relation not only *manifests* the distinction of a person that is understood to be distinguished and constituted by a person's procession or even inchoately by innascibility; rather, relation alone is sufficient to *distinguish* and *constitute* the persons.[18] Personal distinction on account of mutual relation gains a conceptual centrality in the Trinitarian theology of Aquinas. Aquinas's treatment of relation is more extensive and precise than Nazianzen's, but these two doctors are in perfect agreement concerning the heart of the issue.

In *Oration* 29, Nazianzen states clearly that "Father" is a relation, not an essence or an action:

> "'*Father*'," they say, "*is the name either of the essence or the activity; is it not?*" They intend to impale us on a dilemma, for if we say that it names the essence we shall then be agreeing that the Son is of a different essence, there being a single essence of God and that one, according to them, preempted by the Father.

[16] *STh* I, q. 28, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 4:324): "Cum igitur in Deo realiter sit relatio, ut dictum est, oportet quod realiter sit ibi oppositio. Relativa autem oppositio in sui ratione includit distinctionem. Unde oportet quod in Deo sit realis distinctio, non quidem secundum rem absolutam, quae est essentia, in qua est summa unitas et simplicitas; sed secundum rem relativam."

[17] It would be difficult to establish that Nazianzen and Aquinas mean exactly the same thing by "manifestation," but they both consider the idea of distinction among the divine persons by manifestation. Nazianzen's use of ἐκφάνσις (manifestation) here is the sole instance of the term in his Trinitarian theology. Neither Basil of Caesarea nor Gregory of Nyssa uses the term in any context. Thus, ἐκφάνσις comes nowhere near the importance of σχέσις (relation) in the Cappadocians' Trinitarian theology.

[18] *STh* I, q. 40, a. 4.

But if we say that the term designates the activity, we shall clearly be admitting that the Son is a creation not an offspring. If there is an active producer, there must be a production and they will declare themselves surprised at the idea of an identity between creator and created. I should have felt some awe myself at your dilemma, had it been necessary to accept one of the alternatives and impossible to avoid them by stating a third, and truer possibility. O wisest ones, it is this: "Father" is neither the name of an essence nor of an activity, but is of a relation [σχέσις], and about how the Father is toward the Son or the Son toward the Father. Just as with us these names indicate kindred and affinity, so here too they designate the sameness of stock, of parent and offspring.[19]

This is in perfect accord with Aquinas's insistence that the way to understand the real distinction of persons in the perfect identity of the divine essence is through the concept of mutual relative opposition, such as "how the Father stands with respect to the Son or the Son to the Father," as Nazianzen says. However, Aquinas feels less restricted by the formulation of this dilemma, as we shall see.

Regarding the essence, Aquinas is not afraid to concede that "Father" signifies the essence, but he insists that "Father" also signifies relation. Although they are the same in the real order, "essence" and "Father" signify in different ways. Unlike "essence," "Father" is a relative term. Although the terms are at risk of being crushed under the weight of the mystery, in order to elucidate the faith and rule out error, Aquinas explains that "person" signifies what is relative by way of substance; for instance, "Father" signifies paternity insofar as paternity subsists

[19] *Oration* 29 (Barbel, ed., sect. 16, ll. 2-15): "Ὁ πατήρ, φησιν, οὐσίας, ἢ ἐνεργείας ὄνομα; ὡς ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἡμᾶς δήσοντες,—εἰ μὲν οὐσίας φήσομεν, συνθησομένους ἑτεροούσιον εἶναι τὸν υἱόν, ἐπειδὴ μία μὲν οὐσία θεοῦ, ταύτην δέ, ὡς οὗτοι, προκατείληφεν ὁ πατήρ· εἰ δὲ ἐνεργείας, ποίημα σαφῶς ὁμολογήσοντας, ἀλλ' οὐ γέννημα. οὗ γὰρ ὁ ἐνεργῶν, ἐκεῖ πάντως καὶ τὸ ἐνεργούμενον. καὶ πῶς τῷ πεποιηκότι ταὐτὸν τὸ πεποιημένον, θαυμάζειν φήσουσι. σφόδρα ἂν ἠδέσθην ὑμῶν καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν διαίρεσιν, εἰ τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον δέξασθαι ἦν ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ δύο διαφυγόντα τρίτον εἰπεῖν ἀληθέστερον· ὅτι οὔτε οὐσίας ὄνομα ὁ πατήρ, ὦ σοφώτατοι, οὔτε ἐνεργείας, σχέσεως δὲ καὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ὁ πατήρ, ἢ ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα. ὡς γὰρ παρ' ἡμῖν αἱ κλήσεις αὗται τὸ γνήσιον καὶ οἰκεῖον γνωρίζουσιν, οὕτω κἀκεῖ τὴν τοῦ γεγεννημένου πρὸς τὸ γεγεννηκὸς ὁμοφυίαν σημαίνουσιν" (Wickham and Williams, trans., 254-55, slightly modified).

as the divine essence, not insofar as it signifies being toward the Son.[20]

Concerning activity, Aquinas is comfortable with the understanding that the Father is his act of generation, which is his paternity but according to a different mode of signification.[21] And as we shall see below, he readily accepts that the Father is an active producer of the Son, which Nazianzen rejects in the quotation above, concluding that if there is "an active producer," then there must be a "production" that is "created." However, Aquinas agrees that the Father must be thought of as a person who is the principle of activity and not simply an activity:

> Whence the name "Father" signifies not only a property but also the hypostasis, whereas the name "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies only a property, because the name "Father" signifies a relation, which is distinctive and constitutive of a hypostasis, but the name "Begetting" or "Begotten" signifies an origin, [or notional action], which is not distinctive and constitutive of a hypostasis.[22]

One of Nazianzen's concerns is that the Father's being an activity would necessitate the Son's inferiority by making him an effect proceeding from an action. In view of defending the Son's full divinity, Nazianzen allows that the Father is a cause (αἰτία) of the Son but not an activity (ἐνέργεια).[23] Associating causality with the Father in no way implies that the Son is an effect. With the same

[20] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 4:333): "Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, which is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature."

[21] *STh* I, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2: "notional actions differ from the relations of the persons only according to mode of signification and are completely the same in the order of reality" ("actus notionales secundum modum significandi tantum differunt a relationibus personarum; sed re sunt omnino idem" [Leonine ed., 4:421]).

[22] *STh* I, q. 40, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 4:413): "Unde hoc nomen 'Pater' non solum significat proprietatem, sed etiam hypostasim: sed hoc nomen 'Genitor,' vel 'Generans,' significat tantum proprietatem. Quia hoc nomen 'Pater' significat relationem, quae est distinctiva et constitutiva hypostasis: hoc autem nomen 'Generans,' vel 'Genitus,' significat originem, quae non est distinctiva et constitutiva hypostasis." For more on this point, see Ku, *God the Father*, 173.

[23] Nazianzen clearly refers to the Father as the *cause* (αἰτία) of the Son at least a dozen times in his writings: *Oration* 20.6 and 7; *Oration* 23.6 and 7; *Oration* 25.15; *Oration* 29.3 and 15; *Oration* 34.8 and 10. For more on Nazianzen's usage, see Ku, "Divine Paternity," 115-18.

concerns, Aquinas ends up with the opposite assessment of these terms, accepting that the Father is his act of generation but eschewing the term "cause."[24]

Nazianzen goes on in this same passage to assert, in a less-technical way than Aquinas, that the relations of paternity and filiation are simultaneous: "But to please you, let it be granted that 'Father' names an essence. That idea will bring in the Son along with it, not alienate him, if we follow common sense and the meaning of the terms."[25] In Aquinas's words, "if one thing includes another in its meaning, and conversely, then [the relations] are simultaneous by nature, as double and half, father and son, and the like."[26]

C) Properties of the Persons

Nazianzen outlines his understanding of the divine persons' properties, which name personal distinctions, in *Oration* 29. There he speaks of the Father and the Son necessarily being the same in nature (φύσις) or essence (οὐσία), where distinction is rather according to property, which can be compared to separate qualities of the essence or, more literally, what is marked out around (περί) one same essence (οὐσία):

> But if you are talking about begetter and begotten, this [assertion that the Father and the Son have different natures] is a false statement—these must be the same; it is in the nature of an offspring to have a nature identical with its parent's. Here is another objection: what do you mean by "the unbegotten" and "the begotten"? If you mean unbegottenness and begottenness—no, these are not the same thing; but if you mean the things which have these properties in them,

[24] Aquinas rules out calling the Father the cause of the Son in both his early and late works: see I *Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; I *Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 1; I *Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; *Contra error. Graec.* I, c. 1; *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 1, ad 8; *STh* I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1. However, he allows that the Father produces the Son by way of efficient causality. See Ku, "Divine Paternity," 118-23.

[25] *Oration* 29 (Barbel, ed., sect. 16, ll. 15-17): "ἔστω δέ, ὑμῶν χάριν, καὶ οὐσίας τις ὁ πατήρ· συνεισάξει τὸν υἱόν, οὐκ ἀλλοτριώσει, κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὴν τῶν κλήσεων τούτων δύναμιν."

[26] *STh* I, q. 13, a. 7, ad 6 (Leonine ed., 4:154): "Si enim unum in sui intellectu claudat aliud et e converso, tunc sunt simul natura, sicut duplum et dimidium, pater et filius, et similia."

why should they not be the same? Lack of intelligence and intelligence are not identical, but they can be predicated of the same thing, a man. The property does not mark out separate essences, but marks out around the same essence.[27]

Therefore "unbegotten" will have to apply to a person and not the essence. This is a correction of the error of Eunomius, who maintained that the essence is unbegotten and thus cannot belong to the Son, who is begotten.[28]

Nazianzen appeals to this idea of being "around the essence" in three other places within his corpus—once more in *Oration* 29, and also in *Orations* 31 and 41. In *Oration* 41, he repeats the assertion quoted just above from *Oration* 29, but with a different verb that similarly denotes cutting, dividing, or marking out separately. In *Oration* 29, we read that a property "does not mark out [τέμνω] separate essences but marks out [τέμνω] around the same essence,"[29] and in *Oration* 41 that a property "does not mark out [ἀφορίζω] separate essences . . . but marks out [ἀφορίζω] around the essence."[30] His intention here is to avoid compromising the perfect simplicity of the divine essence while uniting real personal distinction with perfect equality of divine being, as closely as human understanding and speech will allow.

In the other two cases, Nazianzen invokes the distinction between the essence and what is around it in order to resolve Eunomian misconceptions. In the second instance of περὶ οὐσίαν in *Oration* 29, Nazianzen agrees with his opponents that if "unbegotten" and "begotten" apply to the divine essence, then the Son would be, impossibly, the begotten-unbegotten, and then

[27] *Oration* 29 (Barbel, ed., sect. 10, ll. 9-17): "εἰ δὲ τὸ γεγεννηκὸς καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον οὐ ταυτὸν λέγεις, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται. ταὐτὸν γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. αὕτη γὰρ φύσις γεννήματος, ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ γεγεννηκότι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. ἢ οὕτω πάλιν· πῶς λέγεις τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ γεννητόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀγεννησίαν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν γέννησιν, οὐ ταὐτόν· εἰ δὲ οἷς ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, πῶς οὐ ταὐτόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἄσοφον καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ἀλλήλοις μὲν οὐ ταὐτά, περὶ ταὐτὸν δέ, τὸν ἄνθρωπον· καὶ οὐκ οὐσίας τέμνει, περὶ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν τέμνεται."

[28] Eunomius, *Apologia* 14 (*SC* 305:260, ll. 7-11).

[29] *Oration* 29 (Barbel, ed., sect. 10, ll. 16-17): "καὶ οὐκ οὐσίας τέμνει, περὶ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν τέμνεται."

[30] *Oration* 41 (*PG* 36:441, ll. 40-42): "Ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ οὐσίας ἀφορίζει . . . περὶ οὐσίαν δὲ ἀφορίζεται."

asks: "but if the distinctions [of properties] are around the essence, how can you be so certain in speaking of this?"[31] In *Oration* 31, Nazianzen refutes the notion that the Holy Spirit is a mere activity (ἐνέργεια) of the Father, which would make him a mere accident (συμβεβηκός). If Scripture shows to the contrary that the Holy Spirit has the characteristics of a substance (οὐσία)—making him a person—then Nazianzen's opponents will have to decide whether the Spirit is a divine person or a created person: "but if he is a substance, not [merely] of those things around the essence, he will be understood either as a creature or as God."[32] The point in three of these cases is that the distinct properties of the persons (around the essence) cause no division in the divine essence; the point in *Oration* 31 is that the divine person is the divine essence, not merely an activity (around the essence).[33]

Having established this distinction in *Oration* 29, Nazianzen then deploys the key term ἰδιότης, arguing that since a property (ἰδιότης), such as "unbegotten," names a person distinctly, it

[31] *Oration* 29 (Barbel, ed., sect. 12, ll. 3-4): "εἰ δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν ἡ διαφορά, τί τοῦτο ὡς ἰσχυρὸν λέγεις."

[32] *Oration* 31 (Barbel, ed., sect. 6, l. 12): "εἰ δὲ οὐσία τις, οὐ τῶν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἤτοι κτίσμα ὑποληφθήσεται, ἢ θεός."

[33] One can see how this case could be extended by Gregory Palamas, who held that the energies (which we can know to some degree) are uncreated and eternal yet distinct in the real order from the (unknowable) divine essence. However, as Alexis Torrance notes, "Gregory of Nazianzus is rarely drawn upon in the discussion of Palamite precedents" (Alexis Torrance, "Precedents for Palamas' Essence-Energies Theology in the Cappadocian Fathers," *Vigiliae Christianae* 63 [2009]: 47-70, at 58). For a sympathetic examination of Palamas, see Marcus Plested, "St. Gregory Palamas on the Divine Simplicity," *Modern Theology* 35 (2019): 508-21.

Yves Congar observes that, grammatically speaking, *peri* with the accusative means "around" in a more ontological sense, and not simply "about" in the sense of our knowing and predication. That is, grammatically, it seems that "*peri ousian*" makes a claim about properties and the divine essence in themselves, and is not simply asserting that the properties are "about the essence" in our understanding or that they lead our minds to the essence. However, Congar cannot decide whether this grammatical usage should be taken to reflect the Cappadocians' theological intention. See Yves Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, vol. 3, *The River of the Water of Life (Rev 22:1) Flows in the East and in the West*, trans. David Smith (New York: The Seabury Press, 1983), 64, 70.

cannot apply to the "divine essence" or to "God," which apply in common to all three persons:

> Surely it is clear that when we are looking, if look we can, for what God's essence consists in, personal property [ἰδιότης] must be left out of account. This is the way to find out that "God" and "unbegottenness" are not identical. If they were identical, the Unbegotten would have to be someone's Unbegotten, since God is someone's God, seeing that logical equivalents can be used interchangeably. But what is it the Unbegotten *of*? God is someone's—he is God *of* all. So how can "God" and "unbegotten" be identical?[34]

Here Nazianzen capitalizes on the negative signification of "unbegottenness" in order to distinguish it from the divine essence: whereas "God" implies a relation to creatures, "unbegotten" does not, since it does not signify the provident creator but rather denies any relation to a principle. And if the modes of signification of "God" and "unbegotten" are different, then the terms themselves are not simply identical; and Eunomius's argument that if the unbegotten Father is God then the begotten Son cannot be, does not follow. Thus, the Son may be the provident creator without being the same person as the one who has no principle.

[34] *Oration* 29 (Barbel, ed., sect. 12, ll. 6-13): "ἢ δῆλον ὅτι, τῆς ἰδιότητος ἀκινήτου μενούσης, ζητήσομεν οὐσίαν θεοῦ, ἥ τις ποτέ ἐστιν, εἴπερ ζητήσομεν; ὅτι δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ θεός, ὧδε ἂν μάθοις. εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν, ἔδει πάντως, ἐπειδὴ τινῶν θεὸς ὁ θεός, τινῶν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον· ἢ ἐπεὶ μηδενὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον, μηδὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι τινῶν. τὰ γὰρ πάντῃ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὁμοίως ἐκφέρεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ τινῶν τὸ ἀγέννητον, ταὐτὰ καὶ ὁμοίως ἐκφέρεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ τινῶν τὸ ἀγέννητον, τίνων γάρ; καὶ τινῶν θεὸς ὁ θεός, πάντων γάρ. πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη ταὐτὸν θεὸς καὶ ἀγέννητον."

In *Oration* 42.15 (*PG* 36:476, ll. 11-17), Nazianzen covers the same territory, employing the same language to differentiate nature (φύσις) and distinguishing properties like "unbegotten" (ἀγέννητον) or "principle" (ἀρχή) that "accompany" or are "external to" (περί) the nature. There he similarly appeals to the negative character of unbegottenness in order to distinguish it from the divine essence, arguing that "the nature of that which is without source does not consist in being without source or being unbegotten, for the nature of anything lies, not in what it is not but in what it is" ("Οὔτε τοῦ ἀνάρχου τὸ ἄναρχον φύσις, ἢ τὸ ἀγέννητον· οὐδεμία γὰρ φύσις ὅ τι μὴ τόδε ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὅ τι τόδε") (*Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* 7, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, trans. Charles Gordon Browne and James Edward Swallow, rev. and ed. for New Advent by Kevin Knight [Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1894], 390, slightly modified).

Aquinas follows the same line of reasoning:

> Since in God "begotten" signifies relation, "unbegotten" also pertains to relation. And thus it does not follow that the unbegotten Father is distinguished from the begotten Son according to substance, but only according to relation, namely insofar as the relation of "son" is denied of the Father.[35]

Elsewhere he explains in greater detail that "unbegotten" as the negation of a relation reduces to the genus of relation because "every privation is known by something had and every removal by something already posited."[36]

Furthermore, Aquinas maintains that, although God is the God of creatures, as Nazianzen notes, he is not related to creatures in the real order.[37] In fact, "God" is not a relational but an absolute name, because it "signifies the divine essence"—even though the source of the name "God" is his action of providence over all—since we, unable to know the divine essence, name God from his effects not his essence.[38]

Aquinas also argues that it is in the nature of an offspring to have a nature identical with its parent's, clarifying further that the Son receives the whole nature not only specifically but numerically.[39]

Regarding real distinction among the properties and their relation to the divine essence, Aquinas easily concludes (following upon his carefully ordered exposition of procession, relation, and person) that the persons are the same as the relations and the properties in the real order. In other words, the Father is paternity—paternity subsisting as the divine essence. Since "'what

[35] *STh* I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 4:363): "Unde, cum *genitum* in divinis relationem importet, *ingenitum* etiam ad relationem pertinet. Et sic non sequitur quod Pater ingenitus distinguatur a Filio genito secundum substantiam; sed solum secundum relationem, inquantum scilicet relatio Filii negatur de Patre."

[36] I *Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: "omnis privatio per habitum cognoscitur, et remotio per positionem" (Mandonnet, ed, 674).

[37] *STh* I, q. 13, a. 7.

[38] I *Sent.*, d. 18, q. un., a. 5, ad 6 (Mandonnet, ed., 446): "deus, quamvis significet essentiam divinam quantum ad id cui imponitur, tamen quantum ad id a quo imponitur nomen, significat operationem." See also *STh* I, q. 13, a. 8.

[39] I *Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1. He states this in numerous places, for example, *STh* I, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2; *ScG* IV, c. 24; *De Pot.*, q. 2, a. 1, ad 11; *In Ioan.*, c. 15, lect. 5.

is' and 'whereby it is' are the same in God" in the real order, and "the Father is Father by paternity," therefore "the Father is the same as paternity," and "the other properties [filiation, procession, innascibility] are the same as the persons." Since "relation, insofar as it is a certain thing in God, is the divine essence itself" and "essence is the same as the person . . . it is necessary that relation be the same as person."[40]

Aquinas recognizes that "relation" does not signify the perfection of being a thing, but properly signifies being toward another.[41] By contrast, "person" does signify the perfection of being something; it signifies someone or a "who."[42] Aquinas understands the divine person to be a subsistent relation, namely, a relation insofar as that relation subsists as the divine essence; that is, he takes person to be a relation signified by way of substance.[43] Here we find an intuition similar to that of Nazianzen, who argues, as we saw above, that the Holy Spirit is not merely a property but the essence.

Thus Aquinas and Nazianzen agree on what must be affirmed and denied according to true doctrine. Furthermore, even though their descriptions of how personal properties are related to the divine essence differ, they are driving at the same conclusion, and they adopt the same strategy of distinguishing property from

[40] *STh* I, q. 40, a. 4, sed contra and corp. (Leonine ed., 4:418): "Sed contra, in divinis non differt quod est et quo est. . . . Sed pater paternitate est pater. Ergo pater idem est quod paternitas. Et eadem ratione aliae proprietates idem sunt cum personis. . . . Sed quia relatio, secundum quod est quaedam res in divinis, est ipsa essentia; essentia autem idem est quod persona, ut ex dictis patet; oportet quod relatio sit idem quod persona."

[41] *STh* I, q. 28, a. 2, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 4:322): "If in divine perfection there were contained nothing more than what a relative word signifies, it would follow that its being would be imperfect, as being related to something else" ("si in perfectione divina nihil plus contineretur quam quod significat nomen relativum, sequeretur quod esse eius esset imperfectum, utpote ad aliquid aliud se habens").

[42] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 4:331): "Person signifies what is perfect in all nature, namely, subsisting in a rational nature" ("persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura").

[43] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 4:333): "Therefore a divine person signifies a relation *as subsisting*. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, which is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature" ("Persona igitur divina significat relationem *ut subsistentem*. Et hoc est significare relationem per modum substantiae quae est hypostasis subsistens in natura divina").

essence. They must grapple with the mystery that each divine person is the divine essence yet each person is distinct from the other persons by property. To account for how the essence is related to property, Nazianzen turns to a preposition, περί ("around" or "outside of"), because he must affirm that the real distinction signified by the properties does not touch the essence, which would claim it for just one person. Aquinas, by contrast, does not allow that the properties are related to the essence according to any preposition. For him, they *are* the divine essence: paternity is the divine essence in the real order—under the aspect of being toward the Son.[44] Aquinas's explanation avoids the insinuation that the properties either are merely extrinsically attached to the essence—an opinion advanced in the twelfth century that Aquinas explicitly critiques[45]—or else are uncreated eternal energies distinct from the essence in the real order, as suggested in the fourteenth century by Gregory Palamas. If one does not see that the relation simply is the divine essence in the real order—so that the subsistent relation is the essence under the aspect of being-toward—then one is left with a conception of the relations or properties as "around the essence" or extrinsically attached. Such a view would be necessary to avoid introducing composition into the divine essence by positing relations in God as accidents, or personal properties as really distinct qualities.

In summary, despite different manners of articulating the doctrine, Nazianzen and Aquinas both understand the divine persons as one thing but not one "who"; they both appeal to the concept of relation in order to assert the identity of the divine person with the divine essence and the distinction of the divine persons from each other; and they both speak of the divine persons as distinct in the real order on account of their personal properties.

[44] In Aquinas's Trinitarian theology, relation does the heavy lifting. Regarding the conceptual convergence of three and one in relation's two aspects of *esse ad* and *esse in*, respectively, see Emery, *Trinitarian Theology*, 89-96.

[45] *STh* I, q. 28, a. 2. Aquinas mentions Gilbert of Poitiers (d. 1154) by name.

II. Unbegottenness: The Father Has No Source

Concerning unbegottenness, Nazianzen and Aquinas share the same theological view, but one can discern a difference in their instinctive emphases on unbegottenness versus paternity as notions of the Father. Here we will (1) present their accounts of the Father as the source of unity in the Trinity, (2) briefly compare their discussions of unbegottenness as applied to the divine essence and to the Father, and (3) note Nazianzen's stronger inclination to speak of the Father as the Unoriginate as opposed to Aquinas's relentless emphasis on the Father's identity as the principle of the Son.

A) The Unoriginate Father Is the Source of Unity

In *Oration* 42, Nazianzen teaches that "the union [of the three persons] is the Father from Whom and to Whom the order of Persons runs its course."[46] In *Oration* 20, he affirms that "both Son and Spirit come back to one cause."[47]

These ideas are also present in Aquinas. He strongly emphasizes the Father's paternity as defining of his identity; moreover, with respect to the Father's being without origin, Aquinas accords special dignity to the Father's innascible paternity.[48] Only the one who is without origin and is the sole principle of another person can claim to be the source of unity in the Trinity: "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead."[49] For Aquinas, in a certain way "principle" may even be said to be

[46] *Oration* 42.15 (*PG* 36:476, ll. 22-23): "Ἕνωσις δὲ, ὁ Πατὴρ, ἐξ οὗ, καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἀνάγεται τὰ ἐξῆς" (Browne and Swallow, trans., 390).

[47] *Oration* 20.7 (*PG* 35:1073, l. 4): "εἰς ἓν αἴτιον καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος ἀναφερομένων" (Vinson, 111; translation modified).

[48] For more on Aquinas's understanding of the Father's innascibility, see Ku, *God the Father*, chap. 2.

[49] *STh* I, q. 33, a. 1, s.c. (Leonine ed., 4:358): "pater est principium totius deitatis." Aquinas repeats this quotation from Augustine's *De Trinitate* in numerous places: I *Sent.*, d. 15, exp. text.; I *Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 1, s.c. 1; I *Sent.*, d. 29, exp. text.; III *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2; IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 4, a. 5, qcla. 3, ad 1; *STh* I, q. 33, a. 1, s.c.; *STh* I, q. 39, a. 5, obj. 6; *STh* I, q. 39, a. 5, ad 6 (twice); *De Verit.*, q. 7, a. 3; *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 2, lect. 4.

"proper to the Father."[50] The Father unites all ways of being a principle: he is the unique principle of the Son, the principal principle of the Holy Spirit, and, with the Son and the Holy Spirit, the first principle of creatures.[51]

Aquinas, perhaps surprisingly, follows Nazianzen in suggesting that the Son and the Spirit are "led back" to the Father:

> Those things that are of the essence are in the other persons from the Father. And therefore there is a certain leading back by the other persons into the Father, as is clear from what Hilary says. And on account of this, the Father is even called the principle of the whole Godhead.[52]

It is not simply creatures who are led back through the Son and the Spirit, for elsewhere Aquinas clarifies that "this leading back does not place a [different] level of goodness in the Father and the Son but only an order of nature; and therefore equality and unity of joy are not taken away."[53]

[50] *In Ioan.*, c. 8, lect. 3 (Marietti ed., no. 1183): "Dicitur etiam Pater principium. . . . Alio modo est proprium Patris."

[51] *In Ioan.*, c. 1, lect. 1. For more on this point, see Ku, *God the Father*, 146.

[52] IV *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 4, a. 5, qcla. 3, ad 1 (Mandonnet/Moos, eds., 753): "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ea quae sunt essentiae, a patre sunt in aliis personis; et ideo fit quaedam reductio ab aliis personis in patrem, ut patet per Hilarium; et propter hoc etiam dicitur pater principium totius deitatis." As I note in *God the Father* (146), this leading back seems to be a reference to Hilary's discussion of all things being reconciled to the Father through the Son. Hilary does not use the word "reductio" but "reconciliatio," in connection with which he cites 2 Cor 5:18-19: "All this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself and gave us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting to us the message of reconciliation." See Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* 8.51 (*De Trinitate VIII-XII*, ed. P. Smulders, Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina 62a [Turnhout: Brepols, 1980], 362, ll. 1-20).

[53] I *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3 (*Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, vols. 1-4, ed. Mandonnet/Moos [Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-1947], 1:40): "illa reductio non ponit gradum bonitatis in patre et filio, sed tantum ordinem naturae; et ideo non tollitur aequalitas et unitas fruitionis." Gilles Emery, "Le Père et l'oeuvre trinitaire de création selon le *Commentaire des Sentences* de s. Thomas d'Aquin," in *Ordo sapientia et amour: Hommage au professeur J.-P. Torrell*, ed. C.-J. Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1993), 85-117, at 88 n. 14, identifies four passages where he interprets Aquinas as suggesting that this order applies not only to creatures being led back to the Son and the Holy Spirit but also to the Son and the Holy Spirit being led back to the Father (I *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3; I *Sent.*, d. 10, q. un., a. 1; II *Sent.*, d. 38, q. un.,

Aquinas is more explicit than Nazianzen in noting that the Father does not have the relationship of an end with respect to the Son or Holy Spirit, as he does for creatures; the divine persons have no end properly speaking, and each person is the end of all creatures.[54] The leading back by divine persons to the Father refers only to the fact that the divine essence is in them from the Father.[55] It absolutely cannot be some distinct second act; that is why one might not expect to find Aquinas embracing this patristic idea. But keeping in mind that the divine processions are immanent, so that each person remains within and interpenetrates each other person, one might envisage this leading back in terms of a circular movement in the procession, or perhaps a proceeding while facing back towards one's principle.[56]

B) Is the Divine Essence Unbegotten?

Aquinas, and Nazianzen less straightforwardly, notes that there are two senses of "unbegotten": "without origin," which applies to the Father alone, and "uncreated," which describes the divine essence and the divine persons. The theological importance of this issue is that Eunomius's key strategy was to conflate these two senses, arguing that, because the essence is unbegotten, the begotten Son could not possess it.

