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HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD?

THE QUESTION of the pleasurable good presents two levels of difficulty. One is the level of understanding. What do we mean by the pleasurable good-the *bonum delectabile?* After analyzing this notion, and noting that the expression *bonum delectabile* has more than one meaning, we can, at this level, suggest an answer to how good the pleasurable good is. The second level of difficulty concerns more the practical problem of the role of pleasure in moral life. To what extent, or how, can we seek a pleasurable good as an object of desire? We shall be concerned primarily with the first level of difficulty, but in the light of what we can show about the nature of the pleasurable good, we can also discuss in a general way the role pleasure can play in moral life.

It is hardly necessary to dwell on the occasion for discussing pleasure in relation to human life. It is enough to suggest that pleasure is frequently misunderstood, both as to what it is and what part it can play. The hedonist approach offers one solution-pleasure above everything else is to be sought at all

times; moral life consists in gratifying our pleasure-seeking instincts. There is, of course, the opposite extreme: pleasure is somehow not a real good unless it can be related to some intrinsic good; it is basically only instrumental in character and hence not something to be sought in any way in and of itself. It is difficult not to gravitate toward one of these extreme positions. The task is to see if there is truly a mean position which will establish just how good the pleasurable good is-that it may not be as good as some think, but on the other hand that it is, after all, a good.

Let us consider first how Aristotle introduces and develops the notion along with some observations St. Thomas has to make. In Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* after considering the purpose of moral philosophy, Aristotle seeks an answer to the most important question of practical knowledge: What is the ultimate good or end for man? "Verbally there is wide agreement; for both the general run of men and people say that it is happiness, and they identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is, they differ. . . . "[1] Note that there is general agreement, not only in the name "happiness,"[2] but also in identifying living well and doing well with being happy. This identification of happiness with activity of some kind is necessary for understanding the problem we are investigating, for, as we shall see, pleasure implies activity or operation.

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics* I, 4 (1095a 16-20).

[2] The translation of *eillia.tp.ovla.* as " happiness " is objected to by Sir David Ross in the following terms: " The conventional translation ' happiness ' is unsuitable in the *Ethics;* for whereas ' happiness ' means a state of feeling, differing from 'pleasure' only by its suggestion of performance, depth, and serenity, Aristotle insists that *eillia.tp.ovLa.* is a kind of activity; that it is not any kind of pleasure, though pleasure naturally accompanies it. The more non-committal translation 'well-being' is therefore better." *(Aristotle,* Meridian Books, Inc., New York, 1959, p. 186.) However, the very ambiguity of the word " happiness," signifying indeterminately " a state of well-being," is particularly appropriate, for at the outset everyone can agree that we seek something like this, familiarly known as " happiness," leaving open the question in what it determinately consists. The whole of moral philosophy will then be devoted principally to giving, so far as possible, a resolution to this basic question.

Following his usual procedure, Aristotle begins to inquire into the various opinions on happiness. Significantly enough, the first one he reports identifies happiness with pleasure. Having noted that this view is "not without some ground," Aristotle proceeds to distinguish three principal kinds of life: the life of pleasure, the political life, and the contemplative. In commenting on Aristotle at this point St. Thomas says, with respect to these three principal kinds of life, *"Et has dicit [Aristoteles]maxime excellentes."* [3] St. Thomas goes on to explain this point by saying that whatever one is most influenced by so he reputes his life to be; now, one is influenced most by what one deems *to* be a supreme good; and thus lives are distinguished by a diversity of what is taken, at least implicitly, as an ultimate end. In this context St. Thomas, after pointing out that the end has the nature of good, divides the good into three kinds: *bonum utile* (the useful good), *bonum delectabile* (the pleasurable good) and *bonum honestum* (the honorable or noble good). St. Thomas then adds: "Two of these, namely the *bonum delectabile* and the *bonum honestum* have the nature of an end, because each is desirable for itself." [4] The significant point here is that St. Thomas speaks of the *bonum delectabile,* and not only the *bonum lwnestum,* as "desirable for itself," opposing them both to the *bonum utile,* which is understood as only good for something else.

However, some ambiguity of meaning still remains in the phrase *bonum delectabile,* which also carries over into the English "pleasurable good." Two distinct, though related, meanings are present. Before indicating them, it should be pointed out that both meanings have in common a reference to delight or enjoyment. The difference is that in one meaning of "pleasurable good," the delight signifies a good possessed by the senses.

• *In I Ethic., 5,* n. 58. The Greek text reads *'Tpe'is "tap* den *p.u.X&cr'Ta ol 'lt'pollx.ov.,.es.* Both the Oxford and Loeb editions translate *'1t'p011X.OV'TES* as "prominent." The Latin *maxime exceUentes* seems closer to the Greek; cf. Liddell & Scott, *G'Teelc Dictwna:ry,* under *'lt'poex.CJJ* from which the participle *'lt'pollx.ov.,.es* derives.

• "Quorum duo, scilicet delectabile et honestum, habent rationem finis, quia utrumque est appetibile propter seipsum." *In I Ethic., 5,* n. 58.

This is the first or strict meaning of " pleasurable good," for no doubt this is what the expression was first imposed to signify, sensible being which we first know. In the second meaning, an extended one, "pleasurable good " signifies delight in some *bonum honestum,* understood as something over and above mere sense-what we might call "intellectual pleasure" or "intellectual delight." St. Thomas is aware of the ambiguity, for he goes on to say: " The good called *honestum,* which is the good according to reason, has also a delight conjoined to it. Hence the pleasurable good, as divided over and against the *bonum honestum,* is the pleasurable according to sense." [5]

Let us look first at the extended meaning of *bonum delectabile,* the resting of desire in the possession of a good according to reason, for it is significant that we associate the pleasurable with a good of the mind as well as more familiarly with a good of sense. Now we speak ?f such intellectual pleasure in several distinct ways. There is a wholly intellectual pleasure we can experience in the delight of sheer knowing, in the understanding of something for its own sake. We also take delight in acting according to moral virtue; indeed, pleasure or delight is a sign that we have this or that virtue; the truly temperate man, for example, is pleased in not being indulgent. Finally, there is pleasure in contemplating works of art, in listening to good music; this is quite a special sort of pleasurable good, peculiar to human beings. It is at once a delight in a good of the mind and of sense, mirroring the intimate union of sense and intellect in human beings.

We are concerned, of course, with the pleasurable good in the primary and strict meaning, the good in which the sense appetite comes to rest. However, in discussing such pleasurable good, we cannot escape reference to the extended meanings of " pleasure " because, as we shall see, human pleasure cannot be understood only in its strict and primary meaning, since

[5] "Honestum autem dicitur, quod est bonum secundum rationem, quod quidem habet delectationem annexam. Unde delectabile, quod contra honestum dividitur, est delectabile secundum sensum." *Ibid.*

man never lives merely a life of sensation. On the other hand, we do have such a life, and in this life the pleasurable good is first realized. Hence, first of all, what is it precisely and wherein lies its goodness?

Now it seems at the outset that such pleasurable good has no other motive than the pleasure it gives, insofar as it has the nature of purpose-an *appetibile propter seipsum.* St. Thomas seems quite explicit on this point, not only in the passage we have already quoted from the Commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics,* but in the *Summa Theologiae* as well. In the latter work, defending the division of good into the three kinds, St. Thomas states, in meeting an objection, " Now those things are properly called pleasurable which have no other aspect of desirability except pleasure, even though at times they are harmful and unbefitting." [6] The import of this last clause, as well as the fact that St. Thomas is dividing the *bonum delectabile* off from the *bonum honestum* and the *bonum utile,* seems clearly to suggest that he has the strict meaning of *bonum delectabile* in mind and that such pleasurable good has the nature of purpose.

In refining our notion of the pleasurable· good, we must take into account two elements involved in sense pleasure: perception, an act of sense knowing, and a rest of desire in the good received. So far we have stressed the latter element, the formal aspect of pleasure, for when a good is possessed then desire is at rest, precisely as terminating the movement of unsatisfied desire. It is in this that pleasure or delight consists, even though we can make some allowance for a certain pleasure in the anticipation of pleasure. Pleasure, therefore, supposes something other than just presence of and rest in an object; it is both a knowledge of and an appetitive rest in a good. Hence, in defining pleasure it is not enough to say that it is a termination of the movement of desire when a good is present;

[6] " Dicuntur tamen ilia proprie delectabile, quae nullam habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis nisi delectationem, cum aliquando sint et noxia et inhonesta." *Summa Theologiae* I, *5,* Art. 6, ad. 2.

it must also be understood that there is cognitive awareness in the presence of this good.[7] The perception of sense is therefore necessary for delight; still, delight does not terminate in perception but is completed in bringing desire to rest.

These two elements, accordingly, are inseparably linked together in the pleasurable good: the sense perception, which is itself agreeable, and the delight in this agreeableness by sense desire. This is properly the *bonum delectabile* which men and animals share. However, we cannot simply reduce sense pleasure as man experiences it to the level of " raw" sense pleasure as it is found in animals. Man certainly enjoys a pleasure which, considered abstractly, is the same as that of the animal; however, he does not experience it as mere animal but as man. In effect, this means that man will enjoy a pleasurable good better than an animal and in a way no animal could; it also means that he can experience it worse than an animal ever could because only man can pervert sense enjoyment by not relating it to something characteristically human. In this way man becomes more bestial than any animal.

Allowing for all this, it still remains true that the pleasurable good in the strict sense is sense pleasure, that properly speaking the pleasurable good is uniquely of the sense order, that is, it is something peculiar to the sense order. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, such a pleasurable good belongs to the order of an end and has an attraction all its own. It therefore appears that such pleasure is related to the sense order as the virtuous is related to the intellectual and moral order, each providing an object of repose for the respective appetites. This is why the attraction of sense pleasure is similiar to de-

'Cf. *Sum11Ul Theologiae* I-II, 81, Art. 1. "Respondeo dicendum quod motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur ... Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem necesse est competere delectationi." Cf. Jean Langlois, S. J., "La Definition de la delectation," *Laval Theologique et Philosophique,* 1949, Vol. V, n. 2, pp. 170-196. Fr. Langlois considers at length the definition of delectation, shoWing in particular that while the perception of sense is necessary for delectation, still it does not terminate in the perception but is completed in the appetite.

light in the intellectual order provided it always retain some ordering to a characteristic human good; at the same time, the delight in a good of sense still differs formally from the delight in the good of reason and is not wholly reducible to it. The whole problem, therefore, consists in sufficiently recognizing, on the one hand, the strict pleasurable good as a distinct kind of good, somehow truly an end, not simply reducible to the *bonum honestum* and in which the *bonum delectabile* in the extended sense is found, that is, a distinctive intellectual delight. The problem is aggravated by the fact that the pleasurable good of sense often occupies an ambiguous position in the minds of some moral philosophers and theologians who tend to reduce it simply to the *bonum utile* or to the *bonum honestum,* making either too little or too much of it.

The problem therefore is more involved than at first appears. In order to see all aspects of the problem so as to resolve the problem satisfactorily, we need to analyze more fully, somewhat more subtly, what the *bonum delectabile* is, both in the broad and strict meanings, and what part it plays and should play in human life. In Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle, and St. Thomas following him, treat pleasure most fully, and for a reason assigned at the outset by Aristotle: pleasure is most intimately connected with our human nature, and to enjoy the things we ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on virtue of character.8 Here we will consider only some of the more important points made in Chapters 4 and 5 of Book X.

Delectation, pleasurable delight, is a certain perfect operation. In the activity of sense, there is the sense power itself

[1] The treatise on pleasure runs from chapter one through chapter five; it is particularly chapters four and five which are relevant. It should be kept in mind that Aristotle is approaching the final resolution, so far as it can be made, as to what human happiness is, and the role of pleasure is inextricably involved in this determination. True, enough, in this context it is the *bonum delectabile* of the intellectual order that is now primary, but the role of sense pleasure is also relevant and best seen in this ordering.

as the principle of operation, and the sensible-what is sensed -the object of the activity. For this activity to be perfect, there must be the best disposition on the part of each. Sense operates perfectly when the operation of sense is well disposed to something " beautiful," i.e., to what is most fittingly proportionate to sense; there is delight, for example, in seeing beautiful color. Consequently, when an operation is at its best it is also most pleasurable or delectable. This relation extends throughout human knowing and appetitive operation. "For there is delectation not only according to touch and taste, but also ac-according to all sense. And not only according to sense, but even according to the speculative operation of the intellect. . . . " [9] Now pleasure perfects operation, not efficiently, but formally; not formally, however, in the sense of bringing about the intrinsic form of a thing, but as that which follows upon a thing already constituted in its kind. It is by this precision that we can see how pleasure perfects an activity as a certain end, that is, as a certain perfection which is inevitably consequent, just as, to use the happy analogy of Aristotle, the bloom of youth follows upon those in the flower of their age.[10]

Such pleasure is found only in the operation of sense and intellect for a reason we have already indicated, namely that knowledge of the presence of the good is a necessary condition for pleasure. Each activity has its proper pleasure, not only as sense differs from intellect but as sense differs from sense. We thus have a basis for the graduation of pleasure. The more immaterial the activity, i.e., the less it is embedded in matter, the more the pleasure. Thus, the pleasure following upon seeing or hearing is superior to the pleasure following upon taste or touch, even though the latter at times may be more im-

[9] " Est enim delectatio non solum secundum tactum et gustum, sed etiam secundum omnem sensum. Nee solum secundum sensum, sed etiam secundum speculationem intellectus . . . " *In X Ethic.*, 6, n.

[10] " Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding permanent state does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age." *Nicomachean Ethics* X, 4, 117ab 30. (Ross translation.)

mediately vehement; similiarly, the pleasure following upon intellectual activity is superior to that of the senses, though again the latter may at times be more immediately intense and obvious. We thus see that the *bonum delectabile,* as a good and as an end, cannot be isolated from the sort of activity upon which it follows. We can only enjoy what is, as it were, the fruit of an activity, and our various activities are specified in terms of their principles, the powers and the objects. Yet, and it is a point of no small consequence, though all dogs enjoy pleasures in the same way, and so with other kinds of animals, men differ in the pleasures they enjoy. The ultimate reason for this is the following:

"The operations and pleasures of animals other than men follow upon a natural inclination, which is the same in all animals of the same species. But the operations and pleasures of men arise from reason, which is not determined to one thing. Hence it is that some men delight in some things and other men are pained by them." [11]

An allied reason for this diversity is that some men are better disposed according to reason than others not so disposed. This, of course, leads to the consideration of virtue which is the measure by which we judge which are true pleasures, even as to sense, and which are not, for the man of virtue delights in what are truly pleasures.

The point of this exposition of pleasure as drawn from Book X of the *Ethics* is to note and underline the true and proper role of pleasure in human activity. The *bonum delectabile* is thereby seen to be a distinct kind of good, worthy of seeking in terms of the activity it complements. Nevertheless, this view of the role of pleasure in human life, and particularly the view that pleasure seems worthy as an end, can readily pose some questions and difficulties. What we have said so far, as

[11] " Cuius ratio est, quia operationes et delectationes aliorum animalium consequuntur naturalem inclinationem, quae est eadem in omnibus animalibus eiusdem speciei. Sed operationes et delectationes hominum proven'iunt a ratione quae non determinatur ad unum. Et inde est quod quaedam quosdam homines delectant, et quosdam contristant." *In X Ethic.,* 8, n. 2060.

drawn from Book X of the *Ethics,* treats pleasure primarily in the extended sense, intellectual pleasure. Can we really speak of sense pleasure in this way? In order to consider sense pleasure more specifically, and to remove difficulties which may still linger as to the value of sense pleasure, we have to turn to Book Vll of the *Ethics.* This Book treats continence and incontinence, at the conclusion of which pleasure and pain are discussed since they form the matter of continence and incontinence. Now if we confine ourselves to sense pleasure, it may well appear that the *bonum delectabile* is not really a good in itself and not really an end. The following quotation from the Commentary of St. Thomas appears to make this very point:

> Some bodily pleasures [i. e., those which are not naturally bad] are medicine for some defect. A sign that this is the case may be seen in the fact that only the needy experience them, for a man finds no pleasure in food when he does not need it. Thus the pleasure of food is a remedy against pain of hunger. Now it is clear that it is better to be perfect than to become perfect. But pleasures of this kind, which we say to be remedial belong to those who are becoming perfect, not to those who are perfect, for they are caused by a need of nature being removed. Therefore, they are not good in themselves, but accidentally, namely insofar as they are necessary for something else.U

An author, commenting recently on this very passage, says: " They are good, in other words, only as means, not as ends." [13] But the matter is not quite so simple. The whole of Lesson XIV in Book VII of the *Ethics,* in which the quoted passage occurs, expressly delineates the character of bodily pleasures.

[12] " *Quaedam* vero delectationum corporalium sunt medicinae contra aliquam defectum. Et *huius signum* est, quia non sunt nisi indigentis. Non enim aliquis delectatur in cibo, quando non indiget. Et sic delectatio cibi est medicina contra tristiam famis. Et manifestum est quod melius habere aliquem iam perfectum quam fieri. Huiusmodi autem delectationes, quas dicimus esse medicinales, accident his qui perficiuntur, non autem his qui iam sunt perfecti. Causantur enim ex hoc quod per id quod non sunt bonum secundum se, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt ad aliquid necessariae." *In VII Ethic.,* 14, nn. 1525-15!l6.

[18] Thomas Dubay, S. M., "An Investigation into the Thomistic Concept of Pleasure," *The New ScholasticWm,* Vol. XXXVI, n. 1, Jan., 196!l, p. 9!!.

Earlier in the lesson it was pointed out that bodily pleasures are good in some way-as removing contrary pains.[14] In other words, they are good, not unqualifiedly, but up to a certain point. It should not come as a surprise that sense goods are restricted goods. And it still remains true that it is not from the fact that a man seeks and enjoys bodily goods that he is bad, because all men in someway enjoy tasty food or wine, and other such pleasures; they become blameworthy only in that they enjoy these not as they ought.[15]

The passage from St. Thomas quoted above actually appears in the context of a parenthetical remark made by Aristotle as to why pleasure is *not* thought to be good, and such a context makes quite a difference in understanding the passage. Two reasons are indicated why some think pleasure is not a good: 1) some pleasures are activities belonging *to* a bad nature, and 2) others are meant to cure a defective nature. It is this latter reason St. Thomas is commenting upon in the passage. It would seem to be reading St. Thomas a little hastily to have him mean that any pleasure which is not bad is only accidentally good and therefore only a means and not an end; moreover, the passage appears in the context of those who need to get into a healthy state, not for those who are in it. In addition St. Thomas, along with Aristotle, points out significantly that some men adhere only to sensible things and do not enjoy intellectual pleasures; now because such men have no other pleasures in which they recreate, it is not reproachable if they accept bodily pleasures as long as such

[14] "*Primo* enim dicit, quod delectationes corporales sunt aliqualiter bonae, inquantum scilicet sunt necessariae ad depellendas contrarias tristitias. Quia· etiam per hunc modum, omne illud quod non est malum ex sua natura potest dici bonum." *In VII Ethic.*, 14, n. 1518.

[15] "Et *huiua signum* est, quod ex hoc aliquis dicitur pravus quod horum bonorum superabundantiam quaerit, etiam si nulli alii noceat. Non tamen ex hoc ipso, quod quaerit corporalia bona, et delectatur, est pravus; quia omnes homines aliqualiter gaudent pulmento, vino et venereis: sed ex hoc vituperantur aliqui, quod gaudent in eis, non secundum quod oportet. Ex quo patet, quod delectatio corporalis est bona usque ad aliquam mensuram, superabundantia autem ipsius est mala." *Ibid.*, n. 1520.

pleasures are not injurious, either to themselves or others.[16] It is not reproachable because they need them as remedy against pain. In many respects, pain comes to man because of his natural movements and activities; the animal nature is always in labor.[17] Even seeing and hearing cause pain, hence the need and pleasure of sleep.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find pleasure referred to in this context as medicative and curative; on the contrary, it throws light on an important role of sense pleasure. Pleasure and pain are contraries, and hence one will remove the other. We therefore seek pleasure, in conformity with the animal nature we have, as a relief from bodily pain. We are thus led to see an important difference between the pleasure of sense and intellectual pleasure. Intellectual pleasure has no contrary. Pleasure of sense, on the other hand, has to be understood in relation to its contrary, and it is in this sense that bodily pleasure can be understood in its curative role, which is not to deny that it is still a good and still worthy of desire. Let us therefore be clear on this point. Even though sense pleasure and pain are contraries, in which respect pleasure can be understood in relation to pain, as curative of it, nonetheless pleasure is not to be reduced wholly to a remedial function. Pleasurable goods which only relieve a need or cure an imperfection are only incidentally pleasurable. A pleasurable good is intrinsically good in the sense it naturally complements our various activities. It is our composite nature which gives rise to contrariety of pleasure and pain in the sense order and which demands a curative role at times for pleasure.

[16] " Dicit ergo *prima,* quod quia corporales delectationes sunt vehementes, quae·runtur ab his quo non possunt aliis delectationibus gaudere, scilicet ab hominibus qui solum sensibilibus inhaerent et delectationes intellectuales non percipiunt. Et inde est quod tales homines praeparent sibiipsis quamdam sitim talium delectationum, dum scilicet sponte seipsos incitant ad earum concupiscentiam, sicut dictum est (n. 1524) de illis qui comedunt salsa, ut concupiscant potum. Et ideo, quia praedicti homines non habent alia delectabilia in quibus recreentur, non est increpabile si corporales delectationes accipiant, dum tamen tales delectationes non noceant, nee eis nee aliis; si autem sint nocivae, hoc est pravam et increpabile, sicut patet delectatione adulterii et cibi nocivi." *Ibid.,* n. 1528.

[17] " Semper en'im animal vigilans est in lahore." *Ibid.,* n. 1529.

Let us now try to take into account all aspects of the *bonum delectabile* and bring them together so as to reach some conclusion as to just how good the *bonum delectabile* is. First, pleasure, whether of sense or intellect, is the rest of an appetitive power in some good that is loved, and that it terminates activity. Since pleasure results from activity, we must see that what is properly willed is an operation which pleasure complements. In this precision, we see that pleasure is not willed precisely as an end, since any pleasure is relative to the activity concerned. Hence, pleasure in general is not enjoyed, but the pleasure of tasting, the pleasure of seeing, or the pleasure of contemplating.

Nevertheless, we have quoted from the text of St. Thomas in which he speaks of the *bonum delectabile* as having the nature of an end and as desirable in itself. How are we now to understand this? By grasping how pleasure *perfects* operation, and in explaining this point St. Thomas distinguishes in what way pleasure does operate as an end:

> Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. In one way, by way of an end, not according as an end is that on account of which a thing is, but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it can be called its end. In this way the Philosopher says that *pleasure perfects operation as a supervening end,* that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, which implies the rest of the appetite in a good that is presupposed.
>
> In a second way as an agent, not indeed directly . . . but indirectly, inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care.[18]

[18] " Respondeo dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter operationem perficit. Uno modo, per modum finis; non quidem secundum quod finis dicitur id propter quod omne bonum completive superveniens, potest dici finis. Et secundum hoc dicit Philosophus in *X Ethic.,* (1174b Sl) quod *delectatio perficit operationem sicut quidam superveniens finis* inquantum scilicet super hoc bonum quod est operatio, supervenit aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito. Secundo modo, ex parte causa agentis. Non quidem directe . • . lndirecte autem: inquantum scilicet agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius attendit ad ipsam, et diligentius earn operatur." *Summa Theologiae,* I-ll, Q. SS, Art. 4.

The *bonum delectabile,* therefore, is an end in the sense that it is the delightful termination and rest of the appetite in an apprehended good. On the one hand, what formally motivates the agent is the known good; on the other hand, because of the pleasure to be taken in the activity, the agent is as a consequence more eagerly intent on the possession of a good and carries out the action with greater care and desire. Both points are made in saying, for example, that one wills the good of eating food which is tasty; one wills the contemplation of truth, which is delightful. When pleasure is inescapably connected with an activity, it does motivate or lead one to will the activity itself; pleasure operates as a necessary property of the good and is willed along with it. In this context, St. Thomas can say:

> It amounts to the same thing to seek good and to seek pleasure, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in the good. . .. Hence, just as good is sought for itself so pleasure is sought for itself and not for something else if the word *for* signifies final cause. If, however, it signifies formal cause, or rather the motive cause, then pleasure is sought for something else, i. e., for the good, which is the object of pleasure, and consequently its principle and gives form to it, for pleasure is sought because it is a rest in the desired good.[19]

We may therefore put the matter generally this way. We delight in something for its own sake *absolutely* only when we delight in what is the final and ultimate end. We delight in other things insofar as an end being known and willed as good is, when possessed, delightful by reason of its form. Whatever has an inherent goodness is delightful, which need not entail that it be the ultimate end. The good of virtuous action, for ex-

[19] " --- dicendum quod eisdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod appetatur delectatio, quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio. appetitus in bono ... Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, et non propter aliud appetitur, si ly *propter* dicat causam finalem. Si vero dicat causam formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio est appetibilis propter aliud, idest propter bonum, quod est delectationis objectum, et per consequens est principum eius, et dat ei formam: ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono desiderato." *Summa Theologiae,* I-ll, Q. Art. 6, ad 1.

ample, though not *the* end of man, is an end as having an inherent goodness and is by that fact delightful or pleasurable to the man of virtue.[20]

Intellectual pleasure causes no real difficulties since it is the rest of the appetite in a *bonum honestum.* But does not the position that sense pleasure is a good desirable as an end (even in the qualified sense we have described) run counter to the teaching of a certain number of moralists? Such a view maintains in effect that sense pleasure must be sought always in conjunction with the *bonum honestum* or the *bonum, utile* with which it is associated by nature. Pressed to its logical conclusion, such a position would demand that the pleasure of eating or drinking must be associated in intention with the nourishment of the body. The *bonum delectabile* therefore could not be sought in any way as an end; it could only be a means.

But such a position would reduce the *bonum delectabile* to the *bonum utile* and would deny that the *bonum delectabile* is in its way desirable for itself and has an attraction all its own. It would seem to be excessive moral rigorism to require that a drink of coffee in the middle of the afternoon had to be taken for the explicit intention of nourishment of the body. It is not only permissible, but desirable, to drink coffee, not necessarily and only for the sake of physical nourishment, but for the pleasure it gives as related very generally to a life ordered to the attainment of a *bonum honestum,* for example the good of conversation or some other aspect of sociability. The last clause of the preceding sentence suggests the distinction which should be made and which appears to be overlooked in an excessively rigorist position. The partial truth in that position is that man cannot seek the good of pleasure as an end absolutely or simply, but it does not follow from this truth that the *bonum delectabile* in no sense is an end. There is a lot of ground between what is purely a means and hence in no way desirable in itself, and what is wholly an ultimate end, either absolutely

[20] Cf. *Summa Theologiae,* I-IT, Q. 70, Art. 1, ad

or in a given order. In between lies a host of ends which are legitimately sought for themselves but which in turn serve also as means to higher ends. The *bonum delectabile* belongs to this order of ends which are also means, and if such ends cannot be considered wholly apart from still being referred or ordered to something else, they are nonetheless ends of a kind.

With this precision, we can say that man, being an intellectual creature, in understanding and enjoying the *bonum delectabile* for itself must nevertheless understand and enjoy it by analogy with the *bonum delectabile* of the intellectual order and thus as associated with the *bonum honestum;* in brief, he is to seek the pleasurable good of sense only in the way in which he seeks the pleasurable good of the spirit, as referrable to a *bonum honestum.*

However, we should acknowledge a diversity or graduation within sense pleasures. The pleasures of touch and taste, the most vehement of all, are the most instrumental in character, ordered as they are to the good and preservation of nature itself; yet as a *bonum delectabile* they terminate and repose appetite however transiently. It is because of their vehement character and because they can so easily go to excess that the man of reason and virtue must deal carefully with them, but it is precisely by being dealt with according to reason that they can be good and can have an attraction all their own.

The pleasure of seeing and hearing are more immaterial; the good of seeing and hearing and the consequent delight in those activities are accordingly more worthy of desire. In tliis respect, we can suggest what is most excellently sense pleasure for man, the delight in experiencing works of art. It is the pleasure which is proportionate to man, not as basic and common as pleasures of touch and taste, nor as lofty as the pleasure of purely intellectual contemplation, but sense pleasure at its finest as far as man is concerned. The composite nature of man lends itself to pleasure of this kind; a form of contemplation which is not abstract; a sense and intellectual delight joined together, disinterested and yet intense, beyond any animal need and still necessary in its way for the human animal. Per-

haps the experience of hearing music is most revealing in this respect. The sense appetite is aroused in the very hearing of music; music represents in its distinctive way the movement of emotion; the art of music, being an intellectual virtue, forms tonal progression so that in the hearing of music the sense appetite is aroused and resolved in accord with reason. We thus have a *bonum delectabile* that is not wholly within sense, as the pleasure of touch and taste, nor wholly within intellect, as the pleasure of philosophical contemplation, but an intimate union of sense and intellect in which man delights in an activity for its own sake. True enough, the contemplative delight in a work of art has its further ordering, to the life of attaining the full *bonum honestum* which is the life of intellectual truth and goodness, but it is nonetheless a good desirable in itself and with an attraction all its own.

Although it is beyond the scope of this investigation to consider explicitly a supernatural point of view, nothing that has been laid down here on the basis of moral philosophy is in contradiction with a supernatural ordering. From an asceticpoint of view, progress in love of God and desire for ultimate union with Him should not be sought simply for the sake of some pleasure it gives. Hence it is that one can renounce the sense *bonum delectabile* more and more if he finds this conductive to achieving closer union with God, just as one can temper the sense *bonum delectabile* for achieving even the natural *bonum honestum*, since sense pleasure can easily distract and even fetter reason.[21] But the whole order of mortification and penance presupposes that one is renouncing a lower good for a higher good, not denying that the lower good is a good with a certain attraction in and of itself. Moreover, a right understanding of the nature of the *bonum delectabile* and the role it plays in human life offset the dangers of a false ascetism and scrupulosity. Among the most perverse men were those who would never drink, never smoke and never eat meat; some of the holiest men have done this too, but there is a *world* of difference, a difference between deviltry and sanctity. What must

[21] Cf. *Summa Theologiae,* I-II, Q. 78, Art. s.

be kept in mind is the nature of man, composite of flesh and spirit, sense and intellect. One can deny" creaturely comforts," those pleasures which form so intimate and widespread a part of human life, only if one is much more than man, and this state is achieved by grace, not by mere human will power. Man as man will become perverse if he denies himself of the sense *bonum delectabile* altogether.

