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DIVINIZATION:
A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ANALOGY

SANCTIFYING GRACE, the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the light of glory: these are finite perfections intrinsic to a creature, and as such they are infinitely below God. At the same time they make the creature to whom they are given mysteriously but really *divine*, lifting it to the supernatural plane of God's own life. This is the fascinating and baffiing mystery of *divinization*, in which a finite gift endows a creature with the proper beauty of the uncreated God.[1]

Saint Thomas has given a humble, reverent, profound explanation of this mystery. A vigorous Thomist tradition, stemming from the great commentators Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, has repeated this explanation, delved into it, and

[1] Thus St. Augustine says: " factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus " (PL 39: 1997) and St. Leo says: "Agnosce, 0 Christiane, dignitatem tuam; et divinae consors factus naturae, noli in veterem vilitatem degeneri conversatione redire" (PL 54:

shown that its true greatness lies in giving a synthesis, perfect " pro modulo nostro," of the finite and infinite aspects of the divinizing gifts. Writers like Ambrose Gardeil and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange have made us familiar with this teaching. Through them we are accustomed to the cardinal distinction of the Thomist theory of divinization: the divinizing gifts are *materially classified* in a finite category of being, but at the same time they are *formally defined* as *participations of the Deity* itself. The possibility of this distinction depends on an analogous application of the Thomist doctrine of transcendental relatives to the supernatural order: the divinizing gifts, though collocated in a finite category of being, are transcendentally relative to the depths of the Divine Being, are consequently formally divine, and communicate properly divine perfection to the creature to whom they are given.[2]

In recent years some writers have been contending that this traditional Thomist theory exaggerates the finite aspect of these supernatural gifts at the expense of their infinite aspect. For Thomism confessedly makes these gifts supernatural and divinizing only as *participations* of the Deity, not as communications of the Deity in the fullness of a union that is more intimate and complete than participation. The sources of divine revelation, to the minds of these theologians, seem to speak of a higher and more wonderful divinization than that which Thomism ascribes to these gifts, a divinization which is absolutely and totally infinite because it is the entire gift of God Himself to the creature. While the Thomists would, they say, place the accent on finite grace, they would place the accent on the infinite gift of God Himself. Dazzled by the beauty of this intuition of a divine communication, they have tried to

• The Thomist commentators treat this problem either in their tract on Grace (concerning the essence of sanctifying grace) re I-II, q. 112, or in their tract on the beatific vision (concerning the essence of the light of glory) re Ia, q. 12. In more recent times this problem is raised in Thomist works of fundamental theology dependent on Garrigou-Lagrange. The modern commentary of J. M. Ramirez, O.P., *De Hominis Beatitudine*, 3 vols., Salamanca-Madrid, 1942-1947, remains a classic source.

explain it in terms of a unique causality called " quasi formal causality" or" pure formal causality," thinking that God Himself is the unparticipated formal Act of the creature thus perfected. They have then tried to find this superior causality in all the divinizing gifts of grace and glory, thus equating divinization and supernaturality with it, and unifying the explanation of all "grace" under this aspect.[3]

Traditional Thomism has not viewed this proposal without sympathy. Saint Thomas, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas and the Masters of the modern Thomist school have known a divinizing gift which is not by way of participation, which is totally infinite, which is God Himself as the very Act of the soul, and, implicitly at least, they have called it a " pure formal actuation " of the soul by God.[4] Traditional Thomism is not entirely foreign, therefore, to the intuition of the modern movement. It has however (and, we believe, with justice) been critical of the way in which recent authors have tried to express their intuition. In particular, it has been careful to distinguish the supreme divinizing gift, where God is the infinite formal Act of the soul, from other divinizing gifts which are truly finite categories of being while being formal participations of the

[3] M. De Ia Taille and K. Rahner are (it seems, independently) pioneers of this movement. P. De Letter pursued it recently in *The Irish Theological Quarterly,* 1960, pp. 221-228, and the present writer answered him in the same review, 1961, pp. 1-15. This study is not directly intended to prolong the discussion of Father De Letter's article: it is rather intended to profit by the occasion of the exchange of views to search the entire problem. Nor is the present rather particular point at issue--basic though it be--the only point at issue between traditional authors and this modern current. The modern current is becoming more and more vocal: cf. on the teachnical level, B. M. Xiberta, 0. Carm., "De ratione entis supernaturalis," in *Carmelus,* 4 (1957), pp. 3-49, and on the popular level, R. W. Gleason, S. J., *Grace,* Sheed and Ward, New York, 1962. It has even been given prominence in the catechetical review *Lumen Vitae:* cf. XVII (1962), pp. 235-240.

• Thus Cajetan writes: "Nam si de actuare et actuari infra totam latitudinem suorum modorum sermo sit, non est remotum a philosophia, divina Deum posse actuare rem creatam. In cuius signum, divinam essentiam esse actum cuiusque intellectus videntis ipsam, et theologi et philosophi fatentur. Cum ergo naturam humanam in Christo ex divina personalitate et esse divino perfici fateamur, non est absonum fateri etiam, quod actuatur aliquo etiam modo per personalitatem et esse divinum . . . . " *(In lllam,* q. 17, a. 2, n. XVIII.)

Deity, and it has refused strongly to apply the notion of a "pure formal actuation" to these gifts. It feels that any explanation which neglects these necessary distinctions and diversities must, in the last analysis, make the infinite aspect of divinization excessively preponderate over the finite aspect and, therefore, be an imperfect speculative explanation of the data of faith. It cannot then equate divinization with pure formal actuation, or finally explain the supernatural order in terms of it.

It is therefore necessary to ask three questions:

1. *Is it necessary to distinguish two kinds of divinizing gift:* one totally infinite, not by participation, involving pure formal actuation by the Deity; the other finite yet formally infinite and divinizing, by participation of the Deity, excluding all pure formal actuation by the Deity?
2. If so, *how must we explain the intimate nature of each of these distinct divinizing gifts precisely as divinizing?*
3. Does this twofold explanation permit, finally, *a single unified picture of divinization?*

To answer these questions would be to unfold a whole Thomistic theology of divinization, and to lay the foundation for a division of the supernatural which corresponds to the needs of modern theological research. It is our conviction that this theology is none other than that of traditional Thomism, that this division is exactly that of the standard authors of the Thomist school. In this study we propose to begin an inquiry into these central problems of speculative thought, by taking up the summit of divinization, the *beatific vision.* There we shall see that it is necessary to distinguish the two kinds of divinizing gift which we have outlined, we shall examine the intimate nature of each kind, and we shall attempt to integrate our findings into a single picture. That picture may serve as an introduction to the *analogy of divinization,* a sense of which is vital to fruitful research in the theology of grace.

The blessed in heaven see the divine essence with an intuitive, face-to-face vision, without the interposition of any creature in the function of object seen. The divine essence immediately manifests itself to them, plainly, openly, clearly. To see God in this way the soul needs a supernatural elevation called the light of glory.[5]

We have no other way of understanding these data of revelation on the beatific vision except through the analogy of intellectual knowledge: for the vision is nothing else than an intellectual knowledge of God as He is in Himself. Unless this analogical method is stressed and fully appreciated, it is impossible to grasp the nuances of our solution, indeed, no solution is at all possible. If this method is fully worked out, it will lead to the difficulties which are *necessary and proper* in the concept of the divinization of the beatified mind. Fidelity to this analogical method will help us to confront these difficulties which are not inconsiderable and which, as facets of a great mystery, must then be understood " pro modulo humano." Our procedure is therefore that of an analogical ascent. We shall first work out the point of departure of our ascent, the speculative meaning of intellectual knowledge. Then we shall institute the analogy and ascend to a concept of the vision of God. Having reached the point of arrival of the ascent, we shall try to understand, as far as we can, the mystery whose lines are clear, and whose depths are forever dark to the thoughts of man.[6]

[5] " Beati ... vident divinam essentiam visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla mediante creatura in ratione obiecti visi se habente, sed divina essentia immediate se nude, clare et aperte eis ostendente." Denz. n. 530. Ex constitutione Benedicti XII, " Benedictus Deus."

[6] This study must not be thought a complete or formal tract on the vision of God. It will rather presuppose a familiarity with standard expositions of the matter, and use that matter to bring out the distinction, the diversity, and the integrated unity of the two modes of divinization.

PoiNT OF DEPARTURE OF THE AscENT

1. *Knowledge as a natural mystery of pure union*

Knowledge is a natural mystery, beyond the power of our minds to grasp completely. We can only describe it negatively and relatively, saying that it is not like other things we know better, and that it is above them. When we reflect on it in this way, we realize that its dark mystery lies in *a new way of communicating perfection,* a way not like that of the physical order, a way above and beyond it. The object known gives its own perfection to the knower without physically altering it, and without achieving in it its normal physical effects. In every physical way it is still apart from the knower, not given to it, and yet in a new, mysterious way it is one with the knower, given to the knower. We call this new way a "spiritual" or " immaterial " way: for there is no material composite formed between known and knower, there is not even material inhesion of the known in the knower. Properly speaking we should say that the knower does not " receive " the form known, but rather "accepts" it, or is perfected by it. We call this new way of perfecting also "objective" or "intentional," for the known and the knower still stand in physical independence, but are drawn together into unity by the mysterious communication of the known to the knower. We can say that the knower is perfected by the known "as other," because it still stands in no new dependence on the knower in extra-cognitive physical reality. We can say it is a case of *"pure union,* of the form known with the knower without the limitation that goes with union of form in the physical plane of nature. But when we have said all that, we have still not said with final positive clarity exactly what this unique union really is. It remains a natural mystery.

We wish now to reflect on this mystery through two great insights which are personal to Saint Thomas: the metaphysics of form and existence, and the religious bearing of the finality of the created universe. After explaining each of these, we shall unite them to give an interpretation of the " pure union " that is the key to the cognitive order.

First, we consider the metaphysics of form and existence. For Saint Thomas, a formal perfection perfects the essence of a being by giving it a potency, an ordination, to a proper act of existence. The communication of formal perfection, or "perfecting" in the active sense, means that *a form becomes the reason the being to which it is given is ordered to a new act of existence.*[7] An already existing form could thus communicate itself entirely to another being only by becoming the reason the other might exist with its own proper act of existence. This is clearly impossible in the physical order, for, in that order of the finite universe, beings are existentially distinct from one another. The necessary distinction of beings in the physical universe implies a necessary limitation in the perfection of each particular being, a necessary "imperfection," insofar as it cannot possess intrinsically the formal perfection of other beings, or their act of existence.

Now let us look at the religious bearing of the finality of the created universe. The purpose of God in creating finite being is to manifest His own goodness.[8] Since no one finite being can adequately manifest that infinite goodness, He has chosen to

[7] Cf. Cajetan, in his commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia* of St. Thomas, ed. Laurent, 1934, pp. 142-143: "... advertendo proportionem quae est inter formam et existentiam. Est enim proportio formae ad esse actuale, sicut proportio diaphaneitatis ad lumen; forma siquidem recipit existentiam et causat earn, sicut diaphaneitas lumen. Sicutnamque aer in eo quod non est capax luminis, sed oportet ipsum diaphaneitate informari, ut proprium receptivum luminis fiat, non aer nee diaphaneitas, sed aer diaphanus ideo est enim qui primo luminosus est, licet secundario tam aer quam diaphaeitas lumine careat; ita in proposito materia sola non est capax existentiae, quia actus in propria suscipi debet potentia, sed oportet in ipsa formam recipi, ut proprium exceptivum existentiae fiat, non materia nee forma, sed compositum ex eis. Unde sicut diaphaneitas est causa formalis aeri diaphano et eius complementum formale ad hoc ut proprium susceptivum luminis sit, et cum hoc comparatur ad lumen adveniens ut composito et complementum eius formale ad hoc, ut proprium receptivum existentiae sit, ac per hoc comparatur ad ipsam existentiam subsequentem ut potentia recipiens secundario tamen ad actum receptum; uncle fir ut ipsum esse actualis existentiae ad nihil aliud comparetur ut potentia ad actum, sed sit ultima actualitas omnis rei etiam ipsius formae."

[8] Deus "produxit res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis et per eas repraesentandam" (Ia, q. 47, a. I).

create a universe of finite beings, that His goodness might be better reflected in the whole than it can be in any part.[9] But even that universe, of course, is still finite, and so cannot fully reveal God's beauty. So even while it fulfills the purpose of creation better than any of its parts, its parts remain necessarily distinct from one other and from the whole. Thus, the parts are unable to achieve in themselves as parts the role that belongs only to the whole/[0] It is precisely to afford some remedy to this situation, according to Saint Thomas, that the Author of the universe has bestowed the power to know on some beings in the universe. *Through the mystery of knowledge, the perfection which is proper to one being, is found in another,* and this is the perfection of the knower as such.[11] The knower is thus enabled mysteriously to enlarge its role of manifesting the Divine goodness, " ad extra." If it were able to know all things in the universe, it would then itself be able, through its own mystery, to fulfill the role of the entire universe in the external praise of the goodness of the Creator. This is the religious bearing of the power of intellect in the universe. In this sense Saint Thomas interprets Aristotle's dictum that the intellect is in some way all things.[12]

[9] "Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repraesentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest uni ad repraesentandam divinam bonitatem suppleatur ex alia: nam bonitas quae est in Deo simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim. Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et repraesentat eam, totum universum, quam alia quaecunque creatura" (Ibid.) .

[10] " Quia esse specificum unius rei est distinctum ab esse specifico alterius rei, ideo in qualibet re creata huiusmodi perfectioni habitae in unaquaque re, tantum deest de perfectione simpliciter quantum perfectius in aliis speciebus invenitur; ut quaelibet rei perfectio in se consideratae sit imperfecta, veluti pars totius universi quae consurgit ex singnlarium rerum perfectionibus invicem congregatis." (De *Veritate* q. 2, a. 2).

[11] " Unde ut huic imperfectioni aliquod remedium esset, invenitur alius modus perfectionis in rebus creatis, secundum quod perfectio quae est propria unius rei, in altera re invenitur, et haec est perfectio cognoscentis in quantum est cognoscens; quia secundum hoc a cognoscente aliquid cognoscitur quod ipsum cognitum aliquomodo est apud cognoscentem; et ideo in III De Anima (comm. 15 et 17) dicitur animam esse quodammodo omnia, quia nata est omnia cognoscere." *(Ibid.)*

[12] " Et secundum hunc modum possible est ut in una re totius universi perfectio existat " *(Ibid.)* .

If we unite these two insights of Saint Thomas, we must realize that in knowledge a form is mysteriously communicated entirely to a knower, and thereby becomes the reason why it and its knower share in one single indistinct act of existence. What can this act of existence be? It is impossible to think that it is the physical ontological act of existence, as such, which the form known has in physical reality: that would destroy the necessary distinction of beings in finite existence. It is equally impossible to think that it is a new physical ontological existence of the form known "in the knower": that would nullify the essential mystery of the cognitive order, for it is to fall back into the physical order to explain what is ultimately not physical. We are forced to conclude that it is an entirely new kind of existence, one proper to the order of knowledge, which the knower is granted through the form given to it in this pure union, and which also exists with the knower in this one existence. We can call it, in our negative and relative terminology, a" new, singular, immaterial, spiritual, objective, intentional, pure" existence. It is, nonetheless, intensely real. It is a true act of existence, not a figment of the imagination. We must therefore open the eyes of our mind and see the amplitude of existence on the finite level. It is not co-extensive with physical, extra-cognitive existence, it embraces also the mystery of cognitive existence. The pure union of known and knower lies in the fact that the perfection of the form of the known becomes the intrinsic reason the knower possesses a new existence proper to the form of the known as known, and thereby communes with the known in the indistinct unity of a single act of existence. At the heart of the process of knowledge as a natural mystery of pure union, there is an intrinsic formal actuation of a very pure type. We might call it by the name of " pure formal actuation," but for an infinitely higher communion of form and perfected which is found only in certain supreme cases of our supernatural gifts. The fore-going reflections will be valuable when we have instituted our analogous ascent and reached the direct consideration of these gifts.

Knowledge in the context of tendential participation

Although pure union is the heart of the mystery of knowledge, it is not the whole of that mystery. Knowledge, as the Author of nature has instituted it, is more than pure union. It is pure union which comes about through the efficient activity of the knower: *the knower unites itself actively to the form to be known and thus enters pure union with that form.* God has thus wished his creature to participate in the efficient causal activity by which, through knowledge, he provides a remedy for the necessary imperfection of the creature as a physical distinct part of the universe. The dynamism which brings about the pure union in which knowledge consists, is not exclusively that of the Divine Governor of the universe. By His great largesse, it is also, subordinately but intrinsically, that of the creature, which under God is moved to know. Moreover, the creature is enabled to act in that marvellous way not simply "ad actum" but permanently and habitually. It is endowed with *an intrinsic and permanent power to know,* a power which flows from its own most intimate essence as a property, and it is thereby intrinsically denominated as a "knower." Since the term of this activity, intrinsic and proper to the knower, is that union to the form of which we have spoken, it is within the knower and thus the activity itself is immanent. To be a knower is to be endowed with life of a very high kind.[13]

To understand the intimate nature of the active potency to know, and the act of knowledge itself, we must invoke principles which are not exclusive to the order of cognition. They are *the principles of specification of transcendental relatives.* As a delicate understanding of them is vital to our later research into the supernatural, we shall explain them in some detail and then situate the mystery of knowledge in their perspective .[14]

[13] More will be said later on the intimate relation between the term of knowledge and the act of knowledge.

[14] The sources of this exposition are: St. Thomas, Ia, q. 77, a. 3; Cajetan on

In classic Thomism, an active potency and its correlative act receive their formal meaning, that is, their specification, from their proper formal object. We say their" proper" object, that is, the object which is proper to them and not to any other potency or act, and their " formal " object, that is, the object as precisely objectivated to them as the term of their tending. This object is said to be the determinant of their formal specific meaning. This means that they belong to a unique group of beings. They are not what we might call" *absolute essence":* beings which not only possess a reality intrinsic to themselves, but which find in themselves the formal determinant of the specific meaning of their own intrinsic reality. We say the " formal " determinant, not the efficient determinant, for no finite being can be the efficient determinant of itself. Nor are these unique beings of which we speak what we might call *"purely respective essences":* beings which, though they possess a reality intrinsic to themselves, are entirely determined in that reality by simply looking towards (or respecting) another being purely as other. These must be the most tenuous of all real beings, for their formal determinant is simply a respecting of another as other, and no more. Rather the unique beings of which we speak must be classified between the two groups mentioned and rejected, and for want of a better name we might call them *"'117Rdian respective essenoes* ": beings which possess a reality intrinsic to themselves, whose formal determinant does not lie in their own absolute reality as absolute, nor yet in a simple respecting of another as other, but in an essential ordination of their whole absolute reality towards another as its crown and perfective consummation. This spe-

this article; John of St. Thomas, *Logica,* "De signo secundum se," art. iv, qualiter dividitur obiectum in motivum et terminativum, in ed. Reiser, pp. 670-679. It must be remarked that the phrase " transcendental relation " seems often used by some recent writers in a sense which is not that of the sources just cited. What Father Gleason writes in *Grace,* p. 158, is hardly adequate to express the sense of the classic Thomists. Father Rahner equally in *Zur Theologie des Todes* (Eng. trans., ed. *Herder-Nelson,* 1961, pp. 28 seq.) seems to use the term " transcendental relation " to describe what really appears in sense to be a predicamental relation.

cial relativity which orders the entire absolute being to the other in this way, is not something superadded to a prior and distinct absolute reality, to be explained in its own right: it is of the very essence of the absolute reality itself, without which it simply cannot be conceived. Thus to be ordained to another, thus to respect another as the crown and climax of its whole meaning, is precisely the whole formal meaning of these unique beings. In defining them we must then posit this tendential-respecting-towards-another in the place of a specific difference in the definition of an absolute essence. In this way, the " other " to which they tend is included in their essential definition, not as an intrinsic predicate, but as an extrinsic term of reference solely *in tendential relation to which* the intrinsic determinant has meaning. It is in this sense that classic Thornism maintains as an axiom that" median respective essences" receive their formal specification by such an intrinsic ordination to an extrinsic object. [15]

[15] Cf. Cajetan, *loc. cit.*, n. IV: "... potentia, secundum id quod est, ad actum dicitur et est; id est, quia potentia, secundum suam entitatem, non est res absoluta ab actu et obiecto; quamvis sit res absoluta a termino, et propterea non est in genere relationis. Imaginamur enim, secundum divum Thomam, quod potentiae et habitus, et alia huiusmodi, sunt entitates quaedam mediae inter absolutas omnino, et respectivas totaliter. Ita quod non per aliquid superadditum, sed per suas essentias essentialiter ordinem habent ad actus, ita quod absque eis intelligi etiam in prima operatione intellectus non possint: non quia differentiae earum sint, sed quia earum differentiae sumuntur ab ordine ad illos; ordine autem dico, non relationis praedicamentalis, sed transcendente." Cf. item John of St. Thomas, l. c., p. 670: "... aliquae res sunt prorsus absolutae, in sui specificatione et constitutione, a nullo extrinseco dependentes, ut substantia, quantitas, etc. Aliae sunt prorsus relativae, quae totum suum esse habent ad aliud et ab illo pendent ut a puro termino. Aliae sunt mediae interistas, quae in se quidem habent quidditatem et essentiam absolutam, ita quod aliquid aliud habent quam respicere et referri; tamen in sui constitutione et specificatione dependent ab aliquo extrinseco, non ad respeciendum, sed ad agendum vel causandum aut aliquid negotiandum. Et sic se habent potentiae et actus et habitus circa ea, quae, attingunt, dicunturque habere ordinem transcendentalem ad ea." John of St. Thomas thus explains the difference between a pure term and a term which determines the 'median respective essence': "... Licet autem quod est pure terminus, non perficiat, sicut in relativis, eo quod relatio non tendit agendo, sed pure respiciendo, et similiter quod est pure effectus, non perficiat, sed pure perficiatur, sicut creaturae respectu Dei, quae ita efficiuntur a Deo, quod ab earum terminatione eius

Classic Thomism applies this teaching to the case of an active potency and its correlative act: they are thus specified by an intrinsic ordination to their proper formal object. The ultimate reason of this is that the proper formal object is for both act and potency the end and term of their whole formal meaning and function. Their object is not merely "what they effect": it is also the crown and climax, the perfective consummation of their very essential intelligibility, which is conceivable only in relation to such an object, not as simply "other," but as formal extrinsic determinant. This too is a natural mystery.

