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THE MILITANT CHRISTIAN VIRTUES

I. THE SENTIMENTAL REVOLT AGAINST HARSHNESS

PRINCIPLES and programs of many religious organizations in the United States are concerned with the attitudes of their communicants toward our enemies during the war and in post-bellum peace negotiations. In these church pronouncements there is a manifest gentleness that approaches spiritual and religious flabbiness. This is a carry-over from the prewar pacifistic activities, which are now necessarily quiescent but which did much to create among religionists the hopeful but spiritless quietism that left our nation unprepared to defend itself against the Axis powers. This current idealism about the gentle attitudes which Christians must take toward their savage enemies during and after the war is only a partial and disparate application of Christian principles to practical life. It pushes out of the picture basic and stern Christian virtues, and it leaves citizens and nations without the help of those vigorous and militant qualities demanded for an organized society in peace and war. Christianity itself is done no great service if, in the popular mind, it is identified exclusively with sentimental idealism to the neglect of the stern

and rational realities of life. Christianity is done no service anywhere if persons with normal and God-given instincts of anger and indignation are made to feel that there is no place within the fold for them. There is need to open up to all a view of real and more complete Christianity as presented in the Catholic Church by the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas.

The definite indictment which can be brought against incomplete and sentimental Christianity is that, in order to create horror for criminal hatred and barbaric vengeance in war and at the peace table, it has exiled from life Christian obligations like holy anger and vindictive justice. Furthermore such partial Christianity has so overemphasized the gentle virtues of meekness, forgiveness, and mercy as to have fallen into vicious extremes of flabbiness against which these very gentle qualities are supposed to protect individuals and nations. In order to protect society against relying on brute power, it has attempted to lead Christians into a grovelling and supine inertia that is an apostasy from reaso:n. There is no intention of questioning the fine and humanitarian spirit that lies behind the efforts of pacifistic and unaggressive Christian leaders. They are rather the victims of two tendencies characteristic of partial Christianity for four centuries. One tendency is that of whittling down the content of Christian teaching and discipline to the proportions of human convenience, through a disregard of the rights of God and the ultimate needs of human nature. This is an apostasy from divine Intelligence. The other tendency is that of failing to adhere to first principles despite the temporary discomfort they may occasion and the consistency of conduct they may demand. This is an apostasy from human intelligence. Both of these tendencies are evident in . the contemporary life of partial Christianity.

The apostasy from divine Intelligence began with the neglect of some of the teachings of divine Revelation, and was consummated in the open repudiation of these teachings. The Sacraments offer a striking example. First some of them were ignored, like Matrimony, Penance, Confirmation, and Extreme Unction; then they were dropped entirely. Now Baptism is

the only remnant of sacramental life on which partial Christianity can present any semblance of loyalty and united action. The divine commandments suffered in a similar manner. Of the Ten Commandments, some were ignored, under the pressure of economic change and consequent moral dissolution. The first three commandments are practically ignored by about seventy-five millions of partial Christians in the United States today. From neglect of these commandments our partial Christians pass on to the open repudiation of them and to the neglect of the others. A similar process of deterioration has taken place and is taking place in regard to the virtues of Christian living. Power politics found it convenient, with the help of Nietzsche, to scrap all the gentle Christian virtues and to make political capital of their opposite vices of hatred, revenge, and savage cruelty. Totalitarian ideology finds it convenient to repudiate Christianity in its entirety and to adopt controllable and kaleidoscopic paganism. Sentimentally partial Christianity :finds it convenient for its pacifistic and selfish purposes to neglect the sterner Christian qualities of vindictive justice, punishment, courage, military prudence, and righteous anger. Already these dynamic qualities have been repudiated by some recognized Christian leaders. There is danger that they will be lost in the general apostasy from divine Intelligence.

The apostasy from human reason is seen in the manifold paradoxes into which truncated and disparate .Christianity falls in adopting a pragmatic and sentimental policy of coasting into a chronic procrastination. These paradoxes of procrastination are not far removed from mental, moral, and social anarchy. Several favorite attitudes and policies of partial Christianity reveal this. In religious life the affair of baptism and the matter of selecting a church or creed are evaded by parents, turned over to children themselves, and postponed until the youngster is supposed to be capable of deciding. In the field of education the theory of self-activity is sovereign. Pedagogues hesitate to teach with authority because of fear of indoctrination. The reaching of conclusions is postponed until immature

minds have completed their discussions and forums. Then the pedagogue must concur rather than demur. In social life at home, and elsewhere, the religious attitude which has negated the facts of the last judgment and the punishments of Hell finds reflection in the theory that authority, parental and political, must rule all by love rather than by fear of punishment. Inexperienced, amateur individuals usurp parental authority in the home, religious authority in the church, pedagogical authority in the school, and political authority in the state. This makes the individual sovereign everywhere and launches anarchy. This procrastinates the fulfillment of duty and passes the responsibility from one refuge to another. This creates the concatenation of paradoxes that always results from the abdication of rational principles and the sovereignty of sentiment. One must avoid punishment and govern only through love, but society has only punishments to offer as sanctions for laws. One must avoid indoctrination and yet teach the accumulated experiences of the past to the young. One must guard group interests and yet turn sovereignty over to individuals. One must preserve liberty and yet surrender the control necessary for the preservation of freedom. One must cultivate through religion the qualities that make for sound social living, and yet one must avoid the control that keeps many virtues from becoming vices. Partial Christianity with its apostasy from reason and its subsequent procrastination, anarchy, and paradox could not escape its present condition. Its historical antecedents have maneuvered it into its sentimental lack of sympathy for righteous anger, vindictive justice, and other stern virtues of Christianity, into its prewar pacifism and into its postwar program of softness. It is interesting to note the nonintellectual use made of Christ's teachings and life in overemphasizing some gentle virtues and in neglecting sterner qualities.

II. pARADOXES OF CHRISTIANITY

Frequent reference, in pacifistic and inferiority Christianity, is made to the meekness and mercy of Christ and to the

obligations of Christian men and nations to be gentle and nonresistant. In fact these well-intentioned persons make gentleness and mercy synonymous with nonresistance. They also make nonresistance and nonpunishment mandatory for every one and take away from all persons, public and private, the duty and the right of demanding justice. There is in this a sad confusion of the respective :force of precept and counsel, a misunderstanding of the nature and functions of justice, a failure to see the full picture of Christ's life and a convenient neglect of some of His narsher words. About the meaning of meekness and mercy and about the difference between counsel and precept we shall ask Aquinas to speak later. Attention is directed now to the partial understanding of Christ's life and words presented by partial Christianity.

No time need be lost in proclaiming the mercy, the humility, the meekness, the charity, the patience, and all the other gentle and submissive virtues of the Master. But with equal readiness one must also proclaim that Christ was always just and also stern and rigourous when conditions demanded Him to be so. He violated none in the hierarchy and interlocked scale of virtues in order to be gentle. Negatively and positively He was stern. In a negative way Christ was stern in the punishments He failed to arrest and in the corrections He did not withhold when charity, justice, and truth demanded severity. Christ possessed all the virtues.[1] His most perfect grace perfected all the powers of His soul and all the acts of these faculties. He had the fine emotions of the nature He assumed, under perfect control and perfectly sublimated.[2] He was subject to sensile pain[3] and also experienced sorrow and grief/ that issued from His knowledge of the perils that beset Himself and His neighbors.5 But as much as Jesus grieved over the distressful punishments that would befall those whom He loved, His virtue

[1] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 7, a. 2. For the benefit of those who wish to make an extended study of these virtues in the works of St. Thomas, copious references will be given throughout this study.

[2] *Ibid.,* q. *15,* a. 4.

[3] *Ibid.,* a. *5,* ad 3.

• *Ibid.,* a. 6.

[5] *Lac. cit.*

demanded that justice take its course. He wept over the city of Jerusalem and lamented its coming destruction, but He did not prevent this calamity. He grieved over the treachery of Judas, but His virtues forbade the arresting of the just fate of the traitor. Jesus sorrowed in the garden over His coming crucifixion and death and over the punishment His murderers would bring on themselves, but He did not stop the divine tragedy by permitting the truthfulness of the prophecies to be gainsaid or the justice of God to be thwarted. Jesus found no pleasure in the denial by Peter, but He did not prevent Peter's denial and subsequent embarrassment. Positively, the conduct of Christ bristled with incidents which showed, side by side with His humility and meekness, His agressive interest in charity, justice, and truth. Parabolic though he may be, Dives is an impressive indication of the devotion of Christ to drastic and punitive action. The cursed and blighted fig tree is also an indication of Christ's ire in the name of justice. That love of neighbor may demand aggressive action against enemies of human welfare is shown in the habitual aggressiveness of Jesus against the Scribes and Pharisees because they blockaded the boulevards between men and God. Actions speak more loudly than words when Christ chases the moneylenders out of the Temple. Gentleness is in the background while vigorous action in the name of justice and charity take the center of the stage. Jesus was capable of and manifested righteous, zealous, and intelligent anger.[6]

The sorrow which is caused by the knowledge of an injury done to oneself or to others is followed naturally and honorably by a desire to right and avenge the wrong. Anger is therefore a, combination of sorrow and the desire for vindication. This combination existed in Christ in a perfect degree and under the perfect control of reason and justice. St. Thomas calls this type of anger with its concomitant and laudable desire for just vindication *ira per zelum*[7] (anger inspired by zeal), and calls attention to the fact that in Christ such anger never impeded

• *Ibid.,* q. 15, a. 9; *Ill Sent.,* d. XV, q. fl, qua.es. 2.
• *Loc. cit.*

understanding. [8] The divine as well as the human dignity of the Savior would not be demeaned by His voluntary and reasonable anger. [9] The righteous indignation of Christ when He beheld the profanation of the Temple by cattle dealers and money-changers showed itself in vigorous action. He drove out the men with lashes, He drove out the cattle and birds, He poured out the money and He overturned the tables and stalls. He was angry because justice and religion had been violated and for their restoration as well as for the punishment of the culprits Christ took vigorous action. [10] This is a phase of the character and the conduct of Jesus which partial Christianity is wont to conceal when it campaigns for quietistic pacifism.

The possibility of remaining a devout Christian even while seeking aggressive vindication of justice is founded on the words of Jesus. The Master surrendered and abdicated none of the gentler virtues when He poured vitriolic denunciation on the Scribes and Pharisees. It was essential for the triumph of truth, for the salvation and happiness of the people, for the sake of obedience to the Man God and for the vindication of justice that these false leaders be exposed in all their raw viciousness. And Jesus spoke with a plainness and force that must embarrass the sentimental and delicate partial Christians of this day who have a smug disdain for what they characterize as "name calling," even in the interests of justice and truth. In His denunciation of them Christ was not as concerned about excusing, condoning, and glossing over their crimes as some of His halfway followers in the United States are concerned in softening their words and their characterizations of the ugly rottenness of the ideology and the conduct of Axis paganism. Jesus called them, among other things, "brood of vipers," [11] " an adulterous generation," [12] " whited sepulchres," [13] " hypocrites," [14] " blind guides." [15] The divine Preacher denounced them while they were present and while they were absent, and

[8] *Ibid.,* quaes. 3, sol. 2, ad 3.
• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2.
[10] *In Joann.,* ii, 2.
[11] *Matt.,* iii, 7.
[19] *Ibid.,* xii, 39.
[13] *Ibid.,* xxiii, 27.
" *Ibid.,* xv, 8.
-.s *Ibid.,* xxiii, 24.

actively spread a contempt for the vices they lived and the havoc they wrought. His caustic condemnation of these enemies of human happiness, temporal and eternal, could be imitated with dignity and with service to truth and justice by contemporary semi-Christian preachers before whose pulpits and on whose horizon stands an army of satanic successors of the diabolical Scribes and Pharisees. Christ's vigorous preaching might be censored by some broadcasting companies and their editorial boards today, but He was the paradigm of the preacher who St. Thomas says ought to be a "soldier," a *titurator/* [6] and a trumpet who calls all to a spiritual warfare. [11] It is clear that ultra-pacifistic Christian leaders are disturbed by the belligerent denunciatory and punitive utterances of Christ. This pacifistic passion is not satisfied with trying to submerge the irate utterances of Christ; it attempts to interpret the Christian philosophy of meekness and forgiveness more abasingly than Christ Himself intended. Take as an example of this tendency the distorted meaning read into the passages: "You have heard that it hath been said: An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say not to resist evil: but if anyone strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other." [18] This has been used often as the charter of universal nonresistance and supine pacifism, very contrary to the true Christian meaning disclosed by the Angelic Doctor. [19] The meaning of this is that one is not allowed to repel injury by taking revenge (*ulciscendo)* or with the purpose of cruelty. But the question is asked by St. Thomas whether nonresistance to evil is a matter of precept or counsel and the answer IS gtven:

Injury can be private and particular, or public; if public, it should be fought against at the command of the ruler. Augustine remarks further that the courage which defends one's homeland, or the oppressed, against the oppressor, or one's friends against robbers, is in full accord with justice. Hence, the precept is for the ruled as well as for the rulers. If the injury should be private, it may be

[1-] *ln 1 Cm·.,* ix, lect. 1.
[17] *ln Is.,* !viii.
Matt., v, 38, 39.
[10] *ln Matt.,* v, 9.

repelled in three ways; it may be impeded ... or it may be forestalled by discussion. These failing, when necessary, that is, when there is no way of avoiding conflict, injury may be fought against either without arms (in which circumstances clerics might participate) or by attacking the oppressor, but always with the proper moderation. To refrain from the use of arms in resisting evil is of precept for clerics, but of counsel for layfolk. Of course, to fight with the intention of exacting revenge is forbidden by precept to alt:w

It would seem from this that under certain circumstances nonresistance would be criminal and that in all but a comparatively few cases it is more or less optional. This is a little bit different f:rom the interpretation usually placed on the words by quietistic Christians. The same distortion of Christ's words and the same confusion of precept with counsel are found in the interpretations of similar passages. These facts make necessary the heeding of certain warnings in building up a nonresistant Christianity that neither does justice to Christ's teachings, nor makes intelligible traditional Catholic teaching, nor fully explains the duties of Christian citizenship in contemporary political society and especially in American democracy at war for peace. These warnings, which will be explained, are: I) Counsels must not be confused with precepts; 2) virtues must not be abused and isolated one from another; 3) the freedom and rights of individuals must not be confused with the freedom and rights of the state; 4) utopian idealism must give place to sound realism in moral and political life.

III. INTELLIGENT wARNINGS

Counsels and precepts differ in the extent of their respective obligating power. To observe the counsels is more difficult than to observe the precepts or commandments especially in :regard to external actions/ [1] because counsels are instruments for attaining the higher or contemplative life.[22] The counsels reenforce the commandments and they protect the keeping of

•• *Loc. cit.* [01] *Quaes. Quod.,* IV, a. ad 9. •• *Ibid.,* ad 5.

the precepts.[23] But the counsels do not obligate as many Christians as do the precepts which fall upon all.[24] The keeping of the commandments is essential for salvation while the observance of the counsels is essential only for a higher spirituallife.[25] In regard to counsels it is commanded that the soul be kept in readiness for them,[26] though under certain unusual conditions a counsel of Christ may become a precept for some. Thus resistance with arms to an invading enemy in the home *may* be refrained from by the laity; they may practice the counsel of nonresistance if the safety of no one else is involved. But a cleric must practice nonuse of arms.[26"] A counsel, as opposed to a precept, is an amicable persuasion.[27] A counsel never obligates unless by some circumstance it passes over into the realm of precept.[28] A perpetually celibate life is counselled by Christ; it is not a matter of obligation unless one in the priesthood or with a solemn perpetual vow of chastity should adopt the counsel and make it preceptive.[29] A parallel situation is found in the case of meekness, mercy, gentleness, and other submissive Christian virtues. There are heroic degrees of these virtues which must be practiced by some exceptional. souls called to and obligated to achieve high perfection and union with God by charity. Others, the majority of men, have no such call to an heroically perfect life and no corresponding obligation to live the counsels. There are grades of perfection[30] and the perfection of life consists essentially in precepts and accidentally in counsels.[31] The inequality of the perfection of .charity is :referred to by Aquinas when he says that the perfection of charity on the part of the one loving is threefold: in act, in

[23] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q.]89, a. I, ad *5.*
[24] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 108, a. 4, ad 4.
[25] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 43, a. 7, ad 4.
[26] *De Virt.*, q. 3, a. !'l; *III Cont. Gent.*, 130; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 108, a.3.
[•••] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 40, a. 3.
[27] *Q. D. de Ver.*, q.l7, a. 3, ad 2.
[28] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. l!'l4, a. 3, ad 1; *IV Sent.*, d. XIX, q. !'l, a. 2, quaes. I.
[20] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 108, a. 4, ad I.
[ao] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 3; q.l86, a. !'l.
[31] *De Regimine Principum*, 6.

seeking, in habit. The first is found in the blessed, the second in perfect wayfarers, the third-to which all are bound-is found in those having charity.[32] An unfair procedure not sanctioned by complete Christianity is the bigotry and intolerance of men who crusade for counsels by trying to change them into commandments and to make them obligatory for all. They try to dragoon into a life of heroic perfection persons whom neither nature nor grace has fitted for such a life. Heroic submission, meekness, and gentleness are not binding on all men. Some have neither the ability nor the right to practice them; justice and charity often make aggressiveness and vindication mandatory. Though a preacher should aim at the betterment of all, he must remember that while all are obliged to tend to the perfection of charity, not all are obliged to have it in that heroic degree.[33]

The abuse of virtues and their dislocation are chargeable to many who, innocently or otherwise, insist on drafting Christ into the service of pacifism and in Christian condonation and encouragement of injustice. It is possible to be too generous and turn charity into a vice. It is possible to be too meek and turn abasement into a crime against justice. It is possible to isolate love of enemies from prudence and thus turn charity into a criminal mockery of truth. During the tensions created by war it is imperative that the real nature of virtue be respected and that the consolidation of virtues be maintained. This means that the mediety and rationality of real virtue must be protected against extremes and emotion and that unity must be preserved against dislocation.

Virtue must stand midway between extremes and it must be rational. In moral virtues, like the meekness and gentleness to which special reference is made here, it is essential that a golden mean be held.[34] This is particularly true where the departure from the golden mean is so subtle and gradual that the virtuous subject is unaware of the transition. Many of our

[32] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. a. 8; q. 184, a.
[33] *Ill Sent.*, d. XXIX, a. 8, quaes. S!.
[34] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3; *Ill Sent.*, d. XXIX, q.l, a.l.

hypersympathetic peacemakers would resent the insinuation that sentiment and emotion have made their virtues fictitious and false.[35] They fail to realize that control is necessary to keep virtue within moderation and that fear of ruining a virtue through the development of an erosive vice is necessary.[36] A defective virtue is likely to become, very rapidly, a vice,[37] and constant vigilance must be exercised to keep to the middle course or the formal element of a moral virtue.[38] Not the least of the difficulties of virtuous living is that of preserving from deteriorating, through excess, virtues already acquired.[39] One test that can be used to test the genuineness of a virtue is to see whether it really makes the possessor of the quality good/[0] and whether at the same time it is not defeating other virtues,H but is strengthening genuinely good inclinations of human nature.[42]

The controls which keep virtue from going to extremes are found in the rational and not in the emotional nature of man. Emotion is too unsteady a guide to be entrusted with the direction of virtue and the appetency from which it springs is too unpredictable.[43] Whether a virtuous act be so called because it springs from a virtue or prepares the way for a virtuous habit,[44] it is inextricably involved with cold, ing intelligence in its genesis and in its endurance. Intellect and will must be sovereign if virtue is to remain virtuous. Right choice is paramount/[5] and right reason is basic in virtue.[46] The virtue remains a virtue only so long as it retains its relation with reason.[47] In fact the distinction and classification of the virtues rests 'on the correlation between the faculties

[35] *Summa Theol.*, IT-II, q. 2:3, a. l; a. 7, ad 2:.
[36] *Ibid.*, q. 123, a. 4, ad 2:.
[37] *Ibid.*, q. 107, a. 2:.
[88] *IV Sent.*, d. XV, q. 1, a. 1, quaes. 1.
[39] *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 13, ad 1; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 63, a. 4.
[•o] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 4; *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 2:.
[41] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2:3, a. 7.
[45] *IV Se:nt.*, d. XIV, q. 1, a. 1, quaes. 2.
[46] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 149, a. 2:.
[47] *11 Sent.*, d. XXVII, a. 2:, ad L
'"Ibid., q. 108, a. 2:.
'"Ibid., I-H, q. *59*, a. I.
•• // Sent., d. XLIV, q. 2:, a. 16.

of the soul and reason/ [8] and reason becomes the taproot of all the virtues. [49] Apostasy from reason is incompatible with virtuous living, [50] and volition and election radicated in intelligence are supreme. [51] The very definitions of a moral virtue indicate these facts: " A moral virtue is only a certain participation of right reason in the appetite," [52] and " A moral virtue is a certain disposition or form sealed and impressed on the appetite by reason." [53] Control by cool reason is particularly necessary during the stress of war if virtues are to remain such. " The seal of reason on the lower powers formally perfects the moral virtues," [54] and " The habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers in that they are moved by reason." [55]

While intelligence must exercise power in the control of virtue, [56] special phases of rational life have priority in preserving the golden mean. " The end of any moral virtue is the attainment in its proper material of a mean determined according to the right reason of prudence." [57] Prudence is the wellspring of intelligence in which all the moral virtues share. [58] Discretion likewise is necessary to prevent sensile emotion from taking charge of and degrading a virtue. Discretion belongs to prudence; it is the cause, guardian, and moderator of the virtues. [59]

The degradation of virtues, especially of the gentle virtues, is affected not only by apostasy from reason but also by dislocation and amputation. The virtues, moral and intellectual, are interlocked. The psychological unity of human personality, with a variety of faculties resident in the one soul indicates this fact. This consolidation of the virtues is discovered in more objective analysis. The object of one virtue frequently becomes the terminal of another, [60] and frequently one virtue will ema-

•• *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 60, a. 5.
•• *De Virt.,* q. 1, a. 4, ad 3.
[60] *S1tmma Theol.,* II-II, q. 47, a.1.
[51] *II Sent.,* d. XXIV, q. 3, a. :2, ad 3.
•• *De Virt.,* q. 1, a. 12, ad 16.
•• *Ibid.,* a. 9.
•• *Q. D. de Ve1·.,* q. :24, a. 4, ad 8.
[66] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 51, a. 2.
•• *Ibid.,* II-U, q. 47, a. 6.
[57] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3.
[68] *Ill Sent.,* d. XXVI, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3.
•• *Ill Sent.,* d. XXIII, q. 2, a. 5.
[60] *ln 1 Tim.,* lect. 2.

nate from another either as a cause or a predisposition. [61] This means, concretely, that real mercy is displaced by the vice of softness unless justice and prudence are in controL It means too that patriotism is affected by religion and that love of country may disintegrate into jingoistic hatred unless charity is operative. It means also that prudence is likely to be debilitated into cunning under pressure of lust and greed. The moral virtues are so connected that they must stand or fall together. [62] This interlocking of the virtues is disclosed further by the fact that often one virtue will regulate many grades of emotion, [63] and that many forms of vice may ensue upon the collapse of one virtue. [64] There is an arresting fact, however, from the viewpoint of the solidarity and subsidiarism of the virtues. Despite inequalities of virtues in the same person, [65] they march to progressive perfection or dissolution together. All the virtues in the same person are equal by proportion because they have equal increase. [66] Neither the virtues of war nor the moral qualities of peace are safe when isolated from supporting virtues and they are slaves of vicious sentiment when they desert reason.

Public leaders looking toward the peace chamber must keep in the differences between the rights and duties of an individual as such and the rights and duties of a nation responsible for the protection of its people and responsible for orderly relations with other single units in the family of nations. It is conceivable that while an individual may have the right, and in some cases the duty, to practice heroically the virtues of the counsels where he alone is concerned with the consequences, a nation would have no such right either in regard to its own people or other nations. Surrender of the right of punishing criminals and abdication of the duty of punishing gangster nations might violate both distributive justice and commutative justice. Such right the state does not possess, and yet

[61] *11 Sent.,* d. XLIV, q. S, a. I, ad 6.
[62] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 65, a.l; *De Virt.,* q. 5, a. S, 3.
[63] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 60, a. 4.
[64] *Ibid.,* II-II, q. 9£, a. l.
[65] *De Virt., q:5,* a. 3.
[66] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 66, a. 1, ad l.

overkind persons will bring American Beauty roses to criminals in the death cell and are deeply worried that the war will produce, in our people, harsh feelings toward the Nazis, Fascists, and Japanese. Such mollifiers are dangerous diplomats to have at a peace table where fear of punishment may be the only sanction available for creating submission to international law. One set of virtues may come to the foreground when a man is acting as an independent individual, another set must be stressed when he is meeting the responsibilities of parental authority, and still another set of virtues assumes importance when he is acting in the capacity of a citizen.[67] In a parallel way public authority may have to vary the virtues in relation to the events with which it must deal. Turning the other cheek after an assault may be optional, as a counsel, to the average lay person. It would be forbidden to public authority where such submission would damage the commonweal of its own people and of society at large.[68] In this light one can understand the statement of St. Thomas: "A prince should rule his subjects with mercy, his captives with rigid justice."[69] Political authority is obligated to a new set of virtues on the assumption of o:ffice/[0] and among these is the obligation of coercing to sound citizenship those who are inclined to crime.[71]

A fourth danger to complete international thinking against which warning must be issued is that of overoptimistic idealism. Kindly and gentle persons are likely to believe that all others are like themselves. Their virtues are so Pollyannish and utopian that they become a vicious menace to public weal. They have urgent need of a realistic point of view which commands a vision of real facts, means, ends, and circumstances. Individuals and nations have tendencies to crime as well as to virtue. Not all individuals and not all nations can be won by love; many can be controlled by fear of reprisal. Christian nations must be astute in dealing with governments that are conducted on standards of pagan trickery and force. It is real-

[67] *De Virt.,* q. 1, a. 10; *Q. D. de Malo.,* q. 4, a. 1.
[68] *In Matt.,* vi.
[69] *In Ps.,* ii, n:xii.
[70] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 47, a. n, ad 1.
[71] *In Rom.,* v, lect. 6.

ism to recognize that Christian virtues are under a handicap when in competition with qualities adopted by pagans as virtuous strength and repudiated by the followers of Christ as vicious weakness. One of the reasons for the tardiness of the coming supremacy of the United Nations is that their diplomats have been dealing with low pagan power politics from the level of Christian idealistic presumptions, and have failed to see many traps into which they have been lured. These Christian diplomats have failed to realize, until too late, that trust can be carried too far, that justified suspicion can be a virtue, [72] and that doubt is not always rash .and vicious. Appeasement, mercy, generosity, meekness are poor weapons for Christian nations to use when dealing with demoniac power governments that have only contempt for them. To the foreground, now and at the peace table, must come a galaxy of sturdy and tough Christian virtues. An understanding of some of them, in the thought of Aquinas, is timely, because these forms of honorable and virtuous hardness are repudiated with disdain by the satin-hearted borderline cowards of this day. Vindictive justice, just anger, righteous indignation, and virtuous disdain ought to be restored to an honorable place in American attitudes. In order to forestall an obvious objection, it should be noted here that, not superior sanctity, but :rather the integrity of right reason, is :required for the just judgment which is essential to righteous punishment. [73]

IV. THE MILITANT VIRTUES

Vindictive justice brackets together a corps of firm and tough-souled qualities and unites them with charity. Justice, in a way, spreads itself over all the moral virtues, [74] but in its stricter sense it looks to the payment of debts, [75] and vindication is one of its subjective parts. [75]. Vindictive justice has respect to an offense that has been committed, which has upset rational order

[72] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 60, a. 3.
[73] *Ibid.,* q. 23, a. *5.*
[74] *Ibid.,* q. 58, a. 6.
[75] *Ibid.,* a.II.
••• *Ill Sent.,* d. XXXIII, q. 3, a. 4, quaes. 1.

and for which reason and order demand reparation. [76] In no other disorder is apostasy from reason so far-reaching and vicious as in that caused by violations of justice. [77] The cunning of smart men and the power of the mighty are weapons with which the structure of orderly justice is wrecked. [78] In its eternal perspective this sabotaged justice is adjusted by God in the endless punishments of the next world. [79] The truth and the goodness of the Deity demand the restoration of order through the vindications of justice. [80] Here on earth wise, just, and beneficent government is disclosed by the concern of earthly rulers for order established and protected by the vindication of justice. [81]

The ordinary implement of vindictive justice is punishment, either medicinal or obliterating. [82] Punishments should have in mind both the restoration of the just order disrupted by sin and the correction of the sinner. [83] Medicinal punishment with this double intention should be distasteful to the culprit: it is of the nature of punishment to be against the will. [84] Given this condition, the action of the just punitive agent is good even though the culprit be indignant. [85] This principle might be kept in mind at the peace table by the delegates of the victorious United Nations in their negotiations. They will be there, not to barter, but to pass just and punitive sentence on the guilty instigators of total war. The vindication of justice and the future and peaceful health of society demand distasteful medicine [86] for the Axis governments and even for the civilian populations who have made them possible. Satisfaction must be demanded in the name of charity, justice, and order, which have been violated and which must be restored. [87] Correction is a function of charity, [88] and in its coactive phase it IS an

•• *IV Sent.,* d. XV, q. l, a. 1, quaes. 2.
•• *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. *55,* a. 8.
[78] *In Job,* vii, lect. I.
•• *IV Sent.,* d. XLVI, q.l, a.l, quaes. 2.
[80] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. Ql, a. *Q.*
[81] *Ibid.,* a. I.
•• *De Anima,* a. Ql, ad *Q0.*
[83] *111 Cont. Gent.,* 144.
•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 64, a. 3.
•• *Q. D. de Malo,* q. 1, a. 4, ad 9.
Theol., I-II, q. 87, a. 7.
•• *IV Sent.,* d. XV, q. 1, a. 1, quaes. I.
""*IV Sent.,* d. XIX, q. 5!, a. I.

inescapable duty of justice,[89] all the more difficult when the culprit is proud and stubborn.[90] In such a situation severity, another virtue, will reenforce the demands of vindictive justice. Severity will give that firmness which sentimental sympathy might abdicate but which :right reason demands.[91]

The desire for vindication, in itself, is a natural urge of human nature. It is more natural to demand reparation for injuries done us than not to demand such atonement.[92] Vindication, therefore, strengthening a natural impulse, becomes a special virtue,[93] and is reenforced by the noble virtues of courage, just anger, and charity.[94] Vindication remains a virtue as long as it keeps the golden mean between cruelty and savagery, at the one extreme, and unjust pardon at the other.[95] It remains a necessary virtue when :reparation is demanded not merely for the purpose of inflicting evil on culprits but to reform them, to restrain their lawless impulses and to guarantee the peace of others.[96] Such vindication to be effective and rational will deprive culprits, individual and national, of those values which they prize most highly.[97] Vindication is a quality that cannot be scrapped in international relations or in national autonomy. The tendency to go soft on this phase of justice is too widespread even though it is explicable. In the religious field, the neglect or denial of eternal punishment on sentimental grounds has created a habit of mind that asserts itself in sentimental softness everywhere. In the ethical and juridical field, the eradication of objective norms of right and wrong and the annihilation of responsibility and culpability have anathematized vindictive justice and punishment. It is to be hoped that the contagion will be arrested by war and that at the peace conference vindictive justice will be restored to its honorable place in the hierarchy of fine moral qualities.

Two virtues that may be coupled and which need emphasis in

[89] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 33, a. 1.
[90] *IV Sent.,* d. XIX, q. !<!,a. 3, quaes. 3.
[91] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad I.
[92] *Ibid.,* q. 157, a. 2, ad 2.
[93] *Ibid.,* q. 108, a. 2.
[94] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 105, a. 2.
[95] *Ibid.,* II-II, q. 108, a. 2, ad 3.
[96] *Ibid.,* a. 1; *Q. D. de Malo,* q. 12, a. 1.
[97] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 108, a. 3.

any attempt to strengthen rational living are just anger and righteous indignation. These sturdy qualities have lost caste under the deluge of sentimentalism engulfing us today. One kind of anger must be suppressed; it is vicious anger that has escaped the control of reason [98] and which results in reprehensible hatred. [99] To this kind of anger is opposed the virtue of meekness. [100] There is another kind of anger which is honorable, anger inspired by zeal *(ira per zelum)* ,[101] and which counteracts the vice of cowardly and unjust pardon. [102] It is this just anger, with which righteous indignation is associated, which needs exaltation and defense today.

Just anger is correlative with vindictive justice [103] and an angry deed has a·threefold relation. Directly and essentially it seeks redress; antecedently it is a manifestation of grief; consequently it involves delight over the punishment merited and in:fl.icted:[104] In all of these relations anger remains just if it remains under the control of reason. [105] Reason is usually operative at least in making known the injury that should be avenged, though frequently reason loses control when vindication is begun. [106] One reason for this is that the physical reverberations of anger often impair the correct use of reason. [107] It is interesting to recall some of the explanations of the interplay of anger with other emotions and virtues given by St. Thomas. These reflections are important in view of the contemporary eclipse of just anger today.

Three important elements or causes of just anger are sadness, daring, and hope. [108] This is why just anger is not usually manifested toward persons in dominating position; [109] one or more of those elements is missing. Grief may be present but

•• *Q. D. de Malo,* q. H, a. I.
•• *Ibid.,* q. 10, a. 3, ad 3.
[100] *In Ps.* xxxvi.
[101] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 158, a. l.
[102] *Ibid.,* a. 8; *Q. D. de Malo,* q. 12, a. *5,* ad 3.
[103] *III Sent.,* d. XV, q. 2, a. 2.
[104] *Q. D. de Malo,* q. 8, a. 3, ad 7.
[105] *Ibid.,* q.l2, a.l, ad 2.
[106] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 46, a. 4, ad 3.
[107] *Ibid.,* q. 48, a. 3, ad I.
[108] *Q. D. de Malo,* q. 12, a. 3, ad 10.
[109] *Q. D. de Ver.,* q. 26, a. *5,* ad 3.

the hope and the courage to render punishment are absenL [110] These elements of anger also account for the fact that the perfidy of false friends arouses very deep anger; [111] the Japanese should be kept informed about this. They might also be made aware of the fact that anger does not cause but rather follows the destruction of love. [112] If anger be kept alive by the vivid memory of the injury done, [113] then our enemies should be deeply detested and our people must be confronted constantly with the slogan, " Remember Pearl Harbor." There are some to whom anger under any guise or under any control is undignified. For this reason it must be kept in mind that while just anger desires to inflict evil on another it operates in the name of vindictive justice. [114] Hatred, on the other hand, wishes evil for the sake of evil, and envy wishes evil for the sake of one's own glory. [115] Anger is not found in those who have low-grade intelligence and poor memories, and who are therefore slow to realize, to anticipate, or to remember injuries. [116] What has been said about just anger controlled by reason applies also to righteous indignation which is one of the phases or *filiae* of anger. [117]

Another virtue which needs rehabilitation in national and international relations is virtuous disdain and hatred of crime, even though one is compelled to cherish a degree of charity for criminals themselves. The contemporary tendency is to declare truce with crime or to condone it because of sympathy for or admiration of the wicked. There is a tendency to gloss over the intrinsic viciousness of atheistic communism because of admiration of the successful winter defense of their country put up by the citizens of Russia. There is a tendency to forget the perfidious treason of the Japanese in the admiration of their successful bombings and invasions. There is a tendency among some to condone the ruthless injustice of the Nazis because of respect for their military might. There is too little openly

[110] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 9?5, a. 3.
[111] *Ibid.,* q. 47, a. 4, ad 3.
[112] *III Sent.,* **d.** XXVII, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4.
[113] *Ibid.,* d. XXVI, q. 1, **a.** 2.
[114] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2.
[115] *Ibid.,* **q. 46,** a. 6.
[116] *Ibid.,* q. 23, a. 3.
[117] *Ibid.,* II-II, q. 41, a. 2.

expressed contempt of injustice, lies, arrogant pride, and other vicious sins. No just anger can be aroused for the prosecution of a successful war unless there burn in the hearts of the United Nations a love of human rights and a contempt of the crimes which have violated them. No permanent order can be established where the United Nations cherish a secret love for the vices which have made the Axis powers temporarily successful. The American people have been noble in basing their patriotism on the love of their own nation and its freedoms rather than on the hatred of other governments and their peoples. The Axis powers are less fortunate in selecting class, race, and national hatreds as the motives for love of country. But America will lose none of its nobility, and will conserve its dignity in promoting among our people a hatred of current international vices. Such hatred of vice is not incompatible with the love of enemies demanded by Christian living.

Hatred is a repugnance of the will to something that has been apprehended as unbecoming. [118] As a person *(quoad naturam)* an enemy may not be hated but the defect in him which is sin must be hated. [119] Everything like sin interfering with genuine happiness should be detested, whether it exists in friend or enemy. [120] Even God hates sinners in the sense that He withholds eternal happiness from them. [121] Even saintly people may wish evil to those whom they love in charity, for their correction, for the common good, and for the justice of God. [122] Sinners may be loved only because of their humanity and in spite of their crimes which one must hate. [123] The evil, the sin, or the crime in friend or foe may not be loved. [124]

Incidental perhaps to the logic of this situation but not irrelevant is the hatred of Americans evidenced especially by the Japanese. Recent writers, after years of observation, trace this hatred to long years of jingoistic Japanese effort to trade on Oriental " face." Natural envy of our nobility and success

[118] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 29, a. 1.
[119] *Ibid.,* II-II, q. a. 6.
[120] *Ibid.,* q. 9W, a. 7, ad 1.
[121] *Ibid.,* I, q. a. 2, ad 4.
[122] *De Virt.,* q. a. 8, ad 10.
[123] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. a. 6.
[124] *Ibid.,* a. 8, ad 3.

as a nation has been lashed into a fmy. Aquinas thought that hatred differs from anger in that hatred desires infinite punishment,[125] that it is more universal,[126] that it is more insane and more permanent,[127] and that it is less merciful.[128] The Japanese, along with the Nazis, had and still have delusions of grandeur which respected justice nowhere and based right on might. We of Western and Christian civilization could not recognize them in the importance they thought they were fated to enjoy. They became more angry whether we ignored them or whether we thwarted them. Forgetfulness and opposition to another's will provoke wrath in so far as they are signs of contempt.[129] Anger grew into hatred[130] which was what the jingoistic party in Japan desired. Their hatred is not necessarily, as some of the softer Americans would have us believe, an indication of basic faults in our own nation. Vicious men usually hate the saints because of dissimilarity, because of envy, and because they dislike the rebuke which living virtue always offers to vicious men.[131] Even God is hated not because of Himself but because some of the effects of His government are not acceptable to some individuals and nations.[132] VVhile American democracy is neither saintly nor divine, it has enough superior qualities to make the totalitarian Axis powers feel inferior. It must be emphasized that American purity of intention and nobility will depend in no small degree on its ability to hate the vices against the consequences of which in the Axis powers it is warring.

