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THE NECESSITY OF BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN CHRIST'S HUMANITY: A RE-READING OF *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE* III, Q. 9

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IT IS WELL-KNOWN that, since the latter half of the twentieth century, there has been a growing discomfort among Catholic theologians with the teaching of Christ's earthly beatific knowledge.[1] According to the traditional teaching, the soul of Christ, from the moment of conception, fully enjoyed the beatific vision of the divine essence. That is, Christ in his earthly life was not only a *viator* but simultaneously a *comprehensor*. In light of both modern historical biblical scholarship, which has heightened our sense of the particular historical conditions of Christ's earthly existence, as well as modern psychology, which has considerably deepened our understanding of the complexities of the human psyche, Christ as understood by St. Thomas Aquinas, and the tradition more generally, appears less and less human.[2]

[1] For a concise introduction to the modern situation regarding Christ's earthly vision, see Simon Gaine, *Did the Saviour See the Father? Christ, Salvation and the Vision of God* (London: Bloomsbury, T&T Clark, 2015), 3-14.

[2] Jean Galot, "La Christ terrestre et la vision," *Gregorianum* 67 (1986): 432: "The perfection attributed to the knowledge of Christ is such that it does not sufficiently respect the distinction between the divine and human nature. . . . We immediately perceive the risk of monophysitism, more specifically, the difficulty of recognizing the inherent finitude of human knowledge and of avoiding all confusion with the perfection of divine knowledge." All translations from French sources in this article are my own.

The tendency away from the traditional doctrine reached its apex in the 1980s, when, as one theologian noted, the doctrine of Christ's beatific vision, formerly held by all, could be described as "frequently denied, rarely affirmed."[3] It was during this time, in order to quell any possibility of a resurgence in the traditional doctrine, that Jean Galot penned what is perhaps its most incisive critique in his article, "La Christ terrestre et la vision."[4] Galot sought to remind his readers of the most serious objections against the traditional teaching. To this end, he highlights the central role of the dubious *a priori* and extrascriptural "principle of perfection," taken for granted by the medieval Scholastics, from which all of Christ's perfection in knowledge is deduced. According to Galot, this principle has the effect of precluding "the realization of the concrete conditions in which the human thought of Jesus developed."[5] Given the nonbiblical character of this principle, it appears possible to identify clearly the fundamental source of Thomas's error.

Thomists have responded to Galot's critique in various ways. Some, having ceded the point, have attempted in turn to correct what they perceive to be unwarranted extrascriptural excesses in

[3] Bertrand de Margerie, "De la science du Christ: Science, prescience et conscience, même prépascales, du Christ redempteur," *Doctor communis* 36 (1983): 124, quoted in Galot, "La Christ terrestre et la vision," 429.

[4] Galot, "La Christ terrestre et la vision," 429-50.

[5] Ibid., 430-31: "The attribution of this triple knowledge to Christ does not arise from a study of the evangelical texts, but from a principle of perfection from which one seeks to develop all its consequences. As the Son of God incarnate, it is thought that Jesus must possess all the possible perfection of knowledge. In him must be verified all types of knowledge found in creatures; consequently, the highest form of knowledge, which consists in the beatific vision, could not be refused to him." For a history of the teaching in the medieval period see William J. Forster, "The Beatific Knowledge of Christ in the Theology of the 12th and 13th Centuries" (dissertation, Angelicum, Rome, 1958); Laurence S. Vaughan, "The Acquired Knowledge of Christ according to the Theologians of the 12th and 13th Centuries," (dissertation, Angelicum, Rome, 1957); Jean-Pierre Torrell, "Le savoir acquis du Christ selon les théologiens médiévaux," *Revue thomiste* 101 (2001): 355-408. For Thomas's unique development and application of the "principle of perfection" with respect to his contemporaries see my article, "The Principle of Perfection in Thirteenth-Century Accounts of Christ's Human Knowledge," *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 24 (2022): 352-79.

Thomas's doctrine. Thus, prominent French-speaking Thomists such as Marie-Joseph Nicholas and Jean-Pierre Torrell variously attempted in the 1980s and 1990s to "re-construct" Thomas's teaching on Christ's knowledge on a more solid, explicitly biblical foundation.[6] Among English-speaking Thomists, Thomas Weinandy has been the most vocal critic of the Thomist doctrine, arguing instead for a more modest approach to Christ's human knowledge based first and foremost on the requisite authenticity of Christ's preresurrectional human life as depicted in the Gospel narratives.[7]

Contrary to the aims of Galot's article, however, Thomas's teaching has seen a surprising resurgence in recent decades.[8] Most notably, two Dominican theologians, Thomas Joseph White and Simon Gaine, have offered compelling arguments for the necessity of Christ's beatific vision based on the exigencies of his earthly mission (whether in terms of his self-consciousness of his identity and mission or in terms of the communication of

[6] See Marie-Joseph Nicholas, "Voir Dieu dans la 'charnelle condition,'" *Revue thomiste* 36 (1983): 384-94; Jean-Pierre Torrell, "S. Thomas d'Aquin et la science du Christ: Une relecture des questions 9–12 de la 'tertia pars' de la Somme de théologie," in *Saint Thomas au XXe siècle: Colloque du centenaire de la "Revue thomiste" (1893-1992); Toulouse, 25-28 Mars 1993* (1994): 394-409.

[7] See Thomas Weinandy, "Jesus' Filial Vision of the Father," *Pro Ecclesia* 13 (2004): 189-201; "The Beatific Vision and the Incarnate Son: Furthering the Discussion," *The Thomist* 70 (2006): 605-15; "The Human Acts of Christ and the Acts That Are the Sacraments," in *Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life*, ed. Reinhard Hütter, Romanus Cessario, and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 151-68.

[8] Gaine, *Did the Saviour See the Father?*; Thomas Joseph White, *The Incarnate Lord: A Thomistic Study in Christology* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of Amerca Press, 2017). See also Charles Rochas, *La science bienheureuse du Christ simul viator et comprehensor: Selon les commentaires bibliques et la Summa theologiae de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Cerf, 2019); Dominic Legge, *The Trinitarian Christology of St Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). One might also point to Bernard Lonergan, who, as Gaine notes, was one of the few prominent theologians in the latter half of the previous century to defend the traditional doctrine. See also Jeremy D. Wilkins, *Before Truth: Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem of Wisdom* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018), 316-51.

truth through his earthly preaching and teaching).[9] What is noteworthy is that, within the context of the contemporary debate, proponents and detractors alike see the necessity of Christ's beatific knowledge as hinging on its role in Christ's pre-glorified or earthly self-consciousness and teaching. Thus, proponents argue that absent the beatific vision Christ would neither have been able to teach and communicate the divine truth, nor would he have had the requisite filial self-consciousness to accomplish his mission. Meanwhile, detractors argue that the beatific vison is in no way necessary for Christ's earthly consciousness and teaching; rather, its affirmation results in a distortion of Christ's human nature as one truly like unto us, that is, as *viator* only.

Notably, Thomas's own argument from perfection seems to play little to no role in the contemporary debate. It is not difficult to see why. Rather than begin from the role of Christ's beatific vision, whether in his earthly teaching or in the unity of his earthly self-consciousness, Thomas's argument indeed appears to rely too heavily on the philosophical language of act and potency, cause and effect, and most of all, the notion of perfection. On account of the apparent irrelevance of Thomas's own argument, many Thomists typically give the argument of the *Summa theologiae* a polite nod before hurrying on to more apparently relevant ones. Thus, proponents and detractors alike seem to agree, at least implicitly, that the truth or falsity of Thomas's doctrine can and, perhaps must, be judged apart from his principal and sole argument from perfection.

Yet it cannot be a matter of indifference how we understand Thomas's argument. It is worthwhile to step back from the contemporary debate (which focuses on the utility of Christ's knowledge in his preglorified, earthly ministry) and reconsider

[9] Thomas Weinandy has criticized Thomas Joseph White's view as Nestorian inasmuch as, for White, the earthly beatific vision is posited as mediating between and ultimately uniting the human and divine will. Weinandy also detects a "whiff" of Nestorianism in Thomas's original argument. Cf. "Jesus' Filial Vision of the Father," 191 n. 2. We leave to the side this more recent debate which turns on the attempt to ground the beatific vision of Christ's humanity in the 'ontology' of the hypostatic union.

Thomas's argument from perfection. As we shall see, Thomas's account of Christ's beatific vision has as its starting point, not an abstract, *a priori* "principle of perfection," but a notion of perfection that is grounded in and determined by broader and more fundamental soteriological concerns.[10] To be sure, Thomas's concern is to provide a *causal* (and in this way philosophical) account of Christ's knowledge, but far from being an *a priori* metaphysical argument, Thomas's account is one that is based squarely in the revealed datum that Christ, in his humanity, is the sole and universal way to God.[11]

In this respect, Thomas's argument is not merely about knowledge as such, but about what must be true of Christ's humanity if indeed he is the universal head and Savior of the Church. The sort of perfection that Thomas posits as necessary for Christ's role as Savior is not defined in abstraction from the revealed economy but is rather grounded in it. If Christ as man (in his glorified state as much as in his preglorified, earthly existence) is to be the author of our salvation (i.e., the universal source of grace), then it is necessary that his human nature be a suitable instrument. This means that he must, as universal principle and cause of grace, possess in his own humanity all the grace of which he is the source: the universal cause in any genus must be a maximum in that genus.[12] Far from what the philosophical character of his argument might suggest, Thomas is

[10] On this point, see Simon Gaine, "*Must* an Incarnate Divine Person Enjoy the Beatific Vision?," in *Thomas Aquinas and the Crisis of Christology*, ed. Michael A. Dauphinais, Andrew Hofer, O.P., and Roger Nutt (Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2021): 126-38.

[11] See Gilles Emery, "Le Christ mediateur," in *"Christus–Gottes schöpferisches Wort": Feschrift für Christoph Kardinal Schönborn zum 65. Geburtstag* (Freiberg: Verlag Herder GmbH, 2010): 337-55.

[12] The philosophical principle at work is the causality of the maximum. On this principle, well-known for its appearance in Thomas's fourth way, see V. de Couesnongle, "La causalité du maximum: L'utilisation par saint Thomas d'un passage d'Aristote," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 38 (1954): 433-44; "La causalité du maximum: Pourquoi saint Thomas a-t-il mal cité Aristote?," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 38 (1954): 658-80.

fundamentally concerned with the question of the perfection of Christ's humanity in order to give an account of how his humanity can be said to be "the source of grace from which all receive." It is precisely because Christ has the perfection of grace within the genus of grace that he is able, in his humanity, to be the universal source of grace for all men.

This article is divided into two parts. In the first part, I review contemporary Thomist arguments for and against the necessity of the beatific character of Christ's earthly vision. Here, I show how contemporary debates tend to focus almost exclusively on the question of the role of Christ's knowledge for his preglorified or earthly existence and mission. While this is certainly a worthwhile and even necessary consideration in its own right, I argue that approaches that begin with the question of earthly utility tend to detract from Thomas's own argument, which is the more fundamental, based on the humanity of Christ as such. In accounting for Christ's beatific vision beginning from the question of its earthly utility, detractors and proponents alike unwittingly relocate the crux of the debate away from what Thomas arguably regarded as *the* fundamental principle: Christ's humanity as the head and instrumental source of all grace.

In the second part, I offer a positive account of Thomas's argument. I begin by comparing Thomas's treatment of the role of Adam's knowledge with that of Christ's knowledge in order to show that Thomas's decision to speak in terms of the perfection of Christ's humanity rather than in terms of earthly utility is in no way unintentional. For Thomas, the consideration of Christ in his human nature as the head of the Church and of his humanity as the instrument of salvation precedes considerations of the *acta et passa* of his earthly ministry. For the role of Christ's humanity goes beyond the external governance and teaching that belonged to Adam. Specifically, Thomas distinguishes Christ's work from that of others insofar as he is, in his humanity, the source of the *interior* influx of grace. Thomas's appeal to Christ's human perfection is to be understood as based not in a philosophical *a priori* (*pace* Galot) but in the revelation of Christ's humanity as the preeminent source of all grace and truth. While philosophical principles are certainly present in his argument, they are

nevertheless subservient to the revealed data. In so presenting Thomas's view, my aim is not to displace contemporary arguments for Christ's earthly beatific vision but to ensure that Thomas's own argument, which offers a more fundamental account of the necessity of that vision, is not too hastily passed over.

I. CONTEMPORARY THOMIST ARGUMENTS

As mentioned above, those involved in the contemporary debate over Christ's beatific vision implicitly distinguish Thomas's position (*that* Christ had the vision) from his argument for it (*why* Christ had the vision). The contemporary debate concerns the former aspect, while the latter is often mentioned only in passing.[13] The reason for this distinction is simple: it is not immediately obvious how Thomas's argument addresses the central question of whether Christ, of necessity, possessed the vision during his preglorified, earthly life.[14] In contrast, Thomas's argument appears to establish Christ's beatific vision in complete

[13] See, for instance, Thomas Weinandy, "The Human Acts of Christ That Are the Acts of the Sacraments," in *Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life*, ed. Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 155 n. 11; idem, "Jesus' Filial Vision of the Father," 200 n. 19; White, *Incarnate Lord*, 238 n. 2; Guy Mansini, "Understanding St. Thomas on Christ's Immediate Knowledge of God," *The Thomist* 59 (1995): 96.

[14] See Torrell, "S. Thomas d'Aquin et la science du Christ," 401-2. Torrell makes sense of Thomas's argument by suggesting that Thomas accepts the beatific knowledge itself as a datum of faith, such that he can only supply an argument for it from fittingness. "[Thomas] supposes that the vision rests on the datum of faith concerning Christ and the single piece of proof that he gives manifestly overstates the text on which it depends. Thomas argues as if Hebrews 2:10 speaks of the earthly Jesus, even though this verse speaks of Christ, that is to say of Jesus resurrected, entered into the share of the glory of the Father. If this belongs to him who brings us to the vision—which is incontestable—, it is necessary therefore that he already possess it. But Thomas neglects to make clear the moment when Jesus has become the Christ, and it is here that his reasoning loses its probative power."

abstraction from the concrete historical and psychological conditions of his humanity.

Thomas's argument from the *Summa* (*STh* III, q. 9, a. 2) is worth quoting in full:

A being in potency is reduced to act through a being in act. For it is necessary that that which heats other things be itself hot. But man is in potency to the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God. And he is ordered to this as to an end. For the rational creature is capable of that blessed knowledge inasmuch as it is [created] *ad imaginem Dei*. But man is brought to this end of beatitude through the humanity of Christ, according to Hebrews 2[:10], "it became him, for whom and through whom are all things, in leading many sons to glory, to be perfected [*consummari*] as the Author of their salvation through the Passion."[15] And therefore, it was necessary that the very knowledge consisting in the vision of God belong pre-eminently [*excellentissime*] to Christ the man, since the cause must always be greater than what is caused.[16]

[15] The Vulgate has "consummare" instead of "consummari." The former more closely translates the active infinitive "τελειῶσαι." Thomas consistently quotes this passage using the passive infinitive "consummari." The result of Thomas's choice of "consummari" is that God *is perfected* as the author of salvation by the Passion. Compare this to the Vulgate, where God *perfects* the author of salvation through the Passion: "It became him, for whom and through whom are all things . . . to perfect the author of their salvation through the Passion." Both readings are theologically defensible. Thomas's broader point vis-à-vis Christ's headship is unaffected by the difference in translation. For other uses of Hebrews 2:10 by Thomas see *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 10, ad 7; *ScG* IV, c. 34. A more detailed exposition of Hebrews 2:10 can be found in *Super Heb.*, c. 2, lect. 3. There, Thomas explains that Christ is fittingly called the author of our salvation insofar as he is the natural Son and the splendor of glory (*splendor gloriae*). Thomas also explicitly links this to the predestination of Christ.

[16] *STh* III, q. 9, a. 2: "Respondeo dicendum quod illud quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum per id quod est actu, oportet enim esse calidum id per quod alia calefiunt. Homo autem est in potentia ad scientiam beatorum, quae in visione Dei consistit, et ad eam ordinatur sicut ad finem, est enim creatura rationalis capax illius beatae cognitionis, inquantum est ad imaginem Dei. Ad hunc autem finem beatitudinis homines reducuntur per Christi humanitatem, secundum illud Heb. II, decebat eum propter quem omnia et per quem omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummari. Et ideo oportuit quod cognitio ipsa in Dei visione consistens excellentissime Christo homini conveniret, quia semper causam oportet esse potiorem causato."

Besides the language of potency and act, cause and caused, there is the troubling appeal to perfection which takes as its proof a text from the Epistle to the Hebrews. More troubling still, as Torrell notes, is that the text Thomas cites only appears to establish successfully the "incontestable" fact *that* Christ's humanity is the way by which we arrive at the beatific vision; it fails to establish the more relevant question of *whether* this must occur prior to his glorification. The logical force of Thomas's argument, it seems, only has strength inasmuch as it abstracts from the concrete conditions of Christ's earthly existence.

In replying to such criticisms, Thomists typically attempt to demonstrate the necessity and reality of Christ's earthly beatific vision on the basis of his *earthly* consciousness and teaching. Thus, in some way or other, the beatific vision is necessary either as the basis for the external and human communication of divine truth to others or for the requisite filial human self-consciousness for Christ's proper fulfillment of the divine mission through his human actions.[17] Beyond accounting for Christ's earthly vision, such an approach has the advantage of providing an account more agreeable to modern sensibilities for Thomas's teaching on Christ's infused knowledge (which also relies explicitly on the problematic "principle of perfection").[18] Since, unlike typical human knowledge, beatific knowledge is immediate and unconceptualizable, it becomes necessary to posit lower types of knowledge (the infused and acquired) to fill in what would

[17] Paweł Klimczak speaks of Christ's infused and beatific knowledge largely in terms of their function in his earthly life, but he also devotes a section to Christ's interior teaching. See Paweł Klimczak, *Christus Magister: Le Christ maître dans les commentaires évangéliques de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2013), 178-83.

[18] See, for example, Torrell, "S. Thomas d'Aquin et la science du Christ," 396: "[Thomas] was led to posit the existence of the beatific vision by reason of the incommunicability of the uncreated knowledge." Further on, Torrell writes, "With the beatific vision we therefore find a problem analogous to that of uncreated knowledge: it is a knowledge which the human soul of Christ cannot use (*disposer*). He can neither think nor speak it in a human fashion" (397).

otherwise be incomplete.[19] Thus, while all agree that some kind of limited infused or prophetic knowledge is necessary in Christ's earthly life, it is nevertheless unclear whether the earthly beatific vision, in conjunction with the infused knowledge, plays any necessary role.

Those who argue against Christ's earthly beatific vision point to the obvious fact that the beatific knowledge, as incommunicable, does not and cannot play any immediate role in the earthly transmission of Christ's human knowledge.[20] After all, nowhere in Scripture do we read of Christ communicating the beatific vision as such in his earthly ministry. From this, critics conclude to its absence. Instead of beatific knowledge, they posit a type of infused knowledge (e.g., Torrell posits a "christic" knowledge analogous to prophetic knowledge) that is clearly warranted by the Gospel narratives.[21] Such a knowledge supplies the content necessary for Christ's earthly teaching and preaching.[22] Furthermore, the substitution of infused prophetic

[19] See White, *Incarnate Lord*, 257; Simon Francis Gaine, "Is There Still a Place For Christ's Infused Knowledge in Catholic Theology and Exegesis?," *Nova et vetera* (Eng. ed.) 16 (2018): 605. Both White and Gaine point to John of St. Thomas as the originator of the explanation of infused knowledge as corresponding to the need of a knowledge of divine things proportioned to the human mind. See John of St. Thomas, *Cursus theologicus in summam theologicam D. Thomae*, vol. 8 (Paris: Vivès, 1886), q. 9, d. 11, a. 2, no. 15.

[20] This is arguably *the* problematic that governs Jacques Maritain's account of Christ's grace and knowledge See Jacques Maritain, *On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus*, trans. Joseph W. Evans (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969).

[21] This includes, for instance, Christ's knowledge of the secrets of men's hearts, of what occurs at a distance, of the future, and so on.

[22] In fact, this is how many interpreters understand Thomas's argument for infused knowledge, even if it is nowhere in Thomas's text. The infused intelligible species form the more proximate basis for Christ's communication of divine truth in a human mode. Here, too, interpreters depart from Thomas's own argumentation. One result of such an approach is that it is no longer clear why Christ must have possessed the infused knowledge of all things. Naturally, even the most ardent defenders of Thomas's teaching on the beatific vision join with his critics in abandoning Thomas's teaching on Christ's infused knowledge of all things. For more on this see my forthcoming article, "Re-thinking Aquinas on Christ's Infused knowledge," *Nova et vetera* (Eng. ed.) 21 (2023).

knowledge for beatific knowledge avoids many complications that otherwise arise. For instance, it seems to avoid a certain docetism according to which Christ only *seems* to be like us, without really being like us in all things.[23] How could Christ have functioned with what, according to some interpreters, is a paralyzing knowledge of the divine essence?[24] As *comprehensor*, it is argued, Christ would not have been able fully to experience human existence in its profoundest depth; for his whole life would have been suffused at every moment with the ineffable joy of heaven. Above all, critics point to the biblical account of Christ's Passion and his cry of dereliction, both of which suggest an immensity of suffering hardly compatible with an enjoyment of the beatific vision.[25] Based on the biblical record as well as the modern emphasis on the complexities of the human psyche,[26] it seems necessary to reject as incredible any portrayal of the earthly Christ who enjoyed the beatific vision.

While pushing back against Galot and others, proponents of Thomas's doctrine nevertheless propose arguments for Christ's beatific vision that are based primarily on its utility in his earthly life. Thus, while acknowledging Thomas's argument, White and

[23] Karl Rahner, "Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of Christ," in *Theological Investigations* 5, trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), 206.

[24] See, for instance, J-M, Nicolas, *Synthèse dogmatique: De la Trinité à la Trinité*, (Paris and Fribourg, 1985), 390; Romanus Cessario, "Incarnate Wisdom and the Immediacy of Christ's Salvific Knowledge," in *Problemi teologici alla luce dell'Aquinate* (Atti del IX Congresso Tomistico Internazionale), *Studi Tomistici* 44 (Vatican City: Libreria editrice vaticana, 1991), 338. Cessario writes, "The beatific vision remains paralyzing, and no creature can act as a result of it."

[25] Torrell additionally points to problems that the doctrine introduces into Thomas's otherwise coherent Aristotelian psychology. See Torrell, "S. Thomas d'Aquin et la science du Christ," 400-402. On the cry of dereliction, see White, "Did God Abandon Jesus? The Dereliction on the Cross," in *Incarnate Lord*, 308-39.

[26] On the basis of the incommunicability of the vision, Jacques Maritain goes as far as to divide Christ's consciousness into two parts: the supraconscious and the conscious. It is only according to the former that Christ enjoyed the vision. See Maritain, *On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus*, 54-61.

Gaine both attempt to go beyond his teaching by establishing the necessity of Christ's beatific vision with respect either to his earthly consciousness or to his earthly teaching.[27] White points to the ontological and psychological constitution of Christ's humanity as requiring, according to a soteriological fittingness, a human "translation" of the divine knowledge, which is further translated into his earthly ministry through an infused "prophetic" knowledge.[28] Here, the vision serves as to guarantee the certitude of Christ's prophetic knowledge, which would otherwise be indistinguishable from theological faith. In this regard, the vision serves a Christological role by providing the condition for the unity of the person "in and through the duality of his natures."[29] Without this vision, White argues, Christ's human action would have been divorced from his personal action as Son of God, for it would not have been immediately subject to the divine will.[30] Only through the beatific vision can Christ's human operations in his earthly existence be directed towards fulfilling the redemptive task in a manner that befits the Incarnate Word.[31] Through this knowledge alone can Christ as man be said to possess an indefectible knowledge of the Father's will "so as to express it in a human way."[32]

[27] See Galot, "Le Christ terrestre et la vision," 434.

[28] White is very much aware that his argument is distinct from that of Thomas. See White, *Incarnate Lord*, 238-39 n. 2. Bernard Lonergan also seeks to understand Christ's knowledge through an investigation of the ontological and psychological constitution of Christ. See Bernard Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, vol 7, ed. Michael Shields, Frederick Crowe, S.J., and Robert Doran S.J. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 2002), 190-285.

[29] White, *Incarnate Lord*, 238. Gaine provides a similar argument; see Gaine, *Did the Saviour See the Father?* 71-102.

[30] See White, *Incarnate Lord*, 239. White explains, "if the human action of Jesus is to be the personal action of the Son of God, it must be immediately subject to the activity of the divine will which it expresses. This requires that the human intellect of Jesus possess the vision of God."

[31] See ibid., 256. In this, White argues against Galot's principle of perfection by highlighting that the vision is necessary "for reasons *essential to the divine economy*."

[32] Ibid., 271. This is not to say that White's argument is invalid or inconsonant with Thomas's teaching but merely to highlight a difference between them. More broadly, my

While White focuses on the necessity of the beatific vision for Christ's filial consciousness, Simon Gaine ties the necessity of the beatific vision more immediately to Christ's earthly teaching. The beatific knowledge is necessary, he argues, insofar as it provides a necessary "line of revelatory continuity" between the divine knowledge and Christ's human teaching.[33] Gaine writes, "it is by the beatific vision that his divine knowledge is communicated to his human mind, on the basis of which his human teaching of the disciples about divine realities can take place."[34] Inasmuch as the beatific knowledge is inexpressible in human language, it requires the infused knowledge: "Jesus's teaching is communicated in human language, categories, images, and narratives, all of which must presuppose a communicable knowledge somehow

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present argument can be read as being fundamentally compatible with White's insights. See esp. *Incarnate Lord*, chaps. 5, 8, and 9.

[33] Simon Francis Gaine, "Is There Still a Place For Christ's Infused Knowledge in Catholic Theology and Exegesis?," *Nova et vetera* (Eng. ed.) 16 (2018): 604.

[34] Ibid., 605. Gaine also recognizes the distinctive nature of Thomas's argument. See ibid., 602: "Aquinas argued that the Saviour himself enjoyed the knowledge of the blessed for the saving purpose of sharing that same beatifying knowledge with us. In other words, our heavenly beatific vision will have been caused by his beatific vision, the members of his body benefitting from what the Head of the body enjoys preeminently." See also Simon Francis Gaine, "Thomas Aquinas and John Owen on the Beatific Vision: A Reply to Suzanne McDonald," *New Blackfriars* 97, no. 1070 (2016): 432-46. In this latter article, Gaine highlights the instrumental role that Christ's beatific vision plays precisely as head. "The point is that this light of glory, like grace, is mediated to the members of the Body by the Head, the light of glory of the saints being a participation in the light of glory enjoyed by the Head. In other words, the saints' beatific vision is a participation in Christ's own beatific vision. The beatific vision is no less mediated to the saints by Christ the Head than is the grace bestowed on the faithful in this life. Thus Christ does not simply mediate the *possibility* of the beatific vision, as McDonald would have Aquinas's view, but he mediates the actual realisation of the beatific vision itself through a participation in his own light of glory" (439). Gaine mentions Thomas's argument, but his own argument does not directly build on it. See also Gaine, *Did the Saviour See the Father?* 5, 17-18, 70, 87; for the most part Gaine's treatment of the beatific vision is in terms of the continuity between Christ's human and divine minds for the sake of the earthly Christ's teaching. See Gaine, "*Must* an Incarnate Divine Person Enjoy the Beatific Vision?," 130.

proportionate to the workings of his human mind."[35] The existence and necessity of the infused knowledge does not however render the beatific knowledge superfluous, since the former depends on the latter. For Gaine, as much as for White, the necessity of Christ's beatific vision is spelled out primarily as fulfilling a condition necessary for Christ's earthly teaching and work.

The speculative developments of Thomas's teaching by White and Gaine present thoughtful and compelling arguments for Christ's earthly beatific vision. Yet, inasmuch as they are responding to contemporary concerns, they tend to go beyond the text of Thomas. This is, of course, both important and necessary. Yet it is also essential that we not lose sight of Thomas's own argument in the process. As we shall see below, Thomas's argument, which is based on the perfection of Christ's humanity, takes as its fundamental starting point the central soteriological role of Christ's humanity as such. It thereby provides a more fundamental argument not only for the necessity of Christ's preglorified earthly vision, but for Christ's vision insofar as he is man, which is to say from the first moment of conception.[36]

II. THOMAS'S ARGUMENT FOR CHRIST'S BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE

As Galot argues, the key problem for Thomas's argument is his appeal to perfection. It appears that Thomas's reading of the

[35] Gaine, "Is There Still a Place for Christ's Infused Knowledge in Catholic Theology and Exegesis?," 605: "This is because, in addition to the need for continuity across divine and human minds, there is also need for continuity across knowledge that is inexpressible and knowledge that is expressible. . . . The beatific vision, however, though it supplies the human mind with knowledge of divine things, does so, according to Aquinas, in a way transcendently disproportionate to the workings of the human mind."

[36] See Gaine's note on John of St. Thomas's assessment of the argument from perfection for Christ's infused knowledge: "Though Poinsot counted Aquinas's argument from perfection as the 'best' one of the three, perhaps regarding it as straightforwardly best in terms of proof, he seems nevertheless to have regarded his own arguments as at least having the advantage of being clearer in regard to the actual workings of knowledge and meritorious activity in Christ's earthly life" (ibid.).

evangelical texts through the lens of an *a priori* "principle of perfection" caused him to overlook the necessary distinction between the earthly and glorified states of Christ's humanity. Was Thomas blind to this distinction? That is, was Thomas unaware that it is not enough merely to provide a general argument for the necessity of the beatific vision in Christ's humanity (which all agree must be said of the *glorified* humanity), but that an additional argument is necessary to establish the vision in Christ's *preglorified* existence? We must respond in the negative. Thomas's argument intends to show the necessity of Christ's beatific knowledge *from the moment of conception*—which necessarily includes his preglorified earthly life. Notably, the argument goes well beyond establishing the *earthly* necessity of Christ's beatific vision to the necessity of that vision inasmuch as Christ is, in his humanity, the universal source of grace. As such, Thomas's argument is meant to hold regardless of the state of Christ's humanity. If recent critics have overlooked this aspect of Thomas's argument, it is on account not of a shortcoming in the argument itself but rather of a failure on the part of Thomas's critics to notice the unique role that he accords to Christ's humanity in salvation.

A) The Argument for Adam's Perfect Knowledge from Its Earthly Utility

As mentioned, Thomas's argument for Christ's beatific knowledge is not primarily contingent upon its function in his earthly life.[37] There are several indications in Thomas's *corpus* that he was not blind to the possibility of arguing for Christ's knowledge in just this manner; that he did not do so, then, underscores the fact that he sought to posit a different basis for the necessity of Christ's beatific knowledge.

[37] It is noteworthy that Thomas, in discussing Christ's life in *STh* III, qq. 27-59 (especially q. 46, on Christ's doctrine), does not readily advert to his treatment of Christ's perfection in knowledge (*STh* III, qq. 9-12).

The strongest clue is seen in Thomas's argument for the relative perfection of Adam's knowledge earlier in the *Summa theologiae* (*STh* I, q. 94, a. 3). The argument is explicitly based on the earthly function of Adam's knowledge. Thomas sees Adam's natural and supernatural knowledge as corresponding to the distinct function that the first man plays in instructing and governing humanity in and toward the truth. With regard to instruction, Thomas explains the reason behind Adam's knowledge of all natural things: "For no one is able to instruct others unless he possesses knowledge. And therefore, the first man was instituted by God in such a way so as to have knowledge of all those things in which man is naturally instructed."[38] Likewise with regard to Adam's role as the leader (*gubernator*) of the human race, Thomas posits supernatural knowledge. Adam's governing entailed ordering the human race to its supernatural end. "For in order to govern one's own life and that of others," he explains, "not only is knowledge of things which are naturally knowable required, but also the knowledge of those things which exceed natural knowledge."[39] The role of knowledge in Adam is accounted for explicitly in terms of Adam's role as instructor and leader of the human race and thus in terms of his perfection in natural and supernatural (infused) knowledge. That this knowledge has to do with its earthly function in Adam (i.e., governance and human instruction) is made all the clearer by the fact that Thomas explicitly excludes the knowledge of things that are unnecessary to this end. Thus, we are told that Adam did not need to know the number of stones in a river.[40] By contrast, Thomas is unwilling to deny such trivial knowledge in Christ.[41]

Thomas could have easily come up with similar arguments for Christ's human knowledge. In fact, given the clarity of Thomas's arguments with regard to Adam, it is strange that he did not.

[38] *STh* I, q. 94, a. 3.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] See *De Verit.*, q. 20, a. 4, arg. 11 and ad 11. On this point, see my forthcoming article, "Re-Thinking Aquinas on Christ's Infused Knowledge."

Further, a glance at contemporary treatments of Christ's knowledge in the *Summa fratris Alexandri* as well as in Saint Bonaventure's *Scriptum* strongly suggests that Thomas's departure from his contemporaries in not explicitly appealing to the Adamic parallel was not unintentional.[42] Clearly, Thomas does not consider Christ's humanity to fulfill the same role as Adam's. More specifically, Christ's human knowledge does not exist *solely* for its function in his earthly life (whether for the sake of his personal unity, or as a link bridging his divine knowledge with his human teaching). Certainly, Thomas's doctrine has implications for Christ's human consciousness and his earthly transmission of knowledge, but these are, at best, secondary reasons and not the fundamental reason for Christ's beatific knowledge. For this, we must look again to Thomas's argument.

B) Christ's Headship and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision

According to critics, if Thomas wished to argue for Christ's *earthly* beatific vision, he ought to have presented an argument that shows specifically why Christ, in his human nature, had to possess this knowledge during his *earthly* life. As we shall see, however, Thomas's argument, which concerns the instrumental role of Christ's humanity, is only secondarily concerned with the

[42] Here, Thomas intentionally abandons a category of Christ's knowledge treated by others: the Adamic knowledge of innocence. In fact, unlike his contemporaries, Thomas rarely compares Christ to Adam with respect to knowledge. The one exception is *De Verit.*, q. 20, a. 6, where Thomas simply posits the superiority of Christ's infused knowledge with respect to Adam. Nevertheless, this is far from an attribution of an Adamic knowledge to Christ. Reference to Adamic knowledge is found in Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum*, lib. III, d. 13, nn. 10, 26 (Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii aevi, 14 [Florence: Quaracchi, 1954], 131 and 136-37); *Summa fratris*, lib. III, inq. un., tract. 3, q. 1, tit. 2; Albert the Great, *De incarnatione*, tract. 4, q. 1, a. 3; Albert the Great, III *Sent.,* d. 13, a. 10, sol.; and Bonaventure, III *Sent.*, d. 14, a. 3, q. 1. For more on this, see my article, "The Principle of Perfection in Thirteenth-Century Accounts of Christ's Human Knowledge," *The International Journal of Systematic Theology* 24 (2022): 352-79.

question of the *earthly* utility of that vision. Thomas considered his argument for the necessity of Christ's beatific knowledge as arising from the instrumental role his human nature plays in redemption.

According to Thomas, Christ's perfection in grace and knowledge are necessary precisely toward this end. In order that Christ be the universal source of grace it is necessary that his grace be possessed in a preeminent manner, that is, as a maximum in the genus of grace. For it is only the maximum in a given genus that can be a universal cause in that genus.[43] Thomas's argument in the *Compendium theologiae* brings out this point more explicitly than does the *Summa*:

> Therefore, since we say that Christ is the author of human salvation, it is necessary to say that such [beatific] knowledge belonged to him as befits the author [of salvation]. For the principle must be immovable [*immobile*] and pre-eminent [*praestantissimum*] in power. Therefore, it was fitting that that vision of God in which the beatitude and eternal salvation of men consists, belong to Christ more excellently [*excellentius*] than to others, as to an immovable principle. But this difference is found between what is movable and immovable. What is movable does not have its own perfection from the beginning, inasmuch as it is movable, but acquires it through the succession of time; *but the immovable as such, always obtains its perfection from the first moment that it exists*. Therefore, it was fitting that Christ, the author of human salvation, possess, from the beginning of his Incarnation, the full vision of God, not having arrived at it through the succession of time as is the case with other saints.[44]

[43] This is the philosophical principle sometimes called "the causality of the maximum," which appears in Thomas's fourth way for God's existence. On the importance of this principle in Thomas's account of Christ's perfection see my article, "The Principle of Perfection in Thirteenth-Century Accounts of Christ's Human Knowledge."

[44] *Comp. theol.* I, c. 216: "Quia igitur Christum dicimus esse humanae salutis auctorem, necesse est dicere, quod talis cognitio sic animae Christi conveniat ut decet auctorem. Principium autem et immobile esse oportet, et virtute praestantissimum. Conveniens igitur fuit ut illa Dei visio in qua beatitudo hominum et salus aeterna consistit, excellentius prae ceteris Christo conveniat, et tanquam immobili principio. Haec autem differentia invenitur mobilium ad immobilia, quod mobilia propriam perfectionem non a principio habent, inquantum mobilia sunt, sed eam per successionem temporis assequuntur; *immobilia vero, inquantum huiusmodi, semper obtinent suas perfectiones ex quo esse incipiunt*. Conveniens igitur fuit Christum humanae salutis auctorem ab ipso suae

According to the *Compendium*, it is necessary that Christ possess that of which salvation consists (namely, the beatific vision) from the first moment of his human existence insofar as his humanity is the immovable and preeminent principle of salvation. Thomas does not have in mind just any principle of grace, he is concerned with its *universal* principle. A universal principle or cause in a genus must be perfect. But what is perfect in such a way so as to be a *universal* principle must possess such perfection from the first moment of its existence (otherwise, it would require yet another principle in that genus and would no longer be universal).[45] Christ is just such a principle with respect to grace, for it is from his fullness that all receive grace. Therefore, from the first moment of Christ's human existence (i.e., conception), it is necessary that Christ have the fullness of grace.

The philosophical character of the argument is unmistakable. Yet, this should not blind us to the fact that the minor is taken from revelation. The argument highlights a frequently overlooked point that is, in fact, central to all of Thomas's Christology: For Thomas, the humanity of Christ is *the* universal and principal source of grace for all intellectual creatures.[46] Thomas simply accepts this as a datum of faith (based on John 1:16); it is what determines his teaching on Christ's beatific knowledge.[47]

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incarnationis principio plenam Dei visionem possedisse, non autem per temporis successionem pervenisse ad ipsam, ut sancti alii perveniunt," (emphasis added). The *Compendium theologiae* explicitly draws attention to the necessity of the immovability of a first principle. Because Christ is the author of salvation, i.e., the cause of others being blessed, he must possess that by which he brings others to beatitude perfectly, i.e., *immovably*.

[45] The example that Thomas provides in the *Tertia pars*, as elsewhere (e.g., *STh* I, q. 2, a. 3: "Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis, sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum"), is the example of heat. Of course, we do not need to consider fire to be the cause of all heat, as the example supposes, in order to hold to the principle of the causality of the maximum.

[46] See *STh* III, q. 8, a. 4.

[47] In fact, *pace* Torrell, it is more accurate to see Thomas treating the teaching of Christ's humanity as the principle of grace as a datum of faith rather than the earthly beatific vision. See Torrell, "S. Thomas d'Aquin et la science du Christ," 401.

That God has deigned to save mankind from sin by way of the Incarnation is contingent upon the divine will alone. Thus, it can be known by us only through divine revelation.[48] Just as Thomas famously teaches that the express purpose of the Incarnation must be guided by what is revealed, namely, the salvation of sinners, he also teaches that precisely because God has foreordained the salvation of mankind through the humanity of Christ, we must regard *this* very humanity as the universal and sole principle of grace for all men.[49] Thus, Thomas tells us that although it belongs to God alone to render souls blessed through a participation in himself, it nevertheless belongs to Christ, as the head and author of salvation, not only to do works of grace as an individual man, but also to lead (*adducere*) others to supernatural beatitude.[50]

Accordingly, if there was a time that the man Christ existed without the fullness of grace, through which he is constituted head of the Church, then one would have to admit that Christ's humanity is not the universal principle of grace—a position that Thomas is unwilling to countenance. According to such a view, Christ, in his human nature, might have merited the grace on account of which he is head (for instance, at his resurrection) but at the expense of his no longer being the immovable source of grace. This is to say that his humanity would be not the universal principle of grace from which all receive grace but, as certain other medievals held, simply a dispositive cause which prepares others for the reception of grace immediately from God.[51] In order to maintain the central and universal role of Christ's humanity with respect to grace, it is necessary to posit his possession of the "maximum" of grace, which, importantly, includes the beatific vision, from the first moment of conception.

[48] See *STh* III, q. 1, a. 3.

[49] See ibid.

[50] See *STh* III, q. 59, a. 2, ad 2.

[51] As if the form of heat were not the cause of heat in things that are heated, but merely disposes such things to the reception of the form of heat without itself communicating it. Alternatively, we could dismiss the principle of the causality of the maximum and argue that a universal cause in a genus need not be the maximum in that genus.

It is helpful to see the way in which Thomas envisions Christ's headship in order to understand the necessity of Christ's human perfection. To speak of Christ as "author of salvation" is, for Thomas, to speak of him as the head of the Church. It is according to Christ's headship most of all that Christ is the universal source of salvation for others. Thomas explicates Christ's headship by reference to the bodily head. Christ is "head" with regard to order, perfection, and power.[52] He is head according to order because Christ's grace is nobler (*altior*) and prior (*prior*) to the grace of others. This is due to the hypostatic union. Even if Christ's human grace is not the first according to time, nevertheless, "all others receive grace with respect to his grace."[53] Thomas grounds this teaching in the predestination of Christ. He quotes Romans 8:29: "For whom he foreknew, these he also predestined *to be conformed to the image of his Son*, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brethren."[54] Insofar as we are predestined to be members of Christ's body, Christ's predestination is understood as the cause of our own: "Because [God] foreordained the Incarnation of Christ, he simultaneously foreordained that he would be the cause of our salvation."[55] On account of his soul's proximity to the Word, the source of grace, Christ is head according to perfection.[56] This is similar to the bodily head insofar as all five senses are contained in the head while only the sense of touch is in the body; similarly,

[52] *STh* III, q. 8, a. 1.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] See *STh* III, q. 24, a. 4, corp. and ad 3. See also III *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 1; *De Verit.*, q. 29, a. 3, ad 6; q. 29, a. 4, corp. and ad 6.