We would introduce here, on the subject of these principles of the specification of transcendental relatives, a consideration whose importance will be paramount later when we deal directly with the divinizing gifts. It deals with *the unique way in which this tendential relativity towards an object is a participation of that object.* In the light of our remarks at the opening of this study, it will be seen that this point is at the heart of the modern divergence of viewpoint concerning divinization.

The tendency, or ordination, of a "median respective essence" towards its formal extrinsic determinant means that *in a certain real sense* the *entire* formal perfection of the determinant is imbibed into that essence. It is of course perfectly true that there is simply no formal intrinsic causality exercised by the extrinsic determinant on the "median respective essence." It is therefore abundantly clear that there is no intrinsic union between that extrinsic determinant and the essence in question. All that we have is a special extrinsic formal causality which we may call objective causality. Nevertheless, the transcendentally relative essence is a tendency to the whole formal perfection of the extrinsic determinant. In other words, that *whole* perfection determines the formal nature of the "median respective essence" and thus can be said

actio in se non pendet; tamen in actibus creatis terminatio dat perfectionem actibus, quia si terminati non sint, perfecti non sunt nee completi, sed quasi in via et tendentia; perficiuntur ergo determinatione ipsa, ad quam tendunt" *(Ibid.,* p. 671).

to be, in its entirety, "in" that essence after the manner in which a term can be said to be "in" a tendency which it terminates and determines. The transcendental relative is not determined by part only of the formal perfection of the determinant, but by the whole of it: the whole of it thus enters in some way into the formal constitution of the relative. We suggest then that we have a case of a unique participation. The relative makes its own the whole formal perfection of the extrinsic form, leaving aside only the entire manner in which that perfection perfects in reality and exercises intrinsic formal causality. We can see with some clarity that it does leave this aside; we can explain, again with some clarity, that it makes its own the entire perfection of the determinant, "as a tendency claims for itself its determinative term"; but we do not see, ultimately and positively, *how* this really takes place. That is the originality and the exact natural mystery of a "median respective essence." That is also the analogy between intrinsic formal causality and formal extrinsic objective causality. In Thomistic language, "participation" often means to imbibe and make one's own some part of a perfection, while leaving aside some other part. Very often it thus means that something less than the full perfection of the participated form is imbibed into the participant. We must avoid such an impression here. Although, *simpliciter,* the full perfection of the determinant is not thus given, that is, by way of intrinsic formal causality, nonetheless, *secundum quid,* that full perfection is given in the singular sense explained. The transcendental relative is thus only a similitude of the determinant, but at the same time it is a similitude of a unique kind, one that is in *total reference to the total perfection of the determinant as such.*

Every basic consideration of an active potency and its correlative act is therefore twofold: material and formal. *Materially,* these realities will be in a certain category of being, but their uniquely determined nature will prevent them from being in the category of substance and reduce them to one of the categories of accident. To consider them materially is thus

to consider them according to the category of accident to which they are reduced, and so in relation to the subject in which they inhere as accident. *Formally,* however, these same realities are specified by an intrinsic ordination to an extrinsic object in such a way that they imbibe into their own formal meaning all the formal perfection of that object insofar as it can be imbibed into a tendency determined by it. Thus they are unique participations and similitudes of that perfection. This key distinction-materially, formally-is not of itself proper to the order of cognition, but is a necessary accompaniment of the mystery of the transcendental relative. It is not therefore the same distinction as that between the physical order of finite being and the pure or cognitive order of that being.

We may return now to the act of knowledge and the intrinsic power by which it is performed and situate them in the perspective of these principles. Immediately we may apply the foregoing distinction. *Materially,* according to their relation to the knowing subject, the act of knowledge and the power to know are accidents and are classified reductively in the category of quality. *Formally,* they are specified by a relation to the object known, by a real intrinsic ordination to this or that kind of object as known by this knower.

Two further remarks will lead us from here to a point where we may see the range of God's plan in instituting the natural mystery of knowledge as it is.

First, let us draw a consequence from what we have said about transcendental relatives and active potencies. An active potency and its act are not merely efficient principles of an effect, producing it in being. By them a creature does not merely share in the efficient causal activity of the Author of nature in bringing about new being and thus constructing the serried ranks of the distinct perfections of the universe. An active potency and its act are also entirely determined in their formal specific perfection by the formal perfection of their object, in the sense explained. They possess, in their own formal

perfection, the full formal perfection of their term, not of course as it stands in inalienable distinctness in the finite universe, but as it is contained in the tendential perfection of the second cause which is ordered to it. In a certain real sense then the very existence of active potencies and efficient activity in the creature is already a step towards the remedying of the essential " imperfection " of the universe and of the acting creature as a distinct part of it. Nonetheless, it is but an initial step. Even when we realize it, we see clearly that we may still invoke the full strength of Saint Thomas' argument in favour of some other and singular remedy for this " imperfection " which even then clearly remains.

Secondly, an active potency to know and the act of knowing have a singular place in the "remedy" for the" imperfection" of the universe. We are now speaking directly and exclusively of the unique order of knowledge, in which the pure union of known and knower is the essential and proper novelty in this remedy. As we have said, it is a case of pure intrinsic formal causality. But this union is and must be the term of the act of knowledge and the fruit of the activity of the active potency to know. If the knower intervenes actively to bring about the mysterious pure union of knowledge, it must not be regarded simply as an executive and no more. The knower thus elicits the act of knowledge through principles which possess intrinsically the very formal perfection of the form united to the knower in the pure union of knowledge, not as that perfection exists in reality in the physically diverse universe, not as that perfection is precisely communicated in a pure intrinsic formal causality in the exact union of knowledge, but as it can be precontained in the tendential participation that constitutes the specific nature of the transcendental relative ordered to it. In the total mystery of knowledge, then, the remedy for the imperfection of the universe takes place *on two distinct but integrated levels.* The first and foremost, surely, is the level of intrinsic formal actuation by the form known in the union which is the term of the act of knowledge. The second, but

still significant, level is the tendential participation of the form known within the active potency to know and its proper act. *The integral mystery of knowledge is a close weaving together of these two aspects: pure intrinsic; formal union, and tendential participation of an extrinsic formal determinant.* To retain one without the other is to miss the full mystery of knowledge as the Author of nature has instituted it to be the remedy of nature.

We are now at a point where we may rightly ask the reason for duality of this remedy in the plan of God. Clearly, the mystery of pure intrinsic formal union is greater than that of tendential participation. It will not be enough to say, without further explicitation, that the advantages of tendential participation over pure formal union reduce to the granting of the dignity of efficient causality to the creature. The true explanation of its advantages is an explicitation of that point. Tendential participation will give the knower, in its faculty to know and its act of knowledge, a more connaturally intrinsic possession of the form to be known than it has in the greater intrinsic pure union at the term of knowledge. For the former gives an intrinsic possession of the form (in tendential participation) according to a mode which is not proper to the cognitive order, which is often found in the physical order of nature, which is therefore more connatural to physical nature than the properly cognitive mode of union. At the term of the act of knowledge the knower possesses *as its own* the perfection of the known form intrinsically actuating it in a pure manner; but it possesses the power to know and the act of knowing *as its own* in a way that is also intrinsic, and at the same time *much more* connatural to it. This additional element of connaturality is what never could be present in the idea of a pure formal union not achieved through the active principles of the knower. In the act of knowledge the knower has within itself, most connaturally and intrinsically, the entire act of the extrinsic determinant, by way of tendential participation. At the term of that act, it has it less connaturally,

still intrinsically, and more perfectly in itself, by way of pure formal union. If the union of the creature to the extrinsic form is to be seen integrally, if the nature of the creature as knower is to be respected integrally, it is *necessary* to retain these two *distinct* modes of possession of the form, and to see them in their *integrated* unity. Anything else would be a depreciation of the creature.

Further, the conception just proposed is necessary lest we depreciate the harmonious plan of the Provident Creator in supplying a remedy for the necessary imperfection of his creature. If there were two disparate ways in which the Creator supplied this remedy, order would be lacking in His plan. That there are two ways is clear. The first is the way of efficiency-the gift of active potency to the creature, whereby it intrinsically becomes an operator. The second is the way of pure formal union-the truly additional gift, coming upon the whole physical order of beings and agents to grant them unity in a non-physical way. These ways would be disparate if pure union were simply passively achieved " ab extra " and not actively produced through the intrinsic efficient fecundity of the perfected knower. They are not disparate, but marvellously ordered, when, in reality, the way of efficiency is enabled to fructify into a pure union which is the result of its own dynamism. Thus the pure union at the term of knowledge is not a " quoddam pati ab extra," but essentially a fructification "ab intra." We say" essentially," not because we would deny the possibility of a pure union which came about purely passively from an extrinsic agent, but because the pure union at the term of the cognitive process is not just any pure union. It has a finality and a function that are harmoniously integrated into the steps of the entire divine plan to remedy the necessary imperfection of His particular creature. The price of seeing the harmony of this plan is to retain its necessarily distinct and integrated stages: tendential participation *and* pure union. To deny one of them, or to confuse them, is to depreciate not only the dignity of the creature which knows, but also

the wise providence of the Creator Who instituted knowledge in His creature.

3. *Complexity in the process of knowledge*

In the mystery of the beatific vision, we are going to see pure union and tendential participation elevated to unsuspected heights. Before we institute the analogy, we ought first to clear the ground by discussing three points which are at the root of the complexity of the natural process of knowledge. Later, when we look back on them, they will enable us to grasp the superior simplicity of the supernatural process of the vision of God.[16]

First, there will be many cases in which the intrinsic active potency to know, already specified by such and such a formal object, will of itself extend indeterminately to many different material objects possessing the same formal aspect. It must then be applied to know one of these objects rather than another, before it can actually perform the act of knowledge. This *objective application* (or determination) is not an increase of the subjective power to know, nor a new exercise of objective specifying causality, but simply a definitive coaptation of a particular knowing faculty to a particular material object, for particular action is in the concrete. We must not then confuse two distinct uses of the word " objective "-as we used it previously concerning objective specifying causality, and as we use it here concerning objective application. Here the active potency to elicit the act of knowledge is passive in regard to the extrinsic agent which applies it to act concerning a definite and particular material object. The actual objective application, though coming to the knower from such an agent, itself can only consist in a certain union of the knower to the form

[16] This section, included for the specific purpose of showing how the material complexity of the cognitive process is but the result of the intimate integration of the two formal aspects of pure union and tendential participation, is thereby deliberately incomplete in doctrine and advisedly free from all documentation.

to be known, as to be known here and now by the applied faculty. This union will then necessarily be in the manner proper to the order o£ knowledge, that is, it will be pure and intentional. Already then before the act o£ knowledge the knower is united to and perfected by the form o£ the object in a pure intentional way, in a way that involves pure formal intrinsic causality. Nonetheless it is not then united with the form o£ the object as *known,* but only as proximately *knowable* by it. The knower has yet to unite itself actively by the act o£ knowledge to the form as known, and that is the proper term o£ the cognitive process. In these cases then there is a twofold pure union o£ object and knowing subject: as objective applicant to, and as formal term o£, the act o£ knowledge, that is, as proximately knowable, and as actually and formally known. *This duality is not rooted in the type of object being known, but in the indetermination of the knowing subject and its active potency to know.* It is an imperfection, a limitation, that comes £rom the radical nothingness o£ finite being itself. It is something that ultimately we cannot grasp clearly in our minds because ultimately it reduces to an absence o£ perfection. It creates complexity in these cases o£ knowledge, so that side by side with the mystery o£ pure union and the mystery o£ tendential participation, which are too perfect to be grasped clearly, we are £aced with the lower mystery o£ the radical insufficiency o£ the creature, formed £rom nothingness. When we come to the vision o£ God, we must retain this point, since it is truly the mind o£ a creature which sees the Divine Face.

Secondly, there will be other cases in which the intrinsic active potency to know, already determined to know such and such a proper formal object, may not be strong enough to know another object which is more perfect than its own proper formal object. It may not be strong enough to be purely united to this object as ultimately knowable, and then to unite itself actively to this object as known. The reason is that it is specified by an essentially inferior formal object. If then it is to know this higher object, it will need a *subjective confortation* (or eleva-

tion) of its intrinsic active potency to know, by which that potency is increased and lifted to a higher level. This confortation must in no way be confused with the objective application of which we have just spoken. It is demanded for a different reason: not to reduce the vague indetermination of the potency (as passive) to a determined first act, but *to make the very potency itself* (as active) *intrinsically proportioned both to first and second act.* A perfection cannot be communicated except to its proper and proportioned perfectible, and an act cannot be elicited except by its proper and proportioned active potency. This is simply an application of the absolutely and transcendentally valid principle of sufficient reason. It is also essentially different in its intimate nature. It is not a union to the form as knowable in pure intrinsic formal causality, but a physical addition to the knowing faculty of a distinct reality which is itself intrinsically specified by a real intrinsic ordination to the higher object as its extrinsic formal determinant, and in which there is real and intrinsic proportion to this object. This addition may be actual or transient, it may be habitual and permanent. If it is the latter, it will be classified (reductively) in the material category of quality and the species of habit. Still it retains its formal nature, like any other "median respective essence," from its tendential ordination to its object. It is important to add that the knowing faculty, thus elevated by a new perfection, becomes with it a single, undivided principle of the act of knowledge to which it is now truly proportioned through the addition. The original potency does not elicit part only of that act, or some aspect of it, but the potency together with the confortation, *per modum unius,* elicits the entire act. Thus it is as truly and properly the knower which elicits the act of knowledge of an object to which it was not proportioned by its native specification, as it is truly and properly the knower which elicits another and lower act of knowledge of an object to which it is proportioned by its native specification. The connaturality of the act is the same in each case.

Thirdly, there are cases in which complexity arises not from the indetermination of the knowing subject, nor yet from the essential inferiority of the faculty in relation to the form to be known, but *from the type and mode of existence of that form (or object) in physical reality.* The physical mode of being of many such finite forms or objects is such that it prevents them entering into union, in pure, intentional existence, with a knower, as they stand in their proper physical existence. To enter into union, then, they need the interposition of a vicar or similitude (called a " species ") of themselves, whose whole purpose is to achieve pure union with such forms. The similitude must possess a physical existence within the knower such that it can, in that state, be the means of the pure union of knower and form vicariously represented. The complexity of " species " in the achievement of pure union with the object derives properly from the limitation of the object. We need not pursue it here, since such complexity will no longer be retained in the beatific vision where the object is God as He exists divinely in Himself.

We could perhaps attempt now to sum up these points of complexity in the natural process of knowledge in the following schema.

In the first phase of the cognitive process, which IS preparatory:

the object-has objective specifying causality.

-has intrinsic formal causality of a pure order, insofar as it is proximately knowable.

the subject-is acceptive of the object as knowable, purely; and perhaps acceptive of a " species " to do so.

-is receptive, perhaps, of an intrinsic subjective confortation in its active potency to know and its passive potency to accept the object.

an extrinsic agent-is efficient of the pure union in question and, if need be, of the " species " involved.

-is efficient of the intrinsic confortation.

In the second phase of the cognitive process, which is proper and formal:

the object-is still exercisinig its objective specifying causality.

-has a new union to the subject in pure intrinsic formal causality, as actually known.

the subject-agent-is efficient and receptive of its own act of knowledge.

-is acceptive of the object as known purely, and perhaps of a " species " which it will produce, virtually in the act of knowledge.

Important as these points of complexity are for a total penetration of the process of knowledge, they are insignificant in comparison with the two great intuitions which are the secret of any true understanding of this natural mystery: the intuition of pure union in intentional existence, and the intuition of act specified by tendential participation of the total perfection of an extrinsic object. These complications have arisen through the three roots we have isolated, namely, the indetermination of the knowing subject, the essential superiority of the object over that knowing subject, and the limitation of the object in its physical mode of existence. In order that the two central mysteries of pure union and tendential participation, in a given case, might be harmonised in the one knower, these complications are necessary. They are the machinery needed to give rise to the integration of the central perfections of the mystery of knowledge, in cases where the frailty of finite being (in subject and in object) is only too evident. They are the manifest evidence that the Author of nature has deigned to grant a noble dignity to His finite work in a way that is, even in its utmost complexity, most fittingly adapted to the weakness of that work made from nothing. In a certain real sense, therefore, these complications are the consequence of the necessary dis-

tinction and integration of the two aspects of knowledge: pure union and tendential participation.

This, then, is the *point of departure* of our ascent, by way of analogy, to an understanding of the vision of God. Such ascent must begin with some grasp of meaning of knowledge in its essential mysteries of pure union and tendential participation, and in its complexities which are their consequence in a knower which is finite.

THE AscENT, BY WAY OF ANALOGY

We know by the most elementary reflection on the data of divine revelation that the beatific vision is an intellectual knowledge of God as He is in Himself. It is therefore legitimate to seek some understanding of the vision by proceeding analogically: removing all the imperfection and impurity associated with lower cases of intellectual knowledge on a natural plane, and thus arriving, by ascent to its summit, at the most eminent possible verification consonant with nature and with the demands of revealed data.

1. *The vision as a supernatural mystery of pure union*

We are faced with the fact that the Deity itself, the supereminent perfection of the Godhead, is communicated to the finite mind which sees it, in pure intentional union, as known. The formal perfection of the Deity thus becomes the reason God and the finite knower commune in the indistinct unity of a single act of pure existence, which can only be the one divine existence. This is the natural result of an analogical ascent which is absolutely valid in theological method. The result is at the summit of mystery and must be investigated in detail later.

2. *The vision as a supernatural mystery of tendential participation*

We are faced with the fact that the vision is a vital activity by which the knower unites himself actively to God and thus actively enters this pure union with Him. Materially, this act of beatific vision is classified among the finite accidental categories of being (at least reductively), but formally, it is specified as a "median respective essence" by an intrinsic tendential participation of the divine object as divine. This result is also the natural term of the same analogical process which is fully valid in theology. But once again it is full of deep mystery and must be investigated further.

3. Complexity in the process of vision.

We must concede that a finite intellectual agent is not of itself determined and applied to know God face to face, and that it therefore needs *an objective application* to the vision, achieved in a preparatory pure union with God. There is thus a twofold pure union of the mind with God: as knowable, and then as known.

We must understand also that the native intrinsic power of a finite intellect is not strong enough of itself to know God face to face, and that it will therefore need *a subjective confortation* or elevation increasing that power, a confortation specified by and proportioned to the act and object in question. With that confortation (which is called the *light of glory),* the intellect then elicits the act of vision as a single, undivided principle. Man sees his God.

We must state too that no vicar or similitude or species of the divine object is possible or necessary. It is not possible, for what is of the finite order of essence-distinct-from-existence, i. e., of limited and circumscribed perfection, cannot sufficiently be the vice-gerent of what is of the infinite order of essence-one-with-existence, i. e., of unlimited and uncircumscribed perfection. It is not necessary, for the divine essence in its own divine existence is more intimate to the knower than the

knower is to itself, and, far from entering into a new distinct existence with the knower (on an intentional plane), admits the knower into a communion, mysteriously, in its own simple and single divine existence.

At the term of our ascent we see what is to be retained and what not retained of the complexities of the natural process of knowledge in the supernatural vision. We may now attempt a schema of the process of vision parallel to the schema given previously.

In the first phase of the process of vision, which is preparatory:

the object-has specifying objective causality.
-has intrinsic formal causality of a pure order, insofar as it is proximately knowable.

the subject-is acceptive of the divine object as knowable, purely, without the interposition of any " species."
-is receptive of the light of glory, which enables it to accept the divine object, and will enable it to see it.

the divine agent-is efficient of the pure union in question.
-is efficient of the infusion of the light of glory.

In the second phase of the process of vision, which is proper and formal:

the object-is still exercising its objective specifying causality.
-has a new union to the subject in pure intrinsic formal causality, as actually known.

the subject-agent-is efficient and receptive of its own act of VISIOn.
-is acceptive of the divine object as known, purely.

The importance of this schema of complexities is that it is manifest evidence of the deep ingrafting of the supreme mysteries of vision in the finite intellect of a creature. For all of these complexities which remain in the vision are entirely on the side of the imperfection of the knowing mind which sees the absolutely perfect divine object. Such a vision, in such a mind, demands them. They tell us once again that knowledge on this supreme level is a profound integration of the two distinct but inseparable aspects of the total mystery of knowledge: pure union and tendential participation.

Our analogical ascent therefore tells us that in the beatific vision we have, essentially, two deep realities which bear much likeness to the pure union and the tendential participation we know in the case of natural knowledge, but which at the same time bear an even greater unlikeness to these things, *because of the unique conditions of the divine object to which they look.* Our task at the term of our ascent is then to explore, as far as possible, the exact likenesses and unlikenesses between pure union and tendential participation in the natural plane, and pure union and tendential participation *in a divine object.* When we have done that, we shall see the *necessity* of distinguishing these two supernatural mysteries, the *diversity,* and, at the same time, the marvellous *affinity* of their supernaturality, in an analogy that is properly of the theological order.

Point of Arrival at the Ascent

1. *The vision as pure union in transformative identity*

If our analogical process is valid, there must be some similarity between pure union in the case of the vision and pure union in ordinary knowledge. In the pure union of the vision, the formal perfection of the Deity becomes the reason God and the knower commune in the indistinct unity of the simple, single act of the divine existence. The *similarity* between this and pure union in the ordinary case lies in the fact that the

divine Form is exercising its proper mode of formal perfecting as form, by being the reason of the perfected's possession with it of a new act of existence proper to it. If, however, our process is truly analogical, there must be some dissimilarity between this pure union of the vision, and ordinary pure union. The *dissimilarity* lies radically in the fact that the new existence given to the mind is the divine existence itself. This immediately gives rise to three basic difficulties, the solution, " pro modulo humano," of which will lead us to the heart of the mystery.

a) How IS the one divine existence truly an intentional existence?

b) How is union to God in this way not, *eo ipso,* a physical union to God?

c) How is one-ness with the divine existence as intentional, possible for a creature?