In *Oration* 28, Nazianzen allows that the essence may be called "unbegotten" (ἀγέννητος) and "unoriginate" (ἄναρχος); but in *Oration* 29, he clarifies in a more careful analysis that the distinctions of unbegotten and begotten are "outside" (περί) the

a. 1, ad 2; IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 5, qcla. 3, ad 1). Durand, *Le Père*, 258, avers that "the return to the Father is constitutive of the persons themselves of the Son and the Spirit."

[54] *STh* I, q. 38, a. 8; II *Sent*., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

[55] I *Sent*., d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3; IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 5, qcla. 3, ad 1.

[56] It is noteworthy that Aquinas invokes the authority of Hilary concerning this ancient patristic theme of the Son and the Spirit being led back to the Father. This debunks the perception of Aquinas as a theological clone of Augustine, largely devoid of eastern influence until much later in his career—as Hilary (ca. 310-67), who spent four significant years of exile in the East, predates Augustine (354-430). Aquinas similarly enlists Hilary's authority for the Father's being greater than the Son while the Son is not less than the Father. See Ku, "Divine Paternity," 127-28.

essence. In *Oration* 28, Nazianzen is examining the term "incorporeal," and he uses "unbegotten" to mean "uncreated":

But this term "incorporeal," though granted, does not give an all-embracing revelation of God's essential being. The same is true of "unbegotten," "unoriginate," "immutable," and "immortal," indeed of all attributes applied, or referred, to God.[57]

In *Oration* 29, his focus is on the question of whether the essence is unbegotten:

"But," they say, "if the Son is the same in substance as the Father, and the Father is unbegotten, then the Son must be unbegotten too." True—provided that unbegottenness constitutes God's being. That would give us an outlandish mix-up—an unbegotten-begotten. But supposing the difference lies outside the essence of God, what validity has your argument got?[58]

Aquinas agrees that "unbegottenness" properly applies to the Father and not the divine essence:

For it is fitting to the Father insofar as he is the principle of generation that he follow generation in no way. Now, in our understanding, something follows generation in three ways: either as the one generated, such as the Son; or as what is received by generation, such as the divine essence; or as proceeding from the one generated, such as the Holy Spirit. Hence "unbegotten," according to the aforesaid mode, is fitting to none of these.[59]

[57] *Oration* 28 (Barbel ed., sect. 9, ll. 3-6): "ἀλλ' εἰ ἀσώματον, οὕπω μὲν οὐδὲ τοῦτο τῆς οὐσίας παραστατικόν τε καὶ περιεκτικόν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγέννητον, καὶ τὸ ἄναρχον, καὶ τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον, καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον, καὶ ὅσα περὶ θεοῦ ἢ περὶ θεὸν εἶναι λέγεται." Using slightly different vocabulary in *Oration* 30.2, ll. 12-13 and 17-19, Nazianzen allows that the Godhead is unoriginate (ἀναίτιος).

[58] *Oration* 29 (Barbel, ed., sect. 10, ll. 1-4): "Ἀλλ' εἰ ταὐτὸν τῷ πατρί, φασιν, ὁ υἱὸς κατ' οὐσίαν, ἀγέννητος δὲ ὁ πατήρ, ἔσται τοῦτο καὶ ὁ υἱός. καλῶς, εἴπερ οὐσία θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον, ἵν' ᾖ τις καινὴ μίξις, γεννητοαγέννητον. εἰ δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν ἡ διαφορά, τί τοῦτο ὡς ἰσχυρὸν λέγεις;"

[59] I *Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4 (Mandonnet, ed., 438): "secunda est, quia per hoc quod dicitur 'ingenitus,' secundum quod est notio Patris, tollitur omnis modus consequendi generationem: hoc enim convenit Patri inquantum est principium generationis, ut nullo modo generationem consequatur. Generationem autem consequitur aliquid secundum intellectum tripliciter: vel sicut genitum, ut Filius; vel sicut per generationem acceptum, ut essentia divina; vel sicut a generato procedens, ut Spiritus sanctus. Unde nulli horum convenit 'ingenitus' secundum praedictum modum."

Aquinas furthermore explains that if "unbegotten" is taken to mean "uncreated," then it does apply to the divine essence:

> According to Damascene, in one way "unbegotten" signifies the same thing as uncreated and is thus said according to substance; for in this way created substance differs from the uncreated. In another way it signifies what is not begotten, and is thus said relatively in the sense that negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not a man" is reduced to the genus of substance and "not white" to the genus of quality. Hence since in God "begotten" signifies relation, "unbegotten" also pertains to relation. And thus it does not follow that the unbegotten Father is distinguished from the begotten Son according to substance, but only according to relation, namely insofar as the relation of "son" is denied of the Father.[60]

C) Emphasizing Unoriginateness versus Principiality

Because Aquinas intends to drive home the understanding of the Father as the subsisting relation for which he is named—that is, paternity—he rarely, if ever, employs "Unoriginate" or "Unbegotten" in place of "Father" to designate the Father. Nazianzen's speech, on the other hand, displays a more even balance of these two names of the Father—undoubtedly because "unoriginate" and "unbegotten" are the key terms of Nazianzen's opponents.

Nazianzen manifests his emphasis on the Father's innascibility in *Oration* 25, where he asserts that the special characteristic (ἴδιον) of the Father is his unbegottenness. In pressing toward this conclusion, he mentions the Father's true, unique, and eternal paternity; he does not simply list the special characteristic of the Father as unbegottenness, even though he simply gives the unique properties of the Son and the Spirit in just two words. Thus he instinctively maintains some balance between these two notions

[60] *STh* I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 4:363): "secundum Damascenum, *ingenitum* uno modo significat idem quod *increatum*, et sic secundum substantiam dicitur; per hoc enim differt substantia creata ab increata. Alio modo significat id quod non est genitum. Et sic relative dicitur, eo modo quo negatio reducitur ad genus affirmationis, sicut *non homo* ad genus substantiae, et *non album* ad genus qualitatis. Unde, cum *genitum* in divinis relationem importet, *ingenitum* etiam ad relationem pertinet. Et sic non sequitur quod Pater ingenitus distinguatur a Filio genito secundum substantiam; sed solum secundum relationem, inquantum scilicet relatio Filii negatur de Patre."

of the Father. However, his conclusion manifests a bias in favor of innascibility:

> The divinity of each will be defined in terms of the property that is unique to each, in the case of the Son, his filiation, in the case of the Holy Spirit, his procession and not filiation. We should believe that the Father is truly a father, far more truly father in fact, than we humans are, in that he is uniquely, that is, distinctively so, unlike corporal beings. . . . and that he is a Father only, not formerly a son; and that he is wholly Father, and father of one wholly his son, as cannot be affirmed of human beings; and that he has been Father from the beginning and did not become Father in the course of things. . . . In turn, *the special characteristic of the Father is his unbegottenness*, of the Son his generation, and of the Holy Spirit his procession.[61]

This bias is also discernible where Nazianzen lists the three persons in order, referring to the Father by names like "Without-Origin," "Uncaused," or "Unbegotten."[62] Still, as a student of Scripture, he affirms that "the personal name of the Unoriginate is 'Father'."[63]

Aquinas insists rather that the Father's fatherhood, not his being without origin, is his special characteristic. Given that Nazianzen was consumed with refuting Eunomius, it is not at all difficult to imagine that the Cappadocian Father would have been completely persuaded by Aquinas's argument. Aquinas probes the question of what constitutes the divine person, an issue that Nazianzen did not consider. Aquinas's understanding of the

[61] *Oration* 25.16 (*PG* 35:1221, ll. 9-13,15-17, 29-31): "ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο θεϊκὸν ἔχωσι τὸ μοναδικὸν, ὁ μὲν τῆς υἱότητος, τὸ δὲ τῆς προόδου, καὶ οὐχ υἱότητος. Ἀληθῶς πατέρα τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ πολύ γε τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀληθέστερον, ὅτι μόνως, ἰδιοτρόπως γὰρ, καὶ οὐχ ὡς τὰ σώματα. . . .· καὶ μόνον, οὐ γὰρ Υἱὸς πρότερον· καὶ ὅλον Πατὴρ, καὶ ὅλου, τὸ γὰρ ἡμέτερον ἄδηλον· καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, οὐ γὰρ ὕστερον. . . . *Ἴδιον δὲ Πατρὸς μὲν, ἡ ἀγεννησία·* Υἱοῦ δὲ, ἡ γέννησις· Πνεύματος δὲ, ἡ ἔκπεμψις" (Vinson, trans., 171-72; translation modified, and emphasis added).

[62] See, for instance, *Carmina Moralia* (*PG* 37:751, ll. 12-13): Ἄναρχον (Without-Origin), Ἀρχὴ (Origin), Πνεῦμα (Spirit), Τριὰς τιμία, Ἀναίτιον (Uncaused), γεννητὸν (Begotten), ἐκπορεύσιμον (Proceeding); *Oration* 23 (*PG* 35:1161, l. 48): ἄναρχος (Without-Source), γέννησις (Generation), πρόοδος (Procession); *Oration* 42 (*PG* 36:476, ll. 19-21): Ὄνομα δὲ, τῷ μὲν ἀνάρχῳ (Without-Source), Πατήρ· τῇ δὲ ἀρχῇ (Source), Υἱός· τῷ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς (With the Source), Πνεῦμα ἅγιον.

[63] *Oration* 30 (Barbel, ed., sect. 19, ll. 16-17: "ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀνάρχου, πατήρ." He repeats this in *Oration* 42.15.

Father as constituted by paternity, according to the view that the divine person is a subsisting relation, precludes Eunomius's lines of argument immediately and definitively. Nazianzen is in fact already on the way there in his recognition that the Father is Father on account of his mutual relation to the Son.[64] Thus, it seems that there is a profound consonance in the thought of these two doctors on innascibility but they weight this notion differently over against paternity.

In summary, Nazianzen and Aquinas both recognize the unoriginate Father as the source of unity in the Trinity; and they both speak of unbegottenness as a unique property of the Father that does not apply to the divine essence, unless it is taken merely in the broad sense of meaning "uncreated"; however, whereas Aquinas understands the Father's identity to be determined by paternity, Nazianzen thinks much more of the Father as the Unoriginate One.

III. The Father Acts through the Word and the Spirit in the Created Order

The Scriptures speak unequivocally of the Father working through the Son in the created order: the Gospel of John and Paul's Letter to the Colossians reveal that "all things were made *through* [διά] [the Word], and without him was not anything made that was made" (John 1:3), "for *in* [ἐν] [the Son] all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or authorities—all things were created *through* [διά] him and for him" (Col 1:16).

Although Nazianzen does not discuss this principle at any length, he does embrace it; and he even develops it with respect to the Holy Spirit. Regarding the Father's acting through the Son, Nazianzen exclaims to the Father:

> O God and Father and Pilot of men who are Yours! O Lord of life and death! O Judge and Benefactor of our souls! O Maker and Transformer in due time of

[64] See above, "Mutual Relative Opposition."

all things *by Your designing Word*, according to the knowledge of the depth of Your wisdom and providence![65]

He also extends the principle, spelling out the distinct personal manner of the Son and the Spirit acting in the economy:

> But since this movement of self-contemplation alone could not satisfy Goodness, but Good must be poured out and go forth beyond Itself to multiply the objects of its beneficence, for this was essential to the highest Goodness, He first conceived the Heavenly and Angelic Powers. *And this conception was a work fulfilled by His Word, and perfected by His Spirit*.[66]

This association of the Spirit in particular with perfection is precisely the direction in which Aquinas moves: the Spirit is not born, proceeding by way of intellect, but is spirated, proceeding by way of will, and is thus especially associated in his personal distinction with love, goodness, and perfection, even bearing the proper name "Love." For Aquinas, following Aristotle, goodness is being, considered from the perspective of perfection.

Aquinas is clear that because the divine persons have a distinct mode of being, they have a distinct mode of action. The Father creates through the Son and the Holy Spirit, who proceed as the principle of creatures.[67] Reflecting on John 1:3: "All things were made through him," Aquinas clarifies how "through" must be understood:

> If "through" denotes causality on the part of the thing done [*operatum*], then when we say that the Father does [*operari*] all things through the Son, it is not

[65] *Oration* 7 (F. Boulenger, *Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours funèbres en l'honneur de son frère Césaire et de Basile de Césarée* [Paris: Picard, 1908], chap. 24, sect. 3, ll. 2-6): "ὦ Θεὲ τῶν σῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάτερ καὶ κυβερνῆτα, ὦ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου κύριε, ὦ ψυχῶν ἡμετέρων ταμία καὶ εὐεργέτα, ὦ ποιῶν τὰ πάντα καὶ μετασκευάζων τῷ τεχνίτῃ Λόγῳ κατὰ καιρὸν καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς ἐπίστασαι τῷ βάθει τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ διοικήσεως." There is also a reference to the Father's working through the Son in *Oration* 29.11, in connection with the Son's doing all that he sees the Father do (John 5:19).

[66] *Oration* 38.9 (*PG* 36:320, ll. 36-42): "Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἤρκει τῇ ἀγαθότητι τοῦτο, τὸ κινεῖσθαι μόνον τῇ ἑαυτῆς θεωρίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἔδει χεθῆναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὁδεῦσαι, ὡς πλείονα εἶναι τὰ εὐεργετούμενα (τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς ἄκρας ἦν ἀγαθότητος), πρῶτον μὲν ἐννοεῖ τὰς ἀγγελικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ οὐρανίους· καὶ τὸ ἐννόημα ἔργον ἦν, Λόγῳ συμπληρούμενον, καὶ Πνεύματι τελειούμενον" (Browne, trans., 347; emphasis added).

[67] For more on this question, see Ku, *God the Father*, chap. 6.

appropriated to the Word but proper to him, because the fact that he is the cause of creatures is from another, namely the Father, from whom he has being.[68]

This explains how the Father is said to act through the Son properly and not merely by appropriation. Aquinas offers the example of the carpenter who makes a stool through an axe. The axe "is not a cause to the carpenter," moving him to act, but is "the cause of the stool's being made by the one acting [*operante*]."[69] Of course, "it does not follow on account of this that he [the Son] is an instrument of the Father, although everything that is moved by another to do something has the nature of an instrument."[70]

Hence, the Father is the principle of creation as the one who has no principle but is the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Son is the principle of creation as the Word that proceeds in the Artist's mind. The Holy Spirit is the principle of creation as the Love by which all creatures are produced by the Artist through his Word:

As the Father speaks himself and every creature by the Word that he generates, insofar as the generated Word sufficiently represents the Father and every creature, so does he love himself and every creature by the Holy Spirit insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love of the first goodness, according to which the Father loves himself and every creature.[71]

[68] *In Ioan.*, c. 1, lect. 2 (Marietti ed., no. 76): "Si vero ly 'per' denotet causalitatem ex parte operati, tunc hoc quod dicimus 'Patrem omnia operari per Filium' non est appropriatum Verbo, sed proprium eius, quia hoc quod est causa creaturarum, habet ab alio, scilicet a Patre, a quo habet esse."

[69] Ibid.: "non est causa carpentario . . . causam quod scamnum fiat ab operante." In *STh* I, q. 39, a. 8, Aquinas alludes to the example of a carpenter using a hammer.

[70] *In Ioan.*, c. 1, lect. 2 (Marietti ed., no. 76): "Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur ipsum esse instrumentum Patris, licet omne quod movetur ab alio ad aliquid operandum, rationem instrumenti habeat."

[71] *STh* I, q. 37, a. 2, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 4:390): "Unde, sicut Pater dicit se et omnem creaturam Verbo quod genuit, inquantum Verbum genitum sufficienter repraesentat Patrem et omnem creaturam; ita diligit se et omnem creaturam Spiritu Sancto, inquantum Spiritus Sanctus procedit ut amor bonitatis primae, secundum quam Pater amat se et omnem creaturam."

What Aquinas says here goes beyond Nazianzen, but it is consistent with the latter's idea of the Father working through the Son and the Spirit.

Finally, both Nazianzen and Aquinas understand adopted sons and daughters to be led by the Spirit to the Son back to the Father, our ultimate end. Nazianzen indicates this order in *Oration* 6 in terms of knowledge, as each divine person sent reveals the one who sent him: "Knowing the Father in the Son, the Son in the Holy Spirit, in which names we have been baptized, in which we believe, and under which we have been enlisted."[72] Aquinas repeats this idea, tying together more explicitly the order in which the divine persons were sent with the order in which we are led back to the Father:

> Likewise, as the Son coming in the name of the Father subjected his faithful to the Father . . . so the Holy Spirit has configured us to the Son insofar as he adopts us as sons of God. . . . For as the effect of the Son's mission was to lead to the Father, so the effect of the Holy Spirit's mission is to lead the faithful to the Son.[73]

The assertion is admittedly subtle in Nazianzen; however, his affirmation that the Son and the Spirit themselves are led back to the Father[74] clarifies his explanation that we find the Son in the Spirit and the Father in the Son.

Thus we can see that both Nazianzen and Aquinas hold that the Unoriginate Father works through the Son and the Spirit in the created order, and that rational creatures are led back to the Unoriginate Father, their ultimate end.

[72] *Oration* 6.22 (*PG* 35:749, ll. 30-31): "ἐν Υἱῷ τὸν Πατέρα, ἐν Πνεύματι τὸν Υἱὸν γινώσκοντες, εἰς ἃ βεβαπτίσμεθα, εἰς ἃ πεπιστεύκαμεν, οἷς συντετάγμεθα" (Vinson, trans. 20).

[73] *In Ioan.*, c. 14, lect. 6 (Marietti ed., no. 1957-58): "Item sicut Filius veniens in nomine Patris, fideles suos Patri subiecit . . . ita Spiritus sanctus configuravit nos Filio, inquantum adoptat nos in filios Dei. . . . Nam, sicut effectus missionis Filii fuit ducere ad Patrem, ita effectus missionis Spiritus sancti est ducere fideles ad Filium."

[74] See above, pp. 76-77.

SUMMARY

Nazianzen and Aquinas are in agreement on the following formulations of doctrine. Each divine person is the one identical divine essence, and each is distinct from the others in the real order by their properties, which are distinct on account of the relations that each person has with another. The unoriginate Father is the source of unity in the Trinity, and "unbegotten" properly applies to the Father, not the divine essence—though it can be taken in a more general sense to mean uncreated. Finally, the Son and the Holy Spirit are led back to the Father, and the Father acts in the created order through the Son and the Holy Spirit to create and to draw creatures ultimately back to himself.

While Aquinas places a strong emphasis on the Father's identity as rooted in his paternity, Nazianzen manifests an inclination to think of the Father as the Unoriginate One. We find in Aquinas a greater coherence and consistency in articulation as well as some conceptual advances. Even so, he allows for some risky ancient Eastern patristic formulations (if understood correctly) through the influence of St. Hilary: namely, that the Father is greater than the Son and that the Son and the Spirit are led back to the Father.

The precision and clarity of Nazianzen's assertions about the persons' distinction by property on account of mutual relations is striking; Aquinas's technical exposition depends and capitalizes on the success of his predecessors like Nazianzen. Separated by nine hundred years and two thousand miles, living in different cultures and writing in different languages, naturally these two holy men articulated their doctrines in diverse ways. But the urgent necessity of refuting corruptions of divine revelation and elucidating the faith reveal that these two theologians are servants of the same confession regarding the Holy Trinity.

The Thomist 85 (2021): 87-125

ON THE SPECULATIVE, PRACTICAL, OR AFFECTIVE NATURE OF THEOLOGY

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IS THEOLOGY a speculative or a practical science? The question is familiar to students of St. Thomas Aquinas from the first question of the *Summa theologiae*, and a glance at any study of the nature of theology in the thirteenth century will discover that it was a common question among Aquinas's contemporaries, who were thinking through the ramifications of Aristotle for understanding revelation. Indeed, it is not uncommon to see this topic presented as emblematic of a fundamental difference between Dominican and Franciscan theology: Dominicans regard theology as a speculative science, while Franciscans regard it as a practical science.[1]

Such popular perceptions almost always have a legitimate point. They are also almost always imprecise. Even more importantly, they can obscure the significance of a question. Why did the masters of the medieval universities begin to ask the question of whether theology is speculative or practical, and what did they regard as essential elements to be considered in coming up with an answer?

The point of the present article is to address such questions by looking at the period in the mid-thirteenth century when the greatest early Franciscan and Dominican teachers were composing their theological syntheses. The authors I will consider are

[1] For a more scholarly look at the late-thirteenth-century Franciscans on this point, see François-Xavier Putallaz, *Figure francescane alla fine del XIII secolo* (Milan: Jaca Book, 1996), 81-90.

the Franciscans Alexander of Hales, Odo Rigaldus, and Bonaventure, and the Dominicans Albertus Magnus and Aquinas.[2] Thanks to the considerable scholarly attention devoted to the nature of theology in the thirteenth century in recent decades, many of the texts are already well known.[3] The point here is not to introduce them to the reader, but to focus on the distinctions made by these authors in the course of answering the relevant questions.

Any investigation of this topic runs immediately up against the fact that the word *theologia* among these masters is not obviously what we mean today by "theology." Henry Donneaud, in his magisterial study of the topic, notes that in the early Church *theologia* most simply meant "the word of God," that is, God's revelation in sacred Scripture, while by the sixteenth century the word (along with its cognates, such as *sacra doctrina*) signified a "rational investigation of the revealed given, in particular through the deduction of conclusions virtually contained in the revealed given."[4] The Middle Ages thus marks a time of transition, requiring of the modern reader some precision. As Donneaud says,

> Even today, one does not know what precise reality the medievals are designating by this word: the Word of God? Christian doctrine? biblical exegesis? the reasoned investigation of the deposit of faith? The question is important, for it serves nothing to explain how some master of the thirteenth century was able to define theology as a science, as a practical or speculative

[2] The texts I will be examining are well known to scholars, but the dating of some of them is a little disputed. Although I will be presenting these authors in roughly chronological order, I acknowledge that there might be reason to dispute exactly which texts were written first, and therefore which ones might have influenced others.

[3] The twentieth-century literature on the nature of theology is too vast to list here. Two recent works are especially helpful in considering at this range of authors: Henry Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi au XIIIème siècle* (Paris: Parole et silence, 2006); and Christian Trottmann, *Théologie et noétique au XIIIe siècle: A la recherche d'un statut*, Études de philosophie médiévale (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1999).

[4] Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 8. A survey of the literature among Thomistic commentators can be found in James A. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of *sacra doctrina* in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1," *The Thomist* 38 (1974): 56-64.

science, using such and such a procedure if one does not already know what reality is encompassed under the term.[5]

Our investigation in this article will pay attention to this distinction. In the interest of precision, *theologia* will hereafter be used to name the knowledge revealed by God, while "theology" will be used to name the intellectual, academic discipline that is based on this. Yet, as we will see, even when our authors ask whether *theologia* is speculative or practical, they are also committed to the existence of theology, and their view of the nature of the former affects their view of the nature of the latter.

In a preliminary way, one might say that the significance of the question depends on whether one is talking about *theologia* or theology. Insofar as *theologia* is equated with Scripture, it seems dissatisfying to regard it as a speculative science (if it is a science at all), for surely the reason divine truth is revealed to us in Scripture is not simply for the satisfaction of our speculative intellect. It is more satisfying to say that the point of this revelation is the rectification/salvation/sanctification of the whole person, and thus that *theologia* has a practical or perhaps an affective end. If, on the other hand, one is talking about theology, the discipline that forms part of the academy—or even that endeavor described by Anselm as "faith seeking understanding"—the point seems to be intellectual; while it is not perhaps divorced from the practical or the affective, it is primarily a speculative enterprise.

The presentation of authors here follows a roughly chronological order, largely for the sake of convenience. I do not intend to make any strong argument for development from one author to another. I am not concerned, for example, to assert that Bonaventure should be regarded as the culmination of the previous Franciscan tradition, or that Aquinas is deliberately setting himself in opposition to the Franciscans. My purpose is rather to

[5] Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 7. The modern reader may too easily assume that when an author refers to *scientia* he must be talking about theology rather than *theologia*. In fact, if an author asks whether *theologia* is a science he is not principally wondering whether there can be an academic discipline of theology but whether the revealed word of God bears the structure of an Aristotelian *scientia*.

identify the vision of each author, the way he reasons about the question.[6]

There are, it must be admitted, problems in treating this question in isolation. On the one hand, each of these authors raises the question in the context of a fuller treatment of the *scientia* of *theologia*, dealing also with such topics as the subject of *theologia*, its unity, and its mode of proceeding. Naturally, these topics bear on each other, and, it may be noted, the very order of the questions can be significant.[7] On the other hand, a full sense of the *ratio* of the distinctions made by the different authors would require a more detailed study of each author's anthropology, religious epistemology, etc. The rationale for the present study is that there is, nonetheless, a value in focusing on the specific answers to the question of whether *theologia* is speculative or practical, highlighting what seem to each to be key considerations that shape the answer of each author. With this in hand, I will offer in the conclusion some assessment of the differences between them and their perennial relevance for theological discourse.[8]

[6] There are enough questions about the dating of some of the texts to render tendentious any claims about a strict chronological order. It is not certain whether the passage I will discuss from the *Summa halensis* was composed before or after Odo's *Lectura* on the *Sentences*; likewise with Odo's *Disputed Question* and Albert's commentary on the *Sentences*. Most tellingly, the two texts from Albert were composed nearly thirty years apart, with all of the contributions of Bonaventure and Aquinas lying in between. It is therefore interesting to consider how Albert is accepting or rejecting Bonaventure and Aquinas in the later text, but I find it more telling to see the way his perspective in the *Sentences* commentary perdures and alters in the *Summa*.

[7] See especially the analysis below of Odo and Albert.

[8] An earlier version of this article was given as a paper in a Thomistic Circles conference on "Friendly Rivals: Franciscan and Dominican Intellectual Traditions" (Washington, D.C., September 28-29, 2018). The title of the conference was interesting for its implied perspective on the relation of these traditions. "Friendly" suggests that the relationship need not be regarded as contentious, and that the adherents of the traditions have something to learn from each other. Few, I think, would disagree with such a view. But "rivals" suggests that the traditions are engaged in similar projects, that their views of the nature, principles, methods, and ends of theology and philosophy may fruitfully be compared to each other. This is a much more contentious claim. I happen to agree with it, but examples abound in the past seventy years of scholars who regard such comparisons as fundamentally misguided. An early example is Étienne Gilson, who closes his *Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure* by insisting that Bonaventure and Aquinas cannot rightly

I. Speculative or Practical—or Affective?

I have named our topic "the speculative, practical, or affective nature of theology." The specific question that is usually posed is, as we shall see, "whether *theologia* is a speculative or a practical science." The question follows the assumption of Aristotle's model of *scientia* for *theologia*, and it stems specifically from Aristotle's division of the sciences, in the *Nicomachaen Ethics*, into the speculative—ordered to knowledge—and the practical—ordered to action, or "that we may become good." In other words, if one is going to regard *theologia*, or theology, as a *scientia*, one of the inevitable questions is whether it is a speculative or a practical *scientia*. It is often supposed, as I have already said, that Franciscans regard *theologia* as practical, while Dominicans regard it as speculative. However true this supposition may be with respect to the later traditions, even a quick glance at the texts reveals that it does not hold in the case of our five authors. As Yves Congar notes, Odo holds a minority position at the time in maintaining that *theologia* is practical, while Aquinas is virtually unique in regarding it as speculative. The majority position is instead that *theologia* transcends the difference between speculative and practical, and is best described as affective, which is the position of Alexander, Albert, and Bonaventure.[9]

The difference between *theologia* and theology suggests a value to the category of the affective. Insofar as one thinks that *theologia*—that is, the knowledge revealed by God—is for the sake of our intellectual apprehension, *theologia* can be said to be

be compared, but rather must be seen as two distinct pinnacles of Christian thought. Perhaps a typical, and certainly striking, example of the same comes from J. A. Wayne Hellmann, who says that as a student he could not understand Bonaventure until he stopped reading him in the way he had been taught to read Aquinas (J. A. Wayne Hellmann, "Author's Preface," in idem, *Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure's Theology*, trans. J. M. Hammond [St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 2001], xv).

[9] Yves M.-J. Congar, *A History of Theology*, trans. Hunter Guthrie, S.J. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968), 126-27.

speculative; insofar as that knowledge is given for the sake of our loving union with him, *theologia* will be better seen as affective. The fact that Aristotle did not talk about the possibility of affective *scientia* (and yet all of our authors are clearly informed by Aristotle's understanding of *scientia*), is sometimes glossed over by commentators, who effectively identify the practical with the affective. As we will see, whether this is a faithful interpretation of the authors in question is debatable.

On the other hand, if one cares to ask whether theology—the intellectual discipline in the academy—is speculative or practical, the answer will depend on whether it is more like geometry—drawing speculative conclusions from a set of premises—or more like house-building—laying down rules for a practical enterprise. There does not seem to be any reason to evoke the category of "affective" here.

II. Alexander of Hales

The first question of the *Summa theologica* attributed to Alexander of Hales,[10] "De doctrina theologiae," sets out a clearly Aristotelian-inspired set of questions (to which the Quaracchi editors refer as "chapters") on the nature of *theologia* that are taken up by later thinkers.[11] While Alexander asks here specifically whether *theologia* is a science, and what its subject and its mode are, he does not devote a question specifically to whether it is speculative or practical. Despite this limitation, Alexander does make two points of interest to this study.