Let us summarize by returning to the threefold division of the good. The *bonum utile* and the *bonum honestum* are at extremes: the *bonum utile* is only a means and never properly an end; the *bonum honestum* is wholly an end, at least in its own order, and not as such a means. The *bonum delectabile* holds something of the position of a mean. The intellectual *bonum delectabile* is a rest in the *bonum honestum* and therefore partakes of the character of the *bonum honestum.* The sense *bonum delectabile* is varied. The pleasure of touch or taste tends toward the *bonum utile* without being wholly that, for such pleasure still has an attraction of its own which the *bonum utile* does not have; the pleasure of seeing or hearing, especially in enjoyment of works of art, tends toward and even participates in a certain way in a *bonum honestum.* The sense appetite in such respects comes to its proper repose in the presence of a good connatural to man, just as in another way the sense appetite comes to its proper repose through moral virtue in the practical order of human conduct, for virtuous acts are pleasurable acts. The temptation is easy and the tendency frequent to reduce the *bonum delectabile* simply to the *bonum utile* or to the *bonum honestum.* The first way leads to a denial of human nature and scrupulosity; the second way leads to sensualism and hedonism· The *bonum delectabile* is neither. It is that good for human nature, attraetive in itself, which is enjoyed so as to enable such composite natures as we are to attain better our wholly human delight of the *bonum honestum,* naturally and supernaturally.

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THE IMPECCABILITY OF THE ANGELS REGARDING THEIR NATURAL END

FEW who make an intelligent study of St. Thomas' tract on the angels in the *Summa Theologiae* can set it aside without having acquired a new awe for the genius of its author. Taking as his starting-point little more than a tangle of half-truths proposed by non-Christian philosophers on the separated substance and a mass of disorganized references to the angels scattered throughout the writings of the Fathers, St. Thomas was nonetheless able to sift what was true, order what was haphazard, and, by dint of his own metaphysical and theological acumen, add to this data not only scientific order, but new profundity.

This work of St. Thomas will be our chief guide in examining St. Thomas' theology of the angels as it bears upon the question of impeccability regarding their purely natural end. The traditional interpretation of the great commentators of St. Thomas has been attacked by many outstanding Thomistic scholars.[1] It is our task to re-examine the pertinent texts of St. Thomas and his commentators on this question and endeavor to show the solid position of the conclusions of classical Thomism in the architectonic scheme of the entire synthesis of St. Thomas. Although at first this subject may seem to be an over-refinement of scholastic subtlety, its investigation necessitates a thorough understanding not only of the entire treatise *De Angelis* but also of the vital question of the nature of free will. Freedom in man is an elusive thing; immersed as it is in matter, the human will is extremely difficult to study, as modern psychology has so keenly demonstrated. In the angel, however, we are faced with the same problem of finite liberty,

[1] Notably: J. Maritain, Chas. Journet, F. de Blic, Phillippe de la Trinite. The various opinions of these writers will be considered later in this paper.

but stripped of the complications and obscurities arising from matter. By studying the angels we can better understand ourselves, as well as go through them to God.

THE PROBLEM

The question of the angels' ability or inability to sin can raise a host of problems. For instance, one might ask what kind of sin an angel could commit, and a compilation of the Fathers' opinions on this point could fill a volume. Again, the question might arise which was so dear to the older commentators: whether through God's absolute power there could be created an intellectual creature who *per se* would be absolutely impeccable.[2] None of these topics will be treated here, except perhaps in passing. Our formal inquiry will be limited to demonstrating this thesis: there exists *de facto* intellectual creatures (angels) who *per se prima, directly* and *immediately* are incapable of sinning as regards their natural end taken alone *(praecise sumptum)* .[3]

We use the terms *per se prima, directly* and *immediately* because we do not deny that the angels could sin against their natural end *ex consequenti, indirectly* and *mediately.* One sins in the former way by willing something that is contrary to the good of nature, or God as he is the natural end. Lying and stealing are examples of this manner of sinning. On the other hand, one can sin *per se primo,* etc., against his *supernatural* end and therefore *consequently, indirectly* and *mediately* sin against his end. One can sin against his natural end *indirectly,* even though it were impossible for him to sin *directly* against it.

By definition, the supernatural order cannot be connatural to any creature.[4] It is this complete lack of proportion between

[1] An excellent summary of the pros and cons in this matter may be found in the Salmanticenses, *Cursua Thevlvgicua* (Paris: Victor Palme, 1877), vol. IV, disp. 9, dub. 1.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] " Ecclesia Catholica definivit supernaturale ... praecise: quod est supra omnem

the supernatural order and the creature's natural powers and exigencies that explains the radical peccability of all creatures with respect to that higher order.[5] Obviously, then, any creature can sin *directly* against the supernatural good. In doing so, however, he necessarily sins against his natural end, but only *ex oonsequenti* and indirectly. This is true, as John of St. Thomas explains, because the objects of the natural and supernatural ends are so related that one cannot sin directly against one end without thereby sinning indirectly against the other.[6] To desecrate the Blessed Sacrament is to sin directly against the supernatural order, but it is also contrary to the natural law which commands us to handle sacred things in a sacred manner.

St. Thomas, with his metaphysical skill, proved that no creature can be absolutely incapable of sinning by his own natural powers; that is, no creature can be absolutely impeccable with respect to both natural and supernatural orders.[7] In this paper we are abstracting from the supernatural order. We do not deny the clear teaching of St. Thomas that the angels were created in grace and immediately to the supernatural order; the supernatural end is merely left out of

naturam creatam, prout excedit vires et exigentias cuiuslibet naturae creatae ..." (R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Revelatione,* Rome: F. Ferrari, 1950, vol. I, p. 18).

[3] *Ibid.*

•" Q.uod vero in elevatione ad supematuralia ita connexa sint ista obiecta, et ordinatio in utrumque finem supematuralem et naturalem, quod si avertatur ab uno, avertatur ab alio, ex eo constat quod, si avertitur a fine supematurali, hoc ipso, non amat Deum super omnia; ergo non subicit illi omnia; ergo nee etiam in ipsa naturali dilectione illi perfecte subicitur. Quia naturalis dilectio, etsi directe solum tendat in naturalem finem, tameD. etiam petit ut non repugnet perfectam subiectionem in naturalibus retinere. Unde non potest aliquis a supematuralibus cadere, quin etiam in naturalibus vulneretur; nee aliquod peccatum est· contra supematuralia, quin etiam sit contra naturam; quia non potest peccatum esse nisi sit contra ordinem rationis et dispositionem naturae: quia etiam in ordine ad supernaturalia ratio dictat ut illis non repugnet neque avertatur, quia bonum est naturae sic elevari ad supematuralem finem." (John of St. Thomas, *CuriiU8 Theologicus,* ed. Solesmensium, vol. IV, Paris: Desclee and Co., 1953, diss. 43, a. 1.)

• *De Veritate,* 24, 7 c. Translations throughout article are taken from that of Robert W. Mulligan, S. J., *Truth* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952-1954), vols. I-lI.

the question. Though hypothetical, it is possible to treat the matter under this formality. In summary, then, our assertion is this: *the angels are incapable of sinning directly against their natural end.*

THE OPINIONS

In theological questions an appeal to the authority of the Fathers of the Church is important. Unfortunately, such an appeal is impossible in this question, since the problem was never treated by them. They were much concerned with sin of the angels, but their sole objective was to establish the fact of their sin as recorded in Scripture, to explain the nature of their sin and to insist on the absolute peccability of all free creatures. Only with the advent of the Scholastic Commentators was the problem first formally considered. Even St. Thomas does not raise the problem explicitly.

The majority of the classical commentators affirm our thesis. Chief among them are Capreolus, Cajetan, Bannez, the Salmanticenses, John of St. Thomas, Gonet and Billuart. Their particular explanations will not be discussed here since we will have reason to cite them frequently later on.

Principal among the older Scholastics denying our thesis are Vasquez, Suarez and Molina. In his tract on the angels Suarez presents three opinions regarding the impeccability of the angels. Two of these he labels " extreme " and the third opinion, his own, he regards as the middle and true position.[8] The first " extreme " is the position of Capreolus, etc., which maintains the impeccability of the angels with respect to their own proper order. The second "extreme" is the opinion of Vasquez, who held that the angels could not help but sin if left in their natural state without the help of divine grace. Suarez' own " middle and true " position is that the angels are free as to specification in such a way that they can sin in the natural order if they so choose.[9]

[8] Francis Suarez, S.J., *De Angelis* (vol. II, *Opera Omnia,* Paris: Vives, 1854), m,ch.7.

[9] *Loc. cit.*

The question lay dormant for two centuries, but in our day the war cry was again raised. The antagonist was Henri de Lubac, S. J., and his book was entitled *Surnaturel.* In his book, de Lubac proposed an unprecedented interpretation of the teaching of St. Thomas and his contemporaries on the distinction between natural and supernatural love. He claimed that they were opposed not as an act that is proportioned to nature is opposed to an act that surpasses nature, but rather as a necessary act is opposed to a free act. From this theory he concluded that the beatific vision is the unique ultimate end for the moral life of all intellectual creatures. A purely natural end for such creatures could not exist even hypothetically. He concludes that God is free to create or not create the angels, but if he does create them, he must also order them to a supernatural end.[10] Although few theologians accepted de Lubac's fundamental principles, his opinion concerning the peccability of the angels due to the exigencies of their freedom won many adherents, even in Thomistic circles.

Two years before the publication of *Surnaturel* Father J. de Blic, S. J. had published an article [11] on the peccability of the angels according to St. Thomas in which he charged that the Angelic Doctor juxtaposes in his works two irreconcilable theses: 1) the thesis that the angelic nature is intrinsically peccable and therefore capable of sinning in the natural state, and the thesis that the angels are peccable only with regard to the supernatural order. To accuse as careful a thinker as St. Thomas of contradicting himself is no light matter; it is understandable that St. Thomas would change from an opinion of an earlier work, but de Blic claims that he has contradicted himself in the same work and even in the same article! [12]

Father Phillip of the Trinity, 0. C. D., re-examined the opinions of the traditional Thomists, de Lubac and de Blic and

[10] Henri de Lubac, S. J., *Surnaturel* (Etudes historiques, Paris: Aubier, 1946), p. 459.

[11] F. de Blic, "St. Thomas et l'intellectualisme moral a propos de la peccabilite de l'ange," *Melangu de science religieuse,* 241-280, fascicule 2, 1944.

[11] *loc. cit.*

regarded none of them as satisfactory. He then proposed his own thesis: " According to the thesis which we propose, the spiritual creature is capable of an ultimate good which would be connatural and supernatural (contrary to the interpretation of Fr. de Lubac), and there is the possibility of the angel sinning in one state as well as in the other (contrary to the current interpretation of Thomistic commentators); the thought of the Angelic Doctor presents no antinomy (contrary to de Blic) ." [18]

Father Charles Journet is in full agreement with Father Phillip of the Trinity and quotes Jacques Maritain to support their position. Maritain claims that the sin of the angels would have to consist in a purely voluntary non-consideration of the *1·egula morum:* " The law according to which every being is peccable would be applied to the angel, if the angel had been created in the state of pure nature-! do not speak with regard to a possible supernatural order; I am talking about the natural order itself. St. Thomas never said the contrary ... In the state of pure nature, the pure spirit would have been able to fall into pride just as he did in the state of grace,-to love without measure his own excellence." [14] Yet it seems that Maritain himself is guilty of holding irreconcilable positions-or at least an evolution has occurred in his thought-for in his

•• Phillippe de Ia Trinite, "Du peche de Satan et da Ia destinee de l'esprit d'apres Saint Thomas d'Aquin," pp. 44-46. *(Satan, Etudes Carmelitaines,* Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1948). " Selon Ia these que nous proposons, Ia creature spirituelle est susceptible d'un bonheur ultime soit connaturel, soit sumaturel (contre !'interpretation du Pere de Lubac), et il y a possibilite de pecher, meme pour ange en l'une et !'autre vocation (contre !'interpretation courante des commentateurs thomistes), Ia pensee du docteur angelique ne presentant aucune antinomie (contre le Pere de Blic) ."

•• Jacques Maritain, *Neuf sur les notions premieres de la philosophie moral,* pp. 129-184. Cited by Charles Joumet, "L'univers anterieur a l'eglise," *Rll'lJ1.te Thomiste,* 58:446, ill, 1968. ". . . ii peche en voulant d'une maniere mauvaise une chose bonne en elle-meme . . . La loi selon laquelle tout etre est peccable se serait appliquee a l'ange,-si l'ange avait ete cree dans l'etat de pure nature,-je ne dis pas seulement a l'egard d'un ordre sumaturel possible, je dis a l'egard de l'ordre nature! Iui-meme. Saint Thomas n'a jamais dit le contraire ... Dans l'etat de nature pure, Ie pur esprit aurait pu, comme il I'a pu dans I'etat de grace, tomber dans Ia suoerbe,-aimer sans mesure sa propre grandeur."

published lecture delivered to the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University in 1942 he said: ". . . even the angels, who cannot sin with respect to the natural order alone, are fallible with respect to the supernatural order." [15]

An answer to these charges was attempted by Father C. Courtes, O.P., in an article that appeared in *Revue Thomiste.* [16] Father Courtes attacked the problem from a new angle. His argument proceeds from the metaphysical notion of the perfection of the end as being that which wholly satisfies the appetite so that the faculty can never swerve from it. The angels, at the moment of their creation, are in immediate possession of their natural end; consequently they are incapable of defecting from it by sin. As we shall see in our development of the traditional position, this answer, true enough as far as it goes, is inadequate.

Now that we have briefly stated some of the opinions on this question we can proceed to expose the doctrine of St. Thomas as interpreted by commentators whom we feel to be more faithful to his thought and his theological synthesis.

PRINCIPLES FOR A SOLUTION
PARTICULAR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE ANGELIC INTELLECT

Since an angel is a purely spiritual substance not united to a body, it possesses only the two faculties of intellect and will. Since angelic sin is an act which involves these faculties, we are very much interested in the nature of these powers and their mode of operation in the angel.

A. *The immaterial objects known by angels.*

The first question that comes to mind regarding the angelic intellect is: precisely what constitutes the object of their knowl-

[15] J. Maritain, St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1942) pp. 5-6.

[16] C. Courtes, "La peccabilite de l'ange chez S. Thomas," *Revue Thomiste,* 58: 188-168, I, 1958.

edge? We are not interested in their knowledge of material things; these are not to our point. As to the immaterial objects of their understanding, however, we are more concerned with *how* they know than with *what* they know. The mode in which angels apprehend immaterial objects of knowledge has immediate bearing on our issue. We must ascertain two things: **1)** the perfection of their comprehension, and 2) whether the objects are known through infused species or through the very form of the angel. The immaterial objects which might conceivably be known by an angel are three: the angels's own being, other angels and God. We will consider only the first and third of those objects, since they alone pertain to our subject.

Assertion: *Since the angels are immaterial, they are subsistent forms, and consequently are intelligible in act. It follows, then, that they know themselves through their form which is their substance.*[17]

Cajetan reminds us in his commentary of this matter that no thinking man would hesitate to affirm that the angels know themselves. Yet to answer *how* they know themselves is not an easy matter. [18] The problem is to determine whether the angels know themselves through their own substances or whether they require an infused species for this knowledge.

Two conditions are necessary for all immanent intellection. The first is that the object be united to the knowing power so that they become one in intentional identity. The second condition is that the object must be a formal principal of knowledge with respect to the knowing power. However, for *sorne* acts of intellection, two other conditions are required: the subject must be moved by the object, and the object must inhere in the subject as an accident. The four conditions, then, are *conjunction, causality, motion* and *inhesion.*[19]

[17] I, *56,* 1 c. References to the *Summa Theologiae,* other than translations, are from the *Opera Omnia* (ed. Leonina, Rome: Typ. Poly. Vat. 1889). References to the Commentary of Card. Cajetan will he from the Leonine *Opera Omnia* also.

[18] Cajetan, *op. cit.,* I, *56,* 1, n. 1.

[19] *Ibid.,* I, *56,* 1, n. !l.

That the angelic substance and intellect meet the *per se* requirements for intellection is quite obvious. Since the angelic substance is a purely spiritual form, it is necessarily intelligible in act (*actu intelligibilis)* and as such can as a formal principle of intellection. The union that is required between the intelligible object and the knowing power exists in a most intimate fashion in the case of the angelic substance and the angelic intellect. The intellect emanates from the angelic substance as a necessary property, and like any other property it is radicated in its proper substance. This union whereby the angelic substance is actually known (*actu intellecta)* and the angelic intellect is actually knowing *(actu intelligens)* establishes between this object and faculty and intentional identity which is the greatest of unions according to Averroes.[20] The angelic intellect, while not being the substance of the angel,[21] is nevertheless in the angel's essence and the angel's essence is in his intellect. As St. Thomas puts it:

> There is no reason why one thing cannot be in a second and the second in the first if this is in different ways, such as the ways in which a whole is in its parts and the parts are in the whole. The same is true here: the essence of the angel is in his intellect as an intelligible is in a knower, and his intellect is in his essence as a power is in a substance. [22]

The two requirements which *per accidens* accompany intellection are not present in the angel's knowledge of itself. The knowing faculty is moved by its object only when it is in a previous state of potency with regard to that object. Man's intellect, since it is in a state of potency regarding all intelligibles, must always be moved by its object. This is due to its imperfection in the hierarchy of intelligences.[23] However, since the angelic intellect emanates immediately from its essence

•• Averroes, De Anima ill, Comm. V, Digressionis parte ult., in Solut. q. 2; cited by Joseph Gredt, 0. S. B., *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomi8ticae* (Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1946), vol. I, p. 860.

[11] I, 54, 1 c.

•• *De Veritate,* 8, 6, ad 6.

,. I, 79, 2 c.

with temporal simultaneity, it is clear that it must immediately comprehend its own substance, for all the essential conditions for knowledge are present: the substance, as an unreceived subsistent form, is necessarily intelligible in act; and its intellect, as a natural property, is perfectly proportioned and intimately united to this substance from which it emanates. Thus, the angelic intellect is never in a state of potency with regard to its essence as an intelligible object, and consequently need never be moved by it. The angel's intellect is always in act as regards its essence, even though it may be in potency with respect to those things for which it requires infused species. St. Thomas in his *De Veritate* has shown the position of the angelic intellect between the human and divine intellects on the basis of potency and act. It deserves to be cited here:

> Now, in beings there are grades of act and potency. One being, prime matter, is in potency only. Another, God, exists only actually. All other intermediate beings exist both actually and potentially. Similarly, in the genus of intelligibles, one being, the divine essence, is in act only; another, the possible intellect, is only in potency, and for this reason the Commentator says that the possible intellect in the order of intelligibles is like prime matter in the order of sensibles. All the angelic substances lie in between; for they have something of potency and of act, not only in the genus of being, but also in the genus of intelligibility.
>
> Now prim'e matter cannot perform any action unless it is perfected by some form ... Similarly, our possible intellect can understand no'thing before it is brought into act by an intelligible form . . . But since the essence of an angel, which is in act of the genus of intelligibility, is present to it, an angelic intellect can understand this intelligible reality within itself, namely, its own essence-and not through any likeness of it but through the essence itself.[24]

Because of the intimate union existing between the angelic essence and intellect-a union of intentional identity-and the perfect proportion of one to the other, it follows that the angels know themselves with a perfect and absolutely comprehensive knowledge. The angel's essence is the primary object of its

[24] *De Veritate,* S, 6 c.

knowledge and the formal *ratio* of its knowledge of all things other than its own substance. [25]

Assertion: *Because the image of God is impressed upon the very essence of the angels., they know God through their essence precisely as it is a similitude of God.*

The importance of this conclusion in relation to our solution is vital; yet those who do treat it often explain it inaccurately or quite falsely. The heart of the difficulty is to determine exactly what it means *to know an object in an image,* for this is how an angel knows God in the theory of St. Thomas. The image in which God is known is the angel's own essence. St. Thomas is consistent in this opinion in all the places where he explicitly treats the matter. [26]

In general, there are three sorts of knowledge: 1) knowledge through the presence of an essence in the knowing power; 2) knowledge through a similitude or *species* of the object in the faculty; and 3) knowledge not immediately through a *species* of the object, but through something else in which the similitude is found. [27]

The first mode of knowledge is that by which the angel knows his own substance. However, God cannot be known in this way outside the beatific vision.[28] The third mode is that which is proper to man after the Fall. We know God by analogy with his similitude found in creatures, yet this knowledge is very imperfect since material creatures reflect God only as vestiges, not as images.[29]

The angel's knowledge of God in the natural state stands

•• " Essentia autem angeli est ei ratio cognoscendi omne quod cognoscit . . . cognoscit enim omnia per modum substantiae suae, ut dicitur in lib. de Causis, et secundum propriam virtutem et naturam, ut dicit Dionysius, 7 cap. de div. Nom." *Ibid.,* a. 4, ad 6. Cf. also I-ll, *50,* 4 c.

•• St. Thomas, *Super Libras Sentent.* (ed. Mandonnet and Moos, Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-47), II, dist. 28, q. 2, a. 1; *Contra Gent.,* ITI, 41; *De Veritate,* q. 8, a. 8; q. 18, a. 1, ad 16; I, *56,* 8.

•• I, *56,* 8 c.

•• *Ibid.*

•• I, 45, 7 c.

midway between these extremes, partaking of both with a leaning towards the latter. [80] This is knowledge through image. St. Thomas defines the representation of an image as an effect that represents its cause as to a similitude of its form.[81] Knowledge through an image is formally distinct from knowledge through a sign, just as intuitive knowledge differs from discursive knowledge. An image is that *in which* (in *quo)* we contemplate directly the thing imaged; a sign is that *from which (ex quo)* we indirectly and mediately perceive the thing signified. It is well to remember that we are speaking of an image precisely as image and not as a thing *(prout imago et non res)*. If we consider an image precisely as such, the knowledge of the image and that which is represented by the image is attained by one and the same motion. This is not the case if we consider the image merely as a thing *(res)*. This is St. Thomas' explicit teaching in the *De Veritate:*

> An image of a thing can be considered in two ways. First, it can be considered in so far as it is a certain thing; and since as a thing it is distinct from that of which it is an image, under this aspect the motion of the cognitive power to the image will be other than its motion toward that of which it is an image. Second, it can be considered in so far as it is an image. Under this aspect, the motion toward the image will be the same as the motion toward that of which it is an image. Consequently, when a thing is known by means of a resemblance existing in its effect, the cognitive motion can pass over immediately to the cause without thinking about any other thing. This is the way in which the intellect of a person still in this life can think of God without thinking of any other creature. [82]

This knowledge of God by the angels, however lofty it may appear to us, nevertheless falls infinitely short of perfect knowledge of God. It is knowledge through a created image, and no created species can perfectly represent God.[83] Yet it would be

[80] "Unde magis ista cognitio tenet se cum speculari: quia et ipsa natura angelica est quoddam speculum divinam similitudinem representens." I, 56, 8 c.

[81] I, 45, 7 .c.

[82] *De Verit.,* p. 8, a. S, ad 18.

[83] Cf. I, 12, 2 c; I, 56, S c.

wrong to conclude that this knowledge is merely knowledge *in confuso* simply because it is n<?t and cannot be quidditative. If this were true, then all natural knowledge of God would necessarily be *in confuso.*[34] But this is precisely contrary to St. Thomas' teaching. The Holy Doctor admits that infused species must be impressed in the angelic intellect if one angel is to know another angel clearly and perfectly. But he never claims that the angels need an infused species to know God clearly and specifically. The reason for this is that God has impressed his image in the very essence of the angel at the moment of his creation. The angel, in knowing his own essence, immediately, directly and in that same act of knowing, knows God as imaged in his essence.

B. *The Mode of Angelic Knowledge.*

We have just investigated the manner in which the angelic intellect acquires its knowledge. Now we shall consider the manner in which it actually exercises that knowledge.

Assertion: *The angelic intellect is never in a state of potency, either essential or accidental, with respect to knowledge of its own essence or that which is known through its essence.*

According to Aristotle, the mind can be said to be in a state of potency in two ways: 1) the state of mind preceding the acquisition of knowledge, and 2) the state of the mind which has acquired knowledge but does not actually exercise this knowledge which it has.[85] St. Thomas calls the first essential potency *(potentia essentialis),* the second accidental potency *(potentia accidentalis).*[86]

Man's intellect, before acquiring any knowledge, is a *tabula rasa;*[a1] it is in a state of essential potency. As we have seen above, this potentiality of the human intellect is affirmed by

•• Cajetan, *op. cit.,* I, 56, 8, n. 8.
•• Aristotle, *De Anima,* Bk. III, ch. 4, 4!l!lb.
•• *De Verit.,* q. 8, a. 6, ad 7.
•• *De Anima,* Bk. III, ch. 4, 480a.

St. Thomas when he refers to it as prime matter in the genus of intellects.[38] At the same time he explicitly states that the angelic intellect is midway between the divine and human intellects in that it has a mixture of act and potency with respect to the acquisition of knowledge. At the beginning, then, when the angelic intellect first emanates from its essence, the intellect is in actual possession of some knowledge. The angel's knowledge can be of two orders, either natural or supernatural. As for the natural knowledge, St. Thomas insists that the angel is never in a state of potency regarding it: "In the first way, therefore (i.e., in the state of essential potency), the angelic intellect is never in a state of potency with respect to those things to which its natural knowledge is able to extend."[39] This knowledge embraces knowledge of its own substance and knowledge through all the intelligible species which are connatural to its intellect and which are infused at creation.[40] Thus, the power of the angel's intellect is entirely complete with respect to what it can naturally know from the very beginning of its existence.[41]

But, since the supernatural order is knowable only through divine revelation, the angelic intellect is in essential potency with regard to mysteries *per se*[42] even though God may have revealed some of these mysteries to particular angels at the beginning of their existence.[48]

The angel's intellect in a state of accidental potency may likewise be considered with respect to both natural and supernatural knowledge. Natural knowledge in the angels may be considered under three headings: (1) direct knowledge of their essence, 2) knowledge of God mirrored and imaged in their essence, and 3) knowledge of all things known through infused species. The angel's supernatural knowledge may be classed as

•• *De Verit.*, q. 8, a. 6, c.

[39] I, 58, 1 c. All translations of the *Summa* are from the *Summa Theologica*, tr. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros., Inc., 1947.

'" I, *55,* 2 c; I, 58, 1 c.

[41] *Loc. cit.*

••1, 57,5 c.

•• *Ibid.*

1) knowledge gained through infused faith while *in statu viae,* and 2) knowledge of things seen in the Word through beatific vision.u

We arrive, then, at the following conclusions from the principles of St. Thomas:

1) *The angelic intellect is never in a state of accidental potency with regard to knowledge which is had through its own proper essence.*

This conclusion is one of the touchstones of our solution. Although St. Thomas does not explicitly mention it in the *Summa,* it is in harmony with his entire thought in that work and is explicitly affirmed in other works. When St. Thomas inquired whether an angel knows himself through his substance, he established the foundation for this conclusion. The substance of the angel is intelligible in act (actu intelligibilis); the intellect which emanates immediately from this spiritual substance as a property is necessarily conjoined, united to the substance and perfectly proportioned to it in the ontological order. In the intentional order it is radically identical with it. All the *per se* requirements for intellection are thereby present. The angel's substance, then, is the primary object of his intellect and the principle and foundation of his knowledge of other things. This is explicitly taught by St. Thomas in the *De Veritate:* " The intellect of an angel is not in a state of potency with respect to his essence. In this respect, it is always in act; But with respect to other intelligible objects his intellect can be in potency." [45]

Because of the intimate union and perfect proportion existing between the angelic intellect and substance, the substance is always actually informing its intellect, with the result that *the intellect can no more refrain from considering its proper object than can our eyes, when open, fail to see colors.* Again in the *De Veritate,* St. Thomas formally teaches this and shows further that the angel, in knowing its own substance, can also

.. I, 58, 1 c. •• *De Verit.,* 8, 6, ad 7.

know other spiritual beings in an imperfect and confused manner without the aid of infused species.[46] That this is the authentic teaching of St. Thomas is affirmed by all his great commentators: Bannez, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, Capreolus, Gonet and Billuart.

2) *The angelic intellect is never in a state of accidental potency with respect to its natural knowledge of God.*

This conclusion follows immediately from what we have said about the angel's knowledge of his own substance. We have seen that it is the opinion of St. Thomas that the angels know God not through the infusion of a species, but as mirrored in their own substances. The angelic substance is a perfect image of God in its own order; in this image they contemplate God directly in an intuitive manner. By this knowledge, the angel recognizes God as his Creator as well as his Final Cause. Thus he is aware, in a single intuition, of his complete dependence upon God as his beginning and end in the natural order.[47] Were this not so, it could not be said that the angel has comprehensive knowledge of itself, for a thing is known insofar as its causes are known.[48]

To anyone familiar with the Thomistic doctrine of knowledge through an image, it should be manifest that it is as impossible for an angel to be in a state of accidental potency with regard to his knowledge of God as it is for him to be in this state regarding knowledge of his own substance. As we have already seen, it is one and the same motion by which one *formally* knows the image and that which is represented in the image. Thus it is that one can adore an image of Christ with the adoration of latria, or venerate with hyperdulia an image of Our Lady.[49] In our present case it must be admitted that the angels are always actually (in *actu)* considering God as imaged in their substance, for they necessarily are always considering their substance.

•• *De Verit.,* 8, 14, ad 6.
"Heris, *op. cit.,* pp. 44i-44S.
•• *Posterior Analytics,* Chap. 2.
•• III, *25,* s.

8) *With regard to its knowledge of things through infused species, the angelic intellect may be in a state of accidental potency. However, in no way can it be in a state of potency with regard to the knowledge of things which it sees in the Word (in Verbo).*

The knowledge had through infused species is of two orders, natural and supernatural. 'J'he species of natural things are called connatural species and are infused into the intellect of the angels at the moment of creation. The dignity of the angelic nature somehow demands the infusion of these species.[50] The species representing things of the supernatural order are infused by God into the angel's intellect at the moment of elevation to the order of grace.

Since the revealed truths of :faith are known by the angel through infused species and not, obviously, through its essence, it is left to the free will of the angel to consider or not to consider these truths. Furthermore, it is impossible that the angels consider simultaneously and actually everything which can be attained through the different species unless they are ordered in some way to one another so as to constitute a formal unity.[51]

On the other hand, in matutinal knowledge or knowledge in the Word,[52] (a knowledge which pertains to the angel's supernatural beatitude) all things can be known actually and simultaneously, for in this case the divine essence serves as a single

•• I, *55,*

n I, 58, " Ea vero cognitione qua cognoscit res per species innatas, omnia illa simul possunt intelligere, quae una specie cognoscuntur; non autem ilia quae diversis."

