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THE BURNING COAL: THOMAS AQUINAS ON LOVING AND EATING CHRIST IN THE EUCHARIST

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THOMAS AQUINAS'S biographers record that, receiving Viaticum in the last days of his life "with devotion and tears," he made an eloquent profession of his Eucharistic faith and love. Asked whether he believed the consecrated Host to be "truly the Son of God, who came forth from the womb of the Virgin, hung on the arms of the cross, died and was raised on the third day for us," Thomas answered:

> I truly believe and know for certain that this is true God and man, the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin mother, and so I believe in my soul and confess in words what is stated by the priest about this most holy sacrament. . . . I receive you, price of the redemption of my soul; I receive you, viaticum of my pilgrimage, for the love of whom I have studied, kept vigil, and labored. You I have preached and taught; I have never said anything against you.[1]

Thomas shifts in the second half of his profession to the familiar second person; as he receives the Eucharist, he addresses it directly, not in its appearances as sacrament, but in its reality as Christ himself, union with whom is the only-desired reward for all of Thomas's earthly labors.

Thomas's prayer is the grateful consummation of a well-attested lifelong devotion to Christ truly present in the Eucha-

[1] William of Tocco, *Ystoria Sancti Thome de Aquino* 58 (C. Le Brun-Gouanvic, ed., *Ystoria sancti Thome de Aquino de Guillaume de Tocco [1323]: Édition critique, introduction et notes*, Studies and Texts 127 [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1996], 197-98).

rist. William of Tocco reports that at the elevation during Mass, Thomas had the habit of addressing the Lord directly by reciting the second part of the *Te Deum*, from "You, O Christ, are the King of glory," through its ending plea for redemption and heavenly fulfilment: "Come, then, Lord and save your people, bought with the price of your own blood, and bring us with your saints to glory everlasting."[2] His final prayer to Christ in the Eucharist reveals a depth of desire that can sometimes be glimpsed even beneath the surface of his theological writings on the sacrament.

Thomas's Eucharistic theology is shaped not only by his conviction of the reality of Christ's presence, but by his insight into how this makes the Eucharist truly the "sacrament of charity." In this essay, I will argue that Thomas, while he is justly well known for his metaphysical elaboration of the doctrine of transubstantiation, defends a strongly realist view of Christ's presence in the Eucharist for mystagogical and spiritual, not simply philosophical, reasons. In particular, I will attempt to show why, contrary to the assessment of some recent scholars such as Gary Macy and Louis-Marie Chauvet, Thomas's attention to Christ's substantial presence in the Eucharist secures, rather than undermines, the fullness of its signification. Furthermore, I will argue that Thomas's reasons for insisting on the metaphysical reality and abiding nature of Christ's presence after the consecration help to elucidate his claim, mostly unelaborated, that "the actual receiving of the sacrament produces more fully its effect than the desire for it alone."[3]

I will begin by outlining some relevant questions raised in recent scholarship, then discuss the context of Thomas's claims in his own theology of the Eucharist as both sign and reality. I hope to show how Thomas's realism provides the foundation for an understanding of the sacrament as true spiritual food—as Christ himself, given and intimately received in love—in which

[2] William of Tocco, *Ystoria*, 198.

[3] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3; cf. q. 79, a. 1, ad 1. Translations of the *Summa theologiae* are based on *S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia Iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vols. 4–12 (Rome: Leonine Commission, 1888-1906). Translations from Latin are my own unless otherwise noted.

charity functions as the keystone holding together the Eucharist as true sign and as true presence. This central role of charity reveals a sometimes underappreciated personalist dimension of Thomas's Eucharistic theology. As the true presence of Christ, and therefore as the preeminent sign of the reality of God's abiding love, the Eucharist, enkindling charity in us, is for Thomas the unifying and deifying sacrament *par excellence*.[4]

I. SCHOLASTIC PITFALLS? THOMAS'S EUCHARISTIC THEOLOGY IN RECENT SCHOLARSHIP

The role of sacramental signs in Thomas's thought, not only as the instrumental causes of grace, but as essential means for engaging the human body, mind, and heart for fruitful reception of that grace, has not always been appreciated, in comparison with the attention given to his more metaphysical considerations. This is perhaps especially true in the case of the Eucharist. And yet, as in his treatment of creation and the Incarnation, Thomas's ontological arguments about the sacraments are all at the service of his teaching on God's loving and personal communication of his goodness to human persons to bring them into relationship with himself.

As is well known, Thomas devotes considerable space in his treatise on the Eucharist in the *Summa theologiae* to an examination of transubstantiation, the Real Presence, and related questions about the persisting accidents of bread and wine. The clarity of his doctrine on these metaphysical matters earned for him a privileged place of authority at Trent and in subsequent magisterial teaching.[5] Less importance has historically been

[4] I am grateful to colleagues who provided very helpful suggestions on various aspects of this essay, especially Boyd Coolman, Gary Culpepper, Bruce Marshall, Jeremy Wilkins, and two anonymous peer reviewers.

[5] However, in the period following Thomas's death his teaching on transubstantiation was not uniformly embraced by Scholastics even in the Dominican Order, and was notably opposed in the Franciscan tradition. See David Burr, "Eucharistic Presence and Conversion in Late Thirteenth-Century Thought," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 74, no. 3 (1984): 26-27. This opposition can be related in some cases to an underlying suspicion of Aristotelianism (ibid., 105). Whereas for Thomas (and Bonaventure) transubstantiation was a way of

placed on his treatment of the sacrament *qua* sacramental sign. Perhaps because of this, his teaching on the sacraments in general and the Eucharist in particular have sometimes been characterized by modern theologians as excessively metaphysical, mechanistic, or nonpersonal.

At least two related loci of concern emerge in these critiques of Thomas's Eucharistic theology. The first is a perceived inattention to the sacrament as symbol, in its scriptural, liturgical, and relational context. Second, and as a consequence, it is argued that the Scholastic distinction between the Eucharist as sacrament (*sacramentum tantum*), as reality and sacrament (*res et sacramentum*), and as reality alone (*res tantum*), led Thomas to allow a metaphysics of Christ's substantial presence (the *res et sacramentum*) to override a theology of the Eucharist as sign. What is more, especially in his insistence that Christ's presence remains in the Eucharist as long as the accidents persist, regardless of the recipient, Thomas purportedly emphasizes the metaphysical stability of the *res et sacramentum* at the expense of its connection to the Eucharist's ultimate effects of grace for human persons alone (the *res tantum*).

A) Problems with Signification

Louis-Marie Chauvet has been especially influential in developing the thesis that Thomas's treatment of the Eucharist is excessively mechanistic or "productionist," and lacking in an adequate anthropological, historical, and scriptural foundation. Chauvet presents these views in his widely read *Symbol and Sacrament*, where he mounts a critique of Scholastic sacramental theology as represented by Thomas Aquinas for these

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explaining Christ's presence, for later Franciscan theologians who accepted the "possibility of presence without conversion," transubstantiation came to seem like more of "a problem to be solved" and was ultimately rejected (ibid., 107). On opposition by Ockham to Thomas's teaching, see John T. Slotemaker, "Ontology, Theology and the Eucharist: Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham," *The Saint Anselm Journal* 9, no. 2 (2014): 1-20. For an in-depth discussion, see Marilyn McCord Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

reasons.[6] Chauvet opposes his postmodern hermeneutic of language and symbol, which he considers most suitable for expressing grace as a relation between persons, to Scholasticism's metaphysical approach, with its "productionist" focus on the instrumental causality of grace.[7] The latter is, by his definition, alien in its categories to the realm of the symbolic order, static rather than dynamic, and inadequate to the task of elucidating the gracious relation between God and humankind.[8] Chauvet is critical too of Thomas's doctrine of transubstantiation, which "seems *dangerous*" especially because of the notion that the Eucharist is perfected in the consecration of the matter, rather than in its reception by the human subject, as is the case in the other sacraments. Thomas argues this because Christ is contained in this sacrament "in an absolute manner" (that is, in his Real Presence); this, Chauvet contends, too easily

[6] Louis-Marie Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1995), 2-3.

[7] Chauvet posits that while grace is the paradigmatic case of that which is "a *non*-object, a *non*-value . . . the category of *causality* is always tied to the idea of production or augmentation." Thus, Scholastic sacramental thought, represented by Thomas, is burdened by an inbuilt defect tied to its very mode of expression: "There is an (apparently fundamental) heterogeneity between the language of grace and the instrumental and productionist language of causality" (*Symbol and Sacrament,* 7). For a helpful overview of the twentieth-century background of Chauvet's thought in alternative approaches to the sacraments focused on symbolism and liturgical participation, see Reginald Lynch, O.P., *The Cleansing of the Heart: The Sacraments as Instrumental Causes in the Thomistic Tradition* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2017), 54-66, especially 55 n. 123.

[8] "Because of its distinctive metaphysical bent . . . Western thought is unable to represent to itself the relation between subjects or of subjects with God in any way other than one according to a technical model of cause and effect" (Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament,* 22). The focus of theology must shift, Chauvet contends, in the direction of the believing subjects themselves (ibid., 41), renouncing the scheme of "explicative" causality and embracing rather the symbolic scheme of language, of culture, of desire, and thus setting up "a discourse from which the believing subject is inseparable" (ibid., 43). According to Chauvet, Thomas's sacramental theology, as an extension of a Christology in which the humanity of Christ is understood as a conjoined instrument, is static, failing to advert to the dynamism understood by the Fathers to be present in the historical economy of grace that involves both God and neighbor in living relationship (ibid., 456).

leads one to "conceive the *esse* of Christ in the Eucharist without the relation of his *ad-esse* to the Church."[9]

Chauvet considers a loss of the true meaning of the Eucharist to be an inevitable consequence of Scholasticism's metaphysical focus on substance, as opposed to a symbolic approach in which Christ's presence is understood in terms of relation (as "*being-for, being-toward*").[10] Because of an excessive focus on transubstantiation, he contends, attention to the symbolic value of the bread and wine in their liturgical context of gift and sharing is neglected by the Scholastics, who do not "take into account this semantic richness of bread and wine in the Bible." Rather, the question of "how" the conversion happens is disconnected from its purpose: Christ's gift of himself to humanity, "a gift so much a gift that he gives it in the form of food and drink."[11] Thomas's sacramental theology flows from his Christology, Chauvet observes, "a Christology fundamentally determined by the hypostatic union," and is thus static and ahistorical. The dynamism of sacramental theology was lost because by a loss of "insertion into the historical movement of the 'economy,'" the *sacramentum* has been "deprived . . . of its relation to the biblical *mysterium* from which it originated."[12]

B) Problems with the Threefold Paradigm

A related critique of Thomas's Eucharistic theology is that his metaphysical attention to Christ's substantial presence in the Eucharist (the *res et sacramentum*) not only undermines its sign value (as *sacramentum tantum*), but also detracts from a proper understanding of the relationship of sacramental reception to the ultimate effect of the Eucharist (the *res tantum*). Like other medieval theologians, Thomas received from the Augustinian tradition the notion of grace, charity, and unity as the *res tantum,* or ultimate reality, of the Eucharist. Thomas draws

[9] Ibid., 388-89. See *STh* III, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3.

[10] Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament,* 392.

[11] Ibid., 393.

[12] Ibid., 456.

upon a threefold Scholastic distinction which had become traditional by the thirteenth century.[13] The final effect of the sacrament in believers is the *res tantum*—the “reality alone” towards which all the symbolism of the Eucharist points, and which is not itself a sign of anything else. The *res tantum* is mediated by the *res et sacramentum* of the Eucharist, that which is both reality and sacrament or sign—the substantial presence of Christ’s Body and Blood. Both realities are symbolized by the *sacramentum tantum*, that which is sacrament or sign only—the accidents of bread and wine in the Eucharistic rite.

In this tripartite scheme, the true presence is both *res* and *sacramentum* because it is both a reality signified by the species of bread and wine and itself further signifies the Eucharist’s *res tantum*. Furthermore, because Christ himself is the *res* of the *res et sacramentum*, his presence is not only sign but also direct cause of the *res tantum* of grace, charity, and unity. Boyd Coolman remarks insightfully that the threefold paradigm

> created a space for the living Christ to be present, not as an inert “thing,” not as a miraculous but static *factum* of his true body and blood, but as the active personal agent of salvation, the direct and immediate source of saving power and spiritual life. . . . The sacramental “space,” as it were, that opened up between the presence of Christ himself (*res et sacramentum*) and the salvific effect (*res tantum*) of his saving activity becomes the sacramental “theatre” of the dramatic encounter between believers and Christ . . . the ecclesial incubator and generator.[14]

Peter Lombard, drawing especially from the Victorine tradition, shaped the tripartite formula in the twelfth century by adding that the twofold *res* of the sacrament can be distinguished, in

[13] On the development of this threefold distinction and its application to sacraments other than the Eucharist see Boyd Taylor Coolman, “The Christo-Pneumatic-Ecclesial Character of Twelfth-Century Sacramental Theology,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Sacramental Theology*, ed. Hans Boersma and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 201-4. For a comprehensive analysis of its origin and development from the time of the Berengarian controversy in the early eleventh century up to the time of Thomas, see Ronald F. King, “The Origin and Evolution of a Sacramental Formula: *Sacramentum Tantum, Res et Sacramentum, Res Tantum*,” *The Thomist* 31 (1967): 21-82.

[14] Coolman, “Christo-Pneumatic-Ecclesial Character,” 206.

that the *res et sacramentum* is both signified and contained in the Eucharist, while the *res tantum* is signified but not contained.[15] In the wake of ninth- and eleventh-century controversies about the mode of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, the threefold formula and Lombard's distinction helped to focus attention on what came to be called Christ's substantial presence in the sacrament, while also indicating its purpose not as an end in itself, but as signifying and bringing about the ultimate reality of the unity of his mystical body, the Church.

Some scholars, however, have argued that this paradigm was not without its pitfalls, for an overemphasis on the distinctions between different aspects of the Eucharist could lead to their disconnection or even opposition. Theologians in the High Middle Ages understood the ultimate unitive purpose of the Real Presence to be achieved not by bodily sacramental eating alone, but by spiritual reception of the *res tantum* of the Eucharist through faith and love. Indeed, spiritual reception of the *res tantum* by desire was held to be possible even without sacramental eating. Gary Macy and others have observed that an increasing emphasis was placed in this period on the possibility of spiritual communion alone, as sacramental reception by the laity and even those in religious life became less frequent.[16] In Macy's view, the teaching that reception of the *res tantum* was the purpose of the sacrament "provided theological support for the growing practice of 'spiritual communion,'" in which "spiritual eating" of the Eucharist through union with Christ by faith and love substituted for actual sacramental reception, especially among the laity.[17] For

[15] Peter Lombard, IV *Sent.*, d. 8, c. 7.

[16] The infrequency of sacramental reception in the early thirteenth century is attested by the Fourth Lateran Council, canon 21, *Omnis utriusque sexus*. This canon decrees that the faithful of both sexes should, after confession, "reverently receive the sacrament of the Eucharist at least at Easter unless they think, for a good reason and on the advice of their own priest, that they should abstain from receiving it for a time" (Norman P. Tanner, S.J., *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 2 vols. [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990], 1:245).

[17] Gary Macy, "Theology of the Eucharist in the High Middle Ages," in *A Companion to the Eucharist in the Middle Ages*, ed. Ian Levy, Gary Macy, and Kristen Van Ausdall (Leiden: Brill, 2012) 365-98, at 391.

instance, Macy notes that "Writing in the early thirteenth century . . . William of Auxerre would describe sacramental communion as the prerogative of the priest while the people receive spiritually."[18] Such a focus on the *res tantum*, he argues, lent "theological justification . . . for the infrequent sacramental communion that marked this period."[19]

Edward Kilmartin too sees a disconnection between the *res et sacramentum* and the *res tantum* at this time, which he traces back to Peter Lombard's distinction between the reality "signified and contained," and the reality "not contained," with deleterious consequences for a proper appreciation of sacramental communion. Kilmartin argues that "subsequent to P. Lombard's analysis, the grace of the sacrament of the Eucharist, with few exceptions, was placed outside the sacrament itself as the 'thing signified but not contained.'"[20] In Kilmartin's view, while Lombard's influential doctrine highlighted Christ's "somatic real presence," it "obscured the eschatological dimension of the actual event of the reception of the sacraments of the body and blood."[21] That is, Kilmartin argues, a shift took place after Lombard that moved the focus away from an earlier, more integrated way of thinking eschatologically about "the saving effect of the reception of Holy Communion . . . as a grace radiating from the eucharistic body, which enables spiritual communion with the glorified flesh of the risen Lord . . . in the midst of the heavenly Church."[22] To distinguish the three dimensions of the Eucharist without adequately relating them, it seems, could lead to their conceptual disjunction, with the practical effect of devaluing sacramental reception. Such an

[18] Ibid. Macy refers to William of Auxerre, *Summa de officiis ecclesiasticis* (Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France) lat. 15168, fol. 89v2.

[19] Macy, "Eucharist in the High Middle Ages," 391. Sr. Albert Marie Surmanski identifies some negative and positive contemporary "readings" of this decline in sacramental reception with greater devotional focus on the elevated host: Sr. Albert Marie Surmanski, O.P., "Adoring and Eating: Reception of the Eucharist in the Theology of Albert the Great," *Antiphon* 20 (2016): 213-40, at 213-14.

[20] Edward Kilmartin, *The Eucharist in the West: History and Theology*, ed. Robert J. Daly (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1998) 63.

[21] Ibid., 64.

[22] Ibid., 64-65.

application of the threefold paradigm would not create, but would rather dismantle, the "sacramental space" in which Christ is present for believers as the "active personal agent of salvation."[23]

In addition to arguing that the Scholastic theology of the *res tantum* contributed to undermining the frequency of sacramental reception in this period, Macy notes an increasing and more philosophical focus on the *res et sacramentum*. Like Chauvet, Macy thinks that this development, for Thomas at least, trumps the sign value of the Eucharist. Macy argues that it was in association with an "enhancement of the power of the priesthood" after the Fourth Lateran Council that "this period . . . saw a dramatic insistence on the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Christ was personally and truly present in every Mass, and only the priest could make this presence possible. The Eucharist became a moment of divine presence and clerical power."[24] In addition, Lateran IV's use of the language of transubstantiation helped to stimulate a focus of thirteenth-century theological debates on the Eucharistic change. As a result, increased attention to the *res et sacramentum* of the Real Presence included especially the use of Aristotelian metaphysics to define more precisely how transubstantiation takes place, and under what circumstances Christ's Body and Blood becomes, and stays, present. Macy points out that Thomas (and Albert the Great) emphasized the continuance of Christ's presence in the Eucharist so long as the species remain, once the substantial change has taken place. Albert, Macy claims, went "further than any of his predecessors . . . in emphasizing the importance of metaphysics over the theology of sign" by arguing that "the body and blood must be present in the stomach of an animal or infidel, a suggestion Alexander [of Hales], William [of Melitona] and Bonaventure reject. It is no wonder that Albert made this suggestion tentatively."[25] Macy goes on to say that

[23] Coolman, "Christo-Pneumatic-Ecclesial Character," 206.

[24] Macy, "Eucharist in the High Middle Ages," 370.

[25] Ibid., 387. It should be noted however that the evidence for Albert's and Thomas's opinion being so much in the minority is not as strong as Macy suggests. See below for further discussion of this question. On Albert's view of different modes of Eucharistic

Thomas too was in the minority in the thirteenth century with his "full-fledged defense" of the opinion that once the bread and wine have been substantially changed into Christ's Body and Blood, they remain, objectively speaking, wherever the species are, regardless of the intentionality of the receiver. Macy comments critically that for Thomas, as for Albert, "the necessary metaphysical connection between the accidents of the bread and wine and the substance of the Body and Blood overrode the theological understanding of the Eucharist as a true sign."[26]

One must ask, then, whether these criticisms are apt. Does Thomas's insistence on Christ's abiding substantial presence emphasize the metaphysical reality of the *res et sacramentum* in such a way as to undervalue the sign value of the Eucharist, as Chauvet and Macy contend? And how does Thomas relate the Eucharist as sign and reality to the *res tantum*? To address Kilmartin's concern, does the focus on Christ's substantial presence as "contained" in the sacrament obscure its relation to the grace "not contained" (and potentially available apart from the sacrament), undermining Thomas's appreciation of the eschatological dimension of actual sacramental reception? In other words, does Thomas hold together the parts of the threefold formula in their proper relation, unity, and balance, so as properly to delineate what Coolman calls "the sacramental 'theatre' of the dramatic encounter between believers and Christ"?

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reception, with attention to developments in his thought, see Surmanski, "Adoring and Eating," 224-32.

[26] Macy, "Eucharist in the High Middle Ages," 389-90. Macy draws on the work of Yves de Montcheuil, who compares Bonaventure and Aquinas on the question of whether Christ ceases to be in the sacrament when it is touched by the lips of a sinner ("La raison de la permanence du Christ sous les espèces Eucharistiques d'après Saint Bonaventure et Saint Thomas," in *Mélanges théologiques* [Paris: Aubier, 1946], 71–82). He remarks that Thomas bases his reasoning on philosophical considerations of the sacramental matter, while Bonaventure bases his on a "religious notion of the sacrament: it is essential to a Christian sacrament to be destined for men, it is essential to a Christian sacrament that the sensible element have sign value" (ibid., 81; my translation). See below for further discussion.

C) Recent Thomist Responses

A number of recent studies have countered the charge by Chauvet and others that for Thomas metaphysics trumps symbol, Scripture, history, and relationality in the sacraments, showing that Thomas foregrounds all of these especially in his mature sacramental theology. His general definition in the *Summa theologiae* of sacraments as "signs of sacred things sanctifying men," as John Yocum notes, differs from his earliest definition in the *Scriptum on the Sentences*, which focused primarily on the New Law sacraments only as causes of grace.[27] Thomas's broader, mature definition of a sacrament in general as a sign simply speaking allows him to encompass both Old Law and New Law sacraments, and also to distinguish them; both are signs leading men to exercise the virtue of religion, but only those of the New Law are both signs and causes of grace. This development not only highlights the role of the sacraments as ordained to worship, but also demonstrates their "historical and social dimension" in the sweep of salvation history from creation to the eschaton.[28] Yocum notes that for Thomas Old Law sacraments function as signs of the New; New Law sacraments themselves anticipate figuratively the bliss of the beatific vision, in which all need for sensible signs will pass away. The sacraments are adapted to the human condition, and bestowed within human history shaped by the narrative of Scripture.[29]

In his careful examination of the development of Thomas's thought on sacramental causality, Bernhard Blankenhorn shows effectively that in Thomas's mature teaching on the sacraments as instruments bestowing grace his use of metaphysics is deeply shaped and directed by reflection on Scripture's realistic claims that the believer's salvation comes through the power of the

[27] John P. Yocum, "Sacraments in Aquinas," in *Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction*, ed. Thomas Weinandy, Daniel Keating and John Yocum (New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 159-81, at 160. See *STh* III, q. 60, a. 2.

[28] Yocum, "Sacraments in Aquinas," 164.

[29] Ibid., 163-64, 167. See *STh* I-II, q. 101, a. 2; q. 103, a. 3.

mysteries of the Word made flesh.[30] Far from turning grace into a reified object or thing, the instrumental power of the sacraments flowing from the hypostatic union allows "a real participation in the efficacy of past historical events, a spiritual contact with the power of Christ's saving actions."[31] This is true of all the sacraments, but the Eucharist especially, because of the substantial presence, "applies the instrumental power of Christ's humanity and its work of justification in both corporeal and spiritual ways."[32] For Thomas, grace is not a "thing produced" but a relationship graciously bestowed by God as a gift of love, "nothing other than a share in the divine nature," which brings human persons into union with him. This sacramental gift is given in the context of a genuine "psychological and ontological encounter with the power of Jesus' actions and sufferings during his earthly lifetime."[33] Indeed, "it is precisely metaphysics that enables the insertion of the sacraments into the dynamism of salvation history, a precious goal for Chauvet."[34]

Blankenhorn demonstrates in more detail elsewhere how Thomas's use of metaphysics in the treatise on the sacraments in the *Summa* is set firmly within a scriptural view of salvation history.[35] By examining how Thomas employs texts from Romans 6 earlier in the *Summa*, in conjunction with the exegesis of his Romans commentary, Blankenhorn shows that "Aquinas's doctrine of sacramental efficacy is the fruit of a meditation on St. Paul, guided by the Fathers, in light of the liturgical practice of the Church, with the help of Aristotelian, Platonic, and original metaphysical tools." Thomas's

[30] Bernhard Blankenhorn, O.P., "The Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments: Thomas Aquinas and Louis-Marie Chauvet," *Nova et vetera* (Eng. edition) 4 (2006): 255-94.

[31] Ibid., 290.

[32] Ibid., 273.

[33] Ibid., 291.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Bernhard Blankenhorn, O.P., "The Place of Romans 6 in Aquinas's Doctrine of Sacramental Causality: A Balance of History and Metaphysics," in *Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life*, ed. Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010) 136-49.

metaphysics of sacramental causality, in other words, supports a kerygmatic teaching on the power of God's gift of grace to human persons in Jesus Christ; it is woven into a "subtle, complex dialectic" with the scriptural, patristic and historical sources which all enriched Thomas's theological reflection.[36]

II. Signs Sanctifying Men

As Thomas takes up the traditional threefold scheme, and the associated distinction between sacramental and spiritual eating, he integrates them into his larger teaching about human sanctification through grace, charity, and Christ's sacraments.[37] He does insist, in contrast to some of his contemporaries, on the permanently abiding ontological finality or "truth" of the substantial presence after the consecration in all circumstances; but this is not the only distinctive aspect of his Eucharistic theology. While he teaches like others that there can be a spiritual eating of the Eucharist by desire alone, in which the *res tantum* is received without the sacrament, he argues that it is better to eat *both* sacramentally and spiritually. The possibility of a purely spiritual communion does not mean that "sacramental eating is . . . without purpose, because the actual receiving of the sacrament produces more fully its effect than the desire for it alone."[38] Thomas does not entirely explain why this is so in any one place, except to say that an eating by desire would be in vain if one were not to fulfill it when possible.[39]

As I will discuss below, Thomas's view of sensible sacraments as fitting instruments for our embodied nature is part of the reason for this claim, though there is more to it than that in the

[36] Ibid., 149.

[37] On Thomas's distinction between spiritual and sacramental eating, and its relation to the threefold formula, see also Joseph Wawrykow, "The Sacraments in Thirteenth-Century Theology," in *The Oxford Handbook of Sacramental Theology*, ed. Hans Boersma and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 218-34; 226-28.

[38] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3; cf. q. 79, a. 1, ad 1.

[39] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 11.

case of the Eucharist.[40] Sacramental baptism too produces fuller effects than baptism of desire alone in adults.[41] But because the Eucharist contains Christ himself, Thomas emphasizes even more the connection between sacramental reception of Christ's Eucharistic Body and its life-giving effects, using insights he gained from reflection on Scripture in the light of patristic teaching. He argues that one must approach the Eucharist with an even greater reverence and devotion than any other sacrament, for in sacramental reception one actually eats the body of "the Son of God, who came forth from the womb of the Virgin, hung on the arms of the cross, died and was raised on the third day for us."[42] Sacramental reception of Christ's true Body thus requires especially serious discernment of one's worthiness of disposition. Thomas is aware that frequency of sacramental communion has varied through history; he attributes the comparatively infrequent reception by the faithful in his time to a decline in the fervor of faith and charity since the early Church. Yet he is distinctive among his contemporaries in encouraging sacramental reception as frequently as one is well disposed, even daily, making no distinction in this between clergy and laity.[43]

Why does Thomas adopt these somewhat distinctive positions about the Eucharist? Is there a connection between them? Does his insistence on the abiding presence of Christ help to explain his teaching that there is a greater fullness of effect in well-disposed sacramental reception than in reception that is

[40] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 4.

[41] *STh* III, q. 69, a. 5, ad 1. See below for further discussion.

[42] William of Tocco, *Ystoria*, 197.

[43] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 10. For a thorough discussion of Thomas's distinctive emphasis on frequent communion in its thirteenth-century context, see Andrew Hofer, O.P., "Frequent Communion for the Greater Glory of God: Thomas Aquinas and Ignatius of Loyola," in *Thomas Aquinas and Ignatius Loyola: Resourcing the Jesuit Tradition*, ed. Justin Anderson, Matthew Levering, and Aaron Pidel, S.J. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, forthcoming). Hofer shows that Thomas strengthened his support for the possibility of frequent and even daily communion for the well-disposed between the *Scriptum* and the *Summa*, and proposes that Thomas's teaching on this matter was a key source for Ignatius of Loyola's legacy to the Jesuits of encouraging frequent communion for the glory of God.

only spiritual, so that he encourages frequent communion? The answer, I think, must take account of the full theological weight he gives to each of the three dimensions of the Eucharist, within one integrated vision of this "sacrament of charity" as a life-giving personal encounter between Christ and the human believer in the mystical body of the Church. Following his patristic sources, Thomas takes seriously the notion of the Eucharist as a true "sign sanctifying men"[44]—involving the signification of both the *sacramentum tantum* and the *res et sacramentum*—and at the same time he holds a strongly realist account of Christ's abiding presence and the objective instrumental power of the Eucharist to communicate Christ's life and so bestow the *res tantum*. In Thomas's Eucharistic theology, it is only if the Eucharist is a true sign of the true presence that it can truly be the sacrament of charity given to rational human persons. Thomas's concern to establish the abiding metaphysical reality of Christ's presence in the Eucharist does not sidetrack or oppose the meaning of the Eucharist as a sign and cause of communion, but rather anchors its signification and transformative power.

A) Sacraments and Anthropology

Thomas's attention to the sign quality of the sacrament is firmly rooted in his anthropology, and therefore in his understanding of the highest human end, to know and love God in eternal life. Drawing on Augustine, pseudo-Dionysius, and Scripture, Thomas argues that sensible signs are fitting for human persons, embodied spirits who access intelligible realities through material ones.[45] The signification of the sacrament is determined by the words added to the visible elements and actions; indeed, every aspect of the liturgical ritual contributes to this signification.[46] The sacraments are founded on the Incar-

[44] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 2.

[45] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 4. See Augustine, *Tractates on John* 80.3; and Dionysius, *Celestial Hierarchy* 1.2.

[46] E.g., *STh* III, q. 66, a. 10; q. 83.

nation, in which the Word's assumption of human nature was itself necessary for our salvation because of our embodied spiritual nature. The sacraments "have a certain conformity" to the Word incarnate, "in that the word is joined to the sensible sign, just as in the mystery of the Incarnation the Word of God is united to sensible flesh."[47] Exterior reception of the sacrament confers interior grace, bestowing a deifying "participation in the divine nature," and bringing about conformity to Christ.[48] Reginald Lynch notes that, for Thomas, sign and cause are not opposing or isolated categories of sacramentality; rather, "Aquinas is able to describe the signate and causal value of the sacraments as different dimensions of the same motive whole, working under the direction of the same principal agent."[49] The sacraments by signifying apply the saving power of Christ's Passion to those who receive them, communicating its effects as extended instruments of his humanity, which itself is the conjoined instrument of the Godhead.[50]

In accord with his integrated anthropology, Thomas thinks that in all of the sacraments the Incarnate Word applies the power of his Passion (suffered in his humanity) to both souls and bodies. To souls he acts in his humanity as an instrumental efficient cause of grace, and to bodies enlivened by graced souls he acts as a kind of exemplar cause also. In a question on the causality of the sacraments as instruments of Christ's humanity, Thomas explains Augustine's teaching that "the Word, as he was in the beginning with God, vivifies souls; as he was made flesh, he vivifies bodies":[51]

> The Word, as he was in the beginning with God, vivifies souls as principal agent, but his flesh, and the mysteries accomplished in it, operate instrumentally for the life of the soul. For the life of the body, however, they

[47] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 6.

[48] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1.

[49] Lynch, *Cleansing of the Heart,* 87. On the development of Thomas's views of sacramental instrumentality see ibid., chaps. 2 and 3.

[50] *STh* I-II, q. 112, a. 1, ad 2; *STh* III, q. 62, a. 5.

[51] Augustine, *Tractates on John* 19.15. See *Tractates on the Gospel of John 11-27*, ed. John Rettig (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988).

act not only instrumentally, but also through a certain exemplarity, as was said above.[52]

Thomas refers here to his teaching in an earlier question that Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours.[53] He quotes Augustine's text elsewhere to explain, again, that Christ will vivify bodies as judge in the resurrection through the instrumentality of his humanity, for "the resurrection of Christ, and the mysteries he completed in the flesh, are the cause of the future resurrection of bodies."[54] However, while "the efficiency of Christ's resurrection extends to the resurrection of the good and wicked alike, its exemplarity extends properly only to the good, who are made conformable to his sonship, according to Rom 8:29."[55] We can infer that when Thomas says that the sacraments act with a life-giving exemplarity for bodies he means that their exemplar causality is at least proleptic, communicating the power of Christ's resurrection, with an ultimate eschatological effect in the glorification of the risen bodies of the just who have been conformed to him by the grace of adoption.

What difference does it make, then, to receive the effect of a sacrament (the *res tantum*) only spiritually but not sacramentally? Thomas makes it clear that in all the sacraments, founded on the Incarnation for embodied human persons, spiritual reception alone has a lesser effect than a reception that is both spiritual and sacramental. His teaching on this is most explicit where he discusses the sacrament of baptism, although similar principles apply *a fortiori* to the Eucharist as well. In sincere reception of baptism (i.e., one that is both spiritual and sacramental), the full effects of the sacrament are received—justifying grace (the *res tantum*) with full remission of the debt

[52] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 5, ad 1.

[53] *STh* III, q. 56, a. 1.

[54] *Super Ioan.*, c. 5, lect. 4 (759, 762). All citations of the Commentary on John are based on R. Cai, ed., *S. Thomae Aquinatis Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura*, 6th ed. (Turin: Marietti, 1972); parenthetical numbers refer to paragraphs in this edition. Cf. *Quodl.* X, q. 1, a. 2; *Super Ioan.*, c. 6, lect. 7 (discussed below).

[55] *STh* III, q. 56, a. 1, ad 3.

of punishment (both eternal and temporal), and also the spiritual character (the *res et sacramentum*). The latter configures one to Christ by participation in his priesthood, with the permanent spiritual power to receive other sacraments in the external acts of Christian worship.[56] Even in insincere reception of the sacrament of baptism (i.e., one that is only sacramental and not spiritual), one still receives the *res et sacramentum*, and is "configured" to Christ by the character, although not salvifically "conformed" to him by grace.[57]

On the other hand, in spiritual reception alone (i.e., in baptism of desire), because one does not receive the sacrament, one does not receive the *res et sacramentum* of the baptismal character that incorporates a person in Christ as a visible member of his body. Baptism of desire does incorporate one in Christ "mentally" by grace.[58] Yet, by desire alone, one will still not receive the full effects of baptismal grace given by actual reception of the sacrament to one who is well-disposed. One can be saved by living faith in Christ's Passion through baptism of desire and so be freed from guilt and the debt of eternal punishment.[59] But a fuller remission of guilt, and of the full debt of temporal punishment, as well as an increase in grace and virtues, is bestowed by subsequent water baptism.[60] In baptism of desire, temporal punishment is still due for sins committed in the body arising from attachment to temporal goods. A catechumen who dies before reception of the sacrament will be saved by desire for baptism, but "as by fire," that is, by purification in purgatory for the debt of temporal punishment

[56] *STh* III, q. 63, a. 2. Baptismal character incorporates one into Christ permanently and visibly as a member of his body, the Church. The character's purpose, as Colman O'Neill puts it, is "the making of *valid sacramental signs*" (Colman O'Neill, O.P., "The Instrumentality of the Sacramental Character: An Interpretation of *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 63, a. 2," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 25 (1958): 262-68, at 268.

[57] Insincere baptism makes one only a dead member of Christ's body, although when insincerity ceases the person will receive the whole effect of baptism. *STh* III, q. 8, a. 3; q. 69, a. 9, a. 10.

[58] *STh* III, q. 69, a. 5.

[59] *STh* III, q. 68, a. 1, ad 1; q. 68, a. 2.

[60] *STh* III, q. 69, a. 1, ad 2; q. 69, a. 4, ad 2; q. 70, a. 4, ad 5.

accrued by sins in the body.[61] By baptism of desire, Thomas says, one "is regenerated in the heart though not in the body."[62]

In his commentary on John 3:5 ("unless one is born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God"), Thomas gives three reasons why water is necessary for full regeneration in baptism, in both body and soul. The first has to do with the way sacraments were instituted to sanctify the whole of human nature:

> For man consists of soul and body, and if the Spirit alone were in his regeneration, only what is spiritual in man would be shown to be regenerated [*ostenderetur regenerari*]. Therefore in order that the flesh also be regenerated, it is necessary that, in addition to the Spirit through whom the soul is regenerated, there be also something corporal, through which the body is regenerated, and this is water.[63]

It is by the signification of corporeal washing ("showing" bodily regeneration by symbolic immersion into Christ's death and resurrection) that the sacrament causes the regeneration of the body as well as of the soul. Sincere reception of the sacrament applies Christ's Passion to the person with all its effects for body and soul; one is fully conformed to Christ, so that one is "healed just as if he himself had suffered and died," and "had offered sufficient satisfaction for all his sins," that is, for both the eternal and the temporal debt of punishment.[64] The exception to this (baptism of blood in martyrdom) proves the rule, because its fullness of effect results from conformation to Christ's Passion in both body (by imitation of Christ's act) and soul (by the fervor of charity).[65]

The other reasons Thomas gives in his John commentary for why water baptism bestows full regeneration also have to do with sacramental signification. First, as a means of human instruction: water is used "for the sake of human understanding" that the sacrament washes clean from sin, since we

[61] *STh* III, q. 68, a. 2, ad 2; q. 68, a. 3.

[62] *STh* III, q. 68, a. 2, ad 1.

[63] *Super Ioan.*, c. 3, lect. 1 (443).

[64] *STh* III, q. 69, a. 2.

[65] *STh* III, q. 66, a. 11, a. 12.

naturally "know spiritual things through sensible things." Also, something material is used for the sake of "congruity of causes." This is a reason from fittingness: because "the cause of our regeneration was the Incarnate Word . . . it was fitting that in the sacraments, which have their efficacy from the power of the incarnate Word, there be something corresponding to the Word, and something corresponding to the flesh, or body."[66] The first of these reasons relates to Thomas's view that, while sincere sacramental reception bestows the total sacramental effect in body and soul, the fullness of this sanctifying effect, even in sacramental reception, depends further on how much one cooperates with grace, by engagement of the mind and heart with the sacramental signs.

Thomas gives considerable attention to the way in which sacramental reception enables the soul, through the instrumentality of the senses, to engage most fruitfully with the material signs. Thomas develops in his later writings the position that it is precisely by signifying grace that New Law sacraments cause it (*sacramenta significando causant*).[67] These sacraments cause grace by signifying the gracious divine action of which they are an instrument.[68] Some Old Law sacraments, such as the immolation of the paschal lamb, signified typologically the holiness of Christ; prefiguring his Passion, they were signs of the faith by which the patriarchs could be justified.[69] But only after Christ's Passion could justifying grace actually be conferred through the instrumentality of external material signs.[70]

The sacraments fittingly cause grace by signifying because they sanctify people, whose intellects and wills are involved and are elevated by grace through the sacramental signs. The power

[66] *Super Ioan.*, c. 3, lect. 1 (443).

[67] This formulation is not seen in the *Scriptum,* where he echoes Peter Lombard (IV *Sent.*, d. 1, c. 4), but is present, e.g., by the time of *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 2, ad 12; for discussion on this point see Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas: Faith, Reason, and Following Christ* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 269-70.

[68] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 1.

[69] *STh* III, q. 60, a. 2, ad 2. Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 103.

[70] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 6. See Blankenhorn, "Instrumental Causality," for a thorough discussion of the development of Thomas's thought on the instrumental causality of the sacraments.

of New Law sacraments to cause grace comes from divine institution, but as instruments of divine power they work in their own proper way as *signs*, the suitable means by which divine realities are encountered by embodied rational beings. Like other medieval theologians, Thomas draws on Augustine for an understanding of sacraments as visible words or signs of an invisible reality.[71] To describe the way in which spiritual power is in the sacraments, he uses Augustine's analogy for the sacraments of a voice speaking words perceptible to the senses, which move the hearer in virtue of the mental concept they convey.[72] The sacraments touch the senses and in the very act of doing so produce effects on the soul, moving it by the power of God, "for soul and body together constitute a unity."[73] As discussed above, grace is not a "thing produced" by the sacrament and transferred to persons; rather, it is the action of God transforming persons from within, by giving them a share in divine life and so a new relationship with himself.