[10] The question of the authorship of the *Summa theologica* attributed to Alexander (a.k.a. the *Summa halensis*) need not concern us here. The scholarly consensus is that it was composed in part by Alexander and in part by his students and collaborators. At any rate, it unmistakably offers a description of *theologia* that is formed by an Aristotelian concept of *scientia*, and is a fitting point of reference for a general discussion of the topic at the time. For convenience, I will refer to the author as Alexander.

[11] Alexander uses a variety of terms to describe what he is talking about; the most common are *doctrina theologiae*, *theologia*, and *scriptura sacra*. Donneaud argues that the terms seem to be freely convertible, and the only way to make sense of Alexander's argument is to read them all as referring to God's revelation in Scripture. See Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 107-78, esp. 117-21.

The first point lies in his description of the difference between various sciences. The very first chapter asks whether *theologia* is a *scientia*, and Alexander's response is twofold.

There is a science of causes and a science of things caused. . . . *Theologia*, which is the science of God, who is the cause of causes, is *sui gratia*. The name of "science" is applied to the sciences of caused things, but the name of "wisdom" is applied to the sciences of the cause of causes. Wherefore the Philosopher says that First Philosophy, which is *sui gratia* and of the cause of causes, ought to be called wisdom. For the same reason theological doctrine, which transcends all other sciences, ought to be called wisdom. . . .

Furthermore, there is a science perfecting knowledge according to truth, and a science moving the affect to the good. The first is like a knowledge according to sight, and therefore ought to be called science absolutely; the second, like knowledge according to taste, and therefore ought to be called wisdom, from "the taste of the affect" [*sapore affectionis*]. . . . Thus *theologia*, which perfects the soul according to affect, in moving to the good through the principles of fear and love, is properly and principally wisdom. First Philosophy, which is the theology of the philosophers . . . perfecting knowledge according to the way of art and reasoning, is less properly called wisdom. And other sciences . . . ought not to be called wisdom, but sciences.[12]

On the one hand, science is the knowledge of caused things, while the knowledge of causes is more properly called wisdom. Thus, first philosophy is wisdom, while lesser disciplines are sciences; and similarly *theologia*, which likewise deals with ultimate causes,

[12] Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* I, tract. 1, q. 1, c. 1: "quod est scientia causae et scientia causati. . . . Theologia, quae est scientia de Deo, qui est causa causarum, sui gratia est. Nomen ergo scientiae appropriator scientiae causatorum, nomen vero sapientiae scientiae causae causarum. Unde et ipse Philosophus dicit quod Philosophia Prima, quae est sui gratia et de causa causarum, debet dici sapientia. Simili ratione doctrina theologica, quae transcendit omnes alias scientias, debet dici sapientia. . . . Praeterea, notandum quod est scientia perficiens cognitionem secundum veritatem; est etiam scientia movens affectionem ad bonitatem. Prima est ut cognitio secundum visum, et ideo debet dici scientia absoluta; secunda, ut cognitio secundum gustum, et ideo debet dici sapientia a sapore affectionis. . . . Theologia igitur, quae perficit animam secundum affectionem, movendo ad bonum per principia timoris et amoris, proprie et principaliter est sapientia. Prima Philosophia, quae est theologia philosophorum . . . ut perficiens cognitionem secundum viam artis et ratiocinationis, minus proprie dicitur sapientia. Ceterae vero scientiae . . . non debent dici sapientiae, sed scientiae" ([Quaracchi, Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924], 2). Throughout this article, translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

is wisdom. On the other hand, science perfects knowledge according to truth, while wisdom perfects the affect by moving it to the good. *Theologia* does the latter in a way no other discipline does, for it "perfects the soul according to the affect, moving to the good through the principles of fear and love." The result, which Alexander expresses rather pithily, is that "the doctrine of *theologia* is wisdom [in the first sense] as wisdom [in the second sense]; first philosophy . . . is wisdom [in the first sense] but as science [in the second sense], while lesser sciences . . . are science [in the first sense] as science [in the second sense]."[13]

Alexander's second chapter asks about the distinction of *theologia* from other sciences.[14] In the single response to the four objections, he makes the following delineation. Speculative sciences have to do with the true as true, and even the good as true. Practical sciences have to do with the true as good, that is, as a moral good. *Theologia*, which is assimilated to the Holy Spirit, has to do with the true as a graced good.[15]

Alexander thus adduces three perspectives on the kind of thing that *theologia* is. One is from the perspective of the subject:

[13] Ibid.: "doctrina Theologiae est sapientia ut sapientia; Philosophia vero Prima . . . est sapientia, sed ut scientia; ceterae vero scientiae . . . sunt scientiae ut scientiae" (Quaracchi ed., 2). Alexander's responses to the objections in this chapter make it clear that he is willing to call *theologia* a science in some sense, but the argument of the conclusion emphasizes how *theologia* is distinct from what we would ordinarily call a science.

[14] The fact that Alexander has already determined that *theologia* is not properly speaking a science yet continues to speak of it as one indicates that he is willing to use the term *scientia* in a very general sense, as a kind of knowledge.

[15] All sciences are from God, "yet other sciences are not said to be so in the same way as sacred Scripture. For there is the true as true, and the true as good, and both are from the Holy Spirit. But when the true is regarded as good, this good is either a moral good or a graced good. . . . In other sciences, namely the speculative, the true is accepted as true and the good as true; in practical moral sciences, the true is accepted as good, but not as graced good, but moral: therefore these are not said to be brought out by the Holy Spirit" ("quod convenit aliis scientiis, sed tamen non hoc modo convenit sacrae Scripturae. Est enim verum ut verum, et est verum ut bonum; utrumque est a Spiritu Sancto. Sed cum accipitur verum ut bonum, illud bonum aut est ut bonum orale aut ut bonum gratuitum. . . . In aliis vero scientiis, speculativis scilicet, est acceptio veri ut veri et etiam boni ut veri; in practicis autem moralibus, etsi sit acceptio veri ut boni, non tamen ut boni gratuiti, sed moralis: unde non dicuntur editae a Spiritu Sancto" (Alexander of Hales, *STh* I, tract. 1, q. 1, c. 2, ad 1-4 [Quaracchi ed., 5]).

theologia is the kind of thing it is because of what it is talking about. From that perspective, the only way *theologia* could properly be called science rather than wisdom is insofar as what it talks about is less than the highest things. For example, we could say that *theologia*, insofar as it focuses on God, cannot be anything except wisdom, but insofar as it has to do with human action, it could instead be called a science.

A second perspective has to do with the aspect under which the subject is considered. While speculative sciences regard both the true and the good simply under the aspect of truth, *theologia* is concerned with the true only insofar as it is a good, and a graced good at that.

The third perspective has to do with the fulfillment or perfection of the theologian, that is, the one who receives *theologia*. If what is going on in *theologia* is that the theologian acquires knowledge about God, it can be called a science; but insofar as what is going on is the movement of the theologian to a greater affective adherence to God, it is not a science, but wisdom.

Again, what has been said so far indicates Alexander's assessment of *theologia*, not theology in the sense of the rational investigation of the faith. He does, however, suggest that theology in the latter sense is a natural outcome of *theologia*. The third objection in chapter 1 argues that *theologia* has to do with things to be believed (*credibilia*), and therefore requires faith, not science. In response, Alexander, following Augustine, distinguishes three kinds of *credibilia*, and one of these kinds has to do with things which, when believed, dispose one to understanding.[16] The fourth objection in the same chapter claims that *theologia* generates only faith, not science; Alexander responds that *theologia* "first generates faith, and then, in the purity of heart brought about by faith through love, generates

[16] "Some things believed dispose to understanding and science, as in the case of those things pertaining to the divine" ("quaedam vero sunt quae disponunt ad intellectum et scientiam, sicut est in divinis" [Quaracchi ed., 3]). Alexander bases his argument on Augustine's *83 Questions*, q. 48.

understanding."[17] It is evident from this that although it is God's revelation, *theologia*, that is at issue in this first question, Alexander recognizes the validity of an intellectual enterprise that follows from the reception of *theologia*—indeed, his language here suggests that the dynamic of *theologia* leads directly to this intellectual enterprise. This is not at all surprising; after all, the remainder of the *Summa theologica* is nothing other than the rational elaboration of the things of faith, motivated by the reception of faith.

Alexander does not say here whether he thinks theology is a science in the strict sense, but it is at least an intellectual endeavor brought about by the reception of *theologia*. As this is not his topic, he does not directly address whether theology is a speculative or a practical science. What he does do is provide a framework for thinking about different kinds of sciences. He has suggested four options: *theologia* deals with God himself, it understands its truth as graced, and it is most concerned to achieve the love of God; first philosophy deals with God himself, it understands its truth simply as true, and it is most concerned to achieve knowledge; other speculative sciences deal with created things, are concerned with their truth, and aim at the acquisition of knowledge; other practical sciences deal with created things, are concerned with their good, and aim at achieving that good. The question is where theology, as the rational investigation of the things of faith, fits with respect to these four types. In terms of scope, it is nearest of all to *theologia*. Moreover, it must be moved by faith and love. Whether its object is the true or the good is debatable.[18]

[17] "Haec scientia primo generat fidem, et postea, mundato corde per fidem operantem per dilectionem, generat intellectum" (Quaracchi ed., 3).

[18] For recent commentary on Alexander and the *Summa halensis* on this point, see Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 96-102. Schumacher summarizes: "The authors of the Summa clearly wish to convey that the intellectual cogency of their theological system has the power to inspire affection for its divine object, and the cultivation of that affection, in turn, is the motivation for enquiry. While those who pursue knowledge for its own sake attend to reality as from the outside, love for God who is the source of all reality gives wisdom or insight into all things, not least God" (ibid., 102).

III. ODO RIGALDUS

Odo Rigaldus, sometime student of and collaborator with Alexander, has two texts pertinent to our topic: the prologue to his *Lectura* on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, and a disputed question on the science of *theologia*, composed some five years later.[19] The topic of the first is, by and large, theology as it is contained in Lombard's *Sentences*—although, as we will see, he moves in the last question to treat specifically of Scripture. The topic of the second is *theologia* in the sense of God's revelation, much as it was in the text from Alexander. Indeed, Odo's disputed question bears a good deal of similarity to Alexander's opening question.[20] Bearing this difference in mind, we can nevertheless see that both texts speak to our question.

In the *Lectura* Odo does not explicitly ask whether theology is speculative or practical, but what he does say provides some insight into his position. He begins the prologue by asking, is the kind of thing that Peter Lombard is doing in the *Sentences* an appropriate activity?[21] If one concedes that it is appropriate—in other words, that one can legitimately attempt "to reveal the hidden depths of theological investigations"[22]—the immediate question is whether one should go about doing this in an argumentative fashion[23]—and if so, what kind of habit is created in

[19] For the texts of Odo see Leonardo Sileo, *Teoria della scienza teologica: Quaestio de scientia theologiae di Odo Rigaldi e altri testi inediti (1230-1250)*, 2 vols. (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1984). All citations of this edition will refer to the second volume, which contains the edited texts. References to Sileo's headings will be cited by page number; references to Odo's text will be cited by paragraph number.

[20] One helpful difference is that Odo's terminology is much more consistent. While like Alexander he uses *sacra Scriptura* and *theologia* interchangeably, he uses the latter nine times as often as the former. See Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 306.

[21] Odo Rigaud, *Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum*, prol., q. 1: "Utrum magister debuit aggredi hoc opus" (Sileo, ed., p. 83).

[22] Peter Lombard, I *Sent.*, prol.2 (trans. Giulio Silano [Toronto: PIMS, 2007], 3).

[23] Odo Rigaud, *Lectura*, prol., q. 2, a. 1: "Utrum magister debuit aggredi hoc opus modo disputatorio" (Sileo, ed., p. 86).

the knower by it?[24] This last is the closest in this text that Odo comes to our question. The objections make clear the problems with asserting that it creates either faith or *scientia*. Odo's solution is that this work creates the habit of *intelligentia*.[25] He differentiates this from *scientia*, saying that it is nobler than any earthly *scientia*, both in terms of what it knows and the source from which it comes.[26] It begins by perfecting the intellect, but it consequently perfects the affect.[27] The knowledge achieved through the *Sentences* is therefore intellectual, but not solely intellectual in the way of certain philosophical sciences; it is a knowledge that naturally leads to the perfection of the affect.[28]

Having established that this is the kind of habit that results, Odo asks about the end of this endeavor.[29] His specific question is, what is the end of this science? This may seem odd: having just denied that the work of the *Sentences* generates the habit of *scientia*, why does he immediately ask, what is the end of this *scientia*? He does not deny that the investigation proper to the *Sentences* is a *scientia*, but he does deny that it can be understood rightly as terminating in knowledge simply. The kind of thing considered in the *Sentences* is typically and thoroughly informed by the revealed knowledge of God, and so must be marked by the end of that revelation, which is affective union with God.[30]

If the first two questions of the prologue are dealing with the project of the *Sentences*, this question seems to deal rather with *theologia*. All of the objections have to do with the end of

[24] Odo Rigaud, *Lectura*, prol., q. 2, a. 2: "Quis habitus in casu generetur" (Sileo, ed., p. 87).

[25] He cites both Bernard of Clairvaux and Richard of St. Victor in support.

[26] Odo Rigaud, *Lectura*, prol., q. 2, a. 2 (Sileo, ed., no. 44): "[intelligentia] est nobilior habitus quam scientia per demonstrationem habita: 'nobilior' dico, quia de nobiliore re et quia a nobiliore dante sive faciente eam in nobis."

[27] Ibid. (Sileo, ed., no. 45): "etsi intelligentia primo perficiat intellectum, tamen consequenter perficit et affectum."

[28] Note that Odo here does not distinguish between the speculative and the practical, but between the perfection of the intellect and the perfection of the affect.

[29] Odo Rigaud, *Lectura*, prol., q. 3: "Quis sit finis huius scientiae" (Sileo, ed., p. 90).

[30] For Odo, the only part of the work of the *Sentences* that is purely a demonstrative *scientia* is those things in book II (on creation) that can be known purely on natural grounds.

Scripture, not of the *Sentences*. In fact, Odo says, the ultimate end is God, which is to say that Scripture has no other ultimate end but to bring us to God. However, his previous answer—about how the knowledge gained through the *Sentences* ultimately perfects the affect—suggests that what he is really asking is what sort of affective habit is perfected by this endeavor. This is the focus of his responses to the objections. Thus there are several proximate ends, depending on one's state. In beatitude there is again a single proximate end, namely, created beatitude, but in this life there are several. For the beginner, the proximate end is fear (*timor*, the pious fear of God); for those who are growing, the proximate end is justice; and for the perfect, the proximate end is love.[31] Again, there is no mention here of the division of speculative and practical. But one can say that, for Odo, theological investigation is an intellectual activity whose *ratio* lies in leading the person to God by means of properly ordered affections.[32]

In his disputed question on the science of *theologia*, Odo first raises the distinction between speculative and practical in the context of an article asking about how *theologia* is distinct from other sciences.[33] There are several reasons for its distinction. The

[31] Odo Rigaud, *Lectura*, prol., q. 3 (Sileo, ed., nos. 52-53): "Proprie unicus est finis ultimis, scilicet Deus. Sed sunt fines sive termini intermedii plures, sine quibus non est devenire ad illum. Horum autem unus est in patria, scilicet beatitudo create. . . . Alii autem sunt in via, et hoc quoad statum incipientium, et sic timor est finis, vel quoad statum proficientium, et sic ipsa iustitia vel opera iustitiae sunt finis; vel quoad statum perfectorum, et sic caritas est finis."

[32] It is arguable whether, when Odo refers to fear, justice, and love here, he means affections or acts. That is, is the end of the understanding of the faith for beginners the proper affection of *timor* or the acts informed by *timor*? When he refers to the state of the *proficientes*, Odo does say "justice or the works of justice." Donneaud claims that Odo takes it as a given that supernatural knowledge is oriented toward an affective end, and that the principal way to this end is the practice of the good (Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 367). If this is true, then it is likely inappropriate to talk about the understanding of the faith terminating proximately in an affection; there is a difference between saying that the end of the knowledge of God is affective union with him and that the intermediate end of that knowledge is a terminative affection.

[33] Odo Rigaud, *Quaestio de scientia theologiae*, p. 1, q. 2: "Utrum theologia sit distincta ab aliis scientiis" (Sileo, ed., p. 19).

one that concerns us is when he says that "other sciences aim at generating knowledge in us, concerning either things to be known or things to be done. But *theologia* aims at generating fear and love in us by faith in justice and mercy and by the manifestation of the judgments and mercies of God in sacred Scripture."[34] This, he says, is the end that distinguishes *theologia*, for no other science has principles of fear and love.[35] Here the duo of speculative and practical sciences makes an appearance, implicitly. The suggestion is that *theologia* is not strictly speculative, for it does not aim at generating knowledge about things to be known, which is proper to a speculative science. But neither is it strictly practical, for it does not aim at generating knowledge about things to be done, which is the point of a practical science. Instead, *theologia* stems from the principles of fear and love, and aims at generating those affections in us. As in the *Lectura* on the *Sentences*, the role of the affections at both the beginning and the end of *theologia* is paramount.

There is a shift later in the disputed question, when Odo asks specifically whether *theologia* is speculative or practical.[36] He is, of all our authors, perhaps the most comprehensive in his objections. One objection argues that *theologia* is speculative, another that it is practical, and three others that it is partly speculative and partly practical.[37] It is this last position that particularly draws Odo's ire: he accepts the Aristotelian division of sciences into speculative and practical, and argues that if *theologia* is partly one and partly the other, then it is not one science. (Having just devoted an article to arguing that *theologia*

[34] Ibid. (Sileo, ed., no. 48): "aliae scientiae sunt ad generandam in nobis cognitionem vel circa speculanda vel circa operanda. Sed theologia est ad generandum in nobis amorem et timorem ex fide iustitiae et misericordiae et ostensione iudiciorum Dei et misericordiarum in sacra Scriptura."

[35] Ibid.: "Ergo cum nulla aliarum scientiarum faciat hoc, manifestum quod differt ab aliis."

[36] Odo Rigaud, *Quaestio de scientia theologiae*, p. 1, q. 6: "Utrum theologia sit speculativa an practica" (Sileo, ed., p. 49).

[37] Ibid. (Sileo, ed., nos. 112-16).

is in fact one science, so clearly he does not want to adopt this point of view.)[38]

The basis for his conclusion is that the division of speculative and practical sciences is related to the end: "For the speculative rests in the knowledge of the truth, but the practical, although it does contain the knowledge of the truth, does not rest there, but orders ultimately to the good, or to work through which one comes to the good intended." Since *theologia* ultimately orders to work, it is practical.[39] In the responses to the objections, his terminology changes somewhat, as he reintroduces the language of affect. So he says, "The intention of *theologia* does not rest in the informing of the intellect alone, but beyond that is ordered to the perfection of the affect."[40] He also says that *theologia* can rightly be called wisdom, for it has to do with taste in the affect (appealing to the etymology of wisdom, *sapientia*, as *sapida scientia*, "tasted knowledge").[41] There does not, therefore, seem to be in Odo a difference between knowledge as ordered to work and knowledge as ordered to the affect.

In short, Odo is committed to Aristotle's division of the sciences into the speculative and the practical in terms of their end, he understands the end of *theologia* to be the ordering of the affections of the person so that he might come to his end in God, and he concludes therefore that *theologia* is a practical

[38] Ibid. (Sileo, ed., no. 117): "Haec scientia est una, sicut supra ostensum est; ergo cum haec sit prima divisio philosophiae per 'speculativam' et 'practicam', et est divisio per opposite, necesse sit theologiam sub altera harum differentiarum contineri, et nunquam sub utraque,---alioquin non esset una, vel illa divisio non esset bona."

[39] Ibid. (Sileo, ed., no. 118): "Dicendum quod haec divisio scientiae per 'speculativam' et 'practicam' datur per comparationem ad finem: speculativa enim consistit in cognitione veri,---practica autem, quamvis sit cognitio veri, tamen ibi non sistit, sed ulterius ordinat ad bonum sive ad opus, per quod pervenitur ad bonum intentum. Quoniam theologia secundum suum finem non sistit in cognitione, sed ulterius ordinat ad opus, ideo dicendum est quod haec scientia sit practica." See also ibid. (Sileo, ed., no. 120): "quia non dicitur speculativa 'quia docet scire' sed 'quia ibi sistit'" ("[a science] is not called speculative 'because it teaches to know' but 'because it remains there'").

[40] Ibid. (Sileo, ed., no. 120): "Theologiae autem intentio non sistit solum in informatione intellectus; sed ulterius ordinatur ad perfectionem affectus."

[41] Ibid. (Sileo, ed., no. 122): "sapientiam, in qua est sapor et gustus in affectu."

science. Speculative sciences are things like metaphysics, which are fulfilled simply in the possession of the knowledge acquired. To be sure, *theologia* deals with things beyond human works (such as the angels, or God), but even this is oriented to wisdom, which is affective. We might say that Odo combines two authorities: Aristotle on the differences between the sciences, and Scripture on the end of theological knowledge.

Everything said thus far about Odo's disputed question refers to *theologia*, not the theology of the theologians. However, what he says here about the ordering of the speculative to the practical applies also to theology. As we saw earlier, Odo regards the work of theologians as an extension of *theologia*; it is therefore marked by the same dynamic as *theologia*. Let us suppose that theology is a properly speculative activity, a reasoning about the things of faith that is supposed to perfect the intellect; even so, it is not meant to stop there. Rather, anything that theology attains in the speculative realm is understood as leading ultimately to the practical, affective end of union with God.

A final point may be made concerning the significance of the location of Odo's treatment of this question, that is, the question of whether this science is speculative or practical. It is the last of his disputed questions on the matter of *theologia*, and immediately follows the related questions of whether *theologia* is one science and how it is distinguished from other sciences. He has yet to treat of the form of *theologia*, that is, its argumentative mode. In the *Lectura*, the whole question of the kind of knowledge engendered by theological investigation occurs in the context of talking about its proper mode. In the disputed question, by contrast, Odo is not able to address the question of whether *theologia* is speculative or practical in light of its mode. The end of *theologia* is therefore not determined here from the style in which it proceeds. Rather, Odo deals with the questions of whether *theologia* is a science, how it is distinct, what its subject is, and whether it is truly one. He has firmly located it among the sciences. In light of an Aristotelian understanding of science, therefore, he must identify it as speculative or practical.

IV. Albertus Magnus

Our next author is Albert the Great, whose commentary on the *Sentences* is roughly contemporary with Odo's disputed question.[42] Albert begins with a distinction containing four articles concerning *theologia* or the *scientia theologiae*, including what is its subject, whether it is one or several, whether it is speculative or practical, and what is its mode. In only two places in this distinction does Albert clearly refer to the theology that is the work of Lombard: (1) in the *divisio textus*, where he says, "the doctrine of this book, which proceeds by the mode of disputation, and is ordered to the perfection of the intellect according to the science of *theologia* . . ."[43] (2) in the *solutio* to the last article, where, after distinguishing the various senses of Scripture and adding that the defense of the faith further requires an argumentative mode, he says, "this mode [i.e., of argument] belongs to the science of this book, while the other modes are observed in the Bible."[44] Other references to *theologia* in these articles seem to concern *sacra Scriptura*.[45] Therefore, when Albert

[42] Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.*, d. 1 (*Opera omnia*, ed. Augusti Borgnet, vol. 25 [Paris: Vivès, 1893]). Borgnet gives five initial articles on theology, but modern commentators uniformly judge that the first "article" is actually part of the *expositio textus*. Nevertheless, citations of this edition will follow the convention of using Borgnet's numbering. See Mikołaj Olszewski, "The Nature of Theology according to Albert the Great" in Irven M. Resnick, ed., *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 71 n. 5.

[43] Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.*, d. 1, divisio textus (Borgnet, ed., 14): "Doctrina istius libri quae modo disputationis procedit, et ad perfectionem intellectus secundum scientiam Theologiae est ordinata . . .".

[44] Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.*, d. 1, a. 5 (Borgnet, ed., 20): "iste modus est scientiae istius libri, alii autem modi sunt observati in Biblia."

[45] The very beginning of his treatment here reads as follows: "It is objected that he [Lombard] says that sacred Scripture concerns things and signs. Four questions are thus posed: the first is, what is the subject of Theology?" ("Sed objicitur de hoc quod dicit, sacram Scripturam esse circa res et signa. Et quaeruntur quatuor: quorum primum est, quid sit Theologiae subjectum" [Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.*, d. 1, a. 2 (Borgnet, ed., 15)]). While Albert does use the words *theologia* and *sacra Scriptura* in these articles, his clear preference is for the simple *haec* (or *ista*, or *ea*) *scientia*; see Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 391. Like Odo, Albert does not hesitate to call *theologia* a science.

asks whether *theologia* is speculative or practical,[46] it is Scripture, not theology, that he has in mind. Nevertheless, his reasoning is suggestive about the nature of theology.

On this question, Albert offers two objections in favor of *theologia* being speculative, and two in favor of it being practical. His own position reads as follows:

> This science has to be determined from its end: now its end is set forth in Titus 1:1-2, where it is said, "Paul, servant of God, and apostle of Jesus Christ, according to the knowledge of truth that is according to piety, in the hope of eternal life." . . . Now the truth that is according to piety has two elements: one is the worship of God in himself and in his members, to which pertains everything that promotes this worship. The other is the end of intention, which is the union of the intellect and the affect and the substance with that which is honored as the beatifying end. Therefore this science is properly affective, that is, of truth that is not divided off from the *ratio* of the good, and therefore perfects both the intellect and the affect. Such an end is not found in created things; thus the philosophers have not treated of such kind of science, but divided them into one according to the truth that is in things, and another according to the good that is in them.[47]

There are two elements to be highlighted in this *solutio*. First, and contrary to Odo, Albert does not regard Aristotle's division between speculative and practical sciences as determinative.[48]

[46] Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.*, d. 1, a. 4 (Borgnet, ed., 18): "an theologia sit scientia speculativa vel practica." It is not certain whether it was Albert or Odo who introduced this question among the Parisian masters.

[47] Ibid.: "ista scientia ex fine determinanda est: finis autem dicitur, ad Titum, I, 1 et 2, ubi dicitur: *Paulus, servus Dei, apostolus autem Jesu Christi, secundum agnitionem veritatis quae secundum pietatem est in spem vitae aeternae*. . . . Veritatis autem quae secundum pietatem est, sunt duo: unum scilicet secundum pietatem cultus Dei in se et in membris, ad quod pertinent omnia promoventia cultum illum. Alterum autem est finis intentionis, et hic est conjungi intellectu et affectu et substantia cum eo quod colitur prout est finis beatificans: et ideo ista scientia proprie est affective, id est, veritatis quae non sequestratur a ratione boni, et ideo perficit et intellectum et affectum. Talis autem finis in rebus creatis non invenitur: et ideo Philosophi non tractaverunt hujusmodi scientiam: sed diviserunt unam ad verum quod est in rebus, aliam autem ad bonum quod est in ipsis."

[48] Christian Trottmann, "La théologie comme pieuse science visant la béatitude selon Albert le Grand," *Revue thomiste* 98 (1998): 394: "The philosophical duality between an ethical science of human ends and a speculative metaphysics contemplating first being seems surpassed by revealed theology, conceived as a science which leads to divine beatitude."

The knowledge that is proper to *theologia*, knowledge "*secundum pietatem*," transcends this difference, and is most properly speaking affective. *Theologia* appears to be unique among the sciences in this regard; the philosophers did not conceive of such a possibility. Second, Albert understands *theologia* in light of its end, which is beatitude. The end of *theologia* appears also in Odo, as "God or Christ," or "things useful to salvation," or "the good to be done."[49] The emphasis on beatitude is a distinctive aspect of Albert's doctrine. It is, in fact, laid down in the previous article, which argues for the unity of *theologia* on the basis of its end in beatitude.[50] There is an intellectual component to this, and an affective component, and a substantial one.

These two points are essential to Albert's responses to the objections. Why is *theologia* not to be regarded as a practical science? Because all of the practical sciences, all of those moral sciences discussed by the philosophers, are ordered to the end of this knowledge, but they do not concern that end themselves. That end is affective truth, which is beatifying.[51] Why is it not a speculative science? Because its concern with truth does not come through the intellect alone, but through the affect as well. In this case, "the intellect is ordered to the affect as to an end."[52] This is because the end it attains is God, the knowledge of whom is beatifying.[53] Beatitude is not a work—it is not an *opus*—but it

[49] Odo Rigaud, *Quaestio de scientia theologiae*, p. 1, qq. 5-6 (Sileo, ed., nos. 104, 111, 118).

[50] In article 2, Albert argues that *theologia* is one not because of the unity of subject, as in philosophy (where the subject is one and accidents are treated in their relation to that subject), but because everything it treats of is related to its beatifying end ("haec scientia una est proportione non ad unum quod subjectum sit aliorum, sicut substantia subjectum est accidentium: sed proportione ad unum quod est finis beatificans" [Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.,* d. 1, a. 2 (Borgnet, ed., 17)]).