""·The expressions "Cognitio in Verbo" and "cognitio matutina" are generally considered as co-extensive. But in I, 1 ad 8, St. Thomas speaks of a knowledge *in Verbo* in the natural order which he claims is not matutinal knowledge properly so called. "Dicendum quod angelus duplicem habet Verbi cognitionem, unam naturalem, et aliam gloriae: naturalem quidem, qua cognoscit Verbum per ejus similitudinem in sua natura relucentem; cognitionem vero gloriae, qua cognoscit Verbum per suam essentiam. Et utraque cognoscit angelus res in Verbo: sed naturali quidem cognitione imperfecte, cognitione vero gloriae perfecte. Prima ergo cognitio rerum in Verbo affuit angelo a principio suae creationis: secunda vero non, sed quando facti sunt beati per conversionem ad bonum. Et haec proprie dicitur cognitio matutina."

intelligible species.[58] Here there is no possibility of a state of accidental potency on the part of the intellect because beatitude consists in an eternal act and not a habit. [54]

Assertion: *The angels do not know by a process of reasoning or judging formally considered; rather, immediately upon the infusion of connatural species, they grasp all that can be known in these species by a simple intuition.*

The importance of analogical reasoning in theology must be borne in mind not only when treating of God, but also when studying the angels. The perfections of intellect, will, etc. which are predicated analogously of God and man are likewise predicated analogously of the angels with respect to man. The common note of *created* intellect as shared by both angels and men in no way diminishes the simple diversity existing between the two kinds of mind. We are accustomed to speak of three acts of the intellect: simple apprehension, judgment and illation. Does this mean that we must affirm that all three acts are possessed by the angels? St. Thomas' answer is that only the first of these acts of knowledge is proper and possible to the angels because of the perfection of their intellectuallife. [55]

Pseudo-Dionysius, whom the Scholastics regarded as the greatest theological authority in angelology, claimed for the angels a perfect intellectual light since their intellect was a "pure and most clear mirror." [56] Of course, this statement is not in itself sufficient to prove that the angels neither formally reason nor formally judge. The validity of this conclusion follows from the Angelic Doctor's understanding of this authority.

First of all, at the beginning of the tract of the angels in the *Summa,* St. Thomas had to argue to the necessity of positing the existence of the angels from the fact that man's imperfect possession of the intellectual light demanded a creature who existed with an intellectual nature in undimmed splendor.

•• I, 58, 2.
•• I, 58, 1.
•• I, 58, 8 and 4.
•• I, 58, 5 c.

. to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances, not having the fullness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, . . . Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things . . . and these we call angels.[57]

Having established the angelic intellect as a perfect intellectual power, St. Thomas proceeds to determine the mode of this power. He takes the term *intellect* in its formal sense as distinguished from *reason:*

Therefore they are called intellectual beings: because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said to be understood (intelligi); hence *intellect* is defined as the habit of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called *rational.*[58]

Discursive reasoning is opposed to the perfection of the angelic nature. Can we say the same thing of the second act, namely, judgment? In this operation, the intellect by affirmation or negation either attributes a predicate to a subject or separates a predicate from a subjecU [9] If it is true that truth is had formally only in the judgment, it would seem that the angels exercise the act of judgnient; for if truth is possessed formally by man, it should also be possessed formally by the angels as superior beings.

St. Thomas, however, denies the possibility of an angel's knowing through judgment. His reason is simple. Man must by many acts of judgment attribute or deny predicates to a subject merely because he does not by simple apprehension immediately grasp all that is virtually contained in a concept. This again is a result of the weakness of the human intellect, [60]

•• I, 51, 1 c.
•• I, *58,* ll c.
•• *De. Verit.,* q. 14, a. 1 c.
[60] I, *58,* 4 c.

and cannot be predicated of the angelic intellect which is a perfect intellectual light.[61]

Respecting the objection that the angelic intellect would not formally have logical truth if it could not formally judge, some clarifications of the notion of judgment are necessary. We can distinguish two aspects in a judgment: 1) the composition or division necessitated by the imperfection of the human mind; and 2) the reference to existence in which judgment is perfected and terminated. At the moment when subject and predicate are joined by the judgment, the object known (*objectum cognitum)* is not a composite but rather a single species known intuitively. Thus if we elminate the antecedent composition or division which pertain to the imperfection of judgment and consider only the reference to existence which is the perfection of judgment, we find that the angel is quite capable of attaining formal, logical truth, for the angel can know existence and non-existence.[62]

One wonders whether St. Thomas is arguing validly when he attributes only an intuitive mode of knowledge as proper to the angels. He reaches this conclusion, it seems, merely by denying to the angel acts which are proper to man's intellect due to its imperfection. Yet it is obvious that we cannot attribute to the angels every sort of intellectual perfection. Why could not judgment and ratiocination be an imperfection shared by both angels and men? Cajetan solves this difficulty by distinguishing what is common to *every created intellect* from that which is special and proper to *man's intellect.* It is common to all created intellects to have an admixture of potency in some order; it is common also for created intellects to require superadded species and many acts for perfect intellectual comprehension of diverse objects. On the other hand, it is proper to man's intellect to reflect on its phantasms, to be in essential potency, etc.[63] Thus, although man possesses all three acts of

[01] I, 85, 5 c.

[••] *De Malo,* 16, 6, 1 *in contrarium;* also: John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theol.,* disp. 42, a. 4, n. 48.

[••] Cajetan, *op. cit.,* 58, 4, nn. 4 and 7.

reason, he needs the acts of judgment and ratiocination only because the more perfect act of simple apprehension is possessed so tenuously due to his imperfect intellectual light. It is for this reason that Dionysius speaks of simple intellection, or intuition, as a proper act of the angels, and possessed by man only as a faint participation of a superior power: [64] whence comes the scholastic adage, " *inferiora ad superiora attingunt."*

Assertion: *There can be no error per se in the angelic intellect; but there can be error per accidens, not with respect to natural knowledge but with respect to supernatural knowledge.*

That there can be no error in the angelic intellect *per se* should be fairly obvious. Inerrancy is not something proper to intellectual knowledge in angels, but is common to all cognitive powers with respect to their proper objects. To deny this would be to deny the principle of intrinsic finality. The proper object of the intellect considered formally as an intuitive power is the quiddity of things or *quod quid est.* In human reason this occurs not in simple apprehension but in judgment or illation. In the first act of reason, the object known directly informs the intellect *(species impressa);* the intellect then shares an infallibility like that which the eye possesses in beholding color. But in composing or dividing and *a fortiori* in reasoning, the human intellect bears the same relationship to formal truth as the eye in relation to the common sensibles such as distance, hardness, etc. [65] Since we have already shown that the angelic intellect does not know by composing or dividing or reasoning, it is clear that the angel cannot err *per se* in the same way as man. [66]

Man's intellect, due to its mode of knowing, can err *per accidens* with regard to both natural and supernatural knowledge; this is not true for the angel. All falsity is a result of a

[80] Dionysius, *De Divinis NominibU8,* c. 7; cited by St. Thomas, *De Veritate,* 15, 1 c.

[85] J, 17, 8.

eel, 58,5 c.

defect on the part of some principle of knowledge. But defect can never be found in something which is always in act according to its nature. A defect can occur in a subject only to the extent that it is in potency, for potency is the basis for privation or further perfection. Act, however, is opposed to privation, and a defect is a privation. Since the angelic intellect is in essential act with regard to all things to which its cognitive power naturally extends, it is clear that the angelic intellect cannot be in a state of error even *per accidens* with regard to natural knowledge.[61]

The case is quite different with regard to supernatural knowledge. As we have seen, the angels are in a state of essential potency with respect to this knowledge, for there is no proportion between the natural and the supernatural. Thus this potency can be subject either to perfection or privation. [68]

With regard to error *per accidens* in matters supernatural, we must make a distinction between the holy angels and the demons. This was unnecessary in speaking of natural knowledge-with regard to connatural truth both good and bad angels are infallible. But concerning things supernatural or those which depend upon God's free will, both good and evil angels can suffer intellectual defect, although in different ways. We will present here St. Thomas' argument in the *De Malo;* it is a fuller treatment than that found in the *Summa,* but the two explanations are completely harmonious.

Since every creature is in .potency with respect to all that exceeds his natural knowledge, says St. Thomas, his mind must be illumined by a superior light if he is to attain this higher knowledge. Thus an inferior angel is illumined by a superior angel. But for supernatural knowledge the light that divine grace bestows is necessary. Since this is altogether gratuitous, however, it can be said that every angel is *secundum quid* intellectually defective. But while in the g.ood angels this defect is simple nescience, that of the devils is false opinion. This is because the holy angels do not presume to judge of those

[67] *De Malo,* q. 16, 6 c. [68] *Ibid.*

matters which exceed them, but the evil spirits, their minds rebellious and their wills fixed in malice, proudly attempt to fathom the mysteries of God and consequently err.[69]

There is much more that could be said of error *per accidens* in the bad angels, but it would take us far afield. The important conclusion for our present problem is that the angelic intellect, regarding natural knowledge, is infallible speculatively and practically, *per se* and *per accidens.*

PARTICULAR CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE ANGELIC WILL

Assertion: *Free will exists in the angels; it exists in them even more excellently than in man, just as the angel's intellect is more excellent than man's.*

Free will is a power possessed by all spiritual beings. Actually, free will is not really distinct from will considered as potency. *Free will* expresses that aspect of the intellectual appetite which concerns itself with means to an end rather than the end itself; it is concerned with the realm of particular goods which can in no way necessitate the will, but which may be freely accepted or rejected. On the other hand, the will as distinct from free will (*voluntas ut natura* as opposed to *voluntas ut ratio)* expresses the appetite precisely as it tends to the good, or end, which is sought for its own sake, or else it refers to the necessary movement of the intellectual appetite in its desire for beatitude and the things necessarily connected with it.[70] Since the will is necessitated only by the universal good (*universalis ratio boni)* which is presented to it by the intellect, all goods which fall short of this universal good can never completely satisfy the will, and therefore are the objects of free choice.[71]

St. Thomas teaches that free will in the angels is more excellent than the analogous faculty possessed by man.[72] This is quite reasonable, since the will must follow the intellect and be proportioned to it. We have already shown that the angelic

[89] *De Malo,* q. 16, 6 c.
[70] 1, 88, 4.
[71] I, *59,* 8 c.
[79] *Ibid.*

intellect stands to the human intellect as the perfect to the imperfect; we must now investigate the notion of free will and try to determine precisely how the angelic will is more perfect than ours.

Our best source in this matter is the *De Malo,* the fifth article of the sixteenth question. In the body of this article, St. Thomas clearly and carefully distinguishes what pertains *per se* to free will from what is merely concommitant or accidental to it. In short, since free will is a " simply-simple " and analogous perfection, St. Thomas clearly shows that what is accidental to free will need not be found in all subjects possessing it; but all must possess what pertains to freedom *per se.* St. Thomas' explanation in the *De Malo* can be summarized in the following points: [73]

1. God, men and angels possess the power of choosing means suitable for attaining an end. This pertains *per se* to free will.
2. The power of choosing between good and evil pertains only *per accidens* to free will; neither God nor the beatified angels and souls possess it.
S. The power of changing one's mind *(mutatio voluntatw)* merely *per accidens* pertains to free will:
    a) intrinsically, men can change their will; so can the angels before making their first choice;
    b) extrinsically, God can change the will by his grace: this is found in men on earth and only in the angels previous to first choice.

The Thomistic doctrine of angelic free will can be briefly stated in four points:

1) The perfection of free will consists in the ability to choose proper means to attain an end (freedom of specification) . The angels possess this perfection in common with God and man. But this power is more excellent in the angels than in man as John of St. Thomas explains: "**...** because they possess a more exalted intellect, they regard their object with greater universality and indifference." [74]

[78] *De Malo,* q. 16, *5.*

.. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theol.,* Q. 59, a. S, in the *Su'TT/ITM Litterae.*

2) The will of the angel is undetermined with regard to things inferior to it, but is determined to that which IS superior/ [5]

3) The angelic will cannot choose evil under the guise of apparent good in the natural order. The reason for this is that the will is ordered to the good as its proper object. An appetite can seek evil as its object when the evil is apprehended as somehow good by a defect on the part of the intellect. [76] But, as we have seen, defect regarding natural truth is impossible to the angelic intellect.

4) Once the angel has made a free choice, he remains inlmovable in that choice. This is true in both natural and supernatural orders, stemming as it does from the very nature of angelic knowledge as St. Thomas points out in the De Malo:

> This pertains to the angelic nature, that they should possess the knowledge of all that they are naturally capable of knowing in act; just as we naturally have the knowledge of first principles in act, from which we proceed by reasoning to acquire a knowledge of conclusions. But this does not happen in the angels, because they intuit in those principles all the conclusions which pertain to their natural knowledge. And just as we are immutable in the knowledge of first principles, so their intellect is immutable as regards all those things which it naturally knows. And since will is proportioned to intellect, it follows that even their will is immutable concerning those that pertain to the natural order. [77]

" . . . quia est in ipsis altior intellectus, cum majori universalitate et indifferentia respiciens objectum suum."

u I, *59,* S, ad i.

•• De *Malo,* 16, *5* c.

[77] *Loc. cit.* "Hoc autem ad naturam angelicam pertinet, ut actu habeant notitiam omnium quae naturaliter scire possunt; sicut nos naturaliter actu habemus notitiam primorum principiorum, ex quibus procedimus ratiocinando ad acquirendam cognitionem conclusionum. Quod in angelis non contingit, quia in ipsis principiis intuentur omnes conclusiones quae ad naturalem eorum cognitionem pertinent. Et ideo sicut immobiliter nos habemus in cognitione primorum principiorum, ita intellectus eorum immobiliter se habet circa omnia quae naturaliter cognoscit. Et quia voluntas proportionatur intellectui consequens est quod etiam voluntas eorum naturaliter sit immutabilis circa ea quae ad ordinem naturae pertinent."

Assertion: *The angel loves God more than himself and all other things with a natural and necessary love.*

This natural love of God above self and all other things is not proposed by St. Thomas as something proper to the angels; rather it is common to all creatures.[78] What is more, St. Thomas explicitly understands this love as a love of benevolence *(amor amicitiae)* rather than a love of simple desire *(amor concupiscentiae).* In St. Thomas' time this point was hotly disputed, but he explicitly rejects the opinions of his contemporaries who cannot admit the natural love of benevolence of a creature for God:

> There have been some who maintained that an angel loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of natural love he loves himself more than he loves God, because he naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity .[79]

And then he states his own case:

> We observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state; and if a man were a natural part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him.
>
> Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every creature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natural love angel and man alike love God before themselves and with a greater love.[80]

[78] Quodlibet. I, q. 4, a. S. "Dicendum est ergo, quod diligere Deum super omnia plus quam seipsum, est naturale non solum angelo et homini, sed etiam cuilibet creaturae . . ."

[79] I, 60, *5* c.; Quodlibet. I, q. 4, a. S c.

[80] I, 60, *5* c.

Despite the apparent over-simplification, St. Thomas' argument is firmly founded in his doctrine of the whole and the part. The validity of the conclusion, as Father Heris explains, becomes clear only when we study it in the light of the ensemble of Thomist thought; then it is seen that few principles are as firmly grounded and as fruitful as this particular thesis.

·we must remember at the outset that God, as final cause of all creatures, tends to communicate his goodness which is his perfection. This communication consists in the creatures' manifestation of the divine similitude according to their place in the hierarchy of being. Since all creatures tend to this divine similitude as their ultimate end, it follows that all beings seek their own good *because they seek to manifest the divine goodness,* and not vice versa.[81] This inclination of all nature toward its perfection is naturallove. [82]

God communicates his goodness so that creatures might be constituted a similitude of it. Since, however, no single creature of whatever excellence can adequately reproduce this similitude, God has provided for a multitude of distinct creatures, each of which somehow supplies what another lacks in mirroring the divine perfection. This ordered multiplicity of creatures taken as a hierarchical whole constitutes a more perfect similitude of God than any single creature taken alone.[83] So it is that St. Thomas can say: " Even though an angel is absolutely better than a stone, nevertheless both natures are better than either one alone: and so a universe in which there are angels and other things is better than one in which there would be angels only." [84]

From this ordered multiplicity of diverse natures a two-fold order is distinguished: 1) the relation of one nature to another, and 2) the relation of the whole to the representation of the divine similitude. The first order is subordinated to the latter

[81] *Contra Gent.,* ill, c. i4.

[82] I, 50, 1, ad 8.

[83] I, 47, 1 c.

[84] I Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. *:!,* ad 6. "Quamvis angelus absolute sit melior quam lapis, tamen utraque natura est melior quam altera tantum: et ideo melius est universum in quo sunt angeli et aliae res, quam ubi essent angeli tantum."

and has its *raison d'etre* in it alone.[85] The doctrine of the whole and the part as St. Thomas applies it to explain the creature's natural love of God can be understood only in this background.

THE WHOLE AND THE pART

Every part obviously exists for the sake of the whole. Furthermore, it is ordered to the good of the whole, otherwise it would not be a part; for a part has no reason for being except in relation to the whole: *"Hoc ipsum quod est, alte1ius est."* [86] Of itself, the part implies imperfection, disorganization and a need to be completed by other parts. It is perfected, unified and completed only when it has its place in relation to the whole. Now it is natural for a being to have an appetite and love for an object insofar as its nature inclines it so to act; [87] and since it is of the nature of a part to be ordered to the whole more than to itself, it follows that its *elan* will be directed toward the universal good of love and ultimately to God himself, of whom the universal good in a similitude, more than toward itsel£.[88]

When St. Thomas uses the doctrine of the part and the whole to explain the natural love of the angels for God, it is imperative for us to recognize that he is arguing, as Cajetan points out, from a sign *(ex signo)* .[89] Father Heris interprets the presentation of St. Thomas as a *manuductio.* In Heris' explanation, the theory of the part and the whole is applicable to the order of created beings only when we are concerned with the relation of the individual creature to the created universe of which he is a part. From this point of view, the creature reproduces the divine goodness by way of similitude. But when we

•• Charles V. Heris, 0. P., "L'amour nature! de Dieu," *Melanges Tkomistea* (Paris: Vrin, 1934), p. 294.

•• I, 60, *5.*

•• 1-11, 109, 8 c.; " ... unicuique naturale est quod appetat et amet aliquid, secundum quod aptum natum est esse."

•• *Ibid.* " Unde etiam naturali appetitu vel amore unaquaeque res particularis amat bonum suum proprium propter bonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus."

•• Cajetan, *op. cit.,* q. 60, a. *5,* n. 2.

consider the relation of the creature, *not* to *the created whole, but to God,* we enter a more elevated realm in which we are concerned with formal *participation,* not with the part and the whole.[90] With this in mind, the Holy Doctor's argument can be reduced to this syllogism:

The angel, as a finite participation of the divine Being, is related to God, the infinite Being, as the part is related to the whole.

But the part is related to the whole in such a way that it loves the whole more than itself with a natural love.

Therefore the angel loves God more than itself with a natural love.

With regard to this syllogism, St. Thomas implies the major premise and explains the minor by two examples: 1) from irrational nature: the hand instantly comes to the defense of the body when the latter is endangered; 2) from rational beings: the citizen exposes himself to danger for the welfare of the republic.[91]

It may be objected that the angel is not properly a part of God but rather a participation of the infinite Being. Furthermore, in the opinion of St. Thomas, the angel as a spiritual substance is not considered as a part but as a quasi-whole in relation to the physical universe. In the material order individuals are corruptible and have no permanent existence-only the species is preserved. But in the spiritual order even individuals are incorruptible and permanent in being.[92] Seen in this way, the angel can never be sacrificed for the universal order of the world; consequently the theory of the part and the whole cannot properly explain a natural love on the part of each individual angel that surpasses its own proper individuality. However, as Father Heris points out, the doctrine of participation does explain this natural love that is greater than self-love:

We must ascend higher and examine the supreme order of things in relation to God: only there do we discover that created intelligence is not a part, but a participation of the infinite whole from which the world is suspended; and this is why it must also go

•• Heris, *Lea Angea,* p. 451. [81] I, 60, 5 c. •• I, 98, I c.

beyond itself in its love in order to find in God the only being who satisfies its desires.[93]

Natural love will be manifested in different modes according to the natures in which this inclination is found. The angel, being a purely spiritual creature, will have a love that is a voluntarily elicited act consequent upon a form apprehended by its intellect. From the first moment of its creation, the angelic intellect knows the angelic substance in a perfect and comprehensive way. In the very same intuition it also knows God (of Whom the angel is an image) in a naturally perfect way. In this comprehensive knowledge which the angel has of its own substance, it grasps intuitively not only the full array of its natural perfections, but also the limitations of that nature.[94] Thus the angel realizes that his existence does not pertain to his essence and that his perfections are but finite participations of the infinitely perfect Being, God. Finally, he realizes that he depends entirely on God for all that constitutes his angelic perfection. His intellect finds its fulfillment in the contemplation of the Infinite Being whom he discovers imaged in his own nature; it frees itself from the limits of its own finitude and so satisfies its natural appetite for the universal in its contemplation of the Infinite.

The angelic will follows a movement parallel to that of the intellect. Father Heris has vividly explained the manner of this natural movement of the angelic will toward God:

> The angel, in his finitude knowing the Infinite and in his limited life knowing Life Itself, cannot allow its will to rest in limited things: this would be a pure contradiction. If he loves himself, a finite being, it can only be because he comes from the Infinite as a participation of God himself. Being conscious of depending upon

[98] Heris, *"L'amour naturel,"* p. 505. "Il faut monter plus haut et considerer l'ordre supreme des chose a Dieu: la seulement nous pourrons reconnaitre que !'intelligence cree est, non point partie, mais participation du tout infini auquel est suspendu le monde, et qu'a ce titre il lui faut aussi se depasser elle-meme dans l'amour pour chercher en Dieu le seul etre qui apaise ses desirs."

[••] "Quae tamen inclinatio (amor) diversimodo invenitur in diversis naturis, in unaquaque secundmn modum eius." I, 60, 1 c.

God for everything that he is, *"hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est,"* the angel could not love itself except under the condition of loving principally and more intensely that God whom he discovers in the depths of his essence and of whom he is but a reflection. The angel would violate the very laws of his being, he would destroy his own intelligence, if, contrary to this natural knowledge which he has of God, he should prefer himself to God. For to prefer himself to God would be to admit to himself that a limited good is superior to an absolute good, that the participated is of greater worth than the unparticipated. A being which is exposed to the distortions of imagination can very well have these illusions. A pure intelligence would deny itself if it were to admit them for an instant. And because the will faithfully follows the 'intelligence; because it is in desire what the intellect is in truth, the angel must, in any case, prefer God to itself, and love itself in God and by God, referring all created things to Him as to their unique and transcendent Source.[95]

SIN AND THE ANGELS

Bearing all the foregoing principles in mind, we must now seek to determine the *general cause* of sin, a cause that is present in all sins whether of commission or of omission, and which is capable of being found even in the angels, at least with regard to their *de facto* sin. The sin of the angels is often ascribed simply to malice. Yet St. Thomas explicitly denies the possibility of a sin proceeding from malice without a previ-

•• Heris, *Les Angu,* pp. 451-452. "Par le fini, connaissant l'infini, par Ia vie limitee connaissant Ia vie meme, l'ange ne peut s'attarder aux limites pour y reposer son vouloir: ce serait Ia contradiction pure, S'il s'aime, lui, etre fini, ce ne peut etre que comme chose de l'infini, comme une participation de Dieu meme. Prenant conscience de dependre de Dieu en tout ce qu'il est,-hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est-, l'ange ne saurait s'aimer lui-meme qu'a condition d'aimer davantage et d'abord-intensius et principalius-ce Dieu qu'il decouvre au plus profond de son essence et dont il n'est qu'un reflet. L'ange irait contre Ia loi meme de son etre, il detruirait sa propre intelligence si, en face de cette connaissance naturelle qu'il a de Dieu, il se preferait a Dieu. Car se pre£erer a Dieu, ce serait, pour lui, admettre que le participe vaut mieux que l'imparticipe. Un etre, expose aux poussees de !'imagination, peut bien avoir de telles illusions. Une intelligence pure se nierait elle-meme si elle les admettait un instant. Et parce que le vouloir suit fidelement !'intelligence, parce qu'il est en desir ce que !'intelligence est en clarte, il faut bien, quoiqu'il arrive, que l'ange prefere Dieu a soi et s'aime lui-meme en Dieu et par Dieu, rapportant tout le cree au Bien supreme comme a sa Source unique et transcendante."

ous disordination either of will or of nature. We must look for the ultimate cause of sin on a more profound level. This ultimate cause of all nioral evil can be defined as *the voluntary non-consideration of the rule of reason or the divine law in the placing of a moral act.* The study of this cause of sin is extremely pertinent here, since it is this cause which St. Thomas gives as the reason for the *de facto* sin of the angels, as we shall see later. St. Thomas' most complete treatment of the causes of sin is found in the first question of the *De Malo,* which we summarize here.

In seeking the cause of sin, we are seeking the cause of evil. Evil, however, can have no cause *per se,* but solely *per accidens.* However, since everything *per accidens* must ultimately be reduced to something *per se,* we are forced to reduce the cause of evil to what is itself good. Now the good can be a cause of evil in one of two ways: 1) insofar as it is *deficient;* 2) insofar as it is *per accidens.* This twofold mode of the causality of evil exists differently in natural beings on the one hand and free beings on the other.[96] Since we are concerned merely with demonstrating the part of the will in causing moral evil, we limit our treatment to the way in which this double modality is found in free creatures.

The root and origin of sin is to be found in the will of the sinner.[97] Yet, as St. Thomas points out, this involves several difficulties.[98] Since sin is a defective act, it must be defective as a result of a defect inherent in its agent cause, i. e., the will, *before the commission of the* act.[99] It seems that we are Confronted with a dilemma. St. Thomas raises this problem and briefly solves it:

> If this defect be natural, then it is always attached to the will, and so the will would always commit a morally bad action when it acts. But virtuous acts show that this conclusion is false. On the other hand, if the defect be voluntary, it is already a morally bad act, and we will have to look in turn for its cause. Thus, our rational investigation will never come to an end. Therefore, we must say

[96] I, 49, 1, ad 5.
[97] *Contra Gent.,* III, c. 10.
[98] *Ibid.*
[99] *Ibid.*

that the defect pre-existing in the will is not natural, to avoid the conclusion that the will sins in every one of its acts. Nor can we attribute the defect to chance or accident, for then there would be no moral fault in us, since chance events are not premeditated and are beyond the control of reason. So, the defect is voluntary. Yet, it is not a moral fault; otherwise, we should go to infinity.[100]

Thomas concludes, then, that the defect which is at the root of sin must be traced to the will precisely as it is *free* and not as *nature.* On the other hand, this defect which exists in the freedom of the will prior to its act of choice cannot be a privation or an evil itself. But if it is not itself a moral evil, how can this defect both vitiate itself and become *per accidens* a cause of sin? St. Thomas' answer to this question shows a remarkable insight into the psychology of the free movement of the created will toward sin:

In all those things in which one thing ought to be the rule and measure of the other, the good in that which is regulated and measured flows from the fact that it is regulated and conformed to a rule and measure; evil, on the other hand, is the result of not being ruled or measured. If, therefore, an artisan who ought to cut a piece of wood correctly according to some plan does not make his cut properly, which is to cut badly, his bad cutting will be caused by the fact that the artisan was without a rule and measure. Similarly, pleasure and everything else in human affairs must be measured and ruled according to the rule of reason and divine law; whence not to use the rule of reason and of divine law is pre-understood in the will prior to its inordinate choice.

It is not necessary to look for a cause of this, namely, of the non-use of the rule spoken of above; because the very liberty of the will itself is sufficient for this, the liberty by which it is able to act or not act; and this itself-which is the actual non-consideration of the rule taken in itself-is neither an evil, nor a fault nor a penalty, because the soul is neither obliged to be always actually considering this rule, nor is it able to do so; but from this (actual non-consideration) it begins to assume the nature of guilt, because it proceeds to choose something without actually considering the rule; . . . the guilt of the will does not consist in the fact that it does not actually *(actu)* consider the rule of reason or of divine law,

[100] *Ibid.* Translations throughout are those of Vernon J. Bourke, *On the Truth of the Cath. Faith* (Garden City: Image, 1956), Book III, Parts 1 and

but it consists in this, that it proceeds to choose without having a rule or measure for its choice.[101]

From this incisive analysis we can draw the following conclusions:

1) If a being is not the rule and measure of his own acts, his acts must conform to an extrinsic rule and measure if they are to be good; otherwise they will be deprived of a due good and will consequently be evil. In the realm of moral activity there is only one being who is the rule of his own acts: God. Every moral act of creatures must be ruled by the divine law if it is to be good.

The liberty of the will suffices as a cause for the non-consideration of the rule of moral acts, since the freedom of the will enables it to act or not to act in this regard. This condition of the will exists prior to its disordered act of choice, and as such is not yet a privation but a mere negation.

3) There is no obligation on the part of the will to consider at all times the rule of its acts. But it is necessary for the will to consider the rule when it proceeds to an act of choice. Two moments are distinguished here in the ontological order relative to the will in its evil choice. In the first moment there is a

[101] *De Malo,* q. 1, a. 3 c. "In omnibus quorum unum debet esse regula alterius, bonum in regulato et mensurato est ex hoc quod regulatur et conformatur regulae et mensurae; malum vero ex hoc quod est non regulari vel mensurari. Si ergo sit aliquis artifex qui debeat aliquod lignum recte incidere secundum aliquam regulam, si non directe incidat, quod est male incidere, haec mala incisio causabitur ex hoc defectu quod artifex erat sine regula et mensura. Similiter delectatio et quodlibet aliud in rebus humanis est mensurandum et regulandum secundum regulam rationis et legis divinae; unde non uti regula rationis et legis divinae praeintellegitur in voluntate ante inordinatam electionem.

Hujusmodi anrem quod est non uti regula praedicta, non oportet aliquam causam quaerere; quia ad hoc sufficit ipsa libertas voluntatis, per quam potest agere vel non agere; et hoc ipsum quod est non attendere actu ad talem regulam in se consideratum, non est malum nee culpa nee poena; quia anima non tenetur nee potest attendere ad hujusmodi regulam semper in actu; sed ex hoc accipit primo rationem culpae, quod sine actuali consideratione regulae procedit ad hujusmodi electionem; . . . culpa voluntatis non est in hoc quod actu non attendit ad regulam rationis vel legis divinae; sed ex hoc quod non habens regulam vel mensuram hujusmodi procedit ad eligendum."

complete non-consideration of the rule (this requires no act). Such a non-consideration is a mere negation of something good; it is not a privation, for the good is not yet *due;* there is at this point no sin. In the second moment, the will proceeds to an act of choice in conformity with the non-consideration of the rule. This is a true sin, for the consideration of the rule in the act of choice is a due good. The will thus becomes *per accidens* the cause of evil by its voluntary non-consideration of the rule in its very act of making its choice.

THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

Having examined the principles and conclusions of St. Thomas both as to the nature of the angel's intellectual and volitional powers and the general cause of sin, we are now prepared to compare and order these conclusions to show that, in the integral thought of the Angelic Doctor, the angels are incapable of sinning against their natural end. Our proof proceeds from an analysis of the proper operations of these perfect intellectual beings, and as such is a demonstration from a formal cause. The following is a formal statement of the demonstration:

Major: A purely spiritual creature whose intellect can admit of no error either *per se* or *per accidens* with respect to the whole of natural knowledge and is not only always actually considering the rule of morality but whose will by a necessity of specification is immovably conjoined to this rule of morality by a natural love which exceeds the natural love which it has for itself, is metaphysically incapable of sinning immediately and directly against its natural end.

Minor: The angels regarded precisely in relation to their natural end are purely spiritual creatures of this sort.

Conclusion: The angels are metaphysically incapable of sinning immediately and directly against their natural end.

