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# FROM PURE NATURE TO WOUNDED NATURE: AQUINAS ON THE EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL SIN

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IN HIS 1948 review of Henri de Lubac's *Surnaturel*, Philip Donnelly pointed out a remarkable deficit in the "nature/grace debate" as it was then emerging:

> Probably the most enlightening phase of future discussion will revolve around the concept of nature, its historical development in relation to the evolution of dogma, and particularly, the divergent viewpoints of many patristic writers and of the Scholastics. The cardinal point here will be the integration of the dogma of original sin into a complete synthesis of the supernatural order.[1]

Although de Lubac was aware of—and had read—Donnelly's critique,[2] he never did take Donnelly up on this challenge to engage in a careful exposition of the theological tradition on the relationship between original sin and nature, to complement his work on the relationship between nature and grace. It is not that de Lubac was unaware of the importance of unpacking the extent to which nature, as we experience it, has been wounded by original sin. Going back as far as *Catholicism* in 1938, he had expressed a reticence over the teaching of his fellow Jesuit and erstwhile cardinal, Louis Billot, which had guaranteed

[1] Philip Donnelly, "Discussions on the Supernatural Order," *Theological Studies* 9 (1948): 247.

[2] See de Lubac's response in Henri de Lubac, *Le mystère du surnaturel* (Paris: Éditions Montaigne, 1965), 98.

happiness apart from Christ for large swaths of the human race, even adults.[3] De Lubac referred to Billot's idea as "natural salvation" (*salut naturel*).[4] He saw it as the logical consequence of Francisco Suárez's idea that fallen nature is pure nature, with a complete set of natural virtues oriented towards a completely fulfilling natural happiness.[5] The specter of such a natural salvation for such a perfectly natural man drove an immense portion of de Lubac's argument against the commentatorial tradition's understanding of nature in *Surnaturel*.[6] The naïveté of it, especially in light of the horrors of Nazi Germany, stood behind the warnings of *The Drama of Atheist Humanism*.[7] And what de Lubac perceived as an attempt to revivify it after Vatican II stood behind what he referred to as the postconciliar "allergy to sin" (*allergie au péché*)—not that the members of the Church stopped *committing* sin, but that we ceased to *acknowledge* sin, to talk about it, and to seek personal healing and forgiveness for it from Jesus Christ.[8]

De Lubac was not the only theologian of his day concerned about a lack of attention to the wounds of original sin, or even more specifically about Billot's idea of natural salvation. As unlikely an ally as Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange also devoted significant attention to the subject. It hardly needs repeating that Garrigou-Lagrange was among the fiercest critics of de

[3] See Henri de Lubac, *Catholicisme: Les aspects sociaux de dogme* (Paris: Cerf, 1938), 180 n. 2. Unfortunately, de Lubac does not refer to a specific work of Billot here.

[4] Ibid., 180.

[5] See de Lubac, *Le mystère du surnaturel*, 98 n. 2. For Suárez's view on the effects of original sin, see Francisco Suárez, *De gratia Dei*, prolegomena 4, no. 4, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. 7 (Paris: Vivès, 1857), 214: "We should say that man, in [the state of] fallen nature, is no less able to act, think, and form judgments about what is to be done well . . . than he would be in a state of pure nature, had he been created in it" ("Dicendum est hominem, in natura lapsa, non minus habilem esse ad bene operandum, cogitandum, et judicandum de agendis . . . quam esset in statu purae naturae, si in eo conderetur").

[6] Henri de Lubac, *Surnaturel: Études historiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946).

[7] Henri de Lubac, *Le drame de l'humanisme athée* (Paris: Éditions Spes, 1944).

[8] Henri de Lubac, *Petite catéchèse sur nature et grâce* (Paris: Fayard, 1980), 94-95.

Lubac's theology of nature and grace,[9] but on the subject of nature's wounding by original sin the two saw relatively eye to eye. To be sure, Garrigou-Lagrange sets up his consideration of original sin differently, rooting it in a firm distinction between humanity's natural and supernatural ends.[10] But from that point onwards, he speaks similarly to de Lubac. Fallen humanity's aversion from its final end, he argues, is caused by a "weak will, inclined to a private good."[11] That selfish orientation of the will, in turn, prevents us from achieving without grace a variety of perfections which humanity, created in a state of pure nature, would have been able to achieve: for example, loving God above all things with natural love,[12] fulfilling the natural law,[13] or forming virtues which are connected by prudence.[14] Simply put, "man has less power to do natural moral good in a state of fallen nature than he would have had in a state of pure nature,"[15] a view with which Garrigou-Lagrange tells us "several authors of the Society of Jesus disagree."[16]

[9] The most classic example of his criticism is Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, "La nouvelle théologie où va-t-elle?," *Angelicum* 23 (1946): 126-45, though one may also point to a series of articles that Garrigou-Lagrange published in the 1930s anticipating the sorts of arguments he would eventually direct against de Lubac: Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, "Le désir naturel de bonheur prouve-t-il l'existence de Dieu?," *Angelicum* 8 (1931): 129-48; idem, "La possibilité de la vision béatifique peut-elle se démontrer?," *Revue thomiste* 38 (1933): 669-88; idem, "De demonstrabilitate possibilitatis mysteriorum supernaturalium," *Angelicum* 12 (1935): 217-22; idem, "An supernaturalia possint naturaliter cognosci?," *Angelicum* 13 (1936): 241-48; idem, "La possibilité de la grâce est-elle rigoureusement démontrable?," *Revue thomiste* 41 (1936): 194-218.

[10] Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *De gratia: Commentarius in Summam theologicam S. Thomae Iae IIae q. 109-114* (Turin: R. Berruti and Co., 1947), 49.

[11] Ibid., 54: "Atqui homo in statu naturae lapsae habet voluntatem infirmam, inclinatam ad bonum privatum."

[12] Ibid., 49.

[13] Ibid., 52-54.

[14] Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *De virtutibus theologicis: Commentarius in Summa theologicam S. Thomae Ia IIae q. 62, 65, 68, et IIa IIae q. 1-46* (Turin: R. Berruti and Co., 1949), 400.

[15] Garrigou-Lagrange, *De gratia*, 51: "Minores vires habet homo in statu naturae lapsae ad bonum morale naturale faciendum, quam habuisset in statu naturae purae."

Although Garrigou-Lagrange tends to lump his Jesuit interlocutors together under the generic title of "Molinists," he does—like de Lubac—single out one: Louis Billot. He sees Billot's opinion that human beings can form natural virtues in relation to supernatural objects as fundamentally destructive of the Christian faith.[17] If humanity could attain a natural parody of supernatural virtue, it would lead to what Garrigou-Lagrange describes as a kind of grace-extrinsicism (*quasi ab exteriori applicatum*): "as gold is layered over silver, for those who cannot buy jewelry made of gold alone," he breaks off into French: 'why, it's made of rolled [gold], it's plated.'"[18] To the contrary, without the "special help of God" (*speciale Dei auxilium*) the virtues which direct fallen man towards higher goods are tainted by the desire "for fame or glory," or similar worldly ends.[19] To be truly virtuous, fallen humanity needs the grace of God, not only elevating us to supernatural life, but also and especially healing us from the wounds of original sin.[20]

Notwithstanding the concerns of de Lubac and Garrigou-Lagrange alike, recent interpreters of Aquinas have argued that he holds some version of Suarez's thesis that fallen nature is effectively pure nature.[21] The support for this conclusion comes

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See also idem, *The Three Ages of the Interior Life: Prelude of Eternal* Life, vol. 1, trans. Timothea Doyle (St. Louis: Herder, 1947), 287-89.

[16] Garrigou-Lagrange, *De gratia*, 51: "Contra plerosque auctores Societatis Jesus."

[17] Ibid., 43, citing Louis Billot, *De virtutibus infusis: Commentarius in secundam partem s. Thomae*, vol. 1 (Rome: Universitatis Gregorianae, 1928] 71, 87, 88. Garrigou-Lagrange goes on to describe the two theses as stating that supernatural acts and habits, respectively, are specified by their principle (i.e., grace) rather than their object.

[18] Ibid., 51: "Sicut applicatur aurum supra argentum, pro illis qui non possunt emere ornamenta ex solo auro confecta, 'c'est du doublé, du plaqué.'"

[19] Ibid., 54-55.

[20] Ibid., 55.

[21] See Robert Barry, "Original Sin and Pure Nature: What's the Difference, and What Difference Does It Make?," *Josephinum Journal of Theology* 25 (2018): 1-28; Daniel Houck, *Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of Evolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020), esp. chaps. 2-4. For a response to Barry from a perspective inspired by Garrigou-Lagrange, see Aaron Henderson, "Falsely Identifying Original Sin and Pure Nature: Christological Implications," *New Blackfriars* 102 (2021): 472-85.

largely from the work of historical scholars from the early twentieth century such as Raymond Martin,[22] Jean Baptiste Kors,[23] and Odon Lottin.[24] Lottin gives this historical approach its classic synthesis. He orients us to Aquinas's context by distinguishing among three views of original sin in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries:[25]

1. An Augustinian view, originating with Anselm of Laon but given its popularity in the thirteenth century through the reception of Peter Lombard, according to which original sin is concupiscence. In this view, original sin has as its primary effect the addition of a positive, habitual wound (*vitium*) to the lower appetites in the soul, which in turn serves as the basis for our personal liability to guilt (*culpa*) for the sin of Adam.[26]

2. An Abelardian view, which gained popularity among the Porretanians in the twelfth century but had largely faded from view by the thirteenth century, according to which original sin is the extrinsic imputation of the sin of Adam to us by the divine will and has as its primary effect our liability to punishment (*poena*) for Adam's sin.[27]

[22] Raymond Martin, "La doctrina sobre el pecado original en la Summa contra Gentiles," *La ciencia tomista* 10 (1915): 389-400, cited in Houck, *Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of Evolution*, 57 n. 3. See also Raymond Martin, *Le controverse sur le péché originel au début du XIVe siècles: Textes inédits* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1930). Martin connects Aquinas with the theology of Anselm of Canterbury (ibid., 45).

[23] Jean Baptiste Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel d'après St. Thomas: Les sources; La doctrine* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930). On the effects of original sin, see esp. 162-63.

[24] Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux 12e et 13e siècles*, 6 vols. (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1942-60). See vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 493-598 on the first movements of the fallen appetites; and vol. 4, pt. 1, pp. 11-305 on original sin as a whole. Lottin's view of Aquinas will be discussed briefly below.

[25] For an English-language overview of this material, see Houck, *Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of Evolution*, 30-54. For a more focused and lengthy treatment of these specific issues, see Charles Keating, "The Effects of Original Sin in the Scholastic Tradition from St. Thomas Aquinas to William Ockham" (S.T.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1959), 1-52.

[26] On the origins of this view, see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, 4.1:15-27. He discusses Peter Lombard on pp. 73-76.

[27] On the origins of this view, see ibid., 4.1:27-29. He comments upon the fate of this school on p. 167.

3. An Anselmian view, which distinguishes in Adam between his personal sin (the sin of Adam *qua* Adam; eating the forbidden fruit) and the sin of human nature in Adam (the sin of Adam *qua homo*; losing original justice). According to this view, only the sin of Adam *qua homo* is passed down to posterity. The essence of original sin lies in the privation of original justice, which is received into each person as *culpa*, while the loss of original justice causes concupiscence as its primary effect, and is received into each person as *poena*, alongside the liability to other effects, such as death, sickness, and injury.[28] Within this Anselmian tradition, most theologians of the thirteenth century thought that all the movements of concupiscence are sins, at least venially, because the will ought to have restrained them; when they occur, the will's silence implies consent.[29]

Connecting Aquinas with an Anselmian revival that began in the second quarter of the thirteenth century, Lottin argues that Aquinas consistently held that original sin is formally a pure privation, the loss of original justice, and only materially concupiscence.[30] Within the Anselmian tradition, Aquinas differentiated himself by a more rigorous insistence on the purely negative aspects of original sin: the movements of the lower appetites in themselves are not sins at all, not even interpretively; only those movements of concupiscence to which the will gives positive consent are sins.[31]

Although Lottin insists that the basic contours of Aquinas's Anselmian view of original sin remained consistent throughout his career, he does reluctantly acknowledge a certain tension between Aquinas's earlier work, where he uses Anselmian language more exclusively, and his later work, where he begins to sound increasingly Augustinian by speaking of original sin as a

[28] On the origins of this view, see ibid., 4.1:13-14.

[29] Among the theologians whom Lottin identifies as "Anselmian," and to whom he attributes the view that the first movements of concupiscence are venial sins because the will ought to have suppressed them, are Jean de la Rochelle (ibid., 2:541), Alexander of Hales (2:546), Albert the Great (2:549), and Bonaventure (2:570).

[30] On the Anselmian revival, see ibid., 4.1:167-71. Lottin subsequently discusses the influence of Anselm on both the Franciscans (171-229), and the Dominicans (230-71). The discussion of Aquinas in particular can be found on pp. 245-71, and of the continuity of his thought in relation to *De malo* and the *Prima secundae* on pp. 263-67.

[31] Ibid., 2:582.

*habitus*, a sickness, and a negative disposition.[32] In the absence of evidence as to why this development appears, Lottin brushes it aside: Aquinas must have just been paying deference to Augustine's widely acknowledged authority; Aquinas's "hidden sympathy" continued to lie with Anselm.[33] Even Kors, who devotes more time to a careful explication of Aquinas's later texts, assumes that Aquinas simply could not possibly have meant to say that fallen nature has any wound that could not be "equally attributable to pure nature."[34]

The purpose of this article is to explain how and in what sense Aquinas's teaching on the effects of original sin takes an Augustinian turn in his mature work. By supplying information about the sources and context for Aquinas's teaching on the effects of original sin in *De veritate*, *De malo*, and the *Prima secundae*, which was lacking to the historical theologians of the early twentieth century, I will show that Aquinas intended his mature position as a synthesis of the Anselmian and Augustinian traditions. With Anselm, he continued to hold throughout his career that original sin is a privation. However, under the influence an anti-Pelagian treatise in the *Summa halensis*, Aquinas came to accept in *De veritate* the Augustinian "fact" that fallen persons cannot avoid all future mortal sins without grace. At this early point, he explains this fact on the basis of the effects of mortal sin rather than original sin: upon reaching the age of reason, every person is bound to "do what lies within themselves" (*facere quod in se est*) by turning to God; those who turn to God receive grace, while those who do not sin mortally, and so incur a habitual inclination that explains their subsequent

[32] Ibid., 4.1:265-66. For the dating of Aquinas's works, I follow Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2d ed. (Paris: Cerf, 2015), 421-24.

[33] Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, 4.1:267: "Nous pensons donc que la sympathie secrète de saint Thomas, l'orientation profonde de sa pensée, le portait vers la formule pure et simple de saint Anselme de Cantorbéry, mais qu'il fut retenu dans cette voie par le respect d'une autorité aussi vénérée que celle de saint Augustin."

[34] Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel*, 162: "Si donc il existe un désordre dans la nature déchue, il doit avoir sa raison d'être dans la nature même, et par conséquent être pareillement attribuable à nature pure."

inability not to sin. In *De malo* and the *Prima secundae*, Aquinas's increased knowledge of Augustine's late works from the semi-Pelagian controversy—a knowledge which Henri Bouillard noted in 1944,[35] but whose significance for Aquinas's teaching on the effects of original sin went largely unnoticed—helped him to see that fallen humanity has no less need of grace to avoid sin in the first moment of turning to God than in subsequent moments; consequently, the tendency that makes us unable not to sin must be an effect of original sin prior to any mortal sin. Under the influence of the Franciscan Walter of Bruges, Aquinas explained this tendency as a *habitus* in the essence of the soul. Enriching what he found in Walter with what he encountered in William of Moerbeke's recent translation of Simplicius's *Commentary on the Categories*, Aquinas was able to formulate this *habitus* in terms of an incomplete privation of rectitude, which confers upon the soul a positive tendency towards the complete privation of rectitude in sin and spiritual death. This way of explaining the effects of original sin allowed Aquinas to combine the Anselmian idea of original sin as privation with the medieval Augustinian idea that original sin wounds human nature and causes within it a tendency inclining towards sin and spiritual death. As a result, Aquinas could at one and the same time say that original sin does not change the principles of human nature, and also that fallen human nature stands ever in need of the healing grace of Jesus Christ (*gratia sanans*).

## I. Bachelor of the Sentences and First Parisian Regency (1252-59)

### *A) Commentary on the Sentences*

When Aquinas was in Paris as a bachelor of the *Sentences* (1252-56) and then as a regent master in the faculty of theology

[35] Henri Bouillard, *Conversion et grâce chez saint Thomas d'Aquin: Étude historique* (Paris: Aubier, 1944).

(1256-59), it had been an open question as to what original sin causes in the soul beyond the mere effects of "passibility," such as pain, sickness, and physical death. Some suggestions were that it causes a positive *vitium* in the lower appetites (as in Augustinian authors in the tradition of Peter Lombard),[36] a positive *habitus* in the essence of the soul (as in Albert the Great),[37] or an *habilitatio* that passes from the powers of the soul to its essence (as in Bonaventure).[38] For his part, the early Aquinas had been uncomfortable with embracing any one of these ideas in its entirety.[39] First of all, he agreed with Albert that original sin resides in the essence of the soul.[40] However, in his early work, Aquinas does not recognize essences or natures as susceptible of habits.[41] Second, he thought that original sin

[36] Peter Lombard, II *Sent.,* d. 30, cap. 9-10 (*Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 3rd ed., vol. 1, ed. Ignatius Brady [Grottaferrata: Editiones collegii s. Bonaventurae ad claras aquas, 1971], 500-502).

[37] Albert the Great, II *Sent*., d. 30, a. 1 (*Opera omnia*, ed. Auguste Borgnet et al., 38 vols [Paris: Vivès, 1890-99], 27:495-99). Albert does not use the word *habitus* himself, but he describes the *corruptio vitii* which constitutes original sin as "difficult to dislodge" (*difficile mobile*). In the Boethian tradition, being *difficile mobile* is what differentiates a habit from a disposition, which is *facile mobile*. See Boethius, *Super praedicamenta* 8 (*PL* 67:242C-D).

[38] Bonaventure, II *Sent*., d. 32, a. 1, q. 1 (*Opera omnia,* 10 vols. [Quaracchi: Collegium s. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902], 2:760-61). On Aquinas's opposition to Bonaventure here, see Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel*, 103.

[39] Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel*, 96: "Saint Thomas, as one can see, attributes a privative character to concupiscence. In this [belief] he is at odds with all his predecessors" ("Saint Thomas, on le voit, attribue à la concupiscence un caractère privatif. En cela, il va à l'encontre de tous ses prédécesseurs").

[40] Thomas Aquinas, II *Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1 (*Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, 4 vols., ed. Pierre Mandonnet and Fabien Moos [Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-47], 2:812). References to Aquinas's *Commentary on the Sentences* will be labeled with his name to distinguish them from other commentaries on the *Sentences*. Other works of Aquinas will be referred to solely by their title.

[41] Aquinas, III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1 (Moos, ed., 3:698). Here Aquinas discusses the various meanings of the word "habit" as a species of quality. Although he does not envision the idea of a habit of an essence specifically, this idea is precluded by his insistence that those things which are determined to one end do not have need of a habit ("Patet ergo quod potentiae naturales, quia sunt ex seipsis determinatae ad unum,

redounds from the essence of the soul to the will.[42] In his early work, Aquinas also insists that the natural desire of the will, insofar as it participates in nature's determination towards its end, has no need of a habit.[43] Third, all of the senses of the words "habit" or "disposition" in Aquinas's early work imply a positive quality.[44] But at the beginning of his career, Aquinas insists on the Anselmian idea that original sin is formally a privation, not something positively infused or otherwise added to human nature, because original sin does not change the principles of nature.[45]

If original sin does not cause a positive habit, then what does one call the quality of a nature resulting from the privation of an until-recently-existing quality? Aquinas's reply is admittedly somewhat vague at this point:

> There is a difference between saying "able" and "apt to". That someone is able to desire comes from his concupiscible power; but that someone is apt to desire comes from a certain habit, or rather from that which behaves in the manner of a habit. For it happens that there even exists a certain privation which leaves behind a sort of aptness, inasmuch as something is taken away which could put forth an impediment, and in this way habitual concupiscence is said to be original sin; that is, not the concupiscible power, nor again some habit which implies something positive, but the aptness itself which is left among the inferior powers towards desiring inordinately; this comes from the fact that the restraint of reason, by which they were being held back from being able to tend towards their object unrestrainedly, is taken away from the appetite.[46]

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habitibus non indigent"), and that nature is such a thing ("Inde est quod habitus ad unum inclinant, sicut et natura").

[42] Aquinas, II *Sent.*, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:774).

[43] Aquinas, III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1 (Moos, ed., 3:699).

[44] Ibid. (Moos, ed., 3:698).

[45] Aquinas, II *Sent.*, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:774-75).

[46] Ibid., ad 2 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:775). "Differt dicere potentem et habilem: quod enim aliquis sit potens concupiscere, est ex potentia concupiscibili; sed quod sit habilis ad concupiscendum, est ex aliquo habitu, vel ex eo quod per modum habitus se habet. Contingit enim ut etiam privatio aliqua habilitatem quamdam relinquat, inquantum privatur aliquid quod impedimentum praestare posset; et ita dicitur concupiscentia habitualis esse peccatum originale, non quidem vis concupiscibilis, neque iterum aliquis habitus qui aliquid positive dicat; sed ipsa habilitas quae relinquitur in inferioribus

Given the number of words and phrases that express indeterminacy, any scholar of Aquinas is forced to engage in a level of interpretation to understand what Aquinas intends here. Does Aquinas simply not know what to call this effect of original sin, or is he grasping after something specific but cannot yet find the words for it?

One way to answer the foregoing question is to look at what Aquinas thinks that nature with this sort of *habilitas* can do, and then to ask how that aligns with what the powers of human nature, considered in relation to their ends, ought to be able to achieve. When we do so, we find that the early Aquinas attributes a number of abilities to fallen human nature in the absence of grace, which the mature Aquinas does not.[47] Fallen nature can, for example, avoid mortal sin consistently,[48] albeit with difficulty and a struggle;[49] with Albert, Aquinas holds that when Augustine speaks of fallen humanity being unable not to sin (*non posse non peccare*), he is referring to rising from past sins, not avoiding future ones.[50] Aquinas also thinks at this stage that fallen humanity can keep the precepts of the moral law, albeit without the motive of charity.[51] Finally, and most importantly, he thinks that fallen humanity can prepare itself for the reception of grace by "doing what lies within itself" (*faciens quod in se est*) to know God and to act virtuously. The natural knowledge of God and acquired virtue dispose us towards faith

viribus ad inordinate concupiscendum, ex hoc quod ab appetitu subtrahitur retinaculum rationis, quo detinebatur ne effrenate posset in sua obiecta tendere."

[47] It must be borne in mind here that "in the absence of grace" does not mean "in the absence of God," because without the motion which God communicates to the soul in the order of nature by providence a person could do nothing whatsoever. Aquinas explicitly makes this distinction in II *Sent.,* d. 28, q. 1, a. 4 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:728).

[48] Aquinas, II *Sent.,* d. 28, q. 1, a. 2 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:723).

[49] Ibid., ad 2 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:723).

[50] Aquinas, II *Sent.,* d. 28, q. 1, a. 2 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:723), following Albert the Great, II *Sent.,* d. 25, a. 6 (Borgnet, ed., 27:433-34). Both texts are cited in Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 50.

[51] Aquinas, II *Sent.,* d. 28, q. 1, a. 3 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:725-26).

and the infused moral virtues respectively.[52] In some sense, they even congruently merit these gifts for us.[53]

In light of the foregoing, the most reasonable inference concerning what Aquinas thinks of the effects of original sin at this time is the one made by the historical scholars of the first half of the twentieth century: that the quality of a nature resulting from the privation of an until-recently-existing quality is, in effect, no quality at all. For if the habit which used to exist in place of the privation was preternatural (*praeter naturam*), then it is entirely "natural" for humanity to be deprived of it, as Aquinas himself says.[54] There is a sense in which fallen nature can be described as defective *secundum quid* in relation to the supernatural and preternatural gifts it used to enjoy, but Aquinas insists that one must always bear in mind along with this affirmation its relativity to an historical situation. Human nature remains completely intact *simpliciter*.[55]

[52] Aquinas, II *Sent.,* d. 28, q. 1, a. 4 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:728-29). On the idea of the natural knowledge of God as a preparation for faith, see II *Sent.,* d. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:729); on the idea of acquired virtue as a preparation for infused virtue, see II *Sent.,* d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:720). Aquinas reiterates these ideas in IV *Sent.,* d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 2 (Moos, ed., 4:833-34), where the preparation envisioned is specifically a preparation on the part of adult converts for the reception of sanctifying grace at baptism, as well as *De Verit.,* q. 24, a. 1, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 22:681), where the focus is on the formation of acquired virtue.

[53] As Joseph Wawrykow (*God's Grace and Human Action: 'Merit' in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995], 91), observes, Aquinas is reluctant to speak of merit as applied to grace in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, but his use of the *facienti quod in se est* principle suggests that this reluctance has more to do with condign merit than congruous merit.

[54] Aquinas, II *Sent.,* d. 30, q. 1, a. 1 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:767). See Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel*, 105-6.

[55] Aquinas, II *Sent.,* d. 30, q. 1, a 1 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:767). See Houck, *Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challege of Evolution*, 90-92. Jean-Pierre Torrell ("Nature and Grace in Thomas Aquinas," in *Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought*, ed. Serge-Thomas Bonino, trans. Robert Williams, trans. rev. Matthew Levering (Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2009), 169) distinguishes Aquinas's concept of man *in puris naturalibus* from the sixteenth-century concept of *natura pura.* See Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel*, 139; and Houck, *Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challege of Evolution,* 93 n. 13. Robert Barry ("Original Sin and Pure Nature," 3, 19-22), is more willing to identify the two with one another.

*B) De veritate*

As Bernard Lonergan and Joseph Wawrykow note, Aquinas's idea that fallen nature remains completely intact began to break down during his first Parisian regency.[56] The precise cause of this breakdown is uncertain, but there is evidence that it may have been occasioned by his reading (or re-reading) a short anti-Pelagian treatise in the *Summa halensis*.[57] This treatise contains nineteen extracts from Augustine's anti-Pelagian works, specifically *De gratia et libero arbitrio* and *De natura et gratia*, to which neither Peter Lombard's *Sentences* nor Aquinas's *Commentary on the Sentences* make reference.[58] Of the texts quoted in this treatise, three come to appear subsequently in Aquinas's work: two do not appear until the *Prima secundae*,[59] but one appears in *De veritate* (*De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 5, obj. 22). In this last text, Aquinas rehearses his own opinion from the *Commentary on the Sentences* as an insistence: he argues against

[56] See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 49-54; Wawrykow, *God's Grace and Human Action*, 45-46.

[57] The treatise can be found in *Summa halensis* IIIa, n. 607 (*Summa theologica*, 4 vols. [Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924-48], 4:950-56).

[58] Victorin Doucet (*Prolegomena* to vol. 3 of the *Summa theologica,* cccii), notes that while the surrounding material is largely taken from the works of Jean de la Rochelle, this particular treatise has no obvious contemporary source. In an attempt to provide some guidance as to the potential origin of this text, the editors of the Quaracchi edition point to Peter Lombard, II *Sent.*, d. 28. However, although the opening sentence of II *Sent.*, d. 28, cap. 1, n. 1 (Quaracchi ed., 1:487) is similar to the proemium of *Summa halensis* IIIa, n. 607 (Quaracchi ed., 4:944), the texts from authority cited by Peter Lombard and the *Summa halensis* are different.

[59] *Summa halensis* IIIa, n. 607, s.c. m (Quaracchi ed., 4:952) quotes a portion of Augustine, *gr. et lib.* 17.33 (*CSEL* 105:154) that is distinct from the portion of that same chapter that appears in Peter Lombard, II *Sent.*, d. 2, cap. 26, n. 1 (Quaracchi ed., 1:470); the text from the *Summa halensis* appears in *STh* I-II, q. 111, a. 2, s.c. (Leonine ed., 7:318). *Summa halensis* IIIa, n. 607, s.c. s (Quaracchi ed., 4:952) quotes Augustine, *nat. et gr.* 26 (*CSEL* 60:255), and the text appears in *STh* I-II, q. 109, a. 9, s.c. (Leonine ed., 7:307). All abbreviations for the works of Augustine as well as the editions in which they may be found follow the *Augustinus-Lexikon*, vol. 4, ed. Robert Dodaro, Cornelius Mayer, and Christo Müller (Basel: Schwabe AG, 2021-2018), xi-xxvi.

the objector that when Augustine says that fallen humanity cannot avoid sin (*non posse non peccare*), it means that we cannot rise from *past* sins without the help of grace, not that we cannot avoid future sins. The objector responds with a quotation from Augustine's *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 13.26 to the effect that this is precisely the view that Augustine attributes to the Pelagians:[60] they are willing to pray in the Lord's Prayer,

[60] The text is *De Verit.,* q. 24, a. 12, obj. 22 (Leonine ed., 22:714). Augustine, *gr. et lib.* 13.26 (*CSEL* 105:148), has "sed si hoc uerum esset, utique in oratione dominica, cum dixissemus, *Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris,* non adderemus: *Et ne nos inferas in tentationem*" (emphasis added). *Summa halensis* IIIa, no. 607 obj. h (Quaracchi ed., 4:952), abbreviates the reference to the Lord's Prayer: "Sed, si hoc verum esset, utique in oratione dominica, cum dixissemus: *Dimitte nobis etc., non adderemus:* Et ne nos inferas in tentationem" (emphasis added). Aquinas's text expands the abbreviation, but Aquinas does not appear to be aware of how much the text had been abbreviated: "Sed si hoc verum esset, utique in Oratione dominica cum dixissemus *'Dimitte nobis debita nostra' non adderemus 'et ne nos inferas in tentationem*'" (emphasis added).

Lonergan (*Grace and Freedom*, 51) observes the importance of the Augustinian quotation, but does not address how or where Aquinas encountered it. The incomplete expansion of the abbreviation provides evidence that Aquinas encountered the Augustinian text through an intermediary source, and that this intermediary source may have been the *Summa halensis*. However, this possibility raises a variety of questions. First, there is the question of the availability of this portion of the *Summa halensis*. Doucet (*Prolegomena,* cccxxxix-ccclv) argues that books 1-3 of the *Summa halensis* were complete "for the most part" (*magna parte*) by 1245, while acknowledging that the entirety of book 4, as well as several passages in books 1 and 2, were added subsequently. More recently, Riccardo Saccenti ("The Reception of the *Summa halensis* in the Manuscript Tradition until 1450," in *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought*, ed. Lydia Schumacher [Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2021], 368), summarizing the work of Giovanna Murano (*Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia* [Turnhout: Brepols, 2005], 242), indicates that the third book of the *Summa halensis* was divided into four textual units for the purpose of copying according to the *pecia* system at the Paris stationers, and that the initial exemplar for the text was available by 1245. Since the text in question is present in the first *pecia* of the third textual unit of the manuscripts that descend from the exemplar, we may infer that it was part of the work in 1245 and that Aquinas had access to it early in his career.

Second, there is the question of whether Aquinas drew on this text, a common source, or some text that descends from this text. Above (n. 58) it was explained that while the material on grace surrounding IIIa, n. 607, is largely taken from the works of Jean de la Rochelle, this particular treatise is not, and that the connection drawn by the editors of the Quaracchi edition with Peter Lombard, II *Sent.*, d. 28, is in some sense

"forgive us our trespasses," but they do not see a need to pray, "and lead us not into temptation," because they think that we can avoid future sins without grace.[61] In responding to the Augustinian objection, Aquinas signals a change of mind by simply conceding the point:

This is why it is necessary for us to ask in the Lord's Prayer not only that past trespasses be forgiven, but also that we be freed from future ones, because unless a man be freed by grace, it is necessary for him to fall into sin at some point in the aforesaid way, although by striving against it he would be able to avoid this or that one.[62]

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misguided. One possible source is the Franciscan Odo Rigaldus. Doucet argues (*Prolegomena,* ccxxxiii) that Rigaldus borrowed from the *Summa halensis* rather than the reverse, which would seem to make Odo a possible source for Aquinas. However, Odo's *Commentary* on the relevant distinctions of the *Sentences* has been edited, and it contains none of the three texts that Aquinas would ultimately utilize. See Jean Bouvy, "Les questions sur la grâce dans le Commentaire des Sentences d'Odon Rigaud," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 27 (1960): 290-343; idem, "La nécessité de la grâce dans le Commentaire des Sentences d'Odon Rigaud," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 28 (1961): 59-96. It seems likely, therefore, that Aquinas drew directly on the text of the *Summa halensis*.

Third, there is the question of Aquinas's prior knowledge of this text of the *Summa halensis*. If the text of IIIa, n. 607 was Aquinas's source, as seems most likely, and if it was available to Aquinas from the beginning of his academic career, why would he not have interacted with it previously? There are at least two possible answers: (1) that he had simply not read that part of the *Summa halensis* before; (2) that he *had* read that part of the *Summa halensis*, but had not yet noticed its significance. Doucet (*Prolegomena*, cclxxviii-cclxxix) shows in relation to the additions to book 2 of the *Summa halensis* that the *Summa halensis* was a text to which Aquinas cycled back at different points in his career. Doucet's focus is on Aquinas's use of the *Summa halensis* in the *Summa theologiae*, but there is no reason the same phenomenon could not also have taken place in *De veritate* with regard to a different text. Whatever the case may be, the most important point for my present purpose is that considering (or reconsidering) the Augustinian text served as an occasion for Aquinas to develop his thought; the *Summa halensis* merely provides the most likely source for Aquinas's encounter with that text.

[61] *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 12, obj. 22 (Leonine ed., 22:714).

[62] *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 12, ad 22 (Leonine ed., 22:719): "Ideo necesse habemus in Oratione dominica petere non solum ut peccata praeterita nobis dimittantur, sed etiam a futuris liberemur, quia nisi homo per gratiam liberetur, necesse habet quandoque incidere in peccatum per modum praedictum, quamvis hoc vel illud contra nitendo

Aquinas confirms this new opinion twice more in *De veritate*: once in his reply to the seventh objection of the same article,[63] and then again later in question 24, article 12.[64] In the former, Aquinas tells us that among his contemporaries there are two views on what *non posse non peccare* means.[65] The first view is his own and Albert's, that not being able not to sin means not being able to rise from past sins without divine forgiveness; the other is Bonaventure's, that because of the effects of original sin humanity can overcome *each* temptation but not *every* temptation without grace, and so will inevitably commit a future mortal sin.[66] In this text, Aquinas declines to choose between the two views. Later, in question 24, he embraces a version of Bonaventure's opinion, as he had done earlier (q. 22, a. 5, ad 22).[67]

Accepting Bonaventure's view *that* fallen humanity cannot avoid all future mortal sins without grace did not mean that Aquinas had to accept Bonaventure's opinion as to *why* this is so, but it did mean that Aquinas had to enter a conversation about this topic that he had either avoided or overlooked in his *Commentary on the Sentences*. That conversation centered around the work of the Oxford Franciscan Richard Rufus. Rufus commented upon the *Sentences* twice. His first commentary was given in Oxford around the years 1245-50.[68] His second commentary dates either to a sojourn in Paris from 1253 to 1256, or to his subsequent period in Oxford from 1256 to

vitare possit." Lonergan (*Grace and Freedom*, 359-61) notices this shift, saying that "it marks the beginning of St. Thomas's integration of the theory of the supernatural with the Augustinian tradition on the need of grace" (ibid., 361).

[63] *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 5, obj. 7 (Leonine ed., 22:622).

[64] *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 12 (Leonine ed., 22:712-20).

[65] *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 7 (Leonine ed., 22:625).

[66] The Leonine editors point to Bonaventure, II *Sent.*, d. 2, 2.2 (Quaracchi ed., 2:685-87). The objection that Aquinas formulates appears to be based around Bonaventure's ad 6 (Quaracchi ed., 2:687). See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 50.

[67] *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 12 (Leonine ed., 22:712-20).

[68] On the authenticity and dating of this commentary, see Peter Raedts, *Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 20-39.

1259.[69] This second commentary takes the form of an *abbreviatio* of Bonaventure's *Commentary on the Sentences*, albeit one in which Rufus feels free to insert his own views throughout, whether in the form of side comments, or at times entire *quaestiones disputatae*.[70]

Rufus discusses his views of original sin most clearly in book 2, distinctions 24 and 30 of his first *Commentary on the Sentences*. He formulates them in response to the Oxford Dominican Richard Fishacre's idea that original sin causes in us a necessity of desiring with concupiscence (*necessitas concupiscendi*).[71] Rufus asks: Since Aristotle says in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.5 (1105b18-20) that there are three things in the soul—passions, powers, and habits[72]—does the gerundive "*concupiscendi*" refer to an act (i.e., consent to a passion with the power of the will) or a habit? Since the *necessitas* exists in children as well as adults, and since children do not have enough use of their reason to make a complete act of the will, Rufus thinks that the term must refer in its most basic sense to a habit.[73] What, then, shall we say about the acts that arise in relation to this habit? Rufus is not quite sure how to answer this question with respect to children,[74] but when it comes to adults he argues that what differentiates mortal and venial sin is the moral gravity of a concrete action. Since, then, the motions of concupiscence are discreet actions,[75] how grave are they? Deliberately referring to the Augustinianism of Peter Lombard, and pushing it in an even more radical direction, Rufus states bluntly: "This [Fishacre's opinion] is not what the Master [Peter

[69] On the authenticity and dating of this commentary, see ibid., 40-63.

[70] Ibid., 47-48.

[71] Richard Fishacre, II *Sent.*, d. 30 (*In Secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. R. James Long [Munich: Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2008], 186).

[72] Richard Rufus, II *Sent.*, d. 30 (Oxford, Balliol College, 62, f. 174rb): "Nam ipsa in anima est, et tria sunt que sunt in anima. Ergo ipsa vel erit passio, vel potentia, vel habitus aut privatio habitus [Ethic. 2.5]. Sed nec passio, nec potentia, ergo etc."

[73] Rufus, II *Sent.*, d. 30 (Oxford, Balliol College, 62, f. 174vb-175ra).

[74] Rufus, II *Sent.*, d. 24 (Oxford, Balliol College, 62, f. 165vb).

[75] Ibid.

Lombard] intends, but that before grace, when a person sins, he or she sins mortally."[76] As Rufus explains, that is because all the motions of concupiscence are imputable to those who experience them through the will's failure to suppress them.[77]

Bonaventure was aware of Rufus's views and responded directly to them in his *Commentary on the Sentences*.[78] Referring to them as "awfully harsh" (*valde durum*),[79] he develops a more moderate view of the effects of original sin by drawing an analogy with personal sin. In any personal sin, there is both aversion from God and conversion towards creatures; so also in original sin, there is the lack of original justice and the inclination of concupiscence.[80] The inclination of concupiscence does confer upon fallen humanity a necessity of *experiencing* the movements of concupiscence, but it does not confer—as Rufus thought—a necessity of *consenting* to them, any more than any other vice causes a necessity of acting in the person who possesses it.[81] What then shall we make of Augustine's *non posse non peccare*? It is here that Bonaventure offers the reply from which Aquinas will borrow in *De veritate*: fallen humanity can avoid *each* mortal sin, but not *every* mortal sin, because of the effort involved in looking out for and overcoming temptation.[82]

If Aquinas had adopted Bonaventure's analogy between original sin and personal sin at this time, the positive sense of *conversio* it entailed would have forced him to abandon his commitment to the Anselmian view of original sin as privation. In order to avoid this consequence, Aquinas looked to other Franciscans, Alexander of Hales and Jean de la Rochelle, whose thought he also would have encountered in the *Summa*

[76] Ibid.: "Nec hoc intendit Magister, sed quod ante gratiam, cum peccet quis, mortaliter peccat."

[77] Rufus, II *Sent*., d. 24 (Oxford, Balliol College, 62, f. 166ra).

[78] See Bonaventure, II *Sent*., d. 30, q. 2, a. 1 (Quaracchi ed., 2:721-24).

[79] Bonaventure, II *Sent*., d. 28, q. 2, a. 2 (Quaracchi ed., 2:686).

[80] Bonaventure, II *Sent*., d. 30, q. 2, a. 1 (Quaracchi ed., 2:722).

[81] Ibid.

[82] Bonaventure, II *Sent*., d. 28, q. 2, a. 2, corp. (Quaracchi ed., 2:686) and ad s.c. 6 (Quaracchi ed., 2:687).

