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## PEN AND SWORD VERSUS GOD

**P**EN and sword used to mean two different things. This is no longer the case in the dominant thought of our times. Swords and pens, and the diversities of created perfections generally, have all been levelled off to one thing. That thing is a very indefinite one, but it does not permit of a plurality of being. The comparative, which of its nature implies at least two things, and which was employed so forcefully by Bulwer-Lytton in his aphorism, "The pen is mightier than the sword," has been suppressed so that only the element common to all things now remains. This sort of mutilation is being perpetrated consistently in every department of modern thought. Whether it be a question of the arts, such as music, painting, and literature; or of philosophy, as in psychology, mathematics, and metaphysics; or whether it be a question of theology and essential education, the results are ever the same, namely, a suppression of the diversity of created perfections with the consequent fusion of all things into one thing. It is neither necessary nor opportune within the limited scope of a single article to verify this assertion in all the afore-mentioned

departments of modern thought. We shall confine ourselves here to the realm of theology.<sup>1</sup>

We select theology on account of its peculiar adaptations for the designs and devices of the moderns. They see the thread of unity, namely, the unity of order to an ultimate in all created things, and in this they are entirely correct in their appraisal; but they close their eyes and minds to the multiplicity of created perfections upon which that order must necessarily be founded, and in this they are perniciously erroneous. For theology, as St. Thomas and the Fathers of the Church conceived it, is a science about God and all His creatures as ordered to Him under the supernatural viewpoint of faith.<sup>2</sup> **It** is the business of theology, therefore, not merely to penetrate the ultimate order of things which refers them all to the common source and end, namely, God, but also to show a scrupulously just regard for the essences of things in their created reality as generically, specifically, and individually distinct from each other. **It** is especially on account of theology's concern for this order in things that it lends itself so readily to the logical manipulations of the moderns.

However, to neglect either of the aforesaid phases of reality can lead only to a sterile and perverse theology. This is precisely what the modern despoilers of truth are doing with a diabolical cleverness inherited from the past four or five centuries of ruinous thought and rhetoric. They dwell upon the ultimate order of things, therefore they are theologians.<sup>3</sup> Theirs

<sup>1</sup> The other extreme opposing this source of modern errors is to rest or linger unduly on the created essences of things, by emphasizing their special diversities to the neglect of their order to the *Maximum*, and thereby the true concept of analogy from the opposite angle in making all things, including God and creatures, univocal or else equivocal. This is a mistake which even those who profess themselves Thomists frequently fall into. To verify this tendency, however, among modern Thomists is outside the purpose of this particular article.

• *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 7.

<sup>2</sup> "The new philosophy . . . , being evolved from the nature of religion, has in itself the true essence of religion, - is, in its very quality as a philosophy, a religion also." Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, translated from the 2nd German Edition by Marian Evans (George Eliot), New York, 1855. Preface to the Second Edition, p. 18. (All references to the are taken from this transla-

is, however, a perverse theology not only because their ultimate is a vague, indefinite something akin to prime matter, nature or their unqualified absolute and not the One True God, but also because they proceed to level off the diversity of created perfections in things and confuse them with their indeterminate ultimate. With such a simple device as this the moderns have carried forward a ceaseless campaign of exploitation of the truths of faith and reason. Their conspiracy has all of the plausibility of a church revival on account of its supporting element of truth, namely, the order that really exists in things, which they play up with a great show of modesty only to dupe the unsuspecting reader or listener into their skeptical and ruinous frame of mind. The poisonous pen and the bloody sword on account of their potentiality for coordination have lost their peculiar identities in the single cause of the modern revolutionaries, which is avowedly or unavowedly none other than the ruin of Christianity.<sup>4</sup> With what measure of success they have accomplished this evil purpose is manifest on every front of modern life.

In order that we may not be summarily accused of indulging in harmless generalities with our heads in the clouds, we shall take a concrete case typical of almost innumerable other possibilities with the purpose of verifying the above thesis. The case we propose for analysis is a book really existing and authentically traceable to an historical person who was undoubtedly a crusader in the cause of modernism. "There are certain books, now lost in the libraries, which three centuries ago caused the revolution which we now behold before our eyes." These words of Lacordaire could very well be applied to the book on which we have decided to base our discussion, even though it dates back only to the last century. We refer to the work of Ludwig Feuerbach entitled *The Essence of Chris-*

tion, because of the impossibility of procuring the German text. The references to the remainder of Feuerbach's work are taken from *Das Wesen des Christentums*, contained in *Sämtliche Werke, 6 Bd.*, Stuttgart, 1908.)

• "Certainly my work is negative, destructive, but, be it observed, only in relation to the unhuman, not to the human elements of religion." Feuerbach, *op. cit.*, Preface, p. 7.

*tianity*.<sup>5</sup> There are two points, then, to be made concerning this book of Feuerbach's which epitomizes so nicely his entire contribution to modern thought: 1) the method which he employed to accomplish the evil purpose already stated above as identical with the modernistic trend of thought; 2) the allocation and logical function of his work in reference to its blood-line descendants and forebears. These two points once properly evaluated will, we think, not only establish our thesis as enunciated above but will also serve as standards of criticism for other departments of modern thought.

## I.

### THE METHOD OF FEUERBACH

Feuerbach's method, in perfect conformity with the best traditions of the moderns, must be labelled as one of exploitation. In other words his major points all usually contain a modicum of truth, just enough, however, to render palatable the poisonous drug of error without impeding its deadly effects upon the uncritical mind. This charge can neither be ignored nor put down as a gratuitous statement.

Note, for example, his point of departure. "My work," says Feuerbach modestly, "contains a faithful, correct translation of the Christian religion, out of the oriental language of imagery into plain speech. The general principles which I premise in the Introduction are no a priori, excogitated propositions, no products of speculation; they have arisen out of the analysis of religion. The ideas are only conclusions, *consequences* drawn from objective facts."<sup>6</sup> He repudiates with horror an absolute, immaterial speculation which is sufficient unto itself. For his thoughts he demands the senses, especially sight. He draws the matter of his thought from the activity of the senses. He calls himself a natural philosopher in the domain of the mind.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Das Wesen des Christentums*. First published in 1841.

• Preface, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup> Preface, p. 4.

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"The present work," he says, "contains nothing else than the principle of a new philosophy which has been practically verified, i.e., *in concreto*, in application to a special object, . . . namely, to religion." <sup>8</sup> Thus he enlists the sympathy of the orthodox reader by pretending to ground himself upon fact, experience, and the veracity of the senses. The reader, however, who perseveres to the end of this book will meet more than enough evidence to convince him that Feuerbach's bold stand upon reality is only an attitude, a pretense.

A case in point is his explanation or rather elimination of miracles. He says: "I only show *what* a miracle is, . . . not *apriori*, but by examples of miracles narrated in the Bible as real events. In doing so, however, I answer or rather I preclude the question as to the possibility or reality or necessity of miracle." <sup>9</sup> The result of a miracle, for example, the wine at the marriage of Cana, is not miraculous; it is the procedure which is. "What suggests to man the notion that miracle is conceivable is that miracle is represented as an event perceptible by the sense, and hence *man cheats his reason by material images* which screen the contradiction." <sup>10</sup> The miracle of turning water into wine, for example, implies nothing else than that water is wine. (!) The transformation is only the visible appearance of this identity of two contradictions. This procedure also demands that one transgress specific differences. But this is impossible. (We shall presently see how, in spite of this apparent regard for specific differences, he succeeds in off the diversities of created perfections to one common denominator.) Therefore miracles are impossible. Therefore they are a product of the imagination. But a whole crowd of people have witnessed the same miracle. In that case there is a

<sup>8</sup> Preface, p. 5.

• The confident attitude which Feuerbach takes is visible in the lines preceding these words: "I do not inquire what the real, natural Christ was or may have been in distinction from what he has been made or has become in supernaturalism; on the contrary I accept the Christ of religion, but I show that this superhuman being is nothing else than a product and reflex of the supernatural human mind." Preface, p. 13.

<sup>10</sup> *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 156. (Italics ours.)

general hallucination. "Miracle presents absolutely nothing else than the sorcery of the imagination which satisfies without contradiction all the wishes of the heart." <sup>11</sup> Miracles, prayer, Providence—the conviction of man of the infinite value of his *own* existence, creation—the first and fundamental miracle, are nothing other than the supernaturalized freedom from Nature, the dominion of self-will over law. This, to Feuerbach, is the essence of Christianity, namely, the exaltation of individuality, egoism, self-will into a God, as against the true divinity and infinity of the species of Nature. This supernatural principle is no other than the principle of subjectivity which in Christianity exalted itself to an unlimited universal monarchy.

Such statements as these on miracles clearly discredit the veracity of the senses as well as Feuerbach's alleged footing upon sensible reality. If a comparison of sense data observed by many individuals is not a secure corrective for the errors of hallucination, then there is no corrective and the reports of our senses are nothing but phases of nature's general conspiracy to delude us in our efforts to penetrate reality. Moreover, a miracle, as we know from St. Thomas <sup>12</sup> and the Vatican Council <sup>13</sup>, is a phenomenon whose nature is not directly accessible to the investigation of natural reason. Certainly Feuerbach's attempt to prove the impossibility of miracles by his purely logical device, namely, the supposed impossibility of transgressing specific differences as he puts it, cannot be based upon sensible reality, because sense data cannot yield any such principle. No rational principle drawn from sense channels can establish the impossibility or repugnance of a miracle with respect to divine agency, its proper cause. Therefore this is only a ruse when Feuerbach says he bases himself upon the testimony of the senses. The sound Scholastic principle that all knowledge comes through the senses is, therefore, proposed by Feuerbach

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

<sup>12</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 105, a. 7; q. 110, a. 4; *De Potentia*, q. 4, a. 2.

<sup>13</sup> *Concilium Vaticanum*: "Miraculum est factum divinum luculenter Dei omnipotentiam commonstrans." Denz., 1790.

not from a conviction of its security as a base of operation but for purposes of exploitation. <sup>14</sup>

This ruse is all the better concealed by his apparent repudiation of other exploiters. He insists, for instance, that the primary postulate in his philosophy is not the *Substance* of Spinoza, not the *Ego* of Kant and Fichte, not the *Absolute Identity* of Schelling, not the *Absolute Mind* of Hegel; it is nothing abstract. **It** is the *Ens realissimum-man*; its principle is therefore in the highest degree positive and real.<sup>15</sup> We shall have ample occasion to test the sincerity of this testimonial of philosophic orthodoxy later. In his own words he places philosophy in the negation of philosophy.<sup>16</sup> Just what philosophy it is, the negation of which furnishes him with his original postulate, is not difficult to identify. **It** is not the philosophy of Kant or Hegel or any of the revolutionaries. **It** is Scholastic philosophy. This new philosophy built upon the negation of philosophy, he tells us, must no longer undergo the temptation of old Catholic Scholasticism or modern Protestant Scholasticism which consists in wishing to prove its agreement with religion by proving its agreement with Christian dogmas. Here indeed is a manifestation of his propensity to deny the diversity in all things, namely, his agility in giving the impression that Catholicism and Protestantism are on an equal footing in their attitude toward dogmas and religion. This is a pretty bit of irony and subtle exploitation as well. He implies that Scholastic philosophy on account of its affinities with Christian dogmas has severed all moorings to the *Ens realissimum* and floats on the dreamy

<sup>14</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 6, *et passim*.

<sup>15</sup> Preface, p. 6.

<sup>16</sup> - This philosophy does not rest on an Understanding *per se*, on an absolute, nameless, understanding, belonging one knows not to whom, but on the understanding of man; . . . though not, I grant, on that understanding of man enervated by speculation and dogma. Yes, both in substance and in speech it places philosophy in the *negation of philosophy*, i.e., it declares *that* alone to be true philosophy which is converted *in succum et in sanguinem*, which is incarnate in Man; and hence it finds its greatest triumph in the fault that to all dull and pedantic minds . . . it appears to be no philosophy at all." Preface, p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Preface, p. 18.

clouds of speculation, the very domain in which Feuerbach himself is most at home. These introductory notes upon his primary postulate and point of departure clearly forecast what is to follow in the detailed fabric of his new philosophy.

Religion was assigned as the special object of his work, but this, too, turns out to be fertile soil for exploitation. In the first part of his book he sets out to show what there is of truth in religion: religion is the mirror of humanity.<sup>18</sup> Of course, no treatise on religion can with any show of ease and grace totally ignore Christianity and its founder, Christ. So Feuerbach to make the travesty all the more devastating places the word Christianity in the very title of his book. "My analysis of Christianity is not simply historical," he tells us, "it is rather historico-philosophical."<sup>19</sup> By this he means that the rationalists felt it necessary to attack the historical person of Christ in their efforts to devitalize Christianity, whereas Feuerbach had no need of this expedient since he allows no distinction between the historical or human Christ and the divine Christ.<sup>20</sup> In other words he considers only the order which both the divine and human nature have to the single personality in Christ and levels off the difference between the human and divine natures in Him. The critics and the Christians, therefore, to his way of thinking are substantially in agreement since the human Christ and the divine Christ are entirely the same. Thus Feuerbach can judge all things without leaving his library and carry on his work of exploitation out of the reach of all criticism.

In the second part of his book he continues the role of exploiter by professing to show what there is false in religion.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The work "is therefore divided into two parts. . . . The first exhibits religion in its *essence*, its *truth*, the second exhibits it in *contradictions*. . . . That into which I resolve religion, which I prove to be its true object and substance, (is) namely *man-anthropology* . . . • Preface, p. 8.

<sup>19</sup> Preface, p. U.

•• Cf. Note 9 above.

<sup>n</sup> "In the first part I prove that the Son of God is in *religion* a real son, the son of God in the same sense in which man is the son of man, and I find therein the *truth*, the *essence* of religion, that it conceives a profoundly human relation as a divine relation, on the other hand in the second part I show that the Son of God-



Religion, he explains, attributes to a personal God what it should attribute to man himself. This is really a synthesis of Feuerbach's thought: the true sense of theology is anthropology. Thus his levelling device is applied indiscriminately to philosophy and theology, to God and man. On numerous pages of the book is displayed his motto: *Homo homini Deus*; Man is God to himself.<sup>22</sup> By this time it has already become evident in spite of his claims to being a natural philosopher that he is a theologian, but a perverse one. There is, however, a shred of truth in all of this. It is true that religion taken materially and subjectively, that is, what has the appearance of being religion, sometimes attributes to God what should be attributed to man. It is not true that this should always be the case with religion considered objectively and formally, as Feuerbach in his mania for confusing the diversity of created perfections would have us believe. A demented or extremely ignorant person can order blasphemy to God under the influence of a subjective conviction that he is offering up a prayer, but everyone knows that objectively and formally this is not a prayer. It is also true that religion subjectively taken for human activity is a sort of mirror or reflection of human nature. Objectively, however, and from the viewpoint of its motive it is a standard of virtue according to which man's activity must be measured. Thus in his concept of theology Feuerbach has replaced the term analogy with the term anthropology. In his concessions to the

not indeed in religion but in theology, which is the reflection of religion upon itself—is not a son in the natural, human sense, but in an entirely different manner, contradictory to nature and reason, and therefore absurd, and I find in this negation of human sense and human understanding, the negation of religion." (Preface, p. 8.) "I change the object as it is in the imagination into the object as it is in reality." Preface, p. 10.

••" ... God, ... , the Trinity ... , the Word of God ... , are not that which the illusions of theology make them,—not foreign, but native mysteries, the mysteries of human nature." (Preface, p. 9.) "Das Bewusstsein Gottes ist das Selbstbewusstsein des Menschen, die Erkenntnis Gottes, die Selbsterkenntnis des Menschen." (*Das Wesen des Christentums*, pp. 15 and 22.) "*Homo homini Deus est-dies* ist der oberste praktische Grundsatz,—dies der Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte." (*Ibid.*, pp. 826, 406, and elsewhere).

truth he always sees to it that error predominates and smothers the truth.

A discussion on religion necessarily implies some idea of the nature of man. So Feuerbach in conformity with his principle makes man God in a few lines and then goes on to create the world. Here again we meet a major travesty on the truth which merits closer attention.

must begin with the essential nature of man, he informs us correctly, since religion has its foundation in the essential difference between man and the brute, a difference which he will not fail to obliterate in the end. But what is this essential difference? **It** is the consciousness of self, not the consciousness of self as an individual, because animals have this. Consciousness of self, says Feuerbach, belongs strictly to a being to which its species, its essential nature, is the object of thought. Therefore man has a double life: he has the consciousness of himself as an individual-this is practical life; he has the consciousness of his nature, of his species-this is the life of the intellect.<sup>23</sup> Marx is going to eliminate this distinction between these two Jives by reducing man to the level of a beast and the beast to the level of absolute matter according to the Hegelian synthesis. For the moment, however, let us observe how Feuerbach makes error capitalize upon the morsel of truth he has just proposed about man.

Religion, then, he continues, is identical with man's consciousness of his specific nature. However, since religion is nothing but the consciousness of the infinite, man also is infinite in nature.<sup>24</sup> A few lines previous, religion was merely founded

"" " Die Religion beruht auf dem wesentlichen Unterschiede des Menschen von Thiere. . . . Bewusstsein im strengsten Sinne ist nur da, Wo einem Wesen seine Gattung, seine Wesenheit Gegenstand ist. Das Thier ist wohl sich als Individuum-darum hat est Selbstgefühl-aber nicht als Gattung Gegenstand. . . . Im Leben verkehren wir mit Individuen, in der Wissenschaft mit Gattungen." *Ibid.*, p. 1-2.

•• " Das .Wesen des Menschen im Unterschied von Thiere ist nich nur der Grund, sondern auch der Gegenstand der Religion. Aber die Religion ist das Bewusstsein des Unendlichen; sie ist also und kann nichts Anderes sein als das Bewusstsein des Menschen von seinem und zwar nicht endlichen, beschrinkten, sondern unendlichen Wesen." *Ibid.*, p. 2.

on the difference between man and brute which consists in consciousness of specific nature on man's part; but now so soon religion becomes identical with this consciousness. From the premise, then, religion is consciousness of the infinite (which, incidentally, contains an element of truth, namely, from the viewpoint of ultimate term it is true), he proves the infinitude of man's nature.

But what is this infinite nature of man? **It** is, we are told, Reason, Will, and Affection-in capital letters.<sup>25</sup> In one short sentence he erases all distinction of faculties among themselves and between faculties and the nature of man. Here he exploits to its very limits the truth which St. Thomas expresses so succinctly by saying that intellect and will are quasi-infinite, that is, on the part of their object.<sup>26</sup> Of course, Feuerbach undermines the foundation for that truth by denying the distinction between subject and object in this case.

<sup>25</sup> "Die Vernunft, der Wille, das Herz. Der Mensch ist, um zu erkennen, um zu lieben, um zu willen. Vernunft, Wille, Liebe oder Herz sind keine Kräfte, welche der Mensch hat-denn er ist nicht ohne sie, er ist, was er ist, nur durch sie." *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>26</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 86, a. 2, ad 4: "... sicut intellectus noster est infinitus virtute, ita infinitum cognoscit. Est enim virtus ejus infinita, secundum quod non terminatur per materiam corporalem. Et est cognoscitivus universalis, quod est abstractum a materia individuali, et per consequens non finitur ad aliquod individuum, se, quantum est de se, ad infinita individua se extendit." *Cir.* also I-II, q. 2, a. 8. In keeping with his practice of perverting truth to his own ends, Feuerbach himself quotes a similar passage in St. Thomas to prove by the Angelic Doctors own words that knowledge and consciousness of the infinite is none other than knowledge and consciousness of one's own infinite nature. Thus after having cited the following passage: "... In habentibus autem cognitionem sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprius esses naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum; sicut sensus recipit species *omnium aensibilium*, et intellectus *omnium intelligibilium*. Et sic anima hominis fit omnia quodam modo sensum et secundum intellectum, in quo cognitionem habentia *ad Dei similitudinem appropinquant* ..." *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 80, a. 1, c. (Italics ours), Feuerbach simply says that this psychological infinity is the ground of theological or metaphysical infinity. God's immensity and omnipresence are nothing but the objectivated immensity and omnipresence of the human imagination: "Die psychologische Unendlichkeit ist der Grunde der theologischen oder metaphysischen Unendlichkeit. Die Unermesslichkeit, die nicht auf Ort und Zeit eingeschränkte Existenz, die Allegegenwart Gottes ist die vergegenständlichte Allegegenwart und Ermesslichkeit der menschlichen Verstellung und Einbildungskraft." *Ibid.*, p. 837-338.

He goes on to consider the end of man, but here again we are face to face with the most brazen exploitation. Reason, Will, and Affection are ends in themselves, he tells us. We think for the sake of thinking, we love for the sake of loving, we will for the sake of willing, that is, in order to be free. Man does not possess these powers. They possess him. They are divine, absolute. He cannot resist them. They are the elements of his nature.<sup>27</sup> Certainly, then, man is nothing without an end, without a goal. The great men of history are those who had a goal which was the object of all their activity. But this object is necessarily none other than the proper nature of the s"p-bject, which is at the same time an objective nature.<sup>28</sup> That is to say, it is the proper nature of the particular man, but it is at the same time the nature of the whole species. Feuerbach gives an example: the Sun is the common object of several planets: Mercury, Venus, the Earth, etc., but each planet has different relations to the Sun. **It** is, therefore, another Sun which illuminates Mercury than the Sun which illuminates the Earth.<sup>29</sup> But it may be well to pause here and search out from this heap of chaff blown over the nature of man, the grain of truth of which Feuerbach avails himself.

St. Thomas justifies many distinct aspects in the ultimate end of man. Subjectively considered, man's ultimate end is a created reality existing in man himself; it is the highest activity of his highest faculty bent to its ultimate capacity upon the loftiest object.<sup>30</sup> Part of the truth in this pattern furnishes Feuerbach the necessary base for his campaign of destruction. Of course, he makes out the activities, faculties, and nature of man to be one and the same thing, but seems in his statements to be contacting the truth that man's end consists in his ultimate perfection. Objectively, however, man's end consists in

•• Cf. Note above.

•• " ... der Gegenstand, auf welchen sich ein Subject Wesentlich, notwendig bezieht, ist nicht Anderes, als das eigene aber gegenständliche Wesen dieses Subjects." *Ibid.*, p. 5.

•• "Jeder Planet hat seine eigene Sonne." *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>80</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 8, a. c.

no creature but only God. Although this would offer no difficulty for Feuerbach, since he has already identified God with man, still he does not seem anxious to exploit this aspect of the ultimate beyond the point of confusing the formal and material aspects of the ultimate end objectively accepted.<sup>31</sup> His exploitation of the difference and sameness of the individual and specific nature of man goes on, however, to further extremes.

In knowing objects, says Feuerbach, man knows himself.<sup>32</sup> He does not mean that the common note of being is detected by comparison and predicated of object and self. That would contain too much truth for him. No, each object is a mirror of the subject after the manner of effect with respect to its cause.<sup>33</sup> Here, as in several instances above, he is applying the false principle that makes knowledge measure objects and not objects knowledge. This principle frequently operates instrumentally under the superior impetus of his more radical error of indiscriminately denying the diversity of created perfections, as will become evident from his further statements on the nature of man.

Man, he states, perceives within himself reason and will as being infinite because the finite and nothingness are identical.<sup>34</sup> Certainly man is other than nothingness, so he is infinite; man's existence is infinite. Nevertheless, he feels himself limited. But it is precisely in this that the distinction between himself and the brute consists. The brute is limited and does not know it. Man, however, knows that he is limited, because he perceives his individual nature. Yet he is infinite, because he perceives within himself the perfection, the infinite perfection of his species, and this by his feeling as well as by his reason.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 7.

<sup>32</sup> - "An dem Gegenstande wird daher der Mensch seiner selbst bewusst." *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Note 28 above.

<sup>34</sup> - "Endlichkeit nämlich und Nichtigkeit sind eins; Endlichkeit ist nur ein Euphemismus für Nichtigkeit." *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>35</sup> - "Wohl kann und soH selbst das menschliche Individuum-hierin besteht sein Unterschied von dem thierischen-sich als beschränkt fühlen und erkennen, aber

Each thing must conceive of itself as that which is best in it. Each thing has its God in itself. Man also has his God in himself:<sup>36</sup> It is his infinite divine nature, a nature shared by all the species but which at the same time is his own. The human species has an infinite nature; each individual man, has an infinite nature.

Is all of this a welter of contradiction? Feuerbach does not think so. Just as there is one Sun which becomes as many different Suns as there are planets according to its relations with each planet while it still remains one Sun, so there is an infinite species which is united in all its fullness with each particular nature and which is by the consciousness which each particular nature has of it. So now there no longer remains any appreciable difference between individual and specific nature—one can be many, being is non-being<sup>37</sup> and the door is wide open for the entrance of Marx and Engel.

Everything that man proclaims as great, as divine, is nothing other than an emanation of his own divine nature, of his nature projected outside of itself and becoming conscious of itself in contact with objects<sup>38</sup> "Take music, for example," says Feuerbach,

if you have no feeling for music, you perceive nothing in the most beautiful music no more than in the wind which whistles by your ear or in the brook which babbles at your feet. What is it, then, that acts upon you when you are moved by a melody? What do you perceive? What else but your own heart? Feeling speaks only to feeling ... the object of feeling is none other than feeling. Likewise the object of the intellect is nothing other than the intellect objective to itself. Divine nature perceived by feeling is nothing

es kann weil ihm die Vollkommenheit, die Unendlichkeit der Gegenstand ist." *Ibid.*, p. 8.

•• "Das absolute Wesen, der Gott des Menschen ist sein eigenes Wesen." (*Ibid.*, p. 8). "Im Bewusstsein des Unendlichen ist dem Bewusstsein die Unendlichkeit des eigenen Wesens Gegenstand, sei es ihm als Gegenstand des Gefühls, oder des Gewissens...." *Ibid.*, p.

<sup>07</sup> This is quite in keeping with Hegel's famous dictum: "Pure being (i.e. being without intermingled non-being) is nothing."

•• *Ibid.*, p. 10.

other than feeling ravished, in ecstasy with itself, feeling drunk with joy, blessed in its own fullness. Such is man, divine man.<sup>39</sup>

From what has been seen, the thought of Feuerbach can be summed up in a few sentences. Man only knows himself. But he can know the infinite, in fact, he does know the infinite. Therefore he is himself infinite. **It** is evident that all depends upon the thesis that man knows himself only. Feuerbach does not prove this. To him it is evident. Kant had proved it. In view of this, one wonders what Feuerbach's comment would be upon the words of Pius XI: "'Our intellect naturally knows being and those things that essentially belong to being, and upon this knowledge the knowledge of first principles is founded.'<sup>40</sup> This phrase does away, root and branch, with the erroneous opinions of those modern philosophers who hold that, in the act of understanding, it is not *being* that is perceived, but a suggestion or impression of the percipient himself."<sup>41</sup> Feuerbach would probably pretend to agree with them and then begin to exploit them.

Having thus reduced all intellectual experience, or rather all experience, to man in the act of becoming conscious of himself, there remains to be examined the notion of God, of a personal God, in human consciousness. One would naturally expect to find here another case of exploitation, the supreme travesty of all. He will not be disappointed.

God is nothing other than the projection of man himself. Man alienates himself, makes God of his own divine nature. From the beginning of the world, men, even geniuses as great as Feuerbach, have believed in God. Yet it required our German philosopher to explain to them that they were only believing in themselves. No one before him had fully realized this, or if any suspected it, only Feuerbach has the courage to proclaim it loudly and boldly. **It** is at this stage that one begins to wonder whether Feuerbach got enough fresh air. Others have been

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

•• *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 88.

.. *Studiorum Ducem*, Pope Pius XI.

locked up for calling themselves Napoleon, but such was the fallen state of common sense around Feuerbach that for proclaiming man was God he was hailed as a genius.