Explanation of the major premise: A sin would have to be caused either by one of the special interior causes of sin, namely,

by passion, ignorance or malice; or by the general cause of sin which is the voluntary non-consideration of the rule of morality in the act of choosing. But a creature such as is characterized in the major is incapable of sinning from any of these causes, as we can see by considering each of them separately:

1. On the part of the special interior causes of sin:

a. The sin of passion. This sin is impossible for a purely spiritual creature, since passions are rooted in a sensitive appetite which is possible only to intelligent beings composed of body and soul in a natural union. A purely spiritual being cannot be naturally united to a body.[102]

b. The sin of ignorance. This sin is likewise impossible for such a creature. Ignorance implies a lack of due knowledge in a subject capable of having such knowledge, or it implies the ability to make a false judgment. But a creature whose knowledge extends to all that is naturally knowable, both speculatively and practically, and who cannot err either *per se* or *per accidens* cannot, it is clear, sin from ignorance.

c. The sin of malice. As St. Thomas shows in the first question of the *De Malo*,[103] the sin of malice necessarily implies a preceding disorder of the appetite by which evil is chosen, at least secondarily. This antecedent disorder results either from a bad habit or a corporeal inclination to evil resulting from a corruption of nature.[104] Clearly, however, the first sin of malice could not result from a bad habit, because that habit would have to have been caused by a sin other than malice; otherwise we fall into a vicious circle. Nor in purely spiritual creatures could the sin of malice proceed from a bodily disorder, as is obvious. We can conclude, then, that the purely spiritual creature we refer to in the major could not sin as a result of any of the three special interior causes of sin.

2. The general cause of sin: the voluntary non-consideration of the rule of moralty in the act of choice itself is the most

[101] I, 51, 1 c. [108] Cf. 1-11, 78, 3. [10·] *Ibid.*

general cause of sin, a condition of every possible sin. If a creature cannot sin from this cause, he is certainly impeccable. Yet a creature who at all times must be actually considering the rule cannot place a free act that would fail to be measured by this rule. Further, the will's necessary and natural love for the rule obliges to make all its choices in accordance with that rule which is loved above all things, including self.

Explanation of the minor: The pure spirits referred to are, of course, angels. We need only explain how the angelic will and intellect are so related. to the rule of morality that the angel cannot sin through the non-consideration of this rule.

We have already explained at some length that the angelic intellect is from the moment of its creation in second act with respect to the knowledge of the angelic substance. Since the angel knows its substance as an image of God, it knows God who is imaged in its essence by one and the same intuition by which it knows itself. Thus it is likewise in second act with regard to its knowledge of God from the first moment of its creation. Knowing himself comprehensively, the angel knows that he is meant for God, that God is his final cause. Since God is his ultimate end, the angel knows further that all his acts must be directed to this infinitely good and perfect God. But it is precisely because God is the sole end, the final cause of all creatures endowed with mind that he is the absolute rule of their activity, it follows that the angel knows God in second act precisely as the rule of his moral acts. Furthermore, the angel must always be considering the rule of morality because he must always be contemplating in act his own essence which is the image of God, the medium in which and through which the angel knows his Creator.

Following upon this natural knowledge of God there is a parallel movement of the will by which the angel loves God above all things as his beginning and end. Necessarily specified by this object, the angel's will is moved by a special motion of God constituting it in second act with regard to its end. Once so constituted, the will is consequently in first act relative to its

power of freely choosing means ordered to this end.[105] The angelic will is moved to will its ultimate end not merely *in communi* (as does man in the fallen state) but *in particulari*, i.e., God as its natural end.[106] Now its will is fixed immutably in this end.[107] Since the angels must always be actually considering their ultimate end, it is impossible for their will to posit an act that is vitiated for lack of consideration of the rule of morality. Therefore it is metaphysically impossible that the angels be capable of sinning directly and immediately against their natural end.

PART TWO

Having completed the formal demonstration of our thesis according to the mind of St. Thomas and the interpretations of his great commentators, we must now defend our position against the attacks of contemporary scholastics. Since most of the charges are raised by students of textual criticism, we are compelled to examine at some length the actual texts wherein St. Thomas treats the angels to show that our thesis is truly in harmony with and a necessary consequence of his thought. The textual method of investigation, so prized by modern researchers, has nonetheless many limitations. Never can it be a substitute for the " formal ,. approach to St. Thomas such as is found among his great commentators. [108]

In his tract on the angels, St. Thomas is not proceeding

[105] Salmant., *ap. cit.*, disp. 9, dup. 2, n. 58. " Et ideo ad hoc, ut voluntas Angeli in primo instanti suae productionis habeat omnem perfectionem naturalem, quae sibi debetur ad hoc, ut sit completa in actu primo respectu omnium mediorum a se volibilium, oportet, ut a Deo peculiariter moveatur, sive applicetur ad volitionem finis per applicationem specialem, et correspondentem et, ut est auctor particularis praedictae voluntatis, ad quem spectat constituere illam complete in actu prima, et tribuere eidem omnia principia necessaria ad hoc, ut ipsa se moveat, et se movendo velit media."

[106] *Ibid.*

[107] *De Malo*, 16, 5 c.

[108] T. L. Penido, O. P., "Cajetan et notre connaissance analogique de Dieu," *Revue Thomiste*, 17: 151-162, Nov., 1984-Feb., 1985.

formally as a metaphysician but rather as a theologian. As such he is interested in the angels precisely as they have been elevated to the supernatural order. From this point of view it is easier to see why St. Thomas does not formally consider the problem of the impeccability of the angels in the natural order. Called to a supernatural end, the angels not only could sin against this order, but as a matter of fact some of them did. It is a fairly simple task to explain the radical peccability of all creatures with regard to the supernatural order; it is an extremely difficult task to explain exactly *how* creatures as perfect as the angels *de facto* sinned.[109] Little wonder, then, that St. Thomas limited his formal inquiry to an explication of the revealed fact, and treated of the natural impeccability of the angels only in passing.

In our introduction we said that there were five principal opponents to our thesis: de Blic, de Lubac, Phillip of the Trinity, Journet and Maritain. Our study of significant texts from the works of St. Thomas will be aimed at establishing the fact that St. Thomas never held contradictory opinions regarding angelic impeccability (contrary to de Blic), nor did he ever deny the relative impeccability of the angels (contrary to the opinions of Journet and Phillip of the Trinity) . We shall also be obliged to refute the doctrine of de Lubac in *Surnaturel* and that of Maritain as found in his recent article " Le peche de l'Ange." [110]

[100] " Petes quomodo angelus potuit peccare? Non enim peccavit ex errore, vel ignorantia; tum quia in eo error aut ignorantia esse non potest; tum quia alias fuisset miser ante peccatum. Neque ex passione, quia passionis est expers, neque ex pravo habitu, quia ante peccatum non praecesserunt mali actus ex quibus acquireretur malus habitus; neque eum habuit a natura qui fuit creatus perfectus. Qua ergo via, qua prima peccatum in angelorum mentes irrepere potuit? Haec difficultas est gravissima et vix· solubilis." C. R. Billuart, O. P., *Summa Sancti Thomae* (ed. Lequette, II, Paris: Gustave Picquoin), diss. 5, a. i.

[110] Jacques Maritain, "Le peche de l'ange," *Revue Thomiste,* 56: Avril-Juin, 1956. English translation taken from that of William Rossner, S. J., *The Sin of the Angel,* Newman, 1959.

I. REFUTATION OF DE LUBAC AND MARITAIN

A. *The pomtion of de Lubac*

A great stir was caused in the theological world upon the publication of *Surnaturel* in 1946. In this book, de Lubac proposed an unprecedented interpretation of the teaching of St. Thomas and his contemporaries on the distinction between natural and supernatural love. He claimed that they were opposed not as an act that is proportioned to nature is opposed to an act that surpasses nature, but rather as a necessary act is opposed to a free act.[111]

Traditionally, *natural* was opposed to *gratuitous.* Not so with Pere de Lubac. For him *natural, necessary, non-deliberative* and purely *phymcal* activity is opposed to *voluntary, free, deliberative* and properly *rrwral* activity in such a way that the former pertains to the order of nature, the latter to the gratuitous or supernatural order.

The dangers latent in such an opinion are not difficult to uncover. If God creates an intellectual nature which, as such, must be gifted with freedom, would he not be bound also to elevate that nature to the supernatural order? If we adopt de Lubac's position, we would be forced to answer in the affirmative, because free acts, by the author's definition, are of the supernatural order.

How does this opinion square with the traditional doctrine of the gratuity of the supernatural? Our late Holy Father, Pius XII, on August 12, 1950 (four years after the publication of *Surnaturel)* , declared in his encyclical *Humani generis:*

> Others destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision.[112]

De Lubac attacks those Thomists who hold for the impeccability of the angels in the natural order because this theory

[111] de Lubac, *op. cit.*, pp. *258-255.*

[112] Pius XII, *"Humani generis,"* AAS, 42:570, Oct., 1950.

seems to deprive the angel of his liberty,[113] This is a puerile objection unworthy of a theologian of de Lubac's stature. The perfection of free will consists precisely in an indifference of the will with regard to its choice of particular goods. This very indifference is a result of the fact that the will is previously determined by a natural and necessary love to an ultimate end which is seen as a common good. By comparison, all other goods are particular. Since the angel from the first moment of his existence contemplates God as his concrete ultimate end, the will of the angel will necessarily be moved to love this end, just as man must always love happiness; Since both the intellect and will of the angel are always actually engaged in a loving contemplation of God precisely as he is the Good, the Ultimate End of the angel, it is impossible for these spirits to make an erroneous practical judgment or to exercise their power of choice in a way that is disordered and not ruled by this end.

The fact that Thomists taught that the angels attained their natural beatitude by an act of natural love was also repugnant to de Lubac. In his opinion an act that was not free was imperfectly voluntary, purely physical and deprived of moral value.[114] Superficially, one might sympathize with this conclusion. There is a tendency for us instinctively to shrink away from the word" necessity," a word used most often to describe the behavior of animals or the inanimate world. We conceive of *liberty* as a power which sets man apart from the rest of the material universe, *necessity* as something which chains us to it. On the other hand, we know that in God the most rigorous necessity is found with regard to his most intimate life: the Father with utter necessity generates the Son; the Holy Spirit necessarily proceeds from both Father and Son, etc. Can we say that these processions in the Trinity are not voluntary even though they are obviously not free? In other words, we must determine whether the terms *free* and *voluntary* are coextensive, or whether *voluntary* may be a broader term embracing even some necessary activities.

[113] de Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

[114] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

John of St. Thomas provides a clarification with regard to the natural necessitation of the will. In the light of this distinction we can find a solution to our problem:

> The will can come to be necessitated in a twofold manner: 1) by the imperfection and restriction of the judgment *ad unum*, and consequently by the removal of the indifference of the will, as is the case in animals and in our indeliberate acts; fl) by the conformity of the whole universality of the potency, and then there no longer remains formal indifference toward acting or not acting . . . there remains only a universality in acting with full advertence, which is the root and the eminence of liberty.[115]

A close inspection of St. Thomas' requirements for a voluntary act reveals that freedom in the formal sense is not required for a voluntary act. Such an act requires but two conditions: an inclination from an intrinsic principle, and some knowledge of the end:

> Since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. . .. The movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word *voluntary* implies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination.[116]

It follows from this that the more perfect is one's knowledge of the end and the stronger is the inclination of his will with regard to this end, the more perfect will be the resulting voluntary act. Applying this doctrine to the angels' natural love for

[115] John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.;* V, disp. 8, a. 2, n. 18. "Voluntas necessita.ri provenire potest ex duplici capite: 1o ex imperfectione et coarctatione judicii ad unum, et consequenter ex remotione indifl'erentiae voluntatis, sicut in brutis, vel in motibus nostris 2° ex adequatione totius universalitatis potentiae, et tunc non manet formalis indifl'erentia ad operandum vel non operandum ... manet tamen universalitas in operando cum plena advertantia, quae radix est et eminentia liberta tis."

[116] I-II, 6, 1 c.

God, it is not hard to see that such a love is more perfectly voluntary than a love which results merely from free will. Natural love is an inclination to the end as such; elective or free love is *per se* concerned with the choice of means to an end. Further, the angel's natural knowledge of God as the first principle and last end of his nature imperates a conscious movement toward the divine Goodness as the object of all its natutal desires.

De Lubac's chief reason for belittling the value of natural love was that he considered it a non-moral act since it issued from necessity and not freedom. Must an act be free if it is to be a moral act? Nowhere does St. Thomas treat this question. But the Commentators take up a question analogous to ours: Is the act whereby man is beatified moral since it is not free? John of St. Thomas' answer is representative of the Thomistic position:

> It is denied that *amor beatificus* is not human and moral in a higher and more eminent manner and with all imperfections removed. For our free acts are moral and human insofar as they are capable of being ruled by the rule of reason, a regulating norm applied, as it were, extrinsically, and which can or cannot be applied to those acts; but beatific love is moral and human, not through an extrinsic application of the rule, but through an intimate and inseparable union with that rule.[111]
>
> Proportionally, there is liberty in such love, not formally and contingently with the ability to defect from the rule, but eminently, and with an indefectible union with the rule. Although formally it is a necessary act, it is not necessary by a necessity of imperfection as is the case in animals, . . . but it is necessary by a necessity of adequation with the total indifference and universality of the will, and such necessity is more eminent than any liberty.[118]

[117] John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, disp. 1, a. 1, n. 45. "Ad primum confirmationem negatur quod ille amor beatificus non sit humanus et moralis superiori et eminentiori modo, et semotis imperfectionibus. Nostri autem actus liberi sunt morales et humani inquantum regulabiles per regulam rationis quasi extrinsecus sibi applicatam et regulantem, quae potest illis applicari vel non applicari; amor autem beatificus est humanus et moralis, non per applicationem extrinsecam regulae sed per intimam et inseparabilem conjunctionem cum ilia."

[118] *Ibid.*, disp. S, a. !l, n. 47. "Proportionaliter invenitur in tali amore libertas,

Natural love, then, while it is not formally moral, is something better than moral. It is eminently moral. De Lubac seems quite false, then, in considering natural love as something " purely physical." [119] Natural love of God is not inferior to a formally moral act; it is preeminently superior to it.

In summary, Father de Lubac's near deification of freedom seems to be the underlying source of the extreme positions he maintains in *Surnaturel.* St. Thomas, of course, fully appreciated the importance of freedom, especially as it is a requisite for meriting. Nevertheless, he did not grant it an absolute value. St. Thomas teaches that Christ did not merit grace and the beatific vision, simply because this would have implied that Christ was deprived of those gifts at the first moment of his human existence. Such a privation seemed to the Holy Doctor as more prejudicial to the dignity of the Incarnate Word than the acquisition of those gifts by his personal merit would have increased it. [120] In God we find liberty joined to a necessary love of the divine Goodness, and accompanied by an absolute moral indefectibility. [121] Why, then, cannot such a condition exist with regard to a creature in a particular order?

To grant such an impeccability to a creature in no way tends to equate the creature with God, for this prerogative would come to the angel by reason of a spiritual perfection received at the moment of creation " insofar as he has his being and his completion only from another." [122] To claim impeccability for the angels in the sense that the Thomists explain it is merely to claim for a creature indefectibility in his own proper order, thanks to his natural gifts.

non formaliter et contingenter, et cum defectibilitate a regula, sed eminenter, et cum indefectibili conjunctione regulae. Et licet formaliter sit actus necessarius, non tamen necessitate imperfectionis, sicut in brutis, . . . est necessarius necessitate adaequationis, cum tota indifferentia et universalitate voluntatis, quae necessitae eminentior est quacumque libertate."

[119] de Lubac, *op. cit.,* p. !!45.

[""] III, 19, S.

[""]I, 19, S.

[122] II Sent., dist. 7, q. 1, a. 1. " ... secundum quod esse et completionem suam non habet nisi ab alio."

On the other hand, to speak of an essential ordination of intellectual creatures to the vision of God, as de Lubac implies, is indeed to usurp an exclusively divine prerogative. Gagnebet has rightly concluded of this position: " (That is) a singular system of truth which, in order to exalt the dignity of the created spirit and to glorify the supernatural, deprives the creature of his specific perfection and the supernatural of its absolute transcendence! " [123]

B. *The position of Maritain*

We cannot hope to present an adequate critique of all the interpretations proposed by Maritain in his recently published article " *La peche de l'ange."* The extent of his inquiry into the possibility of the angels' natural impeccability far exceeds the scope of this article. We will limit ourselves to considering only those aspects of his interpretation which pertain more or less directly to our particular thesis. Happily, we are considerably aided in this matter by M. Maritain's practice of reducing his conclusions to formulas of sentence length.

After explaining the principles which serve as a basis for his interpretation of the angels' peccability, Maritain reduces all that he has said to the following two formulas and a corollary:

I) The *right moral life* of every intelligent creature, insofar as he does not have beatitude, depends upon the *love of free option* for God above everything else, and *not* on any sort of *natural and necessary* love for God above everything else.[124]

An intellectual creature cannot attain that love of God upon which all right moral life depends *solely by virtue of his creation, or by the elan of his nature at its first instant.* [125]

3) It is impossible that an intellectual creature *solely by virtue of his creation or by the dynamism of his nature at its first instant should arrive at the love of God by which he enters into the enjoyment of his ultimate end.*[126]

[108] M. R. Gagnebet, 0. P., "L'amour nature! de Dieu chez Saint Thomas et ses contemporains," *Revue Thomiste,* 48:894, Ill, 1948, p. 84. ' Singulier system a Ia verite qui, pour exalter la dignite de l'esprit cree et magnifier le sumaturel, prive Ia creature de sa perfection specifique et le sumaturel de sa transcendance absolue! " ,.. Maritain, "Le peche," p. 207. [12-] *Ibid.,* p. 209. [126] *Ibid.,* p. 211.

Having reduced his conclusions to the above statements, Maritain proceeds to apply them to the will of the angel both as elevated to the order of grace [127] and as in the state of pure nature. We shall consider his conclusions only as applied iii the latter case.

Granting the hypothesis that the angels could have been created and ordered to a purely natural end, we can distinguish two moments in the movement of their wills toward beatitude.128 In the first moment the angelic will, possessing the three forms of natural love that Maritain subtly distinguishes for it, as well as elective love, is moved by God to its first act. This first act is inevitably good, since God specifies the motion of the will. This moment in which natural love plays the chief role is the moment *par excellence* of the will considered formally *ut natura.* This natural love is not intrinsically free, although free will *can* impede its act (but *de facto* does not). This is the love that follows upon the angel's knowledge of God in the first moment of its existence.[129]

The second moment pertains to the will formally *ut libera.* This is the first moment in which the free will is exercised in a positive way. By its act of liberty, the angel either chooses to love God above all things in the natural order, or else he chooses something other than God. In the first case the angel seconds the movement of his elicited natural love; in the second case, the angel nullifies and loses forever this elicited natural love. Thus the good angels are divided from the bad. In this same act of liberty, the good angels by their free act of love for God above everything would not only have merited their natural beatitude, but *ipso facto* would have been established in that state. On the other hand, the bad angels in this same .act would be permanently placed in a state of sin and misery.[130]

A CRITIC OF MARITAIN'S POSITION

From even so sketchy a statement of Maritain's ideas, it becomes abundantly clear that he is convinced the problem is

[127] *Ibid.,* pp. 224-234.
[128] *Ibid.,* pp. 284-286.
[129] *Ibid.,* pp. 284-285.
[130] *Ibid.,* pp. 285-286.

to be solved on the basis of a necessary defectibility of the will with respect to any object save God as seen in the beatific vision. Fully to appreciate his mind in the matter one would have to investigate the raw materials from which he manufactured his formulas. We will find, I think, that his chief error is his tendency to exaggerate the importance of free will and to misinterpret the true role of elective love. In his explanation of the relationship between natural and elective love, natural love seems to be a thing of little consequence. This is definitely not the attitude of St. Thomas in the *Summa.* [131]

Maritain's first presupposition is that the will does not of itself require ignorance of error as a preliminary condition for its free act of choice. He develops this point at great length, supporting his view by a text from the *Summa* (I, 63, 1 ad 4) where St. Thomas defines his notion of a sin caused by a voluntary non-consideration of the. rule of morality when it is demanded. We completely agree with M. Maritain's explanation of this principle, but we object to his application of it. His use of the principle seems to be this:

One who is not his own rule of morality can sin by a voluntary non-consideration of this rule when such consideration is due in the placing of a moral act. But the angels are not their own rule of morality; therefore the angels can sin, etc.

In other words, Maritain seems to insist that all creatures can sin because they are not their own rule of morality. However, what is essential in this matter is not that one can sin because he is not the rule of his actions, but rather that he can sin *by failing to consider the rule when he is bound to do so.* This is the statement that ought to be the major of the above syllogism. Maritain equates " one who is not his own rule of morality " with " one who can fail to consider the rule of morality." The truth is that the former statement has greater extension than the latter. Maritain attributes to the whole what is true only of the part. God, of course, is the only intelligent being who is the rule of his own acts, and is therefore

[181] I, 60 (tota questio).

utterly indefectible. But the angel, as Cajetan points out,[132] is indefectible with regard to all natural objects, and can sin only because he is defectible with regard to *something,* namely, the supernatural order. Why cannot the angels fail in the natural order? The answer must be that it is impossible for them to fail to consider the rule of their moral acts. As we have already explained, this is due to the fact that the angel's natural knowledge and love of God is always in second act with respect to the rule. Yet this obvious conclusion Maritain ignores.

Maritain's second formula asserts that the acquisition of one's ultimate end in the natural order differs structurally from the attainment of the ultimate supernatural end. Knowledge alone suffices to acquire the vision of God-the supernatural end. But for the attainment of the natural end, knowledge must be coupled with love, for when God is not seen intuitively, "it is better to love God than to know him." We can agree with Maritain in his conclusion. However, we must take exception to his final statement:

> For as long as God is not intuitively seen, *melior est amor Dei quam cognitio,* it is better to love Him than to know Him. The highest natural contemplation of God, angelic or human, cannot be made fl:nal happiness except by the love which makes the contemplated object the supreme joy and delight of the one contemplating, just because it is loved above all.
>
> If, furthermore (always in the hypothesis of pure nature) that final happiness is inadmissible, it is because the intelligent creature is fixed forever in the act of love for God above all. His liberty would have produced that act either in the instant in which his soul was separated from the body or in that in which the pure spirit made his choice.lBS

Without the citation of a single authority, or any attempt to prove his position, he flatly states that the attainment of natural beatitude on the part of the angel is the result of the act of free choice. In other words, the permanence of the angel's natural happiness is not due to the fact that the naturally elicited love of the angel is necessarily specified by God known

[132] Cajetan, *op. cit.,* I, 6S, n. *5.*

[188] Maritain, *op. cit.,* pp. !l02-!WS.

as the supreme Good to be loved above all things for his own sake. But as we shall see, Maritain, like de Lubac, so insists on the supremacy of that he more or less completely disregards a creature's natural and necessary operations. How contrary to St. Thomas' doctrine on natural love is this viewpoint will be evident in our refutation of the individual formulas proposed by Maritain.

The doctrine propounded by Maritain in his third formula results from an astounding division of natural love. Whereas St. Thomas, in the sixtieth question of the *Summa* was content merely to distinguish natural love from elective love and say that the former existed in a subject according to its nature, Maritain applies all possible species of natural love to the angels. He attributes to them four kinds of love.

1) ontological natural love: This is simply the radical inclination of all beings to the good. In the angels it is one with the very essence of their being. Such love is inamissible and is possessed even by the demons.

2) ontological intra-elicited love: By this form of love the creature loves necessarily and with an elicited love the good of his own nature. This love is also inamissible. This is especially the love St. Thomas had in mind in writing the sixtieth question of the *Summa.*

3) elicited natural love: This love arises when the intelligent creature, prior to any act of choice, has the supreme Good presented to it by its intellect. Of itself this love is necessary, but it differs from the previous two forms in that it .depends indirectly and extrinsically on free will. Free will can impede this movement in the same way that it can impede all the indeliberate movements of the elicited appetite. But though free will is able to frustrate this love, *de facto* it never does so. Such an elicited love for the supreme Whole is founded in the angel's natural love for himself. Yet the two loves are quite distinct, and so by the intervention of free will the love for the Whole can cease while self-love continues to exist. Consequently, this love is lost by the angels through sin.

4) love of free choice or elective love: In every intellectual creature there exists a natural inclination (emanating necessarily from nature but not imposing any necessity on the will). to love the supreme Whole more than self·with an elicited love of free choice. The intellectual creature is inclined by his nature to this love which is essentially free in the very manner of its emanation. Maritain insists that this love must be free. His reason for the need of a love that is free is interesting:

> The intelligent creature is inclined by his nature to this love which is essentially free in its mode of emanation. He is inclined or disposed, but not determined, to it by his nature, because it is essential to such an act of love (which goes to God not only according as He is the supreme Whole and common good of all, but also according as He is infinitely separated from all in the mystery of His proper essence) to proceed positively and directly from liberty. As a result, the intelligent creature can, if he so wills, refuse to perform that act which is, nevertheless, natural for him in the sense which we have just indicated. [134]

Anyone familiar with St. Thomas' treatment of natural and free love as found in the angels [135] cannot but be amazed by this division proposed by M. Maritain. He presents no foundation for his division, and cites no authorities for his terminology (which is by no means common in scholastic circles). This is clear when we compare his doctrine of love with the teaching clearly defined by St. Thomas in the *Summa*.

In the first article of the sixtieth question [136] St. Thomas asks whether natural love exists in the angels. 'This is his only conclusion in the body of the article: " In the intellectual nature there is found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, an inclination according to the sensitive appetite; but in a nature which is devoid of cognition, (there is found an inclination) only according to the tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will." All creatures have a natural love; the superior nature of the angel gives rise to a superior expression of natural love.

,•• *Ibid.,* pp. 206-207. [135] I, 60 (tota questio). [188] *Loc. cit.*

We might ask whether the division of natural love given by Maritain is based on the threefold genera of natural inclinations proposed by St. Thomas, for his description seems to conform to these classes of appetites. But Maritain himself forbids us to make this conclusion, for at the end of his explanation of " intraelicited ontological love," he asserts that it is precisely this type of love that St. Thomas has in mind throughout I, 60. Although only beings capable of cognition are the subjects of this particular expression of natural love, nevertheless this love of the Supreme Whole is *not* a result of *knCYWledge* of the Whole. This love, then, is properly found in merely sensible creatures, and is possessed by the angels only virtually and eminently. Surely it is St. Thomas' explicit intention to grant the angels a natural love that is proper to them as intellectual creatures.

It is our opinion that Maritain has perceived the same distinction that we have made in our treatment of the angels' natural love for God-the distinction between the natural love in which the creature considers himself in relation to the created Whole, and the love in which the creature sees himself in relation to God. These two aspects of natural love would be equivalent to the second and third types respectively in Maritain's division. As we have seen, the natural love of God which is consequent upon the spiritual creature's consideration of himself in relation to God is not to be explained, properly speaking, by an appeal to the doctrine of the part and the Whole, but rather by a consideration of the notion of participation. Maritain failed to perceive that St. Thomas' use of the part and the whole in I, 60, *5* was intended as a mere *manuductio* guiding us to a consideration of this love in terms of participation.

In our criticism of de Lubac we demonstrated that a natural and necessary love of God can be both a perfectly voluntary act and an eminently moral one. What we have said will apply equally to Maritain's insistance that a creature's love of God, to be worthy of beatitude (in the natural order), must be an elective love.

To sum up, Maritain has utterly failed to grasp St. Thomas' mind concerning the *voluntas ut natura* and the *voluntas ut ratio.* In his teaching on this matter, St. Thomas always held for the superiority of the former over the latter. He consistently maintains that the *voluntas ut natura* stands in the same relation of perfection to the *voluntas ut ratio* as the habit of *intellectus* does to the habit of *scientia.* The *ratio* of the will as a faculty is first and foremost to attain the end. This ordination of the will to the end is the proper *munus* of the *voluntas ut natura.* On the other hand, free will *per se* is concerned only with the choice of means which are indifferently good. Man alone has freedom with regard to his material end *in cxmcreto.* But this is a result not of his perfection in the hierarchy of beings, but rather of his great imperfection in the genus of intellectual creatures.

These basic notions of will have been misunderstood and misapplied by Maritain. Actually, his opinions are strongly redolent of the tenets of de Lubac. Unlike de Lubac, however, Maritain does admit the possibility of a natural beatitude for intellectual creatures.

II. AN EXAMINATION OF ST. THOMAS' TEXTS REGARDING THE PECCABILITY OF THE ANGELS: A REFUTATION OF DE BLIC AND PHILLIP OF THE TRINITY.

We do not intend to examine all the texts that might possibly be cited for or against our position. We plan, rather, to select those texts in which the Holy Doctor explicitly treats of the peccability of the angels. Whether St. Thomas held irreconcilable positions on this matter (as de Blic proposes) or whether he consistently teaches that the angels are able to sin irrespective of the supernatural order (as Phillip of the Trinity maintains)- in any case his teaching should be apparent in his formal study of the angel's peccability.

These texts will be taken in their chronological order. Yet it should be remembered that if St. Thomas held an opinion in his earlier works which he abandoned in later writings, this fact

alone does not argue to his holding irreconcilable positions. Any writer can change his opinion. One can legitimately argue to irreconcilable positions only if St. Thomas proposes two opinions in the same work which are mutually contradictory.

With this in mind, we can begin our study of the texts. The procedure will be the same for all the texts: 1) we will state the context, 2) we will give the text, and 3) we will briefly interpret the text in relation to its context. Our judgment will be based on the answers to two questions: a) is St. Thomas speaking of the natural or supernatural order? and b) does he explain the root cause of the angels' peccability in a way that is impossible to them in the natural order?

A. *Commentary on the Sentences (1254-1256)*

Context: St. Thomas has just completed his study of the nature and faculties of the angels. He now inquires into their ultimate end. He asks whether the angels possessed their beatitude at the moment of creation; [137] whether they were created in grace; [138] and finally whether they could sin.[139] This last question is asked in the context of their supernatural elevation. [140]

Text: We will quote three texts. The first will give St. Thomas' answer to the question of the possibility of the angels' being created in possession of their beatitude:

> The angel's intellect sees (God) by a natural cognition through His similitude acquired in himself . . . the vision by which the angel sees God is similar to the vision by which one sees a man through the similitude immediately received from him . . . and in this beatitude of the divine vision, which is by nature due to the angels, the angels were created; and this is their perfection according to that time. But there is another perfection, to which they could not attain through their nature, of which nevertheless they are capable: the vision of God himself in his Essence . . . and in this

[187] *Super Libros Sent.,* II, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.
[188] *Ibid.,* a. S.
[180] *Ibid.,* II, d. *5,* q. 1, a. 1.
[""] *Ibid.,* q. 1.

beatitude they were not created, but attained to it, some of them falling.[141]

The second text regards the possibility of the angels' sinning:

The manner in which they sinned is difficult to see; because there can be no sin in the will unless there is some deception in the reason ... (The Philosopher) in Bk. VII, ch. 3 of his Ethics distinguishes a two-fold cognition of things that ought to be done: one universal, the other particular. Since operations have to do with particulars, a man who understands a universal premise correctly can err in particulars. Particulars likewise can be known in two ways: actually and habitually. It can happen, then, that a person who sins habitually has a right estimation of what he ought to do in particular instances, but his knowledge is not *actual.* For in us the habit (of right judgment) can be so bound by passion that it does not go into actual consideration of what ought to be done . . . But even though the angels' judgment cannot be impeded in this way, since such passions do not exist in them, (their judgment) can still be restricted inasmuch as through a consideration of one particular matter it is withdrawn from the consideration of another; for the angelic intellect does not grasp several things at once, except as all things are contemplated in the Word. It can be, finally, that something must be done according to the consideration of one aspect of a thing which, according to a consideration of all the aspects of the matter, must not be done. And thus an erroneous choice in the angels is able to be a sin.[142]

[141] *Ibid.,* II, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1. "Intellectus autem angeli naturali cognitione (Deum) videt per similitudinem eius acquisitam in ipso ... visio qua angelus videt Deum est similis visioni qua aliquis videt hominem per similitudinem immediate ab ipso receptam .... et in hac beatitudine visionis divinae, quae naturaliter angelis debetur, angeli creati sunt; et haec est perfectio eorum secundum tempus illud. Sed est alia perfectio, in quam per naturam suam non possunt devenire, cuius tamen capaces sunt: ut scilicet ipsum Deum in essentia sua videant . . . et in hac beatitudine creati non sunt, sed ad earn, aliis cadentibus pervenerunt."