[56] This is based on the principle of propinquity: the nearer a thing is to the flowing cause, the more perfectly it receives its effect. This principle furnishes the basis for the principle of the causality of the maximum. Since Christ's soul is nearest to the Word, it possesses the maximum of grace. On account of this perfection, the soul of Christ is the universal cause of grace for all who receive grace. The principle accounts for the superiority of Christ's beatific knowledge in comparison to other humans. See *STh* III, q. 10, a. 4.

the full perfection of grace is found united in Christ, while it exists divided among his members. Once again, Thomas grounds this account of fullness in the Johannine testimony: "We saw him . . . full of grace and truth."[57]

Last, and most important for our purposes, Christ's perfection in grace is related to his headship according to power. It is precisely from his perfection and fullness of grace, as cause, that Christ is able to transmit grace to others—not externally as is the case with other men, but interiorly.[58] For it is from Christ's perfect fullness that "we all receive grace for grace" (John 1:16).[59] This last principle brings us back to Thomas's argument for Christ's beatific vision. Christ has the fullness of grace and truth as the Only Begotten of the Father (John 1:14), from which fullness all others receive grace (John 1:16). According to Thomas, it is necessary that Christ be full of grace and truth in order to communicate it interiorly to *all* the members of his body. It is on account of Christ's preeminence in grace and knowledge from the moment of conception that he can be the universal source of grace for others.[60]

There are several consequences to Thomas's teaching. Since Christ is the universal the principle of grace, his headship cannot be restricted to time, place, or state.[61] He is the head of those who preceded him as much as of those who will exist after him. For, according to a Scholastic dictum, the Church has never been acephalous.[62] Most importantly, Christ is not only head of those

[57] Thomas treats the fullness of Christ's grace in *STh* III, q. 7, a. 9.

[58] In fact, Thomas uses the argument found in *STh* III, q. 9, a. 2 to argue for the identity in habit of Christ's singular and capital grace. See *STh* III, q. 8, a. 5.

[59] This organization of Christ's grace is a result of a long development ordering the various graces to one another vis-à-vis John 1:14, 16. The pattern is found throughout qq. 7 and 8 of the *Tertia pars*. See *STh* III, q. 8, a. 1.

[60] *STh* III, q. 8, a. 5.

[61] *STh* III, q. 8, a. 6.

[62] See *STh* III, q. 49, a. 5, ad 1. Albert the Great, III *Sent*., d. 13, a. 8, s.c. 1: "Anselmus dicit in libro *Cur Deus homo*, quod numquam a temporibus creationis hominis super terram Ecclesia fuit acephala, id est, sine capite: ergo semper fuit caput." Albert is likely referring to Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* 2.16.

in via, but also of those *in patria*, that is, of *comprehensores*.[63] In fact, Thomas tells us that it is "first and principally" (*primo et principaliter*) that Christ is the head of the blessed, "who are united to him by glory."[64] This includes not only men but even the angels, whom, as Thomas tells us elsewhere, Christ "purifies, illuminates, and perfects" through his humanity.[65] Christ is the principle of grace for all, "since all receive grace through his grace."[66] It is precisely because Christ is head that all of his action and passion benefit the members of his body.[67] "As if a man," Thomas writes, "through some meritorious work which he accomplished by hand, should redeem himself from a sin which he committed by his feet."[68] Thus, if Christ were not head from the moment of his conception, then none of his earthly human actions could have been meritorious for all of his members. Christ's salutary actions and sufferings can be applied to others only because of the unity of the mystical body, which unity is established from the first moment the human nature is assumed.[69]

It is from this *soteriological* standpoint that we can see how this perfection is related to the hypostatic union. Christ's headship is only possible on account of the sort of union that his humanity enjoys with the divinity. It is only as united to God that Christ can act as head, communicating grace interiorly to others. According to Thomas, the human nature of Christ is united to the Godhead as a conjoined and animated instrument of the

[63] At least one piece of biblical evidence for this is found in Christ's second temptation. Thomas seems to see it as the reason why Christ is able to command angels and demons, and why the angels minister to Christ—for he is their head. See *STh* III, q. 59, a. 6.

[64] *STh* III, q. 8, a. 3; see also *STh* III, q. 8, a. 4, ad 2. The inclusion of angels is significant. Since the patriarchs did not enjoy the beatific vision prior to the descent into hell, Christ, in his earthly life, would have been head of the comprehensors insofar as he was head of the blessed angels. See *STh* III, q. 52, a. 5.

[65] *De Verit.*, q. 29, a. 5, s.c. 3.

[66] *STh* III, q. 8, a. 1.

[67] *STh* III, q. 48, a. 2, ad 1.

[68] *STh* III, q. 49, a. 1.

[69] *STh* III, q. 48, a. 1.

divinity.[70] Thomas writes, "Just as iron burns on account of the fire conjoined to it, so the actions of the humanity were salutary on account of the divinity united to it, of which the very humanity was like an organ."[71] That Christ is head of the Church from the first moment of his human existence is inextricably linked to the claim that his humanity is the conjoined instrument of the divinity by virtue of the union. As a *conjoined* instrument, Christ's humanity is not only able to do works of grace, but is also able to communicate grace interiorly to others.[72] In this his human nature is distinguished from that of all other men, who are extrinsic and separate instruments of God. "For they are moved by God not only to operations proper to themselves, but to operations common to every rational nature, for instance, to understand truth, to love good, and to do justice."[73] While God works in and through all men as instruments animated by rational souls, he nevertheless works through Christ's humanity in a higher manner. It is on this account that Christ's human operations are called *theandric* (*deivirilem*).[74] "The human nature in Christ," Thomas writes, "was assumed in order to do those things instrumentally which are proper to God alone, as, for example, to clean sins, to illuminate minds through grace, and to lead men to the perfection of eternal life."[75]

As an *animate* instrument it is necessary that Christ's humanity possess the proper disposition so as to be used by the principal agent.[76] It is so disposed through habitual grace. Unlike inanimate instruments which are acted upon but do not them-

[70] For more on Thomas's teaching on the humanity of Christ as the instrument of the divinity see Theophil Tschipke, *L'humanité du Christ comme instrument de salut de la divinité* (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2003).

[71] *De Verit.*, q. 29, a. 4. See also *STh* III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 4.

[72] *STh* III, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1.

[73] See *ScG* IV, c. 41.

[74] For Christ's theandric operations see III *Sent.*, d. 13, q, 1, a. 2, qcla. 2, ad 4; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 212; *De Verit.*, q. 20, a. 5. In fact, this is the same rationale behind the causality of Christ's body vis-à-vis the resurrection. See *STh* III, q. 56, a. 1.

[75] *ScG* IV, c. 41. See also *STh* III, q. 7, a. 1, obj. 3 and ad 3.

[76] *STh* III, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3.

selves act (the typical example that Thomas gives is of the axe), the humanity of Christ, animated by a rational soul, requires the due habit in order that it not only be acted upon, but also act. "Wherefore," Thomas tells us, "just as a servant requires a habit so that he might execute the command of his master in due manner; so too, the soul of Christ required a habit in order to do the divine works perfectly."[77] The argument for the necessity of Christ's habitual grace on account of the instrumentality of his humanity fits neatly with Thomas's argument for Christ's fullness of grace. The humanity of Christ as instrument and head is ordered to the redemption of sinners not only through his exterior teaching but especially through the interior influx of grace.

An examination of Christ's human instrumentality provides a helpful framework for understanding the key difference between the purpose of the knowledge of Adam and that of Christ. As an extrinsic and separate instrument of the divinity, the first man had knowledge to aid in his governance and instruction of the human race. Adam's knowledge was directly ordered to his twofold task. In contrast, Christ's humanity, as a proper and conjoined instrument of the divinity, possessed grace and knowledge *not only* to instruct and govern, but also to do things that exceed the power of any creature—that is, to do things proper to God alone. This explains why Thomas does not argue for the perfection of Christ's knowledge on the basis of its mere function in his earthly life. For Christ is greater than Adam. As head, Christ communicates his grace and knowledge to others through his earthly teaching, but, more profoundly still, he works within the souls of men and is able to do so inasmuch as his humanity is the conjoined instrument of the divinity.[78] Thomas specifically points to this interior flow of grace (*interior effluxus gratiae*) as that which distinguishes Christ's headship from that of other men, who, like Adam, might also be called "head" purely

[77] III *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

[78] *STh* III, q. 8, a. 6.

on account of external governance (*ad exteriorem gubernationem*). Yet, acting as this kind of instrument requires a perfection exceeding that of Adam—it requires that the human instrument possess *in full* (i.e., perfectly) that of which it is the cause.

Based on the central role of Christ's humanity in the divine dispensation, Thomas teaches that all grace, both before and after the Incarnation, must be mediated through the humanity of Christ. The grace of union and the fullness of Christ's habitual grace must therefore be understood as ordered toward this power, which belongs to Christ as man, to bestow grace inwardly on others. It is the grace of union that explains Christ's unique fullness of grace; it is his fullness of grace, in turn, that is the basis for his headship. "For the cause must always be greater than the caused." We cannot examine Christ's humanity solely in terms of his external instruction, or even in terms of what is necessary solely for the unity of his human and divine action, but more fundamentally in terms of the interior influx of grace which he, as united to God, transmits to all the members of his body. This is precisely how Thomas presents the perfection of Christ's knowledge, including his beatific knowledge. Understood in this manner, it is necessary that Christ possess the beatific knowledge of the divine essence from the moment the human nature is assumed to the Word, that is, from the moment of conception. For the very humanity of Christ must be as an immovable source if it is to be the font of salvation for all humanity "irrespective of time, place, or state." Absent this perfection, it would be impossible to account for the universal influence of the grace of Christ.

Conclusion

It is not a lack of imagination that prevents Thomas from relying on the earthly utility of Christ's knowledge to establish the necessity of the beatific vision; rather, it is because he considers Christ's perfection in knowledge and grace to be necessary for his humanity to be a universal cause of grace and truth. For

Christ, in his very humanity, was predestined as the source from which all grace is received. Thomas's argument for Christ's beatific knowledge cannot be understood without recourse to Thomas's teaching on Christ's headship. Headship is central for Thomas insofar as Christ's humanity is the universal principle of grace. He is the source of grace and the beatitude of glory not only for *viatores* but also for *comprehensores*; he is the head not only of men, but also of the blessed angels. Moreover, Christ's headship is inexplicable without recourse to the instrumentality of his human nature. For it is only as the conjoined instrument of the divinity that his human operations are theandric, and therefore salutary for his body, the Church.[79] For as Thomas writes, "Not only is grace given to Christ as an individual person, but as he is head of the Church, in order that it might flow from him to his members."[80] With respect to his beatific knowledge, therefore, it is necessary that Christ possess it *in actu* from the first moment of his conception in order for him to be, in his human nature, the immovable and preeminent author of our salvation. If at some point in his earthly life Christ did not possess the beatific vision, this would mean, for Thomas, that Christ's humanity could not be the *universal* source of grace. Instead, the humanity of Christ would be relegated to a particular, dispositive cause of grace. At base, therefore, the teaching of the necessity of the earthly Christ's beatific knowledge is simply an extension of Thomas's understanding of Christ's universal headship, which in turn is an extension of Thomas's teaching on the grace of union or the Incarnation, which is ordered to the salvation of mankind.

In terms of the contemporary debate, the above account of Thomas's teaching has the effect of relocating the primary question. It is not merely a question of whether Christ had the beatific vision in his preglorified earthly life as opposed to his glorified existence, but whether Christ as man is the universal source of grace as head of the Church, which presupposes that he

[79] See *STh* III, q. 56.

[80] See *STh* III, q. 48, a. 1. See also *STh* III, q. 48, a. 2, ad 1.

is the instrument of the divinity, *from the moment of his conception*.[81] Of course, Thomas's argument does not resolve the remaining difficulty of imagining or accounting for the psychological state of Christ as both *comprehensor* and *viator* in his earthly life; but this doctrine (just as the doctrine of the Incarnation itself) does not stand or fall based on our capacity successfully to imagine it.[82] Once we have grasped the necessity of Christ's beatific vision from the moment of conception, it becomes possible and even necessary to investigate further how this relates to Christ's earthly transmission of knowledge or his self-consciousness. It is here that the works of White and Gaine, among others, play an important role for contemporary Catholic theology. Yet this inquiry remains secondary to the more fundamental understanding of Christ's beatific vision inasmuch as it is grounded in a solid Christological account of Christ's humanity as the instrument of the divinity and the source of all grace.

[81] Weinandy challenges precisely this idea on the basis of the scriptural testimony, where it seems that there is a progressive and dynamic aspect to Christ's headship. See "The Human Acts of Christ and the Acts That Are the Sacraments," 151-68.

[82] In other words, just as the truth of the hypostatic union does not depend on the capacity of our imaginative powers, neither does the verity of Christ's simultaneous existence as *viator* and *comprehensor*. As Weinandy states, "The exact nature and specificity of [Christ's] human awareness and knowing is, it seems to me, part of the very mystery of the Incarnation, which in itself can never be fully comprehended" ("Jesus' Filial Vision of the Father," 199).

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THE FATAL FLAW OF NEW NATURAL LAW ACTION THEORY

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THIS ARTICLE aims to diagnose the fatal flaw of new natural law action theory. Several commentators have claimed that new natural law action theorists are prone to make convenient redescriptions of actions, justifying actions that would otherwise be deemed immoral.[1] Craniotomies, for instance, are redescribed as narrowing the baby's head; blowing up a spelunker is described not as killing him but as dispersing his parts; shooting someone with a gun in self-defense is described not as harming him but simply as stopping the attack; performing a D&C on a live baby is described not as killing the baby but as ending the pregnancy.[2]

[1] See, for example, Jean Porter, "'Direct' and 'Indirect' in Grisez's Moral Theory," *Theological Studies* 57 (1996): 611-32; Matthew B. O'Brien and Robert Koons, "Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 86 (2012): 655-703; Steven J. Jensen, "Phoenix Rising from the Ashes: Recent Attempts to Revive New Natural Law Action Theory," *The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 20 (2020): 525-44.

[2] These examples can be found in Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., "Double Effect and a Certain Type of Embryotomy," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 44 (1977): 303-18; idem, "Who Is Entitled to Double Effect?," *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 16 (1991): 475-94; John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, "'Direct' and 'Indirect': A Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory," *The Thomist* 65 (2001): 1-44, at 25; Christopher Tollefsen, "Is a Purely First-Person Account of Human Action Defensible?," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 9 (2006): 441-60, at 450; Germain Grisez, *The Way of the Lord Jesus*, vol. 2, *Living a Christian Life* (Quincy, Ill.: Franciscan Press, 1993), 473, 484; Christopher Tollefsen, "Response to Robert Koons and Matthew O'Brien's 'Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory'," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 87 (2013): 751-78; idem, "Double Effect and Two Hard Cases in Medical Ethics," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 89 (2015): 407-20;

The real issue with new natural law action theory, however, is not redescriptions. Indeed, its advocates will insist that they are not redescribing actions but simply identifying their correct descriptions. The real issue runs deeper. Any penchant for peculiar descriptions arises from the fatal flaw of focusing upon intending effects rather than intending actions; all intention of action (according to new natural law advocates) is only secondary, reduced to some intention of an effect. For reasons that will become clear, this starting point places a premium upon descriptions rather than upon concrete realities.

I may have missed the mark when, in a recent article, I made the following comment: "The new natural law action theory . . . is not necessarily prone to fanciful redescriptions of actions. It has no fatal flaw that leads its proponents to come up with original descriptions. Rather, the theory simply leaves open the possibility."[3] To the contrary, new natural law theorists begin with a paradigm that leads to error.

So fundamental is this paradigm to their vision that they cannot imagine giving a priority to the intention of actions as opposed to the intention of effects. Their paradigm not only prevents them from reaching the correct answers; from the beginning, it prevents them from asking the right question. In a recent article, for instance, Lawrence Masek aims to discover what effect (or effects) agents intend while acting.[4] Similarly, Patrick Lee has published an article focusing upon what effects are intended and what effects are foreseen.[5]

Already we have a problem. We do speak, loosely, of intending effects. Most properly, however, we intend actions and not merely effects. According to new natural law action theory, however, the order is inverted: most properly, we intend effects

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Lawrence Masek, *Intention, Character, and Double Effect* (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press , 2018), 49-50; idem, "The Strict Definition of Intended Effects and Two Questions for Critics," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 95 (2021): 651-78, 670-73.

[3] Jensen, "Phoenix Rising," 544.

[4] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects."

[5] Patrick Lee, "Distinguishing between What Is Intended and Foreseen Side Effects," *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 62 (2017): 231-51.

and only in a secondary way do we intend actions. The advocates of new natural law invoke what they have come to call a strict definition of intention, opposed to what they call broad accounts of intention. As Masek explains the matter, "The strict definition applies to effects, not actions."[6] He does admit that we can speak of intending actions, but he is not concerned to provide a definition of this usage of the word "intend."

A strict definition of intention is integral to new natural law action theory. Indeed, the criticisms in this article most properly apply to the strict definition itself, rather than to a specific overall theory. New natural law action theory is the most prominent view that affirms a strict definition of intention, but someone (Masek may fall into this category) who adopts the strict definition without fully endorsing new natural law action theory still falls victim to the fatal flaw examined here. For convenience, we will henceforth give the label "rigorists" to those who defend a strict definition of intention. This paper targets all rigorists and not just new natural law action theorists.

Patrick Lee also defends a strict definition, but his focus upon effects (rather than actions) is less explicit. Even for Lee, however, actions are entirely reduced to the intention of effects.[7] Once we have determined the effects intended, we then know exactly what action is intended. The intention of actions is only an afterthought. Other rigorists, such as Christopher Tollefsen, express this doctrine by saying that we intend states of affairs.[8] Whatever these are, they are not actions (although they may include actions in abstract form).

Of course, the emphasis upon effects does not prevent rigorists from speaking about intending actions of various sorts. How could it be otherwise? The verb "intend" is naturally followed by an infinitive, which expresses action. Despite this concession to ordinary language, the strict definition of intention is wedded to the intention of effects.

From this often unacknowledged starting point flow a multitude of consequences. The strict definition is at a loss to account

[6] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 657.

[7] Lee, "Distinguishing between What Is Intended and Foreseen Side Effects," 231-32.

[8] Tollefsen, "First Person Account," 453.

for a vast array of common intentions. What intended effect, for instance, identifies the act of adultery? This starting point also leads to a focus upon (sometimes counterintuitive) descriptions rather than realities. Other consequences, not examined in this article, also follow. One casualty of this starting point, for instance, is the coherence of perverted faculty arguments (a topic examined briefly below).

Before we examine these defects in greater detail, we will first provide (in section I) a very cursory explanation of a strict view of intention. Then we will examine two problems that follow upon the focus upon effects (rather than actions). The first (in section II), concerns a vast array of actions (such as adultery) that cannot be described in terms of intended effects. The second (covered in the remainder of the article), concerns the focus upon descriptions rather than realities. This problem first requires (in section III) spelling out the difference between a multitude of descriptions and the unified reality described. This distinction must then be applied (in sections IV and V) to multiple cases, which will help to catalog the rigorists' predilection for descriptions over realities. Then the alternate focus upon actions rather than descriptions must be explained (in section VII). Finally (in section VIII), the link must be established between a focus upon intending effects and a predilection for descriptions.

I. Strict Definition of Intention, in Brief

Broad accounts of intention differ from one another, sometimes quite remarkably, but they all have something in common, something that makes them "broad." They all maintain that actions have something more to them—beyond their effects—that enters into intention. Consequently, intention of actions is broader than mere intention of effects. As Lee expresses it, these broad accounts maintain that we choose actions that have content beyond intended effects.[9]

The strict view of intention has no room for this "something more" because it is, as Tollefsen puts it, entirely a "first-person

[9] Lee, "Distinguishing between What Is Intended and Foreseen Side Effects," 232.

account."[10] This phrase could be benign. It might refer merely to the idea that what an agent does depends upon what he plans to do, upon what he has worked out in his deliberations. On the other hand, it might not be benign. It might refer to the idea that an internal state—typically called "intention"—entirely determines the character of an agent's actions. Actions (on this account) have no character of their own apart from this internal subjective state.

Since intention entirely determines the character of actions, the paramount question concerns the content of intention. What does an agent intend? More precisely, what *effects* does an agent intend? Another question becomes secondary: what *actions* does the agent intend? Actions have no character independent of intention, so we must first determine the effects intended before we can determine the content of action. Intention, then, does not primarily concern actions; it primarily concerns effects.

According to the strict view of intention, the content of intention includes the goal and those means needed to achieve the goal.[11] Since identifying the goal proves unproblematic, all effort concentrates upon the question of what counts as a means. The means are what are found needful for the goal; they are what contribute to the goal.[12]

Suppose that a niece kills her uncle in order to gain an inheritance. In the act of firing a gun, she not only kills her uncle, she also makes a noise, wakes the neighbor, stains the carpet, saddens the family of her victim, and so on. These multiple descriptions are based upon the many effects of her one action. From this array of actions, we must distinguish what the niece intends from what she merely foresees but does not intend. For this task, focusing upon effects intended can prove helpful.

[10] Tollefsen, "First Person Account."

[11] Tollefsen, "First Person Account," 444; idem, "Response to Koons and O'Brien," 752; Christopher Tollefsen, "Terminating in the Body," *The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 19 (2019): 203-20, 205; Lee, "Distinguishing between What Is Intended and Foreseen Side Effects," 232; Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, "Direct and Indirect," 1; Masek, *Intention*, 43; idem, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 653.

[12] Tollefsen, "Response to Koons and O'Brien," 752; Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, "Direct and Indirect," 40.

The niece intends death because that is her goal. What contributes to this goal? The firing of the gun. In contrast, the noise and the waking of the neighbor do not contribute to her goal. Indeed, she might try to avoid waking the neighbor, perhaps by using a silencer. If someone claims that the niece wakes the neighbor in order to kill her uncle, rigorists can reply (in terms of effects) that the firing of the gun causes the neighbor to wake; the neighbor waking does not cause the gun to fire.

For rigorists, "what contributes to the goal" turns out to be ethereal. It depends not upon realities but upon descriptions. As Tollefsen puts the matter, "States of affairs are chosen under a description, and it is only as so chosen that they are part of an agent's intention."[13] Similarly, Finnis says, "The means are included in the proposal . . . under that description which makes them intelligibly attractive as a means."[14] Or as Masek puts it, "The strict definition includes only effects that are relevant in a positive way to the agent's decision to act."[15]

Consider the case of someone defending herself against an assailant. She fires a gun, which contributes to the goal of saving her life. As it turns out, however, it contributes to the goal under the description "stopping the attack" but not under the description "injuring the assailant."[16] The action of firing the gun is intelligibly attractive not because it injures the assailant but because it stops the attack.

Similarly, in the case of craniotomy, the doctor performs the craniotomy under the description "reducing the size of the baby's head," not under the description "injuring the baby."[17] What matters is what is needful to achieve the goal. More precisely, what matters is the description under which it is needful. The

[13] Tollefsen, "First Person Account," 445.

[14] John Finnis, *Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 68.

[15] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 655.

[16] Elisabeth Parish, "Two Theories of Action and the Permissibility of Abortion," *The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 20 (2020): 59-72, at 69; Grisez, *Way of the Lord Jesus* 2:473; Tollefsen, "Response to Koons and O'Brien," 758.

[17] Lee, "Distinguishing between What Is Intended and Foreseen Side Effects," 245 n. 26; Tollefsen, "First Person Account," 449-50; Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 670-73.

craniotomy is intelligibly attractive not insofar as it injures the baby but insofar as it reduces the size of the baby's head. This emphasis upon descriptions rather than realities is no surprise. After all, we are concerned with a first-person account.

For some of the discussions that will follow, it will be helpful to consider briefly Masek's attempt to capture, in a short phrase, the essence of a strict definition of intention: "People intend an effect if and only if they try to cause it, as an end or as a means."[18] This restatement, as Masek seems to acknowledge, might be nothing beyond a rewording of the question. Someone asks, "What do I intend while acting?" and rigorists reply, "You intend what you try to cause." Is this reply any different from saying, "You intend what you intend (that is, try) to cause"? The word "try" must mean something other than the common meaning of performing an action that is as yet inefficacious (although this meaning is found in Masek's example of a child trying to open a cookie jar). Rather, it seems to mean something like "aim," which is what "intend" means.

Masek suggests that the word "try" has certain advantages over the word "intend." It is more accessible, for instance, to well-informed nonphilosophers. This accessibility provides a standard according to which (thinks Masek) a strict view of intention scores well.[19] Furthermore, "trying" cannot be used for future plans but must be used for the action being performed right now. Masek, however, sometimes uses "try to cause" in reference to a remote end rather than the immediate effect in the action itself. A remote end is not the same as a future plan but neither is it quite the same as the effect intended in action.

The word "try" does have another benefit over "intend," although rigorists may not see it as a benefit. We speak of intending both actions and effects, but we do not speak of "trying" effects. Someone can intend the effect of death, but no one "tries" the effect of death. The word "try" has an even stronger tendency than the word "intend" to be followed by an infinitive. Effects can be brought in only by speaking of "trying *to cause*." This

[18] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 653-54.

[19] Ibid., 669-70.

manner of speaking, however, is far from natural. The child is not likely to say that he is trying to cause the lid to be off the jar; rather, he will say that he is trying to open the cookie jar. Masek himself sometimes drops "tries to cause" and replaces it with the trying of some other action verb. He speaks, for instance, of individuals trying to buy a car.[20]

The above description of the strict view of intention should suffice, for it provides the essential features. Further details can be filled in as we try to discover how the focus upon effects, as opposed to actions, is a fundamental flaw.

II. A Dearth of Actions

The first defect of the strict view of intention is the most obvious: it simply does not work for a vast array of human actions. The point becomes clear when rigorists respond to a particular objection against the strict view.[21] Adulterers and thieves, according to the objection, do not (under a strict view) intend to commit adultery or to steal. In response, the rigorists note that a thief might be guilty of theft even if he does not intend to commit theft.[22] In other words, they concede the point: according to the strict definition of intention, thieves do not intend to commit theft; they are simply *guilty of* theft.

If thieves do not (strictly speaking) intend to commit theft, then what do they intend in the act of stealing? More precisely, what *effect* do they intend? Masek grants that "someone can accept the strict definition and still say that my action is intentional, or that I intend an act of theft, in the sense that I intend to take something despite knowing that it belongs to someone else."[23] Ultimately, however, Masek provides (for the

[20] Ibid., 664.

[21] Steven J. Jensen, "Causal Constraints on Intention," *The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 14 (2014): 273-93, at 284.

[22] Lee, "Distinguishing between What Is Intended and Foreseen Side Effects," 249-51; Parish, "Two Theories of Action," 70; Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 657-58.

[23] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 657.

thief) no effect intended but merely another description for the action intended.

Can we discover some effect that the car thief intends? Perhaps he intends the effect of the car being in his possession. Unfortunately, this intention is not precise enough. It is compatible, for instance, with the intention to buy the car. Perhaps the thief intends to transfer the use of the car to himself against the wishes of the proper owner. Unfortunately, "transferring use" is an action, not an effect. Perhaps, then, he intends a transference of use (the action considered in the abstract) that does not conform with the wish of the proper owner. This description gets close, but it does not quite seem to capture what the thief has in mind. It omits, for instance, the notion of "taking" (which is an action). Furthermore, this description is far from what the thief would pose to himself.

Adulterers do not fare any better. What do they intend in the act of adultery? More precisely, what *effect* do they intend? Do they intend pleasure? Or, put differently, do they intend the satisfaction of lust?[24] Perhaps. Pleasure (or the satisfaction of lust) can at least be an effect of their action. This answer, however, is hardly satisfying. The goal of pleasure does not pick out the distinct act of adultery. It might apply to many marital acts, to fornication, rape, and so on.

Does the adulterer intend to have sexual intercourse? No, because that is an action. Does the adulterer intend that his body, as an effect of his intention, move in certain ways? Perhaps such a contorted description can fit within the strict account, but it is certainly not how the adulterer would propose his intention to himself.

The problem with theft and adultery is not peculiar. Our days are filled with intentions that cannot be crammed into the box of strict intentions of effects. What does the niece intend, for instance, when she tells the detective what she did on the day of the murder? Does she intend that the detective come to have an awareness of what she did? To some extent, she does (although she also wants to conceal what she did); furthermore, this

[24] Ibid., 657.

awareness (in the detective) does seem to be an effect of her action. Unfortunately, this description, which expresses only her remote goal, hardly captures what she is about. She does not intend, for instance, that the awareness simply pop into the detective's mind. Rather, she intends to convey the idea to him; that is, she intends an action: to convey an idea. Does she intend that certain sounds come to be in the air? It seems so, and these sounds are effects of what she intends. Once again, however, this description hardly captures her intention. Suppose that the sounds come to be because a friend (standing nearby) utters them. Then the niece would not have achieved what she wants, which was to tell the detective what she did yesterday. Does she want these sounds insofar as they arise from her own mouth? Perhaps, but at this point she is swimming in water more fit for the philosopher than for the well-informed nonphilosopher.

With little effort, examples can be multiplied. What do we intend when we ride a bike? Simply the effect of being in another place? Hardly. What do we intend when we eat ice cream? Simply the effects of the ice cream being in our stomach? Hardly. What do we intend when we mow the lawn? Simply that the lawn be shorter?

The first problem with the strict account of intention, then, is that it does not apply to many of our actions. For a significant subset of actions, however, a strict definition of intention seems more promising. Some actions are described largely in terms of their effects. The action of heating, for instance, is identified (even in its name) by the effect of heat; the act of killing is identified through the effect of death; the act of lifting is identified through the effect of a raised object; and so on. For these actions, the intention of the effect (in terms of which the action is described) lines up pretty well with the intention of the action. To focus on intending effects, then, need not seem so odd. Indeed, it will often prove quite helpful.

Even for these actions, however, the intention of effects does not quite fit the reality. When the niece kills her uncle, we do readily say that she intends the effect of death. By itself, however, this observation is inadequate. This description does not fully capture what she intends in acting. It does not distinguish, for

instance, her intention from a want or a wish. Perhaps the nephew wants the uncle to be dead, but he would never go so far as *intending* his death, that is, he would never intend *to kill* him. He just hopes that he dies of a heart attack.

A complete description of what the niece intends includes not only death. It includes, for instance, the person who dies. She intends, we might say, the death *of her uncle*. Her uncle, however, is not an effect (although, his death is an effect). Once again, simply adding "of her uncle" does not distinguish the niece from the nephew.

A more complete description would suggest that the niece intends the death of her uncle insofar as it arises from herself. This description might fit within the constraints of strict intention, and it does distinguish the niece from the nephew. The niece herself, however, is not likely to propose such an awkward intention to herself as she sets about pulling the trigger.

III. Descriptions and Realities

Despite these deficiencies, we might grant that strict intention applies fairly well to this limited subset of actions. Nevertheless, strict intention has other problems, even for these actions. The focus upon effects rather than actions will (for reasons that will be explained further along) lead to a corresponding focus upon descriptions rather than realities. Masek rightly admonishes those who accuse rigorists of "re-describing" actions.[25] This way of putting the matter presupposes a description, which can be subsequently redescribed. The original description, however, is precisely what rigorists are attempting to ferret out. The real issue is not over redescriptions. Rather, it concerns a focus upon diverse descriptions as opposed to unified realities.

The difference between descriptions and a unified reality is made clear by a case concocted by Alexander Pruss, a proponent of some version of the strict view (but not of new natural law action theory):

[25] Masek, *Intention*, 54.

> An eccentric, literalistic but always truthful magnate tells Sam he will donate to famine relief, saving hundreds of lives, if and only if Sam follow his directions to the iota. Sam is to purchase a gun, sneak at night into a zoo owned by the magnate, and kill the first mammal he sees. Unfortunately the first mammal Sam sees is the zookeeper, and he shoots her. When Sam is charged with murder, he argues that he did not intend to kill the human there, but only to kill the mammal.[26]

Pruss, of course, is speaking in terms of intending actions, but we can easily transfer what he says into the terminology of effects. Sam does not intend the death of a human being. He intends only the death of a mammal. That is, after all, what he needs to achieve his goal.

To say the least, this conclusion seems counterintuitive. A well-informed nonphilosopher, for instance, is likely to judge that Sam intends to kill a human being (or he intends the death of a human being). After all, these two (the death of a human being and the death of a mammal) seem to differ only in description and not in reality.

The difficulty, in this case, is that one and the same reality has multiple descriptions. One and the same death of the zookeeper may be described as the death of a mammal or as the death of a human being. The distinct descriptions arise from the way the human mind knows reality. It separates in the mind (through an action typically called abstraction) what is united in reality. In reality, we have a single individual, the zookeeper, and a single death. In our minds, we distinguish between a mammal and a human being.

The first-person approach of a strict definition of intention favors the distinction in the mind over the identity in reality, which is why Pruss suggests that Sam did not intend to kill a human being. According to the strict account, the means are chosen under the description by which they are intelligibly attractive. What is intelligibly attractive to Sam is the death of a mammal; the death of a human being is presumably repugnant. In reality, of course, the death of the mammal is identical with the death of a human being. The descriptions, however—and not the

[26] Alexander R. Pruss, "The Accomplishment of Plans: A New Version of the Principle of Double Effect," *Philosophical Studies* 165 (2013): 49-69, at 53-54.

unified reality—provide the intelligible attraction. Such, at any rate, is the position of the strict view of intention.

Despite this focus upon descriptions, rigorists can, at times, carefully separate distinct realities. After all, what is distinct in reality will also be distinct in description, although the converse is not the case. Masek provides the example of two cyclists.[27] The first cyclist speeds up in order to increase wind resistance (with the further goal of cooling off). The second cyclist increases speed in order to catch up with the first cyclist. For the second cyclist, increased wind resistance is something of an obstacle (since it slows her down); consequently, the first cyclist intends to increase wind resistance and the second cyclist does not.

The increase in speed (of the cyclists) and the increase of wind (pushing against the cyclists) are clearly distinct in description. They are also clearly distinct in reality. They do not constitute a single change, like the death of the mammal and the death of the human being; rather, the two changes are really distinct. The two changes must be separate for several reasons. First, the cyclists could speed up and yet not incur increased wind resistance. Suppose, for instance, that a headwind happens to decrease at just the same rate at which the cyclists speed up. Second, the increased speed causes the increased wind resistance, which could not be the case if the two were identical.[28] We do not say (for Sam) that the death of the mammal causes the death of the human being, or vice versa.

IV. Reactions to the Zookeeper Case

The fatal flaw of the strict account of intention, then, does not prevent rigorists from discovering distinct realities. Nevertheless, the focus on distinct descriptions might handicap them in the effort to sort out the reality. They may not always recognize when they are dealing with differences in descriptions and when they are dealing with differences in realities. At the very least, their theory causes a dissonance, which is most evident in Pruss's

[27] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 653-55.

[28] Pruss, "Accomplishment of Plans," 60.

zookeeper case, where the obvious unity of the reality conflicts with the diversity in descriptions that appears relevant to a strict account of intention. We should not be surprised, then, to discover that Pruss's case generates some odd reactions from rigorists. They are loath to reach the counterintuitive conclusion that their theory seems to demand. We will look at a couple of these reactions before we proceed to investigate other cases in which the discovery of the reality might be hampered by the fatal flaw of the strict view of intention.

Masek's discussion of this case is evasive.[29] While in general he is concerned to discover what effect is intended, for this case he changes the target and asks whether Sam intends to break the rule against murder, which is then interpreted as intending the death of an organism that the agent (Sam) knows to be human. The conclusion that Sam intends to break the rule against murder is unproblematic, but it does not tell us whether Masek thinks that Sam intends the death of a human being.

If Masek is consistent, it seems he should conclude that Sam does not intend to kill a human being. He distinguishes, for instance, between "trying" in the extensional sense and in the intensional sense.[30] In the extensional sense, Sam does try to cause the death of a human being. In the intensional sense, it seems, he does not. The relevant sense for Masek, however, is the intensional sense. Furthermore, Masek says that—in the strict view—intention includes only effects that are relevant to the agent's action in a positive way.[31] For Sam, however, the death of a human being is presumably negative. Only the death of a mammal positively motivates his action.

Perhaps rigorists will insist that in this case the death of a mammal is indeed the death of a human being, so when Sam tries to cause the death of a mammal he also tries to cause the death of a human being. This maneuver, however, shifts to the extensional sense of trying. More importantly, if the rigorists insist that Sam intends the death of a human being (since the death of a mammal is identical with the death of a human being), they seem to be

[29] Masek, *Intention*, 69-70.

[30] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 654.

[31] Ibid., 655.

adopting a broad view of intention, which Masek calls "event identity."[32] According to this view, an agent intends an effect not only under the description of what makes it desirable; he intends it under all descriptions that apply to one and the same identical event. Sam intends the effect of death, for instance, under the descriptions "the death of a mammal" and also under the description "the death of a human being." This view, thinks Masek, is forced to lump together descriptions that intention is able to separate.

Unlike Masek's treatment, Patrick Lee's treatment of the zookeeper case is not evasive.[33] We do not have to guess at his conclusion. He argues that Sam intends (according to strict intention) not only to kill a mammal but also to kill a human being. In short, Lee wishes to align a strict definition of intention with common-sense intuitions. Because this conclusion does not readily follow from the theory itself, Lee's argument is rather involved. In brief, Lee points out that the zookeeper is essentially a human being and also a mammal. Consequently, by intending to kill this concrete zookeeper, Sam must intend not only to kill a mammal but also to kill a human being. In other words, Lee seems to advocate some version of the event identity view.

Despite his efforts, Lee's argument fails to account for other intuitions. The zookeeper is not essentially a zookeeper, nor is she essentially a female; nevertheless, Sam (according to our intuitions) intends to kill a zookeeper and a female. Furthermore, Lee's insistence upon essential features of concrete effects seems like an ad hoc adjustment to strict intention aimed at patching over a counterintuitive conclusion.

Ultimately, then, Lee's attempt to align a strict account of intention with common-sense intuitions is unpersuasive. Perhaps he should have settled with Masek's approach, arguing simply that Sam is indeed a murderer, even if he does not intend the death of a human being. Then Lee could preserve at least our moral intuitions, although he would forfeit our intuitions concerning the nature of intention.

[32] Ibid., 663-64.

[33] Lee, "Distinguishing between What Is Intended and Foreseen Side Effects," 246-49.

V. THE CRANIOTOMY CASE

In the craniotomy case, the doctor (on account of cephalo-pelvic disproportion) uses forceps to crush the head of the baby, who cannot otherwise be delivered. The doctor's action can be described as crushing a skull, as harming the baby, as reducing the size of the baby's head, as killing the baby, as saving the mother, and so on. Do these multiple descriptions correspond to a single effect in reality that has multiple descriptions, or do they involve distinct effects? In some cases, the effects are clearly distinct. The preservation of the life of the mother, for instance, is clearly distinct from the effect of the death of the baby. In other cases, the unity or diversity is not so clear. Is the narrowed head identical with the crushed skull? Is the crushed skull identical with death of the baby? Is it identical with harm to the baby? We will set aside the second of these three questions, since many theorists who hold a broad account of intention grant that the death of the baby is an effect distinct from that of the crushed skull.[34]

In answer to the first question, Tollefsen and Lee conclude that the narrowed head is not identical with the crushed skull.[35] The doctor need intend only to narrow the head and not to crush the skull. They note that in some instances of cephalopelvic disproportion the baby can be delivered without crushing the skull; temporarily compressing the skull suffices. It follows that the effect of a narrowed head is not identical to the effect of a crushed skull.

Their reliance upon descriptions has separated Tollefsen and Lee far from the reality. They now employ merely hypothetical descriptions, descriptions that do not apply to the situation at hand but to some other situation. The effect needed to end the

[34] Stephen L. Brock, *Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998), 204-5; Christopher Kaczor, "Distinguishing Intention from Foresight: What Is Included in a Means to an End?," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 41 (2001): 77-89, at 85; Thomas A. Cavanaugh, *Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil* (Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2006), 112-13; Jensen, "Causal Constraints," 281.

[35] Tollefsen, "First Person Account," 450; Lee, "Distinguishing between What Is Intended and Foreseen Side Effects," 245 n. 26.

labor is a narrowing of the head sufficient to let the baby pass through the mother's pelvis. Sometimes, indeed, temporary compression suffices for this narrowing. By the time the doctor is performing a craniotomy, however, she has already attempted this measure and found it insufficient. What she needs now is a crushing. The "narrowed" head is now identical with a crushed skull. Nevertheless, the despotism of descriptions so guides the thought of Tollefsen and Lee that they deny (based upon descriptions of *other* situations) the unified reality of the effect. For them, the doctor does not perform a crushing but merely a compressing.

When addressing the third question, Masek concludes that the crushed skull and harm are distinct effects.[36] They are distinct for reasons similar to those discussed for the cyclists. The crushed skull causes harm to the baby and a cause cannot be identical with its effect. So similar are the two cases, thinks Masek, that he cannot imagine separating the effects (of increased speed and increased wind resistance) for the cyclists while identifying the effects (of a crushed skull and harm) for the craniotomy case.[37] Surely, however, the distinction between the two cases is not so difficult to imagine.

The crushed skull certainly does cause the harm of death. It also causes other harms, such as massive blood loss. A crushed skull is not the same effect, in reality, as loss of blood. The two descriptions correspond to two distinct effects. Perhaps the claim of identity, however, does not concern these harms. Thomas Cavanagh, for instance, seems to think that the effect of having a crushed skull is itself a harm.[38] This effect also causes other harms, but these other harms should not distract us from the harm of the crushed skull itself.

Suppose that Sam claims he never intended to harm the zookeeper. He intended only to kill her. After all, the magnate required only the effect of death; he did not require the effect of harm. "What mattered to me," Sam might say, "is that a mammal was dead, not that a mammal (and a human being at that) was

[36] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 672-74.

[37] Ibid., 663.

[38] Cavanaugh, *Double-Effect Reasoning*, 112-13.

harmed." His claims are unpersuasive because we think that death is itself harm. A single effect can be considered in diverse ways, as we have seen. In this case, it might be considered as the cessation of living activity and it also might be considered as harm to the organism.

Another case in the literature provides a closer parallel to the craniotomy.[39] In order to test a new sword, a samurai warrior waylays a passerby and makes a cut, clean through, from the shoulder down to the opposite hip. When accused of killing the passerby, the samurai protests that he never intended the effect of death. He intended only to test the sword, making sure that it could cut a person in half from the shoulder to the hip. It was this cut—and not death—that he needed in order to achieve his goal.

The samurai seems to distinguish correctly between two separate effects. The effect of being cut in half is not the exact same effect as death. The death might occur, for instance, at a slightly later time than the cut. But now suppose that the samurai says that he never intended to harm the passerby. He intended only the effect of being cut in half; the effect of harm did not in any way help him achieve his goal. He might point out that being cut in half is not itself harm because it causes harm. It causes death, and it causes massive blood loss, and so on.

