THE DEBATE OVER *DIGNITATIS HUMANAE* AT VATICAN II: THE CONTRIBUTION OF CHARLES CARDINAL JOURNET

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I N THE MORE THAN fifty years since the Second Vatican Council, no part of the council's interpretation or reception has been more divisive or more complicated than the interpretation and reception of the Declaration on Religious Freedom, *Dignitatis Humanae*.[1] The primary point of conflict is whether the declaration develops or contradicts previous magisterial teaching on the obligation of the state to defend the truth of the Catholic faith and to restrict the practice of false religion.[2]

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[1] See F. Russell Hittinger, "Political Pluralism and Religious Liberty: The Teaching of *Dignitatis Humanae*," in *Universal Rights in a World of Diversity: The Case of Religious Freedom*, ed. Mary Ann Glendon and Hans F. Zacher (Vatican City: The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, 2012), 39-55; Nicholas J. Healy, Jr., "*Dignitatis Humanae*," in *The Reception of Vatican II*, ed. Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 367-92.

[2] In addition to the "primary" conflict over whether *Dignitatis Humanae* develops or contradicts previous papal teaching, numerous essays consider the declaration's proper application and continued relevance. For example, some such essays consider the extent to which its notion of religious freedom is compatible with that embodied in American jurisprudence: see Robert P. Hunt, "Two Concepts of Religious Liberty: *Dignitatis Humanae* v. the U.S. Supreme Court," in *Catholicism and Religious Freedom: Contemporary Reflections on Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Liberty*, ed. Kenneth L. Grasso and Robert P. Hunt (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 19-41; William P. Mumma, "Continuing the Search for Religious Freedom: The American

For example, Gregory XVI, in his 1832 encyclical letter, *Mirari Vos*, identifies religious indifferentism as a source of "the absurd and wrong view, or rather insanity, according to which freedom of conscience must be asserted and vindicated for everybody."[3] Such an error, Gregory warns, "paves the way of that complete and unrestrained liberty of option which rages far and wide to the ruin of sacred and civil communities, whereas some still claim with the greatest imprudence that some advantage is gained from it."[4]

For its part, *Dignitatis Humanae* teaches:

This Vatican synod declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. Such freedom consists in this, that all men should have such immunity from coercion by individuals, or by groups, or by any human power, that no one should be forced to act against his conscience in religious matters, whether in private or in public, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.[5]

Further, the council adds:

this right to non-interference persists even in those who do not carry out their obligation of seeking the truth and standing by it; and the exercise of the right should not be curtailed, as long as due public order is preserved.[6]

Perspective," in *Continuing the Search for Religious Freedom: Fifty Years after Vatican II's Dignitatis Humanae*, ed. Dennis J. Billy, C.Ss.R. (Phoenix: Leonine Publishers, 2016), 17-32. Others consider the extent to which *Dignitatis Humanae*'s notion of religious freedom may serve as the basis for ecumenical dialogue: see Thomas Heilke, "The Promised Time of *Dignitatis Humanae*: A Radical Protestant Perspective," in Grasso and Hunt, eds., *Catholicism and Religious Freedom*, 87-113; David T. Koyzis, "Persuaded, Not Commanded: Neo-Calvinism, *Dignitatis Humanae*, and Religious Freedom," in ibid., 115-33.

[3] As quoted in Heinrich Denzinger, *Compendium of Creeds, Definitions, and Declarations on Matters of Faith and Morals*, 43rd ed., ed. Peter Hünermann, Robert Fastiggi, and Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), 561-62 (§§ 2730-32), at 561 (§ 2730).

[4] Ibid., 561-62 (§ 2731).

[5] *DH* 2 (*Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Norman P. Tanner S.J., 2 vols. [London: Sheed and Ward, 1990], 2:1001-11, at 1002).

[6] Ibid. (Tanner, ed., *Decrees* 2:1003).

Does the council uphold the obligation of the state to defend the truth of the Catholic faith and to restrict the practice of false religion? If it does, then in what way and to what extent does it do so?[7]

At the heart of the dispute over *Dignitatis Humanae* lies the negative assessment of one-time council Father and later Society of St. Pius X founder Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre.[8] During and

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[7] Numerous authors hold that *Dignitatis Humanae* develops, not contradicts, previous teaching—yet, as Healy outlines in "*Dignitatis Humanae*," they do not necessarily all do so in the same way. See, e.g., John Courtney Murray, S.J., "The Declaration on Religious Freedom," in *Bridging the Sacred and the Secular: Selected Writings of John Courtney Murray, S.J.*, ed. J. Leon Hooper, S.J. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 187-99; Basile Valuet, *La liberté religieuse et la tradition catholique: Un cas de développement doctrinal homogène dans le magistère authentique*, 3 vols. (Le Barroux: Abbaye Sainte-Madeleine, 1998); Avery Dulles, "*Dignitatis Humanae* and the Development of Catholic Doctrine," in Grasso and Hunt, eds., *Catholicism and Religious Freedom*, 43-67; Brian W. Harrison, *Religious Liberty and Contraception* (Melbourne: John XXIII Fellowship, 1988), esp. 123-30; F. Russell Hittinger, "The Declaration on Religious Freedom, *Dignitatis Humanae*," in *Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition*, ed. Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 359-82; Martin Rhonheimer, "Benedict XVI's 'Hermeneutic of Reform' and Religious Freedom," *Nova et Vetera* (English ed.) 9 (2011): 1029-54; David L. Schindler, "Freedom, Truth, and Human Dignity: An Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae* on the Right to Religious Freedom," in *Freedom, Truth, and Human Dignity: The Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Liberty*, ed. David L. Schindler and Nicholas J. Healy Jr. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2015), 39-209.

[8] See Marcel Lefebvre, *Religious Liberty Questioned*, trans. Jamie Pazat de Lys (Kansas City: Angelus Press, 2002). Those who likewise hold that *Dignitatis Humanae* contradicts, not develops, previous papal teaching include Michael Davies, *The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty* (Long Prairie, Minn.: Neumann Press, 1992); Charles Curran, *Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Pub., 1976), 72-73, 146-47; Richard A. McCormick, *The Critical Calling: Reflections on Moral Dilemmas since Vatican II* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 21, 25-46, 339; John T. Noonan, *A Church That Can and Cannot Change: The Development of Catholic Moral Teaching* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 154-58. As Healy puts it,

> Despite their obvious differences, "traditionalist" theologians such as Marcel Lefebvre and Michael Davies and "progressive" theologians

after the council, Lefebvre and his followers opposed the Declaration on Religious Freedom, and the latter continue to do so. At the council, (despite voting in favor of the first document promulgated by the council, the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, *Sacrosanctum Concilium*) Lefebvre urged his fellow Fathers to reject what was to become *Dignitatis Humanae.*

Initially, it was unclear whether there would be enough votes to promulgate what became *Dignitatis Humanae* before the close of the council. Numerous speeches were given both for and against it. To help reduce ongoing tensions, the secretariat therefore arranged for noted systematic theologian and Thomist Archbishop Charles Cardinal Journet to speak from the floor of St. Peter's.

In the years following the council, Lefebvre issued an ultimatum:

When the popes condemned liberty of thought, liberty of conscience, liberty of religions, they explained why they condemned them. . . . [A]ll of this [was] based on the Church's fundamental principles, on the fact that the Church is the truth, the only truth. This is the way it is; you either believe it or you don't, of course, but when you believe, then you have to draw the consequences. That is why, personally, I do not believe that the declarations of the Council on liberty of conscience, liberty of thought, and liberty of religions can be compatible with what the popes taught in the past. Therefore we have to choose.[9]

According to Lefebvre, "we have to choose" because the Church is the only truth. As Nicholas Healy comments, "the right to religious freedom cannot be reconciled with the traditional doctrine of the Church" for Lefebvre because "error has no

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such as Charles Curran, Richard McCormick, and John T. Noonan share a common assumption: *DH* represents a break with or contradiction of earlier papal teaching. The former argue that the teaching of *DH* is erroneous, while revisionist theologians often adduce the example of *DH* to support other possible changes in Catholic doctrine. (Healy, "*Dignitatis Humanae*," 374)

[9] Marcel Lefebvre, press conference, September 15, 1976 (as cited in the "Foreword" to *Religious Liberty Questioned*, xi).

rights." For Lefebvre, "civil authority may tolerate other forms of worship as required by the common good."[10] However, such authority "may never give positive approval of error."[11] Even before its promulgation, Lefebvre opposed *Dignitatis Humanae* on the grounds that it broke with previous papal teaching that error has no rights.[12]

To date, almost no scholarly attention has been paid to interpreting *Dignitatis Humanae* in light of Journet's speech.[13] In particular, none of those who have referenced Journet's thought on religious liberty have fully situated his conciliar address within his preconciliar theory of the Church and state as it is found within his magnum opus *L'Église du Verbe incarné*.[14]

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[10] Healy, "*Dignitatis Humanae*," 381.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Interestingly, Lefebvre's name is listed among the signers of the decrees promulgated on December 7, 1965 (see *Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II* [Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1970-1999], vol. 4, part 7, 809). In other words, Lefebvre followed the pope in signing the declaration (once its promulgation was no longer a matter of debate), even if he would later reject its teaching.

[13] A notable exception is Jacques Rime's brief history of Journet's address: Jacques Rime, "L'intervention de Charles Journet dans l'élaboration du décret sur la liberté religieuse," in *Liberté religieuse et Église catholique: Héritage et développements récents*, ed. Renata Latala and Jacques Rime, Studia Friburgensia 106 (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2009), 31-40.

[14] Beyond Rime's history of Journet's address, Journet has been referenced vis-à-vis *Dignitatis Humanae* in at least four recent articles.

Thomas Pink deploys part of Journet's preconciliar theory of the Church and state (as well as the thought of Suarez) to argue that *Dignitatis Humanae* amounts to a change in Church policy, not a change in Church teaching (Thomas Pink, "The Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*: A Reply to Martin Rhonheimer," *Nova et vetera* [English ed.] 11 [2013]: 77-121). He does not deal directly with Journet's conciliar address, only *L'Église du Verbe incarné*.

Martin Rhonheimer references Journet's conciliar address against Pink, arguing that Journet had abandoned his preconciliar theory of the Church and state (Martin Rhonheimer, "*Dignitatis Humanae*—Not a Mere Question of Church Policy: A Response to Thomas Pink," *Nova et vetera* [English ed.] 12 [2014]: 445-70, at 459-62). Rhonheimer does not deal with Journet's preconciliar theory directly but seems to assume that Pink had referenced it in its entirety.

In his conciliar address on what became *Dignitatis Humanae*, Journet offers a compelling interpretation in favor of its promulgation on the premise that it maintains continuity with past Church teaching. He reads the document as doing more than simply changing Church policy[15] but, contra Lefebvre, not abrogating previous papal teaching on the duties of temporal authority toward the truth. Journet argues that what became *Dignitatis Humanae* applies the principle of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual order in a new, higher way. *Dignitatis Humanae* helps make possible the existence of states not just Christian but freely Christian.[16]

In an attempt to make a small but possibly decisive contribution to Vatican II studies and the ongoing debate over *Dignitatis Humanae*, this essay recounts the near-unknown position developed by Journet from the floor of St. Peter's in the latter days of the council. In order better to appreciate the content of his intervention, part I considers who Charles Cardinal Journet was, in particular his status at the council and the expertise with which he spoke from the council floor. Part

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Pink responds to Rhonheimer (Thomas Pink, "Jacques Maritain and the Problem of Church and State," *The Thomist* 79 [2015]: 1-42) as though Journet's conciliar address was an abandonment of previous papal teaching. Here Pink does not reference Journet's preconciliar theory of the Church and state at all.

Gregory Reichberg pits Journet against Pink for Pink's reliance on Suarez in "The Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*," with whom Journet disagreed as to whether the Church was directly responsible for the use of the death penalty against heresy (Gregory M. Reichberg, "Scholastic Arguments for and against Religious Freedom," *The Thomist* 84 [2020]: 1-50, at 5-6, 9, 45-48). Per Reichberg, Journet's conciliar address represents a "promising line of analysis" in continuity with his preconciliar theory and "merits closer examination" (ibid., 48). Reichberg does not explicitly mention Pink's reliance on Journet in "The Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*," only his reliance on Suarez.

In our opinion, Pink's generic thesis that *Dignitatis Humanae* represents a change in policy, not a change in doctrine or teaching, would have been strengthened had he referenced Journet's preconciliar theory more fully. Read within the context of his preconciliar theory in full, Journet's conciliar address confirms Pink's theory. Journet never abandoned his preconciliar theory.

[15] That is, changing Church policy due to necessity alone.

[16] That is, animated by the Church in a way more perfectly in accord with the distinction between the temporal and spiritual realms.

II reviews Journet's theory of the Church and the state in his preconciliar *L'Église du Verbe incarné*. Part III examines how Thomas Pink's work on *Dignitatis Humanae* in "The Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*: A Reply to Martin Rhonheimer" serves as an important point of reference for appreciating how Journet's conciliar address accords with his earlier work. Part IV considers the importance of Journet's address within the context of the council's proceedings. Part V contains a translation of the cardinal's speech (delivered originally in Latin). Part VI indicates how Journet's analysis constitutes a way forward in continuity with his earlier work.

I. CHARLES CARDINAL JOURNET

Charles Journet was born in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1891. He was ordained to the priesthood in 1917 and spent the entirety of his forty-six-year academic career teaching dogmatic theology at the major seminary of the Diocese of Fribourg in Switzerland.[17] Today he is perhaps best known for co-founding the journal *Nova et vetera* in 1926 and for his multivolume work on ecclesiology, *L'Église du Verbe incarné*.[18] Among his

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[17] For a brief biographical outline of Journet's life and principal accomplishments, see Roger W. Nutt, "The Application of Christ's One Oblation: Charles Journet on the Mass, the Real Presence, and the Sacrifice of the Cross," *Nova et vetera* (English ed.) 8 (2010): 665-81, at 666-68. For a more detailed biography of Journet's life and works, see Guy Boissard, *Charles Journet: 1891-1975* (Paris: Salvator, 2008); Jacques Rime, *Charles Journet: Vocation et jeunesse d'un théologien* (Fribourg: Press Fribourg/Editions Saint-Paul Fribourg Suisse, 2010). For a treatment of the cardinal's priestly vocation in his life, work, and spirituality, see Guy Boissard, "Charles Journet, théologien, cardinal, prêtre avant tout," *Nova et vetera* 85 (2010): 21-29.

[18] See Charles Journet, *L'Église du Verbe incarné: Essai de théologie speculative*, œuvres complètes de Charles Journet, vols. 1-5 (Saint-Maurice: Éditions Saint-Augustin, 1998-2005). An English translation of volume 1, *La hiérarchie apostolique*, was published as Charles Journet, *The Church of the Word Incarnate: An Essay in Speculative Theology*, trans. A. H. C. Downes, vol. 1, *The Apostolic Hierarchy* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955). *La hiérarchie apostolique* (within which Journet's theory of the Church and state is located) was first published in 1941. In 1955, Journet published a

peers, Journet was esteemed as a preeminent theologian and Catholic intellectual.[19]

Pope Paul VI was an admirer of his theological work. It was in part that Journet might have a greater influence on the work of the council that, between the third and fourth sessions, Paul VI elevated then Monsignor Journet to the rank of archbishop on February 15, 1965, and to the rank of cardinal on February 22, 1965.

It is often forgotten by interpreters of the council that the elevation of Journet to the episcopacy and cardinalate sets him apart from other prominent theologians of the twentieth century whose names are also associated with Vatican II. Unlike Ratzinger, Chenu, Rahner, De Lubac, Bouyer, Congar, Vorgrimler, and Schillebeeckx, whose reflections, memoirs, and journals from Vatican II are frequently cited and consulted, Journet was a Father and voting member of the council who played an active role at the fourth and final session, at which the Fathers promulgated *Dignitatis Humanae*.[20]

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second edition of *La hiérarchie apostolique*, with two added excurses (one within his theory of the Church and state) and numerous minor additions and revisions. A third and final edition appeared in 1962, demarked this time by the addition of two appendices (one presenting the fragments of a couple of speeches of Pius XII, the first regarding the Church and state and the second religious freedom). Downes's 1955 translation includes both excurses as well as a number if not most of Journet's revisions from the second edition, but not the two appendices.

[19] See *Charles Journet: Un témoin du XXe siècle*, ed. Marta Rossignotti Jaeggi and Guy Boissard (Paris: Parole et silence, 2003). As an example of his influence in the Catholic intellectual world, see his correspondence with Jacques Maritain from 1920 to 1964, which covers over four thousand pages (Charles Journet and Jacques Maritain, *Correspondance*, 6 vols. [Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires; Paris: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1996-2008]).

[20] For a full treatment of Journet's presence at and influence on the council, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., "Présence de Journet à Vatican II," in *Charles Journet (1891-1975): Un théologien en son siècle*, ed. Philippe Chenaux, 2d ed. (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1994), 41-68. For a discussion of Journet's contribution to the council's treatment of the indissolubility of marriage in *Gaudium et Spes*, see Roger W. Nutt, "*Gaudium et Spes* and the Indissolubility of the Sacrament of Matrimony: The Contribution of Charles Cardinal Journet," *Nova et vetera* (English ed.) 11 (2013): 619-26. For a discussion of Journet's contribution to the council's teaching on Holy

One of the factors that made Journet eminently fit for his duties as archbishop and cardinal, including working often in collaboration with Paul VI himself, was the trajectory of his theological work prior to the council.[21] Decades prior to the council, Journet had already worked out a theory of the Church and the state in *L'Église du Verbe incarné* with clear reference to the respective powers of each,[22] including powers that he terms "coercive."[23] In support of his theory, Journet cites not only a bevy of biblical, patristic, and medieval texts, but also nineteenth-century papal authority, especially that of Leo XIII, with whose teachings he deems his own analysis to be in full continuity. As a council Father, Journet was uniquely capable of analyzing what became *Dignitatis Humanae* in light of the full breadth of Catholic tradition.

II. *L'ÉGLISE DU VERBE INCARNÉ*

Journet's theory of the Church and the state in *L'Église du Verbe incarné* anticipates his words at the council in several ways. He did not think that what was to become *Dignitatis Humanae* conflicted in any way with the theory of the Church and the state that he had already articulated in the light of previous papal teaching and the greater Catholic tradition.

In his treatment of the subject, Journet approaches the Church and the state from the vantage point of reconciling "the legitimacy of many measures taken by the medieval Popes in the

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Orders, see Roger W. Nutt, "Sacerdotal Character and the *Munera Christi*: Reflections on the Theology of Charles Journet in Relation to the Second Vatican Council," *Gregorianum* 90 (2009): 237-53.

[21] For a first-hand account of Journet's collaboration with Paul VI at key points during the final session, see Antoine Wenger, *Les trois Rome: L'Église des années soixante* (Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1991), 173-75, 184.

[22] Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 193-381 (chap. 6: "The Relations of the Canonical Power and the Political Power").

[23] Ibid., 194.

name of their powers,"[24] including "transference of Imperial dignity, deposition of apostate princes, suppression of heresy, organization of Crusades."[25] As he sees it, the question of the Church and the state in the present can only be answered by resolving the difficulties of the Church and the state in the past.

On the one hand, Journet confesses, "Popes have issued decrees for setting holy wars on foot, and for compelling princes to hunt down heresy, and I believe that they did so legitimately."[26] On the other hand, he qualifies, "But what I propose to dispute is that they did so in virtue only of their canonical power, and of essential and permanent exigencies of the Kingdom of God."[27] The pope's canonical power and the permanent exigencies of the kingdom of God do not suffice to explain why the beginning of holy wars and the suppression of heresy may have been legitimate.[28] Such decrees only could have been legitimate by reason of additional, accidental exigencies, which Journet describes as "conditions which we look upon today as having passed away for ever."[29]

In support of his thesis, Journet divides his analysis into four sections. In the first, he considers "the analogical character of the canonical jurisdiction [of the Church]";[30] in the second, he describes "the essential claims of the Church in her relations with the State";[31] in the third, he sets out "the normal rôle of the Church in a secular Christendom";[32] and in the fourth he discusses "the rôle of the Church in medieval Christendom."[33]

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[24] Ibid., 193.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., 195.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Journet distinguishes the "canonical" from what he calls the pope's extracanonical power. In regard to the distinction of the two, see n. 53 below.

[29] Ibid., 211.

[30] Ibid., 193.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid., 194.

A) *The Analogicity of the Church's Authority*

In the first section of his analysis, Journet argues that "the resemblance of [the Church's] canonical power to the political power is . . . only analogical."[34] The Church and the state both possess, he explains, "legislative, judiciary, and coercive powers."[35] The Church "must be considered as an essentially supernatural society through and through, having a simple likeness of analogy and proportion to political society, not a univocal likeness, even a generic one."[36] If the Church and the state were two instances of the same species of authority, then the Church would simply be another state. Likewise, if the Church and the state were two species of the same genus of authority, then the matters on which the legislative, judiciary, and coercive powers of the Church could formally bear would be no different from those on which the state can formally bear. That is, the matters on which the Church would bring its power to bear would still be fundamentally temporal.[37] Thus, the likeness between the Church and the state is only analogical.

B) *The Essential Exigencies of the Church in Relation to the State*

In the second section of his analysis, Journet argues that, given the analogical character of the canonical power of the Church, the essential exigencies of the Church in her relation to the state may be reduced either to two tasks or to two facts. The two essential *tasks* of the Church in her relation to the state are "to safeguard her own existence, and to Christianize civil life, to defend the spiritual and to enlighten and inspire the

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., 180-81.

[37] As opposed to Israel being a type of the Church, the Church would, in a sense, be a literal new Israel, Israel's successor as opposed to Israel's fulfillment. Journet talks about the sense in which Israel was a theocracy in ibid., 258-60.

temporal."[38] The two essential *facts* of the Church and the state are that the Church and the state should not conflict and that only the Church is capable of transfiguring the state.[39]

For Journet, the two facts of the Church's relation to the state are "both incontestable, but in union a seeming paradox."[40] Although it might seem like the duty of the Church to Christianize civil life could put the Church and the state in conflict with one another, it is the Church's ability to Christianize civil life that manifests how she and the state need not conflict. Likewise, although it might seem like the divine ends of the Church so transcend the cultural ends of the state that the Church and the state should have nothing to do with each other, it is the analogical transcendence of her authority that enables the Church to bequeath a sublimated Christian existence upon the state.

For Journet, the heart of the paradox of the two facts of the Church and the state is what it means for the state to be given a "sublimated Christian existence." In particular, for the Church

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[38] Ibid., 211.

[39] Journet writes:

> First, the Church is so profoundly differentiated from the state, and her divine ends so completely transcend all merely cultural ends, that the law ruling their relations can be but a law of distinction; of themselves Church and state are not in competition and should not conflict. And further, from the fact that all human activities without exception, each in its own way, should help to bring about our return to God, the Last End of the whole universe, it is clear that the activities whose proximate end lies in terrestrial and temporal goods, have to be ordered, rectified, enlightened and sustained by the activities whose immediate end lies in heavenly and eternal goods; so that the spiritual, far from smothering the temporal and impeding its development, will alone be capable of bringing it to its full completeness; not indeed giving it existence, "instituere *ut sit*," but giving it a purified and sublimated Christian existence, "instituere ut sit *perfecte et Christiane.*" (Ibid.)

[40] Ibid.

to give the state a sublimated Christian existence is not the same as for the state to become an "instrument" of the Church:

The distinction, subtle perhaps, but capital, between a lower principal cause and a mere instrument, and the corresponding distinction between an intermediate end and a pure means, should never here be lost sight of; the lower principal cause acts by virtue of its form, of its nature, the motion it receives being only the *condition* of its activity; whereas the pure instrument does not act of itself at all, the motion it receives being the *total cause* of its activity. Similarly, the intermediate end is, *absolutely speaking*, an end, something desirable for its own sake; it is only in a certain sense that it is a means, something desirable for the sake of something else; whereas the pure means is desirable *solely* for the sake of something else.[41]

According to Journet, the cultural ends of the state are not pure means but intermediate ends. When the state is given a sublimated Christian existence, it is a lower principal cause of that existence. When the Church bestows a sublimated Christian existence upon the state, she does so on the condition of the state's own proper activity. The Church does not always make use of the temporal authority of the state as a pure means to her own ends.

Conversely put, it is possible for the Church to authorize temporal authority to assist her in her own proper activity. However, it is not necessary for the state to be deputized by the Church in order for it *to be* Christian.[42] To be Christian, the state must be elevated in its proper activity as such.

Similarly, Journet notices that the individual Christian cannot just act as a Christian as such, at least not in this life: Christians must also act in any number of temporal ways. Christians may act in a properly human way yet "with a Christian conscience and without even provisionally setting God and Christ aside."[43] Just as the individual Christian may act as a

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[41] Ibid., 207.

[42] If anything, the deputization of the state by the Church would seem to imply that it were already Christian.

[43] Ibid., 209-10.

Christian yet in a number of temporal ways, so the state may pursue its proper, temporal, cultural ends as true yet intermediate ends.[44]

C) *Consecrational versus Secular Christendom*

In the third section of his treatise, Journet distinguishes between two fundamental kinds of Christian state: consecrational Christendom and secular Christendom. Given the essential exigencies of the Church in relation to the state, citizenship can be ordered toward juridical Church membership in a couple of different ways. Consecrational Christendom refers to regimes in which juridical Church membership is a requirement for full citizenship. Secular Christendom refers to regimes in which juridical Church membership designates the perfect way of being a citizen but is not required for full legal citizenship.[45]

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[44] In particular, Journet clarifies that Christians both may act *on* the temporal order and *within* the temporal order. By acting *on* the temporal order, such as "to safeguard certain primordial and permanent temporal values . . . necessary to the normal exercise of the spiritual life itself," Christians are "capable of *preparing* the Christianization of culture" (ibid., 209 [emphasis added]). Only by acting within the temporal order are Christians capable "of setting a society on foot, of giving existence to a cultural whole and bringing it to successful issue" (ibid.).

[45] Ibid., 214-15:

> [Regimes] of the first type—which are not to be dreamed of save in a region populated exclusively or mainly by Christians, indeed by visible members of the Church of Christ—seek to form a political unity of Christians alone, or visible members of the Church alone, granting civic rights to no others.
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>   Those of the second type would try to weld into a political unity all the inhabitants of a region, granting citizenship to all no matter what their religion, but directing them to temporal and political ends which Christianity would regard as legitimate and would not disavow.
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>   In the first case, Christian values permeate the whole political order; the notion of Christianity, of visible membership of the Church, enters into the very definition of the citizen. . . . In the second case, Christian values affect the political order from without, to sustain, enlighten, and sublimate it; the notion of Christianity, of visible membership of the Church, remains outside the definition of the citizen; it designates only

Consecrational Christendom is prior in time, for the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal order initially eclipses the distinction between the two.[46] Secular Christendom is nonetheless prior in idea because it affords greater respect both for the originality of the temporal order and for the originality of the spiritual order. Journet writes:

At the moment when temporal values, though still fully recognized as essentially and intrinsically subordinate to spiritual, begin to be seen with a clearer consciousness of their own specific nature and rôle[,] as such they will be distinguished from spiritual realities, not in the least to be withdrawn from their influence, but, on the contrary, to achieve a dependence that is to be more conscious of itself, and more conformable to the respective natures of either. [47]

Journet anticipates that one might object to the possibility of a secular Christendom on the grounds that "a common activity supposes common principles."[48] In response, he distinguishes between strict doctrinal identity and analogical doctrinal unity:

For answer let us recall (1) that men are fundamentally united as having a common nature; (2) that the immediate end to be practically achieved is in the natural order. That granted, we can go on to say that "the unity of the earthly task and the temporal end pursued necessarily suppose a certain community of principles and doctrine, but not necessarily—however desirable, however evidently better and more effective it may be in itself—a strict and pure and

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a perfect *way* of being a citizen, distinguishing a spiritual family of citizens.

[46] Ibid., 219: "at the moment when the supremacy of the spiritual order is publicly recognized . . . spiritual values . . . inevitably begin to envelop, enwrap, and embrace all values of the temporal order, so that these latter will seem in a way to be based on them, or, more exactly, withdrawn behind them, hidden in them, renouncing all ambition for the time being to assert their difference and emphasize their originality."

[47] Ibid., 219-20. Journet continues: "For the Church too will profit by this differentiation. It will allow her to appear all the more clearly to the world as the Body of Christ, as the Kingdom not of this world, but capable nevertheless of illuminating all the kingdoms of this world with the light of heaven" (ibid., 220).

[48] Ibid., 218.

simple doctrinal *identity*: it suffices that the principles and doctrine should have a unity of likeness or proportion, let us say in the technical sense of the word, of *analogy*, regard being had to the practical end in question, which, although referable to a higher end, is of itself in the natural order, and is doubtless conceived by each party in the light of the principles proper to each, but in its existential reality is extraposed to these conceptions."[49]

Strict doctrinal identity among all a state's citizens is not required for the Church to bequeath a sublimated Christian existence upon the state because revelation is not inherently required for the state to achieve its immediate ends. Although grace might practically be required in a postlapsarian world, the proper, temporal, cultural ends of the state are natural, not supernatural. As Journet goes on to say, "public acknowledge-ment of those Christian values on which all the sanctity of the temporal order depends . . . such as the existence of God, the sanctity of truth, the value and necessity of goodwill, the dignity of the person, the spirituality and immortality of the soul," will be required.[50] However, what results will be a participatory

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[49] Ibid. Journet quotes Maritain's "Qui est mon prochain?" (ibid., 217, n. 2; see Jacques Maritain, "Who Is My Neighbour?" in *Ransoming the Time*, trans. Harry Lorin Binsse [New York: Gordian Press, 1972], 115-40, at 132).

[50] Continuing to quote on and off from Maritain's "Qui est mon prochain?" Journet writes:

> We know of course when we speak in this way that "a complete doctrine, founded on Catholic teaching, can alone bring an entirely true solution to the problems of civilization." Thus the law of fraternal love, "which either party understands with different theological and metaphysical connotations, and which for Christians striving to fulfil a radical—but terribly contradicted—tendency of our nature is the second commandment like unto the first," implies at least the practical and implicit recognition of high spiritual values, such as the existence of God, the sanctity of truth, the value and necessity of goodwill, the dignity of the person, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, no matter what theoretical doctrines may be explicitly professed on these points. In this way, men with different religious convictions can collaborate not only, as is evident, "in establishing a technique, in putting out a fire, in helping the hungry and sick, in stopping an aggression. But it is possible—if the analogical likeness between their principles of action just mentioned really exists—that they should co-

analogically Christian community, not necessarily a unity of Christians tantamount to the unity of the Church itself.[51] According to Journet, within such a community, Christian communion in the full sense of the term will be present, if not predominate.[52] However, not every citizen will need to be in communion with the Church in order for the state itself to be Christian.[53]

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operate at least and above all in procuring the primary goods of earthly existence, in activities that bear on the good of the temporal city and civilization and the moral values invested in them". . . .

[Under the regime of a secular Christendom, the earthly city's] Christianity will be shown in the elevation of its temporal ends, the purity of its chosen political means, its public acknowledgement of those Christian values on which all the sanctity of the temporal order depends, and the unfailing respect in which it holds the rights of the Church. (Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 218-19; see Maritain, "Who is My Neighbour?" 133 ff.)

[51] While strict doctrinal identity is ideal, it need not be required.

[52] For Journet, key for the acquisition and the maintenance of a unity of doctrinal likeness, as opposed to strict doctrinal identity, is fraternal charity. For example, again quoting Maritain's "Qui est mon prochain?" Journet writes, "In the fraternal dialogue envisaged there is a sort of forgiveness, of remission, not bearing on ideas—they deserve none if they are false—but on the state of those who go along with us" (Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 217; see Maritain, "Who is My Neighbour?" 123).

[53] Because such a state's Christianity will be participatory, "there will be no question of falling into 'dogmatic tolerance', which regards all forms of belief or unbelief as equally acceptable, or of seeking some doctrinal minimum common to all citizens, believing or unbelieving" (Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 216). In particular, Journet concludes with a quotation from Maritain's *True Humanism*:

Hence, if by the very fact that it is a Christian work it supposes by hypothesis *that those who take the initiative will be Christians*, with full and total comprehension of the end to be attained, *yet it calls to work all men of goodwill*, all those whom a grasp more or less partial and defective—very defective it may be—of the truths which the Gospel makes known in their plenitude, disposes to give their practical help (which may not be the least devoted or the least generous) in the achievement of their common task. It is here that the text has its fullest force and application: *he that is not against you is for you*. (As quoted

D) *Medieval Consecrational Christendom*

In the last section of his treatise, Journet argues that medieval consecrational Christendom involved certain special exigencies, which help to explain some of the extraordinary measures taken by the medieval popes. This aspect of his treatment is important for understanding his intervention on *Dignitatis Humanae*. There are two schemas according to which the Church had recourse to a secular arm within medieval consecrational Christendom. The Church might have recourse to a secular arm according to the same two schemas even within a secular Christendom. However, if she did so, the mode according to which she had recourse to the state according to each respective schema would be different. Within medieval consecrational Christendom, the papacy had recourse to a secular arm more frequently and, given the special exigencies that medieval consecrational Christendom involved, in a way unimaginable today.[54]

The medieval Church had greater general recourse to a secular arm because, within medieval Christendom, the temporal and spiritual orders were commingled. Because citizenship was restricted within medieval consecrational Christendom to juridical Church members alone, threats to the good of the Church that otherwise would not have been more than an indirect threat to the state instead posed a direct threat to the temporal common good.[55]

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by Journet in ibid., n. 1; see Jacques Maritain, *True Humanism*, trans. M.R. Adamson, 4th ed. [London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946], 200-201)

[54] This, moreover, is not to mention the question of what Journet calls the pope's extracanonical powers, in regard to which see Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 249, 254-58, 275, 328.

[55] Journet writes:

But a special phenomenon appeared in the Middle Ages. In virtue of the principle that bases political unity on the unity of visible communion with the Church, a spiritual element descended into the civil order and became one of its components. Since this element, taken

The two schemas according to which the Church had recourse to a secular arm within medieval consecrational Christendom were as follows. First, the Church had authority to call upon the state as an instrument to aid her, in a spiritualized way, in her own proper task. Second, the Church had authority to call upon the state as an autonomous cause to fulfill its own proper task in its own temporal way. In the first case, the Church takes direct responsibility, as principal cause, for what the secular arm does. In the second case, the state takes direct responsibility (since it is no longer principal cause, the Church only takes responsibility indirectly).[56] In the first, the Church's power is "direct." In the second, her power is "indirect."[57]

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in itself, was spiritual, it remained subject to the Church which had sole authority to define and control it. However, from the fact of its incorporation in the city it could and should be defended not only with spiritual ends in view, for the sake of and by the spiritual means of the church, but also with temporal ends in view, for the sake of the civil order and by the temporal means at the disposal of states; it could and ought to be defended not only as a value of Christianity but also as a value of Christendom. To the degree in which the constitution of medieval society recognized the faith as a value intrinsic to its common good, it is clear that the Church could require the faith to be defended with all the machinery used by cities in defence of their common good. (Ibid., 250)

[56] Journet writes:

We can imagine two ways in which the canonical power might call on the secular power for its use, and two ways in which the secular power might subordinate itself to the canonical.

   Either the secular power consents for the moment to act for a spiritual end, for the sake of the Church as such—by expelling, for example, at the Church's request, public sinners less noxious to itself than to the Church, whose moral standards are stricter. In that case it puts itself at the disposal of the canonical power as a pure instrument, the latter taking the initiative and the direct responsibility, and merely requiring the thing to be done with due regard to its spiritual nature and with less than usual temporal severity. What is done thus by the

In particular, Journet deploys his distinction between direct and indirect power to explain why the medieval Church was not responsible for bloodshed.[58]

I have said that by reason of the spiritual values invested in the temporal common good in a consecrational regime, it was this temporal common good itself which the Church required to be defended, by temporal means used in accordance with their own laws. And if the order of agents always corresponds to the order of ends, the principal agent who bears responsibility for the defence of the temporal, can be only a temporal agent; subjected to the Church as an autonomous cause of a lower order is subjected to a cause of a higher order, but *not* as an instrument is subjected to its principal cause.[59]

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secular arm is spiritualized by the Church and pertains to her own kingdom.

   Or else the canonical power, by reason of the spiritual element interwoven into the very texture of the temporal and constituting its supreme value, throws its influence over the temporal as a whole, making it a pressing duty for the secular power to defend this supreme value by its own proper means, and to oppose those who seek to overturn it, in its own proper way.

   In the first case, the Church asks the secular power to act as a pure instrument for the Church's ends and in the Church's way. In the second case she asks it to act as an autonomous temporal cause fulfilling its proper temporal task (that she can do at all times) while specifying (and this she can do only in a consecrational regime) that the fulfilment of the temporal task involves the defence, by temporal means and in a temporal way, of those spiritual values that are bound up with the temporal. (Ibid., 250-51; see ibid., 260-61, 274-75, 300-301)

[57] Ibid., 260-61. Journet emphasizes that he does not mean the same thing as Suarez does when he ascribes both a "direct" and an "indirect" power to the Church. For Suarez, the "direct" and "indirect" power of the Church are not two ways in which she may have recourse to the state. Rather, the Church has a "direct" power over the faithful and an "indirect" power to utilize the state as an instrument. For Reichberg's summary of the extent to which Suarez believed that the Church could wield the state as an instrument, see Reichberg, "Scholastic Arguments," 38-45; for Journet on the use of the terms "direct" and "indirect power" in the *Syllabus of Errors*, see Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 262.

[58] At least, not by way of her canonical (as opposed to extracanonical) power.

[59] Ibid., 254.

When the state defends the temporal (common) good at the bequest of the Church, she does so as an autonomous cause of a lower order subject to a cause of a higher order. Even when the state defends a spiritual value inasmuch as it has become a civic value (the spiritual as temporal), what Journet elsewhere calls "the formal motive of the intervention" is temporal.[60] However, because the formal motive is temporal, the state bears direct responsibility for the intervention. The Church is only responsible indirectly inasmuch as she lays a duty upon the state to defend the (temporal) common good in its own temporal way.[61]

For example, not only does Journet argue that the use of capital punishment against heresy may have been legitimate within the context of medieval consecrational Christendom inasmuch as it had become anticonstitutional (because citizenship had been restricted to juridical Church members alone) and therefore posed a direct threat to the temporal common good. He also argues that the Church was no more than indirectly responsible for the suppression of heresy inasmuch as its suppression was legitimate.[62] His reason for this is that the Church was directly responsible only for lesser penalties inflicted directly on her behalf, in a spiritualized way, for the sake of her own ends.[63] By definition, the formal

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[60] Ibid., 301.

[61] See ibid., 290. Journet emphasizes that it is because he disagrees with Suarez about the Church's responsibility for bloodshed that he does not use the terms "direct" and "indirect power" in the same way as Suarez. He writes: "[The] chief weakness [of Suarez's line of thought] lies in too closely identifying the two societies, temporal and spiritual, and in failing to notice that their likeness is merely analogical. It does not distinguish with any precision between the privileges belonging to the clergy in virtue of the jurisdictional power alone, and those that accrued to them accidentally owing to the peculiar temporal organization of medieval times" (ibid., 254; see ibid., 292).

[62] See ibid., 283-85, 302-3.

[63] Journet makes clear that he is of the opinion that capital punishment can never be used directly on the Church's behalf (ibid., 270 n. 1).

motivation for the use of capital punishment against heresy was temporal, not spiritual.[64]

In regard to the Church's authority to deputize the state to inflict lesser temporal penalties directly on her behalf for the sake of her own ends, not only does Journet specify that such penalties must be spiritualizable (i.e., capable of being directed to a purely spiritual end). He also specifies that the state must benefit from such a course of action, if only indirectly.[65] It would be morally reprehensible for the Church to call upon the state to aid her in her own proper task if there were not some way in which the state would benefit from doing so.[66]

Within medieval Christendom, in which the temporal and spiritual realms were commingled, it was often the case that there was a sense in which the state benefited from being deputized by the Church. For example, even when states intervened to punish an offence that broke "no law but the Church's," this was to their advantage "because it [was] known that the Church alone [could] speed the advent of a true humanism and a full

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[64] Journet points out that there may have been many clerics who abused their authority over the extent to which a given heresy posed a danger to the (temporal) common good. However, in such cases, the fault was personal. Per Journet, the Church cannot be stained *in se* (see ibid., 271-72).