[51] Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.,* d. 1, a. 4, ad 3-4 (Borgnet, ed., 19): "Finis autem scientiae duplex est, scilicet ultimus, et ordinatus ad illum. Qui a quibusdam finis vocatur ultimus, veritas est affectiva beatificans: finis autem citra illum est, ut boni fiamus."

[52] Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.,* d. 1, a. 4, ad 2 (Borgnet, ed., 19): "non quaeritur cognitio ad veritatem per intellectum tantum, sed per affectum et substantiam: et ideo non est intellectiva, sed affectiva: quia intellectus ordinatur ad affectum ut ad finem."

[53] Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.,* d. 1, a. 4, ad 1 (Borgnet, ed., 19): "hoc autem praecipue Deus est, quem omnes scire scientia beatificante desiderant." Trottmann ("La théologie

does immediately lead to something, namely, the affective and substantial fulfillment of the knower. *Theologia* here below must be of the same genus as the knowledge of God in heaven.[54] Both the perfect and the imperfect knowledge of God seek to know him not only intellectually, but also affectively and substantially. In short, affective knowledge forms an integral part of *theologia*, and therefore *theologia* is not purely speculative.

The most direct point that Albert makes about theology in this text is that—insofar as it is equated with Lombard's *doctrina*—it is ordered to the perfection of the intellect. Yet even there he says that this happens "according to the science of *theologia*." Clearly, an activity like Lombard's is predicated upon the reception of *theologia*, which itself is ordered to the perfection of both the intellect and the affect in beatitude. It remains a question whether this quality of *theologia* leaves a mark upon theology. Albert does not say anything one way or another about this. There are indications that he does not consider theology to be a practical science. In the very question we have been considering, the first objection (appealing to Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*) says that practical sciences are always for the sake of something else; that is, the knowledge contained in the science is meant for undertaking some work.[55] In the response Albert specifies that *theo-*

comme pieuse science, 393) distinguishes between faith (an intellectual adherence to the first truth) as the source of theology, beatitude as its end, and piety as "a way according to which theology is a science"; therefore "theology will necessarily be conceived, in these conditions, as a practical science."

[54] This principle is established in objection 2, which argues that therefore *theologia* is speculative, but it is fleshed out with the reference to the affective and substantial in the *solutio*. See Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.*, d. 1, a. 4, obj. 2 (Borgnet, ed., 18): "What is perfect in a science and what is imperfect do not belong to different genera; but the perfection of this science is the contemplation of God in heaven; therefore the science that is *in via*, although more imperfect, is to the same end; now the contemplation of truth, principally the first and highest truth, is the perfection of the speculative intellect" ("Perfectum in scientia, et imperfectum non differunt genere: sed perfectio hujus scientiae est contemplatio Dei in patria: ergo scientia quae est in via, licet imperfectius, est ad idem: contemplatio autem veritatis praecipue primae veritatis et summae, est perfectio speculativi").

[55] The point of the objection is that *theologia* is wisdom, and wisdom is not sought for the sake of something else, as are the practical sciences.

logia, being about God known in the highest way,[56] is sought for its own sake (*gratia sui*), for the knowledge of God is beatifying. Theology, ordered to the perfection of the intellect, appears to lie between the two: it is not practical, for it is not ordered to the undertaking of some work, but neither is it directly concerned with the beatifying end of man. The question is whether the relationship between theology and *theologia* is such that the former can be described as meaningfully ordered to the affective, beatifying end of man. What is clear is that Odo's firm insistence on the polarity of speculative and practical is not echoed by Albert.[57]

Albert takes up the topic again thirty years later, in his *Summa theologiae* (the latest of the texts we have in view). The first tract of the *Summa* concerns the science of *theologia*, and comprises six questions. The third question, on the subject of *theologia*, is divided into four chapters, the first three of which exactly mirror the first three articles of the distinction from the *Sentences* commentary.[58] The most notable distinction between the *Sentences* commentary and the *Summa* is that the latter devotes specific questions to defining *theologia* over against other sciences.[59] Albert continues to use *theologia* as convertible with *sacra Scriptura*, but he also sees it as encompassing theology; indeed, he is more concerned to differentiate *theologia* from philosophical theology than from the theology of the

[56] Albertus Magnus, I *Sent.*, d. 1, a. 4, ad 1 (Borgnet, ed., 19): "ista scientia principalissime dicitur sapientia, eo quod ipsa est de altissimis, et altissimo modo."

[57] As Olszewski puts it, "The Dominican theologian first clarifies Aristotle's statements and then demonstrates that they cannot be applied directly and strictly to theology. . . . On the one hand, Albert denies any direct applicability of all of the Stagirite's epistemological theses to theology. On the other hand, the confrontation with Aristotle helps him formulate remarkable insights into the nature of theology" (Olszewski, "Nature of Theology according to Albert the Great," 96).

[58] The chapters concern, in order, the subject of the science of *theologia*, whether it is one or many, and whether it is practical or theoretical/speculative.

[59] E.g., question 2, on the definition of *theologia*; question 4, on whether it is separate from other sciences; and question 6, on its end—that is, whether and in what way it is the end of the other sciences.

theologians.[60] In the discussion of *theologia* as practical or speculative (q. 3, c. 3), the term at least includes Scripture itself; it also includes "God and his works," and this formulation raises the possibility that it might encompass theology.

The question posed is the same—whether *theologia* is a practical or theoretical science—but Albert explicitly states that the answer has to be determined on the basis of the subject, whereas in the *Sentences* commentary he says that it has to be determined on the basis of the end. As in the *Sentences* commentary, the objections he invokes argue either that *theologia* is practical (three arguments) or that it is speculative (one argument). Two of the arguments in favor of its being practical are virtually identical to objections mentioned in the *Sentences* commentary.[61] The third invokes "knowledge according to piety" (Titus 1:1) and says, "*theologia* is not of truth as truth, but of truth insofar as it is inclining to piety. . . . It seems then to be practical."[62] The one objection he raises that argues that it is speculative (or theoretical) says that it is about God and his works, not our works, and every practical science is about our works.[63] In his solution he says that Scripture is practical, and the kind of truth it contains is not

[60] See, e.g., Albertus Magnus, *Summa Theologiae* I, tract. 1, q. 5, c. 3 (Albertus Magnus, *Opera omnia* 34/1, Cologne edition [Münster: Aschendorff, 1978], 18) which is on whether *theologia* has a mode of argumentation. The third objection is that *theologia* begins with faith, and faith is above reason, but argument deals with things that are under reason, and therefore *theologia* cannot have a mode of argument. The response is that *theologia* begins from faith as its principle, but faith looks to understand what is believed, as Anselm says. It therefore includes theology.

[61] Viz., theology pertains to work rather than speculation (quoting in both places James 1:25), and much of the content of Scripture has to do with moral matters (precepts, laws, exhortations, etc.).

[62] Albertus Magnus, *STh* I, tract. 1, q. 3, c. 3 (Cologne ed., 13): "theologia non est veritatis ut veritatis, sed veritatis, prout est inclinativa ad pietatem. . . . videtur ergo, quod practica est."

[63] Albertus Magnus, *STh* I, tract. 1, q. 3, c. 3, s.c. (Cologne ed., 13) Similar arguments appear in Bonaventure (I *Sent*., pro., q. 3, s.c. 3) and Aquinas (*STh* I, q. 1, a. 4, s.c.). According to Mikołaj Olszewski, "There is probably only one formal element that enables us to recognize St. Thomas as the source of citation, namely Albert's use of the term *doctrina sacra*, which is typical of Aquinas's language in Question 1 of *Summa* and is exceptional for Albert" (Olszewski, "Nature of Theology according to Albert the Great," 89 n. 84).

purely speculative, but relates to the affect. It is through "the affect or the affective intellect"[64] that we enjoy in faith the highest truth, in hope the highest blessedness, and in charity the highest good. There are, to be sure, moral precepts and concerns in Scripture, but the truth of God and his works that is sought is not regarded as truth simply, but as the most beatifying truth. Albert furthermore invokes Aristotle in book 10 of the *Nicomachaean Ethics*, saying that contemplative happiness, as the end of the acts of virtue (whether intellectual or moral or heroic), belongs to practical or moral science. *Theologia* differs from the practical sciences treated by philosophy, because they deal with the perfect work of the acquired virtues, while *theologia* deals with the perfect work of the virtues infused by grace.[65] Thus *theologia* is not simply speculative; Albert does call it practical, but he also gives reasons to describe it as affective rather than simply as practical.

Although thirty years separate the texts, and some of the details of the argument have changed, there is great consistency in Albert's position. While in the *Summa* he does not call *theologia* an affective science, he still insists on the category of the affective as a way of overcoming the simple dichotomy between the speculative and the practical. Furthermore, he maintains that the question is only adequately addressed by looking at both the ultimate end and the subject of theological knowledge. The end is determinative because the question has to do with the ultimate goal of the science, but this ultimate goal involves a relation to the subject—God and his works—a relation that is beatifying.

In brief, the highest knowledge, the knowledge proper to *theologia*, rightly called "wisdom," might be regarded as speculative, in that it is sought for its own sake; or it might be regarded as practical, in that it leads to something beyond mere knowledge. The matter is resolved by recognizing that *theologia* is affective, which we see when we look at the real quality of the

[64] Albertus Magnus, *STh* I, tract. 1, q. 3, c. 3 (Cologne ed., 13): "per affectum vel intellectum affectivum."

[65] See Olszewksi, "Nature of Theology according to Albert the Great," 89.

knowledge of God in heaven.[66] Furthermore, while it is true that the theology of the theologians is not necessarily the same as this *theologia*, the former cannot help but be marked by the latter. That is, because Albert frames *theologia* in light of beatitude, he is saying that the one who receives *theologia* has no other end than beatitude, and therefore even his practice of theology—thoroughly speculative as it may be—is still subservient to his end in beatitude. Theology may not be affective in its immediate rationale, but it is ordered to an affective end.

V. BONAVENTURE

Our fourth author is Bonaventure, who treats of this topic in two texts: first, the prologue to book 1 of his commentary on the *Sentences*; second, the prologue and beginning of part 1 of his *Breviloquium*. As the latter is less important for our purposes, we will begin with a brief treatment of it.

The topic of the *Breviloquium* is variously called "*sacra doctrina*," "*sacra Scriptura*," and "*theologia*."[67] In the prologue, Bonaventure distinguishes the *modus procedendi* of Scripture and the *modus exponendi*. The *modus procedendi* encompasses all the various modes used in Scripture: narrative, commandment, exhortation, etc.—in a word, the mode of authority. Bonaventure states explicitly that the purpose of Scripture is that we may become good,[68] and so the modes of Scripture are those suitable not so much for rational argumentation as for the movement of the will. The *modus exponendi* looks to the understanding of Scripture. When he takes this up in the prologue, he cites Augustine in *De doctrina christiana* on rules for interpreting

[66] See Ralph McInerny, "Albert and Thomas on Theology," in *Albert der Grosse: Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 56: "Is Theology a science undertaken for knowledge ('sciendi gratia') or in order that we might become good ('ut boni fiamus'). If we consider the end of the science, it is doubtless truth about God as ultimate beatifying end that is the end, but what the knower wants is not only knowledge but that he may be enabled to engage in contemplation and ultimately enjoy union with God."

[67] All these terms appear, and are clearly interchangeable, in *Breviloquium* 1.1.

[68] *Brev.* prol.5 (*Opera omnia* 5 [Quaracchi, Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1891], 206): "haec doctrina est, ut boni fiamus."

Scripture. When he returns to it at the beginning of part 1, he says simply that Scripture deals with the *credibile ut credibile*, while the "books of the expositors" (i.e., the Fathers) deal with the *credibile ut intelligibile*. Thus understanding the truth of Scripture requires a rational activity of elaborating the intelligibility of Scripture. Its goal could be described as speculative insofar as it leads one to see how the truths of Scripture are an ordered whole that is entirely related to God as its first principle and final end, but it does not have a *ratio* other than that of Scripture itself. If the end of Scripture is that we may become good, so too is the end of understanding Scripture.

The prologue of the commentary on the *Sentences* includes four questions concerning the four causes of *hic liber*, that is, Lombard's *Sentences*. We are therefore clearly dealing with the rational exploration of the things of faith, and not revelation itself. The word *theologia* occurs only three times in these questions: once in a quotation from Lombard, and twice over and against *hic liber*.[69]

While the specific question about whether this activity is speculative or practical is raised with respect to the final cause, Bonaventure's treatment of the material and formal causes already suggests an answer. In question 1 we read that the subject (or *materia*) of this book is "the things of faith, insofar as they

[69] Question 3, objection 2 says that *theologia* is of both faith and morals, whereas this book deals with those things pertaining to faith, not to morals ("theologia sit de fide et moribus, liber autem iste de his quae spectant ad fidem, non de his quae spectant ad mores"). Question 1, objection 2 says that God cannot be the "matter" or subject of this book, because the matter of something cannot coincide with its end, and "God is the end of the whole of this work, because he is the end of the whole of *theologia*" ("Deus est finis totius istius operis, quia finis totius theologiae"). Although the meaning of the latter passage is not entirely clear until Bonaventure speaks about the relation of *hic liber* and *sacra Scriptura* in question 2, it clearly means that *iste opus* and *theologia* are not identical, although the end of the former is related to the end of the latter.

In the Quaracchi edition, the word *theologia* also appears in the heading of question 1 and question 3, where it is equated with *hic liber* ("Quae sit materia . . . huius libri vel theologiae"; "Utrum hic liber sive theologia . . ."). These headings, however, do not belong to Bonaventure's text, but were inserted by the editors.

pass over into intelligibility through the addition of reason."[70] In question 2, Bonaventure affirms explicitly that the mode of proceeding in *hic liber* is rational, and he sharply distinguishes this from the mode that is proper to Scripture itself (namely, the narrative mode). We are well on the way to the definition of *hic liber* as a thoroughly speculative enterprise. Yet this is not what he, in fact, concludes.

The conclusion of question 3, on the final cause, reads as follows:

> Our intellect can be perfected by *scientia*. Now we can consider the perfection of the intellect in three ways: in itself, as it applies to the affect, and as it applies to work, an application it achieves through giving orders and ruling. Corresponding to these three modes of perfection, our intellect, because it is subject to error, has three kinds of directive habits. If we consider the intellect in itself, it is properly speculative and is perfected by a habit which exists for the sake of contemplation. This habit is called speculative science. If we consider the intellect as it applies to work, it is perfected by the habit which exists for the sake of our becoming good. This habit is practical or moral science. If we consider the intellect in a way falling between these two, as it applies to the affect, it is perfected by a habit that lies between the purely speculative and the purely practical, but one that embraces both. This habit is called wisdom, and it involves knowledge and affection together. . . . Consequently, this habit is for the sake of contemplation and also for our becoming good, but principally for the sake of our becoming good.
>
> Such is the kind of knowledge contained in this book. For this knowledge aids faith, and faith resides in the intellect in such a way that, in accord with its very nature, it moves our affect. This is clear: for this knowledge, that Christ died for us, and other such truths, moves a man to love, unless he is a sinner and hardened. But a truth like "the diameter is incommensurate with the side" does not. Therefore we should grant that it [viz., the work of this book] is for the sake of our becoming good.[71]

[70] Bonaventure, I *Sent.*, pro., q. 1 (*Opera omnia* 1 [Quaracchi, Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1884], 7): "sic est credibile, prout tamen credibile transit in rationem intelligibilis, et hoc per additionem rationis; et hic modo, proprie loquendo, est subjectum in loc libro."

[71] Bonaventure, I *Sent.*, pro., q. 3 (Quaracchi ed., 11): "Perfectibile a scientia est intellectus noster. Hunc autem contingit considerare tripliciter, scilicet in se, vel prout extenditur ad affectum, vel prout extenditur ad opus. Extenditur autem intellectus per modum dictantis et regulantis. Secundum hunc triplicem statum, quia errare potest, habet triplicem habitum directivum. Nam si consideremus intellectum in se, sic est proprie speculativus et perficitur ab habitu, qui est contemplationis gratia, qui dicitur scientia speculativa. Si autem consideremus ipsum ut natum extendi ad opus, sic perficitur ab

Some comparisons with our previous authors are immediately apparent: Bonaventure is more concerned than Odo to distinguish the affective and the practical, and he does not share Odo's commitment to the idea that a science must be either simply speculative or simply practical. On both of these points, Bonaventure is closer to Albert—although, unlike Albert, he does not speak in terms of beatitude.[72] On the other hand, it is possible to read Bonaventure as very like Odo. Odo says that in Lombard's work, the truth that is known does not remain in itself but orders to something else; Bonaventure repeats the same idea, almost verbatim.[73] Also, Bonaventure's invocation of a habit that

habitu, qui est ut boni fiamus; et hic est scientia practica sive moralis. Si autem medio modo consideretur ut natus extendi ad affectum, sic perficitur ab habitu medio inter pure speculativam et practicum, qui complectitur utrumque; et hic habitus dicitur sapientia, quae simul dicit cognitionem et affectum. . . . Unde hic est contemplationis gratia, et ut boni fiamus, principaliter tamen ut boni fiamus. Talis est cognitio tradita in hoc libro. Nam cognitio haec iuvat fidem, et fides sic est in intellectu, ut, quantum est de sui ratione, nata sit movere affectum. Et hoc patet. Nam haec cognitio: quod Christus pro nobis mortuus est, et consimiles, nisi sit homo peccator et durus, movet ad amorem; non sic ista: quod diameter est asymeter costae. Concedendum ergo, quod est ut boni fiamus." I have lightly revised the translation in Bonaventure, *Commentary on the Sentences: Philosophy of God*, trans. R. E. Houser and Timothy B. Noone, Works of St. Bonaventure 16 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute 2013), 11-12.

[72] Bonaventure does evoke beatitude in fund. 3, which argues that a teaching concerning a part has the same end as teaching concerning the whole, and the end of Scripture is not only that we may become good, but that we may become blessed. The wording is different from Albert's, but the point is essentially the same. It does not, however, enter into Bonaventure's reasoning in the *respondeo*.

[73] In addition to the notion of the intellect applying to work or to affect, we find in the response to the first objection the argument that although there is a speculative aspect to the work of theology, it does not stay there—a point clearly found in Odo. This way of reading Bonaventure can be found, e.g., in Donneaud (*Théologie et intelligence de la foi* [Paris: Parole et silence, 2006], 483) and John Quinn (*The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy* [Toronto: PIMS, 1973], 684-85). Both read Bonaventure in this passage as saying that theology has to be understood in light of its place within Christian life, leading to beatitude. Its proper finality cannot be considered either just within itself (as the understanding of revelation) or as directed to the ultimate end which is the enjoyment of God in beatitude, but rather in terms of its place within the set of activities whereby the Christian in this life moves on the path toward beatitude. Therefore, its proper finality has to do with its place in achieving the practical end of the Christian life—thus the speculative in service of the practical.

encompasses the speculative and the practical is reminiscent of Odo's insistence on the habit of *intelligentia* which is likewise speculative and practical. Perhaps Bonaventure has a more refined understanding of the affect than does Odo, but it is plausible to say that, in the end, he understands this work as practical, much as Odo does.

These comparisons aside, it must be noted that the expectation that *hic liber* is speculative is overturned by the conclusion. Bonaventure clearly says that the habit in question here is "principally that we may become good" and that "we should grant that it is for the sake of our becoming good." At the same time, his choice of example may seem odd: "the knowledge that Christ died for us, and other such truths." Lombard, and Bonaventure commenting on him, discuss these truths, but in themselves they belong primarily to faith, not to *hic liber*. If Bonaventure were to give instead an example of some truth that is achieved precisely by Lombard, would that not be properly speculative rather than practical?

Understanding Bonaventure's contribution on this point requires understanding his insistence on three distinct habits that perfect the intellect, with wisdom—lying in between the speculative and the practical—being the habit that pertains to *hic liber*. We need to discern whether Bonaventure really considers this affective habit as distinct from the speculative and the practical, with its own proper intelligibility, or whether it is simply a way of dealing with the limitations of dividing the sciences into the purely speculative and the purely practical (as it seems to be for Odo).[74] In the latter case, the point would be to highlight the ordering of the speculative and the practical, not to identify a distinct capacity of the person.

[74] This seems to be the way George Tavard reads Bonaventure: "To equate theology with a speculative science would be tantamount to ignore its actual link with holiness and, consequently, with man's future beatitude. To identify it with a merely practical science would amount to understate both the rôle pertaining to the intellect and its natural inclination to 'extend' its contents to the *affectus* with a view to love and action. The Bonaventurian position keeps the middle between two extremes" (George Tavard, *Transiency and Permanence: The Nature of Theology according to St. Bonaventure* [St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1954], 192).

If we confine our attention to this text, we cannot do more than raise the question. A quick look at some other texts, however, sheds some light on the matter. When Bonaventure discusses wisdom as the gift of the Holy Spirit, he describes it as beginning in knowledge and ending in the affect.[75] If, then, the wisdom at issue in the *Sentences* prologue is like or the same as the wisdom that is the gift of the Holy Spirit, it is plausible to say that its speculative aspect exists for the sake of moving to something else (whether that be practical or affective). But there are other texts that rather suggest a distinctive place for this work, other than the speculative or the practical. For example, in a discussion of sciences in book 3 of the commentary on the *Sentences*,[76] Bonaventure distinguishes (1) those that consist in the purely speculative intellect, namely, the philosophical sciences; (2) those that consist in the intellect inclined from the affect, which is the science of sacred Scripture; and (3) those that consist in the intellect insofar as it inclines the affect to work.[77] *Theologia*, the science of sacred Scripture, thus holds a place distinct from the speculative and the practical. Again, in various discussions of wisdom Bonaventure does not advert to

[75] See, e.g., III *Sent.*, d. 35, a. un., q. 1.

[76] The question raised is whether the principal act of the gift of knowledge lies in action or in speculation. This distinction is therefore the lens through which the other sciences are viewed in this question.

[77] Bonaventure, III *Sent.*, d. 35, a. un., q. 2 (*Opera omnia* 3 [Quaracchi, Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1887], 776): "Scientiae quadruplex est differentia. Quaedam est, quae consistit in intellectu pure speculativo; et haec est fundata super principia rationis, et haec est scientia acquisita de quacumque creatura, sicut scientia humanae philosophiae. Quaedam autem est, quae consistit in intellectu inclinato ab affectu; et haec est fundata super principia fidei, quae quidem sunt articuli, et nihilominus acquisita; et haec est scientia sacrae Scripturae, quam nullus habere potest, nisi saltem habeat fidem informem. Quaedam autem est, qui consistit in intellectu sive ratione, in quantum inclinat affectum ad operationem; et haec fundata est super principia iuris naturalis, quae ordinatur ad rectitudinem et honestatem vitae; et huiusmodi est scientia prudentiae-virtutis." The fourth science is the gift of knowledge of the Holy Spirit, which both is inclined (by faith) and inclines (to good works). The intellect inclining the affect to work is not practical science here, but prudence. This suggests a difference between knowing the truth of the moral life (a practical science) and directing oneself to engage in the moral life (a virtue).

"theological wisdom," but he clearly does advert to a kind of wisdom that is different from a purely speculative wisdom and the ultimate wisdom that is the gift of the Holy Spirit—whether it be "wisdom properly so-called,"[78] which is associated with the relation to God one has by means of the theological virtues, or "multiform wisdom" (in the mysteries of Scripture)[79] or "omniform wisdom" (in the reflection of God in the world).[80] Bonaventure wants to talk about a condition of the human knower different from the pure speculation of philosophy, the practical knowledge proper to the work of virtue, and the higher reaches of the experience and knowledge of God that one might call mystical, or appropriate to the gift of the Holy Spirit. This is the condition appropriate to the one who has the science of the things of faith.

In this passage from book 3 of the commentary on the *Sentences* just mentioned, the science of Scripture is moved "*ab affectu*," whereas in the *Sentences* prologue, wisdom involves the intellect moving "*ad affectum*." There is no contradiction here. In both cases Bonaventure is clearly distinguishing the science of Scripture from that sort of activity in which the intellect produces a kind of work, as well as from pure speculation. If the perfection of this wisdom involves being moved "*ad affectum*," this is because it is moved from the beginning "*ab affectu*." The kind of thing that is given in faith demands that it be treated in a way in keeping with that faith.

In short, Bonaventure wants to alert us to the fact that in *hic liber* something is going on that is distinct from the speculative or practical sciences. We are, as it were, in a noetic realm where the point is not that we are trying to accomplish a good work, or to acquire a virtue, but rather that we are penetrating the proper meaning of revelation.

His example is telling: "The knowledge that Christ died for us, and such like truths, moves to love, unless a man be hardened and a sinner; not so the knowledge that 'the diameter is incom-

[78] III *Sent.*, d. 35, a. un., a. 1.
[79] *Hex.* 2.11.
[80] *Hex.* 2.20.

mensurate with the side.'" On an obvious level, this seems to mean that the things we talk about in *hic liber* have a practical or affective end, that the purpose for which we know them is not purely speculative. But insofar as in *hic liber* the intellect is moved by the affect, we must understand that "the knowledge that Christ died for us" has an affective weight that moves the intellect in what is a properly intellectual activity. Affect comes into the picture not so much as the result of this reflection but a directive force behind it that produces a knowledge in harmony with it.

In sum, the intellectual habit involved in *hic liber* should not be called practical because it is not trying to accomplish a work—its content is not purely practical. It should not be called speculative because the speculative philosophical sciences deal with a different capacity of the person. It is wisdom because its consideration of all things lies within the affective realm, being moved by the affect.

VI. AQUINAS

Our fifth and final author is Thomas Aquinas, who offers three treatments of this topic, first in his Parisian commentary on the *Sentences*, second in his Roman commentary on the *Sentences*, and third in the *Summa theologiae*.

> This science, although it is one, is yet perfect and sufficient to all human perfection because of the efficacy of the divine light. . . . Wherefore it perfects man both in right operation and as to the contemplation of truth, wherefore as to this it is practical and yet speculative. But because every science is to be considered from its end, and the ultimate end of this doctrine is the contemplation of the first truth in heaven, therefore it is principally speculative.[81]

[81] I *Sent.*, pro., a. 3 (Adriano Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la "sacra doctrina," avec l'édition du prologue de son commentaire des Sentences* [Paris: Librarie philosophique J. Vrin, 2006], 320-21): "Ista scientia, quamuis sit una, tamen perfecta est et sufficiens ad omnem humanam perfectionem propter efficaciam diuini luminis. . . . Vnde perficit hominem et in operatione recta et quantum ad contemplationem ueritatis, unde quantum ad quid practica est et etiam speculatiua. Set

This science is composed of each [i.e., the practical and the speculative]. For it has in itself that which is speculative and that which is practical. The reason of which is that the ultimate perfection of man is in the knowledge of God. . . . Wherefore since the knowledge of God is both had in the present and hoped for in the future, it is necessary that [this science] manifests to us how it is possible for [God] to be known in the present, and so it is speculative, and teaches how we may come to him through good works, and so is practical. Yet it is more chiefly speculative, because our ultimate end is in speculation. For it is undertaken so that we may be blessed; but beatitude consists in the knowledge of God.[82]

Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss.[83]

quia scientia omnis principaliter pensanda est ex fine, finis autem ultimus istius doctrine est contemplatio prime ueritatis in patria, ideo principaliter speculatiua est."

[82] *Lectura romana*, pro., q. 3 (Thomas Aquinas, *Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardii*, ed. Leonard E. Boyle and John F. Boyle [Toronto: PIMS, 2006], 77): "Haec scientia utrumque complectitur. Habet enim in se id quod est speculative et id quod est practice. Cuius ratio est quia ultima perfectio hominis est in cognitione Dei. . . . Vnde cum cognitio Dei et habeatur in praesenti et expectetur in future, oportet quod <haec scientia> manifested nobis qualiter sit possibilie <Deum> cognosci in praesenti, et sic est speculativa, et doceat qualiter perveniamus ad eum per bonas operations, et sic est practica. Principalius tamen est speculativa, name ultimus finis noster est in speculatione. Operamur autem ut beati simus; beatitude autem in cognitione Dei consistit."

[83] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 1:14): "sacra doctrina, ut dictum est, una existens, se extendit ad ea quae pertinent ad diversas scientias philosophicas, propter rationem formalem quam in diversis attendit: scilicet prout sunt divino lumine cognoscibilia. Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramque; sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit, et ea quae facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam practica: quia principalius agit de rebus divinis quam de actibus humanis; de quibus agit secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua aeterna beatitudo consistit." This translation is taken from Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1947).

The term that Aquinas consistently uses to describe this science is *sacra doctrina*. The term *theologia* appears only rarely. At times, *sacra doctrina* is described as freely convertible with *sacra Scriptura*; at other times, it is clear that while Scripture supplies the principles of *sacra doctrina,* the science itself extends much further, to encompass everything that is knowable in light of divine revelation. Indeed, there is a vast debate among commentators over whether *sacra doctrina* (especially in the first question of the *Summa*) has an ambiguous or analogous meaning—sometimes signifying revelation, sometimes Scholastic theology, and sometimes Scripture.[84] Here, we can do no better than to analyze exactly what Aquinas says on our question. For our purposes, *sacra doctrina* means very much what our other authors signify by *theologia*. Whether, strictly speaking, it encompasses theology may be debated, but it is not difficult to see its implications for theology.