As with the craniotomy, we might concede that being cut in half does indeed cause certain harms, such as death, and that these harms are a distinct effect from being cut in half. At the same time, however, we might insist that being cut in half is itself a kind of harm (and a pretty serious one). The single effect in reality has multiple descriptions in the mind.

The application to a third similar case is not difficult to see. Spelunkers are trapped in a cave because one of their fellow spelunkers blocks the only exit passage. They have enough dynamite to blow their fellow spelunker to bits, thereby opening the passage, but not enough dynamite to blow open a separate exit. Joseph Boyle argues that when they blow up their companion, they do not intend his death.[40] Having one's bodily

[39] Thomas D. Sullivan and Gary Atkinson, "Benevolence and Absolute Prohibitions," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 25 (1985): 247-59, at 253.

[40] Boyle, "Double Effect," 307; Masek, *Intention*, 49-50

parts dispersed is not the exact same effect as death. Perhaps Boyle's conclusion can be defended. Nevertheless, having one's bodily parts dispersed is identical, in reality, with a certain kind of injury, although the two might still be distinct in description.

The well-informed nonphilosopher is not likely to be confused over the real identity involved in these cases, although he may be uncertain concerning its implications for intention, which is a separate matter. Masek, however, in his argument against the view he calls event identity, claims that it *arbitrarily* identifies various actions (or various effects).[41] The only evidence he provides of this arbitrariness, however, is that identity can be a tricky philosophical concept.[42] Understanding Frege and Kripke (in *Naming and Necessity*) as they discuss four different senses of identity is difficult enough for a trained philosopher, and perhaps nearly impossible for the well-informed nonphilosopher.

It is not clear what Masek hopes to accomplish by this argument. If difficult philosophical disputes become the standard, then the well-informed nonphilosopher will be in deep waters applying Masek's own standard. What does the doctor "try to cause"? Modern philosophers from David Hume to Bertrand Russell have had arcane discussions of what it means to cause. Philosophers have also disputed what it means to "try."[43] The irony of Masek's argument is that the nonphilosopher would probably readily consent to various effects being identical. Only by bringing in difficult philosophical analyses does Masek cast doubt upon identity. In this case, as in many others, what is straightforward to the nonphilosopher is (perhaps justifiably) complicated and involved to the philosopher.

At any rate, if the argument works against the event identity view, then it works equally well against strict accounts of intention. Rigorists distinguish between various effects. They distinguish between a crushed skull and harm, between speeding up and increased wind resistance, between a crushed skull and a

[41] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 669.

[42] Ibid., 668.

[43] Brian O'Shaughnessy, "Trying (As the Mental 'Pineal Gland')," *Journal of Philosophy* 70 (1973): 365-86; Timothy Cleveland, *Trying without Willing: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

compressed skull, and so on. Distinction and identity, however, are correlatives. Understanding one concept requires understanding the other. If the identity of effects is a hopelessly philosophically obscure concept, then the distinction of effects must also be.

Of course, rigorists need not give a detailed account of the meaning of "distinction" in order to rely on certain intuitions of distinct effects, but then neither do so-called broad accounts need to give a detailed account of identity. For both views, perhaps, a detailed account would be ideal, but even in its absence the well-informed nonphilosopher is likely (despite his inability to understand Frege and Kripke) to recognize identity and distinction. He will not doubt that in reality the death of the mammal is one and the same as the death of the human being, nor will he question whether being cut in half is itself a kind of injury (and not merely a cause of injury). At the same time, he will be able to recognize that the descriptions are indeed distinct.

VII. The Importance of Actions

As has now become evident, a strict account of intention is more concerned with distinction in descriptions than it is with unity in reality. When needed, its advocates do distinguish distinct effects in reality, such as in the cyclists example. What matters to them, however, is not the distinction in reality but the distinction in description, which naturally follows upon the distinct realities. The strict account of intention, then, is concerned with intending descriptions, not with intending realities. It remains to see how this focus upon descriptions follows from the fatal flaw of the strict account.

I have suggested, in the past, that this focus upon descriptions is merely a matter of convenience, a means by which rigorists can redescribe actions to fit their prior moral intuitions.[44] Nothing about their view, I argued, constrains them to focus upon descriptions rather than realities. Their action theory could equally well focus upon realities as upon descriptions. The focus upon

[44] Jensen, "Phoenix Rising," 526-27, 544.

descriptions is simply a choice that rigorists sometimes make and sometimes fail to make.

On this point, I may have been misled. Despite the unity of certain effects (such as a crushed skull and harm), rigorists insist that intention is directed to descriptions of these effects, not to the effects themselves. The propensity toward descriptions remains, even when the effects are clearly identical (in reality). The underlying cause of the rigorists' predilection for descriptions has not been removed. Even when dealing with identical realities, they consistently focus upon intending effects rather than actions. This disregard for actions is the primary culprit encouraging a multiplicity of (sometimes convenient) descriptions. It is the fatal flaw of a strict view of intention.

According to Aristotle, actions involve an agent that brings about a change in some subject.[45] When fire heats water, for instance, fire is the agent that brings about the change of increased temperature within the subject of water. When the niece kills her uncle, she is the agent that brings about the change of death into the subject of the uncle.

Human actions are more complicated because they involve multiple powers acting in concert. The niece, for instance, uses her reason, her will, and the power to move her body (the locomotive power). She uses her reason to understand the effect of death and to recognize the causes she needs to achieve this effect; she uses her will to desire death as a certain kind of good and to move her body; she uses the locomotive power to point the gun and pull the trigger.

This example, because it uses (beyond reason and will) only the locomotive power, obscures an important feature of human actions. Adultery is a more illuminating example. It also involves the locomotive power, but in addition it engages the power of reproduction. Because of this latter power—and not just because of bodily movements—adultery is a sexual act. In this case, then, the bodily power engaged (reproduction) plays a clear role in defining the action, over and above the role played by the powers

[45] Aristotle, *Physics* 3.3.202a12-202b29.

of reason and will, over and above, that is, any intention of effects.

Rigorists, recognizing (within human actions) the central role of reason and will, which are the distinctive human powers, ignore the importance of other powers. Their account includes only reason, will, and the effects that are brought about. Actions are defined (on their account) in terms of the effects produced, but only as considered under the descriptions that reason proposes as attractive to the will. No other powers enter their account of human actions. Consequently, the action of adultery is perplexing. It is a sexual act because it engages the power of reproduction, but a strict view of intention has ignored the importance of this power. It has focused only upon effects, but no effects—intended by reason and will—define this action.

Returning to Aristotle, we can see that the act of adultery involves a change arising from the power of reproduction. The power of reproduction is directed to the change that is new life. The male agent introduces new life into the female subject of the change. With reason and will, however, this change need not be intended. Indeed, it may be opposed (by means of contraception or some such thing). The adulterer need not intend to bring about the effect of new life. Rigorists, then, are at a loss to identify the effect intended.

The effect is hidden within the power of reproduction, which itself is directed to the effect of new life. With his reason and will, the adulterer need not intend this effect. He need intend only to apply the power (which *is* directed to this effect) to some subject. Human beings can even direct the power to a completely inappropriate subject, in which the effect cannot be brought about. Someone might direct his power of reproduction, for instance, upon a sheep. Nevertheless, we still have an agent using some power, which is directed to bring about a change in some subject.

As a quick aside, we might note a corollary to the difficulty of identifying sexual acts. There follows a corresponding difficulty understanding the morality of sexual actions. Rigorists, for instance, are perplexed by perverted faculty arguments.[46] Contra-

[46] Melissa Moschella, "Sexual Ethics, Human Nature, and the "New" and "Old"

ception, for instance, is often identified as evil because it frustrates the purpose of the reproductive faculty. Similarly, lying is said to be evil because it opposes the purpose of the power of communication. The perplexity of the rigorists is no surprise. It follows naturally from the fatal flaw of a strict view of intention. If sexual actions are not identified in terms of a power applied to some object, then neither can they be identified as evil by reference to a perversion of this power.

The inadequacy of strict intention extends to a whole host of actions (beyond sexual acts) because the powers engaged (within our human actions) need not be limited to the formal powers of the soul identified within Aristotelian/Thomistic philosophy. Consider the example of the niece telling the detective what she did on the day of the murder. What power does she engage in her action? Clearly, she engages the locomotive power, but she also engages what might be called the power to communicate or the power to speak.

The power to communicate does not fall within the list of powers of the soul. Nevertheless, it is distinct from powers on this list through its direction toward the effect of introducing ideas (found in the agent) within the subject of the listener. The niece's action (like the act of adultery) cannot be identified simply in terms of an effect intended. Just as the act of adultery is essentially defined in terms of the power of reproduction, so the niece's act of telling the detective about her day is essentially defined in terms of the power of communication, a power that is itself directed to a certain change in a certain subject.

Other "powers" also enter into human actions. The act of buying a red sports car, for instance, is defined in terms of a power (the power to buy and sell) directed upon a certain subject (a red sports car). This power is not in the formal list of powers of the soul. Nevertheless, it is directed to the distinct effect of a legal change of ownership. This power, like the power to communicate, is partly defined by human conventions, for ownership is itself a human convention. Within legal systems, individuals are given the "power" to transfer ownership.

Natural Law Theories," *The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 19 (2019): 251-78.

Reason and will are clearly integral to these conventional powers, but they do not play a simplistic role of intending some effect under a description. Rather, reason and will interact with the locomotive power. Through this interaction, the power of locomotion becomes the power to change the world around us. With the addition of certain social conventions, this new power is further transformed into the power to make various social changes, such as buying and selling.

These diverse powers can make a crucial difference between actions that appear similar with regard to their effects. In the craniotomy case discussed above, for instance, the doctor aims to save the life of the mother, but the baby dies (and is otherwise harmed). In discussions of double effect, the typical contrast case is that of a hysterectomy on a gravid cancerous uterus. The woman is pregnant, but not so far along that the baby is viable. By performing the hysterectomy, then, the baby will die. Like the craniotomy case, this case involves the doctor saving the life of the mother and the baby dying.

In what way do the two cases differ? The rigorists find no significant difference. In both, the doctor intends to save the mother. In neither does the doctor intend to harm the baby. Broad accounts of intention, however, are concerned not only with effects and the formalities under which they are intended; they are concerned with powers directed upon objects. The resulting actions do indeed differ significantly.

Many broad accounts distinguish the two cases by way of the object upon which the doctor acts. In the craniotomy, the doctor acts upon the baby, introducing the change of a crushed skull. In the hysterectomy, the doctor acts upon the uterus, and the baby is only indirectly implicated. In the craniotomy case, then, the doctor must intend the action of crushing the skull of the baby, which is a kind of harm. In the hysterectomy case, the doctor intends no action upon the baby at all. The doctor does not perform an action of changing the baby. All the more, then, he does not perform an action of harming the baby. The harm to the baby is not an object of his power. He does not take his power to change and direct it upon the baby. Rather, he directs his power onto the uterus of the woman. As often happens in life, the

change he thereby introduces causes other changes, including harm to the baby. In the two cases, then, the actions bear little similarity to one another.

The picture that emerges is not filled with agents intending effects. It is filled with agents engaging powers, which powers are themselves directed toward some effect. A complete account of intention, then, involves not only effects. It involves all three elements of action: the agent, the effect, and the subject. The first element (the agent) is typically manifested by some power of the person. The second element (the effect) is often simply the effect to which the power is directed; it need not be the effect intended by reason and will. Rather, this effect enters intention only obliquely, by way of the power engaged. For this reason, strict intention proves inadequate to describe the intention of most of our actions, from sexual intercourse to eating ice cream.

Within intention, the third element—the subject to which the power is directed—is far from negligible. Sam directs his power to change the world (which he directs in particular to the effect of death) upon the subject of the zookeeper, who is indeed a human being. Sam does not simply intend death, or even the death of a mammal, or even the death of a human being. Rather, he intends an action; he intends to bring about death in this human being. The subject serves as a kind of material element, which brings the effect into the concrete world. By itself, the power is directed toward some effect in general. Through the subject, it is directed toward a concrete effect in this individual.

The parallels that this picture presents with the view of Thomas Aquinas are not difficult to see.[47] Aquinas emphasizes that the objects of actions determine their character. Intention for some remote goal might modify or extend this character, but it does not create this character. Intention for a proximate goal is precisely the intention to engage some power upon some object. The action takes its character from this power insofar as it is directed upon this object.

[47] See *STh* I-II, q. 18.

VIII. How a Focus upon Effects Leads to a Focus upon Descriptions

In the world of a strict account of intention, the will, as formed by deliberative reason, interacts directly with effects. In the real world, the will reaches out to effects only by way of some action that arises from a power distinct from the will. Sam does not immediately intend the death of a human being, of a mammal, or of anything else. He intends to engage his power to bring about death, which is the locomotive power specified to causing some particular effect. He directs this power toward a certain subject, the zookeeper. This power is guided by reason, but it itself is not reason. It is a physical power directed to a very physical effect.

Reason, with its ability to abstract, can direct to mere abstractions; it can direct the will toward mere descriptions of actions rather than toward the concrete actions themselves. In contrast, physical powers are directed to concrete physical effects residing in concrete physical individuals. Reason must reach descriptions by way of powers. It must reach the descriptions, then, by way of the concrete effect realized in this concrete individual. With his reason and will, Sam wants the death of a mammal. He must reach this mere description, however, by way of the very physical power to bring about death, which he must direct to a very concrete physical individual.

Similarly, the doctor wants the size of the baby's head to be narrowed. She reaches this description, however, by a very physical power, which narrows the head by way of crushing. The physical power is directed toward a crushed skull, which is also an injury or harm. The will, following the abstractive power of reason, may be attracted to this crushed skull only insofar as it is a narrowing of the head. The crushed skull is not appealing insofar as it is an injury.

What is appealing, however, is an action of crushing the skull, which is indeed an action of harming. The act of harming may not be inherently appealing, but it is appealing as a useful means to achieve the desired goal. The will cannot get at descriptions in themselves. It can get at a narrowed head only by way of action,

for it has no direct access to effects. The required action, however, is an action of harming.

Perhaps the will desires this action only insofar as it brings about the effect of a smaller head. Nevertheless, the will does desire this action, and this action is an act of harming. The physical action—the application of this power to this object—does not distinguish, as reason does, between different formalities of a crushed skull, between the formality of being a smaller skull and the formality of being an injury. The will must move out to this particular action, which is directed to this injury, even though it does not desire the injury as inherently good.

In the world of a strict definition of intention, reason and will move directly to effects. The intervening power, with its action, is lost from sight. Reason and will, then, are free to move out toward effects simply under this or that description. They need not worry about the act of injuring; they need concern themselves with the crushed skull, but not under the formality of injury.

Once descriptions become the norm, rigorists become prone to use what are merely hypothetical descriptions, as we have seen Lee and Tollefsen do with regard to crushing and compressing a skull.[48] Similarly, Elisabeth Parish compares firing a gun in self-defense with the use of pepper spray, because in some circumstances people do defend themselves with pepper spray. Unfortunately, this description is merely hypothetical to the case at hand, since the person does not have pepper spray but only a gun.[49]

Furthermore, the focus upon effects prevents rigorists from understanding so-called broad accounts of intention, which emphasize actions rather than effects. Another case of identity and distinction illustrates the point. Masek gives the example of a psychopath and a philanderer, both of whom buy a red sports car. "The psychopath tries to buy a car with a color that evokes blood, but the philanderer tries to buy a car with a color that attracts attention."[50] According to Masek, the event identity view

[48] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 672-73.

[49] Parish, "Two Theories of Action," 69.

[50] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 663-64.

blurs the distinction between these two cases. The exact nature of the blurring is never explained, but presumably event identity supposes that the intentions (in the two cases) are identical despite the distinct descriptions.

Significantly, neither the psychopath nor the philanderer is trying to cause—or intend—an effect; both are trying to perform the action of buying. Masek describes both intentions in terms of actions rather than effects, which is unsurprising since the actions do not fall within that category amenable to the focus of the strict view of intention upon effects. Nevertheless, Masek attempts to find some effects that might distinguish their intentions. He looks beyond the action itself toward possible remote goals. The psychopath wants the effect of evoking (in his own mind or in others) the image of blood; the philanderer wants the effect of others paying attention to him. Broad accounts of intention, claims Masek, blur the distinction between these two intentions.

With their focus upon actions rather than effects, however, defenders of broad accounts are likely to recognize two identical actions: both the psychopath and the philanderer buy a red sports car. The two differ not in the action they perform but in the motives that give rise to the actions. Sometimes, of course, we use a broader notion of action; within action, we include motive as well as what is immediately done. The action of buying a red sports car *with the further motive of evoking the image of blood* is indeed distinct from the action of buying a red sports car *with the further motive of drawing attention*. Nothing prohibits broad accounts from adopting this extended sense of action; nothing prohibits them from recognizing that intention concerns not only the immediate action but remote goals as well. In no way, then, need they blur the difference between the two.

Masek, however, blurs the difference between the action performed and the motive for some further effect. The strict account of intention backs him into this corner. Since the action itself (buying a red sports car) has no immediate defining effect, Masek must have recourse to some further goal. This reaction is so automatic—given the paradigm of intending effects rather than actions—that Masek misses the point of the argument to which he is responding. The initial argument did not have two

individuals, a psychopath and a philanderer, but only one individual, who buys a red sports car.[51] The point of the argument had nothing to do with his motive for buying a red sports car, a motive that Masek must introduce in order to find some effect intended. The point was only to suggest that in buying a red sports car, he is also buying (and intending to buy) a car the color of blood.

Masek himself concedes the identity of a red car and a car the color of blood.[52] He does not concede, however, that this identity has any implications for intention. It can affect intention only by some further effect intended. Unless the buyer is like the psychopath, then, he does not intend to buy a car that is the color of blood. Neither—on this rigorist account—does he intend to buy a red car, unless something particular about its being red provides distinct motivation. If he does not care about the color but only wants an inexpensive car, then he intends to buy a car but not a red car. The diverse descriptions of the unified reality enter intention only by way of some effect that can be intended.

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Broad accounts of intention focus upon actions, not effects. Actions intervene between the will (guided by reason) and the effect desired. They arise from some power distinct from reason, a power moving out to real concrete effects in real concrete individuals. Multifarious descriptions are irrelevant to these powers. Reason, using these powers, is tied to an action that moves out to these concrete effects in concrete individuals. Reason might be concerned with these effects on account of a particular description, but it must move out to the action of the power, which is not concerned with descriptions but with realities. Sam must move out to the death of a mammal by way of the power of introducing death, which is not directed to descriptions but to particular individuals. Consequently, Sam

[51] Jensen, "Causal Constraints," 286.

[52] Masek, "Strict Definition of Intended Effects," 674 n. 49.

must intend the action of killing a human being. What effect he may or may not intend is irrelevant.

On account of its fatal flaw, rigorists overlook the action and the power that gives rise to the action. Reason, with its penchant for abstract descriptions, is given complete reign. The reality of actions is lost, and actions become, like clay, the plaything of reason to be shaped by the imagination.

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LOVE OF FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE OF CONCUPISCENCE

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WE LOVE WINE and other lifeless things in a different way than we love our friends. We love our friends for their own sake, wishing good for them and being inherently pleased by their possession of it. We love wine and other such things as objects to be used, enjoyed, or possessed by someone we care about; we do not love them fundamentally as subjects for whom we wish some good but as goods we wish for some subject.

Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics,* drew attention to this difference and, through it, identified friendship as essentially a benevolent love, that is, one that wishes good for the loved one for the loved one's own sake.[1] In the thirteenth century, theologians looked back to Aristotle, and presumably to experience itself, and distinguished between two kinds of love: the kind of love one has toward wine they called *concupiscence* or *love of*

[1] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* 8.2. 1155b27-1156a5 (ed. I. Bywanter [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894]): "ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ (γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, σῴζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ): τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὔνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου γίνηται" ("With respect to the love of lifeless things, the word friendship is not used, for [in such love] there is neither a return of affection nor a wishing of good for such a thing (for it would be ridiculous to wish goods for wine, but if indeed [one wishes anything for wine], one wishes that it be preserved so that one might have it). But people say that it is necessary to wish good things for a friend for that friend's own sake. Those, however, who in this way wish good [to another] they call benevolent when this wishing does not occur [reciprocally] on the part of the other person").

concupiscence; the kind one has toward a friend they called *friendship* or *love of friendship*.

Thomas Aquinas received the distinction between love of friendship and love of concupiscence from his Scholastic predecessors, and in a sense from Aristotle as well. He used the terms *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence* throughout his career, and the distinction associated with them eventually came to occupy a central role in his thought on love. Arguably, the distinction became so central that without it one cannot present his thought except in a vague manner, nor can one solve the primary problem associated with his doctrine of love, namely, how love of others for their own sake is possible.[2]

Scholars have often treated of the distinction between love of friendship and love of concupiscence. Most treatments, however, have been part of a broader inquiry; rarely has the distinction been the proper object of study. The effect has been that scholars have rarely considered the two loves as a controversial topic, one over which to argue.[3] But differences in interpretation do exist, some being more obvious, others more subtle. These differences exist in turn because Thomas's understanding of love of friendship and love of concupiscence is itself difficult to discern. Thomas presents the two loves in a variety of ways, and it is not clear how we are to reconcile these different accounts. Some dedicated studies, accordingly, are needed to

[2] Staples of this discussion include: Pierre Rousselot, *Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour au moyen âge,* Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 6/6 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1908); Louis-Bertrand Geiger, *Le problème de l'amour chez saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Conférence Albert-le-Grand, 1952 (Montreal: Institute d'études médiévales, 1952); Avital Wohlman, "Amour du bien propre et amour de soi dans la doctrine Thomiste de l'amour," *Revue thomiste* 81 (1981): 204-34; and David M. Gallagher, "Desire for Beatitude and Love of Friendship in Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies* 58 (1996): 1-47. For a more recent treatment, see Christopher J. Malloy, *Aquinas on Beatific Charity and the Problem of Love* (Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2019).

[3] More recent works, however, have begun to treat the issue as controversial. See Malloy, *Aquinas on Beatific Charity*, 53-70; and Peter A. Kwasniewski, *The Ecstasy of Love in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2021), 121-42.

address the various textual difficulties and consider the diverse interpretations in the secondary literature.

This study aims to provide such a treatment. With the help of the secondary literature, we will first set out the questions we will seek to answer in our inquiry. Then, to provide a firmer foundation for interpreting Thomas, we will survey his predecessors' use of *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence*. Afterward, we will examine Thomas's own use of the terms throughout his career. Finally, we will return to the questions raised and draw conclusions about how we ought to understand the two loves and the distinction associated with them.

I. SCHOLARLY TREATMENT AND POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS

Twentieth- and twenty-first-century interpreters of Thomas generally present love of friendship and love of concupiscence in one of four ways. Some divide the two loves as other-oriented and self-oriented: love of friendship is a disinterested love of others for their own sake while love of concupiscence is a love of something wished for oneself.[4] Others divide the loves as being of persons and of things wished for persons: love of friendship is of a person, whether oneself or another, for that person's own sake, while love of concupiscence is of some good wished for a person.[5] Still others divide the loves similarly but

[4] Nicholas Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 162: "The love of desire (*concupiscentia*) loves something or someone for the sake of personal well-being, but the love of friendship loves someone as another self, and wants good for the other in the same way as for oneself"; A. Malet, *Personne et amour dans la théologie trinitaire de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1956), 133-37; Jean-Hervé Nicholas, "Amour de soi, amour de Dieu, amour des autres," *Revue thomiste* 56 (1956): 26, 36, and 38; Rousselot, *Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour*, 8-18.

[5] Diana Fritz Cates, "Love: A Thomistic Analysis," *Journal of Moral Theology* 1, no. 2 (2012): 16: "Aquinas calls this sort of intellectual love *amor concupiscentiae* or concupiscence-love. He refers to it also as relative love. . . . We can consent with a relative love to something *as* good for another person"; and ibid., 17: "Aquinas associates direct love with *amor amicitiae*. . . . The person whom we love in this way can be our own self"; H. D. Siminon, "Autour de la solution thomiste du problème de l'amour," in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 6 (Paris: J. Vrin,

add that the loves are not distinct acts, but two aspects or tendencies found in every act of love: in each act, one tends with love of friendship to some subject for whom one wishes some good and with love of concupiscence to some good one wishes for that subject.[6] Finally, some identify multiple senses of the two loves. Most notably, Guy Mansini identifies: (1) a broad, metaphysical sense, in which the loves are divided as being of a subject and of some good wished for a subject; (2) a stricter sense in which love of friendship is exclusively of others and love of concupiscence is exclusively of goods wished for oneself; and (3) a strictest sense in which love of friendship is a love of another that bears upon an honorable good (*bonum honestum*)

1932), 263; M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, “Le désir et l’existence de Dieu,” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (1924): 165-66; Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 122-25; James McEvoy, “Amitié, attirance et amour chez S. Thomas d’Aquin,” *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 91 (1993): 387, and 391-92. McEvoy presents the distinction in such a way that it is evident, even if not explicitly asserted in all its parts, that love of friendship extends to self and love of concupiscence to goods wished for others.

Geiger normally treats love of concupiscence as self-oriented (see *Le problème de l’amour*, 100 and 117), but he formally describes it as involving three things: “a subject who desires, an object that is desired, [and] a good, distinct from this object, for whom this [object] is desired” (ibid., 60 n. 30). This description leaves open the possibility that the love might extend to things willed for others. Geiger identifies love of self as a love not of concupiscence but of benevolence (ibid., 55).

[6] David M. Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love as the Basis for Love of Others,” *Acta philosophica* 8 (1999): 27: “In any act of love, there is a person who is loved—a love of friendship—and at the same time some good willed for that person—a love of concupiscence. These two loves constitute one act . . . a single act directed to two objects, a person and that person’s good.” See also David M. Gallagher, “Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas,” *Acta philosophica* 4 (1995): 56-57; and Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude,” 14; Gregory Stevens, “The Disinterested Love of God according to St. Thomas and Some of His Modern Interpreters,” *The Thomist* 16 (1953): 512-13; Wohlman, “Amour du bien propre et amour de soi,” 211; Michael Sherwin, *By Knowledge and by Love* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 67, 93, and 156; Anthony T. Flood, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Love* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018), 2; Steven J. Jensen, *Sin: A Thomistic Psychology* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018), 88; Malloy, *Aquinas on Beatific Charity*, 53; Kwasniewski, *Ecstasy of Love*, 124.

present in that other, while love of concupiscence is a self-seeking love of some utility or pleasure not yet possessed.[7]

Although diversity in presentation need not signify diversity in understanding, it may, and we can be confident with respect to this topic that, in some cases at least, it does. For our purposes, it is the possibilities of interpretation that matter. The four general forms of presentation suggest different ways we can understand the two loves and provide three important questions for our study. First, we will want to know whether the two loves are divided as (a) other-oriented and self-oriented or as (b) being of persons and of goods wished for persons. Second, we will want to know how the two loves relate. If they are divided as other-oriented and self-oriented, they will be distinct acts. If they are of persons and of goods wished for persons, they may be two aspects found in every act, though certain ways of understanding their objects could preclude this possibility. Third, we will want to know whether there are multiple senses of the two loves.

Because the question of how the loves relate depends on the precise nature of their objects, we must ask further questions about these objects. The secondary literature suggests four questions to consider in regard to love of concupiscence. First, is love of concupiscence always, or sometimes, only of the useful or pleasant good and not of the honorable? Second, is it always, or sometimes, only of an absent good?[8] Third, is it only of external goods, or is it also of inhering perfections?[9] Fourth, if it

[7] Guy Mansini, "*Duplex Amor* and the Structure of Love in Aquinas," in *Thomistica*, ed. by Eugene Manning, *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, Supplementa* 1 (Leuven: Peeters, 1995), 187-88. William Mattison adopts Mansini's account (see William C. Mattison III, "Movements of Love: A Thomistic Perspective on *Agape* and *Eros*," *Journal of Moral Theology,* 1, no. 2 [2012]: 36-37). Kevin White's presentation is also influenced by it (see Kevin White, "Wanting Something for Someone: Aquinas on Complex Motions of Appetite," *The Review of Metaphysics* 61 [Sept. 2007], 15-16).

[8] Mansini's third, strictest sense of love of concupiscence suggests these first two questions.

[9] Geiger identifies the object of love of concupiscence as something external and distinct in subject from the one for whom it is willed, while intrinsic perfections appear on his account to be loved with love of benevolence or perhaps love of complacency (see Geiger, *Le problème de l'amour,* 60 n. 30, 100, and 115). Miner's account suggests

is of inhering perfections, is it of substantial existence properly speaking, or is it not because substantial existence is included in the object of love of friendship?[10]

In regard to love of friendship, the secondary literature suggests two questions. First, some scholars understand love of friendship as bearing upon substantial existence in a special way, while for others it bears more on the more complete good of the person.[11] Is the object of love of friendship, we may wonder, the person as possessing substantial existence, the person as possessing the complete good, or simply the person as such? Second, in question 26, article 4 of the *Prima secundae* Thomas declares that the good that is the object of love of friendship is good in a primary sense, but in his formal treatments of the good in question 21 of the disputed questions *De veritate* and question 5 of the *Prima pars* he explains the good through the notions of the desirable, the end, and the perfect or the perfective. While these notions seem readily applicable to the object of love of concupiscence, it is not clear how, or even if,

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a similar understanding of the object: "*Amor concupiscentiae* is the inclination that any animal . . . has for various objects that are distinct from the animal. . . . Objects distinct from the self are loved with *amor concupiscentiae*. We desire them instrumentally for the sake of something else" (Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 123). Gallagher, on the other hand, identifies love of concupiscence as being chiefly of accidents; secondarily, it may be of external things, such as wine or even another person, willed as a means to these chief objects (see Gallagher, "Desire for Beatitude," 17).

[10] Gallagher's account suggests this question. In "Person and Ethics," 59, Gallagher explains that love of friendship is of "subsistent goods," while love of concupiscence is chiefly of "goods that inhere in persons such as health, knowledge, virtue," each of which is "a perfection of a subsisting being, metaphysically speaking a second perfection, which in some way perfects the substance, which alone has only its first perfection." While Gallagher might hold that substantial existence, like external goods, is a secondary object of love of concupiscence, his explanation here at least raises the possibility that because substantial existence is a part of the object of love of friendship, it might not be an object of love of concupiscence properly speaking.

[11] Miner and Sherwin understand love of friendship as bearing upon substantial existence in a special way. Gallagher in some sense does as well. Cates and Malloy, on the other hand, would say that love of friendship bears more on the more complete good of the person. See Sherwin, *By Knowledge and by Love*, 93; Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 126; and Gallagher, "Person and Ethics," 59-60; Cates, "Love," 17; and Malloy, *Aquinas on Beatific Charity*, 59-60. Malloy addresses Sherwin's position in ibid., 60 n. 73.

they apply to that of love of friendship. In what sense, we may ask, is the object of love of friendship good, and good in a primary sense?[12]

The secondary literature also raises a more general question. Some scholars assert or seem to imply that love of friendship and love of concupiscence exist only at the level of rational appetite, while others maintain that the two loves, or something analogous to them, exists at the sensitive and natural levels as well.[13] Does the distinction between love of friendship and love of concupiscence, we may wonder, pertain only to rational love, or does it pertain to love as a whole?

These questions will guide our inquiry. Those that arise from the general forms of presentation will play a structural role. The first such question, whether love of friendship is exclusively of others and love of concupiscence exclusively of goods wished

[12] The secondary literature suggests this question indirectly inasmuch as we find in the literature certain claims that we could take as providing an answer. Miner and Sherwin, as noted, claim that love of friendship bears on substantial existence in a special way while Stevens and McEvoy identify love of friendship's object with the notion of the end (Stevens, "Disinterested Love of God," 512, and McEvoy, "Amitié, attirance et amour," 392). Perhaps, then, the object's superiority is due to the superiority of substantial existence over accidental existence or to the superiority of the end over the means.

[13] Wohlman explicitly denies that the distinction exists at anything other than the rational level (Wohlman, "Amour du bien propre et amour de soi," 212). Gallagher also appears to restrict it to this level, for he always presents the distinction between the two loves as one of rational love or *dilectio* ("Desire for Beatitude," 13; "Person and Ethics," 56; and "Self-Love," 26). Santiago Ramirez explicitly denies the distinction's application to sensitive love and considers the treatment of the two loves in *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 4 to pertain exclusively to rational love (Jacobus M. Ramirez, *De passionibus animae: In I-II "Summa theologiae" divi Thomae expositio (qq. XXII-XLVIII), Obras completas de Santiago Ramirez,* vol. 5 [Madrid: Instituto de filosofia Luis Vives, 1973]: 83-84). On the other side are scholars such as Miner, Malloy, and Vincent Héris. Miner rejects Ramirez's interpretation of *STh* I-II, q. 26 as arbitrary and boldly asserts: "A horse loves its feed with *amor concupiscentiae*. . . . It loves itself with the *amor amicitiae*" (Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 123 and n. 10). Malloy holds that while the distinction "has its most proper seat" in rational love, it exists in an extended sense at the subrational level (Malloy, *Aquinas on Beatific Charity*, 58). Héris seems to hold a similar position, for he interprets natural (noncognitive) love of God as an "inclination analogous to the love of friendship" (Vincent Héris, "L'amour naturel de Dieu d'après saint Thomas," in *Mélanges thomistes* [Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1923], 291).

for self, will guide our examination of Thomas's predecessors. In our inquiry into Thomas's treatment of the two loves throughout his career, this question will continue to be important, but it will be asked at the service of the more fundamental question of whether there are multiple senses of *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence* in Thomas's thought. In the third and final section, the question of the relation between the two loves will play a central role inasmuch as we will there give special attention to the nature of love's twofold tendency.

II. Love of Friendship and Love of Concupiscence before Thomas

While Aristotle influenced Thomas's understanding of love of concupiscence and even more so of love of friendship, Thomas properly received the *distinction* between these two loves from his Scholastic predecessors. Investigating how they understood it will cast light on Thomas's own understanding. In this section, we will first look at William of Auxerre. While William may not have been the first to draw the distinction, his use of the distinction seems to have been the most influential of its early uses.[14] Afterwards, we will look at Philip the Chancellor, the *Summa halesiana*, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure.

In his *Summa aurea*, William presents the distinction as part of his solution to the problem of natural love of God. Dividing natural love into the voluntary and the involuntary, he explains that the involuntary is of two kinds, one had in common with other animals and one proper to us.[15] Then turning to the other form of natural love, he writes:

[14] Praepositinus and Geoffrey of Poitiers may have preceded William. See Mansini, "*Duplex Amor*," 140 n. 4; and Thomas M. Osborne, *Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 224 n. 100, and 225 n. 112.

[15] William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* II, tr. 2, c. 4 (ed. Jean Ribaillier [Paris: Editions du centre national de la recherché scientifique; Rome: Collegium Bonaventurae, 1982], 43). Marie-Rosaire Gagnebet dates William's *Summa aurea* to between 1215 and 1220; see M.-R. Gagnebet, "L'amour naturel de Dieu chez Saint Thomas et ses contemporains," *Revue thomiste* 48 (1948): 398.

But voluntary love is divided into two, namely into concupiscence and into friendship or benevolence. Concupiscence is the love by which we love all that we desire to enjoy or wish to have, just as someone is said to love wine, because he seeks to enjoy it. The love which is called friendship is that by which we love all those whose good we will, that is, those whose goods we rejoice over.[16]

The distinction, however, pertains not only to natural, voluntary love, but also to charity: "By each love," adds William, "whether by concupiscence or by benevolence, we love God [both] through nature without the help of grace and through grace."[17]

Interpretation of William depends on three questions. The first and most important is whether the division of voluntary love is exhaustive. *Prima facie*, William's claim that "voluntary love is divided into two" suggests that it is exhaustive. If so, then anything loved with a natural voluntary love must be loved with one of these loves.

The second question concerns the scope of voluntary love. Can we love our self and goods wished for others with a voluntary love? If we can, then, provided that the division of voluntary love is exhaustive, we must love our self with friendship or benevolence-love, for we properly love our self as someone "whose goods we rejoice over." Likewise, we must love goods wished for others with concupiscence-love, for clearly we do not love such goods with benevolence.[18]

The third question is whether the terms *friendship* and *benevolence* are interchangeable. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*

[16] William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* II, tr. 2, c. 4 (Ribaillier, ed., 43): "Dilectio autem voluntaria dividitur in duas, scilicet in concupiscentiam et in amicitiam sive benivolentiam. Concupiscentia est dilectio qua diligimus omne illud quo frui appetimus vel quod habere volumus, sicut aliquis dicitur diligere vinum, quia appetit frui eo. Dilectio que dicitur amicitia est qua diligimus omne illud cuius bonum volumus, id est cuius bonis congratulamur." For readability, I have translated the singular neuter *illud* as "those."

[17] Ibid.: "Utraque dilectione, sive concupiscentia, sive benivolentia, diligimus Deum per naturam sine adiutorio gratie et per gratiam."

[18] William's definition of concupiscence-love, if taken strictly, precludes voluntary love of goods wished for others. It is not clear, however, that he intends it to be taken strictly.

(8.2), from which William appears to be drawing, the terms are not interchangeable: friendship is a kind of benevolence, one that is mutually recognized and reciprocated by another person. William himself, however, moves between the terms in a way that suggests interchangeability, and the definition of friendship-love he provides makes no mention of mutual recognition or reciprocation, nor does it even require that the love be of another person. If the terms are indeed interchangeable, and if we can love our self with a natural voluntary love, then he is using *friendship* in a broad sense that allows it to include love of self. If, however, the terms are not simply interchangeable, then presumably *benevolence* is broader and *friendship* names a kind of benevolence. In this case, we might love our self with benevolence but not with friendship, properly speaking.

It is difficult to answer these questions with certitude, though we can say that the division seems exhaustive and *friendship* and *benevolence* seem interchangeable. For our purposes, however, the inherent logic of William's distinction and how others understood his distinction are at least as important as how he himself understood it. Whatever William thought, concupiscence-love should extend to goods wished for others, provided that concupiscence and benevolence give an exhaustive division of modes of love. These goods are objects of love just as much as wine is, for (1) they are desirable and pleasing to us, though as something to be possessed not by our self but by another we care about; and (2) our love for them is just as voluntary as it is for wine wished for oneself. As for how others understood William, Albert the Great thought William considered the self to be loved with friendship-love.[19] Thomas also appears to have interpreted William in this way.[20]

[19] See below, n. 29.

[20] In his treatments of natural love of God above self, Thomas normally presents, and opposes, the position of "certain persons" who hold that by nature apart from grace, a man or an angel would love itself with love of friendship more than God. Thomas seems to have William principally in mind, for the position of these "certain persons" closely resembles that of William. See II *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1; III *Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 3 (*Scriptum super sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi*, 4 vols., ed. Pierre Mandonnet and Maria Fabianus Moos [Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929-47]); *Quodl.* I, q. 4, a. 3 (*Quaestiones*

Philip the Chancellor seems primarily responsible for making *love of friendship* (*dilectio amicitae*) and *love of concupiscence* (*dilectio concupiscentiae*) the standard terms with which to express the distinction. In his treatment of angelic love of God in the *Summa de bono*, written shortly after William's *Summa aurea,* Philip recounts the position of those who "distinguish voluntary love into concupiscence and friendship."[21] "Love of concupiscence," he explains, "is that by which we will a thing for ourselves, the love of friendship that by which we will the good of, or for, that which we love."[22] Philip uses the plural to speak of those who hold this position, but he clearly has William particularly, if not exclusively, in mind. He presents William's *concupiscence* as self-oriented, but the definition he gives of William's *friendship* leaves open the possibility of it being had towards oneself. Philip, however, does not appear to make the distinction his own, for, as Mansini remarks, it seems to play no role in his own solution.[23] Because subsequent theologians adopted Philip's solution to the problem of natural, angelic love of God, his primary contribution to the history of the distinction we are studying lies in establishing both the distinction's place in subsequent treatments of love of God

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Quodlibetales, ed. Raymund Spiazzi [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1949]); and *STh* I, q. 60, a. 5 (*Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M.,* vol. 4-12 [Rome: Commisio Leonina, 1882-]).

In *STh* I, q. 60, a. 3, Thomas seems to understand William to have extended love of friendship to self. There, Thomas distinguishes between two modes of love and then notes that "certain persons" call these modes *friendship* and *concupiscence*. In what follows, it is evident that an angel's love of self is the former kind—what "certain persons" call *friendship*. Again, Thomas seems to have William primarily, if not exclusively, in mind, for *concupiscence* and *friendship* are William's terms; those who come after William speak of *love of concupiscence* and *love of friendship*.

[21] Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono* (ed. Nikolaus Wicki, Corpus philosophorum Medii Aevi Opera philosophica Mediae Aetatis selecta, 2 [Bern: Franke, 1985], 1:89): "Distinguunt etiam dilectionem voluntariam in concupiscentiam et amicitiam." Gagnebet dates the *Summa de bono* to sometime after 1228 (Gagnebet, "L'amour naturel de Dieu," 400).

[22] *Summa de bono,* 1:89: "Dilectio concupiscentie est qua nobis volumus rem, dilectio amicitie qua volumus bonum eius vel ei quod diligimus." I interpret *eius* and *ei* as neuters and *quod* as picking up these rather than *bonum*.

[23] Mansini, "*Duplex Amor*," 156.

above self and its expression in terms of *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence*.

We find William's distinction, expressed with Philip's terminology, in the *Summa halesiana*, a work begun by Alexander of Hales but completed by later Franciscans.[24] We first encounter the distinction in the treatment of the angels' natural love of self:

> There is a love of friendship and a love of concupiscence. Love of concupiscence is either with respect to the desired object [*concupiscibilis*] or with respect to that for whom it is desired; love of friendship tends to another—love of concupiscence does so as well [i.e. tend to another] by reason of that which is desired, but not by reason of that for whom it is desired, for someone desires something for oneself. Beyond this there is a love of pleasingness.[25]

This presentation is peculiar in that it identifies two objects for love of concupiscence: the desired good and the one for whom it is desired. Since this love is then said to be of another only in terms of what is desired, it seems that the one *for whom* the good is desired is solely the self. The desired good, on the other hand, appears restricted to something external. As for love of friendship, we are told only that it "tends to another." Whereas William's division of the two loves potentially allows for love of friendship for self and other-oriented love of concupiscence, the division here seemingly does not. The presentation is also

[24] According to R. E. Houser and Timothy Noone, the *Summa halesiana* was "begun by Alexander of Hales before his death in 1245 [and] completed by John of La Rochelle and William of Middleton, and other Franciscans, perhaps including Bonaventure, sometime after 1260" (Bonaventure, *Commentary on the Sentences: Philosophy of God,* trans. by R. E. Houser and Timothy Noone [Saint Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2013], 88). Elsewhere, they identify the *Summa halesiana* as being "mainly the work of John of La Rochelle . . . and William of Melitona" ("Introduction," in ibid., 20).