The key here is that the notion of causing by signifying involves engagement by the knowing and loving receiver of the sign. This means that the recipient too has an instrumental role—not in the causing of grace, which belongs to God alone, but in the extent to which the grace takes effect, insofar as that is dependent on his or her cooperation. Inherent in Thomas's very notion of sacrament as sign is that, precisely as such, the sacrament engages the person in an interior dynamism toward God, given supernatural finality by grace. God brings humans to himself through the instrumental operation of their own bodily senses and intellect and will under grace. In this dynamic both human person and sacrament operate with instrumental power, the sacrament signifying and the recipient engaging the sacramental sign with all his faculties. Therefore, a sacrament objectively and efficaciously bestows grace by the power of

[71] See, e.g., Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 10.5. This text became widely known, as it was quoted by Peter Lombard in IV *Sent.*, d. 1, c. 2.

[72] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 4, ad 1. Cf. Augustine, *Tractates on John* 80.3; *De doctrina christiana* 2.3.

[73] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2.

God,[74] but the fruitfulness of the sacrament in the individual depends too on the instrumental causality of the person who receives it. Like all instruments, the human person can be well or ill-disposed, can cooperate or place obstacles to grace, and to this extent can determine the effect of the sacrament in himself.[75]

B) Disposition and Devotion

The fullness of sacramental effect takes hold in the recipient who is well disposed to embrace the offered grace.[76] The most important aspect of this worthy disposition is devotion, the internal act of the virtue of religion. Thomas describes a spectrum of the degrees to which the grace of baptism takes effect in its recipients, depending on their level of devotion:

> For some approach with greater, some with lesser, devotion. And therefore, some receive more, some less, of the grace of newness; just as from the same fire, he receives more heat who draws nearest to it, although the fire, in itself, sends forth its heat equally to all.[77]

Devotion is "the will to give oneself readily to things concerning the service of God"; it springs from charity and also feeds it, increasing its warmth and making one ready to serve God with the "friendly deeds" that make one grow in friendship with him.[78] Devotion springs especially from meditation on God's goodness and loving-kindness, and on the shortcomings that make one need to lean on God. Such considerations arouse the "spiritual fire" of charity.[79] Because of our need to be led through the sensible to the invisible, "matters relating to

[74] *STh* III, q. 64, a. 1.

[75] For a helpful discussion of thirteenth-century Scholastic views of the importance of subjective disposition, focusing on Aquinas and the Eucharist in particular, see Wawrykow, "The Sacraments in Thirteenth-Century Theology," 223-24 and 227-28.

[76] See also Daria Spezzano, "Conjoined to Christ's Passion: The Deifying Asceticism of the Sacraments according to Thomas Aquinas," *Antiphon* 17 (2013): 73-86.

[77] *STh* III, q. 69, a. 8. See also q. 69, a. 9.

[78] *STh* II-II, q. 82, a. 2, ad 2.

[79] *STh* II-II, q. 82, a. 3.

Christ's humanity are the chief incentive to devotion" among all the "supremely lovable" divine things. Thomas's own devotion to Christ Crucified emerges as he writes that the consideration of Christ's Passion above all leads one to both sorrow for sin and joy in God's loving-kindness.[80] There can be a kind of sorrow, too, that arises from longing for God; even the joy of surrendering oneself to God's goodness causes "a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy God fully, according to Ps 41:3, 'My soul has thirsted after the strong living God,' and afterwards it is said, 'My tears have become my bread'."[81] Noting Thomas's own habit of weeping while at prayer, Paul Murray remarks that he seems to speak "out of the depth of his own contemplative experience" where he writes of tears shed in devotion: "Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one considers something that gives joy mixed with pain."[82]

Since the contemplation of the Passion is the greatest incentive to devotion, it is not surprising that in the Eucharist such devotion is all the more important for worthy reception. Indeed, "greater devotion is required in this sacrament than in the others, for the reason that the entire Christ is contained therein."[83] This devotion should be felt even by those not participating, since, as the sacrament of the unity of the whole Church, the Eucharist is offered for the salvation of all.[84] On the other hand, one who receives the sacrament without belief in Christ's true presence commits an especially grievous sin, showing "contempt towards Christ who is in the sacrament." As in insincere baptism, one who eats without faith or unworthily does receive the *res et sacramentum* of Christ's Body, but because in this sacrament Christ himself is present, the fault is much more serious and harmful; it is, as it were, more personal. The sin of unbelief, because it kills charity, "severs one from the

[80] Ibid. and ad 2.

[81] *STh* II-II, q. 82, a. 4.

[82] Paul Murray, O.P., *Aquinas at Prayer* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 27 n. 87; *STh* II-II, q. 82, a. 4, ad 3.

[83] *STh* III, q. 83, a. 4, ad 5.

[84] Ibid., and q. 83, a. 3.

unity of the Church [and] makes him utterly unfit for receiving this sacrament, because it is the sacrament of the Church's unity."[85] Any mortal sin is repugnant to union with Christ himself, and with his mystical body, which are both signified in the Eucharist.[86] The unworthy recipient can be compared to Judas, "because each outrages Christ with the sign of friendship" while at the same time acting against his charity "of which this sacrament is a sign"; sinners even resemble those who slew Christ, because they commit a sin against Christ's Body, although not in its own species.[87]

The devotion required for fruitful sacramental reception of Christ's Body in the Eucharist is assisted by the manner of its liturgical celebration: "Since the whole mystery of our salvation is comprised in this sacrament . . . it is performed with greater solemnity than the other sacraments."[88] It is notable how often in Thomas's detailed question on the Eucharistic rite he refers to the way in which the various words, actions, and symbols used in the liturgy function to arouse the devotion of the participants.[89] Everything in the "celebration of this mystery" is

[85] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 5, ad 2.

[86] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 4. As Paul Keller points out in reference to the question of communion for the divorced and remarried, even spiritual communion is impossible for one in a state of mortal sin. Paul Keller, O.P., "Is Spiritual Communion for Everyone?," *Nova et vetera* (Eng. edition) 12 (2014): 631-55, at 642ff. Keller refers in this regard to an essay by Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole, O.P., "Communion sacramentelle et communion spirituelle," *Nova et vetera* 86 (2011): 147-53.

[87] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 5, ad 1-2.

[88] *STh* III, q. 83, a. 4.

[89] E.g., Thomas notes throughout *STh* III, q. 83 that the use of incense, the consecration of vessels and church, the actions of the priest, the singing and words of the prayers all show reverence to Christ who is truly present and increase the devotion of the faithful. Before the consecration, for instance, "the people are first excited to devotion in the Preface, then they are admonished to lift up their hearts to the Lord, and therefore when the Preface is ended the people praise the divinity of Christ with devotion, saying with the angels, 'Holy, Holy, Holy,' and his humanity, saying with the children, 'blessed is he who comes'" (*STh* III, q. 83, a. 4). Fasting before reception also increases devotion (*STh* III, q. 80, a. 8, ad 6). Sr. Thomas Augustine Becker, O.P., examines the many ways throughout the *Summa* that Thomas emphasizes the importance of devotion and how he links it to the sacraments and ritual solemnity in "The Role of *Solemnitas* in the Liturgy according to Saint Thomas Aquinas," in *Rediscovering Aquinas and the Sacraments: Studies in Sacramental Theology*, ed.

done in order to "represent Christ's Passion, or the disposing of his mystical body," or for the sake of "the devotion and reverence due to this sacrament."[90] The Eucharist's sign value, for Thomas, consists especially in signifying God's loving-kindness in Christ truly present, and so eliciting the devotion and charity of those who receive it.

III. THE *SACRAMENTUM TANTUM*: SIGN OF SPIRITUAL NOURISHMENT

In the threefold paradigm as Thomas adopts it, the signification of the sacraments has two aspects, or rather, one twofold depth, which causes grace and assists in fruitful reception by engaging the devotion of the recipient. The symbols of bread and wine (the *sacramentum tantum*) signify the reality of Christ's Body and Blood (the *res et sacramentum*), and both are signs of the Eucharist's ultimate effect of grace, charity and unity (the *res tantum*). Yet it might be argued that the *sacramentum tantum* and the *res et sacramentum* must be called signs in differing, albeit interdependent, ways. After all, while the material *sacramentum tantum* touches the senses, according to the proper definition of a sacramental sign, the *res et sacramentum* is perceived only by faith. It is a "sign" only insofar as it represents the *res tantum* to the intellect of the one who already knows, by faith, that Christ is present under the sacramental species. The signifying activity of the *res et sacramentum* thus depends, in one way, on the signification of the *sacramentum tantum*, while the latter only fully signifies the effect of grace and charity which the sacrament causes by way of signifying the *res et sacramentum* of Christ's Body. For Thomas, the signifying roles of the *sacramentum tantum* and the *res et sacramentum*, while different in mode, are thus integrally related in causing the *res tantum* of the Eucharist. Therefore, the fullness of each one's signification contributes, in

Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais (Chicago: Hillenbrand Books, 2009) 114-35.

[90] *STh* III, q. 83, a. 5.

a reciprocal manner, to the fullness of effect characteristic of devout sacramental reception. The recipient who most completely engages the sign value of the Eucharist as food not only sees but also eats it, and does so with devotion because it signifies that *Christ* is that food. So, she is most fully united to Christ present as life-giving nourishment, and himself the abiding sign of God's love.

Thomas's philosophical treatment of transubstantiation thus anchors a reflection on the sanctifying power of the sacrament that takes into account the human experience of symbols. The persistence of the accidents is not only a metaphysical problem to be solved; Thomas argues that Christ fittingly instituted the Eucharist under the species of bread and wine, precisely for the purpose of signification.[91] And the meaning of all of the Eucharistic symbolism he describes is transformed by the truth of Christ's substantial presence beneath these accidents. The Eucharistic species carry with them a freight of symbolic values, established by Thomas in the context of questions posed before and after his treatment of transubstantiation, and anticipated in his extensive reflection on the sacraments of the Old Law earlier in the *Summa.* Thomas's teaching here is shaped by a scriptural typology based on salvation history and enriched by a variety of papal, conciliar, and patristic sources. Charity is a unifying thread that weaves in and out of this discussion, tying different symbolic meanings together. Thomas's analogy between the spiritual and corporeal life is well known: the Eucharist provides spiritual food and refreshment, perfecting human life.[92] The bread and wine signify the *res et sacramentum* by signifying the spiritual nourishment of Christ's Body and Blood, for, "through the Eucharist we eat Christ," and indeed, as Augustine says, are changed into what we eat.[93] Their separate reception signifies Christ's Passion, "in which the blood was separated from the body," and this contributes to signifying the double effect of the sacrament in both body and soul. Christ's Body, as

[91] *STh* III, q. 74, a. 1; q. 75, a. 2 ad 3; q. 75, a. 5.

[92] *STh* III, q. 73, a. 1.

[93] *STh* III, q. 73, a. 5, ad 1; q. 73, a. 3, ad 2; cf., Augustine, *Confessions* 7.10.16 (*PL* 32:742).

bread, is received for the health of the body, and his Blood, as wine, for the health of the soul, according to Leviticus 17:14, "The life of all flesh is in the blood."[94]

The *sacramentum tantum* also signifies the *res tantum*; the bread and wine as nourishment signify the unity of Christ's mystical body the Church, bound together as grapes in wine or grains in one loaf by charity. Thomas often refers to this image of the unity of the body in 1 Corinthians 10:17 or in Romans 12:5 to explain why bread and wine are fitting species, as well as to Augustine's use of this image in connection with the idea of the Eucharist as the *vinculum caritatis.*[95] Wheat bread is used, not only because it is commonly available, but to signify the strengthening power of the sacrament, and because, unlike hard barley bread, which "denotes the hardness of the Old Law," the softness of wheat symbolizes "Christ's 'sweet yoke' and the truth already manifested, and . . . a spiritual people."[96] Wine is fitting matter, first because of Christ's institution, but also because of "the effect of the sacrament, which is spiritual," giving joy (the fruit of charity) to the heart (Ps 103:15). The commingling of wine and water in the liturgical rite is done not only because this was likely the custom among Jews of Christ's time, but because it has multiple symbolic meanings, pointing both to the *res et sacramentum* and the *res tantum*: it represents the blood and water flowing from the Lord's side in the Passion, and also the union of the people with Christ and the entrance into everlasting life.[97]

Thomas's awareness of the rich polyvalence of the sacramental symbols is evident in these examples, in which he weaves

[94] *STh* III, q. 74, a. 1.

[95] E.g., *STh* III, q. 73, a. 2; q. 74, a. 1; q. 79, a. 1; cf. *Super Ioan.*, c. 6, lect. 6 (960). For instance, Thomas quotes Augustine's words: "O sacrament of piety! O sign of unity! O bond of charity!" These words come from Augustine's *Tractate 26 on John*, with which Thomas seems to have been quite familiar. Augustine is commenting on John 6:52 ("the bread that I will give is my flesh for the life of the world"). Gilles Emery provides further background for this metaphor in "The Ecclesial Fruit of the Eucharist in St. Thomas Aquinas," *Nova et vetera* (Eng. edition) 2 (2004): 43-60, at 44-46.

[96] *STh* III, q. 74, a. 3, ad 1.

[97] *STh* III, q. 74, aa. 6-8; q. 74, a. 8, ad 2.

together scriptural-historical considerations with spiritual exegesis. However, the foundational reason for the significance of the bread and wine is their use by Christ in his institution of the sacrament to signify his sacrifice in the historical context of Passover, when, before he died, he commanded the disciples to eat his body and drink his blood by eating and drinking these elements of the Passover meal.[98] Thomas repeatedly adverts to this narrative of the Last Supper, for "it was fitting that when the hour of his Passion had come, Christ should institute a new sacrament after celebrating the old, as Pope Leo says (*Serm.* 58)."[99] The Eucharist is both sacrament and sacrifice, because it truly contains Christ; the primary Old Testament figure of the Eucharist is therefore the sacrifice of the paschal lamb, because it foreshadows Christ's Passion, of which this sacrament is a memorial. While each of the threefold dimensions of the Eucharist is prefigured typologically in multiple ways in the Old Testament, the paschal lamb foreshadows them all, most obviously in the case of Christ's body as the slain lamb, but also in that of the bread and wine, associated with the unleavened bread of Passover (Exod 12:8).[100] The first reason Thomas gives for why the use of unleavened bread for the Eucharist is most reasonable is that Christ instituted it during Passover ("on the first day of the Azymes . . . on which there ought to be nothing fermented in the houses of the Jews").[101]

[98] Yocum notes that, for Thomas, the meaning of sacraments is rooted primarily in their divine institution rather than in their natural signification: "This means that, from Thomas' point of view, reflection on the Eucharist as a meal, and its meaning as rooted in the anthropological phenomenon of meals in general, is of limited theological value. Much more to the point is the history within which this particular meal has a place: the Passover celebration which Christ shared with his disciples prior to his suffering on the cross and which is a means of communicating his life" ("Sacraments in Aquinas," 167). Yocum's point is well-taken, although I would argue that Thomas is alive to the way in which Christ himself chooses the meal metaphor by his institution of the Eucharist within that context to teach the disciples about his self-offering.

[99] *STh* III, q. 73, a. 5.

[100] *STh* III, q. 73, a. 6.

[101] *STh* III, q. 74, a 4. The second is that leaven symbolizes corruption, and Christ's body was conceived without this; the third is that unleavened bread signifies the sincerity of the faithful necessary in reception of the sacrament. He does not think,

A key Scripture text for Thomas here is 1 Corinthians 5:7-8: "Christ our pasch has been sacrificed; therefore, let us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." In his commentary on these verses, he ties the presence of the sacrifice to the necessary disposition for reception: the faithful themselves should be "unleavened bread," without corruption, able to feast in truth: "since the sacrificed Christ is our pasch, 'let us feast,' by eating Christ not only sacramentally . . . but spiritually," that is, by relishing his wisdom with spiritual joy.[102] The Eucharist is the celebration of the "true pasch" fulfilling salvation history, and the source of spiritual nourishment signified in multiple ways by the *sacramentum tantum*. It is therefore truly "our daily bread," giving daily strength like the manna in the desert, for "just as bodily food is taken every day, so it is a good thing to receive this sacrament every day," as long as one can approach it with the "great reverence and devotion" it requires.[103] Thomas adds that in this sacrament one "receives Christ himself, whose power endures forever . . . so, since a person has daily need of Christ's healing power, one may commendably receive this sacrament every day." Although reverence may hold one back from daily communion, the urging of hope and love to receive is preferable, so long as one is properly disposed.[104]

Andrew Hofer shows that, while Peter Lombard and Bonaventure stayed close to an Augustinian position of neutrality on daily reception, Thomas moves in his mature thought to this emphasis on its profit.[105] On this question, Thomas is also more permissive than his teacher Albert; Sr. Albert Marie Surmanski notes that Albert, while he certainly promoted a warm devotion

however, that the Greek use of leavened bread is invalid, as it is established by ancient custom and has its own patristic heritage of signification.

[102] *Super I Cor*., c. 5, lect. 2 (247). All citations from Thomas's commentaries on the Pauline letters are based on R. Cai, ed., *S. Thomae Aquinatis Super Epistolas S. Pauli lectura*, vols. 1-2, 8th ed. (Turin: Marietti, 1953); parenthetical numbers refer to paragraphs in this edition.

[103] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 10, corp. and ad 2.

[104] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 10, ad 1 and 3.

[105] Hofer, "Frequent Communion for the Greater Glory of God."

to the Eucharist and acknowledged the benefit of more frequent sacramental reception for the devout laity (e.g., holy women), "is not in favor of daily communion."[106] Thomas, on the other hand, holds that, because the appearances of the *sacramentum tantum* signify nourishment, and because we have daily need of Christ's healing power and growth in love, the Eucharist is fittingly engaged by embodied human beings in daily sacramental eating if possible. It is only because what is eaten and drunk has really become Christ that the Eucharist provides such spiritual nourishment. The Eucharist not only signifies Christ as our food, it *is* Christ, sacrificed to be our food. The meaning of the *sacramentum tantum* as food is transformed by the reality it signifies.

IV. The *Res et Sacramentum*: Abiding Reality and Sign of God's Love

Eating that is both sacramental and spiritual has a fullness of effect because it brings about the fullest union with the *res et sacramentum*, Christ's true substantial presence, embraced in faith as reality and therefore as cause and sign of the *res tantum* of grace, charity, and unity. As noted above, the *res et sacramentum* is a "sign" in a way analogous but not identical to the *sacramentum tantum*, because substantial presence known by faith is not equivalent to physical presence known by the senses. And yet, Thomas does treat the *res et sacramentum* as a true sign, in the sense that the Incarnation itself is a sign or demonstration of God's love toward us. The most fundamental reason Thomas thinks that it means something more to eat the Body of Christ both spiritually and sacramentally is that Christ's presence in the sacrament is both reality and a sign of love and union that is most complete when one actually takes the sacrament into oneself, uniting oneself to Christ by receiving his Body into one's own, as food.

We can begin to see this in Thomas's discussion of the necessity of worthy disposition for sacramental eating. In

[106] Surmanski, "Adoring and Eating," 239.

response to an objection that sinners are permitted to look at Christ in the Eucharist, so should be able to receive him by sacramental eating, Thomas answers:

> The body of Christ itself is not received by being seen, but only its sacrament, because vision does not reach to the substance of Christ's body but only to the sacramental species, as was said above. But he who eats receives not only the sacramental species, but also Christ who is under them.[107]

The special necessity of worthy disposition for sacramental eating implies that there is a fullness of union with Christ that can be had only when his Body is sacramentally received, a fullness lacking in spiritual eating alone, even in the well-disposed. While one is united by faith and love to Christ's presence in Eucharistic adoration, one still does not receive his Body, and so there is still not the fullest possible union. We can gain more insight into why Thomas places such importance on reception that is both sacramental and spiritual by examining his explanations in question 75, article 1 of the *Tertia pars*, at the outset of his discussion of transubstantiation, of why it is so fitting in the first place that Christ's Body is present in the Eucharist "in very truth" and not only "as a figure or sign." Thomas thinks that it is both: the very truth of his presence is what makes the Eucharist a true sign of the Father's love.

A) The "res" of Christ's Presence As "sacramentum" of God's Love

Unlike his earlier treatment in the *Scriptum*, Thomas contextualizes his discussion of transubstantiation in the *Summa* by prefacing it with an examination of the historically controversial question of the "truth" of Christ's presence, which arose out of earlier Eucharistic controversies. He refutes Berengar's opinion that "Christ's body and blood are not in this sacrament except as in a sign, a thing to be rejected as heretical, since it is contrary to Christ's words."[108] The creed of the

[107] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 4, ad 4; q. 83, a. 4, ad 5.
[108] *STh* III, q. 75, a. 1.

Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 had declared as dogma that Christ's "body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the forms of bread and wine; the bread being changed [*transsubstantiatio*] by divine power into the body, and the wine into the blood, so that to realize the mystery of unity we may receive of Him what He has received of us."[109] Perhaps to show the antiquity of the doctrine of the true presence, though, Thomas draws here on patristic authorities for support, with numerous texts he had first collected in his *Catenae* on Luke and John. Hilary and Ambrose affirm that "there is no room for doubt about the truth of Christ's body and blood," and Berengar's contention that Christ is present *only* as in a sign contradicts Christ's words in Luke 22:19 ("This is my body, which will be given up for you"), on which Cyril of Alexandria comments, "since [Christ] is the Truth he does not lie."[110]

Thomas does not reject the idea that Christ is present as signified, or indeed that his presence precisely as both reality *and* sacrament has its own important sign value. This can be seen in the three reasons Thomas gives in question 75, article 1 for why it is so fitting that Christ's Body and Blood truly be in the sacrament. First, the Eucharist is the sacrifice of the New Law perfecting the Old which prefigured it; it is a sacrifice that "has something more; namely, it contains Christ Crucified himself, not only in signification or figure, but also in the truth of the reality." This identification of the Eucharist as a perfect sacrifice, containing the victim himself, takes place in a well-established context in the *Summa*; it tells the reader that this is a sacrament of Christ's perfect charity and filial obedience, which caused human salvation in the priestly self-offering of his body, now made present again.[111] Christ in his sacrificial true presence as signified by the Old Testament sacrifices is itself a sign of God's loving plan for human salvation.

[109] Twelfth Ecumenical Council Lateran IV, canon 1 (Heinrich Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum: A Compendium of Creeds, Definitions, and Declarations of the Catholic Church* [Latin-English], 43rd ed., ed. Peter Hünermann [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012], 802).

[110] *STh* III, q. 75, a. 1. Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Lucam* 22:19 (*PG* 72:912).

[111] Cf. *STh* III, qq. 22, 48.

The second reason for the fittingness of Christ's Real Presence is therefore closely related to the first: the fact that Christ is present in "truth"

> belongs to [his] charity, out of which for our salvation he assumed a true body of our nature. And because "it is most proper to friendship to live together with friends," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix), he promises us his bodily presence as a reward; Matthew 24:28, "Where the body is, there the eagles will be gathered together." In the meantime, neither does he deprive us of his bodily presence in this pilgrimage, but through the truth of his body and blood he conjoins us to himself in this sacrament. So he says (John 6:57): "Whoever eats my flesh, and drinks my blood, remains in me, and I in him." Hence this sacrament is the sign of the greatest charity, and the raising up of our hope, from such a familiar conjoining of Christ to us.[112]

Jean-Pierre Torrell remarks on this passage that the phrase "he unites us to himself in this sacrament" shows Thomas's mature conception of Christ's presence: Christ does not become present in a localized sense (the doctrine of transubstantiation excludes any such overly physical interpretation), but "it is we whom He renders present to Himself." Thomas's composition of the Office of Corpus Christi contributed to this development, as well as to increasingly eschatological and affective elements in his Eucharistic theology.[113] The truth of the Real Presence shows Christ's supreme charity, the very motive for his Incarnation, in which eternal love took on matter.

For embodied humans, friendship desires both spiritual and bodily presence; for this reason, Thomas calls the marital union of body and soul the *maxima amicitia*.[114] God's friendship to us in the Incarnation is greater still, and Christ's perpetual self-gift in the Eucharist is the sacrament of this friendship, applying the benefits of the Incarnation to us. The focus in the text above is on the gift of his bodily presence, conjoining us to him in abiding friendship. This presence of his Body signifies much

[112] *STh* III, q. 75, a. 1.

[113] Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, *The Person and His Work,* trans., Robert Royal (rev. ed.; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 135-36.

[114] *ScG* III, c. 123.

more than that his corporeal accidents are present by means of his substance; rather, it is a gift of personal presence, generously given to "live together with his friends" despite his apparent absence.[115] Thomas, in his commentary on John 6:52 ("The bread that I will give is my flesh"), remarks that "this sacrament is nothing other than the application of our Lord's passion to us. For it was not fitting for Christ to be always with us in his own presence, and so he wanted to supply this through this sacrament."[116] In giving us his true Body and Blood to be eaten in the sacrament, Christ in effect attains the purpose of the Incarnation, completed in his paschal mystery—always to "dwell among us," to manifest and communicate God's love for us, saving us from sin, kindling our charity and uplifting our hope.[117]

Finally, Christ's substantial presence in the Eucharist, as an extension of the Incarnation, perfects faith, the third of these theological virtues: "as Christ [that is, in the Incarnation] shows us his divinity invisibly, so in this sacrament he shows us his flesh in an invisible mode." To assent to and love the truth of the Real Presence by faith is to believe and love the mystery of the Incarnation itself. In answer to an objection that "it is the spirit that gives life; the flesh is of no avail" (John 6:64), Thomas responds with Augustine on John: "Let the spirit draw near to this flesh . . . then the flesh will profit much. For if the flesh is of no avail, the Word would not have been made flesh, that it might dwell among us."[118]

All of Thomas's reasons for the fittingness of Christ's true presence in the Eucharist point to the ways in which, as *res et sacramentum,* it functions as cause of grace and sign manifesting God's love in the Incarnate Word, eliciting knowledge and love of God by the theological virtues, and so bringing about a union with God and others which is the *res tantum.* Article 1, on the

[115] Drawing on Aquinas, Bernard Prusak offers an understanding of Real Presence as personal presence, in "Explaining Eucharistic 'Real Presence': Moving beyond a Medieval Conundrum," *Theological Studies* 75 (2014): 231-59.

[116] *Super Ioan.*, c. 6, lect. 6 (963).

[117] *STh* III, q. 1, a. 1.

[118] *STh* III, q. 75, a. 1, ad 1.

purpose of the Real Presence, placed at the beginning of the question on transubstantiation, provides the hermeneutical key to its content. Far from focusing in an overly philosophical way on the mechanics of the change, or reducing the meaning of the sacrament to the production of a static substance, this question is wholly oriented to supporting an understanding of Christ's personal and sacrificial presence as the means of communion with God, an understanding that is congenial to contemporary approaches to the Eucharist.[119]

B) Christ's Presence As an Abiding Reality

But why is Thomas so insistent that the "truth" of the Eucharist must be *abiding*? I noted above Macy's critique of Thomas's argument that once the bread and wine have been substantially changed into Christ's Body and Blood, the Real Presence remains, objectively speaking, wherever the species are, regardless of the intentionality of the receiver. This is a corollary to Thomas's argument that the Eucharist is completed in the consecration of the matter rather than in its use by the recipient.[120] I have argued that Thomas is alive to the essential role of sacramental signs engaging the mind and heart, and so disagree with Macy's claim that for Thomas, "the metaphysics of the Eucharist outweigh the importance of the intentionality of the believer," or the meaning of the Eucharist "as a true sign."[121] I propose instead that in making such a strong case for Christ's substantial presence in the sacrament as abiding under all circumstances in which the accidents remain, Thomas is employing metaphysics precisely to explain the Eucharist's signification. While Macy and Chauvet seem to oppose metaphysics and sign, Thomas sees them as integrally related aspects of the same reality; the "truth" of the Eucharist as sign flows from and manifests the ontological reality of Christ's presence that metaphysics describes. It is because the presence of the

[119] On this, see Prusak, "Explaining Eucharistic 'Real Presence,'" 233.

[120] *STh* III, q. 78, a. 1.

[121] Macy, "Theology of the Eucharist in the High Middle Ages," 389-90.

Incarnate Word is itself a sign of God's love, which is never withdrawn, that it is so necessary to insist on its abiding truth.

To underline Thomas's insistence on the abiding presence of Christ's Body and Blood in the Eucharist, regardless of the receiver, Macy refers in particular to the famously obscure disputed question *quid sumit mus*.[122] When Scholastic theologians debated the metaphysical permanence of Christ's presence, they proposed a number of standard test cases: what happens when the Eucharist is eaten by a sinner, an unbeliever, or an animal who cannot rationally access its symbolic value—for instance, by a mouse that nibbles on the consecrated host?[123] Many held that in some or all of these cases the substance of the Body and Blood would not remain, ceasing to exist under the species of bread and wine, and some posited that instead there would be a reversion to the substance of bread.[124] These opinions were thought to preserve the dignity of Christ's true body, as well as

[122] Macy's discussion of medieval scholastic opinions on this topic can be found in "Theology of the Eucharist in the High Middle Ages," 378-90.

[123] For a good though brief recent discussion of this question, see Brett Salkeld, *Transubstantiation: Theology, History, and Christian Unity* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2019) 133-35. A classic treatment of this question in early Scholasticism is Artur Landgraf, "Die in der Frühscholastik klassische Frage 'Quid sumit mus'," in *Divus Thomas; Jahrbuch für Philosophie und speckulative Theologie* 30, series 3 (1952): 33-50. Also see, Gary Macy, "Of Mice and Manna: Quid Mus Sumit as a Pastoral Question," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 58 (1991): 157-66.

[124] Bonaventure, e.g., held that Christ's presence would remain when eaten by a sinner (IV *Sent*., d. 9, a. 2, q. 1), but the most probable opinion, to avoid "offense to pious ears," is that it does not remain in the stomach of an animal but reverts to the substance of bread (IV *Sent*., d. 13, a. 2, q. 1) (*Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum Magister Petri Lombardi*, vol. 4 in *Doctoris seraphicis S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia*, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae [Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1889]). The position that Christ's presence would depart had some patristic precedent, e.g., Cyprian: "When one, who himself was defiled, dared with the rest to receive secretly a part of the sacrifice celebrated by the priest he could not eat nor handle the holy [body] of the Lord, but found in his hands when opened that he had a cinder. Thus by the experience of one it was shown that the Lord withdraws when He is denied; nor does that which is received benefit the undeserving for salvation, since saving grace is changed by the departure of the sanctity into a cinder" (*On the Lapsed*, 26 [trans. Robert Ernest Wallis, in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 5, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe (Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1886)]).

the relation of the sacrament to human use.[125] Thomas refers to this disagreement himself in question 80, article 3 of the *Tertia pars*, rejecting these opinions in favor of the view that under all circumstances Christ, having become substantially present, would remain so as long as the species persist. It must be said that Thomas was not in as much of a minority in the thirteenth century as Macy proposes; a similar opinion is given not only by Albert but also by Peter of Tarentais (Pope Innocent V), the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, and others, and later on becomes common.[126] Thomas argues that the "error" in the opinion that

[125] Macy draws in part on the work of Yves de Montcheuil, who compares Bonaventure and Aquinas on the question of whether Christ ceases to be in the sacrament when it is touched by the lips of a sinner or an animal ("La raison de la permanence du Christ sous les espèces Eucharistiques d'après Saint Bonaventure et Saint Thomas," in *Mélanges théologiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946), 71-82. De Montcheuil remarks that Thomas bases his reasoning on philosophical considerations of the sacramental matter, while Bonaventure bases his on a "religious notion of the sacrament: it is essential to a Christian sacrament to be destined for men, it is essential to a Christian sacrament that the sensible element have sign value" (ibid., 81; my translation).

[126] I am grateful to Bruce Marshall for pointing out that the editors of Bonaventure's *Opera omnia* note a number of opinions in agreement with Thomas (4:309): the *Summa fratris Alexandri* IV, q. 11, m. 2. a. 2; Albertus Magnus, IV *Sent.*, d. 13, a. 38; d. 9, a. 5; Peter of Tarentaise, IV *Sent.,* d. 13, q. 1, a. 6; Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* IV *Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, n. 2; and other later commentators. Some texts on which Macy relies are not clear in their rejection of the idea that the mouse, though never eating sacramentally, still objectively eats the Body that remains substantially under the accidents as long as they remain. To deny that the Body is "present" symbolically for animals is not the same as to deny that it is objectively present regardless of the recipient (cf. Macy, "Theology of the Eucharist in the High Middle Ages," 381). Alexander of Hales in his disputed questions, for instance, certainly says that the mouse cannot eat sacramentally, in the sense of attaining to the *res* of the sacrament, but does not actually rule out the premise (in an objection) that the Body of Christ remains substantially wherever the species are. He identifies what the mouse does as "a kind of carnal eating, though properly not even carnal eating, because there is no division of substance, but there is nothing but division of the accidents alone" ("quodam modo manducatio carnalis, et adhuc, proprie non est ibi manducatio carnalis, quia non est ibi division substantiae, cum non sit ibi nisi division accidentium solum") (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae Antequam esset Frater*, q. 51, d. 7, memb. 3 [ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), p. 970, no. 208]). Cf. idem., *Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, d. 13, a. 8 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae [Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1957] 204). This position

Christ's presence would depart from the sacrament arises from ignorance of the distinction between corporeal and spiritual eating. In all these situations, the true Body of Christ is eaten, objectively, but, on the part of the sinner, infidel, or rodent, the spiritual *res tantum* is not received.

It is instructive that the reason for this is different in each case, and depends on the extent to which the recipient can access the full sign value of the sacrament. Only humans who are capable of belief and devotion for this sacrament can eat Christ spiritually as well as sacramentally, and the engagement of their will is even more important than that of their intellect; those who are lacking the use of their reason may still have some devotion for the sacrament, and can benefit from receiving it.[127] On the other hand, the believing mortal sinner does eat sacramentally, recognizing it as the Body of Christ, but he does not eat spiritually. His sin has left him in a state of dead faith without charity, imperfectly incorporated into Christ's body.[128] Indeed, his reception is itself a mortal sin, because he falsely professes to attain what it ultimately signifies: unity with Christ and his mystical body (the *res tantum*).[129] Sin hinders charity and is the graver the more one holds Christ in contempt.[130] The mortal sinner thus engages the sign only partially, with his intellect but not his will. If eating is a sign of union, his act of eating is a distortion of the sign, an act of false friendship like that of Judas, the secret sinner.[131] Apart from the

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does not suppose a reversion to the substance of bread, and seems to me to differ little from Thomas's opinion that the mouse eats not sacramentally but only accidentally (see below). In the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, this text of Alexander is quoted and affirmed. Then, in a following and separate question, it is deemed most probable that the Body of Christ does enter into an irrational animal's stomach because it is inseparably under the species so long as the form of bread is retained. In other words, this opinion is not thought to contradict the first. *Alexandri Alensis Angli Summae Theologiae: Pars Quarta*, q. 11, memb. 2, a. 2 ([Coloniæ Agrippinæ : Sumptibus Ioannis Gymnici, sub Monocerote, 1622], 380).

[127] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 9.

[128] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 4; also see q. 8, a. 3, ad 2.

[129] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 4.

[130] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 5.

[131] *STh* III, q. 81, a. 2.

condemnation he earns, he cannot receive the signified *res tantum*, because without the wisdom born of charity he cannot spiritually taste Christ with "savored knowledge" as the one who in loving-kindness died for him, and so cannot attain him in the union of love. Yet, as with Judas at the Last Supper, Christ does not withhold his Body and Blood from the sinner who eats him sacramentally.

Nor does Christ withdraw from the infidel who eats the sacrament, even though this act shows great contempt: "so far as is in him he lessens the holiness of the sacrament, and the power of Christ acting in it, and this is to despise the sacrament in itself."[132] This charge of contempt would presumably apply to an unbeliever who "intends to receive what the Church receives," though he "believes it to be nothing."[133] Unlike the believing sinner, the unbeliever who eats the sacrament thinking it is ordinary food does not, on his part, eat sacramentally. Although, as a human person, he is capable of eating sacramentally by understanding its signification, he does not believe it is Christ's Body, and may even wish to mock this belief, so does not access the meaning of the sign. However, Thomas does think that, *objectively* speaking, he is eating Christ's Body in the sacrament, and in that sense can be said to eat sacramentally—that is, "if the word 'sacramentally' qualify the verb on the part of the thing eaten. But if it qualify the verb on the part of the one eating, then, properly speaking, he does not eat sacramentally, because he uses what he takes, not as a sacrament, but as simple food."[134] The key point for Thomas is that Christ's Body continues to be substantially present, objectively speaking, as long as the species remain.

Likewise, even if the consecrated host is eaten by a mouse or a dog, "the substance of Christ's body would not cease to be under the species, so long as those species remain, that is, so long as the substance of bread would have remained," and to maintain otherwise "detracts from the truth of the sacrament."

[132] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 5, ad 2.
[133] IV *Sent.*, d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 3, ad 3; *STh* III q. 80, a. 3, ad 2.
[134] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 3, ad 2.

But the irrational animal, on its part, eats Christ only "accidently" (*per accidens*), since it is "incapable of using a sacrament."[135] That is, the mouse can never access it as a sacrament by engaging it as a sign, but it can still use the species as food, because they retain their properties of taste, nourishment, and so on.[136] The unbeliever—and even the believer—who eats a consecrated host unknowingly and so neither (on his part) sacramentally nor spiritually, eats like a mouse, *per accidens*.[137]

These examples are instructive in demonstrating Thomas's attention to the crucial role of the recipient's subjective engagement with the sign of the Eucharist, and in clarifying the difference between merely sacramental and spiritual eating, but even more so in underlining Thomas's conviction that, objectively speaking, Christ does not withdraw his substantial presence from the (intact) consecrated host in any circumstance. The opinion that he does is "erroneous," because it "takes away from the truth of this sacrament . . . to which it pertains that as long as the species remain, the body of Christ under them does not cease to exist."[138] Thomas insists on this, in order to safeguard the "truth" of the sacrament, even in spite of common pious objections to the thought of Christ's Body being eaten by an unworthy human or irrational animal, passing into the human stomach, or being thrown into the mire. These all seem to place Christ, unfittingly, into an undignified or disgusting situation. Thomas very often accepts arguments from

[135] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 3, ad 3.

[136] That is, the mouse, with no potential to receive sacramentally, still eats the accidents of bread, which maintain the capacity to nourish (*STh* III, q. 77, a. 3).

[137] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 3, ad 3: The irrational animal "eats Christ's body accidentally, and not sacramentally, *just as if anyone not knowing a host to be consecrated were to consume it*." In his commentary on 1 Cor 11:23-26, which is parallel in many ways to the material on the Eucharist in the *Summa*, Thomas clarifies that a believer who eats the consecrated host unknowingly, an infidel, and a mouse all eat *per accidens* (*Super 1 Cor.*, c. 11, lect. 7 [698]).

[138] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 3. Also see *Super 1 Cor.*, c. 11, lect. 7 (694). Thomas points out that Paul's warning to those who would "eat this bread or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily" and so "drink judgement to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord" (1 Cor 11:27-29) makes no sense if it were true that the Body of Christ ceases to be under the sacrament as soon as it is touched by the lips of a sinner.

fittingness, but he does not do so here. His reasons, I think, do not derive simply from a commitment to the "necessary metaphysical connection between the accidents of the bread and wine and the substance of the Body and Blood" that "overrode the theological understanding of the Eucharist as a true sign."[139] On the contrary, if one considers what Thomas means by "the truth of the sacrament," it becomes clear that he takes full theological measure of the Eucharist's signification of its reality not only as *sacramentum tantum* but as *res et sacramentum*.

What truth about the sacrament would be lost if one were to suppose that Christ would withdraw his presence under various conditions, to preserve his dignity? Thomas's response to these objections from piety is not only to reiterate the permanence of the substantial change[140] but, essentially, to argue that the dignity of the one who became incarnate precisely to give himself as food for our salvation cannot be affected by any created cause, whether natural (digestion, consumption by animals) or moral (human sinners and unbelievers). "God abominates a sinner more than an irrational animal incapable of moral fault, in which there is nothing but what God made," yet "Christ's body is eaten by sinners," so it can also be by animals.[141] These things "cause no indignity to Christ, who willed to be crucified by sinners."[142] Precisely because the lips of sinners (or animals) touch only the species under which Christ's Body is in truth, his Body "contracts no impurity" when they eat it. Indeed, "he gives in this an example of meekness and humility."[143] One might say that Christ's dignity is shown all the more because he willed to humble himself in this way. Although of course proper reverence must be shown for the dignity of the sacrament—and one sins gravely in failing to do so[144]—nothing can actually take

[139] Macy, "Theology of the Eucharist in the High Middle Ages," 389-90.