*halensis*.[83] At one point the Summist asks "Whether Augustine's definition of sin, 'sin is aversion from an unchangeable good and conversion to a changeable good,' is suitable for original sin?"[84] The Summist replies: not exactly, for in original sin, there is neither habitual nor actual *conversio*, nor even an active *aversio*. Active *aversio* and habitual or actual *conversio* all require a free choice of the will, which only adults can make.[85] To explain the fact that fallen man cannot avoid all future mortal sins without grace, while maintaining that original sin is a privation, Aquinas creatively applied the idea of original sin as *aversio* to his understanding of what happens in the moment that persons reach the age of reason.[86] In that moment, they must deliberate about their end. But if God does not withhold grace from those who do what lies within themselves, and all that persons can do in that moment is to choose whether or not they want to order their life towards God, then those who choose to order their lives to God in that moment "will have grace," while for those who neglect to do so "the negligence itself will be imputed to [them] as a mortal sin."[87] That being the case, there is no such thing as an adult in original sin only. Every adult not in a state of grace must also be in mortal sin, and it is mortal sin—not original sin—that adds to the soul the *conversio* towards created goods that Bonaventure had used to explain Augustine's *non posse non peccare*.[88] In this way,

[83] On the identification of Alexander and Jean as sources for the passage upon which Aquinas will draw, see Doucet, *Prolegomena*, cclxxxv-cclxxxvi.

[84] *Summa halensis* IIa-IIae, n. 223 tit. (Quaracchi ed., 3:239): "Utrum illa definitio peccati 'peccatum est aversio ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad commutabile bonum' conveniat peccato originali."

[85] *Summa halensis* IIa-IIae, n. 223 (Quaracchi ed., 3:239).

[86] For the first instance of this teaching, see Aquinas, II *Sent.*, d. 42, q. 1, a. 5, ad 7 (Mandonnet, ed., 2:1065).

[87] *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 12, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 22:718): "Si se ad gratiam praeparaverit, gratiam habebit; alias ipsa negligentia ei imputabitur ad peccatum mortale."

[88] *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 12 (Leonine ed., 22:717). For the source of this view in the *Summa halensis*, see *Summa halensis*, IIa-IIae, n. 223 (Quaracchi ed., 3:239), n. 253 (Quaracchi ed., 3:266-67).

Aquinas was able to accept that fallen humanity cannot avoid all future mortal sins without grace, while continuing to preserve the Anselmian principle of original sin as privation.

## II. Second Parisian Regency (1268-72)

While Aquinas was away in Italy from about 1259/61 to 1268, his views on sin and grace developed. According to Bouillard, the reason for this development was that Aquinas became gradually more familiar with the theological history of the semi-Pelagian controversy. As far as the evidence suggests, he never did come across the actual text of the Second Council of Orange which condemned the idea that the first movement towards God in faith lies within the unassisted power of the human will.[89] However, Bouillard argues convincingly that by the time of the composition of the *Summa contra gentiles* (Orvieto; 1259/61-65) Aquinas had at least learned the theoretical difference between Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism,[90] and that by the time of the composition of the *Prima pars* (Rome; 1265-68) he had not only become aware of the historical difference between Pelagius and the semi-Pelagians, but had also gained explicit access to the text, or at least a generous *florilegium*, of Augustine's late texts from the semi-Pelagian controversy, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and *De dono perseverantiae*.[91]

[89] Bouillard, *Conversion et grâce*, 114-15. Wawrykow (*God's Grace and Human Action*, 273 n. 18) proposes that it may in fact be possible to account for Bouillard's observations by postulating that Aquinas came across the canons of the Second Council of Orange *instead of* the late texts of Augustine, but acknowledges that this hypothesis remains in the realm of pure speculation.

[90] Ibid., 106.

[91] Ibid., 112-14. As the editors of the critical edition of Augustine's text make clear (Augustinus, *Späte Schriften zur Gnadenlehre*, ed. Henning Drecoll, Christoph Scheerer, and Benjamin Gleede, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* 105 [Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2019], 60-63), it is now generally accepted that the two texts are actually books one and two of the same work, although they had already begun to circulate under separate titles by the sixth century. Wawrykow (*God's Grace and Human Action*, 271 n. 16) observes that there was some limited availability of both

Wawrykow observes that one important effect of Aquinas's increased knowledge of Augustine's late work was that his dependence on the *facienti quod in se est* principle to explain humanity's preparation for grace gave way to an increasing emphasis on the priority of divine grace in that preparation.[92] This development makes sense on the basis of the Augustinian texts that Aquinas read. In *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, Augustine argues that if the first movement of faith is not a gift of divine grace, then faith is naturalized,[93] grace is no longer gratuitous,[94] the promises of God depend upon human initiative for their fulfillment,[95] and our understanding of the Incarnation—which is the primary analogue for our understanding of the life of grace—collapses into adoptionism.[96] In *De dono perseverantiae*, Augustine extends this line of reasoning beyond the beginning

titles in Paris in the final quarter of the thirteenth century, but limits the significance of this fact. "These treatises were not widely known by medieval theologians and . . . even when they were read, their import was not fully grasped. Thomas's distinctiveness in this regard seems assured."

[92] Wawrykow, *God's Grace and Human Action*, 85 n. 47, 210-11. See also Bouillard, *Conversion et grâce*, 149-54. Wawrykow notes (40-41) that although Bouillard received sharp criticism from Thomas Deman and Bernard Lonergan for not seeing in the term *auxilium* the existence of a theology of actual grace in Aquinas, nevertheless "in terms of the general development in Aquinas's thought on grace, Bouillard is successful."

[93] *praed. sanct.* 5.10 (*CSEL* 105:189).

[94] *praed. sanct.* 3.7 (*CSEL* 105:184), quoting *retr.* 1.23.2 (*CCSL* 57:69).

[95] *praed. sanct.* 10.19 (*CSEL* 105:196-97).

[96] *praed. sanct.* 15.30-31 (*CSEL* 105:205-6). On the Christological analogy, see J. Patout Burns, "Human Agency in Augustine's Doctrine of Predestination and Perseverance," *Augustinian Studies* 48 (2017): 68-69; Donato Ogliari, *Gratia et certamen: The Relationship between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the so-called Semi-Pelagians* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 165-66; Rebecca Harden Weaver, *Divine Grace and Human Agency: A Study of the Semi-Pelagian Controversy* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1998), 57. As an additional argument against the semi-Pelagians, Augustine observes in *praed. sanct.* 12.24-13.25 (*CSEL* 105:199-202) that if the first movement of faith did not depend upon grace, then the fate of unbaptized infants would depend upon God's foreknowledge of what they would have done had they lived past the age of discretion. But this argument, resting as it does on Augustine's theory of their ultimate fate, is hardly conclusive.

of the life of faith to our perseverance in grace until our passing from this life into eternal glory.[97]

As we shall see below, Aquinas, in appropriating Augustine's late work, not only drew on Augustine's discussion of the priority of grace in the first movement of turning towards God, as well as the importance of an additional gift of perseverance to carry a person from that first moment faithfully through to the end of his or her life, but he also borrowed heavily from one of Augustine's secondary themes: the implications of Augustine's late theology of grace for our understanding of the justice and mercy of God. If the first movement towards God in faith and our perseverance in grace until death are both due to God's gifts, to what extent does God's choice to grant or to withhold them reveal divine mercy and justice rather than a sheer exercise of divine power and will? While the semi-Pelagians believed that God's justice and mercy can be perceived in relation to our future merits, which God foresees,[98] Augustine argues that relying on foreseen merits subordinates God's activity to human initiative, even if that initiative is only

[97] The gift of perseverance in Augustine's thought has received significant attention in recent scholarship. John Meinert ("'Ne deficiat voluntas tua': A Systematic Position on Perseverance in the Mature Augustine," *Augustinian Studies* 45 [2014]: 69-86) argues that Augustine's understanding of perseverance involves both interior and exterior elements. Burns ("Human Agency in the Doctrine of Predestination and Perseverance," 67) spells out these elements in greater detail, seeing perseverance as a "complex divine operation" that involves "conversion and faith, reception of baptism and Eucharist in the unity of the church, good willing and working, prayer for forgiveness of daily failures, repentance and reconciliation after major sins, and a timely end to earthly life." Other scholars take a different approach. Meinert ("Ne deficiat voluntas tua," 71 n. 17) points out that Harden Weaver (*Divine Grace and Human Agency*, 30 n. 14) offers a definition of perseverance that is exclusively interior (although one sees the seeds of exterior grace in her discussion of preaching [ibid., 66]), while Burns ("Human Agency in Augustine's Doctrine," 46 n. 6) argues that Ogliari (*Gratia et certamen*, 77-87, 166-71) oversimplifies Augustine's thought, presumably for seeming to describe perseverance intrinsically and more in terms of what the early modern Scholastics would describe as "efficacious grace."

[98] *perseu.* 9.22 (*CSEL* 105:232), 12.31 (*CSEL* 105:240-41). See Ogliari, *Gratia et certamen*, 103; Harden Weaver, *Divine Grace and Human Agency*, 46.

hypothetical.[99] Instead, Augustine proposes that since original sin creates of itself the condition under which all of fallen humanity deserves condemnation,[100] we can see the mercy of God in relation to the unmerited gifts of faith and of perseverance, and we can see the justice of God in relation to the condemnation of those from whom he withholds these gifts.[101]

Augustine's most important tactic for isolating the consequences of original sin so as to submit them to theological reflection is to appeal to the case of unbaptized infants, who have original sin, but who cannot commit mortal sin because they lack the use of their will.[102] Though Augustine's pessimistic views on the fate of unbaptized infants were already beginning to lose acceptance in Aquinas's time (as Augustine's "*mitissima poena*" gave way to hypotheses that proposed increasing levels of painlessness and happiness in the souls of unbaptized infants after death),[103] Augustine's broader intuition that reflecting upon unbaptized infants could serve as a useful tactic for

[99] *praed. sanct.* 6.11-7.12 (*CSEL* 105:189-91), 10.20-11.21 (*CSEL* 105:197-98); Burns, "Human Agency in Augustine's Doctrine," 62.

[100] *praed. sanct.* 8.16 (*CSEL* 105:194); *perseu.* 8.16 (*CSEL* 105:228), 9.22 (*CSEL* 105:232), 11.26 (*CSEL* 105:236). Over the course of *perseu.* 9.23-10.24 (*CSEL* 105:232-35), Augustine explains this with an extended exegesis of Matt 11:21.

[101] *praed. sanct.* 6.11 (*CSEL* 105:189-90), 8.14 (*CSEL* 105:192-93), 14.29 (*CSEL* 105:205); *perseu.* 8.16-19 (*CSEL* 105:228-30), 9.23 (*CSEL* 105:234), 11.27-12.28 (*CSEL* 105:236-38). See Burns, "Human Agency in Augustine's Doctrine," 65; Harden Weaver, *Divine Grace and Human Agency*, 62.

[102] *praed. sanct.* 12.23-24 (*CSEL* 105:199-201), 14.29 (*CSEL* 105:205); Ogliari, *Gratia et certamen*, 163-65; Harden Weaver, *Divine Grace and Human Agency,* 55.

[103] See the account of the medieval development on this issue given in Serge-Thomas Bonino, "La théorie des limbes et le mystère du surnaturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue thomiste* 101 (2001): 131-66; English translation: "The Theory of Limbo and the Mystery of the Supernatural in St. Thomas Aquinas," in Bonino, ed., *Surnaturel*, 117-54. The classic reference in Augustine's work for the idea that infants undergo eternal punishment, albeit "the lightest of punishments" (*mitissima poena*) is *pecc. Mer.* 1.16.21 (*CSEL* 60:20), although the actual phrase is from *ench.* 23.93 (*CCSL* 46:99). For a list of other pertinent passages in Augustine's writing, see G. Dyer, "The Denial of Limbo and the Jansenist Controversy" (S.T.D. diss., St. Mary of the Lake Seminary, 1955), 24 n. 164, cited in Christopher Beiting, "The Third Place: Augustine, Pelagius, and the Theological Roots of the Idea of Limbo," *Augustiniana* 48 (1998): 16 n. 40.

isolating the effects of original sin in theological discourse continued to exercise broad influence. Augustine argues that the fact that infants are baptized for salvation shows that there is something in original sin from which they need to be saved;[104] since they cannot approach baptism for themselves, it is clear—even more than in the case of adults—that they are not in control of their first movement towards God in faith;[105] and since—like adults—they cannot choose the moment of their death, they are also not in control of their perseverance in grace until they pass from this life into glory.[106] Augustine confirms this argument as well with a Christological analogy: as the human nature of Christ is, without losing anything of its humanity, completely assumed to his divinity without any prior or foreseen merits, so are we—the members of Christ's body—made by grace to believe and to persevere without any prior or foreseen merits of our own.[107]

The clearest illustration that the late Aquinas had been influenced by the late Augustine's thinking on the priority of grace in turning to God can be found in Aquinas's *Quodlibet* I, which was held at Easter 1269, towards the end of his first academic year after returning to Paris and after the developments which Bouillard documents had already taken place. In question 4, article 3, Aquinas is asked about humanity's ability to prepare itself for grace. Previously, he had attributed that ability to the initiative of fallen nature, as we saw above. Now, he does not hesitate to state unequivocally that he attributes that ability to grace: "man needs the help of grace not only to merit, but also for preparing himself for grace."[108] This insistence on fallen humanity's need for grace to prepare for grace allowed Aquinas—with the late Augustine—to maintain with greater consistency the priority of divine action in the life of

[104] *praed. sanct.* 13.25 (*CSEL* 105:201-2); *perseu.* 9.23 (*CSEL* 105:234).

[105] *praed. sanct.* 13.25 (*CSEL* 105:201-2); *perseu.* 12.29 (*CSEL* 105:238-39).

[106] *perseu.* 12.31 (*CSEL* 105:240-41).

[107] *perseu.* 24.67 (*CSEL* 105:270-71).

[108] *Quodl.* I, q. 4, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 25.1:196): "Homo indiget auxilio gracie non solum ad merendum, sed etiam ad hoc quod se ad graciam preparet."

grace, a priority whose consequences he subsequently unpacks at length in the *Prima secundae* (1271). However, it spelled trouble for his earlier explanation of Augustine's *non posse non peccare* in *De veritate*. Unlike Augustine, who isolates the effects of original sin by theorizing about the case of unbaptized infants who lack the use of their will, Aquinas's hypothetical person on the threshold of reason possesses both original sin *and* the use of the will. Consequently, isolating the effects of original sin in this person meant for Aquinas not only coming to grips with the condemnation due original sin and human nature's general inability to raise itself to a supernatural end, but also providing an explanation for Augustine's *non posse non peccare* that does not depend upon mortal sins committed during or after that first moment. For if it is only because of grace that it "lies within" a fallen person not only to turn to God in that first moment but also to avoid the sin of turning to something else, then there must be an effect of original sin, prior to the commission of any subsequent mortal sin, that is sufficient to explain why.[109] In this way, Aquinas combined two questions that had been in some sense distinct in Augustine's work: the question of the first grace, which Augustine treats in relation to predestination, as well as the question of our ongoing need for grace to avoid sin, which Augustine treats in relation to perseverance.

In order to explain why people who reach the age of reason need grace to avoid sin in that first moment, Aquinas had to perform a difficult balancing act. On the one hand, he had to find some way of identifying a habitual tendency towards sin among the effects of original sin antecedent to the commission of any mortal sin. This posed both metaphysical and theological challenges. Metaphysically, it meant returning to the question of what exactly is left behind in human nature after the removal of original justice. Theologically, it meant threading the needle

[109] On the idea that humanity requires grace to prepare for grace, see also *STh* I-II, q. 109, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 7:299-300); q. 113, a. 3, corp. and ad 3 (Leonine ed., 7:332).

between an Augustinian commitment to the existence of such an effect, however articulated, and Rufus's idea that such an effect would cause every movement of concupiscence in the unbaptized to be a mortal sin. What is more, during the time that Aquinas was away in Italy, a version of Rufus's idea had developed—and gained traction—at Paris through the work of the secular master Gerard of Abbeville.[110] Rufus may have held that motions of concupiscence prior to baptism are imputable as sins through the will's failure to restrain them, but Gerard held more simply that original sin is a habit, which makes us worthy of condemnation, and so individual motions of concupiscence prior to baptism—as the acts of that habit—make us worthy of a similar condemnation in the absence of grace.[111] How could Aquinas maintain with Augustine that fallen humanity's inability not to sin is rooted in original sin, without therefore embracing the view that all motions of concupiscence prior to baptism are mortal sins?

Aquinas was not the first theologian at Paris to attempt an answer to this question by exploring the metaphysical consequences of original sin. More moderate Franciscans at Paris, like Walter of Bruges (Franciscan regent master perhaps around the mid-1260s) and Eustachius of Arras (Franciscan regent master in 1268-69) entered into the debate before him such that by 1270 the situation had already ignited into a full-blown theological controversy.[112] Besides the writings of Gerard, Walter,

[110] For the continuity of Rufus's views on the effects of original sin in his second *Commentary on the Sentences*, see Richard Rufus, *Commentum in secundum librum Sententiarum*, d. 30 (Vatican City, Vat. Lat. 12993, f. 264ra-264rb). For an introduction to the life and works of Gerard, see Stephen Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville, Secular Master: On Knowledge, Wisdom, and Contemplation*, 2 vols. (Boston: Brill, 2017).

[111] See Palémon Glorieux, "Une question inédite de Gérard d'Abbeville sur l'immaculée conception," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 2 (1930): 279. For a similar but less developed view, see Gerard of Abbeville, III *Sent.*, d. 3 (Paris, BnF Lat. 15906, f. 41ra).

[112] For the dates of these two figures, see Sophie Delmas, *Un franciscain à Paris au milieu du XIIIe siècle: Le maître en théologie Eustache d'Arras* (Paris: Cerf, 2010), 67-68. Only some of Eustachius's work has come down to us. On this subject, see

and Eustachius themselves, evidence for the existence of this controversy can also be found in Aquinas's own writings from the period. Having never before disputed the question of whether all the acts of concupiscence in the unbaptized are sins, Aquinas included this question no fewer than four times in a few short years in the works published after his return to Paris. In the disputed questions *De malo*, question 7, article 8 (ca. 1270), it is formulated as a question about venial sin.[113] Subsequently, three texts frame it as a question about mortal sin: *Prima secundae*, question 89, article 5 (ca. 1271); [114] *Quodlibet* IV, question 11, article 2 (Easter 1271);[115] and in the revised version of Aquinas's *Commentary on Romans*, chapter 8, lectio 1 (ca. 1272-73).[116] The existence of the quodlibet is particularly important, because it gives us reciprocal,

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Eustachius of Arras, *De peccato veniali*, q. 4 (Dole, Bibliothèque Municipale 81, f. 96a). By contrast, book 2 of Walter's *Commentary on the Sentences*, which discusses original sin in the customary places (dd. 24 and 30-32), survives in two manuscripts: Praha, Archiv Prazského Hradu, Knihovna Metropolitní Kapituly C. XXIII (442) and Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska 1497, ff. 134r-255r. Other manuscripts of this book of Walter's *Commentary* contain only partial witnesses to the text: Paris, BnF Lat. 3085A contains an abbreviated version of the first several questions of book 2 on ff. 168r-170v, while Vatican City, Chig. B.VI.94 is reported to contain a brief fragment on ff. 98v-99, but I have not been able to consult it.

[113] *De Malo,* q. 7, a. 8, proem. (Leonine ed., 23:180): "Octauo queritur utrum primi motus in infidelibus sint peccata uenialia." Torrell (*Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 261) observes that it is important to distinguish the date on which a question in *De malo* was disputed, the period when it was edited, and the date when it was first published. Owing to the familiarity with Parisian disputes, it seems likely that at least the editing of q. 7, a. 8, not to mention its publication, should be dated to Paris, which accords with Torrell's general preference for a 1270 publication date for qq. 1-15 (see ibid., 262-64).

[114] *STh* I-II, q. 89, a. 5, obj. 1 (Leonine ed., 7:145): "Videtur quod primi motus sensualitatis in infidelibus sint peccata mortalia."

[115] *Quodl.* IV, q. 11, a. 2, proem. (Leonine ed., 25.2:343): "Videtur quod primi motus in infidelibus sint peccata mortalia."

[116] *Comm. in Rom.* 8.1: "Ex hiis autem uerbis aliqui uolunt accipere quod in infidelibus qui non sunt in Christo Ihesu etiam primi motus sint peccata mortalia, quamuis eis non consentiant." I am grateful to Adriano Oliva of the Leonine Commission for allowing me to consult Gilles de Grandpré's unpublished edition of this text.

confirmatory evidence within the writings of Aquinas that this question was on the mind of his contemporaries as well.

### *A) De malo*

When Aquinas attempted an initial explanation of the priority of grace on the basis of original sin in *De malo*, he could have relied upon Walter of Bruges's earlier work on this same topic in 1267-68, in which Walter himself drew upon Aquinas's prior work.[117] In responding to Rufus and perhaps also to Gerard, Walter found a way forward not by rejecting the idea that original sin is a habit, as Aquinas had earlier done, but by developing the idea that there can be a habit in the essence of the soul, as distinct from the habits in its powers. Interestingly, even though Aquinas had previously denied that original sin is a habit and had rejected the need for a habit in a creature's essence, Walter appears to have thought that Aquinas's discussion of habits in *Commentary on the Sentences*, book 3, distinction 23, could be adapted to make room for such an idea, if it were supplemented with Averroes's comments about habits of nature in *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* 5.

The first part of the *corpus* of Walter's argument is as follows:

> Habit is said in three ways:
>
> First and properly it is called "the perfection added to a potency by which it is inclined to act when the time arrives," as Augustine says in the book, *On the good of marriage*.
>
> Second, yet broadly, a habit is called "any sort of additional quality that is difficult to dislodge," even as Boethius says in his *Commentary on the Categories*, that "habit is an affinity that is only able to be dislodged with difficulty, whether it is towards what is good or what is evil."

[117] On the dating of Walter's text, see Delmas, *Un franciscain à Paris*, 67. Delmas arrives at this dating by triangulating Walter's text in relation to the circulation of Aquinas's *Prima pars*, which began in 1267 (and of which Walter may have had one of the first Parisian manuscripts), and Walter's entrance into the administration of the Franciscan Order in 1269.

Third, a habit of some nature, which is composed of many [parts] is called a "disposition that is difficult to dislodge according as [the nature] is well or poorly ordered for a while," and in this way health and sickness are called habits.[118]

The first definition, though credited to Augustine, appears to be based on Albert the Great's *Commentary on the Categories*, which was written between 1254 and 1257; only the comment about acting at the right time actually comes from Augustine, and the exact wording has been borrowed from a *sed contra* in Aquinas's *Commentary on the Sentences*, book 3, distinction 23.[119] The second definition does come from Boethius's *Commentary on the Categories*,[120] though notably Aquinas refers to

[118] Walter of Bruges, II *Sent.*, d. 30 (Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 1497, f. 215va-b): "Habitus dicitur tribus modis. [1] Primo et proprie dicitur perfectio addita potentie qua inclinatur ad agendum cum tempus affuerit, ut dicit Augustinus, libro *De bono coniugali*. [2] Secundo, sed large, dicitur habitus qualiscunque qualitas superducta [P: superinducta] difficile mobilis, et sicut [P: sic] dicit Boethius *Super predicamenta*, quod habitus est affectio difficile commutabilis, sive in bonum sit sive in malum. [3] Tertio habitus dicitur alicuius nature ex multis composite dispositio difficile mobilis secundum quam bene vel male se diu habet, et sic sanitas vel egritudo dicitur habitus." I have only noted significant divergences in the manuscripts.

[119] For the definition of habit, see Albert the Great, *De praedicamentis* 5.2 (*Opera omnia*, ed. Bernhard Geyer et al., 41 vols. [Münster: Aschendorff, 1951- ], 1.1B:247): "A disposition is that which disposes towards doing something, and since a habit perfects and inclines a power towards an act or operation, a habit is, according to this [way of seeing things], a disposition" ("Dispositio enim est id quod disponit ad aliquod agendum, et cum habitus perficiat et inclinet potentiam ad actum sive operationem, est habitus secundum hoc dispositio"). For the comment about time, see Aquinas, III *Sent.*, 23, q. 1, a. 1, s.c. 1 (Moos, ed., 3:697): "Augustine says in the book *On the Good of Marriage* (c. 21; l. 40, 390), 'Habit is that by which someone acts when the time [for acting] arrives'" ("Augustinus dicit in libro *De bono conjugali* (c. 21; L. 40, 390) 'Habitus est qua quis agit cum tempus affuerit'"). For the actual text of Augustine, see Augustine, *b. coniug.* 21.25 (*CSEL* 41:219): "What a habit is, is that by which something is done when there is need [for it to be done]; however, when it is not done, it can be done, it is just that there is no need" ("Ipse est enim habitus, quo aliquid agitur, cum opus est; cum autem non agitur, potest agi, sed non opus est").

[120] Boethius, *Super praedicamenta* 8 (*PL* 67:242C-D). Walter offers a synthesis of what is found in Boethius here; the text of Boethius is too long to quote in full.

the corresponding text of Aristotle in the same context.[121] Only the third definition is unique to Walter. It comes from Averroes's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* 5, though Walter has interpolated Boethius's emphasis on habits being difficult to dislodge into it.[122]

In the rest of the *corpus*, Walter uses this last idea of a habit of nature to engage Aquinas's understanding of original sin as a privation in the essence of the soul, and to develop it into the idea of a habit in the essence of the soul.[123] According to Walter, such a habit deprives the soul of its proper ordering towards its end, without therefore making every movement of concupiscence a sin. The subsequent text of the *corpus*, along with the response to the first objection, is as follows:

> Original justice was a habit in this third way, because it was a disposition arising from the obedience of the body to the soul, the right ordering of the lower powers to the higher powers and of the higher powers to God, which was difficult to dislodge, and which was bequeathed [to the soul] in the manner of health from many [components]. But from a different perspective,

[121] Aquinas, III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1 (Moos, ed., 3:698): "And that is why in *Categories* 8 (9a8-10) 'a disposition' is said to be 'easily dislodged,' and a habit 'dislodged with difficulty'; because what is natural cannot be easily changed" ("Et inde est quod in *Praedicamentis* [c. 8. 9a, 8-10] dicitur *dispositio facile mobilis*, et *habitus difficile mobilis*; quia quod naturale est non cito transmutatur").

[122] Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum*, 5.20.25 (*Opera omnia*, 12 vols. [Venice: Giunti, 1562], 8:133va.): "Then he says, 'And disposition is said in another way,' etc., that is, the term 'disposition' is also applied in another way to that which comes to be by composition. In this case a disposition is that from which the composition of the thing becomes either good or bad, like health, which is a disposition of these dispositions. For it is a disposition that arises from the composition of members and humors" ("Deinde dicit 'Et dicitur dispositio alio modo 'etc., id est et dicitur dispositio alio modo de illo quod fit ex compositione, et est dispositio, ex qua compositio rei est aut bona aut mala, sicut sanitas quae est dispositio istarum dispositionum. Est enim dispositio facta ex compositione membrorum et humorum"). In III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1 (Moos, ed., 3:699), Aquinas does refer to the discussion of health as a habit in Aristotle's text (*Metaphysics* 5.1020b.23-25), but not to the corresponding commentary in Averroes. Moreover, he avoids speaking of habits of nature in connection with the idea of health as a habit.

[123] On original sin residing in the essence of the soul, see Walter of Bruges, II *Sent.*, d. 31 (Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 1497, ff. 221vb-222ra).

although sickness implies privation simply speaking with respect to its beginning and with respect to health, nevertheless with respect to the body in which it exists, the privation, which sickness is, and which bequeaths an inequality or disparity of humors which is difficult to dislodge, is called a habit, especially when it is turned into a disease. In this way, also, original injustice (or [original] sin), although with respect to the original justice which it takes away is a privation simply speaking, nevertheless with respect to the soul in which it bequeaths disobedience or the disordering of powers as a disposition which is difficult to dislodge—nay rather, will never be dislodged in this life—is called a habit according to the common rule, after the mode of sickness, paralysis, or disease. Wherefore it is more of a destructive habit than an operative one.

By this [line of reasoning] the response to the first and second [objections] is clear, because [original sin] is a privation *simpliciter*, nevertheless in a certain respect it has the *ratio* of a habit. Ergo etc.[124]

In explaining how destructive this habit is in the response to a subsequent objection, Walter carefully avoids the conclusion that it inclines us directly towards acts of concupiscence. Rather than inclining us towards any particular act, original sin "takes away what stood in the way of an inclination to evil action (that is, original justice)." For this reason, "original sin does not

[124] Walter of Bruges, II *Sent.*, d. 30 (Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 1497, f. 215vb): "Hic tertio [P: hoc tertio modo] iustitia originalis erat habitus, quia dispositio ex obedientia corpus ad animam et recto ordine virium inferiorum ad superiorem et superioris ad Deum difficile mobilis, quod [P: quia] ex multis derelicta ad modum sanitatis. Econtrario vero, licet egritudo quoad sui inicium et respectu sanitatis dicat privationem simpliciter, tamen respectu corporis in quo est [P *om.* est], hec privatio que est egritudo derelinquitur [P: derelinquit] inequalitatem vel discrepantiam [P: intemperantiam] humorum difficile mobilem, precipue quando vertitur in languorem, dicitur habitus. Sic et originalis iniustitia vel peccatum, licet respectu iustitie originalis quam privat sit [P: sic] simpliciter privatio, tamen respectu anime in qua obedientiam [P: inobedientiam] vel deordinationem virium derelinquit ut dispositionem difficile, ymmo nunquam in hac vita mobile, secundum legem communem dicitur habitus ad modum egritudinis, vel paralysis, vel languidinis. Unde est potius habitus defectivus quam operativus.

"Per hoc patet responsio ad primum et secundum, quia simpliciter est privatio, tamen quoad quid habet rationem habitus. Ergo etc."

incline us towards evil action directly, but indirectly."[125] This indirect inclination leaves room for Walter to say with Aquinas that only those movements of concupiscence to which the will gives consent are sins, because individual motions of concupiscence arise from the unregulated powers of the soul, not the essence of the soul itself.

When Aquinas took up the question of the effects of original sin in *De Malo* and the *Prima secundae*, he decided to follow what he found in Walter theologically, but to enrich the metaphysics of Walter's habit of nature with insights he had recently gained from William of Moerbeke's translation of Simplicius's *Commentary on the Categories*. The translation of Simplicius was finished in March 1266.[126] As early as 1267 in Rome, Aquinas had read and begun to refer to it,[127] but A. Pattin and Vivian Boland have already established that it was in *De malo* in 1270 and the *Prima secundae* in 1271 that he made the most significant use of it.[128]

On the subject of original sin, there are two ideas that Aquinas would borrow from Simplicius. The first is Simplicius's critique of Boethius's idea that habits should be defined by their being difficult to dislodge, something which forms the backbone of Walter's discussion of original sin as a habit of nature. When applied to the specific case of the habituation of a nature by the right ordering of its constituent parts, Simplicius does not think that the idea of difficulty in dislodging applies. Health does not become health only when it is stable and permanent; by nature,

[125] Ibid.: "Originale vero non [P *om.* non] inclinat ad opus malum directe, sed indirecte, quia tollit prohibens inclinationem ad malum opus, quod est iustitia originalis."

[126] A. Pattin, "Introduction," in Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote: Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. A. Pattin (Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1971), xi.

[127] See *De Spirit. Creat.* 3 (Leonine ed., 24.2:40).

[128] See Pattin, "Introduction," xiii-xiv; Vivian Boland, "Aquinas and Simplicius on Dispositions—A Question in Fundamental Moral Theory," *New Blackfriars* 82 (2001): 467-78. Both Pattin and Boland focus on the use of Simplicius in Aquinas's understanding of habits, but neither observes his use of Simplicius in the doctrine of original sin.

health can come and go, and we do not for that reason say that the healthy person is not healthy, even if he or she is only healthy for a short time.[129] Instead, Simplicius argues—not unlike Averroes—that health and sickness should be evaluated simply in terms of whether they are perfective or destructive of the nature in which they occur, not in terms of their stability or permanency.[130] The second feature of Simplicius's text that Aquinas would utilize is his development of a more precise way of articulating the nature of a destructive habit like sickness. Simplicius thinks that Aristotle's discussion of privation is incomplete, because it does not adequately account for the distinction between complete privations (e.g., death as a complete privation of life), and incomplete privations, which cause a tendency in their subject towards a complete privation (e.g., sickness as an incomplete privation of health, which tends towards the complete privation of death as its terminal development).[131] The critique of Boethius in the case of habits of nature would have its greatest significance in the *Prima secundae*, but Simplicius's "incomplete privations" had an immediate and substantial impact on Aquinas's discussion of the effects of original sin in *De malo*.

In question 4, article 2 of *De malo*, Aquinas asks what original sin is. In his response, he draws a parallel between original sin and personal sin. Where previously he had used the *Summa halensis* to argue that original sin entails only aversion, now he answers more with Bonaventure. In any personal sin, there is both aversion from God and inordinate conversion

[129] Simplicius, *In Cat.* 8 (Pattin, ed., 2:326).

[130] Ibid. (Pattin, ed., 2:329-30). For Aquinas's adoption of this critique, see *De Malo*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 4 (Leonine ed., 23:164).

[131] Simplicius, *In Cat.* 11 (Pattin, ed., 2:571-74). Aquinas's adoption of this distinction can be found right at the beginning of his discussion of evil, in *De Malo*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 23:6), and his discussion of sin in *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 9 (Leonine ed., 23:54-55). In the former text, Aquinas adopts Simplicius's distinction uncritically, naming his source explicitly, and responding that evil itself is a complete privation. In the latter text, Aquinas draws the same distinction in more detail, borrowing words and phrases from Simplicius *verbatim*, but this time leaving his source to be understood.

towards some created good, as well as a residual habituation in the powers of the soul resulting from the choice to use them inordinately. Likewise in original sin, there is the loss of original justice (which is the result of aversion, and is the formal component of original sin), and there is also "habitual concupiscence."[132] Since all people were as one person in Adam,[133] when Adam used his will to sin, the residual effect of that conversion was passed down to posterity as a habitual inclination of the will, even though the concrete act of conversion was imputed to him alone.[134] As corruptive, that habitual inclination is neither supernatural (*supra naturam*) nor preternatural (*praeter naturam*). Rather, Aquinas explicitly says that it is "unnatural" (*innaturalis*).[135] Since Aquinas repeatedly emphasizes at this point in his career that there is a level of concupiscence which is natural (*secundum naturam*),[136] accor-

[132] *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4 (Leonine ed., 23:112). Houck (*Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of Evolution*, 107) adduces *De Malo,* q. 5, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 23:134) as evidence against this view, but there Aquinas is speaking of what original sin causes in act, not in habit.

[133] *De Malo,* q. 4, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 23:120). In *De Malo,* q. 4, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 23:105), Aquinas also tries to explain the same reality by arguing that Adam was the head of a *collegium*. This view drew significant criticism from John Pecham in *Quaestiones disputatae de natura lapsa* 2 (*Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. Girard Etzkorn [Grottaferrata: Editiones collegii s. Bonaventurae ad claras aquas, 2002], 158-59).

[134] *De Malo,* q. 4, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 23:111).

[135] Ibid., ad 9 (Leonine ed., 23:112).

[136] Houck (*Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of Evolution*, 100 n. 35) adduces three texts from the Roman period (*STh* I, q. 95, a. 1 [Leonine ed., 5:420-21]; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 186 [Leonine ed., 42:153-54]; and *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 8, corp. and ad 7 [Leonine ed., 24.1:71]) as well as two texts from the second Parisian regency (*STh* I-II, q. 17, a. 9, ad 3 [Leonine ed., 6:126]; *De Malo*, q. 5, a. 1 [Leonine ed., 23:131]), which mention the existence of natural concupiscence, as evidence against the idea that Aquinas developed his views on this question in his mature writings. For reasons of space, I will have to reserve a discussion of the context and sources from the Roman period for another time. Suffice to say that *STh* I, q. 95, a. 1; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 186; and *De Malo*, q. 5, a. 1 all speak of the existence of natural concupiscence without commenting upon whether the Fall exacerbates it. By contrast, in *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 8, ad 7, Aquinas actually affirms, against an objector speaking of fallen concupiscence, that there is "also" (*etiam*) natural concupiscence. *STh* I-II, q. 17, a. 9, is slightly different. Since Aquinas holds that original sin does not alter the principles of human nature, this

ding as humanity is composed of contrary principles, this suggests that Aquinas sees the habitual inclination of the will he is describing in *De malo* as somehow different from that which pertains to nature as composed of contrary principles, even if he leaves the details as to how much more severe it is to be sorted out elsewhere.

In affirming that original sin of itself causes a corruptive inclination in the soul, Aquinas is careful not to say that such a corruptive inclination is a positive *habitus*.[137] He will allow that a person could use the word *habitus* to describe it, but he is careful to explain that this is only in a negative sense, in that the removal of original justice leaves in its wake a tendency (*pronitas*) or aptness (*habilitas*) towards sin.[138] This tendency, he argues, has its origin in the essence of the soul.[139] From there it is passed to the will,[140] which—as the motive power responsible for communicating the inclination of human nature to the other powers of the soul, and for coordinating them through command and restraint so as to order them towards the good of nature as a whole—communicates to the other powers the effects of original sin.[141] The will, wounded by malice, is thus born with a tendency to command the other powers of the soul towards acts of evil, or to refrain from stopping them when they proceed there of their own accord.[142] In this way, original sin creates in human nature a tendency towards sin and spiritual death. At this point, Aquinas does not address in detail the concrete consequences of this tendency in terms of Augustine's *non posse non peccare*, but perhaps we can allow the text of

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text explores a question of medieval biology concerning whether involuntary movements of the reproductive organs are connected to the action of the heart, and consequently whether those movements follow from the structure of the body as a principle of nature or not.

[137] *De Malo,* q. 4, a. 2, ad 4 (Leonine ed., 23:112).

[138] *De Malo,* q. 4, a. 2, corp. and ad 4 (Leonine ed., 23:111-12).

[139] *De Malo,* q. 4, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 23:117).

[140] *De Malo,* q. 4, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 23:111).

[141] *De Malo,* q. 4, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 23:117).

[142] *De Malo,* q. 4, a. 2, ad 7 (Leonine ed., 23:112).

*Quodlibet* I, question 4, article 2 to suffice: fallen humanity cannot keep the law without grace, to say nothing of the fact that it cannot merit eternal life.[143]

### *B) Prima secundae*

In the *Prima secundae*, Aquinas expresses a view of original sin similar to that in *De malo*. However, he explains even more precisely what the habit of original sin is, and how it is passed from nature to the will. In question 85, article 1, he asks whether the good of nature is diminished by sin. In his response, he outlines three goods of human nature: that of nature itself and its properties (like the powers of the soul), that of its natural inclination to virtue, and that of original justice (which is natural in the sense of its having been given to human nature). Nature and its powers, he says, remain intact; original justice is taken away completely; but the inclination to virtue is diminished. The diminishment of the inclination to virtue happens through the introduction of a contrary inclination to sin, and through this to spiritual death.[144]

If we want to understand what Aquinas means by the diminishment of our inclination to virtue, we must look to what he says about the natural inclination to virtue in question 63, article 1. Here he explains that the natural inclination to virtue is actually the result of a combination of two things in the soul: the intellect's natural knowledge of the first principles of speculative and practical reasoning, and the will's natural

[143] *Quodl.* I, q. 4, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 25.2:186). Aquinas gives the opposite views as the characteristic views of Pelagius, as distinct even from the (semi-)Pelagians.

[144] *STh* I-II, q. 85, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 7:110). Houck (*Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of Evolution*, 104-5) reads this text in light of *STh* I-II, q. 85, a. 3, where Aquinas says that original sin diminishes the natural *ordering* of the powers of the soul towards virtue, and so argues that when Aquinas says in q. 85, a. 1 that original sin diminishes the natural *inclination* of the soul towards virtue, this does not imply any positive effect upon the soul's motion. However, in q. 85, a. 1 Aquinas is speaking of the essence of the soul (from which natural inclination arises), whereas in q. 85, a. 3, he is speaking of the powers of the soul (which flow from the essence and are ordered by the natural inclination which proceeds from the essence through the will).

inclination towards the good.[145] In the discussion of original sin, it is this latter inclination that occupies Aquinas's attention foremost. Not only does original sin unhinge, as it were, the powers of the soul, but it also causes a particular privation in the will through a distortion of its natural desire.

Aquinas explains the precise origin of the distortion of natural desire in the will in question 82, article 1. Here he addresses the same question as had Walter: whether original sin is a habit. A comparison of Aquinas's text with Walter's suggests that not only has Aquinas read Walter's text, but he has also used it as the base text for his own, and edited what Walter wrote in light of what he had gained from Simplicius: he carefully removes all the references to Boethius's *difficile mobile*; he consequently removes the related idea that a habit of nature needs to remain for a long time; and, most importantly, he introduces the idea of original sin as a corruptive habit along the lines of Simplicius's incomplete privation. The removal of references to the *difficile mobile* criterion and the length of time that a habit needs to remain occurs in the *corpus*, while the introduction of the idea of original sin as a corruptive habit vis-à-vis Simplicius's incomplete privations occurs in the response to the first objection. In the *corpus*, the reader will note that there are only two kinds of habits, instead of Walter's three, since the reference to Boethius has been removed, as has Walter's interpolation of Boethius's *difficile mobile* from Averroes's definition of a habit. In the response to the first objection, Aquinas's description of corruptive habits is a new composition, which adds to what was present in Walter.