[25] Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologica* (*Summa halesiana*), lib. 2, p. 1, inq. 2, tract. 3, sect. 2, q. 2, tit. 1, d. 2, m. 1, c. 1, a. 2, prob. 2, part. 1 (vol. 2 [Quaracchi: Collegium s. Bonaventurae, 1924], 217): "Est dilectio amicitiae et est dilectio concupiscentiae. Dilectio vero concupiscentiae est aut respectu concupiscibilis aut respectu eius cui concupiscitur; dilectio amicitiae in alterum tendit; similiter et dilectio concupiscentiae ratione eius quod concupiscitur, sed non ratione eius cui concupiscitur: aliquis enim concupiscit aliquid sibi. Praeter hoc autem est dilectio placentiae."

peculiar in that it mentions a third kind of love: the love of pleasingness.

The distinction appears again later in the *Summa halesiana*'s treatment of the first man, but it seems understood differently. "Love of friendship," we are told, "is that by which we seek good for him whom we love on account of himself," while "love of concupiscence [is] that by which someone desires the good because it is good for him or pleasant."[26] Love of concupiscence is again self-oriented, but it does not take a double object, and nothing restricts it to external goods. Love of friendship no longer exclusively "tends to another," but, as we soon discover, now extends to self, for it is with this love that the first man loved himself.[27] Since the two texts may not have been written by the same author, it is probably best to take them separately and not attempt to discern a common understanding.

While the *Summa halesiana* makes the distinction its own and develops it, seemingly in different directions, Albert the Great holds the distinction at arm's length. Love of friendship and love of concupiscence appear on several occasions in his *Commentary on the Sentences,* and in no case does Albert present the distinction as his own. In the first book, he presents it as one that is poorly made by "certain persons" (*quidam*).[28] In book 2, he reports that, according to William of Auxerre, in love of friendship, "I will the good for *myself* or another" (emphasis added) whereas in love of concupiscence "I desire

[26] *Summa halesiana,* lib. 2, p. 1, inq. 4, tract. 3, q. 3, tit. 1, c. 1 (2:731): "Dilectio amicitiae est qua appetimus bonum illi quem diligimus propter ipsum . . . dilectio concupiscentiae, qua quis affectat bonum, quia sibi bonum vel delectabile."

[27] Ibid. (2:732): "Potest ergo dici quod primus homo diligebat se propter se, scilicet amore amicitiae."

[28] Albert the Great, I *Sent.*, d. 1, H, a. 22 (*Opera omnia*, ed. Auguste Borgnet [Paris: Vivès, 1890-99], 25:50): "Quidam dicunt aliter, et non ita bene distinguendo dilectionem, scilicet amicitiae, et concupiscentiae." It appears Albert wrote most of his commentary while Regent Master in Paris (1245-48) but completed the final version of book 4 in Cologne in 1249. See John A. Weisheipl, "The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great," in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays*, ed. J. A. Weisheipl (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies, 1980): 22-25.

things so as to enjoy them."[29] In book 3, again assigning the distinction to "certain persons," he explains that love of friendship loves something on account of itself whereas love of concupiscence loves things as good for oneself.[30] Later he asserts that those (i.e., William and perhaps others) who say that one loves oneself with love of friendship "do not speak well . . . for friendship is a relation implying diversity of lover and loved."[31] The distinction also appears in Albert's *Summa theologica,* but this work postdates some, if not most, of Thomas's writings.[32] In general, we may say that Albert does not make the distinction his own, that he consistently presents love of concupiscence as self-oriented, and that, in the *Commentary on the Sentences* at least, he understands William of Auxerre to have held that the self is loved with love of friendship, which he, Albert, thinks is an abuse of language—and this is probably the reason why he does not adopt the distinction.

Bonaventure, unlike Albert the Great, embraces the distinction and, like the *Summa halesiana,* develops it.[33] In the first

[29] Albert the Great, II *Sent.*, d. 3, K, a. 18 (Borgnet, ed., 27:98): "Dicendum, quod hic sunt duae opiniones. Una est Antisiodorensis [William of Auxerre] . . . dicens quod est duplex dilectio, scilicet amicitiae, et concupiscentiae. Amicitiae est in qua volo mihi et alii bonum. Concupiscentiae autem, qua desidero res ut perfruar eis."

[30] Albert the Great, III *Sent.*, d. 27, A, a. 1 (Borgnet, ed., 28:509): "apud quosdam . . . et ideo illi distinguunt duplicem dilectionem, scilicet amicitiae et concupiscentiae, et dicunt, quod dilectione amicitiae aliquid diligitur propter se, sed non supra se: dilectione autem concupiscentiae quae naturalis est, nihil, sed omnia diliguntur ut bona sibi."

[31] Albert the Great, III *Sent.*, d. 28, A, a. 2 (Borgnet, ed., 28:537): "Similiter non est bene dictum, quod aliquis se diligat dilectione amicitiae: quia amicitia relatio est, quaerens diversitatem in dilgente et dilecto."

[32] Albert the Great, *Summa theologica* II, tr. 4, q. 14, m. 4, a. 2 (Borgnet ed., 32:200). Gagnebet dates Albert's *Summa theologiae* to around 1274 (Gagnebet, "L'amour naturel de Dieu," 403). See also, Osborne, *Love of Self and Love of God*, 230 n. 69.

[33] Bonaventure composed his *Commentary on the Sentences* between 1250 and 1252 (Houser and Noone, "Introduction," 16) while Thomas wrote his between 1252 and 1256 (G. Emery, "Brief Catalogue of the Works of Saint Thomas Aquinas," in Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas,* vol. 1, *The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005], 332). Bonaventure did some revision after becoming a Master but probably not much given his commitments; see Houser and Noone, "Introduction," 16.

book of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, asking whether charity ought to be loved by charity, Bonaventure draws a triple distinction:

There is a threefold love, namely, [1] *of friendship*, by which someone wishes the good for someone, [2] *of concupiscence*, by which someone desires something for himself, and [3] *of complacency*, by which someone rests and is delighted in the thing desired, when it is present.[34]

Love of friendship wishes the good for someone (*alicui*). This someone, it seems, may be oneself.[35] Love of concupiscence is self-oriented (as it is in the other thinkers presented), but here appears to be specifically of something as not present. When the good is present, love of complacency, which seemingly corresponds to the *Summa halesiana*'s love of pleasingness, replaces love of concupiscence. Later in the work, however, love of concupiscence appears to subsume love of complacency.[36]

In book 2, the distinction appears in the treatment of the angels' natural love of God but is explained only through examples.[37] Bonaventure provides a proper explanation in book 3: "by love of friendship those for whom we wish the good are loved, but by love of concupiscence those things that we desire are said to be loved."[38] This explanation leaves open the

[34] Bonaventure, I *Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2 (*Opera omnia* [Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902], 1:297): "triplex est amor, scilicet *amicitiae*, quo aliquis optat alicui bonum; *concupiscentiae*, quo aliquis sibi desiderat aliquid; et *complacentiae*, quo aliquis requiescit et delectatur in re desiderata, cum praesens est."

[35] In response to the first objection, which recalls Augustine's fourfold division of those who are to be loved with charity, among which is the self, Bonaventure explains that this division concerns love of friendship.

[36] Love of complacency does not, to my knowledge, appear in the later books, and the language of "accepting" applied to love of complacency in this text ("amore vero complacentiae, scilicet quod diligens acceptat ipsam dilectionem, qua Deum diligit") is later applied to love of concupiscence: to love by love of concupiscence "est aliquod bonum desiderare vel aliquod bonum acceptare" (Bonaventure, III *Sent.*, d. 28, a. 1, q. 5, ad 2 [Quaracchi ed., 3:631]).

[37] Bonaventure, II *Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 3 q. 1 (Quaracchi ed., 2:125): "Contingit enim, aliquid diligi dilectione *concupiscentiae*, sicut aliquis amat vinum, vel *amicitiae*, sicut aliquis amat socium."

[38] Bonaventure, III *Sent.*, d. 28, a. 1, q. 5 (Quaracchi ed., 3:630): "Dilectione *amicitiae* illa diliguntur, quibus optatur bonum; dilectione vero *concupiscentiae* illa

possibility of both love of friendship for self and love of concupiscence for goods wished for others. Elsewhere in book 3 Bonaventure asserts this latter possibility:

> love of friendship in a certain way includes the love of concupiscence, for he who is a friend to another, wishes the good for him, and when he wishes that good for him, he also makes himself desire that very wished-for good and makes himself adhere to the same.[39]

This passage is highly significant. Bonaventure not only declares that love of concupiscence may be of goods wished for others, but he identifies love of concupiscence as being included in love of friendship. While the precise relation between the two loves is not clear, the inclusion of one in the other points in the direction of a conception of the loves as two aspects found in every act of love.

In summary, we may say the following about the distinction prior to Thomas. First, most of Thomas's predecessors present love of concupiscence as a love of something for oneself. Bonaventure, however, explicitly extends it to goods wished for others. While he is in a sense an outlier, his understanding is the logical consequence of conceiving love of friendship and love of concupiscence as providing an exhaustive division of ways we might love something. Second, while Thomas's predecessors sometimes present love of friendship as being only of others, they more commonly seem to conceive it as extending to self. While the name poses an obstacle—and Albert thought that those who extended this love to self were abusing language—the extension seems, again, motivated by the conception of love of friendship and love of concupiscence as providing an exhaustive division.

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dicunt diligi, quae desiderantur." Other comments about the distinction appear in III *Sent.*, d. 26, a. 2, q. 3; d. 27, a. 2, q. 2; and d. 29, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4.

[39] Bonaventure, III *Sent.*, d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6 (Quaracchi ed., 3:595): "*amor amicitiae* quodam modo includit amorem *concupiscentiae*. Qui enim est amicus alii, optat ei aliquod bonum; et dum optat ei illud bonum, et ipsum bonum optatum facit concupiscere et eidem facit adhaerere."

III. Love of Friendship and Love of Concupiscence in Thomas

A) Early Career: "Commentary on the Sentences" (1252-56)

Love of friendship first appears in Thomas's writings in distinction 17 of book 1 of his *Commentary on the Sentences*. In response to the question whether charity is to be loved with charity, Thomas explains:

> the habit or act of charity is not loved by love of friendship or benevolence which is not able to be of lifeless things, as the philosopher says, but by the love of a certain complacency, according to which we are said to love that which we approve and which we will to exist.[40]

Like William of Auxerre, Thomas conceives love of friendship in relation to the second chapter of book 8 of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Unlike William, he contrasts love of friendship with love of complacency, not love of concupiscence. This contrast suggests the influence of Bonaventure, who in response to the same question likewise distinguishes love of friendship from love of complacency. Bonaventure, however, also mentions love of concupiscence, which Thomas does not. Why Thomas neglects this love is not clear, but it might be because, like Bonaventure in his corresponding account, Thomas understands love of concupiscence to be of something absent, and so of secondary importance for the question, for charity's love for charity is principally of something present.

The term *love of concupiscence* and the distinction between this love and love of friendship first appears in book 2 and in the distinction's traditional place: the treatment of angelic love of God. Reporting an opposed position, Thomas writes:

[40] I *Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 5 (Mandonnet and Moos, eds., 1:406): "Sic autem non diligitur charitatis habitus vel actus dilectione amicitiae vel benevolentiae, quae inanimatorum esse non potest, ut Philosophus, VIII *Ethic.*, cap. 1, dicit; sed dilectione cujusdam complacentiae, secundum quod diligere dicimur illud quod approbamus, et quod esse volumus."

> Certain persons distinguish love of concupiscence and [love] of friendship, which two, if one diligently considers, differ according to two acts of the will, namely, desire [*appetere*], which is of a thing not had, and love, which is of a thing had, according to Augustine. . . . Love of concupiscence is therefore that by which someone desires something to make it his own, which is good for him in some way. . . . But love of friendship is that by which someone loves the likeness of something he has in himself in another, willing the good of him with whom he has the likeness.[41]

These persons, Thomas continues, maintain that while the angels naturally love God with love of friendship, they do not love him more than self with this love. This position he then argues is false. The angels naturally love God more than self. By their natural goods they have a likeness to him and so a love of friendship for him, but it belongs to the notion of friendship that the lover love the loved person more than any good that comes from that person, and there is no good in the angel that does not come from God.[42]

Thomas here presents love of concupiscence as a self-oriented love of some absent good and love of friendship as a distinct act that is of other persons and concerns something in them that is similar to what one has in oneself. He does not, however, present the distinction between the two loves as his own, but rather as one drawn by "certain persons" (*quidam*). In so doing, he resembles his teacher, Albert the Great. He also resembles Albert in that he himself does not use the distinction, at least not clearly; love of friendship appears in his presenta-

[41] II *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1 (Mandonnet and Moos, eds., 2:126): "Quidam enim distinguunt dilectionem concupiscentiae et amicitiae: quae duo si diligenter consideremus, differunt secundum duos actus voluntatis, scilicet appetere, quod est rei non habitae, et amare, quod est rei habitae, secundum Augustinum. . . . Est ergo dilectio concupiscentiae qua quis aliquid desiderat ad concupiscendum, quod est sibi bonum secundum aliquem modum. . . . Dilectio autem amicitiae est qua aliquis aliquid, vel similitudinem ejus quod in se habet, amat in altero volens bonum ejus ad quem similitudinem habet." This text presents certain difficulties for translation; for part of it, I have relied on the translation of Peter A. Kwasniewski, Thomas Bolin, and Joseph Bolin found in St. Thomas Aquinas, *On Love and Charity: Readings from the "Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,"* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008).

[42] II *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1.

tion of his own position but love of concupiscence does not. Furthermore, like Albert, he understands love of friendship to be governed by the notion of friendship.[43]

Thomas begins to use *love of concupiscence* as his own term in book 3. A new understanding of the love accompanies this use. Thomas opens his account of charity by asking what charity is—whether it is a concupiscence, a friendship, and so on. He answers that it is a friendship which as a love includes, among other things, a concupiscence.[44] In the following treatment of the objects of charity, he uses this understanding to explain how the virtues are loved with charity:

something may happen to be loved with charity in two ways: in one way as that towards which the friendship of charity is terminated. . . . In another way . . . as that towards which the love, or dilection, that is included in charity is terminated.[45]

This latter, included love "is called love of concupiscence," and by this love "a friend is said to love the health of his friend, and

[43] Cf. Mansini, "*Duplex Amor*," 151-57. Mansini reads this text very differently from me. This difference is due in part to our different readings of Thomas's predecessors. Mansini believes the distinction became obsolete after William of Auxerre and Thomas here encounters it as "now useless baggage" (151-52); while Thomas does not here use the distinction, he finds "a certain promise about it" (157) and will soon incorporate it into his own thought. Mansini also believes that Thomas's claim that a friend loves his friend more than any good, that is, any utility or pleasure, he receives from his friend, reveals that Thomas here sees "the distinction between *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscencetiae* [as] nothing except a statement of the Aristotelian distinction between virtue-friendship, on the one hand, and utility- or pleasure-friendship, on the other" (155, with 171). I do not believe this text provides sufficient evidence for this conclusion.

[44] III *Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1.

[45] III *Sent.*, d. 28, a. 1 (Mandonnet and Moos, eds., 3:904-5): "diligi aliquid ex caritate contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut id ad quod amicitia caritatis terminatur. . . . Alio modo potest dici aliquid diligi ex caritate sicut ad quod terminatur amor seu dilectio qui in caritate includitur."

in this way the virtues are loved from charity."[46] A similar explanation is then given for charity's love of irrational things.[47]

Here Thomas's account closely resembles Bonaventure's. Like Bonaventure, Thomas conceives love of concupiscence as (1) extending to goods wished for others, and (2) being included in another love. Bonaventure, however, identifies this other love as love of friendship, while Thomas identifies it as the friendship of charity. This difference may be merely terminological. Perhaps Thomas considers friendship and love of friendship to be the same, or to differ only as habit and act.

The term *love of friendship* makes its first appearance in book 3 in the following distinction. Preparing to explain why God is loved more than self, Thomas writes:

> since the object of love is the good, someone is able to tend to the good of something in two ways: in one way such that the good of that thing is referred to another, as when someone desires the good of one thing for another, if [that good] is not had, or is pleased if [that other] has it, just as someone loves wine inasmuch as he desires the sweetness of wine and rejoices in enjoying it, not in wine having it; and this love is called *love of concupiscence* by certain persons. This love, however, does not rest [*terminatur*] in the thing said to be loved, but is bent towards [*reflectitur*] that for which the good of the thing is wished. In another way, love is borne to the good of something such that it rests in the thing, inasmuch as the good that [that thing] has, it is pleased that [that thing] has it, and the good that [that thing] does not have, it wishes for it;

[46] III *Sent.*, d. 28, a. 1 (Mandonnet and Moos, eds., 3:905): "et hic amor ordinatur ad amorem alicujus quod principaliter amatur et concupiscentiae dilectio dicitur, sicut amicus dicitur amare sanitatem amici sui; et hoc modo virtutes ex caritate diliguntur."

[47] III *Sent.*, d. 28, a. 2. In an earlier draft of this section of book 3, Thomas understands love of concupiscence as self-oriented, as he does in book 2. Editing this draft, he explicitly notes this understanding as something to be changed. See P.-M. Gils in "Textes inédits de S. Thomas: Les premières rédactions du *Scriptum super Tertio Sententiarum*," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 46 (1962): 612-15. Malloy discusses this earlier draft in *Aquinas on Beatific Charity,* 65-66.

There is also a terminological change in book 3. Whereas in the earlier books, Thomas speaks of the two loves in terms of *dilectio*, in book 3 he begins to use *amor*, though not exclusively. In so doing, he again resembles Bonaventure who uses *amor* about half the time. Prior to Bonaventure, the distinction is normally expressed in terms of *dilectio*. After the *Sentences* commentary, Thomas principally uses *amor*.

and this is love of benevolence, which is the principle of friendship, as the Philosopher says.[48]

We may love something in two ways: as something in which our love does not rest but refers to another, or as something in which our love does rest. The latter mode of love, love of benevolence, may evidently be of oneself or others: the definition allows it to be so, and subsequent usage provides confirmation.[49] The former mode of love may be of things presently possessed or not presently possessed by the one to whom they are referred. Evidently, it is also equally of goods wished for another and goods wished for self, for we may refer goods to either.

Thomas's treatment of the two modes of love in this text is relatively unproblematic, and significant in that it is the first of several he will offer over the course of his career. The text is also informative about his understanding of terms, but here matters are more complicated. Thomas does not himself use the term *love of concupiscence* to name the first mode of love; he only notes that "certain persons" use it to name this mode. Properly speaking, we cannot infer from this text that Thomas himself understands love of concupiscence to be of goods present or absent. Nor can we conclude with certainty that he understands others to conceive love of concupiscence in this

[48] III *Sent.*, d. 29, a. 3 (Mandonnet and Moos, eds., 3:928): "cum objectum amoris sit bonum, *dupliciter aliquis tendere potest in bonum alicujus rei. Uno modo,* ita quod bonum illius rei ad alterum referat, sicut quod bonum unius rei optet alteri, si non habet; vel complaceat sibi, si habet; sicut amat quis vinum in quantum dulcedinem vini peroptat, et in hoc gaudet quod [ea fruitur, non quod vinum ipsam habet]; et hic amor vocatur a quibusdam *amor concupiscentiae*. Amor autem iste non terminatur ad rem quae dicitur amari, sed reflectitur ad rem illam cui optatur bonum illius rei. *Alio modo* amor fertur in bonum alicujus rei ita quod ad rem ipsam terminatur, inquantum bonum quod habet, complacet quod habeat, et bonum quod non habet optatur ei; et hic est *amor benevolentiae*, qui est *principium amicitiae*, ut dicit Philosophus." For parts of my translation, I have again drawn on that of Kwasniewski, Bolin, and Bolin. The text in brackets is taken from the Parma edition found on Corpus Thomisticum.

[49] III *Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 5 (Mandonnet and Moos, eds., 3:934): "*sicut* Deum plus quam seipsum diligere debet benevolentiae dilectione, *ita* etiam plus se quam proximum" ("just as one ought to love God more than self by love of benevolence, so also [one ought to love, by love of benevolence,] oneself more than a neighbor").

way, for Thomas may be connecting the first mode with what others call *love of concupiscence* on the grounds of a general, but not perfect, correspondence.

That said, it probably is the case that Thomas both understands love of concupiscence to prescind from presence and absence and understands others to have conceived it in this way. His predecessors normally used *love of concupiscence* to name a certain love of God. If God, as object of enjoyment, can only be loved with love of concupiscence when he is absent, some other love must replace love of concupiscence when God is present. We do not normally hear mention of a third kind of love. Bonaventure does initially speak of a love of complacency, which is of the good as present, but he later seems to abandon it and to have love of concupiscence take over its function. Thomas appears to have followed a similar course. He mentions love of complacency in book 1 and presents love of concupiscence as being of the "not had" in book 2, but he never mentions love of complacency again, and in book 3 love of concupiscence seems to take over love of complacency's role as that by which charity is loved with charity, for it is with love of concupiscence that charity loves the virtues, and nothing suggests that these virtues must be absent.[50]

The term *love of friendship*, notably, does not appear in Thomas's division of the two modes of love. It occurs later in his conclusion that "by love of friendship God is naturally loved by man more than self." This conclusion unambiguously asserts that God is loved with love of friendship. We could also read it as asserting, or at least implying, that the self is also loved with love of friendship. We should, however, be careful here. If the self is loved with love of friendship, presumably love of friendship is the same as the love of benevolence mentioned in the earlier division of the two modes of love. But why then does Thomas not identify the second mode of love as love of friendship, which is the normal counterpart of love of concupiscence? Further, if the two were the same, we would

[50] Furthermore, in the following article (III *Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2), Thomas compares charity's love of concupiscence to a friend's love for the *possessions* of his friend.

expect to find Thomas using *love of friendship* occasionally in the following articles of the question, but we find him only using *love of benevolence*.[51] It seems, rather, that while Thomas may be trying to indicate a connection between the second mode of love and love of friendship by identifying the mode as "love of benevolence which is the principle of friendship," he intentionally does not identify the second mode as love of friendship.

Why would he not want to identify it as love of friendship? The only remaining text in the *Sentences* commentary in which Thomas uses the term *love of friendship* (III *Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 2) suggests an answer. Addressing whether God loves all creatures, Thomas explains that because "the notion of friendship requires that [one] will for [someone] the good that one wills for oneself," God "loves only the elect with love of friendship."[52] As in the treatment of love of God above self in book 2, Thomas moves from a claim about friendship to a conclusion about love of friendship. Accordingly, he seems to conceive love of friendship as precisely the love one has for a

[51] See III *Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, aa. 5-7.

[52] III *Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 2 (Mandonnet and Moos, eds., 3:1004-5): "amicitia . . . addit aliquid supra amorem, quia *ad rationem amoris* sufficit quod homo velit bonum quodcumque alicui; *ad rationem autem amicitiae* oportet quod aliquis velit ei bonum quod vult sibi, ut scilicet velit conversari cum ipso, et convivere in illis quae maxime amat. Sic ergo Deus, communiter loquendo de dilectione, diligit omnia, inquantum vult eis bonum aliquod, scilicet [bonum] naturale ipsorum; sed bonum quod ipse sibi vult, scilicet visionem sui et fruitionem qua ipse beatus est, vult quidem omni creaturae rationali voluntate antecedente, sed voluntate consequente solum electis, quae est voluntas simpliciter. Et ideo solos electos diligit amore amicitiae, alia autem diligit amore communiter dicto, inquantum sunt bona" ("friendship . . . adds something above love, because for the notion of love it suffices that man will whatsoever good for someone, but the notion of friendship requires that he will for [someone] the good that he wills for himself, such that, namely, he might will to keep company and to spend his days with [that someone] in those things that he loves most. Thus, speaking of love in a general sense, God loves all things inasmuch as he wills some good for them, namely, their natural [good], but the good that he wills for himself, namely, the vision of himself and the enjoyment by which he is blessed, he wills for all rational creatures with an antecedent will but only for the elect with a consequent will, which is will simply speaking. Therefore, he loves only the elect with a love of friendship, but other things he loves with love in a general sense, inasmuch as they are good").

friend. Love of benevolence, however, is broader, for in the second reply we learn that with this love God loves not only the elect, but also irrational creatures.[53] Thus, the most likely reason Thomas does not identify the second mode of love as love of friendship is that this second mode includes love of self, but he understands love of friendship as the love we have for a friend, and one does not properly speaking have friendship with oneself.

The final appearance of love of concupiscence in the *Sentences* commentary occurs in book 4 in a discussion of the ultimate end. Thomas writes:

> the lovable is twofold: one which is loved through the mode of benevolence, when we will the good of someone on account of himself, just as we love friends even if nothing happens to accrue to us from them; [and] another which is loved by love of concupiscence, and this is either the good that is in us or [is loved] because from it some good occurs to us, just as we love delight or wine inasmuch as it causes delight.[54]

Thomas then explains that because the object of love of concupiscence is referred to something else, it cannot be the thing ultimately loved; that which is loved with love of benevolence, however, can.

The distinction here resembles that in distinction 29, question 1, article 3 of the third book inasmuch as Thomas

[53] III *Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2 (Mandonnet and Moos, eds., 3:1005): "quamvis nos non diligamus creaturas inanimatas amore benevolentiae, quia eorum bonum non est a nobis; Deus tamen eas diligit amore benevolentiae, quia per hoc quod eis bonum vult, sunt et bonae sunt. Tamen Deus quamvis non amet aliquid concupiscendo sibi, amat tamen concupiscendo alteri." The objection argues that inanimate creatures can only be loved with love of concupiscence, but God cannot love them even in this way because he has no need for their good; the latter part of Thomas's reply provides further confirmation that he no longer considers love of concupiscence necessarily self-oriented.

[54] IV *Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 1, ad 3 (Thomas Aquinas, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum,* in *Doctoris angelici divi Thomae Aquinatis sacri ordinis f. f. praedicatorum opera omnia*, vol. 7-11, ed. Stanisla Fretté and Pauli Maré [Paris: Vives, 1873], 11:467): "duplex est diligibile: unum quod diligitur per modum benevolentiae, quando volumus bonum alicujus propter seipsum; sicut diligimus amicos, etiam si nihil ex eis nobis debeat accidere. Aliud quod diligitur dilectione concupiscentiae; et hoc est vel bonum quod in nobis est, vel quia ex eo in nobis aliquod bonum fit: sicut diligimus delectationem, vel vinum, inquantum facit delectationem."

again speaks of love of benevolence where one might expect him to speak of love of friendship and once more identifies love of benevolence's counterpart as love of concupiscence—though now the identification is simply Thomas's own. Presumably, he understands love of benevolence as he does in the previous book, that is, as extending not only to others, but also to self. The definition given here does not preclude extension to self, and if the love were only of others, many sinful loves that treat the self as the *ultimum dilectum* would seemingly be impossible. Matters are less clear with love of concupiscence. In book 3, love of concupiscence extends to goods wished for others, but here it appears as self-oriented. Has Thomas's understanding of love of concupiscence changed?

It seems better to say that it has not. If Thomas understood love of concupiscence as exclusively self-oriented, his distinction would not be exhaustive, but he seems to intend it as such. Further, he has reason for avoiding a complete and precise presentation; he is here concerned with identifying both the external, perfective object and the resulting inhering perfection as being loved with love of concupiscence. If he were to add that love of concupiscence may also be of something for another, his presentation would be further, and unduly, complicated. It seems better to say, then, that Thomas understands love of concupiscence as he does in the previous book but does not present it according to his full conception, but according to that part of it pertinent to his immediate concern.

In summary, we may say that Thomas initially conceives love of concupiscence as a self-oriented love of something absent and as a distinct act from love of friendship. His conception changes when he begins to use the terms as his own in book 3 of the *Sentences* commentary. Perhaps influenced by Bonaventure, he there conceives love of concupiscence as extending to goods wished for others. These goods include inhering perfections, such as virtue and health. The disappearance of love of complacency suggests these goods may be either present or absent. Thomas probably continues to understand love of concupiscence in this way in book 4, even though he there presents it as self-oriented.

As for love of friendship, Thomas speaks of this love a total of eight times in four texts. Three uses of the term occur as part of a presentation of the position of others. From the other uses, we learn that we do not love charity with this love, that we and the angels love God with it, and that by it God loves the elect. Perhaps more notable than its uses are its absences, for these raise important questions. Why does Thomas not identify charity or the second mode of love in his twofold division as a love of friendship? Why does he not pair love of friendship with love of concupiscence, except on one occasion when presenting the position of others?

Our survey of Thomas's predecessors suggests the following hypothesis. From his predecessors, Thomas is aware of two ways of understanding the term *love of friendship*: as (1) the love one has for a friend, or (2) the counterpart of love of concupiscence which together with it provides a division of ways we may love something. Bonaventure often conceives it in the second sense, and if Thomas is looking to Bonaventure he evidently likes much of what Bonaventure does with the two loves. Thomas's explanations of love of God above self and God's love of friendship for the elect suggests, however, that Thomas wants to use *love of friendship* as his teacher Albert does, that is, as precisely the love one has for a friend. He sees the other, more common use of the term as conflicting with this one, for if love of friendship and love of concupiscence exhaustively divide love, love of friendship must extend to oneself, whom one does not properly speaking love as a friend. The result is that Thomas keeps Bonaventure's use of love of friendship and love of concupiscence within conceptual arm's reach, but never explicitly presents love of friendship as being of self, and only presents love of friendship and love of concupiscence as dividing love when reporting the position of others.

B) Mid-Career: "Summa contra gentiles" and the "Commentary on the Divine Names"

After the *Commentary on the Sentences*, Thomas's thought develops in two important ways. First, Thomas begins to present love as a twofold tendency. In *Summa contra gentiles* I, chapter 91, he explains that among operations of the soul love appears unique in that it "alone seems borne to two objects," for "love wills something for someone": one of these objects, the someone for whom we wish something, is loved simply and properly; the other object, the something we wish for someone, is loved accidentally and improperly.[55] The terms *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence* do not appear here, but Thomas clearly has the division associated with them in mind. The terms, however, do appear later in the work. In book 2, Thomas notes that Aristotle distinguishes "love of friendship from love which is a passion."[56] In book 3, he explains that if marriage were permitted to those closely related by blood, "the love that is from a common origin and upbringing would be joined to the love of concupiscence."[57]

The second development is found in the connection Thomas begins to draw between the division of two modes of love that we encountered in book 3 of the *Sentences* commentary (d. 29, q. 1, a. 3) and a division of the good that parallels a division of being. In the *Commentary on the Divine Names* (c. 4, lect.

[55] *ScG* I, c. 91 (*Summa contra gentiles* [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1934], p. 83): "cum aliae operationes animae sint circa unum solum obiectum, solus amor ad duo obiecta ferri videtur. . . . amor vero aliquid alicui vult. . . . Unde et ea quae concupiscimus, simpliciter quidem et proprie *desiderare* dicimur, non autem amare, sed potius nos ipsos, quibus ea concupiscimus: et ex hoc ipsa per accidens et improprie dicuntur amari." The *Summa contra gentiles* can be roughly dated to 1259-65. Given what Torrell says about the work's composition, it seems Thomas wrote the above in 1260 or 1261 (see Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:102). Love of concupiscence, while not explicitly mentioned in this passage, seems conceptually present.

[56] *ScG* II, c. 81 (Marietti ed., p. 193): "Aristoteles . . . in VIII, *amorem amicitiae* ab *amatione*, quae est passio, distinguit." The reference is to *Nic. Ethic.* 8.5.1157b.

[57] *ScG* III, c. 125 (Marietti ed., p. 378): "adiungeretur amor qui est ex communione originis et connutritione, amori concupiscentiae."

9-10),[58] he explains that since love is that by which we relate to something as our good, love varies in accordance with the ways something happens to be our good. The first way good varies accords with the way being (*ens*) varies: just as being is said to be "properly and truly that which subsists" while in another sense it is said to be that by which something exists in a certain way, as by whiteness something is white, so good is said in one way to be "that subsisting in goodness" or that "subsisting thing that has goodness" and in another way is said to be that by which something is good, as by virtue man is good. Accordingly, love tends to the good in two ways: that which is good in the first way we love as something *for whom* we will the good; that which is good in the second way we love as that *by which* something might be good in the first way. With this latter love, we love not only inhering perfections, but also substances productive of such perfections. Certain persons call the first mode of love *love of friendship* or *love of benevolence* and the second *love of concupiscence*.[59]

[58] Some date the *Commentary on the Divine Names* to 1261. Others date it to Thomas's stay in Rome between 1265 and 1268. Some evidence indicates that later parts of the work could only have been written after 1266. See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:127; Emery, "Brief Catalogue," 346; and "Additions and Corrections," in Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:434.

[59] Thomas's teaching on the two modes of love in *lectio* 9 is essentially identical to that in *lectio* 10. In the interests of space, my presentation combines the two texts. *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 9 (*In librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio,* ed. Ceslai Pera [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1950], nos. 404-5): "cum amor importet habitudinem appetitus ad bonum amantis, tot modis contingit aliquid amari, quot modis contingit aliquid esse bonum alterius. Quod quidem, primo, contingit dupliciter; nam bonum dupliciter dicitur, sicut et ens: dicitur enim, uno modo ens proprie et vere, quod subsistit ut lapis et homo; alio modo quod non subsistit, sed eo aliquid est, sicut albedo non subsistit, sed ea aliquid album est. Sic igitur bonum dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, quasi aliquid in bonitate subsistens; alio modo, quasi bonitas alterius, quo scilicet alicui bene sit. Sic igitur dupliciter aliquid amatur: uno modo, sub ratione subsistentis boni et hoc vere et proprie amatur, cum scilicet volumus bonum esse ei; et hic amor, a multis vocatur amor benevolentiae vel amicitiae; alio modo, per modum bonitatis inhaerentis, secundum quod aliquid dicitur amari, non inquantum volumus quod ei bonum sit, sed inquantum volumus quod eo alicui bonum sit, sicut dicimus amare scientiam vel sanitatem. Nec est inconveniens si hoc etiam modo amemus aliqua quae per se subsistunt, non quidem ratione substantiae eorum, sed ratione alicuius perfectionis quam ex eis consequimur" ("since love signifies a disposition of the appetite towards the

good of the lover, something is loved in as many ways as it happens to be the good of another. This, firstly, happens in two ways, for good is said in two ways just as being is. For in one way, being is properly and truly said to be that which subsists, as a rock or a man [does]; in another way, [it is said to be] what does not subsist but that by which something is, just as whiteness does not subsist, but by it something is white. Thus in this manner the good is said in two ways: in one way, as if something subsisting in goodness; in another, as if the goodness of another, by which, namely, it might be well for something. Accordingly, something is loved in two ways. In one way, [something is loved] under the notion of a subsisting good, and this is truly and properly loved, when, namely, we will that there be good for it; and this love is called by many love of benevolence or [love] of friendship. In another way, [something is loved] through the mode of an inhering goodness, accordingly as something is said to be loved not inasmuch as we will that there be some good for it, but inasmuch as we will that by it there might be good for someone, as we say that one loves knowledge or health. Nor is it unfitting if also in this way we love some things that subsist through themselves, not indeed by reason of their substance but by reason of some perfection which we obtain from them"). *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 10 (Marietti ed., nos. 428-29): "Sicut autem ens dupliciter dicitur, scilicet de eo quod per se subsistit et de eo quod alteri inest, ita et bonum: uno modo, dicitur de re subsistente quae habet bonitatem, sicut homo dicitur bonus; alio modo, de eo quod inest alicui faciens ipsum bonum, sicut virtus dicitur bonum hominis, quia ea homo est bonus; similiter enim albedo dicitur ens, non quia ipsa sit subsistens in suo esse, sed quia ea aliquid est album. Tendit ergo amor dupliciter in aliquid: uno modo, ut in bonum substantiale, quod quidem fit dum sic amamus aliquid ut ei velimus bonum, sicut amamus hominem volentes bonum eius; alio modo, amor tendit in aliquid, tamquam in bonum accidentale, sicut amamus virtutem, non quidem ea ratione quod volumus eam esse bonam, sed ratione ut per eam boni simus. Primum autem amoris modum, quidam nominant amorem amicitiae; secundum autem, amorem concupiscentiae. Contingit autem, quandoque, quod etiam aliqua bona subsistentia amamus hoc secundo modo amoris, quia non amamus ipsa secundum se, sed secundum aliquod eorum accidens" ("Just as being is said in two ways, namely, of that which subsists through itself and of that which is present in another, so also good is said in one way of the subsisting thing that has goodness, as a man is said to be good, [and] in another way of that which is present to something making it good, as virtue is said to be the good of man because by it man is good, for similarly whiteness is said to be a being not because it itself is subsisting in its own existence but because by it something is white. Love therefore tends to something in two ways: in one way as to a substantial good, which indeed occurs when we love something such that we will good for it, as we love a man willing his good; in another way, love tends to something as to an accidental good, as for example we love virtue, not indeed because we wish it to be good but because through it we might be good. Certain persons name the first mode of love *love of friendship* and the second *love of concupiscence.* But it happens sometimes that we even love some subsisting goods by this second mode of love because we do not love them according to themselves, but according to something accidental to them").

This treatment of the two modes of love is Thomas's most extensive and one of his most metaphysically profound. Beyond the connection between the division of love and a division of being, to which we will return later, there are two other notable features. First, Thomas again presents *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence* as the terminology of others. While he is willing to use these terms as his own, he tends to present them as the terminology of others when they would name an exhaustive division of modes of love. Second, in *lectio* 9, it emerges that the love that is "called by many persons love of benevolence or [love] of friendship" includes love of self, for Thomas subsequently identifies the self as one of the four kinds of things loved in this way. Given the way the two loves relate, it follows that the other love, that which certain persons call love of concupiscence, may be of goods wished for self or others.

This latter feature of the account, however, gives rise to a puzzle. In *lectio* 10, Thomas's presentation of the two loves sets up an explanation of ecstasy in which the two modes of love connected earlier with love of friendship and love of concupiscence are now respectively treated as other-oriented and self-oriented.[60] How are we to make sense of this change? We cannot say that he is using *love of concupiscence* and *love of friendship* in a new and stricter sense, for he is not using these terms at all. Is he using a new distinction, one related to, but different from, the one he has just finished presenting? It seems best not to interpret the text in this way. Rather, as with the text in book 4 of the *Sentences* commentary, it is better to read Thomas as understanding the two loves as he did before but not as expressing or applying them according to their full conception. Strictly speaking, the one mode of love still extends to self, but such love of self is irrelevant because ecstasy can only be of something outside oneself. Similarly, the other mode still extends to goods wished for others, but while there is a certain ecstasy had towards such goods, this ecstasy is reducible to and included in the ecstasy had towards the other for whom

[60] *In De Div. Nom.,* c. 4, lect. 10 (Marietti ed., no. 430).

we wish these goods. To draw explicit attention to this fact would complicate the presentation and add little.[61]

C) *Summa theologiae*

The conception of love as twofold tendency appears again in Thomas's later works *De perfectione* and *De caritate*.[62] In the *Summa theologiae*, we encounter it in the opening article of his first treatment of love (*STh* I, q. 20, a. 1). In the response to the third objection, Thomas asserts that "the act of love always tends to two things, namely, to the good that someone wills for someone, and to him for whom he wills the good."[63] The inclusion here of "always" removes the ambiguity possibly found in the other texts: love is not sometimes borne to one object and sometimes to the other, nor sometimes to one and sometimes to both; it always tends to both objects, that is, in every act. As in the other noted texts, Thomas does not identify the twofold tendency with love of friendship and love of concupiscence.

The terms do, however, appear in the following article, though they are not correlated with the twofold tendency. An objection argues that God cannot love all things because he must love them with either love of concupiscence or love of

[61] Cf. Mansini, "*Duplex Amor*," 173-74; and Kwasniewski, *Ecstasy of Love*, 133-35.

[62] *De perfectione vitae spiritualis*, c. 13 (*Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M.*, vol. 41b [Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969], 84-85): "motus amoris sive dilectionis in duo tendit: scilicet in eum cui aliquis vult bonum, et in bonum quod optat eidem" ("the motion of love or dilection tends to two [objects], namely, to him for whom someone wills the good and to the good that one wishes for that same person"). For the dating of this text, see Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:85. *Quaestio disputata de caritate,* a. 7 (ed. P. A. Odetto, in *Quaestiones disputatae,* v. 2 [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1949], p. 771): "cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, *dupliciter* dicitur aliquid amari: *aut* sicut id cui volumus bonum, *aut* sicut bonum quod volumus alicui" ("since to love is to will the good for someone, something is said to be loved in two ways: either as that for whom we will good or as a good that we will for someone"). The twofold tendency is here implicit. Torrell proposes 1271-72 as a date for *De caritate* but notes that "scholars are far from agreement." See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:201-7.

[63] *STh* I, q. 20, a. 1, ad 3: "actus amoris semper tendit in duo: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult aliciui; et in eum cui vult bonum."

friendship, but he can love them with neither: not with love of concupiscence because he needs nothing, and not with love of friendship "because it is not able to be had towards irrational things, as is clear through the Philosopher in *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII."[64] In his reply, Thomas agrees in regards to love of friendship: God cannot love irrational creatures with love of friendship because friendship requires mutual love and a sharing in the works of life. He disagrees in regard to love of concupiscence. Because "we desire [*concupiscimus*] something for both our self and others," God loves irrational creatures "by a love of concupiscence as it were," for he orders their good to the benefit of rational creatures.[65] Thomas here understands the two loves in the manner proposed above in regard to the *Sentences* commentary: love of friendship is precisely the love one has for a friend while love of concupiscence is the love one has for a good wished for oneself or another.