[142] *Ibid.,* II, d. *5,* q. 1, a. 1. 'Quomodo autem peccaverunt, difficile est videre; quia non potest esse peccatum in voluntate, nisi sit aliquomodo deceptio in ratione; unde omnis malum est quodamodo ignorans ut in III Ethic., cap. 1, dicit Philosophus quod qualiter sit videndum est ad propositae quaestionis intellectum. Ipse enim distinguit in VII Ethic., cap. 3, operandorum duplicem cognitionem, scilicet universalem et particularem: et quia operationes sunt circa singularia, ideo aliquem recte in universali opinantem, circa singularia peccare contingit. Singularia enim contingit cognoscere dupliciter, scilicet in habitu et in actu. Contigit ergo aliquem peccantem rectam existimationem etiam de singulari operabili in habitu habere, non

The third text concerns the nature of the sin committed by the fallen angels. It answers the question whether these angels sinned by seeking to be equal to God.

. . . for he wishes to attain to the perfection of beatitude through his natural faculties; and therefore it is said that he desires to have without meriting what would have been his through his merits if he had persevered.[143]

Summary: Even in this early work, St. Thomas distinguishes a twofold beatitude for the angels; one natural, the other supernatural. They were created in immediate possession of their natural beatitude. This perfection was common to all the angels. The supernatural beatitude was beyond their natural powers to attain. The angels were not created in immediate possession of this beatitude, nor did all of them finally attain it. This doctrine is repeated almost verbatim in the *Summa,* I, q. 62, a. 1. Here we have clear evidence that even as a young professor, St. Thomas taught the relative impeccability of the angels as stated in our thesis.

In the second text St. Thomas has not yet formulated (or at least has not explicitly stated) his theory of the non-consideration of the rule as the cause of the defection of the bad angels. Yet the explanation that he gives cannot be applied to the angels relative to the natural order, for it is impossible for them to sin from ignorance.

The third text explicitly says that the bad angels sinned directly against the order of grace.

tamen in actu; quia in nobis habitus passione ligatur ne in actum exeat circa considerationem particularis operandi . . . Sed quamvis hoc modo in angelis iudicium intellectus lig.1ri non possit, eo quod tales passiones in eis non sunt, potest tamen ligari inquantum considerando unum retrahitur a consideratione alterius; eo quod eius intellectus simul plurium non est, nisi sicut in verbo omnia contemplatur. contigit autem aliquid esse eligendum secundum unam conditionem rei consideratam, quod tamen eligendum non est, omnibus conditionibus concurrentibus consideratis; et ita potuit in angelis error electionis esse et peccatum."

us *Ibid.,* a. 2. "Voluit etiam per sua naturalia in perfectionem beatitudinis pervenire; et idea dicitur quod sine merito habere voluit hoc quod ex meritis habiturus esset si perstitisset."

B. *The De Veritate (1256-1259)*

Context: Question twenty-four of the *De Veritate* has to do with the nature of free will. In the seventh article of this question St. Thomas asks whether it is possible for the free will of any creature to be confirmed in good. It is clear from the third *sed contra* that St. Thomas is arguing from the *fact* of sin (in both angels and men) against the objector who propounds reasons for the impeccability of spiritual creatures.w That his intention is to explain the metaphysical foundation for the absolute possibility of sin for all creatures if left to their natural powers is clear in the fourth *sed contra* where he introduces the necessity of grace for the attainment of beatitude. [145]

Text:

There is not and cannot be any creature whose free choice is naturally confirmed in good so that the inability to sin belong to it by its purely natural endowments. The reason is this. A failure .in an action is caused by a failure in the principles of the action. Consequently, if there is something in which the principles of action cannot fail in themselves nor be hindered by something extrinsic, its action cannot possibly fail. . . . God alone is pure act, admitting no admixture of any potentiality, and thus is pure and absolute goodness. But any creature is a particular good, since it has in its very nature the admixture of potentiality, which belongs to it because it is made out of nothing. [146]

In the answer to the tenth objection St. Thomas makes it quite clear that he is concerned only with absolute peccability.

Since civic happiness is not hapiness without qualification, it does not have invariability without qualification; but it is called unvarying because it is not easily changed. Yet even if civic happiness

[145] " Praeterea, liberum arbitrium non invenitur in aliqua creatura, nisi in angelo et in homine. Sed tam homo quam angelus peccavit. Ergo nullius creaturae liberum arbitrium est naturaliter confirmatum in bono." *Ibid., sed contra,* S.

[146] " Praeterea, nulla creatura rationalis impeditur a beatitudine consequenda nisi rationalis esset naturaliter impeccabilis, ex puris naturalibus sine gratia ad beatitudinem possit pervenire; quod Pelagianam heresim sapere videtur." *Ibid., sed contra,* 4.

ue *De Veritate,* !'l4, 7 c.

were simply unvarying, it would not follow on this account that free choice would be naturally confirmed in good. For we are not speaking of something natural in the sense that it can be acquired by the principles of nature, as political virtues can be called natural, but in the sense that it follows from the necessity of the principles of nature. [147]

Summary: All that can legitimately be drawn from this text is that all creatures are capable of sinning absolutely because they are *ex nihilo.* St. Thomas does not deny the possibility of a free will that is relatively impeccable; he simply prescinds from the question, as we see from his answer to the tenth objection already quoted. This twenty-fourth question of the *De Veritate* is not specifically concerned with angels, but rather with free will. The Saint merely wishes to conclude that the free will of all creatures is defectible and, as such, will actually defect if left to its own natural powers. This does not mean that the angelic will must be defectible in every order; it suffices for the universal truth of the principle that the angelic will be defectible with respect to an order superior to its own proper order.

C. *The Summa Contra Gentiles (1258-1264.)*

Context: Our text is taken from the third book of the *Contra Gentiles.* Here St. Thomas takes up the question of the divine providence of the universe. He shows that the execution of God's providence is achieved through the mediation of secondary causes. These intermediary causes are hierarchically arranged so that the superior cause rules the inferior. Finally he arrives at that aspect of divine government which is outside the normal course of the laws of nature. Here he considers miracles and magic. Regarding the latter, St. Thomas attacks two popu]ar misconceptions of his age; in so doing he shows that the intellectual substances appealed to by magic were not naturally evil, and that the spiritual substances appealed to

[147] *Ibid.,* ad 10.

were capable of sin.[148] Our present text demonstrates precisely how " sin can occur in the demons, and in what way."[149]

As there is an order in agent causes, so also is there one in final causes, so that, for instance, a secondary end depends on a principal one, just as a secondary agent depends on a principal one. Now, something wrong happens in the case of agent causes when a secondary agent departs from the order of the principal agent . . . So, too, in the case of final causes, when a secondary end is not included under the order of the principal end, there results a sin of the will, whose object is the good and the end.

Now, every will naturally wishes what is a proper good for the volitional agent, namely, perfect being itself, and it cannot will the contrary of this. So, in the case of a volitional agent whose proper good is the ultimate end, no sin of the will can occur, for the ultimate end is not included under the order of another end; instead, all other ends are contained under its order. Now, this kind of volitional agent is God, whose being is the highest goodness, which is the ultimate end. Hence, in God there can be no sin of the will.

But in any other kind of volitional agent, whose proper good must be included under the order of another good, it is possible for sin of the will to occur, if it be considered in its own nature. Indeed, although natural inclination of the will is present in every volitional agent to will and to love its own perfection so that it cannot will the contrary of this, yet it is not so naturally implanted in the agent to so order its perfection to another end, that it cannot fail in regard to it, for the higher end is not proper to its nature, but to a higher nature. It is left, then, to the agent's choice, to order his own proper perfection to a higher end . . . Therefore, it was possible for sin to occur in the will of a separate substance, because it did not order its proper good and perfection to its ultimate end, but stuck to its own good as an end. And because the rules of action must be derived from the end, the consequence is that this separate substance tried to arrange for the regulation of other beings from himself wherein he had established his end, and thus this will was not regulated by another, higher one. But this function belongs to God alone.[150]

Summary: A superficial consideration of this text divorced from its context might lead one to conclude that the angels,

148 *Contra Gent.*, III, c. 109.
149 Title of chapter 109.
150 *Contra Gent.*, III, 109.

like man, desire happiness as their proper perfection, but can place this idea of happiness, again like man, in a concrete end other than God (even in the natural order) . Thus, one would conclude that the angel remains free even with regard to his natural end.

A closer examination of the text and context dispels this notion. It must be remembered that St. Thomas is not giving an exhaustive treatise on the angels in Book III of the *Contra Gentiles.* He is formally concerned with the divine government of the universe. The question of the peccability of the angels is occasioned by the latent objection to his thesis that magical rites are effective through the intervention of demons, namely, that spiritual substances could not sin.[151] Thus, we cannot expect the precision here that would be demanded in a formal tract on the angels.

With this in mind, it becomes evident that the term " *finis ultimus* " in the text does not refer to the " proper good of the agent willing" which necessitates the will under the aspect of a natural end, e. g., happiness as regards man; rather, " ultimate end "refers to the supernatural end, i.e., God seen in his essence. The perfection of the creature is subordinated to this transcendent end. Thus St. Thomas can declare, " . . . it is not so *naturally* implanted in the agent to so order its perfection to another end, that it cannot fail in regard to it; *for the higher end is not proper to its nature, but to a higher nature."* [152]

Our only conclusion from this text, as in the text from the *De Veritate,* is that the angels can fail with respect to an end superior to their own proper end. There is no mention of the possibility of defecting with regard to the angel's proper order.

D. *The Summa Theologiae (1267-1268)*[153]

Context: We are in the midst of St. Thomas' formal tract on the angels.[153] He has finished his consideration of the nature,

[151] Courtes, *loc. cit.*

[m] *Contra Gent., loc. cit.* (My emphasis).

[158] We use Mandonnet's date for the *prima para.* Grabmann places its date at 1266.

intellect and will of the angels. He has begun a threefold consideration of their creation: 1) creation in the natural order/ [54] their elevation to grace and glory/ [55] and 3) the defection of the bad angels. [156] Our text is the opening article of this last consideration.

Text: St. Thomas answers the question "Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels" in this way:

An angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to sin, such a creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of rectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God's act, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every desire by a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature; considering the condition of its nature. [157]

This is St. Thomas' direct answer to the question raised in the title of the article. In the third objection, St. Thomas poses a problem that is vital to our position. We give both the objection and answer of St. Thomas.

Objection: What is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is natural for the angels to be moved by the motion of love toward God. Therefore such love cannot be taken from them. But in loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.

Answer: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being.

[16·] I, 50-65. [10S] I, 61. [108] I, 62. [107] 1, 68, 1 c.

comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away by smnmg.

Summary: This is a crucial article for our thesis. It is from the *Summa* that we would like to find the greatest support for our solution, not only because it is the product of St. Thomas' mature synthesis, but also because it contains his only complete treatise on the theology of the angels. After studying this article, de Blic was forced to conclude that St. Thomas was juxtaposing two irreconcilable opinions: [158] 1) the opinion in the body of the article that all creatures are capable of sinning in *every* order, and the opinion in the response to the third objection that the angels were incapable of sinning in the natural order. As we have said, this is a serious charge against a teacher of St. Thomas' stature. Yet we believe that if one does not accept our thesis he is forced to conclude to de Blic's position.

Properly to interpret this article we must recall that St. Thomas is proceeding formally as a theologian throughout the *Summa.* When he inquires whether sin can be committed by an angel his primary concern is to explain what has been divinely revealed in the matter. It is of faith that some of the angels sinned. In the body of the article, then, St. Thomas directly answers the question proposed. His reply, of course, is affirmative. In his explanation he insists that no intellectual creature, whether angel or man, is impeccable by his own natural powers. Only a being who is *in se* the measure of his own activity is capable of producing rectified acts necessarily and by reason of his own nature. Among moral beings, God alone is the rule of his acts by nature. He alone, therefore, is naturally and *absolutely* impeccable. Other creatures produce rectified acts only insofar as they are ruled by the divine rule of morality. If perchance some creature is impeccable, he is so not because of his nature, but by reason of a special gift of grace.

The doctrine presented in the body of the article leaves no

[108] de Blic, *op. cit.,* p. !!47.

room, it seems, for our thesis. But if we study the body of the article in the light of the responses to the objections, we find that our thesis is not only in perfect harmony with the mind of the Angelic Doctor, but that it alone can save him from de Blic's charge of self-contradiction.

The third objection argues that the angels cannot sin because they love God above all things with a necessary and natural love. In his answer St. Thomas explains that the angels' natural love is ordered to God as he is the principle of their natural being. The angels, however, have been elevated to a supernatural end; for the attainment of this end, natural love is not enough. Only the love proceeding from infused charity can love God above all things as He is the author of this supernatural order. Against this order the angel can sin, if left to his natural powers.

Are the two seemingly contradictory propositions given above really irreconcilable? The apparent contradiction is solved in the light of the answer to the fourth objection. In his answer St. Thomas grants that the angels could not sin from ignorance, passion or malice. They could sin, however, simply by proceeding to make a choice without a consideration of the rule of morality. The resulting act would not be measured by the divine rule of morality and consequently would lack due rectitude. We have already explained in detail the implications of this non-consideration of the rule. It is the key which reconciles the doctrine of the *corpus* with the teaching in the answer to the third objection.

Examining the *corpus* and the third response in the light of St. Thomas' answer to the fourth objection we can draw the following conclusions, all of them perfectly reconcilable:

1) The angels are not naturally impeccable because they are not the rule of their moral activity.

2) The angels are impeccable with regard to their natural end because their knowledge and love of God as their natural end and rule of morality is always in second act. They cannot fail to consider this rule in their free choices. Consequently, all

their actions in the natural order are properly regulated by the divine measure.

S) The angelic intellect and will are not always in second act with respect to God as the rule and end of the supernatural order. Therefore they can proceed to an act of choice without due consideration of their supernatural rule. Consequently they can sin against their supernatural end.

Our entire thesis, then, is implicitly contained in this article of the *Summa.*

E. *The De Malo (1268-1269)*

Context: The sixteenth question of the *De Malo* is concerned with special questions about the fallen angels. Our text is taken from the third article, in which St. Thomas inquires into the nature of angelic sin.

Text:

God, by his essence, is subsisting being itself. It is impossible for there to be two self-subsisting beings, just as there cannot be two separate ideas of man, nor two whitenesses subsisting separately. Whatever is from another, then, necessarily participates in being, because it cannot be equal to what is essentially being itself. The devil in his own state could not be ignorant of this: for it is of the nature of a separated intelligence to understand his own essem;e, and thus he naturally knew that his own being participated in the existence of a higher being; this natural knowledge in him was not corrupted by sin.

And whatever else can be said as regards the order of nature could not have been the cause of evil in him; for evil is not found in those things which are always in act, but only in those things in which potency is able to be separated from act . . . But all the angels are so created that whatever pertains to their natural perfection they possessed from the very moment of their creation: but they were in potency as regards supernatural goods, which they were able to attain through the grace of God. It must be concluded that the sin of the devil did not consist in something pertaining to the natural order, but in something regarding the supernatural. [159]

[1] ··· *De Malo,* 16, S. "Deus per suam essentiam est ipsum esse subsistens; nee est possibile esse duo hujusmodi, sicut nee possibile esse duas ideas hominis separatas,

Summary: This is St. ·Thomas' most explicit statement in favor of our thesis. It scarcely needs comment. The angel has sinned in the supernatural and could sin in that order alone. St. Thomas' reason is that the angels are always in perfect possession of all that pertains to their natural perfection. They are always in second act with regard to knowledge of their essence. Comprehending in a single intuition his essence, the angel immediately knows God as imaged in that essence. By the same intuition he knows that God is to be loved above all things as the supreme Being from whom all his perfections derive. Following upon this knowledge, the will inclines toward God as its ultimate end with a natural love. This love is also in second act at all times, and cannot fail since it follows the intellect in its unfailing knowledge of God as the supreme Good to be loved above all things. Sin, then, cannot exist in the angels with regard to their natural end because both their intellects and wills are always in second act *in Deum,* In the supernatural order the situation is quite different. The angel's intellect is not always in act with regard to God as supernatural End. The angel can fail to consider his dependence upon God in this order of grace, and consequently fail to direct his acts toward this end. Not being measured by the divine rule, these acts would be defective and sinful.

In this text St. Thomas makes an explicit appeal to the doctrine of participation to explain the indefectibility of the angels in the natural order. Here we have a direct confirmation

aut duas albedines per se substantes. Unde quidquid aliud ab eo est, necesse est quod sit· tamquam participans esse, quod non potest esse aequale ei quod est essentialiter ipsum esse. Nee hoc potuit diabolus in sua conditione ignorare: naturae enim est intelligentiae, sive intellectui separato, quod intelligat substantiam suam: et sic naturaliter cognoscebat quod esse suum erat ab aliquo superiori participatum; quae quidem cognitio naturalis in eo nondum erat corrupta per peccatum ...

Et quidquid aliud dici potest quod ad ordinem naturae pertineat, in hoc ejus malum consistere non potuit: malum enim non invenitur in his quae sunt semper actu ... Angeli autem omnes sic conditi sunt, ut quidquid pertinet ad naturalem perfectionem eorum, statim a principia suae creationis habuerint: tamen erant in potentia ad supernaturalia bona, quae per Dei gratiam consequi poterant. Unde relinquitur quod peccatum diaboli non fuerit in aliquo quod pertinet ad ordinem naturalem, sed secundum aliquid supernaturale."

of the interpretation we gave to I, 60, *5* in our consideration of the angel's natural love for Good above all things.

CoNCLUSION

We have reached the end of our formal investigation of the problem of the angels' impeccability regarding their natural end. We concluded from the principles of St. Thomas that it is impossible for the angels to· sin *per se primo, directe* and *immediate* against their natural end.

Since we were concerned with the possibility of sin in the angels, it was necessary to consider the angelic intellect and will, the principles of angelic operations. It was necessary to understand, too, the various possible causes of sin.

From our study of the angelic intellect we came to the very important conclusion that the angels knew God in second act from the first instant of their creation. Further, we showed that the angels could never fail actually to consider God as naturally known.

Our treatment of the angelic will terminated in an equally important conclusion: the angels loved God above all things with a natural love. This love was consequent upon the angels' knowledge of God, and was as permanent and unfailing as that knowledge.

In discussing the causes of sin it became apparent that the angels could not sin in the natural order from ignorance, passion or malice, or from failing to place a free act without considering the rule of morality. This ended our formal demonstration.

In refuting the objections to our thesis, we defended the supremacy of the angel's natural love against de Lubac and Maritain, who held exaggerated notions of freedom. We concluded that the angels' natural love was eminently voluntary and moral. Our refutation of de Blic and Phillip of the Trinity necessitated a study of the texts of St. Thomas. Far from concluding with de Blic that St. Thomas held irreconcilable views on this matter, we showed that St. Thomas' thought was self-consistent and in harmony with our solution. Both de Blic

and Phillip of the Trinity failed to distinguish between relative and absolute impeccability.

A theological study of the angels would be deficient no matter what its profundity, if it did not terminate in a greater knowledge of God. This is obvious, since God himself is the proper object of the theologian's study. We hope that this limited study of the angels has at least shown the necessity of purging the mind of all anthropomorphisms when engaging in theological discussion. We hope further that this paper will lead to a more perfect knowledge of God who is imaged in the angels so much more perfectly than in man.

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UNDERSTANDING ACCORDING TO BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, S. J.

PART III

IN TWO previous articles [1] we have outlined Lonergan's theory of understanding and sketched the philosophical synthesis erected on this theory. Any attempt to evaluate this synthesis presents some formidable and rather peculiar difficulties. To grasp the nature of these difficulties let us consider two possible approaches to a critical evaluation.

To criticize Lonergan from above, one would have to develop or assimilate a more comprehensive and more precise synthesis and judge Lonergan from the vantage point of this superior system. Unfortunately, I know of no such synthesis. If such a synthesis does exist, I certainly have not assimilated it. Accordingly, criticism from above is excluded. What of an evaluation from below, a critical investigation of Lonergan's doctrine on a point by point basis? Such a criticism certainly seems feasible, for Lonergan does not and can not have professional competence in all the different fields of knowledge he discusses. Anyone attempting to try Lonergan by such a plodding prosecution will find him peculiarly invulnerable to this evaluation by induction.

To see the reason for this, let us consider an hypothetical example. Suppose a psychiatrist were to reject Lonergan's doctrine that a neurosis is caused by the refusal of unwanted insights. [2] Lonergan could reply by analyzing the analysist's refutation and showing him that it was based: first, on a more

[1] " Understanding according to Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. J., I & II". Hereafter these will be referred to as I & II.

[2] This is explained in *Imight.* chap. v'i, sect. 2. 7. Actually many psychiatrists present explanations of neuroses that are roughly equivalent. See, e. g., Karen Horney's explanation of "alienation from self" in *Neurosis and Human Growth* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950) chap. vi.

extensive experience in treating psychic disturbances than he himself had; secondly, on an understanding of the significance of his experience, particularly through the use of heuristic anticipations such as childhood trauma, sibling rivalry, projection, and fixation; and finally, that the judgment, "Lonergan's explanation of this point is wrong," issues from a reflective grasp of evidence sufficient to warrant this judgment.

More generally, the rejection of any particular point in Lonergan's synthesis must be based on human experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation. However, it is this invariant structure of knowing that grounds Lonergan's synthesis, and not the details synthesized. Accordingly, the refutation of any particular point of his synthesis could ultimately be considered a contribution to the synthesis Lonergan really intended.

If there is no superior vantage point from which one may look down on Lonergan's synthesis and if no amount of undermining from below can topple it, what can a critic do? Perhaps there is another approach. Lonergan's moving point of view implies both a dialogue between his explanation of the process of knowing and the conclusions the readers draws from his own introspective analysis and also a progressive unfolding of the implications of understanding. It is possible to enter into the spirit of this developing dialectic, consider some of his general theses, and posit a few antitheses. Such a dialogue should contribute to the development Lonergan intended, though not necessarily in the way he anticipated. While following this path, we shall concentrate on four topics: his theory of knowledge; his explanation of science and scientific thinking; his development of metaphysics; and his proof of God's existence. The fact that this criticism is intended as part of a dialogue will excuse the personal tone that often intrudes. It will be used to warn the reader that certain criticisms and points of reference are peculiarly my own.

1. LoNERGAN's THEORY oF KNoWLEDGE

There are two distinct questions which should be answered concerning Lonergan's explanation of the process of knowing. The first is: is his summary of St. Thomas' doctrine true to the thought of St. Thomas? The best I can do here is to offer a few animadversions. First, Lonergan insists on the inductive justification of his exposition of St. Thomas.[3] He did not limit himself to a few selected texts, but attempted to synthesize all the texts that seemed pertinent in bringing out both Thomas' basic teaching and the gradual modifications brought about by Thomas' own intellectual development. Any counter-position should have the same inductive justification. Secondly, Lonergan's exposition of Thomist cognitional theory was developed in the context of Thomist trinitarian theory. Lonergan felt that the standard theology texts misinterpreted St. Thomas' theological synthesis of trinitarian doctrine because their authors did not understand his teaching on the created analogue of the trinitarian processions, the intelligible emanation of the word and of love in the human soul. After studying St. Thomas, Lonergan's explanation, and some theology texts presenting other interpretations of St. Thomas' thought on this point, I found Lonergan's interpretation of St. Thomas uniquely intelligible. Any proposed alternative to Lonergan's exposition of Thomist cognitional theory should be at least as adequate in explaining Thomas' trinitarian theory. Finally, the fact that Lonergan's explanation of Thomas' theory of knowledge differs, in many respects, from the Thomistic tradition should riot be construed as *prima facie* evidence of invalidity. Lonergan stressed his " Thomistic- Thomist " distinction precisely because of his conviction that the tradition had misinterpreted the mind of its founder on this basic point.

The second, and more important, question concerning Lonergan's cognitional theory is: is it true? Does the mind of man

a Verbum-IV, 39. In referring to Lonergan's articles we use the notation explained in I. notes 4 and 5.

really function in the way Lonergan explained it. Unfortunately, there is no simple or standard way to answer this question, nor can one appeal to or established doctrine. Introspective analysis seems to be the only basis on which an answer may be attempted. The complicating factor here is that an analysis of a simple act of direct knowing will not suffice. The pedagogical paradigms of philosophy teachers can fit almost any theory and do not really test one's reliance on hypothesis, heuristic anticipations, reflections, etc. One method I found helpful was to analyze the cognitional processes I spontaneously tended to follow in assimilating and evaluating *Insight,* an extremely protracted process. As I read the book, I wrote a detailed outline and evaluation of each chapter. My initial reaction was rather unfavorable chiefly because I disagreed with his explanation of science and because of my belief that his cognitional theory tended towards idealism rather than realism. As my understanding of what he actually meant gradually improved, I came to realize that the charge of idealism-in epistemology-was due to heuristic anticipations generated by my own set of complex mental categories. This increased insight led to reflection on the critical problem and the implicit presuppositions submerged in my previous attitude. A similar analysis of the procedure I followed in accepting or rejecting other parts of Lonergan's doctrine led to the same conclusion. My habitual process of knowing involves experience, insight, concepts, hypotheses, heuristic anticipations, reflection, and judgment in precisely the way Lonergan explained them. My personal conclusion is that Lonergan's cognitional analysis is not only correct but also that in its penetration and explicitness it is superior to any similar analysis that preceded it.

Objections to Lonergan's Cognitional Theory

Many objections, unpublished as well as published, have been brought against Lonergan's cognitional analysis. In many cases these objections actually oppose, not Lonergan himself, but a straw man begotten of a false understanding of what

Lonergan actually means. Misunderstandings of this sort are, perhaps, inevitable due to the intrinsic difficulty and complex extension of *Inmght;* due to the necessity of accepting-at least tentatively-the unique and purposeful methodology of the moving point of view as a necessary condition for understanding; and, finally, due to the occasional opaqueness of Lonergan's literary style. Accordingly, a consideration of these difficulties should contribute to a clarification and evaluation of Lonergan's cognitional analysis.

Fay's article [4] summarizes the outstanding objections to Lonergan's cognitional analysis-the only aspect of Lonergan's thought we are considering in this section. Here we shall consider the two principal criticisms. The first is that Lonergan has presented the critical problem in such a way as to make a realistic solution impossible, that his epistemology is actually idealistic, or Kantian, rather than realistic. Secondly, there is the serious, but less drastic claim that Lonergan's cognitional analysis is incompatible with true Thomism. Though this may be of interest only to Thomists, it is an important point, for Lonergan clearly considers himself a neo-Thomist as well as a realist.

First, the critical problem. As Fay explains it, Lonergan "gets himself into a critical pickle" [5] by concentrating on the structure of knowledge rather than the objects known. This leads Lonergan to reject the analogy between knowing and seeing, and to conclude that what we know *immediately* is not reality but knowledge itself, the contents of consciousness. Hence, the critical problem is to find some medium or bridge

[4] Cornelius Ryan Fay, "Fr. Lonergan and the Participation School," *The New Scholasticism, XXXIV* (1960), 461-87. In the final paragraph Fay indicates his suspicion that he may have misunderstood Lonergan. As we hope to show in the text this suspicion seems justified. Matthew J. O'Connell, S. J., "St. Thomas and the *Verbum:* An Interpretation," *The Modern Schoolman,* XXIV (1946-47), !224-.84, analyzed the first article in the *Verbum* series and expressed the opinion that Lonergan seriously distorted Thomas' teaching by twisting his texts to support an idealistic epistemology. Some of the reviewers of *Insight* expressed similiar opinions.

[5] "Fay, 469.

between the knowledge in the mind and the reality that may be outside it. This approach can lead to no solution: "How to determine whether the hand in your head is like the hand in front of your face is a very vexing problem. In fact, if you can't see your hand in front of your face, you can't solve this old problem at all." [6] While other critics may not rely on such a gross oversimplification of the critical problem they do express serious concern over Lonergan's method of solving it.

This objection, it seems to me, rests on a two-fold misunderstanding. First, Lonergan does not call into question the fact or basic validity of sense knowledge. He is quite capable of seeing a hand in front of his face and quite willing to admit it. The starting point of *Insight* is the fact of sense knowledge, a fact which serves as the point of departure for more penetrating questions. The basic questions this investigation engenders simply can not be answered by sense-level data. [7] Aiken has clearly expressed the difficulties involved in any attempt to justify immediate realism by a reliance on simple experience:

> The philosophy realist uncritically holds that there is a world of independently real things by which alone the truth or adequacy of our ideas may be tested. He forgets that even to say that such a world exists is already to adopt a philosophical position with respect to which the data of experience are completely neutral. [8]

An insight, as Lonergan explains it, is a grasp of what a being is in terms of its intrinsic principles or causes. This is intellectual, not sense knowledge, and ·terminates in judgment which is also intellectual. Lonergan's apparent rejection of immediate realism is due, at least in part, to his insistence that a full act of knowing includes experience, insight, and judgment, and to his carefulness in distinguishing between sense and intellectual knowledge. This same care is not always exhibited by Lonergan's critics. Fay, for example, writes: "In

[6] Fay, 471.

[7] See II, 27-80.