We shall take up these questions in order.

a) *The divine existence as intentional*

There is a natural temptation for the frailty of our human minds to conceive the divine existence as exclusively an existence which is physical and non-cognitive, after the pattern of such" ontological" existence on the finite plane. On that plane, we recall, " existence " embraces both finite physical existence and finite cognitive existence which is instituted as the remedial supplement of the former. There is perfection in each. The source, ultimately, of the perfection of each is the unlimited perfection of the divine existence. In the utter simplicity of one single perfection, the Deity, the divine existence includes in a formal and eminent way all the pure and simple perfection that is found on any level of the finite realm, leaving aside the finite mode in which it is there realized. Thus the perfection of standing in real, physical, ontological reality, and the perfection of standing in pure, intentional, cognitive reality, are united and subsumed in the single supreme perfection of stand-

ing in divine reality. The divine formal perfection, simply because it is divine and therefore one with its own existence, is in the same moment and under the same formal aspect-a divine aspect-the reason for its standing in divine reality and the reason for its standing in the perpetual act of divine knowledge of itself. The dispersion of being on the finite plane into physical being and intentional being is a consequence of the finite character of being, not a consequence of the character of being as such. The supplementary role of intentional being on that level looks properly to physical finite being as finite, not as physical or ontological being. In God, where there is nothing finite, both the dispersion is no more, and the whole role of supplementation in intentional being is no more. God *is* His own Being, and that divine Being is Reality and is Cognition: Reality and Cognition in Him are Being, and that Being *is Himself.* The concept of the divine existence as a true intentional existence in this sense is an immediate property of the key Thomistic doctrine that in God essence and existence are one.

b) *Intentional, not physical, union to God*

The above solution gives rise to a further problem. If the divine existence is eminently and formally ontological and intentional, how can there be union to the divine existence as intentional without, at the same time and under the same formal aspect, being union to it as ontological, or physical? And would we then be able to escape from an immediate accusation of quasi-pantheism in the explanation of the vision of God?

The divine perfection, although it is most simple, can be communicated to inferior beings under different formal aspects. The various perfections which are formally and eminently one in God (in the simplicity of the one divine formal ratio) retain there analogously the true perfection they may have on a finite plane, and thus in God are distinct from one another, not really, but according to a distinction of reason. The force of this distinction is that there may be communication of the divine

perfection to an inferior finite being under one formal aspect divinely verified in the one divine being, but not necessarily thereby at the same time under another such aspect verified in that same divine being. Thus in our case there can be union to the divine existence as intentional, under that precise formality, without *eo ipso* there being union to it under the formality of ontological existence. Certainly there will be union *-materialiter-to* everything that is in the divine reality, when the divine reality itself is given. But there will be union-*formaliter-only* to the divine reality under that formal aspect under which it is communicated. The blessed mind in the vision becomes God intentionally, but not physically or ontologically.

c) *One-ness with the divine existence.*

This brings us to the third and by far the greatest of the difficulties raised. How is one-ness with the divine existence possible for a creature? We touch here on the essential supernaturality of this union, on its essential elevation above the highest pure intentional union conceivable in the natural level. This is more than a difficulty, it is a mystery, an essentially supernatural mystery.

How must we conceive the uniqueness of pure union with the divine existence itself? Pure intentional union on the natural level takes place when a known form is the reason it and the knower commune in the indistinct unity of a single new act of intentional existence. That act of existence is always a finite act, distinct really from the form known and from the knower. Both form known and knower strictly should be said to "have" this new existence in common. If we speak of a certain "becoming" of the known form by the knower, we mean no more than this common possession of a new existence by both, as a fruit of the activity of the knower. Now in the unique case of the vision of God, we have a pure intentional union in which the divine form known is the reason it and the knower commune in the single act of the divine existence. That act of divine existence is an infinite act, really indistinct from

the divine form known, really distinct from the knower who sees the divine form face to face. In the limited framework of our human thoughts, we try to conceive the divine form as distinct (conceptually) from the divine existence, and exercising two formal functions: first, in relation to itself (on its own behalf) , in being the divine reason that it binds to itself in indistinct unity the one divine existence; secondly, in relation to the knower (on the knower's behalf) as given to the knower, in being the divinely given reason that the knower is admitted to commune with the divine form in the one divine existence as intentional. We cannot strictly speak of the divine form, in its first function, as being the reason that it " has " the divine existence: it does not strictly "have" the divine existence, it " is " the divine existence. Likewise, we cannot strictly describe the knower's" communing" in the one divine existence as a "having" or "possessing" of the divine existence. If it is really the divine form which is the title to such " communing," the " communing" will be, mysteriously and intentionally, not a possession but an identity with the divine existence. What really happens then is that the one divine reality, the Deity itself (above "form" and "existence" as we conceive them in our limited thoughts) *is the formal reason for the knower being identified intentionally with Itself.* Only in this case of pure union can there be strict intentional identification of the knower and the form-one-with-existence which is known. Only in this case is there more than the *simple formative communion* of known and knower in a new distinct existence which they "have"; only here is there a marvellous *transformative identity* of the knower into the known, of the knower with the known, not of course in a physical way, but in an intentional way. For the knower, antecedently standing alone in its own distinct physical ontological existence, and remaining in that state throughout the process of the vision, becomes *Deiform* by an intentional identity with the unique reality which it knows, which is form really and intentionally united with its own supreme existence. The proper condition

of the pure formal intrinsic causality of the union of knowledge as verified here would seem then to be best described as a *transforming formal identification* of the knower into the divine form-existence which he knows. This would seem to be the consequence of the fact that the divine object, which is seen, is an object whose essence and existence are one. This transformative identity would appear to be a property of pure union to a divine object.

And, to return to our question, how can such a thing be possible? Without revelation, from the standpoint of pure reason, we do not even know with certainty that it is possible, let alone how it is possible. When we come to speak of the divine modality of this pure union with the divine object as a unique transformative identity with the divine reality (with that ultimate being which is strictly neither essence nor existence as we have them on our finite plane) then any arguments of convenience or probability which we might offer fall down before the staggering mystery, and are impotent to conclude with certainty. After revelation, when we believe, on God's word alone, that the clean of heart shall see God; when we accept, again on God's word alone, that one day we shall be like to Him because we shall see Him as He is, then we believe also that such a union, with all its demands, is possible. Reflecting on our firm faith, we can then see a certain likeness between this supreme case of pure union and that pure union we understand in the natural plane, a likeness which is true and valid, while it certainly does not rule out the vastly greater unlikeness that must always remain between the two. Thus we become aware of a superior analogy, an analogy realized once we grant the data of divine revelation, an analogy proper to theological order. In this analogy, we can distinguish the likeness and the unlikeness: *the likeness is the true communion, through form, in intentional existence; the unlikeness is the manner in which that happens, not by simple formative communion in distinct existence, but by unique mysterious transformative identification with a form that is its own intentional existence.*

The likeness is valuable to us, insofar as it enables us to answer some of the difficulties made against our faith in the divine vision in the name of human reason, and insofar as it lifts the veil of darkness one small fraction to see, dimly and imperfectly, the full harmony of the finite and the infinite worlds which we shall see clearly and perfectly in heaven. The unlikeness is also valuable to us, insofar as it unveils to us in supreme language the very divine conditions of divine union. Thus expressed, it is like a ray of light from a new world, a glimmer of an intelligibility that is proper to the divine order itself, an opening to us of the proper meaning of the divine reality as it is in itself. Both the likeness and the unlikeness have their part to play in the full human theological understanding, *pro modulo nostro,* of the vision that has been revealed to us.

2. *The vision as tendential attractive participation*

We have seen in the process of the vision of God a vital activity of the knower (the act of vision) and a confortation of his knowing power (the light of glory) which are specified by the divine object known, as " median respective essences," by way of an intrinsic tendential participation of that object. There will be likeness and unlikeness between this singular case of tendential participation and the natural cases explained earlier. It is important to elaborate them.

The *similarity* in question will consist in the fact that the divine object of this act and habit truly exercises formal extrinsic specifying causality, by being the extrinsic term of reference or determinant, the whole formal perfection of which is imbibed tendentially into the act and habit which essentially look to it. The *dissimilarity* in question will arise radically from the fact that the divine object is one whose formal perfection is really identified with its own divine existence. Our basic difficulty here is then parallel to our third difficulty in the preceding inquiry: how can the divine reality, where formal perfection is one with existence, be totally imbibed into a tran-

scendental relative by way of tendential participation? Once again, this is more than a difficulty, it is an essentially supernatural mystery.

On the natural level, it is the entire formal perfection of the determinant object which is tendentially imbibed into the median respective essence. That formal perfection, as finite, does not and cannot include the existence of the object within the determining imbibed perfection. Never, then, on the natural level, can there be an imbibing of the entire reality, formal (essential) and existential, of the determinant object. Now, if we grant that the act of vision and its proper principle, the light of glory, are and must be specified in this way, by the divine object as divine, then we must posit within the determinant object in this case, the entire perfection of the deity, which is formally and eminently super-essence and super-existence. We feel that we might best express it by saying that the tendential participation in this case becomes an *attraction* of the median respective essence *to the entirety* of its determinant object. The proper mode in which tendential participation is realized on this supreme level would then be by way of *attraction,* a way which could never be realized on a finite plane. Tendential attractive participation would be proper to a determinant object whose essence and existence were one.

Just how does such a thing take place? Ultimately we cannot answer that question. To do so we would have to explain exactly how an existential perfection, and indeed a divine existential perfection, was intrinsically imbibed, tendentially, into being totally relative to it. When we use the concept of attraction to express what happens, we are forcing ourselves to the limit of our human language to express what we could never have been confident enough to assert with certitude from the standpoint of pure reason. Accepting the existence of such realities as the necessary consequence of revealed data, we feel that such is the best human way we have of describing their inmost essence. That way is both like and unlike tendential participation on the natural level. *It is like it, because it is*

still genuine tendential participation, still genuine specification of a transcendental relative by an object exercising this formal extrinsic causality. It is unlike it, in the way it happens, by attraction to the essential-existential totality of that object. Once again, both the likeness and the unlikeness are invaluable to us. The likeness enables us to see the full range of harmony of such beings on a natural and divine level. The unlikeness opens to us a glimpse of the divine level of being in one of its proper notes, it is a beginning of the light of God's own order dawning in our minds.

This ascending analogical research into the beatific vision therefore leaves us with two realities in which are summed up all the mysterious character and the supernatural riches of that vision. These realities we have called transformative identity and attractive participation. We have seen that they are distinct; we have seen the intimate nature of each in likeness and unlikeness to the corresponding natural realities of pure union and tendential participation. All this has merely been an attempt to supply the framework of the initial problem, on the necessary distinction, the diverse nature, and the analogical integration of two kinds of supernatural divinizing gifts, finite and infinite. As we now have the data of our problem, we may conclude our direct research into the beatific vision of God, and revert to a general statement of questions. We shall ask:

1) Are these two kinds of divinizing gifts, by way of transformative identity and by way of attractive participation, *simpliciter* diverse?
2) Are they *secundum quid* the same?
3) What then is the analogous ratio of divinization?

The solution to these questions will put us in a position to assess the value of the modern critique of the standard Thomist theory of the finite supernatural, and the Thomist reply.

Are these two kinds of divinizing gifts *simpliciter* diverse? We answer affirmatively. They are diverse in purpose, and diverse *simpliciter* in nature.

In purpo8e. The purpose of each of these gifts, in one way or another, is *to divinize.* But the exact kind of divinization envisaged in each case is different, just as the functions of their correlatives in the natural plane, pure union and tendential participation, are different. On the natural plane, the purpose of gifts of tendential participation is to give to their subject a *deeply physical and intimately connatural intrinsic po88e8sion of a certain form.* Through such participation of the form the subject may then act in virtue of that physically possessed form in an intrinsic way that is thoroughly connatural to it. On the natural plane again, the purpose of gifts of pure union, in an intentional way, is to give a knowing subject *an extra-physical intentional intrinsic po88e8sionof a form,* which is the instituted supplement and remedy of that separateness which still remains after all the gifts of physical character have been exhausted. Pure union can *never* possess the *connatural* intrinsicness which tendential possession *mu8t* always possess: for pure union is a mysterious supplement to the physical order, while tendential possession is a mysterious ingrafting into the very context and plane of the physical. Now on the superior divine plane, for example in the beatific vision, these differences of purpose must clearly remain, if our analogical process of investigation has been well founded. On the divine plane, the purpose of the gifts of transformative identity is to endow the creature with the whole perfection of the Godhead, in the only order where such endowment is completely possible, that is, in the intentional order.[17] In these gifts the divine form is communicated as divinizing and being the root of intentional iden-

[17] We here prescind from the real ontological order of personality and substantial existence: the impact of this doctrine on the problem of the Hypostatic Union has already been discussed in the context of the views of Dom. Herman Diepen in our "The Human Activity of the Word," *The Thomist,* 1959, pp. 143-232.

tity with the divine reality. On this divine plane again, the purpose of the gifts of attractive participation is to enable the creature to become a proper intrinsic agent in the achievement of the pure union of transformative identity, by endowing it with the whole perfection of the Godhead in the only physical way possible, that is by a unique tendential participation called therefore attractive participation. The purpose of the transformative identity gift is to grant supreme identity above and beyond the plane of the physical. The purpose of the attractive participation gift, is to grant supreme identity within the plane of the physical. The distinction between the physical plane and the super-physical intentional plane, in the relations between the creature and the Creator, must always be maintained, at the peril of gross confusions which would not, in ultimate analysis, be free from error and absurdity. A diversity in purpose in the two gifts must then be likewise maintained.

In nature. Granting the diversity in purpose, does it follow that the intentional identity with the Godhead, in the gift of transformative identity, is *simpliciter* diverse from the physical-tendential identity with the Godhead in the gift of attractive participation? Again, we answer affirmatively. The former is a strict unity of identity; the latter is a unity of similitude called identity only because it retains some likeness to the former. The former is identity *simpliciter;* the latter is identity *secundum quid,* or, better, participation.

To explain this point, let us state at the outset that no one who has grasped the concept of transformative identity will hesitate to call it identity *simpliciter,* in the strict sense of identity. Further, no one who has followed the nuanced discussion of tendential participation on the natural plane, and the analogous sense of attractive participation, will hesitate to deny to it the eminence of identity *simpliciter,* in the strict sense of identity. In tendential participation on the natural plane, the full, total perfection of the extrinsic determinant, *simpliciter* is not given to the transcendental relative; although,

we grant, and we insist in its right place, *secundum quid,* it is so given. Attractive participation is, by force of the entire analogical process of investigation of the supernatural, an eminent case of tendential participation, a tendential participation verified by manner of attraction to the total essential-existential reality of the determinant object. The uniqueness of attractive participation lies in the *object,* and in the intrinsic reference to the *totality* of the object. It changes nothing in the character of the object as *simpliciter* not given in its entirety (that is, in the way proper to intrinsic formal causality) to the relative it specifies. Transformative identity and attractive participation differ as strict identity *simpliciter* with the divine object, and not strict identity *simpliciter* with that same object. Therefore, they are *simpliciter* diverse. Indeed this essential diversity between them is the very root of their possibility of fulfilling the diverse functions and purposes for which they are posited.

Nonetheless, are these two kinds of divinizing gifts *secundum quid* the same? Once again, we answer affirmatively. We are, moreover, conscious of a duty of insisting upon the value of our affirmative answer. There is a deep similarity between the two kinds of gifts. We may see this in two ways: first, insofar as each gift is similar to a corresponding finite natural reality; and secondly, insofar as each gift is dissimilar to its corresponding finite natural reality. The first point is merely the introduction to the second, which is one of the chief fruits of our study.

First, insofar as each gift is similar to its corresponding natural reality. Transformative identity is similar to the natural case of pure union; attractive participation is similar to the natural case of tendential participation. As pure union and tendential participation, that is, natural formal instrinsic causality and natural formal extrinsic specifying causality, are simi-

lar; so also the two kinds of divinizing gifts, insofar as they retain a likeness to these natural things, will be like each other.

Secondly, insofar as each gift differs from its corresponding natural reality. The chief difference between pure union and transformative identity lies in the immediate total relationship of the creature to the whole Godhead in its essential-existential perfection. The chief difference between tendential participation and attractive participation lies in the total ordination of the whole specified relative to the whole Godhead in its essential-existential perfection. This total, immediate, face-to-face condition of the perfected before the perficient in each case appears to be the key note of what is peculiar to the divine plane of pure union and tendential participation. We must always keep in mind that the perficient in each case is vastly different: in the one case, it is an *intrinsic,* in the other an *extrinsic* perficient. But, while that essential diversity *simpliciter* stands, there is an aspect, peculiar to the divine conditions of each case, which unites them in a remarkable similitude. This aspect is the total immediate reference to the whole Godhead. According to this aspect, *secundum quid,* the two kinds of divinizing are the same.

The two kinds of divinizing gifts are then *simpliciter* diverse and *secundum quid* the same. The nature of divinization, in the case of transformative identity, is *simpliciter* the intentional identity with the divine reality, while the nature of divinization, in the case of attractive participation, is *simpliciter* the physical tendential participation of the divine reality. *Simpliciter* then divinization itself is twofold. But the nature of divinization, in the two cases, is *secundum quid* the same, insofar as it implies a total, immediate reference to the whole Godhead. Divinization is then *secundum quid* the same in the two cases.

CoNCLUSION

At the end of a long and difficult study we must now try to assess the modern criticism of the traditional Thomist theory of finite supernaturality, which occasioned the work. In effect the modern trend accuses the older theology of exaggerating the finite aspect of the supernatural divinizing gifts at the expense of their infinite aspect, that is, at the expense of their very supernaturality and divinizing character. For the modern trend would conceive communicated supernaturality, and divinization, in a univocal fashion: solely the infinite gift of the Godhead Itself can divinize. The sole possible manner of supernatural communication, and divinization, is then that of a pure formal causality or actuation, in which the infinite God, is, as it were, the very Form and Act of the divinized creature. A division of communicated supernaturality is then but a list of cases in which this univocally identical process may be found. Against this, the traditional Thomist view responds that the modern attempt exaggerates the infinite aspect of divinization at the expense of the finite aspect. The Thomist view is deeply conscious of the analogy, not the univocity, of divinization: of two distinct and diverse modes of divinizing which have certain common aspects. It sustains that pure formal actuation can apply strictly to one of these modes, but not to other. And it defends an equally analogous division of communicated supernaturality into essentially distinct members. For the modern view, the older one is at root a depreciation of supernaturality itself. For the older view, the modern one is basically a depreciation of nature, of man who is divinized, and thus also of the merciful and wise Providence of the God who deals with man according to his nature. Each view fears that the other falls into a trap which both abhor. The question is, which view has succeeded in respecting both noble summits of doctrine-the dazzling eminence of supernaturality and the inmost radication of the supernatural in the nature of man? Both would claim to do so. The modern view, in a more obvious and apparent way, seems to do more justice to the

claims of supernature, less to those of nature. The older view, in a more patent way, seems to do more justice to the claims of nature than to those of supernature. The modern synthesis claims that the idea of a total gift of God as Act of the soul is faithful to the infinity of the supernatural, and at the same time to the deep ingrafting of the supernatural in nature. The older view, equally thinking itself a true synthesis, claims that besides such an infinite supernatural communication, there is a true divinizing gift in which God is not the Act of the soul but the Object specifying a finite gift, which, as finite, can pertain to the very proper texture of a finite nature. Which synthesis is the genuine one?

It is obvious from the whole development of this study that our option is for the older theology. But it would indeed be ungracious for us to refuse the modern attempt, and to criticize it, without striving to show that its intuition of genuine supernaturality-an intuition which is indeed so rich and so beautiful-is truly retained untarnished, in the older view, and not merely retained, but integrated there with another intuition-not as sublime, perhaps, but equally necessary-which cannot equally be retained in the modern view. *To insist on the depth of God's entry into man's nature need not prevent us from insisting on the fullness and totality of God's gift of Himself.* That is the coviction at the heart of the traditional Thomist theory of finite supernaturality, which it thus conceives as a divinization which is both thoroughly genuine, and deeply intimate. To show the basis of that conviction has been the design of this study. To carry out that design, we have tried to bring out the analogous unity that exists between the two necessarily diverse modes of communicated supernaturality. We have maintained that between these modes there is diversity *simpliciter,* but unity *secundum quid.* It may well be that, through circumstances of history and background, the Thomism of recent times has been more insistent on the diversity between them than on the unity. We are convinced, however, that it is happy to retain both. On the other hand, we

think that the modern view has transformed the *secundum quid* unity between them into a *unity simpliciter* and thus ended in sustaining, in reality, the univocity of communicated supernaturality. Not that we would reduce the whole modern current to a simple logical fallacy of *secundum quid* and *simpliciter*. We are all too conscious of the natural temptation of the human mind, overcome by the likeness of finite gift to the Infinite Gift, to use language proper to the latter in describing the former. If we think that the modern view has fallen into this temptation, and thus erred-and we do think so-we are quick to add that it is a natural temptation and a natural error in an area where every tongue must stammer. We feel that the older Thomist view, precisely because it is more deeply schooled in the proprieties of analogical predication, has been able to express itself without inconvenience and without damage to any of the manifold sides of mystery, in this area where mystery must always reign. Therein lies the basis of our option.

Further, the unity which both schools of thought conceive in the various cases of divinization, is in reality that of total immediate reference to the entire essential-existential reality of the Godhead. That unifying aspect of the two cases is verified in each of them, according to the older view, in *simpliciter* different ways: by pure intrinsic formal causality and transformative identity, and by extrinsic objective formal causality and attractive participation. The modern view appears to give the name of " quasi or pure formal actuation " to the common aspect, that is, to the total immediate reference to the Godhead, as such. This we would not accept. Intrinsic formal causality must always remain in the order of absolute communication, not in the order of a relationship consequent upon a prior absolute foundation. We would further accept some likeness on the absolute level between the intrinsic formal causality and the extrinsic formal causality involved. This likeness is founded on the natural plane itself, and is manifested in the attribution of the word " formal " to the diverse causality involved there. It is verified also, in the deeper way

we have shown, on the supernatural level, in the proper likeness of transformative identity and attractive participation, the likeness which the consequent relation of total immediacy to the Godhead makes clear. But we would not accept the application of the title "pure formal actuation," or its equivalent, to extrinsic formal causality and attractive participation. For this phrase, it seems to us, has been reserved in the common way of speaking of philosophers and theologians to describe precisely what is *diverse* from extrinsic formal causality and attractive participation in intrinsic formal causality and transformative identity, namely, the unity or identity *simpliciter* without which the latter cannot be. To use such a phrase to indicate the analogous unity of the two modes of divinization would be, once again, to convert that unity into a univocal unity, to hold at root the univocity of divinization.