[64] *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2, obj. 3: "Praeterea, duplex est amor, scilicet concupiscentiae, et amicitiae. Sed Deus creaturas irrationales non amat amore concupiscentiae, quia nullius extra se eget: nec etiam amore amicitiae, quia non potest ad res irrationales haberi, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII *Ethic.*"

[65] *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2, ad 3: "amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad rationales creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem, et communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem: sicut et ad eas proprie benevolentia est. Creaturae autem irrationales non possunt pertingere ad amandum Deum, neque ad communicationem intellectualis et beatae vitae, qua Deus vivit. Sic igitur Deus, proprie loquendo, non amat creaturas irrationales amore amicitiae, sed amore quasi concupiscentiae; inquantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et etiam ad seipsum; non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam bonitatem et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et nobis et aliis" ("Friendship is only able to be had towards rational creatures with whom there may be mutual affection and a sharing in the works of life and for whom things may come about well or badly according to fortune and happiness, just as also towards these there is benevolence properly speaking. Irrational creatures, however, are not able to love God or to share in the intellectual and blessed life with which God lives. Thus, properly speaking, God does not love irrational creatures by a love of friendship but by a love of concupiscence as it were, inasmuch as he orders them to rational creatures and even to himself, not as if he might need them, but on account of his goodness and our utility, for we desire something for both our self and others").

Thomas treats love again in question 60 of the *Prima pars*. Preparing to explain an angel's love of self, he distinguishes two ways something might be loved:

Since love is of the good, but the good is both in substance and in accident, as is clear from *Nicomachean Ethics* I, something is loved in two ways: in one way as a subsisting good; in another as an accidental or inhering good. That which is loved as a subsisting good is loved as that for which someone wills the good, but that which is desired for another is loved as an accidental or inhering good, just as knowledge is loved, not that it might be good, but that it might be had. And this mode of love certain persons name *concupiscence*, but the first [they name] *friendship*.[66]

This account is similar to that in the *Commentary on the Divine Names*: because the object of love is the good, a distinction in modes of love follows a distinction in the good. Again, Thomas does not himself give these modes of love names; he merely connects them with names used by "certain persons," in this case *friendship* and *concupiscence*, the names used by William of Auxerre. Thomas perhaps does so because, as suggested, he wishes to understand love of friendship as precisely the love one has for a friend, but if he were himself to identify the first mode as friendship or love of friendship, it would follow from the mode's definition and subsequent use that friendship or love of friendship could properly be of oneself.

Up to this point, Thomas's treatment of the two loves resembles that found in the *Sentences* commentary and later. We find something new in the *Prima secundae*. In question 26, article 4, within the broader treatment of love as a passion, Thomas asks whether love may be fittingly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence.[67] He responds:

[66] *STh* I, q. 60, a. 3: "cum amor sit boni, bonum autem sit et in substantia et in accidente, ut patet I *Ethic*., dupliciter aliquid amatur: uno modo, ut bonum subsistens; alio modo, ut bonum accidentale sive inhaerens. Illud quidem amatur ut bonum subsistens, quod sic amatur ut ei aliquis velit bonum. Ut bonum vero accidentale seu inhaerens amatur id quod desideratur alteri, sicut amatur scientia, non ut ipsa sit bona, sed ut habeatur. Et hunc modum amoris quidam nominaverunt *concupiscentiam*: primum vero *amicitiam*."

[67] Prior to this text, love of friendship appears explicitly, and love of concupiscence implicitly, in *STh* I-II, q. 2, a. 7, ad 2: "beatitudo maxime amatur tanquam bonum

as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* II, "to love is to will the good for someone." Thus the motion of love tends to two [things]: namely, to the good that someone wills for someone, either for himself or for another, and to that one [*illud*] for whom he wills the good. Therefore, love of concupiscence is had toward that good that someone wills for another; love of friendship is had toward that one [*illud*] for whom someone wills the good.[68]

He then proceeds to explain the relation between the two loves:

This division, however, is according to prior and posterior, for that which is loved by love of friendship is loved simply and through itself, but what is loved by love of concupiscence is not loved simply and according to itself but is loved for another. Just as being simply speaking [*simpliciter*] is that which has existence, but being in a secondary sense [*secundum quid*] is that which is in another, so the good, which is converted with being, is simply speaking that which itself has goodness, but that which is the good of another is good in a secondary sense. Consequently, the love by which something is loved such that there might be good for it is love simply speaking, but the love by which something is loved such that it might be the good of another is love in a secondary sense.[69]

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concupitum: amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum. Unde non est eadem ratio amoris utrobique. Utrum autem amore amicitiae aliquid homo supra se amet, erit locus considerandi cum de caritate agetur" ("beatitude is preeminently loved as a concupiscible good, but a friend is loved as that for whom the good is desired, and in this way also a man loves himself; whence there is not the same notion of love in both cases. But whether by love of friendship man might love something above himself there will be place to consider later when charity is treated").

[68] *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 4: "sicut Philosophus dicit in II *Rhetoric*., *amare est velle alicui bonum*. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii; et in illud cui vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscentiae: ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae."

[69] Ibid.: "Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur: quod autem amatur amore concupiscentaie, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter: amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid."

This presentation is arguably Thomas's most important. It is his only *ex professo* treatment of the two loves, and it is the culmination of the developments in his thought that appear in his mid-career, for here he explicitly connects love's twofold tendency with the division of the good paralleling a division of being. From the perspective of terminology, however, this text appears to be a departure from earlier treatments (III *Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 2; *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2). There, Thomas presents love of friendship as precisely the love one has for a friend, and in accordance with this understanding he does not himself use *love of friendship* to name part of an exhaustive division of love. Now, however, he appears to use the term to name part of such a division and by implication to accept a love of friendship for self.

What are we to make of this apparent change? We could read it as revealing, in a clearer way, an understanding of love of friendship that has been present for some time. Perhaps Thomas has understood love of friendship as extending to self since the third book of the *Sentences* commentary. This interpretation would require us to read Thomas's repeated ascriptions of the terms *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence* to "certain persons" as implying acceptance rather than reserve. Alternatively, we could interpret this text as signifying a change of mind: while earlier Thomas was hesitant to accept a love of friendship for self, now he is willing to embrace it. Lastly, as a third possibility, we could interpret Thomas's presentation here as one in which he is trying to have it both ways with respect to the different senses of love of friendship: that is, he wants to draw on love of friendship's connection with an exhaustive division of love while still understanding love of friendship as precisely the love one has for a friend. On this reading, love of friendship is had toward someone for whom one wills the good, but not towards every someone; strictly speaking, it is not had toward oneself.

The interpretive problem posed by this passage in question 26 is complicated rather than clarified by Thomas's use of *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence* in the following two questions. Questions 27 and 28, on the causes and effects of

love, contain one third of the uses of the terms *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence* that are clearly Thomas's own. In all of the uses in these questions, Thomas presents love of friendship as a love of another and love of concupiscence as a love of some good wished for one's self.[70] Thomas's use of *love of concupiscence* poses less difficulty. In the formal presentation in question 26, love of concupiscence very much appears to extend to goods wished for others, and there is no reason to doubt this appearance since Thomas has clearly conceived the love in this manner in earlier texts (viz., III *Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1; *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2). We should understand love of concupiscence in the immediately following questions in light of this formal presentation, that is, we should interpret Thomas's presentations of love of concupiscence, in which it appears as self-

[70] *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 3: "in amore concupiscentiae amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum quod concupiscit" ("in love of concupiscence the lover properly loves himself when he wills that good that he desires"); *STh* I-II, q. 28, a. 1: "Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse. Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum" ("When someone loves something as if desiring it, he apprehends it as if pertaining to his well-being. Similarly, when someone loves someone with love of friendship, he wills the good for [that someone] just as he also wills the good for himself"); *STh* I-II, q. 28, a. 2: "Amor namque concupiscentiae non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut superficiali adeptione vel fruitione amati: sed quaerit amatum perfecte habere. . . . In amore vero amicitiae, amans est in amato, inquantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua" ("Love of concupiscence does not rest in whatsoever extrinsic or superficial attainment or enjoyment of the beloved but seeks to have the beloved perfectly. . . . But in love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved inasmuch as [the lover] reputes the goods and evils of his friend as his own"); *STh* I-II, q. 28, a. 3: "in amore concupiscentiae, quodammodo fertur amans extra seipsum. . . . Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi habere, non exit simplicter extra se. . . . Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius simpliciter exit extra se: quia vult amico bonum" ("in love of concupiscence, the lover is in a certain way borne outside himself. . . . But because he seeks to have that extrinsic good for himself, he does not go outside himself simply speaking. . . . But in love of friendship, the affection of someone goes outside himself simply speaking because he wills the good for his friend"); *STh* I-II, q. 28, a. 4: "in amore concupiscentiae, qui intense aliquid concupiscit, movetur contra omne illud quod repugnat conseutioni vel fruitione quietae eius quod amatur. . . . Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici" ("in love of concupiscence, he who desires something intensely is moved against all that is repugnant to the obtainment and enjoyment of rest in that which he loves. . . . But the love of friendship seeks the good of the friend.")

oriented, as presentations of this love according to a part rather than the whole of his full understanding. If, with respect to these later texts, we were to ask him whether love of concupiscence is also of goods wished for others, his answer would simply be "yes," rather than "yes, but not in the sense presently being used." Perhaps we ought to say something similar about love of friendship, but matters are less clear because we do not have any clear, prior instances of Thomas extending love of friendship to self.

After the treatise on love as a passion, Thomas speaks surprisingly little of love of friendship and love of concupiscence. There are two texts in which the terms are noticeably absent. The first is question 46, article 2 of the *Prima secundae*. Examining the object of anger, Thomas distinguishes appetitive tendency into the simple and the complex. While the tendency of affections like desire, hope, delight, and sorrow is simple, anger tends rather to a double object. In so tending, it resembles love. It differs, however, in that "love . . . sometimes regard[s] one object only, as when someone is said to love wine or something of this sort" and in that "both of the objects that love regards are good, for the lover wills the good for someone."[71] The other text is question 17, article 8 of the *Secunda secundae*. Treating of hope, Thomas distinguishes between a perfect love "by which someone is loved according to himself, namely as one for whom someone wishes the good" and an imperfect love "by which someone does not love something according to itself but so that that good might be acquired by him."[72]

[71] *STh* I-II, q. 46, a. 2: "Est tamen duplex differentia attendenda circa hoc, irae ad odium et ad amorem. Quarum prima est, quod ira semper respicit duo obiecta: amor vero et odium quandoque respiciunt unum obiectum tantum, sicut cum dicitur aliquis amare vinum vel aliquid huiusmodi, aut etiam odire. Secunda est, quia utrumque obiectorum quod respicit amor, est bonum: vult enim amans bonum alicui, tanquam sibi convenienti."

[72] *STh* II-II, q. 17, a. 8: "Perfectus quidem amor est quo aliquis secundum se amatur, ut puta cui aliquis vult bonum: sicut homo amat amicum. Imperfectus amor est quo quis amat aliquid non secundum ipsum, sed ut illud bonum sibi ipsi proveniat: sicut homo amat rem quam concupiscit."

The terms do appear in question 66, article 6 of the *Prima secundae*. Thomas uses *love of concupiscence* to name the love of that which we hope to attain, and he connects *love of friendship* with charity, that is, the love of God, which hope generates.[73] The terms also appear in the treatise on charity. In question 26, article 3 of the *Secunda secundae*, Thomas identifies the love by which we wish to enjoy God as a love of concupiscence and the love by which we love God in himself as a love of friendship. The absence of the terms in this treatise, however, is particularly noticeable. As in the *Sentences* commentary, Thomas conducts the discussion in terms of *friendship* rather than *love of friendship*. The only other text in which we find *love of friendship* is the opening article of the treatise (*STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 1). Having asked whether charity is a friendship, Thomas draws on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (8.2) and explains that "not every love has the notion of friendship, but [only] the love which is with benevolence." He then contrasts this love with that had towards wine or a horse. This latter love, he says, "is not a love of friendship, but [rather a love] of a certain concupiscence, for it is ridiculous to say that someone has friendship towards wine or a horse."[74] As in earlier texts (III *Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 2; *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2, ad 2), the notion of friendship controls Thomas's use of the term *love of friendship*. Between friendship and love of friendship there is little or no difference.

[73] *STh* I-II, q. 66, a. 6, ad 2: "spes praesupponit amorem eius quod quis adipisci se sperat, qui est amor concupiscentiae: quo quidem amore magis se amat qui concupiscit bonum, quam aliquid aliud. Caritas autem importat amorem amicitiae, ad quam pervenitur spe, ut supra dictum est."

[74] *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 1: "secundum Philosophum, in VIII *Ethic.*, non quilibet amor habet rationem amicitiae, sed amor qui est cum benevolentia . . . sicut dicimur amare vinum aut equum aut aliquid huiusmodi, non est amor amicitiae, sed cuiusdam concupiscentiae: ridiculum enim est dicere quod aliquis habeat amicitiam ad vinum vel ad equum.

D) Other Late Texts

Love of friendship and *love of concupiscence* appear in several other texts that can be dated with confidence or probability to Thomas's mature period. Three of these texts are particularly notable.[75] In *De spe,* Thomas asserts that love is twofold: one imperfect and the other perfect. The presentation is substantially the same as that found in question 17, article 8 of the *Secunda secundae*: imperfect love is the sort had towards a good one wishes for oneself while perfect love is that by which someone is loved in himself. The accounts differ in that Thomas here notes that imperfect love is "named *concupiscence* by certain persons" while perfect love "is said to be love of friendship," presumably by the same persons.[76]

In his *Commentary on the Gospel of John* (c. 15, lect. 4), Thomas writes:

> love is twofold, namely, of friendship and of concupiscence; they differ in that in love of concupiscence, those things that are outside of us we draw to ourselves when by this love we love other things inasmuch as they are useful or pleasant; but in love of friendship it is the other way around, for we draw ourselves towards those things that are outside us.[77]

[75] Less notable texts appear in *De Malo,* q. 1, a. 5; *In Philip*., c. 1, lect. 3; *In Gal.*, c. 4, lect. 5. For the dating of these texts see Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:201-7 and 250-57. The words *amor* and *concupiscentiae* also appear together in *In Psalmo* 13, but the *concupiscentia* there is the sinful sort, and the two words do not function as a term in the way that the *love of concupiscence* we are studying does.

[76] *De spe*, a. 3 (ed. P. A. Odetto, in *Quaestiones disputatae*, v. 2 [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1949], p. 808). Torrell suggests Thomas composed the disputed questions on the virtues near the end of his second teaching period in Paris (1268-72); see Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:205.

[77] *Super Ioan.*, c. 15, lect. 4 (*Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura,* ed. Raphaelis Cai [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1952], 384 [n. 2036]): "duplex est amor: amicitiae scilicet et concupiscentiae, sed differunt: quia in amore concupiscentiae, quae sunt nobis extrinseca, ad nos ipsos trahimus, cum ipso amore diligamus alia, inquantum sunt nobis utilia vel delectabilia; sed in amore amicitiae est e converso, quia nosmetipsos trahimus ad ea quae sunt extra nos; quia ad eos quos isto amore diligimus, habemus nos sicut ad nosmetipsos, communicantes eis quodammodo nosmetipsos." Torrell dates this work to somewhere between 1270-72; see Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:198.

Thomas then connects the two loves with likeness, explaining that in regard to love of friendship likeness causes love while in regard to love of concupiscence it causes hate. This is the only text other than question 26, article 4 of the *Prima secundae* in which Thomas presents *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence* as (1) terms of his own that (2) together signify a division of love. Here, however, love of friendship is emphatically other-oriented while love of concupiscence appears as a self-oriented love.[78] One of three things is occurring: either Thomas is not asserting a strict division of love, or he is not presenting the two loves according to their complete sense, or he is speaking loosely on both accounts.

Finally, in question 4, article 3 of *Quodlibet* I, Thomas presents the position of "certain persons" who claim that "according to love of friendship man naturally loves himself more than God." "Love of concupiscence," he explains, "is that by which we are said to love that which we desire to use or enjoy, just as [we love] wine or something of this sort, but love of friendship is that by which we love a friend, for whom we wish the good." He then rejects this position, asserting that such natural love would be perverse if "someone by love of friendship might love himself more than God."[79] This refutation

[78] Thomas also here connects love of concupiscence with the useful and the pleasant, but we should not read him as restricting it to these goods. He does not deny love of concupiscence for honorable goods, and such a denial would make this presentation conflict with others. Thomas's present purpose, which is to explain why likeness sometimes causes hate, likely accounts for the connection with the useful and the pleasant. Because each person loves his own good more intensely than that of another, hate can arise when two persons are alike in desiring a useful or pleasant good and one person's attainment of it is to the detriment of the other. Such conflict does not arise when two are alike in desiring an honorable good. This context also likely explains why Thomas here presents love of concupiscence as self-oriented.

[79] *Quodl.* I, q. 4, a. 3 (Marietti ed., no. 9): "Dixerunt ergo *quidam*, quod . . . secundum amorem amicitiae naturaliter homo plus diligit seipsum quam Deum. Est enim amor concupiscentiae quo dicimur amare illud quo volumus uti vel frui, sicut vinum, vel aliquod huiusmodi; amor autem amicitiae est quo dicimur amare amicum, cui volumus bonum. Sed ista positio stare non potest. Dilectio enim naturalis est quaedam naturalis inclinatio indita naturae a Deo. Nihil autem naturale est perversum. Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua naturalis inclinatio vel dilectio sit perversa: perversa

is the closest Thomas comes to asserting a love of friendship for self. It is not clear, however, that he is using the term as he believes it should be used. He may be simply refuting the opposed position on its own terms.

IV. Interpretation

We may now return to the questions raised at the outset. Principally, we asked: (1) how love of friendship and love of concupiscence stand with respect to self-orientation and other-orientation, (2) whether there are multiple senses of the two loves in Thomas's thought, and (3) how the two loves relate to each other. The first question guided our inquiry into Thomas's predecessors. The second, together with the first, guided our examination of Thomas's treatment of the two loves throughout his career. As the first question cannot be answered without the second, we will begin by attempting to determine the signification of *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence*, thereby addressing both questions together. Several of the more specific questions concerning the object of love of concupiscence will also find here occasion for consideration. Afterwards, we will turn to Thomas's teaching on love's twofold tendency and discern answers to our remaining questions.

A) Signification of "Love of Friendship" and "Love of Concupiscence"

Thomas's predecessors provided him with two ways of understanding love of friendship. His teacher, Albert the Great, understood love of friendship as the love one has for a friend. William of Auxerre, the *Summa halesiana,* and Bonaventure understood it as the counterpart of love of concupiscence, which together with love of concupiscence provides a division of the ways we might love something. This latter understanding naturally gravitated towards the extension of love of friendship

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autem dilectio est ut aliquis dilectione amicitiae diligat plus se quam Deum." Torrell dates *Quodlibet* I to Easter 1269; see Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:209.

to self. William may have so extended the love—Albert, at least, thought that he did. The *Summa halesiana* did extend it, and Bonaventure seems to have done so as well.

Thomas uses the term *love of friendship* approximately forty-six times in twenty-five texts throughout his career. Of these uses, we can confidently identify thirty-five as his own. If we confine ourselves to these instances, we can see a clear tendency towards Albert the Great's understanding. Three features of Thomas's usage evidence this tendency. First, when he identifies particular objects as being loved with love of friendship, these objects are always others. The self only appears as an object when he is reporting the position of others, or, in the unique case of *Quodlibet* I (q. 4, a. 3), refuting it. Second, in his early and mid-career, he appears to avoid treating love of friendship as the counterpart of love of concupiscence in such a way that together they provide a division of love. When drawing a division of love, he sometimes notes that others use *love of friendship* to name one of the loves; other times, he uses *love of benevolence* where one would expect to find *love of friendship*. In his later career, beginning around the time of the *Prima secundae*, he appears to become more comfortable with using love of friendship and love of concupiscence to divide love, but he tends to treat love of friendship as a love of others (as we see in *STh* I-II, qq. 28-29; and in the *Commentary on John*). Third and most importantly, near the beginning, and in the middle and end of his career (viz., in III *Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 2; *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2, ad 3; and *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 1), the notion of friendship clearly controls how he speaks of love of friendship. In these texts, love of friendship appears as precisely the love found in friendship.

But while Thomas substantially agrees with Albert's understanding of love of friendship, he differs from his teacher in his attitude towards the alternative use of the term. Unlike Albert, Thomas never criticizes others for extending love of friendship to self. Three reasons suggest he in fact finds value in this alternative use. First, his treatment of the two loves in the *Sentences* commentary closely resembles Bonaventure's; assuming he wrote with an eye to Bonaventure, he evidently liked

much of what he found in Bonaventure's use of *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence*. Second, Thomas recognizes that when the term is used in this alterative way, it names part of a division of fundamental importance for love. Third and most obviously, he appears to adopt this alternative usage in question 26, article 4 of the *Prima secundae*.

Does Thomas actually adopt the alternative use in this text? In a way he does, but he does so, I believe, without abandoning the understanding of the term *love of friendship* that we find elsewhere. The *Summa*'s treatise on charity casts light on the problem. In the opening article of this treatise, Thomas presents charity as a friendship and treats love of friendship as the love properly found in friendship. This conception of charity as friendship later poses a difficulty when Thomas considers charity's love for our self and our body. Addressing charity for self, he affirms the source of the difficulty, namely, that "friendship is not properly had towards oneself."[80] In the following article, however, speaking of charity for the body, he responds to the objection that friendship requires reciprocity by explaining that "return of affection has a place in the friendship which is with another, but not in the friendship which is with oneself."[81] These articles respectively reveal that Thomas (1) considers friendship to be properly speaking only of others but (2) is open to extending the term and applying it to that for which we do not properly speaking have friendship but something greater.[82] Given the near identity of friendship and love of friendship that we find in the opening article, it seems we should say something similar about love of friendship: properly

[80] *STh* II-II, q. 25, a. 4: "amicitia proprie non habetur ad seipsum."

[81] *STh* II-II, q. 25, a. 5, ad 3: "reamatio habet locum in amicitia quae est ad alterum: non autem in amicitia quae est ad seipsum."

[82] The claim that we have something greater than friendship appears in the previous article. See also IX *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 4 (*In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio*, ed. Raymond Spiazzi [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1964], no. 1812). Thomas here explains Aristotle's dismissal of the question whether there is friendship towards oneself as being due to the question being more a matter of terminology than truth. It is primarily a matter of terminology because the characteristics by which we identify one person as being a friend of another are found in a superabundant manner in relation to oneself.

speaking it is only of others, but it is permissible to extend the term so that it includes love of self.

Accordingly, in question 26, article 4 of the *Prima secundae* Thomas could be using *love of friendship* in what he would consider an extended and improper sense, one inclusive of love of self. Or he could be using it properly and intend *love of friendship* to name a part, but not the whole, of the love had for "that for whom someone wishes the good." Or he could be understanding the term in neither way determinatively. In this case, love of friendship is the love had toward that for whom we wish the good, but it is for the whole of this group when it is taken in an extended sense and for a part of this group when taken in its proper sense. But however it is to be interpreted, I do not think Thomas understands love of friendship to be of self properly speaking. Such an understanding would conflict with what we find both before and after this text, and we should not posit diverse understandings of a term unless we cannot otherwise make reasonable sense of the text.

Thomas's use of *love of concupiscence* involves less difficulty. The term does not have the Aristotelian connections that *love of friendship* has; Thomas simply receives it from his Scholastic predecessors. These predecessors normally used it to name a love of something for oneself, but the way they combined it with love of friendship to divide love suggested its extension to goods wished for others, and we eventually find this extension in Bonaventure's account of charity. In the first half of the *Sentences* commentary, Thomas understands love of concupiscence as self-oriented, but he changes his mind in book 3 and, like Bonaventure, conceives it as extending to goods wished for others. Unlike the extension of love of friendship to self, this extension involves no abuse of language, for as Thomas later remarks, "we desire [*concupismus*] things both for ourselves and for others."[83] Later, Thomas often presents love of concupiscence as self-oriented, but its other-oriented possibility appears as well (in *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2, ad 3: *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 4). We should not assume two understandings of love of

[83] *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2, ad 3: "Concupiscimus enim aliquid et nobis et aliis."

concupiscence when one will do. It is best to hold, then, that from the third book of the *Sentences* commentary onwards, Thomas understands love of concupiscence as a love of some good wished for oneself or another, but he does not always present this love according to his full conception.

The relation of love of concupiscence to the notions of presence and absence, to the useful, pleasant, and honorable, and to extrinsic and intrinsic goods is also relatively straightforward. Thomas initially speaks of a love of complacency and understands love of concupiscence as being of an absent good. But love of complacency, which presumably is of the good as present, never appears again, and in book 3 of the *Sentences* commentary love of concupiscence seemingly takes over its function and becomes a love of goods both present and absent. After the *Sentences* commentary, the extension of love of concupiscence to the good as present becomes a conceptual necessity. In the *Commentary on the Divine Names* (c. 4, lect. 9), Thomas sets forth the understanding of the affections that he will hold for the rest of his career.[84] According to this understanding, love is of the good, while desire and delight are of the good as absent and as present respectively. If love of concupiscence were only of the good as absent, it would be not a kind of love; it would be desire. Furthermore, in question 26, article 4 of the *Prima secundae*, Thomas connects love of concupiscence with the twofold tendency present in every act of love. If love of concupiscence were only of the good as absent, it could not be found in every act of love, for we sometimes love those who presently possess the good we wish for them.[85]

[84] For the problematic nature of Thomas's approach to the affections in the *Sentences* commentary, see Malloy, *Aquinas on Beatific Charity*, 20-33.

[85] The only text after the *Sentences* commentary that could be read as restricting love of concupiscence to an absent good is *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 3, in which Thomas explains that the likeness of act to potency causes love of concupiscence. If an act-potency relationship only existed when act is not present, the text would indeed imply that love of concupiscence is of an absent good. But an act-potency relationship can exist even after a potency is actualized: we find such a relationship in changeable substances between form and matter and in all created being between existence and essence. Accordingly, we do not need to read the text as restricting love of concupiscence to an absent good. Nor should we; if we were to do so, the text would conflict with the

As for the other notions, Thomas sometimes presents love of concupiscence as being of intrinsic, honorable goods like charity or created beatitude. Other times he presents it as being of the useful and pleasant (as in *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 4, ad 3), and of extrinsic goods, like God. Again, we should not posit diverse understandings of a term unless there is strong reason for doing so, and here there is less evidence for diverse conceptions than there is with respect to self-orientation and other-orientation or presence and absence.[86] It is best to say, then, that love of concupiscence is of the good, whether that good be pleasant, useful, honorable, intrinsic, or extrinsic.

While we cannot draw conclusions with utter certitude, the above investigation of Thomas and his predecessors suggests that Thomas does not understand love of friendship and love of concupiscence according to any of the divisions proposed by the secondary literature. He does not conceive them as dividing love into other-oriented and self-oriented love, nor as dividing love into love of some subject, whether oneself or another, and love of some good wished for that subject. Rather he conceives each in a very literal sense. Love of friendship is the love found in friendship; it is the love one has for a friend. Love of concupiscence is the love of that which we desire (*concupimus*); since we can desire things both for our self and for others, love of concupiscence can be of goods wished for self or others.

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formal presentation of love of concupiscence given three articles earlier in *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 4.

[86] Mansini's proposal to explain Thomas's diverse presentations ultimately rests on the belief that the distinction between the two loves originates from the Aristotelian three forms of friendship, with love of concupiscence expressing the love found in friendships of utility and pleasure and love of friendship expressing that found in the friendship of the good. It is for this reason that Mansini identifies the strictest sense of love of concupiscence and love of friendship as he does and proposes that the other, broader senses arise from it through progressive abstraction (188-89). I do not believe, however, that the texts to which Mansini might appeal—notably, II *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1; *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 4, ad 3; *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 3; and *Super Ioan.*, c. 15, lect. 4—provide sufficient grounds for seeing the three forms of friendship as the source of Thomas's understanding of the two loves. Rather, I believe the primary influences on Thomas's understanding are *Nic. Ethic.* 8.2.1155b27-1156a5 and the treatments of the two loves by William of Auxerre, Bonaventure, and Albert the Great.

Similarly, just as we may desire useful, pleasant, and honorable goods, and goods both extrinsic and intrinsic, so we may have love of concupiscence for all such goods. Love of concupiscence, however, is not concupiscence or desire, but the love that undergirds them; accordingly, it is not only of these goods as absent, but also as present.

B) Love's Twofold Tendency

Our remaining questions all bear some important relationship to Thomas's conception of love as a twofold tendency. We will, therefore, first determine the nature of this tendency, and then, by means of this determination, address these questions.

Thomas's teaching on love's twofold tendency emerges in his mid-career, in book 1 of the *Summa contra gentiles* (c. 91). It appears again in *De perfectione* (c. 13) and *De caritate* (a. 7), and in question 20, article 1 of the *Prima pars* Thomas clarifies it, affirming that love *always* tends to two objects. The teaching culminates in question 26, article 4 of the *Prima secundae*. There Thomas finally connects it with the division of modes of love he proposes in the *Commentary on the Divine Names* (c. 4, lect. 9-10). He also identifies the objects as being loved with love of friendship and love of concupiscence.

Proper understanding of the twofold tendency depends on proper identification of its objects. Certain passages seem to suggest that the division of the good that furnishes the objects corresponds with the division of being into substance and accidents. In question 60, article 3 of the *Prima pars*, Thomas explains that "since love is of the good, but the good is in substance and accident . . . something is loved in two ways: in one way, as a subsisting good, in another as an accidental or inhering good."[87] In the *Commentary on the Divine Names* (c. 4, lect. 10), he says that "love tends to something in two ways, in

[87] *STh* I, q. 60, a. 3: "cum amor sit boni, bonum autem sit et in substantia et in accidente . . . dupliciter aliquid amatur: uno modo, ut bonum subsistens; alio modo, ut bonum accidentale sive inhaerens."

one way, as to a substantial good . . . in another way . . . as to an accidental good."[88] Accordingly, it might seem that the proper objects of love of friendship and love of concupiscence are, respectively, the good found in substance and the good found in the categories of the accidents. This interpretation, however, necessitates that substantial existence, which is not a categorical accident, but something in substance by which substance exists actually, is not loved with love of concupiscence properly speaking. This exclusion of substantial existence is problematic. According to both the *Sentences* commentary and the *Summa*, goods wished for a friend are loved with love of concupiscence. But existence is a good, and in both the *Sentences* commentary and the *Summa,* Thomas identifies existence as something we wish for a friend.[89]

Closer inspection reveals that when Thomas correlates a division of being with a division of the good, he never identifies the division of being as that of substance and accident. While he uses substance and accidents to exemplify the parts of the division, he formally presents the division as being between that "which subsists" or "has existence" and that which is present in something making it to be in some way.[90] In accordance with

[88] *In De Div. Nom.,* c. 4, lect. 10 (Marietti ed., no. 428): "Tendit ergo amor dupliciter in aliquid: uno modo, ut in bonum substantiale . . . alio modo . . . tamquam in bonum accidentale."

[89] III *Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1 (Mandonnet and Moos, eds., 3:904): "amicitia facit ut homo velit amicum esse et bona habere"; *STh* II-II, q. 25, a. 7: "Unusquisque enim amicus primo quidem vult suum amicum esse et vivere." Furthermore, by possessing the perfection of substantial existence, the object of love of friendship is arguably able to stand on its own as a good and be loved. If so, love of concupiscence will not be part of this love, although it might necessarily follow it, with love of the subsisting good of the other person giving rise to a love of concupiscence for the perfective accidents of that person. The two loves, however, would be two acts, not two aspects found in a single act.

[90] *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., no. 404): "bonum dupliciter dicitur, sicut et ens: dicitur enim, uno modo ens proprie et vere, quod subsistit ut lapis et homo; alio modo quod non subsistit, sed eo aliquid est, sicut albedo non subsistit, sed ea aliquid album est" ("good is said in two ways just as being is, for in one way, being is properly and truly said to be that which subsists, as a rock and a man [does]; in another way, [it is said to be] what does not subsist but that by which something is, just as whiteness does not subsist, but by it something is white"; *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 10

this manner of division, he identifies one kind of good as "something subsisting in goodness," "the subsisting thing that has goodness," and "that which itself has goodness"; the other he identifies as "the good of another, by which, namely, it might be well for something," "what is present in something making it good," and "the goodness of another."[91] Evidently, the idea is that just as being is said in two ways, namely, as that which *has* existence and that *by which* something exists in some way, so something may be called good either because it *has* goodness or because *by it* something is made good.

We find this division of the good elsewhere. In Thomas's treatment of the good in the *Summa,* he explains that the good has the notion of the desirable, but "a given thing is desirable inasmuch as it is perfect, for all desire their perfection."[92] Evidently, both the perfect and perfection are desirable in some sense and are therefore good. But the perfect is that which *has* perfection while perfection is that *by which* something is perfect. Accordingly, we may distinguish two senses of good: that which *has* goodness or perfection and that *by which* something is good or perfect.

In addition to being found elsewhere, this division of the good also explains why love always tends to two objects. Something is good inasmuch as it is perfect, but no creature essentially possesses even its most basic perfection, namely,

(Marietti ed., no. 428): "ens dupliciter dicitur, scilicet de eo quod per se subsistit et de eo quod alteri inest" ("being is said in two ways, namely, of that which subsists through itself and of that which is present in another"); *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 4: "ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio" ("being simply speaking is that which has existence, but being in a secondary sense is that which exists in another").

[91] *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., no. 404): "Sic igitur bonum dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, quasi aliquid in bonitate subsistens; alio modo, quasi bonitas alterius, quo scilicet alicui bene sit"; *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 10 (Marietti ed., no. 428): "ita et bonum: uno modo, dicitur de re subsistente quae habet bonitatem . . . alio modo, de eo quod inest alicui faciens ipsum bonum . . ."; *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 4: "ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid."

[92] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 1: "Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile. . . . Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum: nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem."

existence. In all created goods, a real distinction exists between that which has goodness and the goodness or perfection by which it is good. Love is of the good, and when love tends to the created good, it must tend simultaneously to both parts of this real distinction, for neither is good apart from the other. Perfections can neither exist nor be desired apart from some possessing subject—health, for instance, is not lovable simply as such, but as something I or someone I care about might possess.[93] Nor can the subject be loved apart from some perfection, for in abstraction from perfection, the subject is not good. The very nature of the created good, therefore, gives rise to a twofold tendency in love.[94]

In accordance with this division of the good—a division that has a clear foundation in the text, is present elsewhere, and can explain why love always tends to two objects—I propose that the twofold tendency of love is most precisely a tendency to (1) some subject which is to have the good and to (2) that by which that subject is made good. With this interpretation in hand, we turn to the remaining questions concerning love of friendship and love of concupiscence's objects, relation, and existence at the subrational level.

Our one remaining question concerning the object of love of concupiscence is whether substantial existence falls within its purview. It should, for, as noted, we love goods wished for a friend with love of concupiscence, and existence is such a good. The proposed interpretation of love's twofold tendency provides confirmation. In question 26, article 4 of the *Prima secundae*, Thomas identifies the object of love of concupiscence as being that which is the "good of another" (*bonum alterius*). The "good of another," however, is good in the sense of perfection or the perfective; it is that *by which* something is

[93] See Jensen, *Sin*, 104: "Wanting the good in itself—apart from the subject for whom it is good—is to want no good at all; it is the desire for what could be good, if it were possessed by some subject."

[94] Since we acquire our notion of the good from creatures, this twofold tendency is present even in our love for God, in whom we know there is no real distinction between perfection and possessor. See Malloy, *Aquinas on Beatific Charity*, 57-62. The unpublished article that Malloy references, "The Good That We Will," is my own.

made good in the sense of having perfection. The object of love of concupiscence, then, is precisely the good in the sense of that *by which* some subject we care about is made perfect. Accordingly, substantial existence must be an object of this love, for substantial existence is the first perfection by which a subject is good in any respect.

In regard to the object of love of friendship, we asked whether this object is the person as possessing substantial existence, the person as possessing the complete good, or simply the person or subject as such. We also asked in what sense the object is good, and good in a primary sense. In question 26, article 4 of the *Prima secundae*, Thomas asserts that the object of love of friendship is the good *simpliciter*, rather than *secundum quid,* because it is that which "has goodness." According to the above interpretation, this sense of the good is that of the perfect. Consequently, because it is good in this sense, the object of love of friendship cannot be the person or subject simply as such. No subject considered absolutely is good in the sense of the perfect, for no subject essentially possesses even its first and most basic perfection, namely, substantial existence. Rather, the object of love of friendship is something complex: it is the subject as possessing perfection. Thomas's treatment of the object of anger in question 46, article 2 of the *Prima secundae* confirms this interpretation. Love and anger are complex tendencies in which the appetite seeks that some good or evil befall, or be present in, something, but while anger "always regards two objects," love "sometimes regards one object only, as when someone is said to love wine or something of this sort." Thomas does not here speak of love of friendship and love of concupiscence, but the implication is that while love of concupiscence is a simple tendency, love of friendship is complex, having a double object.

This understanding of the object provides the proper means for connecting the primacy of the object as good with Thomas's treatments of the good in question 5 of the *Prima pars* and question 21, article 1 of the disputed questions *De veritate*. There, Thomas explains the good by means of the notions of the desirable, the end, and the perfect or perfective. The notion

of the end cannot be separated from the other notions and uniquely assigned to the object of love of friendship, for Thomas connects the notion of the end to that of the good by the intermediacy of the desirable and the perfective. Rather, the object of love of friendship has the notion of the good because it has the notion of the perfect. This understanding of the object may initially seem problematic, for those we love are often imperfect in many ways. The possession of perfection found in the object of love of friendship, however, is intentional rather than real. The loving agent is moved by the idea of the loved subject possessing its perfection; being pleased in this way by the loved subject's possession of the good, the agent desires to bring about this possession if it is not really present or rejoices over it if it is. Because the object of love of friendship has the notion of the perfect, it also has the notion of the desirable, and in a principal sense. While a perfection like health is in a way desirable, it is only properly desirable as something to be possessed by some subject one cares about. What is properly desirable, and, therefore, properly an end and properly good, is the subject in possession of its perfection.

The object of love of friendship, then, is the good in the sense of that which *has* perfection, this consideration being according to intention rather than present state. The object is for this reason good in a principal sense. Since substantial existence does not make something good simply but good only in the most minimal respect,[95] the perfection that the subject is considered as possessing should not be uniquely identified with substantial existence. We should identify the perfection, rather, with the complete good of the subject, at least relatively speaking.

As for the relation between the two loves, we may say that if love of friendship is taken in an extended sense in which it encompasses love of self, love of friendship and love of concupiscence are present in every act of love at the rational level. Both are present because the notion of the good is complex, involving both a subject and a perfection by which the subject is

[95] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.

good. Since love is of the good, love must tend both to a subject and to something by which the subject is made good, which in creatures are always really distinct. Love of concupiscence names love's tendency to that by which the loved subject is made perfect. Love of friendship, understood in an extended sense, names love's tendency to the subject, though not simply but as possessing perfection—which the subject may not presently have.

Finally, in regard to the question of the existence of the two loves at the subrational level, we must say that love of friendship cannot exist, properly speaking, at the level of sensitive or natural appetite. Irrational animals and inanimate things cannot be objects of this love. A friend is someone for whom one wills the good, but in question 25, article 3 of the *Secunda secundae*, Thomas explains that we cannot properly will the good for irrational creatures because they cannot properly have it, for lacking free-will no such creature is "lord of using the good."[96] Consequently, neither we nor irrational creatures can have love of friendship for irrational creatures properly speaking. Furthermore, irrational creatures cannot properly love rational beings with a love of friendship, for friendship involves a sharing in the works of life.[97] Because friendship "operates from choice,"[98] love of friendship in its proper sense must be a love at the rational level for another rational being.

It is less clear that love of concupiscence exists only at the rational level. As noted, Thomas seems to understand love of friendship and love of concupiscence in a literal manner. While friendship cannot properly exist at the subrational level, concupiscence can. It is even possible that Thomas uses *love of concupiscence* to name a sensitive love in the *Summa contra*

[96] *STh* II-II, q. 25, a. 3: "amicitia ad eum habetur cui volumus bonum. Non autem proprie possum bonum velle creaturae irrationali: quia non est eius proprie habere bonum, sed solum creaturae rationalis, quae est domina utendi bono quod habet per liberum arbitrium."

[97] *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2, ad 3.

[98] III *Sent*., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1.

gentiles (*ScG* III, c. 125), for there it seems to name sexual desire, or rather the love that undergirds it.

But even if love of friendship and love of concupiscence do not properly exist at the natural and sensitive level, something analogous to them must exist. Love at all levels of appetite is a tendency towards the good, but the created good, to which all creatures have a tendency, is complex. Neither natural nor sensitive appetite can tend simply to a perfection or simply to a subject, for neither perfection nor a subject is good in itself. The tendency must be towards both—towards a perfection as possessed by a subject and the subject as possessing the perfection. Inasmuch, then, as love of friendship and love of concupiscence name love's twofold tendency at the rational level, something analogous to them must exist at the subrational level.[99]

CONCLUSION

The twofold tendency is a profound and central part of Thomas's teaching on love. Without it, we can neither understand his thought except in a vague manner nor explain how genuine love of others is possible on Thomistic grounds. In proportion to its importance, there is need for terminology with which to speak of it efficiently. Thomas seems to provide this

[99] Other, textual reasons can also be adduced. First, in *STh* I, q. 60, a. 5, Thomas argues for love of God on the ground that "the natural inclination in these things which are without reason demonstrates the natural inclination in the will of an intellectual nature." The love of God in question is the sort Thomas elsewhere identifies as love of friendship. Consequently, the argument depends on the existence of something analogous to love of friendship at the level of natural inclination.

Second, in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3, Thomas explains that the inclination of nature is sometimes, but not always, curved back onto itself (*recurva in se*). Fire's tendency to an upper place, for example, is curved back, for "fire is moved upwards on account of its conservation," but its inclination to generate new fire is not curved back, for it is "on account of the good of the generated . . . and further on account of the common good which is the conservation of the species." In the inclination of noncognitive things, then, Thomas distinguishes between some good that is sought and a subject for whose sake it is sought. Consequently, inasmuch as love of concupiscence and love of friendship are appetitive tendencies to some perfective good wished for some subject and some subject that is to have this good, something analogous to these loves exists at the subrational level.

terminology in question 26, article 4 of the *Prima secundae*. In light of this text, many contemporary Thomists understand love of friendship and love of concupiscence to be the two tendencies found in every love. Accordingly, love of friendship and love of concupiscence are important to them.

But when we go outside of this text, we find that Thomas's use of the terms *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence* rarely conforms with the understanding suggested there. Love of concupiscence is sometimes of a good wished for another, but Thomas more often presents it as a love of a good wished for oneself. Love of friendship he normally presents as a love of another person. As a result, some scholars present love of friendship as a love of other and love of concupiscence as a love of some good for oneself, while others claim that multiple senses of the two loves are operative in Thomas's thought.