Habit is twofold. There is one whereby a potency is inclined to act, just as different forms of knowledge and the virtues are called habits. And in this way original sin is not a habit. In another way, habit is called a disposition of some

[145] *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 6:406-7). In *De Virtut. in Comm.*, a. 8 (*Quaestiones disputatae*, vol. 2 [Turin: Marietti, 1965], 727-28), Aquinas reiterates what he says in *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 1, and also speaks more expansively about inclinations to virtue in other powers of the soul.

nature composed of many [components], according as it is well or poorly disposed towards something, and especially when such a disposition concerns nature, as is clear in the cases of sickness and health. And in this way original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition arising from the dissolution of the harmony in which the *ratio* of original justice used to consist, just as bodily sickness is also an inordinate disposition of the body, according as the equality in which the *ratio* of its health consists is dissolved. This is why original sin is called a disease of nature.

Against the first objection, we should say that, just as bodily sickness has something of privation, inasmuch as the equality of health is taken away, and something of a positive [nature] (namely, the inordinately disposed humors themselves), so also original sin has the privation of original justice, and with this an inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. *That is why it is not a pure privation, but is a kind of corrupt habit*.[146]

By explicitly denying that original sin is a pure privation, Aquinas uses the language of Simplicius to move significantly beyond the conception of original sin in his early work. Where in his early work Aquinas was insistent that original sin is a pure privation, here he uses Simplicius's understanding of incomplete privations to endorse Walter's view that original sin is in fact a kind of habit, which results from the dissolution of regulating order in the powers of the soul, and which causes a tendency in nature towards sin and spiritual death. In fact, he even goes so far as to say that the habit of original sin can be considered an "acquired" habit in nature, in view of the fact that Adam's

[146] *STh* I-II, q. 82, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 7:94) (emphasis added): "Duplex est habitus. Unus quidem quo inclinatur potentia ad agendum, sicut scientiae et virtutes habitus dicuntur. Et hoc modo peccatum originale non est habitus. Alio modo dicitur habitus dispositio alicuius naturae ex multis compositae, secundum quam bene se habet vel male ad aliquid, et praecipue cum talis dispositio versa fuerit quasi in naturam, ut patet de aegritudine et sanitate. Et hoc modo peccatum originale est habitus. Est enim quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis iustitiae, sicut etiam aegritudo corporalis est quaedam inordinata dispositio corporis, secundum quam solvitur aequalitas in qua consistit ratio sanitatis. Unde peccatum originale languor naturae dicitur.

"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut aegritudo corporalis habet aliquid de privatione, inquantum tollitur aequalitas sanitatis; et aliquid habet positive, scilicet ipsos humores inordinate dispositos, ita etiam peccatum originale habet privationem originalis iustitiae, et cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animae. *Unde non est privatio pura, sed est quidam habitus corruptus.*"

choice acquired the habit for nature, parallel to the way in which our own personal choices acquire personal habits for ourselves.[147] This allows Aquinas to synthesize the Anselmian and Augustinian traditions in a way that no theologian—including Aquinas—had yet been able to do. He could maintain vis-à-vis Anselm that original sin is a privation in the essence of the soul more consistently than Walter, and yet affirm with Augustine that it also confers a corruptive habit upon fallen nature, which alone is sufficient to explain fallen humanity's inability not to sin.

Aquinas thinks that original sin, as a corruptive habit of nature, has an effect on the way in which nature operates at every level. In the *Prima secundae*, he teaches that the operations of human nature have their ultimate origin in God, who simultaneously confers—in every moment of the soul's existence—being and motion upon it.[148] The soul's being is contracted by its nature into *human* being; the soul's motion is directed by its nature into human natural desire.[149] The soul's natural desire, in turn, is passed to the will, which—as a power flowing from and subordinate to nature—seeks the good of nature as a whole according to the character of the motion which nature bestows upon it,[150] as well as the will's own particular good according to the character of the will's habituation.[151] Since the will, in turn, has command of the free acts of other powers of the soul,[152] the character of both its natural inclination (which it receives from nature) and its habituation (which is caused by its own choices) affects the way that the other powers of the soul operate as well. In this

[147] *STh* I-II, q. 82, a. 1, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 7:94).

[148] *STh* I-II, q. 9, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 6:82). On the structure of natural desire in the *Prima secundae*, see Jacob Wood, *To Stir a Restless Heart: Thomas Aquinas and Henri de Lubac on Nature, Grace, and the Desire for God* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019), 326-31.

[149] On this aspect of natural desire, see *STh* I-II, q. 10, a. 1, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 6:83).

[150] *STh* I-II, q. 9, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 6:77-78).

[151] *STh* I-II, q. 6, a. 4, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 6:60).

[152] *STh* I-II, q. 17, aa. 6-7 (Leonine ed., 6:122-23).

context, for Aquinas to say that original sin is a corruptive habit in nature means that—without changing *what human nature is*—it corrupts the pattern according to which motion is received in the essence of the soul from God, the manner in which that motion is mediated from nature to the will,[153] and the manner in which that motion passes from the will to the other powers of the soul in their free actions. In question 85, article 3 he names four wounds in the powers of the soul that result from this corruption: ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, concupiscence in the concupiscible appetite, and irascibility in the irascible appetite. Each of these wounds can be exacerbated by personal sin, but they are all caused by original sin.[154] As a result of them, the fallen person is—precisely as a result of *original* sin—liable to the same kinds of consequences as Aquinas attributed to *mortal* sin in *De veritate*: without grace, he or she cannot avoid all future mortal sins,[155] keep the commandments consistently,[156] or prepare for grace.[157] Additionally, Aquinas emphasizes that, because of these effects of original sin, both before and after the reception of the first grace the fallen person possesses an ongoing need for divine assistance to persevere in grace until his or her passing from this life into eternal glory.[158] This insight ultimately brings Aquinas full circle regarding the idea expressed in Augustine's *De gratia*

[153] *STh* I-II, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 7:110).

[154] *STh* I-II, q. 85, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 7:112-13).

[155] *STh* I-II, q. 109, a. 8 (Leonine ed., 7:303).

[156] *STh* I-II, q. 109, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 7:297).

[157] *STh* I-II, q. 109, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 7:299-300). See also Aquinas's denial that a person can merit the first grace for himself or herself in *STh* I-II, q. 114, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 7:350), where he refers directly to the portion of *retr.* quoted in *praed. sanct.* 3.7 (*CSEL* 105:184), concerning which see above, n. 94.

[158] *STh* I-II, q. 109, aa. 8-9 (Leonine ed., 7:302-3, 307-8). See also *STh* I-II, q. 114, a. 9 (Leonine ed., 7:353-54). For a discussion of the importance of these texts, see Shawn Colberg, "Development in Aquinas's Theology of Grace and the Role of Saint Augustine," *Biblica et patristica thoruniensa* 12 (2019): 271-87; Wawrykow, *God's Grace and Human Action*, 172, 227-28; Joseph Wawrykow, "'Perseverance' in 13th Century Theology: The Augustinian Contribution," *Augustinian Studies* 22 (1991): 125-40.

*et libero arbitrio* 13.26 that it is because of the wounds of original sin that we need to pray in the Lord's Prayer, "And lead us not into temptation." The idea bookends Aquinas's discussion of fallen humanity's need for grace to avoid sin and to persevere in *STh* I-II, question 109, articles 8 and 9: it serves both as the basis of the *sed contra* of article 8, where another anti-Pelagian text of Augustine is quoted to express the same idea even more succinctly,[159] and as the concluding thought in the *corpus* of article 9, where by this time Aquinas has absorbed the point to the extent that he expresses it as his own.[160] In this way, Aquinas completes his Anselmian-Augustinian synthesis in the *Prima secundae* under the influence of Walter of Bruges and Simplicius. The powers of the fallen soul are not merely deprived of original grace and original justice, they are also wounded by original sin through the introduction of a corruptive habit which personal sins only make worse. This corruptive habit is responsible prior to baptism for the fact that we need grace to avoid sin even in the first moment of turning to God, and it is responsible after baptism for the fact that we need an additional gift of perseverance in order to depart this life in grace and so be received into heavenly glory.

## Conclusion

By recovering the context in which Aquinas developed his mature thinking on the effects of original sin, it becomes possible for us to see how he brought together two ideas which most scholars—even in his own day—have considered to be incompatible: the Anselmian idea that original sin is formally a privation of original justice, and the Augustinian idea that original sin is a habit, which confers upon human nature a tendency towards sin and spiritual death. The idea of original sin as a privation of original justice was with Aquinas from the

[159] *STh* I-II, q. 109, a. 8, s.c. (Leonine ed., 7:303). The text is the very end of *perf. Iust.*: *perf. Iust.* 21.44 (*CSEL* 42:48).

[160] *STh* I-II, q. 109, a. 9 (Leonine ed., 7:308).

beginning of his theological career through the influence of Anselm. The idea that the wounds of original sin are alone sufficient to explain humanity's inability not to sin was suggested to him by Augustine's *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and *De dono perseverantiae* during his Italian period. The explanation of this inability not to sin on the basis of a habit of nature was suggested to him by Walter of Bruges in his second Parisian period. And the formulation of this habit of nature as an incomplete privation which causes a tendency towards the complete privation of sin and spiritual death was something he creatively drew from Simplicius's *Commentary on the Categories* during his second Parisian period as well. Taken together, the move from original sin as privation to original sin as privation *and* habit was prompted by Aquinas's increasing knowledge of the Pelagian and semi-Pelagian controversies, as well as his use of contemporary sources to explain how fallen humanity, in the first moment of turning to God as well as its entire journey from grace in this life to glory in the next, needs the assistance of divine grace.

The recovery of the context for Aquinas's mature work on the effects of original sin helps us to see how Aquinas ultimately preserved two sets of important theological goods as his career—and his theological contemplation—advanced. The first set we may call the "humanistic" goods. These are the goods rooted in the goodness of human nature as one of God's creatures, and especially as made in the image of God. Such goods include the fact that original sin does not destroy the primary principles of human nature (its soul, its body, or its powers), that God does not add any negative quality to human nature as a punishment for original sin, and that—even in fallen nature—not every movement of concupiscence is a sin. The second set of goods we may call the "Augustinian," or perhaps more properly, "anti-Pelagian" goods. Such goods include the fact that original sin wounds human nature and its powers, that—though a privation—it creates a tendency in wounded nature towards sin and spiritual death, and that fallen nature's struggle with concupiscence creates in us a need for the healing grace of Jesus Christ in order to live a life free of mortal sin,

and so to persevere to the point of arriving at heavenly glory. On the one hand, "God saw all that he had made and behold it was very good" (Gen 1:31); and on the other, "Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick" (Mark 2:17).

The preservation of both the humanistic and the anti-Pelagian goods in the doctrine of original sin will present some challenges to contemporary scholarship. The idea that the mature Aquinas thinks that fallen human persons exist in a state of pure nature is difficult to maintain in light of the fact that the mature Aquinas thinks that original sin introduces a corruptive habit into human nature. We may add to this the observation that, because of this corruptive habit, the mature Aquinas thinks that fallen human nature cannot perform a variety of activities which it would seem that the powers of human nature, unaided by grace, ought to be able to accomplish, such as keeping the natural law and avoiding all future mortal sins. In fact, there *was* a contemporary of Aquinas who thought that human nature was naturally subject to defects like this: his student, Giles of Rome. Giles, and the Aegidian tradition which developed from him, struggled for centuries to balance this more extreme, anti-Pelagian position with the humanistic goods mentioned above. If humanity cannot avoid all future mortal sins without the gift of original justice, is not God somehow *bound* to give that gift to us, lest humanity have been made "not only avertible, but already averse" from God?[161]

Of course, the purpose of inquiring into the wounds of original sin is not to be pessimistic about human nature. It is, as Augustine, Aquinas, de Lubac, and Garrigou-Lagrange all recognized, the other side of the good news of the Gospel. In the Gospel of John, Christ proclaims, "I have said these things to you, that in me you may have peace. In the world you will have

[161] Giles of Rome, II *Sent.*, d. 31, q. 1, a. 1 (*Commentarius in Secundum Sententiarum*, 2 vols. [Venice, 1581], 2:443 Ad-Ba), quoted in Wood, *To Stir a Restless Heart*, 371: "Si fuisset creatus in puris naturalibus, quia haberet necessitatem se avertendi, deberet dici creatus non solum avertibilis, sed aversus."

tribulation. But take heart; I have overcome the world" (John 16:33). And as *Lumen Gentium*, notes, that victory is not something that Christ keeps to himself:

> Christ, becoming obedient even unto death and because of this exalted by the Father, entered into the glory of His kingdom. To Him all things are made subject until He subjects Himself and all created things to the Father that God may be all in all. Now Christ has communicated this royal power to His disciples that they might be constituted in royal freedom and that by true penance and a holy life they might conquer the reign of sin in themselves. Further, He has shared this power so that serving Christ in their fellow men they might by humility and patience lead their brethren to that King for whom to serve is to reign.[162]

Aquinas anticipates *Lumen Gentium* in his discussion of why it is that, if humanity has been wounded by original sin, baptism does not take away that wound. His answer is twofold. First, although baptism does not take away concupiscence, it does reduce it.[163] Second, although we cannot of ourselves overcome concupiscence, the life of grace, the infused virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit strengthen and empower us so that, by cooperating with Christ, whose grace precedes and establishes our every merit, we may receive the "crown of victory" with him.[164] As Augustine taught all the members of the Thomistic tradition, that crown is not something that fallen human persons can win for ourselves, but it is something that Jesus Christ wants to win in us. So we must follow Aquinas on the journey of humility, which moves from thinking of fallen nature as pure to thinking of fallen nature as wounded, so that in our scholarship and in our actions we may be well disposed not only to the reception of the elevating effects of Christ's grace, but also and especially to the much-needed healing effects of his grace.[165]

[162] *Lumen Gentium* 36.

[163] *STh* III, q. 69, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 12:109).

[164] *STh* III, q. 69, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 12:108).

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# THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN COGNITION AND EMOTION

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SCHOLARLY interpretations of Thomas Aquinas on the relation between cognition and emotion are divided along cognitive and noncognitive lines.[1] Some scholars think that Thomistic emotions are noncognitive, purely conative impulses: "Aquinas's account of emotion," William Lyons writes, is "in terms of impulses or desires, and the accompanying physiological changes and feelings, rather than in terms of cognitive evaluations."[2] While cognitions cause and sustain emotions,

[1] Two clarifications are in order. (1) *Cognitio* is the Latin term referring to both higher-order and lower-order thoughts. It covers everything from beliefs and judgments based on syllogistic reasoning to perception. (2) I translate *passio animae* as "emotion" in large part because this is how many of the scholars I am engaging with choose to translate it (e.g., Peter King, "Emotions," in *Oxford Handbook of Aquinas,* ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump [New York: Oxford University Press, 2012]; Martin Pickavé, "On the Intentionality of the Emotions (and of Other Appetitive Acts)," *Quaestio* 10 [2010]: 45-63; Diana Fritz Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry* [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009]; Mark Drost, "Intentionality in Aquinas's Theory of Emotions," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 31 [1991]: 449-60; William Lyons, *Emotion* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980]). For a defense of this choice of translation, see Craig Steven Titus, "Passions in Christ: Spontaneity, Development, and Virtue," *The Thomist* 73 (2009): 53-87; and Nicholas Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 224-29; for a dissenting perspective, see John Dryden, "Passions, Affections, and Emotions: Methodological Difficulties in Reconstructing Aquinas's Philosophical Psychology," *Literature Compass* 13 (2016): 343-50; and Stephen Chanderbhan, "The Shifting Prominence of Emotions in the Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," *Diametros* 38 (2013): 62-85.

[2] Lyons, *Emotion*, 36.

they are not constituent parts of emotions. I label any reading of Aquinas that denies cognition a constituent part in Thomistic emotions a *noncognitive* reading. Other scholars, by contrast, argue that Thomistic emotions are, or essentially involve, certain types of cognition. "Since emotions are attitudinal responses of the sensory orexis [i.e., sensory appetite] either to objects intended as simple goods or evils or to objects intended as complex goods or evils," Mark Drost argues, "the emotions have a cognitive component in them."[3] On this reading, an emotion has three parts: eliciting and sustaining cognition, appetitive movement, and physiological change. I label any reading that affords cognition a constituent role in Thomistic emotions a *cognitive* reading.

Despite the profound difference between these two readings, little has been done to bring them into conversation with one another.[4] This is surprising because the debate has ramifications

[3] Drost, "Intentionality in Aquinas's Theory of Emotions," 453.

[4] The book-length treatments of Aquinas's account of the emotions by Robert Miner (*Thomas Aquinas on the Passions* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009]) and Lombardo (*The Logic of Desire*) largely ignore the issue of cognition in Aquinas's account of emotion. Cates devotes one footnote to the issue in *Aquinas on the Emotions*. Simo Knuuttila (*Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* [New York: Oxford University Press, 2004]), Paul Gondreau (*The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* [Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2003]), and Susan James (*Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997]) all neglect this issue when discussing Aquinas. Article-length discussions also tend to overlook the issue of cognitive versus noncognitive readings (for example, Stewart Clem, "The Passions of Christ in the Moral Theology of Thomas Aquinas: An Integrative Account," *New Blackfriars* 99 [2018]: 458-80; Alexander Brungs, "Die passiones animae," in *Thomas von Aquin: Die Summa Theologiae*, ed. Andreas Speer [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005]: 198-222; Elisabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens, "Rationalized Passion and Passionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the Passions," *The Review of Metaphysics* 56 [2003]: 525-58; Paul Gondreau, "The Passions and the Moral Life: Appreciating the Originality of Aquinas," *The Thomist* 71 [2007]: 419-50; and Michel Meyer, "Le problème des passions chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue internationale de philosophie* 48 [1994]: 363-74). I engage the relatively few explicit discussions of the issue below but it is important to note that they often stand alone: neither Maria Carl ("St. Thomas Aquinas: The Unity of the Person and the Passions," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 86 [2013]: 201-12) nor King ("Emotions") engages Pickavé, "On the Intentionality of the Emotions" at length; nor does Dominik Perler

for our understanding of how Thomistic emotions relate to reason, rationality, and morality. Robert C. Roberts, for instance, argues that Aquinas's position is that emotions do not include a cognitive component—they are noncognitive impulses—and that this in turn entails that Aquinas cannot do justice to the rationality of emotions.[5] Maria Carl, in turn, argues that Thomistic emotions are intrinsically cognitive and that Roberts's criticism is therefore misguided.[6] The cognitive versus noncognitive debate also has ramifications for our understanding of the applicability of Thomistic emotions to present-day issues. For instance, Giuseppe Butera argues that Aquinas's philosophical psychology can "serve as a theoretical framework" for cognitive therapy.[7] A problem, Butera notes, is that, "whereas CT makes a sharp distinction between emotions and their eliciting cognitions, APP [Aquinas's philosophical psychology] does not."[8] If, however, Aquinas does distinguish cognitions from emotions, then Butera's point about the difference between CT and APP is not apt.

The aim of this article is thus twofold. First, I present the case for endorsing both a cognitive and a noncognitive reading of Aquinas's account of emotion, highlighting the merits of each position. My goal is to bring these competing interpretations into discussion with one another, something that has been largely neglected in recent studies. Second, I argue in favor of a noncognitive reading, according to which Thomistic emotions are caused by but distinct from eliciting cognitions.

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(*Feelings Transformed: Philosophical Theories of the Emotions, 1270-1670*, trans. Tony Crawford [New York: Oxford University Press, 2018]) discuss King, "Emotions."

[5] Robert C. Roberts, "Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 9 (1992): 287-305.

[6] Carl, "Unity of the Person and the Passions."

[7] Giuseppe Butera, "Thomas Aquinas and Cognitive Therapy: An Exploration of the Promise of Thomistic Psychology," *Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology* 17 (2011): 347-66, abstract.

[8] Ibid., "Thomas Aquinas and Cognitive Therapy," 355.

## I. The Noncognitive and Cognitive Readings

Aquinas identifies emotions as moved-responses of the sensory appetite (*De Verit*., q. 26, a. 3; *STh* I-II, q. 22).[9] These responses have both a passive and an active component. Emotions are passive because they need to be actualized: the sensory appetite needs to be presented with a particular good or evil object in order for the emotion to occur. To be clear, that which actualizes an emotion is not a material object. Aquinas recognizes that while Attila experiences fear upon seeing a wolf, Henrietta may experience delight. What actualizes a movement of Attila's and Henrietta's sensory appetite is their sensory cognition of the wolf as good or threatening. Aquinas refers to these evaluative cognitions as "intentions." Intentions are evaluative judgments that enable one to cognize something relative to one's interests (*STh* I, q. 78, a. 4; I-II, q. 22, a. 2, ad 3; *De Verit*., q. 26, a. 4). A sheep judges that the wolf is dangerous and to be feared, not only on account of the wolf's perceptual qualities (e.g., color), but most essentially on account of the evaluative judgment that the wolf is dangerous to it, which judgment is reached by way of the perceptual qualities (*STh* I, q. 78, a. 4). Once formed, an intention is then presented to the sensory appetite, which responds with a movement either toward or away from the object (*De Verit*., q. 26, a. 1; *STh* I-II,

[9] References to Aquinas are in-text. Citations are from *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici. Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII* (Rome: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1882-); all translations are my own. For in-depth work on Aquinas's account of human psychology, see Peter King, "The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism," *Vivarium* 46 (2008): 253-74; and Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For in-depth work on Aquinas's account of the emotions or passions, see Perler, *Feelings Transformed*; Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*; Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*; Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*; Peter King, "Aquinas on the Passions," in *Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 353-84; Meyer, "Le problème des passions"; and Marcos Manzanedo, "La classificación de les pasiones o emociones," *Studium* 23 (1983): 357-78. For historical focus, see Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*; Barbara Rosenwein, *Generations of Feelings: A History of Emotions, 600-1700* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); and Gondreau, *Passions of Christ's Soul*.

q. 21, a. 1). The sheep's fear of the wolf is a movement of the sensory appetite away from the wolf. While Aquinas believes that nonhuman animals form evaluative judgments by "natural instinct," he posits that humans form evaluative judgments through their "cogitative power," which involves the "coalition" or "collation" of ideas (*STh* I, q. 78, a. 4).

Once an intention is presented to the sensory appetite, the sensory appetite responds by moving either toward the object if it is pleasant or away from the object if it is harmful. Because the sensory appetite is a bodily power, emotion-movements necessarily involve a bodily alteration: "Acts of the sensory appetite," Aquinas claims, "are always accompanied by some bodily change" (*STh* I, q. 20, a. 1, ad 2). As Aquinas describes it, every emotion involves a material change (bodily alteration) and a formal change (movement of soul): "just as movement of the appetitive power is the formal element, so also transmutation of the body is the material element, of which one is proportioned to the other" (*STh* I-II, q. 44, a. 1). Attila's fear of the wolf involves, formally, an alteration of her sensory appetite that inclines it to move away from the wolf. Materially, there is an increase in the flow of blood around her heart, resulting in a higher heart rate, perspiration, and so on. Emotions, accordingly, are not movements of the sensory soul that cause bodily alteration: they are movements of the sensory soul that are *mediated* by bodily alteration. It is the creature—not the creature's soul—that experiences the emotion.

Much more can be said regarding Aquinas's theory. What matters for present purposes is the relation between the intention (cognition) and the appetitive movement. Aquinas is clear that emotions have an intentional structure—they are directed to particular things represented under a certain aspect (*STh* I-II, q. 41, a. 2). Emotions are not nonintentional, mere bodily feelings. They are identified and classified by the type of object that elicits them, and they are actualized so long as the object is presented to the sensory appetite. The question becomes, does the intentionality of the emotions entail that emotions are forms of cognition or have a cognitive element?

Aquinas does not say much about how exactly the emotions are intentional and whether their intentionality entails that they have a cognitive element. Advocates of what I call a non-cognitive reading insist that Thomistic emotions are non-cognitive movements that are caused by but distinct from intentions of an object. Shawn Floyd, for instance, writes that "for Aquinas the relationship between passion and cognition is a causal one. Passion is caused by, but not a constitutive part of, cognition."[10] More recently, Nicholas Lombardo writes:

> A passion is nothing other than the movement of the sense appetite, a passive power, from dormancy to act, in response to the apprehension of an object to which the sense appetite is inclined . . . apprehension of an intention being a necessary preconditions for a passion.[11]

We may consider the emotion of hope for an example. According to Aquinas, on this reading, hope is the movement of the irascible power of the sensory appetite, which is the power of the sensory appetite that regards arduous goods and evils, that is caused and accompanied by the intention of a future possible good that is arduous to attain (*STh* I-II, q. 40). It is about or directed toward this object in virtue of being a moved-response to that particular intention; however, hope is *not* constituted by the intention nor does it involve the intention as a constituent part. Apart from their causal relation, cognition is separate from the nature of an emotion. Emotions, on this reading, are directed toward or away from objects in virtue of being moved so via intentions.[12]

[10] Shawn Floyd, "Aquinas on Emotion: A Response to Some Recent Interpretations," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 15 (1988): 161-75, at 165.

[11] Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, 34.

[12] Claudia Eisen Murphy writes, "Aquinas makes sure to differentiate passions explicitly from (1) cognitive states and events, and from (2) movements of the intellective appetite. The first explicit distinction means that passions are not themselves cognitive states, they are responses to cognitive states" ("Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 8 (1999): 163-205, at 167). Other proponents include Pickavé, "On the Intentionality of the Emotions," 48; Eleonore Stump, "The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas's Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions," *Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers* 28 (2011): 29-43; Stephen Loughlin, "Similarities and Differences between

The motivation for endorsing a noncognitive reading is twofold.[13] First, Aquinas insists that emotions are movements of the sensory appetite, which is a power distinct from the cognitive powers of the soul that are responsible for knowledge, perception, and belief. The function of the sensory appetite, unlike the cognitive powers, is to move the creature about in the world, whereas the function of the cognitive powers, in which the cogitative and estimative powers responsible for producing intentions are located, is to arrive at true beliefs about the world. Appetite is outward going, while cognition is inward going: the latter assimilates the known or believed in the subject, while the former draws the soul out of itself toward or away from an object (*STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 2). Aquinas approvingly cites Damascene's definition of emotion as "a movement of the sensory appetitive power" (*STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 3, sc), and often describes emotions as movements following upon cognitions: "movement of the appetitive power follows [*sequitur*] an act of the cognitive power" (*STh* I-II, q. 46, a. 2). He explains that "the cognitive power moves [*movet*] the appetite by representing to the appetite its object" (*STh* I-II, q. 40, a. 2). The relation between cognition and emotion appears to be causal, not constitutive.

Second, and relatedly, the emotions necessarily involve a bodily response, and it is because the emotions involve bodily change that Aquinas posits them as being movements of the sensory appetite. He reasons that no cognitive power is so immediately linked with bodily change, while the sensory appetite does involve the body; therefore, the emotions have to be situated in the sensory appetite (*STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 2). Emotions do not cause a somatic change; rather, they involve a

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Human and Animal Emotion in Aquinas's Thought," *The Thomist* 65 (2001): 45-65; Titus, "Passions in Christ," 63; Dryden, "Passions," 40; Patrick Gorevan, "Aquinas and Emotional Theory Today: Mind-Body, Cognitivism and Connaturality," *Acta philosophica* 9 (2000): 141-51; Lyons, *Emotions*; and Roberts, "Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions."

[13] See Pickavé, "On the Intentionality of the Emotions," 47-48; Gorevan, "Aquinas and Emotional Theory Today"; Roberts, "Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions," 293-94.

material change (bodily alteration) and a formal change (movement of soul), as noted above (*STh* I-II, q. 44, a. 1). It is for this reason that Aquinas thinks that nonhuman animals experience emotions, even though they do not have the rational, cognitive powers that humans have, and that God and the angels, properly speaking, do not experience emotions since they are incorporeal (e.g., *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 3, ad 3). Thus, since emotions involve bodily change and cognition is not so immediately related to the body, it would seem to follow that Thomistic emotions are noncognitive.

However, the noncognitive reading is not without textual and conceptual problems. First, as Mark Drost observes, Aquinas claims that some emotions are not movements at all, but rather a kind of appetitive rest.[14] Aquinas explains that in "concupiscible emotions there is found something pertaining to movements (e.g., desire) and something pertaining to repose (e.g., joy and sorrow)" (*STh* I-II, q. 25, a. 1). Consider his description of love's relation to desire:

> Thus, the first appetitive change by the appetible object is called love, which is nothing other than a complacency of the appetite. From this complacency arises a movement toward the appetible object, which is desire. (*STh* I-II, q. 28, a. 2)

Love is a kind of affective resonance between the appetite and the appetible object, while desire is an appetitive movement toward the object as absent. If all emotions were movements, Aquinas would lose the distinction between love and desire, for instead of love being the springboard for "a person to desire and seek the presence of the loved," love itself would be an inclination to the loved object (*STh* I-II, q. 28, a. 1). Although, to be sure, showing that some emotions are *not* described as movements does not thereby suggest a cognitive reading, it has been used by some scholars to cast doubt on the plausibility of a noncognitive reading, according to which emotions are movements of the sensory appetite brought about by but distinct from cognitions.

[14] Drost, "Intentionality in Aquinas's Theory of Emotions," 455.

A second worry for a noncognitive reading is that separating cognition from emotion undermines Aquinas's hylomorphic theory of human nature. Judith Barad explains that, "For Aquinas, the fact that we are composite beings precludes ascribing emotion either solely to our rational element or solely to our bodies."[15] Human beings are not souls joined to bodies; they are embodied souls, with the body and soul acting as a unified principle of operation. Maria Carl takes the unity of the human being to be evidence of a cognitive position:

> Even though an emotion is susceptible of analysis into constituent elements, having an emotion is possible only through a collaboration of various powers. It is, in this sense, a unified experience that depends upon the person as a whole. The unity of the emotion itself is described on the hylomorphic model; each emotion is a unified complex experience.[16]

As noted already, Aquinas describes emotions as having matter (physical, material change) and form (alteration of the soul). It is the agent that experiences emotions, and the agent is a unified whole of thought, will, and emotion. Accordingly, distinguishing emotions from eliciting cognitions introduces a division that Aquinas denies.

Finally, a more pressing objection is that the noncognitive reading cannot accommodate the identity and intentionality of the emotions: if emotions are in the sensory appetite, then there is a problem with understanding how they have intentionality. "The species and nature of an emotion," Aquinas writes, "is given by its object" because the sensory appetite is a passive power that is brought to actuality via external causes, so its movements are distinguished, sustained, and directed by eliciting causes (*STh* I-II, q. 46, a. 6). Aquinas writes, "emotions differ in accordance with their activators which, in the case of the emotions, are their objects" (*STh* I-II, q. 23, a. 4). Thus, to know the nature, structure, or (in Aristotelian terminology)

[15] Judith Barad, "Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity," *The Thomist* 55 (1991): 397-413, at 402.This is, strictly speaking, problematic because nonhuman animals lack rationality but experience emotions.

[16] Carl, "Unity of the Person and the Passions," 206.

formal cause of a particular emotion is to know its intentional object, which suggests that cognitions make emotions what they are, as Peter King argues: "Aquinas is therefore a cognitivist about emotion, since cognitive acts are not only causal preconditions of emotions, but contribute their formal cause as well."[17] What makes fear an instance of *fear* and not some other emotion is the intention, which is a cognitive element (*STh* I-II, q. 42, a. 4, ad 1). Because the intentionality of the emotions results from a power of the sensitive part of the intellective soul, and because intentionality is a cognitive mental state for Aquinas, it would seem that emotions are partly cognitive: over and above their causal role, intentions figure in the nature of the emotions.

For these reasons, some scholars understand Thomistic emotions to be partly constituted by evaluations of good or bad. Diana Fritz Cates, along similar lines as King and Drost, takes the role of intentions in identifying and defining emotions to be evidence that emotions or passions are partly cognitive:

> In my interpretation of Aquinas, *passio* is indeed a motion of the sensory appetite, but it is inherently object-oriented. A situation is apprehended in a certain way; this act of apprehension causes a *passio*; it also enters into the composition of the *passio* because it defines the form of the passion, as long as the *passio* persists.[18]

To be clear, Aquinas claims that the formal element of an emotion is its appetitive movement and the material element is its bodily change (*STh* I-II, q. 44, a. 1); he does not directly claim that the intention itself is the form of the emotion. Nevertheless, what Cates and others are claiming is that the emotional movement is formed and sustained by an intention, and thereby the emotions, *qua* movements, are partly composed of a cognitive element. The intention—a cognitive act—makes the emotion what it is, as Drost claims: "Since emotions are attitudinal responses . . . [they] have a cognitive component."[19]

[17] King, "Emotions," 215.

[18] Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions,* 75 n. 1.

[19] Drost, "Intentionality in Aquinas's Theory of Emotions," 453.

A Thomistic emotion, on this view, contains three elements: a conative urge or movement, physiological change, and a cognitive evaluation or intention that directs and sustains said movement. Hope, for example, is the emotion that involves a particular appetitive movement *informed by* an intention of a particular object as a future possible arduous good.[20]

## II. A Defense of the Noncognitive Reading

Despite the disagreement, I argue that a noncognitive reading is more faithful to Aquinas's thought. Aquinas is clear that emotions are in the appetitive, noncognitive power of the soul. He entertains the question of whether the emotions are situated in the cognitive power or appetitive power, and argues that they are found in the latter: "the nature of an emotion is more suitably found in the appetitive part of the soul rather than the intellective part," he explains, because it is by the appetite that creatures move about in the world (*STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 2). The cognitive powers are not drawn to things themselves while the appetitive powers are; thus, emotions are situated in the latter power. Similarly, he situates the emotions in the sensory appetite and not in the rational appetite, or will, because emotions involve bodily alteration (*STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 3); nonrational animals experience emotions, while noncorporeal angels do not, strictly speaking. He criticizes the Stoic view that the emotions are false judgments and diseases of the soul by claiming that the Stoics had an incorrect understanding of the

[20] Carl writes, "Every passion (and indeed every appetitive act, including the acts of both the sensitive and the rational appetite [the will]) presupposes and is informed by a cognition" ("Unity of the Person and the Passions," 204). Other proponents include Barad, "Aquinas on the Role of Emotion"; Thomas Ryan, "Revisiting Affective Knowledge and Connaturality in Aquinas," *Theological Studies* 66 (2005): 49-68; Carlos Leget, "Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas on the Emotions," *Theological Studies* 64 (2003): 558-81; Jorge Arregui, "Descartes and Wittgenstein on Emotions," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 36 (1996): 319-34; Stephen Chanderbhan, "'*That Your Joy May Be Full*': *Emotions in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Ph.D. dissertation, Saint Louis University, 2012); King, "Emotions"; Drost, "Intentionality in Aquinas's Theory of Emotions"; Mark Drost, "In the Realm of the Senses: Saint Thomas Aquinas on Sensory Love, Desire, and Delight," *The Thomist* 59 (1995): 47-58.

soul's powers, namely, they failed to locate the emotions in the noncognitive sensory appetite.

There is also a conceptual point to be made here. Given Aquinas's psychology, according to which the powers of the soul have distinct functions, it is difficult to know how to make sense of the claim that an emotion, being situated in the noncognitive part of the soul, can be partly constituted by a cognitive element. This point is worth emphasizing. Aquinas posits a strong division of labor among the soul's powers, and insists on a sharp functional division between the cognitive and appetitive powers (see *STh* I, q. 78, a. 1).[21] Moreover, he regards the soul's different powers as "really distinct," such that they could be separated from each other by an act of God. While one can emphasize the unity of human beings and their experience, this emphasis does not thereby show that cognition figures in the nature of an emotion, *qua* movement of the sensory appetite. At best, it only shows that emotional experiences, not emotions *per se*, involve cognition. To claim that cognition "enters into the composition" (Cates) of an emotion or that emotions are "attitudinal responses" (Drost) does not illuminate how integration is possible, given Aquinas's psychology. How movements of a noncognitive power can have a cognitive part is left unexplained and is in tension with Aquinas's psychology.

## III. Objections and Replies

The challenge therefore is to respond to the objections to the noncognitive reading in a way that explains (a) how Thomistic emotions can be intentional but noncognitive, (b) how the unity of the human being does not entail or support cognitivism, and (c) how some emotions can be described as both rest and movement.

[21] See Peter King, "Late Scholastic Theories of the Passions," in *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, ed. Henri Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Press, 2002), 229-58; and Daniel De Haan, "Perception and the Vis Cogitativa: A Thomistic Analysis of Aspectual, Actional, and Affectional Percepts," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 88 (2014): 397-437.

*A) Movement*

The first problem for the noncognitive reading is that not every emotion is described as a kind of movement, for some are described as a kind of rest. Delight, sorrow, joy, and love are described as kinds of appetitive rest or consonance, and so are not clearly movements (see *STh* I-II, q. 35, a. 3). Partly for this reason, scholars have been perplexed by Aquinas's claim that emotions are a kind of movement or motion (*quidam motus*). Some of the confusion stems from thinking of emotional movement as being akin to physical movement, something that Aquinas himself says in one passage: "appetitive movement is similar to natural movement" (*STh* I-II, q. 36, a. 2). Eric D'Arcy claims that it is "physical movement, involving local motion in the ordinary sense" that is meant.[22] If Aquinas understands appetitive movement as akin to physical movement, then he would be flatly contradicting himself in claiming that delight is physical-like rest and that all emotions are physical-like movements, since rest is the opposite of movement. But if it is not physical movement that is the model for appetitive movement, then what is it?

It is instructive to note that Aquinas refers to Aristotle's account of movement when discussing appetitive movement (*STh* I-II, q. 23). Aristotle defines motion in the *Physics* as the actualization of a power or capacity, "moving" from passivity to act: "the fulfillment of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially" (*Phys.* 3.1.201a10).[23] Motion is grounded in the nature or form of the creature or object. Suzy can raise her arm or become sick because both are compatible with her nature; Suzy cannot, however, fly unaided because this ability is not consonant with her nature. Aristotle further distinguishes three kinds of motion, or ways a power or capacity can be

[22] Eric D'Arcy, *Introduction and Notes to Summa Theologiae, Vol. 19, The Emotions* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); see also Lyons, *Emotion*, 37; Roberts, "Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions," 291; James, *Passion and Action,* 62-63; and Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 248-53.

[23] Citations are from Aristotle, *Physics,* in *The Complete Works: Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

actualized (*Phys.* 5.2.226a23-34). First, there is movement of alteration, which occurs when an agent's capacity to receive a quality is actualized, that is, the agent receives one quality or form and loses a contrary one. Water being heated in a kettle is an alteration because the water's capacity for being heated is being actualized. It loses one quality (coldness) and acquires a contrary quality (hotness). Likewise, a person going from health to illness undergoes a movement of alteration because he goes from one quality to its contrary. The second kind of movement is movement of quantity or, as Aristotle claims, "increase or decrease according as one or the other is designated" (*Phys.* 5.2.226a31). This movement occurs when an object goes from an imperfect state to a perfect state (increase), or vice versa (decrease). The movement from being an acorn to being a full-grown oak tree is a movement from an imperfect state to a perfect one. The movement from being a full-grown oak tree to being a shriveled, diseased tree is a movement in the opposite direction, from a perfect state to an imperfect state. The final kind of movement is one of locomotion, or change of place. This movement is the kind of movement with which we are most familiar—for example, the movement of a dog from one location to another.

Although D'Arcy assumes Aquinas has the third understanding of Aristotelian movement in mind, Aquinas claims that the movement of emotions is the movement of alteration. He writes in the *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate* that "*passio* in this [proper] sense is found only in the movement of alteration," when one quality or form is removed from a person and its contrary is acquired (*De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 1). He reiterates this understanding in the *Summa theologiae* where he argues that the most proper understanding of *pati* (suffering or undergoing) and *passio* involves the loss of one quality and the reception of a contrary: a person who goes from health to a state of sickness (or vice versa) is said to suffer (*STh* I-II, q. 21). The movement of an emotion, therefore, occurs when the sensory appetite's capacity to be altered from one qualitative state to its contrary state is actualized, for example, from love to its contrary of hate. Important for present purposes, *pace* D'Arcy and others, it

is not physical movement that is relevant to emotional movement. Emotions are movements of alterations, and it is in the sense of alteration that joy, sorrow, delight, and similar emotions, which imply no physical movement, are still movements. Sorrow is the movement of alteration from one state (nonsorrow) to another (sorrow).