The content of the treatments does not vary much. In each text Aquinas says that *sacra doctrina* can rightly be said to encompass both the speculative and the practical, but that it is principally, or chiefly, speculative. The grounds of his argument on this point differ. In both the Parisian and Roman *Sentences* commentaries, he appeals to the end of the science, which is "the contemplation of the first truth in heaven," or "the knowledge of God." In the *Summa,* by contrast, he argues from the formal unity of the science that it deals with all things insofar as they are knowable through the divine light, and therefore that it transcends the division of speculative and practical that is found among the philosophical sciences. It is not on the basis of the end, but on the basis of the formal unity of the subject that its character is defined. If one insists on using the terms, however, it is more speculative than practical because, materially, it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts.

[84] For helpful surveys, see Weisheipl, "The Meaning of *sacra doctrina*," 56-64; Henry Donneaud, "Insaisissable *sacra doctrina*? À propos d'une réédition recente," *Revue thomiste* 98 (1998): esp. 183-90.

In saying that *sacra doctrina* is both speculative and practical, Aquinas falls on the same side as Albert and Bonaventure, and against Odo. He makes no mention of the affective, and in this clearly differs from each of our other authors. He does refer to "being good" and beatitude, but does not appeal to the category of the affective.[85]

A point on which Aquinas diverges from all of our other authors is the place he gives to wisdom. For Alexander, Odo, and Bonaventure, the introduction of wisdom is a way to highlight the affective quality of the knowledge in question; for Albert, to call *theologia* wisdom is to invoke the fact that it is about a subject the knowledge of which is beatifying. Aquinas is well aware of the etymology that derives "*sapientia*" from "*sapida scientia*" ("tasted knowledge"),[86] but he does not advert to it here—and indeed, he does not use the category of wisdom to explain the end of *sacra doctrina* at all. In the *Summa*, wisdom is the subject of a distinct question, and Aquinas speaks of it in terms of the architectonic knowledge of *sacra doctrina*.[87] For Aquinas, wisdom does not, as it does for Bonaventure, suggest a different, higher habit, but simply the perfection of the scientific reasoning that runs throughout *sacra doctrina*.[88]

[85] Nevertheless, Jean-Pierre Torrell argues that *sacra doctrina* in Aquinas could well be described as affective—and cites Cajetan in support: "Shall we go so far as to speak of theology as an 'affective' science? Saint Thomas does not. This does not mean, however, that he is taking sides against the 'Augustinian ideal' of an affective science. . . . A Thomist as influential as Cajetan was not afraid to maintain that *sacra doctrina* is the realization of an affective science in the most formal (*formaliter eminenter*)—just as it is the realization of speculative or practical science" ("Theology and Sanctity," in Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Bernhard Blankenhorn, O.P. [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011], 29). The reference to Cajetan is to number 9 of his commentary on *STh* I, q. 1, a. 4.

[86] See *STh* I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2; *STh* II-II, q. 45, a. 2, obj. 2.

[87] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 6, on whether *sacra doctrina* is wisdom. For an analysis of this article, see Gregory F. LaNave, "How Theology Judges the Principles of Other Sciences," *The Thomist* 81 (2017): 567-93. In the *Sentences* commentary, Aquinas has much the same concern. In the *Lectura romana*, he does not refer to *sacra doctrina* as wisdom at all.

[88] See Trottmann, *Théologie et noétique*, 138: "Most of Thomas's predecessors associate the sapiential character [of theology] to its savorous pursuit of ultimate happiness. It is rather as science, less of the final end than of the first cause, that Thomas sees it as the highest wisdom."

Finally, Aquinas echoes the argument made by Albert that the most noble science is for its own sake; practical sciences are not for their own sake; this is the most noble science; and therefore this is not a practical science.[89] In the *Summa*, Aquinas associates this, as Albert does, with the beatifying end of this science; in the *Sentences* commentary, he simply refers to its being the most noble of sciences.

In short, it is fair to say that among our authors Aquinas presents the most thoroughgoing account of *sacra doctrina* as speculative.

VII. Conclusions

What I have tried to do in the analyses of these five authors is to point to the vision they have of *theologia* and theology that governs their answer to our specific question. Now I would like to step back, and consider what the question about the speculative, or practical, or affective nature of *theologia* or of theology might mean.

(1) The question might be taken to mean, what is the purpose of *theologia*? God's revelation is given so that we may come to know and love God. There is no real disagreement among our authors on this point. Aquinas is the only one not to advert to the affective in his discussion, but this is easily explained in light of

[89] I *Sent.*, pro., q. 3, 1.2 (Oliva, ed., 318): "The Philosopher says that the noblest of the sciences is *sui gratia*. But practical sciences are not *sui gratia*, but rather for the sake of a work. Therefore since this is the noblest of the sciences, it is not practical" ("Dicit Philosophus quod nobilissima scientiarum est sui gratia. Practice autem scientie non sunt sui gratia, immo propter opus. Ergo cum ista sit nobilissima scientiarum, non erit practica"). A similar argument is made in *STh* I, q. 1, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 1:16). In this article, Aquinas establishes that *sacra doctrina* is nobler than both other speculative and other practical sciences. Of practical sciences he says "that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose. . . . But the purpose of this science [*sacra doctrina*] in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed" ("Practicarum vero scientiarum illa dignior est, quae ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur. . . . Finis autem huius doctrinae inquantum est practica, est beatitudo aeterna, ad quam sicut ad ultimum finem ordinantur omnes alii fines scientiarum practicarum").

his view that the affections are better understood as a response to what is apprehended. One could say that Odo's argument that intellection in *theologia* is not meant to end in itself but stretches beyond to affection is accepted by all of our authors, although Aquinas regards this fulfillment of the affections as a consequence more than as a further end.

What, by extension, is the purpose of theology? Why do we engage in this academic discipline? It is problematic to say in this respect that theology is essentially speculative, for no one wishes to say that the purpose of Christian life is to know things. It is rather more compelling to say that Christian life has a goal to achieve, namely, attaining beatitude. One could describe this as a project or work, and theology—which leads to this end—as a practical science. To say that theology is an affective science is just to say that it is not only our attainment of the good that is achieved here, but the full satisfaction of our affections.

Is there a fundamental disagreement between our authors on this point? Aquinas appears to be the outlier, because he insists that our fulfillment comes in beatitude in the contemplation of God. But Thomistic scholarship of recent years, from Jean-Pierre Torrell to Gilles Mongeau, seem to have made it its business to warn against a purely intellectualistic reading of Aquinas.[90] The end of the theologian, one wants to insist, is not the mere knowledge of a set of facts, but a knowledge of God that is at the same time a pilgrimage, a way to achieve the fullness of beatitude.

(2) The question can also be understood in terms of the matter of the science: does *theologia* deal with the kind of thing that is treated in the speculative sciences, or the kind of thing that is treated in the practical sciences? (Here there is no difference between *theologia* and theology; the matter of both—the truth revealed by God and known in faith—is identical.) All of our authors will acknowledge that *theologia* deals with matter that

[90] See, e.g., Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 2, *Spiritual Master*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), esp. chap. 1, "Theology and Spirituality"; ibid., "Le savoir théologique chez saint Thomas," *Revue thomiste* 96 (1996): 355-97; Gilles Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom: The "Summa theologiae" as Spiritual Pedagogy* (Toronto: PIMS, 2015), esp. chap. 1, "A Wisdom That Makes One Holy."

exceeds what Aristotle had in mind when he made the distinction between the speculative and the practical sciences. For Alexander, this is reason to call *theologia* wisdom, rather than science. For Aquinas and Bonaventure, it is why "practical" is an inadequate designation for *theologia*. For Albert, it is grounds for saying that *theologia* transcends both the speculative and the practical. Odo alone is still willing, even in the face of this, to identify *theologia* as practical, though by means of equating the practical and the affective.

Is there a fundamental difference between our authors? There is some refinement in the apprehension of this aspect of the question. Aquinas asserts that practical sciences deal with human acts, and therefore *theologia* cannot be practical; none of his contemporaries seems to disagree with him about that. But the further claim, that insofar as *theologia* is about God it is speculative, seems to be unique to Aquinas. Let us say this: insofar as "speculative" and "practical" name sciences that fall under the natural powers of the human mind, we have good reason to deny that *theologia* is among them; all of our authors would agree with that. If one is willing to talk about parts of *theologia*, then part of *theologia* is practical, because it has to do with human acts; another part is speculative, namely, that part that has to do with suprasensible realities. Aquinas is clearly willing to regard *theologia* this way, Odo seems to be inveterately opposed to it, and the case is less clear for Albert and Bonaventure. If one insists on talking about the whole of *theologia*, then its character as speculative, or practical, or affective will have to do with the formal unity of its content—a point to which Aquinas plainly adverts.

(3) A final approach to the question would have to do with the mode of proceeding. If a science is described as speculative, that seems to be of a piece with the idea that it proceeds in a speculative mode—that is to say, an argumentative, or disputative, or ratiocinative mode. If, on the other hand, a science is described as practical, then it would seem to proceed via modes of discourse that are oriented to action: thus, exhortation, admonition, counsel, and so on.

Here we see an obvious difference between *theologia* and theology. *Theologia*—the revealed word of God—has all of the modes of proceeding that one finds in Scripture: occasionally argumentative, but more often rhetorical, exhortative, etc. Theology, on the other hand—whether one thinks of it specifically as the work of Lombard, or commenting on it, or more generally using the faculty of reason to come to an understanding of the faith—properly has a demonstrative, or argumentative, or rational mode. All of our authors would agree with this. Even Alexander of Hales, the one of our authors who explicitly denies that *theologia* is a science, does so in the context of a series of questions that are derived from Aristotle's analysis of what constitutes a science. More tellingly, all of our authors clearly appeal to rational argumentation in their pursuit of theology. Theology exists so that we might understand; *theologia* exists so that we might be saved. Odo's position that *theologia* is practical is more palatable in this light; whereas Aquinas's dictum that *sacra doctrina* is speculative is easily accepted if one takes this to refer to theology, rather than describing *theologia* in its entirety.

Where there is perhaps difference is in terms of what theology looks like in its highest or most perfect state. If we are to take Alexander at his word, the wisdom that is *theologia* is affective, pure and simple. Odo would have us see that any truth rationally arrived at in theology has a *telos* beyond that; it may look rational, but its ultimate dynamism is to the affective. Albert speaks of theology by analogy with the knowledge of God in beatitude; what this might mean for the way that theology is practiced here below would need further exploration. Bonaventure points us to a distinct habit that is both intellectual and affective, and suggests that theology properly practiced not only leads to an affective result (à la Odo) but is itself thoroughly affective. And Aquinas sees theology as mirroring in our frail minds God's own fully intellectual knowledge of himself and his acts—a working-out in speculative ways of what is essentially a contemplative foretaste of the divine.

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I have chosen not to frame these conclusions in terms of a general difference between the Franciscan and Dominican intellectual traditions, because it is obvious that the question requires more precision than that. The authors studied here are, indeed, rivals, for they are asking the same questions, and providing answers that can fruitfully be compared to each other. No Thomist, or Albertinist, or Bonaventurean should think that he must read each of these authors on a given theological point. But I would suggest that a way forward that would be of benefit to the whole of the theological tradition is that one ask, for example, Thomistic questions of Bonaventure, and Bonaventurean questions of Aquinas. What we can see, with respect to the specific question of this article, is the way in which theology could be called speculative, and the way in which it could be called practical, and the way in which it could be called affective. Because the understanding of theology contained in these authors is fundamentally *simpatico*, we may emerge with a consensus as to the possible range of answers, which could inform the conception of theology in any age.

The Thomist 85 (2021): 127-38

THE TEACHING OF THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL IN CURRENT CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

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THE STATE OF THE CHURCH in the aftermath of the Council of Nicaea famously reminded St. Basil the Great of a nighttime naval battle: "The raucous shouting of those who through disagreement rise up against one another, the incomprehensible chatter, the confused din of uninterrupted clamoring, has now filled almost the whole of the Church, falsifying through excess or failure the right doctrine of the faith."[1]

[1] St. Basil's words (drawn from his *De spiritu sancto* 30.77) are cited in the first footnote of Thomas Guarino's book under review here (see below); he is quoting Pope Benedict XVI's Christmas address to the Roman Curia on December 22, 2005. Vivid is the description in Basil's previous paragraph (ibid. 30.76): "To what then shall I liken our present condition? It may be compared, I think, to some naval battle which has arisen out of time old quarrels, and is fought by men who cherish a deadly hate against one another, of long experience in naval warfare, and eager for the fight. Look, I beg you, at the picture thus raised before your eyes. See the rival fleets rushing in dread array to the attack. With a burst of uncontrollable fury they engage and fight it out. Fancy, if you like, the ships driven to and fro by a raging tempest, while thick darkness falls from the clouds and blackens all the scenes so that watchwords are indistinguishable in the confusion, and all distinction between friend and foe is lost. To fill up the details of the imaginary picture, suppose the sea swollen with billows and whirled up from the deep, while a vehement torrent of rain pours down from the clouds and the terrible waves rise high. From every quarter of heaven the winds beat upon one point, where both the fleets are dashed one against the other. Of the combatants some are turning traitors; some are deserting in the very thick of the fight; some have at one and the same moment to urge on their boats, all beaten by the gale, and to advance against their assailants. Jealousy of authority and the lust of individual mastery splits the sailors into parties which deal mutual death to one another. Think, besides all this, of the confused and unmeaning roar sounding over all the sea, from howling winds, from crashing vessels, from boiling surf, from the yells of

Many have found Basil's vivid description of the aftermath of Nicaea pertinent to our troubled post-Vatican II times.

The image of a naval battle seems a particularly apt one. No less than the very first, the twenty-first ecumenical council was launched into rough seas of doctrinal disagreement and left swells of controversy in its wake. History suggests that it is the normal state of affairs for ecumenical councils to settle some things and, where the theological consensus has not taken shape, deliberately to leave other matters unresolved. Not infrequently the very resolutions pronounced by a council remain at the center of contention long after the participants have gone home.[2] The animated theological debates of the sixty-year period leading to the Second Vatican Council, momentarily put on hold during the council itself, resumed afterward with a somewhat altered set of protagonists and an agenda reset by the council itself.

In the midst of current turbulence, it is easy to forget the rough seas of the 1950s and 1960s, not to mention those of the 1920s and 1930s. There is a general awareness but not always a sufficiently profound understanding of the significance of these years for the council's agenda and output. The Modernist controversy—suppressed perhaps prematurely—had left many issues unresolved: the nature of revelation, the role of tradition, the place of historical-critical methods in the study of the Scriptures, the propositional force of doctrines, the possibilities and limits of doctrinal development, and other issues as well. The reform movements that shaped the participants at Vatican II—biblical, liturgical, ecumenical, patristic—had begun twenty, forty, or even sixty years before the council convened. These movements challenged the hegemony of Neo-Scholasticism in

the combatants as they express their varying emotions in every kind of noise, so that not a word from admiral or pilot can be heard. The disorder and confusion is tremendous, for the extremity of misfortune, when life is despaired of, gives men license for every kind of wickedness. Suppose, too, that the men are all smitten with the incurable plague of mad love of glory, so that they do not cease from their struggle each to get the better of the other, while their ship is actually settling down into the deep."

[2] The title of Philip Hughes's classic, *The Church in Crisis: A History of the General Councils 325-1870* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), captures the dramatic quality of conciliar history over the centuries.

Catholic thought as well as settled patterns of law and practice in Catholic life. When contextualized by the social and cultural unrest caused by two catastrophic world wars, the pastoral and doctrinal situation in which the council began its deliberations in the early 1960s was plainly a stormy one. Council fathers, curial officials, and theological experts were expected to assess a variety of contending theological and pastoral proposals about how to address the challenges posed by this new situation.

Jared Wicks succeeds in giving us some idea of how they went about doing this. In the opening lines of *Investigating Vatican II: Its Theologians, Ecumenical Turn, and Biblical Commitment*,[3] he announces that his book "presents the Second Vatican Council as an event to which theologians contributed in major ways and from which Catholic theology even today can gain enormously" (1). With theologians in the spotlight of this highly informative book, readers might well expect Wicks to examine something of the prior theological debates in which some of the very theologians he considers were prominent actors. But he sets his sights elsewhere. In this collection of ten lively essays (originally published between 2009 and 2015), Wicks shows, sometimes in considerable detail, how the positions these theologians espoused during earlier years shaped the eventual teaching of the council. He writes about the contributions of many theologians—including Karl Rahner, Yves Congar, Edward Schillebeeckx, and Joseph Ratzinger—to the development primarily, but not only, of conciliar teaching on ecumenical relations and biblical studies.

In his tantalizing first chapter concerning what he calls the "Tridentine motivations" of Pope St. John XXIII, Wicks sets the theological substance of the council's final teaching in these areas into the broader context of the previous history of doctrine and theology. Marshalling Angelo Roncalli's earlier writings, Wicks shows the influence of prominent Tridentine figures (Cesare Baronio, Charles Borromeo, and Gregory Barbarigo) on Pope John's aspirations for making the council he had summoned "a comprehensive council" like Trent, by complementing the "doctrinal formulations of its four constitutions with a broad

[3] Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018.

program of renewed practice in worship, ministerial service, and the apostolate" (30). Few readers will have been aware of this important aspect of what we might call the remote prehistory of Vatican II.

The more proximate prehistory of the council comes into view later in his book when Wicks reminds us, without much discussion, that, after the proposed schemas of the preparatory commissions had been set aside by the council Fathers, "the revised schemas made use of work by the Catholic pioneers—of 1930 to 1960—of biblical, liturgical, patristic, and ecumenical thought." "These movements," whose proposals were not reflected in the work of the preparatory commissions, "proved to constitute the effective theological preparation for Vatican II" (171-72). This comment suggests that it will always be impossible to measure the full significance of the council documents if the earlier theological developments have not been taken into account—even if this is not the primary focus of this book.

Matthew Levering's *Introduction to Vatican II as an Ongoing Theological Event*[4] takes us deep into four central teaching documents of the council—*Dei Verbum, Sacrosanctum Concilium, Lumen Gentium*, and *Gaudium et Spes*—by studying the proximate prehistory of the council in four areas: fundamental theology, liturgical theology, ecclesiology, and theological anthropology. Levering's method for doing this is ingenious. He devotes each of the four main chapters of his book to one of these topics as exemplified by an important work of a single notable theologian: in fundamental theology, René Latourelle's *Theology of Revelation* (1963; ET 1966); in liturgical theology, Louis Bouyer's *Liturgy and Architecture* (1967); in ecclesiology, Yves Congar's *True and False Reform in the Church* (1950; ET 2011); and, in theological anthropology, Henri de Lubac's *The Mystery of the Supernatural* (1965; ET 1967). Discussion of each of these works allows Levering to range widely in the relevant literature about each topic at the same time that he illumines the theological debates of the first half of the twentieth century that engaged the attention of these four theologians. Each of the four chapters

[4] Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2017.

concludes with a discussion of the specific conciliar constitution under consideration therein.

To be sure, in this fine book, Levering is not interested simply in uncovering the intricacies of theological controversy, and much less in identifying the winners and the losers. The meaning of the council cannot be reduced to "a mere struggle for power, whether between neo-scholastics and the *nouvelle théologie,* clergy and laity, traditionalists and progressives, conservatives and liberals." What counts for him is the Christological center of the council, an interpretation that places the focus on "Jesus Christ crucified and risen and upon how Christ wishes us to share in his life today in the modern world and for the salvation of the world" (176). One may be permitted to hear this argument as an impassioned plea—a *cri de cœur*, as it were—on Levering's part. The council sought to address a range of issues that were in urgent need of attention and, with sheer beauty and finely tuned relevance, succeeded in teaching that Christ is at the center of every aspect of the Church's life.

But in the popular mind and sometimes even in expert analysis of conciliar teaching, it seems as though the council invented a series of controversial positions to upset traditionalists and to cheer progressives. Levering recognizes the critical importance of the understanding of the prehistory of the council—both proximate and remote—to account for the final shape of conciliar teaching in the areas he studies. The presumption is that the council was called to address serious theological and pastoral issues—in liturgy, fundamental theology, ecclesiology, and theological anthropology—that could not simply be left to inquiry and disputation by theologians but required deliberation and direction on the part of the Church's Magisterium.

A failure fully to grasp the complexity of the situation that the council faced has, at least in part, led to challenges to the legitimacy and authority of Vatican II. These challenges arose very early on and eventually produced a "virtual" schism on the part of traditionalists who are members and fellow travelers of the Society of St. Pius X. Even after years of dialogue with the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith about particular conciliar teachings, the Society has refused repeated appeals to

return to full communion with the Holy See and continues to press a wholesale assault on the authority and legitimacy of the council. While unprepared to offer a definitive historical judgment on the matter, one may venture a guess that these "irreconcilable differences" have created an unprecedented conversation in the case of this council. It is not just individual teachings that are rejected, as often happened in the past, but the council as such. Conciliar hermeneutics of Vatican II has thus nearly become a theological specialization of its own: the entire teaching of the council is subjected to a comprehensive interpretation (with usually negative results) to the neglect of the specific ways in which conciliar documents open the way to theological developments that have already been received and appropriated by tradition-minded if not traditionalist theologians.

This reviewer was present in the Sala Clementina on that day in 2005 when Pope Benedict XVI framed the question of the hermeneutics of Vatican II in terms of two general approaches: on the one hand, a hermeneutics of discontinuity and rupture, and, on the other, a hermeneutics of continuity and reform. It was immediately clear that this formulation of the question would define all future discussion of the matter. The terms "continuity" and "discontinuity" refer to the standard represented by previous Catholic teaching. As Thomas Guarino poses the issue in his book, *The Disputed Teachings of Vatican II: Continuity and Reversal in Catholic Doctrine*:[5] "Was the council an authentic development and extension of the prior doctrinal tradition, or was it in fact—at least in certain instances—an unabashed corruption of it?" (2).

A more theologically sophisticated and rigorously argued case for the substantial continuity of the teaching of Vatican II with traditional Catholic teaching than Guarino's would be hard to find. Recognizing the interplay of continuity and discontinuity in the conciliar teaching, he insists that discontinuities need not entail departures from the tradition but can open the way to legitimate development of doctrine. He deploys not only his knowledge of Vincent of Lérins on doctrinal development in

[5] Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2018.

making this case,[6] but also the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas on participation and analogy. Readers of this journal will be interested to know that, according to Guarino, "Thomist ideas are more decidedly present at Vatican II than is usually assumed" (200).[7]

Guarino convincingly shows, regarding a set of disputed teachings—priesthood, Mariology, ecclesiology, ecumenism, theology of religions, and theological anthropology—that principles of participation and analogy were at work even when unmentioned in the conciliar texts. In each of these cases, there was development in Catholic teaching that was fully in accord with the tradition. Regarding ecumenism, for example, the council upheld "the unique status of the Catholic Church, but it did so in a theologically sophisticated way, making it clear that other churches truly, formally and intensively participated in the church of Christ" (104). What is more, "analogical reasoning allowed the council to achieve a new sense of unity with other Christians" by affirming the Church's "traditional self-understanding" but in a way that "does not exhaust the attribute or perfection of the church of Christ" (106). Conciliar teaching on primacy and collegiality, revelation, and religious freedom, because they seem to involve real discontinuities with the tradition, pose a greater challenge for Guarino's methodology. Relying heavily on Vincent of Lérins and a very careful analysis of the issues, he largely succeeds in demonstrating that conciliar teachings on these "disputed topics" are "homogeneous and organic developments" of Catholic doctrine.

The continuity-versus-discontinuity paradigm is a rough tool—much refined in Guarino's skillful hands—that has been helpful in confronting broad hermeneutical issues regarding the council. But what is needed now is a better grasp of the path for

[6] Guarino is also the author of *Vincent of Lérins and the Development of Christian Doctrine* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2013).

[7] In support of this judgment, Guarino quotes Yves Congar's remark in his article "La théologie au Concile: Le 'théologiser' du Concile" (*Situation et tâches présentes de la théologie* [Paris: Cerf, 1967], 53): "It could be shown . . . . that St. Thomas, the *Doctor communis,* furnished the writers of the dogmatic texts of Vatican II with the bases and structure of their thought" (quoted in Guarino, *Disputed Questions of Vatican II*, 200).

theological inquiry as it has been affected by conciliar affirmations directed to addressing the situation the council faced in liturgical theology, revelation, ecclesiology and church order, theological anthropology, Catholic social teaching, and theology of religions, to mention only the most prominent areas of doctrine. Countless books and articles attest to the reality that the reception and appropriation of the teaching of Vatican II among Catholic theologians has been underway for years. While debate about the hermeneutics of the council persists—rarely at the level of sophistication on display in Guarino's excellent book—theologians get on with their work. Generally speaking, theologians do not need to be persuaded that the teaching of Vatican II is in continuity with Catholic teaching. They simply work this out in the course of integrating conciliar teaching into their theological arguments in their particular fields of specialization or expertise.

The Reception of Vatican II[8] exemplifies this healthy dynamic. This book is a collection of sixteen essays on the constitutions, decrees, and declarations of Vatican Council II, edited and introduced by Matthew Lamb and Matthew Levering, and complementing their earlier volume, *Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition*.[9] For the most part, the authors of these essays avoid issues of broad interpretation of the council in order to identify themes that invite theological research and appropriation.

Readers of *The Thomist* will be interested in a long and marvelous essay in which Martin Morard, member of the Leonine Commission, has catalogued and briefly analyzed the use of the teaching of Church councils by St. Thomas Aquinas in his works.[10] Morard's survey reflects what might be called the normal state of affairs in the work of Christian theologians with respect to conciliar teachings. They may express disagreements with certain elements in these councils or examine the interpretations of particular passages. But when Aquinas, Barth, Rahner, or Balthasar—or, more recently, La Soujeole, Mansini,

[8] New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

[9] New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

[10] Martin Morard, "Thomas d'Aquin lecteur des conciles," *Archivium franciscanum historicum* 98 (2005): 211-365.

Feingold, or D'Costa—write about a particular theological topic, relevant conciliar teachings, especially those marked by a certain definitive character, necessarily enter into their exposition.[11] That is the way things work in theology. Conciliar teaching is woven into the fabric of theological inquiry. There may be controversy over particular conciliar affirmations, but eventually a consensus is formed, on the basis of magisterial precedent and theological argument. At the same time, by pointing toward areas of further research and development, councils typically open new pathways for theologians to pursue.

On display in the essays of the new Lamb-Levering volume is a stream of recent work on liturgical theology, sacramental theology, fundamental theology, ecclesiology, theology of holy orders (especially of the episcopacy and diaconate), theology of the laity, theological anthropology, and theology of religions that reflects the steadily maturing assimilation of the teaching of Vatican II in current theology. The overall intention of the council to address modern challenges in a pastoral mode and to avoid dogmatic definitions did not by any means preclude doctrinal teachings in the actual outcomes of the conciliar deliberations. The doctrinal constitutions contributed massively to the Catholic understanding of—to mention just the most prominent issues—the theology and celebration of the liturgy, all aspects of the doctrine of revelation, and many areas of ecclesiology. Normally, the Magisterium follows the theological consensus, and the maturity of development in these areas was affirmed by the council and enunciated in its teaching documents. What is more, as we have remarked, such development both follows and prompts expansion and progress in theological thought. Even though Vatican II, unlike many other general councils, was not intended to be a dogmatic council of dogmatic

[11] Some recent works where the teaching of Vatican II figures prominently: Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole, O.P., *Introduction to the Mystery of the Church* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005); Guy Mansini, O.S.B., *Ecclesiology* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021); Lawrence Feingold, *Faith Comes from What Is Heard: An Introduction to Fundamental Theology* (Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2016); Gavin D'Costa, *Christianity and World Religions: Disputed Questions in the Theology of Religions* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009).

statements, it advanced theological understanding in several areas even in ways that were undeniably controversial. Much of this has in fact already been absorbed into mainstream Catholic theological inquiry, despite the presence of dissenting voices, and even dissenting groups, opposed to one or another element of conciliar teaching. This situation is hardly unique in the history of the reception of the teaching of ecumenical councils.

Theology of religions, for example, has matured enough to receive course corrections from the Magisterium. *Nostra Aetate* occasioned a deepened understanding of the Catholic faith in the universal salvific will of God that allowed, through analogical reasoning (as Guarino would say), a recovery of implicit elements in Christian doctrines about other religions. Again, in ecclesiology, *Lumen Gentium* hugely enriched Catholic teaching on the doctrine of the Church and the relation of the Catholic Church to other Christian communities. While theology in these areas has largely proceeded along lines consistent with the Catholic tradition, there have nonetheless been some deviations, and the Magisterium through the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has been obliged to intervene to set theologians back on the right course—in theology of religions through documents such as *Dominus Iesus* (2000) and *Placuit Deo* (2018), and in ecclesiology through *Responses and Commentary on Some Questions Regarding the Doctrine of the Church* (2007). This is normal. Would it be amiss to hope that the literature of general conciliar hermeneutics will diminish in quantity or at least become less exigent as the normal state of affairs returns after fifty years of controversy over the authority and legitimacy of Vatican II?