[65] Journet writes:

> When the Church wishes to deal with her rebellious subjects, can she approach the State and not merely beg, but require it to punish them?
>   Yes: but only in certain circumstances. . . .
>   From the standpoint of the Church as calling for [such measures], it suffices that the steps in question are really apt and effectual to achieve the desired spiritual good. But that is not all. From the standpoint of the State, on whom the Church calls, other conditions are required. I shall attempt to define them. Since the proper end of the temporal power is the temporal common good, the only acts that can be asked of it will be those which in the long run will contribute to the maintenance and advancement of the temporal common good. (Ibid., 272-73)

[66] See ibid., 274.

political life."[67] Likewise, "even when a country sacrifices itself to defend its fellows in Christendom, it is still a political good—for heroism, fraternal friendship, fidelity are political goods—the memory of which will be cherished among men."[68]

Journet speculates that it might be the case that the Church could have recourse to a secular arm even within a secular Christendom. However, she would not do so within the schema of direct power or within the schema of indirect power according to the same mode. Journet writes:

> Moreover, one fact is evident. In proportion as the temporal power becomes more and more differentiated from the spiritual, in proportion as we pass from a regime of the consecrational type, in which the temporal order is exceptionally well adapted to serve as instrument of the spiritual, to a regime of the secular type bringing together citizens of all confessions and beliefs, any appeal to the secular arm, especially if it be asked to function as a pure instrument of the spiritual, becomes much less frequent, more delicate, more hypothetical. But the essential power, the radical right of the Church, is not therefore modified. It is undeniable. And one can imagine that in a secular Christendom of a pluralist type the Church might still exercise it under new forms, and in connection with her own children alone.[69]

Within medieval Christendom, the Church was able to have recourse to a secular arm in a way unimaginable today because the entire body-politic was Christian. Within a secular Christendom, however, the Church would not have recourse to a secular arm in the same way.

In particular, the Church would not deputize the state to inflict penalties directly on her behalf in regard to all citizens. She would only deputize the state to inflict temporal penalties in connection with her own children.[70] Similarly, the Church

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[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid., 280.

[70] Journet here references Maritain's *Man and the State*, quoting: "In a pluralistic society it is but normal that the particular regulations of an autonomous body may be sanctioned by civil law, from the civil society's own viewpoint, when the interests of the common good are concerned" (as cited in ibid., 219 n. 2; see Jacques Maritain, *Man*

would not admonish the state as though the "fulfillment of [its] temporal task involve[d] the defence, by temporal means and in a temporal way, of [certain]"—purely—"spiritual values that [had been] bound up with the temporal."[71] She would only admonish the state as though the fulfillment of its temporal task involved the "public acknowledgement of those"— analogically—"Christian values on which all the sanctity of [its] temporal order depend[ed]."[72]

For example, the Church would not admonish the state as though its temporal task involved the maintenance of explicit belief in the supernatural mysteries of the Trinity or the immaculate conception. However, she might impose upon the state to foster at least implicit belief in God, the existence and immortality of the soul, and the sanctity of human life.

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In *L'Église du Verbe incarné*, Journet approaches the Church and the state from the vantage point of the legitimacy of certain extraordinary measures taken by the medieval papacy in the name of its powers. Journet argues, first, that the similarity of the Church to the state is only analogical; second, that the two essential duties of the Church in relation to the state are to safeguard herself and to Christianize the state; third, that a secular Christendom is possible; and fourth, that many of the extraordinary measures of the medieval papacy can be explained by certain special exigencies of consecrational Christendom. Having distinguished secular from consecrational Christendom and having laid out the essential exigencies of the Church in relation to the state, Journet characterizes the present era as a period of difficult transition away from strict consecrational Christendom, if not toward secular Christen-

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and the State [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951], 161 n. 17)—not that the Church would be regarded as would any other autonomous body.

[71] Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 251.

[72] Ibid., 219.

dom, it being the case that "the passage from one form to the other could hardly have been effected without a crisis."[73] In regard to this crisis, Journet writes:

The crisis was in fact terrible. Instead of evolving normally towards a secular Christendom, medieval Christendom was ravaged by the wars of religion, by the disastrous error of theological liberalism, by the establishment of a regime of separation between the Church and the State, and lastly by the ideologies of Communism and Racism. It seems that a secular Christendom, however extensive and precious its inheritance from the past, is destined to grow in the midst of ruins. The evil is immeasurable. But thanks to the divine omnipotence it may well, and all unwittingly, lend itself to the ultimate development of the Church.[74]

According to Journet, the question of the Church and the state in the present can only be addressed by answering the question of the Church and the state in the past. While avoiding false optimism, he identifies secular Christendom as the telos of the crisis that the transition away from consecrational Christendom involved. Secular Christendom is prior in idea and more perfectly aligns with the essential exigencies of the Church and state. Not only consecrational but secular Christendom is possible.

III. THOMAS PINK

One of the few postconciliar scholars to recognize the importance of Journet's ecclesiology in accounting for the continuity of *Dignitatis Humanae* with previous papal teaching has been Thomas Pink. In his article "The Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*: A Reply to Martin Rhonheimer," Pink deploys Journet's theory of the Church and the state to argue that *Dignitatis Humanae* amounts to a change in policy, not a change in teaching, much less a change in doctrine. Pink may therefore serve as a point of departure for appreciating the

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[73] Ibid., 221.
[74] Ibid.

consistency of Journet's approbation of what became *Dignitatis Humanae* with his earlier work.[75]

In his article, Pink responds to Rhonheimer's argument that, although not a change in doctrine, *Dignitatis Humanae* reflects a change in teaching at the level of the application of the principles of natural law in regard to whether or not the state may coerce in religious matters.[76] Pink argues that *Dignitatis Humanae* cannot reflect a change either in doctrine or in teaching, for the Church has never thought that the state has had authority to coerce in religious matters in and of itself.

In our opinion, while Pink has laudably moved the conversation forward by means of his engagement with Journet, his treatment of Journet's theory of the Church and the state in *L'Église du Verbe incarné* is underdeveloped. Concerns about Pink's engagement with the full implications of Journet's teaching have already been raised, in a way, by Gregory Reichberg, who notes:

Arguing for the applicability today of "the underlying doctrinal basis for the Church's previous use of the coercive services of the state" as had been theorized by Suarez, Pink focuses on measures of "soft" coercion (excommunication, removal from office, restrictions on movement, etc.). By the same token he downplays the harsher measures, including capital punishment of heretics, forced exile, the placement of restrictions on public worship by Judaism and other "practitioners of false religions," the punishment of "disrespect shown by non-Christians for Christ," and war for

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[75] For a more concise version of Pink's argument in "The Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*" that also makes use of Journet, see Thomas Pink, "Conscience and Coercion: Vatican II's Teaching on Religious Freedom Changed Policy, Not Doctrine," *First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life* 225 (August/September 2012): 45-51. For Pink on *Dignitatis Humanae* but without explicit mention of Journet, see Thomas Pink, "The Right to Religious Liberty and the Coercion of Belief: A Note on *Dignitatis Humanae*," in *Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis*, ed. John Keown and Robert P. George (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 427-42; idem, "Dignitatis Humanae: Continuity after Leo XIII," in *Dignitatis Humanae Colloquium: Dialogos Institute Proceedings*, ed. Thomas Crean, O.P., and Alan Fimister, vol. 1 (Norcia: Dialogos Institute, 2017), 105-46. For an approach similar to Pink's, see Brian W. Harrison, O.S., "What Does Dignitatis Humanae Mean? A Reply to Arnold Guminski," *Faith & Reason* 30 (2005): 243-95.

[76] Rhonheimer, "Benedict XVI's 'Hermeneutic of Reform,'" 1032.

the protection of missionaries, all measures that, as we have seen, were actively promoted by Suarez for the defense of faith. Pink mentions (some of) these measures in passing as though they were regrettable exceptions of a benign policy to "protect the public space of the Christian religion." He speaks as though these measures were only contingently related to Suarez's theory of Church-directed coercion but offers no explanation as to why this might be so.[77]

As Reichberg points out, Pink remains ambiguous about whether the medieval Church was directly responsible for the use of capital punishment against heresy and other like, harsher measures.[78]

In particular, Pink does not reference Journet's development of the possibility of a secular Christendom, how there may have been two schemas according to which the Church had recourse to a secular arm within medieval Christendom, or how it might be the case that the Church could have recourse to a secular arm even within a secular Christendom.[79] Pink focuses almost exclusively on Journet's account of how the Church might instrumentalize the state for penal and coercive ends. Nonetheless, Pink—inasmuch as he does take advantage of Journet's preconciliar theory of the Church and state—serves as a model for appreciating why Journet himself would think that *Dignitatis Humanae* constitutes a change in policy, not a change in doctrine or teaching.

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[77] Reichberg, "Scholastic Arguments," 45-46.

[78] In particular, Pink does not affirm that the Church was responsible for the use of the death penalty against heresy in the Middle Ages. He also does not affirm that he agrees with Suarez about whether the Church could deputize the state to punish heresy with death directly on her behalf. He even references the fact that Journet does not endorse "Suarez's exegesis of the deaths of Ananias and Saphira or the blinding of Elymas as actual cases of the ecclesial authorization of force without state assistance" (Pink, "Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*," 90). However, Pink does not say why Journet disagreed with Suarez.

[79] In particular, Pink only references Suarez's explanation of direct and indirect ecclesial power (in ibid., 95), not that of Journet. (Seemingly for this reason, Reichberg does not explicitly mention Pink's reliance on Journet, only his reliance on Suarez.)

Pink's argument may be summarized by way of five points, the last being his conclusion. (1) While the Declaration on Religious Freedom concerns the authority of the state to coerce in religious matters, it expressly limits itself to the authority of the state or lack thereof, leaving untouched the traditional doctrine of the authority of the Church to coerce in religious matters and the extent to which the Church *could* deputize the state to coerce those over whom the Church has authority. (2) Albeit only over the baptized, the Church has authority to coerce in religious matters in addition to the right to defend against a threat to her mission. (3) In the exercise of her coercive religious authority, the Church has at times had recourse to a secular arm. However, in such cases the state acted by dint of the Church's authority. (4) The Church has never thought that the state had authority to coerce in religious matters in and of itself unless some "religious" sect should contravene natural law. (5) It is true that the declaration calls for the right to religious freedom—that is, the right to be free from religious coercion by any merely human power—to be enacted into civil law. However, such a call reflects a change in continuity with nineteenth-century papal teaching at the level of policy in regard to the extent to which the Church has decided to deputize the state to coerce those over whom the Church has authority, not a change in Church teaching. What follows investigates the extent to which Pink takes advantage of Journet's preconciliar theory more particularly.

First, Pink argues that *Dignitatis Humanae* concerns the authority of the state to coerce in religious matters, not the authority of the Church. It is significant that he begins by distinguishing between the temporal and spiritual orders, or the respective authority of the Church and state. By religious matters, he has in mind anything that falls outside the ken of natural law, namely, anything that might be a matter of supernatural revelation. He does not consider whether it may have been the case that, within medieval Christendom, purely spiritual values had become mingled with the (temporal) common good. That is, he does not consider whether medieval Christendom may have involved certain special exigencies.

From the start, he considers whether the authority of the state vis-à-vis the Church might change. In particular, Pink references the declaration's first section, which reads: "Indeed, since people's demand for religious liberty in carrying out their duty to worship God concerns freedom from compulsion in civil society, [the synod] leaves intact the traditional catholic teaching on the moral obligation of individuals and societies towards the true religion and the one church of Christ."[80] Since religious liberty is said to concern freedom from compulsion within the context of civil society, Pink comments: "far from being expounded and addressed, the nature of the Church's authority and jurisdiction over the baptized, including her authority and jurisdiction over Christian rulers, was very carefully bypassed."[81] Pink is right that the declaration concerns the authority of the state more than that of the Church. However, because he does not consider whether what Journet calls secular as opposed to consecrational Christendom might be possible, he does not consider how the authority of the state vis-à-vis the Church might change in all the same ways as does Journet.[82]

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[80] *DH* 1 (Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1002).

[81] Pink, "Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*," 110.

[82] Rhonheimer's interpretation of the passage from *Dignitatis Humanae* at hand is twofold. First, he argues that the passage implies that "[this duty 'of the individual and of society to the true religion and the one Church of Christ']—as is stated immediately prior . . .—presuppose[s] a 'freedom from coercion in civil society'" (Rhonheimer, "Benedict XVI's 'Hermeneutic of Reform,'" 1036)—in response to which it is necessary to make at least two distinctions. (1) It is necessary to distinguish whether baptism can be coerced. As Journet puts it, "the authentic coercive power of the Church has no authority to force the faith on those outside" (Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 266). (2) It is necessary to distinguish in what sense the act of faith is forced even when the Church applies temporal and spiritual penalties to the baptized. As Journet puts it, "it is not to be supposed that any man can be made virtuous in spite of himself" (ibid., 265). Second, Rhonheimer concludes that, as such, "it seems that, when the Declaration speaks of the duty 'of the individual and of society to the true religion and the one Church of Christ,' the old doctrine on the functions of states as the secular arm of the Church has already been set aside" (Rhonheimer, "Benedict XVI's 'Hermeneutic of Reform,'" 1036)—the question posed by Pink being *whether* or *in precisely what sense*

Second, Pink makes clear that the Church's religious authority is coercive. To exhibit this, he references not only the Council of Trent, *Quanta Cura* and the *Syllabus of Errors*, *Immortale Dei*, and the 1917 *Code of Canon Law*,[83] but also Journet's exposition of the same.[84] Following Journet, Pink

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such a conclusion actually follows. (For Reichberg's analysis of Aquinas himself on the issues of forced baptism and the coercion of the baptized, see Reichberg, "Scholastic Arguments," 21-26.)

[83] Pink also references the 1983 *Code of Canon Law*. See Council of Trent, Session 7, "Canons on the sacrament of baptism," Canon 14 (March 3, 1547), in Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:686; Pope Pius IX, Encyclical Letter *Quanta Cura*, December 8, 1864, "The Independence of Ecclesiastical from Civil Authority," in Denzinger, *Compendium of Creeds*, 589-90 (§§ 2893-96); Pope Pius IX, *Syllabus of Errors*, December 8, 1864, Section V, "Errors on the Church and her rights," Proposition 24, in Denzinger, *Compendium of Creeds*, 592 (§2924); Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Immortale Dei*, November 1, 1885, §§ 13-14 (http://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_lxiii_enc_ 01111885_immortale-dei.html); Dr. Edward N. Peters, curator, *The 1917 or Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law: In English Translation with Extensive Scholarly Apparatus* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2001), 701, can. 2214, § 1; *Code of Canon Law*, Latin-English Edition, New English Translation (Washington, D.C.: Canon Law Society of America, 1998), 409, can. 1311-12. In regard to *Quanta Cura* and the *Syllabus of Errors*, Pink writes:

> First, as far as the magisterial *Quanta Cura* and *Syllabus* are concerned, the authority behind these temporal penalties is undoubtedly the revealed authority of the Church, not the authority of the state under natural law. It is, after all, decisive that the condemned proposition 24 ("The Church does not have the power of using force, nor any temporal power whether direct or indirect") occurs (unsurprisingly, given its explicit content) in the section of the Syllabus—section V, *errors on the Church and her rights*—dealing with the authority of the Church, and not in the following section on the state, section VI, *errors on civil society both considered in itself and in its relations to the Church*—where, were Rhonheimer's interpretation correct, it should have been located. And in *Quanta Cura* the condemned proposition that "the Church does not have the right to suppress violators of its laws by temporal punishments" similarly occurs in a section not asserting state authority over religion but rather defending the authority of the Church against, in particular, the state. (Pink, "Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*," 88)

[84] Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 262-72.

defends the Church as a "properly . . . coercive authority in her own right."[85] According to Journet, "every legislative institution—unlike a merely consultative one—carries with it a judicial authority and a coercive authority."[86] If the Church were not a coercive authority, she would not be a legislative authority and vice versa. However, the Church is necessarily a legislative and therefore a coercive authority.

Third, Pink sets out the Church's authority to have recourse to a secular arm. However, he makes no mention of whether there might be two schemas according to which the Church could have such recourse. It is because of this that he is forced, in the words of Reichberg, to downplay the use of the death penalty against heresy and other harsh measures taken within medieval Christendom. Moreover, because Pink only references the Church's authority to instrumentalize the state, he is less able to account for the extent to which the Church might have recourse to a secular arm outside medieval consecrational Christendom. As indicated above, the Church can only deputize the state to inflict penalties directly on her behalf in certain circumstances. Above all, she can only deputize the state in connection with her own children. Pink does follow Journet in limiting the Church's authority to instrumentalize the state. Not only does Pink reference the Council of Constance, the Council of Trent, and the 1917 *Code*;[87] he also references Journet's

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[85] Pink, "Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*," 93.

[86] Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 264.

[87] In regard to the Council of Constance, Pink references its "condemnation of Hus for denying the legitimacy of handing those subject to ecclesiastical censure over to the state for punishment" (Pink, "Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*," 100; see Council of Constance, session 15, "Condemned Articles of J. Hus," a. 14 [July 6, 1415] in Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 1:430). In regard to the Council of Trent, Pink for example references its "calling in the help of the secular arm to enforce Church law on monastic enclosure, declaring the excommunication of any secular magistrates unwilling to assist" (Pink, "The Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*," 100; see Council of Trent, Session 25, "Decree on regulars and nuns," chapter 5, in Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:777-78). And, in regard to the 1917 *Code*, Pink references Canon 2198, which reads: "A delict that violates only a law of the Church can, by its nature, be pursued only by ecclesiastical

exposition of the Council of Constance, Trent, and the 1917 *Code*, among other texts, in *L'Église du Verbe incarné*.[88]

Fourth, Pink exhibits the Church's belief, even before Vatican II, that the state has no authority to coerce in religious matters in and of itself. He does not consider whether the state might accidentally have authority to coerce in materially spiritual or religious matters, if only within the context of a kind of Christendom not to be seen again. Nonetheless, he is right that the state would not have authority to coerce in materially spiritual or religious matters outside of consecrational Christendom. Likewise, he is right that the state has no authority, in and of itself, to coerce in formally spiritual or religious matters. In particular, he references *Immortale Dei*, which states:

In very truth, Jesus Christ gave to His Apostles unrestrained authority in regard to things sacred, together with the genuine and most true power of making laws, as also with the twofold right of judging and of punishing, which flow from that power. "All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth: going therefore teach all nations . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." And in another place: "If he will not hear them, tell the Church." And again: "In readiness to revenge all disobedience." And once more: "That . . . I may not deal more severely according to the power which the Lord hath given me, unto edification and not unto destruction." Hence, it is the Church, and not the State, that is to be man's guide to heaven. It is to the Church that God has assigned the charge of seeing to, and legislating for, all that concerns religion; of teaching all nations; of spreading the Christian faith as widely as possible; in short, of administering freely and without hindrance, in accordance with her own judgment, all matters that fall within its competence.[89]

Because matters of revealed religion fall within the Church's competence, not that of the state, the state has no authority, in and of itself, to coerce in formally religious matters. Likewise,

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authority, which authority can call upon the arms of civil authority when it judges it opportune and necessary" (Peters, curator, *The 1917 or Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law*, 696).

[88] Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 272-304.

[89] Pope Leo XIII, *Immortale Dei*, § 11.

the state has no authority to coerce in materially spiritual matters outside of consecrational Christendom. However, the state may have had some authority in materially religious matters inasmuch as purely spiritual values had become mingled with the (temporal) common good.

Last, Pink concludes that *Dignitatis Humanae* reflects a change in policy, not a change in teaching. As indicated above, he does not necessarily consider how the authority of the state vis-à-vis the Church might change in all the same ways as Journet does. Pink does not consider how the authority of the Church has changed inasmuch as purely spiritual values are no longer mingled with the (temporal) common good. Moreover, he does not consider how the Church might have recourse to the state in a new mode. However, he is right that the authority of the state vis-à-vis Church has changed. In his view, it has changed inasmuch as the Church has now refused to deputize the state to inflict penalties on her behalf: "The real novelty at Vatican II is the Church's refusal of further license for state involvement in religious coercion under her own ecclesial authority."[90] Pink is ambiguous about whether the Church can deputize the state, in connection with her own children alone, without rescinding its call for religious freedom. Moreover, he does not consider how the Church might have recourse to the state as an autonomous cause. Nonetheless, in support of his position, Pink references how the declaration calls for a right to religious freedom, as in freedom from compulsion in civil society, to be enacted into civil law: "This right of the human person to religious freedom should have recognition in the regulation of society by law as to become a civil right."[91] Because he does not consider how the Church might have recourse to the state in a new mode, primarily but not necessarily exclusively according to the schema of what Journet calls indirect power, Pink does not take as much advantage of

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[90] Pink, "Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*," 81.
[91] *DH* 2 (Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1002).

Journet's preconciliar theory as he could have. However, he acts as a standard for understanding why Journet would argue that *Dignitatis Humanae* is "a reform at the level of policy and from accompanying change in religious and political circumstance"[92] in some way.

IV. THE CONTEXT OF JOURNET'S ADDRESS

It is important to contextualize Journet's address at the Second Vatican Council in favor of what became *Dignitatis Humanae* because the development of the text was long and drawn out. Before being brought to a formal vote, what became *Dignitatis Humanae* passed through several distinct stages, accompanied by multiple debates and numerous interventions from the council Fathers.[93]

It was not until the second session of the council, when a working document was "incorporated as Chapter V of the decree on ecumenism,"[94] that what was to become *Dignitatis Humanae* first reached the council floor.[95] However, during this

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[92] Pink, "Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*," 79.

[93] For a more complete treatment of the development of *Dignitatis Humanae*, see Richard J. Regan, *Conflict and Consensus: Religious Freedom and the Second Vatican Council* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967); Nicholas J. Healy, Jr., "The Drafting of *Dignitatis Humanae*," in Schindler and Healy, eds., *Freedom, Truth, and Human Dignity*, 211-42. For the texts of each of the five initial drafts—namely, chapter 5 of the *schema* on ecumenism, the *textus prior*, the *textus emendatus*, the *textus re-emendatus*, and the *textus recognitus*—in side-by-side English and Latin, see Patrick T Brannan, S.J., and Michael Camacho, trans., "The Five Conciliar Schemas," in Schindler and Healy, eds., *Freedom, Truth, and Human Dignity*, 243-379.

[94] Regan, *Conflict and Consensus*, 36.

[95] Even before John XXIII's December 25, 1961, apostolic constitution *Humanae Salutis*, announcing that there would be a second Vatican council, the Secretariat for Christian Unity had been meeting to draft "a text on religious freedom" (ibid., 13). After the apostolic constitution was issued, both the Secretariat for Christian Unity and the Theological Commission submitted a *schema* on religious freedom to the Central Commission for presentation at the council (the latter as part of its *schema* on the Church), after which an attempt was made to combine the two documents. What became chapter 5 of the *schema* on ecumenism, however, was ultimately a revised document from the Secretariat.

session the Fathers never got around to discussing chapters 4-5 of the *schema* on ecumenism in particular and only brought chapters 1-3 to a vote.[96]

At the beginning of the third session, the Fathers debated a revised text (now an appendix to the *schema* on ecumenism) for three days,[97] after which it was sent back to committee with interventions from the Fathers for further revision.[98] Included among those who stood up to speak during this time was Lefebvre, who (already) protested "that freedom is not an absolute value but ordered to what is good, that internal and external acts in religious matters should be distinguished, that external acts are subject to authority, [and] that grave consequences follow from allowing a right to act externally according to conscience."[99]

At the end of the third session, after their interventions had been taken into account, the Fathers received a third conciliar text,[100] now "a full-fledged declaration, no longer an awkward appendix to the schema on ecumenism."[101] The Fathers received the text on the fourth-to-last working day of the session, at the beginning of which day the Secretary-General announced that a vote would take place two days hence.[102] This initial

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[96] The council Fathers discussed the *schema* on ecumenism from November 18, 1963, to December 2, 1963, the session's last scheduled working day.

[97] After the second session, the various council Fathers submitted 152 total interventions concerning chapter 5 to the Secretary-General for the secretariat to examine. The result, "presented to the Council at the beginning of the Third Session, on September 23, 1964" (ibid., 65), is known as the "*textus prior.*"

[98] After three days, one of the council moderators proposed a standing vote as to whether to table the discussion. After the motion was carried, the Fathers then proceeded to submit over 140 further oral and written interventions for the secretariat to examine.

[99] Ibid., 78. For the full text of Lefebvre's speech, see *Acta Synodalia*, vol. 3, part 2, 490-92.

[100] This is known as the "*textus emendatus.*"

[101] Regan, *Conflict and Consensus*, 100.

[102] Namely, on the session's second-to-last working day, Thursday, November 19, 1964, labeled "Black Thursday" by Xavier Rynne (Xavier Rynne, *Vatican Council II* [Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1999], 417).

announcement notwithstanding, on the day of the vote, one of the council presidents announced: "Several Fathers are of the opinion that not enough time has been allowed for an examination of the text on Religious Liberty, which appears to be an essentially new document. Therefore it has seemed best to the Council presidents, in conformity with the rules, not to proceed to a vote as announced."[103] The third session then ended without a vote.[104]

The Declaration on Religious Freedom was little closer to juridical promulgation at the close of the third session than it was at the start of the council. As Richard Regan puts it, "after four years of preparation, three sessions of the Council, three conciliar texts, and two public debates, the Declaration on Religious Freedom had yet to be put to a vote by the Council."[105]

V. THE CARDINAL'S ADDRESS

When Cardinal Journet arrived at the final session of the council in the fall of 1965, anxiety over the failure of the Fathers to bring the Declaration on Religious Freedom to a vote still characterized the state of their discussion of it, if not more so. Between September 15 and 20, fifty-eight different Fathers addressed the council concerning a now fourth draft of the declaration.[106] Among these was again Archbishop Lefebvre, who addressed the Fathers on September 20, stating: "To me, the principles of the declaration *On Religious Freedom* seem able to be articulated briefly in the following way: 'religious

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[103] Ibid., 418.

[104] In Regan's words, what followed was "the wildest episode of the Council" (Regan, *Conflict and Consensus*, 111). According to Rynne, "a feeble burst of applause . . . was at once drowned out by a wave of grumbling, protests, and commotion which spread throughout the hall" (Rynne, *Vatican Council II*, 418).

[105] Regan, *Conflict and Consensus*, 114.

[106] After the failure to bring the Declaration on Religious Freedom to a vote at the close of the third session, the Fathers again submitted written interventions, this time 218 of them. The resultant text was known as the "*textus re-emendatus.*"

freedom founded in the dignity of the human person requires an equality of rights for all cults in civil society. Wherefore civil society must be neutral and must maintain the religions' protection within the bounds of public order.'"[107] As Regan puts it, Lefebvre, in sum, "bitterly condemned the Declaration," warned that the concept of religious freedom "began to be recognized only outside the Church, among philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Voltaire," and concluded that "only the Church has a right, properly speaking, to religious freedom."[108]

In an effort to rebut the charge that, if promulgated, the declaration would indeed give rise to such indifferentism,[109] Journet took the floor on the following day, September 21, as one of four more Fathers to speak about religious freedom before the debate finally came to a close.[110] His speech reflects a full harvest of the principles laid out in *L'Église du Verbe incarné*. At that time,[111] the declaration was finally put to a formal vote, and, the motion in its favor passing, it was only a

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[107] *Acta Synodalia*, vol. 4, part 1, 409-11, at 409: "Breviter mihi videtur principia declarationis *de libertate religiosa* sic exprimi posse: 'Libertas religiosa fundata in dignitate personae humanae exigit aequabilitatem iurium pro omnibus cultibus in societate civili. Unde societas civilis neutra esse debet et protectionem religionum intra limites ordinis publici praestare debet.'" By contrast, Yves Congar locates the continuity of the Declaration on Religious Freedom with previous papal teaching precisely in its emphasis on human dignity: "Since the pontificate of Leo XIII and Pius XII, the Popes have frequently spoken of the dignity of the human person. There is a clear connection between these earlier Popes' way of thinking and the Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom which Paul VI valued so highly" (Yves Congar, O.P., "Moving Towards a Pilgrim Church," in *Vatican II Revisited: By Those Who Were There*, ed. Alberic Stacpoole [Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1986], 129-52, at 147).

[108] Regan, *Conflict and Consensus*, 147.

[109] Rynne, *Vatican Council II*, 464.

[110] When a standing vote was then taken as to whether to end the discussion, "[t]he Fathers," in the words of Regan, "rose almost to a man" (Regan, *Conflict and Consensus*, 149).

[111] That is, after the standing vote.

matter of time before it was promulgated.[112] In short, in what ostensibly proved instrumental for what became *Dignitatis Humanae* and in open disagreement with Lefebvre's comments the previous day,[113] Journet addressed the council as follows:

Reverend Fathers,

On this question about religious liberty, there is a fundamental, doctrinal unity among us and yet differences, which have principally arisen from the pastoral preoccupations of the many fathers.

These differences, it seems, could be reduced in great measure if some of the following themes—which *are found* in this very *schema* already—would be underscored more, namely:

1. The human person is a member of two social orders: namely, the temporal order and order of political society and the spiritual order or order of the Gospel and the Church.

2. It is to be said in regard to the *temporal order* that the human person, although he be a part of civil society in one regard, nonetheless transcends the entire political order by having been ordered to an immutable good and to

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[112] The discussion having been ended by the standing vote, a formal vote was taken in answer to the question: "Does it please the Fathers that the already amended text on religious freedom should be taken as the basis for a definitive declaration after further amendments in light of Catholic doctrine on the true religion and proposed amendments which will be subsequently approved according to the norms of Council procedure?" (ibid., 150). This motion passed 1,997 in favor to 224 against, with one vote being invalid. No further changes (per the last clause of the question on which the Fathers had voted) could affect the document's substance (see Rynne, *Vatican Council II*, 465-66).

After this, a special commission of the Secretariat revised the previous *schema* of the Declaration according to the stipulations of the September 21 vote, the result being the "*textus recognitus*." After the Fathers approved the *textus recognitus* on October 26-27, "only specific amendments to the approved text were permissible" (Regan, *Conflict and Consensus*, 164).

A final version of the text, the "*textus denuo recognitus*," was finally approved on November 19. On the last working day of the council, after one more final, formal vote, the *textus denuo recognitus* was then promulgated as *Dignitatis Humanae*.

[113] According to Giuseppe Alberigo's *History of Vatican II*, "the secretariat, probably in the person of Father Hamer, had asked Journet to intervene" (Giuseppe Alberigo, ed., *History of Vatican II*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell, English version edited by Joseph A Komonchak, 5 vols. [Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1995-2006], 5:102 n. 206). As to how Journet, in turn, helped settle the minds of his fellow Fathers in favor of what became the declaration, see Rime, "L'intervention de Charles Journet dans l'élaboration du décret sur la liberté Religieuse," 37-40.

God his creator. In this second respect, therefore, the human person: *a*) is *free* in regard to all political society but *b*) will need to render an account of all his choices *to God*.

3. The person who strays or sins or whose conscience is wrong nevertheless remains a human person, and it is necessary that he be regarded as such by the political society in which he dwells. Unless in the case in which he were outwardly acting to destroy society's true public good, he will not be able to be restrained [*coerceri*] by such society. It rather belongs to this person to render an account before God out of the culpability or *non-culpability* of his own conscience.

4. It is yet also the duty of civil society to manifest explicitly in what honor one should hold God. Civil authority cannot therefore ignore the diverse religious sects abounding in the body-politic. It rather belongs to its office to have recourse to them in order that God may be praised by all fellow citizens in a becoming manner.

5. These remarks may concern the rights of human persons. But Christians know that, beyond this natural order, *the Church*, by the will itself of God and Christ, *has the inviolable and supernatural right to preach the Gospel freely to every creature*, and for this freedom the apostles and martyrs died.

6. The leaders of the Church, from the time of Constantine and beyond, did not just once turn to a secular arm in order to defend the rights of the faithful and to serve the political and temporal order of "Christianity" so-called. But, with the influx of the preaching itself of the Gospel, the distinction of temporal realities and spiritual realities little by little became clearer, and today it is plain to all.

Therefore, and this is of the greatest importance: the doctrinal principal according to which temporal realities are subordinate of themselves to spiritual realities *is not abrogated in any way* but rather *is applied in another way*, namely, by attacking errors with arms of light, not with the weapons of a fortress.

All these themes are encompassed, unless I am mistaken, in this very *schema* of the Declaration *On Religious Freedom*, where perhaps they will be able to be asserted in better light. And, for that reason, this *Declaration* seems to me most worthy of approval. I have spoken. Thank you.[114]

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[114] *Acta Synodalia*, vol. 4, part 1, 424-25:

> *Venerabiles Patres,*
>   In hac questione de libertate religiosa, adest inter nos fundamentalis unitas doctrinalis et tamen diversitates, quae proveniunt praesertim ex praeoccupationibus pastoralibus multorum Patrum.

Hae diversitates … videtur, possent pro magna parte reduci, si magis sublinearentur aliqua sequentia themata, quae in ipso schemate iam *reperiuntur*, scil.:

1. Persona humana est membrum duorum ordinum socialium: nempe ordo temporalis et societatis politicae, et ordo spiritualis seu ordo Evangelii et Ecclesiae.

2. Quantum ad *ordinem temporalem*, dicendum est quod persona humana, quamvis sub uno aspectu sit pars societatis civilis, tamen transcendit totum ordinem politicum per suam ordinationem ad bonum incommutabile et ad Deum suum creatorem. Unde sub hoc secundo respectu, persona humana: *a*) est *libera* erga totam societatem politicam; sed *b*) debebit rationem *Deo* reddere omnium suarum optionum.

3. Persona quae errat aut peccat, vel cuius conscientia erronea est, remanet tamen persona humana, et debet ut talis considerari a societate politica in qua conversatur. Non poterit ab ea societate coerceri nisi in casu ubi ageret externe ad destruendum verum bonum publicum societatis. Sed huic personae competet reddere rationem coram Deo de culpabilitate vel *non-culpabilitate* suae ipsius conscientiae.

4. Officium est societatis etiam civilis, explicite manifestandi in quo honore teneat Deum. Ergo potestas ipsa civilis non potest ignorare diversas familias religiosas in civitate vigentes, sed officii eius est recurrere ad eas ut digne ab omnibus civibus Deus laudentur.

5. Haec sint dicta de iuribus personarum humanarum. Sed christiani sciunt quod *praeter hunc ordinem naturalem, Ecclesia*, ex ipsa voluntate Dei et Christi, *habet ius supernaturale et inviolabile, libere praedicandi Evangelium omni creaturae*, et pro hac libertate mortui sunt apostoli et martyres.

6. Ecclesiae rectores, a tempore Constantini et ultra, conversi sunt non semel ad brachium saeculare ut defenderent iura fidelium et ad servandum ordinem temporalem et politicum sic dictae "christianitatis." Sed sub influxu ipsius praedicationis evangelicae, distinctio rerum temporalium et rerum spiritualium paulatim magis explicata est, et hodie omnibus patet.

Ergo, et hoc est maximi momenti: *Principium doctrinale* secundum quod res temporales de se subordinandae sunt rebus spiritualibus *nullo modo tollitur*, sed *alio modo applicatur*, scil. oppugnando errores armis lucis, non armis castrorum.

Omnia haec themata continentur, nisi fallor, in ipso schemate declarationis *de libertate religiosa*, ubi poterunt forsan in meliori luce poni. Et idcirco haec *declaratio* mihi videtur maxime approbanda. Dixi. Gratias.

VI. "In Another Way":
Journet's Analysis As a Way Forward

Journet's address constitutes a way forward in regard to the ongoing debate over *Dignitatis Humanae* because he identifies secular Christendom as the telos of the change in policy that the declaration represents. Although he does not use the term "secular Christendom" within his conciliar address, Journet argues that the declaration applies the principle of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual order in a new, higher way. Read within the context of *L'Église du Verbe incarné*, Journet's address reveals that he viewed the declaration as a potential development in Church policy, a refusal to have recourse to a secular arm according to the (medieval) mode of consecrational Christendom, but not necessarily a refusal to have recourse to the state at all. Journet implies that the declaration represents a step toward the possibility of a secular Christendom because he argues that the change in policy that it represents accords with the distinction between the temporal and spiritual orders more perfectly. Moreover, he supports his claim that the declaration applies the principle of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual order in a new, higher way by underscoring six of the declaration's main theological themes. Within his exegesis of these themes, Journet lays out the essential exigencies of the Church and the state. Rather than indicating an alteration of his theory of the Church and state, his exegesis of the declaration's main theological themes manifests that he finds the declaration in accord with the theory of the Church and the state that he had derived from the nineteenth-century magisterium in *L'Église du Verbe incarné*.

Because Journet identifies the telos and therefore the full nature of the declaration's change in policy, his interpretation

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For a reedited version of his address (in which Journet no longer speaks of the declaration as a schema) and accompanying French translation, see Journet and Maritain, *Correspondance*, 6:73-76.

helps bolster that of Pink in two ways. First, Journet's interpretation allows for greater appreciation of the positive nature of the declaration's approbation of religious freedom; second, his interpretation affords greater insight into why the declaration has been so easily misinterpreted by such figures as Lefebvre and those sympathetic to his objections. In addition, Journet's interpretation helps in conjunction with that of Pink to explain how the declaration does not follow modern, non-Christian political theory. Likewise, Journet's interpretation illumines how *Dignitatis Humanae* upholds Gregory XVI's teaching on the evils of religious indifferentism, to which Lefebvre appeals, and does not abrogate that teaching.

Contra Lefebvre, Journet indicates that the declaration represents a potential development in Church policy by underscoring six of the declaration's main theological themes. First, he distinguishes the temporal and spiritual orders. Second, he explains why the state lacks authority to coerce in formally (if not materially) religious matters. Third, he distinguishes formally religious matters from (formally) temporal matters. Fourth, he identifies that in which civil society's duty to God consists (that is, what makes the state capable of receiving a sublimated Christian existence). Fifth, he references the Church's right to preach the gospel (that is, what underlies the Church's two tasks in relation to the state). Sixth, he questions whether the Church needs to have recourse to a secular arm in order to preach the gospel.

It is significant that Journet begins his explanation of how the declaration represents a potential development in policy by pointing to the way in which the declaration distinguishes between the temporal and spiritual realms.[115] Just as he begins

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[115] For example, section 3 reads: "Furthermore, those private and public acts of religion by which people relate themselves to God from the sincerity of their hearts, of their nature transcend the earthly and temporal levels of reality" (Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1004). Likewise, the declaration references how Christ "recognized the civil power and its laws, and ordered that tax be paid to Caesar, but clearly warned that the higher laws of God should be kept: 'Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's,

his theory of the Church and state in *L'Église du Verbe incarné* by positing an analogical likeness between the Church and state, not a specific or generic likeness, so he begins here by noting the difference between the order of the gospel and the order of political society. It is this distinction that explains how the matters over which the state has authority differ from the matters over which the Church has authority. Because the Church and state share an analogical likeness, not a specific or generic likeness, both the Church and the state are coercive authorities in their own, respective rights; however, the matters on which the Church's respective legislative, judiciary, and coercive powers can formally bear and the matters on which the state's respective legislative, judiciary, and coercive powers can formally bear differ.

Having made this distinction, Journet explains why the state lacks authority to coerce in formally (if not materially) religious matters.[116] Although man must give an account of all his choices to God, including all of his religious choices, he is not bound to

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and to God the things that are God's' [Mt 22, 21]" (*DH* 11 [Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1007-8]).

[116] In regard to this, the declaration states:

> People grasp and acknowledge the precepts of the divine law by means of their own consciences, which they are bound to follow faithfully in all their activity, so as to come to God, their end. They must therefore not be forced to act against their conscience. Nor must they be prevented from acting according to it, especially in religious matters. The practice of religion of its very nature consists principally in internal acts that are voluntary and free, in which one relates oneself to God directly; and these can neither be commanded nor prevented by any merely human power. The social nature of human beings, however, requires that they should express these interior religious acts externally, share their religion with others, and witness to it communally.
>
> Hence wrong is done to the human person and to the order established for people by God, if they are denied the free and corporate practice of their religion within the limits set by due public order. (*DH* 3 [Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1003])

give an account of his religious choices to the state except, perhaps, accidentally (inasmuch as purely spiritual values might be mingled with the temporal common good). Because eternal life is a matter of revelation, the state has no authority, in and of itself, to legislate concerning eternal life properly speaking, to judge concerning such legislation formally, or to coerce delinquents in a formally religious way.[117] In fact, even the Church's authority to coerce in religious matters is restricted to the baptized.[118] To put it another way, man has been ordered to God in nature and in grace. Because man has been ordered to God in grace, not just nature, he has been ordered to God in a way that transcends the temporal order and political realm. Man's religious choices in the full sense of the term concern how he has been ordered to God in a way that transcends the polis. They do not necessarily pose a direct threat to the temporal common good.

Journet goes on to distinguish formally religious matters from (formally) temporal matters. Although the state lacks authority in religious matters in the full sense of the term, it has a duty to uphold natural law. Above all, the state has a duty to maintain and foster the common good. Those who contravene natural law, especially those who do so by setting themselves over and against the common good, are answerable to the state, even when they do so in the name of religion.[119] In general, the

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[117] Even when a state recognizes the truth of the faith, it does not legislate concerning the faith properly speaking. Even within medieval Christendom, the state had no authority to determine what heresy is, what constitutes a valid baptism, etc.

[118] See Journet on whom the Church's coercive power reaches (Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 266-68).