Nevertheless, Aquinas does use another notion of movement when describing emotions. In order to see these different uses of the term, note that he himself considers the objection that delight (*delectatio*), which is a rest of the appetite in an attained good, is not an emotion because it is not evidently a movement: "Delight does not consist in being moved, but in having been moved since it is caused by a good already attained. Thus, it is not an emotion" (*STh* I-II, q. 31, a. 1, obj. 2). Since the sensible good is already possessed by the agent, *delectatio* does not appear to involve occurrent movement of any kind. In reply, Aquinas offers the following clarification:

> Although *delectatio* is a certain rest of the appetite, considered as the presence of the pleasurable good which satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains an immutation of the appetite by the appetitible object, by reason of which pleasure is a kind of motion. (*STh* I-II, q. 31, a. 1, ad 2)

Aquinas's point is that *delectatio* is a movement, namely, the movement of alteration by which the soul is altered from a state of nonpleasure to a state of pleasure via an immutation. Thus, when Aquinas describes *delectatio* as a kind of appetitive rest and as a movement, he is using a different notion of "movement."[24]

What are the two notions of "movement"? On the one hand, there is the movement of alteration which occurs when the appetite is moved from one state to another. This is the sense in which *delectatio* is a motion and the primary sense in which all

[24] I owe this observation to Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 40-42. A reviewer offered an illuminating observation: Aquinas likens appetitive movement to natural movement (*STh* I-II, q. 23, a. 4). Just as fire has inclination to go up, movement up, and rest when it is up, so do the appetites have inclination (love), movement (desire), and rest (pleasure). This is only an analogy, of course; the word "rest" should not be taken literally to refer to the absence of change.

emotions are movements. On the other hand, Aquinas uses the language of being drawn or inclined: "An appetitive act," he writes, "is a kind of inclination [*inclinatio*] to the thing itself" (*STh* I-II, q. 15, a. 1). Things that are cognized as good cause "a certain inclination, aptitude, or connaturalness" in the sensory soul (*STh* I-II, q. 23, a. 4). This language of inclination, being drawn, and rest is not to be understood exclusively in terms of the movement of alteration. To understand this notion of orientation or inclination, it is instructive to note that emotions arise in response to intentions of things as good or bad for the agent, and it is a basic tenet of Aquinas's metaphysics that everything seeks after what appears to be good and avoids what appears to be harmful:

> For the nature of a good thing consists in this, that it is something desirable; hence the Philosopher says that good is what all things desire. But it is manifest that everything is desirable inasmuch as it is perfect, for all things desire their own perfection. (*STh* I, q. 5, a. 1; see also *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 1, ad 3; q. 94, a. 2; *De Verit*., q. 25, a. 1; *STh* I, q. 19, a. 9)

God has constructed the sensory appetite in such a way that it naturally seeks after what is good and flees what is harmful. When an agent experiences an emotion, and her sensory appetite is presented with a sensible good (or evil) via alteration, she will be inclined to seek the good (or flee the bad). For example, when a person experiences hope for a future good, that person's sensory appetite is altered from its previous nonhope state—movement of alteration—and, since hope's object is good, the person's appetite will naturally incline to the good object—natural movement. Similarly, delight is a movement of alteration that, in virtue of the presence of its object, quiets the appetite. Here, the movement is a movement from a state of inclination to a state of quiescence, or rest.

In sum, all emotions are movements of alteration that, in virtue of their object, incline the appetite to rest, seek, or flee. Therefore, observing that some emotions are akin to rest does not undermine the noncognitive reading of the emotions as all being movements.

*B) The Unity of the Human Being*

The second argument offered against a noncognitivist reading of Thomistic emotions is that it fails to do justice to Aquinas's account of our hylomorphic nature. Barad argues that, despite Aquinas's psychology, Aquinas affirms unity in operations, and thus,

> to hold that emotions are only physical sensations is to consider the matter of the phenomenon without the form. And to identify emotions with judgments would be to take the form without the matter. Both views run contrary to Aquinas's hylomorphic theory of human nature.[25]

However, the unity of the person is not a problem for a noncognitive reading. Aquinas explains that emotions involve a material change (bodily alteration) and a formal change (movement of soul) (*STh* I-II, q. 37, a. 4). It is the soul-body composite, the creature, that experiences emotions. But the important point is that the formal element is the movement of the sensory appetite, not a cognition or judgment. Carl is wrong to claim that "it is the person who is angry or who loves, because Aquinas holds that an emotion is complex" of matter and form involving cognition; [26] Aquinas nowhere—to my knowledge—says that the form of an emotion is anything other than a movement of the sensory appetite. There is a conceptual gulf between a movement of the (noncognitive) sensory appetite and cognition of the cognitive powers. According to the noncognitive reading, emotions involve the whole creature, body and soul; they do not involve cognition, however, as a constituent part.[27]

[25] Barad, "Aquinas on the Role of Emotion," 402.

[26] Carl, "Unity of the Person and the Passions," 206.

[27] To help clarify, consider abstract thought, which according to Aquinas is purely intellectual and nonbodily. Aquinas thinks that such thought cannot occur without phantasms derived from sense experience, but he reserves the label "thought" for the nonsensory portion of this process. Likewise, even if a hylomorphic view of human nature demands that the process involved in emotion includes an interrelation between the various powers of the soul, Aquinas reserves the label "*passio animae*" for the

Although emotions are situated in the sensory appetite, a proponent of a noncognitive reading can agree that *emotional experiences* involve cognitions. In other words, given the hylomorphic unity of the person, a person experiences emotions with their causally eliciting and sustaining judgments. Cognition elicits emotional responses, and the person experiencing anger, for example, experiences the complex of cognition, bodily change, and movement of the sensory appetite. Noncognitivists can thus separate the emotion from the emotional experience and insist that cognition figures in the latter. Carl seems to suggest something like this interpretation when she writes that, "Even though an emotion is susceptible of analysis into constituent elements, having an emotion is possible only through a collaboration of various powers."[28] Noncognitivists agree with her that cognition figures in the having of an emotion. Some noncognitivist scholars go so far as to distinguish passion (*passio animae*) from emotion, claiming that Thomistic passions, which I have been calling emotions, do not include cognitions but Thomistic emotions, which I have been calling emotional experiences, do. Murphy explains the reasoning behind this view:

> because it is a necessary condition for the occurrence of a passion that there be evaluative cognition of an object, it turns out that Aquinas's passions, taken together with their proximate cognitive cause, make up a complex that could match our understanding of 'emotions'.[29]

According to Murphy, *passio animae* does not involve cognition in its nature. If we combine *passio animae* with its eliciting cognition, then we can call this complex state "emotion" if a cognitivist so wishes. Regardless of how a noncognitivist decides to capture the intimate relationship between cognition and emotion, all agree that cognition is integral to emotional experience. Noncognitivists just deny that cognition figures in

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noncognitive part of the process. I would like to thank Joseph Dowd for this observation.

[28] Carl, "Unity of the Person and the Passions," 206.

[29] Murphy, "Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions," 168.

the nature of emotions as Aquinas uses the term "*passio animae*."

### *C) Intentions and Identifying Emotions*

There are two challenges for a noncognitive reading of Thomistic emotions, arising from their intentionality. The first challenge is that emotions are identified and distinguished by their formal object, which is provided by the intention ("the species and nature of an emotion is given by its object" [*STh* I-II, q. 46, a. 6]) and this observation seems to suggest that emotions are partly cognitive because intentions figure in their identity. As Carl writes, a noncognitive reading "ignores the intentionality of emotions" because every emotion "is articulated in terms both of cognition and physiology."[30] One cannot know what hope is, say, without knowing the intentional object of hope—a future possible good that is arduous to attain—and the intentional object is a cognitive state.

This point about intentionality is not a damning problem for a noncognitive reading, however. To see why, it is important to recognize how passive powers are identified and actualized. According to Aquinas, we recognize and distinguish among passive powers by what actualizes them, that is, brings them from a passive state to an active state: "the sensory appetite," he explains, is distinguished "by the different particular goods to which it responds" (*STh* I, q. 82, a. 5). Emotions are actualized by an intention being presented to the sensory appetite, and they remain present so long as that intention—the object to which the emotion is directed—is present. Nevertheless, that we distinguish passive powers via their eliciting objects does not entail that passive powers are identical to or constituted by those objects. The ensuing appetitive movement is different from the eliciting cause, even if the cause is the means by which we identify the movement, and this is true even granting that the object makes the ensuing movement the kind of movement it is. In other words, just because the cognition supplies the

[30] Carl, "Unity of the Person and the Passions," 205.

form by which the movement arises, it does not thereby follow that the ensuing movement is cognitive. Consider a potter making a pot. The potter is the efficient cause from which the pot receives its form, but this fact does not mean that the potter himself is part of the pot's form. Likewise, the emotions receive their form from their objects, but this fact does not mean that the objects are part of the emotions' form. Thus, although intentions account for the differences among the emotions, this is not clear evidence that intentions figure in the nature of the emotions.

### *D) Emotional Intentionality*

Still, it might be objected that it is the fact that emotions are intentional, that is, directed at objects, that is problematic. The challenge here is that intentionality, being directed at or onto the world, seems to be cognitive, since only cognitive states are directed at or are about the world.[31] Bodily reflexes are nonintentional, but my belief that today's weather is fine is intentional. It makes sense to ask people *what* or *whom* they are mad at, while it does not make sense to ask who people are sneezing at. This intentionality is grounded in the fact that emotions are actualized by the inherence of an intention in the sensory appetite, as King explains: "the actualization of Jones's potency for loathing requires some form's inhering in the sensitive appetite."[32] Because intentions, which are cognitive acts, contribute the formal cause to emotions, King concludes in

[31] It is precisely this claim—that only cognitive states are intentional—that leads Perler to claim that William Ockham endorses a cognitive account of the passions or emotions: "In his [i.e., Ockham's] explanation of various sensory passions, he makes it clear that most of them are *about* something, and therefore have a cognitive content" (Dominik Perler, "Emotions and Cognitions: Fourteenth-Century Discussions on the Passions of the Soul," *Vivarium* 43 [2005]: 250-74, at 260). Perler assumes that intentionality is cognitive, and so if the emotions are intentional, they are cognitive. This is in stark contrast, however, to his account of Thomistic emotions, as will be seen clearly later on.

[32] King, "Aquinas on the Passions," 359.

another article that "Aquinas is therefore a cognitivist about emotion."[33]

It is instructive, in reply, to ask whether it is anachronistic of scholars to draw this inference. Aquinas himself draws a sharp distinction between cognition and appetite, and nowhere to my knowledge does he entertain the question, whether the intentionality of the emotions entails that they are cognitive. Marc Neuberg has argued that Descartes was the first clearly to distinguish and to discuss the relation between cognition and physiological change, and it was he who set the stage for later debates regarding the relation between cognition and emotion.[34] More recently, Martin Pickavé has argued that Walter Chatton, writing in the fourteenth century, was among the first to ask whether appetitive acts are themselves cognitions when addressing the question, "Whether the love of an angel is distinct from the Angel's cognition?"[35] While Chatton answers negatively, Pickavé focuses on the claim of Adam Wodeham, Chatton's contemporary, that love and other appetitive acts are forms of cognition. Wodeham writes:

> I say—not by way of expressing an assertion, but by way of expressing an opinion—that every act of desiring and hating, and so enjoyment, is some sort of cognition and some sort of apprehension, because every experience of some object is also a cognition of the same object.[36]

Wodeham offers a series of arguments for this position, a position he recognizes is nontraditional. The traditional view, he notes, is that appetitive acts are noncognitive.[37] The important point for our present purposes is that the question of the

[33] King, "Emotions," 215.

[34] Marc Neuberg, "Le traité des passions de l'âme de Descartes et les théories modernes de l'émotion," *Archives de philosophie* 53 (1990): 479-508.

[35] Pickavé, "On the Intentionality of the Emotions"; Martin Pickavé, "Emotion and Cognition in later Medieval Philosophy: The Case of Adam Wodeham," in *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy,* ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[36] Adam Wodeham, *Lectura secunda*, d. 1, q. 5, sect. 4; cited in Pickavé, "Emotion and Cognition," 99.

[37] Pickavé, "Emotion and Cognition," 99.

relation between cognition, intentionality, and the emotions seems to be a nonissue for Aquinas. He appears content to claim that the emotions have intentional objects and that they are caused-movements of the noncognitive sensory appetite. Our interests do not map on to Aquinas's interests.

We still might ask how Aquinas *would* respond if he were pressed with this issue. But the question is not whether the emotions are intrinsically cognitive according to Aquinas. They are not. Instead, the question is how Aquinas understands the relation between cognition and emotions, one that preserves the sharp distinction between the cognitive and appetitive powers but still allows for the intentionality of the emotions. This is the process of charitable historical reconstruction.[38] Dialectically, then, all that is needed is for there to be a plausible story, one that fits Aquinas's theory, of how the emotions can be intentional, noncognitive movements. If scholars in the twenty-first century cannot offer a plausible account, this inability does not provide reason for thinking Aquinas is therefore a cognitivist about the emotions. Instead, it provides reason for thinking that our concerns and interests were not those of Aquinas.

The goal is to offer an account of how to understand the intentionality of the emotions while preserving the distinction between intellect and sensory appetite. An account that has drawn favor from some noncognitivist scholars, a view that I endorse but make no claim to have originated, is the *derivative intentionality model*, according to which the emotions are intentional in virtue of their eliciting cognitions. Pickavé explains the model succinctly:

> It is also clear that on this account the intentionality of the emotion piggybacks on the act of cognition, which provides the sensitive appetite with its object. And since we tend to take sensory experience as intentional experience we may want to say that emotions derive their intentionality from the intentionality of the sensory cognitions immediately causing them.[39]

[38] Pickavé, "On the Intentionality of the Emotions," 48.

[39] Pickavé, "On the Intentionality of the Emotions," 50.

On this view, intentions are the cause of emotional experiences that direct emotional experiences in virtue of their intentionality. Emotions are movements directed *at* particular objects in virtue of the preceding cognition that actualizes and, thereby, moves or inclines the sensory appetite a certain way. What makes fear an instance of fear and not hope is that the intention acting upon the sensory appetite is one that is directed at a future arduous evil; what makes my fear about this snake, as opposed to anything else, is that the eliciting intention is about *this* snake. Fear, in itself, *qua* movement of the sensory appetite, is just that—a movement with accompanying physiological change. It is a directed movement away from some particular object, however, because it was caused and sustained by a particular intention regarding said object. Consider a person throwing a dart at a target. In itself, the dart contains no mental representation of the target. The person does, however, and the dart is directed at the target, not just in the sense that it is moving toward the target but also in the sense that the target is the goal in virtue of the dart's being directed to it by the person. Likewise, a Thomistic emotion, in itself, contains no cognition of its object, but it is directed at its object because the accompanying cognitive intention has directed it that way. Thus, cognition is integral to experiencing an emotion, but it is not constitutive of the emotion itself.

To clarify the derivative intentionality model, it is instructive to compare it to King's cognitivist reading. King seems to endorse something like the derivative intentionality model when he writes,

> So much for the cognitive side of things. At this point there is a hand-off to the sensitive appetite. . . . The sensitive appetite, as a passive power, is reduced from potency to act when it 'inherits' objectual content from the evaluative response-dependent concept.[40]

He defends his cognitivist reading by pointing out that, since intentions make emotions what they are, intentions are their formal cause; and since formal causes are part of the caused

[40] King, "Emotions," 214.

object or event, intentions figure in the emotion. There are a couple of problems with King's inference. First, emotions are situated in the sensory appetite and the sensory appetite is not a cognitive power of the soul. Aquinas describes their relation in terms of mover and moved: "movement of the appetitive power follows [*sequitur*] an act of the cognitive power" (*STh* I-II, q. 46, a. 2). How a movement of the noncognitive appetite can be cognitive remains unanswered and in tension with Aquinas's psychology. Second, and more importantly, we do not need to posit that emotions are intrinsically cognitive because the derivative intentionality model can explain how intentions direct, sustain, and make emotions what they are while maintaining the integrity of Aquinas's psychology. Emotions are movements of the noncognitive appetite with accompanying physiological alterations, and so are not intrinsic cognitive states. However, emotions are not mere feelings, either. Lyons's description of Thomistic emotions as "impulses or desires" plus "accompanying physiological changes" is misleading insofar as it suggests that emotions lack intentionality, for Thomistic emotions are moved-responses toward a good object or away from a bad object with accompanying physiological changes. In this way, a proponent of a noncognitive reading can agree with King [41] who claims that Aquinas's theory of emotions is cognitivist in the sense that, following Robert Kraut, "cognitive processes are somehow essential to emotion." [42] Cognitive acts are essential to bring about, direct, and sustain emotions, but they are not constituent parts of emotions proper. On the model defended here, cognitive acts figure in our emotional experience without figuring in the emotion itself.

## Conclusion

There is good textual evidence for reading Aquinas as a noncognitivist about the emotions. Even though cognition is

[41] King, "Aquinas on the Passions," 341 n. 20.

[42] Robert Kraut, "Feelings in Context," *The Journal of Philosophy* 83 (1986): 642-52, at 643.

essential to emotional experience, the emotions do not have a cognitive element as a constituent part, and the reasons offered to the contrary are not as convincing as the textual evidence that posits emotions in the noncognitive part of the soul. The derivative intentionality model explains the intentionality of emotions without violating Aquinas's psychology, and this is the strongest reason why we should adopt it. This interpretation is contentious, to be sure, and so I close with a challenge for defender of a cognitivist reading, namely, to offer an account that explains how appetitive movements can be intentional in a way that is consonant with Aquinas's sharp division between appetite and cognition.[43]

[43] I would like to thank Joseph Dowd, participants at the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy Inaugural Conference at Notre Dame, and reviewers of *The Thomist* for helpful suggestions and corrections.

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# *VERBA ET FACTA LUDICRA ET JOCOSA*: THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE MORAL LIMITS OF PLAYFUL ENJOYMENT

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PLAY HAS BEEN STUDIED over the past decades by scholars from various disciplines. Psychologists have stressed its role in child development, animal play has puzzled ethologists, and historians have understood play to be the central element for understanding culture. Philosophers have asked questions about its definition, its goal, its rationality. As a source of relaxation, it has been opposed to work, to seriousness, and to daily life.[1]

Thomas Aquinas wrote one explicit text on play—question 168 of the *Secunda secundae*[2]—in which he embeds his insights about the human being as a *homo ludens* in a rich philosophical

[1] Johan Huizinga, *Homo ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955); Roger Caillois, *Man, Play and Games*, trans. M. Barash (Chicago: University of Illinois Press: 2001 [reprint of 1961]); Hugo Rahner, *Der spielende Mensch* (Einsiedeln, 1952); idem, "Eutrapelie: Eine vergessene Tugend," *Geist und Leben* 27 (1954): 346-53; Mihai I. Spariosu, *Dionysus Reborn: Play and the Aesthetic Dimension of Modern Philosophical and Scientific Discourse* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989); Brian Sutton-Smith, *The Ambiguity of Play* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997); Stuart Brown and Christopher Vaughn, *Play: How It Shapes the Brain, Opens the Imagination and Invigorates the Soul* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009); Emily Ryall, Wendy Russell, and Malcolm Maclean, *The Philosophy of Play* (London: Routledge, 2014); John Morreall, *The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987).

[2] Play is also found in Thomas's commentary on the *Ethica Nicomachea* of Aristotle (*In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomacheum expositio,* ed. Raymundi M. Spiazzi [Turin: Marietti, 1949]).

anthropology: we enjoy playing as rational, sensitive-emotional, embodied, and social beings. A subcategory of play is humorous words and deeds. In contrast to present-day studies on humor, Thomas is interested in the morality of humor rather than in its essence, thereby taking a fundamentally positive stance towards humorous play. For him the human person is *homo ridens,* the only creature that has the capacity to laugh and to make laugh.[3]

Throughout my analysis of Thomas's texts, I shall argue for the following claims. First, Thomas's texts on play and humorous play show that he considers the human being to be a *homo ludens, homo delectans,* and *homo ridens.* The capacity to play and to enjoy, and the possession of a sense of humor are undeniable and positive aspects of the make-up of the human being. Second, play can best be understood against the background of two passions of the soul, *tristitia* and *delectatio.* This point has not been stressed enough in the secondary literature on this topic. Third, *eutrapelia,* the specific virtue of play, concerns not only the mean between excess and lack of enjoyment, but is essentially a social virtue. Play contributes to our well-being as individuals in so far as it includes respect for our fellow human beings. As such it can help to express, sustain, and maintain our ethical relationships with our social surroundings.[4]

In the light of the above, this article is divided into three parts. Parts I and II will map out the philosophical anthropology

[3] For studies of play and humor according to Thomas, see, for example, Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, "Vizi e virtu del gioco: L'eutrapelia fra XIII e XIV secolo," in *Giocare tra medioevo ed eta moderna,* ed. F. Aceto and F. Lucioli (Treviso and Rome: Fondazione Benetton-Viella, 2019), 21-36; M. Conrad Heyers, *The Comic Vision and the Christian Faith: A Celebration of Life and Laughter* (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1981); David L. Whidden III, "The Theology of Play and the Play of Theology," *The Thomist* 80 (2016): 273-84; Tobias Hoffman, "Eutrapelia: The Right Attitude towards Amusement," *Mots medievaux offerts a Ruedi Imbach* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011): 267-77; C. De Marchi, "L'affabilitas nei rapport sociali: Studio comparativo sulla socievolezza e il buonumore in Tommaso d'Aquino, Thomas More e Francesco di Sales," (Thesis ad doctoratum in theologia totaliter edita, Rome: Edusc, 2010), 151-59; P. Roszak, "Anatomy of Ludic Pleasure in Thomas Aquinas," *Pensamiento y cultura* 16, no. 2 (2013): 50-71; Basil Cole, O.P., *A Sense of Humour and Virtue: A Thomistic Theological Perspective* (Mumbai, India: The Bombay Saint Paul Society, 2011).

[4] See for this point Mordechai Gordon, "Friendship, Intimacy and Humor," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 46 (2014): 168.

behind the idea of *homo ludens*. Part II discusses the pivotal role of the emotions in play. Part III will show that *eutrapelia* is essentially also a social virtue by focusing on two specific kinds of humorous play: derision and blasphemy. In the conclusion, I will point briefly to the relevance of Thomas for the contemporary discussion about the moral limits of play in general and of humorous play in particular.

## I. *HOMO LUDENS*: PLAY AND REST

The Latin word for play (*ludus*) has different meanings: it can be a game of some kind, public games, sport; it can be spectacle, show, stage play, or social entertainment; it can be pastime, diversion, having fun, amusing oneself with others; and finally it can also be jest, joke, mockery, mimicry, banter, or ridicule. In this last case play includes humor and can be verbal or nonverbal. The different meanings of play show that one can be actively or passively involved in play. The common denominator of these different meanings is that play provides diversion, amusement, or enjoyment.[5] Play is discussed by Thomas in his questions on temperance, and more specifically in his analysis of the annexed virtue of modesty, which concerns, among other things, our bodily movements and actions.[6] The words and deeds of human social interaction can be either serious or playful (*ludus*).[7]

The point of departure in our analysis of play according to Thomas is that he emphasizes its beneficial consequences and distinguishes between its social and its individual purpose. Presupposing that we have a social nature, Thomas writes that play not only takes place in a social setting, but that it is necessary for human interaction (*ludus est necessarius ad conversationem humanae vitae*). It enhances community relations by bringing

[5] Whidden ("The Theology of Play and the Play of Theology") mentions the different meanings of play in the very beginning of his article. The present article can be considered complementary to that of Whidden.

[6] *STh* II-II, q. 160. Modesty is a virtue annexed to temperance, and deals with human actions which are less difficult to restrain.

[7] *STh* II-II, q. 160, a. 2.

about cohesion in a group of people.[8] In his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle Thomas makes the even stronger statement that play is needed as relaxation "from the anxieties and cares of human living and social interaction" (*ab anxietate sollicitudinum in hac vita et in conversatione humana*).[9] Play may facilitate and sometimes even be necessary for human functioning in life and in social interaction.

The second purpose of play receives more attention from Thomas: play aims at the good of the player, as it is meant to provide rest and relaxation after intellectual effort.[10] The amusement obtained by playing serves our mental health.[11] As will be shown in our discussion of the virtue of *eutrapelia* in part III, the "individual" purpose of play can never be severed from its social purpose.

The "individual" benefit of play can be explained by Thomas's concept of nature and its application to our physical and mental powers. Teleology is intrinsic to the particular essence of a being. It includes its specific goal and its specific way to realize that goal, that is, the specific activity of a being within proper limits.[12]

Applying this concept to our physical powers, Thomas can state that they are "finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor."[13] A physical power or faculty is limited in the quantity of work it can do. While working, we use our physical strength, but at a certain point it reaches a limit. We cannot do more than our physical strength allows, and cannot work indefinitely in

[8] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 3, ad 3. See also IV *Sent.*, d. 16, q. 4, a. 2, qcla. 1 (*Scriptum super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi*, vol. 2, ed. Pierre F. Mandonnet [Paris: Lethielleux, 1929]). See also Jacques Le Goff, "Une enquête sur le rire," *Annales: Histoire, sciences sociales* 52 (1997): 452.

[9] IV *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 16 (Marietti ed., 851).

[10] "Ad bonum ipsius ludentis, prout sunt delectantes vel requiem praestantes" (*STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1).

[11] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2.

[12] "Nothing can act beyond its species" ("Nulla res agere potest ultra suam speciem" [*STh* I-II, q. 112, a. 1]).

[13] "Habet finitam virtutem, quae determinatis laboribus proportionatur" (*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2).

time or in intensity.[14] These physical limits are partly individual, but mainly species-determined. A human being and a horse have different limits, while two individuals differ in their levels of physical strength. However, even if we have reached the limits of our physical activity, it is possible to restore and regain the bodily strength needed to act again. The key to this is rest.[15]

A parallel situation exists in the powers of the soul, which can also only perform a specific and fixed amount of work (*virtus finita ad determinata operationes proportionata*).[16] The body regains strength from physical rest; in like manner, the soul needs rest in order to recover from its effort. The comparison between physical and mental work rests on the assumption that mental activity is "work" (*labor*). The human being, according to Thomas, has one intellectual faculty, with two different modes of thinking. Whereas *intellectus* is our capacity for an "immediate grasp" of the essence of things, *ratio* points to our intellectual activity as discursive, as proceeding from first, immediately grasped principles to conclusions, as a movement from one thought to another, as inquiry or demonstration.[17] Given this, it is not difficult to understand why Thomas thinks that intensive (rational) thinking can be a real effort. He even mentions that one can go "beyond his measure" (*ultra suum modum*) in one's intellectual operations (*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2). They become *labor* (hard work, toil) which leads to weariness (*fatigatio)*.

The background for this idea is Thomas's hylomorphic understanding of human nature. Intensive intellectual work causes not only mental but also bodily fatigue, because mental activity engages the body. As Thomas writes: "when the soul

[14] "Oportet operibus laboriosis requiem interponere, eo quod impossibile est semper agere" (IV *Sent*., d. 16, q. 4, a. 2, qcla. 1, arg. 2; X *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 9 [Marietti ed., 2077]; *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2).

[15] "Homo indiget corporali quietem ad corporis refocillationem" (*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2 [*refocillare*: to revive]).

[16] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2.

[17] See *STh* I, q. 79, a. 8; *De Verit.*, q. 15, a. 1 (Turin: Marietti, 1953); *STh* II-II, q. 49, a. 5, ad 3; *STh* I, q. 14, a. 7. See Josef Pieper, *Leisure, the Basis of Culture* (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 1998), 36ff.

works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs."[18] The intellectual powers can "accidentally" become tired "after long and intense study" (*post longam vel vehementem meditationem* [*ScG* III, c. 62]), because they use sensible organs which undergo a real change when they are confronted with sensible objects. But the cause of mental fatigue is not only physical. The fact that human knowledge finds its origin in sense knowledge can in itself be a reason for mental exhaustion, because practical or speculative intellectual activity is less natural to us and therefore an effort. Therefore, even when the first effect of contemplative activity is pleasure and some kind of relief, weariness may accompany it.[19]

Thomas also recognizes an intellectual effort that surpasses our natural limit to such an extent that it not only leaves us "oppressed and weary" but on the verge of a mental collapse. This unusual mental exhaustion is described in strong terms: the danger is imminent that the soul will "break."[20] Using an example found in the Desert Fathers about Saint John the Evangelist, he compares the state of an overworked soul to a bow which, if always stretched, will finally snap.[21]

The natural limits of our intellectual activity which arise from the very nature of human knowledge generate the need for mental rest (*quies animae*). The words used for rest by Thomas are *quies* (rest, repose, cessation) and *requies* (relaxation, intermission, recreation). He stresses that rest is not sought for itself, but "on account of work" (*propter operationem*). Physical and mental work require rest not only because one has reached the limits of one's possibilities, but also because one needs to regain

[18] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2; see also *ScG* II. 79 (*Summa contra Gentiles seu De veritate catholicae fidei* [Turin: Marietti, 1924]); cf. *ScG* III. 62; X *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 10 (Marietti ed., 2089); *STh* I-II, q. 35, a. 5. See also IV *Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, qcla. 2.

[19] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2.

[20] "In like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed" ("Animus hominis frangeretur, si numquam a sua intentione relaxaretur" [*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2]).

[21] See John Cassian, *Conference* 24 ("Conference of Abbot Abraham. On Mortification"). 21. This chapter tells the story of the blessed John the Evangelist.

new strength and be ready for more work.[22] Rest has a temporal dimension: taking place in the present, it relates to the past and the future.

## II. *HOMO DELECTANS*: PLAY AND EMOTIONS

Mental fatigue and healing rest can best be understood through a discussion of two passions: sorrow (*tristitia*) and pleasure (*delectatio*). The importance of this point cannot be stressed enough.[23]

### *A) Tristitia*

In his treatise on the passions[24] in the *Summa theologiae*, Thomas writes about the effects of intensive activity, stressing the role of the passions. Actions or operations are pleasant (*delectabiles*) in so far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent, but become toilsome (*laboriosae*) and irksome (*attaedians*) when a certain limit is exceeded. The agent feels exhaustion and sorrow (*tristitia*).[25]

"Sorrow" (*tristitia*) is one of the eleven passions discussed by Thomas in his questions on the passions.[26] It differs from physical pain (*dolor*) in that it is caused by an "interior apprehension" (with no physical contact involved) of an "evil" object. This is either an object that is judged and experienced by

[22] X *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 2077).

[23] See J. Morreall, "Humor and Emotion," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 20 (1983): 301. He states that amusement is not an emotion and not aimed at survival, as are the emotions. Cf. Glenn A. Hartz and Ralph Hunt, "Humor: The Beauty and the Beast," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 28 (1991): 299-309.

[24] *STh* I-II, qq. 22-48. Passions are psychosomatic actions-reactions to an object on the level of the sensitive soul of both nonrational and rational beings. In the human being the sensitive soul is in close contact with the rational soul. For more details see Elisabeth Uffenheimer, "Rationalized Passion and Passionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the Passions," *The Review of Metaphysics* 56 (2003): 525-58; Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[25] *STh* I-II, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3.

[26] *STh* I-II, qq. 35-39.

the subject as incompatible with itself, as a threat, as contrary;[27] or it is a good object that is absent.[28] The absence can refer to the past or to the future: the object was once present, but is now absent; or the object is absent in the future, in the sense that it is striven after or desired in a hopeless effort.[29] As is true of any passion, *tristitia* or sorrow is psychosomatic: it is a change in the sensitive soul with bodily repercussions. Concerning the physical effect, Thomas writes that of all the passions, sorrow most strongly counters the vital movement of a person[30] and can paralyze external bodily movements.[31] It can also affect the ability to carry out intellectual work.[32]

The effects of *tristitia* on the soul are metaphorically described: there is heaviness (*aggravatio*), the soul is confined (*angustiatus*) and constricted or contracted (*constrictio*), and the sorrow consumes a person completely (*absorbare*).[33] There is fatigue or weariness.[34] In some extreme cases sorrow can deprive a person of the use of reason and lead to melancholy and mania (*melancholia et mania*).[35]

If we link this short analysis of sorrow to what was said in part I, we can understand how intensive intellectual activity can "accidentally" cause sorrow. Its dependence upon the sensible organs[36] as well as its origin in sense knowledge are the cause of impediments and limitations.[37] For example, the contemplation of God can be experienced as a *bonum absens* in the future,

[27] *STh* I-II, q. 35, a. 3, ad 1. *Tristitia* is "de praesentia contrarii" or about a "malum conjunctum" (*STh* I-II, q. 36, a. 1).

[28] *STh* I-II, q. 36, a. 1; q. 35, a. 3, ad 1; q. 37, a. 4, ad 3.

[29] *STh* I-II, q. 35, a. 2, ad 2; q. 36, a. 2, corp. and ad 2 and ad 3.

[30] *STh* I-II, q. 37, a. 4.

[31] *STh* I-II, q. 37, a. 2.

[32] *STh* I-II, q. 37, a. 1, ad 3 and ad 2; q. 37, a. 4, ad 3. See also *STh* I-II, q. 38, a. 4, ad 1.

[33] *STh* I-II, q. 37, a. 2, corp. and ad 2 and ad 3.

[34] *STh* I-II, q. 38, a. 1.

[35] *STh* I-II, q. 37, a. 4, ad 3.

[36] *STh* I-II, q. 35, a. 5.

[37] *STh* I-II, q. 36, a. 2; "'He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow,' either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth" (*STh* I-II, q. 38, a. 4, ad 1); IV *Sent.,* d. 49, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2.

something which one would like to reach, but cannot attain now. This frustration of one's natural desire leads to a loss of hope of ever reaching the desired object and causes *tristitia* or sorrow.[38]

*B) Delectatio*

The soul (or mind), as was said above, needs to rest after intense intellectual work in order to recover its strength and inner balance. Only then will it be able to continue its activity.[39] According to Thomas, leisure (*otium*), play (*ludus*), or unspecified other activities (*alia*) can provide the rest needed.[40] This means that the relief of mental sorrow does not have to consist in another intellectual activity or in pure physical-bodily delights. There are a whole range of activities that can help to overcome one's weariness. We will limit ourselves to play (*ludus*) as a possible cure against mental exhaustion (*STh* II-II, q. 168).

An analysis of pleasure (*delectatio*) is crucial to understanding how play can lift sorrow. This point is almost completely overlooked in the secondary literature on the topic of play.[41] Its importance consists in the insight that it is not *ludus* as such that is necessary for mental survival, but the experience of pleasure which is at its center. The human person is a *homo ludens* as a *homo delectans.*

In his treatise on the passions Thomas stresses that pleasure (*delectatio*)[42] involves the appetitive and the apprehensive powers of the soul. It comprises three things: *bonum delectans,*

[38] *STh* I-II, q. 36, a. 2, corp. and ad 2 and ad 3.

[39] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2.

[40] See for this list: *STh* I-II, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3. The text does not indicate if the rest is physical or mental. "Alia" can be friends, baths, or sleep. See *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, ad 3 and *STh* I-II, q. 38 on the remedies of *tristitia*.

[41] Casagrande and Vecchio ("Vizi e virtu del gioco") point to the role of *delectatio* as a third factor between play and rest.

[42] *Laetitia* and *gaudium* are more specific kinds of *delectatio.* For the difference between them, see *STh* I-II, q. 31, a. 3, corp. and ad 3; *STh* I, q. 20, a. 1. For the morality of pleasure, see *STh* I-II, q. 34.

*conjunctio delectabilis,* and *cognitio huius coniunctionis*.[43] Concerning the appetitive powers[44] Thomas writes that what precedes pleasure are two other passions, *amor* and *desiderium*: the initial congruency (*amor*) of the subject with an object judged to be fitting/suitable (*conveniens*), followed by the desire (*appetitus, desiderium*) for the object.[45] *Delectatio* comes about when the subject actually obtains (*conjunctio*) this good object (*bonum delectans*).[46] As such, pleasure is the opposite of *tristitia* (sorrow when united with an object judged to be bad or evil [*malum*]). It is the coming to rest, the repose of a desire: *quies appetitus* and *quies in fine*.[47] Put differently, the attainment (*adeptio*/*conjunctio*) of a suitable and desired object is experienced as a repose for the appetitive power of the soul. Contrary to sorrow, which causes a metaphorical contraction or depression, delectation causes an expansion (*dilatatio*) in the soul.[48] Therefore it can be a remedy against sorrow.[49]

Just as the appetitive powers take part in pleasure, so do the apprehensive powers of the soul. *Delectatio* includes the awareness of the attainment (*perceptio*/*cognitio huiusmodi coniunctionis*) of a suitable object. As human beings, we not only experience that we have been united with what we judge and desire as right for us, but we know that we enjoy something delightful.[50] This awareness is reflexive knowledge (which in the

[43] *STh* I-II, q. 32, a. 2.

[44] Ibid.

[45] *STh* I-II, q. 25, a. 2.

[46] "Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable and connatural so to speak" ("Quod delectatio se habet in affectibus animae, sicut quies naturalis in corporibus, est enim in aliquo convenienti et quasi connaturali" [*STh* I-II, q. 31, a. 8, ad 2]).

[47] See *STh* I-II, q. 31, a. 1, ad 2; "delectatio est quaedam quies appetitus in bono convenienti" (*STh* I-II, q. 38, a. 1); *STh* I-II, q. 33, a. 1.

[48] See *STh* I-II, q. 33, a. 1, which describes expansion in the apprehensive and appetitive power. See also *STh* I-II, q. 37, a. 2.

[49] *STh* I-II, q. 38, a. 1. Thomas agrees with Aristotle that any enjoyment can take away sorrow if it is intense enough ("omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget").

[50] *STh* I-II, q. 33 a. 1; see also q. 31, a. 1; q. 32, a. 1, corp. and ad 1; q. 11, a. 1, ad 3.

human being is a combination of sensitive and rational awareness).

This short analysis of sorrow and pleasure allows us not only to understand play, but also to discuss the seemingly contradictory goals of this activity. We started our discussion of play according to Thomas by pointing out its beneficial consequences, that is, its social and individual purpose. Play, however, is often described as being an end in itself and as such not serving a further (external) goal.[51]

A key insight of Thomas in this matter is the distinction between the playful acts as acts and what is central to them: that is, the pleasure or enjoyment they provide.[52] When Thomas writes that playful acts are ends in themselves, he does so on the basis of his understanding that pleasure gives rest to the appetite. One plays basketball or tennis, goes to the theater, or tells jokes because one wants to do something enjoyable. And in these activities one's desire for pleasure comes to rest.[53]

Playful acts as such belong to a larger class (*species*) of acts that are carried out for their own sake because they are pleasurable in themselves. Thomas mentions that virtuous actions, happiness, amusement,[54] and contemplation[55] are all pleasurable in themselves and as such are ends in themselves.

[51] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, obj. 3 and corp.; X *Nic. Ethic*., lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 2069-70); *In Boet. De Hebdom*., proe.

[52] "Playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul" ("Ipsae operationes ludi secundum suam speciem non ordinantur ad aliquem finem: sed delectatio, quae in talibus actibus habetur, ordinatur ad quandam animae recreationem vel quietem" [*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, ad 3]). Cf. *STh* II-II, q. 138, a. 1 ad 3: in play a distinction is made between *quies*, which is opposed to labor, and the inordinate delectation which the relaxation brings, but which can be opposed to *eutrapelia*.

[53] "Delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, quia est quies in fine" (*STh* I-II, q. 34, a. 2, ad 2). Cf. *STh* I, q. 5, a. 6; and *In Boet. De Hebdom*., proe: "ludus est delectabilis."

[54] X *Nic. Ethic*., lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 2069-70). "But those activities are designated as desirable in themselves, from which nothing further than the activity itself is sought, inasmuch as they lack nothing to make them worthy of choice" (ibid. [Marietti ed., 2069]). "He subdivides activities desirable in themselves. He says first that these seem to be virtuous actions. . . . Second, even agreeable amusements seem to be desirable of themselves. For it does not seem that men choose these pastimes for any utility, since

However, to return to what was said earlier, the central experience of playful acts is pleasure, which is not only the rest of a desire, but includes also the awareness of the attainment of the enjoyable object.[56] This awareness is present on a sensitive and rational level. What is proper to rationality is that it can organize means towards ends; it can "use" something.[57] As such it can relate to the central element in playful activities not only as a final cause, but as a means towards a further goal, namely, recovery from mental exhaustion, or social relaxation.[58] This is the formal or motive cause of pleasure.[59] Playful activities can be beneficial precisely in so far as they are a source of enjoyment.[60] Thomas goes even further: enjoyable play needs occasionally to be used[61] as a remedy for mental fatigue (*fatigatio)*. "Amusement has the aspect of useful good" (IV *Nic. Ethic*., lect. 16 [Marietti ed., 851]). When playful acts are directed to an end outside themselves they become instrumental.

Parts I and II have shown that Thomas considers the human being to be a *homo ludens* and thereby fully acknowledges that the human person is a *homo delectans*, a creature capable of enjoying itself, in a positive sense. Even when Thomas orders pleasures hierarchically (bodily, spiritually, etc.) and condemns certain kinds of enjoyment,[62] he always acknowledges that the possibility to enjoy constitutes an integral and necessary part of human existence.

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people are more often harmed than helped by such activities. In fact, because of amusements men seem to neglect both their bodies, which are exposed to pains and dangers, and their possessions by reason of the expenses they incur" (ibid. [Marietti ed., 2070]).

[55] *In Boet. De Hebdom.*, proe. Here Thomas compares contemplation and play: both activities do not serve a further goal and are enjoyable.

[56] *STh* I-II, q. 32 a. 1, corp. and ad 1.

[57] *STh* I-II, q. 16, a. 2; q. 16, a. 3, ad 1; q. 32, a. 1, ad 1.

[58] For "relaxatio" see X *Nic. Ethic.,* lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 2077); *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2.