V. MILITANT *AND* GENTILITARIAN VICES

Other rugged virtues essential to the sovereignty of justice, truth, and charity might be introduced and analyzed from the works of the Angelic Doctor. But further elaboration of these rugged and rational qualities is not necessary since his attitudes

[125] *Ibid.,* I-ll, q. 46, a. 6.
[126] *Q. D. dB Malo,* q. 12, a. 4, ad 3.
[127] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 46, a. 6, ad 3.
[128] *Ibid.,* ad I.
[129] *Ibid.,* q. 47, a. 2, ad 3.
[130] *Ibid.,* q. 46, a. 3, ad 3.
[131] *In Joann.,* xv, lect. 4.
[132] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 13, a. 4; I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 5.

toward vindictive justice, just anger, righteous indignation, and virtuous contempt of crime are typical. It is advisable, however, to present in rapid survey some observations about a few detestable vices which soft Christians have begun to look upon as desirable qualities of civilized persons. These counterfeit virtues can be bracketed by way of introduction with vices that are genuinely degrading. Most of these have been referred to in the course of this presentation.

One must not conclude, because of St. Thomas' insistence on justice, that he can be drafted as a protagonist of savagery, cruelty, or unreasonable anger. He decries as sinful cruelty or excessive punishment of the guilty, and says that savagery is bestial.[133] But the inflexibility demanded by right reason in the infliction of punishment is a virtue called severity [134] which is a part of legal justice.[135] The gentle virtues of clemency and meekness do not restrict severity .[136] They prevent despicable cruelty, savagery, and ferocity,[137] and eradicate sinful anger/[88] Clemency is gentleness of a superior to an inferior reasonably moderating the external act of punishment, while meekness controls the passion of anger from which punitive action proceeds.[139] Ferocity is reprehensible; it is not mollified by gifts; it does not bend before mercy; it refuses mercy even to sucklings, and does not spare the young and defenseless.[140] Mercilessness withdraws benefits and is not a stranger to cruelty or excessive punishment.[141] Inhumanity is cold hard-heartedness to the suffering, and stubborn refusal to help. It is a pet vice of the avaricious.[142] Complete Christian living demands that these bestial qualities of ferocity, cruelty, savagery, mercilessness, and sinful anger be neutralized by the virtues of clemency, mildness, and mercy. But complete Christian living demands also that these gentle virtues be kept from going to extremes of mildness by truth, justice, vindication, and severity.

[1]··· *Ibid.,* II-II, q. 157, a. 1,
,•• *Ibid.,* a. 2, ad 1; q. 159, a. 2, ad 2.
[185] *Ibid.,* q. 157, a. 1, ad 2.
uo *III Sent.,* d. XXVI, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4.
[187] *Summa Theol.,* q. 157, a. l, ad 3.
[138] *Ibid.,* q. 158, a. 8.
[139] *Ibid.,* q. 157, a. l.
[140] *In Is.,* xiii.
[141] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 159, a. l, ad 2.
[142] *Ibid.,* q. 118, a. 8.

An example of this latter correlation is given by Aquinas when he says that vindictiveness is a mean between the vices of cruelity and remissness in punishment, one vice an excess and the other a defect.[143] Again in analyzing meekness he shows that it stands midway between anger which is just and anger which is unreasonable.[144] Also, excess in inflicting punishment is injustice, the savagery of soul that inspires such excess is cruelty;[145] ordinate infliction of punishment is virtuous vindictiveness, and failure to impose just punishment introduces the vices of injustice, criminal pardon, and others.[146]

It is evident that viciousness can be incurred both by an excess of gentleness and by the defect of it. This excessive gentleness takes many forms and is thrown into opposition to several virtues. One of the commonest forms of contemporary overgentleness is *mollities*, sometimes called softness and effeminacy. With it is closely associated delicacy, a kindred vice.a[7] Softness and delicacy are vices opposed to perseverance, and they emerge either from natural disposition or from custom.[148] This flabbiness of spirit recoils from sustained effort because of the lack of pleasure.[149] A" softy" refrains from doing even good and necessary works because of difficulties he cannot endure.[150] The fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure. A" softy" is so accustomed to enjoy pleasures that it is difficult for him to endure the lack of them. The " softy " avoids vindictive punishment and other unpleasant duties because they are toilsome and unenjoyable. Softness is not only opposed to perseverance/[51] but it is also a species of luxury and is often a consequence of carnal delectation that softens the spirit and destroys manliness.[152] It is opposed to perseverance because this virtue urges one to sustained laborious work.[153] There may be a close connection in the United States between the increase of softness and the decrease of pioneer regard for

" [3] *Ibid.,* q. 108, ad 8.
''' *11 Sent.,* d. XLIV, q. a. 1, ad 8.
[140] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 159, a. 1, ad 1.
[14"] *Ibid.,* q. 108, a. 2, ad 2.
" [1] *Ibid.,* q. 188, a. 1,
"" *Ibid.,* a. 1.
"" *Ibid.,* ad 2.
[150] *Ibid.,* ad 1.
[151] *Loc. cit.*
'"'*Ibid.,* q. 154, a. 11.
[103] *Ibid.,* q. 187, a. 1.

rigid control in matters of food, drink, and sex, all superinduced by the widespread collapse of religion.

The overgentleness of so many of our citizens and of their religious leaders cannot be divorced from a defect of courage. Courage· is firmness or toughness of spirit, especially in the face of danger/ [54] It seeks to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following reason/ [55] and stands midway between fear and daring. [156] While the virtue of courage is spiritual, it is advanced in war time by several other conditions like health, strength, an abundance of food, determination of spirit, and experience in war. [157] Real meekness and humility are the results of the same courage [158] which in just circumstances produces endurance of hardships and vigorous action against difficulties. [159] This courage shows itself in a disregard for the danger of death in war/ [60] and thus connects with justice. [161] The courageous man is not rash, because he knows when, where, and of what he ought to be reasonably fearful. [162] He knows how to call moderate and virtuous anger into the service of courage. [163] It ought to be a consolation to our men in the service that they have St. Thomas Aquinas on their side in their indignant determination to avenge the atrocities of the Axis powers despite the dangers entailed. Their tough and rational courage will probably inspire some of our soft civilians to desert their fears, [164] to shake off their despair of winning this war/ [65] and to quit dodging the difficulties of war and the benefits of peace that will follow. [166] The nonresistance, the overgentleness, the sentimental appeasement, the emotional dread of even rational disdain are too often the manifestations of a timidity that is more wicked than the wickedness of war. [167]

With the vices of softness, delicacy, and timidity, contemporary " gentilitarians " try to glorify into virtues the vices of

[154] *Ibid.,* q. H!3, a. 2.
[155] *Ibid.,* a. 3.
[156] *Ibid.,* a. 2.
[157] *In Is.,* iii.
[158] *Q. D. de Ver.,* q. l, a. 12, ad \!6.
[159] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. l\!3, a. 3.
[160] *Ibid.,* a. 5.
[161] *Ill Sent.,* d. IX, q. l, quaes. 1.
[160] *De Virt.,* q. I, a.l3, ad 5.
[163] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 123, a. 10.
[164] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 41, a. 4.
[106] *Ibid.,* q. 25, a. 3.
[166] *In Rom.,* viii, lect. 3.
[167] *Summa Theol.,* H-H, q. 142, a. 2.

insensibility and unjust pardon. Insensibility is a dullness and inanition which, against the dictates of reason, neglects necessary things of life.[168] Unjust pardon *(remissio)*, another attempted escape from :reason and from the arduous and unpleasant, is the assassin of vindictive justice.[169] The insensible person is so blase and impervious to pleasure that he cannot be decoyed into the fulfillment of ordinary duty by the allurement of the pleasure which God and nature hold out. Struggle for justice gives no pleasure. Anticipation of victory gives no pleasure. Nothing gives pleasure. Nothing is done. Only blind and dull submission to the " wave of the future " is possible. The unjust ·pardoner will forgive anything, whether justice, truth, and charity allow it or not. It is, at least for the present, the easiest way out of personal inconvenience. These counterfeit virtues are really vices in disguise, and all the popularity they enjoy among partial Christians cannot condone the damage they have done both to Christianity and to social order in the United States. There can be no real social order where there is apostasy from right and sound reason. These species of "gentilita:rianism" enslave reason.

VI. DouBLE STANDARD DIFFICULTIES

Other 'problems of procedure with our enemies have emerged out of the war, and will need to be decided before peace negotiations are begun. They might be named the problems of the double standards. They are represented in the patent conflict between the ethical standards for international relations articulated by Pope Pius XII-akin to the aims of real democracies- and the standards preached and practiced by totalitarian ideologies of the Axis powers. These problems are ultimately reducible to the fact that real democracy is theistic and totalitarianism is godless. The liberties of American democracy have an affinity with the basic teachings of Christianity; the tenets of totalitarianism are pagan. The peace program of the Pope is based on love, trust, God-given rights, wide ownership,

[168] *Ibid.;* a. 1.

[169] *Ibid.,* q. 159, a. !i!, ad 3.

and sacrifice. The objectives of the totalitarian powers are wrapped in hatred, suspicion, state worship, state ownership, and selfishness. Standards of life and conduct are so diametrically opposed that the problems of double standard are tremendous. There will be little hope, after the victory of the United Nations, of winning the Axis governments over to democratic and Christian standards. The United Nations will have to destroy these governments and deal with the representatives of the people in whom there is left some regard for the worth of individual persons and some respect for the rights of God. On the part of the representatives of the United Nations this will call for a principled severity that must not be vitiated by "gentilitarianism." Otherwise there can be no sanctions sufficiently respected to guarantee the observance of natural and international law. Furthermore, Christian gentility will always be looked upon by pagan diplomats and military men as weakness. They will appreciate and respect only the sterner and more rugged virtues sanctioned by Christianity. Christian principles of kindness in competition with power politics have usually suffered at least temporary defeat, just as sincerely Christian business men often take a beating when they are in competition with unprincipled and godless business rivals. At the peace table, the severity of justice will make reasonable the memory that our enemies have declared total war, with all their resources and against all of ours. Civilian population of the Axis seem to have been drafted, more or less willingly, to such a totalitarian conflict. Civilian populations of Poland, Holland, Russia, and other conquered countries know that they have been decimated like front-line combatants. Savage reprisals on Axis civilians are forms of cruelty to be eschewed. But medicinal punishment for them will be necessary to convince them that there are laws for nations that are sacred and that totalitarian governments can never again be permitted to exist by the consent, explicit or implicit, of the people. Christian charity, justice, truth, and the continued peace of the world demands severity with peoples as well as with the Nazis, the Fascists, and the Japanese leaders.

VII. CONCLUSION

The sentimental protest of partial Christianity against the virile virtues is repugnant to the teachings of the Angelic Doctor. Thomas Aquinas with his cosmic philosophy of reality and with his complete synthesis of revealed and philosophical truth is most likely to be right. His realism supports his idealism and his practicality neglects no phase of life. His continued value to public life rests on his refusal to desert reason and intelligence. His loyalty to the intelligence of man and the Omniscience of God will be bulwark of protection against totalitarianism, latitudinarianism, and "gentilitarianism."

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THE CHARACTERS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC

CLASSICAL logic involves a doctrine as well as a technique. Both are intimately associated because the processes of thought organize themselves ultimately on the strength of their correspondence with the deeper fabric of reality. To be sure, the mind can well go beyond the presentations of consciousness, and build logical patterns of its own which may or may not have a counterpart in new experiences. Yet, the fact remains that, in the last resort, the potential must be justified in terms of the actual, and this may be considered as the basic motivation of the Aristotelian logic. On the other hand, modern logic, as expounded by scientific positivism especially, endeavors to explain the real in terms of the possible. From this angle, which stresses exclusively the formal aspect of science, it is natural that Aristotle's logic should appear as a restricted portion of the vast field which is now known as mathematical logic; and the more so, as it is casually maintained that Aristotle built his logic with his biological and linguistic intuitions at the expense of any mathematical inspiration.

These considerations, however, have value only as consequences of the nominalistic principles which have been arbitrarily monopolizing the evaluation of modern logic. A truer alternative is offered by a combined interpretation of Aristotle's logical technique and ontological doctrine. Hence, the purpose of this essay is to show the real characters of the Aristotelian logic, to emphasize the mathematical aspect of its general background, and to estimate its importance with regard to the recent developments of the science of thought.

I. THE ORIGIN oF LoGIC

The idea of necessity, which Plato tried unsuccessfully to impose in his own way on the universe of being, was rediscovered by Aristotle in the concrete world and in the realm of thought separately. In endeavoring to systematize the conditions of this parallelism between being and thought, which the Eleatics had already noticed, Aristotle opened the way to the establishment of logic as a science. In this respect, he well deserves the compliment he paid himself for having created a new science, when he said, without disparagement of others, that the subjects treated in the *Topics* had never before received any scientific discussion. [1]

One can hardly say that a ready-made of logic came out of Aristotle's mind, as many elements of his system are found in earlier writers. But it is also unfair to consider Aristotle as a mere compiler or systematizer of what had been worked out before in this :field? In fact, no complete logical system is to be found in any of his predecessors, although their discussions about mathematics and language have distinct logical implications and prove that they were actively interested in the formal problem of the structure of deductive science.

Plato was aware, of course, of the postulational character of mathematics, which he could not call real knowledge so long as its assumptions were left unexamined. [8] But, though he considered the possibility and the necessity of a higher and more rigorous science, he was able only to describe the aims of dialectic, without establishing it as an independent science. Thinking and reasoning correctly are so natural to the mind, that it seemed scarcely necessary to exteriorize into cold rules the behavior of what we all enjoy as a natural gift. Hence Plato went no further than proposing the gradual mathematization of knowledge as the ultimate practical rule for the rationalization of things [4] and of our knowledge of reality.

' *Sophistic:al Refutations,* 183b 34

• Cf. Enriques, *The Historic Development of Logic,* p. 4.

• *Republic,* VII, 533 C.

• The reduction of pure mathematics to absolute deduction remained but an

It is true, however, that Plato gave in his writings important hints of the later logic, but there is no justification in supplying a science of pure thought by inferences from his own methods, or by a combination of his incidental logical references. As Zeller says, " though we cannot but recognize in Plato essential elements of the Aristotelian logic, it would be a mistake to force these out of their original connection in order to construct from them a Platonic logic on a later model." [5]

Aristotle succeeded where Plato had failed. The supreme science which the dialectic could not establish took shape in the Aristotelian *analytics.* This theory of reasoning was developed in the work forming the *Organon,* which dominated Western thought for more than two thousand years, although its influence on Aristotle's successors was less exclusive than is commonly believed. In its spirit and presentation, it was an entirely new science. Indeed, the Stagirite alone was responsible for the ultimate systematization of the momentous implications of the critical work of the mathematicians and philosophers about the nature and structure of mathematics and language. Moreover, as a result of his own reflections about biology, he integrated into that formal systematization some of the structural characteristics and fundamental implications of that science. These multiple elements of the *Organon* can be shown by developing the implications of the scientific aspects of Aristotelianism.

It is obvious that of all the sciences known at that time mathematics alone could show a sufficient degree of abstraction, accuracy, and systematization, and produce a system of relationships carrying necessity with them. Because of these characteristics of mathematics, the Pythagoreans and the Platonists had already used it extensively in the development of their doctrines. The rational necessity of mathematics became more prominent after the days of Hippocrates, when treatises began to be written on its *elements,* and when certain theories like the

aspiration in Plato's philosophy. After two thousand years, the same ideal has been adopted and worked out more technically, though without a final conclusion, by the founders of mathematical logic.

[5] *Plato and the Older Academy* (Eng. trans. 1876), p. SIO.

irrationals were made the object of a profound critical elaboration by various thinkers. As a member of the Academy, Aristotle must have been impressed from the first by the formal perfection of mathematics.

There is an interesting passage in the *PosteriM Analytics* which indicates that mathematics was considered, until then, as the practical organon of the thinking mind. Discussing the difference between fact and reasoned fact, Aristotle says: "It is the business of the empirical observers to know the fact, of the mathematicians to know the reasoned fact; for the latter are in possession of the demonstrations giving the causes, and are often ignorant of the fact, just as we have often a clear insight into a universal, but through lack of observation are ignorant of some of its particular instances. These connections have a perceptible existence though they are manifestations of form. For the mathematical sciences concern forms; they do not demonstrate properties of a substratum since, even though the geometrical subjects are predicable as properties of a perceptible substratum, it is not as thus predicable that the mathematician demonstrates properties of them." [6]

The mathematical inspiration of the *Organon* is noticeable in some of its terminology. In the *Prior Analytics*, Aristotle uses the words *crxi}p,a* (scheme, pattern) for the figure of a syllogism, *8ufcrTYJP,a* (distance) for the proposition, and *opo<;* (boundary) for the term. It is not unlikely that he represented geometrically each figure of the syllogism, by using lines for propositions and points for terms. We are reminded further by Ross, that " the terminology is borrowed not from geometry in general, but from the theory of proportion. Not only *crxi}p,a, 8tcLCT'T'Y'JfJ-a,opo<;,* but also *aKpOV* and *f.J-ECTOV* were technical terms in this theory." [7] It may be suggested even that Aristotle thought of the premises in the different figures somewhat on the very general analogy of the various proportions.

For Aristotle, however, the compelling force of a mathematical argument had to be sought beyond its structural

• *Posterior Analytics,* 79[4] !'l-10.

[7] Ross, *Aristotle,* p. 33.

presentation. Relations alone could not justify the necessity of a conclusion; for they are accidents by themselves and indifferent as such to a determined result. This necessity had to be rooted in something more fundamental and substantial than relations, namely, in their very terms and ultimately in the objects of the external world which account for them.

Recognition of this basic importance of terms is implied in the reasons given by Aristotle for the logical excellence of mathematics over dialectic. A mathematical argument is rarely weakened by formal fallacies, because its middle term can be seen, so to speak, with an "intellectual vision," while in dialectic the ambiguity may escape detection; it is more usually in the middle term of an argument that the ambiguity lies, since the major is predicated of the whole of the middle, and the middle of the whole of the minor.[8] Moreover, mathematics takes definitions, but never accidents, for its premises; such is not always the case with dialectic.[9]

Hence, we have to turn to the Aristotelian theory of the universal for an explanation of the necessity which characterizes formal arguments. We have seen that Plato and Aristotle recognized the scientific value of the concept. But of course, their metaphysical standpoints are different; whereas Plato justifies the universals through their participation in the world of ideas as the only realities, Aristotle places their real foundation in the concrete world. The Aristotelian universal is found materially in the individual objects of experience, but it exists formally in the mind. Yet, its essence and properties do not result from any operation of the mind, but from the very reality of the particulars in which it is buried. As we have seen, it was the analysis of concrete things which brought to light the relative necessity of the characters of the universal, and which stressed the logical importance of the notions of species and genus embodying the universal.

Moreover, the necessity which connotes the essence of universals, conditions the processes of the mind as well as the

[8] *Posterior Analytics,* 77b 27-33. [9] *Ibid.,* 78• 10.

ultimate laws of thought.[10] Thus, judgments are really explications of the analysis of universals. They are not arbitrary constructions of the mind; but they are justified ultimately by the factual relations of the essential characters of the individuals embodying the universals under consideration. On the other hand, the principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, express the relations which result from the confrontation of being with itself. As they emerge immediately from the contemplation of being as such, they are perceived by an intellectual intuition which is immediate in its operations and results.

The necessity which is involved in the universals and in the laws of thought, is enshrined in the fundamental forms of language, which is the only means of communicating knowledge. All the sciences, whether theoretical, practical or productive, have to be expressed in language. It is natural, therefore, that the analysis of language should provide a clue to the establishment of a science of pure thought. This expectation is the more justified when one takes into account the confusion which the Sophists had introduced into the realm of thought by their abuse of rhetoric. and their deliberate use of fallacious arguments.

The Greeks in general, with their quick wit and ready tongues, were fond of playing upon the words they used. It appears that Heraclitus was aware of the importance of linguistic expression; and that his followers and those of Anaxagoras had developed into arbitrary etymologies the principle that everything has its natural name from which its nature can be known. But it is the controversies of the Sophists which led to a closer study of the forms of speech and of their relation to thought. The subtlety of some of their arguments, like the double dilemma which marked the dispute between Protagoras and his pupil Euathlus, gives an indication of the depth of their linguistic analysis, and of the confusion which could result for thought. In this connection, it is significant to mention the

[10] Chevalier, *La Notion du Necessaire chez Aristote.*

anti-mathematical discussion broached by the Sophists Protagoras [11] and Antiphon/ [2] who defended the empirical character of geometrical concepts. Of the same period are the inquiries of the Eleatics and their controversy with the Sophists, which manifested itself outwardly in the field of linguistics, though it reached deeper into substantial reality. Zeno's arguments could not be disentangled by rhetoric; they had to be ignored by the mathematicians, who developed their methods in spite of the alleged logical blind alley into which they seemed to lead. [13] Yet, there ought to be no essential discrepancy between language and mathematics, if both are manifestations of reason. In fact, the analogy between the form of mathematics and the structure of language pointed to a deeper element of certainty, namely, the concept, common to both. After the discovery of this common factor by Socrates, Greek thought was dominated by the philosophy of concept, and the problem of the relation of language and thought could look to a more constructive solution.

The first steps were taken by Plato who acknowledged the close affinity between speech and thought. [14] He maintained that language is not an arbitrary production of man, and that the purpose of names is to provide us with a picture of the essence of the things they represent. But he reminds us that a picture never reproduces completely its subject, and that the makers of words. may have made mistakes affecting the whole language. This may account for the arbitrary formation of certain words, and why most of them do not represent the same view of the world. Hence, we must turn our attention to the things themselves rather than to names, and we must acknowledge the superiority of dialectic which decides on the correctness or incorrectness of the words. It is interesting to note, however, that although Plato claimed that philosophy

[11] Aristotle, *Met.* II, 2 (20).

[12] Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle'B Physics* (Diels, B. 13).

[13] It seems that Democritus also investigated the problem of verbal expression (Laertius, IX, 48), and the Antisthenes the Cynic wrote on names and language.

[14] Cf. *Cratylus,* 885 D-390 E; and 422 C--440 E.

should go its own way independently of philology, few literary productions can match the beauty of his Dialogues.

At the time of Aristotle then, the Greek language had already achieved its literary perfection. Most of the poets and writers had given their best to the world; for over one hundred years, Greek was being improved, analyzed, and firmly established in its grammatical, linguistic, and logical aspects. Thus, the founder of the Lyceum had all the required elements for writing his two didactic treatises on *Rhetoric;* and on *Poetioal Art.* There is little doubt, therefore, that his linguistic interests formed a major source of inspiration for the elaboration of his logical doctrines.

The structure of a Greek sentence is always centered grammatically and logically around the subject. The orientation of the various elements of a proposition is always towards the subject. From its central position, the subject keeps together the attributes, and conditions the proposition as the expression of one or more of its various implications. In fact, a proposition unveils the internal structure of the subject, for the predicate sheds light on the subject by manifesting itself. In the Aristotelian terminology, the words (proposition), *Kanl.*- (affirmation), and *chr6cpaaw* (negation), are obviously related to (light), and illustrate the parallelism between the world of experience and the operations of the mind.[15] Truth emerges from this illumination which manifests the ontological participation of certain attributes to the subject under consideration. This ontological participation becomes a logical subsumption in the operational development of an argument, as expressed by a series of transformations from one proposition into another. Such a sequence has its parallel in the hierarchy of predicates, which exemplifies the structural order of the universe.

The linguistic transformations which characterize the processes of thought, are not tautological elaborations of sets of notions and postulates arbitrarily stated as primitive. They

[16] These views are discussed and developed in the remarkable study of D. J. Garcia, *L'lnterpretation Historique de la Logique* (Paris, 1940).

result from the analysis and synthesis of concepts which allow the mutual predicability of their elements. It is the verb *to be* which manifests these operations and the generation of each subsequent proposition from the preceding or the initial data. Consequently, the Greeks could scarcely think of a calculus of unanalyzed propositions as in modern symbolic logic; the propositional operations visualized by Aristotle had to be explicit in character, so as to display the paramount importance of the universaL

The operational explication of the processes of thought was confirmed, for Aristotle, by every branch of knowledge. The statements used by the practical and the productive sciences express transformations of materials, or of given situations, with the purpose of exhibiting their participation to the good and the useful. Biological statements are transformations illustrating the hierarchical connections of the organisms. Physical explanations are transformations tending to show how any object of experience embodies the elements. Mathematical operations are transformations exhibiting the various implications of the terms involved. Metaphysical statements also involve transformations, in so far as they illuminate more and more the complex denotation of being and its various manifestations according to their causal development.

In every science, therefore, all thought processes tend to make plain the mutual relations of concepts and their successive participation in the various aspects of being, according to their degree of universality. Hence, all patterns of thinking as such must be fundamentally identical, when considered independently of the subject-matter. From this angle, even demonstrative and persuasive :reasoning are alike, though the former deals with necessary sequences, while the latter involves contingent elements. In fact, reasoning consists of a series of propositions obeying the principle of contradiction individually and collectively. Each one of them expresses the attribution to a subject of a compatible property which is either necessary or contingent. In the same argument, these propositions are linked together on the strength of the relations between their terms.

This technique is performed in the dialectical method, which leaves to thought its alertness and its freedom of movement. But it becomes fully articulate and conscious in the Aristotelian theory of the syllogism. This explains why the syllogism was not used formally by pre-Aristotelian mathematicians; and why it was universally adopted by mathematical writers after its discovery.

It is important to remember, however, that the description and codification of the processes of thought must not blur or screen their dynamic character. For unless thought displays its dynamism, it becomes tautological, unprogressive, and liable to error. Thought must go forward or perish. By considering it as static in its various stages, the Sophists opened the road to metaphysical relativism. At the time, no theory could check their abuse of loose meanings dressed up in strict grammatical forms. Heracliteanism favored that instability of meanings, while Eleaticism could do no more than point out the contradictions resulting from it. With the philosophy of the concept, however, Aristotle was able to preserve the dynamic quality of thought, and to account at the same time for all mutations, predications, relations, and propositional connections. Moreover, Aristotle did not consider the science of pure thought as a study of words, but as a study of the thought signified by words. It considers thought with reference to its success or failure in attaining truth, and not with regard to its natural history. It is concerned with thought as apprehending, and not as constituting, the nature of things.

These are the differences between logic, on one hand, and grammar, psychology, and metaphysics, on the either. Yet logic is not a substantive science; it is a part of a general propaedeutic to the study of any science, which alone indicates what kinds of propositions require proof, and what sorts of proofs should be required for them.[16] In spite of its formalism, therefore, the Aristotelian logic has a dynamic and progressive character. Hence it would be unfair to suggest that it marked a return to the static view of reasoning. On the contrary, it

[18] *Met.,* 1005" 6; *Nicomackean Ethics,* 1094b

emphasized and improved the value of the Socratic and Platonic methods of reasoning, by making explicit their underlying logical structure.

This discussion indicates that the science of pure thought has its origin in the explication of the mechanism of mathematical reasoning and of the structure of language, coupled with the analysis of the necessity which connotes the essential relations between universals, considered in intension as concepts or in extension as classes. Aristotle called it *analytic* [17] in so far as it studies the methods of demonstration by which the conditions of the structure of science are derived from its possibility. He does not seem to use generally the term *logic,* though it occurred in the lost work *1rep'i 'Aoy£Kow* ĳ *Kavwv* of Democritus. [18] It has been said also [19] that Aristotle applied the term *logic* to those methods which do not start from principles, and therefore have no demonstrative value. But it rather appears, from the *Topics* and the *Sophistic Elenchi,* that he reserved the Eleatico- Platonic name of *dialectic* for the art of debating about the probable. It is interesting to note in this connection that the word *logic* was used in the sense of dialectic in the time of Cicero. The Stoics called *ro 'AoyLKov* the study of questions of discourse, rhetoric, grammar, and logic proper, while the Epicureans used the Democritean word *canonic* to denote rules of method. The term *logic* was first used in the sense of logic proper by Alexander of Aphrodisias who applied to it the word *organon* or instrument. The collection of Aristotle's logical works has been referred to as the *Organon* since the sixth century.

Aristotle gave the name of *analytics* to the science of pure thought, because it deals primarily with the analysis of arguments into the figures of the syllogism; [20] and it may be added, because this operation presupposes the analysis of the syllogism into propositions, and of the proposition into terms. The elementary theory of the term and of the proposition is estab-

[17] *Rhetoric,* 1359b 10.

[18] Diels, *Vors.* A. 33, B.lO, p ...

[19] Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (1855), Vol. I, pp. 116, 336.

[20] *Prior Analytics,* 47• 4

lished in the first two treatises, the *Categories* and *On Interpretation* respectively, which may be considered as an introduction to the Aristotelian Organon. It may be interesting to mention, in this respect, the significant importance of the doctrine of the predicables. By stressing the function of the genus and the species, and by marking a distinction between the proprium and the accident, it exhibits the biological interests of Aristotle. Further it emphasizes the necessity of an ordered universe with its notion of the definition; the maximum explication of a conception is obtained by identifying it with the combination of its two essential attributes chosen of necessity from among the hierarchy of possible predicables. Finally, it provides a basis for the class-relationships required by the syllogism, and it offers an adequate approach to the modern calculus of classes.

But whatever be the special conditions of scientific knowledge, the mind must be sure of the validity of each step it takes, and this coherence is secured when the rules of the syllogism and demonstration are observed. These basic doctrines of the Aristotelian logic are contained in the next two works, the *Prior Analytics* and the *Posterior Analytics* respectively. The last two treatises of the Organon, the *Tropics* and the *Sophistic Elenchi*, analyze the arguments which may be syllogistically correct, but fail to satisfy one or more of the conditions of scientific thought; in other words, they refer to the art of arguing where it is aimed at the probable.

II. THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM

The central doctrine of the syllogism is expounded in the *Prior Analytics.* It has been said that, in spite of its name, this treatise was actually written after the *Posterior Analytics,* but the grounds for such a contention are far from being conclusive. Discussing this problem, Ross adduces fresh evidence in favor of the traditional view that the *Prior Analytics* is ear1ier.[21]

[21] " The Discovery of the Syllogism," *Philosophical Review* (May 1989), pp. 251-272.

He shows that there are more references in the *Posterior* to the *Prior* than the other way round; he submits that the doctrines of the *Posterior* presuppose those of the *Prior* but not conversely; and he refutes the view that the *Posterior Analytics* belongs to an early stage of Aristotle's development in which he was predominantly under his master's influence.

The discovery of the syllogism is entirely due to Aristotle. It is true that the Platonic method of division foreshadowed the Aristotelian process of reasoning from the universal to the particular, but it is precisely the syllogistic link of this progression that is here missing. Aristotle stated clearly this difference of the two methods/ [2] when he called the division a powerless syllogism (Jwv because its conclusion is not necessary. He pointed out that this defect is due to the fact that each step in the progress of the Platonic division postulates an option between two opposite terms, so that the minor term which conditions the conclusion is chosen and accepted without demonstration. On the other hand, the syllogism is " an argument in which, certain things being admitted, something other than these follows of necessity from their essence, without requiring any other elements." [23] This seems to be a considerable improvement of the Platonic method, provided an adequate explanation is given of the subsumption of the minor term to the middle term.

The best illustration of the function and structure of the syllogism is offered by the principle of the first figure, the *dictum de omni et nullo,* which is the basic rule of the various types of syllogisms, as they are always reducible to the first figure. This principle states that "when three terms are so related to one another that the last is included in the middle as in the whole, and the middle is or is not included in the first as in a whole, there is necessarily a perfect syllogism connecting the extremes." [24] This statement involves that the terms of the syllogism are predominantly considered in extension,

[22] *Prior Andlytics,* I, 31; *Posterior Analytics,* II, *5.*
[23] *Prior Analytics,* £4b 18.
[24] *"Prior Analytics,* 25b 3£.

although their intension is fully operative, in keeping with the Aristotelian theory of the universal and of the proposition. It makes fully explicit the Socratic conception of the essence or universal as the fundamental element of demonstration. [25] The syllogism is justified partly by the formal conditions of its structure, and necessarily by the quiddity of its terms. It manifests the ground of the attribution of this predicate to that subject by means of the middle term which links the two extremes together. In other words, the syllogism facilitates the illumination of a given subject by bringing into relief its various attributes. At the same time, it helps the explication of that subject by making clear its relations with other subjects.

In case the attribution of a predicate to a subject seems to be remote, an adequate number of middle terms may be called upon to actualize the chain of causal relations linking together the two parts of a final conclusion. But even then, such a complex argument (the sorites), can be reduced to a sequence of formal syllogism. Hence, as the ultimate pattern of the discursive explication of a given subject, the syllogism requires three terms only. Moreover, the order of the syllogistic progression is irreversible, because the causal relation between its terms exemplifies the real order of the substantial world. For these reasons, the Aristotelian logic, unlike the modern symbolic logic, cannot countenance any rules permitting the indefinite substitution or mutation of the terms of proposition of an argument, without the strongest qualifications.

Thus the basic form of discursive thought is the syllogism. There is little doubt that Aristotle believed in the congruence of mathematical reasoning with his syllogistic doctrine, for he reduced to the syllogism all the various kinds of arguments. [26] For example, he did not treat the hypothetical proposition and syllogism as separate logical types. He recognized, however, two kinds of conditional arguments: the *red'l.Wtio ad impossibile,* which assumes that a proposition from whose opposite a false conclusion follows is itself true; and the hypo-

•• *Met.,* 107Sb 24.

•• *Prior Analytica,* 24-27.

thethical argument involving the idea of contingency. He mentioned also the process of reduction proper which is more appropriate to mathematics, though it can be used in all sciences, including ethics.[27] This method consists in working back from a given problem to a simpler one whose solution leads to the demonstration of the first, and so on until a problem is reached which can be solved by the knowledge already at hand. The last step in this analysis is the first to be taken in fact. Aristotle realized that the process of reduction, as opposed to deductive exposition, corresponds to the analytical method of discovery and to the method of deliberation in ethics.[28]

Many criticisms have been levelled against the Aristotelian theory of deduction throughout the history of thought. The Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Sceptics, in developing the principles of the Democritean epistemology, took up positions incompatible with the Aristotelian ontologism. In stressing the importance of sensation and the purely formal character of thought, they introduced relativism in the realm of logic, and robbed the syllogism of its actual value and purpose. By exposing the relative elements contained in the criteria of truth, they directed their attacks against the Socratic rationalism, which asserts that we can reach something of the nature of things in themselves. The Sceptics, in particular, denounced the Aristotelian conception of demonstration on the ground that it leads to an infinite regress, and that the uncertainty of sensation, from which all concepts are derived, is communicated also to the understanding.

These doctrines inspired the various nominalistic schools throughout the ages down to the modern Pragmatists and Logical Empiricists. The former maintain that the conclusion which the syllogism purports to prove must be assumed before its premises can be truly stated; hence it cannot be used for imparting new knowledge. The analysis of the pragmatist arguments, which are an elaboration of the Stoic and the

[27] *Prior Analytics,* fUJ. [28] *Nicomachean Ethics,* HUb 9!0.

Sceptic objections to conceptualism, point to a different doctrine about the nature and value of the universal, so that they can be answered in terms of the Aristotelian theory of the concept.

The Logical Empiricists, pointing to the remarkable development of mathematical logic, fl.atly deny any possible congruence between the logic of Aristotle and the structure of mathematics; they trace the origin of the rift between the two disciplines to the exclusive subject-predicate pattern of the Aristotelian proposition, which does not cover the variety of relations between the terms of a proposition. It is not proposed here to discuss these positivistic ai:guments, although their ancestral filiation can be traced back also to the logical controversies of the Stoics and the Sceptics. It may be interesting, however, to show how the Aristotelian logic can, possibly, meet these basic objections.

It is obvious that if Aristotle gave the basic principles of his logic, he did not analyze all the intricate details of the inferential processes and of the various logical problems connected with the science of thought. In particular, he did not develop a logic of relations which should offer a nearer pattern to the structure of mathematics proper. He did not do so, either because the thought did not occur to him, or because the idea of relation was not for him an independent notion, but just another kind of a predicate amenable to the fundamental subject-predicate form. Hence, it should be possible to derive a logic of relations, as well as the various other calculi of modern from the implications of his doctrine.

The solution proposed involves the dissociation of the technique of modern symbolic logic from its positivistic interpretation, and the attempts to explain or integrate this technique within the broad framework of the Aristotelian philosophy properly extended. The basis of this extension is supplied by the analysis of the subject-predicate form interpreted as the ground of the fundamental logical calculi. Indeed, this form may be considered as a unit symbolized by single letters and taken as unanalyzed, thus yielding the calculus of propositions.

It may also be considered generally as the expression of a simple attribution, thus yielding the calculus of propositional functions. Again, it may be considered as expressing relations between classes (and individuals) as in the case of the predicables, thus yielding the calculus of classes. Finally, it may be considered as expressing a relation in general, thus yielding the calculus of relations. Proper adjustments are required to make good this interpretation of the apophanic form, which appears thus to be more fundamental than any other type of relation.

The advantages of this interpretation of the basic elements of modern logic are obvious. The calculi are given a more realistic ground and justified by means of ontological rather than merely pragmatic arguments, and modern logic as a whole is connected smoothly with traditional logic. The unity of thought and knowledge is thus vindicated against the artifical divisions propounded by other systems, and the far-reaching logical and metaphysical intuitions of Aristotle are shown to have in consequence a permanent and universal value.

III. THE STRUCTURE OF MATHEMATICS

Aristotle's views on the structure of mathematics as a science may be gathered mainly from the *Posterior Analytics,* which contains the most important passages relating to mathematics" Although this treatise deals generally with what he had called demonstrative science/ [9] most of the illustrations used by Aristotle are mathematical, and suggest that he was inspired by mathematics when laying down the general conditions of science. This does not imply in any way the assimilation of mathematics with science; if the "form " of mathematics exhibits all the characteristics of a science, its "matter," which is ultimately derived by abstraction, and even induction, from the sensible world, limits its object to the consideration of numbers and :figures, or of magnitude in generaL

The importance of demonstration in the analysis of the structure of mathematics is clearly justified by the fact that

•• *Prior Anolytics,* 24' 11.

proof gives a universal value to the knowledge it is applied to. The Pythagoreans raised the study of numbers and figures to the status of a science by showing the necessary connections between the propositions dealing with such objects. Plato improved the technique of mathematics by his method of analysis and synthesis and also by his use of dialectic reasoning. The mathematicians of the Academy and their contemporaries showed what wonderful results could be obtained by these methods. Surely, then, demonstration as such ought to be a subject of inquiry by itself; this is the aim of the *Posterior Analytics*, where Aristotle discusses the features of scientific reasoning in contradistinction to dialectical reasoning.

The relation of the *Prior Analytics*, which deals with the forms common to all reasoning, to the *Posterior Analytics* is that of syllogism to demonstration: " Syllogism should be discussed before demonstration, because syllogism is the more general; the demonstration is a sort of syllogism, but not every syllogism is a demonstration." [30] In fact, demonstration is scientific syllogism, that is, a syllogism which yields true knowledge and not merely opinion.

