THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VOL. XXV JANUARY, No. 1

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

WHETHER they agree with him or not, theologians must acknowledge Dom Odo Casel, O. S. B., as a primary influence in the development of contemporary sacramental theology. The fascination that his theory exercises, even if only as a catalysing agent, is made evident in the ever-growing bibliography which by now must have outpaced all but the most leisured theologian.[1] Because of Dom Casel's unwillingness to express himself in Scholastic terms, theologians have experienced a certain uneasiness in dealing with his theories. To speculative arguments advanced against his he invariably reverted to the authority of Tradition and explained with untiring patience that all difficulties could be overcome if the critics understood the presence of the his-

[1] Th. Filthaut, *Die Kontroverse uber die Mysteritmlehre,* Warendorf, 1947 (French tr., Paris-Tournai, 1954) gives an account of the first reactions to Casel. For more recent developments cf. J. Gaillard, "Chronique de liturgie," *Revue Thomiste* 57 (1957). pp. *510-551.*

torical mysteries which he proposed was sacramental. His followers adopt the same appeal. Few theologians have succeeded in suppressing their conviction that the human actions of Christ, being essentially sucessive and therefore temporal, cannot be made present in their historical reality several hundred years after the event. At the same time, few theologians have failed to be impressed by easel's undoubted insight into the fact, attested to by Tradition, that the sacraments are not independent, self-sufficient sources of grace but are essentially related to the mystery of Christ into which they introduce the believer. All serious contemporary sacramental theologians have made and are still making, attempts to express the insight in traditional Scholastic terms. Until recently, the principal sponsors of modifications of Casel's theory were more or less external to the Thomistic school: SOhngen,Warnach, Monden and others. In the last few years, however, a version of the mystery-presence theory has been proposed by Thomists, their number apparently growing, claiming to find it in the pages of St. Thomas himself. In this article we wish to examine the new theory as developed in the works of its principal proponents, evaluate its claim to be Thomistic, and, finally, propose an alternative, more securely based, we believe, on Thomistic principles, if further removed from the ideas of Maria Laach.

I. *New Thomistic theory.*

Rejecting the possibility of presence of the historical mysteries, some Thomists think to find in St. Thomas' teaching on the instrumental efficacy of the mysteries of Christ a clear basis for asserting a certain presence according to an element of the mysteries which is supra-temporal.

Fr. H. E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P., while referring to the eagerly-awaited second volume of his work on the sacramental economy of salvation for a full treatment of the matter, confidently gives a preview of his position as pertaining to· his historical survey of St. Thomas' teaching.[2] Since the mysteries of Christ, he

• H. E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P., *De sacramentele keilseconomie,* Antwerp, 1952, pp. 161 f.

states, when elevated by God, participate in the divine power by reason of the instrumental power (*virtus instrumentalis)* communicated to them, they become " interior mysteries " and thus contain an element which transcends time *(perenniteits-gehalte)* .[3] Since the divine creative action is eternal, giving to effects not merely their substance but also their place in time and space, the historical acts of Christ in the days of his flesh can, therefore, according to their *perenniteitsgehalte,* efficiently produce gracetoday. [4] The sacraments receive this supra-temporal -action of the mysteries and apply it to man. Christ in heaven is not excluded from this action. "The sacraments are not, therefore, *new* actions of Christ, but the mystery-actions of the *Christus historicus,* which, according to their supra-temporal content, are still the present actions of the *Christus gloriosus."* [5] This we take to mean that the *virtus instrumentalis,* communicated to Christ on earth, preserves an element of the mysteries in supra-temporal fashion in the glorified Christ; and when this *virtus* is applied through the sacraments it is the historical event, as so preserved, which is active. Fr. Schillebeeckx explains further that, since the historical mystery of Christ involved his body as well as his soul, its supra-temporal content makes available to us the external action as well as the interior acts of soul (against Sohngen) .[6]

There was also a supra-temporal content in Christ's mysteries, this writer continues, precisely as human actions, not as instruments of God, in so far as they were governed by his beatific knowledge. The redemptive act of will, the heart of the his-

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 168.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp, 164, 165.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 165.

[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 166, 167. Fr. Schillebeeckx's conclusion of his *historical* study of St. Thomas on this point is worth quoting: " S. Thomas aanvaardt dus in de sacramenten een *mysterie-tegenwoordigheid* van de historische heilsdaad, als menselijke, geestelijke en lichamelijke daad, doch *naar haar boventijdelijk, innerlijk mysterie-gehalte,* als *Godefficientie.* Hij spreek niet over de aanwezigheid van de *daad* zelf, maar van haar *efficaciteit,* haar 'virtus.'" (pp. 167, 168; italics author's)-We may be permitted a little surprize that St. Thomas was so explicit about a twentieth-century problem.

torical mysteries, remains, therefore, unchanged in the glorified Christ. Consequently, there is present in the sacraments, not only the *virtus instrumentalis* of the historical mysteries, but also the identical inner human act of redemption.[7] Further, though external actipns are subject to time, they form a single human act with the act of will commanding them, so that the external sacrifice of Calvary forms an existential unit with this interior act governed by Christ's beatific knowledge. Excluding the possibility that the external event of Calvary can be supra-temporal, Fr. Schillebeeckx defers his conclusion to his second volume, while indicating that Thomistic thought would suggest that we see a symbolic parallel to the expression of Christ's inner sacrifice on Calvary in the ,sacramental sign.

Fr. M. Matthijs, O. P., explains the identity of the Mass with Calvary and the Last Supper by appealing to *Summa theol.*, III, q. *56,* a. 1, ad 3, developing the same idea as Fr. Schillebeeckx about the supra-temporal character of the *virtus instrumentalis.*[8] In virtue of the divine power which attains as present all places and times, the act of offering of Calvary is active instrumentally in the consecrating priest so that the sacrifice itself is made present in the symbols of the Church.[9]

Of particular interest is a recent work published by, a Benedictine of Maria Laach itself, Dr. P. Wegenaer, which proposes in Scholastic terminology a theory of the presence of the mysteries intended to reconcile Dom Casel and St. Thomas.[10] As we intend to base our discussion of the new intetyretation

[7] *llJi4.,* pp. 166-171.

[8] M. Matthijs, O. P., " 'Mysteriengegenwart' secundum S. Tomam," *Angelicum,* 84 (1957)' pp. 898-899.

[9] The same interpretation is given *Summa tkeol.,* III, q. 56, a. I, ad 8 by C. Journet, *La Mease,* Brnges, 1057, ·pp. 105 f.; T. Kreider, O. S. B., "Mysteriengegenwart," *Z,a fii,r Phil. und Tkeol':,* 6 (1959), pp. 4!!0-480; Cl.-J. Geffre,O. P., in *Bull. tkom.,* 9 (1956), pp. 81!!-817; J. Hamer, O. P., "Bulletin de theologie dogmatique," *Rev. Sc. phil. et tkeol.,* 48 (1959), pp. 725, 7!!6; cf. below n. !!!!.

[10] P. Wegenaer, O. S. B., *Heilagegenwart. Daa Heilawerk Christi und die virtua divina in den Sakmmenten unter beaonderer Berii.ckaicktigung von Euckariatie und Taufe.* Liturgiewissenschaftliche Quellen und Forschungen, Heft 88. Miinster, Wf., 1958.

of St. Thomas on Dom Wegenaer's important work, as being the most recent and most fully developed presentation of the theory, we give the following summary of his guiding principles.

Dom Wegenaer divides his work into three parts: I. The presence of the *passio* in the sacraments *per contactum virtutis divinae* (pp. 9-53). II. The presence of the *passio in the* Eucharist and baptism (pp. 54-86). ill. The presence of the *passio* in the Eucharist and baptism according to the teaching of Odo Casel on the mysteries (pp. 87 f.).

The basis for the whole speculative structure is found in the first part which, after general remarks on the relation between First and secondary causes .. Dom Wegenaer develops as follows.

1. The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the *virtus divina,* an instrument wholly *sui generis,* since, apart from having dominion over its own acts, it is united hypostatically to the Word. Thus the humanity as instrument participates in the divine power, and in all the theandric actions of Christ the divine saving activity is present. The conclusion drawn from this common doctrine of the Thomistic school is crucial and must be quoted in full:

If the *virtus divina* is active in the humanity of Christ, then the redemptive action of Christ gains thereby an *eternal power* (ref. to *Summa theol.,* III, q. 52, a. 8; q. 22, ad *5,* ad 2) for Christ acts *instrumentaliter* through the power of the divinity (ref. to· III, q. 48, a. 6; ibid., ad 2). On these grounds we may say: the historical mysteries of Christ, especially his passion and death, are a universal cause of salvation (ref. to *C. 'Gentes,* IV, c. 58; *Summa theol.,* III, q. 49, a. 1, ad 4; q. 51, a. 1, ad 2) and, as instrument of the omnipresent *virtus divina* are limited in their action by no spatia-temporal distance. 'All the mysteries of the life of Jesus on earth are, therefore, a living present according to their action, and so they act unceasingly on the supernatural transformation of men, and until the end of time they will continue to act, unchanging, on men's bodies and on the cosmos' (cf. A. Hoffmann, German trans. of *Summa theol.,* vol. 28, p. 453) .[11]

[11] *Op. cit.,* p. 19.

Hence, continues Dom Wegenaer, we can understand how St. Thomas could attribute to the passion, death, burial, descent into hell, resurrection and ascension, efficient instrumental causality in respect of our salvation, even though these acts, in their physical reality, no longer exist, since this is simply an application of his general principle that the *virtus divina* uses the action of Christ instrumentality.

2. Since this ever-active instrumental efficient causality must be specified, "action not determined by an idea *(causa formalis extrinseca)* is a *contradictio"* [12]–the historical actions of Christ exercise exemplary causality in respect to the men on whom they act. St. Thomas is quoted as attributing such exemplary causality to the passion, death, burial, resurrection, and ascension. In this way the faithful are conformed to the historical mysteries of Christ. " The redemptive act of Christ is, therefore, present by action everywhere it works salvation; and this is the historical act of redemption which-though past in its physical being-is made present to all men in need of redemption through the *contactus divinae virtutis."* [13]

3. The sacraments possess a two-fold causality: exemplary and instrumental efficient. To ·show that all the sacraments are exemplary causes in dependence on the exemplary causality of the passion and death of ·christ, Dom Wegenaer appeals to the combined signification of the outer sacrament *(sacramentum tantum)* and the inner sacrament *(res et sacramentum).* As his reasoning is somewhat difficult, we shall follow' his argument closely.

For St. Thomas the sacramental character is both thing and sign. As thing it gives a *configuratio* with Christ in his priestly actions, and " there corresponds to this something similar in the other sacraments " which is also " the mysterious form of our *configuratio cum Christo sacerdote."* The inner sacrament can give us this configuration because in the exemplary causality of the outer sacrament there is given the possibility of a

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 20.
[1a] *Ibid.,* P· !!!!.

partieipatio per similitudinem. [14] A text of St. Thomas permits us to say that the " exemplary efficacy of the humanity of Christ has been transferred to the sacraments, which are the *exemplars* of what happens to men in the sacramental image *[Abbild, eumplatum]* of [his] saving action." [15] Consequently, the sacrament is both *exemplatum* of the historical act of redemption and instrumental *exemplar* of the conformation of the faithful with the death and resurrection of Christ. This conformation is indicated by the signification of the outer sacrament; texts of St. Thomas are quoted (all of them, though Dom Wegenaer does not point this out, referring to baptism). It is not clear, however, considering the external sacramental action alone, .that anything more than external likeness to Christ is in question. But since the outer sacrament produces the inner sacrament and communicates to it its signification it follows that the *res et sacramentum* is also the exemplar of Christ and of his redemptive death. [16] Since the *res sacramervtum* is also sign, an efficacious sign, " the *res* of the ' inner sign,' namely, the signification of the redemptive death of Christ, enters grace, and we can speak of a Christ-figuration *[Christusbildlichkeit]* of sacramental grace." [17]

Since the *res et sacramentum* differs in each sacrament there are correspondingly different forms of this likeness to Christ in grace; but common to all is this essential relation to Christ and his *death.* Consequently, the "redemptive action of Christ, his suffering and death, belong essentially to sacramental,

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 86. Dom Wegenaer refers, presumably, to a participation in Christ the Priest.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 87. Dom Wegenaer cites *Co1111p. tkeol.,* c. !!47. The quotation he gives is from c. 289 (Marietta, 1954, n. 514) • In respect to *justification* St. Thomas states that the death and resurrection of Christ are each *causa effectiva instrumentaliter* and *causa ea:emplaria aac Tamtmtaliter.* Based on St. Augustine, *De Trin.,* IV, c. 8, the passage does not refer to the sacraments. See below, n. 64 and text there.

[18] *Op. cit.,* pp. !J7, 88.

[u] *Ibid.,* p. 88'. Dom Wegenaer's object in this argument is to prove that *every* sacrament really incorporates into the *death* of Christ. Hence the appeal to the *rea et aacramentum* and the attempt to show that in every sacrament it symbolizes and confers participation in the death and resurrection of Christ.

exemplary causality." [18] By reason of the formal dependence of *exemplatum* on *exemplar*, of the Christian on the passion, in all sacraments the passion is present in analogical fashion; and, since the passion exercises its exemplary causality only through efficient causality in virtue of divine power, this is analogy of attribution. [19] The sacrament itself exercises the required efficient causality in so far as it is subordinated as an instrument to the *virtus divina* which is acting through the historical mysteries of the life of Christ, the *instrumentum coniunctum divinitatis.* The problem of the mode of presence of the historical acts in the sacraments remains.

4. As a basis for his explanation of this *mysterius reconditae theologiae* Dom Wegenaer cites the celebrated text of *Summa theol.,* III, q. *56,* a. 1, ad 3, on the efficient causality of Christ's resurrection in respect to the bodily resurrection of all men. The key words are:

> The resurrection of Christ is the efficientcause of our resurrection by divine power which alone can give life to the dead. Now this power attains as present all places and times. And such virtual contact satisfiesthe notion of this efficacy.

Dom Wegenaer comments: " Thus the *virtus divina* is present to every place and to every time. But the human nature also of Christ, as the *instrumentum coniunctum,* spans in its instrumental activity all spatio-temporal distance, and this through its hypostatic union with the omnipresent Logos and the consequent participation of the humanity of Christ in the *virtus divina."* [20] The humanity of Christ is unlike other instruments in that it lacks its own *suppositalitas,* this being supplied by the Logos. But, *quo aliquid est actu, eo agit;* that is, " the causality of the agent is measured by his being-in-act or by his perfection of being"; hence," the divine activity, identified with the divine substance, must, in its perfection of being, stand behind the efficacy of the historical act of salvation and that of the sacraments and enter in to these." It follows that the historical act

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 88. [19] *Ibid.,* p. 89. [20] *Ibid.,* pp. 48, 44.

possesses a supra-temporal saving efficacy and this is transferred to the sacrament.[21] This is sufficient to make the historical action present in the sacraments, not substantially but according to activity, this activity the exemplary and the efficient instrumental causality of the mysteries of Christ and also the subordinated exemplary and efficient causality of the sacramt;)ntal sign.[22]

5. Dom Wegenaer develops logically the application of his principle to baptism and the Eucharist. His exposition of the sacramental theory of the Mass is and in particular his treatment of the of Christ's act of offering, where he maintains the idea of sacramentalism at a point where many writers lose sight of it. He argues in the final part that his theory provides the speculative elaboration of easel's teaching, permitting the latter to make clear its right to the patronage of St. Thomas.

It is only in his final summing-up that Dom Wegenaer mentions, as an after-thought, that the classical commentators of St. Thomas explain the efficient causality of the mysteries of Christ's life in quite another way, namely, in terms of the heavenly Christ. **It** is too easily overlooked, concedes Dom Wegenaer, that the glorification of Christ belongs, as the consummation of his passion, to the instrumental activity of his humanity. "The glorified Christ brings it about that the *mysteria carnis* are present to us today; he unites us to his historical act of salvation which thus becomes present to us, and we gain thereby full particpation ifi the glorified Christ through participation in the historical act of salvation."[23] With this enigmatic statement Dom Wegenaer concludes.

[01] *Ibid.,* p. *50.*

[••] *Ibid.,* pp. *50, 51.* Dom Wegenaer cites the following as holding for his interpretation of St. Thomas on the resurrection: A. Hoffmann, German trans. of *Summa theol.,* vol. 28, p. *45S;* Th. Tschipke, *Menscheit Christi ala Heil11.organd61' Gottheit,* Freiburg i. Br., 1940, p. 187.-R. Tremblay, 0. P., appears to accept the new interpretation; cf. "Mystere de la Messe," *Angelicum,* 86 (1959), p. 199, n. 1, and p. !tOO, n. 1.

[••] Wegenaer, *op. cit.,* p. US. *Ibid.,* p. 122: "Die Frage nach der Wirkweise der historischen Heilstat scheint den Kommentatoren dem ausfiihrlich erorterten Prob-

II. *Traditional interpretation of St. Thomas.*

Well aware of the texts of St. Thomas attributing efficient causality to the passion, death and resurrection, the commentators interpret them as referring to the glorified Christ in whom the mysteries remain virtually. They explicitly exclude the possibility that past event could have an instrumental effect at the present time. John of St. Thomas writes:

> The resurrection operates efficaciously, not according as it no longer actually exists, but according to the risen humanity. That [...] it attains all places and times does not signify that something no longer existing attains the future [...] but that the power is applied by God for all times and all place, that is, according as it coexists with a time or place (yet not as it is contained by that place, but as it coexists with it) because, namely, the risen humanity endures for all that time; and in this fashion the passive resurrection enduring in the humanity causes for all time.[24]

Sylvius also adverts explicitly to the problem of time:

> The past actions of Christ do not serve as physical instruments in respect to our justification or other effects, because the existence of a physical cause is required if it is really to operate; but the humanity itself, since it exists, retains physical causality; and this is what St. Thomas means.[25]

The same position is adopted by Cajetan, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart and others.[26]

The formal point of this traditional teaching of the Thomist school, it should be observed, is that an instrumental cause, as physical cause, must be contemporaneous with its effect; therefore, only Christ as he exists at this moment can cause grace now. If recent developments of theology suggest that in the

lem der philosophischen Moglichkeit einer instrumentalen physischen Wirksamkeit der Menchheit Christi untergeordnet zu sein." What problem the question should be subordinated to, he unfortunately does not inform us.

[24] John of St. Thomas, *De sacramentis,* disp. a. 8, dub. 8, n. 90; cf. disp. i4, a. 1, dub. 9, n. *559.*

[25] Sylvius, *Comment. in Ill,* q. 18, q. 8.

[26] Catejan, *Commet. in III,* q. *56,* a. 1, n. II; Salmanticenses, *De Incam.,* disp. 28; dub. 4; Gonet, *Clyp. thom., De lncarn.,* disp. 19, a. 2, n. 45; Billuart, *De* Incam., diss. 18, q. 2.-0thers cited by Dom Wegenaer, p. 122, n. 601.

glorified Christ there remains some element of the historical passion, this assertion will not be contrary to traditional Thomism. To justify the rejection, however, of the formal element of the commentators' opinion, so :6rmly proposed and considered the only possible reading of St. Thomas, a very detailed examination of St. Thomas' writing would be necessary. This examination the upholders of the new theory do not o:ffer.[27] They simply, if not naively, quote the very text that occasioned such detailed explanations and appear to think that, by insisting that their interpretation is the obvious one, they can establish its truth. This disregard for ordinary ·scientific procedure is part of the legacy of enthusiasm left to sacramental theology by Dom Casel. To propose difficulties to those who have seen the light is to brand oneself blind; it is a risk that we are prepared to run.

III. *Criticimn of the new theOT1J.*

The most important places in St. Thomas indicated as the basis for the new theory are *Summa theol.,* Ill, q. 56, a. 1, ad 1 and ad 8. The article solves the question whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of men's bodily The reply is given:

> The Word of God first attributes immortal life to the body naturally united to Him, so that through it He may operate resurrection in all others.

The first objection argues from the principle:. *Posita causa sufjicienti, necesse est ejjectum poni.* If, therefore, Christ's resurrection is the cause of other resurrections the dead should already have risen. To which St. Thomas replies that it is the power of the Word, controlled by His will, which raises men from the dead. Consequently,

•• Gaillard's indulgent reference, *art. cit.,* p. 688, to this traditional teaching is typical of many modem writers' casual dismissal of theologians who came to their conclusions only·after an immense eftort of reflections and after having taken account of difficulties and objections that do not even occur to their supplanters. Significantly, for Gaillard, the new theory "n'oftre aucune difficulte" (p. 640).

.it is not necessary that the effect follow at once, but according to the disposition of the Word of God.

In reply to the third objection St. Thomas states that Christ's resurrection is the cause of the general resurrection in two ways: as exemplary cause and as efficient cause. The efficient causality he explains in terms of his general teaching that the humanity of Christ is the hypostatically united instrument of his divinity and that " what Christ did or suffered in his humanity are, from the,power of his divinity, saving for us." There follows the battle-cry of the new theory: *Quae quidem virtua praesentialiter attingit amnia loca et tempora.* In attempting to understand thiS' somewhat sibylline utterance two lines of Thomist thought must be followed: the notion of divine instrument and the concept of divine action in relation to created effects. After summing up the conclusions of these inquiries we shall consider the texts of St. Thomas on the mysteries, showing how they fit into the context of his general theology.

(a) *Thomist notion of divine instrument.* An instrumental cause is distinguished from a principal cause in that a principal cause acts in virtue of its own inherent form, the effect bearing a certain likeness, either analogical or univocal, to that form, whereas an instrumental cause acts, not in virtue of its own form, but·" solely in virtue of a motion by which it is moved by a principal agent." It follows ·that the effect produced by an instrument bears. a likeness to the principal agent, rather than to the instrument. [28] The instrument is, nevertheless, truly a cause of the effect, but only to the extent that it is moved by the principal.agent, that. is to say, by reason of the *virtua instromentalis* imparted to ,it by the principal agent. notion of *virtua instrumentalis* is an analogical· one, and though commonly illustrated by the example of local motion-arm, stick, stone-is realized in many different forms. This is especially clear when the idea is applied to supernatural instru-

•• Summa *tkeol.,* m, q. 6!!, a. !.

ments where a very real, if impossible to visualize, *virtus* is required to produce an effect in the order of grace. What is common to every *virtus instrumentalis* is that, compared to the stable and adequate operative power of the principal agent, it possesses only an incomplete entity essentially consisting in a movement transmitted by the principal agent and directed towards the production of the effect: *esse transiens ex uno in aliud, et incompletum.*[29] Just as motion is imperfect act, belonging strictly to no category, but being" reduced" to the category of its term, so the *virtus instrumentalis*, being transient, cannot be defined in itself but cari simply be ascribed in terms of its function, namely, the transmitting of the action of the principal agent to the effect. In this sense it may be reduced to the genus of either of the terms of the operation, so that a *virtus instrumentalis* empowering a creature to cause grace is_to be said to be spiritual or supernatural virtually, though, if received in a material instrument, it may be corporeal entitatively .[80] The term " transient" applied to the *virtus* has nothing to do with duration; it denotes that the instrumental power is not native to the instrument but is imparted to it only in so far as it is actually subordinated to the principal agent and is actually serving it in producing the effect.[31] It is because it has this essential function of transmitting the action of the principal agent and actually, by the very fact of its existence, producing here and now an effect proportioned to the principal cause that the *virtus instrumentalis* is described by St. Thomas

•• *Summa theol.,* ill, q. a. 4.

[80] *Ibid.,* ad 1, ad *De Ver.*, q. a. 4, ad *5.* Cf. Johns of St. Thomas, *CurBUB theol.,* d. 15, a. n. 48: [Cum virtus instrumentalis sit] "motio quaedam divina, quae recipitur in instrumento, si instrumentum fuerit corporale, corporalis erit entitative, spiritualis autem virtualiter, cum circa spiritum operari possit. Si autem instrumentum fuerit spirituale, spiritualis etiam erit motio ilia entitative, cum non distinguatur ut res a re ab ipso instrumento."

[81] Cf. John of St. Thomas, *CurBUB phil., Phil. nat.,* IP., q. "lgitur virtus, quae non datur ut per se operativa, sed ut continuativa cum alia principaliter operante, dicitur dari per modum motus, quia licet operativa sit, non tamen hoc habet nisi ex continuatione actuali ad virtutem principalis agentis cui ministrat et servit, dum actu operatur, et ideo dicitur per modum motus dari."

as intentional, tending towards an effect, with the suggestion of producing in that effect the intention of a principal agent.[32]

Thomists have taken some pains to express precisely this concept of St. Thomas. They distinguish between principal and instrumental cause in terms of the premotion required for the activity of each. A principal cause is, by reason of its complete possession of operative powers, in first act *(actu prima)* or natural potentiality, in relation to action. Premotion applies it to second act *(actus secundus),* actual operation proceeding from the operative power. An instrument, on the contrary, of itself lacking any innate proportion, even potential, to an effect of a higher order than itself, requires, if it is to produce such an effect instrumentally, such premotion as first gives it *actus pri,mus* in respect to that effect and simultaneously applies it to production of the effect. The premotion, or *virtus instrumentalis,* elevates and applies the instrument. Consequently, the *virtus instrumentalis* exists *only for the time or at the instant that the effect is being produced.*[88]

The *virtus instrumentalis* is, like all premotion, always a created reality, even when a supernatural effect is being produced. This St. Thomas points out explicity in the case of the power by which the words of the priest effect transubstantiation and by which the other sacraments are efficacious.[34] Likewise, the power by which Christ worked miracles was a created entity, elevating his humanity to operate as the instrument of God. This power, argues John of St. Thomas, was not divine omnipotence, for this cannot be communicated to a created nature: it follows that it must have been created.[35]

[81] Cf. *De unione Ve,-bi inc.,* a. 5, ad U: "lnstrumentum, inquantum movetur ab agente, consequitur quamdam intentionalem virtutem per influxum agentis, qui per inatrumentum transit in eflectum." *Summa theol.,* ill, q. 66, a. 1: "Est ibi [in water of baptism] quaedam sanctificationis virtus instrumentalis non permanens sed fluens *in komi1lf!lm." Ibid.,* q. 7l!, a. S, ad l!.

[88] Cf. John of St. Thomas, *CuTIIU8 tkeol.,* disp. 15, a. 5, n. 19: "Quare causae instrumentales ut sic tantum constituuntur in ratione talium pro illo tempore, aut inatanq temporis, quo instrumentaliter producunt efl'ectum." *Ibid.,* nn. S1, SS, 56.

[8·] *Summa tkeol.,* Ili, q. 78, a. 4.

[••] John of St. Thomas, *loc. cit.,* n. 17: "Humanitas Christi constitutur in actu

The instrument, prior to its elevation by the principal cause, possesses its own nature and the proportionate power of operating. The corresponding proper, or native, operation, in relation to which the instrument is itself a principal though secondary cause, must be exercised in the production of the common effect.[36]

Since, historically, this notion of instrument was elaborated principally in a theological context, it requires very slight adaptation to accomodate it to the case where the principal agent is God. Unlike created causes, God is under no compulsion to use instruments; if He chooses to do so, it is only in order to associate creatures in His supernatural activity. A further difference follows: the native operation of the instrument used by a creature must be in some fashion adapted to the use to which it is put; such proximate usefulness is not required in divine instruments, though in His wisdom, may choose to employ instruments remotely or analogically adapted to the effect which He produces through them, as He does, for example, in the sacraments.

Further, when God imparts instrumental motion to a creature it is not necessary that the instrument come into immediate physical contact, *contactus suppositi*, with the subject of the effect. The miraculous power which went out of Christ was equally effective whether he touched an invalid, merely spoke, or was far away. Since God is present everywhere, He can apply the instrumental action of the subordinated cause to the subject of the effect, *contactus virtutis.* It is of some consequence to insist that it is the instrumental action which is applied. God does not produce His effect directly by His divine power; that would eliminate the participation of the instrument. The divine effect is produced by God through the instrument; that is to say, it is the created *entitas vialis,* imparted to the

primo in ratione instrumenti physici eflectui gratiae et miraculorum per virtutem creatam, quae est motio aut elevatio Dei, seu usus passivus receptus in ipsa humanitate quo movetur ad producendos eflectus supernaturales." *Ibid.,* a. S; n.

•• *Summa theol.,* I, q. 45, a. *5.*

instrument, which is applied to the subject of the effect, and it is through instrumental activity that the effect is caused. Not to realize or to deny this is to deprive the Thomist theory of instrument of coherence. Now, this *vis instrumentalis* by which God elevates and applies the instrument is, of its nature, intentional; it is transient action from agent in effect. Its very existence depends on its being actually applied to the effect; it cannot be conceived of if this is denied. The fact that the elevating agent is in this case God is quite irrelevant; the nature of the created *vis instrumentalis* remains what it is. So much depends in sacramental theology on this point that it is worth while examining it more closely, clear though it appears in itself.

Cardinal Cajetan in one text is not as explicit about this as other commentators. He appears to suggest that the divine principal agent can overcome all limitations of the instrument:

> And since omnipotence is not confined to certain instruments, place or vicinities, it is of no importance what thing God uses instrumentally for any miracle. For, just as He can perform the work without any instrument, so He can perform it, not only by means of an instrument, but by means of any, wherever it exists and at whatever distance it is.

He adds at once:

> For the divine omnipotence is neither diminished nor restricted to the limits of the instrument He assumes; rather the instrument is raised so as to execute omnipotence in such miracle as it has been destined to efiect.[37]

This last statement, isolated from the context of Thomist teaching on instruments, could be understood to say that God in no way permits His action to be limited by the instrument which He uses; and absurd consequences could be drawn, not only in the question of the mysteries of Christ, but also in the much more developed area of the theology of creation. The question of creation is illuminating for our present problem for when treating of it the Thomist theologians lay down very clear limits to the use of creatures as divine instruments.

•• *Comment. in III,* q. IS, a. i, n. VI.

John of St. Thomas proposes the objection that, if an instrument according to its native operation need merely modify the action of God,-then nothing prevents God using an instrument in creation. He replies that the operation of every created being is an accident, existing, therefore, only in a presupposed subject and requiring a further presupposed subject in which to terminate, action being that which proceeds from the agent to the patient. [88] Consequently, if God chooses to use a created instrument, He must adapt Himself to the mode of operation of the instrument. He can apply it only to a pre-existing subject. [89] It is the nature of instrument that determines the question, not the power of God. A subsumption, pertinent to the problem of the mysteries, is taken from Suarez: why could not an immanent action of a creature be elevated by God to create, for in this case no subject is required to receive the instrumental action. John of St. Thomas replies that it is quite possible that God could elevate a creature's immanent action and apply it at a distance and that there should be no corresponding change produced in the distant subject; (that is, it is not necessary that a corresponding immanent action 'be produced in the effect) . But it is quite impossible that such an immanent action be elevated instrumentally without its producing, through the accidental *vis instrumentalis,* some change in the subject of the effect. The principle governing this conclusion is again that if God wills to grant the dignity of divine instrument to a creature, He thereby wills to adapt His mode of operation to that of the creature. In this sense He freely limits His omnipotence, conforming its execution to the bilities of created action, which is essentially motion from the agent *in:* the patient. If He wishes to make the creature His

[38] Differing opinions on the subject of action do not affect the point at issue here, which is that transitive action for its existence requires a patient. T. S. McDermott, 0. P., "The subject of predicamental action," *ThCl'ITtist,* iS (1960), pp. 189-210, argues persuasively that action is " the proper act and an accident of the agent indeed, but nevertheless in the patient and differing from pBBIIion not *secundum rtnn* but *secundum ratiofiem"* (p. !!02)•

[88] John of St. Thomas, *Our8U8 phil. Phil. nat.,* I P., q. !!6, a. !!:•

instrument He can act only " *intra lineam aotionis immuta:ntis aeu motua."* It is this principle that is pertinent to our present problem rather than the application to creation that John of St. Thomas makes of it. His present conclusion is that, since the native operation of the instrument is accidental action, though immanent, God must produce His effect by way of change, whether formal or total, in a presupposed subject; otherwise, He is simply not using the instrument.[40] The principle is equally valid when applied to all cases where a created *via inatrumentalia* is induced into accidental action, the action, of creatures. This *via* is by definition a transient, transitive action which exists only ll-t the moment of production of the supernatural effect. God can, of course, produce effects when He wills; but .if He chooses to produce them by means of such a created *via fluena,* then He must do so by producing the *via fluena* at the moment in time when He wills the effect to come into existence. Eternal in Himself and in His uncreated action, this operation is in time and the effects of His operation, including premotion of whatever kind, are in time and governed by time even if they are produced instantaneously .[41]

It is further to be noted that the humanity of Christ, though united hypostatically to the ,Person of the Word, is subject to the same conditions in this respect as any other created instrument. The fact that Christ's personality and existence are divine does not make his human actions as such any less human in their-specification:

> To operate is of the subsisting hypostasis, but according to a form and nature from which the operation its species. And therefore from diversity of forms or natures spring diverse species of operations; but from the unity of the hypotasis springs unity according to number as to operation of a species. . . . [42]

•• *Ibid.*

[01] Cf. Cajetan, *Comment. in III,* q. 62, a. 1, .:tl· VI: "Nee etiam inconvenit Deum, voluntarie utendo motu creaturae, agere in tempore; cum nullus adeo desipiat qui ileget Deum posse localiter movere, quod est agere in tempore."·

•• *Summa theol.,* ill, q. 19, a. 1, ad S.

The human nature has operation distinct from the divine, but "the divine nature uses the operation of the human nature as the operation of its instrument; and likewise the human nature participates the operation of the divine nature as an instrument participates the operation of the principal agent." [43] It is actions elicited by Christ's human intellect and will that are elevated and applied by divine power. This requires the creation of a transient instrumental power (via *inatrumentalia)* no different, as regards its essentially intentional or tendential character, from that which elevates and applies ordinary creatures: *agit utraque natura quod proprium eat cum alteriua communione.*

From this examination of the notion of instrument we conclude that an-instrument used by God exists as such only when it is under the actual influence of the principal agent, receiving from this agent a created *entitaa vialia,* consisting in motion which at the same instant elevates and applies the native operation of the instrument to the production in the same instant. of a supernatural effect. The fact that the principal agent is divine has for consequence that the native operation of the instrument may be an immanent action-a direction of the practical intellect, whether command or prayer-since, as elevated, this may be applied efficaciously by God to a locally distant subject. Since. however, the instrumental power has no other reality than motion to the effect, it is impossible that it exist in the instrument except at the instant of time when it is actually productive of the effect in the subject. Consequently, if God wills to use a creature, including the humanity of Christ, as a true instrument, He can do so only by elevating the creature at the instant in time when He wills to produce His effect. Instrument and effect must be contemporaneous.

(b) *Divine action in relation to created effects.* The second line of investigation suggested by *Summa theol.,* III, q. *56,* a. 1, ad 1 and ad 3, concerns the meaning given by St. Thomas to the phrase:

•• *Ibid.,* corp.

(virtus divina praesentialiter "... this [divine] power by its presence is in touch with all places and times" *attingit omnia loca et tempora);* and the similar declaration that divine effects result "according to the disposition of the Word of God."

The examination of these ideas will corroborate our conclusions concerning divine instruments.

The Thomistic sense of the presence of divine power to all times and places is to be found in *Summa theol.,* I, q. 14. All created things "pre-eXist in God as in the First Cause," seen by Him in His essence yet known in all their individuality .[44] Chosen for existence by decree of the divine will, even what are for us future contingent events are known to God with certainty since He knows them, " not merely as they exist in their causes, but as each one of them exists actually in itself."

And though contingent things come into actual being successively, yet God does not known contingent things successively as they exist with their own existence; which is how we know them; but God knows them together because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is His being; but eternity, all existing together, surrounds all time. . . . Hence all things that exist in time are present to God from eternity . . . since His gaze is directed from eternity on all things, as they exist in His presence.[45]

Temporal events are present in the eternal being of God not merely objectively as known, projected objects, but physically as objects really present. To deny this would be to suggest that God's knowledge changes when things come into created existence. Creatures are present in eternity insofar as they are contained in the eternal divine creative action. They exist in themselves as effects ·passively produced only in time; they exist in eternity insofar as the ever-actual divine creative action connotes them as its terms. That is to say, they exist in the divine essence as actually producing them.[46] Though present in this fashion in eternity created things are not pas-

" *Loc. cit.,* aa. *5,* 6, 8.

'" *Ibid.,* a. 18.

•• Cf. John of St. Thomas, *Cur8U8 tkool.,* disp. 11, a. S.

sively produced until the moment willed by God. In *Summa theol.,* q. 14, a. 8, St. Thomas puts forward exactly the same objection as appears in the article on the causality of the resurrection of Christ: obj. 2: Once the cause is placed, the effect is placed *(Posita causa ponitur effectus)* therefore, if the eternal knowledge of God is the cause of things, creatures must exist from eternity. The same reply is given in both cases; here:

> The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things exist in His knowledge. But it was not in the knowledge of God that things should exist from eternity. Consequently, although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures exist from eternity.

This is developed in St. Thomas' discussion of creation and a very pertinent distinction is drawn between the action of creatures and that of God. Particular agents presuppose creation set in motion by God; they act on realities already in existence and already subject to succession and therefore to time. God, however, presupposes no subject to His operation; He creates the thing itself which is subject to motion and to time: He produces the thing and time. Consequently, time is the result, not the presupposition, of His action; and He, remaining unchanged, wills eternally that His effects be passively produced in such order as will best manifest His omnipotence.[47]

Distinguishing, therefore, active creation, identified with the divine essence, and passive creation, the reality which creatures have in themselves, we are led to conclude that all things, and consequently all times and all places, are present eternally to God in His creative action, but that in themselves, passively created in the order willed by God, they are subject to sucession and to time. Since it is in the order of passive creation that one being acts on another as the instrument of God, in virtue of a passively-created *via instrumentalis,* it is impossible that the humanity of Christ be elevated instrumentally two thousand years ago and that the effect come into being today.

•• *Summa theol.,* I, q. 46, a. 1, ad 6.

God is present also to passive creation as author of both natural and supernatural being; but as far as the creature is concerned this is a presence measured by time. The presence of God consists in the immediate contact of the creature with the active reality of God from which contact the creature draws its being. It is a presence, therefore, which is conditioned by the essentially successive nature of created things. So far from liberating things from time, it places them in time.

(c) *Concl't£11ions concerning divine instruments and time.,* We are now in a position to formulate certain conclusions concerning the humanity of Christ as an instrument of the divinity and its relation, as such, to time.

1. The mysteries of Christ's humanity and all Christians, present eternally to God in His act of active creation, are passively created according to the order established by the divine wisdom; hence " according to the disposition of the Word of God."

2. The divine power is present to all times and all places, hence to the mysteries of Christ and all Christians in a two-fold fashion. (a) In the eternal act of active creation, in which all creatures are present to GQd and to one another insofar as they are identified with the divine essence. In this act of creation is established that economy of salvation according to which the mysteries of Christ precede in dignity, and cause, the participation of men in Christ: ". . . [this] divine power by its presence·is in touch with all places and times" *(Virtus divina praesentiaiiter attingit omnia loca et tempora).* (b) Insofar as the humanity of Christ and all Christians depend for their passive creation and conservation and operation on God in their successive existence in time.

8. If God, in His Providence, chooses to elevate and apply the temporal actions of Christ to the instrumental efficient causality of supernatural effects, He can do so only by the creation of an " instrumental power." It being only in the order of passive creation that there is causal inter-action among

creatures, such ." instrumental power " in producing its effect, is subject to all the conditions of passive_creation. That is to. say: it is induced in the. humanity of Christ at a moment in time, according to the disposition of the Word of God; and, since it is of its nature actually productive of its effect, a *vis ftuens,* it can exist only at the instant in which it is producing .this effect.

Whereas, therefore, the divine principal agent could overcome limitations of local distance, applying the "instrumental power" to beings existing at that instant, He could not, while preserving the causal influence of Christ, overcome ljmitations of time. Likewise, if supernatural effects are produced at the present time through the instrumental activity of the humanity of Christ, this can only be in virtue of an " instrumental power " imparted to Christ as he exists at this instant, that is, to the heavenly Christ.

4. Any theory which suggests that the" instrumental power" imparted to the humanity of Christ two thousand years ago could be applied to an effect today, in virtue of the fact that the divine power is present to all places and all times, either confuses the distinction between active and passive creation, or fails to recognize that the presence of God to passive creation-in particular to the *vis ftuens* in Christ and to Christians today-is temporal, this presence being that precisely which gives creatures being in time. Giving *esse incompletum, intentionale,* to the power elevating Christ, God must produce at once the effect.

(d) *Texts of St. Thomas.* The problem of the texts of St. Thomas in which he attributes efficient instrumental causality to the mysteries of Christ remains. Though we have shown why we think correct the traditional interpretation of these texts which refers them to the humanity of the risen Christ in heaven (in whatever fashion modified so as to ensure the sacrificial character of the Mass), the explicit reference by St. Thomas to the efficacy of the mysteries themselves requires an explanation.

As a preliminary, it must be observed that not every time St. Thomas speaks of the *virtus passionis* is he referring to efficient causality. The *modus efficiendi* of Christ's passion comprises merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, " redemption," as well as instrumental causality.[48] Consequently, phrases like: "The passion has, not a temporal or transient, but an eternal power,"[49] refer primarily to the truth of faith that Christ has merited our eternal salvation, as is emphasized by St. Thomas himself when he notes that he is referring to explicit revelation in the Scriptures.[50] Interpretation of such texts in terms of the specifically Thomistic theory of instrumental efficacy must be subordinated to the problem of theological, that is, metaphysical, possibility. Further, the fact that moral and physical causality are simultaneously attributed to the "power" (virtus) of the passion does not necessarily mean that the Christian is subject to each form of causality in the same way.[51] Platitudinous as this observation is, it is made necessary by the inconsiderate use of St. Thomas' text found in some recent authors.

The issue in regard to St. Thomas' teaching on the instrumental efficacy of the mysteries is not, perhaps, quite so clear-cut as discussions which center on Ill, q. *56,* a.l, ad 8 sometimes make it appear. In this article, it is true, St. Thomas attributes to the resurrection of Christ efficient causality in respect of the general bodily resurrection of both just and sinners.[52] In the following article he recognizes a like causality of Christ's resurrection in respect of justification. Justification he has already attributed to the instrumental efficacy of all the actions and suffering of Christ/ [8] to the passion in particular, [5'] to the death *in facto esse,*[55] to the passion and resurrection together/ [6] and

'"*Ibid.,* q. *52,* a. 8; cf. *ibid.,* q. 22, a. *5,* ad 2.

•• Cf. *Summa tkeol.,* Ill, q. 48, prol.

•• E. g., Heb., 10.14, *loc. cit.* in n. 49.

[61] Cf. *ibid.,* q. 8, a. 1, ad 1; q. 22, a. S; *ibid.,* ad 1; q. 52, a. 1, ad 2; q. 62, a. *5.* Cf. *ibid.,* q. 48, a. 2, ad S; q. 22, a. *5,* ad 2; q. 49, a. 1, ad 4; q. 66, a. 9, ad ı.

•• Cf. also *IV Sent.,* d. 48, q. 1, a. 2, q1a. 1, ad S; *Summa tkeol.,* Ill, q. 54, a. 2; q. *56,* a. 1, ad 2.

•• *Summa tkeol.,* ill, q. 48, a. 6; q. *56,* a. 1, ads.

•• *Ibid.,* q. 48, a. 6. •• *Ibid.,* q. 50, a. 6. •• *Ibid.,* q. *56,* a. 2, ad 4.

to the ascension.[57] Likewise, bodily resurrection is attributed, not only to Christ's resurrection, but. also to death *in facto ease*[58] and to death and resurrection together.[59] It is, in fact, only in terms of the eXemplary causality of the mysteries that St. Thomas makes any true distinction between effects: passion and are exemplary causes of the remission of sins,[60] the resurrection is the exemplary cause of gra<!e by which our souls rise in conformity with *Ohriatus reaurgena;*[61] the death is that of the destruction of bodily death,[62] the resurrection that of the restoration of bodily life at the parousia.[68] For St. Thomas,. following St. Augustine, *De Trinitate,* IV, cap. 8, the death and resurrection of Christ are in a two-fold fashion the exemplary causes of our restoration: *causa exemplaria aacramenfuliter* of our interior or spiritual death and resurrection, *causa exemplaria simpliciter* of our exterior or bodily triumph over death.[64]

It would be difficult to coordinate all these texts of St. Thomas if he did not indicate himself the central notion which . gives unity to his thought. He takes the trouble to define for us exactly what he means by the terms " resurrectio Christi " and " Christus resurgens," indicating, moreover, the scriptural background to his whole concept of the mysteries. Q. *56* is a corollary of q. *58,* a. 8, where St. Thomas asks whether Christ is the first to rise. "Resurrection," he answers (the words should be noted well), " is restoration from death to Perfect resurrection, he goes on, is when " a person is liberated, not only from death but also from the necessity and, what is

•• *Ibid.,* q. 57, a. 6, ad 1.
•• *Ibid.,* q. 50, a. 6.
•• *Ibid.,* q. *56,* a. 1, ad 4.
[60] *Ibid.,* q. *56,* a. ad 4.
[61] *Ibid.,* q. *56,* a. ad 4; corp.
[60] *Ibid.,* q. *56,* a. 1, ad 4.
[68] *Ibid.,* q. 54, a. q. *56,* a. 1, ad 8; q. *56,* a. 1, ad 4.
[6,] Cf. *Comp. tkeol.,* c. (Marietti, n. 514); *Summa tkeol.,* ill, q. a. *5,* ad 1.. *Sacramentaliter* means "figuratively," indicating the analogical characters of the similarity between the historical resurrection of Christ and the spiritua.J. of the Christian.

even more, the possibility, of dying." Considering, then, perfect resurrection, Christ is the first of those who rise for "he by his resurrection came first to life which is completely immortal; according to Rom., 6. 9: " Christ having risen from the dead dies no more " (*Ohristua resurgena ex mortuis iq,m non moritur).* It is the Pauline *Ohristus resurgens* which is the key to St. Thomas' thought.

There is, in St. Thomas' teaching on the causality of the mysteries of Christ, the confluence of two principal currents of thought: St. Paul's Christ-mysticism, as expressed chiefly in Rom., 6 and I Cor., 15, and the Aristotelian metaphysical principle: That which is first in any genus is the cause of those which succeed it. Add to this the influence of St. Augustine's explanation of conformation to Christ's Pasch, the pseudo-Denis' concept of a hierarchy of causes and St. John' Damascene's notion of the humanity of Christ as the instrument of his divinity, and q. *56* is seen to be a perfect model of Scholastic theology where philosophical reasoning is used in the light of Tradition to give logical coherence to revealed truth. In order to discover something of the perfection of St. Thomas' solution we shall examine briefly the scriptural sources of his ideas and the theological interpretation he places on them.