According to the system of Feuerbach we see without any difficulty that the consciousness of God is nothing other than consciousness of oneself.<sup>42</sup> It is only those who ignore this who adore a God other than themselves. The divine attributes are simply the attributes of human nature. "You believe in love as a divine attribute," says Feuerbach, "because you love; you believe God as a being wise, benevolent, because you know of nothing better in yourself than wisdom and benevolence. You believe that God exists, that he is a subject--everything that exists is a subject, because you yourself exist, are a subject."<sup>43</sup>

The attributes of God are anthropomorphisms, because they they are the product of man's thought.<sup>44</sup> But one does not immediately comprehend that this is also true of the existence of God, because this is something immediate which arises necessarily from one's own existence. But one must realize that the subject the predicate are identical, not only in God, everywhere. It follows that if the divine attributes are the product of human nature, necessarily the subject of these attributes must arise from human nature.<sup>45</sup> Thus Feuerbach proves logically that man is God.

At this point Feuerbach draws attention to a remarkable phenomenon of religion. Since everything in God is human, the more the religious man reflects upon God, the more he wishes to glorify Him, the more he strips himself, the more he annihilates himself, the more he gives to God his own humanity.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>42</sup> - Das Bewusstsein Gottes ist das Selbstbewusstsein des Menschen, die Erkenntnis Gottes, die Selbsterkenntnis des Menschen." *Ibid.*, pp. 15 and 22.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>45</sup> - Das Geheimnis der unerschöpflichen Fülle der gottlichen Bestimmungen ist daher nichts Anderes als das Geheimnis des menschlichen als ein menschlich verschiedenartigen, unendlich bestimmbar, aber eben deswegen sinnlichen Wesens." *ibid.*, p. 28.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 81.



"iVhathe renounces in himself, he enjoys in an infinitely greater measure in God. The more he renounces sensuality, the more his God is sensuaJ.47 Mysticism is nothing other than egotism.<sup>48</sup> What man denies in himself, he finds again in God, who is nothing other than himself conceived in a supremely egotistical way, needing nothing, no other creature, isolating himself from the species.

Feuerbach does not combat God. He reduces him to the level of human nature, a degradation which is far more odious. At the same time he insults humanity by telling it that until his time it was ignorant of the true nature of God. In a single paragraph he reconciles Pelagianism and the doctrine of St. Augustine.<sup>49</sup> One exalted man, the other God. Without knowing it they were both exalting the same thing. Man-this is the mystery of religion, Feuerbach tells us-projects his being into objectivity. Then he makes himself an object before this projected image which he transforms into a subject. Thus, while man apparently humbles himself as low as possible before God, in reality he is exalting himself to the highest.<sup>50</sup> Never before Feuerbach did anyone have the slightest suspicion of the complicated procedure which a man must follow who believes in God. In order to accomplish this, Feuerbach does not balk before the necessity of attributing a fundamental egotism to the whole human race except Feuerbach. But there is nothing shameful in this. Pascal had said: "The ego is hateful," but for a whole race of philosophers, the ego was to become the moral center of the universe. Feuerbach ends his Introduction by saying: "What yesterday was religion is no longer so today; and what is today atheism will be religion tomorrow."

If one should pause here to try to sift the true from the false, he finds the following points verified beyond reasonable doubt. The parent error of this entire brood is Feuerbach's

" *Ibid.*, p. 32.

•• "Gott die Selbstbefriedigung der eigenen, gegen alles Andere missgunstigen Selbstbesuch, Gott der Selbstgenuss des Egoismus." *Ibid.*, p. 34.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 35.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 87.

proclivity to consider the ultimate order of things and totally ignore the things themselves on which this order is necessarily founded. The truth which he holds before us as bait is that borrowed from Christian doctrine to the effect that man is an image of God and the more he tends to God the more godlike he becomes, always, however, within the laws of analogical participation. Only Feuerbach with his purely logical device hurdles or rather levels off these barriers of analogy, entering in where the good angels fear to tread in order that he may reap the evil fruits of exploitation.

Descending now to the more articulated dogmas of faith, he becomes if possible even more perverse. In the course of this examination he constantly cites the Doctors of the Church in his support and, even more frequently, Luther, as if all were of the same spiritual and doctrinal stature.<sup>51</sup> Whatever they say of God, he attributes to man. If St. Augustine says that God is closer to us than sensible, corporeal things, that proves that God is indeed the consciousness of oneself.<sup>52</sup> If God is infinite, necessary, that is because reason is infinite, necessary.<sup>53</sup> Reason is infinite because it measures all things. Reason is necessary because if there were no reason, there would be nothing. Without pausing for breath, he eliminates the necessity of a Creator. Why does anything exist? Why does the world exist? It is because "if something did not exist, nothing would exist." (Note here how cleverly a mere relative opposition is substituted for the opposition of contradictories which really exists between something and nothing.) But "if nothing existed, reason would not exist." But if reason did not exist, everything would be without reason, unreasonable, absurd. Thus, if the world did not exist, it would be absurd. In the absurdity

<sup>61</sup> - For example, in considering the sacraments, I limit myself to two, for, in the strictest sense (see Luther, t. xvii, p. 558) there are no more." (!) Preface, p. 8.

•• *Daa Weaen dea Christentuma*, p. 15.

•• "Das reine, vollkommene, mangellose gottliche Wesen ist das Selbstbewusstseins des Verstandes von seiner eigenen Vollkommenheit," (*Ibid.*, p. 42.) "In dem unbeschränkten Wesen versinnlichst Du nur deinen unbeschränkten Verstand." (*Ibid.*, p. 48.) "Der Verstand oder die Vernunft ist endlich das nothwendige Wesen." (*Ibid.*, pp. 52-58.)

of its non-existence is found the true reason of its existence. Existence is the absolute necessity; reason the profoundest and most essential necessity.<sup>04</sup>

The doctrine of the creation of the world is thus explained: man feels himself limited by the world. In order to escape from this he makes of God a being completely superior to the world, who creates it from nothing.<sup>55</sup> But we know that the world came from itself.<sup>56</sup> Fundamentally God is none other than the expression of reason comprehending the world; he is the thinking world.<sup>57</sup> Thus all is in agreement. There is no need to explain whence things came, since nothing comes from nothing; everything must come from itself. Specific difference prevents one thing coming from another.<sup>58</sup> From these few examples may be seen whither a logic can lead that takes it upon itself to transform states of consciousness into universes. One may also see the lack of true knowledge of the Christian religion displayed by Feuerbach despite his parade of erudition fit to deceive those who do not know any more about it than he.<sup>59</sup> It is thus that reading Feuerbach becomes more and more monotonous, because he does not even have striking reasons for rejecting what he rejects. He drowns the difficulty under a flood of ambiguous words, or else he sets it aside as unworthy of attention.

Feuerbach's powers, however, are not yet exhausted. He proves the necessity of the world in still another way. What is the cause of life? the need of life? Whence, then, came the world? The world is come from necessity, not from a necessity

"*Ibid.*, p. 58.

•• *Ibid.*, p.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 864 sq.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 99.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 102.

•• Other examples of Feuerbach's lack of understanding of simple Christian doctrine are innumerable. For instance, to him the doctrine of original sin is none other than the doctrine of the sinfulness of the act of generation: "The mystery of original sin is the mystery of sexual desire. . . . The act of generation is, insofar as it is pleasurable, sensual, a sinful act." ("Das Geheimnis der Erbsünde ist das Geheimnis der Geschlechtslust. . . . Der Zeugungsact ist, als ein genussreicher, sinnlicher, ein sundiger Act.") To prove this he quotes the Fathers, among them St. Bernard, who says: *Homo natus de muliere et ob hoc cum reatu.* (!) *Ibid.*, p. 874.

in a being other than itself (this would be a *contradiction*), but from its own necessity, which is not a contradiction. How is it from necessity? This is because if there were no world, there would be no necessity; if there were no necessity, there would be no reason, no understanding. Therefore the world comes from the necessity of necessity. **It** is true that, thus, negatively, as the speculative philosophes express themselves, nothing is the cause of the world . . . ! **It** is true that the world springs out of a want, out of privation, but it is false speculation to make this privation an ontological being. This want is simply the want which lies in the supposed non-existence of the world. **But** the necessity of the world is the necessity of reason. Reason is existence objective to itself as its own end. That which is an object to itself is the highest, the final being. That which has power over itself is almighty.<sup>60</sup> These convulsions of a reason running wild, these logical nightmares, seem, perhaps, puerile. Marx and Engels received them with tears of joy.

Religion exalts divine love; Feuerbach praises it as human love. Love is the union between God and man, of spirit and nature, makes a man of God and God of man. Love is materialism, immaterial love is a chimera. Love makes the nightingale sing, gives the plant its corolla . . . a love which has flesh and blood, which vibrates as an almighty force through all the living. Only "The love which has flesh and blood . . . can absolve from the sins which flesh and blood commit." Mercy is the justice of sensual life.<sup>61</sup> **It** must be conceded that this is somewhat obscure, but it is pure Feuerbach.

The mystery of the Incarnation gives Feuerbach the opportunity to perform several new feats. Here again the author uses the principle: *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. In order that God might become man, it was first necessary that man should be God.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53. This passage, while again demonstrating Feuerbach's ignorance of the Scholastic term *ex nihilo*, is a further example of Feuerbach's reconciliation of contradictories by turning contradictory opposition into purely relative opposition.

<sup>61</sup> "Liebe ist Materie, immaterielle Liebe ist ein Unding . . ." *Ibid.*, p. 59. "Die Barmherzigkeit ist das Rechtsgefühl der Sinnlichkeit." *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

The exploitation is patent. The principle is universally true when qualified with the distinction: from nothing, i.e., nothing in the sense of an efficient cause, nothing is made, concede; from nothing, i.e., a material cause, subdistinguish; by a created agent, concede; by the Creator, deny. But Feuerbach suppresses this necessary qualification.

It is subsequently said that God is love. A distinction is made here between the subject and the predicate. God is therefore other than love. There is a conflict between the two. But then it is said that God by love is become man, that is to say, love (i.e., projected human love) determined God to renounce his divinity (i.e., austere, abstract, moral rectitude) to become man. "Who then is our Savior and Redeemer? God or love? Love, for God as God has not saved us, but Love."<sup>63</sup> Therefore, since God has renounced Himself by love, we also should renounce God through love. Feuerbach confirms his conclusion by citing St. Bernard, who says: *Amor triumphat de Deo*. To reason run wild, all blasphemies are permitted in the name of truth.

The Trinity must also be reduced to the level of an intellect wallowing in matter. Man's consciousness of himself in its totality is the consciousness of the Trinity.<sup>64</sup> The idea of a solitary God is repugnant to the need of love, of community, which human nature has. Religion must, therefore, divide God into two persons.<sup>65</sup> This idea of community is in turn represented by a third person. But Feuerbach eliminates the third person, because two persons are sufficient to the idea of love; among three love is dissipated.<sup>66</sup> The Father represents intellect, the Son, the heart, love. These are the two parts of man, the one specific, the other individual. Together they reflect the whole man, also the divinity of love and friendship. The Blessed Virgin is associated with the two first persons in place of the third in order to give the perfect idea of the family,<sup>67</sup> of the species, and also because maternal love is the greatest, the

•• *Ibid.*, p. 65.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 80.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 82.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 88.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 86.

first yearning of men toward women.<sup>68</sup> On this score Feuerbach reproaches the Protestants with having neglected the Mother of God. Thus he reduces the most cherished realities of the Christian religion to mere symbols drained of all truth except what man's puny mind deigns to impart. But the role of exploiter he refuses to drop for a single moment, and so he upbraids the Protestants in this matter only to win the sympathy of Christians to his perfidious cause.

The Second Person of the Trinity is called the Word, because words are sacred, divine. They are the result of the imagination, a divine impulse, that of man's nature.<sup>69</sup> The ancients, because they were the children of the imagination, made of the Word a being. But the Word is divine, because it manifests human thought which is divine, all-powerful. The word makes man free, because he who cannot express himself is a slave. (!)<sup>70</sup>

In his last chapter, which follows six other chapters on the contradiction between alienated Christian dogma and the divine identity of man, Feuerbach demolishes the personal God and preaches his god, which is the human species. It is, above all, this positive part of his doctrine which attracted Marx and Engels. In it may be seen the more or less perceptible descent of man into matter. The great turning point in history—which coincides with Feuerbach—consists in the admission that the consciousness of God is none other than the consciousness of the species.<sup>71</sup> Man must rise above himself, but not above the laws of the species. There is no other essence that man can think, dream, imagine, feel, believe, desire, love, and adore than that of human nature itself.<sup>72</sup> Feuerbach says that only by uniting man with Nature can we combat the supernaturalistic

•• *Ibid.*, p. 87. Does Freud owe Feuerbach the "Oedipus complex?"

•• *Ibid.*, p. 96.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>71</sup> "Der uoethwendige der Gescl:i.ichte ist daher dieses off'ene Be.kennnis und Eingestandnis, dass das Bewusstsein Gottes nichts Anderes ist als das Bewusstsein der Gattung." *Ibid.*, p. 82lii.

.. *Ibid.*, p. 826.

egoism of Christianity.<sup>73</sup> The species comprises brute nature as being the essence of that nature—a distinction calculated to exclude pure materialism. At the same time nature belongs to the essence of man—a distinction calculated to exclude subjective idealism. These were vain precautions. Engels treats Feuerbach as an idealist and reduces him by contradiction to pure materialism. Feuerbach himself the excuse for this' in saying apropos of the Eucharist that eating and drinking were in themselves religious acts. He ends his book by saying: "Let bread be sacred to us, let wine be sacred, let water be sacred. Amen."

As to the species, its individuals are to be united by love. The first law is the love of man for man which is of itself religious.<sup>74</sup> is not divine because it is an attribute of God. On the contrary, it is an attribute of God because it is itself divine. Marriage is sacred in itself, not by any external restriction.<sup>75</sup> Man and woman complete each other; together they represent the species, the perfect man. The basis of morality is the distinction of the sexes.<sup>76</sup> The sins of the individuals are lost in the species. The sum of all the various individuals constitutes the species. The community alone constitutes humanity. God does not exist, because one has no corporal sensation of Him. But the species is not an abstraction, because it exists in feeling, in the moral sense, in the energy of love. Whence comes this feeling? Feeling comes from the participated sensation, from words, looks, sensible contacts. This is

•• *Ibid.*, p. Footnote.

•• *Ibid.*, p.

•• *Ibid.*, p.

<sup>76</sup> "Die Basis der Sittlichkeit ist der Geschlechtunterschied." *Ibid.*, p. 111. This mysterious statement is thus explained. Nature, as we have seen, i.e., the sensible world, is the very core of reality. Thinking man is nothing but conscious Nature, consciousness of oneself as an individual, of the species as infinite. Nature is the basis of personality (*Ibid.*, p. 111). But Nature in turn is corporeal. Thus the body is the basis, the subject of personality, and the sexual impulse (*Geschlechtsgetrieb*) the strongest in Nature (*Ibid.*, p. 109). Feuerbach concludes: "What is virtue, the excellence of man as man? Manhood. Of man as woman? Womanhood. . . . The basis of morality is the distinction of sex."

the last word of the man who reproached religion with being lacking in culture, of knowing none of the joys of the thinker, seeker in nature, the artist. Religion remits that to the other world; Feuerbach wishes to give it to us in reality, and to this end he reduces man to the level of pure sensation. In other words, he reduces man to matter, since the world is the sum of all reality and the cause of it, including reason.

Thus we see that the sum and substance of his book rests in the ruthless exploitation of the truths of faith and reason through the purely logical device of dropping diversity of created perfections while retaining their order to an ultimate, the *Ens realissimum* which he first proposed as man, but which, in due time, he levelled off to the ignoble condition of matter.

## n.

### THE POSITION OF FEUERBACH

In examining more carefully the position of Feuerbach in modern thought, we are not, therefore, scattering the ashes of the sacred dead; neither are we indulging the idle pastime of flogging a dead horse. We are not, because Feuerbach represents a stage in the march of Hegelian dialectics. This is a march which leaves behind it nothing but ruins, the ruin of Kant, the ruin of Hegel, the ruin of Feuerbach, which is not astounding since the march itself leads to ruin, the ruin of humanity, its swallowing up in prime matter at the point farthest removed from God. Each stage represents the cutting of another link between man and God. Feuerbach has had the unenviable distinction of cutting one of these most important links, the precise link between the divinity and man. In order to mount again towards God, man must reconstitute these links. We have exposed magic, the magic which Feuerbach used to rid himself of God. We have pointed out errors which the Hegelian man will be obliged to dissipate in order to know his Creator once again. In order to knit up the unravelled thread of reason again, we tried to lay our finger on the places where that thread has been broken.



Ludwig Feuerbach is not an insignificant ruin along the Hegelian road. He is an imposing, grandiose ruin, one to rejoice the hearts of the destructive geniuses of humanity. Witness these words of Friedrich Engels at the time when the Hegelian creative struggle seemed upon the point of dying out:

Then came Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*. With one blow it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocution it placed materialism on the throne again .... Nature exists independently of all philosophy; it is the basis upon which men, themselves products of nature, have grown up ... nothing exists outside of nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence .... The spell was broken ... , the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved .... Enthusiasm was general; we all became Feuerbachians on the spot. How enthusiastically Marx greeted this new conception and how much-despite all his critical considerations-he was influenced by him, can be read in *The Holy Family*.<sup>77</sup>

Taken up by Engels and Marx, Feuerbach was associated with the genesis of Communism. Lenin himself sets Feuerbach down as one of the philosophical sources of Marxism when he describes this system, which he qualifies as the greatest accomplishment of scientific thought, as "the system of Hegel which, in turn, led to the materialism of Feuerbach."<sup>78</sup> It is clear that

<sup>77</sup> - Da kam Feuerbachs 'Wesen des Christentums.' Mit einem Schlag zerstaubte es den Widerspruch in dem es den Materialismus ohne Umschweife wieder auf den Thron erhob .... Die Natur existirt unabhängig von aller Philosophie; sie ist der Grundlage, auf der wir Menschen, selbst Naturprodukte, erwachsen sind; ausser der Natur und den Menschen existirt nichts, und die hi:heren Wesen, die unsere religiose Phantasie erschuf, sind nur die phantastische Ruckspiegelung unsers eignen Wesens. Der Bann war gebrochen ... , der Widerspruch war, als nur in der Einbildung vorhanden, aufgel:ist . . . Die Begeisterung war allgemein: wir waren aile momentan Feuerbachianer. Wie enthusiastich Marx die neue Auffassung begri:isste und wie sehr er-trotz aller kritischen Vorbehalte--von ihr beeinflusst wurde, kann man in der 'Heiligen Familie ' lesen." Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klaaischen deutschem Philosophie*, Stuttgart, 1895. p. 11.

<sup>78</sup> - Marx did not stop at the materialism of the eighteenth century, but moved philosophy forward. He enriched it by the achievements of German classical philosophy, especially by Hegel's system, which in turn led to the materialism of

the revolution to which Feuerbach helped to set the spark was not an ordinary revolution, Would Feuerbach himself even recognize it? It is, therefore, as an indispensable stage in the Hegelian march, as a saint in the Marxist heaven, that Feuerbach or rather the study of Feuerbach imposes itself. He had the talent not only of incarnating within himself the errors of the past: denial of the validity of the senses with the consequent arbitrary autonomy of reason working in a void, but also of sowing in his work, so subtly calculated to overthrow Christianity, the germs of future chaos. Hence the enthusiasm of Engels: in a single man to have the synthesis of the past, the campaign plan of the future.

In characterizing Feuerbach as a ruin, one does so in the proper sense of Hegelian dialectics, for Hegelian dialectics are a ruinous system, a system which lives on destruction, where each stage is brought forth by the destruction of the preceding one, just as the new single class is supposed to be brought forth by the destruction through class warfare of all the previously existing classes. This procedure somewhat resembles a man going down a well on a ladder and taking care to destroy each rung after him, thus eliminating his only means of return, Kant cut the link between the external world and the mind, Hegel dissolved being and non-being in divine becoming, Feuerbach dissolved the divine into the human. His successors dissolved man into matter. For them it is not just the body which returns to dust; it is the whole man,

But this philosophy bears within itself, so to speak, its own chastisement. Kant by opposing knowledge and reality turned the mind away from the external world, In revenge he lost the knowledge of the God in Whom he wished so much to believe. It is said that he invented the God of practical reason to con-

Feuerbach. Of these the main achievement is *dialectics*, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fuller, deeper form, free from one-sidedness, the doctrine also, of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter . . . . The historical materialism of Man: represented the greatest conquest of scientific thought. . . . V. I. Lenin, *Marx, Engels Marxism*. New York, 19185, p. 1H.

sole his heartbroken servant. In the end Kant was to ask himself whether he was not himself God, a thought hardly calculated to rejoice the critical mind of the philosopher of Koenigsberg. Hegel resolved the contradictions of Kant by making contradiction the cause of becoming. He traced the evolution of this divine becoming down to the Prussian state, which recompensed him by making him its official philosopher and the most respected professor of the University of Berlin. But the disciples of Hegel reproached him with believing that the culminating and final point of this universal process coincided with his existence at Berlin, a halt which his own system forbade. Consequently his disciples of the left went over to revolutionary ideas, towards Russia, and Hegel was to complain before his death of having been understood by only one man, and he did not really understand him. The same fate was reserved for Feuerbach. He extolled the divine grandeur of man, but his disciples made a materialist of him and destroyed him in his own name. Thus Marx was to write:

His [Feuerbach's] work consists in the dissolution of the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing his work, the chief thing still remains to be done. . . . Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be theoretically criticized and radically changed.<sup>79</sup>

The internal coherence of his system had already pushed Feuerbach towards materialism. In a review of Moleshott's book, *The Theory of Alimentation*, he was to write:

Food is transformed into blood, blood into the heart and the brain, into thoughts and feelings. Human alimentation is the basis of culture and human opinion. Do you want to reform the people? Give them, instead of declamation against sin, better food. Man is what he eats.

<sup>79</sup> - Seine Arbeit besteht darin, die religiöse Welt in ihre weltliche Grundlage aufzulösen. Er übersieht, dass nach Vollbringung dieser Arbeit die Hauptsache noch zu thun bleibt. . . . Also z. B., nachdem die irdische Familie entdeckt ist, muss nun erstere selbst theoretisch kritisiert und praktisch umgewandelt werden." Friedrich Engels, *Ibid.*, *Anhang: Marx über Feuerbach*, N. 4.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 4.

To this end he recommends peas instead of potatoes. By freeing man from God he subjects him to vegetables.

The theories of Feuerbach, which smoothed the Hegelian road for Engels and Marx and which contributed to the spirit of world revolution, were not spontaneous products but the fruit of several generations of warped thinking. The sors of Feuerbach, even Hegel, still had a God distinct from man to Whom they gave a name such as the Absolute or Mind. **It** remained to give some sort of form to this G-od. Feuerbach settled the problem very simply by making God identical with man. This was a perfect Hegelian synthesis.

The philosophical ancestry of Feuerbach explains much. His onslaught upon Christianity, however, remains a personal triumph. He was born in the beginning of the nineteenth century, of a father who was a celebrated Bavarian jurist. He had several very gifted brothers. Ludwig Feuerbach began by studying theology at Heidelberg, where Hegel had been several years before as a professor of philosophy. **It** is a remarkable fact that so many anti-Christian geniuses have begun by studying theology. Hegel and Schelling studied theology together at Tübingen. Feuerbach soon went on to Berlin to study philosophy under Hegel, whom he was to call his second father. Schopenhauer was giving courses there at the same time, mostly to empty class rooms since he had rashly chosen the same hours as Hegel. Despite their diverging ideas, all these philosophers struggled in the same void in which Kant had enclosed them, that of knowledge which had no longer any direct connections with the outside world. They evaded one contradiction only to fall into another. **It** is, no doubt, thus that contradiction became at length a creative principle.

Once he had made the thought of Hegel his own, Feuerbach withdrew to a factory in the country of which he owned a part by the dowry of his wife. Lacking facility in oral exposition, he restricted himself to writing and became known for his polemical style. Having withdrawn from the world, he could overturn it at his ease without being annoyed by reality, like

Kant, who never left Koenigsberg, and who, during his daily walks-so regular that the neighbors could set their clocks by them-never spoke in winter for fear of having to breathe through the mouth instead of the nose; like Schopenhauer, who preached the tyrannical power of the will while living peacefully in a boarding house at Frankfort with his dog; like Nietzsche, who vaunted war and fainted at the sight of blood. It was from Feuerbach's retreat that there appeared in 1841 his mental masterpiece, *The Essence of Christianity*.

In 1845, four years after its appearance, Marx jotted down some notes on Feuerbach's work while he was sojourning with Engels at Brussels after having been expelled from Germany and then France. Of these notes Engels was to say that they were of fundamental value as the first document 'to contain the germs of the brilliant new view of the world-that of Marxism. Forty years later, in London, Engels wrote a long review of a book on Feuerbach, a review which contained a complete exposition of Marxism, in payment of the debt which dialectical materialism owed to Feuerbach.

According to Engels in this review, the contribution of Feuerbach consisted in bringing Hegelian dialectics out of the impasse in which they were at the death of Hegel in 1831. Hegel saw in the world the work of a divine Idea which little by little had disentangled itself from matter into which it had somehow fallen and was taking up its abode with men. At his death it was identified with the Prussian state, and Hegel, the official philosopher of Prussia, did not see why it should go any farther. It was still a God, though a very indistinct one.

But his own system called for perpetual becoming, constant progress emerging from the strife of contradiction.<sup>81</sup> Hegel was willing to stop, but his system would not allow it. To Feuerbach belongs the distinction of setting dialectics in movement

<sup>81</sup> - In the course of progress all earlier reality becomes unreality, loses its necessity, its right of existence, its rationality; in place of the dying reality comes a new vital reality, peaceable when the old is sufficiently sensible to go to its death without a struggle, forcible when it strives against this necessity." *Ibid.*, English translation, Chicago, 1903, p. 40.

again. He perceived the contradiction between the divine Idea and man, and he synthesized them by making man divine. He melted the divinity and nature together into a single world, a world of which man is the superior, reasoning side. Why did Marx and Engels receive this work with cries of joy as a deliverance? It was because, by a single stroke, Feuerbach had disposed forever of the idea of God, and with Him went the last remains of any spiritual principle. He had once again set materialism upon the throne. ;But this was not all; he had demolished the notion of the divine State in the sense of Hegel. He had opened the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Despite this accomplishment of Feuerbach, he fell into the same defect as Hegel. He thought that with him all had been said. He had transformed the religion of God into the religion of man and wished to remain there. But in the Hegelian meaning it was necessary that he, too, should be sublimated, liquidated for progress. The form of his philosophy was to be annihilated by criticism while its content would be maintained. Engels undertakes this criticism and he is very clairvoyant.

The merit of Feuerbach for Engels consisted in this: he had proved that matter is not the product of the spirit, but rather that the spirit is only the highest product of matter. His defect consisted in not recognizing that he had proved materialism and in still wishing to remain an idealist. He did not see that matter regulated all things, even man. By playing the angel, he had played the beast and refused to see it, but Engels saw it very well. The misfortune of Feuerbach was that he was not practical. The ingratitude of men had pushed him into a little village where he was ignorant of the great discoveries on the creative power of matter as expounded in the Darwinian theories and where he was obliged to conceive of man in the abstract.<sup>82</sup>

Still he did not dare to disengage himself completely from the idea of religion. Having noted that love between the sexes

••Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, p. 21-22.

is a fundamental thing, for him the most fundamental thing, he made a religion out of it.<sup>83</sup> He does not see, says Engels, that this man who loves all other men, this love which governs the world, is an abstraction. In practice, and practice is the sole criterion of truth, it is the struggle between the classes, the struggle for economic power which governs the world, which rules men.<sup>84</sup> This struggle is none other than the manifestation of matter in evolution towards a proletarian equilibrium. All comes from matter. Feuerbach had proved it himself. Feuerbach, who wanted to make man God, sees himself accorded the sad glory of having reduced man to matter. He talked of love, but he lives only as the basis of a philosophy of world revolution. Truth has taken revenge upon him.