[140] At least without another reverse transubstantiation; IV *Sent.*, d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 1.

[141] IV *Sent.*, d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 3, s.c.

[142] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 3, ad 3.

[143] IV *Sent.*, d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 1, ad 3.

[144] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 5, ad 3. On canon law dealing with safeguards for reverent treatment of the Eucharist, see Ian Christopher Levy, "The Eucharist and Canon Law in

away from the dignity of the Incarnate Word who is present in it, nor cause him to withdraw his presence.

To draw out the analogy with the Incarnation, the belief that Christ's presence might be withdrawn in such a case may have seemed to Thomas like a kind of Docetism, which holds heretically that the Word suffered only in appearance and not truly in flesh; some Docetists taught that the Word departed from Christ in the indignity of the crucifixion. As Paul Gondreau has shown, Thomas is aware of the dangers of Docetism, writing in his *Commentary on John* that the view that Christ assumed "only imaginary flesh" undermines the "truth of the Incarnation."[145] Gondreau remarks especially on the anti-Docetism implicit in Thomas's commentary on the Bread of Life discourse in John 6: "the realism of the Eucharist, the true nourishment of our souls, *requires* the realism of the humanity of Christ."[146] Like other theologians, Thomas thinks that spiritual eating is achieved only by union with Christ in faith and love. However, he also wants to insist on the "truth" of the sacrament, which would be undermined if the substantial presence of the Body and Blood were not an objective and especially an abiding reality.

The abiding nature of the *res et sacramentum* makes it a true sign of the *res tantum*, the grace, charity, and unity that flow from God's unfailing love in Christ. Thomas first addresses the question of the permanence of Christ's substantial presence in question 76, article 6 of the *Tertia pars*, in the midst of his discussion on the mode of Christ's existence in the Eucharist after transubstantiation. There too he rejects the opinion that

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the High Middle Ages," in Levy, Macy, Van Ausdall, eds., *A Companion to the Eucharist in the Middle Ages*, 399-445.

[145] In his exegesis of John 1:14, "the Word became flesh," Thomas writes that these words "show the truth of the Incarnation against the Manichaeans," who said that the Word assumed "only imaginary flesh" (*Super Ioan.,* c. 1, lect. 7 [169]). Paul Gondreau demonstrates that Thomas's anti-docetism is especially evident in his *Commentary on John* ("Anti-Docetism in Aquinas's *Super Ioannem*: St. Thomas as Defender of the Full Humanity of Christ," in *Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas,* ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005], 254-76, at 255).

[146] Gondreau, "Anti-Docetism," 273.

Christ might cease to exist under the consecrated sacrament at any time except when the species cease to exist. He draws a parallel between God's presence in creation and transubstantiation: Christ, as God, "has unfailing and incorruptible being," and just as God only ceases to be in a corruptible creature when that creature's existence ceases, so Christ is in the sacrament until the species cease to exist and so are no longer in relationship to him. This argument seems strictly metaphysical at first, yet with its analogy to creation it points to a deeper realization about the gratuity of this divine gift. The explanation leaves open the question of why Christ puts himself into this permanent relationship with the species in the first place, for no such continuance can be necessitated of him as God except one that he wills himself. In creation, God's love alone is the reason for his remaining causally present to any creature (i.e., by upholding that creature in being, by a participation in the divine existence).[147] We can extrapolate that, likewise, once transubstantiation has taken place, Christ's substantial presence irreversibly exists under the accidental species so long as they remain, not out of any metaphysical "necessity" impossibly binding the immortal nature of the divine Word, but implicitly, because of his loving will by institution of the sacrament that the consecrated species should remain in relationship to him so long as they exist. Like Christ's substantial presence itself, the permanence of that presence is a fitting sign of God's abiding love in Christ.

An answer to one of the objections in article 6 lends further support to this interpretation. The objection is based on the scriptural image of the Paschal Lamb as a "figure of this sacrament," which Thomas himself employs: according to the command of Exodus 12:10, nothing of the lamb was to remain until the morning; therefore, the objection runs, since "the truth ought to correspond with the figure . . . if this sacrament is reserved until the morning, neither will the body of Christ be there." Thomas responds that the truth exceeds the figure, implying that he thinks the permanence of Christ's presence is

[147] *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2.

part of the perfection of the New Law. For the substance of his rebuttal, though, he responds in Cyril of Alexandria's words: "Some are so foolish as to say that the mystical blessing departs from the sacrament, if any of its fragments remain until the next day: for Christ's consecrated body is not changed, and the power of the blessing, and the life-giving grace is perpetually in it."

This text is part of a passage from Cyril, commenting on Luke 22:19 ("This is my Body"), with which Thomas seems to have been very familiar, and which appears in its entirety in Thomas's *Catena on Luke*.[148] Thomas has already quoted Cyril's directly preceding lines in question 75, article 1 ("Do not doubt that this is true . . . since [Christ] is the Truth he does not lie"). The Truth has said, "This is my Body," and so in the following lines of this text Cyril argues that the life-giving blessing available in the Eucharist flows from the Incarnation itself: "For the life-giving power of God the Father is the only-begotten Word, which was made flesh not ceasing to be the Word, but making the flesh life-giving." The "mystical blessing" of Christ's Body does not depart from the sacrament any more than the Word abandons his flesh. Rather, the power of incorruptible life that belongs to the divine Word is communicated to his human flesh, and so to those who receive it in the Eucharist, for "God, condescending to our weakness, pours into the offerings the power of life, changing them into the truth of his own flesh, that the body of life, like a life-giving seed, may be found in us."[149] The abiding substantial *res* of the Word made flesh for life-giving food in the Eucharist is the *sacramentum* of his unfailing gift of grace for our salvation.

[148] *S. Thomae Aquinatis Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia*, 4 vols., ed. A. Guarenti (Turin: Marietti, 1953). English Translation: *Catena aurea: Commentary on the Four Gospels Collected out of the Works of the Early Church Fathers*, ed. J. H. Newman, trans. M. Pattison, J. D. Dalgairns, and T. D. Ryder (Oxford: Parker, 1841; repr., Southampton: Saint Austin Press, 1997).

[149] See Cyril of Alexandria, *Commentarius in Lucam* (*PG* 72:907-12).

V. THE *RES TANTUM*: THE FIRE OF CHARITY

When he discusses the effects of the Eucharist in question 79, Thomas takes up Cyril's commentary on Luke 22 again, and applies Cyril's view of the life-giving power of Christ's true Body and Blood as sign and cause of the *res tantum*. Thomas's "instrumental realism of the flesh of the Incarnate Word,"[150] drawn from his patristic sources, is the final clue as to why the fullness of the Eucharist's effect can only be had by an eating that is both spiritual and sacramental. Thomas connects the effects of the Eucharist closely in various ways to Christ's substantial presence. Question 79 is remarkable for the use he makes of texts from the Fathers, especially from the Greek tradition, many of which may be found in close proximity in his earlier *catenae* on Luke 22 and John 6.[151]

In article 1, Thomas refers again to Cyril's commentary on Luke 22:19, as he argues that grace is bestowed in the Eucharist, "first of all and principally," because Christ is contained in the sacrament. By "coming visibly into the world" in the Incarnation, Christ "bestowed the life of grace upon the world"; so also, Thomas says,

> by coming sacramentally into man, he causes the life of grace, according to John 6:58: "He who eats me, will live by me." Hence Cyril says [on Luke 22:19]: "the life-giving Word of God, uniting himself with his own flesh, made it life-giving. Therefore it was fitting that he should be united with our

[150] Gondreau, "Anti-Docetism," 275.

[151] Louis J. Bataillon discusses many parallels between the *Catena* and the first section of the *Tertia pars* (*STh* III, qq. 1-59) on the mysteries of Christ's life, noting that, "This use of the rich patristic documentation of the *Catena* shows well how Thomas was more and more aware of the importance of the tradition of the Fathers in his theology" (Louis J. Bataillon, "Saint Thomas et les Pères: De la *Catena* à la *Tertia Pars*," in *Ordo sapientiae et amoris: Hommage au professeur Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P.*, ed. Carlos-Josaphat Pinto, O.P. (Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1993), 15-36, at 25. A recent and ambitious project by Martin Morard and others to research the patristic sources of the *Catena* and make it available in electronic format is in progress and can be found at Martin Morard, "Catena aurea electronica," *Sacra Pagina*, https://big.hypotheses.org/catena-aurea.

bodies through his sacred flesh and precious blood, which we receive in a life-giving blessing in the bread and wine."[152]

The use of Cyril's text again underlines the instrumental realism of Thomas's Eucharistic theology, as he makes a close causal connection between the *res et sacramentum* of Christ's Body and Blood (as both sign and reality) and the *res tantum* of life-giving grace it confers.[153] He draws a parallel between Christ's bestowal of grace by coming into the world in the Incarnation and by coming into humans by sacramental reception of the Eucharist. By bodily union with Christ's own flesh in the Eucharist, we can be united spiritually with him in his divinity, in the life of grace. Because the Eucharist represents Christ's Passion, it "works in us the effect which Christ's Passion worked in the world." The Eucharist signifies the Passion and truly represents it by making present the very Body and Blood sacrificially offered by Christ who was crucified for the

[152] *STh* III, q. 79, a. 1.

[153] The influence of Cyril on Thomas's Christology and in particular in his view of how the sacraments communicate the life-giving power of his Word through the instrumentality of his humanity is fairly widely recognized. For a valuable discussion of the contribution of the Greek Fathers, including Cyril, to Thomas's treatise on the Eucharist in the *Summa*, see Joseph Wawrykow, "The Greek Fathers in the Eucharistic Theology of Thomas Aquinas," in *Thomas Aquinas and the Greek Fathers*, ed. Michael Dauphinais, Andrew Hofer, O.P., and Roger Nutt (Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2019), 274-302. Wawrykow underlines, in the quotations that Thomas selects from Cyril, the stress on the "life-giving power of the eucharistic Christ" truly present (286-88). See also Blankenhorn, "The Place of Romans 6," 139, 141, where the author discusses this in the context of Thomas's theology of baptism, with reference to Cyril's influence via John of Damascus's *De fide orthodoxa.* Blankenhorn makes the point that Thomas synthesizes Cyril's Christology, with its emphasis on all the actions and sufferings of Christ as divinizing and life-giving, with Aristotelian formal causality, so that Thomas "can explain the significance of particular historical events on a metaphysical plane. Formal causality thus enables Thomas to synthesize history and metaphysics, to explain why the particular historical events of Christ's life have particular metaphysical significance. Because of formal causality, the metaphysics of grace is utterly marked by history, that is, the single grace of forgiveness and justification at once bears the spiritual marks or similitudes of Christ's Passion and Resurrection" (ibid., 142). See also Austin Dominic Litke, O.P., "Christological *Ressourcement*: The Development of St. Thomas's Doctrine of Instrumentality," *Angelicum* 91 (2014): 149-65.

forgiveness of our sins. Thomas quotes John Chrysostom on John 19:34: "When you draw near to the awe-inspiring chalice, approach as if you were going to drink from Christ's own side."[154]

As discussed above, Thomas thinks that devout reception of any sacrament has a fuller effect than spiritual reception alone, for both body and soul. This is especially true for the Eucharist, because Christ is substantially present; one is united, body and soul, to Christ himself, receiving "not only the sacramental species, but also Christ himself who is under them."[155] Thomas makes this point again in question 79, article 1: "This sacrament has power of itself to confer grace. . . . It is from the efficacy of its power that even from the desire for it one can obtain grace to be enlivened spiritually. It remains that when the sacrament itself is really eaten, grace is increased, and the spiritual life perfected," specifically (as opposed to the perfection for resisting outward assaults that one finds in confirmation), "so that one may become perfect in oneself by being conjoined to God."[156] Like baptism, the Eucharist sacramentally received has effects on both body and soul. The effect of grace in this sacrament flows too "into the body while in the present life," and "in the life to come our body will share in the incorruption and the glory of the soul."[157] Each of the sacraments is ordered to some special effect necessary in the Christian life; while grace in itself perfects the soul on the level of its nature, and the infused virtues and gifts perfect its powers, the grace given in each sacrament, actually received, has in addition the special effect of conferring "divine help in attaining the end of that sacrament."[158] The Eucharist, especially when sacramentally received, confers a growth in grace that perfects soul and body for union with God, not only in this life, but in the future life of

[154] *STh* III, q. 79, a. 1; *Catena in Ioan.,* c. 19, lect. 10. Cf. John Chrysostom, *Homily 85 on John* (*PG* 59:463).

[155] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 4, ad 4.

[156] *STh* III, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1.

[157] *STh* III, q. 79, a. 1, ad 3.

[158] *STh* III, q. 62, a. 2.

glory, earned for us by the Passion of Christ whom it contains.[159]

It is charity that perfects the soul for union with God in this life and the next, and so the effect of the Eucharist is especially related to this infused virtue. The common medieval notion of the Eucharist as the "sacrament of charity" has for Thomas a particular Christological density. While all sacraments apply the power of the Passion, the Eucharist is "the sacrament of Christ's Passion according as one is made perfect in union with Christ who suffered," and that is why it is "the sacrament of charity, which is 'the bond of perfection' (Col 3:14)."[160] We have seen that Thomas's arguments for the fittingness of Christ's substantial presence center around the way in which it manifests Christ's charity, out of which he suffered. In the Eucharist one is perfected by being actually united to Christ in his sacrificial charity, and by this union made more like him in his charity. Thomas quotes in a number of places Augustine's words about the Eucharist from the *Confessions*: "I am the food of the mature; grow, and you will eat me. But you will not change me into yourself; you will be changed into me."[161] As the "food of the mature," the Eucharist, in a special way, transforms one into the likeness of Christ in his charity; it is the sacrament of both Christ's love and ours. The Eucharist is called the "mystery of faith" in the liturgy, as the object of faith, because it contains Christ's true Body. But it is the sacrament of charity both "figuratively and effectively"; that is, both as the sign of God's charity in Christ and the cause of Christ-like charity in us.[162]

Thomas's treatment of charity earlier in the *Summa* gives us insight into the meaning of this effect. He defines charity in two related ways: as an infused virtue that is a participation by the will in the Holy Spirit; and as friendship with God, founded on his communication of beatitude to us, by giving us fellowship with his Son.[163] These two are related; the Holy Spirit is the

[159] *STh* III, q. 79, a. 2.
[160] *STh* III, q. 73, a. 3, ad 3.
[161] *STh* III, q. 73, a. 3, ad 2; *Super Ioan.*, c. 6, lect. 7 (972).
[162] *STh* III, q. 78, a. 3, ad 6.
[163] *STh* II-II, q. 23 a. 1; q. 23, a. 3, ad 3; q. 24 a. 2; q. 24, a. 5, ad 3; q. 24, a. 7.

bond of Love between Father and Son, by which the Father also loves creatures and draws them to his goodness.[164] God communicates his beatitude to us by loving us, because God's love causally "infuses and creates goodness" in all creatures, but by a special love in the gift of grace God draws rational creatures above the condition of their nature to a "participation in the divine Good," so that they can share his own happiness in eternal life.[165] The virtue of charity flows from grace, which Thomas defines as a deifying participation of the divine nature.[166] A participation in the Holy Spirit by charity deifies the will, directing it to the divine good and uniting us to God and others, so as to allow us to "possess and enjoy" the indwelling Trinity even in this life, and to bring us to share the Son's own end of beatitude.[167] Charity gives a foretaste of this beatitude, reaching its fullness in heaven.[168] Charity is the glue uniting Christ's mystical body in fellowship with the Son, made perfect in glory. When Thomas says that the Eucharist is the sacrament of charity, he is saying that it accomplishes all these things. That is why charity is a central link among the other ways in which Thomas describes the *res tantum* of the Eucharist: as grace, communion, and the unity of the mystical body fully realized in heaven.[169]

[164] *STh* I, q. 37, a. 2.

[165] *STh* I, q. 20, a. 2; *STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 1.

[166] *STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 4; q. 112, a. 2.

[167] *STh* I, q. 43, a. 3. In the background here is Thomas's teaching on the divine missions of the Son and Spirit into the soul in the gift of sanctifying grace, by which the soul's powers of intellect and will are assimilated to the divine persons as the "known in the knower, and the beloved in the lover." The infused virtue of charity assimilates the will to the Holy Spirit, and gifts of infused wisdom (including not only the Spirit's gift of wisdom but faith and every intellectual perfection) assimilate the intellect to the Son. These infused habits make the person capable of the supernatural activities of knowing and loving God that move her towards beatitude. See *STh* I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2. For a thorough treatment of the Trinitarian missions and their effects, see Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 360-412. On the role of the missions and assimilation to the divine persons in deification, see Daria Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace: Deification according to St. Thomas Aquinas* (Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2015).

[168] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 8.

[169] *STh* III, q. 73, a. 2; q. 73, a. 3 ad 3; q. 73, a. 4; q. 80, a. 4; q. 83, a. 4, ad 3.

The Eucharist, therefore, because it truly contains not only the gift of grace but the Giver, is the sign or sacrament of Christ's charity, and the sign and cause of ours. Thomas's sacramental realism is especially clear where he describes how the flesh of the Word in the Eucharist communicates deifying grace and charity. In question 79, article 1 he uses a striking image, taken from John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa*:

> This sacrament confers grace spiritually, with the virtue of charity. So Damascene (*De fide* 4.13) compares this sacrament to the burning coal which Isaiah saw (Isaiah 6:6): "For a burning coal is not simply wood, but wood united to fire; so also the bread of communion is not simple bread but bread united to divinity."[170]

In this text the Damascene, drawing from a common patristic metaphor, is likening the Eucharist to the burning and purifying coal taken from the altar of the temple and placed on the lips of the prophet Isaiah. John explains that the coal of the Eucharist burns with divinity because "it is the deified body of the Lord itself," which communicates deification to others.[171] Thomas uses the metaphor of a burning coal (or of iron in fire) more widely throughout the *Summa* and in his other writings to express the notion of participation in the divine perfections, and especially the participation in the divine nature by grace that flows from Christ's deified humanity to his members.[172] In using Damascene's image here, then, he is indicating that it is

[170] *STh* III, q. 79, a. 1, ad 2.

[171] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 4.13 (*PG* 94:1135-54). Thomas knew this work in the twelfth-century Latin translation by Burgundio of Pisa, and "would seem to have known well the chapter in *de fide* about Eucharist" (Wawrykow, "Greek Fathers in the Eucharistic Theology of Aquinas," 277).

[172] On this, see Spezzano, *Glory of God's Grace*, 173, 179-80. The image of iron in fire is found in a quotation from Theophylactus (*PG* 123:1311) in the *Catena in Ioan.* c. 6, lect. 9, on John 6:58: "We do not eat God simply, for he is impalpable and incorporeal; nor also do we eat simply the flesh of man, which could profit us nothing. But because God has united flesh to himself, that flesh is vivifying; not that it has changed its nature into God's, but, just as heated iron remains iron, while it manifests the action of the heat, so the flesh of the Lord is vivifying, as the flesh of the Word of God."

especially through communion with the Word's deified flesh in the Eucharist that one receives deifying grace and charity.

Thomas draws on this tradition of instrumental realism in his commentary on the Bread of Life discourse in John 6, a text frequently cited in the *Summa*'s treatment of the Eucharist. In his commentary, he discusses the benefits of an eating that is both sacramental and spiritual. Thomas often quotes Augustine's *Tractates on John*, and like Augustine gives considerable attention to spiritual eating of the "bread of life" through faith and love.[173] Augustine's focus is on the *res tantum*: Christ's flesh is his mystical body, in which one can live as a member by faith and love.[174] Thomas follows Augustine closely in his reading of John 6:51 ("I am the living bread which came down from heaven"); this refers to the divine Word who has power to give eternal life.[175] But when he gets to John 6:52, he offers an added explanation, with the help again of John Damascene, of why Christ says "the bread I will give is my flesh":

> He had said [before] that he was the living bread; and lest we think he is so only as the Word, or in his soul alone, he shows that even his flesh is life-giving, for it is an instrument of his divinity. Thus since an instrument acts by virtue of its agent, just as the divinity of Christ is life-giving, so too as Damascene says, his flesh gives life by the power of the Word to which it is joined. Hence Christ healed the sick by his touch. So what he said above, "I am the living bread," pertained to the power of the Word; but what he is saying here pertains to communion in his body, namely to the sacrament of the Eucharist.[176]

Because one is "touched" by Christ's deified flesh in receiving it, the Eucharist "produces spiritual life in us now, and will later produce eternal life."[177] So, the Eucharist transmits the deifying power of Christ's flesh, uniting those who eat it to the Godhead by transforming them into what they eat, for "this is a food

[173] E.g., *Super Ioan.,* c. 6, lect. 6 (950), on John 6:47 ("He who believes in me has eternal life").

[174] Augustine, *Tractates on John* 26.13.

[175] *Super Ioan.,* c. 6, lect. 6 (957-59).

[176] *Super Ioan.,* c. 6, lect. 6 (959). See John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 3.15 and 3.17.

[177] *Super Ioan.,* c. 6, lect. 6 (963).

capable of making man divine and inebriating him with divinity."[178]

As always, Thomas emphasizes the necessity for spiritual eating of the Eucharist when opposed to one that is only sacramental, yet he still assumes the priority of an eating of the "bread of life" (John 6:35) that is both spiritual and sacramental:

> Because the flesh of Christ is united to the Word of God, it also is life-giving. So too his body, sacramentally eaten, is life-giving; for through the mysteries which Christ accomplished in his flesh, he gives life to the world. So the flesh of Christ, according to the word of the Lord, is bread, not of ordinary life, but of that life which is not taken away by death.[179]

Thomas adds that those who receive the Word made flesh within themselves will have both spiritual and corporeal life, for Christ will "raise them up on the last day." With the same quotation from Augustine that he uses in the *Summa* to argue that Christ's bodily resurrection is the cause of ours and that the sacraments instrumentally communicate this effect to us, Thomas explains, "it is the Word who raises up souls, and it is the Word made flesh who gives life to bodies."[180] Here the instrumental exemplar causality of the Incarnate Word is extended in a surpassing way to the Eucharist. Because the Word is present in this sacrament "not only in his divinity, but also in the reality of his flesh, he is the cause of the resurrection not just of souls but of bodies also . . . so the usefulness of eating it is clear."[181] The incorruptibility which belongs to the divine Word—and which makes it so fitting that he remain in the consecrated Eucharist in an abiding manner—is communicated instrumentally through his deified flesh to those who receive him.

[178] *Super Ioan.,* c. 6, lect. 7 (972). A quotation of Theophylactus (*PG* 123:1310), found in the *Catena in Ioan.*, c. 6, lect. 8, on John 6:52.

[179] *Super Ioan.,* c. 6, lect. 4 (914).

[180] Augustine, *Tractates on John*, 19.15ff. *STh* III, q. 56, a. 1; q. 62, a. 5, ad 1. See also *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 239; *Super 1 Cor.*, c. 15, lect. 2 (913).

[181] *Super Ioan.,* c. 6, lect. 7 (973).

In all his sacramental realism, though, Thomas is not forgetful of the role of the signification of the species. To return to question 79, article 1 on the conferral of grace in the Eucharist, while Thomas first notes that it causes grace because Christ is contained, he goes on to describe how the spiritual life, charity, and unity flowing from grace are signified by the *sacramentum tantum*. Since Christ's Body and Blood in the Eucharist are given as food and drink, they symbolize the spiritual nourishment and delight of grace; Thomas quotes Chrysostom on John again: "When we desire it, he lets us feel him, and eat him, and embrace him."[182] The species of bread and wine, chosen by Christ to represent his Body and Blood, symbolize the unity and charity of the mystical body, according to Augustine: "O sacrament of piety! O sign of unity! O bond of charity!"[183] The sacramental species signify the grace, charity, and unity that flow from Christ's true presence in the Eucharist, and in turn contribute to those effects, helping to engage the recipient more deeply precisely by signifying that Christ is not just present, he is present out of sacrificial love as saving spiritual food. Thomas never leaves the *sacramentum tantum* behind in his sacramental realism. There is one twofold signification of the *res tantum* to which both the *sacramentum tantum* and *res et sacramentum* contribute in different ways, and this signification is fullest when the species are actually eaten.

Thomas's emphasis on eating both sacramentally and spiritually allows him to give full play to a Cyrillian instrumental realism that emphasizes the objective life-giving power of the Word's deified flesh in the *res et sacramentum* for both body and soul, without falling prey to any diminishment of the ultimate priority of the *res tantum*, nor neglecting the role of the *sacramentum tantum* or of the recipient in engaging the sign. Thomas is not proposing, any more than is Cyril himself, a "physicalist soteriology governed by a quasi-automatic transfer

[182] Chrysostom, *Homily 46 on John* (*PG* 59:260).

[183] Augustine, *Tractates on John* 26.13.

of divine life through contact with Christ's flesh."[184] Indeed, like Cyril, Thomas gives full weight to the necessary role of human response in the appropriation of divine life.[185] After he introduces the metaphor of the burning coal in question 79, article 1 (in the response to the second objection) to describe the deified and deifying Body of the Lord, he goes on to describe how it communicates the effects of charity to its recipients not only by bestowing grace, but by thereby eliciting their own cooperative and experiential response:

> Through this sacrament, as far as its power is concerned, not only is the habit of grace and of virtue conferred, but it is also excited into act, according to 2 Corinthians 5:14: "The charity of Christ urges us." Hence it is that by the power of this sacrament, the soul is spiritually restored, by being spiritually gladdened, and as it were inebriated with the sweetness of the divine goodness, according to Song 5:1: "Eat, friends, and drink, and be inebriated, most dearly beloved."[186]

The recipient actively cooperates in these acts of charity, inspired by the Holy Spirit and by the "sweetness of the divine goodness" in Christ truly present.

The more charity is in act, the more it brings about all of charity's effects. In the subsequent articles of question 79, Thomas gives some of them. The Eucharist forgives and satisfies for venial sin, "according to the measure of one's devotion and fervor," and lessens concupiscence; it gives spiritual refreshment and delight; it unites one to Christ and to his members, so as to receive the benefits of the Lord's Passion and offer efficacious prayers for others in the body.[187] We can add to these the effects of active charity that Thomas discusses elsewhere: the fire of charity inflames and incites us to acts of love;[188] it merits beatitude, and disposes one more and more for a greater share

[184] Daniel Keating, "Divinization in Cyril: The Appropriation of Divine Life," in *The Theology of St. Cyril of Alexandria: A Critical Appreciation,* ed. Thomas Weinandy and Daniel Keating (New York: T&T Clark, 2003), 149-86, at 170.

[185] Ibid., 170ff.

[186] *STh* III, q. 79, a. 1, ad 2.

[187] *STh* III, q. 79, aa. 4-8.

[188] E.g., *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 10; *Super Ioan.,* c. 20, lect. 1 (2473).

in glory.[189] Thomas quotes Damascene again in the *sed contra* of question 79, article 8, where he discusses whether venial sins hinder the effect of the sacrament:

Damascene says (*De fide orthodoxa* 4.13): "The fire of that desire which is in us, being taken up from this coal, that is, from the fiery ignition of this sacrament, will burn up our sins, and illuminate our hearts, that by participation of the divine fire we may be kindled into fire and deified."[190]

Thomas explains that the distraction of venial sins can hinder the "fire of our desire or love" and so diminish the effect of the sacrament; though one may still obtain grace and charity, "a certain actual refreshment of spiritual sweetness" will be lacking. Thomas refers to the same text of Damascene in one last place in the *Summa*'s questions on the Eucharist: he remarks that Damascene says this sacrament has the name of "communion" "because we communicate with Christ through it, both because we participate in his flesh and divinity, and because we communicate with and are united to one another through it."[191] The deification effected by reception of the burning coal of Christ's true Body and Blood not only transforms individuals by setting them on fire with charity, but as a result has the ecclesial effect of communion.

CONCLUSION

At the end of his *Commentary on John,* Thomas compares the Eucharist to the lakeside breakfast Christ cooks for his friends. Christ prepares three things for the Church's banquet:

Christ carried the burning coals of charity from heaven to earth: "a new commandment I give you: that you love one another" (John 13:34); "I come

[189] *STh* I, q. 12, a. 6; cf. *STh* II-II q. 180, a. 8, ad 1; III q. 55, a. 1, ad 3; q. 79 a. 2.

[190] *STh* III, q. 79, a. 8.

[191] *STh* III, q. 73, a. 4; and by the Damascene "it is called Assumption, because by it we assume the divinity of the Son." It is perhaps worth noting that in a parallel article in the *Scriptum* (IV *Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 3) John of Damascus does not appear, nor does the idea that through the Eucharist we participate in Christ's "flesh and divinity." See John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 4.13.

to cast fire upon the earth" (Luke 12:49). Likewise, he prepared the fish, laid over the burning coals, which is Christ himself: for the roasted fish is the suffering Christ [*nam piscis assus, Christus passus*], who was laid out on the burning coals, when out of the fiery heat of his love for us, he was immolated on the cross. Eph 5:1-2: "Christ loved us and handed himself over for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God; likewise: be imitators of God as his beloved children, and walk in love, as Christ loved us."[192]

The hot coals of Christ's own charity light the fire of his holocaust on the Cross; as a result, Thomas says, we receive "the bread which nourishes us, that is himself."[193] Christ offers his deified humanity to us as the burning coal glowing with charity, transformed into bread baked in a furnace of sacrificial love.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that while Thomas always insists on the necessity of spiritual eating by faith and love to receive the *res tantum*, and on the possibility of receiving this by desire alone, he thinks it best to eat both sacramentally and spiritually, and as often as one is well-disposed. Thomas's view of sacraments as instruments for our embodied nature leads him to hold this view in general. But in the Eucharist especially, he draws a close connection between the *sacramentum tantum*, the abiding *res et sacramentum* of the true presence, and the *res tantum* of deifying grace and charity. While all the sacraments confer grace, in the Eucharist Christ himself is contained—not only present, but present as one who has given his own body as life-giving spiritual food. This food could be offered in no other way than by his own holocaust of love—and this superabundant sacrificial gift especially causes and stirs up charity within us, bringing about unity with him in his mystical body.

In response to the critiques of some contemporary scholars, such as Gary Macy and Louis-Marie Chauvet, I have argued that Thomas's careful philosophical attention to the abiding truth of Christ's presence brought about by transubstantiation does not undermine a truly sacramental theology of the Eucharist as a sign given to people for communion. On the contrary, his metaphysics is at the service of a theological

[192] *Super Ioan.*, c. 21, lect. 2 (2599).

[193] Ibid.

argument for the power of the true presence as both sign and cause of charity in us. Sign and reality are not in opposition to each other; the Eucharist is a true sign for the sanctification of people, manifesting the surpassing reality of Christ's deifying self-gift. To answer Kilmartin's concern that an emphasis on the Real Presence obscures the "eschatological dimension" of sacramental reception as saving "spiritual communion with the glorified flesh of the risen Lord," Christ's loving Eucharistic gift of his own resurrected body is for Thomas the supreme life-giving food for our own resurrection in body and soul. It is truly nourishment for glory in communion with Christ and his body, the Church. As a result, the notion of the Eucharist as the sacrament of charity becomes for Thomas an important locus of his Christological, soteriological, and ecclesiological teaching.

In the post-pandemic Church, when many Catholics have not returned to Mass or continue to watch it at home under the mistaken impression that spiritual and sacramental communion are equivalent, Thomas offers a timely reminder that devout sacramental reception is the most effective nourishment for the *maxima amicitia* possible between the human person and God in this life. Thomas's own example witnesses to the way that sacramental reception can nurture loving friendship with God. While Thomas's Scholastic mode of expression differs from that of some Eucharistic mystics, his deep devotion and desire for full union with Christ in the Eucharist, expressed in his final profession of faith, is the same. Perhaps this is the deepest reason why Thomas encourages even daily reception of the Eucharist for those well-disposed; to receive frequently belongs to love, he says, to abstain sometimes belongs to reverent fear, and both are good; but, "love and hope . . . are preferable to fear."[194]

For Thomas, frequent and familiar conjoining with Christ, by a reception of the Eucharist that is both spiritual and sacramental, teaches one to know and love his sacrificial presence. To the objective efficacy of the sacrament this adds a dimension of devotion that enkindles charity into act and so

[194] *STh* III, q. 80, a. 10, ad 3.

deifies, transforming one in both body and soul for eternal life. To receive this gift is to acknowledge the Father's goodness and generosity in communicating his beatitude to us, for "it is proper to friendship to live together with friends."[195] As for John of Damascus and other Church Fathers before him, the true presence of Christ's deified flesh in the Eucharist is for Thomas a proclamation of the Incarnation, of the love of God who became flesh for us to be the "price of our redemption,"[196] not only providing material sacraments for our embodied nature but desiring to remain with us in order to transform us into himself.

The Real Presence is not an end in itself; as in all things the incarnate Word is mediator of the Father's love, a love communicated by the Holy Spirit to draw all to union with himself. The Eucharist is the sacrament of the Trinitarian God's charity and so of ours; it communicates the Father's eternal love through Love Incarnate—the true presence of Christ's deified humanity—by the gift of participation in the love of the Holy Spirit. Eating Christ himself, who has become truly present in order to be consumed in devout sacramental communion, has the fullest effect because he is the source of life for both body and soul, humbly known, loved, and received. Thomas evidently tasted this fullness not only in theory but by experience. Full and frequent bodily and spiritual union with the Incarnate Word truly present in the Eucharist realizes most perfectly the purpose of the entire sacramental economy given to the human race: to communicate generously a vivifying and deifying share in the Father's abiding love.

[195] Aristotle, *Nic. Ethic.* 8.5. Quoted by Aquinas in *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 1, obj. 1.

[196] *STh* III, q. 48, a. 4, ad 3.

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THE IMPLICIT TRANSCENDENTAL: BEAUTY AND THE TRINITY IN THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS

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THE TRANSCENDENTALS are elaborated by Thomas Aquinas as "additions" to being (*ens*), such that "the one" (*unum*), "the true" (*verum*), and "the good" (*bonum*) are all explicitly said to be "convertible" with being in reality, and "add" to it only in idea, by expressing something not explicit in the term "being" itself.[1] They are those perfections in which all existing things participate as a necessary condition of their existence, and the coextension of the transcendentals with being means that they are also convertible with one another. Therefore, Aquinas states that the true and the good, for instance, are convertible with one another in subject, and differ from one another only logically.[2]

In his most extensive discussions of "the beautiful" (*pulchrum*), Aquinas states in very similar terms that it is identical with goodness in a thing, differing only logically because it adds to the good a relation to the cognitive power.[3] Likewise, beauty and goodness are said to be convertible with

[1] For example, *STh* I, q. 5, a. 1; q. 11, a. 1; q. 11, a. 1, ad 3; q. 16, a. 3; q. 16, a. 4. All translations are taken from *The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2nd and revised ed., 21 vols. (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920-22). See also *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1. All English translations of *De veritate* are taken from, *Truth*, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J., James V. McGlynn, S.J., and Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., 3 vols. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994).

[2] *STh* II-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 1.

[3] For example, *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1; *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3.

one another.[4] And yet, according to Jan Aertsen, the discussion of the beautiful is a marginal concern for Aquinas.[5] For instance, in contrast to the other transcendentals, he does not offer a systematic treatise or a separate *quaestio* on the subject. Furthermore, not only is *pulchrum* never listed among the names of the transcendentals, but Aertsen questions whether it is even possible for it to have a systematic place in such lists.[6] He notes that when the two relational transcendentals of truth and goodness are derived, a special place is given to the soul's "transcendental openness" to being through the two spiritual powers of intellect and will.[7] However, Aquinas does not delineate a third power to which beauty might correspond as its proper object. More fundamentally, the ontological perspective of question 1, article 1 of the disputed questions *De veritate* requires that transcendentals make an addition to being, by expressing a general mode of being not explicit in the term *ens* itself. Aertsen notes that, although it is striking that the identity and difference between beauty and goodness is formulated in terms that Aquinas usually employs in connection with the transcendentals, he nonetheless never explicates the beautiful as expressing a general mode of being *qua* being.[8] Instead, he only ever asserts that it adds to *the good* a relation to the cognitive power.[9] Because "it is the true that adds to being the relation to knowledge,"[10] Aertsen argues, the beautiful is not an addition to

[4] *In De Div. Nom.* IV, c. 22 (590): "pulchrum convertitur cum bono" (ed. C. Pera [Turin: Marietti, 1950]). Parenthetical numbers in citations of this text refer to paragraph numbers in this edition.

[5] Jan A. Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages: A Forgotten Transcendental?," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991): 69-97, at 72.

[6] For example, *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1; q. 21, aa. 1 and 3.

[7] Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 75.

[8] Ibid., 83.

[9] For example, *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1; *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3.

[10] Whether the beautiful adds a relation to the cognitive powers of the soul in precisely the same way as happens in the order of the true is highly debateable. For example, on the difference between a "cognitive" and "aesthetic" attitude of the mind towards being, see Armand A. Maurer, *About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation* (Houston, Tex.: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1983), esp. 32-38. A similar argument is

being as such, but merely "expresses a mode of the good,"[11] and that fundamentally "the good and the beautiful are identical.'[12]

However, this reduction of the beautiful to a mode of the good is unsatisfactory. For Aquinas, the good names the desirability of being—and therefore God, who is *ipsum esse subsistens*, the preeminent source of all created perfections—as that which perfects and completes another.[13] To a large extent the appetibility of the good characterizes it according to what we might call the logic of "possessability," whereby being is seen in terms of the perfection that all seek for themselves.[14] This is an important dimension in the consideration of finite beings, which realize their ends in the passage from potency to act. However, in subsuming the beautiful under the category of the good, there is a danger that the soul's engagement with being, and God, is susceptible to being construed along merely self-interested lines. But it is precisely this perspective that is resisted in those instances in which Aquinas discusses the nature of the beautiful, and in this respect Aertsen misinterprets the crucial distinction between beauty and goodness in question 22 of *De veritate*.[15] The present argument will situate this

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made by Jacques Maritain in *Art and Scholasticism*, trans. J. F. Scanlan (London: Sheed & Ward, 1946), esp. 19-21, 125 n. 55.

[11] Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 83-84.

[12] Ibid., 81.

[13] See *STh* I, q. 5, a.1; q. 6, a. 1; *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 1.

[14] See *STh* I, q. 20, a. 1; *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 1. I am grateful to one of the reviewers of this paper for suggesting the term "possessability" (rather than "possessive"), as an attribute by which to distinguish between the good and the beautiful, such that the beautiful is uniquely characterized as not involving the logic of possession.

[15] *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 12. See Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 75 n. 22. Aertsen's position is particularly singled out because he has offered the most systematic argument in recent times against the distinct transcendental status of "the beautiful" in the thought of Aquinas. See also Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), esp. 335-59. Indeed, Christopher Scott Sevier has argued that Aertsen's objections have yet to receive an "adequate rebuttal," and therefore, like Aertsen, he concludes that the best way to think about beauty is as a "mode of the good" (*Aquinas on Beauty* [Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2015], 126 and 56, respectively). For a persuasive argument in favor of the transcendentality of beauty in Aquinas, which approaches the question from a

remarkable text within a wider framework to demonstrate that, despite the absence of certain explicit formulae, the distinct transcendentality of beauty—its unique "addition" to being—is implicit in the way in which Aquinas distinguishes it from the good, and that this is fully consonant with his thought as a whole. Indeed, whereas the good, on the one hand, expresses the fact that God is the end and perfection of the creature, beauty, on the other hand, as a distinct transcendental, expresses the fact that God is intrinsically love-worthy for his own sake, and as such "possesses the admiration of all creatures."[16]

The argument will be presented in four steps. First, the unique character of beauty as *nonperfective* in relation to the soul places it within a radically different order from the other "relational" transcendentals—truth and goodness. The real question is not how it fits alongside them, but rather how it casts a different light upon the whole order in which they are comprised.[17] Second, the fundamental importance of the Augustinian triad of *modus-species-ordo*[18] in Aquinas's distinction between beauty and goodness explains why he so frequently discusses the former in the context of the latter, and indicates

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different perspective than the one offered in this article, see David C. Schindler, "Love and Beauty: The 'Forgotten Transcendental' in Thomas Aquinas," *Communio* 44 (2017): 334-56.

[16] *STh* I, q. 26, a. 4.

[17] This idea of a nonperfective *ratio* will be explored as much more than merely a negation or privation.