(i) The Pauline *Ohristus resurgens.* St. Paul presents the resurrection of Christ under a two-fold aspect: as the initiation of the eschatological era, ·establishing Christ as judge and investing him with the glory in which he will appear at the parousia (I Thess., 1.10; 4.14; I Cor., 15); and as the source of our spiritual life in so far as the Risen Christ communicates to us already the life-giving Spirit, as an anticipation of our final resurrection to immortal life (Rom., 1. 4, 6). The connection between the two aspects lies in the notion of the Risen Christ as the Lord, the exalted " quickening spirit," *Ohristos pneumatikos* (I Cor., 15. 45; Rom., 1. 4) . In the work of redemption St. Paul does not separate the passion and the resurrection; they form one mystery, the Pasch of Christ, constituted by two parts, one temporal, the other definitive, each

of them necessary for salvation. The sacrifice of Christ, if it is to redeem us from our sins, must be accepted by the Father. The testimony of its acceptance is the resurrection which is, therefo-re,the sign that Christ has conquered death, the penalty for sin, and in conquering death has also conquered sin.[65] The Risen Christ is the "first-fruits of them that sleep," not merely as a God-given pledge of fullness of life; but because he is now the source of all life, his resurrection is the principle of all resurrections, first of men's souls but finally of the whole man raised up to the life of glory. There is an inner causal connec-' tion between his resurrection and others; for, just as all men contract sin from Adam by reason of their descent from him, so, and by a like natural necessity, all those who are members of Christ in his Second Coming (I Cor., 15. 28; Gk. text) shall be raised by him to eternal life, conformed to the body of his glory *(ibid.,* v. 49; Phil., 8. 21). At this moment the resurrec-tion of Christ will have assumed its full proportions, Christ will have definitively destroyed the enemy, death, which represents the victory of Satan and sin. Meanwhile, the Risen Christ reigns as Head of the Church (I Cor., 15. 25), the principle of spiritual resurrection. " We are buried together with him by baptism into death, that as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life" 6. 4). The emphasis is on moral regeneration achieved by symbolic association with the death of Christ. In this interior, preliminary resurrection we are also conformed to the Risen Christ and so, by moral effort, must live together with him, " knowing that Christ rising again from the dead, dieth now no more, death shall have no more dominion over him" (Rom., 6. 9) . And we who are members of the *Christua resurgens* must live as those who are " dead to sin but alive to God in Christ Jesus our Lord " *(ibid.,* v. 11) .

•• Cf. P. F. Ceuppens, 0. P., *Quautiones aelectae ea; epistulia S. Pauli,* Rome, 1951, p. 117; L. Cerfaux, *Le Ch'l'iat dana la theologie deS. Paul,* Lectio divina n. 6, PariS, 1954 (fl ed.), pp. 57 f.; C. Spicq, 0. P., *L'Epitre* aw: *Hebrew:,* vol. 1, Paris, 195fl (!! ed.), pp. 811-816: The whole argument of Heb. rests on the analogy between the Levitical rite of Expiations and the sacrifices of Christ, the point of comparison being the entry through the veil into the Holy of Holies. Cf. Hb., 9; 5.9, 6.!!0, 7.26.

It is this figure of *Christus resurgens* of St. Paul, already in mid-thirteenth century solemnly celebrated by a post-vespers procession in the Dominican Easter liturgy, who holds the contemplation of St. Thomas as he writes on the mysteries of Christ.[66] Whether or not he averted to the fact that the Vulgate mistranslates the Greek, *Christos egertheirs, Christus suscitatus ex mOTtuis,* it is useless to speculate. In any event, his definition of the resurrection of Christ as *pervenire ad vitam penitus immortalem* and his development of the life-giving power of the resurrection clearly indicate that for him it is *Christos Kyrios* of St. Paul, rising indeed from the grave on a day in history but seen as the Head of the Mystical Body, entering first into glory, invested with the power of the Spirit now that he has ascended to his Father, so that he can give life, and thus containing already in himself the glory of the eschatological triumph, it is this risen, heavenly Christ who raises both the sinful soul and the corrupted body to share in his glory. The historical fact assumes a secondary importance in this view of the resurrection as a stage in the participation of Life:

> The resurrecton of Christ transcended common knowledge both in respect of its *terminus a quo,* according to which the soul came back from hell and the body emerged from the closed tomb, and in respect of .its *terminus ad quem,* according to which he obtained the life of glory.[67]

The mystery of the *Christus resurgens* was something " above men'" because

> *Christus resurgens* did not come back to a life commonly known to all, but to a kind of life which was immortal and conformed to God: in accordance with Rom. 6.10: " in that he liveth, he liveth unto God." And therefore the resurrection itself of Christ ought not to have been witnessed immediately by men, but to have been announced to them by angels.[68]

•• Cf. *Summa tkeol.,* III, q. 54, a. 2; *ibid.,* q. *56,* a. 2.
•• *Ibid.,* q. *55,* a. 2, ad 2.
•• *Ibid.,* corp.

The same theme recurs again and again in *Summa theol.,* q. *58-* q. *59,* providing the true commentary on q. *56,* a. 1, ad 8, and indicating the obvious sense of the phrase in that reply: ". . . Christ's humanity, according to which He rose again, is as it were the instrument of his godhead" *(humardtas Christi secundum quam resurrexit est quodammodo instromentum divirdtatis ipsius).* If there is any doubt remaining as to St. Thomas' meaning, it must be removed by his own commentary on I Thess., 4. 14, 15, the description of the parousia. He first refers to I Cor., 15 and develops the causality of Christ's resurrection as he does in the *Tertia Pars:*

> The resurrection of Christ is the [efficientinstrumental] cause of our resurrection, not in so far as it belongs to a body, but in so far as it is the resurrection of a body united to the Word of life.[69]

He himself goes on to offer the usual objection: the resurrection of Christ is now past; why, then, has its effect not taken place? The reply is also the usual one: God acts according to His wisdom; therefore, our resurrection will take place when He wills it. But, continuing the commentary on the text, St. Thomas explains the precise· manner in which Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours. It is' when Christ returns at the day of judgment that he will raise the dead:

> ... he shows that at the presence of Christ all the dead will rise. Now a three-fold cause concurs in the common resurrection. The first, the principal cause, namely, the power of the divinity; the second, instrumental, namely, the power of the humanity of Christ; the third, as it were ministerial, namely the power of the angels who will have some effect in the resurrection [...]
>
> These three causes, therefore, he places: firstly, *the glorious humanity of Christ,* saying: "for the Lord himself, etc." Acts 1.11: "As you have seen him going into heaven, so shall he come."[10]

Considering, further, that for·St. Paul the passion, death and resurrection form the single mystery of the Pasch of Christ, considering, in addition, the impossibility of supra-temporal

•• *Com'TM'nt.mI Thesa.,* c. 4, lect. 2 (Marietti, n. 95).
•• *Ibid.,* nn. 98, 99.

instrumental application of past events, it is reasonable, or rather necessary, to conclude that St. Thomas attributes instrumental efficient causality to these mysteries in so far as they pertain to the *Christus resurgens.* The resurrection of Christ implies the passage through death to life;[71] that is why St. Thomas can attribute the same effect to various stages of the one complex mystery. He himself indicates, clearly enough, why he splits up the mystery in this way. It is because each event in the mystery presents its own exemplary significance for the spiritual and bodily life of man.

(ii) St. Thomas' theological interpretation of Scripture. The principle which controls St. Thomas' systematization of St. Paul is that which he attributes to Aristotle: The first in any genus is the cause of those that come after. He applies it both to God and to the humanity of Christ, developing it first in terms of efficient causality, then, as a corollary, in terms of exemplary causality.

He denominates variously the first cause of our resurrection, whether of soul or body: the resurrection of Christ,[72] the Word of God,[73] the justice of God/[4] divine power/[5] the substance of God/[6] the glory of the body of Christ.[77] These may be reduced to two: the divinity and *Christus resurgens;* God is the source of all life, *principium humanae vivijicationis,*[77] and the resurrection of Christ is the first in the genus of resurrection since Christ is the first to have passed through death to a life which is wholly immortal. *Christus resurgens* is, in fact, a secondary principle, subordinated to the *Verbum' vitae* since to his body, hypostaticallyunited to the Word, was first given immortality.[78]

According to efficient causality, God (the Word by appro-

[71] Cf. *Comment. in Joann.,* c. *5,* lect. 4: (of the Christian) "De hac vita transiet per in vitam, id est per mortem corporis reparabitur in vitam aeternam." (Marietti, n. 777).

[72] *Summa theol.,* q. *56,* a. 1.

[73] *Ibid.,* q. *56,* ad !.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.,* ad !.

[77] *Ibid.*

[18] *Ibid.,* q. *56,* a. 1.-In terms of I, q. 108, a. *5,* resurrection may be attributed to the Word *per exceaaum,* to the humanity of Christ *per proprietatem,* to men *per participa.tionem.*

priation) in whom are identified life, justice, wisdom and goodness, raises first to immortal life the body of Christ, thus permitting the glory of Christ's soul to glorify his body, and establishing him in his humanity as the judge, and as the instrumental cause of the final resurrection, of all mankind, a " quickening spirit." It is *by the same decree* [79] that the divine wisdom provides for the resurrection of Christ and for that of all men, a decree which takes effect " according to the disposition of the Word of God," [80] elevating, at the parousia, the humanity of Christ in which he died and was raised up *(mors et resurrectio)* so that Christ, the Judge, may bring before him the bodily presence of all mankind. Souls and bodies thus reunited, the souls of the just, by reason of their glory, spiritualize their bodies (cf. I Cor., 15, 44), while the souls of the damned associate their bodies in their suffering..

The consequences of this action of the Word of Life, through the humanity of Christ, is that the bodies of the elect are conformed to the glory of the body of Christ, and thus to his Pasch. This is the sense of St. Thomas' exemplary causality "which, indeed, is necessary, not on the part of Him who raises, who has no need of an exemplary cause; but on the part of those who are raised whom He must conform to that resurrection, according to Phil., 8. !Il." [81] The elect are in this fashion perfectly and definitively conformed, not only to the resurrection of Christ, but also to his passion and death, since they, too, have finally overcome the enemy and have won eternal life: *causalitas exemplaris simpliciter.*

It is in function of this final resurrection that the Risen Christ, reigning in heaven, is used as the divine instrument in the course of time to raise the souls of men from the death of sin to the life of grace and glory, giving them faith and charity and the helps necessary that they may walk, by moral effort, in newness of life. In working in us this first stage of final

[10] *Summa theol.,* III, q. 24, a. 8; *ibid.,* a. 4.

[80] *Ibid.,* q. *56,* a. 1, ad 1.

[81] *Ibid.,* q. *56,* a. 1, ad 8.

resurrection, and in restoring us to life when we have fallen again into the death of sin, the incarnate Word makes use also of the sacraments, word making matter life-giving, as extensions of his glorified humanity, subordinated in their tum to the elevating instrumental action of God. The grace produced in us by this divine action is a participation in the divine nature itself and in the Sonship of Christ; it is not yet able to work in us a participation in the glorified body of Christ.[82]

The justification thus wrought in our souls and the moral effort it implies produce in us a likeness w the Pasch of Christ; but here exemplar causality is transposed from the historical plane: the mysteries of Christ's death and life are figures of the progress of our interior life: *causalitas exemplaris sacramentalis.* The *terminus a quo* and *ad quem* of justification conform us spiritually to the passion and death and to the bodily resurrection of Christ,[88] and the life of grace imposes on us a regenerated moral life in imitation of the Risen Christ who " liveth unto God."[84]

It is the figure of *Christus resurgens* who " dieth now no more " which dominates this whole scheme of complete rebirth. It is the glorious humanity of Christ, triumphant in the_eternal consummation of his Pasch, that is used by the Word of Life as the instrument of life,[85] so that men may be led in their own lives through the successive stages, mystical and physical, of their own paschs, so that they may be conformed to Christ in his humanity and his divinity. Beyond the glorified Christ is the true center of theological thought, the unchanging Trinity with its single decree of giving life, the knowledge of Itself, in the temporal order established by divine Wisdom, to Christ and in Christ to his members.

•• *Ibid.,* q. *56,* a. !!, !!.d I; q. !!4, a. 8.

•• *Ibid.,* q. *56,* a. !!, ad 4.

"'Ibid., q. *56,* a. 2.

•• Cf. *ibid.,* q. 72, a. I, ad I: of confirmation: "... in hoc sacramento datur plenitudo Spiritus sancti, quae non erat danda ante Christi resurrectionem et ascensionem, secundum illud loan. 7.89.. -. "

It appears, then, both from a study of the theology of instrumental cause and from the Pauline background to St. Thomas' teaching on the mysteries, that the traditional attribution of instrumental efficacy to the heavenly Christ is correct. A final possible difficulty remains, in the form of a "common-sense" objection to all that has so far been said. Why, if he understood the resurrection as the definitive state of the glorified Christ rather than a merely passing historical event, did St. Thomas attribute efficient instrumental causality to the individual stages of Christ's Pasch, to the passion, death, descent into hell, as well as to the resurrection? Since the new theory is based on what is claimed to be the obvious meaning of the text-though, we hope we have shown, isolated from its context-the immediate reply required is a simple gloss which can be written over the line each time St. Thomas speaks of the efficient causality of an historical mystery.

Before suggesting such a gloss, we make two observations. Firstly, as we have already seen, St. Thomas, in some texts, associates the separate moments of Christ's passage to fulness of life in a common instrumental efficacy; and this suggests sufficiently that he understands present effects to be produced by the humanity of Christ as it exists at the present moment. Secondly, humanity of Christ was, throughout his life and during the days of death, at all times actively an instrument of the divinity. If for no other reason this is clear from the common teaching that Our Lady progressed continuously in grace; and a very significant meaning can be attached to the instrumental causality in respect of our salvation exercised on her by her Son as he hung on the cross and as he lay dead in her arms. Finally, the gloss we suggest is based on St. Thomas' specific teaching on instruments used by God in our salvation. By an analogy with the sacraments we can obtain a very satisfactory explanation of St. Thomas' mode of expression concerning the mysteries.

The sacraments gain their *vis spi:ritualis,* in virtue of which they cause grace, from two sources: from the blessing of Christ

and from use by the minister.[88] The blessing of Christ is explained as the institution of the sacrament by which Christ gave it _power.[87] The sacraments used by Christ when he was instituting them require no blessing from the Church; from Christ's use" they have received aptitude for the perfection of the sacrament."[88] But from whatever source it derives, the blessing is necessary if the matter is to be used as the instrumental cause of grace:

> For just as an instrument acquires its instrumental power *(virtutem instrumentalem)* in two ways, namely, when it receives the form of instrument and when it is moved by the principal agent, so also the matter of a sacrament requires a two-fold sanctification, by one of which it becomes the proper matter of the sacrament, while by the other it is applied to the effect.[89]

Thus the *aptitude* for producing its effect, which the sacraments gain through use by Christ or the blessing of the Church, may be called in a broad sense *virtus instrumentalis;* the waters of the world possess the spiritual power of baptism.[90]

Applying the analogy to Christ, an important modification must be made. The humanity .of Christ was already consecrated as an instrument of God by the Incarnation itself. Nevertheless, the actions and sufferings of Christ in his body, in particular his death and entry into eternal life, make his humanity an apt instrument to raise men from the death of sin to the life of glory. An Incarnation of the Word in which He would not suffer and die according to His humanity is quite conceivable; but; in the present dispensation, in which God became man to redeem us, it is necessary that Christ " should have suffered these things, and so to enter into his glory ";

[86] *Ibid.,* q. 61!, a. 4, ad S.

[87] *Ibid.,* q. 64, a. S; q. 66, a. !!.

[88] *Ibid.,* q. 71!, a. S; *Suppl.,* q. 29, a. *5.*

[80] *Ibid.,* m, q. 71!, a. S, ad 2.

•• *Ibid.,* q. $0,. a. 1. q. 78, a. 5: the historical action of Christ when he pronounced the words of consecration is made parallel to his sanctifying the waters of the world at his baptism. In each case the historical action gives to the sacramental element " form of instrument "; it does not apply it to its effect.

necessary, not merely insofar as the passion is the meritorius and satisfactory cause of our salvation, hut also that the Risen Christ may instrumentally bring life from death. A comparable case of a new aptitude for his mission being given to Christ is that of his own baptism. Though he was " full of truth " he went through this ceremony " as from that moment beginning to teach and preach." [91] The Spirit descended on him in the form of a dove and a voice from heaven proclaimed him as the prophet of God. This was *ad utilitatem Ecclesiae,* a visible sign of the inYisible mission of the Spirit to Christ, " made to him, not at that moment, but in the beginning of his conception." [92]

It is also *ad utilitatem Ecclesiae* that the humanity of Christ should be consecrated anew by the historical mysteries of his Pasch so that, in heaven, he should be constituted *instrumentum efficaa; ad reiJ'UliCitandoshomines in vitam atemam.* [98] In this sense the historical mysteries in their temporal reality' were efficacious of our salvation.

So we return to the great commentators of St. Thomas. They enshrine a tradition of interpretation which is the fruit of centuries of reflection on the text of the Angelic Doctor. The scientific demands of theology, even if respect for tradition means nothing, require at least that serious reasons be proposed for rejecting the common opinion of the Thomistic commentators.

IV. *The sacramental "presence"* of *Christ's mysteries.*

An illuminating passage as regards St. Thomas' thought on the presence of Christ in the sacraments is in *De Veritate,* q. iJ,7, a. 4. God uses the humanity of Christ as His instrument to produce in us the grace won for us by the blood of Christ; and this instrument is applied to us through faith and the sacraments. The degree in which this humanity of Christ is contained in the sacraments is the measure of their perfection:

[81] *Ibid.,* a. 8.
[••] *Ibid.,* I, q. 48, a. 7, ad 6.
[••] Catejan, *Comment. in III;* q. *66,* a. 1, n. ll.

Wherefore that is the most perfect sacrament in which *the body* of Christ is really contained, namely, the Eucharist, and it is consummative of all the others ... [Denis]. But the other sacraments participate something *of that power* by which the humanity of Christ operates instrumentally in *[ad]* justification.

The suggestion is clear enough: the glorified body· of Christ is contained in the supreme sacrament; only the power elevating and applying the same heavenly Christ is contained in the other sacraments. It does not seem to have occurred to St. Thomas to designate as " presence " this instrumental application of Christ's native action through the sacraments. His concern is to establish the nature of the connection between the sacraments and the mysteries of Christ. Our principal purpose here is to attempt to follow his thought. In order, by way of corollary, to express our conclusions in terms of" presence " some working definition of the term is required. St. Thomas notes two forms of presence:

Whatever is in place or in any thing, in some manner comes into contact *[contingit]* with it: for a corporeal things is in something as in place according to contact of extended quantity; while an incorporeal thing is said to be in something according to contact of power.[94]

Presence by action, *per contactum virtutis,* is attributed by the writers we have discussed to the humanity of Christ when it is used instrumentally by God to act on a substance not in quantitative contact with it. Whether this is a legitimate application of a notion proper to the action of spiritual agents, might well be questioned. St. Thomas points out that it is the whole humanity of Christ, body and soul, which has an influence on man.[95] He also points out that the place in which Christ's humanity is after the ascension is heaven;[96] that he has removed from us his bodily presence and is present to the faithful in his divinity.[97] Christ is in heaven *in propria specie,* on our altars *sub specie sacramenti.*[98] Divinely-applied action

•• *Contra Gentu,* ill, c. 68, Item.
•• *Summa thool.,* m, q. 8, a. !!.
•• *Ibid.,* q. 57, a. I.
•• *Ibid.,* ad 3.
[08] *Ibid.,* q. 76, a. 5, ad I.

of corporeal realities certainly gives presence of action in the patient; but action in the patient is precisely passion, an accident of the patient. It will be understood, therefore, that when we speak about a presence of Christ *secundum actionem* (in sacraments other than the Eucharist) we are accepting for the sake of convenience a proposed terminology, and are quite prepared, and even inclined, to deny that it is any true presence of Christ at all.[99] Knowledge, it is to be noted finally, in general does not procure real, but only intentional, presence since, its term being immanent, it does not come into contact with the reality of the object/[00] The Eucharist is clearly a special case and must be considered separately. It will not be necessary, then, to point out each time that it provides an exception to what is said about the other sacraments.

(a) *Sacraments other than the Eucharist.* Insofar as sacramental grace cleanses us from sin and prepares our souls for Christian worship, the sacraments draw their power, *virtus,* from the passion, the power, *virtus,* of which is connected to us when we receive the sacraments.[101] What must be investigated is the nature of this connection. We have already seen that the *virtus efficiens* of the passion, applying the merit and satisfaction of Christ, is " connected " to us by the elevation of the glorious *Christus resurgens ex mortuis.* Significantly, however, St. Thomas is not content with this simple explanation. He is aware of the broader horizons of the economy of salvation and inserts his notion of instrumental causality into the context of Christian *faith.* He places the objection to instrumental efficacy of the passion that contact between instrument and effect would be necessary for such causality and is

•• Pius XII, *Mediator Dei,* indicating the teaching of the Doctors of the Church on the "presence and operation " of Christ's mysteries, speaks of "models of virtue," "sources of divine grace " by reason of the merits and intercession of the Redeemer. The mysteries live on "in their effects in us." There is no question here of the presence of the mysteries themslves.

[10°] Cf. H. Stirnimann, O. P., "Zum Begriffe der Gegenwart," *Div. Thom. Fr.,* !l9 (1951)' pp. 7!l, 78.

[101] *Summa theol.,* lli, q. 6!l, a. *5.*

impossible in the case.[102] In his reply he states that two factors achieve the necessary contact, one on the side of Christ, the other on the side of the Christian:

The passion of Christ, although it is bodily, yet has spiritual power from the united divinity.

We have explained why this refers to the heavenly Christ. On the part of man:

And therefore it obtains efficacy through spiritual contact: namely, through faith and the sacraments of faith.

It is by *faith* in Christ that we are saved and this plays a part in establishing contact with Christ, the instrument of God, even in the sacraments. *Sacramenta fidei* is one of St. Thomas' favorite phrases/[08] the idea expressed being in direct dependence on the first principle of sacramental theology: that a sacrament is *signum rei sacrae inquantum est sanctificans homines,* which he develops with such care in III, qq. 60 and 61, and which he applies throughout the remainder of the *Summa.* As signs of sacred realities, the sacraments must be signs of faith; if they are also causes of grace, subordinated to the humanity of Christ, this must be regarded as a wholly gratuitous gift of God, a bounty granted to the Church, a new dimension given to the liturgical actions of the Christian community, which does not, however, destroy their basic nature as signs of faith. So important is faith that it cannot be dispensed with even in the case of infant baptism; but the child, "whom in the womb of the Church" draws upon the life-blood of the Church which is faith.[104] The faith required is not that of the minister [105] or the recipient/[06] but *fides Ecclesiae.*[107] The essen-

[101] Ibid., q. 48, a. 6, obj. 1 and reply.

[108] Cf. *ibid.,* q. 60, a. 6; a. 8; q. 61, a. S; q. a. 6; q. 68, a. 4, ad S; q. 64, a. S; a. 9, ad 1; q. 66, a. 1, ad 1; a. S; a. 6; q. 68, a. 1, ad 1; a. 4, ad S; a. 9, ad 1; a. II; q. 69, a. 6, ad S; a. 9; q. 70, a. 1; etc., etc.

[10]. *Ibid.,* q. 68, a. 9, ad 1; ad. a. U; q. 69, a. 6, ad S; q. 71, a. 1, ad S.

[105] *Ibid.,* q. 64, a. 9, ad 1; q. 68, a. 8.

[108] *Ibid.,* q. 68, a. 8.

[107] *Ibid.,* q. 64, a. 9, al 1; q. 68, a. 9, ad 1; ad a. II; q. 69, a. 6, ad S; q. 71, a. 1, ad S; a. S, ad S.

tial function of faith is expressed very strikingly and explained in the *Sentences:*

> The principal and *per se* agent in justification is God as efficient cause, and the passion of Christ as meritorious cause. Now to this cause the sacrament is connected through the faith of the Church which relates the instrument to the principal cause and the sign to what is signified.[108]

Hence St. Thomas can say that the power of the sacraments is principally from *faith--praecipue* fide-in the passion and in the resurrection of Christ.[109] The influi:mceof St. Augustine's commentary on St. John's Gospel, tr. 80, 8, so often quoted by St. Thomas, is very clear here:

> Whence is this great power of the water that it should touch the body and cleanse the heart unless it is the effect of the word, not because it is pronounced, but because it is believed.[110]

For St. Augustine and St. Thomas faith is clearly prior to sacraments. A precise notion of the essential part played by the faith of the Church...,.-that is, of the believers who at any given moment live in the Church-in the sacraments is necessary in order to establish the relation of the sacraments to Christ.[111]

Christ, when he instituted the sacraments as means of applying the fruits of his passion, established the relation of signification between certain actions and the giving of grace. The *signatum* is that all-embracing decree of God to bring individuals to glory through the merits of Christ and through the instrumentality of Christ's humanity and of the sacraments themselves. Now, this act of institution is, of its nature, ab-

[108] *IV Stmt.,* d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. S.

[109] *Swmnna theol.,* q. a. 5, ad ad S.

[110] St. Augustine, *CO'l1IlfTl,ent Ioann.,* tr. 80, S. Continues: "Hoc verbum fidei tantum valet *eccluia Dei,* •.•" (CCL 85, .).

[111] I have already discussed this in *The Thomist,* (1958), pp. !!74-!!76._Here I correct some faulty expressions I used there.

stract or general. Each individual sacrament administered by the Church to an individual recipient must be related to the *signatum* (and consequently, though this is not directly in the power of the Church, to the cause of justification). Christ's act of institution cannot do this. Only the Church whose action it is can make it a significant action, can relate it, that is, to the *signatum.* This is where the faith of the Church is essential. The immediate object of this faith is Christ as instituting the sacrament; Christ said: " Do this and grace will be given." The Church responds by faith and performs the action prescribed by Christ. ImpliCit in the faith which the Church thus expresses externally in her ritual is acceptance of the whole reve1ation of Christ, including the signification which he attributed to the sacrament.[112] Each sacramental action of the Church, consequently, is, *mediante fide Eoolesiae et mediante institutione a Christo,* a sign, of its nature efficacious, of the divine will to give grace to the individual recipient and, in the sacraments which bestow a character, to give him some functi'on in the visible life of the Church.

Basically, therefore, the sacraments are intentional, belong to the mind of the Church, of Christians illumined by faith. As significant they are based on knowledge which reaches into the past, into the future and into eternity, giving intentional " presence ,; to its objects. Though it can be said in general that the sacraments signify the economy of salvation as applied to an individual recipient-and consequently signify the eternal divine decree, the historical redemptive acts, the efficacy of the sacraments themselves, grace in its institutional or legal context of the Church, and glory as the future consummation- to gain a more precise idea of the signification and value of an individual sacrament (the only kind that exists) the common Thomistic distinction must be made between the antecedent and consequent salvifi.cwill of God. What the will of God is,

[11]" Revelations may make clear to the Church the signification of the sacraments; but this is not essential to the making of the sacraments. The Church does with faith what Christ instructed her to do.

in respect of this individual recipient, finally determines the signification of the sacrament administered to him on any particular occasion. Christ, hanging on the cross, designated in detail in his human mind, in accordance with his Father's will, the grace, whether efficacious or suffibient, to be given to each human person as preparation for receiving the sacraments,[113] and further designated the grace to be given to each of his members in each individual sacrament to be administered by the Church. This same act of designation, as it remains in the mind of the heavenly Christ, is an element of the native action of Christ according to which the sacred humanity is elevated and applied by God in the execution of His eternal will.

It follows that, by the nature of the case, the Church *does not knmv* the exact significance of the individual sacrament which she administers. At most she can know with that the sacrament signifies the antecedent will of God to save this recipient through the merits of Christ and the Church. It may be that the consequent will of God accords this individual at this moment only the *res et sacramentum;* it may be that it accords him also grace; or the malice of the recipient may prevent all effect.

We have now the elements with which to establish the mode of Christ's presence in the sacraments other than the Eucharist. There is a certain presence common to all sacraments; but to go beyond this it is necessary to distinguish invalid, valid and fruitful administration. Common to all the sacraments· is the expression of the faith of the Church in the divinely-established economy of salvation as revealed by Christ and, in particular, in the institution of the sacraments. This presupposes in the members of the Church conformation to the mysteries of Christ, according to an exemplary, sacramental causality. They have risen with Christ in soul and express this externally in favour of the recipient. Here already is a presence of the *effect* of the mysteries; a presence of the mysteries themselves according to

[118] Cf. *Swmma theol.,* ill, q. 69, a. 9, ad 2.

analogy: analogy of attribution (effect denominated by the term proper to its cause) and analogy of strict proportionality. The symbolic expression of this conformation to Christ achieves an intentional " presence " of the mysteries of Christ, as objects known. In the case of baptism revelation has· made explicit the reference of the act of faith to the passion and resurrection of Christ which is given symbolic representation in the ceremony precisely in so far as it is communicable to an individual. The act of faith attains the Pasch of Christ in all its historical actuality, either.as in the future [1u] or in the past.[116] There are special reasons why baptism, and not the other sacraments excepting the Eucharist, signifies the passion and resurrection in this explicit fashion. It is the sacrament of justification, by which we die to the sin of nature and rise to a new life, the life of the Christian. There can be only one such regeneration; we cannot return to the womb of the Church; Christ died once, nor can we crucify him again to ourselves.[116] No penance is imposed on the recipient of baptism because he has been "incorporated into the death itself of Christ," for to do so would be " an injury to Christ's passion and death." [111] The unique relation of baptism to the death of Christ is referred to again .and again by St. Thomas with recurring references to Rom., 6 [118] and is always explained in term.S of the regeneration of man achieved in this sacrament. In the Eucharist also the death of Christ is but whereas " baptism is given to a man as one dying wtih Christ, the Eucharist is for nourishing and perfecting " in so far as in it *Christus passus* is shown to us as our paschal meal.[119] The other sacraments offer no such explicit symbolism of the passion and death. This is precisely because, with the exception of penance, they

[1u] *Ibid.*, q. 66, a. !!, ad 1.

[11]"Ibid., q. 61, a. 4.

[118] *Ibid.*, q. 66, a. 9. ref. to St. Augustine on Jn., 8.4; to Rom., 6.8 and 10, Heb., 6.6.

[117] *Ibid.*, q. 68, a. *5.*

[118] *Ibid.*, q. 69, aa. 1, !!. 8; etc.

[110] *Ibid.*, q. 66, a. 9, ad *5*, and q. 79, a. *5*, ad 1; cf. q. 79, a. 8, ad !!; q. 78, a. 8, ad IJ.

are sacraments of the living, of those who have already risen with Christ: confirmation gives the fulness of the Holy Spirit, extreme unction perfects· spiritual health;[120] matrimony and orders are directed towards the perfection of the Mystical Body. Penance, finally, does not fit into the normal scheme of resurrection and life; it is *per accidens, ex B'lllppolfitione peccati;* a second raft for the ship-wrecked.[121] Though its efficacy is from the passion and resurrection of Christ, it does not signify these explicitly, does not regenerate us. It is *de iure naturali* that man should repent of his sins and that he should show some *sign* of sorrow. This natural impulse has simply been given determination by the inst{itution of a sacrament.[122] Only in baptism, therefore, and the Eucharist does the Church construct a symbol of the passion and thereby give explicit expression to her faith in this mystery, to its intentional presence in the mind of Christians. The symbolism of the other sacraments refers explicitly to the perfection or restoration of regenerated man.

This common intentional presence of the historical acts of Christ, under whatever modality, is proper *t9* the sacraments as of the Church and abstracts from the efficacy of the sacraments, being achieved even in invalid administration. To determine whether the efficacy procures any further, and more real, presence, the various grades of efficacy must be examined separately.

A *valid* but unfruitful sacrament presupposes the normal configuration of the Church to Christ and ·achieves the basic intentional presence of the mysteries. To the ceremony is added signification of the recipient's intention as well as signification and specification of the action of Christ, instrumentally producing such effect as is possible,namely, the *res et saeramentum.* There is here a real presence of the action of Christ and, in this remote sense, of Christ himself according as he exists at the

[110] *Ibid.,* q. 84, a. 1, ad 1; q. 7!!, a. ·u, ad !B.
[111] Ibid., q. 84, a. 6.
[111] *Ibid.,* q. 84, a. 7; ad 1.

moments of the sacrament: on earth in those sacraments administered during his earthly life,[123] in heaven now. The mysteries themselves are only active and present in the measure that they are consummated in the Risen Christ, having constituted his humanity an apt instrument. The resurrection, understQod as the state of Christ in heaven, has the same presence as Christ himself. In the case of baptism the explicit symbol of Christ's death and resurrection specifies the instrumental action of Christ in such wise that the effect will be incorporation into the Pasch of Christ; in an unfruitful sacrament only in whatever fashion the character gives this. The *res et saMamentum* produces in the recipient an ontological configuration to Christ. The value of this would have to be determined for each of the sacraments. In the case of the characters it gives the recipient power to participate in the sacramental celebration of Christ's mysteries, and is, therefore, only indirectly connected with the mysteries themselves.[124]

In a *fruitful* sacrament there is added signification and specification of Christ's present activity in producing grace as well as signification of the adult recipient's workshop. Now the exemplary causality of the sacraments (based on the faith of the Church) is given full scope and the presence of the action of Christ achieves in the soul of the recipient adequate conformity, though of varying degree, to the mysteries of redemption. Baptism conforms the soul to the death and resurrection, the others grant fuller participation in the life of Christ, merited by the mysteries. It might be suggested further that sacramental grace, by overcoming the effects of sin, as well as equipping men for the Chritian life, increases the power of the soul over the body and its concupiscence and, in this sense, gives a measure of that dominion of spirit over matter which

[188] *Ibid.*, q. 66, a. ad I.

[18]. The characters are directed immediately, not to instrumental production of the effects of the sacraments, but to the construction of signs of Church faith which are *valid* so that, as a consequence, *porlerioritatenaturae,* they are used as instrumental causesof grace. Cf. " The instrumentality of the sacramental character," *Iriak Tkeol. Quarterly, i6* (1928) , pp. !!11!-268.

will glorify the body after resurrection. The summation of this section we defer until after our review of the sacramental system is complete.

(b) *The Eucharist.* The Eucharist, too, is a sign of faith; that is to say, the ordained priest, having the intention of acting as the minister of the Church and following the ritual of the Church, performs an action which expresses the faith of the Church in Christ's command at the Last Supper: "Do this in commemoration of me.'" Because the priest, the individual, bears the character of Christ, this action of the community of believers is, by the very fact of being placed, still a sign, but an efficacious sign. Not the Church but Christ, whose minister the priest is as well as the Church's, by divine power, gives reality to what is symbolized in the action of human worship. Because the action of Christ produces only transubstantiation and not also transaccidentation (which would leave nothing on the altar), the glorified humanity of Christ, united to the Word, is made present under the sacramental species, while remaining in heaven. The presence is real, no longer merely by action; but it is utterly *sui generis* and it is pointless to compare it, except to note the differences, with either symbolic presence or the presence of Christ to his disciples when on earth.

On the level of symbolism, however, there is already, by reason of the double consecration, a representation or image of the external event of the Passion. After the consecration until the communion this is all that there is; and this achieves nothing more than an intentional presence of the historical act of the passion, not essentially different from the presence brought about in the invalid administration of baptism. Though Christ is really present under the sacred species, the same does not hold for the Passion. It is represented in symbol; it is only the faith of the Church and of the individual which can attach such signification to the two-fold presence of Christ in the species of bread and wine. The double consecration produces no change in the Risen Christ himself. At the moment when the celebrant pronounces the words of consecration, however,

there is something more than intentional presence of the passion. Because, by reason of his character, he participates, for sacramental purposes, in the priesthood of Christ, and because, consequently, his words, in the area of the sacraments, are the official, valid *sign* of Christ's words at the Last Supper, the priest at this moment is truly the *eikOn* or *imago Christi,*[125] and 'the sacramental action is truly the *imago* of the Passion; [128] hut, by the very fact, and through the power of Christ elevating and applying the priest's native operation, what is signified is realized. The faith of the Church is rewarded beyond all human expectation. Now, not only does the sign of Christ's body really contain the body, but the priest, offering the Church,s sign-sacrifice, contains the actual act of Christ's offering. It is by one and the same instrumental power, imparted by God to the humanity of Christ in heaven, that Christ's native' action and the native action of the priest are elevated and applied. The native action of Christ thus brought to the altar, at one. and the same instant, transubstantiates and offers. This is a presence of the action of Christ (or, if the phrase is better liked, of Christ *vi actionis)* . His native operation, elevated and applied at local distance by divine power, specified and particularized by the words of the priest, changes tl}.e bread and wine. Thus active within the sacramental order, Christ is able, by his own native power, to offer the sacrament of his passion. Like the Real Presence, the presence of Christ's sacrifice is wholly *sui generis.* To speak of the Mass either as the Passion (" the presence of the Passion ") or as a new sacrifice of Christ is to introduce categories which have no significance in the sacramental world. St. Thomas,· very shrewdly, confines himsell to saying that it is an *imago quaeda:m repraeaentativa passicmis Christi* and that it makes us share in the fruits of Christ's passion; and by reason of this we must say that Christ is immolated in the Mass.[121] Pressed as to the mode of the sacrifice itseH, he simply repeats that it is sacramental, the

[1JI] 8fimmG *theol.,* m, Cl· 88, a. 1, ad 8.
[1oe] *Ibid.,* corp. :u.. *Ibid.*

priest the image of Christ, the ceremony the image of the passion.[128] The question, he says clearly enough, is irrelevant in so far as the objector frames it in terms of temporal succession: a sacrifice now past, a priest no longer with us. Obviously, the historical sacrifice with all its non-intellectual elements (what is intellectual is, of its nature, supra-temporal) [129] is a thing of the past; it is a degradation of theology to construct theories positing what is impossible. The ·Mass gives to the single sacrifice a new mode, not so much supra-temporal (in so far as this term suggests an impossible withdrawal of realities, essentially successive, from the laws of motion) as one that combines temporal and atemporal elements. That is to say, while each is in time, its connection with Calvary pertains to an order of reality which is not governed by time, namely, to the intellectual order, the order of Christ's mind and of the faith of the Church. Each day a new temporal expression is given through signs to the faith of the Church in Christ instituting the Eucharist as a memorial of his passion. Because of the mind of Christ the signs are efficacious, Body and Blood are separated again and again sacramentally and are offered by Christ, not as a new sacrifice, not as an old sacrifice of Calvary, but as the single sacrifice transposed into a new realm of reality. In this sacramental realm there are no new moral values as far as the sacrifice of Christ the Head is concerned; but an opportunity is given the Church to insert, through her transformed signs of her own moral sacrifice into the single &acrifice. It is within the context of faith, looking back to a past event and looking up.to Christ in heaven who can transsubstantiate and offer, that the Mass

Theologians, as is well known, have attempted to determine more precisely the exact nature of the native action of Christ which is applied by divine power to the consecration. As intellectual, this action escapes the passage of time and provides the essential connection between the external rites of the Supper Room, of Calvary and of the Church. The Salmanticenses see

[118] *Ibid.,* ad 2; ad 8.

[111] *Ibid.,* I, q. *86,* a. *4l,* ad 1.

no difficulty in Christ's eliciting in heaven a new offering for each Mass; and their position is arguable since such acts would be only materially distinct but united formally in dependence on Christ's intention when instituting the Eucharist.[180] Most modem Thomists require a more absolute identity between the offerings of Cenacle, Calvary and Mass, theorizing either that the historical offering of the Supper Room is applied instrumentally in each Mass (we have shown why we think this impossible) or that Christ in heaven maintains the self-same act of offering which he elicited on earth. The more common opinion among the latter group is that the offering is preserved unchanging in Christ's beatific knowledge. A variation of this which has not been sufficiently noticed makes a distinction between the inner worship of Christ and the *imperium* of the practical intellect which designated the killing of Christ as a sacrificial externalization of his worship, that is, which designated what others were doing to his body as the sign of his charity. While the worship is maintained for ever in the beatific vision, the act of intellect is preserved until the end of the world in the discrete time of Christ's infused knowledge, always consisting in designation of a suitable sign of inner sacrifi.ce.[181] The advantage of this last theory is that it takes account of the scriptural and theological teaching that Christ's priesthood and the sacraments will have achieved their purpose at the parousia; and there is no reason for the act of offering to be maintained beyond this point.[182]

Granted that the offering is maintained in some fashion, a further actuality is given the sacramental commemoration of the passion. The native act of Christ which is made present, *vi actionis,* in the Mass is itself an element of the historical passion and supper room. The interior activity of Christ, his charity, religion and intellectual act of offering are identical, whether expressed by the immolation of Calvary or of the Mass.

[180] Salmanticenses, *Cv:rBUB theol.,* tr. iS, disp. IS, dub. S, nn. 49, 50.
[181] Cf. W. Barden, 0. P., *What kapptma at Masa,* Dublin, 1960, pp. SS-86.
[132] *Summa. theol.,* ill, q. 22, a. *5,* ad 1.

Granted that the passion-offering of Christ is maintained in *Christus resurgens,* a certain modification must be introduced into our whole concept of the "presence " of the passion achieved, either sacramentally or extra-sacramentally, by the divine use of Christ's humanity as a life-giving instrument. The mediatorial offerings of Christ, as belonging to his humanity, will be applied to us and, therefore, be present *vi* ootionis--that is to say, will be present in Christ acting on us-whenever we receive grace or other supernatural gifts. This does not mean, however, as some unwary Thomists, seduced perhaps by the imaginative prose of Maria Laach, have suggested, that Christ worships, offering his merits, in each of the Church. Not even in the interests of theological peace can the theory of moral causality be combined with the Thomistic physical theory.[188] Christ maintains his worship of the Father in heaven; but he does not formally worship Him in the sacraments other than the Mass. Again it is question of considering the sacraments for what they are and not introducing irrelevant categories. The deciding factor is sacramental symbolism. Apart from the Mass, it is the giving of grace that is signified. The Church makes an act of faith in the application of the passion to the individual recipient. The intervention of Christ is, therefore, limited to the designation of the effect of the sacrament (his native action) and the instrumental production of it. It was in his sacrifice that Christ merited this grace; the faith of the Church is directed back to the historical event; the signification indicates that the recipient is to benefit from it. Only in the Mass does the symbolism require that Christ's native action be applied to offer worship.

The desire to make each sacrament an act of worship by Christ can be met while preserving the strict specification of the symbolism and remaining within the Thomistic tradition.

[188] John of St. Thomas, disp. 24, a. I, dub. 9 and the Salmanticenses, tr. !!!!, disp. 4, dub. 2, in spite of proposing conclusions verbally contradictory, agree that the sacraments have no *intrinsic* moral worth; they signify the passion by reason of a relation arbitrarily imposed on them at their institution.

The sacraments constitute a *81JBtem* of worship in which Christ the priest is the central figure. In this system there are two integral parts, one the sacrifice of the Mass, the other the grace-giving sacraments. These two parts correspond to the two moments of all worship: the God-directed submission of the creature and the consequent enrichment of the creature, this being procured by the act of submission itseH (which perfects the creature, not God) and by the gift of grace merited. These two moments are found in Christ's worship on the cross; but in him they are both mediatorial: he offered the sacrifice for us and it·is we who are enriched as a result. III the sacramental representation of Christ's worship the two moments are given distinct expression in the two integral parts of the sacramental system. In the Mass Christ worships; in the other sacraments we share in the fruits of his worship. On the level of sign-action performed by the Church worship must be inserted in both parts of the sacramental system. We offer with Christ in the Mass; we submit in faith to the divine economy of salvation in the grace-giving sacraments. The whole system, therefore, is the worship of the Whole Christ. The liturgy is the eternal worship of the Church, deriving from the conformation of her members to Christ by faith a:pd charity. Into the sign-actions performed by the Church enters the action of *Chriatua TeauT-gena,* making the symbolic sacrifice of the Church his own sacrifice and thus incorporating the worship of the Church at Mass into the unique sacrifice, and making the other sacraments the channel through which he distributes the fruit of that sacrifice. What is simple in Christ, who by one action merited grace for individuals, is partkipated in multiple and fragmentary fashion by the priesthood of the Church which must perform distinct actions to offer sacrifice and to distribute grace.

(c) *Conclusion.* It is noteworthy that in the extra-sacramental instrumental application of the humanity of Christ efficient causality *p1'odtwea* a likeness to Christ, as is most clear in the act of justification of the sinner and' the bodily resur-

rection of all men (*ca'U8alitaaexemplaris aacramentaliter* and *simpliciter).* In the sacramental order, on the contrary, efficient causality of the humanity and of the sacrament *pretmpposea* exemplary causality: the Church makes a sign-action which specifies Christ's action, the result being further configuration of the Church to Christ. The Church, in performing the sign-actions of her liturgy makes available to Christ the flesh of a new form of Incarnation in the world of symbols. This is a new mystery of Christ: Christ living and active in the sacraments of faith of the Church. The presence of the past mysteries is accordingly brought about in a manner proper to faith: a sacrificial meal symbolizing the passion itself, a symbol of the incorporation of an individual into the death and resurrection of Christ, the various symbols related to the life of the regenerated Christian. What is fascinating in the sacraments is not so much that they bring us grace; that is already implicit in the mystery of the Incarnation. Rather it is the revelation they make of the wisdom of God, of the delicacy of touch with which He sanctifies man in accordance with the psychological demands of man's nature and of his virtue of faith-: The sacramental actions themselves come from within the believers of the Church. They place moral actions, do things, perform liturgies, through their ministers, so expressing their faith in Christ. Into this world of faith, the intentional order, Christ enters with his divine power, not to rehearse past deeds uselessly, but as a glorified, vivifying spirit to conform men's souls to the mysteries symbolized in the faith-signs of the Church.

Behind the whole mystery with its unique Redeemer, passed definitively from death to life, from the mysteries of history to their heavenly consummation, and with its multiform sacramental system, is the *Verbum vitae,* giving life to men so that they may be conformed to the pattern of the Pasch and be brought after resurrection into the immediate of Christ and in his divinity know the Father. Until that final triumph

over death the Church must progress through history, recalling in faith the past mysteries of her Redeemer, and looking up to him where he reigns already in heaven, the pledge of the things to come and the source of life at every moment. The whole faith of the Chruch rests on the fact that Christ has accomplished his Pasch, that his earthly mysteries are past, and that he has risen to die no more, the first-fruits of them that sleep. It is not Christ, but the Church, that must now die to sin and rise to a new life that leads to glory; and her source of life and hope is her glorified Saviour. If the Christian is baptized into the death of Christ this does not mean that Christ's own death must somehow be re-enacted or held suspended in some imaginary yet paradoxically unimaginable world of shades. It means that a new accident has been educed from the obediential potency of the Christian's soul: he is justified interiorly in virtue of the merits and satisfaction of which took place two thousand years ago. It means that something happens *within him* that bears an analogical likeness-by analogy of attribution and of proportionality-to the death and resurrection of Christ. Ontologically and morally the Christian is changed, not Christ; to make the passion itself in any manner present, apart from being impossible, is ,pointless; what is wanted and is given is a symbol of the passion being applied to an individual. The faith of the Church looks back to the earthly mysteries of her Redeemer; in her liturgy the Church enacts symbolic-actions expressing her faith in what is past, so instructing her children that the life she gives them was won by death, and exhorting them to die daily to their evil moral tendencies. The faith of the Church looks up to her glorified Redeemer, knowing that now he is a vivifying spirit and that he has promised to make her sacraments effective in her children; knowing that he has promised, though raised up to heaven, to dwell in her tabernacles; knowing that he has promised that the sacrifice which she daily performs with the symbols of his past passion will remain as his own sacrifice

until the time for sacrifice has passed.. The Church lives in time, looking backwards to Christ and looking forward to his Second Coming. Her future lies in her glorified Saviour who from heaven makes her like himself, raising her first in secret manner from sin so that she may live with his life, hid with him in God, that, when the appointed day shall come, he may " reform the body of her lowness, made like the body of his glory" (Phil., S. !H).