Stephen Bullivant does not try to answer this question. More a sociological than a theological study, his sobering and enlightening volume, *Mass Exodus: Catholic Disaffiliation in Britain and America since Vatican II*,[12] falls into a genre altogether different from the books we have been considering. One might well give to this genre the title of one of its better know specimens: What went wrong with Vatican II? There have been many, many books in this genre that fault Vatican II for any

[12] Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

number of disasters that occurred in the fifty years since the council. Statistics show that declines occurred in church attendance and vocations among Catholics between 1955 and 1975. What caused this shift? For some the answer is simple: Vatican II. Bullivant offers a highly nuanced account of this history. As he points out, Protestant church attendance also declined in that same period. The sexual revolution, feminism, the gay-rights movement, bad vernacular liturgy, religious relativism, abortion and contraception, drug use, erosion of civil order, social unrest, atheism, and so on: is it really plausible to imagine that a number of bishops meeting in Rome caused all of these problems? Those coming of age in the 1960s had been born during or just after the worst world war in the history of the human race. The societal and cultural changes we have experienced in the aftermath of Vatican II did not develop overnight, but over the course of many decades. The entire world underwent a series of revolutions over a relatively short span of time that inevitably affected Catholics everywhere, and thus church attendance, seminary enrollments, and religious vocations, and so on. Knowledge of the proximate prehistory of the council is essential in order to assess the achievement of Vatican II as it struggled mightily to respond to forces already massed at the Church's doorstep. As Bullivant points out, "Had there been no Council, scholars might now be writing books arguing that *if only* the Church has less timidly embraced the Liturgical Movement; *if only* Pope John had realized his dream for a great Council . . ." (254)—and so on. It may well be, as Bullivant and others have suggested, that the council is one of the reasons why the situation is not much worse, that it in fact anticipated later developments, and that it was thus a powerful prophetic voice preparing the Church for the challenges to come.

Like Bullivant, St. Basil wrote an "Exposition of the present state of the churches." It forms the final chapter of his work on the Holy Spirit. In the very last section (30.79), he explains why, despite the uproar that might drown out his words, he decided to speak:

Wherefore we too are undismayed at the cloud of our enemies, and, resting our hope on the aid of the Spirit, have, with all boldness, proclaimed the truth. Had I not so done, it would truly have been terrible that the blasphemers of the Spirit should so easily be emboldened in their attack upon true religion . . . and that we should shrink from the service of that doctrine, which by the tradition of the Fathers has been preserved by an unbroken sequence of memory to our own day.

Readers can be grateful to the authors of the books we have been considering that, like St. Basil, they have not remained silent amidst the surrounding din.

BOOK REVIEWS

Muhammad Reconsidered: A Christian Perspective on Islamic Prophecy. By ANNA BONTA MORELAND. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020. Pp. 192. $45.00 (hard). 978-0-268-10725-3.

Anna Bonta Moreland has written a short, yet bold, yet irenic book, arguing that Christians may, in good theological conscience, name Muhammad a prophet. Drawing upon Thomas Aquinas's treatment of prophecy and the new interreligious openness of Vatican II, they may, she contends, acknowledge him as the recipient of real divine revelations. This cannot be understood in the same way that it is understood by Muslims in the *Shahada*, the Muslim creed, we are assured. Indeed, if it were, this would effectively be an act of *submission* and make us Muslims. How then exactly might Christians, while remaining Christians, correctly speak about Muhammad and so fill in a prominent lacuna left by the council, which spoke in positive tones about the religion of Islam and its adherence to the one, merciful God, but left its founder conspicuously, entirely out of the picture? Moreland has landed upon a genuine *quaestio disputata*.

Her thesis is provocative, but not entirely new. Hans Küng, among others, has advanced the same basic claim. Küng's adventuorous theological orientation is well known, so it is important to add straightaway that Moreland brings forward a new argument and articulation, more ecclesially and magisterially centered (she repeats her interest to work *ex corde ecclesiae*) and she thus offers a more restrained and even open-ended position. It is, nevertheless, easy to detect a hope shared by both Moreland and Küng of "major positive consequences" should Christians take this step of interreligious reverence towards Islam and its founder. Readers of the book may, as I do, admire and applaud Moreland's conscientious attitude and effort, yet also wonder ultimately whether all this is adequately justified—both the optimism and the attempted theological defense.

The 132 pages of text (at its heart a fusion of a 13-page *Modern Theology* article from 2013 and 16-page article published in 2015 in *Theological Studies*) are easily read and summarized. The many questions these pages excite are much more difficult to address, however. This is one of those rare cases where an author has perhaps written too little, rather than too much. As in a medieval *quaestio*, one must address quite a few subpoints and objections.

The book is neatly divided into six chapters with a clear progression, sometimes somewhat disjointed in practice. Chapter 1, entitled "Setting the Stage," makes a protreptic point in highlighting how the contemporary world's troubled engagement with Islam owes much to secular modernity's problematic (areligious) understanding of religion. In this scenario, Moreland agrees with Pierre Manent that the Catholic Church offers unique resources for dialogue. Developments at Vatican II appear of particular relevance here, and from this perspective she proposes exploring Islam, through the sensitive theme of Muhammad's prophetic claims, from within a properly Catholic framework.

The following three chapters then work to plant the project within the bounds of the Catholic tradition, in terms of both magisterial pronouncements and theological reflection. Chapter 2 accordingly runs through a series of relevant Church documents, while chapters 3 and 4 focus on Aquinas's teaching on prophecy.

Moreland, in her discussion of Church teaching, opts to lead with *Dei Verbum*, not in view of any passage directly relevant to Islam or even pertinent to prophecy as such, but rather under the conviction that we have moved to a new hermeneutical phase in the interpretation of Vatican II. Quoting John O'Malley, she agrees that, "Instead of examining the documents in isolation from one another, we are now ready to examine them as interdependent" (19). In practice, this means a certain return to "the spirit of Vatican II," though Moreland later more cautiously speaks of "the spirit and the letter." If *Dei Verbum* thus yields her the notion of a nonpropositional revelation, open to ever-deepening understanding, she means to apply this to a theme nowhere addressed in the dogmatic constitution itself. *Lumen Gentium* and *Nostra Aetate* instead confront Catholics with the challenge of openness to Islam as the religious Other, which Moreland takes as an occasion for exactly the deepened understanding spoken of in *Dei Verbum*. In addition to several postconciliar documents and consistorial instructions guiding Christian-Islamic dialogue, *Dominus Iesus* is the other obvious magisterial landmark on the map. A distinction made in the document between "theological faith" and "belief" is highlighted as important and problematic, and Moreland seems intent on using the distinction later, but, like several hints throughout, it remains in the end a hanging analytical thread.

The two chapters on Aquinas represent Moreland's effort to reach "deep into the tradition" for resources to talk about Muhammad as a prophet. This block of material represents the most significant expansion beyond her two earlier articles and returns, in a way, to her original training, which was in Thomistic theology rather than interreligious dialogue. Chapter 3 thus offers an honest exposition of Aquinas's teaching on the prophetic charism, based upon his systematic works. This material, which is well known to students of the theology of inspiration, is of use here for its attention to prophecy's multiple facets. To her credit, Moreland cites Aquinas's open judgment of Muhammad, in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, as a perverter of Christian revelation. This view, which she recognizes as implicitly incompatible with Muhammad's prophet-

hood, is nevertheless reckoned by her to be occasioned by Aquinas's deficient medieval worldview, as deficient medieval biology and cosmology also impact his thought. Whether such a simple dismissal can convince and bear the full theological weight it must for Moreland's purpose is a question that obviously challenges the foundations of her project.

Chapter 4 concentrates on Aquinas's biblical commentaries. Here are brought forward a number of biblical cases of prophecy on the part of non-Christians, such as Caiaphas and Balaam's donkey. These examples, and the existence of ongoing postcanonical prophecy in the Church, are recurring refrains throughout the book. Moreland shows how Aquinas stops short of attributing to Caiaphas the dignity of being a prophet, admitting instead merely that he prophesied under a supernatural impulse. Oddly, this distinction is blurred in the closing chapter when Moreland again recalls Caiaphas's case to help defend her thesis that Muhammad might be recognized as a prophet—not simply that he may have prophesied, as one might have anticipated based on Aquinas's discussion. The example of the Roman soldiers, very briefly handled, is also curious, since it is merely their deeds in casting lots for Jesus' garment that has a prophetic significance. This paradigm, too, is later again evoked, but not explored as one might have expected.

Chapter 5 moves to modern discussions and considers six different authors—not all theologians—who have weighed in on the question of Muhammad's identity as a prophet. Four have made an affirmative claim, but generally with some attenuated sense of the word "prophet." Küng, who holds that it is only "dogmatic prejudice" that keeps Christians from recognizing Muhammad as a prophet, goes so far as to claim that a decision for Jesus is a decision for his follower Muhammad, who preached the same God. In contrast to Küng, the only other Catholic voices considered by Moreland, Christian Troll and Jacques Jomier, each very well credentialed to speak on the subject, are both against calling Muhammad a prophet. In Moreland's estimation, however, the only reason they offer amounts to the problem of misunderstanding on the part of Muslims, who would take the claim as inimical to Christian beliefs.

The sixth and final chapter ("Closing Argument") promises to tie the threads together, yet turns in a curious direction, leaving the laboriously acquired Thomistic taxonomy of prophecy aside, except as a "complex array of encounters with God" (131), and instead arguing (drawing on David Burrell) that an analogical approach to prophecy and the category of "private revelation" represent the solution to the problem. Muhammad was not a prophet in some equivocal or univocal sense (i.e., not simply a great political leader), and not like the great biblical prophets either. He was perhaps instead like those who receive Marian apparitions, special revelations which do not add to the closed body of public revelation, but rather help to deepen our insight into it and to direct human lives aright. In the end, we are encouraged to explore calling Muhammad a prophet "in a limited and relative sense" (121): a vague assertion that we should imagine as a "theoretical possibility" (132). The final lines of the book are, ultimately, less than convicted doctrinally speaking, even

suggesting that the Church should prudently avoid weighing in too definitively on this question (which reticence was earlier critiqued in the case of Vatican II). Moreland closes by warmly expressing the benefits of reading the Qur'an.

With so slippery a conclusion it can be a bit hard to know just what to fasten upon in responding. It is best, perhaps, simply to address the fundamental question: Can and should we call Muhammad a prophet?

Among the relevant literature not cited by Moreland is a recent article by Wolfgang Pfüller ("Sollte Mohammed aus christlicher Sicht als Prophet anerkannt werden? Eine veraltete Fragestellung," *MThZ 65* [2014]: 131-44), where he makes a very pertinent point missing in Moreland's treatment. Muhammad not only does not preach certain essential Christian truths—which is common enough, even in certain authentic prophetic revelations. Muhammad also contradicts these truths directly and does this with the open claim to have spoken the definitive and full revelation of God. The Qur'an's charge against Christians and Jews of catastrophically garbling the faithful transmission of the real story of revelation (*taḥrīf al-kitāb*) also cannot be ignored, I might add. This whole situation must be recognized as a very big problem. Hints here and there throughout Moreland's book suggest that a sifting, cafeteria-style selection of Qur'anic verses would be necessary for Christians who accept Muhammad as a prophet. Perhaps this is her way of quietly pocketing what Pfüller approaches head-on.

Pfüller himself accepts a rigorously logical scenario. Either we reject outright as "untrue" whatever contradicts the doctrine of councils like Nicaea and Chalcedon, or we recognize instead that these doctrines themselves are wanting in truth. Like a good modern German theologian, he prefers this latter option, which then allows him to approach Muhammad in a generally positive light, if not precisely as a *prophet*—an "outmoded" category that he rejects for many of the same reasons that Moreland finally opts for an analogical meaning. Given Moreland's own clear desire to reason *ex corde ecclesiae*, she must grasp the former horn of the dilemma. Her decision to maintain the language of "prophet" as a meaningful category (*pace* Pfüller) is an additional sign of her religious good faith—though it also puts her in a pretty pickle, given her thesis. It is hard to avoid the suspicion—or, at the very least, it raises the question, never acknowledged in her treatment—that if Catholics can and should call Muhammad a prophet in some real sense, they should also in good conscience promptly append a word such as "false" (or, following Pfüller in being as generous as possible: "at least partly a false prophet")—which would presumably not be a great coup for interreligious good-feeling.

The risk here is worth a moment's pause, for I think that the prudence advised vis-à-vis official Church pronouncements, which Moreland happily sneaks in at the last moment before the back cover of the book turns over, is actually good counsel, not simply for the Catholic Church but for any good-willed, truth-loving person. My instinct, in fact, is to question whether positioning the Catholic Church in the role of the only viable interlocutor with Islam, as Moreland in her first chapter proposes, is not perhaps a dangerous and

premature conceit. On the one hand, the positive turn enunciated at Vatican II is still remarkably fragile and in its earliest infancy. The West—and the Church as a principle protagonist—is frankly so unfamiliar with viewing Islam in any way other than in a polemical, apologetic, or missionary light (a task not made easier in the present climate) that our most basic knowledge of the religious phenomenon on its own terms must be acknowledged as close to nil. There should accordingly be a time, it would seem, of simply getting acquainted on neutral, humane, and humanistic terms, before jumping to enthusiastic religious conclusions about the "mystery of Islam" or the prophethood of Muhammad. Figures like Georges Anawati, it is well worth noting, one of the major architects of the key paragraph in *Nostra Aetate*, were profoundly committed to the primacy of scientific engagement, which had to struggle (and still does) to displace the traditional framework of theological evaluations. On the other hand, in just this connection, I entertain real hope for a project like that of Angelika Neuwirth, doyenne of continental Islamic studies, who, applying means long familiar in Christian and Jewish circles from critical biblical scholarship, means to offer a kind of secular, methodologically grounded vision of the emergence of the Islamic community and their book. Her extraordinary introduction, *Der Koran als Text der Spätantike: Ein europäscher Zugang* (2011), with the associated multivolume Qur'an commentary still forthcoming, appears to me a monumental (very recent) first step in the right direction. Jumping straight to religious categories like prophecy, by contrast, puts the cart ahead of the horse. For my part, at least, I would prefer first to know historically (that is, within the proper limits of historical science) where exactly the Qur'an came from and what we can actually say about Muhammad. Only when Islam is thus placed on a similar hermeneutical plane with the Jewish and Christian traditions, with our sacred books and with our prophets, can we start to treat these items on a level and debate bold theses like Moreland's. Professional readers of ancient religious literature will (like Neuwirth herself) recognize that the bar set by the Bible is extraordinarily high and already perceive the Qur'an in this light.

The value of all this may be illustrated by an article that Neuwirth wrote nearly 30 years ago ("Der historische Muhammad im Spiegel des Koran: Prophetentypus zwischen Seher und Dichter"), in which she highlighted the issue of ecstatic speech and the figures of *kāhin* (seer/soothsayer) and *šā'ir* (poet) as they apply to the "historical Muhammad." In 15 passages the Qur'an forcefully rebuts the suggestion of Muhammad's Meccan contemporaries that he is possessed by djinns and demons, recording various protests that he is not a mere *kāhin* or *šā'ir*.

> I swear by what you can see and by what you cannot see: this [Qur'an] is the word [spoken by] an honored messenger [*rasūlin karīm*], not the word of a poet—how little you believe!—nor the word of a soothsayer—how little you reflect! This [Qur'an] is a revelation sent down from the Lord of all worlds: if [the Prophet]

> had attributed some fabrication to Us, we would have certainly cut off his lifeblood. (69.38-47)

Neuwirth observes that this rejected interpretation of Muhammad's activity as something less than the full-fledged Messenger he claims to be actually finds some explanation and defense in the way certain literary patterns strikingly liken various Qur'anic *surahs* to the literary behavior and style of a certain pre-Islamic *kāhin*. There is an art lurking behind the impressive interface of ecstatic diction, like the work of the *chresmologoi* at Delphi.

So, was Muhammad a fake? That is not necessarily the conclusion, and moving beyond the absurd travesties that plague crusader-era *vitae Machometi* is obviously honorable and right. I am not sure that anyone today is actually defending the story of the cow with the book in its horns, however, or Muhammad's trick of putting corn in his ear. Nevertheless, dismissing the traditional Christian view of Muhammad as a surreptitious twister of Christian doctrine as so much bad medieval biology appears, at least to me, to be a trifle too easy. Indeed, I wonder if we are not here on much firmer ground than speculating on theoretically possible religious experience. The acknowledgment of deep interactions with both Christian and Jewish traditions is part and parcel of the "text of late-antiquity" approach to the Qur'an. So too is the overdue demythologization of the so-called *djāhilyīya*: the "time of ignorance," which construct wipes away all Arabian history before Muhammad, conveniently blown away like the desert sands.

Is not Muhammad's debt and ultimate relation to Christianity (and Judaism) finally unavoidable in any genuine and open Christian-Islamic dialogue? It is, in any case, a historical question. It is also, in this historical sense, the really upsetting part of Benedict's Regensburg lecture: "What that is new has Muhammad brought to the world?" We might even ask what that is new he brought to the Arabs; for it is no longer possible to suppose, as has long been done, that belief in one God was nonexistent in the polytheistic world of the pre-Islamic Arabian peninsula. The epigraphical evidence of the last fifty years has plainly forced a radical revision of this picture, as Julien Christian Robin and others have shown. The Himyarite Kingdom, for instance, in the southern highlands of Yemen, converted from the South-Arabian pantheon, first to Judaism in the fourth century, then to Christianity in the sixth, on the very eve of Muhammad's arrival. So, if his message to them about the one merciful God was not entirely *new*, then perhaps, positively speaking, this great pan-Arab leader brought *renewal* to a degraded state of belief and praxis. Is Jomier thus right to evoke the figure of the *guide réformiste*—while being mindful of Congar's criteria of "true and false reform"?

For Moreland this is not enough. There is a supernatural claim to be staked. It is a challenge, however, to know how precisely Muhammad's charismatic status as the recipient of "private revelation" would put him in a different class from, say, Montanus, Emanuel Swedenborg, or Mary Baker Eddy—or how many countless others like them—all more or less errant Christians, reformers

and prophets, of various stripes. In contrast to being Lewis's Lunatic, Liar, and the Lord all at once, there is nothing impossible about being a Psychotic, Pretender, and Prophet (i.e., beneficiary of real *gratiae gratis datae*) rolled into one. This leaves perfectly open, of course, the "theoretical possibility" for which Moreland is pleading. But it also leaves the damaging ambiguity equally open. Balaam, to whom she repeatedly averts, was clearly both a pretender and prophet. Something was also happening in second-century Phrygia and chances are good it was not all a charade. The "New Prophecy"—a supposed further stage of public revelation—with Montanus's own claims to be a prophet channeling the Paraclete, bear strong resemblances, moreover, to Muhammad himself and his claims, especially if Qur'an 61:6 says what many Muslims (plausibly) think it says about John 14:16. For the Church, however, which in the second century plainly still had her own living prophets, this was a sort of "new" postbiblical prophecy that went far too far.

Shall a sifted approach of throwing out the bad *surahs* like so many bad apples thus bring balance to the situation? Or would this be an intolerable crime against the integral character of Muhammad's meaning, a blind perversion, in its own way, like the travesties of the medieval *vitae*? If a new brand of "New Prophecy" is ultimately the most honest and accurate response to Manuel II Palaiologos concerning what here is actually *new*, it would seem that we have our answer to Moreland's question. The Church has already pronounced on private revelation pretending to be public.

For the Greek apologists, prophecy and not only philosophy was a point of common ground with their pagan dialogue "partners." When it was not the Sibyl, however, who attested to Christ, Greco-Roman prophecy was likely to be reckoned as the work of demons. Maimonides seems to have granted Muhammad unflattering status as the "mad" prophet of Hosea 9:7. Vatican II makes a landmark invitation to recognize common ground with the religion of Islam, but I dare say the council Fathers were shrewd to rest content with the One Merciful God. This provides more than ample space for both religious and secular exchange, before deciding whether the very particular claims of prophetic inerrancy connected with Muhammad and the Qur'an can ever be meshed with the Catholic doctrine of revelation.

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The Oxford Handbook of Catholic Theology. Edited by LEWIS AYRES and MEDI ANN VOLPE with the assistance of THOMAS L. HUMPHRIES. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. 962. $145.00 (hard). ISBN 978-0-19-956627-3.

Lewis Ayres and Medi Ann Volpe have edited an elegant volume of 962 pages that is laudable for its clarity, thematic focus, and, surprisingly, succinctness. A charitable Thomist spectrum and diverse theologies of *ressourcement* dominate, and the Latin-Rite worshipper is named as a primary, but not the sole audience. Within this clearly delineated framework, some attention is also paid to the emergence of non-Western and liberationist sources.

A glimpse of the whole is found under the subheading "Anxieties" (intended as a self-interrogating companion to the stances of trust and wonder) in Ayres's otherwise architectonic essay, "What Is Catholic Theology?" (25-30). Having surveyed the contemporary task of Catholic theology as both proclamatory and speculative, Ayres worries about the risk that is inherent in all speculative thought, a risk of losing sight of concrete realities in one's very midst. Among those realities named by Ayres as necessary and necessarily anxiety-ridden risks, I will highlight three. He worries about: (a) the legitimate provocation of recent contextual theologies to a unified sense of catholicity and to the formal unity of theology itself (34-38), (b) the quickly fading memory of the Catholic tradition in a younger generation and the attendant fear of "newness" on the part of their elders (cf. 727-35 on Hans Urs von Balthasar's bold attempt at confronting Catholic amnesia), and (c) the dissipation of a positive (i.e., not socially constructed) understanding of human nature. Each of the fifty-six essays broaches at least one of these three concerns. The guiding pattern, more positively stated, is to proclaim the Christian message of salvation discovered within the communion of triune love to critically reasoning but sinful creatures as that message has been refracted among distinct loci over the course of centuries.

The first half moves mainly synchronically in describing Catholic teaching (a) in a creedal or definitional sense (four foundational essays), (b) through the lens of "God, Creation, and the History of Salvation" (nine essays), (c) in the sacramental life of the Church (seven essays), and (d) in Catholic moral theology (seven essays). The next half of the volume moves historically from Origen and Augustine (again with a programmatic essay by Ayres) up to the present in outlining the sources, trajectory, and problems of "Modern Catholic Theology" (with a total of twenty-nine essays). It is noteworthy that Vatican II and its innovations receive their due in a key essay by Gavin D'Costa and throughout as an integral part of the stream of evolving tradition that includes Trent and Vatican I (cf. Trent Pomplun, Christian Washburn). The rupture thesis is thus intentionally set aside (799) in order to make ample room for such topics as the postmedieval current of spirituality in Pierre de Bérulle and the French school or the insights on renewal from Johann Adam Möhler (616-20), John Henry Newman (620-6), and nineteenth-century Thomism (658-65). The mid-

twentieth-century renewal that immediately preceded Vatican II is not ignored, but it is not treated as the sole or even decisive pivot to modern Catholicism.

Given the overabundance on the banquet table, a selective scrutiny of representative chapters and interesting arguments must suffice. On the enterprise of Catholic theology, for example, William Desmond comments on the philosophical doctrine of analogy. Though shackled by his didactically excessive neologizing, Desmond charts a creatively modern (but not univocally modern) vocation for reason in Catholic theology. He states, "the created is given a share in, participates in this ultimate good of the 'to be'" (91). Secular modernity turns creation into a "project" brought into being by the nonrelational self. Nurtured by analogy's playful (or "plurivocal" in Desmond's jargon) joining of unity and difference, creation retains its dependence but not as a mechanically caused determinate being. The being created by the Creator for the dwelling of the creature is shrouded in mystery but also, paradoxically, radically concrete. The creature exists "be-cause" of the creature's originating in divine self-exceeding generosity. What about freedom? "Christian freedom," Volpe clarifies several chapters later, "reflects God's own freedom" (366, cf. John McDade). Finite reason's role in this interplay of freedoms, she continues, is therefore not to snuff out desire but to direct it towards its true object: God (367).

Regarding God, creation, and salvation history, Thomas Joseph White, O.P., offers an essay on "The Holy Spirit" that reworks a Thomistic theme in the language of Charles Journet. After surveying biblical and patristic sources, White argues that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son eternally but is sent on a mission temporally into the world to save and divinize (188). Nothing that arises in the economy adds to the divine identity of God. The mission of the Spirit is an invitation to creatures to participate in the triune life of God. After considering prospects for reunion with the anti-*filioque* East in light of the prodding from recent Vatican statements, White turns to the analogy between the created sacramental graces given through the divine love of the Spirit and the "heart" (*STh* III, q. 8, a. 1, ad 3) or uncreated soul of the Church. When the Church worships, it does so out of reciprocal love. The truth that is manifest (cf. John 15:26) and the unity that is upheld (John 17:21) are gifts of the Spirit. Both the mission of evangelizing in the name of Christ and open-ended dialogue with the non-Christian are tasks that fall to the members of the Church with equal vehemence, but the Spirit of truth in both cases is the animating principle of the Church.

Under sacramental life, David Fagerberg and Pamela Jackson speak with characteristic eloquence of liturgy as a source of theology (following Lambert Beauduin) and Martin Laird of the relationship of theology to prayer. Jackson maintains that the liturgy is not just properly regulated ceremonial acts: "It is the vehicle through which God extended his saving action accomplished in Christ to each generation by the power of the Holy Spirit" (264). The entire Trinity acts in the liturgy. Liturgy is not a museum piece or an occasion for mystical ascent into the unknown but a concrete invitation to participate in a

saving reality that derives from the mysteries of Christ's own life. Laird likewise highlights the Trinitarian and ecclesial dimensions of personal prayer as part and parcel of the universal call to holiness. If we seek to contemplate the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit, then prayer is itself "Sabbath rest in the Triune mystery who rests in us" (356). Other essays treat specific sacraments such as Eucharist, holy orders, and marriage and their historical genesis, but the mutual recirculation in the ecclesial bloodstream of the Church's liturgy and the Church's theology is the principal leitmotif of this section.

This handbook stands apart from similar companions of recent vintage in that it highlights the positive contribution of diverse modern revivals of the medieval Scholastic legacy. John T. Slotemaker and Ueli Zahnd, in their survey of Thomism from the death of St. Thomas through high modernity, speak of a gradual and lamentable isolation of Neo-Thomism within Catholic institutions even after *Aeterni Patris* (547). Francesca Aran Murphy and Serge-Thomas Bonino survey the developments from 1871 to the publication of the online *Index Thomisticus* in 2005 in two separate and comprehensive chapters. Servais Pinckaers's revival of a more theological recovery of the Thomistic synthesis concludes these surveys. Declan Marmion defends the transcendental turn within the Thomism of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan, and Gabriel Flynn lays out the critique of the two-tiered theology of nature and grace pursued in different ways by Maurice Blondel, Henri de Lubac, and Karl Rahner. Natural law and virtue ethics are treated principally in Livio Melina's "Virtue and Catholic Moral Theology" and Kevin Flannery's "The Natural Law in Catholic Ethics" as well as in Ulrich Lehner's essay on "Catholic Theology and the Enlightenment." The eighteenth-century rationalism that was initiated by Nicholas Malebranche, Lehner notes, reconceptualized natural law and promoted human rights but without the Thomistic framework. Kevin Flannery notes that the New Natural Law theory of Germain Grisez and John Finnis is, by contrast with Malebranche, more closely tied to Thomism but still fails to appreciate the original account in St. Thomas of the intelligible structures of exterior acts (401). In sum, the legacies of Scholasticism in modernity appear almost as varied as the legacies of modernity itself. The thread that connects them, perhaps most articulately voiced in Josef Pieper's much-lauded synthesis, is the aforementioned counterpoint to the dissolution of the idea of human nature as such.

A welcome but somewhat unexpected development is seen in certain essays with regard to the fluid relationship between the Thomist revival, the theology of Karl Rahner, and liberation theology. Daniel A. Keating shows that human liberation is affirmed, not denied, by Paul VI in *Evangelii Nuntiandi*, even as the Pope issues a clarion call for a new evangelization (336-38). Joseph Wawrykow explains how Rahner employed the Scholastic distinction between uncreated and created grace to counter the neo-Scholastic manuals (418-21). Rahner's explicit recourse to Scholastic sources, Aaron Canty rightly notes, was sometimes more Bonaventurean than Thomistic. In any case, in both Rahner and liberation theology, Wawrykow continues, this technical distinction

regarding the overlapping order of the exigencies of nature and supernatural grace can be placed at the service of the preferential option for the poor. Roberto Goizueta likewise gives a sweeping justification of liberation theology as a Catholic and ecclesial project but argues that its future is only valid in the present context of postmodern nihilism if the theological grounding to the project (such as has been made by the Peruvian Dominican Gustavo Gutiérrez) is deepened and intensified (803-19). Not all the treatments of social questions are equally open to recognizing the programmatic significance of an integral theology of human liberation. While David Matzko McCarthy concludes his overview of Catholic social teaching with the recognition of the complementarity of subsidiarity and solidarity and Chad Pecknold treats religious liberty in a sophisticated neo-Augustinian fashion, the gradual evolution from neo-Scholastic humanism to a modern theology of human liberation is not a central theme in these two treatments of social questions.