[18] This triad is central to Augustine's doctrine of creation, and it appears either as *modus*, *species*, *ordo* in early texts such as *De natura boni* 3, or as *mensura*, *numerus*, *pondus* in other texts such as *De Genesi ad litteram* 4.3.7-4.7.14. It is frequently linked with the text of Wisdom 11:21 ("But you have arranged all things by measure and number and weight"), which shows its importance for Augustine's doctrine of creation. Indeed, these three metaphysical principles are fundamental to his conception of the ontological goodness of all creatures, and in *De natura boni* 3 Augustine argues that where they are absent there is no nature, such that all nature is constituted as good by *modus, species*, and *ordo*. For an extensive discussion of this theme see W. J. Roche, "Measure, Number and Weight in St. Augustine," *New Scholasticism* 15 (1941): 350-76; and for the significance of this triad in relation to beauty and the doctrine of the Trinity see Carol Harrison, "Measure, Number and Weight in Saint Augustine's Aesthetics," *Augustinianum* 28 (1988): 591-602.

the implicit "addition to being" that beauty makes—and therefore its distinct transcendental status—as the admirability of being. Third, the Dionysian dual formula of *proportio* or *consonantia* and *claritas* relates to the *modus-species-ordo* triad in such a way that it signposts the *generic*, *elastic*, and *specific* aspects of the *ratio* of the beautiful, and begins to illuminate its unique *ordo* in contrast to the good. Fourth, Aquinas's Trinitarian theology further elucidates the *ordo* of the beautiful as *the* unique transcendental relation to being by which human beings share in God's joyful vision of creation, as it participates in the wondrous proportions of divine beauty. The whole transcendental order that culminates in the good is transposed into a radically different mood in the nonperfective *ordo* of the beautiful, so that beauty is an alternative perspective upon the whole triadic structure of being; it embraces this same order of being, but relates to it as simply perfect in and for itself, that is, without regard for how it can be perfective of another. In a fifth and final section, I will offer a brief explanation of why the "addition to being" made by the beautiful remains implicit and unsystematized in Aquinas's thought. The argument of this essay proceeds largely from the consideration of the logical consequences of Aquinas's distinction between beauty and goodness according to the Augustinian triad of *modus-species-ordo*, and it is a necessary precursor to resolving the anthropological question raised by Aertsen concerning the correspondence of beauty to the faculties of the soul.

I

The distinct transcendentality of the beautiful depends upon whether it "adds" something to being (*ens*) by making explicit a general "mode of being" that is consequent upon every being considered in relation to another.[19] That it ought to be regarded as a *relational* transcendental is clear from Aquinas's definition of beauty in terms of its proper effect: "beautiful things are

[19] *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1.

those which please when seen."[20] This *per posteriori* definition parallels Aquinas's preferred definition of the good as "what all things desire."[21] However, as mentioned above, Aquinas only ever states the addition that beauty makes to goodness, as opposed to being *qua* being. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight the distinctions that Aquinas makes between beauty and goodness.

An important generic difference can be initially observed, which occurs in a reply to an objection to his argument that all things naturally tend to the good:

> By the very fact of tending to good a thing at the same time tends to the beautiful. . . . It tends to the beautiful inasmuch as it is proportioned [*modificatum*] and specified [*specificatum*] in itself [*in seipso*]. These notes are included in the essential character of good [*ratione boni*], but good adds a relationship of what is perfective in regard to other things [*sed bonum addit ordinem perfectivi ad alia*].[22]

Aquinas argues that beauty and goodness are identical in terms of *mode* (*modificatum*) and *species* (*specificatum*), but distinct in terms of *order* (*ordinem*). This triad will be systematically explored below, but a generic distinction is immediately apparent: the good adds to the concept of the beautiful a relationship by which a being is perfective of other beings. Thus, the tendency towards goodness and beauty is a movement toward the same reality *in seipso*, but insofar as this reality is related to as perfective of others it is considered to be good, whereas when it is regarded as beautiful it is not related to as something that is perfective of others. This distinguishes beauty from both

[20] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1: "pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent." See *STh* I, q. 67, a. 1 for the semantic range of the word *visio*, which includes "knowledge obtained through the intellect."

[21] For example, *STh* I, q. 5, a. 1; q. 5, a. 4, ad 1; *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1; q. 21, a. 1.

[22] *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 12. Aertsen references this text on two occasions, but each time he omits the key phrase, "but good adds a relationship of what is perfective in regard to other things," and so, unsurprisingly, he concludes that beauty is "subsumed under the notion of good" in this text, for he neglects to include the vital distinction Aquinas makes between the two in terms of the nonperfective character of beauty. See Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 75 n. 22; and 92.

goodness *and* truth in a general sense, and precisely in terms of the addition to being that they make.

For example, in the first article of the preceding question in *De veritate*, Aquinas explains how the terms "good," "true," and "one" can add anything to the term "being."[23] The good cannot add to being extrinsically, he argues, because no real being exists outside of the essence of being in general. Neither can it add to being as the ten categories do, which narrow down being by limiting and determining it to a definite manner of being, because the good, like being, is divided into the ten categories. Rather, the good can only add something conceptual to being. Aquinas specifies that negation and a certain kind of relation are the two modalities of that which is merely conceptual, and that the term "one" adds a negation and signifies "undivided being," whereas the terms "true" and "good" are predicated positively, and add a conceptual relation to being. A merely conceptual relation refers to something that "is said to be related which is not dependent upon that to which it is referred, but vice versa," as in the case of knowledge, for instance, which depends upon an object that is in no way dependent upon the one in whom it produces knowledge.[24] The relation by which knowledge is referred to its object is "real," but the relation by which the object is referred to the knowledge it produces is only "conceptual," and Aquinas states that this "holds true of all other things which stand to one another as measure and thing measured or as perfective and perfectible."[25] Significantly, this distinction between "real" and "conceptual" relations indicates that a given reality can be encountered as perfective in relation to others—as in the order of the good—while not being dependent upon that relation, nor having its significance in reality exhausted by it. This is vitally important for understanding the *ratio* of the beautiful; this point will be developed below.

[23] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 1.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

Having made these distinctions, Aquinas arrives at the following general definition: "The true and the good must therefore add to the concept of being a relationship of that which perfects."[26] They differ from one another because a being can be perfective in two ways, namely, according to the formal character of its species and the act of being by which it subsists in that species. According to the first aspect, the intellect is perfected by a being in perceiving its formal and specific character. A being is not in the intellect according to its natural existence in this way—for the act by which a being exists cannot be *in* the intellect—but its intelligible character can inform the intellect, and this is the "mode of perfecting that the *true* adds to being," for "every being is called true inasmuch as it is conformed or conformable to intellect."[27] According to the second aspect, the good names the way in which "a being is perfective of another not only according to its specific character but also according to the existence which it has in reality," because "inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing is such as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that other as an end," and thus the good is rightly defined as "that which all things desire."[28] Crucially, this signals a sharp generic distinction in Aquinas's thought between truth and goodness, on the one hand, and beauty, on the other, and precisely according to what these former terms "add" to the concept of being. In their own way, both the true and the good add a relationship of that which perfects to the concept of being, but this is excluded from the character of the beautiful by Aquinas. If transcendentals are distinguished by their addition to being, then this generic distinction is significant enough to indicate that the beautiful expresses a radically different transcendental relation to being, for relational transcendentals express a unique

[26] Ibid.; cf. *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 3: 'Both the true and good have the essential character [*ratio*] of that which perfects."

[27] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 1.

[28] Ibid.

mode consequent upon every being considered "in relation to another" (*in ordine ad aliud*).[29]

It remains the case that Aquinas does not distinguish a third spiritual power alongside the intellect and will to which aesthetic experience corresponds. This, it might be argued, necessarily precludes beauty from being recognized as a distinct relational transcendental.[30] Although the perspectives of the two articles from *De veritate* (q. 1, a. 1; q. 21, a. 1) are slightly different, it is evident that the "two aspects" mentioned in the latter text, by which any being can be perfective of another, correspond to the twofold "agreement" (*convenientiam*) of the soul with being, mentioned in the former text, through the two powers of intellect and will. In fact, Aquinas uses the same "conformity" definition of truth and the same Aristotelian definition of goodness (*quod omnia appetunt*) in both texts to illustrate his meaning. However, the absence of a third power of the soul ought not to preclude the beautiful from being recognized as a relational transcendental, because beauty does not belong in the order by which being is perfective of another.[31] There is, therefore, no need to try and find a place for it within this order.

Rather, in its general character as nonperfective, beauty offers a radically different perspective upon this entire transcendental order, and this possibility is suggested by Aquinas's distinction between "real" and "conceptual" relations in his elaboration of the true and the good. Whereas the true and the

[29] *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1.

[30] For example, see Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 94.

[31] Francis J. Kovach argues that beauty corresponds to the two powers of intellect and will taken "*jointly*, and not *separately*" ("The Transcendentality of Beauty in Thomas Aquinas," in *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung*, ed. Paul Wilpert and Willehad P. Eckert [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1961], 386-92, 391). For a similar argument, see Piotr Jaroszyński, *Beauty and Being: Thomistic Perspectives*, trans. Hugh McDonald with the collaboration of the author (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2011), esp. 159-205. We might also observe that both "the true" and "the one" relate to the intellect (see *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 3), so a distinct faculty to which beauty corresponds is not necessarily a prerequisite to granting it a distinct transcendental status.

good express a *conceptual* relation whereby being is perfective of others, the beautiful signifies a relation to being that enters more deeply into the intrinsic *reality* of beings in and for themselves. This is further demonstrated by Aquinas's specific distinction between beauty and goodness in terms of the *modus-species-ordo* triad. As was noted above, the two are equated in terms of *modus* and *species*, but distinguished in terms of *ordo*. A distinction in terms of this triad—which has a universal co-extension with being—will now illustrate that the nonperfective character of beauty in relation to others (*in ordine ad aliud*) is indeed a general mode consequent upon every being (*modus generalis consequens omne ens*),[32] and therefore merits a distinct transcendental status in contrast to the good. This is a particularly important distinction to make, because there is a long tradition of interpreting the place of the beautiful in Aquinas's thought as merely "*quaedam boni species*."[33]

II

The *modus-species-ordo* triad belongs within Aquinas's general account of perfection, a thoroughly ontological concept in his thought, which explains its central importance in the elaboration of the transcendentals. For example, he holds that being (*esse*) is the "highest perfection of all", higher even than form, to which it stands as act to potency, because it is "the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections."[34] Similarly, he observes in the *Summa theologiae* that "a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its

[32] *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1.

[33] The phrase "species of the good" originates with Cajetan and his commentary on *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 3, ad 1, which can be found in *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, vol. 6 (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1891), 192. For a refutation of this argument see Kovach, "Transcendentality of Beauty," 389-90.

[34] *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9. All English translations of this work are taken from, *On the Power of God*, trans. English Dominican Fathers (repr.; Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1952 [1932]).

perfection."[35] This "mode of perfection" belonging to all existing beings consists in the three notes of *mode, species,* and *order*. For example, Aquinas explains that "since everything is what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form."[36] That which is presupposed by the form is the "determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode [*modum*]."[37] The form itself is "signified by the species [*speciem*]; for everything is placed in its species by its form."[38] And finally, "upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order [*ordinem*]."[39]

These three notes are not themselves "subsistences," but through them other things are formally constituted as beings.[40] Thus, "according to every being of a thing" is its *mode, species,* and *order*, so that "a man has a mode, species, and order, as a man; another mode, species, and order, as he is white, virtuous, learned, and so on; according to everything predicated of him."[41] The ontological ubiquity of the triad is also clear from its connection to the threefold causality by which every creature is related to God: "because it is referred to God as its efficient cause, it has the measure [*modum*] set for it by God. Referred to God as its exemplary cause, it has species [*speciem*]. Referred to Him as its end, it has order [*ordinem*]."[42] Consequently, it is integral to Aquinas's delineation of the transcendentals. Every

[35] *STh* I, q. 4, a. 1.
[36] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 5.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid., ad 2.
[41] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 3.
[42] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 6, s.c. 3.

creature is "existing by its measure [*modum*], knowable by its species [*speciem*], and oriented by its order [*ordinem*]."[43] The one arises from the "mode" or "measure" of a thing.[44] From "the species alone" is constituted the essence of the true, for "the true is perfective according to the specific character alone."[45] Likewise, given that "in definitions the addition or subtraction of anything constitutes a different species," the essence of the good is constituted "from the species plus the measure," which is "perfective not only in regard to species but also in regard to the act of being,"[46] and "its status as perfective" is signified by "order."[47]

This brief outline of the threefold "mode of perfection" attendant upon *every* being immediately suggests the importance of Aquinas's distinction between beauty and goodness in *De veritate*.[48] According to its *mode* and *species* (*modificatum et specificatum*) a thing is both beautiful and good in itself (*in seipso*). Thus, the two notions are identical in terms of their foundation in form (*species*) and that which is presupposed by a form (*modus*).[49] They differ only in the kind of relation that follows upon that form (*ordo*): to the beautiful, the good "adds a relationship [*ordinem*] of what is perfective in regard to other things,"[50] and "beauty adds to goodness a relation [*ordinem*] to the cognitive faculty."[51] It is striking that Aquinas denotes this

[43] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 6, s.c. 4.

[44] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 6, obj. 2. Although this idea is presented in an objection, it is implicitly affirmed in the corresponding reply: "Good does not differ from being and the one because the notions are opposed but because the notion of good includes those of being and the one and adds something to them" (*De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 6, ad 2)

[45] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 6, ad 3.

[46] Ibid.

[47] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 6.

[48] *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 12.

[49] Cf. *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1: "Beauty and goodness in a thing [*in subiecto*] are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form [*formam*]; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty."

[50] *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 12.

[51] *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3: "pulchrum addit supra bonum, quondam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam." And *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5 (356): "pulchrum addit supra bonum, ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam illud esse huiusmodi"; cf. *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1.

difference with the term *ordinem*, because it is the very same word he uses to characterize the nature of the relational transcendentals in their expression of a general mode consequent upon every being *in ordine ad aliud*.[52] Given the ontological import and ubiquity of this threefold "mode of perfection," a difference in *ordo* requires that beauty and goodness must each possess their own distinct transcendental status, for they express different modes consequent upon every being *in ordine ad aliud*.

The importance of this difference is further demonstrated by the way in which *ordo* is included along with *modus* and *species* in the *ratio* of the good.[53] Aquinas elucidates this inclusion by briefly exploring the ways in which names can imply relations. The *ratio boni* implies a relation, not because the name *good* itself signifies only a relation, but because it signifies something that has a relation along with the relation itself, and the relation implied by the word *good* is that by which the thing itself stands toward another as that which perfects. That which is called good itself is perfective in accordance with both its specific character and its act of being, as an end that perfects the means to that end, and these two aspects of the thing in itself are signified by the terms *modus* and *species*. Since creatures are not their own act of existing, they must have a received existence which is limited and determined according to the measure of the thing in which it is received. Thus, "*species* belongs to the very specific character which, having existence in a subject, is received in a determined measure, since everything which is in a subject is in it according to the measure [*modum*] of the subject."[54] Consequently, every good possesses *ordo* "in its status as perfective"—the relation which the name *good* implies—and, importantly, *species* and *modus* are "causes of that relation."[55] Thus, the difference between the good and the beautiful in term

[52] *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1.

[53] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 6.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

of *ordo* is a difference between two different kinds of relation caused by the *modus* and *species* of every being.

This explains why Aquinas so often discusses the beautiful in the context of the good. The beautiful is structurally identical to the good because both have a *ratio* consisting in the *modus-species-ordo* triad. By contrast, the one arises as a negation from the idea of *modus* alone, and the true as that which perfects according to *species* alone. The good is ultimate in the order of transcendental names taken in themselves absolutely, because its *ratio* consists in the full triadic structure of *mode, species,* and *order*. The good "includes more notes" and is "constituted by a sort of addition" to the other transcendentals.[56] But the good is ultimate only insofar as being is considered as perfective in relation to another. Differing in *ordo* from the good, the beautiful signifies a distinct way of relating to the whole transcendental order of being. Indeed, the relation implied by the word *good* and signified by the term *ordo* is *caused* by the "act of being" (*modus*) and the "specific character" (*species*) of a thing. These two aspects denote the basic composition of existence and essence in all created beings.[57] That the beautiful includes these two notes in its own *ratio* establishes its co-extension with being. Moreover, its distinction from the good, in terms of the unique *ordo* caused by the act of being and specific character of any being, implies that beauty expresses a unique mode consequent upon every being considered in relation to others. The whole transcendental structure is transposed into a radically different mood in the nonperfective *ordo* of the beautiful, so that beauty is ultimate in another sense to the good, or rather, it is an alternative perspective upon the whole triadic structure of being. It embraces this same order of being but relates to it as simply perfect in and for itself, without regard for how being can be perfective of another. The beautiful is its own perfection and must be admired and delighted in for its own sake.

[56] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 3.

[57] See *STh* I, q. 3, a. 4.

That the beautiful uniquely expresses the nonperfective admirability of being is suggested by the way in which Aquinas excludes the character of desirability from its distinctive *ratio* in his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. This may sound counterintuitive, but it will become clear that what Aquinas is denying is not that the beautiful is an object of love, but only that it is sought as a means to one's own perfection. In an objection he raises while discussing the Trinitarian appropriations, Aquinas notes the close linguistic connection between the good (*kalos*) and the beautiful (*kallos*) in ancient Greek. The objection appeals to the authority of Dionysius and states that it seems that all desire beauty and goodness.[58] The force of the objection is that, given the fact that goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit and not to the Son, *species* or beauty ought not to be appropriated to the Son either, if, like goodness, it is an object of desire.[59] However, Aquinas argues in his reply that, like truth, beauty does not properly possess the aspect of desirableness (*rationem appetibilis*), except insofar as it assumes the *rationem boni*, but rather, that the proper *ratio* of the beautiful itself is splendor or radiance (*claritatem*), which is why it is said to have a likeness to the property of the Son.[60]

[58] Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Divine Names* 4.10.708A (*Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, trans. Colm Luibheid, with a foreword, notes, and translation collaboration by Paul Rorem, preface by René Roques, and intro. by Jaroslav Pelikan, Jean Leclercq, and Karlfried Froehlich, Classics of Western Spirituality [New York: Paulist Press, 1987], 79)

[59] I *Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 4: "secundum Dionysium, pulchrum et bonum se consequuntur. Unde videtur quod omnia pulchrum et bonum appetunt; unde secundum nomen in Graeco etiam propinqua sunt, quia bonum dicitur calos, pulchrum callos. Sed bonitas non appropriatur filio, sed spiritui sancto. Ergo nec species vel pulchritudo."

[60] I *Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4: "quod pulchritudo non habet rationem appetibilis nisi inquantum induit rationem boni: sic enim et verum appetibile est: sed secundum rationem propriam habet claritatem et ea quae dicta sunt, quae cum propriis filii similitudinem habent." It is curious how Aertsen fails to incorporate this reply into his argument. For instance, he highlights Aquinas's explanation that the beautiful and the good are discussed in close connection with one another in *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 1 (266), because the beautiful, like the good, can share in the *ratio* of desirability. He concludes, on the basis of this text, that Aquinas simply expresses the dominant idea in Dionysius's exposition of the beautiful, namely, that it is identical with the good, as is

It is remarkable that Aquinas makes this distinction between beauty and goodness as he considers their extremely close etymological connection. His exclusion of the *rationem appetibilis* from the proper *ratio* of the beautiful is particularly significant when his distinction between being and goodness in the *Summa theologiae* is considered.[61] There he argues that goodness and being are identical in reality (*secundum rem*), but distinct logically (*secundum rationem*). Goodness is "what all desire," and the term *bonum* presents this "aspect of desirableness" (*rationem appetibilis*) which is not expressed merely by the term *ens* itself. In a fairly terse argument, Aquinas reasons that because a thing is desirable only insofar as it is perfect (for all desire their own perfection), and because perfection is reducible to actuality, which, in turn, is reducible to that which makes all things actual, namely, existence (*esse*), *bonum* and *ens* are identical *secundum rem*. The only difference between the two, then, is that the good presents this "aspect of desirableness" (*rationem appetibilis*) not explicit in the latter.[62] But according to Aquinas's commentary on the *Sentences*, it is precisely this addition to being made by the good that does not belong to the proper *ratio* of beauty. Although he never includes beauty in his lists of the transcendentals, nor explicitly states that the beautiful makes an addition to being, Aquinas consistently

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expressed by the bringing together of the two in the Greek term *kalokagathia*. It is at this point that Aertsen cites Aquinas's consideration of the close etymological connection between "the good" (*kalos*) and "the beautiful" (*kallos*) in I *Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 4, but he fails to reference the crucial reply to this objection, in which Aquinas asserts that the *rationem appetibilis* does not belong properly to the beautiful as such. Aertsen thus concludes, erroneously, that we cannot say that the beautiful is distinct from the good. But if he is to be followed on this point, then the true must also be denied a distinct transcendental status, for it too can assume the *ratio* of desirableness (see *STh* I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2). However, if Aquinas's distinction between the good and the beautiful in the reply to this objection is noted, all that needs to be said in response to Aertsen is that the beautiful can, of course, become an object of desire when considered in the order of the good, because it is convertible with the other transcendentals whilst being conceptually distinct. See Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 81.

[61] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 1.

[62] See *STh* I, q. 16, a. 3: "bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens."

differentiates beauty from goodness, and precisely according to those terms he uses to articulate the "addition to being" made by the latter. Accordingly, beauty and goodness cannot be merely synonymous, and in this sense, the distinct transcendentality of beauty as an "addition" to being is implicit. Whereas the perfection of being is considered under the aspect of desirability in the order of the good, it is simply considered under the aspect of admirability in the order of the beautiful.

This is consonant with the discussions of the beautiful in the *Summa theologiae*. For example, Aquinas argues that beauty and goodness are identical in a thing, for they are both based upon form, but

> goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen.[63]

The relation of goodness and beauty to distinct faculties is crucial here. On the one hand, Aquinas states that the good is an end to which the appetite moves. This appetibility of being characterizes the order of the good in terms of the logic of *possessability*. As was noted above, Aquinas argues that, "inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing is such as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that other as an end," and thus the good is rightly defined as "that which all things desire."[64] If the good names a regard for being under the aspect of desirability, it does so as something to be possessed, in order that a thing can be perfected and completed by a certain being, and pleasure or delight result from that possession.

Aquinas's distinction here makes it clear that the case is quite different in the order of the beautiful. For beauty is not an end related to the appetite in the order of final causality. This distinguishes the beautiful just as much as the other transcendentals from the good, for "the one and the true do not

[63] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1.

[64] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 1. See also *STh* I, q. 20, a. 1.

have the character of an end as does good; and so they do not have the character of the appetible either."[65] The unique *ordo* of the beautiful relates, instead, to the cognitive faculty and has the nature of a formal cause. Significantly, then, the beautiful causes pleasure not in being possessed, as in the order of the good, but in being seen.[66] As Aquinas puts it elsewhere:

> since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. . . . Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation [*ordinem*] to the cognitive faculty: so that *good* means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the *beautiful* is something pleasant to apprehend.[67]

This pleasure in the beautiful, as a joy that arises not from possession, as in the order of the good, but simply from contemplation, illustrates the unique, nonperfective character of beauty as the admirability of being. Aquinas may not explicitly state that this is the "addition to being" made by the beautiful, but it is implicit in the various distinctions he makes between beauty and goodness according to the *modus-species-ordo* triad.

III

The relation to the cognitive faculty is what the beautiful "adds" to the good, and because this difference between the good and the beautiful consists in a distinction according to the *modus-species-ordo* triad, it was argued above that this is also the *implicit* "addition" that beauty makes to being. Aquinas does not in fact elaborate the nature of the relationship to the cognitive faculty that beauty adds to goodness. Nonetheless, the unique *ratio* of the beautiful becomes clearer in the context of his Trinitarian theology. Indeed, as mentioned above, he defines the proper character of beauty in terms of *claritas* when he discusses the Trinitarian "appropriations" in his commentary on

[65] *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 5.
[66] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1.
[67] *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3.

Peter Lombard's *Sentences*.[68] According to Aertsen, this is the characteristic that "specifies the place of the beautiful."[69] When Aquinas reprises the question of the Trinitarian appropriations in the *Summa theologiae*, and asks whether it is fitting to appropriate *species* or beauty to the Son, he lists *claritas* along with two other "conditions" that belong to the proper nature of the beautiful: perfection/integrity and harmony/proportion.[70] In order to elaborate more fully the implicit "addition to being" that beauty makes—namely, its expression of the admirability of being—it is necessary to examine how these three aesthetic conditions relate to the *modus-species-ordo* triad. Such an examination suggests that perfection or integrity, harmony or proportion, and splendor or radiance, respectively, are what might be called the "generic," "elastic," and "specific" aspects of the *ratio* of the beautiful. This analysis will, in turn, lay the groundwork for situating the *ratio* of the beautiful more deeply within Aquinas's Trinitarian theology.

When he discusses the traditional Trinitarian appropriations in the *Summa theologiae*,[71] one of the questions Aquinas asks is whether it is fitting for Hilary of Poitiers to appropriate the attributes of *eternity, species,* and *use* to the divine persons.[72] Following Augustine, Aquinas takes *species* to be synonymous with beauty (*pulchritudo*),[73] and explains why it has a likeness to the property of the Son according to the three aesthetic "conditions" of integrity (*integritas*) or perfection (*perfectio*), proportion (*proportio*) or harmony (*consonantia*), and splendor or radiance (*claritas*). First, integrity or perfection has a likeness to the Son who suffers no impairment, but truly has within himself the nature of the Father in a perfect way. Second,

[68] I *Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4.

[69] Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 93-94. The word *claritas* certainly means much more than "clarity" for Aquinas. See Mark D. Jordan, "The Evidence of the Transcendentals and the Place of Beauty in Thomas Aquinas," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 29 (1989): 393-407, esp. 397-99

[70] *STh* I, q. 39, a. 8.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* 2.1.

[73] Augustine, *De Trinitate* 6.10.11-12.

proportion or harmony agrees with the property of the Son who is the image of the Father, because an image is beautiful if it is a perfect representation, and Aquinas states, in the words of Augustine, that in this respect there is a wondrous fittingness (*tanta convenientia*) between the Father and the Son. Third, *claritas* agrees with the property of the Son who is the Word, the light and splendor of the intellect, and the art of the omnipotent God.

The first of these conditions, namely, that the Son is beautiful because he truly and perfectly possesses the nature of the Father, does not collapse the distinction that has been made between beauty and goodness, whereby the former, unlike the latter, is considered neither as perfective nor as defined by the logic of possessability. As has been demonstrated, the beautiful is defined by Aquinas in terms of the *modus-species-ordo* triad, which defines the threefold mode of perfection pertaining to all beings. If the good consists in an *ordo* whereby the perfection of beings, in terms of *modus* and *species*, can be possessed by another, then the beautiful is no less based upon that very same perfection. However, in the *ordo* of the beautiful, this perfection is related to by others not as something to be possessed themselves, but as something to be admired and delighted in, so to speak, at a distance. Thus, in the case of the Son, insofar as he possesses the fullness of the Father's nature, he is perfect. If this perfection is considered as something that can be possessed to some extent by another, then it is considered according to the order of the good. However, the connection between the Son's possession of the Father's nature and perfection, and his being beautiful, consists in the fact that the perfection he possesses is admired and delighted in by another as something perfect in and for itself, regardless of how it might be perfective of that other. The perfection possessed by the Son is what makes him beautiful, but the point is that he is beautiful to others, who, when admiring his beauty, do not have his perfection in mind as something to be possessed themselves. As an aesthetic condition, perfection is a *generic* attribute that the beautiful shares with the other relational transcendentals, for

"the true and good have the essential character of that which perfects or of perfections."[74] Although this generic condition is not mentioned elsewhere as a constitutive attribute of the beautiful by Aquinas, its occurrence here confirms that beauty shares in the same transcendental status as truth and goodness in being an ontological perfection.[75]

Instead, Aquinas most frequently defines beauty according to the Dionysian formula of *proportio/consonantia* and *claritas*—a dual formulation that combines the two main traditions of Greek aesthetics, namely, the Pythagorean conception of beauty as based on a relationship of parts and harmony, and the Neoplatonic conception of light and brilliance, by which simple things are said to be beautiful too—and he often refers to the authority of Dionysius when he restricts the features of the beautiful to these two aspects.[76] Indeed, in the fourth *lectio* of his commentary on *The Divine Names*, Aquinas accepts this formula as defining the *ratio* of the beautiful.[77] Moreover, it is striking that almost immediately after stating this fact, Aquinas formulates the *ratio* of the beautiful, according to the dual formula of *proportio/consonantia* and *claritas*, in a way that corresponds significantly with the *modus-species-ordo* triad. He states that the beautiful and the good are the same in subject, because *claritas* and *consonantia* are contained in the *ratio* of both, but that they differ logically, because the beautiful adds to

[74] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 3; cf. *STh* I, q. 6, a. 3, ad 1: "*One* does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision."

[75] Aertsen argues that Aquinas often restricts the *ratio* of the beautiful to the two characteristics of *proportio/consonantia* and *claritas*, not only because of the authority of Dionysius, but also because *perfectio* or *integritas* is a generic condition that binds the beautiful to the good as good. However, he asserts this upon the basis of the fact that the mark of the good is that it is desirable, and something is desirable insofar as it is perfect. But it has been demonstrated that the beautiful does not possess the characteristic of being appetible or of being perfective in relation to others. See Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 91.

[76] For example, *STh* II-II, q. 145, a. 2; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Divine Names* 4.7.701C.

[77] *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5 (339).

the good an order to the cognitive power.[78] In this way, the Augustinian triad and the Dionysian dual formula are brought together in order to articulate the *ratio* of the beautiful, in distinction from the good, in a formulation that is structurally identical to the one found in the first article of question 22 of *De veritate*.[79] Accordingly, it would seem that *consonantia* and *claritas* correspond with *modus* and *species*: both pairs of terms are included alongside *ordo* within the same triadic formulation, by which the good and the beautiful are distinguished. In both cases, Aquinas states the identity of the good and the beautiful according to one of the two pairs, and then differentiates them according to the note of *ordo*.

That *claritas* and *species* correspond with one another in this way is corroborated elsewhere in Aquinas's work. For instance, when he explains the threefold mode of perfection in terms of the *modus-species-ordo* triad, Aquinas states that *species* is what signifies the form of a thing, as outlined above.[80] Likewise, in his commentary on *The Divine Names*, Aquinas makes a very similar connection, arguing that form is what determines the character of a thing, and that this belongs to *claritatem*.[81] Consequently, the only note within the *modus-species-ordo* triad to which *consonantia* could then be connected is *modus*, and Aertsen has argued that this link is corroborated elsewhere in Aquinas's work.[82] For instance, Aquinas's standard example of beauty as a harmony (*consonantia*) of internal relations is

[78] Ibid. (356): "Quamvis autem pulchrum et bonum sint idem subiecto, quia tam claritas quam consonantia sub ratione boni continentur, tamen ratione differeunt: nam pulchrum addit supra bonum, ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam illud esse huiusmodi." For an important discussion of what *illud* refers to in this formulation, see Brendan Thomas Sammon, *The God Who Is Beauty: Beauty As a Divine Name in Thomas Aquinas and Dionysius the Areopagite*, Princeton Theological Monographs (Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick Publications, 2013), 311-12.

[79] *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 12.

[80] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 5.

[81] *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 6 (367): "Forma autem a qua dependet propria ratio rei, pertinent ad claritatem." For the link between *claritas* and form in Aquinas's thought, see Jordan, "The Evidence of the Transcendentals," 403.

[82] Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 93.

that a man is called beautiful because of the due *proportio* or "commensuration" of his members.[83] Aertsen argues, "Thomas frequently uses *commensuratio* as a synonym of *proportio*,"[84] which is significant because the "commensuration" of internal principles is precisely that which signifies *modus* in Aquinas's elaboration of the threefold mode of perfection, as outlined above.[85] But if *consonantia* and *claritas* function in the place of *modus* and *species*, respectively, alongside *ordo* in the triadic formulation of the *ratio* of the beautiful,[86] then Aquinas also links *consonantia* with *ordo* in the same commentary.[87] For example, he argues that while *forma* is linked with *claritas*, the *ordo* to an end pertains to *consonantia*.[88] Likewise, he argues that there is a twofold *consonantia* in things, namely, their order in relation to God and their order in relation to one another.[89] Therefore, in its correspondence with both *ordo* and *modus*, the term *proportio/consonantia* can be characterized as an *elastic* aesthetic condition; in the order of the beautiful, it relates to that which is presupposed by form, and to that which follows upon a form. By contrast, because the term *claritas* only relates to the note of *species* within the Augustinian triad, it can be characterized as the *specific* aesthetic condition.[90] Finally, as noted above, *perfectio/integritas* should be characterized as a *generic* condition of the beautiful, one that is held in common

[83] *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5 (339); c. 4, lect. 22 (589); I *Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1.

[84] Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 93 n. 73; cf. *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 21 (554).

[85] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 5.

[86] *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5 (356).

[87] Sammon also highlights that, for Aquinas, *claritas* is the ground of form in a thing, and that *consonantia* pertains both to the oneness of a thing (which, as seen above, relates to the note of *modus*), and also to its order to particular ends (*The God Who Is Beauty,* 313-16).

[88] *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 6 (367): "Forma autem a qua dependet propria ratio rei, pertinet ad claritatem; ordo autem ad finem, ad consonantiam."

[89] *In De Div. Nom.*, c. 5, lect. 5 (340): "Est autem duplex consonantia in rebus: prima quidem, secundum ordinem creaturarum ad Deum . . . secunda autem consonantia est in rebus secundum ordinationem earum ad invicem."

[90] Indeed, *claritas* defines the proper *ratio* of the beautiful for Aquinas. See I *Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4.

with the other relational transcendentals of truth and goodness, which merely marks it out as a transcendental perfection of being.

These links between the Augustinian triad of *modus-species-ordo* and the Dionysian dual formula of *proportio/consonantia* and *claritas*, and particularly the way in which *proportio/consonantia* emerges as an elastic condition that is linked to the notes of both *modus* and *ordo*, significantly illuminates the difference between the beautiful and the good in Aquinas's thought. In the order of the good there is an external *ordo* that exists *between* beings, whereby being is considered as perfective of another as an end. This is signified by the term *ordo* alone, so that there is a separate term for the individual act of existence (*modus*) by which something subsists in a particular *species*, and another term (*ordo*) for the relation that follows upon that act of existence. In the order of the good, the term *ordo* introduces a new perspective by which a being can be referred beyond itself for some use. By contrast, in the order of the beautiful, there is an *ordo* that relates to the individual reality and intrinsic value of a given being, whereby being is regarded as nonperfective and nonappetible, and is admired in nonpossession for its own sake. Thus, Aquinas links the terms *proportio* or *consonantia* with both the *modus* of the individual act of existing in the beautiful thing, and also with the *ordo* that follows upon the encounter with the beauty of this being. The elastic use of these terms reflects the fact that the beautiful is ordered to nothing other than itself, as something that exists for its own sake, and any *ordo* that exists between the beautiful and another is one of invitation into this individual reality in and for itself. The perfection that the beautiful possesses is its own *ordo*, and one is admitted without taking anything from it. To say that beauty names the admirability of being, then, is to give expression to that aspect whereby the perfection of being serves no extrinsic purpose, but instead gives pleasure simply by the fact that it exists.

IV

The link between the Augustinian triad and the Dionysian dual formula in Aquinas's thought has begun to illuminate the *ratio* of the beautiful, especially in relation to the difference between the beautiful and the good in terms of *ordo*, and the way in which the elastic aesthetic condition of *proportio/consonantia* uniquely relates the two notes of *ordo* and *modus*. This can be developed further by situating Aquinas's conceptualization of beauty more deeply within the context of his Trinitarian theology. Indeed, as was noted above, the three aesthetic conditions occur within the wider context of his discussion of the Trinitarian appropriations of *eternity, species,* and *use* to the divine persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, respectively. A further link can be made between this triad of *eternity-species-use* and the *modus-species-ordo* triad, and once this link has been made, a richer conception of the *ratio* of the beautiful is enabled in two important ways.

The *eternity-species-use* triad does not originate with Aquinas. His purpose is to justify its traditional appropriation to the persons of the Trinity by Hilary of Poitiers.[91] However, the explanation he gives is highly suggestive of the fact that it corresponds with the *modus-species-ordo* triad, not least because of the explicit occurrence of the term *species* and its equation with beauty (*pulchritudo*).[92] Indeed, the whole framework within which Aquinas elucidates the transcendentals is present, and over the course of the same article the term *one* and the mode of efficient causality are appropriated to the Father, the term *true* and the mode of formal causality are appropriated to the Son, and the term *good* and the mode of final causality are appropriated to the Holy Spirit. As was demonstrated above, the *modus-species-ordo* triad is integrally related to these three transcendental names and their corresponding modes of causality. Similarly, Aquinas begins the

[91] See Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* 2.1.

[92] *STh* I, q. 39, a. 8.

article by stating that God must be considered according to the mode derived from creatures, and that in considering any creature there are four points that present themselves in due order: "Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects."[93] This very much echoes Aquinas's statement of the order of the "transcendental names," and the second, third, and fourth points of consideration seem to correspond quite naturally to the *modus-species-ordo* triad. What is especially important is the fact that Aquinas discusses the appropriation of *eternity, species,* and *use* according to the first point, namely, in relation to God considered absolutely in his being. The *modus-species-ordo* triad is integral to each being *qua* being, because it constitutes the threefold mode of perfection by which all things are formally constituted as beings.[94] Thus, the ontological perspective of the first point of consideration in the Trinitarian appropriations justifies connecting *eternity, species,* and *use* with the Augustinian triad, because these terms arise from an understanding of God in terms of his being, and after the mode of creatures. This is also confirmed by the justification given for the appropriations of *eternity* and *use*.

The word *eternity* signifies "*a being* without a principle" and has a likeness to the property of the Father who is a "principle without a principle."[95] This very much echoes Aquinas's explanation of *modus*, which signifies the fact that a "form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient," so that the perfection of form or *species* "presupposes" a certain mode.[96] The presupposition of mode by form is remotely analogous to the eternal "presupposition" of the Father by the Son. The actualization of *species* by a received and measured (*modus*) act of existing

[93] Ibid.

[94] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 2.

[95] *STh* I, q. 39, a. 8.

[96] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 5.

analogically participates in the eternal procession of the Son as the infinitely perfect *species* and image of the Father's measure and existence. Just as existence is not temporally prior to essence in a being, but only logically so, as that which actuates a particular essence, similarly, the Son is coeternal with the Father, but in such a way that the Father is logically presupposed as the source of the Son's *eternity*. Furthermore, the correspondence of *eternity* with *modus* is corroborated by the fact that the latter signifies the commensuration of efficient principles that are presupposed by a form, and Aquinas appropriates efficient causality to the Father and formal causality to the Son in this article.[97]

In justifying the appropriation of *use* to the Holy Spirit, Aquinas argues that the term ought to be taken in a wide sense to include the idea of enjoyment, "according as *to use* is to employ something at the beck of the will, and *to enjoy* means to use joyfully."[98] This agrees with the property of the Holy Spirit in two ways. First, as Love, *use* is that "whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other." Second, as Gift, and the "sweetness of the Begetter and the Begotten," who "pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth," *use* is that "by which we enjoy God."[99] This echoes Aquinas's explanation of *ordo* as that which "follows upon" form as an "inclination to the end."[100] Again, a remote analogy can be observed between Aquinas's definition of *ordo* as that which follows upon *modus* and *species*, and the procession of the Holy Spirit as the second procession within the Godhead following upon the procession of the Son (*species*) from the Father (*modus*). As a certain end follows upon *modus* and *species*, the Holy Spirit is the proper *ordo* of love between the Father and the Son.

Thus, the two triads of *modus-species-ordo* and *eternity-species-use* correspond with one another. Importantly, this opens two ways in which the *ratio* of the beautiful can be

[97] *STh* I, q. 39, a. 8.
[98] Ibid.
[99] *STh* I, q. 39, a. 8.
[100] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 5.

brought to fuller expression through Aquinas's Trinitarian theology. First, because *ordo* and *use* correspond with one another, the difference between the beautiful and the good in terms of *ordo* can be elaborated in the light of Aquinas's twofold appropriation of *use* to the Holy Spirit, in order to articulate the sense in which the nonperfective admiration of beauty is the transcendental relation by which human beings participate in God's vision of creation. Second, the elastic aesthetic condition of *proportio/consonantia*, which relates to *modus* and *ordo*, can now be related to *use* and *eternity*, in order to articulate the sense in which the beautiful comes to light as an experience of the gratuity and fittingness of all creaturely being, as it analogically participates in the proportions of divine beauty, namely, the "*tanta convenientia*"[101] between the Father and the Son, enjoyed in the love and joy of the Holy Spirit. Aquinas's twofold appropriation of *use* to the Holy Spirit will be considered first.