CoLMAN E. O'NEILL, O.P.

Institute I68U8 MagiateT,
Pontifical UnivBTaity of the Lateran,
Rome, Italy

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

The Development in St. Thomas' Teaching

OF all the miracles of Our Blessed Lord the greatest is that of His own Resurrection from the dead. From the first preaching of the Apostles this has been appreciated. In every age the heralds 'and exponents of the Gospel have constantly appealed to the Resurrection of Jesus as to the supreme and 'Unshakeable motive of credibility for the message they brought. If Christ be not risen from the dead, they have cried with St. Paul, your faith is vain.

It is to be noted, however, that for too many the meaning and power of the Resurrection stopped short with that. It was the mightiest proof of Christ's Divinity and Messianship. It was, moreover, for Jesus Himself the moment of triumph and glorification. But nothing more.

Such a manner of proceeding on the part of many Christian authors is a cause of wonderment when one considers, for instance, what the Resurrection meant to the Apostles themselves. Did the words of Paul which these men so confidently cited mean just that and nothing more? Was he merely giving proof of the general credibility of his doctrine? Even a cursory reading of his words in their context will show that indeed he was not. And modem scriptural scholarship is throwing more and more light upon the cardinal role of the Resurrection in Pauline theology and in the doctrine of the New Testament as a whole.

This being so, it is very significant that in, the history of Christian thought as regards this mystery, the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas should stand out in the clearest relief. For

Thomas this mystery meant far more than a motive of credibility, far more than a personal glorification of the Saviour. The Resurrection of Christ looms large in his theology as an integral part of God's plan for human redemption. It follows without saying that a study of his teaching on the Resurrection will be at once interesting and rewarding.

When one thinks of St. Thomas Aquinas, one thinks immediately of his *Summa Theologiae.* This is, true enough, his masterpiece, a sublime work of synthesis that embodies the fruits of long years of theological thought. Yet Thomas wrote many theological works besides the *Summa,* and in most of them he gave some treatment to the mystery of Our Lord's Resurrection. To treat in an adequate fashion of St. Thomas' teaching on the Resurrection .and its redemptive role would thus involve a study of his doctrine as it appears in these other works as well.

Now such a study as this will reveal a very important fact: that the teaching of Aquinas on this point was not something fixed and unchanging. Throughout his years of teaching and writing, St. Thomas' doctrine ever continued to progress and develop. It was expressed more clearly; supported more strongly, linked more closely to the rest of his teaching. In some respects it changed altogether.

It is this progress and development that is to be proposed in this present article.

A Soteriological Role

From the time of his first work in theology, the *Commentary on the Sentences,* St. Thomas attributed to Christ's Resurrection a prominent role in our redemption. This is clear from even a hasty study of this work, in which he states that the Resurrection was necessary, not only from the point of view of Christ Himself, but also *ex paTte nostTa,* and that the Resurrection of Jesus is indeed the cause of our resurrection from the dead.[1]

[1] Cf. *In Ill Smt.,* dist. XXI, q. i, a. I; *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLIII, a. i, qla. 1.

St. Thomas treated significantly of the redemptive role of the mystery in many of his works.[2] A study of them shows that his doctrine on this point can be subsumed under four heads:

(a) The essential role of the Resurrection in *the genesis of faith* and consequently in our justification.
(b) its *ea:empla'f1Jand moTal ca'U80.lity* with respect to our justification and our bodily resurrection from the dead.
(c) Its *instrumental ca'UIJOlity* with respect to these same effects.
(d) The *respective roles of the Passion and the Resu/rrecticm* in the work of our redemption.

We shall consider each of these points in tum and endeavour to trace the progress and development in St. Thomas' thought.

Ca'UIJOlity Through Faith

If we study the history of Christian thought in the West, we find great emphasis laid upon the role of the Resurrection in the genesis of faith, whether as the principal motive of credibility of the Christian faith or as its very object. In this sense, then, it can be said that the Resurrection is the cause of our salvation because without it there would be no faith, hence no justification and ultimately no resurrection in glory. It was indeed in this way that the Western theologians tended to interpret the words of *Romans, 4., 25,* which tell us that Jesus rose for our justification. It was not so in the East where the Christian authors made the connection between the Resurrection and our salvation far more intimate and intrinsic. For

• Fr. F. Holtz in his article "La valeur soteriologique de Ia Resurrection du Christ selon S. ThomRil," *Ephemmdes tkeoZogicaeLO'Vanienaes,* XIX (1958), p. 610, n, 9, makes the following strange observation: " S. ThomRil ne parle de Ia doctrine de la resurrection du Christ qu'au Commentaire des Sentences et dans Ia Ilia Pars Summae." If the writer intends these words to be taken strictly, we feel that our treatment of this doctrine RII it is found in many works other than these two will prove him to be in error on this point.

them the Passion and the Resurrection were co-causes of salvation.[8]

But in the West there had always remained present that tendency to limit the role of the Resurrection to its much more extrinsic and indirect function as at once the motive of credibility and the object of justifying faith. And it was to this tradition, naturally, that St. Thomas Aquinas found himself heir. While even from the outset he never limited himself to this function alone, but with ever increasing emphasis propounded the other soteriological aspects of the mystery, nevertheless, his insistence on this function-its role in the genesis of faith-is obvious throughout, and we find him asserting it in a progressively clearer and more complete fashion.

In the *Commentary on the Sentences* St. Thomas considers the Resurrection from this point of view: it is the object of faith, necessary, therefore, if we are to be justified by faith.' And because the disciples were to be the witnesses of the faith, it was fitting that the risen Jesus should give evidence of His Resurrection by appearing to them, allowing Himself and His wounds to be seen and felt, and even going so far as to eat with them.[5]

These points are to be found throughout Thomas' theological writings, in most of them in a scattered and casual fashion as their scope demanded. However, in the *Compendium Tkeologiae* and in the *Summa Tkeologiae* we are presented once more with a systematic treatment of the Resurrection under this aspect.

The first element of progress to be noted consists in this, that Aquinas deals *ex professo* with many points that had been mere *obiter dicta* in the *Commentary.* For instance, in shoWing the need for Christ to prove His Resurrection by " arguments," he had stated that Jesus had to demonstrate three things

• Cf. D. M. Stanley, S. J., "Ad historiam exegeseos Rom. 4, *26," VMbum Domini,* XXIX (1951), pp. 2671f.; B. Vawter. C. M., "Resurrection and Redemption," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly,* XV (1958), pp. 11-28.

• Cf. *In Ill Sent.,* dist. XXI, q. 2, a. 1, sed contra.

• Cf. *In Ill Sent.,* dist. XXI, q. 2, aa. 8-4.

about it: the reality of His risen life, the reality of His riSen body, and the glory of His Resurrection. [6] This passing reference to the glory of the Resurrection is given great stress in the *Compendium Theologiae,* where the holy Doctor is careful to point out that it was as necessary to demonstrate the glory as the reality of the mystery. [7] In the *Summa,* moreover, an entire article is devoted to the glory of Christ's risen body,[8] and the necessity of demonstrating the glory of the Resurrection is stressed more than once.[9]

Similarly, in the *Commentacy* he mentions the role of the disciples as the witnesses of the faith and consequently as the witnesses of the Resurrection when showing the need for the " arguments " of the Resurrection, and in particular for the visible apparitions of the risen Saviour.[10] But the *Compendium Theologiae* explicitly directs our attention to this point: using the language of the *A.cts of the Apostles,* St. Thomas tells us that, the Resurrection was manifested not to all men indiscriminately but to special witnesses pre-ordained by God.[11] When we come to the *Summa,* we find no fewer than three articles devoted to this question of the witnesses.[12]

Further examples of how Aquinas perfected his doctrine by «fealing expressly and at length with points that had received only passing treatment in the *Commenta:ry* are to be found in the question of Christ's appearing *in aliena effigie*[13] and in that of the sufficiency of the " arguments " for the Resurrection.[14]

Another aspect of progress can be found in the patristic citations ·with which Thomas confirms his teaching in the

[8] Cf. *In Ill Sent.,* diat. XXI, q. t, a. S, corp.

• Cf. *Oomp. Tkeol.,* c. US.

[8] Cf. *Summa Tkeol.,* ill, q. 54, a. t.

[8] Cf. *Summa Tkeol.,* ill, q. *55,* a. S, corp.; a. 6 corp.

[1] Cf. In *Ill Sent.,* diat. XXI, q. !, a S, sed contra; a. 4.

[11] Cf. *Oomp. Theol.*• c. !88.

u Cf. *Summa Tkeol.,* ill, q. *55,* aa. I, !, 4.

[18] Cf. In *Ill Sent.,* diat. XXI, q. !, a. 4, qia. I, obj. Sa et adS; *Summa Tkeol.,* ill, q. *55,* a. 4.

u Cf. In *Ill Sent.,* diat. XXI, q. !, a. S, obj. t et ad i; *Summa Theol.,* ill, q. *55,* a. 6.

Su'TTI/Tna. Almost every article and almost every reply to an objection with regard to this aspect of the mystery are supported by one or more quotations from the Fathers. These can be found in his *Catena Aurea.* Indeed, it would seem that he had the *Catena* before him as he wrote: for example, he answers one objection (q. 58, a. 8, ad 4m.) by quoting Ambrose, Eusebius and Augustine. Now these three quotations are to be found in the *Catena* in connection with the same verse of St. Luke's Gospel (24, 86) and in the same order in which they appear here in the *Summa.*

It is clear, therefore, that throughout' these years of· theological thought St. Thomas was ever striving to strengthen his doctrine on this matter. Keenly alive to the paramount importance of the mystery as the object of the Christian faith, he did not rest content with the treatment he had already accorded it. He gave more precise explanations and arguments, developed points that had been treated only indirectly and obscurely, and above all confirmed his teaching as often as possible with apt citations from patristic authorities [15]–in order to show as perfectly as possible how the evidence for the Resurrection of the Saviour is supremely adapted to achieve its purpose: the leading of men to faith in this mystery and in consequence to their eternal salvation.

Exempla'I"!JCausality

With regard to exemplary causality the most important development lies in the extension of the Resurrection's exemplarity to the resurrection of the soul.[16] In the *Commenta'I"!J on the Sentences* it is proposed as the exemplar of the bodily

[15] For St. Thomas' attitude towards and use of such authorities, cf. G. Geenen, 0. P., "saint Thomas et les Peres," *DicticmnaiTede theologie catholique,* XV (1), coil. 788-61; idem, "The Place of Tradition in the Theology of St. Thomas." *The Thomiat,* XV (1952), pp. 110-84.

[18] Right from the time of writing the *Comnntmta"Y em the StmttmcflB* Thomas linked our justification and our final bodily resurrection by referring to them as the resurrection of souls and the resurrection of bodies respectively. This was a distinction he took from St. Augustine. Cf. *In Ill Sent.,* dist. XXI, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 2a.

resurrection alone,[17] but we find that St. Thomas in the *De Veritate-in* explaining the manner in which the Resurrection of Our Lord is the cause of our spiritual resurrection-invokes for the first time in this connection the category of exemplary causality.[18] By the time he comes to write the *Summa Theologiae* he feels free to place the bodily resurrection and justification in perfect parallel as twin effects of a single exemplary cause, the Resurrection.[19]

In commenting on St. Paul's epistles the Angelic Doctor made still more of this exemplarity. The Resurrection of the Redeemer, he taught, is not only the exemplar of justifiQation itself, but also the pattern of the entire subsequent life of the justified. It is mirrored, not only in the Christian's reception of grace, but likewise in the whole Christian life and vital supernatural activity flowing from grace.[20] It was, moreover, this same commentary on St. Paul that occasioned references to our solidarity in Christ and in the mystery of His Resurrection.[21]

In the *Summa Theologiae* his thought on this question of exemplarity has crystalized, and we find him setting down very

[17] 1t is true that in the *Ooinmumta'l"!/*St. Thomas refutes au objection based on *Romans, 4, 25* (cf. *In Ill Sent.,* dist. XIX, a. 1, sol. 1a, ad Sm; also a. 8, sol. 2a, ad Sm.) by to the univocal character of Christ's activity. Because Christ was mau and His activity humau activity, we can relate His effects in us to those mysteries of His life and death which resemble them. It is in this way, Thomas then taught, that St. Paul attributed the remission of our sins to the Passion and our justification to the Resurrection. This is, of course, appropriation rather than exemplarity. It is only in the *De Veritate* that Thomas first speaks of the very Resurrection as the exemplary cause of our justification.

[18] Cf. *De V61",* q. 27, a. 8, ad 7m.

[18] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* III, q. *56,* aa. 1-2.

[••] Cf. *In Rom.,* c. 6, lect. 1, vv. 4-5; c. 8, lect. 8, v. 17; *In II ad 001'.,* c. *5,* lect. 8, v. 15; *In Phil.,* c. 8, lect. 2, v. 11; *In Ool.,* c. 2, lect. 8, v. U; *In II ad Tim.,* c. 2, lect. 2, vv. 11-12.

[21] Although the phrase is a modem one, the theological reality of the " principle of solidarity" was well-known to St. Thomas. Cf. *In Rom.,* c. 7, lect. 1, v. 4; *In Gal.,* c. 2, lect. 6, v. 19; *In Ephu.,* c. 4, lect. 7, v. 24; *In Ool.,* c. 8, lect. 1, v. 1; *In Heb.,* c. 11, lect. 7, v. 85. Vide L. Ciappi, 0. P., "La solidarieta: Iegge di natura e di grazia," *Sapienza,* Y (1952), pp. 121-40; 225-41. St. Thomas is cited throughout this exposition.

precisely the metaphysical principle on which it is based: that which is most perfect in the exemplar is imitated by the less perfect.[22]

Development is to be noted also in regard to the nexus between the exemplary and the efficient causality of the Resurrection. Once again it is in his elucidation of the Pauline texts that this progress is marked. Christ's Resurrection is the exemplar of ours because it is the efficient cause of ours: an effect is conformed to its cause.[28] This is clearly stated also in the *Summa contra Gentiles*[24] and is seen summed up in St. Thomas' use in the *Compendium Theologiae* of the term " sacramentaliter exemplaris."[25] His development is, in fact, of great importance, for the principle it stresses enabled St. Thomas to give his definitive explanation of *Romans 4, 25.*

Though St. Thomas continued to insist on the Resurrection's exemplary causality, indeed giving it ever greater prominence and using it as a source of further clarification,[26] his increasing preoccupation with the category of efficiency can be noticed. An illustration of this is to be found in the distinction between the resurrection of the just and that of the damned. In the *Commentary on the Sentences* this distinction was founded entirely on the basis of exemplarity: the conformity or lack of conformity to christ.[27] This same point, when dealt with in the *Summa contra Gentiles,* is given different treatment. Here the holy Doctor teaches that Christ assumed human nature in order to repair it: this He does perfectly in the case of those

•• Cf. *Summa Tkeol.,* ill, q. *56,* a. 1, ad Sm.

•• Cf. *In Rom.,* c. 6, lect. !!, v. 10; c. 4, lect. S, v. !!5.

"' Cf. *Ccmt Gent.,* L. 4, c. 8!!.

•• Cf. *Comp. Theol.,* c. !!89. Vide Capmany Casamitjana, *La rll8Urrecci6n del Seiior,* pp. 05-1>8, especially p. *56* where he says: " Esta sacramentalidad de Ia ejemplaridad-eficiente de Ia resurrecci6n de Cristo, ya en sf ya en su representaci6n en el bautismo y demas sacramentos, puede considerarse compendiada en Santo TomW! cuando afirma que la resurreci6n de Cristo tiene una efica.cia instrumental junto a \lll& ejemplaridad sacramental."

•• For instance, in the *Summa Theologiae* he uses exemplarity in refuting the objection from the delayal of our resurrection (ill, q. *56,* a. 1, ad 1).

•• Cf. *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLill, a. 1, q1a. !!, ad S; a. !!, qla. 1, ad 4.

united to Him and His mysteries, imperfectly in the case of the others.[28] It is, it seems, a question of efficient causality here. Thomas is replying to an objection against the thesis of Chapter 79, in which efficiency is invoked: "omnes per Christi virtutem resurgemus." Our Redeemer, then, will be the efficient cause of the resurrection of all, but His efficiency will extend in all its perfection only to those united to His mysteries. However, in the *Summa Theologiae* there is still further precision: the Resurrection of Jesus is the efficient cause of the resurrection of all, but the exemplary cause only of the glorious resurrection of the just.[29]

With this exemplarity may be linked what we may term the moral causality of the Resurrection: its function as an incentive to hope for and to tend towards our own resurrection. This aspect is found throughout the works of St. Thomas, but it is given increasing emphasis. In the *Commentary on St. Matthew's Gospel*[30] and especially in the *Compendium Theologiae,*[31] the Resurrection of Christ is presented as at once the basis and the object of our hope, as the very "sign of salvation." It is this mystery, furthermore, as St. Thomas found to be asserted strongly by the Fathers he cited,[32] that moves us to the practice of virtue and to progress in virtue.

These, accordingly, are· aspects of true development in the thought of the Angelic Doctor regarding the exemplary and moral causality of Christ's Resurrection.

Instrumentally-Efficient Causality

In the development regarding the efficient causality of the Resurrection lie the most important aspects of the progress we are noting. The definitive position of St. Thomas' doctrines as found in the later works is very different from what he

•• Cf. *Cont. Gent.,* I. 4, c. 81.
•• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* ill, q. *56,* a. 1, ad 8.
so Cf. *In Matt.,* 16, 4.
81 Cf. *Comp. Theol.,* especially c. !!86.
•• Cf. *Catena Aurea,* In Matt., !!6, !!9; In Marc., 9, 80; 10, 84; In Joan., 7, 89.

teaches in the first of his theological writings, the *Cmnmenta'T'!J on the Sentences.*

In making this statement we are not without opposition. Fr. Holtz, in his article" La valeur soteriologique de la resurrection du Christ selon S. Thomas," claims that as far as efficient causality is .concerned, the doctrine is identical in the *Commenta'T'!J* and in the *Summa:*

> Saint Thomas' concept of Christ's sacred Humanity's causality certainly underwent changes. Nevertheless that evolution with regard tQ his doctrine on the resurrection is scarcely worthy of mention. As we have seen in the *Commentary on the Sentences,* he attributes an efficient causality both for the resurrection of the body as well as for justification.[83]

Fr.'Holtz's article is not directly concerned with the development or lack of development in this doctrine, but he uses the *Cmnmenta'T'!J* to explain and confirm the doctrine of the *Summa,.* and in so doing expressly denies that any real progress is to be noted.[84] We intend to use a criticism of his assertions as the basis of this section. In following this method we are not guided by any preference for a more negative approach or by a desire to introduce a controversial note here. We do so, on the contrary, for two reasons. Firstly, Fr. Holtz is the only author we have found who explicitly denies this point of our claims, and as such deserves to be answered.[85] Secondly,

•• Holtz, "La valeur ...," p. 6!!9.

•• Besides the quotation given above, cf. Holtz, *op. cit.*, pp. 610, n. 9; 621; 624; 680.

•• Fr. D. Van Meegeren *(De causalitate imtrumentali kwmanitatia Christi iuxta D. Tkomae doctrinam expoaitio eugetica,* Venlo (1989), (cf. especially pp. 55-6) concedes-though this is not his own personal view-that true instrumental causality could perhaps be read into the words of the Expositio textua, *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLVIII. He fails, however, to take into account the explanation given by St. Thomas in Distinction 48 (a. 2, sol. 1a). Van Meegeren maintains that there is one particular case in the *Commenta'1'1J* in which St. Thomas ascribes true instrumentality to the Sacred Humanity, viz., in connection with the *poteataa excellentiae,* so much discussed by the medieval theologians. This, since the instrumental causality is not ascribed to the Resurrection or to the mysteries in·general, does not contradict our claims. It could, however, prejudice one of our arguments namely, that from St. Thomas' early conception of justification as a creative' act or at least as an act equivalent to creation as far as the exclusion of created instruments is

such an approach will very effectively underline the elements we wish to propound regarding development in St. Thomas' teaching on the Resurrection's efficiency.

An examination of Fr. Holtz's article will show that he makes the following three assertions:

- both in the *Commentary on the Sentences* and in the *Summa Theologiae* the Resurrection of Christ is proposed as the instrumentally-efficient cause of the resurrection of souls.
- in both these works the Resurrection of Christ is proposed as the instrumentally-efficient cause of the resurrection of bodies.
- in both these works it is to the Resurrection *in fieri,* and not to the Resurrection *in facto esse,* that the actual salvific influence is attributed.

We cannot agree with any of these assertions. The points contained in them are, in our view, true of the *Summa* but not of the *Commentary.* Let us consider them in turn.

With regard to the first, we say on the contrary:

In the COMMENTARY OF THE SENTENCES the Resurrection of Jesus is not proposed as the instrumentally-efficient cause of the resurrection of souls.

Fr. Holtz gives three arguments to defend his position here[36] One of these is simply a citation of the words from the *Commentary:*

As Christ divinely received the first-fruits of grace and his grace is the cause of our grace.[37]

We shall see later that in the matter of grace there can be no

concerned. It suffices for us to say here that the *potestas excellentiae* attributed to Christ in the *Commentary* involves once again, not instrumental causality, but the meritorious and dispositive causality which we shall be. discussing later. (Cf. *In IV Sent.,* dist. V, a. 1, in corp; a. S, qla. obj. et Sm., ad et ad Sm.)

•• Cf. "La valeur ...," p.

[87] *In IV Sent.,* dist. LXIII, a. sol. la: "Sicut Christus primitias gratiae suscepit divinitus, et eius gratia est causa nostrae gratiae."

question of true instrumentality in the *Commentary,* but even were this not so, it is obvious that the citation is not *ad rem:* Fr. Holtz is not trying to show the causality of Christ's grace [88] but the causality of the mystery of the Resurrection.

Secondly, the same author cites the *sed cantra* in which Aquinas states quite simply that the Resurrection of is the cause, not only of our resurrection from the dead, but also of our justification, as is clear from *Romans* 4, *25.*[89] We may point out that St. Thomas does no more in this argument than simply state the fact of this causality. He gives no explanation of its nature. However, his words in the *Expositio textus* of Distinction 48 attribute the same type of causality to the Resurrection of Jesus in each of our resurrections, the corporal and the spiritual. It can be argued, therefore, that the sense of this *sed cantra* is to be understood in the same way as that of the *Solutio 1a* of the same article with regard to the resurrection of the body. This, we shall show, is not instrumentally-efficient causality as propounded in the later works.

The words of this *Expositio textus* of Distinction 48 form Fr. Holtz's third argument. Since they are to be understood in the sense of the *Solutio 1a* referred to, this argument is not valid, if we show that this *solutio* does not refer to true instrumentality.

To argue more positively: it is impossible that Thomas intends in the *Commentary* to attribute true instrumental causality to Christ's Sacred Humanity or to its mysteries in our justification. At this period the young professor at Paris regarded the production of grace as an act of creation and accordingly denied that there are any instruments co-operating in this work, so that in our justification nothing created can be posited as an instrumental cause.[40] St. Thomas, therefore,

[88] In connection with St. Thomas's reference in *In III Sent.,* dist. XIII, q. 1, a. !i!, sol. la, to the causality of Christ's grace, Van Meegeren thus describes its nature: ". . . haec causalis est causalitas secundae principalis dispositionem facientis . • ." *(De cauaalitate . . .* , p. •

•• Cf. *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLm, a. sed contra.

•• Cf. J. Lecuyer, "La causalite efficiente des mysteres du Christ," *Doctor Com-*

reduces the function of Christ's Humanity and its mysteries to a dispositive and meritorious causality:[11]

Hence the *sed rontra,* which Fr. Holtz adduces to show that Christ's Resurrection operates instrumentally, not only in the resurrection of bodies but also in the resurrection of souls, proves to be an argument in which no true instrumental causality is posited. If, on the one hand, we must place these two effects in parallel as flowing from the same type of causality, and if, on the other hand, there can be no question of true instrumentality in the resurrection of souls, it is but logical to exclude such causality in the case of the bodily resurrection as well.

The following assertion must therefore be made in reply to Fr. Holtz's second claim as outlined above:

In the COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES the ReB'Urrection of Christ is not proposed as the instrumentally-efficient cause of the reB'Urrectionof bodies.

Besides invoking the words of the *sed rontra* just mentioned, and those of the *Ewpositio textus* of Distinction 48, Fr. Holtz relies also on the closing words of the *Solutio 1a* dealing with the causality of the Resurrection:

munis, VI (1958), pp. 98-5;. B. Lavaud, "S. Thomas et Ia causalite physique instrumentale de Ia sainte humanite et des sacrements," *Revue Tkomiste,* XXXll (19!!7), p. 804; T. Tschipke, *Die Memckeit Christi ala HeilsOTgan der Gottkeit,* Freiburg-in Br. (1940), pp. 1!!1-!!!!; Hugon, *La causalite instrumentale dam fOTdre BUmaturel,* Paris (19!!4), p. !!19.

Some authors would question the statement that St. Thomas in the *Commentary* conceived the act of justification as a creative act. Cf. M. Tuyaerts, "Utrum S. Thomas causalitatem sacramentorum respectu gratiae mere dispositivam umquam docuerit," *Angelicum,* Vlli (1981), pp. 149-86. Nevertheless, there is no need for us to tarry on this dispute, for even these admit that he placed the act of justification *(recreatio)* on the same plane as the act of creat,ion as the exclusion of instrumental co-operation is concerned. This he did expressly in *In IV Sent.,* dist. V, q. 1, a. !!: "Et quia recreatio animae rationalis creationi ipsius respondet, ideo in emundatione ipsius immediate (Deus) operatur: nee aliquis ei quantum ad hoc cooperatur tertio modo (i.e. instrumentaliter) sed quarto (i.e. dispositive)."

"Cf. Lecuyer, "La causalite ...," pp. 98-4; Van Meegeren, *De causalitate ...*, p. 58.

But the very resurrection of Christ by the power of the conjoined divinity is the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection; indeed, the divine operations were achieved by means of Christ's flesh after the fashion of an instrument, as the Damascene cites the example of the leper cleansed by bodily contact, Math. 8.[42]

Taken alone and at first sight, these words seem indeed to be referring to true instrumental causality. But a closer examination and above all a more careful study of the· whole *solutio* which they terminate will lead to a very different conclusion.

In the' first place, Thomas here illustrates his doctrine by placing in an evident parallel the causality of Christ's grace with regard to our grace, and the causality of His Resurrection with regard to our resurrection. From what we have already seen to be Aquinas's view of the production of grace at this time, it is clearly indicated that here it is not a question. of true instrumental causality. Secondly, we are given the example of the whiteness of a father causing whiteness in the son. How? Not because the whiteness of the one generates the whiteness of the other, but because what causes whiteness in the father is likewise the generative principle causing whiteness in the son. Let us note how St. Thomas applies this precisely to the case of the resurrection. It is indeed in this way-*per hunc modum-that* the Resurrection of Our Lord is the cause of our resurrection; for what causes His, i. e., the divine power, likewise causes ours. If Fr. Holtz's view were correct, it would be difficult to understand why this example, brilliant and apposite as it is, is never again employed by St. Thomas, even though his treatment of this point recurred repeatedly, or why in the *Summa Theologiae* a completely different example should be used: that of a fire heating the surrounding air and

•• *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLill, a. 2, soL la: "Sed ipsa resurrectio Christi virtute Divinitatis adiunctae est causa quasi instrumentalis resurrectionis nostrae; operationes enim divinae agebantur mediante came Christi quaso quod,am organo, sicut point exemplum Damascenus . . . de tactu corporali quo mundavit leprosus, Math. 8."; cf. Holtz, .,"La Valeur ...," p. 628.

through that heated air heating more distant bodies.[43] The causality of the whiteness in the first example evidently cannot be identified with that of the heated air in the second.

When St. Thomas applies all this to the Resurrection in the *Commentary on the Sentences,* we see that the resulting terminology differs from that used in the later works. True enough, the Resurrection is styled in the *Commentary* the "quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection." The divine operations are said to have been wrought "by means of the flesh of Christ." [44] And our resurrection is effected " as it were instrumentally through the operation of Christ's Humanity " [45]–to be understood (as are all the expressions used here) in terms of the explanation given: that the operation of the Sacred Humanity-here, the Resurrection-acts as does the whiteness of a man who generates another white man.

Let us examine the other works, however, and we find different terminology indeed, terminology attributing virtue and activity, not only to the Sacred Humanity itself, but equally to the mysteries accomplished in it. The instrumental cause of our resurrection is the *virtus humanitatis Christi.*[46] Christ's human nature was assumed by Him in order that it might effect instrumentally operations proper to God alone.[47] His flesh is the instrument of the Divinity and an instrument acts in virtue of the principal cause: hence His flesh vivifies by the power of the Word.[48] So it is too with the mysteries of that Humanity. The Resurrection, for instance, is the efficient cause of our resurrection and our justification; it has instrumentally-effective power.[49] Its power is the *resurrectio virtuosa facta propria virtute.*[50] It operates *in virtute divina.*[51] Thus did Aquinas

•• Cf. *Summa Tkeol.,* ill, q. *56,* a. 1, corp.
" Cf. *In IV Sent.;* dist. XLIII, a. sol. Ia.
•• Cf. *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLVIII, Expositio textus.
•• Cf. *In I ad Thesa.,* c. 4, lect. v. 14.
[47] Cf. *Cont. Gentea,* L. 4, c. 41.
•• Cf. *In Joan.,* c. 6, lect. 6, v. 51.
•• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* ill, p. *56.*
•• Cf. *In Philip.,* c. 8, lect. v. 10.
[61] Cf. *In I ad Thesa.,* c. 4, lect. v. 16.

attribute causality " undividedly and indivisibly " [52] to the Humanity and to its mysteries. True, he reserved the word *instrumentum* for the Humanity and preferred to call the mysteries *causae instrumentales,* but this was quite simply because the word *instrumentum* is applicable to something stable and subsistent rather than to something transitory and accidental. But as far as instrumental causality is concerned, no division is to be made between the Sacred Humanity and what it did or suffered, between the Humanity which rose from the dead and the Resurrection itself. Because the Humanity was the instrument of the Divinity, its actions and passions not only affected the Humanity itself but exercised in our regard an efficient and salvific activity. [53]

All this is different from the terminology of the *Commentary* in which there is no text which demands that actual power or actual activity be ascribed to the Resurrection as far as its effects in us are concerned, and in which, on the contrary, the parallel with the grace of Christ, the elucidation of the doctrine by the example of the white man begetting a white man and the very terminology of the references to the mystery's causality all combine to exclude such actual power or activity.

This is apparent enough in the reply to the first objection:

> Christ's resurrection, moreover, is said to be the cause of ours, as has been said, not because it (alone) achieves our resurrection,

[52] "indivisement, indivisiblement." Sic Lavaud, "S. Thomas et la causalite .-.," *Revue Thomiste*, XXXll (1927), p. 415.

[53] This is expressed in many places in St. Thomas' later works. Cf. e. g., *In Rom.*, c. 4, lect. 8, v. 25; *Oomp. Theol.*, c. 289; *Summa Theol.*, I-ll, q. 112, a. 1, ad 1; ill, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1; III, q. 48, a. 2, corp.; ill, q. 4S, 0.. 6, corp.; ill, q. 49, a. 1, ad 1 et ad 2; III, q. *50,* a. 6, corp.; III, q. *56,* a. 1, ad 8; ill, q. 62, a. *5,* ad I. As Van Meegeren points out, " efficiens causalitas adscribitur formaliter mysteriis Christi et non simpliciter Humanitati eius. Expressis tamen verbis S. Th. adnotat *omnea Christi acticmea et passiones* instrumentaliter ad nostram salutem operari, quia eius humanitas instrumentum est divinitatis. Unde nitro concludit quod passio Christi et alia sua mysteria talem habuerunt functionem." *(De causalitate* . . ., p. 155. Cf. also pp. 84, 86, 166, 172.) Cl. J. Geffre *(Bulletin Thomiste,* IX (1954-6), n. 1571, p. 814) affirms that the actions and passions of Christ are in themselves instrumental causes, and continues: "En fait, ses actions et passions passees, bien que transitoires, operent instrumentalement, de par la puissance divine. . . ."

but through the mediation of its own principle, namely, the divine power, which will effect our resurrection after the likeness of Christ's.[5,]

This very same objection occurs in the later works, but let us note the different terminology of the replies:

> It must be said that it (the Lord's resurrection) is the cause of ours *inasmuch aa it works by the divine power.u*
>
> As has been stated, Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours *through the power of the united Word.*[56]

No longer is it merely the divine power which acts, but also the Resurrection itself. True enough, as an instrumental cause it acts insofar as it is moved by the principal cause, but true power and true activity must be attributed to it in itself.[57]

We submit, therefore, that in the *Omnmenta'l"JJ on the Sentences* true instrumentally-efficient causality is not attributed to the Resurrection of Our Lord. But just as the function of the mysteries in our justification is to be explained as being that of producing in the Sacred Humanity a real disposition for our justification and salvation,[58] so too is the Resurrection's role to be explained insofar as it bears upon our resurrection from the dead: it produced in the Humanity of Jesus a real disposition for our resurrection. The white man generates a white man, not because his whiteness generates whiteness, but because the generating power is the power of a white man.

n *In IV Sent.*, dist. XLID, a. !!, sol. 1a, ad 1: "Resurrectio Christi autem dicitur causa nostrae resurrectionis, ut dictum est, *non quia ipsa agat Tll8Urrectionsm'IWB-tTam, aed mediante principia BUO,* scilicet virtute divina, quae nostram resurrectionem faciet ad similitudinem resurrectionis Christ."

ss In ad Thess., c. 4, lect. !!, v. 15: "dicendum est, quod est causa resurrectionis nostrae *aooundum quod optratuT in viTtute divina."*

so *Summa Theol.*, ill, q. *56,* a. 1, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum est, sicut dictum est, resurrectio Christi causa est nostrae resurrectionis *ptr viTtutsm Vtrbi uniti."*

67 "L'action de l'instrument, en tant qu'instrument, ne se separe pas de celle de la cause principale; une seule passion resulte, un seul eflet procede de leur energies combinees," Hugon, *La cauaalite .•.*, p. SS. Cf. *Summa Theol.,* ill, q. 19, a. 1, ad !.

•• Cf. Lecuyer, "La causalite . • .," pp. 95-8, and the many texts from the *CommentaTy* which he cites and elucidates.

So too the divine power of Christ which causes our resutTection is the power of a man who rose from the dead.

Christ, inasmuch as He is God, is the first cause of our resurrection after the manner of an equivocal cause, but inasmuch as He is both God and risen man, He is the proximate cause and quasi-univocal one.[59]

This explanation is surely in full accord with what St. Thomas also wrote in the *Commentary:*

The Word made flesh is not the proximate disposition for our resurrection, but the Word made flesh and as risen from the dead.[60]

We come, therefore, to the third assertion of Fr. Holtz, viz., that in the *Commentary* no less than in the *Summa,* Aquinas is concerned with the Resurrection *in fieri* and not *in facto esse* when he attributes salvific influence to the mystery.[61] The Resurrection *in facto esse* is the glorified Humanity of Jesus; the ResutTection *in* fieri, Fr. Holtz points out, is the historic event. There ·are theologians who maintain that when St. Thomas says that the ResulTection is the cause of our justification and bodily resurrection by way of efficient causality, he is not attributing this .efficiency to the historic mystery but directly to the glorified Humanity: the role of the mystery is simply that of disposing the Humanity to our justification and resulTection. Others hold that St. Thotnas is attributing efficient causality to the historic mystery of the ResulTection.

Fr. Holtz's view is that from first to last Aquinas intends the historic event when he speaks of the instrumental causality of the ResutTection. However, he does distinguish, quite justly, between two aspects of that historic event: the very Res'urrection co:Q.sidered formally, i. e., the action of rising from the

•• *In IV 86'1/.t.,* dist. XLill, a. !!, sol. 1a: " Christus inquantum sit Deus, sit prima causa nostrae resurrectionis quasi aequivoca: sed inquantam est Deus et homo resurgens, est causa proxima, et quasi univoca."

•• *In III Sent.,* dist. XXI, q. !!, a. 1, ad !!: "Verbum caro factum non est diSpositio ad resurrectionen nostram, sed Verbum caro factum et a morte resurgens."

[81] Cf. "La valeur •..," pp. 616-!!7.

dead, and the *BUppoaitum* to which this action pertains (as Fr. Holtz puts it, "le Christ dans l'acte de sa resurrection"). It is Fr. Holtz's contention that St. Thomas, in the *tary* as much as in the *Summa,* is speaking of the Resurrection *in fieri,* but the efficient 'causality is to be attributed to the Christ Who rose, not to the formal Resurrection itself.[62]

Having posited these precisions we may proceed to give our opinion, and we state it thus:

In the later works, when attributing to the Re8'Urrection an instrumentaUy-efficient causality, St. *Thomas is speaking of the Re8'Urreetion 'in fieri' and not' in facto esse'; in the COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES, however, when he attributes to the Re8'Urrection the causality propounded in Distinction 43 of the fourth Book, he prescinds from this distinction and does not exclude the concept of the Re8'Urrecton' in facto esse.'*

In dealing with the doctrine as found in the *Summa Theologiae* Fr. Holtz lays great stress on what he terms the " objection from. distance," viz., the objection lound in Question *56* [68] which argues that Christ's Resurrection cannot be the efficient cause of ours, because it is separated from ours in time and in space. Fr. Holtz argues that the very fact that Thomas deals with this objection indicates that he is considering the Resurrection *in fieri,* and the reviewer of Fr. Holtz's article in the *Bulletin Thomiste* points out that the objection has no meaning at all, at least as regards separation in time, if the Resurrection is being considered *in facto esse.*[64] We agree wholeheartedly with this line of reasoning. In the *Summa,* Thomas is undoubtedly concerned with the Resurrection *in fieri,* and as we have seen, he refers both to the mystery itself (the Resurrection considered formally) and to the Humanity that rose.

However, Fr. Holtz-still dealing with the doctrine in the *Summa-denies* any efficient causality to the Resurrection formally considered. Why? Because he has found St. Thomas

[81] *Ibid.,* pp. 6!!1-2•.

[88] *Summa Theol.,* ill, q. 56, a. 1, obj. 8.

•• Cf. Cl. J. Geffre, *loc. cit.,* pp. 814-5.

doing so in the *Commentary* and has presumed from the start that the same doctrine is being taught in both works. In the *Commentary,* Aquinas does indeed distinguish between the Resurrection considered formally and the *Christus inquantum est Deus et homo resurgens,* and it is to the latter, and not to the former that he attributes the direct causality, as far as the effects produced in us are concemed.[8G] Not so in the *Summa.* We have already seen that instrumental causality is there ascribed to the very mystery of the Resurrection itself.

Fr. Holtz, moverover, goes on to assert unequivocally that Thomas, when dealing in the *Commentary* with the causality of this *Christus resurgens,* understands by this term, not the risen Christ, not the Resurrection *in facto esse,* but Christ in the very act of rising from the dead, i. e. the Resurrection *in fieri.* He asserts this because, he claims, the same objection from distance is found in the *Commentary* as well as in the *Summa.*[66] In this claim there lies a grave misunderstanding of Thomas' words. Under the one heading of the "objection from distance" Fr. Holtz has placed two distinct objections. The true objection from distance, that described above, occurs only in the *Summa.* The other objection, which is found in both works,S' is entirely different. Unlike the true objection from distance, it does not rest on the philosophical principle that " actio in distans repugnat." Instead it is based on the truth that when a necessary cause is placed, the necessary effect must follow. If then the Resurrection of Christ be the cause of ours, our resurrection should have followed. How explain the delay?

Perhaps an illustration will not be out of place here. Suppose

"5 Cf. *In IV BtJnt.,* dist. XLill, a. !!, sol. 1a.

•• Cf. "La valeur ...," pp. 620-1.

•• Cf. *In IV Stmt.,* dist. XLID, a.!!, obj. 1; *Summa. Theol.,* ill, q. *56,* a. 1, obj. 1. Holtz ("La vale•.ll" ...," p. 620, n. 48) refers us also to dist. XLID, a. S, obj. 1a of the *OommMta1'1J* as to the "objection from distance" once again. This can be summarily dismissed. It i$ not an objection to the Resurrection's causality at all. It is simply the statement of a difficulty in asserting the fittingness of the delayal in our resurrection.

I am confronted by a row of switches and I wish to know which of the switches will turn on a particular electric bulb. I ask, "Is it the switch on the extreme left?" "No," I am told by one man, " it cannot be that switch, for it is not connected to the bulb." A second man tells me," No, it cannot be that switch, because when I turned that one on, the bulb did not light up straightway, but only after a considerable time. Therefore, there must be another switch somewhere else." It is clear that these are two distinct reasons for denying that the switch I am seeking is the one I selected, and if I wished to insist that I had chosen the right switch, I should have to argue very differently with each of the men concerned. To the first I should have to explain how the switch could affect an electric bulb to which it is not. connected. To the second I should have to give a reason for the delayed action.

In the case of the two objections against the causality of the Resurrection with regard to our own·resurrection the position is the same. They are distinct objections and require different answers. And St. Thomas does in fact give different answers. To the objection from distance he replies by appealing to the divine power in virtue of which the Resurrection acts: this divine power can reach all places and all times.[68] To the other objection he replies"that it is not a case of a necessary cause but of a voluntary cause, since the divine power involved always operates according to the divine will.[69]

Since the objection from distance is not found in the *Commentary* on *the Sentences,* no argument can be drawn from it to show that St. Thomas is referring to the Resurrection *in fieri.* But one must examine the other objection to see whether it too can provide an argument to prove the same point. Obviously not, for this objection appeals solely to the fact that from the moment of the historic Resurrection there was

•• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* ID, q. *56,* a. 1, ad 8; Hugon, *La causalite* ..., pp. 108-11.

•• Cf. *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLlll, a. ad 1m; *Summa Theol.,* lll, q. *56,* a. 1, ad 1m; also *In I ad Thess.,* c. 4, lect. v. 15; *In I ad Co-r.,* c. 15, lect. v. 12. Vide Van Meegeren, *De causalitate* ..., pp. 155-8; A. Minon, " Ressuscite pour notre justification," *Revue ecclesiastique de Liege,* XXXVIll (1951), p. !l49.

posited a sufficient cause of our resurrection, and this is true whether one considers as that cause the Resurrection *in fieri* or the Resurrection *in facto esse,* the historic mystery .or the glorified Humanity of Jesus. In either case one can demand an explanation for the delay in the effect. Fr. Holtz has erred, therefore, in interpreting this objection as being likewise an objection from distance and in claiming, as he does,[70] that it too is answered by an appeal to the transcendent efficacy of the divine power.

The fact, however, that Thomas in the *Commenta'T'!J* does not treat of the objection from distance forms a strong argumentthat he is not attributing the efficiencyof the Resurrection to the mystery *in fieri* and excluding the concept of the mystery *in facto esse.* This is, true enough, an argument *ez silentio,* but in my evaluation an efficacious one, for once one ascribes a real and actual efficiency to tlie Resurrection as a past historic event, this is the first objection that comes to mind. Indeed, if we examine carefully the objections at the head of the articles of Question *56* of the Pars Sa in the *Summa,* we shall find that this is the only objection that attacks the Resurrection's causality precisely as efficient causality.[71]

If, on the other hand, as we have shown, the causality ascribed to the Resurrection in the *Commenta'T'!J* is a merely dispositive causality, and if actual efficiencyis there attributed, not to the mystery itself considered formally, but to Christ *inquantum est Deus et homo resurgens,* the distinction of *in fieri* and *in facto esse* becomes of little moment. What is important here is simply the existence of a risen Christ, Whose divine power is to raise us up and in Whose Sacred Humanity, because it is a risen Humanity, there is a real disposition for the resurrection of those united to Him. There is nothing in the words of the *Commenta'T'!Jon the Sentences* to justify the statement that Aquinas· is referring to the Sacred Humanity

Cf. "La valeur ...," pp. 6i8·4.

n St. Thomas, let it be noted, is careful to deal with this objection Ui. his treatment of the efficiency of the Passion as well. Cf. *Summa Tkeol.,* ill, q. 48, a. 6, obj. ia et ad i.

in the moment of the Resurrection and not to the Sacred Humanity in its risen state.

In order that our treatment of this point may be complete we must consider another argument of Fr. Holtz: his appeal to the teaching of Thomas' contemporaries or near-contemporaries. He seems content to show that these attributed an actual salvific influence to the Resurrection *in fieri* and adduces this as an argument to show that Thomas did the same. The position, however, is not as clear-cut as that. It is surely not too much to say that an author may attribute one type of causality to the Resurrection *in fieri* and yet not be prepared to attribute another. For example, an author could evidently appeal to the historic mystery of the Resurrection as the exemplary cause of our own, and at the same time concede efficient causality only to the glorified Humanity. In order, therefore, for Fr. Holtz's argument to have validity and force, he must show these writers attributed efficient or at least dispositive causality to the Resurrection considered precisely as *in fieri.* Let us examine his references to these authors.

First of all, he claims that Alexander of Hales, in the article of his *Summa Theologica* entitled "An resurrectio Christi sit causa coniuncta vel remota ad nostram resurrectionem " [72] is treating *professo* of whether the influence of the Resurrection is to be attributed to the mystery *in fieri* or in *facto esse.*[78] An examination of this article, however, shows that this is not so. The article mentioned is concerned simply with the fact and with the fittirigness of the fact that our resurrection takes place, not at the same time as Christ's, but at the time of the *innovatio mundi,* and with the fittingness of any exceptions to this, e. g., the Blessed Virgin Mary. It is true that when he speaks here of the Resurrection, Alexander intends the mystery *in fieri,* the historic fact, but it is in a context that does not deal at all with ca1,1salityon the part of the mystery. Moreover, a study of the other articles .and *membra* dealing with the Resurrection shows that, on the one hand, its efficient cau-

[01] L. ill, tract. VI, q. 1, m. 2, c. IV, a. I.
[••] Cf. Holtz, "La valeur •..," p. 619.

sality [74] is restricted to the bodily resurrection alone,[75] and that, on the other, this efficiency is attributed to the Resurrection *in faoto esse.*[76]

The teaching of Alexander of Hales may well have been: one of the initial influences on St. Thomas.[17] If so, contrary to the claims of Fr. Holtz, he would have been inclined by Alexander's doctrine to ascribe this causality, not to the Resurrection *in fieri,* but to the Resurrection *in facto esse.* Certainly no argument can be drawn from Alexander's teaching to support the view that St. Thomas in his *Commentary on the Sentences* was excluding the concept of the Resurrection *in facto esse* when he attributed to this mystery the causality described in the Distinction 48.