The section on recent developments includes novel contributions on Scripture, the ecclesial movements, and gender. Mary Healy charts an ecumenical consensus on the return to a theological approach to Scripture, not as a strict method that usurps the non-negotiable historical-critical advances, but as a form of academic and ecclesial renewal that faces squarely the lagging of Catholic preaching. Ian Ker makes a brilliant and novel argument that the extended family ever-so-loosely organized under the banner of "ecclesial movements" was never verbally convoked by Vatican II but is actually promoted through the conciliar plea for the renewal of the organic communion of the People of God. Danielle Nussberger joins the ecclesial programs of modern North American Catholic feminism with John Paul II feminism synthetically and with her characteristic finesse, while being fair to both sides of this debate. A separate and equally lucid essay by José Granados examines John Paul II's theology of the body in its breadth and depth.

One can glean the budding Catholic theology of the World Church in Vimal Tirimanna's chapter on Asia and Anthony Akinwale's chapter on Africa. Both highlight Catholic versions of liberationist thought that are neither Latin American nor the caricature rightly rejected in Vatican documents from the 1980s. Tirimanna outlines the Asian bishops' response to the pluralism in Asia, one that is more advanced than its North American variant, and Akinwale addresses the Catholic response to the growth of African Pentecostalism, which is likewise set in a different context from what is found in the Americas. Paul Murray, in writing on "Catholicism and Ecumenism" provides a formal framework ("receptive ecumenism") that might shed light on these two globally expanding realities, but his helpful article is still too focused on the dialogues with the mainline traditions in their Euroamerican contexts to offer a concrete way forward.

Although, with their elevated style, some essays demand a good deal from the uninitiated reader, *The Oxford Handbook* is, as a volume, organized so as to be easily digestible. It does not aim for the exhaustiveness (or exhaustingness) that one finds in the older European encyclopedia. But the essays are also not

abridged to the point of being mind-numbing flyovers. An advanced undergraduate or beginning master's student will benefit enormously by having this work on her shelf. The introductory notes on sources are valuable as are the suggested readings, bibliographies, and the Catechism cross-references at each chapter's end. The multiple indices at the back of the book are likewise helpful. As with all ambitious endeavors, updating will be needed with time, especially as more work from the Global South and other marginalized communities finds its way deeper into the mainstream.

This first edition of the Oxford Handbook is eminently recommendable for anyone entering the field of Catholic theology today and will certainly be a valuable reference work for anyone of any confession who is seeking to become acquainted with the lay of the land.

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The Fathers of the Church in Christian Theology. By MICHEL FÉDOU, S.J. Foreword by BRIAN E. DALEY, S.J. Translated by PEGGY MANNING MEYER. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019. Pp. xxviii + 399. $34.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8132-3171-6.

"This book . . . has no parallels that I know of in contemporary Catholic theological scholarship," says Brian Daley in his Foreword (xv). That is true for historical scholarship too. There is no parallel historical work providing an overview of the twentieth-century patristic revival, its impact in theology beyond the boundaries of patristics, why this impact mattered, and, again to quote Daley, "why a clear understanding of early Christianity is always of crucial importance for the Church's present freedom to act" (xiv)—and, I would add, to think.

The implications of the book extend beyond Catholicism, since it takes up the relevance and, indeed, exigence of patristic theology for contemporary reflection on such fundamental Christian doctrines as the Trinity, anthropology, the Church, and revelation, as well as for biblical exegesis and for ecumenism and interreligious dialogue. Along the way, challenges to the continuing relevance of patristic theology coming from contextual theologies, anti-metaphysical and deconstructionist worldviews, historico-critical exegetes, and more, are all considered. It is true, then, that the book has no real parallels. For this reason alone it repays the reader willing to accept the invitation to think along with the author about issues that take many of us outside our disciplinary comfort zones.

Michel Fédou limits himself to the question, "*what is the relationship between patristics and theology*" (3). The first chapter, "The Genesis and History of 'Patristics,'" answers by distinguishing "patristics" (as "a part of Christian theology") from "patrology" (as the "history of early Christian literature"). The (modern) words "patristics" and "patrology" serve to focus our attention on the word "Fathers," a distinction that the Tradition, beginning in antiquity, has considered essential. Even the secular discipline of "patrology" (and its descendants) implicitly relies upon the distinction as an indication of the significance of "early Christian studies." Fédou features the phrase "Fathers of the Church," not least in his title, specifying four characteristics of a "Father": orthodoxy of doctrine, holiness of life, approval of the Church, and antiquity (14, 156), all of which are qualified as actually applied. Interestingly, neither sex nor ordination is on the list.

A "Father" is someone that Tradition accords a privileged, authoritative status. Thus it is inconsistent with Tradition to dismiss the Fathers as irrelevant for contemporary Catholic theology or to relativize them as one set of sources among many (negating their status as "Fathers" in any but a trivial chronological sense). Fédou proposes that "the metaphor of 'paternity' . . . be understood in all its profundity," invoking Malachi 3:24 (cf. Luke 1:17) where, before the "day of the LORD," Elijah will come to "turn the hearts of the fathers to their children and the hearts of children to their fathers" (165). "And," Fédou continues, "just as the Old Testament expressed an exigency of reconciliation between fathers and sons, similarly one can understand analogically, in Christian history itself, an exigency of communion between the generation of the Fathers and the following generations" (166). "Communion" does not mean contemporary theologies will not be "original and new." But it is necessary that they be "in their very innovation, in communion with the witness of faith," the "heritage from the Fathers." It is "at the point where contemporary theology accepts this heritage" that there comes about an "engendering" moment that "allows new generations in their turn to engender an understanding of the faith according to newness of places and times" (ibid.). Fédou immediately adds that "this engendering is the work of the Spirit" acting not independent of history but in and through it:

> The engendering of the faith is not immediate, it itself happens through a relationship of paternity and filiation in the very history of Christianity, and the relationship of the Fathers of the Church precisely attests that this relationship of paternity and filiation is found inscribed in the very constitution of Christian theology. (167)

Fédou allows no easy exit from the exigencies implied in the phrase "Fathers of the Church," especially for theology and even for secular study, but at the same time this is not a proposal for a patristic fundamentalism. The metaphor of paternity, as a metaphor of engendering, implies an originating continuity and a newness. One can read the whole book from this perspective.

Examples of this "engendering," taken from the period of the *ressourcement* and Vatican II, abound. Fédou is careful to span the theological spectrum, demonstrating the "fecundity" of the study of patristic texts for both Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar (both undertook painstaking studies of Origen). For them, as for Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou, and Yves Congar, the patristic texts were "not simply considered as 'subjects' for study," but were taken up to help provide theology that will "nourish the faith of the Christian people" (34-35), learning "from historical theology 'the fragment, from our past, that forms our future'" (76), as Rahner put it. I would say that Fédou locates in the Fathers, precisely as Fathers, a dynamic that, if attended to carefully, engenders a continuity that itself entails renewal. This was as true for high Scholastic theology itself (16-20) as it was for nineteenth- and twentieth-century theologians, from Johann Adam Möhler and John Henry Newman (25-29) to those mentioned above and more. And it can also be true for the present. Despite obstacles which would seem to delimit patristic "fruitfulness" to the past, this very same dynamic promises a similar renewal-in-continuity when applied to those very challenges that would seem to require leaving the "Fathers" behind as relics of a hopelessly distant past.

One objection that cuts across many of the theological fields for which Fédou demonstrates the fecundity, past and potential, of the Fathers is that of their "Hellenization" of Christian doctrine. This "reproach" (151) implies distortion of the gospel, along with a reliance on an "onto-theology" that in any event is outmoded. Fédou concedes "there is a partial truth in the suspicion against the 'Hellenization' of Christianity," since it "warns against the risk of deforming or . . . forgetting . . . the biblical message in its original form" (152). Yet long before the Fathers existed there was the Septuagint, not to mention the New Testament—"in its original form" in Greek. In any event this "risk" is not unique to the theology of the Fathers but is "inherent in what is required of every presentation of the biblical mystery in a given cultural context" (153).

Further, the Fathers transformed the meaning of the philosophical concepts they used "in the light of biblical revelation," so that, according to Aloys Grillmeier, the "'Hellenization' of the language [of revelation] has for its counterpart a 'de-Hellenization' of its content." Consequently, in the exact words of Grillmeier, "'Nicaea is not the Hellenization but the de-Hellenization, or the liberation, of the Christian image of God from the dead-end divisions into which Hellenism had landed it'" (154). The theological reader from a different culture can and must make use of this dynamic of reception and transformation of cultural categories.

But further, this first "inculturation" of the gospel message, thus stated neutrally minus the reproach of "Hellenization," has a special place in the ongoing Tradition. It places all future theology in its debt. For one thing, the charge of "onto-theological" metaphysics seems outdated now, given the work of scholars like Jean-Luc Marion and Emmanuel Falque, since "the fact that God is presented as 'the One who is' in no way amounts to, for Gregory of Nyssa or for Augustine, considering him as a 'being' among others" (155).

Even in the context of the challenges of inculturating the gospel in non-Western societies, the original inculturation in Greek terms and concepts does not lose its relevance. The dependence of patristic literature on "Greco-Latin culture . . . ought not to be considered only from the point of . . . obstacles . . . but also from the point of view of what, in itself, helps receiving and thinking about the revelation of Christ—for example, the meaning of history . . . or even the meaning of the human person and his dignity" (282). These are examples of genuine "evangelical preparation," and they can neither be taken for granted nor left behind, especially when faced with philosophies or religions that deny the reality of the finite person or meaning and direction in history.

Rather, as Thucydides says, such things are "a kind of 'possession for all time'" (282). Fédou has in mind both ideas directly inherited from Greco-Roman culture (he gives the example of the dignity of the human person as represented in Homer and the Greek tragedies), and those doctrines, regarding Jesus Christ and the Trinity, for example, that used Greek philosophical terms and reconfigured their meaning to the revealed Mystery, such that "today the writings of the Fathers still remain a reference and a source for all reflection on Christ and the Trinity" (283). And, although Aloysius Pieris "contested the 'models of Greco-Roman inculturation'" specifically because "the Fathers consider that 'only the *culture* of Rome and the *philosophy* of Greece were worth being assumed,'" while 'the patristic tradition was consistently negative in its assessment of other religions'" (174), Fédou spends a chapter ("Theology of Religions") showing that this is an overstatement and instead proposes "the fecundity of patristics for the theology of religions" (320), one that goes beyond the paradigm of "exclusivism" versus "inclusivism" and therefore could potentially revise the very structure of our thinking about this issue (325-26).

The chapter on the contribution to understanding the Bible afforded by the study of patristic exegesis is vigorous and persuasive in its positive recommendations. Yet it is here that the major weakness of this excellent monograph shows through, namely, that it yields too much to modernity as itself a positive good that must go unquestioned. Despite the highly nuanced defense of patristic typology and allegory as representing what de Lubac called a "'polyvalence oriented to the symbol'" (145), we hear in various ways that patristic exegesis "must never be substituted for the search for the literal meaning as it can be established by critical exegesis" (146). Not only in this chapter (e.g., 116, 137) but in subsequent chapters we are repeatedly reminded "to stress . . . the irreversible knowledge that henceforth critical exegesis produces" (269, here with regard to Bible and the Trinity). But these contributions and this knowledge are never specified, even once, in the whole book. It is never mentioned that, apart from a few noteworthy cases, so-called critical exegesis begins from *de facto* atheistic or agnostic methodological assumptions. Perhaps, as a secular discipline, it can establish the "literal sense" of ancient texts, biblical books included, but whatever this sense is, it is not the same as the literal sense of these texts considered *as Scripture*. In effect, the book proposes that the literal sense be yielded to secular exegesis while the

Fathers can contribute to the spirit. But that means the "literal" and the "spiritual" come decisively unhinged, though in the Fathers the literal is always in some way ordered towards the spiritual. Patristic exegesis is ultimately barred from challenging the assumptions or the paradigm of "critical exegesis" itself.

Could it be that this overly optimistic view of the fruits of modernity is related to a mysterious, virtual absence in this book: namely, that of St. Augustine? True, he is present, but in vastly attenuated form. The most sustained discussion of him is essentially an afterthought, his significance relegated to the section on "spirituality" (346-52). The entire chapter on anthropology (208-35) omits him almost entirely, as does the chapter on Christian ethics (236-60). The contributions of Origen and the East are valorized as "fecund" for today's reflection, but one would never know that, in a world which has witnessed genocide after genocide in the last century, the doctrine of original sin (for example) would have anything to offer. It is as though Augustine, the doctor of suspicion *par excellence*, is silenced, lest his bold hermeneutic of cultural suspicion be applied to such untouchable projects as "critical exegesis," or to the sunny evaluations of human progress put forward by modernity.

Nevertheless, considered from the point of view of what is offered, rather than from the point of view of what is not offered, this book remains a magnificent achievement and it places all of us in the author's debt.

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Thomas Aquinas and the Greek Fathers. Edited by MICHAEL DAUPHINAIS, ANDREW HOFER, O.P., and ROGER NUTT. Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2019. Pp. xviii + 360. $44.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-1-932589-82-5.

This volume brings together an illustrious cast of contributors to offer studies on an incredibly important theme. Its publication is thus a cause for celebration. Comprised of twelve chapters (thirteen if one counts, as one should, Andrew Hofer's insightful and developed conclusion) and a short introduction, this collection treats the reader to a feast of scholarship on the use and reception of the Greek Fathers in Thomas Aquinas, as well as the broader implications of Thomas's deep interest in the Greek Fathers for the theological discipline as a whole. In such a short review, I cannot do justice to the many and diverse riches of each individual contribution. I will attempt to offer a succinct summary of the contents. While some chapters will be discussed in more detail than others,

this is not a reflection of uneven quality (happily, this is one of those rare edited volumes with an evenly high quality) but rather simply betrays my own interests.

Dominic Legge, O.P., offers a discerning treatment of the episode of the Transfiguration in Thomas's work. It would be worth considering this chapter along with Marcus Plested's contribution to the volume, which likewise deals with the Transfiguration. Both authors see important points of contact between the Greek patristic tradition and Thomas, particularly via the latter's use of John of Damascus to discuss the light that shone from Christ upon the disciples. Their conclusions, however, differ slightly. For Plested, there is no clear conflict between Thomas's understanding of the light of Tabor and that of Palamas, and the attempt of Prochoros Kydones (a fourteenth-century Byzantine anti-Palamite admirer and translator of Thomas) to drive a wedge between them on this matter was wrongheaded and ultimately a failure: "the Byzantine Aquinas," Plested writes, "was indubitably a Palamite" (220). The possibility for this position arises for Plested from Thomas's mature works, where Plested perceives a shift away from Thomas's earlier explicit identification of the light of the Transfiguration as something created to something more nuanced and open to a Palamite reading.

I daresay that Legge would disagree with Plested's reading on this point. Although he seeks a *rapprochement* between Palamas and Thomas (27-28), he insists on the traditional Thomist reading of the "*claritas*" that shines through Christ's humanity as having its most immediate cause in the created habitual grace and charity that fills Christ's human soul. The importance of Thomas's qualification of John of Damascus's reading is emphasized by Legge: the glory of the Transfiguration is not only "from the divinity [or Godhead]" (as the Damascene writes) but also from Christ's human soul (24). Plested downplays this qualification, whereas Legge amplifies its significance. If the source or cause of the light at the Transfiguration is only "indirectly" (as Legge argues) the divine nature or the grace of hypostatic union, and its more direct and immediate cause is in fact the created habitual grace in Christ's human soul, then a reconciliation between Palamas and Thomas on this point is a rather tall order. It would repay further work.

Jörgen Vijgen's chapter on Thomas's reception of Origen is a gold mine of information and, until Vijgen completes his ambitious project on the subject, can be considered a basic point of reference for any future discussion of the matter. Here, we learn in detail how Thomas considers Origen a theological opponent but nonetheless someone trustworthy in biblical exegesis. We are shown how, in certain contexts, Origen is "*doctor*" and "*sanctus*" for Thomas, but in others (specifically doctrinal contexts), he is "deranged" (*deliravit*) (41, 87). Origen comes in for especial censure on the matter of the preexistence of Christ's human soul (which Thomas ardently rejects), but his *Commentary on John* was deployed favorably and liberally by Thomas compared to others at the time (77). Vijgen has performed a great service to scholarship in bringing together and skillfully situating and delineating Thomas's references to and understanding of Origen.

Khaled Anatolios offers us a refreshing and rewarding comparison of the soteriological concerns of Athanasius of Alexandria and Thomas. His worthy goal is to combat the tired binary that contrasts Western and Eastern understandings of salvation in terms of ethics (West) versus ontology (East), where the West sees salvation as the solution to the problem of sin and the East sees it as the solution to the problem of death (89). Anatolios succeeds in showing how "both Athanasius and Aquinas demonstrate the necessity, fittingness, and intelligibility of seeing divine justice as integral" to a broader ontological framework (109). Anatolios meditates beautifully, using texts from Athanasius and Thomas, on the incorruptible death of Christ and on Christ's vicarious repentance for humanity. He calls for more work on the Christological focus of soteriology, specifically "to extend our contemplation of Christ's salvific work into a consideration of how Christ's thinking and feeling contributed to the working out of human salvation" (109). He sees the groundwork for this enterprise laid in Thomas's focus on Christ's two wills, itself an integral part of the Greek patristic heritage.

John Baptist Ku, O.P., compares Gregory Nazianzen and Thomas on the generation of the Son by the Father. He convincingly argues that although at first blush their varying terminology might appear to imply a substantial difference between them on the issue, these differences indicate slightly different priorities. At root, their positions are the same.

Gerald P. Boersma offers a provocative treatment of the vision of the divine essence in Thomas and the Greek Fathers, in which he argues that "a substratal difference" on the understanding of beatitude exists between them, on the basis that the Greek Fathers reject the language of seeing the divine essence (149). Thomas is clearly the winner for Boersma on this issue, and he appears to think that because the language of "vision of the divine essence" is excluded by the Greek Fathers, they must therefore have an impoverished view of the state of the beatified compared with that of Thomas. I learned much from Boersma about the contours of Thomas's thought on the matter, and I certainly commend the article on that front. Unfortunately, however, on the side of the Greek Fathers, little attention is paid to the fact that for them a "vision of the divine essence" would be tantamount to positing human deification "by nature" rather than by grace (Thomas attempts to circumvent this problem by distinguishing the "vision of knowledge" from the "vision of comprehension," but I am not sure the Greek Fathers would be convinced on this point). From the perspective of Greek patristic theology, two key questions from Boersma's account of Thomas need to be addressed: (1) Since the grace of the *lumen gloriae* is presumably created for Thomas, how is he offering an allegedly better or fuller picture of participation in the uncreated God than the Greek Fathers? (2) If, in Thomas's words, "the divine substance is not beyond the capacity of the created intellect in such a way that it is altogether foreign to it" (144), and the created intellect is closer to the divine intellect than to its own corporeal senses (145), and thus attainment to the intellectual vision of the divine essence is not really a "miracle" (147-48), do we not dangerously fray the edges of the absolute

ontological gap between the natures of creature and Creator? Further, on this view, how does the bodily resurrection function as anything more than an awkward appendix to the understanding of beatification, rendered necessary by the Gospels and the consequent espousal of hylomorphism, but functionally superfluous for the beatific vision? We get the self-confident sense from Boersma that Thomas has cleared away the deficiencies of the Greek patristic approach to sanctification and deification in favor of a more satisfactory vision, but how deeply satisfactory is this alternative? The fact that recent Thomistic studies have highlighted Thomas as a proponent of deification and a champion of the resurrection of the body points instead to recognized deficiencies in the commonly received view of Thomas's understanding of beatification. I am not claiming to have a comprehensive grasp of that understanding myself, but I do think that the Greek Fathers cannot be lightly dismissed as inferior on the matter of beatification simply because they refuse to countenance language that, to them, is equivalent to a form of natural deification (something usually associated, for the Greek Fathers, with Messalianism).

Brian Dunkle, S.J., makes an important contribution by showing the manner in which Thomas deploys one of his favorite Greek patristic sources, namely, John Chrysostom. We learn that Chrysostom is important for Thomas on the issue of Christ as our example, but not so much for doctrine. Furthermore, Dunkle shows how "Thomas seems more willing to correct the statements of Chrysostom than those of his other authorities" (162), pointing to the importance of avoiding blanket statements about Thomas's respect for this or that author based only on bare numerical data (e.g., how many citations of a given author are found in Thomas).

Stephen M. Fields, S.J., gives us a philosophically dense but rewarding look at the need to balance apophatic and kataphatic theology through the use of the category of analogy in Thomas and Dionysius (the latter with the help of Hans Urs von Balthasar), attempting to forge "a middle ground between ontotheology and fideism" (166).

Bernhard Blankenhorn, O.P., brings Thomas and Maximus the Confessor into dialogue in a chapter that richly repays close study. At the heart of this chapter is the theology of union with God, which Blankenhorn helpfully configures Christocentrically for both authors. He identifies many points of contact but also key differences. Of the latter, among the most interesting is Thomas's insistence that "even at the summit of divine cognition" the "human intellect's act still reaches completion by a return to phantasms" (187): that is to say, there is an abiding function of mediations in the mind's union with God (188), an idea absent in Maximus (for whom the deified intellect is fully "caught up" in the divine without created mediations). Blankenhorn, however, turns against Maximian scholar Jean-Claude Larchet's description of Maximus as functionally "monoenergist" on the matter of deification, wishing to see an ongoing created human operation (or cooperation) in the eschatological experience of the saints (200-203), not just the energy or operation of God (which for Maximus is uncreated). I think that to be true to Maximus and also

perhaps to advance the discussion on these matters, one could usefully bring in the idea of being an "instrument of God." This is deployed by Thomas for the humanity of Christ as an instrument of the divine, and yet Maximus also applies this in *Ambiguum* 7 to the saints: they become an instrument of the divine nature, receiving by grace what is Christ's by hypostasis. Could Thomas allow for such a radical position? It also helps account for the strong, apparent "monoenergism" of Maximus's view: the saints do not lose their natural, created operation, but they are now operative, as creatures, with the uncreated operation of God, being instruments of the divine nature.

John Sehorn makes an excellent contribution to our understanding of Thomas's approach to religious images, arguing that Thomas's use of the language of *latreia* for images of Christ should be viewed sympathetically and contextually, but that ultimately the decisions of Nicaea II distinguishing types of veneration (decisions unavailable to Thomas) take precedence on the matter.

Jane Sloan Peters offers us a wonderful chapter on the use of Theophylact of Ohrid's biblical commentaries by Thomas, building on the groundbreaking work of C. G. Conticello and others to give us a glimpse of the exact ways in which Theophylact was deployed by Thomas (mostly for the literal sense of Scripture, as it happens). She has identified dozens more unattributed uses of Theophylact in Thomas's *Lectura super Ioannem*; her scholarship is certainly one to watch.

Joseph Wawrykow's study of Thomas's and his four Greek interlocutors' views on the Eucharist (Cyril of Alexandria, John Chrysostom, Dionysius the Areopagite, and John of Damascus) is a solid contribution to scholarship, delivered in Wawrykow's typical, crystal-clear manner. He demonstrates how Thomas respects yet occasionally expands on his sources when articulating his teaching on the Eucharist. For instance, Thomas adds to John of Damascus the notion of the "instrumental causality" of the created power of the words of institution for the confecting of the Eucharist (292-93). Wawrykow also takes issue, on Thomas's behalf, with Chrysostom's line "He lets us feel Him, and eat Him, and embrace Him" on the basis that "there is not, literally, a bodily encounter, a touching of one body of another" in the reception of the Eucharist (289). This reaction, I daresay, would go too far for the Greek patristic tradition. It points to a tension between the rejection of transaccidentation, on the one hand, and the affirmation of the presence of Christ's bodily accidents "in the mode of substance" by concomitance, on the other. The rejection of transaccidentation must win out between these two if the Eucharist is categorically not "a touching of one body of another."

Finally, Hofer in his conclusion issues a spirited call for Thomas, Thomas, and more Thomas. Thomas is not simply *ad mentem patrum* but *ad mentem Dei cum sanctis*. A strong case is certainly made for the ongoing importance of Thomas as well as the importance of incorporating the deep study of the Greek Fathers into our appreciation of Thomas. The volume as a whole is an eloquent testimony to this. However, if I were to add a methodological question for the overall enterprise being undertaken here, it would be this: if Thomas views the

authority of individual Fathers as intrinsic yet only probable, is the same not true for Thomas himself? By Thomas's own estimation, the chorus of Greek patristic voices on a particular matter might in fact be more probable than Thomas's view taken alone. Yet in some of the included chapters, the tone would suggest that the Greek Fathers are answerable to Thomas, but not vice versa. Linked to this is an occasional tendency to set up the "playing field" of theological discourse with strictly Thomistic categories such that the Greek Fathers can only participate if they somehow play along with that nonnegotiable superstructure and its particular rules. Such an approach, needless to say, will not ultimately help future dialogue between East and West. Happily, even where these tendencies sometimes emerge in the volume, the quality of scholarship is consistently high and honest. This volume has a vast wealth of insight to recommend it to anyone wishing to come to grips with the harmony as well as ongoing notes of tension between the theology of the Greek Fathers and that of Thomas Aquinas.

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Emergence: Towards a New Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science. By MARIUSZ TABACZEK. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2019. Pp. 418. $75.00 (hard). ISBN: 978-0-268-10497-9.

The concept of "emergence" is invoked in discussions of novel and robust phenomena in complex physical systems that seem to be inexplicable in terms of the properties of their parts, and in investigations of various kinds of spontaneous organization observed to occur in biological systems, from individual cells to ecological systems. While the philosophy of science has traditionally concerned itself with epistemological questions, even defining itself in opposition to metaphysics in the early twentieth century, the subsequent revival in metaphysics in analytic philosophy—much of it inspired by Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics—has encouraged philosophers to begin honing and applying their metaphysical tools once again to scientific inquiry and the philosophy of nature. Mariusz Tabaczek believes the concept of emergence requires a serious metaphysic, and his book offers an impressive, wide-ranging analysis of the challenges facing this undertaking.

Tabaczek's analysis is shaped by a reading of the "major turning points" in Western philosophy's search for causal explanations that will be familiar to any Thomist (1). It begins with the creation of Aristotle's fourfold account of causation in terms of "formal," "material," "efficient," and "final" causes (2-

17), which emerged from the primordial turmoil of ancient philosophy to attain its clearest expression in the Middle Ages in the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of hylomorphism (17-20). His narrative includes a Fall in the modern era (20-25), in which a reductionist and mathematics-based approach to nature dispensed with formal and final causes in favor of a material world of efficient causes. We learn little about how or why this descent into causal monism took place, nor do we find any indications of possible weaknesses to which some Scholastic appropriations of Aristotle might have been susceptible. While there may be less nuance in this narrative than some would wish, however, Tabaczek does not indulge in the overblown rhetoric against the "analytic philosophy" of our era that characterizes (and ghettoizes) fashionable theology. He finds within contemporary philosophy two movements that harbor promise of a Restoration.

In the first place, the problem of emergence in the sciences has given rise to the need for a concept of "downward causation," in which the "higher levels" of a system are permitted to act upon their lower-level parts (27-34). While many attempts to articulate this concept are problematic, as Tabaczek argues, it is ripe for analysis in terms of Aristotle's fourfold conception of causation, in which emergent behaviors find a stable footing in the substantial forms that were banished from philosophy by the early mechanists. In the second place, a "dispositionalist" account of causation in terms of an ontology of "causal powers" has shaken itself free of the reductionist shackles of standard causal theories (36-38). While this metaphysical breakthrough has not yet manifested its full potential, in Tabaczek's opinion, it provides a framework for a richer account of causation that admits final causes. His project is to bring these two movements together to produce a metaphysical account of downward causation in terms of the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of hylomorphism (part 2), in which the world consists of various kinds of substances which are metaphysically composed of both matter and form. In these respects, he shares the aspirations of a number of "neo-Aristotelian" analytic philosophers who are drawing inspiration from Aristotle and Aquinas.

The first part of the book is focused on the necessity of providing an adequate account of downward causation. Tabaczek complains that, on the one hand, "it seems relatively easy to say what EM (emergence) is not—that is, which tools of mathematical description commonly used in scientific research are inadequate for describing the cases of global organization of entities and dynamics," but on the other hand, "attempts at a positive description of EM (emergence) are usually methodologically troublesome and confusing" (64). The nonreductive physicalism that dominated analytic philosophy in the last century, which attempted to admit higher-level properties—such as those that feature in the "special sciences"—without challenging the causal monism of physicalism, has come under pressure from a variety of quarters. According to Jaegwon Kim, such properties are excluded from having causal efficacy, so there cannot be *irreducible* higher-level properties (78-80).

Tabaczek considers a number of responses to Kim's causal exclusion argument (80-91), but finds none of them to be entirely satisfactory. He claims that "the whole argument collapses," however, once it is recognized that the downward causation Kim seeks to exclude "is not an efficient cause and cannot be understood in terms of this type of causality" (91). Tabaczek spends some time discussing Terrance Deacon's account of emergence, which purports to restore teleology within nature while eschewing an ontology of substances (99-133). What is problematic in Deacon's account, according to Tabaczek, "is his tendency to reduce formal causation to geometric properties of a probability space" (130). It is not clear why the causal efficacy that he assigns to higher-level "constraints" should not (globally) supervene upon a micro-physics that is fundamentally free of teleology.