Faithful to the general inspiration of his method, Aristotle does not describe *a priori* the characteristics of demonstration; but he infers them from the nature of science. Hence, the *Posterior Analytics* may be divided into five principal parts. [31] Aristotle first gives the conditions which must be fulfilled by the premises of any science (I, 1-6). He then infers the properties of demonstration as showing why subjects have certain characteristics (I, 7-34). He next goes on to examine demonstration as a means to the definition of properties (II, 1-10). Then he considers in greater detail various subjects already mentioned in the preceding sections (II, 11-18) . Finally, he describes the origin of the immediate propositions from which demonstration begins (II, 19).

As demonstration must yield true knowledge, its premises must be true, indemonstrable, prior to and causes of the con-

[30] *Prior Analytics*, 25b 28.

[31] Cf. J. Zabanella, *Opera Logica* (Venice, 1578).

elusion. They must be true (while those of the syllogism need not be), otherwise the conclusion would not be necessarily true. They must be indemonstrable or immediate, otherwise they could not be first principles, for they ought to be demonstrated: "The necessity of this is obvious; for since we must know the prior premises from which demonstration is drawn, and since the regress must end in immediate truth, those truths must be indemonstrable." The premises must be more intelligible than the conclusion and known before it, in as much as when we become aware of them, we perceive their truth more clearly. Finally, they must be causes of the conclusion, in the sense that the facts they state must cause the fact expressed in the conclusion and also that our knowledge of the premises must be the cause of our knowledge of the conclusion. [33]

Aristotle draws an important distinction between formal truth and basic truth. The first is nothing more than self-consistency; [34] while basic truths are those elements in a science the existence' of which cannot be proved but must be assumed, as for example, unity and magnitude. [35] Of the basic truths used in the demonstrative sciences, some are particular to each science, and some are common. Analogically, the former are ·used in relation to the province of the science in question, " for a truth of this kind will have the same force even if not used generally, but applied by the geometer only to magnitudes, or by the arithmetician only to numbers." [36] As examples of particular truths, Aristotle gives the definitions of line and straight.

Common truths are such as " take equals from equals and equals remain," an axiom which Aristotle is fond of quoting. Common truths, common things, common opinions, common axioms, are the names given by Aristotle to the propositions which Euclid calls" common notions" *(Kmvat evvotat).* Hence, Aristotle's explanation of these terms applies to Euclid's axioms also, provided we exclude from them all those with a distinctive

[32] *Posterior Analytics,* 72b 20 and 74b 5.
•• *Ibid.,* 7lb 9.
•• *Prior Analytics,* 47• 8.
•• *Posterior Analytics,* 76• 81.
•• *Ibid.,* 42.

geometrical character, such as the assumption that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, the parallel-postulate, and the equality of all right angles. *As* regards the proposition, " Things which coincide when applied to one another are equal," which may be used as a working definition of geometrical equality, it implies the method of superposition for proving equality. However, considering that superposition involves the possibility of motion without deformation, this axiom should be alien to mathematics, which deals with things which do not involve motion. [37] Nevertheless, Euclid could not dispense altogether with the use of superposition. though he certainly disliked thi.s method of proof.

The most fundamental axioms are those basic truths which must be known if one wishes to learn anything at all. They include such universal propositions as the laws of thought, through which all sciences have common relationship one with the other. There are other axioms, however, such that ignorance of them would not constitute a total bar to progress. [38] Though Aristotle does not give a specific example of such axioms, it is fairly certain that he refers to the particular axioms of each science. For example, ignorance of the axioms of quantity is a bar to mathematical knowledge only. In another passage, however ,[39] where Aristotle speaks of axioms " such as the law of the excluded middle, the law that the subtraction of equals from equals leaves equal remainders, and other axioms of the same kind," he seems to assimilate the laws of thought with distinctly mathematical axioms. :But this casual remark is of little consequence if we take into account the main teaching of Aristotle about the function of axioms in demonstration.

For him, the laws of thought are part of that pre-existent knowledge which is required before the study of any special science. These regulative canons or" common axioms" cannot therefore serve as premises for the proof of all conclusions; by themselves alone they lead to nothing, because they refer only

•• *Physics,* 198" 15. •ff *Posterior Analytics,* 15. ""*Ibid.,* 77• so.

to being as being, while being manifests itself differently in the various sciences. If demonstration is to. be possible, it requires the common axioms as well as premises containing the genus and properties of the science to which they refer. [40] The only cases in which the laws of thought are expressly posited as such in demonstration are those in which the conclusion also has to be expressed in that form; [41] and then the proof lays down as its major premise that the major term is truly affirmed but falsely denied of the middle.

The basic truths appropriate to a particular science must refer to the same genus as that of the science, otherwise the conclusion could not be related to them as effect to cause. Consequently it is not permissible to pass from one genus to another even if the axioms which are premises of demonstration be identical in two or more sciences, as in the case of subalternate sciences. Hence the basic truths of mathematics must be axioms referring to being supplemented by a distinctive attribute, that of quantity.

Aristotle goes even further when he draws a distinction between geometrical and arithmetical truths; considering that the genera of these two sciences are different from one another, he disclaims any validity in the proof of geometrical truths by arithmetic.

In the case of two different genera such as arithmetic and geometry, you cannot apply arithmetical demonstration to the properties of magnitudes unless the magnitudes in question are numbers. Arithmetical demonstration and the other sciences likewise possess, each of them, their own genera. So that, if the demonstration is to pass from one sphere to another, the genus must be the same, either absolutely or to some extent. If this is not so, transference is clearly impossible, because the extreme and the middle terms must be drawn from the same genus. Otherwise as predicated, they will not be essential and they will thus be accidents."

For this reason, it cannot be proved by geometry that opposites fall under one science, or that " thie product of two cubes is a cube." This expression does not refer to the duplication of

•• *Ibid.,* SSb I. " *Ibid.,* n• II). •• *Ibid.,* 75b 4-lli'.

the cube; it means that the product of two cube numbers is also a cube number.

Because no science is concerned to prove anything outside its own subject-matter, geometry cannot prove of lines any properties which they do not possess as lines, that is, in virtue of the fundamental truths of their particular genus. It cannot show, for example, that the straight line is the most beautiful of lines or the contrary of the circle; these qualities do not belong to lines in virtue of their particular genus, but on account of some property they share with other genera. Therefore, no theorem of any one science in general can be demonstrated by means of another science, unless these theorems are related as subordinate to superior, as for example optical theorems are related to geometry, or harmonic theorems to arithmetic.

This point is emphasized also in a passage where Aristotle says that falsehoods are not all derived from a single identical set of principles; and that these principles are not all inferred from the same basic truths:

> Many of them in fact have basic truths which differ generically and are not transferable; for example, units which are without position, cannot take the place of points which have position. The transferred terms could only fit in as middle terms or as major or minor terms; or else have some of the other terms between them, others outside them[Y]

Hence, there cannot be actually any general mathematical axioms, but only basic truths of arithmetic and basic truths of geometry. Though the expression of particular basic truths of these two sciences might suggest the possibility of more general axioms, these could have no practical value, as their meaning would be ambiguous in view of their reference to different kinds of beings. This may explain, as we shall see, Aristotle's rejection of Antiphon's and of Bryson's methods of squaring the circle, which are based on principles not special to geometry but applicable equally to other subjects. It will be

•• *Ibid.,* ss• s1.

observed also that Aristotle's distinction between the special axioms of the particular sciences, runs parallel with his view about the classification of the science according to their specific objectso

The other elements of demonstrations besides the axioms or immediately evident propositions, are the definitions and the hypotheseso Definitions are explications of the meaning of terms. They involve assumptions about the existence of genera and their species connoted by the termso The logical theory of definition is treated in the *Posterior Analytics*, especially in chapters nine, twelve, and thirteeno The definition of a term is obtained by a gradual restriction of the extension of the genus assumed, by means of successive differentiae, until the extension of the term itself is completely circumscribedo

Hypotheses, or postulates, as Euclid called them later, are propositions laid down without proof, though they can be proved, and used without demonstration. [44] These propositions refer explicitly to the terms belonging to each particular science, and state various relationship between such terms. When Aristotle assumes that hypotheses can be proved, he probably means it with reference to knowledge as a wholeo Obviously, they cannot be demonstrated within the particular science to which they belong, for otherwise they could be entirely eliminated as elements of demonstration. In other words, hypotheses are only relative and mediate knowledge; in this sense, they differ from the axioms, which are immediately evident.

There are important distinctions between a definition and a hypothesis. When a proposition " asserts either the existence or the non-existence of a subject, it is a hypothesis; when it does not so assert it is a definition." [45] The definition lays something down, as when the arithmetician says that a unit is quantitatively indivisible. To define what is a unit is not the same as to affirm its. existenceo Definitions require only to be understood, while hypotheses postulate facts on which depend

•• *Ibid.,* 76b 85.

•• *Ibid.,* 76b 85.

the propositions In the case of arithmetic, the existence of the ideas of unit and magnitude has to be assumed, while the existence of everything else has to be proved. The only things which must be assumed in geometry are points and lines, and all the figures constructed from them, as well as their properties, have to be proved to exist. This procedure was adopted by Euclid, who admits as a proof of existence an actual construction based on accepted principles.

The conventional character of the particular assumptions used in geometrical constructions is clearly indicated by Aristotle. He remarks that such hypotheses should not be considered false, because it is stated that the line which is drawn is a foot longer or straight, when it is actually neither. "The truth is that the geometer does not draw any conclusion from the being of the particular line of which he speaks, but from what his diagrams symbolize." [47] In other words, the geometer never uses his diagrams in order to reason from them; he argues about what they represent, the figures themselves being mere illustrations. Hence, the meaning of "existence" with reference to mathematical objects is independent of their actual symbolical representation. Our knowledge of them is based on existential suppositions having a necessary character, since they are true by themselves. It follows that " demonstration does not refer to external speech, but to the speech of the soul." [48]

These views are closely related to the standard teaching of the Academy; and they illustrate Plato's influence on Aristotle's thought. In fact they are similar to the methodological doctrines expressed in the *Republic* and the *Theaetetus.* Aristotle's appeal to our awareness of the self-evident nature of thought is identical with Plato's belief in the inner sincerity of reason. ·" Thought is conversation which the soul holds with itself about the things which it examines - - - - Not even in sleep did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind." [49]

•• *Ibid.,* 72• 18.
•• *Ibid.,* 77• 1. Cf. also *Prior Analytics,* 49b 35, and *Met.,* 1089• 20.
•• *Posterior Analytics,* 76b 25. •• *Theaetetus,* 189 C-190.

For Plato, however, self-evident principles are innate in the mind which becomes aware of them through reminiscence, while Aristotle, in rejecting these Platonic views, maintains that the knowledge of these principles is acquired through sensation primarily. It is the unity of experience existing in the soul which makes possible for the mind the apprehension of similarities found· in particulars, and their perception as universal elements of thought. [50] With this intellectual vision, the understanding *(Su5:vma)* bestows upon its fundamental principles the character of absolute truth. These principles, in turn, are used as elements of demonstration, and help to give to the conclusion of an argument or of a proof the necessity and certainty which characterizes the deductive sciences, or at least that reasonable coherence which makes possible our knowledge in generaL

Aristotle would agree with Plato that mathematics and science are a body of deductions from clearly perceived first principles. But he would insist that experience and induction provide many of their elements. Again, he would agree that the method of analytical regression had to be followed by a synthetic progression; but instead of centering this process towards the world of ideas, he would direct it towards concrete reality, and thus stress the parallelism between existence and thought. Finally, he would argue that the ultimate notions obtained by this double discursive method, need not be mathematical in character, as quantity is only an aspect of being.

Consequently, Aristotle had to reject the Platonic view that there is no necessary distinction between mathematics and science, because he had shown that the study of numbers and figures does not unfold the essence of mind and nature, and does not force its results on both. Just like any other branch of knowledge requiring universals, mathematics involves notions which are idealized properties of sensible objects. These notions have not a separate existence, like the Platonic ideas, but they can be isolated by abstraction, so as to provide the matter of

[60] *Posterior Analytics,* II, 15 (5-7).

mathematical demonstration. For Aristotle, then, mathematics is the development of just one aspect of being, namely the category of quantity; and it has been remarkably developed as such by the great scientists of the Alexandrine period, who used extensively the *Organon* in their work. This is so true, that the so-called static character of Greek mathematics is attributed to the influence of the Aristotelian views on quantity and on demonstrative science.

· But even the prevalent static character of Greek mathematics encouraged by the Aristotelian doctrines, should not be considered as an outdated conception. Of course, it presents a sharp contrast to the rise of calculus and modern analysis, which display a dynamic character with their legitimate attempt to rationalize change by describing it arithmetically. Yet, more recent tendencies in mathematical theory seem to revive, in a certain way, the Aristotelian dualism between number and the continuum, and the subordination of arithmetic and geometry to the qualitative requirements of the logical doctrine. This is particularly the case with the axiomatic. development of projective geometry, of the theory of groups, of the topological systems, and the elaboration of abstract algebras. Indeed, it may be safely said that the characters of the Aristotelian logic, and the inspiration of the peripatetic doctrine, may be used as powerful instruments for the interpretation and justification of many achievements of modern science.

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CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

[Third Installment]

IV. CHARITY COMPARED WITH MODERN THEORIES

Before proceeding to a final comparison of the Christian ethic of love of neighbor with modern social " isms," a recapitulation of our progress so far will not be disadvantageous.

In the introductory section we saw that the everlasting quest of man for unity and order is most poignantly and practically expressed in his herculean attempts at the reconstruction of the disordered society in which he lives. Since order requires a certain unity and unity results from a principle, these attempts may be categorized according to the principles which animate them, principles such as those of individualism, classism, statism, racism, natural justice, and lastly, supernatural charity or love of neighbor. This latter, charity, proposed especially in the recent Papal encyclicals on social problems as " the soul of the social order," was explained-its necessity in view of modern chaos in society and the inadequacy of natural justice, its nature as a theological virtue, and its obligation as expressed in the divine precept, "Love thy neighbor." Since an understanding of the order of charity is essential to an appreciation of charity as a principle of social reconstruction (for in its ability to induce order into society lies its social significance) our thesis was formulated in terms of this aspect of charity, and the material divided as follows: first, the order of charity in itself; and secondly, since contrast serves to accentuate understanding, this order in comparison with other contemporary principles of social reconstruction.

The first major consideration was, therefore, the treatment of the order of charity as expounded by the prince of Catholic theologians, St. Thomas Aquinas. The order may be considered in a threefold manner: between God and ourselves, between ourselves and our neighbor, and the order among our

various neighbors. God comes first in the order of charity; He is its source and final end. The self, joined in friendship with God, friendship based on the sharing of eternal happiness, comes next:, and then our neighbors, as friends of God and cosharers in eternal felicity. Our neighbors, however, are not all loved equally. For while it is true that all are loved as fellow-pilgrims in the journey to the common eternal home, still there is an hierarchy of preferences to be observed among them. This hierarchy is based on their relation to the principle of charity, the terms of which-the object and the agent-are God and the self. Since God lives, through charity, in the self, and inasmuch as the self refers to God the natural ties of blood and affection that unite hiin to his various neighbors over and above the supernatural bond of the co-heritage of beatitude, it may be said that the norm for judging of the order of the self's love for others is this: *those who are more closely united to the self-to self not merely as self but to self as united to God-are to be loved more out of charity.* With this as a principle, an order of preferences among neighbors can be established quite in accord with charity, based on the permanence and the intimacy of the unions which bind the neighbors to the self. Some of these relationships were then mentioned in the concluding pages of the second part, and we shall continue our consideration of them after this resume is completed.

Following the sketch of the order of charity came the review of the historical evolution of modern theories of social reconstruction inasmuch as they are antithetical to that of the Christian ethic, and which, ·therefore, bring the true doctrine into sharper focus. Peculiarly enough, and yet quite in accord with the dictum of St. Augustine that the world is divided between those who love *God* even to contempt of self and those who love self even to contempt of God, the unifying characteristic of all the "isms" treated is that of self-interest with various shades and accents. This unholy egoism, which has been christened the " capitalistic spirit," in the sense that it excludes supernatural, extra-economic criteria as effective norms of social conduct, is quite clearly detected in the centuries im-

mediately following upon the high Middle Ages, when the supernatural ethic of love had attained its most perfect societal realization. The factors leading to the breakdown of the Christian unity of civilization and the rejection of the "comprehensive Christian sociological fundamental idea " of love found concrete expression· in the Protestant revolt. Through this religious revolution, a great portion of civilized society apostatized from the true faith in God, and with the loss of that faith went the true conception of charity, and with that the whole hierarchic structure of society based on the order of charity. The general course of social history from that time to this is the story of man's efforts to reconstruct society on a new basis.

The primary social heresy was, as has been said, the doctrine of self-interest, often styled "individualistic" or "capitalistic." This is very understandable. If we recall that in the order of charity the fundamental sociological idea, which regulates man's relations with his fellowmen, is the principle that those neighbors are to be loved more who are more closely united to the self as conjoined to God through charity [thou-charity (God plus self) ,] then it quite logically follows that when, through heresy, faith in God is lost and charity sacrificed, God disappears from the :relationship existing between neighbor and self, and then the simple relationship (thou-self) or (thou-self, minus God) is most easily resolved in the interest of crass selfishness.

The historical realization of this tTansition was effected in the period which may be referred to as " the adolescence of the capitalistic spirit." Under the tutelage of the two great heresiarchs, Calvin and Luther, and their respective theological progeny, and nourished by the commercial revolution and Puritanism, this new individualism grew and waxed strong, until in the time of Adam Smith and the classical school, it boisterously became of age. As it prospered in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and reached its comprehensive expression in Spencer, another current of thought, stemming from the same source, but more

inclined to the organic concept of society, became noticeable. The familialism of Comte, the classism of Marx, the statism of Mussolini and the racism of Hitler are historical progressions in the development of this trend-all trying to resolve the social antimony consequent upon the denial of God and supernatural love of neighbor, and all, though opposing individualism, able only to project human self-love on increasingly larger scales. Instead of the love of neighbor as referable to God [self-charity (thou plus God)], man sought in altruism to love his neighbor in himself (self-thou, minus God). As a result of this, the service of neighbor was made theoretically the ultimate end, to take the place of God, as in extreme collectivism. Yet even this so-called "altruism" was a species of self-love; for it was still man loving man.

After this summary outline of modern theories of social reconstruction, it is necessary to complete the comparison between these and social charity. In the progress of the preceding section, comparisons between the two were made here and there. A more striking contrast can be furnished by, first, delineating the social implications of charity consequent upon its order, thus providing a frame of'reference for a second, and more particular comparison in which some pertinent concepts of the separate "isms" will be evaluated. Following this a few observations on the role of social charity in a world largely dominated by these alien ideologists will serve as a concluding section.

An understanding of the application of charity's principle of order among neighbors is more than ample refutation of the "isms " based on class, national, or race interests. Charity does not deny the mutual interests of the working class, the national feeling possessed by fellow-citizens, or the race-consciousness of those of a common blood. Rather it insists that people within these groups love one another more, help one another more,- all in the spirit of a divine, universal love which catches up and supernaturalizes these mutual interests and not, as the ideologists of class and state and race proclaim, independently of and often in opposition to the Christian ethic of love. Their

very exclusion of God as the ultimate principle robs their system of order, and this sacrifice of order brings their mutual interests to chaos instead of fruition.

The doctrine on the order in love of neighbor is a striking challenge to man's free will and his concept of values. Perhaps that is why, in an age of determinism and materialism, an age dating from the "servile will" of Luther and the predestinarianism of Calvin, it is so unpopular. It requires of man that he not simplify into a dogma of self-interest, the struggle between the egoistic and altruistic impulses of individual class, nation, or race. It requires him to weigh spiritual and material values, eternal and temporal, personal and social. It requires of him that he love and aid more those who are more closely united to him, that he distinguish the various types of unions-the *natural (carnal*is) , arising from the bond of blood, founded in the possessions of life and family, and including parents and children, husband and wife, blood relatives and "in-laws"; the *spiritual,* arising from the bond of religion, founded in spiritual and eternal goods, and embracing members of the Church, of a religious community, the pastor and his people; the *civil,* arising from a political bond, founded in social goods, and existing among citizens, neighbors, fellow-soldiers, benefactor and beneficiaries, etc.; [222] that he regulate his preferences in accordance with the intimacy of these unions in the goods proper to each union, preferring the one closer to the self according to that union and, in goods common to all the unions, preferring those who are, absolutely speaking, more closely united, i. e., the spiritual before civil, the physical before the spiritual. [223] Charity requires of man that in his benefactions he disburse his surplus not only in accordance with the propinquity of the needy, but also in accordance of the degree of their necessity, be it extreme, grave, or common. [224]

Charity is, paradoxically, intensely simple and intensely complex. It is simple as the summit of a giant Gothic cathedral is

••• Cf. Merkelbach, *Summa Theologiae Mwalis.* I, 696.
•n *lbid.,* pp. 007-698.
••• *Ibid.,* 692-698.

simple-aiming ali its bulk of masonry with direct oneness to the heavens and God. Like the huge edifice, too, it is extremely complex, of multitudinous parts, great and small, the towering columns and the grinning gargoyles, but all united in worship of the Creator, just as charity directs the acts of all the virtues to God. Too ·often charity, when proposed as a remedy for the social order, is considered an ineffective, disorganized panacea. It is nothing of the sort. On the contrary, it is the modern "isms " which are, in the long run, ineffective, simply because their principle-individual, class, state, or race interest-is not big or broad enough to accomplish the task at hand. No one who contemplates the delicate hierarchy of social values consequent upon the order of charity can doubt that in its application lies the sociological as well as the eternal salvation of mankind.

Turning now to a more particular comparison of the Christian ethic of love of neighbor with the modern "isms," we shall briefly interpret their essential concepts in the light of charity.

INDIVIDUALISM

The individualistic, or capitalistic, spirit, insofar as it implie1» a practical denial of supernatural criteria in human life, characterizes, in one way or another, all the modern social "isms," even though communism, statism, and racism sometimes denounce and even deny their parentage. They are children of theological and philosophical individualism, if not of social, political, and economic individualism. The former may be said to have given the general tone to all subsequent social theory; thelatter terms are applied more properly to the first particular embodiment of individualist social theory, early liberal individualism. Let us briefly examine each type of individualism in turn.

Theological individualism derives from Protestanism, particularly from Luther and Calvin. Luther's doctrine of private interpretation, justification by faith alone, and the denial of the efficacy of good works, hits directly, of course, at the medieval

ethic of charity, abolishing its theory and its institutions. The dogma, "Be a sinner and sin boldly, but believe more boldly still," is not only theologically false; it is socially anarchic. Calvin's predestinarianism likewise took away from men the true notion of charity, the friendship of God and man, with all the give-and-take of genuine friendship. Salvation was as a business contract, signed and sealed.

This theological determinism soon underwent rationalization through *philosophical individualism* with its denial of free will. Without free will, as Lacordaire [225] was effectively to point out against the spiritual stepsons of the reformers-the :rationalists-true love is impossible. Love is based on free wilL Its three acts-preference, sacrifice, and union with responsibility-are impossible without free wilL With the denial of free will, and consequently, of true love, man had, first of all, no proper basis for choice, an error which leads to an ethereal humanitarianism or a collectivistic love. Sacrifice and devotedness likewise fell by the wayside; self-interest became the dogma of action. Similarly, union of wills and responsibility became outmoded. It was a question of rights and not duties, just as the hate opposed to charity is all getting and no giving. And if the implications of this social dichotomy were not too patent at first, at least the separation between private and social responsibility, individual and public ethics, was a start, a distinction that might well have arisen from the erroneous theory that while all people are loved equally by the interior affection, yet the external manifestations of love vary according to proximity to sel£.[226]

Social individualism translated this determinism into terms of society. The elemental norm was the Puritan "law of nature," developed by Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, before which man could only let natural forces have free play-*laissez-faire.* Self-love became unsocial without God, and the poor, the beneficiaries of charity, became social outcasts. "A

[205] H. D. Lacordaire, 0. P., *Jesus Christ, God, and Man* (London: 1902), pp. 248-252.

[226] Cf. *Sum'ITUl, Theol.,* II-II, q. 26, a. 6.

society which reverences the attainment of riches as the supreme felicity will naturally be disposed to regard the poor as damned in the next world, if only to justify itself for making their life a hell in this." [227]

The jurisprudential aspects of the new theory found expression in parliamentary democracy, the instrument of *political individualism.* It holds that as all men are alike by race and nature, so in like manner all are equal in control of their life; that each one is so far his own master as to be in no sense under the rule of any other individual; that each is free to think on every subject just as he may choose, and to do whatever he may like to do; that no man has any right to rule over other men. [228] This fictitious equality was decidedly alien to the medieval ethic, in which the order of charity posited a hierarchic constitution of society. Love recognizes inequality and reconciles it in the exchange of affection and goods. The equality of political individualism made for social misery and an extreme legalism, of which the Poor Laws [229] were a pertinent and horrible example.

Economic individualism is likewise alien to the true love of neighbor. Its laws of free competition and of supply and demand are but translations of determinism into the mercantilist vocabulary. In the name of *laissez-faire* no labor organization was permitted, [230] no restriction on the accumulation of goods, no social use of wealth through the almsdeeds of charity. These led to the amassing of private property and the attendant evils utterly foreign to the Christian ethic. [231] Bishop von Kettler refers to this " as a mountain of injustice," which rests on property as abused and diverted from its natural and

[221] R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism,* p. *!!61.*

••• Cf. Leo XIII, EncycHcal Letter *lmmortale Dei,* Nov. 1, 1885, in *Socilll Wellsprings* (Milwaukee: 1940), p. 7il. This volume (!ontains fourteen Leonine encyclicals in English translation.

[229] Cf. Tawney, *op. cit.,* pp.

[28°] Cf. Pius XI, Encyclical Letter *Divine Redemptoris,* March 19, 19$7.

Cf. the writings of Wm. von Ketteler, Bishop of Mainz, quoted and explained by G. Metlake, *Christia'ltSocial Manifesto* (Philadelphia: 1912), pp. 8!!-<Ml, 152-156,

supernatural purpose.[232] The accumulation of extensive private property carried with it a control over money and credit; and it was not long before the theological heresy of faith without works found echo in the economic heresy of credit without wealth. The latest manifestation of economic individualism is the monopoly. Strangely enough, the same bowing to inevitability which lent assurance to the capitalist theory that the busy pursuit of one's private interest would conduce to the public weal is now invoked in a different fo:rm to explain away the very institutions capitalist egoism and a perverted" law of nature" called into being. It is now said that monopolies are inevitable. They are not, any more than *laissez-faire* was necessary. Social charity can mitigate monopoly just as it tempered monopolistic tendencies in medieval times.

Bishop von Ketteler, in his paper discussed at the historic Conference of Fulda in September, 1869, made this observation on what he called" economic liberalism," and it may well serve as a concluding paragraph to our treatment of individualism and the ethic of love.

The social question touches the *deposit of faith.* Even if it was not evident that the principle underlying the doctrines of economic Liberalism, which has been aptly styled 'a war against all,' is in flagrant contradiction with the natural law and the doctrine of universal charity, there is no doubt that, arrived at a certain stage of development, this system, which in a number of countries, has produced a working class sick in body, mind, and heart, and altogether inaccessible to the graces of Christianity, is diametrically opposed to the dignity of a human being and *a fortiori* of a Christian in the mind of God, who meant the goods of earth to be for the support of the human race and established the family for the purpose of perpetuating man and educating him physically and morally, and above all to the commandments of Christian charity which ought to regulate the actions not of individuals only, but of every social organization; therefore this system deserves to be rejected for dogmatic reasons.[233]

••• *Ibid.,* p. 85.
•••*Ibid.,* pp. 177·178.

CLASSISM

Pope Leo XIII, in his encyclical letter *Quod Apostolici Muneris,* Dec. 28, 1878, enumerates the fourfold menace of socialism: (I) to religion; (2) to the State; (3) to the home; (4) to property. [234] In our earlier treatment of Marxian socialism we singled out its classism as providing the most pertinent contrast to the doctrine of the order of love of neighbor, inasmuch as it was economic self-interest projected on a wider scale. For our evaluation of classism now, we shall consider it as embodied in the four aspects mentioned by the " Pope of the workingman." First of all, to interpret all society in terms of an economic class fulfilling the determinism of a materialistic concept of history of its very nature implies a rejection of extra-economic criteria and therefore of religion, God, and the supernatural charity which joins man to Him in friendship. Secondly, the claim that " directly contraposed" classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, are the basic units of society necessarily infringes upon the autonomy of the family, since family relationships often give the lie to the validity of the exclusively class distinction. And as far as the order of charity is concerned, familial ties exact a priority of affection which is extremely prejudicial to the Marxian Thirdly, the State is conceived by Marxism as a mere instrument for the exploitation of the oppressed class, whereas in the Christian economy it is the primary duty of the State to abolish conflict between classes with divergent interests, and thus foster and promote harmony between the various ranks of society.[235] Its relation to charity is succinctly expressed by Leo XIII in his remarks on Christian Democracy as opposed to Socialist Democracy:

(Christian Democracy) must avoid the other cause of giving offense which consists in paying so much regard to the interests of the lower classes as seemingly to neglect the upper classes, who

Cf. *Social Wellsprings,* p. 15 fl'.

••• Cf. Pius XI, Encyclical Letter *Qu.adragesimo Anno,* May 15, 1981.

nevertheless are of equal importance to the preservation and velopment of the State. The Christian law of charity ... forbids this.2a6

Lastly, private property is looked on by Marxism as the source of all class evils. As Bishop von Ketteler, who as a contemporary of Marx witnessed the same abuses of private property, admitted, the notorious dictum ' property is robbery" is something more than a mere lie; besides a great lie, it contains a terrible truth. " We must destroy the truth that is in it, in order that it may become all lie again." [237] However, the remedy is not the reduction of men to a landed equality by communal ownership. The Church recognizes the inequality among men born with different powers of body and mind, and with this the inequality in actual possession of property, [238] and through the operation of charity uses this very inequality as a means of social unity. The great Bishop of Mainz shows how harmoniously the Christian concept of property, private ownership, and common use, fits into a higher plan of God's Providence:

> God created the earth with all it brings forth in order that man might derive sustenance from it. God could have attained this end by ordaining a compulsory distribution of goods; but that was not His intention. He wished to give full-play to man's self-determination and free-will; He wished to hand His work over to man, to make a human work of it, that man by doing the work of God might become God-like. He permitted inequality in the acquisition and administration of goods, that man might become the dispenser of His gifts to his fellow-man. Thus was man to be drawn into the life of that love with which God provides for us, and by distributing his goods with the same love with which God intended them for all men, man was to share in the nature of God, which is love. [239]

The just distribution of property will be achieved not by the Marxist forceful expropriation of the expropriators, " but by

••• Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Graves de Communi,* Jan. 18, 1901, *op. cit.,* pp. 232-233.

[237] Cf. Metlake, *op. cit.,* p. 38.

[238] Cf. Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Quod Apostolici Muneris, op. cit.,* p. 21.

••• Cf. Metlake, *op. cit.,* p. 40.

the *interior regeneration of the heart."* Charity does not deny class interests, nor is it without its practical programme for the realization of these.[241] " It is," says Leo XIII, " a laudable charity not merely to give temporary aid to the working class, but also to establish permanent means of help."[242] But true love does deny the exclusiveness of class-interests, an exclusiveness which is the more base and less practical for being founded on a selfishly economic final end to be attained through revolution.

STATISM

The statism of the Fascist, inasmuch as it conceives of the State as an absolute in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, is by this token inimical to the charity whose ultimate end is God. The State is, according to St. Thomas, a perfect society;[243] but it is not the ultimate end of man; God alone is that.[244] It is the function of the State to help man so to live virtuously here that he may live happily hereafter.[245] Accordingly, man's love for the State should not militate against his love of God, or God's Church. In his encyclical on the ·chief duties of Christian citizens, Leo XIII lays down these principles:

> We have, therefore, to love our country which has given us this mortal life, but it follows of necessity that we should have a greater love for the Church, to which we owe the life that will endure forever .... If we wish to come to a right judgment, the super-natural love of the Church and the natural love of our country are principles having the same eternal source, God Himself being the Author and Cause of both. Hence it follows that the one duty can never be opposed to the other. . . . To love therefore these two countries, both our natural and our heavenly country, and to prefer the latter to the former lest the law of man should be deemed

••• *Ibid.,* p. 48.
···1 Cf. *ibid.,* pp.
"" *Graves de Communi, op. cit.,* p.
••• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 90, a. .
… *Op. cit.,* I, q. a. 8.
••• Cf. *De Regimine Principum,* I, 15.

superior to the law of God, is the chief duty of every Christian and the source of all other duties. [246]

Another occupant of the See of Peter, Pius XI, writing after the rise of the Fascist party to power, speaks of it as" a regime based on an ideology which clearly resolves itself into a true and pagan worship of the State." [247]

The statist ideology, in disrupting the order of love by placing the State before God or the Church, likewise disrupts the order of the love of neighbors. For while, as Mussolini observes, [248] the Fascist in actual fact loves his neighbor, with a love which puts no obstacle to " differentiation of status and to physical distance," he also says that " Fascism repudiates any universal embrace." [249] But with Christian charity, while recognizing that in matters concerning relations between citizens we should prefer our fellow-citizens, [250] still we must love all our fellow men with the same common love of charity insofar as they are referred to the one good common to them all which is God. [251] Though natural and national preferences have their place in love of neighbor, true charity cannot refuse any universal embrace:

> Nor is there any fear lest the consciousness of universal brotherhood aroused by the teaching of Christianity, and the spirit which it inspires, be in contrast with love of traditions or the glories of one's fatherland, or impede the progress of prosperity or legitimate interests. For that same Christianity teaches that in the exercise of charity we must follow a God-given order, yielding the place of honor in our affections and good works to those who are bound to us by special ties. [252]

••• Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Sapientiae Christianae,* Jan. 10, 1890, *op. cit.,* pp. 145, 147.

[247] Pius XI, Encyclical Letter' *Non Abbiamo Bisogno,* June 29, 1931.

••• B. Mussolini, *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism,* p. 8.

••• *ibid.*

Cf. *Summa Theol.,* ll-H, q. 26, a. 7, 8.

Ibid., q. 25, a. 1.

••• Pius XU, Encyclical Letter *Summi Pontijicatus,* Oct. 20, 1939.

RACISM

Accepting literally the words of Hitler, «All that is not race is trash," let us examine the four basic concepts of Nazism-race, folkish philosophy of life, state and society, the principle of individuality and leadership-as they relate to the Christian ethic of love. First, the primary concept of race as the social determinant is materialistic, and as such is opposed to the conception of charity which is spiritual. In this connection, the citation by Pope Leo XIII in his letter on the abolition of slavery of the words of St. John Chrysostom, is pertinent: "Our advantages flow from that new birth and adoption into the household of God, not from the eminence of our race." [253]

Out of this materialistic concept of race and blood, as we have explained in the preceding chapter, flows the folkish conception of life whose end is « the preservation of the racial existence of man." [254] This positing of the racial eristence as the ultimate end of man is obviously contrary to the Christian ethic of the order of love based on God as ultimate end, [255] an error which St. Thomas shows to be contrary to the first commandment of the Decalogue. [256] Pope Pius XI, in his letter to the German people, teaches that

> he who takes the race, or the people, or the State, or the form of government, the bearers of the power of the State, or other fundamental elements of human society ... out of the system of their earthly valuation, and makes them the ultimate norm of all, even of religious values, and deifies them with an idolatrous worship,

[253] Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *In Plurimis,* May 5, 1888, *op. cit.,* p. 108.

[254] Cf. A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf,* p. 579.

[255] While Hitler does speak of God and Fate as directing the course of society, the words are to be understood in terms of the "eternal ' race-soul.' " Cf. *Studien zum Mythus des XX lahrhunderts,* quoted by Micklem, *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church,* p. 21. As Pope Pius observes: "He who, in pantheistic vagueness, equates God with the universe, and identifies God with the world and the world with God does not belong to believers in God." Encyclical Letter *Mit brennender Sorge,* March 14, 1987.

[256] Cf. *The Commandments of God,* pp. 28-29.

perverts and falsifies the order of things created and commanded by God.[257]

The " immortality " of the folkish philosophy of life is quite different from immortality in the Christian sense, which is the continuance of the life of man after death as a personal individual to be rewarded or punished eternally. To designate with the word "immortality" the collective continual enjoyment of life in association with the continued existence of one's people on earth for an undetermined length of time in the future is a perversion of faith, charity, and the moral ordering of the world.[258] The racist State and society, which embody the folkish conception of life, share the same falsity, even though the State is not conceived as an end in itself. It is admittedly a means, but a means to a false ultimate end-the race.

The principle of individuality and leadership, which is the fourth basic concept of Nazism, militates against the order of love of neighbor in two ways. First, regarding individuality, the provision for the purest members of the race to breed apart from the rest, the corollary of which is the prevention of reproduction by the "unfit," bases the order of preferences among neighbors on purely physiological grounds, whereas the order of the Christian love of neighbor, though requiring prudence in use of the reproductive process and giving due recognition to the ties of blood/[59] accepts this relationship only insofar as it is able to be referred to the end of charity. Moreover, true charity does not exclude those not bound to the self by ties of blood, nor does it wage a war of extermination or oppression against those lacking this union of blood, even though these be enemies.[260] Secondly, though we may accept the recognition of personality and its gifts in the leadership principle, still to concede that the militarism of the Party or the Army is the primary school for the understanding and adjustment of the individual of a race is to overlook the moral

••• Pius XI, *Mit brennender Sorge.*

·••*Ibid.*

••• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 26, a. 8.

[06]° Cf. *ibid.,* q. 26, a. 6, 7, 8; q. *25,* aa. 6, 8, 9.

influence of the social and civic virtues, and especially charity, on the gTowth of personality.[261] Christian love of neighbor, through its acts of love, joy, peace, beneficence and self-sacrifice towards all mankind, brings out the best that is in .man.

Conclusion

By way of corollary to all that has been said on the social order of love of neighbor in itself and in comparison with the various modern "isms" similarly aiming at the reconstruction of the social order-a comparison which shows quite plainly the superiority and the uniqueness of charity as *the* principle for the true functioning of society-we might append a few observations on the practical significance of the whole idea. Obviously, the stage of contemporary society is largely dominated by social theories alien to that of Christian charity-the "social-religions" as contrasted with the "God-religion"-and one might wonder if ever true charity will come again into its own as the "soul of the social order." Doubtful as the prospects may seem, there are, nevertheless, factors inherent in charity itself as well as in the trends of the time which lend strength to the conviction that a new Christian order may rise out of the present crisis of civilization.