[119] Similarly, *Dignitatis Humanae* 7 states:

> The exercise of the right to religious freedom takes place in human society and is therefore subject to certain modifying principles.
>
> The moral maxim of personal and social responsibility must be followed in the exercise of all liberties: in the use of their rights individuals and social groups are bound by the moral law to have regard to the rights of others, to their own duties towards others and to

state has authority to legislate concerning the common good, to judge such legislation, and to punish those who break it. Threats to the common good perpetrated in the name of religion fall within the compass of (formally) temporal matters, not formally religious matters.

Civil society does, however, have a duty to God. The state's care for the common good includes within it the duty to manifest the honor in which its citizens should hold God.[120] Again,

the common good of all. All should be treated with justice and humanity.

Further, as society has the right to protect itself against the abuses that can occur under the guise of religious liberty, it is chiefly for the state to provide the relevant safeguards. This should be done neither arbitrarily nor with inequitable discrimination, but by legal rules in accord with the objective moral order. Such rules are required for the effective protection and peaceful harmonising of the rights of all citizens. They are required to make adequate provision for that general peace and good order in which people live together in true justice. They are required for the due protection of public morality. These factors together constitute a fundamental part of the common good, and are included in the idea of public order. Nevertheless, that principle of full freedom is to be preserved in society according to which people are given the maximum of liberty, and only restrained when and in so far as is necessary. (Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1005-6)

[120] Again, the declaration states: "[This synod] leaves intact the traditional catholic teaching on the moral obligation of individuals and societies towards the true religion and the one church of Christ" (*DH* 1 [Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1002]). Furthermore, after stating that "those private and public acts of religion by which people relate themselves to God from the sincerity of their hearts, of their nature transcend the earthly and temporal levels of reality" (*DH* 3 [Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1004]) it immediately proceeds to say, "So the state, whose proper purpose it is to provide for the temporal common good, should certainly recognize and promote the religious life of its citizens" (ibid.), while qualifying that "with equal certainty it exceeds the limits of its authority, if it takes upon itself to direct or to prevent religious activity" (ibid.). Similarly, section 6 reads:

It is an integral part of the duty of every civil authority to safeguard and promote inviolable human rights. The state is therefore obliged to give effective protection to the religious liberty of all citizens by just

man is ordered to God in nature and grace. Even without revelation, man can know that God exists. Likewise, the virtue of religion is first a natural virtue falling within the compass of natural law. Because man is ordered to God in nature, not just grace, he is ordered to God within the temporal order, not just beyond it. Whereas religious matters in the full sense of the term concern the way in which man is ordered to God in grace, the natural virtue of religion concerns the way in which man is ordered to God in nature. The former does not negate the latter; rather, it builds upon it. If the state did not possess the duty to manifest the honor in which its citizens should hold God, then not only would it have no duty to uphold natural law, it also would not be capable of receiving a sublimated Christian existence from the Church. Conversely, it is because the state does have a duty to uphold natural law that it not only has a duty to manifest the honor due to God within the temporal order as creator but is capable of receiving a sublimated Christian existence from the Church. It is true that the state cannot legislate concerning eternal life as such.[121] However, it can recognize the authority of the Church and heed her counsel. Likewise, it is true that the state cannot strictly outlaw any religion that does not contravene natural law.[122] However, it can attest to the truth of the faith by ordering citizenship, in some way, toward juridical Church membership. In general, the Church can enable the state to refer its activity to God as savior, not just creator. If the state did not possess an obediential potency to receive a sublimated Christian existence

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laws and other suitable means, and to ensure favorable conditions for fostering religious life. By these means citizens will have the real opportunity to exercise their religious rights and fulfil their duties, and society will itself benefit from the fruits of justice and peace which result from people's fidelity to God and his holy will. (Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1005)

[121] Such matters would be what constitutes a valid baptism, how often mass must be attended, etc.

[122] See Journet's analysis of the juridical condition of the gentiles and of the Jews within medieval Christendom (Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 224-40).

from the Church, then the way in which man has been ordered to God in grace would not build upon the way in which he has been ordered to God in nature.

The Church has the right and duty to preach the gospel, and it is this that underlies the Church's two tasks in relation to the state, namely, to Christianize the state and to safeguard her existence from the state. The Church's duty to preach the gospel is not subordinate to the exigencies of the temporal common good. Rather, the exigencies of the temporal common good are subordinate to the mission of the Church.[123] If the Church's mission were subordinate to the exigencies of the state, then the Church would lack the capacity to transfigure the state. Moreover, the Church's right to safeguard her existence would be violable, not inviolable. The Church's mission is not subordinate to the state; the exigencies of the state are subordinate to the Church.

Journet finally considers whether the Church needs to have recourse to a secular arm in order to preach the gospel. Given the distinction between the temporal and spiritual realms, it is

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[123] In this regard, *Dignitatis Humanae* 13 reads:

> Among the values which contribute most to the well-being of the church, as of civil society itself, and which are always to be upheld and safeguarded from all damage, the chief is unquestionably that the church should enjoy all the freedom of action it needs to care for the salvation of humanity. For this is a sacred liberty with which the only-begotten Son of God endowed the church he obtained with his own blood. It is so integral to the church that any who attack it are acting against the will of God. This freedom of the church is a fundamental principle in all relations between the church and both the state and the whole social order.
>
> In human society and in the presence of any civil power the church claims freedom for itself as a spiritual authority, established by Christ the lord, on whom lies the duty by divine command of going into the whole world and preaching the gospel to the whole creation. The church further claims freedom in that it is a human association enjoying the right to live in civil society according to the requirements of christian faith. (Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1009)

not necessary for the Church to have recourse to the state according to the (medieval) mode of consecrational Christendom.[124] Within medieval Christendom, the Church had recourse to a secular arm in a way unimaginable today because the temporal and spiritual realms had been commingled. However, it is not necessary for citizenship to be restricted to juridical Church members alone in order for a state to be Christian. To be Christian, a state must be elevated in its proper activity as such: it must continue to pursue its proper, temporal, cultural

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[124] The declaration famously calls for a right to religious freedom to be enacted into civil law (*DH* 2 [Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1002). Furthermore, section 10 reads:

> One of the chief catholic teachings, found in the word of God and repeatedly preached by the fathers of the church, is that the response of people to God in faith should be voluntary; so no one must be forced to embrace the faith against her or his will. Indeed, the act of faith is by its very nature voluntary. Human beings, redeemed by Christ their saviour and called to adoptive sonship through Jesus Christ, can only respond to God as he reveals himself if, with the Father drawing them, they give to God a free and rational allegiance of faith. It is therefore entirely in accord with the nature of faith that every kind of human coercion should be excluded from religion. And so the ideal of religious freedom greatly helps to produce the conditions in which people can be openly invited to christian faith, and can embrace it of their own accord and witness to it in action in their whole manner of life. (Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1006-7)

Likewise, the declaration notes:

> Hence the church is being faithful to the truth of the gospel and is following the way of Christ and the apostles, when it sees the principle of religious freedom as in accord with human dignity and the revelation of God, and when it promotes it. Throughout the centuries it has guarded and handed on the teaching received from the master and from the apostles. Although at times in the life of the people of God, as it has pursued its pilgrimage through the twists and turns of human history, there have been ways of acting hardly in tune with the spirit of the gospel, indeed contrary to it, nevertheless the church's teaching that no one's faith should be coerced has held firm. (*DH* 12 [Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1008-9])

ends as true yet intermediate ends. In order for her to carry out her mission in full, it is necessary for the Church to Christianize the state. However, in addition to a political community of juridical Church members alone, a participatory analogically Christian community is possible.

Having laid out the essential exigencies of the Church in relation to the state, Journet concludes that the declaration applies the principle of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual order in a new, higher way. He implies that the declaration represents a refusal to have recourse to a secular arm according to the (medieval) mode of consecrational Christendom because he argues that the change in policy it represents accords with the distinction between the temporal and spiritual orders more perfectly. Within a secular (as opposed to consecrational) Christendom, the Church might have recourse to the state; however, it would not do so according to the same mode. If the Church would have recourse to the state within the schema of what Journet calls indirect power, then she would not do so as though purely spiritual values needed to be defended in a temporal way. Likewise, if the Church would have recourse to the state within the schema of what Journet calls direct power, then she would not do so as though all citizens would necessarily be subject to the penalties she stipulated. According to Journet, the telos of the change in policy that the declaration represents is none other than secular Christendom.

Because Journet identifies the telos and therefore the full nature of the declaration's change in policy, his interpretation helps bolster that of Pink in two ways. First, given that the declaration represents a step toward the possibility of secular Christendom, it rightly celebrates the possibility of religious freedom being enacted into civil law as helping to make secular Christendom possible. For example, section 10 reads: "And so the ideal of religious freedom greatly helps to produce the conditions in which people can be openly invited to christian

faith, and can embrace it of their own accord and witness to it in action in their whole manner of life."[125] In other words, Journet's interpretation helps to take greater account of the positive nature of the declaration's approbation of religious freedom. Second, inasmuch as the declaration represents a refusal to have recourse to a secular arm as it had within the context of medieval Christendom, it would seem to denote an end to consecrational Christendom. Lefebvre may have been right that the declaration would mean an end to the kind of Christendom he sought to defend (i.e., consecrational Christendom). Journet's interpretation, in other words, affords greater insight into why the declaration has been so easily misinterpreted.

This interpretation, in conjunction with that of Pink, also helps to explain how the declaration does not follow modern, non-Christian political theory. As Pink and Journet point out, the Church has authority in religious matters, including a right to call upon the state (inasmuch as it is fitting) in the fulfillment of her mission. Contra Lefebvre, the declaration is best understood in regard to such teaching, not in regard to modern, non-Christian political theory. Given nineteenth-century papal teaching on the authority of the Church, *Dignitatis Humanae* reflects a change in the authority of the state vis-à-vis the Church (inasmuch as the Church will no longer have recourse to the state as it did within medieval Christendom), not a change in doctrine or teaching.

In particular, Journet helps explain how *Dignitatis Humanae* upholds Gregory XVI's teaching against indifferentism. Not only was it never the case that the state had authority to coerce in religious matters (except perhaps accidentally), but citizenship can be ordered toward juridical Church membership in two ways: either by confining citizenship to it or by designating juridical Church membership as the best way of being a citizen. Within secular Christendom, not only does the Church still animate the state, it animates it all the more in its

[125] Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:1007.

own proper activity as such. Likewise, not only does the state still acknowledge the truth of the faith; it acknowledges it all the more freely.[126] It is true that error is tolerated with respect to the distinction between the temporal and spiritual realms; however, it is not thereby endorsed. In the words of Journet, error is "attack[ed] with arms of light, not with the weapons of a fortress."[127]

CONCLUSION

Given the tension over *Dignitatis Humanae* at the council, and Journet's role in dissipating it, the content of his speech from the fourth session is worthy of much more consideration than it has been given to date, especially in conjunction with *L'Église du Verbe incarné*. Although the cardinal's speech is not indeed the voice of the council, it nonetheless manifests the thinking of perhaps the most theologically sophisticated mind of all of the Fathers of the final session. Furthermore, the issue that Journet adjudicates is nothing less than the primary point of contention among those who continue to debate the document. In Journet's mind, the declaration merited the support of the council Fathers precisely because it stood in continuity with the Catholic principles for the sake of whose defense those opposed to the declaration (such as Lefebvre) actively resisted it. As Journet elaborates between his conciliar address and *L'Église du Verbe incarné*, these principles not only include the Church's ability to deputize the state; they also include the Church's ability to afford the state a sublimated, Christian existence by way of an "'indirect power . . .' in which a duty is laid on the temporal power to act as a second cause, by its own means, for its own ends, and under its own

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[126] That is, in accord with the proper nature of faith.

[127] To put it another way, within secular Christendom, it is realized that one kind of error is religious in the full sense of the term whereas another is religious only in an analogical sense of the term.

responsibility."[128] As Journet puts it, not only a consecrational but a secular Christendom is possible.

Understood in light of Journet's intervention at the council, *Dignitatis Humanae* does not reflect a change in doctrine or teaching but a higher, alternate application of previous papal doctrine and teaching. It is not just a change in policy but a development of Church policy in its relation to the state. *Dignitatis Humanae* does not abandon the idea of a Christian state; it imposes a duty upon the world necessary for the Christianization of the state in a new, higher way. In short, the declaration properly understood is itself an exercise of what Journet calls indirect ecclesial power.

[128] Journet, *Church of the Word Incarnate*, 260.

THE INTENTION AND UNITY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS'S EXPOSITION OF BOETHIUS, *ON THE TRINITY*

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OVER THE LAST several decades, St. Thomas Aquinas's *Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate*[1] has attracted a degree of attention remarkable for a work of its modest profile.[2] It is brief by St. Thomas's standards, and for reasons unknown to us it was never finished:[3] he set it aside

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[1] Although the Latin text here used is that of the Leonine edition (*Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. 50, *Super Boetium De Trinitate. Expositio Libri Boetii De ebdomadibus* [Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1992]), I have chosen to refer to St. Thomas's work not by the title used there (*Super Boetium De Trinitate*), but by that used in Decker's critical edition (Sancti Thomae de Aquino, *Expositio Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate*, ed. Bruno Decker [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965]). This is because the use of the term *expositio* in Decker's title predominates in the manuscripts, as both Decker (43) and the Leonine editor note (P.-M. Gils, "Introduction," in *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, 5).

[2] Martin Grabmann, *Die theologische Erkenntniss- und Einleitungslehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin auf Grund seiner Schrift "In Boethium de Trinitate"* (Freiburg in der Schweiz: Paulusverlag, 1948); M.-D. Chenu, *Introduction a l'étude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montréal: Institut d'Études Médiévales; Paris: J. Vrin, 1950), 81-82, 226-40; Leo Elders, *Faith and Science: An Introduction to St. Thomas' "Expositio in Boethii De Trinitate"* (Rome: Herder, 1974); Michel Corbin, *Le chemin de la théologie chez Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974), 291-474; Alfonso García Marqués, "Introducción," in *Santo Tomas De Aquino, Exposición del "De Trinitate" de Boecio: Introducción, traducción, y notas*, trans. Alfonso García Marqués and José Antonia Fernández (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1986), 10-56; Armand Maurer, *St. Thomas Aquinas, Faith, Reason, and Theology: Questiones I-IV of his Commentary on the "De Trinitate" of Boethius*, trans. with introduction and notes (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1987), vii-xxxviii; Wolf-Ulrich Klünker, "Einführung," *Thomas von Aquin, Über Die Trinität, Eine Auslegung der Gleichnamigen Schrift Des Boethius*, trans. and notes by Hans Lentz (Stuttgart: Verlag

after completing what appears to be only the first fifth of the projected work.[4] In writing on Boethius's theological *opusculum*, moreover, he was out of step with his age. While the previous century, an *aetas boetiana*,[5] produced several commentaries on *De trinitate*, none of St. Thomas's contemporaries shared his interest, absorbed as they were in the project of assimilating the Aristotelian texts newly available.[6]

Freies Geistesleben, 1988), 9-24; Ralph McInerny, *Boethius and Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990), 97-121; Douglas Hall, *The Trinity: An Analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas' Expositio of the "De Trinitate" of Boethius* (Leiden-New York-Cologne: Brill, 1992); Gils, "Introduction," 5-9; Guido Mazzotta, *Tommaso d'Aquino, Forza e debolezza del pensiero. Commento al "De Trinitate" di Boezio. Introduzione, traduzione, note e apparati* (Messina: Rubbettino, 1996), 5*-100*; Lawrence J. Donohoo, "The Nature and Grace of *Sacra Doctrina* in St. Thomas's *Super Boetium De Trinitate*," *The Thomist* 63 (1999), 343-401; Jean-Pierre Torrell, "Philosophie et théologie d'après le prologue de Thomas d'Aquin au *Super Boetium De Trinitate*: Essai d'une lecture théologique," *Nouvelles recherches thomasiennes* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2008), 11-56.

[3] Maurer, *Faith, Reason, and Theology*, 35; Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas,* vol. 1, *The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 67. In the Leonine edition, the *Expositio* is ninety- seven pages long.

That he intended to write more than he did is proven by a remark in the body of question 6, article 3: "God does not have any accidents, as will be shown below" (Leonine ed., 168, ll. 153-54). This matter is not treated in the rest of the text (which consists only of the following article of q. 6), and would naturally be considered in a treatment of the second half of chapter 2 of *De trinitate*, where Boethius makes this claim (Boethius, *The Theological Tractates*, Loeb Classical Series, ed. and trans. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: W. Heinemann, 1968 reprint of the 1918 edition), 10, l. 42–13, l. 58). Also see Grabmann, *Die theologische Erkenntniss- und Einleitungslehre*, 21; Gils, "Introduction," 6.

[4] Elders, *Faith and Science*, 16.

[5] M.-D. Chenu, *La theologie au XII siecle,* Etudes de phil. medievale 45 (Paris: Vrin, 1957), chap. 6, "Aetas boetiana." Cited in Torrell, "Philosophie et théologie," 15 n. 6.

[6] Grabmann does mention one other commentary on *De trinitate* which he dates to the thirteenth century, but that he is not confident in the date is indicated by the fact that he affirms in the same passage that St. Thomas's work stands alone (Grabmann, *Die theologische Erkenntniss- und Einleitungslehre*, 14-15). Reviewing the evidence, another scholar has concluded that the commentary is a twelfth-century work instead (see Elders, *Faith and Science*, 13 n. 15). The lack of commentaries should not be taken as a sign that Boethius's theology was not respected in the thirteenth century, however; his authority remained considerable throughout the period, as Grabmann shows (Grabmann, *Die theologische Erkenntniss- und Einleitungslehre*, 13-14). A discussion of

Nevertheless, the work continues to engage us. This is to be explained, I think, by two features of the *quaestiones* that accompany St. Thomas's careful exposition of the content and order of Boethius's discourse: their exceptional clarity, detail, and sophistication,[7] on the one hand, and the range of fundamental problems they treat, on the other. Theologians[8] are drawn to the *Expositio*'s discussions of several topics, including the nature of sacred theology as a scientific discipline and the necessity of faith. Philosophers are drawn to the accounts of the principle of individuation and the division of speculative philosophy into distinct sciences. The articles on man's natural knowledge of God, furthermore, are of vital interest to both theologians and philosophers.

Yet this very diversity of the *Expositio*, rich and marvelous as it is, immediately presents the reader with a difficulty. As we shall see, St. Thomas presents this work as a coherent whole, just as one would expect from such a profoundly systematic thinker; hence we are unlikely to achieve a clear understanding of his doctrines without grasping them as parts of that whole. But what unites the assorted topics considered in the *quaestiones* is far from clear. What is their common theme or subject? More fundamentally, to what discipline does this consideration

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the reasons why *De trinitate* received relatively little attention in the thirteenth century is given in Elders, *Faith and Science*, 16-17.

[7] See Grabmann, *Die theologische Erkenntniss- und Einleitungslehre*, 22-25; Corbin, *Le chemin de la théologie*, 291; Elders, *Faith and Science*, 19; Marqués, "Introducción," 22; Klünker, "Einführung," 9; Hall, *Trinity*, 15, 38, 42-43; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 67. In fact, the impressive level of the treatment persuaded one scholar that the *Expositio* must have been written at the very end of St. Thomas's life, after the *Summa theologiae* itself (J.-F. Bonnefoy, "La theologie comme science et l'explication de la foi selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* 14 [1937]: 421-46). Subsequent research has disproven this thesis, however, and produced a broad consensus for an early date of 1257-59, after the commentary on the *Sentences*, before the *Summa contra gentiles*, and contemporaneous with *De veritate*. See Grabmann, *Die theologische Erkenntniss- und Einleitungslehre*, 19-20; Hall, *Trinity*, 38-41; Gils, "Introduction," 6.

[8] For the sake of clarity, I restrict the use of the terms *theology*, *theologian*, and *theological* to sacred theology, as opposed to all philosophical disciplines, including metaphysics—even though St. Thomas, following Aristotle, does sometimes call metaphysics "theology" or "divine science."

of theological *and* philosophical matters belong? And inasmuch as both of these questions concern the unity of the *whole* work, which includes the textual expositions as well as the *quaestiones*, they inevitably raise the question of the unity of these two parts, and thus of the relationship which St. Thomas's "commentary," as it is often called, bears to Boethius's work.

There are three interrelated questions. The first concerns the discipline to which the *Expositio* belongs, the second, its subject, and the third, its relation to Boethius's *De trinitate*. These questions articulate the problem to be addressed in the following—namely, the intention and unity of St. Thomas's work. After outlining the work in brief, I indicate three basic reasons why, despite the scholarly attention it has lately received, the problem remains without a satisfactory solution. I then sketch an argument for a threefold thesis which proceeds from an analysis of St. Thomas's prologue to the work. First, I maintain that the *Expositio*, taken as a whole, is a work of the sapiential science of sacred theology, and hence a consideration according to first principles; second, that the proper subject of its scientific consideration is sacred theology itself, considered precisely as a sapiential science; and third, that it studies this subject not *simpliciter* or "in the abstract," but as it is embodied in an actually existing theological work—Boethius's *De trinitate*—which is therefore the matter considered by St. Thomas under the form, or according to the proper subject, of the sapiential science of sacred theology.

I. The Quest for Unity

The *quaestiones* which provoke the question of the unity of the *Expositio* do not appear in a vacuum, but within a work structured as a continuous and clearly ordered whole, even though the plan was not carried to completion. Commencing with the prologue, which discusses *De trinitate* as a whole, St. Thomas proceeds to consider the parts of Boethius's treatise in textual order, providing for each section a careful and detailed literal exposition, structured by a *divisio textus*, of the author's

meaning or *sententia*.[9] He then engages in the *disputatio*,[10] which consists of two *quaestiones*, each divided into four articles. This yields six *quaestiones* and twenty-four articles in all, as the procedure is repeated three times: first, for the *proemium* which begins Boethius's work, then for *De trinitate*'s first chapter, and finally for the first half of its second chapter. Besides suggesting that St. Thomas planned to follow this procedure through all six of Boethius's brief chapters, this rigid uniformity is a strong indication of the intended unity of the work, and thus of the *quaestiones*, despite the variety of their subjects. The *quaestiones* cover the knowledge of divine things (q. 1) and the manifestation of them (q. 2);[11] the things which pertain to the communion[12] of faith (q. 3) and those which pertain to the cause of plurality (q. 4);[13] and finally, the division of the speculative part of philosophy proposed by Boethius (q. 5) and the modes that Boethius attributes to the parts of speculative philosophy (q. 6).[14]

The admirably clear structure of the *Expositio* is doubtless one reason why scholars have sought a principle that would unify its various *quaestiones*. To this one could add its author's well-known habit of constructing even the grandest works according to a sharply defined architectonic, as well as his penchant for finding remarkably precise rational unity and order in unpromising places, like the books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*[15] and the corpus of St. Paul's epistles[16]—not to

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[9] *Expositio c. 1* (105:185 in the Leonine text). All citations of the *Expositio* will hereafter by given by the page and line numbers of this edition (separated by a colon), except where noted.

[10] *Expositio c. 2* (135:121).

[11] "Hic incidit duplex questio: prima est de diuinorum cognitione, secunda de eorum manifestatione" (*Expositio pro.* [79:174-76]).

[12] Decker reads *commendatio* instead of the *communio* of the Leonine text (Decker, 107:4-5).

[13] "Hic est duplex questio: prima de his que pertinent ad fidei communionem, secunda de his que pertinent ad causam pluralitatis" (*Expositio c. 1* [105:186-88]).

[14] "Hic est duplex questio: prima de diuisione speculatiue quam in littera ponit, secunda de modis quos partibus speculatiue attribuit" (*Expositio c. 2* [135:131-33]).

[15] I *Metaphys.*, lect. 4 (Marietti ed., 69); III *Metaphys.*, lect. 1 (Marietti ed., 338); IV *Metaphys.*, lect. 1 (Marietti ed., 529); V *Metaphys.*, lect. 1 (Marietti ed., 749); VI

mention Boethius's five frequently obscure theological *opuscula*, as he does in the prologue of the *Expositio* itself.[17] It would be very odd, indeed, to find him here ignoring his constant principle, stated expressly at the same period in his career in *De veritate*, that while a book transmits the knowledge of many things, it does so more perfectly to the extent that it teaches all of these things by means of "some one thing."[18]

The "some one thing" unifying the *Expositio* has, however, proven elusive. This is certainly not for a lack of candidates, variously proposed as the philosophy of human knowledge,[19]

Metaphys., lect. 1 (Marietti ed., 1144); VII *Metaphys.*, lect. 1 (Marietti ed., 1245); XII *Metaphys.*, lect. 1 (Marietti ed., 2416).

[16] *Super Rom.*, proemium.

[17] 76:69-96.

[18] This statement comes from question 7 of *De veritate,* which inquires into the meaning of the *liber vitae* of Revelation 20:12. Article 1 asks "Whether the book of life is something created." The argument and reply are as follows:

> 4. Furthermore, the word *book*, since it conveys the idea of a certain collection, indicates distinction and difference. But in uncreated nature, which is the simplest of all, there is no diversity; therefore the word *book* cannot be used here.
>
>   4. In reply to the fourth argument, it must be said that it belongs to the very notion of a book to convey a difference between those things which are known through the book, and that this is because the knowledge of many things is handed on through one book. But that diversity *within the book itself* should be necessary constitutes a fault in the book, since a book would be far more perfect if those matters which it treats by means of many things were instead taught by means of some one thing. Consequently, since the greatest perfection is to be found in God, He himself is just such a book, which demonstrates many things through that which is most truly one. (*Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, v. 22/1, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, *QQ. 1-7* [Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae/Editori di San Tommaso, 1970], 197:24-28; 200:196-206)

[19] Marqués identifies this as the subject of the work in its incomplete state (as opposed to the subject of the work as originally projected), and places it within the philosophical discipline of dialectic, i.e., logic (Marqués, "Introducción," 29-30, including n. 39). Though Klünker does not state it as clearly, he seems to share this opinion (Klünker, "Einführung," 13).

the nature of theology as a science,[20] the Holy Trinity,[21] all human knowledge of God,[22] and the nature of the theoretical sciences.[23] Despite this abundance, no commentator has successfully shown, for example, how St. Thomas's treatments of the principle of numerical individuation (q. 4, aa. 2-4)[24] and of the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity (q. 3, a. 4)[25]—the one manifestly philosophical and the other theological—fall under a single discipline, let alone a particular subject within that discipline.[26]

[20] Corbin, *Le chemin de la théologie*, 296; Maurer, *Faith, Reason, and Theology*, viii; Grabmann, *Die theologische Erkenntniss- und Einleitungslehre*, 30-31; Elders, *Faith and Science*, 20. Maurer finds an emphasis on Trinitarian theology, while Grabmann and Elders see the scientific nature of theology as one subject among several. Hall tentatively takes up the closely related thesis that one of the two subjects is "the grounds of theological methodology" (Hall, *Trinity*, 43, 120).

[21] Elders, *Faith and Science*, 20; Hall, *Trinity*, 43, 120. Neither regards the Trinity as the sole subject. Marqués takes it to be the sole subject of the work as originally planned, but not as incomplete; see above, n. 19 (Marqués, "Introducción," 29-30).

[22] Mazzotta, *Tommaso d'Aquino*, 14. Although not as clearly or consistently, Donohoo seems to take this stance as well ("Nature and Grace of *Sacra Doctrina*," 343-44).

[23] Grabmann, *Die theologische Erkenntniss- und Einleitungslehre*, 31; Elders, *Faith and Science*, 20. Again, neither takes this to be the sole subject of the *Expositio*.

[24] 122:1-132:109. Article 3 (126:1-131:300) is not about the principle of individuation itself, but about an intimately related question also raised by Boethius's text (69:56-64)—namely, whether two bodies can occupy the same place. Saint Thomas's view of the connection is made clear in article 4 (131:1-132:109).

[25] 126:1-131:300.

[26] Only three of the recent scholars mentioned here clearly maintain that the *quaestiones* of the work in its actual (i.e., incomplete) state are unified by a single subject within a single scientific discipline. Corbin takes this to be theology as a science (Corbin, *Le chemin de la théologie*, 296); Maurer agrees, while putting an emphasis on Trinitarian theology; while Marqués regards it as the philosophy of knowledge (Marqués, "Introducción," 29-30). Corbin's thesis that the unifying subject is theology as a science rests on the unsubstantiated assertion that question 4 is about "the problem of human discursiveness, or more exactly, the abstraction of language" (Corbin, *Le chemin de la théologie*, 293). This characterization, however, bears no discernible relation to St. Thomas's actual discussions in question 4, which treat of the principles of plurality (a. 1), numerical individuation (aa. 2 and 4), and place (aa. 3 and 4). Indeed, it is such a strange reading that one suspects a typographical error—namely, that Corbin intended it as a description of question 6 instead, which both fits it tolerably well and is wholly absent from his presentation of the work as a whole (Corbin, *Le chemin de la théologie*, 293- 94). If this is correct, however, it means that he gives no account of

More broadly, the relationship these *quaestiones*, taken together, bear to Boethius's text remains unclear. In consequence, since St. Thomas's textual expositions stay faithful to the letter of *De trinitate*, the unity of the *quaestiones* and the expositions is also obscure. Most of the commentators reviewed above, observing that the *quaestiones* are undoubtedly St. Thomas's own doctrine and are structured by his own concerns, conclude that Boethius's tractate is merely a point of departure or pretext for his discussion,[27] and by implication minimize the

question 4 at all, and thus no argument for the stance that it, like all of the *quaestiones*, falls under the theological subject of theology as a science. The obvious and decisive objection, then, remains unanswered. Maurer asserts that the principles of plurality and individuation treated in question 4 are "themes . . . central for the theology of the Trinity" (Maurer, *Faith, Reason, and Theology*, viii). In doing so, he echoes Elders (Elders, *Faith and Science*, 66) and anticipates Marqués (Marqués, "Introducción," 39) and Mazzotta (Mazzotta, *Tommaso d'Aquino*, 43*). But neither Maurer nor any of the others provides any evidence at all for this claim—which is not surprising, since it is only half true at best. For while the principle of plurality, universally speaking, the subject of article 1, might perhaps be important for St. Thomas's Trinitarian theology, the principle of the individuation of species, treated in articles 2 and 4, is most certainly not. Nowhere in his works does he rely on this principle to discuss the Trinity, and it is not difficult to see why: such individuation is grounded in *matter* considered in a certain way, a principle of material substances of a common species, having nothing at all to do with the wholly immaterial divine persons, who do not in any sense belong to a common species. Hall, in fact, confesses himself unable to see how question 4 is connected with Trinitarian theology at all (Hall, *Trinity*, 83-84). Marqués himself grants that the establishment of the Trinity as authentic Catholic doctrine (in opposition to the Arian heresy) in question 3, article 4 is simply a theological consideration, without any epistemological analysis on philosophical principles. Instead of recognizing that this evidence invalidates his reading, however, he maintains that the article corresponds to the subject of the work as originally planned (i.e., the Holy Trinity), but "does not correspond to the present state of the work" (Marqués, "Introducción," 39). This is faulty logic. The article *is* part of the work in its present state, and as such determines the character of the work in its present state. What the article does not correspond to is not the work, but Marqués's thesis about it—or, more accurately, his thesis does not fit the evidence.

    [27] Grabmann, *Die theologische Erkenntniss- und Einleitungslehre*, 39; Chenu, *Introduction*, 82, 231-232, 239; Corbin, *Le chemin de la théologie*, 291-92; Marqués, "Introducción," 27-28; Hall, *Trinity*, 38; Torrell, "Philosophie et théologie," 17. On this reading, the *Expositio* belongs to the literary genre to which Chenu assigns the "commentary" on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. The interpretation of the *Expositio* proposed here, however, implies a different view; see below, n. 72.

unity of the expositions and the *quaestiones*. Yet if *De trinitate* stands outside of St. Thomas's real concern, the evident effort expended upon the literal commentary is altogether super-fluous.[28] A minority of commentators, gesturing towards the obvious connections of the *quaestiones* to the preceding textual expositions,[29] insist that the former directly engage Boethius's thought,[30] and even function to clarify its meaning more fully,[31]

[28] The parallel to *Super sententiis* which has been drawn (see above, n. 27) provides no argument against this claim. Since the university curriculum required St. Thomas to comment on the *Sentences*, while the *Expositio* was by all indications an independent project (Gils, "Introduction," 6), the attention paid to the text would seem to tell us relatively little about his intention in the former case, but speaks volumes in the latter.

[29] While the authors in favor of this reading do not set out the evidence in any detail, it is considerable, and may be summarized as follows. Saint Thomas explicitly identifies Boethius's *sententia* as the origin of his *quaestiones* at the end of his textual expositions (79:174-76; 105:186-88; 135:131-33). Furthermore, the matters discussed in all twenty-four articles clearly derive from his exposition of the text—not merely from some stray phrase, but from a point which St. Thomas finds important enough to explain. Thus in the exposition of Boethius's *proemium*, 77:19-37 correspond to q. 1, a. 1; 78:125-79:129 and 79:147-60 to q. 1, aa. 2 and 3; 77:19-40 to q. 1, a. 4; 77:41-52 to q. 2, aa. 1 and 2; 78:125-79:129 to q. 2, a. 3; and 78:79-87 to q. 2, a. 4. In the exposition of chapter 1, 103:20-25, 42-45, 49-50, 54-56 correspond to q. 3, a. 1; 103:20-27 to q. 3, a. 2; 103:42-62 to q. 3, a. 3; 104:63-98 to q. 3, a. 4; 104:105-32 to q. 4, a. 1; 105:144-67 to q. 4, a. 2; 105:168-82 to q. 4, a. 3; and 105:144-84 as a whole to q. 4, a. 4. In the exposition of chapter 2, 134:69-74 correspond to q. 5, a. 1; 134:74-85 to q. 5, a. 2; 134:86-100 to q. 5, a. 3; 134:101-135:116 to q. 5, a. 4; 135:117-23 to q. 6, a. 1; 135:122-27 to q. 6, a. 2; 135:127-29 to q. 6, aa. 3 and 4.

Again, questions 4 through 6, fully half of the *quaestiones*, consist of straightforward evaluations of Boethius's doctrines, and questions 5 and 6 are explicitly framed in terms of them. In fact, St. Thomas provides his explanation of the "modes" which Boethius laconically assigns to the speculative philosophical sciences not in the exposition, but in the body of the first article of question 6: compare 135:117-21 to 159:119-160:196; 160:224-31; and 162:327-59.

Finally, in at least one article of every question except the second, St. Thomas rather pointedly refers his own account back to the Boethian doctrine already explained. See q. 1, a. 1 (82:178-83); q. 3, a. 3 (113:93-94); q. 4, a. 1 (121:150-59); ibid., ad 5 (122:187-92); q. 4, a. 2 (123:77-80); q. 4, a. 4 (132:70-77); ibid., ad 5 (132:89-95); q. 5, a. 1, ad 9 (141:379-81); q. 6, a. 3 (168:177-84).

[30] McInerny, *Boethius and Aquinas*, 119-20. McInerny cites Chenu's *Introduction* in support of his reading, but the chapter to which he refers (pp. 173-96) concerns the commentaries on the works of Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius, not Boethius. As for the latter, Chenu's position is unequivocally opposed to McInerny's: "Like his contem-poraries, Saint Thomas made only a simple *expositio* of Peter Lombard, which he took

so that the two are intimately linked. Neither side, however, provides a more detailed analysis.

The principal difficulty, I believe, is one of method. All of these attempts seem to resolve to a consideration of the datum which, as it happens, first brings the problem to our attention—that is, the *quaestiones*. However, is this really the best place to start? After all, the *quaestiones* form one of the two integral parts of the body of the work. Surely it is more natural to proceed from the whole to the parts, especially when what we seek is precisely what makes those parts a whole. But how, exactly, are we to do this?

II. THE SUBJECT OF THE *EXPOSITIO*

Although not devoted to our question, J.-P. Torrell's recent examination of theological and philosophical themes in St. Thomas's prologue points out a surer path. From a survey of the role of the prologue in a number of St. Thomas's works, Torrell observes that the genre requires the author not only to reveal his intention, which of course governs the work as a whole, but also "to summarize everything which he has to say";[32] this introductory part of the work is thus the whole writ small. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that the analysis of the prologue to the *Expositio* will yield a more satisfactory account of the unifying principle of the work than has been proposed so far.

Yet while the prologue does indeed encapsulate the whole *Expositio*, as we shall see, it provides no obvious statement of St. Thomas's authorial intention. To discern the latter as well as

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as the text for his baccalaureate studies, and of Boethius (the *opusculum De Trinitate*). Here he remains anchored in the text, which he analyzes (*divisio textus*) and of whose literal sense he gives a summary account (*expositio textus*). Yet these are simply the vestiges of the primitive genre, and in reality he puts all of his effort into the questions, whose multiplicity and variety stand wholly outside of their textual point of departure" (Chenu, *Introduction*, 82).

[31] Gils, "Introduction," 5.

[32] Torrell, "Philosophie et théologie," 13-15.

the former, then, we will have to attend rather to what St. Thomas does and how he does it.

The prologue is headed by an epigraph from the Wisdom of Solomon: "From the beginning of her birth will I search, and I will bring the science of her into the light."[33] Torrell notes that such epigraphs (which appear in the prologues to most of St. Thomas's commentaries on Scripture and theological works) are always chosen with care and applied with precision.[34] Here, it serves as the reference point for the whole discourse, which takes the form of an argument that the words of King Solomon the Wise may fittingly be placed on the lips of the author of *De trinitate*.[35] The reasons given, and thus the sections of the prologue, are four. The first section[36] maintains that the quotation as a whole corresponds to the character of Boethius's entire theological enterprise. Solomon, divinely inspired, describes a pursuit of wisdom which commences "from the beginning of her birth," while the whole treatment of "the things of faith" given in the five tractates is a consideration whose principle is "the highest Origin of things Itself," the triune God.[37] The remaining three sections apply the parts of the verse to three principles of the particular *opusculum* at hand: its "matter, mode, and end."[38] "The beginning of [Wisdom's] birth," understood as referring to the eternal generation of divine Wisdom from the Father, designates the *matter* of *De*

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[33] "Ab initio natiuitatis inuestigabo et ponam in lucem scientiam illius, Sap. VI.," (75:1-2). According to the modern scheme, the scriptural verse is Wisdom 6:24.

[34] Torrell, "Philosophie et théologie," 17.

[35] This feature is somewhat obscured in Maurer's widely used English translation. In two passages where St. Thomas alludes to the scriptural author, Maurer supplies the word "Boethius," thus giving the reader the false impression that St. Thomas attributes the verse itself to Boethius, when he is only arguing that it is appropriately applied to him. Compare Maurer, *Faith, Reason, and Theology*, 4 to 76:69-70; and Maurer, *Faith, Reason, and Theology*, 6 to 76:117.

[36] 75:3-43.

[37] "Boethius, reaching out through the treatise towards the things of faith, therefore followed this order and laid down the beginning of his consideration in the highest Origin of things Itself, namely in the Trinity of the one simple God. Whence the foregoing words, 'From the beginning of her birth, *etc.*' apply to him" (75:39-43).

[38] "Among which, in the present *opusculum*, composed for Symmachus, a patrician of Rome, three things can be noted, namely, the matter, mode, and end" (75:44-46).

trinitate,[39] and the fact that Solomon describes his search as "from" this birth corresponds to the fact that this work is only the first part of the comprehensive Boethian treatment of the various *matters* proper to theology.[40] Solomon's description of himself as searching (*investigabo*) describes the *manner* or *mode* in which Boethius conducts this study, inasmuch as, presupposing the truth of what is conveyed by theological authority, he inquires *per rationes*.[41] Finally, "I will bring the science of her into the light," describes the work's *end* or *purpose*, which is "that the hidden things of faith may be manifested as far as is possible on our pilgrim way."[42]

In demonstrating the aptness of the scriptural verse to the author of *De trinitate*, then, the prologue resolves the work to four principles: what St. Thomas refers to as "the principle of [the] consideration" undertaken in the treatise,[43] its matter, its mode of proceeding, and its end. The first of these is actually twofold, for the proximate principle of the *opusculum*, which determines its character, is the kind of consideration contained in it, while this, in turn, is here described as having its own principle. In the first section of the prologue, St. Thomas explains both of these by way of a consideration of three human cognitions of "the First Truth." The first of these,[44] the fixing of the mind's gaze (*intuitus*) "in the light of the First Truth, from which all things are easily knowable," is a knowledge denied to us because of the mind's union with the corruptible body;[45] the

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[39] 75:47-76:68.

[40] 76:69-96.

[41] 76:97-113.

[42] "Indeed, the end of this work is that the hidden things of faith may be manifested as far as is possible on our pilgrim way: 'Those who elucidate me will have eternal life' (Ecclesiasticus XXIV). And for this reason he says, 'I will bring the science of her into the light' as is seen from Job XXVIII, 'He has probed the depths of rivers and brought hidden things into the light'" (76:114-19).

[43] See above, n. 37.

[44] 75:3-6.