Once rid of God as the supreme being, rid of man as God, reduced to matter as the sole reality, the mind still remains a faculty of order. **It** must put order into the world. **It** must make a system out of existence and hasten the coming of this order which is seen as the inevitable evolution of matter. Marx said that the philosophers had only interpreted the world, whereas the essential thing was to change it. In Lenin he found the man to put this changing to work. Since there no longer existed any God, or any rights of man derived from his spiritual nature, since there was only matter, one could cause blood to flow as one wished, and it was done. One could allow oneself all outrages, and they were allowed. As long as this philosophy exists, its logical consequences will always be in a position to reappear.

The development of philosophy from Kant to Feuerbach is well expressed in the personage of Goethe's Faust. Goethe studied Kant and was a contemporary and friend of Hegel. Doctor Faustus expresses himself thus: "The great Spirit has repulsed me with disdain, nature has closed herself to me, the thread of my thought has been broken, I am disgusted with all science." (This is Kant.) He finishes: "Open then the depths

•• *Ibid.*, p. 26.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

of my sensuality and let the ardent passions which ferment there be sated." (This is unacademic Feuerbach.) <sup>85</sup>

Like Kant, Doctor Faustus begins by saying: "It is ten years now that I have been leading my stupid students through an inexplicable labyrinth. I understand at last that we can know nothing." Like Feuerbach, he ends by crying to Marguerite: "Is not the bond which attaches us one to the other a mystery, eternal, invisible and visible? Give to this feeling whatever name you wish: name it felicity, heart, love, god . . . . Feeling is all; names are only noise, a vain mist obscuring the clarity of the heaven." <sup>86</sup>

From this same angle of feeling the German philosophers rejoin Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose *Emile* had given Kant the idea of a god felt rather than known. Feuerbach later on, like a good pedant, was to give a rational foundation for the primacy of feeling and blind force. Rousseau led to the French Revolution; Feuerbach's revolution is not yet ended. For according to the Hegelian dialectic the conflict between the divine State and creative matter can just as easily be resolved in favor of the former. Whichever wins will be right since, according to Hegel, all that is real is also reasonable. Then, in the name of its divinity, the State may claim for itself all that matter claims, and it does so as we know well. Blood flows again and man is outraged once more.

For those, therefore, who would stem the tide of this revolution it is no longer a question of choosing your weapons. The sword alone taken up in the cause of right is not sufficient. Sometimes it is not enough to die for a cause, but necessary also to live, think, and work for it. They who would defend the right must tear a page from the book of modern lore by coordinating both sword and pen as one instrument in the defense of truth. His Holiness Pope Pius XI told us that it is in errors that lies the source of all the miseries of our time. And on the same occasion he assured us that "St. Thomas Aquinas

<sup>85</sup> Goethe, *Stimmliche Werke, 12 Bd.*, Stuttgart, 1863, p. 434.

•• *Ibido*, p.457o



has altogether overthrown the modernists." <sup>87</sup> Those defenders of the truth, therefore, who are earnestly concerned about the wholesale perversion of modern thought will make the doctrine of St. Thomas their very own and apply its revitalizing correctives at the hidden roots of modern errors. In this they will make a good beginning by carefully weighing these words of the Angelic Doctor: "Sciences are diverse according to the different orders that reason properly considers. The order which reason makes in its own act of consideration belongs to rational philosophy, or logic, whose function is to consider the of the parts of speech to one another. Natural philosophy, or physics, considers the order of *things* which human reason considers but does not create, so that under the heading of natural philosophy is comprised metaphysics." <sup>88</sup> "But theology considers all things from the viewpoint of God, either because they are God himself or because they have an order to God, as principle and end." <sup>89</sup> For our modern errors stem largely, as the foregoing study shows, from the false principle which suppresses the divinely created hierarchy in being by considering the order in things and dropping the things on which this order is founded.

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<sup>87</sup> *Studiorum Ducem*, Pope Pius XI.

<sup>88</sup> *In X Ethic.*, l. 1.

<sup>89</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 7.

THE UNITY IN THE UNIVERSE,  
ACCORDING TO ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD

[*Second Installment*]

III

THE UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE

IN discussing the unity of the universe according to Mr. Whitehead, one meets with a fundamental difficulty. He distinguishes between that universe which is "our present cosmic epoch," and the larger environment in which the present epoch is placed.<sup>90</sup> The latter would have to be included in the usual sense of the term "universe." He also holds that the present universe is only a stage in the dynamic development of things. The present type of order in the world has arisen from an unimaginable past, and it will find its grave in an unimaginable future.<sup>91</sup> Concerning the larger universe it is admitted that we know but little, and of that little, less is known with certainty. We have only the realm of eternal objects, creativity, and God, upon whose wisdom all forms of order depend. These we may know with certainty. For Mr. Whitehead's purposes, however, the inquiry must necessarily be limited. He is an empiricist in philosophy, just as he used empirical methods in physics and the natural sciences. Since what is known empirically is the only certainty, one has no right to extend his conclusions concerning the present cosmic epoch to what is only suspected or surmised concerning the whole larger universe.<sup>92</sup>

The only course open to us is to consider the doctrine as it is presented by Mr. Whitehead, concerning the present cosmic

<sup>90</sup> *Process and Reality*, p. 185.

<sup>91</sup> *Religion in the Making*, p. 160.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

epoch. Hence the term "universe" as used in this study will be taken to mean the present cosmic epoch, unless it is clearly seen that it is to be referred to the ensemble of the unimaginable past and future and the known present.

The question will be treated in three parts:

1. The unity found in individual actual entities of the universe.
2. The order of nature, a unity of external relations.
8. The universe as prehensively one in the consequent nature of God.

### 1. The Unity of Individual Actual Entities in the Universe

According to Mr. Whitehead, the business of philosophy is to explain the emergence of the more abstract things from the more concrete things.<sup>93</sup> Hence philosophy is primarily interested in explaining the unity of the universe which results from the union of its component elements. The theory is dynamistic in character. It begins with the multiplicity of actual entities which become one. "It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity."<sup>94</sup> The task of philosophy is to explain the emergence of the one from the many, rather than the process by which the many are derived from one. Since, however, the many do not simply become one, the flux is also in the opposite direction. The one becomes many, and the many become one. Mr. Whitehead devotes his efforts mainly to the explanation of the former process, the concrescence of the multiple into unity. The purpose of this study is limited to the same process: How is the multiplicity united to form one universe?

In the first place this activity should be considered in microcosm, as the single actual entity evolves from the multiplicity of its component data. The process of "objectification" then continues until all the individual entities of the world are uni-

•• *Process and Reality*, p. 27.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 28.

fied in the one consequent nature of God. The process does not stop there.

For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies the world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. For the Kingdom of Heaven is with us today. The action of (this) fourth stage is the love of God for the world. It is the particular providence for particular occasions. What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation the love in the world passes into the love of heaven, and floods back into the world.<sup>95</sup>

It is hardly necessary to point out that the "perfected actuality" which is the consequent nature of God is by no means transcendent in the strict sense of that term. God is not an entity outside the world but present to the world. He is in the world and a part of it. True to his dynamistic tendencies, Mr. Whitehead emphasizes the process to such an extent that God is not statically complete. The process continues. Between God and the world there is a mutual real relation. The false notion of creation shows itself again. Having denied that the created world is the action of the creating God, holding that God is really related to the world in the same way that the world is related to God, one is naturally inclined to consider the two as entities *mutually* interacting.

Ultimately the unity of the universe is a unity of prehension, by which God prehends the world. Seemingly the prehension of God by the individual entities is the opposite process by which the one becomes many. In any case, prehension is similar to the classical theory of knowledge, according to which the thing known is intentionally in the knowing subject in such a way that the two are united really, intentionally, although they are not physically identical. One must make some distinctions: in the philosophy of organism a subject in the sense of a substance is definitely excluded. The object "known" and the "knowing" subject become physically one, since the resulting

•• *Ibid.*, p. 487.

actual entity is nothing more nor less than the prehensive process of its own becoming. Moreover, this prehension of objects is not necessarily conscious. Even the lowest entities in the scale of things apprehend the data which concreate in the production of those entities. One could enumerate other differences, but these are the most striking.

Before we take up the process of concreation it is necessary to recall that Professor Whitehead is expounding a monistic philosophy. He protests against the "bifurcation" of nature into body and mind, matter and spirit. At the same time he introduces physical and mental poles from which the actual entities arise. Stallknecht<sup>96</sup> says that this is a more complete bifurcation than the division into body and mind. This criticism is partially justified, although Mr. Whitehead attempts to prove that the physical and mental elements both arise from one source. The objection to the distinction is more properly directed against the weak foundation of this division into mental and physical poles, and against the insufficient principle which is said to effect the unification of the two. In his attempt to save the monistic system, Professor Whitehead has recourse to "hybrid feelings." In a *pure physical feeling* the datum is objectified by one of its own *physical feelings*. In a *hybrid physical feeling* the datum (an actual entity) is objectified by one of its *conceptual feelings*. Through the medium of a hybrid feeling, the conceptual feeling passes into the class of physical feelings. According to the Category of Conceptual Valuation, physical feelings give rise to conceptual feelings. In a secondary fashion, according to the Category of Conceptual Reversion, conceptual feelings may give rise to other conceptual feelings. A hybrid *physical feeling* originates for its subject a conceptual feeling with the same datum as that of the conceptual feeling of the antecedent subject. This hybrid feeling is termed "physical" because it feels the preceding actual entity. It is termed "hybrid" because an actual entity is objectified by one of its own conceptual feelings.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>96</sup> *Studies in the Philosophy of Creation*, p. 148.

<sup>97</sup> *Process and Reality*, pp. 36 and 347-49.

According to the Category of Transmutation, one and the same conceptual feeling may be derived impartially from analogous simple, physical feelings. Then, in a later phase, the prehending subject may transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a character of some nexus containing these prehended actual entities among its members, or it may be made a character of some part of such a nexus. Thus a subject, whose conceptual feeling arises from a number of physical feelings, transmutes the simple physical feelings into one physical feeling of a nexus as a whole.<sup>91</sup> In this way Mr. Whitehead attempts to avoid "the disastrous separation of body and mind."

Conceptual feelings are primarily derived from physical feelings, and secondarily from each other. In this statement the consideration of God's intervention is excluded. When this intervention (i.e., God's Conceptual Valuation) is taken into account, all conceptual feelings must be derived from physical feelings.<sup>99</sup>

This explanation is a fine web of words, but the question of how a hybrid physical feeling can really unite the physical and the conceptual remains unsettled. If it were one substance there might be some reason to accept this physical feeling as a unifier. Mr. Whitehead denies that there is any such thing as substance. In a more reasonable philosophy the task of uniting the material and spiritual is given to man, who is one substance, composed of the two elements, "body and mind," to use Mr. Whitehead's expression. It is impossible that a hybrid *physical* feeling can be affected by that which is conceptual. The old problem of how the physical (matter) and the conceptual (spirit) can interact is left unsolved. The "bifurcation of nature" remains what it was.

The explanation of the role played by feelings in this monistic system is only one part of the doctrine of concrescence or prehensive unification. In general the process may be divided

•• *Ibid.*, p. 36 and p. 355.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 349.

into four stages or phases: 1) the Datum, 2) the Process, 3) the Satisfaction, and 4) the Decision.<sup>100</sup>

(1) *The Datum*. The datum in the process is the multiplicity of eternal objects or particular actual occasions in an actual world. Since an actual entity prehends the whole universe, positively or negatively, the whole universe must be its datum. The datum is strictly multiple; each occasion is itself and is no other occasion. The occasions have relations of compatibility and incompatibility one with the other. Nevertheless, they come together in such a way as to have the unity of a datum for the concrescence. In acquiring this connection or unity "their inherent presuppositions" of each other<sup>101</sup> eliminate certain elements in their constitutions (the incompatibilities) and elicit into importance other elements (the compatibilities). In this way the many occasions become one complex datum. It is said that certain elements are "eliminated": taking into account the doctrine and work of negative prehensions, this evidently means that certain elements remain but enter into the constitution of the datum negatively; they are not of importance for the process.

The question inevitably arises: What is the principle of this unification of multiple actual occasions and eternal objects as individuals in the one unity of a complex datum? The many do not become one of themselves. The principle must be either an external force or the mere internal constitution (the nature) of the individual entities by which they are capable of unification and by which they are actually united. Very probably, the external principle is the primordial nature of God, by which

<sup>100</sup> On pages 800-801 of *Process and Reality* three phases are enumerated as constituting the process: I) the responsive phase, II) the supplemental phase, and S) the satisfaction. On page 805 of the same work, the enumeration is as given above. Evidently, in the later classification the author has omitted the datum, divided the process into two phases (responsive and supplemental) and retained the satisfaction, including within it the decision. Such a method of procedure does not help the reader to understand the doctrine, but the two classifications seem to be related as here stated. The division into four stages is clearer and more complete. For that reason it is followed in this description.

<sup>101</sup> *Process and Reality*, p. 298.

and in which all eternal objects and occasions are relevant to the process. Even if it be held that the principle is internal to the constitution of the entities, that constitution is ultimately due to the primordial nature of God, without which there could be no order and, therefore, no constitution. Unfortunately Mr. Whitehead weakens his system by making the primordial nature of God a "condition " but not a determining element of order, and by emphasizing that the order comes from the data themselves as of themselves.

(2) *The Process.* In the second phase these data, unified in some way or other, are received or "felt" as belonging to external centers. This is the phase of mere, pure reception of the actual world in its guise of objective datum for the aesthetic synthesis. One may properly ask: What is the receptive or feeling thing? It might be thought that it is the concretescent actual entity itself. On the contrary, Mr. Whitehead does not indicate that any complete entity can be found in that phase of pure reception. So far only the unification of the actual occasions into one complex datum has been described. The "feeling thing" must be drawn out of the blue. To say that the data are felt or received by each other does not settle the difficulty. Such reception is said to constitute the datum as one, though complex. The entity itself does not appear as a unifying force, because it is constituted by this very unification. The multiple becomes one without, the aid of an adequate efficient principle. And yet, Mr. Whitehead has already told us, "A multiplicity is a type of complex thing which has unity derivate from some qualification which participates in each of its components severally; but a multiplicity has no unity derivative from its various components."<sup>102</sup> He has stated the truth, but fails to follow it in his detailed explanation.

(3) *The Satisfaction.* The third stage is governed by the private ideal or subjective aim, gradually shaped in the process itself. By it the many feelings, derivately felt as alien, are transformed into a unity of aesthetic appreciation immediately felt

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.



as private. Here again would be the place for the action of a substantial form. As a matter of fact, the private ideal or subjective aim is said to be derived ultimately from the primordial nature of God-but the process is not fully determined by that nature. There are indeterminations awaiting the action of the conrescent entity. The determinations which are made are conceptual in nature. They arise from eternal objects as their immediate datum. It has been seen in the section on creation that the being or becoming of the eternal objects is not satisfactorily explained. Their origin violates the ontological principle. They float in from nowhere, and are merely *ordered* in God's Conceptual Valuation.

In this stage there are two subordinate phases, an aesthetic supplement and an intellectual supplement. Both of these phases may be trivial, in which case there is a definite negation of individual origination, and the process passes passively to its satisfaction. The actual entity is then the mere vehicle for the transference of inherited constitutions of feeling.

When these phases are not trivial, the element of individual origination plays a part. In the first or aesthetic supplement, there is an emotional appreciation of the contrasts and rhythms inherent in the unification of the objective content in the conrescence of one actual occasion. . . . It is the phase in which blue becomes more intense because of its contrasts and shape acquires dominance by reason of its loveliness. What has been received as alien is recreated as private.<sup>103</sup>

This re-creation is accomplished by the influx of conceptual feelings and their integration with the pure physical feelings (of the datum) . Up to this point the process is "blind," in the sense that it is not yet determined to the negation or admission of intellectual "sight"; that is to say, the dismissal into irrelevance of eternal objects in their abstract status of pure potentials, or the acceptance of the same into the process. In the first case, no "intellectual " operations are involved, although conceptual operations always take place, even in the first phase

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 808.

or supplement. The intellectual operation of accepting the eternal objects constitutes the second phase or intellectual supplement.

The satisfaction which is the final phase of the internal constitution of the entity is one complex freely determined feeling. The phase is fully determined, or rather, the entity is then fully determined as to its genesis, its objective character for the transcendent creativity (Leibniz, for its objectification in a succeeding actual entity), and its prehension, positive or negative, of every item in its universe.<sup>4</sup>

(4) *The Decision.* The decision marks the very end of the subjective constitution of the actual entity. The end of phase three has been reached when the conceptually originated novelty has been accepted or rejected. At the same instant the fourth stage or decision is begun. The "satisfaction" is the culmination marking the evaporation of actual indeterminacy; so that, in respect to all modes of feeling and to actual entities in the universe, the satisfied entity embodies a determinant attitude of "Yes" or "No."<sup>105</sup> The distinction between the two terms lies in the fact that the decision has to do with the entity and its becoming in the sense of a transition from the settled world to a new actual entity. The decision is associated with the entity in its "private" character, the becoming of the actual entity itself, without explicit relation to the future entity. In a word, satisfaction and the process refer to the entity in its character of "subject." The decision and the datum refer to the entity in its character of "subject-superjecto." The former emphasize the subjective, the latter the objective, phases of the process of concrescence.

Considering the concrescence from the point of view of final causality, there is one item of special interest. According to the Aristotelian conception, the final cause determines the efficient cause to act. It is that for which the agent acts. It is a determining principle, in the sense that the agent is determined

<sup>10</sup>. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 801.

to that end and not to another. There can be no question of a progressively determined final cause. In any given action the agent is completely determined for that action, or it is not determined. The determining element is the final cause. The terms "determined" and "determining" are to be used with clarity. In the philosophy of organism the progressively determined final cause is one which is progressively defined and made clear, but at the same time new elements are added according to the decisions of the concreting entity concerning new propositions. In the Aristotelian system, the final cause determines the agent to act. Before that determination he is potentially capable of performing any one of an infinite number of acts, and he also may act or not act. The final cause is the object which reduces this potency to act. If the final cause were not such a determining element, the agent would ever remain in potency to act, and ever remain in potency to the infinite number of possible acts. Thus the object of any given act is finally determined in the sense that the agent has that end in view and no other, and that during that action there is only one possible outcome, the attainment of that definite object. It would seem that, because the object is sometimes vague and unclear, Mr. Whitehead thinks it undetermined. For example, if a man begins to build a house he may have in mind simply a house, *any* house. Such a man is not acting in an intelligent manner, but he is determined to one end, the building of *a house*, not an automobile or a factory. The object is in that aspect determined, although vague. Moreover, inasmuch as the agent is intellectual and uses his intelligence, he begins building a house, with a complete plan in mind.

Mr. Whitehead confuses the two meanings of the term, making it possible that a final cause may be progressively determined in the sense that it may be made clearer and less vague, but he adds to that the notion that the agent is not in the beginning completely determined to the one object of his action. The first part of his interpretation is possible. The added notion is quite contrary to the truth.

The same subjective aim, the progressively determined final cause, is the principle of unity in the process. God is the mental pole of the process, while the datum is the physical pole. The subjective aim is derived from the primordial nature of God-but with the indeterminations mentioned above. Thus, God and the actual world jointly constitute the character of the creativity for the initial phase of the novel concrescence. The subject, thus constituted, is the *autonomous* master of its own concrescence into subject-superject.<sup>106</sup>

It must ever be recalled that this subjective aim is only incompletely derived from the primordial nature of God.

He is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire. His particular relevance to each creative act as it arises from its conditioned standpoint in the world, constitutes Him the initial "object of desire" establishing the initial phase of each subjective aim.<sup>107</sup>

The initial phase and the final end of the object are confused in this expression; nevertheless it is clear enough that God establishes only the *initial* phase of each subjective aim. Although the world tends towards Him, it is not *completely* determined to this tendency from the beginning.

Whatever arises from God, arises first conceptually in the primordial nature of God. **It** then becomes physical, because as evaluated in God it is part of an actual entity. Hence when prehended in any other further concrescence, the prehension is of the actual entity and, therefore, physical. The passage from conceptual to physical is accomplished by means of "hybrid feelings" as described previously.

As it is explained<sup>108</sup> according to the Category of Subjective Unity, the subject is inherent in the process. (This does not mean that the subject is the substance and the process is the accident. **It** is merely another way of saying that the subject and the process are identical.). In the primary phase a conceptual feeling of subjective aim is found. The ultimate source of such an aim is God. The conceptual feeling is originally very

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 846.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 487.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 816-818.

complex, with conditional alternatives; by successive decisions it is reduced to coherence. In each phase the corresponding conceptual feeling is the "subjective end" characteristic of the phase. In any "incomplete phase" the unity is propositional. At the physical level of consciousness propositions constitute a source of origination of feeling which is not tied down to mere datum.<sup>109</sup> Hence the propositional unity is the unity of a proposition presented as conceptual. The conceptual is an element in the lure for feeling which is always beyond, beckoning the concrescent entity to further unification. In the process the propositional unity retreats before the growing grasp of real (i.e., Whitehead's physical) unity of feeling. Each successive propositional phase is a lure to the creation of feelings which promote its realization. In other words, there are many alternatives in the subjective aim as first derived from God. These alternatives are reduced to coherence or unity by the decisions of the concrescent entity; the subjective aim, in its subjective modifications, remains as the unifying force or factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physical and conceptual feelings. The decisions are impossible for the entity in its process of becoming, before the novelties are proposed in propositions. The propositions, on the other hand, cannot be made until the entity has reached a stage of development at which it can receive such a conceptual proposition. The proposition is said not to exist *for that entity* until the entity is capable of receiving it.

It is further explained, "With this amplification, the doctrine that the primary phase of a temporal entity is physical, is recovered." A "physical feeling" is defined to be the feeling of another actuality.<sup>110</sup> On the preceding page we were told that there must be in the primary phase of the subjective process a conceptual feeling of subjective aim: the other conceptual feelings and the physical feelings originate as steps toward the realization of the conceptual aim through their treatment of initial data. The answer to this paradox lies in the doctrine of

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 817.

hybrid feelings. The conceptual feeling mentioned in the subjective aim is derived from the conceptual evaluation of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God. The physical feeling is the hybrid physical feeling by which the nascent entity feels the actual entity, God; but the actual entity, God, is objectified by His conceptual evaluation of the eternal objects. In this place Professor Whitehead fails to make the distinction which he makes later, when he writes that the primordial nature of God is *deficiently* actual. God lacks the perfection of feeling since His evaluation of eternal objects is only conceptual. He also lacks the "perfection" of consciousness.<sup>111</sup>

The derived conceptual feeling, therefore, which reproduces for the subject the data and valuation of God's conceptual feeling, is the initial conceptual aim referred to in the preceding section. In this sense God can be termed the "creator of each temporal entity." "But the ultimate creativity in the process is not due to God's volition." It is clear enough what is meant: God is not the one creator of the world, in the sense that He produces it out of nothing. He does not create creativity, nor does He create eternal objects, as was seen in the section on creation. "He is truly the aboriginal instance of the creativity; and is therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action. It is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity, and God is the eternal primordial character."<sup>112</sup> It is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity; the operation is performed by the *deficiently* actual God!

Thus the source of the subjective aim is in God's primordial nature. Its function is evident. It is the one determining element in the process, but it is not identically the same when it carries on the determination, since the aim is itself progressively defined.

Process is the growth and attainment of final end. The progressive definition of the final end is the efficacious condition (sic) of its attainment. The determinate unity of one actual entity is

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 486.

*Ibid.*, p. 118.

bound together by the final causation towards an ideal progressively defined by its progressive relation to the determinations and indeterminations of the datum. The ideal, itself felt, defines what "self" shall arise from the datum: and the ideal is also an element in the self which arises.<sup>113</sup>

Mr. Whitehead fails to realize that the final cause and the efficient cause are really distinct, although the final cause is intentionally present to the agent and motivates that agent to act. He denies the doctrine of substance and as a result he identifies the process with the actual entity arising therefrom. Thus he can make the end, precisely as end, not only the final cause motivating the agent to act, but also the efficient cause working immediately upon the process. Since both the actual entity (the efficient cause of its own becoming, as we saw in the section on causality) and the process are identified, the final cause not only acts upon the entity, but also exerts an efficient causality directly upon the process itself. It is a very confusing doctrine. The data are called the efficient cause of the process. In fact, they are both material and efficient causes. The entity itself is its own efficient cause. Now we see that even the final cause is an efficient cause. Mr. Whitehead is sincerely interested in saving final causality, but he refuses to give it the necessary basis and ends by making it an efficient cause as well as a makeshift final cause.

On the other hand, when Mr. Whitehead describes the process of feeling, i.e., *positive* prehension, he emphasizes the separation of the process and the subject of the same. The whole action of feeling is analyzable into five factors: 1) the "subject" which feels, 2) the initial data which are to be felt, 3) the "elimination" in virtue of negative prehensions, 4) the "objective datum" which is felt, 5) the "subjective form" which is how the subject feels.<sup>114</sup> The "subject which feels" is no longer identified with the process of feeling. It suits the purpose of Mr. Whitehead to ignore the identification and to have recourse to a more reasonable position, namely, that the two

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111.

are really distinct. "There is a transition from the initial data to the objective datum effected by the elimination "-in virtue of negative prehension.

The initial data constitute a "multiplicity" or merely a "proper" entity, while the objective datum is a "nexus," a proposition or a "proper entity" of some categorial type. The concrescence of the initial data into the objective datum is made possible by the elimination and is effected by the subjective form. The objective datum is the perspective of the initial datum.<sup>115</sup> The subjective form receives its determination from the negative prehensions, the objective datum and the conceptual origination of the subject. The negative prehensions are determined by the categorial conditions governing feelings, by the subjective form, and by the initial data. This mutual determination of the elements involved in a feeling is one expression of the truth that the subject of the feeling is "*causa sui*."<sup>116</sup>

It is most disturbing to the reader to find that one factor in a positive prehension is elimination, which is carried on by negative prehension. As it is stated, the doctrine is quite incomprehensible. Most probably it is to be understood that the elimination is a step preparatory to the true feeling or positive prehension, and that the true feeling consists in the "feeling" of the "objectified datum" which results from the elimination among the initial data effected by negative prehensions. We have already examined the difficulty in the unification of the data into a datum, in that the author fails to posit a sufficient efficient principle for this elimination. Just as the subject is the efficient cause of its own becoming, so the incompatible data are the cause of their own unification into one datum. We are forced to point out again the fundamental error of the philosophy of organism in denying the existence of substance, and of a subject, really distinct from the data, distinct from the datum, distinct from the process and distinct from the resulting actual entity, which will be the true efficient cause of the whole process and of the actual entity. The identification of subject

<sup>115</sup> This probably should read "data."

<sup>116</sup> *Procesa and Reality*, p.



and process leads to a multitude of difficulties. Mr. Whitehead apparently realizes the difficulty and attempts to separate the two at the same time that he unites them. He fails to explain the process of unifying the data into one resultant entity because of this confused attempt to identify the two and at the same time keep them separate.

## 2. The Order of Nature a Unity of External Relations

For Mr. Whitehead, the principle of unity in the process of constituting an actual entity is the subjective aim, which partakes of the nature of an efficient cause as well as that of a final cause. This aim is partially determined by the primordial nature of God and is progressively determined by the decisions of the concrescent entity concerning propositions which become relevant and existent to the process as it develops. Serious defects weaken this theory. First of all, as was seen, the successive determinations which escape the influence of a First Cause lack any ultimate causal explanation. Secondly, the progressive determination of a final cause of any action is impossible. The cause may be made clearer and more definite, but it is the same cause, the same object with no additions. Especially is this true of an ultimate final cause, whether it be taken in an absolute or a relative sense. The same erroneous doctrine is extended to the final cause of the universe as a whole. As is well known, this position is metaphysically unsound. The end must be determined once and for all by the Creator. Since the Creator is the First Cause, and Himself uncaused, He must also be the last end. Outside Him there can be no being, while being determines the will under its aspect of Good. God is the perfect Good. In truth, the unity which one finds in the world is due to the fact that the creatures within it are truly creatures, produced by the One Cause, tending to the One End.