The first sense of *use*, in Aquinas's explanation of its appropriation, refers to the immanent divine life "whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other" in the *love* of the Holy Spirit, and the second sense refers to the economy by which creatures are drawn into the "bounty and wealth" of that love, and come to enjoy God as a *gift*.[102] The two, *love* and *gift*, can be distinguished inasmuch as the first refers to the perfection of God who exists within and for himself, and the second refers to God insofar as he is perfective of creatures. This second sense of *use* closely parallels the *ordo* of the good, in which being as the likeness of divine goodness is related to another as perfective. But it should be recalled that Aquinas makes a distinction between "real" and "conceptual" relations when he discusses the *ratio boni* in terms of the *modus-species-ordo* triad.[103] The *ordo* of the good is a conceptual relation that follows upon the existence of a being that is not exhausted by this relation, and the distinction between "conceptual" and "real" relations

[101] *STh* I, q. 39, a. 8.

[102] Ibid.

[103] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 1.

suggests the possibility of another *ordo* that relates to this reality within its own terms and for its own sake. This is exactly what is suggested by the first sense of *use*, which refers to the "real" relations of the divine persons whereby God exists for himself in the unity of perfect love, in contrast to the second sense of *use*, which refers to the "conceptual" relation whereby God is related to creatures.[104]

This first sense of *use* parallels the *ordo* of the beautiful in relation to being because, accordingly, God is considered not as perfective of another, but as an intrinsically perfect end in himself. Although he is perfective in relation to others, God is in no way exhausted or defined by that relation, and in this way he is beautiful. Furthermore, since God is not defined by his relation to creation, and because he is always already eternally replete in the perfection and love of the Trinitarian life, creation exists purely as a gift and as something that has significance in and of itself. It does not exist as something that is perfective in relation to God, but is a gift given for its own sake, that it might share in the divine perfection. Accordingly, God regards created being as nonperfective and therefore as beautiful. Upon the basis of God's supereminent beauty, an intrinsic beauty and value is bestowed upon all finite being; because God is beautiful, creation is beautiful, and in the experience of beauty, human beings are admitted into this divine vision of creaturely being, regardless of the way in which it might be perfective of another. Thus, the two orders of the beautiful and the good are grounded in the twofold *ordo* or *use* of the divine perfection, which is also reflected in Aquinas's distinction between real and conceptual relations. To admire the beauty of being is not to consider beings as related beyond themselves for some extrinsic purpose, whereby they might be perfective of another. Instead, it is rather to enter into their intrinsic reality and value, that is, their ontological status as a pure gift, given by God simply that they might participate in the perfection of existence. In this

[104] For the asymmetric relation between God and creation see *STh* I, q. 13, a. 7; q. 45, a. 3, ad 1.

way, the *ratio* of the beautiful, as the admirability of being, is grounded in the divine vision of creation: to see the beauty of creatures is to behold them in the way that God beholds them.

But the *ratio* of the beautiful is not only grounded in God's vision of creation. The second consequence of the correspondence between the two triads of *modus-species-ordo* and *eternity-species-use* is that it becomes possible to ground the order of beauty within the immanent Trinitarian processions in the divine life. Aquinas explains that the primary appropriation of *use* to the Holy Spirit, namely, as *love*—which corresponds to the order of the beautiful—refers to that "whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other."[105] It is striking that this sense of *use* refers to the same reality that Aquinas mentions in order to demonstrate the meaning of *proportio* or *consonantia* as a condition of beauty, that is, the *tanta convenientia* between the Father and the Son.[106] If *proportio* or *consonantia* is an elastic aesthetic condition that refers to both *ordo* and *modus* in the Augustinian triad, and in such a way that makes clear that the beautiful is ordered to nothing extrinsic to its own intrinsic reality and perfection, which is admired and enjoyed in and for itself, then a parallel emerges in this aesthetic consideration of *use* in the divine life. Namely, *proportio* corresponds with both the *use* of the Holy Spirit, and with the *eternity* of the Father in relation to the Son, to whom beauty or *species* is specifically appropriated. In this appropriation, *perfectio* belongs to the Son in a *generic* and substantial way insofar as he does not lack anything of the Father's nature. The condition of *proportio* belongs to the Son in an elastic and relational way insofar as it refers to both the Father whose perfect image he is, and also to the Holy Spirit in whom he and the Father enjoy one another. Finally, *claritas* belongs to the Son in a *specific* and intellectual way because in his identity as the Word he is the "art" of God and the light and splendor of the human intellect. Just as Aquinas argues that perfection consists in form (*species*) and

[105] *STh* I, q. 39, a. 8.
[106] Ibid.

that which is related to form—whether it is that which is presupposed by form (*modus*), or that which follows form (*ordo*)—he also appropriates the *perfectio* of beauty (*species*) to the Son, which consists in what is proper to that "form" or "art" itself, namely, *claritas*, and also that which is related and proportioned to that form—namely, the presupposed *modus* of the Father and the *ordo* of love in the Holy Spirit.

This means that the experience of beauty can be located at the most fundamental metaphysical level. There is a *proportio* or *convenientiam*[107] between the soul and being whereby human beings admire the intrinsic beauty of finite being, and are thereby admitted into the *ordo* or *use* of God's regard for creation. But this delight is rooted in a deeper *proportio* or *tanta convenientia*,[108] whereby the intrinsic beauty of creatures is an analogical participation in the beauty and *proportio* of the Father's *modus* in relation to the *species* of the Son, enjoyed in the *ordo* of the Holy Spirit. Just as God's eternally replete perfection and beauty is the basis upon which he beholds creation as nonperfective in relation to himself, and therefore as beautiful, likewise, the analogical participation of all finite being in that divine beauty is the ontological basis upon which beauty makes an appearance in the world to be beheld by human beings. In other words, the admiration of finite beauty is an analogical participation in the divine being, in that eternal act by which the Father lovingly beholds the Son in the Holy Spirit.[109] As Brendan Thomas Sammon puts it, as the archetype of beauty, "the Son's dynamic is normative for all events of beauty. This dynamic is repeated in a creaturely context when any beautiful thing participates beauty. What makes the participant beauty-filled, one might say, is a procession from

[107] Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1.

[108] *STh* I, q. 39, a. 8.

[109] Sevier helpfully highlights the fact that the common sense of *species* in the Middle Ages was that of "appearance" or "aspect," which derived from the word *specio*, "to look," such that we can say that the Son is the "projection" or "manifestation" of the Father's beauty (*Aquinas on Beauty*, 105-6).

beauty itself as a creaturely recapitulation of the Son's procession."[110]

Indeed, Aquinas's wider use of the related terms of *modus*, *proportio*, and *convenientia* confirms this, and reveals that this analogical participation in divine beauty consists in the delightful fittingness of existence (*esse*) to essence in finite being. Thus, Umberto Eco argues that, for Aquinas, the two related terms *modus* and *proportio* express a "relation of fitness" between the two fundamental metaphysical principles of existence and essence.[111] For instance, Aquinas argues in the *Summa contra gentiles* that there is a proportion wherever we find two things that "complement" one another, which is a proportion of potentiality to act, so that "being [*esse*] itself is the complement of the existing substance, for each and every thing is in act through having being."[112] Likewise, the corresponding term *modus* is used by Aquinas to express this same sense of complementarity or *convenientia*. He states that

> the beings which share "to be" from the First Being, do not share in it according to a universal mode of being as it is found in the First Principle; they participate in it in a particular way, according to a certain determinate mode [*modum*] of being which belongs [*convenit*] to this given genus or this given species.[113]

Thus, the terms *modus* and *proportio* signify the fittingness of existence and essence to one another. They express the fact that being (*esse*) is proportioned and fitted to essence, and that there is a *becoming* aspect to all finite beings as the recipient of an individual act of existence that is complementary to its instantiation in a particular *species* or form.

[110] Sammon, *The God Who Is Beauty*, 349.

[111] Umberto Eco, *The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Hugh Bredin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 84; Eco offers an extensive and helpful discussion of the various uses of "proportion" in Aquinas's thought (ibid., 82-98).

[112] *ScG* II, c. 53 (Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, *Book Two: Creation*, trans. with an introduction and notes by James F. Anderson (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975).

[113] *De Sub. Separ.*, c. 8 (Thomas Aquinas, *Treatise on Separate Substances*, trans. Francis J. Lescoe [West Hartford, Conn.: Saint Joseph College, 1959]).

Being (*ipsum esse*) does not subsist itself, but is given away in particular beings; it is "complete and simple, yet non-subsistent."[114] It is the most perfect of all things, but "existence is considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists."[115] The terms *modus* and *proportio* denote the *convenientia* of this self-donation of being into particular beings, and this lies at the heart of the analogical participation of finite being in the procession of the Son from the Father. The Father is the *eternity* and *modus* presupposed by the Son, and just as *modus* and *proportio* signify the fittingness of the orientation of being (*ipsum esse*) to be given away in beings (*ens*), the Father is eternally and infinitely proportioned to his self-donation in the Son. The Father's being is one that "belongs" to the Son. This is the *tanta convenientia*, the wonderful proportion, in which all creaturely beauty analogically participates as a limited but fitting proportion between *esse* and essence. And the unique delight aroused in the experience of finite beauty answers to the *ordo* of love in the Holy Spirit, in whom the Father's being is entirely given again, as the one in whom he and the Son enjoy one another.

This fittingness is the admirability of being that is experienced in the beautiful, the *convenientia* of all finite being as gift, participating in the eternal fittingness and determination of the Father's self-donation in the Son, eternally enjoyed in the delight and love of the Holy Spirit. As David Bentley Hart argues, the generation of the Son, which is infinitely and eternally traversed in the Spirit as peace and delight, is the "true interval of difference" in which the whole of creation participates.[116] Beauty does not merely "adorn" the spaces of creation—its internal differentiation and its distinction from its divine source—rather, beauty is "the true form of that distance,

[114] *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 1.

[115] *STh* I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.

[116] David Bentley Hart, *The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 248.

constituting it, as the grammar of difference."[117] The admirability of the beautiful is the *convenientia* of this distance, the wonder and delight that created being simply exists. This fittingness itself is expressed by the aesthetic term *proportio* or *consonantia*, and its manifestation to the one perceiving its beauty is expressed by the term *claritas*. In the experience of the beautiful *per se*, this fittingness is not experienced as something good for oneself, but as something good in and for itself. Nevertheless, it is a reality into which one can be admitted, but only as an admirer.

V

Aquinas does not include "the beautiful" in any of his lists of the transcendentals, nor does he ever specify the "addition to being" that beauty makes, which is of criteriological importance for a transcendental according to the first article of *De veritate*. Therefore, the distinct transcendental status of beauty is not an explicit aspect of his thought. However, if one follows the logical consequences of his distinction between beauty and goodness, according to the *modus-species-ordo* triad, then it is necessary to acknowledge that there is an *implicit* "addition to being" made by the beautiful, such that it merits a distinct transcendental status. Beauty is not simply reducible to the good, because the two differ in terms of *ordo*. Neither can the beautiful simply be the true and the good taken together, because truth and goodness add to being a relationship of that which perfects, and Aquinas excludes this from the *ratio* of the beautiful. The beautiful, therefore, must be recognized as a distinct transcendental in the thought of Aquinas, not because

[117] Ibid., 18. A similar point is made by Sammon: the Son is beautiful because he truly and perfectly possesses the nature of the Father, but as a distinct image of the Father's beauty he does not merely *reduplicate* the Father. Similarly, in the realm of created beings, "the beautiful thing *qua* beautiful has truly and perfectly the nature of beauty though in a way that neither merely reduplicates beauty nor is identical to beauty itself . . . a beautiful thing communicates a distinction in beauty even as it communicates the true and perfect nature of beauty" (*The God Who Is Beauty*, 349).

he explicitly states this to be the case in the same terms with which he delineates the other transcendentals, but because it is implicit in the logic of his distinction between beauty and goodness. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that this accords with Aquinas's Trinitarian theology, which might not be systematized thematically around the transcendentality of the beautiful in an explicit manner, yet nonetheless possesses a deep resonance with that theme.

This might simply beg the question as to why these issues remain implicit and not explicit in Aquinas's work. It is certainly plausible that he labored under the weight of the medieval tradition, which almost universally recognized only "the one," "the true," and "the good" as distinct transcendental properties, which correspond, respectively, with the threefold mode of efficient, formal, and final causality, and the three divine persons.[118] Likewise, in following Aristotle's limitation of the powers of the soul to the intellect and will, Aquinas may have felt a certain degree of reticence in claiming too much for the beautiful, since there was not a faculty of the soul to which it could correspond in his anthropology. This might also be the reason why Aquinas does not specify in any great detail the precise nature of the relation to the cognitive power that beauty adds to goodness. However, despite the relative scarcity of the material he devotes to discussions of the beautiful, and the unsystematic nature of those discussions, it is clear that he has seen something essential, which provides the foundation for developing more explicit accounts of "the beautiful."[119]

[118] See Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, esp. 201-334.

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THE FITTINGNESS OF MARY'S VIRGINITY IN BIRTH

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THIS ARTICLE WILL consider the fittingness of Mary's virginity in birth, in three sections. First, to establish the definitiveness of the doctrine, I will conduct a brief review of early patristic teaching on Mary's *virginitas in partu*, with an appended observation about the most recent confirmation of the doctrine in the teaching of the Second Vatican Council. Second, I will consider some potential difficulties with the teaching, as the problems might be more obvious than the fittingness. Finally, in response to the potential difficulties, I will note the three reasons that St. Thomas Aquinas gives for Mary's virginity in birth in the *Summa theologiae*, and I will propose the addition of a fourth Thomistic reason. This last reason, which appeals to the fact that Christ had the beatific vision from the moment of his conception, is the principal point I wish to present. The rest provides context for my modest contribution.

I. EARLY PATRISTIC WITNESSES AND THE MOST RECENT CONFIRMATION

Mary's perpetual virginity has been held from the beginning of the Church's life. Not to be flippant, but obviously Mary knew that she was perpetually a virgin. And her virginity in birth is affirmed rather graphically in an early apocryphal gospel. The *Protoevangelium of James* (ca. 145) recounts a tale of the midwife who was serving Mary informing one Salome

that Mary had miraculously remained a virgin in birth. In anticipation of Thomas the Apostle, Salome said that unless she verified this fact with her own fingers, she would not believe. She was so bold as to do so, whereupon her hand started to burn and she repented of her boldness and lack of faith; she was healed only when she held the Christ child.[1]

The explicitness of this early witness, though not canonical, is significant in that it establishes that the idea of Mary's virginity in birth was in circulation.[2] This strengthens the claims of authors like Joseph Plumpe that Ignatius of Antioch (d. ca. 110) and Justin Martyr (d. 165) "intimate and presuppose" Mary's virginity in birth, even though they do not make the assertion explicitly.[3] That explicit assertion would come some fifty years later in Irenaeus (d. ca. 202)[4] and Clement of

[1] *The Infancy Gospels of James and Thomas*, trans. Ronald Hock, chaps. 19-20 (Santa Rosa, Calif.: Polebridge Press, 1995), 67-69.

[2] Joseph Plumpe opines that it shows that the idea was much debated—affirmed and denied. There are two other lesser known and possibly earlier works, the *Ascension of Isaiah* and the *Odes of Solomon*, that also affirm Mary's virginity in birth. See Joseph Plumpe, "Notes: Some Little-Known Early Witnesses to Mary's *Virginitas in Partu*," *Theological Studies* 9 (1948): 572ff.

[3] Ibid., 567.

[4] Irenaeus, *Demonstratio apostolicae praedicationis*, c. 54 (ed. K. Ter Mekerttschian and S. G. Wilson, *Patrologia Orientalis* 61.12.5 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1917], 700): "Praetera de nativitate eius propheta alibi dicit: 'Antequam parturiret, peperit; antequam veniret partus eius, peperit masculum [Is 66, 7].' Ipse nuntiavit modum insperatum inopinumque nascendi ex virgine" ("Besides, concerning his birth, the prophet says elsewhere, 'Before she was in labor, she gave birth; before her labor came, she give birth to a male child' [Isa 66:7]. He reported unexpected and unforeseen manner of being born of the virgin"). See Plumpe for the larger interpretive context ("Notes," 569-70). All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

Plumpe (ibid., 569), maintains that Origen (d. ca. 253) too articulates Mary's virginity *in partu*, although he notes that Origen contradicts this opinion elsewhere. The evidence in favor of *in partu* is weak, however, and David Hunter is not convinced (David Hunter, "Helvidius, Jovinian, and the Virginity of Mary in Late Fourth-Century Rome," *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 1 [1993]: 62 n. 57). Origen, *In Leuiticum homiliae* 8, para. 2 (ed. W. Baehrens, *Clavis Patrum Latinorum* 198.3.A [Turnhout: Brepols, 1920]), 395, l. 4): "De Maria autem dicitur quia 'virgo' concepit et peperit" ("But it is said of Mary that a virgin conceived and gave birth").

Alexandria (d. ca. 215).[5] Other great figures, like Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 390), Gregory of Nyssa (d. 395), Ambrose (d. 397), Jerome (d. 420), and Augustine (d. 430), would follow suit with an explicit articulation of the teaching.[6]

We then come to magisterial authorities. Leo the Great's letter of 449 affirming the *virginitas in partu* was approved by the Council of Chalcedon in 451.[7] After Leo, Pope Hormisdas would repeat the teaching. Subsequently, the Council of Constantinople II (553) described Mary as *aeiparthenos*, "ever-virgin."[8] Although more skeptical commentators note that Constantinople did not specify explicitly that *aeiparthenos* included virginity in birth, the preceding affirmations over four hundred years hardly leave that in doubt.[9] Two more popes, Pelagius I

[5] Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 7.16 (ed. L. Früchtel, O. Stählin, and U. Treu, *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller* 17 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1970], 66): "Ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ μέχρι νῦν δοκεῖ ἡ Μαριὰμ λεχὼ εἶναι διὰ τὴν τοῦ παιδίου γέννησιν, οὐκ οὖσα λεχώ (καὶ γὰρ μετὰ τὸ τεκεῖν αὐτὴν μαιωθεῖσάν φασί τινες παρθένον εὑρεθῆναι)" ("But, as appears, many even down to our own time regard Mary, on account of the birth of her child, as having been in the puerperal state, although she was not. For some say that, after she brought forth, she was found, when examined, to be a virgin"). English translation taken from *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1971), 551. Brian A. Graebe, *Vessel of Honor: The Virgin Birth and the Ecclesiology of Vatican II* (Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2021), 22 n. 23, has "*Stromata* 7 and 16" instead of 7.16.

[6] See Graebe, *Vessel of Honor*, 24-31.

[7] See ibid., 33.

[8] Council of Constantinople II, canon 6: "If anyone says that the glorious holy Mary, ever-virgin [ἀειπαρθένον] is not Mother of God in the true sense . . . let him be anathema." The English translation is taken from *Compendium of Creeds, Definitions, and Declarations on Matters of Faith and Morals*, ed. Heinrich Denzinger and Peter Hünermann, trans. Josef and Jacques Dupuis (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), 149, no. 427.

"Ever-virgin" appears also in canon 14. See Graebe, *Vessel of Honor*, 34 and Hunter, "Helvidius, Jovinian, and the Virginity of Mary," 57.

[9] Ambrose may be the first Latin author to assert Mary's virginity in birth in writing. See his *De institutione uirginis et sanctae Mariae uirginitate perpetua ad Eusebium* 8.52 (l. 10) (ed. M. Adriaen and P. A. Ballerini, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* 12 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1957]: "Porta igitur Maria, per quam Christus intrauit in hunc mundum, quando uirginali fusus est partu, et genitalia uirginitatis claustra non soluit" ("Therefore, Mary was the door through which Christ entered into this world, when he

and Gregory the Great, would explicitly affirm Mary's virginity in birth; and the Lateran Council of 649—not an ecumenical council—would articulate the threefold teaching that Mary's virginity was preserved before birth, in birth, and after birth.[10] Finally, in 1555—while the Council of Trent, an ecumenical council, was in session—Pope Paul IV defended Mary's virginity *in partu*, and the catechism authorized by that same council teaches explicitly that Mary remained a virgin even in giving birth to Christ.[11]

Evidence regarding the constancy of the teaching down to our own times can be seen in *Lumen Gentium*, which declares that "the birth of Our Lord . . . did not diminish His mother's virginal integrity but sanctified it."[12] This has an augmented significance because the doctrine was challenged and reinterpreted by a number of authors in the mid-twentieth century. In *Vessel of Honor: The Virgin Birth and the Ecclesiology of Vatican II*, Brian Graebe writes that "the years between 1952 and 1964 represent arguably the most significant—and unquestionably the most tumultuous—period in the history of the doctrine of *virginitas in partu*."[13] While, in my judgment, this period could not possibly rival the significance of the early patristic period in establishing the doctrine, a tumult was certainly produced by some contemporary authors who doubted

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was brought forth by a virginal birth, and he did not open the genital gates of virginity"). See Hunter, "Helvidius, Jovinian, and the Virginity of Mary," 47.

[10] Council of the Lateran, canon 3: "Si quis secundum sanctos Patres non confitetur proprie et secundum veritatem Dei genetricem sanctam semperque virginem et immaculatam Mariam, utpote ipsum Deum Verbum specialiter et veraciter, qui a Deo Patre ante omnia saecula natus est, in ultimis saeculorum absque semine concepisse ex Spiritu Sancto, et incorruptibiliter eam genuisse, indissolubili permanente et post partum eiusdem virginitate, condemnatus sit" ("If anyone does not, following the holy Fathers, confess properly and truly that holy Mary, ever virgin and immaculate, is Mother of God, since in this latter age she conceived really and truly without human seed from the Holy Spirit, God the Word himself, who before the ages was born of God the Father, and gave birth to him without corruption, her virginity remaining equally inviolate after his birth, let him be condemned") (Denzinger-Hünermann, 174, no. 503).

[11] See Denzinger-Hünermann, 437, no. 1880; and Graebe, *Vessel of Honor*, 51.

[12] *Lumen Gentium* 57, https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html.

[13] Graebe, *Vessel of Honor*, 55.

the ancient understanding of Mary's *virginitas in partu*, such as Albert Mitterer, Jean Galot, Karl Rahner, Walter Kasper, and Gerhard Müller, who would later serve as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.[14]

II. Potential Difficulties with the Doctrine

When we think of Mary's perpetual virginity, it is easy to allow our attention to be drawn to her virginity before and after giving birth to Jesus, since these are conditions that ordinary human beings experience. Mary's virginity in birth, by contrast, can seem strange and even misogynistic. The teaching could seem to spring from an aversion to the material body such as we find in Docetism, which denies that God truly took human flesh to himself. Indeed, with respect to declaring Mary's virginity in birth, Plumpe discerns an "apparent diffidence" among the earliest Fathers precisely out of concern not to provide support to Docetism.[15] Quite on the other side of diffidence, Tertullian explicitly denies Mary's virginity in birth as a way to refute the Gnostic understanding of Christ.[16] And Augustine reports that Jovinian denied the *virginitas in partu* because he found it to be too close to the Manichean view that Christ was a phantom.[17]

[14] Ibid., 56-73, 105-8.

[15] Plumpe, "Notes," 568.

[16] Tertullian, *De carne Christi* 23 (l. 10) (ed. E. Kroymann, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* 2 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1954]): "Peperit enim, quae ex sua carne, et non peperit, quae non ex uiri semine, et uirgo, quantum a uiro, non uirgo, quantum a partu" ("For she, who gave birth from her flesh and did not give birth from the seed of a man, was a virgin with respect to a man but not a virgin with respect to birth").

[17] Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* 1 (ed. M. Schanz, *Clavis Patrum Latinorum* 351 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1969], col. 643, l. 31): "hoc de manichaeorum nomine et crimine faciebat etiam iouinianus, negans mariae sanctae uirginitatem, quae fuerat dum conciperet, permansisse dum pareret: tanquam christum cum manichaeis phantasma crederemus, si matris incorrupta uirginitate diceremus exortum" ("This charge of Manichaeism was also brought by Jovinian, who denied that Mary's holy virginity, which had existed when she conceived, remained while she was giving birth, as if we believed with the Manichaeans that Christ was a phantasm when we say that in His birth His mother's virginity remained inviolate"). The English translation is taken from *Against Julian*, trans. Matthew Schumacher, The Fathers of the Church 16 (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1957), 6.

This aversion to corporeality could seem to pertain especially to the female human body, and more especially to sexual powers of the female human body. One could certainly encounter this objection today. For instance, a woman's period has been widely regarded as a source of impurity in ancient and primitive societies. As an illustration, we read in Leviticus 12 that it shall be determined of a woman that "at the time of her menstruation, she shall be unclean" (v. 2), and "she shall not touch any hallowed thing, nor come into the sanctuary, until the days of her purifying are completed" (v. 4). After a month or two of purification, she must bring an offering to the priest (vv. 4-6), "and the priest shall make atonement for her, and she shall be clean" (v. 8).[18] Moreover, as National Public Radio documents, in Nepal even today there are "menstruation sheds" for women in their period, where they can be isolated so as to protect the rest of the population from contamination.[19] The journalist Danielle Preiss relates this particular incident: "Koshila Khatri, 27, talks about a time when the dishes she ate from while menstruating were accidentally brought into the house. Then a tiger killed two of the family's goats. Khatri isn't

David Hunter notes that the Manichees had a Docetic Christology (Hunter, "Helvidius, Jovinian, and the Virginity of Mary," 57).

Jovinian and Helvidius share the infamous privilege of being known for denying Mary's perpetual virginity toward the end of the fourth century. Jovinian is of greater interest to this article, because he denied Mary's virginity in birth. See Hunter, "Helvidius, Jovinian, and the Virginity of Mary."

[18] For the larger context of menstruation in Leviticus, see Mary Douglas, *Leviticus As Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 164, 176, 178-80.

[19] Danielle Preiss, "Why It's Hard to Ban the Menstrual Shed," All Things Considered, 13 May 2019, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/05/13/721450261/why-its-so-hard-to-stop-women-from-sleeping-in-a-menstrual-shed.

Although Mary was without sin or impurity, Joseph and Mary offered a pair of turtledoves or two young pigeons for the purification of Jesus and Mary, as Luke (2:22, 24) reports: "And when the time came for their purification according to the law of Moses, they [Joseph and Mary] brought him [Jesus] up to Jerusalem to present him to the Lord . . . and to offer a sacrifice according to what is said in the law of the Lord, 'a pair of turtledoves, or two young pigeons.'" Had the priest recognized their purity and protested, Mary might have replied with the words that her Son would later speak to John the Baptist when he hesitated to baptize him: "Let it be so now; for thus it is fitting for us to fulfil all righteousness" (Matt 3:15).

totally sure whether to blame this attack on menstruation." Here we have a victim of misogynistic superstition.

If now, among the more enlightened, a woman's period is recognized to be no spiritual or physical threat but rather simply a natural process of the body and indeed a sign of a woman's unique wondrous power to bear new human life, should we have doubts about the teaching of Mary's virginity in birth? No. Aquinas's understanding of the glorified human body helps us to see how the doctrine of virginity in birth does not come from an aversion to the human body but is rather an affirmation of its ultimate end in beatitude that comes through Christ's humanity. An examination of this truth can be helpful to believers, for while any believing Catholic would accept the declared teaching as true, it will be held firmly and joyfully if its truth is perceived as luminous. To that end, I will now (1) review the three reasons that Aquinas gives for Mary's virginity in birth and (2) consider the four characteristics of the glorified body—subtlety, agility, brightness, and impassibility—focusing on subtlety, in order to add a fourth, Thomistic, reason of fittingness for Mary's virginity in birth.

III. Thomas Aquinas on Mary's Virginity in Birth

A) Aquinas's Three Reasons

In question 28, article 2 of the *Tertia pars*, Aquinas teaches that it was fitting that Mary remain a virgin in birth for three reasons. First, this accords with Christ's being the Word of God. That is, the most perfect example of a birth is the eternal birth of God the Son from God the Father.[20] And this birth is nothing other than the Word's proceeding in the divine intellect in the Father's act of knowing himself.[21] Now, a word is conceived in the mind without corruption, and it proceeds within the mind without corruption, and thus "to show that [Christ's]

[20] *STh* I, q. 33, a. 3. For the *Summa theologiae*, I use Latin text of the Leonine edition in *Opera omnia*, vols. 4-12 (Rome: Ex typographia polyglotta, 1888-1906).

[21] *STh* I, q. 27, aa. 1-2.

body was [the body] of the Word of God himself, it was fitting that he should be born of the incorrupt womb of a virgin."[22] Second, since Christ came to take away our corruption, it would be unfitting for him to corrupt his mother's virginity by his birth. Third, since Christ commanded us to honor father and mother, it would be unfitting for him to diminish his mother's honor by his birth. The consistent principle here is the avoidance of corruption—first on account of the Son's perfect divinity, and then twice on account of Mary's dignity.

Seven questions later in the *Tertia pars*, Aquinas makes clear that he views Mary's freedom from pain in giving birth as linked to this incorruption.[23] The absence of pain is theologically significant as it manifests that Mary was free from the curse of Eve, who heard the Lord announce to her, "I will greatly multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children" (Gen 3:16). Mary's freedom from pain indicates that she was conceived in the prelapsarian state of original justice; her virginity in birth, as we shall see now, points ahead to the glory of beatitude with which Christ can endow our human bodies.

B) A Fourth Reason for Mary's Virginity "in partu"

We may add one more reason, by considering the properties of the glorified body. This fourth reason clarifies the principle of incorruption in the three reasons that Aquinas laid out.

In the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas notes that Hugh of St. Victor maintained that Christ assumed the properties of a glorified body from the moment of his birth. That is, Christ manifested subtlety in his birth by coming forth from a virginal womb while it remained chastely closed, he showed agility by walking on the waves of the sea, he exhibited brightness in his

[22] *STh* III, q. 28, a. 2: "Nam verbum non solum in corde absque corruptione concipitur, sed etiam absque corruptione ex corde procedit. Unde, ut ostenderetur quod illud corpus esset ipsius verbi Dei, conveniens fuit ut de incorrupto virginis utero nasceretur." Graebe, *Vessel of Honor*, 46, notes that the first reason Aquinas supplies borrows from Hilary, and the second reason is taken from Augustine.

[23] *STh* III, q. 35, a. 6.

Transfiguration, and he demonstrated impassibility at the Last Supper when he gave his body to be consumed by the disciples without its being divided.[24] "The name subtlety," Aquinas clarifies, "is taken from the power to penetrate."[25] The glorified body is able to penetrate and pass through things not because the body has become immaterial or rarified—as various heretics have held—but because of the glorified soul's dominion over the body: the "glorified body is said to be spiritual, as altogether subject to the spirit"; the body is subject to the soul as "matter [is subject] to form" and is thus subject to the soul "for other works of the soul inasmuch as the soul is the mover [of the body]."[26] So, the subtlety of a physical body is on account of a right ordering of nature, not a distortion of nature.

Aquinas, however, rejects Hugh's opinion that Christ assumed the properties of a glorified body from the moment of his birth, since these glorified properties are incompatible with passibility, which Christ assumed until his resurrection—as was evident in his suffering.[27] Rather, explains Aquinas, "all these things were done miraculously through divine power."[28] They were done miraculously because Christ did not have these glorified properties habitually. Regarding this lack, Aquinas

[24] *STh* III, q. 45, a. 1, ad 3; q. 81, a. 3. He mentions these four properties also in III *Sent.*, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2; III *Sent.*, d. 21, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5; IV *Sent.*, d. 11, q. 3, a. 3; *In Matt.*, c. 17, lect. 1; IV *Sent.*, d. 49, q. 4, a. 5, qcla. 3, ad 1; *In ad Heb.*, c. 6, lect. 1; and *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 168, but in the last three cases without examples. In *STh* III, q. 45, a. 2 he mentions subtlety, agility, and brightness; in *STh* III, q. 28, a. 2, ad 3, subtlety and agility; and in IV *Sent.*, d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 2, ad 1, subtlety.

[25] IV *Sent.*, d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 1: "nomen subtilitatis a virtute penetrandi est assumptum." For the commentary on the fourth book of the *Sentences*, I use the Latin text of the Parma edition: *Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, *Opera omnia*, vols. 6-7 (Parma: Petrus Fiaccadori, 1856-58).

[26] IV *Sent.*, d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 1: "corpus gloriosum spirituale dicitur, quasi omnino spiritui subjectum. . . . prout subjicitur sibi ut materia formae, et deinde subjicitur ei ad alia opera animae, prout anima est motor."

[27] III *Sent.*, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2.

[28] *STh* III, q. 28, a. 2, ad 3: "omnia ista facta sunt miraculose per virtutem divinam." Aquinas explicitly identifies the Transfiguration and walking on the water as miracles in *STh* III, q. 45, a. 2.

identifies precisely what was missing: There was no "overflow of glory from the soul to the body."[29]

Even so, this miracle accomplished through divine power was fitting, because Christ had the beatific vision. He was both a comprehensor and a wayfarer.[30] The only reason why Christ did not enjoy the four properties of a glorified body was that he laid them aside so that he could suffer and die to save us.[31] The fittingness of this miracle is evident in Aquinas's quotation of Gregory the Great, who pairs the virgin birth with Christ's entering the upper room through locked doors: "Whence Gregory says in his *Homilies*: 'that body of the Lord that emerged to human eyes from the closed womb of the Virgin through his birth, entered to the disciples through closed doors.'"[32]

After his resurrection, Christ's body was indeed glorified, and he could thus enter through closed doors on account of his property of subtlety. He was fittingly born without opening his mother's womb, but this was not on account of his body's subtlety; rather, it was accomplished miraculously through divine power. It was fitting, but miraculous.

In question 45, article 2 of the *Tertia pars*, Aquinas examines the homologous case of the Transfiguration in greater detail. His analysis there, concerning the fitting but miraculous manifestation of Christ's brightness before his resurrection, elucidates the case of Christ's fitting but miraculous subtlety in birth. Applying Aquinas's insights on brightness to subtlety, we can conclude that in the virgin birth, Christ manifested subtlety of glory "with respect to essence but not with respect to mode

[29] *STh* III, q. 28, a. 2, ad 3: "nec fiebat talis redundantia gloriae ab anima ad corpus."

[30] *STh* I, q. 62, a. 9, ad 3.

[31] In *STh* III, q. 14, a. 3, Aquinas clarifies that Christ did not contract defects on account of sin, but rather he willed to take them on. Once he had them, he would suffer them unless he acted to suspend them miraculously by his divine power.

[32] IV *Sent.*, d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 2, ad 1: "Unde Gregorius in Homil. dicit: *illud corpus Domini intravit ad discipulos januis clausis, quod ad humanos oculos per nativitatem suam clauso exiit utero Virginis*."

of being."[33] The reason why it is not subtlety of glory with respect to mode of being is that "the glory of his soul did not overflow to his body."[34] The glory of his soul would have overflowed to his body from the moment of his conception were it not for "a certain divine dispensation"—the point of which was "that he might fulfill the mysteries of our redemption in a passible body."[35] Now, Christ still had the "power to draw glory from his soul to his body," as exemplified in the virgin birth and the Transfiguration, but in these miraculous cases, he did not do so as if "in a glorified body."[36] For subtlety, agility, brightness, and impassibility overflow from the soul into a glorified body "as a certain permanent quality affecting the body."[37] In fitting but miraculous cases before the resurrection, there is no permanent quality but rather a miracle worked "through the mode of a transient passion."[38] The miraculous subtlety effecting the virgin birth was "of glory" but not "of a glorious body."[39] This was a proleptic manifestation: Christ's subtlety in the virgin birth "represented" the future subtlety of his body.[40]

Mary's giving birth without losing her virginity, then, is an affirmation of Christ's beatitude. This is the insight I wish to mine in order to add a fourth reason of fittingness for virginity in birth. Why does Christ exercise divine power to act with subtlety in his birth? Let us recall Aquinas's three reasons: a Word should not produce corruption, the Savior from corruption should not produce corruption, and God's mother above all others ought to be spared corruption. A fourth reason could be that Christ had the beatific vision, which is normally

[33] *STh* III, q. 45, a. 2: "quantum ad essentiam, non tamen quantum ad modum essendi."

[34] Ibid.: "gloria animae non redundaret ad corpus."

[35] Ibid.: "ex quadam dispensatione divina . . . ut in corpore passibili nostrae redemptionis expleret mysteria."

[36] Ibid.: "potestas . . . derivandi gloriam animae ad corpus. . . . in corpore glorificato."

[37] Ibid.: "sicut quaedam qualitas permanens corpus afficiens."

[38] Ibid.: "per modum passionis transeuntis."

[39] *STh* III, q. 45, a. 2, ad 1: "gloriae, sed . . . corporis gloriosi."

[40] *STh* III, q. 45, a. 2, ad 3: "repraesentabat."

accompanied by subtlety. For our sake, Christ laid subtlety aside; however, he made an exception in the case of his birth from his virgin mother. And this event—which could seem to have Docetic or misogynistic overtones—is rather a revelation of the dignity of Christ and his mother, and is a fact that challenges us to consider the human body, not only as it is weighed down with so much suffering in this world, but also as it will be subtle, impassible, agile, and luminous when the seed of grace blossoms into glory. If our view of human nature is dominated by the effects of sin, we may easily regard the doctrine of Mary's virginity in birth as an offense of some kind—against nature, against women, against peaceful acceptance of sexuality. The doctrine of Mary's virginity *in partu* thus pushes back on the effects of sin on our worldview.

The virgin birth shows, furthermore, the fittingness of Christ's having the beatific vision from the moment of his conception. For if Christ did not have the beatific vision from the moment of his conception, then his being born without opening the womb would be a strange phenomenon. By contrast, with the beatific vision from the moment of his conception, it is fitting that Christ be born as if he had subtlety, which he would indeed have had, had he not laid aside the properties of a glorified body in order to die for our sins.

Conclusion

With this insight, the intelligibility of the mystery of Mary's virginity in birth can shine forth as an affirmation of Christ's glory and Mary's dignity as the true Mother of God. This doctrine is not the fruit of an aversion to the human body, especially the female human body, and more especially the sexual powers of the female human body. Rather Mary's perpetual virginity provokes us to reflect on the effect of grace on the human body, and challenges us to believe that we are made for glory.

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LITURGICAL PREACHING AND THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE*

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IN THE SECOND HALF of the sixteenth century, in the wake of decrees of the Council of Trent calling for more frequent preaching by bishops and parish priests, a new type of exegetical tool was developed for pastors who sought to draw on the theological insights of St. Thomas Aquinas in their preaching.[1] While the Tridentine call for a renewal of preaching and the production of exegetical tools for preachers were rooted in pastoral currents dating back to the thirteenth

[1] See Council of Trent, Session 24 (November 11, 1563), Decree on Reform, canon 4, in Norman P. Tanner, ed., *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 2:763: "It is the desire of the council that the office of preaching, which particularly belongs to bishops, should be exercised as often as possible for the salvation of the people. . . . Bishops are to announce the sacred scripture and the law of God in their own church either personally or, if they are legitimately prevented, through others whom they appoint to the office of preaching; in other churches this is to be done by the parish priest or, if these are prevented, by others appointed by the bishop. . . . This is to be done in the city or in any parts of the diocese that the bishop considers expedient, at least on every Sunday and solemn feast, and daily or at least three times a week during the seasons of fasting, namely Lent and Advent, if they consider this should be done, and as often at other times as they judge appropriate." In canon 7, the council called for a certain type of preaching to be done during the liturgy itself (Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 2:764): "Similarly, during mass or the celebration of office on every feast or solemnity they should explain the divine commandments and precepts of salvation in the vernacular, and should be zealous to implant them in the hearts of all (leaving aside useless questions) and educate them in the law of the Lord."

century,[2] the development of liturgical indexes linking texts from Thomas with the lectionary is a significant development that has been previously overlooked in scholarship on preaching and Thomism.[3]

[2] See, e.g., Fourth Lateran Council (November 30, 1215), canon 10, in Tanner, ed., *Decrees*, 1:239-40: "Among the various things that are conducive to the salvation of the christian people, the nourishment of God's word is recognized to be especially necessary. . . . It often happens that bishops by themselves are not sufficient to minister the word of God to the people, especially in large and scattered dioceses, whether this is because of their many occupations or bodily infirmities or because of incursions of the enemy or for other reasons—let us not say for lack of knowledge, which in bishops is to be altogether condemned and is not to be tolerated in the future. We therefore decree by this general constitution that bishops are to appoint suitable men to carry out with profit this duty of sacred preaching, men who are powerful in word and deed and who will visit with care the peoples entrusted to them in place of the bishops, since these by themselves are unable to do it, and will build them up by word and example." For a broad overview of medieval preaching, see Beverly Mayne Kienzle, ed., *The Sermon*, Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental 81-83 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000). For a discussion of methods of teaching the faith through sermons in northern France on the eve of the Reformation, see Hervé Martin, *Le métier de prédicateur en France septentrionale à la fin du Moyen Age, 1350-1520* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1988), 295-320.