I have proposed that we can best make sense of Thomas's text not by positing multiple senses of the distinction between the two loves but by distinguishing two senses of love of friendship and two manners of presentation. Thomas's predecessors provide him with two ways of understanding love of friendship. Thomas wishes to understand it as Albert the Great does, as the love one has for a friend, but he recognizes the utility of the conception found in William of Auxerre and Bonaventure according to which love of friendship is the counterpart of love of concupiscence and is one of two ways we might love something. The result is that while Thomas understands love of friendship to be properly speaking the love one has for a friend, he is not opposed to an extension of the term in which it would include love of self. He perhaps even uses the term in this extended sense in what is arguably his principal text (*STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 4). As for love of concupiscence, Thomas likewise has effectively one understanding of it throughout his career. From the third book of the *Sentences* commentary onwards, he understands it as the love of a good wished for some subject, whether oneself or another. He does not, however, always present love of concupiscence according to this full conception, but sometimes according to only a part of it.

While we cannot simply equate love of friendship and love of concupiscence with the double tendency found in every act of love, the two loves and the twofold tendency are closely related. Love of concupiscence's connection with love of friendship may have initially made Thomas hesitant to identify love of concupiscence as part of this tendency, but the identification we find in question 26, article 4 of the *Prima secundae* is essentially compatible with the conception of love of concupiscence we find elsewhere. In light of this identity, we can say that the object of love of concupiscence is the good in the sense of the perfective, or that *by which* some subject we care about is made perfect. As the object of love is the good and the good always involves something perfective, love of concupiscence, or something analogous to it, is present in every act of love.

Since love of friendship is properly speaking the love one has for a friend, it is not found in every act of love, but only in those acts at the rational level that are towards others. It does not name the whole of the counterpart of love of concupiscence in love's twofold tendency, but a part of the whole. Still, its object is, generically, the good in the sense of that which *has* goodness. This notion of good is primary because it is complete rather than partial: while perfection is in a sense desirable, it is the subject in possession of its perfection that is desirable, and therefore good, simply speaking. The object of love of friendship is thus not the subject in itself, but the subject as possessing its perfection. Accordingly, we may identify the object of love of friendship as that whose possession of the good is inherently pleasing to us. Inasmuch as love of friendship names part of love's twofold tendency, something analogous to it must be found at the levels of natural and sensitive appetite.

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"TOWARDS A REAL GRATUITOUSNESS": THE GRATUITOUS AS NECESSARY AND DUE IN AQUINAS

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ACCORDING TO Henri de Lubac, "one of the chief motives that have led modern theology to develop its hypothesis of 'pure nature'" has been "the anxiety to establish . . . the supernatural as being a totally free gift."[1] He continues, "There can be no free gift unless the giver could withhold it. . . . When I give a present to someone, if it were not honestly possible for me to withhold it, then it would not really be a present, and to the extent that I am bound by convention to make the gift it becomes a present only in an improper sense."[2] If a gift is forced, if it is necessary, or if it is owed, then it ceases to be free and it ceases to be gratuitous. If, therefore, God is obligated to give us grace, or if it is somehow necessary that he do so, then he gives without freedom and without gratuity.[3]

De Lubac, however, goes on to criticize any too-easy application of these principles to God. In a chapter of *The Mystery of the Supernatural* titled "Towards a Real Gratuitousness," he

[1] *The Mystery of the Supernatural*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1999), 53.

[2] De Lubac, *Mystery of the Supernatural*, 75.

[3] This question of gratuity has haunted de Lubac's proposal since its first appearance. As Nicholas J. Healy writes, "Since the publication of *Surnaturel* in 1946, the sharpest and most significant criticisms of de Lubac's theological anthropology have been articulated by Thomists who fear that he has compromised the gratuity of grace" ("Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace: A Note on Some Recent Contributions to the Debate," *Communio* 35 [2008]: 535-64).

asks for something deeper. Specifically, advocates of "pure nature" had proposed that, in order to safeguard the gratuity of grace, we must hold that God could have created us with a nature able to be satisfied without grace. De Lubac denies that gratuity depends on the possible existence of such a counter-factual universe. He writes that "it is solely in relation to me, in relation to us all, to our nature as it is, this actual mankind to which we belong"—and not in relation to any me, to any us, to any nature, or to any mankind which God might theoretically have created in our stead—"that this question of gratuitousness can be asked and answered."[4] De Lubac, in other words, wants to hold that a gift can be gratuitous even when the receiver could not be fulfilled without it: God creates us such that we can only be happy with his grace, yet his gift of grace remains gratuitous.

De Lubac, however, clarifies that God is in no way obligated to offer us this gift. Because it is gratuitous, it is in no way due: "The supernatural is not owed to nature,"[5] and "There can be no question here of . . . anything owed to nature, no question of anything resembling a demand."[6] In a different vein, he writes that the gift of grace is not only "contingent," but even "super-contingent."[7] Because it is gratuitous, it cannot be necessary. He denies, then, that the gratuity of grace depends on a hypothetical "pure nature." Yet, at least in these passages, he agrees with his critics that the gratuitous can only be gratuitous if it is neither due nor necessary.[8]

[4] De Lubac, *Mystery of the Supernatural*, 60. Lawrence Feingold speaks to this facet of de Lubac's proposal in *The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters* (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2010), 313 and 385.

[5] De Lubac, *Mystery of the Supernatural*, 94.

[6] Ibid., 88.

[7] Ibid., 82. De Lubac is quoting Chenu here: see Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au xiie siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 1957), 157-58.

[8] More recently, Feingold pits the gratuitous against both the necessary and the due throughout *The Natural Desire to See God*. He writes, for example, that "the gratuitous is incomprehensible without the opposing notion of nature's *due*" (ibid., 225), and that "the problem of the gratuitousness of grace and the vision of God lies entirely in showing that they are not *due to nature*" (ibid., 378; emphasis in original in both

There might seem to be little, if anything, amiss here. First of all, most of our daily and nontechnical use of the word "gratuitous" seems to assume that the gratuitous is the nonnecessary, or that for which there is no reason. "Gratuitous sex and violence," for example, refers to adult content which is not necessary for the advancement of a plot or the development of a character. More importantly for us, St. Thomas Aquinas seems to oppose the gratuitous both to the necessary and to the due. As he writes, "Necessity is opposed to gratuitous willing,"[9] and God "wills creatures to be produced neither naturally nor necessarily, but gratuitously."[10] Returning to de Lubac's question, he writes, "Grace, insofar as it is given gratuitously, excludes the notion of debt."[11] To give out of necessity or out of duty is to give without gratuity.

Some, however, have taken a different route. Some have even drawn on Thomas to do so. Ferdinand Ulrich, for example, has argued that true gratuity is right at home with the necessary and with the due—and with things like order, purpose, causality, and responsiveness. For Ulrich, the due and the necessary are not at odds with gratuity; the due and the necessary are a mark of the truest gratuity. And Ulrich presents his proposal as a faithful—if certainly a creative—interpretation of Thomas.[12]

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passages). See also ibid., 224-29, 256-57, and 286-90. Feingold opposes gratuity to necessity and to order on ibid., 134.

[9] *De Verit*., q. 23, a. 4, s.c. 2.

[10] *De Pot*., q. 10, a. 2, ad 6. See also *In Ioan*., c. 13, lect. 7 (1838); parenthetical numbers refer to paragraphs in the Marietti edition.

[11] *STh* I-II, q. 111, a. 1, ad 2. In *Mystery of the Supernatural*, 95, de Lubac cites this text approvingly, and he sees it as evidence for his position.

[12] For an extended meditation on gratuity in Ulrich, see Erik van Versendaal, "*Plenitudo fontalis*: Love's Groundless Yes and the Grateful Originality of Nature," *Communio* 46 (2019): 134-80. Van Versendaal does not speak much to the question of necessity. Yet what Ulrich calls "the *necessary* sense of being" is, for him, a paradigm of gratuity. See Ferdinand Ulrich, *Homo abyssus: The Drama of the Question of Being*, trans. D. C. Schindler (Washington, D.C.: Humanum Academic Press, 2018), 61-96. For a different attempt to rethink gratuity—and to draw out a "coincidence of absolute gratuity with absolute exchange"—see John Milbank, "Can a Gift Be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysics," *Modern Theology* 11 (1995): 119-61, quotation on 135. While Milbank's work is important, and while he engages with

My goal in what follows will be limited. I have no intention of offering anything like a comprehensive account of gratuity in Thomas. Nor do I hope to explain away the texts above, or others like them, in which Thomas opposes the gratuitous either to the necessary or to the due. Instead, I hope to draw attention to two sets of texts from Thomas's Trinitarian theology, and one set of texts from his teaching on gratitude, in which he points toward a sort of gratuity which is compatible both with the necessary and with the due.

To be clear, in none of these texts does Thomas draw any explicit conclusions concerning the meaning of gratuity. Still less does he argue directly that the gratuitous is compatible with the necessary or with the due. He does, however, register a number of claims which carry implications for this question. Even if he does not intentionally set out to do so, therefore, his thought can offer us resources for moving "towards a real gratuitousness."[13]

In unearthing these resources, I hope to uncover principles that can open new dimensions into questions of nature and

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Thomas (see ibid., 140 and 143), he does so only briefly, and without any direct reference to the questions we will consider here. We therefore will not discuss him beyond this note. Yet we can at least mention that the conclusions we will draw here might find in Milbank a fruitful complement.

[13] Feingold indirectly suggests some of the disquieting consequences that would follow if we merely opposed gratuity to duty and to justice. He refers to an argument from Ockham, which he calls "abhorrent" (*Natural Desire to See God*, 381). Ockham begins with the premise that "God is not a debtor to anyone, but whatever He does to us is done from mere grace." Ockham reasons, however, that God can therefore justly damn someone who has always loved him. Because everything is "mere grace" and utterly gratuitous—and because grace and gratuity are opposed to the due and to the just—there is no hint of the due in God's action. Yet, as Feingold points out, this God of grace becomes an "arbitrary autocrat." The point we can make is that, if one merely opposes gratuity to duty and to order, then the purely gratuitous will *inevitably* become the purely arbitrary—with horrifying results for the recipient of gratuity. If more gratuity meant less order, then too much gratuity would become oppressive. Gratuity would cease to be good simply: it would not be like truth or wisdom, which always get better as they grow more present; it would be like heat, which is good to a point but destructive after that point. Feingold himself, then, suggests that, if gratuity is to be the gratuity of a *gift*—and so if gratuity is to be good, without qualification, for the recipient—it must be wed somehow to the just, to the orderly, and to the due.

grace. More deeply, however, I hope to reflect on gratuity for its own sake, and to offer support for a rethinking of gratuity along the lines of what Ulrich has proposed. To be clear, this second goal will be the primary one. I will not, therefore, apply these reflections in any systematic way to questions of nature and grace, nor to any of the immensely thorny difficulties surrounding them.[14] I hope that these reflections might yield insights into these questions around nature and grace—and into other questions besides—and, throughout, I will briefly speak to some basic ways in which they might do so. But my focus is on the question of gratuity in itself.[15]

That said, we should note at least briefly just how important this question is for the nature-grace debate. Again, de Lubac deals with objections concerning gratuity by, at least in part, deflecting them: he denies that, in his proposal, God gives out of duty or necessity. His critics, however, may be right: his proposal, when thought all the way through, may lead unavoidably to the conclusion that God's gift of grace is shot through with some sort of necessity and with some sort of duty—a necessity and a duty, to be sure, that God chooses to take upon himself, and that he was not bound or required to take on, yet a necessity and a duty all the same. If, therefore,

[14] For a survey of recent interventions in this debate, which remains very much alive, see John Meinert, "St. Thomas Aquinas, Perseverance, and the Nature/Grace Debate," *Angelicum* 93 (2016): 823 n. 2.

[15] Speaking more broadly, our reflections here will touch on two questions. First, a historical or exegetical question: Are there openings in Thomas's thought towards a gratuity which is at home with the necessary and with the due? Second, a substantive question: *Is* gratuity, in fact, at home with the necessary and with the due? The second question may be more important in the abstract (and, again, figures like Ulrich and Milbank have reflected on it very deeply). Here, however, we will mostly limit ourselves to the first question. That said, there will be points where, in order to think through the logic of Thomas's texts (the first question), we will speak to the second question: we will offer suggestions as to what this deeper gratuity might look like, and we will argue (at least implicitly) that this deeper gratuity is, in fact, real (see especially our reflections on meals and marriage at the end of section I). We might, in these brief excursions, uncover some modest insights into the second, substantive question. We will only do so, however, insofar as it helps (at least indirectly) to make sense of the texts from Thomas which we are considering—and this task of understanding Thomas's texts will remain our priority throughout.

defenders of de Lubac were to respond to criticism merely by asserting that, on de Lubac's terms, God's gift is touched neither by necessity nor by duty, it would be difficult to advance the conversation. A more fruitful route would be to admit that there is a sort of necessity and duty at work here, but to show that neither this duty nor this necessity is actually at odds with gratuity: to show that God's gift can be gratuitous *and* necessary *and* due—or even that it can be necessary and due *because* it is gratuitous. Some followers of de Lubac have gestured in this direction.[16] None, however, have argued that such a due and necessary gratuity can be found in Thomas's thought. I hope here to do just that.[17]

To do so, I will spend section I working through the first set of texts, which come from the disputed questions *De potentia*.

[16] See Healy's argument regarding friendship in "Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace," 548.

[17] Most of the texts in which we will ground our argument concern the Trinity, and it is true that the relations within God are infinitely different from the relation between God and the world. One might therefore object that these texts can tell us little about the question of gratuity in God's gift of grace. To respond, I should first reiterate that my chief aim is not to intervene in the question of nature and grace, but to illuminate something of the nature of gratuity for its own sake. Even if our synthesis of gratuity, necessity, and duty were limited to God, it would still be relevant to this more basic question. Second, and more deeply, in giving us grace, God adopts us into the sonship of the Son (see *STh* III, q. 23, a. 1). Truths which hold in the Father's eternal relation to the Son, therefore, might at least be relevant to the gift of grace by which God initiates us into that eternal relation. Indeed, Thomas is explicit that there is an analogy—and not mere equivocity—between the Father's eternal fatherhood in relation to the Son and God's fatherhood in relation to us through grace (see *STh* I, q. 33, a. 3; for more on this passage, and for the analogy between eternal sonship and the sonship of grace and glory, see Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Francesca Murphy [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007], 204-9; and Dominic Legge, *The Trinitarian Christology of St. Thomas Aquinas* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017], 83-84). Of course, Thomas never specifies whether the synthesis of gratuity, necessity, and duty found in the Father's relationship to the Son is a point of analogous similarity or of analogous difference between eternal sonship and graced sonship. Yet this analogy at least opens up the possibility of some sort of similarity. Finally, and on a less deep note, while many of our passages here will concern the Trinity, our most suggestive texts will speak to gratitude among human beings. They will therefore make clear that our synthesis of gratuity, necessity, and duty is not limited to the eternal life of God, but finds echoes within creation as well.

Here Thomas addresses the question of gratuity most directly, and it is here that I will be able to pivot toward even deeper insights which he offers in his teaching on gratitude. In section II, I will explore a second set of texts, this time from the *Summa*, which speak less directly to the question of gratuity, but which still carry implications for this question.[18]

I. Gratuitous Love

A) "Not Incompatible with Free Will"

The first set of texts revolve around the love between the Father and the Son, while the second revolve around the Father's gift of the divine essence to the Son. The first thing to say both about this love and about this giving is that they are absolutely necessary. Indeed, everything in God is necessary:

[18] Almost all of our texts involve, and some will revolve chiefly around, love. Some will concern the divine persons' love for each other. Others will focus on charity in human beings. These two loves are obviously very different. Thomas teaches that charity is a specific sort of love. Already by nature, all creatures love God more than themselves (for some reflections on this point in Thomas, see D. C. Schindler, *The Politics of the Real: The Church between Liberalism and Integralism* [Steubenville, Ohio: New Polity Press, 2021], 210-14). Charity, however, goes beyond this natural love: it can only be present if it is given as a grace. In charity, moreover, we love God not merely as the first cause, but as he is in himself: we love him under the formality of his having called us to a happiness which we cannot obtain by nature (see *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 1). In giving us charity, then, God gives us a gift which goes beyond anything we can accomplish by nature: charity is gratuitous. Our natural love is not, at least in the same way: unlike charity, it is baked into our nature (indeed, Thomas even refers to angels' charity as "gratuitous love," and he opposes it to their natural love for God: see *STh* I, q. 63, a. 1, ad 2). These points are important for questions pertaining to nature and grace: by nature, we love God by natural love; by grace, we love him by charity. We will therefore need to pay attention to whether Thomas is speaking of *amor* or of *caritas*, lest we collapse the very relation between nature and grace which I hope these reflections will illuminate. To that end, I will note the Latin at certain junctures. When I do not, it is safe to assume that, where I use the language of "love" (either in a translation of Thomas or in my own voice), I am speaking of *amor*, whereas when I use the language of "charity" I am speaking of *caritas*.

God must exist, and nothing in God could exist in any way other than exactly as it is.[19]

To begin with the giving, it is in generating the Son that the Father gives his essence to the Son. Yet this generation is not the fruit of the Father's will; it is the fruit of his nature. It therefore could not possibly be any different from what it exactly is:

> It is clear that whenever a thing has the will for its principle, it is possible for it to be or not to be, to be such or otherwise, to be now or then. Now everything of this description is a creature. . . . Wherefore if we suppose the Son to be generated by the will, it must needs follow that he is a creature. For this reason the Arians, who held the Son to be a creature, said that he was generated by the will: whereas Catholics say that he was generated not by will but by nature.[20]

If the divine generation were not necessary, then the divine Son would cease to be divine. Similarly, if the procession of the Holy Spirit were anything less than absolutely necessary, then the Holy Spirit would be something less than fully divine.[21] The whole Christian faith hinges on the claim that, when the Father gives his nature to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, his giving is necessary.

Given Thomas's firmness on this point—and given the apparent conflict between gratuity and necessity—we might expect there to be no room for gratuity in the processions of the divine persons. To begin seeing some of the complications in Thomas's teaching here, however, we can turn briefly to a passage where Thomas speaks not of gratuity, but of freedom. Gratuity and freedom, of course, are not synonymous. Yet they have at least one point in common: they both seem to be opposed to necessity. As with gratuity, this opposition not only haunts our commonplace ideas about freedom; it also pops up in Thomas's texts. As Thomas puts it, "free choice is said in relation to the things that one wills not of necessity."[22]

[19] As we will see in n. 38 below, it is necessary not by compulsion, and not as a means to an end, but *per se*.

[20] *De Pot*., q. 2, a. 3.

[21] See *De Pot*., q. 2, a. 3; q. 10, a. 2, ad 4; and *STh* I, q. 41, a. 2, ad 3.

[22] *ScG* I, c. 88. Many other passages could be given.

In *De potentia*, however, Thomas suggests something different. He does so in response the objection that, because the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will, he must proceed "by way of freedom"; and, because he proceeds by way of freedom, he cannot proceed necessarily—which means that he cannot be divine.[23] Thomas responds:

> As Augustine teaches, the natural necessity under which the will is said to will a thing of necessity—happiness, for instance—is not incompatible with free will [*libertati voluntatis*]; but free-will is opposed to violence or compulsion. Now there is no violence or compulsion when a thing is moved in accordance with the order of its nature, but there is if its natural movement be hindered, as when a heavy body is prevented from moving down towards the center. Hence the will freely desires happiness, although it desires it necessarily: and thus also God by his will loves himself *freely* [*libere amat seipsum*], although he loves himself *of necessity*. Moreover, it is necessary that he love himself as much as he is good, even as he understands himself as much as he exists. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *freely*; not, however, potentially, but *necessarily*. Nor was it possible for him to proceed so as to be less than the Father: but it was necessary for him to be equal to the Father, even as the Son who is the Father's Word.[24]

The procession of the Holy Spirit is necessary: he cannot cease proceeding from the Father, and he cannot proceed as anything but equal to the Father. This necessity, however, is not imposed on the Father from the outside; it arises from the Father's nature. It is a "natural necessity." And there is no conflict between freedom and such internal or natural necessity. Freedom is opposed not to necessity, but to "violence or compulsion." When necessity arises from within oneself, necessity can be free.[25]

Again, our concern here is not first with freedom, but with gratuity. It is true that Thomas never explicitly argues that gratuity is compatible with necessity. Yet we will see presently that he lays out claims that imply as much. Indeed, these claims

[23] *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 2, arg. 5.

[24] *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 5. Emphasis in this and all passages from Thomas to follow is added.

[25] See also *ScG* III, c. 138, where Thomas marries freedom to the "necessity that results from interior inclination."

come from the same question of *De potentia* in which this passage appears. And, given that Thomas elsewhere teaches that both the free and the gratuitous are unnecessary, this passage, where he explicitly marries necessity to freedom, can complement and reinforce those passages in which he implicitly marries necessity to gratuity. At the very least, this passage makes clear that things that might *appear* to be at odds with necessity, and that actually *are* at odds with *some* sorts of necessity, need not be at odds with *every* sort of necessity. If, therefore, "natural necessity" is at home with freedom, then it might be equally at home with gratuity.

B) "Opposed to Mercenary Love"

Thomas suggests this point very strongly just two articles later. He does so while discussing not the processions of the divine persons, but the love between them. This love, however, is just as necessary as these processions. To put the matter very briefly, God does not merely choose to love his own goodness, nor could he possibly refrain from loving this goodness. He loves it necessarily. In giving the divine essence to the Son, however, the Father necessarily gives the divine goodness to the Son—for the divine essence *is* the divine goodness. The Son, therefore, possesses—and *is*—the divine goodness which the Father cannot but love, which means that the Father must necessarily love the Son. Finally, the Son loves the divine goodness just as necessarily as the Father does; and, because the Father also *is* this goodness, the Son must love the Father as well. Their love for each other is necessary.[26]

This point becomes important when Thomas asks whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, or from the Son as well. After spending the corpus outlining a number of arguments for the *filioque*,[27] Thomas addresses an objection that

[26] Thomas comes to this conclusion by a different route in *In Ioan.*, c. 5, lect. 3 (753).

[27] For a summary of and background for these arguments, see Emery, *Trinitarian Theology*, 269-79.

turns on Richard of St. Victor's distinction between "gratuitous love" and "due love."[28] The objection runs,

> Augustine proves that the Holy Spirit is love [*amor*]. Now the Father's love of the Son is gratuitous, since he loves the Son not as though he received something from him, but only as giving him something: whereas the Son's love of the Father is a love that is due; because he loves the Father in that he receives from him. Now the love which is due is distinct from the love that is gratuitous. Hence, if the Holy Spirit is love proceeding from the Father and Son, it follows that he is distinct from himself.[29]

If the Father's love is gratuitous and the Son's love is due, and if gratuitous love is opposed to due love, then the Holy Spirit cannot proceed both from the Father and from the Son. For due love is distinct from gratuitous love, and the Holy Spirit cannot be "distinct from himself."

Thomas begins his response by writing, "If we are to come to a right decision on this point, it seems hardly correct to speak of anything being 'due' in the divine persons, since this word 'due' implies subjection and obligation of a kind, and such things cannot be in God."[30] These opening words are important. Again, everything in the divine life is necessary. We might therefore expect Thomas to take issue with the language of "gratuity" in God. Yet he does not. Indeed, we will see that he speaks of gratuity in God without batting an eye. Here, however, he flags language that is inappropriate for God: he clarifies that the language of "due" is "hardly correct [*non omnino recte sonat*]." Thomas is not above criticizing language that Richard of St. Victor had used. If, therefore, Thomas had harbored any concerns about the language of "gratuity" in God, it would have been very easy for him to raise these concerns here. The fact that he raises no such concerns, however, suggests that he *has* no such concerns. He is unfazed by the prospect of some sort of gratuity being present in God—even as everything in God is necessary.

[28] See Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate*, V.16-25.

[29] *De Pot*., q. 10, a. 4, arg. 8.

[30] *De Pot*., q. 10, a. 4, ad 8.

Thomas continues:

> Richard of St. Victor, however, distinguishes between due and gratuitous love [*amoris gratuiti*]: but by gratuitous love he means love not received from another, and by due love, he means love received from another. In this sense, there is nothing to hinder the same love from being gratuitous as the Father's and due as the Son's: since it is the same love whereby the Father loves and whereby the Son loves: yet this love the Son has from the Father, but the Father from none.[31]

We just saw that the Father loves the Son necessarily: there is no possibility that he might withhold his love from the Son. Yet Thomas teaches here that this necessary love is also a gratuitous love. Already in this first passage, therefore, Thomas accepts—at least implicitly—a meaning of "gratuity" that is compatible with necessity, and that is therefore at home in the triune God. The gratuitous is not that which might not have been, which exists for no reason, or which might be otherwise than it is. The gratuitous is that which is not received from another. So long as it is not received from another, even a necessary love can be gratuitous.

Of course, Thomas is not giving direct expression to his own thought here. Instead, he is echoing Richard of St. Victor. Even Thomas's decision to echo Richard, however, is itself an expression of his own thought. Thomas could easily have defused the objection by clarifying that the categories "gratuitous" and "due" are inappropriate for the Trinity, that the Holy Spirit as Love can therefore be neither gratuitous nor due, and that this language therefore presents us with no reason that the Holy Spirit cannot proceed both from the Father and from the Son. Such a tack would have allowed Thomas to accomplish his most immediate goal here, which is to safeguard the coherence of the *filioque*. Yet he does not take it. The fact that he could have rejected Richard's language altogether makes his acceptance of that language more noteworthy. Again, Thomas is by no means above breaking with Richard: he opens this very passage by voicing misgivings around Richard's language of "due." Else-

[31] *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 4, ad 8.

where, he is more sharply critical of Richard.[32] This wariness of Richard more generally, however, makes all the more striking his acceptance of Richard's language of "gratuitous"—and his acceptance of it without so much as a word of caution, despite just having warned us about the language of "due." Thomas is not merely deferring to Richard's authority, and he is not merely reporting what other theologians have said. He is drawing on Richard, but he is also presenting, in his own voice, a reading of gratuity that is compatible with necessity.[33]

That said, Thomas does not merely rubberstamp Richard's reading of gratuity. Instead, he goes on immediately to rework it—and even to turn it on its head. Yet, in so doing, he opens the door to an even deeper reading of gratuity. He does so in response to the next objection:

> The Holy Spirit is gratuitous love [*amor gratuitus*]: wherefore from him flow the diversities of graces according to I Cor. 12:4: "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." If, therefore, the Son's love for the Father is not gratuitous, then the Holy Spirit will not be the Son's love, and thus he does not proceed from him.[34]

When the three persons give us grace, they do so because of their love for us—and the Holy Spirit is this love.[35] The gift of grace, however—as we saw de Lubac insist above—is gratuitous. Because of his association with grace, therefore, the Holy Spirit must be gratuitous Love. Yet, as we just saw, Thomas is willing to define "gratuitous love" as unreceived love. But if gratuity is unreceived, then the Son's received love for the Father cannot

[32] See *STh* I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2.

[33] Remaining with the language of "due," Thomas elsewhere allows some way in which the Father's love of the Son *is* due: in defending his position that God could have created a creature better than the ones he actually creates, he argues that, whereas God owes nothing to creatures, "equality to the Father is owed to the Son by nature [*aequalitas paterna debetur sibi per naturam*]" (I *Sent*., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; see also d. 20, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 2, exp. text.; he uses the language of "*requirit*" in *De Pot*., q. 3, a. 16, ad 22). If, therefore, gratuity is compatible with the necessity of the eternal Trinity, then it may also be compatible with some sort of duty which is eternally present in God.

[34] *De Pot*., q. 10, a. 4, arg. 9.

[35] See Emery, *Trinitarian Theology*, 225-49.

be gratuitous. It seems, therefore, that gratuitous Love cannot proceed from the Son—which would mean that the Holy Spirit cannot proceed from the Son.

To be fair, Richard might have resources for responding to this objection. Thomas, however, does not respond by digging deeper into Richard's categories. He responds by shifting the categories:

> The Holy Spirit is gratuitous love [*gratuitus amor*] *only inasmuch as it is opposed to mercenary love* whereby a thing is loved *not for itself but for the sake of some benefit extrinsic to it*. But if by gratuitous love we understand the love that originates from another, it is not incompatible with the Holy Spirit that he be gratuitous love, since the love whereby we love God through the Holy Spirit originates in God's benefits bestowed on us: and thus nothing prevents even the love of the Son, who derives this love from another, from being the Holy Spirit.[36]

Thomas assumes throughout this passage that the Holy Spirit is gratuitous love. The objector argues that, because the Holy Spirit is gratuitous, because the gratuitous is unreceived, and because the Son's love is received, it follows that the Holy Spirit cannot be the Son's love. As in our last passage, Thomas could have responded by clarifying that the language of "gratuitous" has no place in the God in whom all is necessary. Yet he does not. Instead, he responds by assuming that the Son's love *is* gratuitous, and by arguing that its being received is no threat to its being gratuitous. The Holy Spirit's status as gratuitous love, and so the gratuity of the Son's eternal love for the Father, is accepted without ever being called into question.

More importantly, Thomas says something new here about the meaning of gratuity itself. In the previous passage, he had followed Richard by proposing a gratuity that is open to necessity. Here, he goes beyond Richard by opening up gratuity even further. On Richard's terms, gratuity is opposed not to the necessary but to the received and to the responsive: to love another from whom one receives, or to love in response to a gift one has been given, is to love without gratuity. According to

[36] *De Pot*., q. 10, a. 4, ad 9. "Love" here is *amor* throughout.

Thomas, however, the gratuitous is opposed neither to the necessary nor to the received nor to the responsive. It is opposed to the "mercenary."[37] I cannot love gratuitously if I love in order to receive some "extrinsic benefit": if I love in order to use my beloved or to profit from my love, then I am not loving gratuitously. I can, however, love gratuitously if I receive my love from another: Thomas allows for a sense in which "by gratuitous love we understand the love that originates from another." If, for example, a lover's gift awakens in the beloved a grateful love in response, then this grateful love can be a gratuitous love. So long as the receiver loves the giver not in order to receive

[37] Thomas's definition here of "mercenary love" as a love "whereby a thing is loved not for itself but for the sake of some benefit extrinsic to it" could be filled out by other passages where he defines it more narrowly: "Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the sake of temporal goods" (*STh* II-II, q. 19, a. 4, ad 3). Thomas offers a similarly narrow definition in every other passage where he uses the language of "mercenary love": see III *Sent.*, d. 34, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 1, arg. 2; and *In Psalmos* 43. In these passages, mercenary love is not just any sort of love which seeks just any sort of extrinsic benefit; it is love for God which seeks temporal goods.

That said, in every other passage where Thomas speaks of mercenary love, he is referring to our love for God. In our *De potentia* passage, he is referring to God's love: he is discussing "the love of the Son." This difference might at least partially account for the broader definition he gives. This more open definition also emerges if we look beyond Thomas's use of *amor mercenarius* and to his use of *mercenarius* more generally. Sometimes, following John 10:12-13 (and echoing the narrower meaning of *amor mercenarius* above), the *mercenarius* is a religious leader who acts for temporal gain (see *In Ioan.*, c. 10, lect. 3 [1403]; and *Contra Impugn.*, 5.3). Yet "*mercenarius*" can also have a less negative connotation: it refers to any laborer or wage-earner who receives payment in return for his work (see *STh* I-II, q. 105, q. 4, ad 4; II-II, q. 62, a. 8, s.c.; and III *Polit.*, lect. 4). This use seems to fit with our *De potentia* passage: a mercenary is someone who does work not merely for the work's own sake, but for the extrinsic benefit of payment. Similarly, in III *Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1, arg. 5, a "mercenary act" is opposed to one which is "good for its own sake." Finally, in *ScG* IV, c. 91, a *mercenarius* is anyone who receives any sort of reward for what she has done: even the blessed who receive the reward of heaven are *mercenarii*. We will, therefore, speak in what follows of the "mercenary" in these broader terms, or as that which is ordered towards an extrinsic benefit: for Thomas defines it in those terms on our main passage, and, in doing so, he picks up on other passages where a similarly broad meaning is operative. Yet we should also bear in mind those passages where Thomas defines it more narrowly. For more on the "mercenary" in Thomas, see Gilbert C. Stockson III, "Charity, Reward, and 'Mer-cenary' Intent in Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Biel" (Ph.D. diss., Notre Dame, 2019).

more gifts, but for the giver's own sake, her grateful love can be gratuitous. More to Thomas's point, the Holy Spirit, as gratuitous Love, is able to proceed from the Son no less than from the Father. Because the Son's love for the Father is not mercenary, it can be gratuitous even as it is received.[38]

Most basically, we saw in the previous passage that Thomas is willing to endorse, at least to some extent, Richard's account of gratuitous love in God. We see now that he is willing, in his own voice, to propose a sort of gratuity that goes beyond Richard. There ought therefore to be no doubt that, even as Thomas is prompted by Richard in this second passage, he is presenting us with his own thought. That said, it is true that Thomas's talk of "gratuitous love" in God is limited to two fairly short passages in a single work, whereas Richard's Trinitarian theology features "gratuitous love" more prominently. In this sense, Richard certainly makes more use of gratuity in the Trinity than Thomas does. Yet, at least in this passage, Thomas points towards a gratuity which stretches further through the Trinity than Richard's does. According to Thomas, it is not only the unoriginated love of the Father for the Son that is gratuitous; the received love of the Son for the Father—and, the logic seems to run, the received love of the Holy Spirit for both[39]—is equally gratuitous. For Richard, the Son's love is not

[38] These points may open up a respect—which we can only suggest in the barest of terms—in which gratuity and freedom, beyond being merely compatible with divine necessity, actually touch on the center of divine necessity. When Thomas details the very specific way in which the divine generation (along with everything else in God) is necessary, he writes that it is not necessary as though "an efficient and compelling cause" forced it to be as it is, and it is not necessary "as a means to an end." Instead, it is "necessary of itself [*per se*]" (*STh* I, q. 41, a. 2, ad 5). For Thomas, both unmercenary gratuity and *per se* necessity preclude being a means to an extrinsic end: they both point towards existence for one's own sake. Finally, Thomas defines freedom in similar terms: "he is free who exists for his own sake" (*ScG* IV, c. 22). It may be, therefore, that divine necessity, divine gratuity, and divine freedom do not merely meet at their edges in a sort of extrinsic compatibility. Instead, their centers might all ultimately converge. For all of them point, in different ways, towards intrinsic goodness, or existence for one's own sake.

[39] As Thomas puts it elsewhere, "the Holy Spirit loves himself by himself" (*De 108 art.*, q. 59; see also q. 60). There would be much to sort out here, but the basic point is that, if the Holy Spirit is gratuitous Love, and if he loves "by himself," then he must

gratuitous. For Thomas, it is. Gratuity marks both the Father's love for the Son and the Son's love for the Father.[40]

C) "Duty to Give Something Gratis"

As in the first passage, Thomas affirms here that the Son's love for the Father, which is necessary, is also gratuitous. He thereby again presents us with a gratuity that is at home with necessity. Yet he also goes beyond the first passage: he opens up space for a gratuity that is at home with the due. Returning to the example of grateful love we used earlier, his argument suggests that, even if grateful love were to be due—that is, even if a loving gift *ought* to provoke a response of grateful love in the recipient—it can still be gratuitous. So long as the receiver is not loving so as to gain "some extrinsic benefit," her love can be gratuitous even if it ought to be there. That said, the good of satisfying one's duty could itself be an extrinsic benefit. If, therefore, the recipient of a gift loved the giver only in order to satisfy her debt to him, then her love might cease to be gratuitous. But if she loved the giver for his own sake, and if she happened thereby to fulfill her duty, but if she did so without any regard for any duty she might be satisfying, then her due love might also be gratuitous.

Thomas, of course, never explicitly draws this conclusion. Yet he does explicitly define the gratuitous as the unmercenary, and he explicitly argues that love can be gratuitous even when it is received from another. If we take these claims seriously, and

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love gratuitously. The love of all three persons, therefore, is gratuitous love. For more on the role of the Holy Spirit in divine love, see Emery, *Trinitarian Theology*, 225-33.

[40] If we define the gratuitous as the unmercenary, or as that which is done not for some extrinsic benefit but for its own sake, then we can revisit the category of "gratuitous sex and violence." For it may ultimately be that the problem with most so-called "gratuitous sex and violence" is that it is not actually gratuitous. This sex and violence may not advance the plot or develop any characters. Yet it also is not good or beautiful in itself: it does not exist merely for its own sake. Instead, it exists in order to appeal to the baser appetites of a potential audience, in the hopes that this audience will pay money in return for empty titillation. Such "gratuitous" sex and violence, then, is entirely instrumental: it is entirely ordered to an extrinsic benefit. It therefore should not be called "gratuitous sex and violence," but "mercenary sex and violence."

if we think through their implications, we can begin to see a way in which gratuitous love can be due love.

Thomas goes further down this path in his teaching on gratitude.[41] It is true that, even in the question of the *Summa* that is devoted to gratitude, there are points at which Thomas implicitly opposes the gratuitous to the due.[42] He also teaches that any gratuity at play here is at odds with violence or compulsion from the outside.[43] Yet he also presents us with a gratuity which is at home with a certain sort of duty.

First of all, he writes that "Thanksgiving in the recipient corresponds to the favor [*gratia*] of the giver: so that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed *gratis*."[44] Gratitude is a response to gratuity: the more gratuitously a gift is given, the more gratitude is due from the receiver. Thomas takes things further in the final article of this question. When he asks whether the response of gratitude should exceed the favor which was originally given, he writes that

> gratitude regards the favor received according to the intention of the benefactor, who seems be deserving of praise chiefly for having conferred the favor *gratis* without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is *obligated*,

[41] We will not be able to give anything like a complete account of Thomas's teaching on gratitude. We will instead focus very narrowly on a few questions around gratuity and duty which this teaching provokes. For a fuller account (which covers, among other things, the place of gratitude within Thomas's moral theology more broadly, the different sorts of grateful responses due to different sorts of benefactors, and the relation between gratitude and virtues like religion and piety), see Nathaniel A. Warne, "Institutional Justice and the Virtue of Gratitude," *Anglican Theological Review* 103 (2021): 287-90.

[42] See *STh* II-II, q. 106 a. 2.

[43] See *STh* II-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 2.

[44] *STh* II-II, q. 106, a. 2. Of course, Thomas here uses the word "*gratis*" here (and in all of our *Summa* passages) and not "*gratuitus*." The two words are certainly distinct, and running through the distinctions between them could be fruitful. Doing so, however, would take us too far afield. For our purposes, they are closely enough related for us to treat them as interchangeable. For more on *gratis* and *gratuitus*, see John M. G. Barclay, *Paul and the Gift* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2017), 581. We will see Thomas use the language of "*gratuitus*" in a similar context below.

under a moral *duty*, to give something *gratis* in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something *gratis*, unless he exceeds the quantity of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing *gratis*, but only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more.[45]

We just saw that gratitude is a response to gratuity. Yet we see now that the only fitting response to gratuity is—gratuity! The only way to meet the obligation imposed by the duty of gratitude is to give gratuitously. As in *De potentia*, this grateful thanks-giving is a response to a gratuitous gift: as we already saw, gratuity can be received and responsive without ceasing to be gratuitous. Yet now we see that gratuity can be *due* and *obligatory* without ceasing to be gratuitous: again, "the beneficiary is obligated, under a moral duty, to give something *gratis* in return."[46]

Earlier in this question, Thomas had prepared for this point by writing that "the natural order requires that he who has received a favor should be turned to his benefactor by the repayment of gratitude."[47] Again, this repayment, by definition, is gratuitous; yet this gratuitous repayment is required by the natural order. Gratuity, order, and requirement all meet in gratitude. Later in the same question, Thomas expresses this point more concisely: "Gratitude is a part of justice."[48] Again, gratitude means responding gratuitously to a gratuitous gift. This gratuitous response, however, is not a sort of supererogatory option appended to justice; it is a part of justice. To fail to give gratuitously in response to gratuity is to act unjustly: it is to fail to act as one *ought* to act.

The same paradox emerges in the next question. When Thomas is discussing ingratitude, he writes that "the debt of

[45] *STh* II-II, q. 106, a. 6.

[46] For more on a "moral duty," see *STh* II-II, q. 80, a. 1. More deeply, this link between gratitude and gratuity might be strengthened if we consider that the greatest and most gratuitous of all gifts is literally *named* "thanksgiving": *eucharistia*. It also bears noting that it is "right and just" to offer this supremely gratuitous gift.

[47] *STh* II-II, q. 106, a. 3.

[48] *STh* II-II, q. 106, a. 5, ad 2. For more on gratitude and justice, see Warne, "Institutional Justice," 287-90.

gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin."[49] First of all, this repayment goes beyond that which we are strictly bound to pay—yet we are required to make it. We have here our paradox in a nutshell: we are required to go beyond that to which we are bound. The second point is more basic: in failing to give gratuitously, one does not revert to a sort of lowest-common-denominator standard of morality, or to a sort of just-barely-moral behavior. It is not as though giving less than one has received is sinful, giving equally but less than gratuitously is morally neutral, and giving gratuitously is virtuous. Instead, giving less than gratuitously is *itself* a sin. Not, it is true, a mortal sin—but a sin all the same. Again, the moral law demands that we give gratuitously.[50]

Thomas makes this last point even more strongly earlier in the *Secunda secundae*. As he is cataloguing the parts of justice, he writes that the first set of virtues annexed to justice—religion, piety, and observance—respond to a debt so great it can never be paid.[51] Other parts of justice—liberality, affability, and friendship—lead to "a greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured": these latter virtues add more rectitude to an act that would be sufficiently upright without them.

[49] *STh* II-II, q. 107, a. 3.

[50] There is perhaps a more subtle marriage of the gratuitous and the due in the gift which provokes gratitude. As we just saw, "Thanksgiving in the recipient corresponds to the favor of the giver. . . . Now a favor is something bestowed *gratis*" (*STh* II-II, q. 107, a. 2). Gratitude, by definition, is a response to a gratuitous gift. Yet, when Thomas asks whether we are bound to be grateful to all benefactors, he raises the objection that "some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly, and grudgingly given" (*STh* II-II, q. 107, a. 3, obj. 2). He responds that "if someone has given a favor, not as he *ought* to have given it, the recipient ought not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet the thanks he owes is less than if the favor had been conferred *duly* [*modo debito*], since the favor is less" (*STh* II-II, q. 107, a. 3, ad 2). The problem with a poorly given gift is not merely that it is not given gratuitously; it is not even given duly. It violates not only gratuity, but duty. When gratitude responds to a perfectly given gift, therefore, it is responding not only to the gratuity of that gift, but to the due-ness of that gift. Duty and gratuity meet in a well-given gift.