[59] *STh* I-II, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3.

[60] *ScG* III, c. 25; See also *ScG* III, c. 2.

[61] "Et ideo necesse est talibus interdum uti, quasi ad quandam animae quietem" (*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2); cf. X *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 2077).

[62] X *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 2039ff.).

Playful, pleasurable acts are ends in themselves, but can be used for the individual and social benefit of the rational human being. The moral judgment will consider precisely the use of pleasure in these acts and distinguish between a morally good and morally unacceptable use. A moral virtue will guide and guarantee that the amusement is morally acceptable.[63] Rationality, use, and morality go hand in hand.[64] The morality of play will be treated in the following section.

## III. *HOMO RIDENS*: MORAL NORMS OF HUMOROUS AND NONHUMOROUS PLAY

So far, we have discussed play in terms of the general meaning of amusement—*verba et facta ludicra vel iocosa*. Although the meaning of *ludicrus* and *iocosus* partly overlap, *ludicrus* is more closely connected to sports and theater, whereas *iocosus* means humorous, full of jest, funny.[65] Jocose words and deeds, in which the enjoyment is obtained by humor, can be considered to be a subcategory of the more general category of playful acts. As John Morreall points out, Thomas is one of the few philosophers who classified humorous words and deeds as a kind of play.[66] The importance of this should not be underestimated: "Categorizing humor as playful activity goes a

[63] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, corp. and ad 3. "But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason" ("Delectabile autem dicitur secundum appetitum, qui quandoque in illud tendit quod non est conveniens rationi. Et ideo non omne delectabile est bonum bonitate morali, quae attenditur secundum rationem" [*STh* I-II, q. 34, a. 2, ad 1]). On the morality of pleasure, see *STh* I-II, q. 34 aa. 1-4.

[64] IV *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 16 (Marietti ed., 850): ". . . if no aspect of good can be found in amusement there will be no virtue connected with it"; ibid. (Marietti ed., 851): "But amusement does have an aspect of good inasmuch as it is useful for human living."

[65] Huizinga (*Homo ludens*, 35) points out that the Latin language has one word to cover the whole field of play, namely, *ludus*. *Jocus* and *jocari* mean joking and jesting, and differ from play in the proper sense. The word *ludus* has disappeared but *jocus* entered the Western languages. Morreall writes that humor in the current sense of funniness has only been used since the eighteenth century (John Morreall, "Philosophy of Humor," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [2020]: entry 1).

[66] See Morreall, "Philosophy of Humor," entry 5.

long way to defending it from many traditional accusations, such as the charge of hostility."[67]

The third part of this article will limit itself to play as *verba et facta iocosa* (humorous words [jest, joke, ridicule, etc.] or deeds [pantomime, mimicry, facial expressions]), because this will enable us to come to an insight into the moral norms of play in general.

### *A) Humorous Play and Rationality*

The idea that the human person is a laughing/humorous animal is not to be found in the Bible and does not belong to the initial content of *imago Dei*. Thomas does not take this as a reason to reject humor a priori or to connect it with the devil or with original sin, as did some of his predecessors.[68] On the contrary, following Aristotle and Cicero[69] he considers the ability to laugh to be a quality proper to us (*proprium accidens*) as rational beings, that is, a quality that does not belong to but is nevertheless connected to our specific essence.[70] We have seen in part II that our experience of enjoyment in play involves rational, reflexive awareness. This applies also to humorous

[67] John Morreall, "Humor, Philosophy and Education," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 46 (2014): 125.

[68] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, obj. 1-2 and ad 1-2. Predecessors are Tertullian, Basil of Caesarea, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory the Great. For all these thinkers see George Minois, *Histoire du rire et de la dérision* (Paris: Fayard, 2000), 107ff. Minois also points out (ibid., 119ff.) that the Church gradually changed its attitude about laughter: although originally considered diabolic and related to original sin, its role in recreation and as a means against evil was eventually recognized.

[69] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2. Aristotle's texts are quoted in II *Nic. Ethic*., lect. 7; IV *Nic. Ethic*., lect. 8; X *Nic. Ethic*., lect. 6; VIII *Polit*., lect. 3. See Cicero, *De officiis* 1.103-14. For Aristotle and Cicero as a source for Thomas, see Conrad Hyers, *The Comic Vision and the Christian Faith: A Celebration of Life and Laughter* (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1981), 12ff.

[70] For the definition of *proprium accidens* see *STh* I, q. 77, a. 6, ad 3. For the human person as *risibile*, see *De Ente*, c. 7. See also *STh* I, q. 3, a. 4; q. 3, a. 6; *STh* I-II, q. 2, a. 6; *De Pot*., q. 10, a. 4, ad 7. Risibility is connected to our rational soul, but laughter as a physical reaction itself may be caused by a bodily condition, for example, *gula* or gluttony. Thomas discusses laughter in his treatise on the human emotions; see *STh* I-II, q. 38, a. 2, ad 2 and ad 3.

words and deeds: they are rational acts and the enjoyment they bring about is of a rational nature. The speaker, performer, listener, and spectator of humorous words and acts know that they enjoy something funny, know when a joke is a joke, realize when humor is good and when it crosses a fine line and becomes bad humor, which hurts and insults.

Thomas accepts but does not develop the link between rationality and humor. Nor does he explicitly discuss the creative aspect of rationality in humor by which the world is not only observed but understood and interpreted.[71] He hints, nevertheless, at the presence of creative rationality in humor. For example, when discussing morally bad humor, he states that a person is capable of turning anything into an object of humor.[72] What is not comical/funny in itself becomes so through one's perspective. Humor involves a creative disengagement from its object.[73]

Moreover, Thomas distinguishes (in *STh* II-II, q. 110, a. 2) three kinds of lies, and making a joke is one of them (*mendacium iocosum*). The intention of the humorous lie is amusement and not deception and it can therefore never be a mortal sin.[74] The idea that the content of humor does not have to correspond to reality may suggest some understanding of the creative rationality at work in humor. And finally, Thomas's moral perspective on humor presupposes that humor can conform or fail to conform to moral norms. This in itself presupposes creativity.[75]

[71] See Morreall, "Humor and Emotion," 302-3. The creativity we find in humorous play may be considered to be a particular instance of the creativity at work in play in general. See John Morreall, "The Rejection of Humor in Western Thought," *Philosophy East and West* 39 (1989): 253 and 258.

[72] IV *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 16 (Marietti ed., 852).

[73] See Morreall, "The Rejection of Humor."

[74] The intention is "aliqua levis delectatio" (*STh* II-II, q. 110, a. 4); *STh* I-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1; *STh* II-II, q. 110, a 2; "for a 'jocose' lie is told to make fun" ("mendiacum iocosum est quod fit causa ludi" [*STh* II-II, q. 110, a. 2, obj. 1 and corp.]). See also *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 12, arg. 9; q. 7, a. 1.

[75] See John Morreall, *Taking Laughter Seriously* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1983), 99. See also Morreall, "Humor and Emotion," 300.

## *B) The Morality of Humorous Play*

"Tell me if you laugh, how you laugh, why you laugh, about whom and what, with whom and against whom, and I will tell you who you are."[76]

Playful humorous activities are susceptible of moral judgment and guidance because they are rational in nature.[77] The object of moral scrutiny is not the activities themselves, but the pleasure present in them in so far as it is subjectively determined, desired, obtained, and used.[78] That pleasure in play has its own moral virtue, *eutrapelia*, means that it is not intrinsically evil.[79] Whereas Aristotle considers this virtue to be mostly applicable to jokes in words and deeds,[80] Thomas (in the text of *STh* II-II, q. 168) expands the scope of *eutrapelia* to play in general—without, however, making a clear distinction between play in general and humorous play. In what follows, we will try to understand what *eutrapelia* (as the virtue of play in general) entails, by focusing on different kinds of humorous play (bad humor, lack of humor, and good humor) and by analyzing two kinds of bad humorous play (derision and blasphemy).

### 1. Bad Humor

Thomas never denies that morally bad humor can be a source of relaxation or provide new mental strength. However,

[76] "Dis-moi si tu ris, comment tu ris, pourquoi tu ris, de qui et de quoi, avec qui et contre qui, et je te dirai qui tu es" (Le Goff, "Une enquête sur le rire," 449).

[77] *STh* II-II, q. 138, a. 1, ad 3; "dictum est autem quod ludicra sive iocosa verba vel facta sunt dirigibilia secundum rationem" (*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 3). Cf. Huizinga, *Homo ludens*, 6, who says that play is outside the antithesis of wisdom and folly, truth and falsehood.

[78] *STh* I-II, q. 34, a. 2; q. 34, a. 1, ad 2 and ad 3; cf. *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, ad 3.

[79] "There can be no corresponding virtue and vice concerned with what is intrinsically evil and incapable of having an aspect of good. Consequently, if no aspect of good can be found in amusement there will be no virtue connected with it" (IV *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 16 [Marietti ed., 850]). Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 60, a. 5, obj. 4 and s.c.; II *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 353); II *Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 8.

[80] See Aristotle, *Nic. Ethic.* 4.8; and Thomas, IV *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 16.

in his moral perspective, he characterizes it as excess[81] and distinguishes between different kinds of excess. A first kind concerns the topic of humor:[82] pleasure is obtained by what is morally shameful or hurtful (*in aliquibus operationibus vel verbis turpibus vel nocivis*). The humorous words and deeds are "discourteous, insolent, scandalous or obscene" (*illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscoenum*).[83] Indecent objects or topics produce a low kind of humorous enjoyment, whose content expresses an attitude[84] of exaggerated interest in the earthly, the bodily,[85] and therefore also a neglect of the divine. Thomas remarks that the morally deficient quality of acts or words are not diminished by a humorous framework. Humor does not neutralize immorality; on the contrary, the humorous words and deeds become obscene or shameful. For example, humor about fornication does not reduce the grave sinfulness of this deed.[86]

A second case of excess occurs when the circumstances of the humorous playful activities are not taken into account, such as the position and rank of people who are the object of humor, or time and place (for example, laughing when one should be serious).[87] This kind of excess shows the necessity of what Aristotle calls "tact."[88] The reflexive rationality present in humorous play should assess the amusement in the larger context in which it takes place. Enjoyment is not an isolated experience of an individual person. We should not make jokes about overweight people when there are overweight people in the audience—unless we are making jokes about ourselves.[89]

[81] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2; q. 168, a. 3.

[82] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2.

[83] Here Thomas quotes Cicero, *De offic.* 1.29.

[84] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 1; q. 168, a. 3, ad 3 on the use of "illicitis verbis et factis."

[85] *STh* II-II, q. 153, a. 5, ad 4.

[86] See *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 3, ad 1.

[87] "Sicut et in omnibus aliis humanis actionibus, ut congruat personae, tempori et loco" (*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2). See also ibid., ad 1; q. 168, a. 3.

[88] For tact (tactful, *epidexios*) see IV *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 16 (Marietti ed., 857, 863).

[89] Ibid. (Marietti ed., 861): "It is indeterminate what may offend or please the listener, because different things are odious or pleasant to different people."

A third kind of excess occurs when the amusement is "out of control," in the sense that it becomes a goal in itself.[90] In this case of misuse of play (*inordinate uti ludis*) one is overly interested in the pleasure it brings. Some are even willing to disobey the commandments of God for the sake of play.[91] Thomas does not deny that the experience of enjoyment is central to play, but he is also concerned with the way in which people relate to this experience, the way they desire it. Their search for pleasure can become a primary goal, overriding the beneficial use of play for mental rest and social interaction.[92]

Thomas considers laughter to be the physical expression of enjoyment obtained by humorous play.[93] He judges that it is not morally wrong to burst easily into laughter (*facilis* or *promptus in risu*)[94] and notices that merriness is naturally augmented by laughter.[95] In some cases excessive or superfluous laughter will therefore only be a venial sin.[96] However, when discussing this topic in the context of *humilitas* and its opposite, *superbia*, he makes it clear that laughter can be disturbing for the laughing person as well as for that person's social surroundings, because uncontrolled laughter can cause one to lose inner harmony and self-mastery. When not tempered, the danger even exists of losing one's mental dignity altogether (*ne totaliter gravitas*

[90] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, ad 2; q. 168, a. 3.

[91] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 3. Cf. q. 75, a. 5.

[92] See Thomas's discussion of happiness in *STh* I-II, q. 2, a. 6. He distinguishes between the final and the formal cause of pleasure.

[93] Thomas does not discuss the point that not every experience of humor (active or passive) needs to express itself in laughter; and that not all laughter is occasioned by humor. For an overview of the different words for laughter, see Michel-Marie Dufeil, "Risus in Theologia Sancti Thome," *Le rire au moyen âge dans la literature et dans les arts*, Actes du colloque international 17-19 Novembre 1988, ed. T. Bouche and H. Charpentier (1990): 147-63.

[94] The idea of uncontrollable laughter is expressed in different ways: Thomas mentions "senseless mirth" ("inepta laetitia") (*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 3, ad 2) or "easily moved and disposed to laughter" ("facilis aut promptus in risu") (*STh* II-II, q. 162, a. 4, ad 4).

[95] *STh* I-II, q. 38, a. 2, ad 2.

[96] For *risus superfluus* as a venial sin, see *STh* I-II, q. 88, a. 2; see also II *Sent.*, d. 42, q. 1, a. 4.

*animae resolvatur*).[97] In a social context it can lead to a situation where it is impossible to control a group of people, which is apparently the reason why monastic rules condemned excessive laughter.[98]

## 2. Lack of Humor

*Eutrapelia* should moderate not only excess, but also lack of enjoyment, which consists in the absence of any intention to be amusing and a refusal to share in the fun of others.[99] People who are without humor are called *duri et agrestes*: harsh and boorish/uncultured. Such serious people are burdensome to others because they are neither a source of enjoyment for their fellows, nor do they respond to their merriness.[100] Using a line from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* about friendship, Thomas compares friends, sweetness, and salt. All three are necessary: a few friends are necessary for the sake of pleasure, just as a little bit of sweetness suffices to season life and a little salt suffices for seasoning meat.[101] Although considered to be a vice,[102] the lack of playful fun is less severe than its excess[103] because it is close to *eutrapelia*, which is a virtue of moderation.

The way in which Thomas discusses the lack of humor emphasizes again that enjoyment is part of the human being as a rational creature, and especially as a social creature. Enjoying oneself by play is not only permitted, it is important and

[97] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2. *Resolvere* here means to untie, to loosen, relax, free.

[98] See Jean Verdon, *Rire au moyen âge* (Paris: Perrin, 2001); J. Le Goff, "Le rire dans les règles monastiques," in *Haut moyen-âge: Culture, éducation et société, etudes offertes a Pierre Riche*, ed. Michel Sot (Nanterre: Publidix, 1990), 92-103.

[99] For the difference between excess and lack see II *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 9; IV *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 16.

[100] "Puta dum nihil delectabile exhibit et etiam aliorum delectationis impedit" (*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 4).

[101] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 4, quoting Aristotle, *Nic. Ethic*. 9.10.

[102] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 4.

[103] Ibid., ad 3.

necessary. Social interaction needs to include playful interaction, whether humorous or not.[104]

The above discussion of bad humor and of lack of humor has given us a first idea of what *eutrapelia* stands for. These insights will now be completed by a discussion of derision and humorous blasphemy, which will show that *eutrapelia* guarantees more than keeping the mean between excess and lack of playful enjoyment; it concerns also right intention and social respect.

## 3. *Derisio*

Anything can in principle become the object of humor:[105] lower forms of life (animals), other persons, and even God. The human being is the only creature that can adopt a humorous perspective on situations and other beings.[106] Whereas lower forms of life will not be affected by humor (although they could be affected physically by acts), other people can effectively be hurt by humorous words and deeds.[107] Play in the sense of humorous verbal or nonverbal social interaction may even be most damaging and distressing.

One can engage humorously with another person by imitation or by verbal teasing. As long as the goal of this kind of humorous play is to please and to relax, it will be enjoyed. A fine line is crossed, however, when the humorous interaction turns into mockery (*derisio*). Because words and deeds are signs of one's internal disposition,[108] they become hurtful (*nocivus*) when nourished by a negative emotion, such as contempt, hatred, or jealousy. The other person blushes with shame, fearful of the damage done to his or her social status and repute-

[104] Cole, *A Sense of Humour and Virtue*, 82. Cole points out that playfulness as humor is something we owe to others because we belong to society, we are social creatures. It is not a debt strictly speaking, but belongs to affability.

[105] IV *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 16 (Marietti ed., 852).

[106] See IV *Nic.Ethic.*, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 353).

[107] *STh* II-II, q. 75, a. 2; q. 168, a. 1, ad 3.

[108] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 1, ad 3.

tion.[109] The essential social function of enjoyable humorous interaction disappears: instead of uniting people, humor becomes a source of discord. Jokes of this kind are deadly sins.[110]

Derision shows the human person to be humorous knowingly, willingly, and emotionally. Responsible self-reflection is crucial, and as rational creatures we should know at any point which emotions motivate our humorous play. We have to temper "evil" emotions and be motivated by the intention to entertain, to make it pleasant to be together.[111]

As is often the case in his writings, Thomas shows a subtle awareness of the complexity of human interaction and warns us to be careful when judging another person's intentions. The possibility exists of accidentally hurting somebody by unwillingly and even unconsciously expressing negative feelings in words and deeds. If the primary intention of the joke is to engage in fun or to please, the sinfulness of the humorous words has to be reconsidered.[112]

The possibility that humorous words and deeds become mockery brings our attention to the fact that the virtue of *eutrapelia* includes more than keeping the mean between excess and lack. As noted above, this virtue concerns not only the individual person, because humorous enjoyment in play needs to consider the circumstances in which humorous deeds and words are done and said. Even when engaging in humorous play for mental rest, we still must do so in a socially correct manner.

[109] For derision and shame, see IV *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 16 (Marietti ed., 864).

[110] *STh* II-II, q. 75, a. 2.

[111] For discussions of the relationship between humor/laughter and the emotions, see Moreall, *Taking Laughter Seriously*; idem, "Humor and Emotion"; Henry Bergson, *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic* (New York: Macmillan, 1911). Some aspects of the relationship between emotions and humor are not discussed by Thomas, for example, neutralizing emotions by humor. Somebody can tell a joke in a situation of fear in order to block his or her feelings. A discussion of the fact that humorous words and deeds need a public which is emotionally prepared is also absent. Thomas does, however, mention how emotions can be wrongly expressed in humor and laughter—for example, when one laughs at the wrong time and place (*STh* I-II, q. 38, a. 2, ad 3).

[112] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 3; IV *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 16 (Marietti ed., 860); *STh* II-II, q. 72, a. 2, corp. and ad 1.

*Eutrapelia* is also a virtue of social interaction, which requires the right disposition towards other persons present and a responsible reflection on the motives behind one's words and deeds. It is based on a universal and egalitarian concept of respect.[113]

We can refer here to the distinction Thomas makes between serious and playful social interaction.[114] Serious interaction should be guided by the virtue of friendliness (*amicitia* or *affabilitas*), which guarantees that words and deeds directed towards another person are pleasant and becoming, and truthfulness (*veritas*), which assures that one's outward movements express an upright inner condition. We should show ourselves in word and deed as we are inwardly.[115] Although playful interactions have their own virtue they are and remain a kind of social interaction. Therefore *eutrapelia* cannot be detached from the virtues which apply to serious social interaction.[116] Playful humorous interaction which is aimed to bring rest for the individual person and cohesion in a group of people should be carried out by an upright mind which intends to be friendly with others, and truthful with itself and with the other persons (i.e., clear about one's motivations).[117] The moral norm for

[113] See *STh* II-II, q. 75, a. 1, ad 2. For studies on "respect," see Roberto Mordacci, *Rispetto* (Milan: Cortina, 2012), in particular 67-69 (on the middle ages): he distinguishes between an egalitarian-horizontal concept and a hierarchical-vertical concept; C. Casagrande, "Entre justice et humilité: Les vertus du respect chez Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 101, no. 2 ("Religion, respect, blasphème: Actes de la journée thomiste du 2 décembre 2016") (2017): 219-37.

[114] *STh* I-II, q. 60, a. 5.

[115] Ibid.; *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 1, ad 3; q. 111, a. 1; q. 109, a. 3 ad 1. See also K. White, "The Virtues of Man the *Animal Sociale*: *Affabilitas* and *Veritas* in Aquinas," *The Thomist* 57 (1993): 641-53.

[116] *STh* II-II, q. 168 a. 1, ad 3. *Moderatio* (which belongs to the virtue of temperance) concerns four topics, and one of them "regards bodily movements and actions which require to be done becomingly and honestly, whether we act seriously or in play" ("quod pertinent ad corporales motus et actiones, ut scilicet decenter et honeste fiant, tam in his quae serio, quam in his quae ludo aguntur" [*STh* II-II, q. 160, a. 2]). Thomas makes the connection between playful words and deeds and the virtues of *affabilitas* and *veritas* in *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 1, ad 3. For this point see also Casagrande and Vecchio, "Vizi e virtu del gioco," 21-36.

[117] See also III *Sent*., d. 34, q. 1, a. 2; IV *Nic. Ethic*., lect. 16 (Marietti ed., 856).

amusement not only stands for moderation but includes social awareness, responsibility, and respect. As such can *eutrapelia* help to create, enhance, and sustain social relationships, and promote ethical life.

## 4. Blasphemy

Words and deeds which make God their target of fun belong to the category of blasphemy. Blasphemy is not always humorous, but whenever the human person makes fun of God, this is blasphemy.[118] This specific kind of humorous play with words and deeds is rejected by Thomas[119] because it either denies what is befitting to God, or affirms what is unbefitting to him.[120] Thomas distinguishes intellectual blasphemy from the much worse affective blasphemy,[121] which is accompanied by contempt for God.[122] Further, blasphemy can be present in one's heart (*in corde* [*cordis blasphemia*]) or be pronounced aloud (*per locutionem* [*oris blasphemia*]), and as such is opposed to *confessio fidei*.[123] Offensive verbal humor about God belongs to this last category. Blasphemy is a very grave sin[124] because it "derogates God's goodness" (*derogat divinae bonitati*), and fails to give him the honor due to him. As an act against faith and charity (*dilectio Dei*)[125] it is an upheaval of the metaphysical hierarchy, a profanation of the sacred.[126] It is far worse than any

[118] The general context for the discussion of blasphemy is the discussion of the vices against *confessio fidei* (*STh* II-II, qq. 13ff).

[119] *STh* II-II, q. 75, a. 2.

[120] *STh* II-II, q. 13, a. 1, corp. and ad 3; "quaedam autem est blasphemia, quae est impositio alicuius falsi in Deum, vel ei subtrahendo quod inest, vel attribuendo quod non inest" (IV *Sent*., d. 14, q. 2, a. 5, exp.).

[121] *STh* II-II, q. 13, a. 1.

[122] Ibid.; see also IV *Sent*., d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 3.

[123] *STh* II-II, q. 13, a. 1; blasphemy can be "in ore et in corde et in opere" (*STh* II-II, q. 14, a. 1, ad 1).

[124] *STh* II-II, q. 75, a. 2.

[125] Thomas uses the word *derogatio* (disparagement): *STh* II-II, q. 13, a. 2; *De Malo*, q. 7, a. 1.

[126] For the order-disturbing character of sin, see *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 5. See *STh* I-II, q. 88, a. 2, on "*risus superfluus*" as a venial sin.

injury done to another human being, because of both its object (God) and its intention.[127]

The above seems to suggest that Thomas agrees with Ambrose on the fundamental opposition between the humorous and the sacred.[128] However, he is aware of cases in which one is suddenly overcome by a passion and uses blasphemous words. In this case there is no actual sinful blasphemy.[129] In addition, he writes that Ambrose may reject humor about the sacred, but does not completely ban humor from human interaction (*a conversatione humana*).[130] Thomas clearly shows respect for the authority of Ambrose without giving up his own convictions about the need for humor.

Blasphemous humor, as expressed in deeds and words, helps us to understand another aspect of *eutrapelia*. It is proper to humorous play to create a distance by changing one's perspective towards its object. However, this should never be done by undermining existing hierarchies (*ordines*).[131] In the case of blasphemy this is a metaphysical hierarchy, but the insight applies also to social hierarchies. Thomas combines in *eutrapelia* a demand for universal (horizontal) respect for every other human being with a demand for consideration (or "vertical respect") of existing hierarchies.[132]

[127] See *STh* II-II, q. 13, a. 3, ad 1. In terms of the actual injury done, however, homicide is clearly worse than blasphemy.

[128] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, obj. 1.

[129] *STh* II-II, q. 13, a. 2, ad 3.

[130] "Ambrosius non excludit universaliter iocum a conversatione humana, sed a doctrina sacra" (*STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, ad 1).

[131] *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 5; and q. 88, a. 2 on the difference between mortal and venial sins, and sin as inordinateness or disorder.

[132] See Robert Mordacci, "A Short History and Theory of Respect," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 59 (2019): 121-36.

## 5. Good Jokes

From the above we may infer what the correct use of humorous amusement entails: it is guided by *eutrapelia*[133] ("wittiness" or "happy turn of mind")[134] which guarantees that the mean between two vices is maintained: on the one hand excess, on the other hand lack of enjoyment.[135] It does not intend to suppress enjoyment as such, but only the *delectationes superfluae et inordinatae*.[136] *Eutrapelia* will express itself in the cautious choice of the object of humorous amusement; it will take the circumstances of the situation into account, and will not make the enjoyment a goal in itself. The humorous person will not be influenced by negative emotions and show respect for his fellow players and for given hierarchies.[137] The above can be extended to play in general.

The human being is a *homo ludens*, capable of, and in need of, playful amusement. Such acts are searched after and beneficial for a person's own mental health, but their individual purpose cannot be separated from their social purpose. Renewal of personal mental strength and social cohesion are intertwined,[138] and *eutrapelia*, likewise, is both an individual and a social virtue.

[133] For the difference between temperance and modesty, and the relationship of the latter to *eutrapelia*, see *STh* II-II, q. 160, aa. 1-2; *STh* I-II, q. 60, a. 5; II *Sent*., d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; III *Sent*., d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, qcla. 1; d. 33, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 1, ad 3.

[134] Thomas also uses the word "*iucunditas*": *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 4, ad 3; q. 168, a. 2, s.c.

[135] II *Nic. Ethic.,* lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 353); IV *Nic. Ethic.,* lect. 16 (Marietti ed., 850).

[136] *STh* I-II, q. 168, a. 4, ad 3; *STh* II-II, q. 138, a. 1, ad 3.

[137] In this balanced context, it is not surprising that Thomas can accept the *histriones*, whose task consists in causing fun and laughter. If they use humorous play in a moderate way—without insulting anybody, without using low humor, without exaggeration—there is no problem in hiring them and enjoying their humor. See *STh* II-II, q.168, a. 3, ad 3. This view of Thomas is exceptional according to the French historian Jacques Le Goff, in a world where the guardians of order are hostile towards the disorder created by laughter. See Le Goff, "Une enquête sur le rire," 454.

[138] For the different kinds of enjoyment and the use of enjoyment, see *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 3, ad 3; and IV *Sent*., d. 16, q. 4, a. 2, qcla. 1. The connection between *eutrapelia* and other social virtues is expressed in another way (IV *Nic. Ethic*., lect. 16

The acceptance of Aristotle's *eutrapelia* by Thomas means not only that there is a virtue pertaining to enjoyable play, but that enjoyment (in humorous or other playful activities) even belongs to being virtuous.[139] The wise and virtuous (*sapiens et virtuosus*) person will use (*uti*) play well[140] and will not refuse to participate in enjoyable amusement. The behavior of the virtuous person will reflect the right attitude toward play, enjoyment, and humor.[141] However, more is at stake than the temperate use of pleasurable play. The more one grows in virtue, the less one needs ordinary play for relaxation. Ultimately all the actions of the virtuous person will be pleasurable in a deep, fulfilling sense (*STh* I-II, q. 34, a. 4: "est enim bonum et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum"). He can be said to be a *homo ludens* (taking "play" in a broad sense), *delectans*, and even *ridens* in whatever he does.[142]

Most of us will never reach the ideal state of mind of the virtuous person (perhaps none of us will), but we can nevertheless be certain that we are permitted to play, enjoy, and laugh. According to Thomas playful pleasure is necessary for human life and for life to be human. Thomas's insights were

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[Marietti ed., 857, 858, 863, 865]), when Thomas mentions *eutrapelia* and tact in one breath. *Eutrapelia* is here explicitly connected to social awareness and sensitivity.

[139] On this point see John Lippit, "Is a Sense of Humor a Virtue?", *The Monist* 88 (2005): 72-92; Robert C. Roberts, "Humor and the Virtues," *Inquiry* 31 (1988): 127-49.

[140] *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, s.c. "According, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according to Psalm 132:1, 'Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity" (*STh* II-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 3). See also *STh* I-II, q. 34, a. 1, corp. and ad 2; q. 34, a. 4.

[141] Cf. *STh* I, q. 98, a. 2, ad 3: discussing sexual pleasure, Thomas writes that "By 'immoderately' I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind."

[142] See Cole, *A Sense of Humour and Virtue*, 72. See also the very interesting analysis of Adorno's *Minima Moralia*, 2:84 by Robert Miner, "Human Joy and the Subversion of Work/Play Distinctions: A Note on Adorno's *Minima Moralia* 2:84," *Telos* 191 (2020): 163-68.

rather unusual in his own time. It has been written that it was Thomas who again gave "honest laughter" its rightful place.[143] And, we would like to add, also honest play.

## CONCLUSION

According to Thomas the human being is a *homo ludens*, a *homo delectans*, and a *homo ridens*—a creature with a sense of humor. Play, enjoyment, and humor are important in our personal and social life, and are not primarily to be considered something unruly and disordered that needs to be disciplined. In contrast to modern philosophical discussions about play and humor which have focused on the essence of the comical, Thomas's approach is a moral one. This makes his insights highly relevant for dealing philosophically with the new ways of communication and play which have developed in recent years. Thomas's insights about the purpose of play, about the subtle presence of passions and intentions behind one's acts and words, his reflections about the limits of humorous amusement, and about the moral responsibility we have for our playful enjoyment—all these show once more the relevance of his thought.[144]

[143] Jeannine Horowitz and Sophia Menache, *L'humour en chaire: Le rire dans l'église médiévale* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1994), 35. See also C. Casagrande, "Affabilità, verità, eutrapelia: Le virtù della *communicatio* in alcuni commenti all'*Etica nicomachea* dei secoli XIII e XIV," *Philosophical Readings* 12 (2020): 142; Le Goff, "Une enquête sur le rire," 454.

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# MOVED BY THE SPIRIT: PATTERNING THE GIFTS ON THE PASSIONS IN AQUINAS

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WHAT IS HIGHEST is grasped according to what is lowest.[1] It is fitting, St. Thomas Aquinas affirms, that Scripture teaches spiritual matters by comparison to what is bodily, for the human person "comes to what is intelligible by means of those things that are sensible."[2] What is "more removed from God" is a means by which we come to know God, and so draw nearer to God: "for it is clearer to us what is not of God, than what is."[3] Following this principle, I present the movement of the Holy Spirit in the gifts according to an analogical patterning on the movement of the passions, which ground an understanding of receptivity in human agency. This consideration of passion-movement discloses a mode of activity that emphasizes external agency, and specifies the divine wisdom that undergirds both natural and spiritual instinct.

In an essay on the gifts, re-visioning them as being at the center of Thomistic morality, Servais Pinckaers describes *instinctus*

[1] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 9. All citations of Aquinas refer to the *Opera omnia* project (Lander, Wyo.: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine). Translations are my own.

[2] Ibid. For Aquinas's approach to material metaphors in Scripture, see Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas: Faith, Reason, and Following Christ* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 63-68.

[3] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 9, ad 3. See also Jean Pierre-Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 2, *Spiritual Master*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 40-45.

as needing "to undergo a major transformation" from its use in the broader animal world for use in relation to the Spirit.[4] He also notes that spiritual spontaneity is "very different, in its relationship to freedom, from the spontaneity of the senses or of external nature"; and of the instinct of the Holy Spirit he says, "there is obviously nothing blind about such an instinct."[5] The question is thus raised about the relationship between natural and spiritual instinct: can a so-called "blind" instinct of nature be analogically appropriated to spiritual movement? In order to specify this relationship, I investigate passion-movement and its underlying receptivity as the paradigm for being moved by the Spirit in the gifts.

This approach considers human activity in terms of movements that reflect the intellectual nature of the human person, even if they are not "properly speaking" *rational*. "Properly speaking" is a phrase Aquinas often uses to differentiate properties that belong essentially to the nature of a thing or power from those that belong in an extended or accidental sense. In reading Aquinas on human action and virtue, it may be tempting to rely on the former, namely, the essential attributes indicated in a definition.[6] Such an approach, however, limits Aquinas's thought to the realm of the "proper," leaving aside all other elements as questionable or conjectural.[7] Strictly limiting

[4] Servais Pinckaers, "Morality and the Movement of the Holy Spirit: Aquinas's Doctrine of *Instinctus*," in *The Pinckaers Reader*, trans. Craig Steven Titus, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 389.

[5] Servais Pinckaers, *The Sources of Christian Ethics*, trans. Mary Thomas Noble (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 358.

[6] See, for example, Andrew Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas's Ethics: Virtues and Gifts* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 13-14. Following Eleonore Stump, he points to Aquinas's definition of virtue in *STh* I-II, q. 55, a. 4 as confirmation of the "falsity" of the acquired virtues. See Eleonore Stump, "The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas's Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions," *Faith and Philosophy* 28 (2011): 29-43. Aquinas, however, at *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 7, affirms that if the particular good being pursued in the acquired virtues is a true good (*verum bonum*), then it is *true* but *imperfect* virtue (*vera virtu, sed imperfecta*); thus, "*simply* true virtue is not possible without charity" (emphasis added).

[7] In his study of judgment by inclination, Rafael-Tomas Caldera describes how "judgment by science or demonstration" was assumed to comprise the whole meaning of

the meaning of a term in this way is inconsistent with Aquinas's multivalent use of terms, as well as the limits of particular terms themselves which, in their own limited fashion, signal realities that a term does not (and cannot) fully encapsulate.[8] The movement toward precision in understanding the meaning of a term is then also a movement toward grasping its limits.[9] In grasping the limits of a term for understanding a reality, the reader grasps the divine mystery and agency that surpasses her reasoned grasp, even as it governs and moves her seeking.

The term "human action," properly speaking, refers to the movement of will under reason's deliberation of the end and of means to the end; hence the definition of will as "rational appetite."[10] "Passion," on the other hand, refers to an appetitive movement as "the effect of the agent on the patient," or as the result of "being drawn to the agent," namely, the experience of being moved by an agent-object, especially when it involves bodily change; hence passion "properly speaking" belongs to the sensitive appetite.[11] While the term "human action" primarily describes the person as a self-mover and bears a direct relation to reason, the term "passion," as a movement of the sensitive appetite, primarily describes the person as one who is

judgment: Rafael-Tomas Caldera, *Le jugement par inclination chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1980), 54-58. All translations of Caldera are mine. See also Gilles Mongeau, "Mystery on the Move: Aquinas's Theological Method as Transforming Wisdom," *The Thomist* 80 (2016): 285-300 (especially 289-92).

[8] On the distinction between the "manner of signifying" (*modus significandi*), which is diverse, and the "thing signified" (*res significata*), see David B. Burrell, *Aquinas: God and Action*, 3rd ed., ed. Mary Budde Ragan (Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock, 2016), 10.

[9] See Gilles Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom: The Summa theologiae as Spiritual Pedagogy* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2015), 87-88: "Thomas always seeks to determine the limits, to achieve greater precision. . . . This is not a Promethean quest to contain revelation within a system but to constantly push human thinking forward." Notably, precision is ordered toward "the proper shaping of the person by the mystery under investigation"; in other words, the understanding granted by precision is ordered toward the formation of the person seeking to know God, which always requires further discovery.

[10] *STh* I-II, q. 1, aa. 1 and 2; q. 8, a. 2.

[11] *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 2: "passio est effectus agentis in patiente"; q. 22, a. 1: "nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem."

moved, and is considered a movement that is below reason.[12] At the same time, Aquinas uses the term "passion" to describe human action; an extended meaning of the term "passion" is needed to understand the fullness of the reality he calls "human action."[13]

The emphasis in Aquinas's treatment of the virtues is on the person as source of her actions; it deals with the acts that proceed from the powers of the human soul as informed by the virtuous habits, whether acquired or infused.[14] The gifts, on the other hand, correspond to those acts that the person cannot generate according to reason's direction, even as informed by the infused virtues.[15] Thus, understanding the movement of the gifts requires an attentiveness to the receptivity that underlies human agency, and that is realized in concrete, intentional movements wherein the person is drawn toward objects that

[12] *STh* I, q. 80, a. 2; q. 81, a. 3.

[13] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.

[14] *STh* I-II, q. 55, a. 1.

[15] Traditionally, interpreters of Aquinas have held a basic distinction between the infused virtues and gifts, namely, that the gifts involve a higher mode of action. This is said to be the case even by those who recognize a development in Aquinas's thought on the point. In the *Sent*., Aquinas uses the language of a "superhuman mode" to describe the gifts in contrast to the "human mode" of the virtues (see III *Sent*., d. 34, qq. 1 and 2), whereas in his later treatments he uses *motio* and *instinctus* in describing the gifts (see *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 1, corp. and ad 4). The notion of a superior mode of operation in the gifts does, however, remain (*STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 2, corp. and ad 1 and 2). As Edward O'Connor describes it, "the two expositions are fundamentally compatible," understanding the "superhuman mode" of the *Sent*. as specified as *instinctus spiritus sancti* in the *STh* (Edward D. O'Connor, "Appendix 4: The Evolution of St. Thomas's Thought on the Gifts," in *Summa theologiae*, vol. 24, *The Gifts of the Spirit (1a2ae. 68-70)* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974], 118-19, 122-23). For further discussion on this development, see Ulrich Horst, *Die Gaben des Heiligen Geistes nach Thomas von Aquin* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001); James W. Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas' Exposition of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit: Developments in His Thought and Rival Interpretations* (PhD diss., The Catholic University of America, 2012); Bernhard Blankenhorn, *The Mystery of Union with God* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 270-73. In Marie-Michel Labourdette's overview of the history of interpretation, he follows Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange in asserting that the two treatments are essentially the same: M.-Michel Labourdette, "Dons du Saint-Esprit: Saint Thomas et la théologie thomiste," in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, vol. 3 (Paris: Dabert-Duvergier Beauchesne, 1957), 1617-18.

move her. While the virtues perfect the person to desire what is actually good according to the light of reason, the gifts make the person "readily movable by divine inspiration," wherein the person is moved beyond reason's ability, and such movements especially correspond to passion-movement.[16]

In this article, I first treat passion-movement of the sensitive appetite "properly speaking," and its extended meaning in the will, highlighting how receptivity spans appetitive movement. Second, I consider how passion-movement specifies the receptivity inherent in human action. This is seen especially in the understanding of intention as that which proceeds toward the end (as terminus), grounded by the passion and affection of *amor*. In light of this significance of *amor*, in the third section I turn to the gift of wisdom and Aquinas's invocation of connaturality with the divine. By comparing connaturality on the levels of nature and supernature, I argue that passion-movement provides the matter for analogical appropriation from natural to spiritual movement, thereby specifying the transformation of the term *instinctus*. Finally, in the fourth section, I compare natural instinct and the passions of the sensitive appetite to the way in which the person is moved by the Spirit. By emphasizing the agency of the Holy Spirit and the fullness of human freedom in the gifts, a paradigm of receptivity for human action, or action in the mode of passion, is revealed in the gifts.

## I. Passion-Movement and Receptivity

As Aquinas describes it, the term "passion" (*passio*) denotes "undergoing" (*pati*), which Robert Miner articulates as "being acted upon."[17] More particularly, *pati* is "properly" used "when something is received while something else is taken away."[18]

[16] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 1: "homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab inspiratione divina."

[17] *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 1; Robert C. Miner, *Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa theologiae, Ia2ae 22-48* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 32.

[18] *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 1: "Alio modo dicitur pati proprie, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abiectione."

The passions of the soul "properly said" involve bodily change, and when the change "is for the worse," as in sorrow, then "it has more properly the *ratio* of a passion."[19] "Properly speaking," passion belongs to the form and matter composite, occurring in the soul only accidentally, namely, according to its union with the body.[20] Notably, however, Aquinas affirms that "*pati* insofar as it solely indicates reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that potentially exists."[21] So it is that the soul "has something of potentiality, according as it belongs to it to receive [*recipere*] and to undergo [*pati*]."[22] In this way, the soul's act of understanding, which is not the act of a bodily organ, is considered to be something "undergone."[23]

Aquinas also notes that "to undergo" indicates external agency: "a thing is said to undergo from its being drawn to the agent."[24] This makes passion "properly speaking" appetitive rather than apprehensive, because appetite bears a direct relation to the object that affects it:

> the word passion indicates that the patient is drawn to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing more through the appetitive power than through the apprehensive power. For through the appetitive power the soul is ordered to the things themselves.[25]

In sensitive apprehension, spiritual transmutation occurs: the subject receives (*recipit*) an intention by means of a bodily organ, as in the way the eye receives color.[26] But whether or not the eye changes materially (i.e., undergoes a natural transmutation) is accidental and not essential to sensitive apprehension,

[19] Ibid. Miner appeals to common experience to support this claim, namely, that one experiences oneself "as acted upon" more when the outside force is against one's will (Miner, *Aquinas on the Passions*, 33).