We believe then that a sympathetic retention of the intuition of the modern view will only confirm the sound foundation of the analogous division of divinization which the older Thomist view has always sustained. A communicated supernatural divinizing gift will be either *simpliciter* infinite (and then pure formal actuation, and transformative identity, are implied) or it will be *simpliciter* finite but *secundum quid* infinite (and then attractive participation will be implied). The first member of this basic division can and must be further divided, according to the formal aspect of the infinite form therein communicated (e. g., the infinite form under the aspect of divine essence as actually understood, or the infinite form under the aspect of the relative subsistence of the Word as supplying human subsistence, etc.) . The second member of the basic division can and must be further divided, according to the formal aspect of the infinite form therein acting as specifying object (e. g. the infinite form under the aspect of divine truth, or the infinite form under the aspect of divine good, etc.) . The multiplicity of these divisions of the communicated supernatural will lead us to realize how the single pure white ray of divine beauty is refracted into many colors when given

to the creature, and to realize that each color is still intrinsically supernatural, still divinizing. The prism of finite nature cannot capture the transcendent Deity, but it can and does make its beauty more manifest by separating the various aspects under which it is communicable precisely as Deity. The vision of such radiating glory of the Divine Beauty is a far greater thing than a too simple statement of even a most elevated common denominator that could be found, diversely, in these different cases.

So much for our option of the older view, and our rejection, with sympathetic appraisal, of the modem view. In probing the depths of the problem we are conscious that we have brought forward certain notions that are not explicitly the common property of standard Thomist works in the area. We have gone to the roots of" *pure formal actuation"* and" *transformative identity* "-notions which we had previously used and proposed in treating of the Incarnation. We have developed here for the first time an interpretation of the specification of transcendental relatives by way of " *tendential participation* " and, in the supernatural area, " *attractive participation."* It is our hope that these notions, on which our thesis of the diversity *simpliciter* and unity *secundum quid* of the two necessarily distinct modes of divinization relies, are not really new, but are rather mere explicitations, in a new context and perspective, of what has always been equivalently and implicitly maintained by the masters of traditional Thomism.

These notions, together with the common analogous aspect of *total immediate reference to the Godhead,* could well be of service to positive theologians in their efforts to show us the exact manner in which sacred Sacripture and the Fathers have taught the mystery of God's gift of Himself to man. Perhaps the biblical and patristic themes, so often alleged by the modem speculative view as inexplicable except in terms of its own persuasion, might be found to correspond even more perfectly to the older and traditional theology. If the concepts we have made explicit in the course of this study were to help towards

such an end, they will have been worth the effort that has gone into their formulation.

In fine, the traditional Thomist synthesis appears to us in this case, as in so many others, to have lost none of its vital power to assimilate all that is good and genuine and true in modern research, whether positive or speculative. **Our** study has shown us once again the perennial actuality and the eternal validity of the doctrine and principles of the Angelic Doctor as they have lived in the school which bears his name. *Nova et vetera.*

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SYMBOLISM IN PREACIDNG

IN THIS article we shall examine (1) the essential function of the Christian preacher; the two modes of communication which this function involves; (3) the main problems confronting the preacher today with regard to these two aspects of his task; and (4) suggestions for solving these problems.

(1) Christ, the Word, said of his own preaching that the words he spoke, the message he bore, were not of his own coining, but that he spoke only as the Father had bidden him speak (Jn. xiv, 10); in this he is obviously a model for his own messengers (*apostoloi)* , the original disciples whom he commissioned to teach whatsoever he had commanded them, and their successors down through the ages. In ancient Greece the pedagogue *(paidagogos)* was a slave whose duty it was not to teach the boy but to lead the boy safely to school, to his teacher; similarly the office of the Christian preacher is to lead the faithful to the Word who is their teacher, to prepare them as best he can for their schooling in the words of the Word. So St. Paul declares in his first letter to the Corinthians that it was Christ who sent him to preach, and to preach only the gospel. He had no concern with " any high pretensions to eloquence, or to philosophy," but only with "God's message to you"; he would have nothing to do with "an orator's cleverness," with rhetoric, "for so the cross of Christ might be robbed of its force" (I, 17; II, 1-5) : his only purpose was to speak "of Jesus Christ, and of him as crucified " (II, , i. e., to help his hearers to enter with minds and hearts into God's wisdom, hitherto hidden and secret (II, 7) but now made known through and in the Christian Mystery of the Tree.

In present-day colloquial language we use the word "mystery" in the sense of a baffiing problem to be solved by detection. Here we must think of it as meaning a profound, vital, religious truth: the Truth which is the eternal Word, communicated to us principally through the words of the scriptures, the words spoken, the events described; but these words and events, because of the profundity of their meaning, need to be explicated if we are to understand them rightly and assimilate them fully. The explication is the essential function of the preacher who represents the teaching authority of the Church as " opening " to us the scriptures.

But the Church has two ways of opening the scriptures and communicating the truth; and both ways are necessary to us since each provides the necessary complement to the other. The language of the Bible is essentially the language, not of scientific or reasoned prose, but of poetry in the wide sense of the term: of imagery, of parable and paradox, of the Johannine *paroimiai* or allegories, of symbol. The Church opens the scriptures to us (a) by making use of this same language of symbol, e. g., in its sacramental ritual, and (b) by re-stating the Biblical message in" prose": in the formulas of creed and catechism, in the technical language of theology, and in the elucidation of formulas and theological propositions in everyday terms.

Christ spoke to the multitudes in parables and indeed did not speak to them without parables *(Mk.* iv, 34); and the purpose of this method of teaching was not, as has sometimes been supposed, to hide his meaning from them but on the contrary to communicate his meaning through an idiom which simple, unlearned people could easily understand and which appeals to, and evokes a response from, not merely the mind but the heart, the whole personality. Moreover, symbol-language can take us deeper into mystery than the language of conceptual thinking can, precisely because it is the property of symbol to communicate realities for which no concepts-and therefore no reasoned formulas-exist. But this very pro-

fundity involves a danger of misunderstanding. Scientific prose seeks to prevent misunderstanding by excluding ambiguity and being clear and distinct and univocal; symbol is deeply significant precisely because it *is* of its nature ambiguous (ambivalent or polyvalent). Christ speaks to us in paradox-finding life by losing it, being rich by being poor, attaining peace through the sword, being reborn through death and finding light in darkness-and there is always the danger that we may either fail to see how the two apparently contradictory sides of the paradox meet and fuse in a creative unity, a *coincidentia oppositorum,* or, in our desire to have everything neatly and tidily defined and distinct, may concentrate on one aspect to the exclusion of the other, thus distorting the truth and missing altogether the meaning of the mystery.

The formulas of creed and catechism, then, are an essential complement to, and explication of, the scriptural message since they give definition to our thinking and so prevent us from misinterpreting the message. But they are no substitute for the message; they are not sufficient of themselves to communicate the Word. A formula cannot express the Inexpressible or define the Infinite. We believe not in a creed but through a creed; we believe in the Reality about which the creed tells us things which are true indeed, but finite and therefore partial. Furthermore, definition implies limitation: a formula makes static what is of its nature dynamic, vital; it turns the living, concrete reality into an abstraction. There is a world of difference between the formula H20 and the elusive, mercurial reality of water. Thus, if the ambivalence of symbol involves a danger of misinterpretation, the clarity of abstract formulation involves a danger of aridity and unreality. The twofold function of the preacher is to help us to think theologically lest we misinterpret symbol, and to keep us constantly and ever more deeply aware of symbol lest our theologizing become arid and perhaps in the end meaningless.

(3) But today each part of this double task is beset with difficulties. We live in an age of psychological improverish-

ment: rationalism and *scientisme* have taught us to rely solely on strictly rational, logical, scientific thought processes and to ignore or repudiate as valueless all other modes of psychic experience and avenues to reality. Thus the language of symbol is for us, to a great extent, a" forgotten language "-the Catholic believes in the *efficacy* of the baptismal ritual, but to what extent is the ritual itself meaningful for him?-or, if it is not forgotten, it is suspect, and suspect precisely because imprecise. The Catholic today tends to be Cartesian in his thinking, in the sense of demanding that everything be formulated in terms of clear and distinct concepts. The task of the preacher, therefore, is interpreted, so far as dogma is concerned, simply in terms of instruction, and of instruction simply in the sense of imparting to the hearers the exact wording of doctrinal formulas and definitions. Where morals are concerned, the preacher's task is seen either in terms of the pious generalities and windy rhetoric of the *fervorino* (for while "feeling" as one of the elements in total, personal awareness of reality is misprized, the value of an appeal to the emotions pure and simple is often grossly over-estimated), or else as again a question of the imparting of neat and tidy rules, tabulating the various types of virtuous or sinful behaviour and fixing the exact degree of guilt involved in this or that sin, always viewed in terms of objective standards, of general laws, with little or no regard for particular circumstances or the psychological conditions and attitudes and stresses of the individual. The Catholic, cleric and layman alike, tends to be influenced by the climate of opinion in which he lives; the *fervorino* closely resembles the rhetorical verbosities of the political demagogue, the moral instruction too often betrays a mentality closely resembling the impersonal or anti-personal and procrustean categories of the bureaucrat. Msgr. Ronald Knox, in an article in *The Month* (March 1959), quoting the words "Did not our hearts burn within us when he talked with us on the way?" *(Luke,* xxiv, 82), described what in his view the Catholic " apologist " ought to do but in fact often fails to do and his words are relevant to the work of preaching in general.

He will vindicate the prophecies, not by raking up a score of familiar quotations, but by exhibiting the Old Testament *in extenso* as a cipher message imposed on history. He will prove the divineness of our Lord's mission, not by presenting us with a series of logical dilemmas, but by trying to reconstruct the picture of our Lord himself; what it was that met the gaze of the apostles, and the touch of their hands. He will read the New Testament, not as a set of ' passages ' which must somehow be reconciled with one another, but as the breathless confidences of living men, reacting to human situations, and inflamed with zeal for their Master. He will portray the teaching Church, not as a harassed official' handing out ' information at a series of press conferences, but as a patient pioneer washing out the gold from the turbid stream of her own memories. Everything will come alive at his touch; he will not merely know what he is talking about, but feel what he is talking about.

Whether the preacher likes it or not, the fact is that God wrote his book in the language of poetry, of symbol. The tragedy is that for the most part preachers do *not* like it, and therefore fight shy of symbol-language and in effect repudiate it. The Church does not, and cannot, repudiate it; it speaks through it daily, constantly, in the Mass and the other sacraments; but to the faithful, conditioned by the world they live in and deprived of an adequate pedagogy, it becomes of necessity more and more obscure till in the end it is simply a meaningless hieroglyphic.

But if the language of symbol is meaningless because its idiom has been forgotten, the language of doctrinal definition and theological statement is often meaningless because to the layman its idiom is a technical jargon which he has never really been taught. Whether from laziness or illiteracy or the fear of departing by a hair's breadth from the safe orthodoxy of the Latin formulas he has culled from his textbooks, the preacher will probably make no effort to express doctrinal concepts in contemporary language. Indeed, to put it bluntly, he will fail to talk English. But to transliterate when one should be translating is not merely illiterate, it is to invite a double disaster. Almost certainly what is said will sound re-

mote and unreal; it may also be positively misleading, for a living language is precisely living and therefore constantly changing, so that in course of time words sometimes come to convey the exact opposite of their original meaning. If, for example, we always speak of matrimony instead of marriage, of nuptials instead of a wedding, of spouses instead of husband and wife, and (crowning infelicity) of the marriage debt instead of physical and sexual union, we inevitably give the impression that the sacrament of marriage has nothing to do with the realities of human love. We do not adequately convey the realities of the life-renewing sacrament of repentance if we always call it the sacrament of penance and speak not of sorrow but of contrition, and of the oddly inappropriate "satisfaction." We cannot blame our hearers for going to sleep if our sentences are a relentless succession of ponderous latinisms; nor can we blame anyone but ourselves if we create an atmosphere of unreality by clinging doggedly to difficult polysyllabic terms when perfectly adequate simple, homely words are at hand. It is not helpful to talk of nativity and regeneration when we could perfectly well say birth and rebirth; we do not encourage realism if we can never speak of the sinlessness of Mary except in terms of immaculate conception; we are guilty not merely of illiterate infelicity but of crude error when we refer to the " descent" from the cross or-an ultimate in stupidity-to the "invention" of the true cross; and we do not help but hinder by speaking of the sacrament of extreme unction, since " extreme " seldom means " last," and " unction " nowadays is less suggestive of anointing than of oleaginous insincerity.

The sense of unreality is intensified when to these infelicities and falsifications are added the pious *cliches* which are usually found to accompany them: if a preacher can never refer simply to God, to Christ, to Mary, to the Church or the Pope, but must always unfailingly speak of Almighty God, our divine Redeemer, the blessed Mother, and so on, he should not be surprised to find that his words have a markedly narcotic

effect; nor is that necessarily their worst effect since here too falsification is not uncommon, as when chastity is referred to as " the holy virtue " (which implies " holy *par excellence* ") in plain defiance of the New Testament teaching that the supreme virtue is *caritas*, love.

It should perhaps be added that the dice must inevitably be adversely loaded, the work of training young men to become preachers inevitably start from a lethal basic assumption, as long as that work continues to be referred to in the jargon of the seminaries as a training in " sacred eloquence."

It is not surprising, then, if nowadays the laity often feel, and sometimes voice, a profound disquietude concerning the preaching of the gospel. If a sermon is made up partly of technical terms which, though legitimate in themselves, have become worn away into meaninglessness by over-usage like the inscription on an old coin, partly of illegitimate technical jargon, and partly of the pious cliches which make Christianity and the Christian ideal of holiness seem secretarian or even subhuman, the sermon will be in effect not a homily but a bromide; it will not open, it will effectively close the scriptures. So it is that, as Milton expressed it, " the hungry sheep look up, and are not fed."

(4) What then can be done to remedy this state of affairs? What are the main tasks, the main challenges, confronting the preacher in our contemporary world? The first task is to restore to the Christian his rightful heritage: to help him to recover the lost or forgotten language of symbol, the language of the Bible in general and of the Word himself in particular.

It is sometimes argued that though symbol in general has its uses there is nothing to be gained by attempting to revive interest in the biblical symbols since these were the product of an agrarian society and must be meaningless to our modern industrial-urban civilization. How can one hope, it is asked, to communicate the realities of the Christian mystery in terms of tree and water and wine and fire when those one addresses have no knowledge of wood except in industrial artefacts, or of water

except in pipes controlled by faucets, no real awareness of fire since the hearth has been rejected in favor of central heating, or of wine since they drink only beer or spirits?

The argument, though specious, will not survive any but the most superficial scrutiny. There are indeed some minor symbols which were popular at some period in Christian history but which would now seem " dated," lacking in significance or even ludicrous. The *pius pelicanus* is perhaps a case in point. But there is an essential difference between "invented" and therefore transient symbols, however rich in meaning and indeed sublime these may be for certain peoples or at certain epochs, and the symbols which are so universal, geographically and historically, that they must be regarded as "innate," as part of the very structure of the human psyche. The basic Christian symbols are of this kind, and indeed it is surely unthinkable that the eternal Word would couch his universal message in symbols which he knew would be meaningless to future generations. The " forgotten " language is in fact not so much forgotten as repressed: it was not destroyed by the arrogant repudiations of positivism and *scientisme,* it was merely driven underground, so that today, if it is still excluded from the highest spheres of expression, it will be found-as has often enough been demonstrated-manifesting itself in the spheres of fiction and fantasy, and of course in everyman's world of dreams. And even in the most completely industrialized and urbanized communities today there must be few indeed, if any, who are utterly impervious to the quickening, freshening, youth-renewing qualities of water, the warming, strengthening, liberating therapy of the golden sun, the jubilant evocations of the wine of feasting and fellowship in human history and song and story. A man may never have watched the baking of bread, the making of wine, the catching of fish, the sowing of a field, but he would have to be worse than a moron if when these things were described to him he failed completely to sense their profound and profoundly simple significance.

To open the scriptures then means first of all to help one's

hearers to sense the significance, the implications, the evocations, of the biblical word-symbols which are also the universal *lingua franca*, the *Ur-woerter*, of mankind. This universality means that a prudent and informed mind can find endless- and endlessly thrilling and enriching-sidelights on the scriptural symbols in the art and literature, the myth and folklore, of humanity. Even when these present a picture of reality which is in some way or degree distorted, still we can derive from them a quickening of interest in, and perhaps a new insight into, the biblical pattern or process of rebirth and transfiguration or one or other of the symbols included in it.)

The first way of opening the scriptures therefore consists in helping one's hearers to appreciate, to see into, the idiom of the scriptures and so to enter into the mystery expressed and revealed through that idiom, rather as a connoisseur of painting or poetry can help us to grasp the idiom of the artist and so enter into his creation. This in turn means encouraging the hearers to gain, and then to enrich, develop, deepen, an insight into individual symbols; but it also means helping them to penetrate the inherent ambivalence of the symbols and, in the case of the gospels, the paradoxes in which the Word presents his message, whether in the form of picture-language (e. g., parables and *paroimiai)* or in explicit and seemingly contradictory statements.

The parables have sometimes been" allegorized" for preaching purposes (e. g., by St. Augustine), and some of Christ's parables are in fact a mixture of parable and allegory (e. g., the sower) ; but in its pure form the parable is a picture which presents one single truth or lesson but a lesson which may well be paradoxical and therefore requires, for a true understanding of it, not merely a penetrating but a unifying vision. It has been said of the parable of the prodigal son, for instance, that it might well be called the parable of the prodigal father: the story is a paradox-picture because it portrays for us the mystery of God's mercy, the mystery which can be stated in theological terms by saying that in God justice and mercy are one.

The obvious " difficulty " in the story is the apparent unfairness with which the elder son is treated; the task of the preacher or pedagogue will be not merely to draw out the implications of the details of the story as a portrayal of mercy (e. g., the fact that the father saw the prodigal " while he was yet a long way off" *[Luke,* xv, 20] implies that he was not merely willing to welcome him back but was anxiously looking out for him) but still more to show how this mercy is not an arbitrary abrogation or dilution of justice but is itself justice. The *miserum cor,* the pitying heart, which is implied in *misericordia* is correlative to the miseria, the state of wretchedness, of the one pitied: the greater the *miseria,* the greater the *misericordia;* and this relatively is itself just, is the divine justice which is thus revealed as differing *toto caelo* from the unrealistic, arbitrary rule-of-thumb "equity" of the legalist.

Again, the theandric reality of the incarnate Word, which the theologian describes in terms of hypostatic union, is presented in the gospel through the paradox-picture of the simultaneous total divineness and total humanness of Jesus, a picture painted most vividly by St. John with his genius for fusing together the sublime and the homely, as in the final chapter of the fourth gospel where the might and majesty of the Word, the grandeur and universality of his message, the absoluteness of his demand for love and obedience *usque ad mortem,* are manifested in the homeliness of human love and fellowship, the catching and counting of the fish, the humble breaking of bread together and the sharing together of the food cooking on the fire.

The second main task of the preacher is to present to his hearers the theological implications of the word of God, doctrinal and moral, in an idiom which will be meaningful for them and grip their attention because it is contemporary, vital, concrete and vivid; and also in a manner which, because it springs from a keen insight into and sympathy with the realities of their own immediate and pressing problems and difficulties, will arouse in them not the sense of unreality produced

by vague generalities or diatribes which betray a total incomprehension of their situation, but a sense of immediacy, of a here-and-now enlightening and encouraging message, a manifesting of the law-the law which is Truth and Life and Love, for "our law is Christ "-as indeed "a lamp for [their] feet" (Ps. cxviii, 105) and a lamp which, as the message strikes home to them, they will recognize as what their hearts have been looking for.

All this implies much more than the mere acquiring and memorizing of a new vocabulary. It involves, first, a constantly renewed thinking-out of timeless truths in terms of contemporary situations, problems, mental attitudes; secondly, a constant re-appraisal of the shifting *nuances* of current speech in general; and thirdly a constant alertness in particular for the changes which can and do befall traditional Christian words or phrases not so much in their dictionary-meaning as in their overtones and evocations.

Changes of this latter kind can be of extreme importance, so much so that it may be necessary to discard the old terms altogether and invent new ones; for nowdays the changes often involve a loss of strength, the sort of etiolation which comes of substituting soft sentimentality for the tough realities of deliberation and volition. The tragic deterioration which is revealed in the contrast between the Christ of the Byzantine mosaics or of Giotto or Michelangelo and the saccharine Sacred Heart of present-day popular piety is equally revealed in the contrast between the primitive or medieval and the present-day connotations of many of the great Christian words. It just is a fact-and a fact which we cannot ignore without incurring the catastrophe of falsification-that " charity" no longer conveys the fiery immensities of *caritas* or *agape* but suggests either almsgiving, perhaps impersonal or even condescending, or else a mild and vague emotional benevolence; that " temperance " means not *temperantia* but merely abstention from, or an attitude of cautious timidity towards, the bottle; that "purity" no longer suggests integrity, wholeness, the quality

of being "all of a piece" and free of all base alloy, but has become equated with the (largely negative) idea of sexual continence. Negativism has made "prudence" the equivalent simply of caution and the cult of safety-first; sentimentality has emasculated "meekness" and "mildness"; "humility" has been so grossly misinterpreted that instead of meaning an acceptance of the truth about oneself it now means a complete self-denigration which in fact is deliberate falsehood.