[51] *STh* II-II, q. 80, a. 1.

And, because they are not necessary for rectitude, Thomas writes that there is "little of the nature of anything due in them." Not so gratitude. Gratitude, along with truth and vengeance, belongs to a different set of virtues: they concern a "due [which] is so necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of the due." In this passage, then, Thomas introduces a subset of nonobligatory "bonus" virtues: these virtues adorn acts that would still boast sufficient rectitude without them. If gratitude—along with the gratuity proper to gratitude—were not due in the strictest sense, then Thomas could easily have included it among these cherry-on-top virtues. Yet he does not. Instead, he contrasts gratitude to these superfluous virtues: he numbers it among virtues that are necessary if there is to be any rectitude at all, and that are therefore due in the strictest sense.[52] Again, the moral law demands gratitude—which means that the moral law demands gratuity.[53]

Returning to the more basic point, but moving to a very different context, we see the same coincidence of gratuity and duty in a final text where Thomas discusses gratitude. In his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he writes that

> virtuous men promptly express gratitude to their benefactors as if it were a sacred duty to make them a return in this way: for repaying a favor is characteristic of gratitude. It is fitting [*oportet*] that a man should be of service to one who has done him a favor, i.e., bestowed a gratuitous kindness

[52] The specific sort of necessity at play here (the necessity of a means to an end) could be similar to the "necessity" entailed in de Lubac's gift of grace: it is necessary that we have gratitude if we would have rectitude; it is necessary that God give us grace if he would fulfill the nature he has created. The fact that the gratuity of gratitude is compatible with this sort of necessity, therefore, might again speak to questions of nature and grace.

[53] Of course, liberality, affability, and friendship might be more intimately involved with rectitude than the language I have used ("bonus" and "cherry-on-top") suggests. The point is merely that gratitude is due, and is required for rectitude, in a way that they are not. That said, it remains that even these virtues which have "little of the nature of anything due in them" are *parts of justice*. Thomas even breaks with Tully, on whom he otherwise draws in this article, by including them as parts of justice (see the corpus and ad 2). The fact that justice can stretch out to virtues that go beyond the due may itself be meaningful for our larger question here.

[*gratuitum beneficium*], and that he be not content to give only as much as he received but that in return he begins to offer more than he got so that he himself may do a favor.[54]

In a shift from the other texts on gratitude we have considered, Thomas defines a favor not as "*gratis*," but as "*gratuitum*": a favor is a "gratuitous kindness." And he continues that, if one has received such a gratuitous kindness, then one must respond with one's own gratuitous kindness. To be sure, the word Thomas uses here, "*oportet*," does not suggest absolute necessity. Instead, it conveys a sense of duty, obligation, or fittingness. Yet all of these notes go to the heart of our concern here, for the language of *oportet* suggests that, when one receives a gratuitous kindness, it is fitting, obligatory, and due to respond gratuitously. The gratuitous is not opposed to the fitting, the obligatory, or the due. Nor does the gratuitous merely exceed the fitting, the obligatory, or the due. Instead, the gratuitous is demanded by the fitting, by the obligatory, and by the due. If we would respond fittingly to gratuity, if we would meet the obligation imposed by gratuity, and if we would do all that we must do in response to gratuity, then we must give gratuitously in return.[55]

D) An Infinite Debt

Thomas, however, raises an objection to the dynamic we are considering here. Just before arguing that the response of grati-

[54] V *Nic. Ethic.*, lect. 3.

[55] The original claim from Aristotle on which Thomas is commenting is itself remarkable: "this is characteristic of grace: we should [δεῖ] serve in return one who has shown grace to us [χαρισαμένῳ], and should another time take the initiative in showing it [χαριζόμενον]" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 5.5). The words Aristotle uses, χαρισαμένῳ and χαριζόμενον, both suggest gratuity. According to Aristotle, then, one is obligated to act gratuitously in response to gratuity. This point can return us to questions of nature and grace. Aristotle, using natural reason, was already able to discover a certain coincidence of the gratuitous and the due. If, therefore, nature encounters an even deeper coincidence of the gratuitous and the due in the gift of grace, then this paradoxical coincidence will not violate nature. Instead, it will map onto, and it will fulfill, a truth which natural reason had already discovered.

tude should exceed the favor received, he has the objector argue that

> if one person repays another more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something in his turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore, he that first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely.[56]

Gratitude is a gratuitous response. Yet, if the receiver gives gratuitously in response to the original gift, then the original giver will himself be bound to respond gratefully—and therefore gratuitously—to the receiver's grateful response. Yet this second gift from the original giver will require that the original receiver give a second gratuitous gift in response to the giver's second gift—which will place the burden back on the original giver, who will now have to give a third gratuitous gift. And on and on. We will be caught in a never-ending and ever-escalating cycle of gratuity.

Thomas responds: "The debt of gratitude flows from charity [*ex caritate*], which *the more it is paid the more it is due*, according to Romans 13:8, 'Owe no man anything, but to love one another [*invicem diligatis*].' Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit."[57] Contrary to what we might think, charity does not merely exceed debt and duty, and it does not begin where debt and duty end. Instead, it carries its own sort of debt and duty. Yet it is a debt and a duty unlike any other. Payment of this debt does not release one from one's duty; it increases one's duty. To satisfy this debt is to assume a greater debt—which, because the debtor is in love, is precisely what the debtor wants.[58] Charity, and the gratitude that flows from it, imposes a limitless debt. One can only meet that debt if one gives gratuitously. Yet, the more gratuitously one gives, the greater one's debt. The more the gift

[56] *STh* II-II, q. 106, a. 6, arg. 2.

[57] *STh* II-II, q. 106, a. 6, ad 2.

[58] As Thomas puts it, "The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love [*amoris*], and from the latter no man should wish to be free" (*STh* II-II, q. 107, a. 1, ad 3).

is gratuitous, the more it is due; the more due, the more gratuitous.[59]

This point can bring us back to our original questions around nature and grace. Someone skeptical of de Lubac's proposal might concede that gratuity and duty meet in gratitude. Yet she might counter that, when God gives us grace, he gives without gratitude. Any synthesis of gratuity and duty found in gratitude, therefore, might seem to be irrelevant to God's gift of grace. We will respond to this objection more fully in a moment. For now, we can note that, in light of our current passage, even the person who initiates a gift without any gratitude, and without any duty or debt, can still be required to give gratuitously. If I give a gift to my daughter, I might not be giving because I am grateful to her, I might not be giving in response to anything

[59] It is perhaps important that, in this passage, where we find our most thorough interpenetration of the gratuitous and the due, Thomas is discussing not merely *amor* but *caritas*. Indeed, he even suggests that *any* debt entailed in gratitude (and so the debt Thomas discusses in the corpus of *STh* II-II, q. 106, a. 6 as well) is grounded in charity. As we saw in n. 18 above, *caritas* comes as a gratuitous gift over and above the natural love which is already ingredient in nature. It is extra-gratuitous. On the one hand, then, it is important that Aristotle (as we just saw in n. 55) already saw that *some* sort of due-gratuity and gratuitous-duty is already demanded by gratitude as an acquired (or natural) virtue, in which *amor* is present. Yet it is only with the gift of grace, and with the advent of *caritas*—that is, it is only when love is *most gratuitous*—that gratuity is most thoroughly soaked in the due. As love grows more gratuitous in shifting from *amor* to *caritas*, it does not break further away from the due; it becomes enmeshed more deeply in the due.

Remaining with the logic of charity, Thomas's teaching that the debt of gratitude "flows from charity" might help us to unpack why this debt is limitless. For charity is love directed towards God as our supernatural end (*STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 1). Gratitude which "flows from charity," therefore, would be gratitude first to God. The debt we owe to God, however, is limitless: no matter how much we give in our grateful responses, we can never repay it (see *STh* II-II, q. 80, a. 1; and q. 106, a. 1, ad 1). In charity, however, we not only love God. Instead, in loving God as our supernatural end, we love all human beings—including any human benefactors to whom we may owe a lesser debt of gratitude—insofar as they are ordained to the same supernatural end (see *STh* II-II, q. 25, a. 1). In charity, therefore, our love for our benefactors is encompassed by our love for God—which may mean that the finite debt-of-gratitude we owe our human benefactors is encompassed by the infinite debt-of-gratitude we owe God. It may therefore be fitting that, because this gratitude "flows from charity," the debt it imposes should "have no limit."

particularly beautiful that she's done, and I might not have any duty to give her this specific gift. In initiating this gift, I give gratuitously and without any duty. Yet, if my daughter were to respond by gratefully offering her own gratuitous gift to me, I then *would* be bound to respond gratuitously to her gratuity. If she responds gratefully to my gift—which is how she *ought* to respond, to the point that any lesser response would be sinful—then my un-due, un-necessary, and un-grateful gift will have initiated a process that ultimately imposes on me a duty to give gratuitously. For Thomas, to give gratuitously to one who receives and responds gratefully—that is, to give gratuitously to one who meets the moral duty imposed on her by my gift, or to a receiver who responds as she ought to respond—is to bind oneself to give gratuitously in answer to the receiver's gratuitous response. An unprovoked gift is not itself an expression of duty. Yet, when all goes as it ought to go, it implicates the giver in a web of due gratuity and gratuitous duty.

That said, if the initiator in this example gives duly and gratuitously, then he only does so because he must give gratuitously in response to the receiver's gratuitous response. Even here, due-gratuity is a matter of the giver's gratitude, and so the parallels to God's gift are very dim. Putting these subtleties aside, however, the most important point is that, when I give out of gratitude, I give a gift gratuitously *and* I give a gift I am required to give: I am obligated to act gratuitously. The obligation is no threat to the gratuity and the gratuity is no threat to the obligation. For Thomas, then, there is no reason in principle that a due gift cannot be gratuitous or that a gratuitous gift cannot be due.

E) Gratuity Is Included

To take a step further into this question, I want to reflect on a series of realities that Thomas, at least in this context, never considers. Attending to these realities will allow us to extend the logic he lays out in his teaching on gratitude, and it will allow us to take a step closer to the question of nature and grace.

We can begin with something very simple: a meal. Part of what defines a meal is that it goes beyond strict necessity. It demands all sorts of gratuitous flourishes: the setting of the table, often with a focus on beauty; attention not just to the consumption of calories, but to the flavor, pairing, arrangement, and visible presentation of the food; finally, and perhaps most importantly, the conversation that animates a shared meal.[60] Indeed, conversation itself goes beyond the mere transfer of information insofar as it includes such gratuitous touches as personal attention, free self-revelation, vulnerability, and humor. A meal is a better meal the more it includes these gratuitous elements, and a meal would no longer be a meal—it would become mere metabolism, or the feeding of animals—if it lacked all of them. In order for a meal to be a meal, it is necessary and due that it include gratuity.[61]

Going even further, part of what distinguishes a feast from a meal is, as it were, a gratuitous gratuity. A family meal on a Tuesday night in January goes beyond mere shared metabolism; a feast on Easter Sunday goes beyond an everyday meal.[62] Extravagance enters into the essence of a feast. So too, importantly, does order: in the rhythm of the courses, in the seating arrangement, in the rituals of songs or prayer, and so on. In a feast, order and gratuity meet. Returning to gratuity, a

[60] As Alexander Schmemann writes, "Centuries of secularism have failed to transform eating into something strictly utilitarian. Food is still treated with reverence. A meal is still a rite—the last 'natural sacrament' of family and friendship, of life that is more than 'eating and drinking'" (*For the Life of the World* [Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1995], 16).

[61] This is not to say that a meal ceases to be a meal if *some* of these features are absent: almost every family needs to avail themselves of microwavable dinners at certain points. But, when things are not perfect, even small things—such as lighting a candle at the table while the food is microwaving, or praying over the hastily prepared victuals—can make the meal *more* of a meal. Indeed, if *none* of those elements were present—if, for example, the food were served with an obvious lack of attention to its flavor and presentation, or if there were no conversation at all (and no wordless sharing of selves) as food was being eaten, but instead a stilted silence—then something would likely be felt to be awkward or uncomfortable or wrong about the experience. It would not be just a good thing (eating) with all that "extra stuff" taken away. Something would be *missing* that *ought* to be present in a meal.

[62] For more on feasts, see Schmemann, *For the Life of the World*, 52-55.

feast can only hit the mark if it goes above and beyond; it can only be fully itself if it exceeds. If a feast is not somehow extravagant, then something will be missing from it. A giver of a feast can only act duly if he acts gratuitously.[63]

Shifting gears a bit, we might also think of marriage. In marrying, one certainly assumes a whole host of duties towards one's spouse. Yet, if a marriage becomes *merely* a matter of duty, then the marriage dies.[64] One spouse might rightly say to another: "If you're only here because you have a duty to be with me, or because you want to make me happy, then you cannot make me happy. I can only be happy if I know you *want* to be with *me*: not because it is your duty to be with me, but simply because you want to be with me for my own sake. It *is* your duty to be with me and to make me happy; but you cannot fully fulfill your duty if you love me *in order* to fulfill a bare duty." To use Thomas's language, one cannot be satisfied with a "mercenary" lover, even if the "extrinsic benefit" sought by one's lover is the fulfillment of his duty—which, in the grand scheme of things, is a relatively noble aim. In a marriage, one can only be satisfied if one is loved for one's own sake: one can only be fulfilled by gratuitous love. A spouse would fail to meet his duty if he *merely* did his duty *because* it was his duty; he can

[63] These conditions hold even in conditions of (at least relative) poverty. One thinks of the Cratchits' Christmas dinner which the Ghost of Christmas Present shows to Scrooge in *A Christmas Carol*. The Cratchits wear their best clothes, even though they are shabby; they use their best stemware, even though it is chipped; Mrs. Cratchit goes above and beyond in making an extravagant pudding, even though it is too small for so large a family. If one were to invoke the related category of hospitality, one might think of Eumaeus, the even poorer swineherd, in book 14 of *The Odyssey*. For a deeper meditation on eating and feasting (and for ways in which gratuity might enter into even the feeding of animals), see Erik van Versendaal, "Reason for Being: Festivity, Perfection, and the 'Very Good,'" *Communio* 44 (2017): 502-58. As for conversation, D. C. Schindler has argued that, because conversation is gratuitous, "Gratuity is part of the fundamental meaning of education" ("On the Universality of the University: A Response to Jean-Luc Marion," *Communio* 40 [2013]: 94). Educators, therefore, can only fulfill their duty if they generate gratuitous conversation.

[64] Sigrid Undset offers a deep reflection on the brokenness of a merely dutiful marriage—even when one is perfectly scrupulous in fulfilling all of one's duties—through Lavrans's relationship to Ragnfrid in *Kristin Lavransdatter*.

only fulfill his duty if he goes beyond his duty. The gratuitous is due.[65]

Again, Thomas never offers such reflections on feasts or marriage, and so these final points have brought us beyond anything he says explicitly. Yet they might be able to bring us back to the questions of nature and grace with which we began. As far as I know, it is with reference to gratitude that Thomas himself most deeply marries the gratuitous to the due. Now, at least for Thomas, when God gives us grace, he does not give gratefully.[66] He does, however, invite us to an eternal wedding feast, and he calls us to be his Bride.[67] Attention to the nature of feasts and of marriage suggests that these realities can only be what they ought to be if they are gratuitous. Their essence includes gratuity. If they fail to be gratuitous, they do not merely fail to go above and beyond what they ought to be; they cease to be what they are at all. Thomas is willing to make a similar point concerning a reality—gratitude—that is not present in God's gift of grace. There therefore seems to be, at the very least, some room in Thomas's thought for a similar due-and-necessary-gratuity in realities that *are* associated with God's gift of grace, but that Thomas himself does not present in such terms. Whatever else they might suggest, our passages on

[65] Of course, there are periods in any marriage during which one feels estranged from one's spouse, and during which one may need to fall back on one's duty in order to remain faithful through a dark time. Such periods can be very long. There would be a deep problem, however, if acting out of mere duty were to become a sort of baseline that one accepted as normal (or even as noble), instead of a wounded situation from which one hoped for, and sought, healing. For some deep reflections on love and duty (or love and law), see Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Christian State of Life*, trans. Sister Mary Frances McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1983), 25-32.

[66] For a different take on this point, see St. John of the Cross, *The Living Flame of Love*, trans. E. Allison Peers (New York: Triumph Books, 1991), 101.

[67] He also adopts us as his sons, and there might be ways in which fatherhood (like marriage) requires that a father gratuitously go beyond bare "duty": even if a father were to go to his son's every soccer game and every recital, the son might not be satisfied if he could tell that the father was there *merely* because he *had* to be there. Finally, in John 15:15, Christ calls us friends. Healy, in order to shed light on gratuity in God's gift of grace, appeals to the logic of friendship: see "Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace," 548. Feasts and marriage, therefore, might be but a few of the realities whose logic marries the gratuitous and the due.

gratitude make clear that, in principle, there is no contradiction between gratuity and duty—just as our passages on gratuitous love in the Trinity imply that, in principle, there is no contradiction between gratuity and necessity.

These points about gratuity, duty, and necessity, then, might offer new insights into questions of nature and grace. Yet, as I said at the outset, my aim here is not mercenary: I am not chiefly interested in using Thomas's passages on gratuity in order to achieve the extrinsic benefit of scoring a point in the nature-grace debate. I am chiefly interested in finding in Thomas resources for a deeper reading of gratuity, which is a task worth doing for its own sake. In order to continue on this task, we can turn now to the role of gratuitous gift in his Trinitarian theology.

II. A Gratuitous Gift

Our second set of texts comes at these questions a bit less directly, and they will yield more tentative conclusions. Yet, at the very least, these texts can reinforce the points we have already made. We can begin with a text from the *Summa*'s Trinitarian questions, where Thomas defines a gift:

> A gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says—that is, a thing which is not given with the intention of a return—and in this way it contains the idea of a gratuitous gift. Now, the reason that a gift is gratuitous is love [*amor*]; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all gratuitous gifts are given.[68]

First of all, when Thomas says that a gift is "unreturnable," he does not mean that a giver gives, as we might say, "for keeps." It is not merely a permanent giving.[69] It is a giving in which the

[68] *STh* I, q. 38, a. 2. See also I *Sent*., d. 18, q. 1, aa. 2-3. For more on this passage, and for more on "gift" in Thomas's Trinitarian theology, see Emery, *Trinitarian Theology*, 249-58.

[69] It is also a permanent giving. As Thomas writes, "When something is given to someone only for a time, this is not a true gift; but it is true when something is given to

giver seeks nothing for himself in return for his gift. In a bribe or a sale, the giver expects to gain something. In a gift, he does not. A gift is not given so that the giver can get something in return; it is given for the sake of the recipient—and it is therefore given gratuitously.

This note of "unreturnable" recalls *De potentia*'s language of "mercenary." In both texts, gratuity requires that the giver give not in order to gain. And, in both texts, after defining the gratuitous as the non-self-seeking, Thomas affirms that gratuity is present in God. As we saw above, he affirms this point very openly in *De potentia*. As we will see now, he does so implicitly in the *Summa*. For, within the very question in which he defines a gift in terms of gratuity, Thomas affirms that gift is present in God. When he asks whether "gift" is a personal name in God, he encounters the objection that "no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But the divine essence is the gift which the Father gives to the Son, as Hilary says. Therefore 'gift' is not a personal name."[70] In response, Thomas recalls a point he had laid out in his response to the previous objection: he had argued there that a giver can only give something if it first belongs to him, and he had presented three different ways in which one thing can belong to another. The first way is by "identity": "in that sense 'gift' is the same as 'the giver.'"[71] Thus, "the divine essence is the Father's gift in the first sense: it belongs to the Father by way of identity."[72]

Putting aside certain details, we can focus on the main point: Thomas teaches that, when the Father gives the divine essence to the Son, this giving is a gift. This claim, moreover, comes just one article before Thomas defines a gift as a gratuitous giving. It is therefore hard to believe either that Thomas had forgotten that gift is eternally present in God when he defined a gift as gratuitous, or that he had forgotten that a gift is gratuitous when he affirmed that gift is eternally present in God. It is with

be had forever" (*In Ioan.*, c. 19, lect. 4 [1914]). In our current text, however, "unreturnable" has a different meaning.

[70] *STh* I, q. 38, a. 1, obj. 2.

[71] *STh* I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 1.

[72] *STh* I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 2.

the gratuity of a gift front and center that Thomas affirms that, from eternity, the divine essence is "the Father's gift."

This point is important for us because, as we saw in section I, Thomas teaches that the Father's giving is absolutely necessary. Indeed, our passage comes just three questions before Thomas devotes an article to underscoring the necessity of the Father's giving.[73] Again, it seems a stretch to speculate that Thomas had forgotten the gift-language of question 38 when he came to the necessity of the divine generation in question 41. Thomas knows that the Father's giving is necessary when he affirms that it is a gratuitous gift, and he knows that it is a gratuitous gift when he affirms that it is necessary.[74]

All told, twenty-one times in nine texts Thomas speaks of the divine generation as a gift from the Father to the Son.[75] In none of these texts does Thomas pause to remind us that a gift, by definition, is a gratuitous giving. He also does not conclude that, because the divine essence is a gift, it must be given gratuitously. Yet, again, he speaks of the divine essence as a gift within the very question where he defines a gift in terms of gratuity. He also does so five questions before this passage on gratuity,[76] and he does so again four questions after it.[77] Even more, we saw in section I that, in *De potentia*—which was written within a few years of the *Prima pars*[78]—Thomas explicitly proposed a definition of gratuity that is opposed not to the necessary or to the due but to the mercenary. We also saw him affirm that the relations of the divine persons are marked by this gratuity. It therefore seems at least plausible that Thomas is open to a similar definition of gratuity in these

[73] See *STh* I, q. 41, a. 2.

[74] Indeed, Thomas reiterates that the Father's giving is a gift just one question after the article dedicated to necessity: see *STh* I, q. 42, a. 4, ad 1.

[75] See I *Sent*., d. 16, q. 1, a. 4, exp. text.; *Cat. aur. in Ioan*., c. 14, lect. 8; *ScG* IV 8; *De Pot*., q. 10, a. 1, ad 9; *In Phil*., c. 2, lect. 3; *STh* I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 2; q. 42, a. 4, ad 1; III, q. 7, a. 11, ad 1; and *In Ioan*., c. 14, lect. 8 (1971).

[76] See *STh* I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 2.

[77] See *STh* I, q. 42, a. 4, ad 1.

[78] See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:333 and 335.

passages from the *Summa*—and that he is therefore open to some sort of gratuitous necessity and necessary gratuity.

We should not speculate too much here. Nothing we have said proves that, in his teaching on gift, Thomas intended to imply that gratuity is present in God. Still less does it prove that he had any intention of implying that gratuity is compatible with necessity. None of this even proves that Thomas was conscious that his claims carried these implications. The point worth stressing, however, is that his claims *do*, in fact, carry these implications. We have had to connect some dots in order to see as much, but these dots are there, and they are clustered closely enough together to be connected fairly easily—and they can therefore reinforce the passages in *De potentia* where Thomas explicitly affirms that gratuity is present in God.[79]

CONCLUSION

Having spent this whole article talking about what gratuity is *not*—that it is opposed neither to the necessary nor to the due—we are left with an obvious question: Can we say what gratuity *is*? We will have to be more tentative here, and Thomas might suggest different facets of an answer in different texts. In *De potentia*, where he opposes the gratuitous to the mercenary, he seems to suggest that the gratuitous is that which is done for its own sake. This point is already important. It might be tempting to define the gratuitous as that which exists for no reason. Thomas, however, suggests that it exists for no *extrinsic* reason. The gratuitous does have a reason: in the *Summa*'s passage on

[79] Without exploring this point in detail, we can at least suggest that similar conclusions might be buried in other areas of Thomas's thought. One might consider, for example, the category of the *conveniens*, or the "fitting." Gratuity is often opposed not only to the due and to the necessary, but to the fitting as well. The fitting is what is called for or appropriate in a given situation; the gratuitous goes beyond what is merely called for or merely appropriate. The fitting, we might say, "fits" into the space opened up for it: it does neither too much nor too little. The gratuitous overflows beyond any such space. Thomas, however, teaches that God's most gratuitous actions—the Incarnation and Passion—are supremely fitting (see *STh* III, q. 1, a. 1; q. 46, aa. 3-4 and 9-11). God acts fittingly when he acts gratuitously. The gratuitous, then, might be compatible not only with the necessary and with the due, but with the fitting as well.

gift, Thomas teaches that "the reason that a gift is gratuitous is love."[80] Taking these passages together, we might say that the gratuitous is that which is done out of love and for its own sake.

The passages on gratitude take things further. In them, Thomas seems to suggest that the gratuitous goes beyond whatever is strictly required or called for. He seems, in other words, to oppose the gratuitous to the necessary and to the due. Paradoxically, however, he also suggests that, at least in some circumstances, we are required to go beyond what is merely required; we are called to go beyond what is strictly called for. In this sense, our redefinition of gratuity also entails a redefinition of the due and of the necessary: the due and the necessary, paradoxically, can sometimes include the excessive and the exuberant. The due can require more than is due; the necessary can demand more than is necessary.

Remaining with gratuity, there is a sense in which, after all our exploring, we come back to where we started. For our commonplace notions concerning gratuity turn out to be right: the gratuitous does, in fact, go beyond the necessary and the due. At the same time, our commonplace notions would need to be radically rethought: for it turns out that the gratuitous—at least in some circumstances—is itself due and necessary. Based on our texts as whole, then, we might provisionally define gratuity as follows: the gratuitous exists for its own sake, it is grounded in love, and it goes beyond the necessary and the due—even as it is sometimes required by the necessary and the due.

We should stress, however, that this definition is provisional. There could be other passages where Thomas fills out the definition further by unfolding other dimensions of this deeper gratuity. Even more, there are passages where Thomas works with a nonparadoxical account of gratuity, and where he opposes the gratuitous to the necessary and to the due. We cannot take up the question of how—or of whether—these latter texts can be reconciled with the texts we have highlighted here. All I really hope to have shown is that there are, in fact,

[80] *STh* I, q. 38, a. 2.

multiple strains of Thomas's thought on this question, and that Thomas does not merely oppose the gratuitous to the necessary and to the due. Instead, there are at least some passages where he proposes a gratuity that is right at home with the necessary and with the due, even as it exceeds them. These passages might, at the end of the day, outweigh those in which Thomas seems to operate with a less paradoxical account of gratuity. Things could also tilt the other way: it could turn out that these passages are dwarfed by those where Thomas opposes the gratuitous to the necessary and to the due. Yet, even in the latter case, the passages we have considered would still be enough to show that there are openings in Thomas to a deeper and paradoxical gratuity: a gratuity that may take us deeper into questions of nature and grace, and a gratuity that may open up equally rich insights into other similarly urgent and basic questions.

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CELEBRATING SAINT BONAVENTURE EIGHT HUNDRED YEARS AFTER HIS BIRTH

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ONCE IN CONVERSATION with a colleague (a Thomist, who shall remain nameless), he remarked with surprise that scholarship on Bonaventure, like scholarship on Aquinas, seemed to constitute its own world. Scholarship on great figures like Bonaventure does form a world, even a universe, one that includes both the scholarly universe of the moment and that same universe extended backwards in time. In 2020, The Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University published *Saint Bonaventure: Friar, Teacher, Minister, Bishop. A Celebration of the Eighth Centenary of His Birth*[1]—but in order better to assess this work, a brief overview of some major celebratory volumes published in Bonaventure's honor may be helpful.

In 1874, the sixth centenary of Bonaventure's death, Fidelis a Fanna published *Ratio novae collectionis operum omnium . . . S. Bonaventurae* (Turin, 1874). This volume provided a foretaste of and rationale for the edition of Bonaventure's *Opera omnia* published between 1882 and 1902 at Quaracchi (outside of Florence). A new appreciation for Bonaventure arose from that edition since it included texts, such as his three sets of

[1] *Saint Bonaventure: Friar, Teacher, Minister, Bishop. A Celebration of the Eighth Centenary of His Birth*, ed. Timothy J. Johnson, Katherine Wrisley-Shelby, and Marie Kolbe Zamora, Essays from "Frater, Magister, Minister, et Episcopus: The Works and Worlds of St. Bonaventure, an International Conference hosted by the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University" (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2020).

disputed questions, that had been forgotten since perhaps the fourteenth century, and it eliminated from Bonaventure's corpus many other texts (especially of "spirituality") with which he had long been associated. As that edition and a new Bonaventure emerged into print, medieval studies emerged more fully as a discipline, infused with energy by Pope Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris* (1879). The twentieth century's greatest scholars began a close study of Bonaventure with the new edition in hand, among them Etienne Gilson and a Franciscan friar he helped establish at St. Bonaventure College near Olean, New York, Philotheus Boehner. These two men helped found the two most important intellectual centers in North America for the study of medieval thought: the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto and The Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure College (later University). While Gilson is famous to many, Boehner is better known to students of Franciscana, since he helped establish the critical edition of William of Ockham's works and a series to translate the works of Bonaventure at The Franciscan Institute. Both series are still in print and are still essential to teaching and research in the Franciscan tradition.

From 1874 and the foretaste of a new Bonaventure, we must leap to 1974, when a series of celebrations for the seventh centenary of Bonaventure's death resulted in two great collections of scholarly essays. A five-volume collection entitled *S. Bonaventura 1274-1974*, published by the same college that edited Bonaventure's *Opera omnia*, includes contributions by an incredibly distinguished list of scholars. The first volume opens with a citation from Étienne Gilson; the fourth volume with a previously unpublished note of Philotheus Boehner, who had died suddenly on May 22, 1955. The five volumes were arranged topically, covering Bonaventure's portrayal in art, his life and writings, philosophy, theology, and a final volume that provides a massive bibliography. The volumes are still an essential reference point for scholars, given the exceptional quality of the participants: among them Louis Jacques Bataillon, Jacques Guy Bougerol, Palémon Glorieux, James McEvoy, Bernard McGinn, Anton Pegis, Walter Principe, Michael Schmaus,

Fernand Van Steenberghen, Paul Vignaux, and Grover Zinn. The volumes seemed to be a who's who, not just of the Bonaventurean world, but of the medieval scholarly world.

Another collection, entitled *San Bonaventura maestro di vita francescana e di sapienza christiana*, published in 1976, arose from a major gathering in Rome for the seventh centenary of Bonaventure's death. Paul VI gave the initial address. Published in three volumes, the first volume includes nearly one thousand pages on Bonaventure's life and general issues in his thought. Volumes 2 and 3 are briefer and contain essays focused on specific theological and philosophical themes. These volumes also include a distinguished international list of scholars (some of whom also contributed to *S. Bonaventura*): Camille Bérubé, Ignatius Brady, Jean Châttilon, Ewert Cousins, Luigi Pellegrini, and Wayne Hellmann—a friar who sought to work with a theologian named Joseph Ratzinger but who finished his dissertation in 1974 under the direction of Werner Dettlof (a contributor to both collections of essays).

These collections emanating from 1974 (and others published in that year) signal the end, in some ways, of that major blast of energy that began with Fidelis a Fanna and the new edition of Bonaventure's works. While major works of scholarship on Bonaventure emerged after 1974, the next major blast of energy to celebrate Bonaventure came in 2017. Why 2017? For the simple reason that Bonaventure may have been born in 1217. The evidence is not compelling. Bonaventure was more likely born in or near to 1221 (see Jay Hammond, "Dating Bonaventure's Inception as Regent Master," *Franciscan Studies* 67 [2009]: 179-226, at 199-200). But apparently no one wanted to wait for 2021 and compete with the seventh centenary of Dante's death, so at least three major celebrations with subsequent publications occurred in 2017: a commemorative volume in the journal *Antonianum* (2018:2) dealing with various issues in the reception of Bonaventure (among other things); a large volume stemming from a celebratory gathering in Rome published as *Deus summe cognoscibilis: The Current Theological Relevance of Saint Bonaventure* (Peeters, 2018) (and so, focused mainly on theological topics); and the volume under

review here, *Saint Bonaventure: Friar, Teacher, Minister, Bishop* (hereafter FTMB), marking a celebration at The Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University. All three volumes display the continuing international interest in Bonaventure. FTMB and *Deus summe* are roughly the same size (at around 700 pages each). FTMB stands out for the range of topics addressed and the variety of perspectives offered on Bonaventure. In this way the volume imitates the range of 1974's five-volume *S. Bonaventurae*.

The editors divide FTMB into two parts, each of which is headed by a keynote address. Wayne Hellmann, the only person in this volume who also contributed to the 1974 celebrations, delivered the first keynote, "Sacraments: Healing unto Glory," while Emmanuel Falque offered the second, "The Entrance of God into Theology: Confrontation with Étienne Gilson." The introduction to the volume remarks that these two essays "provide an intellectual trajectory that, in one way or another, is manifest in all of the essays contained in this volume" (1). This remark is worth further assessment but requires acquaintance with the two authors first.

Wayne Hellmann is a Conventual Franciscan friar, educated in Rome and Germany, who for many years taught at St. Louis University in the department of theological studies. (Full disclosure: he was my dissertation director.) Perhaps his most important contribution to *Franciscana* is collaborative: Hellmann is one of the principal editors of the landmark series of translations *Francis of Assisi: Early Documents*, published initially in three volumes by New City Press from 1999-2001 (now augmented by a fourth volume). His dissertation, written in German, was translated in 2001 by one of his own students, Jay Hammond (who also contributes an essay to FTMB). Hellman's essay here builds on another piece of collaborative work: selections from book 4 of Bonaventure's *Commentary on the Sentences*, translated with introduction and notes by Hellmann, Timothy LeCroy, and Luke Townsend (Franciscan Institute Publications, 2016). More than these publications, though, Hellmann is important for his inspiration and guidance of students. At least twelve of the forty-four essays included here

are written by students of Hellmann or students of students of Hellmann. Taking his contributions as a whole, one might say that Hellmann has continued a major part of the legacy Boehner helped found at The Franciscan Institute: teaching the Franciscan tradition and making it more widely available through translation (indeed, in the same translation series Boehner helped establish). Hellmann's essay displays his concern to read Bonaventure closely and to link him to contemporary theological concerns, here emanating from Pope Francis's *Laudato Si* and cosmological reflection on the sacraments.

Emmanuel Falque is a very different sort of scholar. Falque is a French phenomenologist of the "third generation," who takes his inspiration from Merleau-Ponty rather than Husserl or Heidegger (see *Transforming the Theological Turn: Phenomenology with Emmanuel Falque*, ed. Martin Koci and Jason Alvis [Rowman and Littlefield, 2020], xvi-xvii). Falque is a prolific writer, perhaps most widely known for his contributions to the "theological turn" in phenomenology, through which he has challenged the strict separation of theology and philosophy, above all in his *Crossing the Rubicon: The Borderlands of Philosophy and Theology*. Almost all his major works (a "philosophic triduum" among them) now exist in translation, and numerous articles and books in English and French grapple with his complex and rich thought. Falque has engaged Bonaventure throughout his career, especially in his first book, now in a revised English translation: *Saint Bonaventure and the Entrance of God into Theology* (Franciscan Institute Publications, 2018). The book originated as Falque's thesis at the University of Paris, supervised by Jean-Luc Marion. This translation includes a new preface and a new opening "Confrontation with Étienne Gilson," an essay that anticipates portions of Falque's keynote in FTMB. That keynote allows Falque to reintroduce questions of the relationship of philosophy and theology in Bonaventure's thought and in philosophy and theology today.

Hellmann and Falque are two very different thinkers and writers. The introduction to the volume is not simply being hyperbolic, however, when it suggests that the trajectories of

these two essays are related to all of the essays in the volume. The clear differences between Hellmann and Falque, both of method and of concern, result in a rather eclectic volume (something certain readers will lament and others may celebrate). It is easier for me to see how essays resonate with Hellmann's concerns. However, Falque's concerns (and those which I might tie to his) are present in a significant portion of the essays.

After Hellmann's keynote for part 1, five groups of essays follow, under the headings: "Who was Bonaventure?," "Bonaventure's Theological Influences," "Methodology, Illumination and Theology according to Bonaventure," "Bonaventure on Ethics, Evil and Marginality," and "New Insights into Old Texts." It is easy to see the connections to history and texts as relating well to Hellmann's interests, especially those that look back to the Victorines and the *Summa halensis*. But there is something of Falque in these essays too, especially in the concern to utilize new methods to study Bonaventure's texts, as in the contribution of Nicholas Youmans on Bonaventure's generalate, and in the concern to engage Bonaventure's thoughts on theology and philosophy closely. Anyone interested in the list of topics for part 1 will find an essay or essays of particular interest. I particularly appreciated Alfredo Cento's essay on Bonaventure's canonization, since this is an often-neglected part of his history. Bonaventure does not receive much citation in Catholic moral thought, and so the essays directly contributing to that section and other essays that address moral concerns are a useful addition to the literature.

Part 2 offers four groups of essays after Falque's keynote: "Bonaventure on Christology, The Eucharist and the Spiritual Life," "Bonaventure on Preaching and Scripture," "Bonaventure's Enduring Theological Legacy: Past and Present," and "20th-Century Philosophical Considerations." A significant portion of these essays relate well to Falque, especially the last section where critical comparison between Bonaventure and Heidegger takes center stage. Essays on Bonaventure's theological legacy also show some of Falque's interest, perhaps especially in Fernando Valdivieso's "Bonaventure's Challenge to

Contemporary Moral Philosophy." Hellmann's historical interests also shine in this section, as Timothy Johnson puts Bonaventure and Luther into conversation, and Trent Pomplun takes the reader on a tour of "Baroque Bonaventureans on the Primary Reason for the Incarnation." This section, like the first, provides numerous essays that will pique the interest of scholars.

At one level, an objective reader can say that there is no comparison between the volumes stemming from the 2017 celebrations and those stemming from the 1974 celebrations. The prestigious scholars from 1974 are almost all gone. Anyone working today, as Falque himself recognizes in his own critical essay on Gilson, rests on the shoulders of those giants—though no one should be confined to simply repeating their insights. Looked at collectively, those 1974 volumes now seem like the end of something, the end of an enormous burst of energy, perhaps given its greatest push by Leo XIII, a pope who praised the very *scholia* of Bonaventure's *Opera omnia* (notes and essays often comparing Aquinas and Bonaventure) that Gilson firmly rejected. The scholarship produced by that burst of energy will have a perennial value, even if not all of it was of equal worth. Many of those older essays were the first crack at something, or the first time that something had been synthesized. We are now at a very different stage. FTMB feels more like a new beginning: new methods, new concerns, new readings, specific investigations of old sources and old themes. For that very reason, FTMB is not a book I would recommend to someone new to Bonaventure: it is not meant to serve as an introduction to Bonaventure. It is a celebration, a marker of a moment in time, a beginning whose end cannot yet be seen.

As scholars move forward from this beginning, I wish to call attention to the source of all these endeavors: Bonaventure's current *Opera omnia*, produced in the nineteenth century. It is badly in need of updating. We still possess no census of Bonaventure's manuscripts. The edition does not provide enough detail about its editorial choices, and editorial methods have changed enormously since the completion of those volumes. Scholarly knowledge of the University of Paris and of its many

figures has also grown enormously (the nineteenth-century editors knew nothing of the "pecia" system, for instance)—making not only the edition but its notes badly in need of reassessment and updating. As a new beginning in scholarship advances, I hope that some will join scholars like Aleksander Horowski, who has taken up the challenge to begin again at the source: the critical evaluation of the *Opera omnia* and a return to the manuscripts of the Seraphic Doctor.

BOOK REVIEWS

Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy. By TOBIAS HOFFMANN. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. xiv + 292. $99.99 (hard). ISBN: 978-1-107-15538-1.

This excellent book achieves at least two interrelated goals, both suggested by its title: it gives a thorough account of theories of free will as found in the thirteenth century, continuing as far as Ockham (with backward glances to Anselm, Bernard, and Lombard); and it gives a detailed account of the question of the origin of evil in the morally bad choices of (as Hoffmann's authors supposed) a being who was initially not subject to intellectual error. Both topics are hard, the second especially so. But Hoffmann is an expert guide, and is able both to cast new light on the more-or-less well-known material that constitutes the first part of his project, and to give a clear and compelling account of the largely novel material that can be found in the second part of it.

Hoffmann begins with a discussion of the ways in which Aristotle's thinking on choice was incorporated into Western discussions, starting with the translation of John of Damascus's eclectic *De fide orthodoxa* (which included a great deal of Aristotelian psychology with the addition of the notion of a rational will), and continuing with the direct access to relevant parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This latter coincided with, and partly contributed to, what Hoffmann labels the "psychological turn" around the 1220s. Earlier medieval accounts of will were fundamentally theological in character. But Hoffmann notes that thinkers of the early thirteenth century suddenly became interested in action theory and moral psychology as objects worthy of study in themselves. (In this he follows, with due acknowledgement, his former student, Jamie Spiering, who has worked on the topic in Philip the Chancellor and others.) And what immediately followed the psychological turn was a largely intellectualist account, according to which free agency is explained (in Hoffmann's helpful definition) "mainly with reference to the intellect" (5). The story follows a familiar trajectory: intellectualism prevails until it gets condemned (in Paris at least) by Stephen Tempier in 1270, and again with greater force in 1277. Specifically, as Hoffmann notes, the core issue was what he helpfully labels "judgment-volition conformity" (61): that the will automatically wills in accordance with judgment. The worry, of

course, was that judgment-volition conformity entails some kind of determinism.

Now, even the most ardent intellectualists generally allow that the judgment of means (to an end) is in some sense contingent: the output, the judgment, is not determined by the input (reasons in favor of this or that means). So, one of the primary problems for the intellectualist lies in determining how the intellectual process of deliberation is contingent. According to Hoffmann, for instance, Aquinas claims that “one wills in proportion to one’s judgment,” and Hoffmann follows by noting that “the fact that this rather than that cognitive judgment actually becomes a judgment of choice depends on an affective commitment” (47). Aquinas is therefore a “moderate intellectualist” (54). But as Hoffmann notes, there is no explanation within Aquinas’s system for the activity of the will here.

The year 1277 in fact saw two distinct condemnations, both in March: 219 errors of the arts masters, and 51 propositions from Giles of Rome’s *Sentences* commentary. In terms of long-term significance, article 24 of this latter list (that “there is no evil in the will unless there is error in reason”) turned out to be particularly important, since in 1285, when Giles appealed to the new pope, the Parisian theology masters conceded the previously condemned proposition—the so-called *propositio magistralis*.