[3] To my knowledge, liturgical indexes to the *Summa theologiae* have not yet received scholarly attention beyond a brief discussion in Kent Emery, Jr., and Louis E. Jordan, "Familia Praedicatoria in the University of Notre Dame Library: Manuscripts, Incunables and Sixteenth-Century Books Containing Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers," in *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans*, ed. Kent Emery, Jr., and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 493-591, at 522. Although the use of texts from Thomas in Reformation-era preaching (including in the preaching of the seventeenth-century Puritan preacher Thomas Goodwin) is occasionally discussed in Hughes Oliphant Old, *The Reading and Preaching of the Scriptures in the Worship of the Christian Church*, vol. 4 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002), no attention is given to the methods by which preachers would have drawn on Thomas's writings. Emily Michelson, *The Pulpit and the Press in Reformation Italy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013) analyzes the role of printed books in the preparation and diffusion of homilies and notes the attention given in in sixteenth-century preaching manuals to Thomas's *Catena aurea* (see pp. 48, 167) and various forms of preaching tables or indexes (see pp. 151-52) but does not mention Thomistic liturgical indexes. Despite their breadth and depth, the essays in two recent volumes on the historical reception of Thomas do not mention liturgical indexes: see Lidia Lanza and Marco Toste, eds., *Summistae: The Commentary Tradition on Thomas Aquinas' "Summa Theologiae" from the 15th to the 17th Centuries*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy - Series 1 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2021); Matthew Levering and Marcus Plested, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas* (Oxford:

Beginning in 1569, shortly after the 1567 declaration of Thomas as the fifth Doctor of the Church,[4] Thomistic scholars began to publish liturgical indexes that collated articles of the *Summa theologiae* with the readings of the Sundays and Feasts of the Liturgical Year.[5] Over the course of the next four hundred years, various iterations of the liturgical index pro-vided preachers with suggestions of articles of the *Summa* that could help them to preach about the Epistle and Gospel pericopes assigned for each liturgical celebration, drawing not only on the ideas of Thomas but also on his authority as a Doctor of the Church.[6] By exploring the origins and development of this

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Oxford University Press, 2021). For discussion of the use of Thomas as a source for preaching in the era before the development of the sixteenth-century liturgical indexes, see Peter Francis Howard, *Beyond the Written Word: Preaching and Theology in the Florence of Archbishop Antoninus, 1427-1459*, Quaderni di Rinascimento 28 (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1995), 47, 60, 92, 122, 132.

[4] See Pius V, *Mirabilis Deus* (April 11, 1567), in Laertius Cherubini and Angelo Cherubino, eds., *Magnum bullarium romanum: A Pio quarto usque ad Innocentium IX* (Lyon: Arnaud and Borde, 1673), 2:222-23. Regarding the liturgical significance of the 1567 decree and its relationship to liturgical devotion to Thomas within the Roman Curia, see John W. O'Malley, "The Feast of Thomas Aquinas in Renaissance Rome: A Neglected Document and Its Import," *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia* 35 (1981): 1-27, at 6-7: "In actual fact this document does not 'declare' Thomas anything. It simply prescribes that Thomas is to be given the same liturgical standing as the four Latin doctors. Thomas was the first saint to receive such honors, and the document was immediately and correctly interpreted as a declaration."

[5] In addition to tools that helped preachers prepare homilies based on the lectionary, vernacular translations of the readings for Mass accompanied by explanatory passages were also widely available; see Michelson, *Pulpit and the Press in Reformation Italy,* 153-54. The *Epistole et evagelii che si leggono tutto l'anno alla Messa, secondo l'uso della Santa Romana Chiesa,* translated and annotated by the Italian Dominican Remigio of Florence, first published in 1567 and appearing in twenty-four editions in the sixteenth century, was particularly influential; see Edoardo Barbieri, "The Bible in Contention: Roman Prohibitions and Italian Biblical Texts for the Mass," in *Negotiating Conflict and Controversy in the Early Modern Book World*, ed. Alexander Samuel Wilkinson and Graeme Kemp (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 48-70. Notably, despite being prepared by a Dominican, the volume followed the Roman lectionary rather than the Dominican lectionary.

[6] For instance, the Italian bishop Agostino Valier's 1574 treatise on preaching draws special attention to Thomas in the context of a discussion of the use of arguments from authority in preaching: "Magna est etiam auctoritas Doctorum qui scholastici

practice and examining several liturgical indexes in detail, we can gain insights into how the works of Thomas were presented for the use of preachers who sought to share the insights of the Angelic Doctor with their congregations.

In this article, I will first give a brief account of medieval resources for liturgical preaching. I will then trace the development of liturgical indexes of the *Summa theologiae* from the sixteenth through the twentieth century. I will conclude with a theological exegesis of the references provided in one version of the index for the Mass at Dawn of Christmas Day.

I. Medieval Resources for Liturgical Preaching

The sixteenth-century liturgical indexes of the *Summa theologiae* built on a foundation of theological resources for liturgical preaching developed by Dominicans and Franciscans in the Middle Ages.[7] As Mary and Richard Rouse have shown, the advent of new modes of preaching by Cistercians, Dominicans, and Franciscans in the thirteenth century played a decisive role in the development of new modes of presenting texts in a way that would make them more easily utilized for the purpose of preaching.[8] In addition to the famous Dominican

appellantur, præsertim beati Thomæ Aquinatis, quem sancta Concilia, Tridentinum in primis, magna veneratione dignum iudicavit, eorumque auctoritas valet plurimum ad confirmanda veræ religionis dogmata et ad falsa et perniciosa refellenda" ("The scholastic doctors have great authority, especially blessed Thomas Aquinas, whom the sacred councils, especially the Council of Trent, have judged worthy of great veneration; their authority is most efficacious for confirming the dogmas of true religion and refuting what is false and pernicious"). See Agostino Valier, *De rhetorica ecclesiastica libri III*, I.46, ed. Manuel López-Muñoz, Renaissance Society of America (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 81. Despite highlighting the importance of Thomas and citing texts from Thomas throughout his treatise, Valier does not mention the availability of Thomistic liturgical indexes.

[7] For general overviews of medieval preaching tools, see Laura Light, "The New Thirteenth-Century Bible and the Challenge of Heresy," *Viator* 18 (1987): 275-88; D. L. D'Avray, *The Preaching of the Friars: Sermons Diffused from Paris before 1300* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).

[8] See especially Mary A. Rouse and Richard H. Rouse, "Statim invenire: Schools, Preachers, and New Attitudes to the Page," in idem, *Authentic Witnesses: Approaches to*

biblical concordances initially overseen by Hugh of St. Cher,[9] the thirteenth century saw the appearance of alphabetical subject indexes developed especially by the Cistercians and Franciscans that aimed at making the content of particular manuscripts more easily accessible.[10] According to the Rouses, "the use of alphabetical order was a tacit recognition of the fact that each user of a work will bring to it his own preconceived rational order, which may differ from those of other users and from that of the writer himself."[11] The preparation of these indexes engaged the most astute theological minds of the thirteenth century: important Dominican contributions to this development included Robert Kilwardby's *tabulae* on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and on the works of St. Augustine, as well as Thomas's *tabula* on the *Ethics* of Aristotle.[12]

In addition to alphabetically arranged indexes, the early thirteenth century also saw the development of indexes arranged according to the cycle of liturgical pericopes of the lectionary.[13] In their catalog of Dominican manuscripts and early printed books at the University of Notre Dame library,

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Medieval Texts and Manuscripts, Publications in Medieval Studies 17 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 191-219; idem, "The Development of Research Tools in the Thirteenth Century," in *Authentic Witnesses,* 221-55; idem, "The Impact of the Dominicans on Books at the University of Paris, 1217-1350," in *The Medieval Dominicans: Books, Buildings, Music and Liturgy*, ed. Eleanor J. Giraud and Christian T. Leitmeir (Turnhout: Brepols, 2021), 31-50.

[9] See Richard H. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, "The Verbal Concordance to the Scriptures," *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* 44 (1974): 5-30.

[10] Rouse and Rouse, "Development of Research Tools," 226-36.

[11] Rouse and Rouse, "Statim invenire," 204.

[12] See Philipp W. Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's Sentences* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 84-85.

[13] For overviews of medieval lectionaries, see Aimé Georges Martimort, *Les lectures liturgiques et leurs livres*, Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental 64 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992); Innocent Smith, "Lectionary: Christianity: Medieval Times and Reformation Era," in *Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 16:3-5. While further research is needed on the breadth of medieval and early modern lectionaries, important digital resources for studying this phenomenon are available at the Usuarium database (https://usuarium.elte.hu/) and the ThALES database (http://www.lectionary.eu/).

Kent Emery and Louis E. Jordan describe four Dominican manuscripts and books that give an indication of the development of this phenomenon from the late thirteenth through the early sixteenth century.[14] A late thirteenth- or early fourteenth-century manuscript of the *Summa de abstinentia* by Nicolaus de Byardo (likely a Dominican friar) includes a reference table spread over five folio pages which links the subjects he treats in his book with the lectionary readings for the Sundays and feasts of the liturgical year.[15] A 1478 printing of the Lenten sermons of Leonardi de Utino, O.P. (d. 1469) includes "an extensive alphabetical topical index, an index of scriptural authorities, and an index applying the materials of the Lenten sermons to the Sundays throughout the liturgical year."[16] A fifteenth-century edition of a moral manual for preachers composed by Johannes Herolt, O.P. (d. 1468) likewise includes "a table ordering materials collected from the sermons for preaching on the Sundays of the liturgical year."[17] Finally, a 1537 edition of Thomas's *Catena aurea* provides two sets of indexes collating Thomas's patristic sources with the liturgy.[18]

II. Liturgical Indexes for the Dominican Lectionary

In the second half of the sixteenth century, a new type of index was developed that collated the articles of the *Summa theologiae* with the Mass lectionary then employed by the Do-

[14] Emery and Jordan, "Familia praedicatoria."

[15] Ibid., 498-99. Emery and Jordan refer to the manuscript under its former shelfmark "Ms. 15"; it now has the shelfmark Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame, Hesburgh Library, cod. Lat. b. 5; see David T. Gura, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts of the University of Notre Dame and Saint Mary's College* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016), 175-78.

[16] Emery and Jordan, "Familia praedicatoria," 504.

[17] Ibid., 504-5.

[18] Ibid., 520-21: "At the end of the running commentaries on Matthew, Mark and Luke are tables indicating the folio numbers where Thomas treats the Gospel pericopes for the temporal cycle of the liturgical year; a global index for all four running commentaries for both the temporal and sanctoral sequences follows Thomas's commentary on the Gospel of John."

minican liturgy. In the sixteenth century, the Order of Preachers still maintained a distinctive form of the Latin liturgy that had been codified in the mid-thirteenth century by Humbert of Romans.[19] The Dominican liturgy's pericopes for the Epistle and Gospel differed in important respects from those of the Missal of the Roman Curia promulgated in a lightly revised form by Pius V in 1570 as the *Missale Romanum*.[20] Although there was much overlap of content between the Roman and Dominican lectionaries, the Dominican lectionary provided a different order for many of the readings; as Maura O'Carroll observes, "the difference in pericopes lay not so much in Scripture content, as in their liturgical timing."[21] For the First Sunday of Advent, for instance, both the Roman and Dominican missals provide Romans 13:11-14 as the epistle, but the Dominican missal gives Matthew 21:1-9 for the Gospel whereas the *Missale Romanum* gives Luke 21:25-33, a text which the Dominican missal employs instead on the Second Sunday in Advent. Table 1 indicates the readings provided for the four Sundays of Advent in the two lectionaries.

Table 1 — Lectionary Readings for the Four Sundays of Advent[22]

Occasion	*Missale O.P.* (before 1601)	*Missale Romanum*
First Sunday of Advent	Rom 13:11-14 Matt 21:1-9	Rom 13:11-14 Luke 21:25-33
Second Sunday of Advent	Rom 15:4-13 Luke 21:25-33	Rom 15:4-13 Matt 11:2-10
Third Sunday of Advent	1 Cor 4:1-5 Matt 11:2-10	Phil 4:4-7 John 1:19b-28
Fourth Sunday of Advent	Phil 4:4-7 John 1:19b-28	1 Cor 4:1-5 Luke 3:1-6

[19] See Innocent Smith, "Dominican Chant and Dominican Identity," *Religions* 5 (2014): 961-71, doi:10.3390/rel5040961.

[20] For a brief overview of the medieval and early modern versions of the Roman Missal, see Innocent Smith, "Missale Romanum," in *Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 19:425-28.

[21] Maura O'Carroll, "The Lectionary for the Proper of the Year in the Dominican and Franciscan Rites of the Thirteenth Century," *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* 49 (1979): 79-103, at 84.

[22] This table is adapted from ibid., 85.

In 1569, the Antwerp printer Christopher Plantin (ca. 1520-89) published an edition of the *Summa theologiae* that has been described as a "landmark edition . . . [that] set a standard that other late sixteenth-century publishers of Thomas's work attempted to surpass."[23] Prepared by a group of theologians from Leuven, including the Dominican Antonius de Conceptione (d. 1585), this printing of the *Summa* included a set of five general indexes: (1) an index of scriptural authorities, (2) an index of passages where Thomas deals with various topics such as *abstinentia* or *amor*, (3) an index of "memorable teachings" (*doctrinas memorabiles*) of Thomas, (4) an index of passages where Thomas provides clear statements about topics which had become controversial in the Reformation era (*claram et solidam refutationem praecipuorum aliquot dogmatum, quae hodie ab haereticis asseruntur*), and finally, (5) an index of passages in the *Summa* collated with the Epistles and Gospels of the Sundays and feasts of the liturgical year.

Table 2 — 1569 Plantin Index: First Sunday of Advent[24]

Dominica Prima Adventus.
Epist. Rom. 13. NOX PRAECESSIT. De veteri et nova lege, 1.2. q. 107.
Evang. Matth. 21. ECCE REX TUUS VENIT TIBI MANSUETUS. De causa efficiente passionem Christi, Par. 3. q. 47.

For each Sunday and major feast day, the *Index quintus* of the 1569 Plantin *Summa* provides one or occasionally several

[23] Emery and Jordan, "Familia praedicatoria," 522. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa totius theologiae* (Antwerp: Christopher Plantin, 1569). For an overview of Plantin's editions of the works of St. Thomas, see Léon Voet and Jenny Voet-Grisolle, "Thomas ab Aquino," in *The Plantin Press (1555–1589): A Bibliography of the Works Printed and Published by Christopher Plantin at Antwerp and Leiden* (Amsterdam: Van Hoeve, 1980-83), 5:2195-218.

[24] The typography of this and the following tables has been lightly adapted from their original sources. The lemma for each set of Summa references appears in small caps, and "&" is expanded to "et." I have left in place the slightly inconsistent manner of references to the Summa itself. The full text of the 1569 Index may be consulted at https://www.digitale-sammlungen.de/en/view/bsb10686166?page=603.

passages from the *Summa* that are linked by the editors with specific verses of the liturgical pericopes. For the Epistle of the First Sunday of Advent, Romans 13:11-14, the *Index* highlights the words "Nox praecessit" (Rom 13:12), and suggests question 107 of the *Prima secundae*, which treats of the Old Law and New Law. Although this question of the *Summa* does not appeal to the authority of Romans 13, the editors link Paul's exhortation to abandon vice and put on Christ with Thomas's discussion of the perfection of the New Law. For the Gospel pericope, Matthew 21:1-9, which describes Jesus's entrance into Jerusalem on a donkey, the *Index* suggests question 47 of the *Tertia pars*, which discusses the efficient cause of Christ's passion. Although it may seem surprising to modern sensibilities about Advent and Christmas, the editors of the *Index* draw the attention of the preacher to the Passion of Christ, which is the culmination of Christ's entrance to Jerusalem.

After the printing of the 1569 edition of the *Summa,* other publishers began to reprint the material collected by Plantin and his editors.[25] In 1575, Plantin released a new printing of the *Summa theologiae* with a revised edition of the five indexes.[26] In the updated version of the liturgical *Index quintus,* the entries for each pericope were significantly expanded: in the 1569 printing, this liturgical index took up just five folio pages, while the 1575 index spanned twenty-one.[27] Instead of just one reference for each reading of the First Sunday of Advent, the 1575 version provides eleven references for the Epistle and five for the Gospel.

[25] In 1575, the five indexes of the 1569 Plantin edition were republished in Lyons with the addition of an index of apparent contradictions in Thomas's writings. This volume reprinted the 1569 Plantin liturgical index without expansion; see *Sex copiosissimi indices* (Lyon: Philippi Tinghi Florentini, 1575).

[26] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa totius theologiae* (Antwerp: Christopher Plantin, 1575). This edition is not included in Emery and Jordan's catalog but is an important link in the chain of liturgical indexes of the *Summa*. The full text of the 1575 liturgical index is available at https://books.google.com/books?id=-jR9KRpUeugC&pg=RA15-PT3.

[27] Cf. Voet and Voet-Grisolle, "Thomas ab Aquino," 2198, 2206. Voet and Voet-Grisolle do not draw attention to the expansion of the index in the 1575 edition.

Table 3 — 1575 Plantin Index: First Sunday of Advent

Dominica 1a Adventus, Epist. Rom. 13.
CUM CREDIMUS. De fide 2-2ae. q. 1a. et sequentibus. An credere sit necessarium ad salutem. 2-2ae. q. 2. ar. 3.o[mnia]. An credibilia sint per certos articulos distinguenda. 2-2ae. q. 1a. ar. 6. An hi articuli fidei convenienter enumerentur. 2-2ae. q. 1. ar. 8. An convenienter in symbolo fidei ponantur, ubi supra [2-2ae. q. 1.] ar. 9. Fide credenda esse, quae nobis sunt evangelizata, et a Conciliis atque Pontifice definita. 2-2ae. q. 1 a. 9. 10 et q. 5. 3. NOX PRAECESSIT. De veteri et nova lege. 1-2ae. q. 107. NON IN COMMESSATIONIBUS, ET EBRIETATIBUS. De gula. 2-2. q. 148. De ebreieta 2-2. q. 150. NON IN CUBILIBUS ET IMPUDICITIIS. De castita[te]. 2-2. q. 151. De luxuria 2-2. q. 153. IN CONTENTIONE, ET AEMULATIONE. De discordia. 2-2. q. 37. De contentione. 2-2. q. 38. De invidia. 2-2. q. 36. INDUIMINI DOMINUM IESUM. Quomodo quis dicatur induere Christum. 3a. q. 69.9.1m.
Evangel. Matth. 21. ECCE REX TUUS VENIT TIBI. De adventu Christi in carnem. 3a. q. 1a. et seq. Utrum pro redemptione generis humani fuerit necessarium Deum incarnari. 3a. q. 1. art. 2. Utrum si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. 3a. q. 1. art. 3. De causa efficiente passionem Christi. 3a. q. 47. TURBAE AUTEM QUAE PRAECEDEBANT, ET QUAE SEQUEBANTUR. Cur utraque turba, et praecedens et subsequens Christum, clamabat osanna. 3a. q. 45.3.c.

In the 1575 Plantin index, both references from the 1569 edition are retained within a broader range of references for each pericope. In some cases, the 1575 index refers to an entire question, but sometimes it specifies an article or a response to an objection. In addition to the reference to the Old and New Law regarding Romans 13, for instance, the revised index highlights Thomas's writings on faith in light of Paul's statement that "our salvation is closer to us now than when we first believed" (Rom 13:11) and identifies Thomas's treatments of each vice proscribed by Paul. With respect to the Gospel pericope, the 1575 index broadens the focus from the efficient cause of the Passion of Christ to the "coming of Christ in the flesh," while retaining the reference to Thomas's treatment of the Passion.

After the appearance of the expanded edition of the liturgical index in the 1575 Plantin edition, some publishers began to copy the new index immediately, while others continued to print the more limited 1569 version. In 1576, another publisher in Antwerp released an edition of the *Summa theologiae* that contained the expanded 1575 index,[28] while in 1581 a publisher in Lyon released an edition that included the 1569 version.[29] Publishers in Venice and Rome included the expanded version in editions of the *Summa* or in independently published handbooks of indexes to the *Summa* in 1585,[30] 1586,[31] and 1588.[32]

Alongside these various reproductions of the shorter and longer Plantin indexes, in 1596 the Giunti family in Venice collaborated with Francesco de Franceschi (active in Venice from the 1560s through the 1620s) to publish a further expanded version of the liturgical index, now labeled as an "Index Praedicabilium."[33] While clearly based on the 1575 index, the 1596 Giunti edition makes two major changes. First, rather than separating the texts for Sundays and feast days of saints into two sections, it intersperses the texts provided for feast days such as St. Andrew (November 30) with the Sundays of the year. Second, it includes texts for the weekdays of Lent, although these texts are restricted to those that treat of the Gospel, while the Lenten weekdays epistles are ignored.

[28] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa sacrae theologiae* (Antwerp: Viduam et Haeredes Ioannis Stelfii, 1576), https://books.google.com/books?id=Ej02Fpnv14MC.

[29] Tommaso Caietano, *Opuscula omnia R. D. D. Thomae de Vio Caetani* (Lyon, 1581), https://books.google.com/books?id=3k4z0utlQqYC. No publisher is cited on the title page, but the volume includes the printing mark of the Giunti family.

[30] Thomas Aquinas, *Tertia pars summae theologicae* (Venice: G. Bindoni, 1585), https://books.google.com/books?id=ALoUsyG_SR0C.

[31] *Quinque novi indices* (Rome: In Ædibus populi romani, 1586), https://books.google.com/books?id=831RAAAAcAAJ.

[32] *Sex copiosissimi indices* (Venice: Apud Iuntas, 1588), https://books.google.com/books?id=NRzTWsogL04C.

[33] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa totius theologiae* (Venice: Apud Iuntas, 1596). https://books.google.com/books?id=cSOUSoQW8vwC. On the title page, the printer is listed "Apud Franciscum de Franciscis Senensem," but "Apud Iuntas" appears at the back of the volume.

III. LITURGICAL INDEXES FOR THE ROMAN LECTIONARY

At the turn of the seventeenth century, perhaps inspired by the broadening use of the Roman Missal in the wake of the Council of Trent, the 1601 General Chapter of Rome decided to adapt the lectionary of the Dominican liturgy to bring it into closer conformity with the lectionary of the Roman rite.[34] Although the Order of Preachers continued to maintain many distinctive liturgical practices, especially in the *Ordo missae* and melodies for the liturgical chants, beginning with the missal of 1603 the Dominican liturgy used essentially the same pericopes as the Roman Missal.

After the adoption of the Roman lectionary by the Order of Preachers, publishers continued for a time to print versions of the liturgical index still paired with the older Dominican lectionary. A 1604 edition of the *Summa* published at Cologne maintained the 1575 Plantin version of the liturgical index,[35] whereas a 1612 edition published at Venice maintained the 1596 expanded index.[36] As late as 1623, the 1575 Plantin index was reprinted at Lyon.[37] It is possible that these versions of the index were maintained due to the expense involved in resetting the text, particularly in the case of the 1612 Venice edition which is identical to the 1596 edition printed by the same publisher. On the other hand, the earlier indexes may have still been useful for preachers following various liturgical traditions that were relatively similar to the Dominican liturgy.

The first version of the liturgical index linked to the Roman liturgy was published by the printer Denis de la Noüe (1584-1660?) in Paris in 1617 as part of an edition of the *Summa*

[34] *Acta capitulorum generalium ordinis praedicatorum,* ed. Benedictus Maria Reichert (Rome: In domo generalitia, 1902), 6:30. Cf. William R. Bonniwell, *A History of the Dominican Liturgy 1215-1945*, 2nd ed. (New York: J. F. Wagner, 1945), 311-25.

[35] Thomas Aquinas, *Tertia pars summae theologicae* (Cologne: Antonii Hierati, 1604), https://books.google.com/books?id=9SNLAAAAcAAJ.

[36] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa totius theologiae* (Venice: Giunta, 1612), https://books.google.com/books?id=OIO8XbsuxmgC.

[37] *Quinque novi indices* (Lyon: Antonii Pillehotte, 1623), https://books.google.com/books?id=xT4M-befvbgC.

theologiae.[38] The 1617 de la Noüe index was clearly adapted from the 1575 Plantin index (or one of its copies) rather than the 1596 Giunta index, as it omits the texts for the weekdays of Lent. In the case of the First Sunday of Advent, the 1617 de la Noüe index maintained the same texts as the 1575 Plantin index for the identical Epistle of Romans 13:11-14, and transferred the material for the Second Sunday of Advent from the 1575 Plantin index to the First Sunday to account for the reading of the pericope Luke 21:25-33 on the First Sunday rather than the Second Sunday of Advent. In the case of the Fourth Sunday of Advent, however, it was necessary to provide new texts, as the Roman pericope of Luke 3:1-6 did not have an immediate parallel at hand in the older Dominican missal. Among the other texts provided for this Sunday, the 1617 de la Noüe index points to the treatment of the Incarnation in question 1 of the *Tertia pars*, a text that was cited in conjunction with Matthew 21 in the 1575 index, but which had lost its place due to the absence of Matthew 21 from the Advent cycle of the Roman lectionary.

Table 4 — 1617 Liturgical Index: Fourth Sunday of Advent

Dominica 4a Adventum
Evang. Luc. 3. PRAEDICANS BAPTISMUM POENITENTIAE. De baptismo Ioannis, 3a q. 28.o[mnia]. IN REMISSIONEM PECCATORUM. An baptismus Ioannis contulerit gratiam, 3a qu. 28.3.o[mnia]. ET VENIT IN OMNEM REGIONEM IORDANIS. Quare S. Ioannem decuit austeram vitam ducere, non Christum, 3a qu. 40.2.1m. ET VIDEBIT OMNIS CARO SALUTARE DEI. De Incarnatione, 3a q. 1 et seq. De Christi conversatione, 3a q. 40.o[mnia].

Over the succeeding centuries, liturgical indexes of the *Summa* were printed in various forms by a variety of publishers. We will here only attempt to give a partial list. In 1652, another edition of the *Summa* was published at Paris with the 1617 de

[38] Thomas Aquinas, *Summae theologicae . . . tertia pars* (Paris: Dionysii de la Noüe, 1617), https://books.google.com/books?id=XpxiAjoMzB0C&d.

la Noüe index.[39] In 1663, a new edition of the *Summa* with a liturgical index and a separate edition of indexes for the *Summa* were published by different publishers at Lyon, each following the 1617 model.[40] In 1702, a *Summa* with a liturgical index was printed at Lyon.[41] In 1773, a liturgical index with additional texts for the weekdays of Lent appeared at Rome.[42] In 1797, the 1617 de la Noüe index without Lenten weekdays appeared at Madrid.[43]

In 1860, Jacques Paul Migne (1800-1875) included the liturgical index in his *Summa theologiae* published at Paris.[44] Migne's edition for the most part reproduces the 1617 selection of texts, but also provides readings for selected ferial days of Lent, while not providing the full selection offered by the 1773 edition.[45] In 1873, the Vivès edition of Thomas's *Opera omnia* included the liturgical index in the final volume of the *Summa*.[46] In this edition, the editor observes that the liturgical index might be fruitfully used in conjunction with the scriptural index also offered in the volume.[47] The Vivès edition follows the Migne edition in offering texts for selected Lenten

[39] Thomas Aquinas, *Summae theologicae. . . tertia pars* (Paris: Sebastianum Cramoisy & Gabrielem Cramoisy, 1652), https://books.google.com/books?id=Bi7teeiXRYgC.

[40] Thomas Aquinas, *Tertia pars summae theologicae* (Lyon: Ioan. Girin & Francisci Comba, 1663), https://books.google.com/books?id=d6AVAxyqRl0C. *Indices omnes in D. Thomae Summam theologicam* (Lyon: Viduae Petri Bailly et Petri Bailly, 1663), https://books.google.com/books?id=Bs3OAKPh7Z4C.

[41] Thomas Aquinas, *Supplementi tertiae partis summae theologicae* (Lyon: Anisson & Pousuel, 1702), https://books.google.com/books?id=1010jmXDdkQC.

[42] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica* (Rome, 1773), https://books.google.com/books?id=E5MJAEhnhrcC.

[43] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica* (Madrid: Josephi Doblado, 1797), https://books.google.com/books?id=bAl4r1rqmzkC.

[44] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica* (Paris: Migne, 1860), https://books.google.com/books?id=n0O3qISVVtAC.

[45] While Migne's selected ferial days do not convey the same material as the related ferial days in the 1773 index, they are related to the 1773 index in some ways. For instance, the Migne edition repeats the material offered for the Gospel pericope of Matthew 25 that is found in the 1773 edition for All Souls Day.

[46] Thomas Aquinas, *Supplementum tertiae partis* (Paris: Ludovicum Vivès, 1873), https://books.google.com/books?id=rl0-AAAAYAAJ.

[47] Ibid., 667.

weekdays.[48] In 1887, an edition published at Rome presenting the Leonine text in a smaller format included a liturgical index on the model of the 1617 edition that omitted the selected Lenten ferial days.[49] Likewise, an 1891 edition printed at Turin by Marietti omitted the Lenten texts.[50]

The liturgical index continued to appear in the twentieth century. In 1932, Marietti reprinted their 1891 index with the same material and pagination.[51] In 1948, an English-language adaptation of the liturgical index appeared in the edition of the *Summa* published by Benziger Brothers in New York. This edition maintained the now-traditional text of the index for the Sundays of the year, slightly adapting the mode of presentation of the texts and omitting the feast days.[52] Finally, as late as 1965 the third edition of the Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos *Summa theologiae* included a liturgical index on the model of the 1617 edition.[53]

IV. THEOLOGICAL EXEGESIS OF THE EPISTLE FOR THE NATIVITY OF CHRIST IN THE 1617 INDEX

In the 1617 liturgical index, the earliest version arranged according to the Roman lectionary, selections from the *Summa*

[48] Even after the promulgation of a new Mass formula for the Immaculate Conception by Pius IX on September 25, 1863, which replaced the Genealogy of Matthew (Matt 1:1-16) pericope found in earlier sources with a pericope drawn from Luke's account of the Annunciation (Luke 1:26-28), the Vivès edition merely reprinted the selections for the Matthew Gospel pericope rather than providing readings for the Luke pericope. Subsequent versions of the liturgical index likewise neglected to update this section. For an edition of the *Missale Romanum* printed at Vienna in 1862 containing the pre-1863 formulary on pp. 300-301 in addition to the 1863 formulary in a section of "Missae propriae recentiores pro archdioecesi Viennesi" added at the end of the volume, see https://books.google.com/books?id=wfq2iarsgXAC.

[49] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica* (Rome: Senatus, 1886-87), 6:352-86.

[50] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica* (Turin: Marietti, 1891), 6:389-429.

[51] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica* (Turin: Marietti, 1932), 6:389-429.

[52] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica, First complete American edition* (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948), 3:3725-49.

[53] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1961-65), 5:918-55.

theologiae are provided for the Mass at Dawn, with the pericopes of Titus 3:4-7 and Luke 11:1-14.[54] I will now offer a more in-depth consideration of the *Summa* passages proposed for the Titus reading.

Table 5 — 1617 Liturgical Index: The Nativity of Christ

In die Nativitatis Christi
Epist. Tit. 2 [sic][55] APPARUIT BENIGNITAS ET HUMANITAS. De infinita Dei bonitate, 1a, q. 6 et 3a qu. 1a art. 2. NON EX OPERIBUS QUAE FECIMUS NOS. An ergo homo non possit mereri vitam aeternam, 2-2ae, q. 114, 3, o[mnia]. SED SECUNDUM MISERICORDIAM SUAM. De Dei misericordia, 1a, q. 21. Quomodo vita aeterna fit gratia sive misericordia, 1-2ae, q. 114.3.2m. Quomodo nascamur omnes filii irae et peccato obnoxii, 2-2ae, quaestion. 81.1 et 3. PER LAVACRUM REGENERATIONIS. Cur Christus voluerit dare hominibus gratiam susceptione sacramentorum, 3a q. 62.o[mnia]. Quomodo baptismus dicatur lavacrum regerationis, 3a quaest. 66.1.1m. et 5.c.

For the first verse of the pericope, Titus 3:4, the index highlights the words "the goodness and kindness appeared." The index points to two passages from Thomas which suggest the infinite goodness of God: question 6 of the *Prima pars*, and question 1, article 1 of the *Tertia pars*. The index suggests that all of the articles from the earlier question are worth considering for the subject at hand. Question 6 of the *Prima pars* addresses four questions: (1) Whether goodness belongs to God? (2) Whether God is the supreme good? (3) Whether he alone is essentially good? (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness? None of these articles refer to Christ specifically but describe the goodness of God and of the Trinity. The

[54] Thomas Aquinas, *Summae theologicae . . . tertia pars* (Paris: Dionysii de la Noüe, 1617), https://books.google.com/books?id=XpxiAjoMzB0C&pg=RA14-PA10. The indices in this edition are unpaginated.

[55] The incorrect labelling of the Titus reading as chapter 2 rather than chapter 3 is repeated in some later printings of the index, including the 1652 Paris edition (p. 486) and the 1663 Lyon edition (unpaginated). See notes 38 and 39 above for further bibliographical details.

Index seems to put them forward as a way of emphasizing that in the Incarnation we encounter not only the humanity of Jesus Christ, but divine goodness itself.

The compilers of the Index recognize that preaching on the Incarnation need not focus only on the themes discussed in Thomas's treatment of the Incarnation but should contextualize the goodness of the Incarnation within God's eternal goodness. To effectively proclaim the goodness of Christ, it will be helpful for the preacher to understand the broader questions brought up in the articles of question 6 of the *Prima pars*: God is the supreme good, the only being that is good essentially and not by participation, whereas all other things that are good are good by participation in divine goodness. In this context, the preacher will be able to use more effectively the material provided by the editors from the more strictly Christological *Tertia pars*. In this case, the editors highlight not an entire question but a specific article: "Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate?" The editors have chosen a text that perfectly dovetails with the consideration of God's goodness in general by focusing on the Incarnation as a communication of God's goodness to creatures:

> But the very nature of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* i). Hence, what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain from Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv). Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by "His so joining created nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three—the Word, a soul and flesh," as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate.[56]

After emphasizing the diffusiveness of God's goodness as the central element of the fittingness of the Incarnation, the editors next turn their attention to Titus 3:5. Passages from the *Summa* are provided for three sets of words from the same verse: (1) "not from works that we have done," (2) "but according to his

[56] *STh* III, q. 1, a. 1.

mercy," and (3) "through the bath of regeneration." In the first case, the editors focus the preacher's attention on question 114, article 3 of the *Prima secundae*, which distinguishes between condign merit and congruous merit in the context of treating the question of whether a man in grace can merit eternal life condignly. Notably, Thomas does not appeal to Titus 3:5 in this article, although he makes use of the words *ex operibus iustitiae* from Titus 3:5 elsewhere in passages discussing predestination (*STh* I, q. 23, a. 5, s.c.) and the question of whether any merits preceded the Incarnation (*STh* III, q. 2, a. 11, s.c.), the latter of which might be especially relevant for a preacher preparing a homily for Christmas day. This is a reminder that the liturgical index does not function simply as an index of scriptural citations. In fact, in the *Index primus* of the 1617 *Summa*, which lists places where Thomas cites various scriptural verses, the editors provide three passages in which Thomas uses Titus 3:5 (*STh* I-II, q. 98, a. 4; *STh* III, q. 2, a. 11; and *STh* III, q. 24, a. 3).[57] This suggests that the editors of the liturgical index may have expected it to be used in conjunction with the scriptural index provided in the same volume in order to find a broader range of relevant preaching material. On the other hand, some entries in the liturgical index do make direct connections between scriptural verses read in the lectionary and verses cited in the *Summa*. For instance, in addition to being cited in the liturgical entry for Christmas, question 114, article 3 of the *Prima secundae* appears in the 1617 liturgical index for the

[57] In contrast to the liturgical *Index quintus,* which was substantially expanded and modified in later editions, the original 1569 Plantin *Summa* edition of the scriptural *Index primus* provides identical references for Titus 3:5 to those found in the 1617 *Summa*. A 1948 index of scriptural verses cited by Thomas includes a fuller range of references to Titus 3:5 in the *Summa*: *STh* I, q. 23, a. 5, s.c.; *STh* III, q. 2, a. 11, s.c.; *STh* III, q. 62, a. 1; *STh* III, q. 65, a. 1; *STh* III, q. 69, a. 4, s.c.; *STh* III, q. 84, a. 10, ad 1. See *Indices auctoritatum et rerum occurentium in Summa theologiae et Summa contra gentiles et in annexis commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani et Francisci de Sylvestris Ferrariensis item in praefationibus, notulis atque appendicibus editorum id est indices in integros tomos IV-XIV cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum*, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici opera omnia iussu edita Leonis XIII P.M. 16 (Rome: Apud Sedem Commisionis Leoninae, 1948), p. 126.

Fourth Sunday after Pentecost, where it is linked to the lectionary reading Romans 8:18-23.[58] In this case, the editors of the liturgical index are likely inspired by Thomas's use of Romans 8:18 in the first objection of the article, although they specify that the entire article is relevant for the occasion. In addition to its appearance in the liturgical index, the same article is also cited in the *Index quartus* of the 1617 *Summa,* in which the editors provide "clear and firm refutations of the principle dogmas which are asserted today by heretics."[59] In the *Index quartus,* the article is listed under the heading *Opera bona esse meritoria vitae aeternae* (good works are meritorious of eternal life). The multiple appearances of this article in the various indexes of the 1617 *Summa* show that the editors provided multiple pathways by which readers might be referred to this passage from Thomas, depending on whether they were searching for references based on scriptural citations, liturgical readings, or the relevance of Thomistic teaching to contemporary controversies between Catholics and Protestants.

In the second case ("but according to his mercy"), the editors expound God's mercy by proposing three different texts. First, they put forward question 21 of the *Prima pars*, which contains four articles treating the justice and mercy of God. Next, the editors make a reference to a specific reply to an objection, that is, the reply to the second objection in question 114, article 3 of the *Prima secundae*, which they summarize with the words "How eternal life is grace or mercy." This passage, which had already been referenced with respect to the possibility of meriting eternal life, now invites the preacher to consider again the question of merit and eternal life in connection with the

[58] "*Dominica 4a post Pentecost. Epist. Rom. 8.* Existimo quod non sint condignae passiones.] An ergo opera iustorum non sint meritoria vitae aeternae, I-IIe. quaest. 114.3.o[mnia]. De magnitudine gloriae, supra in Evang. Dominicae 2e post Pentecost. De patientia, 2-2e q. 136."

[59] "Index quartus, in Summam S. Thomae indicans claram et solidam refutationem praecipuorum dogmatum quae hodie ab haereticis asseruntur, plurimum in hac postrema editione locupletatus." Like the liturgical *Index quintus*, the *Index quartus* in the 1617 *Summa* is considerably expanded in comparison with the earliest version of the *Index quartus* found in the 1569 Plantin *Summa* discussed above.

consideration of God's mercy. Finally, the editors call attention to articles 1 and 3 of question 81 of the *Prima secundae*, with the gloss "How we are all born as children of wrath and liable to sin." These articles discuss the transmission of original sin from our first parent to all those born by human generation. It is interesting to note that while the Index does not by any means shy away from a consideration of original sin, it situates it after a prior consideration of God's goodness and mercy.

The Index concludes its presentation of the Titus pericope with two passages for "through the bath of regeneration." First, the index proposes question 62 of the *Tertia pars*, which gives a general consideration of the sacraments as instrumental efficient causes of grace. Next, the index points to two texts from question 66 of the *Tertia pars*: the replay to objection 1 in article 1, and the body of article 5. Each of these texts is proposed in order to focus the attention of the preacher on baptism as a regenerating washing, in order to explicate the text of the pericope. For the editors of the Index, then, the Epistle for Christmas is not merely an isolated chance to speak about the birth of Christ, but a source for assisting the preacher to connect the mystery of Christ's Incarnation with a broad set of considerations including God's goodness, God's mercy, and the sacramental system instituted by God for the regeneration of human beings.