Tabaczek's extended criticism of Deacon's account in this book is incisive, albeit somewhat repetitive. Yet a disciple of Deacon might press him, in turn, to explain how formal and final causes are supposed to get a grip on the microphysical level. Tabaczek shies away from taking any stance on quantum mechanics, and wisely avoids claiming that the micro-entities of particle physics can be treated straightforwardly as substances. His case for formal causation might be strengthened, I would suggest, by drawing upon some recent work on hylomorphism and quantum mechanics by neo-Aristotelian philosophers, and by considering the contextual interpretation of quantum mechanics put forward by George Ellis and Barbara Drossel, which endows thermal properties with top-down causal powers.

The second part of this book is focused on the new dispositionalism in philosophy, which has introduced an ontology of "powers" into contemporary analytic metaphysics, and on the doctrine of hylomorphism, which carves the world into substances that fall under different natural kinds. Tabaczek spends some time expounding and critiquing a number of standard analyses of causation in analytic philosophy, including the regularity view (139-46), the counterfactual view (146-51), the probability view (151-55), the singularity view (155-57), manipulability-based views (157-68), and the process view of causation (168-74). This is good textbook material, which students will appreciate, although the author has a taste for tortuous acronyms. All of these theories share "the inherent shortcoming" of looking at causation "only in terms of the efficient cause" (179), and none of them has succeeded in achieving anything like a consensus.

Dispositionalism is to be lauded for admitting "real causal connections in nature" (181) and reintroducing teleology by admitting an ontology of powers which are directed toward their manifestations. According to Tabaczek, causal powers "can be taken as universals which have their instantiation in substances" (183), in which every event is "an effect of powers manifesting themselves in a causal process" (189). The literature on powers is now complex and vast, and it is not surprising that his summary overlooks some significant variations: according to Anna Marmodoro, for example, we carve the world into different substances according to our explanatory interests, but the basic building blocks

are "power-tropes" which co-manifest in a wide variety of ways. There are good grounds, however, for thinking that some type of dispositionalism could be combined with some form of hylomorphism to allow nature to be carved by biology as well as by physics.

The various neo-Aristotelian attempts to reclaim hylomorphism, however, are given short shrift. Tabaczek discusses, all too briefly, the "mereological" hylomorphisms of Kathrin Koslicki, Mark Johnston, Kit Fine, William Jaworski, and Robert Koons (218-23); the account of "incomplete entities" offered by Edward Jonathan Lowe (223-25); and the "mixed version" of hylomorphism put forward by Gordon Barnes (225-28). Marmodoro is judged to offer a more satisfactory account of form in terms of an "operation" that strips the elements of a substance of their distinctness, but she is "not entirely clear in her understanding of matter" (228). In fact, Marmodoro thinks of form as a *conceptual* operation that we subjectively perform upon nature, rather than being the *cause* of a substance being what it is, so she does not require prime matter. Koons, for his part, is explicit in his rejection of any structural conception of form, so it seems misleading to lump his account with Jaworski's.

Still, Tabaczek makes a good case for the need for a more classical conception of hylomorphism than the structuralist variety—one that requires the physical parts of a substance to be transformed within the whole. (The more fundamental issue underlying the debate about structural hylomorphism, I would suggest, is the debate about the unicity of substantial form, which divided the disciples of Aquinas from the followers of Scotus.) Given how many pages are spent in summary and critique, however, it is a little disappointing how little space is allocated to offering a positive account of a classical version of hylomorphism that can commend itself to analytic philosophers. Many questions are left unaddressed. For instance, how is matter as pure potentiality one in all things, and how does it individuate them? What is the precise ontological status of matter and form, and how do they compose something that is metaphysically one? What is the mereology of virtual parts, and how do they retain their powers in a substance without their substantial forms? What does it mean for their forms to be "not entirely corrupted" in the process of substantial change? These are questions that neo-Aristotelians might reasonably expect Tabaczek to answer at greater length.

In summary: the principal challenge that faces Tabaczek's project is how to implement a full-fledged, classical hylomorphism within a contemporary analytic idiom. This book is at its best in applying pressure to nonreductive physicalism and promoting curiosity about the teachings of Aristotle and Aquinas, but the positive account that it offers is too cursory to be entirely convincing, and its engagement with analytic attempts to appropriate the insights of Aristotle is uneven and sometimes lacking in depth. Nonetheless, Tabaczek has managed to digest an impressively encyclopaedic quantity of scholarship on metaphysics and science within a single volume which will be useful for both teachers and researchers, and his challenge to reclaim a more classical conception of hylomorphism is timely and apt to invigorate lively

discussion. Here is an amusing irony. Among Catholic progressives, a preoccupation with the "Aristotelian" metaphysics of Aquinas is the mark of a recalcitrant theological conservatism which has turned its back on the modern world. In the academy at large, however, "Aristotelianism" is the new revolution among young philosophers seeking to overturn a hidebound reductionism, in order to make better progress in understanding the complexities of modern science. A wise man (C. S. Lewis) once observed: "If you are on the wrong road . . . the man who turns back soonest is the most progressive." Tabaczek's book may help truth-seekers to get their philosophical bearings, but there is still a long road ahead.

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Bound for Beatitude: A Thomistic Study in Eschatology and Ethics. By REINHARD HÜTTER. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019. Pp. xiv + 493. $65.00 (hard). ISBN: 978-0-8132-3181-5.

Consonant with its appearance in the "Thomistic Ressourcement Series," this book is an important exercise in retrieving Thomas Aquinas's theology of beatitude in today's postmodern context, where teleology and the transcendent have been excluded, as the author charges, from much contemporary philosophy and theology. Not only does Reinhard Hütter offer a positive assessment of Aquinas's philosophical and theological approach with its employment of teleology and openness to the transcendent, he also tackles a number of influential objections to it with roots he locates in Protestantism, modern philosophy, existentialism, and disability studies. In response to these objections he concludes that, while none of them is successful in defeating Aquinas's project, all of them in fact manifest the same critical neglect of teleology and the transcendent that haunts modernity. Aquinas's account, in contrast, enables us to view the crisis for what it is, while at the same time offering us resources for overcoming it.

Hütter's manifesto therefore is that today's impoverished theology of immanence requires for its enrichment the restoration of a transcendent teleological orientation, which in turn demands that philosophical metaphysics be theology's privileged partner and instrument. While sensitive to the role of narrative in theology, Hütter is determined to see philosophical argument restored to the central place it had in the work of Aquinas. In this way the author presents the overall argument of his book as a paradigmatic case study in recovering from Aquinas a "sacred doctrine" (*sacra doctrina*) that "teaches

God, is taught by God, and leads to God" (87), a truly metaphysical and argumentative theology that can bring real benefits to the theological task today. Hütter's aim is to show that, in this particular case, the impoverishment of contemporary theology can be met by the riches of a Thomistic theology of both beatitude and the virtuous journey to that beatitude, which he draws especially from Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*. Hence the introduction includes helpful commentary on the opening questions of the Second Part of the *Summa*, where Aquinas outlines the final end of all creatures, including the human being, and the objective and subjective dimensions of the essence of ultimate human happiness. With a strong but subtle sense of Aquinas's distinction between the supernatural and the natural, as well as between perfect and imperfect happiness, Hütter is well placed to explore the relationship between ultimate human happiness and the journey of the "sojourner" (*viator*) to that end.

Hütter's synthetic approach to beatitude and virtue is perhaps highlighted by the appearance of the terms "eschatology" and "ethics" in his subtitle. At first glance, one might say that Hütter deals with eschatology or beatitude itself in his lengthy introduction and lengthy postscript, and with ethics—or the moral journey to beatitude—in the chapters in the body of the book, with the first chapter easing the reader from eschatology towards ethics. Thus, while chapter 1 presents the case for restoring the teleological principle of finality to the heart of theology—since without it one cannot have the central tenets of Aquinas's theology of beatitude—it thereby treats the basic orientation of human nature to happiness through the finality of the created intellect for beatitude and the natural desire for the vision of God, and thus also humanity's basic need for making the moral journey there. Prolonging this metaphysical approach into consideration of the good, chapter 2 explores how one is naturally equipped to journey to beatitude through the natural law, prudence, and conscience, while chapter 3 turns to supernatural salvation from the obstacle of sin, which stands in the way of this journey's taking place, an obstacle removed by the Cross of Christ.

Since Hütter's book is by no means an attempt at a complete moral theology, his treatment of the virtues of the *viator*, theological and moral, is happily selective, while at the same time avoiding too narrow a selection of examples of virtuous action. Chapter 4 examines the theological virtue of faith as the beginning of beatitude in us, and chapter 5 the theological virtue of charity as the continuation of the journey through divinization and friendship with God. Rather than attempt to cover even the four cardinal moral virtues in a standard way, Hütter turns in chapter 6 to the virtue of religion as justice towards God, which he notes is somewhat neglected in theology today, while chapter 7 treats the virtue of courage as a reclaiming of martyrdom, and chapter 8 the virtue of chastity through a very insightful examination of contemporary addiction to pornography and the traditional notion of spiritual apathy (*acedia*).

What is notable, though—and why I say that the above division of the book into eschatology and ethics is made at first glance—is how Hütter genuinely and consistently highlights the link between the two throughout his work. This can

be seen in a special way in his final chapter on the Blessed Virgin Mary, which takes "The Exemplar of Beatitude" for its title. For Hütter, not only is she exemplary for all sojourners in terms of such virtues as religion, courage and chastity, but as assumed into heaven she is a beacon for sojourners by holding out to them the hope for that beatitude which she already personally possesses. In this way chapter 9 leads the reader once again firmly into the eschatological realm of our final end, to which Hütter devotes his postscript.

It is worth noting that, by exposing the links between beatitude and the natural and supernatural means required for the attainment of beatitude, Hütter is constantly pursuing a theology that is not only metaphysical, but also at once speculative, dogmatic, and moral. He states that it is beyond the scope of his book to show how the biblical and historical are integral parts of theology, and promises in this connection a future work based on that of Yves Congar. This limitation in the present work is a significant admission, because the role of history in theology and its relation to metaphysics are central problems in theological methodology bequeathed to us by modernity. Nevertheless the integration of the metaphysical, the dogmatic, and the moral is not without crucial significance, and in this respect the overall integrative nature of Hütter's method in the present book shines through.

While he is in all this practising a genuine Thomistic *ressourcement*, Hütter does so with an order that does not exactly match that of the *Summa theologiae*. One can see this in the case of Christ, whom Aquinas treats formally only in the *Summa's* Third Part, where he appears specifically as our "way" to beatitude. It is therefore only from the Third Part that Hütter can be sure of the "Christ-centred and Christ-informed nature of the *viator*'s journey" (49) in Aquinas's thought. And so he also states that "admittedly, in his formal analysis of beatitude in *ST* I-II, Aquinas is not quite as explicit about the Christocentric nature of the journey to beatitude as he possibly could or should be" (48).

This "could" or "should" seems to align Hütter with those who harbor reservations about how Aquinas introduces Christology only after the Second Part has identified the content of beatitude and explored the virtuous journey to it. It seems to me that Aquinas operates with his own criteria as to how far Christ should be explicitly introduced prior to the Third Part, and it is not clear whether Hütter's comments put him at odds with Aquinas's whole structure, the criteria Aquinas uses for speaking of Christ in advance of the Third Part, or his actual application of these criteria. But whatever Hütter's position, it seems to me that, since Aquinas himself tried out various orderings of the data of theology throughout his career, a Thomistic *ressourcement* which is also speculative must be free to some extent to try out other theological orderings too. Thus, while the *Summa* presents Christology in the light of the foregoing metaphysical examination of the moral end and journey found in the Second Part, the Thomist is also free to present the metaphysics of morals and beatitude in the light of Christology. Thus, such reservations as Hütter may have about Aquinas's order of material are perhaps reflected in the placing of Chapter 3 on salvation from sin through Christ (Third Part material) ahead of Chapters 4 to

8 on the virtues (Second Part material). But if this is the case, there are perhaps missed opportunities for a greater explicit Christological dimension in the latter run of chapters.

In light of this, I am left unsure whether Hütter's division of eschatological material between the introduction (and chapter 1) and the postscript enjoys a methodological power equal to that employed by Aquinas in the ordering of the *Summa*. By planning a treatise on eschatology for the conclusion of the unfinished Third Part, Aquinas was evidently intending a properly Christological treatment of the beatitude that is merely outlined in the Second Part as something to which God might have brought us in some way other than the incarnation. Hütter, in contrast, more or less sets out the Second Part's position on beatitude in his introduction and the first chapter, and returns in the postscript to various concerns arising about Aquinas's account from modern theologians, including the roles of the bodily and social aspects of our heavenly humanity. One important point picked up from chapter 1 is the key failure of Germain Grisez's moral theology to issue in an eschatology where God himself constitutes our ultimate goal, instead effectively leaving God as one among many celestial ends. Hütter is able to offer, in contrast, a more convincing Thomistic account of heaven which places the essence of our beatitude in the vision of God—without claiming to give an exhaustive account of beatitude in its every mode. It seems that Hütter is perhaps too easily dismissive, however, of the usefulness of the traditional distinction between essential and accidental beatitude found among Aquinas's commentators, which he (not unreasonably) finds open to misunderstanding.

Nevertheless, despite this split in the material, both the introduction and postscript contain a wealth of useful information for the reader. For example, Hütter gives a lengthy and helpful explanation of Aquinas's account of the workings of the beatific vision, which can do much to help the reader avoid falling into confusion on a difficult topic. A slip does, however, seem to be made when Hütter states that the habit of the light of glory "allows the active intellect to do its proper job, to understand (*intelligere*) the essence of God – nothing more and nothing less" (405). If knowledge of God's essence is the "proper job" of the *active* intellect, then the beatific vision would somehow render God's being actually intelligible (when he is in fact always supremely intelligible), since it is precisely the job of the light of the active intellect to render objects that are potentially intelligible actually intelligible. Moreover, would Aquinas have argued in favor of Christ's acquired knowledge on the basis that Christ's active intellect would otherwise have been left idle, as he did in the Third Part, if he had held that Christ's beatific vision had already engaged the active intellect? Rather, Aquinas's account seems to leave the active intellect without a role in the act of beatific knowledge, and this was indeed a criticism made of him in the Middle Ages. What happens in Aquinas's account of beatitude is surely that the *possible* intellect is brought into act—the intellect in act rather than the active intellect. This, however, is only a quibble regarding an extensive and otherwise accurate account of this beatific act, found within a rich volume of

considerable learning, mature theological insight, and promise for the future of theology.

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The Voiding of Being: The Doing and Undoing of Metaphysics in Modernity. By WILLIAM DESMOND. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2020. Pp. 312. $65.00 (hard). ISBN: 978-0-8132-3248-5.

In *The Voiding of Being: The Doing and Undoing of Metaphysics in Modernity*, William Desmond reflects on our loss of the wonder of being, which Plato asserted to be the beginning of all philosophy. Desmond traces this loss in various areas of human concern, but the diagnosis is always the same, namely, that this wonder is lost when we lose sight of the overdeterminateness of being in favor of either univocal determination or equivocal indetermination. The latter two tendencies can be seen at work mostly within modern and postmodern philosophy, in response to which Desmond advocates for a metaphysics of the between that is capable of thinking through such overdeterminancy without losing sight of the wonder at being by which we philosophize in the first place.

The first chapter shares its title with the book, "The Voiding of Being." In this chapter, Desmond looks at the modern project of philosophy and observes how being is a concept that has been either dismissed or undermined, yet continues to reemerge from the burial site of metaphysics. In typical fashion, he resists the univocalizing tendencies that beset modernity, opting for a metaphysics of the between wherein univocity sits hand-in-hand with equivocity. He observes that in the ancient world there was a wonder at being. This wonder is in reaction to the too-muchness of being; being is overdeterminate, it exceeds our determinations. The challenge in philosophy is to render the astonishment at this intelligible and thereby come to terms with being; this is the classical project of metaphysics. Modern philosophers tend to univocalize, to pin down what cannot be pinned down, resulting in loss of being, or they equivocalize by thinking the overdeterminate as indeterminate and thereby void of intelligibility. Desmond proposes a metaphysics of the between, what he calls a "metaxological metaphysics" between univocal determination and equivocal indetermination—a metaphysics that thinks through the thereness of being as being other and its fullness in our midst.

Chapter 2 is titled "Analogy and the Fate of Reason." Herein Desmond considers the analogical turn in contemporary philosophy as a fruitful way of engaging with the overdeterminacy of being without replacing metaphysics with phenomenology. If there is any tradition of thought that seeks to strike a balance in the between of univocity and equivocity it is Aristotelian Scholasticism where analogy is the all-important factor. This analogy of being betrays an analogical reasoning which is at home with sameness in difference and does not tend to univocalize the likeness between God and creatures, nor to equivocalize their difference. Desmond traces the loss of this analogical thinking in modernity only to see ciphers of its reappearance in various places—for example, in Kant and Hegel. Desmond believes that in contemporary philosophy there is a space for a transdialectical reason, which does not shuttle from univocity to equivocity but, like analogical reason, is at home in and seeks to word the between; such a metaxological reason can ponder the porosity of philosophy and religion which has been closed by the unvocalizing tendencies of modernity.

Chapter 3, "The Dearth of Astonishment: On Curiosity, Scientism, and Thinking as Negativity," engages with the wonder that Plato and Aristotle took to be the beginning of philosophy: a wonder in the face of being, of the too-muchness of being. Herein Desmond distinguishes between an astonishment in the face of the overdeterminate, a perplexity in the face of the indeterminate, and a curiosity for the determinate. We are initially astonished at the too-muchness of being, and this passes over into perplexity, seeing that the overdeterminacy of being escapes our grasp. Very easily this perplexity passes into a negative thinking by which we seek to render the indeterminate determinate; this leads to a curiosity for greater and greater determination. Desmond likens this curiosity for the determinate to the univocal thinking of scientism, which takes natural science to be the measure of the being of things. Scientism as an ideology is an all-encompassing, all-determining (all-univocalizing) worldview that loses the wonder of being. Wonder is in turn replaced with an idle curiosity that pretends to seek more and more knowledge but is, in fact, a self-enclosed immanence that never rests but only negates so as to produce determinancy.

I had the privilege to be present when Desmond delivered the public lecture whose material forms chapter 4, "Are we all Scholastics now? On Analytic, Dialectical, and Transdialectical Thinking." Continuing with the same themes that have already emerged in the book, Desmond notes the richness in thinking in the face of the overdetermination of being in the Scholastic tradition. But he proceeds to draw out the moral that when determination of the overdeterminate is sought, univocal ways of thinking become dominant. Scholasticism became decadent through attempting to render determinate what cannot be determined, and the analytic and continental traditions are inheritors in their own ways of the univocal and equivocal elements held in fine balance within classical Scholastic thought.

Chapter 5, "Between System and Poetics," focuses on an issue close to Desmond's heart: the interaction of philosophy and poetry. Desmond is no

doubt a philosopher, and a good one, but he also has the mind (or heart) of a poet. In this chapter, Desmond looks at different practices of philosophy and explores the possibility or the porosity in the interaction of philosophy and poetry. One of the ways in which he explores this possibility is in the idea of being systematic but without loyalty to a system. Such disloyal systematicity requires an *esprit de finesse*—as opposed to the more geometrical and univocalizing thinking of much modern thought—in order to think through and into poetry as philosophy's other.

In chapter 6, "Saturated Phenomena and the Hyperboles of Being: On Marion's Postmetaphysical Thought," Desmond engages with Jean-Luc Marion, and compares Marion's thinking on the saturated phenomena with his own hyperboles of being. As is well known, Marion is a thinker who seeks to think beyond being, replacing metaphysics with phenomenology. In this chapter, Desmond sees much that is common between his thinking and Marion's, and this precisely because Desmond is dissatisfied with the kind of univocal metaphysical thinking about being beyond which Marion wishes to think. Yet Desmond advocates a metaxological metaphysics that deals with what he calls the hyperboles of being. These hyperboles are described as happenings within immanence that cannot be determined in terms of immanence; this then invites a going beyond of immanence and thus univocal determinancy to a metaphysical mindfulness of the overdeterminancy of being rather than the more phenomenological approach advocated by Marion.

We turn in chapter 7 to issues of a more epistemological nature. In "Being True to Mystery and Metaxological Metaphysics," Desmond engages with the issue of being true in the face of mystery. He begins with an appreciation of Lonergan's highlighting of the desire to know as driving the cognitional process forward in its determination of that desire. Desmond adopts and adapts this approach by stressing the mystery of the overdeterminancy of being. As is made clear throughout the book, the overdeterminancy of being is not a mere indeterminancy from which one must flee into the arms of univocalizing determinancy. Rather, the overdeterminancy is a richness or an overflow of intelligibility which faces us or invites us to contemplate. This invites us to be true in the face of that mystery, but such being true is not exhausted in the univocal correctness found in factuality, but in being porous to the true; we need to be faithful to the original relationship with the overdeterminancy of being that invites our wonder and contemplation.

Desmond ends the book with a chapter on Heraclitus titled "Flux Gibberish: For and against Heraclitus." Here he notes the enigmatic figure of Heraclitus who seems to have been the only Presocratic truly to appreciate the manifold senses of being. One finds in his thought a delicate balance of unity and flux. Aristotle's impatient dismissal of the Heracliteans is seen to be somewhat hasty, given the role that the logos plays in Heraclitus's thinking. So too Desmond argues there is a lack of appreciation of the Heraclitean logos in Hegel and Nietzsche's appreciation. Desmond wishes to stress the unity in being and the becoming in unity that is characteristic of Heraclitus's thinking.

If there is one theme that I think can be seen throughout this book it is the call to be sensitive to the original sense of being which induces the wonder that is the beginning of all philosophy. In each chapter, Desmond seeks to advert to this sense of being and its loss in modern and contemporary philosophy. Being has been voided and with that voiding metaphysics has come undone. Either we are left with overly determinate metaphysics (of the Neoscholastics or the analytics) or we have gone beyond metaphysics in the phenomenological turn. Desmond falls broadly within the metaphysical turn of postmodern contemporary philosophy. In this respect he seeks to preserve the sensitivity to being that can be found in classical thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and others, but also to reintroduce this sensitivity in a postmodern context. For the latter alone, Desmond's work is a welcome addition for all of us who feel a certain poverty in contemporary approaches to metaphysics or the rejection thereof.

As a Thomistic philosopher schooled in the analytic tradition but also sympathetic to certain thinkers within the continental tradition, I found Desmond's book to be challenging. Desmond is well known for his idiosyncratic thinking of the between, and it is often a struggle to come to terms with his thought on this issue. However, the effort that it requires to think through his work pays off, since it does indeed highlight the original sense of wonder at being that invites the philosopher (as it invited a number of my philosophical heroes) to think metaphysically in the first place. I would heartily recommend this book for anyone who takes seriously metaphysics and the role that it plays in contemporary philosophy.

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Thomas Aquinas's Quodlibetal Questions. Translated and introduced by TURNER NEVITT and BRIAN DAVIES. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 592. $49.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-19-006953-7.

The question whether the game is worth the candle is common in discussions of Thomas Aquinas's quodlibetal questions. Do they not, as Kevin White says, "seem at first sight negligible in size, redundant in content, and inferior in organization"? What can we get from these obscure exercises that is not available better and cheaper elsewhere, since "90% of the 264 quodlibetal articles are paralleled elsewhere in Thomas's work" (White). Does Aquinas not abandon a second round of commentary on the *Sentences* and embark on a wholly independent venture, the *Summa theologiae,* so as not to be constrained by the requirements of *librorum expositio* or derailed by an unpredictable

occasio disputandi? And is not unpredictability, while present in all oral disputation, the very soul of the quodlibet, where the questions can be posed by anyone and about anything?

Any successful reply to these objections will need to begin with the stubborn fact that Thomas Aquinas must have thought the quodlibetal questions important since he conducted twelve of these nonobligatory exercises—not just when beginning as a master (1256-59: *Quodl.* VII-XI), but "maxing out" the occasions for conducting them in his second Paris regency (1268-72: *Quodl.* I-III, VI, IV-V, XII) when, in addition to his regular duties, he was writing the *Secunda secundae* and commentaries on Aristotle. Indeed, it would be easier to defend the position that Thomas Aquinas loved disputation than the contrary. Despite his reservations about the current methods of *legere et disputare* for instructing beginners in theology, he adopts the disputed-question format for his *Summa*, and reimagines the book of Job as disputations on the nature of divine providence.

Turner Nevitt and Brian Davies, who have produced a new and complete English translation of *Thomas Aquinas's Quodlibetal Questions* based on the critical edition published by the Leonine Commission (1996), explain the ubiquity of this genre in Aquinas and other medieval teachers as "arising from respect for dialogue" (xxxiii). This is perhaps an anachronistic explanation—Aquinas only once uses the term "dialogue" in his *opera omnia*—but it serves to place the medieval disputation within the history of philosophical writings with a similar goal: namely, that a conclusion should not be put forward without a thorough vetting of the arguments for and against it. Whether it was through his experiences with disputation in the Dominican houses he lived in, his education at the University of Paris, or his role in defending the new mendicant orders, Thomas Aquinas clearly trusted this relatively new method for solving theoretical and practical problems.

The introduction to this well-designed volume contains brief but carefully sourced sections on Aquinas's life and writings, the concept of the quodlibetal question, and its place in the writings. The authors " roughly group" the topics of the quodlibets into those on "(1) the divine nature, (2) God as triune and incarnate, (3) angels, (4) blessedness, (5) damnation, (6) grace, (7) sin, (8) human nature, (9) matters concerning clerics and members of religious orders, (10) pastoral concerns, and (11) motley questions," such as the famous "Is truth stronger than wine, kings, and women." They also provide "readers an introductory and selective account" of these topics—one, however, which is rich with representative texts.

Nevitt and Davies provide several useful tools for studying this unusual work, which are more than usually welcome, since Aquinas himself provides almost no help: no introductions, and minimal division of the text (e.g., "There were three sorts of questions. The first about spiritual substances, the second about the sacrament of the altar, and the third about the bodies of the damned"). For each article of the quodlibets, a list of parallel passages from Aquinas's other writings is provided, allowing for careful comparison of his

treatment of similar problems with regard to content, context, and development, as well as to subtler variations arising from the propinquity of the written text of the quodlibets to its spoken antecedents. There are some articles that have no parallel treatment, for example, "If something were reduced to nothing, could God bring the numerically same thing back into existence?" (*Quodl.* IV, q. 3, a. 2). These have their own attractions.

Other features of this volume expand the availability of the text beyond those familiar with medieval philosophy and theology. A glossary of terms, from the relatively familiar ("the Virgin") to the relatively obscure ("allegorical" and the other senses of Scripture), brief descriptions of authors and works cited explicitly in the quodlibets (e.g., "Avicenna" and the *Decretals*), and a robust index, are all welcome features.

The translation achieves its twin goals of fidelity to Aquinas's Latin and being "intelligible to contemporary readers of English" (xxi). It has no whiff of neo-Scholasticism: for example, it avoids transliterations of technical terms and limits the use of "man" as a translation of *homo* to biblical quotations, places where the preferred "human being" or "people" would be awkward (e.g., "white man"), or where it is clearly the best translation (e.g., "this man is the son of God"). It manages a felicitous rendering of terms that have no obvious contemporary equivalent, like *maleficium* as "bewitchment" (*Quodl.* XI, q. 9, aa. 1 and 2). This does not mean one could not quarrel with some of the translators' choices. An example would be the translation of *liberum arbitrium* (or *arbitrii libertatem*) as "free choice" in three of four instances in an article on predestination (*Quodl.* XI, q. 3). If "free choice" helps distinguish human causality in predestination from that of the divine "will," then why not use it in all four instances? If the term is translated as "free-will" in an article on preparation for grace (*Quodl.* I, q. 4, a. 2) because *electio* must be translated as "choice," why do so when discussing forced baptism of Jewish children, the bonds of matrimony, or the entry of boys into religious orders (*Quodl.* II, q. 4, a. 2; II, q. 5, a. 1), where "choice" would seem to be the issue? Since both "free-will" and "free choice" lend themselves to misinterpretation, given contemporary usage, it might be preferable to translate *liberum arbitrium* consistently as "free choice" or "free decision" (as Jamie Spiering suggests) acknowledging that it is a narrower power than free-will, namely, being-free-to-will any available alternative. Translating it as "free-will" obscures Aquinas's understanding of the human being as possessing free will even before she can freely choose or even when there are no "choices."

Another example is translating *duplex est preceptum legis nature* as "natural law makes two sorts of demands." "Demand," however, as compared with "command" or "commandment," implies power rather than authority, will rather than reason, and hostage situations rather than law-giving. Nevertheless, given the seventy-nine instances of some form of *praeceptum* in *Quodl.* VII, q. 7, one sympathizes with the translators' task of achieving clarity among them. An instance of no importance is translating *pulchre vie* as "a nice way" (*Quodl.* XII, q. 21,a. 1). While technically doing violence to neither the Latin nor

English language, "nice" is a word which has been emptied of meaning in contemporary usage and so sounds strange in the mouth of Thomas Aquinas. Such pitfalls as these, however, lie everywhere for those who choose to translate as opposed to "render into English." We should be very grateful to Nevitt and Davies that they have translated *Thomas Aquinas's Quodlibetal Questions*, enabling us to assess each quodlibet as an individual performance in an exacting genre, where truth is sought through combat.

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