The first factor in the nature of charity itself is the truth that the law of charity does not remove the law of nature, but perfects it by remedying its defects.[262] The social import of this idea has been demonstrated in our discussion of the order of the Christian love of neighbor in which the principle was enuntiated that those who are more closely united to the self are to be loved more out of charity. Grace perfects nature; it does not destroy it or do it violence. It gathers up, supernaturalizes all that is best in human living-its ties and affec-

[261] Cf. Pius XI, *op. cit.* The conscientious observance of the ten commandments of God and the commandments of the Church . . . is for every individual an incomparable schooling of systematic self-discipline, moral training and character formation-a schooling that demands much, but not too much.

[262] Cf. St. Thomas, *In Col.*, 8, lect. 4.

tions for self, family, friends, economic and social class, nation, race, and the broad expanse of humanity-and finds place for all in the grand, pyramidal hierarchy of love whose source and ultimate goal is God.[263]

Correlative to this universality of charity is the futile quest of modern man for a higher social order, a quest which has progressively led him through the errors of individualism, classisrn, statism, racism, and even the new " theocracy of humanism " in search of a transcendent sociological synthesis. This synthesis can be achieved only through charity whose object, God, transcends a world whose progress and perfection can only be realized in relation to Him. Charity can take all the good that undoubtedly lies in these various "isms"; it can rescue them from the evils that, with equal surety, now result from their lack of proper orientation.

If we consider, moreover, that no other virtue has so great an inclination to act or acts so delightfully as charity,[264] that whoever has charity has all the other virtues/[65] that charity is the bond of perfection/[56] there is the more reason to expect men to appreciate it if only they come to know it. It is a sad experience, in reading the history of social thought, to see how ignorant of charity were the parents of the modern "isms"- Adam Smith, Marx, Spencer, and the rest. Charity has not failed in modern times as a social principle. It has not failed because it has not been tried.

True, charity is a supernatural virtue which comes from God alone, and cannot be acquired by mere human effort; even the dispositions for the reception of charity must come from God.[267] But there are two kinds of knowledge of charity, experimental and speculative; and one without charity can have the second, though not the first.[268] It is not necessary for the new Chris-

••• Cf. Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris.*
••• Cf. *Summa Theol.•* II-II, q. 23, a. 2.
••• *Ibid.,* I-II, q. *65,* aa. 3, *5.*
••• *Coloss.* iii, 14.
[267] *Summa Theol.•* II-II, q. 24, a. 3, ad lum.
••• *111 Sent.,* XXIII, q. l, 2 ad lum.

tendom [269] that all possess charity, but only a number sufficient to affect the tone of the society; the others may speculatively, if not experimentally, appreciate it; and since grace does not destroy nature, they should feel no repugnance to cooperating in the life of a society with charity as its principle of order,

For philosophers and theologians with a sociological bent (and we simply must have more such), the subject of charity and the reconstruction of the social order offers a challenge that is well-worthy of acceptance, Pope Pius XI in his encyclical letter on atheistic Communism urges the necessity of promoting a wider study of social problems in the light of the doctrine of the Church. " It is," he says, " of the utmost importance to foster in aU classes of society an intensive program of social education adapted to the varying degrees of intellectual culture." Elsewhere in the same encyclical, after specifying charity as more directly calculated to cure social evils, the Pontiff sorrowfully remarks not only that justice is poorly observed, but that the precept of charity is not sufficiently appreciated, is not a vital thing in daily life. "We desire, therefore, Venerable Brethren, that this divine precept, this precious mark of identification left by Christ to His true disciples, be ever more fully explained by pen and word of mouth. , .." [270]

To be sure, the problem is as large and difficult as the challenge is forceful. Still true scholarship, and especially Christian scholarship, delights in essaying herculean tasks, There is a universality about this problem that will satisfy the most comprehensive and penetrating of intellects; and, at the same time, the observation of social phenomena, the collating and cataloguing of the tremendous body of sociological dat§t acquired in recent years will be a perennial labor of love

[269] For a treatment of the spiritual and temporal problems of a new Christendom, cf. J. Maritain, *True Humanism* (New York: 1938): "For this new epoch in the history of Christian culture the creature will neither be belittled nor annihilated before God; his rehabilitation will not be in contradistinction to God or without God, but *in* God ... integral humanism, the humanism of the Incarnation " (p. 65) .

[270] Pius XI, Encyclical Letter *Divini Redemptoris, passim.*

for those given more to method and research. A comprehensive exposition of the social order, perhaps a *Summa Sociologica* embodying a new science of society based not merely on institutions, geography, customs, or political ideologies, but on the social animal himself, man-not only man with his natural faculties and gifts, but man destined for the supernatural, an absorbing personality pulsating with divine grace, powerfully influencing his social milieu through the operation of natural and infused virtues crowned by a universal charity-all this is something to hope for. Towards the :realization of that hope, the sociological labors of a group of Christian scholars might profitably be directed.

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THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION

I. THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY

FROM its beginning experimental psychology has perseveringly attempted, with an increasingly rigorous precision, to amass all the facts which might throw light on the psychological phenomenon involved in the process of perception. The wealth of material thus gathered, and still being added to by new observations, naturally stimulated endeavors to find for it a rational explanation which would be adequate. A detailed history of opinions, or a step-by-step analysis of these attempted explanations is beside the point here.[1] A brief exposition, systematical rather than historical, will suffice to bring out certain essential aspects of the problem which are the principal issues in a still open discussion.

Associationism, at least in its most recent manifestations, is in agreement with the psychology of form in accepting these postulates:

a) Sensation, in its simplest form, is a pure abstraction; as such, therefore, it is rarely encountered in our cognitive life;[2]

b) The normal human cognitive operation is therefore a complex operation, commonly designated by the name " perception";

c) Concerning the object of perception, the perceiving subject identifies the thing before him, recognizes in it a table, an

[1] Instead of mentioning again the classical works familiar to all psychologists, we shall be content here to refer to expositions that are more accessible: E. Pialat, "Une conception nouvelle de la vie psychique: 'La Gestalttheorie,'" *Revue Neo-Scolaatique de Philosophie,* XXXI, (1989), 48-74; T.V. Moore, "Gestalt Psychology and Scholastic Philosophy," *The New Scholasticism,* Vll (1988), 298-825; VIII (1984), 46-80; P. Guillaume, *La Psychologie de la forme,* (Paris: Flammarion), 1987.

• Cf. E. B. Titchener, *Manuel de Psychologie* (Paris: Alcan, 1922), pp. 854-856, 874; G. Dumas, *Nouveau TraiU de Psychologic* (Paris: Alcan, 1986), p. 1.

orange, etc. This identification, however, consists not in the apprehension of the individual concrete substance, but in the substitution of a verbal symbol for a sensory synthesis composed of sensations and images, or a configuration, a structure, a form *(Gestalt).* Consequently, consideration is restricted to what is called the perception of number, of space, of movement, of forms, of positions, etc.[3] In short, despite notable divergences, contemporary psychologists continue on the whole to offer us a rigorously phenomenalist and sensationalist explanation of perception. Keeping in view this preoccupation with. the phenomenalist and sensationalist which unites the two explanations and has a strong influence on the ends of investigators, we shall endeavor to define the contrasts which define the two attitudes.

Since each side has recourse to different descriptive concepts, the statement of the problem of perception must be twofold and the procedures employed in resolving the problem itself must reflect opposite methods. Since for associationism, the first complex experience can be reduced to simple elements-into psychic atoms-it fittingly applies the procedures of analysis which have been so successful in chemistry and physics. Perception is broken down into sensations and images, and an attempt made to discover the dynamic principles which initiate and direct the organization of the parts in reconstructing the whole according to an order of growing complexity. Once it is admitted that the establishment of an existential link among the elements of perception results from the exercise of the functions of attention and association, an effort is made to set forth the laws which condition the influence of these functions. Finally, when the content of perception has been translated into terms of signification, on the plane of consciousness, a reconstruction of the history of consciousness from its original flowering until its burial in the obscure depths of the subconscious can be undertaken. A brief description borrowed from one of the

[8] Cf. Boring, Langfeld, Weld, et alii, *Psychology: a Factual Textbook* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1935), pp. 207-273.

protagonists of the movement, the head of the Cornell School, will help to render this abstract schema more understandable:

> Our description of the psychology of perception is now complete. It has embraced four principal points. First, according to the general laws of attention and the special laws of the connection of sensations, the sensations have been joined, united, incorporated into a group. Secondly, this group of sensations is completed by images. Thirdly, this complementary group possesses a fringe, a background, a context, and this context is the psychological equivalent of its logical meaning. Fourthly, the meaning can fade from the consciousness and the conscious context can be replaced by an unconscious nervous disposition. If we transpose this description into genetic terms, we have, as the first form of perception, a certain sensory complexus enclosed in a kinesthetic framework. There then takes place an invasion of the consciousness by images which eventually modify the complexus and its framework and can, in time, replace to a great extent the sensory elements of the former and substitute itself entirely for the latter. The images themselves are far from immutable: they change and grow weak; they tend more especially to reduce themselves to a common denominator, the verbal image-a sort of symbolical shorthand replacing the primitive ideography of the mind. Finally the central complexus can appear as a pure skeleton of that which it was at first, it is no longer but a simple symbol of its original complexity and its kinesthetic framework may no longer appear at all: henceforth a certain physiological organization sustains the meaning. [4]

As might be expected, this theory had a considerable repercussion in the domain of educational psychology. In fact, its influence, intensified and prolonged by the· astonishing favor with which behaviorism was met everywhere in America, is still preponderant. In spite of its reactionary attitude towards associationism, whose curiosity regarding the content of our mental experiences and whose interest in the introspective method it does not share, behaviorism is satisfied with carrying its analytical method over into the field of conduct. In keeping with the procedures formerly employed in the study of perception, it began by seeing in a certain behavior a composite gathering of reflexes which are later linked up by adaptation

• E. B. Titchener, *op. cit.*, pp. 876-377. See also G. Dumas, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

and habit. [5] Practically speaking, such a conception entailed a radical readaptation in the manner of envisaging mental development by the communication of knowledge, and the development of personality by the inculcation of habits. Thus, on this continent, the great majority of the theorists of education, allowing themselves to be deeply impressed by the incontestable authority of E. L. Thorndike and above all by the massive array of his experimental contributions; [6] came to deny nearly all educational value to formal education-to what we call general culture-and to proclaim the necessity of the utmost specialization in teaching methods. [7] A far-reaching reaction has begun to take shape, a reaction at once interesting and liberating, but to which we cannot here give the consideration it deserves. [8]

If we turn to the point of view of the Gestalt theory, the position of the problem is appreciably modified. It is well to bear in mind the essentials of its solution to the problem:

a) The psychologists of the associationist school begin by

[5] Cf. R. S. Woodworth, *Contemporary Schools of Psychology* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1931), p. 94. To show the parallelism existing between the description of perception offered by behaviorism and that offered by associationism, we cite the following text: " It is important to realize that objects, events and their properties *as we perceive them* are the outcome or result of definite bodily processes. The perception of snow, for example, involves (1) retinal stimulation, possibly also the stimulation of other receptors, (3) transformation of the stimulus energy before it reaches the receptors and also in the receptors, (4) release and propagation of neural impulses and (5) regrouping and repatterning of the neural impulses at various stages of their journey in the neural system. In order fully to understand the perception of an object, we must relate the perception to every one of these stages of bodily activity" (Boring, Langfe!d, Weld, et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 274-275).

• Cf. especially: *Educational Psychology*, Vol. II. *The Psychology of Learning* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1913); *Human Learning* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1931); *The Fundamentals of Learning* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University,

• For a complete and authorized resume of the conception of learning which has become classical in this school of psychologists we refer the reader to P. Sandiford, *Educational Psychology* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), pp. 183-!W6, 275-300.

[8] Cf. G. W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological lnterpretat£on* (New York: Holt and Co., 1937), pp. 248-285.

supposing a sort of jumbled matter out of which the mind, through the intermediary of its synthetical functions, constructs an object, a fact, which it perceives. Thanks to its work of grouping and organizing, a form arises from this scattered collection of indifferent elements. For the partisans of the Gestalt theory, on the other hand, forms or structures should be considered as the primitive elements or points of departure.

b) The problem of perception is therefore not reducible to the question of what grouping of sensations produces a represented form, but to defining the conditions which are responsible for the apparition of a form and the laws which regulate its transformations.

c) For the Gestalt theory, the intellectual fact does not introduce into the domain of perception a factor which is properly speaking originaL At the most, it implies a certain enfranchisement from" the fixations inherent in the initial mode of representation," a power of reorganizing representations, operating when new relations between the objects are perceived.

d) For the associationist theory, perception comes into being only when the data of sensation have been grouped in the categories of experience and have, by this fact, acquired a significance; in other words, the influence of the memory commands the *whole* organization. On the other hand, the gestaltist interpretation admits no more than a secondary influence of memory on the organization of perception. Hence it :refuses to :find a sufficient explanation of perception in " the meaning which experience has bestowed on primitive inorganic sensations." In fact,

> in order that the object acquire a meaning it is necessary that it already exist as a sensible object by virtue of its intrinsic characteristics. The influence of memory is secondary to this organization which it implies but does not explain. The specific, concrete properties of the figure and the setting are not explained by differences of familiarity or practical interest. Here there exists a difference of *aspect,* primary in relation to what is added by education. A thing which was not distinguishable from its background would be a .very bad object of perception and it is hard to

see how our habits would be able to graft themselves upon it; on the contrary, they are easily poured into the mould offered by the perceptive organization of the object. [9]

One immediate consequence of these premises imposes itself upon the theorist of educational methods. If psychological reality is in keeping with this new description, is it not necessary to agree that the child in learning and the scientist in experimenting do not proceed gropingly, by "trial and error," by the critical selection of the means recognized as efficacious? Research would never encounter an impasse but would rather be a continued sequence of partial solutions, obtained by sudden adaptations or immediate intuitions. Relying less upon a disordered activity and the repetition of fortuitous attempts than upon his effort of reflection and attention, the subject would react unceasingly to the entire situation and to the interlacing of relations which give it meaning. [111]

It is worthy of note that the precursors of the Gestalt Psychology-Ehrenfels and Meinong-had undergone the influence of the Scholastic thought which dominated the teaching of their master, Franz Brentano. [11] Hence, according to them, elements of jntellectuality penetrated even our perceptions as factors of organization or interpretation of the sensory data. Although, under its present form, the Gestalt theory appears before us as the prolongation of their reaction against classic associationism, their hold remained too hesitant and weak to prevent its partisans from slipping towards a radical sensationism. Nevertheless, thanks no doubt to the definitely intellectualist character of its beginnings and the abundant factual matter that it has recently furnished in its effort to break away from outmoded forms and to create new ones better adapted to the complexity of reality, the theory exerts a powerful attraction upon those scientists who have again taken up contact with the

[9] P. Guillaume, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

[1°] Cf. L. A. Pechstein and F. D. Brown, "An Experimental Analysis of the Alleged Criteria of Insight Learning," *The Journal of Educational Psychology,* XXX (1939), pp. 38-52.

[11] Cf. T.V. Moore, *op. cit.*, VTI, 298-316.

Scholastic tradition. To be convinced of this, it is sufficient to glance at the recent works of A. Gemelli [12] and T.V. Moore. [13] Unfortunately, these men, who manipulate experimental techniques with perfect dexterity, as soon as they venture upon philosophical terrain, show signs of a too hasty and insufficient assimilation of the main Scholastic theses. All in all, despite certain misinterpretations and the incomplete nature of their description of the perceptual processes, they retain the merit of having brought out elements of explanation whose importance cannot be overestimated. They are principally these:

a) The Gestalt theory, in full agreement with Scholastic philosophy on this point, denies the possibility of explaining perception by means of an atomist and associationist interpretation.

b) The object of perception is an organized *whole (gestaltete)* , and this is immediately encountered as such in the consciousness, thanks to a primary sensory synthesis brought about by the *sensus communis* whose nature and function have been perfectly described to us by Aristotle and St. Thomas.

c) Nevertheless, perception cannot be confounded with that " organic configuration " or that " sensory organization," as is the case in the gestaltist interpretation. As can be seen by experience, signification, which is implied in perception as the condition for adequate identification of the object, remains distinct from the configuration, although inherent in it.

d) In perception, then, the sensory synthesis appears as a *primary* element independent of our previous experiences. But, since the end of perception consists in the identification of the object, it is necessary to admit a *secondary* intervention on the part of experience and memory which, through the inter-

[12] Cf. "La Psicologia della Percezione," *Acta Pont. Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aq. et Religionis Catholicae* (Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1936), II (1935), pp. 80-119.

[13] Ct *op. cit.;* also "The Scholastic Theory of Perception," *The New Scholasticism,* VII (1933), pp. 222-!il38; *Cognitive Psychology* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1939), pp. 325-383.

mediary of signification, influences the definitive orientation of the sensory organization.

According to the authors in question, nothing thus far seems too brutally opposed to a compromise with the gestaltist interpretation. But discord breaks out when these Scholastic psychologists, agreeing with several others on this point,[14] dare to offer a description of perception which transcends the data of radical sensationism. However, it must be noted that certain among them-Moore in particular-seem to incline toward an exaggerated intellectualism.

This systematical exposition of the principal attempts to explain the phenomena of perception accounts for certain tendencies which appear in various educational theories. AU these proposed explanations fall short of their object in failing to utilize thoroughly the data observed; they leave room for an interpretation at once less fragmentary and more gratifying to the experimenter.

II. ELEMENTS OF A THOMISTIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION

A theory of perception lifted out of the context to which it is related must necessarily present the schematic, truncated appearance of a partial sketch which needs to be integrated into a more ample structure. The one which we will endeavor to elaborate here will be fully intelligible only to minds already familiar with the profound gnoseological speculations of Aristotle and St. Thomas. But we believe that those who follow it to the end will be strengthened in the conviction that from this theory alone can be derived an interpretation which in no way does violence to the conclusions imposed by the facts.

First of all, it is important to note that two general characteristics eliminate the confusion which might result in an insufficient differentiation of the perceptual process in relation to other cognitive processes. On the one hand, perception is a

[10] Cf., for example, C. Spearman, *Les Aptitudes de. l'homme* (transl. by F. Brachet. Paris: Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, 1986), p. 145. J. Bourjade, *L'intelligence et la pensee de l'enfant* (Paris: Alcan, 1987), pp. 88-98, may also be cited among the theorists of education.

total grasp of the object which falls on the senses. Nevertheless! it is not a question of that group of conditions explored by the Gestalt school, which can establish upon a given foundation a clearly outlined structure, which in turn will be translated in the consciousness into a sensory configuration. The process that puts us in contact with the superficial appearances of the object, even in so far as they present a certain degree of organization, belongs to the order of sensation and not to the order of perception. This is a point to which we shall return. In passing, it is interesting to note that in order to explain this power of totalization which unites variegated aspects of the same object in a perceptual synthesis, certain contemporary authors agree with St. Thomas in not hesitating to pass beyond phenomena to the radical unity of the knowing subject. [15]

On the other hand, perception is also recognizable as an *immediate* grasp of the object. To explain better the sense of this affirmation a summary description of the modalities of human knowledge is demanded. In a general way we distinguish within ourselves a knowledge which we qualify as *intellectual,* whereby we attain the intelligibility in things, and a knowledge which we qualify as sensible or *experimental.* [16] By experimental knowledge we mean a knowledge (a) which is

[15] This conception, at once so profound and so realistic, can never be sufficiently opposed to the caricature of mental life left us by the undeservedly famous "faculty psychology," the pale substitute with which the adepts of a decadent Scholasticism gradually replaced the traditional psychology. St. Thomas expresses himself thus: " Homo cognoscit singularia per imaginationem et sensum, et ideo potest applicare universalem cognitionem quae est in intellectu, ad particulare, *non enim proprie loquendo, sensus et intellectus cognoscunt, sed homo per utrumque (De Veritate,* q. 9.!, a. 6, ad 3) ." In our own time we find an analogous affirmation from the pen of W. Stern: "Perceptual Gestalten are autonomous on their level; they *give* to the sensory material organized within them the laws of precision, completeness, transposability, etc. But they are not autonomous for levels above themselves; on the contrary they *receive* their laws and even their existence from a superordinate principle, the *person.* No Gestalt without a 'Gestalter' (former of Gestalten) . Perceptions occur as Gestalten because the person as a whole is able to apprehend the world only in separate wholes of a lesser order " *(General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint,* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938, p. 114).

[16] " Sed contra est quod dicit Philosoph us quod universale secundum rationem est notum, singulare autem secundum sensum" *(Summa Theol.,* I, q. 86, a. 1).

concerned with a singular thing,[17] and (b) which requires the presence of the object known.[18] Consequently, memory, in spite of the concrete nature of its content, is not, properly speaking, knowledge as it in no wise implies the reception of something new.[19] It is the same for the imagination, which pursues, not existential reality, but an "appearance," an *idolum,* a fiction.[20]

There is another distinction of capital importance, and it seems strange that precisely those among the neo-scholastics who have approached the study of the problem of perception have consistently misunderstood it. We mean a division of experimental knowledge which presents a striking parallel with that which is established in intellectual knowledge and expressed by the concepts " intellect " and " reason."[21] There is, first of all, an *immediate* experimental knowledge wherein the object, which is the accidental sensible *(sensibile per accidens),* is grasped without inquisition or reasoning as soon as the sensible thing becomes present to us. This is what we call *perception.*[22] Beyond this there is a discursive experimental knowledge wherein the object-a concrete relation, a particnlar cause, a contingent existence-is attained through the intermediary of a collation among the intentions *(intentiones).* This is what we shall call with the ancients the *experimentum*-experience.23

[11] " Est enim m nobis experientia, dum sil1gularia per sensum cognoscimus " *(Ibid.,* I, q. 54, a. 5, ad 2).

[18] Cf. *Ibid.,* I, q. 58, a. 3, ad 3, where St. Thomas attributes *experience* to angels and demons " secundum quamdam similitudinem," that is, in so far as they attain, like us, *present* sensible things, " prout scilicet cognoscunt sensibilia praesentia." See also *De Sensu et Sensato,* lect. 1, n. 11.

[19] Cf. *De Memoria et Reminiscentia,* lect. 4, nn. 352-353.

[20] Cf. *III De Ani1TI.a,* lect. 4, nn. 632-633.

[21] " Apud nos ea quae *statim* naturaliter apprehenduntur, intelligi dicuntur " *(Summa Theol.,* I, q. 58, a. 3) - - - - "Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere; ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam " *(Ibid.,* I, q. 79, a. 8).

[22] "Perceptio autem experimentalem quamdam notitiam significat " *(Ibid.,* I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2). We hasten to add that for St. Thomas everything contained in the sensible object is not the object of perception, " sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur," as he himself takes care to emphasize (Cf. *II De Ani1TI.a,* lect. 13, n. 396) .

[23] " Experimentum enim est ex collatione plurium singularium in memoria

Without doubt, it is to bring out this distinction that St Thomas applies to the *cogitative* operation a nomenclature that makes sense only in reference to intellectual knowledge. Thus, after using the Aristotelian designation "passive intellect" *(intellectus passivv-s)*,[24] he asserts that it also deserves the name" particular reason" *(ratio particularis)* because one of its functions is to bring about rapprochements between the " individual intentions " in the same way the " universal reason " *(ratio universalis)* does between the "universal intention."[25]

From what has been said the external characteristics of perception have been treated sufficiently to distinguish it from all other cognitive processes. Perception, by attaining the underlying substantial reality in the concrete, leaves us with a synthesis which while transcending by far the sensory synthesis of definitely phenomenalistic aspect offered by the common sense *(sensus communis),* integrates it in its proper category. By the fact that it is experimental knowledge, perception gives guarantees of realism and originality which the imaginary or mnemonic syntheses do not possess. By this same fact it is distinguished from intellectual perception[26] which is abstract knowledge that neglects in the concrete the conditions of actual existence and regards only an internal structure, an intimate law, essential relations, which will be identical in all the subjects in which they are found. Finally, by its character of immediateness, perception is distinguished from experimental discursus which,

receptorum" (1 *Metaphysicorum,* lect. I, n. 15). It is evident, then, that perception has for its aim the apprehension .of those singulars whose comparison, *after the manner of reasoning,* will lead to the *"experimentum."* For the classical description of this process, see the text of *11 Posteriorum Analyticorum,* lect. 20, n. 11.

[24] " Passivus intellectus corruptibilis est. . . . Tamen haec pars animae dicitur intellectus, sicut et dicitur rationalis, inquantum aliqualiter participat rationem, obediendo rationi, et sequendo motum eius. . . . Sine hac autem parte animae corporalis, intellectus nihil intelligit" *(Ill De Anima,* lect. 10, n. 745).

[25] " Huiusmodi autem collatio est homini propria, et pertinet ad vim cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur: quae est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis intentionum universalium" (I *Metaph.,* lect. 1, n. 15). See also *11 De Anima,* lect. 13, n. 396 and *Ill,* lect. 16, n. 845.

[26] Cf. P. Hoenen, "De origine primorum principiorum scientiae" *Gregorianum* XIV (1933), pp. 153-184.

basing itself upon data furnished by perception, arrives at an image stripped of all the more accessory contingencies. That is, it arrives at a judgment of fact, a beginning ofscientific generalization, or at a concrete judgment of value which engages the affective side and gives the impulse to our activity. Perception is insufficient to supply this new extension of experimental knowledge which must appeal to memory to supplement the necessary data:'<l

The perceptual process is capable of a profound analysis beyond the purely descriptive treatment we have attempted, and since nothing enlightens us more on the nature of a functional process than the study of its object, we shall consider the object of perception. We have already admitted that for the Thomistic psychologist this object is none other than the accidental sensible *(sensibile per accidens),* that is, the concrete substance. This affirmation, as all are aware, goes against phenomenalistic prejudices, which still dominate contemporary scientific thought, but are beginning to repel the better minds who are corning to realize the attractive perspectives opened up by philosophical speculations.

First of all, what exactly do we mean by an «accidental sensible," a *sensibile per accidens?* Those familiar with the terminology of St. Thomas know that in opposition to the *sensibile per se* which produces in the sensory organ an alteration determining the species or modality of the sensation, the *sensibile per accidens* is that which causes no modification in the sense as such.[28] More precisely, two conditions permit the identification of the *sensibile per accidens:*

a) It must be presented conjointly with that which is perceived by the sense *per se,* as when the white thing is at the same time a *man.*

[21] " Ex sensu fit memoria in illis animalibus, in quibus remanet impressio sensibilis; ex memoria autem multoties facta circa eamdem rem, in diversis tamen singularibus, fit experimentum; quia experimentum nihil aliud esse videtur quam accipere aliquid ex multis in memoria retentis" (II *Post. Anal.,* lect. 20, n. H).

[28] See on this subject the limpid text unfortunately only too often neglected or misinterpreted, of *11 De Anima,* lect. 18, nn. 898-394.

b) It must be perceived by the subject simultaneously with the quality which is modifying his sensory organ. [29]

The *sensibile per accidens,* then, is that which is immediately perceived by the subject knowing at the same time that one or the other of his sensory organs is actuated by its specific stimulus. This supposes, of course, a cognitive activity which accompanies and prolongs the sensory activity. The function whereby we reach that which is contained in the content of the sensation, [30] and yet which transcends the assimilative powers of the latter, is attributed by St. Thomas to the cogitative power or to the intellect accordingly as it is directed towards the concrete substance or the abstract nature. [31]

We cannot pause here to study intellectual perception which is characterized on its own level by a veritable immediateness, but which is necessarily prepared by an experimental discursus which is more or less elaborate. [82] We are obliged to admit that the neo-scholastics of our acquaintance who have undertaken the study in reference to contemporary theories have made serious errors on the true nature of sensible perception. Either they seem to have completely ignored (as is the case with T.V. Moore and A. Gemelli) the preponderant role the cogitative power plays in intellectual cognition [33] or else, when they have suspected the importance of this intervention, they have (like C. Fabro [34]) confused perception, or immediate experimental

•• Cf. *II De Anima,* lect. 13, n. 395.

[30] Cf. *11 Post. Anal.,* lect. n. !4.

[81] " Quod ergo sensu proprio non cognoscitur, si sit aliquid universale, apprehenditur intellectu; non tamen omne quod intellectu apprehendi potest in re sensibili, potest dici sensibile per accidens, sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensatae o.pfWehenditur intellectu. Sicut statim cum video aliquem loquentem, vel movere seipsum, apprehendo per intellectum vitam. eius, unde possum dicere quod video eum vivere. Si vero apprehendatur in singulari, utputa cum video coloratum, percipio hlillc hominem vel hoc animal, huiusnwdi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam . . . " (Il *De Anima,* lect. 18, n. 396).

•• Cf. M. *I.* Congar, "Le role des images dans !'abstraction intellectuelle se!on Cajetan," *Revue Thomi8te,* (numero double: nov. 1934--fevr. 1935), pp.

[83] See the writings of those authors already mentioned at the beginning of the present WGrk.

•• Cf. "KnGwledge and Perception in Aristotelico-Thomistic Psychology," *The New Scholasticism,* XII (1938), pp. 337-865.

knowledge, with the *experimentum,* or discursive experimental knowledge.

More precisive was the psychological intuition of the older Scholastics who have left us a description of sensible perception admirable in its firmness and exactness. We are already acquainted with the principal elements which entered into its elaboration: distinctive characteristics of perception, ontological content of perception, role of the cogitative power. Henceforth we have only to follow in detail the evolution of this process and situate it in its gnoseological context. For greater conciseness we shall have a recourse once more to a systematic exposition:

a) Let us suppose that a certain object be placed for a moment in my hands. We all know that its resistance, its temperature, its color, its sound, its smell, etc., immediately begin to exert a specific stimulus upon my sensory organs. But, in keeping with contemporary psychologists, St. Thomas explicitly affirms that this stimulus will assume a different modality according to the dimensions of the object, its disposition, its conformation, its state of rest or motion, etc. In a word, the specific stimulus will be necessarily shaped according to the conditions deriving from the quantitative determination of the object."[5] We are here in presence of an objective configuration, called by St. Thomas a" sensible by nature" *(sensibile per se),* in which he distinguishes a proper sensible *(sensibile proprium)* and a common sensible (*sensibile commune)* in order to satisfy the demands of psychological analysis.

35 " Differentiam autem circa immutationem sensus potest aliquid facere dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad ipsam speciem agentem; et sic faciunt differentiam circa immutationem sensus sensibilia per se, secundum quod hoc est color, illud autem est sonus, hoc autem est album, illud vero nigrum. . . . Quaedam vero alia faciunt differentiam in transmutatione sensuum, non quantum ad speciem agentis, sed quantum ad modum actionis. Qualitates enim sensibiles movent sensum corporaliter et situaliter. Uncle aliter movent secundum quod sunt in maiori vel minori corpore, et secundum quod sunt in diverso situ, scilicet vel propinquo, vel remoto, vel eodem, vel diverso. Et hoc modo faciunt circa immutationem sensuum differentiam sensibilia communia" (II *De Ani11W,* lect. IS, n. 394).

b) This objective configuration affects the subject perceiving it after the manner of a multiple stimulus. But one ought not to conclude from this that the configuration cannot cross the threshold of consciousness without undergoing a falsifying disjunction. In fact, the common sense *(sensus communis),* which is the center of convergence of all sensory activity, [36] presents us with an organic and living synthesis that is the conscious reproduction of the objective configuration, a synthesis that is not a reconstmction but is immediately grasped in its original unity. [37] Nevertheless, it should be noted that if we were to stop there we should know the organized ensemble of the sensible appearances of an object only as the determinant of the sensory configuration that has just made its appearance in the consciousness. Even though we should not know the significance of these sensible properties, we would know that they are not a product of our irnagination. [38]

c) At this juncture, the necessity of having recourse to an intervention of the cogitative power, which alone attains the singular substance, becomes more and more obvious. In fact, by themselves and outside of the subject -to which they refer, accidents have neither existence nor unity. This comes down to saying that, once detached from their subject, accidents lose all ontological consistency and offer no hold to knowledge under any form whatsoever. [39] This will suffice to help us glimpse something of the nature of the new synthesis presented to us

[36] " Et licet sensus exteriores sint plures, tamen ultimum, ad quod terminantur immutationes ·horum sensuum, est unum; quia est quasi quaedam medietas una inter omnes sensus, sicut centrum, ad quod terminantur omnes lineae, quasi ad unum medium " *(Ill De Anima,* lect. n. 773).

[37] St. Thomas, while attributing to the " *sensus communis* " the power of distinguishing between the different sensory changes, shows that this power presupposes the primacy of synthesis: " Ostendit quod oportet simul utrumque cognosci. . . . Hoc autem non potest esse, *nisi simul ea apprehenderet,* idest in illo instanti, pro quo iudicat esse altera. Manifestum est ergo quod simul cognoscit utrumque. Ergo sicut est inseparabilis potentia, id est una et eadem quae cognoscit utrumque eorum inter quae iudicatur differentia, ita oportet quod in inseparabili tempore apprehendat utrumque" *(Ill De Anima,* lect. 3, n. 605).

[38] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 84, a. 8,

[••] Cf. *VII Metaph.,* lect. 4, nn.

by what we shall call with Cajetan the " simple functioning of the cogitative power" *(simplex cogitaivae operatio)* and to explain its character of immediateness. What appears to us is the concrete substance, upholding this very complex structure with its qualifications, its determinations, assuring it an inalienable originality in the midst of all existing things. No material detail escapes this total view: the nuances are precise, the lines clear, the outlines sharp. We know how difficult it is for a child to recognize as a dog an animal-actually a dog-whose appearance presents to the child differences from that of his own dog which an adult would hardly notice. Likewise a slight diversification of clothing suffices to trouble a child's perception of a person he knows.

d) This explanation brings to light the role played by perception in the more general process of human knowledge. Perception is a first contact with a given object, completely individuated and therefore containing inexhaustible virtualities, a sort of unlimited invitation to further cognitive activity. As Cajetan, [40] following Averroes/ [1] has taken care to emphasize

[40] " Sed ut clarior pateat supradictorum et materiae huius intellectus, notandus est modus quo Aristoteles hoc in loco putat ex sensu cognitione generari cognitionem principiorum: hoc enim plurimum proderit. Cum vidisset Aristoteles quod intellectus non movetur nisi ab intelligibili in actu, et res intelligibiles (prout sunt in particularibus sensibilibus) esse intelligibiles (in potentia valde remota) eo quod plurimum materialitatis habeant, posuit ipsas res intelligibiles deferri primo ad sensus, ut in eis positae sine materia magis approprinquant ad hoc quod fiant intelligibiles in actu. Deinde quoniam in sensibus exterioribus et communi positae multas habent conditiones materiales posuit eas poni in cogitativa, ad hoc ut proximae fiant intelligibilitati, et quoniam *simplex cogitativae operatio* non sufficit universaliter ad hoc ut res per earn cognita sit tantae spiritualitatis, ut possit actione intellectus agentis fieri actu intelligibilis, posuit *frequentem conver.nonem et operationem cogitativae circa eamdem rem,* disponere rem illam ut cogitatam, ad hoc ut proxima sit intelligibilitati in actu, et habilis sit ut earn transferat intellectus agens in ordinem intelligibilium in actu. Habent autem vim taliter disponendi huiusmodi actus frequentati pro quanto habent vim collectivam, et adunativam particularium in unum quasi universale, quod est objectum experimentalis habitus, qui ex frequentia talium actuum generatur. Cum enim terminus ultimus istius processus sit cognitio vere universalis, consentaneum est ut id, quod ultimum medium et simillimum termino est, sit quasi universale (quod universale confusum possumus appellare). Sic autem re disposita et reducta ad tantam spiritualitatem, operatione intellectus agentis fit vere universalis et intelligibilis in

with his customary keenness and depth, perception-called here *8implex cogitativae operatio,* (simple functioning of the cogitative power) by analogy, *no* doubt, with intellectual simple apprehension-furnishes us with an image which, at least in most cases, needs to be decanted or dematerialized in order to become intelligible in *proximate* potency. This task of reduction and schematization which, in order to leave a concrete beginning for generalization, strips away the notes which are too accessory and individual, marks a new phase in the process of knowledge. It is to be identified with that " gathering together *of* individual intentions " *(collatio intentiom.tm individualium),* that discursive, experimental knowledge of which the old Scholastics speak, and should consequently be regarded as *normally* following the simple perception of the concrete. The synthesis at which it arrives is relieved of details, impoverished; yet in a sense it is less confused, for the links connecting it with its origins are more explicit and more exactly appreciated. In this synthesis we recognize the image which is sufficiently " spiritualized " for the universal to be drawn from it by abstraction. But to follow the process of human knowledge to its final stages would be beyond the scope of this study.

Nevertheless, before we conclude, there is a further point worthy of discussion, that is, the extent to which intellectuality

actu et movet consequenter intellectum possibilem ad sui cognitionem" *(Commentaria in libros Poster. Anal. Aristotelis* (Venetiis, apud Junctas, MDLVI), lib. IT, c. 13 (19), fol. 1llrb. Cited by C. Fabro, *op. cit.,* pp. 858-859). For a more detailed exposition of Cajetan's thought on this subject, we refer the reader to M.-J. Congar, *op. cit.,* pp. 225-245.

"."Non intendebat (Arist.) quod sensus comprehendit essentias rerum, sicut quidam existamaverunt, hoc enim est alterius potentiae qui dicitur intellectus. sed intendebat quod sensus cum hoc quod comprehendunt sua sensibilia propria, comprehendunt intentiones individuales diversas in generibus et · speciebus: comprehendunt igitur huius hominis individualis et huius equi individualis, et universaliter intentionem uniuscuiusque decem praedicamentorum individualium, et hoc videtur esse proprium sensibus hominis . . . Et ista intentio individualis est ilia quam distinguit virtus cogitativa a forma imaginativa *et ezpoliat* earn ab eis quae sunt adiuncta cum ea ex istis sensibilibus communibus et propriis et reponit ea in rememorativa" *(Commenta:ria Il'Uper libros Aristotelis de Anima,* ed. Veneta, 1562, t. VI, lib. Ill, t. 6, fol. 154r. Cited by C. Fabro; *op. cit.,* p. 854).

is discernible in human perception. We have alluded above to the exaggerated intellectualism contained in the interpretations proposed by certain neo-scholastics. [42] In view of the long description just given, it should be evident that our conception of the problem cannot be open to a like charge. Therefore, instead of delaying in useless discussion, we shall simply try to show at what point intellectuality insinuates itself into the perceptual process,

All know, in a general way, that our sensibility has origin in an intellectual soul, and receives thereby a certain ennoblement, which, without affecting its essential constituents, transforms the modality of its activity. [43] As to perception, this originality finds expression in three characteristics which we shall now endeavor to define.