Conclusion

Although they have been ignored in scholarly literature on the reception of the theology of Thomas Aquinas, liturgical indexes to the *Summa theologiae* were an innovative and widely available tool that aided preachers to draw on the thought of Thomas in the preparation of homilies. Further analysis is needed to understand fully the interrelationships of the various versions of the index as well the extent to which they were used by preachers throughout the centuries. Nevertheless, the continuous appearance from the sixteenth through the twentieth century of Thomistic liturgical indexes adapted to various

lectionary systems and presenting various ranges of texts indicates that publishers took great care to make these tools available to preachers. While no versions of the Thomistic liturgical index have yet been developed for the three-year lectionary promulgated after the Second Vatican Council, it is significant that the *Homiletic Directory* published in 2014 by the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments presents a similar type of index that pairs texts from the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* with the three-year lectionary.[60] In addition to their value for understanding the historical reception of the thought of Thomas in pastoral contexts, liturgical indexes should be given further consideration as a resource for the renewal of preaching in the con-temporary Church, so that preachers may ever more fruitfully carry out their duty of explaining "the mysteries of the faith and the norms of Christian life . . . from the sacred text during the course of the liturgical year."[61]

[60] Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, "Homiletic Directory," https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccdds/documents/rc_con_ccdds_doc_20140629_direttorio-omiletico_en.html. As the *Homiletic Directory* notes in §158, some editions of the *Roman Catechism* published after the Council of Trent "included a *Praxis Catechismi* which divided the contents of the *Roman Catechism* according to the Gospels for the Sundays of the year." For an analysis of the index presented in the *Homiletic Directory*, see Mirosław Chmielewski, "Catechetical Dimension of the Homily against the Background of the Homiletic Directory: Selected Aspects," *Roczniki teologiczne* 64 (2017): 151-67.

[61] Vatican II, *Sacrosanctum Concilium,* §52; cf. *Code of Canon Law* (1983), can. 767 §1.

BOOK REVIEWS

The True Christian Life: Thomistic Reflections on Divinization, Prudence, Religion, and Prayer. By AMBROISE GARDEIL, O.P. Translated by MATTHEW K. MINERD. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2022. Pp. xxvii + 289. $34.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8132-3453-3.

Ambroise Gardeil was an enormously influential Thomist theologian, active in the first part of the twentieth century, who largely disappeared from the theological map after Vatican II. This English edition of *The True Christian Life* is an effort to contribute to the "retrieval of Gardeil," as Matthew Levering explains in the Foreword to the volume, not by setting Gardeil in opposition to Vatican II, but rather by reading his work "in light of the whole Catholic tradition and in light of our biblical faith" (xvii). As a work of retrieval—of genuine *ressourcement*—this volume admirably succeeds. Gardeil is shown to be a careful and insightful commentator on St. Thomas, wonderfully opening up for the reader an insightful and grace-filled account of the divine life and its attendant virtues.

The reader, however, is presented with three layers of Introduction (a foreword, a preface, and an introduction) before getting to Gardeil's own writing. Matthew Levering's illuminating description of Gardeil's theological contribution in the Foreword outlines his thought from other published works (not the volume in hand), while Matthew Minerd's Preface very helpfully opens up Gardeil's thought as expressed in the three articles in this volume. A long Introduction then follows, written by Gardeil's nephew and fellow Dominican, Henri-Dominique Gardeil, that accompanied the original publication of this work in 1935. The goal of this Introduction is to place the three articles of the present volume within the larger project that Gardeil outlined but never completed (the analytical outline of that larger program is included as an appendix).

With this threefold orientation in hand, the reader is ready to engage what are really three distinct "articles" of varying length. The first article, "The Fundamental Idea of the Christian Life," presents a brilliant, compact account of God's grand design for us: our divinization and transformation into Christ through the indwelling of the Trinity. Framed by a quotation from Leo the Great, "Recognize, O Christian, your dignity," Gardeil sets out to identify "a correct idea of this life, going all the way to its foundations" (50). He is

convinced that many Christians have only a partial understanding of the Christian life, and so do "not live knowingly" (51). Gardeil entertains three possible candidates for a true idea of the Christian life—the self-serving idea, the superior form of moral conduct, and the religious idea—but finds each of them falling well short of the mark. Instead, he proposes what he considers to be the true and full idea of the Christian life: "The originality of our Christian lives is built upon the idea of a life shared with God, bound together in friendship and nourished on a gracious communication in the secrets of the divine life" (57). Such a life does not focus on externals but "flows out as from a wellspring . . . all the way to eternal life. Our God is no longer outside but, rather, is within us" (59).

Gardeil does not hold back when describing the excellence of this life of God in us (and us in God). He claims boldly that "the Christian life is the divine life—I mean the life that God Himself lives—communicated to man, adapted to his faculties, and finally, vitally lived by him" (59-60). This is a high, exalted view of the Christian life that Gardeil believes is available to all believers. He recognizes that this divine life as lived by us occurs in what he calls "two degrees," by which he means (1) the fullness of this divine life in the blessed life of the age to come, and (2) life here in this age that is still on the way, the life of the wayfarer. It is noteworthy that Gardeil begins his account with the blessed life, because for him this defines the true goal that we enter into in part even now. Gardeil offers an exalted view of what divinized life will look like in its completion, expressed in bold language that seems to echo the bolder claims of Maximus the Confessor. In the blessed life of the age to come, the faithful will have their intellects "divinized, deiformed" (63). Then Gardeil offers this remarkable summary: "Plunged into God, both by the root of his divinized being and by the terminus of his activity, as well as by the very act that unites his power to its terminus, the blessed person, on his creaturely level, quite literally lives the entire life of God" (64).

Gardeil rejects the commonplace view that the life of the wayfarer is "just an earthly life in its present tenor," with the divine life only coming into play in the age to come. Instead, he maintains that "the Christian life is eternal life already begun. From here-below, it is a divine life" (65). This divine life is certainly adapted to our condition as wayfarers, but despite the real limitations of our present condition, God gives us the divine energy to love him truly in this life. Graced with the theological virtues, we begin to live this divine life even now. Following the patristic dictum, Gardeil recognizes that "grace does not make us into God" (73). Nonetheless, through grace we become divinized and deiform even in this life. By presenting this full-bodied understanding of divinization, Gardeil not only closely follows the path of St. Thomas but he reflects and expands the teaching of the Greek and Latin Fathers. In sum, this short article on our divinization is a theological gem. It also displays the falsity of the view that the doctrine of deification was at best an exotic flower in the Western theological tradition. Here we find at the heart of Thomism a finely

tuned and exalted account of divinization—the effective indwelling of the Trinity in the believer—as the true "idea" of the Christian life.

In the second article—"Our Personal and Supernatural Self-Government"—Gardeil sets out to show the wisdom of God in giving to us an internal governing principle that brings order out of internal chaos and enables us to recognize and choose the particular good in each situation. Gardeil presents supernatural prudence, "infused into our reason by the Holy Spirit" (81), as a moral virtue that "establishes a synergistic coordination of all our efforts on behalf of the good" (84). Many Christians shy away from this virtue, he believes, and take refuge in "a simplified line of conduct, abandoning themselves to the general inspirations of God's love" (88). He thinks we should not accept "this defeat" but instead should grasp the gift by which God enables us to govern ourselves through his gift of infused prudence. For Gardeil, this prudence "is a tactician of the first order" (88) and makes us capable of "onsite adaptation" that no manual of cases (casuistry) can match (89).

Standing back from his topic, Gardeil sees in St. Thomas "two divine governments" that are meant to work in tandem. One is supernatural prudence by which we are active in self-government; the other is government by the Holy Spirit through the gifts of the Spirit—and here we are passive, yielding to the work of the Spirit's gifts and promptings (97). Both of these proceed from charity and should work together in a balanced harmony. The remainder of the article is occupied with the particular acts of supernatural prudence (deliberation, judgment, realization), and with the results of the operation of this virtue. The end result of this divinely given self-government, for Gardeil, is growth of the divine life in us and greater configuration to the image of Jesus Christ (144).

The third and final article (and by far the longest), "Our Personal and Supernatural Self-Education by the Virtue of Religion," is an explanation and defense of the virtue of religion according to St. Thomas. The main problem Gardeil addresses here is the tendency to dismiss the virtue of religion as something primitive, and "to reabsorb the whole of religion into the divine life and the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit" (147). His aim, then, is to display the properly moral character of this virtue and its value as a debt of justice owed to God. To this end, he contends that "religion" as a virtue is "the indispensable auxiliary for the theological virtues and for the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the realization of holiness" (148). This is a significant claim, and he makes a persuasive case that the virtue of religion remains an essential auxiliary for our attainment of holiness. Given that we live in an age that has largely jettisoned any sense of what we owe to God, the recovery of this virtue is probably more needed in our time that it was when this work was written.

Gardeil undertakes an in-depth study of this virtue, showing it to be a properly moral virtue that renders a debt of justice to God, and that preeminently gives rise to worship (161). It may *seem* more pious to attribute

all our relating to God to love (charity), but Gardeil insists that something is lost in the full range of our relationship with God when the fundamental debt of justice is cast aside. He acknowledges that the moral virtues are governed by the theological virtues and serve their greater good, but he maintains that the virtue of religion preserves its own competency and importance in the service of our love toward God: “The virtue of religion relates our acts, works, and goods to God whereas the theological virtues embrace God himself, through thought and love—this is the difference between them” (174).

To conclude his commentary on the virtue of religion, Gardeil gives a detailed account—general and particular—of the two auxiliary virtues most closely related to the virtue of religion, namely, devotion and prayer. Here we see something of the traditional Scholastic approach, breaking down these virtues into their parts, activities, results, and so on. There is a great wealth of insight found in Gardeil’s treatment here.

If there is a critique to be made of how Gardeil presents the supernatural virtues (theological and moral), it is the tendency to present them—and their beautiful interconnection—in an almost utopian way, as if we were already living a life of glory. Here is his summary of the virtuous man: “How beautiful he is, our just man, thus balanced and unified by the integrated impulse of his manifold tendencies toward the good inspired in him by charity and developed in him by prudence. What an admirable sight! What a divine splendor!” Gardeil suggests that before such a man, we like Peter would like to “pitch our tents upon this Tabor” (140). Gardeil himself seems aware of this tendency toward exaggeration, and asks the reader, “Are we dreaming?” (142). He defends this transfigured vision of the virtuous man by recourse to the biographies of the saints who exemplify these virtues. Perhaps this is true in some cases, but the majority of saints’ biographies typically show a great deal more struggle and inward tumult than Gardeil tends to present. And the *autobiographies* of the saints seem always to display, not so much a glorious transfigured life on Mount Tabor, but ongoing inward struggle in the pursuit of holiness. This leads to a further “absence” in his treatment of the spiritual life and the governing virtues: there is no mention of Satan or the reality of spiritual warfare in his account of the inner man and the struggle to attain a life of virtue. Given how prominent the spiritual battle against the devil is in much traditional teaching on holiness (and in the lives of the saints), one wonders why it does not have a place in the account Gardeil offers for how prudence governs the inner life of the Christian. Nevertheless, *The True Christian Life* is replete with wisdom, insight, and truths that need recovery and retrieval in our own time. We should be grateful to those who labored to make this excellent work available to the English-speaking world.

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Glory of the Logos in the Flesh: Saint John Paul II's Theology of the Body. By MICHAEL MARIA WALDSTEIN. Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2021. Pp. xiii + 883. $45.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-1-932589-76-4.

Michael Waldstein is presently Professor of New Testament at Franciscan University in Steubenville, Ohio. A scholar with wide-ranging interests in Scripture and theology, he might be best known for his definitive English translation of Saint John Paul II's catecheses that have become known as the Theology of the Body (TOB). That work was published in 2006 under the title *Man and Woman He Created Them*. The present volume, he tells his readers, is "a more developed version of the introduction to my translation of TOB" (1 n. 1). And more developed it certainly is, covering much of the same ground but in a text that is over six times longer than the already lengthy introduction to *Man and Woman*.

When Karol Wojtyła was unexpectedly elevated to the Chair of Peter in 1978 after the very short ministry of John Paul I, a debate broke out in the scholarly world. The debate was over whether the Polish prelate and academic could be better described as a phenomenologist or a Thomist, and both camps put forward pointed arguments for their claim. Waldstein clearly has a dog in this fight. He locates Wojtyła/John Paul II squarely in the Aristotelian Thomist tradition. It was from the Angelic Doctor and his more experiential and mystical appropriation by the Mystical Doctor, John of the Cross, that Wojtyła received his intellectual formation and lifelong trajectory as a thinker. His later engagement with Kant and Scheler provided some further enrichment of that already settled foundation—nothing more.

Waldstein divides the book into three sections. The first deals with the "debate about the breadth of reason" in the Western intellectual tradition, contrasting the pursuit of beauty, truth, and goodness through reason (*Logos*) in classical Greek philosophy and Christian theology with the instrumentalization of reason in the pursuit of technical power since the scientific revolution in the West. The second section deals more directly with Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II's conception of the breadth of reason in his prepapal work in philosophy and theology and in the TOB itself. Each of these first two sections opens with an initial chapter which provides the point of departure for what follows and then is further subdivided into three critical chapters and three constructive chapters. The critical chapters consider the narrowing of reason's scope through the scientific revolution and its impact on modern philosophy exemplified in the work of people like Descartes, Kant, and Scheler. The constructive chapters contrast this with an examination of reason (*Logos*) in Plato, Aristotle, and in patristic and medieval Christian theology, and the way Wojtyła/John Paul II uses this expansive realist understanding of reason in his own work. Waldstein likens these two major sections to concentric circles delimiting the wider and more proximate intellectual context of the TOB. A third and final section offers

readers a "map" of the TOB itself in the form of a summary with the addition of John Paul II's own headings from the original Polish text (unearthed through arduous archival work). This, Waldstein believes, helps dispel the false impression of endless repetition or lack of argument that even some scholars carry away from their reading of the catecheses.

The first and largest of the concentric circles deals with the scope of reason in Western thought. Waldstein takes as his point of departure the controversy over contraception surrounding the teaching of Pope Paul VI in *Humanae Vitae*. He sees the bitter opposition to the document as generated by a widespread acceptance of the scientific reduction of reason to technological power used to subjugate nature understood mechanistically, which had become dominant in the West. The result is the irrelevance of nature as a moral category enshrined in the "naturalistic fallacy" which divorces the "ought" of moral obligation from the "is" of being. Conversely, it is the understanding of nature being ordered to specific ends that enables the encyclical and the TOB which develops Pope Paul VI's reasoning more fully, to see conjugal love as inseparably unitive and procreative or "unitively procreative" (59). As Waldstein repeatedly affirms (e.g., 410, 522), nature and person must be understood together rather than dichotomized.

The critical section of part 1 (chaps. 2-4) offers a fascinating genealogy for the now dominant scientific reason. Waldstein offers a sympathetic reading of Luther, highlighting the similarity of his nuptial hermeneutic with that of John Paul II but noting that this is ultimately subverted by the Reformer's reliance on Ockham's nominalism and voluntarism, which see divine and human causality as competitive and thus can find no space for love in the human response to grace. He continues with an examination of the reduction of reason to power in modern science and the resultant enthronement of mechanics and displacement of reason and virtue as the privileged forms of human knowledge. He then traces this trajectory through Catholic phenomenological personalists prior to Wojtyła, such as Dietrich von Hildebrand and Herbert Doms. In spite of the former's defense of the person against collectivism and materialism and his vociferous support of *Humanae Vitae*, Hildebrand (and Doms even more so) participates in the "hollowing of nature" (199) ushered in by the scientific revolution. Love and procreation are only extrinsically related rather than inseparably united.

The constructive section of part 1 (chaps. 5-7) seems to go farthest afield from the center of Waldstein's project. By way of contrast to the narrowing of reason in the modern scientific paradigm, Waldstein offers a lengthy dive into the concept of *Logos* developed by Socrates in Plato's *Republic*, showing that love formed by reason is open to all being and ultimately open to the infinite. This is followed by an examination of nature in Aristotle's *Physics* demonstrating its fundamental intelligibility and ordering to the good. The final chapter takes on De Koninck's critique of modern personalism. After surveying the notion of the common good in patristic theology, Thomas Aquinas, and John Paul II, Waldstein is able to show that, rightly understood, these goods are

not competitive: the good of the person is ordered to and perfected in the common good both now and eschatologically.

Moving closer to the center of the project, part 2 considers the breadth of reason in John Paul II. The point of departure here is Wojtyła's book on the reception of the Second Vatican Council, *Sources of Renewal*. The council, says Waldstein, is "the center around which his thought came to revolve" (347). Waldstein vociferously disagrees with Buttigione's judgment that Wojtyła sees the heart of the council's teaching in the freedom and rights of conscience. For him, this smacks of Kant's autonomous individualism. Instead, "Wojtyła points to Trinitarian communion as the true heart of the Council" (373). This leads directly into the critical section (chaps. 2-4). In his critical period, Kant proffers an anti-Trinitarian personalism of individual autonomy which casts sexual relations as a "human rights violation" not fully overcome even in marriage (406). Scheler's phenomenology, reacting against Kant, at the same time, mirrors Kant in making the individual person the ultimate value—even to the point of self-deification. He thus "rejects gift, dependence, and sonship as radically as Kant does" (472). Both divorce moral judgment and action from the reality of the world. Waldstein then offers a close reading of Wojtyła's *Habilitation* thesis on Scheler which has not yet been translated into English. Waldstein cites Wojtyła's own conclusion that a Christian theologian "*who makes use of phenomenological experience in his work, cannot be a Phenomenologist*" (505). Waldstein helpfully notes that this "applies to Phenomenology as understood by Husserl and Scheler in the degree that they develop a philosophy of essences detached from real being" (ibid.).

The constructive section of part 2 (chaps. 5-7) deals more directly with Wojtyła/John Paul II. Waldstein offers a lengthy and clear analysis of Wojtyła's philosophical opus *Person and Act,* contrasting its ideas with those of Kant and Scheler, while underscoring their congruence with Aquinas. Turning to Wojtyła's early work in theology, Waldstein demonstrates decisively that the Doctor of Fontiveros is indeed a formative source (*fons*) for the intellectual career of the Polish thinker. From the great Spanish mystic, Wojtyła derived his characteristic foci on the unique subjectivity of the person grasped through the lived experience of faith and the centrality of Trinitarian communion which became the "two pillars of Wojtyła's theological vision" that would deeply inform the TOB (560). Waldstein then turns to a potential and actual objection to John Paul II's claim in the TOB that: "Man becomes the image of God . . . in the act of communion" (595, citing TOB 9:3). This idea, the objection holds, had already been considered and rejected by Augustine and Aquinas in favor of what Waldstein calls "the analogy of the word." Against this objection, Waldstein marshals three interrelated arguments. First, the analogy of the word "is an account of the Church's faith from natural reason and not itself part of the faith" (639). Second, the analogy of mutual love "is not a philosophical

argument but directly revealed" (650). And third, the two analogies are best understood as complementary.

The third part of the book offers a "map" of the TOB. That is, it offers a comparatively short summary of John Paul II's catecheses. Though less than one-fifth of the length of the catecheses themselves, this map still runs close to one hundred pages of fairly dense summary. Those already familiar with the TOB will find the summary clear and useful, especially with the headings added from the original Polish text that do bring the structure and argument into clearer view. Those looking for a simple "Cliff Notes" style summary or an easily digestible overview may be disappointed.

A volume of this length and scope is bound to be uneven at times in quality and argument, and Waldstein's tome is no exception. In spite of commendable efforts to cross-reference ideas to make the various essays better cohere, there are disjuncts. At times he overstates positions in one place only to qualify or walk them back in another. For example, in places he dichotomizes Kant and Wojtyła: "He rejects Kant's thesis that the human person *is* an end and replaces it with the thesis that the human person *has* or should *have* ends" (310). Yet later he will acknowledge Wojtyła's critical appropriation of Kant's personalism even while exploding his autonomous individualism from within (556). Arguing against Ana Maria Tymieniecka's effort to airbrush Wojtyła's Thomistic metaphysics of the person out of the English translation of *The Acting Person*, he minimizes Wojtyła's debt to Scheler (510-11) yet elsewhere concedes his indebtedness to him for the account of the lived experience of "self-dominion" (455) or phenomenology as "openness to receive what is given" (469). At times the analysis takes on a kind of free-association feel as Waldstein glides through texts, genres, and authors without indicating to his reader where he is going or why. Some chapters end rather abruptly with little or no conclusion. Many readers might wish for a more developed argumentative structure to weave the material together, even though this would add to the book's already massive size.

Nevertheless, the breadth of Waldstein's reading matches that of his scope and subject matter. He moves easily from Scripture to classical mythology to texts from literature, philosophy, and theology. This impressive breadth is matched by a skill set that enables him to treat individual texts with care and precision in a remarkable variety of original languages. And the payoff of this impressive undertaking by such a gifted scholar is some genuinely striking insights, such as the positioning of Wojtyła's Thomistic personalism as a virtuous mean between Kant's formalism and Scheler's emotionalism, holding together the uniqueness of the personal acting subject with objective moral truth. Rightly understood, conscience bridges the gap between is and ought, transforming "the experience of the theoretical truth about the good into the practical judgment" (546). The thrust of Waldstein's argument to claim Wojtyła/John Paul II as a Thomist (though one enriched by personalist and phenomenological insights) is a well-demonstrated and a genuine contribution to the scholarly literature.

Scholars and advanced students will greatly benefit from the treasury of knowledge and depth of insight in this volume. Its value as a research tool is greatly enhanced by generous indices. Both as a commentary to stand alongside Waldstein's masterful English translation of the TOB, and as a contribution to the theological discussion on the nature of reason, this volume is well worth reading.

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Mind and World in Aristotle's "De Anima." By SEAN KELSEY. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. xii + 181 (hardback). ISBN 978-1-108-83291-5.

In Sean Kelsey's book, Aristotle asks the question, "what is it about the Mind that makes it such as to know the World," and "the nub of [Aristotle's] answer to it is that in a way Mind *is* World—in his language, '*psuchē* in a way is all beings'" (1, quoting *De anima* 3.8.431b21; translations of Aristotle are by Kelsey unless otherwise indicated). This might suggest that Aristotle is a precursor of Bishop Berkeley, but Kelsey adds as clarification that by "in a way" Aristotle means "potentially" (*dunamei*) and by "all beings" Aristotle intends "the *forms* of all beings" (1-3). Kelsey finds the key to unlocking Aristotle's meaning in the following lines: "The result is that *psuchē* is just like the hand: indeed, for the hand is tool of tools, and intelligence (*nous*) form of forms, and sensibility (*aisthētikē*) form of sensibilia" (*De anima* 3.8.432a1-3). Kelsey's entire book is in essence an extended exegesis of this hand/mind analogy.

The book has three parts. Part 1 ("Questions") sets the stage. Chapter 1 ("Objectives") explicates Aristotle's question: "by being what does it belong naturally to *psuchē* to know all beings?" Chapter 2 ("Problems") considers whether knowledge for Aristotle is "like by like" and a kind of "alteration" in such a way that *psuchē* can successfully discriminate objects and arrive at the truth. Chapter 3 ("Solutions") addresses these problems by analyzing *De anima* 2.5, which, though it is ostensibly concerned with sensibility, also has import for intelligence. Part 2 ("Angles") focuses on the two main ideas involved in the "admittedly enigmatic" hand/mind analogy. Kelsey argues that a "form of forms" means something that *makes* its objects forms, "i.e. makes them intelligible," and that "that form is intelligence itself." He remarks that this seems to imply "that every intelligible being is intelligent and that every

perceptible being sentient—which is simply absurd" (67). In order to make sense of this implication Kelsey examines in chapter 4 ("Affinities") in what sense a faculty of awareness is "like" its object. In chapter 5 ("Measures") he argues that "measures for knowing objects of some genus are prior to—enter into the very idea of—certain particular forms of objects of that genus" (19-20). Part 3 ("Proposals") employs the ideas of affinities and measures to interpret Aristotle's theory of sensibility and intelligence. In chapter 6 ("Sensibility") Kelsey argues that sensibility is "the 'standard' in relation to which perceptible qualities are the particular sorts of quality they are" (21). In chapter 7 ("Intelligibility") he explicates Aristotle's identity thesis as the claim that an intelligible object is the same as the activity of understanding it. And in chapter 8 ("Intelligence") he explains the special sense in which intelligence is a kind of "measure." The activity of intelligence consists in making its objects intelligible by separating them from matter. The clarity and distinctness of intelligent activity "are (as it were) the very form of its objects," that is, that in which the intelligibility of its objects consists (22). This leads Kelsey to a controversial conclusion. In a way Aristotle agrees with Protagoras that man is the measure of all things, but with a special qualification: "except not just any man, but Man himself, and particular men only, if and so far as they come up to the mark set by their nature" (23). Thus, Aristotle endorses a form of *anthropocentric* species relativism in contrast to the individual relativism of Protagoras. On Kelsey's interpretation "for Aristotle, there is a kind of priority—the priority of measure to measured—of sensibility and intelligence to perceptible and intelligible beings" (159). Hence, Aristotle is "an idealist of sorts about intelligible beings" since he makes essences, insofar as they are intelligible in fulfillment, "*ideas*, i.e. activities or operations of intelligence" (164).

Before examining Kelsey's central argument for this controversial conclusion, I should remark that his book is in many ways a well-wrought scholarly monograph. The thesis is clearly stated, and the main argument is summarized in both the introduction and conclusion with major steps sign-posted throughout. All claims are supported with textual evidence, and obvious objections are anticipated and answered. Kelsey refers to important secondary literature in different languages (albeit with only a single fleeting reference to Aquinas). It is meticulously edited, with no errors I could detect. On the other hand, the book would not serve as a general introduction to Aristotle's psychology, because it is narrowly concerned with how perception and intellect are related to their objects, and does not show how this issue of epistemology is related to the overall aim of *De anima*: namely, to study *all* the attributes of *psuchē* (*De anima* 1.1402a7-10). The presentation is often technical with subtle distinctions and close interpretations of difficult texts. This is a work for the cognoscenti, not for beginners or the faint of heart.

The linchpin of Kelsey's interpretation is the claim that mind is the "form" of its objects in the sense of being their *measure*, although he admits (100) that Aristotle uses the vocabulary of "measure" (*metrein*) only once in *De anima* (3.11.434a9—and this in a special context involving deliberative imagination).

Moreover, although Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* calls knowledge and perception the "measure" of things, he adds, "They are measured rather than measure other things" (*Metaphys.* 10.1.1053b31-3 [my translation]; cf. *Metaphys.* 10.6.1057a9-12). Since, however, "mind is measure" is Kelsey's fundamental claim, it will be the focus of the rest of this review.

The concept of measure applies primarily in the category of quantity, where a measure is a unit whereby particular quantities can be counted; for example, a foot-length is used to measure someone's height (e.g., five feet). Kelsey emphasizes that "measures of quantity are conceptually prior to the particular quantities they measure" (90); for example, a foot is prior to a particular five-foot length. (But is the foot-length prior in this way to the particular length without qualification or only qua five-foot length?) The concept of measure applies analogically to other categories including quality (*Metaphys.* 10.1.1052b18-25, b4-6). Aristotle thinks of perceptible qualities as lying on spectra bounded by contrary extremes: for example, colors fall between black and white, and there is a middle point on the spectrum such that colors are dark or light depending on whether they fall on the side closer to black or the side closer to white. Finally, different species of color are defined in terms of ratios that are defined by reference to the mean. For example, if one color is 3:2 and another is 4:3, we can infer that both are dark but the former is darker, that is, farther from the mean than the latter. Kelsey persuasively argues that in this way the mean serves as a sort of measure by which we can compare colors with each other (20).

But Aristotle also states that "sensibility is as it were a sort of mean between contraries in perceptible objects" (*De anima* 2.11.424a4-5). Kelsey understands this to imply that "sensibility is a standard in relation to which particular perceptible qualities are the sorts of qualities they are: for example, dark or light, cold or hot, low or high, and so on" (113). In other words, sensibility is "'the measure' of these qualities, inasmuch as the character of those qualities—where they lie on a spectrum—is defined in terms of their relation to it" (116). Kelsey admits that this interpretation "is tantamount to a kind of Protagoreanism," but qualifies this as a general claim about *human* sensibility (117-18). Kelsey takes his interpretation to be "clinched" by *Meteorology* 4.4.382a18-20 (117): "it is clear that we have defined (*hōrikamen*) hard and soft absolutely in relation to touch, using touch as a mean." A problem with this is that the term Kelsey translates "defined" can also be translated "determined," so that we determine (i.e., discern) whether objects are darker or lighter (or harder or softer, and so forth) by reference to our perceptible mean state. On this view, instead of claiming that human sensibility is a *standard* by which perceptible qualities are defined, Aristotle may intend the more cautious claim that it is a *reliable indicator* of perceptible qualities. Kelsey does not provide a convincing case that Aristotle means the former rather than the latter.

A more general problem for Kelsey's anthropocentric interpretation (118) is Aristotle's recognition that in some cases other animals have a more accurate sensibility than humans: for example, "we [humans] do not employ this sense [i.e. smell] with precision, on the contrary we are worse off than many animals. For human beings smell poorly, and they perceive no odor unless it is painful or pleasant, which indicates that our sense-organ does not operate precisely" (*De anima* 2.9.421a9-13 [my translation]). This passage weighs against the thesis that that perceptible qualities are generally *defined* in relation to human sensibility.

Kelsey takes a similar approach to intelligence (*nous*). "I take for granted that intelligence functions as a kind of rule (*kanōn*) or 'measure,' a kind of standard 'with which primarily' we discern the essence of things" (145; cf. 123). This is a bit of a stretch, since intelligence does not involve any obvious counterpart to the unit of quantity or even the mean state of quality (cf. 152). In a rather surprising move, Kelsey offers a Cartesian interpretation: "what makes intelligence the 'measure' of its object is the clarity and distinction which belongs to them both" (153). Intelligence makes essences intelligible by "separating them from matter" (132), and the measure of its success is whether the outcome is "(relative to us) clear and distinct," which Kelsey admits is a "subjective" standard (154). Kelsey conjoins this point with Aristotle's identity thesis that the activity of understanding is identical with its object (137-39; cf. *Metaphys.* 9.9.1075a4-5; 130, 137; cf. *De anima* 3.4.430a2-5). As Kelsey sums up, Aristotle argues "that there is nothing intelligible that is not without matter, that there is nothing without matter that is not being understood, and that there is nothing being understood that is not the same as the activity of understanding it" (140-41). But this entails that an intelligible object is also an activity of intelligence. Hence, "everything intelligible is also intelligent" in the sense that it "attains its own most perfect realization in activities of intelligence" (131, 141, in connection with *De anima* 3.4.430a3-7). Given the measure thesis and the identity thesis, Kelsey concludes, "the clarity and distinctness which is the 'form' of [intelligent] activity is likewise (in a way) the 'form of its object," which, he remarks, is tantamount to a form of idealism (164).

Although this is not the place for extensive criticism of Kelsey's interpretation, two problems deserve brief mention. First, he claims that intelligible objects are activities of intelligence because "to be intelligible (*noēton*) is to be being understood (*nooumenon*)" (163). However, it is more probable that *noēton* means 'a *possible* object of understanding' whereas *nooumenon* means 'an *actual* object of understanding'. The latter is evidently the meaning of *Metaphys*. 12.7.1072b22-3: "The understanding (*nous*) understands itself in virtue of participating in the object of understanding (*noēton*); for it becomes an object of understanding in making contact and understanding [this object], so that understanding and object of understanding are the same. That which is capable of receiving the object of understanding (*noēton*), i.e., substance, is understanding (*nous*), and it is active when it possesses it." This passage indicates that both the understanding and the object of understanding may be

in a potential or actual state, and it is when both are actual that they become the same: “the act of understanding (*noēsis*) is one with the [actual] object of understanding (*nooumenon*)” (*Metaphys.* 12.9.1075a4-5 [my translations]). This presents a problem for Kelsey’s general claim that to be intelligible *is* to be an activity of intelligence. Second, Aristotle’s frequent remark that we should start from what is “poorly knowable” (*phaulōs gnōston*) but knowable to us and proceed to the knowledge of what is knowable “in itself by nature” implies that objects are intelligible in an objective sense alien to Kelsey’s interpretation (see *Metaphys.* 7.3.1029b3-11; this is quoted by Kelsey on page 156 but an important part is missing).

To sum up, Kelsey stakes out an original interpretation and defends it forcefully. Even those who are not convinced will gain valuable insights, especially concerning Aristotle’s concept of measure and his emphasis on intelligence as active process rather a mere passive reception of forms. It is a must read for any scholar of Aristotle’s epistemology.

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The Christian Structure of Politics: On the “De regno” of Thomas Aquinas. By WILLIAM MCCORMICK, S.J. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2022. Pp. xiii + 272. $75.00 (hardback); $34.95 (paperback). ISBN 978-0-8132-3447-2.

The five chapters of William McCormick’s *The Christian Structure of Politics* are divided into two parts. The first four are devoted to a detailed, nuanced, and sympathetic commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s *De regno*; the last one outlines an argument for how the doctrine of *De regno* is particularly apt for approaching the problem of Christianity and politics within modern liberal regimes.

Before addressing each of these parts of the book directly, however, it may be helpful to review briefly the story of *De regno*, for it has a complicated history that has resulted in a complicated legacy of commentary as well. The view of the work that has emerged in modern times and now seems to be relatively stable is that Thomas intended the work for one of the Cypriot kings but left it unfinished. His reasons for abandoning the work are not clear, but one possibility is that the king to whom Thomas intended to address the work died. In any case, *De regno* was then extended and “completed” by Ptolemy of Lucca

as *De regimine principum*. Often students of Thomas were unaware of the compositional history of *De regimine principum*, which of course led to considerable confusion, especially since *De regno* continued to circulate independently of *De regimine principum*. To the relief of all, *De regno* has now been rescued from *De regimine principum*, and a critical edition of *De regno* was published in 1979 by Dondaine, who relied particularly on the 1949 historical spadework of Eschmann. McCormick treats only *De regno* in *The Christian Structure of Politics*, but *De regimine principum* and Ptolemy's political thought generally have been studied in our time especially by James Blythe.

McCormick freely admits that he owes much to the historical inquiries of Eschmann and Dondaine, but they—especially Eschmann—tended to interpret *De regno* as a collection of fragments and emphasized its unfinished qualities. McCormick reads it much more generously than his predecessors, tending to downplay what might appear to some as lacunae, and indeed often interpreting gaps and silences in the text as implicit provocations for further inquiry. McCormick thereby treats *De regno* as far as possible as a relatively complete statement of Thomas's mind on those questions of politics raised within it. As a result, McCormick's readers are able to learn much more about Christianity and political governance than they might have from a consideration of the earlier scholarship alone. In addition to improving our understanding of *De regno* itself, McCormick's approach enables us to engage better the enduring questions of the relationship between Christianity and politics. Indeed, McCormick is able to use *De regno* to shed light upon the fundamental political questions of our age.

The four chapters that form McCormick's commentary on *De regno* are divided into four topics that correspond to four sets of chapters from Thomas's text. The first chapter treats Thomas's discussion of Aristotelian political naturalism as it is expounded in book 1, chapters 1-2; the second chapter turns to Thomas's treatment of the "Augustinian" criticisms of fallen politics, which is found in *De regno* 1.3-6; the third chapter takes up the topic of earthly and eternal rewards of kingship as they are explained in 1.7-12; and the fourth chapter is aptly titled "The Politics of Revelation" and considers *De regno* 2.1-8.

Not the least of the many advantages of this commentary section of the volume is McCormick's attentiveness to the genre of *De regno*, namely, the *speculum principum*—"a mirror of princes" or "a mirror for princes." *Specula* were not treatises or disputed questions or *summae* but a genre distinct unto themselves. Students of politics today are mostly familiar with this genre through *The Prince* of Machiavelli, but Machiavelli's *speculum* is an anti-*speculum*, as it were, aiming at how to make a prince appropriately "bad," whereas Thomas's is a traditional *speculum* aiming at how to make a prince "good." By confronting seriously *De regno*'s genre, McCormick is able to keep in front of his readers the fact that the teaching of the text is, at least in part, aimed at a king who is presumably not a theoretical scholar but a practical person concerned primarily with mundane matters such as war, and who,

perhaps, is even tempted to tyranny. McCormick could have stated more clearly that *specula* also had a second intended audience, consisting of more sophisticated readers. That is to say, *specula* were written not only for the profit of the king to whom they were addressed, but also, since they circulated publicly, to political advisors, gentlemen, and even scholars. Just as Machiavelli's audience was not only Lorenzo, even so Thomas's audience was not only the king of Cyprus.

In McCormick's interpretation, the first two sections of *De regno*—corresponding to the first two chapters of *The Christian Structure of Politics*—are to be read against each other or even understood as intentionally in tension with each other. That is, the approving view of political life present in Aristotle's teaching on political naturalism (1.1-2) is interpreted as contrasting sharply with Augustine's generally unapproving view of political life as rooted in the fallenness of human nature (1.3-6). In approaching this tension, McCormick states that he is especially influenced by the work of Nederman, who suggested that medieval Christian political thought was largely dominated by the tension between Aristotle and Augustine, and that often Cicero was used as a sort of mediating thinker between the two extremes. One opportunity that McCormick may have missed by proceeding in this way is that of making a more thorough investigation of an argument from Avicenna in the opening chapter of *De regno*. Avicenna's argument—used without attribution by Thomas—is a strange one to include, not only because *De regno* is dedicated to a king of Cyprus but also because Avicenna appeals in the argument to human need or mere necessity; indeed, the argument presumably goes back to the derisive criticism of the "city of sows" of book 2 of Plato's *Republic*. McCormick also does not acknowledge Albertus Magnus as an important source for Thomas in this part of *De regno*. To be sure, Albert's large commentary on the *Politics* of Aristotle is thought to have been completed independently of Thomas's incomplete commentary on the same work, but Thomas was very much involved in the production of Albert's enormous and valuable commentary on the *Ethics*. Of course, one cannot cover everything in a single book, but one does not want to permit the contrast of Aristotle and Augustine, which is now so common in our understanding of medieval Christian political thought that McCormick eventually refers to it as "cliché" (221, 231), to cause one to overlook other potentially important and intriguing sources.

These issues, however, will hardly prevent McCormick's four chapters of commentary on *De regno* from becoming the new standard of interpretation for the text, for McCormick reads more carefully and far more thoughtfully than other commentators on the work. The objections to his commentary presumably will be that he does not exhibit much concern for the fact that the text is incomplete, and that he does not make an extensive attempt to read *De regno* against the *Summa theologiae*. He can answer the latter concern easily enough by saying that he is not trying to offer an interpretation of the whole of

Thomas's political teachings, but only those treated in *De regno*. He might respond to the first concern by pointing out that among Thomas's unfinished works are his *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, his commentaries on Aristotle's *Politics*, *On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption*, and *Meteorology*, and even his *Summa theologiae*; if we were to give only minimal attention to such works because Thomas left them unfinished, we would be demoting a great deal of Thomas's writings indeed. More important than such rejoinders, however, will be the insight of the old saying that "the proof of the pudding is in the tasting," for McCormick is able, by refusing to fret too much about the incompleteness and alleged inadequacies of *De regno*, to offer more profound insights and comments on the text than his fellow commentators.

More controversial will be the second goal of *The Christian Structure of Politics*, namely, McCormick's attempt to use the principles derived from *De regno* as a means of approaching contemporary debates surrounding the relationship between the Church and the modern political regimes of the West. McCormick is very ambitious in attempting to address this second goal of his book within the confines of a single chapter. His strategy is divided into four steps. First, he abstracts the essential teachings that have emerged from his careful reading of *De regno*, all of which pertain to the question of the relationship between the spiritual and the temporal. The most fundamental of these seems to be "Gelasian dualism," which is how McCormick refers to Thomas's teaching that the spiritual and temporal ends of humanity are distinct but that the spiritual end is higher than the temporal. After he has extracted and explicated Thomas's teaching on the spiritual and the temporal ends, Second, McCormick clarifies Thomas's position by contrasting it with the positions of John of Paris, who in effect denies the primacy of the spiritual, and of Giles of Rome, who in effect denies the principle of dualism. Third, McCormick borrows the distinction of Levy's *Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom* regarding the rationalist and pluralist tendencies within modern liberalism. In Levy's understanding, rationalism predominates in modern social contract theories while pluralism is predominant within those regimes that accept and indeed encourage the development of structures to stand between the constitution and the people—including religious institutions such as the Church. Finally, McCormick shows that, rather clearly, the Thomistic position derived from *De regno* has little opportunity for engaging rationalist liberalism but may find some opportunity for engaging with pluralist liberalism. He accepts, however, that even with respect to the latter form of modern liberalism, the room for engagement is surely bounded, for although Thomas's Gelasian dualism admits that there are two ends to be described in a teleological view of human nature, it does not admit of an unlimited number. More importantly, the highest end for the Christian is obviously the spiritual, but acknowledging the supremacy of the spiritual goes further than even pluralist liberalism is willing to go.