For concepts such as these, therefore, the preacher today needs a new vocabulary unless he is prepared, every time he mentions them, to begin with a laborious correction of misapprehensions concerning the old. Once again, it is not a question merely of finding new words for old but of seeing and stating timeless truths in the context of the immediate here-and-now problems and pre-occupations of his audience; and this in turn involves a great deal of imaginative sympathy. The priest has his own personal problems, but one of his main tasks as a preacher is to identify himself with the quite different problems and mental attitudes of his people: his message will never seem real to them or get under their skins unless he can think himself into their skins. If he treats of the theology of God's providence he must explain how the Father's loving care is compatible with the frustrations, the tragedies, the derelictions which his *people* experience; he cannot speak convincingly of the motherhood of the Church unless he first faces with courage and compassion the widespread feeling of the laity that the Church is far more severe and impersonal than Christ. It is useless to expound the ideals of Christian justice or sexual morality unless he really understands the problems of how to be honest and yet survive in our rat-race world and how to be chaste in spite of all the economic, social, emotional and psychosexual stresses which pull, sometimes so overwhelmingly, in the other direction; and to speak of deep-rooted sinful habits as determining an eternal destiny, without having a vivid awareness (whether experiential or sympathetic) of the psychological factors whereby the culpability of such habits is itself determined, is not merely useless but positively harmful.

But even here we return in the last resort to the question of words. A preacher who had taught himself to understand and to feel his people's problems would still be unable to reach them unless he had also taught himself to speak of these problems in their own language. And if he is to undertake this task, or even be aware of its necessity, he must first acquire a deep feeling for words. He is not required to be an orator, and he is definitely required *not* to concern himself with the pomposities and verbosities of empty rhetoric; on the other hand, he certainly will not achieve his objective by the pitiful expedient of injecting a few ill-chosen colloquialisms into his discourse. *Cor ad cor loquitur:* he must know in his own heart, in his bones, the words which will not just skim the surface of other minds but dig down deep into minds and hearts alike. What a tragic irony, when those who worship the Word and whose office it is to proclaim the Word betray a complete lack of awareness, appreciation, love and reverence for words. The words of a living language are themselves living things: mutable, fragile, fugitive; and their loveliness too (when they are lovely) is fragile, easily marred by the accretion of ugly overtones or the arrosions of misinterpretation or the destructive effect of drab associations. The office of the preacher is to lead his hearers to an *epopteia,* a beholding, of the Word through his use of words: with what love and reverence, therefore, with what care for clarity and simplicity, for vividness and vitality, must he use them! He must open the scriptures, and to open the scriptures is to open a door and the door is Christ *(In.* x, 9) . When the reading of the gospel is announced in the Mass we cry *Gloria tibi Domine:* not " Glory be to the Lord " but " Glory be to you, Lord, here and now present in our midst," for the gospel means not merely a promise for the future but a present beholding. The events it records are, as events, in the historical past but as symbols are timeless and therefore contemporary; and as we are the widow's son, the demoniac boy, the cripple, the blind man, the prodigal, so Christ is here and now for us the vine and the wine, the living bread, the living

water, the shepherd and the door of the sheepfold, the living and life-giving Word.

We live in a world in which multitudes are filled with despair because they find life meaningless. But *Logos* means "meaning"; as Peter declared, the Word has the words which give life, the secret of life (Jn. vi, 69) because he is himself the meaning of life. It is for those who are the Word's messengers to learn to use words lovingly, carefully, creatively, so as to heal the despair of a world without meaning; and to make sure that their words are truly pedagogic, truly life-bringing and light-bringing, because leading their hearers to that *epopteia* in which blindness is forever healed in and by the sight of the Life and the Light.

t GERALD VANN, O. P.

SOME CAUSES OF THE ELIMINATION OF CAUSALITY IN CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE

MANY QUESTIONS are being raised in the philosophy of science-questions such as, "What is science?"; "What are its aims?"; "What is its methodology?" " What is the relationship of scientific theory to empirical fact? ". This latter question together with its correlative, "What is the place of causality in contemporary science?", will be investigated in this article.

Ample evidence indicates that the views which some " bench scientists " hold on these matters tend to be naive. Indeed, many work-a-day scientists are in nearly complete ignorance of the views discussed by more articulate spokemen concerning the philosophy of science.

Most scientists may say that they don't particularly care about the philosophy of science. This is certainly a very comfortable attitude, even though it is exceedingly ostrichlike in its characteristics. It is ostrichlike because many problems raised in philosophy of science have had and will have profound repercussions for them and their sciences.

Men are saying things in the philosophy of science which we cannot afford to ignore. Some of these men are from the usual ranks of self-appointed spokesman, but many speak with the full authority of the scientist. The prominence and importance of science in our contemporary society cannot be denied. Nevertheless, certain responsibilities go hand in hand with being in the spotlight. Among these is the obligation that scientists explain to others (as well as to themselves), not only what they are really doing, but what they are even talking about.

This calls for a genuine and sometimes agonizing reappraisal of science. Perhaps " appraisal " might be the better word, for

many have not taken time to reflect at all on this matter. Many scientists would be unpleasantly surprised if they attempted to answer certain questions in the philosophy of science. Even the attempt to formulate these questions would prove a formidable task, for it is no easy thing to pose an intelligent question. Indeed, a question cannot be well formulated unless one already knows a good deal about the answer. Yet, we agree with Planck that there are such things as " phantom problems." [1]

Although many practical scientists have ignored the philosophy of science, other scientists (together with some who are not scientists) have been influential in alternately clarifying and beclouding the future directions of science. We may be amazed by what they say. We may not like what they have to say. We may eventually dismiss what they have to say, but we cannot ignore what they have to say.

The authority of spokeman such as Einstein, Planck, Mach, Bohr, Heisenberg, Eddington and Jeans, is at least sufficient to command our attention. Yet there are others who may not be so familiar, but who have had much to contribute. Such men are P. Frank, H. Poincare, P. Duhem, R. Carnap, L. Wittgenstein, B. Russell, and M. Schlick. Everyone of them has had a strong influence in determining the course of the philosophy of science.

Let us briefly trace the historical background from which current problems in the philosophy of science have arisen. A schism developed between philosophy and science at the end of the middle ages and the beginning of the modern era. We refer to the period of Francis Bacon and the 16th century. Bacon was no scientist, but he was a trumpeteer for the new science. Ample testimony for this assertion is found in his *Novum Organum* and in his *On the Proficience and Advancement of Learning.* Prior to this era, science and philosophy

[1] Cf. Max Planck, "Phantom Problems in Science" in *Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers,* tr. Frank Gaynor (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 52-79.

had constituted a unity. However, at this time it began to appear that the embrace of the two was more of a stranglehold-especially to science-and in many ways it proved to be just that. *L'affaire* Galileo demonstrates the point. Hence, it seemed that science would have to bid adieu to philosophy. The breakup occurred not at once, of course, but over a period of centuries.

Traditionally, philosophy concerned itself with an investigation of reality in terms of four basic kinds of causes.[2] Very briefly, these are the *material* cause (that out of which a thing comes to be or that which is acted upon); the *formal* cause (that which makes the thing to be such a thing); the *efficient* or agent cause, and the final cause (that for the sake of which). Originally, science concerned itself with all of these causes as well, for it claimed (as did philosophy) that knowledge was not scientific unless it was causal knowledge. As Aristotle said:

> We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is.[3]

However, as the success of science grew almost in proportion to the extent that it divorced itself from philosophy and theology, and while philosophy in some respects grew more decadent, it appeared to many that philosophy never had any real content of its own, other than that which science (in the new meaning) had given to it. Apparently, this was the time for science to assert itself and walk in its own right, instead of being dragged down by philosophy which it had been needlessly supporting. [4]

•" Now the causes being four, it is the business of the physicist to know about them all." Aristotle, *Physics,* II, 7, 198a 22-25 in *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 248. Cf. also *Physics,* II, 3 and *Metaphysics,* I, 1-10.

[3] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics,* I, 2, 71b 8-12, *ibid.,* p. 111.

• Remarkably enough there developed an almost exact parallel in the relationship of philosophy to theology-a relationship of estrangement.

Two effects were immediately witnessed; (1) philosophy regressed to a rationalism with such exponents as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and others; [5] and (2) science ventured down the path of empiricism. On this latter point, Werner Heisenberg correctly observes, "The exact sciences-physics and chemistry-of modern times were, until the discovery of the Planck quantum, materialistically oriented." [6]

It is almost axiomatic that since philosophy talked about four causes, science, in trying to escape the clutches of philosophy, would do its best to break away from any doctrine of the causes which bore the slightest resemblance to those treated in philosophy. The time was ripe for such a trend, for many philosophers themselves were confusing the analogical doctrine of the causes by unwittingly reducing all to a manifestation of efficient or agent causality.

To some extent, Rene Descartes, the father of modern philosophy and the inventor of analytic geometry, is the villain of the piece-at least to begin with. He sought to restore philosophy by mathematizing it, but instead, gave the impetus to subsequent science to become mathematized. This tendency has revealed itself more fully in our time than in any other. His influence was apparent on Newton. Note the title of Sir Isaac's classic work, *The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.*

Decartes' reasons for wanting to mathematize everything were quite simple. He said:

> There is, however, one principal property of every substance, which constitutes its nature or essence, and upon which all the others depend. Thus extension in length, breadth, and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance. [7]

[5] It is no coincidence that these men were rationalistically and idealistically oriented, for there has always been a tendency for mathematicians to lean in such a direction upon venturing into philosophy. Cf. Plato, the Pythagoreans, etc.

[6] Werner Heisenberg, "From Plato to Max Planck: The Philosophical Problems of Atomic Physics," *The Atlantic Monthly,* CCIV, 5 (November, 1959), p. 110.

[7] Rene Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy,* LUI, in *A Discourse on Method, Etc.,* tr. John Veitch (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1912), p. 185.

Surely, if the *nature* of material being is *extension,* no more appropriate way to study it will be found than through mathematics. Because of this tendency to mathematize, certain causes gradually came to be ignored, if not positively denied. The initial attack began against final causality. There are good reasons why this was so, for the final cause was regarded as the highest of the causes and the reason that the others were actually causes.

Francis Bacon was one of the earliest in modem times to lead the movement which ultimately resulted in a rejection of final causality within the domain of science. He moved the analysis of final causes from the realm of special physics and placed it in the area of metaphysics. In effect, this was a rejection of finality, for in Bacon's view, final causality was little more than anthropomorphism, an idol of the tribe which should be expurgated from science.

The contemporary scene has reinforced this view. As Gilson aptly puts it:

> For centuries final causes have been mistaken for scientific explanations by so many generations of philosophers that today many scientists still consider the fear of final causes as the beginning of scientific wisdom. Science is thus making metaphysics suffer for its centuries-long meddling in matters of physics and biology.[8]

There are many who claim that to the extent which biology still seeks purposes, it must be regarded as an inferior science, or even worse, as unscientific. Nagle sums up the case quite accurately when he declares,

> Modern science, on the other hand [vs. Aristotelian science] regards final causes to be vestal virgins which bear no fruit in the study of physical and chemical phenomena; and, because of the association of teleological explanations with the doctrine that goals or ends of activity are dynamic agents in their own realizations, it tends to view such explanation as a species of obscurantism. [9]

[8] Etienne Gilson, *God and Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941)' p. 129.

[9] Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), pp. 401-402.

Perhaps Nagle and contemporary scientists have misunderstood the authentic view of final causes. Certainly there is ample opportunity to do so, considering the mistaken notions philosophers have ascribed to it; yet the fact remains that mechanism appears to explain the phenomena in question as well as teleology explained them. Hence, they argue, we should eliminate the complex explanation (teleology) and retain the simple one (mechanism) . Such a view is in keeping with the principle of economy stressed by Ernst Mach-a principle known to philosophers as Occam's razor. However, it is a principle which, if left unbridled, might lead to serious error.[10]

There are, of course, biologists who still accept the term " teleology " in their science, but when questioned closely on the meaning of this term, it is clear that only *function* is indicated. To ask if there is teleology, is equivalent to asking whether there is a function. In short, teleology is acceptable to modern biologists only if it is not teleological-only if it is not a cause.

However, it is not only final causality which has been sliced off by Occam's razor. Gradually, the efficient or agent cause has also been lost sight of. Through men such as C. S. Peirce, the efficient cause has been reduced to its effect and its effect reduced to an irreducible fact. Thus there are only facts. " The existence of a fact is equivalent to the existence of its consequence. Thus, if the consequences of a supposed fact exist, then, so does the supposed fact for the pragmatist." [11]

Elsewhere Peirce writes:

> Whether we ought to say that a force *is* an acceleration, or that it *causes* an acceleration, is a mere question of propriety of Ian-

[10] Cf. Copernicus' view on planetary motions as perfectly circular and the subsequent correction by Keppler proving their motions to be elliptical. Cf. Also the destruction of the simplified principle of parity and its replacement with a more complex explanation. Embarrassed by such untoward happenings, scientists quickly discovered that ontological simplicity did not imply logical simplicity and corrected the principle of economy accordingly.

[11] Charles S. Peirce, *Collectoo Writings,* ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-3), 1. 431.

guage. Consequently, if we know what the effects of force are, we are acquainted with every fact which is implied in saying that a force exists, and there is nothing more to know.[12]

The exit of efficient causality from contemporary science then, has been unceremoniously hurried by the taking over of methodology by mathematics. After all, in mathematics, one does not ask" Who did what?". All that is asked is" What is the structure? ". Indeed, by mathematical manipulation, cause and effect may be replaced by symbols in an equation. Then if we like, the symbols may be reversed algebraically so that what formerly was a cause may now be regarded as an effect, with no appreciable mathematical difference. St. Thomas himself points out that, " There is no demonstration by means of an efficient cause in mathematics." [13] To quote Gilson on this point:

The marked antipathy of modern science toward the notion of efficient cause is intimately related to the nonexistential character of scientific explanations. It is of the essence of an efficient cause that it makes something be, or exist. Since the relation of effect to cause is an existential and a nonanalytical one, it appears to the scientific mind as a sort of scandal which must be eliminated.[14]

The tendency today is to talk about statistical incidence, instead of causation-a case in point would be cigarette smoking and incidence of lung cancer. Such an attitude appears to be a mark of sophistication. Because mathematics abstracts from material things, material causality is also beginning to lose its place. There are no perfect circles in nature (indeed, there are *no* circles in nature) any more than there are lines or points or plane surfaces.

To sum up this view: in order to attain his object, the mathematician has been obliged to abstract from the real. Thus

[12] Charles S. Peirce, *Values in a Universe of Chance,* ed. Philip P. Wiener (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958), p.

[13] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Thealogiae,* I, 44, 1, ad 3 in *The; Ba$l,c Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,* ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945), I, p.

"Gilson, *op. cit.,* fn. p. 131.

he is more often dealing with concepts and ideas (logical structures), than with things or sensible realities. This is the difference between a mathematical approach to reality and an experiential or even an experimental approach. Mathematics, and so the mind, contains the ideal (something first conceived, such as the perfect circle); then reality is compared to it and judged in the light of this ideal. In such a view, things measure up to what exists in the mind, rather than the mind conforming to the ways things are.

Immanuel Kant, who provided a philosophy for Newtonian science, certainly gave the contemporary view a strong push when he instigated his own " Copernican Revolution " by declaring," The understanding does not derive its laws (a *priori)* from, but prescribes then to, nature." [15] Pierre Duhem writes in a somewhat similar vein saying, " The experimental verifications are not the bases of the theory, but its culminations." [16]

Is the starting point things or mind? Those inspired by Kant, and their number is legion, declare for mind.

Of course, the attack upon efficient causality, especially in science, came with the empiricist, David Hume, who denied any necessary connection between cause and effect, other than that of psychological association. However, there is no need to quote 18th century Hume, when we can find a century man articulate the same basic proposition. We refer to Moritz Schlick of the *Wiener Kreis* who says:

> Necessity means nothing more than universal validity [i. e., the universal is simply a complete enumeration]; the sentence: "A follows necessarily from B," so far as content is concerned, is completely identical with the sentence: *"In every case* where the state A occurs, the state B follows," and says nothing more whatsoever.17

[15] Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomma to any Future Metaphysics,* 86 in *From Decartes to Kant,* ed. T. V. Smith and Marjorie Grene (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 840.

[16] Pierre Duhem quoted in Philipp Frank, *Modem Science and its Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 16.

[17] Moritz Schlick, *The Philosophy of Nature,* tr. Amethe Van Zeppelin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 89.

Occurrence, not causality, has become the byword in science. In quantum physics, probability of occurrence would be an even more accurate expression.

Max Planck faced the question quite squarely when he asked, "Is there any infallible sign to indicate that a happening in nature is causally determined by another?" [18] In answering his own question he states, *"An occurrence is causally determined if it can be predicted with certainty."* [19] But, *"It is never possible to predict a physical occurrence with unlimited precision."* [20]

What are we to make of this? Planck himself wishes to side with the determinists (i.e., those who accept causality), yet he admits that the indeterminists are in the majority today. In the face of the difficulties with which the indeterminists confront him, Planck is forced to make certain concessions-one of them being the construction of his famous *Weltbild.*

As he puts it:

> We have been able to carry through the deterministic viewpoint only with the expedient of replacing the directly given sense world by the world picture of physics, that is, by a provisional and alterable creation of the human power of imagination. [21]

The necessity for doing so is rooted in the character of occurrences.

> While in the sense world the prediction of an occurrence is always associated with a certain element of uncertainty, in the world picture of physics all occurrences follow one another in accordance with precisely definable laws-they are strictly determined causally. Therefore, the introduction of the world picture of physics-and herein lies its significance-reduces the uncertainty of predicting an occurrence in the sense world to the uncertainty in translating that occurrence from the sense world into the world picture and in retranslating it from the world picture into the sense world.[22]

[18] Planck, *op. cit.,* p. 121.
[19] *Ibid.,* p. 122.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 124.
[21] *Ibid.,* p. 144.
[22] *Ibid.,* p. 130. (Need it be added that something is often lost in a translation!)

Eventually, Planck is forced to conclude that

the law of causality is neither true nor false. It is rather a heuristic principle, a signpost-and in my opinion our most valuable signpost-to help us find our bearings in a bewildering maze of occurrences, and to show us the direction in which scientific research must advance in order to achieve fertile results.[23]

The great physicist, Ernst Mach, in one of his anti-metaphysics tirades wished to make physics descriptive, precisely in order to avoid causality. He explicity states: "There is no cause nor effect in nature; nature has but an individual existence; nature simply *is*. ... The essence of the connection of cause and effect, exists but in the abstraction which we perform for the purpose of mentally reproducing the facts." [24]

Commenting on this problem, Bertrand Russell makes what must be considered a " generous " concession; " There is therefore *something* to preserve in this notion [i. e., of causality], though it is a very tiny part of what is commonly assumed in orthodox metaphysics." [25] Apparently what is " preserved " is a group of fairly constant relations, but nothing more.

Victor Lenzen tells us, " Causality is a relation within the realm of conceptual objects .... In the sophisticated stage of science [i. e., contemporary science] causality must be attributed to a model which the scientist constructs out of concepts." [26]

These are serious accusations and they raise important problems in the philosophy of science. If true, and if mathematics is becoming the language of the sciences, and if the sciences have parted with real causality, then *to what extent do the sciences deal with reality?* Certainly for Mach, theory is *not* an explanation. It is merely a representation.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 149.

"'Ernst Mach, *The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of its Development* in *Readings in Philosophy of Science,* ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 447.

•• Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1922), p. 227. Cf. also p. 230.

•• Victor Lenzen, *Causality in Natural Science* (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1954)' p. 6.

Henry Margenau asserts that it is a " naive claim of textbook writers that the first principle of science is to recognize an external world." [27]

Max Planck holds that:

> Directly observable magnitudes are not found at all in the world picture. It contains symbols only. In fact, the world picture even contains constituents which have only a very indirect significance for the sense world, or no significance at all, such as ether waves, partial vibrations, frames of references, etc. Primarily, such constituents play the part of dead weight or ballast, but they are incorporated because of the decisive advantage assured by the introduction of the world picture-that it permits us to carry through a strict determinism.[28]

The situation has become even more acute in attempting to establish a rapport between the macroscopic world of classical mechanics with the new sub-microscopic world of atomic and sub-atomic physics. Does the language of the macroscopic fit the sub-atomic world? Do the laws of the one fit the other? Can the motion of sub-atomic particles be described by Newtonian law? Moritz Schlick suggests that we abandon all attempts at translation here.

According to Lenzen, Kant " may be described as the philosopher of causality in classical mechanics." [29] However, his "doctrine that the principle of causality is founded on an immutable form of thought is uncongenial to an era which is accustomed to relativity and change in the foundations of science." [30] Becoming more specific, Lenzen points out, " In classical physics it was assumed that a statistical regularity is the manifestation of more basic dynamical regularity. As we shall see, however, quantum theory has introduced statistical regularities which are not reducible but fundamental." [31]

[27] Henry Margenau, *St. Thomas and the Physics of 1958: A Confrontation* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958), p. 35. Cf. also Lenzen, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5 and Planck, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137.

[••] Planck, *op. cit.*, p. 129. Cf. also p. 128 where Planck explains the double meaning which is always present in the interpretation of measurable magnitudes.

[29] Lenzen, *op. cit.*, p. 55. [30] *Ibid.*, p. 22. [31] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Summing up the views expressed here then, causality may be viewed as *dynamical* or *statistical.* The former was common to classical mechanics and required the notion of force and necessary connection. The latter is appropriate to sub-atomic physics. All that is required is regularity or uniformity.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain this schizophrenic attitude toward the macroscopic and sub-atomic. As Nagle observes, " In consequence, the view has become widespread that all laws whatever, even those about macroscopic objects and events, are at bottom statistical, and that in the end all natural processes are acausal." [32] Certainly men such as Peirce, Eddington and Boltzmann make nature acausal, while others such as Philipp Frank and Henri Poincare make cause a mere conventionalism.

Contrary to Lenzen's position, it is permissible to wonder if modern science has really transcended Kant, for the present statistical view of causality is much akin to a Kantian *a priori* form playing the role of a regulative principle but not a constitutive one for experience. [33]

Werner Heisenberg has taken upon himself the task of raising the implications of these problems. In his view, those who oppose the Copenhagen interpretation of the quantum theory

> would prefer to come back to the idea of an objective real world whose smallest parts exist objectively in the same sense as stones or trees exist, independently of whether or not we observe them. This, however, is impossible or at least not entirely possible because of the nature of atomic phenomena. . . . It cannot be our task to formulate wishes as to how the atomic phenomena should be; our task can only be to understand them. [34]

[32] Nagle, *op. cit.,* p. 312.