It is clear to Mr. Whitehead, as it is to any intelligent observer, that the world is one, that there is an ordered multiplicity which constitutes the world as it is. The order of nature is one of the "stubborn facts" which confront us. Certainly

the unity arises proximately from multiplicity. The one universe is made up of many creatures. According to Mr Whitehead this unity is a "physical " one. Each of the entities prehends every other actual entity, so that the universe is one because it is prehended by that one entity. The term "physical" is used. It may be limited to the strict meaning the word in the philosophy of organism, according to which it means simply that an actual entity physically prehends another actual entity and not an eternal object. Nevertheless it certainly is more than an *intentional* union of the object prehended and the prehending subject. In the process of prehension, the prehended thing is objectified, and made an integral part of the subject. If the unity attained were limited to the intentional unification of knower and thing known, as in intellectual cognition, the doctrine would have some basis. In fact, *every entity* is said to prehend other entities and to receive them into its physical constitution. Therefore, the doctrine must be rejected.

Apart from this unity of subjective prehension there is a real unity of order. The many entities of the universe are really related one to the other in such a definite and settled fashion that they constitute one whole, the order of nature. Within this order one sees a subordination of entities which makes it possible to term the group a hierarchy in the sense in which that word is used in St. Thomas. The philosophy of organism and the doctrine of St. Thomas are by no means identical in this respect, but there is a similarity between the two. The difference comes especially because the organic system fails to posit a relation of all to one, with a sound principle for that relation. According to this system all things in the world tend to *physical* oneness in the consequent nature of God. Moreover this tendency is without a sufficient reason. The unity attained is really an accident, due rather to chance than to design. Of course it is not difficult for Mr. Whitehead to hold to a physical union of the world of creation and God. Matter and spirit do not exist, nor could there be any real distinction between the two. God and the world are of the same composition. Ultimately God is the universe as prehended by Him.

This question will be treated in greater detail in the next section. It is sufficient to note that one of the two elements in order of the world is insufficiently explained. The order *ad unum* will be discussed later. For the moment we shall consider only the order *ad invicem*.

As everyone sees, the things of the world consistently attain their ends, and the same ends, acting in the same way. Consider the growth of a plant. It begins as a tiny seed, carries on the process of germination and growth, and produces fruit just as all the other members of its species and class. For that process there is an internal order within the seed and the growing plant which is evident enough. But there is also an external order of the elements of the environment of that plant, the sun, water, soil, temperature and so on. Seemingly these entities are ordered to the plant, in which case each of them is externally ordered. At the same time each would be found to be internally ordered to its own good, according to its own nature. Each member of the society which constitutes the world has an internal end which may be easily recognized. The external end which it has is often more difficult to find. One often asks: What is the external end of the cancerous growth which destroys the living thing on which it lives?

The organic doctrine is not at all contrary to this description. Internal and external relations are not so clearly distinguished, and hence comes a difficulty. But the definition given by Mr. Whitehead is as follows: "Order applie'd to the relations among themselves enjoyed by many actual entities which thereby form a society."<sup>117</sup> The emphasis is placed upon the relations of one entity to another, that is, the external relations. The internal order is not considered in the notion as here expressed.

As a result of the relation of entities a "society" is formed, which may be termed an "order," or group of ordered entities. The term is applicable to a society which is composed of a number of men united for one aim, a moral society, as well as a

<sup>117</sup> *Process and Reality*. p. 123.

physical "society," a living cell. The cosmic epoch as a whole may be considered as a society of electromagnetic occasions. The notion of "society" is a rather vague one because Mr. Whitehead does not point out the real cause of the union. He considers the fact that there are societies but fails to make clear the relations between the members and the principle, which make the society one entity, either physical or moral, the relation *ad unum*. A number of entities may be related one to another, but there must be something common to all before they can form a unity. They remain strictly multiple, un-united. As such they do not form one entity but a number of entities. *Unum et ens convertuntur*. The multiple as multiple does not exist. If the society, *quid unum*, is to have being, the various members must be brought together by a principle of unification. The multiple as multiple does not become one of itself. The efficient cause of the unification does not act without an end. *Omne .agens agit propter finem*. That which impels the agent to act is the end, or final cause. Thus the society has a duplex relation, to the one efficient cause and to the one end toward which the society tends. The simple relations among themselves cannot constitute a true society.

In theory Mr. Whitehead admits the necessity of such a principle. He writes, "Order involves the attainment of an end since it is differentiated from mere 'givenness' by the introduction of adaptation for the attainment of an end."<sup>118</sup> His "subjective aim" in the concrescence of a single actual entity partakes of the nature of both efficient and final cause. Thus he speaks of the order reigning in an actual entity as well as the order in the entire universe. More than that, he definitely says that the order in the world of nature demands a principle. His principle, however, is a deficient one.

The order of the world is no accident. There is nothing actual which could be actual without some measure of order. The religious insight is the grasp of this truth: that the order of the world, the depth of reality of the world, the value of the world, in its

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

whole and in its parts, the beauty of the world, the zest of life, the place of life and the mastery of evil, are all bound together—not accidentally but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a creativity with infinite freedom and a realm of forms with infinite possibilities; but that this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is, God.<sup>119</sup>

The doctrine is clear enough. At first sight it would seem to be an alternative expression of the fifth way of proving the existence of God according to St. Thomas. As a matter of fact, it is not. It is true that Mr. Whitehead holds that there is nothing actual which could be actual without some measure of order, and without a principle of the same. The principle to which he refers, however, is the "completed ideal harmony" which is God. The expression is rather ambiguous. It may refer to Him in two senses, in the primordial or consequent nature. The adjective "ideal" suggests the antecedent nature, the Conceptual Valuation of eternal objects, the source of the subjective aim of creatures. The term "completed" seems to be synonymous with "realized ideal" (which, of course, is no longer a true ideal). In other words, this would be the consequent nature of God. On the other hand it may refer to the "completed ideal" or conceptual valuation in God's primordial nature, by which the eternal objects are ordered, and made relevant for the process.

One finds it difficult to accept the term as meaning that the consequent nature of God is the efficient cause of unification. For it is emphasized that "God as conditioning the creativity with his harmony of apprehensions, issues into the mental creature as moral judgment according to a perfection of ideals."<sup>120</sup> One must take this statement in connection with another description:

The consequent nature of God is His judgment of the world. He ... saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of His own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can

<sup>119</sup> *Religion in the Making*, p. 119.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

be saved. God's role lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonization. <sup>121</sup>

The whole statement is in accord with the general trend of the philosophy of organism, that the consequent nature of God is the terminus, the result of the concrescence of the universe. <sup>122</sup> Therefore, the completed ideal harmonization, the source of order, and the principle of concretion, are aU the primordial nature of God. The consequent nature is the result of the process and, in a limited sense, the final cause of the process, not by any means the efficient principle.

The efficient cause of the universe must be the primordial nature of God, which was shown to be a very unsatisfactory cause when creation was being discussed. A divine causality which is limited to the ordering of eternal objects that have no complete dependence on God's creative action is hardly a true divine causality. The creativity also lies outside this divine cause, which only characterizes it. Moreover a *deficiently* actual God is supposed to make actual that which was not actual. The effect has a perfection not contained in its cause. Moreover, the world is" and *causa sui* by means of its own decisions, in accordance with a subjective aim which is only partially derived from the divine cause. In a word, the primordial nature of God is said to be only a partial cause of the becoming of the ordered entities. Although the necessity of a principle is admitted, we find no sufficient principle or efficient cause of the world and its order in the primordial nature of God. The doctrine is not another way of expressing the fifth way of St. Thomas, because it denies the first and second ways which are essentially connected with the fifth.

The description of the order of nature as it is found to be empirically, is more satisfactory. Mr. Whitehead is then on his own ground, the field of empirical science. He describes a hierarchical order of nature which is a hierarchy of expanding circles rather than the more or less pyramidal Thomistic order. Perhaps the image which best approximates to this hierarchy is

<sup>121</sup>"*Process and Reality*, p. 490.

<sup>122</sup>u• Cf. *Modes of Thought*, p.

that of a nest of boxes, in which the smallest is enclosed within the next larger and so on until all are enclosed in the largest one. This image is by no means perfect or complete, because the hierarchy is not strictly serial. If the "smallest box" be called A and the intermediate "boxes" bear the letters of the alphabet up to Z; A may be directly enclosed within C, as well as related to C through the mediation of B. This would be the simplest example of the complexity of relations. It can easily be imagined what the entire nexus would be like.

The characteristic of this hierarchy is an increase in unity as one progresses higher in the grouping. A stone possesses unity for it is all stone. If one were to go deeper in the scale of entities and consider the unity of the atom, for example, an atom of hydrogen, a greater unity is seen in the fact that the whole atom is one, hydrogen. If one were to consider the electrons and protons which are thought to make up an atom, the unity would be said to be greater, that of an electric charge. Since the atoms and electrons and protons refer to the theory of physics and chemistry, and since, while they are seemingly well-founded hypotheses, they still remain such, we can take as an example the stone, and call its unity a unity of homogeneity, of oneness of composition. Certainly a living being shows greater unity; the various organs of the body are dynamically united in the performance of functions which are for the good of the whole. In the rising scale of living things one is faced with an ever greater unity of composition and of action. The whole world is one in composition, in its make-up of matter and form. But the higher entities are very complex entities. The higher the entity in the material world, the greater the *complexity* which it exhibits, but also the *greater* the *unity*. From the purely colonial algae, through the simple sponges like the hydra, to the highest class of vertebrates, there is certainly a progression and increase in unity. We are not speaking of an evolutionistic progress but we only note that in the ordered grouping which scientists make, the classes are arranged beginning with the lowest and least complex to the highest and most complex world entities. In

this ordering the entities become more complex but they also become more one. In the complex body of one of the higher vertebrates each organ has its own proper end, but it is also ordained to the good of the whole body, so that that body forms one whole.

The same growth in unity is recognized in the philosophy of organism. The actual entities themselves have a oneness of prehensive composition. They are the final things of which the world is made up.<sup>123</sup> The simple actual entities may be united to form a complexity, a nexus of things which possesses greater or less unity. As a society it possesses a defining characteristic which produces the "causal laws" which dominate its social environment. The origin of the defining characteristic would offer a very interesting subject of discussion, since it is not "created" by the society but "elicited into importance" for its members. It would finally be seen that it, too, lacks a proper causal explanation.

For the moment, however, we are limiting the discussion to the hierarchy of order in the universe. In the description of the order, mention is made of societies, whose nexus possess "social" order, then come the "enduring objects," which are endowed with "personal order."<sup>124</sup> Division is also made into "corpuscular" and "noncorpuscular" societies. The former are analyzable into strands of "enduring objects"; the latter are not so analyzable.<sup>125</sup>

Later on Mr. Whitehead introduces the notion of a society which includes subordinate societies and nexus with a definite pattern of structural interrelations. These he terms "structured societies."<sup>126</sup> Within such a society some of the important groups of occasions are called subordinate *societies*, which could have retained the dominant features of their defining characteristics in the general environment apart from the structured

<sup>123</sup> *Process and Reality*, p. 24.

<sup>124</sup> That is, societies in which the genetic relatedness of the members orders them serially, and the nexus of which forms a single line of inheritance of its defining characteristic. *Process and Reality*, pp. 46-47.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 137.



society, although they would not then be quite the same. Other groups are labelled "subordinate nexus." These, excepting the general systematic characteristics of the external environment, present no features capable of genetically sustaining themselves outside of the structured society. For example, molecules are structured societies, and so in all probability are electrons and protons. A molecule is a subordinate society in the structured society which we call the living cell. The nexus which is the empty space within a living cell is called a subordinate *nexus*, not a subordinate society.<sup>127</sup>

The gradation of society is indicated according to the traditional form when the more special societies of the present electro-magnetic world are enumerated:

The most general examples of such societies are the regular trains of waves, individual electrons, protons, individual molecules, societies of molecules such as inorganic bodies, living cells, and societies of cells such as vegetable and animal bodies.<sup>128</sup>

We may rightfully conclude that the higher orders possess the perfections of the inferior members, since Mr. Whitehead holds to the doctrine of "objectification" of the entities which form the datum in the subject of the process. Moreover, the higher entities prehend the data positively rather than negatively. God is the highest member of the world hierarchy, and an integral part of it, not truly transcendent. As such He possesses all the perfections of the world entities, for He is constituted by the prehension of them.

Within the entire order of nature, the philosophy of organism admits no specific differences. Everything is reduced to a unity of process. No distinction can be made between material and spiritual beings; they are one in process. Nor is there a specific difference between intellectual and non-intellectual entities. The distinction between the mentality enjoyed by living and non-living, intellectual and non-intellectual actual entities is one of degree, not of kind. Mentality is simply more developed

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.* p. 137.

in the higher entities. "Mental activity is one of the modes of feeling belonging to all actual entities in some degree but only amounting to conscious intellectuality in some actual entities."<sup>129</sup> A veritable evolution of reason or mentality is described in some detail in *The Function of Reason*, especially on pages 27 and 28.<sup>180</sup>

Serious difficulties are found in the more complete description of the world hierarchy. Each society is not simply an entity in itself; it depends upon the wider environment in which it is set.<sup>181</sup> In effect, every society is a part of a wider society. Finally one must arrive at the existence of one wide society which includes the whole world. When he reaches this stage of things, Mr. Whitehead's expressions and doctrine become very vague.

In the general properties of extensive connection we discern the defining characteristic of a vast nexus extending far beyond our immediate cosmic epoch. (This vast nexus) contains in itself other epochs, with more particular characteristics incompatible with each other. Thus, from the standpoint of our present epoch, the fundamental society in so far as it transcends our own epoch seems a vast chaos mitigated by the few elements of order contained in its own defining characteristic of "extensive connection." We cannot discriminate its other epochs of vigorous order, and merely conceive it as harbouring the faint flush of the dawn of order in our own epoch. This ultimate vast society constitutes the whole environment in which our own epoch is set, so far as systematic characteristics are discernible by us in our own present stage of development. In the future the growth of things may endow our successors with keener powers of discernment.<sup>182</sup>

**If** we can know so little about this wider society, how can we arrive at definite, true principles? **If** our knowledge is only true of the present epoch, and uncertain concerning the widest world, it may be completely changed when our successors attain to the keener powers of discernment of which mention is made.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>180</sup> Cf. also *Modes of Thought*, pp. 104-106.

<sup>181</sup> *Process and Reality*, p. 187.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.

Is that widest society also a process of concrescence? Does it also "create" God? The answers given by Mr. Whitehead indicate that he remains ever an empiricist. Philosophy is only a system of hypotheses which unites all the other empirical sciences, and connects one with the other. Metaphysics is a *general* science, which has no more certainty than the natural sciences, the conclusions and findings of which it generalizes. Philosophy is concerned with the proximate causes of things, rather than the ultimate causes. Metaphysical necessity has no meaning. Metaphysics, philosophy, and generality are synonymous terms/<sup>88</sup>

In our present cosmic epoch

the physical relations, the geometrical relations of measurement, the dimensional relations, and the various grades of extensive relations involved in the physical and geometrical theory of nature, are derivative from a series of societies of increasing width of prevalence, the more special societies being included in the wider societies. This situation constitutes the physical and geometrical order of nature.<sup>134</sup>

In an attempt to explain this unity according to a monistic system, Mr. Whitehead is led to affirm:

Our present cosmic epoch is formed by an "electromagnetic" society, which is a more special society contained within the geometric society.... The electromagnetic society exhibits the physical electromagnetic field which is the topic of physical science. The members of the nexus are the electromagnetic occasions. But in its turn, the electromagnetic society would provide no adequate order for the production of individual occasions realizing peculiar "intensities" of experience unless it were pervaded by more special societies, vehicles of such order. The physical world exhibits a bewildering complexity of such societies, favouring each other, competing with each other.<sup>185</sup>

<sup>133</sup> Cf. "Science should investigate particular species and Metaphysics should investigate the general notions under which those specific principles should fall." *Process and* p. 167.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 186-87.

The expression "bewildering complexity" is of special interest, for that complexity is a natural result of the theory that beyond these societies there is disorder, where "disorder" is a relative term expressing the lack of importance possessed by the defining characteristic of the societies in question beyond their bounds. The term "disorder" refers to a society only partially influential in impressing its characteristic in the form of prevalent laws.<sup>136</sup>

Societies arise and evolve from chaos, as they manage to impress their defining characteristics on the environment. Thus there is a conflict and complexity. The societies "favour each other and compete with each other" in impressing their characteristics (either complementary or opposite) upon the environment. And these societies constitute the order of nature!

The bewildering complexity is due not merely to the incomplete unification caused by the societies. Elements of chaos are found in the environment itself.

Spread throughout the environment there may be many entities which cannot be assigned to any society of entities. The societies in an environment will constitute its orderly element, and the non-social actual entities will constitute its element of chaos. *There is no reason, so far as our knowledge is concerned, to conceive the actual world as purely orderly or as purely chaotic.*<sup>137</sup>

In other words, *although the universe is tending toward unity, it is not fully unified in fact.* The world can be considered a "society" only in a derivative sense. The world contains ordered entities or societies but it is not itself purely ordered. If it is neither purely ordered nor purely chaotic it is simply not orderly, nor is it one in itself.

Here there is no question of internal finality. Mr. Whitehead does not deny that the entities of the world attain their own proper internal ends, *sicut in pluribus*.<sup>138</sup> The point at issue

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 128.

<sup>137</sup> *Process and Reality*, pp. 154-55.

<sup>138</sup> In accordance with the "self-creative" nature of the entities, the which they reach as their internal ends does not always coincide with the plan as

is that, since the world is not purely orderly, it is not completely ordered, and therefore it cannot be truly one. It is supposed to be an entity constituted by the relations of its members among themselves. Since those relations do not lead to the *unification* of the relata, the world cannot be truly one.

And yet, the universe is prehensively united in the consequent nature of God. According to the doctrine seen so often, the process and the reality resulting from the process are the same. The entity is nothing but the process. If God is the actual entity resulting from the process, He is the process itself. In fact God prehends the world. Since there is no such thing as a substance, and since the prehension and the prehender are one, we are forced to conclude that the process of prehending the world constitutes the consequent nature of God. This is the explanation of the statement: "It is as true to say that God creates the world as that the world creates God."<sup>189</sup> What then can be said of the entities which have attained a satisfaction outside of, if not contrary to, the aim of God? What is to be said of those entities which cannot be assigned to any society? Somehow, they are brought into the unity of prehension, although it cannot be said that God prehends them merely negatively. As one rises in the scale the entities negatively less and less, and prehend positively more and more. God is admittedly the highest of entities. In Him one should find a minimum of negative prehension.

From the point of view of attainment of end there is nothing new in Whitehead's doctrine. The distinction between internal and external finality, between proximate and ultimate causality, was made long ago. That the universe is ordered in such a way that some entities fail to attain their internal ends is evident.

outlined in God's primordial nature. The satisfaction so attained is sometimes opposed to the plan of God. This fact is the foundation of Mr. Whitehead's solution of the problem of evil, that God is not responsible for the evil in the world. As a result, the Principle of Concrescence and the Harmonizer of the Universe must "save what can be saved"; He must introduce such harmony as He can among the more or less unruly entities.

<sup>189</sup> *Process and Reality*, p. 492.

As St. Thomas says, things attain their internal ends, *sicut in pluribus*. The human mind is led nevertheless to think that the world is certainly ordered to the attainment of unity. The external finality of a given entity may sometimes escape us, but the external finality of all entities together, the ultimate end of the universe as a whole, must be attained. This is metaphysically certain. If it were not so, it would indicate an imperfection in the creator. Mr. Whitehead cannot use this argument because his "creator" is admittedly imperfect. He is correct in saying that the entities of the world co-operate in the attainment of the ultimate end of the world. As a matter of fact, it is exactly in attaining its own end that a world entity co-operates in attaining the end of the world. Finally just as the fact of becoming or change in the world demands that there be an unchanged entity as the principle of it, so also the fact of finality proves the existence of the principle of finality, an Intelligent Being who directs the things of the world in the adaptation of means to their ends. Mr. Whitehead cannot accept this conclusion in its entirety because he fails to make the Principle of Concretion a true creator, who is unmoved and unchanged, uncaused, simple, perfect, and who directs all things to their proper end; who is Subsistent Being. Because the Principle of Concretion is none of these, world entities can attain ends contrary to the general plan as outlined in the primordial nature of God. He is a "persuader" rather than creator of the universe, or ruler of the world. "He does not create the world, He saves it: or more accurately, He is the Poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by His vision of truth and goodness."<sup>140</sup>

The image under which the operative growth of God's nature is best conceived is that of a tender care that nothing be lost.... The Consequent Nature of God is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 490.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

This is the fundamental weakness of the philosophy of organicism. If God is not the true creator, there is no necessity that He should be the ultimate end of things. An article which is not made entirely by a given man does not necessarily form a part of his possessions. Much less is it ordered uniquely to him and his good. For the same reason any order in the world is purely accidental. Disorder must be expected in the world since the world itself escapes divine causality. It has been known for centuries that there can be no order without a principle of order. Two elements are required, an ordered distinction, and the communication of the distinct entities in the whole.<sup>142</sup> As it has been summarized: "Order requires unity among diversities."<sup>148</sup> Hence one must consider that whatever order may be found in nature, it is due ultimately to the relation of creature to creator. The fact that the world entities are ordered *ad invicem* in the wonderful way that we see is only an indication that there is some real relation, not only of the things among themselves, but of all created entities to their principle. The relation is twofold: first, in that the creatures are caused by God and depend upon Him as the principle of becoming and being; secondly, in that these creatures return to God as their end.<sup>144</sup> The two aspects of the relation are correlative. If the creature owes its entire becoming to the creator, the creator must be the ultimate end of the creature. If one rejects the solid foundation of creationism, he casts aside the only solid basis for making God the ultimate end of things. If things then attain to God as their end, it is purely by accident.

Evidently Mr. Whitehead realizes this truth. For this reason, probably, he makes his Harmonizer of the Universe the poet leading creation by his vision, "persuading" the world into the

...St. Thomas, *In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 12 (Ed. Marietti), n. 2687.

ua Cf. Comte Amedee de Silva Tarouca, L'essentiel du tout ordre est l'unite des relations au principe commun. . . . L'ordre est donc un devenir "pour" la fin de l'ordre, "à cause" du principe d'unite, "afin" de realiser cette unite. From his article, "L'idee d'ordre dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas," *Revue Neo-Scholastique de Philosophie*, XL (1987), 859.

"*Summa Theologica*, ill, q. 6, a. I, ad I; *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, 19.

unity of his prehension" Seemingly God is given the function which is more properly allotted to man. Man brings the physical world, aU its multiplicity and diversity, into the intentional unity of his knowledge. The unity of prehension is then a unity of experience" We could say "unity of knowledge " because, for Mr. Whitehead, there is no difference between the two. Certainly the unity effected in knowledge and experience is one form of unifying the world" One must distinguish dearly, however" There is a *real order* in the universe, consisting in the relation of things *ad invicem*" *This order exists reality, independent of all prehensive or perceptive knowledge* (except that of God which causes both the entities and their order) . Secondly, there is also a real relation of aU the entities *ad unum*, which is their first cause and last end. Mr. Whitehead tries to separate the two, whereas they are really inseparable. Things are ordered among themselves because they are ordered by and to the creator. Mr" Whiteheadsees the effect, although he does not recognize the cause. He realizes that the things of the world are adapted to attain their ends; that is, that there is order in the world. Hence affirms the principle of final causality. Yet, the final causality which he describes is not complete" He does not go to the bottom of the question. It is true that every existing thing has an end" The reason for this fact is found in the more complete expression: "Every agent acts for an end"" That which exists has an end because the agent which gives it existence acts for an end, which is to be attained as the true final cause of that entity. **If** God exists, and has created, it is then metaphysically necessary that all His creatures have Him as their ultimate end. **If** God is not truly God, and not a true creator, it is purely accidental that the world comes to Him. And any order in the world is also due to chance. As Garrigou-Lagrange points out, "Chance is merely the absence of an explanation for things, of a *raison d'etre* of intelligibility!" Consequently it is absurd to try to explain the order of things by chance"

In a word, we may judge the fact of the order of nature ac-



ording to the principles of natural empirical science. We are not considering that aspect of the philosophy of organism. Concerning the causal *explanation* of that order, Mr. Whitehead gives us a doctrine which is by no means satisfactory. The order *ad invicem* which he admits requires an order of real relation *ad unum* which he does not accept in its entirety. Therefore, his explanation must be rejected.

#### 8. The Universe as Prehensively One in the Consequent Nature of God

The order of nature is, then, imperfect, since disorder is found within it. It is an order of multiplicity in which the multiple remains multiple, in spite of a certain amount of unification. A more complete unity is found in the universe as it is prehensively united in the consequent nature of God.

The unity of each individual entity is a unity of "satisfaction." This "satisfaction" is the last step in the process of concrescence or "prehension." Thus, "The notion of 'order' is bound up with the notion of an actual entity as involving an attainment of something individual to the entity in question."<sup>145</sup> In describing the Ontological Principle, Mr. Whitehead writes that it (the Ontological Principle) "constitutes a first step in the description of the universe as a solidarity of many actual entities. Each actual entity is conceived as 'feeling' the many data so as to absorb them into the unity of one individual 'satisfaction.'" <sup>146</sup>

This process then continues. Not only does each actual entity prehend the whole universe and so unite the world in a system of positive and negative prehensions; but the consequent nature of God is also constituted by His prehension of the entire universe. In the highest sense, therefore, the unity of the universe is attained in His prehension of it. The multiplicity which is the universe passes into the unity of the consequent nature of God, and is reduced to the unity of His primordial aim.<sup>147</sup>

<sup>145</sup> *"Process and Reality*, p. 116.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 494: At the same time it is asserted that the unity of God becomes

The element of purpose in the universe is the aim of God in relation to the universe as a whole.

He, in his primordial nature, is unmoved by love for this particular or that particular . . . His aim for it (an immediate occasion) is depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step toward the fulfillment of his own being. His tenderness is directed toward each actual occasion as it arises.<sup>148</sup>

The universe is aimed at God, but only *in a general way*. The particular entities of the world enjoy a certain measure of freedom in their concrescence.

God's unity of conceptual operation is a free creative act, untrammelled by reference to any particular course of things. It is deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what in fact comes to pass. The particularities of the actual world presuppose it; while it merely presupposes the general metaphysical character of the creative advance, of which it is the primordial exemplification.<sup>149</sup>

The element of individual freedom in the entities within a general, loosely-ordered orientation toward God has been emphasized so frequently that there is no need to repeat it here. Nevertheless it is a fundamental point, and a fundamental weakness, of the philosophy of organism, and it must be kept in mind even when it is said that the unity to be attained by the world is a unity of prehension in God. What is prehended into that unity of God's consequent nature is really multiple, physically multiple. Each actual entity of the world seeks its own end freely, and attains its own individual satisfaction. Thus it attains its own internal end. An external end is superimposed, as it were, by God upon the constituted entity. Because of the "overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonization" he can patiently bring about unity in his prehension of the

multiple because of His absorption of the many entities of the world into Himself. One may explain this paradox by remarking that God is multiple because He is composed of a multiplicity of entities. He is one because that multiplicity is one in Him. Mr. Whitehead does not give this answer.