Let us now consider Fr. Holtz's citation of St. Bonaventure's teaching. He states that in this teaching the Resurrection is posited as the exemplary and efficient cause of our resurrection, and that St. Bonaventure answers the objection from distance by appealing to the union between ourselves and Christ the Head. This treatment of the objection from distance indicates, he says, that the Resurrection is being considered as *in* fieri.[78] Here, however, are the· words of the objection referred to, as they are found in St. Bonaventure's *Commentary on the Sentences:*

[7·] There is no need for us to expand upon the nature of the "efficient causality" which Alexander attributes to the Resurrection. It was, we believe, a dispositive causality such as St. Thomas propounded in his *C0111111U1f/,tary.* Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologica,*L. ill, tract. VI, q. 1, m. 1, c. I, ad 1.

[TG] Cf. *Su'17111na Theologica,*L. m, tract. VI, q. 1, m. !!, c. II.

[TO] Cf. *Summa Theologica,*L. m, tract. VI, q. I, m. !!, c. I, ad !!m: "Dicendum ergo quod est in genere causae efficientis, scilicet per .modum operantis ipse Christus resurgens. • • . Causa autem resurrectionis prima est ipse Deus; caUsa. media ipsa humanitas Verbi seu Verbum humanatum; causa proXima est *ipsa humanitaa Verbi appartmB glorioaa in iudicio."* Cf. also I. III, tract. VI, q. 1; m. 1, c.·I, ad lm., where he states that the *'JYI'o:r:ima dispositio* for our resurrection is the *Verbum· pa.rmm in came et reBUrgtmBet venitmBad iudicium;* also m. !!, c. IV, a. I.

[77] " It (the Summa) already existed about 1!!50, but what its composition may have. been at that date is not known." E. Gilson, *Hi6ttny of Chriman Philoaophy* in *the Middle Agea,* London (1956), p. 3!!7.

[78] Cf. "La valeur •••," p. 619.

Likewise, if it is a cause, I ask, in what genus? It is clearly not that of efficient causality, because of the fact that Chrises resurrection is past; whatever is past does not produce that which is to come. That it is neither final nor material should be clear; it remains, therefore, that it is exemplary. But on the contrary: an exemplary cause do"es not involve its effect, yet the resurrection of Christ does imply our resurrection: therefore . . .

And here is how he replies:

With regard to the objection that an exemplary cause does not imply its effect, we reply that this is the cause of an exemplar in which *the thing is known;* an exemplar, however, in which *a thing has its begi'TI!Tting,* where it cannot be left as imperfect, necessarily involves its effect; accordingly just as the head cannot exist without its members, so too neither can there be the resurrection of the head without the resurrection of the members.[7Q]

It is clear that Fr. Holtz has misapplied the teaching of St. Bonaventure. He has taken the words of the objection to. efficiency on the part of the Resurrection and given as Bonaventure's reply to them the words in which he refutes the objection to its exemplarity. Bonaventure, in fact, does not deny the force of the objection from distance as regards efficient causality: he does not claim that the Resurrection is the efficient cause of ours, but attributes instead this type of causality to the *vox Christi.*[80] The most Bonaventure will say of the Resurrection itself is-that it is a *causa exemplaris relata ad efficientem,* inasmuch as the effect is found inchoatively in the exemplar. By this *inchoatio,* as is clear from Bonaventure's words, is indicated the simple fact that God will not leave His

[78] St. Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLill, a. I, q. 6, obj. 2 and 2m: "Item, si est causa, quaero, in quo genere? Non *efjiciens;* constat quia Christi resurrectio est praeterita sed quidquid praeteritum est, non eflicit id quod futurum est. Nee *fonalia* nee *materialia;* constat; ergo est *eumplo:ria.* Sed contra: causa exemplaris non infert suum effeetum sed resurreetio Christi infert nostram: ergo, ... Ad illud quod objicitur quod exemplar non infert, dicendum quod verum est de exemplari in quo *1'68 cogooscitur,* exemplar, tamen, in quo *1'68 mckoattl4',* ubi non potest relinqui imperfectum, de necessitate infert; unde sicut caput non potest esse sine membris, sic nee resurrectio capitis, quin consequatur resurrectio membrorum."

[8°] Cf. *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLill, a. I, q. 8, corp.

works incomplete: if He has raised up the Head, He will raise up the members too. Therefore, Fr. Holtz is incorrect when he sees efficiency expressed in the use of the word *infert:* throughout it is a question of exemplarity only.

. . . on our account Christ became incarnate, suffered and died and likewise He rose for our sakes, and our resurrection in Him began as in an exemplar: if therefore God's works are perfect, then *it befits the com.tptible to don incom.ption.*[81]

Granted, therefore, that St. Bonaventure is considering the Resurrectio *in fieri* (as is shown by the occurrence of the objection from distance), nevertheless, Fr. Holtz's thesis can glean no support from the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor, since he ascribes to th'e mystery not efficient causality but exemplary causality only.

Finally, Fr. Holtz invokes the teaching of St. Albert the Great. That Albert is ascribing an actual salvific influence to the Resurrection *in fieri* is deducible, according to Fr. Holtz, from his use of the phrase *Christm remrgens* and from the presence of the objection from distance.[82]

Now Fr. Holtz himself[88] identifies the distinction made by St. Albert between the *remrreotio Clvriati abstracta* and the *Christm reiJ'Urgens* with the distinction made by St. Thomas in the oft-cited *Solutio 1a,* viz., that between the Resurrection formally considered *(ipsa remrrectio)* and the *Christm inquantum est Deus et _homo re8Urgens.* What we have said above regarding St. Thomas's *Commentary-that* it contains nothing to indicate that he is excluding the notion of the Resurrection *in facto esse-we* say likewise of the *Commentary* of St. Albert. In both cases the phrase *Christus remrgens* is obviously employed in contradistinction, not to *Christus resmrreotus* but to *ipsa remrrectio,*[84] and accordingly is no indication that by its

[81] *Ibid.,* Epilogus.

[81] Cf. " La valeur . . . ," pp. 619-!0.

[88] *Ibid.,* pp. 6!0, 628.

•• Alexander of Bales, we have noted above, also used the term *Okriat'UlIreaurgens* when he w8J certainly referring to the Resurrection *mfacto* 611/le.

use either Thomas or Albert intended to refer to the mystery precisely as *in fieri.*

And what we have said regarding the absence of the objection from distance in Thomas' *Commentaru* holds good for that of Albert also. Fr. Holtz refers us to two objections in this work of St. Albert as being examples of this objection.[85] The first is the very same objection from the delayal of our resurrection which we have found in St. Thomas' *Commentaru* and which, being completely diverse from the true objection from distance, is no argument that it is the mystery *in fieri* that is being considered. The second, curiously enough, has no reference at all to separation or distance, whether in time or m space.

It is difficult, moreover, to see how Fr. Holtz reconciles his claim that St. Albert attributed an actual salvific influence to Christ in the very moment of His historic Resurrection with the citation he himself makes of Albert's words:

> Christ wearing the signs of our redemption in the day of judgment will be an actual, efficient and univocal cause; accordingly, forthwith our resurrection will follow.[86]

That the *Christus resurgens* (and not the Resurrection formally considered) is the habitual cause [87] of our J.'eSUrrection and that the *Christus portans insignia redemptionis in iudicio* will be the actual cause, perfectly expresses the view of those who maintain that the efficiency of the Resurrection is to be attributed to the mystery *in facto esse.*

We conclude, therefore, that Alexander of Hales and St. Albert the Great did not exclude the concept of the Resurrection *in facto esse* and attribute efficient causality (in the sense in which they understood it) to the Resurrection *in fieri.* We

[85] Cf. Albert the Great, *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLill, a. *5,* abj. lm. et obj. *5.* Vide Holtz, "La valeur •..," p. 619.

[88] St. Albert the Great, *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLill, a. 5: " Causa efficiens univoca secundum actum sive actualis erit Christus portans insigna redemptionis in iudicio: unde statim sequitur nostra resurrectio."

Cf. Albert the Great, *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLill, a. *5,* ad I. Vide Holtz, "La valeur ...," pp. 6!el, 6!t8.

conclude also that St. Bonaventure did not attribute any efficient causality to the Resurrection, but only exemplary causality. From these contemporaries or near-contemporaries one can deduce no argument that would lead to an interpretation of St. Thomas' doctrine in the *Oomrnenta1'1Jon the Sentences* such as Fr. Holtz has made. On the contrary, the study of the authors mentioned has confirmed us in our view that at the time of writing this his first theological work, a work which embodies his teaching activity as a *Baccalaureus* at Paris, when he must needs have conformed in many ways to current traditions,[88] St. Thomas Aquinas did not exclude the concept of the Resurrection *in facto esse* and ascribe either dispositive or efficient causality to the Resurrection *in fieri* as such.

We may now sum up briefly what we have been saying on this point:

According to Fr. Holtz, St. Thomas in the *Oommenta1'1Jon the Sentences* taught that the Resurrection *in fieri,* in the sense of Christ in the very act of rising from the dead, but not in the sense of the Resurrection formally considered, is the instrumentally-efficient cause of our spiritual and corporal resurrections. And this same teaching, he claims, is reproduced in the *Summa Theologiae.*

In our view, however, St. Thomas taught in the *Oommenta1'1J* that the Resurrection of Christ itself considered formally is the dispositive cause, the *Ohristus inquantum est l)eus et homo resurgens* (prescinding from the distinction between *in fieri* and *in facto esse)* is the efficient cause of each of these resurrections. In the *Summa,* on the other hand, it is a question of true instrumental causality, and this is ascribed to the Resurrection *in fieri,* involving both the Resurrection formally considered and the Sacred Humanity in the very act of rising. This causality is exercised in respect to both the spiritual and the corporal resurrections.

It is therefore our contention that between the *Oommenta1'1J*

[88] Cf. Van Meegeren, *De ca'U8alitate...*, pp. !!6, 108.

and the *Summa* there was a profound development in the thought and teaching of Aquinas. This began with the *De Veritate* and continued to be more and more clearly expressed until in the *Summa* we are presented with the final crystallization of his thought in all its clarity and precision.[89]

In conclusion, it mut be noted that while we are in agreement with Fr. Holtz that in the *Summa Theologiae* Thomas is referring to the causality of the Resurrection *in fieri,* we feel that, because of his identification of the doctrine in the *Summa* with that of the *Oommentaey,* his argumentation for the most part lacks cogency. The force of the objection from distance we have already admitted,. But Fr. Holtz's argument from the ·words of the *Summa:* "Resurrectio Christi est causa e:fficiens, inquantum ·humanitas Christi, secundum quam resurrexit, est quodammodo instrumentum divinitatis ipsius et operatur in virtute eius" [90] is vitiated by his *modus procedendi,* for he explains this phrase *secundum quam _reaurrer:iit* as expressing the doctrine of the *Oommentaey* and its der.dal of actual causality to the Resurrection considered formally.[91] Since we have shown that the teaching is different in the two works and that in the *Summa,* as in the other later ·works, the Resurrection itself is posited as an cause, this explanation is erroneous. This same phrase, however, can be shown to be referring to the Resurrection *in fieri* by a comparison with a passage in the *Summa contra Gentiles* where the same phraseology is employed and where the Sacred Humanity is said to merit for us.[92] It is evid(:m,tlya case of the redemptive mysteries *in fieri,* for there can be no question of merit, if we are regarding simply the glorified Humanity of Christ.

A concise criticism of the *in facto esse* interpretation of

[88] Cf. Lecuyer, "La causalite •• ," pp. 99 ff.; S. Lyonnet, *De peccato et redem!ptione,* Vol. I, Rome (1957), p. 18; Tschipke, *Die Menacheit* •• . , p. U9; Van M:eegeren, *De ca'll8alitate* . . . , pp. 67 ff., especially pp. 108-9.

•• *Summa Theol.,* ill, q. *56,* a. 1, ad s.

[01] Cf. Holtz, "La valeur . . . ," pp. 621-!!!l; Geffre, *Bulletin Thomme,* IX, n. 1571, pp. 814-5.

•• *Contra Gmtu,* L. 4, c. 96.

Thomas' definitive doctrine, as expounded for example by Billuart, is to be found in these words of Fr. Van Meegeren:

> Such an interpretation seems to us arbitrary and to twist the text of Saint Thomas. He speaks constantly of the instrumental causality of the very same mysteries of Christ; indeed, from the fact that the humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead, he invariably concludes to the instrumental causality of the respective mysteries. In addition the causality of the sacraments is ascribed formally and properly to Christ's passion, which interpretation Billuart views as improper. Furthermore nothing whatsoever concerning this view is clear from the texts.[91]

In the later works, accordingly, St. Thomas Aquinas attributed true instrumentally-efficient causality to the very mysteries *in fieri,* so that ·the Resurrection of Jesus is proposed to us as the instrumental cause of our justification and our resurrection from the dead. Our considerations of Fr. Holtz's article have cast into clearer relief the development that led to this doctrine.

The Passion and the Resurrection: Their Respective Roles

Having ascribed from the outset a soteriological role to the mystery of the Resurrection, St. Thomas would, we expect, have ever kept before his eyes the question of its relationship with the mystery of the Passion and Death and the problem of explaining their respective functions. Hence we must needs look to his words and endeavour to trace the progress he made in stating this relationship and elucidating these functions.

In the *Commentary on the Sentences* [94] he stated that the Passion was ordained to .the removal of evil by way of satis-

•• Van Meegeren, *De cauaalitate...*: "Interpretatio illa nobis videtur arbitraria et detorquet D. Thomae textum. Ipse enim continue loquitur de caus8litate instrumentali ipsorum mysteriorum ChriSt; immo, ex hoc quod humanitas Christi est divinitatis instrumentum, semper concludit ad causalitatem instrumentalem singuuorum mysteriorum. lnsuper causalitas sacramentorum formaliter et. proprie adscibitur passioni Christi; secundum tamen interpretationem quam habet Billuart improprie tantum. lnsuper de hac interpretatione nihil omnino ex textibus constat."

•• Cf. *In III Sent.,* dist. XIX, a. 1, sol. 1a, ad Sm.; a. S, sol. ia., ad Sm; dist. XXI, a. 1, ad Sm. et ad 4m.

faction, while the Resurrection was ordained to perfecting in good by the inauguratioa of the new life. We attribute the remission of sin and the removal of the *poenalitates vitae* to the Passion, justification and glorification to the Resurrection, by a form of appropriation, since Christ, the cause of these benefits, is like us in nature and hence His activity can in a certain sense be said to be univocal causality.

In the *De Veritate* [95] he again posits this appropriation, relating the remission of sin to the Passion and justification to the Resurrection, as an example to explain the Augustinian appropriation of spiritual resurrection to the Word *simpliciter,* and bodily resurrection to the Word Incarnate. But here in the *De Veritate* he has already ascribed true exemplary causality to the Resurrection with to justification, so that one would expect to see this latter development influencing the question of the respective roles of the Passion and the Resurrection.

We do in fact find a very significant advance in the *Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles* as regards this question. It was above all *Romans* 4, *25* that occasioned this. [96] Confronted with the problem of placing the two mysteries-the Passion and the Resurrection-in parallel as causes and at the same time of distinguishing between their effects, as is demanded by this verse of St. Paul, he invoked the three types of causality that are applicable: meritorious, efficient, exemplary. Only the Passion of Jesus was meritorious, but both mysteries were efficient and exemplary causes. Hence the parallelism is explained on the grounds of efficiency, the dichotomy of the effects by exemplarity. Moreover St. Paul's teaching elsewhere led him to extend this distinction in the effects of their twin causality to corporal death and corporal resurrection: His death destroyed

•• Cf. q. !l9, a. 4, ud 1; q. !l7, a. 8, ad 7.

•• "De. fait, telle etait !'explication que S. Thomas avait donnee de ce verset qu'il cite tres souvent dans ses oeuvres et qui semble avoir joue un role important dans l'elaboration de sa synthese theologique de la redemption," Lyonnet, "La valeur soteriologique de la resurrection du Christ selon saint Paul," *Christua Victor Murtia,* Terza settimana teologica, Univ. Greg., Rome (1958), p. 101.

our death, His Resurrection inaugurated for us a new and perpetuallife. [97]

In the *Summa contra Gentiles* [98] the scope of the work limits his observations to the question of the bodily resurrection. Aquinas is preoccupied with the penal character of our death, so that rather than relating the destruction of our death and our resurrection to the Death and Resurrection of Jesus respectively on the basis of exemplarity between cause and effect, he relates Christ's Death to the destruction of sin and His Resurrection to the destruction of sin's penalty, viz., death. It is once again a question of exemplarity but a different exemplarity: this time the Death of the Redeemer is regarded as the exemplar of victory over sin, His Resurrection as the victory over death, rather than as being exemplars of the negative and positive aspect of the one victory over death.

The *Compendium Theologiae* imposes no restrictions on St. Thomas' treatment, and it is here that we are given an almost perfect and certainly a very complete synthesis of the respective functions of the two mysteries. This is how Thomas up the question:

> Christ's death, therefore, is the cause of the remissionof our sin: the efficient cause instrumentally, the exemplary cause sacramentally, and the meritorious cause. In like manner, Christ's resurrection was the cause of our resurrection: the efficientcause instrumentally and the exemplary cause sacramentally, but it was not the meritorious cause.... [99]

The *Summa Theologiae* [100] reproduces succinctly the satis-

[97] Cf. *In R<nn.,* c. 4.lect. S, v. !M; c. 14, lect. 1, v. 9; *In II ad Tim.,* c. 1, lect. S, v. 10.

[98] Cf. L. 4, c. 79.

[99] *Comp. Tkeol.,* c. 289: "Sic igitur mors Christi est causa remissionis peccati nostri et effectiva instrumentaliter, et exemplaris sacramentaliter, et meritoria. Resurrectio autem Christi fuit causa resurrectionis nostrae eflectiva quidem instrumentaliter et exemplaris sacramentaliter, non autem meritoria."

[100] Cf. ill, q. 58, a. 1, ad S; q. *56,* a. 1, ad 4; q. *56,* a. 1, ad 4; q. *66,* a. 2, ad 4m. Vide A. Vandenberghe, "De resurrectione Christi," *Collationea* XL (1940), pp. 118-17; Capmany Casamitjana, *La re81/,rreci00...*, pp. 68-70; Vawter, "Resurrection ...," p. 17.

fying treatment occasioned by the *ClYmmentary on St. Paul's Epistles* and developed so fully in the *ClYmpendium.* It adds, however, one important clarification. In the earlier works St. Thomas taught that the Death and the Resurrection both act He taught also that the one is the exemplary cause of the remission of sin and of the destruction of death, the other the exemplary cause of positive justification and of the newness of life by grace. But obviously while we may distinguish in justification a negative and a positive element, these aspects cannot be separated, so that the efficient cause of the one must be the efficient cause of the other.[101] It is equally obvious that the Passion of Christ must be the efficient cause of eternal life, if it is the efficient cause of the destruction of death, and· His Resurrection must destroy death if it is the efficient cause of the newness of life. This difficulty is solved very simply by St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae.* While we distinguish the causality of the two mysteries on the basis of exemplarity, we do not make this distinction in the case of efficiency: under this aspect they act together as one cause-*per modum* unius-and are together the single cause of the two-fold effect.

Once again a tracing of doctrine through the works of the Angelic Doctor has led· us to a fuller appreciation of the perfection of doctrine and theological precision in his definitive teaching.

The Resurrection in St. Thomas' Soteriology

While St. Thomas Aquinas treated the Incarnation itself and the entire life of Christ from the soteriological aspect, it is nonetheless clear how he stressed in particular what may be termed the redemptive mysteries *par excellence.* The Passion, for example, is given special treatment, because it was in a particular way ordained to our redemption and salvation. Though Thomas attributed a soteriological to all the

[101] Cf. Concilium Tridentinum, Sess. 6, c. 7 (Dens. 799-800); Minon, "Ressuscite ...," p. 244.

actions and passions of Our Lord's Humanity/ [02] he pointed out that for many reasons and from many points of view the. Passion of Jesus and His death upon the Cross possessed ill the plan of God a fittingness and a necessity in human redemption.108 And associated with the mystery of the Passion and sharing in its unique and necessary role were the mysteries of the Resurrection and the Ascension.[104]

Hence we are justified in restricting our considerations to St. Thomas' treatment of these mysteries when we wish to study the place the Resurrection held in his soteriology. We are given a systematic treatment of the Redemption in the *Commentary on the Sentences,* the *Compendium Theologiae* and the *Summa Theologiae.* A study of the position ascribed in each of these to the Resurrection of Jesus will enable us to highlight the development and progress in this matter.

That the Sacred Passion enjoyed in Thomas' teaching a role such as we have referred to is clear from even a cursory examination of the *Commentary on the Sentences.* His observations on this mystery are, however, followed by a treatment of the Resurrection and the Ascension. This further treatment was not demanded by the *Sentences* upon which he was commenting: Peter Lombard had but a passing reference to the Resurrection here and he made no mention of the mystery of the Ascension, and in this he was followed for the most part by his commentators. Aquinas, nevertheless, intro!fuced into his commentary an explicit treatment of both mysteries. Very clearly, then, St. Thomas, even in this his fir!!lt work in theology, was not content to ascribe the Christian redemption to the Passion alone, but felt it necessary to point out the role of the Resurrection and the Ascension as well.

••• Cf. *av:pra,* n. 58.

108 Cf. *In Ill Smt.,* dist. XX,. q. 1, aa. S, 4; *Comp. Tkeol.,* cc. US, !!29; *Su11V11UJ Tkeol.,* ID, q. 46, aa. 1-4.

10· This is expressly taught of the Resurrection. Cf. *8u1TIIIIIUJ Tkeol.,* m, q. *56,* a. 1, ad 2m, where the same hypothetical necessity is attached to the Resurrection as to the Passion. N. B. the Leonine editor's reference to q. 46, a. 2. St. Thomas' doctrine on the Resurrection justifies the extension of this to the Ascension as well.

If, however, we study the treatment of the role here attributed to the Resurrection, we find that the whole stress is laid on its function in our bodily resurrection. True enough, St. Thomas speaks of its role in justification by faith, but this would pertain to the subjective redemption rather than to the objective redemption which must form the object of soteriology. And it' is true also that he extends the dispositive causality of the Resurrection, expounded in the commentary on the fourth Book, to the spiritual as well as the corporal resurrection. This, however, was done in view of St. Paul's teaching in *Rmnans 25,* and the references to this causality as regards the spiritual resurrection are indirect and in passing.[105] Thus, as far as Thomas's soteriology is concerned, the Resurrection's role is concerned before all and above all with our bodily resurrection from the dead.

This role, as we have seen, is one involving exemplary. cau-·sality and dispositive causality, and it is under this aspect that Aquinas sees the necessity of the Resurrection *ea; parte nolftra:*

> ... so that the resurrection in glory, which for the members was yet to come, might have its start in the head.[108]

This being so, we need not be surprised that the soteriology of the *Commentary* is almost entirely taken up with the role of the Sacred Passion, that such meagre treatment is allotted to the function- of the Resurrection and that its role in our justification is almost ignored. For, on the one hand, St. Thomas does not here extend the exemplarity of the Resurrection to our justification, and on the other hand the dispositive causality of which he speaks is united by him with the concept of merit. It is an aspect of Christ's meritorious activity, necessarily involved in it. This we can glean first of

[105] Cf. *In III Sent.,* dist. XIX. a. S, q1a. 2, ad Sm; *In IV Sent.,* dist. LXIII, a. 2, q1a. 1, sed contra; dist. XLVIII, Expositio textus.

[108] *In III Sent.,* dist. XXI, q. 2, a. 1: "... ut scilicet in capite gloriosa resurrectio inchoaretur quae in membris futura erat."

all from Thomas' invoking the doctrine of the Mystical Body, as he does in the quotation just given. The of the Head upon the members which must found the *ratio capitis* is by way of merit only:

> Christ as man is our head. Accordingly he has some influx relative to us, but only by way of merit.[107]

This same point is to be gleaned secondly from the *corpus* of the article here cited, which deals with Christ's meriting for us; here Thomas founds the ability of Christ to merit for us upon the activity of His Humanity as an instrument of the Divinity. By this, as we have seen, was meant not true instrumentally-efficient causality but dispositive causality. In the following Distinction he says:

> A cause is said to be efficient in one way if it completes its effect and this is the principal agent which brings about the form and thus God alone blots out sin . . . in another way a cause is said to be efficient by disposing the material for receiving a form: and thus whoever merits the removal of sin is said to blot it out: because from merit somebody is made like matter which is disposed for the receiving of grace through which sins are blotted out .... Christ alone, however, can merit sufficiently for others .... [108]

Merit, accordingly, means more than an extrinsic *ius ad praemium:* the meritorious action disposes the subject of the action, and because Christ's Humanity is the instrument of the Divinity, His influence spreads over the whole human race and the disposition produced by His meritorious activity affects not only that Humanity itself but all mankind: [109]

[107] *In III Sent.,* dist. XVII, a. 6, q1a. 1, Sed contra: "Christus secundum quod homo, est caput nostrum. Ergo nobis aliquid infuit, sed non nisi meritorie."

[108] *In III Sent.,* dist. XIX, a. 1, sol. 1a: "Dicitur ·enim causa efficiens, uno modo perficiens effectum; et hoc est principale agens formam;. et sic solus Deus peccatum delet . . . alio modo dicitur efficiens ruSponens materiam ad recipiendum formam: et sic dicitur peccatum delere ille qui meretur peccati deletionem: quia ex merito efficitur aliquis dignus quasi materia disposita ad recipiendam gratiam, per quam peccata deleantur • . . Solus autem Christus aliis potest sufficienter merer1. ...."

[109] Cf. Lecuyer, "La causalite ...," pp. 98-8.

Grace comes forth from God through the mediation of the man Christ: for He has disposedthe entire human race for the receiving of grace.l1°

Here, then, in the *Commenta1'1Jon the Sentences,* Aquinas explained the influence of Christ upon His members as meritorious causality, involving a dispositive causality. Since His merit is to be ascribed to the Passion and Death which He endured, Thomas' soteriology is largely taken up with a discussion of this mystery: through the satisfactory merit of His Passion,[111] Jesus freed us from sin, from the devil, from sin's penalties, and reconciled us to God.[112] Since it was the Passion that merited Christ's Resurrection and hence ours also, it is understandable why St. Thomas in this context gave but a brief treatment of the Resurrection's causality with regard to ours and no direct treatment at all of its causality in our justification.

In the *Compendium Theologiae* the work of human redemption is regarded as the *reparatio vitae nostrae.* It was becoming that God should repair human nature, infected as it was by the sin of our first parents.[113] This infection consisted in a twofold death, spiritual and corporal, so that the Redeemer must needs conquer both. This He did by His own death upon the Cross and by His Resurrection, the former thus becoming the ca.use of the destruction of death, the latter the cause of the restoration of life.[114]

These two mysteries are thus placed side by side as twin causes of man's redemption:

[110] *In III Sent.,* dist. XIII, q. 2, a. 1, ad 8: "Gratia fluit a Deo mediante homine Christo: ipse enim disposuit totum humanum genus ad susceptionem gratiae."

[111] St. Thomas here does not separate the concepts of satisfaction and merit as clearly as he does in the *Summa.* Cf. *In Ill Sent.,* dist. XIX, a. 1, sol. la, where he says: ". . • satisfaciendo pro tota natura, sufficienter meruit peccatorum remissionem allis .•. "; also dist. XVIII, a. 6, qla. 8, ad lm.

[11"] Cf. *In Ill Sent.,* dist. XIX, aa. I, 2, 8, *6.*

[111] Cf. *Oomp. Tkeol.,* c. 199.

[110] *Ibid.,* c. 289.

Christ, in whom the second death had no place, destroyed both of these deaths in us, that is, the bodily and the spiritual, by the :first death He underwent, namely, that of the body .... By his bodily resurrection, therefore, Christ is the cause both of the bodily and spiritual resurrection in us, ... Christ's death, therefore, is the cause of the remission of our sin: the efficient cause instrumentally; the exemplary cause sacramentally and the mertorious cause. In like manner, Christ's resurrection was the cause of our resurrection: the efficient cause instrumentally and the exemplary cause sacramentally, but not meritoriously ... [111]

The references to the Ascension are more indirect and less explicit, but it seems clear enough that to this mystery as well is ascribed a similar soteriological role.[116]

Clearly then the treatment given here to the mystery of Christ's Resurrection, unlike the treatment in the *Commentary em the* is no longer overshadowed by that accorded to the Sacred Passion, and equal emphasis is laid upon the Resurrection's causality with regard to our justification and its causality with regard to our bodily resurrection from the dead.

It is to be expected that in the *Summa Theologica* there will be further evidence of this increasing emphasis on the Resurrection's role as a redemptive mystery and in particular on its role in our justification. This latter point is clear enough: of the two articles dealing with the causality of the Resurrection, [111] the first deals with the mystery as the efficient and exemplary cause of the bodily resurrection, the second with the mystery as the efficient and exemplary cause of the spiritual resurrection. These two effects are therefore given identical treatment.

However, the position of the Resurrection compared with

[110] *Ibid., loc. cit.,* " Christus autem . . . per primam mortem quam subiit, scilicet, corporalem, utramque in nobis mortem destruxit, scilicet, corporalem et spiritualem .... Per resurrectionem igitur suam corporalem utriusque resurrectionis, scilicet corporalis et spiritualis, nobis est causa. • . . Sic igitur mors Christi est causa remissionis peccati nostri et effectiva quidem instrumentaliter, et exemplaris sacramentaliter, et meritoria. Resurrectio autem Christi fuit causa resurrectionis nostrae effectiva instrumentaliter, et exemplaris sacramentaliter, non autem meritoria .... "

[118] *Ibid.,* cc. !MO, !41.

[117] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* m, q. 56, aa. 1, !.

that of the Passion can perhaps be somewhat obscured by the detailed and lengthy treatment accorded to the latter mystery. For instance, while St. Thomas devotes an entire question of some six articles to the mode in which the Passion brings about its effects and another entire question of six articles to these effects themselves,[118] there is only one question of two articles dealing with these points in regard to the Resurrection. One could consequently be tempted to interpret St. Thomas as though he were throwing almost the entire burden of our redemption upon Christ's Passion and death and hence minimizing the function and influence of the Resurrection.

One would be led to do this the more easily, were one to take as the principal factor in Thomas' soteriology a *modus causandi* other than that of efficiency, for Aquinas attributes to the Resurrection only efficiency and the exemplarity which this efficiency begets. On the other hand, to the Passion of Jesus is ascribed the causing of our salvation *per modum meriti, per modum satisfactionis, per modum sacrijicii, per modum redemptionis,* as well as *per modum efficientiae.* If the paramount factor in our redemption were merit or satisfaction or sacrifice, then the .Resurrection's role would be excluded: it was not meritorious, for Jesus was no longer *in statu viatoris;* it was not for it bore no penal character; it was not an integral part of Christ's sacrifice, for in the mind of Thomas it was rather the fruit of that sacrifice. Hence, if any of these be taken as the key to his soteriology, Thomas could be accused of a lack of unity, of a confusion between the objective and subjective aspects of our redemption, of a failure to distinguish between what properly pertains to the work of redemption and what is merely consequent to that work.[119]

[118] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* ill, qq. 48, 49.

[119] Such criticism has in fact been levelled against St. Thomas' treatment of Redemption. Cf. Adolph Harnack and A. Sabatier, cited by J. Riviere (" Redemption," *D. T. 0.,* XIII, col. 1950} and by J. M. O'Leary *(The Development of the Doctrine of St. Aquinll8 on the Pll8sion and Death of Our Lord,* Chicago (195!!), p. xii). Riviere himself takes L. Hardy to task because the latter in his

Let merit, satisfaction or sacrifice be the prime factor in the objective redemption wrought· by Christ, and it must at once be admitted that this redemptive work came to a close with His death upon the Cross. Yet there remains the disconcerting fact that St. Thomas proposes the Resurrection to us as a mystery ordained to the common salvation of all/ [20] as the efficient and exemplary cause of our justification and resurrection from the dead.[121] And to the Ascension is .·ascribed a function which pertains to the objective redemption, according to the Angelic Doctor himseH, for he states that the Ascension is the cause of our salvation in two ways: *ex parte nostra* and *ex parte ipsius Christi-a* distinction that is surely to be identified with the theological distinction between subjective and objective redemption.[122]

However, a close study of this section of the *Summa* will show that it is not merit or satisfaction or the notion of sacrifice that is paramount in St. Thomas's soteriology, and that the stress laid upon the mystery of the Resurrection in the *Compendium* has not been abandoned here. For the *modus efjicientiae* of the Passion itself (the *modus* which is attributed equally to the Resurrection and the Ascension) was certainly uppermost in Thomas' mind when he spoke of the way in which the Passion brought about its effects.

For Aquinas saw all redemptive influence in the context of the doctrine of the Mystical Body. He himself states:

La *doctrine de la Redmnpticm ekes 8. Tlunnaa* (Paris, 1986) had devoted an entire chapter (pp. liH-91) to what he termed the "prolongement& de Ia Passion" (viz. the Resurrection, the Ascension and the Sacraments) . Riviere claimed that all this was outside the scope of the subject and involved a confusion of the objective and subjective redemptions. (Cf. J. Riviere, *Le dogme dela redmnption dans la theologie contempMaine*, Albi (1949), p. 167). St. Thomas himself would be open to the same criticism, as far as his treatment of the Resurrection and the Ascension is concerned, if merit were intended to be the basis of his soteriology, In reality, of course, it is Riviere himself who is to be criticized for his neglect of the role of the Resurrection. Cf. Minon, "Ressuscite ...," pp. 284 :lf.

[120] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, ill, q. *55*, a. 1, ad !!.

[121] Cf. *8'1Jn11111W, Theol.*, III, q. *56*, aa. 1, !!.

[122] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 58, a. 6, corp. et ad 2.

Now to save men and to be a propitiation for their sins belongs to Christ as Head.U[8]

Thus when teaching that Christ's Passion caused our salvation by way of merit, he rests this ability to merit for us upon the fact that Christ is our Head.[124] Similarly with satisfaction: He could satisfy for us through His Passion, because Head and members form, as it were, one mystical person.[125] The Passion also acted *per modum redempticmis:* it freed us from the bonds of sin.

. . . Christ's Passion causes forgivenessof sins by way of redemption. For since He is our head, then, by the Passion which He endured from love and obedience He delivered us as His members from our sins as by the price of His Passion.[126]

Finally, the efficacy of His sacrifice presupposes our union with Christ as members united to their Head.[121]

Let us now examine the doctrine of St. Thomas on the Headship of Christ,[128] and,,we shall find that His instrumentally-efficient causality in the production of grace is at its base.[129] Our Lord is said, to be Head because He has primacy through the superiority and primacy of His grace, because He has perfection through the fullness of His grace, and because He has power to infuse grace into all the members of His Church.

[108] *Summa Theol.,* ill, q. 8, a. 8, Sed contra; vide Van Meegeren, *De cauaalitate* ••., p. 171; E. Sauras, "Thomistic Soteriology and the Mystical Body," *The Thomist,* XV (1952), pp. 548-71)•

[19·] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* ID, q. 48, a. 1.

[118] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* ill, q• 48, a. 2, ad 1.

[10"] *Summa Theol.,* ill, q. 8, a. 1. "... passio Christi causat remissionem peccatorum per modum redemptionis. Quia enim ipse est caput nostrum, per passionem suam, quam ex caritate et obedientia sustinuit, liberavit nos, tamquam membra sua, a peccatis, quasi per pretium passionis suae."

[107] Cf. ·*Summa Theol.,* ill, q. 49, a. 4, corp. In this text St. Thomas demands for the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice a union with Him "secundum modum praemissum." This surely refers us to the preceding article where the efficacy of Christ's satisfaction for us is said to be dependent upon our incorporation into Him as into our Head.

[108] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* ill, q. 8, a. 1, corp.

[129] Ct Van Meegeren, *De causalitate* ...," pp. 167-9, 179; Sauras, "Thomistic Soteriology . . .," especially pp. 560-78.

By this latter point is undoubtedly meant efficient causality: "Tertio, virtutem habuit influendi gratiam in omnia membra Ecclesiae…." Now it is this third point that is most important and most fundamental, for it is the .basis of the other two. Thomas tells us that Jesus possessed the fullness and perfection of grace, not only because of His nearness to the very cause of grace, but because it was conferred on Him in order that He in turn might transmit grace to others. It was conferred on Him "as upon a universal principle in the genus of those possessing grace."[130] It was a principle with Aquinas that what is first in any genus is the cause of ·what comes after it in the genus, and he used it when affirming efficient causality.[131]

If then St. Thomas has recourse to the Headship of Christ in order to explain the different ways in which the Passion wrought our salvation, and if the efficient causality of His Humanity is paramount in the *ratio capitis* pertaining to Him, we are surely justified in seeing this efficient causality as the prime factor in Thomas' treatment of the Passion's causality. And this being so, the unity of his soteriology is obvious, for the instrumental efficiency attributed to the Passion is ascribed likewise to the Resurrection and the Ascension.

This same conclusion is confirmed by the fact that Thomas often explicitly invokes efficiency when treating of the other ways in which the Passion· achieves its effects. For instance, the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice involves the instrumental causality of His Sacred Humanity:

> Insofar as His human nature operated by virtue of the Divine, that sacrifice was most efficacious for the blotting out of sins.[182]

Moreover, the Passion of Our Lord saved us *per modum redemptionis,* insofar as it freed us from the bonds forged by sin. But St. Thomas tells us, we are freed from sin

[130] "tanquam cuidam universali principia in genere habentium ·gratiam." *Summa Theol.,* lli, q. 7, a. 9, in corp. Cf. also q. 7, a. 11, in corp.

[181] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* ill, q. *66,* a. 1.

[18] "*Summa Theol.,* ill, q. 22, a. S, ad 1: "Et ideo, inquantum eius humanitas operahatur in virtute divinitatis, illud sacrificium erat efficacissimum ad delenda peccata."

inasmuch as Christ's flesh, wherein He endured the Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead so that His sufferings and action operate with Divine power for expelling sin.[188]

Merit too is closely linked to efficiency, whatever must be said about these two as distinct types of causality.[184] For Thomas introduces the concept of merit into a context expressly dealing with instrumentally-efficient causality:

... inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial, namely, by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and effi.ciently.[186]

The mind of St. Thomas is clear enough. He was fully alive to the fact that no matter what type of causality is invoked in this connection, the effect will be in us and not in God. We may speak of appeasing God's anger, of satisfying His justice, of obliging Him to crown our merits, but these are really metaphors. Properly speaking, God does not owe it to us to accept our satisfactions or reward our merits. He owes it to Himsel£.[136]

. . . since our action has the character of merit only on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that God is made our debtor simply, but rather His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should be carried out.[187]

[181] *Swmma Theol.,* Ill, q. 49, a. 1: "inquantum caro, secundum quam Christus passioniem sustinuit, est instrumentum divinitatis, ex quo eius passiones et actiones operantur in virtue divina lid expellendum peccatum."

[184] Cf. H. Bouesse, " La causalite efficiente et la causalite meritoire de l'humanite du Christ," *Revue Thomiate,* XLIV (1988), pp.

[181] *Summa Theol.,* Ill, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1: "... eius humanitas fuit instrumentum divinitatis eius. Et ita actiones ipsius ex virtute divinitatis fuerunt nobis salutiferae, namely, by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently." This text provides a further argument tllat Thomas is referring to tile efficient causality of tile mysteries *in fieri.* Since merit and efficiency are here placed in parallel, and since merit can be referred only to the mysteries *in fieri,* we must refer tile efficiency to the mysteries *in fieri* likewise.

[188] Cf. Lecuyer, "La causalite ...," pp. 116-18.

[187] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 114, a. I, ad 8: ". . . quia actio nostra non habet rationem meriti nisi ex praesuppositione divinae ordinationis, non sequitur quod Deus efficiatur simpliciter debitor nobis, sed sibi ipsi: inquantum debitum est ut sua ordinatio impleatur "; cf. also *ibid.,* I, q. 1, ad S.

Aquinas has not forgotten these principles when he comes to treat of the causality of the Passion. Merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, liberation-none of these brings about any real changes on the part of God. They affect us. Their effect must be in us. And in this context, obviously, the category of efficient causality is to the fore. It pertains essentially to the objective redemption by Christ,[188] and it alone can give unity to St. Thomas' soteriology in general and his treatment of the salvific role of the Passion.

We see then that the Passion and the Resurrection and the Ascension are placed side by side as causes of salvation. Together these make up one complete mystery, a mystery with three facets.[189] What Thomas expressly affirms of the Passion and the Resurrection-that they act together as the efficient cause of the same effects-can be extended to the Ascension also. This threefold cause produces in us effects that are patterned on the three mysteries it embraces: by it we die to sin and to sin's penalities, we are renewed in spiritual and corporal life, and we are introduced into the heaven that is our destiny.

The development, as far as the Resurrection's position in St. Thomas' soteriology is concerned, is clear from what has been said. In the *Commentary on the Sentences* its role is eclipsed by that of the Passion and it is regarded directly as being the cause of our bodily resurrection alone. In the *Compendium Theologiae* and the *Summa Theologiae,* however, the Resurrection is placed in parallel with the Sacred Passion as a redemptive mystery, and it is proposed as bearing, not only on our bodily resurrection, but equally upon our spiritual resurrection by the grace of justification.

Such then, is the position occupied by the mystery of the Resurrection in the soteriology of the later works. To ignore

[188] Cf. Vandenberghe, "De resurrectione ...," p. 99; Minon, "Ressuscite ...," p. *285;* Lyonnet, "La valeur ...," pp. 104-9; Van Meegeren, *De causalitate* ..., pp. 150-55.

[189] Cf. Capmany Casamitjana, *La re.mrrecci6n...*, pp. 64-5, 74-9.

it or to minimize its importance is to warp our conception of Thomas' doctrine. It is obvious that most authors have indeed ignored its role and minimized its importance, and this may well be ascribed to the reaction against the Protestant reformers. These erred gravely in their concept of the redemptive merit of Jesus, so that Catholic apologists had to emphasize the true doctrine in this respect. Thus the spotlight was centered on the aspect of merit in our redemption. In the context of merit the Resurrection has no direct role, and so its function in our salvation came to be neglected.[140] But the viewpoint of the Angelic Doctor was not basically that of merit: it was the viewpoint of the instrumentally-efficient causality of the redemptive mysteries. It is surely desirable that his rich and satisfying doctrine should be exploited to the full.

The Causes of the Development

It remains for us now to attempt to spotlight the causes and influences that led to this development. In this context we are using the words "causes" and "influences" in the broadest sense, for the teaching of St. Thomas seems to have been singularly free from external influences in the strict sense of the word.[141] Apart from the progress occasioned by the works upon which he was commenting or the works which he himself was writing, any other development can be ascribed to the internal evolution of Aquinas' own thought, and the seeds of this latter progress were all present in his first theological work, the *CO'mmentary on the Sentences.*

The thought and teaching of his contemporaries and near-contemporaries would no doubt have influenced him at the outset, but the fruit of this influence is already found in the *CO'mmentary*. The body of doctrine in the *CO'mmentary* concerning the Resurrection of Christ is to a large extent the same doctrine that was taught, for example, by Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure and St. Albert the Great. But the progress

[140] Cf. Vawter, "Resurrection ...," pp. 19-20.
[141] Cf. Van Meegeren, *De causalitate ...*," pp. 88-89, 109.

we have traced through the later works of Aquinas cannot be attributed to the influence of writers such as these, for it is proper to him alone. We must, moreover, always keep in mind the originality of St. Thomas' thought on so many points of his theology.[10]

We submit, therefore, that the definitive doctrine of St. Thomas emerged more and more clearly in the lllter works which he composed, not because of such influences as these, but simply because on the one hand he utilized to the full the scriptur8.1and patristic data upon which he was commenting, and because on-the other hand he was ever striving to plumb the depths of the data already contained in the *Ocnnmenta'I"JJ on the SentenCes.*

This is very clear as regards what we have been terming causality through faith. As we have pointed out, the progress. in this element of his teaching in two things. Firstly, he developed fully many points that had been referred to in the *Ccnnmenta'I"JJ* only indirectly and in passing. Secondly, he made the most of the patristic data placed at his disposal by the compilation of the *Catena Aurea.*

Moreover, as regards the treatment of exemplary causality, Aquinas was once again clearly influenced by the writings upon which he was commenting, especially the epistles of St. Paul and the works of the Fathers.- The extension of the ResurreC-tion's exemplarity to embrace the resurrection of the soul was made, it is true, in the first instance in the *De Veritate* and seems to flow directly from the attribution of true instrumentally-efficient causality to the mystery, according to the principle that an effect is like its cause. Once again, however, we find an instance of St. Thomas' utilizing the doctrine in the *Ocnnmenta'I"JJon tke Sentences,* for the seed of this particular development was there. -He was aware even there of the principles governing univocal causes, viz., that they produce effects

[10] Cf. Geenen, "Saint Thomas et les Peres," *D. T. 0.,* XV (1), coli. 751-52; P. Mandonnet, *SigM de BTabant,* Fribourg (1899), p. LXI. Vide also De Tocco's *Vita S. Tlwmae Aquinatis,* c. XIV (cf. D. Pruminer, *Fun.tea Vitae 8. Tkomae Aquinatia,* Toulouse (1911), p. 81).

in the likeness of their own form.[143] Therefore, as soon as he had posited in the *De Veritate* that the Resurrection of the Redeemer was the instrumental cause of our justification, Thomas affirmed its exemplary causality as well. He then proceeded to comment upon the Pauline epistles and to compile the *Catena Aurea*, and from the teaching of the Apostle and the words of the Fathers he extended this exemplarity still further, making the Resurrection the pattern and incentive of the Christian life and Christian virtue, a mystery in which, through our union with Christ the Head, we have solidarity. Thus, as regards exemplary and moral causality, the development in Thomas' thought and doctrine flows from the unfolding of the teaching already contained in his earliest work in theology, together with the progress occasioned by the very labours he undertook in the writing of the later works.

In the emergence of his doctrine regarding the efficient causality of the Resurrection lies, we have said, the most important (and it is also the most fundamental) aspect of development as far as this mystery is concerned. Here again the same points are to be noted: the more complete utilization of the doctrinal riches in the *Commentary* and the fruits of his scholastic labours in the writing of the later works.

Thus, in the first place, a study of the *Commentary* will show that the Angelic Doctor already possessed a clear grasp of the elements of the Aristotelian doctrine of instrumentality .m St. Thomas, though ·aware of this doctrine, refrained from applying it to supernatural effects. The reason for this we have already seen. At the time of writing the *Commentary on the Sentences* he regarded justification as a creative act and hence as not admitting instruments. However, before the holy

[108] Cf. e. g., *In IV Stmt.*, dist. XLID, a. !!, sol. 1a. This was a constant point of St. Thomas' teaching and a very important one. "·Few formulae recur as often as the one that expresses this relation: since all that causes acts according as it is in act, every cause produces an effect that resembles it: *omne agens agit sibi simile."* Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, London (1950), p. *95.*

[1-] Cf. *In IV Sent.*, dist. I, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1a et sol. 28.; also dist. XVlll, a. 1, ad 4m.