[33] For practical purposes, real causality has been relegated to the realm of faith. Here is the contemporary interpretation of Kant's goal " to deny *knowledge,* in order to make room for *faith."* Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason,* tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: The Modern Library, 1958), Preface to the 2nd ed., B xxxi, p. 22.

[34] Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy* (New York: Harper Bros., 1958), p. 129.

In this same work, Heisenberg points out that we can't describe what really happens in the atom. " The words ' description ' and ' really ' and ' happen ' can only refer to the concepts of daily life or of classical physics." [35] For Heisenberg, these terms are unambiguous but also very inaccurate. What he seeks, therefore, is an ambiguous language predicated on a theory of indeterminism and probability.

At this point, it is easy to see the opening provided in science for the linguistic analysts to enter, and entered they have-*en masse.* Their position will be considered shortly. **But to** continue with Heisenberg, in contemporary physics:

There are large areas of experience which cannot be even approximately described with the concepts of classical physics.

In these areas of atomic physics, a great deal of the earlier intuitive physics has gone by the board-not only the applicability of its concepts and laws but the entire notion of reality which underlay the exact sciences until our present day atomic physics. . . . In science we are not dealing with nature itself but with the science of nature-that is, with a nature which has been thought through and described by man .... [That is to say] science stands between man and nature and that we cannot renounce the application of concepts that have been intuitively given to or are inborn in man. . . . [It is difficult] to designate the smallest particles of matter as being " truly real." For if the quantum theory is correct these elemental particles are not real in the same sense as the things in our daily lives-for example, trees or stones-are real; they appear as abstractions derived from observed material which in a literal sense is real.

They are simply expressions of fundamental mathematical constructions which one comes upon in striving to break down matter ever further, and which provide the content for the underlying laws of nature. In the beginning, therefore, for modern science, was the form, the mathematical pattern, not the material thing. And . . . the mathematical pattern is, in the final analysis an intellectual concept. . . . The task of present-day atomic physics is to explore this meaning [i.e., of the concept] in all its details. [36]

[35] *Ibid.,* pp. 143-145, *passim.*

[36] Heisenberg, *Atlantic Monthly,* CCIV, 5, *loc. cit.,*

Heisenberg clarifies this still further:

> Scientific concepts are idealizations. . . . But through this process of idealization and precise definition the immediate connection with reality is lost. The concepts still correspond very closely to reality in the part of nature which had been the object of the research. But the correspondence may be lost in other parts containing other groups of phenomena.[37]

It is clear that here the distinction among the various sciences is being erased. In former times, biology, chemistry, physics and mathematics each had its own proper area. A status level even prevailed here. The biologist charged that the philosopher was not a scientist; the chemist disclaimed biology as a science; the physicist didn't regard the latter two areas as really scientific; and, of course, the mathematician lorded it over all. Perhaps the mathematician was correct, for the unification of the sciences today is one being accomplished by a mathematical method. Descartes' dream is close to fulfillment. The case is not one of physics and chemistry becoming biological, but rather of all three becoming mathematical. Whether the process whereby this is being achieved is assimilation or osmosis or what have you, it is difficult to say-but it is happening.

The problem of meaning was mentioned a few moments earlier in connection with symbols and the expression of scientific problems in mathematical formulae. Let's explore this a bit more for it raises the question of the extent to which a given theory deals with facts.

According to Bertrand Russell (whom nearly all contemporary mathematicians call " Master ") , at rock bottom in mathematics, we start from assumptions which are arbitrary. Granted, he says, within a given system conclusions may be affirmed, but this by no means is to confirm the statements. Other systems could explain it as well. There can be different logical systems for the same explanation. Many physical hypotheses could be " verified " by several conflicting theories,

[37] Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy,* p. 200.

each of which is logically self-consistent. As Pierre Duhem says, "An infinity of different theoretical facts may be taken for the translation of the same practical fact." [38]

Several concrete applications of this principle appear to bear out its validity. Certainly, Bohr's principle of complementarity has proven most fruitful in practice; consider the application to a corpuscular vs. a wave theory of light; a diffused mass vs. an orbital theory of the atom; a system which employs alternately Euclidian or non-Euclidian geometry, etc.

Rapoport and other semanticists provide further backing for these ideas. Writing in *ETC,* Rapoport claims:

> According to our view you cannot have certainty *with* content . . . . Some of us go on to draw a moral from this limitation: if we cannot have certainty about the real world, we must learn to live without it.
>
> Mathematics . . . has had to admit that any set of axioms underlying a mathematical system is arbitrary and meaningless . . . . Mathematics gained its stature by recognizing that it started not with self-evident truths but with a set of arbitrary rules.
>
> At the rock bottom of each system [of science or mathematics] there are only meaningless terms. [39]

Truth or falsity is no concern of theirs-only meaning. And their principle of verification or meaning states that whatever is non-sense is meaningless. Meaning can only occur *within* a logical system which at rock bottom is arbitrary. Only *logical* necessity, not *metaphysical* necessity is meaningfuJ.4° Wittgen-

[88] P. Duhem, *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory* in *Readings in Philosophy Science,* Wiener, p. 918.

[89] Anatol Rapoport, "General Semantics and Thomism: Their Contrasting Metaphysical Assumptions," *ETC. A Review of General Semantics,* XVI, 91 (Winter, 1959), pp. 140-146 *passim.*

•• Of course it was Descartes who set up the basis for this position, for in his view, there are no intelligible necessities in things, because they measure, not up to Divine ideas, but to an arbitrary Divine Will. In short, there is no basis for truth in things themselves. Cf. Descartes' influence on Kant's a priori laws, Berkeley's denial for a needless material world and James' will to believe.

stein tells us that, " A necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only logical necessity." [41]

These men warn us that in sub-atomic physics we cannot be naive and set up mechanical models as was done in Galileo's day. But they also remind us that we do have a substitute, namely, the logical construct which is really mathematical construct. To insist that one draw a graphic picture or artists' conception of sub-atomic parts, would be requested only by one ignorant of physics and mathematics-surely not by the physicist.

As Mach saw it, the atomic theory " is a mathematical model for facilitating the mental reproduction of facts." [42] P. Frank states:

> The nature which the human mind rationalizes by means of theoretical science is not at all the nature that we know through our senses. The law of causality and with it all of the theoretical sciences have as their object not empirical nature but the fictitious nature of which we spoke above. [43]

Duhem puts it this way. "Between the concrete facts, as the physicist observes them, and the numerical symbols by which these facts are represented in the calculations of the theorist, there is an extremely great difference." [44]

For Margenau, "A *theory,* still exact and deterministic in its own terms, is related to the realm of immediate experience by *probabilities* only." [45]

Mach saw reality as merely a name for the sum total of the complexes of observable sensations. [46] For Mach:

[41] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1949), 6.37, p. 181.

[42] Mach, *op. cit.,* p. 45!l.

[43] Frank, *op. cit.,* p. 58.

[44] Duhem, *op. cit.,* p. !l7.

[45] Henry Margenau, *Philosophy of Science* in *Readings in Philosophy Science,* Wiener, p. 549.

[46] For a brief but excellent summary of Mach's position here, cf. Joergensen, "The Development of Logical Empiricism," *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,* II, 9 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 9.

Sensations are not signs of things; but, on the contrary, a thing is a thought-symbol for a compound sensation of relative fixedness. Properly speaking, the world is not composed of "things" as its elements, but of colors, tones, pressures, spaces, times, in short what we ordinarily call individual sensations.[47]

In Mach's view all scientific statements are statements about sense observations. In Russell's view, "a thing is a certain series of appearances, connected with each other by continuity and certain causal laws."[49] It might be added that for Russell these laws are logical rather than ontological in origin and structure. For Poincare, the general laws of science, e. g., conservation of energy, etc. are arbitrary conventions about the use of words.[50]

R. Carnap, one of the chief spokesmen for the old *Wiener Kreis* has published a book whose title is very revealing. It is *Der logische Aufbau der Welt-The Logical Construction of the World.* Carnap claims that there are two languages which we possess; one is a "thing-language" while the other is a "phenomena-language." When we speak of tables, desks, etc., we are using a thing-language. However, it would be more scientific to speak of a patch of red or green instead, thereby employing a phenomena-language. The combining of patches of green and red is a logical construction. We don't actually see chairs, only their patches of color, etc. Carnap is thus forced to view causality as beyond the realm of proof or disproof, for it is a purely conventional definition.

Both Eddington and James Jeans saw physics in their day as heading toward an idealistic philosophy. Eddington is quite

[47] Mach, *op. cit.,* p. 447. Cf. also, "In nature there is no *law* of refraction, only different cases of refraction." *Ibid.,* p. 448. The nominalism which serves a backdrop for this school of thought is unmistakable.

[48] Cf. Frank, *op. cit.,* p. 14.

[48] Russell, *op.* cit., p. 111. If this is not succinct enough, Russell states, "More generally, a 'thing' will be defined as a certain series of aspects, namely those which would commonly be said to be of a thing." *Ibid.,* p. It is clear to Russell that any other mode of speaking is a product of a "gratuitous metaphysics."

[5]° For a summary of Poincare's position here, cf. Frank, *op. cit.,* p. 10.

frank in holding that science more often *makes* than *discovers* its laws and objects (and to that extent is idealistic.) Science is obliged to interfere with the object it studies, thereby making it impossible to know reality as it really is. This is somewhat similar to Heisenberg's principle of interference. Consequently, knowledge of the physical world is a structural knowledge only.[51]

In a particularly revealing text, Eddington explicitly discloses his leaning toward idealism and rationalism.

> But if it were necessary to choose a leader from among the older philosophers, there can be no doubt that our choice would be Kant. . . . Kant anticipated to a remarkable extent the ideas to which we are now being impelled by the modern development of physics.[52]

As has been made clear throughout this paper, Eddington was not the only one influenced by Kant. The list of those so inspired could go on indefinitely. Philipp Frank admits to the Koenigberg philosopher's influence on himself and the entire analytic school.[53]

Max Planck declared that," Observed from without, the will is causally determined. Observed from within it is free."[54] Finally along this line, would it be too much to suggest that current views on the principle of complementarity had their paths paved by Kant's dichotomy of the phenomenal and noumenal orders? Does not the physicist have to guard himself against the " seductive " tendency of the " human spirit " to view the sub-atomic order in terms of the laws of the macroscopic (much as Kant advised the philosopher to guard against

[51] Cf Arthur Eddington, *The Philosophy of Physical Science* (New York: Macmillan, 1939), p. 190.

[52] *Ibid.,* p. 188.

[53] Cf. Frank, *op. cit.,* p. 7.

[54] Planck, *op. cit.,* p. 75. How different is this from Kant's view that the will is phenomenally determined, but noumenally it can be free? For further evidence of Kant's influence on Planck, cf. *ibid.,* pp. 69-75. The view of Planck that either the will is caused or it is free, sets up a false disjunctive, or at any rate, not a perfect disjunctive. Here St. Thomas shows quite clearly that we can both have our cake and eat it; the will can be caused *and* free. Cf. *Summa. Theol.,* I, 83, and esp. ad 3; and 1-11, 9, 3-4.

the tendency to interpret the noumenal in terms of the phenomenal?) In contemporary science, is a *realistic* physics any more possible than metaphysics was for Kant? Wittgenstein sums up this view quite succinctly, "At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena." [55]

What has happened with respect to causality in today's science, may now be stated quite succinctly. Of the four causes of reality formerly investigated by science, only one cause remains in its employ, namely, formal causality. But the formal cause which remains is but an image of its former self, because it is not the formal cause *in the thing* which is investigated; it is the formal cause *in the mind* of the investigator-a sort of *exemplary* formal cause-the logical construct.

There is no arguing here with a scientific method. All one can legitimately ask is, "Does it work?". In this it is quite permissible to be pragmatic. Yet the current reflection on method and theory by modern thinkers has shown that perhaps science is not as far away from philosophical presuppositions as it once thought itself to be. As one historian observed, it is paradoxical that while philosophy, traditionally accused of being rationalistic, is becoming more empirical; science, traditionally accused of being empirical, is becoming increasingly rationalistic. It now appears that empirical science which hoped to put metaphysics to death, has succeeded only in being instrumental in its rebirth. Surely, some kind of unity between science and philosophy is once more in the offing.

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•• Wittgenstein, *op. cit.,* 6.371, p. 181.

VATICAN II: THE THIRD SESSION

A THEOLOGIAN's REPORT

THE FATHERS of the Church, especially St. Augustine, fascinated by the magic of numbers, saw in the number three a symbol of Heaven (the three Persons of the Trinity) and in number four a symbol of earth (the four elements; earth, water, fire and air), both together forming the mystic number seven, the number of creation and of redemption (sacraments, virtues). One is tempted, in this spirit, to see the first three sessions of the Council as concerned principally with the Church as divine, and the fourth and final one as looking to the world which is the concrete setting of the Church. In the first sessions the new consciousness of herself which the Church has slowly and with difficulty attained was formulated; once that had been accomplished she could turn her attention to her situation in the world and her attitude to others.

In the first session the Council became truly ecumenical, fully universal. Refusing to confine itself to the narrow Latin limits and restricted perspective set for it by preparatory bodies under the guidance of the Roman Curia, it constituted itself as a Council that was really Catholic, not Latin only, or European, or even Western, but universal in fact and aim. As Pope John wished, it became a Council that was above all pastoral and ecumenical, not called to define or to condemn but to adapt the Church to the needs of her divine mission in the world to-day and to prepare the way for the unity of the whole Christian community.

The second session made it clear that the central theme of this Council is the Church, first in herself and then in her relations with the other Christian communities and with the world. From a concept of herself that had, in the West, be-

come too exclusively juridical the Church turned to one that is more inward and spiritual based on the primacy of the ontology of grace that makes her one living reality with her Founder as Head. She revealed herself as the sacrament of Christ, the visible and efficacious sign of the saving presence of God in history, and renewed and adapted her internal life of worship and of sanctification in the Constitution on the liturgy, the first practical fruits of the Council. At the same time the Council began to take the daily directions of the Church from the hands of jurists and functionaries and to place it in the hands of pastors awake to the needs of their time. The conciliar commission set up to work out the practical application of the constitution on the liturgy was composed of residential bishops from all over the world, a practical example of episcopal collegiality in fact, and a sign of what is to come, and to be normal in the future of the Church.

The Council is sometimes seen as a body set up to promote renewal and reform in the Church. It is far more than that. It is the Church herself, in her divinely appointed leaders, in the process of renewing and reforming herself. It is the work of the divine Spirit acting within the Church to draw its members to greater likeness to their Head and to draw the attention of men to the Mystical Body of Christ. Once the Council had become a truly Catholic one the Church could, in the decisive second session, define herself as a sacrament, the efficacious sign of God to the world; her external form could more easily be seen as having value primarily as a sign and means by which the Holy Spirit acts in the world, so that her visible structure could be fully referred to the invisible reality of Christ.

In his discourse to the Fathers at the opening of the third session Pope Paul summed up the theme of this Council saying: " The hour has come when the Church must present herself, saying what Christ thinks and wishes her to be. . . . The Church must define herself, and draw from the consciousness which she has of herself the teaching which the Holy Spirit

makes known to her." And the burden of his first encyclical, *Ecclesiam Suam,* is that the Church is now more conscious of herself as the Body of Christ and of her role as mediating between Christ and men, totally belonging to Christ, totally at the service of men. This entails a new atmosphere and new attitudes in the Church, above all a less defensive and polemical attitude towards other Christian Churches, a readiness to acknowledge the divine elements retained in other communions and to enter into dialogue aiming at unity. For many commentators, the Council, in the first two sessions, brought the period of the Counter-Reformation to an end, and in the third session passed to the period of ecumenism, of dialogue with others. The Pope's encyclical contains a solemn declaration of this sincere desire for such dialogue and of a willingness to plan for it.

Many circumstances have combined to make possible this transformation in outlook and attitude within the Church. The renewal of liturgical life and of theological thought as well as of biblical studies was accompanied by the first sporadic but practical steps towards Christian unity, helped by the example of non-Catholic Christians in their efforts for greater unity among themselves. In the light of what is happening in the Christian Churches one may discern one reason at least why divine Providence should allow the growth and world-expansion of atheistic Communism. The presence of this common threat to Christian values, no less than the religious indifference which is so common to-day, makes the need of Christian unity ever more urgent. Under Communist, as under Nazi, persecution Catholic and Protestant and Jew suffered together; such unity, sealed by blood, could not be forgotten, nor could such sacrifice be without effect. As the Church enters into closer relations with other religious bodies, and thinks of those who have been won over to Communism or are hostile to religion, she has to examine the manner of her presence in the world to-day and study the forces that mould men's thinking and influence their choice.

Such a profound transformation could not be expected to take place in the Church without stress and strain on the part of the human elements that give her visible and historical reality. Each session so far has had its moment or moments of tension, its dramatic high-lights. One is tempted to see the Council, from the human view-point, as a symphony in four movements all based on the contrast between two main themes. In the first, the themes are stated, and reach their highest contrast in the debate on the sources of revelation, a contrast solved by Pope John's decision on Nov. 21st., 1962 to send the schema back for revision by a mixed commission. When the contrast showed itself once more in the second session, the vote on episcopal collegiality and the diaconate (Oct. 30th., 1963) showed that henceforth it was a question of majority versus minority; one theme in the symphony begins to assert itself as against the other. The minor theme remains vocal in the third session, and leads to still another dramatic confrontation in mid-October on the question of religious freedom and the declaration on the Jews; the echoes of this clash are heard again as the session draws to a close, and a minority prevents a vote being taken on the question of religious freedom. The major theme is, however, firmly in the ascendant and will impress itself on the final movement as the whole work draws to a peaceful close.

These high-lights are a good index to the change that has been brought about in the Church by the Council, and to the progress of the Council. In her effort at self-renewal, the Church had to return to her sources, the sources of the divine truth which she must preach and of her life of grace and love in the liturgy. She could then begin her meditation on herself, in the light of what Christ wants her to be, and with new vigour for the task of expressing the life of Christ more fully in herself define her essential structure more clearly than before. Having attained this more complete self-consciousness, she could then, in the third session, turn her attention towards other Christians and to the world, and prepare for the more

practical reforms in her members that will allow them to take part more fully in her mission.

The Church

The most important fruit of the third session is without doubt the constitution on the Church. Since its introduction towards the end of the first session, the text has undergone so much revision as to be a new and newly ordered document. This revision was begun in the first intersession, in the light of the interventions made in Council and of written ones later sent in. The revised text was debated from the opening of the second session until the end of October, when the guiding-vote on the famous five points (collegiality and the diaconate) was taken; on the previous day (Oct. 29) the Fathers had decided by a slender majority to include the schema on Our Lady as the last chapter of the document on the Church. The text was again revised by the theological commission between the second and third sessions, and another chapter (the 7th.) added dealing with the Church as tending to its final state in Heaven.

The third session began its debates with this chapter and the final one, on Our Lady (Sept. 15-18). One of the striking features of this session was the procedure, adopted in order to hasten the work of the Council, of voting on texts that had been previously debated and revised, while debates on other subjects were going on. This subjected the bishops to very heavy pressure of work, but it enabled them to get through an enormous amount of material in little over two months, in 48 General Congregations and about 150 hours of debate. In this period there were 659 oral interventions, and 1586 written ones, dealing with the 15 themes proposed for discussion and explained to the Fathers in 54 expositions (relations); apart from the standing votes, to decide when a theme had been sufficiently debated, there were 148 votes taken on individual sections or chapters and on texts as a whole. It was also far more common in this session for bishops to speak not

just in their own name but on behalf of many others, a procedure that could become normal only as a result of experience and methods of organization learned during the preceding sessions, and that considerably speeded up the pace of the Council.

One feature, adopted to quicken the tempo of the Council, did not find favour with all the bishops. When a text, revised in the light of a debate, was being voted on part by part, and chapter by chapter, the only votes allowed were those in favour or those against the text. When the schema as a whole was being voted, before it went to the public sessions presided over by the Pope, the bishops could also vote with modifications; but these suggestions, which sometimes were quite a large number, were not considered by the competent commission. For instance, after the various " modi " in the decree on Ecumenism had been voted, the text came back to the bishops, for definite approval, with a significant change in regard to *communicatio in sacris* which was evidently inspired by a similar passage in the Decree on Catholic Eastern Churches. This change could be interpreted as favouring the opinion of those who regard the Anglican Church as on an equal footing with the Russian and Oriental Churches since so large a number of Anglican ministers, and perhaps bishops, have secured valid Orders. (The second last Lambeth Conference announced that a complete fusion had been effected with the Old Catholic Church of Holland) . The 300 or so *modi* sent in, dealing with this change, were rejected by the Commission, on the grounds that substractions could not be made from a text that had already been approved.

The various chapters of the text on the Church were voted on from Sept. 17th. onwards. The controversial points of chap. 3 (on the Hierarchy, the relations of the episcopate to the Pope, and the diaconate) were voted on individually from Sept. 21-29, with the power to ask for modifications of the text. The other chapters were approved without difficulty; but great anxiety was felt as the controversial third chapter, with

its amendments, had not been placed before the Fathers for their final vote with only one week left for the session to close. Fears that it might not meet with Papal approval were dispelled when the text was given to the bishops on Nov. 14th. and voted on on the 17th. While distributing this text, the Council Secretary reminded the Fathers of the declaration made by the theological commission on March 6, 1964, to the effect that only those matters are to be regarded as defined by the Council as of faith and morals which are expressly declared to be such. He added that the explicative note added to the text by the theological commission was to be regarded as part of the Acts of the Council. On Nov. 19th. the complete text was approved by vote; and after the final vote (with only five dissentients) at the public session on Nov. the constitution on the Church was promulgated by the Pope.

Since the dogmatic constitution on the Church is the centre and climax of the whole Council, that to or from which all the other texts lead, the Council, by promulgating it, has substantially completed its work. It has, in the words of Pope Paul at the close of the third session," brought the doctrinal work of the First Vatican Council to completion; it has explored the mystery of the Church, and outlined the divine plan of its basic structure." It sees the Church " as being in Christ the sacrament, that is the sign and instrument, of the intimate union with God and of the unity of the whole human race " (text., par. I). It sees all the faithful first of all in their fundamental state and in their equality as members of the holy people of God, so that the Church should not be seen primarily as composed of groups with different functions and powers, but as a community of persons bound together in Christ by baptism, by faith and love. The divinely instituted powers and degrees in the Church can then be seen as destined for the service of the Church and of all men, as Christ himself said that he came not to be served but to serve.