Considered from the point of view of the object, human perception appears to be incomparably more extensive than that of the animal. Whereas every material *thing,* as such, in that it possesses an individual existence, offers a hold to this sensible apprehension, it is only by its useful or harmful aspect that it strikes the animal. The sheep indeed perceives this lamb and this grass, but not as this lamb and this grass; this lamb is ·perceived by it in so far as it is *nourishable,* and this grass in so far as it is *nourishment.* In a word, everything that does not constitute for the animal a beginning or a term for its activity necessarily transcends its power of perception. In the animal, in contrast to what takes place in man, the limits of action are those that circumscribe the field of perception. [44] Even if we

[42] By way of example, we cite here several lines of the summary in which Father T. V. Moore resumes his thought: "The interpretation of experience is intellectual cognition, transcending sensation and imagery. When one arranges proper conditions, it is found that perception, or the interpretation of experience, goes through certain stages: a) A general knowledge best expressed by the word "something." b) More detailed information which arises by assimilating the incoming sensation to past intellectual categories of experience. . . . The past categories of experience, to which a sensory presentation is assimilated in the process of perception, were termed in the Middle Ages: *species intelligibiles" (Cegnitive Psychology,* p.

[43] In this sense, St. Thomas affirms: "Sensus etiam est quaedam de:ficiens participatio inteHectus" *(Summa Theol.,* I, q. 77, a. 7). See on this subject K. Michalski, "La sublimation thomiste," *Angelicum,* XV (1937), pp. 2l!il-S22.

[44] "Cogitativa *apprehendit* individuum, ut existens sub natura communi; quod

were to envisage perception exclusively as a principle directing action, it is impossible to deny the ennobling influence of intellectuality. Animal perception orientates activity in a single direction which the animal itself is powerless to modify; to the same stimulus it habitually reacts in the same, easily foreseen way. Furthermore, at this level, perception could not give birth to a supple and many-sided activity which takes into account the adaptations required by the infinite variety of circumstances. Human perception, on the contrary, initiates a " rational " process which allows the child to escape early this double determinism. [45]

Finally, with man, perception is a source of disinterested enjoyment, of esthetic enjoyment. [46] For him alone knowledge

contingit ei, inquantum unitur intellectivae in eodem subiecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hie homo, et hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum. Aestimativa autem *non apprehendit* aliquod individuum, secundum quod est sub natura communi, sed solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius actionis vel passionis; sicut ovis cognoscit hunc agnum, non inquantum est hie agnus, sed inquantum est ab ea lactabilis; et hanc herbam, inquantum est eius cibus. Unde alia individua ad quae se non extendit eius actio vel passio, *nt#lo modo apprehendit* sua aestimativa naturali " (II *De Anima*, lect. 18, n. 898).

•• " Eorum autem quae a seipsis moventur, quorumdam motus ex iudicio rationis proveniunt, quorumdam vero ex iudicio naturali. Ex iudicio rationis homines agunt et moventur; conferunt enim de agendis; sed ex iudicio naturali agunt et moventur omnia bruta. Quod quidem patet tum ex hoc quod omnia quae sunt eiusdem speciei, similiter operantur, sicut omnes hirundines similiter faciunt nidum: tum ex hoc quod habent indicium ad aliquod opus determinatum, et non ad omnia; sicut apes non habent industriam ad faciendum aliquod aliud opus nisi favos mellis; et similiter est de aliis animalibus" *(Q. D. De Veritate,* q. a. I).

••" Sensus autem, ut dicitur in *I Metaph.,* in princ., propter duo diliguntur, scilicet propter cognitionem et propter utilitatem: unde et utroque modo contingit esse delectationem secundum sensum. Sed quia apprehendere ipsam cognitionem tamquam bonum quiddam, proprium est hominis, ideo primae delectationes sensuum, quae scilicet sunt secundum cognitionem, sunt propriae hominum; delectationes autem sensuum, inquantum diliguntur propter utilitatem, sunt communes omnibus animalibus" *(Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 31, a. 6). "In aliis enim animalibus ex aliis sensibus non causantur delectationes nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus; sicut leo delectatur videns cervum vel audiens vocem eius, propter cibum. Homo autem delectatur secundum alios sensus, non solum propter hoc, sed etiam propter convenientiam sensibilium . . . sicut cum delectatur homo in sono bene harmonizato . . . " *(Ibid.,* 11-11, q. 141, a. 4, ad 3). See also: *Ibid.,* I, q. 19, a. 8, adS; I-ll, q. 35, ad 3; ll-11, q. 167,

is a delight; for him alone everything which has color, shape, proportions pleasing the eye, everything that gives a harmonious sound, is an occasion for emotion. If, on the contrary, we perceive in an animal a flash of curiosity or satisfaction at the appearance or sound of something, we do not doubt for a moment that this new perception contains a promise of satisfaction for its appetite, an invitation to rest or well-being.

III. CoNCLUSION

Some, perhaps, will consider our procedure too abstract. We have deliberately abstained from reviewing the facts of observation which we suppose to be present in the memory of every philosopher worthy of the name, in order that we might devote ourselves to the explanations which those facts have suggested to investigators belonging to different schools. To approach the roots of a very difficult problem which has been confused by innumerable controversies, we felt that comparative study of the various attempts at interpretation was necessary. Following this, we have utilized the data offered by the powerful Scholastic synthesis, in an endeavor to elaborate a description of human perception which would enlighten us as to its true nature and its properties, and would bring out the precise significance of the facts gathered by experimentation. Thomistic philosophy we believe offers as an approach to the study of contemporary psychology that ,sure and firm lucidity which is at the basis of every truly progressive enterprise.

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THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

PART III

THE END OF THE STATE: HAPPINESS

(continued)

IN THE preceding sections of Part III, we established two propositions of crucial importance to the theory ?f Democracy-two principles which are indispensable to understanding the demonstrability of the truth that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government. The first of these propositions was that human life can be perfected in time by a purely natural happiness, which is truly a last end *simpliciter* because it is not ordained to any greater good as a means, even though it is subordinate to another last end which is a greater good, namely, the supernatural happiness of eternal beatitude. The second proposition consisted in the definition of natural happiness, what it is and what it is not. Let us repeat the definition which we proved to be true: happiness is activity in accordance with perfect virtue in a complete life attended by a sufficiency of the goods of fortune. This defi:nition conceives natural happiness as the strictly proportional analogue of supernatural beatitude: each is a whole of goods; each leaves nothing to be desired in its own order because it consists in the possession of all good things, the one successively in the process of a whole life, the other simultaneously in an eternal rest.[20] [1t]

Vd. Part III, Section S, *supra,* in THE THOMIST, IV, I. There is no difficulty in understanding the distinction between natural happiness and supernatural beatitude, for they differ not only as ends to be attained by natural and supernatural means, but also by reason of the radical diremption between time and eternity. What does require care, however, is the distinction between two perfections which occur in time, i. e., between natural happiness and supernatural contemplation, which is an inchoate participation in, and a remote anticipation of, the beatific vision. When this distinction is understood, it will be seen that natural happiness does not consist in contemplation, for supernatural contemplation is obviously excluded, and purely natural contemplation (i. e., the activity of the speculative

Natural happiness, thus defined, is the end of the state. *As* we have shown, the very naturalness of the state, its necessity as a means, depends upon the existence of this end.[204] No

virtues) is only a partial good, albeit the most worthy, and no partial good 'can be identical with happiness. Furthermore, the division into active and contemplative does not apply to the natural dimensions of human life, but only to the life of grace; human life naturally lived is (in a sense already explained) a life of work, not of rest, and intrinsically a social life. Hence we can also define natural happiness in the following terms: work in accordance with the social virtues, in a complete life, lived politically, enriched by the fruits of the common good, as well as supplied sufficiently with the goods of fortune. Vd. Section 3, *supra, lac. cit.,* p. 178, and fn. 198 and 198a.

On the point that natural happiness leaves nothing to be desired *which is naturally attainable in this life,* that it leaves no *natural,* as opposed to *transcendental,* desire unsatisfied, see fn. 148, l49a, and 161 *supra.* This truth must not be exaggerated, however, to the neglect of the equally important fact that natural happiness is essentially imperfect. Wherein lies this imperfection? The answer turns on a distinction between two aspects of the good as an object of desire: (l) we desire to obtain a good we do not now possess; (2) we desire to retain a good we now enjoy. The good is not only an object to be attained, but to be preserved from loss. We not only seek the good but work to persevere in it. (Vd. Part II, *supra,* in THE THOMIST, III, 4, pp. 595-97.) Now no temporal and natural good is immutable. With the attainment of such goods, the will cannot rest, for even if no more goods remained to be sought, the achieved goods would have to be preserved; as subject to loss unless we work to preserve them, they remain objects of desire. The essential imperfection of natural happiness, then, arises from the mutability and impermanence of the goods which constitute it. Although natural happiness can satisfy every natural desire which is a motion toward the attainment of some type of good, the desire to persevere in the goods attained, or to increase them, cannot be finally satisfied in the realm of time and change. (Cf. *III Cont. Gent.* 48; also *ibid.,* 39, wherein the defect of the best natural knowledge is made clear.) The imperfection of the natural last end is thus seen in the paradoxical fact that it is an end which can never be fully achieved: it can never be so fully reached that desire itself is abolished and the will is at rest. We have already indicated this by contrasting natural and supernatural happiness as a happiness of work and a happiness of rest-the one a happiness perpetually becoming, the other a happiness eternally in being. (Vd. Part III, Section 3, *supra, lac. cit.,* pp. 149-151, 166.) There can be no rest in time within the orbit of natural motions. Only in eternity and in the supernaturally granted knowledge of God, can there be rest, the abolition of all desire, the complete quiescence of the will. But although the imperfect (natural) end cannot put an end to desire, it functions as the end at which natural desire perpetually aims. In the order of time and natural operations, there cannot be a *terminal* end, an end which terminates desire; but there can be a *normative* end, an end which sets the measure of *attainable* perfection at which natural desire can *effectively* (not transcendentally) aim.

••• Vd. Section 2, *supra, lac. cit.,* esp. pp. 132-36.

other end-neither eternal beatitude, nor supernatural contemplation in this life--can account for the state as originating naturally in response to a natural need-the need of a rationally social animal for political community in order, not merely to live, but to lead a good human life, the life of virtue. [205] A fundamental metaphysical truth is regulative of our analysis at this point. Whatever has its being as a natural means must also have causal efficacy in the attainment of a natural end; from which it follows that no natural means can ever operate merely as an instrumental cause in the attainment of ends which, being supernatural, require supernatural means as the principal causes. This truth can be stated in another way: whatever has the efficacy of an instrumental means in an order of causality which transcends its mode of being must also have the efficacy of a principal means in an order of causality which is commensurate to its mode of being. Hence, since the mode of being of the state and of the acquired virtues is natural, their efficacy as means cannot be entirely instrumental; on the contrary, they must be able to operate *primarily* as principal means and, therefore, toward the attainment of a purely natural end. [206]

[205] The reader must remember that the common good (i. e., the *bonum communitatis)* is not the end of the state when the state is viewed as a means; and, furthermore, that the common good is an intermediate end, which requires that it be ordained, within the natural order, as a means to a greater good, also natural. Whatever operates naturally as a means must be able to work for a natural end. The analysis presented in Part II *supra* (THE THOMIST, Ill, 4) should prevent any reader from confusing or identifying happiness, the perfection of an individual human life, with the common good, which is the well-being and welfare of a community *as such;* but it is necessary to remind the reader here of the ambiguity of another traditional phrase. " The good of civil life " is sometimes used as equivalent in signification to " the common good," and sometimes as meaning natural happiness, for that, being the life of the social virtues, is impossible apart from civil circumstances. We shall use the phrase in the latter sense exclusively. Vd. Part III, Section 3, *supra, lac. cit.,* pp. 144-46.

[200] - Every instrumental agent carries out the action of the principal agent by some action proper and connatural to itself: thus natural heat produces flesh by dissolving and digesting, and a saw works for the completion of the bench by cutting. Accordingly if there is a creature that works as an instrument of the first creator, it must do oo by some action due and proper to its own nature. The

This being true, there would seem to be no difficulty about accounting for the achievement of happiness in terms of the operation of purely natural causes. But, unfortunately, an absolute consideration of the relation of means to ends does not suffice, because it abstracts from the actual condition of man's fallen nature, and so leads to a false simplicity in the practical order where we must concern ourselves with using means that are available. The practical problem is not whether the acquired virtues are principal means to natural happiness, but whether, in view of the actual condition of fallen nature, men can acquire these virtues by purely natural operations. What is here said about the acquired virtues applies equally to the state as a natural means, for the question is not whether the common good serves happiness, but whether, in a *de facto* consideration of man's nature, the common good itself can be naturally procured. [207]

We turn at once to the consideration of this theological problem in Section 4. Subsequently, in Section *5,* we shall consider what is, in contrast, more properly a political question and for the philosopher-the problem of the state as a means to happiness, in view of the fact that the state seems justified in asking men to risk their lives for the common good. And finally, in Section 6, we shall try to show what bearing this whole discussion of happiness has upon the theory of Democracy. [208]

effect corresponding to the instrument's proper action precedes in the order of generation the effect which corresponds to the principal agent: for the cutting of the wood precedes the form of the bench, and digestion of food precedes the generation of flesh" (II *Cont. Gent.,* 21).

[207] We pointed out, in Part III, Section 1 (vd. *loc. cit.,* p. 130), that the order of three questions must be carefully observed: *whether natural happiness is* precedes the discussion of *what such happiness is;* and both are logically prior to the question, *how can it be attained?* It is important to stress the posteriority of this third question, because, no matter how it is answered, the prior proof that natural happiness is, and the prior analysis of what it is, stands unaltered. The same thing is true of beatitude. That it is and what it is are prior, in the order of understanding, to the more difficult, and also more practical, question concerning the means, their source, their availability, their use, etc.

[208] This order of topics conforms to the outline of Part III, given in the Preamble Vd. *loc. cit.,* pp. 129-130.

4. With respect to the dogma of man's fall from grace in consequence of original sin, there are two errors which must be avoided. The first is the error of supposing that fallen nature is *deprived merely* of the preternatural and supernatural gifts which man would retain so long as he deserved to remain in Eden. If one accepted the false supposition that integral human nature exists in this world, one would have no reason to doubt that man as he is has sufficient competence to acquire the natural virtues and to attain thereby the sort of happiness in this life which is his connatural end. If the fallen nature were in no way weakened or disordered, if original sin in no way interfered with the pursuit of natural goods-goods which are due to the nature--then we could proceed to discuss the attainment of natural happiness entirely in philosophical terms, and without any reference to theology. [209]

The second error consists in supposing that fallen nature is *entiTely deprived* of its capacity for seeking the good. Those who hold this view use the word " corrupt " to signify a nature in which the inclination to virtue is not merely weakened or diminished by original sin, but completely destroyed. In terms of this false and pessimistic conception of man as he exists in the world, there could be no philosophical discussion of the pursuit of natural happiness, nor for that matter could the philosopher (even in the light of theology) consider the cooperation of natural with supernatural causes. The efficacy of natural causes being totally abolished, there could only be a theological account of moral acts in terms of a theory of grace which regarded grace as supplanting nature, rather than as elevating and restoring it. Error in the understanding of fallen nature necessarily leads to an erroneous conception of grace.

[209] On this interpretation, there could be no defense of Maritain's proposition that, adequately considered, moral and political philosophy must be subalternated to theology. Moral and political philosophy would be *incomplete* as practical knowledge because they dealt only with natural ends; but in treating such ends, and the means thereto, the philosopher could speak adequately, not only theoretically but practically, without appealing to anything but natural principles. Cf. fn. 161 *supra.* Vd. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom,* New York, 1940: pp. 161-176,

The Thomistic interpretation of the consequences of original sin avoids both of these errors. To the question, whether sin diminishes the good of nature, St. Thomas replies:

> The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature.
>
> Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz., the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Human acts produce an inclination to like acts. Now from the very fact that a thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other contrary is necessarily diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue. [209]

In Thomistic terms, the two errors we have mentioned arise from failing to understand this threefold distinction among the goods of nature. The error at the pessimistic extreme seems to suppose that sin destroys the good of nature in the first sense, for so long as natural principles remain, such as reason and will, they must retain some efficacy as powers operating toward a connatural end-the end of virtue. [210] The error at the optimistic extreme seems to suppose that sin merely deprives man of the good of nature in the third sense, without in

[209] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 85, a. 1.

[210] The good of nature that is diminished by sin is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely" (*Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 85, a. 2). Cf. *Ibid.*, a. 3; and also, II-II, q. 164. For a description of the state of innocence, in which human nature is elevated by original justice to a condition superior to the hypothetical condition of integrity apart from supernatural gifts, vd. *ibid.*, I, qq. 94-101.

any way having an effect on the inclination to virtue and virtue's end that is the tendency of nature's powers. And just as the one error leads to a false conception of grace, so the other results in a denial of the need for grace to enable men to achieve those goods which are their natural due.

Our task is to solve the problem which results from a proper understanding of fallen nature and its need for grace. ·when we use the word " corrupt " to refer to human nature as it exists in the world, we shall mean only what St. Thomas means in using this word, namely, a nature weakened and disordered by original sin; wounded in the sense that the efficacy of its natural powers is impaired; sinful in the sense that, as a result of its deordination from God, it is inclined to evil as well as to good.[211] And when, henceforth, we refer to a *de facto* consideration of man's life in the natural order, we shall mean a consideration of moral and political problems, not merely with reference to the *fact* of the fall, but in the light of that *interpretation* of the fact which denies man's competence to achieve natural happiness unaided, but does not withdraw all efficacy from natural causes. In contrast, by an *absolute* consideration we shall mean a discussion of means and ends in relation to human nature, *not a.s it is*, but on the *hypothesis* of an uncorrupted or integral condition.

We have already seen that there is no problem if fallen nature is simply nature deprived of supernatural habiliments,

[211] In regard to St. Thomas's use of the word "corrupt," vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 82, aa. 2, 4; q. 83, a. 4; q. 85, aa. 1,. 2, 3; also q. 109, a. 2, subsequently quoted in our discussion of grace.

In regard to the precise character of the disorder or corruption which is due to original sin, vd. *IV Cont. Gent., 52:* "Man was from the beginning so fashioned that, as long as his reason was subject to God, not only would his lower powers serve him without hindrance, but there would be nothing in his body to lessen its subjection, since whatever was lacking in nature to bring this about, God by His grace would supply. Whereas no sooner did his reason turn away from God, than his lower powers rebelled against his reason, and his body became subject to sufferings that counteract the life it receives from the soul." Original justice consisted in the perfect subjection of the lower powers to reason-" God supplying by grace that which nature lacked for this purpose." As a result of sin man not only forfeited this gift of grace (i. e., original justice), but also suffered an actual disorder in the powers of his specific human nature.

rather than nature suffering the loss of its own integrity. But it is equally true that no problem exists if the only ultimate good, the only last end *simpliciter,* is supernatural beatitude. In the first place, neither integral nor corrupted nature can achieve a supernatural end without supernatural means, in relation to which, as principal causes, all natural means must function instrumentally. And, in the second place, the incompetence of natural means with respect to a supernatural end is true in terms of an absolute mode of consideration, and quite apart from a *de facto* consideration of man's actual condition. Even with human nature in its integrity, the acquired cardinal virtues are not sufficient, by themselves, to help man achieve any greater good than his natural end. Since it is admitted that the fall does not destroy nature, but only weakens it, it remains within the power of fallen nature to achieve some of the partial goods which are objects of natural appetite. fallen nature is hindered only from obtaining *the whole good* which is its due. Now if the only whole of goods (i. e., the only last end, the only happiness) is supernatural beatitude, then man's natural condition may complicate his pursuit of happiness, but it does not generate a special problem, because such an end is not due his nature even in its integrity. The special problem we are considering, therefore, cannot be understood except in terms of two facts: first, the weakened condition of fallen nature, and second, a purely natural whole of goods which as constituting the happiness of temporal life is the end commensurate to nature in its integrity. [212]

[212] In carrying this discussion forward, we shall not mention supernatural contemplation in this life, which is strictly not a species of happiness, *as* are eternal beatitude and the perfection of a whole temporal life, but is rather an imperfect participation here and now of the beatific vision-what St. Thomas calls an "inchoate beatitude." Without supernatural causes, such contemplation would be impossible for human nature even in its integrity; in this respect it does not differ from what is truly the supernatural last end; and, therefore, it raises no special problem we need consider here.

It should be emphasized again that those who deny temporal happiness as *a perfect end in the natural order,* due to misconceptions about the objects of natural desire (vd. fn. 148 and l49a *supra),* must acknowledge that the incompetence of fallen nature becomes unintelligible for them. For the special incompe-

There is one further point to be observed, of major importance for the understanding of this problem. Suppose someone were still to say-in spite of all our efforts at proof to the contrary-that the common good (i.. e., the *bonum communitatis)* is the only natmal end in the temporal order, that beyond the common good there are only supernatural ends, whether in time or in eternity, and that the common good is an end *secundum quid* which, as intermediate, is ordained to serve these higher, but supernatural, goods. We mention this supposition, which is demonstrably false, for two reasons. In the first place, the aetiological problem is unaltered. Those who persist in this error must face, in terms of it, exactly the same problem that we do in terms of the truth about natural happiness, because *if* the common good is the supreme objective of man's natural activities (if it is the highest good which is commensurate with his nature in its integrity), *then* the wounded condition of fallen nature must impede its complete attainment, as much as that weakened condition makes the full achievement of natural happiness impossible. The incompetence of corrupt nature to obtain all the good that is due the integral nature bars man equally from procuring the common good in its perfection and from fulfilling his capacity for happiness. Both frustations flow from the same cause, i. e., the inability of fallen man perfectly to acquire the cardinal virtues (as interconnected) through the unaided exercise of his natural powers. To whatever extent the cardinal virtues cannot be perfectly acquired by fallen man, to that extent he is defeated in his efforts to realize the ideal common good of the political community, as much as in the pursuit of his individual happiness. [213]

tence of fallen nature must be understood in terms of its inability to achieve the whole good that is proportionate to nature in its integrity. If the integral nature had no connatural object-an end naturally attainable because commensurate with the full efficacy of natural means-then it could not be true that fallen nature is debarred from this proportionate good by the reduced efficacy of natural means. Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 109, a. 5, ad 3.

[213] Once it is admitted that the political order has a certain autonomy, and hence that the common good has a certain status as an end, albeit intermediate or *secundum quid,* the problem arises concerning the full accomplishment of this

This leads us to see, in the second place, that the crux of our problem is formulated by questions concerning the cardinal *(natural)* virtues. Can they be acquired by fallen man to any extent, or in any way, without supernatural aid? Can they be acquired perfectly with supernatural aid? In either case, is the natural end attainable in a proportionate degree? However these questions are answered, the answers apply to the efficacy of human efforts with respect to the common good as well as to happiness. Furthermore, in our *de facto* consideration of how man attains natural happiness, we can, for the time being, concentrate on the acquired virtues as principal means, because, though the state is also a principal (and productive) means to happiness and though the common good is a constitutive part thereof, both the state's good operation and the realization of its common good depend causally on the acquisition by individual men of the natural, cardinal virtues. [214]

With the problem focussed by these questions, we can now proceed to its solution in three stages: (1) by an *absolute* consideration of the acquired virtues as means; (2) by a *de facto* consideration of their acquisition; and (3) by an application of these analyses to the aetiology of fallen man's pursuit of natural happiness.

(1) Within the sphere of human habits which can be regarded as virtues, there are many grades of inequality. Although all virtuous habits are good, they are not good in a univocal sense. [215] There are two criteria in terms of which

purely natural good by fallen man. Unfortunately, those who tend to regard the common good as the uitimate end, both temporarily and naturally, sometimes fail to raise the question about its attainment with the same theological precision that they always apply to the accomplishment of a purely natural happiness in this life.

[214] The converse aetiological problem-how the state helps men to acquire the natural virtues-will be considered in Section *5 infra.* In that analysis of causal dependence, we shall see how the state plays the role of a principal productive cause of natural happiness.

[216] Vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 61, a. 1, ad l: "When we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally, and to accident relatively. Such is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things."

virtues can be distinguished as perfect and imperfect: according to the end they serve, and according to their status as habits. By reference to their ends, we distinguish the theological and the infused moral virtues as perfect, in comparison with all the acquired virtues as imperfect.[216] But within the sphere of the natural virtues (natural both as to end and acquisition), we distinguish the cardinal virtues as perfect, in comparison with the intellectual virtues (excepting prudence) as imperfect; and this distinction is partly by reference to end, and partly by reference to the mode of the habit itself: by reference to end in so far as the cardinal virtues make a man good simply, whereas the intellectual virtues make him good only in a certain respect;[217] by reference to the mode of the habit in so far as the intellectual virtues confer only an aptitude for good work, whereas the cardinal virtues are habitual inclinations toward the performance of good deeds.[218] Now with respect to the cardinal virtues which alone among all the natural virtues conform perfectly to the notion of virtue, there is still a further distinction according to their mode of being. For the cardinal virtues can either exist perfectly or imperfectly according as they are or are not interconnected. If any cardinal virtue is possessed in the absence of the others, it exists that is, it has the status of a disposition, easy to change, rather than of a habit, difficult to change.[219] And since mode of operation

[216] Vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. *65,* a. 2; q. 63, aa. 3, 4; q. *51,* a. 4. Cf. *ibid.,* q. 61, a. *5.*

[017] Vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. *56,* a·. 3; q. *57,* a. I.

[218] Vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. *56,* a. 3; q. *57,* a. I; q. 61, a. I; q. 66, a. 3. What is here said is not inconsistent with the superiority of the intellectual virtues simply as habits of man's highest power.

[219] Vd. *Summa Theol.,* q. *65,* a. 1: "Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance, for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind or good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected; since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of chastity. But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well, and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that they are connected." Cf. *ibid.,* q. *58,* a. 4, ad 3.

follows upon mode of being, cardinal virtues which exist imperfectly (in the status of dispositions) will function imperfectly as means to the end to which they are naturally ordained. Since it is possible for a virtue to be perfect, with respect to the end it serves (thus, each cardinal virtue is perfect in contrast to each intellectual virtue), and yet this perfect virtue may not exist or function perfectly (thus, one cardinal virtue in separation from the others is imperfect in status and operation) , it is necessary to describe the adequate means to natural happiness as virtues perfect in both ways-i. e., the cardinal virtues existing perfectly through interconnection. [220]

From this analysis we reach certain conclusions concerning the causality of the acquired cardinal virtues. (a) They, and they alone, function as principal means to natural happiness,

[220] This analysis is confirmed and summarized by St. Thomas's account of three grades of virtue in *De Virt. Card.*, q. 1, a. 2. Here, neglecting entirely the intellectual virtues as essentially imperfect even with respect to the natural end, he sets up the following hierarchy: (l) moral virtues which, being disconnected, have only the status of ·dispositions; (2) the interconnected cardinal virtues; (3) the interconnected supernatural virtues. Although the first are imperfect by comparison with the second and the third, they are, in a sense, more perfect than the intellectual virtues because, even though they function dispositively, they dispose a man toward the whole natural good rather than merely confer an aptitude for some particular good work. The second grade of virtues (unlike the first which, being without prudence, " do not have the aspect of virtue perfectly ") can be called "perfect by comparison with the human good." Nevertheless, he says, they are not perfect absolutely because they do not attain to the ultimate end, i.e., the supernatural as opposed to the natural end. "Therefore, they, too, are deficient in the true aspect of virtue," just as moral without prudence are deficient in the true aspect of virtue. Hence, the third grade of virtues, which are without any deficiency or imperfection, are those which are interconnected through charity (as the virtues of the second grade are interconnected through prudence), i. e., the theological virtues and the infused moral virtues. And St. Thomas concludes by saying: " Thus, if we take the virtues as absolutely perfect, they are connected because of charity, because no such virtue can be had without charity, and he who has charity has them all. But if we take the perfect virtues in the second grade with respect to the human good, thus they are connected through prudence, because without prudence no moral virtue is possible, nor can one prudence if he be lacking in moral virtue. Nevertheless if we take the four cardinal virtues according !IS they import certain general conditions of virtue, it can also be said that they have connection from the fact that it does not suffice to any act of virtue that one of these conditions be present unless all are."

just as the supernatural and infused virtues are the principal means in this life toward the attainment of supernatural beatitude.[221] (b) The acquired cardinal virtues, when subalternated and elevated by the supernatural virtues, may also function as instrumental means toward supernatural ends.[222] (c) Operating as principal means toward natural happiness, the acquired cardinal virtues have two grades of efficacy, according as, through interconnection, they function perfectly, or as, through disconnection, they function imperfectly. (d) The only condition which must be satisfied as prerequisite to the perfect functioning of the acquired cardinal virtues as principal means to happiness is that they be interconnected with one another, whether this interconnection be viewed as a togethernesss of the moral virtues through a common dependence on prudence, or as a participation by each of the four cardinal virtues in the general conditions of virtue common to them alJ.[223] This last point is true, of course, only in the context of an absolute consideration of the virtues, but it is analytically important, nevertheless, to insist upon its truth in relation to human nature in its integrity; for to say that, absolutely considered, the perfect existence of the acquired virtues depends upon their being connected through charity would be to deny the absolute causal commensuration of natural means to their natural end.[224]

[221] The supernatural virtues are also, of course, the principal conditions prerequisite to the enjoyment of participated beatitude in this life, i. e., supernatural contemplation.

[222] "The virtue ordained to an inferior end does not produce an act ordained to a superior end except by the mediation of a superior virtue" *(De Virt. in Com.,* 10 ad 4). Maritain describes the instrumental cause as one "which, only exercising its own causality in the degree to which a superior agent makes use of it for its own end, produces an effect higher than its degree of specific being" *(True Humanism,* New York, 1988: p. 148). Cf. fn. 206 *supra.*

[223] Vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 61, aa. 8, 4; q. 65, a. 1. Cf. fn. 220 *supra.*

[224] Observing the distinction between perfect and imperfect virtue in terms of ordination to a supernatural or a natural last end, St. Thomas plainly says that the imperfect virtues can be without charity. "It is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man; and when they are thus acquired, they can be without charity,

(2) But the question arises whether the natural virtues can be perfectly acquired by man in the actual condition of his nature. The foregoing analysis merely tells us, absolutely speaking, what is required for a perfect existence of the natural virtues and, hence, for their perfect functioning as means toward the attainment of natural happiness. It does not tell us whether by the unaided exercise of his powers man is able to acquire the natural virtues perfectly and so attain his natural end completely. We must pass, therefore, to a *de facto* consideration of fallen man's competence in the sphere of natural goods.

Let us observe the theologian's answer to this question. Considering whether man can *will* or *do* any good without grace, St. Thomas says:

even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly, and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity" *(Summa Theot.,* I-II, q. *65,* a. 2). The argument for this last point turns on the relation between the infused moral virtues and infused prudence, which parallels the relation between the acquired moral virtues and acquired prudence. Since prudence with respect to a supernatural last end cannot be apart from a rectification of the will toward this end, and since such rectification requires charity, " it is evident, therefore, that neither can infused prudence be without charity, nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence." Here St. Thomas is referring only to infused prudence and the infused moral virtues as dependent for their coexistence upon charity. He is not considering here whether fallen man is competent to acquire the moral virtues perfectly, i. e., as interconnected with one another through acquired prudence. The *de facto* consideration of these matters belongs to the treatise on grace. In the treatise on the virtues, St. Thomas proceeds analytically in Question *65* to define the connection of different types of virtue *inter se:* in Article l he is making the same point that Aristotle made in the *Ethics,* VI, 13, namely, that the acquired moral virtues exist perfectly only when they are connected with one another and with prudence; and in Article 2 he undertakes a parallel analysis of the infused moral virtues, which depend not only upon infused prudence but upon charity. In neither case does he raise the question whether, without grace, men can acquire the natural virtues perfectly. In fact, his remark about the Gentiles-many of whom, he seems to say, were able without charity to acquire moral virtues productive of good works directed to a natural end-must be interpreted in the light of what is said later in the treatise on grace. It cannot mean that the natural virtues can, in fact, be perfectly acquired apart from grace. It must be understood hypothetically: if the natural virtues could be so acquired without grace, they could exist perfectly without charity.

Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good whatsoever. But in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, such as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfill it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; just as the sick man can of himself make movements yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of one in health, unless by the help of medicine he be cured. And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz., in order to do and to wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz., in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well.[2248]

There are three points here which must be carefully distinguished. The first point is that, apart from grace, nature needs Divine help in order to accomplish its own work. As in physics we understand all natural causes to be secondary causes which always depend upon the cooperation of the First Cause, so in moral matters must regard all natural means as secondary, even when they function as principal means toward a natural end. A secondary principal means is not an instrumental means. It can be a principal means, just as a natural cause can be a principal cause, though both are secondary in relation to the First Cause upon which they depend. This fundamental metaphysical truth applies to the efficacy of human nature in a condition of integrity as well as of deficiency.

[2248] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 109, a. 2.

Moreover, the Divine help here being considered is not the same as the addition of grace to human natme, whereby it is healed or elevated, for this mode of Divine help extends to every natural thing in so far as it operates naturally in any way or condition. [225]

The second point is that man needs Divine assistance in order to do works of surpassing good, that is, works beyond the efficacy of his natural powers, and through such works to attain supernatural happiness. Man needs such assistance both in a state of integrity and in his corrupt condition, for in neither case is nature adequate to the accomplishment of a supernatural end. God gives man such assistance by the gift of grace. Through the infusion of supernatural virtues, " gratuitous strength is superadded to natural strength " so that man " can do and wish supernatural good." This is the primary function of grace: to elevate nature to what is above it. And since the supernatural good is above nature both in its integrity and its deficiency, this mode of elevation is required by man in either condition.

The third point is that human nature in its present deficiency needs Divine assistance in order to achieve the good that is proportionate to man in his integrity. This is a secondary function of grace: to elevate, not nature, but *fallen* nature, to the level from which it declined throug4 sin. Here gratuitous strength must be superadded to deficient natural strength as a therapeutic or restorative measure. The healing power of grace is needed only by fallen man; and only in the case of fallen man does grace perform both functions-enabling him to reach an

[225] It is in the light of this point that we must understand what St. Thomas means when he says " it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end by means of his natural principles, *albeit not without the Divine assistance" (Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 6!il, a. 1). The clause we have italicized refers to Divine assistance only in the sense of the cooperation of the First Cause with secondary causes; whereas, in contrast, the aid which man receives from God in the way of " additional principles whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness " is the gift of grace, for thus man is elevated to an end beyond his powers, not merely sustained in their natural operations.

end *absolutely* beyond his powers, and restoring the vigor he needs to pursue natural happiness, which is beyond his powers only *relatively,* i. e., relative to the defect of his powers as the .result of sin.

Since we are here concerned with the attainment of natural happiness by fallen man, the third point alone requires further analysis. We have distinguished two modes of elevation by grace: on the one hand, the elevation of nature, integral or defective, to the plane of supernatural goods; on the other hand, the elevation of fallen nature to the plane of natural goods. This second mode of elevation differs from the first in that fallen nature is not totally incompetent with respect to natural goods, as nature in any condition is completely incompetent with respect to supernatural goods. The effect of grace, in this second mode, is to make it possible for fallen nature to " do *all* the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing." Emphasis must be placed on the word " all " because, as St. Thomas points out, " human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good." Even in a state of corrupted nature, man can, by the unaided exercise of his natural powers, achieve *some* of the goods which are his due. Now natural happiness consists, as we have seen, in the possession of *all* natural goods. Hence, it follows that natural happiness cannot be perfectly achieved by fallen man unless the efficacy of his powers is restored by grace. Postponing an examination of the full significance of this fact, let us interpret it aetiologically. The perfect achievement of natural happiness depends on the perfect possession of the acquired virtues. The fact that man cannot achieve natural happiness without grace must mean that, unless his natural powers are restored to their true vigor by grace, he cannot through their exercise acquire the natural virtues perfectly. It must mean also that without grace man can acquire the natural virtues imperfectly (i. e., in some degree of disconnection and, hence, as having the status of dispositions in some degree of stability less than that of true *habitus)* . In short, although the acquired virtues, absolutely considered, can be connected and exist perfectly

apart from grace and charity, a *de facto* consideration of man's infirmity as the result of sin reveals the causal dependence of human powers upon the restorative efficacy of grace for competence to acquire the natural virtues perfectly. [226]

The two ways in which grace elevates fallen nature correspond to two modes of causality on the part of the acquired virtues. With respect to the supernatural end, the conjunction of the infused with the acquired virtues confers upon the latter an instrumental causality which they could not have by themselves even as perfectly existing. With respect to the natural end, the conjunction of the infused with the acquired virtues restores the latter to the vigor of that principal causality which properly belongs to these means in a condition of natural integTity. In addition to these two, we must recognize one other sort of causality on the part of the acquired virtues. Apart from the infused virtues, the acquired virtues, to whatever extent they exist imperfectly, function as principal means with respect to the natural end, albeit inadequately. By reason of what they are, they cannot exist in any degree without having some causal efficacy, even though it falls short of sufficient virtue to obtain the whole temporal good of man. To attribute principal causality to the acquired virtues does not deny their dependence on the First It is only to say that that is their primary mode of causality, whether it is exercised inadequately apart from the infused virtues, or adequately with the help of grace: [228]

••• Vd. fn. 224 *8'11/fYra.* We thus concur in the conclusion which M. Maritain has reached concerning this problem (vd. *Science and Wisdom,* pp. 145-154), but we· disagree with his interpretation of the relevant Thomistic texts. The two articles in the treatise on virtue (65, l, 2) do not support this conclusion because there St. Thomas is engaged in an absolute consideration of the natural and the infused virtues, in which mode of consideration there is no causal dependence of the one upon the other. The authority of St. Thomas in support of this conclusion is rather to be found in the treatise on grace (109, S), where the mode of consideration is *de facto.* Cf. Maritain, *op. cit.,* pp. 224 fl'.

[227] Vd. fn. 225 *supra.*

[228] Cf. Maxitain, *Science and Wisdom,* pp. 210-16. The two ways in which moral philosophy is subalternated by moral theology parallel the double subalternation of the acquired by the infused virtues. On the one hand, moral philosophy is

(3) We can now make explicit two conclusions which have already been indicated. These conclusions answer our main question, whether man as he actually is can attain natural happiness in this life. Both answers are affirmative. The first is that, with grace, natural happiness is completely attainable. [229] The second is that, without grace, natural happiness is attainable *in some degree short of completeness,* that degree being proportionate to whatever degree of efficacy the acquired virtues possess in their imperfect mode of existence part from the infused virtues and charity. Nothing need be added to what has already been said in order to certify the first of these conclusions, though certain difficulties surrounding it must be resolved. Before we attempt that, however, let us be sure that the significance of the second conclusion is clear, and that its truth is evident.