Doctor wrote his *De Veritate,* he had completed the writing of two important philosophical works: the *De Principiis naturae* and the *De ente et essentia.* These metaphysical pursuits led him to distinguish precisely between substantial and accidental forms. Not only did his precisions regard the nature of these forms, but also their origin, so that he saw clearly that accidental forms have their origin not in creation but in a generation improperly so called.[145] Hence it was that in the *De Veritate,* when confronted with the objection that no creature can be the cause of grace, since grace comes about through creation, Thomas was able to reply by openly distinguishing between creation and co-creation.[146] The way was now open to Thomas for the propounding of his doctrine of the instrumentally-efficient causality of Christ's Humanity and its mysteries. And this he did, commencing with the *De Veritate* and reaching his definitive clarity of expression in the *Summa Theologiae.* For once having conceived the act of justification as something other than a strictly creative act, he could admit the co-operation of instruments in this work.

But what led St. Thomas to posit immediately the instrumentality of the Sacred Humanity and its mysteries? According to Fr. Backes this was due to a direct influence of the Alexandrine school of theology, through the intermediacy of St, John Damascene/" because St. Thomas continues to cite the Damascene's formula: " The flesh of Christ is the instrument of His Divinity." This view, however, is difficult to accept.

First, in the *Oommenta'l"!Jon the Sentences,* Aquinas quoted this same formula in connection with the meritorious and dispositive causality of Jesus on our behalf.[148] When therefore he continues to cite it, but uses it to affirm true instrumental

[1]-- Cf. *De principiis naturae; De ente et essentia,* c. VII. Vide Lecuyer, "La causalite . . .," p. 100.

[108] Cf. *De V*8'1'., q. 't7, a. 8, ad 9m.

[1].. Cf. J. Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas von Aquin und die griechischen Kirchenviiter,* Paderborn (1981), pp. 116, 215-6, especially 271 ff.

[118] Cf. *In III Sent.,* dist. XVffi, a. 6, sol. 1a; *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLIII, a. 2, sol. 1a; dist. XLXIII, Expositio textus.

causality on the part of Christ's Humanity, this surely was due, not to the direct in:Huenceof St. John Damascene's doctrine or that of the school he represented, but rather to an internal development of Aquinas' own thought.

Moreover, it is difficult to concede that Aquinas could have interpreted the Damascene as teaching this precise doctrine. Comparatively recent researches have claimed that his formula did not ascribe a physical efficiencyto the flesh of the Saviour.[149] Regardless, it is certainly true that he was not primarily concerned with the same question as St. Thomas. When he ennunciated his formula, it was not in order to attribute *ea; professo* an efficient and salvific in:Huenceto Christ's Humanity. He was concerned, on the contrary, with the problem of showing how in Christ there was a two-fold activity, and yet He retained His unity· of person, there being the one *principium quod* and each nature acting with the communication of the other.[150] And St. Thomas himself was fully aware of what St. John Damascene was teaching and of the scope of his teaching. When in the *Commentary* he himself treated of the hypostatic union and its consequences, Thomas quoted from this same book of this very work of the Damascene to show that in Christ there is unity of *hypostasis* but duality of nature.[151]

The formula Thomas took from St. John Damascene is, of course, a pregnant one, and he saw clearly the doctrinal riches latent in it. But when he took this formula and applied to it

[108] Cf. J. Pierres, *FO'T'ITIAJla Sancti Joannis DamaBceni:* "H (Toii *1C11plov) YJna.PoJI* T;jf *9e6T'J1'TOf,'e Sancto Maximo ConfeasOTe enucleata,* Rome (1940).

[15]° Cf. *De fide ortkodoxa,* L, ill, cc. 15, 19 (PG 94, coli. 789-U!!S)). "La preoccupazione del Damasceno e certamente quella di voler salvare la distinzione delle due operazioni nel Cristo, giacche, epitomatore del pensiero patristico greco, egli dove necesssrimente interessarsi delle eresie monofisite e monotelete che finivano col confondere le due nature. Collocate queste in una distinzione inconfondibilimente chiara, egli doveva spiegare anche la comunione delle medesime nell'unica Persona del Verbo. E' qui che si inserisce il concetto di operazione 'teandrica.'" G. Sciarretta, *La C'TOCe e la chiesa, nella teologia di S. Paolo,* Rome (195!il), p. 108, n. !il.

[1111] Cf. *In III Sent.,* dist, VI, q. 1, a. 1, qla. 1, sed contra. Thomas' familiarity with this Book of the Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* is clear from the numerous citations from it that can be found, e. g., *In II Sent.,* dist: VI, q. 1, a. 1, q1a. 8, obj. 1m et ad 1m; q. 1, a. !il, obj. 5m et in corp.; q. !il, a. 1, obj. 6m, etc.

the Aristotelian doctrine of instrumentality (with which St. John and the Alexandrines were not familiar and which even St. Thomas' immediate predecessors did not invoke), the resultant development in his teaching is not to be ascribed to the direct influence of these Greek Fathers, but to his own penetrating mind which saw the use that could be made of this formula in expressing the doctrine he wished to propound.m

It is our contention that there were two influences at work to occasion this development in Aquinas' doctrine.. These were his own teaching on the Headship of Christ and the teaching he found in St. Paul's epistles_regarding the salvific influence of the redemptive mysteries.

St.·Thomas was concerned from the outset with the question whether the *ratio capitis* pertained to Christ according to His human nature.[158] He was unable, when writing the *Commentary on the Sentences*, to give an unqualified affirmative reply to his own query: " Utrum Christ,us sit caput Ecclesiae secundum quod homo." He had to invoke the divine nature as well as the human nature in order to explain Christ's Headship. The reason for this was that the *ratio capitis* demands an efficient *influa;us* of grace.upon the members, and-according to· the doctrine of the *Commentary-Christ* as man did not exercise such an *influa;us:* the function of Christ as man stopped short with dispositive causality exercised by way of satisfaction, merit and intercession.[154] Thus Aquinas had to invoke the divine nature to explain the *influa;us gratiae* on the part of

[159] " --- concludere possumus doctrinam de causalitate inatrumentali Humanitatis Christi a S. Thoma non sumptam esse ex theologia Graecorum per intermediam Damasceni, prout Backes supponit . . . eius (i. e., Damasceni) enim doctrina de communicatione naturarum, per conceptum .instrumenti expressa, a S. Thoma de vera et efficiente instrumentali causalitate intelligitur, et sicut per participationem divinae virtutis Christus tangendo leprosum sanavit, -unde inatrumentaliter miraculum patrasse dicitur, ita etiam ex divinae perfectionis participatione, actiones eius et passiones nobis salutiferae sunt, id est, ita S. Thomas, instrumentaliter ad spiritualem elfectum operantur." Van Meegereit, *De causalitate* ..•, pp. 49,90. It is to be noted that Backes himself pays tribute to the genius of Aquinas in developing all the doctrine latent in the formula concerned, cf. *Die Ckristologie* ••., pp.

[188] Cf. *In Ill Sent.*, dist. XID, q. i, a. 1.

[•••] Ibid., dist. XIII, q. 2, a. I, ad S.

Christ the Head, while on the other hand the *conformitas in natura* which he likewise demanded in a Head could pertain to Christ according to His human nature only.

It can be readily understood how this duality in the *ratio capitis* was unsatisfactory to St. Thomas' mind. Hence when his philosophical studies led him to admit the co-operation of instruments in the work of justification, he found the solution to his difficulty by applying instrumental causality to the Sacred Humanity. Once this was done, he was able to teach that Christ is the Head of the Church according to His hlun.an nature, since His Humanity is the instrumentally-efficient cause of our grace. And this is in fact what we :find to be his teaching in the *De Veritate.*[155]

In this way Aquinas' preoccupation with the doctrine *de Christo capite* placed great emphasis on the question of the causality of Christ's Humanity and led him to seek a more satisfying solution than that expounded in the *Commentary on the Sentences.* At the same time there was the role of the mysteries of that Humanity to be considered: even in the *Commentary* a soteriological role had been ascribed to these mysteries under the influence especially of St. Paul's teaching. Once again we must irisist on the important role of *Romans 4, 25.* This verse is cited in the *Commentary* in connection with both the Pa-ssion and the Resurrection.[156] St. Thomas could well propose to himself the task of explaining the function which the Apostle obviously assigned to these mysteries themselves, to the very actions of dying for us and rising from the dead. The explanation he had given in the *Commentary* would not have satisfied him, for immediate salvific influence is there ascribed, not to the ,mysteries, formally considered, but to Christ Himself in Whose Humanity these mysteries exercised a dispositive causality only. We have considered this point

[166] Cf. *De Ver.,* q. a. 4, in corp. For the influence of this doctrine *de Christo capite,* vide Van Meegeren, *De causalitate* . ••, pp. 6I-i.

[168] Cf. *In Ill Sent.,* dist. XIX, a. I, qia. I, obj. 8m et ad 8; *In IV Sent.,* dist. XLIII, a. 2, qia. I, sed contra; dist. XLVIII, Expositio textus.

at great length above insofar as it bears upon the mystery of the Resurrection.

But once again, as soon as the concept of instrumentality in the work of justification was admitted by Aquinas, he was in possession of a clear and satisfying solution. Since according to the formula of John Damascene the Humanity of Christ is the instrument of His Divinity, it follows that the mysteries of that Humanity-all that it did or suffered-exercised a salvific efficiency that reaches out to each one of us, because they act in virtue of the divine power itself. Thus there came about the development in this aspect of which we have treated; the salvific influence-and it is now true instrumentally-efficient causaJity-is attributed to the mysteries themselves, i. e. to the Passion and the Resurrection *in fieri.*

Thus, through positing the instrumentality of the Sacred Humanity and its mysteries St. Thomas was able to present an explanation that gave unity to his teaching on Christ's Headship and at the same time explained the insistence of the Apostle on the causality of the redemptive mysteries. Moreover, this particular development is the key to the most of the progress visible in the later works in regard to the Resurrection. On the basis of his teaching regarding univocal causes, Thomas was able immediately to extend· its exemplary causality to embrace the resurrection of souls as well as that of bodies. And when he comes to comment on the Pauline letters, he can explain the teaching of St. Paul in such a way as to lead directly to his own definitive synthesis, wherein the Passion and the Resurrection are at once the efficient causes of the same supernatural effects and the exemplary causes of distinct effects. Hence, too, from the more or less obscure position it held in the soteriology of the *Commentary on the Sentences,* the Resurrection-because it is, like the Passion itself, the efficient cause of our salvation-is placed side by side with this latter mystery in the scheme of redemption.

Ccmclusion

It seems evident, therefore, that the development we have

been studying in its various ramifications is to be attributed to the genius of St. Thomas Aquinas in plumbing to the very depths the theological data already contained in the *Ccnnmenr tary on the Sentences*, in making the fullest use of the doctrine placed at his disposal by the scriptural and patristic data upon which he was commenting or which he was compiling, and in viewing all theology as an organic whole, in which progress and development in one element demand and beget progress and development in another. He emerges, therefore, as a thinker never content merely to present the doctrines of his contemporaries or even to present again the doctrine he himself has given in earlier writings. He emerges rather as a thinker ever striving to perfect his thought, to present it more persuasively, to explain it more fully and precisely, to correct its weaknesses and defects. And it was only the God-given realization that he would never achieve the complete perfection he sought in this matter that led him finally to lay aside his quill and write no more.

NICHOLAS CROTTY, e.P.

St. Patd'a Retreat
Urrbrae, Mitcham,
Sooth At.t.Btralia

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

ALL the classic works of the supernatural life devote great attention to the practice of mortification. The great writers in the field of Ascetical Theology assure us that without mortification there can be no true striving after supernatural perfection. This study has been undertaken with the idea of determining the place of mortification in the life of virtue as proposed by St. Thomas. We wish to determine the precise function of mortification in the life of virtue. Once we have determined this fundamental point we hope to find therein the solution to three other problems that arise from the doctrine of the writers on asceticism concerning mortification. These problems are: 1. Will the inflicting of pain lessen the desire for pleasures of the flesh? 2. Is not mortification psychologically dangerous? 8. Will ·mortification strengthen man's will for future combat?

This question of mortification, however, we will treat neither as a theological problem nor as a study in Ethics. Rather, we will treat the various acts of mortification from a psychological standpoint. We are to treat the acts of mortification, not as measured according to a moral norm, but as they are in themselves. We are to consider these operations in themselves, their very make-up, constitution, and mechanism. We are to probe the iriter-dependence of the various human cognitive and appetitive faculties and to study the acts of mortification as contributing to the harmony and smooth functioning of the human personality or as .destructive of this harmony and equilibrium. We aim to determine the psychological function of mortification in the development of virtues. The point of determining the psychological function of mortification is this: to

see if mortification, psychologically speaking, is capable of attaining the purpose traditionally assigned to it by the great masters of asceticism.

Regarding terminology, we will use mortification as a very general term signifying any kind of restraint and moderation in activity. The other terms, control, denial, abnegation, and self-discipline are merely more concrete and determinate particularizations of this general term.

Our treatment is divided into four parts:

I. Psychological problems involved in the practice of mortification.

II. Mortification, a requisite in developing intellectual and moral virtues.

III. Mortification as a means of developing temperance.

IV. Proposed solutions to the psychological problems of mortification.

I. PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE PRACTICE OF MORTIFICATION.

The theologian, with St. Thomas, sees man with his two-fold nature, sensible and intellectual, and the consequent danger of the preponderance of the sensible over the spiritual. This tendency of the sensible nature to predominate over the spiritual is deepened and intensified by man's personal sins. It is the role of mortification to eradicate in man the bad habits contracted by a life of sin.

But its task goes still further. Not content with allaying in man all disordered movements of his nature, mortification combats his lower nature by acts contrary to its yearnings. The purpose of these acts is to keep the lower nature under

[1] "Non enim angelus est compositus ex diversis naturis, ut inclinatio unius naturae impetum alterius impediat aut retardet; sicut in homine accidit, in quo motus intellectivae partis aut retardatur aut impeditur ex inclinatione partis sensitivae." *Th.eol.*, I, q. 6i, a. 6).

perfect control. Mortification causes man to refrain from the use of that which pleases, even when that use would not be a hindrance to the love of God in the soul. The precise purpose of this renunciation is to prepare man for future combats wherein the practice of virtue will prove a real difficulty.[2]

Mortification demands the renunciation of the enjoyment of lawful This renunciation strengthens dominion over pride and concupiscence. It prohibits and limits the enjoyment of certain goods and requires the deliberate choice of certain bodily pains such as that inflicted by means of the cilicium and discipline. This limiting of enjoyment and positive choice of austerities is meant to interrupt normal comfort and physical well-being to free the spiritual person from his weakness toward his body and its instincts. The thoroughly legitimate use of certain good things is renounced for the sake of purification or liberation. By mortification the spiritual person is set free from the life of instincts and acquires a mastery over the entire domain of concupiscence.

These are formidable tasks assigned to mortification: keeping man away from sinful pleasures, overcoming the wounds left by personal sin and gaining mastery over the violent movements of his sense nature. Because of the nature of these tasks, acts of virtues appear not less formidable. The authors of the classic works on the spiritual life recommend the discipline several times a week and the wearing of a chain around some part of the body. The body is to be kept in perpetual restraint. St. John of the Cross demands of his followers a deep spirit of mortification. They should reject the delight they might experience by looks, by conversation with their neighbor or through any other of their senses. If they must of necessity use things which are agreeable to the senses, they ought to avoid taking pleasure in them. They should

• " Die Abtotung verzicht et auch dann, wenn der Gebrauch in einzelen jetzt und bier kein Hindernis der Gottesliebe ware, um sich einzuuben auf schwierge Lagen, wo wirklick die Tugend auf dem Spiele stehen wurde." Bernhard Haring, *Das Guetz Christi,* I Buch, VI Kap. pg. 5SS, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1954, Wewel.

rather strive to extinguish and blot out the impression made by the pleasure as if they had not experienced it at all. They ought always to tend toward things that are hardest, least tasteful, most disagreeable, and which cause them aflliction.[8]

According to the writers of ascetical theology, mortification connotes a deliberate suppressing of a good, normal and reasonable desire to speak and communicate with others. It entails a constant giving-up of good, pleasing and even noble things for which human nature craves. It demands a constant, ceaseless surveillance of every conscious act, a holding in of the faculties when they are clamouring to spring into action. It is a calculated war against the external senses of touch and taste and hearing and sight, an even more determined checking of the imagination and memory, a constant demand upon the will to choose that which is hard and even difficult to do.

With this description of mortification in mind we may well ask the following questions.

1. *Will the infiicti.;,g of pain lessen the urge for sexual pleasure?*

Will the inflicting of pain by means of the discipline and the cilicium .}essen and subdue .the cravings of the flesh for sexual delights? Is it not a fact that some-of those who have tried to subdue and repress the promptings of their sexual desires by flagellations and fastings have ·experienced even greater difficulty than before their voluntary maceration of the flesh?

i. *Is not mortification p81Jchologicdllydangerous?*

Is it not probable that this war against one's natural instincts, longings and desires will destroy the correct balance of an individual? Will it not hinder the smooth and harmonious functioning of his personality? Will it not leave a man drained of all the vast, rich power of his personality?

[8] San Juan de 1a Cruz, 8ubida. *del Mtmte CM'IIU!lo,* Liber I, Chapter Xll, Obras Vol. II, pg. 80, 61.

8. *Does mortification strengthen man's will for future combataf*

Will the fact that a person represses his longing for a satisfaction of one kind strengthen him to deny urgings of another kind? Will a man who denies himself daily in eating and drinking and represses an intense desire to speak •strengthen himself thereby. to overcome temptations of the flesh?

II. A REQUISITE IN DEVELOPING INTELLECTUAL AND MoRAL VmTUES.

A. *Mortification-The Virtue of Temperance Taken in a General Sense.*

In several passages of the *Summa Theologica* St. Thomas speaks of the cardinal virtues taken in a very general sense as signifying a necessary condition and prerequisite for the attaining of an.y moral virtue. He. explains that we can consider the cardinal virtues according to their common formal aspects. In this respect they are said to be common to all the virtues. Every virtue which causes good in reason's act of consideration can be called prudence; every virtue which causes a rightness in operation can be called justice. Similarly every virtue which curbs the passions may be called temperance and every virtue which strengthens the mind against any passion whatever may be called fortitude.' In another passage prudence is described as discretion in any matter whatsoever; justice, as a certain rectitude of the mind whereby a man does what he ought in any matter. Temperance is described as a disposition of the mind moderating any passion or operation so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, as a disposition by which the soul is strengthened against any assault of the passions and against the labor involved in operations of any kind.G

Applying this doctrine more specifically to the notion of temperance we see that the virtue of temperance in this wide signification governs the whole realm of human emotions and

[4] *Summa Tkeol.,* I-ll, q. 61, a. S. il *Sum7114 Tkeol.,J-ll,* q. 61, a. 4.

actions. As a general virtue it is a disposition of soul which imposes moderation upon the operations and upon the urgings of t:b.e passions.[8] Temperance, as a general virtue, is an element found in each of the moral virtues. It is the element of control over human passions and activities. Each act of a moral virtue signifies a certain control over the soul's activity. No moral virtue can be acquired without this control. The task of justice is to see that man renders to everyone his due. This can be done only at the price of controlling selfish interest and motives. Fortitude strengthens the soul against fears that paralyze virtuous action. Temperance, as a special virtue, controls pleasures which are excessively alluring, governing the use of food, drink and the sexual function. These virtues presuppose a firm control over the passions and the soul's operations. This control is the temperateness, the moderation which St. Thomas calls the general virtue of temperance.

Temperance as a general virtue is the denial or control exercised as a necessary prerequisite for the attaining of any moral virtue. In the ascetical life, mortification would seem from the definitions given of it to be not only temperance as a general virtue, but also an intensification of this general virtue. Writers, in treating of the supernatural life, usually employ the word mortification to signify the more difficult intense and arduous acts of the general virtue of temperance. To understand the place of these acts of denial and repression in human striving we must inquire into the psychology of habit formation.

B. *Mortification-Necessary for Developing Operative Habits.*

An operative habit is a disposition, difficult to remove, according to which a potency or a faculty is disposed well or badly in relation to an act. It is a steady disposition of a faculty of the soul by which the faculty's indeterminateness in regard to its several possible ways of acting is given a

[8] Nomen temperantiae significat quandam temperiem, idest moderationem quam ratio ponit in humanis operationibus et passionibus. TI-ll, q. 14.1, a. !!.

dynamic, teleological ordination to a certain act, By it the faculty is given a certain operative unification of its multiple potentialties. A habit modifies a man, gives a definite channel along which his almost limitless powers will flow. It is an accidental form perfecting and determining the faculty.

Operative habits can be developed only in those faculties which are not determined to one thing. Therefore they are found in the intellect and in the will, in the imagination, memory and cogitative power as serving the intellect in its operation, and in the sensitive appetite as possessing an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, the will.

Except for the habit of first principles, all of our operative habits, whether they reside in the intellect or in the will or in those powers of our sensitive part which are susceptible of habits, are the result of conscious, deliberate, repeated effort.

In the formation· of an operative habit almost all of our human cognitive and appetitive faculties are involved in some way, either positively or negatively. Each one of these faculties has its own proper object toward which it tends by its very nature. Each one of these faculties has a natural appetite for its object. Each one of man's faculties or powers is a certain nature. Each has an active inclination to act according to that nature, to attain the proper object to which it is transcendentally ordered. This innate inclination of a form toward the object to which it is ordered St. Thomas calls a natural appetite. [7]

Man possesses a two-fold nature. This nature is composed of both spiritual and corporeal elements. The powers of both these natures meet in the soul and therefore the human soul abounds in a variety of powers.[8] The vegetative powers, reproductive, augmentative and nutritive, give the body existence,

• Appetitus Jiaturalis est inclinatio cujuslibet rei in aliquid ex natura sua: unde naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens. I, q. 78, a. 1, ad Sum.

[8] Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum: videlicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum. I, q. 77, a. 2.

enable it to acquire due quantity and preserve it in existence and in its due quantity.

In common with brute animality man possesses sensitive powers of motion, knowledge and appetite. For sense knowledge man is endowed with five external senses each limited to its own particular object. Since each external sense is thus limited to its particular object, some common center of sense perception is necessary to distinguish between the various external senses and between their various objects. This common center of sense perception is the internal sense called *8entJ'U8 CO'ITI/m'Uinia.*

The other three internal senses further elaborate the material received from the external senses through the *sensus communis.* The imagination has as its task to receive and to retain that which comes to us through the external sense. Its specific act is to represent objects previously sensed in their absence and without the limitations of time and space. The imagination in man can also reconstruct new objects from the elements which it has already received. The cogitative power has the highest function among the internal senses. Its task is to apprehend the individual as existing *sub natura communi.* It formulates particular syllogisms and provides the minor of a practical syllogism. It prepares the phantasm received from the imagination for the working of the intellect. Memory in man has as its task not only the sudden recollection of the past as in other animals, but also, because it works in conjunction with the cogitative power, it has the act of reminiscence by which it quasi-syllogistically seeks for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions.[9]

The sense appetite in man follows upon the apprehension of sense Imowledge. The concupiscible appetite tends toward sensible goods simply as being suitable to the sensitive nature. The irascible appetite tends toward goods under the special aspect of their being attainable only with difficulty.

'I, q. 78, a. 4.

Man's intellect is a spiritual faculty which knows the essences of things, formulates universal concepts, judges and reasons. The will is the appetite following-upon the knowledge of the intellect.

Each human faculty then has its own propet object toward which it tends. Yet all of these human faculties, vegetative, sensitive, motor and spiritual are Wormed by one spiritual soul. The human soul is the source and origin·of unity in the human composite, a substantial as well as a dynainic unity. Because all of man's faculties are informed by the same human soul, they are inextricably interlocked and interwoven with one another in their activity. In their operations they depend on one another, influence one another and hinder or help one another. The activity of the one affects the activity of the other.

Because our various faculties are so closely related and inter-twined in their operations, if one particular faculty is developed and trained and cultivated in a special manner, the other faculties will·be affected. They will, as a natural consequence, be made to serve and to Ininister to the partictilar faculty which is being given the preferential treatment. When the operation of one potency becomes intense the operation of another potency is hindered and the intense action of this one potency leaves its effect by way of redundance upon the other.[10] The reason one power is hindered in its act when another is intensely engaged is this, that one powet alone does not suffice for such an intense action unless it be assisted by receiving from the principle of life the infiow that the other powers or members should receive.[11]

In their acts, .man's various powers mutually influence one another. The same holds for the development of an operative habit which is formed by a succession of acts. In the develop-ment of an operative habit, the will must exercise its power as

[10] . . . quod cum operaUo unius potentiae fuerit intenaa, impeditur alterius operatio et e contra. fit redundantia ab una potentia in aliam.

[11] IV Sent. 44, i, 1, q. S, 4oum.

governor of the whole man. It must exercise its authority to take care that the executive and sensitive faculties are rendered habitually subservient to the operations of the intellect and will.

C. *Mortification-and the InteUectual Habits of Science.*

Developing intellectual habits presents difficulties to man. Nature gives man a foundation for intellectual habits in the perfection of the senses. Those who by nature possess well-disposed sense organs of knowledge are better able to understand than others, because the sensitive powers are necessary for the operation of the intellect. Keen sense organs are a decidedly good start toward intellectual habits. Yet, though nature gives a foundation for these habits, they must, nevertheless, be developed by repeated acts.

Of the three other speculative habits or virtues assigned to the intellect the one with which we are concerned primarily is science, the virtue which deals with truth known through demonstration. The truth it seeks is that which can be deduced from first principles or gathered from facts in the light of first principles furnished by the virtue of understanding. It comprises what we would call knowledge. The acquiring of knowledge is a difficult, somewhat painful process. All of man's cognitive faculties are involved in this process.

The intellect in acquiring knowledge is dependent upon the senses. Success in learning then demands control over the sensitive cognitive faculties. The sight and hearing must be made to concentrate on the matter at hand. It is especially from these two senses that the imagination, via the *sensus communis*, receives the material for its phantasms. Without an habitual control over these two external sense faculties, the internal senses will be constantly distracted and unable to serve the intellect in acquiring knowledge. The imagination, together with the cogitative power and memory, must elaborate the phantasm, the material of which it has received from the external senses. These three internal senses prepare the phantasm for the

intellect. These internal senses are susceptive of habits because they are possessed of a certain indetermination and can be moved at the command of reason. They must be controlled, must be brought to obey the will in producing the phantasm of the matter one wishes to master. Other phantasms will present themselves to distract the intellect's attention. Constant care is required to keep the proper phantasm presented to the intellect so that this spiritual faculty can concentrate solely on this particular bit of knowledge at hand. Because the intellect is so dependent upon the internal senses both in acquiring new knowledge and in recalling things already learned, these three internal senses must be made to serve the intellect, must be made to present the intellect with the proper phantasms. They must be made to reject other phantasms that come forth and threaten to dispel the one the intellect is using. The will, as possessing power over these faculties can acquire a rather strict domination over them by repeated victories. Its control is never absolute. Even the limited control it attains must be continually guarded and kept up. The imagination, the memory and the cogitative power tend by their nature to their own objects. They are part of the equipment of our sensitive nature. The internal senses, if left to' follow their own inclination, will not present the intellect with the phantasms it needs to conserve and increase its knowledge. Thus the intellectual habits of scientific knowledge are weakened. Our knowledge, laboriously acquired, disappears. This process St. Thomas describes in speaking of the diminution of habits. He states that all habits which are gradually undermined by contrary agents are diminished or destroyed altogether by long cessation from act as is clearly seen in the case both of virtue and science. Thus when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange imaginings or fancies which at times are in opposition to these intellectual habits arise in the imagination. Unless a man check these fantasies or imaginings by frequent use of his intellectual habits, he becomes less apt to make correct judgments and sometimes is completely disposed

to the contrary. Thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.[12]

The formation of the intellectual habits of knowledge, therefore, presupposes that the sense faculties, particularly the internal sense faculties, be checked and controlled in their operations and that their operations be made to serve the operation of the intellect.

D. *Mcwtifioation and the MMal Habits of Prudence, Justice, and FMtitude.*

Though the intellectual virtues demand as a condition a certain subjection of the sense faculties to reason, yet they are imperfect virtues. They perfect a man in a particular line of activity. They can make a man a good mathematician or a good architect without· influencing his conduct in other fields. Developing perfect virtues, i. e., those habits which make the whole man good, presents a greater problem and difficulty for man. These perfect virtues which make the whole man good belong to the will, or if found in another faculty, it is in that faculty insofar as it is moved by the will.

Prudence perfects the whole man. Though residing in the intellect, it is in a very real sense a moral virtue because it deals with human acts. Its proper task is to enable a man to reason well with regard to right conduct as a whole. Prudence is wisdom about human affairs. The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely in conformity with right reason. It belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by what means a man can in a concrete action attain that mean of right reason. It applies to action the first principles of the practical order. It is the virtue that gets things done

[12] Similiter etiam est ex parte habitum intellectualium, secundum quod est homo promptus ad recte judicandum de imaginatis. Cum igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus insurgunt imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes: ita quod nisi per freciuentem usum habitus quodammodo succidantur, vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte judicandum et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. ·Et sic per cessationem ab actu diminuitur vel etiam corrumpitur intellectualis habitus. I-n, q. 58, a. s.

the way they should be done. Its perfection consists in excellence of command. Its principal act, therefore, is one of command whereby a man applies the knowledge he has to the purpose of appetition and operation.

Such a habit is not easy to acquire. Its task is to apply universal knowledge to particulars. It, therefore, presupposes some knowledge. It uses knowledge already attained and by its three acts of judgment, counsel, and command it applies this knowledge to some particular act to be placed here and now. St. Thomas states that prudence is corrupted by the passions.[18] He gives an explanation of this in another part of the *Summa*, showing how reason has four acts in matters of actions. The first presupposed, to prudence, is the simple understanding which grasps some end as good. The passions, by engaging the attention of the internal senses, influence the intellect's work of understanding and tend to hinder the formation of a habit of knowledge and to diminish it if already acquired. The vices are habits by which the passions have acquired mastery over the will. Thus the passions, especially through the vice of lust, hinder the act of understanding. The three acts of prudence, judgment, counsel, and command, are also hindered by lust. Counsel about what is to be done for the attaining of an end is hindered by the concupiscence of lust and in this respect there is rashness, which denotes an absence of counsel. Judgment about things to be done is also hampered by lust and the result is thoughtlessness. The reason's command about the thing to be done is likewise impeded by lust in this, that a man, carried away by concupiscence, is hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done.u

Justice can be practiced only by controlling selfish interests and motives. It is not difficult to see that for a man to be perfectly fair and just in each of his dealings with every one of his fellow men presupposes and demands a strong control.

[18] Prudentia non directe tollitur per oblivionem sed magis corrumpitur per passiones. II-II, q. 47, a. 16.

J' 11-ll, q. loS, a. G.

But it is particularly in regard to the virtues of fortitude and temperance that we see the need of strong control and denial.

It is the task of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through the fear of bodily evil. Fortitude as a cardinal virtue has as its assigned role the governing of the irascible appetite. The irascible appetite is the sense appetite that· tends toward sensible goods under the aspect of the good as difficult to attain. A consideration of the difficulties involved in the attainment of this virtue illuminates the doctrine on the dual nature of man and the consequent need or mortification in striving for virtue.

In speaking of the angels, St. Thomas says that the angel is not a combination or compound of different natures so that the inclination of one part hinders or retards the tendency of the other as in man in whom the intellective part is hindered over his natural desire to possess and to use material goods, and retarded by the inclination of his sensitive part.[15] Speaking of the relation of these two natures to each other in man he explains that the powers of the sensitive part, save for the vegetative powers, are born to obey reason's command.[16] But this power of the will over the movements of the sense appetite is not a complete, absolute power. The soul rules the members of the body by a despotic power because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the rule of the soul. But reason rules the concupiscible and irascible appetite by a political power. This means that the sensitive appetite has something proper to itself whence it resists the commands of reason. The concupiscible and irascible powers resist reason insofar as we sense or imagine something pleasant which reason forbids or something unpleasant which reason commands.[17] In developing

[15] I, q. 6!!, a. 6.

[16] Et ideo voluntas per modum agentis movet onmes animae potentias ad suos actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur. I, q. 8!!, a. 4.

[17] Sic igitur anima dominatur corpori despotico principatu quia corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae. . . . lntellectus autem, seu ratio dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu; quia appetitus sensibilis

the habit of fortitude the will's task is clear. It must strengthen and tighten its control over the movements of the sense appetite.

Fortitude strengthens the reason to control the passions of the irascible appetite. These passions, following upon sense knowledge and following their own natural bent, incline the soul to flee from every bodily harm, especially death. Fortitude guards the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through the urgings of these passions, through the fear of bodily evil. The will must override the promptings of the sense appetite which shrinks from bodily harm, when reason sees this bodily harm should be suffered for some greater good.

Habitual control by the will over all the movements of the irascible appetite demands as a postulate previous strong acts of the will, restraining, directing and controlling the movements of this appetite. Each one of these single acts which begets the virtue means a concomitant act of denial. It means that the will has intervened in the natural movement of the sense appetite toward an object convenient to it. It has allowed the movement of the sense appetite toward a convenient object to proceed only to a certain point, and then has restrained and curtailed this movement so that its functioning would not hinder but would rather assist the will's movement toward another good it has chosen. Should reason see that it can only effect this indirectly by removing the phantasm which has caused the passion to arise, a complete removal of the passion is necessary. The virtue of fortitude, therefore, is acquired by repeated acts of denial, acts by which reason curtails the movements of sense or turns these movements to serve its own chosen purpose.

We can summarize the findings of this section by stating simply that some denial, repression and control are the necessary prerequisites for success in any field of human endeavor. In acquiring knowledge, some persons, because of well-disposed

habet aliquod proprium unde potest reniti imperio rationis. Unde experimur, irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat; vel triste quod ratio praecipit. I, q. 81, a. 8, ad2um.

sense organs, enjoy an advantage. Yet, even for these talented persons and aU the more for those less-gifted, habits of knowledge are devefoped only by a process of subordinating the sense faculties to the work of the intellect. This involves a degree of denial and control. Moral virtues which perfect the whole man demand much greater control and denial. Thus we can state that, excluding the habits of vice and the habits of first principles, a certain degree of temperance, control and repression is a prerequisite and concomitant condition for the formation of every habit and therefore for success in human endeavor.

III. MoRTIFICATION As A MEANS oF DEVELOPING TEMPERANCE.

It is in acquiring of the virtue of temperance that we can see more vividly and more in detail how an element of mortification enters in to the development of a moral virtue. Temperance regulates the use of food, drink and venereal pleasure. We consider this virtue more in detail because it is in constant use in our daily lives. Comparing temperance to meekness, the virtue which governs anger, St. Thomas notes that the impetuousness of anger is caused by some incident as a painful hurt and that therefore it soon passes, though its impetus be great. But the impetuousness of the desires for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause. Therefore this desire is more lasting and more general.[18] Pleasures of touch occur every day so that temperance is in very general use.[19]

Temperance .is not only in constant use, it is also of vital importance in the conducting of human life. For this we can quote the authority of St. Thomas. He states that temperance withholds us from those things which are most seductive, from things which have a most disturbing effect on the souP' The

[18] " Impetus irae causatur ex quodam accidente, puta ex aliqua laesione contristante: et ideo cito transit, quamvis magnum impetum habeat. Sed impetus concupiscentiae delectabilium tactus procedit ex causa naturali: unde est diuturnior et communior." 11-11, q. 141, a. 7, ad !rum.

[18] 11-11, q. 141, a. 8, ad Sum.

so "· Ea ·circa quae est temperantia maxime possunt animum inquietare. • • ." 11-11, q. 141, a. i, ad ium.

things from which temperance withholds us pertain to the lowest part in man, his animal nature, and therefore it is natural that such things should defile him. Temperance withstands the vices ,that bring most dishonor on man.[21] Intemperance is opposed to man's clarity and beauty because the pleasures which are the matter of intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises.[22] Because this virtue is in such constant use and is so important in leading a truly human life, and because it shows in a clear way the mutual working of our dual nature, we use it as an example to illustrate the function of mortification in developing a virtue.

Temperance has as its task the regulating and controlling of the concupiscible appetite. To discuss the virtue of temperance we must first examine the passions which this virtue regulates. A passion is an operation, a movement of the sense appetite which follows upon sense knowledge and is necessarily accompanied by some bodily transformation. The soul alone is not and cannot be the subject of a passion. The true subject of a passion is the composite of both soul and body and the true nature of a passion is both psychic and somatic. While a physical transmutation is related to the act of sense knowledge only *per accidens,* such a transformation is ordered *per se* to the act of sense appetition, so that in the very definition of passion there is included some natural transmutation of the organ.

The word passion stresses the passive side of the movement of the sense appetite. But a passion is an active thing as well. The sense appetite, in operation, together with its concomitant bodily reactions, is passive in the sense that it has been acted upon by the attractive sensible good. Thus the organ may be called the patient and the sensible good the agent. Nonetheless, in its own right a passion is definitely active. For it is a tendency, a striving toward the agent, a positive aspiration to possess the sensible good.

[21] D-11, q. 141, a. t, ad Sum. •• 11-11, q. 141, a. 4, c.

The object of the concupiscible appetite is that which is delightful to sense. The first movement of this appetite called love is the attraction which the appetite receives from the object itself. The object apprehended as good impresses itself on the faculty and proportions the faculty to itself. Love adapts the faculty to the object, creates in the appetite a convenience with the object. Love is the active, vital reaction of the appetite to the drawing force of the object.

Good causes in the sense appetite a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect to itself. But if the good is not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement toward the attainment of the good loved. And this is the passion of desire or concupiscence.[23] Pleasure is that movement of the sense appetite which follows the possession of the desired good. At the moment of pleasure, the appetite rests and is quieted.

The virtue of temperance governs the pleasures of touch. Because the pleasures of touch are the greatest of all bodily pleasures and are so vehement,[24] the passions of love and concupiscence moving toward these pleasures are likewise vehement. The concupiscible appetite attains its greatest impetuosity and consequently its most dangerous excess at the instant of desire. The effect of love, when the beloved object is not possessed, is concupiscence. And as Augustine says, we are more sensitive lo love when we lack that which we love. Consequently, of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is most felt.[25] And temperance must govern and control the passions of love and concupiscence tending toward the vehement pleasures of touch.

To speak of developing temperance we must first treat of the virtue of continence. St. Thomas uses the word continence to describe the virtue whereby a man resists evil desires which are vehement in him. It is the task of continence to regulate

•• I-II, q. !l8, a. 4.

•• "Quia manifestum est quod id quod est naturale in unoquoque, est potentissimum. Hujusmodi autem delectationes tactus sunt ad quas ordinatur concupiscentiae naturales, sicut cibi et venerea et hujusmodi." I-II, q. 31, a. 6.

•• I-II, q. *25,* a. 2, ad lum.

the pleasures of touch. But continence resides in the will and not in the concupiscible power. In this it differs from temperance. In the continent man the concupiscible appetite breaks out into evil and vehement desires. But the will chooses not to follow them. With temperance residing in the concupiscible appetite, this appetite is rendered submissive to reason in such a way that ordinarily, vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in it. In the continent man the concupiscible appetite is not submissive. It resists reason by its vehement desires. Continence has something of virtue and in another way it falls short of the idea of virtue. Continence can be compared to temperance as the imperfect to the perfect.

The man who desires to practice continence and to develop the virtue of continence into the virtue of temperance has a difficult task facing him. For the married person continence regarding veneral pleasure means using one's sexual function properly and solely with one's married partner. For the unmarried it means total abstention from deliberate sexual pleasure. The contil,lent man must govern his reproductive function according to right reason. This reproductive function is numbered among his vegetative powers and is not under the direct control of the will. The acts of the generative function are controlled by the will indirectly through its control of the sense appetite. [26]

This process we wish to describe more in detail. Neither the intellect nor the will operates in a spiritual vacuum. Man possesses besides his spiritual powers the inferior powers of sensory and vegetative life. These lower faculties and their acts are not in complete isolation from the operation of the intellect and the will. There is a constant inter-action between the lower and higher powers. Because all of the faculties are related to the one soul as their principle, their acts are inextricably interwoven with one another. The absolute dependence of the intellect upon the senses as the material and instrumental cause of intellectual knowledge is a fundamental truth of Thomistic

•• I-II, q. 17, a. 8, ad Sum.

psychology. Man must derive his knowledge by way of abstraction from sensible matter. The will is in a somewhat similar position. The appetitive acts of the sensory part are constantly affecting the acts of the -rational appetite. The will is an appetite that finds itself, as it were, surrounded by other appetites, each calling upon it to lend support to its inclinanations and to add its consent to the objects which have moved it.

Because of his dual or two-fold nature man is in the unique position of having a two-fold elicited appetite, the will and the sense appetite. The movements of these appetites are sometimes parallel, often diverse. Each appetite is moved according to its own object and according to the laws of its own particular nature. When these objects conflict, there is an inward struggle. It ends only when one appetite succumbs to the other. Therefore, in its activity, the will does not operate in the realm of pure spirituality. It operates as existing in a being which participates in both the world of spirit and the world of matter.

No other faculty of the soul can move the will by efficient causality. The intellect can move the will by presenting it with its object and by means of this object exercises formal -and final causality on the will. The senses and the sense appetite can move the will mediately through the intellect. That which is apprehended under the aspect of the good and the suitable moves the will in the manner of an object. But an object appears good and suitable because of two factors, the condition of the thing proposed and the condition of the one to whom it is proposed. But a man is changed to a certain disposition by reason of some passion so that something appears suitable to him which would not appear suitable to him were he not affected by that passion. In this way, by influencing the condition of the one who is to make a judgment, the passions influence the will which follows on the judgment.[27]

[27] "Id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis movet voluntatem per modum objecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contigit: scilicet ex conditione ejus quod proponitur et ejus .cui proponitur - - - -

The passions therefore influence the will through the intellect. This they can do because of the nature of the intellect's activity in presenting an object to the will as desirable. This can be seen from a consideration of the mutual causality of intellect and will.

The will enjoys an active indifference towards the objects presented to it. It has the power to choose or refuse them. It cannot be forced or coerced to choose any particular object presented to it. The active indifference of the will must extend to the judgment which specifies the act of the will. Otherwise the will would be coerced by the intellect and would not be free. To say simply and without qualification that the will follows the judgment of the intellect is to assign an extrinsic determination to the will that destroys its freedom.

Yet we cannot say that the will is independent of the intellectual judgment, for the will is precisely the appetite that follows upon the judgment of the intellect. If the intellect presents an object which it has judged to be preferred over the others, the will follows the judgment of the intellect. To understand how the will follows upon the judgment of the intellect and yet retains its freedom of choice, we must understand the nature of the judgment which the will follows.

Among the judgments of the intellect we distinguish speculative judgments and practical judgments. A speculative judgment is an act of the intellect which simply affirms a truth and which has no reference to any kind of action. A practical judgment is a judgment ordered to action, either remotely or proximately. If such a judgment merely exi>resses a universal principle of action, it is called a " speculativo-practical " judgment. It is remotely ordered to action. The practical judgment proximately ordered to action is called " practico-practical." It is a singular, particular judgment, made in the light of all the present, individuating circumstances and conditions in which the subject finds himself. Only this

Manifestum est autem quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua videtur sibi aliquid conveniens quod non videtur extra passionem existenti."

practico-practical judgment is sufficiently particular to serve as that knowledge from which an act of the will immediately flows. Confronted with the particular situation in which this particular subject finds himself and surrounded by all the conditions and circumstances which are unrenewable and unique to this particular case, the intellect is able to consider the possible courses of action with a complete indifference. It can compare the various courses of action, each a particular good, with the idea of the perfect good and can see in each no compelling reason for action.

To formulate a practical judgment, man must leave the sphere of the abstract and the universal and must descend to the realm of particular and individual. Only here can he lay hold of the singular object which can serve as the end and purpose of action.[28] But it is in this same sphere of concrete and singular that the movement of the sense appetite arise. These passions, aroused by the apprehension of sense and with the bodily changes that accompany them, can alter the cognitive character of the senses, particularly of the imagination and of the cogitative power because these are faculties using bodily organs. Since these faculties are the means by which the intellect can know the singular, any modification of their cognitive operations will necessarily affect the judgment of the practical reason. For this reason the judgment of the practical reason is often at variance with the speculative judgment which is not affected by the passions.

In *De Veritate* St. Thomas says that the good grasped by the universal reason does not move the will except by a particular apprehension, because actions are in the sphere of particulars. And because of passion there can be bodily change in this realm of sense. This change, resulting from the passion, hinders and can sometimes completely blind the particular

[28] "... cum motus et operationes sint in singularibus, et ab universali propositione non possit fieri descensus ad conclusionem particularem nisi mediante assumptione particulari; non potest universalis conceptio intellectus applicari ad electionem operis, quae est quasi conclusio in operabilibus, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., nisi mediante apprehensione particulari." Q. D. DeVer., q. 14, a. 4, ad 3um.

apprehension so that what the superior reason knows in the universal it cannot apply to the particular case. Thus the will is moved toward that good which the particular reason presents and not by the good presented by the intellect.[29]

In the *Summa Theologica* he treats the same problem. He states that a passion of the sensitive appetite can move the will only indirectly, first by a certain abstraction. All the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul and therefore, when one power performs an intense act, another power becomes remiss or is even entirely impeded. This occurs because the energy of the soul, being centered on one thing, is less able to be directed to several, and the attention of the soul, being fixed on one thing, is withheld from others. Secondly, a passion affects the will indirectly because the judgment and apprehension of reason are impeded by a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power. The apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite and therefore those affected by a passion do not easily tum their imagination away from the object of the passion. Thus the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite and as a result, the will follows it also, since it is natural for it to follow the judgment of the reason.[80]

•• " Objectum enim voluntatis est bonum apprehensum, sed bonum apprehensum a ratione universali non movet nisi mediante apprehensione particulari ut dicitur in ill de Anima, eo quod actus sunt in particularibus. Ex ipsa autem passione appetitus sensitivi potest esse interdum complexio corporis, quaecumque impressio corporalis: quia ex hoc quod appetitus ille utitur organo, impeditur et interdum totaliter ligatur ipsa particularis apprehensio, vel id quod ratio superior dictat in universali, ut non applicetur actu ad hoc particulare. Et sic "oluntas in appetendo movetur ad ilium bonum quod sibi nuntiat apprehensio particularis, praetermisso illo bono quod nuntiat ratio universalis." *De Ver.*, q. U, a. 9, ad 6um.