<sup>148</sup> *Process and Reality*, p. 147.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 487.

world. The whole scheme suggests the Bergsonian conception, of finality in the process of evolution—a progressively defined aim.<sup>150</sup>

Mr. Whitehead has attempted to "rationalize" Bergson's philosophy but the Bergsonian denial of true finality has such great force that the "rationalizer" could not bring himself to admit complete finality. Ultimately, therefore, he falls into the same error as the philosopher whose system he attempts to rationalize.

Finally, the unification by prehension is analogous to that brought about by cognition in Thomistic philosophy. The term "prehend" is admittedly analogous with the expression "to know." It is, however, merely analogous. "Perception" is construed as meaning "taking account of" the essential character of the thing perceived. (This is *not* the perception of the essence of the thing perceived.) The "sense" of Francis Bacon's *Natural History* becomes cognition for Mr. Whitehead. ("It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no *sense*, yet they have perception.") It is emphasized: "We certainly do take account of things of which at the time we have no explicit cognition. We can have a cognitive memory of the taking account without having had a contemporaneous cognition."<sup>151</sup>

Mr. Whitehead takes great pains to avoid the position that prehension means *cognitive* perception or *cognitive* apprehension. "I will use the word prehension for uncognitive apprehension; by this I mean apprehension which may or may not be cognitive."<sup>152</sup> He emphasizes that prehension which is like

<sup>150</sup> Cf. "Le chemin a été créé au fur et à mesure de l'acte qui le parcourait . . . . Jamais l'interprétation finaliste, telle que nous la proposerons, ne devra être prise pour une anticipation sur l'avenir. C'est une certaine vision du passé à la lumière du présent. . . . La théorie des causes finales ne va pas assez loin quand elle se hâte à mettre de l'intelligence dans la nature, et elle va trop loin quand elle suppose une préexistence de l'avenir dans le présent sous forme d'idée . . . . L'avenir n'était donc pas continu dans le présent sous forme de fin représentée." Bergson, *L'Evolution Créatrice* (Paris: 1912), pp. 55-56.

<sup>151</sup> *Science and the Modern World*, p. 101.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

apprehension and perception (in the sense of "taking account of") is not necessarily either conscious or cognitive. There is no essential distinction between prehension and intellectual cognition. The latter is merely a species of the former genus. In his note to Chapter IV of *Science and the Modern World*, he quotes from Descartes' *Reply to Objections- against the Meditations*:

Hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky but objectively, i.e., in the way in which objects are wont to exist in the mind; and this mode of being is truly much less perfect than that in which things exist outside the mind, but it is not on that account mere nothing, as I have already said.

Mr. Whitehead continues,

I find difficulty in reconciling this theory of ideas (with which I agree) with other parts of the Cartesian philosophy.<sup>153</sup>

According to this statement one is justified in concluding that just as the object is in the mind of the knower, so also the object prehended is in the prehending subject. Only, in the process of prehension the object-the data-really becomes the subject. Logically, therefore, Mr. Whitehead should conclude that the object becomes one with the knowing subject. The object is in the mind of the knower, not "formally" but "objectively."<sup>154</sup>

ua *Ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>151</sup> The reader may object that we are here reading into Whitehead's words the idea of substance, the subject whose knowledge is an accident, while Mr. Whitehead's doctrine specifically denies substance. In reply, it must be stated that Mr. Whitehead himself makes the subject the substance. In spite of his formal denial of the doctrine, he necessarily admits it in practice. This is clear in his example of a feeling (positive prehension): "As a simple example of a feeling, consider the audition of sound. In order to avoid unnecessary complexity, let the sound be one definite note. The audition of this note is a feeling. This feeling has first an auditor, who is the subject of the feeling. But the auditor would not be the auditor that he is apart from this feeling of his." (*Process and Reality*, p. 330). As may be seen, the idea of a substance pre-existing, and subject of the feeling, is implicitly admitted. The feeling modifies the subject so that he is the auditor that he is because of his feeling. Certainly it cannot be asserted that this is opposed to the doctrine of substance. The feeling subject is certainly modified by his feeling. It

The theory of prehension should be considered also in the light of the "monadology" of Mr. Whitehead. "This theory of monads differs from that of Leibnitz in that his (Leibnitz') monads change. In the organic philosophy they merely become. Each monadic creature is a mode of the process of feeling, in every way determinate."<sup>155</sup> This statement applies especially to the unity of the universe which is due to the fact that the whole universe is prehended in the unity of each actual entity. There are far more negative than positive prehensions in the constitution of the lower entities. As they grow in complexity and ascend in the scale of things, there are fewer negative and more positive prehensions in them. One may, therefore, conclude that in God the universe is positively prehended, with a minimum of negative prehensions. The knowledge of God (Whitehead calls it his "judgment") includes the whole world. All is included in his "judgment." The whole world must be "objectively" in God. The multiplicity of the consequent nature of God is due to the fact that the monadic entities are united in Him. This is the unity which is to be found in His prehension of the universe. The actual entities are "formally" individual, atomic and monadic. They are "objectively" one in God.

The explanation of this "objective presence" of the object in the prehending subject is the main task of the philosophy of organism.<sup>156</sup> All that we have seen leads up to this "objectification" of the world in God. It is the *perceptive* constitution of the actual entity which presents the problem.

How can the actual entities, each with its formal existence, also enter objectively into the perspective actual entity in question? This is the problem of the solidarity of the universe. The classical doctrine of universals and particulars, of subject and predicate, of individual substances not present in other individual substances, of the externality of relations, alike render the problem incapable

is an accidental modification, but the subject feeling is not quite the same as the same subject not-feeling.

<sup>105</sup> *Process and Reality*, p. 111.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, J., 69.

of solution. The answer given by the organic philosophy is the doctrine of prehension, involved in concrescent integrations, and terminating in a definite complexity of feeling. To be actual must mean that aU actual things are alike objects enjoying objective immortality in fashioning creative actions: and that aU actual things are subjects, each prehending the universe from which it arises. The creative action is the universe always becoming one in a particular unity of self-experience, and thereby adding to the multiplicity which is the universe as many. The insistent concrescence into unity is the outcome of the self-identity of each entity. No entity-be it "universal" or "particular "-can play disjointed roles. Self-identity requires that every entity have one, conjoined self-consistent function, whatever be the complexity of that function. <sup>157</sup>

There is, therefore, a unity or togetherness of things in experience. The whole theory is a theory of unification by concrescence or prehensive experience, a process which is carried on by all actual entities, living and non-living, intellectual and non-intellectual. Hence, Mr, Whitehead can give us his "reformed subjectivist principle" which denies that togetherness can have any other meaning than its "experiential togetherness." This "experiential togetherness" of things considered "formally" makes knowledge possible-even God's knowledge. The very possibility of knowledge should not be an accident of God's goodness; it should depend on the interwoven natures of things. After aU, God's knowledge has equally to be explained.<sup>158</sup>

As a result of this doctrine, Mr. Whitehead must find a togetherness or solidarity of the universe. In spite of his denial of a real unity or complete order of nature, he must find some kind of unity. He turns for this purpose to the "extensive continuum" which is "that general relational element in experience, whereby the actual entities experienced, and that unit of experience itself, are united into the solidarity of one common world." <sup>159</sup> The world as a "continuum" is the world as a potential. The physical world is incurably atomic. Hence,

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

the actual entities atomize the extensive continuum, and thereby make real what was antecedently merely potential. The atomization of the extensive continuum is also its temporalization, that is to say, it is the process of the becoming of actuality into what is in itself merely potential,<sup>160</sup>

This unity of the universe which is due to the extensive continuum, or extensive relations of things, the primary relationships of physical occasions, might be thought to exist independently of the consequent nature of God. In this connection it is necessary to recall the general doctrine of organic philosophy. The process *is* the entity, and the actual entity *is* its process. The actuality of the universe is brought about by a process of experience or prehension. The entity which is formed by the process of experiencing the universe of God, in His consequent nature. So God experiences the universe, but God prehending the universe is the universe as prehended, just as any other actual entity is the prehension of its data. In that way the world creates God!

Yet there is an antithesis. God creates the world. The planation of this may be found again in the "extensive scheme," which

is nothing else than the generic morphology of the internal relations which bind the actual occasions into a nexus, and which bind the prehensions of any one actual occasion into a unity, coordinately divisible. These extensive relations do not make determinate *what* is transmitted, but they do determine conditions to which all transmission must conform. They represent the systematic scheme which is involved in the real potentiality from which every actual occasion arises. This scheme is also involved in the attained fact which every actual occasion is.<sup>161</sup>

The most important question arises in connection with the "real potentiality" from which every actual occasion arises. Ultimately these occasions arise from the concrescence of eternal objects, each of which has an individual and a relational essence. The individual essence is merely the essence con-

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.* p. 408.

sidered in its uniqueness; it is the particular individuality of an object, and cannot be described otherwise than as being itself. The relational essence determines how it is possible for the object to have ingression into actual occasions.<sup>162</sup> Finally, "the general relationships of eternal objects to each other . . . are the relationships in God's conceptual valuation. Apart from this realization there is mere isolation indistinguishable from non-entity."<sup>163</sup> In this way, the extensive scheme which conditions transmission depends on God's primordial nature. The ordering of eternal objects depends on God. The subjective aim of each entity is only partially determined and derived from God, as we have seen previously. In this sense God is the creator of the universe.

The antithesis is thus explained! The world comes from God and is progressing toward God, and in the process the world creates God. This must be the character of the unity of the universe. It is a unity of prehension, but that prehension creates God. So is the world one with God and in God.

The concrescence of the world into God, like the concrescence of data into any other actual entity, is a unification without an efficient principle. The primordial nature of God, as was seen above, is a very imperfect and partial efficient cause. In his consequent nature God is only prehending the created universe. He is not responsible for the being of the world. The doctrine that God is the end of the universe-as far as a dynamic creation according to organic philosophy, with its constant flux in two directions, can have an end-is unfounded. That "end" is a progressively defined aim. Whitehead has advanced little beyond the "finality" of Bergson, which is not true finality.

Since the process of unification is the same for all entities, God included, the world is no more necessarily destined to unity in the knowledge of God than in the experience of other actual entities. The knowledge of God is more perfect, in that there are more positive and fewer negative prehensions in its con-

<sup>162</sup> *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 229-230.

<sup>163</sup> *Process and Reality*, p. 368.



stitution. For that reason the unity of the universe is greater in the divine prehension than in that of other actual entities. Nevertheless the fundamental error of the system remains. God is not the First Cause, Himself uncaused, of the world, therefore He is not necessarily its last end. Only by accident does the world attain to unity in His knowledge. Even in that purely accidental unity one cannot find an efficient principle.

On the other hand, if God is the true First Cause of all that is, having no pre-existing material cause from which He may produce the world, and if God is Subsistent Being, there is no other possible end of creation than Himself. With such a foundation, one can prove that it is metaphysically necessary that the world be ordained to unity in Him.

The method of attaining that unity remains to be seen. The theory of prehension may be accepted if it be limited to true perception or knowledge. Whitehead admits a hierarchy of entities in which the inferior is contained within the superior entities. This is true in the hierarchy of being, in that the higher contains within itself the *perfections* of inferior entities; as, for example, the sentient animal possesses all the perfections of vegetative life. An intellectual being has all the perfections of the lower non-living, vegetative, and sentient orders.

In knowledge, however, there is a greater unification of the thing known and the knowing subject. Mr. Whitehead says that the object known is not "formally" but "objectively" in the knower. If knowledge is to be possible the object must be united to the subject. Otherwise the two remain radically separated, so that we cannot know things, as they are in themselves, by our own activity. Knowledge is simply limited to the appearances of things; or it may be a pure creation of the mind, with no true connection with reality, if there is any reality outside the mind. If there is any agreement between things as they are and as we know them, it is due to some pre-established harmony. Our certainty is due to a confidence in the veracity of God, who would not permit us to be deceived.

Mr. Whitehead wishes to avoid the Cartesian and Kantian

theories of knowledge. His doctrine of "objectification" is supposed to be the means of avoiding them. Still, he goes too far. In order that the object should be in the subject it is by no means necessary that it should be present *physically* in the subject. It is only necessary to be present intentionally, *secundum modum cognoscentis*. In the purely sense knowledge of an animal, the object is present, but the representation or form of that object is purely material. When known by an intellectual being, composed of matter and spirit, though united in one being, it is possible that that material perception can be spiritualized, because the knowing subject is both material and spiritual. The material is thus spiritualized in the act of intellectual cognition, by which the subject becomes one with the thing known. Although the object is intentionally present to the subject, it is not perfectly identical with the subject, nor is it radically separated from the subject. There is a real but imperfect identity of the two.<sup>164</sup> The divided world is thus united. The fact of the existence of material and spiritual entities is not denied. The problem of how the one can act on the other is settled. The problem of how the material world can return to the Pure Spirit, who is God, is answered. Man is the bridge. The world is made for him, that he may lead it to God. He reduces the universe to unity by knowing it and making it a part of himself. As the highest type of entity, he already possesses all the perfections of the lower orders of creation. He is a living creature composed of body and soul, material and spiritual elements. Matter and spirit are united in his one being. By his material faculties he is in contact with the world of matter. By his spiritual faculties of intellect and will he is in contact with the world of spirit. Since he is only one being, passage from matter to spirit can be effected. The act of knowledge is not unlike *cognitive* prehension. It is understood that we cannot follow Mr. Whitehead in giving the power of cognitive knowledge to non-living entities. Moreover, he is mistaken in

<sup>16</sup>. Cf. Hayen, "Intentionalite de l'etre et Metaphysique de la Participation," *Revue Neo-Scholastique*, XLII (1939), 385-410.

maintaining that there is no essential distinction among magnetic attraction, sense perception, and intellectual knowledge. There is a bifurcation in nature. Matter and spirit are stubborn facts. The simple denial of this condition of the created world is useless. Employing the very theory of prehension and reducing it to reasonable limits, we arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the unity of the universe. Mr. Whitehead gives to God the task of uniting all the entities of the world in His consequent nature. This is impossible. The fact is that the unification is brought about through the mediation of one creature, composed of matter and spirit, uniting both elements in the unity of his one being. The world comes from God and must return to God. It is made to be known by man. Through him the material world is spiritualized, and by the exercise of his spiritual faculties, the intellect and will, he can offer all that he is, and all that he knows, to the Creator. Here is the true unity of the universe toward which Mr. Whitehead has taken several hesitating steps in his theory of prehensive unification.

## CONCLUSION

### UNITY OF FINALITY IN THE UNIVERSE

As a man looks back upon the past years of his life he is often surprised by the great unity which he observes therein. He sees and marvels that events and actions which at the moment seemed absolutely opposed to any unification or general purpose have really been keystones in the harmonious building of his days. He marvels all the more because that coherence of events is so little due to his own planning. Things which he tried most resolutely to avoid have actually been most essential to the general scheme. The occurrences which caused him the greatest sorrow and pain were quite necessary to his present good and joy. He may very properly wonder at the manner in which the many events have united to form one integral whole. For he sees that while he himself may have had a definite plan, another unifying element has also been at work, interweaving

the seemingly extraneous and contradictory facts into one complete unity. He has used his limited intelligence while another intelligence seems to have ordered the thing as a whole.

Much more must a man wonder at the harmony of the universe. From the time of Plato and Aristotle the question asked has not been, "Is there unity in the universe?" but "Whence does it come?" Unity or oneness has been defined as undivided being. Hence the elements of being and absence of division are essential. That there is being in the world goes without saying. All that is, is being. That there is an absence of division is also clear. The universe is one continuum. **It** is one in composition. Dynamic unity is so evident that scientists posit the principle of the conservation of energy. Some monists even consider the universe as one being, and even one "animal," i.e., one animate being. There is unity of action inasmuch as the activity of each body seems to be transmitted to the limits of the whole world. This is one of Professor Whitehead's fundamental principles. Lastly, there is unity of finality inasmuch as the whole universe comes from one and tends toward one. **It** is with this last element that this paper is concerned. Professor Whitehead definitely holds final causation but his final causation is not quite our finality/ <sup>65</sup>

The fact of unity must be admitted. There is certainly an order in the universe, for we see how all the individual elements generally attain an e.q.d. Although not all seem to attain their own proper end, even in such a failure they aid other elements to attain their end. Each individual thing, each "event," is a composite; and the universe is a composite of these constitutive parts. The most striking fact, proving the unity of the whole, is that each individual seeks not merely its own good but that of the whole universe. For example, if one were to put aside the universal ordering, it could hardly be considered a good for the animal to be eaten by man. Continued existence and further perfection of that state would seem to be the good of any living thing. But when one considers the complex of nature he sees as a constituent part carnivorous animals for whose growth,

••• *Function of Reason*, p. 9; *Process and Reality*, p. 118.

development, and functioning other animals are necessary as food. The animal which is destroyed really fulfills its purpose, attains its end, in that very destruction. An animal exists for its species, while the species exist for the universe. Thus, in preserving and continuing its species the animal realizes its end. Dissolution and decay are not necessarily retrogressive steps in the order of nature, but steps in the perfection of it. The lower is subordinate to the higher. In their destruction, the lower things of the world often lose their own proper existence in order to enter into a higher life. The hierarchy in the order of nature is so clear, and it is so evident that man is the highest member of that hierarchy, that many philosophers have declared man to be the king of the universe. Some have done this to the exclusion of every theocentric aspect of the universe, making it exclusively anthropocentric. Certainly man is to be placed at the top of the world hierarchy. But *why* does he hold that exalted position? Why, for example, does the sunlight serve him, while he is not bound to worship the sun?

In order to understand the reason for this ordering one must go back to the fundamental question of creation. To consider the one to which the world tends and to neglect the one from which it proceeds, would leave the problem unsolved. Certainly Professor Whitehead's idea of creation is not in conformity with the true doctrine. The latter system is founded on the evidence that the present universe is an effect, and no effect can come into being unless it is produced by a cause which is prior to it in nature. This may be what Professor Whitehead terms the "Semitic theory of a wholly transcendent God creating out of nothing an accidental universe,"<sup>106</sup> but it is the only reasonable and satisfactory explanation. To create means to produce from absolutely nothing. It is the production of being from non-being. To place God as only one element among several component elements in creation is absurd. God *is*, and outside Him there can *be* no other. He possesses the fullness of being. Hence there can be no other being which He can use as a pre-existing material or with which He can co-operate in creation.

<sup>106</sup> *Process and Reality*, pp. IS11-S.

He alone produces the totality of the effect. **If** He does not do so, either there is no creation or He is no true God. He is the First Cause and is Himself uncaused. He is the sufficient reason of His own existence. He is the totality of Being of whom aU other being is only a participation. It is by no means necessary to deny an evolution of the world because one holds to the fact of creation. One is not required to maintain that at the moment of creation the world appeared in its present form. Nor does one defend the statement that the world was created in six days of twenty-four hours each. One must maintain that there was this production of being from non-being. The one essential is that no matter how or when the world reached its present state, it was created from ab.solutely nothing. The First Cause of all is God. H there is one effect in the world there is a First Cause communicating being to that effect. **If** any potency is actualized, there must be a Pure Act which is the moving force of that actuation. **If** there is one contingent being in the world, it follows that there is a Necessary Being through whom that contingent being is. In other words, the world began to exist and it began in virtue of the creative act of God, communicating to it *being*.

Causality is essentially the production of existing being. A cause is the positive principle from which a thing really proceeds according to a dependence in being. The more perfect the effect, the more perfectly does it participate the being of its cause. Moreover, the nearer it approaches to its cause in its development the more perfectly does it participate the being of that cause. Hence, if an effect is to tend to perfection it must tend to unity by assimilation to its cause. Creation is a form of efficient causality and, in creating, the First Cause communicates being to the world. **It** mu,st also be remembered that an efficient cause can only act in virtue of an end which is known and wined. Otherwise it would ever remain undetermined to the production of this or that effect. The First Cause is necessarily perfect; it must contain aU being in itself. Moreover no agent can act except to attain a good. But good is being. Hence the First Cause cannot seek anything outside Itself but :rather the

end to be obtained in the act of creation can only be Itself, its Own Being, under the aspect of Good. Naturally this is the ultimate end, first in the order of intention and last in the order of execution.

As a matter of fact, we know that a of beings has been created in the universe. Can the Creator have produced this multitude merely for the sake of multiplicity? The answer must be in the negative. He who is perfect Being is perfectly one, for one and being are convertible. Unity must therefore will oneness primarily, and cannot will multiplicity for its own sake. Thus in the act of creation the Creator primarily wills the entire universe and its perfection. The component parts are willed only secondarily. Their perfection is to lead to the perfection of the whole.

It is well known that the good is the object of the will and that, therefore, the ultimate end of the divine will must be perfect Good. Since God is His Goodness, it also follows that the ultimate end of creation can only be Himself, perfect, subsistent Being. Subsistent Being is, therefore, the end; first in intention although last in execution. Hence it is easy to understand that in communicating being to creatures, the Creator wills that they should attain their perfection by union with His own perfect Being. This is the aim of the universe-assimilation with Subsistent Being.

In fact, within the multiplicity of the created universe there is a hierarchy of being. In the first and lowest place there is inanimate being, the chemical elements, air, water, rocks, which possess mere existence without any form of life. Above them are the plants with vegetative life, capable of immanent activity. In the next grade is sentient life or the being of animals. Finally there is man, endowed with an intellect and a will which place him immeasurably above the lower creatures. These inferior creatures necessarily tend toward their end. Even the higher animals act because of instinct, conscious of what they are doing but not knowing the purpose of their action. Man alone in creation knows what he is doing and he alone can will the attainment of an end. Within this hierarchy

there is an order of subordination from inferior to superior. According to this hierarchy, each attains to its own end and in so doing tends toward the perfection of the higher members and so to the perfection of the whole universe.

As was seen above the only ultimate end of created things is a return to the Creator, for the perfection of an effect is to return to its cause. The more nearly it approaches to the Being which it is a participation, the more perfect does it become. Whatever proper end the individual creature may attain, it must always be in subordination to the end of the whole universe, the Subsistent Being, God. The question at issue is: How can the universe attain this end? It is clear that each part of the created world has its own proximate end, and that in general that end is attained. Each being attains its own end by its own activity. At the lower orders the lower entities serve the higher. The plant is not merely vegetative. The lower entities possess the perfections of their inferiors. The plant also possesses the perfections of non-living beings composed of and material elements, is endowed with the perfections of the lower orders of nature. He makes use of those inferiors in his own proper ends. In his nature, he is a microcosm, with all the perfections of the world. yet he is not merely a microcosm; he is also a metacosm. By his spiritual nature he stands outside the world. He is a person, with all the independence which his nature demands. The lower orders of creation the members of a species are simply created and as such, they are ordained to the good of the species. Man is not merely an individual. He is not only an individual existing for the species and for the universe: he is also a person, independent of both species and universe, with an end proper to himself. That end must be attained, at all costs. Over and above the perfections of the lower beings of creation, man is endowed with an intellect and a will. By his intellect he knows that his ultimate end is union with the Creator. By his voluntary faculty he wills that union, and so returns to Being. This is not, however, merely because man actually possesses all



the grades of within himself that he can fulfill the duty of returning nature to God. The object of his intellect is universal being, under the aspect of truth. By that faculty he can know all the universe. The material world, being known by him, is intentionally in the mind of man; the whole universe is really intentionally present in the spiritual faculty, the intellect. The knower becomes the thing known; the union thus arising is perfectly real, although there is not a physical identity of the two. This is the element of truth upon which the philosophy of organism is founded. It is expressed in the doctrine of prehensive unification. Unfortunately, Mr. Whitehead ascribes mentality and the power of prehensive unification to *all* the entities of the world. This is an exaggeration. Mentality cannot be characteristic of *all* created things. True intellectual cognition is the operation of a spiritual faculty, and cannot be found in purely material entities. The material things lose their materiality and are spiritualized by man's knowledge of them. Yet man's intellect seeks all truth; he knows that he can find his ultimate end in none of the created things of the universe, nor in the universe as a whole which he spiritualizes by his knowledge. All these things are for him. He is not for them. He must look higher for his end and he finds the object of his search in Truth itself, Subsistent Being, the All-Good Creator. Every created thing which he knows, is only an image of the Deity. Therefore, being reasonable, man is not satisfied with the image. He seeks rather the reality behind the image, Subsistent Being. His intellect presents that Being to the will under the aspect of Good. Then, by the act of this other spiritual faculty, man turns to God the AU-Good, offering all that he is by his nature and through his intellectual knowledge to the Giver of all.

Thus the cosmos returns to its Creator through the intellect and will of the highest creature. The effect is perfected by return to its cause. This is the duty of man in the universe. There is a subordination of things, and an order among themselves, in order that all lower nature may be subject to man. The whole well-ordered creation is subject to him as its king

in order that, through his intellect and will, it may attain to its ultimate end. For this reason the earth yields up its richest treasures for the use of man. Therefore do the plants and animals serve him in the myriad ways of nature. Therefore do the mountains raise their rugged peaks skyward in his sight. Therefore do the waves, in his hearing, lash in majestic fury the rocky barriers of the sea. They are to be known by man and so raised to the higher spiritual level of his knowledge. Therein they take on a new existence. The universe loses its material character as man by his knowledge spiritualizes it. Then, by man's voluntary act, God is recognized and all creation is offered to its creator in grateful and loving union.

Thus the creative act of God is rendered perfect by return to Him. Man was made, for this purpose, a constituent part of the world. The continual return to Being must go on as long as man is man and as long as the world remains. Philosophers can certainly come to the conclusion that the universe attains its ultimate end through the intellect and will of man rendering to Being all the beings of the world. Herein lies the explanation of the unity of finality, the order of things in the world. The order of aesthetic development of nature is not an end in itself but it is directed to the one ultimate end of all, union with Being. If one is mistaken in the matter of creation he cannot understand its ultimate end. As Professor Whitehead himself says, "The sheer statement of what things are may contain elements explanatory of why things are."<sup>167</sup> Hence, it is not to be wondered at if one makes a mistake concerning the end of the world when he is mistaken concerning its cause. Mr. Whitehead is to be admired because he has dared to re-introduce finality into the world. It only remains for him to realize that finality must be found in the very beginning in intention, as well as in the end in execution. His philosophy will then be complete in that respect.

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# THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

## PART V

### THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE: CITIZENSHIP AND SUFFRAGE

**W**E have proved that Constitutional government is absolutely more just than a Royal regime. In the motion of human affairs, the step from Royal, or even from Royal *and* Political, government to the purely Constitutional commonwealth is a step of progress; and once these advances have been made, every tendency in the opposite direction indicates the corruptive force of injustice at work. The struggle in which the world is convulsed today draws its light from this truth which, again and again in twenty-five hundred years of European history, has made battlefields and bloody revolutions more than empty conflicts between opposing might.

The leaders who united the Greek city-states in their defense against the Persian aggressor could identify their cause with that of liberty and justice, for their fellow countrymen were fully conscious of the advantages which Constitutional government had over despotic absolutism. The victories at Thermopylae and Salamis were not empty even though twenty-five hundred years later the same fundamental issue had to be refought in the same mountain passes, on the same plains by the sea, and in the same waters; nor do we believe they were in vain because the recent battle of Thermopylae was a defeat at arms. In the twenty-five hundred years between the Persian and the present war, the fight for Constitutional government has been lost as often as it has been won, but each time that it has been lost, the efforts which men will always make for liberty and justice have brought about a rebirth of constitutionalism, and in each new incarnation the principle of con-

stitutionality has been better understood and embodied with greater practical wisdom-hence more firmly established and more surely protected against dissolution from within, if not from external assault.