The truth of the second conclusion follows from the fact that, in the words of St. Thomas, " human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good." That the virtues which can be acquired by fallen nature, apart from grace, have only the imperfect status of dispositions, does not deprive them of all causal efficacy but only of their adequacy as means. To whatever extent a man is able to acquire true virtues, he posseses the means for living a good human life. According as a man is more or less virtuous, so will he lead a more or less happy life. Fully to understand the point that is here involved, it is necessary to observe a distinction between natural and supernatural happiness with respect

instrumentally employed by the theologian in the consideration of those practical truths, concerning ends and means, which belong to faith alone; on the other hand, moral philosophy becomes practically adequate as the principal discipline for dealing with natural truths in the practical order only when it is guided by the light of faith. Vd. *ibid.,* pp. 174-ft05, 217-ftO. Cf. fn. 161 and 209 *supra.*

••• Cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," in *The Review of Politics,* **ill**, 8, p. 881. **"If** grace makes possible the integral possession of the natural virtues, then it not only enables a man to direct his life toward a supernatural end, but also enables him to possess natural virtue in such a way that the temporal happiness, due his nature, can be achieved. With God's help a man can live well on earth if, but for the grace of God, he cannot " *(ibid.,* fn. 48).

to existence in degrees. Between salvation and perdition, there is an absolute discontinuity, an infinite gap, though it remains true, of course, that there are gradations of both blessedness and damnation. But in the sphere of natural happiness, there is a continuum of degrees between the most happy and the most unhappy of human lives. The finite whole of goods which constitutes natural happiness can be more or less possessed in the course of a complete life, precisely because *it is a whole and can be approximated by the accumulation of partial goods.* The less happy man is not separated from the more happy man by the chasm which divides Hell from Heaven. In the natural order, the metaphysical truth that everything has as much goodness as it has being can be given moral significance. In proportion as a man fulfills his capacities for *human being* through the acquisition of virtue, to that degree he is not only good as a man but is able to lead a good life. In the natural order, and apart from grace, there is no distinction *in kind* between happiness and unhappiness, but only a difference *in degree* between the more and the less happy, or the less and the more unhappy. It may be objected, however, that the factor of grace introduces a distinction in kind between men who, enabled to have the natural virtues perfectly, achieve natural happiness completely, and men who, unable to acquire virtue except imperfectly, can never attain *all* temporal goods. This must be granted. But then it will be said that, since happiness consists in the possession of all good things, there is an absolute distinction between happiness and unhappiness in the natu:ral dimension of human life; moreover, this accords with the fact that there is a distinction in kind between the status of habit, which the acquired virtues can have when nature is restored by grace, and the status of disposition above which they cannot :rise without grace. All this must be admitted, and yet the point remains because the distinction " in kind " here noted is not like the separation between the blessed and the damned. In the natural order, this distinction becomes another sort of distinction in degree, for the contrast is only between a *complete* and an *incomplete* attainment of the same end. Moreover,

with grace as without grace, all men do not have acquired virtue to the same degree. Hence, to our original statement (that, without grace, human life can be more or less *incompletely* happy) we must now add that, with grace, men can be more or less *completely* happy. [230]

We must now return to the first conclusion, in order to complete this phase of our discussion by considering a difficulty that attaches to it. It would appear that, with the help of grace, a man is able to work for two last ends concurrently-natural happiness and eternal beatitude. But these two last ends are irreducibly two in the sense that natural happiness is not an intermediate end, i. e., not a means to supernatural happiness. [231] How shall we understand this duality of ends within the unity of Christian moral life? There are several ways in which an answer can be formed. In the first place, we should remember that the duality of ends corresponds to the

.oao This conclusion is confirmed by a consideration of the absurdity to which its denial reduces us. The common good of the political community is a work of the acquired virtues. Now let us suppose that when the acquired virtues do not exist perfectly, through the restoration of nature by grace, they are incompetent to work for the common good *in any degree,* whence it would follow that the common good must exist in sonie degree of completeness or not at all. But, then, how shall we understand the existence of ancient pagan cities and modern secular states? To understand the obvious facts of history, we must see that the co=on good can exist either *completely* or *incompletely,* and in either case in some degree. To whatever extent a population possesses the acquired virtues, apart from grace, to that extent it is able to work for and establish the common good in some degree of incomplete attainment. The superiority of what might be called a Christian state is relative to the inferiority, not to the non-existence, of other political communities, as it would have to be if the common good could not be incompletely established in some degree by the operation of the natural virtues, acquired imperfectly in the ab$ence of grace. The force of this *reductio ad absurdum* applies to natural happiness, as well as to the common good, for both are ends achieved by the exercise of natural virtue. Cf. fn. 274 *infra.*

This conclusion may also throw some light on what St. Thomas meant when he spoke of the natural happiness which many Gentiles enjoyed as a result of acquired virtue. Vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 65, a. 2. Cf. fn. 224 *supra.* It was an approximation to natural happiness, corresponding to the way in which virtues having the status of dispositions approximate the operative efficacy of virtues having the status of habits.

[231] Cf. Maritain, *Seience and Wisdom,* pp. 179-80. Cf. *True Humanism,* pp. 13-14, 169-71.

dualism of the natural and supernatural orders, in both of which the man of grace is simultaneously engaged, for grace does not abolish nature, but restores it to its own vigor as well as elevates it beyond its created power.[232] In the second place, we should observe that, although the natural end is not ordained as a means to the supernatural end, it is nevertheless subordinate thereto as an inferior to a superior good. Furthermore, there can be no conflict between those two ends, of the sort which might occur if one required acts that would impede the attainment of the other.[233] In the third place, we should note how the unity of the moral life is preserved by the fact that it is through the operation of the same virtues that a Christian works simultaneously for two distinct ends. The acquired and the infused virtues cooperate, though not in the same way, as means toward both the natural and the supernatural end: toward the natural end, the natural virtues functioning *principally*, the supernatural virtues rendering them efficacious in this work; toward the supernatural end, the supernatural virtues functioning prinicipally, the natural virtues serving *instrumentally*, elevated by conjunction with superior causes?[234]

[232] " Nature elevated by grace above itself does not therefore lose its natural activities and ends, and human nature is not just exalted in any fashion, but is raised to a formal participation in the uncreated life. There are two worlds of different kinds. In the compound of animal nature and reason and grace which makes up human life, two different worlds-the world of nature and the world of (participated) Deity-meet and interpenetrate one another " (Maritain, *Science and Wisdom*,, pp. 179-80).

[233] The dualism here is not the Averroistic enormity of two autonomous realms-reason and faith-which exist together in man's life without being thoroughly harmonious with one another. The Thomistic disposal of the fallacy of "two truths" applies to a fallacious conception of "two ends." Vd. *l Cont. Gent.,* 7. Both sorts of truth, that of reason and that of faith, come from God, though one is acquired naturally and the other is received supernaturally; hence, from the fact that both are true, and that both are from God, we must conclude, says St. Thomas, that there can never be any conflict between them. Similarly, since both ends are good, since any goodness which man can enjoy, whether by natural accession or supernatural gift, is by Divine allotment, it follows that there can be no conflict between the pursuit of natural happiness and the good works which merit salvation, when both are performed through the help of grace.

[234] In terms of this, we can understand Maritain's remark that, " man only orders his life effectively to his natural last end if he keeps his eye also on his

Such things can be said to answer the question, but nothing can be said which will completely remove the mystery that confronts us. We cannot penetrate sufficiently into the union of grace and nature, the cooperation of natural and supernatural causes, fully to understand how a single moral act can, despite its atomic singleness, be at once a motion toward two ends which are irreducibly two. Nor should we expect to fathom this mystery, for it lies in the mysterious nature of grace itself, as a principal cause, employing the instrumentality of natural causes. The obdurateness of this mystery signifies that we have reached the limits of analysis, not that analysis has failed to yield its proper fruits. The conclusions which solve the problem of how natural happiness is attained by fallen man are not invalidated by the fact that they entail consequences which are not, and cannot be, completely intelligible to us.[235]

5. Natural happiness being attainable, what part does the state play as a means? We are asking this question in abstraction from the variety and gradation of political forms. The question here is not whether one form of good government is a

supernatural last end" *(Science and Wisdom,* p. 182). The remark should, perhaps, be completed by saying that a man must keep his eye on his natural last end in order to direct his life effectively to his supernatural last end. A full understanding of the sinfulness of suicide will illuminate this point. There is a natural goodness about human life which we are not permitted to discard wantonly, even if our motive be to sacrifice a lesser for a greater happiness. Salvation itself can be *inordinately* desired, and such excessive, and hence sinful, zeal arises from a failure to render to each last end what is its due. There is, in short, an irreducibl P. tension in human life between the spiritual and the temporal, the supernatural and the natural. As Maritain says, there is " in the soul itself and in the moral life of the person two zones or domains corresponding to the classical distinction between the spiritual and the temporal, between the kingdom of God and the ' political ' world or the world of culture" *(Science and Wisdom,* p. 218). Cf. *True Humanism,* p. 129; *The Things That Are Not Caesar's,* New York, 1981: pp. *5* fi., 88-84, 178; *Scholasticism and Politics,* New York, 1940: pp. 225-228.

It may be said that what is here required of man-that he keep his eyes at once on two ends so radically divergent in plane-must result in a sort of moral strabismus or, even worse, schizophrenia. That man can remain clear in vision and one in soul despite these demands upon him is the mystery of the unity formed by grace and nature.

••• Vd. Part III, Section 1, *supra, loc. cit.,* p. 181.

better means to natural happiness than another, but rather what causality any type of just political regime is able to exercise in serving ultimate ends. To answer this question, we must consider the state in relation to the causes we have already discussed.

Like the acquired virtues, the state can function only as an instrumental means toward supernatural ends (either supernatural contemplation in this life, or beatitude), and then only as subalternated to and ministerially used by the church. The The state is related to the church, in the sphere of extrinsic causes, as the acquired natural virtues are related to the infused and supernatural virtues, in the sphere of intrinsic causes. Among extrinsic causes, the church alone can function as a principal means toward supernatural ends. But with respect to natural happiness, the state is a principal means, cooperating with the natural virtues in a complex pattern of reciprocal causality.

We must remember, in the first place, that the state is both an end and a means. As an end, the state is the common good, existential or ideal, and virtuous political activity is required for its procurement or enhancement. [236] As a means,· the state, like the virtues, is both a constitutive means and a productive means to happiness. It is a constitutive means in so far as the common good is itself a partial good, responding to man's natural desire for social life; the enjoyment of social goods is as indispensable a part of human happiness as the possession of health and wealth, the enjoyment of pleasure and knowledge. [237]

[236] The incompetence of fallen nature apart from grace is, of course, as critical a fact with respect to the achievement of the common good, as with respect to natural happiness. Cf. fn. 9180 *supra.* In so far as the church plays the role of an extrinsic cause cooperating with the infused and supernatural virtues, and in so far as both together are indispensable for the restoration of fallen nature to competence, the church is itself a cause, though indirectly, of the state's well-being and advancement. The common good of purely secular states must, therefore, be a diminished good, as natural happiness attained through purely natural means must be an incomplete perfection. Cf. Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics,* pp. 83-88, 100-101; and Ch. VIII, IX.

[237] It should be obvious at once that we are viewing the same good in two aspects when we regard the state as an intermediate end (i. e., the common good

It is a productive means in so far as the institutions and agencies of government operate as efficient causes either to provide certain goods which are indispensable parts of happiness or to facilitate and support the operation of the virtues as the intrinsic, the direct, productive causes of a good human life. There is no difficulty in understanding the way in which the state works with respect to the provision and distribution of economic goods, the care and maintenance of health, the availability of pleasures through an amplitude of recreational facilities. Nor is there any difficulty about the state's agency in the sphere of intellectual virtues, for by its educational program it cultivates, and by its cultural institutions it encourages, knowledge and art. But there is a problem about the state's causality with respect to the cardinal virtues for two reasons: first, because the well-being of the state itself depends causally upon the exercise of these virtues by the primary political agents who must work to maintain and improve the common good; and second, because the state by itself is not adequate, even as an extrinsic cause, in the formation of the cardinal virtues.

The first of these difficulties is resolved by the fact that the state is not cause and effect with respect to the same elements in its population. It operates as a cause primarily with respect to the morally immature members of its population, those who are still in the process of character formation. Neglecting here its repressive and corrective enforcement of the laws against vicious disturbers of the public peace, we need only recognize the way in which the state, through every variety of political regulation, contributes to the training of the young, in order to understand how the state is productive of the cardinal virtues in an inchoate form.[238] When individuals pass from immaturity to is measured morally by the transition from

to be achieved), and as a constitutive means (i. e., the common good as an essential elemeRt in the order of goods which constitutes happiness) .

[238] For a fuller discussion of " inchoate virtue " as a stage in the acquisition of true and perfect virtue, and as the precise locus of the state's efficiency as a means, vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, pp. 883C85.

inchoate to genuine virtue-they become responsible political agents, and the causality is reversed: the state which served them as a means, working for their moral development, now profits as an end which they, in turn, serve by a virtuous dedication of their efforts to the common good.

The second difficulty is partly solved by the distinction, already noted, between the moral virtues in an inchoate condition and as genuinely formed. The virtues are genuinely formed, whether imperfectly or perfectly, only through the exercise of reason on the part of the individual agent. Not only must each individual acquire virtuous habits through his own good acts, but for the habits formed to be genuinely virtuous, the acts must follow the rule of reason which that individual himself actively exercises and applies. Good acts can be performed, however, under extrinsic regulation by the reason of another, supported by persuasive or coercive force (i. e., rewards and punishments) . When they are so executed and oft repeated, they generate inchoate virtues (dispositions of the appetite toward right ends), and this formation enables prudence gradually to emerge when the reason of the individual becomes competent in the choice of means. The inchoate virtues are, in short, a preparation for the acquisition of genuine virtue through an intrinsic rule of reason.[239] The mission of the state with respect to the formation of the cardinal virtues can go no further than this work of preparation. That follows from its mode of operation as an extrinsic cause. But even so its efficiency is inadequate. It needs the cooperation of two other institutions: so far as a purely natural acquisition of virtue is concerned, it needs the help of the domestic community in this work of preparation (i. e., the work of training the immature and so generating the inchoate dispositions toward virtue); and so far as fallen nature is incompetent to acquire virtue perfectly, it needs the help of the church

[239] If inchoate virtue were not a stage in the acquisition of genuine virtue, the circular causality that is set up by the dependence of the moral virtues upon prudence and the dependence of prudence on the moral virtues, could not be circumvented. Vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, in fn. 238 *supra*.

through whose ministry grace is available to men. The relation between the state and the family is that of cooperating factors which belong to the same order of natural causes. But church and state do not cooperate as causes belonging to the same order, for each is ordained to a distinct ultimate end. The relation between state and church, as extrinsic causes, parallels the relation between the natural and the supernatural virtues. Just as the acquired virtues become adequate as principal means to natural happiness only through conjunction with the infused virtues, so the state becomes adequate as a principal means (in its own sphere of extrinsic, productive causality) only through conjunction with the church. As thus subalternated to and elevated by the church, it remains a principal means to its own proper end (i. e., natural happiness); it does not become merely an instrumental means toward the supernatural end which defines the mission of the church:'Ho

••• More than any contemporary thinker, Maritain has made clear this double relation between church and state. Each cooperates with the other in respect to that other's proper end, toward which that other works as a principal means. As cooperating with the church toward supernatural ends, the state functions instrumentally; as cooperating with the state toward the natural end of temporal happiness, the church functions through the ministry of grace to restore natural causes to their full competence. Cf. *True Humanism,* Ch. II, VI. It is doubtful, however, whether the ideal of good order among these causes has ever been fully realized in the concrete embodiments of history. As Maritain points out, mediaeval Christendom tended in practice to subordinate the secular arm primarily to the performance of its instrumental functions. " In the mediaeval order the things that are Caesar's, while being clearly distinguished from the things that are God's, filled to a large extent a *ministerial* function with regard to them: to this extent they were *instrumental causes* with regard to the sacred, and their proper end ranked as a means, in relation to eternal life" *(True Humanism,* p. 143). Cf. *ibid.,* pp. 169-171. To this extent mediaeval Christendom was defective as a culture, slighting natural happiness as a finite and imperfect final end, and the role of the acquired virtues as principal means within the autonomous order of natural goods. Modern secular culture embodies, of course, the exactly opposite error, both in theory and practice. Through its denial of supernatural ends, and the principal means thereto, it is defective in a much more crucial respect.

Whether Maritain's dream of a new Christendom will ever be realized on earth is difficult to judge. The ideal he has in mind calls for so delicate a balance between disparate factors, so just an appraisal of temporal and eternal values, and such nnderstanding of the mystery of grace and nature, that one may be permitted to

The role of the state as a means to happiness (both as a constitutive part thereof, and as productive of, or cooperative with, its other conditions) is now clear. Its peculiar inadequacies as a productive means present no further difficulties, but its limitations must be remembered. The state cannot be expected to have greater efficacy than properly belongs to it as a natural and an extrinsic cause.

A difficulty does arise, however, from another quarter; in fact, a difficulty so great that it has led many to be satisfied with an easy half-truth. The state, it would seem, can become an obstacle to the individual's pursuit of happiness. Does it not rightly demand the sacrifice of individual goods for the sake of the common good? Do not virtuous men feel called upon to lay down their lives for their country's welfare, thus apparently setting its continued well-being above the happiness of a completely rounded life? If these things are so, how can we say that the state is a means to the happiness of its individual members, that the common good is only an intermediate end in the temporal order? But one must also ask, in the light of the truth about natural happiness, how one can say that the common good is anything but a partial good, or that the state is not a means ordained by its very nature to individual happiness as its end. The contradictory answers which these questions seem to elicit generate an antinomy in the natural order-an apparent conflict between the claims of the individual and the state, happiness and the common good, to take precedence over each other.[241] Failure to solve this antinomy has

despair of its human achievement, though one may also continue to hope that its fulfillment is intended, and will be brought into being, by Providence.

[241] This antinomy is more perplexing than the one which M. Maritain has frequently discussed, *because it is entirely in the natural order*. In terms of his distinction between the individual and the person, he has been able to subordinate the individual to the state with respect to temporal goods, and the state to the person with respect to supernatural and extra-temporal goods. Vd. *True Humanism*, pp. 127-130; *The Things That Are Not Caesar's*, pp. 125 ff.; *Three Reformers*, New York, 1932: pp. 20-24, 193-195; *Freedom in the Modern World*, New York, 1936: pp. 47-53; *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 67-77. But we are here dealing with a conflict between purely natural goods, because the happiness which claims to take

led men to the violent extremes of either individualism or totalitarianism; and the resultant controversy is made bitter by the fact that each extreme holds on to a half-truth which it cannot, and should not, surrender, but which it must not exaggerate into the whole truth at the expense of denying the complementary part. That, of course, is precisely what happens when the totalitarian, rightly demanding the sacrifice of individual goods and the risk of lives for the state's welfare, denies that individual happiness matters at all (unless it be nothing but the idolatrous joy of mystic union with the state); and when the individualist, on his side, rightly affirms that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are ends which the state must serve, but (with the folly of anarchism) comes to regard the state as an evil thing, encroaching upon the individual because it asks a price for its services. There is no choice between these extremes, even though the totalitarian position becomes increasingly objectionable as it tends to make a travesty of the common good, and even though the individualist, usually less of a villain at heart, has caught an essential truth in his caricature of Democracy-the truth that all men have, by nature, temporal rights above the state. There is no choice because nothing less than the whole truth is enough, either in theory or in practice. But if we will not be satisfied with half-truths, we must resolve the antinomy which shatters the whole into irreconcilable fragments. The contradiction we have indicated must be shown to be *merely apparent.* Without any appeal to supernatural fulfillments, we must see man as an end and as a means, and the state as a means and an end, each ordered to the other in such a way that natural happiness remains the last end in the temporal order, while the common good, though only an intermediate end, retains a value which imposes obligations upon the individual, even to the risk of life itself.

Here, as always, an apparent contradiction is resolved by making distinctions and by specifying the diverse respects in

precedence over the common good is as truly natural and temporal as the common good itself. Vd. fn. *infra.*

which a thing can have manifold relations. Our prior analysis of the common good,[242] has already provided the distinctions needed for a partial resolution of the antinomy-partial in the sense that it takes care of every aspect of the problem except one, and that one presents the most difficult case. Let us briefly state this partial resolution in order to concentrate on the special case which calls for special treatment.

What is called an "individual good" must be understood in two senses: (a) as individual because it perfects the being of a single man or his life; (b) as individual because it is an accidental good, relative to this man's individual differences in power or circumstance, rather than a good which this man shares with all others because of their common human nature. What is called " the common good " must be understood in two senses: (a) as common because it perfects the well-being of the community as such, the organized multitude of men rather than any individual man; (b) as common because it is an essential good, relative to man's specific nature, rather than an accidental good which belongs to this alone in his individual difference from all others. Now it is obvious at once that a good may be individual in sense (a), and also common in sense (b) . Such a good is happiness, which is the same for all men and yet is the perfection of each of them individually, and not of them as an organized multitude. And all the essential parts of happiness are common goods in this sense; moreover, all the constitutive parts of happiness, except *the common good* (i. e., the *bonum com'f(iunitatis* which is a good common in both senses of the word) , are also individual goods in that, like happiness itself, they perfect the being or life of an individual. And in so far as even *the common good* is enjoyed by individuals as a constitutive part of their happiness, it is an individual good in this sense.

By what principle is any good ordered to any other, subordinated thereto, subject to sacrifice therefor? There are two such ordering principles: (1) that an inferior good be subordinated to a superior good, and if there ever be conflict

[242] Vd. Part II, *8Upra, lac. cit.*, pp. 598-607.

between the lesser and the greater good, the former must, of course, be sacrificed; (2) that a means be ordered to its end, in such wise that the means be sought no further than it serves the end.

Now, according to the first principle, all accidental goods are ordered to essential goods. It is permissible to seek accidental goods only in so far as they in no way impede the pursuit of essential goods, or encroach upon their continued possession. Accidental goods are entirely superfluous; no natural rights are founded in them. In this sense, and only in this sense, *individual* goods *(qua accidental)* are ordered to *the common good (qua essential)*. But in this sense, it must also be said that, quite apart from *the common good*, which is only one of the essential human goods, each individual, in the pursuit of his own happiness, must be prepared to sacrifice such accidental goods if they in any way interfere with his obtaining the essential constituents of the whole of goods in which his happiness consists. One example will make this clear. Wealth is an essential component of happiness, but not in *any* quantity. A sufficiency of external goods is indispensable for life itself, and hence for a good life. But beyond that sufficiency, any excess in quantity of wealth is superfluous to *man as man*, though such an excess may appear to be good to this individual, according to his peculiar desires and circumstances. Not wealth *per se* but any quantity of wealth which exceeds the human need for sufficiency is an accidental good, relative in its goodness to individual, not specific human, needs. Hence in the pursuit of his own happiness, each individual must seek wealth only to a degree that is proportionate to its place in the order of goods constituting the whole; and if excessive wealth or undue desire for external goods ever stands in the way of obtaining any other essential good, such superfluous wealth must be readily sacrificed or the inordinate desire must be rectified so that the order of desires conforms to the order of goods (i.e., of desirables). Similarly, if excessive individual possession of wealth in any way impairs the common good of the political community, the individual can claim no right for this purely accidental good

against the paramount right of the community to so appropriate or apportion eternal goods (by taxation, regulation, etc.) that the welfare of the state be preserved or advanced. The principle which justifies this sacrifice of the individual to the common good is here the same as in the pursuit of happiness: accidental goods are superfluous and individuals can indulge in their possession only so long as they do not interfere with the attainment of essential goods. The only difference is that, in the one case, the individual is morally obliged to order his own desires by this principle, whereas, in the other case, the state has the extrinsic authority to enforce such just demands upon its members.

According to the second principle, all partial goods must be subordinated to the whole of goods, because partial goods are constitutive means to the possession of the whole, and hence no partial good should be sought beyond the point where it serves this end. This principle applies to the ordering of essential goods, according as they are partial and means, or the whole and the end. In terms of it, *the common good* is ordered to *happiness,* as the lesser to the greater good, the part to the whole, as well as by reason of the fact that the state is also a productive means, an extrinsic efficient cause, of happiness, and must, therefore, be ordered to its end. To prefer the common good to happiness is the same type of error, though not as egTegious, as preferring health to happiness. No such question of preference should ever arise, however, because if each partial good is desired only so far as it is essential to happiness, and not in any accidental excess, there will be no con:f:lict between the parts and the whole. For this reason, we need not speak here of *sacrificing* the common good to happiness, as before we stated the conditions under which accidental goods must be sacrificed, e. g., when such an individual good as wealth in accidental excess impedes the common good, it must be sacrificed to the maintenance of that essential good.

All of this can be summarized in language which reveals the oversimplification of the traditional formula, namely, that the good of the whole is greater than the good of the part, and

hence that the latter must be ordained to the former. In this formula, "whole" usually stands for community, and "part" for an individual human being. But what is usually forgotten is that the " good of the whole " in this sense is a partial good, and that there is one "good of the part" (i.e., happiness) which is the whole of goods. The truth being complex, it can be fully expressed only by saying that the whole good of each part (the happiness of each man) is greater than the partial good which is the good of the whole (the community) , though such goods of the parts as are uniquely individual (accidental) are inferior and must be sacrificed to any partial good which is essential (such as the good of the whole, i.e., the common good) and certainly to happiness itself (which is the whole of goods) .[243]

When the truth is so stated, is the antinomy resolved? If the state never called upon its members to sacrifice anything but accidental goods in its behalf, no problem would remain. But the facts are otherwise. There seem to be circumstances in which the state asks men to jeopardize their health and even their lives for the common good. If this demand is *just-and let us concede at once that it* is-then it would appear that the common good takes precedence over happiness, for if a man endanger his health and risk his life for the common good, he would seem to be foregoing the pursuit of happiness (which requires health and certainly life) . Such sacrifice could be regarded as just only if the common good were greater than the happiness of this individual or that. But, according to the analysis of goods we have made so far, that is false. Hence the antinomy persists if it is true, on the one hand, that individual happiness is always paramount over the common good, and if it is just, on the other hand, for the state to ask individuals to surrender their hold upon goods or conditions essential to the pursuit of happiness. We have, however, succeeded in focussing the issue in a way that may help us to solve the antinomy, for we now see that the claims of individual and state conflict only under very special circumstances-in fact, only under condi-

[243] Vd. Part II, *supra,* fn. 58; Part III, *supra,* fn. 120, 130, 169.

tions that can be described as emergencies in which the very endurance of the state is threatened by the *vis major* of natural cataclysms (such as earthquakes, epidemics, etc.) or by the violence of that man-made catastrophe which is martial aggression .[244]

Let us examine briefly a few obvious cases of civic emergency. During a serious epidemic, which endangers the state's well-being by threatening to decimate its population, all men, not only physicians and nurses, can be impressed into the service of public health, even at the risk of their own health, and perhaps life. When a community is similarly threatened by earthquake or flood, all its members can be similarly to assume perilous risks. In times of peace, not only are officers charged

••• The *only* truth in the many passages, in the writings of both Aristotle and St. Thomas, which seem to say that the common good takes precedence over individual happiness (by appeal to the too-simple formula that " the good of the whole is greater than the good of a part ")-the only truth in all these texts is the truth of a very special case, which is an exception from the generally prevailing ordination of the state to the service of man's good. That special case is made by the dire emergencies in which the survival of the state itself is at stake. Clearly the state must survive if it is to perform its service as a means to individual happiness. To salvage a means which is indispensable to the end each man seeks, individual men, it would seem, must place the means before the end. But this cannot be true. In short the truth about the just demand which the state makes upon its members under emergency conditions must somehow be made consistent with the greater truth-the truth of a superior principle--that the state is a means and individual happiness the end. We are challenged here to show how an apparent exception proves the rule. Cf. fn. 251 and 263 *infra.*

A point of method should be observed. In any analysis, the principles should be inductively formulated by reference to the normal, not the exceptional, case. The principles of political philosophy should, therefore, express the !'elation of the state to man in terms of the ordination that is exhibited under conditions of peace and security. These are the normal (i.e., the ideal) conditions, even if they are not statistically normal (i. e., the most frequent) . The apparent reversal of this ordination is found only in the abnormal conditions of war and catastrophe. The traditional statements about the supremacy of the common good, which we are here criticizing, seem to place primary er.phasis upon abnormal emergency conditions. By this error in method, principles are developed which explain the special case at the expense of making the general case appear to be abnormal or even unintelligible. The opposite procedure is obviously sounder: to formulate principles which apply without any difficulty to the normal situation, and then to solve the difficulties which arise in the abnormal case. And, it should be added, such difficulties must be solved without altering the principles in the least respect.

with enforcing the law duty-bound to risk their lives in the apprehension of criminals, but so, in fact, is every citizen obligated to assist the police, if there be such need, or even, in the absence of police, to undertake alone the dangerous task of blocking the path of desperate criminals. This case is misunderstood if it is supposed that the *duty* here is as between one individual and another, the one risking his health or life to protect the life or property of another. The obligation in *justice* is rather a civic duty to protect the peace and order of the community against the ravages of crime.[245] The public peace of a community is as much menaced, though seldom as dramatically, by the spread of unchecked crime within its borders, as by the advance of unchecked aggressors upon its territorial domains. Hence the duty of a citizen in time of peace is no different from his duty in time of war, though under the conditions of modern warfare, which efface the ancient distinction between soldiers and non-combatants, every member of the community is more likely to experience the precariousness of a frontline position in defense of his state's well-being. The emergency of war differs from 'the emergency of crime in one other respect: not only is it usually a more intense emergency, having a more widespread impact upon the whole population simultaneously, but it raises a question of justice, which crime by definition does not. Absolutely speaking, no citizen can be justly required to take part in a purely predatory, or unjust, attack upon a neighboring community. The use of military force against outsiders is justified only in deiense, just as the use of police power withiR the state is justified only by crime. We need not here become perplexed by the subtleties, which tend to sophistries, in the casuistry of arguing that

••• An obligation in *justice,* which generates a *civic* duty, must be distinguished from an obligation in *charity,* which generates a personal duty to one's family, one's friends, and even to all one's fellowmen united in. brotherhood under sonship to God. We shall return to this point shortly. Vd. fn. *255 infra.* Here let it suffice to mention the formation of vigilante groups in frontier communities to illustrate the civic duty which every member of the community has to protect its peace and order by assuming the sort of risks that professional police are supposed to face in the pursuance of their official duties.

this war is defensive, and hence just. Our present concern is only with those principles of justice which generate civic duties to perform strenuous acts at great risk to individual welfare for the sake of preserving the community from ruin.[246]

All of the emergency situations we have reviewed-and they are sufficiently typical to represent those which have not been mentioned-have the following elements in common: (a) the health or life of the state is *threatened;* (b) the health or life of its members is *risked;* (c) the *obligation* which is imposed upon individuals to assume the risk has its source in *natural justice,* not in supernatural charity. When these three elements are properly understood, the antinomy can be resolved, at least so far as principles are concerned, if never perfectly in actual practice. The key to the solution lies ln the very nature of justice, and in the proportionality between two *probabilities*- the *threat* to the state, on the one hand, and the *risk* to the individual, on the other. Let us consider each of these in turn.

Justice is the virtue by which human acts are directed to the common good, but the acts of the other virtues, such as fortitude and temperance, are also drawn, by the command of justice, into the service of the common weal?[247] Yet all the natural virtues, justice included, are ordained as principal means to one ultimate end-not the common good, but that natural happiness which consists in a whole life lived according to virtue. Hence any virtuous acts which justice commands, especially those deeds of supreme fortitude in facing mortal peril, must be directed *ultimately* to the happiness of the individual agent, even though, as acts of justice, they are *proxi-*

[246] The following pages were written before Sunday, December 7, 1941. They were not intended to be prophetic, though they now appear to have great pertinence to our present national situation. If they are philosophically true and thereby deal universally with the problem of happiness and the common good in time of war, they must, of course, apply to the ordeal which each of us now faces. It is necessary to remember, however, that a wise application of principles to an instant case cannot be accomplished without the qualifications of competent casuistry.

[247] " Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly; but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal " *(Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. *65,* a. *5,* ad 4). Cf. *ibid.,* II-II, q. 58, aa. 6, 12.

mately intended to serve the common good. There is no difficulty here, because the common good is, by the very nature of the state itself, an intermediate end and a necessary means to natural happiness. It is the function of an intermediate end, not only to be an intrinsically worthy good in itself (a *bonum honet;tum)*, but also to *mediate* between the act which serves it and the more ultimate good which it in tum serves (for it is also in this respect a *bonum utile)*. Furthermore, the intention of an ultimate end entails the intention of all the means which that end necessitates as indispensable to its attainment. Hence there can be no conflict between the intention of such means and the intention of the end; the demands of justice with respect to the common good can never be inconsistent with the causality of all the natural virtues in the production of individual happiness. Speaking in utter strictness, justice, like natural love, is partly selfish, despite its *apparent* ordination of one man to the good of another. The appearance here of complete altruism is seen as illusory when we bear in mind that the good of another-whether of a single individual, or of the organized multitude-is an indispensable means to each individual's own welfare, because he is a social animal, and because he needs the life of the community to sustain his own life, and its benefactions to support his own pursuit of happiness. [248]

••• Because it is only partly selfish, justice is also altruistic in part. Justice falls between two extremes: the immorally selfish act, which considers self to the total exclusion of the other; and the supernaturally unselfish act, which considers the other to the point of forgetfulness of self. Being both virtuous and natural, the act of justice is neither totally selfish nor totally unselfish. The acts of justice, like the acts of every other natural virtue, aim at the well-being of the agent and, in this sense, they are concerned with self; but the acts of justice, and of every other virtue in so far as they are commanded by justice, also aim at the common good, and hence at the good of others as involved in the common good. .Vd. fn. 249 and 255 *infra.* When, henceforth, we refer to the selfishness of justice, we mean only to contrast it with the complete altruism of charity, and not to imply that its acts are devoid of any consideration for others.

In the sense in which justice is selfish, human love has a note of selfishness about it. Only God, only the superabundant in being and goodness, can love others with complete generosity; for only God is the perfect agent, incapable of added perfection, working only to communicate, not to acquire, perfection. Every other creature must work to an end that is its own perfection. Man comes closest

Homicide and larceny, arson and perjury, are *crimes* because they imperil the peace and order of a civil community; and this is true even of such non-criminal acts as breach of contract or fraudulent misrepresentation. Every act which the positive law prohibits is deleterious to the common good, either directly as in the case of criminal misdemeanors and felonies, or indirectly as in violations of what is called the civil code. In short, every act of justice refers to the common good and, paradoxically, by that

to loving man in the Divine way when, through the motions of charity, he loves *all* his fellowmen for love of God. For such love he must be supernaturally elevated; he must participate in the Divine love. By this supernatural love, a man loves all men as belonging to God and as potential friends of God Who is his Friend; by his natural benevolent love, man loves those who are bound so closely to him as to be "other selves." The element of self-perfection is, then, present in both; but in natural love, this consideration is more to the fore, and the scope of that love is extremely limited; in supernatural love, self may be entirely forgotten-though never excluded-and, moreover, such love is completely universal in scope. Natural love gives more than is required, whereas natural justice gives only what is due. Yet, even so, natural love does not extend to all men, as does supernatural love, nor is it, like the latter, complete in its forgetfulness of self. When sacrifice is understood as an act which is a complete giving, apart from all return, it will be realized that only God can sacrifice in the fullest sense of the world. Justice does not move a man to sacrifice, and love does so only in proportion as it approximates the Divine love. The precepts of charity must, therefore, never be confused with the Golden Rule, for the latter is a maxim which expresses the sort of selfishness that is proper to justice-the giving that stops at strict due and calculates recompense. Vd. fn. 253 *infra.*

There is one radical exception to the foregoing account of natural love, and that concerns man's natural love of God. It is natural to seek and love things ac('ording as they are naturally fit to be sought and loved, St. Thomas tells us (vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 109, a. 8). Now God is the supreme and infinite good; "hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things " *(ibid.)* . But without grace man eannot act according to this love. Although integral man does not need " the gift of grace in order to love God above all things naturally, he needed God's help to move him to it" *(ibid.);* that is, man naturally " loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good"; whereas, through charity, man "loves Him as He is the object of beatitude " *(ibid.,* ad 1). The love of God does not exceed nature's integral power, but to act in full accordance with such love does. "Nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength; but to love God above all things is not such an act " *(ibid.,* ad 2). In a state of corrupt nature, however, man loves himself before God; grace is needed to restore order among the objects of natural love.

very fact is selfish, because the common good is not an end in itself; it is a means to the individual happiness which each man seeks, but can only achieve through virtue, justice included. [249] From all of which it follows that no obligation which arises from justice can withdraw a man from the pursuit of his own happiness to the service of some alien good, for no other natural good a man can serve is really good except as a part of, or a means to, his individual happiness.

How, then, can justice require us to risk our lives, or anything essential to happiness, such as health, even in those emergencies in which the state's survival is threatened? The answer turns on the fact that what is required is only a *risk*, and not an *absolute surrender*, of these essential goods. *The risk of life is not suicide.* Regardless of how dire the emergency may be, the state cannot ask a man to kill himself for its good. Nor can the state kill men who have not forfeited their lives by criminal attack upon the social welfare. Whether or not the capital punishment of criminals is justified by retributive justice, it is certainly true that, apart from the sort of violence through which a man declares himself to be an enemy of the state, the state cannot kill men without committing the injustice of murder. Suppose a famine or a pestilence, and suppose that it would be obviously expedient, in the protection of the whole community, to kill a few-the aged or the infected.

[249] It may be objected that the natural law commands one not to harm one's fellow man and to render to each his due, and that the natural law, being prior to the civil community and its positive legal institutions, imposes this obligation *absolutely* and entirely apart from the common good. This is a false inter!Jretation of the natural law. There are many precepts (all of them first, or indemonstrable, principles) which analytically expand the simple injunction of the natural law to seek the good-i. e., the natural last end. To seek happiness, we must seek all its component parts, its constitutive means: we must seek wealth and health, pleasure and knowledge, and the common good. The precept which is expressed by " Do good to others, harm no one, and render to each his own " is not the whole of natural law (which is expressed simply by "Seek the good,"-i. e., the whole of real goods) . It is rather one of the partial principles of natural law which stands to the whole principle, as the parts of happiness stand to the whole. And the part here being considered-a partial good which belongs to the whole order of goods that constitute the end-is the common good. Vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 94, a. 2. Cf. *ibid.,* q. 10, a. 1, ad 3; a. 2, ad 3.