[45] "The natural gaze [*intuitus*] of the human mind, oppressed by the weight of the corruptible body, cannot be fixed in the light of the First Truth, from which all things are easily knowable" (75:3-6).

second,[46] reason's knowledge of the Creator proceeding discursively from the knowledge of creatures which arises from sensation, frequently goes astray; the third[47] is a "knowledge given from above," whose principle is "a discernment of the First Truth infused by faith,"[48] and which proceeds therefrom to a consideration of creatures. It is this third sort of knowledge, a science which is assigned to the theologian as opposed to the philosopher,[49] that according to St. Thomas constitutes Boethius's consideration in the tractates; in other words, he regards *De trinitate* as a work in which *the science of theology* is realized. And in the fact that Boethius here begins with "the highest Origin of things Itself," St. Thomas discerns *a principle of the science of theology* at work in the treatise[50]—namely, "discernment of the First Truth infused by faith."[51] If we turn to the three other principles identified in the prologue's analysis of *De trinitate*, we find that they, too, are *principles of the science of theology* operative in this particular treatise: the Trinity as the scientific subject matter treated, argument *per rationes* as one of the modes in which the human intellect effects the

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[46] 75:6-20.

[47] 75:20-38.

[48] "Just as, therefore, the principle of the natural knowledge [of the Creator] is the discernment of the creature received from sense, so also is the principle of the knowledge given from above a discernment of the First Truth infused by faith" (75:29-32).

[49] "Whence it is that one proceeds by a different order from here to there: for the philosopher, who follows the order of natural knowledge, places the science of creatures prior to the divine science, namely natural metaphysics, but the procedure among theologians is the converse, so that consideration of the Creator comes before consideration of the creature" (75:32-38). The distinction drawn between philosophical and theological cognitions of God and creatures, which differ insofar as they begin from different sources and proceed in opposed orders, presupposes that they belong to a common genus. But St. Thomas identifies the disciplines of the philosophers as *scientiae*; by implication, then, theology too is a science. This notion of science is explained in the account of the scientific character of theology given in q. 2, a. 2: "Since the intelligible character of science consists in the fact that, from some known things, others are concluded of necessity, and since this is the case with regard to divine things, there is therefore a science of divine things" (95:54-57).

[50] See above, n. 37.

[51] See above, n. 48.

science, and a partial manifestation of the truth apprehended by faith as the end of the science. Under the sign of the Wisdom of Solomon, then, St. Thomas is resolving *De trinitate* to its proper principles *qua* specimen, or rather, model, of the science of sacred theology.

In doing so, moreover, he combines in a single discourse two distinct components: a description of the content of Boethius's treatise, on the one hand, and his own doctrine about the principles of the science of theology, on the other. That is to say, the elements of textual exposition and independent doctrine, which are divided in the body of the *Expositio*, are here united. Moreover, review of the content of the doctrine presented in the prologue shows that it corresponds quite closely to that of the *quaestiones*.[52] Since the doctrine of the prologue exclusively concerns the science of sacred theology operative in *De trinitate*, then, can we say the same for the *quaestiones*?

We should make this question more precise before attempting a preliminary answer, and may do so on the strength of the correspondence between the prologue and the *quaestiones*, which allows us to interpret the one in light of the other. In the

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[52] The account in the first part of the prologue of the natural knowledge of God through a prior knowledge of creatures (75:6-14) clearly anticipates q. 1, aa. 2 and 3, while its doctrine on the limitations of such knowledge (75.15-20) adumbrates q. 1, a. 4, on the impossibility of knowing the Trinity by natural reason—a point sharpened by q. 3, a. 4, in which St. Thomas characterizes Arianism as a bastardized Platonism masquerading as Christian faith.

Furthermore, the grounding of the necessity of faith in these limitations, first presented in the prologue (75:20-22), is developed in q. 3, a. 1. Again, while the first section of the prologue touches on the natures of, and relation between, natural philosophy and metaphysics (75:33-36), qq. 5 and 6 give a careful treatment of the parts of speculative philosophy; its implicit claim that theology, too, is a science (see above, n. 49) is the subject of q. 2, a. 2. The Holy Trinity, identified in the second part of the prologue as the matter of *De trinitate*'s scientific consideration (75:47-48), is treated in q. 3, a. 4. The specification given in the third and fourth parts of the mode (76:97-113) and end (76:114-119) of the theological work, moreover, foreshadow q. 2, aa. 1 and 3, on the permissibility of inquiring into divine things, and of using philosophy to do so. In short, Torrell's claim that the prologue contains everything that St. Thomas will say in the *quaestiones* is almost literally true, at least in the work's incomplete state.

study of sacred theology's status as a science in question 2, article 2, St. Thomas maintains in the reply to the first objection that it is not only a science but a *wisdom*: besides being concerned with the highest principles, it also proceeds from them.[53] This is precisely how theology is characterized in the prologue. Like the (unattainable) intuitive knowledge of spiritual substances and the rational knowledge of the philosopher, theology is an apprehension of the First Principle; yet unlike philosophy (and like simple intuition), it has "the highest Origin of things Itself" as its primary and proper object, in virtue of knowing which, it knows all else. We also learn in question 2, article 2 that sacred theology is wisdom insofar as it "orders and rules" other sciences.[54] This is realized in *De trinitate*'s mode of arguing *per rationes*, which, as St. Thomas states in his exposition of the *proemium*, consists in Boethius's use of philosophical sciences such as metaphysics and logic.[55] In view of these things, the prologue's attribution of the self-description of the Old Testament's paradigmatic *sapiens* to the Roman theologian makes much more sense; we should therefore say that the prologue concerns the *sapiential science of sacred theology* operative in *De trinitate*.

III. The Theological Character of the *Expositio*

Yet it is not only Boethius who exercises a knowledge of first principles which takes its beginning from God and directs lower sciences in doing so. The author of the prologue does not merely uncover the theological principles at work in *De trinitate*, but in each case considers the first principles involved. Thus Boethius's theological consideration, which informs his written discourse, is in turn traced back to the knowledge of God received in faith.[56] Again, this latter is resolved to God, its object[57] and donor;[58] to the human mind, its recipient[59] and

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[53] Q. 2, a. 2, ad 1 (96:97-98).
[54] Ibid. (96:98-103).
[55] 78:125-79:129.
[56] See above, n. 37.
[57] 75:20-25, citing 1 Cor 2:11.

beneficiary;[60] and then to the human body, for it is in virtue of the body's sensory mode of knowing[61] and, ultimately, its corruptible condition[62] that the mind united to it stands in need of the gift. Similarly, the Holy Trinity is identified not simply as the matter of the work, but as the first principle of the whole matter of the science;[63] the mode of theological investigation *per rationes* is shown to rest on the prior mode of citing authority;[64] and in describing the proper end of the science as the manifestation of the hidden things of faith "so far as is possible on our pilgrim way,"[65] St. Thomas gestures toward its ultimate end, the complete manifestation of God granted in the Beatific Vision. This consideration of *De trinitate* according to first principles, moreover, derives from the First Principle itself, for inspection shows[66] that St. Thomas resolves every part of the analysis to the knowledge of God which he himself has received in faith. This is why the prologue is brimming with scriptural citations and allusions, as Torrell so rightly emphasizes,[67] and why it is oriented toward and structured by the verse from the Book of Wisdom. This mode of proceeding, of course, is *per auctoritates*—that is, the primary mode of the science. But at the same time, St. Thomas makes use of the *rationes* of philosophy, not only in his general analysis of *De trinitate*, whose debt to the doctrine of the four causes is unmistakable, but also in the particulars. The account of natural knowledge,[68]

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[58] 75:20-23, 25-28, citing 1 Cor 2:10 and 2 Cor 4:13.

[59] See above, n. 58.

[60] See above, n. 58.

[61] 75:6-10, 29-30, citing Rom 1:20 and Wis 13:5.

[62] 75:3-6, alluding to Wis 9:15 and St. Augustine, *De trinitate* 1.2 (*PL* 42:822; *CCL* 50:31). As Torrell points out, this reference to Wisdom implies a properly theological understanding of the corruptibility of the human body: "God is not the author of death" (Wis 1:13), rather, "God created man for immortality and made him an image of His own eternity, but through the envy of the devil death entered the world" (Wis 2:23-24). See Torrell, "Philosophie et théologie," 20 n. 4.

[63] 75:47-76:96, citing Prov 8:24, Ps 2:7, Eph 3:15, Col 1:15, and Prov 8:22.

[64] 76:103-12, citing Sir 39:1 and the example of St. Augustine's *De trinitate*.

[65] 76:114-17, citing Sir 24:31.

[66] See scriptural citations provided above, nn. 57-63.

[67] See Torrell, "Philosophie et théologie," 18.

[68] 75:29-30.

for example, is clearly informed by the Aristotelian thesis that there is nothing in the intellect that is not first in the senses. In thus ordering philosophy to the higher ends of sacred theology, St. Thomas exhibits the third mark of theological wisdom, that of ruling and directing the lower sciences. In every way, then, St. Thomas himself speaks as the wise man in considering *De trinitate* as a work of his own sapiential science. With this in mind, if we reinterpret the divine wisdom to which it refers as sacred theology, the epigraph to the prologue of the *Expositio* emerges as a bold and concise declaration of St. Thomas's own intention: "From the beginning of her birth will I search, and I will bring the science of her into the light."[69]

IV. *DE TRINITATE* AS THEOLOGY INCARNATE

Such a study illustrates the doctrine stated plainly in question 5, article 4: "theology is principally about God as about a subject, but it takes up many things about creatures according as they are his effects or are in any way related to him."[70] Being an expression of the exercise of the science of the self-revealing God, Boethius's *De trinitate* stands in a definite relation to the principal or proper subject of that science, and, as such, is itself an apt object for theological consideration.

The subject studied in the prologue is accordingly twofold. Materially speaking, it is "the present *opusculum*, composed for Symmachus, a patrician of Rome."[71] What constitutes this matter as a subject appropriate to sacred theology, however, is its character as a theological work, since it is in virtue of this that the *opusculum* relates to God as known by faith, the proper subject of the science. Ultimately and universally, then, the subject that defines St. Thomas's consideration here as scientific is God himself, and in this respect the *Expositio* is of a piece with straightforwardly theological works such as the *Summa theologiae*. Proximately and particularly, however, the formal

[69] See above, n. 33.
[70] Q. 5, a. 4, ad 8 (156:339-41).
[71] 75:44-46.

component of the subject is the science of sacred theology—a subtopic, one could say, of the science as a whole. From this point of view, the *Expositio* is somewhat like a greatly expanded version of question 1 of the *Summa*, though it is undertaken as a self-standing study. In the *Summa*, by contrast, the examination of the nature of the science constitutes a justification of the method presently to be employed in the work's consideration of the classic, "first-order" subtopics: the existence and essence of God, the Holy Trinity, creation, man's ordination to God as his final end, sin, the Incarnation, the Redemption, the sacraments, and so on.

V. Unity Exposed

We can now return to our original concern: the unity of the *Expositio*. If the prologue is the whole in microcosm, then the textual expositions and *quaestiones* constitute complementary parts of a single theological and sapiential consideration of a single composite subject—namely, *De trinitate*, which is its material component, and the sapiential science of theology, which is its form. The expositions, then, are not a superfluous pretext for the *quaestiones*, but an indispensable preparation for them, in which the principles of theology are laid bare in their nature *as* principles, and furthermore as principles of a groundbreaking theological masterpiece; thus St. Thomas demonstrates the proper character of his own discussion of their truth.[72] By

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[72] This reading of the *Expositio* invites a consideration of its relationship to *Super sententiis*.

If one agrees with Chenu's claim (see above, nn. 27 and 30) that St. Thomas has no intrinsic interest in the Lombard's text, but only uses it as an occasion for the development of his own views, the foregoing account of the *Expositio* as a case study in scientific theology implies that these two works belong to different genres. A striking difference between the analyses of the works which St. Thomas gives in his respective prologues would support this conclusion. In the prologue to book 1 of *Super sententiis*, St. Thomas determines only the material cause of the work, that is, the subject treated therein, both as a whole and in its parts. This fits with Chenu's view that St. Thomas regards the *Sentences* merely as a source from which he can extract the subjects which he wishes to discuss in the *quaestiones*. Yet in the *Expositio*, as we have seen, he lays out all four causes of the work—a procedure which he follows in the scriptural

the same token, he is not simply explaining the Roman theo-
logian's teaching, or even, strictly speaking, engaging in a
dialogue with him. The doctrine and guiding concerns of the
quaestiones are St. Thomas's own, and his proper interest lies
not in *what* Boethius is saying, but *what he is doing* in saying it.
The *Expositio*, in other words, is not a commentary in the
normal sense, but a "meta-commentary"—a master's reflection
on principles of his own discipline exemplified in a masterwork
of an illustrious predecessor.

How the *quaestiones* constitute a unity among themselves on
the account offered here may be briefly indicated by a glance at
question 3, article 4 and question 4, articles 2-4, which have so
far defied all attempts to place them within a common science,
let alone under a particular subject within that science. The first,
it will be recalled, raises its eyes to the Catholic doctrine of the
Trinity, the acme of immaterial actuality, while the second
descends to the humblest principle of material substances. Yet
both are principles of Boethius's discourse in chapter 1, as St.
Thomas's exposition makes clear.[73] The doctrine of the Trinity
is, of course, the material principle, the particular subject under
consideration. In treating of it, Boethius engages in the theo-
logical mode of argumentation *per rationes* described in the
prologue. His account of the article of faith rests on the
philosophical thesis that the principle of plurality is otherness,
and this in turn is grounded in his account of the principle of
individuation, one which involves the assertion that no two

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commentaries as well (see Torrell, "Philosophie et théologie," 14-15). This indicates
that St. Thomas is concerned with *De trinitate* in its own right; to this extent, the
Expositio would be a "commentary" more closely resembling those on the books of
Scripture than *Super sententiis*.

Alternatively, one might conclude from the quality of St. Thomas's *divisio* and *ex-
positio* of the *Sentences* that, contrary to Chenu's claim, the Angelic Doctor is concerned
with that work in its own right as well. In this case, the relationship between the two
"commentaries" becomes more subtle: the *Expositio* might represent a refinement in the
theological method of a genre whose first instance in St. Thomas is *Super sententiis*. (For
this latter proposal I am indebted to a reader of this article for *The Thomist*.) A
thorough examination of the method followed in *Super sententiis* would determine
which of these lines of inquiry would be more fruitful.

[73] 103:9-12; 104:63-69, 99-132.

bodies can occupy a single common place.[74] By taking up these subjects in question 4, St. Thomas is simply examining the principles at work in the text before him; since they are philosophical in nature, he, just as much the sapiential theologian as Boethius, employs the services of philosophy. Although it has the appearance of a strictly philosophical discussion,[75] then, the fourth *quaestio*, as conducted within the context of the *Expositio*, also belongs to the sacred theologian's consideration of his own sapiential science as instanced in Boethius's work.

The view proposed here cannot be accepted with full confidence until it is shown how it explains the unity of St. Thomas's work in every detail. But I hope that the foregoing has succeeded in showing two things. First, the effort is worthwhile. Second, a promising place to continue the search for that "some one thing" without which the *Expositio* would be an essentially defective book—and with which we can more accurately understand the doctrine presented in it—is the prologue's sapiential theological treatment of Boethius's work as an outstanding embodiment of the science of sacred theology.

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[74] 104:63-69; 104:99-105:184.

[75] Even this is not quite true. The theological character of the discussion does shine through in q. 4, a. 3, where the first objector appeals to the miracles of the Virgin Birth and the risen Christ's entry into the locked room in which his disciples were hiding in order to argue that two bodies can indeed occupy the same place (126:1-15). Saint Thomas addresses the principle of the theological difficulty in his reply to the objection (129:208-130:230). These details, of course, strengthen the case for an ultimately theological, as opposed to a merely philosophical, reading of this text.

THOMISM AS A TRADITION OF UNDERSTANDING

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But in choosing or rejecting opinions, one ought not be led by love or hatred for the one who introduces the opinion, but rather by the surety of the truth; and therefore we ought to love both those whose opinion we follow and those whose opinion we reject. Both have diligently inquired into the truth, and helped us in this.[1]

S CHOLASTIC THEOLOGIANS were wont to identify themselves with schools. Despite their differences, the schools shared a common set of questions and a common procedure for establishing a question. Schools could be distinguished and related by their positions on these questions. Thus, a century and a half ago, the renowned historian of dogma Théodore de Régnon remarked that Thomism, in its widest sense, indicates the doctrinal options proper to the Dominican school, but, in a more restricted sense, means the positions of Bañez over against those of Luis de Molina on the efficacy of grace, predestination, and divine operation.[2] As this

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[1] Thomas Aquinas, XII *Metaphys.*, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 2566, ad fin): "Sed, quia in eligendis opinionibus vel repudiandis, non debet duci homo amore vel odio introducentis opinionem, sed magis ex certitudine veritatis, ideo dicit quod oportet amare utrosque, scilicet eos quorum opinionem sequimur, et eos quorum opinionem repudiamus. Utrique enim studuerunt ad inquirendam veritatem, et nos in hoc adiuverunt." Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. The words taken here in epigraph are quoted by John of St. Thomas at the conclusion of his article on the marks of a Thomist (see below, section II).

[2] Théodore de Régnon, *Bañes et Molina: Histoire, doctrines, critique métaphysique* (Paris: Houdin, 1883), vi; cf. William Matthew Diem, "Why Not to Be a 'Thomist': A

example suggests, however, historical scholarship has troubled our conception of the relationship between the schools and their eponymous masters.[3] More momentously, it has dissolved the situation in which recognizable schools could flourish in controversial relation to one another. Theologians disagree not only in their evaluation of past achievement but also about what the important questions are today. Scholarship has become more sophisticated, but also more difficult to integrate systematically and coordinate methodically. The range of discourses now trading as "theological" is riotously diverse. The deprecation of Scholastic theology and philosophy may be one point on which almost everyone agrees. School loyalty seems otiose.

Thomism, however, continues to inspire a following. The nature of the Thomist tradition has been the object of explicit reflection among professing Thomists ever since the provocation of William de la Mare's *Correctorium fratris Thomae* in the thirteenth century, and continues to be so today.[4] Still, as

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Critique of the Bañezian Reconciliation of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom," *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 22 (2020): 191-218.

[3] See Géry Prouvost, *Thomas d'Aquin et les thomismes: Essai sur l'histoire des thomismes*, Cogitatio fidei 195 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1996), 14-17. The difference between the thought of Aquinas and the school that he inspired has been widely recognized, both as an historical fact and, as we shall see presently, as an aspiration. Jean-Pierre Torrell distinguishes "Thomasian" thought from the tradition of his school, Bernard Lonergan used "Thomist" and "Thomistic" to the same effect, and German theologians commonly distinguish "Thomanism" from "Thomism." See Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Recherches thomasiennes: Études revues et augumentées* (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2000); Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 153 n. 5; Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, "Systematic Theology: Task and Methods," in *Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives*, ed. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 18.

[4] See Michael Demkovich, "Meister Eckhart and the Controversial Corrections of Aquinas," *New Blackfriars* 91, no. 1033 (2010): 335-44; Elizabeth Lowe, *The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas: The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain*, Studies in Medieval History and Culture 17 (New York: Routledge, 2003); but see also Thomas Prügl's review of this same book in *Speculum* 80 (2005): 627-28. For a brief, accessible history, see Romanus Cessario and Cajetan Cuddy, *Thomas and the Thomists: The Achievement of Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters*, Mapping the Tradition (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017).

more recent reflections attest, the exemption of Thomists from the sociological and intellectual transformations of the field has been, if anything, only partial. A Thomist receives something from Thomas Aquinas, but what?

"Thomism" may designate the thought or perhaps the system of Aquinas. In this sense, Thomism can be neither more nor less perfect than the thought of its originator; only Aquinas is the ideal Thomist, and the best we can do is internalize his lessons and defend them as the need of the hour suggests. Alternatively, "Thomism" can name a set of positions on recognized questions. These positions can be identified in retrospect. But retrospect does not settle the present, the possibility of a living Thomism, open to dialectical purification and development in relation to new questions.

Here, I take up the question of a living Thomism, but what I have to say is germane, I believe, to larger questions about the development and authority of theological traditions. First, I distinguish traditions of belief from traditions of understanding, and suggest that a tradition like Thomism ought to be understood primarily as a tradition of understanding. However, the matter is not quite so simple, especially in the case of Aquinas, who came to occupy a place of unique privilege in the firmament of Catholic thought. A second section, accordingly, considers how the authority of Aquinas has been construed, and a third examines his enduring value. Besides Aquinas, there is the matter of Thomism. It once seemed possible to define Thomism by a set of theses on common Scholastic questions, but the introduction of new questions, the re-evaluation of some old ones, and historical criticism of the Thomist tradition has complicated matters. What, then, is it? At the very least, Thomism is a complex of intellectual and social relations among thinkers whose positions are shaped, in fundamental ways, by an apprenticeship to Aquinas, as I argue in a fourth section. What it might yet be, in our very different, post-Scholastic context, I suggest in a fifth part by the example of Bernard Lonergan.

I. Belief and Understanding

In a famous little quodlibet, Aquinas was asked whether a teacher ought to respond to questions by giving reasons or authorities.[5] He answered by distinguishing two sorts of question. If the student is asking what ought to be believed, the teacher should reply with trusted authorities. But if the student is asking how to understand what is believed, the teacher is bound to give reasons, however imperfect, lest the hearers go away empty. The two questions move on different levels, corresponding to different acts of the mind: assent and understanding.

In a broad and improper sense, we are said to "know" whatever enters our experience. Properly speaking, however, knowledge is achieved through true judgment. Judgment is a rational act that proceeds from a grasp of the evidence on a question as sufficient grounds for a (certain or more or less probable) yes or no. One must distinguish, however, the judgments that arise through immanently generated knowledge from the judgments that are acts of believing others. Immanently generated knowledge designates what is known through one's own understanding and judgment: because I understand, I am able to work out the conditions for judgment; because I grasp those conditions to be fulfilled in fact, I can affirm thus and so to be true.[6]

Belief is collaborative knowledge rather than immanently generated knowledge. Belief is assent that rests on a decision, and the decision in turn rests on the (often tacit) judgments that someone can and should be trusted. To believe, in other words, is to take another's word for what I myself do not (properly) understand and, therefore, cannot competently judge.[7] To believe, then, is to know by collaboration, by deciding to accept

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[5] *Quodl.* IV, q. 9, a. 3. Cf. *STh* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.

[6] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 296-340.

[7] Lonergan, *Insight*, 725-40. By thus contrasting belief with immanently generated knowledge, I am using the word "belief" differently from those epistemologies that define knowledge as "justified true belief" or the like.

what others know and understand as part of my own knowledge though I do not understand their knowledge. Believing is fundamental to collaboration and to learning, and therefore to the human good as historical project.[8]

Both the judgment of belief and the judgment regarding immanently generated understanding are eminently reasonable, but their reasonableness differs. In the case of immanently generated knowledge, assent concludes a process that regards a possibly relevant understanding of some matter and asks for evidence to affirm it. But in the case of belief, assent concludes a process that begins with asking whether someone can and ought to be trusted. Because the judgments of credibility (fact) and credentity (value) are reasonable, belief is reasonable, even if the objects believed are hardly understood.

In short, the vector of belief is from above, so to speak, downwards: from trust in someone's competence and honesty, to the decision to assent though one has not fully understood, to the gradual development, perhaps, of some (proper or analogous) understanding of one's own: *crede ut intelligas*. The vector of immanently generated knowledge, conversely, is from below upwards: from the schematic representation of problems in phantasm, to insight and formulation, to a reflective construal and appraisal of the evidence grounding a reasonable and measured judgment on a matter one has personally understood.

The difference between the transmission of knowledge through belief and the transmission of knowledge through the development of understanding gives us two senses of tradition. Because to believe is to hold in trust what only another understands and knows to be true, traditions of belief rest on authority. What is handed on is received insofar as it is believed. A tradition of understanding, by contrast, is successfully handed on and received just insofar as its fundamental insights and skills are assimilated. One becomes a believer by accepting the word,

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[8] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, ed. John D. Dadosky and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 14 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 42-47.

but one becomes a scientist or a mathematician only by developing one's own understanding.

Nevertheless, our formulation of this difference so far is only a first approximation. Concretely, belief and understanding are so interdependent as to be inseparable, though perhaps not indistinguishable, in practice. This is so not only in a static sense (the current inventory of one's knowledge) but also in a dynamic sense, in the coming-to-be of one's knowledge of the world. Learning and teaching are an identity; where there is no learning, there may be words and deeds, but there is no teaching. But learning, and therefore teaching, is a gradual process. At the outset it is a matter of successive approximations in the learner to the understanding possessed by the teacher. Almost of necessity, therefore, the teacher of beginners is initially involved in what she knows to be vast oversimplifications, and the beginning pupil is involved in misunderstandings quite beyond his competence to measure. But gradually the simplifications are complicated, corrected, and qualified; gradually and almost imperceptibly, the pupil acquires the coalescence of insights and the familiarity with the matter that will eventually make him a competent judge in his own right.

Because learning is such a process, even a tradition of understanding may begin with the trust a pupil reposes in a teacher and a consequent belief in her teachings. Belief comes first and understanding follows; *crede ut intelligas* holds, in its way, for education generally.[9] Still, the goal of an educational tradition, it seems to me, is more properly the development of understanding than the communication of truths, and the giving (*traditio*) and receiving are an identity. If a proportionate development of understanding does not occur, the tradition is not, properly speaking, handed down. Perhaps it is even radically betrayed.[10]

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[9] See *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 14; *In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 3, a. 1. Discussion in Oliva Blanchette, "Philosophy and Theology in Aquinas: On Being a Disciple in Our Day," *Science et esprit* 28 (1976): 34-35.

[10] See Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3d ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 1-5.

Any modern science, furthermore, involves a vast colla-
boration. No scientist wastes her time trying to prove every-
thing that has already been established or master every skill
pertinent to her field; she takes the competence and honesty of
her colleagues more or less for granted, confident that
methodical procedures will eventually expose experimental
errors and theoretical defects to yield more complete, verified
understanding. Scientific collaboration, accordingly, involves a
good deal of belief, whatever the conceits of "scientism."[11]
Nevertheless, the collaboration is methodical precisely because
it rests on the development of complementary competencies,
that is, interlaced and overlapping capacities for experimen-
tation, understanding, and judgment. A scientific tradition could
not be scientific in any meaningful sense apart from the
proportionate development of the relevant and complementary
competencies in those who receive it.

Now, both these circumstances have their parallels in the-
ology, for theology is an educational tradition and it is also a
collaborative inquiry. But theology involves a further element of
belief, insofar as it regards the mysteries of faith. For the mys-
teries are hidden in God and accepted by us only through divine
revelation. Where the natural sciences begin with data, Aqui-
nas's *sacra doctrina*—I shall speak of the systematic or specu-
lative function of theology—begins with truths.[12] Systematic

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[11] By "scientism" I mean, roughly, the conceit that scientific knowledge is the only
valid form of knowledge and that it is appropriately contrasted to belief as the rational
to the irrational.

[12] I leave aside disputed questions about how exactly Aquinas conceived *sacra
doctrina*, or how we might best render the term in English. We do not have to
determine the whole content of Aquinas's concept of *sacra doctrina* to say that it is a
subalternated science presupposing revealed truths. I shall speak rather of systematic
theology, not because I wish to determine the meaning of *sacra doctrina* but because I
would transpose Aquinas's quest for an *intelligentia fidei* into the larger context of a
functionally differentiated theology in which systematics is but a single function. See
Lonergan, *Method* (CWL 14), 121-38; discussion in Jeremy D. Wilkins, *Before Truth:
Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem of Wisdom* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 2018), 180-230.

theology, that is to say, is a subalternated science. As subalternated, it presupposes the articles of faith as true. As a science, it develops explanatory understanding. But theological understanding is never proportionate to the mysteries held in faith; it is analogical, imperfect, obscure, developing, and nevertheless highly fruitful. Analogical understanding is analogical precisely because our insight is not directly into the mystery, which exceeds the proportion of our understanding, but rather into the analogue proportionate to our understanding; in this life we know what God is not and what God is like, but not what God is. Systematic theology, then, begins with a prior assent to the mysteries and proceeds to the development of an imperfect and analogical understanding as its proper task; theological theory is scientific only on the basis of assumed truths. Of course, theologians make consequent judgments about the relative adequacy of this or that theological account of the mysteries, but these judgments never achieve the certitude antecedently proper to the mysteries themselves, which a believer is bound to regard as most certain.[13]

This conception might suggest that the relationship of belief to understanding is a one-way street in theology. In fact, they are interdependent in theology as in life and, as we already noted, in education. In life, this is because what is not at least minimally understood is all the easier to reject, forget, or doubt. In theology their interdependence is cumulative and ongoing, for advances in theological understanding ripen the conditions for doctrinal judgments, and doctrinal judgments open the way to, and set the problems for, the further development of theological understanding.

Though interdependent, doctrine and theory are distinct. One does not assent to the Trinity because one grasps the possibility of subsistent relations or, still less, because one has an elegant hypothesis of intelligible emanations in God. We do not

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[13] For a valuable discussion of this question, see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, trans. Michael G. Shields, Collected Works 12 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 30-58 (Latin with interleaf translation).

expect to improve upon revealed truths, though perhaps we may grasp and state their meaning more clearly. We know that in the matter of revelation, we are believers possessed of mystery, and not judges except in a very qualified sense.

We ought, however, to expect a continuous development of theological understanding, or at least we might if contemporary theology approximated a scientific discipline whose practitioners could agree about its present problems and past achievements, rather than being a welter of uncoordinated activities and results. This development will also have the character of successive transpositions to fuller and richer scientific contexts, a topic to which we shall return below. The mysteries of faith are permanent; but theological contexts are relative to scientific and popular cultures, which are not permanent.

When, therefore, theology is conceived of as an ongoing and collaborative enterprise, one has to trust others and rely on their results. The collaborative believing I have in mind, however, is not a condition of coming to understand what is believed, but a condition of coming to understand other questions. If, for instance, I include within a Christology seminar a unit on the New Testament testimony, I incorporate the scholarly findings of others whose work I have neither the intention nor the capacity to reproduce. I can, of course, follow and critique an argument; but the premises in an historical argument are themselves judgments, and at some point my competence to reoriginate those judgments ends. A collaborative interdependence of this kind is not quite the same as believing a teacher as a preliminary step in coming to understand for oneself what the teacher understands, but it illustrates one source of the novelty of our situation. If one considers theology in its full sweep of activities—of which the systematic function is but one—it seems quite impossible to conceive it as a habit in a single mind.

II. The Thomist Tradition

What kind of tradition is Thomism, and what kind of tradition ought it to be? On the question of fact, we shall presently hear from representative Thomists. On the question of value, an answer is at least implicit in the doctrine and practice of Aquinas himself. The apostles and the prophets attest the truth of revelation; the theologians manifest its meaning by adducing probable reasons.[14] Hence our distinction between traditions of belief and traditions of understanding would seem to run parallel to Aquinas's distinction between the chair of the pastors, whose doctrine is the proclamation of the Gospel (*doctrina praedicationis*), and the chair of the theologians, whose doctrine is theological science (*doctrina scholastica*), a wisdom acquired through study and imparted to others on the basis of acquired competence.[15] As he understood himself to exercise the theological chair (*magisterium cathedrae magistralis*), it seems indubitable he would wish us to take him as a mentor in the acquisition of wisdom through study. As a practical matter, this matches his stated aim in composing the *Summa theologiae* as a textbook suitable to beginners, not in faith but in theological science.[16]

Thomism, then, is, or should be, more a tradition of understanding than a tradition of belief. For the sake of convenience, and not to argue over words, let us distinguish an apprentice from a disciple. A disciple belongs permanently to the tutelage of a master. An apprentice acquires the master's craft to become a master in her own right. We are, then, disciples in relation to Christ, and we believe him unconditionally because in this life we do not and cannot grasp the truth of the mysteries intrinsically. In relation to Aquinas, however, we are

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[14] *STh* 1, q. 8, a. 2.

[15] See *Quodl.* III, q. 4, a. 1; *Contra impugn.*, p. 2, c. 1, ad 2. Compare *STh* I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3. The neo-Scholastics commonly distinguished two magisteria, one (the ecclesiastical) *attestans*, another (the theologians') *docens seu scientificum*. See Avery Dulles, *A Church to Believe In: Discipleship and the Dynamics of Freedom* (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 109, 113-15, 118-19.

[16] Blanchette, "Philosophy and Theology in Aquinas," 34-43.

apprentices. We believe him provisionally as a route to the acquisition of wisdom, much as he himself learned from Aristotle or Augustine.

That might be the end of the matter, were it not the case that the name and the doctrine of Aquinas held, and to some extent still hold, pride of place in the firmament of Catholic thought. Indeed, so great has been the authority of Aquinas that he is called Common Doctor, and one may find handbooks setting forth his official bona fides.[17] This authority is not that of an original witness to revelation. It is not that proper to the chair of the pastors, though it enjoys their endorsement. It would seem to be like the authority of a grand master in the guild of his craft. But how shall we understand this, if the craft itself develops? And what is owed to the Church's preference for Aquinas, in view of the peculiar symbiosis of belief and understanding in theology? These questions shall occupy us in this section and the next.

Though he cannot be said to have envisioned the questions just as we have put them, John of St. Thomas (Poinsot) at least attempted an explicit statement on Thomas and Thomism. He prefaced his commentary on the *Summa theologiae* with a treatise, in two disputations, on the approbation and authority of Aquinas.[18] I shall summarize at length to convey something of

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[17] See J. J. Berthier, *Sanctus Thomas Aquinas "doctor communis" ecclesiae* (Rome: Editrice Nazionale, 1914); Santiago Ramirez, *De auctoritate doctrinali S. Thomae Aquinatis* (Salamanca: S. Stephanus, 1952), esp. 35-107; in English, "The Authority of St. Thomas Aquinas," *The Thomist* 15 (1952): esp. 20-73. Ramirez appeared first in English and soon after, with minor revisions and extensive supporting documentation in appendices, in Latin. For his part, Berthier produced some six hundred pages of testimonies gathered mainly from the Roman pontiffs, the general councils, and eminent prelates. He tells us that Thomas is called common doctor, first, because of the way he investigated and adhered to the common doctrine of the church, and second, because of the solemn and frequent manner in which the Church has endorsed his theology (lxi-lxii).

[18] Page references in the text refer to two editions: John of St. Thomas [Poinsot], *Cursus theologici*, vol. 1 (Complutum [Alcalá de Henares]: Antonio Vazquez, 1537), www.prdl.org; John of St. Thomas [Poinsot], *Cursus theologici*, Solesmes, vol. 1 (Paris:

Poinsot's spirit. His object in the first disputation is to determine the meaning of the church's endorsement. There are different levels of ecclesiastical approbation (disp. 1, a. 1 [187-90/225-28]). The Church's commendation of Aquinas is a positive and special preference, superior to the preference accorded other doctors of the Church, comparable to but wider than that accorded St. Augustine on grace. This is proved from the testimony of the universal Church, of the Roman pontiffs, and of the Council of Trent (disp. 1, a. 2 [190-200/228-39]). Contrary opinions are refuted (disp. 1, a. 4 [208-15/248-55]). So high an endorsement could only be possible were Aquinas's doctrine certainly free from error ("sine ullo prorsus errore" [219/261]), and not indefensible on any point (disp. 1, a. 3 [200-208/240-48]). Naturally it also means that the defense of Thomas is likewise a defense of the Church's judgment (186/222).

The second disputation, accordingly, is largely devoted to common imprecations of his teaching (disp. 2, aa. 1-4 [219-51/262-97]), but its concluding article sets forth five marks (*signa*) of the true and proper disciples of Aquinas.[19] Thomism, as Poinsot presents it, is a sociological fact, a community of belonging and service, a tradition of devotion and of study. One enters this community by devotion to Aquinas. It is not necessary to have yet reached his mind; it is enough to seek it, to promote it, to adhere to it as true and as Catholic (disp. 2, a. 5 [251/297]). Nevertheless, the doctrine of Aquinas is and has been understood differently by different readers, each per-

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Desclée, 1931). The former is available at the Post-Reformation Digital Library. The latter is the critical edition.

[19] A summary and discussion of the five marks is provided by Jörgen Vijgen, "What Is a Thomist? The Contribution of John of St. Thomas," *Thomistica.Net* (blog), December 10, 2018; https://thomistica.net/. Vijgen describes Poinsot's approach as a "moral or psychological" construal of what makes a Thomist, because rather than foregrounding a set of doctrines or a methodological orientation, it foregrounds a suite of intellectual and moral dispositions: "humility, honesty, *affectus* and love for the truth, combined with a sense of realism regarding the human condition." But, as Vijgen explains, the moral, doctrinal, and methodological approaches are complementary and, indeed, it seems that the moral alone, without reference to a concrete tradition of thought, could hardly define a Thomist—neither Poinsot nor Vijgen suggests otherwise.

suaded of the correctness of her own understanding, and Poinsot proposes his five marks to discriminate the wheat from the chaff in this history (251/297-98).

Thomism is a concrete tradition of interpretation. Just as a Catholic understands Scripture in accord with the ecclesiastical tradition, so the Thomist reads Aquinas through the authentic and continuous tradition of his disciples. Though not unanimous on every point, the school is sufficiently agreed on the major points to offer reliable guidance, wherever the mind of Aquinas is unclear (mark 1° [251-52/298]). To belong to this tradition is to promote its concord and unity; discord, though inevitable, only serves to derogate from the authority of the master (5° [254/300-301]).

Thomism is a tradition of ministerial, martial (*militia*), devotional service. Aquinas and his school are to be defended. They are his worthy heirs who now enlist in the legitimate succession of his disciples to fight under its banner. Intellectual penetration is a form of care, and care begins with love. Thus, a special love for Aquinas is to be carefully cultivated, and it is altogether better to praise his doctrine, even where it is not understood, than to wish to depart from it. Motivated by affection for the saint himself and for his teaching, they are to defend his doctrine and overcome difficulties rather than find excuses to deviate from it, even if their own limitations, or his profundity, prevent them from understanding or expressing it fully (2° [252-53/298-99]). A disciple at heart and in truth is not concerned for his own glory but for the glory of the teacher and the propagation of his doctrine. A Thomist, accordingly, prefers the teaching of Aquinas to her own opinion, to applause, or to novelty, and regards herself as his minister (3° [253/299]).

The disciple of Aquinas not only accepts his conclusions but wishes to expound and declare his reasons, lest the positions of the master appear baseless. There is no science without reasons; unless Aquinas's reasons are understood, his science is not possessed, and unless they are defended, he is not well served. No one could venerate him and not wish to possess his scientific

understanding. Doctrine (*dogma*) progresses, as St. Vincent of Lerins explained, not by alteration but by deepening understanding, science, and wisdom, within the same kind, meaning, and judgment (*genus, sensus, dogma*), always maintaining its fullness, integrity, and property (*plenitudo, integritas, proprietas*). This applies also to the doctrine of Aquinas, and should be the aim of his disciples. Apparent contradictions are to be harmonized and obscure passages explained from clearer ones (4° [253-54/299-300]). Poinsot admits, however, that Aquinas's thought developed, and gives pride of place to the *Summa theologiae* as the work of his maturity (disp. 1, a. 5 [215-19/255-60]).

Poinsot's five marks are a suite of dispositions linked directly to a concrete tradition of interpretation and, obliquely, to the positions staked out by that tradition. His overarching purpose in laying them out seems twofold: first, to distinguish the authentic tradition so that one may attach oneself to it, and second, to encourage its ideals. The tenor, on balance, is devotional: Thomism is a military service, a ministry, a devotion to his person and his school, a care for his glory. The values of identity, continuity, and certitude loom large. The school reads Thomas in an authentic and continuous tradition, like the Church reads Scripture: his doctrine is safe, probably safest, it has a permanence and a development comparable to that of dogma. A Thomist, then, is identified by his attachment to this tradition; the marks are, as it were, conditions of belonging and ideals of service; and the Thomistic school is identified both sociologically, by an historical succession of interpreters— Poinsot gives a list of names from Capreolus to Soto—and doctrinally, by its positions on the major Scholastic questions.

Is Thomism, so construed, a tradition of belief or a tradition of understanding, a discipleship or an apprenticeship? It seems ambiguous. The extrinsic motivations—authority, especially that of the Church, certitude or safety, and the continuity of the school—are more proper to a tradition of belief. So too, it might seem, are the antecedent commitments to defend and propagate, hold and praise a teaching though one has not (yet) fully understood it, to prefer the master's opinions and be

unwilling to deviate from them, to make oneself his minister and soldier. Reliance on the recommendation of the Church seems especially congruent, however, to the status of theology as a subaltern science; we shall return to this below. These motivations ground a commitment to personal development that is obviously laudatory and essential to apprenticeship. The presumption that one's present failures of understanding are more likely due to the limitations of the pupil than those of the master has a sound basis in the provisional deference owed by a student to a teacher, before the student has become a competent judge in her own right.