Thus, with respect to the second goal of *The Christian Structure of Politics*—the achieving of some sort of rapprochement between Thomistic political

thought and modern democratic liberalism—one notes in McCormick's volume the sort of hopes and longings one associates with Jacques Maritain or John Courtney Murray. McCormick, however, is ultimately more sober or realistic about such hopes being realized in our troubled age. Sounding something like Plato, in the final pages of his volume McCormick appeals to "a spirituality of politics" existing at least for now only in speeches and prayers, and not to a regime that could actually come into being anytime soon.

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The Center Is Jesus Christ Himself: Essays on Revelation, Scripture and Evangelization in Honor of Robert P. Imbelli. Edited by ANDREW MESZAROS. Foreword by Cardinal TIMOTHY M. DOLAN. Preface by Bishop JAMES MASSA. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021. Pp. 352. $75.00 (hardback). ISBN 978-0-8132-3410-6.

Father Robert Imbelli wrote a December 2021 article in the *Church Life Journal* entitled "Remembering and Misremembering Vatican II," in which he defended the irreplaceable role of Christ's revelation for Catholic theology and Christian life.

> For if God does not truly reveal himself, there is no foundation for the Church. It becomes only a human association and organization. Furthermore, if God has not given himself definitively in Christ, there is no basis for the liturgy. It becomes a merely human gathering, bereft of transcendent reference.
>
> Distinctive to *Dei Verbum*'s presentation of revelation is that it is explicitly Christocentric. Though it celebrates God's revelation in the course of the history of the people of Israel, it confesses that God's revelation attains its fullness in the person of Jesus Christ. It is this Christ-centered understanding of God's revelation and promise that permeates the documents of Vatican II—prominent not only in *Sacrosanctum Concilium* and *Lumen Gentium*, but also in *Gaudium et Spes*.

Written toward the end of his professional career, the above quotation summarizes several decades of Imbelli's scholarship and, most importantly for this book, his teaching. Contrary to certain trends in progressive or dissenting

Christian theology, Imbelli has held that God has revealed himself definitively to humanity in Jesus Christ for the salvation of the human race. This truth is the decisive characteristic of the Church's identity as rearticulated by the Second Vatican Council.

The present volume of essays edited by Andrew Meszaros as a *Festschrift* for Imbelli presents a remarkable unity of focus on the necessarily Christocentric—or "Christic" as is used throughout this volume—character of both revelation and the new evangelization. This Christic dimension shapes the imaginative and intellectual resources of the Catholic theological tradition in such a manner that it must continue to return to the Lord Jesus or lose its center. It was Imbelli's early defense of the 2000 CDF document "Dominus Iesus" that gave concrete public expression to the theological direction that would shape his remaining years as a priest, professor, and theologian. This direction culminated in the 2014 publication of *Rekindling the Christic Imagination: Theological Meditations for the New Evangelization*, a work frequently referenced among the fifteen essays that make up this volume.

In his introduction to the present volume, Meszaros indicates that Imbelli discerned a crisis in the Church over the eclipse of the center of the Christian faith; in Imbelli's words, "That center is Jesus Christ himself." These words provide the title and shape of the book. Meszaros identifies a second thread uniting Imbelli's theological writings and teachings, namely, what he terms "the Christian demeanor with which he addresses that crisis." These words not only present a vision of Imbelli's legacy but also serve as the guiding thread of the volume itself: addressing the crisis in Catholic theology especially since Vatican II by recovering the Christological unity of divine revelation and the Church's mission. I will offer a brief summary of each of the fifteen chapters that comprise the volume.

Meszaros's opening chapter is the only chapter dedicated primarily to Imbelli's own work. He expands Imbelli's insights in dialogue with Newman to show how imagination shapes our overall view of the truth. Meszaros offers a thorough treatment of Imbelli's writings to demonstrate a consistent argument for the reception of Vatican II. First, Meszaros shows how Imbelli presents Vatican II as primarily presupposing revelation in Christ. Second, he shows how the Church needs to facilitate the imagination to recover this same centrality of Christ.

Jared Wicks, S.J., offers an extended summary and analysis of an early text of Joseph Ratzinger entitled "The Will of God Regarding Human Beings," a text originally prepared for the committee on revelation at Vatican II. Wicks carefully presents Ratzinger's contribution to the conciliar argumentation surrounding what would eventually become *Dei Verbum*. In this reading, Ratzinger situated revelation first within God, then in Christ, and then in us—as opposed to beginning with our reasoning about the world. By employing Bonaventure's idea of *reductio*, a "leading back to," Ratzinger presents revelation as moving from God, in Christ, to us with the purpose of leading us in Christ back to God.

Wicks's chapter happily includes an English translation of Ratzinger's brief document.

Frederick Lawrence considers the interplay of the will and the intellect in the reception of divine revelation. Beginning with the works of von Balthasar and Rahner, Lawrence develops Lonergan's presentation of faith—in part against Imbelli's suggestion that the later Lonergan falls into a voluntarist account, one that loses its Christic center with truth-laden claims. As Lawrence presents Lonergan's insights over time, the later Lonergan has not set aside the truth-value of Christ's revelation in his switch to a more voluntarist (love first, value first) account of faith. Lawrence develops some interesting observations about the sin-impacted character of our feeble attempts at human knowing and thus opts for a more passive and passionate reception of the darkness of faith via love. While undoubtedly surrender and love are necessary for faith, this reviewer wonders whether darkness, rather than the illumination and renewal of our minds, is a sufficient image of faith.

Khaled Anatolios presents Irenaeus of Lyon as an early exemplar of the Catholic integration of faith and reason as called for in Pope Benedict's Regensburg address. Against the Gnostics who upheld the nonsensical and irrational character of God, Anatolios shows that Irenaeus argues that a proper account of creation allows for God to be manifested through creation. In other words, no creation, no revelation. In a memorable phrase, Anatolios writes, "[Irenaeus] sees the Catholic doctrine of creation as an embracing of creation's testimony to its creator and the doctrine of the Incarnation as indicating the creator's testimony to his creation" (92). The Christian faith thus accords with reason and elevates human reason to share in divine reason.

Thomas Guarino makes a convincing case that Vatican II and the new evangelization presuppose Aquinas's doctrine of participation and analogy. He argues that the conciliar Christocentricism is presented in a careful and nuanced manner so that Christ stands as the prime analogate in which certain other realities participate. Priesthood, mediation, and holiness are principally realized in Christ and then shared in by others. Engaging with some of Imbelli's writings, Guarino helpfully shows how recognizing the role of Aquinas's doctrine of analogy avoids the confusion often at work in descriptions of how other religions "share" in Christ's redemptive work. Such sharing is not a proper analogy—as it is in the ministerial priesthood and the priesthood of the baptized. Most importantly, any claims of participation in saving realities—proper and otherwise—are only intelligible insofar as Christ remains the prime analogate.

Gerard O'Collins, S.J., recovers the Christic imagination by deploying Augustine's claim that Christ was "beautiful in laying down his life" as a lens through which to consider Christ in the New Testament. O'Collins shows, first, how Jesus links his Last Supper to the coming banquet of the final kingdom; second, how Christ carries out acts of kindness during his passion in Luke; and,

finally, how in John Jesus births the Church from his side as God had earlier birthed Israel (Deut 32:18; Isa 42:14). In so doing, O'Collins reminds the reader that rekindling the Christic imagination requires rekindling the biblical imagination.

Matthew Levering likewise turns to the biblical witness for theological renewal. By choosing three less-prominent passages from the Gospel of Matthew (3:11; 12:28; 12:32), Levering places patristic, medieval, Reformation, and contemporary exegesis in conversation with one another. Levering shows how Jesus' unique relationship to the divine Spirit—"he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit"—manifests his identity as the divine Son now indwelling a human nature. Thus, there is what Levering calls a "Matthean (proto-)Trinitarian Christology" (152). Rooted in the biblical revelation faithfully handed on in the ecclesial tradition, such Christological truths are necessary to serve the new evangelization.

Nathaniel Peters presents an instructive and illuminating account of the twelfth-century Cistercian monk theologian Isaac of Stella. By means of detailed analysis of Isaac's understanding of Trinitarian theology, the mystical body of Christ, and the Eucharist, Peters shows how Isaac's monastic theology was deeply intellectual and organized while also being shaped directly by the biblical and liturgical mysteries. Peters draws particular attention to the way that Isaac emphasized the Spirit's role in the mystical body of Christ in the Church as part of the Eucharistic mystery.

Christopher Ruddy contributes an excellent reflection on the centrality of theo-centric liturgy for Ratzinger/Benedict XVI's theological project. At the heart of this project is the contrast between the idolatry of self-worship (communal and/or individual) and the true worship of the Creator. Christ thus faithfully and truly worships God eternally in the Father-Son dialogue and invites us to enter into the same. Ruddy highlights three themes that flow from this God-centered and Christ-centered worship: God must have priority in worship; worship is a gift to be received rather than a task; and beauty is to be found amidst brokenness. Ruddy suggests how Imbelli took up this same Ratzingerian thread.

Ryan Connors offers a solid presentation of the Christic character of Pope John Paul II's *Veritatis Splendor*. Drawing upon the work of Servais Pinckaers and others, Connors defends the Christological dimension of Aquinas's treatment of the moral life and shows how this provides the background to *Veritatis Splendor*'s focus on following Christ. Connors moreover shows how the recovery of a virtue-based approach to morality allows for a sense of excellence in the moral life as well as how the Christian moral life is not attained by our own effort but received as a gift of Christ. Connors ends with a tribute to Imbelli's witness "to the centrality that Christ holds in the life of the Church" (203).

Boyd Taylor Coolman writes a moving analysis of the role of compassion in Hugh of St. Victor. He begins by noting the prevalence of refences to Christ's compassion (*splangchna*) in Paul and the Gospels. In Hugh, Coolman observes

a bivalent character to affectivity: *compassio* for those in misery and *congratulatio* for those in delight; or, in Paul's exhortation, "Rejoice with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep" (Rom 12:15). Interestingly, Hugh shows how Christ enters into our suffering and also into our co-suffering so that he might save us from both. Even more interestingly, Hugh shows how it is *congratulatio*—or rejoicing—that most effectively overcomes our prideful and envious egos since in rejoicing with those who rejoice we share in the other's good as our own and in our good as the other's, especially as from God. The recovery of the Christic imagination thus includes a recovery of our affections in imitation of our incarnate Lord.

Brian Daley, S.J., masterfully summarizes and presents Augustine's instructions on preaching and evangelization in *On Christian Doctrine/Teaching* and *On Catechizing the Uninstructed*. Daley focuses on how Augustine consistently turns to the biblical story to show how God's love and his incarnate humility invites us to turn from pride and so through Christ's humility to love God, neighbor, and ourselves in God. Thus, Daley recovers, first, Christ as the revelation of God's love and, second, the ecclesial community as revealed in the Bible as the proper receptor and practitioner of the Christological revelation. In this way, Augustine places the whole Christ at the heart of biblical interpretation and preaching.

Andrew Salzmann argues that a proper Christocentricism does not collapse into a Christomonism—as some have alleged—but allows for a united and distinctive role of the Holy Spirit. In support of this position, Salzmann offers an intriguing investigation of Josiah Royce, the subject of Imbelli's dissertation at Yale. Salzmann suggests that Royce presents a voluntarist account of human agency but one that avoids individualism by rooting the structure of the will within the community. Jesus Christ thus inaugurates the perfect community, the beloved community, in which the Holy Spirit unites all in love, or what Royce terms "loyalty." Beginning with this basic insight, Salzmann considers the biblical witness of the Spirit's anointing of Jesus as received within the ecclesial tradition as a model for the way in which Spirit draws us into communion with the Son and with the Father. This reviewer questions the adequacy of Royce's voluntarism to sustain the Christic character of the tradition that Imbelli recovered more explicitly from Ratzinger and others in the tradition.

Angela Franks integrates Aquinas's theology of the Trinitarian missions into von Balthasar's theology of mission both of Christ and the Christian. Franks addresses how the new evangelization is needed to address the peculiar deformities of what she describes as "liquid modernity" and resulting "liquid selves." To do so, Franks recovers both a philosophical and a theological dimension to personhood. Against those who criticize von Balthasar as lacking an account of personhood outside of Christ, Franks argues that he holds, first, that personhood remains part of all human beings according to Boethius's famous definition and, second, that such personhood also is the fruit of our

"yes" to God's call in Christ and so to the reception of a new mission and a new identity. Franks is surely correct to show that Christ alone offers us the fullness of our personhood, mission, and identity. This reviewer wonders if there might also be a natural or philosophical level to the moral response to the world that needs to be recovered as well.

Thomas Weinandy, O.F.M. Cap., in the final chapter, offers a penetrating analysis of the creed of Chalcedon and its connection to evangelization. In Weinandy's brief yet erudite summary, Chalcedon teaches that "Jesus must be *truly the Son of God* who *truly exists* as *truly man*" (303). Weinandy goes on to show that this Christic and Trinitarian confession is what makes possible the new evangelization. The new evangelization is nothing other than calling for salvation in and through a personal relationship with Jesus and the resulting Eucharistic ordering and communion, our new home and destiny.

The significance of this volume is that it shows the richness and fecundity of a theological vision that begins in the uniqueness and universality of the lordship of Jesus Christ. Fidelity to Scripture, Tradition, and the Magisterium does not stunt theological scholarship but instead gives it a center that renders it possible, and that center is Jesus Christ himself.

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Joyce, Aristotle, and Aquinas. By FRAN O'ROURKE. Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2022. Pp. 334 (hardback). $90.00. ISBN: 978-0-8130-6863-3.

Reflecting on the influence on artists of Jacques Maritain's Thomistic account of beauty, Yves Simon observed,

> That an artist should be interested in scholasticism . . . and should use the principles of this philosophy to understand and explain what is going on in the vanguard of painting, music, and poetry in the twentieth century, will remain one of the best surprises that ever confronted historians of philosophy. (John Griffiths and Yves Simon, *Jacques Maritain: Homage in Words and Pictures* [New York: Magi Book, 1974], 5])

The friendships cultivated by Jacques and his wife Raissa with numerous writers and artists, including Georges Rouault, Igor Stravinsky, and Jean Cocteau, prompted many artists to be intrigued by Scholasticism. Perhaps no twentieth-century artist was more of a student of Scholasticism than the Irish novelist

James Joyce. From his Catholic education in Dublin through his own independent reading of Aristotle and Aquinas, Joyce was imbued with Scholasticism. The greatest of Joyce scholars, Richard Ellman, reports on a conversation Joyce had with someone who had complained that Aquinas's work had nothing to do with them. To which Joyce responded peremptorily, "It has everything to do with us" (44). Joyce is somewhat dismissive of modern philosophers, especially in comparison to Aristotle, whom he calls the greatest of philosophers. In many of his writings, from the early unfinished manuscript *Stephen Hero*, through *Portrait of the Artist As a Young Man*, right through the hugely influential novel *Ulysses*, Joyce scatters references to Aquinas, often going so far as to depict characters appealing to Aquinas in debates, sometimes quoting him verbatim in Latin, or quarreling about how to interpret his texts.

The influence of Thomas Aquinas on Joyce was explored in *Joyce and Aquinas*, a beautiful little book by the Jesuit William T. Noon (Yale University Press, 1958). But Noon was not a philosopher; where he attends to big questions in Aquinas's texts, his focus is almost always theological. Moreover, in his treatment of the sources of Joyce's knowledge of Scholasticism, his work is incomplete or even misleading. Fran O'Rourke's new book, *Joyce, Aristotle, and Aquinas*, remedies these shortcomings in Noon's study. We know that Joyce spent time during his stay in Paris writing out passages from Aristotle into a notebook, what has come to be known as Joyce's Early Commonplace Book. In the last chapter, O'Rourke includes an annotated analysis of the quotations from Aristotle that Joyce included in the Commonplace Book. O'Rourke goes further in demonstrating how attentive Joyce was to, and in how many contexts he had opportunities for, the study of Aristotle and Aquinas. Previous studies have ignored the popularity of Thomistic philosophical handbooks, which supplied not only explications of the texts and teachings of Aristotle and Aquinas but also often compared them to modern philosophical alternatives.

O'Rourke's mastery of the relevant sources—in the primary texts of Aristotle and Aquinas; in the proximate, mediating texts available to Joyce; and in Joyce's own texts—render this a magisterial treatment, sensitive to both the obvious and the subtle ways in which Aristotle and Aquinas surface in Joyce's fiction. If O'Rourke demonstrates that Joyce had greater access to Aristotle and Aquinas than most previously have seen, he is also careful to point out the ways in which Joyce misinterprets or departs from these sources.

The influence of Aquinas on Joyce is most evident from the famous discussion of the nature of beauty in *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, wherein the character Stephen Dedalus explicates the famous three marks of the beautiful. While Noon and others hypothesize that Joyce had his knowledge of beauty only through Maurice de Wulf's *Aesthetic Theory according to Thomas Aquinas,* O'Rourke shows that he likely learned of it from his conversations with his Jesuit professor of Italian. Whatever the source, Joyce, or at least his character Stephen, gives a peculiar twist to the marks of the

beautiful, presenting them as stages in the knowledge of an object. Stephen says we first apprehend an object as one thing, which he equates with the object's *integritas*; then we understand its composite structure, which is its *consonantia or proportio*; finally, we apprehend the way the thing manifests its essence, which is associated with *claritas*. Such an approach, as O'Rourke shows, is foreign to the texts of Aquinas. Instead of stages of apprehension arrived at through analysis, Aquinas supposes that the "intellect spontaneously recognizes these qualities before analyzing them in detail" (186).

The peculiar approach to beauty in *Portrait* evinces Joyce's fascination with questions of knowledge and the identity of objects, especially personal identity. One can find in his texts, particularly in *Ulysses*, a welter of modern positions, from Locke's reduction of identity to memory through Hume's bundle theory of the self to versions of Berkeley's idealist thesis that "to be is to be perceived." The awareness of change haunts many of the characters. In *Ulysses*, the two main characters are, once again, Stephen Dedalus and Leopold Bloom, a secular Jew, who is an outsider in Irish Catholic Dublin. At one point, Stephen muses about his own identity: "Molecules all change. I am other I now." But he is also aware that a subject endures through the changes. Stephen states: "But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under unchanging forms" (105). O'Rourke notes the similarity to Locke's account of identity as rooted in memory, but goes on to show that what differentiates the view is the addition of the notion that the self exists "under unchanging forms," as an entelechy, a term that surfaces surprisingly often in Joyce (106). Indeed, Joyce's transcriptions in his Commonplace Book of passages from Aristotle come predominantly from *De anima*. Particularly noteworthy here is Aristotle's statement on the soul as the first entelechy of naturally organic body. As much as he is attentive to mutability and alteration, Stephen the character, and even more so Joyce as author, are equally attentive to processes of growth and development, for which the teleological language of soul is apt. Ellman attributes to Joyce in *Portrait* the discovery of the gestation of the soul as a new principle of order in modernist literature (99).

The richest philosophical sections of O'Rourke's book concern the nature of the soul and our knowledge of its existence. O'Rourke demonstrates the presence in Joyce's *Ulysses* of the most influential modern conceptions of human knowledge and self-knowledge—from Locke to Berkeley and Hume. These vie with an Aristotelian view. Coming up empty in the search for the soul or self through an inspection of the contents of our consciousness, the modern tradition repudiates knowledge of the soul, except as a kind of pure hypothesis: Locke's "I know not what" that underlies our conscious awareness and its activities. As O'Rourke notes, for Aristotle and Aquinas, the human substance is not known through an inspection of isolated sense data, the arena in which Hume failed to find it. Instead, the soul is "observed in and through its activities" (122). O'Rourke depicts Joyce's characters as groping toward an Aristotelian view but hampered in that quest by apparent unawareness of the

distinction between accidental and substantial change and by an occasional error in conflating potency with possibility.

On O'Rourke's reading, the "enigma of self-identity . . . never ceases to preoccupy" Joyce. With his literary deployment of stream of consciousness, Joyce's dramatic depiction of the self eagerly explores the complex subjective conditions of our awareness, perhaps especially of our very sense of our own identity. But Joyce's vision does not lapse into a kind of idealism. Another Aristotelian motif from *De anima*, namely that the soul is potentially all things, is dear to Joyce. To borrow language from Charles Taylor, the self in Joyce's fiction is porous rather than buffered. Leopold Bloom, an outsider in Catholic Dublin, is obsessed with the fragility of the self and sometimes inclined to a Heraclitean view of the self. "Life is a stream," he observes, "No-one is anything" (73). Attending a funeral and channeling Dante, Bloom wonders to himself: "how many! All these here once walked around Dublin." Imagining the dead speaking to the living, he muses, "As you are now so once were we." He speculates at one point, "What if we were all suddenly someone else" (108). O'Rourke calls this a "manifest contradiction" and strictly speaking of course it is (ibid.). But I take this to be a hyperbolic way of making a point that O'Rourke himself makes. That we are potentially what others are now and our sense of self is in part determined by how others see us, which is a way of underscoring our inherently social nature.

If Stephen Dedalus, an aspiring writer, is in some obvious ways based on the life of Joyce, Bloom is in other ways a stand-in for the novelist, perpetually noticing affinities and coincidences between situations and characters. Like the novelist, he is attentive to the "concrete richness of the ordinary" (199), to the diverse dialects not just of different peoples but of individuals. Such discoveries lead not to the dissolution of the self or to a radical incommensurability between lives and characters. Joyce was aware of, and resistant to, certain elements of modernity. As modern as his stories and his styles may be, Joyce resists what one of his characters in *Stephen Hero* calls the "modern spirit" of "vivisection" (17). Joyce seeks the universal in the particulars. Perhaps no other writer has brought out the particularities of a single place (viz., the city of Dublin) better than Joyce. Yet he insists that he could capture the whole of the human condition, its universality, in that singular city.

Those who would reduce the self to an assemblage of sense data, memories, and an underlying suppositum strip away the sense of the mystery of concrete reality, particularly of the concrete reality of human persons. The general principle that O'Rourke discerns in Joyce, that the "*individuum est ineffabile*" (114), applies especially to persons. The mystery is also present in the strange and surprising overlaps between characters and their storylines. Here O'Rourke argues that the principle needed to appreciate Joyce's literary predilections is analogy, analogy of proportionality to be precise, which provides the novelist with a way of discerning and depicting "similarity in difference and unity in

diversity" (132). The principle of "analogical similarity enables the mind to transcend duality and diversity, to perceive unity in bipolar tension"; through analogy "opposites are not rescinded nor tension abandoned" but enabled to display "mutual enrichment, allowing reciprocal comparisons and the exchange of attributes" (161).

As O'Rourke astutely shows through careful analysis of a judiciously selected set of passages from Joyce's fiction, the philosophical thought of Aristotle and Aquinas informs Joyce's reflections on a wide array of topics, including "authentic selfhood and authorial identity" (4). The poet W. B. Yeats once remarked that "Joyce's work incites to philosophy" (7). Yet that does not mean that we should go to Joyce expecting extended philosophical arguments or that what is of value in a literary work is its residue of philosophy. As O'Rourke wisely notes, "a writer who overtly uses his medium to convey a philosophical message will damage his art" (234). Too much emphasis on philosophy makes for either bad literature or bad readings of literature. Joyce came of age as an author in a period in which artistic and literary theory began to flourish, an era in which theory seemed at least as important as the text or work of art itself. Yet his accent on the mystery of concrete reality lends an anti-theoretical bent to his writings. As he puts it in *Finnegan's Wake*: "let us leave theories there and return to here's here" (109). That places Joyce comfortably within a broadly Aristotelian approach to human action, one that had already been revived by John Henry Newman, an important influence on Joyce, and that would soon become a feature of an Anglo-American movement in ethics informed equally by Aristotle and Wittgenstein.

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Infidels and Empires in a New World Order: Early Modern Spanish Contributions to International Legal Thought. By DAVID M. LANTIGUA. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. xiii + 374 (hardback). $110.00. ISBN: 978-1-108-49826-5.

David Lantigua's book examines the contribution of sixteenth-century Spanish—and specifically Dominican—thought to the development of international law. His argument is that this contribution was fundamental and has been insufficiently valued so far.

On the face it, this contention may appear strange because the central role of the debate about the Indies at Valladolid between 1550 and 1551 has

attracted a vast amount of scholarly interest. Furthermore, the Spanish writers on both sides of the debate about Indian rights have been exhaustively examined. But Lantigua's claim is that there is more to be said from the international-law perspective, as distinct from the historical. From the point of view of those interested in the history of the Dominican order, their defense of Indian rights was their finest hour: the role of Bartolomé de las Casas was particularly important.

Lantigua's claim steams straight into a problem because international-relations specialists and historians do not see this question in the same way. IR practitioners give great importance to the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, the notion of territorial state sovereignty which they imagine was set in stone by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, and which brought the Thirty Years' War to an end. Historians tend not to think in the same way. Lantigua does battle with those who overvalue the Westphalian model, which can appear to be used in anachronistic ways: arguing more from an historian's point of view, he performs a service by prioritizing the largely theologically based Spanish writers.

This book draws on a very thorough knowledge of the secondary literature and a secure employment of a large number of quotations from the primary sources. For those reasons alone, it performs a very useful function for the reader.

Lantigua divides his book into six chapters. The first is introductory and sets out the research question he is pursuing by addressing relevant aspects of medieval and early modern Catholic theological teaching and papal pronouncements. He then considers the IR Westphalian interpretation. Details are then given of the Valladolid debates and the role of the Amerindians in the new world order opened up by the discovery (from the European point of view) of the Americas.

Part 1 of the book is subdivided into three substantial chapters. The first is entitled "Theocratic World Order and Religious Wars." It takes a wide perspective, bringing in the crusades and infidel rights. The claims of the papacy as regards world order are seen in the context of the vast geographical expansion of Spanish and Portuguese rule. Attention is given to the issues raised by religious wars. The second chapter, "Spanish Dominicans and the 'Affair of the Indies'," goes into detail about the theological debates concerning conquest, infidel rights, restitution, world order, unjust war, and the ethics of evangelization. In the third chapter, entitled "The Politics of Natural Law at Valladolid, 1550-1551," Lantigua examines these debates with, as one would expect, particular reference to the views of Las Casas. What was remarkable was that these state-sponsored debates under the auspices of Emperor Charles V took place at all. The fundamental issue of the rights under natural law of the Amerindians was at stake. The opposing views, making use of Aristotelian ideas of natural slavery, were strongly put, but the decision was made in favor of the

natural rights of the Indians, placing them on the same level as Spaniards, a remarkable result for an early colonial enterprise. The question was, how much difference did this make to the condition of the native peoples in practice?

Part 2 of the book consists of two chapters. The first, called "From Infidel Rights to Savages: Empires of Commerce and Natural Rights," looks at the Protestant imperial enterprises, notably those of the English and the Dutch. These were justified in ways totally different from those of Spain and Portugal. Whereas the Iberian empires always had Christian evangelization as a justification, partly through papal involvement, the Protestant empires thought in terms of trade and land colonization. Lantigua examines Protestant natural law theory as regards the question of Indian rights. Perhaps the most important chapter is the final one, "The Scholastic Law of Nations, Native Occupation and Human Solidarity." This discusses in particular the role of the *ius gentium* (law of peoples), especially in its relationship to natural law. Theological and juristic aspects are considered, notably Las Casas's reliance on fourteenth-century commentators on the Roman law. This shows just how rich the intellectual treasury of late medieval theological and juristic thought was as a source for early modern ideas. The early seventeenth-century Protestant theorists of international law, Grotius and Albericus Gentilis, used the works of these medieval lawyers as a foundation for their thought. The whole concept of international law had late medieval, Roman, and canon law roots.

Lantigua's conclusion sums up his overall argument: that the sixteenth-century Spanish sources were fundamental for the origins of international law. Again, he stresses the difference between the Iberian evangelical aspect of the justification of the colonial project, and the commercial and land settlement arguments put forward by Protestants. The question of infidel rights, first understood in connection with contact with Moslems in the Mediterranean, became a central driver of the development of international law, against the background of intensive discussion of the requirements of natural law.

So, how should one assess Lantigua's contribution to scholarship? The subject-matter and the sources are, in themselves, very well known. What is new is the way in which the author addresses his thesis in terms of a confrontation with IR interpretations of the past—in this case, the origins of international law. It has become increasingly clear to IR specialists that they have been working with anachronistic models based on Westphalia. William Bain, for instance, has seen this clearly. Historians (including legal historians) have been increasingly talking to IR practitioners. Historians who deal with the late Middle Ages see all sorts of problems associated with the importation of the term "international" to apply to their period. Properly speaking the category of international law is at home in a world viewed as a collection of territorial states with horizontal relations with one another—from the early seventeenth century, in short. The terminological shift took place from the *ius gentium* to the *ius inter gentes* (the law between peoples). Late medieval juristic thought regarding the *ius commune*, the combined Roman and canon law, was concerned with the

vertical relationships between territorially sovereign powers, whether kingdoms or city-republics, and the universal powers of emperor or pope.

A word of warning should be issued at this point. Westphalian IR interpretations tend to contrast the secular state-based international order with an earlier one dominated by universal imperial and papal powers. It was perfectly true that such universal claims remained in Roman law and canonist scholarship, but they did not undermine the emergence of territorially sovereign powers in reality. The pope himself had very little territorial power; the Holy Roman Emperor, as such, also had very little. Charles V ruled by a variety of titles. Fourteenth- and fifteenth-century jurists coped with this problem by an imaginative use of the *de iure-de facto* solution, as Lantigua knows. I would also say that legal historians also tend to take papal claims at face value. Papal pretensions remained on the books but were overtaken by history, as Pius V found when he excommunicated Elizabeth I of England and declared her deposed.

What strikes the reader of this book is that it is often written in a tortuous way. It can be clear but it often is not. The author's thought often has to be teased out of his sentences (which is not to deny the importance of much that he says). There are also errors of fact. These tend to occur when Lantigua strays into the medieval period. On p. 35 he states that Gregory VII "hoped to liberate Byzantium from the Turks." When Gregory wrote, part of the Byzantine empire had indeed fallen to the Seljuk Turks in the aftermath of the battle of Manzikert. But Constantinople remained in Christian hands, as it would do till 1453. Gregory did, however, want to bring aid to the Eastern Christians in what was, arguably, the first call for crusade. More seriously, Lantigua makes much of the crusades as an example of missionary war. Over the centuries, crusading developed in a number of wide-ranging ways including, in some places and at some times, a missionary aspect. But the original crusades in the period from 1095 to 1204 were not missionary wars. The crusaders were not trying to convert anyone. They were seeking to reconquer lands that had once been Christian. The Holy Land, in particular, was seen as having been made Christian forever by the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. The Crusades were, in effect, wars of defense from the Western Christian point of view; from the Moslem side, they were seen as wars of aggression justifying holy war in defense of lands made Moslem forever by the early conquests of Islam. On a minimal point, the last university position of Baldus was at Pavia, not Padua (90). More seriously, it is not clear what the author means by referring to "the merely conciliarist roots of modern ideas about sovereignty" (91).

This is a book that should be read by anyone interested in the origins of international law and the complexities of the issues raised by the debates about the Indies. It contains highly significant contributions to the development of ideas of human rights. The brave and unflinching role of Spanish Dominican friars in defending the natural rights of Indians, derived from the common

humanity they shared with their European conquerors, shines through more brightly than ever through Lantigua's book.

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Over the past few decades, there has been a shift of focus in Augustinian studies concerning some important themes in his thought. This shift concerns the sources from which scholars engage with Augustine's positions on various topics. In addition to the over-studied masterpieces— namely, *Confessiones*, *De Trinitate*, *De civitate Dei*—interest has increasingly shifted to his pastoral works, such as his sermons and letters, as valid research sources for examining his thought. Kevin Grove joins this trend, taking up the study of memory from the perspective of Augustine's preaching.

The book is composed of three parts. Part 1, comprising chapters 1 and 2, tackles the question of the "Beginning of Memory." In chapter 1, Grove focuses on Augustine's earliest treatises and letters. Here, Augustine uses memory language to describe various aspects of mediation within the human person. Grove demonstrates that memory is central to Augustine's philosophical and theological anthropology, rendering the human person intelligible amid the pushes and pulls of body and soul, of changing knowledge and enduring wisdom. He notes that even though Augustine's earliest writings on memory are not systematic and are varied in literary form, the importance of memory increases as he progresses in those writings. Grove convincingly shows that whatever Augustine may have gained from ancient philosophy on the concept of memory, that never determines his use of it as mediating the unity of the human person. Augustine's most productive partner for thinking about the anthropological mediation of memory is the salvific mediation of Christ (30). From Grove's reading of the *Confessions*, it emerges that Christ Mediator is the one who can unite the scattered fragments of human life, who can bridge memory and expectation in all who are pulled in opposite directions by multifarious distractions. In a nutshell, Grove makes a strong case that, for Augustine, memory as an anthropological mediator fails to make the self coherent amid the competing realities it faces. In the *Confessions*, memory's failure was the failure of any sense of self. It was, however, a failure that led to Christ the true Mediator, the successful salvific Mediator. Ultimately, the

trajectory of this chapter forms a link between memory and Christ the Mediator, while shifting the discussion of *memoria* from philosophy to preaching, and from the self to the whole.

This is precisely the approach that Grove takes up in the second chapter, where he begins with Augustine as preacher of the Whole Christ. Having underlined the importance of the psalms in Augustine's life from Cassiciacum in 386 to his deathbed in 430, Grove contends that the development of the story of Christ's mediation is the story of a preacher learning to speak about Christ and then in Christ. Worthy of mention are the considerations on Augustine's *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 21. Analyzing this text, Grove posits that, in assuming human flesh, Christ also assumed a human voice and a human death. He spoke in human words so that human beings might speak in his. He died a human death so that humans might die in him. Grove insists that mediation remains ongoing even though Christ has risen from the dead and ascended into heaven (75), and transfiguration is a new term for that ongoing mediation. The Lukan narration of Paul's conversion in Acts 9:4 plays an important role in the articulation of the doctrine of the Whole Christ, a communal and daily reality manifest in the Catholic Church. Within the context of Christ as Mediator (Totus Christus), Grove arrives at the true function of memory and shows how Idithun, "the leaper across," becomes the figure through which Augustine exercises his congregation in shared memorial ascent to Christ.

In part 2, Grove introduces and treats "The Work of Memory." It is here that he explores the ongoing exercise of the Whole Christ, as practiced by Augustine and his congregation. Chapter 3, "Learning to Leap," presents the daily, ongoing spiritual exercise and dynamic activity of the Whole Christ. Leaping is a strenuous and ongoing activity that forms an identity. It causes Idithun, "one who leaps," to remember God, to continue leaping, even though he falls and becomes troubled; to move within the private retreat of his mind in order to gain freedom from distraction and the exterior turmoil of human affairs (91). Leaping also involves a certain form of kenosis. Idithun's leaping out of himself into Christ allows him to discover the way of healing offered to the self by means of the Whole Christ. While leaping concerns remembering the works of the Lord, it also involves forgetting into Christ. Here, Grove uses Phil 3:12-14 to show that the body of Christ is always forgetting. Forgetting frees memory from being overwhelmed by preoccupations in order to open up to the expectation of Christ as End. Grove concludes chapter 3 by insisting that by means of memory in Christ, Augustine the preacher challenges the scholarly presentations of him as an elderly bishop and thinker whose optimism about humanity darkens as he ages. Remembering and forgetting become the optimistic possibility of enjoying life and prayer together.

Chapter 4 explores the "Work of Remembering" by showing that, for Augustine, memory in the Whole Christ is not merely an occasional exercise but

constitutes existence in the Whole Christ. Grove emphasizes that the passage from memory as occasional exercise to remembering as a defining character of Christian existence is a major advance in memory's role (140). In the exercise of memory in the Whole Christ, the mystery of self is disclosed by the Christic memory of the whole. The promise of memory becomes the source of great hope, but the pain of its not yet being fulfilled is the work of mourning and groaning. Thus, the eschatological reach of memory is not only made possible in Christ, but is made simultaneously into a painful memory of how that body is still on the way to the place where its head has already gone. The work of remembering is the work of Christian existence.

Chapter 5 focuses on the "Work of Forgetting." Grove shows how forgetting takes on a positive connotation, as it is meant to help pilgrims to keep striving towards their end in Christ. To indicate to what extent the Whole Christ is able to exercise this type of forgetting, Grove explores how memory has a certain need for forgetting. Using the images of Paul as runner (Phil 3:13-14), Lot's wife, the story of Israel's Exodus, and the metaphor of the aging eagle that sheds part of its beak to be able to eat, Grove exposes the ideas of forgetting forward and backward. Paul's athleticism, he contends, becomes the key to forgetting as work (147). The cases of Lot's wife and Israel show that memories of sin entrap individuals and communities who can be locked in a false paradigm of their selfhood. That is why forgetting emerges as necessary for keeping Christian existence oriented toward its goal and not allowing one to slip back into the repetition of former cycles of sin. Grove rightly indicates that Augustine's understanding of forgetting does not efface temptations but allows for the Whole Christ not to be haunted by past temptations. Forgetting is the ongoing work of enabling the Whole Christ, with respect to individual vocation and station, to continue the pilgrimage together.

The second part of the book closes with chapter 6, which focuses on the "Work of Memory" as participation in Christ, the heart of Christian existence. Grove presents four binaries, each of which emerges in some way as a source of struggle for Augustine. These binaries—lyre and psaltery (below and above), labor and rest, solitude and communion, and praising and groaning—are a way for Augustine to expose the life of grace in Christ in concrete applicable ways for his congregation. The ongoing works of remembering and forgetting helps the members of Christ learn together how to live the contradictions of human life not as the despair of distention, but as hopeful extension into the fullness of grace (182).

The third part, on the "End of Memory," comprises chapters 7 and 8. In chapter 7, Grove explores the fruits of the work of memory by discussing its intellectual consequences. He shows how it plays out in Augustine's taking up of memory's telos in *De Trinitate*. Reflecting on "Transitus and Trinity," Grove contends that the work of memory, in the Whole Christ, bridges the psychological triad of the inner person and the reformation of the *imago Dei* of Trinitarian participation. He further contends that one cannot rely solely on *De Trinitate* for a Christological grounding of Trinitarian contemplation, as that

work leaves only partially answered how precisely Christological community matters (190). Memory in *De Trinitate*, Grove suggests, is a fruit and consequence of the work of memory in the Whole Christ. Ultimately, by revealing the profound continuity that exists between Augustine's preaching and *De Trinitate* and his mature contemplation about Christian doctrine and the work of memory, Grove shows that the body of Christ is not secondary to Augustine's Trinitarian theology but the necessary precondition for it (212).

In the final chapter, Grove explores the consequences of the work of memory through the use of Psalm 50 in Augustine's preaching and especially at the end of his life, making the case that the likeliest psalm text Augustine had at his bedside was Psalm 50. Grove contends that Possidius, working within the narrow conventions of ancient genres of biography, fails to dig deeper into the psalms and thus misses Augustine's relationship with the very texts pasted on his walls around his deathbed (214). His presentation of Augustine's meditation on his sinfulness by praying the penitential psalms seems to reinforce the darkness of the latter's worldview, often expressed through so-called Augustinian pessimism. Grove has the merit of pinpointing that the work of memory suggests that it is time to revisit this pessimistic account of Augustine's worldview. He brilliantly demonstrates that the work of memory prepared Augustine to read the penitential psalms with a positive end for memory and for himself. Grove examines remembering backward and forward to show that, for Augustine, memory is configured less to memorization than it is to life, to existence mediated by Christ at its communal fullness forever. Ultimately, the work of remembering and of forgetting ends in becoming Christ together (226). Grove uses the tax-collector of the Lukan parable and the woman caught in adultery to show how the sinner confronted by his or her offense is delivered by Christ's abiding help.

This book successfully demonstrates how the work of memory played an important role in Augustine's preaching, especially when the holy bishop instructed his congregants that the life of grace could only unfold within the Whole Christ. Grove's terse and lively style, which runs effortlessly through the key dimensions of Augustine's thought on memory, is a great asset. All the book's sections are well articulated and will be useful to a range of readers. The overall outcome is refined and orderly. Grove's work is mostly successful in achieving its stated goal. He offers several well-researched and theologically interesting engagements with Augustine's sermons and other texts as well as a new approach to the study of memory in Augustine.

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