Is it not perfectly obvious that such expedients cannot be resorted to because they violate justice? And they violate justice because they wrongly place the common good before and above the inalienable rights of each individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. [250] Though it deprives men of less than life, the sterilization of the unfit is also judged to be against natural law, and contrary to justice, regardless of how strong a case can be made out, on clear factual grounds, for its expediency. Now if the common good were the highest good, if within the sphere of purely natural means and ends the common good were the last end, whatever was *truly expedient* as a means to the common good would be *naturally justified.*

These things not being so, we return to the important distinction between the *probability of risk* and the *certainty of sacrifice.* And the probability of risk is related to another probability-the *probability of threatening ruin* which confronts the state in dire civic emergencies. If it were possible to know with certitude that, despite all efforts, the state was doomed to perish in this emergency, there would be no point to risking one's life, nor could that risk be justly required; just as; if it were possible to know with certitude that the act one was about to perform for the state's defense would lead to death, the act could not be obligated or rendered in justice for it would be murder (by the state which demanded it) o:r suicide (by the individual who, believing himself bound in justice, renders it). To stay within the bounds of justice, we must stay within the domain of probabilities, in which there is a proportionality between the probable risk the individual undertakes and the

[250] Again we see that the truth depends upon the subordination of the common good to a natural last end, and not merely to supernatural ends of superior worth. For if it were true that the only good superior to the common good is supernatural beatitude, the individual would have no natural and inalienable rights against the state. If this were the case, what would prevent a Christian state from providing the plague-stricken with the Sacraments and then lining them up against a wall and shooting them? Such an act would certainly be for the common good, and would not interfere with the attainment of their ultimate supra-temporal good by the individuals who had been removed for the sake of the community's welfare and, in a sense, dispatched from their temporal misery to their eternal happiness.

probable threat the state faces. Within this domain we can understand why the state can ask, and why the individual can render, a service that *appears* to violate the order of natural goods. The violation is only apparent because the risk the individual takes is balanced against another probability which threatens him. If the state were to perish, the individual himself might not survive the catastrophe, or at least its consequence would be a drastic impairment of the conditions he needed for continuing his pursuit of happiness. He, therefore, risks his life in the hope, not only of his own survival, but of the community's preservation and future prosperity, so that, the emergency being surmounted, the danger past, peace and safety once more regained, the state will continue to play its normal role as a common good to be enjoyed and as a means to be used. Within the sphere of probabilities, which permit men to cherish hope in the face of risks and threats, the individual does not *naturally* hope for the state's safety with no concern for his own fate, nor does he hope for his own survival with no thought of his community's endurance; rather he hopes that good fortune will attend his efforts in respect to both goods, and he hopes for both because either without the other would frustrate the intentions of his natural appetite. Moreover, the order of his hopes follows the order of his intentions: as both biological subsistence and a benevolent society are means necessitated by happiness as the end, so does he hope for his own survival and the state's endurance as indispensable conditions prerequisite to the attainment of happiness. These two goods are not only means to the same end, but they are reciprocally means to each other, though not with the same stress under conditions of safety and peril, for whereas under circumstances of peace and security society provides its members with aid in the struggle for subsistence, the reverse causality predominates in times of war and impending disaster, when men must help the state survive. Because these two means to happiness (individual subsistence and society's endurance) are thus co-implicated in reciprocal causality, because the emergency situation involves two inseparable risks, not one, the individual is not

free to disregard one threat and to protect himself entirely against the other. His individual happiness is doubly threatened by the emergency: it is as much threatened by the probability that the community will not endure unless its members will assume risks proportionate to this danger, as it is threatened by the probability that he may perish if he undertakes to prevent disaster to the community. Clearly, then, it follows that when a man acts in such situations with the fortitude that justice commands, he is not exalting the common good above his individual happiness; and when the state justly exacts such conduct from its members, it is not preferring its own life to the life of its members, but rather regarding both as means to happiness and both as inseparably threatened.

Each member of the community enjoys its common good, and profits by the state's ministry to his individual welfare. Each individual must, therefore, be prepared to pay a price, in effort and risk, for these benefits, because he cannot avoid such effort and risk without risking their total loss. But since, in a just community, all share equally in the fruits of the common good, and all profit proportionately from its benefactions, the principle of justice requires a fair distribution of burdens to balance the distributive justice of properly shared goods. It is this principle which completes our resolution of the antinomy. If the burdens of effort and risk are justly distributed among the members of a community, each is called upon to do no more than the rest in the protection and support of goods they commonly enjoy and proportionately share. No man would then be sacrificing himself in any way for his fellows. Justice, be it remembered, never calls for sacrifice or generosity; it exacts only a just price; it asks only for' what is due. Accordingly, if distributive justice prevails with respect to common goodil and common burdens alike, then each man who acts justly in the performance of his civic duty in times of emergency, cooperates with his fellows for the social welfare so that it in turn will continue to support the welfare of himselt Each acts with all for the good of all because upon that depends the. good of each. And no risk of life can be too great so long as it is proportionate

in its probability to the probability of disaster which threatens the state, and so long as one man's assumption of risk is not proportionately greater than another's.

Thus is resolved the apparent antinomy which arises from what seems to be a conflict between the common good and happiness. [251] But this solution is not perfect. On the side of practice, it must be corrected and completed by a *defacto* consideration of man's fallen nature and by regard for the weakness of its motivations. On the side of principle, it must be qualified and supplemented by a consideration of supernatural ends, and by regard for the supernatural dimension of human aspirations. Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance to insist that, on purely natural grounds, the principle of justice resolves the antinomy, because it is reason's right to claim that, without help from faith, it can dispose of the false issue between individualism and totalitarianism-that it can know the whole truth here, from which these extreme positions depart by exaggerating half-truths. None of the solution's defects in actual practice-many of which arise from the deficiency of natural justice without grace-alter the truth of the solution in principle; nor do the qualifications which must be added when supernatural causes and ends are considered subvert the natural principles; on the contrary, they appear to be supplementary.

In very small primitive societies, and in isolated frontier communities (such as stockaded settlements in the American wilderness surrounded by hostile savages), the principle of distributive justice upon which the solution depends actually seems to have historical exemplification in relatively succf'ssful

[251] It must be remembered here that we have been considering the problem entirely in terms of justice, because it is only in these terms that there is an *apparent* antinomy-only if justice demanded the *sacrifice* of individual life for the state's well-being, would there be a conflict between the common good and happiness as ultimate ends in the natural order. (Cf. *III Cont. Gent.*, 146, wherein St. Thomas considers the justice of capital punishment.) We have not considered the motivations of patriotism or the fact that, in time of war, a few men may give so much for so many. Whether it springs from natural love entirely, or whether it draws its strength from the resources of charity, patriotism leads men to the performance of acts which cannot be required by justice. The state cannot *justly* ask for the devotion of patriots; it can demand only that citizens do their duty. Vd. fn. 248 *supra.*

practice. It would be difficult to say that such successes were accomplished by men whose acquired virtues no vigor from grace; but, on the other hand, it would be equally difficult to say that, in such compact communities, the imperfectly acquired natural virtue of justice was not competent to solve the problem practically when the emergency arose. The defective application of the natural principles in the practices of complex and large societies, such as all civilized states in which there is an elaborate hierarchy of functions and classes, may proceed as much from the gross magnitude and intricate structure of these communities as from the inadequacy of acquired virtue without grace. The complexity of civilized societies so increases the difficulty of achieving distributive justice even in times of peace and security, and even, be it said, in Christian states where the church strengthens the political regime in its own line of causality, and where grace restores the efficacy of nature, that there is *a fortiori* grounds for expecting a large degree of failure in times of storm and stress. How much more so is such failure to be expected in modern secular states which are both enormously complex and also radically deprived, by their secularism, of the help human governments and individual men need.

But the help of grace, and the ministry of the church, must not be viewed exclusively in terms of their assistance to the operation of natural principles-whether the institutions of government or the operations of acquired virtue. The whole situation takes on another dimension when supernatural ends are the objects of human aspiration, and supernatural means become available for their attainment. The shift is marked by the appearance of two elements which have no place in the purely natural order-the fortitude of heroic virtue, and the altruism of charity. As we have seen, the intentions of natural justice are selfish. They do not regard the good of another man *as such,* but only as a part of the community which must be preserved for one's own good. Now just as natural justice and natural love are selfish, so neither is heroic. Neither leads men to martyrdom. [252] Though natural love is less selfish than

••• It may be that heroism is an indisputable fact in pagan societies---

justice, in that it involves some· genuine forgetfulness of self, and though natural love, unlike justice, impels men to the generosity of sacrifice, it remains, nevertheless, on the plane of imperfect action, in which the agent always seeks to perfect himself as well as another, and in fact regards the other as an extension of self-as an *alter ego.* In this sense, the promptings of natural love never deviate from the fundamental tendency of natural desire-for *each thing to seek its own perfection.*[258] For

that the literature of Greece aud Rome, for example, is rich in the examples of men who *genuinely sacrificed* their lives for their country in martial exploits. Such heroism may be further explained by pagan beliefs in the immortality of the soul and in the rewards awaiting heroes in the Elysian Fields hereafter. 'And the Japanese today may be offered as another example of a people among whom there are heroes-men who almost commit suicide for their country's welfare aud who do so because of a "religious" belief in the Emperor. But on closer examination it will be found, we think, that such heroism is spurious aud ;that there is no sacrifice involved because there is no forgetfulness of self; the deed is done for the sake of the reward-whether that be a place of distinction among the departed shades, or the lasting glitter of one's name aud fame in the memory of men. The predominant motivation among the ancient pagans was not the privileges and pleasures aceorded the brave in the Elysian Fields. Even apart from such myths about the hereafter and such tenuous " beliefs " in au immortal soul, the pagan " hero " would have been motivated by a concern for his good name-pride of self and pride in family, to be gratified by the sort of "immortality" which a mau wins when he is honored in the enduring records of his people. So long as this is the motivation, there is neither generosity in the act, nor sacrifice; hence no true heroism. The Christian martyr does not seek martYrdom *as suck.* Yd. T. S. Eliot, *Murder in tke Cathedral,* New York, 1935. The Christian hero does not calculate his reward in heaven. His act proceeds entirely from his love of God aud love for his neighbor. Moreover, unlike the pagan, he is not serving the common good primarily, but the well-being of his fellow men, for which the common good is a means. Yd. fn. *!t55 infra.*

••• Yd. Part II, *supra,* pp. 596-97, fn. 43, 45. Yd. also fn. !t48 *supra,* in which the mitigated selfishness-the altru-egoism-of natural justice and natural love are compared. For clarity of understanding, it is necessary here to define the precise sense in which we are speaking of love as "natural." Desire can be called "natural" in two distinct senses: (I) as opposed to the rational (or the sensitive), desire is natural if it is appetitive tendency apart from knowledge or estimation of the object, and thus we oppose natural to desire; (!t) as opposed to the supernatural, desire is natural if it is appetitive tendency, natural or elicit, which is not elevated to the plane of supernaturally appointed ends, aud thus we oppose the natural desire for happiness, including even the transcendental and ineffective desire for beatitude, to hope which is a supernatural, elicit, aud effective desire for beatitude. If, then, we make our primary division between natural aud elicit

the fullness of generosity in sacrifice and for complete selflessness, we must look to the precepts of charity which impel men to give, not only more than is due, but unstintingly .[254] The heroic discharge of civic duty in defense of the common good, like the self-immolation of the martyr in witness to his faith, flows in its perfection from that charity through which men love God, and their neighbors as themselves in God's bosom. Here there is the altruism and generosity of transcendent sacrifice, which does not calculate the commutations and distributions of what is justly due. Here the sacrifice may serve the welfare of another individual directly with no thought of fair requital; or if it serve the common weal directly, it does so for the ultimate benefit of the multitude of others who will survive to reap its fruits. [255] It does not bargain risk of loss against the

desire, according as appetite is not or is determined by knowledge of the object, we can further subdivide elicit desire into natural and supernatural, according as the knowledge of the object is naturally acquired or supernaturally received, and according as, in the latter case, the will is elevated to the supernatural plane of effective motion toward a supernaturally known end. Now similar distinctions can be made in the sphere of love. Love is either natural or elicit, and elicit love is either natural or supernatural, the latter being .charity, as supernatural desire is hope. Furthermore natural elicit love can be divided into the sensitive and the rational: the former is usually called " concupiscent love " and the latter " benevolent love." Of these, the former is entirely acquisitive and hence entirely selfish; but the latter is the source of actions which aim at the perfection of another, the loved one, as well as at the perfection of self, and here selfishness is mitigated by concern for the other, even though that othe:r is one's other self. We have been using the phrase " natural love " to signify the natural as opposed to the supernatural, not the natural as opposed to the elicit; and also to signify the benevolent (i.e., the rational) not the acquisitive (i.e., the sensitive) mode of elicit human love. Justice is less selfish than acquisitive love or any other motion of the sensitive appetite; and benevolent love is less selfish than justice in the sphere of the rational appetite, though it, in turn, is more selfish than charity as a supernatural virtue of the will.

••• Vd. *Summa Theol.,* II-II, qq. 26, 27.

[255] The sharp difference between the selfishness of justice and the altruism of charity is revealed by the difference in their relation to the common good. Justice directs men to the common good, and to the good of individual fellow-men *only in so far as* their good is involved in the co=on good, the reason being that justice, like the other natural virtues, aims at the happiness of the individual agent and, in aiming at the common good, justice aims through it, as an intermediate end, to natural happiness (of *self)* as the ultimate end; but this it could not do if it

probability of profit which may redound to self if the transaction eventuates fortunately.

The hero and the martyr ask no requital, but the supernatural virtues which impel them to love's generous acts do not prescind, nevertheless, from the hope for the reward which :flows from the Divine mercy and justice. Such men act not only from supernatural charity, but also in supernatural faith and hope. It is only in terms of such motivations that Maritain's analysis of sacrifice can be verified.

> When a man gives his life for the community's sake, he accomplishes, through an act of such great virtue, the moral perfection by which the person· asserts his supreme independence as regards the world. By losing himself temporally for the city's sake, the person sacrifices himself in the truest and most complete fashion, and yet does not lose the stakes; the city serves him even then, for the soul of man is not mortal, and there is eternallife. [255]

Apart from the supernatural dimension of human life-its causes, its aspirations, and its ends-there is only the justice of distributed risks and the calculation of temporal burdens in relation to temporal requitals. [256] It would be utterly false to explain the risking of individual life for the common good in terms of man's immortal soul and eternal destiny and *at the same t·ime* to talk of such acts as :flowingfrom the obligations of natural justice. To do so would be to confuse natural and supernatural principles. But it is not inconsistent to say, in view of the weakness of fallen nature, that natural justice, imperfectly

aimed at the good of another individual *as such.* In contrast, charity directs men to the good of *all* their neighbors as potential friends of God. Charity aims at the common good only in so far as it is a means to the well-being of each individual; hence, in aiming at the common good, charity aims through it, as an intermediate end, to the happiness of others, the Divine good (i. e., beatitude), as the ultimate end. Thus we see two things: that justice is divided against charity as consideration of one's self is divided against thoughtfulness for others; and that the common good is not an ultimate end for either justice or charity, but always mediate as a means to the happiness-natural or supernatural--of self or of others.

•••• *Politics and Scholasticism,* p. 78.

[258] We mention justice, and omit natural love, because the antinomy we have been considering turns on the demands of justice, and not the benefactions of love. Vd. fn. 251 *supra.*

acquired, is insufficient to solve in practice the antinomy between the common good and happines, however perfectly such principles enable us to solve the problem in theory. [257] Moreover, the supernatural virtues which accompany charity not only strengthen the natural virtues in their own sphere of operation, but raise men to the level where, acting from charity, they pass from selfishness to altruism, from the calculations of justice to the generosity of love, from the cooperation of all for the sake of each to the sacrifice of one for the sake of all. Yet even on this level, the fundamental truth about the state in relation to man is confirmed, for even as on the level of justice men serve the state only to gain their own ultimate natural end, so on the level of charity, as Maritain points out, the city still serves the man who, losing his mortal life for the city's sake, gains thereby the eternal good of his immortal soul. The common good, in short, never takes precedence over happiness, natural or supernatural; the good of the civil whole is never greater than the whole good of its human parts, corporeal persons in this life or spiritual beings hereafter. [258]

[257] If it were possible, in a complex modern society, for each man to think that everyone else was bearing proportionate burdens and risks-as that is almost certainly known by the members of a small frontier community-then the natural virtue of justice would be sufficient: the just man would not hesitate to face the greatest risks for the community's welfare. But since in any large and complex society, the ideal of distributive justice is very imperfectly realized, and individuals are beset by doubts about the full cooperation of their fellow men in a common cause, natural justice is not enough to impel men to take the risk which may turn out, in fact, to have been a sacrifice, because it exceeded the risks others have assumed. In such a situation, ·love is required. Only through love for one's fellow man is anyone impelled, beyond mere justice, to take the chance of doing more than others. And it is certainly a question whether natural love is enough. The truly heroic cannot be accomplished without charity.

[258] Maritain's solution of the antinomy seems to us to be inadequate, or even false, because it appeals to supernatural principles. The antinomy between the common good and individual happiness arises entirely in terms of natural goods; it occurs entirely within the order of natural means and ends. Therefore, it cannot be solved except in natural terms. In our view, l\1aritain's radical error here consists in failing to consider the natural last end, or arises from obscuring its precise character as a distinct end by considering it as if it were almost identical with the common good as that flows back to the members of the community. (Vd. fn. *supra.)* He then resolves the antinomy by subordinating the common good to the

6. Thus is completed the whole first stage of our undertaking in this series of articles. We have now shown that the conclusion concerning Democracy is demonstrable, by answering objections and meeting difficulties supposed to arise from the untenability of that conclusion in the light of traditional principles. What remains to be done, of course, is the demonstration itself. · That will aim to establish the *truth* of the proposition which we have so far been defending only with

extra-temporal end of the immortal person, whereas it should be subordinated to the quite temporal end of the mortal individual-who, by the way, is also truly a person even though corporeal, if the meaning of " person " is *an inteUigent substance.* (Vd. fn. 130a *supra.)*

This manner of thinking is clearly revealed in a recent article by M. Maritain, "The Immortality of Man" in *Tke Review of Politics,* ill, 4, pp. We are not denying that a man who sacrifices his life to speak the truth against a tyrant-even if the act is not required for the common truly a hero; we are only saying that such heroism cannot be *justified* by concern for the common good, and even less by the desire for natural happiness, to which, in fact, it seems to be antagonistic. With respect to supernatural ends, a man may act from a certain contempt of this life, as *almost worthless* in comparison with the infinitely greater worth of eternal life. But it is the ultimate and genuine worth of this life which justifies a man's risking it for the common good, at the peril *of* losing the common good upon which the fulfillment of this life's potentialities depends. (What truth there is in the preceding sentences must be reconciled with the more fundamental truth that is expressed in fn. *supra:* " a man must keep his eyes on his natural last end in order to direct his life effectively to his supernatural last end.")

The disaster of France in the current war may require an explanation in terms of the lack of enough heroism among the people and their leaders, which, in turn, signifies the lack of supernatural motivations. Vd. Maritain, *France My Country,* New York, 1941; cf. Yves Simon, *La grande Crise de la Republique Frongaise,* Montreal, 1941. But this only means that natural justice is inadequate under the conditions of modem society (vd. fn. *supra),* not that natural justice is inadequate in principle to sustain an effective morale among a people at war. There is certainly impressive evidence that the promptings of natural morality had become extremely weak in large portions of the French community and that, on the contrary, an unjust pursuit of individual (i. e., accidental) goods at the expense of the common good prevailed-not only to the detriment of the common good but also to the defeat of the individual (i.e., essential) good of happiness itself.

To insist that natural principles must be sufficient to solve what *appears* to be an antinomy arising in purely natural terms is not to proclaim the self-sufficiency of man. Everything we have said should disabuse the reader of that interpretation. In the order of execution, man is not sufficient unto himself: without God he can do no good; and especially in a corrupt condition, is he dependent upon grace even for vigor in the pursuit of natural ends. Vd. fn. *infra.*

respect to its *intelligibility.* If this proposition could not have been understood in terms of the fundamental principles of moral philosophy, it would have been unintelligible, and there would have been no need for further inquiry into its truth.

We do not, and cannot, pretend that our thesis about Democracy was obviously compatible with traditional principles, or immediately intelligible in terms of the prevailing understanding (among exponents of *philosophia perennis)* of the order of goods. Had it been so, the several objections we have considered could not have had sufficient warrant to deserve such extended analyses as we have undertaken to answer them. On the contrary, these analyses were necessitated by the fact that with respect to certain fundamental points traditional theory is defective. The objections arose from adherence to traditional theory on the very points in which it is crucially deficient.

The deficiencies are of two sorts. For the most part, they are inadequacies in analysis which can be readily supplemented; but in consequence of these inadequacies there are one or two matters about which the truth has not merely been obscured, but wholly denied. The two major inadequacies which we have tried to remedy are (1) an incomplete analysis of the common good, which failed to distinguish between the common good as *finis causa* and *finis effectus,* and hence which failed to understand the *possibility* of a plurality of common goods achievable by governments intrinsically unequal in justice; [259] and (2) an incomplete analysis of the order of all human goods, which failed to distinguish the natural happiness of individual men from the well-being of their civil community (i. e., *bonum commune hominis* from *bonum commune communitatis* within the natural order), and hence which failed to understand the natural end of the state.[260] In consequence, a major eiTor resulted, for the common good was *falsely* affirmed to be the highest natural good in the temporal order, and man's natural dignity (i.e., his natural worth as an end the state must serve)

••• To remedy this defect was the work of Part 11 *su;pra.*

••0 To remedy this defect was the work of Part ID, *11Upra,* Sections 1, 2, S.

was *falsely* The whole truth about the order of goods, and a satisfactory account of means and ends (both natural and supernatural), cannot be grasped so long as natural happiness is omitted, or its constitution is misunderstood. That such omission and misunderstanding have prevailed throughout the tradition cannot be denied by anyone who has studied the traditional texts dealing with the order of goods, the disposition of means and ends, and the meaning of happiness. The origin of the fault may be attributed to Aristotle's *Ethics,* in so far as Book I and Book X require careful reconciliation, but that could have been accomplished by the commentators and followers. Because it was not, inadequacy and error resulted, and have long prevailed.

When, therefore, we say that the Theory of Democracy is consonant with traditional teaching, it would be disingenuous of us not to add that this calls for a radical re-examination of many traditional texts, and a rejection of some long-standing errors of interpretation. With respect to natural happiness, for example, it is only necessary to read St. Thomas in the light of difficulties arising from the apparent conflict between *Ethics,* I and *Ethics,* X; [262] but with respect to the common good, it is *necessary to reject as false* all the passages in which St. Thomas declares that the common good is supreme in the natural, temporal order; or, *if* this is not a fair interpretation of all those texts in which St. Thomas says that the common good takes precedence over the individual good because the good of the whole is greater than the good of its parts, *then* we must at least reject this false interpretation of what St. Thomas *see71UI*

••• The correction of this error was begun in Part II and in Part ill, Sections 2, 3, *supra,* but it was not completed until, in the present article (Section *5 supra),* the apparent antinomy between man and the state (i. e., between the claims of happiness and the common good to take precedence over each other in the natural order) was resolved in such a way that, although individuals may be called upon to risk their lives for the social welfare, the common good they thus serve remains throughout a means to the happiness they seek. Vd. Part II, *supra,* fn. *58,* wherein the antinomy to be resolved was first indicated. Cf. also Part III, fn. 130 *supra.*

••• Vd. the commentary on *Summa Theol.,* I-II, qq. *3-5;* and *III Cont. Gent.,* 84-48, 63, given in Part ill, *supra,* Section 3.

to say, even though it has prevailed among his commentators and followers to this day. [263]

Despite the qualification which we feel obliged to add, we reiterate that the Theory of Democracy has been shown to be acceptable to Aristotelians and Thomists, because it rests upon

--[3] The texts in question are too numerous to permit an exhaustive enumeration. It will suffice to cite a fair sampling of them chosen from a variety of contexts. Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. *65*, a. 2; I-II, q. 21, a. 4, ad 8; q. 90, a. 2; II-II, q. 26, a. 4, ad 3; q. 89, a. 2, ad 3; q. 58, aa. *5*, 7, 9, ad 3, 12; q. *65*, a. L All of these passages seem to argue from a purely *metaphiYtical* resemblance between the :relation of an organic or substantial part to its substantial whole, on the one hand, and the relation of a human individual, which is a whole substance, to the non-substantial whole which is the civil community, on the other. Man is not a part of the state as the arm is part of the body. (Cf. Part II, *11Upra,* fn. 59, 60, 68.) There is one passage in the *Summa Theologica* which speaks in a contrary vein: " We observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him" (I, q. 60, a. 5). Here, clearly, the supposition (" if man were a natural part of the city ") is a statement contrary to fact. But reason, which is the principle of virtuous action, recommends that, *in certain circumstances*, a man act for the good of the whole *.as if he were a natural part* of the community. When these circumstances are specified as constituting the emergency situations in which the endurance of the state is threatened, and when reason's recommendation is understood in terms of the calculation of one risk (the probable "danger of death") against another risk which is equally undesirable (the probable loss of the common good), there is nothing in the inclination of the social virtues (i. e., the tendency of justice itself or of the acts prompted by justice) which gives the common good precedence over individual natural happiness among the goods of the temporal order. Vd. Section *5 supra.* In short, neither by nature nor by reason is man subordinated to the state *as* means to end; on the contrary, both by nature and by reason, the being and goodness of the state is *as* a means to individual happiness, for the end in any order is always the whole of goods, and every partial good is a means thereto, whether constitutive, or productive, or both. If man were by nature a part of the civil community-as the arm is by nature a substantial part of the body-then it would be contrary to both nature and reason for man to conceive his whole good (his happiness) as including the good of the whole (the common good) .

One further point. The fact that man is a. substantial being and the state is an accidental being (and hence man is not a substantial part of the state) must not be confused with the fact that both happiness and the common good, as *goods simply*, are convertible with *being relatively* which is second act (or accidental being), not first act (or substantial being). Vd. *Summa Them.*, I, q. *5*, a. 1, ad l;

the principles of their philosophy and because it calls for a supplementation of those principles only where they are inadequate, or for a rejection of certain notions which are none the less false for having been repeated through the centuries. Quite apart from our thesis about Democracy, these deficiencies should be remedied and these errors repudiated in order to bring traditional political theory to a fuller expression of the truth. An adequate and correct account of the common good and of natural happiness, in themselves and in relation to one another, is requisite for a true understanding of man's political activity and life, even if it be false that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government.

But the situation is actually otherwise. Not only has the Theory of Democracy required us to rectify traditional political doctrine, but these rectifications also ensure the intelligibility of the proposition about Democracy and, removing obscurities, show that its truth *can be proved* .. The bearing of a plurality of common goods (each a *finis effectus)* has already been explained: a moral hierarchy of political forms (i. e., forms of government) is *possible* because the several forms of government, unequal in justice, are respectively the effective means to establishing states which are unequally good (i. e., the common good of which is either diminished or ample) There was no difficulty about showing this because, the common good being the end of political activity and political institutions, a moral gradation among the means (according to the elements of justice they incorporate) became immediately intelligible in terms of a correlative gradation among the ends (the possibility of diverse existential common goods). For the same reason, there is now a .difficulty in explaining the moral hierarchy of states in relation to the one end they all serve-natural

cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," *lac. cit.,* fn. 18. Hence there are two distinct arguments here: one against the error of supposing that the common good is greater than happiness *because* the state subordinates man as substantial whole does substantial part; the other against the error of denying that, in the order of goods simply (all of which are accidental in being)' happiness is the whole of goods, of which the common good is a part.

••• Vd. Part II, *auyra,* esp. pp. 624-52.

happiness. To complete our analysis, this difficulty must be overcome. Since the end of the state is happiness, it is now necessary to show how states which are unequally good as ends of political activity are unequally good as means to happiness. The state being an intermediate end in the order of natural goods (both a *bonum honestum* as end and a *bonum utile* as means), a full account of its goodness requires us to understand how its *utility* as a means is proportioned to its *'Worth* as an end. It is inconceivable that, among several intermediate ends, the one which is of greater worth in itself should also have less efficiency with respect to the ultimate end they compete to serve.[265]

To solve the problem indicated, we must distinguish between the common good as an end and as a means, in two ways. First, as an end to be achieved, the common good is a good *collectively* enjoyed by the members of the community, but as a means to be used the common good is a good *distributively* employed in its ordination to the happiness of individuals. This follows from the nature of happiness as a good which is common

[265] This is inconceivable because the goodness of anything which is a means, even though it also be an end, comes from the ultimate end in a given order. The much misused maxim, that the end justifies the means, becomes true only when it becomes precise in this sense: the only end which justifies every means (which determines its moral goodness) is the ultimate end. And no intermediate end justifies any means unless it functions as a mediator between that means and the ultimate end. In other words, if any political act or institution is morally good because it works for the common good, it must also work for happiness; and if one is better than another because it achieves a greater common good, it must also somehow achieve a greater happiness. But here a difficulty arises because, unlike the common good, natural happiness may be attained in *various degrees,* but it does not exist in several essentially distinct grades. What, then, does it mean to say " achieve a greater happiness *"?* This is the problem which remains to be solved. Cf. Part ill, *supra,* Section 1 at p. 126: **"It** is necessary to show that the several grades of common good are, as means, not equally efficient in the production of human happiness; in fact, there must be a perfect correlation between the grade of intrinsic goodness (i.e., justice) possessed by each type of common good (Royal, Republican, and Democratic) as an intermediate end, and the degree of efficiency it is able to exercise as a means to the ultimate end *simpliciter"-simpliciter,* of course, in the natural order, not absolutely.

to all men *only essentially, not existentially.'*[56] Second, as an end to be achieved, the goodness of the common good is its *intrinsic worth* to the community of men who enjoy it *collectively,* but as a means to be used the goodness of the common good is its *extrinsic efficiency* in *distributing* the conditions of happiness to individual men who must live together politically in order to realize the ultimate perfection of their human lives. The two distinctions are thus seen to be correlated. But the question still remains, what is meant by the qistributive efficiency of the common good, and how is one common good superior to another as a means in this way? The same question can, of course, be asked in terms of the state, for the existential common good in any grade is identical with the existence of a state in that grade of well-being. Since such phraseology is more usual, let us formulate the question thus: what is meant by the distributive efficiency of the state as a means to happiness, and how is one kind of state superior to another when it so functions as a means? (The *kinds* of states being considered are identical with the three grades of existential common good: the Royal state, the Republican state, and the Democratic state.)

We arrive at an answer by seeing how one of two possibilities is eliminated and how the other is necessitated. The two possibilities which exhaust the situation are: (1) that the efficiency of the state is measured by the *greater degree* of happiness produced, and that one state is more efficient than another through providing men with the conditions for a *greater happiness;* (2) that the efficiency of the state is measured by a *wider distribution* of happiness among its members, and that one state is more efficient than another through providing *more men* with the conditions of happiness. The first alternative is rendered impossible by the nature of natural happiness, and by the way the state functions as a means. As we have seen, natural happiness can be attained completely or incompletely, and in either case the attainment may be further qualified by degrees which

[56] Vd. Part II, *supra,* pp. 600-607.

reflect the intensity of the natural virtues either subalternated to the supernatural virtues or functioning inadequately apart therefrom. [267] But these differences in attainment represent a *continuous* variation in degrees of happiness as the perfection of a whole human life; they cannot be understood as distinct grades of happiness differing essentially in kind, as natural happiness differs from supernatural beatitude. [268] Furthermore, if the differential efficiency of diverse kinds of states as means were to be interpreted in terms of their being able to produce essentially distinct grades of happiness, not only should such distinct grades of happiness be discoverable, but there would have to be some explanation of these differences in efficiency in terms of an intelligible functional relationship between the grade of justice embodied in the state and the grade of happiness attained by its members. But there is neither evidence for the one, nor any way of conceiving the other. Finally, we know that the virtues are the intrinsic productive causes of happiness, whereas the state, in so far as it is a productive means, functions only as an extrinsic cause, either through aiding the formation of genuine virtue by disciplining the immature at the stage of inchoate virtue, or by providing the conditions which all require for the development and exercise of genuine virtue. Hence the degrees of natural happiness vary continuously with degrees of strength in the virtues, but not with the grade of goodness in the state, for to whatever extent a state is just it provides *some* men with requisite conditions for becoming happy, whether or not these men utilize their opportunities; moreover, the extrinsic conditions which the state provides will be used more or less effectively according as individual men acquire the natural virtues more or less adequately, and it is with respect to the latter factor that degrees of happiness will directly vary-assuming, of course, a certain constancy in the deliverances of fortune.

The elimination of the first alternative not only brings us to the second, but also reveals its necessity. Several means can

••• Vd. Part III, Section 4, supra, at pp. 295-98. ••• Vd. *ibid.*, at pp. 304-06.

vary in efficiency only by producing more or less of the same good which is their end. But this is possible in two ways: either by a quantitative difference in the end as achieved by any individual capable of attaining it, or by a quantitative difference in the number of individuals who are helped to reach the same end of which they are all capable. The exhaustiveness of these two possibilities being evident, the elimination of the first, as shown above, necessitates the second. That the second possibility affords us the true explanation of the way in which different kinds of states can be more or less efficient means to happiness, is confirmed by what we have already seen about the nature of the state as a means, namely, that it *functions distributively.* It is further confirmed by the fact that, though the employment of the conditions for happiness which the state, as an extrinsic cause, provides depends upon the voluntary conduct of individuals, the intrinsic moral character of the state itself (its grade of justice) determines the extent to which these conditions are distributed, that is, whether they are afforded only a few men, or many but not all, or all. Here is an obvious correlation between the inequality of the three kinds of states in their intrinsic justice (and hence the three grades of common good as ends) and their h;:tequality in extrinsic efficiency (and hence the three grades of common good as means). The more just a state is, the more efficient will be its distribution of the conditions of happiness, i.e., *by making available to more men.* Now when we say that the end of the state is the happiness of men, we do not mean " the greatest happiness of the greatest number"; for, on the one hand, the state being an extrinsic cause cannot determine the degree to which its conditions will be used for the attainment of more or less happiness by each man; and, on the other hand, the state being naturally required by every man in order that he may lead a good life, the state is naturally ordained to the happiness of each man-to *the happiness of the greatest number only if that be all.* Hence, absolutely speaking, the best state will be that which aims at the happiness of every man by an unrestricted distribution of those conditions of human welfare which any state is able to provide;

and less good states will be those which to a greater or less extent impose some restrictions upon their benefactions, according to the number or character of the men whom they deem worth serving as ends. Since such restrictions are, absolutely speaking, unjust (because all men are by their common human nature equally entitled to the benefactions of the state, and because distributive justice demands an equal treatment of equals), the degree of distributive efficiency manifested by the several kinds of states flows directly from the grades of distributive justice by which they are themselves established. [269]

But, it may still be asked, in what way do the imperfectly just states withhold the conditions of happiness from some men? The answer must obviously be in terms of the full poli-

••• This analysis enables us to place an interpretation upon a famous passage in Aristotle's *Ethics,* more acceptable than the usual one which finds it another text for the precedence of the state over the individual. Aristotle says that " though it is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation " *(Ethics,* I, 2, 1094b8) . Now if "nation " here be understood to mean "all the people" *distributively,* and not the multitude taken *collectively* (i. e;, as politically organized), the passage means that the state which provides the conditions of happiness for all men is, absolutely speaking, the best state, though any state which provides the conditions of happiness for some men, even for a few, is to that extent good and just. Cf. fn. 130 *supra.* This interpretation is supported by the equally famous passage in the *Politics,* where Aristotle says that " the best form of government is one under which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily" (VII, 2, 1324•23). Now, if Aristotle really means *every* man here, the point is beyond dispute, but we have reason to suspect that he means only every *free* man, or every man who, on some false criterion of privilege, is entitled to be a citizen. Our suspicion is justified not only by Aristotle's doctrine of natural slavery, as expounded in *Politics,* I, but also by such an explicit statement as the following: " a state exists for the sake of the good life, and not for the sake of life only; if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice" *(Politics,* III, 9, 2180•30-35). In short, Aristotle has the truth *implicitly,* in so far as he definitely proclaims that the best state is the one in which every (free) man is provided with the conditions of his happiness; he is prevented from reaching the truth explicitly by his own fatal, and almost incredible, error about natural slavery. Once this error is expunged, the whole truth shines forth clearly. All men are born free, or, as says in one place, man *(not some men_* is born for citizenship *(Ethics,* I, 7, 1097bll). To be born free and to be born foi' citizenship are equivalent; and through their equiva.-lence we see that the state must provide all men with the conditions of happiness by admitting all to the political role proper to free men-the status of citizenship.

tical status to which men can be admitted, or from which they can be barred, and the rights and privileges appertaining thereto. The political status necessary for the pursuit of happiness is citizenship. Happiness, as we have seen, is the good of *civil* life; this good cannot be attained or enjoyed by those who are deprived of civil status-who cannot claim the rights and privileges or exercise the duties and functions of citizenship. The happy life is a social life, a life of work according to the inclinations of the social virtues, whether it. be primarily engaged in the speculative, or primarily in the practical, undertakings of reason. But no man can achieve social maturity-either in the discharge of obligations or in the performance of functions-unless he has the duties and does the work of a citizen. Active participation in the common good is an indispensable part of happiness, and this is granted only to those who have the status of citizenship. Others may passively enjoy some of the fruits of the common good (as children share in the common good of the domestic community), but this condition of subjection, as opposed to citizenship, not only keeps a man from becoming a political adult, but also deprives him of that full possession of the common good as a work in which he is himself actively engaged. Finally, happiness as the life of virtue requires the development of prudence, for that is indispensable to the transition from inchoate to genuine virtue. But the man who is either a political slave or a political subject is either wholly or partly dispensed from that exercise of his practical reason, out of which true and perfect prudence grows. Hence, it follows that the condition of citizenship is necessary for the complete development of prudence, and so also for the attainment of the moral maturity that is marked by a genuine, as opposed to an inchoate, formation of the cardinal virtues. Unless a man achieve such maturity, he cannot become happy, he cannot lead a life enriched by the possession of all good things through activity in accordance with perfect virtue. We have ignored the political distribution of economic goods and other external conditions of human welfare because, for one thing, they will be unequally distributed among men of unequal

political status, and, for another, it is chiefly through the status of citizenship that the state provides men with the conditions of a good human life.[270]

At the opposite extreme from citizenship, the status of the slave confirms the truth about citizenship. The slave has only the economic status of an instrument to be used. He totally lacks the politica1 status of a man as an end to be served. **It** is beyond dispute that the status of slavery is absolutely incompatible with the pursuit of happiness. The slave may be provided with all the external goods which are needed to sustain life. He may even enjoy certain simple pleasures and be exempt from the pain of brutal treatment. But this is not enough for human happiness. The slave is totally excluded from participating in the fruits of the common good; though a member of the community's population, he is beyond the pale of its political life and deprived of both those civil and those cultural opportunities which are indispensable for the development and exercise of the moral and intellectual virtues. Enslavement is, therefore, properly defined as the alienation of the good which is peculiar to a human life. Such alienation follows necessarily from the exploitation of a man as an economic instrument, **If** there were natural slaves, as Aristotle supposed, the Aris-

[270] Much that is *merely said* here (especially the points about subjection and about prudence) will subsequently, in Parts IV and V, be given adequate analytical treatment. But even prior to such supporting discussion the main line of reasoning is certainly plain: the end of the state is the happiness of each man; this follows from the very nature of the state as necessitated by the fact that, without it, men can live, but cannot lead good human lives; hence, by its very nature the state works as a means to man's end by providing him with the conditions of a good human life, i. e., the conditions of happiness; but economic goods, which the state can provide, are the conditions of mere living; they are not peculiar to living well; what is peculiar to living well or humanly is the opportunity to develop and exercise the virtues, both moral and intellectual; both sorts of acquired virtues are social, in that they require the cooperation of men living and working together; hence the state provides men with the conditions. needed for happiness by giving them the civil status indispensable for enjoying the good of civil life; such civil status is perfectly realized only in citizenship (we need not pause here to consider the imperfect civil status of the subject as opposed to the citizen); therefore, in giving them the opportunities and privileges, as well as the rights and duties, of citizenship, the state provides men with the conditions of a good human lik

totelian conclusion would be completely true, namely, that such hypothetical creatures (neither men nor brutes) could not be humanly happy. [211] We shall subsequently prove that the Aristotelian hypothesis of the natural slave is false because self-contradictory.272 But the truth of the Aristotelian conclusion remains, though it is transposed from natural to moral terms: if no man is a natural slave, then any man who is exploited as an instrument, and has the peculiar good of his human life totally alienated from him, is unjustly enslaved; but whether he is a slave by nature or by injustice makes no difference to the result: degraded below the level of human status, the man who is enslaved is deprived of the conditions needed for living a good human life; debarred from civil status, he is not supported by the state in the pursuit of that happiness which is the good of civil life. Hence it follows that, absolutely, speaking, any state in which slaves are members of the population, but excluded from the narrow circle of political membership, is a state which is both imperfectly just (intrinsically) and also imperfectly efficient (extrinsically) in functioning as a means, because it falls short of distributive perfection: it fails to provide the conditions of happiness for every man who belongs to its community.