It is easy for the student, who has benefitted from years of apprenticeship to the extraordinary mind of Aquinas, to appreciate Poinsot's devotion. It is difficult, however, to find it praiseworthy without qualification. Today, the Thomistic commentators are often derided as epigones who aimed for fidelity but betrayed the genius of their master. They failed to reach up to his authentic ideas but more importantly failed to realize his intellectual spirit. It would seem rather involved to judge such a question, and I do not intend to do so here. It is enough to point out that intellectual devotion is a two-edged sword. It can be an operator of growth and learning, but also a source of group-think, of a stifling fear of innovation, and of party spirit. The formation of opposed schools almost inevitably resulted in students learning to repeat and praise the "correct" doctrines even if they did not understand them. It gave rise, further, to the genre of textbooks *ad mentem Thomae* which, by vastly simplifying and often impoverishing the thought of the master, diminished the power of his thought to transform minds.[20]

The aim of apprenticeship is personal mastery. Properly speaking, the doctrine of Aquinas is not a mystery of faith but a synthesis of understanding that can be given and taken only by the proportionate development of one's own mind. The

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[20] See Prouvost, *Thomas d'Aquin et les thomismes*, 43-48.

decision to put one's own gifts at the service of a better thinker can be a responsible use of them. The methodical way of doing so, however, is not to substitute another's judgment for one's own, but carefully to distinguish direct discourse, speaking for oneself, from indirect discourse, speaking of another. To explain a position is to speak of another, but to defend it is to speak for oneself. In a tradition of understanding, a position becomes one's own by personal understanding, judgment, and decision.

Finally, Poinsot's commitment to the harmony of the texts and the school is in tension with our commitment to historical methods. The temptation to harmonize can be a font of misreadings. It also inhibits our learning one of Aquinas's most important lessons: the continuous enlargement of one's mind. The history of the school is more complex than Poinsot lets on. His theological context is also relatively static compared to our own. It seems to suppose the essential principles for resolving the essential questions for intelligence have been laid out once for all. Such an attitude only seems possible when everyone agrees what the important questions are, no one expects a scientific revolution, and confidence or certitude are the intellectual priorities. There seems to be at least an ambiguity here about the speculative or systematic function of theology, a tension perhaps inherent in the conception of science derived from the *Posterior Analytics*: is speculative theology a quest for certitude (*certa cognitio*), or a quest for explanatory understanding (*per causas*)?

Let us turn to a more recent example. Santiago Ramirez, one of the more important neo-Thomists of the twentieth century, framed the question of authority in terms of the virtue of obedience to the Church, in a treatise first published in English in *The Thomist* and, later that year, as a Latin booklet with additional supporting appendices.[21] Although most of Ramirez's

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[21] Ramirez, "Authority of St. Thomas Aquinas"; Ramirez, *De auctoritate doctrinali S. Thomae Aquinatis*. References in the text are to the English first, then the corresponding Latin. No translator is named, and the Latin text seems more developed than the English, so one imagines a Latin original, translated at an early stage for *The Thomist,* and later expanded for independent publication. It bears noting that the English

work is a selection and arrangement of official documents, his basic question regards their force and obligation (2/10). Again, I will summarize at length. Ramirez distinguishes the philosophical from the theological authority of Aquinas, and his intrinsic, scientific authority from the extrinsic, canonical authority conferred by the church (2-3/10-11). Brief discussions of his intrinsic authority in philosophy (3-9/12-20) and theology (9-20/20-34) preface a more fulsome treatment of Ramirez's real object, Aquinas's canonical authority both in theology (21-46/36-69) and in philosophy (46-73/70-107). "The weight of this type of authority [viz., canonical] is wholly derived from the authority of the Church" which, by its long and consistent commendation, effectively "makes [his] doctrine its own, and invests [Lat. *communicat*] it with its own authority" (21/35). Aquinas is recommended not only in speculative but also in positive theology and exegesis (29/46), not only in dogma and morals but also in other departments of theology (34-35/53-55), not only in theology but also, in a manner unique among ecclesiastical writers, in philosophy (73/107). Taken all together, "there can be no doubt that *the complete doctrinal authority of Aquinas both intrinsic and extrinsic, by the approval and commendation of the Church, is truly the greatest among all ecclesiastical writers in philosophy as well as in theology*" (80/117, emphasis in original).

The deference owed to these ecclesiastical endorsements is Ramirez's concluding topic (80-109/118-79). It would be impious and disobedient to condemn, minimize, or deride Aquinas's philosophical or theological doctrine (81-82/118-21), or to neglect it, study it insincerely, or seek only its defects (82-83/121-23). Nor is it sufficient to praise Aquinas as great in his time but irrelevant to the questions of ours (83-84/123-24), or to limit his philosophical relevance to a few points of natural theology and dismiss the rest (Lat. only, 124-39), or to treat

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sometimes imparts a force to the Latin that is stronger than necessary: compare, e.g., the middle of page 100 of the English version to the corresponding Latin (p. 165, ll. 2-4).

him as merely a representative figure, as if the Church meant to praise Scholasticism in general not Aquinas in particular, or as if all Scholastic authors were equally safe and Aquinas were not the safest, soundest, and surest of them all (84-89/139-46). On the other hand, it would be too much to deny doctrinal authority to all others (89-91/146-49), or to treat each and every element of Aquinas's thought as of equal scientific or canonical authority (91-93/149-51). The greatest authority attaches to his most fundamental principles, but even these are not each and all "imposed upon the mind for belief and assent" ("omnia et singula imposita . . . ad credendum vel assentiendum mente"), and their free examination is permitted (93-94/151-53). Besides, development is human, Aquinas himself developed, and his system is not so perfect as to exclude further development (94-96/154-56).

Indeed, Aquinas has nothing to fear from probing examination or comparison to others, as long as truth is its genuine aim (96-100/157-65). Still, given all that the Church has said to approve, commend, and enjoin the study of Aquinas, "no Catholic is free to deny the matchless doctrinal authority of Aquinas, whose teaching in philosophy and theology, amidst all that surround it, not only outside but also within the Church, she prefers and praises over others" (100/163). Nor is novelty desirable for its own sake (102-4/166-69), and while it is true that his disciples ought to strive to do for our age "what the Angelic Doctor did for his age and what he would do for our age if he were living" (104/169), still this can hardly mean substituting for Aristotle the philosophies of our own day, as if Aquinas had been merely an Aristotelian. Indeed, with the help of his Christian predecessors, Aquinas purified Aristotelian principles to develop the perennial philosophy, that is, "the philosophy without qualification" (107/172). The errors of modern philosophy, however, run so deeply contrary to Christian faith that they can hardly be purified, and, Ramirez ventures, we must suppose Aquinas would treat them with the greatest caution (104-8/169-73).

As for Poinsot, so for Ramirez, Thomism is at once a devotional and an intellectual tradition, and the devotion is

both to the saint and to the Church. As Ramirez puts it in summary,

the true cultivation of St. Thomas, according to reality and the recommendation of the Church, consists in holding sacred and inviolate his method, principles and doctrine in philosophy and theology, and imitating at the same time his scientific, intellectual and moral qualities, as well as cultivating them, and manfully expressing them in the life of his disciples, so that Thomas continues to live in them completely, especially according to the spirit. (108)

Here Ramirez echoes the ambient language of his sources and era, to which we shall return in the next section. The fact itself of the Church's approbation makes it all the easier to convert Thomism into a tradition of belief. Ramirez concludes his survey of Aquinas's endorsements with an approving quotation from Joseph de Guibert:

"By the very fact [writes de Guibert] of anyone's embracing the doctrine of St. Thomas, he embraces the doctrine most commonly accepted in the Church, safe and approved by the Church itself . . .; when there is no grave contrary opinion, the authority of St. Thomas suffices to prefer his opinion." This is not only true [Ramirez adds] in theology to which [de Guibert] solely refers, but in philosophy as well; for there is one and the same force and approbation for both.[22]

The approval of the Church gives presumptive confidence in the conclusions of Aquinas in both theology and philosophy. The orientation of this confidence is to the truth of Aquinas's doctrine, whether or not one has understood it. But does one authentically embrace the doctrine of Aquinas by holding his conclusions, or in some other way? That doctrine can be affirmed by one who barely understands, or by one who understands badly, or by one who understands thoroughly and

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[22] Ramirez, "Authority of St. Thomas Aquinas," 109, quoting de Guibert, *De Ecclesia Christi* (Rome: Gregorian University, 1929). (Ramirez's English gives the reference to de Guibert as p. 386; his Latin, p. 177, gives it as p. 326. I did not consult de Guibert to resolve the discrepancy.)

does not progress beyond the questions faced by Aquinas, or by one who does so progress. The temptation to identify Aquinas with the truth rather than with understanding may also discourage us from letting him enlarge our minds in ways that might challenge our present convictions; he must mean what we already know is true. It may generate a felt obligation, to which Poinsot's rebuttal of the imprecations against Aquinas gives witness, to make him say what he "ought" to have meant.

Decidedly, the pastors prefer Aquinas. What does this preference mean? It is not adduced as the judgment of the most scientifically learned. It is not adduced as the opinion of the majority. It is adduced as the judgment of those whose office it is to judge whatever touches upon the truth God has revealed. Still, their judgment cannot mean Aquinas possesses the truths of faith while others do not. Its object here is not divine revelation but a theological and philosophical synthesis. A comparative judgment presumes a correct understanding of Aquinas, but even within the commentary tradition there is more than one interpretation of Aquinas. A comparative judgment presumes a correct understanding of the (philosophical and theological) alternatives to which Aquinas is preferred, and those alternatives are legion. A comparative judgment refers to some set of questions to which Aquinas's principles ground superior answers. The judgment is relevant to, and as durable as, that context of questions, which may be thought of as fixed, as developing without fundamental transformation, or as subject to transformations without loss of validity. It would seem, then, to regard especially his method and principles. Understanding grasps principles, science works out their implications, but it is the work of wisdom to select, order, and validate the principles themselves. The selection, the order, the judgment of Aquinas is deemed wisest and therefore most fruitful—but it can be fruitful for us, only in the measure that we succeed in reaching up to him.

On its own terms, there is something odd about Ramirez's project here. His distinction between intrinsic, scientific authority and extrinsic, canonical authority runs parallel to our distinction between traditions of understanding and of belief.

Extrinsic authority is an appeal to the will; hence, for Ramirez, the virtue at stake is obedience. But the vices of defect Ramirez names—neglect, hostility, historicism—are vices in the first place not because they run counter to the preference of Church authorities, but because they are intellectually unserious and irresponsible (as he seems tacitly to admit [21/35]). His fusillade of quotations cannot, properly, persuade us of Aquinas's scientific value; that is something each must judge for herself, and in speculation, as distinct from dogma or doctrine in the proper sense, the argument from authority has little value. It might persuade us to wish never to depart from him, but what does such a desire come to? Unless we first understand for ourselves, we cannot know whether we have departed or not; but once we do understand, we no longer have need to believe that Aquinas is wise—it is something we know and measure for ourselves. At best, Ramirez's case for the canonical authority of Aquinas is a contribution to the hermeneutical spiral of believing to understand. We are bidden partly to believe and partly to attend: to believe, by crediting the Church's estimate of Aquinas as the wisest and safest; to attend, on the strength of that credit, by giving him a full and fair and trusting opportunity to persuade us, so that extrinsic authority might have its ulterior finality in an appreciation of intrinsic authority. Even so, many who believe and trust will never understand, and many who understand will not first have believed.

Aquinas, as we saw, distinguished two inverse procedures in theology, an appeal to authority to establish the *credenda*, and an assignment of reasons to develop understanding. But these reasons, the principles of theological understanding, are never the intrinsic intelligibilities of the mysteries themselves, for the intrinsic intelligibility of God is the divine essence, and the intrinsic intelligibility of the economy of salvation lies in the divine wisdom and goodness. In this life we do not have a positive understanding of God, but we can have a positive, sub-alternate understanding of revealed truth by way of principles that are analogical, obscure, and developing. Natural theology

at least demonstrates what it knows analogically of God, but
with regard to revealed mystery we cannot even do this. Hence
we ought to distinguish the antecedent truth of the *credenda*
from the consequent truth of theological understanding. The
antecedent truth, revealed by God and infallibly declared by the
Church, is most certain. But theological understanding of this
truth is hypothetical or theoretical. It is verified by its
compatibility with the truths of revelation, by the range of its
explanatory power, and by the exclusion of alternative
explanations. Verification is neither proof nor certitude.

I would not be misunderstood. By my lights the Church is
right to propose Aquinas as the wisest of theologians. The
question Ramirez brings into focus, however, is whether a
Catholic simply as such is bound to concur. And to this question
I would simply point out, first, that an intellectual synthesis
does not enjoy the certitude of the truths of faith; next, that it
falls under the Church's magisterium only indirectly; third, that
the kind of authority proper to a tradition of understanding is
its intrinsic explanatory power; and, finally, that explanatory
power is relative to a scientific context.

III. A Common Doctor?

Official enthusiasm for the mastery of Aquinas is not fixed
for all time. From the late nineteenth century to the mid-
twentieth, Aquinas was practically the Church's official thinker.
Leo XIII placed him at the heart of his program for the renewal
of Catholic thought and especially philosophy.[23] Aquinas's cen-
trality to seminary curricula in both philosophy and theology
was obligated by the 1917 *Code of Canon Law*: both were to be
inculcated entirely (*omnino*) according to his method, doctrine,
and principles (*ratio, doctrina, principia*), and these were to be

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[23] Leo XIII, encyclical letter *Aeterni Patris*.

held inviolably (*sancte teneant*).[24] We saw this same language in Ramirez's summary judgment.

In the interval Catholic thought has entered a new context. Vatican II enjoined Aquinas as the guide for the formation of clerics in the penetration of the mysteries and their inter-connections in speculative theology, but said nothing of his role in philosophy, or the other parts of theology. The overall orientation of theological formation is to be not systematic but historical, emphasizing the study of Scripture, salvation history, and the history of dogma and theology before instruction in speculative theology.[25] In these prior domains, Aquinas is not proposed as master. Indeed, when John Paul II described Aquinas as a "master of thought and model of the right way to do theology," he quoted Paul VI in praise not of Aquinas's doctrine so much as of his daring.[26] The Church, he added, has no official philosophy[27]—which is not quite the impression his predecessors had managed to make.[28]

It is perhaps too obvious to point out that what is true of official enthusiasm is truer still among Catholic theologians and philosophers today, especially outside the seminaries. Aquinas

[24] *Codex Iuris Canonici* (1917), can. 1366, § 2. Because I take it to be Aquinas's wisdom in the selection and arrangement of questions that is in view above all, I would be inclined to read "doctrina" as order, in the sense of the *ordo doctrinae*.

[25] Vatican Council II, "Decree on Priestly Formation *Optatam Totius*," 16, in *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Norman P. Tanner et al., 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 2:955-56. A nod is made to perrennial philosophy, but no mention of Aquinas in this connection (§ 15). The language around theology is echoed in *Codex Iuris Canonici* (1983), can. 252 §§ 2-3; there Aquinas "especially" (*praesertim*) is to be the guide in speculative theology. See Prouvost, *Thomas d'Aquin et les thomismes*, 18n.

[26] John Paul II, encyclical letter *Fides et Ratio* (September 14, 1998), 43.

[27] *Fides et Ratio*, 49.

[28] See William L. Portier, "Thomist Resurgence," *Communio: International Catholic Review* 35 (2008): 494-504. Ramirez, expounding the teaching of Pius XI, says: "In a word, the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is the philosophy of the Catholic Church, i.e., 'a Christian, Catholic, Roman philosophy'" ("Authority of St. Thomas Aquinas," 70; *De auctoritate doctrinali S. Thomae Aquinatis*, 102). The English supplies a definite article not present in the Latin.

remains an important, even a central figure with whom
everyone ought to deal, but as a practical matter he is one
among many. To some, however, this displacement has seemed
to go a little too far. Reinhard Hütter welcomes the contem-
porary surge in historical scholarship on Aquinas for its valuable
contributions to our understanding of him. But he urges
something more, a *ressourcement* in Aquinas.[29] For the scholar,
Aquinas is an eminent figure of thought, but not the common
doctor of the Church. Historical scholarship does "not
necessarily translate into a genuine, substantive, and normative
turning to Thomas's philosophical and theological vision."[30]
What is most significant here, I think, is the adjective
"normative." Against Aquinas's work, others are measured; they
"have lights of their own," as John Senior puts it in a passage
Hütter quotes approvingly, but his is the light by which we are
to judge, for (quoting Senior again) "he holds the mean between
dogma and opinion."[31]

   Now, Hütter is perfectly aware that the religious, the
cultural, and especially the educational situation in which
Aquinas could be a teacher for beginners has ceased to exist, for
reasons he seems to attribute here solely to decline. The name
of the game now is "patiently and actively 'waiting for
Thomas'."[32] Waiting for Thomas means, in part, reaching up to
him as best one can, and in the meantime insinuating his
insights into such openings as the late modern "supermarket of
ideas" presents. Since the "deconstruction of all objective
standards of judgment leaves the . . . mind tangibly dissatisfied,"
opportunities are bound to come.[33] Actively waiting for Thomas
is not just waiting around.

   With these objectives I am deeply sympathetic. Aquinas is a
reach, and the reaching is profoundly transformative. Aquinas is

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[29] Reinhard Hütter, *Dust Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2012), 4-7.

[30] Ibid., 5.

[31] Ibid., 6, quoting John Senior, *The Restoration of Christian Culture* (Norfold, Va.: IHS Press, 2008), 80.

[32] Hütter, *Dust Bound for Heaven*, 3.

[33] Ibid., 4.

a realist, and the normativity of truth and objectivity for intelligence could stand reassertion. Aquinas is wise, and wisdom is in short supply. Becoming wise is difficult, and one could do worse than to apprentice oneself to an epochal genius whose achievement includes permanently valid and valuable contributions to theology. Hütter is right to think Aquinas can still orient us reliably to the permanent things. Hütter's project deserves a full and sympathetic hearing, which is impossible here, so my remarks should not be mistaken for a judgment on his work. I restrict myself to a single question raised by his introduction: is a common doctor still possible?

It seems a fact that we are separated from Aquinas not only by decline but also by progress.[34] Both the progress and the decline raise genuinely new theological problems. The scientific revolution, the differentiation of philosophy from the sciences, and a new awareness of historical and cultural relativity have transformed our understanding of the world and ourselves. Aquinas can help us, but it is we who must answer.

Theology mediates a tradition that is historical. That tradition, because it is historical, will not submit to an integration on the level of logic or metaphysics or theory. Its wholeness is the wholeness of development across time and space, and the development is not a smooth linear unfolding from a single principle but a dialectical process marked by decay and corruption as well as progress and purification, loss as well as achievement, and notable shifts in intellectual and cultural context. Aquinas's synthesis is a glorious achievement but it is also somewhat innocent of the historical problems presented to us now. A fundamental problem for contemporary theology is the requirement to understand the history of theology, and there Aquinas can help us only indirectly.

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[34] Hütter acknowledges progress in our historical understanding of Aquinas, but he fears it could just as easily "bury even deeper Thomas's teaching as that of the *doctor communis*."

Hence, I do not think the attempt to recover Aquinas as the common doctor does full justice to the differences between our context and his. The very notion of a common doctor belongs to a cultural and therefore a theological moment that has passed away and will not return. One can have a common doctor if theology is stable and its context is merely incidental. On the other hand, it is more difficult to have a common doctor if theology is an ongoing scientific collaboration and its context is not merely incidental.

Among the more notable transitions separating our time from that of Aquinas is the scientific revolution and the extension of analogous techniques into the domains of history and hermeneutics. In the Scholastic context that produced the Thomistic school, theology was conceived as a science, but the model of science was drawn from Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. That model of science and so of theology stressed necessity and permanence and, increasingly, in its fourteenth century, Baroque, and neo-Scholastic manifestations, also certitude.[35] It defined each science by its formal object, which, for theology, is God and all things as related to God. Because the scientific ideal was permanence, theological science was conceived as a habit to be reproduced in each theologian.

The ideal of modern science is not the necessity and permanence of the (Aristotelian) scientific syllogism, but the provisionally verified hypothesis. The verified hypothesis is a waypoint. So far from being certain, it is virtually certain to be revised, qualified, or transformed by integration into some more comprehensive, more powerfully explanatory synthesis. Still, this supersession is anything but arbitrary. The new hypothesis does not discard the old data. It does not (if it is Catholic) replace the truths of faith with some new and better invention of reason. It does not repudiate what was valid in the old explanation, but incorporates prior insights into a new synthesis

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[35] Prouvost, *Thomas d'Aquin et les thomismes*, 18n., distinguishes Scholasticism into medieval, Baroque ("Renaissance"), and Leonine (neo-Scholastic) phases. On the turn to certitude in Baroque Scholasticism, see Yves Congar, *A History of Theology*, trans. Hunter Guthrie (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 163-65.

capable of providing a more thorough and more elegant explanation for the known facts. In this context what unifies a science is not its theories or its objects but its operations or procedures. The operations are, in fact, cooperations. A contemporary science is not anyone's habit; it resides in a complex of coordinated skills and understandings across a scientific community.

It seems to me that the notion of a common doctor presupposes that what has to be learned does not develop more than incidentally. It presupposes that theology can be a habit in a single mind. It presupposes that a theoretical or cultural synthesis can be permanent and, perhaps, normative. On the other hand, when theology is an ongoing and collaborative process, neither Aquinas nor anyone else can be its common doctor by way of providing a permanently stable integration. What is normative for an ongoing process of inquiry is the methodical probity of integrating reason. A modern science is held together by its coordinated procedures; and what can hold theology together is likewise a framework for coordinating activities, integrating results, and carefully sifting wheat from chaff.

Further, theology, as a service to the Church, has as its finality the communication of the gospel. We have to help the Church be all things to all people so that some might be won (1 Cor 9:22). There are vast differences between cultures and between educated and uneducated persons within cultures. A contemporary theology has to help the Church speak to the questions of contemporary persons and not to the questions of thirteenth-century persons, however much we may stand to learn from them and however true it is that some questions never lose their relevance. I do not mean that all of theology is contextual, but large parts of theology, in both its mediation of the past and its address to the present, are contextual in the sense that they deal with the concrete and particular, past or present; further, theology has to deal with the transitions of the one faith from one context to another. Finally, in its speculative

or systematic task, theology's object is not to determine the truths of faith but to develop an imperfect, analogical, fruitful understanding of those truths, and to show how they can be reconciled with the (still developing) conclusions of the sciences, philosophy, and history.

Although the typical formulation of a question in the writings of Aquinas suggests a question for judgment (*utrum*, *videtur quod*), his most original contributions are explanatory and, accordingly, hypothetical in the sense described. We have already distinguished the antecedent truth of the mysteries from the consequent truth of theological understanding. Nor was Aquinas unaware of the difference, for he acknowledged a twofold mode of divine truth and applied different methods to the mysteries than to the preambles of faith.[36] It remains the case that Aquinas, and the Thomists generally, speak of his object as truth, whereas I keep speaking of developing understanding. The reason for this difference is a transformation in the notion of science. If science is conceived as certain knowledge of causal necessity, its ideal is truth. But if science is conceived as an ongoing process headed toward ever fuller, verified explanation of all data or, in systematic theology, of what God has revealed in its connections with what the human mind can discover, then its remote goal is complete explanation (which will be had only in the beatific vision) but its proximate goal is verified approximations to complete explanation.[37] Verification is not proof. Verification affirms the consequents of explanatory hypotheses. But to affirm the consequent is not to prove the antecedent. The possibility of a series of more powerful hypotheses is not excluded.[38]

None of this is to say that Aquinas's theology is false. He improved on Aristotle and Augustine without, by and large, falsifying them. He could do so because their explanations were incomplete and so capable of incorporation into a larger, more

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[36] *ScG* I, cc. 3, 8, 9; IV, c. 1. In general, the mysteries are illumined by reasons that are analogical, fitting, and probable.

[37] See Lonergan, *Method* (CWL 14), 90-93.

[38] Lonergan, *Insight*, 324-29.

rounded whole. He could hardly have thought otherwise about his own achievement, for between the reality of divine wisdom and any understanding of it we can have in this life, there is an infinite difference to be explored. In his own context, Aquinas was the "master capable of envisaging all the issues and of treating them in their proper order."[39] He represents the best achievement relative to the state of his questions. Still, the state of his questions is not the state of ours, because of developments in science, philosophy, scholarship, and culture. How these developments might be integrated with his achievement is our problem, not his. What, in fact, his permanent achievements are, and just how they are relevant to the further questions we are obliged to face, are to be worked out with patience and care. What, then, is normative in the process of evaluating and retrieving Aquinas today? It cannot be his answers or even his questions, since they are part of what has to be evaluated.

The reader may fear that I am relativizing Aquinas, and indeed I am. Relativity, however, is not the same as relativism. Our present crisis of normativity results (in large part) from the discovery of cultural relativity. Ideological relativism is just the mistaken conclusion that because cultures are not normative, nothing is normative. The need of the hour is not for a common doctor but for a common illumination of the real ground of normativity, which is not in the systems intelligence produces, but in the intelligence, the reason, the love that produces, judges, refines, and transforms them.[40]

Thought progresses, and there are permanently valid contributions to its progression. Aquinas made permanently valid contributions to the development of theology, just as Einstein or Newton made permanently valid contributions to the development of physics or mathematics. Aquinas was not just any theologian, and Einstein was not just any physicist. All subsequent

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[39] Lonergan, *Method* (CWL 14), 345.
[40] See Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 37-57.

physics and mathematics, if they are serious, must incorporate (in some form or another) quantum theory and the calculus. All subsequent theology, if it is serious, must incorporate (in some form or another) the theorems of divine transcendence and the supernatural order, the hypothesis of intelligible emanations in God, and other permanently valid contributions of Thomas Aquinas; and these, in turn, rest on permanently valid contributions Aquinas absorbed from Aristotle and his other teachers. But it would be quite another matter, and preposterous, to suggest that all subsequent physics is not just enriched but measured by the light of Einstein. Though theology is quite different from a natural science in many important ways, it is nevertheless equally preposterous, I submit, to claim that all subsequent theology is measured, not just enriched, by the light of Aquinas. One may wish to say that the permanently valid is normative, and in a derivative sense perhaps it is; but attention and intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility, and above all the love of God shed abroad in our hearts—these are normative in a way that cannot be superseded and form the real normative basis for all progress and restoration. The normative measure of theological achievement after Aquinas as it was before is the light of reason illumined by genuine faith in the mysteries handed on once and for all to the saints.

Theologians are not original witnesses to revelation. They are not infallible judges of its truth claims. But it is not only in defining that the Church is the best judge of the things she does and believes. In the light of that judgment, Aquinas stands out as a witness to the Church's reception and understanding of her own life and message. He witnesses to an understanding of the faith demanded by the problems and questions of his time. Insofar as those problems and questions endure, he is a reliable guide to facing them. Insofar as they are transformed by the later problems and questions presented by our time, his achievement cannot be the measure of our own responsibilities.

As Ramirez documents, there was a time when Aquinas was recommended as a guide to practically every kind of question in theology or philosophy. His more recent endorsements reflect a

more sober but also a more accurate evaluation of his true genius. Aquinas is a guide in theological speculation because here, the wisest of theologians is worth more than the majority. The function of wisdom is to order and to judge. The function of speculative or systematic theology is the intelligible ordering of the truths of faith. It is the penetration of the mysteries in their interconnections to one another and their relation to our final end, but also in their interconnections to all that we know from the natural and human sciences and historical scholarship of which Aquinas had the barest inkling. Today this function presupposes a positive theology far more involved than his, a positive theology that can ground an understanding of the history of the tradition itself in its genetic and dialectical unfolding. A development of wisdom is needed to order the tasks of a theology on the level of our time.

Aquinas is not just any theologian. When the Christian world of his day was unsettled by a new science, Aquinas sensed the need of the hour and applied himself with great diligence and creativity to development of a new theological and cultural synthesis. He did not wait for the return of cultural and intellectual conditions that would not be coming back. He sought to foster the new conditions under which Christianity could be intellectually credible and culturally fruitful in his time. He is or can be a common doctor in the sense that his contributions to theology are durable advances, part of the common and permanent patrimony of theology. He also is or can be a common doctor in the sense that his contributions and their reception make him an exemplar of the progress the tradition of the apostles makes in the Church. But he is not the common doctor in the obsolete sense, the light by which other theologies are judged.

IV. THOMISM TODAY

A Thomist, as we said in the introduction, receives something from Thomas, but what? If it seems too much to forever

prefer his judgment to one's own, correct interpretation alone seems too little; surely the mere understanding of Aquinas, however exact and complete, does not make a Thomist, as Hütter rightly points out.[41] Oliva Blanchette suggests that a Thomist accepts not so much a "completed doctrine" as an open but disciplined "system of questions" at once philosophical and theological, theoretical and practical. But perhaps we shall need a new dialectical approach "that would focus more properly on the historical and the social as its methodological starting point, the *place* or the *event* where God reveals himself."[42] Géry Prouvost, for his part, has suggested as a preliminary statement that a Thomist is one who accords Aquinas a privileged place in his own reflection on theological or philosophical questions. He adds, however, that the question about Thomism implies another: should a Thomist be identified by the adoption of certain essential theses or positions of the master?[43] Which?

Serge-Thomas Bonino observes that, historically, Thomists have been identifiable by their institutional affiliations, but more importantly through a genetic continuity of thought with the master.[44] Both he and Thomas Joseph White underscore that Aquinas did his thinking in a tradition, and should likewise be read within a tradition, both anterior and posterior to himself. For Bonino, "a Scholastic form of thought," developing "in the laboratories of tradition," is appropriate to the very nature of human learning.[45] White, too, emphasizes that Thomism is "rooted in a larger conversation" and "does not emerge from nowhere," like a meteorite.[46]

[41] Hütter, *Dust Bound for Heaven*, 4-6.

[42] Blanchette, "Philosophy and Theology in Aquinas," 52-53; see 27.

[43] Prouvost, *Thomas d'Aquin et les thomismes*, 9.

[44] Serge-Thomas Bonino, "The Thomist Tradition," *Nova et vetera* (Eng. ed.) 8 (2010): 871-72. Similar considerations in Prouvost, *Thomas d'Aquin et les thomismes*, 9-18.

[45] See Bonino, "Thomist Tradition," 870; Serge-Thomas Bonino, "To Be a Thomist," *Nova et vetera* (Eng ed.) 8 (2010): 764.

[46] Thomas Joseph White, "Thomism after Vatican II," *Nova et vetera* (Eng. ed.) 12 (2014): 1052.

Both Bonino and White seek not only an historical criterion by which to determine the contours of the Thomist tradition, but also an open and vital Thomism for today. Bonino's ideal is a "living fidelity to the teaching of Aquinas," which he opposes to both an ahistorical "fundamentalist Thomism," and its opposite, an historicizing "Thomism-by-inspiration."[47] A living Thomism takes seriously "the historical dimension, not of truth, but of the exercise of thought."[48] White's concern is similar. He would forge a middle path between what he regards as Chenu's historicism, on the one side, and Garrigou-Lagrange's "idiosyncratic and methodologically arbitrary" anachronism, on the other.[49] A contemporary Thomism would combine Fabro's emphasis on integrity of principles with Congar's concern for a vital engagement with contemporary questions.[50] It would also continue to shape Dominican life.[51] For both Bonino and White, then, Thomism is not a timeless ichor, but a tradition of thought expressing itself in quite different intellectual and social contexts.

What Bonino calls "Thomism-by-inspiration" is, he thinks,

currently on the path to extinction, since it can really flourish only in a context where it is "obligatory" to refer to St. Thomas, so that it has to seek out ways of simulating the Master's teaching and honoring him without necessarily adhering to his doctrine.[52]

The result of this posture, too often, is exegetical contrivance[53] (although one might add that ahistorical Thomism is differently

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[47] Bonino, "To Be a Thomist," 770-71.

[48] Ibid., 771.

[49] Thomas Joseph White, "The Precarity of Wisdom," in *Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life. Essays in Honor of Romanus Cessario, O.P.*, ed. Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 93-97, quote at 96.

[50] White, "Thomism after Vatican II," 1046-48.

[51] Ibid., 1060-61.

[52] Bonino, "To Be a Thomist," 769.

[53] Ibid., 772.

prone to the same vice). Plainly enough, Bonino does not feel that "Thomism-by-inspiration" is really interested in Aquinas the thinker but only in Aquinas the symbol. This kind of Thomism, he feels, relativizes the doctrine of Aquinas in favor of his "spirit" (it seems easy to hear the echo here of contests over the reception of Vatican II). "Its main tenet is to repeat today what St. Thomas is said to have done in the thirteenth century, namely, expressing the Christian faith in contemporary cultural categories," which, he coyly suggests (echoing Ramirez), now means assimilating Freud, Heidegger, and Derrida instead of Aristotle.[54] With considerable justice, Bonino points out that Aquinas's involvement with Aristotle and neo-Platonism "is not primarily because they are 'modern' but because he perceives them to be true."[55] This seems quite just, though if there is progress as well as decline in thought, we might expect the best state of the questions in the thirteenth century to have been superseded in some ways since then.

For White, too, the aspiration to imitate Aquinas is a valid but "painfully minimalistic" element of a contemporary Thomism.[56] Although it will not do "to define Thomism merely by reference to Aquinas's most unique philosophical and theological theses," nevertheless "Thomism has an essence" and "constitutes an identifiable intellectual patrimony" discernible in certain principles and patterns of thought.[57] It is, in part, a "Christian Aristotelianism" which, often in common with other varieties of Scholasticism, "typically transmits core principles of Aristotelian derivation" such as the division and methods of philosophical sciences, the resolution of being into substance and the predicaments, and so on.[58]

As an historical statement, this seems unimpeachable. As a guide for what to do next, it leaves a great deal to be desired. Aquinas did not accept Aristotle as presenting a ready-made metaphysics. He discovered the validity of Aristotle's program

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[54] Ibid., 769.

[55] Ibid.

[56] White, "Thomism after Vatican II," 1048.

[57] Ibid., 1054; see ibid., 1048-54.

[58] Ibid., 1050; see ibid., 1049-51.

and made it his own through his own reflection and judgment. In doing so, he also developed it considerably and, as Blanchette urges, we should not be afraid to do likewise.[59]

The supposition that for Aristotle we may simply substitute the philosophers *du jour* is, indeed, historicist. The whole difficulty comes down to a dialectical retrieval of the pertinent principles, and what are the criteria for that? If, for example, metaphysics is a science, it is (on Aristotelian grounds) knowledge through causes. The predicaments, however, are (mostly) not causes but descriptions, and so they do not pertain to an explanatory metaphysics.[60] The proper sensibles are descriptive, too, at least in their initial formulation; they would need transposition to an explanatory form to pertain to an explanatory metaphysics.[61] In any case, metaphysics is an integrative science but no longer the basis of all science, at least in the sense of providing the fundamental categories of all other sciences, as it functioned in Scholastic thought. When the sciences were all built on metaphysics and the histories on testimony, Aristotle could be "master of those who know" (Dante, *Inf.* 4.131). But a contemporary science is not a branch of philosophy, and does not derive its fundamental notions from metaphysics; it has to work them out autonomously.[62]

A fidelity that is living is open to development. Bonino does not (in the articles examined here) spell out how Thomism might develop, except to note that changes of cultural and intellectual context will inevitably determine which positions of Aquinas a Thomist will be called upon to defend.[63] This might seem a little minimalistic itself, if it suggests nothing more than incidental adjustments within or additions to a fundamental

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[59] Blanchette, "Philosophy and Theology in Aquinas," 29.

[60] Lonergan, *Insight*, 420.

[61] Ibid., 459-59.

[62] See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Future of Thomism," in *A Second Collection*, ed. John D. Dadosky and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 39-47.

[63] Bonino, "Thomist Tradition," 874.

framework, purified, perhaps, of certain antiquated assumptions. Can we envisage the possibility of transposing Aquinas's thought into a still more comprehensive framework, as he himself did for Aristotle and Augustine? Here, I feel, a more dialectical posture is called for. I would ask for a more adequately differentiated statement of our relation to Aquinas and the differences separating our historic responsibilities from his.

"Theology," Bonino writes, "does not primarily and fundamentally seek to translate the faith into the language of an era"; I think this is quite just as far as it goes. "But," he adds,

it sets itself the task of disengaging the intelligible content from within the Word of God and expressing it in a scientific way, seeking as much as possible the organic and universal essence which allows a doctrinal system to transcend its own era.[64]

This seems to be faithful to Aquinas's conception of the matter, and there is something right about it. Theology has universalizing functions. They establish the scientific context proper to theology in its systematic moment. Still, Aquinas conceived that scientific context on a model of science derived from the *Posterior Analytics*, certain knowledge through (analogically conceived) causes, subaltern to the truths of faith. As I have urged, the contemporary problem for theology is history; it is understanding the dialectical unity of the Christian tradition. That problem is not met by a doctrinal system, howsoever transcendent. A contemporary methodical theology will include doctrinal and systematic functions, but it will have to include a great deal more, if it is to meet the problem of development as Newman identified it.

Bonino urges that the continuity of the Thomist tradition is analogical. Inevitably, he adds, it suffers certain deformities by defection from the true thought of Aquinas or, perhaps, an insufficient leavening by it.[65] But this seems an awkward way to put it. Unless we identify Aquinas himself as the "ideal Thomist," Thomism as an historical reality is still under con-

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[64] Bonino, "To Be a Thomist," 769.
[65] Bonino, "Thomist Tradition," 873.

struction. It would seem more adequate, therefore, to say that the continuity of the tradition is both dialectical and genetic. It is subject to both progress and decline, and only a dialectical method can tease them apart.

If the leading challenge for theology today is the (analogous) extension of scientific techniques into the domain of history, Aquinas, too, must be restored to his place in history. The implementation of a functionally specialized theology, such as Lonergan has proposed, restores Aquinas to his place in the history of theology without historicizing him.[66] By distinguishing and relating exegesis, history, dialectic, and theoretical systematization, it eliminates the need for exegetical contortions "in defense of Thomas," as well as the tendency to argue as if getting Aquinas right and getting reality right were the same task. By so doing, it may also increase the likelihood that we will let Aquinas really challenge us without fearing that his horizon may turn out to be quite different from the one we presently occupy. It replaces the vague notion of "living fidelity" with precise questions of historical influence. It re-places the problematic notion of an "essence" of Thomism with an investigation of the precise similarities and differences among thinkers, and the questions motivating the development of their thought. This might seem "painfully minimalistic," but it is a method adequate to its object. "Thomism" is not a single thing with a single essence but an historical complex of relations among thinkers.

What is wanted, I suggest, is an apprenticeship to Aquinas that is more explicitly open than the "living Thomism" of Bonino and White but shares with it an appreciation for the importance of a tradition in the development of understanding. It would be more serious than "Thomism-by-inspiration," in part because it does not make Aquinas an authority (in the sense of a tradition of belief) and therefore has no need to conceal its real preoccupations under the mantle of Aquinas. It is

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[66] See Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 180-230.

concerned rather with what may be learned from him, and therefore studies him with care. If Thomism is a tradition of understanding, then what may be learned from Aquinas cannot be adequately transmitted by belief but only by a development of understanding.

If by Thomism we mean a tradition of understanding rather than of authority, then the difference between the Thomist and the student of Aquinas will be fundamentally a matter of personal judgment. One is a Thomist who not only grasps but also appropriates, as true, fundamental insights of Aquinas; in this I agree with White, though I probably dissent from some of his judgments about what those insights are. The principal meaning of fidelity thus becomes standing by the genuine insights one has learnt from Aquinas, not because they are his but because they are correct.

Finally, the example of Aquinas is distinguishable, but not separable, from the content of his theology. One reaches up to both only through a careful and usually long apprenticeship. It is always worthwhile to struggle with a great author, and Aquinas is an uncommonly great author. Reaching up to his thought involves a great enlargement of one's understanding. The reach may be helped by competent teachers, exegetes, and commentators; but it can also be inhibited by them, perhaps all the more when the commentary becomes its own tradition, espouses an ideal of affective fidelity, and develops a penchant for ahistorical systematization. Reaching up to Aquinas does not require us to expect that everything he says will be true, and to prepare ourselves to defend it. In fact, a responsible apprenticeship to Aquinas will also involve us in a dialectical disengagement of his valid contributions from such historical relics as the cosmic system, the biology, and the very model of science he inherited from Aristotle.

V. THE FUTURE OF THOMISM

It has become fashionable to speak of Aquinas "the Augustinian."[67] The title is piquant; Aquinas was hardly the most obvious "Augustinian" of his generation; he was not Augustinian in any conventional sense, and later polemics typecast him as an "Aristotelian" over against the "Augustinians." To be sure, Aquinas was "one of [Augustine's] greatest medieval interpreters."[68] But that alone would not make him an Augustinian, nor would even the adoption or development of Augustinian positions on some incidental series of questions. If indeed Aquinas is an Augustinian, it is because in some way he made Augustine's thought his own, not only on select problems but after the manner of a leaven for his entire work. It is because the encounter with Augustine was decisive for Aquinas; his thought is unimaginable otherwise, not on this or that point only, but in its whole texture.

Because Aquinas was not only an interpreter but also an appropriator of Augustine, what he received both transformed him and was transformed by him.[69] To judge Aquinas an Augustinian, then, one has to penetrate below the surface of both thinkers, to grasp in a profound transformation an equally profound form of fidelity. Aquinas's sublation of Augustinian thought was a better homage than its repetition could ever be.