[8] Henry D. Aiken (ed.), *The Age of Ideology: The 19th. Century Philosophers* (Paperback edition; New York: New American Library, 1956), p. 55.

his maturity, Aquinas explicitly devotes a whole question to what must have seemed at the time a trivial point to many of his readers. It was the question of whether you can see your hand in front of your face, 'Whether the intelligible species abstracted from phantasms are related to our intellect as that which is understood.' "[9]

The second source of misunderstanding, which can lead to the conclusion that Lonergan's presentation of the critical problem excludes a realistic solution, is his adherence to the moving point of view. Though we have mentioned this before we may not have sufficiently clarified its pertinence to the present problem. If one reads a chapter devoted to a particular topic one normally expects that when he has assimilated the chapter he understands the author's position on the given topic. This normal expectation (or heuristic anticipation) can lead to a misinterpretation of *Insight.* In part I of this work, Lonergan treats experience, insight, hypotheses, reflection and judgment, and yet never commits himself on the problem of reality or objectivity. He never says, for example, that insights are true if they correspond to reality, but simply shows how insights function in the progressive development of human knowledge. One who considers this initial development to be an adequate representation of Lonergan's position on these topics naturally concludes that Lonergan is concerned only with explaining *phenomena* while prescinding from the problem of the *noumena,* the unknown objective reality which causes the subjective phenomena.

Actually, Lonergan does not prescind from this ,problem. He is, however, convinced that a naivete in matters epistemological does not provide the spring required to leapfrog the limitations inherent in human knowing.[10] He is particularly

[9] Fay, 485.

[10] A rather extreme example of such naivete would be the use of the scholastic definition of truth, the conformity of the mind to reality as a proximate criterion of truth. One first 'looks' at reality and then 'looks' at the idea in the mind, and compares the two. Few, if any, scholastics would defend this position when presented so bluntly. Yet, Father Lonergan would contend, a scholastic philosopher

careful to avoid implicit presuppositions in either metaphysics or epistemology. His basic aim is to make explicit the metaphysical orientation implicit in human knowing, or, in his own terms, to develop the 'position.' Accordingly, he proceeds by way of an ever deepening analysis, each step of which is intended to yield a greater insight into the earlier analysis and present further questions for inquiring intelligence. Until one has assimilated this process in its entirety one cannot really understand Lonergan's position on any of the intermediate stages. In more traditional terms, he is following the *'via resolutionis'* which St. Thomas considered the proper path of the metaphysician [11], with, however, the complication engendered by the critical problem, that he can not begin a metaphysical resolution until he has first established his metaphysical principles. It was this feature of his work that motivated me to present an outline of his integral development before attempting to evaluate any particular aspects.

In the light of these considerations the criticism that Lonergan's cognitional analysis (here we are prescinding from an evaluation of the metaphysics he develops) is idealistic or Kantian is easily settled. The essence of Kant's epistemology is his contention that we know only *phenomena,* things as they appear to us, but that we can not know *'noumena,'* things as they are in themselves. Lonergan explicitly and emphatically holds that in a full act of knowing completed in a virtually unconditia'ned judgment man can attain a true knowledge of objective reality. [12] His epistemology is realistic, not idealistic.

who refuses to accept reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned as the proximate criterion of truth is implicitly relying on this naive standard. For his explanation of truth see *Insight,* chap. xviii, sect. 6.

[11] Thomas' clearest explanation of this is contained in his commentary, *In Librum Boetii de Trinitate,* pp. 5 and 6, esp., p. 6, a. 1.

[12] The difference between Lonergan's view and Kant's are explained in *Insight,* chap. xi, sect. 10. Lonergan's distinction between 'body' and 'thing' is analogous to Kant's distinction between *'phenomenon'* and *'noumenon.'* The significant difference is that Lonergan holds that 'things' can be truly known while Kant holds that *'noumena'* can not be known as they truly are. The objections brought against Lonergan are really attempts to prove he has not adequately justified his

However, the basic criticism, brought by Fay and others, that Lonergan has overstressed the process of knowing to the exclusion of the reality known is, in my opinion, a valid one. What I am objecting to is the implication drawn from this insight that Lonergan's epistemology is incompatible with realism, though it must be admitted that an incomplete or uncritical following of Lonergan's methodology could lead to idealism. In later sections I shall return to this criticism in a different and more pertinent context.

The second criticism to be considered is that Lonergan's approach to the problem of knowledge is incompatible with Thomism. This is certainly true in the sense that Lonergan's methodology differs radically from customary scholastic procedures. This Lonergan would admit, but he would contend that his doctrine is compatible with the true teaching of St. Thomas. The survey was arranged to bring out his dependence on St. Thomas and the isomorphism between the position he attributed to St. Thomas and the conclusions of his own study. My purpose here is complementary and minimal, simply to show that the alleged incompatibility between Lonergan's cognitional analysis and St. Thomas' explanation of what it means to understand is based on a misunderstanding. As Fay focused the objection, Lonergan has rejected the analogy between knowing and seeing, a rejection which determines the direction of his development and leads to excessive concentration on the structure of knowing.[13] This, Fay feels, is a distinct break from St. Thomas and the whole Thomistic tradition and it ultimately involves Lonergan in a vicious circle. Because of the repeated and often rhetorical emphasis which Lonergan does give to this rejection it is important to consider this point in some detail.

Thomas, to be sure, did use the seeing-knowing analogy. It is of interest to consider the significance he attached to it. One

position. There is no basis for saying that Lonergan holds that man can not know reality as it exists but only the forms which the mind imposes upon it.

[18] Fay, 466 ff.

of his earlier and more detailed treatments contrasts bodily, imaginative, and intellectual 'seeing':

> But between the kinds of sight mentioned there is this difference, that bodily sight terminates at the body itself, whereas the sight of imagination terminates at the image of the body, as its object. So, also, when it is said that intellectual sight embraces things which have no likeness not identical with themselves, this does not mean that spiritual sight does not take place through species which are not the same as the things understood, but that intellectual sight does not terminate at the likeness of a thing but at the very essence of the thing. [14]

Other aspects of this analogy are elaborated elsewhere. The source of intellectual light, making things actually intelligible as the sun makes them actually visible, is the agent intellect. [15] The objects of intellectual ' sight ' are clarified: " Those things are said to be seen which through themselves move our intellect or our sense to a knowledge of them." [16] Thus, first principles are said to be seen in the sense that they move the intellect.[17]

From these and similar citations the significance St. Thomas attached to the comparison is fairly clear. A material object is seen because, when illuminated, it can move the sense of sight. Similarly, something is seen intellectually when, through the illumination of the agent intellect, it moves the mind to know it. This applies to first principles, conclusions deduced from these principles, the essence of material objects, antl, in general, any knowing in which the mind is not free not to assent. It does not apply to faith or opinion.

This comparison between knowing and seeing has had a long complex history since the time of St. Thomas, since any explanation of knowledge is inevitably modified by changing modes of thought. An historical study of the changing significance of

[14] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Truth,* trans. James V. McGlynn, S. J., q. 10, a. 8, ad 2 (second set) (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), p. *45.*

[10] *Sum?TUL Contra Gentiles,* III, chap. 58, par. 6.

[16] *Sum?TUL Theologiae,* II-II, q. 1, a. 4, c.

[17] *Ibid.,* a. *5,* c.

the knowing-seeing comparison would involve such factors as: Scotus' emphasis on the priority of conceptualization; Cajetan's interpretation of Thomas' doctrine on abstraction; the effect of the rise of science on modes of understanding; the pedagogical revolution effected by Peter Remus with his stress on visual rather than aural imagery; Descartes' insistence on clear and distinct ideas as the basis of philosophical thought; the rise of scientific psychology; and even the psychological effects of the so-called 'image industries.' Accordingly, one cannot presume that the significance a modern man, even a neo-Thomist, attaches to this comparison is the one Thomas intended. [18] To the modern mind the analogy between knowing and seeing generally implies two features: immediacy and a subject-object duality. In the preceding paragraphs we saw the significance Thomas himself attached to the feature of immediacy. The object itself moves the act so that one is not free not to see or not to know whenever the object acts on the faculty. Lonergan not only admits this aspect of the analogy but has given it a detailed and precise treatment. [19] However, Lonergan definitely rejects the seconJ feature of the analogy, the implication that knowing necessarily involves a duality analogous to the seer and the object seen, as well as the implication that knowing, like seeing, is essentially a one-step process (at least from a cognitional point of view.). Hence, the question of whether or not Lonergan's theory is compatible with Thomas' on this point seems to reduce to a question of whether or not Thomas taught that knowing necessarily involves a duality between the knower and the known. In other words, what did St. Thomas mean by *"intelligere,"* " to understand?"

Lonergan answered this question by a detailed inductive

[18] Another factor which is of some significance is the common medieval explanation of sight as quasi-spiritual. The general doctrine was that any perception by a bodily sense required a corporeal alteration, the material contribution in the activity of the matter-form composite. Before the advent of modern physiology and theories of vision no corporeal alteration was known for sight.

[18] This is the central topic in Verbum-ill. For a brief summary, see I, 10-H.

study. Here we will try to complement his work by simply presenting Thomas' own characteristic explanation of this point, even though this involves elements which are not of contemporary interest. In explaining this point Thomas seemed to think that we get our purest idea ·of what it means to know by beginning with the purest form of knowing and working down to more complex cases.[20]

God knows, according to St. Thomas [21] simply by being what He is, without any questioning, reasoning, or judgment. The principle applied here is that intellectual knowing is essentially the presence in act of an intelligible form to an intelligent being, what Karl Rahner has designated by the apt but untranslatable term *"insichreyektierheit."* Angels, in the Thomistic theory, know themselves perfectly by a simple connatural reflection on what they are. Here there is no 'looking' and 'looked at.' An angelic essence is intelligible in act; an angel is highly intelligent. The intelligibility intrinsic to his being is immanent to his conscious awareness without the necessity of any process.[22]

Man's place among intellectual beings, for St. Thomas, is similar to that of prime matter among sensible beings.[23] The luminous self-transparency proper to beings that understand is considerably dimmed, but not completely dark. Just as prime matter is actually sensible only through some added form, so the possible intellect is intelligible in act only through some species which is impressed on it through the coordinated activity of the agent intellect and the phantasm. When this species is received the possible intellect has a determination which makes it intelligible in act. Understanding is essentially the immanence to conscious awareness of this conjunction of intel-

[20] For examples of Thomas' use of the order we are following, see *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 87, a. S, c.; q. 79, a. 2, c.

[u] *Ibid.*, I, q. 14, a. 2, c.

[02] *Ibid.*, I, q. *56,* a. 1, c. According to St. Thomas angelic self-knowledge involves a duality only inasmuch as there is a transit from potency to act: " Ex quo patet quod moveri ab objecto non est de ratione cognoscentis inquantum est cognoscens, sed inquantum est potentia cognoscens." In the Thomistic theory pure spirits know other things through connatural infused species.

[••] St. Thomas, *De Veritate,* q. 10, a. 8.

ligence and intelligibility. Thus, in spite of the extreme attenuation of understanding characteristic of the weakest of all intellectual beings, the act of understanding is found in man in a way analogous to that proper to God and the angels.

However, because man is a body-soul composite whose power to understand requires activation, man's knowing process is more complex than that proper to God or an angel. In Thomas' theory, human understanding requires the reception of a *'species'* which is both an ontological and an intentional determination. The ontological determination which the possible intellect receives through the combined activity of the agent intellect and the phantasm makes it intelligible in act and identical, in the intentional order, with the essence of the thing understood. [24]

What significance does this theory have for our present evaluation? First, for St. Thomas, the essential note of any true understanding is identity, not duality. In the intentional order the intelligible determination immanent to conscious awareness is identical with the intelligible determination present, at least potentially, in the thing understood. Secondly, because of man's dependence on matter and the weak and limited nature of his understanding, further processes are required for the inception and completion of true knowledge. These processes: sense experience, abstraction, the formation of a concept expressing what is understood, reflection, and judgment, need not be explained again. Lonergan had studied this theory of knowledge in all its details, and tested its correctness by introspective analysis and by applying this theory to contemporary thought processes. He accepted it. He felt, however, that scholastic manuals seriously distorted Thomas' true teaching on this matter, especially by minimizing the significance of the

•• This is brought out in Thomas' repeated use of the Aristotelian idea *"intellectua in actu est ipse inteUectum in actu."* The *species impressa* is first an ontological determination of the possible intellect, the *' intellectum in actu.'* This ontological determination is immaterial, a form inhering in an intelligent being. As such, it is intrinsically intelligible and is the *'inteUectua in actu's* immanent to conscious awareness. See his *Summa Tkeol.,* I, q. 87, a. 1, adS.

two points summarized above. One of the reasons for this misrepresentation was, he thought, excessive reliance on the seeing-knowing analogy as it is interpreted today. Accordingly, he rejected this analogy, and did so to explain, not to reject, the teaching of Thomas Aquinas.

It must be admitted that Lonergan often relies on sharp oversimplification and rhetorical refutation of opposing views. Yet, his positive explanation of the process of knowing is, in my opinion, correct in itself, and a distinctive and valuable contribution to Neo-Thomism. This admission entails certain obligations on my part. In the remainder of this analysis, even in points where I disagree with Lonergan, I am obliged, by rational consistency, to evaluate Lonergan's development from the general framework of his own cognitional analysis. The degree to which this tips the scales in his favor remains to be seen.

II. SCIENTIFIC KNOWING

The most serious criticism that has been brought against Lonergan's explanation of science and scientific knowing is Albertson's remark: "In placing his starting point in the analysis of acts of knowledge urged on by an interior drive, Father Lonergan lays the foundation for what I would suggest to be the characteristic feature of the entire study; namely, the absence of a distinction between those intelligibilities immanent in the objects and patterns of experience, and those intelligibilities projected by the knower into objects and patterns of experience." [25] I agree with this criticism inasmuch as it applies to Lonergan's explanation of science. Unfortunately, the significance of this objection has been misunderstood. To circumvent, if possible, further misunderstanding it may be helpful to approach this point rather indirectly through a brief historical digression on theories of science.

The Aristotelian ideal of science, certain knowledge of things based on a knowledge of their causes, was accepted by medie-

[25] James Albertson, S. J., rev. of *Insight* in *The Modern Schoolman,* XXXV (1957-8)' 288.

val philosophers and animated their explanation of science.[26] Accordingly, the fundamental laws of science were considered to be both principles of being and principles of knowing.

The transition from the medieval synthesis to the world-view of the Enlightenment ultimately involved a rejection of Aristotelian physics and its methodology.[27] The Aristotelian ideal, however, perdured through a subtle transformation. The basic laws of the new science were still considered to be both laws of reason and laws of nature. Since these laws were mathematical rather than philosophical this new mode of explaining reality entailed a different picture or model of the physical universe. The cosmic image characteristic of the Enlightenment was the clock-work universe, the world as a huge machine with many interacting parts, and the whole subservient to the laws of mechanics. In this conception, discovering a law of nature was analogous to discovering America. The law, or the land, was 'already out there.' What was needed was the requisite ingenuity, courage and perseverance to make the discovery.

The clock-work universe of the mechanists crumbled under the stress of modern revolutions in science. These, in turn, triggered an intensive re-examination of the foundations and methodology of physics. This critical analysis was initiated by Mach, Duhem, Poincare, and others, stimulated by the reinterpretations of mathematics, and furthered by the development of relativity and quantum theory. In the light of these criticisms it no longer seems possible to hold the position that the basic laws of physics are laws of nature in any direct or immediate sense.[28] The Aristotelian ideal that the principles of

•• Medieval Aristotelian scientists often showed a greater flexibility in the use of hypotheses and plausible reasoning than this simple definition might suggest. For a clear explanation of such methodology in its most successful form see: William A. Wallace, O. P., *The Scientific Methodology of Theodoric of Freiberg: A Case Study of the Relationship between Science and Philosophy* (Fribourg, Switzerland: The University Press, 1959). Even Theodoric, however, held that 'true' science was knowledge through causes.

•• A survey of this transition and some of its implications is contained in my article, "Motion, Mechanics and Theology," *Thought*, XXXVI (1961), 844-70.

08 The precise significance of 'basic laws' in physics is a disputed question.

being should also be principles of understanding does not apply to reason as it is found in modem science, though some philosophers exhibit a nostalgic longing for its eventual return.

The present situation in science is considerably more complicated than anything envisioned by Aristotle and his medieval disciples. All that we hope to do here is to present a rather simplified outline of some aspects of this situation which are pertinent to the present criticism. The development of a scientific theory may be schematized as a five-step process.

1. *Discovery.* To adapt a terminology Lonergan uses elsewhere, this is the analytic process proper to science and is concerned with the discovery of new physical facts and laws. A simple example is Newton's discovery that white light is composed of a spectrum of colors. He established this by his experiments with prisms and then, by his "*experimentum crucis,*" showed that no other explanation could fit the observed facts. Though scientific observation and experiment are not independent of theory, such discoveries as: the acceleration of a body in a vacuum is independent of its weight; a gas is composed of independent molecules; heat is a form of energy, etc., logically precede the theories that build on these facts.

2. *Model.* A model is essentially an idealization which includes only the data which scientific abstraction has found to be pertinent. In classical mechanics, for example, one studies all bodies *as if* they were nothing but a collection of point masses with such properties as inertia and gravitational abstraction. In less sophisticated times, such models were often thought of as fairly accurate representations of reality. Today, they are more likely to be looked upon as a scaffolding useful for further construction.

3. *Mathematization.* This is achieved by establishing an isomorphism between elements of the model and elements of a

Here, we simply mean laws which serve as a basis for deduction but are themselves not deduced from higher laws. Examples are: Newton's three laws of motion, Maxwell's equations, the three laws of thermodynamics, and Schrodinger's wave equation.

mathematical system. Velocity, for example, is represented by a vector; quantum mechanical observables by Hermitian operators.

4. *Axiomatization.* The two-fold abstraction (models from matter, mathematics from models) that led to mathematization has also brought the theorist into a radically different domain, one with its own rules of organization and development. The ideal here is an axiomatization intergrating all the lower level laws and observations into a deductive framework based on a few postulates, such as Newton's three laws of motion or Maxwell's four laws, or through the more rigorous axiomatizations attempted in recent times. Here one also encounters the complexities and problems proper to axiomatic systems, such as consistency, completeness, and independence of postulates. Since such axiomatic systems determine the ultimate integration of scientific knowledge they confer a distinctive formal intelligibility on the knowledge they unify. In the course of scientific development theoretical systems tend to grow in complexity and to exert a more and more dominant influence on the other elements of scientific thought.

5. Verification. The conclusion deduced from the axioms, or basic laws, of science are verified or falsified by their consistency with an established body of knowledge and by experiments which serve to relate the theory to observations, rather than to the models used to construct the theory. The problems of verification, which we are merely skimming, afford some insight into the status of the basic axioms of a theory in mathematical physics. The combination of induction, abstraction, axiomatization and inspired guess by which they are established cannot guarantee their validity. [29] Any deduction based

•• Lonergan cites some simple examples, such as Archimedes' discovery, to show that the significant feature in induction is the act of insight which grasps a universal intelligibility in a particular case. An 'inductive proof is based on such an insight plus the principles of classical heuristic structure, " similars are similarly understood." Such reasoning 'is appropriate when it is a question of grasping the intrinsic intelligibility of an object or some natural property or relation. Such simple reasoning, however, can not justify the type of fundamental law listed in the

on these principles has this general form: if the principles are correct, the conclusions derived from them should check with experiment. However, a successful verification does not guarantee the correctness of these laws. To affirm this would be the fallacy of the consequent.[30] Accordingly, there seems to be no rational basis for considering the basic axioms of physics to be certain principles which are strictly true of nature. The discovery of a basic physical law could be more properly compared to the designing of a new jet plane than to the discovery of America. What pre-exists is not an ideal jet or theory 'already out there' in some Platonic heaven of ideas, but a set of precise requirements to be met and a developed tradition by which competent specialists can meet these needs. The new product that results receives its distinctive unity from the creative mind that fashioned it.

Because of the deductive nature of physics, conclusions or special applications obtain their distinctive intelligibility, as scientific statements, from the pril).ciplesand the general theory from which they are deduced. In this sense, scientific laws reP.resent a man-made intelligibility imposed upon nature. This imposition is not arbitrary, for the development of science involves a continuing process of correction by which scientific theories give an ever closer approximation to the data they systematize. Yet, scientific statements understood in their technical sense do not directly express an intelligibility immanent in this data.[31]

preceding footnote. A survey of the problems concerning induction in modem science is given by Carl Hempel, in *Synthese* (to be published) .

[30] A implies B; but B; therefore A. The process of deduction and verification proper to physics is more complicated than our simple sketch indicates. But the further complications do not invalidate the simple conclusions we have drawn.

[31] These ideas are developed in more detail and applied to a critical case in my article," Thomists and Atomism," *The Modern Schoolman,* XXXVIII (1961), 41. The basic principles involved were developed by George Klubertanz, S. J. in "The Doctrine of St. Thomas and Modern Science," *Sapientia Aquinatis* (1955), 89-104.

The majority of Thomists who have written on this problem do not hold the position, which we have defended here, that the formal note distinguishing modem

How is this discussion related to Lonergan's treatment of science? First, it should be noted that Lonergan's primary purpose in *Insight* is *not* to explain the nature of science or the structure of scientific theories. Rather, he uses scientific reasoning processes to explain and illustrate how the mind functions. Yet, he can not prescind from these problems. One becomes a successful scientist by assimilating a highly developed intellectual tradition in such a way that it becomes an habitual and operative part of one's thinking process. Implicit in this tradition are the difficulties concerning the epistemological and ontological status of scientific theories and laws. Secondly, Lonergan is not unaware of these difficulties. This is apparent in his stress on the function of hypotheses in physics, in his canons of scientific method, and in his insistence that a scientific judgment is never more than probable. Nevertheless, I believe that his treatment of scientific reasoning reflects either a misunderstanding of the problem or a false solution. He considers the successful laws of physics to be expressions of an intelligibility immanent in reality, and immanent in a sense that the general consensus of philosophers of science would consider inadmissable. [32]

physics from all branches of philosophy is the physicist's habit of organizing and synthesizing data through the imposition of a man-made intelligibility. This clash, however, is partially verbal and not crucial in the present instance. 'Physics,' for these Neo-Aristotelians, refers essentially to laws which explain the characteristic properties and activities of bodies in terms of the intrinsic principles of being proper to the first degree of abstraction. However, this school of thought generally admits that the basic deductive laws of 'mathematico-physical theory' (which is not formally in the first degree of abstraction) do not directly express the intrinsic intelligibility of material bodies. These are the laws most pertinent to the present discussion.

•• An example of the type of reasoning we have in mind is: The Aristotelian, the Galilean, the Newtonian, and the Einsteinian accounts of the free fall of heavy bodies are all open to revision, for all are determinate contents. On the other hand, a merely heuristic account is not open to revision. One cannot revise the heuristic notion that the nature of a free fall is what is to be known when the free fall is understood correctly; for it is that heuristic notion that is both antecedent to each determinate account and, as well subsequent to each and the principle of the revision of each. *(Insight,* p. 894)

If this is to mean something more than the tautology that one will understand

Perhaps this can be shown in more detail by considering Lonergan's treatment of this point in a more or less historical order. In his discussion of formative abstraction in the *Verbum* series, Lonergan explained the Aristotelian- Thomistic position that there can be a science of changeable things only by concentrating on the changeless *ratio,* the universal which is abstracted from and applied to particular instances. [33] In the subsequent article he explained the pertinence of this Aristotelian ideal to modern science:

For Aristotle perfect science is certain; but all science is knowledge through causes, and knowledge through causes is understanding and so of the universal and necessary. Because the conceptualist accepts only one element of the Aristotelian ideal, while modern science realizes the other element, a quite unnecessary abyss has been dug by conceptualists between the Scholasticism they claim to represent and, on the other hand, the contemporary ideal of science.[34]

In a slightly later work this Aristotelian ideal was expressed more succinctly: "What is significant (in science) is exclusively the fact that the *propter quid* has been grasped, assigned, and become operative in the deductions of science." [35]

In the first part of *Insigh-t,* where science is treated in detail,

free fall when he understands it, it implies that the goal animating physics and towards which physics is tending through a series of successive approximations is an understanding of free fall in terms of its natural principles or causes (or, as he calls it, " the nature of free fall ") . I do not believe this can be extrapolated from the past history, presents trends, or forseeable development of the problem through an extension of present methods. The definitive history of this problem is Max Jammer's, *Concepts of Force: A Study in the Foundations of Dynamics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957). The central theme of this historical account is the gradual banishment of such concepts as force and cause from physics. Since the book was written, however, causality (in a highly refined sense) has been extensively discussed in connection with quantum field theory.

[88] Verbum-IV, 14ff.

[••] Verbum-V, 385. Since he is castigating conceptualists for the cult of certitude, the " other elements " realized by modern science must refer to knowledge through causes.

[••] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. J., "A Note on Geometrical Possibility," *The Modern Schoolman,* XXVII (1950), 129.

Lonergan prescinds from the question of reality and objectivity, a precision justified by his "moving point of view." As he explains it here, the distinguishing note of science is the use of explanatory rather than descriptive conjugates, i.e., conjugates based on the relation of things to other things rather than of things to us. This means that the goal of science is an intelligibility immanent in the data of sense: "It (the -canon of relevance) states that empirical inquiry primarily aims at reaching the intelligibility immanent in the data of sense." [36] This statement is qualified by adding that scientific laws express, not an absolute necessity, but a realized possibility of explanation. Yet, he concludes that this intelligibility is a species of formal causality, a topic which will be considered later.

After he has established the isomorphism between experience and potency, understanding and form, judgment and act, he can apply this isomorphism to scientific knowing. He C?oncludes that scientific judgments are probably true and therefore of the probably real. By a heuristic anticipation of judgments which are certainly true, he can argue that the correlative understanding is isomorphic to a constitutive form which constitutes the structure of proportionate being.[38] Finally, in a work written since *Insight* he clearly restates the Aristotelian ideal that science is a certain knowledge of things through their causes.[39]

Thus, Lonergan's theory of science is essentially a form, albeit a unique one, of Neo-Aristotelianism. Other scholastic philosophers have made heroic attempts to preserve and revitalize Aristotle's physics. Ordinarily, this is done by distinguishing between a philosophy of nature (a modernized version of Aristotle's physics) and physics in the modern sense of the term. Lonergan differs from such Neo-Aristotelians in that he

[86] *lnaight,* p. 77.

[87] Ibid., chap. xvi, sect. 8.2.

[88] The development of this point is done by stages. See chap. xiv, sect. 8; chap. xv, sect. 1 and 2; and chap. xvi, sect. 8.2.

[89] *Divinarum Personarum,* p. 288. (See I, note 7)

totally rejects any version of Aristotelian physics and transposes the ideal traditionally considered proper to this branch of philosophy to modern physics. Then his argument from isomorphism circumvents the difficulties other scholastic philosophers experience in seeking formal causes, natures, etc.

Lonergan's position involves two major difficulties. The first, the argument from isomorphism, will be considered in a discussion of his metaphysics. The second is-to adapt his terminology-a failure to make an adequate distinction between the analytic and synthetic processes as they are actually found in physics. Lonergan investigated the analytic process by considering some simple insights and the hypotheses formed on the basis of these insights. The structure of scientific theories and the distinctive problems they entail were not considered in any detail. Instead, Lonergan seems to have assumed that the complex theories of modern physics are essentially linear extrapolations from the simple insights and hypotheses he considered and that the synthetic process is simply a question of pivoting, when one has reached the most basic laws, and proceeding in a deductive fashion.[40] Only such an assumption, whether implicit or explicit, can justify his position that scientific laws are a formal expression of an intelligibility intrinsic to matter. I believe that this assumption is incorrect, that the formal laws or axioms of science represent an extrinsic man-made intelligibility imposed upon data which reflect the intrinsic intelligibility of reality only in an indirect ion.[41]

Many other philosophers draw on the findings of modern physics without becoming involved in critical considerations

•• See, e. g., Lonergan's explanation of the canon of parsimony, *Insight,* pp. 78-86, esp. the four steps of empirical method on p. 79.

[01] This point has been repeatedly stressed by Bohr and Heisenberg. Thus, in a recent popular article Heisenberg says: " Here again we are brought up sharply before the rock-bottom truth that in science we are not dealing with nature itself but with the science of nature--that is with a nature which has been thought and described by man " (from his article, " From Plato to Max Planck: The Philosophical Problems of Atomic Physics," *The Atlantic,* CCIV [Nov. 1959], IU).

of the formal intelligibility of technical statements. In Lonergan's case, however, this omission is critical, for he utilizes, not particular findings, but the nature of scientific thinking as an integral part of his philosophical development. Yet, what he is actually using is an oversimplification which seriously distorts the nature of scientific knowing. This oversimplification is not immediately apparent because his development is embedded in the matrix of a subtle and highly complex cognitional analysis.

We have concentrated on the nature of scientific knowledge rather than. on some of the debatable details given in *Insight* for two reasons. First, because in his treatment of particular problems, e.*g.,* classical and statistical mechanics, Lonergan is primarily concerned with illustrating rational methods of investigation and only indirectly concerned with an elucidation of the particular problem. Accordingly, it is somewhat misleading to identify his classical heuristic structure with classical mechanics or his statistical heuristic structure with statistical mechanics. These branches of science simply supply instances of the type of reasoning he is endeavoring to explain. Secondly, some of the particular problems raised by Lonergan are problems that I have treated elsewhere.[42]

The rejection of Lonergan's explanation of scientific reasoning precipitates a serious difficulty in this evaluation of his thought. I stated my opinion that Lonergan's cognitional analysis is correct and agreed to evaluate his synthesis oy the standards this analysis sets. In *Insight* he developed much of his cognitional analysis through his examination of scientific reasoning. Is it really possible to retain his cognitional analysis while rejecting the scientific theory he utilized in establishing it?

Lonergan would certainly reply, "No," and feel that the

••In both the survey and the criticism I have om:itted a discussion of Lonergan's theory of space and time because the latter problem was treated separately in my article, "Time and Contemporary Physics," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 11 (1962), 428-57, where the difference between my position and Lonergan's is indicated.

position presented here implicitly contains a naive uncritical realism. For example, I have argued that one cannot establish a simple correlation (or isomorphism) between scientific knowing and reality. This position would seem to presuppose a knowledge of physical reality independent of the knowledge given by the physical sciences, a privileged knowledge used as a norm in judging which aspects of scientific knowledge correspond to reality. Whence such knowledge? Is it simply the " already out there now real " known through simple experience or determined by a consensus of opinion on the proper use of the term" real".

It must be admitted that such uncritical assumptions are not uncommon. They are not, however, necessary. What is needed to supplement Lonergan's development is a two-pronged attack. The first prong is the development of an adequate philosophy of nature, a philosophical discipline formally distinct from both modern physics and applied metaphysics. A modern integral development of this subject, something which has not yet been done satisfactorily, would utilize the findings of modern science, of psychology, and of semantic analysis, but proceed according to its own norms. Though the detailed information given by such a study is meagre it is complementary to physics and when used in conjunction with physics supplies some basis for the application of the term, "real". The second prong is an epistemology of science which investigates, not simply selected instances of scientific knowing, but also the origin, structure, functioning and verification of scientific theories. The implementation of such an attack is undoubtedly a long and laborious process, but it should supply a more critical norm for judging than a simple assumption about the nature of scientific theory. This insistence that reality is known only through critical judgment is in accord with Lonergan's cognitional analysis. However, the philosophy of nature, as explained here, does not seem to be compatible with either Lonergan's explanation of the nature of philosophy or his method of development.