The sharp contrast between the extremes of slavery and citizenship also makes clear the critical importance of a right conception of natural happiness. Let us suppose that natural happiness did not exist, and that the only happiness for man was either supernatural beatitude hereafter or that inchoate participation in beatitude which is supernatural contemplation in this life. On this false hypothesis, it would make no difference to a man whether he was a slave or a citizen, for his pursuit of happiness would depend *intrinsically* on possession of the supernatural virtues and *extrinsically* on the ministry of the church. On this false hypothesis, the nature of the state would be unintelligible, for it would have no necessity as a principal means to any end; the state would not be in a position

on Vd. *Politics,* III, 9, uso•so-35. [111] Vd. Part IV•, *infra.*

to provide men with the conditions needed to attain happiness; it could be viewed only as instrumental cause working in subalternation to the church by maintaining a peaceful and orderly community in which the church would operate as the principal extrinsic cause in providing men with the necessary conditions. In such a view of the state, the abolition of slavery might still be argued in terms of justice, but it could not be argued in terms of happiness, and this would result in another unintelligible consequence, namely, that a more just state would not necessarily be one which more efficiently functioned as a means in the service of man. Even if we made the slighter error of supposing that natural happiness exists but that it is identical with natural contemplation (i. e., the activity of the acquired speculative virtues), the role of the state as a principal means would be denied. Though in this case, slavery might be an obstacle to the pursuit of happiness, political subjection, as opposed to citizenship, would not be; on the contrary, the political subject who was exempt from major civic responsibilities might thereby be facilitated, through leisure and detachment, in the attainment of the speculative virtues. On this false hypothesis, there would also be the unintelligible consequence that a less just state (restricting citizenship to some and keeping others in subjection) could be regarded as more efficient in its operation as a means to provide men with the conditions of happiness. Thus we see that the fundamental truths about the state (and especially about the perfect correlation between the hierarchy of states in terms of intrinsic justice and the hierarchy of states in terms of extrinsic efficiency, i.e., as means to happiness) depend upon the truth about the existence and character of natural happiness; i.e., they depend upon the complete denial of the two false hypotheses, which are reduced to absurdity by the consequences they entail.

The foregoing analysis throws light on another facet of the whole truth. We have already seen that the natural virtues cannot be perfectly acquired by fallen man without the restorative efficacy of grace and apart from the supernatural virtues. [273]

[273] Vd. Section 4, *supra.*

Even though the acquired virtues are the principal means to natural happiness, they cannot function adequately unless they exist perfectly (i.e., in the status of habits through interconnection). The same thing must be said about the state as an extrinsic cause of natural happiness. It is always a principal means to this end, but the adequacy of its functioning depends upon subalternation to supernatural agencies and factors. Supposing for the moment the truth we shaH subsequently prove (that Democracy is the best state because, in consequence of its distributive justice, it provides the conditions of happiness for all men), the efficacy of Democracy depends upon the cooperation of causes which are outside the political, as they transcend the natural, order. In the extreme case of a purely secular Democracy (from which the ministry of the church was totally excluded), or in the more likely case of a Democracy which was merely neutral with respect to Christianity (in which some men might have grace), the state would still function as a principal means to its natural end, but its efficacy would be seriously impaired, for though it provided all men with the conditions of happiness, only some would be enabled by grace fully to avail themselves of these conditions by acquiring the naturarvirtues perfectly. The converse situation must also be considered: in any state which is less just than Democracy, men might be enabled by grace to acquire the natural virtues perfectly, even though they were subjects or slaves; but though they thus possessed the natural virtues, their lack of civil status would prevent them from exercising these virtues as *principal* means in the pursuit of natural happiness; in this situation, the natural virtues would function only as *instrumental* means to supernatural happiness. This confirms a point already made, namely, that the status of slavery or subjection presents no obstacle to the attainment of supernatural ends. But the lack of grace absolutely bars the way to the attainment of supernatural ends, and leaves nature's vigor impaired for the pursuit of the natural end. The fact that the natural virtues can have their proper function diminished in two ways- (1) by being reduced to the role of merely instrumental causes, and (2) by

being inadequate as principal causes-shows man's need for both Democracy and religion. Considering every man in relation to both natural and supernatural ends, we see that without Democracy some men will be debarred from natural happiness because, lacking civil status,, their natural virtues will be limited in operation to the role of instrumental causality; and without religion some men will not only be debarred from supernatural happiness but will also be impeded in the pursuit of natural happiness because, even though they have civil status as a condition for the operation of their natural virtues as principal causes, this operation will be inadequate for the complete attainment of happiness by men whose wounded nature has not been healed. [274]

If the distinction between slave and citizen exhausted all the possible pm:itions a man might occupy, the demonstration of Democracy could now be simply accomplished, for it would only require the proof that there are no natural slaves and

[274] This conclusion has great significance for the problem of the purely secular or merely neutral state, in contrast to the Christian state. We shall return to its fuller consideration in Part VI *infra.* (Vd. fn. 229, *supra,* and cf. T. S. Eliot, *The Idea of Christian Society,* New York, 1940; C. Dawson, *Religion and the Modern State,* New York, 1937; A. Hyma, *Christianity and Politics,* Philadelphia, 1938.)

Here we wish ·to make only one comment on the relation between Democracy and religion. That Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government, can be proved entirely in terms of natural evidences and natural reason. There need be nil appeal whatsoever to what is known by faith or through Revelation. But this truth about Democracy is theoretic in mode, albeit practical in its object and direction to the end of action (i.e., it is a speculatively-practical truth). The truth about Democracy cannot be actually put into operation successfully apart from the guidance of religious knowledge and the help of religious institutions and practices. Without grace, and without the ministry of the church, fallen man can neither achieve and sustain the perfect common good of the Democratic state, nor can they in their own lives utilize the conditions which Democracy provides for the complete attainment of natural happiness. In short, Democracy does not depend upon religion in the order of intention (and at the speculatively-practical level on which natural ends are defined) but it does depend upon religion in the orde1• of execution (and especially at the practically-practical and prudential levels on which reason must make a right judgment about the means to be used) . The ideal of Democracy is not, as Maritain claims, Christian in principle, but it does require what Maritain calls "the .Christian leaven" to be realized in fact. Cf. *Scholasticism and Politics,* Ch. lli, IV.

hence that the enslavement of men is, absolutely speaking, always unjust. But if this were so, it would also follow that only a generic distinction could be made between states in terms of justice: every government which enslaved men because its tyrannical rulers exploited men as means would be unjust; and every government which avoided tyranny because its rulers exercised political power proximately for the common good and ultimately for human happiness, would be just. But the demonstration of Democracy as the *best* state requires, as we have seen, specific distinctions among three just forms of government which concur in being generically good. Hence the distinction between slavery and citizenship does not suffice and we must consider the intermediate case of political subjection. The political subject is neither degraded to the economic status of a slave, nor is he granted the full political status of a free man, which depends upon political equality between rulers and ruled. As the difference between slavery, on the one hand, and subjection or citizenship, on the other, must be understood in relation to the generic distinction between tyrannical and just government; so the difference between subjection and citizenship must be understood in relation to the specific distinction between Royal and Republican government, i.e., in terms of the principle of ;;onstitutionality. Hence, in order to prove our conclusion about Democracy, we must not only argue against natural slavery and show that any enslavement is, absolutely speaking, unjust; but we must also argue against political subjection and show that non-constitutional government is, absolutely speaking, less just than constitutional government. This will be the work of Part IV to follow. Beyond that we must show, still absolutely speaking, that all men are entitled to citizenship and hence that the Republican form of constitutional government is less just than the Democratic form. When this is done, in Part V to follow, the demonstration of Democracy as the best form of government will have been completed. [275]

[276] In Part IV, we shall not only argue the injustice of slavery, and prove the distinction between subject and citizen, but we shall undertake an analysis of the

We have just stated the steps of the demonstration in terms of justice. It can also be stated in terms of happiness. The two sets of terms should be seen in perfect correlation with one another. The statement we are now about to make not only affords a compact synopsis for the demonstration to follow; it also summarizes the work of Parts II and ITI in preparing for that demonstration.

I. ROYAL GOVERNMENT AND THE ROYAL STATE: A (B, C)

A. *Just* by only *one* principle of justice: a just exercise of political power for the common good.

B. *Least efficient* as a means to the end of the state-the happiness of men.

EXPLANATION: In a Royal state, no men are citizens in a strict sense, for apart from constitutional government the status of citizenship does not exist. But the ruling class in a Royal state, whether that comprise just one man or the few who as his deputies participate in his status, have full political freedom and full participation in the common good for which they actively work. Those who have the status of rulers in the Royal state thus have the political conditions needed for a happy human life. All the rest are either *subjected* or *enslaved.*

two virtues which are so important to political theory-prudence and justice. The analysis of prudence is necessary for the distinction between subjection and citizenship (vd. fn. 270 *supra).* The analysis of justice is necessary in order to relate justice as the virtue of an individual to justice as a moral quality of governments and constitutions; the three elements of political justice which we have so frequently referred to must be understood in relation to the traditional distinctions between general and specific justice and between the parts of the latter. In Part V, we shall deal with liberty and equality in relation to justice. Current discussions of the ideal of Democracy tend to over-emphasize either liberty or equality as the chief goods which Democratic institutions enshrine. We shall try to show that neither liberty nor equality is a political good except in terms of justice.

One further point. The emphasis on the qualification expressed by the phrase " absolutely speaking " should not be overlooked or ignored. Relative to historic circumstances, a form of government which is absolutely less just than another may be more fitting; in which case that less just form of government would be the best, relatively speaking. Even slavery can be justified in relation to certain circumstances, though it is always absolutely unjust. We shall consider these matters in Part VI to follow, when we apply the Theory of Democracy to an interpretation

C. CoRRELATION: Because it is (1) established by what is intrinsically the least just among the several forms of good government, the Royal state is (2) identical with the least perfect common good, and (3) serves the happiness of men least efficiently, i.e., by the most restricted distribution of those conditions which the state should provide for all men.

II. REPUBLICAN GoVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLICAN STATE: AB (C)

A. *Just* by *two* principles of justice, the additional principle being: a just constitution of political power.

B. *More efficient* than Royal Government as a means to the end of the state-the happiness of men.

ExPLANATION: In a Republican state, the status of citizenship exists, as it does not in a Royal state, because constitutional government entails political equality between those who at a time occupy the offices of rule and those who are ruled. The name for the status of being ruled as an equal is "citizen." But in a Republican state, *only some men are citizens, not all.* Those who are not admitted to citizenship in a Republican state will be either slaves or subjects. In this respect, the status of the disfranchised classes does not differ in the Royal and the Republican states. In both, slavery may be abolished, but in both subjection must remain: in the Royal state, because there is no status like citizenship for those who do not exercise ruling power; in the Republican state because it lacks the principle of distributive justice, by which deficiency Republican government is inferior in goodness to Democratic government. Hence only those who hold governmental office and those who are ruled as citizens, enjoy the political equality which belongs to all men.

of the actual facts of political history, and try to reach an understanding of political dynamics--the motions of progress and decay, political revolutions, etc.

C. CORRELATION: Because it is (I) established by what is intrinsically a more just form of government than is the Royal state, the Republican state is identical with a more perfect common good, and (3) serves the happiness of men more efficiently, i. e., by a wider distribution of those conditions which the state should provide for an men.

III. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE: ABC

A. *Just* by *three* principles of justice, the additional principle being: a just distribution of full political status, i. e., citizenship and equality.

B. *Most efficient* as a means to the end of the state-the happiness of men.

EXPLANATION: In a Democratic state, aU men are admitted to citizenship, with the exception of those who must be treated as subjects because they are morally or intellectually incompetent. The distinction between the Republican and the Democratic state turns on the grounds for disfranchisement: in the Republican state, unjust criteria of privilege, such as wealth, the accidents of birth (family, race), etc., operate to exclude some men from citizenship; in the Democratic state, the principle of distributive justice eliminates an of these false privileges, and with the exception of those who are charges upon the state by reason of mental o:r moral deficiency (i. e., the feebleminded, the insane, and felons), all men are justly accorded political equality through the grant of citizenship. Moreover, there can be no political slaves in the Democratic state, as there can be in the Republican state. And, finally, it should be observed that those who are treated as political subjects are also public charges: being unable to rule their own lives, being incompetent to become, or remain at, the head of a family, these men are neither ruled as equals (i. e., as citizens), nor competent to rule others (i. e., capable of holding public office). To speak of political subjects as public charges is to indicate that their status in the political community is analogous to that of children in the domes-

tic community. (Political subjection in the Republican state must not be confused with political subjection in the Democratic state, because in the former case many are unjustly treated as subjects, whereas in the latter case, none are. That man is unjustly subjected who does not deserve to be treated as a public charge.)

C. CoRRELATION: Because it is (I) established by what is intrinsically the most just form of government, the Democratic state is (2) identical with the most perfect common good, and (8) serves the happiness of men most efficiently, i. e., by the widest distribution (restricted only by justice) of those conditions which the statP. should provide for all men.

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(To *be continued.)*

BOOK REVIEWS

A Companion to the Summa (I: The Architect of the Universe). By WALTER FARRELL, O. P. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1941. Pp. vii+ 457, with index. $3.50.

Those who have been so agreeably instructed in the moral theology of St. Thomas through Father Farrell's splendid exposition of the second part of the *Summa Theologica,* will not be disappointed in the latest addition to his series of "companions" to the *Summa. The Architect of the Universe* corresponds to the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa,* and it reveals to us the great edifice of Thomistic speculative and dogmatic doctrine with the same clarity and charm which were evident in the portrayal of the moral principles *(The Road to Happiness* and *The Fullness of Life).*

As Father Farrell has explained, these companions to the *Summa* are neither books about the *Summa* nor are they commentaries on the *Summa.* They are the *Summa* itself reduced to a form more understandable to the average modern layman, who would like to know something of the thought of the Angelic Doctor, but who feels the need of a preparatory conditioning before venturing alone into the profound depths of the *Summa* itself. *The Architect of the Universe,* therefore, like its two predecessors, " is a beginner's book in a much more literal sense than is the *Summa Theologica,* explicit as Thomas was in aiming his book at beginners" (p. vii). But the *Companion to the Summa* should not be read only by beginners. The professional philosopher and the teacher of philosophy can find in Father Farrell's work a chance both to review the thought of St. Thomas in its organic completeness, and to see how profound thoughts can be given a dear and beautiful expression. Father Farrell is especially gifted with the ability to explain an idea by the use of apt metaphors and analogies.

In *The Architect of the Universe* the order of questions discussed corresponds generally with that of the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa.* (In a few instances the author rearranges the sequence of questions.) The first chapter is devoted to an explanation of the nature of wisdom, a description of theological wisdom as the sovereign of both speculative and practical sciences, and praise of Thomas Aquinas, in whom were united the wisdoms of the philosopher, the theologian, and the saint. Father Farrell then proceeds to show to the reader this wise man at work in his treatment of the great problems regarding the existence of God, His infinite perfections, the divine knowledge and love, and the nature of divine providence. After a rather short chapter on the Trinity, Father Farrell continues with an explanation of the remaining questions pertaining to God's creative act, the angelic world, the nature of man and the condition of our First Parents,

and the government of the universe. Not all questions are given space proportionate to that which they receive in the *Summa*, but I think Father Farrell has been wise in giving greater attention to those problems which are of greater value and interest to the modern reader. The chapters on the nature of man and on the government of the universe are exceptionally good.

The author usually begins the discussion of each new problem with a brief account of the non-Thomistic solutions which have been advanced by various philosophers, and he concludes the chapter with pertinent comments which reveal by comparison the superiority of the Thomistic doctrine. As frequently pointed out by Father Farrell, the two principal evils characteristic of the modern spirit in its attitude toward the great problems of philosophy are a distrust of reason as an instrument of truth, and a certain moral and intellectual cowardice, a " cowardice that would surrender rights, hopes, ideals, success, independence and control in order to escape responsibilities, disappointments, failure, labor and self-control" (p. 449).

In reading this excellent presentation of the thought of St. Thomas, one cannot but reflect on what the modern world has lost in exchange for its material gains. With the supplanting of theology and metaphysics by the more " practical " sciences directed to the domination and control of physical nature, we have been progressively blinded to the ultimate reality of our universe, its Creator, and to the real nature and destiny of man. Surely, no enduring reconstruction of our world, after the present forces of totalitarianism have been defeated, will be possible unless we learn again that true wisdom which acknowledges the supremacy of the Divine_Architect and which sees the true place of the human person in the hierarchy of the universe.

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From Aether to Cosmos-Cosmology. By CELESTINE N. BITTLE, O. F. M. CAP. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1941. Pp. v + 498, with index. $4.00.

Father Bittle continues his series of textbooks in Scholastic philosophy to give us the most complete treatment of problems cosmological yet to be had in English. In accordance with his general method, the presentation has the advantages of doctrinal summaries concluding each chapter, definitely specified recommended readings, a helpful glossary of terms, and a bibliography with an abundance of titles. The distinctive feature of the book lies in its inclusion of a thorough summary of the contemporary findings and theories of experimental physics and chemistry relevant to the central problem of the essential constitution of bodies.

Father Bittle departs from Aristotelian-Thomistic cosmology in several details. The order of Aristotle is abandoned; motion, the proper passion of bodies, no longer retains its predominant place nor is it the basis of systematization. Indeed, it does not merit special treatment or definition; it is merely described in the midst of the discussion of time. Thus any philosophic discussion of action, passion, locomotion, and alteration is either brief or entirely omitted. In general, this may be due to the author's preoccupation with what Thomists regard as a formidable difficulty, the application of hylomorphism to inorganic nature, but only as a difficulty, and not a justification for tampering with the nature and unity of natural philosophy as a science. This preoccupation may also have led Father Bittle to a too cursory examination of the traditional Scholastic cosmology. Objections which a comprehension of the terms would dispel are treated as valid and questions are left open when previous definition necessitates a choice, as in the consideration of the plurality of substantial forms. However, the author's studious and purposive avoidance of any overly metaphysical implications may be the reason.

More fundamental is the reiterated deference to natural science, its methods and discoveries. At times, with its overemphasis upon the dependence of cosmology, this attitude amounts to suberservience. Knowledge gained without instruments or controlled experiment is termed pre-scientific; Aristotle is admired for his effort, commiserated for his achievement; medieval thinkers-Capreolus, John of St. Thomas-are dismissed with an historical nod, their contributions unconsulted or given no reference; only on the data furnished by science can be built a philosophy with a possibility of correct solution and adequate interpretation. The book itself is in contradiction: the definitions of time, space, place, etc., are those of Aristotle; the most modern of erroneous theories are condemned by reduction to and upon the basis of analyses furnished by the Stagirite and St. Thomas; the numerous scientific facts have given rise to no new principle nor reversed any old ones. Science has affected cosmology as science should affect philosophy. It has illuminated the truths of philosophy by copious illustrations, has provided clear-cut cases of principles at work, has widened the interpretative range of ultimate solutions. It has not rendered philosophy more profound by changing the measurements of the world, nor has it deprived natural philosophy of its autonomy. The failure of Aristotle and St. Thomas to distinguish philosophy from science, and the inadequacy and falsity of the latter as they knew it, should not blind us to the truth that Scholastic philosophical cosmology of today is the fruit of their labors.

Withal, *From Aether to Cosmos* is distinctly welcome to both teacher and student of cosmology. Clarity of exposition, liberality with examples, lucid condensation of difficult material (as relativity), all recommend the book in the face of debatable methodological strictures. To further the

avowed aim of a "broader synthesis of science and philosophy," the inclusion of a chapter dealing with the interrelations of these bodies of knowledge as developed by Maritain, Adler, and others might be suggested,

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The Psychology of Aristotle. By CLARENCE SHUTE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xiv + 148, with index. $2.00.

This is a sympathetic, if somewhat unusual, treatment of Aristotle's *corpus psychologic·um.* It represents a painstaking analysis of all the important texts of the Stagirite, bearing on the problems of the soul and human nature. These texts range from the *Physics* to the *Nicomachean Ethics,* with most of the emphasis laid on the *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia.*

I have said that the treatment is somewhat unusual. By this I mean that to a Thomist who has habituated himself to reading the Aristotelian texts in the perspective set by Aquinas, there are real difficulties in reconciling Mr. Shute's interpretation of the Stagirite with what we have commonly come to regard as the traditional view. This is not a brief for the tradition; yet it does seem to imply a rightful Thomist claim to a hearing when the exegesis of the Stagirite's texts is at stake.

At any rate, one might ask such questions as these: did Aristotle actually teach that powers do not exist except when active (p. 64); that practical intellect is a function of a body possessed of organs (p. 65); that sensation and knowledge (and not sensitive knmyledge and intellectual knowledge) are essentially diversified (p. 87); that error is found in sensation (p. 102); that mind is the thinking process itself (p. 100); that the soul is identical with the potentialities of the organism (p. 125).

I am reminded of a remark of Dr. Wolfson at Harvard (a profo•J.nd student of all the ancient and medieval philosophers) that of all the thinkers who labored over the intricate texts of the Stagirite, Thomas Aquinas probably came as close as anyone to understanding the true *mens aristotelica.* The great Peripatetic unquestionably needs clarifying distinctions and sharpened contrasts in order to grasp the drift of his psychological analysis; and I fear that Mr. Shute, despite the freshness of his biological or organismic approach, has failed to perform these necessary services for the Stagirite.

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Hegel's Hellenic Ideal. By J. GLENN GRAY. New York: King's Crown Press, 1941. Pp. viii + 104. $1.50.

Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. By HERBERT MARcusE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pp. xiv + 431. $3.75.

There was a time when Hegel's philosophy, much criticized and little read, appeared as the apex of abstrusity and as the most striking example of the divagations of a philosopher who cared nothing for facts. The Nco-Hegelian school, prominent mainly in England and in Italy, did not attract much notice outside of its own circles. Today, things have become somewhat different. We are sufficiently distant from Hegel to view him in the historical context in which he belongs, and sufficiently objective, one may hope, to acknowledge what is great and what is true in Hegel's conception. Studies of serious criticism, based on a thorough knowledge of Hegel's intellectual world, and attempts at an appreciation of his philosophy have become more frequent in recent years.

Mr. Gray's little book is such an objective and scholarly contribution to our understanding of Hegel. Anyone who is even slightly acquainted with the ideas of this philosopher is impressed by the great place Greek thought, Greek art, and Greek civilization hold in his mind. Though not blind to the disadvantages of ancient Greece and fully aware of the progress achieved by history since Periclean times, Hegel still felt that these ages came closer to some ideal than any others. Of him is especially true what Mr. Gray states as a general characteristic of German idealism, that its "permane'nt value consists in its poetic apprehension of empirical phenomena, its artistic appreciation and religious insight." The interest of this school focussed on " the meaning of events, their relevance to human experience, not on recording and interpreting facts."

Mr. Gray starts with a clever analysis of Hegel's vision of history, his conviction that human affairs prove, in the ultimate and long term, to be rational, his basic conception that history is mankind's march towards a more and more perfect freedom to be achieved by the gradual actualization of the spirit. The fundamental categories of Hegel's philosophy of history are clearly stated. Chapter II deals with young Hegel's discovery of the Greek. He was then inclined to evaluate Greece, its history, and civilization more highly than he did in his mature years. At first, he had no very clear view of the progress Christianity achieved. Later, the influence of Holderlin, Schiller, and other prophets of classic beauty wore away. The retrospective mood of romanticism was replaced by a strong emphasis of forward movement. But he could not conceive of history as a wholehearted progress. If Christianity had freed the individual and enhanced the dignity of the human person, something also had been lost, that is, the harmony and the

unity of society, the beauty pervading everyone's life, and, most of all, the awareness that freedom can be realized only if the individual is thoroughly embedded in the life of the community, that is, the state. It was Hegel's idea to bring about a perfect synthesis of modern freedom and the Greek idea of realization of the individual within and through the community.

Not less learned than Mr. Gray's book, Mr. Marcuse's work is of a different nature. The book has two main theses, although they are not announced explicitly. One is that to evaluate Hegel one has to consider his philosophy as a precursor of Marxian dialectics; the other is that Hegel is quite unjustly reproached for having paved the way for totalitarianism.

The book has two parts. The first deals with "The Foundations of Hegel's Philosophy." The author develops in a very instructive way the various stages of Hegelian thought, and makes extensive use of the writings of Hegel's youth. The reader will profit much by following the progress from the earliest conceptions to the philosophy of politics and of history. This exposition, although striving for objectivity, is in a way "colored" by the first of the propositions mentioned above. Hegel's philosophy is, perhaps, envisioned too much from the angle of social philosophy. True, hardly any thinker before Hegel gave as much attention to the phenomena of history and of social life, but one might question the notion that society and history represent the truly basic aspects of this philosophy.

The second part describes "The Rise of Social Theory." While Hegel, notwithstanding his interest in social philosophy, remained essentially a philosopher, there developed, principally through his influence, a true theory of society as a science, as a system based on facts and not mainly on ideas. Hegel's dialectic took on another shape in the hands of Kierkegaard. The chapter on this philosopher is, to the present reviewer's mind, not very satisfactory. Another development is characterized by the names of Feuerbach and Marx. There follows an interesting chapter on "Positivism and the Rise of Sociology," Saint-Simon, A. Comte, the positive philosophy of the state as conceived by F. J. Stahl, and, finally, the foundation of sociology by Lorenz von Stein are analyzed.

The concluding chapter has for its title "The End of Hegelianism." The British Neo-Idealism, of Bradley or Bosanquet, appears to the author as a dead end. On the other hand, Marxian dialectics underwent a profound change in the hands of the Revisionists. The alleged relation of Italian Fascistic philosophy (Gentile) to Hegel is mere appearance. The basic ideas are utterly different from those Hegel himself held. Nor is German National Socialism an offspring of Hegelian Idealism. On the contrary it is eminently antagonistic to the latter, so much so that Hegel has been severely criticized and his philosophy declared incompatible with the new ideology. It is, therefore, so the author concludes, not possible to

see in the recent developments in Germany the result or the continuation of Hegelianism.

The facts, of course, must be admitted. The antagonism referred to by the author evidently exists, but this is not a sufficient proof of essential independence. Although Hegel's conception of the state is not the one advocated by Rosenberg and others, and although these writers oppose *Volk* to *Staat,* there is indubitably a great similarity between the way they conceive of *Volk* and the way Hegel conceived of *Staat.* Dependence, in things ideological, does not necessarily mean wholesale acceptance. Also a negation may depend on a position it negates and be inconceivable without this position preceding it. Hegel alone cannot be made responsible. It is quite true that he would have repudiated the modern conceptions and considered them as a serious falling back to a lower level of history. But without Hegel and his successors, however far their ideas may be from those of the Rosenbergs, Schmidts, and others, one hardly can imagine these ideas to have arisen.

Though the Marxist slant in Mr. Marcuse's book somewhat falsifies the outlook on Hegel's world, one may recommend this work to anyone desirous of getting a comprehensive view of Hegelianism and its subsequent developments. A not too extensive, yet useful, bibliography is added.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Legal Realism and Justice. By EDWIN N. GARLAN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xii + 161, with bibliography and index. $2.00.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of this book is its precision and consequent clarity. The title is scrupulously exact; the approach to the realists of the last few decades is philosophically objective in its treatment of "The Problematic in Justice," "The Indeterminate in Justice," and "Legal Justice." It is only in the last two chapters-" Philosophic Justice" and" The Unity of Justice "-that the author's own opinions are unveiled.

Clearly the author's knowledge of the realists is that of a master. His critical dissection of individual opinions is the expert penetration of a truly philosophic mind with an edge as sharp as a scalpel. It is astounding to see the dismembered opinion reassemble itself and come to life a totally different thing under the vitalizing influence of Dr. Garlan's kindly interpretations of what the authors must have meant. This happens again and again, providing eloquent testimony to the author's charity and to the brilliant recognition that only by such tortured interpretations could these opinions be squared with sanity.

All this gives rise to great hopes from the last two chapters, making more bitter the disillusionment of their philosophic emptiness. Dr. Garlan has a philosophic mind; it is tolerantly mature in the field of criticism, but constructively it brings out no more than the sad penalty paid for intellectual malnutrition. His masters have been too much for him. He cannot escape the limits of legal decisions and rules in his philosophizing on justice; that is to say, he has not yet broken down the barriers that exclude him from the field of philosophy. A prophet would not be taking a serious risk with his reputation in predicting that such a mind would not long be content to remain in such barren fields.

Both the bibliography and the index are remarkably well done.

Historical Introduction of the Theory of Law. By J. WALTER JONES. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940. Pp. 800.

Beginning with the Greeks and pursuing the diverse theories of law down to modern Russia, Italy, and Germany, the author has produced a pocket encyclopedia of legal theory. Both terms of this description of an excellent book are fully justified. The book is encyclopedic in its scope and detailed references; but it is pocket size in the incredible brevity which gives more than a paragraph to a theory only with rarity and extreme reluctance.

The subject matter is united under eleven wide theories of law: The Civilians; The Historical School and Codes; The Sovereignty Theory; The Law of Nature; Public and Private Law; The Fiction Theory; The Psychological Theories; The Metaphysicians; The Pure Theory; Law and Economic Theory; "Revolutionary Legality." Throughout the study the author has been abstemiously objective.

English Political Pluralism. By HENRY MEYER MAGID. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. 100, with bibliography and index. $1.25.

This book is a study of Figgis, Cole, and Laski as the most prominent figures in the English pluralistic movement. Not historical in its development, the study attempts to evaluate the contribution of this movement to the analysis of freedom.

The essay concludes that " the nature of freedom can be discussed more adequately on the basis of a distinction between social freedom (freedom in the community) and political freedom (freedom for parties)." In arriving at this conclusion, the author, after his orderly and profound study of the three pluralists, brushes aside the necessity of natural law and an ultimate good in explaining the unity of law and rushes to the championing of political parties. The party system is more than a system of freedom, it is a form of government, the most satisfactory device yet invented to organize diverse interests in the community for changes of public policy.

It seems fairly evident that the author has been badly scared by totalitarianism, so badly, in fact, that he would make of democracy not even a conscientious policeman, as some of his liberalist predecessocs preferred, but a reluctant referee of group brawls. Democracy's proper setting, he says, is the existence of diverse ways of life practiced by various groups in the same community; its work as a government is to settle the problems arising from a clash of these groups.

What Nietzsche Means. By G. A. MoRGAN, JR. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. xviii + 408. $4.00.

Here is an author to whom the subject he treats evidently means a great personal experience and who, accordingly, is serious and honestly enthusiastic about the ideas he explains. Dr. Morgan, Associate Professor of Philosophy in Duke University, prefaces his book by a personal confession. Nietzsche, to him, is " an oasis of life in the desert of the postwar period. Amid the sands of humanitarian optimism, when Western civilization was a foolish ostrich, he met my thirst for a mind fresh and fearless and deep." You cannot argue with a personal experience, and you

cannot criticize enthusiasm. The present reviewer cannot and will not enter into an analysis of Nietzschean philosophy, nor inquire whether it is truly an oasis or merely *a--fata morgana.*

As the book stands, it is a very exhaustive statement of Nietzsche's ideas. It is, perhaps, more systematic than the texts justify, and this notwithstanding the fact that the author is fully aware of this danger. It also takes Nietzsche's philosophy too much as a consistent whole. The author, of course, is conscious of certain changes and developments in his hero's ideas. He often contrasts " the later Nietzsche " with the author of earlier works. But there are more inconsistencies than he is willing to recognize.

The work of Dr. Morgan may serve well as an introduction to Nietzsche's ideas. Sometimes the translations are a bit doubtful. The author often adds the German word in brackets. Several texts, however, ought to have been given in the original, because they allow for an interpretation different from the one· preferred by the author. The " Selected Bibliography " is, compared with the enormous number of works and articles written on Nietzsche, short. A serious drawback is that the author never considers any adverse or critical opinion. For example, he lists in his bibliography an article by Scheler (leaving out the important study on the *Rehabilitation of Virtue),* but does not in the text refer to Scheler's comments. Another point, too, would have deserved consideration. Practically nothing is said about the influences which contributed to the formation of Nietzsche's philosophy. The few references to Schopenhauer, Hegel, and others, are quite insufficient. Thus, the book is in fact only on " What Nietzsche Means," as Dr. Morgan understands him.

Irving Babbitt, Man and Teacher. Edited by FREDERICK MANCHESTER and ODELL SHEPARD. New York: Putnam, 1941. Pp. xiii + 337. $3.00.

This book consists of thirty-nine biographical essays on Irving Babbitt. All the authors assert the greatness of Irving Babbitt both as a man and as a teacher; unanimously they liken him to Socrates and Johnson. To be likened to one of these men is no mean honor, but to image both of them is a tribute rarely given to any man.

The shadow of Socrates hovers over him as he follows the maieutic and heuristic methods of leading the student to a precise definition of a term or the meaning of a word. Socrates is seen again in Babbitt as he philosophizes or moralizes on human conduct. The figure of Johnson looms up in him as he labors over the literary works of great men, muttering his approval of the masters, Aristotle, Plato, Confucius, and Buddha, and fulminating against lesser lights, especially Rousseau.

In the educational world, although during his lifetime he was stigmatized

as a radical, Babbitt can be more truly called a reformer. He maintained that " the most practical way of promoting humanism is to work for a revival of the almost lost art of reading," which sounds like the present-day call of Hutchins and Adler towards a true liberal education.

In the philosophical world Babbitt is classified as a Humanist. From his study of the masters he found what he thought were the principles of a full human life. Man, as analyzed by Aristotle, Plato, Confucius, and Buddha, provided. him with the natural principles of good conduct. The Christian idea of grace as an exterior source of good human conduct was repugnant to him. Whatever may have been his distaste for Christian dogma and grace, it must be noted that he did appreciate the effect that Catholic teaching had upon the moral life of its adherents as far as decency and restraint are concerned.

The essays are interesting and well written. The one by Paul Elmer More provides a deep understanding of the " inner man " of Irving Babbitt. Some of the essays are repetitious but this is to be expected when a number of authors recall a common friend. All of them portray Babbitt as a very powerful person, a learned man and a unique teacher.

Marriage and the Family. By JAcQuEs LECLERcQ. New York: Frederick Pustet, 1941. Pp. xx + 387, with index. $4.50.

This is one of the important modern Catholic efforts in the field of social philosophy. Skillfully combining the philosophical, religious, and sociological aspects of marriage, Doctor Leclercq has written a work which is admirably adapted for the private library or the public classroom. With such headings as: Principles and Social Implications of the Family, Chastity the Guardian Virtue of the Family, Free Love Ethics, Birth Rate and Birth Control, Woman in the Family and in Society, the Child in the Family and in Society, as pivotal points for discussion, the author has constructed a scholarly fabric which will wear well and long. This eminent Louvain professor does not content himself with the theory of the various theses; history and the findings of sociologists are brought in as witnesses to the practical effects of the doctrines proposed or the errors refuted. Throughout there is a note of commendable restraint, and the opinions of dissenters are refuted with a courtesy which is sometimes lacking in books on social philosophy. The translation from the original French by Rev. Thomas R. Hanley, O. S. B., is a most successful one.

This Way Happiness. By REv. CHARLES P. BRUEHL, Pa. D. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1941. Pp. xiv + 241, with index. $2.50.

Dr. Bruehl's complaint on page 20 that "especially since Kant, ethics has taken on a somewhat grim and sour mien " gives us the key to this

work. Accordingly he calls it " Ethics in Homespun," and, in his own words, " it seeks to unstiffen ethical teaching and recast it in a less rigid mold." Hence the book is above all a practical and readable presentation of moral philosophy; it is offered to the college student and the general reader. Thus it was written with one eye on the classroom and the other on the armchair. We would have preferred a single aim, in this case, an ethics for the general reader. However, the book, with supplementation by professor and student, could be used as a basic text for college ethics. Any text requires some supplementation, and probably the greatest value of this book to the college student would lie in its use as a supplementary text. To the general reader the work will be valuable for the practical presentation of ethics it offers. By giving to Catholics rational basis for their attitudes and actions, it should go far to counteract the apologetic attitude of many who find it embarrassing always to be swimming against the stream.

The Thomistic Theory of the Passions and Their Influence on the Will. By RICHARD R. BAKER. Notre Dame, Indiana: 1941. Pp. vi+ 147.

Dr. Baker's work is a simply written and extremely clear account of the structure of the appetitive act on the sensitive level. The author has given serious thought to the problem, and has presented the philosophic aspects of passion with such success that we wish to see him go on to develop the empiriological factors of his problem. A tremendous amount of information regarding the physiology of the emotions is now available to any philosopher who has the inclination and aptitude for correlating such information with the philosophy of emotional life. Dr. Baker has given us ample guarantee of his ability to perform such a task.

One problem which lies strictly within the ontological dimension, but which is not treated in the present work, concerns the possibility of what one might call tendential species that determine the appetites in a way analogous to the intentional species that determine the cognitive powers, Perhaps later on the author will investigate this interesting possibility.

Regards sur les Sciences Experimentales. Edited by NoEL MAILLOUX, O. P. Montreal: Les Editions de L'ffiuvre de Presse Dominicaine, 1942. Pp. 187.

It is always a pleasure to receive the annual report on the meeting of the ACFAS. Professor Mailloux is an indefatigable student of human nature and his psychological knowledge has been extended into one of the

most important spheres of modern action-the practice of pedogogy. Science, he rightly contends, has enormously enlarged our purview on the meaning and usefulness of speculative truth; and it is the task of a dynamic Thornism to avail itself of all advances along the lines of investigative research.

In the present symposium the following scholars have contributed papers towards the establishment of a sound methodology in the teaching of the experimental sciences: Noel Mailloux, O. P., J. E. A. Marcotte, Jean Martin, Robert Dolbec, Leo G. Morin, C. S.C., Jules Brunei, J. Emile Jacques, Roger Gauthier, Jacques Rousseau, Cyrias Ouellet, Abel Gauthier.

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