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[67] See Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew Levering, eds., *Aquinas the Augustinian* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), xi-xxiv. "Any overly facile application of the term 'Augustinian' to a theology whose roots are as philosophically and theologically diverse as Aquinas's must be rejected. We might say rather that Aquinas is an 'Augustinian' in the sense that, like all of Augustine's greatest interpreters, he engages with and elaborates upon Augustine's insights in a manner that challenges us to think afresh about the realities known and loved by Augustine" (ibid., xxiv). Poinsot had already described him as Augustine's most faithful follower and disciple (*Cursus theologici*, 219/261).

[68] Dauphinais, David, and Levering, eds., *Aquinas the Augustinian*, xvii.

[69] And not always to the better, some have thought: see John M. Rist, "Augustine, Aristotelianism, and Aquinas: Three Varieties of Philosophical Adaptation," in Dauphinais, David, and Levering, eds., *Aquinas the Augustinian*, 79–99.

But how many of the gatekeepers of Thomism would recognize as "Thomist" any thinker who stood in so transformative a relationship to the achievement of Aquinas as Aquinas himself stood to the achievement of Augustine? Can we reckon with the possibility that a certain kind of self-conscious Thomism would, in all likelihood, greet a genuinely transformative sublation of Thomist thought with the same incomprehension that greeted Aquinas himself from the self-appointed guardians of Augustinian orthodoxy? Lonergan, anyone?

Lonergan is usually counted, or rather discounted, as a "transcendental Thomist," which is to say, a "Thomist-by-inspiration" whose more important debts were to Kant, or Hegel, or Descartes.[70] Though it is admitted his early writings were deeply involved with Aquinas, his interpretations were idiosyncratic, while his most personal work—especially *Method in Theology*—seems like an excursion off the reservation. Though by common consent Lonergan is one of the brighter stars in the twentieth-century Catholic firmament, his project is not so much a rejected as an unrecognizable option in the contemporary conversation about what it could mean to be a Thomist. He is as absent from it as Aquinas would have been from any comparable debate on the meaning of Augustinianism in the fourteenth century. His number will not be retired in a Thomistic Cooperstown any time soon.

Yet Lonergan spent eleven years in apprenticeship to Aquinas, whose stamp is everywhere on his thought. In the epilogue to *Insight*, he spoke of its importance:

After spending years reaching up to the mind of Aquinas, I came to a twofold conclusion. On the one hand, that reaching had changed me profoundly. On

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[70] Lonergan did not reject the label "transcendental Thomist," because he considered his method transcendental in a sense analogous to both the Scholastic distinction between the transcendental and the predicamental, and the Kantian question about the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of knowledge. But he did not consider much light was shed on his project by its association with those of others, like Karl Rahner and Emmerich Coreth. What he was up to cannot be deduced from general comparisons. See *Method* (CWL 14), 17 n. 11; or *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13 n. 4.

the other hand, that change was the essential benefit. For not only did it make me capable of grasping what, in the light of my conclusions, the *vetera* really were, but also it opened challenging vistas on what the *nova* could be.[71]

I wonder whether Aquinas could have felt much differently about his own struggle with Aristotle, or, for that matter, Augustine. In relation to them, his ideal was not the kind of fidelity proper to a tradition of belief. His ideal was getting things right. His fidelity was only to the gospel and the truth. He could not otherwise have been a leading architect in a great shift in the paradigm of theology.

Lonergan certainly understood himself as some kind of Thomist, even after the "hermeneutical turn" he took in *Method in Theology*. In that book, his list of factors of continuity in systematic theology includes human nature, grace, the permanence of dogma, and such past achievement as would constitute permanently valid contributions to theological understanding. The last is illustrated by a single example: Thomas Aquinas.

For Aquinas's thought on grace and freedom and his thought on cognitional theory and on the Trinity were genuine achievements of the human spirit. Such achievement has a permanence of its own. It can be improved upon. It can be inserted in larger and richer contexts. But unless its substance is incorporated into subsequent work, the subsequent work will be a substantially poorer affair.[72]

In effect, Lonergan tells us, his own project cannot be understood, concretely, apart from something he discovered in Aquinas.[73]

The real issue at hand, however, is not whether Lonergan thought of himself as a Thomist, but whether we ought to think of him that way, and, more to the point, whether his example can helpfully enlarge our conception of Thomism.

[71] Lonergan, *Insight*, 769.
[72] Lonergan, *Method*, 325; or *Method* (1972), 352.
[73] Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 96-130.

Transposition was one of Lonergan's favorite metaphors. It is the kind of thing he found Aquinas doing for his own masters: transposing Aristotelian thought into a Christian universe, transposing Augustinian content into a scientifically constructed theology. Generally, though not always, Lonergan means by transposition the restatement of a position in a new context.[74] Sometimes the restatement is a lateral clarification, as, for instance, when a proposition is transposed by enumerating its necessary and sufficient ontological conditions. But often enough, transposition means enriching restatement. For instance, Newtonian mechanics was transposed into the context of Einsteinian relativity.[75] Similarly, the twelfth-century problematic of habitual grace was transposed into the thirteenth-century context shaped by the theoretical distinction of natural and supernatural orders.[76] A prominent recurring example in Lonergan's theology is his transposition from the Christological structure, one person in two natures, to the parallel structure, one subject of two consciousnesses. Here transposition is not restatement but analogical extension.[77] He saw a similar possibility in the isomorphism—the structural parallel—of Thomism and modern science. Science is theory, contingently verified in instances. As theory, it is parallel to form; as verified, to contingent act; and as in instances, to potency.[78]

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[74] This working definition and many of the examples that follow are drawn from Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Horizons and Transpositions," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 409-32.

[75] Ibid., 410.

[76] See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 3-20.

[77] Note that a subject is a conscious person and a person a potential subject; a nature is not identical to consciousness, even in an intellectual being, if that being is compound, developing organically as well as consciously, and sometimes asleep. See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Christ as Subject: A Reply," in *Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 182-83.

[78] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," in Crowe and Doran, eds., *Collection*, 133-41.

Lonergan conceived his *Insight*, in part, as a "transposition of [Aquinas's] position to meet the issues of our own day."[79] "Aquinas's position," of course, means a coordinated series of positions. For instance, Lonergan affirmed that the Thomist theorem that God applies all agents to their activity could be disentangled from its accidental involvements in Aristotelian cosmology.[80] The result is a set of affirmations regarding the conditions of all finite agency and its necessary instrumentality to God, coupled with a repudiation of the universal causality of the celestial spheres and the other limitations of prescientific cosmology. Such disengagement of the valid from the invalid terms and relations is dialectical. It develops what belongs properly to the position by integrating it with further discovery; it reverses the incompatible or counterpositional elements.

Most sweeping are the transpositions resulting from entry into a new stage in the control of meaning. Such stages, cumulative not supersessionary, are marked by the introductions of writing, of logic and metaphysics, and of method, especially method as controlled by self-appropriation.[81] So the largely narrative and symbolic witness of the New Testament raised questions for judgment that were resolved through the dialectical emergence of the logical and incipiently explanatory context of ecclesiastical doctrine.[82] Ecclesiastical doctrines in their turn raised questions for understanding addressed by dialectical procedures within the metaphysical and more fully explanatory context of Scholastic theory. So Aquinas transposed Augustine's position on operative grace by setting it in a vastly

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[79] Lonergan, *Verbum*, 222; Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Scope of Renewal," in Croken and Doran, eds., *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980*, 293-98.

[80] Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 91-92. Compare the parallel formulation in *Insight*, 686-87.

[81] See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon," in Croken and Doran, eds., *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980*, 404-8.

[82] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Origins of Christian Realism (1972)," in Dadosky and Doran, eds., *Second Collection*, 202-20; further discussion in Wilkins, *Before Truth*, 235-77.

enriched theoretical context, while pruning the descriptive exuberance of Augustinian vocabulary into a tighter set of systematically interrelated concepts. A changed horizon might entail the restatement of a whole range of coordinated positions. So the systematic perspective of Aristotle was incorporated into the Christian vision of Aquinas, and Aquinas's achievement was transposed in turn by Lonergan.[83]

In such cases the continuity is largely by analogy (as Bonino put it) and isomorphism (as Lonergan might). The differences are a function of specializations, shifting priorities, the explication of the implicit, and analogical and isomorphic extensions. We have already noticed examples of these last. By specialization Lonergan understood not a narrowing of scope but an intensification of capacities for differentiated investigations. So in the thirteenth century theology became scientific. In later centuries natural sciences would emancipate themselves from philosophy, analogous techniques would be extended into historical scholarship, and philosophy itself would, in Lonergan's opinion, find its proper focus on the general conditions of all inquiry and method. Shifting priorities displace metaphysics. A critique of the existential and inquiring subject becomes the first office of philosophy. The empirical turn, initiated by the concreteness of Aristotle and considerably deepened by the experimental orientation of modern science, turns out to be more durable than the scientific syllogism.[84]

As we see, transposition is an extremely general and materially rather vague notion. It is not determined or assessed by any rule, because it is realized differently in different cases. A basic revision is not deductive but intelligent, "a series of leaps from the logic of one position to the logic of the next."[85] Transposition can be methodical, but "method is not to be confused with anything as pedestrian as a recipe, a prescription,

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[83] Lonergan, *Insight*, 765-70.

[84] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation," in *A Third Collection*, ed. John D. Dadosky and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 34-51.

[85] Lonergan, *Insight*, 502; see ibid., 190; "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon," 395.

a set of directions."[86] If dialectical method has precepts, they are "develop positions; reverse counterpositions."[87] Dialectical purification of categories can be subject to no test, control, or rule besides the careful judgment of the theologian who is actually converted intellectually, morally, and religiously, who is competent in the zone, and who thoroughly inhabits the new horizon; for "there are no satisfactory methodical criteria that prescind from the criteria of truth."[88]

Transposition is not rupture. Theological continuity includes the development of understanding. A commitment to the development of understanding does not entail historicism or modernism. Historicism is the mistaken conclusion that because statements are meaningful in a context, their relevance is restricted to that context. Modernism is the mistaken reduction of Christian doctrines to symbolizations of interior religious experience. For the modernist, the function of symbols lies in their utility, so that as human needs change, new and more useful symbols ought to be devised. But the dogmas are not symbolizations of religious experience; they are true judgments about the meaning of the Christian message. These judgments answer questions, and questions arise in contexts. From this it follows that to understand the judgment, one has to figure out the question. It does not follow that the question is of only passing significance or that the truth of the judgment is restricted to its original historical context.

Because the mysteries of faith are permanent, the dogmas through which we affirm the mysteries also are permanently meaningful.[89] This permanence is not merely verbal; it is permanence in the sense, the meaningfulness, intended by the Church. To repeat the words and change the meaning is as

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[86] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion," in Dadosky and Doran, eds., *Third Collection*, 196.

[87] Lonergan, *Method* (1972), 249; Lonergan, *Method* (CWL 14), 234.

[88] Lonergan, *Method* (1972), 292; *Method* (CWL 14), 273; cf. "Horizons and Transpositions," 410.

[89] Lonergan, *Method* (CWL 14), 298-301.

unacceptable as to change the words to change the meaning. Besides continuity in the mysteries of faith, there is continuity in the light of faith and in the subordinate light of reason. Further, there are, as I have noted, permanently valid achievements in theology. Because of them theology can be a tradition of accumulating insights, although, as is plain enough, it can also become a tradition of disintegrating synthesis and systematized incomprehension, as seems to have happened, at least sometimes, in the Baroque schools.[90]

At the end of the day, however, a classification of Thomisms is the question for history and dialectic, that is, for the theological specialties that investigate how different thinkers are related to one another. Outside of these specialties, asking about a theologian's fidelity to Aquinas tends to confusion. Thomism is not a religion or a club. If Thomism means a tradition of understanding, then it is inherently open and cannot be transmitted merely by belief. The important Thomism is a tradition of understanding, and one enters it by an apprenticeship. One learns from Aquinas how to envisage all the issues, put them in order, and get things right. That is the important meaning in Blanchette's "order of questions."

CONCLUSION

The best wisdom of Aquinas is to prefer no wisdom to Christ's. But Christ's wisdom is not a written wisdom. It cannot be embodied in a permanent synthesis of thought. It is a living docility to the prompting of the Spirit to face the need of the hour. By his teaching on the new law of the Spirit, on the superiority of the wisdom that flows from love to every form of acquired wisdom, Aquinas has relativized himself.

Thomism at its best is a great tradition of understanding. Deference to a great teacher has its place, but its meaning is that

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[90] On continuity within a methodical theology, see ibid., 324-26; on disintegrating synthesis, see Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 143-49; on systematized incomprehension, Jeremy D. Wilkins, "The Spiration of Love in God According to Aquinas and His Interpreters," *The Thomist* 83 (2019): 357-405.

one expects to learn from Aquinas. There is an Aquinas to be surpassed and an Aquinas to be emulated. The Aquinas to be surpassed is a thirteenth-century man with thirteenth-century questions, a thirteenth-century cosmos, operating on a thirteenth-century paradigm of scientific theology. The Aquinas to be emulated engaged his own teachers dialectically, transposed their best ideas into the larger and richer context of his own age, and made permanently valid contributions to theology. If we want to measure up to Aquinas, these are among his more important lessons.[91]

COMMON BY CAUSALITY AND COMMON BY PREDICATION: AVICENNA AND AQUINAS ON A TWOFOLD DIVISION OF PRINCIPLES

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THE IMPORTANCE of Aristotle for Thomas Aquinas is difficult to overstate, but to make him not just the predominant but the sole source for Thomas would be an exaggeration. The initial transmission of much of Aristotelian thought to the West depended on the Arabic tradition, and this diffusion was often accompanied by interpretation. Increasing interest in the philosophical practice of the medieval Arabic tradition has called to attention the influence of, among others, Avicenna.

The present study examines Avicenna as the source for a distinction Thomas employed discretely but repeatedly in his works: namely, a twofold division of common principles into those that are common by causality and those that are common by predication. While one might assume that Thomas found this division in Aristotle—understandable, given the richness of Aristotle's account of causes and principles and his obvious influence on Thomas's works—it is, perhaps surprisingly, a distinction drawn explicitly not by Aristotle but rather by Avicenna. This distinction is not only important for Avicenna and Thomas, but it is also an instance of the development of Aristotelian thought before its reception and acceptance into the Latin West.[1] I do not mean to imply that this distinction is in no

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[1] Some studies of the relationship between Avicenna and Thomas of general relevance to the present study include: Rahim Acar, *Talking about God and Talking*

way present in the Aristotelian corpus, but Aristotle does not explicitly formulate it. Avicenna, by contrast, does draw this distinction and uses it not only to clarify the kinds of principles a given philosophical science must consider but also to distinguish between physical and metaphysical considerations of causes. Thomas, for his part, adopts this distinction explicitly from Avicenna and employs it in treating a variety of issues, even while commenting on Aristotle.

This Avicennian distinction and the Thomistic implementation of it have already been noted in a pioneering treatment of Thomas's *De principiis naturae*.[2] In the present study I seek to consider them in greater detail. First, I will consider possible Aristotelian roots for the distinction, focusing on the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*.[3] Second, I will examine its presentation and implementation in Avicenna's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* of

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about Creation: Avicenna's and Thomas Aquinas's Positions (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005); R. E. Houser, "The Friar and the Vizier on the Range of the Theoretical Sciences," *Anuario filosófico* 48 (2015): 19-54; idem, "Introducing the Principles of Avicennian Metaphysics into *sacra doctrina*," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 88 (2014): 195-212; idem, "Why the Christian 'Magistri' Turned to Arabic and Jewish 'Falasifa': Aquinas and Avicenna," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 86 (2012): 33-51; Jon McGinnis, "The Avicennan Sources for Aquinas on Being: Supplemental Remarks to Brian Davies' 'Kenny on Aquinas on Being'," *Modern Schoolman* 82 (2005): 131-42; idem, "Making Something of Nothing: Privation, Possibility, and Potentiality in Avicenna and Aquinas," *The Thomist* 76 (2012): 551-75; Nathan Poage, "The Subject and Principle of Metaphysics in Avicenna and Aquinas," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 86 (2012): 231-43; John Wippel, "The Latin Avicenna as a Source of Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* (1990): 51-90.

    [2] I have in mind the study of R. E. Houser, "Avicenna and Aquinas's *De principiis naturae*, cc. 1-3," *The Thomist* 76 (2012): 577-610. In this work, Houser references the "non-Aristotelian" distinction between principles that are common by predication and those that are common by causality (while showing how Thomas followed Avicennian methodology and terminology in the *De principiis*) and notes other instances of this distinction in Thomas's works. See especially 585-586.

    [3] Because I am not making an argument from a particular point of translation, I will employ the following translations of these works: *Physics* (trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye) and *Metaphysics* (trans. W. D. Ross). Both are found in *Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

The Healing.[4] It will be necessary to see the distinction in general and then to examine the specific commonality of each of the four causes. Third, I will investigate the application of this distinction in Thomas's works, beginning with his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, turning to *De veritate,* and ending with his commentaries on Boethius's *De Trinitate* and Aristotle's *Physics.*

As a preliminary, one should have clearly in mind the importance of this distinction for both Avicenna and Thomas. The goal of attaining knowledge in the sense of *epistēmē* (Arabic: *'ilm*; Latin: *scientia*) or knowledge of a thing in terms of its causes, arrived at through demonstrations of some thing's essential attributes, was shared across the intellectual world of the Middle Ages. Both Avicenna and Thomas, mindful of the importance of causes for acquiring *'ilm* or *scientia*, are keenly aware not just of the common fourfold division of causes into material, formal, efficient, and final but also the various modalities of any given cause. A necessary step toward attaining knowledge, for both of these thinkers, is an identification of the *kind* of causes and principles that can constitute it. Both maintain that knowledge, if it is to be true knowledge and not mere opinion, needs to be common and not particular or merely incidental.[5] Furthermore, if a given science is to achieve knowledge,

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[4] I will employ the following editions of Avicenna: *The Physics of the Healing*, trans. Jon McGinnis (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2009); *Metaphysics of the Healing*, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005). Because this study focuses on the influence of Avicenna on Thomas, however, I will provide the Latin translation of Avicenna's text from *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, ed. S. Van Riet (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997); and *Liber primus naturalium: Tractatus primus de causes et principiis naturalium*, ed. S. Van Riet (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992).

[5] The focus of the present study is on the two kinds of commonalities by which a cause or principle is common, but discussion of these kinds of common causes leads to questions about the two contraries to common causes: particular and proper. A particular cause or principle, for Avicenna, is either the individual cause of an individual effect (*this* physician for *this* cure or *this* builder of *this* building) or a cause matching its effect in specificity (for example, doctors causing cures, builders causing buildings). Avicenna contrasts this with a *universal* cause which is broader (for example, referring

it must employ principles that are appropriate to its subject of investigation. The critical importance of common causes or principles if one wishes to attain ʿilm was surely a motivation for Avicenna to distinguish the way a cause can be common. For him, a cause or principle that is common by predication is one predicate that can be truly said of many things. A cause or principle that is common by causality, by contrast, is only said of one thing, which is the cause of many different effects.[6] Avicenna formulated this distinction to clarify the kind of common efficient cause investigated by physics and metaphysics, and to show how the principles of natural things (matter, form, privation) are common to all natural things. Thomas, in adopting this distinction, expanded its implementation, even using it to clarify the concerns of theology.

Two terminological clarifications are needed at this point. First is the distinction between "cause" and "principle." Simply put, both principles and causes are fundamental aspects or elements of a given thing, which must be grasped if one is to attain true knowledge of the thing. Avicenna provides a rough definition of "principle" within his presentation of privation as an element of change.[7] A principle is a precondition for a thing that exists, and may or may not exist simultaneously with this thing.[8] "Causes" are particular kinds of principles.[9] In other

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to the cause of a cure as a "professional" which, though true is broader than "physician" and could include, say, "plumber" or "professor") (*Physics of the Healing* 1.12.3) Avicenna does not include a discussion of proper vs. incidental explicitly within his outline of causal modalities, but one can detect the meanings of these within his discussion of the kind of causes or principles with which the science of physics is concerned (see *Physics of the Healing* 1.1.1-5) A proper cause for Avicenna is a cause that is essentially connected with its effect, in opposition to a common incidental cause that is only accidentally associated with the effect.

[6] So, for example, one might predicate "mother" of my mother but also many other women and, in this instance, "mother" is common by predication. One might also, though, refer to my mother as the cause of many children (not just me, but my individual siblings as well) and, in this instance "mother" is common by her causality.

[7] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.2.14.

[8] The challenge in understanding "privation" as a principle is that principles seem to be *existent*, but a privation is, by definition, the *lack* or *nonexistence* of something.

words, "principle" is a broad category while "cause" is more specific. Despite this distinction, there is a certain looseness in Avicenna's terminology. For example, he uses "principle" when drawing the distinction between "common by causality" and "common by predication," but then uses various causes as examples.[10] When explaining what kind of common agent is not considered by natural philosophy he also begins by using the term "principle" but then references the causality of this principle.[11] Later he continues to use "principle" but clearly indicates that he intends the four causes.[12] For the present

Therefore, Avicenna states that privation can be understood as a principle if a "principle is whatever must exist, however it might exist, in order that something else exist, but not conversely. If that is not sufficient for being a principle, and a principle is not whatever must exist, however it might exist, but rather is whatever must exist simultaneously with the thing whose principle it is without being prior or posterior, then privation is not a principle" (ibid. 1.2.14).

[9] Ibid. 1.3.12: "Having finished [the discussion] of those principles that most properly are called principles—namely, those that are constitutive of what is subject to generation or of the natural body—we should next focus on those principles that most deserve the title causes."

[10] Ibid. 1.1.8: "Now, since our present discussion concerns the common *principles*, the agent and end considered here are common to them. Now, what is common may be understood in two ways. One is the way in which the agent is common as producing the first actuality from which all other actualities follow. . . . The other way that something is common is by way of generality, as the universal [predicate] agent is said of each of the particular agents of particular things, and the universal [predicate] end is said of each one of the particular ends of particular things."

[11] Ibid. 1.1.10: "The efficient principle common to all in the first sense (if natural things have an efficient principle in this sense) would not be part of the natural order, since everything that is part of the natural order is subsequent to this principle, and it is related to all of them as their principle [precisely] because they are part of the natural order. So, if that principle were part of the natural order, then either it would be a principle of itself, which is absurd, or something else would be the first efficient principle, which is a contradiction. Consequently, the natural philosopher has no business discussing [such an efficient principle], since it has nothing to do with the science of physics. Also, if there is such a thing, it may be a principle of things that are part of the natural order as well as things that are not part of the natural order, in which case its causality will be of a more general existence than [both] the causality of what specifically causes natural things and the things that are specifically related to natural things."

[12] Ibid. 1.1.11.

study, the distinction between "principle" and "cause" is irrelevant as neither Avicenna nor Thomas strongly or consistently distinguishes between them in the texts now under consideration. Consequently, I will use them interchangeably.

A second terminological clarification concerns the terms used to refer to these two kinds of commonalities. Avicenna himself refers to them at times as principles or causes that are "common by causality" and "common by generality."[13] A recent systematic treatment of the *Physics of the Healing* uses instead "numerical commonality" and "generic commonality."[14] The former corresponds with "common by causality" and the latter with "common by predication," as will be made clear in the course of the present study. But, in this study, I will use the terms "common by causality" and "common by predication."

Attempting to offer an account of common principles in the thought of either Avicenna or Thomas—to say nothing of Aristotle, or other possible influences on them—would be daunting, and an attempt to consider both might verge on the audacious. Therefore, a few initial caveats must be made to set the parameters of my study. First, it is not my intention to give an exhaustive investigation of Aristotle, but consideration of his works is appropriate when one claims that Thomas adopted this distinction not from Aristotle but from Avicenna. Second, since I am primarily interested in the Thomistic adoption of this distinction, I will limit my consideration of Avicenna to the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* of *The Healing,* the Avicennian texts to which Thomas could have had access. The logical works of Avicenna must await another study. Third, this study does not encompass the broader philosophical context of Avicenna nor does it consider where or how he derived this distinction.[15] My

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[13] See ibid. 1.2 passim.

[14] Andreas Lammer, *The Elements of Avicenna's Physics: Greek Sources and Arabic Innovations* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 155ff.

[15] For more extensive treatments of the relationship between Aristotle and Avicenna, see Amos Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitâb al-Shifâ': A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought*, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science: Texts and Studies 63 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006); Lammer, *Elements of*

purpose is to explore the sources of this distinction for Thomas, who explicitly attributes it to Avicenna, not to any other thinker.[16] Fourth and finally, I will not attempt to argue for or against the overall influence of Avicenna on Thomas's philosophical system. The focus of the present study is strictly limited to one division Thomas found in Avicenna which, though singular, merits consideration.

I. ARISTOTELIAN BACKGROUND

The exposition of Aristotle here will be brief, but indispensable for one seeking to understand the contribution of Avicenna concerning this division of common causes.

A) *The Physics*

From the outset of the *Physics*, Aristotle makes clear the importance of causes and principles:

When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge and understanding is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary causes or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its elements. Plainly, therefore, in the science of nature too our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.[17]

Aristotle thus begins with a consideration and dialectical defense of principles in book I (identifying matter, form, and privation) before turning to the causes in book II. After defining nature itself in the first chapter of book II, Aristotle defines each

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Avicenna's Physics; Paul Lettinck, "Aristotle's 'Physical' Works and the Arabic Tradition," in *Aristotle and the Arabic Tradition*, ed. Ahmed Alwishah and Josh Hayes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Jean Jolivet, "La répartition des causes chez Aristote et Avicenne: Le sens d'un déplacement," in *Lectionum varietates: Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904-1987)*, ed. J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, and A. de Libera (Paris: Vrin, 1991).

[16] Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boet. De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4.

[17] Aristotle, *Phys.* 1.1.184a10-15.

of the four causes (material, formal, efficient, final) in chapter 3 and outlines a variety of divisions applicable to each of the causes. Among the six causal modes he delineates is the distinction between particular and generic causes. Drawing this distinction, he emphasizes the importance of matching the generality or specificity of an effect with its cause: "generic effects should be assigned to generic causes, particular effects to particular causes, e.g. statue to sculptor, this statue to this sculptor."[18] This division is not between two kinds of commonality but between the common and the particular. Thomas, however, in commenting on the distinction between common and particular glosses the text to include a distinction between the different kinds of common causes, one which parallels Avicenna's distinction (as will be seen below).

While the account of nature and the causes in Aristotle's *Physics* is rich and extensive, one would search in vain for the explicit distinction between causes that are common by predication and those that are common by causality. Nonetheless, there are passages that bear some semblance of this distinction. For example, Aristotle's treatment of how "nature" can be said of matter and form in chapter 1 of book II seems to be an instance of "common by predication."[19] Here Aristotle is showing how one term, "nature," is a singular term that can be predicated of many instances (not just matter and form, but natural things in general, as well).[20] Similarly, "common by causality" can be discerned in his treatment of the Unmoved Mover in books VII and VIII. This primary cause of natural motion is a common cause of motion that is, itself, unmoved. Aristotle's argument for such an Unmoved Mover, one should note, is an element of his physics that stands in stark contrast to

[18] Ibid. 2.3.195b26-30. He makes this point because arriving at genuine causal knowledge of a thing requires that one grasp its proper or appropriate cause.

[19] Ibid. 2.1.193a10ff. See also Thomas, I *Phys.*, c. 1, lect. 2 (*Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis* [Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1882]).

[20] See Aristotle, *Phys.* 2.1.192b9-193a3.

the physics of Avicenna, which reserves consideration of such a cause to metaphysics.[21]

B) *The Metaphysics*

Metaphysics is concerned with grasping the causes of its subject, but the causes of concern to the metaphysician are the causes not merely of motion or natural things, but of existence itself. Aristotle's concern with common causes and principles in this work should be beyond debate. But what is at issue is whether he makes the explicit distinction between different kinds of common principles that the present study is investigating. Like the *Physics,* the *Metaphysics* contains a delineation of four causes and an outline of various ways the causes can be divided (particular/universal, proper/accidental, composite/simple, which can each be either potential or actual, bringing the total number of modalities to twelve).[22] The modality of particular/universal is not, importantly, the same as the distinction between common by causality and common by predication; again, this distinction is between two kinds of commonality. Nonetheless, this modality has some similarity to the distinction between common causes inasmuch as it concerns the way a given cause can either be universal (and thereby predicable of more individual things) or particular (and thereby the proximate cause of a given thing). But nowhere in his presentation of the causes does Aristotle draw the distinction between a principle that is common by causality and a principle that is common by predication.

Nonetheless, his discussion of the way "being" can be predicated in book XII, chapter 5 is relevant to this distinction. Aristotle begins by noting that a given term can be said in

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[21] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.2.10. McGinnis notes: "Here Avicenna is anticipating his position put forth in book 1 of his *Ilāhīyāt* (1.1-2), that discussions of the First Efficient and/or Final Cause—God—properly belong to the subject matter of metaphysics, and that Aristotle and the tradition following him erred when they discussed the deity in the science of physics" (McGinnis, trans., 16 n. 6).

[22] See Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 5.2.1013b16-1014a25.

different ways of different things (that is, "analogically").[23] This chapter offers a solution to the problem of using one term in reference to many different kinds of things without falling prey to fallacious equivocation. In other words, it explains how one can use terms like "being" or "form" to describe or identify many different kinds of beings and forms. Analogy allows a focal meaning of a term which can then, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to other things. This is relevant to the present study insofar as it concerns how one predicate or term can be applied to many (not only how we can use "common" to refer to causes or principles that are common by predication and common by causality but also how a cause that is common by predication can be accurately said of many). But this account of analogy goes beyond the distinction of commonalities I am now considering insofar as it gives an explanation for how a given predicate can be accurately ascribed to many different kinds of things. Simply distinguishing a principle that is common by predication, in other words, does not thereby outline the parameters for employing a given term. At the same time, though, this account of analogy does not go as far as the distinction of "common by predication" and "common by causality" because analogy does not, for Aristotle, explicitly divide physics from metaphysics or natural from metaphysical causal investigations.

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It would be a mistake to conclude from this cursory exposition that there is *no* appearance of principles that are common by causality and common by predication in Aristotle's works. Although Aristotle does not explicitly make the distinction between them, he does treat the content of this distinction, in ways such as I have noted above. [24] But it would

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[23] Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 12.5.1071a4ff.

[24] For the purpose of the present study, the focus is on the physics and metaphysics of Aristotle and Avicenna and not their logical works. Nonetheless, some brief remarks

also be a mistake to ignore the clarifying move of uniting these two discrete kinds of commonality as we find in Avicenna.

II. THE FOUR CAUSES IN THE *PHYSICS OF THE HEALING*

The causes are of central importance to the science of nature for Avicenna, because *'ilm* is knowledge of a thing in terms of its causes and principles.[25] He launches physics by situating it in relation to metaphysics and identifying its subject as "the sensible body insofar as it is subject to change," a whole and

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can be made about the *Posterior Analytics*, which not only contains Aristotle's account of demonstration and *episteme* but also served as the structuring guide for Avicenna's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* of *The Healing*. In the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle presents his account of demonstration, a logical process by which one arrives at certain, causal knowledge of a thing. In explaining how this process is possible, he presents an ordering structure of a given area of investigation divided according to a proper subject (that is, what the science considers), principles (which the science employs in demonstrations about the subject), and conclusions (which yield certain causal knowledge about the subject). The question of how a principle is common is critically important to this work, both because Aristotle maintains that, strictly speaking, knowledge is universal while also affirming that a given demonstration must proceed from *proper* principles, not common. Aristotle's primary concern when considering common principles is how they feature in demonstrations and, consequently, how knowing some universal aspect of the thing can yield scientific knowledge of it. Yet, as in the *Physics*, Aristotle does not explicitly draw the distinction between different kinds of commonalities. While elements of the distinction between "common by causality" and "common by predication" can assuredly be found in this work, this precise distinction and comparison is nowhere to be found, neither in Aristotle's text nor in Thomas's commentary.

[25] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.1.1: "Natural things have principles, reasons, and causes without which the science of physics could not be attained," and thus "the only way to acquire genuine knowledge of those things possessing principles is, first, to know their principles and, from their principles, to know them, for this is the way to teach and learn that gives us access to the genuine knowledge of things that possess principles" (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 6, ll. 20-26: "Si res naturales habent principia vel occasiones et causas, non certificatur scientia naturalis nisi ex illis, quia iam expressum est in scientia probationis quod non est via ad certitudinem cognitionis rerum quae habent principia nisi per comprehensionem suorum principiorum, et per comprehensionem principiorum habetur cognitio earum, quia hoc genus doctrinae est docere quomodo per illud perveniatur ad certitudinem cognitionis rerum quae habent principia").

composite being.[26] The causes are necessary precursors for a natural thing's coming to exist and continuing in existence. Some of them—matter and form—constitute the subject of this science while others—agent and end—are needed to account for motion. But the natural philosopher who wishes to attain knowledge of the subject must grasp each of them.

The initial causes or principles that Avicenna presents are matter and form, the causes that are constitutive of the natural body, introduced via an analogy: "One of them is like the wood of the bed, while the other is like the form or shape of the bed. What is like the wood of the bed is called *material* . . . whereas what is like the form of the bed is called *form*."[27] He returns to matter a few paragraphs later and identifies it, more precisely, as the principle of potentiality in the natural thing.[28] Form, by

[26] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.1.2 (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 5, ll. 8-10: "Et eius subiectum [quandoquidem scisti quod omnis scientia subiectum habet] est corpus sensibile secundum hoc quod subiacet permutationi").

[27] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.2.3 (*Liber primus naturalium*, pp. 19-20, ll. 26-32): "Sed principia quibus apprehenditur eius corporeitas quaedam sunt partes esse eius et intra essentiam eius et haec digniora sunt apud eos vocari principia. Haec autem duo sunt, quorum unum sic est corpori sicut materies lecto, aliud vero sicut forma lectitas abstracta a lecto. Et quod est in eo tamquam materies in lecto vocatur hyle, subiectum, materia, origo et elementum, sed diversis respectibus, et quod est in eo sicut forma lectitas in lecto vocatur forma."

[28] Avicenna outlines five related but distinct meanings that "matter" can convey, moving from the more general to the more specific in *Physics of the Healing* 1.2.6. First, matter in the sense of "material," which is prime matter; second, matter in the sense of "subject," which is matter actually bearing some form; third, matter in the sense of "stuff," which is matter under the perspective of being common to all forms; fourth, matter in the sense of "element," which is matter taken as a simple part of a whole composite, arrived at via an analysis of the whole, that is still receptive to form; fifth, matter in the sense of "component," which is also matter taken as the simplest part of a component (and, as such, it is related to "element") but arrived at via a process of composition. Of these, Avicenna most often uses the term "elemental," because this is the meaning of "matter" as a principle arrived at through analysis, the methodology of *Physics of the Healing* 1. In all of these differing terms, "matter" is understood as the principle of potentiality intrinsic to the natural being and, thus, of receptivity to the actuality of form. In the *Metaphysics of the Healing*, too, Avicenna lists synonymous terms, each of which refers fundamentally to "the bearer of the potentiality of existence, which has the potentiality of a thing's existence" (4.2.26) The primary focus of this

contrast, is the principle of actuality.[29] As in his consideration of matter, Avicenna also presents a variety of meanings that "form" can convey before settling on the one of greatest interest to the natural philosopher: the form that makes matter to subsist (that is, the substantial form).[30] Matter and form are the two principles that directly enter into the composition of sensible bodies. If one is to achieve knowledge of natural things, one must comprehend material and formal causality.

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metaphysical consideration is the division of matter into the matter that is part of a thing (that is, a principle of the matter/form composite) and matter that is not part of a thing, though it remains receptive to it (that is, prime matter, which must be rendered subsistent through substantial form or at least the form of corporeality), for instance in *Metaphysics of the Healing* 6.1.4. Because the precise differences in meaning between these is irrelevant to the present study, I will not consider them in any greater detail.

[29] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.10.9: "The form taken as one of the principles is relative to what is composed of it and the matter—namely, that it is a part of it that necessitates its being actual in its instance, whereas the matter is a part that does not necessitate its being actual (for the existence of the matter is not sufficient for the actual generation of something, but only for something's potential generation). So, the thing is not what it is through the matter; rather, it is through the existence of the form that something becomes actual" (*Liber primus naturalium*, pp. 93-94, ll. 49-54: "Et forma quae accipitur pro uno ex principiis est secundum comparationem eius quod est compositum ex ipsa et materia, quia est pars eius quod ipsa constituit in actu, qualecumque sit illud, et materia est pars quae non constituit in actu, quia esse materiae non sufficit ut sit res in actu, sed ut sit in potentia. Ergo res non est id quod est ex sua materia, sed ex esse formae fit res in actu").

[30] See ibid. 1.10.9. First, it can be said of the essence of something that allows a species to subsist. Second, form can be said simply to be the shape of a thing (for example, a bowl has a flat bottom and raised sides, so it can be set down and hold things). Third, form can be said of a disposition of a thing or its order (some examples Avicenna gives are the form of an army or the regulative order of the law). Fourth, form can be said of the separate intelligibles (that is, forms existing separate from matter). Making these distinctions, Avicenna considers each in passing but devotes his attention to the precise meaning of "form" that concerns the natural philosopher: form that makes matter to subsist or, more precisely, substantial form. While there are, of course, accidental forms, Avicenna notes in *Physics of the Healing* 1.10.9 that "the form that makes the matter subsist . . . stands above [any] other kind." The explanation of form in terms of actuality is echoed in the *Metaphysics of the Healing* 6.1.2 when Avicenna initially defines form as the "cause which is part of the subsistence of the thing and in terms of which the thing is what it is in actuality."

Avicenna then turns to agent and end, introducing them—
like matter and form—in reference to the sensible body:

The body also has additional principles: an agent and an end. The agent is that
which impresses the form belonging to bodies into their matter, thereby
making the matter subsist through the form, and from [the matter and form]
making the composite subsist, where [the composite] acts by virtue of its form
and is acted upon by virtue of its matter. The end is that for the sake of which
these forms are impressed into the matters.[31]

Thus, he identifies the principles of physics via an analysis of
the subject, identifying in turn matter, form, agent, and end.
Each of these are per se principles, either entering directly into
the composition of the being or accounting for its change. To
these is added a fifth, privation, which is not a per se principle
but is nonetheless needed to account for change.[32] The dis-
cussion of the causes here in chapter 7 is rather brief. Avicenna
returns to this topic in chapter 10 to offer a delineation, again
emphasizing the importance of identifying each cause in order
to attain knowledge of the natural thing.[33] Before concluding his
account of causality, he turns in chapter 11 to consider the
relation between the causes and then outlines various causal
modalities in chapter 12.[34]

[31] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.2.7 (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 22, ll. 74-78:
"Sed corpus habet alia principia: efficiens et finale. Efficiens autem est quod imprimit
formam quae est in corporibus in materia eorum et perficit materiam per formam, et ex
utrisque constituit compositum quod agit per formam et patitur per materiam. Finalis
est propter quam impressae sunt formae in materiis").

[32] Ibid. 1.2.14 (*Liber primus naturalium*, pp. 26-27, ll. 48-68).

[33] Ibid. 1.10.1 (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 86, ll. 3-7.

[34] Besides the division of common principles which is the focus of my study,
Avicenna presents five paired causal divisions in *Physics of the Healing* 1.12.1 (this is a
parallel to Aristotle's *Physics* 2.3, which Thomas comments on in II *Phys.*, c. 3, lect. 6).
He devotes the entirety of *Physics of the Healing* 1.12 to these divisions, applying them
to efficient causality in par. 2-3, material causality in par. 4, formal causality in par. 5,
and final causality in par. 6-7. He expands on the division between potential and actual
causes in par. 8. These divisions are paired contraries such that a given cause can be a
combination of them (for example, a proximate particular cause or a complex universal
cause), a point Avicenna grants in *Physics of the Healing* 1.12.3 but does not dwell on.

Turning briefly to the *Metaphysics of the Healing*, one finds a similar fourfold division of the causes. The account in the *Metaphysics* is, in some ways, a simpler and more streamlined account than the earlier account in the *Physics of the Healing*. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the metaphysical account is focused on the existential relevance of each cause, that is, how each cause helps account for the existence of a thing. Book VI begins with the standard fourfold division of the causes which relates each cause to an existing thing. Avicenna divides the causes of a thing into those which are "included in its subsistence and [are] part of its existence [and those which are] not."[35] As in his account in the *Physics,* two of the causes are included in the subsistence of a thing (matter and form) while two are not (end and agent).[36] Here, however, this grouping of the causes centers around subsistence (that is, a kind of existence), not natural composition. This division accords with the account of matter and form in the *Physics of the Healing* as those causes which enter directly into the composition of the natural body. Avicenna uses this general division of causes while giving brief definitions of each:

By formal cause, we mean the cause which is part of the subsistence of the thing and in terms of which the thing is what it is in actuality. By the elemental [cause, we mean] the cause that is part of the subsistence of the thing, through which the thing is what it is in potency and in which the potentiality of its existence resides. By agent [we mean] the cause which

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An additional classification, applicable both to all four lines of causality and also to each of these pairs of subdivisions, is *potential* and *actual* (*Physics of the Healing* 1.12.3).