This Council notably completes the previous Vatican Council by its treatment of the episcopacy in itself and in its rela-

tion to the Pope. It was the right time to do so, as Pope Paul said in his concluding address, since theologians had given much thought to the subject, and the bishops were anxious to have their status clearly defined. The spread of the Church throughout the world, and the problems met with in the daily government of the Church, called for such a declaration. The teaching set forth in the text, continued the Pope, is not new. "That which until now was lived is now expressed; that which was uncertain is now made clear; that which was meditated, discussed, and to some extent controversial, attains now a peaceful formulation." The bishops are not just vicars or delegates of the Pope; as consecrated to the fullness of the priesthood by the integral sacrament of Orders, they are placed by the Holy Spirit to rule the Church of God. As united among themselves with and under the Pope they constitute a college in succession to the college of the Apostles with full and supreme power over the universal Church, by the will of the divine Founder of the Church. [1]

[1] According to the famous explanatory note referred to above, in the light of which the teaching in this chapter of the text is to be understood, (i.) the word *college* is not to be taken in a juridical sense. It signifies that the episcopate is a permanent body in which the relation between bishops and Pope is similar to, but not identical with, that which existed between the Apostles and Peter. (ii.) Membership of this college is acquired by episcopal consecration and hierarchical communion with its head, the Pope, and its members. Such consecration places the recipient in the radical state of being able to share in the government of the Church; but the actual exercise of that power depends on the juridical assignment of an office or subjects by which hierarchical communion is effectively realized. (iii.) The episcopal college has full and supreme power over the whole Church only in so far as the college includes its head who, at his discretion, determines the manner in which that power is exercised. (iv.) The college acts fully as a college only at intervals, and only with the consent of its head, and never without that consent.

The question of the validity and liceity of the exercise of episcopal authority by Orientals separated from Rome is left open to theological discussion.

This note does not, even as a foot-note, form part of the text voted on by the bishops, and approved and promulgated by the Pope. It is, however, included in the Acts of the Council; and the Pope referred to it while approving the constitution on the Church. The dogmatic value of this note will certainly be the object of much discussion. It can at any rate be regarded as an instrument of theological research, and its usefulness will be measured by the way it aids the theologian to clarify the teaching set out in the text.

Pope Paul expressed his joy at being able to approve this text that so honours his brethren in the episcopate. Rather than fear any lessening of his own divinely given authority he felt that through it his power to rule the Church would be strengthened by this closer union with the world-episcopate. The application of the conciliar decrees, he said, would require the establishment of commissions in which the collaboration of the episcopate would be indispensable. The liturgical commission, already set up and active, with powers formerly entrusted only to the Congregation of Rites, sets a head-line for such future commissions where residential bishops rather than officials of the Curia will guide the process of *aggiornamento.* The many problems set for the Church by the world to-day, continued the Pope, make it advisable for him to convoke and consult aptly designated members of the episcopate from time to time in order to benefit by their counsel and experience and to have the support of their authority. The bishops will be asked to take part not only in the post-conciliar commissions, but also in the various organs of the Roman Curia, whose reform is at present being studied by a special commission. The Pope did not refer expressly to the episcopal senate which so many wished to see established. The prudent way in which he has acted up to now suggests that he may gradually work towards setting up some such body, perhaps as growing out of the various post-conciliar commissions and on the analogy of the present co-ordinating commission of the Council. At the end of chapter *3* the restoration of the diaconate as a permanent and separate ministry in the Latin Church is envisaged. Deacons, as belonging to the hierarchy, may, when duly authorised, administer solemn baptism, communicate the faithful and bless their marriages, give Viaticum to the sick, preside at meetings of the faithful and read the sacred scriptures to them, bestow the sacramentals, and officiate at funerals and burials. They may also be given charge of works of temporal administration and of charity. They can thus, especially where there are few or no priests, be of very

great service to the community. If the local episcopal conference finds it fitting and necessary, the diaconate may, with the approval of the Pope, be restored in that region, and conferred on married men of mature age. If young men are ordained deacons they will be bound by the law of celibacy.

The fourth chapter, on the place of the laity in the Church, had been fully debated in the second session, and had been amended in view of that debate. It provides an outline for a full theology of the laity, a new and most significant phase in the Church's renewed meditation on herself, and it meets the growing demand of the lay members of the Church for a more explicit and positive recognition of their place and role in the plan of salvation and in the activity of the Church. It was fitting that at this session not only male members of the laity (raised from IS to 21) were present, but also, for the first time in conciliar history, women, to the number of thirteen, including both Religious and unmarried seculars. Perhaps the next and final session will see a married pair added to the lay auditors, to symbolize the presence of the Church to men in every state of life.

The nature of the Church is largely determined by the ends which, in God's plan, it pursues, and which are summed up as the sanctification of its members on earth so that they may join the blessed in Heaven. The relation between the general call to holiness and the more specific one to the state of evangelical perfection is clarified in chapters five and six, while the final state of the Church as gathered in glory around its Head in Heaven is described in chapter seven. The final chapter treats of Our Lady in the mystery of Christ and the Church in a way that does justice to her sublime prerogatives and at the same time warns against such excesses as marr popular devotion to Mary in certain countries. The most controverted points in this text concerned certain titles commonly given to Our Lady, and principally those of "Mediatrix" and" Mother of the Church." The text retains the title " Mediatrix," not as strictly theological, but as one of the many titles given to

her by popular devotion, but does not salute Mary as Mother of the Church. At the end of the third session Pope Paul put an end to this controversy by solemnly proclaiming Mary as Mother of the Church, a title which admirably sums up the eminent and unique place which she holds in the plan of salvation and in the Church.

Explaining why he chose this moment to bestow such a title on Our Lady, Pope Paul recalled that the central theme of this Council is that of the Church. " The reality of the Church," he continued, " is not confined only to its hierarchical structure, its liturgy, its sacraments, its juridical enactments. Its inner nature, and the primal source of its sanctifying power, are to be found in its mystical union with Christ. We cannot think of such a union apart from her who is the Mother of the Incarnate Word, and whom Jesus Christ himself wished to be so intimately united to Himself for our salvation. Hence it is within the vision of the Church that we must set the loving contemplation of the marvels which God worked in His holy Mother. And the knowledge of the true Catholic teaching on Mary will always be a key to the exact understanding of the mystery of Christ and of the Church."

Divine Revelation

The deeper self-awareness which the Church has gained is based on a renewed study of divine truth as made known to us by Revelation. The controversial text dealing with the sources of Revelation was the occasion for the council in its first session to assert its pastoral end ecumenical character and to sanction newer trends in biblical scholarship and in theology. This matter was not touched on in the second session. A revised version of the text, one that met with general approval, was debated in the third session from Sept. 30 to Oct. 6.

The new text deals with the role of Sacred Scripture and Tradition in allowing man to know and encounter God. It sees Revelation as more than the communication of abstract truths since it includes also God's actions and words, and is

summed up in the Person of Christ. Faith implies not only intellectual assent to revealed truth but a vital encounter with Christ made present in the Church to all men. Divine truth is not just a static collection of set formulae; it is also a personal communication which the Divine Spirit aids the faithful to grasp and the Church to penetrate more deeply. The text is important not only for the faithful, but also for those outside the Church, insofar as it explains why the Church holds her beliefs, and how she knows that God has indeed revealed Himself to men. It encourages biblical scholars to make prudent use of modern means of research, and appeals to the faithful to nourish their piety and further their doctrinal formation by recourse to the Bible.

The text does not define the relation between Sacred Scripture and Tradition, since theologians are still not agreed on this question. In their criticism of Protestant views which regarded Scripture as the sole rule of faith Catholic theologians had generally tended to insist that Tradition is a distinct and independent means of knowing divine truth, and that some truths are learned from it that are not expressed in the Scriptures. The written word always has need of an interpreter, and the living authority of the teaching Church is both the judge of the meaning of the inspired writings and is by itself a sufficient rule of faith.

The more general tendency now is to see Tradition not so much as a distinct source of revealed truth but as the interpreter of Scripture, and to regard both Scripture and Tradition as united and active within the one life of the Church in her temporal continuity. Revelation is considered, not as a book or a tribunal, but as God's living word as He now speaks by the Church to His people, as a revealing that is active and present to all times and places by means of the Church as she meditates on the Scriptures and explains them to her children. God is the one source of revelation; and the Scriptures, as interpreted by Tradition, contain, at least implicitly, all that He has revealed.

By adopting a non-committal formulation the Council leaves this point open for theological discussion. This policy of compromise has been greeted with satisfaction by many of the more progressive theologians; it does at least mean that the Council has not rejected their views. But it is possible that the more conservative thinkers may be equally happy, and not just because the Council did not accept the view which they oppose, but because the way is left open for a decision to be made later on, for instance by the Holy Office, or for reprobation of theories that may be considered extreme.

Many bishops moreover feel that a non-committal policy is not what one would expect from a General Council, even if its aims are primarily pastoral, and that the desire not to offend those outside the Church should not lead the Council to vagueness especially on matters that have immediate practical bearings. On the question, for instance, of the relation of non-Catholics to the one true Church of Christ, the teaching of Pius XII-that only those who are members of the Catholic Church are members of the Mystical Body-is not mentioned, and the doctrine is so phrased that an answer to the question, e. g., "Are the Anglicans members of the one true Church? " is left more uncertain than before. When the practical consequences of this ecumenical attitude are raised, as with regard to inter-confessional acts, such as taking part in non-Catholic services, or allowing non-Catholics to hold services in Catholic Churches, it will not be any easier to come to a decision. At any rate, some uncertainty is an invitation to the theologians to busy themselves with the problems involved; and the post-conciliar commissions and the new code of Canon Law will issue practical directives.

Ecumenism

In a lecture at the Greek College, Rome, on the significance of the Decree on Ecumenism for the dialogue with the Orthodox Churches, Cardinal Lercaro said he was convinced that this Decree and the Constitutions on the Sacred Liturgy and on the

Church constitute an indivisible trilogy since they touch what is deepest in the theology of the Church, and that they form the very heart of the Council willed by Pope John. This decree defines the Catholic attitude towards the ecumenical movement and establishes the principles which must guide Catholic effort in favour of the restoration of Christian unity which, from the beginning, has been one of the principal aims of the Council. If Christ has destined His Church for all men, a renewed self-consciousness must lead the Church to meditate on her relations with men, and especially with those who profess the name and faith and share the sacraments of Christ.

Towards the end of the first session, the original draft on this subject was sent back for revision. The revised text was thoroughly debated at the second session, from Nov. 18 to Dec. 2, and the text was altered in the light of that debate. It was presented at the third session for voting, without debate, but with the power to suggest modification, from Oct. 5 to 8; the individual chapters were voted on from Nov. 11-14, and the text as a whole was passed on Nov. 20. The next day it was approved in public session, with 11 dissentients, and promulgated by the Pope.[2]

This conciliar document is not a dogmatic constitution, but takes the form of a decree since it has immediate practical and pastoral implications. It does, however, present us with a theology of Church unity and the doctrinal basis of Christian dialogue. From this point of view, the decree is best seen as a prolongation of the text on the Church since it recalls some of its main ideas to serve as directives for action in search of Christian unity.

[2] The bishops found that the text presented to them for final approval at the end of the session had, in nineteen places, been re-touched in accordance with "benevolent suggestions authoritatively expressed," as Monsignor Felici put it. Some of these changes were merely formal. Others, where the reference is to non-Catholics, modify the meaning, as when " the disciples of the Lord " is changed to " those who profess to be disciples of the Lord "; or when " under the action of the Holy Spirit, in the Scriptures they find God who speaks to them in Christ," is changed to " invoking the Holy Spirit they seek God who as it were speaks to them in Christ." These changes were not voted on in themselves; to vote against them would, at this stage, have been to reject the entire text.

Although this text is intended primarily for those who believe in Christ, it is not without significance for mankind in general. The divisions between men and nations are largely based on religious grounds. The example of the Council in seeking to restore unity among Christians and to establish relations with other religions cannot but be effective and contagious and a potent force in promoting world-unity. Every attempt to achieve Christian unity will at the same time help to remove the scandal to the world of the divided if not opposed Christian Churches and serve to draw the attention of men to the true Church of Christ. Disunion, no less than the faults of her members, hides from men the true face of the Bride of Christ. Perhaps the gravest fault of Christians has been precisely that they destroyed the unity which Christ willed to be one of the fundamental marks of His Church. Catholics are not altogether without blame in this respect. And the Church, in her deep and humble meditation on herself, does not hesitate to make this confession, and to ask pardon of past injuries from God and her separated brethren (Text, pars. 3 and 7) . It is this aspect of the Church in her human members, as penitent, that may finally overcome the prejudice of many separated from her, and to whom an unwillingness to admit defects or injustices in the past could only seem at variance with the truth and humility of the genuine Church of Christ.

The first chapter, on the Catholic principles of Ecumenism, teaches that the complete unity willed by Christ, and the fullness of His revealed truth and of the means of salvation instituted by Him, are found only in the Catholic Church. It explains the various ways in which the separate Churches and communities are related to the one Church of Christ, and singles out the divine elements found in them. In regard to ecumenical activity, to which the second chapter is dedicated, the Council urges Catholics to adopt a charitable and positive approach to their separated brethren, and to consider rather what they hold in common than what keeps them divided. They should try to understand the mentality and attitudes of

other Christians, and recognise what is true and divine in their beliefs, and be ready to join with them in the common defense of Christian values and in charitable activities. The bishops are asked to encourage and direct participation by the faithful in ecumenical activity. Directly ecumenical dialogue, however, should be engaged in only by qualified persons, especially by adequately prepared theologians, and in ways approved by the local bishop or episcopal conference.

Evidence of the way in which a more truly Catholic consciousness has spread in the Church is provided by sections of this text which draw a distinction between unity and uniformity (pars. 4 and 16). Within the one Church due freedom must be allowed for variety in forms of the spiritual life, of liturgical worship, and of the theological explanation of divine truth. This is particularly stressed in the section of the third chapter dealing with the Orthodox Churches. Unity is preserved in the Orthodox East by fraternal communion between local groupings of sister Churches, usually around a patriarchal See. Within each group there is a distinct and living tradition, expressed in its own proper discipline, liturgy, spirituality and theology. The Orientals have always feared that union with Rome, after agreement had been reached on matters of divine faith, would imply the destruction of these venerable traditions and practices and the imposition of ways of thought and worship that are foreign to them. Reason for such fears has often been afforded by those Latins who regard the Eastern Churches as quaint and almost archaeological relics of the past, or at best as picturesque appendages that are barely tolerated by the Church. This text assures the Eastern Christians that the Catholic Church not only allows but welcomes variety within the limits of the one true faith, and regards it as a sign of the universality of the Church destined by Christ for all nations and all cultures. Such diversity is not an obstacle to unity, but rather enhances its beauty. [3]

[3] At the Solemn Liturgy in the Siro-Malancarese Rite during the Eucharistic Congress in Bombay on Dec. 4th. Pope Paul referred to this theme: " The

On the practical level, since the Orthodox Churches have preserved the Mass and the Sacraments, Catholics are allowed by the text to join in prayers with these separated brethren, especially when they are offered for the unity of the Church. Participation in their religious services, insofar as this would be taken to signify membership of their Church, remains unlawful; insofar as it signifies use of the means of grace left to us by Christ, it may be not only lawful but desirable, especially where refusal to take part would be a cause of scandal to others. Such sharing in the worship of God, if it is to be truly ecumenical, should be done with the consent of both churches, and with the approval of the bishops concerned.

The section of the third chapter dealing with the Churches and Communities of the Reform recognises that unity, though ardently desired, is an ideal that still seems far from realization, and it confines itself to indicating the mentality with which Catholics should approach this task, and such preparatory steps as careful study by priests and theologians of Protestant teachings, and meetings of experts with representatives of the separated Churches under the supervision of the local bishop. Many of the observers present at the Council have expressed their satisfaction with this text, especially as evidence of a more positive and constructive approach to the problem of unity. Oscar Cullmann, one of the leading Protestant theologians among the observers, wrote, in the *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* of Nov. 5, that the Council has opened the door to real dialogue, and contributes much towards the restoration of unity by its teaching on the collegiality of the bishops,

plurality of these traditions is a living witness to the Catholicity of the Church, which is at the same time for all men, embracing all cultures, and also can express in a particular way the truth and beauty which exist in each culture." He then quoted from the second chapter of the Constitution on the Church: " The Church fosters and takes to itself, in so far as they are good, the ability, riches and customs in which the genius of each people expresses itself. Taking them to itself, it purifies, strengthens, elevates and consecrates them," and continued: " Perhaps in the past, the idea of legitimate plurality joined 'with mutual cooperation may have been obscured at times. But today there must be a new dedication to this idea."

by its dynamic theology of the Church, by the restoration of the Diaconate, by its formulation of mariological teaching, and by its treatment of Revelation and of Ecumenism. And Cardinal Bea, receiving the observers on Oct. 27, could thank them for their presence at the Council, and not only for their prayers and suggestions which had been so helpful, but for the fact of their presence which was a concrete reminder to the bishops of the urgency of the problem of unity and of the ecumenical aims of the Council.

The Catholic Oriental Churches

The text of the Decree on the Eastern Churches in communion with Rome was debated from Oct. 15 to Oct. 19 and was the occasion of some notable and courageous interventions in favour of a sincere and profound respect for these Churches and in condemnation of ill-judged and harmful efforts in the past to latinize them. It is such actions, declared Monsignor Slipyi, that make the Orthodox believe that union with Rome is but a bridge over which one passes to fall into the Latin sea. The first votings (Oct. 20-22) resulted in many modifications being proposed, which was only to be expected since the decree is intended to be temporary, to remain in force only until more perfect unity with the Orthodox Churches has been secured. Although it concerns Catholics of Eastern Rite, its aim is to prepare the way for unity with Oriental non-Catholic Churches by removing some obstacles and allowing some forms of intercommunion. The final vote on the text as a whole was taken on Nov. 20, and on the 21st the vote in public session revealed that 39 bishops were still dissatisfied with the text. It may be for this reason that the Pope, in promulgating the Decree, decided that it will not come into force until January 21, and granted the Patriarchs the faculty of anticipating or of extending the end of this time limit.

The Decree opens with a declaration that the Church honours and respects the customs, rites, ecclesiastical traditions and discipline that are proper to the Oriental Churches as part of

the common heritage of the one true Church. Such variety does not harm but rather affirms the unity of the Church. The ancient rites and customs, and the internal discipline, of those Churches must be preserved. If adaptation to modern needs is required, this must be seen to by the Churches concerned and especially by the Patriarchs, whose special rights and privileges are confirmed by this Council.

Most of the Decree is taken up with practical ways in which inter-communion may be practised in territories where Catholics of Latin and of Eastern rites, or where Catholics and Orthodox, live together. Since simple priests may, in the Oriental tradition, be ministers of the Sacrament of Confirmation, Catholic priests of Oriental rite are empowered by the Decree to confirm faithful of the Latin rite. The obligation to assist at Mass on Sundays and Feast Days may be fulfilled on the previous evening, after the time of Vespers. The faithful may go to confession to any Catholic priest with the necessary faculties whatever his rite. The marriage of a Catholic with an Orthodox in the presence of an Orthodox priest is declared to be valid, and a Sacrament, although unlawful.

Oriental Catholics are reminded of their special duty to work towards the unity of their Church and the Orthodox ones. In order to foster such unity certain forms of inter-communion are allowed which do not endanger the unity of the Church or the faith of those taking part, and which do not entail profession of error or indifferentism or give rise to scandal. The Sacraments of Penance, the Eucharist, and the Annointing of the Sick may be administered to Orthodox Christians in good faith who freely ask for them, for the good of souls may often demand this. Catholics may receive the same Sacraments from validly ordained Orthodox ministers where recourse to a Catholic priest is difficult. Permission is also granted to Catholics to take part, for a sufficient reason, in the sacred functions of the Orthodox Church; the same permission is extended to Orthodox believers in regard to Catholic services.

These concessions are made by the Church on its own initia-

tive, and they are unilateral. This is about as far as the Church can go without entering into some kind of formal agreement with the Orthodox Churches and without the risk of being accused of proselytism. Unity can probably be restored as much if not more by the gradual extension of such forms of practical collaboration in Christian living as by meetings of theologians and of representatives from the separated Churches.

What effects the texts so far promulgated by the Council may have outside the Catholic Church depends as much on those whom she wishes to engage in dialogue as on her own members. We will not have to wait long for their effects within the Church. The liturgical reform is already under way and will be most efficacious in diffusing the new self-consciousness of the Church among the faithful. The number of commentaries on the Constitution on the Liturgy that have already appeared make it clear that we can expect a very vigorous development in the realms of theological thought and of biblical scholarship, especially in regard to the nature of the Church and to the relation between Sacred Scripture and Revelation. The renewal that is now taking place in moral theology will be paralleled by similar trends in other areas of theological science where abstract procedures and mentalities will be complemented by a more personalist approach. Whole sections of theology have still to be cultivated or revised in the light of new problems and of the advances made by secular science: the theology of the apostolate, of work, of marriage, of the missions, of the lay state and spirituality, to mention only a few. It is the patient, often thankless if not actually hampered, work of genuine and dedicated theologians that has, to a great extent, been responsible for the growth in self-knowledge which the Church has made in the Council. The Council will, in turn, stimulate the progress and perfecting of theology, all the more that the bishops have now been confronted with the problems of the universal Church and made familiar with the work and tendencies of theologians to-day.

Pastoral Themes

Once the main lines of the theological exposition of the nature and prayer of the Church and of her relations to other Christian bodies had been determined, the Council could turn its attention to the reform and adaptation of the internal structure of the Church and to the renewal of the spiritual life of her members. Such pastoral themes alone would have been sufficient reason for convoking a General Council; the internal reform of the Church was the object of several previous Councils. The Second Vatican Council will be a land-mark in the history of the Church for many reasons, not the least being that it approached the subject of internal renewal from within the wider context of mature theological reflection on the nature of the Church and of a general liturgical revival.