Harsh as it may sound, I think that the inadequacies of his theory of science are due to his failure to follow some of the implications of his own cognitional analysis. First, a point he frequently stresses, understanding precedes conceptualization, for meaningful concepts express what is understood. An implication of this is that one must first understand science as it is before fitting it into a conceptual scheme. In practice, there are two complementary ways of achieving such an understanding: by an active participation in current scientific research, which enables one to learn by insight into actual experience the manner in which scientific concepts are generated, hypotheses are formulated, and conclusions are verified; and, secondly, by a detailed study of scientific thought, which penetrates the gradual and laborious growth of scientific understanding rather than merely lists the signal achievements. Lonergan does not give evidence of having followed either of these procedures. From a humane point of view it is quite unreasonable to ask this of him. He has already achieved a diversity and depth of understanding which bear witness to a more than heroic effort. Yet, the ultimate taskmaster, the problem to be solved, requires this effort of someone.

The procedure Lonergan actually followed, as far as I can reconstruct it, began with his own early studies in philosophy and mathematics. The basic ideas in his cognitional analysis were fixed in his *Verbum* series. This supplied a conceptual framework and, to a considerable extent, science was interpreted by fitting his further scientific studies into this framework. Undoubtedly, he thought of this framework as an heuristic structure. But, to invert our previous criticism, what he actually seems to have done was to project his own constructural intelligibility upon science rather than uncover the intelligibility immanent in scientific reasoning processes.

A second fundamental point in his cognitional theory is that truth is had only in judgment. An insight isolated from the full structure of an act of knowing has no formal truth value. We may apply this principle to his phenomenological analysis of

scientific insights. The occurrence of an insight means that through and in a particular case one has recognized a general principle or universal. Whitehead has stressed the fact that one of the characteristic qualities of the successful scientist is his ability to see particular cases as exemplifications of abstract principles. However, the fact that one has such an insight does not prove that one has recognized an immanent intelligibility or detected a formal cause.[43] This can be settled only by a judgment supported by a reflective grasp of all the pertinent evidence. Lonergan did not adequately justify his correlation of insight and formal causality by this criterion.

Rather he used his canon of relevance to distinguish between intelligibilities which draw the inquirer away from the matter at hand and those that do not. The latter is the meaning which Part I of *Insight* attaches to "immanent in data." Granted this immanence he focused on the question of whether this insight corresponds to efficient, instrumental, material or formal cause. In part II of *Insight* he simply applied his argument from isomorphism to conclude that the formal cause so defined represents a constitutive principle of reality. This procedure circumvents a critical judgment as to whether a scientific in--sight necessarily attains a cause at all in a philosophically acceptable sense of the word " cause." I believe that a more critical judgment on the nature of scientific knowledge would impede such a facile application of the argument from isomorphism.

To conclude this section on a more positive note, I think that a more objective and comprehensive analysis of scientific knowing would verify the active role of intelligence manifested through a pattern of experience, insight, concepts, hypotheses, heuristic anticipations, reflection and judgment, which is the basic theme of *Insight* without reflecting a distorted theory of science. In such a framework Lonergan's cognitional analysis

•• See *Insight*, pp. 76-78. The idea that physical laws express formal causality is not new. It was defended by Kepler three centuries ago and by others since his time.

would be of considerable value in elucidating current as well as perennial problems.

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHYSICS

Lonergan's method of developing metaphysics has been criticized on the grounds that it is not Thomistic and that it is not the way in which metaphysics should be developed.[44] We simply accept the fact that Lonergan has elaborated a systematic development of metaphysics consistent with his distinctive methodology. The question of immediate concern is: Is he successful? In attempting a partial answer to this question, we limit ourselves to a consideration of three points: his argument from the isomorphism between knowing and being; his explanation of the elements of being; and his exposition of the intelligibility of being.

The Argument from Isomorphism

Lonergan's basic point of departure in the development of metaphysics is his contention that any metaphysical system which implicitly contradicts m,an's natural way of knowing ultimately leads either to its own reversal or to some form of obscurantism which disguises its failure in the pseudo-profundity of ultimately meaningless questions. This is developed intermittently and finally summarized in the form of a general theorem: "... any philosophy, whether actual or possible, will rest upon the dynamic structure of cognitional activity either as correctly conceived or as distorted by oversights and by mistaken orientations."[45] Accordingly, he attempted to construct an explicit metaphysics consistent with the latent metaphysics implicit in man's way of knowing. Many would object to the stress on cognitional analysis as a basis of philosophy.

[44] F. E. Crowe, S. J. has recently presented a detailed and scholarly reply to the criticism that Lonergan's argument from isomorphism is incompatible with the doctrines and practice of St. Thomas, "St. Thomas and the Isomorphism of Human Knowing and its Proper Object," *ScienceBEcclesiaBtiqueB,* Xill (1961), 167-90.

[45] *]wight,* p. *580*

However, the theorem seems to be one that most philosophers would admit, at least in a limited sense: an explicit metaphysics should not implicitly contradict the way of knowing proper to man or the metaphysical implications of this way of knowing. Whether this necessary condition is also a sufficient basis for the establishment of metaphysics is a further question. Here again, we will make no attempt to prejudge this point. Our purpose is to evaluate Lonergan's success in developing a valid metaphysics on this basis, and to evaluate this in terms of the norms he himself has established.

The argument from the isomorphism between knowing and being concludes to the existence of matter, form, and act from the factors of experience, understanding, and judgment in knowing.[46] What probative value does this argument have? The question of proving metaphysical principles presents unique problems. First, as Lonergan has shown[47], one cannot deduce metaphysics from *a priori* principles. Nor is it reasonable to judge his metaphysics by the degree to which his methodology or conclusions conform to one's previous preferences. Such an evaluation vitiates the significance and purposefulness of his development.

Lonergan's method, a unique one, of establishing the structure of the known is summarized in a statement that is worth repeating and analyzing:

> Secondly, the major premise is the isomorphism that .obtains between the structure of knowing and the structure of the known. If the knowing consists of a related set of acts and the known is the related set of contents of these acts, then the pattern of the relations between the acts is similar in form to the pattern of the relations between the contents of the acts. This premise is analytic.[48]

To see the significance of this we must recall the distinction between an analytic proposition and an analytic principle.[49] An

•• This was outlined in II, 19ff.
•• *Insight,* chap. xiv. sect. 4.1.
•• *Ibid.,* p. 899; see also pp. 499-502.
•• This is explained in *Insight,* pp. 804-09 and summarized in II.

analytic *proposition* is an instance of the virtually unconditioned in which the meaning of the partial terms is hypothetical. For example, the statement, "Every *A* has the relation *R* to *B*," is true by definition and *so* virtually unconditioned. Yet the partial terms, *"A," "R,"* and *"B,"* may be pure symbols with no existential significance. An analytic *principle* is an analytic proposition in which the partial terms do have an existential significance because they occur in their defined sense in judgments of fact.

To apply these definitions to the citation above we may frame the analytic proposition: *In a complex act of knowing, which is explanatory rather than descriptive, the pattern of relations between the acts of knowing is similar in form to the pattern of relations between the contents of these acts.* This analytic proposition becomes an analytic principle through the judgments of fact by which the partial terms receive an existential significance. The long painstaking elaboration of the moving point of view supplied the pertinent judgments of fact:

1. There are acts of knowing.

2. A full act of knowing is compounded of three distinct cognitional acts: experience, understanding, and judgment.

8. There is a corresponding compounding of the contents of knowing. What is understood is formally distinct from what is simply experienced. Judgment adds a distinCt contribution, and answer of "Yes " or "No " to the quest.ions formulated on the level of understanding.

4. Though the knowing is compounded, one and the same thing is experienced, understood, and judged.

5. Man can be certain that he attains a true knowledge of existential reality in the affirmation of himself as a knowing being.

Through such judgments of fact the analytic proposition becomes an analytic principle enabling one to pass from the structure of knowing to the structure of the thing as known to the constitutive principles of the thing as existing. Without

such an isomorphism there could not be true knowledge. But the existence of valid knowledge has already been established.

My initial reaction to this argument was a simple rejection o.f it as a *petitio principii.* After extensive discussions with Lonergan and some of his more devoted disciples and a certain amount of soul searching, I find myself in the peculiar, unenviable, and perhaps temporary position of finding his statement correct as a philosophical proposition, yet unconvincing as a philosophical argument. I think that it is correct as a philosophical proposition regarding central potency, form and act in the sense that these elements -are, and must be, isomorphic to experience, understanding and judgment as integrated in a fully explanatory knowledge. Yet, I find it unconvincing or insufficient as a general argument for the establishment of potency, form and act as constitutive principles of being for three reasons.

The first reason involves the role of analysis. In deciding whether or not a given object: a dog, a stone, or an atom, is a natural unit (or is composed of a central form with a correlative potency and act) one must examine its characteristic properties, activities, and changes and then argue to their distinctive source. Such an analysis is difficult and often frustrating. Yet, it is absolutely necessary, for only upon the completion of such an analysis can one be certain that a given object does have a central form. Lonergan by-passes such difficulties through his heuristic anticipation of fully explanatory knowledge and then allots to analysis the supplementary role of filling in the heuristic structures he has established. I believe that analysis has a primary rather than a supplementary role, that one cannot postulate, for example, an isomorphism between understanding and form until one has analyzed certain selected objects and established the fact that there is a central form which is a constitutive principle of being. With this done, one can probably adapt Lonergan's reasoning and argue, for example, that whatever is understood through an act similar to the understanding of the known central form is

also a central form. Such a development would give a far greater stress to the content of knowledge than Lonergan accords it and yet include his very valuable insight on the significance of isomorphism. It would also, I believe, be more consistent with Lonergan's avowed intention of constructing a metaphysics which makes explicit the latent metaphysics implicit in man's way of knowing. Such an explicitation must acknowledge the primary, rather than supplementary, role man assigns to the contents of the known in his attempt to understand the nature of reality.

The second reason for finding Lonergan's argument insufficient involves the difficulties discussed in the previous section on science. Scientific knowledge can, in its own distinctive fashion, be truly explanatory rather than merely descriptive. Yet, I do not believe that one can establish any simple isomorphism between what is experienced, understood, and judged in science and constitutive principles of being. This will be considered in more detail in discussing the elements of Lonergan's metaphysics.

The third, and perhaps most nebulous, reason for considering Lonergan's argument insufficient as a basis for establishing the elements of metaphysics is the subtle transformation of the nature and proper scope of philosophy entailed in his development. Metaphysics, in his opinion, is not concerned with questions of detail, even with details traditionally considered part of philosophy. Thus he writes: "If one wants to know just what forms are, the proper procedure is to give up metaphysics and turn to the sciences; . . ." [50] Aristotle, Aquinas, and the scholastic tradition in general have considered such questions pertinent to philosophy, as Lonergan seems willing to admit. Yet, he relegates such points to the status of a secondary minor premise in the development of metaphysics and concerns himself almost exclusively with the impli-

[50] *Insight*, p. 498. Scholastic philosophers may debate the question of whether the knowledge of forms pertains to metaphysics or the philosophy of nature, but they seem to be agreed that it does belong to philosophy.

cations of the dynamic structure of knowing. An outstanding difficulty with this position is, in my opinion, the fact that one who gives up metaphysics and relies on the sciences, especially the positive sciences, will never know forms as such. This sort of knowledge is not the proper goal of scientific inquiry. If individual forms are to be known as such they must be an object of philosophical investigation. The scope of philosophy must be both broader and, at least in part, more humble than the lofty niche to which Lonergan's methodology has consigned it.

The Elements of Metaphysics

The 'elements' of metaphysics, according to Lonergan's terminology are central and conjugate potency, form, and act. Lonergan's own evaluation is that his 'central potency, form, and act' are essentially the same as that of the Aristotelian-Thomistic 'prime matter, substantial form, and existential act,' though he derived his concepts in a different way. His ' conjugate form,' however, differs from the standard scholastic ' accidental form.' The reason given for the difference is that the scholastic doctrine stemmed from Aristotelian physics and seemed to rely on sensible qualities as sensed. Lonergan relied on modern rather than medieval science and insisted that no forms are known apart from understanding. Each of the four types of understanding previously considered: classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectic, has its own conjugate forms. implicitly defined by empirically verified explanatory relations. What is the philosophical significance of this doctrine?

This is a rather difficult question to answer, partly because of the novelty of the doctrine and partly because Lonergan has merely stated the principles without working out any detailed examples. However, an evaluation of sorts seems possible. 'Implicit definition' is an idea stemming from the methodology of modern mathematics. In set theory, for example, one begins with a set of elements, using ' elements ' as a perfectly empty term. A few axioms concerning these elements

are than postulated and these axioms implicitly define the meaning of the elements. The use of this method to establish philosophically significant explanatory conjugates has some interesting consequences. It implies that the relationships (such as Newton's three laws of mechanics), rather than the terms of these relations (such as force, mass, acceleration) are the primary carriers of intelligibility. The relationships which are decisive in establishing these implicit definitions are, accordingly, the constitutive laws of the particular branch of science being considered. This implies that conjugate forms implicitly defined by the basic laws of a physical theory simply express aspects of the formal intelligibility of that theory. But, as we have argued earlier, the formal intelligibility of a distinctive branch of physical science, is a man-made intelligibility projected on the data. It is not an expression of the intrinsic intelligibility of the bodies considered. It follows that these conjugate forms do not directly express the intrinsic intelligibility of a being. Nor are they explanatory in the sense Lonergan attributes to them, i.e., an expression of the relation of things to other things.[51]

Perhaps this rather abstract criticism can be concretized by considering the only clear example of a conjugate form Lonergan offers:

> To illustrate the meaning of the terms, central and conjugate potency, form, and act, let us suppose that mass-velocity is a notion that survives in a fully explanatory science. Then the mass-velocity will be a conjugate act; the mass, defined by its intelligible relations to other masses, will be a conjugate form; the space-time continuum of the trajectory will be a conjugate potency . . . .[52]

Unless Lonergan is to hold for strict scepticism until the advent of his projected fully explanatory science, he must hold

[51] It is interesting to note that Lindsay and Margenau, to which Lonergan referred for many of his ideas on physics, insist that a physical theory is descriptive rather than explanatory. See their *Foundations of Physics* (paperback reprint; New York: Dover Publications, 1957), pp. 79. It must be admitted, however, that their use of the terms "explanatory " and " descriptive" does not have the technical significance Lonergan attaches to them.

[52] *Insight,* p. 487.

that present science is partially explanatory. This applies particularly to the classical mechanics which he is considering in this definition of mass. Within its proper domain it is as securely established as any branch of science. Do the verified laws of classical mechanics implicitly define mass in such a way that this concept, "mass," expresses a formal cause, or a direct gasp of some aspect of the intrinsic intelligibility of material bodies?

This question has both historical and logical dimensions which should be considered. Newton was the first to introduce a definition of mass which clearly distinguished mass from weight: "The quantity of matter (or mass) is the measure of the same, arising from its density and bulk conjointly " [53] Mach's criticism of the foundations of Newtonian mechanics included a rejection of Newton's definition of mass on the grounds that it involved a vicious circle.[54] Mass was defined in terms of density, while density involved the concept of mass. Because of this and other deeper difficulties, physicists generally rejected the Newtonian definition. The present procedure can, perhaps, be explained in terms of two levels of procedure.

On the practical level, one distinguishes between the definition of mass and the method by which it is measured. Mass is defined as the quantitative or numerical measure of a body's inertia, i.e., its resistance to acceleration. In principle, this definition allo.ws for an assignment of all mass values respect to an arbitrary unit mass by simply measuring the acceleration resulting from a mutual interaction. In practice, the unit mass is determined by weighing a standard body under specified conditions, while other masses are determined

•• Isaac Newton, *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy,* Motte-Cajori trans. (Great Books Series, 84; Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 5. For an explanation of Newton's ideas and later criticism see Jammer, *op. cit.,* chaps. vii, viii, and xi.

•• Mach's views are explained in Jammer, *op. cit.,* pp. 220-222. Pertinent fragments of his criticism have been reproduced in various anthologies, e. g., Feigl and Brodbeck (eds.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (New York: Appelton-Century-Crofts, 1958), 165-70.

by weighing them and introducing the requisite correction terms. Such a definition was discussed by Lindsay and Margenau [55] and seems to have been the general type of procedure Lonergan had in mind. It should be noted that this is *not* an implicit definition in the technical sense of the term. That is, the concept "mass" is not implicitly defined by the verified laws of classical mechanics. It is, rather, defined in operational terms and the meaning thus determined is presupposed in the development of physics. However, this is a minor point, since Lonergan's explanation of conjugate form is broad enough to include its experimental basis.

On a more fundamental level, the concept of mass and the significance it has in physical theory can be studied by logical analysis and also by examining the physical basis of mass. Logical analysis of the structure of classical mechanics does introduce implicit definitions, but it does so only by requiring a rigor which the standard formulations of physics do not supply. Fortunately, this need has been met, at least partially, in the recent works of Suppes and others on the logical structure of classical mechanics. [56] Here we shall simply summarize the way in which mass is implicitly defined in such an approach. One begins with a mathematical set involving six elements (P, T, s, m, f, g). Here' m' (and the other symbols) are primitive terms which are undefined except for the requirements that 'm' is a unary function. Three kinematical and four dynamical axioms are then postulated interrelating these elements. The term, 'm,' may be said to be implicitly defined through these axioms. This is a purely formal mathematical definition with no physical significance whatsoever. To attach a physical significance to the unary function, ' m,' one needs a physical interpretation of this abstract axiomatic system. For the sake of simplicity, we may represent this by a two-step process. First, through the use of observational definitions one

•• Lindsay and Margenau, *op. cit.*, sect. *3.5.*

•• For a summary see Patrick Suppes, Introduction to Logic (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1957), pp. 291-304.

establishes a correlation between measured quantities of a physical system and aspects of an idealized model. Secondly, one establishes an isomorphism between this model and the axiomatic system. It is this process of physical intei"P.retation, rather than the mere implicit definition, that is decisive in assigning a physical meaning to the term,' mass.' What insight does this term then convey? If the term is used in a non-technical sense its intelligibility comes from the more or less prescientific knowledge used to relate the operational definition to meaningful experience. If one uses the term in its full technical significance it involves the whole of classical mechanics. In this case, it cannot be simply borrowed by the philosopher and used in a philosophical context. An intelligent use of the term in its full technical significance and its interpretation with regard to the nature of material bodies would require a prior searching examination of the epistemological and ontological status of classical mechanics.

The detailed study of the physical factors which determine the property of mass also stems from the work of Mach and involves an assumption now known as "Mach's hypothesis." This states roughly that the mass of a body is not an intrinsic property of the body but is due to the influence of fixed stars. Within the last few years this principle has been the subject of considerable controversy and of elaborate experimental tests.[57] To date, all attempts to detect the effect predicted by Mach's principle (a slight mass anisotropy in the direction of the galactic center) have yielded negative results. Dicke has argued rather convincingly on the basis of the theory of relativity that the failure of these tests supports rather than refutes Mach's hypothesis, but that no local test can give a decisive result.[58]

[07] Cocconi and Salpeter, *Nuovo Cimento,* X (1958) and *Phys. Rev. Letters.* IV (1960), 176, explained a way in which this principle could be tested. Various tests all gave negative results: see *Phys. Rev. Letters,* IV (1960), and 899; *Phil. Mag.,* VI (1961), 688.

[••] R. H. Dicke, *Phys. Rev. Letters,* VII (1961), 859-60. For further implications of Mach's principle see the discussion between Dicke and Dirac in *Nature,* (Nov. 4, 1961), 440-41.

What is significant for our present purpose is, not the status of Mach's hypothesis, but the fact that a technical understanding and evaluation of it inevitably involve the complexities of physical theory and the question of the formal intelligibility of scientific statements. Such questions are often not of crucial importance for other philosophers who borrow concepts or conclusions from science in their treatment of special problems. Lonergan, however, is doing far more than simply borrowing illuminating ideas or established conclusions. He is basing an integral part of his metaphysics on an understanding of science which, in my opinion, is untenable. He is certainly justified in his desire to purge scholastic philosophy of any lingering dependence on obsolete physics. But, the substitute he has suggested must be rejected as simply inadequate. This rejection of his explanation of conjugate potency, form and act necessarily implies a rejection of further doctrines, such as his explanation of genus and species and many of the details of his doctrine of emergent probability, which presuppose the validity of his conjugate elements.

3. The InteUigibility of Being

Lonergan's definition of being as whatever can be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation can not be considered as an isolated definition.[59] From his cognitional analysis and his self-affirmation as a knowing being he obtained a primordial notion of being. Subsequent analysis gradually clarified and deepened the ·significance of this notion until the restricted metaphysics of proportional being was transformed to become a subordinate part of a more general metaphysics.[60] This approach to the problem has occasioned serious criticism.[61]

•• For an explanation of this definition see ll, 15ff.

60 *Insight,* p. 665, " In the 2Srd. place… "

61 W. N. Clark, S. J., in *Theological Studies,* XVIll (1957), 629-32, expressed his misgivings about the reversal of the priority of being over thought. James Collins in *Thought,* XXXll (1957-8), 445-6, objected to Lonergan's contention that an insight into being implies omniscience. Lonergan's conclusion, he feels, flows from his definition of being as the object of the pure desire to know. It does not

None of these critics, however, have attempted the difficult task of evaluating Lonergan's notion in its cognitional roots, its gradual unfolding, and its final as well as its primordial significance. Nor shall we attempt such a criticism. We simply wish to make one point, that Lonergan has not established the *complete* intelligibility of being.

Intelligibility, Lonergan insists, is correlative to insight; it is that which, when grasped, constitutes an insight. Yet, he also insists that we have no insight into being, that such an insight would be an understanding of everything about everything. Accordingly, the intelligibility of being as being, like the notion of being, must be attained at a second remove. Lonergan does this by using " being " for whatever is known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. This allows him to conclude that being is intelligible, for being is whatever is known by correct understanding.

Our purpose in this analysis is to evaluate Lonergan from within the framework set by his own cognitional theory and, as much as possible, to judge him on his own terms. Accordingly, rather than attempt an alternative development of the notion of being, we shall accept Lonergan's approach to the problem as a working hypothesis. Even on these grounds, it seems that his argument does not establish the complete intelligibility of being. First, a point we have repeatedly stressed, he has not adequately distinguished between intrinsic and projected intelligibility. Accordingly, there are cases in which one understands correctly, and yet the intelligibility grasped is not primarily the intelligibility intrinsic to being, but the intelligibility intrinsic to a man-made explanatory system which is used to systematize the pertinent data. It follows that the fact of correct understanding is not, in itself, sufficient to establish the complete intelligibility of being.

apply to a notion of being based on affirmation of the real existence of experienced objects. Germain Grisez, in the *The Thomist*, XXI (1958), 554-60, objected: " ... if it is necessary to go from the structure of knowledge to the structure of being, how can one justify the transit without begging the question?" (p. 559).

Secondly, Lonergan's excessive reliance on heuristic anticipations is open to serious criticism. To clarify this point it may be helpful to sidestep the limitations imposed by the 'moving point of view' and use the doctrine of creation, as explained in Thomistic terms, to illuminate the intrinsic intelligibility of being. Any created being is composed, on the most fundamental level, of essence and existence. Its essence, that which is understood when a being is actually kn:own in a complete act of knowing, is ultimately a limited imitation of the divine essence. This is due to the very fact of creation, in which the divine essence served as an archetectonic idea virtually containing all the limited similitudes of it which creatures could possess. Here is the ultimate solution to the problem: How can a material being be intelligible if intelligibility is essentially spiritual? A material being is potentially intelligible because it reflects in its very being an infinite intelligibility. In this sense a material object may serve as a bridge between the divine .and human minds.

Man, inasmuch as he is spiritual, is also intelligible in act. This active intelligibility of the human mind can be projected onto material objects in various ways. A machine, for example, reflects the intelligibility of its maker by the dynamic and purposeful interaction of its parts. Data can be made intelligible by imposing an explanatory system upon the data. This type of projected intelligibility need not and, in fact, can not exclude the essential intelligibility intrinsic to the objects studied. Yet, the formal intelligibility is man-made, a reflection of human rather than divine intelligibility.

Lonergan's reliance on heuristic anticipations involves a similar, though subtler, form of the same difficulty. Since being is defined as whatever is known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, all being is intelligible. It matters not whether it is actually known or merely anticipated. If it is being it is intelligible, for being is defined in terms of intelligence. This approach, however, does not settle such questions as: Could something exist which is unintelligible, or could there be some

aspects of reality which are unintelligible? Thus, Plato considered changeable being unintelligible in itself, while Aristotle thought that matter, as such, was strictly unintelligible. For many existentialists, all inquiry ends in the absurd rather than the inte1ligible. In a creationist view all reality, apart from God, exists only because God created it and is intelligible because it conforms to the Divine mind. Lonergan's methodology precludes any recourse to the divine mind at this stage of the development. He has not, accordingly, excluded the possibility of some thing or some aspect of a thing existing which is not intelligible. This unintelligible "thing" would not be a being according to Lonergan's definition of being. Yet, it would be a being in the more customary sense of the term, " that which exists," and, apart from terminological quibbles, would be an aspect of reality which is unintelligible. Lonergan subsumes such problems under the general notion of a larger whole in which the irrational is inversely intelligible. But this applies only to special cases in which the absence of understanding is due to the fact there is nothing to be understood. In this sense one may surely say that Lonergan has not established the complete intelligibility of being.

Lonergan's development was motivated, at least in part, by a critical dissatisfaction with the implicit presuppositions found in many scholastic treatments of thi's problem, presuppositions which often involve an evasion .rather than a solution of the critical problem. Yet, his own development seems to be in danger of degenerating into either nominalism or a vicious circle; nominalism, if one argues that complete intelligipility is what is had when one understands completely; a vicious circle, if one argues that it is reasonable to anticipate the complete intelligibility of being and then uses this anticipation to prove that being is completely intelligible. As Lonergan insists, all obscurantism must be rejected. But the adoption of such a policy is not tantamount to a proof of its total success.

4. *The Proof of God's Existence*

Lonergan's proof has already been outlined and need not be summarized here.[62] His approach to the problem, however, has some distinctive features that are worth considering. First, he does not set out with the explicit intention of proving the existence of God. Rather, he wishes to understand the beings of experience and eventually reaches the conclusion that these are radically unintelligible without a transcendent source of intelligibility and being. Secondly, the core of his proof is the complete coincidence of being and intelligibility. Finally, the metaphysical essence of God, i. e., that attribute of God which is basic in the order of metaphysical understanding, is God as an unrestricted act of understanding. The Thomistic tradition on this problem is somewhat amorphous, chiefly because of the diverse, often contradictory, interpretations of St. Thomas' "five ways." Yet, Lonergan clashes with almost every scholastic sub-group on at least one of his principal emphases. What evaluation can one give to his proof?

This question is slightly misleading. An evaluation is not given by some objective impersonal " one," but by the reasoned judgment of a definite individual. My personal evaluation is conditioned by the fact that, even after prolonged study, I have never found the traditional proofs of God's existence truly satisfactory. Fortunately, O'Brien's recent penetrating study of the Thomistic tradition on this question offers some norms which are helpful in evaluating Lonergan's proof.[68] O'Brien has, I believe, conclusively established that Thomas did not consider the problem of proving God's existence to be a separate metaphysical question, one part of the subject matter of metaphysics. The way of the metaphysician, as

•• See ll, 84-41.

[68] Thomas C. O'Brien, 0. P., *Metaphysics and the Existence of* God: *A Reflection on the Question of God's Existence in ContempOTary Thomistic Metaphysics* (Washington, D. C.: The Thomist Press, 1960). This study was originally published under the title, "Refiexion on the Question of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics," *The Thomist,* XXIIT (1960), 1-89; 211-85, 862-447. Future references will be to the book.

Thomas explained it, begins with a general knowledge in which being is known as a confused whole and proceeds by way of resolution to the intrinsic and extrinsic principles of being. The purpose of this resolution is the speculative one of understanding the beings of experience. Through the completion of this resolution God is attained, not as a part of the subject matter of metaphysics, but as the principle of the subject, i.e., the Being whose existence is required to explain the existence and intelligibility of the beings known by experience: " For St. Thomas, then, metaphysics is not the science of *Being as Being* [i.e., Gilson's doctrine that the proper subject of metaphysics is God] it is the human science which considers being in common, separated precisely, as its proper subject; which consequently attains God solely and exclusively as principle of this subject." [64]

Some rather startling conclusions flow from this analysis. One which O'Brien makes explicit is that the standard interpretations of the " five ways " do not represent the mind or intention of St. Thomas. An even more drastic conclusion, which seems implicit in O'Brien's analysis, is that a strictly metaphysical and critically justified proof of God's existence developed in accordance with the stringent requirements of Thomas' "via reductionis" has not, as yet, been given.[65] St. Thomas set the norms and indicated the manner in which they

•• O'Brien, pp. 175-6.

•• Some clarification of this statement is required to prevent possible misunderstanding. Direct knowledge is prior to reflexive analysis of that knowledge and is more certain and immediate than reflection on the process of knowing. Similarly, a direct proof of God's existence is essentially a question of bringing the potential reader or hearer to the reasoned conclusion that reality can not explain the determined existence, intelligibility, or distinctive attributes which it does, in fact, have unless there is a transcendent source of being and intelligibility. Such a proof, which is not difficult to develop, is valid in itself and quite capable of producmg certitude. The question at issue in the present analysis is not so much a direct proof of God's existence as it is a reflective analysis and critical justification of the proof and all its presuppositions. This extremely difficult problem has not yet, in my opinion, received an adequate treatment.

should be fulfilled. Any of his followers who misinterpreted these norms, could not fulfill them.[66]

Lonergan seems to have had a similar judgment on the proper order to be followed in proving God's existence. The exigencies he had to meet, however, were even stricter than those envisioned by St. Thomas, in that Lonergan could not presuppose a basic metaphysics. Nor could he even presuppose the validity of any principles, such as the principle of causality or the principle of sufficient reason, until they were strictly established according to the order of the moving point of view. This moving point of view begins with instances of insight and proceeds by a methodical and ever deepening analysis until it eventually reaches God as the transcendent source of being and intelligibility required to explain the beings of experience. Thus, the first peculiarity of Lonergan's proof is in conformity with the requirements set by St. Thomas. The significant point, of course, is, not that St. Thomas set such requirements, but rather that he showed them to be intrinsic to the problem treated.

The same analysis clarifies the significance of the second distinctive feature of Lonergan's proof. The proper goal of philosophy is an understanding of the beings of experience in terms of their intrinsic and extrinsic principles. Metaphysics

this on the most basic level of being and reaches its perfection as a philosophical science only when being as such has been made truly intelligible. Accordingly, any valid metaphysical proof of God's existence must be based on the intelligibility of being. This point is sometimes obscured in the standard treatments of this problem, but it becomes clear when one asks why there cannot be an infinite series of moved movers, of caused causes, etc. These cannot be for they are unintelligible. Unfortunately, it is not always made clear just how this intelligibility is to be established in a critical way.