[35] Avicenna, *Metaphysics of the Healing* 6.1.3 (*Liber de philosophia prima*, p. 292: "Dico enim quod causa rei necessario vel est intra essentiam rei et pars esse eius vel non."

[36] Another way of referring to this distinction is causes that are "immanent" or "transcendent," as is evident in Robert Wisnovsky's work "Towards a History of Avicenna's Distinction between Immanent and Transcendent Causes," in *Before and After Avicenna*, ed. David C. Reisman and Ahamed H. al-Rahim (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 49-68. This distinction is also of concern to Jolivet ("La répartition des causes chez Aristote et Avicenne") who argues that this distinction is one that is innovative on Avicenna's part, something Wisnovsky directly critiques.

bestows an existence that is other than itself. . . . If it [the cause] is that for whose sake it [an effect] is, then it is the purpose.[37]

   In the course of *Metaphysics of the Healing* VI, Avicenna elaborates somewhat on the meaning of each, but places particular emphasis on the efficient or agent cause. He does so because, though he will trace each line of causality back to a first, it is especially through the termination of efficient causes that he will prove the existence of the Necessary Existent, God, in book VIII. Here in book VI, Avicenna notes that the efficient cause is not limited to causing motion but rather extends to causing existence itself.[38] This distinction traces the division of commonalities which I have already introduced and on which I will elaborate in the next section of this study. For our present purposes, the general meaning we should ascribe to the agent cause is that of bringing potentiality into actuality. Both motion and existence are instances of a potency becoming actual (in the former, the potential to move; in the latter, the potential to exist at all). Avicenna touches on this critically important distinction only briefly here. He is able to do this because he has already presented and explained it in the *Physics of the Healing*, to which I will turn shortly.

   The formal cause is an intrinsic cause that is responsible for rendering a being to be what it is in actuality, while the material

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[37] Avicenna, *Metaphysics of the Healing* 6.1.2-3 (*Liber de philosophia prima*, pp. 291-92: "Dico igitur quod nos non intelligimus esse causam formalem, nisi causam quae est pars essentiae rei per quam est res id quod est in effectu. Materiam vero intelligimus esse causam quae est pars essentiae rei in qua est id per quod res est in effectu et in qua requiescit potentia esse eius. Agens vero est causa quae acquirit rei esse discretum a seipso. . . . Finem vero intelligimus causam propter quam acquiritur esse rei discretum ab ea. Et potest ostendi quod non est causa alia praeter has").

[38] See ibid. 6.1.2: "The metaphysical philosophers do not mean by 'agent' only the principle of motion, as the naturalists mean, but the principle and giver of existence, as in the case of God with respect to the world. As for the natural efficient cause, it does not bestow existence other than motion in one of the forms of motion" (*Liber de philosophia prima*, p. 292: "Divini philosophi non intelligunt per agentem principium motionis tantum, sicut intelligunt naturales, sed principium essendi et datorem eius, sicut creator mundi; causa vero agens naturalis non acquirit esse rei nisi motionem aliquam ex modis motionum").

cause makes something to be what it is in potentiality.[39] All actuality that a given being has, then, is had on account of its form. This much was shown in the *Physics*. In the *Metaphysics*, Avicenna goes on to argue that form is a necessary but not sufficient principle for existence. The coming to be of the form, though it is the principle of actuality within the composed being, is itself in need of a cause. The form, then, can exert two kinds of causality: considered in itself, it is a formal cause that informs matter and makes the being to be what it is. Considered as a proximate cause, it is a necessary but not sufficient principle for a thing to come into and remain in existence, though the ultimate cause of existence, as Avicenna will show, is an agent that is fully actual.[40] While form can function as a kind of efficient cause in this way, its primary kind of causality is that of being the formal aspect of a composite being: "form . . . is only a formal cause for the thing composed of it and matter."[41] This is, furthermore, the aspect under which the natural philosopher investigates it.[42] For Avicenna, the efficient cause is an extrinsic cause that bestows existence in some way, thereby actualizing a potentiality. The end (or final cause) is the cause on account of which some effect is brought about—a point on which Avicenna does not elaborate here, though he will return to show its finitude in *Metaphysics of the Healing* VIII, chapter 3 while arguing for the existence of a first metaphysical cause.[43]

To summarize, the central concern of the *Metaphysics of the Healing*'s account of the causes is the existential relevance of each. This streamlined account assumes many of the careful

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[39] Ibid. 8.4.8.

[40] Ibid. 6.1.5 (*Liber de philosophia prima*, pp. 293-94).

[41] Ibid. (*Liber de philosophia prima*, 294: "forma non est nisi forma materiae et non est causa formalis materiae").

[42] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.3.11.

[43] For Avicenna, there cannot be an infinity of ends (or an infinite line of ordered goods) because, he explains, an agent is only actually effective when acting for a final end. (Avicenna, *Metaphysics of the Healing* 8.3.1-3.) This cause is important, though, because of its role in making the agent cause actually efficacious (see Robert Wisnovsky, "Final and Efficient Causality in Avicenna's Cosmology and Theology," *Quaestio* 2 [2002]: 97-123).

distinctions drawn in the earlier *Physics of the Healing*. Indeed, preceding the entire treatment of the causes in the *Metaphysics* is the distinction from chapter 2 of the *Physics* between the ways in which causes can be common by predication and the ways in which they can be common by causality. The placement of this distinction in the opening of the *Physics* indicates its great importance, to Avicenna, for launching the science of physics in a way that distinguishes physics from metaphysics while affirming that both sciences are concerned with causes that are common in some sense.[44] Let us now return to the *Physics of the Healing* to see this distinction.

III. THE TWOFOLD DIVISION OF COMMON PRINCIPLES IN THE *PHYSICS OF THE HEALING*

While Avicenna is not uninterested in specific knowledge of natural beings, his order of investigation begins with what is common before moving to the more particular. As he puts it, "the principles of common things must first be known in order that common things be known, and the common things must

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[44] Obviously, this treatment of causality in the work of Avicenna is cursory. For some more-extensive treatments of relevance to the present study, see Syamsuddin Arif, "Causality in Islamic Philosophy: The Arguments of Ibn Sînâ," *Islam and Science* 7 (2009): 51-68; Ahmad Hasnawi, "La physique du Shifâ': Aperçus sur sa structure et son contenu," in *Avicenna and His Heritage: Acts of the International Colloquium. Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve, 8th–11th Sept. 1999*, ed. Jules Janssens and Daniel De Smet, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series 1, vol. 28 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002); Kara Richardson, "Avicenna and Aquinas on Form and Generation," in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci, Scientia Graeco-Arabica 7 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011); Kara Richardson, "Avicenna's Conception of the Efficient Cause," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 21 (2013): 220-39; Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna on Causal Priority," in *Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism* ed. Parviz Morewedge (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1981); Michael E. Marmura, "The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna (Ibn Sina)," in *Islamic Theology and Philosophy*, ed. M. E. Marmura (New York: State University of New York Press, 1984).

first be known in order to know the specific things."[45] This is because, again, the science of nature is concerned with showing what is said truly of all natural beings, not just one particular natural thing or what is incidental to natural things.

To reiterate, there are two ways, according to Avicenna, that a cause can be common. In one way, it is common by causality. This kind of common cause is a numerically distinct being with multiple effects. This commonality is a commonality in reality, then, as the cause exists as an individual with multiple effects. In another way, a cause can be common by its generality or by predication. This kind of common cause is not numerically distinct but rather refers to a singular aspect that can be predicated of multiple individuals. This is a logical commonality, then, as it concerns something that can be predicated of existent things, but is not a thing itself. As Avicenna explains,

The difference between the two is that in the first sense, common denotes a determinately existing entity that is numerically one [and] which the intellect indicates that it cannot be said of many, whereas in the second sense, common does not denote a single determinately existing entity in reality, but an object of the intellect that applies to many that are common in the intellect in that they are agents or ends, and so this common thing is predicated of many.[46]

Though applicable to other types of causality, this distinction is most important for efficient causality, which allows for a clear dividing line between physics and metaphysics: physics treats

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[45] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.1.3 (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 8, ll. 50-52: "Quia ergo sic est, debent cognosci principia rerum communium prius quam res communes et res communes prius quam res minus communeso").

[46] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.2.9 (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 23, ll. 93-99: "Et differentia quae est inter duos modos haec est scilicet quod commune, secundum primum intellectum, est in esse essentia una numero, et innuit intellectus quod ipsa est et non competit ei ut dicatur de pluribus. Commune autem, secundo modo, non habet in esse essentiam unam, immo est res intellecta complectens essentias multas convenientes in intellectu secundum quod sunt efficientes aut finales; ergo hoc commune dicetur de multis").

causes that are common by predication, while metaphysics deals with causes that are common by causality.[47]

Applying this distinction to agent and end, the agent can be common in one way insofar as it is the cause that produces "the first actuality from which all other actualities flow."[48] An end can likewise be common in this way if there is one end toward which all natural things tend. In these instances, there is an individual being (agent or end) that is common by its causality (efficient or final). In both cases there is a singular cause with many effects: a commonality of causality. In another way both agent and end can be said to be common by their generality. In this case, there is not just one being that is an agent or end but rather many particular beings of which "agent" or "end" can be predicated. When speaking of natural agents and natural ends in physics, then, what Avicenna has in mind are commonalities of generality or predication (i.e., the way in which "end" and "agent" can be *said* of all natural beings). The agent that is common by causality is a singular being with multiple effects. This most common agent is the concern of the metaphysician, as it is the cause not only of material beings, but of all beings, and thus its effects extend beyond the scope of natural philosophy.[49] Efficient causality is considered by both the

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[47] The investigation of such a common cause culminates in proof for the existence of God, the Necessary Existent, the ultimate cause of the existence of all other things, in *Metaphysics of the Healing* 8.1-4.

[48] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.2.8 (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 22, ll. 82-83: "Uno enim modo, efficiens communis est ille qui facit primum opus ex quo cetera opera habent ordinem").

[49] As he explains, "The efficient principle common to all in the first sense (if natural things have an efficient principle in this sense) would not be part of the natural order, since everything that is part of the natural order is subsequent to this principle, and it is related to all of them as their principle [precisely] because they are part of the natural order" (*Physics of the Healing* 1.2.10 [*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 23, ll. 1-5: "Sed principium efficiens commune omni secundum modum primum, si res naturales habent principium huiusmodi, non erit naturale, quia omne naturale est post hoc principium, et ipsum habet ad omnia relationem eo quod est principium eorum, non quod sit naturale quia, si principium esset naturale, tunc esset principium sui ipsius, quod est impossibile"]). Thomas is clearly aware of this distinction, too, and uses it frequently in his commentary on the *Sentences* (e.g. I *Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3. See also I *Sent.*,

natural philosopher and the metaphysician, but their interest in this cause differ.[50]

While the division between a principle that is common by causality and one that is common by predication is used especially to treat efficient and final causes, it is applicable to all the principles of nature. Avicenna therefore also utilizes it while treating matter, form, and privation, emphasizing the importance of common principles to the science of physics. As he maintains, "since our inquiry is about common principles only, we should inquire into which of the two aforementioned ways these three common principles [that is, matter, form, and privation] are common."[51] Beginning with matter, he asserts that material bodies can be either generable and corruptible or not. The material of generable and corruptible bodies gains or loses forms temporally, while the material of nongenerable and noncorruptible bodies is eternally conjoined.[52] Matter common by causality would be a singular material cause of things, but matter that is susceptible to noncorruptible forms is not susceptible to corruptible forms. It is impossible, then, for there to be one matter that is common by causality. Matter can, though, be common by predication inasmuch as there are aspects of matter truly predicable of all material things (e.g.,

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d. 37, q. 1, a. 1; d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; II *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; d. 15, q. 1, a. 2. See also *De Verit.*, q. 2, a. 3, ad 20.

[50] The distinction between a metaphysical and natural efficient cause is referenced and returned to in *Metaphysics of the Healing* 6.1.2.

[51] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.3.1 (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 35, ll. 2-4: "Quoniam nostra speculatio fuit hic de communibus principiis, debemus considerare in his principiis tria communia secundum quem duorum praedictorum modorum sint communia").

[52] Ibid. 1.3.2: "It will become apparent to us later that some bodies are susceptible to generation and corruption (namely, those whose material acquires a new form and loses another), while others are not susceptible to generation and corruption and instead exist as a result of an atemporal creation. If that is the case, then there is no common material in the first of the two senses, since there is no single material that is sometimes susceptible to the form of what undergoes generation and corruption and at other times is susceptible to the form of what is naturally incorruptible and has no material generation."

potentiality).[53] Matter as a principle of the thing that is receptive to form and from which a natural thing is generated is the common matter of concern to physics, a matter common by predication. A consideration of matter that is common by causality is, like the agent and end common by causality, properly the concern of metaphysics.

Turning to form, Avicenna again begins by entertaining the suggestion that natural beings have a form that is common by causality. In such a case, this common form must be numerically one and shared by all natural things. A possible candidate for such a common form might be the "form of corporeality," as this is, for Avicenna, what makes a natural thing to be a body.[54] Consequently, the "form of corporeality" is possessed in some way by all natural things.[55] But, if there is one common form for all natural things, then one runs into the problem of how to explain natural diversity and multiplicity and, further, the problem of how this common form could remain even through substantial changes.

Cognizant of these problems, Avicenna denies that the "form of corporeality" is common in the first sense. If it were, then it would have to be a numerically unique and subsistent form. But such a view of form goes against his account of natural hylomorphic unity, as Kara Richardson and Abraham Stone have shown.[56] For Avicenna, the "form of corporeality" is a way to identify an aspect of natural things that actually exists in tandem with their substantial forms and accidental features.

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[53] See ibid. 1.3.10.

[54] There is no distinction between "form of corporality," "form of corporeity," and "form of corporeality," as each are translations of the same term.

[55] See, e.g., ibid. 1.3.3 (*Liber primus naturalium*, pp. 36-37, ll. 32-45).

[56] See Richardson, "Avicenna and Aquinas on Form and Generation," 258. Richardson's solution to the issue of whether the form of corporality is a subsistent form or not is to view it as "merely conceptually distinct from the species form" (258 n. 26). In this, Richardson is in agreement with Abraham Stone, who maintains that the form of corporeity cannot be an additional substantial form, given the relation between form, subject, and accident. See Abraham Stone, "Simplicius and Avicenna on the Essential Corporeity of Material Substance," in *Aspects of Avicenna*, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2001), 100.

This form is, then, neither a substantial form nor one that is common by causality. There cannot be a numerically distinct form, for Avicenna, that remains throughout substantial change because substantial change is, precisely, a change in form. He thus concludes that there cannot be a form that is common by causality. Nonetheless, as in his treatment of matter, agent, and end, there is a sense of form that *is* common by predication: namely, a disposition acquired by matter that is a principle of actuality within the natural thing.[57]

A final point of consideration in this discussion of commonality is privation. Avicenna quickly dismisses the suggestion that it might be common in the first sense (that is, common by causality).[58] Privation is, by definition, the absence of something and when this "something" comes about the privation is gone. It is not an existing singular thing, nor is it even a cause in the per se sense that matter and form are. Privation, furthermore, is not simply an absence, but a lack of some form that the natural thing has the potency to acquire. It cannot, then, be numerically identical because privation is not something that multiple effects share in common.[59]

Having considered the possible commonality of matter, form, and privation, Avicenna presents a brief discussion in chapter 3 of how they might be common by predication.[60] Such short shrift here assumes the presentation in chapter 2 of what

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[57] See Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.3.10.

[58] See ibid. 1.3.4 (*Liber primus naturalium*, pp. 37-38, ll. 50-54).

[59] For a study on the meaning of privation in the thought of Avicenna and Thomas, see Jon McGinnis. "Making Something of Nothing: Privation, Possibility, and Potentiality in Avicenna and Aquinas" *The Thomist* 76 (2012): 551-75.

[60] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing* 1.3.5: "As for that which is common in the second of the two senses, the three principles are common to what is subject to generation and change, since it is common to all [of those sorts of things] that they all have matter, form, and privation" (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 38, ll. 55-59: "Sed commune, secundo modo ex duobus, potest inveniri in unaquaque maneria horum principiorum secundum quod sit commune omnibus generatis et mutabilibus, quia omnia conveniunt in hoc quod unumquodque eorum habet formam et materiam et privationem").

is meant by "common by predication." Avicenna himself adverts to his earlier discussion of this distinction, explaining that

> our entire inquiry into and approach to form and its being a principle is strictly limited to its being a principle in the sense that it is one of the two parts of something that undergoes generation, not that it is an agent, even if it is possible that a form be an agent. Also, we have already shown that the natural philosopher does not deal with the efficient and final principles that are common to all natural things in the first way [mentioned in the previous chapter], and so we should concentrate our efforts on the second [way] that the efficient principle is common to all natural things.[61]

Having eliminated matter and form as common by causality, he is able quickly to conclude that the matter and form that the natural philosopher is concerned with must be common by predication. In other words, physics is not concerned with the singular kind of matter that, say, metaphysics considers, nor with any singularly existent form. What physics is concerned with is how matter and form pertain to all natural things, both as principles of natural composition and as indispensable elements of natural change. While concerned with principles that are common, physics does not consider all kinds of common principles. As Avicenna explains, "our inquiry and discussion are about the principles from this perspective [common by predication] and not the first one [common by causality]."[62] Similarly, it is possible to speak of privation as common by predication. Because "everything of which *privation*

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[61] Ibid. 1.3.11 (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 42, ll. 40-51: "Et tota nostra speculatio de forma et de eius principalitate ad id perducitur scilicet quod est principium ex intellectu quod est una ex duabus partibus generati, non quod sit efficiens. Si autem conceditur quod forma sit efficiens, <cum> iam declaravimus quod naturalis non habet tractare de principio efficiente et principio finali communi secundum modum primum omnibus naturalibus: ergo debemus tractare de principio efficiente communi naturalibus quae sunt post eum. Quandoquidem iam explicavimus de principiis quae magis debent vocari principia, idest constituentia generatum sive corpus naturale, debemus ergo tractare de principiis quae magis digna sunt vocari causae, et ex illis notum faciemus principium efficiens commune naturalibus, quod est natura."

[62] Ibid. 1.3.6 (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 39, ll. 78-79: "Et nostra speculatio de principiis est hic hoc modo. Non enim loquimur hic de primo modo").

is predicated is the nonexistence of some instance of what we have called *form* in that which is capable of acquiring it [that is, in the material]."[63] The commonality of privation is thus bound up with form, as privation is understood as the absence of some form, and it can be commonly predicated of absences of forms.

In sum, while the distinction between agents that are common by causality and those common by predication is of particular importance to Avicenna—given his metaphysical commitments—this is a distinction that is also applicable to matter, form, and privation. The kind of common cause of concern to natural philosophy is, in each instance, a commonality of predication. The kind of common cause of concern to metaphysics is the commonality of causality.

IV. THOMISTIC ADOPTION

Having presented the two ways a cause can be common for Avicenna and its application to each of the causes, it is now possible to see the adoption of this distinction in the works of Thomas.

A) *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (ca. 1252-57)

Reference to the distinction between a cause that is common by causality and one that is common by predication is found in Thomas as early as his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Here, Thomas uses the distinction first within the context of divine names, while asking whether "qui est" should be accorded priority; he then uses it within a discussion of beatitude as the ultimate end of human life. In treating divine names, he raises an objection that "good" should be given priority over "being" because there is a way in which "good"

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[63] Ibid. 1.3.10 (*Liber primus naturalium*, p. 42, ll. 38-39: "Et quicquid dicitur privatio est non esse id quod vocamus formam in suo susceptibili").

applies even to things that do not exist.[64] In answering this objection, he employs the two different ways a cause can be common. He argues that "good" is more common not by predication but rather by causality. "Good" is common by causality because the causality of an end extends even to things that do not yet exist (such as when imperfect things desire further actualization).[65] In this way, "good" is more common inasmuch as its causality extends even to not-yet-existent effects. "Qui est" is still accorded priority, though, since this is more appropriate inasmuch as God is fully actual, lacking all nonexistence.

The second, somewhat more extended use of this distinction in the *Sentences* commentary is in the context of presenting beatitude as the ultimate end of life. An objection is raised that beatitude, if it is a good, would have to be common, but life includes other animals who have their own respective ends; therefore, it seems impossible for there to be one common beatitude.[66] Thomas responds that a thing can be common in two ways: "through predication" (in which case there are many individual causes) and "through participation" (one thing taking part in another, common thing). There are goods that are common through predication but different in kind (the good of a human vs. the good of a dog, for example) but beatitude is a good that is common by participation. That is, beatitude is the singular end that is shared, in different ways, by all. This common good is, for Thomas, the way in which individuals

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[64] I *Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 2: "Praeterea, illud quod est communius videtur esse prius. Sed bonum est communius quam ens: quia divinum esse extendit se tantum ad entia quae esse participant; bonum autem extendit se ad non entia, quae etiam in esse vocat: dicitur enim bonum a boare, quod est vocare, ut Commentator dicit super Lib. de Divin. Nominib. Ergo bonum est prius quam ens" (Parma ed. [1858]; ed. Roberto Busa).

[65] I *Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.

[66] IV *Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 4, arg. 3: "Praeterea, praesens vita hominis est perfectior quam praesens vita alicujus alterius animalis. Sed vita praesens aliorum animalium includit finem ultimum eorumdem. Ergo et vita praesens hominis beatitudinem includit, qui est finis ejus" (Parma ed. [1858]; ed. Roberto Busa).

"arrive at that which is the common good of all beings, namely, God."[67]

While the commonality of predication here clearly tracks the distinction from the *Physics of the Healing,* the reference to "common by participation" seems to differ from Avicenna's "common by causality." But this difference, I suggest, is not significant. "Participation" is itself used by Thomas to describe the causal existential relation between God and creatures. Furthermore, like Avicenna's identification of the cause common by causality as being outside the natural order (ultimately, the Necessary Existent), Thomas also identifies the end that is "common through participation" as God.[68] Thus, in the *Commentary on the Sentences* Thomas employs the division of "common" into predication and causality, albeit with somewhat different terminology.

B) *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate* (ca. 1256-59)

The distinction reappears in Thomas's disputed questions on truth within a discussion of the *vita gloriae* (that is, the end of a life of grace). An objection is raised that whatever is more common is more noble, but natural life seems to be more common than the life of grace (inasmuch as natural life continues even when one falls from grace); therefore, it seems as if natural life is more noble than the *vita gloriae*. In

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[67] IV *Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 3: "Dupliciter aliquid dicitur esse commune. Uno modo per praedicationem; hujusmodi autem commune non est idem numero in diversis repertum; et hoc modo habet bonum corporis, communitatem. Alio modo est aliquid commune secundum participationem unius et ejusdem rei secundum numerum; et haec communitas maxime potest in his quae ad animam pertinent, inveniri; quia per ipsam attingitur ad id quod est commune bonum omnibus rebus, scilicet Deum; et ideo ratio non procedit."

[68] See *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 5: "Unde oportet quod ab uno illo ente omnia alia sint, quaecumque non sunt suum esse, sed habent esse per modum participationis. Haec est ratio Avicennae. Sic ergo ratione demonstratur et fide tenetur quod omnia sint a Deo creata" (*Quaestiones Disputatae*, ed. R. Spiazzi et al., vol. 2 [Turin: Marietti, 1949]).

responding, Thomas explains that a thing can be common in two senses:

First, it is said to be common through effect or predication; that is, it is found in many things according to one intelligible character. In this sense, that which is more common is not more noble but more imperfect, as animal is, which is more common than man. Now, it is in this sense that natural life is more common than the life of glory. Second, a thing is said to be common after the manner of a cause; that is, it resembles a cause which, while remaining numerically one, extends to many effects. In this sense, what is more common is more noble. . . . In this sense, natural life is not more common than the life of glory.[69]

Things that are common "through effect or predication" tracks Avicenna's "common by predication." Both of these kinds of predicative commonalities refer not to a singular existing thing but to an aspect of the thing that is common to it and to many others. By contrast, a thing that is "common after the manner of a cause" is precisely like Avicenna's "common by causality" inasmuch as this kind of common cause is numerically one and related to multiple effects. The life of glory, for Thomas, is common by causality and therefore it is "more noble" than natural life. It is not common by predication, though, because "life" can be said of more than just the *vita gloriae*. This division, not used to distinguish the principles of a science, is nonetheless in accord with the distinction outlined by Avicenna and even follows the original terminology, trans-planted here to another context.

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[69] *De Verit*., q. 7, a. 6, ad 7: "Dupliciter enim dicitur aliquid commune. Uno modo per consecutionem vel praedicationem; quando, scilicet, aliquid unum invenitur in multis secundum rationem unam; et sic illud quod est communius, non est nobilius, sed imperfectius, sicut animal homine; et hoc modo vita naturae est communior quam vita gloriae. Alio modo per modum causae, sicut causa quae, una numero manens, ad plures effectus se extendit; et sic id quod est communius, est nobilius, ut conservatio civitatis quam conservatio familiae. Hoc autem modo vita naturae non est communior quam vita gloriae" (*Quaestiones Disputatae*, ed. R. Spiazzi et al., vol. 1 [Turin: Marietti, 1949]; English translation by Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. [Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952]).

C) *Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate* (ca. 1257-59)

While there are other discrete invocations of this distinction in Thomas's works—such as in his scriptural commentary on the Book of Romans[70]—perhaps the clearest use is found within his commentary on Boethius's *De trinitate*.[71] Discussing the division of sciences in question 5, Thomas considers in the fourth article what divine science (metaphysics) considers. As Avicenna himself did, Thomas explains that knowledge (*scientia*) of a thing is acquired "through knowledge of principles."[72] But principles can be taken in two senses, either as complete beings that are principles of others or as beings that are incomplete in themselves.[73] Principles are also divided (in a way more relevant to the present study) according to whether or not they are common to a particular genus or, as Thomas puts it, are "the principles of all beings." These principles common to all beings can be said in two ways, he explains:

As Avicenna says, these principles can be called common in two ways, first, by predication, as when I say that form is common to all forms because it is predicated of all; second, by causality, as we say that the sun, which is numerically one, is the principle of all things subject to generation.[74]

Thomas takes this distinction directly from Avicenna and openly attributes it to him. Following Avicenna, the second kind

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[70] See *Super Rom.*, c. 7, lect. 2.

[71] For a more-extended treatment of the influence of Avicenna on this work, see John Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna on the Relationship between First Philosophy and the Other Theoretical Sciences: A Note on Thomas's *Commentary on Boethius's* De Trinitate, Q. *5,* art. 1, ad 9," *The Thomist* 37 (1973): 133-54. See also Houser, "The Friar and the Vizier."

[72] *Super Boet. De Trin.*, q. 5 a. 4 (*Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate*, ed. Bruno Decker [Leiden: Brill, 1959]; English translation by Armand Maurer [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1953]).

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.: "Quae quidem principia possunt dici communia dupliciter secundum Avicennam in sua sufficientia: uno modo per praedicationem, sicut hoc quod dico: forma est commune ad omnes formas, quia de qualibet praedicatur; alio modo per causalitatem, sicut dicimus solem unum numero esse principium ad omnia generabilia."

of common principle (that which is common by causality) is numerically one, while the first (that which is common by predication) allows multiple beings. While there can be multiple causes that are common by causality (as explained already in the *Physics* commentary), the principle of *all* beings must "be being in the highest degree" such that it is "most perfect and supremely in act" because "actuality is prior to, and more excellent than potentiality."[75] Therefore, the existential cause that is common by its causality must be God.

Expanding on Avicenna's original delegation of common causes to metaphysics, Thomas turns to how common causes concern theology. A common cause can be studied inasmuch as it is the principle of beings or insofar as it is a being in its own right. The discipline of metaphysics considers this kind of common cause inasmuch as it is the principle of existing things. For Thomas, we come to knowledge of this common cause through its effects. But to study this kind of common cause as something in its own right properly belongs to theology, where this common cause reveals itself:

Because these divine beings are the principles of all things and nevertheless they are complete natures in themselves, they can be studied in two ways: first, insofar as they are the common principles of all things, and second insofar as they are beings in their own right. . . . We can reach them by the light of natural reason only to the extent that their effects reveal them to us. It was in this way that the philosophers came to know them as is clear from the Epistle to the Romans: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Philosophers, then, study these divine beings only insofar as they are the principles of all things. Consequently, they are the objects of the science that investigates what is common to all beings, which has for its subject being as being. The philosophers call this divine science.[76]

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[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid.: "Huiusmodi ergo res divinae, quia sunt principia omnium entium et sunt nihilominus in se naturae completae, dupliciter tractari possunt: uno modo, prout sunt principia communia omnium entium; alio modo, prout sunt in se res quaedam. Quia autem huiusmodi prima principia quamvis sint in se maxime nota, tamen intellectus noster se habet ad ea ut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae, per lumen naturalis rationis pervenire non possumus in ea nisi secundum quod per effectus

Though Avicenna would agree that causes that are common by causality are the concern of metaphysics, he does not make any theological claim such as Thomas does. This expansion is, instead, an advancement by Thomas, who never forgets the superiority and uniqueness of theology. As he explains:

> Accordingly, there are two kinds of theology or divine science. There is one that treats of divine things, not as the subject of the science but as the principles of the subject. This is the kind of theology pursued by the philosophers and that is also called *metaphysics*. There is another theology, however, that investigates divine things for their own sakes as the subject of the science. This is the theology taught in *Sacred Scripture*.[77]

Thus, Thomas uses the distinction drawn by Avicenna in his *Physics of the Healing* while commenting on *De trinitate* in order to establish the subjects of metaphysics and theology. This is an expansion of Avicenna's distinction that remains consonant with its original intent and purpose.

D) Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum (1268-71)

Finally, Thomas returns once again to the question of common principles while commenting on Aristotle's natural philosophy. In *Physics* II, chapter 3 Aristotle provides three pairs of causal divisions and maintains that all six could be either actual or potential, bringing the number of causal divisions to four in total.[78] He does not make the distinction that Avicenna later does between causes common by predication

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in ea ducimur; et hoc modo philosophi in ea pervenerunt, quod patet Rom. 1: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Unde et huiusmodi res divinae non tractantur a philosophis, nisi prout sunt rerum omnium principia. Et ideo pertractantur in illa doctrina, in qua ponuntur ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, quae habet subiectum ens in quantum est ens; et haec scientia apud eos scientia divina dicitur."

[77] Ibid.: "Sic ergo theologia sive scientia divina est duplex. Una, in qua considerantur res divinae non tamquam subiectum scientiae, sed tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia, quam philosophi prosequuntur, quae alio nomine metaphysica dicitur. Alia vero, quae ipsas res divinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientiae et haec est theologia, quae in sacra Scriptura traditur."

[78] See Aristotle, *Phys.* 2.3.195a28-b30.

and those common by causality. Thomas, however, does intro-
duce this distinction while commenting on Aristotle's text. As
Thomas explains,

> It must be noted, however, that the universal cause and the proper cause, and
> the prior cause and the posterior cause, can be taken either according to a
> commonness in predication, as in the example given about the doctor and the
> artisan, or according to a commonness in causality, as if we say the sun is a
> universal cause of heating, whereas fire is a proper cause.[79]

Thomas takes "doctor" and "artisan" as examples of things
common by predication (because there are many individuals
about whom these can be said), while the example of causes
common by causality is the sun causing heat. Thomas uses the
terminology of Avicenna exactly, employing an Avicennian dis-
tinction to clarify the Aristotelian text. Of course, what Thomas
is applying this distinction to is somewhat different from the
original Avicennian application. Nonetheless, this is further
evidence of the expansion of this distinction by Thomas.

Interestingly, Thomas then shows how these two kinds of
common cause can correspond and relate to one another. For
him, causes that act by more universal forms (and are thereby
more commonly predicable) extend to more objects (and can
thus be more universally causative). As he explains, "Any power
extends to certain things insofar as they share in one *ratio*, and
the farther that that power extends, the more common that
ratio must be."[80] This correlation of causes common by predi-
cation and common by causality might seem, at first, to blur the
careful distinction that we have seen with Avicenna. But the

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[79] II *Phys*., c. 3, lect. 6: "Advertendum est autem quod causa universalis et propria,
vel prior et posterior, potest accipi aut secundum communitatem praedicationis,
secundum exempla hic posita de medico et artifice; vel secundum communitatem
causalitatis, ut si dicamus solem esse causam universalem calefactionis, ignem vero
causam propriam." English translation from R. J. Blackwell, R. J. Spath, and W. E.
Thirlkel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

[80] Ibid.: "Manifestum est enim quod quaelibet virtus extenditur ad aliqua secundum
quod communicant in una ratione obiecti; et quanto ad plura extenditur, tanto oportet
illam rationem esse communiorem."

distinction is still present even when applied to the same existent cause. For example, an agent that is common by predication can be common by causality in some respect (such as "doctor" being the cause of many effects, although "doctor" is itself a term that is common by predication). The numerical oneness of a cause common by causality and the numerical multiplicity of a cause common by predication, central to Avicenna's distinction, is still preserved.

The association of a cause common by causality with God is likewise present. Several paragraphs later, Thomas notes,

It follows that just as inferior agents, which are causes of the coming to be of things, must exist simultaneously with the things which come to be as long as they are coming to be, so also the divine agent, which is the cause of existing in act, is simultaneous with the existence of the thing in act. Hence if the divine action were removed from things, things would fall into nothingness, just as when the presence of the sun is removed, light ceases to be in the air.[81]

Once again using the sun as an example (just used, above, to illustrate a cause common by causality) Thomas shows how God is the prior, superior cause that is common by his existential causality. While there can be causes that are common by causality yet are not God (a doctor, for example), Thomas recognizes that an *existential* common cause must ultimately be God. In sum, while Thomas expands the usage of Avicenna's distinction and treats the way these two kinds of commonality can relate to each other, the terminology and association (that is, of a cause that is common by causality with God) remain unchanged.

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[81] Ibid.: "Unde habetur quod sicut agentia inferiora, quae sunt causa rerum quantum ad suum fieri, oportet simul esse cum iis quae fiunt quandiu fiunt; ita agens divinum, quod est causa existendi in actu, simul est cum esse rei in actu. Unde subtracta divina actione a rebus, res in nihilum deciderent, sicut remota praesentia solis lumen in aere deficeret."

Summation

In the present study, I have explored a twofold division of common principles in the thought of Avicenna and the subsequent adoption of this division by Thomas. While the content of this distinction is not foreign to Aristotle, one searches his works in vain for an explicit formulation of it. Such a formulation is, instead, an innovation of Avicenna. Here, then, one sees a clear example of the development of Aristotelian thought within the Islamic philosophical tradition. The distinction between causes that are common by causality and those that are common by predication is only one of many drawn by Avicenna, but it is a particularly important one. It leads Avicenna to divide natural philosophy from metaphysics and to insist that proof of the "First Mover," a cause that is common by causality, is proper only to metaphysics.

Seeing in this distinction a valuable tool, Thomas utilizes it in a variety of contexts. His use of it in his commentary on *De trinitate* stands out as particularly important because he expands it to include not only the difference between physics and metaphysics but also the difference between metaphysics and theology. In this commentary, Thomas seeks to present theology as a distinct discipline and consequently must offer an account of what it properly considers. In applying Avicenna's distinction to a theological issue, Thomas is thus able to defend metaphysical and theological investigations of common causes while safeguarding the unique character of theology. The twofold distinction of common principles is but one example of concurrence between Avicenna and Thomas, but grasping this distinction allows insight into the thought of both.[82]

BOOK REVIEWS

Cooperation with Evil: Thomistic Tools of Analysis. By KEVIN L. FLANNERY, S.J. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019. Pp. 279. $34.95 (paper). ISBN 978-0-8132-3244-7.

Our world is increasingly interconnected. People in disparate regions across the globe are working together in unprecedented ways. The power to accomplish great things emerges from our human collaboration ("if two of you agree on earth about anything you request, it will be done for you by my Father in heaven" [Matt 18:19]); but as we know from the tragic lessons of history, when people collaborate for wrongful ends the impact of evil is proportionately magnified.

Collaboration in evil is conceptually most unproblematic when several people join in a project of deliberate wrongdoing, as when an organized band of criminals conspire to rob a bank. But most such efforts also depend on other individuals who, not directly part of the criminal purpose, nonetheless contribute tacit support to the initiative, if only out of fear—say, a bank employee who, having been blackmailed, hands over the combination of a bank's safe. Still others are unwittingly caught up in the crime's wake; for instance, a taxi driver who is asked to drive men to a bank and is told to wait for their return, only finding out afterwards they were there to conduct a robbery. Unlike the fellow conspirators who are clearly guilty, it is much harder to parse the responsibility of the other actors mentioned; intuitively we think the bank teller bears some attenuated guilt, and the taxi driver none.

The Catholic tradition has long sought to explain these different contributions to wrongdoing by appeal to the distinction, made famous by Alphonsus de Liguori, between *formal* and *material* cooperation in evil. In broadest terms, the former designates a contribution that (in one way or another) is culpable, and the latter a contribution that is blameless. How to parse the difference is where the rubber hits the road; here as elsewhere the devil is in the details. The analytical challenge has become progressively greater as human beings find themselves in ever larger and multiple groupings, such as the employees in an international conglomerate with its multiple subsidiaries, or the citizens of a large bureaucratic state.

The Latin *cooperatio ad malum* (literally "cooperation toward evil"—nicely rendered in French by "la cooperation au mal") is ordinarily translated into

English using the prepositions "in" or "with." While the latter is used in the present volume, I prefer the former, because the issue is about cooperating with others *in* deeds that are evil, not partnering *with* evil as when Faust made a pact with the devil in Goethe's famous play. Moreover, in Scholastic moral theory, *malum* designates sins of potentially different degrees of gravity, not only those that are grandiosely sinister. "Cooperation in wrongdoing" would accordingly be the most suitable translation of the Latin phrase under discussion.

Is the "Catholic" distinction between formal and material wrongdoing adequate to the task of differentiating culpable from nonculpable contributions to wrongdoing? Answering this question is, fundamentally, the agenda that Kevin Flannery sets for himself in this book. To simplify the gist of a complex narrative, the answer he provides is basically "no." His argument is chiefly textual and historical. By tracing the origination of the distinction and its opposing interpretations, he seeks to show how the binary formal/material cannot provide a silver bullet for determining whose contribution to wrongdoing is culpable, and whose is not. For the principles that can guide discernment of the most relevant categories and their application to concrete cases, he urges us to consult Thomas Aquinas. In offering this Thomistic analysis of cooperation in evil and showing why it is superior to the approach later formulated by Alphonsus and his successors, Flannery has succeeded well at his task. As suggested by its subtitle, the book also aims to provide tools for sorting out the complex issues of collaboration we confront today. In other words, the author presents his project as of interest not only to historically minded Thomists and specialists in Church casuistry, but to a wider readership of philosophers and theologians reflecting on wrongful cooperative strategies within a variety of domains. But in this regard he has succeeded less well.

The story begins with Alphonsus de Liguori; although not the first to characterize wrongful cooperation as either formal or material (Flannery [25] attributes the original appearance of the contrast to Hermann Busenbaum, S.J., whose *Medulla theologiae moralis* was the basis for Alphonsus's *Theologia moralis*), it was he nonetheless who introduced this nomenclature into the mainstream of Catholic moral discourse such that after him "the formal/material distinction came to be associated in a special way with cooperation" (26).

For Alphonsus, in formal cooperation the cooperating agent contributes to (literally "runs up to" [*concurrit ad*]) the bad will of the malefactor (31); in material cooperation, by contrast, the cooperator's action is linked with the malefactor's action, but not with his bad will. Morally speaking, in the first case an intelligible whole emerges, while in the second case the malefactor's and cooperator's wills are only coincidentally (*per accidens*) united. Alphonsus does not equate the joined wills with a shared intention, namely, both parties knowingly adopting the same project. This, for Alphonsus would set the bar for formal cooperation too high, as it would exclude from the category situations in which the cooperator lends her assistance out of fear (e.g., because of loss of employment). To parse the difference between the two modes of cooperation,

but without recourse to shared intention, Alphonsus instead relies on the doctrine of indifferent acts. The material cooperator is engaged in an action that has its own intelligibility apart from its linkage to the action undertaken by the malefactor, and *in se* the former action is in no way wrongful. To use the example given, should a servant hold a ladder and afterwards the thief (his master) take goods, the servant is not responsible for the latter's theft, as he could have been holding the ladder for an entirely different purpose—say, to repair a broken roof tile, an act that in kind is neither morally good nor bad (35). "Afterwards" need not denote temporal succession; the ordering of "before" and "after" are instead meant to designate the relative independence of "separate intelligibilities," namely, actions undertaken for two quite different reasons (36-37). Alphonsus gets himself into conceptual trouble, however, when he ends up using the same examples of "indifferent actions" (e.g., a servant writing an amorous letter, breaking into a strongbox, or serving as a lookout) to describe both material and formal cooperation, a discrepancy noticed by his critics (37) and which Alphonsus sought to remedy by more closely attending to Aquinas's doctrine that although acts can be indifferent in kind they are never such under their concrete circumstances (38).