[80] ·· Passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere aut movere voluntatem, sed indirecte potest; et hoc dupliciter: uno modo quidem secundum quamdam abstrationem; cum enim omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicentur, necesse est quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu remittatur, vel etiam totaliter in suo actu impediatur, tum quia omnis virtus ad plura dispersa fit minor, unde e contrario quando intenditur circa unum, minus potest ad alia dispergi; tum quia in operibus animae requiritur quaedam intentio, quae dum vehementer applicatur ad unum, non potest alteri vehementer attendere

We see, therefore, that the intellect must make use of the internal senses to bring to act the knowledge that it possesses in an habitual manner. Gripped by a passion which fixes the imagination and the cogitative power exclusively upon the delightful object, the subject is faced with great difficulty in producing a contrary phantasm, a phantasm needed by the intellect to actualize the habitual knowledge by which the sensible object would be judged in a rational way.

The fact that there is a discrepancy between what the intellect affirms as good in the universal and what it judges to be good in the last practical judgment shows that there are in the mind two universal judgments and consequently two particular judgments deducible from them in the mind. The passion which arises··can greatly hinder the reason in making a practical conclusion under the one universal and can incline it very strongly toward making the practical conclusion under the other universal.

The freedom of the will depends upon the freedom of the intellect to deliberate on the merits of the alternative courses of action. The will's freedom demands as a prerequisite that the intellect should not be so bound by a passion that it cannot consider those things which are contrary to the object of the passion. So long as the reason remains indifferent in the presence of passion and is able to judge that the object of the passion is only a particular good, the will remains free to accept or reject that object to whcih the passion inclines.

The will can move the sense appetite only through the imagination and the cogitative power. Once the imagination and the cogitative power have provided the sense appetite with

alio modo ex parte objecti voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. lmpeditur enim judicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis et judicium virtutis aestimativae, ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio et judicium aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur judicium gustus; unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his quae afficiuntur; unde per consequens judicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem sensitivi, et per consequens, motus voluntatis, qui natus est semper sequi judicium rationis." 1-11, q. 77, a. 1.

its object, the appetite tends toward that object and the will cannot destroy this natural movement of the sense appetite.

The task of the will, therefore, is clear. To maintain its supremacy, to assure its predominance over the urgings of the passions, the will must be able to cause the internal senses to produce a substitute image for the one which is giving rise to a passion which it wishes to remove. The will has the power to move the intellect in the formation of the last practical judgment by which the act of the will is specified. To make this singular judgment, the intellect must revert to the sphere of the singular. ·This it can do only by reverting to the internal senses. Therefore the will can exercise unhampered control over the practical judgment of the intellect only by controlling the internal senses, by having them call forth the precise image it wants. But the will's control over the imagination and consequently over the other internal senses of memory and cogi.. tative power is hampered by the passions.

It is a phantasm of the imagination further elaborated by the conjoined working of the cogitative power and memory that presents the passions with their object. The passions, upon receiving their object, immediately function. And with the awakening of the passions there occurs a connatural bodily transformation. The imagination, cogitative power and memory are also organic faculties. They are strongly influenced in their operation by the bodily transformation caused by the passions. The precise effect of the bodily transformation caused by the passion is to rivet and to fix the attention of the imagination and of the other internal senses on the object of the passions. Being on the same organic plane with the passions, the internal senses are greatly disturbed by the bodily movement caused by the passions. The vehement movement of the passions focuses the attention of these internal senses on the object of the passions. Therefore, once the passions are aroused by an object presented to them by the internal senses, the whole bent of the internal senses is toward that object which they have presented to the passions. Unless a higher power intervenes, the attention

of these senses will remain riveted on this object. Profoundly influenced by the bodily movement of the passions, they become captivated by the object pleasing to the senses. Because the intellect in making a practico-practical judgment must revert to the sphere of the singular, must revert to the internal senses and because these same internal senses, disturbed by the bodily movement of 'the passions, have their attention fixed upon the object pleasing to the passions, the passions hamper the judgment of the intellect, the judgment which specifies the will.

This is the precise case of the continent man. In him vehement passions urging him, to illicit sexual pleasure arise. The phantasm of the imagination further elaborated by the memory and cogitative power presents the passions of love and concupiscence with their object. In this case the object is a venereal delight. The commingled passions of love and concupiscence, upon being presented with their object, immediately move toward that object. The continent person has made by means of his practical intellect a speculativo-practical judgment that all deliberate sexual pleasures contrary to right reason are to be avoided. Yet here and now he is confronted with a particular situation and he must make a practico-practical judgment. His judgment will either be a practical conclusion flowing from the speculativo-practical judgment that all illicit deliberate sexual pleasures are to be avoided, or it will be a practico-practical judgment flowing from another speculativo-practical judgment that sexual pleasures are very delightful and therefore to be chosen.

The internal senses have presented the passions of love and desire with an object pleasing' to them. The passions cause a bodily transformation which in the case of venereal pleasure is particularly vehement. The internal senses consequently have their attention riveted on this pleasurable object. Profoundly disturbed by the movement of the passions, they are captivated by the pleasing object. Now the intellect, to make its practico-practical judgment, must revert to the phantasm. But the phantasm that it finds present is that of the illicit,

sexual object, an object opposed to right reason. The intellect need not make its practico-practical judgment in favor of that object. The will can exercise its control and make the intellect deliberate on the opposite object; abstention from sexual delight here and now and can determine the judgment to choose this abstention. But as long as the passions remain aroused they disturb the internal senses and keep the attention of the internal senses transfixed on their object. By their bodily transformation they continue to influence and to disturb the internal senses which operate on the same bodily plane as the passions. Because the intellect is so dependent upon the sensible phantasm, its attention is also being focused on the sexual satisfaction. Consequently the will has a tremendous struggle to cause the intellect to make its judgment contrary to sexual satisfaction. The will is not necessitated by the urgings of the passions.· But as long as they remain aroused, greater and special strength of will must be expended to resist them. As long as they remain awakened the struggle will continue.

The will can exercise a certain control over the passions· by causing the internal senses to present a different phantasm to the passions. The will does this by directing the attention of the internal senses and the intellect to some other object. Deprived of the phantasm which has caused them to arise, the passions with their accompanying bodily transformation subside and the will can continue more tranquilly' in its resolve to abstain from all illicit sexual enjoyment. But often the offending phantasm, though rejected and dispelled, will continue to return unbidden into the imagination. Thus the struggle continues. The will must continue to make strong and determined acts, forcing the intellect to consider an object different from that which aroused the passions.

This is precisely the plight of the continent man who must resist desires in him which are vehement. For continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them, but rather its task is to resist them.

Because continence is related to temperance as the imperfect

to the perfect, the beginning of the virtue of temperance is the virtue of continence. To convert continence into temperance the will must repeat over and over its victories over the sense appetite. By repeated victories it acquires control over the concupiscible appetite. This must be a control of such a kind that no longer will the passions rush vehemently toward the object pleasing to them, but rather will submit calmly to the command of the will, and will move toward an object pleasing to them only insofar as the will permits.

Moral virtues are habits of choosing the means. Attaining the mean of virtue is difficult. This is certainly true of those virtues dealing with the passions. To decline from a mean is easy. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas states that precisely because of the difficulty involved in attaining the mean of virtue, he who is striving to attain this mean should recede more from that extreme which is more contrary to the virtue desired.[31] Now it is stated in the *Summa* that the opposite of lust is not found in many because men are more inclined to pleasure. St. Thomas remarks also, in his *Commentary on the Ethics,* that only infrequently does it happen that men fail by defect in regard to pleasure, by enjoying less pleasure than they ought, less than is required for health and good disposition of the body and for fitting dealings with their fellow men.[32] Sins of intemperance are most common because they are connected with the common use of human life and in these many happen to sin.[88]

In the Commentary on the Ethics we read also that all are naturally inclined to pleasures and delights. Therefore they who are striving for virtue must be on their guard against these pleasures because once something is apprehended as delightful, it easily draws the appetite. It is difficult to make a correct judgment about pleasure because, while dwelling upon it and considering it, the appetite is so strongly drawn toward it.

[81] *Ezpositio in Decem LibToa Ethicorum,* Lib II, Lectio XI.
[••] *Ibid.,* Lib ill, Lectio XXI.
[88] 11-11, q. 14!!, a. 4, Objectio !!.

It is not difficult, therefore, to see that, if in striving for virtue one must recede more from that extreme which is more contrary to the virtue desired, then in striving for temperance, efforts must be directed against unduly bodily pleasure and delights. Aristotle illustrates this process. If we have a bent piece of wood and we wish to straighten it, we must bend in quite far in the opposite direction if we wish to restore it to its original position. St. Thomas adds that this is the most efficacious way of attaining a virtue and is the way marked out for those who have a really strong desire to avoid vice and practice virtue.[8]

Because the pleasures of touch are so alluring, to attain the virtue of temperance one must bend his energies in the opposite direction. The first requisite for the practice of temperance is a strict control over the external senses. Such control over the sense of ,sight is vital because the imagination relies so heavily on the sense of sight for so many of its images.

Despite control over external senses, phantasms of forbidden objects will arise in the imagination. Control of this faculty is all important in the acquiring of temperance because ultimately it supplies the material for the object of the passions. The will can never acquire complete control over this faculty. But it can bring it to a certain subjection. The imagination, if left to itself, will wander through the whole gamut of sensible phantasms it has within its possession. It will take the phantasms it has stored up and by combining them, will form new and varied phantasms. It is a ceaseless, tireless movie machine, producing images delightful to the sensitive part of man since it is to this realm in man that it belongs. The images it produces, because they are pleasing to sense, will be elaborated by the cogitative power and will serve to arouse the various passions of the sense appetite.

But the will can take this tireless faculty in hand, can bend and mold its activity so that in its activity it will not serve merely the sensitive part. The will can direct the imagination's energy and activity to supply phantasms that the intellect

[8] *Ezpositio in Decem Libroa Etkicorum,* Lib. ll, Lectio XI.

needs in acquiring knowledge. By refusing to allow the imagination unlimited freedom, by harnessing its energy and making it use its energy to serve the intellect, the will acquires a certain control over this restless faculty so that it will obey the directions and commands of the will with a certain docility. By means of study and judicious reading a person can direct his imagination along proper channels, can see to it that it is occupied with objects not contrary to the demands of temperance. A person can train his imagination too, so that as soon as an unlawful phantasm arises and he becomes aware of it, immediately he can make his imagination fasten its attention on some other phantasm chosen beforehand for precisely such an occasion, a phantasm the imagination and the whole sensitive part will find pleasing, without its being representative of an object contrary to the moral law.

Through controlling the operation of the imagination proper, the will controls the workings of the other two internal sense faculties of memory and the cognitative power. Thus indirectly, it attains a certain mastery over the passions. When once it has attained this mastery over the passions, the will is not forced to fight and struggle against vehement sense desires. By closely guarding the internal sense faculties in their operation and by refusing to choose the objects which the passions find pleasing, the will begins to forge a control over the concupiscible appetite. This appetite, if left to itself, becomes stronger, more vehement .and more impulsive until a very insignificant stimulus suffices to awaken and arouse it. But if the will checks and curbs and controls this appetite carefully through controlling and checking the internal senses the concupiscible appetite loses some it its vehemence and impulsiveness. Gradually its movement and energy yield more easily, calmly and submissively to the direction of the will.

This submissiveness of the concupiscible appetite, this control exercised over it by the will is the fruit of self-denial, denial of the external senses, denial of the imagination's desire for uncontrolled freedom, denial of the concupiscible appetite as

it moves toward an object pleasing to it. A virtue such as temperance is bought by constant curtailing of our faculties. It is the result of mortification.

To attain the virtue of temperance, denial and mortification are especially requisite for certain persons. The concupiscence of pleasure thrives in the young on account of the ardor of youth.[85] Youths therefore, because their passions are so easily aroused and because, being unmarried, no sexual satisfaction is allowed them, must practice an incessant and stern brand of mortification if they hope to gain the virtue of temperance. Among adults, in this matter, some have more need of mortification than others. Some people have a natural disposition for some particular virtue.[86] For some the practice of temperance offers little difficulty. Hence for them, the practice of mortification is not of vital importance in attaining to temperance. But many others have a special propensity to difficulties in this matter. This is true especially of those who have contracted a habit of lust. Venereal pleasures are impetuous and if one consents to them, this increases the force of concupiscence and weakens the strength of mind.[87] St. Thomas compares intemperance to a child's manner of acting. He states that a child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed. So too concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength. Therefore Augustine says: (Con£. VIII, 5) "Lust served, became a custom and custom not resisted became a necessity."[38] People addicted to a habit of lust can attain to temperance only by a special and more severe checking of their sensitive .nature according to the principle enunciated above.

Mortification, therefore, is ordinarily an absolute requisite in attaining mastery over the concupiscible appetite that is signified by temperance. When once this mastery has been attained, this mortification remains necessary, lest habit be corrupted by contrary passions. But this mortification becomes easier to practice, since as an essential part of the virtue, it

[85] 11-11, q. 149, a. 4.
[86] 1-11, q. 68, a. 1.
[87] 11-11, q. 151, a. 8, ad 2um.
[88] 11-11, q. 142, a. 2.

has become, with the virtue, a sort of second nature. It no longer has the difficult aspect that. is presented at the beginning of the habit's formation. Denial, and with it a submission of the appetite to the will, has a secand nature. Once this battle has been won the soul is freed from vehement struggles and has greater strength and freedom to push on to greater victories over the sensitive part. By means of control and denial, temperance can be developed and perfected until man has acquired such a perfect mastery over the sensitive part that as far as nature allows, it neglects the needs of the body.[39]

IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF MORTIFICATION.

A. *Problems of Mortification in the Development of Virtue.*

The purpose of this study is to determine the psychological function of mortification in the development of virtue. We have described in some detail the process of mortification involved in the development of the virtue of temperance. This detailed description shows how the external senses supply material for the internal senses. The internal sense elaborate this material. In doing so they supply the passions with their object. Once the passions are awakened they tend to fix the attention of the internal senses on the object pleasing to them. Consequently, reason experiences difficulty in choosing an object different from the object which the passions find alluring. The internal senses, disturbed and agitated by the bodily movement of the passions, tend to be entranced by the object pleasing to the passions. Since the intellect must rely on material presented to it by the internal senses, the intellect's attention is drawn to the object pleasing to the passions and reason experiences great, difficulty in choosing another object. But the will is not determined to choosing that object. Rather, it has the power to cause the intellect to consider another object and can make the intellect choose this other object. Also, the will can control the workings of the passions by a control over the

•• J-ll, q. 61, a. *r;,*

operations of the internal senses of imagination, memory and the cogitative power. The description of this process brought into strong relief the fact that man's cognitive and appetitive powers, both rational and sensitive, are interwoven and interlocked in their operations. If the operation of one faculty is to predominate, the other faculties must be brought to serve that particular faculty.

All the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul. Hence it necessarily happens that when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn toward the action of one power, it is withdrawn from the operation of another power.[40] The various actions of the soul can hamper and impede one another. When the attention of the soul is focused on one operation or when one power of the soul is to be specially perfected, the other powers of the soul lend their energy to that particular favored potency. The other powers continue their own operation, at least up to a certain point. But their own proper operation, their tendency to their own proper object, is directed and controlled and·channeled toward helping and assisting the particular faculty which is being specially favored and perfected. The operation of the other faculties ·continues. These faculties move toward their own objects, but their movements are controlled in such a way that these operations are brought into line and made to serve and assist in developing a more perfect operation of the favored faculty. When the operation of one faculty is intense, the operation of the othet is remiss. The reason for this is that when one potency is intensely engaged, this one potency alone does not suffice for such an intense operation unless it is assisted by receiving from the principle of life the inflow that the other faculties or members should receive.[41] This process is necessary for even one act. It is all the more necessary for the development of an operative habit. In the development of an operative habit, a certain

[40] Quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicantur necesse est quod, quando intentio animae vehementer trabitur. ad operationem unius poientiae, retrahatur ab operatione alterius. 1-11, q. 87, a. I.

[41] *Scriptum Super Libroa Sententiamm,* IV, 44, 21 qu S, 4um.

power of the soul is brought to a degree of perfection. But developing an operative habit involves more than perfecting one particular power. Other powers of the soul, as a natural consequence, must become more remiss in their activity. Indeed, to develop an operative habit the other powers of the soul are not merely allowed to grow remiss, They must be positively checked in their own activity and made to serve and minister to the activity of the favored potency.

This process is very apparent in the development of the various intellectual habits. It is even more apparent, more necessary in developing moral virtues. Our rational nature, as reason, is composed of intellect and will. Because the intellect is a spiritual faculty, it contains all reality within the scope of its knowledge, has universal being and truth as its common formal object. The will, as the appetite following upon intellect's knowledge, has a commensurate object, the universal good. It has unlimited possibilities of choice. When once reason has fastened upon some determinate end to be attained, the will can use its own operation and the operations of the other powers of the soul to attain that end. This it is able to do because contained under its universal object are all of its own operations and the operations of the other potencies of the soul. Therefore, the will as an efficient cause, can move itself and all the other potencies of the soul to their proper acts.[42] Habits are formed in the various potencies of the soul by l'epeated acts. The habit can be formed directly in the will, such as the habit of justice, or in the intellect, such as the habit of prudence, or in the sensitive appetite as is the case with fortitude and temperance. In the development of each operative habit the ·practical intellect exercises its control over the operations of intellect and will and over the operations of the other potencies of the soul.

The moral virtues of temperance and fortitude signify a control of reason over the sensible part. Prudence presupposes that degree of control over the sensitive part which will allow

•• *Swmma Theol.,* I-II, q. 9, a. I.

it to choose well, undisturbed by any undue cravings for sensible pleasures. Because it signifies a habit of right choice, it presupposes likewise a control and care exercised for a long time by the practical intllect over its own choices. Justice, the virtue residing in the will, by which a man easily and as from second nature gives everyone his due, results from a practice of constantly subduing selfish interests as soon as they conflict with the rights of others. All of the virtues contained under the four cardinal virtues as integral, subjective or potential parts, indicate a habit developed by repeated acts. In each act, reason has had' to exercise its prerogative of control over its own operations and over the operations of the other powers of the soul. By repeated acts its control has become more sure and certain; it flows more simply and easily.

This sure and certain control exercised in the operation of intellectual and moral virtues is the result of restraint exercised over the various human faculties and powers. This restraint is not in the form of a complete repression by which the faculty or power is denied its operation. But it is a channelling, a directing of the faculty's operation toward an objective chosen by reason. This control is a prerequisite, a concomitant of every operative habit. It is a general condition of soul that is found as a necessary part of each intellectual and moral virtue. It is what St. Thomas means when he speaks of the general virtue of temperance. Every good operative habit presupposes and requires a rather firm control over human operations, potencies and passions. This control is the temperateness, the moderation which St. Thomas calls the general virtue of temperance. This general virtue of temperance, when applied to the acquiring of moral virtues, acquires the name of mortification. Mortification is then the self-denial and control that is a necessary element in the development and growth of morai virtue. It is a prerequisite and a concomitant of every moral virtue, a general condition of soul found in all virtues, a necessary condition of virtue. With this idea of mortification in mind we can proceed to consider the questions proposed in Part I.

B. *Relation of the Inflicting of Pain and Mastery Over Sense Passions.*

Will the in:Hicting of pain by means of the discipline and cilicium lessen and subdue the cravings of the flesh for sexual delights? What indeed is the precise psychological connection between this in:Hictingof pain and victory over a yearning for sexual delights?

The answer seems to be contained in the doctrine on the passions and the control of the passions as exercised by the virtues. It is precisely the task of temperance to govern and control the passions of the concupiscible appetite. When an object is presented to the passions as pleasing to them, the passions of love and desire for that object arise. Love gives the sense appetite a connatural affinity for the objects and makes it proportionate to that object. Immediately upon this first movement of complacency in the object there follows desire for that object, a movement toward that object. If the object is attained, there results the passion of pleasure, a vital adhering to the object. It is precisely these movements that temperance must control in its struggle for mastery over the concupiscible appetite. Corresponding to the movements toward a delightful object are the movements away from an unpleasant object. If the object is presented 'to the passions as harmful or unpleasant, there arises the movements of hatred and flight from the unpleasant object and sorrow or sadness at its presence.

The purpose of inflicting pain on one's body with the discipline or cilicium cannot be to suppress all feeling in the sense of touch. It is impossible to do this; To strive for such a purpose would almost inevitably cause serious psychological difficulties. The purpose of discipline is rather to gain a control over the movements of the concupiscible appetite. Ordinarily, as soon as pain is felt in the sense of touch, the passions of hate, aversion, and sorrow arise in the concupiscible appetite. The passions, presented with an object distasteful to them, tend· away from the object and if the object persists, sadness

or sorrow arise in the subject. Reason, as the governor of the whole body, can exercise its control over these passions and over the will considered solely as a particular nature. The passions and the will naturally shrink from sensible pains and bodily suffering. But reason, can choose these things in relation to an end. Sensuality and the will in man absolutely considered, shrink from burning. Yet will, as reason, may choose this burning for the sake of health.[48] Thus reason can inflict pain and accept this pain despite the opposite movements of the passions. These movements continue during the whole time of the inflicting or suffering of pain. Yet reason chooses the pain. In so doing it is forging a stronger mastery over the concupiscible appetite. By denying the movements of the concupiscible appetite away from an unpleasant object, reason's control over this appetite becomes stronger, more secure. When pleasurable objects are presented to the passions, pleasurable objects to which reason does not want to consent, reason by virtue of the control acquired by forcing the sensible appetite to submit to the choice of pain, can more easily set aside these cravings and yearnings of the sense appetite.

Ordinarily the passions, presented with a pleasurable object, tend to fix the attention of the cognitive faculties on this object and continue drawing reason toward that object. Reason can acquire control over these movements so that immediately, upon their mere appearance, it can step in and without difficulty refuse their prompting and urgings and tum its atteiltion to other things. This control is acquired, not only by denying the passions of the concupiscible appetite objects pleasing to them, but also by deliberately restraining the passions in their flight from a displeasing object.

This then would seem to be the purpose of inflicting bodily pain upon oneself, to gain a mastery over the passions fleeing from that pain. It can be an effective means of acquiring control. Yet, while stressing its effectiveness, we must also admit its danger. It is a fact that for some the inflicting of

[48] III, q. 18, a. 5c.

bodily pains upon themselves is precisely a means of causing sexual delight or at least a means of arousing desire for sexual delight. To examine into the psychological process involved in masochism would lead us far afield. We merely mention the fact that the suffering of physical, bodily pain *can* cause the awakening of sexual desires in some persons. However, it is not a universal phenomenon. We maintain that, in general, a judicious use of the cilicium and the discipline can serve to give reason a mastery over the concupiscible passions. If, in a particular case, the inflicting of such pain causes sexual disturbance, this specific means must not be employed to attain mastery over the concupiscible appetite.

C. *Is Mortification Dangerous?*

Our second problem concerns the danger involved in denial and mortification as prescribed in books treating of the spiritual life. Will not a continual, ceaseless war against natural instincts, longings and desires destroy the correct and perfect balance of an individual? Will it not hinder the harmonious functioning of man's personality and deprive him of all the richness of his personality?

Mortification can be a dangerous thing. The reason for this is that it is a negative process, a withholding, a restraining, a cutting down of natural movements and tendencies. We have described mortification as the necessary prerequisite and concomitant of every good operative habit. Every operative habit, excluding the vices, signifies a training, a of a human faculty. For this training, special attention must be directed to that faculty. It must be developed and trained and made to perform ever more perfect acts that will engrain more deeply the habit that is being developed. This signifies a control, a checking, not only of the particular faculty developed, but also of the other faculties that are being made to serve in the formation of the habit. Each habit or virtue demands a certain withholding, denial, mortification. This denial is the negative aspect of the development of an intellectual or moral virtue.

Mortification is a general virtue, a general condition of every virtue. It is concomitant with the acquiring of every virtue, a controlling and directing action by which the energy and the functioning of various human faculties are directed toward the development of a particular virtue. We have seen, for example, how the passions, if left unchecked, are an obstacle to the virtue of temperance. As long as these passions have their own way, they disturb reason's peaceful possession. But by a checking and controlling of these passions, they are brought into line. Their functioning is made to serve reason's purpose and end. Temperance is not a chaining of the passions but a directing of them and their powers and energy to the higher good of reason.

Each of our powers tends to assume an independent role, to follow its own natural activity and thus to attain its natural object. It is reason's task in the development of habit to channel the various faculties with their operations and energies toward the habit desired. Every faculty, every power of the soul is made for activity. It is the task of mortification to direct these activities toward a particular chosen good.

Control and denial must be used in this way, as serving in the development of virtue and remaining as part of that virtue. It is dangerous if made an end in itself. Self-denial must not be destructive of nature, nor a denial of our essential sensible nature. Mortification must serve solely as a means of ordering, controlling and directing the faculties of our soul toward the attaining of intellectual and moral habits. If made an end in itself, mortification lacks any justifiable reason for its practice. This is not to deny its importance but simply to stress the fact that it must be practiced with some particular end in view and not simply for its own sake. It must be used as a means of fulfilling some duty or practicing some virtue.

That denial is necessary for the development of personality is obvious. If each faculty and potency of the soul were left to move with unrestrained freedom to its own object, the result would be a disordered personality, one in which the

sensible nature, by its very vehemence, would predominate, to the detriment of reason. Without denial and restraint there is little possibility of worthwhile accomplishment in any chosen field of endeavor. St. Thomas, speaking particularly of the pleasure governed by temperance, maintains that though nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary for man's life, it is sometimes praiseworthy and even necessary for the sake of an end to abstain from the pleasures which result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink and sex. Denial is also necessary for fulfilling certain engagements. Athletes and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures to fulfill their duties. Penitents, to recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures and those who wish to give themselves up to contemplation and to divine things need to refrain very much from carnal things."

Thus we can see that denial and mortification are always linked with accomplishing some purpase, fulfilling some duty, developing some intellectuai or moral virtue. In the practice of some virtues denial plays a far greater and more direct part than in others. For example, in the practice of temperance as a special virtue, denial is involved very directly, a greater or less denial according to the intensity. to which the virtue is developed. The same is true of the virtue of penitence, that virtue which aims at the destruction of past sin considered as an offence against God. This virtue, as a species of justice, seeks to some kind of compensation to God for sin committed. This compensation the penitent strives to make to God by abstaining from pleasure and submitting his body

•• Sciendam tamen quod ab hujusmodi delectationibus consequentibus hujusmodi operationis quandoque laudabile, vel etiam necessarium est abstinere propter aliquem finem; sicut propter sanitatem corporalem aliqui abstine11-t a quibusdam delectationibus ciborum, potuum et venereorum; et etiam propter alicujus officii executionem, sicut athletas et milites necesse est a multis delectationibus abstinere, ut proprium officium exequantur.. Et similiter poenitentes, ad :tecuperandum animae sanitatem abstinentia delectabilium quasi quaedam diaeta, utuntur; et homines volentes contemplationi et rebus divinis vacare, oportet quod se magis a carnalibus desideriis abstrahant. ll-ll, q. 14!, a. 1.

to certain corporeal punishments. In other virtues denial performs a less prominent task. But in every virtue there is contained some denial, some mortification. No virtue, intellectual or moral, can exist without it.

With this thought in mind we can see how incorrect and inaccurate it is to maintain that St. Thomas is not a strong proponent of mortification. He devotes great attention to the virtue of temperance, that special virtue most closely liiiked with the practice of mortification. Moreover, in the practicing and carrying out of each virtue there is involved necessarily an element of mortification. The more intensely the virtue is developed the greater is the degree of mortification involved in its practice. According to the thought of St. Thomas, the virtues can be developed to a very high and intense degree. He speaks of perfecting virtues, virtues of men who are tending toward divine similitude. Prudence counts as nothing all the things of the world and directs all the of the soul to God alone. Temperance, as far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body. Fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things, and justice consists in the sours giving a wholehearted consent to follow the way thus prepared. [45] each virtue, developed to such an exalted state, demands as a concomitant condition an equally intense degree of mortification and denial.

This consideration answers the difficulty of the danger involved in mortification. ,Certainly there is danger involved because of the very negative aspect of mortification. To deny oneself pleasure constantly and unremittingly, to practice constant denial of the external senses, allowing them little delight, choosing always food that is less palatable, eating not because eating is pleasant but simply and solely because it is God's will, keeping silence when there is a great desire to speak, halting in the midst of an absorbing story, always choosing the harder, the more unpleasant and less comfortable things, all this can easily be dangerous and lead to difficulties if not used

•• I-II, q. 61, a. 5.

properly and correctly. All of these practices can serve as a means of developing the various virtues.

Virtue, even at its very lowest degree, demands a certain amount of mortification. As the virtue increases and grows, the practice of mortification likewise increases because it is part of that virtue. Because this denial and restraint are part of the virtue, they become second nature and are integrated into the smooth functioning of the personality. If used in connection with the developing of virtue, mortification undergoes growth parallel to and concomitant with the virtue. Considered in this way it is not dangerous. In one sense, it is a war against our natural instincts, longings and desires. But if carried out as a concomitant part of the development of virtue it is a well-regulated and gradual control of our human powers. It does not destroy the correct and perfect balance of an individual any more than does the development of virtue. With each increase of virtue there is also an increase in the process of greater control over our various faculties and powers. But in this case, mortification is constantly serving merely to direct the energy and functions of the human powers to a higher goal. Therefore, mortification does not give us an individual drained of all the richness of personality, but rather an individual whose powers and energies are all directed toward the higher goal of virtue and whose energies flow easily and effortlessly in that direction. As we have seen in the passage quoted above, the saint can practice a heroic mortification without an unbalancing of the personality because this severe, seemingly fierce mortification is the concomitant part of the heroic virtue to which the saint has attained. There is no void left in the personality. Having arrived at a high state of perfection, the saint is rapt in the things of God. The things of sensible nature hold little interest for him. But if such severe mortification be carried out by a person not so exalted in the ways of virtue, there is grave danger involved. When by our own free choice we renounce some particular good, there is a void left by that resignation. If that void is not filled by some higher motive or good, there

is danger that some compensation, even a compensation of a lower kind, will creep in to fill the void left by that renunciation.

This then is the answer to the question: " Is not mortification dangerous?" Not if used correctly, not if practiced as the natural concomitant of every virtue. It is dangerous if set up as an end in itself. Moritification and denial, carried out to the point described by St. John of the Cross, would be dangerous for an ordinary soul, a beginner in the spiritual life. Mortification, carried to this degree, seems to be that adapted to the souls which have attained to that state of virtue described by St. Thomas above. The various types of mortification proposed in the books on Asceticism as for instance, repressing an urge to speak or narrate a story, not gazing at some particularly beautiful and absorbing scene. in nature, not reading letters immediately upon receiving them, all of these deliberate calculated mortifications of every natural and good desire can be dangerous psychologically if carried out too intensively. These acts of denial can serve a good purpose of developing a particular virtue or accomplishing some specific task or duty. But such mortification must be done calmly and gradually and without great psychological disturbances. If directed toward developing a virtue such as studiousness, temperance or penitence, acts of this kind performed calmly but steadily and perseveringly become, as part of the virtue, a second nature. Acts of this kind can be very valuable in the spiritual life. But they can become too aggressive, too intense, too much an attack on human nature with its inborn need for enjoyment and pleasure. In mortification of this type there is need of great prudence.

D. *How Mortification Strengthens the Will for Future Combats.*

The previous consideration leads us quite naturally into the next problem. Mortification as proposed in the books on Asceticism has as one of its aims the strengthening and reinforcing of the will. It is to prepare and to strengthen the will for future attacks. Victory or defeat in some sudden and violent

assault of passion, spiritual writers tell us, may well depend upon whether one has practiced self-discipline in such small matters as food or sleep or little acts of self-indulgence. Is there such a thing as strengthening of the will? Will the fact that a person denies himself, restrains his longings and desires for a satisfaction of one will this self control help him and strengthen him to deny urgings of another kind? For instance, will the fact that a man performs some acts of denial each day at table, eats a bit less than he would like to eat, will that denial strengthen him to overcome desires for sexual pleasures when these desires press in upon him?

The answer to this question can be found in the doctrine on the connection of the moral virtues through prudence. A virtue is a good operative habit. A moral virtue is a habit which makes its possessor good and renders his work good. The intellectual virtues make a man good in this or that line and are therefore incomplete virtues. We cannot properly speak of the connection of the intellectual virtues. We do not observe in them the connection to be found among the moral virtues.[46] The moral virtues are complete and perfect virtues. They make the whole man good and not merely his faculties. The moral virtues of which we are speaking are those acquired by means of human works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man. These moral virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, together with the parts contained under them, are all connected. Each moral virtue is bound to the others and so dependent on the others that one cannot exist in a subject without the others.

St. Thomas distinguishes between imperfect and perfect moral virtues. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for example, is nothing more than an inclination to do some kind of good deed. The inclination can be either by natural temperament or by habituation. Moral virtues taken in this sense are not connected. Thus we can see men who, by natural temperament or by being merely accustomed to do so, are

[46] I-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad Sum.

prompt in performing works of liberality but are not prompt in doing works of chastity.[47] A man can exercise himself in good deeds regarding one matter but not in regard to another. For instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence, he will acquire a certain habit of restraining his anger. But the habit will lack the nature of virtue through the absence of prudence which is wanting in matters of concupiscence/[48] Likewise some people have a certain temperance from a natural disposition insofar as certain imperfect virtues are natural to man or acquired by habituation. However, these virtues, through lack of prudence; are not perfect virtues because they are not perfected by reason.[49]

But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines toward doing a good deed well. And such a moral virtue cannot be without prudence. Moral virtue is a habit of choosing well and it makes a man choose well. It is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice. Right choice requires not only an inclination to a due end but also a correct choice of things conducive to that end. This choice is made by prudence which counsels, judges and commands in those things that are directed to the end.[50]

Likewise we cannot have prudence unless we have the moral virtues. Prudence is right reason about things to be done, not

[47] I-II, q. *65,* a. Ic.

[48] Dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam perficiunt hominem secundum communem statum, scilicet quantum ad ea quae communiter in omni vita hominum occurrunt agenda. Unde oportet quod homo simul exercitetur circa materias omnium virtutum moralium. Et si quidem circa omnes exercitetur bene operando, acquiret habitus omnium virtutum moralium. Si autem exercitetur bene operando circa unam materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras, non autem circa concupiscentias, acquiret quidem habitum aliquem ad refrenandum iras, qui tamen non habebit rationem virtutis, propter defectum prudentiae, quae circa concupiscentias corrumpitur. I-II, q. *65,* a. 1, ad 1um.

[49] II-II, q. 141, a. 1, ad

[50] Nulla virtus moralis potest sine prudentia haberi: eo quod proprium virtutis moralis est facere electionem rectam, cum sit habitus electivus; ad rectam autem electionem non solum sufficit inclinatio in debitum finem quod est directe per habitum virtutis moralis; sed etiam quod aliquis directe eligat ea quae sunt ad finem, quod fit per prudentiam, quae est consiliativa et judicativa et praeceptiva eorum !1\lllt lld finem. I-II, q. *65,* a. I.

merely in general, but also in particular, because actions are about particulars. Right reason demands principles according to which reason can proceed. And when reason considers particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. Regarding universal principles of action, man is rightly ordered or disposed by the natural understanding of principles whereby he understands that he should do no evil, or also by some practical science. But this is not enough for man to reason correctly about particular cases. It can happen that the universal principle known by means of understanding or science is corrupted in a particular case by a passion. Thus, when a person is swayed by concupiscence and is overcome by it, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, just as by the habit of natural understanding of principles or of science, man is rightly disposed regarding universal principles of action, so for him to be correctly disposed regarding particular principles of action, he needs to be perfected by certain habits so that it becomes connatural for him to judge correctly as to the end. This is done by moral virtue. For the virtuous man judges correctly regarding the end of virtue because such as a man is, such does the end seem to him. Therefore right reason about particular things to be done, i. e., prudence, requires that man have moral virtue.[51] Prudence, therefore, presupposes the moral virtues as a prerequisite in the same way that principles are prerequisites for the conclusions obtained by the various sciences. There can be rio true moral virtues without prudence nor true prudence without the moral virtues. From this it follows clearly that all the moral virtues are connected with one another. He that has one perfect moral virtue has all of them.

A perfect moral virtue then, is one which through prudence is perfected by reason. No such perfect moral virtue can exist without prudence, for without prudence it is lacking in an essential element of virtue, namely, that it be totally according to right reason. But if one possesses prudence he necessarily

[61] I-ll, q. 58, a. 5.

possesses all of the moral virtues. Those things to which the moral virtues incline are as the principles of prudence. Therefore prudence, as right reason, needs all of the moral virtues to supply it with its principles. Else it might be correct in one matter or field, but lacking a certain moral virtue, it would be incorrect in judging and commanding those things pertaining to that moral virtue. Being deficient in that principle, it could not be called right reason.

Mortification is a concomitant part of each moral virtue. But the moral virtues are connected through prudence in such wise that if one such moral virtue is acquired all of them must be acquired. Also, by reason of their connection with prudence if one moral virtue grows and increases, the other moral virtues enjoy a simultaneous but proportionate growth. If a man sets about to acquire some moral virtue, he must, as a prerequisite to the attainment of that virtue, practice some type of mortification and denial. By practicing that denial he can acquire that particular moral virtue toward which he is striving. When a man places these final acts which by force of all the similar acts which have preceded them change a dispostition into a habit and produce a moral virtue, those acts also generate the virtue of prudence. But prudence is not generated unless it brings together with itself all the other moral virtues which, together with synderesis, constitute the principles of prudence. Thus, those acts of mortification performed with the precise purpose of acquiring or increasing one particular moral virtue indirectly work toward the acquiring and the increasing of the other moral virtues as well. In this way with each act of mortification by which a moral virtue is increased, the power of the will is strengthened.

In this way we explain how denial in licit things strengthens the will so that when illicit desires press in upon the soul, the will can refuse to accede to these desires. This is a psychologically sound procedure, if denial and mortification are used correctly, if they are used to develop and to strengthen virtues in the soul. Each act of denial, if prudent and therefore according to right reason, will aid and contribute to the

strengthtening and growth of some virtue in the soul. With the strengthening and growth of one virtue, there is a proportionate growth and strengthening of all moral virtues because of their connection through prudence. Thus each act of denial and mortification, performed according to right reason, strengthens the will. It strengthens some particular virtue and consequently all the virtues. This is merely another and perhaps more accurate way of saying that the will is strengthened to face future combats. In this way it is psychologically correct to advocate the practice of mortification as a means of preparing for future combat.

Conclusion.

In this paper we have established the role of mortification, particularly in the attainment of moral virtue. Mortification gives the denial and control which are necessary elements in the development and growth of moral virtue. It is a prerequisite and a concomitant of every moral virtue, a general condition of soul found in all virtues, a necessary condition of virtue. With this fundamental point established we offer solutions to three problems:

1. *The purpose* of *inflicting pain upon the senses.*

Pain is inflicted upon the senses to acquire greater control over the sense appetite. Reason acquires control over the concupiscible appetite by restraining and checking the passions of love and concupiscence and delight as they tend toward and take pleasure in an object pleasing to them. It likewise strengthens its control by restraining and checking the movements of the passions of hate and aversion and checking the movements of the passions of hate and aversion and sorrow as they tend away and flee from an unpleasant object and register their distaste at its precence. Reason, by resisting the movements of passion away from a painful object strengthens its control over the sense appetite.

2. *Is mortification dangerous?*

Because mortification is an absolute requisite for reaching a high degree of moral perfection, writers place great stress upon

it. There is a tendency to make it a virtue in itself. It is not that. It is rather in the line of an instrument or a tool used to develop a virtue. It is a very effective tool. But because it is so effective it must be used with great care and caution. Just as a powerful tool or instrument if used improperly can mutilate and even destroy the product being fashioned by the worker, so also with mortification. It must be used with great prudence and always with the precise purpose of developing a particular virtue. Acts of mortification directed toward developing a particular virtue become, as part of that .virtue, a sort of second nature. As the particular virtue increases, the acts of that virtue become more intense. The denial inherent in these acts becomes· likewise more intense. But all of this as a gradual steady growth. After years of striving toward spiritual perfection, a man can place really intense acts of virtue without great strain or difficulty. Such acts, if placed at the beginning of his striving for spiritual excellence, would have been imprudent and psychologically dangerous. They would have involved denial too great and too onerous for a nature unaccustomed to denial. But practiced as part of a highly developed virtue they are acts _to which \his particular nature has been gradually accustomed and are acts placed under the direction of prudence. As such they are not psychologically dangerous.

3. *Hm.o does mortification strengthen the will for future combats?*

Mortification is a conc01nitant part of each moral virtue. Each act of mortification and denial, if prudent and according to right reason, will aid and contribute to the strengthening and growth of some virtue in the soul. With the growth and strengthening of one virtue there is a proportionate growth and strengthening of all the moral virtues because of their connection through prudence. In this way mortification mcreases virtue and strengthens the will for future combats.

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN, C.SS.R.

RedemptqriatFatkera,
Oconomowoc,Wiacomin.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS

COLMAN E. O'NEILL, O. P., S. T. D., formerly a professor at the Dominican House of Studies, Tallaght, Co. Dublin, Ireland and contributor to *The Irish Theological Quarterly*, is presently Professor of Dogmatic Theology at the Institute *Jesus Magister* in Rome.

NICHOLAS CROTTY, C. P., S. T. D. (Angelicum), contributor to the *Australasian Catholic Record*, is teaching Moral Theology and Experimental Psychology at the Passionist Studentate, St. Paul's Retreat, Urrbrae, Mitcham, South Australia.

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN, C. SS. R., Ph. D., a graduate of the *Angelicum*, Rome, is presently teaching Ethics and Moral Theology at Immaculate Conception College, Oconomowoc, Wisconsin.

NICHOLAS F. HALLIGAN, O. P., S. T.D., presently preparing a manual of Moral Theology which he formerly taught at the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C., is Professor of Fundamental Theology at the Dominican House of Studies, Dover, Massachusetts.

MICHAEL E. STOCK, O. P., Ph. D., a frequent contributor to scholarly journals, is Professor of. Psychology at the Dominican House of Studies, Dover, Massachusetts.

DANIEL F. REILLY, O. P., Ph. D., is Professor of History at Providence College, Providence, Rhode Island.

JOSEPH C. TAYLOR, O. P., Ph. D., is Professor of Metaphysics and History of Greek Philosophy at the Dominican House of Studies, Dover, Massachusetts.

IGNATIUS J. MCGUINESS, O. P., S. T. D., is Professor of Theology at Marymount College, New York.

DENNIS C. KANE, O. P., S. T. L. is Professor of Philosophy at Providence College, Providence, Rhode Island.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Law of Christ. Vol. I, *General Moral 'J'heology.* By BERNARD HXIuNa, C. SS. R. Translated by Edwin S. Kaiser, C. PP. S. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1961. Pp. xxxi, 615 with notes, bibliographies and index, $8.50.

Father Haring's work has received high praise both in the original and in translation. It is to be expected that his chosen approach to this important branch of theology will likewise gain the acclaim of a new audience.

The author lays down his guidelines in the Foreword. "A textbook or manual of moral theology is written primarily to suit the purpose proposed by its author .... Our purpose is an integration and synthesis of various systems. . . . First, we shall endeavor to describe the perfect ideal of the life in Christ and with Christ. This is the ideal of radical conformity with Christ through the exercise of the Christian virtues. Secondly, in conjunction with the treatment of the virtues, we shall point out the limits of the law . . . beyond which our conduct becomes a ·contradiction to the life of Christ and a hazard to the of Christ. . . . This leads to our third point. Moral theology must reveal how the good, like an arch resting on solid foundation, has its sound basis in law, but reaches to the summit of perfection. The dynamic character of morality is explicitly treated in the special chapter on conversion placed between the chapters on sin and virtue, but it is implicit in all the chapters of our work. ... With this end in view, the author attempted to keep the technical terminology at a minimum and to provide a text within the grasp of the earnest layman and also suitable for ready use by preacher and confessor for whom it should lighten the burden of presenting the eternal truths in a manner befitting our times. The very fact that a moral theology has been adapted to the capacity of the interested non-theologian may prove to be its best recommendation to the theologian and director of souls." (pp. viii-ix) How Father Haring develops his purpose is first judged by a survey of the content of the book.

The first volume is divided into six parts with a total of fourteen chapters. Part One: *Introduction* has two chapters, the first being an historical survey of moral teaching from the time of Christ to the moral theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A relatively extensive treatment is accorded to St. Thomas and the magnificent beginning. which he gave in the Second Part of his *Summa Theologiae* to what is now known properly as moral theological science. Beginning with Sailer and Hirscher in the nineteenth century, the author concentrates on the German moralists, especially of the Tiibingen school, of which he is an alumnus. He makes

clear his sympathy with those authors who have reacted against the emphasis upon law and duty or obligation (" minimal legalism " and " the extreme bias of the juridical approach,") and who have approached moral matters in the light of freedom in the grace of Christ, of conformity to Christ, of love as at least an equal principle in moral theology. This outlook underscores the succeeding chapters.

The second chapter, *Essential, Concepts of Moral Theology,* considers morality as responsibility, as fellowship, and as imitation of Christ. A grea\ role is assigned to the virtue of religion and responsibility is emphasized as the concept which expresses the Christian moral life. " Hence responsibility means that in a community between man and God, man responds to God's word with the responsibility of his personal decision and action " (p. 46}. The attention of the reader is arrested by the many lofty thoughts concerning religion, prayer and imitation.

Part Two: *The Subject of Moral Values, Theological Anthropology,* devotes two chapters to the consideration of man, the subject of moral. values, in his vocation as disciple of Christ-" the whole man with all that he is and has from the standpoint of the call of Christ to man" (p. 61). Chapter three, *Christ Invites Man to Follow Him,* has as its theme that " moral value belongs to man in the integrity of his nature, body and soul in their entirety ... [and] in the entire context of being and life, in the texture of relations which enrich his life and which offer him the opportunity to develop his inner capacities fully " (p. 78). Most interesting insights are developed into the meaningful interrelations of person and community in the moral order which reach their highest expression in the Mystical Body of Christ.

All of this is presented as " the background of tremendous dimensions which provides the setting for moral decision and personal ;moral growth and development" (p. 99). Thus chapter four, *The True Basis of Morality,* first takes up at considerable length the doctrine of human liberty as the foundation for morality. The traditional notions regarding human freedom as the participation of the djvine freedom, its characteristics in man in this life, the formation or education of freedom in the spirit of an enlightened obedience are explained. The remainder of the tract considers intention, the voluntarium and the enemies of the voluntarium. In this last is included the influence of mass suggestion, so prevalent in modem societies, as well as the influence of psychical defects and illnesses. Father Haring does not attempt to dismiss culpability or the restriction of liberty of the human act in these areas until it becomes rather evident. " In the fundamental problem of the nature and degree of freedom essential for moral responsibility, the Church, not experimental psychology, has the authority to make the final decision" (p. 120}.