[20] *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 1.

[21] Ibid., ad 1: "Sed pati prout importat receptionem solam, non est necessarium quod sit materiae, sed potest esse cuiuscumque existentis in potentia."

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid. See also *STh* I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3.

[24] *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 1.

[25] *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 2.

[26] Ibid., ad 3.

as for instance when the eye becomes tired from careful observation or the brightness of the object.[27] Sensitive appetite, on the other hand, involves natural transmutation as essential to its act.[28] In both cases, however, receptivity governs the relation between the appetitive subject and the object, the experience of which is mediated by the sensitive apparatus which attunes subjects to certain objects, or qualities in objects, rather than others.[29] By receiving intention by means of a bodily organ, sensitive apprehension shares to some degree in the appetitive logic that orders the soul to the thing itself wherein the subject is moved or affected by the object.

Further, the meaning of the term "passion" is not restricted to sensitive nature. Rather, the relationship between sensitive appetite and its object as that "toward which" one is drawn has a consonance of meaning with the "movement toward an end" in the will's act of intention.[30] Pertinent here are those movements of the will that Aquinas calls "affections." While movements of the sensitive appetite include corporeal transmutation and are passions "properly so called," "affections" refer to simple acts of will "with similar effects" to the passions of the sensitive appetite, but without corporeal change, or at least no felt or immediately noticeable corporeal change.[31] In this way, the meaning of "passion" is not restricted to sensitive appetite; rather, "the *ratio* of passion is *more properly found* in the act of the sensitive appetite than in the intellectual appetite."[32] The passions of the sensitive appetite signal a kind of intending

[27] Ibid. For discussion on spiritual or immaterial change in relation to physical change, see Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 54-57.

[28] *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 2, ad 3.

[29] *STh* I-II, q. 9, a. 2.

[30] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 2, ad 3.

[31] *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 3 and ad 3; q. 31, a. 5. For an overview of the affections as parallel to the concupiscible passions, see Nicholas E. Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 78. On the relation of emotion to the body, see Diana Fritz Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 84.

[32] *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 3 (emphasis added).

movement, where *intentio* (the aim at an object) indicates the form of the act, and the somatic aspect comprises the matter.[33] Affection, by comparison, takes the form or *intentio* of the corresponding passion, but without the material element that is constitutive of the passion. "Affection," then, is a broader term than "passion," and describes the appetitive intention or aim common to movements both of sensitive appetite and of will.

This exploration of passion-movement reveals that "reception," which undergirds the logic of passion, involves both potentiality and actuality: it is the power in act according as it receives intention from an object. Receptivity, therefore, refers to activity from the perspective of passivity, or of "undergoing," that is, from the perspective of the object of the act functioning as agent, or as moving the subject. In this way, while receptivity points to a basic passivity of power, it is not an inert or amoral category. Rather, it posits a power *in potentia* to the acts to which it is moved, signalling an agent-object or power that is outside the subject. This bears important consequences for the will, namely, the power of self-determination in the human person. As Daniel Westberg puts it, the will (and intellect) as a *passive* potency is moved by or attracted to some object, "but as potencies reduced to act they become active and enable a person to be an agent, that is to be free to think, desire, and do things."[34] There is, in other words, no "pure" expression of will's passivity, just as there is no "pure" expression of will's activity. Any movement of will insofar as it is reduced to its act by some object moving it involves both its passivity, according to which it is rendered receptive to its object, "the good and the end," and its activity, according to its own inclination.[35]

A comparison to Caldera's analysis of the three senses of connaturality will assist our grasp of the receptivity central to human action. First is connaturality considered from the object that "possesses this [connatural] consonance with the natural

[33] See also Miner, *Aquinas on the Passions*, 37.

[34] Daniel Westberg, "Did Aquinas Change His Mind about the Will?," *The Thomist* 58 (1994): 41-60 (especially 54).

[35] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 3.

appetite or with the very nature of a thing"; this is parallel to will's passivity, according to which it is moved by objects that are convenient or proper to it.[36] Second is connaturality understood as the tending of the appetite to its connatural object, namely, the appetitive subject inclining; this is parallel to will's activity, wherein it is reduced to act according to its own inclination.[37] Third, connaturality refers to all that "pertains to the nature of a thing," namely, the "consonance between the natural appetite and its object"; this is parallel to the relation that exists between will and all those objects to which it potentially inclines.[38] The third sense, as the broadest, grounds the first two which emphasize either the object of love or the subject who loves. Receptivity, then, on the one hand, describes an underlying capacity, the potency of a power to be actualized; and, on the other hand, it *is* a kind of intentional activity, the actualization of a potency—in sensitive appetite, in will, and in the order of grace. Finally, there is a dynamic set of relations between the subject and those objects that are proper to it, according to which the subject is by nature "amenable" (or "readily movable") to receiving from certain objects.

## II. Human Action in the Mode of Passion

The receptivity of the will in its intentional activity provides a means of considering human action in the mode of passion. In the human person, *actus* describes the activation of a potency that *intends*, namely, that aims for some end. It is taken for granted that human action, "properly speaking," proceeds from the will which relies on reason's ordering of means to end, and even more basically on knowing that one is acting for an end.[39]

[36] Caldera, *Le jugement par inclination*, 64.

[37] Ibid. See also *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 1, corp. and ad 3.

[38] Caldera, *Le jugement par inclination*, 64.

[39] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 1; q. 12, a. 4; q. 6, a. 1. For an overview of the history of interpretation of Aquinas's "stages" of human action, see Daniel Westberg, *Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 119-35. On the simultaneity of intellect and will in human action, see Westberg, "Did Aquinas Change His Mind about the Will?," 51-58; and Michael S.

Thus, a person with a "deliberated will" knows what she is doing, and here the human person as self-mover is particularly evident. Aquinas's presentation of human action also relies upon considerations of passion, and especially the intending of *amor* which joins subject to object, wherein the human person *as moved* is particularly evident. This provides a paradigm for human action that de-centers reason's deliberative function, and this is especially reflected in the gifts of the Spirit.

The deliberating capacity of reason referred to in the first article of Aquinas's account of human action in the *Prima secundae* introduces the kind of action that is proper to the human person, namely, that which evokes the "deliberative" mode of knowing proper to the human species, and therefore informs human action.[40] In the following article, Aquinas states that rational nature properly "tends toward the end as if acting [*agens*] or leading [*ducens*] itself to the end," but nonrational nature tends toward the end "as if by another acting or leading [*quasi ab alio acta vel ducta*]."[41] In this way, Aquinas affirms that

> man is master of his actions through reason and will; hence, free will is said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions which proceed from a deliberated will are properly called human. If there are other actions which belong to man, these can be called actions of a man, but not properly human, since these are not of man insofar as he is man.[42]

In the third article, the emphasis shifts from the powers of reason and will to the object of the will, namely, "the good and the end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts,

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Sherwin, *By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 18-24. In Sherwin's presentation (ibid., 85-102), the act of choice, human action "properly so called," and moral action become synonymous: "When through an act of will we choose the act, this act becomes a human act properly so called, and is thus something for which we are morally responsible" (102). While he describes "a fundamental receptivity in the will" (97), he uses the formal act of choice (of means) as the paradigm for love to become "a principle of action" (93).

[40] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

[41] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 2.

[42] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

insofar as they are human, is the end."[43] Aquinas then explains that the end is also the *terminus* of human action: "where the human act terminates is what the will intends as the end."[44] On this basis, "moral acts properly receive species from the end, for moral acts and human acts are the same."[45]

Here, Aquinas aligns the notion of end as *terminus* with an understanding of action as *passion*, namely, as being drawn toward or moved by the end. The first objection states:

> it seems that human acts do not receive species from the end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But each thing possesses species from some intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts do not receive species from the end.[46]

Aquinas replies:

> the end is not extrinsic to the act in every way, because it is considered in relation to the act as principle or terminus; and this itself is of the *ratio* of an act, namely that it is *from* something, considered as action, and that it is *toward* something, considered as passion.[47]

Human action, then, is both active, according to the intrinsic principle that is born of reason and will, and passive, according to the exterior reality that moves or draws the person, including that reality which is not yet actual, but also not merely potential.[48] The human act proceeds from the end as principle, and toward the end as terminus.

In considering action as *passion*, the object of the act is received more than it is conceived according to reason's deliberation. In other words, action as passion retains the meaning of being drawn to the object according to basic receptivity of power, and posits a mode of human action that

[43] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 3.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid., obj. 1.
[47] Ibid., ad 1 (emphasis added).
[48] Ibid., ad 2.

can also be described as being led or directed.[49] At the same time, the end of the act is received according to the proper mode of will, namely, in the knowledge that one is acting for an end with some cognitive grasp of that end; in this way, the end is also principle of the act.[50] On the one hand, all human action reflects both aspects, namely, being a self-mover and being moved; on the other hand, these two aspects provide two paradigms for human activity, wherein the first emphasizes interior powers of agency, and corresponds especially to virtue-formation, and the second emphasizes exterior agency, and corresponds especially to gift-formation. Each, importantly, suggests that the other is needed for fuller realization of agential *potentia*.

Especially significant in this regard is Aquinas's notion of "works" according to which the person knows *what* he intends, but "not what will follow from his work."[51] In treating the gifts of the Spirit, Aquinas relies on this understanding of "work": "wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, insofar as it proceeds from the judgment of reason, but it is called a gift, insofar as it *works from divine instinct* [*operatur ex instinctu divino*]. And this is said similarly of the other gifts," namely, those that share the name of a virtue.[52] I will return to the difference between

[49] I am not attempting superficially to separate end as principle versus end as terminus: insofar as intention is considered as principle, it becomes end as terminus in moving toward it; conversely, intention considered as terminus is also end as principle as it is interior, or grasped as end. The point is that end as principle versus end as terminus provides different means of accounting for the different ways that intention arises or originates. Intention as terminus, I am arguing, aligns more with an understanding of action as passion, analogous to the way in which sensitive passions respond to an object as that toward which one tends.

[50] *STh* I-II, q. 6, a. 1: "Now in order that a thing be done for an end, *some* knowledge of the end is required. Therefore, whatever acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle in this way, namely, that it has *some* knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act so that it not only acts, but also acts for an end" (emphasis added).

[51] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 1, ad 2: "Intention is said to be a light because it is clear to the one who intends. Therefore works are called darkness, because man knows what he intends, but not what will follow from his work" ("opera dicuntur tenebrae, quia homo scit quid intendit, sed nescit quid ex opere sequitur").

[52] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ad 4.

the two kinds of judgment in the third section. Here, it is important to note that the voluntariness of human action in the gifts relies on the same reality that expresses freedom in human action in general, namely, the intention that grasps some object as present to and purposeful for the exercise of the person's agency.

This understanding of intention is especially illuminated by Aquinas's treatment of *amor*, for that which tends toward an object first receives the form of its tending, intellectually or sensibly. In treating the passion of *amor*, Aquinas says that "a natural agent brings about a twofold effect in the patient: first it gives form, and second it gives the motion that follows from the form."[53] The desired object gives to the appetite "first, a certain fittingness to itself, which is an appetible complacency," namely, the passion of *amor*, "from which follows movement toward the desired object," namely, the passion of *desire*.[54] This movement is circular: "because the desired object moves the appetite, making itself in some way to be in the intention of the appetite; and consequently the appetite really tends to the desired object, such that the end of the motion is where the principle lies."[55] The end of the motion is the passion of *joy*, which is a resting in the appetible object. Again, Aquinas equates the end of the motion (parallel to the terminus of action) with the principle, or intention, which was "made" according to *amor*, namely, as complacency in the object that initially moved the appetite toward itself. Thus, in tending toward and resting in the object that is loved, intention evolves according to the relation of the appetitive subject to the object, originating always from a complacency in the object. In other words, *amor* causes the object to exist in the appetitive subject's horizon.

Aquinas concludes that *amor*, properly speaking, is considered a passion since it is in the concupiscible power. He affirms, however, that "in an extended sense" (*et extenso*

[53] *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 2.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.: "Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III de anima, appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium."

*nomine*), *amor* is in the will.[56] In this way, *amor* is the sign of will's free exercise (viz., whether will inclines toward an object brought into its horizon), and is integral to the meaning of intention, for *amor* is "the principal movement tending toward the end that is loved."[57] Notably, in comparing *amor* and *dilectio* in Dionysius, Aquinas writes:

> by *amor* man can tend toward God, in a certain manner passively attracted by God himself, more than his own reason can lead him, which pertains to the *ratio* of dilection. . . . And in this way *amor* is more divine than dilection.[58]

While intention presupposes "the ordination of reason ordering something to the end," the presence of *amor* in the will affirms that intention can be "known" simply by the appetitive tending toward an object, with varying degrees of knowledge being present in the volition.[59] We come to "know" something by

[56] Ibid.

[57] *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 1: "In natural appetite, the principle of motion is its connaturality to that toward which it tends, which can be called natural *amor*, just as the connaturality of a heavy body toward the center is through weight, and can be called natural *amor*. Similarly, the fittingness of the sensitive appetite, or of the will, toward some good, namely, its complacency in the good, is called sensitive *amor*, or intellectual or rational *amor*. Therefore, sensitive *amor* is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual *amor* is in the intellectual appetite. And it pertains to the concupiscible, since it is said to regard the good absolutely, and not with difficulty, which is the object of the irascible."

[58] *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 3, ad 4: "Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio." Aquinas is here responding to the position stated in the *sed contra* (my thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out).

[59] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 1, ad 3. See also *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 1, for Aquinas's use of the term "intention" as "tending to something" ("*intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, significat in aliquid tendere*"). Westberg describes it as follows: "intention is usually taken to refer to a state of mind, but Thomas defined it as a tending towards something. This very simple definition obviously fits in well with his metaphysics of potency and act, and also makes it possible, at a basic level, to include the movement of animals as showing a kind of intention. More importantly, it is a realist account in that it stresses the reality of the object as motive force and relates intention to that. Intention can be defined, then, as the aiming of an action towards something" (Westberg, *Right Practical Reason*, 136).

virtue of having been moved by it or drawn toward it. In human action, "properly speaking," reason presents will with the object; in action as passion, will is affected by the object, which affectivity includes intellectual grasp. In this way, the will's movements of *amor* posit an affective knowing that relies on the will's passivity, rendering it receptive to ends that are not of the subject's own making.

## III. The Matter of Nature and Grace in Connaturality and *Instinctus*

The role of *amor* in intention provides the matter for conceiving human action according to the receptivity that undergirds human agency. Beginning with the passions of the sensitive appetite, and proceeding to the affections and intentions of the will, receptivity enables and is expressed in passion-movement. In this way, passion-movement is built into Aquinas's account of human action, which relies on ends that move the person. The gifts of the Spirit provide the paradigm for this receptivity inherent in human action, emphasizing the agency of the Spirit who moves the person, directing and leading her to the end of salvation, fulfilling human freedom and transforming the relationships of nature.

The centrality of passion-movement for the gifts is especially apparent in the gift of wisdom, which reveals in turn the centrality of the *instinctus Spiritus Sancti* for all the gifts. The judgment of the gift of wisdom occurs by way of connaturality with things divine, which is the effect of charity, rather than discursively by use of reason, as in the intellectual virtue of wisdom.[60] While nature prepares for, or grounds the movement of, what is supernatural, the latter transforms nature from its very roots. It does this not by negating the natural order of instinctive action, but by fulfilling it in light of the divine wisdom that is its source and end.

The way in which the judgment of the gift of wisdom occurs reveals its nearness to nature, namely, as modelled on the ease

[60] *STh* II-II, q. 45, a. 2.

of movement that occurs in connatural tending. In treating the cause of love (*causa amoris*), Aquinas says that "*amor* indicates a certain connaturality or complacency of the one who loves toward the thing loved; moreover, that which is good for a thing is what is connatural and proportionate to it."[61] The virtue of charity causes connaturality with the divine, wherein the act of loving God is performed with the ease and pleasure that reflects the connatural tending of a natural power toward its object.[62] Charity, therefore, furnishes the person with an affectivity attuned to the divine, which renders the person receptive to the Spirit's activity. Because connaturality, both on the level of nature and in charity, implies an affinity with that which is good, an apprehension of goodness is able to occur without a discursive process of reasoning.[63] There is no need to compare one thing to another, or to move from something understood to something new; rather, the intellect is able to pronounce a judgment of goodness owing to the very presence of the object.[64] As love grounds the free movement of the subject toward her natural good, so love grounds the free movement of the subject toward her supernatural good.[65]

In treating sacred doctrine as wisdom in the *Prima pars*, Aquinas articulates a twofold manner of judging on account of which there is a twofold wisdom, which grounds the distinction between wisdom's act of judgment in the intellectual virtue and in the gift.[66] He distinguishes between judging through inclination, "as one who has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of those things to be done according to the virtue, inasmuch as he is inclined toward them," and through knowledge, "as one

[61] *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 1.

[62] *STh* II-II, q. 45, a. 2; q. 23, a. 2.

[63] *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 1; II-II, q. 45, a. 2.

[64] Note *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 2: "*amor* requires *some* apprehension of the good that is loved. . . . Therefore knowledge is the cause of *amor*, by reason also of the good, that nothing can be loved without being known" (emphasis added). See also *STh* I-II, q. 6, a. 1.

[65] See especially *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 4, on *amor* and connaturality: "now every motion toward something, or rest in something, proceeds from something connatural or fitting to it, which pertains to the *ratio* of *amor*."

[66] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3.

instructed in moral science can judge about virtuous acts, even if he does not have the virtue."[67] As Caldera notes, the judgment by inclination of the virtuous person is used as a model for understanding the judgment by inclination of the spiritual person.[68] As the virtuous person, assimilated to the rule of reason, is the measure of human action, so the spiritual person, "assimilated to the supreme rule," which is God, makes judgments in light of the divine rule by his very inclination toward the object, rather than by the discursive use of his reason.[69] By his inclination, or his "affective reaction," the object appears to him "as it truly is"; in other words, "it is experienced by him rightly."[70]

In Aquinas's treatment of the gifts, the Spirit is the agent that moves, or affects, the person by giving her the object or intention, such that the person is affectively moved by it "rightly."[71] In the first question on the gifts in the *Prima secundae* Aquinas uses the term *inspiratio* to express the text of Isaiah

> where the name is not gift but rather spirit, for thus it is said in Isaiah 11, "the spirit of wisdom and understanding," etc. "will rest upon him." From these words, we are clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by divine inspiration [*inspiratione divina*].[72]

[67] Ibid.

[68] Caldera, *Le jugement par inclination*, 68.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid. Further describing the "affective reaction," Caldera says that the present object "touches a cord of our affective register," causing "a sort of inclination of our being" which adheres to or flees from the object. While it is a "non-intellectual" reaction (i.e., the tending toward or away carries the judgment), there is an "intuitive grasp of knowledge" that accompanies the affective reaction (69-70).

[71] The nautical image used by John of St. Thomas communicates this connatural ease of movement that reflects both "the stability of a habit" and the Spirit as "the source of serenity": John of St. Thomas, *The Gifts of the Holy Spirit*, trans. Dominic Hughes (Providence, R.I.: Cluny Media, 2016), 63 (II, n. 10); 75 (n. 29); 79-80 (n. 35).

[72] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 1. For the scriptural foundation of Aquinas's teaching on the gifts, see Edward D. O'Connor, "Appendix 1: The Scriptural Basis for the Doctrine of the Gifts," in *Summa theologiae*, vol. 24, *The Gifts of the Spirit (1a2ae. 68-70)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 80-87.

Having followed Scripture's manner of speaking in setting down what the gifts are, namely, *spirits* that are in us by divine inspiration, Aquinas specifies that *inspiratio* "signifies a certain motion from the exterior," and then describes how this divine activity occurs in us, namely, by following an *interior instinct*.[73] *Instinctus*, therefore, signifies interior motion that proceeds from an exterior source. This dynamic already coheres with the movement of passion where, as we saw in the first section, an interior motion responds to an exterior agent-object, namely, an object that affects the subject. I will compare the gifts with passion-movement more extensively in the fourth section. Here, it is important to establish the primary agent of the gifts, namely, the exterior source who moves the person interiorly, since this is the basis on which Aquinas distinguishes the gifts, and their mode of operation, from the virtues.[74]

In the first article on the gifts, Aquinas aligns the divine instinct with an interior instinct, and affirms that the former is "better" than human reason: "for those who are *moved by divine instinct* do not prepare to take counsel according to human reason, but *follow interior instinct*, because they are moved by a principle better than human reason."[75] In the second article, he aligns the *instinctus* principle with the person of the Holy Spirit:

[73] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 1: "debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturae"; "inspiratio autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori."

[74] Ibid.; and q. 68, a. 2. Stroud argues that the gifts of the Spirit are "a necessary part of every graced action" (Stroud, *Aquinas' Exposition of the Gifts*, 211). Meinert further argues that "the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and common actual grace (the *auxilium* of ST I-II, 109, a. 9) are one and the same" (John M. Meinert, *The Love of God Poured Out: Grace and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in St. Thomas Aquinas* [Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2018], 264). While these approaches strive to safeguard the constancy of the gifts in the moral life, resisting a historically conjectural treatment of the gifts, they fold the actualization of the gifts into the acts of the virtues. For an index of historical treatments of "the special motion of the Holy Spirit" in the gifts as compared to charity and common *auxilium*, see Dominic Legge, *The Trinitarian Christology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 204 n. 74. See also Shawn M. Colberg, "Aquinas and the Grace of *Auxilium*," *Modern Theology* 32 (2016): 187-210 (esp. 192-93).

[75] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 1 (emphasis added).

But in the order to the ultimate supernatural end, to which reason moves, in a manner and imperfectly, as it is formed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason itself does not suffice, without *the instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit from above being near*, according to Romans 8:14, 17, "those led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God; and if sons, then heirs." And in Psalm 142:10 it says, "your good Spirit leads me in the right path," namely, because no one can reach the inheritance of the land of the blessed unless *moved and led by the Holy Spirit. Therefore to reach this end, it is necessary that man have the gift of the Holy Spirit*.[76]

Aquinas affirms that the Holy Spirit, a source exterior to the human person, is the author of the instinct and motion, and yet, the instinct and motion of the Spirit is a sign of the Spirit's presence to the person.[77] In other words, the presence of the Spirit is marked by the Spirit's *moving and leading*, an articulation that aligns with Aquinas's description of nonrational nature: "it is proper to rational nature that it tend toward the end as if acting or leading itself to the end, but the irrational nature, as if by another acting or leading."[78] Charity provides the matrix of connaturality with the divine, wherein the person "has compassion or connaturality toward divine things."[79] The gifts take their place as *habitus* within this transformed

[76] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 2 (emphasis added): "Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte formata per virtutes theologicas, non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi *desuper adsit instinctus et motio spiritus sancti*, secundum illud Rom. VIII, 'qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt;' 'et si filii, et haeredes,' et in Psalmo CXLII dicitur, 'spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam;' quia scilicet in haereditatem illius terrae beatorum nullus potest pervenire, nisi *moveatur et deducatur a spiritu sancto. Et ideo ad illum finem consequendum, necessarium est homini habere donum spiritus sancti*." For discussion on Aquinas's commentary on Romans 8:14 and other texts as these pertain to how the Spirit moves Christ, see Legge, *Trinitarian Christology*, 202-6.

[77] For Aquinas's affirmation of a created habit of charity, in contrast to Peter Lombard's identification of charity with the Holy Spirit, see Dominic Doyle, "Is Charity the Holy Spirit? The Development of Aquinas's Disagreement with Peter Lombard," in *Questions on Love and Charity: Summa theologiae, Secunda secundae, Questions 23–46,* ed. Robert Miner (London: Yale University Press, 2016). The created habit of charity, however, is not unaccompanied by the presence of the Spirit. See Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 253-58, and 392-95.

[78] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 2.

[79] *STh* II-II, q. 45, a. 2.

connaturality, so that the person is "made readily movable by divine inspiration."[80] In this way, the person easily and freely follows the Spirit's leading, reflecting an order of activity that follows divine wisdom in natural instinct: "every agent whether natural or free, as if of itself spontaneously reaches toward what is divinely ordered. And in this way it is said that God disposes all things sweetly."[81]

## IV. Moved by the Spirit

In the gifts of the Spirit, Aquinas invokes an exterior agent that moves the person interiorly, which parallels his description of the movement of the passions. Further, connaturality with the divine, which especially informs the gift of wisdom, provides a paradigm for human activity in the order of grace that reflects the divine wisdom of natural instinct. It remains now to specify the comparison of the Spirit's moving the person in the gifts to the movement of the sensitive passions and of natural instinct. This serves to demonstrate the freedom inherent in gift-movement, and the fullness of human agency contained therein, as relying on passion. The gifts of the Spirit provide a paradigm for human activity that perfects the logic of receptivity that undergirds passion-movement, in the sensitive appetite and in the will.

The *sed contra* of the third article on the gifts again signals the Spirit as the primary gift, who also gives the gifts as habits:

> the Lord says to the disciples, speaking about the Holy Spirit (John 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you." The Holy Spirit however is not in men without his gifts. Therefore his gifts abide in men. Therefore they are not only acts or passions, but also permanent habits.[82]

Aquinas's response confirms the alignment of the *instinctus Spiritus Sancti* with the Holy Spirit who indwells, and provides an analogy by way of the moral virtues, which perfect the

[80] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 1.
[81] *STh* I, q. 103, a. 8. See also *De Verit*., q. 22, a. 1.
[82] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 3, s.c.

appetite, for understanding the agency of the Spirit, who perfects the person:

> *the gifts are certain perfections of man, by which he is disposed to follow well the instinct of the Holy Spirit.* Now it is evident from what has been said above that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it participates in a certain way in reason, namely, inasmuch as it is natural for it to be moved by the command of reason. Thus, in this way, the mode in which the gifts of the Holy Spirit are had by man in relation to the Holy Spirit is just as the moral virtues are had by the appetitive power in relation to reason. Now the moral virtues are a certain habit by which the appetitive powers are disposed readily to obey reason. *Hence also the gifts of the Holy Spirit are a certain habit by which man is perfected readily to obey the Holy Spirit.*[83]

At the outset, Aquinas invokes the instinct of the Holy Spirit, and he concludes by invoking the Holy Spirit himself. The gifts of the Spirit, like the moral virtues, are perfecting habits possessed by the person; as the moral virtues perfect the appetite to follow reason, the gifts perfect the person to follow the Holy Spirit.[84]

Aquinas describes this activity as the Spirit "acting upon" the person, yet not without the person also acting as principle of the movement: "he is so acted upon by the Holy Spirit, that he also acts, inasmuch as there is free will; hence, he needs a habit."[85] As the appetitive power is moved by reason and retains its nature as a power, so the person is moved by the Spirit and retains her power of self-movement. Further, as the appetitive

[83] Ibid., a. 3 (emphasis added): "*dona sunt quaedam perfectiones hominis, quibus disponitur ad hoc quod homo bene sequatur instinctum spiritus sancti*. Manifestum est autem ex supradictis quod virtutes morales perficiunt vim appetitivam secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem, inquantum scilicet nata est moveri per imperium rationis. Hoc igitur modo dona spiritus sancti se habent ad hominem in comparatione ad spiritum sanctum, sicut virtutes morales se habent ad vim appetitivam in comparatione ad rationem. Virtutes autem morales habitus quidam sunt, quibus vires appetitivae disponuntur ad prompte obediendum rationi. *Unde et dona spiritus sancti sunt quidam habitus, quibus homo perficitur ad prompte obediendum spiritui sancto*."

[84] See also John of St. Thomas, *Gifts of the Holy Spirit*, 82-83 (II, n. 42-43), where he says that the Spirit "regulates and delimits the objects of the gifts," comparing them to the virtues where "the reason . . . moves the will by presenting and delimiting its object."

[85] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 3, ad 2.

power receives its proper fulfillment according to the order of reason, so the person receives freedom from the Spirit moving her. Finally, in treating the passions of the sensitive appetite, Aquinas states that sorrow especially possesses the quality of passion according to the outside force it manifests.[86] In the gifts, the logic of receptivity is especially revealed by the presence of the Spirit; in this way it is unlike the absence of good in the evil undergone (as in the case of sorrow). The person is moved, in other words, by a divine abundance which "overwhelms" the person.

In his commentary on chapter 8 of Romans, on what it means for human persons to be "led by the Spirit of God," Aquinas makes the primary agency of the Spirit even more explicit, while maintaining the freedom of the human agent. To express this reality of spiritual freedom, Aquinas describes a correspondence in movement between being led by the Holy Spirit and moving according to natural instinct, affirming that the "highest" movements resemble the "lowest."[87]

Aquinas explains that to be led by the Spirit of God "is to be ruled as by a certain leader and director, which indeed the Spirit does in us, namely inasmuch as he illumines us interiorly about what we must do."[88] There is a similar comparison in Aquinas's discussion of reason's "rule" over the sensitive appetite, wherein the sensitive appetite retains its power: "the intellect, or reason, is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a political rule, because the sensitive appetite has *something of its own*, such that it can resist the command of reason."[89] On the one hand, the sensitive appetite receives the perfection of virtue in order

[86] See above, n. 19.

[87] In his study on the gifts, Pinsent prefers to liken the movement of the gifts to "joint attention" in order to avoid the use of the term "instinct," which he describes as "unhelpful, given the association of the word with the behavior of animals rather than the union of persons" (Pinsent, *Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas's Ethics*, 38). Yet Aquinas himself draws on understanding of the natural world to grasp the spiritual movements of the human person.

[88] *In Rom*., c. 8 lect. 3 (Marietti ed., n. 635); my translation, although I have consulted *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans*, trans. Fabian R. Larcher (Lander, Wyo.: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012).

[89] *STh* I, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2 (emphasis added). See also *STh* I-II, q. 56, a. 4, ad 3.

that its powers be well disposed to act according to reason, and not resist.[90] At the same time, insofar as moral virtue is generated in the sensitive appetite, the latter is itself conformed to reason: "inasmuch as they are truly conformed to reason, then the good of moral virtue is generated in them."[91]

Likewise, Aquinas affirms that the person who is led by the Spirit acts also from herself, namely, "through will and free will . . . because the Holy Spirit causes in them the very motion of the will and free will, according to Philippians 2:13: 'God is at work in you both to will and to work.'"[92] When the person is moved by the Spirit, the movement itself is the expression of a free act, and therefore contributes to the person's moral growth or gradual perfecting of her powers of agency. In this way, the Spirit moves the person in keeping with her nature and its virtuous perfection which, as Pinckaers has noted, provides the basis for spiritual spontaneity.[93]

At the same time, Aquinas takes an analogy from natural instinct to highlight the quality of *being led*:

> Hence we say that animals do not act but are led, because they are moved to their actions by nature and not from their own motion. Similarly, the spiritual man is not moved from his own will principally, but from the instinct of the Holy Spirit inclining him to act, as it says in Isaiah: "he will come like a rushing stream, which the wind of the Lord drives" (Isa 59:19); and in Luke: "Jesus was led by the Spirit into the wilderness" (Luke 4:1).[94]

[90] *STh* I-II, q. 56, a. 4, ad 3. Aquinas says that the body obeys the soul as completely disposed to it (*ad nutem obedit*), but this is not the case with the concupiscible and irascible powers (*non ad nutum obedient rationi*), but rather these powers "have their own proper movements [*habent proprios motus suos*] by which they sometimes oppose reason." Hence, the rule of reason over sensitive appetite is as a political rule in which persons also exercise their own will, even when they follow political authority.

[91] Ibid., ad 2.

[92] *In Rom*., c. 8, lect. 3 (Marietti ed., n. 635).

[93] Servais Pinckaers, "Ethics and the Image of God," in Berkman and Titus, eds., *The Pinckaers Reader*, 139.

[94] *In Rom*., c. 8, lect. 3 (Marietti ed., n. 635): "Similiter autem homo spiritualis non quasi ex motu propriae voluntatis principaliter sed ex instinctu Spiritus Sancti inclinatur ad aliquid agendum."

While the nonhuman animal has an interior instinct that it follows, it does so not according to its own will, but sensibly, according to the ordering of divine wisdom.[95] Intelligibility lies in this sensible relation by way of natural instinct in the creature. Further, the tending of the stream which occurs naturally arises from an apprehension which exists in God, and not in the stream.[96] So "the spiritual person" is inclined, not principally by his will in accord with reason which arises from himself, but by the Holy Spirit who leads. In this way, following the Spirit in the gifts is a human and intellectual experience of the world and of the divine, and at the same time a *reditus* to what is common to all of creation, namely, God as source and end—that *from which* creation proceeds, and *to which* it returns, via natural instinct for all creation, and the instinct of the Holy Spirit for human creatures.

Lastly, the analogy of the "rushing" stream "driven" by the Lord for the inclination that proceeds from the Spirit points to the strength that signals the work of the Spirit, according to which one is "led" by the Spirit wherever it leads, "as Jesus was led by the Spirit into the wilderness." This movement affirms the fulfillment of human agency through following the wisdom of an exterior source, provided by the example of Christ who was also *led by the Spirit*. Notably, for the analogy with natural instinct to perform this purpose, it cannot be "blind." Rather, spiritual spontaneity as modelled on natural instinct relies on the relationality between a living creature and its object,

[95] *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4. See also q. 81, a. 3, for the ordering of motive powers. On the principle of Dionysius, followed by Aquinas, wherein "divine wisdom joins the end of one thing to the beginning of the next," and how this relates sensuality to will, see Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L. K. Shook (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), 238-41. On the universal character of natural love and appetite, see *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 1, ad 3; *In Div. Nomin.* 4, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., n. 401); Caldera, *Le jugement par inclination*, 62-63; Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, 106-9.

[96] *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 1: "For there is a certain appetite that does not follow the apprehension of the one desiring, but another, and this is said to be natural appetite. For natural things desire what is fitting to them according to their nature, and not through their own apprehension, but through the apprehension of the one who establishes nature."

namely, on the "connaturality" that exists between a nature and that which is convenient to it. The ease of movement that reflects divine wisdom in nature provides the matter for conceiving human experience of the Spirit, which in turn provides a paradigm for human activity based on the receptivity expressed in passion-movement.

## Conclusion

That the human person can move herself to will the good does not mean that she ceases first to be moved, in nature or in grace.[97] This creaturely quality of *being moved* as it pertains to human persons is especially apparent in the passions, as well as in the gifts of the Spirit—in other words, in the "lowest" and "highest" movements of human agency. It is not simply a matter of the sensitive or animal nature taking its seat below, or even beside, the rational nature of the human soul. Rather, sensitive nature is part of an integrated whole, such that a full understanding of human action requires taking stock not only of "formal" human action that proceeds from ends directed by reason, but also of those ends that move the person from without, as in the passions and in the gifts of the Spirit. Though these ends move from without, they are experienced through the interior faculties of human apprehension and appetite. In this way, the gifts of the Spirit reflect the fullness of human agency according to a paradigm of human action that relies on passion.[98]

[97] On the person as self-mover, see *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 2; and on all beings as moved by God, see q. 109, a. 1. See also Daniel Shields, "Aquinas on Will, Happiness, and God: The Problem of Love and Aristotle's *Liber de bona fortuna*," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 91 (2017): 113-42 (esp. 138).

[98] I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer and the Editor of *The Thomist* for helpful feedback and suggestions, and to John Berkman, Diana Fritz Cates, and Robert Sweetman for constructive conversation in the development of ideas in this paper.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*Virtue and Grace in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas*. By JUSTIN M. ANDERSON. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. 341. $99.99 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-1-108-48518-0.

Struck by the unique way he combines comprehensive genius and judicious balance with an air of serene detachment, many regard St. Thomas Aquinas as such a complete thinker that the idea of him repeatedly changing his mind can seem outlandish. While it is not controversial to say that his thought developed from his early to his later works, few could imagine him writing a book like St. Augustine's *Retractations*, or would suggest that Thomism would have taken some radically different shape had he lived a decade longer. His mature works come across not as brilliant detours but as fully ripened conclusions, making the notion of an incessantly "evolving" Aquinas seem deeply eccentric.

At the same time, there were a few periods—such as his fruitful stay at Orvieto and then Rome in the 1260s—where Aquinas made remarkable discoveries and changed course in important ways. Recognition of this is sometimes traced to the twentieth century, but already in the 1440s John Capreolus (the "Prince of Thomists") noted major shifts in Aquinas's teaching on grace after his earlier *Scriptum* on the Sentences, as did Cardinal Cajetan and the Salamancan Dominic de Soto a century later. For Capreolus the *Summa theologiae* was a kind of understated *Retractations* in that Aquinas fully "moved back from the Pelagian error" which his contemporaries and his own earlier *Scriptum* did not completely root out. On this view, it is to the late Aquinas that we owe a fully adequate doctrine of grace from which the theological and infused cardinal virtues flow.

In this excellent book, Justin Anderson takes up the role of a latter-day Capreolus, pushing firmly against any current trends toward a "Thomistic Pelagianism" (169). He argues that Aquinas's theology of virtue and grace underwent "titanic developments" that led him to stress themes such as the moral necessity of grace and the damaging effects of sin in ever more refined and emphatic ways. This argument is substantially correct and vast in its implications, but Anderson holds that these shifts have yet fully to impact Thomistic moral theology, like a detonation that has flashed on the horizon but whose fallout has yet to land. The book seeks to trace the fallout, showing how Aquinas's mature teaching on grace and sin pulled his virtue theory in ever more Augustinian and Pauline directions, yet without forfeiting core Aristotelian

commitments. The book also joins this stress on Christian particularity with a quite different effort to affirm the category of "pagan virtue" on very generous terms. It is by turns an in-depth exegesis of Aquinas's texts, an historical examination of the hundred years preceding, and an attempt to shift the conversation in Thomistic virtue scholarship toward the moral consequences of Aquinas's later teaching on grace. It is an engaging story that in some ways could have been better told, but there is no doubting its importance.

The first chapter gives a general outline of Thomistic virtues as habits perfective of human powers. Anderson distinguishes virtues based on their causes and ends, and as bundled into cardinal and theological, acquired and infused, and other familiar clusters. The second examines Aquinas's exact vocabulary of virtue to describe its many meanings and analogous senses. The most important concern virtue *simpliciter* or "without qualification," and virtue *secundum quid* or in a "qualified sense." Gratuitous or infused virtue, which directs us to our ultimate end, is virtue *simpliciter* (61). By contrast, connatural or acquired virtue falls short of that end, and yet its level of perfection does qualify it as virtue *secundum quid*. It can be said that the full definition of virtue (*simpliciter*) is theological while leaving space for "pagan virtue" in a secondary sense (*secundum quid*).

But it is from the third chapter onward that the really significant achievement of this book emerges. Anderson gives a detailed study of how the distinctions between nature and grace were worked out with increasing precision in the century before Aquinas, from the pioneering labors of the School of Chartres to the full recovery of Aristotle. The crucial moment came when Philip the Chancellor identified grace as an operating principle of human acts distinct from nature, so that grace was seen not just as "healing" us from the effects of sin but also "elevating" us to a supernatural level of action (79).

Aquinas adopts this view of habitual grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) but, as chapters 3-5 show, his model crucially shifted. For instance, his early *Scriptum* on Lombard's *Sentences* taught that even without habitual grace one can avoid mortal sin entirely, prepare oneself to receive habitual grace by doing one's best (*facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam*: "to the one doing what lies in him, God does not deny grace"), and persevere to the end without the help of some further form of grace. The *Summa theologiae* overturns this earlier optimism and teaches that without habitual grace one can avoid each temptation to mortal sin individually but not all cumulatively, and that we are disposed for conversion not by our moral efforts but by unmerited "helping" graces (*auxilia*) whose continual support we likewise require after conversion to persevere in grace and not relapse into sin (87-90). Bernard Lonergan's description of this as a "low opinion of man" may be excessive, but we are still left asking what caused such a dramatic shift.

Henri Bouillard made the influential proposal that during his stay in central Italy in the 1260s Aquinas discovered works from Augustine's later period on what is anachronistically called the semi-Pelagian controversy, and that in light of these he revised his teaching on grace. While leaving space for Aquinas's own

speculative advances, Anderson largely endorses this view (137-42, 148), correctly noting the paper trail of manuscript evidence in its favor. Given its more pessimistic moral anthropology, Aquinas's mature work may seem more influenced by Augustine than by Aristotle, but the story here is mixed, and Anderson's really brilliant point is that Aquinas uses Aristotle himself to shore up his growing Augustinianism—for instance, by framing the operation of grace as a "motion" construed in Aristotelian terms (148).