Despite its internal difficulties, Alphonsus's conceptualization of evil co-operation had the great merit of highlighting this as a distinct issue for moral inquiry, something no one before had done, not even Aquinas. Over the next hundred or so years, the Redemptorist's treatment gave rise to competing accounts, which may roughly be divided into minimalist and maximalist theories of cooperation. On minimalist accounts (the author cites *inter alia* the Jesuit Hieronymus Noldin, author of a manual in wide circulation up to the Second Vatican Council), cooperation will be deemed *formal* solely when "the cooperator shares the intention of the malefactor" (42). Along a similar line of analysis, the Augustinian Nicola Cretoni held that even should a cooperator engage in an act that is intrinsically evil, if his intention was not joined to that of the principal agent, his cooperation must be deemed *material* only, despite the fact that qua *action* it is sinful. On the other side of the coin are the maximalist interpretations (the Redemptorist Joseph Aertnys is cited in this connection [39]) which pick up on the doctrine of indifferent acts to explain how *both* shared intention and exclusion of indifference (commission of intrinsically evil acts that are part and parcel of the cooperation) will result in formal cooperation. The scope for formal cooperation is thus significantly wider on this account because the latter element is sufficient for its inclusion even in the absence of shared intention. Thus, for Aertneys, "formal cooperation is due either to the end of the act [*ex fine operis*] or to the end of the agent [*ex fine operantis*]" (the words in brackets are Flannery's), while for Noldin "the *only* thing that that can bring an act into the category of formal cooperation is the cooperator's intention" (43).

Having thus set the scene through this close examination of the quandaries faced by Alphonsus and his successors (up to page 52), in the remainder of his

book Flannery details how Aquinas provides a more satisfactory treatment of the attendant issues. The analysis is very rich. It covers not only the settings where Aquinas deals expressly with problems of cooperation (or comes very close to doing so, as in his treatment of scandal—"practically any situation in which immoral cooperation is an issue is also a situation in which scandal is an issue" [99]), but also in his wider discussion of circumstances, justice, charity, force and ignorance in relation to voluntariness, omission, consent, restitution, and side-effect harm. Concerning the last, and apropos of scandal, Flannery very usefully explains (citing *STh* I-II, q. 73, a. 8) how some acts have *per se* a propensity for determinate harmful effects; even should these effects occur despite the agent's intention, they are nonetheless attributable to him as a circumstance that renders his action sinful and perhaps even gravely so (112-13). Whatever speech an agent might make to himself regarding his dislike of these effects and his intention to the contrary, his willingness to act regardless will be sufficient to place his action within the category Alphonsus later termed "formal cooperation"—unless his role, say a priest hearing a criminal's confession "insulates him from immoral cooperation" (188). Here as in the surrounding pages, the analysis of Aquinas's principles is clear and precise; one can learn much about his theory of human action from them, even apart from the issue of cooperation that is the direct topic of study.

The book's great virtue is its careful exegesis of Catholic authors (Alphonsus, the manualists, and Aquinas), its disentangling of the various strands of debate on material versus formal cooperation, and the balanced judgment shown in its conclusions. *Cooperation with Evil* is sure to become the standard text for future discussions on this topic.

Where I found the book wanting, however, is in its engagement with current issues. Alongside the standard Scholastic examples of cooperation—servants writing amorous letters for their masters, and the like—the book does make some attempt at relating to the contemporary scene. But here the examples cited are almost wholly from situations involving procured abortion. The reader can come away with the impression that the Thomistic doctrine endorsed therein is ready-made to support a conservative social agenda. Gratuitous jabs against "political activists" and "rights rhetoric," as well as against (unnamed) ecclesial documents that purportedly display "complicity in incoherence" (210) reinforce this impression. However, the principles invoked could have equal applicability for a wide range of other issues that are usually associated with a progressive agenda—*inter alia*, corporate social responsibility, the arms trade, nuclear deterrence, systems of taxation, economic inequalities, and climate change.

In a concluding section, the author imagines "an ideal legislature" that "must establish laws that prohibit certain ways of collaborating with evil" (213). It is hard to know what exactly is being presented here: is it a complete moral teaching on cooperation that would be made known to all citizens or a legal code with sanctions attached? The imperfect overlap of law and morality—not all bad acts should be punishable by law, nor all good acts commanded (to

paraphrase from Aquinas)—is nowhere mentioned. This would surely be relevant to the discussion. Nor is there any allusion to existing laws (in the U.S. or U.K. jurisdictions, for instance) on complicity, despite the existence of several books on the topic. During the last few years there has likewise been a spike of philosophical interest in complicity, inducement, collusion, and related themes, but none of the relevant works are referred to either. If Aquinas is to offer us moral principles that can illumine our contemporary problems and concerns, this potentiality will be actualized only if the Angelic Doctor's teaching is placed in dialogue with the cultural production of our present day.

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Christ the Heart of Creation. By ROWAN WILLIAMS. London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2018. Pp. xvi + 279. $35.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-4729-4554-9.

Dense and occasionally opaque, this challenging book by the prolific former Archbishop of Canterbury is rich in insight and learning, and is surely worth the read. Offering a sustained meditation on Jesus Christ, Williams's theological acumen is on full display. The book might fairly be termed a celebration: of Christ, of the traditional Christology that is incarnational and that insists on full divinity and full humanity while seeing the two in their proper accord. As presented by Williams, this Christ does stand at the heart of the faith, and holds together and informs all that Christians believe (about God, creation, God's grace, Church) and practice.

Williams is methodical in the unfolding of this Christology. It is, and crucially so, a single-subject Christology. "Single subject" speaks to unity. The second nature is united to the first in the person of the Word or Son of God. "Single subject" also speaks to identity. It is the second divine person who becomes incarnate. As divine, the Word is absolutely free, unconditioned in agency, the fully effective agent who in full intelligence and love is not limited in causing in and through what God creates. And the Word who is one God with the Father and the Holy Spirit, same in divinity, is a distinct divine person, standing in intimate relation to the Father. The Son eternally receives from the Father, and in eternally proper relation to the Father eternally offers to the Father. In becoming incarnate, the personal property of the second person is inscribed in the humanity taken up, instantiated, by the Word. And so Jesus, the Word incarnate, is in correct relation to the Father and in his human actions—

nicely summarized in terms of love—gives to the Father appropriately, uncon-ditionally. Other humans are made in the image of God, but have fallen from God, distorted the image, by sin. As the Word who is incarnate, Jesus can meet the problem of their sin, can reconcile others to God; and as related to Jesus by their faith and love, and in imitation of the Word, and of the Word as incarnate, they will live in correct relation to God, giving to God what is God's, and offering themselves, as did Jesus, for others. In sum, this Christology is of immense significance for a theological anthropology, and for an account of ethics and the true flourishing of humans as humans (made by God, for God, and able to live out of themselves by Christ).

The unfolding of this Christology is at once metaphysical and grammatical. Williams is constantly alert to the difference between God and creation, between what can be said of God and what said of the creature. There is a logic of divinity and a logic of createdness, the one not to be confused with the other. The creature and God cannot be two things alongside each other, as if falling into the same category, as if they are subject to the same conditions. Rather, they bespeak different planes of existence, different operations. Hence, what holds of creatures does not hold of God; creaturely limitations, restriction, are to be denied of God (and so there is an appropriate apophaticism in the discourse about God). God is transcendent. Yet, creation and God do stand in relation, and Williams rightly plays this up as well. The creature receives all that it has from God: its nature and being, and even its acting. Creatureliness speaks to dependence. God moves creatures to their act. But this is not at the expense of the intrinsic capacity of a creature. Rather, God as agent respects the nature of the creature, applying the creature to act in accordance with its God-given nature. When it comes to creatures endowed with will, they are so applied to act that they too act; they will and they do in accordance with their own willing—as made possible, actualized, by God. Creaturely particularity and causality are most decidedly not removed by divine agency; and God in God's effectiveness is shown through what creatures, including volitional beings, effect. This last point, not incidentally, must be kept in mind when talk turns, as it frequent does in the first part of the book, to "asymmetry." The creature is dependent on God, is what it is and acts as it does because of God. God does not require the creation to be God; hence the asymmetry. Yet, God is present in the world and known through the world. The Word is active in Jesus and known in Jesus.

This general pattern—difference; a relation of dependence; noncom-petitive—is observed in the Christology of the tradition. There is plenty of "denial" in rendering Christ. Christ is neither merely man nor merely God. Christ is both, and the affirmation of full divinity is not at the expense of full humanity. Jesus is fully human—having, being, whatever is essential to being human. The statements "Christ is God" and "Christ is human" do not play out the same way. The Word is eternal God, eternally generated by the Father. In becoming human, a potential (associated with the nature assumed) is realized,

the Word as incarnate comes to exist (and act) in a new way, without loss to itself as fully divine second person. As Williams nicely shows, the humanity of the Word incarnate stands in the apt relation of dependence on the Word. To use a term familiar to readers of Aquinas, we can think of instrumentality here, of the humanity standing to the divinity as instrument (Williams himself can refer to "vehicle" [e.g., 30] or "instrument" [e.g., 34, 39], although what follows is taken by me from Aquinas, who can be even more instructive on the point). "Instrument" nicely conveys subordination, dependence, as well as the actuality of the one who is "instrument." There is a noteworthy difference between Jesus and, say, the saints (I have in mind *ScG* IV, c. 41). God works through both saints and Jesus. The saints stand to God as animate, separate instruments. The "animate" asserts that a saint is fully human, endowed with body and soul, and so an agent. The humanity of Christ stands to the divinity as proper, conjoined, animate instrument. Again, the "animate" signifies full humanness and human agency. The "proper and conjoined" speaks to the intimacy of the relation between humanity and divinity in the case of Christ. The humanity that is taken up and instantiated in incarnation is that of the Word; it belongs to the Word as incarnate, is wielded by the Word in what the Word wills and does, and in and through the Word's assumed humanity, itself willing and doing and undergoing humanly. Divine willing does not eradicate or constrict the human willing (to think that it must is to neglect the logics of divinity and of createdness); the human willing, enabled by the Word, is real and meaningful. God achieves (grace, salvation) through the human willing, doing, undergoing, of Jesus.

A particular strength of the book is the concern for history. Williams draws out the metaphysics of incarnation, the grammar of incarnation, and the implications of Christ so construed, in conversation with important authors in the tradition, all of whom are committed to the fullness of Christ. The organization of the book is in the main chronological, proceeding from earlier to later. Part 1 of the book recounts the story from the New Testament (with particular concern for Paul) through to the Middle Ages. The early ecumenical councils receive their due, and Williams makes deeper dives into, for example, the two Leontii (of Byzantium and of Jerusalem). Part 2 takes things up from the dissolution of the medieval synthesis (meaning here the move away from the teaching on Christ of Aquinas) in the later Middle Ages, through the recovery of the classical Christology in the Reformation (with Calvin), and up to the relatively recent past. Among those with whom Williams engages, along with Calvin, are Bonhoeffer, who compellingly portrays the ethical upshot of Christology, and Przywara (Williams even, in an appendix, brings in Wittgenstein, who however may not be contributing much to the overall argument). The range of authors is considerable. Experts in a given author will likely quibble with this or that in the treatment of their author (I will do something of the sort shortly, when it comes to Aquinas). But, I think, Williams gets everyone covered in the book mostly right; and his judgments ring true, even his judgments of those who do not advance this Christology and depart from it

in significant ways. Thus, for example, he can refer, when it comes to some later medieval Western theologians who contributed to the "dissolution," to their "curious amnesia about many aspects of the earlier terminological refinements that were designed to avoid major misunderstandings" (122); and elsewhere he makes a point that is quite plausible, that the traditional Christology is difficult to grasp by those lacking a participatory metaphysic (128; 135). The overall effect of this engagement in the history of theology, in historical theology, is staggering and convincing. There is a consistency in convictions about God, about creation, about Christ, that carries through the tradition; Cyril, Aquinas, Calvin, Bonhoeffer do indeed form part of the same Christological tradition, and they get it right.

The only departure from the chronological ordering comes in the book's first chapter. Here two important authors, one modern, the other medieval, are brought forth, setting the stage each in his own way for what will follow. The first is the twentieth-century Anglican thinker Austin Farrer, whose reflections on the infinite and the finite yield the basic metaphysical pattern at play in any talk of God and world. Only in one respect does Williams veer from Farrer. Farrer had first limned the metaphysical pattern and then followed that up by forays into diverse Christian doctrines, including Christology. For Williams this is to underplay the contribution of Christology, the sustained reflection through the ages about Jesus Christ. In his opinion, it is in thinking about Christ, and trying to do justice to the truth of Christ, that theologians worked towards the fuller grasp of the ontology of divinity and of humanity, of what it means to be human, seen in its integrity and in its dependence on God. Christology, in effect, can in this sense be said to come first, in turn promoting keener insight into creation, grace, Church, into the transcendent God's work in the world. The discussions of the early authors in part 1 of the book, not least the post-Chalcedonian, do in fact lend credence to Williams's opinion.

Aquinas is the other important thinker treated in the first chapter. With Aquinas, Williams is, as the title of this chapter puts it, "Beginning in the Middle (Ages)," and Aquinas receives the bulk of the attention in the chapter. Williams holds Aquinas in high esteem: Aquinas summarizes well the preceding Christological tradition, both East and West, and offers the most methodical examination of the issues important for this book (7). In presenting Aquinas, Williams stays close for the most part to particular questions and articles. He considers Aquinas on the mode of union, turning to select articles in *STh* III, q. 2; he looks at the more speculative Christologies of *STh* III, q. 3 (e.g., aa. 6-7), to show Aquinas's concern for Christological grammar; and he does much with *STh* III, q. 17, on the single *esse* of Christ. Williams's discussion of the single *esse* according to Aquinas is insightful and surely on the right track in playing up the personal property of the Word. Affirming the single *esse* is a Thomistic way of proclaiming hypostatic union, of insisting that there is a single subject in Christ, the Word who actualizes a potential for a human form of life (takes up human

nature) and as human, as incarnate, truly acts as human while remaining the eternal Word, fully God and fully active.

The pages on hypostatic union and on single *esse* are made more difficult than they might have been, however, by the engagement along the way with Richard Cross. Cross's *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* (2002) is invoked to help in the rendering of Christ's unity according to Aquinas, but especially for his Scotus-inflected critique of Aquinas on Christ (e.g., that the Christology is ultimately Monophysite), and even for his own Christology (according, one might say, to the mind of Scotus) that allegedly avoids the flaws of Aquinas's. Yet, as Williams can observe, Cross is not always fair in his reading of Aquinas (31), and can miss Aquinas's point (20), thus muddying the waters; the Scotistic critique that he urges has been answered in detail along with a robust restatement of Aquinas's actual Christology (Williams mentions [16, n. 24], Michael Gorman's *Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Incarnation* [2017]); and the Scotistic Christology that Cross advances is itself severely flawed. But, in the end the decision to bring in Cross/Scotus may not have been misguided. To the good, they provide an illuminating foil, to show, in distinction from the traditional Christology, what is involved in a Christology that is not as consistent in distinguishing infinite and finite, and that verges on assimilating God to the universe of created beings, and on positing what is very close to a two-subject Christology. The virtues of the traditional Christology are thus put in finer relief.

Williams concludes the first chapter with reflections on Aquinas's ecclesiology. The ecclesiology follows on the Christology. Aquinas retains the teaching of Paul on Church as mystical body, with Christ as head. Williams plays up the Word in parsing headship; to be a member of the body is to be conformed to Jesus, the Word incarnate, to have the personal property of the Word conveyed to the assumed humanity in turn shared with those who belong to Christ. This goes well with the theme of adoptive filiation as grounded in the natural filiation of the second divine person. The stress on the Word in portraying the mystical body, with Christ as the head, is an interesting take; and surely it does matter that Jesus is the incarnate Word. But in these final pages of the opening chapter the exegetical basis of the rendition is not at all obvious. One would have expected that in an account of Church as mystical body and Christ as its head *STh* III, q. 8 would be prominent. That question, however, is hardly mentioned here, if at all. It is too important to ignore. Question 8 is on the capital grace of Christ, and is to be read in tandem with question 7, on the personal grace (and virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit) of Christ. It is the same grace, viewed from different angles, the personal grace required for the successful human action of the Word incarnate that is salvific, capital grace for the conveying of Christ's fruits to others. The location of these questions is significant; they open the section of the treatise on Christ that is given over to the "co-assumed," that is, to those perfections and imperfections that qualify this human, give texture to this particular human being. It is as human, perfected by this grace, that Christ

is head of the Church; and it is from his fullness that others—that is, his members—receive. Question 8 also gestures at the work of the Spirit, given by Christ, in constructing and guiding the Church. The Holy Spirit (as stated in *STh* III, q. 8, a.1, ad 3) is the "heart" of the Church, bringing members into conformity with the Word made flesh, bringing them to the faith and charity that unites Christ's members to him as head and to each other. Elsewhere in the book, with regard to other important figures in the tradition (see, e.g., 81ff.), Williams is not shy about the role of the Spirit in the application of Christ's work and the formation of the Church. The present chapter marks a missed opportunity when it comes to Aquinas's like conviction.

Aquinas's star turn comes in this chapter; but he returns later in the book (chap. 2.1), this time in a supporting role. And with him comes Scotus again, this time on his own, without Cross. To prepare for the discussion of Calvin, Williams rehearses the views of Scotus and Aquinas on the infinite merit of Christ. In Williams's telling, the two take different approaches, Scotus looking at the act (as the act of a human, can it be infinite in value?), Aquinas playing up the person, that is, the Word become incarnate. The Word in the human acts of Jesus merits reward; the Word does not need such reward, as eternally possessed as natural Son of what God might give adoptive children; the Word can thus pass on the reward to those who stand in need. The discussion of Aquinas in this chapter marks a step forward from that at the end of the first chapter: mention of grace is now made (see, e.g., 129-30 n. 7) and *STh* III, q. 8 can even be brought forward as part of the analysis. Yet, there is more to Aquinas on grace, and more to Aquinas on the personal and capital grace of Christ, than is here acknowledged. Moreover, the discussion of Christ's merit would have been enhanced by a treatment of condign merit. What establishes the equality in value of what a human does and what God gives in reward? As in *STh* I-II, q. 114, a. 3, it is the Holy Spirit, active in the good moral action of any human correctly oriented to God. To recall the example of the saints and Christ mentioned earlier: whether that of a separate or a proper, conjoined instrument, the good moral action of God's instrument is dependent on grace (and adjacent gifts). The difference between Christ and saints in grace and merit comes with their differing status in God's saving plan. Christ is savior, Christ is head of the Church, and he receives an abundance of grace suited to his calling, to his work in willing, doing, undergoing, as human for others (e.g., *STh* III, q. 7, aa. 9-11). The culmination of the chapter is the presentation of Calvin's Christology, a return to the traditional Christology of the Church. Calvin too plays up the single subject, but also gives credit to the Holy Spirit, who is active in Christ, guiding, leading, moving him to meritorious acts, and for the benefit of others. Without claiming for Calvin a first-hand knowledge of Aquinas, Williams does, rightly, stress the continuity in Christology when it comes to the subject, to the Word. One can add, however, that the connection runs deeper, in their common appreciation of the Holy Spirit, of grace, in the saving work of Christ.

Whatever its shortcomings, this is a most impressive book, the fruit of a decades-long encounter with Christ and the Christological tradition by a disciple of Christ endowed with a rare combination of philosophical, historical, and theological skill. The book succeeds in teaching and stimulating, and should inculcate a deepened appreciation of the abiding wisdom of the Church's proclamation and understanding of Christ.

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Dying and the Virtues. By MATTHEW LEVERING. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2018. Pp. xi + 260. $45.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-8028-7548-8.

In *Dying and the Virtues*, Matthew Levering affirms that dying leaves indifferent neither nihilists, who see death as a disaster, nor optimists, who expect the afterlife to be familiar. Levering's approach is a thoroughly Christian response to the tragedy of death and its meaning. He draws from Hans Urs von Balthasar (2-4), who offers three essential ways to find sense in dying. First, there is the incomprehensibility and absurdity of death. It insults meaning, undermines the whole of life, and unsettles the very permanence of love. Second, there is the New Testament affirmation that believers need not worry about death. They have already died with Christ in baptism and will also be resurrected and live forever with Christ (John 6:58). Third, union with Christ and his redemptive suffering is the source of new life. For Levering, these three angles—death as absurd, death as conquered, and union with Christ's death as the source of becoming a new creation—combine to illuminate the Christian call to a virtue-informed preparation for dying.

Levering provides a compelling approach that pairs the virtues with themes and exemplars: (1) love and Job's challenge to God, (2) hope and meditation on the nature of dying, (3) faith in Jesus and the fulfillment of desire, (4) penitence and the witness of the protomartyr St. Stephen, (5) gratitude and St. Macrina, (6) solidarity through divine mercy and redemptive suffering, (7) humility as evidenced in Jesus' dying and in our own, (8) surrender and the sacrament of the sick, and (9) courage to say goodbye to the world as we know it. His matching of the virtues with such themes and models, practices and goals becomes enriched as throughout the book he draws out insights through careful study of its sources.

In the first five chapters, Levering addresses the three theological virtues and their effects in a unique way. Chapter 1 employs the Book of Job to reveal the urgency of the question about whether God loves Job, which is especially pertinent in the face of Job's loss of family and his anguish about the annihilation of his personal existence. Levering's interpretation of the narrative of Job identifies the pattern of the encounter between God and Job: God's definitive response to the painful course of events opens up a silence through which God responds with divine love to queries about life after death (27).

Chapter 2 offers narratives that demonstrate how to bolster hope by meditating on dying (*meditatio mortis*) as a preparation for death. Christian examples include Josef Pieper, Robert Bellarmine, Francis de Sales, and Jean-Pierre de Caussade, who contribute to a philosophy and theology of death, the spiritual soul, and the existence of God. There is a vivid contrast to the Christian approach in the way philosophical materialists, such as Susan Sonntag and Oliver Sacks, suffer despair due to their denial of meaning in life and in death (31). They suffer from an expectation that their desire for eternal interpersonal communion will be met with everlasting nothingness. However, the believer's imagination is marked by the ultimate end of life (37). Christ offers a way to die well, to be patient in suffering (Rom 12:12), and to hope on one's deathbed.

Chapter 3 addresses the questions of what the greatest and most persistent desire of people is when they are dying, and whether Jesus responds to this desire. Levering compares a Christian perspective with interreligious and New-Age perspectives on the experience of dying. In particular, Kathleen Dowling Singh (*The Grace in Dying*) and David Kuhl (*What Dying Persons Want*) identify the main human desires in the face of death: eternal "existence, communion, and unity" (59). Beyond these three desires, however, Levering rightly recognizes the need for reconciliation with God. Although expressed through self-giving love, reconciliation is not usually included in such non-Christian approaches. Nonetheless in basic human experience, we do find that dying persons often have a further need for the honesty, mercy, forgiveness, and union that lead to the healing of shame and guilt and the mending of relationships. While it is common to address the emotional side of these desires, there is a need to respond to the whole person, including the existential and spiritual facets, where the God of love alone both creates and fulfills these desires through faith in Christ. Because his own death and resurrection affect the human activities of true repentance, conversion, forgiveness, and reconciliation, Christ can address our fear of dying and annihilation and our need for reconciliation.

In chapter 4, Levering shows his exegetical skills in framing dying and the virtue of penitence by using the stoning of Stephen in the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 7). Defined as "sorrow for past sin" against God with the purpose of making amends (64), penitence is combined with gratitude in Levering's exegesis. Scripture looks back in history to the condemnation of God's people Israel (Ezek 20) as well as to gratitude for them (Heb 11). Levering argues

likewise that dying persons should look back on their communal and individual past with gratitude for God's redemptive work and with repentance for sins. Looking back and looking forward elicit both gratitude and penitence. Stephen's death (Acts 7) offers an extended specificity to Christian dying: He forgives those that stone him, and he looks forward as he witnesses the manifestation of the glory of God and the resurrected Christ (76).

Chapter 5 focuses on the virtue of gratitude and the dying of Macrina, as recounted by her brother Gregory of Nyssa (*Life of Saint Macrina*). This Christian perspective is set in contrast to the atheistic and evolutionary effort of the medical doctor Sherwin Nuland (*How We Die*), who believes the dying person can be grateful in looking back and forward on life, for death, even if it is painful and grotesque, is a simple continuance of the natural evolutionary cycle. Since one is annihilated by death, in the perspective of the "death awareness movement" (82) one achieves dignity by accepting the futureless necessity of death. To counter this wasteland of hopelessness, Levering calls on Joseph Ratzinger's assertion, "Man has been made so that he cannot live without a future" (87). Levering goes on to employ the account of Macrina's death to explore how the Christian perspective involves also being grateful in looking back and forward on one's life. When rooted in Christ's life and death, in a journey toward resurrected life, human history is tied to hope for the afterlife. Macrina's example of living and dying intertwines with the gratitude and penitence that is rooted in Christ's community of sacrificial thanksgiving.

The last four chapters address several troubling and difficult questions that a dying person often experiences. Chapter 6 offers responses to the problem of suffering, especially how a merciful God uses suffering as a means to salvation, "redemptive suffering" (100). Levering draws from sources such as Jon Sobrino, Benedict XVI, Faustina Kowalska, and Henri Nouwen. Insights on the Christian understanding of solidarity and suffering are found in Sobrino (*Where Is God?*), who recognizes that there is a good and necessary form of voluntary suffering, a "real solidarity (or co-suffering) with the poor in Christ" (103), bearing the burdens of the involuntary poor (106), God's "crucified people" (108). Benedict XVI (*Spe Salvi*) affirms the sense of Christ's suffering and our calling to be in relationship with those who suffer physically and spiritually. Faustina Kowalska offers deep insights into the results of participating voluntarily in the mystical, redemptive power of Christ's divine mercy. In her mortal illness, Faustina experienced this suffering intertwined with consolation through her contact with the Divine Mercy and through solidarity with Jesus and with others in living and in dying. Finally, Nouwen (*Our Greatest Gift: A Meditation on Dying and Caring*) affirms that it is only when we admit that we all will suffer and die that we can be in solidarity with the poor and "let their dying help us to die well" (117).

Chapter 7 involves a conversation of complementary insights drawn from historical-critical biblical research (Brant Pitre, *Jesus, the Tribulation, and the End of Exile*) and Aquinas about humility, Christ's dying, and our own dying

(Phil 2:8) (119). Levering makes a case for understanding humility as more than a type of moderation operative in the virtue of temperance. He argues that God has made suffering and dying a part of the plan for salvation, because humility is efficacious in overcoming pride and related associated vices such as violence, greed, lust, and oppression (ibid.). The importance of the virtue of humility for Aquinas comes from the fact that the vice of pride is one of the most difficult ones to avoid (ibid.). The centrality of humility comes from the centrality of the Cross in the announcement of the kingdom of God. There is something about suffering that can conform one to Christ and his glory (Rom 8:17) (127). Even after the redemptive death of Christ, however, dying continues to be painful, according to Aquinas (*STh* III, q. 45, a. 1) (129), because our suffering and dying serve as spiritual training to face our own death. It is because of Christ's redemptive death, involving the New Passover, that discipleship will continue to involve temporal and spiritual training, while his disciples are strengthened and nourished by baptism and the Eucharist. Finally, Levering quotes Ratzinger to depict graphically the work of being trained in holiness and the working of the virtue of humility, through which God tears "away from us the selfish, self-seeking, egotistical existence so as to reshape us according to his image" (134).

Chapter 8 addresses other troubling and difficult questions that a dying person often has, concerning surrender and the place of the sacraments. There is a need for the grace of healing and for spiritual strength throughout life but especially at the time of death. This can be seen when Richard John Neuhaus (*As I Lay Dying: Meditations upon Returning*, 2002) identifies the difficulty of surrendering oneself to God's will as a "wrenchingly wonderful truth" (102). Levering identifies how the sacrament of the sick enables suffering persons intimately to surrender themselves in charity and to enter into union with the suffering Christ and the Christian community (136). Levering identifies two contemporary Catholic perspectives on the sacrament of the anointing of the sick, which complement each other: as an anointing for healing (John C. Kasza, "Anointing of the Sick," 2015) and as an anointing for dying (Lizette Larson-Miller, *The Sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick*, 2005). The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* highlights the role of the Holy Spirit in this sacrament to heal the soul (and possibly the body) and to grant a deeper union with Christ's self-offering to the Father (141). Levering argues for the retrieval of Aquinas's connection of the sacrament with Christian dying, mercy, and the spiritual "healing of the remnants of sin that impede our full self-surrender to God" (142).

Finally, chapter 9 addresses how the virtue of courage allows us to face the difficulty of bidding goodbye to this world as we know it, to embrace a new world that we do not know. Levering interprets both Old and New Testaments in terms of the destruction of death and the creation of new life (148). God will put an end to death forever and will make "all things new" (Rev 21:5; also Isa 65:17) through Christ's death and resurrection. This re-creation elicits both joy (1 Cor 2:9) and anticipation (Heb 10:31); the reason for the need for courage,

though, is the radical nature of the change. To explore the radical trans-
formation of death, Levering uses Greek thought (Plato), the Qur'an's prophe-
cies, and the Bible's arguments (N. T. Wright, Richard Middleton, and
Griffiths) (152-58) about the continuity and discontinuity of the present and
the afterlife. Levering confirms that divinely given (infused) courage in dying
involves a participation in divine life (2 Pet 1:4) and a communion in God's
Life, Wisdom, and Love (162). This new life requires courage and hope because
it is completely other and unfamiliar, a true greatness that is misunderstood if
we fail to consider our call to a divine liturgy of worship made possible because
of our deification. When dying, we must face human fear, trials, and weakness
while bidding goodbye, bolstered by divinely infused courage to suffer with
Christ in order to be glorified with him (Rom 8:17).

Although the virtues have shown themselves to be resilient through the
centuries, it is telling to set Levering's book in the context of the renewal of
virtue. He contributes to this renewal by structuring his reflections on dying
according to the virtues, enriched thematically and narrated through a wide
variety of Christian and non-Christian sources.

There are many contemporary works on death. Levering addresses a great
many of them, which come from different approaches in sociology, philosophy,
and theology. However, Levering's work is rather unique in the way that it
contributes to the renewal of virtue in theory and practice. For instance, it
parallels but goes beyond the approach of the positive psychology movement
(not mentioned by Levering). Although often maligned, positive psychology
(Christopher Peterson and Martin E. P. Seligman, *Character Strengths and
Virtues*, 2004) is about more than mere optimism and emotion, or a happy
ending. The more synthetic, scholarly, and empirical treatments of positive
psychology's selection of virtues and character strengths—wisdom and
knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence—bring
to light important aspects of the significance of meaning and of final ends.

There is a uniqueness to Levering's book, which combines reflections on the
virtues of dying in the perspective of Christian thought, practice, and sources.
His numerous writings on themes related to Christian dying serve his present
reflections in their depth and breadth (see ix-xi). The work expresses Levering's
expansive exposure to sources. The first of its sources is Scripture (see index of
biblical references), to which he attributes theological authority. But he also
employs patristic, medieval, and contemporary authors. His method engages
these sources to find meaning in an author and an argument. Then, he makes
the case for a stronger position that is sometimes contrastive, and often
synthetic, seeking to find the common ground of faith, reason, and science, with
an integrative purpose, fit for theological, spiritual, and pastoral applications.

Levering's book is so well documented that the second half of the book is
academic apparatus, notes, and comments. The reader may, however, be
hesitant to turn to the back of the book for the numerous parallel conversations,
which might have been more easily followed if they had been presented as

footnotes on the page or at the end of each chapter. Nonetheless, these notes make great contributions to the arguments.

Levering's book can serve many purposes, including the task of accompanying the silence needed when facing the fear of death and preparing for actually dying. It offers compelling reflections on the virtues (Eph 6:11) and on our need for Christ, merciful judge and redeemer (168). It makes a real contribution to the renewal of virtue theory in the light of the Christian life and Church. In sum, it affirms that we are called to prepare ourselves to die well, by being docile to the Spirit and by obeying Jesus' command to take up one's cross and follow him (Matt 10:38).

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God in Himself: Scripture, Metaphysics, and the Task of Christian Theology. By STEVEN J. DUBY. Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 2019. Pp. 354. $40.00 (paper). ISBN 978-0-8308-4884-3.

This book covers a breadth of topics related to the doctrine of God, natural and supernatural revelation and the knowledge of God, the incarnation, theology and metaphysics, and analogy. Given the range of available judgments on these issues, and the extensive significance they have for the shape and content of systematic theology, it is to Steven Duby's credit that the presentation and evaluation of these topics remain consistently insightful and balanced. Also impressive and laudable is the sweep of Duby's engagement with Scripture, and with ancient, patristic, medieval, early modern, modern, and contemporary sources. Throughout the work, there is a deft interweaving of biblical exegesis, historical theology, and systematic theology. In this way, the author both argues for and performs the greater inclusion of patristic, medieval, and Reformed orthodox theologians amongst modern and contemporary theologians as sources for doctrinal reflection.

Materially speaking, the book's main proposals regard the purpose, object, nature, and limitations of theological knowledge and the importance of proper speculation regarding God *in se* (chap. 1); the salutary place of the natural knowledge of God within the divine economy of the blessing of and fellowship with rational creatures (chap. 2); the formal and material relationship between Christology and the doctrines of God and the Trinity (chap. 3); and the necessity of the use of metaphysics and analogy within the doctrine of God (chaps. 4 and 5 respectively). The brief conclusion summarizes the arguments

of the chapters and begins by noting one of the threads that is sown throughout the book: the importance and primacy of *theologia*, of the consideration and description of God *in se*, "without primary reference to the economy" (193). These chapters and this thread are offered as an extended correction to a contemporary theological landscape which Duby views as bifurcating *theologia* and *economia* and assuming that one must choose between a speculative doctrine of God which employs natural theology and metaphysics (often illustrated in this book by Thomas Aquinas, but also the Reformed Scholastics) and a doctrine of God centered upon Jesus Christ and the economy (often illustrated by Karl Barth and other modern Protestant theologians). Duby argues that this bifurcation is unnecessary and damaging to systematic theology, and so he attempts to repair this disjunction through the rehabilitation of a variety of theological prolegomena. In this repair, he especially marshals Reformed Orthodoxy and Aquinas in an effort to ameliorate the influence of modern Protestant theology, especially that of Barth and some of his followers, in matters of speculation, the natural knowledge of God, metaphysics, analogy, specifics regarding the incarnation of the eternal Son, and the debates surrounding Trinity and election. In terms of triangulation, then, it seems that Duby would wish for contemporary theology to move beyond the overinvestment in *economia* and the underinvestment of *theologia* he finds in the theologies of Barth, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jürgen Moltmann, and Robert Jenson with the help of Reformed Orthodoxy, which he in turn would like to become more permeated with insights from patristic and medieval sources, and most especially the theology of Aquinas. In the Introduction, Duby mentions Katherine Sonderegger and John Webster as contemporary theologians who have sought to return theology's attention to God *in se* and who have attempted a provide a more classically inflected doctrine of God that includes but is not materially exhausted by Christology. In what follows I will focus upon Duby's understanding and presentation of Barth—as he is the theologian with whom I am most familiar and as Barth and some of those influenced by him appear to be the main foils of the book—before raising some observations and questions about some of the positive claims put forward in the book.

Duby is well aware of the structure and content of Barth's *Church Dogmatics*, and so much of his interpretation of Barth is his own. When reading, presenting, and engaging with Barth, his primary interlocutor seems to be Bruce McCormack, rather than Hans Urs von Balthasar, John Webster, George Hunsinger, or Paul Molnar. It makes sense, then, that the dominant picture of Barth in the book is that of a revisionist modern Protestant theologian. Barth was indeed a distinctly modern theologian who felt at liberty to modify, criticize, and revise his Reformed inheritance at several key junctures, and so many aspects of this picture seem accurate to Barth's theology. Finer granularity might have been possible with increased attention to Barth's own engagement with and use of the Reformed and Lutheran Scholastics (controversial in mainstream German and Swiss theology at the time); his retrieval and

engagements with Anselm, Aquinas, and other medieval theologians; his own dissatisfactions with nineteenth-century Protestant theology; and most especially his winding and frequent forays into the exegesis of Scripture. These aspects of Barth's theology seem to form common cause with Duby's argument that modern Protestant theology, and Reformed theology in particular, should broaden its array and consideration of past sources.

The book also contains learned and measured discussions of complex topics within Barth's theology, such as the relationship between nature and grace, the possibility and content of the natural knowledge of God, the content and ordering of the divine decrees, the metaphysics of the incarnation, and the place and function of analogy within theology. Monographs have been devoted to each of these issues, and Duby handles each of them well, albeit quickly and in broad strokes. As is the case with the interpretation of any figure, the works and passages selected shape the result, as does the space afforded to their consideration. One of the primary themes of the book is the nature and importance of knowledge of God *in se*, and here Duby thinks that the Reformed Orthodox are helpful inasmuch as they are "offering a Protestant approach to the doctrine of God that is significantly different from that of Barth" (8). It seems appropriate, then, that Duby himself notices and mentions Barth's presentation of the Trinity *in se* and *pro nobis* in *Church Dogmatics* I/1 (133-34) as well as his consideration of each of the divine perfections in terms of God both *pro nobis* and God *in se* in *CD* II/1 (46-47 *inter alia*), and his retrieval and reformulation of God's aseity (164-66). Duby is aware of this material, and considers such themes and emphases salutary for theological reflection, yet one wonders how and to what degree these discussions contribute to his overall picture of Barth. Of particular note is how well and insightfully Duby handles Barth's various positions on the *extra-Calvinisticum* and how illuminating and fair Duby's responses and criticisms are (177-87). Nonetheless, I find myself in less agreement with his presentation and evaluation of other aspects of Barth's theology. For instance, consideration of Barth's account of Jesus Christ as the "light of life" (*CD* IV/3.1, mentioned by Duby on 123) might have shifted the book's presentation of Barth on the possibility and content of natural knowledge of God. Additionally, while there are a host of references to Barth's doctrine of creation (*CD* III), I would wonder whether they sufficiently affect Duby's presentation and concerns regarding: (1) the integrity and goodness of the order of creation in Barth's theology and (2) Barth's understanding of the necessary place of analogy within both theological ontology and epistemology (272-79). Also of potential help in these matters might be Barth's presentation of Jesus Christ's miracles as indicating God's intention to enact the restoration of nature (*CD* IV/2 [211-45]). I would imagine there might be some disagreement even among Barth scholars in these matters, but there would indeed be many passages within his doctrine of creation and some of the secondary literature which might suggest that a different overall interpretation of Barth is available and perhaps preferable.

Another concern has to do with the balance and space in the array of presentations and responses that Duby offers. For instance, in chapter 2, Duby explores the topic of the natural knowledge of God—its origins, content, purpose, and limitations—in terms of Scripture, the history of ideas, and conceptual analysis. There are discussions of the Psalms, Acts 17, Romans 1-4, and other Pauline passages. While he considers the views of Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and some of the Reformed Orthodox, he also considers Kant's objections to certain conceptions of knowledge of God, Heidegger's criticisms of ontotheology (as mediated through Merold Westphal), and some of Barth's worries. In view of such a wide array of texts, figures, concerns, and time periods, it is understandable that Kant and Heidegger are handled briefly (although there is a long excursus detailing technical matters in Aquinas's account of analogy on pp. 78-85). The example of Kant may serve as an illustration of what happens when so much material from different intellectual contexts is presented with a particular question in mind and a particular end in sight. The cogency of the presentation and the convincingness of Duby's response might have been increased with greater attention to the intellectual context of Kant's philosophy, to the problems Kant was attempting to resolve, and to the different receptions of Kant within modern Protestant theology. Thinkers often have to negotiate between the width and depth of their engagements with different figures, and so I think it fitting to gauge the tenor and confidence of one's pronouncements with the level of attention devoted to a figure or theme. Additionally, the conclusion to chapter 2 regarding natural theology and Christian theology (126-31) is constructive and measured in its constructive proposal. In terms of space, these final points could have been expanded (particularly the first and fourth points regarding the origin of natural knowledge of God and the noetic effects of sin upon it), and some of the material handled in footnotes could have been brought into the primary argument. It would have also been interesting to hear how Duby's arguments regarding natural theology and the natural knowledge of God might differ from some of patristic, medieval, and Reformed figures he is describing and evaluating.

These concerns and worries are, however, slight compared to the many laudable aspects of the book: its range of constructive proposals, its originality and clarity, its generally sympathetic engagement with other thinkers, and its attempt to employ a host of biblical and theological sources in its reflections and considerations. The book ably raises and handles a host of significant issues within contemporary theology, delivers a strong case for the importance of attention to God *in se* in fundamental and systematic theology, and adroitly continues several perennial conversations in Christian reflection.

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