A section on the knowledge of God as the basis of value opens up an

extensive and stimulating treatment of the role of value in moral knowledge –a Christian value ethics. Value is the good not simply as known but especially as it is loved, longed for, appreciated in the fullness of awareness. The ultimate value is God and all moral knowledge, taken in the dynamic sense of the appreciation and love of values, .is a likeness to God's own knowledge, (p. 1!!0) and thus is the basis of moral freedom. The emphasis throughout on the right conduct, right affection, etc., would seem to be a concentration upon the right ordering of the affective side of our nature inasmuch as this has an influence upon the operation of the intellect and the quality of knowledge.

The consideration in chapter four is conscience as the subjective source of moral good. Here Father Haring applies his purpose of composing Thomistic and Scotistic attitude. " The comprehensive concept of conscience which we adopt and propose is built on the double foundation of the practical intellect .seeking truth and the natural yearning of the will and heart of man for the true good. It is Thomism which stresses the practical intellect as likeness to God, whereas the Augustinian-'Franciscan tradition lays greater stress on heart and will tending toward the good. The comprehensive theory of conscience aims at a synthesis of the two, for the ultimate dynamism of conscience is explained, not from the distinct nature of intellect and will viewed in isolation, but from the profound unity of the two in the depths of the soul. We view them in the light of their profound likeness to God as He is active in the depths of the soul in a rich and wonderful harmony of its whole being" (p. 148}. (By way of criticism here, the Thomist teaching does not isolate the activity of the practical intellect and conscience; on the contrary, it emphasizes their mutual influence and dependence in human activity. An attempt to unite voluntaristic principles to a Thomistic base must leave one -with a foggy impression.) In the practical formation of the conscientious judgment and act in the realm of uncertainties, the author not surprisingly is an avowed follower of St. Alphonsus (equi-probabilism), yet states: "But nonetheless a moderate probabilism or probabiliorism may not be set down as unecclesiastical. These systems have outstanding theologians to propose and defend them. Practically the differences between one system and the other do not loom so large today" (p. 189). Father Haring is also a clear proponent of the obligation to choose the better good, because, " if any individual should form the judgment, clearly and prudently, that one specific choice or course of action is manifestly better for him, that it is here and now the wiser and more suitable, he would be obliged to follow this one course of action or choose this one specific good" (p. 175}. Final considerations in chapter four take up human act and action, the emotions and " the heart " but the result is far from satisfying.

Part Three analyzes *The Moral Duty of the Disciple of Christ.* "This

is determined by his actual existing nature and being to which in the present order the endowments of grace also belong-and by everything with which his activity can be concerned! This is the object or goal of his inner attitudes and his actions: God, neighbor, community, self, the world" (p. 225). Chapter five considers the particular standards of morality under their legal aspect of norm and law. The norm of morality is portrayed very clearly as rooted in value, as there must be a value appeal to the will, a good which obliges. Ultimately this good which is a value and thus a norm must be good whether approached philosophically or theologically. In the latter view, "the immediate or proximate norm of morality for us is the will of God revealed in Christ, as it is presented by the Catholic Church (objective norm) , and as it is understood by human reason submissive to supernatural revelation and inwardly enlightened by the Holy Spirit (subjective norm)" (p. 229). A warning is given that: "One who is exclusively concerned with the normative formula without being taken up by the value which is its foundation and source will inevitably descend to a moribund legalistic morality " (p. 285). The remainder of the chapter discusses the law with its types and characteristics. Both the natural law and the positive divine law in Old and New Testaments are extensively examined. A comparison-seldom made in moral theology texts-is drawn between the Catholic and Protestant conceptions of law and its role. " However, nowhere in all Protestant thought do we find the clear and simple notion of external law which characterizes Catholic theology and according to which the law is primarily the guide to the correct perception of the inner law of freedom and love " (p. 264).

Father Haring rejects the concept of a purely penal law. He reasons that " to say a law itself [a true law] does not bind in conscience is tantamount to saying that it does not bind at all. . . . It is foolish to hold that the legislator has no desire to affect the conscience simply because he tries to attain his purpose by penalties regardless of the conscience of the individual .... Finally, it is a universally valid proposition that when the legislator fixes a sanction to a law, he is particularly intent on the observance of the law and looks upon the violator as deserving of punishment " (p. 271). He will admit a justifiable introduction of penal law in moral theology solely in the case of an obligation to submit to a penalty for refusal to obey an unjust law (p. 278). (But does not the obligation in conscience to observe certain unjust laws or the penalty when there has been no true guilt have its source in the higher law of charity and prudence and not particular justice?)

Chapter six is concerned with *The Moral Object in Itself and in the Situation.* This includes the usual treatment of objective value and the circumstances influencing the morality of an action, together with cooperation in a twofold effect. A brief presentation contrasts the Catholic moral

attitude toward the actual, practical and individual situation with situation ethics. The concluding portion of the chapter on command and counsel, command and vocation again opposes the so-called legalism: "Great is the Church's concern to preserve and protect the freedom of choice in the vocation to sacerdotal or religious life. But it is not at all her mind that the clearly recognized call of grace can be ignored as though it imposes no obligation at all, on the pretext that surely there is 'no law' in this matter, as though the guidance and directive of grace were not the most actual of laws for the genuine disciple of Christ. Precisely on this point does the pure 'legal ' morality part ways with the morality of grace" (p. 301). "As to the controversy on the point of obligation concerning the following of the ' evangelical counsels ' or a special vocation, which is not the object of a universal law and demanded of all men, it is asked whether the counsel or special vocation can become an obligation in conscience for any individual. But the very question presented in this way insinuates the legalistic manner of presentation of moral questions " (p. Rather, for Father Haring, the solution lies in the freedom of the children of God under grace, " for whom deeds of love and the guidance of grace through the special divine providence are actually the law" *(ibid.).* If the Christian in all docility and prudence and loyalty to grace recognizes a divine vocation or special mission, the counsel then becomes for him an obligation, an inescapable duty. The question is tied to the problem of whether the Christian is always obliged to choose the better good. The author answers in the affirmative, in the sense that "every Christian, however, is bound to do that which he himself, with the aid of God's grace, realizes to be most conformable to his state and his powers. Should anyone with the help of divine grace arrive at the prudential judgment that a particular action or choice of vocation is, according to all evidence, the most suitable for him, he is not truly prudent or truly submissive and docile toward the interior Teacher, the Holy Spirit, if he still chooses what is obviously less suitable for him. This holds good whether the object be the more perfect or the less perfect. Quite frequently, however, there is question not merely of one particular act or choice, but of a veritable multitude of possibilities with very little to differentiate them. Where no clear and express differentiation can be made, only personal initiative can be responsible for a decision without fear of disobedience to God's guidance " (p. 306) .

Chapter seven on *The Moral Motive* is a fruitful analysis of the significance of the *finis operantis* in the moral action. Chapter eight covers *The Problem of Indifferent Actions, Coordination of Object, Circumstances and Motive.* As a possible domain of indifferent acts-although less properly so-called-there is posited a realm " which is not penetrated by the clear insight of the moral conscience or leavened by its influence, not fully taken up with the spirit of moral responsibility, not yet placed fully in submission to the vigilance of true moral freedom " (p. .

Part Four, *The Following of Ckrist Placed in Jeopardy,* surveys the *Nature and Consequences of Sin* in chapter nine and the *Distinction of Sins* in chapter ten. In the knotty question regarding the nature of venial sin the author argues from the fallen nature of man. " Obviously one must predominate, for two basic complete principles of equal force, two fundamental orientations, cannot co-exist in man. Whenever a fully clear and deliberate decision has been made for good or bad, the other basic orientation ceases to be ultimate and free. 'From this it follows that venial sins are acts of secondary orientation. They are not acts of complete departure, sweeping aside the prior fundamental orientation to God, as it were casting it into discard. In this sense they simply do not attain the fullness of the act of human orientation" (p. 859).

Part Five, *Conversion,* analyzes the sinner's return to the grace and imitation of Christ. The necessity, nature and dimensions of conversion are the subject of chapter eleven as the *Invitation and Response to tke Imitation of Ckrist. Tke Convert's Skare in Conversion,* that is, the three free acts of penance under grace: contrition, confession and satisfaction, are exposed in chapter twelve. Clear distinction is made between true contrition and religious sorrow on the one hand and" the comfortable fallacy of psychoanalysis " and mere ethical regret on the other. The points of departure and the elements of value between the moral theology of contrition and the guilt of psychoanalysis are pointed out (pp. 428-426) . The minimum in the three acts of the penitent for removal of sin and for conversion and for the sacrament, but especially the heights for which he should strive in the way of perfection are highlights in the author's delineation of the true imitation of Christ. (In view of the obligation to submit directly to the keys all known grave sins, even though already indirectly forgiven, a greater clarification would therefore be desired for the following: " It may occur that an invalid confession is followed by a series of worthy repetitions of the sacrament of penance, without any validation of the unworthy confession because the matter was overlooked or forgotten. In such a case the penitent is not· required to repeat the confessions made in good faith, though he must confess that he made one unworthy confession and reconfess the mortal sins included in that sinful reception of the sacrament.") (pp. 466-467} •

Part Six: *Growtk and Perfection in the Followingof Christ, the Christian Virtues,* completes the first volume with chapter thirteen on *The Virtues in General* and chapter fourteen on *The Cardinal Virtues.* In this connection Father Hii.ring explains why he treats the cardinal virtues before the theological. "At first blush it may seem a serious departure from the exalted theological plan in the concept of St. Thomas to place the cardinal virtues before the theological, as we do. Our presentation has the practical purpose of placing all possible emphasis on the life in grace and the

theological virtues. Therefore, the fundamental attitudes {cardinal virtues) are treated in general moral theology, where they are described as general attitudes or dispositions in the following of Christ. Special moral in its entire content is presentation and explanation of the three theological virtues " (pp. x-xi). " In the *Secunda Secundae* Saint Thomas first treats the three theological virtues and then takes up the four cardinal virtues. This very arrangement in itself, and even more so the text as such, makes it clear that the actual foundations, the ' hinges ' (*cardines)* of the Christian life of virtue are not the four cardinal virtues, but the theological virtues. (Our arrangement is not in opposition to this order of Saint Thomas. Here we take up the cardinal virtues and explain them principally only as fundamental attit:udes. We treat their intrinsic tasks according to the theological virtues.) " (p. 497).

How grace and the theological virtues are highlighted by a previous consideration of the cardinal virtues is almost impossible to understand. In the " life in ,. there can be no more " fundamental attitudes " than faith, hope and love. In the hierarchy of supernatural human acts they are supreme and give orientation and supernatural vitality and effectiveness to the cardinal virtues (as is brought out in this very chapter). Moreover, , to suggest that the theological virtues are really the hinges and actual foundations of the Christian life is to risk introducing confusion into traditional theological terminology that has come down from as early as St. Ambrose. Virtues are called cardinal inasmuch as the whole Christian moral life moves upon them (because they are concerned with the means through which we move toward our end) and inasmuch as they are the entrance to that higher life which is contemplative. The theological virtues put us in possession of our end, the ultimate and unmovable goal and support of the Christian life of virtue. They are indeed its foundation, anchor and root but they are not movable or calculated to lead to anything further or to serve as introduction to a more interior life. Although most principal and excellent among virtues, the theologcial virtues are not susceptible of the properties of the cardinal.

A like criticism must be made against the whole structure of this volume. The procedure is too contrived; the " call and response " or " invitation and following " theme does not readily lend itself to a systematic moral theology, does not offer an intrinsic division of subject matter. Thus the unity of the whole treatment is weak. So many thoughts, repetitions, Scriptural passages and quotes or paraphrases from various modern writers (sometimes lacking in cogent application) , indicate a need for more recapitulations and resumes. Any eclectic attempt must inevitably expose its seams.

St. Thomas is clearly second to none in his respect for the preeminence of love, for the primary role of supernatural charity in the Christian life. But he is better known for his emphasis on the intellectual factors, since at

all times love must be intelligent, properly directed and applied, having no power of understanding of its own. It is true that the abuse of " legalism " in morals (much more of a European concern) must be counteracted by recourse to the vital force of divine love enlivening moral theology. But it is not proved that this must be done outside the organic structure of traditional theology or by a patchwork drawn from diverse sources that offer support to a theme that purposes principally to inspire.

It is strange that a direct consideration of supernatural grace and its workings is absent from this volume, since it is intimately involved in the subject matter of almost every chapter. The law of Christ, which entitles this work, expresses the law of conformity to Christ, which it is the burden of this volume to set forth as the end of the Christian life, and as such is the work of grace. Here also lack of clearly drawn distinction invites confusion or misunderstanding (cf. p. 61 and *passim).* Grace is a sharing in the *divine* nature and thus the beginning of glory. The ultimate end of the Christian life is beatitude in the inamissible possession of the divine vision as the fruit of a faithful participation of the divine nature in the measure of conformity to the Humanity of Christ, full of grace. Christ is not the focal center of Christian moral theology and life in the sense of the ultimate end. He is as man the exemplar end of all His followers, the way to God, the Light that by His example illuminates our pathway to beatitude and by His grace moves and quickens our human actions toward a conformity with His in the pledge of a similar and proportionate reward. Man's response to grace is a response to the leadership of Christ; the invitation to fellowship with God is in the manner of Christ's. Christ as God is the object and ultimate end of moral as well as of dogmatic theology. Christ as man is the indispensable means of return to God and the necessary exemplar cause of that return.

The Law of Christ is clearly animated by a sincere desire to inspire a more perfect love and a more pure life of virtue. It succeeds in offering religious motivation and encouraging genuine zeal. These are its positive contributions. It is less· successful as a book of instruction. The lack of clear-cut distinctions, such as have become necessary precisions in modern moral works, does not recommend it as a textbook, but rather as supplementary reading. It is not written for the confessor, and this burdened minister of God will not find it a prime reference book. Nor will the reader interested in discussions and analyses of modem moral problems be satisfied with the extent of treatment given to those considered here. The attempt of Father Haring to rethink and to present in a more vital manner the perennial truths of morality with a view to modem trends, findings and problems is very encouraging; but not, I am afraid, wholly successful.

NICHOLAS HALLIGAN, O. P.

St. Stephen's Priory,
Dover, Mass.

Evolution and Christians. By PHILIP G. FOTHERGILL, F.R.S. E. London, Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1961. Pp. 840, with bibliography and index. $9.50.

In his introduction, the author states that his book "brings together information about evolution and its relation to parts of philosophy and theology which is generally available only in separate and diverse volumes." This represents, I believe, a succinct understatement of the excellence of Dr. Fothergill's latest contribution to the field of evolutionary literature. A complete account of evolutionary theory, simply as a scientific theory, necessitates excursions into paleontology, geology, anthropology, anatomy, embryology, biochemistry and genetics, to mention only the broader areas of investigation; a study of the implications of evolutionary theory carries the student on into Biblical science, theology, philosophy, the history of ideas, sociology, etc., until the hope of ever arriving at a sufficiently balanced and penetrating understanding of the matter begins to fade for all but the professional evolutionist. Even within the strictest confines of evolutionary thought itself, the grasp of the various sub-theories and hypotheses, the particular or limited principles, laws, trends and generalizations already present a formidable challenge to ordinary students. Dr. Fothergill attempts and achieves a comprehensive summary of this extensive and heterogeneous corpus of theory, fact and implication.

The book is frankly intended for the serious student rather than the casual reader. It presumes familiarity with scientific terminology and does not attempt to bypass intricate reasoning and complex analyses of data. Nevertheless, for the student who wishes a more than superficial knowledge of evolutionary theory, or, more especially, for the teacher who wants a thorough grasp of its many areas somewhere this side of the expertise of the professional evolutionist, this is the book. To my knowledge, there is no other book which covers the subject so broadly and competently.

The main strength of the book is in the presentation of the many facets of the scientific endeavor vis-a-vis evolutionary theory. All the aspects of the data are offered at least by way of example, and the variety of particular interpretations held by different evolutionists regarding different points of fact or implication are presented very fairly and generously. Such is not always the case in books of this sort. As the core his broader intellectual stance, Dr. Fothergill has indeed certain cardinal theological and philosophical positions of his own, which he openly professes and ably maintains. His merit is in this, that these positions do not color his scientific judgments, leaving him able to sustain a fine deference towards opposition opinion at the scientific level.

However, as has been indicated, besides the presentation of evolutionary theory in its purely scientific dimensions, Dr. Fothergill wishes to place the

contemporary state of the theory within a historical context, and within the context also of philosophy and Catholic theology. The historical sections of the book, however, are brief, especially for earlier periods, and in their brevity sometimes timd to over-simplify a historical position. It does not seem right, for instance, to say that Aristotle's theory of hylomorphism precludes evolutionary theory because it entails an immutability of species. Some contemporary Aristotelians hold that hylomorphism is an ideal philosophical position within which to develop a scientific theory of evolution; St. Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, allowed the possibility of the development of new species from old, within the framework of hylomorphism. It ill true to say that some of the Church Fathers eSpoused evolutionary theories, but these theories must be taken in their proper context. The Fathers arrived at these opinions through theological considerations, because the exigencies of Scriptural interpretation led them to conceive the possibility that all things were not created from the beginning in their fullest, actual form. Their ideas, then, not being generated out of a oonsideration of paleontological or genetic data, would seem to be of a different genre from contemporary evolutionary theories. When we come, then, to a consideration of St. Thomas' thoughts on evolution, it is not precisely correct to say simply that he opposed evolutionary ideas. That he did. not feel compelled to follow the Fathers in their theologically inspired views of evolution is true, but he also respected these ideas and did not contradict them. It seems more accurate to say that, not seeing these ideas as necessarily true from the theological point of view, and not having at hand the scientific data which support such views, he found no positive reason for affirming evolution as an actual explanation of the development of living forms. He did, however, expressly assert that the origin of new species from old was not impossible.

It is perhaps unwelcome to stress philosophical points in a book whose major impact is in the area of the scientific-theological confrontation, but one more issue ought to be mentioned. In an early section of his book, Dr. Fothergill accepts the position of Jacques Maritain regarding the need for a philosophy of nature which is neither metaphysics nor science, but holds a place midway between them. Later, however, under the heading " Evolution and Philosophy: the Faith of a Catholic Biologist," this position seems to have been lost. Here there seems to be no middle ground between the phenomenological and evidential view which belongs to science; and the view of the ' essences' of things, which belongs to metaphysics. The statement is also made that when science leaves the observable and measurable levels it is no longer science, but philosophy. The anguish this statement will cause philosophers is apparent: they might be willing to lose their roots in the measurable, but if their foundations in the observable are also cut off, all of their intellectual endeavors seem condemned to float unanchored in the realm of fantasy.

I doubt if it is Dr. Fothergill's intention so to sever the speculations of the philosophers, even the metaphysicians, from reality. But I wonder also if the notion of such a severance does not follow, or tend to follow, from Maritain's division of knowledge. His dichotomy between empirical science and the philosophy of nature is so sharp that it tends to relegate the latter, and *a fortiori*, metaphysical knowledge, to the realm of the unrooted, although this is far from his own understanding of these forms of knowledge. A more realistic and integrated view would make empirical science and the philosophy of nature not two separate and distinctively qualified approaches to reality, but two stages of one single approach-the first stage that of observation, classification, measurement, etc., and the second stage that of reflecting on and findin_g the meaning of the observed, classified and measured.

In the theological sections of his book, where he weighs the impact of evolutionary theory upon traditional theological propositions, especially on the interpretation of the First Book of Genesis, Dr. Fothergill, guiding himself on the pertinent pronouncements of the Church's magisterium, elaborates the many possible interpretations which fall within the grounds of the theologically tolerable. He cites even the extreme positions, biologically extreme or theologically extreme; his own preference leans towards the explanations which least tax credulity. His intention seems to be, not so much to propose and insist on any one explanation, as to propose all of them, and allow the reader to find the answers which most conform to his own intellectual bents. Probably in an area which is still so fiuid, this is the only reasonable approach. The teacher of Christian doctrine who must answer questions in this area, and satisfy a variety of minds, will find this section a welcome resume of acceptable alternatives.

There is, finally, an intriguing idea which the author mentions in the last pages of his book. He raises the point that Catholic doctrine puts a difficulty in the way of intellectual satisfaction with evolutionary theory, because, even if it accepts all that science can prove, it insists on the special creative act of God to account for man's spiritual soul. This introduces a dichotomy into nature, a gap in the continuity of things, which, necessary as it might be, nevertheless irritates the mind which yearns for perfect coherence. It is intellectually more reasurring to see things in an unbroken continuum. The new idea suggested by Dr. Fothergill's text is an alternative to the simple or homogeneous or undifferentiated continuum in evolutionary progress. It is, nevertheless, a continuum. He suggests the continuum constituted by the limited and its limit, a continuum of degrees of evolving organic perfection approaching ever more closely to, but never actually achieving the limit under its own powers. The limit marks a new order of things, in this case, the human order. In this view, evolution is a natural movement towards the human composite, obtaining its direction

and finding its intrinsic meaning from the exigencies of the human organism. All of evolving creation has a natural community with the huma.il. composite when the latter has been produced, but none of the forces producing pre-human evolution is capable on its own account of producing man. In support of this idea is the widely accepted thesis that, after the advent of man on the scene, evolution seems to have become a qualitatively different kind of thing, and perhaps evolution of the original kind has ceased to operate.

The community of man with the rest of organic nature is emphasized in the relation of the limit to the limited, for the limited is defined and terminated by the limit. It is as though the human organism is the crowning point or keystone of the whole thrust of organic evolution. The uniqueness of human nature is emphasized by the extrinsicness of the limit in relation to the limited. Thus both the essential distinctiveness of the human com- and its real community with the rest of nature are simultaneously underlined. The idea seems to be worth further consideration.

MICHAEL STOCK, O. p.

St. Stephen's Priorg,
Dooer, Maaa.

Religion in American Life. Edited by JAMES WARD SMITH and A. LELAND JAMISON. Vol. I: "The Shaping of American Religion," 514 pp. $8.50. Vol. II: "Religious Perspectives in American Culture." 427 pp. $7.50. Vol. IV: "A Critical Bibliography of Religion in America," 2 vols., 1,219 pp. $17.50. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Four-volume set (including Vol. III when published), $32.50.

Religion in American Life stands alone in conception and in high accomplishment.

Religion in American Life sprang mainly from the upperclass seminar of the Special Program in American Civilization offered at Princeton University between 1948 and 1958. Volume III of the series which is entitled "Religious Thought and Economic Society: The European Background," is to appear very soon.

The worth of this ambitious project is twofold: the scholarship of the historical presentation, along with the analysis of American religion and the critical bibliography which makes it the American religion researcher's dream.

One essay each has to do with those religions which have come to be known in the United States as 'the major Faiths,' i. e., Protestantism, Catholicism and Judaism. However, whereas "Catholicism in the United

States " and "Judaism in the United States " are the titles of the studies proper to these two religions, Protestantism is not so treated. The study of Protestantism is presented under the title " The Protestant Movement and Democracy in the United States" of which H. R. Niebuhr is the author. With all proper respect to our cherished form of government, this lack of ' straight ' reporting on Protestantism will undoubtedly puzzle some readers.

A. Leland Jamison, one of the two editors of this great symposium, has also contributed "Religions on the Christian Perimeter." His sixty-nine pages of exposition and explanation of more than four hundred sects can win for them a better understanding than that of" the lunatic fringe."

Speaking of the amorphous mood of American religious thought, Dr. Jamison recalls Will Herberg's caustic remark about the state of mind of these multitudinous sects, viz., " a creedless surrogate for a vital and defined faith in the God of the Bible."

Two historical surveys trace American religion from the Revolution to 1914. Perry Miller's urbane essay examines American Protestant thought from 1775 to the Civil War. Substantiation, clarity and gentle irony characterize his presentation of the great part of the church-related people in the then existing American states. They viewed themselves as standing in a contractual relationship with the "Great Governor" and Dr. Miller shows that this federal theology was quite widespread.

In "Religion and Modernity, 1865-1914" Professor Stow Persons indicates the serious slackening of religion as an influence in American life during the post-Civil War period. This was the era in·which the large rival Protestant denominations in the United eStates learned to accept and get along with one another and James McCosh, President of Princeton, attempted to bridge the evolution-religion gap.

In one of Professor Persons' few remarks about Catholics he says that they " must confess the shocking failure of their Church to come to terms with modern culture" (i.e., with new ideas on freedom, democracy, progress, science, etc.). He holds that "the militant anticlericalism of Western Europe was the inevitable consequence of such folly." This may shake the more complacent Catholics in the United States who think their Church is meeting the problems of modernity rather well. But the critic who makes the charge seems to want to be objective and fair.

Disclaiming statements in the Introduction of Volume. I try to ward off criticism for neglecting Catholic influence in American life. One such statement points out that " for three centuries the main thrust of American religion stemmed from the Reformation." This is indeed true. However, to say that " a study of religion in American life a century hence would need to place far more stress upon Catholic influence " does not suffice. It is hardly sufficient reason to ignore the rising tide of Catholic influence in the nineteenth century, however culturally humble that tide may have

been. The very depth and breadth of the hostility and persecution directed against Catholics of the United States in the nineteenth century show the inadequacy of these disclaimers. Ray Allen Billington's *The Protestant Crusade* is but one of the fairly numerous studies which support this point of view.

Except in the essay of Henry J. Browne the writers in this symposium show little understanding of Catholic influence in this country prior to the early twentieth century. Surely the Maryland settlement, the colonial Philadelphia Catholics, the earliest American city areas of St. Augustine and Santa Fe, the California mission system and the settlements on the water route between Quebec and New Orleans mean something.

Reverend Henry J. Browne, a Catholic priest and an historian, contributes "Catholicism in the United States," a forty-nine page summary of the history of the Catholic Church in this country. It is almost certainly the best such summary that has been offered to date.

This essay was written for a study sponsored by one of the country's justly famous Protestant universities. Understandably Father Browne has soft-pedaled the harassment and suffering visited upon Catholics by their separated brethren. Though this was considerable during the past one hundred twenty-five years, most of it has disappeared today.

A more adequate mention might have been made in Father Browne's essay of the position of Catholics in the United States during the Mexican War. Cahenslyism too, should have been explained. The Vatican ranking the Catholic Church in this country as a mission church till 1908 helps make clear why American Catholics were slow to awaken to a sense of cultural maturity.

Educationally and culturally, Catholics are painted with most of their warts showing. This is as it should be. That it can be done today without defensive cries of anguish is a healthy sign in the Catholic body in this country.

Midwestern Catholics may differ from and even reject Father Browne's rather patronizing compliment for their " growing independence of clerical dominance." Their forefathers lacking a chance for higher education chose freely to trust their clerical leaders. Issues affecting them were often colored by overtones of national background. To explain past Catholic solidarity as " clerical dominance " is to seek too easy an explanation. Such a position has not been demonstrated in American history.

Volume II, " Religious Perspectives in American Culture," is concerned with the relation of religion (mostly Protestant) with education, law, politics, Church-State relations, religious novels, the Bible in fiction, poetry, music and architecture.

Willard Thorp, who writes "The Religious Novel as Best Seller in Alllerica/' offers the written piece, while Will Herberg

seems to have brought the best insight to his work. Thirty-two pages of illustration make the study on architecture attractive.

Bibliographers may be excused for over-praising the two volume Bibliography. It serves not only those seeking books on religion but is also an equerry to readers in related fields.

In it a surprisingly large number of dissertations and studies on Catholic education is noted. Peter Guilday's *Life and Times of John England* is called the finest biography of an American Roman Catholic bishop. However, some Catholic encyclopedias seem to have been omitted, along with some basic American Catholic biographical work. The section "Religion and the Intellectuals" seems quite thin.

Some Catholic (or other!) graduate historical seminar could consider what is pointed out on page 1042 in the second book of the Bibliography: "The History of Roman Catholic Seminaries in the United States-still lacks a scholarly and comprehensive work." It might also be noted that in the two essays concerning theology, no attempt is made to assay Catholic theology, either in historical survey or to judge its conclusions. This fact seems to indicate that at least there should be a beginning survey of Catholic theology in the United States done by some competent scholar or group.

In sum, all who hold religion to be vital to the United States are in debt to the editors and authors of *Religion in American Life.*

DANIEL F. REILLY, O.P.

Providence College,
Providence, R. I.

Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum. KARL BARTH. Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1960. Pp. 178. $8.00.

Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum offers us Karl Barth's study of Saint Anselm's search and discovery of what was to his mind an irrefutable proof of God's Existence. The author confesses to a continued interest in Saint Anselm, the theologian, particularly in the context of his famous proof. The work, which is the second edition of a study originally made in 1981, fulfills a twofold purpose. In the preface to the first edition Barth explains the work as an apologia for his great interest in this catholic theologian whose merit, he claims, has never been fully understood and appreciated. But the thought of Saint Anselm also exercises its own attraction. "From all this I cannot deny that I deem Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God in the context of his theological Scheme a model piece of good, penetrating and neat theology, which at every step I have found instructive and edifying" (p. 9). Underlying Barth's study and becoming more and more

apparent with the progress of the work is the conviction that the so-called *ontological proof,* a description he strongly resents (p. 171), has been almost always wrenched from its proper setting and made to appear in a false garb.

Throughout the work Barth, whether wittingly or not, tends to create the impression that no one, besides himself, ever approached the ansehnian proof sympathetically, that the interest of others was to disprove rather than to understand. His attitude towards catholic theologians seems to proceed from such an assumption and from time to time he lends credence to this suspicion by the curtness with which he refers to them. Frequently he seems to question their appreciation of theology in rejecting Saint Anselm's proof, rather than the grounds upon which they do reject the argument. Surely, it would be more acceptable to presume that any theologian would be moved sympathetically towards every argument purporting to prove the Existence of God. And if a proof be rejected, it could be licitly assumed that the rejection was based not on the absence of sympathy on the part of the theologian, but on the insufficiency, real or apparent, of the proof. The very failure to approach Saint Ansehn with sympathy which he charges and decries in other theologians, is perceptible in his approach to them.

The study itself of Saint Ansehn's Proof begins with a rather extended treatise on the Theological Scheme which constitutes the framework of the Proof. In it Barth discusses the nature and necessity of theology, its possibility and aim. In his description of theology he lays and proper emphasis on the revealed character of its principles and exj>lainsthe source of their attainment, faith. He gives an adequate characterization of theology's function with regard to. its principles. He places great insistence on the importance of *inteUigere* in theology, the understanding of what is accepted through and by faith. This he designates as the terminus of the mind's inquiry into the area where faith and revelation hold absolute sway.

In general one can agree with the description of theology given by the author. Certain details, however, must evoke a dissent. His notion of faith places the essence· of that infused Habit in the will, while relegating the intellect's role to merely a passing glance. Though he speaks of the Church as the authoritative source in matters pertaining to faith, his conception of the Church is left hazy, but it is certainly not the catholic notion. Again he appears to identify theology, at least the theology he prefers, with the Gift of UNDERSTANDING, the divinely given insight into the articles of faith. This is suggested by his account, filled with a sense of admiration, of the manner in which Saint Ansehn came upon the discovery of his famous concept of God, " *aJiquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest."* Of its genesis he writes: " Is this a scientific report on an investigation or it is not rather a-perhaps quite typical-account of a prophetic insight? " (p. 76).

We do not have any quarrel with the theologian for whom theology is not

simply a study but also a prayer for understanding. Saint Thomas Aquinas is an eloquent witness to the fecundity of such a prayerful attitude in theology. What we do object to is the implied criticism of the theologian who eschews any outward revelation of his inward piety in the theological work he writes. From the tenor of his ·references to theologians whose writings are devoid of outward signs of inward piety, it would appear that Barth considers such to be theologians in a very minor key. This, I believe, to be unwarranted. Again, when he speaks of the created things as a pathway to the knowledge of God, Barth seems to actually close off this pathway." There is nothing in the world which is *simile* to human reason as such and per se, which is necessary to it and which quite independently of anything outside itself is also a medium for knowledge of God" (p. 117)• Are we to understand by this remark that there is no ontological link between the Creator and the creature? that there do not exist any *vestigia* which, if searchingly followed, could and would lead to a knowledge of, not indeed the God of revelation, but the God of nature? Or is Barth speaking exclusively of God of faith and revelation? This point is of more than passing interest. On it depends the identity of God as the object of the Proof offered by Saint Anselm and interpreted by Barth.

The principal portion of the book is taken up with the study of the argument of Saint Anselm which is drawn from the Proslogion, !! & 8. Together these present the Proof which, in the opinion of Saint Anselm, not only established the Existence of God as an incontrovertible fact, but further proves that it is impossible to ever conceive God as not existing. The Proof in its physical entity, and I use that phrase out of deference to the author, is sufficiently known to every theologian and student of theology to make its restatement here unnecessary. But the heartbeat, the vivifying soul of the Proof is, according to Barth, a totally different matter. This is the x factor, the element that has been passed over by generations of theologians. It can be best expressed in the author's own words about the meaning of proof in Saint Anselm's Proslogion. " He himself reminds us again of what he understands by proof. Not a science that can be unravelled by the Church's faith and that establishes the Church's faith in a source outside itself. It is a question of theology. It is a question of the proof of faith by faith which was already estabilshed in itself without proof. And both the faith that is proved and the faith that proves-Anselm expressly understands not as presuppositions that can be achieved by man but as presuppositions that have been achieved by God, the former as a divine *dOnare,* the latter as a divine *iUuminare*" (p. 179).

In the light of such a conception of proof one can legitimately inquire for whom is the proof instituted? for the man of faith? for the unbeliever, the *insipiens* of Psalm xiii? If for the man of faith, then the purpose of the proof cannot be to convince, for he already holds the conclusion prior to its

being a conclusion and on much more convincing grounds. What the proof, since it is a proof of faith by faith, achieves is what Barth describes as *intelligere.* But it can achieve this only on the supposition that the original presupposition, the sure knowledge of God's Existence through faith, is not even momentarily set aside. But what if the proof is instituted for the benefit of the insipiens, who rejects or will not admit the necessarily required presuppositions? What possible results are we to expect? Barth examines this qusstion by first detailing qualities of this *inaipiens,* and admits that there is nothing to prevent "the person so informed (about the inner consistency of Christian statements) from doubting, denying and despising the whole thing as much as ever and, with the whole, the details too " (p. 70). However, despite this very likely efiect Barth suggests that "it may be, however, that Anselm could quite well have risked that astonishing assumption because of the power of the objective ratio of the object of faith that enlightens and is enlightened from above by the *summa veritas* and which, according to Anselm, was able to teach and all along did teach truths that are beyond the power of one human being to teach another " (p. 70). This signifies that the destruction of his unbelief cannot be expected when the *insipiens* is confronted with this proof of faith by faith, since faith is not a matter of demonstration but a gift. But there is given him in the proof an occasion of grace in virtue of the power of faith to enlighten because it itself is enlightened from above by God.

But this places the efficacy of Saint Anselm's Proof outside itself. Its ability to convince the mind of the insipiens that God does exist lay not in any intrinsic merit but in its opportuneness as an occasion of grace. But herein, too, lay its weakness, namely in its lack of intrinsic merit. As Saint Thomas warns, the proof that is not really a proof might well be the occasion for that ridicule which derides the faith for its supposed reliance on proofs that are not proofs. And the argument of Saint Anselm does suffer from an obvious weakness. For if we do not accept the theological presupposition and their light glowing brightly throughout the entire course of the argumentation, we have simply an argument which on philosophical grounds makes an unjustified transition from the purely conceptual or noetic order to the ontological or ontic order.

Anselm: Fides QureTens lntellectum of Karl Barth shows plentiful evidence of a thorough study of the thought of Saint Anselm, in the course of which the author manifests a good understanding of that terminology which is the daily fare of the catholic theologian. I particularly mention this because such an understanding is not met with in protestant theologians in general. His appreciation and evaluation of the famous Proof is, I believe, a faithful echo of the mind of Saint Anselm himself. For there can be no doubt that the Saint was convinced of the efficacy of his Proof. Yet it is a proof that is inherently weak and vulnerable when viewed, as

the majority of theologians do view it, as a rational proof of God's Existence. And when viewed as a proof of faith by faith, it might well be an occasion of the gift of faith, but also an occasion for ridiculing the faith.

JOSEPH C. TAYLOR, O.P.

St. Stepkm'a Priory,
Dovi?JI', Maaa.

The Spirit of Protestantism. By RoBERT McAFEE BROWN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 254 with indices. $4.50.

In the Foreword the author prepares us for what is to come and answers the questions which such a title naturally suggests. Whose Protestantism? That of the age in which the salve of the conscience of the apostate friar and the avaricious prince become the confessions of Augsburg and Westminster; that of earlier ages in the ideas of the Donatus, Pelagius, Acacius, Photius, Leo the !saurian, John Wyklif; that of our times, the religion of such varied ministers of a varied Gospel as Paul Blanshard, James Pike, Adam Clayton Powell, Norman Peale, Billy Graham, Bromley Oxnam, Dean Inge?

He addresses liis book to perplexed Protestants, wishful pagans, Concerned Roman Catholics, inquiring college students and beleaguered Protestant ministers. He chooses as Protestantism the " shared convictions " of those inside the Protestant churches and, in the last analysis, what he himself believes.

He ambitiously covers the whole of his field in three parts: past, present and future. In Part One he disposes of what he considers false images of Protestantism: that it is protest against something, that it is diluted Catholicism, that it is " believing certain things," that it is " the right of private judgement "; he then proposes that Protestantism was not a revolt, nor an economic, political movement but a religious revival of the full Gospel of the early church; he bravely sketches the denominations by genera, by theological attitude, and by ecumenical family; and then in ten pages expounds the spirit as " constant renewal·at the hand of God." ·The Second Part is a systematized presentation of the ideas and practices, which he thinks a good Protestant should hold on grace, faith, authority of Scripture, Sovereignty of God, Priesthood of Believers, worship and Sacraments. The Third Part entitled Ongoing Protestant Concerns deals with the relation of Protestantism to Roman Catholicism, to the doctrine of authority, to culture, to the world and with tensions within Protestanism. Twenty seven pages of notes which are simultaneously a rich and varied bibliography, and two indices complete the work.

This is a work of consummate art. Working with deceptive ease and honesty; ingenuous, ready to blame as well as praise; erudite, but never pedantic; didactic, but never prosy; fluent, urbane, but never glib; he has produced an image of Protestantism with a skill that the best among Protestant apologetes might wish he could match.

To say as much is only fair, but to continue is difficult because a reviewer must have a point of departure. The Protestant insider and the Catholic outsider cannot reasonably evaluate Rev. Brown's Protestantism in the same way. And if the outsider is already disposed to be critical of Protestantism, then Rev. Brown's version will be subject to censure too.

This outsider admires the skill with which the fundamental and insuperable barriers between Protestant and Catholic unity are detected and expounded, namely the notions of the Church and of authority, but he is disappointed and irritated at the many ambiguities, equivocations, gratuitous assertions, some of which are due to Protestantism, some of which are due to the author. For if the reviewer cannot abstract from his dogmatic commitments, neither does Rev. Brown, for all his sincerity, rise above his heritage.

A great part of the charm of this book, and the favorable impression that it makes is due to the chaste, eirenic style. There is no innuendo, no emotion-loaded adjectives. Rev. Brown is not of the school of Luther, Foxe, or Blanshard; all is sweet reason. It is sad therefore to note one lapse. In the spirit no doubt of Protestantism, Rev. Brown consistently refuses to admit that the mother and head of all the churches should be called Catholic. For him Catholic means the full Gospel, which Rome does not possess, and so he cleverly reduces the Church to just another sect by constantly employing the adjective Roman. We shall indulge him in this orthodoxy?

Rev. Brown uses the common coinage of Christian religious thought, but he arbitrarily, albeit consciously, gives them his own value and content. Faith, grace, Church, Sacrament, and others, become equivocal terms. For example even when he accepts, as a third definition of sacrament, the Patristic phrase " outward signs of inward and spiritual grace " he blandly ignores the Patristic meaning and gives it his own. Incidentally why must he quote, of all the Fathers, St. Augustine, the perennial champion of orthodoxy?

But this is to digress. The pivotal point of the whole book is the doctrine of the Church. Rev. Brown first presents this in Chapter 4 of Part One as the essence of the Reformation, and in Latin. " Ecclesia reformata sed semper reformanda (the church reformed but always to be reformed)." Let Rev. Brown speak for himself. " The notion that the Reformation is complete, or can be completed, is a denial of what " reformation " in the Protestant sense really means. This is perhaps the ultimate issue dividing

Protestantism and Roman Cathlicism (p. 45. Visser't Hooft points out that Roman Catholicism can allow for . . . reforms *in* the Church, the cleaning up of aspects in the Church's life that have gotten tarnished. But it cannot allow for the possibility of reform *of* the Church, the recognition that at the very basis of its being the Church's ways need to be shaken, judged, purged and re-made."

"Protestantism affirms . . . (that) its life must be a life of constant renewal, for it is an ecclesia peccatorum, ' a church of sinners ' a church that is constantly failing to fulfiill its high calling. The attitude that must characterize the church, therefore, is the attitude of repentance. St. Augustine, who used to describe the church on earth as being without spot and wrinkle, realized toward the end of his life that the description was incorrect, and the Church could only pray, 'Forgive us our sins.'"

And later in the chapter on Roman Catholicism "... the Roman Catholic position asserts that . . . the Pope (understood as the vicar of Christ and the successor to Peter) ... speaks infallibly. That is to say dogmas proclaimed by him are irreformable and beyond possibility of error . . . a position incompatible with the notion that the church is semper reformanda. . . . Here then is the heart of the difference; the dogmas most distinctive of Roman Catholicism, the infallibility of the Pope, is the dogma that most separates it most decisively from Protestantism and the whole of non-Roman Christendom. The place where the Roman Catholic feels that the voice of the Holy Spirit is most clearly discerned is the place where the Protestant feels that the voice of the Holy Spirit is most surely stifled."

And with the hearty fellowship representative of the whole book. . . • " These may seem like harsh things to say about the beliefs of one's fellow Christians, particularly when one sees the wonderful riches of grace and humility which the Roman Catholic Church imparts to individual lives. But there is nothing to be gained by refusing to say them, and there is everything to be gained by saying them to try and locate the core of the problem at the point of greatest disagreement " (p. 167).

By way of criticism of this ecclesia reformanda, it must first be observed that the facts seem to be otherwise. The reformers always spoke of the Church as the Donatists did, the assembly of the saints, the godly, the righteous, the elect. Augsburg, 1580, cap. VII, Of the Church: ... " one holy Church will remain forever. Now this Church is the congregation of saints, in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the sacraments rightly administered .... " Westminster, 1648, which to this day is the formulary of the Scottish Church; Art. III, of God's eternal decree, art XVII, of the perseverance of the Saints, lead logically to Art. XXV. Of the Church: " The Catholic or universal Church, which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect.... " Baptist, First Confession, 1646, XXXIII: " The Church is a company of visible saints, called and separated from the world

by the word and Spirit of God. . . . " Of course, Rev. Brown is not unaware of this, and so he answers this objection . . . "We must acknowledge a certain truth in the charge (that the Reformers themselves had no such clear understanding of the " ongoing Reformation ") but insist that the notion • . . was implicit in their concerns even if not always explicit in their actions. . . ." (p. 46). (It might be observed in passing that Rev. Brown always controls his history with Luther-like serenity. Denifle and Grisar, for example, are dismissed as out-of-date.)

Secondly, ari ecclesia reformanda seems a caricature of the Church presented in St. John and St. Paul. Rev. Brown quotes to his own purposes the encyclical of Pius XII, *Mystici Corporis,* so he cannot be unaware of the doctrine of the Mystical Body, the union of Christ and His members. He chooses, however, to ignore all but one aspect of Christ's teaching. " I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance." Mk. 2, 17 (Rev. Brown's version). It is only in this sense that the Church, holy in its founder, purpose and very life-giving principle, is a church of sinners, sinners called to be saints. Rev. Brown cimnot see the church for the church-goers, which must give some pain to the ghost of Jean Calvin wherever he presides in the assembly of the elect. Again, is it not strange that the sacrament of penance, for which there is certainly scriptural warrant in the words of Christ, should shrivel into a perfunctory prayer in the Protestant churches if they considered themselves sinners? Luther alone clung to Penance, " the one and only remedy for troubled consciences," but the rest of the godly Reformers were not as troubled as Luther. The irony of the evolution of Luther's *sola fides* into *opera* is repeated here in the evolution of the Calvinist assembly: of the saints into an assembly of sinners.

Now as to some of the relatively minor irritations. In the Foreword, the word " protest ' is cleverly twisted with the aid of Webster to mean affirm rather than dissent, and therefore Protestantism should be affirmative rather than negative. Rev. Brown follows this line even when comparison with Romanism wo!J].d suggest,itself. However, it cannot escape the reader that in the exposition of his central thesis he is compelled almost in spite ·of himself to play the dissenter and compare his church with the historic Church of Christendom. His second false image of Protestantism is a dilute Catholicism. The absence of the derogatory adjective indicates that Catholicism here is not to be taken for the Roman brand, but for the full Gospel (p. 19). However, when he comes to expound)lis central Protestant affirmations, and later to indicate the bases of Romanist-Protestant " creative dialogues," every single item was and is and will be found in the Roman Church, so that Protestantism is again distinguishable by what it denies, rather .than by what it affirms. " Grace," says he (p. 53) , " the most important word in the Protestant vocabulary . . . . " It is·not based "on

merit or need (on the part of God) or appeal." "Because it is mercy and forgiveness, grace is also power." "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ is good news." The implication is that non-Protestants think otherwise. In fact he states that the assertion of these truths by the Reformers "upset the medieval world. But they saved the church" (p. 58). The ambiguity here is suspiciously deliberate. It is not grace that the Reformers discovered but a novel way of obtaining it; it was not by affirming grace that they upset the world, but by denying (Protesting) the established means of increasing grace; the Church, the Sacraments, supernaturally good works. For a systematic theologian like Rev. Brown to overlook the necessary clarifications and distinctions is unpardonable.

That he can make distinctions is evident when he treats of faith. Among the meanings of the word he lists "assent," and continues, "This seems to have been the dominant understanding of faith among late medieval schoolmen, and a rejection of it was one of the reasons for the Reformation." That is plain and clear, and so Rev. Brown discarding the intellectual aspect of faith both as to object and act, describes the conversion of Martin Luther, and takes faith "as a lively, reckless confidence in the grace of God," unto salvation. So that from the Catholic point of view Protestants have no faith, only a hope, which borders on presumption.

RomaD.ists assent to what God has revealed principally through Jesus Christ. Faith is the act of assenting, and the body of truths assented to, and the motive for this assent is the truthfulness of God. Romanists do not believe the Church or the Council of Trent or St. Thomas AqUinas; they believe God's Word proposed to them; or to use the technical word, "defined" for them by the Holy Spirit working through human agencies. The teaching of the Church is the rule of faith, not its object. Protestants having changed the meaning of faith and the meaning of the Church, find this incomprehensible and seek to find the word of God in Scripture alone. There is another ambiguity in taking Scripture as the source and test of faith, after denying any intellectual content to faith, but that is one more among so many. The authority of Scripture is an area in which Rev. Brown is evidently much at home and this is one of his better chapters. Romanists can sympathize with problems of other Bible-readers, the more so becaUse, although Rev. Brown does not mention this, it was by and in the Roman Church that certain Scriptures were written, collected, declared canonical, and preserved, because they and they alone were written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. We do not share, however, the facile solution adopted by modern Protestants to the problems raised by modern criticism; we still preserve the notions of inerrancy and inspiration which they now discard contrary. to the spirit of their forefathers. Romanists do not give less authority to Scripture than Protestants; they giye more. Roman worship does not use Scripture less, and Protestant preaching, to judge by

the admittedly inadequate norm of the published topics of their sermons, does not use Scripture more than Sunday Mass with epistle, gospel and sermon in the vernacular.