While the previous chapters examine virtue *simpliciter* at length, the remaining chapters turn to virtue *secundum quid* ("pagan virtue"). The seventh affirms the reality of pagan or "graceless" virtue, describing Aquinas as "optimistic" in this respect. But Anderson also insists that "authentic, pagan virtue" is possible for Aquinas only with a "theological backstory" (219) since it is dependent on divine motions even at the natural level. These may concretely overlap with grace, and yet are distinct from it (287). The eighth chapter states that it is not enough to ask if pagan virtue is possible since we must also determine whether "graceless" virtue is likely to persevere. Of course, the goods of nature are damaged but not destroyed by the Fall ("Aquinas is not an early Calvinist" [233]). But if even those with the infused virtues are in danger of moral atrophy, then the long-term prospects of pagan virtue undefended by grace would seem to be "ominous" (240).

At this point the account begins to wobble between what the texts say and the good-news story that Anderson would like to tell. Having followed the later Aquinas to a rather Augustinian brink, Anderson shifts course and says there is "a way back toward optimism" which lies in an appeal to "God's active work on the natural plane" enabling pagan virtue (244). He speculates as to how exactly this "natural *auxilium*" (219) moves human agency to virtue at the natural level through "divine application" working upon the intellect and will, and concludes that this possibility is why Aquinas is "so pessimistic about a fallen agent's natural capacities" and yet "so optimistic about every moral agent's ability to live a life of virtue" (247).

But the missing point here is that "optimism" about what Aquinas thought *possible* is fully compatible with pessimism about what he thought *probable*. As István Bejczy notes (*The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages*, 2011), Aquinas's views on this topic relative to other Scholastics were not especially "liberal" (187). He affirms pagan virtue as a possibility but does not suggest that it will occur with regularity: nor, indeed, did the pagan philosophers themselves. They often describe the virtues as rare accomplishments attained only through the best upbringing with the utmost exertion by a favored few. Aristotle's assumption that "the many" (*hoi polloi*) will not attain virtue (*Nic. Ethic.* 10.9) seems to meet with sympathy from Aquinas, who viewed the human race without divine law and grace as prone on the whole to fall "headlong into most shameful vices" (*STh* I-II, q. 98, a. 6; see also *STh* I-II, q. 106, a. 3), and observed that "it is difficult and the lot of the few to acquire true virtues" (*enim difficile est paucisque contingit veras virtutes assequi* [*De Regno* I, c. 8]). These views stem not from misanthropy but from complex treatments of habituation that

take seriously the needs and challenges of virtuous formation in flawed societies. This might seem depressing, but in the Middle Ages such pessimistic concerns (if that is what they are) often served as an appeal for magnanimity: as calling people to resist moral complacency and undertake urgent reforms, and as diagnosing ills for the sake of stimulating people to greater exertion in justice and charity.

The final chapter on the "end" of pagan virtue argues against Henri de Lubac for a connatural end and examines the nature of this "pagan happiness" (287). Pagan virtue is said to manifest divine goodness at the natural level (ibid.) and to that extent it "serves the glory of God" (282). Though lacking in grace, such virtue is a participation in connatural happiness involving natural contemplation (286) and as such is a "natural analog" of "heavenly *beatitudo*" (269). The fact that Aquinas himself sees such "graceless" happiness as fully compatible with eternal perdition does not interrupt the upbeat tone of this chapter. But a more proximate concern is that Anderson does not discuss the virtue of religion at the "pagan" level. Yet this is a crucial question: nested within justice, religion is nothing less than "foremost among the cardinal virtues" (*STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 6). Any adequate account of pagan virtue—and this is especially pressing for a very optimistic account such as Anderson's—needs to address whether and how acquired religion shorn of grace is a genuine but "uniquely imperfect virtue," as Reinhard Hütter put it (*Bound for Beatitude* [2019], 280), and what the implications of this might be.

Overall this book is remarkable for its historical depth, and provocative in some of its conclusions. Anderson argues that the "mature Aquinas" shifted to a more pessimistic moral anthropology combined with a greater need for grace, and in this he is undoubtedly correct. The most curious feature of the book is the effort to combine this argument with a resolutely upbeat story for the overall prospects of pagan virtue, and the tension between the two is never quite resolved. Part of the reason is that unlike Aquinas and Aristotle Anderson offers no philosophical account of habituation into virtue with its challenges, so that "overall optimism" (244) about pagan virtue's prospects comes across as not having paid its way.

Much of the book examines the nature and relationship between infused and acquired virtue. That fraught question and the need to resolve it is a good synecdoche of the work as a whole. Because Anderson does not address other recent attempts to do just this (such as David Decosimo's *Ethics as a Work of Charity* [2014]) or the last decade's extensive debates over the exact relationship between the acquired and infused virtues, the book is in some ways downstream from the *status questionis*. Adding to this is a lack of clarity as to the precise target of Anderson's criticisms. He repeatedly attacks "Thomistic Pelagianism" understood as any theory of virtue that neglects sin, grace, and divine action. Yet actual passages of reproach tend to lack proper names and citations, making it difficult to situate his critiques within the existing literature. But the book's results are impressive just the same, and in some ways far exceed the *status questionis*: for example, by engaging the Thomist commentatorial

tradition in far greater depth than is usual and showing its enduring value for this subject.

Anderson succeeds in demonstrating that a "theological backstory" is crucial to Aquinas's full account of virtue, and in detailing the "titanic developments" which his teachings on grace and virtue underwent. He shows us that Aquinas's late teaching on grace and perseverance has yet fully to impact how we construe the reception and retention of the infused virtues, and presses home their vast but neglected consequences for virtue theory and moral theology. I am unaware of any recent author who has stated these important points with such forcefulness or in such detail, and for this we are very much in his debt.

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*Human Perfection in Byzantine Theology: Attaining the Fullness of Christ*. By ALEXIS TORRANCE. Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology. Oxford: Oxford University, 2020. Pp. xii + 289. $85.00. ISBN 978-0-19-884529-4.

This book is the best anglophone book in Byzantine theology of the past twenty years. It has a strong claim to being the most important book in Byzantine theology in any Western language since Vladimir Lossky's *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (1944). Other studies, such as John Meyendorff's *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas* (1959) laid the foundation for later research, but his book had a rather narrow focus. Meyendorff also wrote more broad-ranging books, such as *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought* (1969), *Byzantine Theology* (1974), and *Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions* (1989), which either provided important surveys or proposed theses that were not very bold. Jaroslav Pelikan's works, too, tended to be overviews. The German Jesuit Gerhard Podskalsky focused on particular historical periods or again, like Meyendorff and Pelikan, provided important surveys. I hope to explain in this review why Torrance's book is so significant as well as draw attention to places where the book is uneven.

Like Lossky in his *Mystical Theology*, Torrance does historical theology at the highest level, propounding original if somewhat controversial theses, for the sake of an intervention in what we might call systematic Orthodox theology (vii, 6-7, and all of chapter 1). The motivation for Torrance's study of the Byzantine tradition of reflection on Christ's humanity deified by the hypostatic union (34) is that some important strands of modern Orthodox theology have strayed from this center of theological anthropology and risk "theological

shipwreck (1)." While the founders of the various schools of Orthodox thought for the most part avoid this problem (with the important exception of Sergius Bulgakov), their students stray into theological error.

Georges Florovsky is central to this book, both in his approach to historical theology and in his Christocentric paradigm (3). Florovsky proposed his neo-patristic synthesis in the mid-twentieth century and this name, if not its method, has been taken up by a number of his students. These followers often repeat the Fathers without engaging the contemporary world. This has led many Orthodox theologians to criticize Florovsky and his method as being inattentive to the nuances of the various Fathers (because of his synthesis) or ignoring the modern context (because of his attention to and attempt to be faithful to the Fathers). Torrance, influenced especially by the work of Matthew Baker, puts up a spirited defense of the neo-patristic synthesis, claiming the method is good, but often poorly applied (7).

Torrance is sympathetic to those Orthodox theologians such as Norman Russell and John Behr who call for a symphony (or harmony or polyphony) of the Fathers rather than a synthesis, but he worries that there is a possibility of dissonance in the metaphor of a symphony. On the other hand, Torrance thinks that in their concern to address the modern world many contemporary Orthodox theologians stray from the normative "quickening and guiding presence of the Holy Spirit in Scripture . . . the experience of the saints . . . [and] the living Body of Christ through history" (ibid.).

In the rest of his programmatic first chapter, Torrance examines contemporary strands of personalism in Orthodox theology. At times he strays far afield, for instance in his examination of the British and Boston schools of personalism in the early twentieth century. Here more attention to Florovsky or the normative character of the saints would have been useful. Torrance's concern about modern Orthodoxy's theological anthropology is that it sidesteps Christ who must be the cornerstone of any Christian anthropology (8, 10, 13). One can claim this about John Zizioulas who does not begin with Christ yet retains a strong Christological element, but whose followers tend to forget Christ altogether, or at least to subordinate him. Other Orthodox thinkers such as Nikolai Berdyaev, Sergius Bulgakov, and Vladimir Solovyov stray from the traditional Orthodox sources, for the tradition has Christ as its starting point and center (23-25, 35-36). Defenders of Bulgakov will respond by saying that he puts the Incarnation at the center of creation. Torrance could respond by asking if he is attentive enough to the particulars of the Gospel accounts of Jesus.

At this point a question must come up in the reader's mind. Who, then, is to guide theology? If Orthodoxy is a neo-patristic synthesis, isn't the modern theologian simply alone with his texts, an Orthodox *soli patres* instead of the Protestant *sola scriptura*? Torrance does not, to my mind, give enough attention to this question although he does give an answer indirectly. The modern canonized Orthodox saints (St. Sophrony Sakharov and St. Justin Popović) are

normative both in their approach to the tradition and the Christological center to their anthropology (26, 35-37, 39, 45-46, 81, 215).

A Catholic wonders here, however, if this somewhat muted magisterium can avoid the problem of *soli patres*. Isn't the Catholic and scriptural concept of the deposit (παραθήκη) of the faith helpful (1 Tim 6:20; 2 Tim 1:14)? The Catholic approach is not merely a synthesis for which a theologian is responsible, but an external reality, the deposit (really, Christ), to which the Fathers witness. Furthermore, in Torrance's Orthodox approach the bishops certainly have a role in their decision, guided by the Holy Spirit, to canonize certain saints. But is this enough? Is there not, as in the Catholic position, a need for an ordinary magisterium to provide guidance to specific controversial questions as they arise? Here we have a difference between the Catholic and Orthodox approaches to theology, both of which, of course, are grounded in the tradition. Perhaps the Orthodox theologian has more liberty and the Catholic more assurance. Still, Torrance is much closer to the Catholic position than many contemporary Orthodox theologians, for he sees the modern canonized saints as playing a role similar to the Catholic "Doctor of the Church."

After the first chapter, four chapters on individual Byzantine saints follow (Maximus the Confessor, Theodore the Studite, Symeon the New Theologian, and Gregory Palamas). The two strongest chapters are those on Maximus and Palamas. I will give attention to the chapter on Maximus because he is likely to be more familiar to readers than Gregory Palamas and it is the most controversial chapter of the four.

Torrance's chapter on Maximus focuses on deification, as all the chapters do, but he gives especial attention to *epektasis*, or perpetual progress in the union with God in the afterlife. Torrance sees, in both Maximus and Palamas, a maximalist view of deification: Maximus's "argument implies that in the age to come, God does not live in one way and the saints in another way: they live in *exactly the same way*, only one lives it as God by nature and the other as human by nature" (59, cf. 76-78). His reading of Maximus on this point is in strong contrast with those of Hans Urs von Balthasar, Paul Blowers, and Norman Russell who are concerned to maintain that infinite gap between creator and creature.

Torrance has a few criticisms of the notion of *epektasis* in Maximus and the Greek theological tradition in general and takes his cue from St. Sophrony Sakharov (45-46). *Epektasis* has become popular in Orthodox thought (John McGuckin, Kallistos Ware, Christos Yannaras), but Torrance does not see it in the tradition as others do. First, it is only to be found in a few passages, including, famously, Maximus's *Ambiguum* 7.27 (53, 69, although see Torrance's discussion of Maximus's commentary on *Ambiguum* 7 in his late *Opusculum* 1 on 67-68). Second, Torrance argues against the view of Jean Daniélou and his followers who see in the Greek patristic tradition the pure Gospel stripped of its Hellenism (44). For Daniélou the Greek philosophical conception of resting in union with God must be excluded because of the statements of Nyssa and Maximus that speak of movement in the afterlife. But

Torrance argues that this misses the coincidence of opposites of both stasis and movement in Nyssa and Maximus (45). Furthermore, Byzantines didn't idealize flux, and it is hard to have both *epektasis* and the "immovable [eschatological] kingdom," βασιλεία ἀσάλευτος (Heb 12:28) (48). Indeed, many cited authorities for *epektasis* in the Greek Fathers are in fact texts about the spiritual life here below.

In the end, Torrance's commitment to a maximalist sense of deification contributes to his rejection (or at least muting) of *epektasis*. He suggests Maximus's "ever-moving rest" or ἀεικίνητος στάσις is the proper way to understand the question (70). How, in the end, could there be a deification that connotes an identity between God and the saint? *Epektasis* seems to deny this identity. One of the strengths of *epektasis* is that it avoids the danger of pantheism. But Torrance questions if it is faithful to Maximus's texts, which speak of the eschaton for the most part in terms of rest although not stasis (72). For Torrance, Maximus proposes movement only in the infinite operation of God in the saints (74). It is a dynamism without change, growth, or progress. Torrance's reading on deification is preserved from pantheism, as Torrance affirms: "there will always be that which saves (God) and that which is saved (the saints), which in turn implies a difference of nature" (68). Here we see Torrance's desire to avoid the pantheism he sees in Sergius Bulgakov.

In the next three chapters Torrance considers various aspects of Christology. In his chapter on Theodore the Studite he draws our attention to Theodore's defense of the created human identity of Christ. His chapter on Symeon the New Theologian presents Symeon's fight against mediocrity and his exhortation to begin the process of deification in this life. Finally, and perhaps most originally, Torrance sees in Palamas's distinction between essence and energies a Eucharistic aspect (184). In the Eucharist we are given an opportunity to participate more fully in the divine life than we are in the light of Tabor.

Torrance concludes his book by considering two councils from the twelfth century concerned with "my Father is greater than I" in John's Gospel. The conclusion of the councils is that this must apply to Christ's humanity. Although deified, this humanity remains human and not "consubstantial with God, in which case the natural properties of creaturehood, of circumscription, and the other properties contemplated in the human nature of Christ would be abandoned and transformed into the nature of divinity" (199, translation of the *Synodikon of Orthodoxy*).

From here Torrance proceeds to laud John Behr's recent work which takes Christ as central in theological anthropology (204), but he worries that Behr's interpretation of 2 Corinthians 5:16 leads him to exclude "Christ's historical existence as a man. Christ perpetually disappears . . . (207)." This exclusion is in part due to Behr's postmodern-patristic view of history that is not concerned with the modern view of what really happened (Leopold von Ranke), but rather views everything "retrospectively from the Cross" (209, citing Behr). In the end, Behr's approach to theological anthropology, while praiseworthy for its focus on Christ, is not faithful to the councils and tradition of the Orthodox Church.

It should be noted by Catholic readers that Torrance repeatedly lapses into criticisms of Catholic ideas that do not seem germane to the question at hand. Thus, he argues against Christiaan Kappes's 2014 claim for the Immaculate Conception in the Byzantine tradition without engaging him (98). This is based, Torrance claims, on the different ideas of original sin in the Catholic and Orthodox theological traditions. Later in the book he sees a disjunction between Aquinas and Palamas on created grace, mentioning his own disagreement with Bruce Marshall and Norman Russell but not presenting or refuting their arguments (180). But again, a book with as bold and original a claim as Torrance makes must have some imperfections.

Torrance has attempted to reorient theological anthropology, the main concern of Orthodox theology for the past century and a half, to the humanity of Christ. He sees good in many of the main figures of the personalist anthropology of the past sixty years, especially in their attention to Christ, but is critical of their followers who lose the anchorage in Christ entirely. Torrance argues that this approach is not faithful to the councils, to the tradition, and to the recently canonized theologian saints. Torrance's method is a retrieval of Florovsky's neo-patristic synthesis, and he defends it as more subtle than the caricatures of its detractors and distortions of its defenders. His argument is cogent, and it is hoped that this book will be a major intervention in Orthodox theology. It has the potential to bring Orthodox theology both to its roots and, with its retrieval of the sources, to a deeper critical but ecumenical engagement with the modern world.

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*Thomas Aquinas on the Immateriality of the Human Intellect*. By ADAM WOOD. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2020. Pp. 335. $75.00 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-0-8132-3256-0.

I was keen to review Adam Wood's recent contribution to debates on Aquinas's arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. I immediately discovered his book treats far more than my narrow interest had anticipated. In six engaging chapters Wood explores an impressive array of disputed questions on Aquinas's views on the physical and metaphysical aspects of the human soul and intellectual powers. The arguments for the immateriality of the intellect are confined to the fifth chapter, but Wood does show—sometimes surprisingly—how many different debates are directly relevant to understanding Aquinas's

contentions that the human soul is incorporeal, immaterial, incorruptible, immortal, and compatible with the resurrection.

The questions driving each stage of Wood's monograph are clearly signposted and typically are variations on two basic questions: What should we say is Aquinas's view on X, given rival readings of Aquinas's view on X? and what are the philosophical merits of holding such a view today? Most of the book is dedicated to an accurate interpretation of Aquinas's positions, which Wood helpfully situates amongst the positions and objections of Avicenna, Roger Mareston, Francisco Suárez, David Armstrong, Saul Kripke, William Jaworski, and many other historical and contemporary thinkers. For these investigations alone I heartily recommend Wood's study to anyone interested in a critical survey and contribution to the major disputes orbiting Aquinas on the intellect's immateriality. Before considering some challenges to Wood's argument for the intellect's immateriality, I will give an overview of the book's major theses.

Chapter 1, "Forms as Limiting Principles," commences with Aquinas's hylomorphism. The central challenge is squaring hylomorphism with Aquinas's contention that the intellectual soul is an *immaterial form* that can subsist apart from the body. Wood shows why explicating matter and form as "stuff and structure" or "referent and truthmaker" cannot meet this challenge, but the analogy of being can. He explains how Aquinas's sixfold division of being illuminates an understanding of form as an immaterial mode of being and limiting principle of *esse* which can be directly participated in without matter. The human intellect "is an accidental form inhering directly in the human soul, rather than in the human being as a whole. Consequently, the human intellect has its act of being in an immaterial mode. This is what Aquinas primarily means by asserting its immateriality" (39). Wood marshals these resources to defend two theses of Aquinas. First, contrary to universal hylomorphism, the intellect can directly inhere in the rational soul alone; it need not inhere in a composite of form and spiritual matter. Second, that the rational soul both subsists in itself and informs matter is philosophically justifiable and coherent.

Chapter 2, "Forms as Essences, Structures, Truthmakers, and Powers," clarifies that "form" can mean either the essence as a whole—including matter and form—or the formal part of an essence, like souls and other substantial forms. Because Aquinas rejects the plurality of substantial forms, he maintains that the soul provides the single overarching structure for the essence of the whole composite. Essences locate composites within a kind or species. "Yet within the essence it is the form of the part that does the important identity-determining work, because matter on its own, or prime matter, is pure potentiality, and not actually anything at all. It takes some structuring or 'perfecting' by a form of the part for matter to exist in act as flesh, bones, or anything else" (72). The soul also plays a "unifying role" as the "overarching structure" that unites "material components into a single composite whole synchronically, and maintains its unity diachronically even as it cycles bits of matter in and out throughout its career" (73). Additionally, Wood identifies the

roles substantial forms play as grounding powers and other properties of the composite, and elucidates five points on forms as truthmakers (73-78).

Wood defends a trope-theory interpretation of Aquinas's doctrine of universals. "Because Thomas thinks the numerical distinctness of natures from one another is derivative, he countenances a peculiar sort of trope—derivatively distinct individuals—not typically recognized in disputes about universals. He then analyzes the sameness of natures in terms of the lack of intrinsic differences between numerically distinct nature-tropes" (57). Essences and forms are real but are only universal when intellectually intentionalized and predicated. These predications' truthmakers for kind-membership are the natures or forms of real things that are "internally the same" and "intrinsically non-individual." Wood succinctly locates Aquinas's position with respect to Avicenna, Scotus, Ockham, and contemporary debates between realists and nominalists.

Because forms or tropes are derivatively individual in virtue of some additional principle of individuation, Wood is led to survey debates on individuation in Aquinas with respect to angels, celestial bodies, sublunary bodies, and rational souls. Wood suggests Aquinas's view on the individuation of composites is akin to Kripke's "origins essentialism." "Hence while matter along with quantitative dimensions jointly explains a substance's individual identity at first, its substantial form assumes the explanatory role of preserving its individual identity diachronically" (62). Even rational souls separated from matter retain this individual identity. The chapter concludes with Aquinas's views on psychological powers, including vegetative and sentient powers that are substructures of bodily tissues and organs, and intellectual powers that do not inform any material components. Wood examines Aquinas's major reasons for refusing to identify souls and powers before expounding the ins and outs of the levels of hylomorphic composition found within inanimate and animate substances, parts, and powers. I found attractive his distinction between tissues and organs, where organs are "the highest-level parts oriented toward systems-level tasks" (88). I wholeheartedly agree with Wood that many powers can be regarded as "substructures responsible for configuring the body such that it is capable of carrying out or contributing to certain operations" (83). I wish this insight had been developed more in later chapters in place of the attempts to present Aquinas as a sort of emergentist and reductionist but not as either one is typically defined.

Chapter 3, "From Incorporeality to Incorruptibility," explains how establishing the incorporeality of intellectual operations and powers leads Aquinas to the immateriality and so separability and incorruptibility of the human soul. To get a handle on "incorporeality" Wood investigates the real definitions and four causal explanations of incorporeal psychological operations; after rejecting four inadequate definitions he defends the following formulation.

> If a power X is ontologically dependent on some bodily feature Y, then Y is part of X's real definition. But for some Y to be part of a power X's real definition is for it to be involved in the explanation of how X operates. Hence if a power X is ontologically dependent

> on a bodily feature Y, then X's operation is explicable in terms of Y. (139)

If the explanatory definitions of intellectual operations are not ontologically dependent on corporeal features, then they are incorporeal. Wood then endeavors to persuade us that nonreductive physicalists, substance dualists, and emergentists should accept this account.

Chapter 4, "Aquinas's Theory of Cognition," reviews debates on whether sensation is immaterial and without physiological processes—which would leave obscure its distinction from intellect—and whether Aquinas's criteria for cognition and its intentional mode of being are so promiscuous as to make inanimate media, like air, cognizers. These were important debates, but whereas I hold that most of them have been sufficiently settled exegetically, I think Wood treats too many of them as being unsettled, even when he takes sides.

Chapter 5 introduces Aquinas's three major arguments for the immateriality of the intellect, judiciously discloses their fatal flaws, and suggests another strategy that might work. Chapter 6 concludes with interesting treatments of disputed questions on why an incorruptible soul must be immortal, why separated souls are not human persons, why Aquinas only acknowledged a weak form of gappy existence that permits the cessation of humans between death and resurrection, but not the cessation of the *esse* and form by virtue of which the soul's individual continuity is preserved. Wood lucidly demonstrates the core arguments of Aquinas that proceed from the incorporeality of intellectual acts—unexplained by corporeal phenomena—to their immateriality, which entails the soul's separability, incorruptibility, and immortality.

This is an impressive study of Aquinas, which merits critical engagement. If I had more space I would raise issues with Wood's information-processing construal of cognition, his overly restrictive reading of animals' cognitive powers, the paradigm conflations in his comparisons of Aquinas's positions with views from philosophy of mind, and his reluctance to adjudicate on sufficiently settled exegetical debates. I conclude with what sparked my initial interest: Wood's treatment of Aquinas's arguments from scope, self-reflexivity, and mode for the intellect's immateriality.

The scope-argument's problems are widely acknowledged, and Wood sums up the conclusive case against this argument from the intellect's purported *scope* to know everything. Aquinas, critics, and defenders focus more on the mode-argument from the intellect's universal *mode* of cognition, which is contended to be incompatible with being material, given that matter is the principle of individuation. This argument's fatal objection is its illicit shift from the *intentional mode* by which some object is understood to the *ontological* features of the operations and powers by virtue of which one understands some object. What it fails to explain is how ontological conclusions can be drawn from the intentional ways objects are cognized. Robert Pasnau dubbed this the "Content Fallacy" and collated examples of Aquinas recognizing and falling victim to this error. Wood recapitulates and amplifies examples where Aquinas claims the

intentional mode by which something is cognized cannot disclose the ontological nature of the cognizer or object cognized. So, animals cognize colors without becoming colored, universals can be known by the intellect without universals being denizens of reality, and God is immaterial and yet knows individual material things.

Wood acknowledges the efforts of John O'Callaghan and Therese Cory to defend Aquinas by objecting to Pasnau's misleading ascription of "content." But Wood is certainly correct that their exegetical amendments do nothing to save Aquinas's argument from a redressed version of the same objection. For it is "no less objectionable to move without further ado from claims about the intellect's mode of cognizing certain objects—that is, an absolute mode—to claims about the intellect's ontological status than to move from claims about content to ontological status" (234). Rather than fallaciously trying to move from intentional modes of cognizing objects to the intellect's ontological status, we instead need an argument for why any power that can intentionally cognize universals must be an incorporeal power. Wood critically examines proposals by Klima, Haldane, and Cory to explain this, and demonstrates why none of them succeeds.

Wood spends less time on but is more optimistic about the self-reflexivity argument: no corporeal thing can reflect upon itself, but the intellect is *self-reflective*, so it must be incorporeal. Unfortunately, the proposal he outlines from Cory clearly runs into the same error that plagues the mode-argument, for the intellect is only *intentionally* self-reflexive and first-personal.

I believe the most important conclusion of Wood's careful investigation is that none of Aquinas's three major arguments for the immateriality of the intellect is successful. Perhaps Aquinas's arguments offer plausible reasons for holding that the intellect is immaterial, but as Cajetan—whose assessment is surprisingly not mentioned by Wood—also came to concede, they do not demonstrate this conclusion. Any Thomist who thinks otherwise must now contend with Wood's meticulous study. Like Wood, I do not think this evaluation should be a cause for either despair or skepticism. It should be a catalyst for truly insightful and constructive Thomistic enquiry drawing on phenomenology and metaphysics to arrive at properly neo-Aristotelian—not neo-Cartesian—arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. What these arguments should start with are features proprietary to rationality (enquiry, definition, categoriality, truth, inference, reflexivity) and which require ontological factors that are excluded by any hylomorphically embodied psychological power.

The most ingenious recent proposal was sketched by James Ross, but Antonio Ramos-Díaz has shown Ross's argument has been misunderstood by its most influential proponents, who conflate indeterminacy of formal operations with indeterminacy of form. I believe this misunderstanding includes one of Ed Feser's construals and Wood's efforts to give it a Thomistic reading (239-54). Ross's best argument concerns the formal or categorial determinacy of the very intellectual operations of *adding* or *quadding*, not the determinacy of any form,

content, or representation of addition, quaddition, triangles, trees, rabbits, or pointing. Ross establishes why wholly physical systems are incapable of realizing *determinate formal operations* as persons do. But the realization of *determinate forms* is a different issue, and denying their hylomorphic realization, as Wood does, is precariously "Platonic." For no Aristotelian can hold that the forms of all physical things are indeterminate and are only determinate if immaterial. It seems to me that Wood's attempt to develop Aquinas's mode-argument in this direction is vulnerable to this and related problems, such as, how can the intellect abstract determinate forms from indeterminate hylomorphic things? I would welcome being corrected on these fronts. I will say that it can be disentangled from these worries, I think Wood proposes a more promising avenue for establishing the intellect's immateriality in his initial suggestion to focus on the "fact that [intellects] cognize objects as members of kinds at all" (240), rather than on the intellect's abstracting away individual features. This percipient suggestion merits further enquiry.

Despite my reservations and disagreements with some of Wood's interpretations and arguments, his book contains, to my knowledge, the best critical survey of the recent fascinating and difficult disputed questions that surround the immateriality of the intellect in Aquinas.

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*The Summa Halensis: Sources and Contexts*. Edited by LYDIA SCHUMACHER. Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie 65. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020. Pp. x + 328. $114.99 (hardcover) and open access. ISBN 978-3-1106-8492-6.

*The Summa Halensis*: *Sources and Contexts* collects seventeen essays on this important medieval text. The *Summa Halensis* was a collaborative effort of the early Franciscan studium at Paris and is referred to by this title or others (e.g. *Summa fratris Alexandri*) because one of the text's chief contributors and designers was the first Franciscan Master of Theology at Paris, Alexander of Hales (d. 1245). The first three books of this enormous compendium reached their current stage of completion in 1245. Pope Alexander IV asked the Franciscans to continue work on the text in 1256. The result was an enormous but unfinished fourth book, which still has not been published in a modern critical edition.

As the acknowledgment to this collection notes, the volume's essays began life as presentations at a series of conferences held at Oxford in 2018. Many of the essays seem to have been augmented beyond their original form, since many contain analysis and documentation that would exceed the scope of a conference presentation. The volume's essays fall into two parts: essays in part 1 address "The Sources of Early Franciscan Thought" and those in part 2 address "The Historical and Intellectual Content." Most readers will reach for the essays of most concern to them and so the organization of the volume is of no importance. Naturally, in an edited collection, some essays hold up better to a peer scholar's criticism than others and some essays address the *Summa Halensis* more directly than others. Experts can make their own judgments about individual pieces. My concern here is for the student or scholar new to the *Summa Halensis*, who may wish to approach the volume as an introduction to this work. How should such a person read these essays? In what follows, I will provide a strategy for using the volume as an introduction to the *Summa Halensis*, though I note that Victorin Doucet's original "Prolegomena" (1948) to the critical edition of book 3 of the *Summa Halensis* (known as tome 4) is still essential reading. Depending upon interest, there are also older, often difficult to find, studies on the *Summa Halensis* that are still valuable.

A student or scholar new to this material should begin with Ayelet Even-Ezra's contribution, "The *Summa Halensis*: A Text in Context." This essay provides a broad tour of the texts and movements surrounding the *Summa Halensis* and highlights the importance of the architecture or structure of the *Summa*. Given the size of all *summae* of this period (and especially the behemoth that is the *Summa Halensis*), the essay cannot be very detailed. This should simply point the reader to the *Summa Halensis* itself and to other *summae* produced during the same period.

Next the reader should turn to Sophie Delmas's "Odo Rigaldi, Alexander of Hales and the *Summa Halensis*." This essay may be a reader's first contact with Odo, one of the most important Franciscans of the thirteenth century. It may also be a reader's first encounter with Delmas, who has contributed other important studies, like her study of the Franciscan theologian Eustace of Arras, *Un franciscain à Paris: Le maître en théologie Eustache d'Arras (o.f.m.) au milieu du XIIIe siècle*. Delmas's contribution in this volume gives a clear introduction to Odo and his significance. Her essay also displays the need for a critical edition of Odo's works, most of which still exist only in manuscript. To this end, Delmas provides a helpful list of Odo's works and their manuscripts as well as information on the partial editions that have been made of some of his work. This is exactly the kind of help students and scholars often need to begin their study but which is not often acknowledged. Odo himself occupies a unique position in relationship to the *Summa Halensis*: he studied theology at Paris while the Franciscans worked on the *Summa* and he became a Master of Theology after the deaths of Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle (another principal contributor to the *Summa*). Odo therefore knew and certainly used the *Summa Halensis*. Delmas argues that Odo also contributed

to individual elements of book 3 of the *Summa* (which covers issues in Christology and begins but never finishes a treatment of the virtues) and "took partial responsibility" (279) for the third book's construction. She also shows that Odo was critical of various positions in the third book of the *Summa Halensis*. This point should be noted by those concerned to understand how early Franciscans themselves utilized the *Summa Halensis* and formed a potential school.

With Even-Ezra's general introduction and Delmas's handling of a specific Franciscan user and contributor in view, the reader should turn to Neslihan Şenocak's essay, "Alexander's Commentary on the Rule in Relation to the *Summa Halensis*." Şenocak is known to scholars of Franciscana for her contributions to understanding Franciscan education, as in *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order, 1209-1310*. Her essay in this volume can further orientate readers to the group of Franciscans that produced the *Summa Halensis* and their historical moment. The essay also provides a helpful reading of the *Commentary of the Four Masters* on the Franciscan Rule. If Şenocak's analysis of the relationship between the *Commentary* and the *Summa Halensis* holds, then she has shown that the *Summa Halensis* is perhaps most "Franciscan" right where we might expect it to be: when it is dealing with matters that intimately touch their Rule and how to observe it, issues related above all to poverty.

With these three historical essays in view, the reader may now wish for a more explicitly theological orientation to the *Summa Halensis*. Here I recommend turning to the essays of Aaron Gies and Boyd Taylor Coolman. Gies takes on the unenviable task of considering "the *Summa Halensis* as an exercise in interpreting the Scriptures" (11). Coolman, as one would expect given his prior work, deals with Hugh of St. Victor's influence on the *Summa Halensis*, focusing on the *Summa*'s opening discussions of theology itself. These two essays helpfully orientate the reader at the foundation of the *Summa*'s theological concerns.

From here it is less clear how the reader should proceed. One point made in this volume that no student or scholar should miss is the influence of William of Auxerre's (d. 1231) *Summa aurea* on the *Summa Halensis*. At least four essays demonstrate the dependence of the *Summa Halensis* on William of Auxerre. The essays of Richard Cross and Johannes Zachhuber both study the presence of John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis*. Cross notes that at times the *Summa Halensis* appropriates John by appropriating the *Summa aurea* verbatim (77); Zachhuber notes the same phenomena (109, 111). Stephen Brown's essay displays the reliance of the *Summa Halensis* on William (and Prepositinus of Cremona and Allan of Lille) for its doctrine of supposition, a critical but poorly understood tool of medieval theology. Finally, Aaron Canty's essay, "The Influence of Anselm of Canterbury on the *Summa Halensis*' Theology of the Divine Substance," indicates William's role in the *Summa Halensis*'s reception of Anselm, even if the *Summa Halensis* went on to employ Anselm to greater lengths. Beyond verifying the influence of William of

Auxerre, Giles Gasper's contribution, "Creation, Light, and Redemption: Hexaemeral Thinking, Robert Grosseteste and the *Summa Halensis*," cautiously speculates on another influence: the Oxford theologian and Bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253). The lesson from these five essays is that the influence of William of Auxerre is so important, along with other late twelfth and early thirteenth-century figures and texts, that students and scholars should always look to these volumes to understand the *Summa Halensis* better. Further, as Delmas's essay displays, there are still many unedited works that one would need to consult to scrutinize the *Summa Halensis* thoroughly. Scholars that do not engage these other resources when studying the *Summa* run the risk of asserting rather than demonstrating their claims.

Two other essays in this volume may be very useful to students and new scholars even though they do not substantively touch on the *Summa Halensis*. Lesley Smith's "Slippers in Heaven: William of Auvergne Preaching to the Brethren," acknowledges immediately that the essay does not directly concern the *Summa Halensis* (285). For some readers, however, William of Auvergne (d. 1249) will be completely unknown and so Smith's essay can provide an orientation to another important thirteenth-century figure lurking in the *Summa Halensis*'s context. In a similar way Catherine Kavanagh's "The Eriugenian Influence in the *Summa Halensis*: A Synthetic Tradition" only looks at the *Summa Halensis* in its conclusion. The bulk of the essay presents "a general historical overview of the fate of Eriugenian texts and ideas" (118). The essay can therefore present a student with an orientation to another part of the *Summa Halensis*'s context.

If a reader has followed my suggestions to this point, or chosen some other path through the essays, a fairly consistent feature will have emerged. Most essays, at some point, use the word "innovation." Most of these do not, however, make the term a substantial part of the argument. Other contributions seem to show that the *Summa Halensis* is not "innovative," though this judgment depends on having a clear sense of what "innovation" means and how it can be demonstrated. Here, Lydia Schumacher's introduction to the volume could have provided more methodological helps for the reader to understand the volume's view of "innovation," how it can be demonstrated and why it is important, outside of commonsense meanings of the term. As it stands, I found Schumacher's introduction and contributions to the volume difficult to assess, since the broad claims made in them often have confusing justification or documentation. I mention just two examples in order to caution the reader and new scholar and hopefully to provide a useful corrective. First, Schumacher's introduction reports that Bernard Klumper oversaw the editorial production of the first three volumes of the *Summa Halensis* (2-3). This is simply a misreading of the title page of the edition of the *Summa Halensis*. Bernard Klumper was the Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor in the 1920s when the editors began their work. Oddly, Schumacher references, on the very first page, a study of Ignatius Brady that provides a history of how the twentieth-century edition of the *Summa Halensis* came to be, which would have corrected this error.

However, Schumacher references Brady's study to substantiate that Bonaventure and his forebears worked to systematize Augustine, something the essay does not discuss. Second, Schumacher reports that Bonaventure credited "everything he learned to his 'master and father' Alexander of Hales, which is scarcely an exaggeration" (2). The reader is referred to Bonaventure's own works to substantiate this claim, with the following reference to book II of Bonaventure's commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*: "Prologue, Lib II, d 23, a 2 q e (II, 547)" (2 n. 5). The reference is misleading, since it probably refers to two texts, one of them incorrectly. Turning to the page in the edition Schumacher references, the reader will find Bonaventure describing Alexander of Hales as *patris et magistri nostri* but nothing about his indebtedness to Alexander. The reader will also not find any mention of a "prologue" at this point. This is because the reference probably also means to send the reader to a different text within Bonaventure's corpus, the so-called "Praelocutio" to book II of the *Sentences*—a text the editors placed before the "Prologue" to book II. This text does mention Alexander in two places, again as "our Father and Master" and adds *bonae memoriae* (II, 1 and 2). The text also indicates in two places that Bonaventure wishes to stay close to (or not depart from) Alexander's *vestigia*, something different from learning everything from him. Regarding this "Praelocutio," students and scholars should consult Edward D. Synan, "A Bonaventurian Enigma: 'Praelocutio' or 'Epilogus'? A Third Hypothesis," in *Bonaventuriana: Miscellanea in onore di Jacque Guy Bougerol*, ed. Francisco de Asís Chavero Blanco, vol. 2 (Roma, 1988), 493-505.

These problems and others like them should not detract from the useful essays found in this volume. The work as a whole sounds a warning to all those who would study a text like the *Summa Halensis*, whether to demonstrate its "innovations" or to grapple with its positions: comparative work is essential. This comes out clearest to me in Delmas's piece on Odo and in the essays that indicate William of Auxerre's influence on the *Summa Halensis*. Comparative work requires texts and we know that many texts and figures have not yet received editions and still remain only in manuscripts. Thus, one of the most essential tasks in the study of the Middle Ages is the production of new editions. There are far too few laborers in this field. While I appreciate the scholarship Schumacher has brought together here, we must always bear in mind how contingent much of it (and indeed all our work) may prove to be. Like Dante, we may see the mountain we wish to ascend early in the journey, only to find that a deeper, longer way is demanded.

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*The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics: Patristic Philosophy from the Cappadocian Fathers to John of Damascus*. By JOHANNES ZACHHUBER. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xii + 357. $105.00 (cloth). 978-0-19-885995-6.

This excellent book provides a thorough study—to my knowledge, the first of its kind—of the philosophical dimension of Christian doctrine in late antiquity. Like some recent scholars (e.g., Mark Edwards and George Karamanolis), Zachhuber sees a "Christian philosophy" emerging in this period. For him, the label denotes "a set of logical and ontological concepts underlying the articulation of doctrinal statements" (3). These concepts coalesced into theories which, while not themselves carrying doctrinal weight, were nonetheless inseparable from the articulation of doctrine in late antiquity. Zachhuber focuses on those ontological concepts—nature (*physis*), substance (*ousia*), and hypostasis—which served this purpose within Greek and Syriac Christianity starting with the pro-Nicene Trinitarianism of the Cappadocians and running through miaphysite and Chalcedonian Christology in the fifth through seventh centuries. Despite the singular in its title, the book spotlights the tendency to plurality in the centuries after Chalcedon, even within the same doctrinal camp, thereby avoiding the mistake of using Chalcedon's normativity to excuse the neglect of alternative traditions.

The argument, in a nutshell, is that in post-Chalcedonian traditions a new philosophical perspective emerged, one that prioritized individual existence as such. Different accounts were developed of the fundamental ontological priority of the individual, and each represented a reworking of the philosophy originally developed by the Cappadocians for Trinitarian purposes. According to Zachhuber, the explanation for this philosophical innovation lies not in a renewed Aristotelianism but in the demands of the Christological controversies themselves.