The peculiarity of Lonergan's development is his insistence

•• A history oi the various interpretations oi St. Thomas on this question is given in O'Brien, *op. cit.*, part I.

on *complete* intelligibility as the core of a metaphysical proof of God's existence. Being is completely intelligible, Lonergan insists, for being is known completely only when all intelligent questions are answered correctly. It should be noted that this requirement is more extensive than is generally considered necessary in a metaphysical proof of God's existence. What is generally done is to consider being under some special aspect, e. g., contigent existence, and seek an ultimate explanation of this. Such a limitation is justified if one holds, as I do, for a formal distinction between metaphysics and other philosophical and scientific disciplines. Lonergan's stress on complete intelligibility seems to flow from his conception of metaphysics as an integral heuristic structure. The difficulty with his development is that, as we have attempted to show above, he has not succeeded in establishing the complete intelligibility of being. Accordingly, I consider his proof inconclusive.

The third distinctive feature of Lonergan's development, the conclusion that the metaphysical essence of God is an unrestricted act of understanding, is not without precedent in the scholastic tradition. Since the metaphysical essence of God is determined by the properly ordered metaphysical understanding of the relation of creatures to God, the validity of Lonergan's explanation of God's metaphysical essence depends on the validity of his proof of God's existence. A rejection of his proof as inconclusive leaves this derivative question unsettled.

The evaluation which we have been attempting leads to one general conclusion. A proof of God's existence by way of a metaphysical resolution which does not rely on implicit presuppositions and which probes the intelligibility of being in the light of modern knowledge and critical awareness of the foundations of this knowledge remains one of the outstanding and basic problems faced by contemporary Thomism.

SUMMARY

Perhaps in summarizing this series we can take a more global view of Lonergan's synthesis. The key that opens the

door of his system is his cognitional analysis. This was first elaborated in Lonergan's historical studies of St. Thomas' theory of knowledge. Yet, Lonergan did not explicitly presuppose either this study or its conclusions in *Insight.* His guiding principle was that Thomist cognitional theory was valid because and to the extent that it can be verified by a careful analysis of basic intellectual operations. In the methodology he developed Lonergan implicitly reinterpreted the method and function proper to Neo-Thomism. The most distinctive feature of this method can be schematized as a two step process. First, study St. Thomas' thought in the context of his intellectual background, his environment, and his distinctive methodolgy, trying especially to understand the factors that contributed to either a clarification or change in his opinions. Secondly, analyze modern problems in the light of personal understanding developed by the first step. Though the intellectual development of the individual will depend on a dialectical interplay of these two steps, a finished product, such as a book, should exhibit a clean separation. Gone is the proof by citation, the deduction of contemporary answers from medieval texts, the argument from authority and party loyalty. Neo-Thomism must be able to stand as an autonomous contemporary philosophy.

The structure and development of *Insight* was determined by what Lonergan calls the "moving point of view." This is essentially a modem version of the *"via resolutionis,"* which Thomas Aquinas had insisted was the proper path for the metaphysician. Lonergan, however, had the added complication that metaphysical resolution could not begin until the metaphysical principles to be employed had been given a critical justification. Though Lonergan focused on scientific and on common-sense knowledge as the matter to be analyzed, the form of his analysis manifests a concern for the criticisms and contributions made by non-scholastic philosophers. Four philosophers whose influence seem significant can serve as pegs in outlining the critical form of Lonergan's development before we take an overview of the matter developed.

Kant presented the critical problem confronting the would-be metaphysician in a challenging form:

> In order that metaphysics, as a true knowledge or science, may claim not merely to persuade deceptively but to produce insight and conviction, a critique of reason must exhibit the whole stock of concepts *a priori*, in a complete system arranged according to their different sources: senses, intellect, and reason. Such a critique must also present a complete table of these concepts together with an analysis of them and all that can be deduced from them. [67]

Insight is essentially the type of study Kant had anticipated, the development of a metaphysics flowing from a critique of reason. The not-infrequent charge that Lonergan is Kantian bears witness to the uncompromising honesty with which he met the challenge presented some 170 years earlier.

How should such an analysis begin? Edmund Husser! [68] had outlined a phenomenological method which began with description (or sense data) and proceeded by way of reduction to essences and thence to the intentionality of the philosopher as the ground of philosophy. Lonergan's moving point of view followed a somewhat similiar path expanded to include explanatory as well as descriptive knowledge, and focused on insight rather than the complicated "bracketing" procedure of phenomenology. The terminus of this phase, the bridge leading from cognitional analysis to the unfolding of metaphysics was the judgment, **"I** am a knower." This immediately suggests Descartes' "Cogito, ergo sum." However, the function of self-affirmation is somewhat different in the two systems. Descartes self-affirmation was a privileged truth which served as the first link in a chain of deductive reasoning. Hegel had shown that dialectical reasoning was a better tool than pure deduction in the development of a universal synthesis and had broadened philosophy to include 'philosophies of' (history, art, etc.) as

[67] - Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysics," *The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant's MOTal and Political Writings*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: The Modern Library, 1949), p. 110.

[68] Husserl's name was used because of his temporal priority in the phenomenological movement;. Heidegger's thought may have exerted a greater influence.

well as pure philosophy. Lonergan accepted and transformed this insight. From self-affirmation his analysis spiraled outward into a philosophy of philosophies, and bored down into the core of being's intelligibility. This creative adaption brilliantly fulfills Lonergan's stated purpose, *veteris novis augere et perficere.*

Following the rather facile distinction, introduced for the sake of a summary, between the form and matter of Lonergan's development, we can call the matter a metaphysics-centered synthesis of knowledge. It has two pre-metaphysical props: a 'subjective' one, the cognitional analysis itself; and an 'objective' one, the intelligibility of being to the degree that it is grasped in the explanatory conjugates proper to the various ways of understanding; common-sense, classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectic. Physics recieves the most detailed treatment in this part of.his analysis. We have rejected his explanation of the way of knowing proper to physics on the grounds that it misrepresents the ways of knowing actually characteristic of physics, it neglects the formal distinction between physics and philosophy, and it leads to erroneous conclusions. This rejection, however, does not imply a rejection either of the cognitional analysis Lonergan developed or of the need for a pre-metaphysical analysis of physical reality in terms of intrinsic principles. In the Thomistic tradition, such an analysis generally takes the form of a philosophy of nature, which argues from the properties and activities of physical objects to an intrinsic composition of substance and accident on one level, and to the composition of matter and form which, on a deeper level, constitute the essence of a natural unit. This traditional philosophy of nature has, to be sure, come upon difficult days. Yet, the fact remains that one who wishes to follow the moving point of view, or the *'via reductionis'* must begin with a proximate analysis before moving on to an ultimate analysis of physical reality. If, as we have suggested, the formally distinguishing note of theoretical physics is its systematization of data through an imposed extrinsic intelligi-

bility, then a complementary proximate analysis of the intrinsic intelligibility of being is required and must be developed. Lonergan's doctrine of explanatory conjugates may be a species of what Whitehead has aptly dubbed "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness," but the necessity this doctrine expresses for an explanatory, rather than a purely descriptive, analysis of physical reality prior to metaphysics is perfectly valid.

The metaphysics central to Lonergan's synthesis has some weaknesses both in content and development. Yet, the synthesis itself has a depth and a scope new to Neo-Thomism, especially in the English-speaking world. What is required now is neither a total rejection of Lonergan's doctrine as a novelty, nor a total acceptance based on enthusiasm for change, but a critical dialogue. Here we are all in Lonergan's debt, for he has not only given us a broad base for such a dialogue but has also sharpened the tools to be used, the critical analysis of knowledge, the moving point of view, the positing of positions and counter-positions, and the understanding of dialectical method. If such a dialogue ensues through a critical analysis of his development, through alternate developments of the moving point of view, and through the positing of different positions, these antitheses could lead to the formation of an extensive and more rigorous synthesis than *Insight.* It was in this spirit that the present criticisms were offered.

I wish to thank Father Lonergan for his cheerful generosity in discussing these problems and especially for his very helpful criticism of the first draft of these articles.

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BOOK REVIEWS

HERBERT FEIGL and GROVER MAXWELL, ed., *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. 3, " Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time," Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962. Pp. xv plus 628, with name and subject indices. $8.50.

ADOLPH GRUNBAUM, *Philosophical Problems of Space and Time*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963. Pp. xi plus 448, with bibliography and index.

These two titles are significant works in the philosophy of science that bring the reader abreast of recent developments in this rapidly expanding field. The first, Volume Three of the *Minnesota Studies*, differs from previous volumes in this series in that it is devoted less to the foundations of psychology and more to the philosophy of physics. The second is Volume One in a new series edited by Sidney Morgenbesser under the general title of Borzoi Books in the Philosophy of Science. Both volumes examine in considerable detail the recent literature on scientific explanation, on space, and on time. They are of particular interest to the Thomist for the differences of opinion they show to exist among contemporary empiricists, as well as for manifesting some basic divergences that still exist between empiricism and moderate realism.

* * *

Nine authors contribute ten essays, somewhat uneven in length and in emphasis, to the Minnesota volume. Eight of the papers are concerned with problems of explanation, leaving only two for the consideration of space and time; of these two, one by Adolph Griinbaum occupies 122 pages and covers much the same ground as the Borzoi volume, while the other, by Wilfrid F. Sellers and entitled "Time and the World Order," runs over 90 pages. The remaining 400 pages consist of two essays by Grover Maxwell, entitled respectively " The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities" and" The Necessary and the Contingent"; and individual essays by P. K. Feyerabend on "Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism"; by Carl G. Hempel on "Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation"; by Michael Scriven on " Explanations, Predictions, and Laws "; by May Brodbeck on " Explanation, Prediction, and ' Imperfect ' Knowledge "; by W. W. Rozeboom on " The Factual Content of Theoretical Concepts "; and by Hilary Putnam on " The Analytic and the Synthetic."

It would be impossible to detail the contents of all these essays and offer a critique of their theses within the compass of this review. Since Thomists have become interested in the rejection of instrumentalism by a number of empiricists, among whom the thought of Maxwell and Feyerabend has been

influential, and because of the pronounced overtures towards realism made by this same group, the review will be confined to examining the realist commitments contained in the papers by Maxwell and Feyerabend and in the related paper by Rozeboom.

In his essay on " The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities," Maxwell attempts to prove that " electrons, photons, and even electromagnetic fields are just as real, and exist in the same full-blooded sense as chairs, tables, or sense-impressions " (p. vii). Maxwell is critical of the phenomenalism to which many of his colleagues subscribe, and particularly of the dichotomy they attempt to introduce between observational and theoretical statements. He argues against those who would hold that " even stars and microscopic objects are not physical things in a literal sense, but merely by courtesy of language and pictorial imagination " (p. 7). His point is that there is a continuous series, proceeding in the order: "looking through a window-pane, looking through glasses, looking through binoculars, looking through a low-power microscope, looking through a high-power microscope, etc." and that in this series it is impossible to draw a line that is not arbitrary between " observation " and " theory " (p. 7). He argues also that " many of the theories extant today are well confirmed enough to argue strongly for the reality of theoretical entities" (p. 20). Against those who would deny their reality because of difficulties with quantum theory, he proposes the following line of reasoning.

> . . . And the fact that many theoretical entities, for example those of quantum theory, differ a great deal from our ordinary everyday physical objects is no reason whatever to ascribe a questionable ontological status to them or to contend that they are merely " calculating devices." After all, the very air we breathe as well as such things as shadows and mirror images are of quite different kinds from chairs and tables but this provides no grounds for impugning their ontological status (p. 24).

It is not clear, however, just what degree of confirmation is necessary, in Maxwell's mind, to guarantee the reality of the entities under discussion. That he has somewhat uncritical views in this matter is suggested in the following assertion:

> Indeed, using our painfully acquired theoretical knowledge of the world, we come to see that we " directly observe" many kinds of so-called theoretical things. After listening to a dull speech while sitting on a hard bench, we begin to become poignantly aware of the presence of a considerably strong gravitational field, and as Professor Feyerabend is fond of pointing out, if we were carrying a heavy suitcase in a changing gravitational field, we could observe the changes of the $G_{p.v}$ of the metric tensor (p. 14).

It seems to this reviewer that there is considerable difference between being aware of a body's gravity or heaviness and of " directly observing "

a gravitational "field" or a "metric tensor." If this is so, the cause of realism is not served by assigning equivalent ontological status to physical attributes and to theoretical constructs used to calculate the metrical aspects of such attributes. Nor can one easily assign to the so-called elementary particles of modern physics a degree of reality that would place them on a par with the tables and chairs of ordinary experience (for details, see the author's "The Reality of Elementary Particles," being published in the *Proceedings of the American Catlwlic Philosophical Association,* Vol. XXXVIII, 1964).

When examined for their full implications, nonetheless, Maxwell's statements seem to argue in favor of assigning various ontological levels or strata to the objects investigated by modern science. However unlikely the proposal of such a thesis by an empiricist may seem, there is no doubting its accord with the basic ontology of Thomism.

A somewhat different picture is painted by Professor Rozeboom in his article on "The Factual Content of Theoretical Concepts." Aware of contemporary difficulties with the ontological status of theoretical concepts, he proposes to divide questions about such concepts into two main categories:

> On the one hand we find *positivistic* positions, which hold theoretical terms to be either meaningless computational devices or explicitly definable by observation terms, so that statements using theoretical terms can assert nothing inexpressible in the observation language. In contrast, there are the *realistic* interpretations, which regard the designata of theoretical terms to be (in general) beyond the scope of observational reference, a view which might seem to imply that the factual commitments of a theoretical statement are incapable of expression in the observation language. Each view has its difficulties, the former in that its application to specific cases has met with repeated failure, while the latter flirts with transcendentalism. It is my opinion that, as is so frequently true of philosophical disputes, the insights of both positions are substantially sound (p. 274).

Tracing the extent to which Rozeboom is willing to countenance the realistic i:tterpretation, one finds that he is favorable to an "empirical realism," which affirms "both that knowledge about unobserved entities is possible and that this knowledge is given only through what is observed" (p. 331). The possibility of such language is justified in part by the author's" Thesis of Semantic Empiricism," which states that" the semantic properties, if any, of theoretical expressions derive, in a potentially useful and syntactically general manner, wholly from their use with the observation language" (p. 303). Despite the care with which Rozeboom treats the problem of theoretical entities, however, he is seemingly unaware that what scientists accept as "fact" is itself frequently not without some theoretical content. Linguistic analysis to the contrary, Rozeboom states his personal commitment unambiguously: "There *are* facts, and no theory of semantics can be adequate which does not examine the relationship of sentence to (extra-linguistic) fact" (p. Q75n).

The paper by Feyerabend is directed against the twin evils of apriorism and instrumentalism. The author proposes to establish his thesis by refuting two principles that have been invoked by most contemporary empiricists, the principle of deducibility and the principle of meaning invariance. His paper is summarized as follows:

This article contains an exposition and a criticism of two principles which contemporary empiricism .shares with some very influential traditional philosophies, such as Platonism and Cartesianism. The first principle, the *principle of derivability,* asserts that explanation is by derivation, that when an explanation is given, the explanandum is derivable from its explanans without any change in its original formulation. The second principle, the *principle of meaning invariance,* asserts that the process of explanation leaves, or should leave, meanings unchanged. It is shown (1) that these principles are inconsistent both with actual scientific practice and with a reasonable, nondogmatic empiricism, (2) that contemporary empiricism which has adopted these principles thereby decreases the empirical content of scientific theories, making them less empirical and more dogmatic, (3) that the difficulties which emerge when one attempts to solve such major philosophical problems as the mind-body problem, or the problem of the existence of the eternal world, are due to the fact that the two principles are made the *conditio sine qua non* of their solution, and (4) that a formal account of explanation is impossible. Finally, an attempt is made to present the outlines of a disinfected empiricism, one no longer bound by these two principles (pp. vii-viii) .

In establishing his thesis, Feyerabend presents a section in which he analyzes the differences between the Aristotelian theory of impetus and the Newtonian theory of inertia that is of interest to Thomistic philosophers of science. Against a commonly accepted notion that the growth of scientific theories always permits the earlier theory to be explained by, or reduced to, the latter theory, and leaves the meaning of the key terms invariant in the process, Feyerabend argues that the medieval concept of impetus cannot be assimilated by, or equated with, the Newtonian concept of momentum. In fact, in criticism of a theory of Ernest Nagel, he argues that while the notion of impetus is incompatible with Newton's theory-and therefore is not only incapable of reduction to Newton's theory but is also incapable of explanation in terms of the latter-the impetus theory itself permits the incorporation of the concept of momentum (pp. 52-62).

While not manifesting the ready commitment to the real that is apparent in Maxwell's essay, and at the same time being more circumspect in his acceptance of " facts " than Rozeboom, Feyerabend defends a position that is not easily reconciled with moderate or critical realism. Like many empiricists-" nondogmatic," " modest," and " disinfected " included-he proceeds on the assumption that all of human knowledge must be modeled on, and be subject to the same limitations as, the specialized theories of modern science. He is opposed to any notion of finality in knowledge, and thinks

that " absolute truth," if ever attained, cannot make any claim to factual content. His personal estimate of epistemology is contained in the following sentence: " What is needed is a method which does not-in the name of either 'universal principles,' 'revelation,' or 'experience '-put fetters on the scientist's imagination but which enables him to use alternatives to the point of view which is the one commonly accepted " (p. 72). Statements such as this are not intended by Feyerabend to be applied only to the language of the scientist; they apply also to " ordinary language " and the statements of philosophers. As he himself states, "Using our earlier arguments ... we may now infer the untenability, on methodological grounds, of meaning invariance as well. And as our argument is quite general we may also infer that it is undesirable that the ' ordinary ' usage of terms be preserved in the course of the progress of knowledge. . . . Violation of ordinary usage, and of other ' established ' usages, on the other hand, is a sign that real progress has been made . . ." (p. 81). Or again: " This example refutes the thesis which has been defended by some philosophers that " everyday languages are fairly free from hypothetical elements and therefore ideally suited as observational languages. It refutes the thesis by showing that even the most harmless part of a common idiom may rest upon very far-reaching hypotheses and must therefore be regarded as hypothetical to a very high degree" (p. 85). He also applies his generalization to the problem of induction, concluding: "No number of examples of usefulness of an idiom is ever sufficient to show that the idiom will have to be retained forever" (p. 89).

Feyerabend's refutation of meaning invariance and of deducibility is cogently presented and makes good sense to a Thomist in terms of the latter's understanding of the use of analogy and demonstration in scientific discourse. His dissatisfaction with linguistic analysis, however, and his rejection of much of the non-empiricist philosophical tradition of the past lead one to question whether his basic commitment is not more methodological than ontological, and-as a corollary to this-to question how much he himself has abandoned the apriorism and instrumentalism he set out to refute.

* * *

Grtinbaum's volume on *Philosophical Problems of Space and Time* does not reveal the interesting diversity of opinion found in the *Minnesota Studies,* being limited to the forcefully expressed views of the ·author on his subject. The book contains a series of essays of varying length and development. It presupposes an extensive knowledge of the literature, particularly the contributions of Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Camap, with whom the author is in general agreement although he does differ on particulars. The treatment is divided into three parts, the first considering the metric of space and time, the second the topology of time and space, and

the third philosophical issues arising in the theory of relativity. Although none of these parts makes light reading> Grunbaum presents his arguments well and in considerable detail; one may not agree with his conclusions, but is generally not at a loss in following the line of thought. Yet the overall presentation would have been more comprehensible had the author been more precise in defming the problems in which he was interested and in summarizing the results toward which his lengthy, discursive analyses were directed.

The inherent difficulty of this book argues against its receiving attention from many Thomists, even those interested in the philosophy of science and of mathematics. Of interest to all, however, is a section in which Grtlnbaum reveals the extent of the differences between an empiricist view of geometry and that of the moderate realist (pp. 147-151). The section occurs in a critique of Einstein's philosophy of geometry wherein Griinbaum attacks Maritain's analysis of the geometrically real, as expounded in the latter's *Degrees of Knowledge.* The statement of Maritain that gives GrUnbaum most trouble is one maintaining that "the geometric properties of existing bodies " are " those properties which the mind recognizes in the elimination of all the physical" (p. 151). Reading the earlier, defective translation of Maritain's work, Griinbaum is understandably puzzled as to what Maritain can possibly mean. Throughout Griinbaum's discussion, however, no appraisal or critique is given of the doctrine of abstraction, on which Maritain'.s statement is clearly based, nor, throughout the book, *is* there any recognition by the author that space may be treated differently by the geometrician than it is by the physicist. The obscurities of Maritain's presentation notwithstanding, there is little profundity in Grilnbaum.'s analysis and rebuttal. Or, to put it in another way, the basic presupposi· tions of the two authors are so different that they almost preclude any intelligible discourse between them. Much the same could possibly be said of the general empiricist position on these matters when compared to that of the moderate realist.

* * *

If these two volumes reveal that the realist commitments of contemporary empiricists differ from the realist commitments of Thomists, they also reveal that the empiricists' position is not as monolithic in the 1960's as it has been in the first half of this century. As the active discussion and controversy from which these volumes emerged continue, one may reasonably expect a broadening of the base of contemporary empiricism to a point where moderate realists can enter, with profit, into its controversies.

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Syllogistic and Its Extensions. By OTTO BIRD. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. xii and 116.

A Modern Formal Logic. By MILTON FRSK. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. xi and 116.

These two monographs are the first to appear in the *Prentice-Hall Fundamentals of Logic Series.* The five authors wrote or are writing these monographs while members of the faculty of the University of Notre Dame. The other titles and authors in this series are: *Language and Logic* by Ernan McMullin, *Method in the Sciences: An Introduction* by Harry Nielsen, and *History of Logic* by Ivo Thomas, O. P. The series, under the general editorship of Ernan McMullin, is intended to present to the teacher and the student the general principles, scope, and development of logic. Though there are many and varied texts in the field of logic, this series has merit in that many authors are able to treat subjects best known to them. These first two monographs deal with logic as a formal system.

Otto Bird in *Syllogistic and Its Extensions* treats syllogistic in the first two chapters and he reserves the last three chapters for the extensions of basic syllogistic. Since his concern is syllogistic, he does not proceed in the same manner as the authors of traditional texts on logic in which the treatment of logic is divided into the three acts of the mind. Rather, Bird begins his study of syllogistic with an introduction of all the necessary elements of syllogistic argumentation. The notion of syllogism itself is introduced by way of description and analysis and its definition remains for a later section. Syllogistic in the first part of the book is restricted to general, affirmative and referential names. Since Bird stresses the formal character of logic, he does not discuss concrete statements but functors and variables. For functors he uses the traditional symbols A, I, E, and O. The subject and predicate are replaced by name-variables b and a. In explaining the laws of the square of opposition Bird uses Euler circles and a truth table. Having defined syllogism in Aristotle's terms, Bird discusses validity. Validity does not depend on the truth or falsity of the premises. A valid syllogism occurs *if* the premises are true, *then* the conclusion will be true. If from true premises one infers a false conclusion, then that argument is invalid. Using these as criteria Bird analyzes validity in the various figures and moods of syllogistic arguments. In explaining the valid moods he uses Venn diagrams and the traditional verse containing all the valid moods.

Realizing that syllogistic laws are numerous and difficult to handle, Bird in the second chapter discusses the systematizing of syllogistics. There is a short treatment of Aristotle's reduction to the first figure. The notion of indirect reduction is used as a bridge to introduce antilogism which applies the law of compound transposition. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with logic as a formal axiomatic system. The expressions, rules, axioms, and definitions of system CS, categorical syllogism, are enumerated

and explained. Employing this system Bird derives all the traditional laws of basic syllogistic. The final part of this chapter deals with the properties of a formal deductive syStem: the independence of its axioms, its consistency, and its completeness. System CS can not handle negative terms. And in his explanation of negative terms Bird mentions the difficulties that arise in using transcendental terms and terms that mutually exclude everything else in the universe. However, with the introduction of negative terms more operations are possible: contraposition, obversion, and inversion. Employing these operations and the octagon of opposition, Bird shows that negative terms can be reduced to affirmative terms and with some restrictions on system CS, system CS (n) is introduced. Syllogistic with nonreferential terms is the subject for the fourth chapter. Empty terms in system CS (n) make some of its operations invalid. In explaining the admission of empty terms Bird uses Venn diagrams and Boolean algebra. In this chapter there is a detailed discussion of the notion of existential import. The final chapter contains short discussions on four additional extensions to syllogiStic: singular terms, modality, sorites, and quantification. In an appendix Bird explains the use of truth tables in evaluating arguments.

Bird had set out to explain syllogistic and this he has done with success. He has treated syllogistic as contained in the old logic and he has introduced the reader to the new logic by his mention of Boolean algebra, quantification, and truth tables. His explanations are enlightening and quite adequate especially those dealing with negative and empty terms. However, in some of his explanations he uses Venn diagrams but does not fully explain how these diagrams are to be set up and how they are to be interpreted. Bird also includes an annotated bibliography as well as an index. This book alone could well be used as a text in a logic course, for Bird treats logic as a method of discourse and this notion is carried throughout the entire work, even though the concrete application of the principles and laws evolved are left to the exercises at the end of the book.

In Milton Fisk's *Modern Formal Logw* there is a different approach to the study of logic. Fisk holds that there is a rich conceptual dimension to logic and for this reason he does not present a mere survey of modern logic, but rather he sets out to investigate ordinary discourse and develop a system of logic. In the first chapter, entitled "Validity," Fisk begins with an investigation into arguments in general and the various types of arguments. It is the argument types that lend system to logic, for if an argument type is valid, then an argument representing this type will be valid also. Throughout this chapter he uses *modus ponens* as his basic example of an argument. Since there are several provinces in the field of logic, each of the remaining three chapters is devoted to one of three provinces: " The Logic of Sentences," " The Logic of Monadic Predicates," and " The Logic of Polyadic Predicates."

In the second chapter Fisk introduces the symbols and notations to be used in the remainder of the book. After giving the basic principles and rules for system S, the logic of sentences, Fisk explains the definition of proof and the method of proof. The method of proof is similar to that used in proving theorems in geometry. To complete the treatment of proof Fisk concludes this chapter with a short section on the use of truth tables. In the next chapter Fisk proceeds to discuss the logic of monadic predicates. This entails a long explanation of quantification. Before developing system P, the logic of monadic predicates, Fisk has a short section on the relation between syllogistic logic and predicate logic. The remainder of the chapter follows the same outline as the previous one: basic principles, rules of system P, and then a discussion of proof. It is in this chapter that Fisk introduces the notion of the singular and the problems this entails. The final chapter is concerned with the logic of relations. The majority of the chapter deals with the translation of sentences into the correct symbols. Included with this treatment is a discussion of predicates and predicate substitution. The discussion of system R, the logic of polyadic predicates, follows the same lines as the preceding two chapters. This similarity of arrangement aids in the reading of each chapter.

Unlike the first book, the exercises appear right in the text itself. And rather than a general bibliography Fisk has supplied a reading list for each chapter. The readings are intended as a supplement to the text and not as an explanation. A name and subject index has also been included to facilitate quick references.

This book gives a detailed treatment of argumentation in general and the three provinces of logic, but it does so from a particular point of view. As Eman McMullin remarks in the Editor's Note (p. vii) this work "builds up formal logic from the whole range of argument-forms found in ordinary discourse and constructs a powerful and original system of ' natural inference ' that is in important respects different from the less intuitive 'material implication ' system given in the majority of elementary textbooks." However, this leads to a difficulty. Using the statement that principle two is "clearly correct" (p. 4) as an illustration, it seems that no standard is given for asserting that this principle is correct. Granted that some principles are arrived at intuitively, this does not mean that they are outside the realm of rational explanation. In an important section on " Logic, Practice, and Meaning," (pp. !il8-30) Fisk seems to offer an explanation for the correctness of principles. But this explanation gives general acceptance and success as the foundations of correctness. This is true to a point but intellectual reflection also plays an important role in establishing the correctness of logical principles. In another important section on categoricals and quantification (pp. 73-75) involving the notion of existence, Fisk seems to go outside the realm of his intended subject matter, formal logic.

Aside from these two observations the book as a whole presents a distinc-

tive treatment on formal logic. Each of these works has its own particular merits. If modern formal logic is the subject under study, then Fisk's book along with the readings offers a good basis. Whereas Bird's book with its treatment of traditional syllogistic could well be used in a course on traditional logic. Bird's book also serves as an introduction to modern logic. Naturally the use of either of these books will depend on the purpose of the teacher or the reader.

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Dieu et la Permission du Mal (Textes et Etudes Philosophiques). By JAcQUEs MARITAIN. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1963. Pp. 111.

Three seminars conducted by Maritain for the Little Brothers of Jesus in Toulouse, during May, 196fl, make up this book. The style is simple, colloquial. The occasion was chosen as a means of responding to some objections by one of his Dominican friends, P. Jean-Herve Nicolas, who wrote in the *Revue Thomiste* partly against Maritain's theories expressed in *Court Traite de ['Existence et de l'Existant* (translated as *Existence and the Existent).* Maritain's central purpose, however, is to go more deeply into questions that he has been thinking about all his life and into the manner of facing them which, he believes, is more than ever valid.

He treats, in order, (1) the innocence of God regarding sin; (fl) some difficulties in the classical Thomist school, "la bonne ecole"; (3) his own position as expressed in the *Court Traite* regarding the non-consideration of the rule, the shatterabie motion from God, and the divine permissive decree consequent to the non-consideration of the rule; (4) the objections of P. Nicolas; (5) how God knows evil; (6) the divine eternal plan; (7) finally, predestination and reprobation.

Briefly, P. Nicolas had taken Maritain to task for departing from the traditional Thomist position by introducing the idea of a shatterable motion from God that has no definite term (thus an indeterminate divine motion, which, to a Thomist, is unthinkable), and for positing a *consequent* rather than the traditional *antecedent* permissive decree. Maritain rather humbly admits that some of his doctrine regarding the shatterable motion was poorly expressed and takes back a long footnote of the *Court Traite,* written, as he says, in haste; though he does not back down from his basic hypothesis. He in no way backs down from his doctrine on the consequent decree, but firmly defends it.

His defense is based on his conception of God's knowledge of existing things. It is not, he says, like a dramatist's knowledge of the characters he creates, since that puts all the emphasis on the *pre-knowledge* and the

antecedent decrees, and makes mere puppets of God's free creatures. Since every moment of time is present to the divine eternity there is no question of a time before time; everything takes place in the eternal instant. Maritain's elaboration of this concept is quite complex, yet exceedingly worth reading. He avoids Molinism by insisting on the radical dissymmetry between the line of good and the line of evil. God has the initiative in the first, the free creature in the second. Regarding any act that is placed by the creature in the line of good, or being, l\'Iaritain shows that there can be absolutely no determination of God. In the line of evil the creature begins with a non-act, a pure negation, which causes the privation of sin.

Be it noted that P. Nicolas includes Marin-Sola and Muniz among the adversaries of the classical Thomist position. Whether or not Maritain is correct in all aspects of his theory, he has given us some fresh insights into an old, old problem. This reviewer for one hopes that the book is read seriously by anyone who ever has been perplexed by the problem of how the antecedent will of God that all men be saved is reconciled with the doctrine on predestination. In the last part of the book Maritain confronts this problem and handles it with his characteristic vigor and skill.

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