This odd chain of events allowed the initial imposition of some kind of voluntarism to be somewhat tempered. A key figure here is Henry of Ghent, one of the movers behind the first of these 1277 condemnations: the will is a self-mover (else it would be determined *ab extra*). The remarkable Franciscan Peter Olivi allows, in line with this, that it is possible for the will to choose its own end. But the *propositio magistralis* opened the way for intellectualism to return. Key among the adherents of this kind of theory is Godfrey of Fontaines, who takes the metaphysical impossibility of the self-motion of something part-free to show that psychological voluntarism must be false. But according to Hoffmann, even in Godfrey the will has some kind of role: “to apply an object to the intellect” for consideration (117). So, again, as in Aquinas, there is in Hoffmann’s judgment some irreducible and unexplained contingency in the will’s activity.

The story continues on through Duns Scotus, Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of St.-Pourçain, and Peter Auriol, with greater or lesser emphasis on the will, until we arrive at William of Ockham, “the most modern . . . of the thinkers here considered” (151). According to Ockham, for an object to be willed, it is not required even that the object possess “some aspect of the good” (155). The thinking is plain enough: both intellectualists and voluntarists (in Hoffmann’s analysis, at least) ultimately make choice “primitive, unexplainable” (159). There is no contrastive account of choice (why this was chosen rather than that); perhaps there is no noncontrastive account either. As so often, Ockham simply draws out implications already present in the work of his predecessors.

Following this narrative logic, the rest of the work discusses the origin of evil choices, reprising many of the thinkers discussed in the first half of the book. On the face of it, the situation is harder for the intellectualists: "if a sinful act presupposes a cognitive deficiency, then angels cannot sin" (199). For some of the more intellectualist theologians, indeed, some sort of cognitive deficiency was required. Aquinas, for instance, at least in his later work, attributes to the angels some kind of "lack of consideration": they "overlooked the divine rule by which their will was to be regulated" (209). But primal sin is a problem for voluntarists too: if the will is responsible, with no intellectual error, how is the angels' choice not irrational? Henry has the most intriguing account: Lucifer took innocent delight in his role, superior to the other angels, but then took "inordinate glory in it" (224). And this defect in the will "caused the intellect to err" (225). Scotus has the most ingenious account (something to which Hoffmann has drawn attention in previous publications): the will is a "collative power," capable of putting together distinct concepts. In Lucifer's case, while the intellect could not form a complex judgment affirming Lucifer's equality with God, the will could, since the will is not circumscribed by the logically possible in the way that the intellect is. And if the will can form the relevant complex, it can also will it.

A final chapter deals with the equally intriguing topic of diabolic obstinacy in sin. But rather than summarize this, I would like to focus on what strikes me as the only real difficulty in the account, because the discussion of Scotus's view of the fall raises it rather sharply. Early on, Hoffmann makes an observation in relation to his definitions of "intellectualism" and "voluntarism": "Medieval thinkers consistently held that, properly speaking, it is not the intellect and will that act, but rather the person who acts by intellect and will. Nevertheless, once the emphasis is on the relative contributions of intellect and will in free agency, it becomes convenient to speak loosely as if the intellect knows, understands, considers, judges, and deliberates, and the will desires, chooses, and enjoys" (5–6). It is easy to see what Hoffmann is thinking: talking in this way can avoid awkward clarifications and circumlocution. But the difference is more than just a manner of speaking. In some cases, it is not readily possible to translate the one form of talk into the other. I will take a couple of simple examples.

Consider, first of all, the extensive discussions of the possibility (or otherwise) of the will's self-motion. Godfrey of Fontaines maintains that something simple, such as a soul or a will, could not move itself. But the argument is germane to the intellectualism/voluntarism question only if it is held that it is the will itself that is the agent of choice.

A more extreme example of the difficulty arises with Hoffmann's account of Scotus on Lucifer's primal sin. As Scotus sees it, the will is a collative power: both intellect and will can combine concepts into some syntactic complex; but unlike the intellect, the will can combine incompatible concepts into complexes. But how might we spell this distinction out if we treat these powers (intellect and will) not as themselves agents but merely as the powers

of an agent, in the way Hoffmann proposes? Is it that a rational being has one power in virtue of which it can only combine compatible concepts into complexes (intellect), and another power in virtue of which it can combine both compatible and incompatible concepts into complexes (will)? And is this second power also the one in virtue of which a rational being wills things? I do not suppose that the way of talking implied in giving positive answers to these questions is absolutely unintelligible. But it seems that we would need to do a great deal more work to show just how it is comprehensible.

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Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Human Act. By CAN LAURENS LÖWE. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. vii + 225. $99.99 (hardcover). ISBN 978-1-108-83364-6.

Thomas Aquinas's account of human action is of perennial interest to scholars of medieval philosophy. The secondary literature on this topic is voluminous. Thus, one might wonder whether there is anything new to say. This recent book by Can Laurens Löwe answers that question with an emphatic affirmative.

The innovative aspect of Löwe's work is the view that Aquinas held a thoroughly hylomorphic account of human action. Of course, the basic framework of human nature is hylomorphic in character; on Aquinas's view, human beings possess a particular kind of soul (the form) that configures matter (to use Eleonore Stump's useful phrase) and (in Löwe's words) determines the particular powers within human beings (14). Furthermore, in Aquinas's account of choice in question 13 of the *Prima secundae*, he argues that choice is formally an act of intellect while materially an act of the will. Löwe's discussion not only delves much deeper into what Aquinas means by this claim but also argues that the human act itself has a hylomorphic structure for Aquinas.

The book is divided into three parts. In the brief part 1, Löwe provides the general framework that will be important for his account and introduces some central notions such as powers, acts, and passions that all play a role in the hylomorphic structure of human acts. He then proceeds to the heart of his account, the hylomorphic components that account for human action. In part 2, he discusses what he calls choice hylomorphism, which forms the foundation for a human act, while in part 3, he concentrates on what he calls act hylomorphism. He ends the book with a brief chapter comparing

Aquinas's explanation of action with those of philosophers working on action theory in the nonhistorical literature. He argues that Aquinas's account avoids many of the difficulties that current accounts face, making it, on his view, an attractive alternative (198). He is willing to grant that Aquinas's account faces its own difficulties—in particular, a commitment to dualism insofar as he holds that the powers of the rational soul that produce human acts are nonphysical (201). Löwe thinks that one need not be committed to dualism in order to support act hylomorphism and sketches briefly how this might work. Although he is not able to develop this defense in this book, he argues the possibility of an answer implies that Aquinas's account ought to be taken seriously by contemporary theorists (202).

On Löwe's interpretation, the human act is a hylomorphic composite of an act of use (the form) plus the commanded act (the matter). What explains the particular act performed by the agent is the hylomorphic structure of the choice that precedes the human act. Löwe acknowledges briefly the activities that precede choice, for example, volition for the end, intention, deliberation (if needed), and consent (31). Nevertheless, his focus is on choice and the human act itself because he is interested in both the ontology of and the explanation (the aetiology, in his words) for the human act, the latter of which, he argues, Aquinas identifies as choice.

The content of a choice is determined by a judgment of the power of reason. This judgment generates an assent by reason to a particular alternative for action, presenting this alternative to the volitional power (the will) as its object. In doing so, reason exerts both formal and final causation on the will (86-89). The judgment of choice enables the will to move itself with efficient causation to incline toward the object presented by reason (97-98). The judgment of choice constitutes what Löwe calls an external form (because it is external to the will). On the basis of this external form, the will generates the choice. Thus, choice has a hylomorphic structure that consists of a volition of the will (the material component) and the content of that volition, that is, the object toward which the will inclines. Löwe calls this inclination the intentional directedness toward a particular alternative, which has been derived from the judgment but is different in nature. This is the (internal) form of the choice (111-13). Choice in turn sets in motion the human act, which is a hylomorphic construction of an act of use (i.e., the form, which is a volition of the will) plus the commanded (bodily or mental) act (i.e., the matter). The act of use follows from an act of command, which constitutes another extrinsic form originating in reason. Command is the act of reason that is generated as a result of the choice (138-39).

Thus, human acts are hylomorphic constructions that are themselves produced by choices, which are also hylomorphic constructions. The details of how these hylomorphic constructions operate is extraordinarily complicated, far too complex to explain in any detail in this short review. For example, the notion of remaining virtually in a power applies at several points along the chain of events. Use is an immanent act while the bodily commanded act is

transeunt. In a corporeal human act, use and the commanded act are both inherently and durationally heterogeneous, while in a mental human act use and the commanded act are inherently homogeneous but durationally heterogeneous. It can be rather tricky to keep these (and other) distinctions straight, but fortunately Löwe provides detailed explanations and helpful examples of these notions and their roles in the causal chain producing human actions.

Löwe has an impressive command of both Aquinas's corpus and the appropriate secondary literature. His detailed interpretation is well supported by references to the relevant texts, with the Latin included in the notes. Every individual component of the account is documented by close readings of passages from across Aquinas's corpus with careful explication of the technical notions and ideas. Engagement with the relevant secondary literature on Aquinas is constant throughout his discussion.

Furthermore, Löwe is well versed in the current literature on human agency. He often incorporates technical ideas from this body of literature (suitably cited and described) into his explanations of Aquinas's ideas. Such an approach runs the risk of anachronism, but Löwe demonstrates how current ideas can help to explicate the often-obscure notions found in Aquinas's own discussions.

I will end this review with some points I found surprising. First, a minor point, but one that might startle those familiar with the literature on Aquinas's account. I found it surprising that Löwe translated *appetitus* as "striving" instead of the standard "appetite" or "inclination." This is obviously a minor point, but, at least in my view, the English word "strive" has connotations not found in the Latin. The more standard translations also better preserve the sense of *appetitus* as a technical term.

More surprising to me was the failure to mention an additional factor in Aquinas's account of human acts, namely, the passions of the sensory appetite. Löwe discusses the general idea of a passion as an exercise of a passive power insofar as it is moved (18). This proves to be an important idea in his discussion of act and choice hylomorphism. But as far as I can tell, he never acknowledges the role played by the particular passions located in the sensory appetite.

Of course, Löwe is correct that ultimately intellect and will are the powers that drive human action, but the passions can affect the operations of reason and will, whether well or badly, which in turn can impact the particular action chosen by the agent. It is true that, on Aquinas's account, the passions are not able to determine the activities of the rational powers if those powers are functional. Still, I would have thought that such a thorough account of human action as the one presented by Löwe would have acknowledged the influence of the passions at least in a footnote. Perhaps he did so, and I missed it, but I saw no such mention. This is especially surprising given Löwe's acknowledgment that the metaphysics of Aquinas's account is an important foundation for his ethical theory (see 30-33).

As Löwe notes, human beings engage not only in physical acts but in mental acts as well. In his discussion of the structure of mental acts, Löwe focuses on reminiscing, which is an act of sensory cognition grounded in recollection. This discussion was fascinating, but I wondered whether an analogous explanation would apply to the operations of intellective cognition. Löwe briefly mentions intellective cognition in a footnote in chapter 1; his worry there is whether Aquinas can maintain a distinction between the volitional act of use and the mental act itself, given that both acts are nonphysical. Such a distinction would be necessary to maintain the hylomorphic account. It is not clear to me that Aquinas cannot maintain a distinction between them, given that the act of use is volitional and the mental act itself is not, but clearly this is a topic for future investigation.

Finally, Löwe argues that, for Aquinas, choice explains why we are moral agents subject to praise and blame. This is because we choose our actions freely. Thus, choice accounts for the freedom of human action. Löwe argues that the need to account for this freedom explains why Aquinas privileges choice in his theory of action (see 31-33 and 139). I concur that for Aquinas, free choice is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, as Löwe notes. But I would like to suggest that for Aquinas choice is pivotal in another respect: which particular action is performed is determined by choice. To adopt one of Löwe's reoccurring examples, the fact that I take a walk instead of engaging in yoga is also a function of choice over and above its status as free.

This book makes an innovative and impressive contribution to the field of Thomistic studies of human agency. It will, however, most likely be of interest primarily to scholars who have at least a passing familiarity with Aquinas's account of action. Although Löwe provides detailed discussion and many well-chosen examples, the discussion is dense and highly technical. Nevertheless, it is also highly original and engaging.

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Pride, Politics, and Humility in Augustine's "City of God". By MARY M. KEYS. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. 253. $99.99 (hard). ISBN: 978-1-009-20107-0.

This book represents a careful reading of Augustine's *City of God* through the optic of virtuous humility and its antithesis, sinful pride, especially in the political sphere. The author proceeds by commenting sequentially on each of

the twenty-two books of Augustine's *magnum opus*, adhering closely to this "rhetorical dialectic," pride-humility.

For Keys, "Augustine's humility is the virtue or excellence by which human beings willingly acknowledge their dependence on God and their essential equality with their fellow human beings and strive to live accordingly with right worship, justice, moderation and mercy." Pride, on the other hand, "resists rightful subordination to God and disdains equality with one's fellow human beings." In the political sphere, pride "propels to domination, war, and oppressive, inequitable peace" (10).

In her treatment of the first five books, Keys shows how pride opposes "what is by nature right in human affairs" (16). Here she traces Augustine's treatment of the harmful effects of pride on Roman political history. For example, pride blinds pagan leadership to the horrors of war. In book II, Augustine challenges Roman historian Sallust's claims about the respect for natural right and justice that allegedly characterized Rome's polity. He does so by citing Sallust's own words to show that this was not the case. In book III, Augustine continues to refer to Sallust's account of Roman history to contend that pride negatively impacted social and familial relationships in pre-Christian Rome. Keys suggests that Augustine's treatment of virtuous moderation in book IV closely parallels his concept of humility. Augustine employs moderation as a counterpoint to pride and its moral and political consequence, domination, in order to propose a close parallel between the harmony of a virtuous family and a moderately sized kingdom, which Rome was not content to be. Roman pagan religion is reintroduced into Augustine's analysis for nurturing this prideful ambition on the part of Rome's political leaders. At this point, too, Augustine nods in the direction of a later, fuller account of Christ as the exemplar of humility which promotes a different, Christian polity. Love of glory led Roman leaders to the folly of imperialism, a theme which Augustine explores in book V. Here he contrasts the humility of Christian heroes, the martyrs, with the vainglory of Rome's pagan heroes and emperors.

Civil religion forms the principal theme of books VI-VII. Keys points out that this theme is the prelude to Augustine's engagement with Plato and his followers in book VIII. She notes that the rhetorical dialectic of pride-humility is for the most part lacking in these books, although they nevertheless play significant roles in the development of that dialectic (46). Hence, books VIII-X mark the "first peak" of Augustine's defense of virtuous humility against vicious pride (70). Following treatments of Socrates, Plato, and the Platonists in book VIII, Augustine turns in books IX and X to Apuleius, Plotinus, and Porphyry. Keys notes Augustine's "pilgrim framework" in these books, which contain lengthy debates on natural theology, including a discussion of the false humility of daemon worship. She treats each "Platonist" philosopher sequentially, and in book IX observes Augustine's contrast of the futility of daemon worship with the humility of the true mediator between God and man, who is Christ. Keys then claims that book X "is pivotal to and a pinnacle

of Augustine's rhetorical dialectic in *The City of God*" (87). In this book Augustine faults Platonic philosophy, especially in Porphyry, for limiting divinity's power while it elevates the mind excessively in the pursuit of happiness. Such philosophers eschew true humility evidenced in the corporeal humanity of Christ as the way to salvation. However, Augustine's condemnation of Platonic philosophy on these grounds is not absolute. He indicates ways in which the great Platonic achievements in ethics, logic, and metaphysics "give rise to true, if imperfect, forms of philosophic humility" (88).

In book XI, Augustine turns to the origin of the two cities, earthly and heavenly, and weaves this treatment into the rhetorical dialectic of pride-humility. Keys observes that Augustine does not treat these cities as polarities, but stresses the mixed nature of citizenship in the heavenly city on account of the flawed condition of human beings living in the world (107). Hence, the cities are entangled with one another in the *saeculum*. It is in these books that Augustine develops his metaphysics and epistemology of humility and pride. Humility depends for its foundation upon an acknowledgement of creatureliness and a rightly ordered love. Pride is understood "only as a defection, a turning away from 'that which supremely is' . . . toward oneself and one's own power, and so toward lesser being" (128). Human humility is motivated by the creation of man and woman as recorded in Genesis.

Following his treatment of the origin and ends of the two cities and the beginning of the human race, Augustine turns his attention in books XIII-XIV to the fall of the first human beings and the propagation of human death. Keys notes that Augustine treats humility in this context as "fertile soil for life" while pride "pollutes the ground and withers life at its roots" (140). Even though she observes that pride (*superbia*) occurs only once in book XIII, and humility (*humilitas*) not at all, she nevertheless argues that humility remains in the background. However, book XIV, which is about original sin and death, is a "book about pride" (153). It also contains a strong discourse on humility. Pride is identified as the source in human beings of "an unnatural being-toward-death." Humility is held up as restoring human beings and divinizing them by participation in God. Augustine holds that the human race should be bound together by concord and peace. Christ exemplifies humility while the devil is possessed by pride.

In books XV-XVIII Augustine treats humility and pride in the context of human history, principally as recorded in Scripture. His overall intention in these books is to inspire readers, through the use of exemplars, to choose to imitate humility in cooperation with divine grace. Keys points out that "he also underscores the limited but nonnegligible benefits citizens can offer to social life and politics in this world" (171). She pays particular attention to Augustine's surprising treatment in book XVIII to the ways in which cities and nations recall "the blessings they have received from remarkable benefactors" (195). Book XVIII concludes with a brief but significant treatment of Jesus the Mediator, the supreme exemplar of humility.

Keys insists that book XIX is "pivotal" to Augustine's overall argument in relation to humility and pride. Humility is presented as the key to the attainment of happiness. The peace which is the hope of the prideful individual negatively contrasts with the peace of a just fellowship under God. In book XX, Augustine turns to the final judgment of human beings. The proud are portrayed as trampling on the dignity of the humble. Jesus' assumption of a human body and soul and his voluntary submission to death bestows on suffering a redemptive value. Augustine thus treats three motives that human beings have for practicing humility: epistemological, moral, and theological.

In book XXI, Augustine faces the reality of the desperate end of those who live for themselves and not for God. Pride plays a key role in their demise. Augustine introduces humility in terms of the universal human need for mercy, and sees hope in the humble attitudes of those who repent of their sins. He also emphasizes "recognition of the possibility of miracles and the rich humanity of openness to being in wonder" (220). This latter theme carries over into book XXII, the final book of his work, where he also continues the treatment begun in book XXI of the *summum bonum* and carries it over into his discussion of the fulfillment of all people and nations in the city of God. This is humility's triumph whereby the citizens of the city of God enjoy the bliss of God's own life, attained as a common good and as a grace.

Keys has given us a supremely readable account of Augustine's *City of God*. Her book, with its thoroughgoing treatment of the rhetorical dialectic of pride-humility, resumes the principal philosophical, scriptural, and theological arguments of Augustine's work. Keys's book represents an original contribution which nevertheless summarizes the best English-language scholarship on that work while it also focuses attention on the wider oeuvre of the bishop of Hippo. As such it is valuable both to novices in the study of the *City of God* and to students of the history of political theory and philosophy who are looking for an appropriate optic to read Augustine's *magnum opus*. My one criticism is that Keys's research is largely limited to English scholarship. For example, she would have found useful Notker Baumann's 2009 monograph, *Die Demut als Grundlage aller Tugenden bei Augustinus*. Nevertheless, the range of her grasp of Augustinian scholarship is remarkably broad. This book is essential reading for all students of the *City of God*. Its treatment of humility and pride in Augustine's thought is thorough as is Keys's placement of this rhetorical dialectic in the context of the political thought expressed in Augustine's work.

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Aquinas, Bonaventure, and the Scholastic Culture of Medieval Paris: Preaching, Prologues, and Biblical Commentary. By RANDALL B. SMITH. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. x + 452. $99.99 (hardback). ISBN 978-1-1088-4115-3.

At the end of the Introduction to this substantial work, Randall B. Smith admits that he is

> aware that different readers will likely use [this book] in different ways. Some will be interested only in Thomas, others only in Bonaventure. Some may be interested only in the historical and cultural "preliminaries" part, others only in the chapters on the relationship between preaching and biblical commentary in the thirteenth century. Still others may pick up the book simply to read about a particular prologue. So although the chapters are meant to form a coherent whole, I have also done my best to organize the book so that it can be more easily accessed as a reference tool. . . . Although I have tried to keep unnecessary repetition to a minimum, crafting each chapter to be able to stand on its own in this way made some repetition unavoidable. The goal has been to produce a book whose parts are as useful as possible for a wide range of scholars with varied interests in the subjects covered. (21).

This admirable statement nevertheless offers small comfort to the conscientious reviewer, faced with more than 450 larger-format pages in (what appears to be) a rather small, dense font. Smith has produced a heroic work, but how many readers will tackle the whole thing is a matter for doubt. In many ways, that would be a shame, since the piling up of evidence and examples and the sheer volume of medieval prologue material makes for an immersive dive into exegetical practice, especially for those unused to its conventions.

Smith's aim is to emphasize the links between preaching and biblical commentary in the work of thirteenth-century Parisian, Scholastic theologians. He wants medievalists to remember that the university chairs of thirteenth-century theologians were, metaphorically speaking, three-legged stools whose limbs were biblical exegesis, disputation, and (crucially, for Smith) preaching. This triple formulation is taken from twelfth-century scholars such as Peter the Chanter, who describes biblical commentary as the foundations, disputation as the walls, and preaching as the roof of the house of faith which teachers set out to build in their students and themselves. Clearly, Smith is right to recall the importance of this triad, and to remind readers of the place of preaching, especially for members of the mendicant Orders who supply his material here. Whether it was the conventions used in preaching that led the way for developments in disputation and commentary, however, or the influence was another way round, I was not quite so convinced. Indeed, in his conclusion (424) Smith seems rather to backtrack from what I understood to be the assertion of the rest of the book: "I have not drawn conclusions about

causality or lines of influence, preferring rather to restrict my comments to 'habits of mind'." Instead, he shifts to a broader aim, to reclaim a wider definition of "Scholastic," which he thinks has too often been used solely to define the argumentative speculative theology of the Paris schools rather than the more inclusive intellectual culture to which the metaphor of building the house of faith gestures.

The meat of the book is the examination of a group of prologues to a variety of works by Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. Smith's argument is that there is a link between the form and manner of production of these prologues and the *sermo modernus* style of Parisian preaching. The *sermo modernus* was a break from the older homiletic mode of proceeding in which the preacher went through the day's scriptural passage one phrase or verse at a time. In the "modern sermon" method, the preacher began with a biblical verse apparently unconnected to the day's reading, using it as a kind of thematic introduction to what was to come. The preacher's skill was shown firstly in the choice of this additional text that would illuminate the nonliteral, "spiritual," meanings of the reading of the day, and then in the clarity with which he expounded those meanings. Smith argues that the proficiency acquired in the preparation of *inceptio* and *resumptio* sermons required of all new theological masters at Paris gave them an expertise that they also employed when creating prologues to their various other works, exegetical and thematic. In this way, he claims, the conventions of the new preaching had much wider effects on exegesis. While I agree entirely about the importance of preaching, I was not so sure of the argument about the direction of travel of the influence on show—or indeed, whether there is a single direction of travel at all.

The book is thus divided into three parts: an introduction to the university culture of the second half of the thirteenth century; detailed studies of each of the Aquinas prologues; and detailed studies of each of the Bonaventure prologues. For readers interested in any of these individual works, Smith pulls together a mass of scholarship and translation, together with his own careful exposition of each of them. It has clearly been a labor of love. For the benefit of readers who may wish to know if their own particular field of interest is covered, the works under consideration are as follows:

> For Aquinas: the prologue to *Rigans montes* (Aquinas's *Inceptio* sermon); the prologue to *Hic est liber* (Aquinas's *Resumptio* sermon); the prologues written as a student for his commentaries on Jeremiah, Lamentations, and Isaiah; the prologue to his *Sentences* commentary; the prologue on *Contra impugnantes*; the prologue to his commentary on Boethius, *De Trinitate*; the prologue to his commentary on the Pauline Epistles; the prologue to his commentary on the Psalms; the prologue to the commentary on the Gospel of John.
>
> For Bonaventure: the prologue to *Omnium artifex* (Bonaventure's *Inceptio* sermon); the prologue to his *Resumptio* sermon (an early

> version of *De Reductione artium ad theologiam*); the prologue to his *Sentences* commentary; the prologue to the commentary on the Gospel of John; the prologue to the commentary on the Gospel of Luke; the prologue to the *Breviloquium*; the prologue to the *collationes* on the Ten Commandments; the prologue to the *collationes* on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit; the prologue on the *collationes* on the Hexaëmeron.

Smith has written previously on Aquinas's preaching and is steeped in his thought and scholarly approach. His admiration for Aquinas's clarity and method of proceeding is not disguised. Nonetheless, that does not prevent him from appreciating Bonaventure's somewhat different gifts, and indeed from celebrating the great Franciscan's stunning literary talent. Often, devotees of one of these thirteenth-century giants seem to have taken sides against the other, so it is refreshing to see Smith finding himself in enjoyable thrall to Bonaventure's luxuriant language. In fact, Smith's detailed celebration of the Latin made me wonder whether or not Bonaventure was in some degree trapped by his own gifts. His remarkable, (usually) triadic phrase-making, with its alliterations, rhyme and scansion, all of which, as Smith notes, may help readers and hearers remember the theological points that Bonaventure is trying to convey, at times seem to take on a life of their own, beyond the exposition of the text. He is so caught up in the medium that the message can seem somewhat distant or esoteric.

What I missed in this book, lost a little in the mass of detail, was a broader imagination of just how the relationship between biblical commentary and preaching worked—the chicken-and-egg problem of what conclusions were acceptable in exegesis and where they came from. Alan of Lille famously said that Scripture had a wax nose, which could be pulled any which way, once it had been softened up. The exposition of these prologues, and of the *distinctiones* and other teaching and preaching aids called in evidence, exemplifies this in spades. Just where do these interpretations come from, and who decides whether or not they are "right"? Part of the answer to this question is certainly to be found in the importance of form or genre in medieval theological teaching—something often forgotten today: what could be claimed in disputation was not always what could be expounded in the lecture room nor, even more, could be preached from the pulpit. In this way, Smith's insistence on looking at prologues as a particular *form* of medieval theological writing is absolutely correct—and I was only disappointed that the wider question is not ever really discussed here.

My other wish was for a consideration of what sort of religion these sermons, with their multiple three-point structure and their complex language, purveyed, and to whom. What is their relationship to the lists of jokes and proverbs we know were also provided for Franciscan preaching in particular, or the descriptions of the troubadour nature of their communication with a vast variety of audiences and congregations? The material Smith uses here is firmly rooted in modern published sources and, though understandable, that is

unfortunate. It means the book has little or no sense of the original form of these materials, where the unsettled quality and character of manuscript transmission gives a different, more provisional view of medieval academic life. Smith has done scholars a real service in putting these prologues together, to be compared side-by-side. He is right to remind his readers that preaching, disputation and exegesis were all part of a medieval theologian's duty. But preaching to whom, and how, and what—those are questions left for another day.

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Christian Platonism: A History. Edited by Alexander J. B. Hampton and John Peter Kenney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. xvi + 497. $130.00 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-1-108-59034-1.

It is gratifying to find a volume devoted to Christian Platonism. The validity of this category is sometimes denied, especially with reference to patristic Platonism. In the Introduction, by editors Alexander J. B. Hampton and John Peter Kenney, the Harnackian model of a pure biblical Christianity as opposed to its Hellenization is rightly called into question. The volume is divided into three sections. Section I, "Concepts," contains six chapters, from the perennial value of Platonism to participation. Section II, "History," offers nine chapters that range from the Bible and early Christianity through the Renaissance to modernity. Section III, "Engagements," contains six chapters that study such topics as natural science, the environmental crisis, and art. Of the twenty-four contributors, only three are women. In the interest of space, I must be very selective and cannot refer to my own scholarship in support of my points or agreements/doubts expressed, but they are all buttressed by arguments, either published or in process.

Lloyd Gerson reflects on the perennial value of Platonism—what I would call Platonism as *philosophia perennis*. Gerson rightly notes that patristic Christians who "wanted to reflect philosophically on their religion did so almost exclusively within a Platonic context" (15). Aristotle was received as propaedeutic to Plato. Gerson lists Aristotle as a Platonist (22; see his book, *Aristotle and Other Platonists*). Aquinas Christianized Platonic metaphysics (32). Something similar, I note, happened with the allegedly Aristotelian *Liber de causis*, based on Plotinus and Proclus. Plato's language of Good, One, Being and Nous and beyond Being and Nous, and overflowing, was received by Origen, Nyssen, Dionysius, and others as terms of God. I agree that Plato's

ethical intellectualism has a metaphysical foundation (19), which can also be found in patristic Platonism, in evil as nonbeing—one of the pillars of the doctrine of apokatastasis, it can be added, in Origen, Evagrius, the early Augustine, Dionysius, and Eriugena. Gerson deals, among other things, with Numenius and Plotinus: the latter's debt to Aristotle is highlighted (25), although Proclus seems to have charged Origen alone, not Plotinus (his fellow-disciple of Ammonius), with Aristotelian innovations. The One as ἔρως (26) was joined to God as ἀγάπη by Origen, Nyssen, and Dionysius. The three Neoplatonic movements, μονή–πρόοδος–ἐπιστροφή (27), were received, I note, by patristic Platonists, such as Origen, Dionysius, and Eriugena, who consciously dovetailed or replaced ἐπιστροφή with apokatastasis. The unity-plurality relation (28, based on Proclus, *Elements of Theology* 1) is connected with the principle "all in all (but οἰκείως)," present in late "pagan" and Christian Platonism. "Having rejected the solution of Proclus, the problem that Damascius revealed appeared to indicate a plausible need for Christian revelation," although Porphyry presented Christian revelation as irreconcilable with Platonism (30). It seems to me not accidental that some identify Damascius with Ps.-Dionysius after converting to Christianity, for there is a continuity between their ideas. Platonists are indifferent to history, Christians not (31)—because of Christ's incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection. This is, I note, a charge against Origen, along with that of postulating many resurrections, although Origen insisted on the centrality and historical unicity of such events—even if they are repeated in the hearts of believers—one crucifixion being sufficient for the salvation of all rational creatures in all ages. The clash over history is also, I find, the reason why the Christian Platonist Dionysius uses the present tense when speaking of God and seems to some not to support apokatastasis because he did not use the future tense.

In chapter I.2, John Dillon and Daniel Tolan investigate the notion of the Ideas as thoughts of God. This theory is traced back to Xenocrates, Alcimus, Antiochus of Ascalon, Philo, Alcinous, and other early imperial Platonists such as Plutarch and Atticus. Clement, whose theory of the Ideas as God's thoughts Origen arguably knew, is somewhat overlooked, but Origen's view is examined within his attack, not on Plato's ideas—exemplarism surfaces throughout Origen's oeuvre—but on the theory that the Ideas are not in the divine mind (and/or the Stoics' Ideas, I might add, given Origen's frequent polemics against Stoic metaphysics), based on the Athenian reading of the *Timaeus*'s Demiurge as different from God. Origen's *On First Principles* 2.2.3, on Wisdom's creation through *species* and *rationes* corresponding to εἴδη/ἰδέαι and λόγοι and his *Commentary on the Gospel of John* 1.19.114-16, on creation assimilated to that of a house or ship, are rightly taken into account. I find this a middle way between the eternity of creatures and an artisanal creation by God also denied in a fragment reported by Eusebius from Origen's lost *Commentary of Genesis*. In the *Commentary on the Gospel of John* 1.19.114-16, the mention of "alpha and omega" suggests that Origen was mindful of Clement. Indeed, Dillon and Tolan correctly mention Philo

and Clement as antecedents; I would add Bardaisan. I only doubt the Clement-Origen dichotomy (49), as both state that the Father is only One and the Son is One-All. Certainly, Origen claims that the Father is beyond νοῦς and οὐσία, but also is νοῦς and οὐσία. This, I think, develops *Resp.* 509B (cited in *Cels.* 6.64) and posits equality and sameness of divinity and eternity (and οὐσία: this is more controversial but arguable). Maximus's λόγοι (50) derive from Origen, and their link with God's will in divine creation and knowledge—a move to preserve God's transcendence—was anticipated, I note, by Ammonius and Pantaenus, received by Origen.

In chapter I.3, Andrew Radde-Gallwitz reflects on God One and Trinity. I think the novelty of Origen is paramount in the doctrine of one God in three hypostases, so much so that Origen arguably impacted even "pagan" Platonism. Radde-Gallwitz studies the relation between Trinity and Triad; I think the main discrimen is the latter's hierarchic structure. Radde-Gallwitz is correct that Christian theories of the Trinity rested on Platonism. Origen and Augustine testify to the importance of Platonism in their conception of God as immaterial. Radde-Gallwitz counters the Arianism-as-Platonism trope that joins Origen, Arius, and Eunomius. There is another narrative maintaining that Christianity shifted from the intelligible-sensible distinction to the creator-creatures distinction: Radde-Gallwitz contests it, as I did. Nyssen had both; even in his last work, *Homilies on the Song of Songs* 3, Nyssen maintained that the former is supreme. I concur that "presuming an irreconcilable conflict between Platonism and Christianity" (68) in Gregory is misleading. Dionysius posited God as beyond intelligible being (ibid.), I suspect because he depended on both Origen and Proclus, arguably joining them in a double-reference scheme, as he often does. I agree that pro-Nicene theology is based not only on Platonism, but also on Scripture—because, I add, these were *Christian* Platonists and the opposition of the Bible to Platonism/Hellenism is misleading, Scripture being often already Hellenized from books of the OT to the NT, not to mention its Platonizing reading from Philo to Origen.

In chapter I.4, Kevin Corrigan observes that "Christian Platonism" is problematic, but "Platonizing Christianity" suggests Harnack's thesis. I find "Christian Platonism" no more problematic than "Islamic Platonism" or "pagan Platonism" (the last problematic because of "pagan," a label often rejected in history of religions). That Demiurge and Chora are coeval is "anathema to Christianity" (82): this is true, but not of all Christians, not Justin or (if Christian) Calcidius. Corrigan gives three examples, focusing on Plotinus, of how "Platonic 'pagan' thought was decisively influenced" by Christian Platonism (85). I agree and have argued for other instances, for example in Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus. The soul-body relation is closer than previously thought (98), as I had argued. For Gregory of Nyssa, the preexistence of soul without the preexistence of body contravenes fundamental principles of Platonic thought (96). Origen, I note, claimed analogously that his interpretation of *creatio ex nihilo* was supported by Plato.

Both Origen and Plotinus were disciples of Ammonius Saccas (90): I concur, although the footnote refers to scholarship arguing that they did *not* study under one Ammonius. I agree about the identification of hypostases with ἀρχαί in Περὶ ἀρχῶν (90), for which I argued at length. Double creation in Gregory and Evagrius (95) is another element in this interesting chapter.

In chapter I.6, Rudi te Velde explores "Aquinas and His Neoplatonic Sources" on the Platonic category of participation. Besides Dionysius, Augustine and Boethius, I add that Origen used it often—and strategically with respect to his Logos Christology. I observe that the four conditions of Christian creation that te Velde checks for compatibility with Neoplatonism are all present in Origen: *creatio ex nihilo*, the world as nondivine, creation by a free God, the world's diversity as positive (although resulting from the Fall, for Origen it is an expression of freewill and will result in universal restoration).

Section II begins with Mark Edwards, who studies in II.1 the Bible and early Christian Platonism. An important role in philosophical exegesis was played by allegoresis. Philo influenced Origen here—as in much else. The goal of the Christian ascent is not the One or the Good, but God (157)—of course, as *Christian* Platonism. This did not prevent Platonic transcendence from being an inspiration to Christian apophaticism. No Catholic attempted to show that the Trinity is like the Neoplatonic Triad (160): the difference, I think, is primarily hierarchy, and Origen and especially Nyssen refrained from embracing it; Synesius, Neoplatonic bishop, is ambiguous, but is he included in the "Catholics"?

In chapter II.2, Kenney studies Christian Platonism in late antiquity, offering an overview, necessarily incomplete (e.g., little on Origen, no mention of Synesius) and with scanty literature: he lauds "advances" in this field (162), but cites very few. And patristic Platonism still needs much painstaking research. I agree, as would Beierwaltes, that Platonism grounded Christian transcendentalism. Origen integrated Platonism with Scripture, posited the Logos as seat of the intelligibles, and theorized *creatio ex nihilo* in parallel with Platonist interpretations of the *Timaeus* in which the Demiurge produced the Receptacle (173). Origen's theology of freedom is rightly highlighted. Henotheism (166) was central to Christian appreciation of Plato. The role of "pagan" philosophy in Christian self-definition is correctly acknowledged (162). The use of the *Chaldaean Oracles* was not a "failure of nerve" by Platonists (164) but, I add, denotes a revelation not so different from Scripture: both needed philosophical exegesis. Scripture's deeper meaning is disclosed through philosophical allegoresis, already used by Stoics and Platonists. For Augustine, Platonism is notionally the soundest philosophy although insufficient to salvation (179). The Cappadocians, Ambrose, and Augustine are indebted to earlier Christian Platonism and Nyssen revisited Origen's theology in light of Nicaea and Plotinus (176). I add that Nyssen did not correct Origen, and Plotinus was likely known partially to Origen too. Origen is said to display a "hierarchism" (176) that should be nuanced, but it

is correct that hierarchism was "endemic to Platonism." Among the "few ancient Christians who studied formally as members of a Platonist school" besides Origen, who studied at Ammonius' like Plotinus (166), I would add Synesius (who attended Hypatia's school) and perhaps Dionysius, with his arguable double-reference strategy (e.g., he uses θεουργία for liturgy and replaces ἐπιστροφή with ἀποκατάστασις) and his possible formation in Athens, where he absorbed Proclus's thought.

In chapter II.4, Torstein Tollefsen treats Christian Platonism in Byzantium, concentrating on Ps.-Dionysius, Maximus, and Palamas. That they were "not conscious of being Platonists" (206) might be true of Maximus and Palamas, probably not of Dionysius. Tollefsen highlights God's radical transcendence, the Forms/λόγοι, the theory of procession/reversion—which I note Christian Platonists such as Dionysius and Eriugena arguably joined to apokatastasis intentionally. For Maximus, the Logos is incarnate both in Jesus and in Scripture's words and hidden meanings (as he is for Origen). Created substances are not eternal (218). This, I note, is the same position as Origen's: the Forms-Logoi are eternal in God's mind but creatures' substances are created at a certain point. *Divine Names* does give the impression that the world has no temporal beginning and is everlasting (211). This is why, I suspect, it seems that Dionysius excludes apokatastasis as he speaks of it in the present, but this is because God is beyond time and Dionysius joins apokatastasis to ἐπιστροφή. In Palamas, the δύναμις-ἐνέργεια theory (221) derives from the Cappadocians, who in turn arguably derived it from Origen (and probably Iamblichus).

In chapter II.5, Stephen Gersh examines Ficino as the paradigm of Renaissance Christian Platonism, offering a brilliant account of Ficino's engagement with the Platonic tradition. Ficino found profound convergences between Plato and Scripture—as did Origen, Nyssen, Augustine, and others. The ancient theological tradition was perfected by Plato, interpreted by Plotinus, and transmitted by Ficino's translations. He did not take up metensomatosis—like Origen, I note: they knew Plato expounded it only mythically and never as a theory of his own. Both accepted a voluntary, not ontological change: vicious people become *like* animals in their behavior, not by transmigration. As Origen assumed both a common inspiration by the Logos and Plato's dependence on Jewish Scripture to explain the convergences between Plato and Christianity, so does Ficino explain such convergences by assuming that Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, and Proclus knew John's Gospel and Dionysius. The latter was in fact unknown to Origen but John was commented on by Amelius and Origen. Ficino thought that Origen's Platonism was the truest form of Platonism, explicitly said that Plotinus was a disciple of the Christian Ammonius with Origen, and deemed Dionysius the pinnacle of both Platonism and theology (237): I find this in line with Dionysius's aforementioned double-reference scheme. Ficino appreciated the theory of the divine Logos containing all the paradigms of creatures, citing Philo, Amelius, and Iamblichus. This exemplarism was supported by Philo, imperial Platonists,

arguably Bardaisan, and Origen. Ficino found in Platonists, including Plotinus, traces of the Trinity—although the Triad, as noted above, was hierarchical.

Derek Michaud (II.7) tackles Christian Platonism in early modernity, mostly in the Cambridge Platonists. He uses Douglas Hedley's edited Cambridge Platonism online sourcebook. Cudworth adduced "Clement and Origen . . . the Christian Platonist tradition" (288). Apokatastasis is not discussed but intimated: Conway thought, "our fallen condition cannot result in eternal damnation" (293). Apokatastasis, I remark, was important in the Cambridge Platonists—not surprisingly, as it was central in Origen.

In chapter II.8, Douglas Hedley examines the deep influence of Platonism on Romanticism: the Platonic legacy in Leibniz (including the Monads as "fulgurations of the Divinity") and Shaftesbury, the influence of Boehme, Hamann, Jacobi, and the Muenster circle, and the impact of Platonic politics on De Maistre. Hedley assumes, like De Maistre (and Ficino), that Origen was clearly a Platonist (310).

Among others, there are suggestive chapters in sections II and III by Catherine Pickstock on Christian love and Platonic friendship, Lydia Schumacher on Christian Platonism in the mediaeval West (a partial reception, often not in Greek), and Stephen Clark, on multiplicity and unity. I definitely agree with Clark: "Plotinus' Platonism, I suggest, is closer to the Christian version, despite some ambiguities, than most Christian scholars have recognized" (472). Further research on the Origen-Plotinus comparison is needed. The same is the case with Porphyry, who studied with Plotinus and Origen. The rhetorical question, "Does this constitute a real difference between the Plotinian and the Christian view of Origen's creative activity?" (481), invites a negative answer with which I concur. Exemplarism in creation, like much else, is remarkably similar in Origen and Plotinus.

There are some typos: for example, "Move" for "Mover" (23); "Porphyry's of first principles" for "Porphyry's *triad* of first principles" (56); "we will better positioned" for "we will *be*" (58); a possible repetition of *Enn*. VI.7.[38]4-5 and its interpretation (96; 97); "the Platonism" for "Platonism" (170), "related all other humans" for "*to* all" (219), "the mind form above" for "from" (223), "he arguable embraces" for "arguably" (297), and missing cross-references such as "see p. 000 above" (235 etc.).

This dense volume is very welcome and should be complemented and deepened by a detailed study of patristic Platonism and monographic treatments of, and commentaries on, single thinkers and works.

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