It is necessary only to mention the names of Demosthenes and of Cicero to remember that the Greeks succumbed to the Macedonian despots after vanquishing the Persian kings, and that the Romans expelled the Tarquins only to surrender their liberties to the Caesars. But we must also remember that, when human history is looked at in the large, the Roman Republic succeeded the Greek city-states and, by political institutions and legal provisions of great practical intelligence, embodied the principles of Constitutional government in a way that not only surpassed any other example of this form in the ancient world, but set a model to guide the constructive efforts which followed all of the modern revolutions against despotism. Nor should we forget that the *regimen regale et politicum* in the middle ages-though absolutely inferior to the Roman Republic-was another rebirth of constitutionalism *after* the absolute dominion of the Caesars and *in* the transitional centuries when the social and economic arrangements of feudalism demanded a form of government peculiarly adapted to such conditions. As the imperfect embodiment of any form naturally tends toward its own fuller realization, predisposing the matter in which it is received for the perfection it anticipates, so the *regimen regale et politicum* prepared the way for the purely Constitutional governments that began to arise again in the eighteenth century. From the thirteenth century on, from Magna Carta and the revolt led by Simon, Earl of Montfort, to the Great Rebellion and the Bloodless Revolution in seventeenth-century England and the uprisings in America and France in the eighteenth century, whose meaning is set forth in Bills of Rights, Declarations of Independence, and written constitutions, history records a development of constitutionalism, albeit a development punctuated and made tortuous by the degeneracy of kings (and, in a later day, of the nobility also), seeking to extend Royal prerogatives into despotic power.

The Republics which grew up in England, in America, and on the Continent, even in the more backward countries, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were not conceived as new forms of government. Their authors were explicitly conscious of a return to Greek and especially Roman models, in some cases even acknowledging a debt to mediaeval precedents or principles. They realized that by its very nature the *regimen regale et politicum* made any attempt to return to absolute government a resurgence of despotism rather than an institution of Royal justice. And it should be noted that in such politically undeveloped countries as Prussia and Russia, revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth century established constitutional regimes only in the sense that kings and czars were forced to accept the limited power of constitutional monarchy. In these countries, the tide of political progress had not yet reached the level of Republican, or purely Constitutional, government, but the condition of the people demanded, at least, the imperfect constitutionality of a *regimen regale et politicum*. In no case, however, is the political achievement merely a return to ancient or mediaeval models. Whether they be perfect or imperfect embodiments of the principle of constitutionality, modern governments have given that principle more explicit definition in the understanding of men, and greater force in practical application, by the formulation of written constitutions and the provision for their amendment, by the invention of politically enforceable sanctions, and by the public debate of constitutional questions which has acquainted an ever-increasing number of people with the jurisprudence of constitutional law.

We have briefly recounted twenty-five centuries of history—the history of actual motions in political life, not of shifting winds of doctrine in political theory—in order to account for the struggle that is now going on in the world, and in order to grasp its double portent for the future.

Looked at in one way, the present war is simply the latest stage in the struggle of Constitutional government against despotism. It is certainly true that the military dictatorships

of Germany and Japan, and the fascist regime of Italy, are despotisms. The peoples of these countries are no longer in a condition which justifies Royal rule, and any absolute government must, therefore, be despotic. Again, though the inclusion of Russia and other countries such as Greece and China in the ranks of the United Nations complicates the picture and makes the political issue ambiguous, it is certainly true that England and its associated free dominions, and the United States, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway, champion the principle of constitutionality, which has been the hard-won prize of their political careers. And, on the side-lines, in such countries as France and Spain, in many ways as firmly rooted in mediaeval precedents as England, and as vigorously awakened by as many centuries of political debate, there is incipient civil war between republicans and the forces of fascism which cannot disguise the despotism that is involved in any abrogation of truly Constitutional government.

To view the war as a conflict between constitutionality and despotism in government is not to ignore the economic and territorial issues, the problems made by imperialism on the one side and by state-idolatry on the other, which complicate the political issue; for capitalistic imperialism detracts from the merit of one side in this conflict almost as much as false worship of the deified State increases the despotism of a Fuehrer or a Duce and their parties by making an absolute ruler the mouthpiece of an absolute state. The despotism of the kings who claimed absolute rule by Divine right was, if anything, weakened by the true religion in whose name they spoke, whereas the despotism of the present dictators is strengthened by the false religion which erects the State into a Moloch, before whose high priests the people lie prostrate. Nor are we forgetting that the totalitarian regimes have used their despotic powers tyrannically, enslaving their own peoples as well as those they have conquered; any more than we neglect the fact that a rampant individualism and a false liberalism in England and the United States have dissipated the vigor of Constitutional government as a means to the common good,

by romantically glorifying the anarchy of *laissez-faire*, by regarding limited government as only less of a necessary evil than absolute government, and by supposing that individual liberty is encroached upon by any degree of civil authority.

Despite all these qualifications, we still insist that the first and most important, though not the only, issue in the present war must be defined in terms of the opposition between Constitutional government and despotism. If the United Nations lose, juridical institutions and the blessings of liberty have less chance of surviving anywhere, and more chance, if they win, of extending their domain. At this awful moment, it would be rash to predict either event, but it is not blind hope to say where victory will ultimately rest. Out of twenty-five hundred years of history arises the confidence that the human spirit will not endure despotism, even when imposed by crushing might, and that man's love of liberty and devotion to justice will always revive Constitutional government as it always has in every earlier phase of the long struggle, no matter how complete be its annihilation by the temporary ascendancy of might divorced from right. To believe otherwise is to believe that merely human ingenuity can contrive enough force or guile to blot out right from the hearts of men. To believe this is to forget that right is not a human invention, but the natural law which God gave man when He armed him with reason. Despots can abolish constitutions, but not the natural law from which they spring, and so, unless one deny the Providence of God in human affairs, or minimize His power, one must believe that despotism is fighting a losing battle.

There is one other ground for confidence in the ultimate outcome. There is a new struggle in the world today, a new striving which reinforces the age-old effort to set up and preserve Constitutional government. Whatever may be the earlier anticipations in theory, the actual steps of constitutional amendment, whereby the Republican form of government has been gradually transmuted to Democracy, were first taken within the last hundred years. These changes have, of taken place and endured only in countries where Constitutional

government, in its Republican form, was already firmly established. Their development elsewhere depends upon the prior establishment of Constitutional government. In the countries which can claim to have achieved some slight measure of Democracy, the fuller fruition depends upon the preservation of a Constitutional regime. Apart from the principle of constitutionality in government, Democracy is impossible. But the reverse is not true, for *Constitutional government which is not Democratic is quite possible and has, in fact, been the best form of government that men have known and fought for in all but the last century of political history.*

This new struggle for Democracy is virtually contained in the defense of Constitutional government, but the two objectives must not be confused or identified. Both, it is true, draw their strength from the natural law; both can hope for God's help in their cause because both bear the divinely wrought emblems of justice and liberty upon their shields. But one promises a greater justice than the other, a justice which does not augment freedom in its intensity, but extends it as widely as the fellowship of man. From the point of view of the common man, the defense of Constitutional government now involves higher stakes than ever before, because now as never before the promise of Democracy, whether in its bare beginnings or in its progressive realization, means justice for all, not for some.

In those two words-" for all "-are contained the spirit, if not the precise definition, of the essential difference between the Republican and Democratic forms of Constitutional government. In every one of the great revolutions or struggles of the past, the advantage to be gained has been *for some* only. But the Democratic revolution which began little more than a century ago turned men's eyes toward the universal brotherhood of man as something having political, as well as spiritual and theological significance.

Though the present war masks for the moment the progress of that revolution, men of vision see that we are fighting not merely to be worthy of the best in our past, but to be guardi-



ans of a better future that is about to be born. We seek not merely to preserve a political heritage, but to bequeath one which will be the beginning of a new fortune in human affairs. We have reached a turning point in history-as epochal as that one in the remote past when men first fought for Constitutional government. Today we stand side by side with those men, and with all their successors, but though our hands are linked with theirs, our eyes are toward the future. <sup>554</sup>

After a century in which the idea of Democracy has taken hold of our imaginations, after a century in which the phrases needed to articulate it have formed upon our lips, after a century in which stumbling steps towards its realization followed a stammering declaration of its distinctive principle, we can at last dearly cut through all the jargon and all the limited perspectives of traditional political theory to say and see what Democracy is. The fact that the word "democracy" is as old as Constitutional government no longer blinds us to the fact that Democracy, properly conceived, is a new form of government, one which is as essentially different from the Republican form of Constitutional government as that is from the Royal regime.

Moreover it is a form of government which will not exist in fact until social and economic and even cultural changes that have not yet occurred, take place. Though he is the Vice-President of a government which operates under a written constitution that is *almost* Democratic, Mr. Henry Wallace speaks of the century of the common man-the Democratic century-as a thing of the future. <sup>555</sup> In its legal provisions, a Democratic

<sup>554</sup> "Man's social life," said Burke, "is a partnership in all Science; a partnership in all Art; a partnership in every virtue; and in all perfection. As the end of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but r"tween those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born" (*Reflections on the French*

••• "Some have spoken of the 'American century.' I say that the century on which we are entering-the century which will come of this war--can be and must be the century of the common man" (*The Price of Free World* New York, 1942, p. 19). Though the more obvious implication of Mr. Wallace's remark is that Democracy must begin for peoples the very terms in which he

constitution makes Democratic government possible, but for that possibility to be realized the form must fructify in a matter that is no longer intransigent. Though there have been in certain countries conditions predispositive to the reception of the Democratic form, in none have the conditions been unmixed with contrary or antagonistic factors. Hence it is true to say that, on its formal side, Democracy has shown its face to the world before it has been fully embodied in working institutions or in actual practice. We must distinguish, therefore, between formal or legal Democracy—a form of government which can be created by constitutional enactment—and concrete or real Democracy which will exist only when, social, economic and cultural impediments having been overcome, the spirit of the practice fulfills the letter of the law.

In this Part of our work, we shall deal only with the formal distinction between Republican and Democratic government in terms of the constitutional provisions which make the one only imperfectly just, and the other perfectly so. In Part VI to follow, we shall consider the factors upon which depend the

understands the Democratic fulfillment show that he is also thinking of what remains to be done in his own United States.

"This is essentially what Woodrow Wilson had in mind," writes Professor Edman, "when he pointed out, in his famous 'New Freedom,' that under the conditions of modern industrial society, men must be equipped socially to be free. . . . The relativity of freedom and its dependence upon social arrangements is illustrated historically. The Emancipation Proclamation and the end of the Civil War rendered Negroes free. It did not assimilate them, nor has it yet done so, to equal freedom politically and economically with the white population in the South—or, for that matter, in the North. The freeing of the serfs in Russia did not make the serfs economically emancipated. Workers not able to bargain collectively or to unite have the nominal liberty to quit their jobs, but they have not the economic freedom to do so. The rich and the poor are equal legally, but not economically or in a society where wealth is also prestige—morally and socially" *of Freedom*, New York, 1941: pp. 187-88).

In the light of such observations, Professor Edman quite properly concludes that "the conditions of democratic society have only begun to be established in education, industry, and international relations. The resources of the common man have only begun to be tapped. What funds of vitality and genius a relatively free and just society might promote outruns imagination bred in an unequal world. . . . The reason men feel the democratic world must survive is not that it is perfectly realized; it is scarcely realized at all" (*ibid.*, p. 19i).

concrete realization of the plenary justice of the Democratic constitution.

We shall begin here with a definition of the terms necessary for understanding the distinction between Republican and Democratic forms, and with a brief survey of relevant passages in political theory to show how recent has been the awareness of the elements of this distinction. We cannot insist too much upon the inadequacy of past political theory, as well as upon the imperfection of past political institutions. We are involved in the strange work of writing a political treatise which is concerned with a form of government that belongs to the future. **It** has so recently taken shape in the affairs and in the minds of men, that it is still but a shadow of what it will become. The Theory of Democracy will not be understood by anyone who persists in supposing that Democratic constitutions are older than yesterday or who fails to realize that the tomorrow in which Democracy will really exist may be a hundred or a thousand years off.

1. "The constitutional regime," said Aristotle, "is a government of free men and equals."<sup>556</sup> This statement does not imply that *all* men should be ruled as free men, or that *all* men should enjoy the equality of status that is involved in citizenship under Constitutional government. The essence of Constitutional government abstracts from the distinction between *some* men and *all*. **If** this were not so, the generic traits of Constitutional government could not be understood as common to its several species which are differentiated primarily by reference to this distinction.

But the distinction is far from being as simple as the two little words "some" and "all" might lead one to think. The Greek distinction between the oligarchical and the democratic constitution did not suppose that all men were free men, nor did it use the word "man" to signify the female human being as well as the male. The controversy between Greek oligarchs and democrats was not whether some or all members of the

••• *Politica*, I, 7, 1255b110.

total population should be admitted to citizenship, or should in some way be eligible for office. Both sides agreed that resident aliens could not be naturalized, that women need not be considered as qualified for political status, and that those who were in fact slaves-whether "by nature" or "by convention" (i.e., by conquest or purchase) -**did** not belong to the political community, any more than domestic animals or other chattels. The issue, therefore, concerned only a small part of the total population, probably less than one-sixth of its human beings. That issue, as we have already seen, was made by the question whether all of "the people" or only some of "the people" should be admitted to citizenship and office, both sides agreeing as to who "the people" were-those who were left when slaves, metics, women (and, of course, children) were excluded from the political community.<sup>557</sup>

The distinction with which we are here concerned-the essential difference between the Republican and Democratic forms of Constitutional government-must not be confused with the opposition between oligarchy and democracy as two types of constitution. The question now is whether all or only some human beings must be considered with regard to qualification for citizenship and public office; or, in other words, whether "the people" shall be co-extensive with "the population." The Republican answer may go further than the most extreme form of Greek democracy, for it may permit the naturalization of aliens, or it may deny that any man can be treated as property wholly or even in part, and yet it remains Republican if it keeps women in a condition of political inferiority, or if it allows inequality in wealth to determine inequality in political status. On the other hand, the Democratic answer does not hold that every person who is biologically classified as human should be a citizen, for it may exclude the criminal, the insane, and the feebleminded members of the

<sup>557</sup> Women, children, and most of the slaves belonged to the domestic community; but all the resident aliens (i. e. the metics) and some slaves were attached to the political community, not as members, but as foreign bodies existing in a living organism, or as tools in its hands.

total population; and it need not go as far as Greek democracy in regarding all citizens as so equally eligible for office that appointment to office can be determined by lot rather than by election.

By these criteria it is clear that all the Constitutional governments in the ancient world were Republican rather than Democratic, the Greek democracy as well as the polity and the oligarchy and, of course, the Roman Republic as well as the Greek city-states. But it is also clear that the Democratic constitution cannot be defined as one which gives "liberty and equality" to everyone in equal measure--certainly not in the egalitarian sense in which Greek democracy tried to give liberty and equality to all "the people," i. e., all the members of the political community.

The words "some" and "all" will not enable us to define the distinction between Republican and Democratic constitutions unless we ask the right questions and understand the terms of the answers precisely. In the first place, we must always keep separate the problem of qualification for citizenship and the problem of qualification for governmental office. Though the one may be included in the other (i. e., no one but a citizen being eligible for office), we shall show that a just constitution can never identify the two; for that necessarily results either in too high a standard for citizenship or in too low or indiscriminate a standard for public office. Inequality in *degree* of competence cannot justly be made the basis for excluding some men from citizenship, any more than *radical* equality (i. e., possession of the same competence in some degree) can justly be made the basis for opening all offices to all men. Hence we see that a proper consideration of equality in relation to the justice of a constitution must (1) observe the distinction between political status (citizenship) and political office (governmental function) and must (2) make equal status available to all who are radically equal and respect inequality in degree in providing for appointments to office.<sup>558</sup>

••• By this test, none of the Greek constitutions were free from injustice. Though better in certain respects than either oligarchy or democracy, the mixed constitution

Furthermore, the consideration of human equality should never be separated from the consideration of the inequalities among men. Undue or exclusive emphasis on one or the other was, according to Aristotle, the cause of injustice in oligarchies and democracies.<sup>us</sup>

or polity nevertheless retained some of the injustice peculiar to each. And all three were equally unjust, as we shall presently show, in their treatment of women, slaves, metics. It must be remembered, of course, that we are here speaking in terms of absolute justice. Whether or not the imperfect Republican constitution can ever be justified relative to inferior social and economic conditions is a question we shall postpone until Section 5 *infra*. We shall there consider it as we have previously considered the relative justification of the least perfect of all regimes--the absolute or non-constitutional (Royal) form of government. Vd. Part IV, Section 8, *supra*, in THE THOMIST, IV, 8, 505-20. Nor are we forgetting the qualification with which we concluded that discussion, taking account of the possibility that the conditions which could justify absolute government may never have existed, and so such government is always actually unjust. Vd. *loc. cit.*, pp. 520-22. For similar reasons all Republican constitutions may be actually unjust as well as absolutely imperfect.

As we shall see, there have been modern Republican constitutions which, while remaining imperfect, are more just absolutely than any known to the ancient world. They tend to approach the perfection of the Democratic constitution as an ideal limit--albeit a practicable ideal and an attainable limit. The fact that there is something like a continuum, made by variation in degrees of justice among all the varieties of Republican constitution, does not destroy the integral and essential character of the distinction between every Republican constitution--the best as well as the worst--and the Democratic constitution. Among political forms, as among natural species, the highest degree of the lower form tends to approximate the higher form in its lowest degree. We shall return to this point later.

•n Vd. *Politics*, III, 9, 1280<sup>a</sup>80. Though he himself does not apply it, Aristotle's point applies to every type of Republican constitution. Even constitutions which respect inequalities in the distribution of offices, and which grant to *some* who are equal equality of status, may refuse such equality of status to others whose equality deserves it. It is in this last respect that Aristotle's polity is as unjust as democracy, though it corrects the democratic injustice of awarding offices by lot. In this last respect, moreover, Greek democracy was obviously more just than Greek oligarchy, because the latter, setting up a property qualification for citizenship, excluded from such status the poor who were equal in competence, if not equal in possessions, with the rich.

It is unfortunately necessary to add that the state which Aristotle regarded as "ideal"--a thoroughly practicable ideal--was not as just in the constitution which Aristotle formulated for it, as either Greek democracy or the polity. Unlike the democratic or the mixed constitution, the "ideal" constitution, according to Aristotle, is one which excludes from citizenship all the laboring classes--husbandmen and traders, mechanics and sailors, etc. Vd. *Politics*, VII, 8, 9. The Aristo-

In the second place, the notions of liberty and equality, so frequently evoked in discussions of democracy or of Democracy, have no political significance apart from the theory of justice. Men are by nature equal and unequal in many different respects. They are also equal or unequal as a result of social or economic accidents, or by the acquisition or loss of qualities and possessions through their own voluntary efforts. All of these equalities and inequalities (natural, accidental, or voluntary) are antecedent to political equality and inequality. Only the latter are caused by the form of government under which men live. Democracy cannot be judged the best consti-

tian prejudice against working men as members of the political community is confirmed by his praise for the oligarchical features of the Spartan, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions in Book II, -Chapter 9-11. An attempt may be made to defend Aristotle against this criticism by saying that his "ideal" constitution was aristocratic, not oligarchical-that it excluded the working classes from citizenship because the life of labor was incompatible with the life of virtue. This defense, however, merely reveals the source of the Aristotelian error at this point, namely, a false conception of the life of virtue, a conception of human happiness which makes it attainable only by the few. We shall return to this point later in our criticism of Aristotle's views on slavery. Our criticism, it will be seen, applies equally to the standard which he sets for citizenship in his "ideal" constitution.

The principles of justice which Aristotle employs in Books III-VI to criticize democracy and oligarchy, and to show the superiority of the polity as a mixed constitution, he does not apply in Book II or Book VII. What he says about such actual states as Sparta and Crete in Book II and what he outlines as an "ideal" state in Book VII cannot be defended against the criticisms which he himself applies to constitutions in the basic middle books of the *Politics*. If the polity or mixed constitution is more just than the oligarchy, then it is also more just than the actual constitution of Sparta or Crete, and more just than the "ideal" constitution Aristotle formulates in Book VII. In what sense, then, is Aristotle using the word "ideal" here--if it neither signifies the most just constitution that is practically attainable, nor an impracticable regime which is "ideal" only by reference to the Divine model? We are forced to one of two conclusions: either Aristotle is using the word "ideal" in Book VII in a manner that is like his use of the word "ideal" to refer to the absolute regime of the godlike man, namely, to describe a state in which only men of superior virtue are admitted to citizenship; or he is simply expressing his oligarchical prejudices against the laboring classes. The first explanation reduces to the second when one realizes that there is no intrinsic or essential connection (except in the mind of a Greek oligarch) between freedom from manual labor and the life of virtue. Though Aristotle's prejudices may be explicable and even somewhat excusable, the errors from which they arise, and the false judgments to which they lead, should not be tolerated.

tution, therefore, simply because it regards all men as politically equal; for if they were not antecedently equal in some respect which justly deserved equality in political status, the Democratic constitution would be unjust in its distribution of political equality.

The problem is to determine the respects in which *antecedent* equalities and inequalities deserve *consequent* equality and inequality in political treatment.<sup>560</sup> When the respects are rightly determined, then the actual facts about the human beings living together in a given community must be observed, and a reasonable margin of error must be allowed in the making of such difficult observations about the equalities and inequalities among men. Only then can one judge what form of government is just for that community. With respect to constitutions, therefore, it cannot be said that one is more just than another because there is *more equality* under one than the other. *The amount of equality by itself is no criterion.* Rather that constitution is more just which distributes political equality and inequality more nearly in accordance with the merits or just deserts of the community's members. If we say that the Democratic constitution is most just, we mean, then, that under it *all* who are *in fact* equal in respects which deserve political equality are so treated; and that such equality in political status does not prevent inequalities in other respects from receiving the political recognition which they merit.

Similarly, the form of government or the type of constitution

<sup>560</sup> Furthermore, it should be observed that some of these antecedent conditions of inequality are natural, whereas others are not natural, but caused by the operation of social and economic forces. Such social and economic inequalities may be contrary to the dispositions of nature. To the extent that these social and economic inequalities are themselves subject to voluntary control, there may be a question of justice about the antecedent conditions of inequality from which political consequences flow. As an immoral act which is based on ignorance of relevant circumstances is excusable only if the ignorance itself is not voluntarily avoidable, so certain antecedent conditions of inequality can justify certain political apportionments only if these conditions are not themselves the result of voluntarily avoidable injustice. We shall return to this point subsequently. It is obviously relevant to the whole problem of the relative justification of the imperfect Republican constitution, which we shall discuss in Section 5 *infra*.



not make men free. The natural freedom which men have—the freedom of choice which they have through reason, or the autonomy which attaches to their personality—can neither be given nor taken away by government. **It** is only political liberty, or its lack, which men owe to the government under which they live. But the grant of political liberty, like the award of political equality, is a problem of justice which must be solved in the light of the facts. **It** is not true to say that that government is best which gives liberty to the most men or to all men, unless it is also true that most men or all men deserve it; for if there were, in fact, some men who are natural slaves, it would be unjust to rule them as if they were free men; and no one would say that criminals should be given the same liberties as law-abiding citizens. Nor is it true to say that that government is best which gives the maximum liberty to men; for, in the first place, not all men may deserve the same degree of liberty; and, in the second place, if the "maximum degree of liberty" means "doing what one likes" it ceases to be political liberty and becomes anarchic freedom. This indicates that political liberty is always measured by justice; it is a condition of being ruled in a certain way, not the total absence of being ruled or governed. When Plato and Aristotle caricatured Greek democracy by attributing to its exponents the notion that democratic liberty consists in everyone doing what he likes, they described an impossible anarchy, not a form of government.<sup>561</sup> The tyrant who does not consider the com-

<sup>561</sup> After describing democracy as "a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike," Plato caricatures the democratic citizen as "living from day to day, indulging the appetite of the hour. . . . His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom. . . . He is all liberty and equality." (*Republic*, Book IX). Vd. *POLITICS*, VI, ¶, 1817b1f; and also V, 10, 1810'80-86, where Aristotle says: "Men think . . . that freedom means doing what a man likes. In such democracies everyone lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides 'according to his fancy.' But this is all wrong. Men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for that is their salvation."

Indeed, it is all wrong, but Pericles, the great Greek democrat, would have said it was all wrong, as readily as Aristotle and Plato. The Greek oligarchs are not

mon good or the good of others is a man who does what he likes. This false notion of "democratic liberty" would convert every man into a tyrant, and a "community" of tyrants would know no other law or peace than that of the jungle.

Political liberty is the freedom which men have in relation to government, but it does not consist in freedom *from* government. It is, on the contrary, nothing more or less than the condition of those who are justly governed. Now government is just if it gives a man the status he deserves and safeguards all the rights and privileges attached thereto. Hence we see that political liberty, deriving as it does from just government, depends upon antecedent conditions of equality and inequality, for it is these which determine the justice of a regime or a constitution. The question whether *all* men should be given political liberty or whether *all* should be given the *same degree* of civil freedom is a question of justice which cannot be answered except in terms of the natures, powers, virtues, and perhaps even extrinsic accidents, of the men under consideration. In our earlier discussion of the distinction between the dominion of servitude and the dominion of freedom,<sup>562</sup> we made

the only ones to know the folly of libertarianism. To charge the eighteenth-century exponents of political liberty and equality with the errors of libertarianism and egalitarianism is to perpetuate this unfair caricature. Locke and Montesquieu, for example, are as sound on the nature of political liberty and equality as are Suarez and Bellarmine, or St. Thomas. Vd. Second Essay *Of Civil Government*, Ch. IV, No. 21, where Locke says: "Freedom, then, is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us: 'A liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, .and not to be tied by any laws,' but freedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live by, common to everyone of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it." Cf. *ibid.*, Ch. VI, No. 57: "Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot be where there is no law. ••• For who could be free when every other man's humour might domineer over him?" And vd. *Spirit of Laws*, Book XI, Ch. 8, where Montesquieu writes: "Political liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom. In government, that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will. ••• Liberty is the right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow citizens would have the same power." With regard to the folly of egalitarianism, vd. Locke, *op. cit.*, Ch. VI, No. 54; Montesquieu, *op. cit.*, Book V, Ch. 5. Cf. fn. 688 and 645 *infra*.

<sup>660</sup> Vd. Part IY, Section 2, *supra*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 465-91.

clear that to be ruled as a slave is to be ruled as a means to the good of the ruler, and that to be ruled as a free man is to be ruled for one's own good.<sup>563</sup> But nothing can be justly treated as a means to the good of another thing unless the greatest perfection which it can achieve is essentially different from and radically inferior to the perfection of the being which it serves as an end. This, in turn, depends upon the nature and consequent powers of the thing in question. Man is justified in using inanimate things, plants, and brute animals as means to his own end because these substances are inferior in essence and power, and their greatest perfection is clearly less than the human good which they serve when they are properly used.

The difficult question of justice is whether the *use* of one man by another can ever be justified. In our subsequent discussion of the problem of slavery, natural or conventional, we hope to be able to show that the enslavement of men is never justified. Here we are only concerned to make the conception of political liberty precise by connecting it with the notions of equality and justice.

The problem is complicated by the fact that there seem to be different and unequal degrees of political liberty. If the only element in the liberty of the governed were his status as an end (i. e., ruled for his own good, either immediately or through the mediation of the social common good), then children would be *as free* under parental government as citizens are under constitutional government; and there would be no difference between the liberty of such citizens and the freedom of subjects under the absolute regime of a benevolent king. But we know that this is not so. Therefore, we must distinguish between perfect and imperfect liberty under government, (I) according as the ruled has or lacks *legal* right or *juridical* power to resist unjust commands, and (II) according as the ruled does or does not exercise an effective voice in his own government.

••• If government is for the common good, it is also for the individual good of each member of the community thus governed; for the common good is itself a means to the happiness of each individual.