This account therefore avoids reducing patristic philosophy to its non-Christian sources. It also corrects the claim made by Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas that Cappadocian Trinitarianism marked a metaphysical revolution, shifting attention from universal being to the particular being of persons. Zachhuber argues that something like this revolution did occur, but much later, especially in the writings of John Philoponus and John of Damascus. Zachhuber's revolution is only somewhat similar, since its result is an emphasis on the ontological primacy of the individual rather than personalism *per se*—though he sees hints of personalism in the Damascene. The Cappadocians are aligned with the "ancient metaphysics" that, according to Zachhuber's title, was brought to an end by the turn to the individual. Post-Chalcedonian authors were motivated to make this turn because they were trying to explicate the "irreducible individuality" of Jesus Christ (181). They had to revise the earlier ontology, which "was ultimately based on a vision of being as universal and one" (308). There is an implication, which comes largely from the book's title rather than its contents, that this ontological turn was also a move from a less

to a more genuinely Christian system. This claim would require more defense than it receives, though fortunately it does not interfere with the book's quite successful historical argument, which readers can accept wholeheartedly even if they do not view a more monistic ontology as *eo ipso* less properly Christian. Likewise, while the title implies a certain supersessionism with respect to "ancient metaphysics," Zachhuber does not argue that the latter ended full-stop, but only that within Christology the priority of universal class over individual became marginalized.

In chapter 2, Zachhuber outlines the philosophy of the Cappadocians, which he thereafter dubs the "classical theory." The presentation of this theory will be partially familiar to readers of his 1999 monograph *Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa*, but it is laid out here in clearer terms and its subsequent influence is traced here for the first time. The classical theory originates in Basil's stipulation that, in the case of the Trinity, we ought to use *ousia* for what is common to the persons and *hypostasis* for what is particular to each. This usage was adopted more or less systematically by Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus, and additionally the term *physis* ("nature") came to be used interchangeably with *ousia*. On the classical theory, *ousia* necessarily loses what Aristotle in the *Categories* had called its primary sense, namely, denoting concrete particulars. Instead, it is restricted to its secondary sense of naming species and their genera.

Zachhuber argues that the theory has two dimensions, which he calls the abstract and concrete accounts. In its abstract dimension, which was Basil's primary emphasis, the theory focuses on *properties*: those contained in the common "formula of substance" (*logos tēs ousias*) and those that distinguish the hypostases. Thus far, it is a "grammatical," "logical," "epistemic," and "subjective" theory aimed at classifying human language and concepts (66). In its concrete dimension, we encounter the theory's "physical," "metaphysical," and "objective" side (ibid.). Here, the focus is on the instantiation of properties in concrete particulars: the extension of a class rather than its intension. Zachhuber credits Gregory of Nyssa for developing this side of the theory. For Gregory, a universal, considered as a set of properties, only subsists in its hypostases. According to Zachhuber, it is also an essential feature of Gregory's theory that the hypostases of any nature form a definite set. Universal natures are thus wholes comprising exactly these particulars as parts; it is an ontology "deeply grounded in prioritizing the one over the many" (61).

Chapter 3 traces the beginnings of Christological dispute in Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, and the Apollinarian debate. Despite Cyril's importance to later Christology, his interest here lies chiefly in providing evidence for the establishment of Cappadocian language as a classical theory. Next come three chapters on miaphysite theologians: Severus of Antioch (chap. 4), John Philoponus (chap. 5), and Damian of Alexandria and Peter of Callinicus (chap. 6). Chapter 4 debunks Joseph Lebon's influential claim that Severus and his followers simply identified *physis* and *hypostasis*. The most interesting miaphysite, and the book's central character, is John Philoponus with his novel

theory of particular natures. Zachhuber shows Philoponus breaking with Severus's endorsement of a collective, concrete universal. For Philoponus, the universal nature, on its own and apart from its instantiations, is entirely abstract. Yet the same nature exists in particulars as a particular nature—for example, the animality in *this* horse, which is not in any other animal. Fascinatingly, then, the same nature admits of contrary properties: in itself, it is indivisible and single; in particulars, it is divided and becomes many—a direct contrast to Gregory of Nyssa and a distinct foregrounding of individual existence. Philoponus says that a particular nature and a hypostasis are "roughly the same," though not strictly identical since the latter also includes individuating properties (154).

Zachhuber rebuts those who explain Philoponus's originality by pointing to his comments on universals in his Aristotelian commentaries. I do hear an echo of Plotinus's handling of the line in the *Timaeus* that soul, indivisible in itself, "becomes divisible around bodies" (*Tim*. 35a2-3; *Enn*. 4.2.1, 6.4.4). A *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* search reveals about twenty references to this phrase in Philoponus's philosophical works, especially his *Commentary on Aristotle's "De anima."* Perhaps future research could find a link between Philoponus's particular natures and his psychology. Regardless, Zachhuber is surely correct that, even if Philoponus's philosophical work prepared him to devise the doctrine of particular natures, the impetus for doing so came from Christology—though he did later apply it to the Trinity, with famously controversial results outlined by Zachhuber.

The final three chapters examine Chalcedonian theologians: John the Grammarian and Leontius of Byzantium (chap. 7), a set of authors writing between A.D. 553 and the outset of the monergist controversy (chap. 8), and Maximus the Confessor and John Damascene (chap. 9). Zachhuber identifies two strands, both of which evince increasing philosophical precision and an awareness of Philoponus's particular natures. One runs from Leontius of Byzantium through Theodore of Raïthu and, with significant revisions, into Maximus. Here, in a mirror image of the miaphysites, the emphasis is on the abstract dimension of universal natures. There was a problem with affirming *two* natures in the single hypostasis of the Word. After all, all these authors held to the axiom, common at the time, that there can be "no nature without hypostasis" (Zachhuber: NNWH). In miaphysite hands, NNWH became a weapon against the Chalcedonian confession that Christ has a human nature with no corresponding human hypostasis. Zachhuber finds Leontius of Byzantium and his followers less than adequate in their reply to this objection. Leontius speaks of two individual natures made to subsist in Christ, but is rather vague on why this does not entail two hypostases. Better is the other strand of Chalcedonianism, which runs from John the Grammarian through Leontius of Jerusalem and culminating, with major revisions, in John of Damascus. Zachhuber credits the Grammarian with developing a model in which Christ's human nature is present in his hypostasis somewhat as an accident is present in a substance. Christ is one person in two natures, but only the divine nature is

substantial and thus hypostatic. John's "Substance/Accident" model had a long Scholastic afterlife, as Richard Cross has shown.

The Damascene pushes this strand further. If Philoponus is not the book's hero, John of Damascus is. The latter effectively denies that the NNWH principle holds at all. He conceives of the hypostasis as the ground of *all* of its properties, substantial and accidental. The hypostasis or individual itself is thus pure existence or, in modern parlance, a bare particular. An individual is not the realization of a nature, but that in which natures inhere. John retains universal natures, but they become features of individuals not entirely unlike accidents. On their own, universals are merely abstract; they "inhere wholly in each of their individuals" (302). It follows, perhaps shockingly, that "when one of the hypostases suffers, the whole *ousia*, to which the hypostasis belonged, is said to have suffered in one of its hypostases" (ibid., quoting John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei* 50). This does not mean that all the individuals of that nature suffer simultaneously. Rather, it means that because the nature's abstract properties are instantiated without remainder in this individual, the whole nature suffers with its carrier. While this nature must be in some sense repeatable, its subsistence depends upon individuals, and it is only by conceptual collection that one can claim that the *same* nature is instantiated in others of the class. Hypostases, the only independently subsistent items in John's universe, are "ontologically foundational" (291) and "the carrier of all other being" (309).

This highly innovative move effectively separates existence from essence. To be sure, the idea that hypostases alone do not inhere in other types of being sounds like the definition of primary substance in Aristotle's *Categories*. However, Zachhuber finds this source insufficient. He is right. Consider a passage not mentioned in the book. Porphyry, in his *Commentary on Aristotle's "Categories,"* entertains an objection to the notion that concrete beings like Socrates are ontologically primary and universals secondary. He assumes that X is prior to Y if Y cannot exist without X. Porphyry's objection notes that "human being" or "animal" went on existing when Socrates died. In reply, Porphyry rightly notes that when Aristotle uses Socrates as an example of primary substance, he is actually looking to the whole class-extension of "human being" rather than to Socrates as an individual. It is true, he says, that when an individual dies, the species goes on, but if all members of a species were to die, the species would expire with it (Porphyry, *in Cat*. 90.10–91.12 [ed. Busse]). This example lends contrast to John of Damascus's claim that when an *individual* dies, the nature dies too, and it adds confirmation to the insight demonstrated brilliantly in Zachhuber's book that the Damascene and his contemporaries were consciously revising prior philosophical tradition.

This intellectual tour de force is necessary reading for patristic scholars and will be of great interest to historians of late antique and medieval thought generally. It is, I think, the most important book on early Christian doctrine in the past decade or more. It is clearly written, though conceptually demanding,

and thereby provides a needed model for how to study dogmatic theology's complex philosophical underpinnings.

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*Augustine on the Will: A Theological Account*. By HAN-LUEN KANTZER KOMLINE. Oxford Studies in Historical Theology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xv + 469. $135.00 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0-19-094880-1.

If the problem were in our intellects, a really good lecture or some classic tome might cure all that ails us. But, as Augustine knew so well, this gnostic diagnosis of locating fallen humanity's resistance to the divine in the noetic is far from true. The vileness is not in our knowing (as faulty as that may be), but in our willing, in our very unwillingness to be loved and thus to love truly. In this hefty and helpful work, Han-luen Kantzer Komline lays out Augustine's understanding of the process of our needed healing in a most beautiful manner. Divided into eight chapters, the book is as doctrinally delightful as it is spiritually strengthening. Kantzer Komline writes wonderfully, offering lengthy excerpts from Augustine himself, providing both a scholarly context as well as her own thoughtful analysis of what exactly the Doctor of Grace is doing, and when and why.

The ultimate question Kantzer Komline seeks to answer is this: To what extent can human goodness be ascribed to the human agent and to what extent must it be ascribed to God himself? In addition, how does Augustine's theology of the will develop as he moves out of a mechanical Manichaeism into the fullness of the Catholic faith as priest and bishop, and then into the Pelagian controversies which set the essence and the power of the human will front and center of the fifth-century Church's concerns? Furthermore, how does the incarnation of the New Adam undo and even ameliorate the will inherited by children of the first Adam, and how do Jesus' human and divine wills interact, especially in the classic moment of Gethsemane?

Chapters 1-3 trace how Augustine laid the developing foundations for this theology of the graced will. Who are we really and how are we constituted as knowing and freely desiring persons? Early on, when he was a Manichean, the will was not a question for Augustine. All was determined, set into motion by the cosmic struggle between the *summum malum* and the *summum bonum*. One's response, one's actions, were ultimately not really one's own at all, but instead extensions of this war between good and evil. Contrast this necessitated

servitude with the Christian account of the will which would finally become Augustine's own. Kantzer Komline deals with this progression early on, clearly showing how Augustine came to understand the Greek concept of *akrasia* through the scriptural warrants of St. Paul—e.g., "For I do not do the good I want to do, but the evil I do not want to do—this I keep on doing" (Rom 7:19).

The divided because fallen will of Adam effected a weakening of all wills issuing forth from our protoparents. Augustine is clear-sighted enough to distinguish created natures which God has made ontologically good, "very good" (Gen 1:31), from the fallen will of created persons whose defects come not from the Creator but from our own perverse cupidity. In the "Fallen Will" (chap. 2), then, Kantzer Komline traces Augustine's line of thought over the decades, increasingly emphasizing the solidarity of the children of Adam as well as the utter insufficiency of the will to perform any virtuous action whatsoever without divine assistance. "God's calling precedes good will, not the other way around, and though human will is still free subsequent to the fall, this freedom is of little avail for turning to God" (116).

So, when Kantzer Komline does turn to "What Is in Our Power?" (chap. 3), the answer is not good. The enigmatic self is a constant for Augustine, marred and distorted through sin. In fact, he avers that we can know more about the inscrutability of God than we can of our own selves, taking St. Peter as an example. This so-called "Rock of the Church" knew that Jesus was "the Messiah, the Son of the living God" (Matt 16:16), but had no idea that he himself would be among the first to betray him, a moment of public apostasy right along that of Judas the Iscariot on Holy Thursday Evening (cf. *The Nature and Origin of the Soul* 4.7.11). Scriptural narratives such as this are used by Kantzer Komline to show that as Augustine's thought matured, it became more and more biblically centered. Passages such as, "The will is prepared by the Lord" (Prov 8:35 [LXX]) and, "After all, what do you have that you have not received?" (1 Cor 4:7), formed his growing insistence that the will's goodness is ultimately the Lord's doing. This is a development Kantzer Komline traces in three periods throughout the "Anti-Pelagian" writings.

The first stage lasted from 411 to 417, when Augustine still found himself leaning toward the view that a good will is within one's own power. We might not be able to perform the good always but we can at least desire it. In the second phase, 417-26, Augustine began to see how the will cannot do anything meritorious on its own and that even any good desire of the will is in fact God's moving the will toward a good it could not naturally desire apart from God. By 426, this radical dependency on the divine indwelling in the soul for it not only to choose but to choose rightly is set in clear and unalterable relief.

Chapters 4-6 concentrate on the power of God to bring the will out of its solipsistic demise into conformity with the liberation of Christ. Chapter 4, "God's Gardening" utilizes Augustine's thoughts on the "Our Father" to explain how prayer is essential in the uniting of wills. To do this, God begins to convert the will to find him and his ways more and more attractive and delightful. In chapter 5, "The Redeemed Will" and chapter 6, "Christ and the Will," Kantzer

Komline concentrates our attention on how this grace is nothing other than *caritas Dei*. It is in this message of hope that she lays out the various images and concepts Augustine employs to show the interconnectedness of our lives: the created will acts as a hinge (*cardo*) in a long series of human wills forming a link (*ansula catenae*) in the chain of human posterity. The Savior uproots and renews these weakened links providing a wholly new root (*radix*) in conforming our wills to his own through love alone (*ex Deo*). We can turn away from this love—and that is wholly our own doing—or we can surrender to the Lord's bidding, allowing us to realize the bountiful goodness of both God and his creation. That is, a *bona uoluntas* is not only God's orienting us back to himself but also the way he allows us to make this earthly pilgrimage with integrity and joy. Only in God does the restless will find a stability, brought about by the incarnation of the Son in whom the human and the divine coalesce. When that occurs in the creature, the will is redeemed, "made possible by Christ's life, death, and resurrection on the cross. This redeemed will is different from both the created will and the fallen will. Unlike the created will, it has a checkered history. Unlike the fallen will it is free from sin" (328).

Chapter 7, "The Holy Spirit and the Will," and chapter 8, "The Eschatological Will: Full Freedom at Last," answer the question of how the Spirit of God and the human will interact. The Holy Spirit shows and enables the will to be what God intended it to be: docile to the divine and ever cooperative with *caritas*. Now vivified by the Holy Spirit, the redeemed will finds the good delightful and acts not out of duty or fear but out of *caritas Dei*. In this way, in the Spirit, the virtuous life is the happy life, as the Father does not want his children to find true blessedness difficult and onerous. Accordingly, despite all the ways our fallen wills have reveled in some acid joy during moments apart from their Creator, in heaven the Father mercifully weaves even those fallen delights into a redeemed eternity. In heaven all of our lives become an eternal act of praise to the Father. And as Kantzer Komline writes so poetically, such a sanctified soul "includes an awareness of this history, and the occupation of the saints in the heavenly city will be the endless singing of the story of the will's liberation to the praise of God. Thus free eschatological willing, exercised in endless worship, will embrace and transmute into praise all previous stages of human willing" (411). This is the Good News, that not only despite our sins but precisely because of Adam's fall, we have been elevated out of our original state of no longer "being able not to die and being able to sin" (*posse non peccare, posse non mori*), while in Christ we will actually be "no longer able to sin or able to die" (*non posse peccare, non posse mori*). *O felix culpa* indeed!

What Kantzer Komline has done, she has done well, extremely well. This work will prove to be a standard referent for future works on Augustine's theory of the will and the development of his thinking for a long time to come. There are, however, perhaps two ways her reflections here might be expanded and maybe even improved. First, as she wants to explain in the early chapters, God is the agent in empowering the creature's will to choose rightly without rendering that will into an inert tool with no agency or character development

of its own. Could this cooperative act be bolstered by drawing from Augustine's theology of deification? For in this key soteriological doctrine, these two truths remain both real and active: it is God who provides the grace for me to choose and to choose rightly, but he does it not only above me or in me, God does it *as* me. "Let us rejoice then and give thanks that we have become not only Christians, but Christ himself" (*In Jo. eu* 21.8 [*PL* 35:1568]), Augustine never tires of exclaiming. In uniting the divine and the human in an act of divinization, we might see even more brightly how God and his divinely adopted sons and daughters are never in competition in the only-begotten Son. Our Creator never acts in such a way that the human is rendered robotic or the divine runs roughshod over it. Through grace *I* am empowered to act as Christ acts because in his assumption of my humanity to himself he makes *me* an extension of his own incarnate life.

Second, one wonders exactly how Augustine understands the practical means by which the fallen will is transformed. How exactly, say, are the fruits of Jesus' passion, crucifixion, and resurrection transmitted to us today? Here Kantzer Komline might expand her next work on the rites and practices of Augustine's ecclesiology in order to answer what exactly must happen for God to rectify and sanctify my will. She is right in that prayer is essential (she could have drawn richly from Augustine's commentary on the "Our Father," *epistle* 130 to Proba, who alongside Pelagius and Caelestius also fled to North Africa after the Fall of Rome in 410), but is it sufficient? Certainly questions of Augustine's practice as priest and bishop and his rich theology of the Church as the *Christus totus*, the celebration of the sacraments—especially baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist—and the ascesis of various Christian disciplines will have to be examined in order to show precisely how the incarnate Son of God enters my human condition and, equally as important, exactly how the Spirit of Love is poured into one's heart.

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*Spiritual Traditions and the Virtues: Living between Heaven and Earth*. By MARK R. WYNN. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xii + 254. $85.00 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0-19-886294-9.

In this book, Mark R. Wynn offers a richly integrative account of the spiritual life. He notes that its practitioners are often as motivated by the practical goods embedded in a way of life as by cool-headed intellectual assent to a worldview's propositional content (2). Philosophers of religion have good

reason to consider the claims that spiritual goods make on our lives more seriously and to evaluate those goods as defining features of lived and living spiritual traditions (ibid.). Wynn develops an account of spiritual "hybrid" goods, in which particular theoretical commitments find expression in distinctive practices. He contrasts his approach with one that treats spiritual practices as detachable from any determinate metaphysical worldview (e.g., Pierre Hadot), and one that focuses on metaphysical commitments abstracted from their embodied practice and practical motivations (e.g., Richard Swinburne). Wynn also expands what counts as spiritual practice beyond intentional virtuous acts, and likewise expands what counts as a rational theoretical commitment beyond assessments of the probability of truth of propositions. Wynn's middle way is inspired by Aquinas's account of the infused moral virtues, which he takes to be a paradigm case of goods that are theory- and theology-laden and yet embodied within a mundane way of life (32). Attending to such "thick" spiritual goods and practices better explains why people are motivated to embrace the way of life characteristic of a given spiritual tradition and how their choices are reasonable.

In chapter 1, Wynn argues for an integration of metaphysical and theological views with spiritual practices and goods, against their mutual independence or the priority of one over the other. (Those mistakes characterize Hadot's view of spiritual exercises in one way and analytic philosophy of religion's view of theoretical commitments in another.) Despite this mutual determination, some categories of spiritual goods remain not only intelligible to those outside the worldview but also appealing from that standpoint, for example, as supererogatory goods or admirable cases of virtue (chap. 2). In chapters 3 and 4, Wynn broadens the concept of spiritual practice and the fruit it yields beyond intentional virtuous actions. On his holistic view, one's demeanor and one's perceptual awareness—including, notably, aesthetic experience—can be freighted with theological content. Chapters 5 and 6 address further epistemic and justificatory concerns, noting that practical experiences of spiritual goods and encounters with attractive exemplars of a way of life can explain and motivate adherence to a worldview. Such "data" from the side of practice also gives theoreticians new material for reflection. Wynn argues that his account of "hybrid goods" (85, 133, *inter alia*) offers a compelling explanation for each of these features of the spiritual life. He also considers how even the most theologically laden or revelation-dependent spiritual goods can lead non-believers to affirm a religious worldview if those goods are beautiful enough (204). Wynn concludes that practitioners are attracted to a way of life as a holistic "package" of beauty, goodness, and truth, and a tradition's distinctive confessional truths may be rationally affirmed as part of that package, even if they are not independently probable enough to motivate adherence on their own. Thus, "broad and deep congruence" between spiritual practice and a particular theological narrative (chap. 7, p. 208 *inter alia*)—evident in a worldview's "spiritual fruitfulness"—is worth attending to when evaluating a way of life (241).

To say that theory and practice are mutually informing in the spiritual life is too bland and oversimple a description for Wynn's mature, creative, and detailed exposition, which engages both historical and contemporary philosophical and theological thinkers. On Wynn's reading of Hadot, one's practice can stably and fruitfully anchor a way of a life regardless of supervening theoretical commitments, which can be revised or even rejected. For example, one might find practices yielding Epicurean virtuous tranquility worth affirming, even if one comes to deny the atomism which supports one's lack of fear of death. In contrast, Wynn argues that, in significant cases of spiritual goods and practices, particular truth commitments can and do shape the contours of the practice itself. For example, Aquinas's "beatific vision" specifies who must and must not be loved as one's "neighbor" and why. Aquinas's view of the infused moral virtues serves as an exemplar case of how views from "heaven" (theological claims, based on revelation, about our supernatural *telos*) bear on and are enfolded into mundane "earthly" practices, such as eating or dealing with neighbors. Infused temperance includes the temporal goods available to human reason (e.g., eating for bodily health—a good of reason), but also extends them to new practices, such as abstinence, that are revealed to be "congruent with" the soul's eternal life with God, begun in a preparatory way even now (41-42).

Whether and to what extent we embrace such spiritual practices depends on our metaphysical commitments. But the opposite is also true: which theological commitments we entertain may also depend on practices and experiences. Even when fine-grained metaphysical claims characteristic of, say, Christianity are not by themselves compelling or highly probable, an encounter with an exemplar (a saint) might be enough to draw one into a certain life. The quiet beauty of a nun's demeanor toward a suffering patient might convey the truth of the intrinsic dignity of every human being better than any theologian's verbal articulation. Witnessing the power of forgiveness or love extended even to enemies might prompt one to think that Christianity, for all its peculiarity, might have a view of reality worth inhabiting. According to Wynn, too many philosophers of religion have treated theological claims as prior to such practical encounters or as principally a matter of rational argument, ignoring these crucial motivational moments embedded in practical experiences. So the second major point Wynn advances is that access to a worldview and its appeal often comes from the side of practice, rather than from rational assent to propositional truths on their own.

Wynn also advocates a more expansive view of how we grasp spiritual goods, beyond conceptual articulation to various forms of experiential engagement, including immediate perceptual awareness (how the world "looks" and "feels") and embodied experiences (the way someone carries or comports herself). He suggests this enriched account because, "the subjective feel of a given philosophical 'way of life'—for instance the felt quality of Epicurean contentment—cannot be captured simply by reference to the 'philosophical discourse' that supports the way of life" (66). A significant strength of Wynn's

account is his insistence that our awareness of and attraction to beauty counts as a lived expression of and motivation to embrace the spiritual life—hence the book's recurring preoccupation with the aesthetic and its relationship to the moral and spiritual features of a way of life. For Wynn, the allure of the spiritual life within a spiritual tradition has at least as much to do with how it illuminates certain goods, adds meaning and weight to human choices, opens us to transcendence and mystery, and transforms our perspective of the world. These features play an epistemic role in the rationality of faith commitments, but in a richer, more holistic way than philosophical assessments of truth-claims and theoretical commitments would typically attend to. Even theologically determinate spiritual goods can, however, appear attractive and motivating to those outside the supporting worldview, a thought reminiscent of the longing Charles Taylor describes in *A Secular Age* for an "enchanted" world experienced by those "haunted" by a sense of lost transcendence or meaning.

The project overall therefore yields a rich account of the spiritual ways of life and the traditions of thought that shape them (and are in turn shaped by them). Wynn's approach functions as a commendable corrective to conversations that artificially divide traditional academic theological reflection from spiritually formative practices, exemplary lives, and embodied experiences. His incorporation of the aesthetic realm into the spiritual life is particularly insightful and innovative. And examples both fictional and real help enliven his carefully crafted academic prose.

Wynn showcases a controversial aspect of Aquinas's thought—the infused moral virtues (*STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 3)—to make his case. Is this a liability? Medieval and contemporary thinkers alike have objected to this category of virtue as superfluous and hard to integrate with acquired moral virtues. I think Wynn's argument stands independently of such criticisms. In fact, I appreciated his overall thesis even though I found his exegesis of both Hadot and Aquinas strained at several points. For example, one of Wynn's paradigm cases early in the argument is "neighbor-love," which he calls "a theological virtue" (20). While he is certainly referring to *caritas*, strictly speaking there is no distinct virtue of "neighbor-love" in Aquinas. Charity is the love of friendship, a virtue with a single species, directed principally at God and secondarily at neighbor and self for God's sake (*STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 5, ad 1). Wynn's reading, which leans toward conceptual categories like altruism and obligation, jars with the eudaimonistic frame of Aquinas's account of this theological virtue as a virtue friendship. The conclusion Wynn draws, however, stands: Christian love of neighbor is particularized in practice by theological details about the nature of human beatitude, even if it can nonetheless appeal as a virtuous form of life to those who do not share those theological assumptions.

The usual questions about the relationship of the acquired and infused virtues arise in Wynn's account. To mention a few: Wynn does not discuss infant baptism, when infusion also happens (see *STh* III, q. 69, aa. 4 and 6). This might complicate his developmental story, in which the infused virtues follow the acquired (68-70), and which seems to track adult conversion better than

faith development throughout childhood. Their integration is further complicated by the two sets' different objects (species), ends, and causes (*STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4). Moreover, Wynn thinks that spiritual commitments to certain goods are practically rational even under conditions of uncertainty in part because there is something lost by foregoing a theistic perspective but not much earthly good to lose if one's heavenly commitments are false (176-85). I was less convinced by Wynn's general optimism about the outside-in rationality and motivational appeal of a life marked by the infused moral virtues, precisely because there *does* seem like much to lose: surely celibacy, martyrdom and the role of suffering in spiritual growth, trustful surrender and obedience, and the abstinence required by fasting generally involve fairly serious sacrifices of other goods in ways that often make acts of infused virtue appear less attractive or too costly (even for those inside it). Witness Augustine's terrible struggle with conversion, despite *knowing* the truth of Christianity. If nothing else, such examples complicate the seamless-integration story of grace perfecting nature (150). Lastly, Wynn's reading of Hadot often felt tilted toward caricature, especially since the only example he used from Hadot was Epicureanism. We have evidence that most ancient schools (including early Christianity) embraced similar forms of soul care such as *prosochē* or *memento mori*, regardless of differences in views of reality. It would be a fascinating but complicated question whether and how Stoic detachment might be a theory-laden hybrid good distinct from the Platonic art of dying or a Christian taking up her cross or the habit. I take Hadot's main point to be that theoretical insight and reflective endorsement come only from within a life of serious discipleship, whose goal is not a perfected theory but a well-lived life. In such cases, the priority leans toward the practical and the theory is judged acceptable insofar as it is fleshed out in a fine and virtuous life—a point Wynn himself appreciates (241) and Christians might also affirm (Matt 7:15-17; 25:31-46).

Wynn rightly concludes that we should "examine world views and ways of life in combination" (205), because the spiritual goods involved are hybrids of both. Only a holistic view that interweaves those elements will yield a full picture of that life in all of its goodness, reasonableness, fruitfulness, and choice-worthiness.

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*The Light That Binds: A Study in Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of Natural Law*. By STEPHEN L. BROCK. Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick Publications, 2020. Pp. xv + 277. $35.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-1-5326-4729-1.

Although the subject of this superb book is Thomas's doctrine of natural law, it will greatly profit those interested in any area of his thought. The long history of Thomism has passed through phases, and Stephen Brock's book can serve to mark the end of the "neoscholastic" period, which lasted most of the twentieth century. Neoscholastics decided to counter the onslaught of the nineteenth-century rationalists against the Roman Church by meeting them on their own ground, separating Thomas's philosophy from his theology. The motto of this tactic can be seen in the English subtitle of the Vatican II document *Gaudium et spes,* "The Church in the Modern World." Unfortunately, as Catholics reached out to the "modern" world, it became "postmodern."

The era's two most renowned Catholic philosophers, however, Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson, eschewed the neoscholastic path. When Gilson asked the positivist Lucien Levy-Bruhl to direct his dissertation, he was told he "must undertake something *positive*, speculative philosophy just wouldn't do." Gilson said he would "do the history of philosophy. That's positive enough, isn't it?" And Jacques Maritain's *The Degrees of Knowledge* ranges from ordinary experience of the physical world, through modern science, natural philosophy, metaphysics, and theology, all the way to mystical experience.

Brock's book began life as a dissertation (xiii) structured in response to neoscholastic views on Thomas's natural law. Far from dating it, this structure is what makes this book so important *now*. He begins by organizing neoscholastic efforts (chap. 1), which opens up his lengthy response (chaps. 2-7), a detailed analysis of Thomas's own texts and arguments, the only sure way to capture Thomas's genuine thought, combined with clear-headed critique of selected neoscholastics. So Brock offers not just a superior interpretation of Thomas, but also a tutorial on how to arrive at it.

Brock first divides neoscholastic views into two groups: (I) a natural law completely autonomous from God and eternal law; and (II) natural law in some way connected to God. Then he subdivides each, producing four types.

I.A. "Natural Law as Law in a Qualified Sense": The neoscholastic view was initiated by Odon Lottin, O.S.B., who demoted natural law to the status of an "intrinsic morality," a purely rational ethics which is not law in the full sense, for it lacks a strong sense of "obligation" (*debitum*), command, and sanction. Germain Grisez followed him, and Grisez's collaborator, John Finnis, said natural law is "only *analogically* law."

I.B. "Self-Standing Law": Natural law, considered in itself, is law in the full sense of the word, so much so that Frederick Copleston, S.J., said "it is the human reason which is the proximate or immediate *promulgator* of the natural moral law." Consequently, "we can speak of a certain *autonomy* of the practical reason."

II.A. "A Not Quite Natural Law": On this view, in order for natural law truly to be law it must involve God. For Ernest Fortin and Harry Jaffa, however, this connection cannot be established rationally; so rational natural law fails.

II.B. "Natural Law as a Natural Divine Law": To be law, natural law needs some necessary connection with God; but proponents split about whether we can or need to *know* this connection. Francisco Suarez, S.J., said that this connection is not self-evident, like the principles of the natural law themselves, but it is proven rationally: "The natural law existing in us is a *sign* of some will of God. . . . Therefore natural law includes this will of God"; a view also embraced by Lawrence Dewan, O.P. Others, however, hold that while the reality of natural law in us depends upon God, to be sure, it can function without our knowing this. Peter Geach says "the rational recognition that a practice is generally undesirable is . . . *in fact* a promulgation to a man of the *Divine* law forbidding the practice, even if he does not realise this . . . even if he does not believe there is a God." And Elizabeth Anscombe adds that "a special, peremptory 'moral' sense of the term *ought,* is simply meaningless outside the perspective of an ethics somehow based on a *divine* law." Here we should note that both connect natural with *divine* law, which is revealed through faith, not with eternal law in God, which Thomas thought is known through reason.

After this preliminary survey, the rest of Brock's book (chaps. 2-7) is devoted to a detailed textual and philosophical analysis of Thomas's presentation of natural law in the *Summa theologiae,* not as isolated from the other types of law in the neoscholastic way, but in its full context. The context is crucial because Brock recognizes that Thomas offers a "scientific" argument for law. It begins with the principle for all that follows, his causal and general definition of law, established using the example of human law as the basis for inductive generalization followed by "intellectual insight" (*intellectus*) into its truth: "a certain ordinance of reason [matter], for the common good [end], promulgated [form], by him who has care of the community [agent]" (*STh* I-II, q. 90, a. 4).

Thomas then distinguishes five types of laws (*STh* I-II, q. 91, aa. 1-6): "eternal law" in God; "natural law" in all humans; "human law" devised by us; revealed "divine law"; and even a "law of sin." Brock keenly discerns that Thomas not only distinguishes conceptually the *essences* of these specific kinds of laws, but argues for their *existence*. Thomas's question is not "*what* is the natural law?' but "*whether* there is in us some natural law?" an existential question. These questions cannot be answered by definitions alone, but require arguments addressing both the existence and the essence of these types of law.

This is the reason why chapter 2 is not called "On the Natural Law" but is titled "The *Relation* of the Natural Law and the Eternal Law," which is its cause. About eternal law, Thomas says "*granted that the world is ruled by divine providence*, as shown in the First Part, it is clear that the whole community of the universe is governed by divine reason" or "eternal law." The backward reference is important, for it shows that Thomas's argument is based on his earlier philosophical arguments that God exists, his essence is "subsisting

existence itself," God is creator of the world, and so the exemplar cause of creatures, whose perfections come from providential participation in divine perfection. So the full argument for *eternal* law is a long set of philosophical demonstrations, superbly arranged with this kind of deduction in mind.

The argument to prove the existence of *natural* law and reveal its definition can be shorter because it simply takes the next step: As a "rule and measure law can be in something in two ways," in the ruler or in the thing ruled. Now "all things participate in some way in the eternal law," but humans in a special way, as "ruler *and* thing ruled." Consequently, "natural law is nothing other than the rational creature's *participation* in the eternal law" (*STh* I-II, q. 91, a. 2). We might take this to be a mere definition, but Brock shows it is a definition of natural law through its causes, which therefore demonstrates the existence of natural law. This is why Brock calls this definition through participation "formal." And the sequence does not stop here; question 91 proceeds to establish the existence of "human law," a revealed "divine law," and even a "law" of sin.

Brock then turns to Thomas's "material" definition of natural law (*STh* I-II, q. 94), which reveals the contents or "specific properties of natural law." While promulgated by God, the natural law consists in our *rational* knowledge of its precepts, which are "rules and measures" based "on the very notion of the good" (chap. 3). Thomas explains those precepts (*STh* I-II, q. 94) by drawing an analogy between speculative and practical reason. *Speculative* reason has three levels of principles known to all. Topmost is the fundamental notion of "being," opposed to nonbeing. Second is the primary propositional principle: noncontradiction. And third come more limited axioms, such as "the whole is greater than the part," and the equality axiom. Of course, falling under these are even more specific principles as well as demonstrated conclusions. *Practical* reason has three analogous levels of principles. First is the fundamental notion of the "good," opposed to the bad and defined teleologically as "what all things seek." Second comes the primary propositional precept: "the good should be done and pursued, and the bad shunned." Third, Thomas presents three more limited precepts by correlating them with three levels of our "natural inclinations." The first we "have in common with all substances," namely, "preserving its own being." Second are inclinations we have "in common with other animals . . . sexual union and raising our young." Third and peculiar to humans are "knowing the truth about God and living in society." And more specific principles and practical actions follow (cf. Cicero, *De officiis*, 1.4.11-13).

It is the third level of precepts, based on our "natural inclinations," to which neoscholastic commentators objected vehemently. Germain Grisez asked rhetorically: "Is reason merely an *instrument* in the service of *nature*, accepting what nature indicates as good by moving us toward it? No . . . not because they are given, but because *reason's* good, which is intelligible, contains the aspect of end" (115-16). John Finnis added: "by a simple act of non-inferential understanding one grasps that the object of the inclination which one

experiences is an instance of a *general form of good*. . . . The proper measure of moral good and evil is thus reason, *not* nature" (116-17). What follows is not a hierarchy of real goods but a democracy of "basic human goods" that are "equally self-evidently good," any one of which an individual mind can determine to be "most important." The problem they find is that "natural inclinations" base the precepts of natural law on ontology and on features of human nature that are less than rational, whereas natural law should function at the purely rational level from beginning to end. This is why they drop Thomas's third-level precepts altogether, and use only "do good and avoid bad."

The problem with this interpretation of Thomas, which is really a critical rejection, is that it wrongly assumes that "natural inclinations," which Grisez calls "felt inclinations" of "sense spontaneity" (115), are demoted to the prerational level, inclinations that follow from mere physical attraction. But this is not what Thomas means by human "nature" or "natural inclinations." For Thomas, "natural inclinations" are tendencies toward the good that follow the "nature" of a thing, in this case human nature, which includes reason. The "natural inclination" toward preserving our being, or sexual union and raising young, or knowing truth, is a rational inclination, not a subrational one. This is why Thomas can use the correlation between "natural inclinations" and moral precepts to reason from the inclinations to the precepts, as in *STh* I-II, q. 94, a. 2, but also to reason in the opposite direction, from the precepts to evaluate inclinations as natural or unnatural, especially in arguments that actions are immoral because done out of unnatural inclinations.

Consequently, Brock devotes the centerpiece of this superior book to a very detailed explanation and defense of Thomas's thought on God's promulgation of the natural law through "natural inclinations" (chap. 4) and through "nature and human nature" (chap. 5), and on the issue of the legal "force of natural law" (chap. 6).

The book is, as a whole, the best one I have read on Thomas's natural law. It has the feature that distinguishes the very best studies: it took me back to Thomas's texts, especially ones I have read and taught, to learn something new. I would suggest the reader open the *Summa* next to Brock, who here takes us into the next phase of Thomist thought on natural law, where ontology and human nature have been returned to the study.

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*The One Creator God in Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Theology*. By MICHAEL J. DODDS, O.P. Sacra Doctrina. Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2020. Pp. 229. $29.95 (paper). ISBN 978-0-8132-3287-4.

This book provides a treatise on the One and Creator God inspired by the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. One of the strengths of the author, Michael J. Dodds, O.P., is his ability to reveal the relevance of this theology in the concert of contemporary theologies, while integrating some new questions into the Thomistic synthesis. The book is classically constructed, with chapters on God's existence (chap. 1); divine attributes (chap. 2); our capacity to know and name God (chap. 3); God's knowledge (chap. 4); his will (chap. 5); his love, justice and compassion (chap. 6); providence (chap. 7); power (chap. 8); beatitude (chap. 9); and divine action as creation and government (chap. 10). The presentation of each topic is pedagogical and informed, without excessive technicality. I wish simply to point out some original features of the book, conducive to discussion or further study.

Regarding the *Tertia via*, Dodds explains the thesis that what is contingent cannot always exist by means of the presupposition—for the sake of argument—that the world has existed for an infinite time (43). Given this assumption, if contingency in existence is one of the essential properties of the realities considered at the starting point of the *Tertia via*, they must not always exist. One might object to Dodds that such an assumption belies the biblical belief in creation, involving a temporal beginning of the world. It seems therefore awkward that Thomas would make such an *ad hoc* assumption.

The explanation of the *Quinta via* includes a useful clarification. This path, based on the observation of a finality in natural things that occur mostly in the same way, is distinct from arguments about Intelligent Design. The latter start from a basic configuration sought and found in the distant past and do not reach a Designer who is both truly transcendent and truly immanent to the world (53-54). The *Quinta via*, on the other hand, leads to a God who causes the substantial form by which natural things are directed to a natural end.

The exposition of the divine attributes and the way of knowing God in this life is classic, with three important clarifications in the contemporary context: the correlation between transcendence and immanence in the face of the middle term represented by panentheism (69-71), the type of analogy adjusted to name God (87-92), and the doctrine of the mixed relation between God and creatures (93-100). On this last point, a study by Gilles Emery ("*Ad aliquid:* Relation in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas," in *Theology Needs Philosophy: Acting against Reason Is Contrary to the Nature of God*, ed. Matthew L. Lamb [Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016], 175-201) would provide interesting additions. While many biblical accounts present a God who reacts (or seems to react) to the behaviors of his creatures, it would also be relevant to show how such "metaphors" are meaningful and cannot be reduced to merely secondary statements. For instance, most of the passions

attributed to God in biblical narratives, such as sorrow, anger, regret, or envy, are not to be understood as properly signified. It does not mean that they are irrelevant, but that their mode of attribution is of a different kind. Improper attributes might be highly valuable and revelatory, as well as proper attributes.

The explanations of God's knowledge and his will have in common that they argue for a compatibility between the transcendence of divine operations and the necessity or contingency ordered by him in created causes or agents (104-7 and 114-17). God's eternal operations do not impose necessity on contingent things.

In discussing the compassion of the impassible God, Dodds argues that he does not suffer at all in himself, but actually suffers as the incarnate Son, in his humanity, and in the members of his body (124-25).

The following chapters on providence, predestination and evil, God's power, and his beatitude, hold no surprises for the reader informed about Thomas's doctrine. However, Dodds repeatedly offers keys to answer common objections or erroneous presuppositions. On the act of creation and divine action, Dodds further engages the debate between Thomism and contemporary perspectives, especially those explored at Berkeley in the research programs of the Center for Theology and Natural Sciences. While receptive to these new contributions, Dodds criticizes the univocal notion of causality that leads one to look for spaces—empty, free, or favorable—for God's action in various theories—quantum, chaos, emergence (171-73).

This pedagogically oriented book is equipped with two appendices: a brief vocabulary of philosophical terms and a historical note on the emergence of monotheism. Students thus have a very good handbook on the one God in the theological tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas. The purpose of CUA Press's Sacra Doctrina series has been well served by Michael J. Dodds.

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