Nor do Protestants outdo Romans in their admiration of the Sovereignty of God. Rev. Brown himself admits this in a later passage, when he quotes with approval from Niebuhr "... when Protestantism, or parts of it, tended in the direction of humanism, it was Roman Catholicism which maintained the principle of the sovereignty of God. Sometimes it was this Roman Church, more than the Protestants, that resisted human authority when this conflicted with the word of God." And, may we add, the Roman Church still does in such matters as birth prevention, divorce, family life, education, mercy killing, secularism, communism.

But the burden of this chapter is the Calvinist doctrine of predestination and election. Here we must protest another deliberate ambiguity. "Calvin had a great deal to say about election and predestination, to be sure, but only because he found that the Bible said a great deal too. The doctrine, particularly in its negative implications, had been systematically formulated by St. Augustine, a thousand years before Calvin, and St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century had stated it in ways just as severe as those of Calvin. The doctrine was no invention of the Reformers." It is difficult not to see a concealment of truth here. To take the last sentence first, what is the "doctrine"? Election and predestination to heaven antecedent and independent of merits foreseen, is Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin; Election consequent to merits foreseen is Semi-Pelagian; non-election which consists in positive reprobation, antecendent and independent of sin and demerit foreseen is not Augustine, is not Aquinas, but Calvin; non-election which consists in reprobation consequent upon sin is Augustine, Aquinas, but not Calvin. The invention of the Reformers was not election to be sure, but positive antecedent reprobation was revived by them and again condemned by the Council of Trent. Does Rev. Brown think that in the condemnation of Calvin, Augustine and Aquinas are included? Or is he unaware of session VI, Can. 6, " St. Thomas Aquinas has stated *it* in ways just as severe as those of Calvin." *It* cannot be found in the place cited in the works of St. Thomas for the reason that there are only 163 Chapters in the III book of the Contra Gentes. But aside from that, it is true that Aquinas and Calvin are in general agreement that predestination to heaven is a gift of God, because they read St. Paul; the doctrine of positive antecedent reprobation-supralapsarianism, is no where in Aquinas nor Augustine, and is condemned by the Councils of Carisiacum (D. 318), Valentium (D.

It is true that St. Augustine addressed himself to the negative aspects of predestination, and his pungently imaginative phrase, " Massa perditionis " is classic, but Augustine taught negative reprobation, non-election, Calvin taught positive reprobation, antecedent damnation. It is also

true that Calvin did not invent this; he simply revived a false doctrine already condemned by the Church as repugnant to the plain sense of Holy Scripture. Further on, Rev. Brown glowingly writes. "Since salvation is God's gift ... it is not presumptuous to believe in our election." "The presumptuous thing would be to doubt it." The Council of Trent says, Sess. VI, Chap. XII," No one, as long as he is in this mortal life, ought so far to presume as regards the secret mystery of divine predestination as to determine for certain that he is assuredly in the number of the predestinate; as if it were true that he that is justified, either cannot sin any more, or if he do sin, that he ought to promise himself an assured repentance." Rev. Brown would do well to ponder which is more Pauline, "to work out salvation in fear and trembling " (Phil. or with reckless confidence.

With regard to the Priesthood of all Believers, Rev. Brown-makes the point that the phrase does not mean " every man is his own priest," it means " every man is priest to every other man." But to discover the meaning of the word priest . . . " is perhaps the most difficult task we face in this entire book, but it is essential " (p. 95).

He sees that a priest is mediator between God and man, and that a priest offers sacrifice to God. on behalf of men. He also sees that Christ, the great high-priest in whose priesthood all believers share by baptism, is both sacrificer and sacrificed. All of which is Romanist doctrine. But then he concludes with striking originality, quoting T. W. Manson, "we may conclude then that the priesthood of all believers lies in the fact that each believer offers himself . . . and that all these individual offerings are taken up into one perpetual offering made by the one eternal high-priest of the New Covenant." A Protestant priest apparently offers himself then, instead of Christ, a poor substitute. " Christians are to offer themselves to one another ... to sacrifice themselves on behalf of one another . . . so that ... the high-priesthood of Jesus Christ may be more effectually communicated to them all " (p. 97).

In the light of this it is easy to see that Protestant worship will be basically different from Romanist worship, however much the external forms and even words might be retained. The Mass no longer matters, because the sacrifice of Calvary is to be replaced by a trinity, Scripture and sermon and sacrament.

Protestant worship, which Rev. Brown admits is chaotic, is characterized by five things, the offering of prayer, congregational singing, scripture and sermon, the offering of gifts (the collection), and the sacraments. Here for once, Romanist worship appears to be a diluted Protestantism, for we do not today lay stress on the congregational singing, although Rome insists that the congregation take more active part in liturgical worship. This does not mean, however, that there are no Catholic hymns, nor does it

mean as Rev. Brown seems to imply, that there were no Catholic hymns or hymn tunes at the time of the Reformation. Hymnologists know that many beloved Protestant hymns are set to traditional Catholic airs.

" The Bible permeates the whole of Protestant worship. Opening sentences and benediction, hymns and prayers, responses and litanies, all are couched in Biblical language . . . Biblical imagery. At least one portion of Scripture is read aloud, frequently two (Old and New Testament lessons) and sometimes three (Old Testament, Epistle and Gospel)." And later " The conviction that word and sacrament belong together is a basic Protestant conviction. . . . Calvin's Genevan Liturgy, for example . . . the sacrament of the Lord's Supper was intended to be the culminating point of the service. . . . The same intent is apparent in the Episcopal Book of Common Prayer. The central expression of Episcopal worship is the . . . Eucharist, . . . Churches in the Calvinist tradition . . . recognize that the integrity of worship demands frequent . . . celebration of the sacraments, and in Episcopal churches there is increasing emphasis on the Holy Communion as a family service which includes at least a brief sermon " (p. 144). This is certainly diluted Catholicism, and typical of the equivocations to which Protestant principles lead. What they protest in Roman practice, they surreptitiously re-introduce under another n¥IJ.e, as unscriptural as the one they reject. " Priest " " clergy •: they discard; " an ordained minister " replaces it. Prelacy they reject; elders they admit. Mass they reject; communion service they admit. Vestinents are popery; a Geneva gown is evangelical. They deny authority to a Pope. They vest it in a stated Clerk.

When we read "... the impetus for Reformation came from the fact that like Wycliffe, Luther and Calvin read their Bibles •.." (p. 128) we must remember that Thomas Aquinas, Anthony of Padua, Robert Bellarmine read the same Bible. Reading Bibles is not a Protestant invention, as Rev. Brown implies; but reading one's own religious convictions, novel or imperfect they may be, into the Word of God is very much so.

One can detect two pervasive'pattems in the author's thinking. Possibly they are connected. The first is his evolutionism, wedded to the fallacy that all change is for the better. For Rev. Brown, Christ did not found a church; He could not have, because the Church is not. even yet formed. He finds a possible good in the proliferating Protestant sects as each denomination contributes " its own particular gifts tp the *coming great ckurck* " (p. 218). Besides this Hegelian dialectic, he suffers from an epistemological block. He repeatedly laments that we know and assent to words and ideas instead of reality; that words cannot convey what a thing is; it must be felt, experienced. Words are for him the *quod,* not a *quo.* Hence in many words he us to distrust the church, Scripture even, lest they get between us and Christ. Hence his chapter on the study of theology,

which is most appropriately called " loving God with the mind," is as great an inconsistency as writing books for illiterates.

It is in this spirit that we allow Rev. Brown to assess his own work. " These convictions are not my own creation. . . . None of us understands them fully .... All our attempts to express our faith-excepting liturgy and prayer, and perhaps occasionally even then, must include an echo of laughter .... Authentic religious language is not the language of books and arguments but the language of liturgy and prayer .... Protestantism when all is said and done is more adequately represented by its hymns and prayers than by its textbooks ..." (p. x). Having watched for 226 pages, we must concur.

IGNATIUS MCGUINESS, O. P.

Marymount College,
New York, N.Y.

A History of Formal Logic. By I. M. BOCHENSKI and translated by Ivo THOMAS. Published by University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1961. Pp. 567, with indices. $20.00.

Fr. Bochenski's history of formal logic, completed some five years ago in the German language edition of *Formale Logik,* was intended to be the "first comprehensive" history of the problems of formal logic. Aware that a scientific study of logicians and their writings, extending over twenty centuries, was more than one man could effectively accomplish, the author readily admits that his *Formale Logik* really mirrors the collective efforts of very many scholars. To such men and to such schools of scientific research, especially those of the Warsaw and Munster he gives most credit for being able to present and to interpret scientifically about a thousand original texts.

The author begins by defining the centre and scope of formal logic. In so doing he hopes to avoid the mistakes and shortcomings of most historians of formal logic in the past. After pointing out *how* he is going to proceed in the telling of the history of logic, he narrates 'in capsule form its geographical and chronological evolution. He next makes clear *why* he has adopted the methodology employed throughout, because " logic shows no linear continuity of evolution," and " the essential feature of the whole history of logic seems then to he the appearance of different varieties of this science separated both in time and space " (p. 12). He pictures the four distinctive *varieties* of logic (ancient, scholastic, mathematical and Indian) as aspects of the same one reality and suggests that there are at least a half-dozen empirical reasons" for speaking of one logic" {p.14). Despite the " depressions " experienced in each variety of logic, over the years a noticeable and genuine progress has been made. Fr. Bochenski relies greatly on the textual evidence of the logicians themselves. He explains that such a

" documented history " will more perfectly and more scientifically delineate " the history of the *problematic* together with the complex of essential ideas and methods that are closely connected with it " (p. 18). Realizing the handicaps in adopting such a scientific methodology and a non-linear view of logic's evolution, he frankly admits that he is aiming at a type of general orientation in the specific problems, methods and notions characteristic of each of the four varieties of logic. In this way, the author assures the reader that a" general course of the history of logic and its laws" (p. 19) will be presented in the succeeding :five Parts.

His methodology becomes more apparent in Part II. For the Hellenic variety of logic, fathered by Socrates, the author has both respect and praise. Strange as it may seem, it is " the relatively best-known period in the development of formal logic " (p. 27). Beginning with the pre-Aristotelians and some of their more important contributions, Fr. Bochenski credits Zeno with fashioning an axiomatized system of logical inferences and Plato as " the :first to grasp and formulate a clear idea of logic " and " that his thought made possible the emergence of the science with Aristotle " (p. 89).

His extensive treatment of " the :first formal logician," Aristotle, who " was undoubtedly the most fertile logician there has ever been " (p. 27) occupies the major part of the second period of antiquity. His careful exposition of the principal features of Aristotle's systematic logic occupies sixty-five pages. The more salient problems that should prove helpful and interesting to logicians generally and devotees of Aristotelian logic in particblar are the authenticity and temporal sequence of the Peripatetic's treati.Jes on logic. Employing criteria involving the internal evidence of the texts themselves, such as the presence of propositional variables and degree of formal technique, he feels that these knotty problems will be unraveled with " as high degree of probability as is ever possible in the historical sciences " (p. 48). He defends his lengthy study of Aristotelian logic on the groul)ds that " within the short span of Aristotle's life formal logic seems to have made more progress than in any other epoch " (p. 40) •

After a brief treatment of Theophrastus and his contributions to the development of logic, the author takes up the doctrines of the Megarian-Stoic schools. His paramount reason for this is to counter the widespread error " that there was a Stoic, but no Megarian logic " (p. 106). In light of the scientific interpretations of Peirce and Lukasiewicz, Fr. Bochenski charges that it was " Prantl, most of all, who completely mistook the significance of this logic " (p. 108). He concludes that the lack of originality in the third period of antiquity was very evident and that for the most part the more famous logicians, Galen, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry and Boethius, directed their efforts towards the writings of commentaries and manuals.

In Part III the author now interprets and evaluates a new variety of logic developed by the logicians of the Scholastic era. The time prior to Abelard "is not remarkable for any logical novelties" (p. 149). During the creative period, the middle of the 18th century, the essential elements of Scholastic logic took definite shape, giving rise to manuals, of which " the most authoritative " was the *Summulae Logicales* of Peter of Spain. Then, in the twilight of the Middle Ages originality waned and logicians for the most part discussed, subtly and at length, the problems and solutions of the past. Yet, the author admits that this resulted in " an extremely comprehensive logic and semiotic" (p. 149), and praises the works of Ockham and Paul of Venice as most representative of the 14th century. In its serious " endeavor to abstract the laws and rules of a living (Latin) langauge " and yet maintain a respect toward the entire realm of " the semantical and the syntactical functions of signs " was the novelty of Scholastic logic (cf. p. Although semiotic problems become the center of interest and the meta-language became a most popular vehicle of conducting this logic, nevertheless, by its dynamic interest in the problems of propositional logic, modal logic, and semantical antinomies it made tremendous contributions to the growth and history of formal logic.

To this reviewer Part IV is too short. In his condemnation of " classical logic," begun in and typical of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, the author seems to be somewhat severe. Suspicious of anything associated with formal logic and disdaining everything medieval " as sheer barbarism " (p. , the intelligentsia of that period almost jettisoned logic as worthless. But, if Vittoria and Cajetan and John of St. Thomas did carry on "deep and original investigations " (p. of logical problems, then, it seems to this reviewer, they should have been given more documentary consideration. He terminates this " transitional period " with an informative treatment of Leibniz who made some excellent advances in the interpretation of the Aristotelian syllogistic and is recognized historically as " the founder of mathematical logic" (p. This last is the subject of Part V.

Here the author is probably at his best in explaining elemental factors of the mathematical variety of logic and its phenomenal growth up to the *Principia.* After praising Boole, De Morgan, Peirce and others for their contributions to the evolution and perfection of this type of logic, he is most grateful to Gottlob Frege for his insights on logical problems and techniques and compares his *Begrijfsschrift* to Aristotle's *Prior Analytics.* However, the author points out that not a few of the "discoveries" of logical entities since medieval times are really "re-discoveries": e. g. supposition and the antinomies. Here, too, he strives to avoid excesses in the use of symbols, but many non-symbolic logicians will find difficulty. Because of the healthy state of research in this type of logic, Fr. Bochenski's textual evidence throughout this section is numerous and varied.

For many Part VI will be quite interesting for its panoramic view of Indian logic. Yet the author admits quite readily that his study is incomplete and based mostly on translations of varied reliability. This variety of logic sprang from discussion by Buddhist, Brahaminst and Jinist logicians. It formally began with the editing of the *Nyay(;8'Utra* in the Second century, A. D. Though this constitutes the W,9&mental text for the whole of Indian logic, there have been many other Commentaries and texts. He claims Dignaga is the greatest Indian logician, but also praises the efforts of Vasubandhu, Dharmakirti and Gangesa. After showing that Indian logicians were not unaware of propositional logic and that their tendency to employ examples as premises in syllogistic argumentation was quite unique in the history of logic, he closes with the observation that " once more then it can be said that we meet here an original and interesting variety of genuine formal logic " (p. 447)•

Unquestionably this excellent work is a " must " for every library and for all those who are occupied with logic and its contiguous sciences. Its 75 pages of bibliography and 81 pages of indices of proper names, logical symbols, mnemonics and subject matter are noteworthy accomplishments in themselves.

Fr. Thomas offers a very satisfactory translation. It is seldom difficult to read even though at times it must subordinate literary excellence to the exactness of logical meaning and the literal sense of terms. English speaking philosophers must be grateful to author and translator for so necessary and so rewarding an accomplishment.

DENNIS C. KANE, 0. P.

Providence College,
Providence, R.I.

BRIEF NOTICES

Introducing Tke Old Teatament. By FREDERicK L. MoRIARTY, S. J. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. xi, *268.* $4.20.

Recent biblical research has cast new light upon Old Testament life and literature. This book, incorporating modem Old Testament scholarship, attempts to introduce its results to the educated non-specialist.

Father Moriarty has chosen to present the history of the Old Testament in terms of its great, heroic figures: Abraham, Moses, Joshua, Saul, David, Elijah; Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezechiel, Second Isaiah, Nehemiah, Job, Qoheleth, .and Daniel. The result is a highly dramatic account of the great events and personalities of the ancient Israelites.

Father Moriarty must of necessity make a choice of solutions so far proposed. His choice is generally a happy one: modem but never extreme. The following points in the first study "Abraham Our Father," are of interest in themselves and also indicate the tenor of the whole work: (1) due to the work of the archeologists and linguists, the period known as the Patriarchal :Age can no longer be treated " with a generous dose of scepticism"; (2) there cannot be the slightest doubt that our present biblical text of Genesis is the result of a long process, beginning with orally transmitted material; (8) the he}>rew historian does not retell the past for its own sake but for the very practical purpose of instructing, edifying, and inviting men to see God's hand in their history; (4) the contents of our Pentateuch are, in general, very much older than the date at which they were finally edited (i. e., sometime after the Exile in the sixth century B. C.); (6) it is extremely important to distinguish carefully between the age of the biblical material incorporated into a work and the date of the incorporation itself, for failure to appreciate this distinction can give rise to misunderstandings which are entirely unnecessary. Some of these points exert considerable·influence on the remaining studies of this work.

Almost any serious student of the Old Testament will profit from the careful .study of this book. We are indebted to Fr. Moriarty for giving us a modem and well written introduction to the Old Testament.

THoMAS AQUINAS CoLLINS, 0. P.

Providence College,
Providence, R.I.

What Is Philosophy? By DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1960. Pp. viii + 242. $4.25.

What Is Philosophy? By JosE ORTEGA Y GAsSET. Translated from the Spanish by Mildred Adams. New York: W. W. Norton,1960. Pp. 252. $4.50.

What is philosophy? In simplest terms, it is metaphysics, mathematics, logic and the natural, moral and social sciences-all according to the mind, method and principles of St. Thomas Aquinas. This is, of course, a rather rigid and narrow view. A broader view would bring Descartes, Kant, etc., into the world of philosophy, and a still wider view would extend the notion to include the hazy world view of the common phrase, " a philosophical outlook." These distinctions and all the possible variations of them must be kept in mind if we are to attempt any sort of evaluation of the two works here being briefly noted, since both have the ambitious title, *What Is Philosophy?*

Von Hildebrand's book has a curiously ambiguous character. The introduction is belligerently polemical (against those "betrayers of philosophy," the logical positivists), while the rest of the work contains a straightforward, unemotional exposition of von Hildebrand's personal brand of phenomenology.

This type of phenomenology is openly proclaimed by von Hildebrand as a philosophical novelty. While for him it was " at the basis of every great philosophical discovery" of the past, it is yet "new, and even revolutionary " because all " former philosophers used this arch-method of philosophy only occasionally and always unsystematically" (p.

Ortega y Gassett also preaches a new philosophy, or rather, a novel philosophy. For the work of this Spanish writer of extremely vigorous prose (who died in 1955) has been known in this country for some thirty years. His best known work is undoubtedly *The Revolt of the Masses,* published in English in 1942.

In the present work the more theoretical aspects of his philosophy are developed, but the main lines of his thought are more or less the same. We find here at least a trace of anti-clericalism ("in the way of priests everywhere, Japanese priests curse all that is earthly ...," p. There is some arrogance toward idealism, which Ortega admires but claims to be transcending ("We go beyond idealism ...," p. 179), and even more toward Greek and medieval philosophy ("Ancient realism ... is philosophic ingenuousness," p. 177). But the main theme is an elaboration of Ortega's own "new" philosophy, which can perhaps be best described as an existentialism of " life," by which he means human life lived to the full.

Even though Ortega's *What Is Philosophy?* must appear, to the Thomistic

eye, as philosophically negligible, the book can be recommended (for Catholics, with permission) as an exercise in amazingly vigorous W!jting. Ortega can express himself with real power, and it is easy to see how he managed to gain an ascendancy over the minds of his Spanish speaking audiences. Von Hildebrand's book is more substantial. It presents a refutation of barren " analysis " that is cogent and sometimes eloquent, even in those parts of the work that are purely expository. Yet it too suffers from imperfections. The most notable (aside from basic disagreements with phenomenology itself) is a constant usage of neologisms (" the how-it-is," "the such-being," "knowledge-thematicity and object-thematicity," and many others) that may well confuse the reader. Nevertheless, beneath this layer of difficult phraseology, one often suspects meanings that are not too far from the realism of the traditional *philosophia perennis.*

PAUL R. DURBIN, O.P.

Dominican Ho'lUJe of Studies,
WMhington, D. C.

General Ethics. By KENNETH F. DouGHERTY, S. A. Peekskill, N.Y.: Graymoor Press, 1959. Pp. 188, with index. $8.00.

To his *Logic* and his *Cosmology,* Fr. Dougherty now adds *General Ethics* in his Collegiate Philosophy Series. The author's aim is to give a Thomistic presentation of the basic principles of moral life based on the threefold division of End (called " Human Destiny " in the book), Means (" Human Conduct ") and Law. In many respects, Fr. Dougherty achieves a straightforward exposition of the important points in ethics. He distinguishes ethics from moral theology even though ethics can give only a partial view of morality; rather curiously, he maintains that " ethics *demonstrates* its own proper principles as a philosophical science" (italics added). However, on the question of man's ultimate end, Fr. Dougherty follows a theological approach and order rather than a philosophical one, relying on St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* to prove that God is man's final end. Actually, as far as an ultimate terrestrial end of man is concerned (which ethics, as distinct from moral theology, treats and which Fr.. Dougherty presumably wishes to observe) St. Thomas does not depart from Aristotle's understanding of such an end; natural happiness is not realized simply and concretely in the natural contemplation and love of God, although this knowledge and love enter into the constitutives of natural happiness. Given the practical character of the science, its primarily compositive mode of procedure, and the frequent reminders both Aristotle and St. Thomas make with regard to the tentative character of so much of ethical knowledge, the tendency to a didactic manner of writing and the occasional use of the

thesis method with proof of major and minor hardly seem to be the appropriate way to develop ethics. On the other hand, Fr. Dougherty's references to modem authors and problems help to make the study of ethics pertinent and lively. Within the confines of a relatively brief treatise, he covers the main topics of a standard course in ethics clearly and determinately. The questions at the end of each chapter are also helpful for reviewing the material.

Man and Morals. By D. J. **B.** HAwKINs. London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960. Pp. 108. $8.00.

Father Hawkins' book might well be described as a series of informal essays on some of the major topics in the ·field of ethics. His somewhat easy manner of exposition in no way precludes sound and penetrating observations and reflections; indeed, his pleasant manner permits both a fresh and forceful exposition. The chief attraction of this little book is that it graciously leads any attentive reader, even a one, to reflect on the nature of moral experience, the problems of free will, the relation of morality to intelligence and, finally, to see what Fr. Hawkins is most concerned to nudge his reader into recognizing, a " view beyond morality " in which moral relations are grasped as simply working out the loving relationship between God and creature. It is a sympathetic contribution toward recognizing, on the one hand, the respect which a natural morality should command and, on the other hand, the necessary completion it must have in the order of grace. Fr. Hawkins, philosophical grasp does not always measure up to his style of writing. In his chapter on " Soul and Body," he thinks Aristotle's arrival at the "undifferentiated substratum" came by way of an easy inference from the " science of his day," i. e., from the four elements manifesting characteristic pairs of contrary qualities which, transmuted one into the other, demanded such a substratum of change. Fr. Hawkins adds: " This line of argument is no longer open to us." It wasn't to Aristotle either, for the four elements and their pairs of contrary qualities of hot and cold, dry and wet, are entirely apart from the investigation and analysis which led Aristotle to a prime matter-not only apart from, but even irrelevant to what Aristotle sought, when in Book I of the *PkysiC8* by analogy he was arguing to the necessity of an ultimate underlying subject of motion. Apart from matters such as these, Fr. Hawkins succeeds admirably in showing how a study of morality " retains its value both because it yields truth on its own level and because without it we could not understand what is needed in order to go beyond it."

Problems of Etkics. A Book of Readings. Edited by Robert E. Dewey, Francis W. Gramlich, and Donald Loftsgordon. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961. Pp. 488. $6.00.

This book of readings has a number of desirable features. First, and perhaps most important, constructed topically rather than chronologically, it permits a problematic and, especially for ethics, a more interesting approach. Secondly, the original writings of philosophers rather than secondary texts are usually chosen. Thirdly, the editors have restricted themselves to brief helpful introductions. Fourthly, every major philosophical position, with one exception, has an added selection which is critical of that position. Some other features are perhaps not so desirable. The division suffers from some lack of comprehensiveness and adequacy. The first section on the preliminary problems (divided into Psychological Egoism, Cultural Relativism, and Freedom vs. Determinism) is least interesting; most of the authors selected are not commanding or representative enough. The second section on The Search for a Moral Staiidard is too diffuse and is uneven with respect to quality of choice of sources; the brief excerpt from Cardinal Mercier's *Manual of a Scholastic Pkilosopky,* for example, is hardly sufficient as representing the position, from a Catholic viewpoint, of the authority of God as a moral standard. Further, the inclusion of Aristotle in this section under " Self-realization " is ambiguous, to say the least, and the excerpts chosen from the *Nicomackean Ethics* not altogether the most relevant for discussing a moral standard. However, the last major section, The Analytic Approach to Ethics, is particularly well done. It is divided into Intuitionism, The Emotive Theory, and The" Good Reasons " Approach. Each of these positions is well represented and so well arranged that not only does one major part within this section lead to the next, but frequently one author within a part leads to another. The last part, The " Good Reasons " Approach is the one section to which no critical selection has been added, but this omission does not detract from its value. Indeed, the view put forth in this section by Hampshire and Toulmin is especially interesting by way of seeing a return to ethics as a normative science based on reason in its practical dimension derived appropriately, though hardly exclusively, from Aristotle's practical syllogism. It is this third section which gives the book special value, a value which this reviewer has had occasion to verify in class use.

JoHN A. OESTERLE

University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Ammonius. (Verberke, G., Ed;). *Com,mentaire Sur Le Peri Hermeneias d'.Aristote.* Louvain: Editions Neuwelaerts, 1961. Pp. 516. $6.00.

Armstrong, D. M. *Perception and The Pkysical World.* New York: Humanities Press, 1961. Pp. 196, with index. *$5.00.*

Armstrong, W. H. *87 Ways to Help Your Ckild In Sckool.* Barron's Educational Service, 1961. Pp. 214 with index. $1.95.

Averroes'. (Zedler, Beatrice H., Ed.). *Destructio Destructionum Pkilosopkiae .Algazelis.* Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961. Pp. 496 with index. $8.50.

Bahm, Archie J. *Types of Intuition (Social Sciences and Pkilosoplvy Number 3).* Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1960. Pp. 58. $1.25.

Barth, Karl. *.Anselm:Fides QurerensIntellectum (Faitk in Searck of Understanding.* Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1961. Pp. 178 with index. $8.00.

Baumgardt, David. *Cheat Western Mystics: Their Lasting Significance.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 284 with index. $4.50.

Bausola, Adriano. *L'Etica di Jokn Dewey (Serie Terza, Scienze Filosofiche -Vol. II) Universita Cartolica del Sacro Cuore, 1960.* Milan, Italy: Societa Editrice Vita e Pensiero, 1960.

Bender, 0. P., Ludovicus. *Forma Iuridica Celebrationis Matrimonii: Commentarius in Canones 1094-1099.* Rome, Italy: Desclee & Co. Pp. 844 with index.

Bettoni, 0. F. M., Ph. D., Efrem (Bernardine Bonansea, 0. F. M., Ph. D.) *Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of kis Pkilosopky.* Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press. Pp. 220 with index. $4.75.

Blass, F. and DeBrunner, A. (Trans. R. Funk). *.A Greek Grammar Of Tke New Testament and Otker Early Christian Literature.* Chicago, Dlinois: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Pp. *825* with index. $10.00.

Bochenski, I. M. (Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner, Trs.) *Contemporary European Philosophy.* Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. 844. $1.75.

Bocheilski, I. M. (lvo Thomas, Trans. and Ed.). *.A History of Formal Logic.* Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. Pp. 589. $20.00.

Bose, Jean; Guitton, Jean; Danielou, Jean (Olsen, Robert J., Tr.). *The Catholic Protestant Dialogue.* Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. 147. $3.50.

Bouyer, L. *The Word, Church and Sacraments.* New York: Desclee Co. Pp. 80. $2.00.

Brant!, G. *Catholicism.* New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1961. Pp. *256* with index. $4.00.

Bredvold, Louis 1., and Ross, Ralph G. (Eds.). *The Philosophy of Edmund Burke: A selection from his Speeches and Writings.* Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1960. Pp. 284. *$5.95.*

Bresnahan, 0. S. A., J. E. *The One True God.* Villanova: Onterio, 1961.

Brillet, C. Or., Gaston (Jane Wynne Saul, R. S.C. J., Trans.). *Meditations in the Old Testament.* New York: Desclee Co., 1961. Pp. 274. $3.75.

Brown, Robert McAfee. *The Spirit of Protestantism.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 284 with index. $4.50.

Butler, 0. S. B., Christopher. *The Church and The Bible.* Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. 111. $2.95.

Butler, 0. P., Richard. *Religious Vocation: An Unnecessary Mystery.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961. Pp. 180. $4.00.

Callahan, S. J., D. (and others). *Christianity Divided.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 335. $6.00.

Calvez, S. J., J. Y and Perrin, S. J., J. *The Church and Social Justice.* Chicago: Henry Regenery, 1961. Pp. 441 with index. $7.50.

Caraman, S.J., P. and Walsh, S.J., J. (Ed.). *The Fulton Sheen Sunday Missal.* New York: Hawthorn Book, Inc., 1961. Pp. 630. $7.50.

Carol, 0. F. M., J. B. (Ed.). *Mariology Vol. III.* Milwaukee: Bruce, 1961. Pp. 456 with index. $9.50.

Carre, 0. P., A. M. *The Everlasting Priest.* New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1961. Pp. 132. *$3.50.*

Chauvin, Remy. *God of the Scientist, God of the Experiment.* Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. 159. *$3.95.*

Chisholm, R. M. (Ed.). *Realism and the Background to Phenomenology.* Glencoe, lllinois: Free Press, 1961. Pp. 308 with index. $6.00.

Colledge, Eric (Ed. and Introduction). *The Mediaeval Mystics of England.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961. Pp. 304. $4.95.

Collingwood, F. *Philosophy of Nature.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1961. Pp. *306* with index. $4.50.

Collins, J. *Philosophical Readings in Card. Newman.* Chicago: H. Regnery, 1961. Pp. 436 with index. $7.50.

Congar, Yves, 0. P. (Donald Attwater, Tr.). *Laity, Church and World.* Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. 94. $2.50.

Conway, C. S. P. *Catholic Catechism 2.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1961. Pp. 96 with app. $.75.

Copi, Irving M. *Introduction to Logic (Second Edition).* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961. Pp. 525 with index. *$5.25.*

Daniel-Rops, H. *Monaieur Vincent.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 141. *$8.95.*

Danielou, Jean. *Ckrist and Us.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 286. *$8.95.*

Davis, Charles. *Liturgy and Doctrine.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960. Pp. 128. $2.50.

Dawson, Christopher. *Tke Crisis of Weatem Education.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 252. *$8.95.*

Day, Jn. P. *Inductive Probability.* New York: Humanities Press, 1961. Pp. 886 with index. $8.00.

de Gaultier, J. *From Kant to Nietzscke.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1961. Pp. 290 with index. $4.75.

de Grandmaison, Leonce. *Jesus Ckrist.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 281. $4.50.

Descalzo, Jose Luis Martin (Rita Goldberg, Tr.). *A Priest Confesses.* Fresno, California: Academy Library Guild, 1961. Pp. 218. *$8.95.*

de Vinck, Jose (trs.). *Tke Works of Bonaventure, I, Mystical Opuscula.* Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1960. Pp. 278. $6.00.

Duffey, C. S.C., Felix D. *Witk Anxio'UB Care.* St. Louis: R Herder Book Co., 1961. Pp. 184 with index. $2.75.

Dewey, Robert E., Gramlich, Francis W., Loftsgordon, Donald (Ed. by). *Problems of Etkics.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961. Pp. 492. $6.00.

Eisenhofer, Ludwig Lechner, Joseph. *Tke Liturgy of tke Roman Rite.* New York: Herder and Herder, Inc., 1961. Pp. 522. $8.50.

Eliade, M. *Images and Symbols.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 189 with index. $8.50.

Eskow, Seymour. *Barron's Guide to tke Two-Year CoUeges.* Great Neck, New York: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1960. Pp. 870. $2.98.

Fabro, C. P. *Participation et Ca'UBalite.* Louvain, Bel.: :Editions Nauwelaerts, 1961. Pp. 670. $8.90.

——. *Partecipazione e Ca'UBaliea.* Intemazionale: Societa Editrice. Pp. 698. $20.00.

Fandal, O. P., Damian C. *Tke Essence of tke Euckaristic Sacrifice.* River Forest, lllinois: The Aquinas Library, 1960. Pp. 126. $2.50.

Fanfani, O. P., J. C. D., Louis and O'Rourke, O. P., J. C. D., Kevin D. *Canon Law For Religio'UB Women.* Dubuque, Iowa: Priory Press, 1961. Pp. 898 with index. $4.95.

Flood, J. M. (Ed.). *Tke Mind and Heart of Aug'UBtine.* Fresno, California: Academy Library Guild, 1961. Pp. 106. *$2.45.*

Forestell, C. S. B., J. Terence (Commentary by) . *The Book of Proverbs.* New York, New York: Paulist Press, 1960. Pp. 96. $.75.

Fothergill, P. G. *Evolution and Chriatiana.* London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1961. Pp. *895* with index. *$9.50.*

Gardiner, S. J., Harold C., and Getlein, Frank. *Movies, Morals and Arl.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 186. *$8.50.*

Gargan, Edward (Ed.). *Leo XIII and the Modern World.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 246. $4.50.

George, Charles H., and George, Katherine. *The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation 1570-1640.* Princeton, New Jersey. Pp. 462 with index. $8.50.

Gerbert (tattin, H. P., Trans.). *The Letters of Gerberl.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. 412. $7.50.

Gilbert, N. W. *Rennaisance Concepts of Metkod.* New Y'Ork: Columbia Press, $6.00.

Gilson, Etienne. *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961. Pp. 114 with Indsx. $1.25.

Glanzman, S. J., G. S., and Fitzmeyer, S. J., J. A. *An Introductory Bibliography For The Study of Scripture.* Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1961. Pp. 185 with index. $1.50.

Gleason, S. J., R. W. *To Live is Chriat: Nature and Grace in the Religious Life.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 191. $8.00.

Goldbrunner, Josef. *Teaching the Catholic Catechism with the Religion Workbook, Vol. Ill.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1960. Pp. 122. *$1.65.*

——. *Teaching The Sacramenta.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1960. Pp. 141. $1.75.

Guardini, Romano (John Murray, J., Trans.). *Freedom, Grace, and Destiny.* New York: Pantheon, 1961. Pp. 251. $4.00.

—— (Elinor C. Briefs, Trans.). *Power and Responsibility: A Course of Action for the New Age.* Chicago: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1961. Pp. 887 with index. $7.00.

Guillet, S. J., J. *Themes Of The Bible.* Chicago: Fides Publisher, 1961. Pp. 279. *$6.95.*

Guitton, Jean. *The Church and The Gospel.* Chicago: Henry Regenery, 1961. Pp. 286 with index. *$6.50•*

.Grant, R. *Gnosticism.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961. Pp. 254. *$5.00.*

Hamlyn, D. W. *Sensation and Perception.* New York: Humanities Press, 1961. Pp. 210 with index. *$5.00.*

Hii.ring, Bernard, C. SS. R. (Edwin C. Kaiser, C. PP. S., S. T. D., Trans.). *The Law of Chriat, Vol. I: General Moral Theology.* "Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1961. Pp. 646. $8.50.

Hawkins, D. J. B. *Man and Morals.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 111. $8.00.

Hill, Johnson D. and Stuermann, W. E. *Philosophy And The American Heritage.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1961. Pp. 254. *$8.50.*

Hofinger, S.J.J. and Howell, S.J., J. *Teaching All Nations.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1961. Pp. 421 with index. *$6.95.*

Hopper, Vincent F., and Gale, Cedric. *Essentials of Effective Writing.* Great Neck, New York: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1961. Pp. 208 with index. $1.50.

———. *Practice for Effective Writing.* Great Neck, New York: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1961. Pp. 160. $1.50.

Haunt, Ernest. *Le Peche Contre la Chair.* Paris: Beauchesne et Ses Fils. Pp. 124. $9.90.

Huesman, S.J., Ju. E. *The Book of Isaia, Part I & II.* New York: Paulist Press, 1961. $.75.

Hutchins, Robert and Adler, M. *The Great Ideas Today.* Encyclopedia Brittanica Inc., 1961. Pp. *562.* $8.95.

Johnston, Leonard. *Witnesses to God.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 185. *$8.50.*

Kingston, F. Temple. *French Existentialism: A Christian Critique.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961. Pp. 286. *$5.50.*

Klausner, N. W. and Kuntz, P. G. *Philosophy, The Study of Alternate Beliefs.* New York: Macmlilan, 1961. Pp. 674 with index. $6.75.

Kovauch, F. J. Die *A.sthetik des Thomas Von Aquin.* Berlin: W. De Gruyter & Co., 1961. Pp. 279 with index.

LaFont, 0. S. B., G. *Structures et Methode Dans La Somme Theologique deS. Thomas d'Aquin.* Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer, 1961. Pp. 494 with index. $8.90.

Lauver, R. Z. *The Mind of Voltaire.* Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1961. Pp. *155* with index. *$8.50.*

Leclerg, J. *Christians in the World.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 174. *$8.50.*

Lefebvre, Dom Georges. *The Well-Springs of Prayer.* New York: Desclee Co., Inc., 1961. Pp. 79. $1.75.

Lestapis, deS. *Family Planning and Modern Problems.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1961. Pp. 826 with index. *$6.50.*

Levasseur, J-M. *Le Lieu Theologique histoire.* Editions Du Bien Public, Trois Rivieres, 1961. Pp. 282. $4.00.

Lillie, Wm. *An Introduction To Ethics.* New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1961. Pp. 842. *$1.25.*

Luijpen, 0. S. A., Wm. *Existential Phenomenology.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1961. Pp. 875 with index. $6.75.

MacNutt, 0. P., Sylvester F. *Gauging Sermon Effectiveness.* Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1960. Pp. 154. $1.95.

Macquarrie, J. *The Scope of Demythologizing.* New York: Harper. 1961.

Maiano, Vincenzo. *Problematicismo e Educazione.* Istituto Superiore di Pedagogia, 1960, Rome, Italy. Pp.

Makrr, 0. P. (Mary L. Trans.). *The Hsiao Ching.* Jamaica, New York: St. John's University Press, 1961. Pp. 67. $8.50.

Marc, S. J., Andre. *Raison et Conversion Chretienne.* Bruges, Belgique: Desclee de Bouwer, 1961. Pp. 806.

Maritain, J. *On The Use of Philosophy.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 71.

Masi, Robert. *Cosmologia.* New York: Desclee & Co., 1961. Pp. with index.

Masterson, 0. P. (Ed.) . *Theology in The Catholic College.* Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1961. Pp. 84. $8.95.

Mcinerney, R. *The Logic of .Analogy.* Martinus Nijhoff The Hague. Pp. 184 with index. $15.65.

Menne, 0. C. S. 0., Raymond. *The Theory of Personality of Carl Rogers.* Rome: Angelicum. Pp. 67.

Miller, B. *The Range of Intellect.* London: G. Chapman, Ltd., 1960. Pp. with index.

Murray, 0. C. S. 0., M. P. *The Concepts of Self-Acceptance and Self-Respect in Karen Horney's Theory of Neurosis.* Rome: Angelicum. Pp. with index.

O'Connor, C. S.C., Edward D. *Faith in the Sy1Wptic Gospels.* Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. Pp. 184 with index. $4.00.

Ortega Y Gasset, Jose (Mildred Adams, Tr.). *Wkat is Philosophy?* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1960. Pp. $4.50.

Pepper, Stephen C. *World Hypotheses.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. 861. $1.95.

Pflirtwer, S. *Luther und Thomas im Gespriich.* Heidelberg: F. H. Kerles. Pp. 188. $8.80.

Pinsk, J. *Toward the Center of Christian Living.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1961. Pp. $4.50.

Pius XII. Teen-Age Purity. New Rochelle, New York: Salesiana Publishers, 1961. Pp.

Poole, Reginald L. *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning (Second Edition, Revised).* New York: Dover Publications, 1961. Pp. 886. $1.85.

Proceedings Fifteenth Annual Convention of Tke Catholic Theological Society of .America, June 20-23, 1960. Washington, D. C., The Catholic Theological Society of America, 1961. Pp. with index.

Rabut, O.P., Olivier. *Teilkard De Ckardin.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 24'7. $8.95.

Ragusa, I. and Green, Rosalie (trs.). *Meditations on the Life of Ckrist.* Princeton University Press. Pp. 465 with index. $15.00.

Rahner, S.J., H. *Our Lady and The Ckurck.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1961. Pp. 181 with index. $8.50.

Rahner, S.J., Karl (C. Ernest, 0. P., Trans.). *Theological InvestigationB.* Batlimore: Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. 882. $10.95.

Ramirez, 0. P., Santiago. *La Esencia de la Eaperanza Cristiana.* Madrid, Spain: Ediciones Punta Europa, 1960. Pp. 852 with index.

Ramsey, Ian. (Ed.). *Prospect for Metapkyaics.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1961. Pp. 240. $6.00.

Raymond of Capua, Blessed (George Lamb, Tr.). *The Life of St. Catherine of Siena.* New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1960. Pp. 884. $4.95.

Rossi, C. M., G. F. *La Filosofia del CoUegio Alberoni E Il Neotomiamo.*

Sattler, C. SS. R., Henry V. (Ed.). *Togetker m Ckrist, a Preparation for Marriage.* Washington, D. C.: Family Life Bureau, 1960. Pp. 804. $8.50.

——. *Togetker m Ckrist Teacking Manual.* Washington, D. C.: Family Life Bureau, 1960. Pp. $.75.

Scanlan, S.M. A., Kevin. *Ordination and the Canonical Statua of Clerics m Societies witkout Vows.* Rome, Italy: Angelicum, 1960. Pp. 178.

Schlier, H. *Principalities and Powers in the New Testament.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1961. Pp. 89.

Schoeck, H. and Others (Ed.). *Relativism and The Study of Man.* Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1961. Pp. *259* with index. *$6.50.*

Sheerin, C. S. P., John B. *The Sacrament of Freedom.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1961. Pp. 178 with index. $8.50.

Shrady, M. L. (Ed.). *In the Spirit of Wonder.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1961. Pp. 147. $4.50.

Siegman, C. P. P. S. (Ed. Comment.). *Book of Ezechiel.* New York: Paulist Press, 1961. Pp. 94. *$.50.*

Simmons (Ed.). *Tke Scientific Art of Logic.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co. Pp. 881 with index. $4.80.

Singer, M.G. *Generalization in Ethics.* New York: Alfred A. Knopt, 1961. Pp. 851 with index. No price.

Smith, S. J., Gerard and Kendzierski, Lottie H. *The Pkilosopky of Being: Metapkyaica* I. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961. Pp. 425 with nidex. *$5.75.*

Smith and Jamison (Eds.). *Religion in American Life.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

Vol. 1: *The Shaping of American Religion.* Pp. 514. $8.50.

Vol. II: *Religioua Perspectives in American Culture.* Pp. 427. $7.50.

Vol. IV: *A Critical Bibliography of Religion in America* (2 volumes). Pp. 1219. $17.60.

Smith, V. E. (Ed.). *Tke Philosophy of Science.* Brooklyn: St. John's University Press. Pp. 82 with index.

Stebbing, L. S. *A Modern Elementary Logic.* New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961. Pp. 214. *$1.26.*

Stein, Edith. *Die Frau. Ihre Aufgabe nach Natur und Gnade.* Louvain, Belgique: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1959. Pp. $1.50. *$5.96.*

St. John-Stevas, Norman. *Life, Death and tke Law.* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1961. Pp. 876 with index. *$6.96.*

Stuhlmueller, C. P., Carroll (Commentary by). *Tke Book of .LevitiC'U8.* New York: Paulist Press, 1960. Pp. 96. $.50.

Synave, P. and Benoit, P. *Prophecy and Inspiration.* New York: Desclee Co., 1961. Pp. 186. $8.76.

Tavard, George H. (Royce W. Huges, Tr.). *Two Centuries of Ecumeniam.* Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers Association, 1961. Pp. 250. $4.96.

Taylor, A. E. *Elements of Metaphyaica.* New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961. Pp. 419. $1.96.

Taylor, Jerome. *The Didaacalicon of Hugh of St. Victor.* New York: Columbia University, 1961. Pp. 254 with index. $6.00.

Thomas S. Aquinas (J. P. Rowan, Trans.). *Commentary on tke Metaphyaica of Aristotle (2 Volumes).* Chicago: H. Regnery Co. (set) $25.00.

Tillich, Paul. *The Shaking of tke Foundations.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. Pp; 186. $1.25.

Tonquedec, S. J., Jos. *La Critique de la Connaiaance.* Pp. 666 with index.

The New English Bible: New Testament. New York: Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press, 1961. Pp. 460. $4.96.

Vann, O. P., Gerald. *Tke Eagle's Word.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961. Pp. 247. $4.60.

Van Noort, Mgsr. G. (Translated and Revised by J. J. Castelot and W. R. Murphy). *Dogmatic Theology Vol. Ill.* Westminster, Maryland: Newman, 1961. Pp. 420 with index. $7.60.

Van Steenberghen, F. *Dieu Cache, Essaia philoloaphiques 8.* Louvain, Editions Nauwelaerts, 1961. Pp. 871.

Van Zeller, O. S. B., Hubert. *Approach to Calvary.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 128. $2.96.

Vawter, C.M., B. *Tke Conscience of Israel.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 808 with index. $5.00.

Von Balthasar, H. U. *Prayer.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 246. $5.00.

Von Leyden, W. *Remembering.* New York: Philosophical LibraJ:y, 1961. Pp. 128 with index. $4.75.

Ward, C. S.C., Leo. *God and World Order.* St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 961. Pp. 222 with index. $4.00.

Watkin, E. I. *The Church in Council.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 227 with index. *$8.95.*

Weigel, S. J., Gustave. *Catholic Theology in Dialogue.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961. Pp. 126. $2.75.

White, 0. P., Victor. *God and the Unconscious.* New York: Meridian Books, 1961. Pp. 287 with index. $1.85.

Wilkin, S.J., V. *From Limbo to Heaven.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 145. *$8.50.*

Will, Garry. *Chesterton Man & Mask.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 252 with index. $4.50.

Wu, John {Trans.). *Tao Teh Ching.* Jamaica, New York: St. John's Univedsity Press, 1961. Pp. 118 with index.