"We have seen that neither *natural* right nor *natural* power can be used as a

If these two elements are inseparable, then there are only two degrees of political liberty (the imperfect liberty of subjects, the perfect liberty of citizens), having one note in common, namely, that the governed be ruled as ends for their own good, and distinguished by the two elements which *together* may or may not be added. But if these two additional elements are themselves separable from one another, then there are three degrees of liberty, and we shall have to find a name for that which lies intermediate between the liberty of subjection and the liberty of citizenship. The intermediate status will be determined by the fact that, in addition to being ruled as an end, the governed has certain legal rights and juridical powers, but he does not have an effective voice in his own government. We shall, in the course of all our further discussions, use the word "suffrage" to signify having an effective voice in one's own government. We can, therefore, speak of citizenship without suffrage and citizenship with suffrage, and for brevity of reference we can call the latter "citizenship" simply or without qualification, and the former "second-class citizenship."

The precise definition of suffrage as an element in complete citizenship will be one of our major undertakings, but for the present it is sufficient to point out that "an effective voice in one's own government" means *at least* a share in the constituent *or* amending power by which a constitution is made or changed, a direct or represented voice in the deliberations of government and, in the second alternative, a direct voice in the choice of one's representatives. Thus we see that suffrage does not consist simply in having a vote; nor does it, at the other extreme, consist in having a share in all the offices of government.<sup>565</sup>

definitive element in P.olitical liberty. Vd. Part IV, Section *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 487-90, and especially fn.

<sup>565</sup> In some of the Greek democracies, notably the Athenian, the principle of appointment to most of the major offices by lot was regarded as indispensable to democratic liberty, because the Greek democrats wrongly supposed that perfect freedom consisted in something more than suffrage, namely, in being able to participate in every aspect of government. Vd. W. R. Agard, *What Democracy Meant to the Greeks*, Chapel Hill, pp. "It is clear that the legisla-

The general principle we have observed in the case of servitude and freedom applies to the several degrees of freedom as well. Since each degree of freedom is a different condition of being ruled, a different status of men under government, the problem of a just distribution of political liberty cannot be solved apart from the facts of equality and inequality, for it is these which determine what men deserve. **It** is necessary, therefore, to summarize here distinctions already made.<sup>566</sup>

There are four *possible* relations of equality and inequality among men.

(1) Equality in specific nature combined with inferiority in natural power, the defect in power making it impossible to form certain habits of mind or character. Let us call this "radical equality in nature" and "radical inequality in power."

Radical equality in specific nature and in natural power combined with inferiority in the development of power (for whatever causes—whether immaturity or deprivation of opportunity and exercise), the inferiority consisting in the lack of habits possessed by others. Let us call this "radical equality in power" (which, of course, implies radical equality in nature) and "radical inequality in habit."

(3) Radical equality in specific nature, natural power, and habit combined with inferiority in the intensity or degree to which habits are developed in one individual as compared with another (again for whatever causes—whether due to natural

tive, executive, and judicial functions of Athens were in the hands of all the citizens; there was representation in the executive and judicial bodies, to be sure, but on the extreme democratic principle of annual selection by lot. . . . There were no appointive offices, and only in the case of the Board of Generals did the people actually elect their representatives rather than choose them by lot, the principle being that military and naval strategy was a highly technical job which could not be wisely entrusted to any person whose lot might be drawn. In practical terms this meant that every citizen of Athens during the course of his life had been engaged in public service. . . . It is obvious, therefore, that the ordinary citizen of Athens had an extraordinary opportunity for participating in political life; freedom to him meant, not so much the lack of restraint as the privilege of sharing in community enterprises."

<sup>566</sup> Vd. fn. 309 and 387 *supra*.

and unalterable differences in degree of power, or to the degree to which natural powers are exercised). Let us call this "radical equality in habit" (which implies both radical equality in nature and radical equality in power) and "inequality in degree of habit." It should be noted, furthermore, that inequality in degree of habit may or may not imply inequality in degree of power, and if not, the extent to which it is due to exercise may reflect either voluntary causes or external impediments or accidents.

(4) Radical equality in specific nature, natural power, and habit combined with equality in the intensity or of habit. Let us call this simply "complete equality."

We have enumerated four *possibilities*. The enumeration is intended to be analytically exhaustive, not to correspond simply with the actual facts. We know, for example, that *all* men are not completely equal. We know, therefore, that there must be some men in the third of the above classes, that is, men who are inferior to others in degree of habit. We know that children are radically inferior in habit, but there may be some question whether this second class is also occupied by some chronologically adult men and women. We know that the first class is occupied by subnormal or feeble-minded individuals, but whether any normal individuals can be so classified is another question, and upon the answer will depend the position we take concerning Aristotle's conception of the "natural slave." A just determination of the political status of women must also be made by approaching the problem of equality and inequality between the sexes in terms of these four basic categories. Controversy about diverse races of men, sometimes regarded as superior and inferior, must be similarly resolved. In short, every problem of justice concerning political equality and inequality, political liberty in its several degrees and political servitude, requires us to examine the antecedent facts about the natural or acquired equality and inequality among men.

Now, furthermore, we can see the correlation between political equality and political liberty. The highest degree of politi-

cal liberty (the freedom of complete citizenship) should be enjoyed by those who, because of radical equality in habit with their rulers, deserve equality in status with them, even if residual inequalities in degree of habit do not entitle every citizen to participate directly in every function of government. The lowest degree of political liberty (the freedom of subjection) should be enjoyed by those who, because of radical equality in essence and power, must be ruled as ends rather than as means, even if radical inferiority in habit does not entitle the ruled to equality of status with their rulers. Equality of status between rulers and ruled is, therefore, not a necessary accompaniment of the freedom of the ruled under government, for imperfect freedom can be enjoyed without it, as in the case of the just Royal regime. Similarly, equality in function is not a necessary accompaniment of equality of status as between rulers and ruled, for perfect freedom can be enjoyed without it, as in the case of Constitutional government.

But two questions remain. (1) What about the intermediate degree of liberty which attaches to the status we have called second-class citizenship, or citizenship without suffrage? Here there seems to be inequality of status and of freedom between different portions of the citizenry, for wherever there are second-class citizens, there must also be citizens with suffrage.<sup>561</sup>

••• Constitutional government cannot exist unless some men have suffrage. This is its minimal condition. Hence it is impossible for there to be only second-class citizens, though of course, the reverse is not impossible. There may be no second-class citizens. All who are citizens may have suffrage. At the other extreme, it is impossible for all who live under some just form of civil government to be ruled as slaves. Hence we can enumerate all the possibilities with regard to divisions of a given population under civil government: (1) all are citizens with suffrage; all are citizens, some with and some without suffrage; (2) all are politically free, but some are citizens (with or without suffrage) and some are subjects; (3) some are politically free (either citizens or subjects) and some are politically enslaved; (4) some are politically free, but none are citizens, and some are politically enslaved; (5) all are politically free, but none are citizens. Now of these six possibilities the last two can occur only under a Royal regime; the first four can occur only under Constitutional government. Of these four, the first (with some qualifications to be added later) can occur only under a Democratic constitution; the remaining three exhaust the possible situations which can occur under a Republican constitution.

What antecedent condition of inequality can justify this inequality in political status and degree of liberty? It would seem as if there had to be something between radical inferiority in habit (which justifies subjection and the lowest degree of freedom) and inferiority in degree of habit (which, since it implies radical equality in habit, can justify nothing less than citizenship). But there can be no such intermediate condition, for either men do not share the same habits, or if they do, they can differ only in the degree to which they possess them. Perhaps, then, it will be said that only those who possess a certain sufficiently high degree of the habits common to all should be admitted to the privileges (i.e., suffrage) as well as the rights of citizenship. There are reasons for rejecting this suggestion also. This is one of the most difficult problems connected with the definition of Democratic justice. We shall, of course, deal with it subsequently,<sup>568</sup> and we hope to show that there are no conditions which can justify citizenship without suffrage, even if there are conditions which can justify subjection.

(2) Is the status of subjection the same when it occurs under Royal and under Constitutional government? Ignoring the condition of slavery for the moment, *essentially* the same under any form of government which deprives some portion of the population of political liberty, we see that it may make a difference whether no men are citizens and all free men are subjects (as under Royal rule), or whether those who are subjects are deprived of the citizenship to which others in the same community are admitted (as under Constitutional rule). It may, for example, be the case under Constitutional rule that no man who is free (i.e., not enslaved) lacks all legal rights or juridical powers, yet some of these may be deprived of suffrage. The ground for such deprivation may be a supposed radical inferiority in habit. Were this to occur for this reason, then what we have called second-class citizenship would be identical with subjection under Constitutional government, and subjection under Constitutional government would differ from sub-

•••In Section 4 *infra*.



jection under Royal government in that, in the latter case, the ruled is also without legal rights or juridical powers. The point here being considered has an obvious bearing on the previous problem about citizenship without suffrage. It also has a bearing on another sort of subjection which can occur in relation to Constitutional government—the condition of a subject people living in a conquered province or in a dependent colony. Strictly speaking, such people are not living under a Constitutional regime, even though they are ruled by a state which is itself Constitutional. One need only consider the dependencies of Athens and Rome, or the condition of the English colonies in the New World before the American Revolution, to see that a Constitutional government may have subjects that do not differ in status from the subjects of a Royal regime.<sup>569</sup>

We have raised this second problem, not to solve it here, but to suggest that the crucial words of this analysis, "slave," "subject," and "citizen," are unavoidably ambiguous. Not only may "subject" have a different meaning under Royal and Constitutional governments, as well as the same meaning under both; not only may there be variations in the meaning of "citizenship" which overlap variations in the meaning of "subjection"; but there may even be variations in the meaning of "slave" which permit us to distinguish between slaves who have some attenuated legal rights and slaves who are without any. The former is a condition of slavery which verges on the status of subjection, even as there is a condition of subjection which verges on the status of citizenship. To deny that such a continuum exists from the extreme of unmitigated slavery to the extreme of perfect and complete liberty would be to deny the unquestionable facts of political history. The existence of this continuum does not, however, prevent us from reaching clear definitions, even though we may have to use the same

••• Vd. Hobbes's observation that, though Rome was itself a republic, the people of Judea, or any other conquered province, did not enjoy republican government: *Leviathan*, Part II, Ch. 19. Cf. John Stuart Mill, *Essay on Representative Government*, Ch. XVIII, "Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free State," which considers the case of India under British domination.

words in several carefully distinguished senses; nor does it affect the principles of justice which must be applied in the classification and gradation of distinct forms of government. If, for example, slavery is always essentially unjust, the essential injustice is not removed by the mitigation or amelioration of the slave's condition in accidental respects. Similarly, if and when all normal men deserve to be citizens with suffrage, then their subjection is unjust despite the fact that, under Constitutional government, they may have *some* of the rights of citizenship.

But it may be objected that if there is a continuum among the several dominions (i. e., the several conditions of being ruled), there is also a continuum among the several regimes (i. e., the several modes of ruling), in which case it may not be possible to separate two or three distinct forms of government. We have already faced this objection/<sup>70</sup> but it is worth reiterating that an essential distinction of forms is quite compatible with an *apparent* continuum among the accidental varieties to which these forms give rise in their concrete embodiments. The continuum is only apparent, for every accidental variety of one form is distinguished from every accidental variety of another form by some definitive trait that is involved in the essential differentiation of the two forms. Thus, in the order of natural species, every brute lacks reason, no matter how high the degree of sensitive power and no matter how much an anthropoid ape may resemble the least intelligent man. Similarly, in the order of political forms, purely Constitutional government is marked by perfect popular sovereignty and perfect vicegerency, so that no matter how closely the intermediate *regimen regale et politicum* approaches Constitutional government we know that it is not a Republic (or purely Constitutional regime) by the fact that a king still retains some degree of personal sovereignty and that *all* the ruled are in some respects still in subjection. Unless every governmental function is discharged by a mere officeholder and unless *some* of the ruled are truly and completely

no Vd. fn. 558 *supra*.

citizens, the minimum of purely Constitutional government (i.e., a Republic) does not exist.<sup>571</sup>

Nevertheless, the objector may continue, the very nature of Constitutional government makes any further essential distinction impossible. There is an integral difference between absolute and limited government which no variations in degree can efface, but within the sphere of Constitutional regimes there is only a difference in the *number* of men who are admitted to citizenship with suffrage. Whether all, many, or only a few are, every essential characteristic of Constitutional government remains the same. Hence there can be no form of government which stands to the Republic as Constitutional government stands to the Royal regime—specifically distinct and hierarchically superior.

The objection is overcome when two points are remembered. In the first place, in the order of political forms, as in the order of natural species, both of two superior forms can differ from one which is inferior to both by the same generic traits, and yet differ from each other specifically. The fact that men and brutes are both cognitive, and thus differ in the same way from plants, does not prevent brutes from lacking reason. So the fact that both the Republican and Democratic forms of government are Constitutional, and so differ generically in the same way from the Royal regime, does not prevent the Republic from having defects which specifically distinguish it from Democracy, even as defect of reason differentiates brute from man. In the second place, we must remember that the forms of government are in a moral, not a natural, hierarchy, and that the defect which differentiates one species of government from another must be a defect in justice. We have already explained how the Royal regime can be said to *lack* an element of justice when compared with Constitutional government.<sup>572</sup> It follows,

<sup>571</sup> Vd. Part IV, Section 4 *supra*, in THE THOMIST, IV, 4, pp. 711-18.

<sup>579</sup> Vd. Part IV, Section 6 *supra* in THE THOMIST, VI, 2, pp. fl'. The comparison must, of course, be made absolutely, and not relatively to particular conditions. Only when they are absolutely considered, can inferior forms of government be said to lack elements of justice actually present in more perfect regimes. Fur-

therefore, that if a constitution can be perfectly just, absolutely speaking, any defect of justice in a constitution will determine an inferior form of Constitutional government. Republican government is constitutional, but a constitution that is defective in justice. Democratic government is constitutional, but with a constitution that is perfect in justice.

Whereas, in Part IV, our problem was to define the principle of constitutionality as a differentia, and to prove that Constitutional government was superior to Royal regime, in the absolute scale of justice, our problem here can be looked at in two ways: we can define the perfectly just constitution or we can define Democracy and show that it, and it alone, is the perfectly just constitution. Let us consider these alternatives.

(1) Suppose we say that the perfectly just constitution is one which distributes freedom and equality to *all* members of the population according to their *just* deserts. Since this is a tautology, no further argument is needed. Any other constitution would be actually unjust in some respects. There is certainly no need to argue that one constitution is better than another if one is just in every respect and the other is unjust in some respects. Furthermore, to proceed in this way not only makes the identification of Democracy with the perfectly just constitution purely verbal, but violates our distinction between an absolute and a relative consideration of inferior regimes. If we were to identify the Republican with the non-Democratic constitution according to this definition, it would follow necessarily that every Republican government must be *actually* unjust. While may be the case in fact (if the hypothesis is false that inferior conditions exist which justify inferior regimes relatively), it should not be necessitated by purely formal or analytical considerations. We must, therefore, define the Democratic constitution and prove that it is perfectly just, rather than define the just constitution and call it "Democratic."<sup>573</sup>

thermore, defect of justice need not be the same as actual injustice relative to a particular set of conditions.

<sup>573</sup> We might similarly speak of brute and man as defective and perfect cognitive natures. In both cases, the defect and the perfection occur in the very trait

We propose to define the Democratic constitution as one under which *all normal and mature human beings*, regardless of sex, race, wealth, or other similar accidents, are admitted to the status of complete citizenship, and can enjoy its rights and privileges unless they forfeit their suffrage or their liberty by a crime of sufficient gravity to warrant such penalty. This means, negatively, that a Democratic constitution abolishes political slavery, and that it abolishes subjection for all except those whose unripe years or natural defects place them in the care of a home or an institution, or those whose anti-social behavior requires them to be taken into custody. This does not mean, positively, that citizenship *by itself* qualifies a man or woman for any public office, not even that of a juror, for additional qualifications may be needed for every governmental function, or special factors of disqualification may enter into the selection.

We shall presently increase the precision of this definition, but it is clear at once that there is need to prove that the Democratic constitution, thus defined, is perfectly just. We must prove, for example, that there are no natural slaves, that neither criminals nor prisoners of war can be justly treated as slaves, and that no man can be justly permitted to sell himself into slavery or purchase other men as slaves. We shall make this step of our proof in Section 3. We must prove also that all normal adults, of whatever sex or race or economic fortune, can and should become citizens exercising suffrage, and that the status of subjection (or second-class citizenship) must be restricted to minors, the incurably incompetent, and criminals. We shall undertake this step of our proof in Section 4. When these things have been demonstrated, we shall have shown that, taking man as he is or can become, anything less than the Democratic constitution is lacking in justice, even though it may not also be actually unjust relative to social, economic or cultural conditions which prevent some men from being all they can become. In Section 5, we shall consider the relative justifi-

(cognition) by which the two forms are differentiated from what is inferior to them both.

cation of Republican government, and the various perversions to which Democracy is susceptible. And in Section 6, we shall expound the theory of political justice in terms of which all our comparisons of diverse regimes have so far been made.

Let us complete this preliminary discussion by making certain that the definition is clear, and that its implications are precise. Unless such clarity and precision are attained, it will not be possible to judge whether the proposition to be proved—that Democracy is the most just form of government—has been demonstrated.

In the first place, it is necessary to show why there cannot be more than three major forms of government, for if there were more than three, Democracy might be more just than the Republic and the Kingdom, and yet not be the most just regime. This can be shown as follows. The distinction between absolute and limited government is exhaustive. Even though the intermediate *regimen regale et politicum* reveals these terms not to be exclusive, it can be truly said that every form of government either is or is not *purely* Constitutional. Now this twofold division of all regimes is capable of only one major subdivision. On the side of *purely* Royal government, there are only accidental subdivisions—such as the numerical distinction between absolute rule by one (called "monarchy") and absolute rule by a few (called "aristocracy"). No gradation in justice is here involved. But on the side of *purely* Constitutional government, there can be essential subdivisions according as the constitution is less or more just. We have already seen that, within the range of Greek constitutions, the polity can be said to be more just than democracy or oligarchy, and these three terms represent an essential subdivision of Constitutional government because principles of justice are involved.<sup>514</sup> It would, therefore, appear that the hierarchy of political forms contains more than three terms, for if Democracy is distinct from the three Greek constitutions, and is more just than any of these, as all of these are more just than Royal

<sup>514</sup> Vd. IV, Section 5, *supra*, in THE THOMIST, VI, 1, pp. 81-93.

government, then there are at least five terms in the hierarchy. But all the Greek constitutions, along with the constitution of the Roman republic and the constitutions of many modern governments, are alike in one essential respect. From the point of view of absolute justice, they are all imperfectly just. Even though they differ *inter se* in the degree of their imperfection or in the cause and locus of the particular defect of justice which they exhibit, they all agree in *failing to extend citizenship and suffrage as far as it can be justly granted*. The perfectly just constitution is, therefore, exhaustively divided against all these. Now since every form of government is either Constitutional or not, and since every constitution is either imperfectly or perfectly just, there cannot be more than three major terms in the hierarchy of political forms. This does not prevent us from recognizing that there can be more or less effective embodiments of the Democratic *form*. In fact, the Democratic *form* is an ideal which can be progressively approached by more and more adequate realizations of its principles in practice. This distinction between formal and real Democracy, previously acknowledged, does not alter our conclusion that Democracy is the most just *form* of government.<sup>015</sup>

In the second place, we can now see how difficult it is to draw the line between \_\_\_\_\_ and Democratic constitutions. In earlier discussions we have been content with imprecise formulations of this distinction. We have said that the mark of the Republican constitution is restricted suffrage, whereas the Democratic constitution is defined by universal suffrage. But this is neither adequate nor accurate. The opposition between giving political liberty and equality to some men and giving it to all conveys the spirit of the difference, but without further qualification the words "some" and "all" express only a rough approximation of the truth. The real trouble is with the word "all." Unqualified, it signifies children as well as

Vd. p. 874, *supra*, where we pointed out that in this Part of our work we were going to consider Democracy formally, reserving for Part VI the discussion of the progressive steps by which this ideal or best form can be more and more adequately materialized in concrete historic embodiments.

adults, the feeble-minded and insane as well as the normal, the criminal as well as the law-abiding members of the population. Without here attempting to make precise the limits of immaturity, abnormality, and criminality, we can, nevertheless regard these three classes in any population as *justly* excluded from suffrage. Moreover, on this point there is no difference whatsoever between the Republican and the Democratic constitution: both agree that *at least* these three classes are justly disfranchised. With this point understood the word "all" can be used to signify the universality of suffrage which characterizes the Democratic constitution. In contrast, "some" expresses the restricted suffrage of the Republic.

The line between the Republican and the Democratic constitution can, therefore, be drawn by regarding the disfranchisement of any members of the population, *except* the three classes indicated above, as the distinguishing mark. The Republic enslaves *or* subjects men who can and should be citizens. The existence of a slave class, countenanced by the constitution as a legitimate political category, is not indispensable to the definition of Republican government, for even with the abolition of slavery as a political category, human beings who are not in the three justly disfranchised classes may be excluded from suffrage for one of the following reasons: because they are females, because they are foreigners for whom naturalization is not made available; because they lack sufficient property; because they are illiterate as a result of insufficient education; because of color, creed, or previous condition of servitude.

What is indispensable to the definition of the Republican constitution is that it does distinguish between subjects and citizens and places in subjection human beings who are not children, abnormal, or criminal. The Democratic constitution, on the other hand, gives the equality of complete citizenship and the perfection of political liberty to all except these. This distinction being clear, the problem of demonstrating its validity consists in proving that all except these justly deserve political equality and liberty of the sort which attaches to citizenship with suffrage. We must prove, in short, not only that



enslavement is unjust, but also that every disfranchisement which is based on sex, property, the accidents of birth, etc., is *absolutely* unjust.

In the third place, it must be observed that the various criteria of disfranchisement which can be employed by a Republican constitution fall into two groups. They are either traits which are inseparable and unalterable accidents of human nature or they are purely extrinsic accidents capable of voluntary modification. Thus, for example, sex, race, or color, are inseparable and unalterable accidents of birth. In contrast, poverty and illiteracy are accidents due to causes which are within the voluntary control of the individual and of the society in which he lives. Either a child is feeble-minded or normal. If incurably feeble-minded, then no voluntary efforts on the child's part or on the part of the community can cultivate the child's powers by education; but if not *incurably* feeble-minded, then either the abnormality, if one exists, can be remedied, or if the child is normal, he can be educated. His lack of education is a voluntarily avoidable deprivation, for which the home and the state can be held responsible. Hence the problem of whether illiteracy (or total lack of education) is just ground for disfranchisement must be viewed in two ways: (a) taking the population as it is, it may be just to disfranchise those adults who are illiterate or who lack a certain minimum of education; but (b) since the existence of such human beings in the population is the result of social, not natural, forces, and since these forces are themselves voluntarily controllable by the agency of government, it cannot be *permanently* just to disfranchise men who, but for causes beyond their own control and within the power of government to remedy, would not be disqualified for citizenship.

By observing the difference between these two points of view, we can see how it may be possible to justify a Republican constitution relative to an existing state of affairs (in which, for example, some portion of the population is uneducated or illiterate), and yet at the same time to say that, absolutely speaking, illiteracy cannot be a just disqualification in the case

of normal men because government can, in the course of time, remedy the defect, and should make every effort to do so. "Whether, at a given time, the government is fully responsible for the illiteracy that then exists, and so can be charged with actual injustice, is an extremely difficult question which must take into account a variety of social and economic causes. These may be so complex in their historic contingency that the deplorable situation to be remedied may not be sufficiently under the voluntary control of government to warrant the charge of injustice on the ground of malfeasance.

We shall return to this difficult problem in Section *p* when we consider the historic conditions relative to which the imperfect justice of Republican constitutions may be justified, that is, shown to be *not actually* unjust, though lacking in a point of justice that is ultimately attainable in the course of historic developments under the voluntary control of men and societies. We have said enough here about this one factor (illiteracy) to show how the general principle also applies to poverty and to foreign birth. The application must, Of course, be made differently in each case. In the case of the resident alien, signifying a desire to become a citizen, the problem is one of providing just naturalization proceedings. In the case of the pauper, the problem is one of distinguishing between criminal indolence and incapacity for self-support, on the one hand, and lack of economic opportunity, on the other. And here the problem of justice requires us to define the minimum amount of property, or more generally, the economic condition of the person, which is relevant to a just distribution of suffrage. The amount must not be so large, or the condition so special, that it is *impossible* for *all normal* and *willing* persons to qualify, social and economic impediments being ultimately removable by the voluntary efforts of just government.

In contrast to these remediable disqualifications, such traits as sex and race present a different problem. Either the members of the female sex and the members of certain racial groups are by nature inferior, so that their condition is beyond voluntary control, or no such natural inequalities exist in any way

that has political relevance. We shall try to prove that the second alternative is true, showing that the contrary supposition reduces to the absurdity of regarding women and certain racial groups as incurably subnormal. Nevertheless, it may be necessary to consider here whether social and economic impediments can cause a remediable inferiority which, so long as it exists and is not immediately alterable by governmental action, may justify the Republican constitution which disfranchises these human beings at a given time in history.

In the fourth place, we must note that a just abridgement of political liberty is not equivalent to slavery. The insane who are taken into protective custody or otherwise confined in hospitals, the feeble-minded who are incarcerated in institutions as charges on the public care, are not free, but neither are they slaves, for they are being taken care of for their own good and the common good, not being used as means to the good of other individuals or of the state. They are not *property* (i.e., chattel) in any sense or respect. This holds true also for the *just treatment* of prisoners of war or enemy aliens who must be interned for the public safety. And it is equally true of the punitive justice which condemns criminals to death or to imprisonment, for life or for a term of years. In the latter case especially we see that the criminal has voluntarily forfeited his right to life, or to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The insane and the feeble-minded do not forfeit their rights, for theirs is not a loss of rights due to voluntary misconduct on their part; rather the rights which never cease to be potentially theirs, they cannot actually claim, because of natural impediment or defect. In a sense, these rights are always held in trust for them by society, as against the day when medical science may be able to restore them to normal manhood.<sup>576</sup> Their

<sup>576</sup> Any child of human parentage must be presumed to have the potentialities of human nature, regardless of the pathological factors which operate against their development, and even tend to conceal their existence. It can never be presumed that these pathological factors are absolutely incurable, even though, in the present state of medical knowledge, successful therapy may be very unlikely. If the first presumption did not prevail, and if the second were not untenable, there would

political status, with its consequent liberty, is, therefore, in abeyance. It is for the time being abridged, but it is not nullified or permanently lost. Similarly, the who suffers incarceration for a term of years, rather than death or life imprisonment, also has his rights and liberties temporarily abridged. When he has paid his penalty, they may be restored to him upon his return to the community. But here distinction may be made among crimes, according to the gravity of the felony or misdemeanor and the moral turpitude it reflects, which defines certain crimes as just cause for the permanent forfeiture, not of all political rights, but of suffrage. Such disfranchisement is, of course, an irremediable loss of perfect liberty, but it is neither enslavement nor unjust subjection.

On all these points, there is no necessary difference between Republican and Democratic justice, for either sort of constitution may make the same provisions for the insane and the feeble-minded and for enemies of the state, from within or without, during peace time or in war. But if, as many historic examples reveal, a Republican constitution treats any of these classes as slaves, converting them into the property of individuals or of the state, it is going beyond just disfranchisement and committing an actual injustice, an injustice which no conditions can excuse. We shall return to this point in Section 3 where we shall attempt to prove the actual injustice of slavery *as a legal category*. The theory of natural slavery is not the only error to be corrected. Nevertheless, it is important to observe here that such errors about justice are not essential to the defect of the Republican constitution, though they may be an additional blemish upon its character.