The purely pastoral texts are brief. The major documents of the Council have placed the conditions that make real reform possible, having indicated the general principles that must guide and inspire all the activity of reform and adaptation. With the texts that remain to be considered in the last phase of the Council the work of internal reform in the main practical spheres is set in motion, and will be continued through the post-conciliar commissions which will have more time and experience to propose more detailed legislation.

Discussion on one of these pastoral texts, that on the pastoral duties of bishops, had started in the second session. The parts that had not been debated, including the original schema on the care of souls which is now incorporated into this text, came before the Council from Sept. to When votes were later taken (Nov. 4 and 6) so many modifications were proposed that the text had to be sent back for revision. The amended text was ready at the end of the session, but there was not enough time to vote on it. Moreover, since this text depends so much on the one on the Church it could not be passed until that one had been approved.

The three chapters of this schema deal with the relations of the bishops to the universal Church, to their own dioceses,

and of dioceses among themselves. The first chapter is notable for the section on the relations between the bishops and the Roman Curia. It affirms the desire of the bishops to take a more immediate part in the government of the whole Church in ways to be determined by the Pope, perhaps through some form of central council. It touches on the problem of the reform of the Curia and suggests that bishops from all over the world should be consulted on decisions of policy and on judgments on authors. The text also denies the right of the State, still claimed in some countries, to interfere in the nomination of bishops. In the second chapter it recommends that old or ailing bishops should freely resign from their Sees, and it suppresses the right formerly enjoyed by pastors not to be removed from their parish or relieved of their pastoral charge. In this chapter a brief section is devoted to the relations between the local bishop and the exempt Religious of his diocese, granting greater episcopal control over the works of the apostolate in his territory. Detailed directives on this and other such practical problems are left to the consideration of the Commission for the revision of the Code of Canon Law.

One of the measures taken by the Co-ordinating Commission to speed up the work of the Council was to order that several texts prepared in the form of full schemata should be reduced to a short series of propositions; the original texts would be used by the post-conciliar commissions. This measure was not quite successful since the majority of the bishops wanted, in some of these matters, a thorough examination of the questions that face the Church in her effort to adapt herself to actual conditions, and pressed for a full text that would do justice to the theme considered. For these reasons the shortened texts on priestly life and ministry, and on the missionary activity of the Church, were sent back for more detailed treatment. It was unfortunate that this last document should have been judged inacceptable just after Pope Paul, who assisted at a conciliar Mass during the debate on the missions to show how much importance he attached to them, had recom-

mended the Fathers to accept the text. Seemingly he had been advised that the bishops would certainly accept the text in its reduced form. This incident did at least serve to emphasize the freedom of the Council debates and votings.

The beginning of the debate on priestly life and ministry (Oct. 13 to 15) was notable for the fact that for the first time a group of parish priests (35 in all) attended the General Congregation. They continued to attend until the end of the session, and sent their observations on the texts to the competent commissions through Monsignor Veuillot. One of their number, Don Marcos of Madrid, addressed the Council and voiced some of the desires and hopes of the parish clergy whom he represented. On the morning of Oct. 28 Mass was concelebrated by the Secretary General, Mgr. Felici, and twelve of the parish priests.

Three other pastoral texts were debated from the lOth to the 19th of November, those on the renewal and adaptation of the religious life, on the training of priests, and on Christian education. Some of the propositions of the first of these texts did not obtain the necessary two-thirds of the votes cast, and will have to be revised. Since voting on the major texts to be promulgated at the end of the session was going on during these days, the debates were hurried, but sufficient material was provided to ensure that the texts could be presented in a more perfect form at the next session. It is a pity that these important texts should have been shortened in an attempt to end the Council at its third session, and even more so that the debates on such vital matters could not be carried on with the leisure and attention which they deserve. The text on Christian education was voted on as soon as its debate was finished, on the 19th and 20th; the changes suggested will have to be considered before the final text can be presented for approval at the next session. The text on seminaries and priestly training has won general praise and it may lead to significant changes in a system that dates back to the Council of Trent, especially in that it gives Episcopal Conferences the

power to adapt the methods of formation according to local needs and traditions.

The last document set before the Council deals with the Sacrament of Marriage. It is neither a dogmatic constitution nor a decree, but what is technically called a *Votum,* and is a series of practical and juridical recommendations concerning such questions as mixed marriages, impediments, and the legal form of the marriage contract. A vote was taken at the last General Congregation (Nov. 20) on the proposal to refer the questions raised by this text to the personal decision of the Pope, perhaps with the hope that changes in the existing legislation concerning marriage could be made without having to wait for the next session. The proposal was carried, by 1592 as against 427 votes, with the result that this text will not come before the Council again. The Pope, it may be remembered, has also reserved to himself the right to decide on the lawfulness of new methods of contraception.

The fourth chapter of the Constitution on the Church deals with the place of the laity in the Church. It is the first time that a General Council has treated expressly of this subject. For the first time also the kindred theme of the apostolate of the laity has been debated in a General Council in an attempt to draw out some of the practical consequences of the Church's meditation upon herself as the People of God and as the Mystical Body of Christ. The text on this subject had been presented at the last General Congregation of the second Session. It was debated during the third Session from the 7th to the 13th of October, a debate that summed up the practical experience of bishops in dealing with their people, and that did justice to the aspirations of lay-folk throughout the world.

It was fitting that lay people, men and women, should have been present in the Council for this period, and that they could voice their sentiments through addresses made on their behalf to the Fathers by Pat Keegan, James Norris and Juan Vasquez. One of the most significant moments of the Public Session which closed the third phase of the Council was that of the

Communion during the Mass which the Pope concelebrated with twenty-four of the bishops. The Auditors approached the Papal altar from the Tribune of St. Andrew to receive the Sacrament from the hands of the Vicar of Christ. This union between the head and members of the Church on earth, at the moment of receiving the Body of Christ, symbolized most aptly the spiritual unity of the members of the Mystical Body of Christ with their Head, and pointed to what is both the source and the goal of all the apostolic activity of the Church on earth, viz, sacramental oneness with Christ.

The Non-Christian Religions

When the bishops re-assemble for the fourth and last session of the Council, which should not be a long one, the text on the Apostolate of the Laity will be voted on without debate. So too will the schema on Divine Revelation, although suggestions for improvement of the text and of those dealing with priestly life and ministry, relations with non-Christian religions, and religious freedom may be sent in until January 31st. There will be votings on the modifications that have been already proposed in Council on the schemata that treat of the pastoral duties of bishops, the re-adaptation of Religious Life, the training of priests, and the relation of the Church to non-Christian religions. Short debates will take place on the texts concerning the Church in the world to-day, religious freedom, the missionary activity of the Church, and priestly life and ministry.

If the attention of Christians separated from the Catholic Church was especially focussed on the third session, and particularly on the Decree on Ecumenism, it is in the final session that the world in general may be expected to show most interest. However important in themselves and for the internal life of the Church the other texts to be promulgated may be, they will be overshadowed, for most people at least, by those in which the Church defines her attitude to the world to-day, to the great non-Christian religions, and to the thorny question of religious freedom.

It was at the personal request of Pope John that Cardinal Bea, and his Secretariate for Christian Unity prepared a declaration on the Jews, not only to stress the special relation between the Church and the people and religion of the Old Law, but also to deny one of the motives most invoked in anti-Semitic movements, the charge levelled against the Jewish people of collective deicide. The text prepared by the Secretariate was introduced at the second session as a declaration attached to the Decree on Ecumenism. It was not discussed except in the general debate on Eumenism. The text was revised in the inter-session, and discussed during the third session on Sept. and 30th. The revised version, probably due to pressure brought to bear on the Vatican by the Arab States, did not refer to this charge of deicide, and seemed to many of the bishops, and to the Jews, to extend an invitation to the Jews to join the Church by an act that could only be interpreted by believing Jews as national apostasy.

One of the uneasy moments of the third session followed on the report that Cardinal Bea had been informed on Oct. 9th by the Secretary General, acting on instructions received " from higher authority," that the text on the Jews was to be annexed to the Constitution on the Church, and would therefore come under the competence of the Theological Commission as well as of the Secretariate for Christian Unity; and that the document on religious freedom would be revised by a commission of ten members, three from his Secretariate, three from the Theological Commission, and four nominated by the Pope. Three of these nominees would, it seemed, be Fathers known to be very critical of the declaration on religious freedom. This report moved sixteen Cardinals to send a letter of protest to the Pope on Oct. 11th, asking him to intervene to defend the rights of the Council. There was fear that a situation would develop that was similar to the clash between Council and Theological Commission on the subject of the collegiality of the bishops at the second session.

Tension was eased by the decision to leave these controverted

texts to the competence of the Secretariate for Unity which would submit them to the consultative vote of designated members of the Theological Commission, and to unite the declaration on the Jews to one on the non-Christian religions, as many bishops had requested during the debate, so as to form a document that could eventually be added as an appendix to the Constitution on the Church.

The text finally agreed on deals with the charge of deicide in order to refute it; and, on the subject of conversion, it says that "the Church awaits the day, known only to God, when all peoples with one voice will call on the Lord and serve Him in unison." It condemns all discrimination against persons by reason of their race or religion, and reminds men that God is the common Father of all. The first part of the Declaration treats of the non-Christian religions, with a paragraph devoted to Islam in particular since many of its basic doctrines agree with those of Christianity. Catholics are asked to study these religions, and to acknowledge the good and positive elements in them. That the Church is anxious to promote good relations with these religions is shown in a practical way by the Pope's establishment, last Pentecost, of an organism, under the presidency of Cardinal Marella, to study and to encourage contacts with the great and ancient religions of the East. The Declaration was voted on and passed at the General Congregation of Nov. 20th. This was not only the first time the present Council had voted on such a text, but the first time that any Council voted on this subject. Since the Fathers were allowed to suggest modifications to the text, these will have to be considered by the Secretariate for Unity before it presents the definitive text for voting in the next session.

Religious Freedom

As the bishops left the Council Hall after the last General Congregation of the second session, many of them openly voiced their disappointment that the text on religious freedom had not been accepted by vote at least as a sufficient basis for dis-

cussion. Their disappointment at the end of the third session was even greater. The text, revised in the inter-session, had been debated from the 23rd to the 25th of September, a debate which showed that there was strong opposition to, and even stronger support for, an open and sincere declaration in favour of freedom, both of individuals and of groups, in matters of conscience and religion, and an exposition of the doctrinal basis of such a right. The fears aroused by the October crisis already referred to were allayed when it became known that the Secretariate for Unity would remain responsible for the text but would seek the advice of the Theological Commission. The consultative vote of this Commission, on Nov. 9th, was favourable to the text, which was handed to the Secretary General on Nov. 11th. It was given to the bishops on the 17th, to be voted on by the 19th.

On the 18th, the Secretary General made it known that many bishops (the number is said to have been about 120, mostly Spanish and Italian) wanted the vote to be deferred as they had not enough time to reflect on the text which, by reason of the many changes made in it, could be regarded as a new text and which therefore, according to the rules of the Council, should first be debated before being submitted to vote. The Moderators and Presidency had decided therefore to leave it to the bishops to determine by vote on the next day whether the text should be debated again or voted on at once. On the 19th, when the bishops expected to vote on this issue, Cardinal Tisserant as head of the Presidency informed them that this guiding vote would not be taken since the rules of the Council indicated that there should be a debate if notable additions had been made to the text. Instead of the vote there would be an exposition of the text by Monsignor De Smet (whose address was greeted by the longest applause heard in the Council) , and the bishops would be allowed to send in their suggestions up to Jan. 21st. Immediately there was a move by several bishops to collect signatures to a letter asking the Pope to have the text voted on before the end of the session, and

about a thousand bishops favoured this course of action. The Pope, however, decided that the Council rule invoked did apply to this case, and that the text should therefore be debated as soon as possible in the final session.

Bearing in mind the extreme diversity of social and cultural conditions in different countries and peoples, the difference in formation and outlook of the bishops, and the difficulty of the problem itself, one is not too surprised that the text will be the object of further reflection and discussion. After all, the United Nations have already spent seven years in trying to draw up a charter on religious freedom. This is the first time that a General Council has had to consider and make a pronouncement on the subject of religious freedom. It is barely over two years since the Council first met, and this matter is one item on a huge agenda. Moreover Pope Paul is understandably anxious to secure acceptance for the conciliar texts that will be as nearly unanimous as possible. The wise and patient way in which he has done this so far, especially with regard to the Constitution on the Church, gives every reason to hope that there will be far greater agreement on the final text in the coming session than could have been attained in the previous one.

The obstacles to such unanimity are partly practical (such as the reluctance of bishops in Catholic countries to admit the right of other religious bodies to preach and practise what the Church must regard as false) and partly theoretical. It is only one hundred years since Pius IX issued the Syllabus which condemned the notion of freedom of religion and of conscience put forward by a rationalism that was hostile to religion. To many bishops the context in which this problem must be placed appears to be essentially the same as in the last century. What is objectively false cannot have any rights; those who know and possess the truth may at most, when the common good so requires, tolerate the permanence of error and of worship by those outside the Church.

The text, as it stands at present in its third version, traces

the evolution of thought and of social conditions since the last century which places the problem of freedom in a new context, and notes that men to-day demand that the Church should explain her position on this subject. In answer to this reasonable request it clearly affirms the strict obligation to respect the dignity of the human person which is the natural basis of human rights and duties. With the encyclical *Pacem in Terris* of Pope John, it asserts that not abstract truths but concrete human persons are the subject of rights. The person has the right and duty to observe the law of God as it is perceived by his conscience, for that is how God calls on him to act. He has the duty of conforming his conscience to the will of God in so far as he can know it, and the right to act according to that conscientious judgment, as well as to practise that religion which he believes to express God's will for him. In practice, this means that the individual may not be forced to accept any one religion, or be prevented from practising his own. In so far as that religion is founded on an act of faith it postulates freedom, for the internal act of faith is of its very nature free.

What is true of individuals in regard to such freedom is true also of communities. The State has no power to deny such rights, to impose any form of religion, or to interfere directly in affairs of conscience and religion. But no human right is unlimited. The individual is bound in the exercise of his rights by his responsibility towards others. The powers of the State are determined in view of the end of society as ordained by God, namely to allow men more fully and easily to attain their perfection than they could in isolation. In so far as these powers imply the obligation to preserve public order, to safe-guard public morality, and to guarantee the rights of all, the State may limit the exercise of freedom by the individual.

The last section of the text shows how this teaching on religious freedom is implied in the practice and teaching of Christ and the Apostles, and it affirms the right of the Church to preach the Gospel everywhere, in obedience to the com-

mand of Christ. It is God's will that His revealed truth be made known to all men by means of His Church so that they may freely, under the impulse of grace, accept it and live by it. The vast majority of men to-day are not Christians; the Church has the divine commission to speak to them all. The world to-day with its growing desire of freedom and its greater insistence on the rights of man will be more disposed to listen to the message of a Church that asserts the freedom of conscience and of religion. The first condition of dialogue is respect, respect for the truth which can set man free, and respect for the person, who is the image of God and who is called to the freedom of the children of God.[4]

Dialogue with the World

Having dwelt on the relations of the Church with other Christian bodies and with the non-Christian Religions, and on the need for the recognition of moral freedom, an essential condition for human dialogue, the Council could enlarge its horizon even further so as to turn to all men. This again is something quite unique in a General Council. A Catholic Council could be in fact universal when the known world was largely Catholic, or even Christian. Catholics today form less than one-fifth of the world-population; there are about 1,500 million men who are not Christian. The first Vatican Council, even had it pursued its normal course, could hardly have risen sufficiently above the defensive and polemical mentality bred by the Anti-Reformation in most of its members to envisage such an ap-

• The spirit of this text and of that on the non-Christian Religions is well summed up in the words of Pope Paul to the people of India pronounced during the open-air Mass at the Church of St. Paul on Dec. 4th: "We are deeply grateful for the freedom assured to the preachers of the Gospel in your country. They communicate the message of Jesus with highest respect for the convictions of others, in the language and cultural expressions of the people, and encourage Christians to express their faith and devotion in harmony with the civilization of India and in truly Indian forms. Thus the Church, having gathered the varied treasures of many cultures of East and West, will be further enriched by the contribution of her Indian sons, drawn from their country's rich and ancienl cultural tradition."

proach to mankind as this Council has made. Nor could it have hoped for such a hearing as men are willing to give the Church now that they live under the constant threat of atomic war, and are more conscious of the obstacles to unity among nations and of the needs of other peoples, especially the underdeveloped ones. The very fact that the Council can address itself to the world is a sign not only of a deeper consciousness in the Church of her nature and mission, and of her own historicity and of that of the world, but of the respect which the Church has gained in the eyes of the world during the last century.

The original agenda of the Council did not include the theme of the Church in the present-day world. The bishops brought with them to the Council the problems and worries of their people and of the world; and the great charity of Pope John readily responded to the desire often expressed in the first session that the Council should not only treat of the internal affairs of the Church but give the world a proof of her concern and love for man by undertaking to study some of the great questions and urgent problems of life today, and to indicate guiding principles for their solution in the light of the Gospel. After the first session a commission was formed from the members of the commissions for Faith and Morals and for the Apostolate of the Laity to prepare a schema dealing with the effective presence of the Church in the world. No other text was the object of so much speculation or revised and re-written so many times. Eventually a draft was submitted to the Co-ordinating Commission on June 1964, which decided that the text must be drastically reduced but that the main portions of the text could be retained in the form of annexes. This new document was presented for debate on Oct. and was discussed until Nov. lOth. The debate was not only the longest of the session, and in many ways the most notable; it was the one followed with greatest interest by the world and most publicized by the press.

The first three chapters of the document explain the per-

spective from which the Church views the problems that affect the temporal life of man, while the fourth deals with the major questions put to the Church by the world today. What is attempted in the text may be described as an outline of a theology of temporal reality, or the setting of problems of life and culture today within the context of the Christian outlook on man and reality. Some of the matters raised are so delicate and complex that it is hard to see how the Council can do more than give general directives and leave the more difficult of them, on which theologians do not yet agree and which involve scientific research that is not yet complete, to the study of the commissions that will prolong the work of the Council. The important thing, however, is that the Council has shown the world that the Church is indeed concerned about its problems and that she is willing to enter into a dialogue with it in an effort to find solution and to help to make life more worthy of man.

Never was the pastoral aim of the Council more clearly shown than during this debate which brought the problems of the home, of society, of the world of science and culture, and of modern civilization into the Hall and around the Altar where the Sacrifice of the Cross is renewed and the inspired Word of God enthroned. As the discussion slowly took up in turn the themes of the dignity of the human person, marriage and the family, the advancement of culture, social and economic life, the solidarity of the human race, and peace, the burning questions of human misery and want, of war, racism and injustice, of atheism and evil were raised. One cannot in a few words sum up so momentous a debate; it is possible, however, to indicate the setting in which these problems were placed. In general, the Council's attitude to the world was positive. It rejected the alternative, with its Manichaean overtones, of God *or* the world. It saw the world as coming from God, and directed its attention to what is essentially good and holy in it. It pointed out that its use may and must enter into God's plan for man's salvation, and stressed that it shares

in that work of Redemption. The key to this Christian attitude to the world is not only the fact of Creation but also the fact of the Incarnation, the assumption of a created nature into the divine order, and the consecration of the natural order through the insertion into it of the divine. The natural order of things is not without significance for man's sanctification; it contributes to his perfection and is destined to share, especially through the human body, in the final glorification of all through union with Christ.

The subject and spirit of both the text and of the debate could hardly be better expressed than by the words of Pope Paul addressed in Bombay to the representatives of the non-Christian Religions: " Today the human race is undergoing profound changes and is groping for the guiding principles and the new forces which will lead it into the world of the future. Your country also has entered into a new phase of her history and in this period of transition you too feel the insecurity of our age, when traditional orders and values are changed, and all efforts must be concentrated on building the future of the nation not only on a stable material basis, but on firm spiritual foundations. You, too, are engaged in the struggle against the ills that darken the lives of innumerable people all over the world: against poverty, hunger and illness; you too are fighting the relentless battle for more food, clothing, housing, for education, for a just distribution of the wealth of this world. Are we not all one in this struggle for a better world, in this effort to make available to all people those goods which are needed to fulfill their human destiny and to live lives worthy of the children of God?

Therefore we must come closer together, not only through the modern means of communication, through press and radio, through steamships and jet planes,-we must come together with our hearts, in mutual understanding, esteem and love. We must meet not merely as tourists, but as pilgrims who set out to find God-not in buildings of stone but in human hearts. Man must meet man, nation meet nation, as brothers and

sisters, as children of God. In this mutual understanding and friendship, in this sacred communion, we must also begin to work together to build the common future of the human race. We must find the concrete and practical ways of organisation and cooperation, so that all resources be pooled, and all efforts be united towards achieving a true communion among all nations. Such a union cannot be built on a universal error or fear of mutual destruction; it must be built on the common love that embraces all and has its roots in God, who is love." [5]

The liturgy celebrates at Christmas the revelation of God made Man to the chosen People of God, and at Epiphany the manifestation of the Incarnate Word to the world. One might see the first three sessions of the Council as a kind of Christmas of the Church, a new showing-forth to the faithful of its divine and yet human character. The fourth session will be a new Epiphany, a revealing of the Mystical Body of Christ to the world. Its message cannot be other than one of love, for Christ is love incarnate, and the Mystical Body is one in love. That message will also be a prayer; and both message and prayer are, once more, summed up in the words of Pope Paul to the non-Christian world: " True love must be renewed in our midst and must become the inspiring force of all our efforts. We need peace and stability in our world, we need food, clothing and housing for millions, we need honesty and devotion and untiring work for bettering man's condition, but all these efforts must be animated by true love. I pray that the words of the motto of this Congress-' order your lives in love '-remain imprinted in your hearts, and become a living seed that will grow and bear fruit. May God awaken this love in all of us and unite us through that invisible, yet unbreakable bond which should bind all those who are sheltered in the love of God. May He make of us the one family of His children."

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• The words of Pope Paul spoken in India are quoted from reports in the *Osservatore Romano* from December Srd to 5th.

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