Similarly, there is no necessary difference between Republican and Democratic principles of liberty, so far as these classes in the population are concerned. Despite their fundamental difference on the qualifications for suffrage, the Republic and the Democracy both understand constitutional liberty—the per-

be no violation of natural law in killing off the unfit on the specious pretense of serving the common good by removing a burden from society.

feet liberty of complete citizenship-in the same way. For both, liberty is not an absolute right, but a privilege to which obligations are annexed, and which is limited by the ends that justify it. **If** constitutional liberty can be justly granted or justly withheld, abridged, or forfeited, then such liberty is itself the creature of justice. Divorced from considerations of justice, there is no such thing as political liberty, any more than there is political equality. There is only license and anarchy. The two ends which regulate the justice of liberty are the common good and happiness. *No man deserves more liberty than is compatible with the common good, nor less than he needs to lead a good life.*<sup>571</sup> Liberty is not an end, coordinate with happiness. **It** is rather linked with happiness as a condition indispensable to its pursuit. So far as liberty is thus justly conceived, there is no difference between freedom under Democratic and under Republican government. Being constitutional, both can be called "free governments" in contrast to absolute regimes which severely limit the freedom of the

<sup>571</sup> John Stuart Mill's *Essay on Liberty* is misread by those who charge him, as they charge Locke or Rousseau, with being a libertarian. Vd. fn. 561 *supra*. His theory of civil liberty can, in fact, be summarized by the italicized sentence in the text above. The end which justifies every degree of civil liberty is happiness; the end which limits civil liberty and draws the line between it and license is the common good; for, according to Mill, the prohibition of acts which injure others or transgress the common good in no way infringes on political freedom. The problem of civil liberty, he says in his opening sentences (op. cit.) concerns "the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual." Mill's position throughout is like that of St. Thomas, who held that the positive law cannot command virtue or prohibit vice except in so far as the acts of virtue and vice affect the common good (general justice) or in so far as they injure other persons directly, and so are violations of particular justice. Cf. *Utilitarianism*, Ch. V, "On the Connection between Justice and Utility."

Maritain identifies what he calls the freedom of autonomy with happiness. This is the terminal freedom toward which all other freedoms operate as means. The initial freedom is the natural freedom of man's free will. Intermediate between the natural freedom of free choice and the terminal freedom of autonomy is civil liberty, which is neither natural nor terminal. Civil liberty is the freedom of men under law or government to exercise their power of free choice in such a way that they not only work toward happiness or spiritual autonomy, but so that they also do not interfere with others in the same process. Cf. Maritain, *The Problem of Freedom in the Modern World*, pp.

ruled.<sup>518</sup> But though the *quality* of freedom (its intensity) is the same in a Republic and in a Democracy, differing in the same way from the *quality* of freedom under a Royal regime, the *quantity* of freedom (i. e., distributively) is greatly enlarged by the superior justice of the Democratic constitution.

These considerations about the relation of political liberty to justice will have a bearing on our subsequent demonstration of the injustice of any degree or kind of enslavement. Furthermore, the relation of perfect liberty (i. e., the dominion of citizenship) to the pursuit of happiness will enable us to prove, in the light of our conception of natural happiness,<sup>579</sup> why no normal adult should be subjected, much less enslaved. But it may be objected at once that we have omitted moral virtue in our enumerations of traits relevant to citizenship and suffrage; yet the moral virtues are indispensable to the pursuit of happiness and should, therefore, be made a condition of granting liberty to men as something which should be exercised for the common good and the life of virtue. Suffice it here to answer that the notion of moral virtue has been tacitly involved in our discussion of the habits relevant to political status, and that, moreover, it is obviously implied in the disfranchisement of children, the insane, the feeble-minded, and the criminal elements in the population.

The really difficult problem here is whether moral virtue can be made a positive condition (i. e., of enfranchisement), as well as a negative condition (i. e., of disfranchisement). We know, for example, that children have unformed characters, or

••• If the word "freedom" is used to signify the dominion of imperfect freedom (subjection) as well as the dominion of perfect freedom (citizenship), then the Royal regime must be called "free." Only tyrannical government is enslaving government. Any regime which is just in its direction to the common good is "freeing." But as the word has come to be used, both in ancient and modern discussions of Constitutional government, emphasis is placed on the perfection of political liberty which is inseparable from citizenship, and so only Constitutional government is called "free," as only Constitutional government is called "popular." Both appellations can be applied to the Republic, as well as to the Democracy, despite the essential difference between the imperfect distributive justice of the one, and the perfect distributive justice of the other.

<sup>519</sup> Vd. Part III, Section 3, in *THE THOMIST*, IV, I, pp. 147-81.

that criminals are vicious and unjust men, for that is signified by the moral turpitude involved in serious injuries to other men or violations of the common good. So far we can go in using obvious lack of moral virtue, or obvious presence of vicious inclinations, *negatively-as* a condition of disfranchisement. But can we go further and demand evidence of a well-formed moral character as a positive condition of enfranchisement? The question is not whether such a criterion would be desirable or just. Certainly it would be. The question is a practical one, namely, whether such evidence is sufficiently available, or ascertainable with sufficient accuracy, to permit the practical employment of this criterion in the distribution of citizenship and suffrage. If not, it can have no place in the practical science of politics, or in the practical affairs of government. With all due respect for the "idealism" of ancient and mediaeval political theory in this respect, we must nevertheless insist that it is *only capacity* for the moral virtues and prudence and never the *actual possession* of them which can be made a *positive* qualification for citizenship and suffrage. No actual constitution has ever set up such a qualification (*actual possession* of virtue) because it is so obviously impracticable. The point can have no relevance to the distinction between Republican and Democratic government, though it inevitably arises in connection with the so-called "ideal" constitution that Aristotle proposed in Book VII of the *Politics*. It also has a bearing on his theory of natural slavery and the disfranchisement of the laboring classes.<sup>580</sup> We shall, therefore, return to a fuller consideration of it in Sections 5 and 4.

<sup>580</sup> Vd. fn. 559 *supra*. According to the "ideal" constitution set forth in Book VII of the *Politics*, Aristotle saw nothing wrong with recommending that the laboring classes be worse than disfranchised or refused citizenship—reduced to the condition of slaves of the state, comparable to the condition of slaves in the household. Vd. *loc. cit.*, Ch. 9 and 10 "Husbandmen, craftsmen, and laborers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of the state, but the members of the state are the warriors and councillors" (1829"35). The laboring classes are, in short, to be *mere means*. "But where there are two things of which one is a means and the other an end, they have nothing in common except that the one receives what the other produces. Such, for example, is the relation in which workmen and tools stand

In the fifth place, the essential distinction between the Republican and the Democratic constitution must not be confused by the addition to either of extraneous elements which have manifested themselves historically, but which do not belong to the essence of either constitution. We have in mind here two things especially, the one peculiarly characteristic of Greek democracy, the other a characteristic of Greek oligarchy (or even the polity), of the Roman republic, and of many modern Constitutional regimes.

The first is the principle of appointment to offices (some or all) by lottery. This can never be justified because it either requires too high a qualification for citizenship, thus unjustly disfranchising many, or if the standard is rightly set with

to their work; the house and the builder have nothing in common, but the art of the builder is for the sake of the house. And so states require property, but property, even though living beings are included in it, is no part of the state, for a state is not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals aiming at the best life possible" (*Politics*, VII, 8, 1828<sup>a</sup>27-88).

With respect to the main point under consideration in the text (i.e., the inutility of virtue as a positive prerequisite for citizenship), two things should be noted. In the first place, even as in the administration of justice we presume the innocence of a man until he is proved guilty, so in the practical science of politics we must presume that a man has "civic virtue" until the contrary is evidenced by his conviction for violation of the law. We use the phrase "civic virtue" to signify virtue in relation to the common good. It is only such virtue which the positive law can command. Yd. *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 96, 2, 8. Hence a serious violation of the positive law marks a man as sufficiently lacking in civic virtue to be unfit for citizenship. In the second place, God, who can see into the hearts of men, is able to judge the goodness of a man absolutely-in regard to every virtue, and with respect to its interior as well as its exterior acts. But one man cannot, and therefore should not presume to, judge the virtues of another man absolutely. Some judgment of a man's virtue is necessary, of course, as in the administration of law, but as we have seen, this goes no further than our knowledge of exterior acts, and only concerns acts which are affected with the public interest. The same limitations apply to the provisions of constitutional law: because men cannot judge the virtue of their fellow men absolutely, human government cannot employ virtue as an absolute criterion in the distribution of civic honors. A just constitution can go no further than to disfranchise criminals because they have *by their acts* shown themselves to be *vicious with respect to the common good*. This does not mean, of course, that the rest of the non-criminal population are genuinely men of virtue, civic or otherwise. But who shall set himself up to judge the virtue of his fellow men, and what tests can be practically applied? Cf. Section 4 *infra*, where this problem is treated more fully.



respect to a just enfranchisement, then the principle works injustice by disregarding inequalities in degree of competence with respect to the hierarchy of governmental functions. Greek democracy (considering its various disfranchisements and its acceptance of slavery, etc.) neither has the justice of the Democratic constitution, nor does it represent a relatively just Republican constitution, because it involves an actual injustice which cannot be excused by reference to historic conditions.<sup>581</sup>

The second is the principle that special political privileges belong to persons of noble birth or of more than average wealth. This principle may operate with respect to qualification for political office, or with respect to political powers granted a special class in the population, such as the Roman patricians, who had access to the legislative authority of the Senate from which the plebs were excluded, or the British peerage, which exercised an undue influence on legislation before the House of Lords was diminished to its present powers; or it may operate, as in the old Prussian constitution, by proportioning the number of votes to the amount of property held by an elector. This oligarchical principle-it should never be called "aristocratic" by anyone who has respect for that word-can be separated from Republican criteria for citizenship and suffrage. **It** is highly questionable whether it can ever be justified, as the

<sup>581</sup> Confusion results from supposing that Greek democracy is merely an incomplete achievement of true Democracy. Professor Agard, for example, knows that Democracy can recognize "no validity in the prejudices of class or race" and that the Democratic conception of equality is "that all men deserve equally to be respected as human beings and given a fair chance to their ability" (*What Democracy Meant to the Greeks*, p. 7). But he is, nevertheless, willing to say, in answer to the question whether the Athenian constitution is genuinely Democratic, that "it is, *in many respects*" (*ibid.*, p. 68; italics ours), even though "Athens denied political rights to important groups of residents" (p. 75). Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 79-82. Above all, he fails to note that the principle of appointment to office by lot is an actual injustice which cannot be condoned. To speak of Greek democracy as a limited or incomplete achievement of the ideal constitution is, therefore, both misleading and erroneous. It would be more accurate to say that Greek democracy anticipates this ideal primarily, if not exclusively, in one respect-its overthrow of oligarchical privileges and oligarchical restrictions.

latter perhaps can, by reference to special historic conditions. But whether or not it is always actually unjust, this oligarchical principle is *separable* from the essence of a Republican constitution, as the original constitution of the United States indicates, although we must recognize the historic fact that most Republican governments have been more or less flagrant in the embodiment of it.

This enables us to see that one of the properties which flows from the essence of a Democratic constitution is the abolition of all politically privileged classes. The Democratic commonwealth is identical with the classless society—in the precise sense of *no social or economic classes having special political rights or privileges, powers or immunities*; but never in the sense of total egalitarianism which violates the hierarchy of governmental functions, for that is the (Greek) democratic fallacy which has no place in the truly just Democratic constitution. The Republican commonwealth, on the other hand, is always a society in which the classes are set against the masses; for even when certain social or economic classes do not have special powers or privileges, rights or immunities, *over and above* those granted to the ordinary citizen, the disfranchised masses under Republican government always belong to certain under-privileged social or economic groups.<sup>582</sup> The ideal of Democracy can, therefore, be defined as that of the *free and politically classless* society.<sup>583</sup> It repudiates the oligarchical

••• Vd. *Politics*, VII, 10: "It is no new or recent discovery of political philosophers that the state ought to be divided into classes, and that the warriors should be separated from the husbandmen" (13ii!9b). Cf. Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws*, Book II, Ch. 2.

<sup>582</sup> The Republican society, in contrast, is one in which freedom is hampered by the constitutional preservation of illegitimate class distinctions.

Precisely because the Democratic constitution abolishes the political classes that the Republican constitution recognizes and retains, there can be no such thing as a mixed Democratic constitution. The mixed constitution, properly understood, can occur only under Republican government, effecting some sort of compromise between the opposed social and economic classes which, if their desire for power is unchecked, naturally tend to the extremes of oligarchy or democracy. Cf. Part IV, Section 5, *supra*, *loc. cit.*, and esp. fn. 500, 502, 508, 5U, 513.

Cf. Maritain, *Freedom in the Modern World*, pp.57-58: The ideal society "would

prejudice in favor of giving *special* privileges, or withholding *basic* privileges, according to the accidents of birth or wealth. The perfect justice of the Democratic constitution will be fully realized in the concrete only when all the counteractive *oligarchical* forces—whether social or economic—are extirpated from the body politic.

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(To *be continued.*)

in effect be a society *sans classes*, that is to say one in which the distinctions between classes which have been heretofore observed in our Western civilization would have disappeared, such distinctions having been founded in earlier times chiefly on the inheritance of blood, in modern times on the inheritance of money. But a fresh differentiation would inevitably arise in a community of human beings all of whom were alike included in the category of workers, for there is no order without diversity and inequalities of rank; and in a world where social values would depend not on birth or on riches, but on work ". . . there would be " a true aristocracy of popular choice closely bound to the service of the community by the very object of their office." Cf. Jefferson's distinction between the true and the false " aristocracies." Vd. fn. 649 *infra*. In a recent article on the Jeffersonian tradition (entitled "Education for a Classless Society"), President Conant of Harvard described England as a free but socially stratified society, Russia as one not free but aiming to be classless, and the United States as approximating a classless and free society (*The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 165, No. 5, pp.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*T. Lucreti Cari de Rerum Natura Libri Sex.* Edited with Introduction and Commentary by WILLIAM ELLERY LEONARD and STANLEY BARNEY SMITH. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. Pp. ix + 886. \$5.00.

Lucretius is an author about whom opinions have greatly differed and one whose study has fluctuated to a great extent during different periods. Some writers have assigned him the primacy among the poets of Rome. No less capable a Latin scholar than Denys Lambin wrote the following tribute to his use of language: *non dubitanter affirmabo, nullum in tota lingua Latina scriptorem Lucretia latine melius esse locutum, non M. Tullii, non C. Caesaris orationem esse puriorem.* Yet he never attained the prominent place in later Roman education that was justly granted to the bards of Mantua and Venusia.

As a philosopher, Lucretius has failed to make a great mark. His hexameter poem *De Rerum Natura* is the best Latin exposition of Epicureanism; but his school lost the Roman field to Stoicism, which, for all its errors, appeared more worthy of acceptance to the minds of Romans. The middle ages looked upon him as a scientist more than as a philosopher; and even in science he was not held in the same esteem as Pliny or Seneca, to mention only the Latin authors.

Modern philological study of Lucretius began with Lachmann in the last century. Munro in England, Brieger in Germany, and Giussani in Italy carried on further researches into the interpretation of his poem. In our own century, Ernout and Robin, Bailey, Merrill, Diels, and Martin have published useful editions and commentaries of *De Rerum Natura*.

The present edition is a cooperative project, "the result of nearly life-long interests of two scholars, which some fifteen years ago became merged in a cooperative enterprise." Professor Leonard has contributed the General Introduction. on "Lucretius: The Man, the Poet, and the Times"; Professor Smith has contributed the Latin text, the Commentary, and the Introduction to the Commentary, but "in a broader sense they are jointly responsible for the whole" (p. v).

Such a cooperative project has the obvious advantage of two heads instead of one, but in one instance at least it has led to overlapping. Witness the treatment by Leonard of Mss. (pp. 84-91) and the fuller treatment by Smith (p. 95 ff.), where there is necessarily some repetition. Usually, however, this overlapping is happily avoided.

Leonard's introduction is pleasantly written and sufficiently informative. It shows first-hand acquaintance with the Latin writings of the contemporaries and predecessors of Lucretius. His years are given as 99-55 B. C. on the basis of St. Jerome's Chronicle. The question of his madness is discussed, and Leonard is unable to agree fully with Postgate and Conway who considered V. 1308-49 as a "madman's dream." The poem itself is used with advantage to obtain a view of the author's personality, but some of the conjectures are rather fine spun and unconvincing. The treatment of Epicurus, his influence on Lucretius, and the independence of the latter in certain instances, is excellent. Leonard deals roughly with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (p. 73; especially with the last, whose scientific interests in the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms receive scant mention. A student would get the erroneous idea that Aristotle was a mere deductive logician with a distaste for experiment. Again, Epicurus is mentioned as "perhaps the founder of inductive (as distinct from deductive) logic" (p. 47), although Aristotle is more deserving of such a title from the viewpoint both of time and of merit. It is admitted (p. 48) that Epicurus and Lucretius "smuggled into" their system both reason and ethical judgments which are not accounted for by their system of materialistic atomism. The strong influence of Empedocles in addition to (and sometimes even distinct from) that of Epicurus is rightly insisted on. The agreement between the philosophical atomism of Lucretius and the modern scientific atomic theory is greatly overstressed. Leonard has a prejudice against teleological thinking, upon which his information seems very limited (p. 60). He fails to appreciate the value of divine revelation as a guardian against error, and so naively speaks of "religious myth" as blocking free speculation on early man (cf. pp. 73). No mention is made of the inconsistency of Lucretius in rejecting the tales of gods as mere mythology, and then using that same mythology to point out, in the sacrifice of Iphigenia, the evils that religion could produce.

Professor Smith has a clear discussion of the Mss. all of which go back to an archetype of the fourth century. His treatment of "Textual Errors" is very helpful. He has a useful sketch of the diction and style of Lucretius which sums up neatly the results of several works: Ernout, Cartault, Deutsch, and Spangenberg. He falls into the old error about the shifting quantity of a *vowel* preceding a mute or liquid (pp. 160-1). It is taught by philologists that the quantity of the *syllable*, not of the vowel, differs in such instances (cf. Kent, *The Sounds of Latin*, ed., p. 104). The wrong date is assigned for the death of Isidore of Seville (p. 104). There are a few other minor errors, showing lack of acquaintance with modern views on quantities.

But I have no desire to go into a list of errors. I feel justly grateful for the useful information assembled into this one volume. The commentary,

which is really helpful, shows that the authors have in mind the needs of our sad generation of college students who have little Latin and less than less Greek. Where Merrill cites the original Greek, this edition gives a good translation, often original. Much has been done since Merrill's edition in 1907, and this work offers a convenient **If** it does not displace Merrill in our American courses, it will at any rate be a welcome addition to his fine volume. The University of Wisconsin Press can well be proud of this finely printed and well-indexed book.

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*The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino.* By PAUL OSKAR KRUSSELLER (Trans. by Virginia Conant). New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. Pp. xiv + 441. \$4.50.

The philosophers of the Renaissance are little known. The textbooks usually pass over the two centuries which mark the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of modern times with a few perfunctory remarks. The overthrow of the medieval system and the rise of the new science seem to them more important than the work done by thinkers who, after all, form the link between the past and the present. Thus, we welcome any study which makes us better acquainted with the personalities who fashioned thought in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Among these thinkers, Marsilio Ficino (1438-1499) holds a prominent place. He was the founder and the head of the "Platonic Academy" at Florence and exercised a great influence on many people. Pico della Mirandola, for instance, was his pupil. Ficino, who was ordained a priest in 1473, attempted to work out a synthesis of Christian doctrine and Platonic, or rather Neo-Platonic, philosophy, although he took account, even to a large extent, of Aristotelian and Thomistic ideas. He was thoroughly opposed to Averroism which, at his time, dominated many of the philosophical schools. Ficino's translations played an important role in the "humanistic" movement; the one he made of Plotinus is still highly regarded. Notwithstanding his dependence on ancient and medieval philosophy he was not without ideas of his own. His work is well worthy of consideration. Accordingly, one opens Dr. Kristeller's book with great expectations. That one is disappointed, in a measure, is the result of several defects, two of which are of a rather serious nature.

The many quotations from Ficino are mostly given in English translation only. This is in itself a drawback. It becomes the more so when the reader realizes that the translations are open to objections. Terms are

used for which it is difficult to imagine the original expression, e. g., "the peculiar end of a thing" (p. 143), "charm" (p. . . . "model" (p. 95). Sometimes the translation is definitely mistaken: p. 37 where *sufficiencia 8Ubsistendi* is rendered by "capacity for existence"; the phrase *universi natura possibilis* . . . (p. 72) is mistranslated; *demens* on p. 165 does not mean "mad" but "lacking mind," or "not mindlike"; *secretio* (p. . . . is not "secretion" but rather separation, what Eckehardt called *Abgeschiedenheit*, nor does *vacatio* mean "vacation" but being free for, having a mind emptied of other things. It is hardly correct to translate *affectio* (of will) by disposition. On p. 39 *decuit* is rendered by "it was convenient," *decet* by "meet," although the use of the past and present tense is obviously significant. *Princeps* becomes "prince" on p. 80, and "head" on p. 83; neither of these words gives exactly the sense. Act and action are not distinguished (pp. 77 and 236). Twice one comes across mistakes which, perhaps are printing errors, p. 21 *desiderant-denyng*, p. 296 *laetus in praesens*. The phrase "the angel has a number" (p. 88) is to say the least, clumsy and not to be understood by anyone not acquainted with Neo-Pythagorean speculation. *Complexio* is not a "sum" (p. . . . but something like an integration, an organic togetherness, and must be read in the light of Cusanian philosophy.

Ficino mentions Cusanus, the author tells us, only once, and the editors of the great edition of Cusanus' works refer to only one passage which might be, but probably is not, taken from the writings of the Cardinal. However, the absence of literal quotations and of the name does not constitute a sufficient proof for the absence of any influence. *Complexio*, for instance, is a Cusanian term. Also, Ficino speaks--the author does not mention this but it is reported by Fr. Olgiati--of *docta religio*, an expression sounding much like an intentional echo of *docta ignorantia*. There are other passages in which one is strongly reminded of Cusanus. These parallels ought to be investigated.

They are, however, as little considered in this work as are many other obvious references, on Ficino's part, to his predecessors. To characterize the thought of any philosopher it is necessary to view him against his intellectual background. To have omitted this, constitutes the other serious defect of this work. Many ideas are presented as Ficino's own, perhaps even as original, which are simply repetitions of statements contained in various writings of the past. It is of a minor importance that the use of *latitudo* is, hypothetically, traced back to the *Calculations* of Suiseth, though the *Tractatus latitudinum formarum* by Nicholas Oresme was printed in 1486 at Padua. The author rightly emphasizes the influence of St. Augustine--as well as of Plato and the Neo-Platonists; he also mentions occasionally St. Anselm. But there are many passages which obviously stem from Thomistic writers. Curiously, the only work of Aquinas ever

referred to is the *Contra Gentes*; one may, however, presume that Ficino was not ignorant of the rest of Thomistic literature. He was a canon at the Cathedral of Florence; from 1446 to 1459 St. Antoninus, a Dominican, was Archbishop there; he is the author of a once famous *Summa*, written *ad mentem doctoris*. This book figures also among those contained in the library of Pico della Mirandola. It is highly-improbable that Ficino should not have been acquainted with this work and other Thomistic treatises. In fact, there are many passages in which notions occur which are well known to any student of Thomism: To mention only a few examples: pp. 44, 138, 176 the concepts of *actus immanens* and *transiens*, pp. 51 and 63 of ontological truth, pp. 63 and 138 of *bonum diffusivum sui*, p. 160 the principle *anima quodammodo omnia*, p. 166 the *argumentum ex gradibus*, and so on.

No reference is found to St. Bonaventure, although his exemplarism apparently influenced Ficino. Nor is it mentioned that many of Ficino's principles are common to all his predecessors. The reader is led to overrate Ficino's originality.

Dr. Kristeller only refers in a general manner to Ficino's indebtedness to his predecessors. It is, therefore, left to the reader to find out what are the truly characteristic contributions of the Florentine thinker. The author emphasizes mainly two notions which, if this reviewer understands correctly, he considers as Ficino's most personal ideas. One is the *primum in aliquo genere*, which is discussed pp. 146-170. The second is the notion of *appetitus naturalis*, pp. 171-172.

Concerning the first, the author correctly refers to similar notions, *perfectum in aliquo genere*, as found in St. Anselm, St. Thomas and others. One may consider also another writer who, at this time, was highly regarded: Thomas Bradwardine, *doctor profundus*, who in *De causa Dei* (1344) says *quod nullus processus infinitus in entibus, sed est in quolibet genere unum principium*. This *primum* is the perfect realization of the *genus* (which, it seems, should be considered, ontologically, as a *species*), and the other members are relatively imperfect and impure. The *genus* reproduces, as it were, within its structure the plan of Being as a whole, with its hierarchy; so also there exists a last and lowest member in every *genus*. The *genera* thus become definite spheres of reality, reproducing each the structure of the universe. The conception later developed in Leibniz' monadology, that each particular being mirrors the universe, can be traced back to Plato and the Stoics, and is found with various modifications in many writers (*minor mundus*); sometimes it is referred to man alone, sometimes generalized so as to apply to any being whatsoever. Here, again, the relation to Cusanus needs clarification.

Ficino holds, with many of the medieval "Platonists," that the universe is an animated being, also that the celestial bodies have their own souls



around which it is "natural" to them to revolve. It is furthermore in accordance with this tradition that man is considered as the very center, the point where the sensible and the intelligible world touch one another. It should be noted, incidentally, that this view has nothing of the often mentioned "anthropocentrism" of the medieval system, nor is the idea that man is the "crown" of sensible creation indicative of a lack of humility. Contrary to the ideas often expressed by the enthusiastic admirers of "modernity," it was the medieval mind which was humble, and it is the modern scientific mind which is not.

In his anthropology Ficino appears to be not quite consistent. On one hand he held that "man is the soul" (p. 318), a view reminiscent of older ideas, e. g., of Hugh of St. Victor; on the other hand he has an argument for the necessity of resurrection of the body gathered from the notion that soul and body are ordained to one another.

In his psychology one may note the notion of the *formulae innatae*—adumbrating the idea of "inborn ideas"—which *formulae* seem to become actualized much in the same manner as is the case with the first principles in Aquinas. The intellectual substances are credited with a direct knowledge of the particulars, by an argument *ex eminentia*.

The notion of symbolic cognition plays an important part. The image is related to the "idea" it represents as the thing directly pictured to the thing symbolized. We know things by the accidents and also symbolically; lower things are symbols of higher ones the nature of which becomes visible in the symbol (p. 95 ff.).

The nature of man and mind is conceived on the basis of the same ontological principles on which the whole order of being rests. These principles are, in the main, Neo-Platonic with, however, the difference that, contrary to Plotinus, it is not the higher emanation which brings forth the next one, but they all are created by God. Ficino apparently does not apply the notion of analogy to being, since he asserts that the One is above Being (p. 45).

The homogeneity of Being leads to the theory of the *appetitus naturalis*, which on the other hand is related to Ficino's conception of love and of human relations. Dr. Kristeller believes that Ficino took this term and idea from Epicurus, who elaborated the Aristotelian doctrine of *orexis*. However, it should be noted that term and notion belong to traditional teaching and that Ficino must have come across them elsewhere too. In fact, there seems to be little in Ficino's ideas which would go beyond the traditional views.

Ficino seems to be the father of the notion of "Platonic love," although the author is obviously mistaken in his belief that medieval philosophers knew of love only as existing either between the sexes, or—as friendship—between individuals of the same sex. Even a superficial study of Aquinas' remarks on *amor amicitiae* might have shown the falsity of this interpretation.

Notwithstanding the many criticisms this work calls forth, we must gratefully acknowledge our debt to Dr. Kristeller for having made accessible the philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. Our gratitude would be greater still if the author had found ways to add a chapter on the further influence of Ficino, beyond the circle of his immediate pupils and friends. If there are many conceptions in this philosophy which link it definitely to the past, there are others pointing to the future. The "ancestry" of what is called "modern" philosophy is still known but incompletely, and Ficino may well be an intermediary between medieval Scholasticism and more recent philosophies. To evaluate his influence would appear as an important and attractive task.

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